

THE IMPACT OF *TANZİMAT* POLICIES ON THE 19TH CENTURY CIVIL TURMOIL
IN THE *VİLAYET* OF ŞAM AND THE 1860 CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

SARPER ATAKUL

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES

MARCH 2012

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdoğan Yıldırım	(METU,SOC)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur	(METU, HIS)	_____
Assist. Prof. Dr. Selçuk Dursun	(METU, HIS)	_____

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Name, Last name : Sarper Atakul

Signature :

ABSTRACT

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Atakul, Sarper

M.S., Department of Middle East Studies

Supervisor : Assoc. Prof. Dr. Recep BOZTEMUR

March 2012, 118 pages

The *Tanzimat* period had been an era of political change and transformation for the Ottoman Empire as it introduced many new new tools in political arena, particularly to reach centralization and the whole period is widely debated in many successful studies. However, the implementation of the *Tanzimat* reforms in specific provinces are generally ignored. Similarly, 19th century civil turmoil in the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire had been a subject that discussed frequently. However, in many studies the events are generally discussed only as a religious conflict between Muslims and Druzes rather than a reflection of a complex system of political and socio-economic factors. In this context, the role of the *Tanzimat* reforms are generally ignored.

This study aims to adress these two points at the same time. First it focuses on the specific implementation of the *Tanzimat* reforms in Lebanon rather than the promised aspects of the package. It details how the reforms were implemented, why it was implemented in that specific form, what were the complaints and the results. Second, it tries to understand the civil war in Lebanon in terms of a complex web of state-society relations. It puts the state at the center of analysis and shows how the implementation of the reforms effected the factors that led to the civil war and its different dimensions.

Keywords: Lebanon, Civil War, Tanzimat, 19th century, Syria

ÖZ

TANZİMAT REFORMLARININ 19. YÜZYIL ŞAM VİLAYETİ OLAYLARI VE 1860 LÜBNAN İÇ SAVAŞI'NA ETKİLERİ

Atakul, Sarper

Yüksek Lisans, Orta Doğu Araştırmaları Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur

Mart 2012, 118 sayfa

Tanzimat dönemi özellikle merkezileşmeyi sağlayabilmek için yeni birçok politika aracını ilk defa getirmiş olması sebebiyle Osmanlı İmparatorluğu için siyasal bir değişim ve dönüşüm dönemidir ve bir bütün olarak birçok başarılı çalışmada ayrıntılı bir şekilde incelenmiştir. Bununla birlikte Tanzimat reformlarının eyaletlerdeki uygulanma şekli genellikle ihmal edilmektedir. Benzer bir şekilde 19. Yüzyılda İmparatorluğun Suriye bölgesindeki vilayetlerde yaşanan iç çatışma süreci de çokça tartışılmış ancak birçok çalışmada olayların karmaşık bir sosyo-ekonomik ve politik bir ilişkiler ağını yansıtmaktan ziyade Maruniler ve Durziler arasındaki dinsel bir çatışmaya indirgenmiştir. Bu bağlamda Tanzimat reformlarının oynadığı rol de genelde ihmal edilmiştir.

Bu açıdan bakılırsa bu çalışma aynı anda bu iki hususa birden yanıt vermektedir. İlk olarak reformların nasıl uygulandığına, aldığı özgül biçimlere ve uygulamada yaşanan kısıtlara ve sonuçlarına dikkat çekilecektir. İkinci olarak, Lübnandaki iç çatışma sürecini karmaşık bir devlet-toplum ilişkileri ağı açısından inceleyecektir. Çalışma, devleti analizin merkezine koymakta ve reformların uygulanma şeklinin iç çatışmaya giden süreci ve çatışmaların farklı boyutlarını nasıl etkilediğini gösterecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Lübnan, İç Savaş, Tanzimat, 19.yüzyıl, Suriye

To My Parents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe a deep gratitude to my family whose support and encouragement were indispensable in realizing this study. Without their support and patience, this study would stay as a plan and could never be realized. In this sense, if having an academic degree is a success, I think my parents possess the greater part of it.

My supervisor Recep Boztemur have always been a friend rather than being merely a supervisor. He inspired me to study “about people”, taught that studying history would be a better choice for a student of politics and persuaded me that this topic, which was once only a paper, worthed to focus on. I followed his advices and despite all the difficulties, I have always found my topic significantly interesting. I thank Prof. Boztemur for inspiration and all the friendship.

I should also thank my former colleagues in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism namely Bengü Demirci, Müberra Yücker, Tayfun Esmer and Nilgün Kılıçarslan whose tolerance and supportive stance regarding my academic ambitions facilitated the study.

Some of my other friends have directly or indirectly contributed to my masters study. Friendships of MES colleagues, Hasibe Tuna, Yasin Tamer, all the law school guys, Orhan Gürgen and Halil Güner have also contributed indirectly to my study. I also owe them a thank for their valuable friendships.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: LEBANON AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The Ottoman Empire, as a multi ethnic political identity governed, ideally, by a centralized bureaucratic system and an absolute monarch, faced significant transformations throughout the new world of the 19th century. This new world made substantial pressures on the Empire and created deep interactions in different areas, groups, institutions and social networks. For this reason, the responses given to these pressures and the form of mentioned interactions had been totally new things for the *sultans* and high level bureaucrats of the Empire.

At the level of foreign policy, the governors of the Empire suffered military defeats, fear of dismemberment and increasing impact of foreigners within the Ottoman territories which eroded the bonds between the non-Muslim *tebaa* and *Devlet-i Âli*. At the economic level, these pressures showed themselves as increasing commercialization, which placed the Ottoman territories in kind of a periphery within the world trade system, increased foreign influence in the internal economy and the reduced income of particularly Muslim *tebaa*. Lastly, at the level of internal politics, the Ottoman state was trying to cope with the rebellions of both non-muslims (*zimmis*) and strong governors.

As this was the picture, the Ottomans tried to respond to these problems by developing a specific set of reforms. Although they were deeply in continuation with the previous reform attempts, this set which was the first to cover a broad spectrum of areas with a single rule in mind: “modernization”. However, the biggest component of this “modernization” in the reform package called as *Tanzimat-i Hayriye* was contemplated as centralization in the state system.

Tanzimat, as a “modernist” project, tried to transform the Empire to a centralist state, and to achieve this, it covered different areas covering military, bureaucracy, economy, the rights of people and law and order. In addition, the new

principle was envisaging education and other “services” to be offered by the state, at least normatively.

However, the societies and the people in the Empire already had their own lifestyles, orders and institutions in these areas. *Tanzimat*, as a project with an aim of modernizing and centralizing these institutions, entered in an interaction with these institutions and the actors within it. It should be said that, although *Tanzimat* had its own projects in ideal, in implementation, it was these set of interactions that shaped the history of the 19th century Ottoman Empire during the 19th century.

This study will try to locate the civil conflicts and political re-structuration in the *Vilayet* of Şam, which found its peak with the 1860 civil war in Mount Lebanon and the massacre in Şam, within the context of these interactions and seek to understand how the events and the political processes in Lebanon was effected by the developments within Empire at large, how the reform process was implemented in the *Vilayet* of Şam in general and Mount Lebanon and what kind of interaction existed between the political factors inherent in the region and these reforms.

The implementation of the “modernist” reforms in Lebanon started with the period of İbrahim Paşa at a time when the Sublime Porte was dealing with the pre-Tanzimat reforms. İbrahim’s reforms were similar to Tanzimat in nature but at the end he failed due to developments in the foreign relations and the opposition in the internal affairs of the Mount Lebanon. The most important impacts of his policies had been the roots of the conflict sowed between Maronites and the Druzes and the increasing power of the commoners in the region.

When they came back to Lebanon, the first attempt of the Ottomans was to reverse back the reforms made by İbrahim to win the loyalty of the people. However, this was an attempt that would undermine the implementation of the *Tanzimat* reforms when they started. The implementation of the reform package in the *Vilayet* of Şam is analyzed in five components in this study: administration, urban politics, military affairs, rights and sectarian relations and the economy. Each component had its own characteristics in implementation, limitations and consequences.

In administration, the main aim of the Ottomans had been to bring a centralist rule to the Mount and eliminate the power of the notables. In practice, this had been in form of frequently changing borders of administrative units and the decreasing

power of the *vali*, as an institution and the establishment of the Double *Kaim makamate* order in the Mount. However, the Ottomans lacked enough cadre and political and economic power to implement the reforms. The weakened position of *Vali* was a further impediment. Particularly the establishment of Double *Kaim makamate* empowered the notables and forced people to define themselves using the sectarian loyalties. It should also be said that many times the Ottoman officials were unable to curb the rebellions because of the lack of enough military and political power. Particularly *Vali* had to somehow negotiate with the notables to perform his duties. A similar pattern also showed itself in the urban politics as the main aim was to weaken the notables and increase the representation through the establishment of the *Meclises*. However, in practice, the notables increased their representation, gained power to manipulate the *meclises* to further their interests. As for the reforms in the army, the Ottomans failed to establish a sustainable army with enough troop as regular recruitment process also failed. The wars with the European countries and Russia was also a significant problem on this score. Particularly the Crimean War is mentioned in this study as it forced the Ottomans to send the regular troops in the region. Lack of regular troop was a significant source of the resentment against the Ottomans and the lack of ability to curb the rebellions. The equality between members of different religions was the biggest challenge for the implementation of the reforms in Lebanon as it was in the Empire at large. Clearly, the equality between Muslim and non-Muslim *tebaa* was not achieved and there was a significant hostility against the Christians and their gaining of new rights. However, this study considers this point as a reflection of socio-economic developments rather than of a mere sectarian hostility.

Economically, the developments stemming from the new foreign commercial relations is analyzed in this study as it left a significant damage on the local economy on one hand, and created new forms of economic relations on the other hand. Again the position of the foreigners in the foreign commercial relations is analyzed as it particularly caused tension between sects. Particularly increasing power of commercial agriculture and its impacts had been a significant source of new developments in the region which particularly effected the relations between the peasant and the landowner. Issues regarding taxation and land management coincided with these points. On one hand the Ottomans could not establish a just taxation system due to lack of political power and the cadre to implement the direct

taxation. On the other hand, the reforms in land management did not produce the intended results and the notables and big landowners continued to hold the land.

This pattern of implementations with all its characteristics and shortages faced, and deeply interacted, with a specific local political framework in the region under analysis to produce the specific shape of the conflicts. On the one hand, the rise of commoners that started with the policies of Bashir II was underway. The most dramatic example of this is the Kisrawan rebellion when the peasants expelled their lords under the leadership of the powerful and Maronite clergy who was dominated by the lower classes. On the other, commercial groups were gaining power at the expense of the traditional notables. All these groups were in struggle with the Ottoman officials. In some cases, the Ottomans failed to implement the policies in a successful way due to lack of power as many times they were even unable to curb the rebellions. To overcome their relative weakness, the Ottomans either deliberately provoked local rivalries or tried to open ways for the commoners to enter into the political arena. The hostility of the Druzes against the *zimmis*, stemming from political or economic interests and threat perceptions and the increasing status of particularly the Maronites was an important source of the hostility. This aspect of the conflicts coincided with economic aspect as in many cases the attacks were directed against the rich. The policies of the foreign countries also played their own roles. However, this study employs the term foreign “involvement” rather than “intervention” to emphasize the foreigners were only one actor to enter into interaction with the above mentioned characteristics of the local politics and were not conflict producing always.

All these points found their reflection in the conflicts that reached peak with the 1860 civil war. The *Tanzimat* reformers answered the conflicts with specific policies and a period of political restructuration which found its peak point in the establishment of *Mutasarrifate* of Lebanon, which also reflected these points. Within this context, although this study will cover the whole *Vilayet* of Şam to some extent, as both the civil conflict and the modernist political restructuration both were relevant most to Mount Lebanon in form of 1860 war and establishment of a new form of administration respectively, this study will mainly focus on Mount Lebanon.

Assumptions

Within this perspective, this study argues that it is coherent to say that there was more than one war, occurred at the same time. The flag of war was carried by the demands of the Muslim notables, the weakening role of traditional leadership, the disappointed feelings and hatred of the peasant, challenges of the emerging commercial groups to the traditional leadership, struggle of the Ottoman officers with local factors, the disappointed feelings of Muslims regarding their diminishing economic and political power, rise of *zimmis* and the impact of the foreigners. *Tanzimat* policies affected these sources of conflict along three lines:

First, in some cases, the social transformation and the *Tanzimat* supported the emergence of the new social groups including the Maronite clergy. As we see with the case of 1858 Land Code, it was impossible for these groups to gain power so rapidly without the impact of the *Tanzimat* reforms, which similarly gave momentum to the decline of some traditional groups.

The second way is the fact that the method of the reforms, although undeliberately, furthered the reduction in the economic and social power of the Muslims, which was going to become a social reaction to the reform process with the introduction of the principle of equality. The concept of equality was so important for the conflict that, in the special case of Lebanon, those who used the newly given rights more modestly remained untouched during the wartimes.

The third, last and the most important point, emerged after the combination of the Muslim resentment and the administrative implementations: sectarianism and empowerment of religious affiliation. This point had two dimensions: first, the model of Double *Kaim makamate* deeply affected the relations between the peasant and the landowner. The religious difference between the landowner and the peasant, particularly in the south, together with the above mentioned two lines, somehow changed the character of the conflict. Both the Muslims and the Christians started defining themselves in terms of their religious and sectarian loyalty and contemplating all the above mentioned sources of conflicts along religious lines. Within this context, a second aspect is that *Tanzimat* reforms made the people percept class based and economic issues along religious lines.

Approach

This study principally deals with the “*Vilayet* of Şam” in the Arabian territories of the Empire. However, as the boundaries of this administrative units changed frequently preventing a coherent analysis and the events in the region were linked to each other the reader should know that this term here is used interchangeable with the terms “Syria” or “*Vilayet* of Syria” and encompasses approximately Nablus, Aleppo, Beirut, Anti Lebanon, Mount Lebanon and Damascus with Mount in the focus. However, as mentioned the focus will be the Mount and the Şam.

When analyzing this geography and the political developments within it, this study will take on board a broadly defined state-society relations approach that cannot be essentialized solely to the term “identity conflict” which is independent of political and economic factors. As it is trying to detect the “impacts” of *Tanzimat* reforms, it will put the state at the center point of the framework. It should be said that as the implementation was part of the wider framework of the Ottoman Empire, the implementation, the specific shape of the *Tanzimat* reforms and their consequences in Syria were affected from, and to some extent determined by, the developments in Empire at large. However, it is not right to demote the whole conflict only to state policies. People have their own dynamics to write history and to understand the civil conflicts. For this reason, as in all other political events, in understanding civil conflicts, these dynamics inherent to the society should be taken into account. In such a scheme, the role of the state will never be taken as an all explanatory tool but rather as a structure to enter into interaction with the social dynamics. Furthermore, *Vilayet* of Şam during the 19th century was a place where many foreign countries played their political cards with their agents in the region. For this reason, the impact of foreign relations and policies should be added to the picture as well.

Departing from such a point, this study will try to find an answer to the question: “is the period that led to 1860 Civil War in Lebanon a reflection of political and economic factors, or is it right to consider the events as a reflection of mere Muslim-Christian hostility?”.

Organization and Methodology

This study starts with analyzing the overall situation of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. Although briefly, it will mention the reasons of the economic decline with its impacts both in foreign and internal economic relations. It shows that, as the Empire was losing its power and its position in the world trade, the framework of internal economic relations was being transformed accordingly and this process made some poorer and some more wealthy. This transformation was reflected in the Christian-Muslim relations as the Christians gained more economic power and the Muslims, to a considerable extent, lost their ground in the economy. This economic decline was accompanied by the relevant political processes as the Ottomans were suffering from military defeats at foreign hands, territorial losses and internal riots. The Sublime Porte was trying to respond these processes with the mentioned reform movements. Accordingly, this chapter aims to show the reader what was the logic or the motivation behind the development of *Tanzimat* reforms as a cure to the decay of the Empire, why it was implemented in that specific method and where Lebanon fit in the bigger picture of the Ottoman Empire. Without this chapter, it would be hard to understand why, for example, the *valis* (provincial governors) were weakened in the initial implementation of *Tanzimat* or the Ottomans were so afraid of foreign intervention in the focus area of this study.

The next chapter focuses on the *Tanzimat* as a modernist package. It briefly introduces the logic of *Tanzimat* and how it was implemented in legislative bodies, administrative framework, economy, education, military and rights. Although the *Tanzimat* reforms cover a larger spectrum of thematic areas, these points were selected to focus on as they had been the most relevant ones to the *Vilayet* of Şam.

The third chapter, which is specifically on Lebanon, starts with the period of İbrahim Paşa as this period is very relevant to the conflicts of the *Tanzimat* period. Then, it provides, to the best of its abilities, details on the implementation of the reforms in Mount Lebanon. This chapter, which deals with Mount Lebanon specifically, starts with the area of administrative affairs and continues with the military, rights and sectarian relations, economy and urban politics. It should be mentioned that, as it focuses specifically on the state perspective and the direct impacts of state policies, this chapter leaves the factors that were not controlled directly by the state to the coverage of the next chapter. The interaction of policy

implementation with the society and indirect impacts of the state policies are examples in this sense.

The chapter four, thus, mainly focuses on the society and its transformation during the first sixty years of the 19th century as relevant to the civil conflict. It starts with decline of the traditional classes and continues with state society relations, sectarian relations, effects of economic inequality and the impacts of foreign intervention. This chapter offers the reader a set of analytic tools to understand the reasons of the civil conflict at the level of people and the roles of the state. It should be kept in mind that the chapter three and the chapter four somehow complements each other and show different sides of the same picture.

The last chapter which focuses on the post-civil war period, starts with the direct results of the war in Lebanon and consecutive massacres in Şam in 1860. This point will be discussed in terms of humanitarian losses and the material damage. The chapter continues with the political and economic impacts of the civil war, the arrival of Fuat *Paşa* and his pacifying efforts and ends with the establishment of the *Mutasarrifiate* of Lebanon as it puts an end to a period of civil turmoil and made the political restructuration process of the Mount reach the peak point.

Sources

This study has benefited substantially from some studies on Lebanese politics and history. Maoz's study "Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine" was the most inspiring one and this study shares a significant ground with that study as both this study and Maoz's stimulating findings try to analyze the events in terms of state-society relations and reject a term of identity that is independent of social and political dynamics. The slight difference of the approach of this study with that of Maoz is the emphasis made on the Ottoman mind, the relative coherence of the Empire and the impacts of the developments in other parts of the Empire on Lebanon.

Fawaz's "An Occasion for War" has been another important analysis for this study. In this study, the author makes a significant emphasis on the internal dynamics of the society, particularly on the issues classified, as a unit of analysis, under the relations between the social groups such as the peasant lord relations and the weakening of traditional elites. It also analyses well the different aspects of the

conflict in terms of economic factors inherent in society. However, this study lacks mainly the emphasis on the state policies and their effects, which has been a point this study tries to achieve.

Salibi's "Modern History of Lebanon" seemed to be adopted the approach that this study endeavored to falsify: "identity based conflict". The conflicts had significant social and economic dimensions such as the problems between the lords and the peasants, increasing power of the Maronite clergy, the struggles between Ottoman elite and local political actors, the rise of the Christians in the political, social and economic arenas and reactions to it. However, Salibi generally essentializes the issue to a conflict between different religions rather than regarding it as a result of a complex system of state-society interaction.

Farah's "Politics of Interventionism" has also been a source that is most benefited throughout this study. This book was instrumental in understanding the foreign impact in Lebanon and providing data about the daily development of the political affairs. However, it should be mentioned that, although it enjoys an extremely comprehensive archive research, this study lacks a general theoretic tool to explain the events in Lebanon.

Any study on Lebanon somehow benefits from Hourani's theory of "politics of notables". In this analysis, Hourani explains a specific set of political relations and analyzes the events in a model developed around the Muslim urban notables. In this set of political relations, the Muslim notables had played significant roles in shaping the relations between the state and the society. Although this study does not make reference to his books that much, Hourani's analysis helped much to understand the underlying character of the political framework in Lebanon and thus was significantly instrumental in shaping the model offered in this study.

Khoury's "Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism" is the last source to be incited in this sense. Also following Hourani's notables theory, his analysis somehow reconciles the role of the notables with the political economy of Syria in terms of class relations.

CHAPTER 2

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN 1800-1850

From many aspects, the 19th century has been the most significant period in the Ottoman history. In the area of foreign policy, there was the progress of transition to the “sick man” of Europe. As for the internal politics, she experienced the increasing inability to cope with demands for power in administration at the local level or in some cases, for independence. In the economic area, the increasing power of commercialization and the impact of foreign trade transformed local economies and the societies which, many times, deteriorated the economy. A possible change in the ruling family was even discussed¹. The *Tanzimat* had been a response to this decay and its draft and specific implementation reflected the characteristics of this process. This chapter will shortly analyze this period to demonstrate how the implementation of the reforms was affected from the above mentioned trends.

2.1 Economy

As an issue of key importance to the political processes, economy is the starting point of this chapter. There were two interrelated problem that affected most the political processes in the provinces: the results of increasing powers of localization in the economy and the impact of foreign economic relations.

To start with the decentralization issue, it should be said that this was a significant problem for the Sublime Porte. As the greater part of the production was taking place in the rural areas, the political inability to control these places meant the loss of income for the Ottomans. The state was unable to collect taxes itself and was leaving the job generally to the local governors or notables, which had generally been in form of *iltizam*. The problem of this system had been that these people were

¹ Hakan T.Karateke, “Who is the Next Ottoman Sultan? Attempts to Change the Rule of Succession during the Nineteenth Century,” In *Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration*, by Itzhak Weismann and Fruma Zachs (Eds.) (London: I.B. Tauris and Company, 2005)

keeping the greater part of the income for themselves²³. This method was usually creating political unrest in society and economic impoverishment for the treasury accompanied by the diminishing state control over the society. The obligation of the *mültezims* was to pay a certain portion of their *iltizam* before possessing it and this obligation helped to a rise in the money lending groups such as bankers, money changers and merchants. In this sense, the *iltizam* system behaved as the agent of change in the economy because now the farms were generally adopting a market oriented approach in production⁴. The members of these three groups were also entering the process of lending money to the peasants and involving in the process of sale of crops for their own profit⁵. Now the peasant was able to find money from, and indebted to, a source other than the landlord or other traditional sources. This certainly contributed to the decline of the traditional power holders in Ottoman society⁶. This situation further accelerated the transformation of economy as the pressure of paying more than it had earned, forced the peasant to cultivate for market. They were forced to contemplate supply-demand relations⁷. The role of the illegal *waqfs* further deteriorated the situation as they were reducing the Ottoman control over the economic actors⁸.

Another issue was the foreign economical relations and the foreign commercial relations constitute the best point to start analyzing the economy⁹. When the 19th century of the Ottoman Empire was taken as a whole, it is coherent to say that, there was a significant expansion process in the foreign commercial relations and although there were not any all-out destruction, with the additional impact of low barriers created by the 1838 Agreement, there was gradual process making the Empire became an agricultural products exporter¹⁰. The capitulations increased the damage

² Reşat Kasaba, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Dünya Ekonomisi* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1993), 19.

³ Replacing these people with officials from İstanbul were tried but the results generally had been much worse. For further information see: Sydney Nettleton Fisher, *The Middle East: A History* (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1968), 276.

⁴ Kasaba, 27.

⁵ Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2002), 17.

⁶ This diminishment in their power will be scrutinized in Lebanon. *Ibid.*, 12-13.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁸ Kasaba, 19.

⁹ Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 126-127.

¹⁰ Beinin, Joel. *Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 21; Issawi, C. "Decline of the Ottoman industry in the 1840s." In *The Economic History*

given by the foreigners in the economy¹¹. As the economy was already dominated by small enterprises, the local actors failed to compete with the foreign manufacture and the Empire was becoming kind of an open market¹². The increasing rate of indebtedness was added to this picture. The efforts to pay the debts were so hard that, in some cases, the Sublime Porte was unable to pay even the salary of the officials¹³. However, as there was not an all-out destruction, there is no single example of the effects of the process as different parts of the Empire was effected from this process, including some positive results. The concrete results will be detailed in the following chapters but only for the *Vilayet* of Şam.

The impact of this was the decline of the manufacture and the accompanying decline of guilds which had been social institutions that had already been weakened by the abolition of the “*Yeniçeri Ocağı*”¹⁴. The decline of guilds disrupted the internal equilibrium of the Ottoman society and the ability of the Ottoman government to control it as they were instrumental in reaching the society and its daily life¹⁵. The result had been the diminishment in the role of the small, homemade production. This change in the framework of the economy was causing a shift from male, urban, guild based production to female, unorganized, rural and urban labor¹⁶.

The political mistakes of the Ottomans were also relevant in the political and economic decline. As the products were unable to compete with those from Europe, the actors of the Ottoman economy were not eager to do something on this score.

of the Middle East 1800-1914: A Book of Readings, by Charles Issawi (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 42; Ubicini, M.A. “Letters on Turkey.” In *The Middle East Economy 1800-1914: A Book of Readings*, by M.A. Ubicini, 43-45 (London and Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 43; “Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1839, L.291-295,” In *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914: A Book of Readings*, by Charles Issawi (Great Britain: University of Chicago Press, 1966). It should be said that this expansion remained minor compared to the expansion in world trade as a whole. This means the growing pattern of world trade was independent of the Ottoman Empire and its territories. For further information see Kasaba 42; Küçükkalay, M. *Osmanlı İthalatı: İzmir Gümrüğü 1818-1839* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007), 14-15; Charles Issawi, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Avrupa Ekonomisindeki Yeri (1600-1914) Bazı Gözlemler ve Sorunlar” In *Osmanlı ve Dünya Osmanlı Devleti ve Dünya Tarihindeki Yeri*, by Kemal Karpaz (İstanbul: Ufuk Kitap, 2006).

¹¹ Fisher, 250.

¹² Owen, 9.

¹³ Rodkey, F.S. “Ottoman Concern about Western Economic Penetration in the Levant 1849-1856.” *Journal of Modern History*, (1958): 348-353; Owen 100-101; Belen, M. *Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi Hakkında Tetkikler*, (Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti Yayınları, 1931).

¹⁴ For further information on the relation between the *Yeniçeris* and the guilds, see Quataert, 137-139.

¹⁵ Beinlin, 16-18; Owen, 47. See also M.E. Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East 1792 -1923* (London and New York: Longman Group, 1991), 24-25 for further information.

¹⁶ Quataert 136-139.

They insisted on employing the same ineffective methods and the outdated styles in products. When they tried, many of their efforts proved themselves to be unsuccessful¹⁷. They tried to raise the customs levels but new treaties to protect local producers came only in 1860s¹⁸.

However, beyond the mentioned damage, it should be mentioned that this framework and all these factors changed the institutional factors of economy. To start with, the importance of the region analyzed here was increasing. 23 percent of France's overseas landing between 1852 and 1861 was made in the Arabian *vilayets* of the Empire. The foreign commerce was changing the patterns in the foreign economic relations the Empire, as new institutions were emerging at the financial level. The relative importance of different ports changed, affecting even the settlement patterns of people¹⁹. Furthermore, some regions specialized on the export of certain goods such as the cereal in Syria and silk in Lebanon²⁰.

Thus, the Ottoman Empire was incorporated to the global economy as a dependent region, a supplier of raw material and a consumer of European finished products. These changing patterns produced results even in the legal area as the increase of the commercial relations between local merchants and Europeans gave also a stimulus to conflicts between local actors and Europeans. Such conflicts were influential in the establishment of commercial courts in Syria even during the term of Mehmet Ali *Paşa* and this process continued in the Ottoman period as well²¹.

As the last point, in addition to these conflicts, it should also be said that as a result of the capitulation agreements, the local intermediaries became the key actors in commercial relations between Europe and the Empire. They were assisting to foreign merchants copying the local goods, which was increasing the sales. In addition, they were also instrumental in accessing the interior regions and in

¹⁷ *Feshane* and the paper factory at İzmir are two results. They survived but could not get competitive results. The mentioned interaction between this demand boom and local elements was a significant factor to shape the future developments of the Empire. This will be discussed in a detailed way in the following phases. See also Ubicini, 43-45.

¹⁸ Charles Issawi, "Anglo Turkish Convention of 1838," In *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914: A Book of Readings*, by Charles Issawi (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 38.

¹⁹ Owen, 85.

²⁰ Quataert, 135.

²¹ Owen, 88-90.

generating the credit needed for the expansion of the local trade. The relevance of these groups in the Vilayet of Şam will be scrutinized seperately.

2.2 Politics

Political relations are in a deep relation with the economy and similar to economy, the political arena should also be analyzed in different components. To start with the diplomacy, it should be kept in mind that when the 19th century started, the Ottomans were already suffering military defeats and internal rebellions supported by foreigners²². Together with the increasing influence and interests of foreign powers in the Ottoman lands, the Empire was forced to employ a more active foreign policy²³.

The turning point of this process came as the Crimean War, when the weakness of the Empire was made clear by the Treaty of Paris and its accompaniment, the “*Islahat Fermanı*” which envisaged further rights for the non-Muslim citizens as it was forced by the foreigners rather than stemming from an Ottoman will to enhance the lives of the non-Muslims. As seen in Lebanon, the further rights were a source of resentment for the Muslim.

As for the internal political area, the first point was the increasing power of the notables (*Ayans*) vis-a-vis İstanbul. Varied in origin, the actors of provincial administration gained a kind of a political power in local politics and constituted an intermediary power between İstanbul and local people in daily political issues²⁴.

²² Though in such a scheme, the main motives behind the policy makers in Europe varied, the foreigners were also involved in the modernization process as well and should not be considered merely as a source of problem. This issue will be analyzed seperately with regard to Lebanon.

²³ Albert Hourani, “Modern Ortadoğu'nun Osmanlı Geçmişi,” In *Osmanlı ve Dünya: Osmanlı Devleti ve Dünya Tarihindeki Yeri*, by Kemal Karpaz, 93-117 (İstanbul: Ufuk Kitap, 2006), 103; S. Tufan Buzpınar, “The Question of Caliphate Under the Last Ottoman Sultans,” In *Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration*, by Itzhak Weismann and Zachs Fruma (eds.) (London: I.B. Tauris ve Company, 2005), 18; although not an analytic study, Oral Sander, *Anka'nın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü: Osmanlı Diplomasi Tarihi Üzerine Bir Deneme* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2000) is a good summary of the intense period of diplomatic affairs. See also Arnol J Toynbee, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Dünya Tarihindeki Yeri.” In *Osmanlı ve Dünya: Osmanlı Devleti ve Dünya Tarihindeki Yeri*, by Kemal Karpaz (Ufuk Kitap, 2006) for perception of caliphate by the Christians.

²⁴For the various kinds of notables, and the reasons for their emergence, see Kemal Karpaz, “The Land Regime, Social Structure, and the Modernization in the Ottoman Empire,” In *Beginnings of the Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, by William Polk and Richard Chambers (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 71-77; Kemal Karpaz, “Osmanlı Tarihinin Dönemleri Yapısal bir Karşılaştırmalı Yaklaşım.” In *Osmanlı ve Dünya*, by Kemal Karpaz, 119-145, (İstanbul: Ufuk Kitap, 2000) 135; Roderic Davison, “The Advent of the Principle of

Although they created problems in some cases, the notables were the key people in the well functioning of the system. In fact, they had a vested interest in the system so it was to their advantage to keep their loyalty. Some examples to them can be cited as the Karaosmanoğlus of Western Anatolia; the Jalilis of Mosul, the Azms of Şam and Hama, the Shibabs of Mount Lebanon²⁵.

Another issue was the rebellions which, in addition to the traditional reasons such as taxation or maladministration, took a specific shape with nationalisms, undermining the very foundation of the Empire as a monarchy²⁶. In such a scheme an important issue to be added to the analysis, is the association of foreign powers with local actors, which was, in fact, was not something that was invented in 18th or 19th century. The point is that it started causing problems for the Sublime Porte when the Empire started losing its power, particularly in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. However, the foreign intervention in rebellions was a new concept to the Ottomans, and it was a major factor behind the success of nationalist rebellion in Morea, Serbia and so on. But as it will be more detailedly defended for Lebanon, it is not right to see the foreign powers and their agents as the only source of resentment against the Empire. The impact of the foreigners differed in different parts of the Empire in different parts. In many places, the foreign consuls, rather than causing rebellions, became actors in local politics and economy. In some cases, they were in competition with the local groups whereas in others the notables became client to foreign consuls. As we also see in Lebanon, the rich Christian merchants, were also attached to foreign consuls through the institution of *protege*²⁷. This pattern was also undermining the power of the Ottomans at local level and created unrest in provinces throughout the Empire and many times the reforms were tools to limit foreign

Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire,” In *Beginnings of the modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, by William Polk and Richard Chambers (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1968) 95.

²⁵ Beinin, 9; Karpat, *Osmanlı Tarihinin Dönemleri*, 136-139; Mehrad Kia, *The Ottoman Empire* (Conneticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2008), 101; Kasaba, 53. The examples in Lebanon will be analyzed separately,

²⁶ Eric Jan Zürcher, “The Ottoman Empire 1850-1922- Unavoidable Failure,” [www.transanatolie.com](http://www.transanatolie.com/english/turkey/Turks/Ottomans/ejz31.pdf). <http://www.transanatolie.com/english/turkey/Turks/Ottomans/ejz31.pdf> (accessed 28 02, 2010), 7; Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 51.

²⁷ Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,” In *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, by William R. Polk and Richard L. Chamber (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 67.

intervention, whether to assure the Europeans or to seek alliance²⁸. In this sense, this merchant class who had foreign backing was key to many political processes²⁹. It should also be said that, while the Christians were rising in trade, the Muslims were being pushed to less important sections of the commercial relations, to insignificant jobs and at the end they ceased to be meaningful forces in the economy in many cases. The foreign intervention at the political level and increasing power of the non-Muslims were, to some extent, interrelated. This was a source of hostility in different parts of the Empire as well as many people were regarding the foreign intervention as reason of their status and the decreasing power of the “Muslim” state and see particularly Christians as collaborators³⁰. The specific circumstances of the *Vilayet of Şam* will be analyzed separately.

2.3 Pre-Tanzimat Reforms and Their Consequences

The pre-*Tanzimat* reforms created the first momentum to draw the future course of the reform process and deeply affected the *Tanzimat*. So, it is useful to understand the pre-*Tanzimat* Process to understand the processes aftermath.

Selim III was the first *sultan* to assume a serious westernization initiative and take radical steps when tenuous reforms failed. He was the person who laid the groundwork for the future reforms as his efforts somehow determined the patterns of the future reforms with components in military, navy, education and taxation like building a new army or trying to adopt direct taxation and efforts to create economic source for the reforms³¹. Selim III’s *Nizam-ı Cedid* (the New Order) created kind of the “base” of the reforms by establishing the would-be “men of *Tanzimat*”. The *Nizam-ı Cedid* were supported by some segments of the *ayans*, the people employed by the new bureaucratic institutions and the *sufi* orders whereas the opposers included the rest of the Muslim clergy (*ulema*), those bureaucrats disturbed by the

²⁸ Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları), 170.

²⁹ Although the case in Lebanon is not a nationalist movement, these people were the leaders of the nationalism in the Balkans and their power stemmed from commercialization Keyder, Ç. “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Gerileyişi ve Çöküşü.” *www.scribd.com*. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/238600/Calar-Keyder-Osmanli-mparatorluunun-Gerileyii-ve-Cokuu> (accessed March 5, 2010), 4.

³⁰ Karpas “Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908.” *International Journal of the Middle East Studies*, (July 1972): 249-250.

³¹ Hanioğlu, 42-47; Owen 60.

reforms, some *ayans* whose power was undermined by the centralist policies and particularly the remnants of *Yeniçeri Ocağı*³². The end of his period came with the rebellion of these opposition groups when he was deposed by them. Mahmud II replaced him and built his reforms on the cadre and mechanism created by Selim III.

When he acceded to the throne, Mahmud II had to deal with many troubles such as national rebellions or wars with foreign powers³³. While dealing with these, he adopted a comprehensive but gradual reform program: the *Sened-i İttifak* was followed by opening of western style education institutions and reorganization of the administration in form of the establishment of the ministeries and population censuses. The most important of his reforms was the abolishment of *Yeniçeri Ocağı*, which destroyed the corrupted military forces but also made the army lack its backbone, a significant factor in the inability of handling with the rebellions especially in the Balkans³⁴.

Mahmud II's reforms also had its own shortages and deficiencies but certainly affected the fate of both the Empire and the future reforms considerably. Buzpinar argues that the *Tanzimat* was shaped in part as a reaction to Mahmud II's style of rule, in the sense that in wake of 1839, the power was transferred from the *Sultan-halife* to the Porte because of the failure of the two *Sultans*³⁵. However it is a fact without any doubt that the efforts of these two *Sultans* ignited the modernist reform process and created the motivation and the cadre that will further the aim of reforming the Empire.

The results of these pre-*Tanzimat* reforms showed their reflections in Serbian, Greek and Mehmet Ali *Paşa* rebellions. In all these cases, the processes were affected by the reform process and show similarities to Lebanon. For example in Serbia, the lost status of the sharecroppers, who became serfs on their own lands and treatment of local officials to them were two important sources of resentment when

³² Buzpinar, 34-35; Goldschmidt, Arthur, and Lawrance Davidson. *A Concise History of the Middle East*. (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 2006), 175; Kia, 102; Owen, 58.

³³ Davison, Roderic. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire: 1856-1876* (New York: Gordian Press, 1973), 23.

³⁴ For the negative results of Mahmud II and reactions to his policies see (Fisher 1968, 280; Owen, 61-62; Buzpinar, 23-24 and M.Sicker, *The Islamic World in Decline : From the Treaty of Karlowitz to the Disintegration of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Praeger Publisher, 2001), 126.

³⁵ Buzpinar, 24.

the rebellion broke out in 1804³⁶. In the Greek rebellion, as we will see in Lebanon as well, the Church was an important factor both in the development of Greek nationalism and the Greek state³⁷. Similar to the the case in Syria, the leaders of Greek movement were rich merchants or the newly emerged intellectuals, rather than aristocracy or *ayans*³⁸. Another similar point is that, what made the Greek revolt successful, actually, was the intervention of the foreign powers that showed a great sympathy to the “struggle for the liberation”³⁹.

The rebellion of Mehmet Ali was the strongest one in capacity and effect. He was a reformist governor seeking independence and his reforms were very similar to the ones conducted in the Empire⁴⁰. His reforms in Egypt included education, military, agriculture, industry, bureaucracy and many other aspects of the state administration and social life. In 1811, all Mamluks were destroyed; to deprive the *ulema* of their principal source of power, the waqfs were abolished. Most privately owned land was put under state control, thereby wiping out the tax farmers and rural aristocrats and causing the emergence of big landholders. New reforms and technics in agriculture was introduced including credits given to peasants. Efforts towards industrialization were introduced including machinery imports and new educational institutions on military, chemistry, veterianary and engineering were established. The reforms was accompanied by significant military successes as by the end of 1832 he was ruling most of the Fertile Crescent and it was his forces that saved the Ottomans in Greek revolt⁴¹.

However, after the intense diplomatic and military struggles after the Greek war, his forces were destroyed and the reform process was significantly stopped. But although he failed at the end, he was so close to independence and his policies

³⁶ Kia, 105-106; Hanioglu, 51-53.

³⁷ Fisher, 270. However, different from Lebanon, the Greek church rejected the riot. An interesting example is the fact that it rejected granting the statue of saint tho those died in the revolt for a long time. İlber Ortaylı, “Tanzimat Döneminde Balkanlarda Ulusal Kiliseler ve Rum Ortodoks Kilisesi,” In *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İktisadi ve Sosyal Değişim: Makaleler I*, by İlber Ortaylı, 285-290 (Ankara: Turhan Yayıncılık, 2000), 286.

³⁸ Kasaba, 32.

³⁹ William McNeill, “Dünya Tarihinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu,” In *Osmanlı ve Dünya: Osmanlı Devleti ve Dünya Tarihindeki Yeri*, by Kemal Karpat (İstanbul: Ufuk Kitap, 2006), 58; Fisher, 270-271.

⁴⁰ Although Mehmet Ali was an Ottoman governor in essence, he was independent in reality so it is not inconsistent to speak as if Egypt was independent from the Sublime Porte in the period under analysis.

⁴¹ Fisher, 285; Cleveland 66-68; Hanioglu 173-174; Owen 66-67.

significantly shaped the future period of the events in the Middle East. Regarding his political efforts, there were two more important points for our subject. First, the power of Mehmet Ali *Paşa* and the fact that his highly possible independence was prevented only by foreign intervention, created a specific set of idea in the mind of the Ottomans: “to prevent the emergence of such new strong *Paşas*”. The other point for the subject of this thesis is the fact that he also governed Lebanon and left substantial impacts which will be scrutinized separately later⁴².

⁴²For further information on Mehmed Ali Paşa and his policies, see Kia, 111; Hanioglu, 173-174; Owen, 66-76; William Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 2004), 66-73.

CHAPTER 3

TANZİMAT MODERNIZATION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Taken as a document, the uniqueness of *Tanzimat Fermanı*, lies only under the fact that it somehow was the first initiative led by the newly educated bureaucratic strata, or as it is called by Shaw, “*the men of Tanzimat*”, to realize their ideal of a “modern” state which found its reflections in the specific promises she covered: kind of a liberal economy, the security of life, property and honour accompanied by a just and fixed taxation, a regular system of military conscription and most remarkably religious equality and the passage to a rule by the centralized bureaucracy⁴³. The ultimate aim, however, was to prevent the dismemberment of the Empire⁴⁴.

To achieve all these points, “the Men of *Tanzimat*” adopted a comprehensive program in a wide spectrum covering administrative issues, economy, education, military, judiciary affairs and rights of people.

3.1 *Tanzimat* in Administration and State Society Relations

The most important component of the *Tanzimat* package was the public administration because the Sublime Porte was having significant problems in the provincial administration. The centralization was regarded as the cure and was set as the base of the new understanding of state. However, the Ottoman mind was twofold: although the centralization was the principal objective, locality and word to the local

⁴³ Davison, *Reform*, 40; Buzpinar, 25; Quataert 2000, 64; Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel K. Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 58; Stanford Shaw, “Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reformers,” In *Beginnings of the Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, by William Polk and Richard Chambers, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 36-37; Dominic Lieven, “Dilemmas of Empire 1850-1918. Power, Territory, Identity,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, no. 2 (April 1999).

⁴⁴ İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003) 14; Karpas, *Transformation*, 70.

people in the provincial administration was included in the target list. This means the plan was to eliminate possible rebellions on one hand and to win the loyalty of the people on the other⁴⁵.

The initial strategy was to weaken the governors through giving its powers to officials nominated by, and responsible to, İstanbul. First, tax collectors with fixed salaries sent by and responsible to İstanbul (*muhasıls*) were introduced in 1840; the second phase in the plan was re-drawing the *sancaks* to be comparable in population and wealth and subdividing them into *nahiyes*, the third component was the establishment of assemblies that will comprise the representatives of the ruling class. These were all to prevent the emergence of a new Mehmet Ali Paşa case⁴⁶. This policy continued, to some extent, until 1858, when the governor was given significant rights.

The last point, is what may be called, the rise of the state in social life in the sense that the state tried to assume services that were traditionally offered by local notables; which certainly was bound to undermine the social basis of the notables. The extent of success on this score varied in different areas but the very fact that the nature of *Tanzimat* and centralization was in conflict with the notables' power produced significant results, also in *Vilayet* of Şam.

3.2 *Tanzimat* in Economic Affairs

As the administrative efforts to create a “modern” state were underway, economic reforms accompanied them. The *Tanzimat* leaders started with amending the institutional framework, particularly by reorganizing the Ministry of Finance and the establishment of the Ministry of Trade. However, the crucial point was to change the taxation system as particularly the tax-farming was causing significant economic and political problems for the Ottoman administration and economy. For this reason, establishing a more efficient tax system was one of the most important tenets of the reform package. The first changes regarding taxation took place in 1839. All the traditional taxes except the sheep tax and poll tax were abolished together with the *iltizam* system and a profit tax was levied for the merchants and artisans. the new

⁴⁵ Davison, *Reform*, 46.

⁴⁶ Shaw and Shaw, 84.

taxes were to be collected by salaried state officials. In 1847, the terms of tax farms was extended to five years in return for some provisions to protect cultivators⁴⁷.

However, to abolish *iltizam* through replacing it by the direct taxation, something needed for *Tanzimat*'s political and economic targets, and the other reforms in taxation failed⁴⁸. The tax revenues declined and the new system was proved to be inefficient that in 1840, the *mukata* (tax farming system or rights to collect taxes for two year terms) was employed again⁴⁹. It should be confessed that the political developments, particularly the Crimean war, was the reason for the failure and in time exacerbated the expenditure-income balance and became a factor for the failure of the tax reforms. In 1858, following the foreign loan during the war, new reforms was introduced. The ministry of Finance was reorganized, the annual budget system was introduced, a new census was performed, a new property tax (*arazi ve müssakafat vergisi*) was levied to be accompanied by “*temettuat vergisi*” imposed on people engaged in commerce industry and trade.⁵⁰

Furthermore, as the reforms in the industrial area such as opening new factories failed, the efforts to promote agriculture also proved themselves to be unsuccessful⁵¹. As the *timar* system was already disrupted and the efforts to regularize land holding failed, the liberal land reform was needed to increase the tax revenues. In 1841 and 1847, the first liberal regulations were made when deeds were given to the lands that were under personal use⁵².

The monetary policy was also problematic, new standardized gold and silver coins at fixed rates were introduced⁵³. In 1844, “*Usul-i Cedide Üzere Taksim-i Ayar Kararnamesi*” fixed the value of golden money and stipulated that it was going to be stamped only in İstanbul, in *Darphane-i Âmire*⁵⁴.

The climax was the 1858 Land Code which transferred the *miri* lands to private property. The 1858 Code aimed at regularization of the taxation, registering who was going to be responsible for the tax of a specific land and at protecting the

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 96.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 95.

⁴⁹ Hanioglu, 69; Shaw and Shaw, 97.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 97.

⁵¹ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, 203; Owen, 62.

⁵² Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, 214-216; Owen, 62.

⁵³ Hanioglu, 70.

⁵⁴ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, 134.

state lands⁵⁵. It was the first attempt of the *Tanzimat* leaders to consolidate their victory over the old holders of the power by supporting the new middle class against the notables. However, the result of the 1858 Land Code had been the strengthening of wealthy individuals controlling large estates. The leaders of *Tanzimat* generally supported this trend and further encouraged the improvement of the new wealthy class particularly to increase the volume of the agricultural production and to diminish the power of notables⁵⁶. This pattern was directly seen in Lebanon.

Another economic point to discuss is the efforts towards achieving a better management in foreign commerce. As been mentioned, from many aspects *Tanzimat* somehow favored a free trade despite its crowding out effects⁵⁷. Particularly with the 1856 Decree, significant rights were granted to the foreigners such as the right to be involved in mining and land disposal, many of which were already used by the foreigners. What was made by the decree was only to register the existing situation⁵⁸.

Accompanied by above mentioned factors, efforts towards industrialization precipitated the decline of the traditional craft industries and guilds; new factories were founded outside the conventional production centres, away from the influence of the guilds. During the era of Abdülmecit, technicians and machines were imported from Europe in addition to the foreign private initiative in the Ottoman lands. Many of the newly built factories were producing clothing and headgear in addition to the army factories and the glass factory⁵⁹. When particularly the non-Muslim merchants gained success in the Balkans, it was contrary to the Ottoman interests⁶⁰.

From many aspects, the economic success of the *Tanzimat* reforms remained limited but at the last analysis it helped a new economy system based on commerce to flourish and the new urban middle class such as artisans, moneylenders and merchants develop⁶¹.

⁵⁵ Davison, *Reform*, 99.

⁵⁶ Shaw and Shaw, 114-115.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 122.

⁵⁸ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, 219-220.

⁵⁹ Shaw and Shaw, 122-123.

⁶⁰ Kasaba, 30.

⁶¹ Shaw and Shaw, 123.

3.3 *Tanzimat* in Education

Although the imperial education was not mentioned explicitly in the decree, the *Tanzimat* leaders also made reforms on education⁶². Due to the fact that the Empire was trying to transform itself to a modern state based on nationality, education was the primary instrument to make people embrace the new ideology of the state⁶³. Different from its antecedents, the target groups of the *Tanzimat* reforms were the civilians in principal.

To start with, new institutions emerged. New schools that were going to teach in Turkish were going to be founded like the Council of Education (*Meclis-i Maarif*) was established in 1846 and in 1857 it became the Ministry of Education (*Maarif Nezareti*). The Council of Knowledge (*Encümen-i Daniş*) was created in 1851 with the leading political and administrative figures of the period⁶⁴. The civilian education system changed significantly when elementary schools were made compulsory and many important institutions such as *Mekteb-i Sultani* (*Galatasaray* Lycee) or *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* were established⁶⁵. The momentum also found its reflection in technical schools with *Ziraat Mektebi* (School of Agriculture) in 1847 and *Orman Mektebi* (Forestry School) in 1857⁶⁶.

This motivation also found its reflection in the Military education. In 1844 *Baytar Mektebi* (Veterinary School), *İdare-i Harbiye Mektebi* and *Erkan-ı Harb Mektebi* were opened. From 1845 onwards, experts were invited from Prussia and France and particularly with the arrival of refugees from Poland and Hungary the reforms gained a significant success in terms of the quality of education although the enrolment rates remained low⁶⁷. These can also be linked to the military reforms.

⁶² Karal, 181.

⁶³ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, 185-186.

⁶⁴ Actually this was going to be made a meaningful change only for the Muslim citizens of the Sublime Porte. The *zimmis* had already completed this phase through the prevalent modern schools. The Muslims were principally preferring military or technical education following the primary school see Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, 186-187. Interestingly the reforms included the simplification in language, elimination of the Arabic and Persian words and reform in the alphabet. In 1855 a Decree was issued envisaging that the official documents would be written in simpler Turkish, see Shaw and Shaw, 106-129 for further information.

⁶⁵ Hanioglu, 102.

⁶⁶ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, 186-187.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 136.

3.4 *Tanzimat* in the Military Affairs

Tanzimat in the military was the locomotive of the new reform process. For the conservatism was too strong, many times the only way to continue with the reforms was to integrate them to the military. This is why the first medical and engineering schools were component of military⁶⁸.

The most important reform of the *Tanzimat* leaders regarding the military was the change in the recruitment system. The military service now was considered a service for the homeland (*vatan*) and the recruitment was going to be obligatory regardless of the religion of the subjects. The justice was also promised in the recruitment process⁶⁹.

However, in practice, equality in recruitment could not be achieved and in 1845, the non-Muslims were allowed to be exempt from the military service by paying “*bedel-i askeri*.” In 1857 a simple military service tax was imposed on non-Muslims who were liable to conscription so that they were exempted from the conscription⁷⁰. Similarly compulsory recruitment remained a problem.

To support the reforms in provincial administration, the military was also reorganized being divided into provincial commands each under the command of a field marshal (*müşir*) appointed by and responsible to İstanbul. Totally there were five armies (*ordu*): *Hassa Ordusu*, *Dersaadet Ordusu*, *Rumeli Ordusu*, *Anadolu Ordusu* and *Arabistan Ordusu* based in Şam (in charge of Syria, Cilia, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula.) In 1849 a sixth army based at Baghdad was founded for Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula⁷¹. The reforms in the army was completed with further reforms on rights.

3.5 *Tanzimat* in Rights and Judiciary Affairs

As for the rights of the people, then the most debated component of the reform package, *Tanzimat* had its own characteristic and aims. As a modernist body, the *Tanzimat* state was going to try to intervene more directly in the social life of the people. She introduced equality between Muslims and Christians, directly or

⁶⁸ Kia, 115.

⁶⁹ Karal, 178-179.

⁷⁰ Shaw and Shaw, 100.

⁷¹ Shaw and Shaw, 85.

indirectly adopting kind of a human rights concept⁷². The aim was to reduce the foreign intervention and ensure the loyalty of the non-Muslims.

The idea in principal was to make a transition to an administration based on universal laws. This was necessitating a change from individual *millets* based on religions to the concept of “Ottomanism”, a term based on secular bonds of citizenship. This “Ottoman” concept was going to replace the old distinctions between Muslims and non-Muslims as the *Gülhane* Decree was an expression of this intent. To further the religious equality, the death penalty that was imposed to those who converted from *İslam* to other religions, was abandoned in 1844. Additionally, new codes that reconcile existing legal system with Principles of *Gülhane* Decree were going to be issued such as 1840, 1851 and 1858 penal codes and *Mecelle* (civil code)⁷³. In 1850 the Supreme Council declared that there would be no religion based difference in the army. The Christians had the right even to be officers, which both sides were not eager to implement and was not implemented to a meaningful extent⁷⁴.

In 1856, another reform decree was declared. This time there was a greater emphasis on ensuring equality before the law, right to be state officer without any limit of religion, making army a service for the “*vatan*”. In addition, the liberal ideas of the West started to be circulated within the Empire, the studies of such famous authors as Montesquieu and Rousseau were translated to Turkish and all these further empowered the newly emerged debates in line with the liberal ideas.

The reforms in rights were completed with amendments in judiciary affairs aiming at establishing the tribunal system that will prevent the intervention of the Europeans. The *Dar-ı Şura-yı Bab-ı Ali* (the Advisory Council for the Porte) was authorized to prepare the drafts of forthcoming laws in addition to analyzing and reaching settlements regarding all the problems about *Tanzimat*⁷⁵. It was also going to deal with the complaints of the non-Muslim subjects which used to be submitted

⁷² Shimon Shamir, “The Modernization of Syria: Problems and Solutions in the Early Tanzimat Period of Abdülhamid,” In *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, by William Polk and Richard Chambers (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 351; Karal, 193-194; Ubicini, 162.

⁷³ Hanioglu, 74.

⁷⁴ Davison, *Reform*, 45.

⁷⁵ Shaw and Shaw, 76-78; Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, 148.

by the Patriarchate⁷⁶. In addition, mixed tribunals were founded to deal with the commercial and criminal conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims and mixed councils for the cases regarding civil affairs⁷⁷. All these courts were established to enforce laws and were to be put under the general heading of “*mahkeme*” later⁷⁸.

⁷⁶ Karal, 172.

⁷⁷ Shaw and Shaw, 108; Ubicini, 172-180.

⁷⁸ Davison, *Reform*, 98; Karal, 174-175; Shaw and Shaw, 118.

CHAPTER 4

TANZİMAT AND THE POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE VİLAYET OF ŞAM

One of the aims of this study is to show that all these mentioned points that were experienced in other parts of the Empire proved themselves relevant regarding the *Vilayet* of Şam. The growing volume of foreign trade created kind of a merchant class these people, who were generally Christians having role in the commercial relations with the West, and was to the contrary of the interests of the traditionally privileged classes whether they were Maronites or Druzes. The traditional classes were losing their role in trade which was decreasing their power as the moneylenders who were generally Christians and Jews also rising in the cities and the peasants could borrow money from them⁷⁹. As a result, the Maronites became the principal actor in wealth creating foreign commerce and increased their income, changing the sectarian balance. On the other hand, those groups who were engaged in foreign commerce rose in the economic and social life. The *Tanzimat* bureaucrats generally supported these groups vis-a-vis the traditional notables. As for the traditional leaders of the society, it is also possible to say, in regard of Lebanon and Syria, that some of the traditional leaders kept their power.

Particularly to the end of the 1850s, with the effect of the economic developments and the 1858 Land Code, another more specific transformation started taking place: the weakening of the Damascene Muslim notables. Some notables for the first time lost their roles in the administration which caused their resentment against the reforms. Although they strengthened their role as the intermediary between state and society, the community still lacked an efficient leadership and this was increasing the disorder⁸⁰.

As for the services, the new age opened new doors particularly for the education. The modern education now was the core of the society but the state was

⁷⁹ Fawaz, 23-26.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 26.

not able to address all the demands. The vacuum was filled mainly by the missionary schools and in the special case of Lebanon and its adjacent geography this was also a factor in the rise of the Christians in the social life. They were the ones who had been better educated and this helped them to rise in the bureaucracy. These missionary schools also created a social mobility because among the students of them there were people of lower origins.

All these, changed the daily life as well in the form of a change in the tastes. In many aspects of life, the European style were adopted and the locally produced products were replaced by the European made products or local manufactures made in the European sense. This transformation, mainly in trade towns further damaged the economy⁸¹.

The rest of the study will try to analyze these points to show that *Tanzimat* had deeply affected the specific set of relations in Lebanon. However, as they are very important to the *Tanzimat* period, pre-*Tanzimat* events will also be analyzed briefly.

4.1 Lebanon before *Tanzimat*

4.1.1 Lebanon Before 1831

In fact, Lebanon has always been a problematic region for the governors of the Empire even before the *Tanzimat*. Throughout the ambitious reform periods of Selim III and Mahmud II, the Mount Lebanon (*Cebel-i Lübnan*) had been generally neglected. The Ottoman administration in Lebanon was loose and based on using balance of power within the local groups. This case of affairs in the government empowered the local dynasties such as Azms and Shibabs. These people kept the city centers in a tolerable order, away from the attacks of the Bedouin tribes, which were giving them a moral support and the loyalty of the people. However, in the rural areas, there was a significant lack of security as particularly the mountainous regions were experiencing autonomous rules. Until 1831, the Ottomans pursued this pattern of government and generally avoided from involving in the affairs of the Lebanon. Mahmud II's attempts achieved some progress but the success in Rumelia, Anatolia

⁸¹For detailed information on the daily lives of the people in Syria and particularly in Lebanon see Schilcher, 161 and Chasseaud.

or later in Iraq and Kurdistan were not reached in Syria where most districts continued to be governed by rebellious or autonomous governors. The mountainous regions, Mount Lebanon, Cebel Druze, Cebel al-Ansariyya, Cebel al-Nablus and those around Jerusalem continued to be governed by local chieftains. A fierce struggle was taking place between the local elements and Ottoman *Paşas* to govern the region. These struggles were accompanied by popular uprisings against the Ottoman administration in the initial years of 1800s. In 1814 a popular uprising deprived the powerful Celaledin *Paşa* of his power, which was followed by that of 1819. In 1825, playing to the power balances in the region, Bashir Shibab declared that he converted to Christianity with an aim to gain the support of the Christians in crushing the Druze rioters⁸². A similar uprising took place in Şam⁸³. These uprisings generally targeted the governor or the *mültezims* who exerted much money from them. The local elements also contributed to this mess. Convened around traditional struggle patterns such as clan, kinship, tribe or sect, various local elements fought each other⁸⁴. In addition to being involved in a bloody warfare, they were also destructing local economy and commerce. The state was also not successful in the economic area. In addition to the previously mentioned economic problems in the Empire at large, public works were generally neglected while the people were suffering under heavy taxation⁸⁵.

4.1.2 The Period of İbrahim Paşa

İbrahim *Paşa* was the son of Mehmed Ali *Paşa* of Egypt, the Ottoman *vali* who was the primary source of fear for the Ottomans in the eastern territories and famous with his centralist reforms in Egypt. Within such a scheme, İbrahim's arrival in Lebanon in 1831 marks a new phase in the political history of Lebanon. Capitalizing on the advantage of having enough military power, he introduced centralist reforms, made a re-organization in the administration abolishing the *Paşaliks* and put the whole Syria and Palestine region under a single ruler

⁸² Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of the Modern Lebanon* (London: Ann Arbor, 2007), 9-11.

⁸³ Similar events also took place in Tripoli, Palestine and Jerusalem several times.

⁸⁴ Surely this relative isolation, should not be regarded as self sufficiency. Even the Mount, the most isolated from the world outside. It has its own political and commercial ties. What we talk about here is a struggle between the state and society to assume the governmental power (Fawaz 1994, 8).

⁸⁵ Moshe Maoz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861: The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 1-10.

(*hükümdar*). His arrival also created the first conflict between the Druzes and Maronites when Druzes fought against the Maronites who supported İbrahim Paşa's arrival⁸⁶.

Following the early months of his arrival, Mehmet Ali and his son İbrahim Paşa, employed a fourfold policy: he levied *ferde* (personal tax) on all men and made all the other existing taxes more efficient, recruited troops from the coastal regions, including those from the Christians, disarmed the population and monopolized silk production, mainly to finance and strengthen the army, which by 1836 covering a number between 40000 and 60000 and 90000 in 1839⁸⁷.

Another marking development was the flourishing international economy. The process brought increase in the coming ships from 256 in 1830 to 500 during the first nine months of 1833. Exports from the town doubled in value between the years 1833 and 1838⁸⁸. During the reign of İbrahim, Beirut also became a commercial centre⁸⁹.

His reforms introduced many good values such as safety, justice in taxation, representation and equality as his centralist approach to the government also deprived the local notables of their power, not peacefully many times. However, his reforms cannot be summarised without its social effects, which created new sources of conflict within Lebanon and started the transformation that will accelerate during the *Tanzimat* period. To speak generally, there were mainly two reasons of the rebellions during this period: the *ferde* tax, which was causing a significant burden on the people, and the military recruitment.

The policies in this period also created tensions between Christians and Muslims. Using the advantages peculiar to them, the Christians benefited more from the religious equality and freedom. During the reign of İbrahim, nearly all distinctions between the Druzes and Maronites were abolished. The Maronites were allowed to take any role in the statecraft. They gained more representation in the

⁸⁶ Caesar E.Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon 1830-1861* (London and New York: Centre for Lebanese Studies & I.B.Tauris, 2000), 14.

⁸⁷ Owen, 77; Farah, 22.

⁸⁸ Owen, 80.

⁸⁹ Antonius Amenuy, *Notes from the Life of a Syrian* (London: Alfred W.Bennett, 5 Bishopsgate Without, 1860), 13; Philip Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 16.

assemblies and social life, higher posts in the public administration and became richer, in addition to still being exempt from the conscription. They were also able to operate in some commercial areas that were traditionally allocated to the Muslims and they were the main benefitor of the increasing commercial relations⁹⁰.

He gained a significant success in establishing stronger controls over the urban notables and especially the religious establishment. For example the religious court system was contained with issues related to personal situations; by placing the charitable endowments under direct government supervision, he also drained a significant source of their income. The new *meclis* system did not give them equal representation and he was not opposed to arresting or executing the religious notables⁹¹. However, all these produced their reaction. The biggest attempt against the rule of İbrahim started with a Druze revolt in Houran, spreading to Biqa and Wadi al-Taym soon. Particularly Houran was taking a significant amount of Druze immigration in 1830s as well⁹². To counter the Druzes, İbrahim distributed arms to Christians and by the end of the year 1838, he had fifteen thousand armed men. The Druzes were defeated by their Christian neighbours but rebellions against his rule continued. Afraid of a possible Christian participation to the rebellions, İbrahim asked Bashir to disarm them which put them in rebellion⁹³.

İbrahim Paşa's reign had been successful from many aspects but on the whole he was an oppressor and his policies produced significant reactions of the people, which will last even after his reign ended. An interesting point with this is the fact that this set of affairs not only changed sectarian relations but also intra sectarian relations. The armament of the peasant gave it a relative power and moral supremacy over the lords for the first time in history of the region⁹⁴. As for the sectarian relations it also should be mentioned that the armed Christian militia was an

⁹⁰ C. Churchill, *The Druzes and Maronites under Turkish Rule: from 1840 to 1860* (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1862), 29; Kemal Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Widenfield and Nicolson Publications, 1968), 30; David Dean Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 11.

⁹¹ Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 16.

⁹² George Washington Chasseaud, *The Druzes of Lebanon: Their Manners, Customs and History: With a Translation of Their Religious Code* (London: Richard Bently, 1855), 306.

⁹³ Traboulsi, 13.

⁹⁴ Marwan Buheiry, "The Peasant Revolt of 1858 in Mount Lebanon: Rising Expectations, Economic Malaise and the Incentive to Arm," In *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, by Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: The American University of Beirut, 1984), 295-298.

innovation for the region. This also changed the terms of the events for the future periods particularly in terms of the sectarian relations⁹⁵.

In addition, the tensions between Christians and Muslims were also to some extent a result of his policies⁹⁶. However, more specifically, his reign was to the disadvantage of Muslims. The recruitment took the young people away, they could not gain any favour enjoyed by the Maronites, upon their revolt, İbrahim sent many Druze leaders exile and the Druze families were dispersed. Their properties were damaged in their absence while the Christians became more prosperous. Bashir II also confiscated the properties of the Druze families and dispersed them between the Christians⁹⁷. As his policies were harmful to both sects, it was not a coincidence that people preferred Ottoman rule to that of İbrahim⁹⁸.

The policies of Bashir II must be mentioned here as well as it deeply affected the future course of the affairs in Lebanon. *Emir* Bashir Shibab, a Maronite, always considered the Druzes an important component of society and tried to keep the Druze power under his authority. Some Druze lords were paid significant amounts of money but for those who insisted on resisting, the precautions were not so peaceful as his policies many times created tensions between the two important sects⁹⁹. He first, selected the *mukatacis* among the Maronites instead of Druze feudals¹⁰⁰. As many Druze notables were sent to exile, the Maronites were also able to confiscate the property of the Druze families. As will be mentioned the claims over the ownership of the territory created significant hostilities when the exiled notables returned their territories. When the Druzes revolted, again the armed Maronites were the ones who suppressed them¹⁰¹. Makdisi argues that the sides adopted systematic

⁹⁵ Charles A. Frazee, *Catholics and Sultans: The Church and the Ottoman Empire 1453-1923* (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 276-277.

⁹⁶ Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), 21.

⁹⁷ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 47-48.

⁹⁸ Fawaz, 94.

⁹⁹ Churchill, *The Druzes and Maronites*, 26; Colonel Charles Henry Churchill, *Mount Lebanon: A Ten Years' Residence from 1842 to 1852 Describing the Manners, Customs and Religion of its Inhabitants with A Full and Correct Account of the Druze Religion and Containing Historical Records of the Mountain Tribes*. Vol. 2. 3 vols. (London: Saunders and Otley, 1853), 286.

¹⁰⁰ Farah, 4.

¹⁰¹ Erdoğan Keleş, "Cebel-i Lübnan'da İki Kaymakamlı İdari Düzenin Uygulanması ve 1850 Tarihli Nizamnâme," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 27, no. 43 (2008): 133.

killing during the sectarian conflicts in the period under analysis to ultimately fix this problem by reducing the population and killing the notables¹⁰². Upon the departure of Bashir Shibab, any property bought with that money was declared illegal¹⁰³. He also was the first person to elevate the lower Maronite clergy in the social system¹⁰⁴. In this sense, as Fawaz argued, his policies also helped to transform the empowerment of the Maronites to sectarian hatred. When he damaged the Druze leadership and weakened Maronite *mukatacis* replacing them with the clergy, people regarded these efforts of consolidating leadership as sectarian policy¹⁰⁵. In this sense, the rule of Ibrahim and Bashir II somehow sowed the crisis between sects¹⁰⁶.

The arrival of the Ottomans reflected this pattern. With the start of the second conflict with the Sublime Porte, Ibrahim ordered complete disarmament of the Maronites and Druzes. *Emir* Bashir Shibab, loyal to his alliance with Mehmet Ali, implemented the orders. In a short period of time a new riot broke out. The coalition forces proved themselves soon to come and the Ottoman control over Lebanon was once again established¹⁰⁷.

When they arrived, the Ottomans distributed arm to people, left the countryside to the control of the Bedouins promised tax exemptions and sometimes the officials of the Sublime Porte promoted anti-Christian feelings among the Druzes, undermining the future of the reforms¹⁰⁸. In the continuing periods, the Sublime Porte was going to try to impose a new system similar to that of Ibrahim under the name of *Tanzimat*, which constituted contradiction with early *Tanzimat* period policies.

¹⁰² Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: The University of California Press, 2000), 139.

¹⁰³ Churchill, *Mount Lebanon*, 286.

¹⁰⁴ Farah, 13.

¹⁰⁵ Fawaz, 19.

¹⁰⁶ Charles Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 25.

¹⁰⁷ Frazee, 276-277.

¹⁰⁸ Moshe Maoz, "The Impact of Modernization on Syrian Politics and Society during the Early Tanzimat Period," In *The Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, by William Polk and Richard Chambers (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 334; Edmund Bosworth, "The Land of Palestine in Late Ottoman Period as Mirrored in Western Guide Books," *Bulletin (The British Society for Middle Eastern Studies)* 13, no. 1 (1986):37.

As for the economical relations of Syria, as relevant and the foreign commercial relations of the region the first issue is that, the economy of Syria had not been an isolated region in terms of commercial relations. There had always been a flourished commercial system which had local, international and regional aspects. However, with the 19th century, we talk about the increasing power of the international commercial relations of the region and, because, as mentioned, the period under analysis had been the era of the integration to the world economy for the Empire at large and of course Syria had its own role within the bigger scheme of the Empire. The 1830s, brought the long distance trade with long distance navigation which damaged the caravan trade. Thus, during the 1840s, the foreign commerce to a large extent gained prominence over the local and regional trade kinds¹⁰⁹. International trade was largely dominated by the imports or re-export of goods imported from Europe.

Generally European manufactured goods were imported in exchange for Middle Eastern raw materials. A small exception to this pattern was the export of small quantities of Syrian cotton thread and cloth sold to France¹¹⁰. Main products were wheat, cereals like maize and sorghum were grown only in certain areas like Mount Lebanon and northern Palestine. Houran worthed particular mention in this sense as it generally produced high quality wheat and barley and these were subjected to export trade. In addition, considerable specialization in cultivation of cash crops was achieved. Other cash crops included olive oil in Beirut and the coastal districts in southern areas, indigo in the Beisan valley in Palestine, rice and grapes in Druze regions of Mount Lebanon¹¹¹. Certainly there was a specific trend in the economy and the share of European commerce in Middle Eastern commerce was increasing at a rapid rate. By 1836-1838, over half of the trade of Egypt and Syria was realized with the Europeans. Owen, citing the trade figures of Şam, says that, "the goods arriving from the East were worth twice as much as those from the Mediterranean

¹⁰⁹ Dominique Chevallier, "Western Development and Eastern Crisis in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Syria Confronted with the European Economy," In *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, by William, Chambers, Richard Polk (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 205.

¹¹⁰ Owen, 51.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* 29-30.

Coast, by 1833 this margin had shrunk to 30 percent". This resulted in increasing outflow of golds and species in the trade relations with the Europe¹¹².

Another issue is the effects of the 1838 trade agreement which symbolically marked another phase in the economic history of the region. The 1838 agreement abolished the customs duties for the foreign goods and within a short period of time the foreign goods flooded the region. Surely this happened gradually: during the 1840s as the customs duties were abolished step by step but in general the picture did not change¹¹³. In historical sequence, the first sector to be affected was the cloth industry, the strongest industrial production in the region, which was facing the cheap cotton goods of the European factories¹¹⁴.

On the whole, when the results of the arrival of the Ottomans are scrutinized, it should be said that the strong and oppressive rule of İbrahim was replaced by much less efficient Ottoman administration and the region returned to its old days. The corruption increased, the rule and order lost its efficiency and the Christians were insulted even in public places¹¹⁵. The Ottomans started implementing Tanzimat policies on this basis.

4.2 The Implementation of *Tanzimat* in Lebanon

As the reform package itself varied in different areas, the implementation found its reflection in different points. In each area, the *Tanzimat* policies took a specific form, in some cases away from the intended version, and entered in a significant interaction with the framework mentioned above, strengthening the unintended transformation created by İbrahim in some cases and reversing it back in the others.

4.2.1 *Tanzimat* in Administration of Lebanon

One of the primary aims of the new administrative system was to bring centralization to the Arabian *vilayets* where generally the city centers were held under control and the urban areas were left to the sovereignty of local notables. The control of Syria was particularly important for the Sublime Porte because of its

¹¹² *Ibid.* 97.

¹¹³ Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 176-178.

¹¹⁴ Chevallier, 209.

¹¹⁵ Churchill, *The Druzes and Maronites*, 34-35.

location and the specific mood of the Ottomans: On the one side, the European territories were under threat due to the rebellions and on the other side, in the Arabian *vilayets*, there was the case of Egypt who sought independency under the leadership of Mehmet Ali. The Ottomans were trying to prevent further dismemberments. All the policies on the ground served this aim although they sometimes resulted to the contrary. Furthermore, Şam, in this sense, was an important center as the starting point of the pilgrimage¹¹⁶. The *Vilayet* of Şam had a governor of ministerial rank and imperial troops. In fact, Şam, together with Cairo and Aleppo, was among the territories that had been tried to be controlled directly by the Ottomans even before the arrival of *Tanzimat*'s centralist policies¹¹⁷. Now, to establish direct rule in Mount, would serve both the aims of the Ottomans at the imperial level and achieve tranquility in the region as it was regarded as the only way to do it¹¹⁸.

However, as mentioned, it is not possible to say that the Ottomans started their projects in a good way. With the re-arrival of the Ottomans and evacuation of İbrahim's forces, the centralist efforts of the governors were diminished to a considerable extent. Although revitalized such efforts in 1839, the Ottomans lacked the financial and military power and the political desire of İbrahim. In addition, the Ottomans were starting to experience a new thing: the direct foreign intervention which gained a particular visibility in Mount Lebanon¹¹⁹.

After getting over with the initial shocking moment of being back in Lebanon, the Ottomans started implementing their policies. At the first place, they brought back the old system of division into *Paşaliks*. Syria was divided into three *Paşaliks* (*eyalets*): Aleppo, Şam and Sidon with subdivisions as: *Sancak* (*liva*), *nahiye*, *kaza*. The first thing that attracts attention was the frequent changes in the borders of the *eyalets*. For example the *Paşalık* of Sidon, was enlarged to cover Beirut and most of the Lebanon in 1840-41 becoming a centre of government as important as *Paşalık* of Şam¹²⁰. Mount Lebanon was divided into two *Kaim makamates* in 1841, both of whom had a certain degree of autonomy. In 1854,

¹¹⁶As guessed, this was also a source of prestige and legitimacy for the Ottoman state.

¹¹⁷Fawaz, 14.

¹¹⁸Farah, 234.

¹¹⁹Owen, 80.

¹²⁰Farah, 55; Fawaz, 13.

Jerusalem became another *eyalet*¹²¹. So, in the first place, the strategy of the Ottomans was to separate the *eyalets*, to make them smaller units, so that weakening *valis* and decreasing their power. The underlying logic was to prevent any possibility of emergence of a too powerful *Paşa* and its rebellion, as in the case of Mehmet Ali. This action further weakened the Ottoman governors in the region and further diminished their ability to control the events in the region.

Another point to discuss the change in the administration was reorganization of urban administrative units. The target, again, was to prevent the empowerment of *valis*, who were appointed for one year or a shorter period, or more aptly, to deprive them any kind of power.

The first change in this sense was the introduction of the institution of *Serasker*. The *Serasker* was a person who was the commander in chief with administrative powers. The institution of *Serasker* significantly decreased the control of the *Vali* over the army as the *Vali* did not have the right to employ regular troops as they were taking orders from the local military officers who was under the rule of the *Serasker*. So, he was only left with irregular troops, which was making him unable to perform his duties related to security. This significantly prevented *valis*' intervention into the affairs of the region. Many times, the military source at the hand of the *vali* was not enough to contain urban conflicts.

Another official nominated to contain the power of the *valis* was the *Defterdar*. The *Defterdar* was to collect the revenues and pay the expenditures and he was going to be responsible to the finance minister in İstanbul as he was equal in jurisdiction with the *vali*¹²². He also had the right to fix the salary of the junior officials in the *eyalet*, to limit the number of the irregular troop and to refuse to the pay the expenditures for the military actions¹²³.

To sum up, it is right to call *vali*, at this initial stage of the reforms, as the victim of the new reform period. He was nominated for one year terms or even for shorter periods and had no authority over his sub governors. He was in a continuous

¹²¹ Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 31-33.

¹²² Farah, 55.

¹²³ A further control over the power of the *vali* was the establishment of the *meclises* which also became the center stage of the urban politics. The interaction of these actors in the government of the Lebanon will be discussed separately in another subchapter. Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 35.

struggle in the provincial administration with *Serasker* and *Defterdar*, and his power was significantly eroded by them¹²⁴.

However the situation of *vali* changed in time. In 1852, he was empowered with the rights to call regular troops, appoint or dismiss all the civil servants, inspect the financial accounts, and the right to nominate or remove the members of the *meclis*, and with legal powers authorizing him to punish all the crimes. This trend of strengthening *vali* continued in the following years.

Although these reforms did not achieve all of the intended results, it changed the situation of the *vali* in a certain way¹²⁵. The *vali* of the early *Tanzimat* period did not have the potential to somehow disobey the Sublime Porte but it was also incapable of performing his duties. As mentioned, this certainly prevented the ensurement of the rule and order in the provinces. However, as it will be seen seperately, particularly because lack of regular troops due to rebellions or wars in other parts of the Empire, *vali* continued to be incapable of performing all the intended duties.

Another issue in parallel with the position of the *Vali* was another question of vital importance: “who were going to be the executors of the *Tanzimat* policies?” or more openly, who was going to be civil servants. As said, *Tanzimat* was the policy of a cadre of modern bureaucrats and one of the main tenets of the *Tanzimat* was to equip new modern bureaucrats to implement the policies and let them have the power in daily governance of the state.

Within the special case of Lebanon, things had been a bit hard regarding the bureaucrats. To start with, the general lack of well trained bureaucrats showed itself in Lebanon. There were successful civil officers but, as the case with the *valis*, they were few in number. Generally the bureaucrats in Syria were people of the old style, without the sense of the modern bureaucracy. They lacked the discipline, interest in the local culture and the sense of responsibility. Some of them were in banishment there, so they were clearly from the anti-reform group. This pattern was complemented with the Ottoman decision to dismiss the officers of the Ibrahim

¹²⁴ Maoz, *The Impact of Modernization*, 335-338.

¹²⁵ It should also be said that the things depended on the character of the *vali* as well. The competent *valis* were able to restore the direct central rule in the region but such *valis* were limited in number and they served for short periods. Their efforts were nullified by successors Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 36-38.

regime. Many of those who were supposed to be the “executors” of the reforms were not eager to implement the reforms; even in 1856 there was the need for trained bureaucrats. They were also in financial difficulties as the salaries were not regular and the bribery was still relevant¹²⁶.

Within this scheme it is no coincidence that the Sublime Porte failed in certain areas of centralist administration. In addition to the problems in conscription, they failed to suppress the power of the nomads and the bedouins who were attacking urban areas. In public service area, which was one of the most important components of the reform process, despite the emphasis on this issue within the decree, the progress remained limited.

The postal system was introduced to Syria in mid-1840s. The telegraph came to Syria only in early 1860s. As for the health system, successful quarantine system was established particularly along the borders and sea ports. However even their success remained limited; for example in 1848 they could not prevent the cholera epidemic. To the contrary, in addition to the limited progress in the health and posting system, the most important tenet of a centralist administration, road construction (and their complements such as bridges) was neglected, also giving damage to the economy. For example, the construction of Beirut Şam road, originally planned in 1851, started in 1857 and was not finished until 1861 when it was opened by a French company. In addition, no new roads were built during the first two decades after *Tanzimat*, the existing roads were not maintained although money were raised from the people to this end. Many governors, excluding exceptional ones like Mehmed Kıbrıslı, ignored such activities and wrote in their reports to the Sublime Porte that the service had been performed¹²⁷.

4.2.1.1 Double *Kaim makamate*

Although the pattern of the development in the *vilayet* of Şam at large was reflected, the Mount Lebanon, the traditional safe heaven for the fugitives and those who escaped from the cities for some reason, had its own characteristics¹²⁸. When they came to Lebanon, the first implementation of the Ottoman government was to

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 61-70.

¹²⁷ Maoz, 166-169.

¹²⁸ Amenuy, 3.

expel Bashir II. However the first armed conflict of the new Ottoman period broke out in 1841 as his successors failed to seek the balances as successfully as he did¹²⁹. This was capitalized on as an opportunity to end the special administrative status of the Mount by the Ottomans. The Bashir III, the ruling *emir*, was deposed and the end of the Shibab *Emirate* was declared.

The next step of the Ottomans came in 1842 with appointment of Ömer *Paşa* as the governor of the Lebanon. Ömer *Paşa* had no tie with the families of Lebanon and this was deemed as a cure to the rebellious spirit. However his appointment only caused another riot under the leadership of Shibli al-Aryan¹³⁰ and the following period only increased the sectarian hostility. The Maronites were lobbying for the return of the Shibab dynasty and particularly the Maronite clergy was lobbying against the restoration of the rights and privileges of the Druzes (those ones which were in force during the Shibab period). This situation was causing resentment of those who were seeking a revival for their privileges. The Druzes were also had hostile feeling towards the efforts to disarm them¹³¹.

The next policy tool of the Ottomans came in 1842 with the establishment of the Double *Kaim makamate* as a provisional method, although remained in force until 1861 with revisions¹³². Originating from an offer of Prince Metternich, backed also by Britain and France, this plan divided the Mount Lebanon into two parts, each under a district governor called *Kaim makam*. The *Kaim makams* were going to be directly appointed by İstanbul and be accountable to the Ottoman *Paşa* of Sidon, who was residing in Beirut¹³³. Druzes and Maronites were each going to have a *kadı* and a *na'ib*. The other Christian sects, since they did not trust the Maronites, were going to have their own *zabit*, appointed by and responsible to the *Kaim makam* of Maronite district¹³⁴. At the beginning, each *Kaim makam* was authorised to govern

¹²⁹The Druzes saw the nomination of *Emir* Kasim something against them and the attitudes of the new prince further empowered this understanding. He constantly threatened them to kill them, or deprive them of their feudal powers. Within this scheme, the Maronite patriarch also played his role, sent an order to the Christians to select representatives who were going to have the right traditionally enjoyed by the Druze feudals Churchill, *The Druzes and Maronites*, 36-38.

¹³⁰ Interestingly, he was the one who led the riot of 1838 against the forces of Mehmet Ali in Houran, see Farah, 139.

¹³¹ Fawaz, 27.

¹³² Farah, 248.

¹³³ Traboulsi, 24.

¹³⁴ Farah, 260.

people from their own sects and any problem that might arise from the relations with the other sects in individual districts were going to be solved by *Vali* of Şam¹³⁵.

The *Kaim makam* of the northern district was going to be a Maronite and that of the southern district was going to be a Druze. Haydar Abu'l Lam, a Christian was selected as the *Kaim makam* for predominantly Christian north district and Ahmad Arslan, a Druze, was selected for the mixed southern district. Both were from prestigious families and politically and socially influential actors¹³⁶.

In theory, the Double *Kaim makamate* was bringing a more modern administration to the region. Although there were separate Maronite and Druze regions, all the sects had somehow access to the government and had representation beyond the level of *şeyh* and Patriarch. But the practice did not attest to the theory and what ensured the relative success of this system was the fact that it was never implemented as the way envisaged in the theory¹³⁷.

However, this policy was not able to solve the problems of Lebanon and in fact, created bigger problems. The underlying cause of this situation was the fact that this system could not address the social problems and structure of the Mount, where the population within the jurisdiction areas of the respective *Kaim makams*, were not homogenous and the population guesses were based on manipulations¹³⁸.

The biggest problem was the underlying assumption that Beirut-Şam road was creating two different regions, which was absolutely unfounded. For example many Druzes were living among the Maronites in the Matn, the southernmost town of the Christian *Kaim makamate*, whereas the number of the Christians living in north was more than double of the Druzes. Of all the Druze districts, only Shuf had a Druze majority, where Dayr al-Kamar, the most important Christian town, was at its

¹³⁵ Farah, 259.

¹³⁶ These two people were the notables who gave the highest number of soldiers to the Ottomans in 1832. See *Ibid*, 13. The Ottomans had wanted to work with the people they trusted most. See Fawaz, 28; Traboulsi, 24.

¹³⁷ Winslow, 33-34.

¹³⁸ J.M. Wagstaff, "A Note on Some Nineteenth Century Population Statistics for Lebanon," *Bulletin (British Society for Middle East Studies)*, 1986: 27-28.

hearth. According to contemporary observations, more than two hundred villages were mixed in the religion of the population¹³⁹.

The Ottomans, aware of this, limited the jurisdiction of each *Kaim makam* to its own territory, leaving the Christians at the jurisdiction of a Druze *kaim makam* and preventing them from appealing to the Christian majority¹⁴⁰. This also exacerbated the situation due to the fact that, many people escaped from the censuses at the initial period because of the fear of taxation or conscription and thus there was a significant heterogeneity in population¹⁴¹.

In addition, many of the sides opposed this agreement. The Maronite church demanded that the Christians in the *Kaim makamate* in the south be put under the jurisdiction of the *Kaim makam* of north and this demand was certainly in contradiction with the Druze arguments who were anticipating their traditional right to rule over the whole Mount Lebanon¹⁴². Other Christian sects were also opposing the *Kaim makamate* of the Maronites saying that they would prefer a Druze *Kaim makam* over a Maronite one¹⁴³.

Even at the beginning, the appointment of the new *Kaim makams* caused much bigger problems dividing the Maronites to two groups: those who support the Bashir Assaf and others who support Bashir Ahmad, creating a conflict which was going to last till 1860¹⁴⁴. There was also a problem with choosing the Druze *Kaim makam*. The Druze chiefs choosed *Emir Ahmed Arslan*, whose family ranking was highest at the hierarchy in theory and was surpassed by Janbalats in practice. Ahmed Arslan was also forced to an agreement by the heads of the five Druze *şeyh* families: he was going to get the full support of them in return for guaranteeing the privileges and interests of the Druze aristocracy¹⁴⁵.

Furthermore, the implementation of the system was not homogenous: in the south, two *vekils*, a Druze and a Maronite, was appointed to help the *Kaim makam* in

¹³⁹ Habeeb RiskAllahEfendi, *The Thistle and the Cedar of Lebanon* (London: James Madden, 1854), 322.

¹⁴⁰ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 62-63.

¹⁴¹ Fawaz, 28.

¹⁴² Traboulsi, 25; Farah, 316-319.

¹⁴³ Farah, 314.

¹⁴⁴ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 74.

¹⁴⁵ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 64.

collecting the taxes or conducting jurisdictional affairs. The *vekils* functioned as a check on the power of the Ahmed Arslan who was also backed by the Druze notables. But in the north, the *kaim makam* was free from this check on his power. In addition, he was also facing with the internal resistance by the Maronites who were trying to establish the Shibab dynasty again. In the south, the *vekils* were chosen by the people and for this reason they were behaving as ombudsman between landowners and the peasants. However, in the north, the peasants were not in good relations with the lords¹⁴⁶. It did not took long time for the system to become a source of conflict. An interesting point here is the fact that this system further contributed to the weakening of the Maronite *mukataci* families. As Winslow points out, the Maronite peasants living in the mixed towns were away from responding to the excessive demands of their landlords, a point which affected peasant- *şeyh* relations to a large extent. The pressure on the Maronite peasant by his co-religionist *şeyh*, made them resistant against the *şeyhs* and oppose to react with them as a group in relations with the Druzes¹⁴⁷.

In the implementation, the *Kaim makamate* faced further problems. Ahmed Arslan insisted on the return of the Druze *şeyhs*. He was removed from his office as a result of this conflict but he was reinstated because no one could be found to replace him. Some of the Maronite feudal chiefs rejected the authority of the Haydar Abu'l Lam but the pressures of As'ad Paşa and French consul made them to accept. Moreover, other Christian sects resented his authority. His title was changed from “*Kaim makam* of the Christians” to “*Kaim makam* of the Maronites”. A further blow was the detachment of the district of Jubayl from his authority. This problem was reflected in İstanbul and Halil Paşa came to fix the problem in 1844 when each *Kaim makam* was going to be seconded by two *vekils*, a Druze and a Christian, who exercised judicial and fiscal authority over the members of their respective communities¹⁴⁸. The mentioned *vekil* system was created. The *vekils*, one Druze and one Maronite, were to be chosen by the respective communities with the approval of the local *Kaim makam* but each was going to be responsible to the *Kaim makam* of

¹⁴⁶ Fawaz, 29.

¹⁴⁷ Winslow, 34-35.

¹⁴⁸ Traboulsi, 24.

its own sect. Dayr al-Kamar was going to enjoy a special status, free of the feudal authority and have its own *vekils*¹⁴⁹.

4.2.1.2 Şekip Efendi Reglement

In 1845 another turn was taken in administrative area when simultaneously clashes between the Druzes and the Maronites emerged. The district of Dayr al-Kamar was taken within the context of the system and was divided into the jurisdiction of the two *Kaim makams*.

Another important initiative was the proclamation of the Şekip Efendi Reglement. Şekip Efendi was sent by İstanbul to disarm the population and to ensure full control of the Ottomans over the Mount Lebanon. Mehmet Namık Paşa was appointed as *vezir* and *müşir* of the “*Arabistan Ordusu*” with the authority to dispatch the soldiers to Mount Lebanon when the need arises and with the instruction to support Şekip Efendi in implementing the administrative measures¹⁵⁰. Simultaneously, İstanbul declared that the foreign consuls were no more to interfere in the affairs of the Mount Lebanon. When he arrived at Lebanon, Şekip Efendi first recalled all the consuls not to interfere in the internal affairs of the region and demanded all the foreign citizens leave the country¹⁵¹. Then, he put most important leaders of the society, including the Christians and the Druzes ones into the custody. Ahmed Arslan was replaced by his brother Amin as the Druze *Kaim makam*. Haydar Abu'l-Lam kept his status to prevent the claims of the Shibabs. He proceeded with the a general disarmament and distribution of a compensation for the Christians¹⁵².

Actually, Şekip Efendi reglement made some minor changes in the system. First, each *Kaim makam* was going to be accompanied by a council to assist them in collection of taxes and the adminsitration of justice. Each council was going to work under the authority of *Kaim makam* and be composed of 12 members: a deputy *Kaim makam*, a judge, a counsellor for each sect and an counsellor for the Shiites. They were allowed to select a list of candidate *vekils* for themselves¹⁵³. Both *Kaim makams* were considered Ottoman government officials and subject to the authority

¹⁴⁹ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 65-66.

¹⁵⁰ Farah, 417.

¹⁵¹ Upon negotiations, the foreign merchants were allowed to stay *Ibid*, 423-424.

¹⁵² Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 71.

¹⁵³ For the process of selection, see Farah, 459.

of the *vali* and they were not going to interfere in the authority of each other¹⁵⁴. As such, the *Kaim makams* and the members of the *meclis* were salaried state officials, constituting a step towards centralization¹⁵⁵.

However, the Şekip Efendi Reglement exacerbated the crisis. To start with, it was a heavy blow to the authority of the feudals. At the first place, all the powers of the *meclises* traditionally belonged to the *şeyhs*, whereas authority was limited to judge cases of the first instance and to carry out fiscal decisions of the council and now, even this fiscal decisions belonged to the *vekils* in the mixed districts¹⁵⁶. But the power of these newly created institutions was limited. In addition, although the councils and *vekils* constituted alternative institutions to the *mukatacis*, these traditional sources of the power were terminated only at the surface. The Druze *mukatacis* found place for themselves as the administrators of the five districts of the southern *Kaim makamate*, employing the general method to compensate their privileges terminated by the reforms: to take role in the government and administration¹⁵⁷.

The Christian *vekils* in the south were chosen in consultation with the clergy and the notables. In the north, the institution of *vekil* was not applied. In addition, the Christians in the south were able to found a representation whereas in the north, their co religionists were left without political representation and at the mercy of Khazin and Hubaysh Maronite *mukatacis*. Many times, the feudal families made every effort to obstruct the implementation of the plan. As for the sectarian relations, it should be said that the Reglement did not bring a remarkable improvement in the social status of the Druzes in the Christian districts and the Christians in the Druze districts. Moreover, the cadastral survey and the population census, both vital for the health of the system, could not be conducted mainly due to the efforts of the feudals. So, in practice, the sectarian divisions were strenghtened vis-a-vis social and socio-economic divisions and the *mukatacis* were further strengthened¹⁵⁸.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 425.

¹⁵⁵ Traboulsi, 27; Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 72.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 72.

¹⁵⁷ Traboulsi, 30.

¹⁵⁸ Traboulsi, 27.

Another vital thing, for the project of centralization, curbing the influence of the foreign consuls could not be achieved as well¹⁵⁹. The foreign polics also played their own game as France made its best to prevent the success of the system¹⁶⁰. The failure showed itself as early as 1845 when skirmishes emerged with Maronites attacking with a power of 11000 with weapons procured from France¹⁶¹. However, the role of the foreign agents should not be regarded as an all explanatory tool as it will be detailed later.

4.2.2 *Tanzimat* and Urban Politics: The *Meclises*

One of the things that changed the future of the region was the introduction of the *meclises*. In fact, there were ancient *Meclises* even before the arrival of İbrahim Paşa. However, İbrahim replaced this system with a more regulatory, comprehensive and representative scheme. The Ottomans also changed the system upon their arrival in 1841. In Şam, two former councils had been dissolved and a new *Meclis* was established. It was composed of government officials, deputies elected by their respective communities, notables, *ulama* and merchants from non-Muslim and Muslim communities. This institution presided over the *Vali*. Additionally, the new *Meclis* was to deal with administrative, financial and judiciary affairs. Commercial issues were put under the authority of “*Mahkeme*” and later, in early 1850s, to *Meclis-i Ticaret* (Commercial Council) which was established in Beirut, Şam and Aleppo¹⁶².

The *meclis* of *Tanzimat* had both administrative and judicial powers. But more important than that, and what constituted the difference of *Tanzimat meclises* compared to the previous examples is its aim of affecting social life more directly. However, in the implementation, it had significant problems of representation. The lower classes and the non Muslims were not represented at the desired level whereas upper classes and especially Muslim religious leaders were over represented, far beyond the official limits¹⁶³. In such a way, the traditional power holders prevented

¹⁵⁹ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 73-74.

¹⁶⁰ Farah, 419.

¹⁶¹ Wagstaff, 3; Farah, 377-378.

¹⁶² Moshe Maoz, “Syrian Urban Politics In the Tanzimat Period Between 1840 And 1861.” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 29, no. 2 (1996): 281-282.

¹⁶³ Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 91-92; Maoz, *Syrian Urban Politics*, 283-284.

the representation of the ideas of the lower classes and excluded groups. This case of affairs strengthened the process that led the politicization of these people in more a rebellious manner.

Another point regarding the *meclis* is its powers. The *meclis* had important rights regarding taxation, customs, agriculture, recruitment, in addition to its rights over the junior civils such as fixing their salaries or inspecting their conduct. The provincial *meclises* supervised the work of the district councils. To sum up, it was nearly impossible to do anything in financial and administrative areas without its consent. It also had judicial authorities. The Muslim court “*mahkeme*” was to deal with only issues related to personal status, property holdings and the like. It was also a court of appeal against the decision of district councils. In lower levels, these duties were performed by *meclises* of sancak or kazas.

In the course of time, the need for reform in the *Meclises* occurred. The regulations in 1850 was the first one which ordered the *Meclis* of Şam to manage civil and financial affairs in separeate sessions. In 1854, the *meclis* was seperated to two units: *Meclis-i İdare* (administrative council) and *Meclis-i Tahkik* (council of investigation)¹⁶⁴.

With the powers as such, it made important impacts on the local politics. To start with, it constituted a further check on *vali*’s authority which was already limited by the pressures of other senior officials. Actually the *vali* had an inferior position when compared to the *meclis*. Although in principle the *meclises* were contemplated as assistants to the *vali*, in practice the *valis* failed to dominate the *meclis*; even the president of the council constituted a problem. Till 1852 the president was an official appointed directly by Istanbul whereas in 1852 the *Defterdar* was appointed as the president of the *Meclis* but this time the *Meclis* was under direct control of the *Vali*. In fact, the reform in 1852 did not change the status of the *Vali* in relation to the *Meclis* because could not do anything without the endorsement with a “*mazbata*” by the *meclis*. Only some strong *valis* such as Kıbrıslı could control the *Meclis* but once they gone, things used to start happen in old style. The *paşas* generally could not

¹⁶⁴ Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 93-95; Maoz, *Syrian Urban Politics*, 287.

dare to antagonize notables who could use their connection with Istanbul or arouse local disorders which would, at the end, result in the replacement of the *Paşa*¹⁶⁵.

Within such a scheme, the *meclis* became the center stage of the local politics and competition for the promotion of the interests and in fact what constituted the core of the impact of the application of the *Tanzimat* reforms was the interaction between these interest groups, the encounter between the *vali* and other senior officials, local elites and subgroups of *ulema*¹⁶⁶. Making *vali* an ordinary member of various actors in the political area, the *Tanzimat* policies somehow consolidated the urban leadership of the *ayan* and *ulema*. It also made important impacts on the relations between the masses and the Muslim urban leaders. Exploiting their position as a *meclis* member, they somehow entered in an alliance with the *vali* to maintain order in return for certain privileges from the implementation of *Tanzimat*. They had no strong motive to promote conscription and actually they avoided from this, in addition to directly preventing the recruitment of their relatives. They also avoided from direct taxation, divided the *iltizam* over the urban areas between its relatives and so that gained great profits. In addition, they levied the *ferde* in a way that will increase the burden of the lower classes whether it is Muslim or non Muslim. They also undermined the religious equality showing a tacit consent for the anti Christian activities¹⁶⁷.

The Sublime Porte made various attempts to limit the power of the *Meclises* till the date 1861. For example their number were reduced or the *ulema* and *ayan* were replaced with the community representatives. In mid- 1800s, a general reorganization was made which found its reflection in 1849 for Beirut and Jerusalem, in 1850 for Şam and in 1851 for Aleppo. The number of Muslim notables were reduced to the official number and their non Muslim counterparts gained a bit larger representation. But these attempts did not gain success on the whole except for a short term in Aleppo. The 1856 decree also included provision regarding these issue but this also did not produced result until 1861¹⁶⁸.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 288; Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 95-98.

¹⁶⁶ Maoz, *Syrian Urban Politics*, 289.

¹⁶⁷ Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 98-99.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 101.

4.2.3 *Tanzimat* in the Army of Arabistan

As discussed in the chapter dealing with the *Tanzimat* as a concept, the military was a most significant component of the reform policy in theory and this theoretic importance found its reflection in the implementation as well. Actually, the military was the vital institution in the implementation because, as cited in the previous chapters, the reforms regarding the military was serving more than one purpose: depriving the local actors and the people of their power, forcing the measures regarding the implementation of the reforms, centralization etc.

At the inception, it should be said that, till the *Tanzimat* period, only Şam had inhabited regular imperial soldiers and the rural areas were generally ignored¹⁶⁹. The security of the rest of the region used to be achieved by regional alliances. Now, the security was going to be achieved by the hand of the central state instead¹⁷⁰. For this reason, the major aim of the executors of the *Tanzimat* period, was to achieve security with the hand of the state even in the urban places and all the policies on the ground were directed towards this end.

The first aspect to be discussed here is the reorganizations within the Army. The first reform, that is also important for the implementation of administrative changes is the introduction of the post of “*Serasker*”, an ancient term used even by İbrahim Paşa, now indicating a different term. The *Serasker* was kind of a commander in chief who also had administrative powers. It is obvious that the necessity of reconquering Syria and Palestine, and limiting the power of the *vali* urged the reformers to create such a strong position.

The first *Serasker*, İzzet Paşa, was appointed as the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Governor of Syria. At the beginning of 1841, he was succeeded by Zekeriya Paşa and he was replaced by Selim Paşa in a few months. Following the outbreak of civil war Selim Paşa was also replaced by Mustafa Nuri Paşa. In fact in this period one thing that marks this office is instability because two more *seraskers* succeeded him till the appointment of Namık Paşa in 1844. With the appointment of Namık Paşa this position was transformed from being an ad hoc position administered from Beirut to being the Commander in Chief administered from Şam.

¹⁶⁹Şam has been the starting point of the pilgrimage caravans. Its this privilege in terms of the security, should be sought within this scheme, see also Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 44-45.

¹⁷⁰ Doumani, 9.

When Namık *Paşa* was appointed in 1844, he was expected to do many things that were normatively the job of local governors or *Meclises* such as containing the power of Bedouins and local notables. This certainly had the potential to create political problems between *Vali* and *Serasker* and it did so¹⁷¹.

In 1853, the offices of Commander in Chief and *vali* of Şam were amalgamated. This decision was not implemented in practice until 1854 and in 1855 these two posts were diversified again waiting 1859 to be amalgamated again. The events of 1860 changed the organization again and in 1861 the position was splitted in line with a new plan. Şam, Aleppo and Beirut were to retain separate headquarters, each was to be equally dependent on Istanbul while the military commander was to remain independent of all centres¹⁷². Thus, the command of the army was marked by increasing instability till the outbreak of 1860. Also creating power conflicts between *Vali* and *Serasker* in the first period, the style of the command diminished the efficiency of the army.

Another point is the reorganization within the imperial army which also affected Syria and Palestine. In 1843 a big reorganization was made regarding the army. This attempt, fixed the term of the military service to five years in the regular troops (*nizam*), which was composed of 150 000 troop and seven more years in the reserves (*redif*), which was going to include 90000 soldier. The “*Arabistan Ordusu*” was to consist of 25000 men under the command of *Müşir* Namık *Paşa*. Within a time frame of one year, the *Arabistan Ordusu* reached to a level close to its expected strength. However most of the recruits were *redif* soldiers who were not as capable as the regular troops. In 1845, this implementation was accompanied by the dissolution of the ill disciplined Albanians and some *sipahis*. These, resulted in the withdrawal of many of the regular troop from northern Syria to be concentrated in Aleppo where the headquarter of Namık *Paşa* was established. The result of this had been the tranquility in Aleppo at the expense of disorder in the remaining regions. In 1845, the headquarter was transferred to Şam. The Turkish soldiers were deployed in key positions throughout Syria and Palestine leaving about the half of the army in Şam within the reach of Namık *Paşa*. Until early 1850s, the military in Syria helped to great extent to ensure the implementation of *Tanzimat* policy and achieve the

¹⁷¹ Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 38-41. As seen the frequent changes in the holders of the post has the potential to create problems in implementation.

¹⁷² *Ibid*, 42-43.

tranquility. However, the Ottoman army had problems as well, which prevented from extending the rule over the Bedouins and the Druzes of Houran. These groups had certain advantages in the fighting area but the Ottoman army had structural shortages¹⁷³.

There were various reasons that prevented the success of the regulations regarding the army. To start with, although there was some progress in empowering it, the *Nizam* continued to lack enough improvement in power, equipment, training and command. There was a chronic financial problem, the soldiers were ill paid, ill disciplined the greater part of the army consisted of irregular troops and all these were causing significant problems. There were cases when the regular troops remained unpaid for six month¹⁷⁴. The most underlying problem was the shortage of regular troop. The size of the *Arabistan Ordusu* never reached 25000, even in 1845 when its size reached climax the number was 20000 which was only about a quarter of the army of Mehmed Ali in Syria in 1839. In 1852 this figure diminished to the level of 12000. In addition to the general shortage of troop, the regular troops were being withdrawn on a regular base and this was causing further problems because the vacuum was filled generally by ill disciplined irregular troops¹⁷⁵. The new recruitments, many times the Damascenes, were from the lower strata who had not respect to the upper stratas¹⁷⁶. These people, away from having the discipline, caused security problems in the city, attacked people and plundered them. Still committed to their sectarian and tribal bonds, they also were involved in sectarian and tribal conflicts between different groups. The stance of the soldiers caused significant resentment among the people.

The decision to recruit local Syrians to enlarge the size of the army in 1850, resulted in riots in Aleppo and other parts of the region. Although the army was reinforced with regular troops in 1852, the outbreak of the Crimean War reversed this trend and by the year of 1860, just before the outbreak of the war, the number of regular troops was within the level of 4000¹⁷⁷. What filled the gap in the army of

¹⁷³ Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 48-49.

¹⁷⁴ Farah, 75.

¹⁷⁵ The role of the irregular troops in 1860 will separately be discussed. Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 48-50.

¹⁷⁶ Kemal Salibi, "The 1860 Upheaval in Damascus as Seen by al-Sayyid Muhammad Abu'l-Su'ud al-Hasibi, Notable and Later Naqib al-Ashraf of the City." In *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, by William Polk and Richard Chambers (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 190.

¹⁷⁷ Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 50-53.

Arabia was the irregular soldiers. They were ill paid, ill disciplined, their treatment to the people were harmful and they were involved in rebellions against the state and feudal clashes¹⁷⁸. Although the Ottoman authorities made efforts to increase the number regular troops, the Crimean War was a major impediment. Between 1857 and 1859, a new force under the title *Avniye* was created, mainly from the local Arabs. These soldiers were given salaries from centre directly. However, this attempt did not prevent the involvement of the soldiers in 1860 events¹⁷⁹.

Another issue that will be scrutinized within the context of Lebanon is the issue of the conscription and the military service. As cited above, *Tanzimat* introduced military service as a service for *vatan* and made conscription compulsory. However, this provision had the potential to produce significant reactions and it did so when there was a general population census in 1847 and a conscription based on this census in 1848, which made people fled to the mountain or armed to resist the decision.

The general conscription started in 1850 and caused rebellions including the severe one in Aleppo¹⁸⁰. The state informed people that the conscription would be made in justice, in addition, the local authorities and notables were appealed to help the state in conscription. Although in the plains this was achieved relatively easily, the mountains witnessed strong rebellions. All these rebellions were suppressed or the state reached a consensus with the rioters¹⁸¹.

In any case however, in some regions the conscription could never reached the desired levels. Houran and the regions of Bedouins had been examples to this effect. From 1853 on, this issue was no more an important point between the state and the society. Some regions, for example Beirut and Aleppo, gave no new soldiers. When conscription was achieved, it was not equal or just. Those who were recruited were generally from the lower classes and the children of rich and influential families managed to flee from conscription or in some cases were exempted from conscription¹⁸². The *Hattı Hümayun* of 1856 envisaged that the Christians would pay “*bedel*” for exclusion from the compulsory military service. The Christian

¹⁷⁸ Maoz, *Syrian Urban Politics*, 136

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 58-59.

¹⁸⁰ Chasseaud, 172.

¹⁸¹ Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 82-83.

¹⁸² Chasseaud, 172.

communities opposed this and said that the *bedel* was a continuation of *haraç* demanding the French help to abolish it. The Christians even offered making military service as an alternative to delay in payments in 1859 which was rejected because the Ottomans needed cash money. The *vali* offered only a delay of for two nights and said the money would be collected by force otherwise¹⁸³.

Following the 1860 events, there was a big attempt and hundreds of men were conscripted but even this time, some of them managed to flee from conscription by paying high sums of money or bribing the public officials. In places where the conscription was achieved, as in some Syrian towns, conscription helped the destruction of local paramilitary organizations and the establishment of absolute military superiority. But in the mountains the Ottomans failed to establish their military superiority and they could not achieve conscription similarly to the failure in the disarmament¹⁸⁴.

As for the general picture of implementation, one can concur that in many cases the military force was of primary importance for the peace of the region. Dayr al-Kamar, which had been an important commercial center particularly for the silk production and the richest region in the Mount Lebanon, constituted an interesting example to this effect. This town had suffered a strong sectarian conflict in 1851 but in the following period the region remained in peace until 1860. The primary reason for this was the existence of an Ottoman garnison nearby¹⁸⁵.

As another point, it should be said that, as mentioned, in a centralized state, the disarmament of the local population was a *sine qua non* condition. However, *Tanzimat* failed also on this score. The collected weapons were old and not the best ones people had possessed. In addition they were able to find new one with the trade through the trade over the Sinai desert¹⁸⁶.

¹⁸³ Farah, 531.

¹⁸⁴ Maoz *Ottoman Reform*, 84.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 41.

¹⁸⁶ Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 85.

4.2.4 *Tanzimat* in Rights and Sectarian Relations

As mentioned, equality in rights was strongly emphasized in *Tanzimat* and this was the most conflict producing provision in the Decree. However, the *Tanzimat*'s equality was not the first attempt seeking some kind of equality for Lebanon as İbrahim Paşa brought the first equalitative reforms to Lebanon and the *Tanzimat* reforms somehow pursued the same pattern. However reactions to İbrahim did not reach to the level of big massacres during the *Tanzimat* period¹⁸⁷.

It should also be said that for the daily life of the people, it is wrong to say that there was a significant pressure on the Christians. Churchill, a contemporary observer, argues that Maronites were in a full religious liberty. The only way to realize the existence of the Muslim state was the taxation and even that was raided by local authorities. It is their own leaders that make them suffer most. They were as free as in any other Christian state¹⁸⁸.

However, the equalist reforms of *Tanzimat* came in a period when the balance between Muslims and non Muslims had already changed. In such a scheme, the grant of new rights further deteriorated the situation. At this point, it should be said that the issue of rights should not be understood as merely an issue equality in religion but also as the opportunities of appointment to high administrative ranks, membership in the *meclises* and access to other high posts in the society where the non Muslims were gaining power in bureaucracy and economy at the expense of Muslims¹⁸⁹.

However, particularly the economic rivalry was creating hostility¹⁹⁰ and there was an intense reaction. For example, upon the pressures, the local *Meclis* forbidded the Christian craftsmen from producing a certain kind of silk material because the first fierce based reactions were taking place. Similarly, Christians riding horses in certain towns or wearing Muslim dress were assaulted. The newly built houses of rich Christians also fed the jealousy which showed itself in Aleppo in 1850 and Damasucs 1860. However, although their life quality increased, in social and economic areas, and this created reactions, the *zimmi*s could not get an equivalent status in the political arena. They continued to be unequal before the state and its

¹⁸⁷ Maoz, *Syrian Urban Politics*, 187-188

¹⁸⁸ Churchill, *Mount Lebanon*, 100-101 (vol.3).

¹⁸⁹ Yaron Harel, "Jewish Christian Relations in Aleppo as a Background for the Jewish Respond to the Events of October 1850," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30, no. 1 (February 1998): 13.

¹⁹⁰ Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 201.

institutions. At the beginning the discriminatory *cizye* (poll-tax) were collected although in a much softer way, by the heads of the communities. In 1855, the forbiddance for the *zimmi*s to carry guns was abolished but even from then, the non-Muslims continued to be exempt from conscription by paying a certain tax, *bedel*. Another discriminatory right was revived at the same time, when they were forbidden to own Muslim slaves. In addition, in certain parts of Syria, they were not allowed to own certain kind of lands while in some other they were having great difficulties in buying land. Government orders were also coming periodically forbidding to sell land and immovables to non-Muslims. Also contrary to the *Tanzimat* instructions, the “*mahkeme*” was interfering in cases of inheritance by Christians¹⁹¹. Moreover, there were also cases where Muslim population did not let *zimmi*s to build or repair places of worship; some churches and synagogues were closed and converted to mosque by force. Some of the conservative Muslim and even the soldiers were violating the other churches and synagogues. The Christians and the Jews were forced to adopt Islam and in contradiction with the Imperial Order of 1844, Muslim converts to Christianity were prosecuted or forced to leave Syria¹⁹².

However, the Jews and the Christians were treated differently. The treatment against the Jews did not go beyond the limit of the traditional intolerance but there was a fierce reaction against the Christians¹⁹³. The Jews used the new rights in much more humble way in addition to being less benefited from the economic expansion. The events in Halep in 1850, were cases to this effect. In several towns, the Christians used their new rights to behave in a way that had been forbidden so far, such as ringing the church bells. Their courageous behave provoked a strong anti-Christian movement and in the end they were killed, their houses and churches were sacked and burnt. The primary reason of this was the explicit use of some rights in public arena. For example among the conditions of the rebels to lay their arms down, there were certain issues regarding the Christians like the “bells must not be rung, neither the cross be carried in procession”. The style of using the new rights was so

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*, 194-195.

¹⁹² *Ibid*, 189-190.

¹⁹³ Following 1830, in 1840 and 1841 special *fermans* guaranteeing the rights of the Jews to and Syria were issued. Another ferman in 1841 was focused on the preservation of the status of the Jews in the bureaucracy. For examples of non-muslims in bureaucracy: (*Ibid*, 206).

effective that the Jews who did behave in a more humble way, and accepted paying money for protection, were left untouched in 1850 events¹⁹⁴.

The 1856 Decree, which further emphasized and enhanced the rights of the *zimmi*, was a turning point in this sense. In Syria and Palestine, Muslim reaction was strong and carried a strong disappointment. The Christian clergy was disappointed with the decree both because it was to undermine their status and the Christians were not eager to accept equality with the Jews. Some Christian elements also feared that this new decree might strengthen the declining Empire. However, they did not refrain from using their new liberties outwardly. In some cases, they went so far to the level of insulting or attacking the Muslims. In addition to the liberties they used, they refrained from the responsibility that the Muslim hated most: conscription. When the *zimmi* were regarded liable for the military service, they did not conceal their dissatisfaction however when they were able to refrain from the military service by paying the “*bedel*” (military exemption tax) which, they thought, a reincarnation of the poll tax in 1856, they refused to pay it. The Jews paid the *bedel* without objection and they were untouched both in 1850 Aleppo and 1856 Nablus, as they were in 1860¹⁹⁵.

4.2.5 *Tanzimat* and the Economy of Vilayet of Şam

The implementation of *Tanzimat* reforms covered different aspects also in economical issues varying from foreign commercial relations to land management. As different policies were implemented, they got in interaction with the economy as a whole system and produced effects shaping the entire system. For this reason economical policies were highly relevant to civil conflict.

¹⁹⁴ Despite the limitations it should be said that the Syrian Christians enjoyed a greater religious freedom during the 1850s. *Ibid*, 190-191; Bruce Masters, “The 1850 Events: An Aftershock of Syria's Incorporation into the Capitalist World System,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22, no. 1 (Feb. 1990): 6 Of course it is possible to say that Jews were less in number and they did not constitute threat to the Muslims see Harel , 14.

¹⁹⁵ Maoz Ottoman Reform, 202-204.

4.2.5.1 Foreign Commerce

As mentioned, Syria had never been an isolated region in terms of foreign commercial relations even before the *Tanzimat* period. The first economic effect of *Tanzimat* had been strengthening this pattern. Encouraged by increasing means of transportation throughout 1840s, the foreign trade of Syria increased remarkably and this process made Britain the greatest trade partner of Syria¹⁹⁶. According to the statistics covered by Owen, between 1824 and 1850, exports of British cotton manufactures to Ottoman Turkey, Egypt and Syria/Palestine increased from an annual average of around 500,000 sterlins in the mid 1820s to 4,500,000 in 1836-1839 and 2,500,000 sterlins in 1845-49. By 1836-1838, over half of the trade of Egypt and Syria was with the Europeans¹⁹⁷.

However, the point here is that, the region imported more than the amount she exported and there was a huge trade gap. It should also be added that all through this process, the Beirut, Latakia and Jaffa were the principal outdoors of the foreign commerce and the trade volume of these ports increased dramatically whereas the traditional ports such as Sidon and Tripoli lost their relative significance¹⁹⁸.

The interaction with the European economy made specific impacts on the economy of the region. The first impact was the changing nature of the economy. As the time passed, the region became a raw material exporter and this affected mainly the agriculture. An increasing commercialist tendency took place in agriculture and the production of certain crops particularly silk and cotton in Syria and Mount Lebanon was introduced. The second point is that, the impact of foreign trade was not only an increasing pattern of relations as it also changed the internal order of the economy. There are mainly two points in this sense, the first is that, although we are not talking about an all out destroy, the increasing foreign commercial relations significantly damaged the internal economy. When the European machine goods replaced the handicrafts, in many parts of the world the vacuum was not filled and the situation led to a deindustrialization process. The second point is that, the transformation in the foreign trade helped the change from the tribal or communal

¹⁹⁶ Charles Issawi, "Middle East Economic Development," In *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*, by Charles Issawi (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2005), 181-182.

¹⁹⁷ Owen, 97.

¹⁹⁸ Maoz, Ottoman Reform, 178-181.

land ownership to private property¹⁹⁹. However, these are points to be discussed separately.

4.2.5.2 Decline of Manufacture

As mentioned, there was a significant crisis faced by the local producers with the increasing arrival of cheap European cheap fabrics, protected by the minimal tariffs, the Middle Eastern spinners and dyers were forced out of the business²⁰⁰. Those who were most affected, were textiles, cotton and silk, covering the greater part of the production in the region. To cite an example, Aleppo's textile looms which had recorded the number of 40000 in past, declined to 4000 in 1856 and rose back only to the level of 10000 in 1859. The number of the looms in Şam, in a similar way, fell from 34000 to 4000 in the late 1850s²⁰¹. This meant unemployment and loss of economic source of people. The consumption of European textiles increased every year but nothing was done to protect the local industry. To the contrary, the customs policy exacerbated the situation. This situation was also affecting the textile workers too as the diminishment in the volume of local textile market, was also meaning increasing unemployment for the workers²⁰².

It should be added that those industries which did not face foreign competition was immune to the decline, although they were the smaller part of the economy. Particularly the closing years of 1850s was the period that the economic difficulties made themselves most felt. The export revenues came to an end and there was a tightening in credits. These were accompanied by bad harvests and declines in local purchasing power. The results had not been peaceful, the attacks on the settled population also increased and these economic difficulties constituted the background of Şam events in 1860²⁰³.

The decline in the manufacture was compensated by the increasing raw materials export. As the time passed, the relative importance of the raw materials in the export changed. However, the increase in the raw material exports further damaged the economy because it was getting harder for the local manufactures to

¹⁹⁹ Issawi, *Middle East Economic Development*, 177.

²⁰⁰ However, to talk about an absolute destruction of the Middle Eastern economy is not so coherent. The Syrian industry for example, somehow protected itself to some extent and defended itself against its European rivals, see Owen, 92.

²⁰¹ Owen, 167.

²⁰² Fawaz, 25.

²⁰³ Owen, 167; Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 179-180.

find cheap raw material for industrial production. Also, as the factories produced more qualified and larger amounts of silk products compared to the traditional methods²⁰⁴. This certainly affected their position towards the landlords and their *şeyhs*.

It should be said that the damaged industries were closely linked to foreign markets and for this reason, even when it experienced a slight revival, the success was due to factories owned by foreigners. Actually, there were also slight revivals for the industrial materials and new experiences due to foreign commercial relations.

However, it is not right to talk about an all out destroy. For one thing, the non Muslim merchants needed local people in trade relations. As different merchant groups were operating under different conditions, the Europeans were working tightly organized in commercial factories with little contact with the local people. In addition they were enjoying the protection by capitulations and their consuls. However, they were also living under the fear of the local population. Under such circumstances they needed local intermediaries with the needed abilities such as knowledge of Arabic and Turkish languages and the local commercial practices. These intermediaries were often given a *berat* which gave them the same privileges and protection enjoyed by the Europeans. The importance of this pattern for this study is the fact that when these European traders got retired their gap was filled by by these local agents²⁰⁵.

Another thing is that the statistics about the looms at work in Şam and Aleppo between 1825-1860 show that despite the fluctuations and European pressures the Middle East economy protected itself to some extent. There had been various reasons for this resilience. The first reason was the enlargement of the size of the Middle Eastern market both in terms of trade volumes and and of sources such as population. The second reason is the originality of local production. The machinized production could not imitate the local goods. When the Europeans were able to copy the local production, it is coherent to say that this interaction was mutual. According to Owen, this was the case with the manufacture of silk cloths in Mount Lebanon

²⁰⁴ They were also buying too much raw material, which made the peasant less vulnerable to natural processes and were making them more advantageous see also Chasseaud, 139-140. This certainly affected their stance towards the landlords or *şeyhs*.

²⁰⁵ Owen, 55.

which was centralized in some town such as Dayr al-Kamar²⁰⁶. The local producers were successful in responding to growing demand for Middle Eastern silk and cereals following the British Corn laws and more importantly the Crimean war²⁰⁷. There were also other initiatives such as the silk factory in Lebanon which was opened in 1853 and selling nearly all of its products to France or olive oil extracting plants in Syria and rug factory in Şam and they were able to gain profit to some extent²⁰⁸.

As the time passed, the local entrepreneurs gradually took the control of the silk industry. In the initial years of the production, the local producers lacked the capital needed for the factories which came from the rich merchants of Lyon. However in the coming periods the local people became able to raise the initial capital to enter the market, they were better established and the flow of capital from France to Lebanon increased. When they were able to establish or manage their own factories the local producers had advantages over their foreign counterparts operating in the same region. They had a better access to the factors of production (raw material, labour) and had the knowledge of local languages and tradition which might be very instrumental. When the managers were able to persuade Maronite clergy to send females and even orphans to their factories also, the local people had clear advantages²⁰⁹.

Another thing is the change in the importance of the trade routes. The commercial developments of the 19th century gave rise to the long distance trade and decreased the significance of the caravan route to the inland areas. Compared to Şam, the most rich city of Syria at the beginning of the century, Beirut was the real benefitor of this process. The market in Şam remained small and relatively poor

²⁰⁶ Owen, 94.

²⁰⁷ Owen, 167; Haim Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East* (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 49.

²⁰⁸ Shaw and Shaw, 123.

²⁰⁹ In addition to the above mentioned resilience the results of the foreign competition was not the only reason of the problems. There were additional problems for the Middle Eastern craft industry. One problem was the difficulty of obtaining money that was needed to expand production. Another problem was the small sizes of the local markets. The European competition even exacerbated this problem. The institutions were small in size, they were not expanding and the craftsmen were producing only for demand not for stock Owen, 47.

compared to Beirut when the volume of trade through it had been increasing, the interior areas were suffering from the decline²¹⁰.

This also had its own reflection in sectarian balance. The new trade system favored the non-Muslim merchants who were to a large extent owner of the trade links with the Europe. With the economic recession in 1857-58, the small Muslim merchants of Şam even sought to take loans from their Beirut counterparts. The Land Code of 1858 also gave permission to the Europeans and their *proteges* to buy urban and real estate and agricultural land from the impoverished Damascene Muslim notables²¹¹.

4.2.5.3 The Rise of *Zimmis*

In addition to the trade gap, another characteristic of the integration to the world economy demonstrate that somehow this pattern in commerce resulted in to the benefit of the non Muslims and the decline of the Muslim merchants²¹². In 1826, local Beirut merchants who traded with the Europe were only 6 out of 31, by 1848 this number shrunk to three. Muslim merchants increasingly had to confine themselves to inland trade with their co-religionists²¹³. Those who were enriched, among the non Muslims, were the Uniate Christians, or particularly the Maronites²¹⁴. The enrichment of the non Muslims and the domination of the economy with the foreign goods were accompanied by the social results of the new trade patterns. The craftsmen and manufacturers could not found the market for their traditional products and they were impoverished. In addition to this, some urban social institutions, which had been the backbone of the society such as the guilds, started losing their power and to decline. This last point was also encouraged by the Ottoman authorities who were in an aim to weaken the traditional intermediary actors or institutions²¹⁵. Some guilds were dissolved whereas some Christians were able to establish their own

²¹⁰ Owen, 81; Bashara Doumani, "The Political Economy of Population Counts in Ottoman Palestine: Nablus circa 1850" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26, no. 1 (February 1994): 1-2.

²¹¹ Fawaz, 25-26. 1858 is also the date of one of the most robust riots in Syria: that one in Kisrawan. For the impacts of these development on the social equilibrium please see the relevant chapter. The other effects of the Land Code dated 1858 will be discussed separately.

²¹² It should also be said that the long distance trade were subject to a less fierce competition and it was much easy to make money with the involvement in foreign commercial relations Owen, 42.

²¹³ *Ibid*, 99.

²¹⁴ Masters, 4.

²¹⁵ Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 182.

guilds. The members of different sects started being involved in the economic activities that are traditionally professed by a certain sect. Also some Jewish children became apprentices in shops owned by Muslims and Christian²¹⁶. Furthermore, all these developments were accompanied by the injustice in the taxation system and developments in landholding will be discussed separately.

4.2.5.4 Silk Trade, Commercial Agriculture and the Decreased Importance of the Landownership

The period under analysis witnessed the diminishing importance of the ancient sources of economic wealth and even the pilgrimage trade was also affected as the textile industry. In 1843 it was recorded that no Persian pilgrims had come to Şam and this affected mainly the notables. However, they also compensated these losses through some new opportunities. The taxes continued to be farmed annually and the Land Code also gave the permission to register the land with to their names also by exploiting on their status in *meclises*²¹⁷.

The silk production and the export, were of critical importance in this sense. With the integration to the world economy the silk exports became the main source of the export revenues. This kind of incorporation to the world economy and the increase in the agricultural wealth brought a transformation in the organization of the agricultural production and this mainly took the form of commercial agriculture. With silk at the top of the list, increasingly the goods that were subject to European demand most were started to be cultivated. In addition, to address the increasing demands, larger agrarian units were established. This process generally took the form of proliferation of dismantlement in prebendal holdings and the agrarian restructuring was supported by the state²¹⁸.

The growth of urban population, accompanied by increasing opportunities of communication, empowered the links between external and internal markets and

²¹⁶ Harel, 11.

²¹⁷ Hourani, *Ottoman Reform*, 63-64.

²¹⁸ Faruk Tabak, "Agrarian Fluctuations and Modes of Labor Control in the Western Arc of the Fertile Crescent, c. 1700-1850," In *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, by Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), 142-147.

made the control of agricultural wealth more important²¹⁹. In this sense, there was a significant transformation taking place. In the control of the wealth, the proportion of the ownership was diminishing as the greater part of the agricultural wealth was at the hands of the commercial intermediaries and this situation also divided the people along the sectarian lines. The lands where the silk was produced, did belong to the Druzes and they had encouraged the settlement of the Maronites and the Maronite church in silk production centers like Shuf or Kisrawan. However, now, the Druzes were taking only a small part of the revenue because the ownership of the land did not bring revenue and the trade was the source of large amounts of the revenues and this was dominated by the Maronites. The Maronites were cultivating the silk, they were the money lenders who lending money for it in the cities, and they were functioning as the intermediary between the European wholesaler and the local retailer or producer. The Druzes, who were the owner of the land, played nearly no role in this process²²⁰.

4.2.5.5 Taxation and Land Management

Among the provisions of the *Tanzimat* policy, one of those that most affected the 1860 events, and the future course of the events in the Lebanon and Syria at large, is the taxation. There was a clear emphasis in the decree, on abolishing the *iltizam* system and replacing it with direct taxation. Another aim was to undermine the economic sources of intermediary actors and institutions in the taxation process. Abolishing *waqfs* and the tax collection rights of local groups were among this²²¹.

The most urging issue was the fiscal status of the *Vilayet* of Şam. There were even special missions to assess the financial problems in Syria. In reports, it was said that the people was complaining from over taxation and tariffs. It was also said that the tax burden and the customs on internal traffic was much lower²²². Taxation was the best tool to alleviate the problem.

²¹⁹ James A. Reilly, "Property Status and Class in Ottoman Damascus: Case Studies from the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of American Oriental Society* 112, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar 1992): 9-10.

²²⁰ Fawaz, 23-24.

²²¹ Timur Kuran, "The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact and Limitations of the Waqf System," *Law and Society Review* 35, no. 4 (2001): 16.

²²² Farah, 63-64.

In the implementation of reforms in taxation, the Ottomans made a brief attempt to introduce direct collection of tax in 1841. However, this attempt did not live long and the tax collection was surrendered to traditional methods: the sell of *iltizams* to wealthy towns people: *mukatacıs* term and the notables. These people had the chance to make the iltizam kind of a hereditary system because it was much easier for the children of a dead *mültezim* to take the bid²²³. The government officials also were involved in the *mukata* process sometimes aligning itself with one of the bidders for *mukatas*²²⁴.

The issue of direct taxation was completed with the changes in the practical implementation of taxation, at least in theory. The equality issue found its reflection in the taxation as *Ferde* was abolished together with *cizye*.

However, the taxation reforms had significant problems. To start with, the bigger part of the burden was on the city and this burden was not progressive; even in the cities the tax was generally assumed by Muslim middle class, peasants and non-Muslims. The passage from the *ferde* (personal tax), to property tax was prevented by the rich, urban notables. In 1852 and 1853 “*vergi*”, a new tool, was introduced despite the opposition of the notables. However, backed by the authorities, the notables evaded from taxation and the burden of the new tax was again on lower and middle classes. Even when *ferde* was abolished, this was the result of their riot as in Aleppo of 1850. This was fed by the alliance between Turkish *Paşas* and notables for creating a monopoly in some basic consumption goods. In addition *muhassıllık* ended in 1842 and iltizam was introduced²²⁵.

The most important development during the 19th century, in terms of land management was the tendency to private property. In the Ottoman system, there used to be certain measures in front of the establishment of private property such as the establishment of *wakıfs* and the struggle between the central authority and local authorities²²⁶.

²²³ Gilles Veinstein, “On the Çiftlik Debate,” In *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, by Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), 45.

²²⁴ Owen, 80.

²²⁵ Keleş, 133; Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 183-185.

²²⁶ Gerber, 119.

However, starting with the 19th century, there was a certain tendency towards an interest in large estates by the notables. This was accompanied by the expansion of cultivated area, settlement of notables and commercialization of agriculture and deterioration of regional industry. The land was a more secure investment in such an economic atmosphere and wealthy merchants and capital owners started investing in land ownership. Within such a scheme, the 1858 Land Code was only an effort to control this trend, regularize taxation and resulted in the accumulation of wealth by notable, in such a scheme, its consequences, is worth to scrutinize separately²²⁷.

Regarding the other tenet of this chapter, the land management, the most striking development had been the introduction of the new land code in 1858 which improved the previous attempts to reform the land management. At the principle, the Land Code of 1858 was a continuation of the *Tanzimat* reform package in the sense that revitalization of the state's property rights over the land, which had been lost much time ago. It tried to control the passage to the *çiftliks* because on one hand the emergence of the *çiftliks* meant that the Empire was depending on local leaders who were going to suppress and subjugate the peasantry and collect the tax and the Ottoman system still based on the limited amount of private property on the other²²⁸. The Land Code, divided the state's land into five categories: *mulk*, *miri*, *wakıf*, *metruka* and *mewat* but it did not attempt to radically change the traditional landownership patterns existent in the Middle East. Sluglett and Marion argue that it is also doubtful to think that it aimed to create directly a small ownership on land²²⁹. But it certainly did attempted to regularize and modernize (or capitalize) the land

²²⁷ Philip Khoury, "Continuity and Change in Syrian Political Life: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," *The American Historical Review* 96, no. 5 (December 1991): 138; Gerber, 56; Kuran; Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "Land Tenure Problems and Their Social Impact in Syria around the Middle of the Nineteenth Century," In *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, by Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: The American University of Beirut, 1984).

²²⁸ Çağlar Keyder, "Introduction: Large-Scale Commercial Agriculture in the Ottoman Empire?" In *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, by Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), 2. For different types of land ownership and the emergence of *malikane* please see Halil İnalcık, "The Emergence of Big Farms, Çiftliks: State, Landlords, and Tenants," In *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, by Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1991).

²²⁹ Peter Sluglett and Farouk Marion, "The Application of the 1858 Land Code in Greater Syria: Some Preliminary Observations," In *Urban Transformation and Land Tenure in the Middle East*, by Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: The American University of Beirut, 1984), 413.

ownership and constituted a milestone in the consolidation of the private property and thus the bureaucratic-landholding class²³⁰.

The crucial provision of the Land Code was the obligation to register the land for every owner. This was somehow the Ottoman tool to adapt itself to the changing conditions. Absentee landlordism and the dependence of the peasant to moneylenders or other urban dwellers because of the high taxes was not something new²³¹. For the first time, the Law enabled the land to be owned legally and on the paper. The main idea, was to register the land to facilitate the passage to a peasant-led market economy in a way that will maximize state revenues and to encourage peasants to register the state owned land in their names to prevent emergence of the intermediary bodies. However, the law proved itself in the opposite direction its implementation facilitated the appropriation of the lands by the notables²³².

At the initial phase, its main aim was to regularize and register the small ownership in the land but the consequences attested to the contrary and opened the way to the ownership of the land by the large landlords. At the result, the lands were registered in the name of the urban moneylender, *şeyhs* or the notables rather than the peasants or the village men. The peasant lost power and became a serf in his own land. The moneylender, urban notable and the *şeyhs*, consolidated their rule over the society and the peasant weakened²³³.

There were various reasons for the failure of the Land Code. The main reason was the fact that it was based on false assumptions. The peasant was unwilling to register the land in his own name, believing the registration was related with the conscription and taxation. They did not register the land in his name and registered the land in the name of deceased family members, of big city patrons and particularly of rural notables in return for protection. Even when they registered in their names, they were unable to hold it, clearly because the administration of the land register (*deFTERhane*) was not efficient and impartial²³⁴. Moreover, The *mukatacis* made every

²³⁰ Reilly, 9.

²³¹ Sluglett and Marion, 413-416.

²³² Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 27.

²³³ Gerber, 67-75. It should be said that the other developments in the region during the period under analysis, the demographic changes, increasing European demand for the foodstuff and facilitate transportation also helped the establishment of large estates. See also *Ibid*, 119.

²³⁴ Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 27.

effort to sabotage the implementation of the new land code²³⁵. Economic reasons were also relevant: in some cases registration fee was high or the land was returned to the state for the peasant was unable to afford buying seed for three consecutive years²³⁶. Whatever the reason was, the result did not change and the peasant weakened and became a sharecropper in their own lands.

To sum up, the integration to the world economy left important effects over the set of conditions in the region. If we think that the regions which witnessed social disorders or turmoils were those towns or cities that was dealing with the foreign economic relations most is a good example. In this scheme, the mistaken tactics of the Ottoman governors further exacerbated the situation. For one thing, they encouraged the competition and hostilities between families, offered the competents high level positions in bureaucracy. For another, they abandoned the policy of settling the nomads, promoted the hostilities between different groups and sects²³⁷.

²³⁵ Traboulsi, 28.

²³⁶ Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 27.

²³⁷ Owen, 81.

CHAPTER 5

STATE-SOCIETY DYNAMICS AND THE WAR

Although the implementation of Tanzimat was a big deal for the Ottomans and they were trying hard, it was impossible for them to control everything and ensure a smooth implementation without interacting with the society. The society had its own interests and they also played their own games and exist within the absence of the Ottomans or the agents of foreign countries²³⁸. This chapter will mainly focus on the dynamics of the society.

5.1 Social Groups in Daily Politics

The first aspect of the issue was the social grouping within the society. The political interaction of these groups significantly affected the political framework as some of them gained more power or some lost. In some cases, different groups struggled with the Ottoman officials for more power in daily political framework or economic interests.

5.1.1 Weakening of Traditional Elites

The Mount Lebanon of the 19th century underwent two important transformative factors: increasing autonomy and the commercialization of the political power. These two processes turned out to be contrary to the interests of the traditional elites of the society and caused a diminshment in their power.

The traditional notables in Syria, mainly had their income through land ownership and inland trade particularly over the pilgrimage routes. They also enjoyed economic benefits of being an intermediary actor between the landless peasant and the state²³⁹. The *iltizam* of the fertile plains surrounding the cities also

²³⁸ Kemal Salibi "Introduction: The Historical Perspective," in *Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus*, by Nadim Shedadi and Dana Haffar Mills (Great Britain: I.B.Tauris 1992).

²³⁹ Kenneth M.Cuno, "Egypt's Wealthy Peasantry, 1740-1820: A Study of al-Mansura," In *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, by Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: The American University of Beirut, 1984), 303. These people constituted a different feudal group. The primary marker of elite status in Lebanon had been rank, rather than the religion. There were many marriages between the members of the important feudal families many times crossing the religious lines, see Makdisi, 35. A contemporary observer also supports the argument that there are strict boundaries between the lords and the commoners Churchill, *Mount Lebanon*, 288-289 vol.2.

belonged to them. The core of their political power had been their ability to act as intermediary between the state officials and local society and to find a balance between them. In Ottoman mind, they were powerful people who could be relied on to govern people²⁴⁰. Showing no single sociological type, they had religious (Muslim families, *ulema* and *eşraf*) and secular (merchant, taxfarmer and *aghas*) kinds and definitely they were status groups rather than being a class²⁴¹.

As mentioned, the main aim of *Tanzimat* had been to weaken these groups and with the help of other developments, this weakening had been visible in Syria as throughout the 19th century, the merchants and the financial intermediaries gained power at the expense of the landed group and the service groups²⁴². Furthermore, the period under analysis demonstrated the supremacy of the new patterns: the land ownership was no more important. What differed was, as mentioned, was the high profit gained by being an intermediary in commercial relations. Together with direct taxation, this new pattern in agricultural wealth reduced their income. The new political framework that based on principle of increasing representation also empowered this process. The new *meclises* and administrative bodies let the emerging groups to join the administration for the first time in the history of the region²⁴³.

There was also a passage from the landless peasant to landowner peasant and this also had been one reason for the conflict. Even when the peasants worked on soil of someone else, it was now possible that the owner of the land was someone other than the traditional notables. The landowner could be even a person of peasant origin. In the production arena, many times the peasant landowners were more

²⁴⁰ Khoury, Philip. "Continuity and Change in Syrian Political Life: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," *The American Historical Review* 96, no. 5 (December 1991): 177; L. Schatkowski Schilcher, "The Hauran Conflicts of the 1860s: A Chapter in the Rural History of Modern Syria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 13, no. 2 (May 1981): 160.

²⁴¹ Khoury, *Continuity and Change*, 1378-1380. In this sense, *iltizam* had also been a political institution in Syria and had some characteristics. First, it was a reward for services regarding political and military issues. Second was the hope of creating an accommodation with the local lords who could not be eradicated and reducing the losses created by their existence and third, it was employed as a method to introduce new elements into the group of local chiefs carrying the hope that the newly introduced elements would be in struggle with the existing ones and stay loyal to the state, see Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "The Iltizam of Mansur Furaykh: A Case Study of Iltizam in Sixteenth Century Syria," In *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, by Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984), 250-251. It is obvious that, the changes in this institution were also linked to political aims and developments.

²⁴² Fawaz, 3; Hourani, *Ottoman Reform*, 52-54.

²⁴³ Doumani, 6.

successful in responding to the changing economic conditions especially after the introduction of French machinery in silk industry. They were more successful, they had more income, they were now able to own land and now it was possible for them to have more economic and political power than their lords²⁴⁴.

Generally, it should be said that this weakening was much more pronounced for the Christians. Even during the wartimes, the Christians lacked efficient leadership whereas the Druzes were governed by their *şeyhs*²⁴⁵. This pattern of the affairs stemmed mainly from the leadership patterns in the society and economic inequalities internalised in it. The Druze and Maronite leadership patterns were different. The Maronite *mukatacis* were tax collectors and quasi feudal lords over their own co-religionists whereas the Druze *şeyhs* had similar power over Christian subjects. In addition, the Druze leaders distributed the privileges granted to them by Istanbul to their commoners which meant paying fewer taxes, and benefiting from the revenues collected outside their dominions. Traboulsi mentions that as early as 1840, the Maronites were complaining about the inequalities within their communities²⁴⁶.

However, the Druze notables were under threat as well. The *iltizams* of some of the villages that were attacked by the Druzes in the east of Anti-Lebanon, like in the al-Judayda, belonged to the Muslim Damascene notables. The 1841 conflict in Dayr al-Kamar, originated from the claims of Druze Canbolats and Nakads over their former territories. The Maronite villagers opposed the restoration of the rights of Druze lords over their villages. Druze Nakads attacked Shaykh Bashir Qasim²⁴⁷. For this reason, it should be said that there were Druze notables did not rectify the attacks as their status and property also was under threat²⁴⁸.

²⁴⁴ Buheiry, 295.

²⁴⁵ Fawaz , 49-51.

²⁴⁶ Traboulsi , 16.

²⁴⁷ Makdisi , 63-64.

²⁴⁸ Salibi, *The Upheaval*, 192-197.

5.1.1.1 The Kisrawan Case

The developments in Kisrawan was the most significant case to show the weakening of the ruling *mukataci* families. Much of the land in Kisrawan was controlled by the strong *şeyhs* of Khazin family. But Bashir II (Ahmad)'s efforts to undermine their power and their involvement in the local politics reduced their strength. The monetarized economy and the new trade patterns further accelerated this decline. They sold their lands, run into debt, wasted their money and also lost the goodwill of the peasants by extracting further privileges. The tax burden was on the peasant and they were the ones who made the grater part of the job in public works. This, accompanied by the decreasing dependancy to the *şeyh* or the landowner, increased their resentment against them, resulted in 1858 with the expel of them²⁴⁹.

The igniter of the tensions actually started as a conflict between two notables, *Kaim makam* Bashir Ahmed and the other candidate Assaf. *Kaim makam* Bashir Ahmed, trying to impose its own rule, was in a significant struggle with the feudal families. Led by the Hubayshes and the Khazins, particularly the feudals resented the *Kaim makam* from the outset²⁵⁰. Facing such an opposition, Bashir Ahmad sided with Maronite church and the commoners and tried to behave like the champion of the Roman catholic faith. He soon began inciting the Maronites against the Greek Catholic. He arrested the feudals in 1855 and 1856.

This struggle reached the highest level in Kisrawan. Before the rebellion, each village formed a committee of youth and each committee elected a speaker: "*şeyh şebab*" (chief of the youth). Tanius Shanin al-Baytar Sa'adi of Rayfun was selected as the official to represent all the deputies. Following this, the peasants declared a "*cumhuriyet*" based on the principle of full equality with their feudal lords²⁵¹. In this sense, this was the beginning of the new period for the Lebanon which reached climax with 1860 events. In the same year, in Ghazir, where the Kisrawan events started, a revolt was organized against the Hubaysh *şeyhs* renouncing their authority and demanding the election of a *şeyh şebab* to manage the administration of the town. Next year, the feudals entered in an alliance with Bashir

²⁴⁹Fawaz, 43-44. The increasing impact of the European culture and the change in the tastes may be contemplated as a further deteriorator in this sense. The increasing impact of the European culture may be thought as a thing that differentiated the living style of the landowner and peasant. The changing tastes and differentiation brings conflict between social groups.

²⁵⁰This struggle of the Khazins with the *Kaim makam* also weakened them see Buheiry, 294.

²⁵¹ Farah, 533.

Assaf and his partisans and established a common group against the *Kaim makam*. What he did not know, was the fact that the peasants were also organizing their own rebellion against the feudals, choosing *şeyh şebabs* for their villagers. Unaware of the actual aim of these organizations, the feudals did not try to prevent and even encouraged them assuming that they could be helpful in the rebellion. But as soon as the Kisrawan revolt started, it turned out to be “against the feudals” in nature and particularly against the Khazins. What started something as against *Kaim makam* was now a conflict between the feudals and the commoners²⁵². Tanyus Shanin was now the leader of the movement. He made decisions and punished people in the name of the “*cumhuriyet*”. Half of the plundered property was saved for the “army” whereas the rest was distributed to people. He also attacked to neighboring neutral villages. Members of the lower clergy joined the “army” and stood against the *şeyhs*. After their initial demands was accepted, the peasants gained more confidence and became eager to take the revenge of the long lasting inequality between them and their lords. *Vali* and “Churchill *Beg*” was called to interfere. As the result of the negotiations, no Khazin *şeyh* lost his life in the uprising but in April 1859, 600 Khazin *şeyhs* and their families were expelled from Kisrawan²⁵³.

In addition to the the great families, there were also other groupings who were negatively affected from the reforms. These people resisted the reforms and somehow entered in the political arena on this basis. This situation, as Masters call “the peripheral process” covered mainly artisans, urban lower middle class and lower bureaucrats. All resisted the reforms by using Islamic references and this process contributed to what can be called as social mobility²⁵⁴.

5.1.2 Social Mobility: Merchants, Commercial Classes and Their Challenge to the Traditional Elites

The period under analysis heralded the emergence of some sort of a new class: the Christian middle class. This new class was the product of several different but simultaneous processes: European economic penetration and extension of commercial production, the differentiation of the peasantry and the development of

²⁵²1858-1959 were also a period marked by economic difficulties for Kisrawan. This, was also a reason of conflict, see Buheiry, 295. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 82-84.

²⁵³ Farah, 534-535.

²⁵⁴ Masters, 4; Schilcher, 162.

commerce, finance and artisan production. As mentioned, the complex trade network depending Mount Lebanon, Syria and Palestine and their individual ties with abroad, enabled the Christians to hold the key points. This newly rich merchants started investing the land in person, making their own production and entering in a direct contact with the peasant. This meant that both the lords and peasants were dependent financially to the new class.

The case of Dayr al-Kamar is informative in this sense. In this trade town, the lands of the Druze lord, Abu Nakad, was expropriated and distributed among the Christian commoners. There were also other cases where the lands of the Druzes were bought by the Christians inhabitants of the town and where such cases had led to conflicts over taxation, crops and land distribution²⁵⁵.

The case of Kisrawan had also constituted another instrumental example in this sense. The main demands of the rebels during the riot, was the abolishment of the privileges of the *şeyhs*, equality between *şeyhs* and the commoners and also revoke of the institutions that used to prepare the groundwork of the injustices. When Kisrawan was liberated from its *şeyhs* of the Khazin clan, it remained under the authority of a rebel council for nearly two years. This council consisted of one hundred members, more than half of them were small or landless peasants and 32 of which were rich or middle level farmers²⁵⁶.

The changes in the land system and commercialization of agriculture precipitated this transformation. In fact it was not something new to the after 1858 period that urban dwellers gain the property of the rural lands. In fact starting with 18th century, the moneylenders dwelling in the city were able to make the peasants dependent on them and sometimes gain their land particularly in times of economic depressions. On one hand there was a greater security and on the other hand the cultivated lands and the value of them as a revenue generating source was increasing. These developments meant greater tax burden on land. However, this burden was not decided in accordance with the position of the cultivator or fertility of the land. At the same time, commercialization of agriculture made the lord impose higher estates on the peasant and if possible to reduce him to subsistence which also damaged the peasant-lord relations. The peasant families and the village community found

²⁵⁵ Traboulsi, 19-20; Schilcher, 163.

²⁵⁶ Traboulsi, 30-31.

themselves besieged by profit and land seeking notables and moneylenders. Many peasants, and in some cases whole villages, lost their lands and became a sharecropper or were completely dispossessed to become wage earner in the estates of big landowners or fled to small towns or cities. Similarly, the traditional bonds between the tribe chiefs and their followers were broken²⁵⁷. The direct producers under such circumstances switched to more profitable agricultural products i.e. commercial products. Within such a scheme, a new and urban class of moneylender was bound to rise in the social life²⁵⁸. The merchants, tax farmers and other non scholarly groups had money but lacked the status in provincial administration²⁵⁹. The rest of the history in the 19th century was going to witness their struggle to gain correspondent position in the administrative system.

5.1.3 Changing Role of the Maronite Clergy and the Social Mobility

Another tendency was the increasing social mobility within the Christian community. The first aspect of the social mobility within the Maronite community was the *mudabbirs* who were among the emerging groups were also related to religious. These Christian people emerged mainly as a result of the missionary activities and rised in the social order without being confined to the rules of the *mukataci* system. This group helped in the accumulation of merchant capital and served as the institution enabling the emergence of new leaders and rise of a new Christian middle class²⁶⁰. Economically, they were the new representators of the social interests in Beirut, the main exporting port of Syria.

The second and more important issue is that the period covered in this study also witnessed a change in the role and the position of the Maronite church and clergy in the region. There were two simultaneous processes: increasingly, the Maronite church gained more importance in the Lebanese politics and simultaneously it became dominated by the lower classes and became the

²⁵⁷ Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 5-6.

²⁵⁸ Sluglett and Marion, 413-416. In the Ottoman cases, the transition to large estates did not occur but rather merchants, moneylenders or local notables were the real benefitters of this process in terms of social power Keyder, 4-5.

²⁵⁹ Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 19.

²⁶⁰ Traboulsi, 18-23. However it is wrong to assume a coherent and unified body concerning the church. There was a clear division between the lower strata of the clergy and the influential bishop were fierce to the revolt. The decisive point here was the rise of the lower strata people within the clergy vis a vis the aristocratic part of the clergy, Traboulsi, 33.

representative of them. This, was partly the result of the *Tanzimat* reforms particularly with its efforts to weaken the traditional notable class and partly of the missionary activities. As the time passed, the Maronite church became a significant economic actor as it also was the biggest landowner controlling the one third of the whole Mount Lebanon. Their *waqfs* also played their role in this process.

The increasing education opportunities for the Christians, were ignited by Bashir II whose efforts were towards elevating the commoners within the social system instead of feudals, and supported by İbrahim Paşa. To weaken the feudal lords, Bashir II deprived the principal Maronite feudal families of their decisive voice in electing the upper clergy. By doing this he created an alliance with the clergy and also opened the way for their rise in the social hierarchy. However, after he was removed, the feudals tried to regain their traditional power over the clergy. This was one of the sources of the rift between the clergy and the feudals²⁶¹. However, this was not something regarding merely the ownership of assets but it was also a fact that the religious system was mobile in terms of classes and the commoners was gaining more power in the system and they were in opposition to the feudals²⁶². The rift within the clergy continued and the two processes went on simultaneously.

The 1841 war alienated the greater part of the clergy from the feudatories and the Maronites in the mixed districts were also from their co religionists in the north because of the fact that they did not attend to the “holy war”²⁶³. At the same time, the status of the Maronite patriarch changed when *Sultan* gave the permission to exist a *kapı kahyası* for the Maronites, promised him to honour his *millet's* traditional privileges and made him administratively accountable to *defterdar* and *vali* rather than the Grand *emir* of Lebanon. The existence of *kahya* gave the opportunity to patriarch not only to interact with the *sultan* only but also with the foreign powers²⁶⁴.

The rift between the clergy and the feudal emerged first in 1845 when patriarch Hubaysh died. Yusuf al Khazin, bishop of Şam and Bulus Mas’ad, bishop of Tarsus and a man of humble origin, were the two candidates. However Mas’ad waited till 1854 when Patriarch Yusuf al-Khazin died together with the *Kaim makam* Haydar Abu’l Lam, to become the new patriarch. This nomination implied the

²⁶¹ Farah, 713-717.

²⁶² Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 15.

²⁶³ Farah, 118.

²⁶⁴ Farah, 55.

certain victory of the commoners²⁶⁵. As mentioned, the Maronite clergy and the leaders of the Maronite church now was of peasant origin and officially encouraging the peasants against the lords and using the resistance card every time when the unity efforts were spent by the feudal²⁶⁶. The new Maronite patriarch Bîlus Mas'ad was of humble origin, unlike the previous ones who represented feudal families, and his opposition to the feudal families was strong. Thus *Kaim makam* Bashir Ahmad and the patriarch were on the same side of the conflict against the feudals²⁶⁷.

The changing role of the Maronite clergy is visible in some different examples. For example, when Ömer Paşa was nominated as the governor of the Lebanon upon trying to gain the loyalty of the feudal aristocracy he tried to gain the support of the commoners as well. Using his agents, he started circulating a petition praising the direct Ottoman rule and rejecting a possible return of the Shibabs. The Druzes signed the petition but the Maronites, encouraged by the strong pro-Shibab clergy, rejected signing the document. In addition to the corrupt Ottoman methods, some of the feudal lords themselves, Khazins, Hubayshes and Dahdadhs went to villages to support the Ottomans but the Patriarch were the leading power to demand the restoration of the Shibab rule and his stance also forced many important chiefs not to side with the petition²⁶⁸. Patriarch Hubaysh also published a letter demanding that a Maronite prince appointed rule Lebanon. He also urged the Maronite peasants to defy their Druze landowners. This petition in 1840, based on the Christian domination in the rule of Lebanon disrupted the equilibrium²⁶⁹.

However, despite its power, the Maronite church was only one of the actors and its rise was only an aspect in the local politics. Another important aspect of the political framework in the cities is the struggle of the local actors with the Ottoman officials.

²⁶⁵Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 74. For centuries, the Maronite patriarchs had been selected among the members of one of the leading families. But the new patriarch was of peasant origin. He had two important features: hatred towards the feudal aristocracy and the strict commitment to the tenets of his religion, see Churchill, *Druzes and Maronites*, 123.

²⁶⁶ Farah , 715-720.

²⁶⁷ Farah , 507.

²⁶⁸ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 54-60. Those Maronite chiefs who did not support the church in this event, was going to be arrested later.

²⁶⁹ Frazee , 278; Traboulsi , 15.

5.1.4 Urban Elites vs. Ottoman Establishment

As the Ottomans were not able to establish the new administration system in their mind, their efforts meant a quarrel for power between the Ottoman officials and the actors at the local level.

To start with, as the Ottomans were weak in military power and for this reason people were urged to find their own methods of protecting themselves from the Bedouin attacks, bandits and tax collectors. Another point is that, upon the arrival of the Ottomans the most important thing was the situation and the privileges of the *şeyhs* which also prepared the core of the conflict in 1841. Upon the departure of İbrahim, the Druze *şeyhs* sided with the winning group demanding the reinstatement of their traditional rights which was rejected by the *Emir* and the Maronite clergy. In the attack, the Ottomans sided with the Druzes and ultimately the Druzes got successful when the Maronites lost the war. Then, Ömer Paşa was nominated instead of Bashir Qasim with the mission of implementing the *Tanzimat* reforms. Within a short period of time, both the Druze and Maronite notables became opposite to the Ottoman policies that threatened the sources of their traditional power. The Druzes, accepting the return of the Shibab dynasty and a compensation for the losses of Maronites in the previous fights, even offered alliance to them. This offer of alliance was declined but in 1842, the Druzes, on themselves, did not hesitate to attack Ömer Paşa who was saved only by the help of soldiers came from Beirut under the command of their Paşas²⁷⁰.

Within this context, the local leaders from the hereditary *şeyh* families regained their power as the urban notables and many times, for there were too much constraints on their power, the *valis* had to align with them to perform his jobs. However, in some cases they also constituted obstacle on the use of the power of the *valis* and led the resistance against the Ottoman policies²⁷¹.

When members of the *şeyh* families were no longer *timar* holders, they were appointed as the chiefs of the districts by *Vali*. If an Ottoman officer had managed to

²⁷⁰ Winslow, 28-31; Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 60-62.

²⁷¹ Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 17; Adel Manna, "Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Rebellions in Palesine," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 1 (1994): 52.

deprive one *şeyh* of his power, another family member used to rise to his position²⁷². When they gained the perspective of position in bureaucracy or certain privileges, they also fought between themselves to gain it²⁷³.

When they also fought for supremacy between each other and for the social and the political control of the districts, the Ottoman officials were directly involved in the conflict as actors. An interesting case was regarding the Yazbaki-Janbalati divisions within the Druzes in the south. After 1845, Said Janbalat, an ambitious person, rose to the leadership of the Janbalatis. His growing prestige caused concern among the Yazbakis and forced them to organize an internal opposition under the leadership of Naşif Abu Nakad. The Ottoman governor and the French consul also had concerns about the situation. To counterbalance, they backed the mentioned regrouping among the Yazbakis and encouraged internal opposition within the Janbalatis, although failed because Said Janbalat emerged as the leader of the Druzes. In the following phases, to oppose the British backed Janbalats, the Ottomans encouraged the *Kaim makam* to oppose him. In 1849 the new *Kaim makam*, Amin Arslan, rejected the previous agreement between *Kaim makam* and the Druze chiefs saying that he was appointed by Şekip Efendi instead of being elected by the Druze notables. Said Janbalat made the propaganda that Amin Arslan and his family was not a strict Muslim and the *Kaim makam* should be held by Muslim. The Druzes became also against the Ottomans because of the selection of the *Kaim makam*. The opposition to *Kaim makam* somehow made the Janbalatis and Yazbakis come together with the support of Britain and the result of all these antagonism was the 1852 riot against the Ottomans where only a few clashes between Maronites and the Druzes took place²⁷⁴. All these struggles also took place in the implementation of the reforms and during the regular working of the *meclises*.

²⁷² Alexander Scholch, "The Decline of Local Power in Palestine after 1956: the Case of Aqil Aga," *Die Welt Des Islams, New Series*, 1984: 459-460.

²⁷³ Keyder, 9-10; Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 13.

²⁷⁴ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 76-77.

5.2 State-Society Relations

The state society relations can be regarded from several aspects because the Ottomans entered in an interaction with the society in more than one way. Some of these interactions and their consequences directly affected the success of the *Tanzimat*, its relations with the society and the civil relations. In addition to the other aspects mentioned in this study, at the last analysis the state strategy and its feature can be summarised in three main categories. To start with, the state failed in implementing certain policies. It could not achieve many of the tenets of the reform package and the second is that, to alleviate its situation and gain relative power, the state somehow encouraged struggle between different local actors. It also somehow encouraged the introduction of ordinary people into the political arena.

5.2.1 Inability of the State to Impose its Rule

When the Ottomans came Syria again, they had to do things that were the important tenets of their reform package. However, the early 1840s were marked by revival of the disorders similar to pre İbrahim period. Following the initial retreat in terms of the centralist reforms, the Ottomans forced the people to obey its rule by imposing certain obligations like disarmament, taxation, and other duties for the army on the one hand and achieving a perceptible progress in the control of the land on the other such as land management or population counts on the other²⁷⁵. However, the state failed to impose the rule and order even during the war.

As for the security forces, it should be confessed that many times there was no police force to stop the events and the irregular troops further deteriorated the situation and the Christians saw these as support to the the Druzes²⁷⁶. Following the outbreak of the war, it was once again seen that the Ottomans still had problems regarding the “tools” of the modern state. In Wadi al-Taym, the Christians took refuge in the palace of the governor where the Ottoman governor let the Druze attackers in and caused the murder of the people inside. The number was close to one thousand. There were much similar cases. In Dayr al-Kamar also the Ottoman soldiers disarmed the Christians and then opened the gate for the Druze attackers²⁷⁷.

²⁷⁵ Sluglett and Marion, 410; Rafeq, 385.

²⁷⁶ Fawaz, 48-50. The attacks of the troops were not something indigenous to the wartime events. Even during the ordinary times, particularly during the times of harvest these başıbozüks were attacking villages, see Rafeq, 386.

²⁷⁷ Winslow, 37-38.

When the revolt started, the Druzes somehow reached the weapons collected from the Christians and then, the Ottomans failed to protect the Christians²⁷⁸.

In some cases, some of those who had come to protect the Muslims from the possible massacres were among those who committed war crimes in the previous attacks. The soldiers who would protect the Christian quarters withdrew. Particularly the irregular troops attended the rebellion²⁷⁹. The former *Yeniçeri* factions were also relevant to the conflict. In Aleppo events of 1850, many of the people who attacked the non-Muslims were from the eastern suburbs²⁸⁰. Economically this part of the city was the poorest one, mainly involved in the displaced caravan trade, however, these places were also strongholds of the city's *yeniçeri* factions. Their leader, Abdallah al-Babinsi is said to refuse to lead the attacks but he is also said to be demonstrating a tacit approval of the attacks²⁸¹. During the great war in 1860 the ottoman irregular troops attacked even the woman who were left untouched by the Druzes²⁸². The Ottomans also failed to protect the Christians from the Druze attacks. When the revolt started, the Druzes somehow reached the weapons that were collected from the Christians and then, the Ottomans failed to protect the Christians²⁸³. In some cases, the Ottomans promised the Christians to protect them but they failed²⁸⁴. Some Ottoman troops were accused of maltreating the Christians women left alive and untouched by the Druzes²⁸⁵.

The population count constitutes another example. As mentioned, both to evaluate the tax base and ensure recruitment for the army, population count was the *sine qua non* component of the reform. When the Ottomans attempted to achieve such an important component of the reform process, aware of the population count would be a source of conflict between state and society, they reinforced their attempt

²⁷⁸ Fawaz, 59.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 85-88.

²⁸⁰ Masters, 14.

²⁸¹ *Ibid*, 5.

²⁸² Churchill, *Druzes and Maronites*, 145. To depict how hard the situation of the Ottomans is, it is right to say the Ottomans may have had an excuse. The Ottomans were too busy with the revolts and developments in the Balkans. For this reasons they did not paid the due attention to the events in Syria and Lebanon at least at the initial phases, see Mustafa Akar, "Arşiv Vesikaları Işığında Cebel-i Lübnan ve Şam Hadiseleri (1860-1861)," *Unpublished Thesis for the Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Contemporary History from the University of Istanbul* (İstanbul, 1996),155.

²⁸³ Fawaz, 59.

²⁸⁴ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 98-102.

²⁸⁵ Fawaz, 64-69.

with the arrival of the an army under the command of Muhammad *Paşa*. The local notables, aware of the fact that motives of the count were taxation and military recruitment, undermined the efforts and undercounted the population. This was also the case in Mount Lebanon²⁸⁶. The events in 1852 which the Ottomans failed to ensure conscription is also another example.

The Ottomans also failed to increase the services that had, categorically, constituted a significant ingredient of the reform package. The road buildings, spread of education and health services failed. In the absence of the Ottoman services, the Druze and Maronite elites turned to the missionaries for modern education²⁸⁷.

5.2.2 Enhancing State Autonomy by Encouraging War among Local Actors

It is possible to say that to some extent the failure of the Ottoman state was deliberate. As the Ottomans were trying to establish direct rule in Syria, they somehow tolerated or supported local conflicts. The most important reason for adopting this policy was the fact that the Ottomans lacked enough military power and there were many examples to prove this²⁸⁸. The Ottomans generally did not do anything to change the oppressor *kaim makams* and the commissions to investigate the claims about the oppression of them generally failed on purpose. Their aim was to prove that no government, except a direct Ottoman administration could fix the problems inherent in Lebanon and provide the rule and order in the region²⁸⁹.

To start with, the polarisation took a long time before the outbreaks. Following the Şekip Efendi Reglement, inter-*mukataci* rivalries emerged; the Khazins opposed Bashir Ahmad Abu'l Lam, the *Kaim makam* of the north and similarly Druze leaders Sa'id Janbalat refused to recognise the authority of Amin Arslan, the *Kaim makam* of the south. This clash led to a revolt in 1852 for which the parties prepared regularly and thoroughly for a long time²⁹⁰. The Ottomans could have

²⁸⁶See Doumani , 2-5. However, this resistance faced less resistance than those occurred during the era of Ibrahim the main reason of this was the changing political environment: the local notables preferred to cooperate with the Ottomans in return for certain advantages see also Doumani, 13.

²⁸⁷See Makdisi, 91. An argument to explain the harsh reaction of Fuad Paşa emphasizes the coercive monopoly of the state implying that Fuat had established that monopoly see also Makdisi , 149.

²⁸⁸ Makdisi , 73; Chasseaud , 251; Scholch, 459.

²⁸⁹ Churchill, *Druzes and Maronites*, 124-125.

²⁹⁰ Traboulsi , 27.

interfered in by, *inter alia*, prohibiting arms imports or prevent the procurement of French money for buying arms, but they did not do anything to prevent or stop the clashes²⁹¹. Even after the outbreak of the conflict, the Ottoman governor did not try to stop the conflict. Moreover, behaving to the contrary to the state concept of the *Tanzimat* mind, they supported the Druzes in some cases²⁹².

Thus, there were cases that the Ottomans were not objective regarding the sectarian relations. It is also true to say that some Ottoman *Paşas* were biased toward the Druzes. The war in 1845 had been a case to this effect. When the Maronites attacked the Druze villages, the Ottomans clearly sided with the Druzes and stopped the Maronite advancement. Only upon the reactions of the European consuls made them stop the Druze retaliations on the Maronites²⁹³. However, there were reasons for this situation. One reason for such treatments was the feeling of religion²⁹⁴. During the revolt in 1841, Salim *Paşa* of Beirut supported the Druzes. Ottoman arms were transferred to the Druzes and even the Ottoman soldiers fought with the Druzes. Main aim in this point is to encourage a sectarian war that will end the *emirate* and the special administrative status of Lebanon. When Ottomans intervened in to mediate, Mustafa *Paşa* tried to convince the Christians about the merits of direct Ottoman administration. Nearly no attempt was made to stop the bloodshed. In addition, the fugitives from the attacked villages were robbed by the Ottoman troops²⁹⁵. In Dayr al-Kamar the Ottomans did not try to stop the conflict, they also surrendered the refugees to the Druzes²⁹⁶. In some cases, the Ottoman soldiers were sent to help the Druzes against the Christians as Vecihi *Paşa* did in 1845²⁹⁷.

²⁹¹ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 88.

²⁹² Salibi, 95-99.

²⁹³ Winslow, 32-33.

²⁹⁴ It is possible a partial religious prejudice of the Ottomans. When it came to the Christians, they were successful many times in containing the movement that could transform into a war. For example Shi'i *şeyhs* from the district of Jbaa and the regions of Shqif, Shumar and Bsharreh, attempted going to Jbaa and attack the Druzes but the Ottomans stopped them, see also Fawaz, 60.

²⁹⁵ Salibi, *The 1860 Upheaval*, 50-52.

²⁹⁶ Akar, 21.

²⁹⁷ Salibi, *The 1860 Upheaval*, 69.

5.2.3 The Introduction of Ahali into State Politics and Empowerment of the Sectarianism

The *Tanzimat* policies affected to a great extent inter sectarian relations as well. One of these aspects is the publicization of the political arena the introduction of “*ahali*” to the politics²⁹⁸. Surely *Tanzimat* was not the only power who integrated masses to the political arena but it was an important motive to this end. To start with, the *meclises* were one tool as they had been designed to introduce people to the political arena and ensure a greater representation. Improved education and increasing social mobility also helped this process, the examples of which can be observed in any upsurge of the peasants. However, this is certainly in conflict with the interests of the notables as we seen in the case of Kisrawan. This is why many times the implementation of the reforms took form of a contest between the lower classes and the notables. The representation in *meclises* is an example to this effect.

Another dimension of this issue is the strong upsurge the *Tanzimat* policies gave to the sectarianization of the Lebanese politics. This process started particularly with the Double *Kaim makamate*. Certainly the establishment of this new administrative system was not a local decision and was led by the wrong assumptions of the foreigners about the demography in Lebanon. This system legitimated the sectarian politics by dividing the Mount across religious lines. The elites adopted this new division for their role and rank was continuing²⁹⁹. But maybe the most long lasting impact it left is the fact that this system divided the society along the sectarian lines. It let the sectarian lines to cross over all the alternative loyalties and made people adopt their sects as the only way to join in the political arena and left the other loyalties whether class or status nearly meaningless in political arena³⁰⁰.

5.3 Sectarian Relations

Sectarian relations were also relevant as a factor inherent in the society. This issue will be analyzed by the reaction of the Muslims to the developments and the rise of the *zimmis*.

²⁹⁸ Makdisi, 66.

²⁹⁹ Makdisi, 80.

³⁰⁰ Akar, 10.

5.3.1 Muslim Reflex to Protect Islam

It is not right to link the failures of *Tanzimat* to only its own shortages. The Muslim reaction to the modernist reforms were also relevant. The men in the street in Syria, as in many other places of the Ottoman Empire, regarded the reforms as tools to undermine the power of the Islam and reacted in line with this argument³⁰¹. The use of the rights given to the Christians somehow disturbed them as the Christians forgot that the Muslims were still more powerful than them and all the administrative elite were Muslims³⁰².

The situation of the Jews, who used their rights more modestly, is already mentioned in 1850 Aleppo events. In addition to this, the demands of the rioters in the same event also reflects the fear of the Christian reforms. In addition to the reaction to conscription, the three demands of the rioters were no ringing of church bells, no carrying of crosses and the forbiddance to the non-Muslim to own their own slaves³⁰³. The Druzes were regarding themselves as a part of the oppressed Muslim majority and in this sense the process was part of the general reaction to the reform policy an accompaniment to the mentioned economic developments. For this reason the threat perceived by the Druzes was not only the abolition of their traditional privileges but also their sources of revenues like the territory³⁰⁴. They were regarding themselves as warriors who were protecting the Muslim state. When the revolt broke out in Şam, some people were believing that the *Sultan* ordered them to exterminate the infidels³⁰⁵.

This feeling found its reflection in the mind of the Muslim *Kaim makam*. He was hostile to the Christians and after the Crimean War and the rebellions in the Balkans, the *Kaim makam* thought it was convenient to execute the “friends of Russia”. This issue was so serious that at the end Sultan published an order saying not to execute the Christians “friendly to Russia”³⁰⁶.

³⁰¹Hourani, *Ottoman Reform*, 59. Interesting point is that, in İstanbul, the Druzes were considered *zimmis* and exempt from conscription, they were exempt from toll tax as well, see Urquhart, 192-193.

³⁰² Mikhayil Mishaqa, *Murder, Mayhem, Pillage and Plunder: The History of Lebanon in the 18th and 19th Centuries* (New York: Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 244

³⁰³ Masters, 6.

³⁰⁴ Traboulsi, 27.

³⁰⁵ Salibi, *Modern History of Lebanon*, 107.

³⁰⁶It should be said that the biggest supporter of Kaim makam was the Patriarch Mas'ad see Farah, 507.

5.3.2 Non-Muslim Domination of Social and Political Life

The first aspect of the non Muslim domination of social and political life is the demography and the fact that the Christian rates of population growth outnumbered the Muslims. But more important than that is the issue of migration due to the fact that the commercially important districts gained a particular importance in this sense throughout the *Tanzimat* period. The Maronite immigration to the south, which began during the term of Fakhr al-Din II, continued. The trade towns became more cosmopolit places. It helped creating a division within the society: a Druze bloc primarily tribal in which military function dominated and a Christian bloc with a wide artisan and peasant base with strong commercial financial aspects³⁰⁷.

Zahleh, an important commercial center, is an interesting example in this sense. The population growth accompanied the expansion of the commercial activities in the region. It took a significant number of refugee, especially peasants and semi nomads from the surrounding regions. The population of Zahleh was less than one thousand people at the end of the 18th century whereas this number was within the range of 10000 to 12000 in the middle of the 1850s. This changed the balance within the population as the Greek Catholics overwhelmingly outnumbered the Druzes. Zahleh, was the stronghold of the Greek Catholic interest and anyone other than the Greek Catholics had been facing aggressive treatment³⁰⁸.

Dayr al-Kamar, another industrialized, commercially important centre and the most rich district in the region also had similar patterns. At the beginning of the 19th century, it had 4000 residents and this figure rised to the range of 7000-10000 in the late 1850s. The Christians overtook the Druze population³⁰⁹. Actually Dayr al-Kamar was a place in which the sectarian relations were traditionally tolerable but when they grew richer, they also increased their consumption, enhanced their quality of lives and they also showed this in public. They also maintained a standing military force, and started more aggressively interfering in the social and political life of the surrounding regions³¹⁰.

³⁰⁷ Traboulsi, 16.

³⁰⁸ Fawaz, 36.

³⁰⁹ This happened as a result of the deliberate policies of Bashir II because even as early as 1853 the Christian population was five or six times more crowded than the Druzes.

³¹⁰ Fawaz, 38-40.

The classical tradition of the Ottoman system encouraged the non-Muslim to specialise in commerce, finance and handicraft industry. This system found its reflection in Lebanon as there was a Druze community dominated by tribal warriors and Christians with a large peasant and merchant base³¹¹. The period under analysis witnessed the rise of the merchant class and the peasants. Economically, the Christians became the middle man of the European trade. In addition to their advantageous role in the commercial relations, they also had the *protege* status so were exempt from the tax and similar duties. These two issues resulted in the rise of new Catholic entrepreneurial class as in Aleppo. As a result, the cities expanded and even the suburbs became subjected to the European influence³¹².

Another dimension of the non Muslim domination was the expanding education opportunities. Both the missionary schools and church's initiatives increased the education opportunities for the non-Muslims. İbrahim Paşa also contributed to the early efforts of the Maronite church by military schools in Aleppo and Şam, regimental schools to teach reading and writing to Syrian conscripts and by sending students to Cairo for education³¹³. All these aimed, and to some extent served, to weaken the power of the local notables and social groups.

5.4 Economic Inequality and its Effects

The other aspect of the issue was the economic roots of the conflict. As the economic framework was changing in the region, the new framework significantly damaged the internal equilibrium of the society also in economic sense. The results of the new economic relations demonstrated itself in mainly three areas: foreign commercial relations, relations between different kind of classes and the relations between the peasants and the lords.

5.4.1 Foreign Trade

The impact of the increasing foreign trade affected the conflict in more than one way. All the guilds were under burden. Textile guilds were protected to some extent but service guilds became extinct³¹⁴. As the guilds were not only economic

³¹¹ Traboulsi, 4.

³¹² Masters, 16

³¹³ Salibi, *The 1860 Upheaval*, 122-140.

³¹⁴ Masters, 15.

actors, as mentioned earlier, this process significantly deteriorated the ability to control the society.

All through this process, the merchants became the intermediary between the foreign traders and peasants. However this process attested to be contrary to the wishes when the interest rate of the peasants reached the level of 40 percent, twice higher than that one in the era of İbrahim³¹⁵. This put them under a hard economic condition when the foreign commerce also affected the landowner-peasant relations. The increase in the price of the cash crop also strengthened the status of the landowners but certainly the real benefitor of this process was the merchants in the city³¹⁶. The loser in this system was certainly the peasant.

The production was also affected negatively from the foreign trade as the economic crisis severely damaged the silk and cloth industry in Syria, as the incorporation to the world economy had been an inflationary period so it also brought a further burden on, say, “middle class”³¹⁷. In Şam, the attackers were generally craftsmen and shopkeepers³¹⁸. This economic decline was also combined by the mentioned rapid urbanization in the port cities. It was also relevant to say that the ratio of consumers within the society increased more rapidly comparing to the producers³¹⁹.

As it is aimed to be argued throughout this study, the economic transformation and the inability of the Ottomans to respond was a significant reason of the conflicts and the foreign trade was the most important component of this process. All the conflicts took place in trade towns that were exempt from this transformation and, to a large extent, were away from the events as well. This mentioned framework inevitably led to a kind of a class based conflict generally between the peasant and the lord or the attack of the poor to the rich.

³¹⁵ Traboulsi , 22.

³¹⁶ Rafeq , 391.

³¹⁷ Tabak , 138-139.

³¹⁸ Makdisi, 146.

³¹⁹ Tabak, 140-141.

5.4.2 Class Based Conflicts

It is possible to talk about two dimensions of the class based conflict in the period under analysis. To start with, there is a certain pattern for all the events mentioned in this study: the attacks, more or less, were the upsurge of the poor against the more rich segments of the society. So, if we adopt the approach of Khoury who says that the class, in the case of 19th century Lebanon, could be essentialized to the similarity of interests and a shared conscious, it should be said that the conflict analyzed in this study was a class based conflict³²⁰. Moreover, it should be added that the mobs generally consisted of unemployed Muslims and textile workers who lost their jobs. They were angry with the Christians who were identified with the European interests who impoverished them³²¹.

After the biggest riot broke out in 1860, the implications of this feature again found its reflection. The rioters attacked the houses of rich Christians first and then the local churches as the second³²². In Şam, the Jews and relatively poor Christians were spared³²³. During the same events, the men of Tanyus Shanin plundered the property of the Christian merchants in Antilyas and threatened and some other Christian bands threatened Bishop Nicholas Murad to do the same for his property³²⁴.

The other aspect of the issue on the other hand is the attack of the commoner against their lords³²⁵. Despite there were some small and middle level agricultural owners, the majority of the inhabitants of the Mount Lebanon were peasants who were exploited severely. The peasant had the right to possess and cultivate the land, the *tasarruf* and if he had no sons, the other relatives could replace him by paying a tax³²⁶. They sometimes had to contract loans to pay the taxes but the burden of

³²⁰ Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 3.

³²¹ *Ibid*, 23.

³²² Fawaz, 89.

³²³ Makdisi, 146.

³²⁴ *Ibid*, 136.

³²⁵ In this sense this is a class study. The fact is that in the north, the Maronite regions, the landowners were the Maronites and they were oppressing their own co-religionists. In the south, the mixed regions, the Druze landowners were oppressing the Maronite peasants and was dependent on the Druze peasants to continue with their positions. The Druzes did not have problems with their landowners in this sense. This division was to a large extent the result of the policies of after *Tanzimat* period.

³²⁶ A.L., Vdivitch, and A.M. Tvarki, "Ottoman Land Tenure and Taxation in Syria," *Studia Islamica: Ex Fasciculo L.* (Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve- Larose, 1979), 118.

taxation urged them sometimes migrate to the neighboring villages. Sometimes they also had to sell all their property to generally the moneylender in the town or more generally in Şam. The 1858 Land Code further strengthened the absentee lords and the moneylenders by giving them the opportunity to have the ownership of the lands they controlled. The 90 percent of the silk harvest was confiscated by the *emirs*, *şeyhs*, monasteries, middle men and Beiruti merchants thus leaving only 10 percent to the real producers³²⁷.

This inequality showed its results. After the events in Kisrawan and the consecutive and similar events in Dayr al-Kamar, Bilad Jubayl and Ghazir, it did not took a long time when the rebellion reached a new phase demanding land distribution and better conditions for tenant farming. Dayr al-Kamar, the most important Christian town, overthrew its Druze overlords. Finally Zahleh also declared its independent commune under the leadership of a council of eight notable families, expelling appointee of *Kaim makam* and appropriating the property of the *Kaim makam*. Similar agrarian revolts mixed with the reaction against the *Tanzimat* and bread riots took place also in Lattakiya, and Aleppo in 1858 and 1859 respectively. In all cases, the armed peasants confiscated land, harvests and livestock belonging to the *şeyh* while the tenant farmers cultivated the land if their lords and took over the harvest. Bands of landless peasants, tenant farmers and unemployed workers attacked the villages to track down members of Khazin family. What stopped them was the leader of the rebellion, patriarch Shanin³²⁸. As this was the state, it was impossible for them not to be involved in the economic based aspects of the issue.

5.5 Foreign Involvement

Another aspect of the political conflict in Syria was the impact of the foreign involvement in the local affairs. Actually, the foreigners had their role in Ottoman lands for a long time and one of the main aims of the *Tanzimat* movement was to eliminate this effect³²⁹. At just point it should be said that this study rejects any argument who somehow essentializes the conflict to “foreign intervention” ignoring

³²⁷ Rafeq , 388-390; Traboulsi , 17.

³²⁸ Traboulsi , 28-32.

³²⁹ Churchill, *The Druzes and Maronites*, 235.

the local interests. For this reason, the term foreign involvement is preferred implying the embeddement of foreign interests in local factors.

Regarding the foreign impact in Syria, it is possible to talk about mainly three types. First is the foreign merchants who had settled in the region. Second is the officers or consuls of Russia and Western European states who were implementing official foreign policies of individual states. Third is the missionaries who had come to spread their faith. As the first one is discussed sepererately in this thesis, this part of the study will focus on consuls and missionaries³³⁰.

Actually Lebanon constitutes an interesting example in this sense. France and Britain were the two countries which intervened in the affairs of the *Vilayet* of Şam during the 19th century. It was no surprise that the main reason behind this interventionist soul is economics as the region had been a good import and export market for the foreign countries. It also has importance for the trade routes. Syria was exporting cash crops to England and France and a viable alternative to Russia for grains³³¹.

Within such a scheme, the consular intervention in the sectarian problems of the Mount started in the period of İbrahim Paşa and when Ömer Paşa was nominated, it was already a common feature in the Lebanese politics. The local people, always suspicious of the Ottoman rule, had adopted the method of getting in relationship with foreigners to further their interests. In early 1840s, the Austrian and French counsellors were competing for the protection of the Maronites. For France, which also had historical ties with the region, the involvement had reached to a high level and became so integrated with the internal struggle in Lebanon that the French influence was equated with the Maronite power³³². The Russian consul was trying to protect the Greek Orthodox. Although not visible in early phases, the Druzes enjoyed

³³⁰ I think it is more reasonable to consider those who have come for Ottoman state service within the regard of the Ottoman statecraft. Also, I don't think the individual travellers left an impact comparable to the two other type of "foreigners". This is why this study doesn't cover these types of people. Schilcher (1981) categorizes the consulars within the context of individual interventions but for these people were implementing the official policies of the states to a large extent, they have not been seperated from the state policies. There were foreign settlements particularly in Mount at significant amounts the mainly because of the silk trade, see C.W.M. Van De Helde, *Narrative of a Journey Through Syria and Palestine in 1851-1852*, Vol. 1. 2 vols. (Edinburgh and London: William Blackburn and Sons, 1854), 61. However, they were not as influential as the consulars politically.

³³¹ Schilcher, 160.

³³² Akar , 14 However, as I have defended so far, I don't think it is right to regard foreign influence as the only conflict creating factor.

support from the Britishes in the wake of 1840s³³³. However, particularly French agents were promoting a Druze-Maronite coexistence particularly in the early phases³³⁴.

Within this complex system, the consuls were very influential as they interacted with the Ottoman officials and the local actors and as mentioned were involved in the local politics. The consulates many times served as a sanctuary for the rebels, which sometimes created problems between the Ottoman *Paşas* and the consuls. During the execution of the *ferman* regarding the rebels in 1842, the British Consul even threatened to resist against the Ottoman troops³³⁵. In some parts of Palestine, people asked for the help of the consuls to avoid from conscription³³⁶.

The protective rights enjoyed by the consuls and their agents were so powerful that gave them kind of a veto right over the administrative issues in Lebanon after 1840 and they were gaining a significant amount of income, very close to the most important Ottoman *Paşas*³³⁷. As the time passed, they became too embedded with the locals in Syria as the daughter of the British council married with a member of the Shibab family³³⁸. French consul general in Lebanon was strong enough even to nominate Ottoman officers or open or close the doors of the prison³³⁹.

However, the problem was not only the consuls themselves. There was a certain institution, *protection*, extending their power and the privileges of foreigners to local people. It was in the seventeenth century when for the first time the French government gave the Maronites the “letter of protection” and the time made them nearly sovereign over them³⁴⁰. In the 19th century, this became much more institutionalized. They established relationships with merchants, who were replacing the traditional notables as the person who provided money to the peasant. These merchants had a significant wealth and they were also attached to the consuls with the institution of *protege*. The consuls also supported the process directly when

³³³ Chasseaud , 302-303.

³³⁴ Salibi, *The 1860 Upheaval*, 56.

³³⁵ Churchill, *Mount Lebanon*, 318-321.

³³⁶ Helde, 315.

³³⁷ Farah, 20; RiskAllahEfendi, 269.

³³⁸ Farah, 503.

³³⁹ C. Churchill, *The Druzes and Maronites*, 116-117.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 20

Jewish and Christians became moneylenders and purchased the claims of landowner which created hostility against the reforms³⁴¹.

By the early 19th century, the number of the *proteges* were within the range of thousands. Most of them were local Christians so they were the main beneficiary of the increasing European influence³⁴². It was not only merchants though: when a peasant entered into the service of a foreigner, he was exempt from taxation and similar duties. When these privileged foreigners had kids in Syria, with Syrian wives, the children also carried the privileges of his/her father. There were many merchants under the foreign protection and they were receiving a good amount of income³⁴³.

The events in Dayr al-Kamar in 1852 constituted an example to this effect. When the Ottomans decided to perform recruitment, people responded by fleeing to the highlands of the Wadi el-Taym and declared revolt. The clear support of Britain and France to the rioters was a significant factor in the resulting inability of the Sublime Porte in crushing the rebellion. They actively tried to prevent the Ottoman intervention³⁴⁴.

The nature of these interventions is a another point. To start with, these foreign agents did not regard the Empire as a multi ethnic and multi religious society but instead considered it as a Muslim society with large “minorities” with the Christians as “victims” of the Muslim domination. There was a strong religious hatred and one of the aims of the ambassadors was to “free” these Christians³⁴⁵. But what is defended in this study is that the main reason should be sought within the context of more secular ideas. Similarly, the consent of the European states to supervise the welfare of their co-religionists should be explained in terms of their

³⁴¹ Hourani, Ottoman Reform, 67-68; Edmund Burke III, “Rural Collective Action and the Emergence of Modern Lebanon,” in *Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus içinde*, by Nadim Shedadi and Dana Haffar Mills, Great Britain: I.B.Tauris 1992), 27.

³⁴² Fawaz, 22-23;

³⁴³ RiskAllahEfendi, 95. As the time passed, the native agents for commercial relations became a problem for the foreign merchants. Britain ordered its envoys in the region to limit the protection only to the non-Ottoman subjects by birth and to afford protection only to British subjects. If they were Ottoman subjects by birth, they would not be subject to the protection, see Farah, 528.

³⁴⁴ Winslow, 34. It is reasonable to seek the British support to the Druzes under the fact that both France and Russia and a co-religionist in Lebanon. The Druzes was the only remaining groups because there was no considerable Protestant community see also Makdisi, 106.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 10.

political, economic and particularly commercial interests³⁴⁶. The interests of the states many times had been more important than the religion.

The Khazin *şeyhs* of Kisrawan is an example. They demanded the Britishes to represent them in front of the Porte when the uprising just broke out. They were attacked, they and their families were oppressed and their property was confiscated. No one (Ottomans, British consul and French) cared the situation of the Khazins³⁴⁷. It is true that Hurşid Paşa did not have the power to pacify the region. However, it is also true that the Europeans also tried to prevent the Ottomans from interfering in the problem³⁴⁸. The state interests were more important than religious ties.

Another feature of the involvement of the consuls in local politics had been the fact that it does not always create hostility and conflict. In 1841, according to a contemporary observer, what prevented the war in Dayr al-Kamar was the intervention of British consul. As in some cases the French consuls tried to prevent a riot against the Ottomans³⁴⁹. Russia, on the other hand, was supporting the Ottomans against the feudals and sectarianism with an aim of reducing the power of Britain³⁵⁰. Similarly, Austria paid money on the condition that the Maronites stay loyal to Sultan³⁵¹. So it should not be contemplated as every foreign country was encouraging locals to riot against the Ottomans.

The other grouping important for the period under analysis is the missionary activities in the region. American Protestant missionaries began to arrive in Lebanon in 1820s and after the expulsion of İbrahim Paşa they started consolidating their existence particularly in the rural area³⁵². By 1841, they were so important that the permission to open a church in Lebanon became a diplomatic problem³⁵³.

On the surface, their principal activity covered education. They opened schools and published books, both scientific and religion. In 1850s, they reached the number of six stations and had fifteen free schools with hundreds of students, one

³⁴⁶ C. Churchill, *Druzes and Maronites*, 7.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 125-126

³⁴⁸ Makdisi, 106.

³⁴⁹ C. Churchill, *Druzes and Maronites*, 44-45; Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 77.

³⁵⁰ Farah, 60-61.

³⁵¹ *Ibid*, 118.

³⁵² Churchill, *Mount Lebanon*, 175.

³⁵³ Farah, 297-298; Akar, 6.

fourth of which were girls. They also had two other schools for higher degree³⁵⁴. The Missionary schools were so important and spreading so quickly that in 1870 a specific mission was sent from the Great Britain to analyze the situation of these schools³⁵⁵. In addition to education, they also offered health services to people³⁵⁶. In 1848, the missionary activities were declared free by the Sublime Porte and the local governors were ordered to protect them when necessary.

However, the missionaries were not only involved in health and education but they were political actors as well. They were influential in the early conflicts during the 1840s provoking the Maronites to rise against the Druzes³⁵⁷. On the one hand, in some cases, they provoked some of the conflicts actively encouraged a “Christian victory” against the Druzes³⁵⁸. In addition they distributed the knowledge along the sectarian lines which also increased sectarian polarization³⁵⁹.

They also entered in a rivalry with local Christian groups³⁶⁰. Their rivalry with the Maronites was so strong that upon departure of Bashir Shibab, Maronites sought the help of France against them when the French consul accused the missionaries of provoking the Christians against them and the patriarch threatened that any Maronite who got in contact with the missionaries will be excommunicated³⁶¹.

5.6 Nature of the Conflict

Within such a scheme, the nature of the conflict is a widely debated issue. Although it is easy to regard the conflicts under analysis of an age-old religious hatred, the situation is a bit more complex and to essentialise the issue to only religious hatrecy is wrong. To start with, disorders in Lebanon, in which the Christians and the Muslims confronted was not a new thing to Lebanon. But a confrontation to the extent in 1860 was a new thing although many reasons such as conscription and taxation were common. As Makdisi emphasizes, this is not the age old Christian-Muslim conflict. This conflict had been the result of an interaction

³⁵⁴ Churchill, *Mount Lebanon*, 176-188.

³⁵⁵ Alexander Duff, James Muldsen, *Report of a Mission of Inquiry in Lebanon*, (Edinburgh 1870)

³⁵⁶ RiskAllahEfendi, 306.

³⁵⁷ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 56.

³⁵⁸ Makdisi, 125; Harel , 8.

³⁵⁹ Makdisi , 91.

³⁶⁰ Helde , 65.

³⁶¹ Frazee , 278.

between the local political actors, international environment and the policies of the Sublime Porte³⁶².

There are various things that make the nature of the conflict more complicated than a mere sectarian identity. To start with, the people of Syria and particularly Lebanon was living in a place where intense interactions were taking place. It is wrong to think that there was a complete religious equality internalized in Lebanon but the religious boundaries were not strict, they were complex and variable in different regions, cases and terms³⁶³. For example Al-Qattan, referring to court cases, argues that the *zimmis* were able to find justice in for example Muslim courts³⁶⁴.

What is more is that, the boundaries, many times, were not religious but rather sectarian. There were cases showing that Maronites disowned other Christian sects. In Zahleh, for example, the Greek Catholics targeted not only Druzes but also to other Muslim and Christian sects. In addition there were cases that the sectarian understanding was dismissed as unimportant when they faced with the political motivations. They were also ignored by Bashir II³⁶⁵. In addition, for example the Greek Orthodoxes who were demanding a separate *Kaim makam* for themselves, refused to join the attacks in 1845 war³⁶⁶. Particularly the Greek Orthodoxes were oppressed by Maronites and Muslim sects both. Their arguments in the courts were neglected particularly in conflict with a Maronite and claims were punished with assaults³⁶⁷. Many times the Maronite church was ignoring their demands.

In addition, within the regard of the two combatant groups, we should not assume two homogenous camps. Although many times the Christians were the triggers of the events, the Maronites had not any sole leadership and the efforts of the Maronite clergy could not achieve this aim³⁶⁸. The main reason of this situation was the framework of the administration. The bonds of religion between the mukatacis

³⁶² Makdisi , 140.

³⁶³ Najwa Al-Qattan, "Litigans and neighbors: The Communal Topography of Ottoman Damascus," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44, no. 3 (2002): 524; Charles Issawi, *The Middle East Economy: Decline and Recovery: Selected Essays* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995).

³⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 515.

³⁶⁵ Fawaz, 34-36.

³⁶⁶ Winslow, 33.

³⁶⁷ Churchill , *Druzes and Maronites*, 123.

³⁶⁸ Fawaz , 52-54.

and the subjects in the north created a division between subjects and the leaders among the Christians whereas among the Druzes the situations were to the contrary³⁶⁹. Many times the cases had been depicted, also throughout in this study, Maronites or Druzes attacking their own co-religionists.

Although this period of turmoil is called sectarian conflict, this is not always the case. Till the clash in Dayr al-Kamar, the sectarian character was not given to the war and the commercial interest overwhelmed the sectarian interests. Many people hesitated to take sides. In additions for example in Wadi el-Taym, the primary rivalry was between the Druze and the Sunni Shibab family. The resentment took an anti-Christian character only when the local Christians rejected to join the uprising against the Shibabs³⁷⁰.

It is also wrong to connect every death to sectarian hatred. There were also cases that the deaths were related to the urban political rivalry between Ottoman authorities and local actors³⁷¹. During the rebellion against Ibrahim the Druzes did not touch the Maronites³⁷². There were not an all out war because many Muslims, some of them notables helped the Christians during and after the war and thousands of Christians were saved by Muslim help³⁷³. In Rashayya, those Muslim Shibab *Emirs*, who provided sanctuary for the Maronites were also killed³⁷⁴.

Another point is the fact that, in some cases, it is more relevant to talk about tribal loyalty rather than sectarian loyalty. For example it is true that Ibrahim used the Christian soldiers against the Druzes but it is wrong to assume that these Christian soldiers did not fight the Druzes on the grounds that there was religious difference. The real motivation was their loyalty to the lords³⁷⁵.

There were also other factors such as rivalries within the *mukataci* families. For example some *seyhs* of Kisrawan and of northern Lebanon, jealous of the authority of Abu'l Lam did not attend the war in 1845. In some cases, the alliances crossed the sectarian lines. Greek Orthodox, suspicious of the numerical majority

³⁶⁹ Traboulsi, 16.

³⁷⁰ Fawaz, 58.

³⁷¹ Fawaz, 62.

³⁷² Makdisi, 55.

³⁷³ Fawaz, 80-99.

³⁷⁴ C. Churchill, *Druzes and Maronites*, 175.

³⁷⁵ Makdisi, 56.

of Maronites, supported the Druzes during the revolt in 1841³⁷⁶. The Christians of the Greek Church sided with the Druzes in this war³⁷⁷. When the Druzes revolted in 1852 against the authority of the *Kaim makam*, they also enlisted the Christians³⁷⁸. In Hasbaya, the Muslim arm of the Shibabs sought for Christian support against the Druzes³⁷⁹. During the revolt of 1840, all the sects in Lebanon swore to be together against Ibrahim³⁸⁰. The alliances between Khazins and Canbolats constitute another example³⁸¹. Before the Dayr al-Kamar incident, the Druze notables were trying to persuade their Maronite counterparts to be loyal to Sultan and enter an alliance with them evoking the old cooperation³⁸².

The last point is that it is wrong to assume the Druzes as bloody vandals and Maronites as only the victims. Both Maronites and Druzes made sectarian “cleansing” and no side was innocent³⁸³. The Maronites also provoked Druze hatred. In addition to the words and their armaments, a body established in Dayr al-Kamar forced its co religionists not to enter any kind of interaction with the rival sect. any association was to be punished³⁸⁴. In Zahleh and Dayr al-Kamar, they had their own armed militia. They had even had a single uniform before the 1860 event³⁸⁵.

³⁷⁶ Salibi, *The 1860 Upheaval*, 51- 68.

³⁷⁷ Churchill, *Druzes and Maronites*, 50.

³⁷⁸ Traboulsi 27.

³⁷⁹ Churchill, *Druzes and Maronites*, 108.

³⁸⁰ Makdisi, 58.

³⁸¹ Churchill, *Mount Lebanon*, 88.

³⁸² Actually this was not so weird that the notables somehow benefited from the ottoman system as their power to some extent depended on their annual renomination as district governors, see Doumani, 19 and Makdisi, 66.

³⁸³ Traboulsi 2007, 30.

³⁸⁴ Churchill, *Druzes and Maronites*, 85-86.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 105-108; Salibi, *The 1860 Upheaval*, 88.

CHAPTER 6

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE CIVIL WAR

The emergence of the war and reactions to it deeply affected many factors mainly in political and economic arena. It also somehow interacted with many factors in the long term as well. The impacts of the war can be analyzed in three headings: social groups, political impacts and economic impacts.

Analyzing the position of social groupings after 1860, it should be noted that some strong families of the pre-1860 period also converted their hereditary tax to land ownership and retained control of charitable endowments in addition to diversifying their sources of power and held secular posts. The rest however, should not be contemplated as completely removed from the social arena. It's true to say that they lost lands and many statues in *meclises* however as the punishments generally were temporary exiles, and there were many economic interests untouched, their social prestige was damaged but not terminated³⁸⁶. It is interesting to point that, in line with the decline of the traditional classes, many of those who had land after 1860 were newly emerging elites climbing social ladder after 1860 and most acquired land through their place in the local administration. The wealth they gained opened the doors for higher positions in the administrative area. The *aghawat* also benefited from the process and became a group of merchant or moneylender³⁸⁷.

Politically, there was a significant problem for the Ottomans as the issue became a diplomatic problem. The deaths of Christians found a significant place in the European press and the Ottomans was accused of deliberately causing the events. Sultan had the sentiment that this could make his subjects oppose against him and simultaneously such events could be used as a tool for further interference in the internal affairs of the Empire. Particularly when the news of the massacres in Şam were learned, the concerns of Sultan increased forcing him to issue another *ferman* to

³⁸⁶ Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 25-28.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 26.

the *valis* of the Anatolian provinces, Iraq and to the commanding officer of Arabistan saying that they would be held personally responsible for similar possible attacks in their provinces³⁸⁸.

As for the economy of Syria and the Empire at large, it should be said that the events further exacerbated the situation. The short term effects of the riots in 1860 on the local production were disruptive. Textile production reduced as a result of the destruction of Christian owned looms. The measures against the notable families also negatively affected the city life. The fines levied on non Christian communities and the wholesale conscription of the Muslim young had been other factors. However it is not clear how long this bad situation in the economy prevailed as there were commercial quarters remained untouched which helped to revitalize the local economy to a large extent. As a second factor, the arrival of the Ottoman troops became the chance to restore rule and order even in many remote areas³⁸⁹.

In addition, the civil war made a significant damage to the economy of the mount and agriculture in it. It should also be said for the Druze chiefs, without the Maronites the economy would experience significant problems for this reason, it was no coincidence that during the war, many Druze chiefs escorted their Christian tenants³⁹⁰.

6.1 Negotiations and Reconciliation

The possible reconciliation was the most important point in the Ottoman mind. First, on 1 July, *Kaim makam* summoned all the principal *şeyhs* and *emirs* to a meeting about reconciliation in *Vali's* saray. The demand of Maronite patriarch and his bishops to join was rejected. Then, Hurşid Paşa made another meeting composed of *Şeyhs*, *emirs*, *mukatacis* and the *vekils* of all districts and the *divans* of *Kaim makamates* to secure their acceptance of the terms agreed upon. Neither the patriarch nor Taniyus Shahin responded to the invitations. The meeting took in the presence of Vasfi *Efendi*, Hurşid's *Kahya*. The participants also agreed to stop the skirmishes and to adopt the principle of "what has passed, passed" (*mada ma mada*) as a condition of peace: no side was going to claim on the other. A *mazbata* was drawn, signed by

³⁸⁸ Farah, 603-609.

³⁸⁹ Owen, 170.

³⁹⁰ Farah, 586.

the participants including the *mukatacis* except the *kadi* of the Maronites. The text was counter signed by Hurşid Paşa. This reconciliation was welcomed, particularly by the Druze chiefs, because their tenants, whether Druze or Christian, was the real victims of the civil war. They suffered considerable loss of property and possessions. However, it was not enough to stop the Ottomans especially after the massacres in Şam was heard in İstanbul³⁹¹.

6.1.1 Mission of Fuat Paşa

Upon negotiations with regard to all the candidates for the mission, in 8 July, Mehmed Fuad Paşa was appointed as the commissioner with absolute powers. Sultan gave his personal *tuğra* to Fuad Paşa and issued a *ferman* to all officials in Syria announcing Fuat's mission and ordering them to cooperate with him. As he sought the support of France before leaving as a diplomatic manoeuvre, the French foreign minister offered establishing a delegation to work with the Turkish government, which will also make changes in the administrative framework upon negotiations, she was also allowed to send troops³⁹².

He had mainly three assignments: pacification of the rebellion, establishing a political system for future and ensuring compensation. Fuat Paşa brought four thousand troops with itself whereas in total 15000-16000 troops were assigned to the mission³⁹³.

Upon arrival, Fuad sent letters to both *Kaim makams* and their chiefs ordering to prevent further bloodshed and cooperate with him although Druzes replied by saying that it was the Maronite committee who started war and for this reason, the greater part of the responsibility was in their hands. The high level administrative officials in the region was deposed including Hurşid Paşa (the *paşa* of Sidon) and were removed from their posts³⁹⁴. To compensate the damages, a committee was established. The Christian committee members formed an influential lobby under Fuad Paşa's protection and managed to gain a significant compensation for what they

³⁹¹ *Ibid*, 585-586.

³⁹² *Ibid*, 604-607.

³⁹³ *Ibid*, 608; Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 8.

³⁹⁴ Farah, 608-610.

suffered in the events³⁹⁵. Fuad then went to Şam to set up two commissions one for arresting the suspects and the other for investigating the charges made. Then, several thousands of troops spreaded to the city to find the plundered properties from the Christians³⁹⁶.

In less than 20 days, 3000 suspects were arrested by the 7000 Ottoman troop in the city. After arrest and trial, 167 were found guilty. 57 were executed by hanging. 110 irregular troops were shot for assaulting the Christian quarters. Many were condemned to death in absentia, 139 to lifetime service in the galleys for participating in plunder while armed, 145 to exile for unarmed participation into the plunders, 186 to hard labour and the galleys. 3000 Şam youth were drafted for the Ottoman army many houses were evacuated for the displaced Christians³⁹⁷. A penalty tax of 90,000 purses was levied on the non-Christian inhabitants including the Jews, who were thought to be helping the mob. 85,767 of this was going to be paid by Şam itself and the Kazas of B'albak, Biga, Houran, al-Jaydur, Houran, Habayya and Rashayya. Fuad then went back to Beirut. He deprived all the Druze chiefs from their ranks and feudal offices, their properties were sequestered, they were put under confinement in *Saray*³⁹⁸.

As for the Ottoman officials, Hurşid Paşa, who is said to have done nothing to stop the war, was condemned to life imprisonment. Tahir Paşa, the military commander of Beirut received a sentence of life imprisonment. As for the sentences on the Druze chiefs, 11 *şeyhs*, including Said Janbolat, who had played little role in the conflicts according to Farah, were sentenced to death. 16 more of those who had fled to Houran were also sentenced to death. In this manner every Druze *mukatacis* or significant *şeyh* was sentenced to death³⁹⁹.

6.2 *Mutasarrifiate* Order in Lebanon

Although at the judicial level the problem was solved, at the political level it was much harder to solve the problem which became more difficult particularly with the involvement of the foreign powers. Upon the pressures of the Europeans, a

³⁹⁵ Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 8;

³⁹⁶ Farah, 611.

³⁹⁷ Amenuey, 162; Churchill, *Mount Lebanon*, 117.

³⁹⁸ Farah, 610-628.

³⁹⁹ Farah, 625.

committee was established by the Ottomans including many foreign countries including Britain and France⁴⁰⁰.

However, the first administrative manoeuvre of the Ottomans was to centralize the administration. As the Maronite leaders were weakened in Kisrawan, the circumstances were apt for further weakening the feudal powers in Syria. While the international conference was undergoing, the Ottomans abolished existing feudal structure and the Druze *kaim makamate*. Instead, Ömer Paşa was appointed military governor with his official residence at Dayr al-Kamar. In addition he had the powers of the abolished Druze *Kaim makamate*.

Selecting the Christian *Kaim makam* was also subject to political struggle. Bishop 'Awn was one of the most influential people in the ways leading to 1860 events. For this reason, although there were efforts to restore Shibab rule, now under the influence of Bishop, this was unacceptable to the Ottomans. At the end Yusuf Karam, a member of the Khazin family, instead of someone from the Shibab family, was appointed as Christian *kaim makam* with the support of the British Ottoman alliance.

The diplomatic negotiations were continuing on the other hand. While France with the support of Russia, offered the restoration of the Lebanese *Emirate*, Britain, Austria and The Sublime Porte were rejecting it. The British proposed to turn the whole Syria a vice loyalty or two divide the Lebanon to three *Kaim makamiates* –one for Maronites, one for the Druzes and one for the Greek Orthodoxes- was also rejected. Finally in 9 June 1861 Reglement Organique was signed and accepted formally by the foreign counsellors. “*Cebel-i Lübnan Nizamnamesi*” was prepared by Fuat Paşa and the European Commission and was transformed into an international agreement by foreign ambassadors and *Sadrâzam* Ali Paşa. It was also declared as *Hatt-ı Humayun* of the *Sultan*.

In this document, Lebanon was gaining autonomy and be put under the guarantee of the six signatory powers. The mountain was to be governed by a Christian of the highest Ottoman rank *müşir*. Although he was going to be named by *Sultan* and removable by and responsive to him, he was also going to be approved by the foreign powers. No mention was made to his origin but it was presumed to be a

⁴⁰⁰ Chevallier, 161.

non Lebanese catholic Christian⁴⁰¹. The *Mutasarrifiate* was to have all the administrative powers within the *Mutasarrifiate*. Public order with a manpower of 1500 and taxation would also be within the jurisdiction of the *Mutasarrif*. He was nominated for three years and three months before the end of the nomination, the Sublime Porte and the foreign ambassadors in İstanbul was to convene to nominate the next *mutasarrif*⁴⁰². The *ikta* system was abolished and the clergy was removed from the administration⁴⁰³. The first *mutasarrif*, was going to be David *Efendi* of Armenian origin.

The *mutasarrif* was going to be assisted by a local administrative council composed of twelve elected members representing different sects and this council was also going to have judicial powers. The territory of the *Mutasarrifiate* was to be divided into seven administrative districts (*kazas*), in each of which a *Kaim makam* was going to be appointed by the *Mutasarrif*. Each district was going to be divided into *nahiyes* governed by a special administrative official. Finally, each village was going to elect a village headsman. A Lebanese *gerdarmerie* was to assist the *mutasarrif* in maintaining order and no Ottoman soldier was going to be in Lebanon. Taxes collected in Lebanon were to serve as a basis for the Lebanese budget and only the surplus was going to be turned over to İstanbul, this budget was going to be independent from the central budget. Finally the feudalism was going to be abolished and all the individuals were declared as equals before the law⁴⁰⁴. The administration council was still in force to assist the governor who also was going to conduct his judicial powers on its own and establish the order with its own forces. No Ottoman soldier was going to be present in the Lebanese territories and the budget of the “*Mutasarrifiate*” was going to be autonomous from the central budget. The first *mutasarrif*, was going to be David *Efendi* of Armenian origin⁴⁰⁵.

The agreement had two main functions: first, it reassured a *Tanzimat*-minded equality among the subjects. Second, it emphasized that the political arena should not be publicized. The notables of all sects easily accepted the agreement because it reinstated their traditional rights because each sect was somehow going to be

⁴⁰¹ Farah, 696; Chevallier, 159.

⁴⁰² Churchill, *Mount Lebanon*, 134-135

⁴⁰³ Farah, 720.

⁴⁰⁴ Sluglett and Marion, 110-111.

⁴⁰⁵ Kia, 134-135.

governed locally⁴⁰⁶. More or less, the Ottoman government took the control. The reglement somehow replaced a secular social order with a new one based on the sectarian relations. It forced people to choose a single social identity in the sense that the sect of a person defined their ability to join in the public work, collect tax, to be appointed to the office and govern etc.⁴⁰⁷. It also ensured the transition to peripheral commercial relations⁴⁰⁸.

⁴⁰⁶ Hanioglu, 142-145

⁴⁰⁷ Makdisi, 162.

⁴⁰⁸ Traboulsi, 24; Farah, 696.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This study initiated from a simple question: is it right to analyze the events by merely focusing identities of the people, without considering politic and economic factors underlying and shaping it. In this sense it has tried to analyze the events in the 19th century Syria by focusing on the interaction between the state and the society. The state was trying to realize a set of reforms called *Tanzimat*, mainly to prevent the decay it was suffering. As the Ottoman Empire was still strong and had the ability to control its territories more than any other foreign country, this set of reforms was bound to leave a significant impact on the society.

On the other hand there was a strong political and social framework in Lebanon and the actors of this framework entered into interaction with the *Tanzimat* policies. It was this interaction who was the real power to shape the course of the events in the period under analysis and after it. This study has shown that the civil conflict that took place between 1840 and 1860 in the *Vilayet* of Şam and the political restructuration in Mount was good examples in this sense.

From the side of the state, the study has shown that *Tanzimat*'s was implemented in a significantly inefficient way. The Ottomans lacked enough political and economic power to implement the reforms in the desired form and there were significant constraints as described in the relevant chapters. Here it should be said that the specific implementation of *Tanzimat* in Lebanon was significantly effected by the developments in the Empire at large both in terms of constraints and mood of the "men of *Tanzimat*". The lack of enough military force, cadre to implement the reforms, the fears of a foreign intervention and over-strengthenment of the local bureaucrats all stemmed from developments in other parts of the Empire and found its reflection in, among others, inability to establish the rule and order, inability to establish the components of the *Tanzimat* in services and rights or weakening of the *vali*. At the result, the implementation of the *Tanzimat* produced results contrary to

its aim: consolidated the urban leadership and forced people to define themselves in terms of religious identities at the expense of those other mentioned in the study, and enter into political arena by using this. In addition, in the lack of the success in other components of the reform package, only one point got prominence and became the most visible component of the reforms: rights.

This way of implementation and especially this rights-based approach coincided with some social factors. On one hand, there was the rise of the Christians in the social life. On the other hand, traditional notables were losing power particularly among the Christians and the lower classes were led by the strong Maronite church. Economic power of the non-Muslims particularly those other than the traditional notables increased and now they were demanding the political power they lacked. At the same time the Muslims were impoverishing. As there was already resentment by the Muslim against the economic power of the Christians, the *Tanzimat* reforms seemed to empower the non-Muslims also in the political arena. As the other components were unsuccessful, the Muslims were seeing the rich Christians gaining more visibility and power in the daily life. This situation made people perceive the problems as if they were related to religion in nature and forget the other economic and political dimensions of the political processes in the region. The political framework offered by the *Tanzimat* reformers, the Double *Kaim makamate* where there were two different political bodies based on the religion. In this sense, it was impossible for the political processes in the region including the civil turmoil to take the specific form described in the study without the three lines of interaction mentioned in the study. In this sense, departing from the findings of this study, the “modernist” bodies and policies that were created in the modernist period starting with İbrahim Paşa and continued significantly with the *Tanzimat* era produced the sectarian skirmishes in the period under analysis and sow the roots of, what is called, “sectarianism” in the later periods including today. In this sense, the period covered in this study, style of the sectarian skirmished, local political events and the way that led to the establishment of the *Mutasarrifiate* of Lebanon constitute useful tools to analyze the political conflicts that are still taking place in the region.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

☐

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü

☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı : ATAKUL

Adı : SARPER

Bölümü : Ortadoğu Araştırmaları

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : The Impact of Tanzimat Policies on the 19th Century Vivil Turmoil in the Vilayet of Şam and the 1860 Civil War in Lebanon

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

☒

Doktora

☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

☐

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

☒

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

☐

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: