

**RUSSIA'S ASIA-PACIFIC POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR
ERA**

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ABSTRACT

RUSSIA’S ASIA-PACIFIC POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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The purpose of this study is to analyze and discuss Russia’s Asia-Pacific policy after the end of the Cold War by focusing on Moscow’s bilateral relations with the major regional countries and its overall multilateral approach and policies towards the Asia-Pacific region. Contrary to the views of scholars who claim that Russia has already emerged as a major power in the Asia-Pacific, the thesis argues that Russia’s strategy of becoming a great power in the Asia-Pacific Region has significant limitations stemming from its competitive and assertive policies that ignore the role of multilateralism and international cooperation. Although Russia has been actively engaged in the region at the bilateral level and through its participation in the regional organizations in the post-Cold war era, this region has its own particular dynamics which necessitate a greater level of regional economic integration and a liberal approach to multilateralism rather than a realist “power politics” approach. Russia’s policy of aligning itself with China militarily in the region has counterproductive consequences as it intensifies geopolitical competition in the region, and marginalizes Moscow further.

The thesis is composed of six chapters. After the introduction, the second chapter examines origins of Russia’s presence in the Asia-Pacific Region. The following chapter discusses the sources of Russia’s increasing interest in the Region. The fourth chapter is concerned with Russia’s relations with main actors of the Asia-Pacific Region while the fifth chapter focuses on Russia’s involvement in the regional organizations. The last chapter is the conclusion.

Keywords: Russia, Asia- Pacific, Post-Cold War, China, Great Power

ÖZ

RUSYA’NIN SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI ASYA-PASİFİK POLİTİKASI

Şavlı, Tülay

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler

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Bu çalışmanın amacı Rusya’nın soğuk savaş sonrası Asya-Pasifik Bölgesi’nde izlediği siyaseti, Moskova’nın belli başlı bölge ülkeleri ile ikili ilişkileri ve bölgedeki bölgesel organizasyonlara yönelik yaklaşımı ve politikaları üzerine yoğunlaşarak, incelemek ve tartışmaktır. Rusya’nın Asya-Pasifik Bölgesi’nde büyük güç haline geldiğini öne süren akademisyenlerin görüşlerinin aksine, bu tez, Rusya’nın Asya-Pasifik Bölgesi’nde büyük güç olmak için izlediği rekabetçi ve iddialı politikaların çok-taraflılık ilkesini ve uluslararası işbirliğinin rolünü gözardı etmesi nedeniyle ciddi kısıtlılıklarının olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Rusya’nın soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde Asya-Pasifik Bölgesi’ne yönelik olarak izlediği aktif politikalara rağmen, Bölgedeki dinamikler bölgesel işbirliği ve daha liberal bir çok-taraflı yaklaşımı gerekli kıldığından, Rusya’nın Çin’le çok yakın bir askeri işbirliği politikası izlemesi Bölgedeki jeopolitik rekabeti arttırırken, Moskova’yı da bölgede daha da tecrit edici bir etkisi olmaktadır.

Bu tez altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümünden sonra, ikinci bölüm Rusya’nın bölgedeki varlığının temellerini incelemektedir. İzleyen bölüm, Rusya’nın Asya Pasifik Bölgesi’ne artan ilgisinin kaynaklarını tartışmaktadır. Dördüncü bölüm Rusya’nın bölgedeki temel aktörlerle ilişkilerini incelerken, beşinci bölüm Rusya’nın bölgesel işbirliği mekanizmalarıyla ilişkilerine odaklanmaktadır. Son bölümü sonuç oluşturmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya, Asya Pasifik, Soğuk savaş sonrası dönem, Çin, Büyük Güç

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ABBREVIATIONS

APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Countries
ASEAN-PMC	ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conferences
ASEAN+3	ASEAN+China, Japan, South Korea
ASEAN ISIS	ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
ADMM Plus	ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus Meeting
ASEAN-Russia DPFF	ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership Financial Fund
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEM	Asia- Europe Meeting
BRICS	Brasil, Russia, India, China, South Africa Grouping
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
EAS	East Asia Summit
ERIA	Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia
ESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
NEACD	Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue
PBEC	Pacific Basin Economic Council
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
RIC	Russia-India-China Grouping
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEANWFZ	The Protocol on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-free Zone
TAC	The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	viii
ABBREVIATIONS.....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	x
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA’S POLICIES TOWARDS ASIA-PACIFIC REGION	12
2.1 Introduction.....	12
2.2. Historical Origins (17 th century - 1991).....	12
2.3. Russia’s Approach towards the Asia-Pacific Region under Boris Yeltsin (1991-2000).....	20
2.4. Russia’s Approach towards the Asia-Pacific Region under Vladimir Putin (2000-2008).....	23
2.5. Russia’s Approach towards the Asia-Pacific Region under Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012).....	26
2.6. Conclusion.....	28
3. THE SOURCES OF RUSSIA’S INCREASING INTEREST IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION.....	30
3.1 Introduction.....	30

3.2. Political Factors.....	30
3.3. Economic Factors.....	34
3.4. Security Factors.....	38
3.5. Internal Regional Factors.....	45
3.6. Conclusion.....	47
4. RUSSIA’S RELATIONS WITH MAIN ACTORS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION.....	50
4.1. Introduction.....	50
4.2. U.S.A.....	51
4.3. China.....	57
4.4. Japan	62
4.5. India.....	68
4.6. South Korea.....	74
4.7. Australia, New Zealand.....	76
4.8. Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos.....	77
4.9. Conclusion.....	80
5. RUSSIA’S INVOLVEMENT IN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.....	82
5.1. Introduction.....	82
5.2. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).....	82
5.3. Association of Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN).....	90

5.4. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).....	99
5.5. East Asia Summit (EAS).....	102
5.6. ASEAN Defense Ministers-Plus Eight Meetings (ADMM).....	105
5.7 RIC (Russia-India-China) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia-India-China-South Africa) Cooperation.....	109
5.8. Non-Governmental Mechanisms.....	112
5.9. Conclusion.....	113
6. CONCLUSION.....	115
LIST OF REFERENCES.....	122
APPENDIX.....	138

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In this thesis Russia's policies in the Asia-Pacific Region in the post-cold war era will be examined. The period of 1992-2012 will be mainly covered while a historical perspective is summarily given. The research question of the thesis is what are the limitations to Russia's claim to be a major power in the Asia-Pacific Region. Russia has been increasingly interested in the Asia-Pacific region which has become one of the key drivers of global economics in the past decades. Russia, who lost its superpower status with the end of the cold war, has entered into a search for becoming a part of evolving Asia-Pacific regional architecture with an aim of obtaining a major power status in the region. The aim of this thesis is to show that Russia's desire and claim to be a major power in the Asia-Pacific Region has its limitations deriving from its policies conducted on the basis of power politics. The thesis claims that the Asia-Pacific Region has its own particular dynamics which necessitate a policy course based on cooperation instead of "power politics" to become a principal power in the region. Russia, by aligning itself with China in the region, impedes its chances of reaching major power status. Russia can attain its goal of obtaining major power status if its regional policies are conducted on the basis of liberal institutionalists' assumptions not on the basis of realist assumptions.

Although the term of Asia-Pacific Region has been used widely in the past decades, the region does not have a definite description. The region varies in size depending on context, but it usually includes Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and much of Oceania. The term may also include Russia (on the North Pacific) and countries in North and South America which are on the coast of the Eastern Pacific Ocean; the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, for example, includes the United States, Canada, Chile, Russia, Mexico and Peru. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) has a wider definition which includes

South Asia, Central Asia, Caucasia, Turkey and Iran.¹ In the context of this thesis the definition of re Asia-Pacific Region is based on a narrower description which includes Northeast Asia (China, Japan, North and South Korea), Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Brunei), the U.S., Australia and New Zealand. The definition of the region in the thesis largely coincides with 21 APEC members² with the exception of Chile, Canada, Mexico and Peru. India is also included in the context of the thesis since the country has substantial ties with the region and has been part of the ASEAN driven regional cooperation mechanisms since its inception although the country is not a member of APEC (India applied for membership to APEC in 1991, but has not been accepted yet³). ASEAN countries and its full dialogue partners (the US, Australia, China, Japan, India, South Korea, Russia, New Zealand) are in the scope of this thesis since ASEAN has been the main driver of the region-wide cooperation.

Russia's growing interest in the Asia-Pacific Region has been in parallel with the region's growing importance in global economics and politics. The region comprises % 61 percent of the world population,⁴ accounts for about 50 percent of the world trade and 60 percent of global GDP⁵. The APR comprises major geopolitical and economic centers such as the US, China, Japan. Almost half of the G-20 countries are Asia-Pacific countries.

Russia's foreign policy direction in the post-cold war era has been analyzed by an important number of scholars in the field. Russia's emphasis on a multipolar world order and regional-international institution building and its subsequent implications

¹“Member Countries”, *ESCAP website*, <http://www.unescap.org/about/member.asp>

² For further information on APEC member economies: <http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Economies.aspx>

³ Raghendra Jha, “Bring India into Club”, *The Courier Mail*, 16 November 2006, online at <http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/opinion/bring-india-into-club/story-e6frerdf-111112535055> (accessed on 10.11.2011)

⁴ ---“Statistical Yearbook for the Asia and Pacific”, UNESCAP publication, 12 October 2011, online at <http://www.unescap.org/stat/data/syb2011/> (accessed on 02.12.2012)

⁵ Joshua Meltzer, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership — Its Economic and Strategic Implications”, *Brooking Institution*, 30 September 2011, online at http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0930_trans_pacific_partnership_meltzer.aspx (accessed on 14.12. 2011)

on its foreign policy course have been discussed from different perspectives. In this framework, Russia's growing interest and interaction with the Asia-Pacific Region has been part of a wider discussion with regard to Russia's new foreign policy course following the loss of its super-power status. The scholars like Jeffrey Mankoff, Bobo Lo, Andrei P. Tsygankov, Fyodor Lukyonov, Eric Shiraev, Robert Kanet, argue that Russia's new foreign policy course in the world and in the Asia-Pacific region is still mainly informed by realist approaches. They view Russia's declared adherence to a new multipolar world order essentially as a desire to create "a concert of powers" where a few main actors give shape to the world order. The importance attached to the UN and other international and regional organizations by Russia is also criticized by these scholars. On this point, they question the sincerity of Russia and argue that Russia tries to promote these institutions to balance the US domination of world affairs and to pursue Russia's national interests through strengthening Russia's role in the emerging multipolar world not to elevate them as genuine instruments of international cooperation.

In this line, Jeffrey Mankoff in his book "Russian Foreign Policy: Return of Great Power Politics" argues that the great power competition has characterized Russian foreign policy in the post-cold war era.⁶ He traces this tendency back to the Yeltsin era, when Russian leaders abandoned a liberal, pro-Western orientation and committed themselves to reestablishing Russia as a great power. He states that in the light of great power politics Russian foreign policy has been focused on bilateral relations specially with other influential, big states such as the US, China and India rather than on multilateral arrangements based on shared values.⁷

Another scholar in the field, Bobo Lo, in his book "Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Order: Reality, Illusion and Myth-Making" stresses that Russian foreign policy making in the post-cold war continued to be shaped by geopolitics, great power status, and security concerns. According to Lo, Russia emphasized diversification and multivector foreign policy in reaction to perceived Western

⁶ Jeffrey Mankov, *Russian Foreign Policy: Return of Great Power Politics*, (Maryland: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp.2-5

⁷ Ibid, p.14

attempts to establish a unipolar world in which Russia would be threatened to play a secondary role⁸. The only way of achieving ‘equal partnership’ with the West, he underlines, was to encourage the development of a global environment that would enable the ‘emergence of a broad field for maneuvering, for multivector diplomacy’. In this way, Lo argues, ‘independence’ and multipolarity concepts tied in directly with conceptions of Russia as a great power. Lo further argues that the Asia-Pacific regional mechanisms such as ARF(ASEAN Regional Forum) appeared to offer increased possibilities for bringing Russia closer to the international mainstream, enabling its diminishing security voice to be heard, and improving its chances of developing the ‘alternative rational consensus’ to American global leadership.⁹ He comments that posing as the champion of multilateralism offered Russia the opportunity to present itself as a pioneer in an alternative rational consensus, one that challenged both the primacy of the United States and the moral universalism of Western values.¹⁰

In his article “Preserving Influence in a Changing World: Russia’s Grand Strategy” Andrei P. Tsygankov, a Russian scholar at the San Francisco State University in the US, pursues the argument that Russia’s central objective in the post-cold war era has been to become an independent center of power and influence by creating flexible international coalitions.¹¹ Tsygankov argues that using various foreign policy tools, the Kremlin has succeeded in building pragmatic alliances within the former Soviet region and across the world. The tools of such policy include energy, military power, diplomacy, cultural/historical capital, and technological expertise. Within a predictable geopolitical environment these tools may be sufficient for carrying out Russia’s generally defensive strategy of preserving international influence. However, Tsygankov draws attention to the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership as a source of risk, and comments that as Russia continues to supply China with energy and

⁸Bobo Lo, *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Order: Reality, Illusion and Myth-making*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp.12-25

⁹ *Ibid*, p.134

¹⁰ *Ibid*,p.89

¹¹ Andrei P. Tsygankov,, “Preserving Influence in a Changing World: Russia’s Grand Strategy”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 58, No. 1, (March-April 2011) p.29

weapons, and as China grows at a considerably higher rate than Russia, the risk of Moscow becoming a junior partner in a Beijing-led coalition increases. Tysgankov says while China's rise requires that Russia continue to build relations with other states in East Asia and beyond, it is also critically important that Moscow not fall behind in strengthening ties with Beijing.¹² Eric Shiraev, another Russian born American scholar writing on Russian politics, argues in his book "Russian Government and Politics" that Russia's foreign policy understanding is still dominated by security concerns and power struggle, and Russia aims to counterweight the power of its opponents by forging alliances. Shiraev further argues that Russia desires to create a strategic alliance with China and India against the U.S. dominance in the Asia-Pacific and the world.¹³

Roger Kanet is another American scholar who studies the transformation of the Russian foreign policy in the post-cold war era. In the book edited by Kanet, "Russia: Re-emerging Great Power", he states that that Russia's foreign policy after 1996 centered on the building of alliances with other states that shared Russia's concerns about the dominant US position in world affairs. He argues that since the political rise of Vladimir Putin in 1999, with his commitment to rebuilding the political and economic foundations of the Russian state, the goal of re-establishing Russia's place as a great power has become the overarching objective of Russian foreign policy. He further argues that Russia has increasingly employed its central location and its re-emerging economic capabilities, especially its command of energy resources and their distribution in its search for great power status.¹⁴

Scholars like Andrew Kuchins, Alexei Zagorsky, Paradorn Rangsimaporn, Richard Sakwa, Alexander Sergouinin, and Vladimir Petrovsky interpret Russian foreign policy from different perspectives. They mostly have the view that both neorealist and liberal tendencies give form to the Russian foreign policy under both external and domestic factors. Kuchins, internationally known expert on Russian foreign and

¹² Ibid., p.40

¹³ Eric Shiraev, *Russian Government and Politics: Comparative Government and Politics*, (Newyork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.272

¹⁴ Roger E. Kanet, "Introduction: The Consolidation of Russia's Role in World Affairs" in *Russia: Re-emerging World Power*, ed. Roger E. Kanet, (Newyork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),p..1-3

domestic policies, and Zagorsky, Russian scholar in the field of Northeast Asia argue in their research paper titled “When Realism and Liberalism Coincide: Russian Views of U.S. Alliances in Asia” that Russia’s foreign policy in general and regional policies in the Asia-Pacific are informed by both realist balance-of-power considerations and liberal idealist or multilateral interdependence considerations.¹⁵ They conclude that which of these two frameworks comes to dominate in Russian policymaking in the future will depend to a considerable extent on Russian domestic political factors, and the external environment mainly the policies of China, Japan, and most significantly the United States. Similarly, Rangsimaporn argues that while the desire to counterbalance US unilateralism informs Russian perceptions and advocacy of multipolarity globally, the complex and fluid balance of power in a multipolar Asia-Pacific complicates Russian perceptions and policies in the region directing Russia to apply both neo-realist and liberal-constructivist approaches in the region.¹⁶

On the other hand, Richard Sakwa in his book titled “Putin: Russia’s choice” defines the Russia’s post-cold war policies within the framework of a “new realism” which asserts Russia’s national interests while integrating into the world community. Sakwa argues that Russian foreign policy has long been located in the realist tradition, however post-cold war realities has altered the main paradigms of Russian foreign policy, and while Russia is still holding to the notion of “great power” status, its broad aim is not to set itself up as an alternative, or to forge alliances to counter the U.S. unipolarity, but to create a system based on the autonomy of the sovereign states.¹⁷ Vladimir Petrovsky a Russian scholar and Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union between 1986-1991 argues that in the post-cold war period, the regional level priorities of Russia’s foreign policy have been a stable and safe international environment where its military, political, and economic positions in the world arena can be promoted and secured by employing regional cooperation

¹⁵ Andrew Kuchins, Alexei Zagorsky, “When Realism and Liberalism Coincide: Russian Views of U.S. Alliances in Asia”, *Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University*, July 1999, p.23 online at <http://sygdom.info/pdf/coincide/1.pdf> (accessed on 03.11.2011)

¹⁶ Paradorn Rangsimaporn, “Russian Perceptions and Policies in a Multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 9, 2009, pp. 207–244

¹⁷ Richard Sakwa, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, (London: Routledge, 2008), p.274

mechanisms.¹⁸ In Petrovsky's view, the basic Russian goal in the Asia-Pacific region can be described as a desire for closer integration into existing multilateral institutions promoting regional security and economic cooperation as well as greater bilateral cooperation with the region's other major powers: China, Japan, and the United States.

Contrary to the views of scholars who claim that Russia has emerged as a major power in the Asia-Pacific Region, this thesis argues that Russia's strategy of becoming a great power in the Asia-Pacific Region has considerable limitations stemming from its competitive and assertive policies that ignore the role of multilateralism and international cooperation. Although Russia has been actively engaged in the region at the bilateral level and through its participation in the regional organizations in the post-cold war era, and put substantial efforts to become an important component of the Asia-Pacific Region, this region has its own particular dynamics which necessitate a greater level of regional economic integration and a liberal approach to multilateralism rather than a realist "power politics" approach. Russia's policy of aligning itself with China militarily in the region has counterproductive consequences as it intensifies geopolitical competition in the region, and marginalizes Moscow further while at the same time reinforcing existing divisions. This thesis is based on a liberal institutionalist theoretical framework as opposed to political realism which neglects the role of regional economic cooperation.

The Asia-Pacific Region is beginning to re-emerge as a significant actor in global affairs, the economic and political arrangements in the region are crossing philosophical lines, and the people and nations within the Asian-Pacific region are energizing and mobilizing the region to meet their present and future interests.¹⁹ Although the U.S. dominance in the Pacific affairs, and its role as the guarantor of security is widely accepted as a given fact, the regional interests are no longer

¹⁸ Andrew Kuchins, Alexei Zagaorsky, "The Russian Federation and Asian Security: Marginalization or Integration" Paper presented at *the Conference on America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia*, Stanford University, August 1998, p.7

¹⁹ Randall Doyle, *Geography, Hegemony and Politics in the Asia-Pacific*, (Maryland: University Press of America, 2009), p.19

viewed as secondary or peripheral to the interests of the US or other major powers such as China. The regional countries are divided by geography, history, religion, size, relative power and by some other issues, however they have found enough common ground to make common regional interests promoted by institutions and organizations. In this new line of understanding, the Cold War era is over for the nations of Asia-Pacific. They try to encourage more cooperative attitudes in the region, to promote engagement over containment, and to prevent domination of the region by any power through these evolving cooperation mechanisms. This is undeniable fact that there is cooperation as well as competition; and efforts of containment and confrontation among major powers are observed in the relations of the US-China, China-Japan, China-India in the Asia-Pacific. Aware of these great power politics, majority of regional countries put their utmost effort into effective functioning of Intra-Asia-Pacific organizations such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the six-party talks, as well as track two mechanisms such as the Shangri-La Dialogue or the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue. These are seen as principal instruments to advance a cooperative approach in the region without dominance of any power.

Under these circumstances, Russia needs to embrace a new understanding to project influence in the region. The policy of containing the US preeminence in the region while increasing its own power base through forming alliances with major powers cannot be a long-term strategic policy to gain influence in the Asia-Pacific. The countries of the Asia-Pacific do not want to be caught between rival powers, or to be forced to choose sides while they aim to cooperate and integrate to meet the political, economic and security challenges they face in the 21st century as a rising region. In this context, Russia can be more successful in its quest to become a major power in the Asia-Pacific if its policies are centered on the cooperation through regional mechanisms instead of on forming alliances with China, and to some extent with India, other two powers which aim to challenge the perceived U.S. hegemony in the region.

Based on this liberal institutional theoretical framework this thesis will employ the following methodology in examining Russia's policies in the Asia-Pacific Region.

The thesis will analyze the official documents about Russian Foreign policy and international legal documents on the developments in the Asia-Pacific Region. The thesis will also examine joint declarations and press statements, made during the high level visits and summits, as well as speeches and interviews given by the Russian leaders. The thesis will explore foreign policy concept papers of the Russian Federation. I also examined the some issues of leading newspaperpapers in order to analyze media coverage of the developments in the region. Besides, the secondary sources including articles, books and think-thank reports written by the prominent scholars on the development on these topics have been surveyed in detail.

Before the actual policy initiatives are discussed the origins of Russia's presence in the Asia-Pacific will be examined in the second chapter of the thesis. Firstly a historical background to Russia's entry into region will be given. In the later parts of the second chapter, the policies of the three Presidents of Russian Federation in the APR will be discussed. It will be observed that after an initial period of pro-Western approach during the Boris Yeltsin's first term presidency, the three Russian leaders, and political establishment committed themselves with varying degrees to the resurgence of Russia as a great power in a new multipolar world order. The Asia-Pacific emerged as an important component of Russia's general strategy aiming to create a multipolar world where Russia's interests and security needs will not be challenged by the U.S.

In the third chapter of the thesis, the sources of Russia's increasing interest in the Asia-Pacific Region will be analyzed under the political, economic and security headlines. It will be noted that it was only natural for Russia whose 60 percent of territory lies in Asia to turn its attention to the Asia-Pacific Region after the barriers of the cold-war were removed. The Asia-Pacific Region has taken a central role in shaping the Russia's post-cold war policy formulations. Since the development of Far East and Siberia and its effective integration into the Asia-Pacific Region is one of the main concerns of the Russian government, this issue will be analyzed more in depth than the other factors in the end of the third chapter.

In the fourth chapter of the thesis, Russia's relations with the major actors of the region will be analyzed. I will focus on the bilateral relations of Russia with four principal countries in the region, the US, China, Japan and India. The relations with

South Korea, Australia and New Zealand as well as Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, old cold-war allies of Russia will be summarized. The attention will be drawn to the strategies of Russian Federation to achieve a strategic partnership with China through close bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

The fifth chapter will outline Russia's relations with regional organizations. In this context, Russia's entrance to APEC, ASEAN+10, ARF, EAS, ASEAN Defense Ministers+8 meetings; their basic aims and functions will be examined. Non-governmental mechanisms will also be mentioned. RIC and BRIC cooperation processes will be also in the scope of this chapter. In the fifth chapter, I will also underline that Russia's chairmanship of APEC in 2012 is expected to contribute to its integration with the Asia-Pacific region.

In the final chapter, the thesis will assess the process through which Russian foreign policy has come to today's stance in the APR. The thesis will conclude that while the Russian Federation aims to increase its global importance through an influential presence in the Asia Pacific region, the policies it employs are not fully in accordance with the regional realities. Although Russia forged closer and diversified relations both with main actors of the APR, and regional bodies, Russia's integration into the Asia-Pacific has been dependent on China. Russia sought China's collaboration to obtain a legitimate political and military presence in the region. In the light of post cold-war developments, and of their implications in the Asia-Pacific Region, Russia needs a more independent and cooperative policy in the region to achieve its goal of becoming a major power. Russia should employ more independent policies in the region since the relationship among principal powers in the region such as United States, China, Japan, India are fluctuous and have a very complex nature; choosing alignment with China over a balanced relationship with all the major actors will limit the area of maneuver for Russia in its relationship with the other principal powers, and lead to a strained relationship with middle powers which do not want cold-war era type blocs that can create obstacles to regional integration.

As it is noted above, Asia-Pacific countries mainly desire a new regional order shaped to a far greater extent by the countries of the region itself in which dominance of one power or power blocs could not influence regional politics by

giving prominence to the interests of particular nations over others. Although the presence of the U.S. is still mostly welcomed as a security guarantee against the threats such as instability in Korean peninsula, South China Sea disputes, re-militarization of Japan; the regional countries aim to establish an effective regional cooperation where the rivalries between the US and China, or China and other major powers would not impede regional integration which will make Asia-Pacific a more prosperous, stable and influential region. Given this preoccupation of majority of regional countries about the rivalry among major powers, Russia should be able to carry on independent policies rather than alignment with China to gain an influential position in the evolving regional architecture.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA'S POLICIES TOWARDS ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, origins of Russia's presence in the Asia-Pacific region will be examined. In this context, a summary of historical presence of Russia in the Asia-Pacific Region from 17th Century to the post-cold war era will be given, and the policies of three post-cold war Presidents of the Russian Federation will be discussed.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background to the examination of Russian post-cold war policies in the APR, and to try to ascertain continuities and differences in the Russian policies before and after the cold war in the region.

In the following section Russia's expansion towards Pacific region, establishment of Russian Far East and Siberia Governorates, first encounters with regional powers, consequences of two world wars for Russia in the region, and cold-war period will be examined. In the third chapter, Boris Yeltsin's policies towards Asia-Pacific, as the first President of Russian Federation, will be analyzed. The fourth section will define the policies of President Putin towards Asia-Pacific. The last section will review the Dmitry Medvedev's approach to the Region during his presidency.

2.2. Historical Origins (17th century - 1991)

Russia involved in Pacific arena since 17th century. Since the founding of the port of Okhotsk in 1647, located in the Russian Far East, Russia sought to expand its naval power into the North Pacific Ocean.²⁰ Russians did not meet important resistance in their expansion from the local population, and signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk with

²⁰ Daryl Morini, "Putin's Pacific Power: An Asia-Pacific Strategy for the Twenty-First Century", paper presented at *Fourth Oceanic Conference for International Studies (OCIS)*, 2010, p. 7

China in 1689 by which China recognized Russian authority in the most of Siberia while reserving the area around the eastern Amur River for China.²¹ The Russian colonization of Siberia all the way to the Pacific coast continued without hindrance during the next 150 years. In this process, the Russian Empire modernized its state administration on the European model, built a new army and started a navy, consolidated its control of Siberia, established Siberian Governorate in 1708, and further extended its rule across the Bering Strait into Alaska, known then as “Russian America”.²²

After the Crimean War of 1854–56, Russia’s priorities shifted away from the Northeast Pacific. Alaska was sold to the United States in 1867.²³ The central and northern Kurils were handed over to Japan in exchange for Sakhalin in 1875. Russia concentrated on Siberia and Russian Far East regions. In 1884, the Transbaikal, Amur, Primorye, and Sakhalin districts were united under a new Primorskiy governor-generalship. This established an institutional framework for the regional identity of the Far East. Starting in 1894, the Primorye region became a staging ground for Russian penetration into Manchuria.

Russia's longstanding desire for a Pacific port was realized with the foundation of Vladivostok (which means literally “rule the East”) in 1860 following “Beijing Treaty” with which China ceded the territory to the Russians changing the demarcation of border by the Treaty of Nerchinsk.²⁴ By 1880, Vladivostok had grown into a major port city, and the lack of adequate transportation links between European Russia and its Far Eastern provinces soon became an important problem. To overcome this problem, Trans-Siberian Railway which links two parts of the Empire was completed in 1905. The Trans-Siberian Railroad brought European and Asian Russia together. Ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Tatars moved to the Far

²¹ Charles E. Ziegler, “The History of Russia”, (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press,2009), p.35

²² “Russian America”, online at <http://history.howstuffworks.com/american-history/history-of-alaska2.htm> (accessed on 26.12.2011)

²³ “Milestones:1866-1898, Purchase of Alaska”, website of the US Government, online at <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/AlaskaPurchase> (accessed on 25.12. 2011)

²⁴ “Russia’s Transsiberian Railway”, online at <http://www.geographia.com/russia/trasib01.htm> (accessed on 28 .12.2011)

East, where they were also Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese residing within the governor- Primorskiy. This ethnic mix shaped regional development.

During the 1850's, the Chinese Qing Dynasty stagnated and assaulted by European powers. Russia entered into the competition with the European powers to gain further territories from China. Russia signed the treaties of 1858, 1860, and 1864 with a weak China which added some 1.5 million square kilometers to the Russian Empire.²⁵ After the foundation of Peoples Republic of China, 19th Century border agreements were challenged by Chinese leaders. The exact location of the border remained an area of contention throughout the 20th century. Beginning in the 1960s, the Chinese demanded that the Soviet Union evacuate the disputed regions. In 1969 the two countries entered into an armed conflict over territorial issues. Following the end of the cold-war Russian Federation wanted to secure stable and cooperative relations with its neighbors when the transition was taking place at home after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia and China reached an agreement on “ Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas”. China and Russia along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the Agreement in 1997.²⁶ The issue of disputed territories along the 4300 km long Russia-China border were solved in a final agreement after 40 years of negotiations in 2008.²⁷

The source of controversy with Japan existed over the status of Sakhalin Island, a large island northwest of Hokkaido, and over Kuril islands group which populated by both Russians and Japanese. The first Russian-Japanese agreement to deal with the status of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda which also established first official relations between Russia and Japan.²⁸ In 1875, Japan and Russia agreed that Japan would give Sakhalin Island to Russia in exchange for 18

²⁵ Liz Bagot and Josh Wilson, “The Russian Far East Gateway to Asia”, online at http://www.sras.org/russian_far_east(accessed on 20.11. 2011)

²⁶ “Sino-Soviet Border”, *Global Security*, online at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/prc-soviet.htm> (accessed on 17.12. 2011)

²⁷ Li Xiaokun, “China, Russia, sign border agreement”, *China Daily*, 22 July 201, online at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-07/22/content_6865847.htm (accessed on 10.01.2012)

²⁸ Natalia Narochnitskaya, “Who rightfully owns the Kuril Islands”, *New Easter Outlook*, 01.02.2010, online at <http://journal-neo.com/?q=print/108> (accessed 16.12.2011)

Kuril Islands. Following the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, Japan regained control of south Sakhalin. In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution of 1917, Japan also occupied the Russian part of Sakhalin.

Meanwhile, the competition between Russia and Japan for controlling Manchuria led to the 1905 war. In 1910's the U.S. also joined in the rivalry for Manchuria promoting an "open door" policy, which meant the international use of Russian and Japanese concessions in the region. Russia and Japan strongly opposed the plan and signed secret conventions against the U.S in 1907 and in 1910. However, after 1917 Bolshevik Revolution the new Soviet government decided to withdraw from the war against Germany in early 1918, with this development the era of Japanese-Russian rapprochement came to an end.²⁹ Russian Empire's collapse gave Japanese military leaders the opportunity to enter into the Russian Far East. The occupation was called "the Siberian Intervention", and realized together with allied forces (the U.S. and Britain) with the aim of instating a pro-allied White Russian Government in the region.³⁰ The allied occupation under the Japanese leadership began in 1918 and lasted until 1925 (although allied forces were withdrawn from the mainland in 1922, Japanese forces remained in northern Sakhalin until 1925).³¹ After the withdrawal of allied forces, the Far Eastern Republic was incorporated into the Soviet Union on December 30, 1922. The negotiations between the Soviet Union and Japan were completed with signing of a treaty of recognition in January 1925. In return for Japan returning northern Sakhalin, the Soviet government recognized the validity of the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty and granted Japanese companies oil and coal concessions on Sakhalin.³² In the meantime the U.S., Britain, Japan and France attended Washington Conference to limit the naval arms race and prepare security agreements in the Pacific. The Soviet Union and Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) which was representative of China were not invited to the Washington Conference signaling an isolation of Soviet Union and China by western powers.

²⁹ Joseph P. Ferguson, *Japanese-Russian Relations: 1905–2007*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p.14

³⁰ Benjamin Isitt, "Siberian Intervention" online at , http://www.isitt.ca/content/Isitt_Siberian-Intervention.pdf , accessed on 23.04.2012

³¹ Joseph Ferguson, *op.cit*, p.17

³² *Ibid*, p.25

In the 1920's the Chinese Revolution that began in 1911 was still going on. The leader of KMT SunYat-sen was trying to unify the country against the growing power of regional warlords. After the revolution of 1917, the new Soviet government cooperated with KMT, rejected all past Tsarist policies and promised to give up all claims on China, including the Chinese Eastern Railroad in Manchuria. Until the US started to support KMT in the Chinese civil war in 1941, the Soviet Union financially and politically continued to back the KMT.³³ While the Chinese civil war was ongoing, Japanese army subjected Manchuria to Japanese control in 1931. This led to Japanese-Soviet border skirmishes along the Manchurian and Mongolian borders escalating by the late 1930s.³⁴

The Far East's distance from the center, its low population density in the 1930s, the increasing numbers of Japanese forces in Manchuria intensified insecurities in the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities responded to Japanese threat with their own military build-up and a renewed emphasis on establishing permanent settlers as the first line of defense.³⁵ A voluntary resettlement campaign was started aimed at explaining the strategic importance of the region, the need to exploit its natural resources and the urgency of fortifying it against Japan. Close to 300,000 individuals volunteered to be resettled in the Far East. The public perception was created that the Japanese were well on their way to establishing a Manchurian concessions with the intention of using it as "a platform for war against the Soviet Union."³⁶ This resettlement campaign helped to the success of Red Army against the Japan in the late 1930's. During the 1941-1945 Russia and Japan remained neutral based on a bilateral agreement of 1941. The ultimate breakdown in Japanese-Soviet relations occurred when Red Army forces invaded Manchuria on August 8, 1945 joining the War in the camp of the Allied Forces.

³³ *Ibid*, p.26

³⁴ *Ibid*, p.28

³⁵ Elena Schulman, "Those Who Hurry to the Far East " in *Peopling the Russian Periphery*, eds. Nicholas B. Breyfogle, Abby Schrader and Willard Sunderland, (Oxon: Routledge, 2007) , p. 214

³⁶ *Ibid*, p.216

Following World War II, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 with allied powers. Under the treaty, Japan had to give up all its claims to the Kuril Islands. However, the treaty did not recognize sovereignty of the Soviet Union over the islands. The Northern Kuril Islands, the four closest to Japan - Shikotan, Etorofu, Kunashiri and Habomai- became a source of conflict for two countries. Russia did not sign the San Francisco Treaty, and Japan claimed that “these four islands” were not part of the Kuril Islands chain. Since that time, the Soviet Union has become Russia, which has agreed to re-examine the issue of the Kurils. However “the Northern Kuril Islands” (for Russia Southern Kurils) issue remains unresolved.

Another historical event which linked the Russia to today’s security problems in the region was the Korean War. The Soviet Union occupied North Korea in the name of the Allied Forces along with Manchuria ending Japanese occupation, and helped establish a communist state in the North Korea.³⁷ The Korean War of 1950-53 created two states with two different ideologies and systems. North Korea became a Soviet ally while South became a U.S. ally. North Korea has become a source of instability for the whole region since it started its nuclear program in 1980’s.

In the economic sphere, the eastern parts of the Russia played an important role in East Asia from the end of the nineteenth century through the years leading up to the World War I. It attracted loans and investments that supported its industrialization. Although economic interaction between the region and the rest of Russia was limited, the Far East was open for relations with Asian countries. Labor resources were satisfied by migration not only from the European part of Russia but also from China, Korea, and Japan. In general, the region was seen as a place for agriculture, exile, and a base for the Russian Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok. During the early Soviet period, the region, known as the Far Eastern Republic, developed as a relatively autonomous economic area. However, in the 1930s Moscow adopted a model of centralized state control and support. The Soviet system imposed a centrally planned economy, limiting the region’s economic ties with the outside world. The central government provided substantial economic support because of the geostrategic

³⁷ “Origins of Korean War”, online at http://warchronicle.com/korea/origin_war.htm (accessed on 15.01.2012)

significance of the region, but it paid little attention to the long-term development of the Far Eastern economy, a negligence which created repercussions still felt today.

Within the Cold War geostrategic understanding, the Far Eastern region had an almost exclusively military significance in Asia-Pacific, the Soviet Union saw the region as a vulnerable frontier in continuous need of military protection as it was perceived in the history.³⁸ Economically, in contrast to the increasing cooperation among the capitalist countries of the Asia-Pacific, the Soviet Far East's ties to its regional neighbors were extremely limited. Moreover, any desire among the local leaders to develop closer ties with their Asian-Pacific neighbors was subordinated to the Soviet Union's development strategy based on a geographical division of labor, with its Far Eastern region serving basically as a supplier of natural resources for the country's industrialization and producer of military-industrial products to meet the country's defense needs.³⁹

In this context, the Soviet Union concentrated on the development of mining and defense industries in the Far East. Meanwhile, the massive Soviet arms buildup in the Far East and the Pacific was a source of concern for China, Japan, and South Korea. By the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet border was closed due to the tension, and in 1969 a border conflict worsened the relations. This hostile environment was not conducive to economic contacts in the region further limiting ties of Russian Far East with neighboring countries. However in 1970's, Soviet authorities eased the central control of the Siberia and Far East, and encouraged an export-based development strategy opening the way for contact with China and Japan. By the mid-1980s the Far East began to reorient from a military outpost gradually to an economic player.

During the cold war economically and politically the Soviet Union saw the APR and its own Asia-Pacific territories from the prism of the cold war realities. The Soviet Union, the West and the U.S. although allies in the Pacific zone of the World War

³⁸ Tsuneo Akaha, "Introduction: Politics and Economics of the Russian Far East" in *Politics and Economics of the Russian Far East Changing Ties with the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Tsuneo Akaha, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. xix

³⁹ *Ibid*, p.xix

II, soon fell on the different camps in the aftermath of the end of the war. Establishment of communist regimes in China and North Korea, and the following Korean war changed the U.S. strategical thinking and its approach to the Soviet Union in the region. Japan was given central status in the US Asia strategy focusing on securing Japan within the Western bloc and assuring a long-term US military presence in this country. The San Francisco Peace Treaty also reflected these new approach and left territorial problems in the region unresolved creating frontiers of conflict which still mainly exist today.

The Soviet Union based its policy in the region on bilateral relations with its ideological allies, and challenged the U.S. presence as the leader of the opposite pole. The U.S., on the other hand, formed a network of bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand. During the course of the Cold War, the two sides confronted each other at the Korean and Vietnam Wars in the Asia-Pacific . Both Japan and the Soviet Union had actively participated, in auxiliary roles, in the Korean war. Japan was America's major supply base; the Soviet Union was the major supplier of hardware to both the North Korean and Chinese forces fighting on the peninsula.⁴⁰ During the Vietnam War the Soviet Union also supplied North Vietnam with military apparatus in its fight against South and the U.S. military. The Soviet Union remained political and economic supporter of North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos during the Cold War.

The U.S. attempts in 1950's and 1960's to establish a multilateral security system like NATO in the APR region did not come to a conclusion. The U.S., only succeeded to lead the formation of SEATO (South East Treaty Organization) which included the U.S., United Kingdom, Australia as well as their allies in the region. SEATO lasted from 1955 to 1975.⁴¹ With the establishment of communist regimes in unified Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the SEATO was dissolved in 1977. The U.S. initiated other formation in Southeast Asia, ASEAN, established by the U.S. allies in 1967. ASEAN based its existence on a need for the non-communist Southeast Asian states to band together, so as to guard against a common perceived

⁴⁰ Joseph P. Ferguson, *Japanese-Russian Relations, 1907–2007*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p.36

⁴¹ "Southeast Treaty Organization", online at <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/SEATO> (accessed on 12.11.2011)

communist threat, and excluded all non-western oriented countries in the region like Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.

As it was noted above, forced by the external conditions, the Soviet Union relied on bilateralism in its managing of regional affairs throughout cold-war years.⁴² The end of the Cold War set off a series of changes that profoundly impacted Asia-Pacific. The freeze in relationships among the nations of the region belonging to the different ideological camps softened allowing the enlargement and reshaping of existing regional mechanisms such as ASEAN, APEC, and establishment of new ones like ARF, EAS, ASEM, and the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula. Following the end of the cold war Vietnam was admitted to ASEAN in 1995, Laos and Myanmar also became members in 1997, Cambodia became a member of the group in 1999 completing today's 10 member ASEAN structure which encompasses entire region without ideological divisions. China, Japan, Russia and the U.S. have, for the first time in the region's history, have become members of the same groupings in Asia-Pacific.

2.3. Russia's Approach to Asia-Pacific Region Under Boris Yeltsin (1991-2000)

In spite of the fact that the disintegration of the Soviet Union objectively shifted the geo-strategic centre of Russia to the east, initially there was a marked decline in Moscow's interest in the Asia-Pacific region.

There were several reasons. First, the liberal, pro-Western government of the Russian Federation made relations with the United States and Europe its first priority. Secondly, the Russian government suddenly abandoned its former close Asia-Pacific friends - North Korea, Vietnam, and India - without replacing them with other countries in the region. Thirdly, Japan was targeted as new major partner in the region which led to neglect of the other countries.⁴³ Russian leaders assumed

⁴² Remy Davison, "Introduction: The New Global Politics of Asia Pacific", in *The New Global Politics of the Asia-Pacific*, eds, Michael Kelly Connors, Rémy Davison, Jörn Dosch, (Oxon: Routledge&Curzon., 2004), pp.1-6

⁴³ Rouben Azizian, "Russia in Asia, Unwelcome Intruder or Accommodative Player", Working Paper, No: 16, /00 Center for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 2000, p.4

that by giving two of disputed four Kuril Islands they could come to easy agreement with Japan.

However, the disappointment with the West and Japan's unyielding positions on the disputed four Kuril islands and accompanying reluctance to develop economic relations with Russia caused a shift in the foreign policy of Russia. Between late 1992 and early 1993, Russia intended to balance the pro-American and pro-European tilt in its foreign policy and launched a more active diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. The view was becoming prevailing among the Russian leadership that both the Asian part of Russia and the Asia-Pacific region were of increasing importance for the development of Russia. Boris Yeltsin declared during a visit to Seoul in November 1992 that "Russian diplomacy must follow the spirit of the old Russian emblem on which a two-headed eagle is depicted looking both westwards and eastwards."⁴⁴

The Russian Security Council's document of May 1993 stated that the country's foreign policy priorities included the development of balanced and stable relations with all countries, especially the US, China, Japan and India. The paper also stressed the urgency of consolidating the breakthrough achieved in relations with China - "the region's most important state in geo-political and economic terms".⁴⁵ It was one of the early signs of Russia's approachment to China as an ally in the Asia-Pacific affairs.

President Yeltsin's address to the Federation Council on National Security in June 1996 referred to the Asia-Pacific region as Russia's third priority after the CIS and Western Europe but before the United States.⁴⁶ In the document, the need for maximizing Russia's involvement in regional political, economic and military bodies, including joint activities aimed at developing Siberia and the Far East was underlined. First priority was given to strategic partnership with China. The

⁴⁴ Ibid, p.6

⁴⁵ Ibid ,p. 10

⁴⁶ "The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy", online at <http://countrystudies.us/russia/77.htm> (accessed on 10.12.2011)

document also called for more arduous effort in order to conclude a peace treaty and establish cooperation with Japan.

President Yeltsin went to China 1992, 1996, 1999 on official visits. During his visit in 1996 the two countries decided on the establishment of a strategic cooperation partnership. A year later during President Jiang Zemin's visit to Russia, both sides issued a 'Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International Order', which declared that both countries would 'strive to promote the multipolarisation of the world' and made a concealed criticism of the US's interference in Russia's and China's internal affairs.⁴⁷ Russia and China institutionalized regular meetings between premiers of the two countries in 1996.⁴⁸ President Yeltsin, as the President of Russian Federation did his first visits to India and Japan in 1993. In an effort to reach a formal peace treaty, and develop bilateral relations Russia and Japan established annual political consultations at Foreign Minister level in 1994. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and South Korea in 1991, President Yeltsin visited South Korea in 1992, the first visit by a Moscow leader to the South Korean capital.⁴⁹

Besides the efforts to improve the relations with the neighboring countries at the eastern borders, Russia embarked upon in establishing structural relations with the regional bodies. During the Yeltsin's presidency, Russia has participated in the ARF as a founding member in 1994 and was accepted as a full member of the APEC in 1998. Russia's dialogue with ASEAN which was initiated in 1991 as subsequently elevated to full Dialogue Partnership in 1996.

⁴⁷ Bobo Lo, "The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia's Evolving China Policy", *International Affairs*, Vol.80, No., March 2004, p.295

⁴⁸ "Backgrounder: Major events in Sino-Russian relations", Xinhua Net, 3 March 2010, online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/database/2010-03/20/c_13218328.htm (accessed on 15.01.2012)

⁴⁹ Sam Jameson, "S. Korea Abduction Eclipses Yeltsin Visit", *Los Angeles Times*, 19 November 1992, online at http://articles.latimes.com/1992-11-19/news/mn-948_1_ruling-party, (accessed on 15.01.2012)

2.4. Russia's Approach to Asia-Pacific Region Under Vladimir Putin (2000-2008)

Following the years of post-cold war decline in international arena, Russia, during the Putin's presidency, put a substantial effort into proving that Russia mattered internationally.⁵⁰ Putin's policy aimed to achieve the great power status which Russia lost following disintegration of USSR. Estrangement from the West and need to reassert Russian power elsewhere turned Russia's attention to Asia.

However, statements issuing great-power aspirations would have remained unconvincing if Russia did not have the necessary qualities to become one. Russia would have to build up its power first in order to be taken seriously in East Asia and globally. Putin's aim was to make Russia great power, turning Russia into a strong and respectable member of the international community. He emphasized economic modernization and development as the foundation for restoring Russia's greatness.⁵¹ In December 1999 in his political treatise before becoming President, he asserted that 'Russia was and will remain a great power, conditioned by the inherent qualities of its geopolitical, economic, and cultural essence'.⁵²

In February 2000, Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin outlined the three main goals of post-Yeltsin Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis the Asia-Pacific. First, Moscow seeks "maximum participation in international security structures" to help ensure "stability and predictability" in that region. Second, it aims for the security of its borders and the introduction of long-term confidence-building measures. And third, it wants to establish political and economic relations with all countries of the region that would help promote the development of Russia's Far East. With regard to the latter goal, Karasin pointed to the realization of projects in the energy, transport, and high-technology sectors.⁵³

⁵⁰ Jeffrey Mankov, *Russian Foreign Policy: The return of Great Power Politics*, (Maryland:Rowman&Littlefield, 2009), p. 7

⁵¹ Andrei P.Tsygankov, New Challenges for Putin's Foreign Policy, *Foreign Policy Research Institute, ORBIS*, Winter 2006, page153

⁵² Fiona Hill, Clifford G.Gaddy, "Putin and Uses of the History" *National Interest*, 4 January 2012, online at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/putin-the-uses-history-6276?page=show> (accessed on 18.01.2012)

In the framework of these goals, President Putin developed stronger ties with the major countries of the region. China figured as the closest partner both regionally and globally. President Putin went to Beijing four times during his two terms of presidency in 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006, while his Chinese counterpart also visited Russia four times at bilateral level establishing a practice of annual visits at the highest level. In 2001 Russia and China signed the “Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation”.⁵⁴

Russia and India also established the practice of regular high level visits first of which was President Putin’s state visit to India in December 2000. Russia and India, during the visit, signed “Declaration on the Russia India Strategic Partnership” which has become most important reference point in their relationship.⁵⁵ Russia tried to include India in Russian-Chinese partnership to oppose the US unilateralism, and to form an “anti-hegemonic” coalition in the region.⁵⁶ In the process of developing closer relations with India, President Putin paid further visits to New Delhi in 2002, 2004 and 2006. The declaration of 2000 also institutionalized regular policy consultations at Deputy Foreign Minister level. The RIC (Russia-India-China) cooperation was started in 2002 thanks to the substantial Russian efforts. The RIC process added a new dimension to Russia-China, Russia-India bilateral relations as well as creating tripartite cooperation to promote a more plural world order. Japan and South Korea as well as North Korea were other countries President Putin sought to improve the relations.

President Putin went to Japan during the first year of his Presidency; the second visit was realized in 2005 which also marked the 150th anniversary of signature of the Treaty of Shimoda, the first between two countries. The unofficial Summit Meetings on the sidelines of multilateral meetings have also taken place almost yearly since

⁵⁴ “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation”, 07.24.2001, online at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm> (accessed on 18.01.2012)

⁵⁵ “India-Russia Relations”, online at <http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=50044518> (accessed on 20.01.2012)

⁵⁶ Ambrosio, op.ed., p.85

2000 during which the Kuril Islands issue, joint development of the Far East and Siberia and energy cooperation are reviewed.⁵⁷

The relations with South Korea was further strengthened during President Putin's presidency. He went to South Korea in 2001 and 2005, while also visited North Korea in 2000. North Korea visit marked a historical event as a first trip by a Soviet or Russian leader to North Korea, the trip helped reestablish ties with North Korea which became strained after the diplomatic recognition of and closer ties with South Korea.⁵⁸

While strengthening ties with China, India, Japan and South Korea at the bilateral level, President Vladimir Putin has also tried to enhance the relations with ASEAN and other regional organizations during his presidency. Russia upgraded relations with ASEAN by signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC, 2004) and by inaugurating the annual Russia-ASEAN Summits (2005). Russia also showed its interest to become part of the East Asia Summit (EAS), and President Putin attended the First EAS Summit in December 2005 in Malaysia as the Guest of the Government of Malaysia. President Putin, at his address to the EAS, stated that "Our country, as an integral part of the Asia-Pacific region, supports peace, security and constructive cooperation throughout the entire region. We do not seek unilateral benefits. Our credo in Asia is an equal partnership and mutual benefits" and expressed Russia's willingness to take part in the Organization's activities.⁵⁹ Putin paid special attention to the better integration of Russia into APEC mechanisms, in this respect personally took part in the APEC Summits. The

⁵⁷ "Japan-Russia Relations-Summit Meetings", website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, online at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/> (accessed on 21 January 2012)

⁵⁸ "Putin's Visit to North Korea: A Breakthrough?", *The James Town Foundation*, Vol.6, Issue.142, 21 July 2000, online at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=22206 (accessed on 17.01.2012)

⁵⁹ "President Vladimir Putin took part in the inaugural East Asia Summit, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, December 14, 2005, *Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*, online at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/f68cd37b84711611c3256f6d00541094/627aeded1651bee0c32570d8002b9ed4?OpenDocument(accessed on 15.11. 2011)

important decision with regard to hosting APEC 2012 in Vladivostok was also taken during his presidency.

2.5. Russia's Approach to Asia-Pacific Region Under of Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012)

Under the leadership of Dmitry Medvedev Russia has not abandoned its claim to great power status, however reevaluated what made a state a great power in 21st century. Medvedev made modernization the center point of Russia's efforts to restore Russia's international position. His modernization agenda aimed at reconstructing Russia's economy, encouraging competition, breaking up the monopolies, promoting high-technology and high-value added industries, all of which required good relations with the technologically advanced countries of both the West and East.⁶⁰ Medvedev stressed the importance of development of Russian Far East and Siberia as an indispensable undertaking in the process of Russia's modernization. Closer bilateral relations with Asian-Pacific countries and stronger integration into region's regional cooperation mechanisms have been seen as critical factors to reach modernization in the Russian Far East and Siberia.

Bilateral relations between Russia and major powers of the region remained a high priority for President Medvedev. The relations with China has had the central place. President Medvedev, after he was sworn in as President on 7 May 2008, paid his first foreign official visit outside CIS Countries to China on 27-29 May 2008.⁶¹ President Medvedev's choice of China as the first major destination can be seen as a continuation of President Putin's foreign policy direction during his second term presidency. President Putin also made his first foreign trip to China after he commenced his second term in August 2004. The Russian and Chinese leaders also had bilateral meetings on the margins of the multilateral events such as BRICs Leaders Meetings, the SCO Summits, and APEC and G-20 meetings. During President Medvedev's last bilateral visit to China on 26-28 September 2010 "Joint

⁶⁰ Jeffrey Mankov, *op.cit.*, p. 7

⁶¹ Li Xiaokun, "Medvedev's visit to consolidate Ties", *China Daily*, 21 May 2008, online at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-05/21/content_6700460.htm(accessed on 12.01.2012)

Statement on Comprehensively Deepening the Strategic Partnership and Coordination” was issued.⁶²

President Medvedev pursued the same policy of close cooperation with India, and during his 2010 trip to India the countries concluded a series of agreements on defense, space, energy and trade.⁶³ Russia and South Korea relations gained a new dimension with the initiation of “Russia-Korea Dialog Forum” in 2010 presided at the Presidential level.⁶⁴ Russia- Japan political relations, however, have become strained over Kuril Islands issue, and no bilateral visit was paid during the Medvedev’s term as President. Although no official visit was paid, President Medvedev and Japanese Prime Minister had Summit Meetings in 2009 on the occasion of Prime Minister Taro Aso’s visit to Sakhalin to attend the start-up ceremony of the liquefied natural gas plant of the Sakhalin II Project, and in 2011 on the sidelines of APEC Honolulu Meeting.⁶⁵

President Medvedev continued the policy of closer integration with regional architecture. During his presidency, Medvedev attended the second Russia-ASEAN summit which was held in 2010. At his address to the Second Russia-ASEAN Summit President Dmitry Medvedev underlined the growing importance of the Region by following words:⁶⁶

Today very significant potential is concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region. It already accounts for sixty percent of the global domestic product, half of world trade and about forty percent of total international investment. This reflects the fact that the centre of economic life has broadly shifted here. For these reasons, the

⁶² “China-Russia Bilateral Relations”, *website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China*, online at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjzb/zzjg/dozys/gjlb/3220/> (accessed on 25.01.2012)

⁶³ Rajeev Dharma, “The Significance of Medvedev’s India Visit”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No:4244, 23 December 2010

⁶⁴ Vyacheslav Nikonov, “ Relations With South Korea Are a High Priority For Russia”, Interview by Olga Gorkina, *Russky Mir Foundation Website*, 11 November 2010 , online at <http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/en/publications/interview/interview0027.html> (accessed on 25.11.2011)

⁶⁵ “Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Sakhalin)”, *website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, online at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/> (accessed on 21.01. 2012)

⁶⁶ “Speech at the Second ASEAN-Russia Summit”, October 30, 2010, Kremlin.ru archive, online at <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/1226> (accessed on 29.11.2011)

consideration of mutual interests, as well as building mutually beneficial and equal relations takes on all the more importance for the countries of the region. This approach is shared by many of our partners and we are ready to further develop our relations on the basis of these principles

Likewise Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated in an article published before the ASEAN-Russian Summit that the 21st century will be the century of Asia. He added “Like it or not, time will tell. But the importance and potential of this area of the world, its special role in the destiny of our planet is not in doubt. Perhaps it is here in the AP region that the contours of the new world order are being laid out, a new shape of the system of global governance is emerging”.⁶⁷

At the 17th ASEAN summit in Hanoi in 2010, a decision was made to include both Russia and the US in EAS, and at the 5th EAS, organized concurrently with ASEAN Summit, the member countries officially invited Russia to join the Summit.⁶⁸ Russia has also joined ASEM (Asia – Europe Meeting) dialog mechanism at the 8th Summit of ASEM in 2010⁶⁹, which brings Asia and European Union countries together. Russia’s augmented diplomatic role during Medvedev’s presidency took place concurrently with major progress in the regional architecture and hierarchy of multilateral organizations in the Asia-Pacific Region.

2.6. Conclusion

Russia has been involved in the Asia-Pacific affairs since the 17th century, was an established presence in the region in 18th century, and became a major player in the Asia-Pacific Region by the 19th century along with the European powers and the US. Russia’s expansion towards Pacific was carried out against the interests of China and Japan leading to the confrontation and the war, the effects of which are still observed in the Russian-Japanese relations. Russia emerged victorious from the World War II

⁶⁷ Sergei Lavrov, “There Is Much Russia and ASEAN Can Accomplish Together,” *International Affairs*, Issue No. 10, October 2010, retrieved from official website of Russian Foreign Ministry, online at http://ftp.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/59A052E8F2FBCD30C32577D2004F78 (accessed on 17.12.2011)

⁶⁸ “Chairman’s Statement of East Asia Summit”, Ha Noi, 30 October 2010, online at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/asean/eas/index.html> (accessed on 17.12.2011)

⁶⁹ “Chairs Statement of the 8th Asia –Europe Meeting”, Brussels, 4-5 October 2010, online at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/116887.pdf>

in the Pacific, and became a military superpower globally. During the cold-war years the Soviet Union followed a policy towards Asia-Pacific based on bilateral relations with the ideological allies. The break-up with China in 1950's following Stalin's death further polarized the region hindering region-wide cooperation. The Russian Far East was a critical military outpost of Soviet power in Asia, and both Siberia and the Russian Far East were providers of natural resources to the Soviet Union. Both regions remained mostly isolated from its Asian neighbors, and lacked investment and long-term growth strategy.

End of the cold-war changed the strategical priorities of Russian leaders. On the one hand, Asia-Pacific, without cold-war barriers, emerged as an important region to engage in to create a new multipolar world order in the interests of Russia, on the other hand the region was seen essential for the development of Siberia and Far East.

Russian leaders have had the common understanding that Russia, to successfully carry out reconstruction and modernization at home, and follow a foreign policy abroad based on a multipolar world order, needed a strengthened position in the fast-growing Asia-Pacific region. To this aim they cultivated a regional policy at bilateral level centered on strategic partnership with China, and at multilateral level centered on ASEAN-led regional cooperation mechanisms.

In the following chapter, the sources of Russia's growing interest in the Asia-Pacific region will be analyzed from political, security and economic points of views.

CHAPTER 3

SOURCES OF RUSSIA'S INCREASING INTEREST IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the main reasons of Russia's growing interest in the Asia-Pacific Region will be analyzed from the three main perspectives, namely political, economic and security reasons. The Russian Far East and Siberia will be the topic of a separate section since it contains political, economic and security reasons at once.

The purpose of this chapter is to show how post-cold war realities have changed the perceptions of the Russian policy makers with regard to the region, and how the new perceptions affected the policy making process in the region.

This chapter will begin by exploring political factors behind Russia's interest in the region. Special attention will be given to the concept of "multipolarity" since it has become a main theme in the Russian foreign policy, and in the Russian-Chinese partnership against American dominated unipolarity. Benefits of Russian-Chinese strategic partnership as well as possible challenges it could bring will be examined as an underlying political factor for the involvement of Russia in the region. The following section will give an overview of economic factors. Security-related topics, Korean Peninsula, the US-Japan, the US-South Korea military alliances, American led anti-missile defense system initiative in the region, and non-traditional threats will be examined in the fourth section. The final section will highlight the importance of the long-term development and successful integration of Siberia and Russian Far East into Pacific Rim as a driving force for Russia's engagement with the region.

3.2 Political Factors

The policy of multivector foreign policy in a multipolar world order has been the central theme of the Russian foreign policy since 1996 when Yevgeni Primakov

resumed the post of Foreign Minister. The Asia-Pacific Region which is itself a region with multiple power centers such as China, Japan, India, ASEAN, has created a conducive arena for Russia to engage in its quest for reaching a polycentric world. The current Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, asserted that the process toward multipolarity is ‘vividly pronounced in the Asia-Pacific space’.⁷⁰ Lavrov in his article on Russia-ASEAN relations stated:

Today the vast Asia-Pacific Region, of which Russia is an integral part, is entering upon a qualitatively new stage in its evolution. Russia's unique geographical position and its status as a great Eurasian power dictate the necessity to pursue a multivector foreign policy, of which the essence is to stand firmly on our feet both in the West and in the East. An active policy in Asia is our conscious choice, free of any momentary considerations of expediency, which among other things reflects our recognition of such a reality as the Asia-Pacific Region's moving into the position of one of the largest and most promising world development centers.

Lavrov’s article underlined these main assumptions: Russia is an integral part of Asia-Pacific. Russia is a great Eurasian power, which should be equally involved in West and East, thus Russia should envisage and pursue a multivector foreign policy to secure its position as a strategic great power in the 21st century.

In the light of these assumptions, it can be concluded that the main political incentive for Russia to interact closely with the Region is her desire to achieve a multipolar world where Russia is the regional leader and a great-power to be reckoned with. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the desire to counterbalance US unilateralism has played an important role in shaping Russian foreign policy, which consequently turned Russia a leading advocator of a multi-polar world.⁷¹

As it is noted earlier, the Asia-Pacific Region has emerged a conducive ground to promote Russia’s post-cold war foreign policy with its power centers such as China and India which share similar concerns about a world dominated by the U.S.

⁷⁰ Sergey Lavrov, “ASEAN Regional Forum”, article originally published in the Newspaper Izvestia on July 28, 2005, English version online at http://www.in.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/13AA3BFBCAF11234C325704D004C9D72 (accessed on 27.11.2011)

⁷¹ Thomas Ambrosio, *Challenging America's global preeminence: Russia's quest for multipolarity*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), pp.100-101

Evolving regional structure made also possible for Russia to engage in the regional organizations together with other main powers. Russia also has seen Asia-Pacific regional structures as one effective way to constrain other powers, including the United States, by enmeshing them in the rules and norms of multilateral regional security structures like the ARF and APEC.⁷²

Driven by above-mentioned incentives Russia has recently achieved notable success in its bilateral and multilateral relations in the Asia-Pacific.⁷³ Relations with China have dramatically improved, and cooperation with India remains close and promising. Moscow has reanimated its diplomatic presence on the Korean Peninsula by Putin's visit to North Korea in 2000, and resumed economic cooperation with former communist allies—Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos during the first term of Putin's presidency. Russia joined APEC in 1998 even earlier than predicted and has enhanced its role and profile in the ASEAN Regional Forum and in the ASEAN dialogue process. Together with China, Moscow has institutionalized a new multilateral forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, which aspires to promote security and economic cooperation that transcends subregional groupings. Finally, Russia, and particularly its Siberian and Far Eastern regions, are attracting increasing interest from their energy-reliant Asian neighbors.

However while Russia reached a historical high point in its relations with China, Russian-Chinese relationship is a complicated one by nature. On the one hand, China has emerged as the most important partner of Russia in its quest for a multipolar world order. Trade with China and investment from China to Russian Far East and Siberia are key factors in the development of the Russian East. But on the other hand, China's increasing successful engagement in the Asia-Pacific Region and its growing economic ties with the Russian Far East (RFE) and Siberia have also become worrying factors for Russia. Russia has a fear that rise of China will lead to the "steady marginalization of Russia from regional and global decision-making",

⁷² Paradorn Rangsimaporn, "Russian perceptions and policies in a multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 9, 2009, p. 209

⁷³ Alexei Borodavkin, "Russia's Eastern Policy: Summing Up and Looking Forward", *International Affairs*, No. 2, Vol.0057, 2011, pp: 28-32

and Russia will stay in the shadow of China in the region. Another source of worry is Chinese encroachment in Russian Far East.⁷⁴ Some military and intelligence officers have also, to various degrees, warned against a Chinese threat, militarily, demographically, and through its economic expansion into the RFE to capture natural resources.⁷⁵ In 2000, President Vladimir Putin warned local population that unless Russia put more effort into the region's development, they would end up speaking Korean, Japanese, or Chinese.⁷⁶

So China has had a dual motivating role in Russia's closer engagement with the region. On the one hand China offers a valuable partnership in the Asia-Pacific which lets Russia connect with the broader region, and form stronger networks to resist the U.S. dominance. On the other hand China has become a challenge domestically in the Far East, and regionally in the Asia-Pacific Region with its rising economic and military power which can prompt a threat against Russia's standing in the region. Thus fear of rising China has also reinforced Russian determination to turn its attention to the Asia-Pacific and its own Asian territories.

Russian desire to contain the U.S. in the region has multiple effects in its policy formulation. It contributes to Russia's determined efforts to further strengthen Russia-China strategic partnership, and to make Russia-India-China cooperation more effective. This desire also leads to active participation in and promotion of regional cooperation initiatives, while also urges Russia to cooperate with Japan and South Korea, the two important US allies in the region. Russia wants to prevent the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation from becoming stronger by establishing its cooperative and mutually beneficial bilateral relations with South Korea and Japan.

⁷⁴ Luke Harding, "Russia Fears Embrace of Giant Eastern Neighbour", *The Observer*, 2 August 2009, online at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/02/china-russia-relationship> (accessed on 04.11.2011)

⁷⁵ Gabe Colins, "China looms over Russian Far East", *The Diplomat*, 22 June 2011, online at <http://the-diplomat.com/2011/06/22/china-looms-over-russia-far-east/> (accessed on 05.12.2011)

⁷⁶ Stephen Blank, "At a Dead End, Russian Policy and the Russian Far East", *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 17 (2009), p.123

To solve territorial disputes and conclude a peace treaty with Japan has been another political motivation for Russia to actively engage in the region. Russia aims to create favorable conditions for Russian-Japanese close cooperation to pave the way for a compromise solution on the issue of Kuril Islands.

Containment of the US power, creation of a multipolar world, reaching a strategic partnership with China as well as not to become a junior partner of China in the region, and improving relations with Japan have constituted major political motivations for Russia's active involvement in the Asia-Pacific Region.

3.3 Economic Factors:

In recent years experts and academics have begun to use the term Europacific power with regard to Russia. The 21st-century imperatives offer a new view of Russia as a Euro-Pacific country, not only European or Eurasian.⁷⁷ This term emphasizes the geographic position of Russia, a united country positioned on two continents – Europe and Asia. However it is clear that active and successful participation in the rapidly developing Asia-Pacific region is an indispensable condition for Russia to fulfill its status as a Europacific power.

Asia-Pacific Region accounts for about 60% of the world's production, half of its trade, 48% of foreign investment. Asian and Pacific nations are increasingly becoming the leaders of global advance. They are justifiably called "the region of the 21st century", and "the locomotive of global economy". It is in this region that the Russian economy comes into direct contact with the biggest (after the EU) world economies - the United States, China, Japan, India, ASEAN. The economic upsurge of the Asia-Pacific Region is highly important for Russia which is the region's inalienable and fairly large part.

Rich in natural resources, Russia has the largest natural gas reserves in the world, the second largest coal reserves and the eighth largest oil reserves. All these resources

⁷⁷ "Going East: Russia's Asia-Pacific Strategy, Russia in Global Affairs", Report by *the Russian National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific*, 25 December 2010, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Going-East-Russias-Asia-Pacific-Strategy-15081> (accessed on 28.10.2011)

constitute a major portion of Russia's exports. In fact, 80% of Russia's exports constitute oil, natural gas, metals, timber, and defense equipment. Share of oil and gas sector in Russian GDP is estimated to be around 24%.⁷⁸ In Asia-Pacific Region China, Japan, South Korea, India which are major consumers of energy are important buyers of Russian oil, gas and defense equipment. Russia seeks to increase volume of the trade with these main partners and its exports to the countries of the Region.

EU is still the first economic partner of Russia and biggest buyer of Russian oil and gas. However oil and gas exports to traditional European markets are coming under increasing competitive pressure. One major emerging alternative is to intensely develop oil and gas reserves in Eastern Siberia and offshore Far East to secure a basis for large-scale oil and gas exports to Asia, more specifically to China. Russia's energy strategy through 2030 envisages spectacular growth in the oil and gas production share of Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East from a respective 3% and 2% in 2008 to 18-19% and 15% in 2030.⁷⁹

China in its search to diversify energy sources has already become an important buyer of Russia's oil. In 2009 that Russia became China's fourth largest oil supplier, providing 7.8% of China's imports, up from 6.3% in 2008.⁸⁰ This figure is expected to rise thanks to the opening of the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean oil pipeline on January 1, 2011. China overtook Germany to become Russia's largest trading partner in 2010. Foreign trade turnover of Russia with China increased by 43.1 percent compared to 2009, and has reached US\$55.44 billion in 2010.⁸¹ China's outbound direct investment in Russia was US\$2 billion in first half of 2010 and is expected to reach US\$12 billion by 2020. China buys about \$1 billion worth of military stuff from Russia each year. It is the biggest foreign buyer of Russian arms and Russia is

⁷⁸ Masaaki Kuboniwa, Shinichiro Tabata and Nataliya Ustinova; "How Large is the Oil and Gas Sector of Russia?" Research Report, *Slavic Euroasia Studies* Sopporo, Japan (Issue. 11, 2006) , online at http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/no11_ses/contents.html (accessed on 30.10.2011)

⁷⁹ "Oil and Gas Exports to Asia", 2011 Russia Forum, online at <http://2011.therussiaforum.com/forum/program/oil-gas-exports-to-asia> (accessed on 25.11. 2011)

⁸⁰ Richard Weitz, "Chinese Pipe Dreams", *The Diplomat*, 3 January 2011, online at <http://the-diplomat.com/2011/01/03/chinese-pipe-dreams/?all=true>(accessed on 12.01.2012)

⁸¹ "China to Become Russia's Largest Trade Partner", *Russia Briefing*, 10.03.2011, online at <http://russia-briefing.com/news/china-to-become-russias-largest-trading-partner.html/> , accessed on 12.01.2012

China's main weapons supplier.⁸² In the future, the Asia-Pacific region has the potential to stay the largest buyer of Russian weapons. More than 70 percent of Russian arms are sold to China and India. Moscow is trying to diversify its Asian arms trade and has been successful in increasing its sales to ASEAN member states, particularly Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia.⁸³

Russia's overall trade and economic relations with the Asian states have also importantly intensified in the last decade. In the first 9 months of 2011, Russia's trade with APEC nations reached \$142.5 billion (24 percent of its total trade volume).⁸⁴ Direct investments of Asian states in Russia's economy have increased and continue to grow. This is true of the Far East and Siberia as well as Russia's European part. Asian money coming from Japan, South Korea, China started flowing to Russian oil refining and gas processing.⁸⁵

To reach stated goals for the increasement of oil and gas exports to Asia-Pacific region Russia should focus its attention on Russian Far East and Siberia. Today, the economic progress of Siberia and the Russian Far East is inconceivable without their integration into the new formats of multisided and bilateral cooperation in East Asia and, more broadly, the Asia-Pacific Region. On the other hand Russia aims to diversify its economy not to depend on heavily on the exports of natural resources in the long term. In this line Putin called for an "innovation society" in February 2008 and Medvedev called for "modernization" in November 2009.⁸⁶ Medvedev has criticized Russia's reliance on oil and gas exports as "primitive".⁸⁷ President

⁸² "Facts and details", online at <http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=286&catid=8&subcatid=52>(accessed on 04.01.2012)

⁸³ Ibid, page 9

⁸⁴ Steve Gutterman, "Russia Eyes Regional Role, US Ties at APEC Summit", *Reuters*, 10 November 2011, online at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/10/us-apec-russia-idUSTRE7A936020111110> (accessed on 29.11.2011)

⁸⁵ Alexei Borodavkin, "Russia's Eastern Policy: Summing Up and Looking Forward", *International Affairs*, No. 2, Vol.0057 (2011), pp 28-32

⁸⁶ Vladimir Putin, "Speech at Expanded Meeting of the State Council on Russia's Development Strategy through to 2020", 2 February 2008, online at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/02/08/1137_type82912type82913_159643.shtml (accessed on 07.01.2011)

⁸⁷ Dmitry Medvedev, "Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of Russian Federation", 12 November 2009, online at

Medvedev stressed the importance of socio economic development of the Russian Far East to reinforce the position of the Russian Federation in the Asia Pacific Region. The president formulated a dual task: on the one hand, Russia should tap the Asia Pacific Region's potential for comprehensive modernization and diversification of its economics to switch to the innovation development model and, on the other, promote Russia's competitive and high-tech products on the regional markets.⁸⁸

With these considerations in relation to modernization and innovation, Russia launched modernization alliances with the region's technological leaders such as the Republic of Korea, China, Japan, India and Singapore.⁸⁹ In 2010, Russia together with its APR neighbors was engaged in large-scale bilateral economic projects. The Skovorodino-Daqing oil pipeline was opened and started bringing Russian oil to China. Russia is developing its cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy with China, India, Vietnam, Mongolia, Australia, Japan, and Bangladesh; the same applies to space research where Russia is working together with China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Indonesia; it increased its supplies of liquefied gas extracted on Sakhalin to the Republic of Korea and Japan; the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) and the Shanghai Stock Exchange launched ruble-yuan trading to shift bilateral trade to the national currencies basis.

In sum, basic components of Russia's economic interests in the region are to increase and diversify its trade activities with the regional partners, to start joint development projects for gas and oil resources in the Far East and Siberia regions, to cooperate with the regions technological leaders to spread innovation based economy in Russia, to create economic spheres which are independent from world's financial fluctuations in a US dollar based system.

http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/11/12/1321_type70029type82912_222702.shtml
(accessed on 23.10.2011)

⁸⁸Alexei Borodavkin, "The Asian Vector of Russia's Policy and Modernization", *International Affairs*, No. 5, 2010, p.25

⁸⁹Chen Yurong, "Modernisation Oriented Russia", *China Institute of International Studies*, 10 August 2010 online at http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2011-08/10/content_4395645.htm (accessed on 02.02.2012)

3.4. Security Factors

At the global security level, Moscow emphasizes the central role of the United Nations and the UN Security Council as the single most legitimate forum for multilateral diplomacy and for the maintenance of international peace and security.⁹⁰ Russia, believing that the U.S. increasingly pursues a unilateral foreign policy which in turn leads to the weakening the role of the U.N. in the face of international crisis, strives to establish a multipolar world based on sovereign democracies.⁹¹

At the regional level, Moscow has advocated the concept of 'regional multilateralism', particularly in its immediate neighborhood. Russia, in parallel with its regional security assumptions has grown increasingly interested in multilateral mechanisms for security and economic integration in the Asia-Pacific. By doing so, Russia expects to increase its role in regional affairs at a time when Russia's national power remains limited and constrained after the breakup of the USSR.

With these considerations, Russia has participated in the ARF which has been premier forum for security cooperation in the region since its inauguration in 1994, acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) on 29 November 2004, was invited to attend the first ASEAN+ Defense Minister Meetings in 2010 together with seven (China, United States, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia New Zealand) ASEAN Dialogue Partners. In 2010 Russia was accepted as a member of EAS which is a leader's led dialogue process on strategical, political, economic issues as well as traditional and non-traditional security issues.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which Russia was a founding member also initiated a cooperation process with ASEAN with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in 2005. Counter terrorism, drugs and narcotics

⁹⁰“Position paper of The Russian Federation at the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly”, online at <http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/interview/240807indexen.htm> (accessed on 10.12.2011)

⁹¹ Andrei Zagorski, “The Limits of Global Consensus on Security: the Case of Russia”, *Chaillot Paper*, No:118, October 2009, pp.67-83

control; arms smuggling; money laundering; and trafficking in persons were listed as priority cooperation areas in the MoU.⁹²

Russia aims to actively participate in these security related regional mechanisms mainly for two reasons: to advance multilateral security frameworks to curb the hegemony of the U.S in the region, and to address its security concerns and involve in their solution effectively. The primary security concerns of Russia in the region are the nuclear threat in Korean peninsula, nuclear proliferation, the U.S.- Japan, the US-Korea military alliances, creation of an American missile defense system, and non-military and non-traditional threats such as terrorism, separatism, maritime security, arms control, illegal immigration, infectious diseases, environmental degradation. Territorial disputes with Japan has a particular place among other threat perceptions since it is a politically sensitive historical issue which has strictly bilateral character for Russia and Japan. The issue of territorial disputes with Japan is explained both historical background and bilateral relations sections.

Advancing multilateral security frameworks in the Asia Pacific Region has been a Russian objective since the end of the cold war. Russia is keen on engaging in multilateral mechanisms to enhance security in the APR since it believes that it can have more influence in these frameworks where the U.S. is constrained by other powers than on a bilateral basis. On the other hand relative military weakness of Russian Federation has drawn Russian leaders into a policy of promoting multilateral mechanisms. Russian forces stationed in the vast region of Eastern Russia, and the Pacific Fleet have been particularly badly affected by the meager defense budgets of the first post-cold war years. “The Eastern Military District”⁹³ comprising one of the four military districts under the new structure of the Russian army which has roughly 300.000 troops is smaller in size than China’s, as well as North and South

⁹² “Memorandum of Understanding Between Asean Secretariat and SCO Secretariat”, 21April 2005, online at <http://www.asean.org/ASEAN-SCO-MOU.pdf> (accessed on 03.01.2012)

⁹³ The Eastern Military District was established on Dec. 1, 2010, in accordance with the RF Presidential Decree of September 20, 2010 “On the military-administrative division of the Russian Federation” on the basis of the Far Eastern Military District (FEMD) and a part of the troops of the Siberian Military District (SibMD). It also includes the Pacific Fleet and the 4th Command of the Air Force and Air Defence.

Korea's in the Pacific zone.⁹⁴ With the Russian armed forces in the region relatively weak, a multilateral approach to security has been regarded as in Russia's interest.

On the other hand NATO enlargement towards East, NATO's growing involvement in the world affairs, Yugoslav crisis, UN sanctions and Western military action against Iraq made Russia feel marginalized from international security community, and motivated Russia to participate in Asia-Pacific security structures such as the ARF, EAS, ASEAN + Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM Plus), and second track regional structures like "the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)", "the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)", "the Shangri-La Dialogue Conferences" and "the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)", the Asian Senior Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) .⁹⁵

Apart from region-wide cooperation initiatives, Russia has also been involved in the resolution process of the North Korean nuclear issue since 2003 when the six party talks started. Prior to its inclusion in the six party talks, Russia claimed that as a neighboring country which is territorially present in Northeast Asia, and which has been a major player in the region's international system ever since the late 19th century Russia has a justifiable interest in the Korean process.

North Korea started its quest to become a nuclear power in mid 1980's.⁹⁶ The U.S. entered into negotiations with the North Korea in 1993 to freeze the nuclear facilities of the latter.⁹⁷ The decade-long negotiations did not come to a conclusion and in 2003 the U.S.-China and North Korea conducted the first trilateral negotiations which has turned into six-party talks by the inclusion of Russia, Japan and South Korea later that year. The six-party talks aimed to end North Korea's nuclear activities in exchange of economic incentives. Despite ongoing meetings in 2006

⁹⁴ Rouben Azizian, "Unwelcome Intruder Or Accommodative Player?", *Centre for Strategic Studies - Victoria University of Wellington*, Working Paper, No:16 (2000) p. 20

⁹⁵ Bobo Lo, *op. cit.*, p. 96

⁹⁶ Rachel Weise, North Korea Nuclear Timeline, 9 October 2006, *Center for American Progress*, online at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/10/north_korea_timeline.html (accessed on 28.01.2012)

⁹⁷ Paul Kerr, "Chronology: More than a decade of the US-North Korea Nuclear Tension" *Arms Control Today*, September 2005, online at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_09/USNKChronology(accessed on 29.10.2011)

North Korea set off its first atomic device, and in 2009 successfully conducted its second nuclear test. The six-party talks broke off in April 2009 when North Korea walked out a month before its second nuclear test. Since the cessation of the talks Russia has engaged with North Korea bilaterally to convince the North Korea to come back to the negotiation table. President Medvedev and North Korean leader Kim Jung Il had discussed the renewal of the talks in a meeting in August 2011 in Siberia. The leaders announced that North Korea was ready to restart six-party talks without preconditions.⁹⁸ However death of the Korean leader in December 2011 precluded any possibility of early resumption of the talks.

In their last meeting, Medvedev and Kim also agreed to establish a commission to work out a deal that would allow Russia to send natural gas to South Korea by way of a pipeline through the North, and discussed Russian investment in rail links which would facilitate Russia's access to South Korea's vibrant economy.⁹⁹ However, there are obstacles on the way of realization of the Russia's long-desired projects. Firstly Pyongyang has been reluctant to play any role that would be helpful to Seoul although the country is very much in need of the cash the transit fees would bring. Secondly, Seoul has also been unwilling to consider the pipeline before North Korea dismantles the nuclear facilities fearing that North Korea could use pipeline and gas supplies as a leverage in further negotiations.

Russia wishes to see a reduction in tensions and an early denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. A settlement would bring multiple benefits to Russia. It could allow Russia to pursue overland trade with South Korea, which has long been a Russian ambition. It could open the way for a gas pipeline through North to the South Korea. It will end the potential threat of war near the Russian border. It can lead to withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Far Eastern Region. Besides North Korea's continuing threats and experiments with regard to the development of nuclear weapons fuel conflict near Russian borders and create friction between

⁹⁸ Will Englund, "North Korea May Return to Six-party Talks, *Washington Post*, 24 August 2011, online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-may-return-to-nuclear-talks-russia-says> (accessed on 04.03.2012)

⁹⁹ Charles Clover, Christian Oliver; "North Korea Seeks Allies in Russia Talks", *Financial Times*, 24 August 2011, online at <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2ce5fc2a-ce5c-11e0-99ec-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1qv2YMIpI>(accessed on 29.02.2012)

China, a traditional North Korean ally and the US. The possibility of a conflict is a potential threat to Russian security in this region. Russia would not like to see any side taking military actions in this sensitive area, where Russia's positions has considerably weakened in the post-Soviet era.¹⁰⁰ In the long term Russia also prefers to see a unified Korea which will create more opportunities to solve regional security problems including ecological security, terrorism, illegal immigration, arms trafficking, and would create opportunities to develop economic cooperation with a larger Korean economy.¹⁰¹

The U.S.-Japan and the U.S.-South Korean alliances, and cooperation of these three countries on missile-defense system in the region are regarded as security threats for Russia. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was signed during the Korean War in 1951 at the same time as the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which formally ended the Allied occupation of Japan. The security treaty enabled U.S. troops to remain in Japan and opened Japanese facilities as a staging area and logistics base for American forces in the war being waged on the Korean peninsula. U.S. military bases in Japan were seen as essential to containing communist expansion, especially since the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea were considered a great threat by the US and its regional allies. The U.S.-Japan military alliance has continued to this day. There are approximately ninety U.S. military facilities throughout mainland Japan and Okinawa, and about 47,000 U.S. troops are stationed in these bases.¹⁰² U.S. also has 38,000 troops stationed in South Korea. The US had to close its bases in Philippines in 1992 upon the request of the Philippines Government, however maintained the bilateral security cooperation with this country under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.¹⁰³ The U.S. also have a network of partnerships and bilateral agreements with other countries of the region namely Singapore, Australia and Thailand.

¹⁰⁰ Georgy D. Toloraya, "Russia's Stake in a Denuclearized Korean Peninsula", *Nautilus Institute*, 1 September 2011, online at <http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/forum/TolorayaUlan-Ude> (accessed on 13.11.2011)

¹⁰¹ Seung-Ho Joo, "Russia and Korean Peace Process" in *The Korean Peace Process and Four Powers*, eds., Tae-Hwan Kwak, Seung-Ho Joo, (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), pp.154-155

¹⁰² "U.S. Forces in Japan", online at <http://www.usfj.mil> (accessed on 27.01.2012)

¹⁰³ "Background Note:Phillippines", *The US Department of State*, online at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm> , (accessed on 27.01.2012)

The end of the Cold War has greatly reduced threats to regional peace, but U.S. has not downsized its military presence in the Pacific since it has broad economic and security interests in the region. Those who favor continued American military presence in Japan and South Korea generally agree that the U.S. presence remains crucial to the defense of South Korea and Japan, to balancing the rising power of China and to the protection of sea lanes that are critical to trade throughout East Asia.¹⁰⁴ On the other camp, Russia and China are two main countries which feel threatened by U.S. military dominance. That is the reason Russia is increasingly urging for collective security arrangements in Asia-Pacific, and taking part in all the regional initiatives to form a cooperative security framework involving all players in the region.

Japan and South Korea are both also part of a grand U.S. military project involving the global stationing of anti-missile systems and rapid military forces, as put forward during the Reagan Administration.¹⁰⁵ The Asian part of the global military project has been endorsed in Asia as a means to counter the possible threat of a North Korean missile attack. China has also been identified as a justification for the development of a broad military alliance, involving an integrated military network in the Far East, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim.¹⁰⁶ America and Japan have made considerable progress in Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) cooperation and interoperability since the two countries started to work together in 1998.¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, liberal South Korean presidents from 1998-2007 downplayed the North Korean danger, and Seoul resisted joining an integrated missile defense system with the U.S.

¹⁰⁴ Zhiqin Zhu, "Americas Military Presence in Northeast Asia after the Cold War: Winning Without Fighting?"; *The Institute of East Asian Studies Publication*, Seoul, Volume 2, No:12, Summer 2000, online at http://www.ieas.or.kr/vol12_2/chiquanzuh.htm (accessed on 15.01.2012)

¹⁰⁵ Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, "Global Military Alliance: Encircling Russia and China US Sponsored Military Partnership in the Far East and the Pacific Rim", *Global Research*, 10 May 2007, online at <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5605> (accessed on 19.02.2012)

¹⁰⁶ "Missile Defence is not Expandable", *CNN Security Blog*, 20 November 2011 <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/11/20/debate-prep-missile-defense-is-not-expendable/> (accessed on 20.02.2012)

¹⁰⁷ Frank A. Rose, *Keynote Speech at the 2011 Multinational BMD Conference*, Copenhagen, Denmark, 5 September 2011, online at <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/171693.htm> (accessed on 04.03.2012)

Seoul's reserve about defending itself under a missile defense system against the North Korean threat changed radically with the election of conservative President Lee Myung-bak in 2007.¹⁰⁸ With this policy shift, U.S. and South Korea has started a closer missile defense cooperation. South Korea indicated interest in acquiring a missile defense capability that includes land- and sea-based systems, early warning radars, and a command and control system. Australia was also one of the first U.S. partners on BMD when it signed a BMD Framework MoU with the U.S. in July 2004.

America's missile defense cooperation with its allies in East Asia has been a source of concern for Russia. Russia worries that such a system will undermine current strategic balance between major powers in the region. Russia and China also argue that BMD would change military balance in the region which will give U.S.-Japan a new superiority over others. Russia has China as its main ally in opposing the Missile Defense System development in East Asia. Two countries articulated their opposition in their Joint Statement signed by Jiang Zemin and Vladimir Putin in 2000:¹⁰⁹

A non-strategic missile defense program and international cooperation in such areas, which is not prohibited by ABM, should not undermine security interests of other countries, nor lead to the establishment of any closed military or political bloc, or threaten global and regional stability and security."“China and Russia are deeply concerned that a certain country in the Asia-Pacific region might deploy any such non-strategic missile defense system, and steadfastly oppose this.

Besides traditional military threat sources, serious cross border challenges are evident in international terrorism, ethnic and religious separatism and extremism, organized crime, illegal migration, drug trafficking and arms trade in the region. These cross-border challenges have prompted Moscow to enter into regional cooperation to effectively surmount threats to its national interests. Russia also sought for allies in restraining the resurgence of fundamentalist groups in Caucasia and Central Asia. India and China are perceived by Moscow as the two most like-

¹⁰⁸ “Missile Defence is not Expandable”, *CNN Security Blog*, 20 November 2011
<http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/11/20/debate-prep-missile-defense-is-not-expendable/> (accessed on 20.02.2012)

¹⁰⁹ Shulong Chu, “MD and East Asian Stability”, Working Paper, September 2001, online at <http://irchina.org/en/xueren/china/pdf/csl3.pdf> (accessed on 17.01.2012), p.4

minded partners with regard to the challenges brought by religious extremism and separatism. In this context, the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral cooperation also includes anti-terrorism-separatism dimension.¹¹⁰ Russia, China and India are also cooperating in the regional organizations to bring the other members closer to their position on the issue.

3.5. Internal Regional Factors

Development of the Russian Far East and Siberia, and their effective integration into the Asia-Pacific has been a critical factor in Russia's determination to pursue an active policy in the APR affairs. These regions are bordered by Northeast Asian countries are opening gates of Russia to the Pacific region. They offer large territories with abundance of natural resources and potential arable lands. However, Russian Far East (RFE) and Siberia are two of the most disadvantageous regions of the Russian territories.¹¹¹ Far Eastern Federal District is one of the biggest regions in Russia. Total area of the district is 6,215,900 km² that equals 36.4% of the total area of Russia, and only boasts 6.7 million inhabitants (about 5% of the entire Russian population). The RFE, constituting over one-third of Russia's territory, is home to major natural resource deposits, and is essential to maintaining increasingly valuable Asian trade routes. Despite the richness of natural resources and strategic position, share of the Far East Federal District in Russian Federation's GDP is only % 4, 6, placing the district at the bottom of the seven Federal Districts.¹¹² Over the last 20 years, since 1991, the district's population has shrunk by a quarter. This is certainly the most worrying trend in the district, and something that requires Russia's close attention. This alarming statistic has attracted the attention of the Russian government, which is currently discussing repopulation, reindustrialization, and massive infrastructure programs for the area, particularly around its major city, Vladivostok.

¹¹⁰ "RIC Seeks Stepped up Efforts Against Terrorism", *The Hindu*, 15 November 2010, online at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article887522.ece> (accessed on 23.01.2012)

¹¹¹ Liz Bagot and Josh Wilson, "The Russian Far East Gateway to Asia", *The School of Russian and Asian Studies (SRAS)* online at http://www.sras.org/russian_far_east (accessed on 16.02.2012)

¹¹² Michael Bradshaw, "The Geography of Russia's New Political Economy", *New Political Economy*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 2008), p.193-194

Siberia (Siberian Federal District) makes up about 30% of Russia's territory (5,114,800 sq km.) but has only 14% (20 million people) of Russia's population. Siberia is extraordinarily rich in minerals, containing ores of almost all economically valuable metals as well as extensive unexploited resources of oil and natural gas. The Siberian Federal District's territory contains 85% of Russia's lead and platinum reserves, 80% of its coal and molybdenum, 71% of its nickel, 69% of its copper, 44% of its silver, and 40% of its gold. Share of the Siberian Federal District in Russian Federation's GDP is 11.4%.¹¹³

Since the late 1980s, the Soviet Union and Russia have sought to integrate Siberia and the Far East into the process of Asia-Pacific regional economic cooperation with domestic economic reconstruction. The initiatives have gained momentum in the last years. Russian government revealed a "Strategy for the Social and Economic Development of Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East" in 2002.¹¹⁴ However two regions continues to be among the least developed ones in Russia.¹¹⁵ Dmitry Medvedev held an important meeting in Khabarovsk on the Far East's socioeconomic development and cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region countries in July 2010.¹¹⁶ The Khabarovsk meeting attended by heads of federal agencies and the federation subjects of East Siberia and the Far East discussed the social and economic development of the region, strengthening of Russia's positions in the APR and the country's full-scale involvement in regional integration.

Russia is trying to attract investment both from Western and Asia-Pacific countries to reconstruct the economy of the two regions. Energy and transport infrastructure development in Russia's Far East with foreign investment has been a priority for Russia. Rapid development of Far Eastern infrastructure is crucial for boosting Russia's exports and keeping its share of East Asian energy and metals markets. Chinese,

¹¹³ "Siberian Federal District", online at http://www.smsr-senclub.ru/en/region/index.php?SECTION_ID=349 (accessed on 02.12.2011)

¹¹⁴ Stephan Blank, "Russia's Failure in Asia", UNISCI Discussion Papers, No:24, October 2010, p.67

¹¹⁵ Bobo Lo, *Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics*, (Washington DC:Brookings Institution Press, 2008) p. 66

¹¹⁶ Dmitry Medvedev, *Speech at the Khabarovsk Meeting*, 2 July 2010, online at <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/547> (accessed on 19.11.2011)

Japanese, South Korean, French and American companies are involved in joint projects for infrastructure, and natural gas and oil development. Russia also offers joint development of agriculture investment projects. China emerged as the biggest investor in the region investing about US 3 billion in 2010.¹¹⁷ China, Japan and South Korea are three main trade partners of RFE and Siberia regions. However, the lack of stable investment environment, and the fear regarding the safety of their investments have kept Japan and South Korea away from large-scale investment projects which Russia hoped for.¹¹⁸

While economic development and integration of Russia's eastern territories into the Asia Pacific Region has been one of the main driving forces for Russia to engage in the region, Russia is also aware of the challenges this undertaking brings. That is why Russia is trying to balance increasing Chinese influence in these two regions by trying to attract Japanese, South Korean, the US and EU investment. APEC 2012 annual summit, which will be hosted in Vladivostok is expected to contribute significantly to the efforts of highlighting the region's potential to attract investment from diverse sources. Planning for the summit has already resulted in a massive influx of federal funding as well as foreign investment for the construction of hotels, bridges, and roads.¹¹⁹ Russia is also expected to announce new regulations and incentives to make Siberia and RFE more attractive to new investors.

3.6. Conclusion

Although Russia has been a part of the Asia-Pacific region since 17th century, Russia has never deemed itself as an Asian country. The end of the cold-war set off some substantial changes in the perceptions of Russian policy-makers with regard to Russian position in the Asia-Pacific. The change in the perception of Asia-Pacific was both encouraged by external and internal factors. Russia's declining international prestige in the immediate post-cold war era, and disappointment with Western economic assistance resulted in a shift away from pro-Western positions on

¹¹⁷ "China investing in Russian Far East more than Russian Government", *Russia Briefing*, 19 April 2011, online at <http://russia-briefing.com/news/china-investing-in-russian-far-east-more-than-russian-gov%E2%80%99t.html/> (accessed on 25.10.2011)

¹¹⁸ Stephen Blank, *op.cit*, p.61

¹¹⁹ Liz Bagot and Josh Wilson, *op.cit*.

foreign and economic policy towards Asia-Pacific. Growing importance of the region prompted Russia to improve relations with all the main actors of the Asia-Pacific and its regional bodies. However, because of the continuing impasse with Japan over the Kuril Islands, the US-Japan military alliance and some outstanding issues in bilateral relations with South Korea, Russian efforts to play a more active role in Asia have concentrated on the development of a close relationship with China. Shared concern over the US unilateralism, and desire to promote a polycentric world based on sovereign states concept made China and Russia natural partners in regional and global politics.

Economic benefits of integration with the Asia-Pacific have been an important factor in Russian policy change towards region. A region with important consumers of oil and natural gas, and military equipments have brought Russia chance of diversifying its clients for natural resources and defense material. The potential of new customers which are geographically closer to the Siberia and Far East (which have vast oil and gas reserves) than Western countries encouraged Russia to develop closer ties with China, Japan and South Korea. Russia also aimed joint exploration and development of these resources with more technologically advanced partners in the region. Military sales to China and India as well as Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand have helped to save vast defense industry during the difficult years following the disintegration of the USSR.¹²⁰ Military sales later have become an important source of revenue for the modernization efforts in the Russian military system and weaponry. Becoming a member of APEC, and Russia's recent entry to WTO has accelerated the pace of progress of Russia's attempts to integrate economically with the region, and increase mutual trade volumes.

As well as politic and economic considerations, traditional security considerations, and common challenges of non-traditional threats to the region such as maritime security, piracy, illegal immigration, environmental issues motivated Russia for closer engagement in the regional cooperation activities.

¹²⁰ David Isenberg, "Military Muscles Bulging in Southeast Asia", Asia Times, 03.05.2010, online at http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HE03Ae03.html , (accessed on 05.02.2012)

Internal domestic factors, firstly long-term development of Siberia and Far East, and modernization drive in Russia have been two important incentives for Russia to enter into close partnership with regional countries China, Japan and South Korea.

Motivated by the array of economic and political opportunities and security challenges the Asia-Pacific brings, Russia Federation has embarked upon an active foreign policy in the Asia Pacific Region. In the following chapter, the bilateral aspect of the Russia's foreign policy in the region will be examined.

CHAPTER 4

RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH MAIN ACTORS OF ASIA PACIFIC REGION

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, political, security and economic relations of Russian Federation with the main actors of the Asia-Pacific region will be examined in the context of the regional affairs.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze changing nature of Russia's bilateral relations with the regional countries influenced by the new post-cold war international system. While these changes led to dramatic changes in Russia's bilateral relations with some countries mainly China, Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries, some of the cold-war friendships also gained new dimensions such as partnership with India and Indochina countries. The relationship with the US gained a more complex character since the new era brought two countries together in regional organizations adding cooperation to rivalry and competition. This chapter will attempt to show how these changes occurred during the last two decades.

The chapter begins with the U.S., dominant power in the Pacific affairs, while Russia-China relations will be examined in the following section. China-Russia relations will be the main focus of this chapter since China has a determining role in Russia's regional policy. India-Russia relations, which has revitalized since 2000, will be discussed in the third section. Russian relations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will be examined in the subsequent chapters.

4.2. U.S.A

The U.S. has been involved in Pacific affairs since 18th century, and is still a major actor in the region. The U.S. has a network of partnerships and agreements with its allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, and an important role in the regional mechanisms. Washington has a crucial part in administering key regional crises in Asia-Pacific such as the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Straits; freedom of navigation and maritime security deterrence functions in the region are also still mainly insured by the US naval presence; and its superior forces have led in large-scale regional disaster relief operations such as those following the 2004 and 2011 tsunamis.¹²¹

During the cold war U.S. and Soviet Union heading different ideological and economic camps in the world, experienced direct armed conflict in the Asia-Pacific such as Korean War and Vietnam-Cambodia War. The U.S. sponsored the foundation of ASEAN excluding the Soviet allies in the region. America also established strong alliances with Japan and South Korea among others in the region.

Russia has had different stages in its relationship with U.S. regarding the global politics as well as Asia-Pacific. In the first post-cold war years Russia inclined to accept the unipolar system led by the United States by integrating itself with the West. Between 1993 and 1996, Russia changed its policy course, and started to assert its independence of the United States, and attempted to balance the U.S. through the creation of a multipolar world. This balancing phase lasted until 2001. During the wave of anti-terrorism that followed the September 11 attacks, Russia spent another short period of aligning itself with the U.S. However, developments like the invasion of Iraq caused Russia to return to its old policy of balancing U.S. power. While Russia tried to balance U.S. power in the world and in the region, it has not stopped dialogue and cooperation with the U.S. and the West. During the Medvedev's presidency, Russia's modernization oriented policy caused readjustment in its position towards the U.S. To achieve economic modernization, to

¹²¹ Evelyn Goh, "Institutions and the Great Power Bargain in East Asia: ASEAN's Limited 'Brokerage' Role", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* Volume 11, 2011, pp.373-401

lessen the dependence on resource-based economy, and to attract Western capital and high technology to balance Chinese investment, Medvedev placed the development of relations with the US, Germany, France and other Western countries as a priority.¹²²

While President Medvedev adopted “modernization oriented diplomacy”, President Obama also revised George W. Bush’s foreign policy, adopted a new security strategy of multilateralism and offered to “reset” the US-Russia relations. Russia appreciated this opportunity to better its relationship with the EU and the US and move closer to the West. In July 2009 the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) was established.¹²³ It was set as a framework for managing U.S.-Russian cooperation across multiple areas in the wake of the 2009 “reset.” The BPC is co-chaired by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov as Coordinators, and senior-level officials from both sides heading each of the seventeen individual working groups.

Following the “reset” of the relations the two countries signed a new nuclear disarmament treaty in April 2010; “Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” to replace the old treaty which expired in 2009. On their comments on the new treaty, Medvedev said that it opened a new chapter in Russia-US relations, and Obama said that the new treaty was an important step in “resetting” the US-Russia relations.¹²⁴ Secondly, Russia and the US reached a consensus on Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2010 after 17 years of negotiation process.

While these positive developments occurred in Russia-the U.S. bilateral relations, on regional scale the U.S. intensified its efforts to remain “dominant power” in Asia-Pacific which is contrary to Russia’s interests and the goal of polycentric Asia-

¹²² Chen Yurong, “Modernization Oriented Russian Diplomacy”, *China Institute of International Studies*, August 10, 2011, online at http://www.ciiis.org.cn/english/2011-08/10/content_4395645.htm (accessed on 09.12.2011) p.1

¹²³ “US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission” <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/usrussiabilat/index.htm> (accessed on 10.12.2011)

¹²⁴ Chen Yurong, *op.cit.*, p.3

Pacific. The new policy understanding of the U.S. were outlined in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's article "America's Pacific Century" which was published in "Foreign Policy" magazine in November 2011. Clinton says;¹²⁵

Our challenge now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across the Atlantic. That is the touchstone of our efforts in all these areas.

With this in mind, our work will proceed along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.

The US administration after scheduling the withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan has decided to pay closer attention to the Asia Pacific as the title of the article suggests. Clinton's emphasis on bilateral security alliances and broad-based military presence in the Pacific are particularly worrying factors for Russia's interests in the Asia-Pacific. Russia already has been wary of the U.S.-Japan close partnership and alliance, as well as the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation on building an antimissile defense system in the region.

Clinton continues to say in the same article;

So the United States has moved to fully engage the region's multilateral institutions, such as ASEAN and the APEC forum, mindful that our work with regional institutions supplements and does not supplant our bilateral ties. There is a demand from the region that America play an active role in the agenda-setting of these institutions and it is in our interests as well that they be effective and responsive.

While Clinton's article tries to show the US does not intend to abandon regional security structure, the following statement "our work with regional institutions supplements and does not supplant our bilateral ties" shows that greater emphasis will be put on the bilateral alliances then the growing multilateral regional bodies to the dismay of Russia and China.

¹²⁵ Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century", *Foreign Policy*, November 2011 online at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century (accessed on 02.12.2011)

Although the US seems to still base its policy in the region on bilateral alliances, the Obama administration signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in July 2009 as a prerequisite for joining EAS, a year later, the US accepted the invitation of EAS to join the Summit. The U.S. also attended the first ASEAN+Defense Ministers Meeting in 2010. It can be said that America is pursuing a policy of inserting “multilateral” security diplomacy into its existing network of alliances in the region without endorsing a single approach, and promoting the application of different multilateral bodies to particular issues.¹²⁶

In concordance with the views expressed in Clinton’s article President Obama participated in the East Asia Summit in 19 November 2011 to show the commitment of the U.S. in Asia-Pacific affairs.¹²⁷ U.S. President Barack Obama also made a tour of Asia-Pacific countries in November 2011 to promote a new trading bloc (Trans-Pacific Partnership/TPP), and stronger military ties with U.S. allies in the region. On November 12, 2011, the Leaders of the nine countries – Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States – announced the achievement of the broad outlines of a 21st-century TPP agreement that will enhance trade and investment among the TPP partner countries.¹²⁸

TPP initiative has not been welcomed by Russia and China, these two countries prefer existing mechanisms for regional economic cooperation. The TPP is seen as a political response to China’s new dynamic and sometimes imposing existence in the region. Based on the fact that TPP has been built particularly excluding China and Russia, some analysts argue that therefore TPP built in a spirit of confrontation and containment, not of cooperation.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ William T. Tow and H. D. P. Enval, “The United States, Asia, and “Convergent Security”, Policy Paper, *MacArthur Asia Security Initiative, Australian National University*, No:7, 13 December 2011, online at http://asi.anu.edu.au/policy_background/ANU-MASI_Policy_Background_Paper_007.pdf (accessed on 05.02.2012) p.1-3

¹²⁷ Hillary Clinton, *op.cit*

¹²⁸ “Trans-Pacific Partnership”, online at <http://www.ustr.gov/tpp> (accessed on 06.02.2012)

¹²⁹ Jagdish N. Bhagwati, “America’s Threat to Trans-Pacific Trade”, *Council on Foreign Relations*, 30.12.2011, online at http://www.cfr.org/trade/americas-threat-trans-pacific-trade/p26944?cid=rss-op_edds-america%E2%80%99s_threat_to_trans_paci-123011, (accessed on 06.02.2012)

In the context of complicated nature of bilateral and trilateral relations of Asia-Pacific countries in the region, the renewed U.S. policy of containment of China is both detrimental and beneficial to Russia's policy in the region. The U.S. is seen as a counterbalancing actor against the rising China in the Asia Pacific Region particularly by regional leaders in the Russian Far East and also some circles in Moscow. There is specially a strong opinion in the Russian Far East that America's economic and political presence would help diversify and balance Russia's interactions with regional powers.¹³⁰

At the same time, China is the closest ally of Russia in the Asia-Pacific, and biggest trading partner in the world. China has supported the integration of Russia into Asia Pacific cooperation mechanisms, and is a key partner in the Russia's modernization drive in the Russian Far East. Therefore the U.S. policy of China's containment in the region can have negative consequences for Russia. Moreover the U.S.'s decisive policy to remain the leader of the region can impede Russia's search for "its own place" in the Asia-Pacific as a first-rate participant, and weaken the role of existing multilateral institutions such as APEC, ASEAN and EAS in the region, the regional bodies which both Russia and China want to promote as leading forces for regional integration.

The U.S. is also trying to advocate a closer cooperation between Russia and Japan, the closest partner of the U.S. in the region. By the initiative of the U.S, the strategical institutes of three countries, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of US., Japanese Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences started to organize Russia-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Conferences. First conference held in 2010. These "Trilateral Conferences" are designed as forum where experts with insights discuss regional security issues from the mid- and long-term perspective, with the participation of government observers who deal with

¹³⁰ Rouben Azizian and Boris Reznik, "Introduction: Russia, America, and Security in the Asia-Pacific" in *Russia, America and Security in the Asia-Pacific*, eds, Rouben Azizian, Boriz Reznik (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), 2006, p.xi

actual policy-making and diplomatic negotiations on a daily basis.¹³¹ The domestic and nuclear affairs of North Korea, energy security in the Far East and East Siberia, and maritime order in East Asia were the main topics of discussion. The U.S. also initiated the establishment of “the Working Group on the Future of Russia-U.S. Relations” to foster cooperation between two countries in the Asia-Pacific. The Working Group is a joint project of the Valdai International Discussion Club, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University, and the Russian National Research University . It was set up in spring 2010 with the aim of overcoming mutual distrust in Russian-U.S. relations.¹³²

Strategical and economical realities of the post-cold war Asia-Pacific drive Russia towards a dual-track relationship with the U.S. Russia, on the one hand, tries to balance U.S. dominant presence in the region by its partnerships firstly with China and to some extent with India, and by placing greater emphasis on multilateral forums; on the other hand perceives U.S. as a balancing factor against a potential threat from rising China, and cooperates with the U.S. based on a selective term in accordance with its strategical necessities.

In broader terms, the cooperation between the Russia and the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific does not provide a strategical goal and clear perspectives for the future.¹³³ Moreover Russia’s strong discontent with the efforts of the U.S. to base antimissile systems in Europe, and its worry over a similar development in Asia-Pacific based on the U.S.-Japan-South Korea antimissile systems cooperation further blur the direction of the Russian-U.S. future relations.

¹³¹ ---“Japan-US-Russia Trilateral Conference”, *CSIS (Center for Strategic&International Studies, Washington)*, 18 January 2011, online at <http://csis.org/event/japan-us-russia-trilateral-conference> (accessed on 03.02.2012)

¹³² “4th Session of the Working Group on the Future of Russia-U.S. Relations”, 17.12.2011, online at <http://valdaiclub.com/event/35600.html> (accessed on 02.03.2012)

¹³³ Sergei Karaganov, “The US.-Russia Relations After the “Reset” :Building a New Agenda. A view from Russia”, *Valdai Discussion Club Paper*, March 2011, p.3

4.3.China

The Russia-China partnership has come to the fore after more than three decades of tension and hostility. Two countries rapidly mended their strained relationship following the disintegration of the USSR, and have become strategic partners in 1996. The two countries have had reversed positions in the new era; while Russia lost its super-power status of the cold-war period, China emerged as an aspiring super-power in the post-cold war era. Russia and China developed a relationship based on these current dynamics, and China has gained a central position in Russia's policy formulations. Russian-Chinese partnership has propped up the international standing of Russia while it felt isolated from the West. China's support has also been crucial for Russia's aspiration to participate in the economic and political processes of the Asia-Pacific both through bilateral links with Beijing as well as through becoming a member of APEC. On the other hand, China has benefited from a new Russia which offered China economic opportunities and vast natural resources, as well as military and diplomatic support in international affairs.

Russia and China have also a range of common interests in the region. They both aim to counterbalance the growing American influence in the region by military-technical cooperation, to contain fundamentalism in Central Asia, to prevent the rise of resurgent powers in the Asia-Pacific, to strengthen the role of regional organizations in the region, and to promote a new common security architecture which will have the potential to overtake the US network of bilateral alliances.

However, the close relationship also entails some challenges for Russia. As many experts on the topic comment Russia- China partnership, particularly in Asia-Pacific, has led to Russia's overdependence on China, and has limited its own independent engagement with the region as it will be discusses later in the chapter.

Over the past two decades, Russo-Chinese relations have developed at a steady pace based on the common understandings. Seventeen summits at Presidential level, sixteen visits at prime minister level were realized during this time. President Yeltsin made his first visit to China in December 1992, during which both sides affirmed that "the two nations regard each other as friendly countries". When President Jiang

Zemin visited Russia in September 1994, the two countries announced the forging of a “constructive partnership” between Russia and China oriented toward the 21st century. During President Yeltsin’s second trip to China in April 1996, Russia and China this time announced the development of a “strategic co-operative partnership of equality and trust oriented toward the 21st century” bringing the level of cooperation to a next stage. During Jiang Zemin’s trip to Russia in April 1997 the two sides signed a joint statement on the multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order, a clear sign of their discontentment with the US unilateral policies in the world. The demarcation of the eastern section of the Sino-Russian border was the major achievement of Boris Yeltsin’s third visit to China in November 1997. The disputes over border have been the major source of conflict during the cold-war, and 1997 marked the beginning of the resolution of the border issue. The annual high visits had become a practice and continued through the Putin’s presidency. President Putin realized his first trip to China in 2000. In 2001 Russia and China signed the “Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation” which has become the main official document of their strategical alliance.¹³⁴ In March 2003, when Hu Jintao was selected as the new president of China, for his first trip abroad he chose Russia.¹³⁵ Likewise when the President Putin commenced his second term presidency, he selected China as the first foreign destination. In the summer of 2005, Russia and China jointly conducted a military exercise for the first time in their history.¹³⁶ President Medvedev, after he was sworn in as President on 7 May 2008, also went to China as the first destination outside CIS countries in 26 May 2008.¹³⁷ During President Medvedev’s last bilateral visit to China on 26-28 September 2010 “Joint Statement on Comprehensively Deepening the Strategic Partnership and Coordination” was issued.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ “Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation”
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm> (accessed on 15.12.2012)

¹³⁵ Iwashita Akihiro, “Primakov Redux? Russia and Strategic Triangles in Asia”, Research Paper, Slavic Research Center Publication, Sappora, No:17, 2007, p.176

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.167

¹³⁷ Li Xiaokun, “Medvedev’s visit to consolidate Ties”, *China Daily*, 21 May 2008, online at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-05/21/content_6700460.htm (accessed on 12.01.2012)

¹³⁸ “China-Russia Bilateral Relations”, *website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China*, , online at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbj/zjg/dozys/gjlb/3220/> (accessed on 25.01.2011)

A series of remaining border disputes were resolved by the two countries during the high level visits in 2006 and 2008. After solving their bilateral territorial disputes, in 2010 Russia and China jointly issued a call for a new security order in Asia based on “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation.”¹³⁹ According to their joint proposal this new order in Asia-Pacific should be transparent, equal and indivisible, these principles reflected Russia and China’s discontent with the US bilateral alliances in the region which are regarded as non-transparent, unequal and divisive by the two countries.¹⁴⁰ Russia and China also emphasized the importance of each country’s sovereignty and integrity which can be interpreted as their preference for non-interference in domestic affairs, and as a sign of China’s determined posture on Taiwan, the Senkakus Islands and Spratly Islands, and Russia’s stance on the issue of Kuril Islands.

Two countries also intensified the economic cooperation and trade ties. China has become Russia’s largest trade partner in 2010 (\$59.3 billion in total trade volume, which was 9.6 percent of Russia’s foreign trade).¹⁴¹ In 2011, bilateral trade increased by more than 30 percent to \$80 billion.¹⁴² When Russian Prime Minister Putin traveled to China to attend the 16th Regular Meeting of the Prime Ministers of Russia and China in October 2011, economic issues were on the top of the agenda. A total of 16 economic and trade agreements worth more than \$7 billion were signed including the fields of aerospace, biochemistry, IT, renewable energy, etc. The leaders declared the goal of lifting bilateral trade to \$100 billion by 2015 and \$200 billion by 2020.¹⁴³ They also identified 13 areas of cooperation including Far East/Siberia economic projects, special economic zone and high-tech park creation and management, finance, customs, cross-border transportation infrastructure, high-

¹³⁹ “China, Russia Call For Efforts in Asia-Pacific Security,” *China Daily*, 28.09. 2010, online at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/28/content_11361116.htm (accessed on 19.11.2011)

¹⁴⁰ Stephen Blank, “Russia, China, ASEAN and Asian Security”, 04.08.2011, online at <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/04/russia-china-asean-and-asian-security/> (accessed on 20.11.2011)

¹⁴¹ ---“China to become Russia’s Largest Trading Partner”, *Russia Briefing*, 10.03.2011 <http://russia-briefing.com/news/china-to-become-russias-largest-trading-partner.html/> (accessed on 02.11.2011)

¹⁴² Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: Between Geo-Economics and Geo-Politics”, *Comparative Connections-E Journal*, 1 January 2012, online at http://csis.org/files/publication/1103qchina_russia.pdf (accessed on 10.12.2011) p. 1

¹⁴³ *Ibid*, p.3

technology cooperation, aerospace, environmental protection, agriculture, forestry, and labor migration.

During Putin's visit, the two Prime Ministers also signed "Cooperative Memorandum for Economic Modernization". The origin of the document was Russia's "Modernization Partnership" program with the EU which was signed in 2010. China has "long proposed creating an analogous program," according to Russian sources. During President Medvedev's visit to China in September 2010, the two sides finally agreed to develop such an agreement. Before the agreement, Russia was doubtful of the level of Chinese technological development, and was inclined to consider Western countries exclusively as its source for advanced technologies for modernizing its economy.¹⁴⁴ Until that point, the only Asian country with which Russia had signed a modernization memorandum was South Korea. Two countries signed the memorandum in November 2010 during Medvedev's visit to Seoul.¹⁴⁵

Cooperation on energy field is another important aspect of two countries growing relations. Russia has become the fourth biggest oil supplier of China in 2010.¹⁴⁶ Although Russia opted for Japan's proposal instead of China's for the important "East Siberia Pacific Ocean Pipeline (ESPO) Project" which will carry Russian crude oil to Asian markets, it has not stopped collaborating with China to build a spur pipeline to this country. Two sides agreed on the construction of a branch to Daqing in China from ESPO main route in 2009. Vladimir Putin officially opened the valve of the Russian section of the pipeline in August 2010, at the opening ceremony Prime Minister Putin hailed the pipeline as a multidimensional project to enhance Moscow-Beijing energy cooperation.¹⁴⁷ In September 2010, President Hu Jintao and President Medvedev jointly attended the ceremony to mark the completion of Chinese side of

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*,p.4

¹⁴⁵ "China-Russia to Cooperate on Modernization", online at <http://rt.com/politics/putin-china-visit-modernisation-433/> (accessed on 23.02.2012)

¹⁴⁶ Sergei Blagov, "Russia Secures Trade Surplus with China", *The Jamestown Foundation*, 14.02.2010, online at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36039 (accessed on 27.01.2012)

¹⁴⁷ "Putin Opens Russian Section of Russia-China Pipeline", 30.08.2010, online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/business/2010-08/30/c_13468842.htm (accessed on 18.03.2012)

ESPO Daqing spur, and an agreement was signed by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Russia's Transneft (builder of ESPO) over the operation of the oil pipeline that stretches from Skovorodino in eastern Siberia to Daqing in Northeast China.¹⁴⁸ President Hu Jintao described "the pipeline a "milestone" for energy cooperation between the two countries at the opening ceremony.¹⁴⁹

Despite the high level of cooperation and the "strategic partnership", the two countries have a number of divergent interests and even disagreements such as Chinese illegal migration to the Russian Far East, cloning of Russian weapons for export purposes, Beijing's nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, and China's reluctance to take decisive measures against piracy in the South China and East China Seas which prevent building a fully effective strategic alliance between the two countries.¹⁵⁰ China is not looking very favorably on Russia's attempts to gain influence in North Korea and Vietnam. Russia and China also continue to favor opposite sides in the India-Pakistan rivalry. However they recognize their shared interests in Asia-Pacific and their need for close cooperation against the US domination in the region.

Russian-Chinese bilateral relations in the region have been enhanced by RIC and BRICS cooperation as well as cooperation in the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). SCO is an intergovernmental international organization founded in Shanghai in June 2001 by six countries: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as a successor to Shanghai Five process which initiated to strengthen confidence-building and disarmament in the border regions. SCO has evolved into a regional body with diverse areas of cooperation ranging from security and military cooperation to economic and cultural cooperation. SCO has also forged ties with ASEAN by the signing of an MoU in

¹⁴⁸ Chen Yurong, "Modernization Oriented Russian Diplomacy", *China Institute of International Studies*, August 10, 2011, online at http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2011-08/10/content_4395645.htm (accessed on 17.11.2011)

¹⁴⁹ Cheng Guangjin, "Energy Deals Mark New Era", *China Daily*, 28.09.2010, online at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-09/28/content_11356991.htm (accessed on 15.12.2011)

¹⁵⁰ Alexander Sergounin, "Russian Security Policy and the Prospects for Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific", Nizhny Novogorod Linguistic University, PONARS Policy Memo 84, October 1999, p.2

April 2005 which focuses on cooperation against terrorism and other transnational crimes.¹⁵¹ India is also supported by Russia to become a full member to the SCO.

4.4. Japan

Although Russo-Japanese trade relations are expanding and diversifying, political relations are hindered by a dispute over the Kuril Islands, an archipelago which separates the Sea of Okhotsk from the North Pacific Ocean. These islands are under Russian jurisdiction as part of the Sakhalin Oblast, but Japan claims four of them as its own.¹⁵² The conflict arose after World War II, when Japan was forced to abandon the islands, but the Soviet Union was not explicitly granted sovereignty over them. In large part because of this disagreement, the two countries have actually never signed a treaty to formally end their WWII conflict.¹⁵³

Moscow's position is essentially that Japan has no claim to the territories because it surrendered the entire Kuril chain in the San Francisco peace treaty. The victorious Soviet Union, therefore, acquired the islands as well as the southern half of Sakhalin Island (the northern half was already Soviet territory before the Second World War) as agreed in the Yalta Conference among the allied leaders. But ambiguity of the San Francisco Treaty over the country to whom Japan surrendered the islands, and later claims by Japan (supported by the U.S.) that the four contentious islands (Shikotan, Etorofu, Kunashiri and Habomai) did not actually belong to Kuril Islands Chain created a tension between Russia and Japan which lasts until today.¹⁵⁴

Following the disintegration of Soviet Union, Russian's new ruling class oriented their foreign policy towards West, in Asia-Pacific only Japan was taken as a serious partner since it was seen as a major source of economic support. Yeltsin tried to

¹⁵¹ ---"MoU Between ASEAN and SCO", online at <http://www.asean.org/ASEAN-SCO-MOU.pdf> (accessed on 27 .12.2011)

¹⁵² "The History of the Kuril Islands Dispute", *Rianovosti*, online at <http://en.rian.ru/infographics/20101102/161176425.html> , (accessed on 04.01.2012)

¹⁵³ Martin Fackler, "Kurile Islands Dispute Between Russia and Japan Intensifies", *The New York Times*, 02.11.2010, online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/world/europe/03kuriles.html>, (accessed on 04.01.2012)

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*

negotiate a solution to Kuril Islands territorial problems to open the way for economic cooperation and investment from Japan. However, Japan refused to increase commercial activity with Russia until the countries resolved the territorial issue (by which Japan meant that Russia would recognize its sovereignty over four islands) and signed a peace treaty. Russia offered only to return two islands after a peace treaty was signed. In the meantime, Yeltsin's efforts to improve bilateral relations faced increased domestic criticism from hard-line politicians, regional officials in Russia's Far East, and elements within the military establishment.¹⁵⁵ In 1992 this criticism culminated in Yeltsin's cancellation of his presidential trip to Japan. With the cancellation of Yeltsin's visit to Japan, Russian government's approach to Asia-Pacific region had to be reevaluated, and gradually the policy shifted from a policy based on bilateral relations to a policy with more emphasis on strategic context of the region.

The efforts to reach a peace agreement with Japan, and develop closer economic ties continued despite the initial setback, and Yeltsin paid a visit to Japan in October 1993 during which the two sides signed the "Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese Relations".¹⁵⁶ In 1996 the national policy document called for "more strenuous effort in order to conclude a peace treaty and establish cooperation with Japan".¹⁵⁷ In 1996 the Hashimoto Government in Japan also began considering relations with Russia in a more positive light, which was reciprocated by Moscow. In a speech before the Japan Committee for Economic Development, Prime Minister Hashimoto announced three principles concerning Japan's new diplomatic policy towards Russia: trust, mutual interests and a long-term perspective in assuming a constructive approach concerning the Northern Territories issue, and economic relations.¹⁵⁸ Consequently the "Yeltsin-Hashimoto plan" unveiled in Krasnoyarsk in November 1997 involved cooperation between the two sides to encourage investment and facilitate the fundamental integration of the Russian economy into the world economy, increased assistance for Russia's reform, the training of

¹⁵⁵ Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet Russian Relations Since 1945*, (London: Routledge, 1999) p.173-176

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.186

¹⁵⁷ Rouben Azizian, *op.cit.*,p.5

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*,p.12

personnel, and collaboration in the sphere of power engineering and the peaceful use of atomic energy.¹⁵⁹ The positive trend in the relation continued with the 1998 Moscow Declaration which called for “creative partnership” between Russia and Japan, and announced the establishment of a joint committee to work on the territorial disputes and peace treaty.

In August 1998, Russia and Japan had their first joint naval exercises, which took place in the Sea of Japan. Next year in August, Russian and Japanese defense chiefs signed a memorandum on boosting ties between the two countries' defense agencies. The memorandum signed at a time when Russia started to voice its concerns about Japan's decision to carry out research with the US on setting up an "umbrella" to protect US troops and allies in Asia against missile attacks.¹⁶⁰ Japan's gesture can be interpreted as an effort to appease Russian concerns.

An agreement on encouragement and protection of investments was signed in November 1998. Russia was pleased by the fact that Japan became the only G-8 country prepared to extend financial assistance to Russia, after Russia's financial crisis, not conditioned to Russia's financial policies or IMF terms. In February 2000, Japan allocated US\$120 million to finance partly the decommissioning of old Russian nuclear submarines.¹⁶¹

In parallel with the steps taken to establish closer relationship between two countries, after many years of opposition Japan finally supported Russia's membership in APEC, as well as Russia's admission into the G-7 respectively in 1998, and in 1997. One motivation for this new Japanese policy of encouraging economic relations with Russia was a desire to increase support in Moscow and the Russian Far East for resolution of the Kuril Islands dispute. For example, the decision to expand participation in visa-free exchanges and to allow joint economic activity on the

¹⁵⁹ Kimie Hara, *op.cit.*,198-202

¹⁶⁰ Rouben Azizian, *op.cit.*, pp.12-13

¹⁶¹ *Ibid*, p.13

disputed islands were steps to win over the local population and to overcome resistance to a territorial concession by the local authorities.¹⁶²

Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshiro Mori, was one of the first foreign leaders to meet with Russian president Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg in April 2000.¹⁶³ The Japanese were hoping to take advantage of Putin's domestic political strength in order to achieve a solution on the territorial issue. But Putin, who showed a tough stance on Russian territorial integrity issue during the presidential campaign, did not make any concessions involving the surrender of land.¹⁶⁴

Japan also remained inflexible regarding the Kurils as it felt it had a strong bargaining position ensured by its belief that Russia would need massive Japanese funding to finance the Pacific route to carry the Siberian oil to the Asian market.¹⁶⁵ Putin's compromise proposal in late 2004 to return back the two smaller islands was refused by Japan. Meantime, in March 2004 Russia declared its decision to build a Siberian oil pipeline to the Pacific port of Nakhodka as Japan hoped, and discarded the main China route.¹⁶⁶ Putin's decision to build ESPO pipeline through the RFE to the Pacific Ocean, as opposed to Daqing in China, was based on the following considerations: Russia did not want to be overdependent on the Chinese market as the single buyer; needed Japan's investment for the development of Russia's eastern regions; and hoped that Japan would be more persuadable to making concessions on the territorial issue if the Pacific route was chosen.

¹⁶² Peggy Meyer, "The Russian Far East's Economic Integration with Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects", *Pacific Affairs*, Summer, 1999, p.213

¹⁶³ "The History of the Territorial Issue Between Japan and Russia", online at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition01/preface.html> (accessed on 02.04.2012)

¹⁶⁴ Rouben Azizian, *op.cid.*, p.15

¹⁶⁵ Shoichi Itoh, "Russia Looks East: Energy Markets and Geopolitics in Northeast Asia", A Report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program, July 2011, p.46

¹⁶⁶ Sergei Blogov, "Russia Walks Thin Line Between Japan and China", *Asia Times*, online at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/GA05Ag01.html (accessed on 03.04.2012)

Japan's decision to finance ESPO was mostly based on geopolitical motivations, rather than economic.¹⁶⁷ Japan did not want China to be able to diversify of its energy supply, and to further strengthen its relationship with Russia. Tokyo was also aware of local Russians' fear of increasing Chinese presence in their region. The local governments in the Russian Far East themselves were supportive of Pacific route. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi visited Khabarovsk, the second largest city in RFE after Vladivostok, to further strengthen the support for the Pacific route.¹⁶⁸ The RFE local leaders had long urged for greater economic cooperation with Japan and the US to keep in check Chinese influence in the region. They declared support for the Pacific route, with a possible branch to China, since the China route alone would create the danger of 'dictatorship of the exclusive buyer'. The local leaders also supported the Pacific route for the economic benefits its construction would bring to their territories – employment, funds for regional budgets, and development of regional infrastructure. The ESPO pipeline was scheduled to be constructed in two phases: first, construction of the Taishet–Skovorodino oil pipeline with annual capacity of 30 million tons and of the oil terminal in Perevoznaya Bay. Secondly, construction of the Skovorodino– Pacific Ocean (Kozmino) oil pipeline with annual capacity of 50 million tons to link up with the Taishet–Skovorodino pipeline with total annual capacity of 80 million tons. The first stage of ESPO completed and commissioned in December 2009, the first oil passed through the pipeline in November 2010. This second phase would be in conjunction with the development of oil fields in Eastern Russia and is expected to be completed in 2014¹⁶⁹

Despite ESPO agreement, no breakthrough regarding the territorial issue was achieved during Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda's April 2008 visit to Moscow and during President Medvedev's visit to Hokkaido for the G8 Summit in July 2008. The two sides reiterated their former positions, and the expectations regarding a solution became very low. The Japanese government's decision in 2008 which instructed that school textbooks would state that Japan has sovereignty over the four disputed

¹⁶⁷ Paradorn Rangsimaporn, *op.cid.*,p.221

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p.222

¹⁶⁹“ESPO Pipeline”, online at <http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/espopipeline/> (accessed on 15 12.2011)

islands reignited tensions. Dmitry Medvedev's 2010 visit to the one of the disputed Kuril Islands which was the first visit by any Russian leader, led to further deterioration of the territorial issue, and to greater tension in bilateral relations.¹⁷⁰

Although the eventual outcome of the territorial dispute is unclear, the countries are aware that the level of trust between Moscow and Tokyo must improve substantially if a mutually acceptable solution is to be reached. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had an important meeting in Hawaii prior to APEC Summit in November 2011. During the meeting the leaders reaffirmed the need to solve the territorial issue before signing a peace treaty, and agreed to continue discussions on the issue.¹⁷¹ The two leaders agreed to promote exchanges between the two countries' defense authorities to ensure security in the Asia-Pacific region. They also agreed to boost cooperation in the energy area, including oil and natural gas development projects off Sakhalin. Prime Minister Noda expressed Japan's readiness to cooperate with Russia for success of its presidency for the APEC 2012 Meeting in the Far East city of Vladivostok.¹⁷²

President Medvedev told during the meeting that he welcomed the development of governmental talks between Japan and Russia, saying that he wanted to utilize a variety of channels for this, including dialogue at the Foreign Ministers level and parliamentary exchanges. In addition, he said that he was satisfied regarding the expansion of Japan-Russia economic and trade relations to the highest level in recent years. President Medvedev invited Prime Minister Noda to Russia. Prime Minister Noda expressed his gratitude for this while stating that he wanted to consider it.¹⁷³

Besides two leaders meeting, Japanese Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Yukio Edano and Russian Minister of Economic Development Elvira Nabiullina signed a

¹⁷⁰ Elen Bary, "Kurile Islands Visit by Medvedev Angers Japan", *The New York Times*, 01.11.2010, online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/world/asia/02kuriles.html> (accessed on 14.12.2011)

¹⁷¹ "Japan, Russia Agree to Discuss Territorial Dispute in Quiet Atmosphere", *The Japan Times*, 14.10.2011, online at <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20111114a4.html> (accessed on 15.12.2011)

¹⁷² *Ibid*

¹⁷³ "Summit Meeting (Overview)", November 13, 2011, online at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/statement/201111/13russia_e.html (accessed on 18.11.2011)

memorandum of understanding, which is aimed at boosting bilateral cooperation for enhanced trade and investment based on Russia's modernization needs.¹⁷⁴ Edano told reporters after his meeting with Nabiullina that responding to Russia's needs for economic modernization with Japan's various technologies, especially energy-saving expertise, would help create a "win-win relationship" on the economic front between the two countries. He added the move could also become a "driving force" to resolve issues lying between the two countries in a favorable manner for Japan.

The territorial dispute is expected to continue to impede Russian -Japanese bilateral relations. The Russian and Japanese governments are insistent on their positions due to strategic importance of the islands as well as strong nationalistic public sentiment against a compromise. Other factors which can be obstacles to a higher level cooperation are Japanese-the US military alliance, and Russia's alignment with China in the region. However despite these tension-creating factors, two countries have achieved a considerable development in their relations in the last two decades.

4.5. India

Following the end of the cold war, Russia exercised a passive policy towards India causing a slowing down in relations with the traditional friend of the cold-war times. During the President Boris Yeltsin's visit to India in 1993 two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship which replaced 1971 Friendship Treaty which encompassed clauses targeting China and the US. The new treaty removed these clauses which were formulated under cold-war circumstances, and India-China, Russia-China bilateral tensions.¹⁷⁵ Until 2000 there had not been any Presidential visits from Russia to India. 2000 marked a turning point towards revitalization of bilateral relations. Russian President Vladimir Putin made his first official visit to India in December 2000, during the visit the two countries signed a "Declaration of Strategic Partnership" and other agreements of importance to reactivate their cooperative

¹⁷⁴ "Edano's Remarks After Talks with Russian, Thai Trade Ministers", Kyodo News, 12 November 2011, online at <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Edano's+remarks+after+talks+with+Russian,+Thai+trade+ministers-1-a0272373701> (accessed on 18.11.2011)

¹⁷⁵ Arun Mohanty, "Toasting Legacy of 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty", 09.08.2011, *Russia&India Report*, online at http://indrus.in/articles/2011/08/09/toasting_legacy_of_1971_indo-soviet_friendship_treaty_12842.html (accessed on 20.11.2011)

relations. Since the declaration of “Strategic Partnership” in 2000 India-Russia ties have attained a new character with enhanced levels of cooperation taking place in almost all areas of the bilateral relationship including political, security, trade and economy, defense, science and technology and culture.¹⁷⁶

In the Declaration “military technical cooperation, joint research and development, and training” were listed as the main aspects of the strategic partnership. India and Russia also pledged to work together for the establishment of a multipolar world based on the sovereign equality of all states. Like Russia-China joint declaration of 1997 on multipolarity in which China and Russia opposed unilateral policies in the world affairs, Russia and India also expressed their "determined opposition to the unilateral use or threat of use of force in violation of the UN Charter, and to intervention in the internal affairs of other states, including under the guise of humanitarian intervention." This also reflected the general unease in the international community about NATO's war on Yugoslavia and the economic blockade against Iraq at that time.¹⁷⁷

Under the Declaration of Strategic Partnership, several institutionalized dialogue mechanisms have been put in place that operate at the political and official levels, and ensures regular interaction between two countries. In the framework of the new phase of their relations, the two countries started the practice of Annual Summit meetings between the Prime Minister of India and the President of the Russia. It is the highest and most important institutionalized dialogue mechanism between two countries. Meetings are held every year in India and Russia alternatively. Since the Declaration of Strategic Partnership, twelve Summit meetings have taken place. The 12th Summit meeting was held in Moscow, on 15-17 December 2011, between Prime Minister Singh and President Medvedev.¹⁷⁸ The Joint Statement released on the occasion reflected the “special and privileged” nature of the India- Russia strategic partnership. Before departing for the summit, Singh announced that he was

¹⁷⁶ “India-Russia Relations”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India, online at <http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=50044518> (accessed on 20.12.2011)

¹⁷⁷ Julie M. Rahm, “Russia, China, India: A New Strategic Triangle for a New Cold War?”, *Parameters*, Winter 2001 Issue, p.87-88

¹⁷⁸ “Official Visit of Prime Minister to Russia”, online at <http://www.indianembassy.ru/index.php?option> (accessed on 20.12.2011)

looking forward to in-depth discussions with Medvedev on trade, Russia's leadership in the global economic crisis, and political developments in Middle East and Asia. Singh said he was convinced that India-Russia consultations on global issues were more necessary than ever before.¹⁷⁹ The bilateral conversation also addressed how to make advances in international forums such as United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Group of 20 (G20), and the BRICS and East Asia Summit.

The two leaders announced the "Joint Statement Furthering The India-Russia Strategic Partnership To Meet The Challenges of A Changing World" in the end of the 12th Summit Meeting. In the joint statement,¹⁸⁰

The sides reiterated their support "to the creation of a transparent, open, comprehensive, and balanced architecture of security and cooperation in the region" based on the recognized principles of international law as well as respect for the legitimate interests of all states. They emphasized their commitment to the principle of indivisibility of security, unacceptability of attempts to enhance their own security to the detriment of other states' security, inadmissibility of preservation and creation of new dividing lines.

The reference to "the to the creation of a transparent, open, comprehensive, and balanced architecture of security and cooperation in the region" in the Russian-Indian joint declaration implies the both countries' discomfort with the US bilateral alliances in the region which they think as opaque and threatening to the overall security situation in the region. The views expressed by Russia and India are also in parallel with the 2010 Russian-Chinese proposal for a new security order in Asia-Pacific. The East Asia Forum which brings together all the countries with a stake in the region is tried to be promoted as the principal instrument for regional security and stability instead of bilateral US alliances.

¹⁷⁹ Vladimir Radyuhin, "Expanding Indo-Russian cooperation in India's interest", *The Hindu*, 15 December 2011

¹⁸⁰ "Joint Statement Furthering The India-Russia Strategic Partnership To Meet The Challenges Of A Changing World", 17 December 2011, online at [\(http://www.indianembassy.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=798%\)](http://www.indianembassy.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=798%) (accessed on 20.12.2011)

In the following paragraph of the Declaration the two leaders express their agreement;

That the SCO had become an important factor for regional security and cooperation. Russia welcomed India's intention to join the organization as a full-fledged member and expressed the belief that its participation would significantly increase the political weight of the SCO and give new quality and dimension to cooperation within its framework. Russia stated that it stood for joint efforts with other SCO members to accelerate the process of India's full membership of the organization.

Russia's willingness for India to become a full SCO member (currently has observer status) shows Russia's continuing efforts to form a stronger Russia-China-India nexus to balance the US position in the region.

In spite of close bilateral and regional cooperation in the format of multilateral organizations or processes such as ASEAN+10 (ASEAN's dialogue partners), ARF, EAS, RIC and BRICS, the relationship between two countries is not free from tension mainly due to the contentious issues between China-India. India is dismayed by the fact that Russia does not directly support India's bid for UNSC membership under the influence of China. While China and Russia have been keen to emphasize a multi-polar order and greater security cooperation, they did not offer a formal support for India's initiative. The RIC joint statements only called for "reform to make the UN more representative and democratic" without directly referring to India's possible UNSC membership.

However Russia-India relations is based on a broad range of convergence of interests, and it is not likely to be significantly affected by the UNSC issue. In contrast with India-China relationship which is frequently defined by rivalry, Russian-Indian ties are less contentious and more mutually beneficial. India needs Russia for its military and energy security, and pleased that Russia accepts India as the eminent power in South Asia, and that supports its quest for a great power status.¹⁸¹ India's "Look East" policy towards a growing comprehensive vision for the

¹⁸¹ Ash Narain Roy, "Indo-US and India-Russia: Strategic Partners All?" *Mainstream*, Vol. XLVIII, N.1, 26.12.2009, <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1849.html> (accessed on 02.01.2012)

East Asia region has been coincided with Russia's Asia-Pacific policy.¹⁸² But there is a possibility that the RIC cooperation will be affected from India-China rivalry, harming interest of Russia in forming an effective balancing bloc to the U.S. in Asia-Pacific.

While Russia-India-China triangle has being created, the US made its own efforts to distance India from China and Russia. On the other hand India also needed a balancing strategy towards China since it perceives a threat in China's growing military and economic might. Under these considerations, the U.S. and India launched "a Strategic Dialogue on the Asia-Pacific" in 2010. The U.S.-India-Japan trilateral consultation on regional issues followed the U.S.-India dialogue. India, United States and Japan held their first trilateral meeting in Washington in December 2011 during which Tokyo and Washington affirmed deepening of their strategic ties with India.¹⁸³ Although the leaders declared that the dialogue was not directed against China, China interpreted it an effort to contain China in the APR. China was already uncomfortable with improving bilateral ties between India-Japan since the two countries started annual high level visits in 2005, and announced "Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India" in 2009.¹⁸⁴ The general opinion is that the two countries are trying to restrain the Chinese military ambitions with defense dialogues, bilateral maritime exercises and a possible Japanese arms export to India.

In the economic sphere, Russia and India has a promising prospect of cooperation. They have untapped economic complementarities, there is vast potential for an increase in bilateral trade volumes and investment. In 2009, both sides set the target of achieving USD 20 billion in bilateral trade by 2015.¹⁸⁵ Special attention is being

¹⁸² C.S. Kuppaswamy, "India's Look East Policy: A Review", South Asia Analysis Group, 12.02.2010, online at <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3662.html> (accessed on 05.03.2012)

¹⁸³ "First US-Japan-India trilateral meeting", *Hindustan Times* 20 December 2011, online at <http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/Americas/First-US-Japan-India-trilateral-meeting/Article1-784695.aspx> (accessed on 02.01.2012)

¹⁸⁴ Dipanjan Roy Chaudry, "China's aggression brings India-Japan closer", *India Today*, 29 December 2011, online at <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-aggression-brings-india-japan-closer/1/166332.html> (accessed on 03.01.2012)

¹⁸⁵ "India, Russia target USD 20 billion trade by 2015", *Russian Embassy in New Delhi*, online at http://rusembassy.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1640%3Aindia-russia-target-

paid to the energy, pharmaceuticals, IT, steel, hydrocarbons, aerospace, diamonds and agriculture sectors for this purpose. Overall bilateral trade has been growing steadily. Trade in 2009 was USD 7.46 billion, in 2010 it was USD 8.535 billion, and the figure is expected to reach US\$ 9 billion in 2011. The two-way investment between the two countries stands at approximately USD 7.8 billion.¹⁸⁶ The arms trade constitutes an important aspect of Russia-India bilateral relations. The average annual arms trade between two countries approximates US\$800 million. About 60 percent of the Indian army's military hardware is Russian-made, while 70 percent of naval hardware and 80 percent of air force hardware is Russian-made or of Russian origin¹⁸⁷

The other main areas of cooperation between the two countries are Nuclear Cooperation and Space. Russia has been a partner of India in the field of nuclear energy for a long time. The construction of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project is an example of ongoing cooperation in this area. During the visit of Prime Minister Putin to India in March 2010, an “Inter Governmental Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes” for broad based cooperation in the nuclear field was signed and a “Road Map” of long term cooperation in the field was also finalized.¹⁸⁸

Russia supports India's intention to seek full membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export control regimes. In June 2011 the two countries signed a MoU on cooperation on India's ‘Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership’ initiative¹⁸⁹. India and Russia have also been collaborating in several high-technology space projects under the 2004 Inter-Governmental Agreement on

usd-20-billion-trade-by-2015&catid=16%3Apress-on-bilateral-relations&directory=155&lang=en (accessed on 03.01.2012)

¹⁸⁶ “India-Russia Relations”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India, online at <http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=50044518> (accessed on 20.12.2011)

¹⁸⁷ Julie Rahm, *op. cit.*, p.88

¹⁸⁸ Pallavi Pal, “The Way Ahead in Indo-Russian Ties”, *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi*, 20.12.2010, online at <http://www.idsa.in/node/6435/2006>, (accessed on 22.12.2011)

¹⁸⁹ “India-Russia Relations”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India, online at <http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=50044518> (accessed on 20.12.2011)

“Cooperation in the area of exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes”.

Russia-India relations is an important component of Russia’s Asia-Pacific policy. The two countries have convergent interests and complimentary economies. However, Russia’s closer alignment with China and India’s balancing policies towards China through strategic cooperation with US and Japan, and the US efforts to include India in its network of alliances in the region are the elements which prevent a fully effective Russia-India-China trilateral strategic partnership, which has been a strategic design for Russia to balance the US in the Asia-Pacific Region.

4.6. South Korea

The cold war delayed the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and South Korea for four decades. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between two countries in 1990, Russia and South Korea have enjoyed rapidly developing political and economic relations. Presidents of the two countries have met twenty one times since the establishment of diplomatic relations in bilateral summits.¹⁹⁰ Russia abandoned cold-war policy of supporting North Korea on ideological basis, and established pragmatic cooperative relations with South Korea which has become a partner in Russia’s modernization drive. The two countries have been collaborating also in multilateral forums such as six-party talks, ARF, APEC, ASEAN + Defense Minister’s Meeting, and most recently EAS and ASEM.

During his visit to South Korea in 2010 President Medvedev stated that relations between Russia and South Korea is one of high priority for the Asia-Pacific region and the partnership between two countries is acquiring a strategic character.¹⁹¹ During the visit Russian and Korean sides have signed 11 documents, mostly in the economic field. President Medvedev underlined the positive trend in trade and economic relations between the two countries in the 20 years of diplomatic ties, and specified priority areas for further cooperation as energy, medicine, space, nuclear

¹⁹⁰ “Russia-South Korea Political Relations”, *Russian Embassy in Seoul*, online at <http://www.russian-embassy.org/english/political.html> (accessed on 04.01.2012)

¹⁹¹ Svetlana Andreyeva, “Russia-South Korea Relations is a Priority in Asia-Pacific-Medvedev”, *Voice of Russia*, 10 November 2010, online at http://english.ruvr.ru/_print/33093213.html (accessed on 04.01.2012)

and computer technologies. President Medvedev drew attention to the joint plans for the development of Siberia and Far East and praised Korean investors for bringing modern technologies and a modern production culture.¹⁹² The trade volume was 11 billion dollars in 2010, and two sides agree that there is great potential to further increase the volume.

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Russia in 2011 also focused on economic cooperation and joint investment in the Eastern territories of Russia. "Cooperation in many spheres is developing dynamically... Our countries are good partners, we do not have problematic issues [in relations]," Lee said, adding that his country is ready to take part in developing Siberia and Russia's Far East.¹⁹³

Development of Siberia and RFE has a special place in bilateral relations. Russia puts intense efforts to attract the South Korean investment in these regions. Over the past years, regional governments in the RFE have held numerous meetings with representatives of South Korean businesses and its government to discuss regional development in areas such as infrastructure, agriculture, and transportation. In exchange, Russia has opened a vast energy market to South Korea, allowing Seoul to develop multiple LNG facilities in the RFE to better supply its energy-hungry economy.¹⁹⁴

Russia and South Korea are aware of the complementary nature of their economies, and willing to cooperate on this basis, and their industrial and technological partnership is growing. South Korean-US military alliance, frequent joint military exercises conducted by the US and South Korean armies and Ballistic Missile Defense cooperation activities are hindrances for full political-security cooperation between Russia and South Korea, nevertheless they do not interfere with economic-technological cooperation between two countries.

¹⁹² *Ibid*

¹⁹³ "Russia-South Korea Relations Have Good Future-Medvedev Says", *Ria Novosti*, 2 November 2011, online at <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111102/168352620.html> (accessed on 05.01.2012)

¹⁹⁴ John Yi, "Energy Diplomacy", *The Diplomat*, 17 November 2011, online at <http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/11/17/energy-diplomacy/> (accessed on 05.01.2012)

4.7. Australia and New Zealand

Both Russia and Australia consider themselves to be part of the Asia-Pacific rim, Australia like Russia has been more actively involved in the Asia-Pacific affairs in the last two decades. Australia has taken active part in the establishment of APEC and has become a party to all ASEAN-led regional mechanisms. Australia and Russia cooperate in a number of important international and multilateral forums, including those involved with non-proliferation issues and regional security. Australia has taken steps to deepen the evolving regional cooperation during Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's tenure, he proposed an "Asia-Pacific Union" similar to the European Union to be established in the region. This proposal and subsequent visits of Prime Minister Rudd to the regional countries to promote the idea generated a fruitful discussion, yet had not been endorsed by regional leaders.¹⁹⁵

President Putin became the first Russian leader to visit Australia when he attended APEC Leaders' Week in September 2007 in Australia. Joint statements issued during the visit noted Australia's and Russia's shared commitment to addressing the global challenges of climate change and energy, reaffirmed both countries' interest in combating terrorism and in expanding bilateral trade and investment through the reconvening of the Australia-Russia Joint Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation (JCTEC), which first met in 1995.¹⁹⁶ During Putin's visit, Australia and Russia signed an "Agreement on Cooperation in the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes".

The trade and investment between two countries has shown a positive trend in the last years, and it expected to accelerate following Russia's WTO accession in 2011.¹⁹⁷ Further rapprochement and deeper contacts between the Russian Far East and Australia are also developing.

¹⁹⁵ Matthew Franklin, "Kevin Rudd to Drive Asian Union", *The Australian*, 5 June 2008, online at <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/rudd-to-drive-asian-union/story-e6frg6no-1111116542913> (accessed on 02.02.2012)

¹⁹⁶ "Russian Federation Country Brief-Bilateral Relations", website of Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/russia/ru_brief.html (accessed on 12.02.2012)

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, economic relations section

Australia is committed to comprehensive engagement with the Asia-Pacific region, however, since Australia is a traditional ally of the US, and advocates centrality of the US and its bilateral relations to the future of the region, Australian and Russian perceptions of regional cooperation can be divergent or sometimes conflicting in the future.

New Zealand:

The relations between Russia and New Zealand had been constrained during the cold-war years. In 1949 New Zealand closed its Mission in Russia, and did not reopen it until 1973. New Zealand declared the Soviet ambassador in Wellington persona-non grata in 1979 and the Soviet Union reciprocated.¹⁹⁸ The dramatic economic and political changes culminating in the dissolution of the Soviet Union created a new basis for relations between two countries from 1991.

Today New Zealand regards Russia as an important Asia-Pacific power with common interests in comprehensive regional cooperation.¹⁹⁹ As the regional structures of the Asia Pacific region have been developed, the two countries found themselves participating in many of the same forums. New Zealand has also become first country in the region to start FTA negotiations with the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union which is expected to be concluded in 2012. New Zealand has also been supportive of Russia's bid for membership of the WTO.²⁰⁰

4.8. Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos

The three countries of Southeast Asia had been cold-war allies of the Soviet Union. The end-of the cold war has given a new shape to their relations after a transitory period of adjustment and resolution of the issue of Soviet time debts. After Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia became members of ASEAN respectively in 1995,

¹⁹⁸ Chris Elder, former Ambassador of New Zealand to Moscow, "Sixty-Five Years of Diplomatic Relations between New Zealand and Russia", *The Diplomat*, August 2009, retrieved from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand, online at <http://www.nzembassy.com/russia/relationship-between-new-zealand-and-russia/new-zealand-and-russia>(accessed on 25.02.2012)

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid*

²⁰⁰ "New Zealand- Russia Relations", *website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand*, online at <http://mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Europe/Russia.php> (accessed on 14.02.2012)

1997 and 1999; they also acted as a bridge between ASEAN and Russia dialogue partnership. Russia's close relations with these countries also present an opportunity for Russia's contribution to ASEAN integration by assisting them to build capacities to participate in and integrate further into ASEAN.²⁰¹

During the 1980s, Vietnam received almost US\$3 billion a year in economic and military aid from the Soviet Union and realized most of its trade with the U.S.S.R. and COMECON countries.²⁰² When the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, Russia pressed Vietnam for a repayment of debts totaling US\$1.7 billion. It took nearly a decade to negotiate a settlement. In 1994 the two sides codified their relationship with a “Treaty on Principles of Friendly Relations”. Six years later Vietnam agreed to pay back its debts in 20 years period, but also asked Russia to pay an annual fee for continued access to Cam Ranh Bay. The Russian Federation preferred to withdraw from Cham Rahn Bay which was leased in 1979 for 25 years period as a base for Soviet Pacific Fleet in South China Sea. Once the debt and military base issue were resolved two countries raised their relationship to comprehensive strategic partnership in March 2001 during President Putin’s visit to Vietnam.²⁰³

Russia and Vietnam have identified four priority areas for cooperation: energy, mining, agriculture, science and technology. As Russia recovered from its economic crisis of 1998 it has sought to exploit market opportunities in fast growing Vietnam and the transport links between Vietnam and the Russian Far East. The two countries expressed their plan to expand their joint venture operations to explore oil and gas on Vietnam’s continental shelf and step up joint investment activities in Russia.

²⁰¹ “Report on the Conference on ASEAN-Russia: Foundations and Future Prospects”, *ASEAN Studies Center, Institute of Southeastern Studies*, 26-27 April 2011, <http://asc.iseas.edu.sg/about-us/home/item/3-asean-russia-conference>,

²⁰² “Vietnam-Soviet Union Relations”, online at <http://countrystudies.us/vietnam/61.htm> (accessed on 25.02.2012)

²⁰³ “Visit to Vietnam Pays Dividends for Putin”, *The Jamestown Foundation*, 05.03.2001, Volume:7, Issue:44, online at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=22860&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=215 (accessed on 26.02.2012)

Russia will also construct first nuclear power plant in Vietnam which will be also the first one in Southeast Asia.²⁰⁴ Russia and Vietnam signed an agreement for the construction of the nuclear plant in October 2010, and Russia will also provide a loan to Vietnam for the said project. In line with the overall positive trend in bilateral relations, Russian and Vietnamese trade volume has increased steadily reaching 1.8 billion USD in 2009. Vietnam and Russia declared that they aim to boost two-way trade to \$5 billion by 2015.²⁰⁵

Vietnam acted as a bridge in Russia's dialogue relations with ASEAN after it has become a member in the organization in 1995. Vietnam also supported Russian participation in ASEM and EAS processes.²⁰⁶ Vietnam welcomes and promotes greater Russian engagement in Asia-Pacific to balance the influence of other great powers. The leaders of two countries frequently declare their determination to coordinate closely their policies in regional and international forums such as the United Nations, the ARF and the APEC forum for the sake of a new, equitable and democratic world order.²⁰⁷

The diplomatic relations with Cambodia and Russia were established in 1956.²⁰⁸ The USSR supported Vietnam when the country invaded Cambodia to end Khmer Rouge regime in 1978, and Cambodia entered into a long phase of civil war where the parties aided by major powers fought for power. In 1989 the negotiations began to end the civil war within the UN framework. Russia took part in preparation and signing of the Paris agreements in October 1991, as well as in the UN peacemaking

²⁰⁴ "Russia to Build Nuclear Plant in Vietnam", *World Nuclear News*, 01.11.2010, online at http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Russia_to_build_nuclear_plant_in_Vietnam-0111104.html (accessed on 15.02.2012)

²⁰⁵ "Vietnam Russia Target 5 Billion Dollar in Trade", online at <http://en.hanoivietnamplus.vn/Home/VN-Russia-target-5-blN-USD-in-trade-by-2015/201111/2079>, accessed on 25.02.2012)

²⁰⁶ "Vietnam-Russia Relations", *website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam*, online at http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/cn_vakv/euro/nr040819111648/ns070919141659 (accessed on 25.02.2012)

²⁰⁷ "Vietnam-Russia Third Annual Strategic Dialogue", *website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam*, online at <http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns100816091026> (accessed on 19.02.2012)

²⁰⁸ "Russia-Cambodia Relations", *Embassy of Russian Federation in Cambodia*, online at <http://www.embrusscambodia.mid.ru/dip-policy-e.html> (accessed on 27.02.2012)

operations between 1991 and 1993. Russia supported the Cambodian government during the crisis in July 1997, as well as contributed to the restoration of the Cambodian membership in the UN.

End of the cold war brought a new understanding to Russia-Cambodian relations. The ideological basis for relations gave way to a more pragmatic approach based on economic-technological and regional cooperation. In 1995 Russia and Cambodia signed the “Joint Declaration on the Foundation of Friendly Relations”, and a series of other bilateral agreements on trade and economic cooperation. The Declaration also included establishment of an annual political dialogue mechanism at the deputy foreign minister level.²⁰⁹

The relations between Laos and Russia also gained momentum in the recent years. During the visit of President of Laos to Moscow in October 2011, the two sides agreed to raise their relationship to strategic partnership and also approved a declaration on a strategic partnership in the Asia-Pacific region.²¹⁰

4.9. Conclusion

Improving bilateral relations with the regional countries has been the main component of Russian efforts on the way to integration with the Asia-Pacific. Russia’s economic and political decline in importance following the disintegration of the USSR has affected its international standing while opening up new opportunities to extend its relations beyond the cold-war lines. Russia, keeping in mind its relative weakness and lack of substantial ties with the regional countries has chosen the path of aligning itself with China in its process of integration with the Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, Russia’s awareness that it cannot balance the US power in the region by its own means led China’s emergence as principal partner in Russia’s quest for creation of a new regional structure not dominated by the US.

However, Russia has also become partner with the US especially by the work of regional organizations, and the US was regarded as a valuable partner for the

²⁰⁹ ---“Political Relations”, website of the Russian Embassy in Cambodia, <http://www.embrusscambodia.mid.ru/dip-policy-e.html>

²¹⁰ Phonekeo Vorakhoun , “Laos, Russia declare strategic partnership” *Vientiane Times*, 17-10-2011

Russia's internal modernization program. The new realities of post-cold war Asia-Pacific thus forced Russia and America to cooperate on several issues although their broad interests, and opinions with regard to security architecture of the region differed widely.

Russia has successfully improved its relations with South Korea which has become an important investor in the Eastern Russia, and a key modernization partner for Russia. However North Korean issue is an obstacle for full exploitation of Russia-South Korea rapprochement. Russian-Japanese relations, despite growing economic ties and construction of ESPO pipeline, are shadowed by Kurile Islands issue which does not show any signs of early solution. India-Russia relations both bilaterally and in RIC and BRICS format have gained a strategic importance for Russia transforming traditionally friendly relations into a more structural cooperation. However Russia's desire to strengthen RIC cooperation has limitations deriving from China-India rivalry, and India's belief that China does not want an equal regional power which can undermine China's supremacy in the region.

While on the first level, Russia tried to lay foundation for closer relations with the leading countries in Asia, on the second level Russia assumed an active participation in building the "regional architecture of security and cooperation" in the Asia-Pacific through the support of China and ASEAN. In the next chapter the engagement of Russia with regional bodies and processes will be examined.

CHAPTER 5

RUSSIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

5.1. Introduction:

As it was underlined in the second chapter 'multipolarity' has become a key concept in Russia's foreign policy in its attempts to secure its position as a great power in the world arena in the post-cold war era. In its search for a multipolar world order, Russia sought to enhance its relationship with principal powers of the Asia-Pacific countries as well as regional organizations to attain an influential role in the region which has become a key driver of global economy and politics. In this context, Russian Federation's relations with the APR's leading regional organizations will be analyzed in the current chapter.

The purpose of this chapter is to assess the role of regional organizations in the process of regional integration in the Asia-Pacific, and to evaluate Russia's position in these organizations after more than a decade of involvement.

The chapter will begin with APEC which has been the sole grouping bringing most of the Asia-Pacific countries together with the aim of regional economic integration. ASEAN will take a central part in this chapter since the organization has been the driving force for all the other regional groupings except APEC. ASEAN-led mechanisms or processes such as ARF, EAS, ASEAN+Defense Ministers Meeting and second-track mechanisms will be explained in the subsequent sections.

5.2. APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)

APEC was founded in November 1989 as an informal consultative forum to promote economic cooperation. APEC was established at the initiative of the Japanese and Australian governments in 1989 upon the proposal of Australian Prime Minister Bob

Hawke.²¹¹ Japan and Australia had been at the forefront of the regional economic cooperation with their previous leading role in the establishment of Pacific Basin Economic Council in 1967 (PBEC), and Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1980.²¹²

The founding members of APEC were Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States. In 1991, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were admitted to APEC. APEC was promoted as the primary regional vehicle for promoting open trade and practical economic and technical cooperation.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia's new foreign policy has sought greater integration with the world economy, and as a part of this policy, it has aimed for entering the existing frameworks of regional cooperation in Asia-Pacific. China's membership was also noted positively by Russia. China as a country which professed socialist values became a full member of a capitalist economic institution and accepted to belong to same organization with Taiwan. China's attitude showed that in the post-cold war era economic realities have become more pressing than ideological choices.

Russia formally applied to APEC membership in 1995. However participation in APEC was limited to economies in the Asia-Pacific region that have strong economic linkages in the Asia-Pacific region, and that accept the objectives and principles of APEC as embodied in the Seoul APEC Declaration. Russia did not have a substantial intra-regional trade in Asia-Pacific at that time. In 1997, intra-APEC trade recorded \$5.2 trillion, which accounted for 54 percent of the total world trade. On the other hand, the total trade between Russia and APEC members was \$22.3 billion, which accounted for only 0.4 percent of total APEC trade.²¹³ APEC

²¹¹ Takashi Terada, "The Australia-Japan Partnership in the Asia-Pacific: From Economic Diplomacy to Security Cooperation", *Contemporary South East Asia*, Vol.22, No:1, April 2000, p.76

²¹² *Ibid*, p.78

²¹³ Koto Mihoko, "Russia's Multilateral Diplomacy in the Process of Asia-Pacific Regional Integration: The Significance of ASEAN for Russia." *Slavic Research Centre*, 18 Sept. 2011., <http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no16_2_ses/06_kato.pdf>, (accessed on 10.03.2012), p.142

members, conversely, amounted to 16.2 percent of the overall value of Russia's external trade.

Besides poor economic linkages there was opposition to Russia's entry into APEC from different members of the APEC. The U.S. was trying to bloc Russia's participation in Asia-Pacific regional mechanisms. Japan was opposed to Russia's membership because of its territorial disputes with Russia. Australia and Singapore, in particular, pointed out the poor economic linkage between Russia and Asia-Pacific countries. ASEAN and Australia also voiced their concern that APEC would be threatened to be dominated by Japan, China, the US, and Russia.²¹⁴

Russia searched for Japan's support for its application to APEC. In March 1995, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev visited Japan and asked Foreign Minister Kono for Japan's support in joining APEC but his request was declined by Japan. Until the mid-1990s, the Japanese Foreign Ministry maintained the principle that expansion of economic cooperation with Russia and the progress of negotiations on the territorial issue were inseparable. On the other hand, Russia tried to use China's contribution to Russia's entry. China shifted to a position of official political support of Russia's intention to become active in APEC when Russian-Chinese relations entered a progressive stage with the high level visits and negotiations to solve existing border problems. China and Russia announced a constructive partnership in 1994. In a joint declaration in June 1995 China formally announced its support for Russia's APEC membership.²¹⁵

In the following two years the position of the U.S. towards Russia's membership had changed drastically in the light of NATO's eastward expansion. In an effort to decrease Russia's official and public opposition to NATO's enlargement, the U.S. helped pave the way for the inclusion of Russia in APEC and some Western dominated institutions.²¹⁶ Japan supported the U.S.' new stand as a close ally of the U.S although the territorial disputes with Russia remained unresolved. Japanese

²¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.127

²¹⁵ Gaye Christoffersen, "Russia's Breakthrough into the Asia-Pacific: China's Role", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 10, 2010, p.63

²¹⁶ Koto Mihoko, *op.cit.*,p.128

government also thought that Japan might be able to improve its relations with Russia by supporting Russia's entry to APEC.

In the 9th APEC Ministerial Meeting convened in Canada in November 1997 while China, Japan, and the United States strongly supported Russia's membership, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, Mexico, Chile, and New Zealand opposed it. Following the persuasion of opposing members, Russia along with Vietnam and Peru was accepted as a member to APEC in 1998 and attended the 10th Ministerial Meeting in Malaysia in November 1998.²¹⁷

At present APEC includes 21 economies of the Asia-Pacific region: Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; the People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; the Philippines; the Russian Federation; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; the United States.

APEC members account for 57% of the world's GDP, 48% of international trade, over 40% of direct foreign investment and about 40% of the world's population.²¹⁸ The prime mover of the APEC process is the annual APEC Economic Leaders' Meetings (AELM) which are preceded by the APEC Foreign and Trade Ministers' Meetings (AMM). Each year, one of the APEC Member Economies becomes the APEC host economy and has the obligation to host the major APEC meetings and serve as the APEC Chair. Since its inception, APEC has been driven by three core principles: Promotion of sustainable economic growth; development and strengthening the multilateral trading system; increasement of the interdependence and economic prosperity of its members. These principles underpinned the Bogor Goals, which were agreed by APEC leaders in 1994. The Bogor Goals sought to achieve "free and open trade and investment" in the region by 2010 for developing economies and 2020 for developing members. In 2005 APEC conducted a review of

²¹⁷ "Tenth APEC Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement", 15.11.1998, online at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/apec/1998/joint15.html>, (accessed on 15.03.2012)

²¹⁸ "APEC", online at http://www.apec2012.ru/docs/about/apec_forum.html, (accessed on 17.03.2012)

progress towards the Bogor Goals, and issued the "Busan Roadmap" to chart further progress.²¹⁹

In 2010 an assessment of the five industrialized economies and eight APEC developing economies that volunteered to be part of this exercise was carried out. While no economy was assessed as having reached the Bogor Goals, the assessment found that significant progress had been made toward the Bogor Goals. However, it was concluded that more work remained to be done to achieve free and open trade and investment in the region. All of APEC's economies will be collectively assessed again in 2020. APEC members pursue the Goals through a range of channels, including unilateral measures, APEC collective action plans, global trade talks (in the World Trade Organization) and free trade agreements. Progress towards the Goals by member economies is monitored through a peer review process.²²⁰

Joining APEC has been a major step in integration of the Russian Federation to Asia-Pacific regional mechanisms. Particularly after Putin's coming to power, Russia started paying significant attention to APEC. Putin attended all APEC Leader's Meeting's (informal summits of APEC) since 2000 during his two presidential terms, and has made efforts to deepen personal exchange with Asian leaders. Putin's growing engagement with APEC was in concordance with the new version of the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation, which was approved in June 2000. The concept mentioned that for Russia, the significance of Asia is growing, because the need for economic progress and development in Siberia and the Far East has become more pronounced.²²¹ In this context, it was recognized that Russia needs to participate in APEC as a key economic integration system in Asia-Pacific.

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, APEC members announced the APEC leaders' statement on counterterrorism and took joint action to prevent the flow of funds to terrorists. Russia regarded it as a positive development, and saw APEC

²¹⁹ "APEC's Goals and Achievements", *website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand*, <http://mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/APEC/2-Goals-and-achievements.php> (accessed on 13.12.2011)

²²⁰ *Ibid*

²²¹ "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", 28.06.2000, online at <http://www.idsa.in/eurasia/resources> (accessed on 15.12.2011), p.15

membership as an important measure to strengthen the fight against terrorism both at the global and regional level. Russia has been actively involved in APEC efforts in the field of human security, especially in counter-terrorism and disaster preparedness. Russia's initiatives are focused on providing international information security, fighting cyber terrorism, improving protection of key energy infrastructure, expanding interaction in these areas with G20 and other international bodies.²²²

Russia has hosted major APEC events, like APEC Investment Fair as well as meetings of the APEC Working Groups on Transportation, Energy, Industrial Science and Technology. Russia proposed to host annual “APEC Summit of 2012” in the APEC Summit in Vietnam in 2006. The following year Russia’s proposal to organize the APEC Summit 2012 in Vladivostok was accepted. Russia chose Vladivostok as the venue of the Summit to attract attention to its Far East region and bring more direct investment to the region by APEC member countries.

To prepare the groundwork for APEC 2012 Summit in Vladivostok, Russia organized the First Asia-Pacific Congress in 2007 in Vladivostok between APEC and Russian business circles with a focus on deepening business links between the Russian Federation and APEC. The second congress was held in 2008 with the motto “Russia and APEC Countries: From collaboration to integration”. The third Congress organized in 2009, and attracted important number of businessman from APEC countries. The oil and gas potential of the Russian Far East, and the Greater Vladivostok Project as well as other long-term projects for the strategic development of the Russian Far East were presented at the Congress.²²³

Russia's priorities as APEC-2012 host economy were declared as trade and investment liberalization, regional economic integration, cooperation for innovative growth, food security as well as supply chains connectivity.²²⁴ Russia announced the theme for APEC 2012 AS “Integrate to Grow, Innovate to Prosper”, and pledged to

²²² “APEC 2012 Priorities” *official website of APEC 2012*, online at <http://apec2012.ru/docs/about/apec2012.html> (accessed on 29.01.2012)

²²³ Gaye Christoffersen, *op.cit.*, p.76

²²⁴ “APEC 2012 Priorities” *official website of APEC 2012*, online at http://www.apec2012.ru/docs/about/apec_forum.html (accessed on 29.01.2012)

facilitate APEC's collective efforts to increase sustainability and the pace of development.

Russian Senior Officer in charge of APEC, Ambassador Gennady Ovechko announced that APEC will seek to achieve tangible results based on the above-mentioned priorities. Ambassador Ovechko also pointed out to the fact that regional economic integration plays a key role in promoting peace and stability, and in improving regional and global food security;²²⁵

To address these concerns, APEC will seek to make progress on a number of issues such as integration, investments, fighting protectionism, securing food markets, establishing reliable supply chains and fostering innovation policies," "Facing major challenges to the food supply, such as price fluctuations, APEC will search for sustainable development in the agricultural sector, facilitation of investment and trade, establishing efficient and resilient food markets and market infrastructure ... In 2012, APEC plans to push for policies that encourage innovation in the region that will increase productivity and ensure economic growth.

The priorities Russia announced for APEC Meeting 2012 coincide with the national priorities Russia put forth for the development of Siberia and Russian Far East, and to reach "innovative and modern" society. Russia is working hard on the infrastructure indispensable for the summit; various grand projects have been undertaken, including the Far Eastern Federal University; a conference center; freight terminal to transport construction materials and power-generation facilities on Russky Island; cable-stayed bridges across Eastern Bosphorus Strait and Golden Horn Bay.²²⁶

APEC officials will convene throughout 2012 in Russia, including Moscow in February, Kazan in June and Vladivostok in September. Ministers will also meet during the year in these cities, as well as in St. Petersburg, Khabarovsk and

²²⁵ "APEC Takes Further Action to Sustain Regional Economic Growth", 08.02.2012, online at <http://www.apec2012.ru/news/20120208/462375354.html> (accessed on 29.03.2012)

²²⁶ ---"Investments for APEC 2012 Summit" online at <http://vladivostok2012.com/> (accessed on 23.01.2012)

Yaroslavl. Finally, the APEC Leaders' Meeting will be held on Russky Island in Vladivostok on 8 - 9 September 2012.²²⁷

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin also identified Russia's goals for the APEC chairmanship in the following statement.²²⁸

We actively support political efforts to build up involvement in regional economic processes. These are tailored, above all, as much as possible to facilitate solving our country's modernization and innovative development problems, as well as socio-economic growth in Siberia and the Far East. Participation in the activities of the APEC will play a major role in this, as Russia will serve as chair in 2012.

It is important for Russia to reach concrete results during its APEC chairmanship to foster Russia's economic integration with APEC countries. As Borodovkin points out Russia will get a chance to claim a much closer involvement in regional economic integration if it can fully capitalize upon the benefits that chairing APEC provides the host economy.

The importance attached to "APEC Meeting 2012" by Russian authorities is a manifestation of growing weight of Asia-Pacific for Russian economy and for its future direction. After the completion of 14 years of its membership to APEC, Russia-APEC trade has reached nearly \$175 billion in 2011 from \$22.3 billion in 1997. While Russia's trade with APEC nations amounted to 16.2 percent of the overall value of Russia's external trade in 1997, this figure reached 24 percent in 2011. However the share of Russian trade in the overall intra-APEC trade volume roughly accounts for 1 per cent mainly due to the lack of FTA's between Russia and APEC member countries.²²⁹

²²⁷ "APEC 2012 Leader's Forum", online at http://www.apec.org/Press/News-Releases/2011/1213_isom.aspx (accessed on 30.01.2011)

²²⁸ Alexei Borodavkin, *Interview by Alexander Gabuyev, Kommersant*, 1 December 2011, online at http://indrus.in/articles/2011/12/01/the_asia-pacific_region_has_become_the_engine_of_global_development_13327.html (accessed on 30.01.2011)

²²⁹ Artyom Lukin, "Russia Looks to the Pacific in 2012", *East Asia Forum*, 06.03.2012, online at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/03/06/russia-looks-to-the-pacific-in-2012/>, accessed on 12.03.2012

Russia does not only aim growing trade ties with APEC members, Russia sees APEC as an opportunity to assert its role as a premier energy supplier, a transport ‘bridge’ between the Asia- Pacific and Europe and as a competitive food exporter to the region. To reach these aims Russia needs extensive infrastructural improvement, increasing investment and integrated policies. Russia hopes that successful integration into APEC economies will provide favorable environment that could help Russia follow the innovation path of economic development, contribute to the effective use of the region’s potential for the purposes of the social-economic recovery of its eastern territories and to the strengthening of the position and role of the country in the regional security and cooperation architecture.

5.3.ASEAN

The Soviet Union viewed Southeast Asia as a region divided into two ideologically distinct camps, the pro-Western ASEAN and communist Indochina. However, under the new realities of post-cold war world it was only natural for a more economic and less military oriented post-Soviet Russia to leave behind the old perceptions, and cooperate with ASEAN which was gaining a considerable influence in the region. The way ASEAN functioned which is called “ASEAN way” based on consultations, consensus-decision making, non- interference with domestic affairs has also been consistent with Russia’s own preference for regional cooperation.²³⁰ Therefore Russia readily accepted ASEAN’s leading role in regional institutionalization which also reflected ASEAN way in their functioning.

ASEAN, which was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, later joined by Brunei in 1984 had been internally focused during the cold war years.²³¹ The six member states were together to ensure stability and economic growth in their own region. End of the cold war has propelled ASEAN to

²³⁰ Amitav Acharya, Alastair Iain Johnston, *Crafting Cooperation: International Regional Institutions in a Comparative Perspective*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.35

²³¹ Anthony Mcgrew and Christopher Brook, eds., *Asia-Pacific in the New World Order*, (London: Routledge, 1998), page. 116

reconsider its regional role and policies. To remain relevant in an increasingly globalized and multilateral world, ASEAN had to open its doors to non-member states in a wider region. On the one hand, ASEAN accepted new members which were in the opposite camps during the cold-war ending ideological divisions. Vietnam became a member in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, Cambodia in 1999, making up what is today the ten Member States of ASEAN.²³²

On the other hand ASEAN started to form new processes to engage with the non-member states. ASEAN, as the only regional institution of importance until 1990's, took the leading role in institution building in the Asia-Pacific. It was convenient for non-ASEAN countries of the wider region to build on the strengths and achievements of ASEAN in the new initiatives of regional cooperation.²³³ The first step was taken with the establishment of ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conferences (ASEAN-PMC) in 1992. In the 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992 member states signed "Singapore Declaration", 4th article of which states that "ASEAN could use established forums to promote external dialogues on enhancing security in the region as well as intra-ASEAN dialogues on ASEAN security cooperation. To enhance this effort, ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters by using the ASEAN- PMC".²³⁴

As stipulated in the Singapore Declaration ASEAN commenced to organize ASEAN-PMC meetings with its dialogue partners which were Australia, Canada, the European Community, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and the United States at the time. The meetings have been held in conjunction with ASEAN Summits with the participation of foreign ministers of ASEAN member states and the foreign minister of the dialogue partner on a ASEAN+1 format. Russia and ASEAN started to organize ASEAN-PMC after Russia became a full dialogue partner in 1996.

²³² Amitav Acharya, *Asia Rising: Who is Leading?*, (Singapore:World Scientific Publications, 2007), p.128

²³³ Amitav Acharya, Alastair Iian Johnston, *op.cit.*, 32

²³⁴ "Singapore Declaration of 1992", 28 January 1992, Singapore, *ASEAN website*, online at <http://www.aseansec.org/5120.htm> (accessed on 15.02.2012)

ASEAN diplomacy reached to a new phase in 1994 with the setting up of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which brought together all the main actors of the Asia-Pacific Region for the first time (U.S., China, Japan and Russia) to discuss regional security and strategical issues. The forum was unique in the way that the big powers were prepared to allow an association of middle powers to be at the head of the regional security mechanism. ASEAN was at the driver's seat for two reasons: firstly as mentioned in the previous page ASEAN was the only regional body with a well established structure and achievements under its name, secondly no major power or group in Asia-Pacific was acceptable to all members to lead regional initiatives.²³⁵

ASEAN has continued being at the forefront of the formation of Asia-Pacific regional architecture, and security cooperation. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) signed by ASEAN members in 1977 was opened to accession for the states outside the Southeast Asia in 1988. China and India became the first non-member states acceding to the treaty in 2003.²³⁶ Russia, Japan and South Korea acceded to the Treaty in 2004. By the accession of the European Union and U.S. to TAC in 2009, all the principal actors of the Asia-Pacific region have become parties to the Treaty.²³⁷

ASEAN developed into a more coherent institution by the adaptation of ASEAN Charter in 2008 which gave to the Association a legal framework and legal personality. ASEAN Charter enabled ASEAN with the legal and institutional framework to reach "ASEAN Community" by 2015 which is comprised of three pillars, namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.²³⁸

²³⁵ Amitav Acharya, Alastair Iain Johnston, *op.cit.*, pp.67-69

²³⁶ --- "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation", *ASEAN Website*, online at <http://www.asean.org/1217.htm> (accessed on 25.02.2012)

²³⁷ "U.S. Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation", Congressional Research Report, May 2009, online at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/124064.pdf> (accessed on

²³⁸ "ASEAN Charter", online at <http://www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf> (accessed on 03.03.2012)

Today Russia regards ASEAN as one of the system-forming elements of regional architecture, and as one of the main partners of cooperation in Asia-Pacific.²³⁹ Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov underlined the position of ASEAN as the leading actor in the region in his various statements. Lavrov expressed the ASEAN's positive role in his article published in 2010 :²⁴⁰

The development of the Russia-ASEAN Dialogue Partnership is one of the priorities of our policy in the AP region. It is the ASEAN format that allows the Southeast Asian nations to effectively defend collective interests and to conduct an equal dialogue with international partners. The Association acts as a kind of nucleus of such influential organizations as the ARF, the ASEM, and the mechanisms of ASEAN+3 (China, Republic of Korea and Japan) and the East Asia Summit.

Russian participation in ASEAN affairs began with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's attendance at the twenty-sixth meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers held in July 1993. Kozyrev declared that Russia was interested in economic expansion into ASEAN, a purpose which was in line with the Foreign Policy Concept that called for "enhanced ties" with Asia-Pacific countries which was made public in April 1993.²⁴¹ Upon Russia's initiative Russia was offered an agreement on full partnership in July 1994 at the annual ASEAN conference. Russia was subsequently elevated to a full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN at the 29th AMM (Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers) in July 1996 in Jakarta.

After Russia became a full dialogue partner, the relations between ASEAN and Russia progressed in many fronts. Russia has placed ASEAN in the center of its regional integration efforts. In July 2003, two sides signed a joint declaration on "Partnership for Peace and Security, and Prosperity and Development in the Asia-

²³⁹ Alexander Borodavkin, "The Asian Vector of Russia's Policy and Modernization", *International Affairs*, No. 5, (2010) p.23-30

²⁴⁰ Sergey Lavrov, "There Is Much Russia and ASEAN Can Accomplish Together," *International Affairs*, Issue No. 10, (October 2010) retrieved from the web-site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, online at http://www.in.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/59A052E8F2FBCD30C32577D2004F7839 (accessed on 02.02.2012)

²⁴¹ "Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy", *Country Studies*, online at <http://countrystudies.us/russia/77.htm> (accessed on 07.01.2012)

Pacific Region” at the Foreign Ministerial level.²⁴² In the Declaration the foreign ministers of both sides stressed the importance of further enhancement of the effectiveness of the United Nations and existing multilateral regional mechanisms, particularly ARF. In this document, Russia referred to the encouragement of dialogue partners to accede to ASEAN’s two basic norms, the TAC and the Protocol on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-free Zone (SEANWFZ). Furthermore, ASEAN noted Russia’s efforts to promote peace and security in the region within the SCO.

The views expressed in the Declaration were in conformity with the basic principles Russia promotes for a new security architecture in the region which would be based on regional mechanisms under the guidelines of the UN principles. Russia and China, as it was noted earlier, are willing to replace US based security architecture in the region by a regional cooperation process. On this point ASEAN shares a similar view even some of its individual members have close military cooperation with US such as Philippines and Thailand. On the other hand, the fear felt towards China’s military rise among several ASEAN members which have territorial disputes with China (Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei) makes US military presence a welcome factor, and slows the progress in regional security cooperation.

Following the 2003 Declaration, Russia signed TAC in 2004, and started cooperation same year in combating international terrorism with ASEAN.²⁴³ ASEAN and Russia adopted “the ASEAN-Russia Work Plan on Countering Terrorism and Transnational Crime” and have held regular dialogue at senior officials and expert levels since 2005.

Russia became sixth country after China, Japan, the US, South Korea and India which ASEAN held summit meetings. The first ASEAN-Russia Summit held in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur.²⁴⁴ During the Summit the ASEAN leaders and

²⁴² “Joint Declaration ASEAN-Russia on Partnership for Peace and Security, Prosperity and Development in the Asia-Pacific Region”, *ASEAN Secretariat official website*, online at <http://www.aseansec.org/14849.htm> (accessed on 03.01.2012)

²⁴³ “ASEAN-Russia Joint Declaration on Terrorism”, *ASEAN official website*, online at <http://www.asean.org/16225.htm> (accessed on 12.01.2012)

²⁴⁴ “Overview of ASEAN-Russia Relations”, online at <http://www.aseansec.org/5922.htm> (accessed on 15.01.2012)

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed “the Joint Declaration on Progressive and Comprehensive Partnership”.²⁴⁵ The Joint Declaration expresses two sides’ commitment to strengthen ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership in a wide range of areas including political and security, economic and development cooperation. ASEAN and Russia also adopted the “Comprehensive Program of Action (CPA) 2005-2015” to realize the goals and objectives set out in the Joint Declaration.

The second ASEAN-Russia Summit was held in October 2010. During the second summit, two sides reaffirmed their commitment to consolidate and further promote ASEAN-Russia partnership towards enhancement of the relations to a higher plane, and to work closely together in the evolving regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific.²⁴⁶

During the ASEAN+Russia PMC in 2011, ASEAN and Russian Foreign Ministers endorsed the “Joint Statement on the Occasion of the 15th Anniversary of the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership”. In the 4th clause of the Declaration Russia reaffirmed its continued support for maintaining ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture. The 4th clause says;²⁴⁷

Russia reiterated its continued support for maintaining ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture. ASEAN welcomed Russia’s active contribution to promoting peace, stability and socio-economic development in the region. We reaffirmed our commitment to the development of an ASEAN-led regional architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive, and based on principles of consensus, multilateralism and equality, and generally-accepted norms of international law. This architecture would include the EAS, ARF and ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). ASEAN and Russia are prepared to make efforts with a view to developing working relations between ASEAN-led arrangements and other key multilateral forums, such as the APEC and the SCO.

²⁴⁵ “ASEAN-Russia Joint Declaration on Progressive and Comprehensive Partnership”, *ASEAN official website*, online at <http://www.asean.org/18070.htm> (accessed on 12.01.2012)

²⁴⁶ “Overview of ASEAN-Russia Relations”, online at <http://www.aseansec.org/5922.htm> (accessed on 15.01.2012)

²⁴⁷ “Joint Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the ASEAN and Russian Federation on the Occasion of the 15th Anniversary of the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership”, 22 July 2011, Bali, online at <http://www.aseansec.org/26480.htm> (accessed on 14.01.2012)

The Russian Federation also reaffirmed its continued support for ASEAN's efforts in community building and the implementation of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity during the ASEAN+Russia PMC Meeting. Following his participation to 6th EAS Summit in Bali in September 2011, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov gave an interview to an Indonesian newspaper in which he outlined the current state of relations with ASEAN:²⁴⁸

Deepening relations with ASEAN is one of the priorities of Russian foreign policy. This is our conscious choice, owing to the important role that ASEAN+ 10 (ASEAN's dialogue partners) play in the Asia-Pacific region.

Over the past fifteen years, Russian-ASEAN political dialogue, including at the summit level, has been intensively developing. There were two Russia-ASEAN summits. I happened to be a direct participant in them and see firsthand how the leaders' meetings stimulated the advancement of our relations.

Our approach largely fits in with the concept of "dynamic equilibrium" in the AP region, put forward by Indonesia, now chairing the ASEAN.

One of the biggest challenges is building up the momentum in our trade and economic ties. There are some positive developments in this respect. Last year trade between Russia and the ASEAN countries topped \$12 billion, having increased in two years by almost a third. Our specialized agencies are finalizing a roadmap for commercial, economic and investment cooperation between Russia and ASEAN envisaging concrete measures to expand partnerships in such key areas as energy, transport, telecommunications, outer space, agriculture and industrial production.

Russia is also willing to increase its economic cooperation with ASEAN as specified in Lavrov's statement. ASEAN, with a 580 million population, \$1.5 trillion combined GDP, and a cumulative trade turnover of \$1.7 trillion, ranks among the global heavyweights and plays the key role in Asia Pacific.²⁴⁹ That is why Russia pays special attention to trade and economic relations with ASEAN. In this respect,

²⁴⁸ Sergey Lavrov, "Written Interview granted to The Presidential Post following EAS Bali Summit", *The Presidential Post*, 05.11.2011, online at http://www.indonesia.mid.ru/press/324_e.html (accessed on 12.02.2012)

²⁴⁹ Igor Tomberg, "Russia-ASEAN Summit: Attempting to Crush Stereotypes", *Strategic Culture Foundation*, 31 October 2010, online at <http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2010/10/31/russia-asean-summit-attempting-to-crush-stereotypes.html> (accessed on 12.02.2012)

ASEAN and Russia concluded the “Agreement between ASEAN and the Russian Federation on Economic and Development Cooperation” in 2010. The Agreement provides favorable conditions for the development of multifaceted cooperation between the two sides in economic, trade and investment, scientific, technological and cultural areas.

Two sides aim to increase the total trade which was US\$9.06 billion in 2010.²⁵⁰ Although Russia’s share of the ASEAN trade turnover is modest, it showed % 34 increase in 2010. Russia is very keen on the expansion of economic cooperation with ASEAN countries. Until today Russia has not entered into Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with individual ASEAN countries or ASEAN. However, after its access to WTO, Russia declared that the initiative to start negotiations for establishment of a free trade zone between the “Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (CU)” and the ASEAN would be taken in 2012, and this project would be one of the priorities during Russia’s chairmanship in APEC in 2012.²⁵¹ If the FTA can be completed, it will help boost two way trade between Russia and ASEAN.

The First Consultations between ASEAN Economic Ministers and Economic Minister of Russia was held in August 2010 in Vietnam, which aimed to create momentum to bring trade and economic relations to a new stage. The Ministers explored ways to increase trade and investment flows as well as economic cooperation between ASEAN and Russia. They also agreed to develop a possible roadmap to enhance economic relations between ASEAN and Russia.

Energy has been viewed as one of the most promising areas for cooperation between ASEAN and Russia. The first “ASEAN Senior Officials on Energy (SOME)-Russia

²⁵⁰ “ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Relations”, *ASEAN website*, online at <http://www.aseansec.org/5922.htm> (accessed on 12.01.2012)

²⁵¹ “Russia-ASEAN FTA under plan”, 14 December 2011, online at http://www.aseanaffairs.com/asean_news/ties/russia_asean_fta_under_plan (accessed on 12.01.2012)

Consultation” held in July 2010 Vietnam adopted the “ASEAN-Russia Energy Cooperation Work Program 2010 – 2015.”²⁵²

In his 2nd ASEAN-Russia Summit address, President Medvedev praised the Russia-ASEAN cooperation in the electric power, nuclear and renewable energy, and gas sectors, and also put forward a more dynamic vision for the future based on joint efforts in high-tech areas such as machine-building, new materials, medicine, earth remote-sensing, aerospace, and the satellite navigation.²⁵³

In fact, a number of joint activities have been undertaken in science and technology, energy, SMEs, tourism and human resource development. ASEAN-Russia joint cooperation projects are funded by the ASEAN-Russian Federation Dialogue Partnership Financial Fund (DPFF) which was established in June 2007 with initial contribution of US\$ 500,000. In keeping up with the growing ASEAN-Russia cooperation, Russia has expressed her intention to contribute 1.5 million U.S. Dollar annually to the Dialogue Partnership Financial Fund for cooperation projects in 2011.²⁵⁴

The structure of dialogue mechanisms of the Russia-ASEAN partnership is being actively expanded. Currently it includes annual Russian-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meetings (ASEAN PMC), Senior Officials Meetings on Political Affairs (at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers), on Economic Affairs and on Energy , and joint working groups on economic, trade, scientific and technological cooperation, and on countering terrorism and transnational crime. The main coordinating bodies for practical interaction are the “Joint Cooperation Committee” and the “Joint Planning and Management Committee”.

Russia-ASEAN partnership is in the center of Russia’s regional integration process. Unlike the U.S. Russia does not have a network of bilateral alliances in the region, consequently supports ASEAN as the main-driving force in the evolution of region-

²⁵² “Joint Statement of 2nd ASEAN-Russia Summit-Economic Relations Section”, 30.09.2010, online at <http://www.aseansec.org/25502.htm> (accessed on 14.01.2012)

²⁵³ Dmitri Medvedev, “Speech at the Second Russia-ASEAN Summit”, *website of the President of Russia*, 30 October 2010, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/1226> (accessed on 15.03.2012)

²⁵⁴ “ASEAN-Russia Dialogue”, *ASEAN website*, <http://www.asean.org/5922.htm> (accessed on 16.03.2012)

wide political-security cooperation frameworks which Russia hopes will include all regional actors without dominance of the US.

5.3.ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

Russia's participation in the regional cooperation framework was realized in its involvement with the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994. Then, ASEAN members pursued the building of a new security mechanism to respond to new, emerging threats in the aftermath of the collapse of the Cold War structure, especially China's challenging policy in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. ASEAN countries needed to establish a security cooperation system, including all major powers and former communist parties, to avoid the emergence of a dominant power in Southeast Asia. In this context, Russia was needed to build the new security framework.

The Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference, which were held in Singapore in July 1993, agreed to establish the ARF.²⁵⁵ The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994. The objectives of the ASEAN Regional Forum are outlined in the First ARF Chairman's Statement, namely: to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.²⁵⁶

ASEAN played a critical role in shaping the new security forum so that it would be acceptable to its own members, and more importantly, to the three regional great powers, the United States, China, and Japan. ARF is engaged in confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy. As the structure which brings together not only the Ten ASEAN dialogue partners but also the other Asia-Pacific countries (Bangladesh, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea) and European Union, ARF is an important contribution to the region's architecture. It is also the

²⁵⁵ "About the ASEAN Regional Forum", *ARF Website*, <http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html> (accessed on 04.02.2012)

²⁵⁶ *Ibid*

region's only intergovernmental structure which includes North Korea.²⁵⁷ Its representatives (non-governmental experts, academics and officials as private individuals) are also involved in ARF's second track - the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP).

ARF was welcomed by all the participants since it was inclusive of all the great powers yet not dominated by any one of them, since it was led by the small states of ASEAN that had a 'counter-realpolitik' agenda.²⁵⁸ Second, the loose dialog format and the 'ASEAN style' of non-intrusive, informal, voluntary-compliance processes appeased concerns in China, Japan, and about the potentially legalistic negotiations over sensitive issues like arms control and territorial disputes. ARF followed the ASEAN pattern of "soft institutionalism".²⁵⁹

The highest level ARF meetings are held annually at Foreign Minister level, senior officials meetings in preparation for Minister level meetings take place before the annual meeting. Defense officials' dialogues are held twice a year, while inter-sessional meetings on confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy; counter-terrorism and transnational crime; non-proliferation and disarmament; maritime security; and disaster relief are held annually. ARF also organizes annual "Security Policy Conferences" since 2004.²⁶⁰ The participants also discuss some sensitive issues more openly in the last years such as Nuclear Security in Korean Peninsula, South China Sea disputes, Myanmar, Thailand-Cambodia territorial problems, developments in Afghanistan and Middle East. North Korea started to attend the meetings in 2000, the meetings are usually attended by senior officials of North

²⁵⁷ *Ibid*

²⁵⁸ Evelyn Goh, "Institutions and the Great Power Bargain in East Asia: ASEAN's Limited 'Brokerage' Role", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 11, 2011, p.379

²⁵⁹ Amitav Acharya, Alastair Iian Johnston, *op.cit.*, p.247

²⁶⁰ "ARF Chairman's Statements and Reports", *ARF-ASEAN website*, online at <http://www.aseansec.org/11997.htm> (accessed on 02.02.2012)

Korean Foreign Ministry, but the last two meetings have been attended by the Foreign Minister.²⁶¹

A gradual evolutionary approach to regional security problems has been adopted by the ARF. This evolution is envisaged to take place in three stages: 1) promotion of CSBMs ; 2) development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms; and 3) development of conflict-resolution mechanisms.

In the 18th ARF meeting which was held in Bali in September 2011, during discussion on regional security architecture, the Foreign Ministers of the attending countries welcomed the progress of the ARF in achieving and entering the phase of preventive diplomacy while continuing to strengthen confidence-building measures process. The “work plan for preventive diplomacy” was discussed by Ministers. The Ministers reaffirmed that the ARF should serve as a platform for countries in the region to deal with challenges in the security environment while continuing to uphold the principles of the peaceful settlement of disputes.²⁶² The Ministers underlined the relevance of the ARF as the central pillar in the evolving regional architecture, in particular within the framework of political and security cooperation. The Ministers noted the establishment of the ADMM-Plus and the expansion of the EAS which would contribute constructively to the evolving regional architecture. In this regard, they underscored the need for these mechanisms to synergize and complement each other’s work and develop closer linkages as well as to avoid any duplication between the said mechanisms. Furthermore, they emphasized the importance of the ARF achieving ideal synergy with the ADMM-Plus.

In the emerging security architecture of the region ARF is the oldest and most inclusive one in relation to EAS and ADMM Plus. It can be said that the ARF is now complemented by the ADMM+ and EAS both of which focus on security concerns in the Asia Pacific. While EAS is a leaders led discussion forum, ARF is more institutionalized and expert-based process. While ADMM Plus is a mechanism led

²⁶¹ Zhou Shixin, “ARF Touches Difficult Issues”, *china.org*, 26 July 2010, online at http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-07/26/content_20575236.htm (accessed on 03.02.2012)

²⁶² “Chair’s Statement 18th ASEAN Regional Forum” 23 July 2011 Bali, Indonesia, online at [http://www.kemlu.go.id/Documents/DOC/ARF%2018th%20Chair%27s%20Statement%20as%20of%2023%20July%202011-\[Final\].pdf](http://www.kemlu.go.id/Documents/DOC/ARF%2018th%20Chair%27s%20Statement%20as%20of%2023%20July%202011-[Final].pdf) (accessed on 03.02.2012)

by Defense Ministers of ASEAN and eight dialogue partners, ARF is led by Foreign Ministers of ASEAN, its ten dialogue partners and seven more APR countries. On the other hand with the introduction of EAS into the regional architecture in 2005, ARF has begun to evolve from a consultative and nonbinding discussion to a de facto ministerial meeting preparing the agenda for the EAS meeting. In fact, as regional security architecture develops in the Asia Pacific, it is possible that the ADMM+ will begin to play a similar ministerial role for defense ministers leading up to the EAS. It should be also noted that EAS agenda not only covers security issues, but also political and economic aspects of region-wide cooperation are discussed by the leaders.

5.5. East Asia Summit (EAS)

The new integration processes in the APR are pushed forward by the annual EAS set up on the ASEAN initiative as an umbrella for top-level discussions of the key strategic political issues and regional security and economics. The first of such summits was convened in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur. The list of the participants (the ASEAN members plus China, South Korea and Japan as well as Australia, New Zealand and India) indicates that the participants conceived East Asia as a political-economic notion then a geopolitical one. ASEAN considers EAS as a chance to talk to those of the dialogue partners which have progressed far enough in their cooperation with the ASEAN. This is best illustrated by the three criteria of EAS membership: the status of an ASEAN full-scale dialogue partner, being signatory to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and "substantive relationships" with the Association.

Russia assuming that the country met all three criteria applied for the membership in 2005. However, on the ground that Russia did not have the lack of substantive economic ties with ASEAN members, Singapore and Indonesia opposed Russian membership in the newly formed East Asian Summit, despite Russia being an ASEAN dialogue partner since 1996 and having acceded to the TAC in 2004, as well as having the support from other ASEAN members such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand.²⁶³ The Russian application was discussed for a long time while ASEAN

²⁶³ Paradorn Rangsimaporn, *op.cit.*, p.218

and its dialogue partners were also looking for different integration forms better suited to the current integration realities. In 2009 and 2010, the region actively discussed the idea of a much wider cooperation mechanism - the Asia-Pacific Community (APC) - put on the table by former Premier of Australia Kevin Rudd, which resembles in part the European Union. Japan suggested an East Asian Community (EAS).²⁶⁴ Some of the ASEAN members interpreted this as an encroachment at the Association's "driver's seat" in the Asian-Pacific regional cooperation. The ASEAN brainstorm that followed produced an idea of Russian and American involvement in EAS. In 2010 Russia was invited to take part in EAS together with U.S. Invitation to the Russia after 5 years of deliberations by ASEAN side shows the fact that ASEAN has finally accepted Russia's role in the new integration processes within the APR.²⁶⁵

During 2010 the 5th EAS convened in Vietnam under the aegis of ASEAN 18th Summit, the leaders of EAS Countries signed "Ha Noi Declaration on the Commemoration of the Fifth Anniversary of the East Asia Summit". ASEAN's central role in EAS and other regional schemes highlighted in the declaration as expressed in the 2nd and 3rd articles.²⁶⁶

“...2. To reaffirm that the EAS with ASEAN as the driving force, working in close partnership with the other participants of the EAS, is an important component of the evolving regional architecture, which includes other existing and mutually-reinforcing processes such as the ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, ARF, ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and APEC, and promotes community building efforts in East Asia;

3. To redouble efforts to move progress and cooperation in the EAS further forward, including in the priority areas and in the promotion of regional integration through supporting the realization of the ASEAN Community and such initiatives as the ASEAN Plus FTAs and other existing wider regional economic integration efforts including studies

²⁶⁴ Baogang He, "The Awkwardness of Australian Engagement with Asia: The Dilemmas of Australian Idea of Regionalism", *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 12, No. 2, March 2011, online at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2030016>, (accessed on 05.04.2012)

²⁶⁵ A. Ivanov, "The APR and Russia: A New Role in Global Development", *International Affairs*, No:5, (2010) pp.76-78

²⁶⁶ "Ha Noi Declaration on the Commemoration of the Fifth Anniversary of the East Asia Summit", online at <http://www.aseansec.org/25548.htm> (accessed on 05.02.2012)

on East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA);”

The sixth EAS took place in November 2011 in Bali with the participation of its newest members — Russia and the US — .²⁶⁷ The U.S. was represented by President Obama while Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov participated in Russia’s name. The US and Russia’s inclusion opened an opportunity for greater geopolitical security dialogue. Indonesia, host of ASEAN meetings and EAS in 2011 narrowed the agenda of the 6th Summit on security and political matters to allow heads of state to solve pressing problems within the region, while APEC could tackle economic issues. In the 6th Summit three specific issues drove the dialogue between leaders: regional cooperation on disaster management, connectivity and maritime cooperation.²⁶⁸

Connectivity was an ASEAN concept which was made public with the publication of “Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity” in 2010. The Master Plan was developed in cooperation with international organizations such as Asian Development Bank (ADB), Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and World Bank; and aims foster ASEAN Community Building by 2015 by enhancing regional and national physical, institutional and people-to-people linkages. The Master Plan has also a vision for connectivity with wider region, it says “in light of rapid developments in the region and the world resulting from globalization, ASEAN must continue to strive to maintain its centrality and proactive role by being the driving force in the evolving regional architecture. To do so, ASEAN needs to accelerate its integration and Community building efforts while intensifying relations with external partners”.²⁶⁹

In the 6th EAS Summit participating leaders focused on Connectivity as one of the main themes. They expressed that a successful implementation of the Master Plan on

²⁶⁷ “ASEAN Annual Report 2011”, online at <http://www.aseansec.org/publications/AR1011.pdf>, p.1, accessed on 09.04.2012)

²⁶⁸ Maria Monica Wihardja, “The Sixth East Asia Summit: Keeping up the Neighbourhood”, *East Asia Forum website*, 12 November 2011, online at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/12/the-sixth-east-asia-summit-keeping-up-the-neighbourhood> (accessed on 07.02.2012)

²⁶⁹ “ASEAN Master Plan on Connectivity”, ASEAN website, online at <http://www.aseansec.org/documents/MPAC.pdf> (accessed on 06.02.12)

ASEAN Connectivity is in the interest of both ASEAN and non-ASEAN EAS member states. Negative effects on regional connectivity like transnational crime, terrorism and pollution were also discussed during the Summit.

“The Declaration of the EAS on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations” was the second important document adopted by EAS Leaders during the 6th Summit. The declaration contains basic norms and common principles taken from various previous basic documents including the UN Charter, the TAC and other arrangements among EAS participating countries. It aims to serve as the guidance of conduct for EAS participating countries towards promoting and maintaining peace, stability and prosperity in the region.²⁷⁰ The declaration also welcomed the inclusion of the U.S. and Russia in the EAS.

The maritime cooperation constituted an important aspect of 6th EAS Leaders discussions. It consisted of diplomatically sensitive issues, including the South China Sea, and less-sensitive issues like piracy, people smuggling and transnational crime.

The EAS aims broadly to promote peace, stability and economic prosperity in the region. ASEAN-led EAS is an important achievement since it brings together all major players in the region (China, US, Japan, India and Russia) together at the highest level. ASEAN’s stability as an institution for over 44 years and its increasing efficiency over this time is a proof that ASEAN serves well as a regional power-broker and conciliator. Its maintenance of a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ in the region by avoiding the hegemony of any particular power also supports a successful and fluid regionalism, including the emergence of forums like the EAS.²⁷¹

5.5. ASEAN Defense Ministers-Plus Eight meetings (ADMM Plus)

The ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May 2006 was a historic and significant milestone in ASEAN’s evolution. For the first time

²⁷⁰ “The Declaration of the EAS on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations”, 19 November 2011, ASEAN official website, <http://www.aseansec.org/documents/19th%20summit/EAS%20Principles.pdf> (accessed on 07.02.2012)

²⁷¹ Maria Monica Wihardja, “The Sixth East Asia Summit: Keeping up the Neighbourhood”, *East Asia Forum website*, 12 November 2011, online at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/12/the-sixth-east-asia-summit-keeping-up-the-neighbourhood> (accessed on 07.02.2012)

since the formation of ASEAN, the ASEAN Defense Ministers came together in a formal meeting. The establishment of the ASEAN defense sectoral body brought ASEAN one step closer towards the realization of an ASEAN Security Community.²⁷² The Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ADMM, which the ASEAN Defense Ministers adopted at the inaugural ADMM on 9 May 2006, stated that the ADMM shall be “open, flexible and outward-looking” in actively engaging ASEAN’s friends and Dialogue Partners in promoting peace and security in the region. Pursuant to this, the Protocol to the ADMM Concept Paper called for the establishment of an ADMM-Plus to facilitate the ADMM’s engagement of ASEAN’s friends and Dialogue Partners.

The First ADMM-Plus was convened in Vietnam in October 2010. The Meeting was attended by the Defense Ministers and Representatives of Defense Ministers from ten ASEAN Member States and eight ASEAN Dialogue Partners; Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, and the United States.

The ADMM-Plus is the first official defense forum involving Defense Ministers of ASEAN Member States and key extra-regional countries. The Meeting recognized the positive contributions by the “Plus” countries in enhancing peace, stability and development in Southeast Asia.²⁷³ The Meeting also welcomed the interest of the “Plus” countries in promoting closer cooperation with ASEAN through the ADMM-Plus. During the meeting the defense ministers reviewed the Discussion Paper on “Potential, Prospects and Direction of Practical Cooperation within the Framework of the ADMM-Plus”, and agreed that the paper provided a useful basis for discussion on how the ADMM-Plus member countries could further enhance practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest. In this connection, the Meeting agreed that the five areas suggested in the paper, namely, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, military medicine, counter-terrorism and peacekeeping

²⁷² “ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-plus) –Concept Paper”, *website of ASEAN*, <http://www.asean.org/21216.pdf> (accessed on 07.02.2012)

²⁷³ “Chairman’s Statement of the First ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus: “ADMM-Plus: Strategic Cooperation for Peace, Stability, and Development in the Region”, *website of ASEAN*, online at <http://www.aseansec.org/25352.htm> (accessed on 10.01.2012)

operations (PKO) were areas that the ADMM-Plus member countries could work together for the beginning. In this regard, the Meeting agreed to establish an ASEAN Defense Senior Officials' Meeting-Plus (ADSOM-Plus), comprising senior officials from all the ADMM-Plus member countries.

An analyze of overall security architecture of the APR shows that the system is functioning at two levels. The first level is the American bilateral hub-and-spokes alliance system, and at the second level there are broader regional frameworks such as ARF, EAS, ADMM Plus at the first track level , and CSCAP, Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), Shangri-La Dialogue, ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS), at the second-track level. These two levels of cooperation coexist in the region.²⁷⁴ The U.S. has a network of alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and has a strong bilateral military cooperation with Philippines and Singapore. Although India is not a formal ally of the US, and the US policies in favor of Pakistan is a constant source of worry for India, India has also expanded the scope of its defense and security cooperation with the US to include joint military-to-military exercises involving all the branches of the armed forces. The deepening of bilateral security cooperation has started with the signing of 10 year defense framework agreement in 2005 after two country upgraded their relationship to “strategic partnership” in 2004.²⁷⁵

Security cooperation among those US allies that form the “spokes” has also been evident in recent years, creating what might be called an alliance web. Japan-Australia relations have shown the most notable progress, as a “Trilateral (US-Japan-Australia) Strategic Dialogue” and joint training exercises are being carried out. Japan-India relations are taking a similar path; the two countries issued a “Joint Statement: Vision for the Enhancement of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership upon entering the year of the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” during the visit of the Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshihiko

²⁷⁴ Ryo Sahashi, “The Rise of China and Changing Regional Security Architecture-US-Japan Papers”, *Japan Center for International Exchange*, (December 2011) p.6

²⁷⁵ Alan Kronstad, “India-US Relations”, *Congressional Research Service Report for U.S. Congress*, 12 August 2008 online at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/150780.pdf> (accessed on 12.01.2012)

Noda to India in December 2011.²⁷⁶ The Joint Declaration also foresees a joint naval military exercise in 2012. In addition to bilateral exercises, US-Japan-India conducted trilateral joint naval exercises since 2007, and a US-Japan-India strategic dialogue at the bureau chief level was initiated.²⁷⁷ Japan and South Korea have also been looking for ways to strengthen their relationship as the situation on the Korean Peninsula deteriorated in 2010. In addition to a trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, Japan, and South Korea, the countries confirmed their intention to strengthen trilateral relations in a joint statement issued at the June 2011. Meanwhile, Japan and the Philippines agreed in June 2009 to form a strategic partnership.²⁷⁸

The regional countries generally pursue a policy which aim to benefit equally from their bilateral security arrangements and multilateral forums. They try to balance their security ties with the US by developing closer relations with China which became the biggest trade partner for almost all regional countries, and by multilateral forums where the US and China are both a part. The dispute over the South China Sea between China and some of the regional countries primarily Vietnam and Philippines is a major source of tension. The territorial dispute over South China Sea also affects the US, since the South China Sea is one of the major sea lanes in the region. The territorial dispute, and general assertiveness of militarily and economically overwhelming China push the regional actors to seek to counter China's might through solidarity within ASEAN, by taking advantage of the US presence in multilateral frameworks and by attempting to achieve balancing within institutions.

This complex security architecture in the region has given impetus to Russia to carry out a three-layer balancing. In the first level Russia tries to balance the US

²⁷⁶ “Joint Statement: Vision for the Enhancement of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership upon entering the year of the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations”, website of Prime Minister of Japan, online at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/diplomatic/201112/28india_e.html (accessed on 12.01.2012)

²⁷⁷ Sandeep Dikshit, “India, Japan to firm up strategic ties”, *The Hindu*, 25 December 2011, online at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2745232.ece> (accessed on 15.01.2012)

²⁷⁸ Ryo Sahashi, *op.cit.*, p.9

preeminence with “strategic partnership” or with an informal alliance with China. In the second level Russia aims to balance China’s rising power through forging closer relations with India and to some extent with Japan. In the third level Russia engages in the regional mechanisms where the US and China are also present to have an equal voice with them in the development of the region’s political-security architecture.

5.6 RIC (Russia-India-China) and BRIC (Brazil- Russia-India-China) Cooperation

Russia, India and China have begun to cooperate in two mechanisms in Asia-Pacific Region in 2000’s. They are the RIC trilateral summits and BRIC annual meetings process. The RIC cooperation was started with the first RIC ministerial meeting in New York in 2002 upon the initiative of Russia.²⁷⁹ For almost 10 years RIC trilateral format has remained a unique international mechanism uniting three countries that comprise 20 per cent of the total global landmass, 39 per cent of the global population and around 25 per cent of global GDP.²⁸⁰

The three countries express that they stand for a greater presence of emerging and developing economies in international decision-making bodies. Trilateral interaction gives them greater leverage on international issues and opportunity to deliver its views through the West-controlled multilateral institutions. These three countries have common views on reshaping the global governance architecture. Eventually trilateral dialogue in areas such as global economic governance architecture, climate change, trade policy and development cooperation may lead to the emergence of an alternative pole in international decision making process. On the whole, interaction in the format of RIC created both opportunities and challenges for these three countries.

Besides pressing global issues, the trilateral format is also designed to foster mutual cooperation in economic and developmental areas, including agriculture, disaster relief, health and medicine. All three countries have identical views on the Doha

²⁷⁹ Vladimir Radyuhin, “For A New World Order”, *The Hindu*, online at <http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl2512/stories/20080620251205200.htm> (accessed on 05.04.2012)

²⁸⁰ Natalia Stapran, “Acting in Concert in Southeast Asia?”, *New Eastern Outlook*, 04.05.2011, online at <http://journal-neo.com/?q=print/6244> (accessed on 05.02.2012)

round of trade talks, the rising protectionism in the West, climate change proposals, energy security and cross-border terrorism, border dispute, nuclear and conventional military modernization. Energy is another key area for cooperation. Russia is a dominant supplier of oil and gas; China and India are big energy buyers, but significant suppliers of manufactured products and services. All those facts prove that the RIC trilateral format can go behind the words, and achieve tangible results.²⁸¹

The RIC cooperation received a fresh impulse by the November 2010 meeting of the RIC foreign ministers in Wuhan (China), and demonstrated that the format was developing into an efficient mechanism of cooperation on urgent regional issues and a platform of sectoral practical cooperation²⁸²

In the joint declaration after Wuhan Summit the three foreign ministers;²⁸³

Expressed conviction that the trilateral meeting mechanism had deepened coordination and cooperation among the three countries on international and regional issues and helped promote multilateralism and democracy in international relations. The Foreign Ministers reiterated that the cooperation between China, Russia and India does not target any other country.

Stressed the need to develop an open transparent inclusive and balanced security and cooperation architecture in the Asia Pacific region based upon universally agreed principles of international law and giving due consideration to the legitimate interests of all states.

Foreign Ministers of China and Russia welcomed India's constructive participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an Observer Country and attached importance to India's intention to play a larger role in the SCO.

The BRIC acronym was first used by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill in 2001. According to the thesis of the O'Neill these four countries would become four

²⁸¹ Natalia Stapran, "Acting in Concert in Southeast Asia?", *New Eastern Outlook*, 04.05.2011, online at <http://journal-neo.com/?q=print/6244> (accessed on 05.02.2012)

²⁸² Alexei Borodavkin, "Russia's Eastern Policy: Summing Up and Looking Forward", *International Affairs*, No. 2, Vol.0057, 2011, pp: 28-32

²⁸³ "India-Russia Relations", Website of the Indian Embassy in Beijing, 15 November 2010 online at <http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=2&SubMenuId=0> (accessed on 05.02.2012)

dominant economic powers of the world by 2050.²⁸⁴ He also forwarded the idea that BRIC countries are natural partners since they have similar patterns of economic development; since they embraced capitalism after a long socialist past; and finally since their economies are complementary, Russia and Brazil as suppliers of raw materials, China and India as suppliers of manufactured goods and services. These qualities give BRIC a potential to form a bloc.

This thesis later adopted by the BRIC countries has opened the way for official summits between four countries to coordinate firstly their economic policies in the world stage. The first BRIC summit took place in Yekaterinburg, Russia in June 2009. The four leaders, Brazil (Luis Inacio Lula da Silva), Russia (Dmitry Medvedev), India (Manmohan Singh) and China (Hu Jintao) attended and discussed global issues such as financial crisis, 2007-2008 world food price crisis, global development and future strengthening of the BRIC group.²⁸⁵ The second summit took place in April 2010 in Brazil. The leaders issued a Joint Statement at the end of the summit which dealt with international economic and financial issues, international trade, development, climate change, energy as well as global governance. The opening clauses of the Statement underlined shared perception of the four countries that the world is undergoing major and swift changes that highlight the need for corresponding transformations in global governance in all relevant areas; their support for a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all States; stressed the central role played by the G-20 in combating the crisis through unprecedented levels of coordinated action; welcomed the fact that the G-20 was confirmed as the premier forum for international economic coordination and cooperation of all its member states.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁴ Gillian Tett, "The Story of BRICS", *The Financial Times*, 15.01.2010, online at <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/112ca932-00ab-11df-ae8d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1vLJ0Cjmc> (accessed on 16.04.2012)

²⁸⁵ "Press Statement following BRIC Summit 2009", online at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/06/16/2300_type82915type84779_217967.shtml (accessed on 16.04.2012)

²⁸⁶ "Second BRIC Summit - Joint Statement", 16 April, 2010, online at <http://www.unaoc.org/docs/II-BRIC-Summit.pdf> (accessed on 06.02.2012)

The third summit took place in China in April 2011. South Africa joined the BRIC Group as a consequence of growing presence of BRIC Countries in the African continent. In the third Summit BRIC countries announced their support for Russia's WTO membership. In the joint statement issued after the Summit, the leaders declared that five BRICS countries should join hands to promote common development for all countries, bolster international exchanges and cooperation, and strengthen the BRICS partnership for common development.²⁸⁷

5.7. Non-Governmental Mechanisms

It should be noted that regional security institution-building in the Asia-Pacific is no longer an exclusively inter-governmental affair. A number of non-governmental actors are increasingly active in promoting dialogues and suggesting policy options on regional security. Such organizations as the ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies and Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) (with 14 countries represented, including Russia) played a key role in pushing ASEAN in the direction of a formal process of security dialogue including conflict resolution, CSBMs, arms sales issues, and regional maritime cooperation. In April 1996, a seminar on security and stability in the APR was held in Moscow. A Code of Inter-State Conduct for the Asia-Pacific ("Pacific Concord") was discussed at the seminar. In September 1998, Russia organized an international conference on security in the APR in Vladivostok. A revised version of the "Pacific Concord" has been submitted to conference participants.²⁸⁸

"The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)", "the Shangri-La Dialogue Conferences" and "the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)", the Asian Senior Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) are other second track initiatives Russia has taken part in the region.

²⁸⁷ "Third BRICS Summit (Sanya) Declaration", online at <http://www.bricsindia.in/thirdSummit.html> (accessed on 10.02.2012)

²⁸⁸ Alexander Sergounin, "Russian Security Policy and the Prospects for Multilateralism in the Asia—Pacific", PONARS Policy Memo 84 Nizhny Novogorod Linguistic University (October 1999), p.7

5.9. Conclusion

The pre-eminence of American power and ideas in the Asia-Pacific region have relatively declined and given way to another phase in the post-cold war era in which there are multiple influences and an arising multipolarity. The regional groupings such as ASEAN and ARF sought to include all the regional countries in the evolving process of ASEAN-centered Asia-Pacific regional order. While Russia was aiming to be part of the evolving new regional structure, ASEAN provided Russia with an opportunity to be involved in the dialogue and cooperation on regional security problems by inviting Russia to the ARF, and accepting Russia as a full dialogue partner. Russia, as a recognized nuclear and conventional military power, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, supplier of energy, and defense products was seen as a valuable contribution to ASEAN and related initiatives. At the same time, China went through a policy change towards a positive approach to the regional integration process. China rapidly developed its relations with ASEAN, and foundation of ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, South Korea) process in 1997 as one of the core cooperation mechanisms gave a prominent voice to China in the region.

China's growing weight in the regional architecture also helped Russia become a party to evolving regional bodies. As a strategical partner of China, Russia had the support of China to become a member to APEC, and to be invited to ARF, EAS and other regional cooperation initiatives.

Although Russia gained access to all the regional groupings, it has not yet become a major player in the regional affairs partly due to the still weak economic ties with the region, and partly due to the its alignment with China which restricts independent decision making on part of Russia.

On the other hand, there are other factors which have a negative impact on the full and effective development of the regional cooperation. The U.S. policy of containment of China, and the importance the US gives to its network of bilateral alliances over region-wide cooperation weaken the role of regional initiatives. Moreover, China's reluctance to discuss the issues regarding China and its neighbors in the regional forums create another obstacle for effective functioning of these

regional organizations. Although China officially fully supports the regional cooperation, it refuses to bring its territorial conflicts to the agenda of regional forums. These factors have raised doubts about the future of the collective security and political mechanisms in the region.

Therefore Russia's purpose to become an influential player in the Asia-Pacific through regional organizations have drawbacks which are caused by both external factors and Russia's own policy. Russia can have more chances to be taken as a serious and reliable partner in the regional affairs if the country follows a more independent path without jeopardizing its political and economic ties with China.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis has sought to examine Russia's Asia-Pacific policy after the end of the Cold War by focusing on Moscow's bilateral relations with the major regional countries and its overall multilateral approach and policies towards the Asia Pacific Region. Contrary to the views of scholars who claim that Russia has emerged as a major power in the Asia Pacific Region, this thesis argues that Russia's strategy of becoming a great power in the Asia Pacific Region has significant limitations stemming from its competitive and assertive policies that ignore the role of multilateralism and international cooperation, and its military alignment with China.

The following findings support this hypothesis and main argument. In the first chapter it was demonstrated that Russia since becoming a major actor in the Asia-Pacific in the 19th century has followed policies based on great power politics, extending its territories, going into the war with its neighbors and entering into competition with other major powers of the region to gain strength and dominance.

Russia's territorial extension towards Pacific region during the 18th century culminated in Russian Empire's emergence as one of the main players of the region in the 19th century and onwards. Following the end of WWII, the Soviet Union exerted its influence in the region through its super power status without integration with the region. Dissolution of the Soviet Union gave way to a new chapter in the world politics as well as in Russian politics. The country lost its superpower status, and embarked on a search for a new place and identity in the world politics. Russian Federation, inheritor of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire, has not given up the notion of "great power" despite the difficult transition period. Under the leadership of President Putin Russia's claim to great power status became one of the central themes of foreign policy formulation. Russian Federation has been in need of a polycentric world to achieve the status of great power. Therefore Russia has pursued

a policy aiming to create multiple power centers through informal alliances and regional mechanisms. In the Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation published in 2000 a strong emphasis made on Russia's great power status and a need for multipolar world in the face of U.S. unilateralism. The Concept Paper says one of the main objectives of the Russian foreign policy is "to achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community, most fully consistent with the interests of the Russian Federation as a great power, as one of the most influential centers of the modern world".²⁸⁹ On the multipolar system "The Concept Paper" says "Russia shall seek to achieve a multi-polar system of international relations that really reflects the diversity of the modern world with its great variety of interests".²⁹⁰ The challenge for the Russia has been to achieve this multipolar system where Russia's influence would be equal to other principal powers. Russia's did not have a natural place in the world politics deriving from its superpower position anymore, and has not had many of the attributes which define a great power following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Therefore Russia has opted for alignment with China in the process of reshaping of its policies in the Asia Pacific. China has been seen as the only potential power to balance the dominance of the US in the Asia-Pacific affairs, and a strong partner to exert influence together in the establishment of a new regional order in the Asia-Pacific. The two countries have relied on the notion of multipolarity and region-wide cooperation in their attempts to challenge the US preeminence and the US system of bilateral and trilateral alliances in the region. The rise of different power centers like Japan, India along with China made Asia-Pacific a more receptive environment for Russia's advocacy of multipolarity.

In the third chapter, it was attempted to analyze why relations with Asia-Pacific has become one of the main foreign policy objectives for Russia in the last two decades, and what are the sources of increasing engagement of Russia from the perspective of interests and challenges. Russia has both political and economic interests, and security challenges in the region due to Russia's direct geographic and historical links with the region. Russia's 60 percent of the territory, an important amount of its natural resources, and agricultural land lie in the Asia-Pacific. To be a great

²⁸⁹ "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", General Principles Section, 2000, online at <http://www.idsa.in/eurasia/resources> (accessed on 12.12.2011)

²⁹⁰ *Ibid*, Modern World and Foreign Policy of Russian Federation Section

power, Russia needs a country-wide strong economy and a modern society in the 21st century terms. Therefore, Russia needs Asia-Pacific cooperation both for the development of Siberia and the Far East aided by foreign investment and financial support, and for greater economic and trade ties with regional countries such as China, Japan, India, South Korea and ASEAN member countries. Russia has already achieved greater economic cooperation and trade ties with regional countries. One example of it China's becoming number one trade partner of Russia in 2010 with a trade turnover of US\$ 56 billion. APEC countries' share in total Russian trade reached %24 in 2010 from %16,2 in 1997. The investment from regional countries, especially from China, to Siberia and Far East has substantially increased. In 2010, Northern China has invested in Russia's Far Eastern and Siberian regions US\$ 3 billion which is more than the Russian federal government's US\$1 billion.²⁹¹ The opening of ESPO pipeline mostly funded by Japan and China also brought new destinations to Russia's oil and gas export routes. However, overreliance on China especially for the development of Siberia and the Far East regions has created vulnerabilities for Russia which is at a disadvantage in the region with regard to China in demographic, economic and military terms. Therefore, Russia should diversify its partners in the region for both the development of Siberia and the Far East, and the overall modernization of its economy to avoid the contradictions and disputes which overreliance on China could bring.

In the third chapter, the security challenges Russia faces in the APR were also discussed such as North Korea nuclear issue, territorial disputes with Japan, the US-Japan alliance and antimissile defense system cooperation, and non-traditional, cross-border threats. Russia needs to address these challenges both at bilateral and regional level. The solution of North Korea problem would bring about both a more secure environment and richer economic opportunities for Russia. Russia can realize its two projects which are on hold due to the North-South Korea tension: a railway and pipeline which will go through from Russia to North Korea. Russia is also in need of a solution to Kuril Islands problem to carry its relations with Japan to a higher, and tension-free level. The US-Japan alliance and antimissile defense system cooperation are the issues that worry Russia. Russia does not want to be confronted with a

²⁹¹ Marina Romanova, "Sino-Russian 'Bad Dates' and Chinese Relations with 'Abandonment Child' of Moscow", *Russia Briefing*, <http://russia-briefing.com/news/sino-russian-bad-dates-and-chinese-relations-with-abandonment-child-of-moscow.html/> (accessed on 20 December 2011)

changed security environment where Russia is at a disadvantage. Therefore Russia strongly advocates regional forums to address the region-wide security issues. Ethnic and religious separatism and cross-border threats, mainly maritime security, piracy, illegal arms trade are also issues Russia wants to cooperate on with regional countries.

On the issue of perceived security challenges, Russia and China mostly have convergent ideas. They strongly agree on the need of a new security concept for the region “based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation” replacing what they call “closed and opaque bilateral alliances between Asian countries and the United States”, they have parallel views on the issue of North Korea, nuclear non-proliferation, American anti-missile defense system, maritime security and other non-military threats. However, Russia’s alignment with China puts Russia in a passive role with regard to the problems between China and other regional countries. Russia is not able to play a constructive role in some regional problems which China considers to have strictly bilateral character like the issue of South China Sea territorial problems or Taiwan Strait. In the face of the risk of alienating China, Russia has had to distance itself from these issues although they are critical in the achievement of a lasting stability in the region. Russia’s this stance might generate a feeling of distrust in the regional countries in relation to Russia’s commitment to a regional order characterized by cooperation, integration and growth, in which shared interests predominate.

In the fourth chapter of the thesis, Russia’s relations with major actors of the region were examined, and it was observed that Russia put substantial effort into developing a strategic partnership with China while it has also improved its relations with India, Japan, South Korea and other regional actors. Russia and China, having similar experiences, a complementary role in geo-politics and economic development, and shared concerns in global politics have become close partners in the post-cold war era. Russia – China alignment has accelerated Russia’s integration attempts into the region, however it also limited its policy options vis-a-vis other regional actors as it is observed in its relation with India and Japan. China and Japan have strained relationship deriving both from historical enmity and from current issues such as Taiwan strait and Senkaku islands. China and India have also ongoing tension in

their relations deriving from contentious territorial issues, China's support to Pakistan, and India's nuclear cooperation with the US. The two countries cooperate on the basis of common interests at bilateral level and multilateral forums such as RIC and BRICS, however their mutual suspicion persists. Therefore, China is opposed both to Indian and Japanese aspirations to become permanent members of the UNSC. There is a wide-held perception that China is reluctant to see equal partners emerging in Asia who might come to compete with Beijing's privileged position, especially within the UN Security Council. On the other hand, while China has achieved to establish a powerful presence within Asia-Pacific, this presence has also created suspicions and perceptions of threat among its regional neighbors. The primary reason for the growing unease throughout the region is China's continued rise, economically and militarily. Despite repeated denials from Beijing that they do not possess a secret geopolitical strategy to replace the US, and create an Asian sphere of influence focused on China, some level of mistrust continues to exist throughout the region especially due to South China Sea dispute. In this context, Russian alignment with China has the potential to undermine Russia's process of regional integration with the Asia-Pacific, and to disrupt its bilateral relations with other regional actors.

The relations with Japan, which has a significant potential to help Russia modernize and integrate into the region, are shadowed by Kuril Islands issue. Russia has not shown enough flexibility due to domestic pressure and the fear of weakening its geostrategic importance and of harming its national interests. If Russia can show a more constructive approach to the issue, Russian-Japanese partnership can become an important contributor to the realization of Russia's regional aspirations.

In the fifth chapter of the thesis, Russia's engagement with the APR cooperation mechanisms was analyzed. It was observed that Russia has pursued a very active policy in terms of its relations with the main integration structures of the Asia-Pacific Region, however was not able to gain the influential role it aspired. Over the last 20 years the regional structure in the Asia Pacific Region has witnessed an important phase of transformation. The perception of regional affairs has shifted from a bloc understanding to a new uncertain era with the end of the cold war. The regional actors were uncomfortable with the uncertainty of the security dynamics. They

needed new regional venues where all the major powers that have stake in the region come together. ASEAN as the longest serving regional institution in the APR took the initiative to create new forums which will focus on region-wide dialogue, information share, and coordination of policies. ASEAN also had a functioning ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences system where ASEAN and dialogue partners had bilateral consultation on political and security issues. Thus ASEAN undertook the obligation of being primary driving force behind ASEAN Regional Forum to which Russia participated from its foundation. ASEAN's leading role in the formation of ARF and successive regional mechanisms such as EAS, ASEAN ADMM, ASEM has been welcomed by Russia. Russia did not want dominance of any big power particularly the US in the evolution of regional structure; therefore ASEAN was readily accepted as the leading force behind regional cooperation.

While Asia-Pacific region strives to create stability and prosperity enhancing mechanisms such as a high level of economic integration and regional institutions, power relations among major actors still shape the limits of regional cooperation. The US-China, China-Japan, China-India rivalries have negative effects on regional integration like China's opposition to India's APEC membership, or the US attempts for the creation of "Transpacific Partnership" which can interfere with APEC's work on economic integration. Russia can become a more constructive partner in the regional cooperation if the country distances itself from power balancing policies in the region, and shows a stronger commitment to regional integration as a neutral regional actor.

Asia-Pacific region has a long way to reach the level of integration such as Europe has achieved. The region is more diverse, less predictable and is host to several major powers with converging and conflicting interests. Therefore it is natural to expect that the integration process will be different in scope, time and with regard to the limits to the national sovereignty. The regional institution building process which is in the early stages of its progress is now open to all the regional actors. Russia can benefit from this open-process to help giving shape to the institutional design and norms of the emerging regional bodies in a more effective way if it becomes an independent, responsible and cooperative voice in the region.

In sum, the Asia-Pacific region with its dynamic economy and growing weight in the world affairs has become instrumental in Russia's future position in the world. Russia wants to reclaim its "great power" status, and to attain this status Russia needs a strong economy and innovative, modern country. Russia's integration into the APR is expected to serve both to its aim of modernization, and to gaining bigger influence in the region and the world. However after two decades following the end-of cold war, Russia's place in the Asia-Pacific region is not yet clearly defined. Russia should support its active policy of engagement with the region by creating a comprehensive long-term strategy in the light of current dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. The Asia-Pacific is a region which is receptive to transformative potential of international political and economic forces for regional order. Regional countries do not want a return to the bloc-politics of the cold-war years which will hold back the region from realizing its true and full potential. Russia should be able to devise and maintain a strategy towards the realization of common goals shared by the majority of the regional countries. In this vein, Russia's current policy of containing the U.S. power through alignment with China can be counterproductive to its goal of becoming an influential actor of a integrated Asia-Pacific region which will have a strong voice in international politics to match with its economic weight. Russia's desire to be accepted as a Euro-Pacific power with a leading role in the Asia-Pacific affairs has a greater chance of success if Russia will be able to pursue a policy based on interdependence, common interests, cooperation, and adherence to international and institutional norms, which will help consolidate the APR's regional integration process.

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YAZARIN

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TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Russia's Asia-Pacific Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

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