

DEFINING THE DIFFERENT:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RENTIER,
FAILED AND ROGUE STATE THEORIES

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ABSTRACT

DEFINING THE DIFFERENT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RENTIER, FAILED AND ROGUE STATE THEORIES

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This thesis focuses on three state theories that aim to define the structures of the Third World states by the West. The terms of the ‘rentier’, ‘failed’ and ‘rogue’ states are critically examined in an attempt to understand how they define the difference, how they negate the different, and how they legitimize certain policies towards the different. By concentrating on the liberal theorizing that analyzes the state on the basis of the claimed civil society-state divide, and from an orientalist perspective, this study aims to demonstrate that these state theories refuse the possibility of transformation of those states by their own internal dynamics. It is argued that with the help of such discourses, rather than being simple theoretical constructs these state theories have become functional means to legitimize certain historical practices.

Keywords: Rentier state, rogue state, failed state, intervention, Third World

ÖZ

FARKLIYI TANIMLAMAMANIN ELEŞTİRİSİ: RANTIYE, BAŞARISIZ VE HAYDUT DEVLET TEORİLERİNİN ANALİZİ

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Bu tez, Üçüncü Dünya Devletlerinin farklı yapılarını tanımlamayı hedefleyen üç farklı devlet teorisini incelemektedir. Farklılığı tanımlama yöntemlerine odaklanılarak, rantiye, başarısız ve haydut devlet kavramları eleştirel olarak analiz edilmektedir. Çalışma, bu üç devlet teorisinin, farklılığı nasıl tanımladıklarına; farklılığı nasıl olumsuzladıklarına ve farklıya bir müdahaleyi nasıl meşrulaştırdıklarına bakarak bu teorilerin bir teorik bütünlüğünü ortaya koymaktadır. Bu üç devlet teorisinin, devleti sivil toplum-devlet ikiliği varsayımı üzerinden incelemesi ve oryantalist söylemi yeniden üretmesiyle, ilgili devletlerin kendi iç dinamikleri aracılığıyla bir dönüşüme kapalı olduğunu iddia etmeleri üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu sebeple, bu çalışmada bu devlet teorilerinin düşünsel bir inşa olmalarından ziyade belli tarihsel pratikleri meşrulaştırmak üzerine kurulmuş kavramlar oldukları iddia edilmektedir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Rantiye Devlet, Başarısız Devlet, Haydut Devlet, Müdahale,
Üçüncü Dünya

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CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION

“So even as we respect the unique culture and traditions of different countries, America will always be a voice for those aspirations that are universal. We will bear witness to the quiet dignity of reformers like Aung Sang Suu Kyi; to the bravery of Zimbabweans who cast their ballots in the face of beatings; to the hundreds of thousands who have marched silently through the streets of Iran. It is telling that the leaders of these governments fear the aspirations of their own people more than the power of any other nation. And it is the responsibility of all free people and free nations to make clear that these movements -these movements of hope and history- they have us on their side.”

Barack Obama-Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech

Respect for differences is perceived as the biggest virtue of modern times. But is it for all the differences? Of course not. As it is indicated by the Nobel Peace Prize Winner US President Obama, there are universal values that have to be protected and accepted by everyone. Does not this mean that the ‘different’ is respected only if it is a good different? This understanding exactly indicates that the ‘different’ will be only tolerated if it is similar to “us”. Then what characteristics should the ‘different’ possess? As President Obama underlines, the ‘different’ should also respect to the differences. Can freedom of any state be respected if she does not respect to the freedom of their people? Does the difference of any state that is not parliamentary democratic and pro free-market economy may be respected? Especially after the demise of the Second World this is not really feasible. Then, will it be wrong to claim that the respect for the differences is only applicable when the ‘different’ is consistent with this “universal identity”?

Hence, if the ‘different’ is intolerable in some cases, whose responsibility is it to defend these universal values that the ‘different’ stands against? As President Obama mentions, it is “*the responsibility of all free people and free nations*”. Does not such interventions for the sake of human rights, or as Badiou labeled the embarkations of charitable *legionnaires*, splits the Subject that is presumed to be universal into two?¹ On the one side, there are the victims and on the other, there are the free people and nations who intervene for the protection of the universal values.

In this regard, this thesis will aim to analyze three state theories that target to define the different structures of those states. Since these state literatures view the difference of the states concerned as not in the scope of deserving respect, it will be tried to show that they suggest certain interventionist policies towards those states. These efforts of defining the different structures of states concerned in order to sustain their transformation are not a new phenomenon.

Beginning in 1970s, some scholars have started to concentrate on the Third World states with the aim of defining their different structures. The main concern of those scholars has been to make a theoretical examination of the conditions that provide the survival of these regimes. Iran was able to survive without any industrial development; despite of their underdeveloped economic functions the states of Qatar and Kuwait did not collapsed; Saudi Arabia and Iraq were dependent on one leading sector but their states have not experienced any instability; in spite

¹ Badiou, A., *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, London: Verso, 2002

of her underdeveloped state apparatus, Bahrain has managed to survive. These scholars ask what provides these states the necessary conditions for their survival. Their response to this question is the rents. Even though on a problematic methodological ground, in the “rentier state” theory there is an attempt “to understand” why the Middle Eastern states are different. This theoretical analysis of the concerned states has not been transformed into policy due to the Cold War context.

However, early 1990s witnessed one of the most crucial events in the world history: the demise of the Soviet Union. The Cold War structures and dynamics that dominated the world order almost half a century has come to an end and the Second World, which has been standing against the Western capitalist system and restricting its expansion, collapsed. The demise of the Soviet Union was accompanied by the dissolution of the old structures and discourses. Starting from ex-Soviet regimes, huge transformation in the state structures experienced. Outside interventions by the Western capitalist states in the name of democracy, human rights and peace started to be more feasible and rampant. Compared to the 1970s, when there were only three, the 1990s witnessed thirty seven UN operations. The main aim of the operations is presented as stopping the internal violence and rebuilding these states. It is claimed that these states are unable to prevent the civil disorder in their territory and therefore, international actors have a responsibility to intervene in those cases because of humanitarian concerns. The first subjects of such policies were Angola, El Salvador, Western Sahara and Cambodia. Not only the Third World states but also ex-socialist states of former Yugoslavia were also subjected to these interventionist policies. Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and

Republic of Macedonia were intervened with humanitarian concerns and state building purposes. In those cases, people were killing each other and therefore, great powers claimed that they have the responsibility to stop the human catastrophes. Until the beginning of the 21st century, these interventionist policies especially towards the Third World states continued and legitimized with the discourses of human rights. In the same period, huge amounts of academic studies produced within the liberal discourse concentrated on the so-called “failed states”. It is claimed that some states are weak and their population suffers and therefore, “civilized” nations have a responsibility to help those “uncivilized”.

This sympathy towards the sufferers of the Third World states was vanished with another event. In September 11, 2001 one of the symbols of the capitalist world system, World Trade Center, was attacked by the terrorist organization called Al Qaeda. This attack has not only changed the perception of the state failure –state failure started to be seen no more as an internal problem having internal consequences but as an internal problem having global consequences- but also resulted in the emergence of new state conceptualizations such as the “rogue states”.

These historical events and the emergence of these state literatures propel us to ask whether the rentier, failed and rogue state theories are a recognition that is brought by the historical events or are they ideological discourses that are extensions of certain policies.

Regarding the main concern of the failed and the rogue state literatures, which seems to identify the different structures of those states rather than to explain

why they are different, and regarding their usage of these differences as a ground for the intervention in these states, it may be claimed that they are extensions of certain interventionist policies. The rentier state theory is also a concern of this study since it is not only the first initiative that aims to define the different structures of those states but also since it opened the way for analyzing these states as exceptional. Hence, this study will target to prove that a critical reading of the rentier state theory may demonstrate that it also legitimizes certain interventionist policies.

Keeping these in mind, the main argument of this study is that these state theories, rather than being scientific constructs, are political discourses that try to legitimize certain historical practices. This thesis aims to build a theoretical integrity upon this argument.

In this regard, the first chapter will analyze the main tenants and arguments of these state theories. The main aim of such an analysis will be to demonstrate how these state theories try to define the “different”. It will be claimed that these theories assume these states as exceptional and therefore, try to study them by the construction of new theoretical frameworks. For this aim, the chapter will begin with an analysis of the rentier state literature and, the failed and rogue state literatures will follow that.

The main aim of the second chapter will be to demonstrate how these theories “negate the different”. With a critical reading of these literatures, a theoretical integrity of them will try to be established and the common underlying premises of the theories will be aimed to be elaborated. In such an analysis, the

main argument will be that these three state theories share the discourse that builds its analysis on the state-civil society antagonism and orientalist thinking and, within this perspective they attribute certain embedded characteristics to those states which in turn enable them to negate these states. In this regard, the chapter will start with an analysis of the state-civil society antagonism in the rentier, failed and rogue state literatures subsequently. This section will be followed by the analysis of the orientalist discourse in those state literatures in subsequence.

The main aim of the last chapter will be to respond to the question of which historical practices these state theories legitimize. It is foreseen that a discursive analysis of these literatures may bring us to the point that these theories suggest certain interventionist policies. Therefore in the last chapter, it will be claimed that while the rentier state theory suggests a preventive intervention in those states, the failed and the rogue state literatures propose a broad range of interventions from humanitarian to military ones.

The readers should keep in mind that this study does not aim to make a theoretical analysis of the underdeveloped Third World states. Instead, it is aimed to make an inside critique of these three state theories that target to define the different structures of the Third World states. In the end, it is targeted to demonstrate that these theories rather than being theoretical constructs, are ideological discourses that aim to legitimize certain historical practices.

CHAPTER I

2. DEFINING THE DIFFERENT

This chapter of the study aimed to analyze notions of “Rentier”, “Failed” and “Rogue States” which are started to be studied widely by the dominant political science and international relations literatures. These literatures by referring to these concepts try to define the social and political reality in a particular value-laden way on the basis of a claimed scientific analysis. All these literatures, which base on different qualifications of states as either ‘rentier’, ‘failed’, or ‘rogue’, tend to rely on an idealized Western model of states and civil society as a comparative case where the “society” is defined on an individualistic basis as the simple sum of citizens.

In order to describe what these state theories refer, a definition of those literatures are to be made one by one and historical development of the concepts is tried to be presented for identifying in which historical context they are produced. The chapter will start with the examination of the rentier state literature which is not as recent as the other two literatures are. Even rentier state literature is started to be produced within the context of the Cold War, contrary to the two other literatures, it still deserves attention and examination with together with these theories because its use of the similar discourse. Analysis of the failed state will follow that section and different versions of failed states, and what meant by state failure is to be discussed. The last section is reserved for the analysis of rogue state literature which is the most recent term that is started to be used widely

2.1. Rentier State

The rentier state literature emerged in the context of the Cold War and has developed even after the demise of the Soviet Union. Therefore, more space is reserved for the analysis of the rentier state than it will be done for the analysis of rogue and failed state literatures because more studies have been produced on the study of such states. The theory of rentier state has evolved and revised by many scholars who criticize the mainstream theory and reproduce some of its main claims. In short, the historical evaluation of the rentier state theory enables us to categorize three different waves of rentier state theory and one revisionist literature.

2.1.1. Defining Rentier States

The term “Rentier State” was first used by Hossein Mahdavy in 1970 to describe the Iranian state before the Islamic Revolution. Mahdavy defines rentier states as the states which receive substantial amount of rents paid by foreign individuals or governments.² These rents have no relation with domestic production processes of a given country. For example, payments of ships passing through Suez Canal can be categorized as rents; or the revenue that oil producing states receive (which is the main study of rentier state theory) can be labeled as rents. These rents enable the rentier state to finance its expenditures without collecting taxes from its population. Financing its budget without collecting taxes creates “no taxation no representation” debate which will be discussed later. As a result of this,

² Hossein, M. “The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran”, in *Studies in the Economic History of Middle East*, ed. M.A Cook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 428

governments of these states become an important and dominant factor in economy because rather than domestic production process, the main dynamo of the economy becomes rents that leak to the state. In this type of states, public sector expands rapidly resulting in, as Mahdavy called, a “fortuitous etatisme”.³

Since the main concern of Mahdavy is the problem of development in rentier states, in his piece he generally concentrates on the obstacles for development in rentier states. However, some of his claims have been the main starting point for the analyzers of rentier states. For example, one of his claims is that since huge amount of rents leaking to rentier states create sufficient means to finance their budget and economy, these states do not develop domestic industry.⁴ This type of state exploits her natural resources rather than her population. Only, when these states face decrease in their oil revenues they try to develop their industry. This point is important because later some writers, such as Delacroix, concentrated on the same point and analyzed this trait of rentier states as a consequence of world system.

Mahdavy, who first used the term rentier state, does not give an explanation why this certain type of state emerges in those cases and why we do not see another type of state system. This question is answered firstly by Jacques Delacroix. Delacroix, who can be counted as one of the members of the first generation of the rentier state theory, analyzes what he terms as the distributive state in 1980.⁵ He

³ Ibid. P. 432

⁴ Ibid. P. 442

⁵ Delacroix, J. The Distributive State in the World System, Studies in Comparative International Development; Fall, Vol. 15 Issue 3, 1980.

claims that the use of the term distributive state is against Marxist and Weberian models of state. He refuses the Marxist analysis of state by condemning it as being Euro-centric. He says that since the Marxist theory of state takes classes to the center of its analysis, it cannot explain political entities where there are no classes; where ruling bodies do not extract surplus from the lower strata; and where classes cannot be described by Marxist terms (bourgeoisie and proletariat). He claims that states in the periphery exhibit one or more of these characteristics.⁶ He also refuses the Weberian model of state by claiming that Weberian analysis of coercion is still based on classes and, similar to the Marxist theory of state, Weberian analysis of state ignores redistributive function of the state.⁷ Quoting Mamdani, Delacroix maintains world system theorists' arguments and claims that in the peripheries either the main exploiting class is outside the boundaries of the periphery, or class exploitation is lacking altogether like in trade based states.⁸

Delacroix theorized state by taking dependency relation between states to the center of his analysis. He claims, like the other World System theorists, peripheral states are local watchdogs for core states' interests; and therefore, in order to understand the nature of rentier states, we need to concentrate on dependency relations.⁹ He views the existence of a distributive state in the periphery not as a consequence of casual events but as a result of the operation of the world

⁶ Ibid. P. 7

⁷ Ibid. P.9

⁸ Ibid. P.8

⁹ Ibid. P.3

system. He suggests that the world system is able to impose this type of a state because of the controllability of resources by the state elite and also by the core states. States in the periphery have the resources but lack industrial development. At the same time, states in the core need these resources for their own industry. Moreover, in order to extract oil from the underdeveloped periphery, core states need to build costly equipment into the periphery's soil. This situation sticks core states' interest to the rulers of peripheral states.¹⁰ As a result of these structural conditions, certain type of state, which is the distributive state according to Delacroix, emerges in resource rich regions.

During the 1980s and 1990s, another wave of rentier state theorists emerged who tried to explain the effects of external rents on the regime type. They looked at the large scale external rents to explain the durability and the origins of the regime type. Giacomo Luciani and Hazem Beblawi can be counted as the members of this wave.

In one of his articles in his edited book, Luciani by concentrating on the conditions of oil production and role of state in economic life makes a distinction between allocation and production states.¹¹ He starts his thesis by claiming that the availability of sufficient resources is the most important pre-condition for stability of regime and state.

¹⁰ Ibid p. 14

¹¹ Luciani, G. "Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework", in G. Luciani (ed.) *The Arab State*, Kent: Routledge, 1990

Luciani then proposes that in order to describe rentier states we need to look at the origins of income of a state rather than the nature of that income, in other words, whether state raises income domestically or not. He claims that oil producing states in the Arab world by exporting their oil, are able to manage their economy without raising income domestically.¹² Within this perspective, Luciani describes allocation states as states which provide their financial resources from oil or other foreign sources as a substantial share of the GDP.¹³

Luciani maintains that democracy is not a main issue for allocation states. He claims that even though we can see democracy in allocation states, the absence of it creates problems in the production states, while not in the allocation ones. He builds his argument on the claim that in production states, population derives its income from sources different than the state. In these types of states economic policies are able to be implemented with the funds provided from taxes. Since economic policies are not neutral from distributional point of view, different interest groups try to affect those economic policies according to their interests. The mechanism to pursue their interest is to find representation in institutional mechanisms. Moreover, for any state to collect taxes from its population, it needs to take acceptance to collect tax and that population's willingness to pay tax depends on their ability to affect economic policies; and the mechanism for that is democracy. Therefore, no taxation without representation debate rises in production states but not in the allocation states. Hence, in allocation states the main stand is

¹² Ibid. P.71

¹³ Ibid. P.72

“no taxation no representation” or as what Okruhlik called “no representation without taxation”.¹⁴

Since allocation states are able to spend without collecting taxes from their population, according to Luciani, their expenditure policies are seen as benefiting everybody. Some people may be indirectly damaged from unequal distribution of expenditure policies but this situation will not result in any collective attempt to change political institutions because any individual who feel uncomfortable from the expenditure policies will try to maneuver within the existing setup rather than to seek alliance with others in similar situations.¹⁵

Being patrimonial non-national states is another characteristic of allocation states according to Luciani. He claims that these states avoid any national myth because national myth within the boundaries of a country will create the basis to claim a say in allocation process and since rulers try to restrict the number of people who have a say on the allocation process they avoid any national myth. Another way to limit decision makers in the allocation process is traditional segmentary politics. Since the main part of the GNP is composed of government expenditures, practically few or no alternative groups evolve.¹⁶ Moreover, since -apart from elites- citizens do not poses any power to affect economy in accordance with their interests; political parties only represent cultural and ideological orientations.

¹⁴ Okruhlik, G. Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No.3, April, 1999, p.296

¹⁵ Luciani, G. “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework”, in G. Luciani (ed.) *The Arab State*, Kent: Routledge, 1990, P.76

¹⁶ *Ibid.* P. 77

Legitimacy and regime stability in the allocation states are bought through the revenues from abroad.¹⁷

Despite this conceptualization of the allocation state, Luciani claims that Arab states are modern states. Contrary to the modernization theory, he claims that there is not one type of modern state and a linear modernization project is not inevitable because this will not explain the reactionary movements in the Arab world. Moreover, neither traditional nor feudal the Arab states are. The concept of allocation state, according to Luciani, explains state in the Arab world because the patrimonial form of governments in the region had adapted to those specific characteristics of allocation states.¹⁸

In the same book, following Luciani's article, Hazem Beblawi's *The Rentier State in the Arab World* article discusses rentier state theory. In his article, Beblawi tries to give a definition of the rent and the rentier states and aims to give readers an overall idea about what a rentier state is.

By taking classical economy theorists, such as Smith and Ricardo, as a reference, Beblawi emphasizes that rents have no relation with production.¹⁹ He defines rentier economies as the economies where rent situations predominate. Beblawi puts that in rent type economies, incomes of rents are in the hands of a small group and the rest of the society participates in either the utilization or the

¹⁷ Ibid. P.78

¹⁸ Ibid. P.80

¹⁹ Beblawi, H. "The Rentier State in the Arab World", in G. Luciani (ed.) *The Arab State*, Kent: Routledge, 1990, p.85

distribution of this wealth. This small group who control rents comprises the government, and the government is the principal receipt of those external rents. Oil revenues, which compose 90 percent of the budget revenues and 95 percent of exports, are produced and distributed by 2-3 percent of the labor force. These revenues directly linked to government or state and the role of government is to distribute these rents.²⁰ This argument is similar to what Luciani calls as distributive state.

The main contribution of Beblawi to the rentier state literature is what he calls “rentier mentality”.²¹ Rentier mentality, according to Beblawi, is the mentality that eliminates the work-reward causation which exists in conventional economic behavior. In rentier states income is not related to work, it is not a result of production. It is rather a consequence of accidental or situational circumstances. Citizens are only the economic beneficiaries of rents. As a result of this, a hierarchy of layers of rentiers emerges. On the top there is the government as the main receiver of rents and on the bottom there is the population to whom rents are distributed.

Beblawi, following the arguments Luciani, claims that lack of taxes make citizens reluctant to demand political participation. Loyalty and allegiance of population is bought through distributing favors and benefits of rents. Therefore, a question of legitimacy never rises.

²⁰ Ibid. P. 87-89

²¹ Ibid. P. 88

Jill Crystal is another member of this wave of rentier state theorists. However, because of her research on the institutional similarities among rent dependent states of the Middle East she can also be considered among the third wave of rentier state theorists, which will be discussed later,. I preferred to analyze her as one of the members of this wave because, like Beblawi and Luciani, her main concern is to analyze the effect of oil on regime type and institutional mechanisms of rentier states.

In her article, written in 1989, Crystal analyzes how the political coalitions have changed in Kuwait and Qatar after those states became oil rich states. Her main concern is the change in the decision making procedure and the question of how, after the development of oil, a new state apparatus emerged.²²

Crystal, in her analysis of the continuities and changes in the state structure of oil states after the development of oil, discovers that even though there is continuity at the top of the political system, merchants, who historically pressed their claims on state, were removed from the political life. Crystal claims that as a result of an agreement between the rulers, trading families and merchants, in return for a large share of oil revenues merchants accepted to renounce their historical claim to participate in the decision making. This new agreement is followed by the development of two more new ties: the first one is between the *Amir* and the ruling family, and the second one is between the *Amir* and population.²³

²² Crystal J. Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar, Comparative Politics, Vol. 21. No. 4, July, 1989, pp.427-443

²³ Ibid. P. 427

Like Delacroix, Crystal refuses modernization theorists' claim of linear and inexorable connection among capital accumulation, economic growth, social mobilization and representative democracy. However, contrary to Delacroix, Crystal also refuses dependency with the claim that the center-periphery dichotomy is not applicable to the Gulf States.²⁴ Instead of these approaches, Crystal applies Barrington Moore's analysis of European states for her analysis of the Gulf States. Moore, in his book *Social origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, had tried to show how states and regimes were shaped by economic interests, with social formations and class alliances as the intervening variables.²⁵ Crystal employs this perspective to give a sense to the pre-oil and post-oil political coalitions in Kuwait and Qatar. Before the development of oil, those states were ruled by a coalition between the *Amir* and trading families. Merchant families, who earned money from pearl divers, provided the *Amir* financial support through giving a portion of revenues that they extracted from pearl divers, through customs dues, pearl boat taxes and personal loans. From this economic power they earned political power. However, when oil developed as the main sources of revenue, rulers had direct access to external rents. Therefore, their dependence on the merchants decreased. However, merchant class managed to reproduce itself even after the development of oil. Their collective class consciousness, according to Crystal, forced the rulers to take them into account. The result is that merchants were bought off by the state as a class.²⁶ For example, in Kuwait, land owned by the merchants has bought by the

²⁴ Ibid. P. 428

²⁵ Moore, B. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966

²⁶ Ibid. P. 431

state at high prices and sold to low prices again to the merchants. Another example is 1960 Law of Commercial Companies which requires that 51 percent of all companies have to be owned by the Kuwaitis. Moreover, there are indirect supports such as investment incentives.

These situations show two distinct features of the transition of Gulf States to oil producing states. The first one is that demands of political participation of the merchants were tied to their ability to mediate that extraction of state income from the population and when this ability was removed with oil production they withdrew from the political life. The second one is that state has been to keep the opposition quiet with the oil revenues, which is similar to Luciani's claim. In other words, oil rents will bring stability.

Stability, according to Crystal, is gained through three ways. The first one is, as discussed above, through buying the merchant class. The second one is distributive policies. Prosperity of the population is seen directly as a result of state action. State is providing free education, health care, subsidized goods and services such as housing and direct transfer of wealth. Majority of the population is employed by the state. As a result of these distributive policies population has no demand on political participation according to Crystal. The third way is the creation of new institutional mechanisms after the development of oil. With distributive policies the size of the state has increased and in order to control those activities the *Amir* started to collaborate with the ruling family which is the most reliable set of allies. The ruling family's political role is not a historical tradition. Instead, it emerged as a result of the development of oil. Therefore, it can be claimed that the need for the implementation of distributive policies has created the necessary

condition for a new state administration. The distributive policies have resulted in the need of a bureaucracy which, in turn, has created the centralized state system in oil producing states.²⁷

Unlike Luciani, Crystal questions stability in distributive states and claims that there is always an existing potential of instability in rentier states even if oil revenues do not decrease. She claims that bureaucracies may develop their own centers of power, social relationships and political goals which would affect the stability of the state. Moreover, the concentration of power and bureaucracy reduce direct dependency of the population to the *Amir* that would possibly result in another potential source of instability. Furthermore, according to Crystal, as time passes, the population of those states would start to see the distributive activities of states not as rulers' largesse but as a right. Lastly, in the line with other rentier state theorists' claims, Crystal also asserts that if oil revenues decrease the stability in those states may be challenged.²⁸ Since oil exporting states are tied to one leading sector, under fiscal pressures those states need to turn to domestic extraction. However, rentier states have little extractive capacities which may result in inability to extract. Moreover, decrease in oil prices would also mean decrease in the payoffs to social groups. These two characteristics of rentier states, in turn, may result in regime instability.

Since the second wave of rentier state theory could not explain survival of the system despite the decrease of oil revenues in the 1980s a new wave of rentier

²⁷ Ibid. P. 435-436

²⁸ Ibid. P.438-439

state theory emerged which concentrates more on internal dynamics such as demands for the distribution of rents and the nature of distributive institutions.²⁹ In the early 1990s, some scholars try to make sense of the states in the Middle East by paying attention to the historical contingencies and institutional legacies. They employ some of the arguments of mainstream rentier state theorists. This phase of rentier state theory uses domestic variables to explain differences among the rentier states. Their main aim is to explain the institutional similarities and political variations of rentier states.

Kiren Aziz Chaudry is one of the members of this third wave of the rentier state theory. In an article written in 1994, Chaudry compares economic liberalization programs of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Chaudry says that this comparison would show the importance of historical contingencies in determining social responses and how politics shapes economic outcomes.³⁰ He tries to show the effects of political coalitions and institutional structures on the outcomes of economic liberalization. This emphasis proves that instead of focusing only to the rents to explain the state structure, Chaudry looks at the internal dynamics or, as Peters and Moore termed, “microlevel decision-making processes”.³¹

²⁹ Peters, A. M., Moore P. W., Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, *Stud Comp Int Dev* 44(3), 2009, p.261

³⁰ Chaudhry K.A. Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State, *Com Pol.* 27 (1), 1994, p.1

³¹ Peters, A. M., Moore P. W., Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, *Stud Comp Int Dev* 44(3), 2009, p.260

Chaudry concludes that unsuccessful market reform movements in Iraq and Saudi Arabia are an inevitable consequence of the decrease in oil revenues. This argument is emphasized by Mahdavy when he says that until rentier states do not face a decrease in their oil revenues they will not develop their domestic economies because the rents leaking to these states provide necessary resources to finance their budget and to manage economy.³² Chaudry looks at the transformation of government-business relations after the decrease in oil revenues and the internal dynamics in the failure of those reform projects. For example, he claimed that the intense statism of the 1970s in Saudi Arabia and Iraq was tried to be changed with economic liberalization programmes after the recession of the 1980s. However, both cases were failed to liberalize their economies because of some common and unique reasons. In both cases, since the oil prices decreased, states experienced lack of foreign exchanges and this in return created lack of credit for the newly established private sector. In Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, a new merchant class created by the government in the oil boom of the 1970s, opposed government's reforms in the 1980s. On the Iraqi side, even though the government intended a rapid privatization, at no point state's share of industrial production fell below 76 percent.³³ While Chaudry examines these cases from a micro-level perspective, he mentions that this instance can be seen in the less developed countries (LDC)

³² Hossein, M. "The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran", in *Studies in the Economic History of Middle East*, ed. M.A Cook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 428

³³ Chaudhry K.A. Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State, *Com Pol.* 27 (1), 1994, p.9

because the governments of the developing world may directly control the production, distribution and price fixing.³⁴

Gwenn Okruhlik is another member of this wave of rentier state theorists. In 1999, Okruhlik writes an article in which she criticizes political economy approaches for ignoring the political level in their analysis of oil states.³⁵ She argues that rentier state theory reifies the state and overemphasizes state resources and state autonomy from the social consequences of expenditures and therefore it is inadequate.

Okruhlik also rejects rentier state theorists' claim that rentier states are able to placate potential opposition by distributing oil wealth. She claims that empirical reality in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain proves that opposition movements may emerge. Contrary to Luciani's claim that unequal distribution of rents has no important consequences in oil producing states, Okruhlik claims that unequal distribution of rents directly creates opposition. Moreover, she mentions that rather than being a tool of oppression for the rulers, oil rents provide dissident groups with necessary resources to mobilize against the regime. This argument is similar to "oil-as-spoils" thesis which maintains that oil revenues will cause political instability by presenting booty for the potential rebels or by creating opposition because of unequal distribution of oil wealth.³⁶ However, for Okruhlik, even though rents do

³⁴ Ibid. P. 3

³⁵ Okruhlik, G. Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No.3, April, 1999, p.296

³⁶ Smith, B. *Hard Times in the Lands of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia*, London: Cornell University Press, 2007, p. 20

not directly oppress opposition, they enable the state to have a large space for maneuvering when dissidence rises.³⁷

Okruhlik uses Saudi Arabia, which is a classic rentier state according to her, as an example to prove her thesis that rents do not bring stability automatically. She says that financial autonomy of Saudi Arabian state from its population does not guarantee her immunity from civil pressures. To prove that unequal distribution of rents is crucial, Okruhlik gives several examples from Saudi Arabia. For example, starting from the mid-1980s the Saudi government began to move all diplomatic missions and financial headquarters from Hejaz, which was the center of commerce, to Riyadh, where ruling family has traditionally enjoyed more support. This has created an opposition of the Hejazi merchant class.

Another group which was affected from mal-distribution of rents was the Shiites in Eastern provinces. This Shiite community in the province used to constitute the labor force in oil industry. However, the infrastructure was inadequate and hospitals and schools were not sufficient in that region. As a result of this, the 1979-80 riots started. After the riots, oil rents have started to be leaked to the region.

Okruhlik views the cause of the riots as a outcome of the political choices of the rulers. She claims that opposition rises not because of rentier wealth but because of the political choices of personal regimes on how to distribute those rents.

³⁷ Okruhlik, G. Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No.3, April, 1999, p.297

Therefore, she suggests that rentier state theory should take politics into consideration in its analysis of the state.

In short, Okruhlik while accepting main propositions of the rentier state theory, she suggests that the theory should be refined by drawing links among political choice, state strategies and consequences for particular social groups. She proposes that in order to make rentier state theory viable, rentier state theorists should not reify the state and the autonomy of the state from its society because state and society penetrate one another and the boundaries between the state and the society are permeable and fluid.³⁸ Moreover, refusing Beblawi's argument, Okruhlik claims that rentier mentalities, biases and behavioral correlates do not explain the relation of rent, behavior and political reality. She says that it is not the rentier mentality that makes private investors unproductive but it is the unpredictability in the behavior of some princes and there is no assurance that will encourage investors to take that risk.³⁹

The third wave of the rentier state theory has been criticized by a revisionist literature with the claim of containing some of the same problems of the mainstream rentier state theory. This wave is preferred to be called as revisionist literature because rather than proposing a new direction to the rentier state theory, it aims to bypass some of its claims. According to the revisionist literature, the third wave assigns particular casual properties to external rents and neglects the

³⁸ Ibid. P. 308

³⁹ Ibid. P. 309

differences in institutional arrangements that occur as a result of fluctuations in rent supply and political demand.⁴⁰

The revisionist literature was born in the beginning of the 21st century. Being critical of the previous waves of rentier state theories, this revisionist group refuses the claim that rents are structural variables with independent and uniform effects on the state type. Instead of this, revisionist literature sees external rents as intervening variables which is mediated by domestic variables.

Moore, who is one of the members of the revisionist literature, wrote an article in 2002 on the fiscal crisis and its effect on the regime's stability in the Gulf region. Contrary to the claim of previous rentier states theorists, such as Luciani, Moore says that despite of the fiscal crisis that emerged as a result of decrease in oil prices, change in the state type in the Gulf region has not occurred.⁴¹ Therefore, Moore suggests relaxing some of the propositions of the structural approaches' of the rentier state theorization. Moore, in order to explain the cases, offers an analysis of business-state relation as an important variable and analyzes Kuwait and Jordan as a case in his book written in 2004.⁴² In this book, rather than portraying a general framework, Moore chooses a comparative analysis and claims that his comparative approach built upon structural and incentive-based models of business state

⁴⁰ Peters, A. M., Moore P. W., Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 44(3), 2009, p.261

⁴¹ Moore P. W., Rentier Fiscal Crisis and Regime Stability: Business-State Relations in the Gulf, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Spring 2002, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 34

⁴² Moore, P. W., *Doing Business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic Crisis in Jordan and Kuwait*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004

relations gets over the constraints of rentier state approach. In the opening chapter of his book, Moore said that:

“For example, David Walder argues that the (rentier) thesis fails to distinguish between constraining conditions and permissive conditions; the presence of externally derived wealth makes certain arrangements possible but it does not dictate their establishment. The argument of this book proposes patterns of business-state relations as one set of constraining conditions on the ebb and flow of external revenue, an approach that requires attention above and below the level of the state.”⁴³

Moore claims that rentier state theory, or what he calls structural/statist approaches, views the state in the oil economy as the locus of wealth creation⁴⁴ and private sector as the body pursuing that wealth.⁴⁵ Therefore, the interest of the private sector mirrors state interests and the distribution of wealth domestically creates multi-tiered rentier economies. Since every structure is encircled around oil, according to structural/statist approach, state institutions turn out to be inflexible and social actors resist any reform because of their dependence on oil; and therefore, stagnation creates regime decay and decline.⁴⁶ Moore, from the beginning, is against the idea that in the oil states, every institutional set up is

⁴³ Ibid. P. 5

⁴⁴ Moore, P. W., *Doing Business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic Crisis in Jordan and Kuwait*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 p. 7

⁴⁵ Moore P. W., Rentier Fiscal Crisis and Regime Stability: Business-State Relations in the Gulf, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Spring 2002, Vol. 37, No. 1, P. 36

⁴⁶ Karl, T. L., *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p. 240

encircled around oil. For example, he claims that Kuwaiti business is not created by oil, instead they have a pre-oil history of institutional autonomy. Kuwaiti business has its own institutional capacities and it acts together with state in responding the fiscal crisis. Because of this rentier states can adapt themselves to the fiscal crisis. A new business-state relation has occurred after the crisis which according to Moore is an important factor in regime stability.⁴⁷

Moore claims that in the countries where state capacities are underdeveloped, in order to understand the economy, it is crucial to analyze how state and business coalesce and are related to social systems of production.⁴⁸ However, he adds that even though business-state relation is the key factor in oil exporting states for the durability and stability of the state, this coordination between the business and the state does not have similar characteristics in each state.⁴⁹ The main criticism of Moore to structural-statist approaches of state is that they do not pay enough attention to historical and institutional trajectories in their analysis of state. He also aims to pay attention to different state-business relation and reflection of this relation in each different case. He claims that historically constituted relations creates differences in the results of external capital flows. Therefore, according to him, external capital flows should not be taken as a whole and everything in rentier states should not be explained as a consequence of capital

⁴⁷ Moore P. W., *Rentier Fiscal Crisis and Regime Stability: Business-State Relations in the Gulf*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Spring 2002, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 44

⁴⁸ Moore, P. W., *Doing Business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic Crisis in Jordan and Kuwait*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 p. 7

⁴⁹ Moore P. W., *Rentier Fiscal Crisis and Regime Stability: Business-State Relations in the Gulf*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Spring 2002, Vol. 37, No. 1, P.49

flows. Moreover, unlike structural-statist approaches' claim, social actors are not one piece and their relation with state differs in different cases. This stand of Moore can be presented as his main argument. He criticizes the previous rentier state theories for looking just to the general frame. By this he means that rentier state theory views developing states as intervening variables and external economic shifts as determining state capacities, politics and business. Rentier state theory, for Moore, holds that the character of resources available to a state shapes politics in that country.⁵⁰ However, he suggests a break from taking all foreign aid revenues into a single category of budget support because there are various forms of rents with different natures such as military and security support, concessionary loans, loan forgiveness, technical assistance, supports for development projects etc.⁵¹ Moore agrees with Chaudry's claim that different types of rent flows lead to different institutional arrangements between state and business and lead to contrasting forms of state autonomy in each case. Moore especially pays attention to the rents that emerge from foreign aid and trade. Even though he accepts that this type of rent is much smaller than oil, it needs to be paid attention because it affects micro-decision making level since they are scarce in aid recipients, restricted to certain groups and they pursue multiple goals. In short, he claims that foreign aid's institutional outcomes are more diverse than the main concentration of mainstream rentier state theory which is the distribution-extraction dichotomy. Moore pays

⁵⁰ Moore, P. W., *Doing Business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic Crisis in Jordan and Kuwait*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 p. 13-14

⁵¹ Peters, A. M., Moore P. W., Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 44(3), 2009, p.262

great attention to these institutional outcomes because he claims that in the long run these institutions create obstacles for institutional reform and provides the necessary conditions for the durability of distributive institutions and authoritarian rule.

To sum up, Moore suggests relaxing some of the claims of rentier state literature and including domestic factors to the analysis such as business-state relations, historical trajectories and different social structures to have a more coherent state theory. He suggests paying greater attention to micro-level decision making processes. In his book, he describes the aim of the book as advancing “*the institutional revisions of political economy by arguing that assumptions about incentive and choice in business-state relations need to be relaxed and that systematic analysis is needed of the historical-institutional legacy of those relations and the political context of social actors.*”⁵² He suggests that rentier state theory should take into consideration: the source of and the demands on rents, under which conditions rents are obtained; the institutional means by which regimes supply rents; and how this conditions change over time.⁵³ For example in his study of Jordan, Moore paid his main attention to the coalition size. He claims that size of coalition is important to understand how rulers institutionalize their rule, how they deal with domestic and international challenges and to what extend a ruler might desire to incorporate external rents into these institutions at various times.⁵⁴ He

⁵² Moore, P. W., *Doing Business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic Crisis in Jordan and Kuwait*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 p. 11

⁵³ Peters, A. M., Moore P. W., Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 44(3), 2009, P. 280

⁵⁴ *Ibid* p. 263

goes even further and claims that the presence or absence of rentier state is based on the size of the regime coalition. He says that where there is disparate regime coalitions or where alliances between business and subaltern classes exists, the rulers have to apply distributive policies in order to finance side payments to coalition members. When narrow coalitions emerge, such as a coalition just between state and business, the demands for side payments decrease; therefore, despite huge amount of rents, rentier state does not exist in those cases.⁵⁵ Therefore, Moore is able to claim that differences in coalition demands affect the institutional outcomes of external rents.

Another member of this revisionist literature is Benjamin Smith. Smith, in his book *Hard Times in the Lands of Plenty*⁵⁶, pursues a close argument to Moore's claims. Smith tries to prove that the effects of oil rents on state institutions may change, depending on whether oil is the major export commodity or not. This claim is contrary to the mainstream rentier state theory's handling of oil rents as having similar effects on each case. To support his argument, Smith mainly analyzes the different political consequences of oil booms in the 1970s and oil bust in the mid-1980s for the cases of Iran and Indonesia.

Smith mainly claims that even classical rentier state theory looks at whether one country is oil rich or not in order to analyze the state, the main starting point of the analysis should be when a country is oil rich. The timing of the arrival of oil wealth is important for Smith because, it affects the main characteristic of the state

⁵⁵ Ibid. P. 281

⁵⁶ Smith, B. *Hard Times in the Lands of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia*, London: Cornell University Press, 2007

and its institutions. Specifically, for him the milestone is the late development which is described by him as a set of policies in which the state provides necessary means for the development of private sector capital and labor, and in which state applies interventionist policies for the creation of state-owned industries. If oil wealth was not gained before the late development, then this might mean that there was already an opposition against the ruler emerged out of power struggles during the state formation; therefore, the ruler had to build coalitions and state institutions which enable him to gather revenues and get control over social movements. In other words, if a state is rent scarce at the beginning of late development the ruler needs to build a strong state with well established institutions and a ruling party or coalition. After the late development if state starts to receive oil rents, it will invest it back into institutions or coalitions which will result in a durable authoritarian regime. On the contrary, if the state has already accessed to oil wealth without mass opposition before late development, then the ruler will not need to build political coalitions, develop extractive institutions and pursue the aggressive expansion of infrastructural power into local settings. When oil revenues were already received before the late development and there is a weak opposition, there will emerge a weak state and shallow coalition or ruling party, which in return will result a fragile authoritarian regime⁵⁷ For example, since Iran accessed to oil revenue before late development, she was unable to survive when oil prices decreased; however, Indonesia did not have access to oil rent in its late development and therefore, it was able to bypass consequences of the bust. In short, similar to Moore's argument, Smith is against the idea of monocausal effects of oil wealth. While in some cases

⁵⁷ Ibid. P.1-9

while oil revenue results in weakening of state institutions and regimes, in other cases it contributes to longevity and this depends on the timing of oil revenues.

Going back to Luciani's distinction between allocation and production states, it can be said that for Smith, if oil rents are received after late development there will emerge purely an allocation state that is unable to develop extractive capacities, which may result in the fall of that state during the oil bust periods.

Smith also rejects "oil as spoils" thesis which claims that oil revenues create the incentive for rebellions. He claims that oil wealth creates little intensity for domestic opposition against the state. Oil revenues enable the rulers to develop repressive means which in return decrease the possibility of regime failure in rentier states. Like Luciani, Smith also claims that while oil wealth brings durability to the state it decreases the possibility of democracy. However, contrary to Luciani, Smith claims that this durability of the regimes is independent of the oil revenues because decrease in oil revenues does not bring regime crisis and instability to the oil exporting states. Moreover, he claims that repression cannot provide a full account of how regimes were able to survive even during the oil bust. Hence, Smith concludes that rentier states may have strong social coalitions that are deeper than simply purchasing legitimacy. He also says that this stability of states shows that they have institutions which enable them to counter organized opposition with nonrepressive means.⁵⁸

In short, the revisionist wave of rentier state theory condemns classical rentier state theory of being structural determinist. They suggest paying more

⁵⁸ Ibid p. 27-37

attention to history and agency which, for them, shapes oil's impact on state type and institutions. They prioritize institutional configurations, agency and historical legacies in their analysis of the effects of oil revenues on state.

To sum up, this section of the study has presented three different waves and one revisionist perspective of the rentier state literature. Even though there are differences in the claims of these different generations of the rentier theory, it can be said that they are reproducing the same discourse which base on state-civil society antagonism and views the society as the sum of individuals as compose it. Therefore, it can be claimed that the efforts to remedy the deficiencies of the theory by the subsequent generations were fruitless and unable to develop a different state theory. The general aim of the rentier state theory was to explain the different structures of those political formations; however, as it will be discussed in the last chapter of the study, the practical reflection of this has been the legitimization of certain historical practices which in the end enable us to conclude that the rentier state theory, together with rogue state and failed states notions, are functional concepts.

2.2. Failed State

Another concept that is started to be used widely after the end of Cold War is the “failed states”. Failed state discourse has aimed to underline different structures of certain types of states, like the rentier state literature. This chapter aims to define what is meant by the ‘failed state’. In order to do that, the failed state discourse will be analyzed in detail and the characteristics of the failed states are tried to be identified.

Since these notions of “failed states”, or its other versions, are used widely after the end of the Cold War there has emerged a discussion that whether these states has emerged immediately after the demise of Soviet Union. Similar to the rogue states literature, some scholars of failed states discourse have implied that the failed states have emerged immediately after the demise of the Soviet Union because these political organizations use to be able to survive by the support of one of the superpowers. These scholars, such as Ignatieff, Rosh, Helman, Ratner and Ayoob, claimed that variety of states have failed after the end of Cold War because the support they received as proxy allies from one of the superpowers ceased.⁵⁹ Gros, even though reproducing the same political discourse as the scholars mentioned above, claims that failed states existed even during the Cold War period but superpowers overlooked the failed states issue in order to keep them within their spheres of influence. Therefore, he agrees with the arguments that the failed state

⁵⁹ Ignatieff, M. *Blood and Belonging*, Toronto: Viking Press, 1993, p.8; Rosh, R. ‘Ethnic cleavages as a component of global military expenditures’, *Journal of Peace Research*, 33, 1989, pp. 21-30; Ayoob, M. ‘State-making, state-breaking and state failure: Explaining the roots of third world insecurity’, in Goor, L., Rupensinghe K, and Sciarone, P. (eds.), *Between Development and Destruction*, London: Palgrave, 1996, pp 67-86; Helman, G. B. & Ratner S. R, ‘Saving Failed States’, *Foreign Policy*, No.99, Winter, 1992-1993, p.4

crisis emerged immediately after the end of Cold War.⁶⁰ Contrary to these debates some scholars, by concentrating on the post-colonial statehood, claim that notions of “failed, weak, quasi, collapsed, rogue state” are a series of representations of the post-colonial states that have arisen in and beyond the context of the Cold War.⁶¹ These scholars claim that such representations legitimize certain policies that serve to the interests of those who employ it.

There are varieties of concepts that are used to describe the degrees of failed states such as weak and collapsed states. These concepts are used interchangeably but they do not refer totally to the same discourse. The failed state literature is built upon a distinction between the strong and the weak states.⁶² Therefore, some scholars such as Carment, suggest that failed states are identified on the basis of a comparison made with the strong states.⁶³ In this perspective, strong states are defined as the states which control their territories and deliver a full range and high quality of political goods to their citizens.⁶⁴ Located against the strong states, the weak state is used to define a category of state which is prone to fail, and the

⁶⁰ Gros, J. ‘Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.17, No.3, 1996, p.455

⁶¹ Bilgin, P., Morton D., ‘Historicising representations of failed states: beyond the cold-war annexation of social sciences?’ *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1, p.55

⁶² Carment, D. ‘Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy’, *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.409

⁶³ Ibid. p.410

⁶⁴ Rotberg, R. I., ‘Nation State Failure: A Recurring Phenomena?’ An Essay for NIC 2020 Project, Inaugural Workshop, November 2003, viewed April 10, 2012, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/nic2020/panel2_nov6.pdf >

extreme version of the failed state is the collapse state⁶⁵ which means a total vacuum of authority.⁶⁶ Weak states are viewed as those harboring ethnic, religious, linguistic or other tensions that create conflict. They are characterized with deteriorated physical infrastructures, low GDP per capita and absence of civil society.⁶⁷ Failed states, on the other hand, are defined as those providing limited political goods in the absence of any state activity, bureaucracy and democratic debate.⁶⁸ Collapsed state, as the extreme version of failed states, is defined as the state that has no legitimacy, limited functioning institutions and no services to be provided to the population.⁶⁹ Such a classification is done by concentrating on the states performances of effective delivery of the most crucial political goals.⁷⁰ As Rotberg mentions:

“Weak states show a mixed profile, fulfilling expectations in some areas and performing poorly in others. The more poorly weak states perform, criterion by

⁶⁵ Rotberg, R. I., ‘The New Nature of Nation-State Failure’, *Washington Quarterly*, 25: 3, Summer 2002, p.90

⁶⁶ Rotberg, R. I., ‘Failed States in a World of Terror’, *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, p. 133

⁶⁷ Rotberg, R. I., ‘Nation State Failure: A Recurring Phenomena?’ An Essay for NIC 2020 Project, Inaugural Workshop, November 2003, viewed April 10, 2012, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/nic2020/panel2_nov6.pdf >

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Carment, D. ‘Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy’, *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.414

⁷⁰ Rotberg, R. I., ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.2

criterion, the weaker they become, and the more that weakness tends to edge towards failure, hence the subcategory of weakness that is termed failing.”⁷¹

In short, this literature makes a distinction between the strong and the failed states. Contrary to the strong states, failed states are regarded as dangerous with the following eight characteristics which will be discussed in detail below:

“a rise in criminal and political violence; loss of control over their borders; rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities; civil war; use of terror against their own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion; high level of corruption; a collapse of health system; rising level of infant mortality and declining life expectancy; the end of regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per capital; escalating inflation; a widespread preference for non-national currencies; and basic food shortages, leading to starvation.”⁷²

2.2.1. Defining Failed States

After this overview of the debates on the definition and conditions of emergence of the failed states, now it is useful to discuss what a failed state is and what characteristics are associated with that type of political organizations.

One of the main characteristic of the failed state is their inability to provide positive political goods to their people.⁷³ Rotberg claims that the *raison d’être* of the

⁷¹ Ibid. p.4

⁷² Rotberg, R. I. ‘Failed States in a World of Terror’, *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, p. 132

⁷³ Rotberg, R. I., ‘The New Nature of Nation-State Failure’, *Washington Quarterly*, 25:3, Summer 2002, p.85-96

nation state is to provide a decentralized method of delivering political goods to its population.⁷⁴ Relying on a ‘performance-based’ understanding of statehood, Lambach also underlines the states’ responsibility of providing public goods. Hence, for him, if a state provides public goods which her citizens consider important, this brings the state legitimacy. He suggests that this understanding shows that the state’s inability to provide security associated with the state’s inability to promote development.⁷⁵

Khan suggests a different understanding on the delivery of political goods in the failed states. He claims that the delivery of political good is directly related with states’ success in pushing social transformation rapidly in the direction of viable capitalist economies.⁷⁶ The main focus of Kahn is the institutional and political capacities of the state in the developing countries. He suggests that the institutional capacities (such as system of property rights), the intervention of state to the economy (which defines the rents and the incentive structures) and democratic/authoritarian decision making bodies are the variables that affect the economy and growth. He claims that state failure is a result of the absence of these capacities which are necessary for assisting and accelerating a dynamic transformation. He underlines the importance of institutions by focusing on the period of social transformation of the state from a pre-capitalist to capitalist order.

⁷⁴ Rotberg, R. I., ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.2

⁷⁵ Lambach, D., ‘Security, development and the Australian security discourse about failed states’, *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 41: 3, 2006, p.409

⁷⁶ Kahn, M. H., ‘State Failure in Developing Countries and Strategies of Institutional Reform’, Paper presented at the World Bank ABCDE Conference, 24-26 June, 2002, Oslo

He asserts that this transformation necessitates an active intervention of state in property rights and state management of growth-enhancing rents. However, during such a transformation, state fails because of the problem of failing to enforce necessary institutions. As institutions fail, states also fail because through these institutions states accelerate transformation and growth, and are able to intervene into the process.⁷⁷ He developed this understanding contrary to what he termed as the “liberal-market consensus” or “the service delivery state”. The liberal-market consensus maintains that the absence of democracy in those states results in rent-seeking and rent-seeking in return increases the power of certain interests groups. The presence of rents, on the other hand, results in further rent-seeking behavior. This rent-seeking behavior combined with the weak bureaucracy results in corruption which makes the organization of political will to reform bureaucracy difficult. As a result of this interdependence, these societies are locked into undemocratic, highly corrupted and highly distorted equilibrium.⁷⁸ The inevitable result of such an understanding is recommending political and institutional reforms which will create the movement towards democracy and the establishment of civil society. Kahn criticizes this service-delivery model of state and, instead, suggests the state transformation perspective which maintains an instrumentalist view to the state. He says that in strong states, the state apparatus is in the hands of the capitalist class. Therefore, in these types of states the politics is conducted around a narrow range of options that seek to conserve the dynamism of the capitalist sector. However, since failed states are in transition to capitalism and the capitalist class is

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

not dominant, a rich variety of policies and institutions would exist. Therefore, Kahn suggests the aim of reforms should be improving institutions and political organizations, rather than directly creating democracy so that state capacities for managing and regulating rents and organizing changes in property rights systems would increase.⁷⁹

The second identifying characteristic of the failed states is violence, mainly internal violence.⁸⁰ It is claimed that there are three types of violence in the failed states: political violence, civil war and criminal violence. However, rather than the existence of violence, it is the enduring character of violence, the direction of that violence against the government and rationalization of that power through demands for sharing power or autonomy that identifies failed states. This view of the violence in failed states was also used by the formal documents. For example, the US State Failure Task Force defined failed states as the cases where the central state authority collapses for several years and as a result, revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, genocide and politicides emerge.⁸¹

The issue of violence is highly related with the first characteristic of the failed states which is its inability to provide political goods to its citizens. As Rotberg mentioned, failed state analyzers viewed the prime function of state as providing political good of security such as preventing invasions, loss of territory,

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Rotberg, R. I., 'Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.1

⁸¹ See State Failure Task Force Reports.

domestic threats and attacks, crimes and other related dangers to human security.⁸²

Failed state is claimed to be unable to perform these functions for its own population.⁸³

Pupavac also approaches to the concept of violence in failed states from a critical perspective and claims that the concentration of violence legitimizes certain activities against those political organizations. She claims that in failed states the violent acts are seen as a social dysfunction. Therefore, it is thought that such a dysfunction may be rehabilitated. However, such a view, she asserts, legitimizes outside intervention.⁸⁴

The third indicator of state failure is said to be the absence of the central authority.⁸⁵ It is claimed that absence of the concentration of power in the failed states results in the effectiveness of the official power only in the capital city or in specific areas. As Rotberg mentioned,

⁸²Rotberg, R. I., 'Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.3

⁸³ Carment, D. 'Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy', *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.409

⁸⁴ Pupavac, V., 'Therapeutic Governance: Psycho-social Intervention and Trauma Risk Management', *Disaster*, 25:4, 2001, 367

⁸⁵ Gros, J. 'Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.17, No.3, 1996, p.457

“In these instances the institutions of central state were so weakened that they could no longer maintain authority or political order beyond the capital city.”⁸⁶

Built upon the Weberian concept of statehood, it is claimed that this would result in states’ inability to maintain monopoly over violence. Since states are unable to exercise their power in all parts of its territory, other power centers within the nation states emerge resulting in political violence. Therefore, the absence of the concentration of political power is seen as the reason of violence. Since there are other power centers, it is said that, in these cases state loses its monopoly over the use of force. Failed state discourse maintains that in such a condition state is under-consolidated, contrary to the over-extended state which turns out to be a threat to its own population.⁸⁷

The fourth characteristic of the failed state is its inability to fulfill its obligations, or in other words, to maintain state functions. As Zartman mentions, the basic functions of state are no longer performed which would result in the deterioration of state structure, authority, law and political order.⁸⁸ The failed states are characterized as the cases where corpus of formal and informal rules governing the society is broke down and formal authority or its operation is disappeared. Related to this, in these forms of political structures there is no higher body to

⁸⁶ Rotberg, R. I., ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.20

⁸⁷ Wallenstein, P. ‘Beyond State Failure: On Internal and External Ways of Ending State Failure.’, Paper presented at the Conference on Failed States, Florence, Purdue University, 7-10 April, 2000; Carment, D. ‘Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy’, *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.415

⁸⁸ Zartman, Collapsed states: the disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority, p.5

provide security, education, health services, economic opportunities legal protection and infrastructure to its population.⁸⁹ In some cases even though states provide such facilities, they favor certain groups.

According to the failed state literature, states inability to fulfill their obligations stems from the weak bureaucratic structure which is the fifth characteristic of state failure. The weak bureaucracy is also seen as the reason of states' inability to exercise their power to all parts of their border. Since states do not develop infrastructures like roads for instance, they are unable to extend their power upon other areas apart from the center. In failed states, the only state function that works is the executive. Bureaucracy is not professional and it only carries out the orders of the executive to oppress citizens.

Depending on the characteristics mentioned above the sixth characteristic of the failed states is the absence of state legitimacy. Built upon Weberian ontological stand, states' inability to develop a monopolized use of physical force and provide necessary state functions and political goods, it is said that states lose their legitimacy in the eyes of their populations. Combined with the previous deficiencies, this trait of the failed state causes emergence of other groups that seek autonomous control over the national territory.⁹⁰ The issue of legitimacy is also rises from the failure of prevailing societal values to legitimize existing divisions of

⁸⁹ Carment, D. 'Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy', *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.409; Khor, M., 'Failed States Theory can cause Global Anarchy', *Third World Network*, March 2002, viewed April 12, 2012, < <http://www.twinside.org.sg/title/et0125.htm>>

⁹⁰ Rotberg, R. I. 'Failed Sates in a World of Terror', *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, p. 129

labor and political order.⁹¹ The issue of the absence of state legitimacy also claimed to be highly related with the break down of the social contract between the state and people which will be discussed later in analysis of the distinction of the public and the private spheres in the failed state discourse.

Seventh trait of the failed states is claimed to be the threat that they pose not only to their population but also to the international community. As Lambach mentioned, the understanding of state failure has evolved in time. Instead of perceiving state failure as a problem of underdevelopment, scholars have started to concentrate on the issue as a security issue.⁹² The issue of underdevelopment used to be perceived as a source of conflict, criminalized activity and international instability before. While the failed state discourse was also related to the issue of underdevelopment and humanitarian issues before, now it is mainly approached as a security concern.⁹³ Poverty is started to be concentrated as a cause of terrorism and such discourse is widely accepted after 9/11. It is not anymore the poverty that the developed capitalist world concentrates; instead, it is the consequences of it. Thus, the failed states are seen as a threat to liberal peace whose aim is to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies into stable actors of the international community:⁹⁴

⁹¹ Carment, D. 'Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy', *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.413

⁹² Lambach, D., 'Security, development and the Australian security discourse about failed states', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 41: 3, 2006, p.407

⁹³ Lambach, D., 'Security, development and the Australian security discourse about failed states', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 41: 3, 2006, p.416

⁹⁴ Ibid. p.408

“This outcome troubling the world order, especially to an international system that demands - indeed, counts on- a state’s capacity to govern its space. Failed states have come to be feared as “breeding ground of instability, mass migration, and murder”, as well as reservoirs and exporters of terror. The existence of these kinds of countries, and the instability that they harbor, not only threatens the lives and livelihoods of their own peoples but endangers world peace.”⁹⁵

As it can be concluded from the above statement, failed states are said to create a threat to the foundation of the international system.⁹⁶ According to the failed state literature, since national governments are the primary actors of the international system, they are the building blocks of the international order as well. By preventing chaos at home and preventing spread of anarchy beyond their borders they maintain international stability. However, when they fail or collapse the international system also breaks down.⁹⁷ This is why the state failure is called as emerging anarchy.⁹⁸ Therefore failed states are claimed to be incapable of being a member of the international community.⁹⁹

It is said that the problem of security which is a consequence of the absence of state function- combined with the food shortages diseases, starvation- results in

⁹⁵ Rotberg, R. I. ‘Failed States in a World of Terror’, *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, p. 128

⁹⁶ Rotberg, R. I., ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.1

⁹⁷ Rotberg, R. I. ‘Failed States in a World of Terror’, *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, p. 130

⁹⁸ Carment, D. ‘Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy’, *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.416

⁹⁹ Helman, G. B. & Ratner S. R, ‘Saving Failed States’, *Foreign Policy*, No.99, Winter, 1992-1993, p.3

huge population shifts and refugee problems.¹⁰⁰ The refugee problem presents failed states as a threat to its neighbors. As Ignatieff mentioned,

“States that are fighting losing battles against insurgents, states where civil wars have become endemic, or where state authority has broken down altogether, radiate instability around them. Failing states are more than problems for themselves. They create what Myron Weiner memorably called “bad neighborhoods... A collapsing state thus has the capacity to metastasize and to spread its problem through the region.”¹⁰¹

In short, the absence of political authority is said to cause a safe heaven for the terrorist activities and drugs.¹⁰² Therefore, failed states are not seen as posing a risk only to themselves, their people, and their neighbors but also to the globe.¹⁰³

The last indicator of state failure is claimed to be the weak economic performance¹⁰⁴ and inability to integrate to the world economy. When a nation state favors closed economic system, or when openness to international trade is low or

¹⁰⁰ Carment, D. ‘Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy’, *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.409

¹⁰¹ Ignatieff, M., ‘Intervention and State Dailure’, *Dissent Magazine*, Winter 2012, viewed April 9, 2012, <<http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=641>>

¹⁰² Khor, M., ‘Failed States Theory can cause Global Anarchy’, *Third World Network*, March 2002, viewed April 12, 2012, <<http://www.twinside.org.sg/title/et0125.htm>>

¹⁰³ Rotberg, R. I. ‘Failed Sates in a World of Terror’, *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, p. 127

¹⁰⁴ Carment, D. ‘Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy’, *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.409

nonexistent, it falls into the category of failed state.¹⁰⁵ In other words, according to the failed state literature, failure to integrate with the global economy and attracting foreign investment lead to failed states. Persistent shortfalls in growth rates compared to similar category of countries provide prima facie evidence of state failure and severity. Low living standards are associated with the rulers' deliver of financial rewards to favored families, clans or small groups. There is also the lack of foreign exchanges which results in shortages of food and decrease in government spending on services such as education and health care. Moreover, there might be corruption through which rulers skim the few resources available.¹⁰⁶ Khor also attributes the failure to the economic conditions such as falling commodity export prices, the debt burden and inadequate aid and technology transfer.¹⁰⁷

Rajan concentrates on the economic structure of the failed state from a distributional perspective. He suggests that the insecure nature of the failed states is due to the distribution of economic wealth. He claims that only a limited group has the economic power; therefore, they provide protection of their property by their own private armies, a condition which means lack of main institutions such as the police force. However, as a result of this, middle class professionals or small entrepreneurs cannot afford their own protection, leading to economic failure, on

¹⁰⁵ Rotberg, R. I., 'Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.20

¹⁰⁶ Rotberg, R. I. 'Failed Sates in a World of Terror', *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, p. 128

¹⁰⁷ Khor, M., 'Failed States Theory can cause Global Anarchy', *Third World Network*, March 2002, viewed April 12, 2012, < <http://www.twinside.org.sg/title/et0125.htm>>

the one hand, and insecure political environment on the other hand.¹⁰⁸ Rajan proposes that if economic power is widespread, then individuals who need protection will act collectively for the emergence of a police force and an impartial juridical system.

Built upon this understanding, Gros defines five types of failed states: The first one is the anarchic states where there is no central government; the second one is phantom or mirage states where there is a limited authority; the third one is the anaemic states where counter groups try to take the authority of the state; captured states where the state mechanism is captured by insecure elites to frustrate rivals; and lastly aborted states where the state has already failed even before its formation.

As the anaemic state model asserts, in the failed state literature an instrumentalist state perspective dominates. The instrumentalists view the state as an impartial body that is serving to the interests of the group whoever controls it.¹⁰⁹ Gros claims that in failed states the group that controls the state apparatus uses state power against rival groups. As it is indicated above, the same political discourse is also used by Kahn who maintains that in strong states, the state apparatus is in the hands of the capitalist class and failed states fail because of the lack of the capitalist class that controls the state. A similar perspective was suggested by Rajan. Rajan claims that in the failed states whoever wins the elections firstly destroys the institutions that curb his/her power and uses the instruments of the state to increase

¹⁰⁸ Rajan, R. 'Failed States, Vicious Cycles, and a Proposal', Manuscript, International Monetary Fund, 2004

¹⁰⁹ Sweezy, P. *The Theory of Capitalist Development*, (New York: Monthly Review Pres), 1942, p. 243

his/her power. Later the oppositional group organizes its power to get the control of the state apparatus as a result of which a vicious cycle occurs.¹¹⁰

To sum up, the failed state literature has evolved after the end of the Cold War even though there is a debate on when the failed states emerged. As it can be seen above the forename ‘failed’ is referred to characterize certain political formations that are claimed to possess different structures from those that the developed states possess. Failed states are described as a version of weak states whose extreme version is the collapsed state. The characteristics that failed states are claimed to possess are gathered under eight traits which are: inability to provide political goods, emergence of political violence; absence of central authority; absence of state functions; absence of an effective bureaucracy; absence of state legitimacy; emergence of threat; and weak economic performance. Moreover, it is said that some claims of the literature exhibit an instrumentalist perspective to the state. All of these characteristics of the failed states will be put into a critical reading later, in order to decipher the state-civil society dichotomy and orientalist discourse prevailing within failed state literature.

2.3. Rogue State

When the Soviet Union demised and the Cold War came to an end, a new international order has emerged which in return resulted in abandonment of the terms and discourses of the previous decades. New concepts, such as the failed state, started to be re-produced in order to describe the new dynamics of the

¹¹⁰ Rajan, R. ‘Failed States, Vicious Cycles, and a Proposal’, Manuscript, International Monetary Fund, 2004

international system. One of such concepts is the *rogue states*- or *outlaw or backlash states* which are used interchangeably. Even though these concepts are used before the end of Cold War, their use and content have changed dramatically after the demise of the Soviet Union. It is not a coincidence that such a transformation in the content of the terms occurred in a period when the old Cold War dynamics came to an end. In order to capture this change, it is useful to set forth first the historical use then the contemporary meaning of the concept

Rather than the dominant discourse that legitimizes certain policies towards those states, a critical reading of the concept is needed in order to capture the main dynamics of the use of the term “rogue”. Such a reading necessitates not only concentrating on the physical appearance of the reality but also analyzing real relations that generate those surface appearances. Moreover, a critical reading should also show within which discourse does the mainstream description of rogue state talks and what political consequences have emerged out of this discourse. Therefore, the following section will try to problematize the underlying premises of the mainstream definition of the term “rogue state”.

2.3.1. Defining Rogue States

During the 17th and 18th century in Virginia, covenanted servants and white-skinned quasi-slaves, when they escaped, were stigmatized with the letter “R” (rogue). By that way, they were easily recognized and unable to escape. The issue of the recognition of the rogues was resolved practically as the white quasi-slaves were replaced with black slaves. The color of the skins of blacks made

stigmatizations redundant and blacks started to be synonymous with rogues.¹¹¹ Today, the term is started to be used to stigmatize those who try to escape from the community of liberal democratic states. With this stigma, those states are prevented to escape from the capitalist world system.

In its historical meaning the concept “rogue” was not just used for the slaves but also for states- even though these terms “rogue” and “state” are not similar, hence follow each other in its contemporary use. Those states or political communities of the time, performing “rogue” activities, were labeled as outlaw political communities. For example, Gauls, German Visigoths and Vandals were defined as rogues because they were constantly violating borders of the Roman Empire. Vikings were also put in the same category because of their challenge to Northern Europe.¹¹² Apart from those bandits, assassins and Barbary pirates of the early 19th century were also defined as outlaws.¹¹³

In the 20th century it was Nazis Germany that was first labeled as rogue. Moreover, liberal ideologues defined the Soviet Union as rogue by claiming that it supported dictatorships of the Third World states, such as Iraq, Libya and Iran, which were also sponsoring terrorist activities against the Western states.¹¹⁴ During the 1970s, academics and policy analysts started to use the title “rogue” for states

¹¹¹ Losurdo, D., ‘Lenin ve Herrenvolk Demokrasisi’, in Zizek, S., Budgen, B. and Kouvelakis S. (eds.), *Yeniden Lenin: Bir Hakikat Siyasetine Doğru*, İstanbul: Otonom Yayıncılık, 2007, p.284

¹¹² Henriksen, T. H., ‘The Rise and Decline of Rogue States’, *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2001, 54, no.2, p. 350

¹¹³ Preble, C., ‘The Bush Doctrine and Rogue States’, *Foreign Service Journal*, October 2005, p.26

¹¹⁴ Henriksen, T. H., ‘The Rise and Decline of Rogue States’, *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2001, 54, no.2, p. 352

by looking at their internal behavior. By focusing on the internal behavior of the state, analysts tried to discover if those states were diplomatically isolated from the rest of the international community because of their egregious domestic conduct.¹¹⁵ After the 1980s, the term evolved and started to be used to define certain international behaviors. In this decade, those states were perceived as an immediate threat to the security of certain regions that were vital to the American interests. As a result of this, even though the term “rogue” was not used, in the Export Administration Act of 1979, states such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Sudan were included into the official terrorist list because of their challenge to the US interests.¹¹⁶ After the late 1980s and early 1990s, the term has started to refer to those states who arguably constitute a threat to international community due to their aggressive policies such as producing WMD, or sponsoring terrorism.¹¹⁷

In 1985, President Reagan used the term “outlaw states” to describe such political communities; however, it is not until the Clinton Administration that the term was adapted into policy. In a speech in 1994, Clinton labeled Iran and Libya as rogue states that acquires WMD and underlined this as a challenge to the security of

¹¹⁵ Litwak, S. R. *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War*, Washington: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2000, p.50

¹¹⁶ Copy of the Act can be found on <http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/crs-RL30169.pdf> , accessed March 6, 2012

¹¹⁷ Caprioli M., Trumbore P. F., ‘Rhetoric versus Reality: Rogue States in Interstate Conflict’, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No.5, October 2005, p.773

Europe.¹¹⁸ This speech was followed by an article written by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. Lake categorized certain types of states –Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya- as outlaw states as they stood outside of the family of democratic states but also oppose their main values. According to Lake, these states had certain common characteristics such as, being ruled by a group that ensured power through coercion and violated human rights in order to promote radical ideologies; inability to build constructive relations with the outside world; and possessing WMD.¹¹⁹ Therefore, it can be said that the “rogue doctrine” has since then helped identifying those hostile Third World states with large military forces and WMD and that abuse human rights and challenge prevailing world order.¹²⁰

After the terrorist attack to the World Trade Center in September 11, 2001 the rhetoric and policies against the so-called “rogue states” have stiffened. In 2002, in the National Security Strategy for United States of America (NSSUSA 2002), rogue states were clearly characterized as the main threat to the national security of USA. President Bush openly described rogue states as the chief threat to global order and devoted himself to the elimination of this threat through any instrument necessary.¹²¹ Therefore, as Caprioli and Trumbore also mention, it can be said that

¹¹⁸ Bill Clinton, “Remarks to Future Leaders of Europe in Brussels, January 9, 1994,” *Public Papers of the Presidents, William J. Clinton, Volume 1* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 11

¹¹⁹ Lake, A., ‘Confronting Backlash States’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No.2, March/April 1994, p. 45

¹²⁰ Caprioli M., Trumbore P. F., ‘Rhetoric versus Reality: Rogue States in Interstate Conflict’, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No.5, October 2005, p.770

¹²¹ Preble, C., ‘The Bush Doctrine and Rogue States’, *Foreign Service Journal*, October 2005, p.27

rogue states have turned out to be the synonymous in US military and foreign policy circles with the post-Soviet threat.¹²²

As this analysis implies, traditionally certain political organizations are defined as rogue states if they violate the principle of state sovereignty. In the Article 2 of the UN Charter it is written that:

“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

However, as the scheme above proves, the content of the term has changed in time. Rather than taking reference to Article 2, a new interpretation of the international relations has started to be made that is based on the “responsibility to protect”. This was obviously stated by Kofi Annan in the Council on Foreign Relations in 2004 where he said “Governments must assume their responsibility to protect their citizens. Where they fail to do so, the Security Council must assume its responsibility to protect.”¹²³ This new interpretation has substantially transformed the meaning of the term “rogue”.

In today’s usage, the term “rogue states” refers to those states conducting certain rogue behaviors. Such behaviors can be categorized under four headings: the

¹²² Caprioli M., Trumbore P. F., ‘Rhetoric versus Reality: Rogue States in Interstate Conflict’, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No.5, October 2005, p.775

¹²³ Preble, C., ‘The Bush Doctrine and Rogue States’, *Foreign Service Journal*, October 2005, p.26

development WMD capability; involvement in international terrorism; posing a military threat to local and global agents; and challenging international norms.¹²⁴

Some scholars, such as Henriksen, have claimed that rogue states re-appeared suddenly in the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union.¹²⁵ It is as if these states were hiding so that they emerged immediately as the Communist Bloc collapsed. However, none of the so-called rogue states experienced any change in their rule after the demise of the Soviet Union. Indeed it is argued that, the existence of the Soviet Union use to create the necessary space for the survival of those states. Therefore, when the Cold War came to an end, the obstacles against the spread of liberal states has removed¹²⁶ and formal democracies have started to develop, spread and turned out to be the universal form.¹²⁷ As a result of this, the US through international institutions and in cooperation with other capitalist states has started to deal with the “rogue state”. As the National Security Advisor Anthony Lake mentioned, since the Cold War ended nations have committed themselves to the pursuit of democratic institutions, expansion of free trade, and promotion of collective security.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Hoyt, P.D, “The Rogue State Image in American Foreign Policy, *Global Society*, Vol. 14, No.2, 2000, p. 303

¹²⁵ Henriksen, T. H., ‘The Rise and Decline of Rogue States’, *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2001, 54, no.2, p. 357

¹²⁶ Özdemir, A. M., *Güç, Buyruk, Düzen*, Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 2011, p. 289

¹²⁷ Chimni, B. S, “An outline of a Marxist course on public international law”, in Marks, S. (ed.), *International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.58-59

¹²⁸ Lake, A., ‘Confronting Backlash States’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No.2, March/April 1994, p. 45

In the post-Cold War era, the US hegemony acquired a new form with renewed capability to impose its own liberal values, which are necessary for the operation of the capitalist system on other political units. In the following sentences of his article, Lake openly clarifies this situation:

“For the sake of both its interests and its ideals, the US has a special responsibility to nurture and promote these core values... As the sole superpower the United States has a special responsibility for developing a strategy to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international community... We seek to contain the influence of those states, sometimes by isolation, sometimes through pressure, sometimes by diplomatic and economic measures.”¹²⁹

Hence, the concept of “rogue states” has started to be used more widely as part of the US foreign policy as the US has had no fear of destabilizing Cold War balances. As is known, today the US government demonstrates these states as the biggest challenge to the world peace and human rights, even though the USA herself once supported those authoritarian rulers of the Middle East in order to use them against the Communist bloc. However, this understanding has changed dramatically now those states have become rogues to be transformed.

As it can be concluded from above, these states that are termed as rogue neither appeared suddenly nor started acting as rogues immediately after the demise of the Soviet Bloc. The main change has been the USA’s getting the ability to deal with these underdeveloped capitalist states freely in order to create a new capitalist

¹²⁹ Ibid. P.46

order/disorder. This has enabled some commentators to conclude that such labels (rogue, failed, quasi, collapsed or weak) have helped define post-colonial states in an attempt to transform them in the line with the economic, political, security interests of those who employ them.¹³⁰

Moreover, some commentators suggest that the term rogue does not define a new class of state but instead represents a new perpetual construction of the enemy. As Hoyt suggests, the end of the Cold War has enabled policy makers to replace “reds” with “rogues”.¹³¹

To sum up, in this section the historical development of the notion of the rogue states has been investigated. It is claimed that even though the forename “rogue” is used to define a certain type of state, what is really referred to is rogue behaviors, such as the development of WMD capability; involvement in international terrorism; posing a military threat to local and global agents; and challenging international norms. Those international behaviors are associated with certain internal structures and such a view helps legitimize certain policies to be implemented against these states. Moreover, the section has questioned the timing of the emergence of the rogue states discourse. Even though some claims that rogue states emerged immediately after the demise of Soviet Union, it is claimed that with the end of Cold War obstacles against the operation of liberal states against the formerly “rogue states” have been removed and “formal democracies” have turned

¹³⁰ Bilgin P. Morton, A. D., ‘Historicising Representations of ‘Failed States’: Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Social Science?, *Third World Quarterly*, February 2000, Vol.23, No. 1, pp.55-80

¹³¹ Hoyt, P.D, “The Rogue State Image in American Foreign Policy”, *Global Society*, Vol. 14, No.2, 2000, p. 297

out to be the universal form, which in turn has resulted in the description of those that escape from the community of liberal democratic states as rogue states.

CHAPTER II

3. NEGATING THE DIFFERENT: CRITICAL EVALUATION OF RENTIER STATE, FAILED STATE AND ROGUE STATE LITERATURES

In order to analyze practical reflections of those state theories that are aimed to describe certain state structures claimed to be possessing different characteristics than the Western type of states, it is useful to make a critical reading of those theories. The critical reading of these literatures would show that all these state theories share some common discourses and paths. It will be claimed that through these common characteristics these theories attribute certain embedded characteristics to those states and through these characteristics they negate the different structures of those political formations. These common characteristics that all these state theories share can be seen in their understanding of the separation of public and private spheres, or state-civil society antagonism, and in their orientalist discourse. Therefore, this chapter will start with the analysis of the separation of state-civil society within all these state theories one by one.

3.1. State-Civil Society Antagonism in Rentier, Failed and Rogue State Literatures

Liberal thinking separates the public realm (state) from the private one (civil society). Within this perspective, while the state is described as the public sphere

that is antagonized from civil society, the civil society is presented as the private sphere where citizens act. Even though the emergence of the civil society is conceptualized in a different way by variety of scholars, such as Bodin, Spinoza, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Locke, Kant, Paine, Mill and Tocqueville,¹³² the civil society literally is perceived as a bulwark against the state where citizens enjoy their individuality and freedom. As Boussard mentioned civil society is composed of the “citizens who act collectively in order to promote or defend their interests towards the state”.¹³³

The critical reading of the literatures of rentier, failed and rogue states shows that all these theories analyze those political formations with the presupposition of state-civil society antagonism. The following sections aim to elaborate this question. The main argument of each section is that these entire literatures search for a Western type of civil society in those social organizations and with this methodology reproduce the liberal discourse. It will be claimed in each section that these theories search for the private sphere standing against the public sphere and claim that in these social organizations there is no civil society. It will be indicated in each section that the claimed absence of the civil society aims to support the argument that these societies do not contain a potential for emancipation and therefore, an outside intervention is necessary to transform these states into liberal-democratic states.

¹³² See Keane, J. *Demokrasi ve Sivil Toplum: Avrupa Sosyalizminin Açmaları, Toplumsal ve Siyasal İktidarın Denetlenmesi sorunu ve Demokrasi Beklentileri Üzerine*, İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1994

¹³³ Boussard, C., *Civil Society and Democratization*, in Ole Elgström & Goran Hyden. *Development and Democracy: What Have We Learned and How?* London, New York: Routledge, 2002

3.1.1. State-Civil Society Antagonism in Rentier State Literature

Like rogue state and failed state literatures, rentier state theory analyzes the state on the basis of the claimed civil society-state dichotomy. A critical reading of the literature shows evidences of such an understanding and discourse.

As it is indicated before, one of the main claims of the rentier state theory is that since the state does not need extraction for financing its budget due to the rentier wealth, the people of those states do not demand political representation.¹³⁴ It is the absence of state's need for taxes and state's autonomous economic activities that eradicate the demand of people for political participation. As Crystal mentioned,

“The rentier state literature, like its predecessors, also presents, albeit in a very different way, a view of civil society as fundamentally weak. As several writers (myself included) have argued, oil revenues empower the state at the expense of society. Oil revenues allow the state to undercut existing social groups and to preempt the formation of new ones... Revenues also give the state the power to weaken social groups by co-opting them collectively or by fragmenting them through selective co-optation of key members. Oil revenues allow the state to weaken civil society.”¹³⁵

Such an understanding is the reflection of the liberal thinking which stresses state-civil society antagonism. These scholars are unable to locate a Western type

¹³⁴ Mahdavy, Luciani, Beblawi, Okruhlik and other rentier state theorist supported this claim.

¹³⁵ Crystal, J. ‘Civil Society in the Arabian Gulf’, in Norton, A. R. (ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Leiden: Brill, 1994, p. 259

private sphere against the public sphere and therefore, underline the deprivation of these societies from a space of emancipation within which private individuals – who normally gain the right of representation due to the taxes- act. From this point these scholars claim that rentier states will never turn to a modern civilized nation.

Even Delacroix, who takes dependency relations to the center of his analysis, reproduces this liberal perception of state-civil society antagonism. As Jill Crystal mentioned both modernization and dependency perspectives within the rentier state theory views civil society as weak or absent in those countries. This is an indicator that rentier state theorists analyze state with the presupposition of the separation of state from society:

“Both the older literature, written from a dependency as well as modernization perspective, and much of the more recent literature on the rentier state conclude that independent groups are unimportant in the Gulf, that associational life is weak, and the public space between the nuclear family and the state is sparsely populated.”¹³⁶

Going back to Delacroix, he refuses both Marxist and Weberian analysis of the state on the basis of the claim that the class structure of both understandings does not exist in rentier states.¹³⁷ However, in this understanding what is really meant by the absence of classes is the absence of civil society. Delacroix searches for the civil society understanding in classical liberal thinking and emphasizes the

¹³⁶ Crystal, J. ‘Civil Society in the Arabian Gulf’, in Norton, A. R. (ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Leiden: Brill, 1994, p. 259

¹³⁷ Delacroix, J. The Distributive State in the World System, *Studies in Comparative International Development*; Fall, Vol. 15 Issue 3, 1980

absence of it by recognizing the absence of capitalist social classes in those societies. By underlying the absence of classes, what Declacroix tries to mention is that in distributive states there is no civil society which necessitates regulatory activities of a bureaucracy that tries to extend its sphere of influence through rational cautions.

The discourse of civil society-state antagonism can also be seen in the works of Luciani. As indicated before, Luciani questions the existence of political parties in allocative states.¹³⁸ Such an understanding is the reflection liberal thinking that search for the civil society. According to him, in the absence of civil society, within which private individuals freely realize their activities based on private property, the existence of political parties may be controversial and if they exist their only orientation will be either cultural or ideological.¹³⁹

The lack of or the nature of existing political parties and relation of this situation with the separation of public and private sphere within the rentier state theory is also mentioned by Crystal in her quote from Anthony¹⁴⁰:

“At the independence... there were no trade unions, political parties, free presses or elected bodies in any of the sheikhdoms through which reformist inputs into the local decision making processes could be articulated with any hope for achieving success... The legacy of the traditional system of rule by tribal chieftains, even

¹³⁸ Luciani, G. “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework”, in G. Luciani (ed.) *The Arab State*, Kent: Routledge, 1990, P.78

¹³⁹ Ibid

¹⁴⁰ Crystal, J. ‘Civil Society in the Arabian Gulf’, in Norton, A. R. (ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Leiden: Brill, 1994, p. 259

since independence, continues to weigh against the establishment of such organizations or interest groups in the near future.”¹⁴¹

Okruhlik’s analysis of the rentier state theory is thought to move beyond the civil society-state dichotomy due to her claim that classical rentier state theory reifies the state and overemphasizes state autonomy from the social consequences of expenditure.¹⁴² Moreover, her statement that state and society penetrate one another and the boundaries between state and society are permeable and fluid¹⁴³ strengthens such appearance. Although the attitude against “reification of state” is stimulating for rentier state debate; a critical reading of Okruhlik’s proposal demonstrates that she also reproduces the civil society-state dichotomy. Since she develops her critique within a liberal individualistic methodology, she is unable to suggest a new conceptualization of state that goes beyond state-civil society dichotomy and; therefore, state, in her analysis, remains as an organic entity standing against civil society and outside of the social forces that comprise it. In this regard, political representation of the local classes; interests of the capitalist classes of other states; social contradictions reflected in state policies; and demands that state power do not protect are not taken into account in this analysis. Such an understanding enabled Okruhlik to view decision making procedure as a voluntary process. She views state as an organism standing above society and making decisions on distributing rents; therefore, she claims that opposition in rentier states

¹⁴¹ Anthony J. D. *Arab States of the lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum*, Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1975, p. 220

¹⁴² Okruhlik, G. Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No.3, April, 1999, p.296

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* P. 308

rises not because of rentier wealth but because of the political choices of personal regimes on how to distribute those rents.

In short, this understanding of the civil society-state antagonism in the rentier state literature make the theory to conclude that state is totally independent from any social pressure and insensitive to the demands of society. As Shambayati mentioned,

“Even though, rentier states typically play a heavy role in the domestic economy, they are not well integrated into domestic society. In fact, rentier states are isolated from the societies they rule. As Lisa Anderson has noted “rentier states are relatively insensitive to the changing character of the domestic population... and to the sometimes deleterious results of policies they advocate.”¹⁴⁴

Therefore, the consequence of rentier state discourse that reproduces the classical liberal understanding of state and civil society is the claim that rentier states will never turn into democratic states with their own internal dynamics because of the absence of a private sphere that exhibits emancipating capabilities. Even though rentier state theorists support this argument with their reductionist economic analysis, the main motive for such an argument is the absence of civil society in those states. Such an understanding mediates certain policies towards rentier states that call for the intervention if these states are tried to be democratized.

¹⁴⁴ Shambayati, H. ‘The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, No.3, April, 1994, p.308

Lastly, this characteristic of the inability to turn these countries into democratic nations in the rentier states is certainly a consequence of the discourse formulated within the modernization perspective. Even though the majority of the rentier state theorists may reject the claim of a singular path of development, their search for a Western type of civil society in those cases and their recognition of the absence of it, and after that their conclusion that absence of this emancipating private sphere prevents those states to be democratic civilized nation prove that they rely on a linear path of development which in return enables us to claim that they reproduce the modernization discourse.

To sum up, the rentier state theory like the ones on rogue and failed states reproduces the liberal discourse of state-civil society antagonism and claims the absence of the latter in the political formations concerned. They claim that since state in those cases does not need to extract taxes from the population, the conditions for the establishment of the civil society are removed. Moreover, the absence of the civil society which necessitates regulatory activities of bureaucracy is underlined as a result of distributive policies. Therefore, the potential for transformation in those states on the basis of internal dynamics is not accepted and outside intervention becomes inevitable for transforming these social organizations into modern democratic states.

3.1.2. State-Civil Society Antagonism in Failed State Literature

Like the rentier state literature, the failed state literature also builds its theory on the presupposition that state and civil society are antagonistic to each

other and attributes the latter the potential for emancipation. As Carment mentions, most scholars of the state failure are puzzled how to conceptualize the relation between state and civil society in the cases concerned.¹⁴⁵ This comment indicates that failed state scholars analyze the state failure with the presupposition of state-civil society antagonism even though they exhibit differences in the conceptualization of the relation between these two antagonistic units.

Failed state literature's presupposition of state-civil society distinction can be analyzed with a critical reading of their emphasis on the violence in those cases. As it is indicated before, many scholars of failed state discourse claim that failed or collapsed states are unable to provide the security of their population which is the main function and responsibility of the state.¹⁴⁶ In other words, what these scholars tend to mention is the emergence of, what Hobbes called, the state of war.¹⁴⁷ According to the Hobbesian understanding, before preceding to the governments there was the state of nature which was unstable, anti-social and violent. However, individuals under this state of nature came together and gave up some of their sovereignty to an upper body which was the state. Through this, a social contract has emerged which has resulted in the formation of state. State with this social contract was removed the state of war and; therefore, gained its legitimacy from the frightened members of the society. With the abolishment of state of war and

¹⁴⁵ Carment, D. 'Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy', *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.409

¹⁴⁶ Carment, D. 'Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy', *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.415; Gros, J. 'Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, liberai, Rwanda and Haiti', *Third World Quarterly*, 17, 1996, p.456

¹⁴⁷ Hobbes, T. *Leviathan*. 1651 Edwin Curley (Ed.) 1994. Hackett Publishing

establishment of state, a civil society has also emerged.¹⁴⁸ The failed state discourse also searches for the Western type civil society in those states and they claim that in those cases it is absent. Therefore, they claim that those states have returned back to state of war because the failed states have broken the social contract by being unable to provide its obligation which is to provide the security of the people.¹⁴⁹ As these states are unable to provide safe heavens for the emergence of civil society, failed state theorists also view those social formations as lacking a sphere of emancipation. Because of the insecure nature of those social formations, it is claimed that people turned their face to other institutions and third parties to provide their security. As it is indicated before failed state literature viewed the reason of the civil conflict as a result of this security issue. As Carment mentions,

“...broken social contracts and weakened oppressive institutions open political space for political entrepreneurs to mobilize support...”

Under conditions of decay, if the state center loses its autonomy by favoring one group over another, the disadvantaged group is likely to believe that whatever social contract there was is broken and cannot be fixed without some sort of third party to provide minimal security guarantees.”¹⁵⁰

Gros makes a similar argument and defines failed states as those:

¹⁴⁸ Keane, J. *Demokrasi ve Sivil Toplum: Avrupa Sosyalizminin Açmaları, Toplumsal ve Siyasal İktidarın Denetlenmesi sorunu ve Demokrasi Beklentileri Üzerine*, İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1994, p.61-63

¹⁴⁹ Rajan, R. ‘Failed States, Vicious Cycles, and a Proposal’, Manuscript, International Monetary Fund, 2004

¹⁵⁰ Carment, D. ‘Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy’, *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.415-416

“in which public authorities are either unable or unwilling to carry out their end of what Hobbes long ago called the social contract, but which now includes more than maintaining the peace among society’s many factions and interests.”¹⁵¹

Ignatieff also demonstrates a similar standing with his claim that,

“These Hobessian situations teach the message of the Leviathan itself: that consolidated state power is the very condition for any regime of rights whatever.”¹⁵²

As it can be concluded from the above statements, failed state literature recognizes the emergence of other power centers as a result of the breach of the social contract. This demonstrates the Weberian perspective of state understanding in the failed state literature which perceives the state as the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.

One of the indicators of state failure according to these writers is the loss of state legitimacy. This is also related with their perception of broken social contracts. Since the state does not fulfill its responsibility to protect, it loses its legitimacy and other power centers emerged. In this regard, failed state theorists make sense of state-civil society antagonism on the basis of the social contract between the state and people.

¹⁵¹ Gros, J. ‘Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.17, No.3, 1996, p.456

¹⁵² Ignatieff, M., ‘Intervention and State Dailure’, *Dissent Magazine*, Winter 2012, viewed April 9, 2012, <<http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=641> >

Rajan also underlines the absence of the private sphere that creates a pressure on the ruler's power. He suggests that in failed states there is no institutional environment and civil society to restrict ruler's activities, the ruler does not protect individuals and their contractual rights.¹⁵³

As mentioned before, another characteristic of the failed states is its inability to provide political or public goods to the citizens. This inability is also perceived as an obstacle to the emergence of civil society. Lack of political goods is seen as the reason of the absence of civil society the emancipating role of which limits ruler's activity by pressuring demands. Lack of political goods is perceived as preventing citizens to participate freely, openly and fully into the political process.¹⁵⁴ As the Western type civil society is also searched and not found in those states, these social formations are regarded as lacking an emancipation potential which in turn results in the emergence of the authoritarian regimes. As Rotberg mentions:

“Weak states usually honor rule of law precepts in the breach. They harass civil society. We states often ruled by despots, elected or not.”¹⁵⁵

As it is indicated failed state literature starts its claims by making a distinction between the strong and the failed states. Whereas strong states are seen as responding to popular discontent and accommodate dissident political challenges,

¹⁵³ Rajan, R. 'Failed States, Vicious Cycles, and a Proposal', Manuscript, International Monetary Fund, 2004

¹⁵⁴ Rotberg, R. I., 'Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.3

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p.4

failed states are regarded as not responding to such demands.¹⁵⁶ In failed states, like in rogue states, it is claimed that, the rulers prevent the democratic process and the emergence of civil society. Such a claim can be seen in Rotberg's analysis of the failed states:

“A leader and his associates begin by subverting democratic norms, greatly restricting participatory processes, and coercing a legislature and the bureaucracy into subservience. They end judicial independence, block civil society, and suborn the security forces. Political goods become scarce or are supplied to the leading class only. The rulers demonstrate more and more contempt for their peoples, surround themselves with family, clan, or ethnic allies, and distance themselves from their subjects. The state becomes equated in the eyes of most citizens with the particular drives and desires of a leader or a smallish group.”¹⁵⁷

The presupposition of state and civil society antagonism and absence of the latter is seen as the reason of the emergence of threat of instability caused by the military. It is claimed that in those cases the military is poorly trained and lacked discipline. Such a structure of the military is seen as a threat to nation-building in the developing world. The literature claims that this threat worsens and spreads since there is no democratic civil society institution to countervail such activities.¹⁵⁸

To sum up, in each argument of the failed state discourse signs of presupposition of state-civil society antagonism can be found. The sources of

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p.21

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Gros, J. 'Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.17, No.3, 1996, p.464

violence in these political formations are found the absence of civil society, a condition which results from the break of what Hobbes called as the social contract. As the social contract breaks, individuals rather than applying to a higher body for their security, search for third parties for their protection. As a result of this, different power centers emerge and the civil society or the monopoly of legitimate use of force diminish. Moreover, it is claimed that the absence of civil society removes the private sphere which restricts the ruler's activity and opens the way to state failure. State's inability to provide public goods is also seen as a reason of the absence of civil society. In the end, the lack of civil society helps legitimize an outside intervention to these societies to turn them into claimed recognition of the civilized- modern nations.

3.1.3. State-Civil Society Antagonism in Rogue State Literature

A critical reading of literature of the "rogue state" shows that discourses produced within this literature try to search for a Western type of civil sphere in these states. As it is indicated above, from that liberal perspective no civil society is found in those political formations; therefore, these societies are viewed as lacking a sphere of emancipation. Such a view supports the argument that these states will never be transformed to modern civilization without any intervention. The "rogue" behaviors are seen as being conducted by irrational political leaders who face no oppositional demands from any power centers which compose the civil society. As O'Reilly quoted from Tanter:

“Rogue regimes are more subject to the politics of personality... the policies of the new rulers are more a reflection of the whims of charismatic individuals than the outcome of bargaining among multiple centers of power”¹⁵⁹

The literature of rogue states mainly claims that one of the main characteristics of those states is their being ruled by authoritarian rulers. Accordingly, it is claimed that such a rule leaves no private sphere that civil society rests. As O’Donnell and Schmitter claimed:

“The authoritarian governments strive to destroy self-organized and autonomous associations and replace them with state-founded organizations with prescribed goals and tightly monitored activities. Besides this regime-controlled arena, the space for public activities may be low and limited to “a few tolerated dissidents and some mavericks carefully ignored by the regime-controlled media”¹⁶⁰

Regarding rogue state literature’s emphasis on the authoritarian, irrational rules of those states that leaves no space for civil society, the conceptualization of the “rogue” evolved by concentrating on the internal rogue activities and giving the ruler the responsibility to protect. As it is discussed above the historical definition of the rogue activity was associated with violating sovereignty right (Article 2 of the UN Charter). However, the reference on Article 2 was replaced with the “responsibility to protect” principle. As it is indicated by Kofi Annan in 2004,

¹⁵⁹ O’Reilly, K.P. “Perceiving Rogue States: The Use of the “Rogue State” Concept by U.S. Foreign Policy Elite”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol.3, Issue.4, 2007, p.297

¹⁶⁰ O’Donnell, G. & Schmitter, P. C.. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p.48

governments were forced to protect their own citizens and failure to meet this responsibility will result in the possible intervention of the Security Council.¹⁶¹

Within this liberal perspective, civil society is attributed an active role in changing the regimes and bringing people into the development process.¹⁶² Since rogue states are perceived as lacking the private sphere which is to conduct that active role, the rogue state literature directly calls upon outside intervention for preventing the “rogue” behavior.

To sum up, rogue state literature analyzes those states on the basis of a state-civil society antagonism. Their search for a Western type civil society in these political formations which in their view also do not exist there is claimed to be a result of the authoritarian rules which prevents the emergence of the private sphere. The absence of private sphere is claimed to remove the possibility of the emancipation which is carried by the civil society. As a result of this, the literature is able to claim that these states will not turn into democratic states because there is no internal pressure for such direction. As a consequence of this understanding, the literature calls upon outside intervention for the “freedom” of these societies.

3.2. The Orientalist Discourse in Rentier, Failed and Rogue State Literatures

Orientalism, roughly, is the Western perception of Eastern societies.¹⁶³ In other words, it is the representation of the East by the West. Edward Said defines

¹⁶¹ Preble, C., ‘The Bush Doctrine and Rogue States’, *Foreign Service Journal*, October 2005, p.26

¹⁶² Seckinelgin, H. ‘Civil Society as a Metaphor for Western Liberalism’, *Global Society*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2002, p.357

¹⁶³ Said, E. W., *Oryantalizm: Sömürgeciliğin Keşif Yolu*, İstanbul: İrfan Yayımcılık, 1998, p. 12

orientalism as a composition of geo-economic views that are tried to be transferred through esthetic, scientific, economic, sociological, historical and philological texts. By employing Foucault's conception of power-knowledge, Said claims that through the methods indicated above the West claims that they have the knowledge of the East which in return provides them with the legitimacy to rule.

Said maintains that orientalist thinking is based on otherness which creates "us versus them" dichotomy. Through this way, more dichotomies are created in which the East is presented with the traits or titles that are opposite to the ones that the West is claimed to possess.¹⁶⁴ For example, while Westerners are associated with rationality, virtue, morality, development; the East is associated with irrationality, immaturity, apathy, immobility. Therefore, one who thinks about the East develops his/her ideas through such presuppositions. As a result of this, the West is regarded as culturally and intellectually superior. Edward Said claims that such orientalist thinking causes certain policies such as colonization.

This section of the thesis aims to demonstrate the domination of the orientalist discourse in the three literatures examined above. However, the understanding of the orientalism in the following sections is not identical to what Said claims. In other words, Said's definition of orientalism will be critically employed. Said claims the Western identity is formed by locating itself against the Eastern societies to which certain characteristics are attributed. In other words, he claims that the West and the East created each other. In this sense, he views the existence of such opposite identities only in the discourse level. This is one of the

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. p.63

main characteristics of the post-colonialist and post-modernist studies. According to them, there is no other reality apart from the discourse.

What is aimed to be underlined here with the critique of Said is that he neglects the historical and structural factors that result in the attribution of certain characteristics to the societies concerned. This is to say that the “civilized” Western and “uncivilized” Eastern identities are built on certain historical practices. These identities that enable domination of the Western states on the Eastern ones do exist since they are *Trägers* of certain historical roles. For years, due to either its geographical advantage or contingency, the West has developed earlier and built domination over the Eastern societies. In order to legitimize its domination, the West has attributed certain inferior and uncivilized characteristics to the Eastern societies.

This is not to say that Said is totally wrong. His ideas will be used in the upcoming sections. However, it is acknowledged that his approach breaks the connection of orientalist discourse with the imperialist project since he neglects its relation with production relations. These identities are not created just in the discursive level nor have they created each other. They are emerged out of certain historical practices. In this sense, orientalism in this study is presented just as an imperialist tool that gives the so-called “civilized” the role of civilizing the “uncivilized.” In other words, in this study, orientalism is perceived as an ideological tool employed for the legitimization of the domination of the developed capitalist Western countries on the underdeveloped Eastern ones. While the orientalist thinking is represented as the cause of the imperialist project by Said, in this study, without neglecting relation of orientalist thinking with historical and

structural factor, it is taken as a discursive tool which in return legitimizes such policies.

In this regard, a critical reading of these theories will show that their arguments exhibit strongly orientalist thinking in the sense mentioned above. It will be claimed that such an understanding openly legitimizes outside interventions in those political organizations. Therefore, in the upcoming sections, the orientalist thinking in rentier state, failed state and rogue state literatures is to be analyzed in subsequence.

3.2.1. Orientalist Discourse in Rentier State Literature

In 2001 Nonneman mentioned that:

“With the end of the Cold War and some signs of (very limited) political and economic liberalization in the region, attempts were made to challenge the consensus reigning among social scientists not specializing in the region-as well as among many 'Orientalists'-that the Middle East was 'exceptional' and unlikely to develop democratic politics, due to cultural and historical factors as well as the political economy of rentierism.”¹⁶⁵

As it can be concluded from this statement, for years there has been a consensus to analyze the political, social and economic structures of the region as exceptional and delineate them by giving reference to the cultural and historical

¹⁶⁵ Nonneman, G. ‘Rentiers and Autocrats, Monarchs and Democrats, State and Society: The Middle East between Globalization, Human "Agency", and Europe’, *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 77, No. 1, January, 2001, p. 142

factors. It can be claimed that the rentier state theory contains similar elements of orientalism.

One of the components of orientalism is essentialism. A critical reading of the rentier state literature demonstrates that the states in these regions are regarded as products of certain cultural, racial traits or other characteristics –by neglecting the effect of production relations on these characteristics- such as rentier economies that are claimed to be related with the essence of those political formations.¹⁶⁶ Explaining social, political and economic structures of those political formations with reference to the essence of those societies refuses the potential for change and legitimizes certain policies. Beblawi’s “rentier mentality” conceptualization is an example of this understanding. As it is indicated before, Beblawi claims that in rentier states citizens do not need to work for income and they are only the economic beneficiaries of rents. As a result of this, as he suggest, the causation between work and reward does not exist in these societies.¹⁶⁷ In other words, citizens turn out to be unproductive because they get used to earn without working. By this way, Beblawi correlates underdeveloped economies of those states with the unproductiveness of the population which is due to the oil rents that they utilize. In short, rentier states are unproductive, according to him, because people of those states are lazy which is caused by the oil revenues. Therefore, Beblawi is able to claim that if oil revenues decrease the fragile economies of those states may break.

¹⁶⁶ Mitchell, T. ‘Orientalism and the Exhibitionary Order’, in N. Mirzoeff (ed), *The Visual Culture Reader*, New York: Routledge, p.294

¹⁶⁷ Beblawi, H. “The Rentier State in the Arab World”, in G. Luciani (ed.) *The Arab State* , Kent: Routledge, 1990, P.88

While Okruhlik rejects “rentier mentality” thesis, she reproduces the orientalist discourse by analyzing non-production based economies of the rentier states as a result of the unpredictable behaviors of the princes.¹⁶⁸ In other words, she claims that it is not the rentier mentality that prevents investors to invest but the unpredictable economic environment caused by the princes. This is another orientalist perspective through which the rulers are attributed the characteristic of irrationality. In some texts written within rentier state literature the absence of the civil society is even reflected as a consequence of irrational authoritarian rules of the rulers:

“It is certainly true that Gulf monarchs have shown a considerable antipathy to organized groups, even groups with most apparently apolitical intentions.”¹⁶⁹

In this statement the absence of civil society is perceived as a consequence of the antipathy of the rulers. Rentier state theory through such discourse tends to link every structure of those political formations to the will of the ruler. For example, one of the main claims of the rentier state literature is that rulers are unwilling to diversify the economy because of the rentier wealth. According to those scholars, the lazy rulers are get used to earn without working and as a result of this, the economy turns out to be highly fragile. This orientalist thinking of rentier state comes up to the conclusion that rentier states, because of their fragile economies, may be easily turned into failed states in case of depression in oil prices.

¹⁶⁸ Okruhlik, G. Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No.3, April, 1999, P. 309

¹⁶⁹ Crystal, J. ‘Civil Society in the Arabian Gulf’, in Norton, A. R. (ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Leiden: Brill, 1994, p. 259

Oil revenues decrease rulers need for taxes and as a result of this, according to the rentier state theory, a well established bureaucratic apparatus is not developed. Therefore, there is a high possibility that these states may become ineffective states. However, unlike failed states, the devastative effects of these ineffective states are not seen because of the oil wealth. As a result of this, the rentier state theorists by blaming the irrational rulers and “rentier mentalities” claim that if any transformation is going to be experienced in rentier states, it will not be towards a modern civilization but it will be towards the same “failed” destiny.

Moreover, rentier states are presented as exhibiting the potential for internal conflict as failed states experiences. As it is indicated before, Luciani claims that rentier states hesitate to use national myths and employ segmentary politics in order to prevent people to have a say on the distribution process.¹⁷⁰ Speaking within such a discourse, an internal conflict may easily emerge within these atomistic units of the society. Rentier state theory claims that it is the rentier wealth that holds society together. Therefore, in case of a decrease in oil wealth it is claimed that the segmentary politics may result in a civil conflict which is one of the main traits of “failed states”.

Another characteristic of the orientalist thinking is the presentation of the orient through antilogies in order to legitimize the imperialist policies. When rentier state literature analyzed in detail, it is seen that these societies are presented as static because of some embedded characteristics, contrary to the developing Western societies. This was seen in Luciani’s claim that democracy is not a problem in

¹⁷⁰ Luciani, G. “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework”, in G. Luciani (ed.) *The Arab State*, Kent: Routledge, 1990, P.77

rentier states, or what he calls as allocation states. Moreover, this static character of the rentier states is clearly attributed to the nature of these societies itself. For example, Luciani claims that even the individuals are uncomfortable from the expenditure policies they will try to maneuver within the existing setup instead of seeking alliance with other in order to transform the political and social dynamics.

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To sum up, as rogue state and failed state literatures, rentier state theory also accommodates traces of orientalist thinking. The orientalist discourse may be seen in their concentration on cultural and historical traits of those social organizations. They mainly focus on certain attributed essences to those states and explain their characteristics through referencing those essential characteristics. By this way, they refuse the potential for change in those societies. Moreover, similar to the failed and rogue state literatures, rentier state theory also attributes certain inferior characteristics to the rulers of those states. In general, rentier state theory by attributing certain embedded/unchanged characteristics towards these states and by explaining social reality from such a perspective reproduces the orientalist discourse. The reproduction of the orientalist discourse within rentier state literatures legitimizes certain policies towards those states.

3.2.2. Orientalist Discourse in Failed State Literature

Similar to the rentier state literature, the failed state theory also exhibits certain elements of orientalist thinking. As indicated before, such a perspective attributes certain characteristics to these political organizations and explains the

¹⁷¹ Ibid. P.76

political, economic and social structures of those states as a consequence of these characteristics.

Failed state theory regards the reason of the failure as a consequence of the ineffective governance of the rulers; and therefore labels those states as ill-governed states.¹⁷² The rulers of those political formations are characterized as being incapable of exercising power in any meaningful way.¹⁷³ Some scholars even go further and label the rulers as poor, arbitrary, absent-minded creations.¹⁷⁴ Their inability to take effective decisions and exercise power is seen as the biggest cause of state failure:

“Destructive decisions by individual leaders have almost paved the way to state failure...These rulers were personally greedy, but as predatory patrimonialists they also licensed and sponsored the avarice of others, thus preordaining the destruction of state.”¹⁷⁵

The irrational rulers are thought to use the resources of those states ineffectively and for their personal luxuries. Therefore, the cause of the failure is attributed to either corruption or the leadership errors. Both of these claims can openly be seen in Rotberg’s two different statements on the cause of state failure:

¹⁷² Rotberg, R. I., ‘The New Nature of Nation-State Failure’, *Washington Quarterly*, 25: 3, Summer 2002, p.96

¹⁷³ Gros, J. ‘Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.17, No.3, 1996, p.458

¹⁷⁴ Rotberg, R. I., ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.19

¹⁷⁵ Rotberg, R. I. ‘Failed Sates in a World of Terror’, *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, p. 128

“Corrupt despots drive grandly down city boulevards in motorcades, commandeer commercial aircraft for foreign excursions, and put their faces prominently on the local currency and on oversize photographs in public places.”¹⁷⁶

“It is the leadership errors across history have destroyed states for personal gain; in the contemporary era, leadership mistakes continue to erode fragile polities in Africa, and Oceania that already operate on the cusp of failure.”¹⁷⁷

As seen above, the failed states are regarded as being deemed to fail because of either corruption or bad planning choices. Some scholars also put forward ideological dogmas.¹⁷⁸ Whatever these stands prioritize, they share a common characteristic which neglects the structural causes and views of failure seeing it as mainly man-made. They view the process of the failure as a consequence of political will, or reluctance, as well as neglect.¹⁷⁹ For example, Rotberg claims that state failure has no relation with geographical environmental or external causes. He insists that it is the leadership decision and failures that destroy the state and weaken the polities.¹⁸⁰ Carment and Gros also follows a similar argument and claim

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 129

¹⁷⁷ Rotberg, R. I., ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.22

¹⁷⁸ Ignatieff, M., ‘Intervention and State Dailure’, *Dissent Magazine*, Winter 2012, viewed April 9, 2012, <<http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=641> >

¹⁷⁹ Rotberg, R. I., ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.14

¹⁸⁰ Rotberg, R. I., ‘The New Nature of Nation-State Failure’, *Washington Quarterly*, 25: 3, Summer 2002, p.93

that it is the reluctance of the public authorities that cause the break of what Hobbes long ago called the social contract.¹⁸¹

Since one of the indicators of the state failure is transformation of those territories to the safe heavens for terrorists, failed state literature also attributes this to the ineffective rulers. As Rotberg mentions:

“In Afganistan, Gulbuddin Hakmatyar and Burrhan ul-din Rabani tried to prevent Afghans other than their own Pashtun and Tajik fellow nationals from sharing the perquisites of governance, their narrowly focused, self-enriching decisions enabled the Taliban to follow them in triumph and Afghanistan to descend into all-out terror.”¹⁸²

As state failure is regarded as a consequence of the irrational, incapable and self-enriching rulers, the solution to such failure is presented as building visionary leadership. The orientalist thinking, while presenting the “East” as irrational and incapable by building a contradiction with “West”, claims that the West is rational and visionary. Therefore, what they suggest for preventing failure is the establishment of visionary leadership¹⁸³ which will, of course, be built by the Westerners.

¹⁸¹ Carment, D. ‘Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy’, *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.415

¹⁸² Rotberg, R. I., ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.23

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.19

Moreover, contrary to the Western societies which are seen as civilized and modern, societies of failed states are regarded as irrational, violent and traditional. The cause of the violence in those cases are just seen as the activities of teenage fighters that are triggered by not any legitimate cause but instead, by boredom, the intoxicating effects of local stimulants, and the emotional immaturity.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, failed states are constantly labeled as uncivilized political communities and the failure is associated with population growth. This is seen as a consequence of those states' inability to be turned into the modern nations. As Gros mentioned in his definition of anaemic states:

“States may also be anaemic because the engines of modernity were never put in place; as a result, as population growth puts increasing demands on archaic structures, state agents are in no position to assert effective control.”¹⁸⁵

What these entire discourses share is that they search the reasons of failure in the traits embedded in those local cultures such as internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, inability, incapability, uncivilized population, incapability to be modern and so on.¹⁸⁶ Such an understanding opens the debate of “blaming the victim” within the failed state theory. The concept of blaming the victim refers to the situation in which failed states are condemned for their population and rulers for their failure. Viewing the causes of failure as a

¹⁸⁴ Gros, J. ‘Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.17, No.3, 1996, p.459

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p.459

¹⁸⁶ Rotberg, R. I., ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.4

consequence of certain traits embedded in those societies inevitably results in an orientalist understanding. Moreover, the consequence of blaming the victim leads to the legitimization of outside intervention in those cases. As Khor mentioned:

“The expanded theory of the failed states not only puts the blame onto the country concerned, but also opens the way to political even military intervention in many countries.”¹⁸⁷

3.2.3. Orientalist Discourse in Rogue State Literature

A critical reading of the rogue state literature indicates that culture is taken as an independent variable in explaining political antagonisms and the rogue behavior. It can be seen that an intrinsic cultural inferiority is attributed to the societies or rulers of those states and therefore calls to “rational” bodies to cease those irrational activities is made.

The policies conducted by the rogue states and their refusal of international norms are associated with the irrational rulers of those states.¹⁸⁸ These rulers are perceived as having incompatible goals because they do not realize their power capabilities and pursue adventurist policies. As a result of this, they are accused of being “irrational”. As O’Reilly mentioned,

¹⁸⁷ Khor, M., ‘Failed States Theory can cause Global Anarchy’, *Third World Network*, March 2002, viewed April 12, 2012, < <http://www.twinside.org.sg/title/et0125.htm> >

¹⁸⁸ Bueno de Mesquita, B. *Principles of International Politics: People’s Power, Preferences and Perceptions*, Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010 p. 84-88

“...the rogue image appears to combine the perceptions of the target state having incompatible goals, as having an inferior culture, and as having lesser power capabilities...

...Accordingly, perceptions of the nature of governance within a rogue state inform views held by decision makers as to matters of legitimacy, rationality and respect for the rule of law. As one commentator has offered, the labeling of a rogue state is “a certificate of political insanity”. These perceived in governing at the domestic level are transferred to the approach rogue states take toward the international system.”¹⁸⁹

Anthony Lake also presented a similar perspective when he claims that the rulers of those states in order to promote their radical ideologies pursue adventurist policies, violate human rights and control their power through coercion.¹⁹⁰ Within that discourse the pursuing of WMD and refusing international norms are perceived as indicators of irrationality. As Caprioli and Trumbore mention, the rogue state literature maintains that these states are a threat to the security of globe because of three reasons (apart from WMD and terrorism): they are more likely to be involved in militarized disputes than nonrogue ones; when involved in a militarized dispute, rogue states are more likely to initiate militarized action than nonrogues; when involved in a violent militarized interstate dispute, rogue states are more likely to use force first than nonrogues.¹⁹¹ Even though the statistical work on the military

¹⁸⁹ O’Reilly, K.P. “Perceiving Rogue States: The Use of the “Rogue State” Concept by U.S. Foreign Policy Elite”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol.3, Issue.4, 2007, p.297

¹⁹⁰ Lake, A., ‘Confronting Backlash States’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No.2, March/April 1994, p. 45

¹⁹¹Caprioli M., Trumbore P. F., ‘Rhetoric versus Reality: Rogue States in Interstate Conflict’, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No.5, October 2005, p.770-791

conflicts between 1980 and 2001 produced by Caprioli and Trumbore proves the opposite, rogue states are still viewed as willing to use military means by the rogue state literature because of their irrational rulers who are claimed to be willing to use force in any occasion.

Another indicator of labeling rogue states by referencing their culture is the perception that rogue states are culturally inferior. This characteristic of the rogue state literature also mentioned by Hoyt:

“Culturally the rogues are seen as inferior. Commonly described as lacking principles and morals, such states are seen as “renegades” or “outlaws”. They also seen as having no respect for international system, preferring instead to disrupt what exists.”¹⁹²

Such a view is openly a reflection of the orientalist thinking. While rogue states are associated with irrationality, immaturity, apathy and immobility West is presented as holder of the virtues of ration, morality and development and guardian of these characteristics. Therefore, it is seen as a moral duty of the “civilized” to civilize the others. As it is indicated above, rogue state literature attributes the rogue behavior to the “irrationality” of those states’ rulers. The inevitable consequence of such an understanding is to suggest a rational rule to these states in order to stop the rogue behavior. Since those societies are seen as irrational, the rationality needs to be built by the rational West. Moreover, as it is indicated above, rogue state literature takes the culture to the center of its analysis and declares societies of

¹⁹² Hoyt, P.D, “The Rogue State Image in American Foreign Policy”, *Global Society*, Vol. 14, No.2, 2000, p. 308

rogue states as culturally inferior. West, on the other hand, is regarded as culturally and intellectually superior. As Hoyt mentions,

“The perception of inferior culture within rogue states lessens faith in negotiation strategies and confidence-building measures as a means to solve disputes with rogues. Therefore less rely in diplomacy. Force is seen as appropriate and feasible.”¹⁹³

It can be concluded that rogue state discourse contents elements of orientalism and reproduces its claims. The orientalist view of the rogue state structure underlines another factor of that literature –the civil society/state dichotomy also makes a similar conclusion- which is explaining the rogue behavior with certain reference to internal behavior having external consequences and solutions.

¹⁹³ Hoyt, P.D, “The Rogue State Image in American Foreign Policy”, *Global Society*, Vol. 14, No.2, 2000, p. 308

CHAPTER III

4. FUNCTIONAL TERMS LEGITIMIZING CERTAIN HISTORICAL PRACTICES?

4.1. The Three Paths

The previous chapters have underlined that all three literatures aim mainly to define the different. They try to analyze what they claim as the different structures of rentier, failed and rogue states.

These literatures by concentrating on the absence of civil society and strengthening that vision through the orientalist discourse aim to explain these third world states or- applying Badiou's analysis- the "other". Even though respect to otherness is one of the main discourses of the liberal thinking, regarding the practical suggestions of these theories, which will be analyzed in detail below, it is seen that differences are not really allowed. Badiou claims that suspicions on the respect for differences emerge as it is seen that the ones who declare themselves as the disciples of diversity are terrified from the differences that are standing lively. He maintains that the "other" is respected and accepted only if it is a "good" other- which really means that if the "other" is similar to "us". In other words, the different is respected only if it is the supporter of parliamentary democracy, free market, freedom of speech, environmental protection, feminism etc. Therefore, respect to differences and human morality defines an identity/similarity. Differences

are accepted if it is within the scope of this identity which is totally the Western identity. The other is only accepted by focusing on its willingness to be integrated and its limits of integration. Consequently, ethical ideology maintains: “Become like me and I will respect your difference”.¹⁹⁴

Another set of argument that can be concluded above is the “negation”. These theories do not only define the “different” but also “negate” them. As the previous chapters proved all three theories defined the structures of those states with specific references such as, being undemocratic and authoritarian, lack of private sphere, uncivilized, unable to develop, no respect for human rights, so on. This can be termed as the “negation of the different”. Through the negation, these states were mentioned as the outsiders of the international system; they are referred as the rogues out-lawed or failed political units of the state system.

Another common set of interrelated claims in these literatures is the refusal of the potential for development and change in those political organizations by their own internal dynamics. This was the main argument that can be concluded from the analysis of the previous chapter which has focused on the state-civil society antagonism and orientalist discourses in these literatures. All these theories search for a Western type of civil society in those social formations and they claim that either because of the authoritarian rulers or breach of social contract or lack of states’ need for taxes, the civil society has not developed in these political organizations. Absence of the civil society is claimed to prevent the existence of a private sphere which can limit the activities of the rulers. Moreover, the liberal logic

¹⁹⁴ Badiou, A. *Etik: Kötülük Kavrayışı Üzerine Bir Deneme*, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2006, P. 38

attributes a role of emancipation to the private sphere and absence of it is, therefore, referred to the absence of change in these states by their internal dynamics.

The orientalist discourse also serves to support the same argument. Again as mentioned in the previous chapter, these social organizations are labeled as uncivilized, incapable to develop, undemocratic, authoritarian, irrational etc. Such categorizations are made on the basis of certain cultural traits embedded in those societies. In other words, these societies are attributed certain traits, whose opposites are claimed to be possessed by the West, and because of those embedded characteristics it is claimed that these societies may never become liberal democratic states by the keep of their own internal dynamics. The orientalist discourse views those internal dynamics as deficient to create a change in those societies which is necessary for the transformation of those political organizations in to modern civilizations and effective states.

This is not to say that these social formations do not exhibit any structural differences from the Western capitalist states. What it is in fact underlined is that social phenomena do not have their own tongues. They cannot talk. It is important to understand how the facts are interpreted. The responses to the questions change the perception, as a result of which certain policies are made legitimate. All these theories' perception of the differences in those societies and their concentration on certain factors as the cause of those differences legitimize certain historical practices.

As it can be concluded above all these theories follow three paths in their analysis: defining the different, negating the different and refusing the internal

potential for change. This sets the ground for the transformation of these states through outside intervention, even the degree and methods of intervention varies. They do this by presenting the difference as a deficiency and attributing the differences to the internal causes. Therefore, the structures of those societies are seen as internal problems having universal consequence that can only be solved through external mechanisms. The following section aims to show different solutions proposed to fix these deficiencies. It will be claimed that the rogue state and failed state literatures propose humanitarian and military interventions in those states. Rentier state theory, on the other hand, presents a difference among those literatures since it is developed in the Cold-War context. However, in the end it will be showed that this theory also calls for an external intervention since those states are claimed to be undemocratic and never be able to turn to democracy by its own internal dynamics. Actually the rentier state theory views a potential for change in those cases if the oil prices decrease. However, this change will not be through a modern civilization. It is regarded that these states might become failed states because of their fragile economies. Therefore, an outside intervention might be also needed to transform them. In the end, it will be claimed that these state theories are functional concepts that legitimize certain historical practices which are mainly interventionist.

4.2. Rentier States: From Industrialization to Democracy Promotion Model of Development, A Case of Preventive Intervention

Rentier state theory, unlike failed and rogue state literatures, was first developed during the Cold War years. As analyzed before, both the failed state and the rogue state literatures contain certain elements that reflect the general political

and economic structures of the post-Cold War world. Therefore, while certain types of similarities exist between the rentier state literature and the other state theories, rentier state literature needs to be analyzed within a different context in order to capture how it opens the way for an outside intervention for the transformation of those political formations.

During the Cold War years the development was associated with industrialization. However, as the Cold War came to an end, this understanding has been replaced with a new perspective. As it will be indicated in failed state and rogue state literatures, one of the main discourses of the post-Cold War period is democracy. Since the end of Cold War has been celebrated by some as the end of ideologies and victory of democracies,¹⁹⁵ democracy promotion is started to be main strategy in dealing problems that has emerged out of underdevelopment.

During the Cold War years, no link was established between democracy and development. On the contrary, some scholars, such as Huntington and Nelson,¹⁹⁶ claimed that development would be prevented by democracy since regimes should take into consideration the popular demands and pursue populist measures that were inimical to such economic growth. However, by the end of the Cold War, development has started to be regarded in a different way. The influence of the new practices after the demise of the Soviet Union has added a new dimension to the understanding of development. Development is no more associated only with poverty, environmental degradation or gender inequality; it is also associated with

¹⁹⁵ See Fukuyama F., *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, 1992

¹⁹⁶ Huntington, S., Nelson, J., *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976

democracy, democracy enhancing and peace building. One of the consequences of such an understanding is that democracy has turned out to be a component of the interventions in the Third World in order to maintain development in those states.¹⁹⁷

As Rajagopal mentioned:

“The articulation of an intricate nexus between peace, democracy and development has become a central feature of international interventions in the Third World...In other words, instead of understanding post-Cold War peace operations and the turn to democratization as merely functional responses to a chaotic post-Cold War world, I suggest that it might be more useful to understand them from a perspective of political economy as interventions that aim to incorporate the Third World into the modern world.”¹⁹⁸

There is also another layer included to this new understanding of development. It is started to be claimed that not only development and democracy are related but also peace is an important variable in the development process. This relation between democracy, peace and development is built in such way that peace becomes necessary for the functioning of democracy and development, whereas a culture of democracy is likely to lead peace. Democracy enables development to succeed through its participatory methods, whereas development encourages the stakes that a community has in defending its autonomy.¹⁹⁹ In other words, now it is regarded that peace is a prerequisite for development, and democracy is essential if development is to succeed over the long term. Civil society has also been regarded

¹⁹⁷ Rajagopal, B, *International law from below: development, social movements, and Third World resistance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.138

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, p.137

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, p.143

as an important component of this. It is suggested that greater participation of civil society would lead to democracy and development.²⁰⁰ The logic behind this is that voice²⁰¹, openness and transparency promote long term development.²⁰² This understanding has made democracy as the main discourse of social transformations in the Third World.²⁰³ As a result of this, a new political culture of legitimacy has emerged in the form of human rights, democracy and peace that has had tremendous implications for the notions of sovereignty and autonomy.²⁰⁴

The changes mentioned above may also be seen in the literature of rentier states which, in turn, enable us to conclude that rentier state is a functional term that legitimize certain historical practices. The change in the discourse of development from industry based understanding to democracy-centered analysis can be seen also in the rentier state literature. The first wave of the rentier state literature has concentrated on the inability of those political organizations to diversify their economic activities. Their main concentration has been the effect of oil wealth on the development of industry. For example, Mahdavy, in his article in which he analyzes the problems of economic development in the rentier states, claims that huge amounts of rents leaking to rentier states create sufficient means to finance

²⁰⁰ Ibid, p.150

²⁰¹ Hirschman, A.O., *Exit, Voice, Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970

²⁰² Stiglitz, J., 'Participation and Development: Perspectives from the Comprehensive Development Paradigm', *Review of Development Economics*, (6)2, 2002, p.164

²⁰³ Rajagopal, B, *International law from below: development, social movements, and Third World resistance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.136

²⁰⁴ Ibid, p.135

their budget and economy which makes the development of industry unnecessary. It is claimed that the need for the development of the industry in these cases will not emerge until there emerges a decrease in the oil revenues.²⁰⁵ Therefore, these states are deemed to be underdeveloped. However, the evolution of development from industry-based understanding to a democracy-based one has impact on the concerns of the rentier state theory. Starting with the second wave of rentier state theory which emerged in the early 1990s, the main concentration of the theory has become the problem of democracy in rentier states rather than industrialization. The new scholars of rentier state theory have started to deal with the effect of oil on the regime type and institutional mechanisms of those states and their main concern has been the lack of democracy in those cases. For instance, Luciani claims that democracy is not a problem in the allocation state.²⁰⁶ It is claimed that since in rentier states, state does not need to tax its population to finance its economy there emerges no debate on democracy. In other words, studies of rentier states argue that democracy is unlikely or even impossible without taxation, which has a crucial role in the emergence of representation and democracy in the European history.²⁰⁷ The same argument is made by Okruhlik who is one of the members of the third wave of the rentier state theory. She claims that in rentier states lack of the need for taxes

²⁰⁵ Mahdavy, H., 'The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in the Rentier States: The Case of Iran', in M. A. Cook (ed.) *Studies in the Economic History of Middle East*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 432

²⁰⁶ Luciani, G. "Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework", in G. Luciani (ed.) *The Arab State*, Kent: Routledge, 1990, p.71

²⁰⁷ Herb, M., 'No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development, and Democracy', *Comparative Politics*, Vol.37, No.3, April, 2005, p.297

creates the issue of no representation without taxation.²⁰⁸ Moreover, Okruhlik claims that oil rents enable to maneuver in the times of the rise of opposition which enables continuation of undemocratic rules.²⁰⁹ Later, the discourse of democracy is also used by the revisionist literature of the rentier states in their analysis of the underdevelopment of those cases. For example, Smith claims that the oil wealth enables the survival of the durable authoritarian regimes which in return decreases the possibility of democracy.²¹⁰ In short, what rentier state theory has started to underline after the end of Cold War, as Micheal Ross called, is the thesis of “oil hurts democracy”.²¹¹

This analysis suggests that during the Cold War years since development used to be associated with industrialization, the ‘civilizing mission’ of the Western powers aimed to develop the industry in the Third World states. However, the end of the Cold War has replaced the discourse of industrialization with the discourses of democracy and peace. Therefore, the interventions to the Third World states have been now attributed to the aims of democracy promotion. The change in the concentration of rentier state literature from lack of industry to lack of democracy provides the basis to claim that this literature has also legitimized certain historical practices. The difference is negated by attributing certain types of deficiencies to these political formations. As a result, outside powers have been given the

²⁰⁸ Okruhlik, G. ‘Rentier Wealth, Unruly, Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States, *Comperative Politics*, Vol. 31, No.3, April 1999, p.296

²⁰⁹ Ibid, p.297

²¹⁰ Smith, B. *Hard Times in the Lands of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia*, London: Cornell University Press, 2007, p.27-37

²¹¹ Michael L. Ross, ‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy?’, *World Politics*, 53, April 2001, p.356-57.

responsibility to transform these states to modern civilized nations which in turn is thought to bring peace and stability to the world.

The second line that may show how rentier state theory enables the intervention of outside powers to those states through “negating the different” may be traced in their claim that rentier states may easily become failed states. As it is indicated in the failed state section, weak state is one of the categories of the failed state which is prone to failure. Rentier states were also categorized as weak states which has a fragile authoritarian regime.²¹²

The reason of rentier states to be weak is associated with its highly dependent economy on oil rents. It is claimed that oil revenues have prevented those states to diversify their economic functions and development of the industry. It is claimed that rents leaking to those states have enabled them to finance their budget without developing extraction capacities.²¹³ However, if oil revenues decrease, these states will need to turn to domestic extraction. Since there is no developed extractive capacities that may be built through institutional mechanisms, any decrease in oil prices may lead to regime instability and state failure. As Schwarz mentions:

“Rentier States in the oil-rich Middle East rely on oil rents and not on domestic sources of taxation. Their non-tax revenue base hinders an active engagement with their citizens and society, as taxation invariably provokes demands for political rights. The resulting state structures in the Arab Middle East are therefore largely divorced from society; they are not strong enough to actively cope with societal

²¹² Smith, B. *Hard Times in the Lands of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia*, London: Cornell University Press, 2007, p.1-9

²¹³ See Mahdavy 1970 and Chaudry 1994

demands and show their weakness in times of crises. In the absence of effective state structures, rentier states may turn into failed states if they engage in wars, as evidenced recently in the case of Iraq.”²¹⁴

It is claimed that since every structure is encircled around the oil revenues, in rentier states institutional mechanisms are inflexible, which may result in stagnation in the times of crisis. Therefore, weak rentier states may easily become failed states.

It is also claimed that rentier states are able to get legitimacy and provide their stability through oil wealth.²¹⁵ As Beblawi claims, in rentier states a question of legitimacy never rises because loyalty and allegiance of population is bought by distributing favors and benefits of rents.²¹⁶ Crystal also presents a similar perspective and claims that the legitimacy and stability of the rentier states are gained not only as the merchant classes are bought off by the state, but also through the distributive policies and strengthening institutional mechanisms with the funds provided by the oil wealth.²¹⁷ These claims are the reflection of ‘rents bring stability thesis.’ In short, what these perspectives suggest is that rentier states have fragile economic and political structures because every institutional set up is arranged in a

²¹⁴ Schwarz, R., ‘From Rentier State to Failed State : War and the De-Formation of the State in Iraq’, *A Contrario*, Vol. 5, 2008/1, 2008, p.102

²¹⁵ Luciani, G. “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework”, in G. Luciani (ed.) *The Arab State*, Kent: Routledge, 1990, p.90

²¹⁶ Beblawi, H. “The Rentier State in the Arab World”, in G. Luciani (ed.) *The Arab State*, Kent: Routledge, 1990, p.87-89

²¹⁷ Crystal, J., ‘Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar’, *Comparative Politics*, Vol.21, No.4, July, 1989, p.431

dependent way to oil wealth, therefore, these weak states may easily experience failure if oil revenues decrease.

Another claim of rentier state theory that indicates that these states may easily become failed states is the dominance of traditional segmentary politics in those political organizations. As Luciani mentions, rentier states are patrimonial non-national states that avoid any national myth in order to restrict the number of people who have a say in the allocation process.²¹⁸ Therefore, these states are perceived as being prone to internal conflict and violence which is one of the main characteristics of the failed states.

This analysis of the rentier states opens the way for a ‘preventive intervention’ in those states in order to prevent their failure. Regarding the new understanding of the failed states as the cause of global problems such as refugee and terrorism, one of the main dynamics of new political conduction is the intervention in those cases before they face failure. Since rentier states are seen as prone to such failure, it may be claimed that rentier state literature legitimizes such actions by describing the different structures of those states, and then negating those difference.

It can be concluded that rogue state, failed state and rentier state literatures have aimed to define different structures of those states. They not only define the different but also negate it through attributing certain inferior characteristics to those political organizations. Moreover, any transformation of those states through the internal dynamics is seen as impossible. Therefore, an outside intervention is

²¹⁸ Luciani, G. “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework”, in G. Luciani (ed.) *The Arab State*, Kent: Routledgeü, 1990, p.77

seen as inevitable to change the fragile structures of those states. The basis of such claim has been built through the orientalist discourse in such theories and presupposition of state-civil society antagonism. This path may also be seen in rentier state literature.

Luciani, with his presupposition of state-civil society antagonism and the absence of the latter in rentier states, claims that the individuals who feel uncomfortable due to the unequal distribution of rents may not transform their discomfort to a collective movement to change the institutional set up of the state.²¹⁹ This understanding openly refuses any potentiality of change in those states through internal dynamics. Lack of political parties, empowerment of state at the expense of civil society with the revenues of oil,²²⁰ lack of trade unions, lack of free presses and elected bodies²²¹ are all seen as an obstacle in the establishment of a civil society that has an emancipating role and will provide the basis for the transformation through institutional mechanisms.

Another set of arguments in rentier state theory that refuses the potential for change through internal mechanisms may be seen in the orientalist discourse. As it is indicated in the previous chapter, the rentier state literature defines these societies as exceptional and unlikely to develop democratic institutions because of cultural

²¹⁹ Ibid. p. 76

²²⁰ Crystal, J, 'Civil Society in the Arabian Gulf', in A. R. Norton (ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Leiden: Brill, 1994, p.259

²²¹ Anthony J. D. *Arab States of the lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum*, Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1975, p. 220

factors embedded in them.²²² Attributing the economic structures of those states to rentier mentalities²²³ or unpredictable behaviors of the irrational rulers,²²⁴ who have antipathy to organized groups²²⁵ and who are unwilling to diversify the economy, also leads to the same aim. In short, through the orientalist discourse, rentier states are represented as static that do not contain any internal dynamic that will transform them to the modern civilized nations.

To sum up, this section has claimed that rentier state literature legitimizes certain historical practices. This may be seen in the change of the understanding of the development. As it is indicated, the development was used to be considered as an industrialization problem; and this understanding has changed by perceiving it as a matter of democracy. This change in the notion of development is also reflected in the rentier state literature. Moreover, by perceiving rentier states as weak states that is prone to failure and refusal of any potentiality of change through internal mechanisms openly calls for preventive or other methods of intervention in those cases. In other words, rentier state theory legitimizes intervention in those states which in turn enables us to label rentier state conceptualization as an operational term that legitimizes certain historical practices.

²²² Nonneman, G. 'Rentiers and Autocrats, Monarchs and Democrats, State and Society: The Middle East between Globalization, Human "Agency", and Europe', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 77, No. 1, January, 2001, p. 142

²²³ Beblawi, H. "The Rentier State in the Arab World", in G. Luciani (ed.) *The Arab State*, Kent: Routledge, 1990, P.88

²²⁴ Okruhlik, G. Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No.3, April, 1999, P. 309

²²⁵ Crystal, J. 'Civil Society in the Arabian Gulf', in Norton, A. R. (ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Leiden: Brill, 1994, p. 259

4.3. Failed States: From Humanitarian to Military Intervention

As it was mentioned above, how this theories build their analysis is crucial since it affects the political process. Failed state literature's analysis of the state type in those cases legitimizes outside intervention in these states. But this time, contrary to the rogue state literature, this intervention is labeled as humanitarian. This suggestion of intervention is indicative on where the failed state literature searches for the causes of the failure.

As mentioned both before in the analysis of state-civil society antagonism and orientalist thinking of the failed state theory, scholars search the reason of the failure in the internal structures which are claimed to be embedded in those societies. Therefore, failure is considered as having internal roots and a result of internal deficiencies. For example Gros mentions five causes of state failure all of which are internal causes: economic malperformance, lack of social synergy, authoritarianism, militarism and environmental degradation caused by population growth.²²⁶ As seen all sources of state failure are defined as internal ones.

Moreover, through the orientalist discourse in failed state literatures, the conflict and state failure are seen as consequences of cultural traits. For example, the cause of violence is perceived as an irrational activity of the teenagers²²⁷ or the lack of state activity is seen as a consequence of irrational ruler's policies. Because

²²⁶ Gros, J. 'Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.17, No.3, 1996, p.462

²²⁷ Ibid., p.459

of such characteristics attributed to these societies possibility of democracy is also refused. As Gros mentioned,

“As soon as there is a democratic opening, however, ‘oppressed’ communities may begin to insist not only on greater autonomy, but outright break-up from erstwhile state.”²²⁸

Furthermore, beyond the other internal crises, humanitarian disasters were seen as having internal causes. It is said that the poor leadership in the Third World caused these human atrocities. In short, governments are blamed not only for their inability to prevent the human rights abuses but also for initiating these abuses.²²⁹

Such an understanding reproduces blaming the victim thesis.²³⁰ Jones describes blaming the victim as the explanation of state failure as a consequence of states’ own choices and commitments. She suggests that viewing states as isolated and externally related units results in putting the blame of failure on the victim. Such a perception neglects the global class relations and takes states responsible for their own failure. As Richardson underlines, blaming the victim is like free market ideology. As free market ideology holds the poor individually responsible for their poverty due to their inability to take advantage of the available opportunities; failed state literature blame the state for its inability to take advantage of opportunities

²²⁸ Ibid., p.458

²²⁹ Teson, F. R., ‘Collective Humanitarian Intervention’, *17 University of Michigan Law School Journal*, 1996, p. 342

²³⁰ Jones, B.G. (2004) “‘Failed States’: An Ideology of the Imperialism of Our Time’, Paper presented at ‘BISA 2004 Conference’, 20-22 December 2004, University of Warwick

which in turn result in the failure of those states.²³¹ Majority of the failed state theorists search for the embedded internal factors for the cause of state failure. Therefore, the discourse of blaming the victim is valid for the failed state literature. Gros recognizes this openly in the following:

“Some readers might conclude that by focusing on internal causes exclusively the author is putting the blame entirely on the people of failed states.”²³²

The result of blaming the victim is the legitimization of outside intervention in these societies. As Khor also indicates:

“The expanded theory of the failed states not only puts the blame onto the country concerned, but also opens the way to political even military intervention in many countries.”²³³

Since all causes of state failure is thought to be embedded in the state concerned, remedying the situation through internal means becomes impossible. Therefore, an outside intervention is legitimated in order to stop the sufferings. This outside intervention is shown as project of empowering the weak rather than domination of it.²³⁴ Even though some failed state scholars concentrate to external

²³¹ Richardson, H. J., ‘Failed States, Self-Determination and Preventive Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and Democratic Expectations’, *Temple International & Comparative Law Journal*, Vol. 10, 1994, p. 21

²³² Gros, J. ‘Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.17, No.3, 1996, p.465

²³³ Khor, M., ‘Failed States Theory can cause Global Anarchy’, *Third World Network*, March 2002, viewed April 12, 2012, <<http://www.twinside.org.sg/title/et0125.htm>>

²³⁴ Chandler, D., ‘The Other-Regarding Ethics of the “Empire in Denial”’, in Chandler D., and Heins V. (eds), *Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: Pitfalls, Possibilities and Paradoxes*, 2007, p.162

factors, they still call for an outside intervention because they blame decolonization as the cause of the failure:

“The current collapse has its roots in the vast proliferation of nation-states, especially in Africa and Asia, since the end of World War II... The idea then, that states could fail- that they could be simply unable to function as independent entities- was anathema to the *raison d’être* of decolonization and offensive to the notion of self-determination. New states might be poor, it was thought, but they would hold their own by virtue of being independent.”²³⁵

It may not be wrong to claim that Hamilton maintains a similar perspective on the state failure even he aims to criticize colonization. He says that, since those states are Western constructs they were unable to function properly.²³⁶ Therefore, he blames decolonization for the cause of failure. The consequence of such an analysis becomes interestingly a call for returning back to colonialism.²³⁷

Another discourse of the failed state literature that calls for outside intervention is the claim that failed states lack of civil society, the previous chapter has showed, due to this lack, the failed state literature views these societies incapable of turning into democratic states. Since there is no means to establish the civil society through internal means the responsibility is given to outside powers:

²³⁵ Helman, G. B. & Ratner S. R, ‘Saving Failed States’, *Foreign Policy*, No.99, Winter, 1992-1993, p.3-4

²³⁶ Hamilton, A., ‘The Idea of the Nation State is Fatally Flawed’, *The Independent*, 18 August 2004, viewed April 24, 2012 < <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/adrian-hamilton/the-idea-of-the-nation-state-is-fatally-flawed-6163498.html>>

²³⁷ Ptaff, W. ‘A New Colonialism? Europe Must Go Back into Africa’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1, January- February, 1995, p.2-6

“The United Nations should also foster democratic institutions and help build elements of a civil society. Thus, it might help draft a constitution, organize free elections, or encourage NGOs that are working to strengthen civic institutions, including political parties and judicial systems.”²³⁸

This discourse of giving outside powers the responsibility to build the civil society in order to enable these states’ transformation to democratic units can also be seen in Rotberg’s analysis. Rotberg offers four goals that should be maintained by the transnational administration and international agencies in order to stop state failure: jump-starting the economy, restoring the rule of law, re-creating political institutions, and rejuvenating civil society.²³⁹

The Weberian analysis of the state in failed state literature not only calls for intervention because of the conditions created by the absence of civil society but also for the need to restore monopoly over the means of violence. For example, Ignatieff who describes state failure as the disappearance of the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence claims that the Western states has the task to intervene in these states in order to help them regain the monopoly over the means of violence, to increase the competence of local institutions, to conciliate ethnic conflict and to build a functioning economy.²⁴⁰

²³⁸ Helman, G. B. & Ratner S. R, ‘Saving Failed States’, *Foreign Policy*, No.99, Winter, 1992-1993, p.14

²³⁹ Rotberg, R. I. ‘Failed States in a World of Terror’, *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, p. 139

²⁴⁰ Ignatieff, M., ‘Intervention and State Dailure’, *Dissent Magazine*, Winter 2012, viewed April 9, 2012, <<http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=641> >

In time, the perception of the state failure has been transformed into an understanding that views state failure as a more vital and urgent situation. The first conceptualization of the failed state used to refer the cases in which the country is suffering because of its own internal problems. As Gordon mentions, state failure used to be associated with the state's inability to perform its basic governance functions in their internal realm whereas they continued to function in the international realm.²⁴¹ The blame of the failure, on the other hand, was put on the states of those societies. Therefore, it was labeled as the "failed state"; it was the state who failed, not the societies. Thus, the cure of the failure was to rebuild the state through outside intervention. The legitimacy of such intervention was gained through the discourses of human rights. However, as the perception of state failure changed, the previous tools of legitimization of intervention have also been transformed. The rising refugee problem all over the world and their consequences of instability in other states –even the European ones- combined with the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have been influential in this. After that moment, rather than humanitarian concerns, failed states themselves are started to be presented as a security problem. The failed states are no more viewed as internally nonfunctional but internationally functional units. Due to the refugee and terrorism problems, they started to be viewed as also internationally nonfunctional units. The country which was viewed as suffering because of its own problems is now presented as exporting these problems to worldwide.

²⁴¹ Gordon, R., 'Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neo-Colonialist Notion', *American University Journal of International Law & Policy*, 1997, p. 903

“Now, however, as much as their citizens suffer, the failing states also pose enormous dangers beyond their own borders. Preventing nation-state from failing, and resuscitating those that have failed and will fail; have thus become the critical, all consuming, strategic and moral imperatives of our terrorized time”²⁴²

Now failed states are viewed as having internal deficiencies that create universal consequences and whose solution is in the external bodies.

“The need to safeguard international peace and security has already prompted, at rescuing failing states through direct involvement in their internal affairs.”²⁴³

As a result of this, the old discourses of legitimization have started to be deficient to cover the whole reality. It was no more only the humanitarian disasters that make an intervention necessary. But it has been terrorism and the refugee problem combined with humanitarian disasters that make intervention necessary and urgent now. As Chandler mentions, this has transformed the “fear for the Other” to “fear of the Other”.²⁴⁴ However, since it is a security threat rather than merely a humanitarian disaster, the human rights discourse is needed to be supported with other discourses in order to regain legitimacy. As a result of this, defending and establishing world peace and democracy have started to be the main mottos of intervention.

²⁴² Rotberg, R. I., ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror*, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2003, p.24

²⁴³ Helman, G. B. & Ratner S. R, ‘Saving Failed States’, *Foreign Policy*, No.99, Winter, 1992-1993, p.8

²⁴⁴ Chandler, D., ‘The Other-Regarding Ethics of the “Empire in Denial”’, in Chandler D., and Heins V. (eds), *Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: Pitfalls, Possibilities and Paradoxes*, 2007, p.167

On the other hand, the sovereignty principle, which is guaranteed by the UN Charter, with its emphasis on the non-intervention into the domestic affairs of any state has been still challenging the legitimacy of those actions. Two methods have been used to deal with this dilemma: first, new concepts are started to be used in dealing with these states; second international law has been modified- in some cases it is neglected and denied-, methods which become possible by the demise of the Soviet Union.²⁴⁵

Before mentioning the changes in the concepts and international law, it is important to open a parenthesis here. As terrorism and refugee problems have started to be the main concern of the Western state, the failed states have started to be criminalized and be viewed as a security problem. As a result of this understanding, a link between humanitarianism and militarism is forged.²⁴⁶ As the line between humanitarianism and militarism gets blurred, military actions in the name of peace and humanitarian concerns have turned out to be acceptable in the West.²⁴⁷ The use of military intervention as a mechanism to deal with failed states has abandoned the mechanisms of strengthening failed states.²⁴⁸ This change in the perception of state failure may be termed as “Rogueization of the Failed State”. This has coincided with the period where international actors have started to put

²⁴⁵ Ozdemir, A. M, *Güç, Buyruk, Düzen*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2011, p.311

²⁴⁶ Nesiah, V., ‘From Berlin to Bonn to Baghdad: A Space for Infinite Justice’, *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, 2004, p.76

²⁴⁷ Orford, A. *Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 27

²⁴⁸ Alston, P., ‘The Security Council and Human Rights: Lessons to be Learned from the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis and Its Aftermath’, *13 Australian Year Book of International Law* 107, 1992

“Rogue States” issue to the center of their agendas rather than the “Failed States”. This may prove that the labels of “failed” and “rogue”, which are used to characterize certain type of states, are functional concepts to legitimize certain historical practices. In short, because of the “rogueization of the failed”, the following descriptions on the changes in the principles of international law and the concepts have become valid for the rogue state literature.

As mentioned above, one of the consequences of the change in the perception of the state failure has been the emergence of the new concepts in order to deal with such failure. One of such terms is the “preventive intervention”. As the failed states have started to be perceived as the safe heavens for terrorist activities, it is thought that it is too late to intervene after the state collapses; therefore, what is suggested is preventive intervention:

“While there is no lack of rhetoric on the necessity of prevention, serious attempts to give organizations the tools to put preventive systems into place are best models.”²⁴⁹

The logic of prevention is to mention that in any case outside intervention is necessary to these states. However, if the weak state actually fails than there will be a need for reconstruction; therefore, a preventive intervention is less costly and more rational.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ Carment, D. ‘Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy’, *Third World Quarterly*, 23:3, 2003, p.421

²⁵⁰ Rotberg, R. I. ‘Failed Sates in a World of Terror’, *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, p. 132

“Strengthening weak states against failure is far easier than reviving them after they have definitely failed or collapsed. As the problem of contemporary Afghanistan shows, reconstruction is very long, very expensive, and hardly a smooth process... Then comes the re-creation of an administrative structure- primarily re-creating a bureaucracy and finding the funds with which to pay the erstwhile bureaucrats and policemen”²⁵¹

The indicator of the fact that failed states have started to be perceived and presented as a security problem is the use of the term anticipatory self-defense instead of preventive engagement in some cases. Since state failure is thought to challenge the world peace through terrorist activities, the prevention of failure is regarded as a task of defense which in turn result in the emergence of such concept.

“These views include the theory that failed states do not have the right to exist and the doctrine that a country can strike on the basis of anticipatory self-defence.”²⁵²

Another concept that has started to be used to identify in the policies towards the failed states is the constructive engagement. What is really meant by constructive engagement is the establishment of the interim administration. The aim of such intervention is said to provide security through the development of local forces and train local administrative units. It is claimed that by this way legal codes

²⁵¹ Rotberg, R. I., ‘The New Nature of Nation-State Failure’, *Washington Quarterly*, 25: 3, Summer 2002, p.94

²⁵² Khor, M., ‘Failed States Theory can cause Global Anarchy’, *Third World Network*, March 2002, viewed April 12, 2012, < <http://www.twinside.org/title/et0125.htm>>

may be introduced, a stable rule of law may be established and economy may be regularized.²⁵³

One of the other concepts that legitimize intervention is the “post-conflict peace-building”. This policy is claimed to pursue the aim of strengthening governmental institutions, protecting human rights, pursuing bilateral cooperation projects and encouraging demilitarization. This task however is given to the outside powers. It is said that the outside powers should create a new political, economic and social environment for states riven by war which is said to be crucial for the world peace.²⁵⁴

Another term that has emerged in relation to the state failure is the “responsibility to protect” principle. This is a crucial notion since it transforms the sovereignty principle. Responsibility to protect is a report delivered to UN Secretary General by Canadian Government in 2001. According to the document, all states have to protect their citizens and where states are unwilling or unable to do that, so that humanitarian catastrophes occur, other states have a responsibility to provide that protection.²⁵⁵ This modifies non-intervention into the domestic affairs principle and aims to legitimize the intervention in those states. Feinstein and Slaughter propose

²⁵³ Rotberg, R. I. ‘Failed States in a World of Terror’, *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, p. 137

²⁵⁴ Helman, G. B. & Ratner S. R, ‘Saving Failed States’, *Foreign Policy*, No.99, Winter, 1992-1993, p.8

²⁵⁵ Ignatieff, M., ‘Intervention and State Failure’, *Dissent Magazine*, Winter 2012, viewed April 9, 2012, <<http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=641> >

that responsibility to protect principle brings preventive security actions.²⁵⁶ These preventive security measures set the ground for pre-emptive strikes.²⁵⁷

The second way to legitimize the methods dealing with the state failure can be traced in the changing norms of the international law. The failed state theorists criticize the principle of the sovereignty which, according to them, causes the subordination of human rights to the state sovereignty. The articles 2.1 and 2.7 of the UN Charter define state sovereignty in terms of inviolability and non-interference.²⁵⁸ It is claimed that the Article of 2(7) in the UN Charter (which maintains that states are not authorized to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state except when the Security Council is enforcing its will under Chapter VII) has created a legal and political reluctance in the intervention of disasters in the failed states. This has caused the failed state theorists to label the sovereignty principle as an ill-defined and amorphous notion which underlines all internal affairs of the states as being beyond the scrutiny of international community.²⁵⁹ However, this perception of the sovereignty principle has started to be revised. As Herman and Ratner mentioned:

“But the tide is slowly changing, or, as Boutros-Ghali has put it, perhaps the tide was never as far out as some proponents of sovereignty would have it. In his June

²⁵⁶ Feinstein, L., Slaughter A.M, ‘A Duty to Prevent’, *Foreign Affairs*, January-February, 2004, p.136-137

²⁵⁷ Daalder, I., Steinberg J., ‘Preventive War, A Useful Tool’, *Los Angeles Times*, 4 December, 2005

²⁵⁸ Ignatieff, M., ‘Intervention and State Dailure’, *Dissent Magazine*, Winter 2012, viewed April 9, 2012, <<http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=641> >

²⁵⁹ Helman, G. B. & Ratner S. R, ‘Saving Failed States’, *Foreign Policy*, No.99, Winter, 1992-1993, p.9-10

1992 report, he observed that the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. He called for a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.”²⁶⁰

These scholars claim that such a change in the conceptualization of absolute sovereignty has increased member states’ willingness to deal with the failure issue which, in turn, has created new alternatives for responding to the failed state. It is claimed that by this way the traditional view of sovereignty has decayed and it is recognized that UN may take measures inside the member states to save them from self-destruction.²⁶¹ This openly enables a UN intervention, or by any body that may act in the name of UN. Such a method is now labeled as conservatorship of UN. This conservation suggests three models for dealing with the failed states: governance assistance, delegation of governmental authority, and direct UN trusteeship. In this regard, under governance assistance UN will assign personnel to rule the government, under the delegation process UN will take the responsibility of governmental function, under the trusteeship UN will directly rule the state. Of course it is said that the Security Council will be responsible for such rule.²⁶² If the UN does not maintain such activities, then it is said that it is the responsibility of a

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid., p.11

²⁶² Ibid., p.18

regional or subregional organization, or a well-intentioned or hegemonic outside power.²⁶³

With these methods it is claimed that the aim is not only to reconstruct those states in order to prevent terrorism or human catastrophes but also to integrate these states to the global economy. As Rotberg mentioned,

“Outside support should be conditional on monetary and fiscal streamlining, renewed attention to good governance, reforms of the land tenure systems, and strict adherence to the rule of law. External assistance to create in-country jobs by reducing external tariff barriers and by supporting vital foreign direct investment is critical.”²⁶⁴

The responsibility of such interventions to “rescue the failed” is said to be the “civilized” and “developed” states. As Rotberg assumes, it is presented as preventing states from failing due to strategic and moral imperatives.²⁶⁵ In this regard, it is useful to refer the arguments of Alain Badiou. Regarding the failed state literature, on the one hand there are the victims who are suffering, on the other there are the representatives of “morality”. Therefore, there is the expectation of the civilizing mission of the civilized to rescue the uncivilized. Any practice conducted by the “civilized” firstly necessitates humiliation of the victims. Therefore, “morality” is highly associated with the following argument: the poverty of the third world is due to their own inadequacy, their own ineptitude, in other words their own

²⁶³ Rotberg, R. I. ‘Failed States in a World of Terror’, *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, p. 130

²⁶⁴ Rotberg, R. I., ‘The New Nature of Nation-State Failure’, *Washington Quarterly*, 25: 3, Summer 2002, p.95

²⁶⁵ Rotberg, R. I. ‘Failed States in a World of Terror’, *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2002, p. 127

inferior humanity.²⁶⁶ This understanding of the state failure is combined with the representation of those states as a threat to the world peace. Therefore, another set of morality added to this understanding becomes protecting the world-peace.

To sum up, the failed state literature legitimizes certain policies. The scope of those policies have been transformed from the humanitarian intervention to military intervention as the concept of failed state is revised. The failed state literature used to refer to a state that is suffering and it is presented as a moral task to prevent that failure through outside intervention. However, as failed states started to be perceived as safe grounds for terrorist activities and as a fountain of refugee problem, the failed states are rogueized. The moral task was transformed from protecting the people of those societies to protecting the world peace. Discourses of the world peace and democracy are included to state failure discourse in dealing with those states. As a result of this, preventing state failure is presented as a more vital and urgent task. Regarding the absence of the civil society and the orientalist discourse in failed state literature, this task of transformation has been given to “civilized” West. In short, it can be concluded from the arguments above that since changes in the policies have triggered changes in the conceptualization of the failed state, the failed state theory might be labeled as a functional concept legitimizing certain interventionist historical practices.

4.4. Rogue States: Democracy Promotion through Military Intervention

As it is indicated in the section above, the policies towards rogue states cannot be analyzed separately from those towards failed states especially after the

²⁶⁶ Badiou, A. *Etik: Kötülük Kavrayışı Üzerine Bir Deneme*, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2006, p.28-29

‘rogueization of the failed’. Therefore, some of the issues that are analyzed in the section above will not be mentioned here in order to prevent repetition. In the policies towards rogue states, same discourses of pre-emptive self-defense, humanitarian intervention and war on terrorism have been also used. The main difference of the policies towards rogue states from the ones towards the failed states is that since the beginning, rogue states have been associated with certain international behavior. Because of this, while the policies towards failed states were oriented to rescue them, rogue states are tried to be disciplined because of their crimes.²⁶⁷ The prevention of rogue behavior have been associated with military intervention. However, as Simpson maintains, such disciplinary procedures take the rights of those states. Simpson claims that rogue states are excluded from the state system and a new legal regime developed for them in which they possess no rights and subject to continual surveillance and disciplinary violence.²⁶⁸

However, this discourse of disciplining the rogues, which has started especially after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, has changed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As indicated in the section on the rogue states, especially after the 9/11, the rogue states have started to be the main issue on agendas of Western Powers. As the failed states have started to be seen as a security issue with this attack, the perceptions of and the policies towards rogue states have changed. With the “rogueization of the failed states”, saving the failure policy has evolved to regime change. In the same direction, the policy of disciplining the rogue states through

²⁶⁷ Simpson, G., ‘Two Liberalisms’, *European Journal of International Law*, 2001, p. 560-65

²⁶⁸ Simpson, G., *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 293-294, 313-314

surveillance and community-sanctioned violence has changed into transforming those political organizations. Therefore in that period, we have witnessed the rise of democracy promotion discourses. As the Security Council Resolution no. 1483 stresses:

“Stressing the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources, welcoming the commitment of all parties concerned to support the creation of an environment in which they may do so as soon as possible, and expressing resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly...”²⁶⁹

This discourse of democracy promotion through outside intervention is highly related with the rogue state literature’s perception of the absence of civil society in those cases. As it is indicated in the previous chapters, rogue state literature analyzes those political organizations on the basis of state-civil society antagonism and attributes certain characteristics to those states as a consequence of the absence of the latter. It is claimed that the societies of rogue states are suffering and if the rulers of those states let the emergence of the civil society, those civil societies may call for outside intervention to stop their sufferings. As it is indicated by Rajagopal, democratization process that is pursued by the UN is presented as a response to the wishes of the countries requesting assistance and therefore in conformity with sovereignty.²⁷⁰ However, since in rogue states, it is claimed that, there is no civil society that will pressure the state to develop democratic

²⁶⁹ The document can be found at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html>

²⁷⁰ Rajagopal, B, *International law from below: development, social movements, and Third World resistance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.142

institutions, it is the moral responsibility of the international actors to intervene for the establishment of democracy and to “free” people of those states. Therefore, it is claimed that even it may be seen as illegal to intervene in those cases because there is no demand for such help, it is legitimate to intervene. It is said that it is legitimate because the absence of such demand is due to the absence of civil society. For that reason, it is seen as a moral duty of Western powers to do that:

“United States had a unique responsibility to develop a strategy to neutralize, contain and through selective pressure, perhaps eventually transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international community.”²⁷¹

Moreover, rogue state literature’s emphasis on the absence of a civil society, with which an emancipating power makes them to conclude that these states will never turn into modern civilized nations. Since the absence of the civil society is attributed to the irrationality of the ruler who does not leave any space for the development of the private sphere, the solution to such problem is an outside intervention in the name civilizing mission. This is presented as a moral imperative.

On the morality issue, it is useful again to refer Badiou. As indicated before, one of the paths that these state theories are following is the negation of the different. In rogue state literature, the rogue states are presented as evil standing against the good.²⁷² Such a description not only characterizes the terrorists but also

²⁷¹ Lake, A., ‘Confronting Backlash States’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No.2, March/April 1994, p. 46

²⁷² Remember US President George W. Bush, ‘Speech at Guarduation of the United States Military Academy, June 1, 2002, accessed April 25, 2012
<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>>

views the inherent nature of those states as irredeemably wicked.²⁷³ As Badiou claims, such an understanding gives the responsibility of disciplining the ‘uncivilized’ to the ‘civilized’.²⁷⁴ This may be referred to as a civilizing mission or white man’s burden.²⁷⁵

“For the sake of both its interests and its ideals, the US has a special responsibility to nurture and promote these core values... As the sole superpower the United States has a special responsibility for developing a strategy to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international community... We seek to contain the influence of those states, sometimes by isolation, sometimes through pressure, sometimes by diplomatic and economic measures.”²⁷⁶

The emergence of democracy promotion discourses also coincidences with the rogueization of failed states and re-emergence of rogue state debates which soon has started dominate international agendas. As was analyzed in more detail in the analysis of the policies towards rentier states, through such changes, understanding of the underdevelopment has also changed. During the Cold War period, underdevelopment of the Third World used to be associated with industrialization.²⁷⁷ However, as the Cold War has come to an end, development

²⁷³ Khan, L. A., ‘The Essentialist Terrorist’, *Washburn Law Journal*, Vol.45, No.1, 2005, p.49-50

²⁷⁴ Badiou, A. *Etik: Kötülük Kavrayışı Üzerine Bir Deneme*, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2006, p.28-29

²⁷⁵ Anghie, A. *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.38

²⁷⁶ Preble, C., ‘The Bush Doctrine and Rogue States’, *Foreign Service Journal*, October, 2005, P.46

²⁷⁷ Rajagopal, B, *International law from below: development, social movements, and Third World resistance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.138

has started to be associated with economic liberalization and democracy.²⁷⁸ Therefore, the discourse of intervening in those states to develop the industries of those cases is replaced with the discourses of democracy promotion.²⁷⁹ The change in this discourse is supported by the discourse of peace. Regarding the definition of rogue states which maintains the lack of democracy and threat to world peace; and regarding the emergence of the rogue state debates in the end of the Cold War it may be claimed that rogue state is just a functional term that is used to legitimize certain historical interventionist practices.

Therefore it can be said that the policies towards the rogue states are presented as aiming to include those political organization into the family of the democratic states. As it has been analyzed in the section defining the rogue states, one of the main characteristics of rogue states is their being outside of the family of democratic states²⁸⁰:

“In the modern context, rogue states show contempt for international norms by repressing their own populations, promoting international terrorism, seeking weapons of mass destruction and standing outside the global community.”²⁸¹

²⁷⁸ Chua, A. L. ‘The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy’, *Harvard International Law Journal*, Vol.41, Spring, 2000, p.287-381

²⁷⁹ Fidler, D. P., ‘The Return of the Standard of Civilization’, *Faculty Publications*, Paper 432, 2001, viewed April 24, 2012, <<http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/432>>

²⁸⁰ Lake, A., ‘Confronting Backlash States’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No.2, March/April 1994, p.45

²⁸¹ Henriksen, T. H., ‘The Rise and Decline of Rogue States’, *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2001, 54, no.2, p. 349

“Their presence, in any event, confounded hopes for a harmonious world based on economic integration, political interdependence and peaceful resolution of disputes.”²⁸²

This shows that the aim of such interventions is the inclusion of those states into the ‘modern’ world. As Rajagopal mentioned:

“In other words, instead of understanding post-Cold War peace operations and the turn to democratization as merely functional responses to a chaotic post-Cold War world, I suggest that it might be more useful to understand them from a perspective of political economy as interventions that aim to incorporate the Third World into the modern world.”²⁸³

Since such inclusion is regarded together with a security threat, the means to such an end is the military intervention. The rogue states have been characterized as being ruled by coercive groups that abuse human rights and develop WMD. This is claimed to be a threat to the world peace. The National Security Strategy of USA 2002 (NSSUSA 2002) labels rogue states as the main threat to the world peace; therefore, elimination of this threat through any instrument is presented as legitimate.²⁸⁴

The reason of the preference of military intervention in those cases is that it is the state that is blamed for rogue activities. The crimes committed by rogue states

²⁸² Henriksen, T. H., ‘The Rise and Decline of Rogue States’, *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2001, 54, no.2, p. 357

²⁸³ Rajagopal, B, *International law from below: development, social movements, and Third World resistance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.137

²⁸⁴ Preble, C., ‘The Bush Doctrine and Rogue States’, *Foreign Service Journal*, October, 2005, p.27

are seen as a consequence of immaturity or irrationality rather than an inevitable result of global power relations.²⁸⁵ This understanding may be seen by paying attention to the orientalist thinking in rogue state literature. Those political organizations are attributed the traits of inferior culture and irrational rulers. As it is indicated above such an understanding legitimize the civilizing mission of the ‘civilized’ since the ineffective rulers and inferior culture are blamed for the rogue behavior. This understanding can be seen in Security Council Resolution no. 1483:

“Calls upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future...”

The orientalist discourse within the rogue state literature also gives a new meaning to terrorism which is presented as another characteristic of the rogue states that challenges the world peace. The conventional terrorists are characterized as using violence as a means for their political ends. However, in dealing with rogue states a new forename is used for the terrorist having resident in those states. The ‘essentialist’ terrorists are used to describe the terrorists in those states which are perceived as irrational that use violence as an end in itself.²⁸⁶ “Terrorism”, in the orientalist thinking, is attributed to fanaticism, lack of modern values, lack of democracy and lack of development. This indicates that terrorism has no neutral

²⁸⁵ Jackson, R. H., *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 21

²⁸⁶ Khan, L. A., ‘The Essentialist Terrorist’, *Washburn Law Journal*, Vol.45, No.1, 2005, p.48

readability because, as Badiou mentions, they dispense with a reasoned examination of political situations, of their causes and consequences.²⁸⁷ In short, rogue states are blamed for their incapacity to develop properly which results in terrorism and other security problems. It is the responsibility of those governments to prevent terrorism but they are unable to maintain this because of their irrationality and incapability, according to rogue state theory. Therefore, the prevention of those activities necessitates an outside intervention. In rogue states case, such intervention is the military intervention.

As analyzed more detail on the section on failed states, the policies towards the rogue states have caused the emergence of new concepts. Especially the attacks of 9/11 have led to the discussions that the terrorism of the modern times is a new phenomenon. Therefore, existing legal structures are novice to deal with this security issue. It is claimed that the traditional constitutional and international legal constrains are unresponsive to the issue of international terrorism.²⁸⁸ Therefore, it is claimed that there is a need to revise international law. As indicated before, since the end of the Cold War, the US gained the ability to shape international law.²⁸⁹ The emergence of responsibility to protect principle and its application to the rogue states coincide with this. Even the UN did not support the invasion of Iraq, international law and institutions have created an environment that made the

²⁸⁷ Badiou, A., *Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy*, London: Continuum International, 2005, p. 146

²⁸⁸ Franck, T. M., 'Criminals, Combatants, or What? An Examination of the Role of Law in Responding to the Treat of Terror', *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 98, No. 4, Oct., 2004, p.686-688

²⁸⁹ Ozdemir, A. M, *Güç, Buyruk, Düzen*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2011, p.311

invasion of Iraq possible. Responsibility to protect principle has also been associated with the terrorist activities. Bush claimed that state was responsible for those terrorist activities; therefore, no distinction was to be made between the terrorists and the states harboring them.²⁹⁰ This has also transformed the concept of terrorism, which used to be treated as a crime under domestic law, for it is now considered as being under the jurisdiction of international law. After that, it is claimed that the existing legal regime is inadequate to prevent terrorism which leading to a change of the concepts of law.²⁹¹

This transformation may also be seen in the UN Charter's article 2(4) that prohibits military intervention to another state unless it is self-defense (article 51) or authorized by the Security Council. Terrorist attacks of 9/11 do not fall into this category because international law permits the use of force against terrorist attacks only if the attack is attributable to a state. Since this was not the case in Afghanistan and Iraq, other methods of legitimization has been searched. However, the UN resolution of 1368 let the use of force against terrorist attacks for the first time. This is an indicator of the US ability to change the international law which indeed has become possible with the demise of Soviet Union. Later Resolution no. 1373 supported this. This has also changed the use of Article 51 which has started to

²⁹⁰ President George W. Bush, 'Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People', 2001, viewed April 24, 2012 <
<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911jointsessionspeech.htm>>

²⁹¹ President George W. Bush, 'State of Union Address', 20 January 2004, viewed April 24, 2012 <
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_012004.html>

include the cases which are thought to be a threat to international peace and security.²⁹²

It is not only the US's ability to shape international law, but also her ability to transform the states which are labeled as rogue, that have enabled her to develop such policies towards those cases with. The concept of "rogue states" is started to be used more widely and policies towards them stiffened since the US no more has to fear that her harsh policies will lead these states to move towards the Soviet camp. As it is known that today, the US Government demonstrates these states as the biggest challenge to the world peace and human rights, even though the USA supported those authoritarian rulers of the Middle East for years in order to use them against the Communist bloc. However, this understanding has changed dramatically and those states have started to be characterized as rogues that have to be transformed. This proves that the rogue state literature has emerged to legitimize certain historical practices of intervention.

To sum up, the rogue state literature has aimed to the difference of certain type of state. This differences are negated through the orientalist discourse and through the attribution of certain characteristics to those states. Before the 9/11, the policies towards the rogue states used to be aimed to discipline the rogue behavior- even there were exceptions such as Gulf War-, after the terrorist attacks to World Trade Center, the discourse and policies towards those states have changed from disciplining to intervening militarily.

²⁹² Cassese, A. 'Terrorism is also Disrupting some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law', *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 12, No.5, 2001, p.994

5. CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to establish a theoretical integrity of three state theories that aim to define the different structures of certain types of states. The main argument of the thesis was these state theories, rather than being theoretical constructs, are functional terms that are used to legitimize certain historical practices.

To support this argument, the first chapter has aimed to demonstrate how these state literatures theorized the state structures of the states concerned. The chapter has begun with the demonstration of the rentier state literature. More space has been reserved for the analysis of the rentier state theory than it has been done for the failed and the rogue state theories since the roots of the rentier state literature go back to the 1970s. The section of “Defining the Rentier States” has shown that in the rentier state literature there is an attempt to understand why the Middle Eastern states are different. However, since this attempt was built on a problematic methodological ground, the rentier state theory suggests similar policies towards those states as the failed and the rogue state theories do. In the other two sections of the first chapter, the failed and the rogue state literatures have been examined and it has been shown that their main concern is to identify these states’ difference rather than explain why they are different.

The next chapter has aimed to make a critical reading of the state theories concerned. The chapter has targeted to show how these state theories negate the different structures of those states they defined. Two paths have been drawn to

prove the argument that they negate the differences and to establish a theoretical integrity of the literatures. The first section has shown that all three literatures reproduce the liberal thinking that analyzes the state on the basis of the claimed civil society-state dichotomy. It has been claimed that within such analysis all three literatures attribute civil society, which is claimed to be absent in the states concerned, an emancipating role. Therefore, it has been maintained that with the claimed absence of the civil society, all three state theories aim to argue that these societies do not contain a potential for emancipation and therefore, an outside intervention is necessary to transform these states into liberal-democratic states.

The following section of the same chapter has targeted to demonstrate another discursive similarity of the three literatures. It has been maintained that with their orientalist discourse, all three state theories attributes certain embedded characteristics to the states, societies and rulers of the units concerned and through these characteristics they claim that these societies do not contain a potential for emancipation through its internal dynamics. It has been shown that with the orientalist discourse these state theories give the “civilized” the responsibility to civilize the “uncivilized”.

The last chapter of the study has shown which policies towards the states concerned do the rentier, failed and rogue state theories suggest and what historical practices do they legitimize.

The chapter has begun with an analysis of the rentier state literature. It has been shown that the change in the perception of the development from an industry based understanding to a democracy based one has a reflection in the rentier state

theory. It has been maintained that before the 1990s, when the underdevelopment was associated with the lack of industrialization, the rentier state theorists has concentrated on the dependence of the rentier states to one leading sector which has been seen as a direct consequence of the lack of industrialization. However, after the 1990s, it has been seen that the main concern of the rentier state literature has started to be the problem of democracy in those societies. It has been shown that both inadequacies are portrayed as the cause of the fragile economic and social structures of the rentier states. Therefore, it has been claimed that the rentier state theory suggests a preventive outside intervention in those weak states in order prevent their failure.

The following section of the last chapter has targeted to examine the policies suggested by the failed state literature towards the states concerned. It has been demonstrated that while the interventions to the failed states used to be presented as a moral duty of preventing the human catastrophes in those states, with the event of 9/11, the humanitarian concerns have been transformed into the security ones. I have labeled this situation as the “rogueization of the failed” since not only the perception of the state failure has changed but also the policies towards them have been transformed from humanitarian intervention to military one which was the main policy against the rogue states.

In the last section of the third chapter, it has been argued that since the beginning of the emergence of the rogue state concept, the rogue state theory has suggested that the only way to annihilate the anti-democratic structures of those states -which has been seen as the main cause of the rogue behavior- is to organize a military intervention. While the rogue state theory, for a short period of time, has

suggested disciplining the rogue behavior with sanctions and enforcements, with the terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center, the suggested policy has transformed into a regime change through military intervention. The rogue states are perceived as the most urgent type of states that has to be transformed immediately and any means for succeeding this aim are presented as legitimate by the rogue state theory.

As it can be seen, this study has targeted to make an inside critique of the three state theories that aim to define the different structures of the Third World States. The theories have been discussed on the basis of their internal contradictions and inconsistencies. They have been analyzed in terms of what kind of real politics they have been created. Since such an analysis aims make an inside critique of the theories by concentrating on the contradictions of their claims and arguments, an alternative theoretical reading of the underdeveloped Third World States has not been presented during the study. However, it should be kept in mind that social science theories have an impact on the concrete in real not only with what they say but also with what they leave out of the analysis. In other words, in social sciences a theory should be evaluated not only on the basis of how it transforms the concrete in real into concrete in thought but also on the basis of how it prevents the presentation of concrete in real by excluding certain forms of analysis outside of their examination. Certainly the states concerned are underdeveloped and bear some differences from the developed capitalist states; certainly some of them host terrorist groups; certainly they experience internal conflicts and wars; certainly their population suffers; certainly there is famine, hunger and the states are ineffective in dealing with such shortages; however, facts do not have their own tongue, they cannot talk by themselves. If a social theory neglects and ignores, by mistake or on

purpose, the main variables that are effective in the emergence of the facts then, as in the case of the rentier, failed and rogue state theories, their analysis may result in the legitimization of certain policies.

In this regard, the main problem of these state theories is that they perceive the structures of the states concerned as atypical because they ignore and neglect the dynamics that are formed by the needs and effects of the capital accumulation and global capitalist relations. In these state theories, states are perceived as atomistic and isolated units. In other words, the dependent relations between the states and the dominant classes are neglected. However, as Holloway mentioned, “*no national state, rich or poor can be understood in abstraction from its existence as a moment of the global capital relation.*”²⁹³ Even though by some of scholars of the concerned state theories there is an emphasis on the dependency relations, such efforts again are unable to present the reality because the emphasis was made on an individualistic basis and the main motives that enforce such dependent relations are neglected.

In this regard, a political economic analysis that takes into consideration the global capitalist relations may be useful to demonstrate the underlying factors which determine the structures of the underdeveloped capitalist formations and brings an outside intervention in those states onto stage. Therefore, in this concluding part, it is useful to present a brief discussion of the states concerned from a political economic perspective.

²⁹³ Holloway, J., ‘Küresel Sermaye ve Ulusal Devlet’, in Bonefeld, W. and Holloway J. (eds.), *Küreselleşme Çağında Para ve Sınıf Mücadelesi*, İstanbul: Otonom, 2007, p.145

Luxemburg argues that the capitalist mode of production, for its expanded reproduction needs the pre-capitalist social formations on the one side and destroys the pre-capitalist mode of production in those social formations on the other side.²⁹⁴ In this sense, imperialism does not only contain capital export and the expansion of capitalist production relations in the global scale but also the legal, political and ideological transformation -which means transformation of the state structure- that may carry out this expansion. These legal, political and ideological structures are transformed according to the international division of labor. As Baran mentions, international division of labor shapes the production, distribution and consumption relations of the periphery states not according to the needs of their people but of the rich center states.²⁹⁵ The underdeveloped industrialization of the rentier states or their dependency on one leading sector may be captured with a concentration on this dynamic. This is how the states concerned are turned into so-called rentiers, failures or rogues of the system.

However, the transformation of the underdeveloped capitalist formations decelerated during the Cold War years and immediately accelerated with the demise of the Soviet Union. As discussed before, the Second World existed as a long-standing threat to the global capital accumulation and restrained interventions - aiming to sustain the capital accumulation- into the Third World states. The demise of the Soviet Union not only made such interventions aiming the transformation of those states more rampant and feasible but also intensified the process of

²⁹⁴ Luxemburg, R. *Sermaye Birikimi*, İstanbul: Alan, 1986, p. 275

²⁹⁵ Baran, P., *Büyümenin Ekonomi Politikası*, İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1974, p. 279

globalization. The tendency that resulted in globalization, as Marx defines in *Communist Manifesto*, is the need of the bourgeoisie for a constantly expanding market for their products.²⁹⁶ This situation chases the ruling class over the whole surface of the globe.

Globalization, contrary to the dominant discourse, does not mean the disappearance of the nation state. As Wood claims, globalization brings a global economy whose operators are the states and local sovereignties that are structured in a complex relation of domination and subordination.²⁹⁷ The nation-states are vital for enforcing the property rights, stabilizing the market and prices, constraining labor militancy, guaranteeing the national treatment of the foreign investment, setting the rules of contract, suppressing the opposition and social unrest. So what kind of states may conduct such duties? Of course not the ones with weak state institutions, mal-economic performance and function or the ones having intentions to destabilize the operation of such a system. Operation of this system necessitates effective states which are in the orbit of global capitalism. Therefore, the failed states should be transformed into the strong states that have strong institutional mechanisms to enforce the necessary structures for the global capitalist relations. The rogue states, on the other hand, have to be transformed into the docile units of the state system. Then, what methods may be used to acquire such transformation? As Panitch and Gindin suggests, since rogue states are not within the orbit of global capitalism –this does not mean that there is no capitalist mode of production and

²⁹⁶ Marx, K., Engels, F., *The Communist Manifesto*, London: Pluto Press, 2008

²⁹⁷ Wood, E. M., *Empire of Capital*, New York: Verso, 2003, p.141

capitalist relations in these states- neither penetrating external economic forces nor international institutions can effectively restructure them.²⁹⁸ Then the only method remained to transform these states into the effective units for the operation of global capitalism is an outside intervention. This is how the intervention in those states became inevitable.

Another key factor in this imperialist project emerged especially after the end of the Cold War is the ideological tools that legitimize such interventions. The rentier, failed and rogue state theories are one of such tools. As Patnaik claims, “*imperialism has become so adept at managing potential challenges to its hegemony made us indifferent to its ubiquitous presence.*”²⁹⁹ In this regard, the role of ideology steps in. With the discourses of human rights, democracy and peace, – which may be termed as the universalistic language of liberal democratic ideology- the interests of the ruling class are presented as the interest of the world community. By this way, the interventions are presented as a sacred mission aiming to discipline the rogue behavior, to cease the terrorist activities, to prevent suffering of the “uncivilized” and to protect the innocents from their failed or cruel rulers. This is how the intervention is justified and legitimized.

²⁹⁸ Panitch, L., Gindin, S., ‘Theorizing American Empire’, in Bartholomew, A. (ed.), *Empire’s Law: The American Imperial Project and the War to Remake the World*, London: Pluto Press, 2006, pp.21-43

²⁹⁹ Patnaik, P., ‘Whatever Happened to Imperialism?’, *Monthly Review*, 42(6), 1990, pp.1-6

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APPENDIX: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

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