UNDERSTANDING CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AS RESISTANCE:
THEORIES OF SELF IN STIRNER AND FOUCAULT

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ABSTRACT

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The main objective of this thesis is to examine conscientious objection to military service as a case of resistance to modern power in relation with the possibilities of “self”. In this context, Max Stirner’s theory of “ego” and Michel Foucault’s conceptualisations of modern power and modern subject are critically analyzed. In accordance with the relation between conscientious objection and the possibilities of self, Foucault’s theories of “power over life” and “ethics of care of self” are discussed by examining disciplinary power and bio-power in relation with militarized society characterized by universal male conscription. On the other hand, Stirner’s theory of “the union of egoists” and his conceptualization of “Ownness” is
employed in order to investigate the possibilities of constituting an autonomous self. This study reveals that the act of conscientious objection overlaps objector’s endeavour of creating an autonomous self. It is argued that following Stirnerian and Foucauldian conceptualisations of “self”, the objector, by refusing external power over his/her will in militarized society, indeed, engages in a struggle to constitute his/her own definition of self and his/her way of life.

Key Words: Conscientious Objection, Modern Power, Self, Michel Foucault, Max Stirner
ÖZ

VİCDANİ REDDİ DİRENİŞ OLARAK ANLAMAK: STİRNER VE FOUCAULT’DA KENDİLİK KURAMLARI

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Bu tezin temel amacı, bir direniş örneği olarak askerlik hizmetine karşı ortaya çıkan vicedani reddi “kendilik” olanakları doğrultusunda incelemektir. Bu bağlamda, Max Stirner’in “ego” kuramı ve Michel Foucault’nun modern iktidar ve modern özne kavramsallaştırmaları incelenmiştir. Evrensel zorunlu askere alma politikasyyla karakterize olmuş militarist toplumu, disiplinci iktidar ve biyo-iktidar kavramları ile inceleyerek, Foucault’nun “yaşam üzerinde iktidar” ve “kendilik kaygısı etiği” kuramları tartışılmıştır. Öte yandan, bağımsız bir “ben”in yaratım olanaklarını sorgulamak için Stirner’in “egoistler birliği” kuramı ve “kendilik” (Ownness) kavramsallaştırması kullanılmıştır. Bu çalışma şu ortaya çıkarmıştır ki, vicedani vi
red eylemi, redçinin bağımsız bir “ben” yaratma çabası ile örtüşmektedir. Stirnerci ve Foucaultcu “kendilik” kavramsallaştırmalarını takip ederek söylenebilir ki; militarist toplum içinde, vicdani redçi kendi iradesi üzerineki iktidarı reddederek aslında kendi “ben” tanımını ve kendi yaşam biçimini kurmak için mücadeleye girişmiştir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Vicdani Red, Modern İktidar, Kendilik, Michel Foucault, Max Stirner
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

He who joyfully marches to music in rank and file has already earned my contempt. He has been given a large brain by mistake, since for him the spinal cord would fully suffice. This disgrace to civilization should be done away with at once. Heroism at command, senseless brutality, deplorable love-of-country stance, how violently I hate all this, how despicable and ignoble war is; I would rather be torn to shreds than be a part of so base an action! It is my conviction that killing under the cloak of war is nothing but an act of murder.

*Albert Einstein*

This thesis is an attempt to develop a critical discussion of conscientious objection to military service in accordance with Max Stirner’s theory of “ego” and Michel Foucault’s conceptualisation of modern subject. Conscientious objection would be conceived as an attempt that seeks to materialize individual’s freedom of conscience by refusing external power over her will. In this respect, I will try to answer the question whether conscientious objection to military service constitutes an understanding of “self” through resisting the implications of modern power or not. To this end, anti-essentialist accounts of Foucault and Stirner concerning the modern subject will be taken into consideration. I will discuss the argument that
modern power benefits from the claims concerning human essence and the universalist approaches (Newman, 2001) that maintain an attitude in order to define the modern individual in terms of subject formation. In so doing, I also aim to discuss the possibilities of resistance to modern power and one’s ability of attaining his/her autonomy against modern power that is external to his/her will.

Presupposing that both social practices and modern power construct individual’s perception of conscience, freedom, practice of individuality and the ability to resist power, I seek to answer the following questions: Does the conscientious objector have (the consciousness of) freedom to resist? Is s/he still in a subject position while resisting to military service which is an aspect of modern power? On which grounds is the practice of conscientious objection that aims to resist militarism constructed. Concerning these questions, Foucauldian conceptualisation of “power over life” and his approach to subject formation will be discussed especially by examining disciplinary power and bio-power. Also, I will employ Stirnerian theories of “ego” and “union of egoists” for the theoretical framework of the thesis. Following Foucauldian and Stirnerian arguments on the notion of “self”, I will try to demonstrate that conscientious objection as resistance would not result with one’s attaining his own self in all types of objection but only in absolutist/ total objection which is based on the idea of refusing all of the implications of modern power over individual’s conscience and his individuality.

Considering the possibility of one’s attainment to his/her alternative definition of self with the act of conscientious objection, it might be claimed that both from Foucauldian and Stirnerian accounts there are various similarities as well
as differences in their conceptualizations of modern power, society and especially in
the ways of attaining one’s own self. The main similarity between Foucault and
Stirner can be given by their anti-essentialist theories of self that they both reject the
idea of “Enlightened Man” which is “historically determined by the universal ideals
of Enlightenment for Foucault (Foucault, 1997: 313). Similarly, for Stirner,
humanist ontology of the Enlightenment locates human subjectivity in the realm of
morality and imposes on the individual a fixed identity (Stirner, 1995). In so doing,
it constructs individual as a political subject. From this point of departure, it may be
argued that both Stirner and Foucault seek to formulate an alternative hermeneutics
of self. For Foucault it is the ethics of the care of self where he refers to Delphic
principle “Know Yourself!” Stirner, on the other hand, refers to the future self,
which is called the “Ego”. In order to understand these conceptualizations of self in
relation to conscientious objection, I will focus on the theory of modern power and
its role in the constitution of modern subject.

Deriving from this point, I will mainly discuss the disciplinary society which
seeks the docility of human body and his obedient mind while constructing her/him
as a subject. In this sense, I will draw a parallelism between the militarized society
and disciplinary society. Additionally, concerning the implications of modern
power over the life of individual, I will try to show how conscientious objector
resists to modern power by refusing to serve in military and militarized society.
After giving Foucault’s conceptualization of modern power and its role in
constituting the modern subject, I will proceed to Stirnerian theory of the ego which
is a critique of modern man. Although Stirner criticizes modern power and modern
individual as an effect of this form of power, he embraces a promising account of the self by claiming that the one attains his/her autonomy by rejecting every form of external power which threatens his/her will by using his/her might. In this way, the individual (or in his words, the ego) could attain his Ownness/self. Thus, in order to have an in depth analysis of the case of conscientious objection and its picture drawn from Foucauldian and Stirnerian perspectives, this thesis is composed of three main chapters.

In the second chapter, I draw the theoretical framework of Foucault’s views on modern power and modern subject which are essential for the evaluation of the act of conscientious objection regarding the possibility of resistance to modern power and one’s ability to attain his/her self. The first part opens with Foucault’s genealogy of modern subject which focuses on the question how human beings turn into subjects in history. By following genealogical approach, Foucault claims that the universal claims of humanism serve the discourses of modern power which turn individuals into subject by deploying certain technologies upon the individual. I will introduce Foucauldian hermeneutics of the self and its relation with modern power. In this part, technologies of power will be employed in order to highlight the subjectification process of the individual. While discussing this process, first, I will give examples for the act of individual upon his/herself from ancient times starting from Early Roman to modern times in order to shed light on the relation between subject and power. In this manner, I will focus on “pastoral power” which developed as an individualizing form of power. Then, I will examine Foucault’s theory of “governmentality” which follows the logic of pastoral power, and
accordingly, I will focus on the *raison d’État* that conducts the lives of individuals living in a territory. Following these, Foucauldian theory of “power over life” will be employed in order to see how disciplinary and bio power\(^1\) try to constitute subject by operating through his/her body and mind and thus, regulate the life of the individual in particular and the population in general. In this sense, I will discuss the individualizing and totalizing effects of power upon individual subject. In the second part, I will introduce Foucault’s theory of resistance and in relation to this; I will discuss Foucault’s possible views on conscientious objection.

In the third chapter, Stirner’s radical work “The Ego and It’s Own” (1907) will be discussed in order to present his criticism of modern man and his theory of the ego. In this chapter, I will start by giving Stirner’s critique of humanist ontology and relationally his philosophical background. In relation to his critique, the ontology of his theory of the ego will be presented in order to understand “ego” as a future project of self which is conceptualized against modern man. Driven from Stirner’s ego, I will introduce his theory of Ownness as a way towards the freedom of the individual. Then, I will discuss the possibilities of resistance from Stirnerian perspective. Additionally, the Union of Egoists will be introduced as an alternative association before society and as a means of attaining one’s Ownness. Following Stirnerian critique of the modern man and his future project of the ego, in the second part I will discuss the meaning of conscientious objection from Stirnerian point of view.

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\(^1\) I prefer to use the concepts of disciplinary and bio-power as the components of power over life.
Fourth chapter will be composed of two parts. In the first part, I will examine conscription from its history to its philosophy as a current governmental technology of the modern nation-state. While dealing with the history of conscription, I will briefly touch upon the forms of recruitment strategies that have been adopted at different times in history and following it, I will focus on modern conscription which dates back to American War of Independence. Modern conscription can be given as a crucial point where it brings about the governmental policy of “citizen-creation” of the nation-state. Regarding the implication of modern conscription, I will discuss the ways of refusal to serve in military and the act of conscientious objection. The act of conscientious objection will be discussed in terms of its history where I categorize this act of refusal into the categories of the sacred and the secular. Lastly, the reality of conscientious objection will be employed in order to underline the governmental policies towards the conscientious objection movement and the objectors.

The second part of the fourth chapter will be the synthesis of the theoretical frameworks and the case of conscientious objection. The first section of the second part tries to understand the act of conscientious objection from Foucauldian viewpoint. In order to materialize the conscientious objection as resistance to power, I will introduce the definition of conscience and its relation with one’s ability to create his/her own definition of self. In this manner, I will try to map out the relation between modern subject and the attempt of creating the self-ethics in relation from the eyes of the conscientious objector. Besides, I am going to deal with the governmental technologies of the nation-state by using Foucault’s theory.
of “power over life” and the fact of militarized society both as an obstacle against the objector and as an impulsive force that the craving to have his/her own autonomy. And lastly, I will argue that the act of conscientious objection as resistance to modern power can be seen as an attempt of creating the ethics of self.

Second section will be the discussion of the conscientious objection from Stirnerian point of view. The case of conscientious objection will be approached in terms of the possibility of attaining one’s Ownness. In this respect, I will employ the Stirnerian notion of might as a form of power that the individual has, in order to indicate how definition of conscience and the use of one’s might overlaps in terms of creating a unique value of the self. After dealing with the nation-state as a humanist form of power, I will discuss the possibility of Ownness in relation with the act of objection.

In the concluding part of the thesis, I will deal with the possibilities of self in relation with Foucauldian conceptualization of “power over life” and the governmental strategies of the nation-state which have been operating on the citizens, candidate soldiers and conscientious objectors of militarized society. In so doing, I will try to present how would be the act of conscientious objection seen from Foucauldian account. On the other hand, regarding the Foucauldian conceptualization of disciplined society I will question the possibilities of creating the ethics of the self. Additionally, I will try to map out the possibility of Ownness and the ego as a future project of self in relation with the forms of conscientious objection. In this context, I will try to present the reason behind the objection and the objector’s ability to attain his/her unique self.
“Sapere Aude!”, the motto of Enlightenment, advises people “daring to know” or it may also be defined from Kant’s point of view, as having the courage of using one’s own reason. While choosing this motto in his response to the question of “What is Enlightenment?” Kant was aiming to underline the fact that man should overcome “self-incurred tutelage” and his immaturity. In doing so, *Enlightened Man* does not accept any external authority over his will and reason. However, in the same response paper, Kant indicates that “argue as much as you will, and about what you will, but obey!” (Kant, 1784: 3). The intention behind that statement is locating individual’s public use of reason over his private use of reason. The essential point here is that, Kant endeavours to unravel the antagonism between “man as a transcendental subject and as determined object”. However, Foucault points out that, these two characterizations of Man could not be detached (Simons, 1995: 15). In addition, by considering these different approaches from Foucauldian point of view, the search for free and autonomous subject seems to be limited with the idea of freedom to make one’s reason operating at the public level. The striking point is that, as Foucault quotes from Baudelaire, the modern man as a project of Enlightenment is not the one who tries to discover himself. Rather he is the one who
endeavours to invent his own being. Herein, it can be stated that modernity obliges him to produce himself, not to liberate him “in his own being”. Foucault embraces the idea that subjects are not autonomous as Kant suggested, besides, Foucault seeks to present subjects as constituted in the relations of power. In order to have an account of ourselves, Foucault suggests, proceeding “with the analyses of ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment” (Foucault, 1997: 313). At this point, the question of “who are we in our actuality?” gains importance. The main objective of this chapter is to examine the formation of the self through relations of power. In this manner, it might be argued that modern power and social practices constitute individual’s conception of social reality, his awareness of his own being and his perception of freedom. While dealing with the issue through theoretical explanations, the crucial point of this chapter is to explain the notion of resistance to the external power over individual’s conscience and over his will. The theoretical importance of “resistance”, as an attempt to practice of self, derives from its promising feature that provides the comprehension of techniques of power which turn individuals into “docile” bodies and construct society as a laboratory of power relations. In order to have a critical account of “conscientious objection” as form of resistance, the theoretical framework on the theories of “self” and “modern power” will be introduced. To this end, the ideas of Foucault on modern power and subjectification of individuals will be examined as the remarks helpful for assessing the possibility of resistance to modern power and constitution of the self.
2.1. Foucault’s Genealogy of the Modern Subject

Foucault dwells upon the question: how human beings are turned into subjects. To this end, he searches for an alternative reading on the philosophy of self and began with a concern about its historical constitution (Foucault, 1988: 4). His approach towards the notion of subject resembles his genealogical method. Unlike classical historical account, genealogy assumes that there are no fixed essences or laws about human nature. Thus, genealogy presupposes that there is no fixed or defined subject. From this point of departure, the major aim of genealogy is to unmask the discourses of progress that classical history writing embraces. In this way, genealogy attempts to analyse the neglected and denied events of history. Foucault’s genealogy seeks to indicate, “history is not the progress of universal reason. It is the play of rituals of power, humanity advancing from one domination to other” (Dreyfus, 1982: 110). About the relation between genealogy, history and subject, Foucault argues:

One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that’s to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history (Foucault, 1980: 117).

On the other hand, employing genealogy aims to have a critical account of the epoch of Enlightenment and its humanist regime wherein the individual is defined
as having fixed identity through the universal laws. To this extent, genealogy exhibits humanism as “a series of doctrines which ties us to our subjective and to particular notions of personhood. These ties prevent us from attaining maturity and binds us to the authority of the forces that limit us” (Simons, 1995: 17). The very significance of the genealogical method comes to existence at this point. So that, unlike Kant’s “anthropological humanism” that depended on “the autonomy of the will” (Reynolds, 2004: 957) as universal moral law suggested; Foucault suggested that human beings are not rational nor they are autonomous per se. The essential point here is the comprehension of autonomy as a reliance of one’s own reason. However, by referring to the individual as a “rational” being who uses his own will, the universal claims of humanism serve the discourses of modern power which aim to produce certain modes of subjection. To this extent, in addition to the question of “What are we in our actuality?” genealogy seeks to answer the question of “Do we have autonomy to use our own authority?” In order to present possible answer these questions, in following sections Foucauldian conception of power and its relation with the formation of modern subject will be introduced.

2.1.1. Foucauldian Conception of Power and Its Relation with the Hermeneutics of the Self

The notion of power is defined in social sciences as “the actions of individual or institutional agents or the effects of structures or systems” (Smart, 1985: 122). However, such definitions would be so classical or simplistic in
comparison to Foucault’s account of power. In contrast to the classical account, he
defines power with its relational and fluid character. It is relational in terms of its
exercise in a social body and it is fluid to the extent of its non-hierarchical model of
implication. In this manner, power could not be comprehended as a possession.
From this point of view, power neither belongs to the decision of an individual
subject nor it is a thing that is owned by individual. In *History of Sexuality* Foucault
defined power as such “power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it
certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex
strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault, 1978: 91). Thus, power may
be intentional but it still is non-subjective. Moreover, power is exercised through
calculations and aims where it serves for the objectives of particular technology
rather than individual interests.

Furthermore, Foucault’s prior concern is not analysing the phenomena of
‘power’; he rather aims to unravel the history of the modes through which “human
beings are made subjects” (Dreyfus, 1982: 208). The theory of power would be
unsatisfactory where he thinks, power consists of flexible games of constantly
changing rules (Nilson, 1998: 65). On the other hand, the modes of objectification
that transforms human beings into subjects can be seen as one of his prior concerns.
He defines three modes of objectification, first mode is the objectification of the
speaking subject by placing the “productive subject” in certain forms of linguistics.
Second mode is concerned with the objectivising the subject in “dividing practices”.
In this mode, “the subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others”.
The mad and the sane can be given as an example for this objectification. Last mode
is the objectification through “the way a human being turns him-or herself into a subject” (Dreyfus, 1982: 208). These modes of objectifications need a certain type of power. For him,

This form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word ‘subject’: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to. (Foucault, 2000: 331).

As it is indicated previously, Foucault had been known by his works on power, he was mainly interested in “the history of how an individual acts upon himself, in the technology of self” (Foucault, 1988: 19). By pointing out the technologies of self, he aims to underline the technology, “which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Foucault, 1988: 18). On the other hand, because the general theme of his research is not the power but the subject (Foucault, 1982: 327), he gives priority to the history of ‘self’ in order to comprehend both the constitution of the modern subject and its relation with modern power. In relation with the construction of modern subject, Foucault questions how individual (human subject) fits into certain games of truth. For this reason, rather than following coercive practices, he tries to depict the practice of self-formation with games of truth (Foucault, 1997:
The focal point of his concern about the formation of modern subject is to show how the subject was established at different moments and in different institutional frameworks as an object of knowledge (Foucault, 1997: 88). Tracing back to the relation between games of truth and formation of subject, it might be stated that this relation is driven from his concern about the notion of truth. According to him, “truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in power”. His conceptualisation of “truth” indicates a history of the ways of human beings develop a knowledge about themselves such as psychiatry, economics, penology so on and so forth. For him the crucial point is not accepting the knowledge about ourselves as a stated value but tracing back the formation of these “truth games” where they are related to particular techniques that serve to human beings to understand themselves and analyse them accordingly (Foucault, 1988: 18). From this point of departure, Foucault explains the decisive character of “truth” in terms of creating a social reality for subjects and their conduct in a specific manner:

Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its of regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts true (Foucault, 1980: 131).

In this manner, he illustrates the development of hermeneutics of the self in order to have an in depth analyses of the formation of self. He first deals with the “Greco-Roman philosophy in the first two centuries of A.D. of the early Roman Empire”
which is related with the idea of “self mastery”. Following the Greco-Roman tradition, he depicts “Christian spirituality” which developed in the fourth and fifth centuries of the late Roman Empire, which was related, with the fact of cultivation of the soul (Foucault, 1988: 19). For Foucault, history of the “care of oneself” enables us to attain the history of subjectivity and the forms of power that shape this subjectivity. Hereby, the establishment of “human” subject at different moments and in different frameworks of history (Foucault, 1997: 88) points out the question of the autonomy of the subject. In this regard, he pursues a genealogy of ethics, as he calls, “the genealogy of the subject as subject of ethical actions” (Foucault, 1997: 266). It may be argued that the care of the self started with individual’s desire of mastering himself. From this point of departure, ethics of caring the self implies individual’s way of conducting his way of life independent from any external power that is implied on him by social and political institutions. So that, individuals were to become autonomous in their behaviours and conducts concerning their life and their own being. Thus, autonomy of the individual is related to his capacity to use his own conduct on his decisions. To this extent, the ethics of care of the self connotes the individual’s practice of freedom.

For Foucault the practice of freedom can be exemplified through various traditions. For instance, he claims that the Greco-Roman definition of individual freedom (or civic liberty) was associated with the care of the self. Greek definition of freedom would serve us in figuring out the perception of freedom. On the other hand, Foucault claims that the Stoic philosophy advices individual knowing how to conduct himself, this means individual should gaze upon himself in a continuous
manner. Besides, one’s care of oneself is needed to have a right conduct and “proper practice of freedom” where as Delphic principle advices “taking care of oneself requires knowing oneself” (Foucault, 1992: 85). The crucial point here is that individual’s care of oneself should be prior to his care for others.

However, in the future periods of history the priority of caring oneself will be transformed with the emerging political use of the notion of self. He underlines that the idea of care of oneself is seen as a cultural practice in Greco-Roman world. The use of the concept of tekhné could be given as an example. For instance, the concept of tekhné (arts of life) means for Greeks, Romans and Chinese, exercising the perfect art of mastery over oneself. In the time of Socrates and Seneca, the main concern was choosing the right tekhné in order to live well. Later on, in Greek, the meaning of “the concern of self” turned out to be “the concern of the city”, so that, “tekhné of life” started to mean taking care of the city. Interestingly, Plato also indicated the political use of care of self. He emphasizes tekhné as an art of life in his piece Alcibiades, accordingly for him; one has to take care of himself because he has to rule the city (Foucault, 1997: 259-60). From this point of departure, the good ruler should know how to exercise his power over himself at first, and in this way, he could direct his power over others.

In the Christian hermeneutics of the self, the meaning of tekhné turned out to be a practice of self-renunciation. From now on, tekhné as an art of living conceived as a way of attaining salvation in the other world. In Christianity, like in Greco-Roman the tradition of “taking care of self”, individual has the duty of knowing himself. That means, individual should know what is happening inside him, what
are his desires and appetites on the one hand; in this manner, he should accept his faults, facing up to temptations, on the other. It should be pointed out that the regime of truth in Christianity depends on the practice of confession. The obligations of truth in this culture of tekhnē are quite strict that the individual must accept the external authority over himself. As Foucault depicts, Christian way of living need to have “the duty to accept a set of obligations, to hold certain books as permanent truth, to accept authoritarian decisions in matters of truth, not only to believe in certain things but to show that one believes, and to accept institutional authority” of Christianity (Foucault, 1982: 40). Besides that, the practice of confession as a discipline and control mechanism of population is used in Christian tradition in an effective manner. To confess is not only beneficial for the confessor in order to have each and every detail of individual’s inner self but it also gives hope to learn the “truth” about individual’s own being.

2.1.1.1. Pastoral Power

It might be claimed that the subjection of human being has also taken place in the tradition of Christian morality where it uses self-renunciation as a way of salvation. In other words, the use of self-renunciation seems to appear as an entrance for the commitment of knowing oneself. With the Christian heritage of care of the self, pastoral power as an individualizing technique of power comes into prominence. The importance of ethical techniques that form the identity of an individual could be understood through the implications of technologies of the self.
As it is introduced, these technologies served for the process of subjection of human being in terms of configuring the conduct of the subject.

Foucault stresses that the Christian pastorate led to an art of conducting human beings with the promise of taking care or in other words taking charge human beings both individually and totally. Thus, with the Christian pastorate, the new form of power appears, because, pastoral power appeared as individualizing form of power. As it may be understood from the word “pastor”, pastoral power connotes religious meaning at first glance. However, it has taken its meaning also from the metaphor of shepherd and his flock. The shepherd exercises his power on his flock rather than on a territory. To this aim, he gathers his flock together and guides his flock. In this way, the shepherd gathers up “dispersed individuals” with his command. On the other hand, the shepherd could only disappear for scaring the flock. In so doing, he underlines the fact that the existence of the flock depends on the presence of his presence. Thus, the role of shepherd is to provide salvation of his flock. The main concern for him is to save them all individually and behave them gently. Therefore, every conduct of shepherd is for the well-being of the flock. He feeds them, he gazes upon them while they were sleeping and he watches over them (Foucault, 2000: 302-3). In relation with the shepherd-flock analogy, it might be stated that where the main concern of the shepherd is the lives of his flock; the pastor has responsibility of the lives of individuals. At this point, it should be noted that evolution of the pastorship as a technology of power depends on four mechanisms that are responsibility, obedience, knowledge and mortification. Responsibility is related with the shepherd who has the responsibility for the fate of
both the whole flock and “each and every sheep” in his flock. *Obedience* implies the religious conception that God as a shepherd, his flock should follow him as accepting his will and his laws. *Knowledge* refers to particular kind of knowledge that individualizes. For this type of knowledge, it may not enough to know the situation of whole flock, instead each sheep must be known. And lastly, as an example of the link between ‘total obedience’, ‘knowledge of oneself’ and ‘confession to someone else’, *mortification* has the aim of getting people “to work at their own mortification in this world” (Foucault, 2000: 307-310). To this end, Foucault calls pastorship as an individualising form of power where the techniques of power are intended as a continuous and permanent way of ruling (Foucault, 2000: 300). To sum up, at the first instance, related to its religious character, pastoral power aims individual salvation in the next world. Besides, it is not a form of power that governs; it must also sacrifice itself for the salvation of the flock. Lastly and crucially, pastoral form of power “cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It implies the knowledge of the conscience and ability to direct it”. In this way, this form of power is related with the production of truth of the individual himself (Foucault, 2000: 333). Thus, it is clear that the modes of individualization “have been carried out by the ideas of salvation, the law, and the truth (Foucault, 2007: 183). Pastoral type of power that had been related with the religious institution over centuries spreads out the whole social body. Its individualizing tactics could be seen from micro level such as family to the macro level those of the education, medicine and psychiatry (Foucault, 2000: 335). But,
the crucial point is that Foucault underlines the fact that state should be seen as a new form of pastoral power or in other words, as a modern model that the technique of individualization is applied through its constitution.

Staring from the sixteenth century, rather than questioning the salvation of people in other world, state as a new form of pastoral power aims to ensure the salvation in this world. This new meaning of salvation bears various different meanings than the religious one; this new model of pastoral power supervises the issues such as, health, security, well-being of people, etc. Moreover, with the transformation of pastoral power in both its form and its structure, the agents of pastoral power increased. Before moving on the detailed explanation of the agents of new pastoral power, its relation with the technologies of the self should be introduced.

It might be claimed that Foucault’s main purpose in investigating the relation between technologies of the self and pastoral power was examining the formation of modern subject. Beyond his philosophical analyses of the formation of the self, he wants to unravel the relation between the technologies of domination that modern subject comes across and its relation with the institution of state. Recall that, we have seen the notion of “government” presented in various ways: first, the government of oneself as a personal conduct and as a part of Stoic revival. Following the personal conduct, pastoral doctrine of government of souls and lives as an individualizing technique had appeared and lastly, the government of the state by the sovereign comes into prominence. All those three processes aim to conduct people’s way of conduct concerning their lives. In this regard, the notion of
governmentality comes into prominence in terms of having right to say in the
ducts of people. The pivotal character of the notion of governmentality is not
only driven from shaping people’s conduct but it also carries out its aim in a
permanent and systematic way in each and every domain of society.

2.1.1.2. Governmentality, Police, and Raison D’état

The main concern of governmentality, both for the religious and the state
authorities has been deciding the methods of how to be rule and ruled, by whom do
people need to ruled or how strictly ruled (Foucault, 1991: 88). Hence, the
technique of governmentality ensures the strategic games between “the games of
power” and “the state of domination” (Lemke, 2002: 5). In this regard, people have
little space for manoeuvre where their border of liberty is limited by this
technology. To this extent, by pointing out the notion of governmentality Foucault
aims to analyse the capacity of “autonomous” individual that for him liberation
would not be sufficient to explain “freedom”. Herein, it may be argued that
governmentality as a political rationality uses various ways in order to conduct
individual’s conduct for the sake of the salvation of the state. In this context,
Foucault talks about “the rationality behind the exercise of the state power”, this
rationality is constituted through the doctrine of the theory of police and the
document of the reason of the state. The doctrine of police aims to designate “the
nature of the objects of the state’s rational activity; it defines the nature of the aims
it pursues” (Foucault, 1979: 314). From this point onwards, “the care of individual
life is becoming [...] a duty for the state” (Foucault, 1988: 147). Hereby, men had
become the true object of the police. The striking point here is that, the main concern of the police is men’s coexistence in a territory and his social conducts in that territory. As Foucault states, the purpose of the police is to produce permanently the new technologies of care in terms of life of its citizens and strength of the state. From this motive, the governance of the police does not depend on the law but “a positive intervention in the behaviour of individuals” (Foucault, 1988: 159).

On the other hand, as an art of government, reason of the state (Raison D’état), “relies on the technology of police to make individuals useful (Simons, 1995: 39). Thus, it is taken “its rationale from the observation of the nature of the governed” (Foucault, 1979: 314). It should be noted that raison D’état cannot be conceived as an art of government according to “divine, natural or human laws”, it does not follow the general rules of the world, it rather is a government for the state’s strength (Foucault, 1979: 317). Thus, instead of aiming the individual salvation, raison D’état aims salvation of the state. Foucault summarises the idea of raison D’état as follows:

The idea of raison D’état is the state itself, and if there is something like perfection, happiness, or felicity, it will only ever be the perfection, happiness, or felicity of the state itself. There is no last say. There is no ultimate point. There is nothing like a uniform and final temporal organization (Foucault, 2007: 259).

In this manner, raison D’état has taken its mentality from the state regulatory idea of its governmental reason. However, at this point, Foucault concerns about the notion of politics in terms of highlighting raison D’état as a crucial principle of the
state. Politics, at the first instance, is not something that can be explained with the systems of laws or something that is constituted through legality. It rather uses laws as an instrument when it needs them. Politics is not concerned with legality but necessity (Foucault, 2007: 263). Thus, reason of the state depends on the idea of necessity which is defined by Le Bret that, “necessity silences the laws. Necessity puts an end to all privileges in order to make itself obeyed by everyone” (Foucault, 2007: 263). On the other hand, necessity calls a new kind of power; it is not a power that is exercised for the sake of sovereign but it is the power that targets life of entire population.

2.1.1.3. Power over Life

It may be argued that reason of the state has taken its character from a form of sovereign power that ensures the right for the ruler to “seize things, time, bodies, ultimately the life of subjects” (2003, Rabinow and Rose: 1). Sovereign power can also be defined as having the right to decide on life and death. The sentence of death could only be used when the sovereign’s existence in threat. For instance, in the name of right of death sovereign could wage war and calls his subjects to war for the defense of the state; “without ‘directly proposing their death’, he was empowered to ‘expose their life’: in this sense, he wielded an ‘indirect’ power over them of the life and death” (Foucault, 1978: 135). But the crucial point is, the revolt against the laws of sovereign and his laws would not be tolerated. Instead, the sovereign could exercise ‘direct’ power over the criminal’s life for his own survival (Foucault, 1978: 135). Herein, “power of life and death” denotes “the right to take
life or let live” (Foucault, 1978: 136). On the other hand, Foucault argues that from the 17th century onwards, West has come across the transformation of the mechanisms of power. The right of death which was held by sovereign turned out to be “the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life” (Foucault, 1978: 136). Thus, the power of death has started to have a positive effect on administering, optimizing, multiplying and subjecting individuals with certain regulations. As Foucault exemplifies,

Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. (Foucault, 1978: 137).

The focal point here is the shift from the conception of power that is calling death as a mechanism towards the survival of sovereign’s existence to the power that has the aim of ensuring, sustaining and multiplying life. The power, from now on, is over life where it constitutes domination; where the death is the limit of power; and where the meaning of death has been detached from the public realm, and where the notion of death turned out to be “the most private” (Foucault, 1978: 138).

From the 17th century onwards, power over life developed in two forms. These two forms are intrinsic to each other. The first form is centred on the body that is disciplining, seeking the usefulness and docility of the body like a machine. Power over life characterizes certain disciplines which may be called anatomo-politics of the human body. On the other hand, second form concerns the body
through its biological processes like birth, mortality, longevity, etc. Thus, this form focuses on the body at the level of species, and it aims to intervene and regulate the activities of population, which is called *bio-politics of the population* (Foucault, 1978: 139). The sovereign power that is constituted on the power of death was turned out to be the management of life and calculation of the bodies with the aim of sustaining life.

Foucault argues that in order to function, power needs certain set of procedures. These set of procedures depend on the mechanisms of power that establish, maintain and transform the conception of truth in a society. From Foucault’s point of view, it is clear that both bio-politics and disciplinary power can be seen as an outcome of these procedures which aim to constitute a kind of politics of truth. In this regard, in order to shed light on the role of power over life in the formation of modern subject and possibilities of the self, bio-power and disciplinary power need to be discussed.

2.1.1.3.1. Bio-power: The Political Technology of Life

Foucault indicates that there is a relationship between the emergence of bio-politics and the technique of power that was concentrated on individual body. This technique is called bio-power and it is exercised at the level of life. In *History of Sexuality* Foucault argues that this new technique of power chooses to guarantee the existence of population rather than letting them die. With this new form, the problem would not be the existence of the sovereignty anymore; but the “biological” existence of the population because bio-power functions at the level of
the species. From now on, the new role of the state was to control the biological one, rather than the individual. From this perspective, the particular aim of bio-power was to make knowledge and power as agents that are used in the transformation of human life. For Foucault, beginning from the 18th century, bio-power is primordial element in the development of capitalism. Human bodies as the objects of bio-power were needed for the machinery of production, besides, there should be an adjustment of the population as an element of this economic production. Herein, the very existence of bio-power aims to govern population by the practices of making them docile and accessible. At this point, with the aim of administering life of individual, bio-power diffuses in to every level of society.

From this point of departure, Foucault states that, subjugation of the bodies of human beings and the control of populations started with the technology of bio-power (Foucault, 1978: 139). The administration of population targets the biological existence of population in terms of birth and mortality, life expectancy, longevity, level of health so on and so forth (Foucault, 1978: 139). In doing so, bio-power targets individual’s body that man’s bodily existence does matter for the state. Foucault underlines that “for the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political existence” (Foucault, 1978: 142). Rather than dealing with the legal subjects of the state, power started to deal with the living beings in a particular territory. In an impressive manner, the technique of bio-power exercised “at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its access even to the body” (Foucault, 1978: 143).
Another striking point as an outcome of the development of bio-power is that the life became a political object. The massifying power that targets the man as a species intervenes the phenomena of population at the level of determining life (Foucault, 2003: 245). In doing so, bio-power uses the norm that is at the charge of the law. The juridical law would not aim death as enforcement or it does not aim to find out the enemies of the sovereign but the law operating as a norm aims to regulate the population (p.144). Bio-power as a regulatory technology aims to have a normalizing society where there is incorporation between the apparatuses of law and the institutions of the state (such as medical, administrative, educational, etc.). In order to comprehend the aim of normalizing society we should also introduce disciplinary power.

2.1.1.3.2. Disciplinary Power

It is indicated that human beings that stand on the threshold of modernity, are exposed to power in various ways under the name of power over life. The striking point is that disciplinary power can be exemplified as one of the most effective mechanism of power in terms of managing and re-creating the life of the individual. It is seen that under the implications of bio-politics human beings are targeted through their bodies. Although the mentality of the disciplinary power targets the body with the aim of disciplining it in order to make it docile and productive, it also targets the conscience and behaviour of the individual. The very reason for this conduct is normalizing the ‘abnormal’, which would be disharmonious to the social order. The purpose of disciplinary power is arranging
the society in a normalized and carceral manner. The significance of disciplinary power derives from its approach to human subject. In this regard, the body of the subject is located in the field of politics as an object of knowledge. In so doing, disciplinary technology puts calculable man against the “individual” man. It does this, by placing the human beings as subjects such as criminals, delinquents, the sick ones etc, and objects of knowledge for human sciences. All of those practices edifice to attain “normalized society” with the implications of carceral network of power. In this way, modern subject is comprehended as both an effect of disciplinary power and the element of its articulation (Smart, 1988: 75). The crucial point is that through the practices of power, modern subject is nothing more than an artefact.

In *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison* (1975) Foucault shows how normalizing practices are realized. His book begins with the chapter on the body of the condemned and he exemplifies how the disappearance of physical punishment in public spectacle had occurred. He wants to shed light on the target of new mode of power which in actuality, is no more the body but the soul or the “psyche” of human subject. For Foucault, disappearance of the public spectacle paves the way to a new type punishment which uses disciplinary methods aiming to normalize the ‘abnormal’ or the ‘delinquent’ criminal. In this regard, disciplinary power uses the mechanisms of hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and the examination. Disciplinary gaze depends on a particular kind of hierarchy that seeks continuous and functional surveillance of individuals. Normalizing judgement, on the other hand, depends on the action to normalize the wrongdoing of the criminal
rather than repress or expiate him. Thus, throughout surveillance and normalization, disciplinary power has become the prior forms of power from the classical age up until now. The examination combines both of the two techniques of hierarchical observation and normalizing judgement and through the effect of normalizing gaze, it classifies and judges individuals. Following these mechanisms, disciplinary power creates a “knowable man” with the premise of punishing him in a humanitarian way and normalizing his behaviours.

Disciplinary techniques of normalization work as a carceral network not only in prisons but also in society. The body of individual is located in a field of politics where disciplinary power targets the body as a docile, obedient and useful in terms of the aims of power relations (Smart, 1988: 25). The panoptic model gains importance at this point, wherein it aims to arrange everyday life of human being (Foucault, 1991: 205). The panoptic mechanism rests on the idea of arranging the spatial units that are seen constantly and recognized immediately (Foucault, 1991: 200). In this way, the visibility of panoptic mechanism is a trap where the individual can be seen but he could not see. In this way, he becomes “the object of information” but never “subject of communication” (Foucault, 1991:200) Foucault summarizes the effects of panopticon:

He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraint of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection (Foucault, 1991: 202-203)
The modern society in this respect for Foucault is analogous to the panoptic model of discipline. The panopticon, thus the society from now on, functions as a kind of laboratory of power (Foucault, 1991: 204). The aim of controlling space that the panoptic model presupposes turns out to be a controlling mechanism of disciplinary power on society. In doing so, disciplinary power sustains the organization of individuals in the places of school, army, hospital, etc. In other words, normalized society is the new place where the ‘individual’ would be corrected.

2.2. Foucault’s Work on Resistance and the Case of Conscientious Objection

We have seen that Foucault focused on the place of modern subject in power relations where the modern subject becomes a target of objectifying practices of power. The remarkable thing is that, Foucault did not attempt to theorize the notion of resistance in a comprehensive manner, nor as Kusch indicates, his conception of resisting agent could not developed (Kusch, 1991: 219). His well-known catchword on resistance\(^2\) has taken place in *History of Sexuality* where he says, “where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never a position of exteriority in relation to power (Foucault, 1979: 95).

Although Foucault has not attempted to establish a theory of resistance, he recommended investigating the forms of resistance in order to comprehend what the power relations are about (Foucault, 2000: 329). For Foucault, resistance or anti-authority movements concentrate around refusal of the administration that aims to

\(^2\) Foucault’s another piece “The Subject and Power” (1982) also deals with the relation between power and resistance.
intervene people’s way of living. These movements for Foucault are transversal that they are limited in a particular country or they are not peculiar to a specific form of economic or political government. It should be noted that, these struggles are the struggles against the “government of individualization” (Foucault, 2000: 329-330).

Foucault’s conception of resistance constituted in the question of the location of individual. For Foucault, the main target of the resistance against power is the effects of power which is linked with knowledge. At this point, Foucault argues that the regime of knowledge (savoir) plays significant role in terms of the constitution of the modern subject that knowledge functions and spreads out through power relations (Foucault, 2000: 330-331). Foucault questions how individuals fit into certain games of truth in history. Regime of knowledge to that extent plays very significant role in terms of the constitution of the modern subject at the different moments in history as an object of knowledge. Because the truth games ensure a knowledge regarding how human beings develop knowledge about themselves through psychiatry, medicine, education, penology etc., the role of regime of knowledge becomes crucial in terms of resistance movements. For Foucault struggles against the modern power, revolves around the issue of questioning, “Who are we?” For him, these struggles refuse the truth games that are nothing but the mere abstractions which go hand in hand with “ideological state violence” or “scientific administrative inquisition” (Foucault, 2000: 331) that ignores the individual and replaces him/her with obedient subject. In this respect, the effects of power over the individual are the crucial target of these movements. Briefly, the struggles or forms of resistance are against a particular form of power
that aims to categorize the individual, marking the individual through his own individuality, and detaching him from his own self and devoting him an artificial identity.

2.2.1. Possibilities of Resistance

Although it is known that Foucault did not write on the notion of resistance in a comprehensive manner, it can be stated that the genealogy of the modern subject leads him to deal with the notion of resistance and struggles that are against the techniques of individualization, which are carried out by modern power. The crucial point in Foucault’s genealogy of modern subject is his questioning of autonomy through which he deals with antiquity and modernity in terms of hermeneutics of the subject. The issue of autonomy in Foucault is driven from his questioning the process of how human beings turn into subjects. Genealogy helps us to reveal the individualizing techniques of power that are operated by institutions such as the state, prisons, family, schools, army, etc. and are internalized by the society. In this manner, governmental strategies that modern state follows have remarkable role in exerting power over the life of individuals. These strategies do not only detach the subject from his own individuality, but at the same time, they discipline, organize, normalize, manage and govern his life. In this respect, Foucault turns back to the problem of “actuality”.

It may be indicated that the question of Enlightenment, “Who are we in our actuality?” turns out to be “What is my actuality?” for the modern subject. This
question opens room for the possibility of resistance where the modern subject comes across the modes of individualizing techniques of power that eradicate his potentiality of attaining his own self. For Foucault, the criticism of humanism comes into prominence at this point, because humanist political rationality binds individual to his own subjectivities (Simons, 1995: 47). At this point, humanist tradition for Foucault, advices not to resist because as Foucault claims in Kusch’s words:

...the totality of discourse through which Western man is told: “Even though you don’t exercise power, you can still be a ruler. Better yet, the more you deny yourself the exercise of power, the more you submit to those in power, then the more this increases your sovereignty” (Kusch, 1991: 222).

Nevertheless, from Foucauldian point of view, “the individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise of power. The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces” (Simons, 1995: 47). We have seen in previous sections that modern government follows humanist rationality by employing individualizing and totalizing mechanisms over its subjects. In this sense, the modern individual is linked with the subjectifying implications of modern power that develops new rationalities about how to govern the individual.

The problem of “how individual acts upon himself” should be seen as a crucial point in order to materialize the issue of possibilities of resistance. It is seen from previous chapters that modern subject is detached from his own selfhood
through various mechanism of power. While placing individual as a subject position, rationalities of power use knowledge in order to maintain universalised (objective) truth forms. Truth, in this respect, plays significant role in both the formation of modern subject and his capacity and potential for the resistance to modern power. In this manner for Foucault, the crucial point is not to accept knowledge as an actual value but to analyse the ‘truth games’ in relation with the techniques that are used by human beings (Foucault, 1988: 18).

In this regard, it might be claimed that the meaning of resistance can be traced back in opposition to Kant’s view that “argue as much as you will, and about what you will, but obey!”(Kant: 3) The reason for this opposition is to question as Foucault did “What is the meaning of this actuality? And what am I doing when I speak about this actuality?” For Foucault, these questions are the signs of questioning modernity (Foucault, 2007: 86) as well as, they would be the blueprint for the resistance against modern power. In this sense, according to Foucault, for the possibility of resistance to modern power there is a need to make ontology of the present and ourselves and thus, questioning the actuality, in other words the Truth (Foucault, 2007: 95).

2.2.2. Foucault on Conscientious Objection

It might be useful to remind that this chapter is an attempt to show how the place of modern subject is determined in a network of power. So, it would not be inappropriate to argue that the main concern of this chapter is to display the relation
between subject and his/her freedom in a carceral society. In this regard, conscientious objection as resistance to modern power could be comprehended as a refusal of militarized form of society which is parallel with carceral society. In this context, the objector is against the implications of modern power (the state/ the army and even the society that s/he lives in) that targets his/her life by using the techniques of individualization. It is known that Foucault did not write on conscientious objection specifically but his lecture that was held on 1st March 1978 at the Collège de France (Foucault, 2004: 191-226) touches upon the question of recruitment and the ways of refusal against the recruitment policies of the nation state. From Foucauldian point of view, the act of refusals can be seen as “moral-counter conduct” that aims to exclude the reason of the state.

Considering Foucault’s approach to the recruitment strategies of nation-state, I claim that for him, conscientious objection can be seen as individual’s attempt of creating his/her own ethics. At this point, the act of objection is an effect of objector’s questioning his/her own being and his/her refusal of external authority that limits his/her autonomy.

2.3. Concluding Remarks on Foucault

From Foucauldian viewpoint, it may be argued that the act of conscientious objection might be seen as a refusal of the implications of modern power. The objector, in this sense, is the one who does not welcome the effect of modern power over his/her life with its regulative and disciplinary implications that turn him/her
into a docile body and obedient mind. As a way of refusal of all these implications and as an act of resistance the objector aims to create his/her own truth following his/her conscience rather than the regime of truth that modern power imposes on individual and society.

Although, the implications of the state/military as a form of modern power over the life of individuals aims to disrupt one’s realization of the self, the objector’s attempt of having his/her own truth is the very indicator of his/her ability to create an alternative self. In this sense, individual is eager to create the ethics of self by refusing the operations of modern power or militarized society as a reflection of carceral network of power in the case of conscientious objection. In order to have a better understanding of the relation between conscientious objection as a form of resistance and individual’s aim of creating self –ethics, I will deal with Stirnerian critique of modern power and his theory of Ownness as an alternative way of creating ethics of self.
CRTIQUE OF MODERN ‘MAN’: “THE EGO &ITS OWN”

One may claim that most of the resistance movements have been taking the notion of ‘subject’ as their point of departure. Such movements are formed against the implications of modern power over individual. The reason behind the attempt of resistance might be explained in terms of the notion of selfhood and autonomy of a person. Having one’s own account of interpreting the world that s/he lives in paves the way for an authentic definition of self. The point is that politics of the self can be seen as a search for unravelling the connection between modern power and the constitution of modern individual as a political subject. It may be argued that social reality that individual lives within, constructs individual’s perception of his/her own self, his/her capability of freedom and his/her ability to resist against the power that s/he is not comfortable with. The question of having consciousness of freedom to

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resist gains importance in terms of realizing one’s own self. In this context, Stirner’s extraordinary book *The Ego and Its Own* can be given as an account of failure of modernity for developing a free subject. This book offers a theory of egoism in order to detach the destructive effects of modern power, which constitute the individual as a political subject. Following the Stirnerian problematization of modern subject, the main objective of this chapter will be questioning the mechanisms of modern power that dominate individual and searching the reasons behind individual’s allowance of his/her own domination by an external power aside from his/her will. In relation to the question of self-domination, following the Stirnerian theory of the ego, the possibilities of resistance will be discussed. Additionally, Stirner’s account of social association will be introduced as an alternative to existing social structures. Lastly, I will introduce the philosophy of conscientious objection in relation with the theory of ego and Union of Egoists as an alternative way to resist against military service as an implication of modern power.

### 3.1. Stirner and His Critique of Humanist Ontology

Stirner was a member of Young-Hegelians circle in his studentship. It might be stated that he was more or less under the influence of Hegelian tradition. In his most genuine piece, *The Ego and Its Own*, he follows this tradition in order to constitute his theory of *ego*. Before moving on Stirner’s ego as his peculiar theory of “self”, his philosophical background should be given. In his *Philosophy of Mind*,
Hegel had dealt with the notion of “subject” in a detailed manner. Hegel depicts stages of individual development, by dividing it into four stages: childhood, adolescence, maturity and old age (Stepelevich, 2006: 166). As a follower of Hegelian tradition in his youth, Stirner follows this formulation of individual development in his work. Although he attacks Hegelian Spirit as a form of reality, which transcends the individual ego (Clark, 1976: 11), he employed Hegel’s conceptualisation of ‘human life’ as a metaphor for explaining the place of modern subject. In his comprehension of “human life”, Stirner depicts his specific attitude toward the world (Stepelevich, 2006: 167) by developing a critical manner towards “humanity”. He does so; by using the analogy between Hegelian approach towards the subject by displaying the stages realism, idealism and egoism in parallel to childhood, youth and adulthood. Both for Stirner and Hegel, childhood is the phase where child plays the role of slave (Stepelevich, 2006: 168). In this context, childhood meant to obey the command of the parents. Stirner exemplifies this stage by stating, “we exercise the beginnings of our strength on natural powers. We defer to parents as a natural power; later we say: father and mother are to be forsaken, all natural power to be counted as riven” (Stirner, 1995: 14). The power that is forsaken in physical manner leads to the emergence of spiritual power in child’s

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4 Stepelevich summarizes these four stages as such: “He begins with Childhood- mind wrapped up in itself. His next step is the fully developed antithesis, the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjective (as seen in ideals, fancies, hopes, ambitions) against his immediate individuality. And that individuality marks both the world which, as it exists, fails to meet his ideal requirements, and the position of the individual himself, who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play (Youth). Thirdly, we see man in his true relation to his environment, recognising the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it…to (Manhood)” pp.166-7.
mind as an immaterial power. This form of power in Hegelian terms is “the domination of abstract ideals, imaginings, *oughts*, hopes, etc” (Stepelevich, 2006: 168). With the very fact of the “ideals” childhood ends and the phase of youth starts. In this phase “the youth…is reflectively embodied, dominated by the realm of ideas, and seeks to be disembodied” (Stepelevich, 2006: 174). For Stirner, the adolescent mind, or as it might be called the youth refuses to obey authority of the parents. Henceforth, the youth enters the stage of maturity by refusing the external authority over his/her will. Maturity in this respect can be seen as a product of both child and youth where the person acts through the physical and mental power that “the physical and the ideal world become his own *Eigentum* [absolute ownership]” (Stepelevich, 2006: 174). Following Hegelian analogy of human life, Stirner uses an extraordinary illustration of individual’s stages of life. However, Hegelian approach would not be sufficient for his comprehension and analysis of modern individual because he could not embrace the idealistic aspects of Hegelian philosophy.

The reason of his dissatisfaction with Hegelian philosophy was because of idealistic point of view that Young Hegelians have embraced. For him, they could not overcome the youthful feelings that they were engaged with the ideals which were far beyond maturity. Stirner’s approach towards the comprehension of the world was neither the mere ideal nor the materialistic ‘realities’. His main concern was the absolute ownership of one’s own life. Both as a critique of Hegelian idealism and as a thinker who defends the notion of ownership, he explains his relation with idealism as such:
As I find myself behind things, and that as mind, so I must later find myself also behind thoughts, namely, as their creator and owner [Schöpfer und Eigner]. In the time of spirits thoughts grew until they overtipped my head, whose offspring they yet were; they hovered about me and convulsed me like fever-phantasies, an awful power. The thoughts had become corporeal on their own account, were ghosts, such as God, emperor, Pope, fatherland, etc. If I destroy their corporeity, then I take them back into mine, and say: ‘I alone am corporeal’. And now I take the world as it is to me, as mine, as my property [Eigentum]; I refer all to myself. (Stirner, 1995: 17)

Beyond the confines of Hegelian idealism, Stirner’s main concern was criticising the Enlightenment’s humanist ontology. Following this, he mainly engaged with the critique of Feuerbach. Stirner writes his piece The Ego and Its Own as a response to Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity. Before introducing the critique of The Essence of Christianity, it might be useful to say a few words on Stirner’s approach towards the idea of humanism. Stirner defines humanism as problematical that it supposes a universal and fixed human essence at the core of the human existence, according to Stirner this presumption is nothing more than a “new form of religious idealism” (Newman, 2007: 72). For this reason, he detaches himself from Hegelian tradition and criticises Feuerbach who was a member of Young-Hegelians. For Stirner, Feuerbach could not oppose the view of religious and metaphysical idealism in a way. The most striking point of Stirner’s criticism of humanism is that it carries tendency of conceptualizing the idea of Man as sacred. Hence, Stirner finds the idea of Man as metaphysical as the idea of God. For him, constituting Man as an ideal and a telos meant conceiving the God in the same manner (Newman, 2001). Stirner’s criticism of Feuerbach makes sense to the extent that Feuerbach could not response to the trouble of modernity’s futile attempts of detaching itself
from religious mode of thoughts. Feuerbach attempts to apply the notion of alienation to religion in his piece *The Essence of Christianity*. He presupposes that religion is alienating “because it requires that man abdicate his essential qualities and powers by projecting them onto an abstract God beyond the grasp of humanity” (Newman, 2003: 3). From this point of departure, “Stirner rejects the contemporary consensus that Feuerbach had completed the critique of religion, and provocatively insists that the Feuerbachian problematic reproduces the central features of Christianity” (Stirner, 1995: xix). As it can be seen from the Stirnerian approach towards Young-Hegelian tradition and religious sort of metaphysical “ideas”, remaining parts of Hegelian tradition refer to the dialectic between master-slave. Stirner has taken a critical account by claiming that religion and all sorts of “sacred” ideas enslave man by detaching his individuality from his own. To that extent Stirner claims that Feuerbachian category of abstract individual inevitably reproduces the religious alienation – with which Feuerbach tries to overcome the problem of alienation- by placing the category of individual or Man into the “sacred”. In doing so, Man turns to be God and the value of individual decreases to Man (Newman, 2001). So that Man becomes as coercive as God as an inevitable result of modernity’s attribution of essence to Man. The prior concern of Stirner was realizing oneself apart from any external power over one’s individuality. From this point of departure, he criticizes the idea of sacred which turns individuals into

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5 “For Feuerbach, the central error of religion was that it separated human attributes from actual individuals by transferring the predicates of the species into another world as if they constituted a self-sustaining being. But, for, Stirner, the errors of religion are not overcome with a rejection of god as transcendent subject; rather, religion is defined formally as the subordination of the individual to spirit in any of its guises” (Leopold, The Ego and Its Own, introduction, pp. xix-xx)
“powerless and humble” creatures (Zeitlin, 1994: 116). At this point, Stirner argues that modernism categorizes Man both as the creator and as sources of power by sanctifying him but it at the same time, ignores the *might* of the individual. The importance of the Stirnerian notion of *might* is driven from the following definition.

...in opposition to the state, I feel more and more clearly that there is still left me a great might, the might over myself, over everything that pertains only to me and that exists only in being my own (Stirner, 1995: 227).

In this respect, Might can be defined as personal power where individual is both the creator and at the same time the source of power. Above all, might is the mere indicator of self-autonomy. In order to have a better comprehension of the role of self-autonomy, in following section, Stirner’s theory of the ego will be examined. In this way, we would reach a clear view of his critique of modern individual and his theory of the ego as an alternative to subjugated modern individual through the practices and implications of modern power.

### 3.2. Stirner’s Ontology of the Ego

In previous section, we have seen Stirner’s criticism of Enlightenment’s humanist ontology through his criticism of Hegelian idealism and Feuerbach’s piece *The Essence of Christianity*. It has indicated that the humanist conceptualization of Man, which is defined by universal capabilities and properties, was a counterfeit of the God. Yet, Stirner’s main concern was freeing Man from his role of being God.
Beyond that, the notion of morality has a prior importance in his criticism of modernity. He depicts Enlightenment’s definition of morality as a fixed idea of humanism whose traces date back to Christian ideal that both dominates and oppresses individual. For instance, morality for him is linked to the mechanisms of political domination and it legitimates the police state (Stirner, 1995: 241). “Certainly everything that regards the principle of morality is a state affair” (Stirner, 1995: 200). By locating human subjectivity in the realm of morality, modern power also constructs individual as a political subject. Stirner, at this point, preserves the notion of individual autonomy against the authority of external powers such as the State, religion, society, etc. His theory of the ego gains importance where the theory would be seen as a radical revolt against “fixed ideas” and essentialist conceptions of the self.

In this regard, he uses the concept of ‘creative nothing’ in order to depict the creative potential of the ego in terms of creating itself in a permanent way. The ego in this respect plays significant role in the attainment of one’s own use of might to oppose and insurrect any other external will over his/her will. In the following section, we will go through an in depth analysis of Stirner’s view’s on ego.

### 3.2.1. The Ego as “Creative Nothing”

Following the criticisms of humanist notion of self, Stirner offers his theory of the ego, which presupposes the possibility of eradication of the domination over Man (Stirner, 1995: xxii). The motive behind his theory is an attempt of creating an alternative conception of self. It should be noted that the theory of egoism could not
simply be seen as “selfishness”. Conversely, “Stirnerian egoism should be distinguished from the individual pursuit of self-interest.[...Rather], Stirner is often critical of self-interested action simplicitier’’(Leopold, 2006: 182). His counter criticism towards Feuerbach (titled *What is Stirnerite Egoism?*) is an example for his peculiar definition of egoism:

The Egoism for which Stirner acts as spokesman is not the contrary of love, nor of thoughtfulness, and is not inimical to the tenderest of cordiality, nor is it the enemy of criticism, nor of socialism: in short, it is not inimical to any interest: it excludes no interest. It simply runs counter to un-interest and to the uninteresting: it is not against love but against sacred love, nor against thinking, but against sacred thinking: not against socialists, but against the sacred socialists, etc (Guérin, 1998: 23).

If we come back to Stirnerian ontology of the ego, it might be stated that the ego for Stirner is an indispensible element and “the mere indicator of ultimate reality” (Clark, 1976: 18). In contrast to the essentialist conception of 'self', Stirner’s ego does not presuppose itself. Instead, Stirner follows the idea that ego would not be totalized by a certain definition; it rather is a "source of all ideas and all values" (Clark, 1976: 18). On the other hand, it should be noted that Stirner does not claim that his conception of ego is the source of all reality. He considerably indicates the alternative way of formation of the self in contrary to the essentialist notions of self such that both Christianity and Young- Hegelians embrace (Clark, 1976: 18). In this regard, the notion of ego denotes neither a thing nor an idea but a process of creativeness. From Stirnerian reading of humanist ideology, autonomous subject is

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6 Stirner’s response essay to Feuerbach titled “What is Stirnerite Egoism?” is reached from Guérin’s book “No Gods No Masters”, 1998
impossible that the subjectivity of an individual is constructed through the
discourses of essentialism. Meaning that, the claims of human essence contribute a
fixed identity to individual that is external to him/her. To this extent, as it is
indicated before, for Stirner there is no essential human nature, it is only a
construction. Individual ego constitutes his/her own self. Stirner’s ego in this
respect is not "a thing, but a nothing; not an idea but a process" (Clark, 1976: 18-
19). The ego, thus, is nothing that it has no persistent form, besides; there is various
selves rather than one self in a period of time. Above all, these series of selves
surpass the prior selves in the process of self-creating activity (Clark, 1976: 18-19).

As Stirner himself states:

I do not presuppose myself, because I am every moment just
positing or creating myself, and am only by being not presupposed
but posited, and again, posited only in the moment when I posit
myself; that is, I am creator and creature [Schöpfer und Geschöpf] in
one (Stirner, 1995: 135).

As it can be understood from the quotation above, Stirner defines the ego as
"creative nothing" that ego does not have a defined value. As mentioned before,
each ego has its own values and each are nothing to all the other egos. Defining
more clearly, each ego embraces various selves that are formed in some period of
time and surpass the other selves through this ongoing process of creation. The
process of formation of various selves serves only for the development of one,
unique ego (Clark, 1976: 19). On the other hand, by referring to “creative
potentiality of life” (Caroll, 1974: 48) Stirner depicts that “I am nothing in the sense
of emptiness, but I am the creative nothing, the nothing out of which I myself as creator create everything” (Stirner, 1995: 7)

Furthermore, creative nothing, presupposes the individual’s uniqueness. The uniqueness of individual infers the detachment of fixed identities that are imposed on individual and it also opens room for his/her creativity in order to construct his/herself by his/her might rather than any other external power that is alien to him/her. Stirnerian notion of uniqueness also leads us to authenticity as a central notion in his theory of ego. Authenticity of the ego has taken its characteristics from individual’s own use of might where his/her might would not be limited in certain aspects of being but transcends the notion of one particular self. So that, individual who realises his/her characteristics of creative nothing would not be dominated by particular alien power which is external to his/her will, such as modern power concerning the State, church or even family. Stirner, in an implicit manner, talks about the authenticity of the ego in order to constitute an alternative self apart from the subject that modern power constructs. Authenticity to that extent, detaches itself from the abstractions of modern power (i.e. quasi-religious form of power) that identify individual as abstract human being and bestow him an essence where it aims to detach the individual from his unique self.

I am what I have become through my own efforts, through my development, through my appropriation of the outside world, of history, etc.: I am ‘unique’. But, deep down, that is not what you want. You do not want me be a real man. You would not give a farthing for my uniqueness. You want me to be “Man”, such as you have construed him, as an ideal, exemplary type. You want to make the “plebian egalitarian principle” the guiding light of my life (Stirner, 1995: 25).
For Stirner, modern power governs the individual by locating him into the position of “subject” or, of “Man” as we have indicated in critique of essentialism and Feuerbachian idealism\(^7\). It is shown that religions and ideologies can be given as an instance for this subjugation. Stirner brings out the fact of subjugation by the state. At this juncture, he claims that “the state betrays its enmity to me demanding that I be a man, which presupposes that I may also not be a man, but rank for it as an ‘un-man’, it imposes being a man upon me as a duty” (Stirner, 1995: 161). From this point of departure, two points might be underlined: first, as it is indicated several times in this chapter, state power as a form of modern power constitutes individual as a political subject by governing him/her through subjectification and by imposing on him/her the duty of being Man. In this manner, from Stirnerian point of view, human essence that essentialist discourses defend is not a pure place (Newman, 2001). For instance, the quotation above shows that human essence is the place where power constructs itself with the very idea of the State. The reason for this would be constructing individual as a body of power where the State could subordinate the individuality of human through his/her own existence. Second point is driven from the previous assumption is that either State power or any form of modern power not only detaches individual from his/her authenticity or uniqueness they also threaten the capability of creating/transforming one’s own self.

\(^7\) For Stirnerian critique of essentialism in relation with the concept of “creative nothing”, see p.34 of his book: “The supreme being is indeed the essence of man, but, just because it is his essence and not he himself, it remains quite immaterial whether we see it outside him and view it as ‘God’, or find it in him and call it ‘essence of man’ or ‘man’. I am neither God nor man, neither the supreme essence nor my essence, and therefore it is all one in the main whether I think of the essence as in me or outside me”(Stirner, 1995: 34)
I am owner of my might, and I am so when I know myself as unique. In the unique one the owner himself returns into his creative nothing, of which he is born. Every higher essence above me be it God, be it man, weakens the feeling of my uniqueness, and pales only before the sun of this consciousness. If I concern myself for myself, the unique one, then my concern rests on its transitory, mortal creator, who consumes himself, and I may say:

All things are nothing to me (Stirner, 1995: 324).

In this sense, power for Stirner appears with the rise of the category of Man. But, the more important point is that in his theory of the ego, individual could be capable of using power in order to have his/her self-mastery for being free. The theoretical importance of Stirner’s egoistic individual comes to scene at this point. However, Stirner proclaims that the State and other modern forms of power are obstacles against the freedom of the ego. In order to have an account on the possibilities of the ego and freedom, his critique of the State and society will be discussed in the following section. Such discussion is important for grasping resistance (and have its relevance to conscientious objection) in Stirnerian theory of the ego.

3.3. Ownness, Freedom and Possibilities of Resistance

Stirner’s crucial concern was to make a critique of social structure. In this sense, he attacks the notion of State as a form of humanist power. This form of power for him is based on individual’s power (Newman, 2003: 65) but ironically, the state as the possessor of modern power aims to “indoctrinate” its individual subjects (Caroll, 1974: 48). On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that, in addition to the entity of state, society also erodes “creative potentiality of life”
(Caroll, 1974: 49) that the egoist is craving to have. Stirner's criticism of social structure can frankly be seen one of the part in his book that is titled *My Intercourse*. He underlines the fact that because “the character of the society is determined by the character of its members [and because] they are its creators” (Stirner, 1995: 188), the state is not established on the idea of mutual decision but on mutual dependency. Following this, he claims that state and society are constituted with the consent of members of that society. He explains mutuality of state and society by declaring that, “they are pre-ordained, having an independent and indissoluble life of their own, being against us individualists” (Stirner, 1995: 198). Driven from this statement, Stirner's objection towards state and society lies beneath the idea that they both are not product of free and creative choice of individual ego. For him, both state and society can rather be seen as involuntary organizations that are imposed on individuals through coercive means. At this point, the place of the ego in society gains importance to the extent of its use. The ego, in this respect, would not be comprehended as an end. Nevertheless, the striking point for Stirner is that while society becomes an end; ego would only be used as a means for constructing society as something sacred (Clark, 1976: 77). Because the idea of sacredness depends on the annihilation of individual will, Stirner attacks the notion of society by accusing it for the eradication of individuality and freedom. Besides, he points out that the State and the existing form of society destroy the uniqueness of individual. As he underlines:

The state always has the sole purpose to limit, tame, subordinate the individual to make him subject to some *generality* or other; it lasts only so long as the individual is not in all in all, and it is only the
clearly-marked restriction of me, my limitation, my slavery. Never does a state aim to bring in the free activity of individuals, but always that which is bound to the purpose of the state (Stirner, 1995: 201).

Concerning the question of individual will against the will of the sacred (State, society, religion, etc.), Stirner points out the prior role of the ownness against the implications modern power that dominates individuals through the institutions of the State or society. In this regard, in relation with the institutions of state and society I will focus on Stirner’s theory of ownness as a way to attain one’s own freedom.

3.3.1. Ownness as a Way towards Freedom

Stirner’s theory of ownness can be seen a way of taking a critical stand towards modernity and its discontents: “[m]odernity could not reach a state of overcoming the religious modes of thoughts that subjectify the individual” (Stirner, 1995: 163). In this manner, as we have indicated before, he mentions morality as a fixed idea that traces back to Christian ideal and dominates individual through its discourses. On the other hand, he points out that morality is linked to the political domination and it “legitimizes the police state” (Stirner, 1995: 241) where it constructs human subjectivity in terms of moral norms. Besides, as it may be understood, the universalist and prescriptive elements in human nature are rejected by Stirner. This rejection leads him to the critique of Enlightened Man defined through particular moral norms, which advice how one should live in accordance
with these laws. Stirner criticises this state of mind by indicating, “I am a man just as the earth is a star. As ridiculous as, it would be to set the earth the task of being a ‘thorough star’; so ridiculous it is to burden me with the call to be ‘thorough man’” (Stirner, 1995: 163). The State as a reflection of religious mode of thought plays crucial role in terms of creating an order and stability by taking advantage of its citizens. In doing so, it also creates dependence of individual to its existing order (Caroll, 1974: 50). Upon such criticisms, Stirner offers his theory of ownness as an alternative path towards freedom.

Ownness is *sine qua non* element of Stirnerian egoism, it indicates self-mastery, and *autonomy* of individual that s/he can use his/her own might over his/her individuality. “I am my own only when I am master of myself, instead of being mastered either by sensuality or by anything else (God, man, authority, law, state, church)” (Stirner, 1995: 153). From this point of view, the idea of Ownness is the prerequisite in order to be free; nevertheless, because individual finds her/himself at the centre of the power relations s/he neither has her/his Ownness nor freedom. “My freedom becomes complete only when it is my- *might*; but by this I cease to be a merely free man, and become an own man” (Stirner, 1995: 151). In this regard, Stirner insists on the necessity of "personal autonomy" and "individuality" with respect to the very fact that freedom is the choice of individuals rather than an enforcement of the external or "arbitrary authority" (Clark, 1976: 61). Stirner’s conceptualisation of freedom differentiates itself from the negative conception of freedom. For him, “freedom that is granted or given is no freedom at all. Only the freedom one takes for oneself is the real egoist’s freedom, the product
of will so gratifying to one’s passions” (Zeitlin, 1994: 120). Stirner follows the positive notion of freedom, which depends on the idea of reinventing oneself. The ego, on the other hand, holds its freedom, its being the possession of itself and its on behalf of the egoist’s might where Stirner declares “might is right!” For Stirner the egoist’s freedom “becomes complete only when it is my--might; but by this I cease to be a merely free man, and become and own man” (Stirner, 1995: 151). For him, might is needed in order to value oneself as an own person. Besides, one’s own might gives him the right over oneself and to the other things. “To the question, what or who gives [one] the right to do this or that, the traditional answer is God, love, reason, humanity and so on”. The ego, thus, is the only authority to decide what is right and what is not (Zeitlin, 1994: 120). In this sense, ownness meant to be free in every case, even in the most oppressive situations where it is a kind of freedom which starts with the individual. However, the notion of freedom under the influence of ‘sacred’ formations of state and society is a fixed idea and does not transcend itself. In order to create its own and to transcend itself, the ego struggles against authority of the State.

3.3.2. Modern Power and Insurrection

We have seen that by imposing being a Man upon individual as a duty, modern power and its institutions (such as state) constitutes individual as a political subject. In this sense, it may be claimed that human essence that modern power asserts is not a power-free dimension: human essence is the place where power
constructs itself along with the very idea of the State. Because human being has been constituted as a location of power, state subordinates individual through his/her own existence. Stirner’s approach to individual as a source of power has crystallised at this point (Newman, 2001: 37-55). Power comes to scene with the very existence of individual but the important thing is that individual could be capable of using this power in order to have his/her own mastery. Yet, for attaining both Ownness and freedom, one needs to be free from the given essence to the self. Stirner’s main concern is then overthrowing the authority which is external to the ego and which lacks freedom of the ego.

The idea of insurrection comes to the scene at the point where an authority or modern power threatens the existence of the ego. Insurrection is the refusal of fictitious identity that is imposed by modern power on individual. It has been indicated that the ego is a creative process; it is a “self-creating flux” (Ferguson, 1982: 279). However, modern power, both by ignoring the potentiality of self and by imposing fixed ideas to the self, lacks its creative process. Here, “Stirner suggests, what should be freed is not human essence from external conditions but the self from human essence, from fixed identities” (Newman, 2003: 68). In order to free the modern individual, he embraces the idea of revolt rather than revolutionary actions through the ways of emancipation from modern power. According to Stirner,

Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. The former consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established condition or status, the state or society, and is accordingly a political or social act; the latter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet
does not start from it but from men’s discontent with themselves, is not an armed rising, but a rising of individuals, a getting up, without regard to the arrangements that spring from it. The revolution aimed at new *arrangements*; insurrection leads us no longer to let ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on ‘institutions’ (Stirner, 1995: 280-281).

Insurrection follows the law of oneself and regretting the arrangements of external authority over one’s own will. While defining ownness Stirner denotes that unique ones or in other words, the egoists are autonomous individuals and having their own law and living accordingly to that law (Stirner, 1995: 182). On the other hand, he states that “[...] a law over human action (ethical law, state law, etc.) is always a *declaration of will*, and so an order. Yes, even if I myself gave myself the law, it would yet be only my order, to which in the next moment I can refuse obedience” (Stirner, 1995: 174). Insurrection, thus gains importance as an act of rejecting the value of existing social order or any kind of social community. Besides, it also opens the room for a new edifice of association. Let me now examine this very interesting suggestion of Stirner.

### 3.3.3. “The Union of Egoists” as an Alternative Association

By developing theory of ownness and by suggesting the idea of insurrection in order to detach all forms of social domination over the ego, Stirner aims to reach a new kind of association. It should be noted that while constituting his theory of ego, Stirner did not aim to develop a pure individualistic theory. He rather theorizes his ego at the social level and his egoism finds its worth by creating a realm that is based on the idea of interaction between egos (Clark, 1976: 71). The
disenchantment of social system leads him to attack entity of the State and society that is cohesive to it. Besides, he problematizes the notion of sovereignty in the sense that concept of sovereignty is used for the justification of the State and its actions (Clark, 1976: 71). The main concern of Stirner, however, is the idolization of the State and accepting its authority over one’s own will. By claiming so, Stirner describes the State that locates individual as a servant to state power and comes up with an alternative association that is called Union of Egoists. The existence of Union rests on the idea of mutual agreement among the egos. As Clark comments:

[Union of egoists] is an arrangement in which the egoist loses nothing. ‘I sacrifice nothing at all’. Stirner’s frequent over-optimism about egoism again comes out here. It is true that an egoist will not enter into a contract unless what is received is desired or needed more than what is surrendered. But this will only mean that ‘nothing is sacrificed’ in a situation in which both parties are in an equal bargaining position” (Clark, 1976: 81).

Union of egoists has taken its importance from the fact that it serves to theory of Ownness. As indicated before, Ownness in this regard, presupposes all of the possibilities to resist power. The resistance against power also implies the very fact of abolishing the subordination that power carries over individual. Stirner indicates that the State demands commonality of individuals thus; the human value of individual depends upon being a citizen of the State (Stirner, 1995: 90). Stirner declares that,

The state and I are enemies. I, the egoist, have not at heart the welfare of this ‘human society’. I sacrifice nothing to it, I only utilize it; but to be able to utilize it completely I transform it rather into my property and my creature; that is, I annihilate it, and form in its place the Union of Egoist (Stirner, 1995: 161).
It has been indicated that the major objection of Stirner against the State and society is driven from their restrictive characteristics that target the creativity of the ego and possibilities of freedom that the ego seeks to have. From this point of departure the union for Stirner, offers a new understanding of liberty, which aims to eliminate the coercion of the State and “society life”. In doing so, the union would be the place where the ownness of the ego is completed (Stirner, 1995: 272-273). In this respect, union of egoists could serve the interest of individual selves where it is an arrangement that each and every ego could establish his/her autonomy and Ownness. The difference of union of egoists from society is that, it is not a law binding contract among individuals, it rather presupposes the mutual agreement between individuals who form the union and they can leave the union by their own will. On the other hand, the individual is not born into the union as it is in society and the state: “a state exists even without my co-operation: I am born in it, brought up in it, under obligations to it, and must ‘do it homage’. It takes me up into its ‘favour’, and I live by its ‘grace’”. The independence of the state thus presupposes individual’s dependency on it (Stirner, 1995: 199). Besides, the union would not demand an altruistic behaviour from its member such as giving up from his autonomy it rather looks for individual’s self-development where individual would appear with his/her uniqueness. The reason for searching to realize the self in the union according to Stirner would be the very idea of union’s refrainment from the institutionalisation. In the union, in contrast to the institution of society, “egoists are said to have only one relation to each other, that of usableness, of utility, of use” (Leopold, 2006: 194-5). Thus, it may be argued that the union would be seen as a
contractual relation in which the egoist loses nothing and sacrifices “nothing at all” but having his own self (Clark, 1976: 81). In this way, the egoistic self would be freed from the self as a political subject. From this point onwards, the possibility of practice of egoism comes to scene.

At this point, I should relate Stirner’s philosophy in general and resistance in particular to the case of conscientious objection. The striking question for this thesis is that would conscientious objection as a form of resistance against modern power be able to create a new understanding of self; the self, which is able to act in an autonomous manner? In the coming section, conscientious objection in relation to practice of egoism and the possibility of resistance in relation with the ego will discussed.

3.4. Stirner and Conscientious Objection

We have seen that humanism presupposes a fixed human essence, which is far from taking the self into consideration as having a potentiality of creativeness and defining it with its floating characteristics. In this case, Stirnerian motto (like Kant embraced) “Realize yourself!” (Zeitlin, 1994: 114) comes to the deadlock from humanist perspective. But, it is the deadlock that opens new paths for realizing oneself in terms of having a conception of self-autonomy for an individual. Conscientious objection in this manner is driven from a kind of “self-imposed handicap” where the one goes into an evaluation of norms and goals of the society that s/he lives in (Cohen, 1966: 13). For instance, military service as a mandatory
and at the same time as a sacred duty of citizen in nation state, from the perspective of the objector it is an external conduct that is imposed to individual through the norms of the society. These norms as the sanctions of society or the policy of the state locate individual in the situation that s/he comes into a conflict with her/his self-conscience.

Although Stirner did not write on the case of conscientious objection, his critique of the State or all forms of modern power would enlighten us in grasping his possible confrontation against military service. For Stirner, the case of military service would include the very possibility of idea of sacrifice, which may be seen as one of the ultimate constituent of being a good citizen. One can argue that conscripting armies thus, become a moral issue for the State where one’s conscience is constructed through the public use of reason. However, most of the time, being a good citizen as a part of public morality contradicts having one’s own conscience or in other words, it hinders one’s own definition about his/herself. Stirner summarizes this fact by claiming, “in our being together as nation or state we are only human beings” (Stirner, 1995: 90). The value of individual thus, is not having one’s own definition of oneself but being the part of the commonality of the State and “being a citizen of that State” (Stirner, 1995: 90). In this respect, although conscience is subjective and a “reflection on [one’s] own acts in relation to the [one’s own] standards of judgement” (Childress, 1979: 318) conscience of the State or the nation transcends the individual. Then, conscientious objector refuses the external authority over his/her decisions because s/he “fear the loss of selfhood,

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8 Military service as a sub-title of conscientious objection will be dealt in chapter four in a more detailed manner.
integrity, and wholeness in the anticipated judgement of the future self on the present self’s acts, and s/he expresses this fear” (Childress, 1979: 321) with the act of being an objector. From Stirnerian point of view, because the conscience could be seen as a place where one constitutes his/her selfhood in it, the fear of loss of might or will to power of one’s own brings individual to the act of objection.

Deriving from this brief examination of conscientious objection up to now, it is indicated that one of the ways of reading conscientious objection is discussing it on the basis of moral disagreement\textsuperscript{9}. Another important point is the similarity between mentality between the Union of Egoists and conscientious objector. I am not claiming that these two completely overlap in their definitions and practices. But, it should be noted that the case of conscientious objection may be used as a variable in order to test the applicability of the philosophy of Union of Egoists as a kind of association which aims to create a place for self governing practices of the egos. In his criticism towards being servant of the State Stirner denotes that, in the moral understanding of the commonality “to serve the state or the nation became the highest ideal, the state’s interest the highest interest, state service (for which one does not by any means need to be an official) the highest honour” (Stirner, 1995: 91) for ordinary or subjugated human beings. Following this claim, Carl Cohen’s explanation concerning the stance of conscientious objectors would be applicable to Union of Egoists. Conscientious objection first of all, is a style of life for Cohen (Cohen, 1968). For him, objectors could form an alternative community where they

\textsuperscript{9} My analysis of conscientious objection would not be limited to the sphere of morality at all. In the fourth part of the thesis, I am dealing with the concept in terms of a revolt against the governing mentality of the State and its technologies of power.
would able to have their own ‘moral conviction’ and life style (Cohen, 1968: 270). This means, by creating conscientious objection as a style of life, one revolt against social domination over him/herself imposed by the duty of military service. From this point of departure, the question of being a political subject and the possibility of attaining freedom gains importance in terms of the possibility of creating one’s Ownness apart from the implications of modern power.

3.5. Concluding Remarks on Stirner

From Stirnerian point of view, conscientious objector could be seen as the one who is in a search of attaining his/her freedom and autonomy. In this sense, the act of conscientious objection denotes that the objector puts his/her reason and moral understanding above the reason of the state. In this respect, Stirnerian theory of the ego can be applied to the case of conscientious objection. In doing so, we can understand how modern individual act against the implications of modern power over him/her. From this point of departure, the case of conscientious objection develops an alternative way to construct one’s own conscience by refusing the established norm of the society that s/he lives in.

One of the most striking point is that by his refusal of fixed identities imposed by the humanist tradition on the modern subject, Stirner opens a new path of considering the self as a creative process. The intersection point for conscientious objector and Stirner’s ego as a ‘creative nothing’ is their ability to have a law of oneself. It is the law that embraces an autonomous individual in relation to the declaration of the will of that individual and refusal of obedience. The definition of
self-conscience gains importance at this point where “conscience is simply a motivation based on the realization or judgement that doing certain acts would violate the inner harmony of the self” (Wiberg, 1985: 360). Stirner with his theory of the ego depicts importance of the autonomous conscience in the sense of one’s disharmonious acts. In this sense, social norms that are constructed from an external authority to his will such as nation state do regarding the issue of military service.

The case of conscientious objection to military service in this respect can be seen as a form of resistance against modern power. Thus, it enables the objector to achieve his/her autonomous self. By focusing on Stirner’s theory of Ownness as a practice of freedom and his Union of Egoist I will try to present the act of conscientious objection as an attempt of one’s own use of might against the implications (military conscription) of modern power and society (nation state, militarized society). In this manner, in the following chapter, I will deal with the case of conscientious objection in a detailed manner from its history to its philosophy, and then I aim to examine the case of objection from both Foucauldian and Stirnerian perspective.
CHAPTER IV

UNDERSTANDING CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AS RESISTANCE TO MODERN POWER AND POSSIBILITIES OF SELF

4.1. Brief History of Conscription

It has been stated that the institution of conscription appeared in Early Mesopotamia and it was called *ilkum*. The institution of *ilkum* was most widely known mechanism of conscription at that time. As an obligation to the state, *ilkum* was mentioned in the Code of Hammurabi and it required the duty to serve in the royal army and in return to this service, one can have the right to hold land (Postgate, 1992: 242). It is argued that the institution of *ilkum* requires to participate in military which also includes state service activities in the time of peace, too (Postgate, 1992: 242). The indicative evidence that underlines the importance of the institution of *ilkum* can be given by reference to the sanctions of the code on military service. In the Code of Hammurabi, it was indicted that “soldiers who failed to turn up when commanded to join a royal campaign would be executed” (Postgate, 1992: 242). It might be claimed that this process involved sanctions, which could be as very indicator of comprehending military service as a custom of society. The other important point concerns the philosophy and the political reasons behind the conscripting armies. Since Early Mesopotamian tradition, the conscription have changed in its appearance and reasons. Yet, in order to have an in
depth analysis of the institution of conscription as a governmental policy of the state, modern conscription is critically important. Above all, the modern conscription would not only provide clues about society but it would also help to crystallise the relation between citizen and the state. In addition to that, in our context the institution of modern conscription presents a struggle between the individual and the state (as a form of modern power) concerning individual autonomy and the practice of the self.

As it is indicated before, the theoretical importance of the institution of conscription for this study plays crucial role in terms of analysing the disciplinary techniques over the lives of citizens/population which are carried by the state and military. For this reason, there need to be a brief history of modern conscription\(^10\). In this regard, forms of recruitment as a less institutionalized form of conscription should be given attention in order to comprehend the historical process behind the modern conscription.

4.1.1. Forms of Recruitment

As it is presented previously, modern form of conscription has found its roots “in the Medieval and early Europe” (Lucassen and Zürcher, 1999: 7). But before moving to modern form of conscription, recruitment as a less institutionalized form of conscription should be discussed shortly. It could be said

\(^{10}\) In this respect, because the issue of conscientious objection will be the focus point of the thesis, I would rather prefer limiting the scope of countries that put into practice conscription system. In this respect, I will deal with the issue of conscription in general terms.
that there have had mainly four types of recruitment strategies in the Middle East and Europe from the late seventeenth century to early twentieth century: “feudal recruitment, unfree recruitment, recruitment on the labour market and conscription” (Lucassen and Zürcher, 1999: 2). Feudal form of recruitment “was based on the non-monetary relation between the state (for example, king or sultan) and feudal lords or tribal chiefs” (Lucassen and Zürcher, 1999: 2). Unfree recruitment, on the other hand, based on an unequal relation between the State and its subjects who were not free and the relation between the State and its subjects was based “on conquest and subjugation” (Lucassen and Zürcher, 1999: 4). Labour markets also served as a supplier of men power for the military in terms of recruiting possible soldiers for the State, both national and international markets were quite developed in this area that “some regions and ethnic communities specialized in this trade” (Lucassen and Zürcher, 1999: 5). Now let me focus on the modern form of the recruitment strategy that is called conscription. (Lucassen and Zürcher, 1999: 7).

The shift from recruitment to its modern form includes certain specific stages. In this process, we come across two branches of conscription which are indirect and direct conscription. Indirect conscription was characterized in the pre-national period “before national, centralized and theoretically universal conscription was introduced” (Lucassen and Zürcher, 1999: 7). Human subjects of the State or (landowner) were to be selected in order to serve for the army. In this form, the individual was not free. In contrast to indirect conscription, in direct conscription

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11 For instance, Peter the Great’s conscript army was recruited indirectly in that the great landowners were charged with filling their complement of recruits and largely left free in their choice of
the state was to be in relation with the free subjects. French revolutionary era would be given as an example for this type of conscription. The critical point here is that with the introduction of direct conscription, the policy has been used in a more instrumental manner: first, it might be stated that the government policy on conscription aims to use soldier as a “human material” (Bröckling, 2009: 53) during the process of strengthening the borders of nation-state. Besides this fact, the reason of the state was concentrated on creating “the citizen” as a form of obedient subject who has “the duty” and “right” to serve to the state. Conscription, in this sense, engenders the system that have been in a constant search of war even in the time of peace, which is needed to have permanent armies and the control of population seen as the possible soldiers of the army of the state. Aydın called this process as “total war”. For him:

Total war also meant that the masses assumed to form the nation were to become soldiers as a whole. This state of conscription does not only pose a quantitative issue, but it also manifests as a phenomenon that encompasses all stages of human life and involves the recruitment of groups that were previously not expected to serve in the military- such as women and children- or causes them to directly affected by the conditions of war (Aydın, 2009, 17).

Total war, to this extent could be seen as a govern-mentality of the state and it gives clues about the conduct of the state on its citizens. But, before moving to the analysis of this conduct, it would be useful to discuss the implications of modern conscription.

conscripts. The actual selection was then mostly left to the village elders in the mir (Lucassen and Zürcher, 1999: 7).
4.1.2. Modern Conscription

It is said that the appearance of modern conscription dates back to the American War of Independence with George Washington’s draft. Following the American War of Independence conscription appears in Europe during the process of “citizen creation” as a part of the policy of nation-states. The policy attracts attention from other countries and it also was followed throughout the late eighteenth century (Aydın, 2009: 17). In this regard, French case on modern conscription should be given in order to comprehend both social and ideological aspects of the institution of conscription. French Revolution, which was under the influence of War of Independence touched off the existing universal conscription as a governmental policy of the nation state. In this way, the ideals of French Revolution could spread out the whole world via French soldiers as missioners (Zürcher, 2009: 45). Another aspect of French conscription can be seen in Levi’s reflections on conscription, for her throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries one of the ongoing negotiations between citizens and state officials was over what makes for equitable rules governing conscription (Levi, 1996: 134). Beyond these definitions, it would be claimed that the implication of conscription based on army system or mandatory military service derives from the idea that every citizen has to be soldier as a part of the practices of nation-state. For instance, the right to carry weapons would be a useful example for creating citizen-soldier. Especially after the French Revolution, the idea of sovereignty brought the notion that each and every person regardless of his/her social status is the citizen of the state. Hereafter, “the right to carry weapons” was no more the privilege of the
nobility and military service would not be a status that was bought with money. Military service or the right to carry weapons has become a right for every individual citizen of the state under the institution of the army (Aydıν, 2009: 17). We have already said that the shift in conscripting soldiers might be seen as a part of the governmental reason behind the nation-states. In this sense, Napoleonic age would be a good example for this shift: the military success of Napoleon was indubitably related with the creation of “national consciousness”. We have seen previously that the policy of maintaining the consciousness of people endeavours the policy of spreading out the ideals of the French Revolution to whole of the world (Aydıν, 2009, 18). Like the institution of church that aims spreading out the religious ideals to whole of the world, the French military had begun to appear as a new missionary in order to expand the glory of the revolution. However, Napoleonic dream of spreading the revolution around the world ceased away as an unsuccessful attempt, from this point on because military service turned out to be an aim of guarding the borders of nation state (Aydıν, 2009: 18).

Beyond the fact of creating citizen-soldier, conscription was imposed during the war with the aim of securing the borders of the state in Anglo-Saxon world such as Britain, the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia (Levi, 1996: 134). Besides, calling the citizens into the arms the institutions of conscription were used in several ways in order to serve to the state, however it attracted reaction in various ways. In the American Civil War, conscription, or the draft as Americans call it, was used “as a means of generating money and encouraging volunteers, but generated riots instead” (Flynn, 1998: 5). Britain, on the other hand, was the first
Anglo-Saxon country that adopted military conscription and it also included “overseas duty” (Levi, 1996: 136). Similar to the U.S. case in American Civil War, Britain faced with an unsuccessful attempt of volunteer recruiting during World War I (Levi, 1996: 136). After a while, though President Wilson initiated “Selective Service Act in 1917” the draft was seen as a limitation against the individual freedom (Flynn, 1998: 5).

This limitation rested on the idea that the very existence of the individual depends on the very existence and will of the state (Rand, 1982: 171). In contrast to the reason of the state, it is argued that the main duty of the state or the government is to protect its citizen’s fundamental rights such as “right to life” and in this respect, conscription is seen as “an abrogation of rights [where it is claimed by the state that the life of individual] belongs to the state, and the state may claim it by compelling him to sacrifice it in battle” (Rand, 1982: 171-172). Another striking point in the policy of conscription is the idea that each and every individual/citizen of the state have rights and duties towards the state. Deriving from this point, conscription was defended by arguing that the rights that the individual has impose obligations. The crucial point is that this discussion shows that “rights are a gift from the state, and that a man has to buy them by offering something (his life) in return” (Rand, 1982: 172).

Deriving from the conscription policies in various countries that are mentioned above and the reason of the state in applying the policy of conscription, it is clear that the institution of conscription brings about the opposition against military service. This opposition can be classified in various ways but the crucial
point for this thesis will be its character that locates the “autonomy” and “freedom” of the individual at the centre. In other words the main concern of the opposition acts has taken shape on resisting against the identity of being soldier which is given by the State and the military (as a reflection of modern power) over the individual. Conscientious objection in this respect can be seen as a more institutionalized form of opposition. It may be defined as an act of refusing to serve in military because of philosophical, political or religious motives. Briefly, this act of refusal indicates individual’s refusal of an external power over his/her will. In this respect, it might be seen that modern form of conscription as an institutionalized form of recruitment paves the way to the act of conscientious objection. Now let me introduce conscientious objection as a form of resistance against military service.

4.2. The Ways of Refusal to Serve and Conscientious Objection

Following Foucault and Stirner one may claim that throughout history most of the institutions or institutionalized form of thoughts that are constituted by modern power such as state, society, religion and even family generate themselves as a means of producing docile bodies and obedient minds rather than considering the free will of the individual. Following this, it may be claimed that, military organization is based on an involuntary participation of possible soldiers. The striking thing is that these kinds of organizations have been carrying the possibility of paving the way to disobedience and resistance. Bröckling summarizes the issue of refusal to serve in military as such:
Every form of military organization and soldier production...generates specific forms of resistance and refusal: soldiers, or those being forced to become soldiers, revolt, flee, take refuge with the enemy, disobey orders, get sick or simulate sickness, wound themselves or commit suicide. Or they refuse to serve, to carry a gun or to go to the battle-front from the outset (Bröckling, 2009: 53).

Another example can be given in the Ottoman era that the recruits can refuse to serve in military by hiding “in Anatolia and Balkans, ‘leaving for the mountains’ to escape the demands of the state and it was an age-old tradition” (Lucassen and Zürcher, 1999: 13). Zürcher’s noteworthy example of the refusal to serve in military should be given in order to have a better understanding of the refusal in the Middle East. He talks about refusing to serve to the military certain some ways. One is being a pacifist in relation to the religious sect that one belongs, but the implications of conscription in the Ottoman Era would be gripping and should be received attention in terms of objecting to the military service by other means. Desertion was the best known way of objecting to serve in the Ottoman Empire such that “desertion in the First World War, Ottoman army assumed proportions completely unknown in the armies of the belligerents of western and central Europe at the time” (Zürcher, 2009: 46). Ottoman Empire was not the only one that come across desertion, all of the armies that engaged in World War faced the problem. In any way, Ottoman army might be shown as the only one that encounters desertion in a dramatic way where “by the end of the war the number of deserters had further increased to nearly half a million, a number far higher than that of the soldiers remaining in the field. This is a number over three times of that of the deserters
from far larger German army” (Zürcher, 2009: 48). Beyond the fact of refusing to serve in military in such ways, conscientious objection should be comprehended in an extensive manner.

Conscientious objection appears different compared to other forms of refusal to military service such as, revolt, desertion and “other forms of disobedience” (Bröckling, 2009). For Bröckling, it “becomes an issue only in the cases when armies do not consist of volunteers or mercenaries (paid soldiers) and where personnel are subject to mandatory conscription or some other form of forced recruitment” (Bröckling, 2009: 53). In other words, it may be claimed that like the institutionalization of recruitment, conscientious objection can be seen as an institutionalized form of refusal to serve in military. That is why with the emergence of institutionalization of mandatory conscription conscientious objectors turned out to be a problem for the state (Bröckling, 2009: 54). For a better comprehension of the philosophy behind the conscientious objection and the relation between the state and the objector, we should first deal with the history of conscientious objection.

4.2.1. A Brief History of Conscientious Objection

We mentioned that conscientious objection plays crucial role in the relation between the objector and the state where the objector refuses his/her duty to defend the territory of the state and to fight for the country (Moskos, 1993: 3). But, before moving to an examination of conscientious objection as form of resistance against
the implications of modern power, first let me focus on a brief history of conscientious objection.

4.2.1.1. The Sacred and the Secular

The reasons for refusing to serve military under the name of conscientious objection have quite diverse characteristics from religious to political. It is stated that religious motivated conscientious objection cases trace back to the Roman Antiquity (Bröckling, 2009: 53). Also, since the early sixteenth century Protestant communities such as Mennonites and Quakers have refused to join any “armed service” in relation with their beliefs (Bröckling, 2009: 53). This refusal can be explained by the Sixth Commandment of Protestantism, which is “Thou shalt not kill” and it would be seen as a first attempt of conscientious objection under a religious form of passivism (Zürcher, 2009: 45). It might be argued that religious form of passivism follows a kind of community spirit rather than following one’s own conscience or his/her individualist decision of refusal to serve. In this respect, Bröckling points out substantial and quite interesting point: from a historical perspective in the beginning of refusal to military service, conscientious objectors as a religious dissidents “justified their disobedience of secular laws on the basis of their obedience to the laws of God and consented to state repression instead of risking isolation from their religious community” (Bröckling, 2009: 54). At first glance, refusal to serve could not be identified with a revolt against the authority but as it is indicated above, the refusal was mostly related with conscience of the
religious fraternity (Bröckling, 2009: 54). Starting from the end of the nineteenth century and especially “during the twentieth century”, religious form of objection begins to cease.

With the modern form of conscription and the emergence of secularism in the relation between the state and the objector, secularization of conscience has occurred. In this stage, not only religious form of passivism was the motive of conscientious objection but also apart from the religious motives, the individual and political motives began to rise in the act of conscientious objection. In addition to the religious form of pacifism, secular and socialist pacifism began to develop at the end of the nineteenth century in Europe and America. Following the secular form of pacifism, Europe had become the land of the anarchist form of pacifism starting from the nineteenth century. This form would be seen as the most radical form of pacifist acts or conscientious objection in the military context because this form presupposes the refusal of the legitimacy of the state and “state’s claims on its citizens” (Zürcher, 2009: 45). Thus, “secularization of conscience” (Chambers II, Moskos, 1993) paves the way to political form of objection, which could be seen as an individualistic act that problematizes the individual freedom and the policies of the state over one’s body and will. It needs to be denoted that during the process of secularization of conscience, conscientious objection is not only politicized by individualistic motives but it also has taken its political character with the discourses of “anti-militarist groups”, “non-violence groups” (Bröckling, 2009: 54), with the policies of the state. With the political character of the objection, realization of conscientious objection became inevitable. Before moving to the
realization of conscientious objection by the state, it would be better to identify the forms of objection briefly.

There have been various forms of conscientious objection; we have already mentioned religious and secular forms of objection. Still we can clarify these two forms: religious conscientious objectors are the ones who act through their churches, religious beliefs and historic peace sects. Secular objectors, on the other hand, bear the political and individualistic motives and they may oppose either to a particular war or to all kind of wars. The state offers selective service to the ones who refuse to fight in the battlefield so that selective conscientious objection is embraced by the ones who refuse to use weapons such as the ones for “mass distraction” and “nuclear weapons”. Being a noncombatant is another choice for objectors who want to serve in the military but refuse to bear arms. They basically serve in the medical corps to save the lives of the injured soldiers. Alternative service could be seen as one of the most effective policy of the state in order to use human material effectively where the alternativist objector accepts to serve to the state in public or private agencies such as the domains of health and culture. There is also “the grey area of objection where the objector declares his/her objection in relation with his ethnicity, nationality and racial objection. Absolutist COs are the most radical opponents of the military service (Moskos, 1993: 5-6). They would be defined as the most politicized ones where they reject the authority of the state in all the domains of life and they are the ones who are the opponents of the militarized society. Because of these characteristics of their opposition, they are the ones who are imprisoned by the punitive sanctions of the state. Although it seems that there is
wide range of motives behind the objection, as it might be seen from the difference between the absolutist and the alternativist forms, the state’s attitude towards the objectors may vary depending on the basis of the objection. From this point of departure, it might be useful to introduce state’s recognition of the reality of conscientious objection.

4.2.1.2. Facing the Reality of Conscientious Objection

During World War I, the need for conscription had reached its ultimate point. The increase in need for “human material” in the battlefield also led to the increase in the acts of conscientious objection. During this process, especially European states could not escape the reality of conscientious objection. Just because of this reason, conscientious objection had to be recognized and circumscribed in rules and regulations, in many countries in Europe. Bröckling points out that until 1945 the ones who refuse to military service or who resist against being a soldier was either seen as criminals or as pathological cases. There were even cases where the objectors were seen as traitors to his country. But, the most extraordinary penalty was the punishment of death. Because of these oppressive conditions, most of the objectors had to leave the country or they were forced to live subterranean life (Bröckling, 2008: 389). A specific law on conscientious objection was passed first in Denmark in the First World War” (Zürcher, 2009: 45). Following
Denmark\textsuperscript{12}, Britain had to pass the law on conscientious objection when the British state realized its need for conscription policy during World War I. Denmark and Britain were the isolated instances where most of the European male population had rather preferred to fight in the War. The only solution for the states in war was to pass the law on conscription. However, one way or another objector should serve for the state during the wartime. Small number of the objectors preferred to serve as non-combatant. On the other side, few of the objectors were imprisoned and mistreated in their sentence. In between these two poles, the others served for “national importance” for instance working as hard labour in the farms. Zürcher indicates “the Mennonite communities in Russia did both: they worked in hospitals and logged timber for the state” (Zürcher, 2009: 45).

Coming to near history, the act of conscientious objection in Western Europe went up especially during the late Cold War years. According to Moskos, during these years the rate of conscientious objection increased to seven times of from the years between mid-1960s to 1980s (Moskos, 1993: 3). 1990s would be seen as a period where objection became prevalent in European countries. For instance, in Northern Europe, “one out of four draftable men was declaring some form of conscientious objection to avoid military service in the early 1990s” (Moskos, 1993: 3). If we look at the United States, during the Vietnam War most of the young American did not want to attend war: “the widespread resistance to conscription and

\textsuperscript{12} During 1920’s only Denmark and Sweden legally recognized conscientious objection. Surprisingly, after the Second World War, Western Europe and North America emerged to be the places of conscientious objection movements (Speck, Friedrich, 2009: 121).
military service was one of the reasons for the withdrawal of American forces from Southeast Asia and for the end of the draft in the United States in 1973 (Moskos, 1993: 4). Reaching the 1990s conscientious objection has recently occurred in the former socialist countries, beyond that various states such as Switzerland, Israel and South Africa have also harboured objectors (Moskos, 1993: 4).

It should be noted that the recognition of conscientious objection by the state has been a controversial issue to the extent that the attitude of the state towards objectors depends on in which grounds the objector refuses to serve in the military. This attitude is formed in terms of state’s calculation of the possible threats towards herself from the objector. In early modern society, the state only recognized the objection of ‘historic peace faiths’ which are the Protestant churches formed after Protestant Reformation such as Mennonites, the Quakers, and the Brethren. Following these churches, “Jehovah’s Witnesses and Seven Day Adventists claimed conscientious objectors status” and this kind of objectors would serve as a non-combatant (Moskos, 1993: 6). Religious form of objection did not change in the late modern Western societies, the state only recognized the members of Roman Catholic and mainline Protestant churches as objectors. Besides, this stage indicates the appearance of alternative civilian service in lieu of mandatory military service (Moskos, 1993: 7). “In this phase church bodies also may play an intermediary role between the state and the alternative servers” (Moskos, 1993: 8). If we take a look at the reaction towards the secular basis of objection, it can be stated that despite the fact that states accept the existence of conscientious objection as a disobedient act against their governmental policies, “in 1990 the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) agreed to consider introducing forms of alternative service for conscientious objectors in lieu of military service among the thirty-five participating states” (Moskos, 1993: 4). Coming to near history, the right to conscientious objection to military service has been recognised by The European Court of Human Rights under Article 9\(^\text{13}\) (which is on freedom of thought, religion and conscience). In relation with the implication of the Article Council of Europe Directorate General of Human Rights and Human Rights and Legal Affairs declares that:

   The exercise of this right is, however, subject to rules and practices that differ greatly from country to country. Experience shows that, unfortunately, the rights of certain objectors are not recognised in law or in practice in their country although the right to conscientious objection to military service is recognised in many states as a human right\(^\text{14}\).

Following the quotation above, it may be argued that the states develop various strategies against the objectors. For instance, in the forty-seven “Council of Europe member states”, twenty-eight of them have no conscription policy such as France,

\(^{13}\) Article 9- Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


Germany, Spain, Macedonia, United Kingdom, etc.\textsuperscript{15} Conversely, fifteen of the member states maintain conscription as a governmental policy such as Armenia, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, and Norway\textsuperscript{16}. However, Turkey as a country that has conscription policy “does not recognise the right to conscientious objection for conscripts. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, recognises the conscientious objection in its constitution but it has no law on the right of conscientious objection. Eleven of these countries that maintain conscription have a law of civilian service which may be “discriminatory” and “punitive”\textsuperscript{17} besides, Denmark and Estonia “have a law providing a non-discriminatory and non-punitive civilian service” (Report on Conscientious Objection in CoE Member States in 2011). On top of all this:

4 recognise the right to conscientious objection for professional soldiers: Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland and United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{7} 7 have in recent years sentenced conscientious objectors to imprisonment: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Greece, Norway, Turkey and United Kingdom. 3 prosecute conscientious objectors repeatedly for their continued refusal to serve in the army: Greece, Norway and Turkey. 2 do too little to prevent the ill-treatment of conscientious objectors in detention: Azerbaijan and Turkey. 1 has imprisoned persons for speaking in public in favour of the right of conscientious objection: Turkey. Moreover, conscientious objectors who flee their country of origin because of the compulsory military service, or professional soldiers who have developed conscientious

\begin{itemize}
\item[4] recognise the right to conscientious objection for professional soldiers: Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
\item[7] have in recent years sentenced conscientious objectors to imprisonment: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Greece, Norway, Turkey and United Kingdom.
\item[3] prosecute conscientious objectors repeatedly for their continued refusal to serve in the army: Greece, Norway and Turkey.
\item[2] do too little to prevent the ill-treatment of conscientious objectors in detention: Azerbaijan and Turkey.
\item[1] has imprisoned persons for speaking in public in favour of the right of conscientious objection: Turkey.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{15} The complete list for the countries that have no conscription: Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak, Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{16} Countries that maintain conscription are: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Norway, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{17} Armenia, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Norway, Russian Federation, Switzerland and Ukraine (Ibid.).
objection but cannot obtain release from the military have been refused political asylum in various European countries\textsuperscript{18}.

I may claim at this very point that the forms of the objections seem to be dependent on the strategies that the state follows. All forms of objection (except the absolutist ones in particular cases where they totally refuse the implications of modern power in the form of the state) should be seen as an indirect interference to modern power, which originates from the state and the religion. They are the ones that shape the conscious of the individual where the individual is still docile and obedient to the institutions which aim to impose “fixed” identity on the individual. So, the recognition of the conscientious objection by the state depended on the benefits of the reason of the state rather than the reason of the individuals. As Bröckling states “what makes conscientious objectors a source of annoyance and causes their imprisonment is that they see their own reason to be above that of the state” (2009: 59). In order to discuss the very crucial question of the state reason and the individual reason we should focus on the ideas behind the act/movement of conscientious objection in a concise manner.

We have indicated that the modern conscription appeared as a means of securing the borders of the state and at the same time as an apparatus of spreading out the revolutionary ideals of the French Revolution. Nationalism in this sense became the sacred idea in most of the states where the policies of the states have been shaped concerning the national interests. Military service, in this sense, was seen both as an unconditioned duty and right of the individual as an obligation of

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
his/her state. However, conscientious objectors are the ones who are not happy with this idea of obligation where they see this obligation as a limitation of individual freedom and rights. In contemporary era most of the conscientious objectors but especially absolutists display more radical stance towards the obligation of military service by claiming that they are against all forms of power over their will and at the same time they are in opposition with the militarized form of society. If we define militarism “as the moulding of everyday life by military structures and practices formed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the system” (Görengeli, 2009: 37), we may claim that the objector in this sense is the one who opposes to be ‘structured’ by the system. In this sense, from my point of view conscientious objection can be comprehended in two ways, first: as a way of resistance in terms of refusal of the given identity towards an external power over one’s own conscience/will and second: in relation to this as a way of creating a kind of self-ethics. Yet, those two characteristics will be developed in coming sections in which we will discuss the act of objection from Foucauldian and Stirnerian perspectives. But before moving on the main part of the thesis first we should touch the notion of conscience¹⁹ as an indicator of the possibility of creating the self.

¹⁹ I will focus on the notion of conscience in relation to its relation with its role in the process of self-creation and individual autonomy. Conscience may be taken in a metaphysical manner but my focal point will be its role in the resistance against an external will that is imposed on individual. Simply, conscience might be comprehended as a common denominator of the individualistic act of resistance.
4.3. Understanding Conscientious Objection from Foucauldian Viewpoint

One may perhaps argue that the main dilemma of modernity is its conceptualisation of “subject” which gained the name of Enlightened Man when modernity evolved into the age of Enlightenment. While the enlightened man tries to overcome the ‘self-incurred tutelage’, he is asked locating the public use of reason and public good over his own reason. If we adopt this presumption to the case of conscientious objection, it is seen that the objector is the one who is unhappy with the public use of reason over the reason of his own. The objector, in this sense, is the one who is eager to liberate himself from his own identity that is given to him by modern power. At this point, from Foucauldian account conscientious objector can be comprehended as the one who is constituted in the relations of power but who, at the same time, is the one that seeks to attain his own definition of self. His act of objection to military service (and in some cases all forms of state authority) in this respect would be seen as an attempt for creating an alternative definition of self by challenging the ‘fixed’ identity that is ascribed to him, which is being a soldier as his duty for the state. In other words, it is asked to him to be a docile and obedient as an obligation of the modern state.

In order to understand conscientious objector and his refusal concerning resistance to modern power and possibilities of creating the self, first, I will clarify the meaning of conscience. This would be a kind of short moral and philosophical investigation and it provides us an account to understand how the objector engaged with creating his ethics of self and his own perception of freedom. Following the brief definition of conscience, I will try to explain how militarism as an apparatus of
the state arranges the lives of people. In this respect, the position of conscientious objector gains importance in terms of his ability to refuse the authority of the state in order to have autonomy of his own. Lastly, I will discuss if conscientious objector could have the possibility of creating the self or not with his act of objection.

4.3.1. Modern Subject and Creating a Self-Conscience

Foucault suggests that the need for writing the genealogy of the ethics was his eagerness to know history of “the subject”. From his point of view, the subject constitutes itself through his/her ethical actions (Foucault, 1997: 266). If we turn back to the beginning part of the thesis, it has been said that in order to have one’s own definition of self, one needed to have a mastery over him/her where one can have the knowledge about his/her own self. “Knowing Oneself” as Delphic principle advices, enables individual to have the master of his/her own. At this very point, from my point of view, the notion of conscience plays significant role. Conscience is briefly explained as a place where one constitutes his/her selfhood in it. In this respect, justification of conscientious objection both as a ethico-philosophical and at the same time as a political concern in relation to individual autonomy and freedom would be useful for comprehending modern subject’s craving for creating his/her own notion of self and his/her resistance against the modern power. From moral stance, conscience is defined simply as “a motivation based on the realization or judgement that doing certain acts would violate the inner
harmony or integrity of the self” (Wiberg, 1985: 360). Conscientious objection, in this sense, bears the paradox of the social morality. Thus, from political point of view, it might be stated that it is a form of resistance that presupposes being against the constructed morality imposed by modern state which suggests or even provokes fighting for the sake of the nation and welfare of the state.

Nationalism, in this sense, as an indispensible discourse of nation-state is imposed as a part of public morality. In the book “Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler”, (Civil Information for the Citizen) that was written by Afet İnan, “‘nation’, which is defined as a society composed of people from the same culture’, is also the source of the morality of a given deed. Hence, morality can neither be partial nor individual but only ‘national’” (Aydın, 2009: 26). Deriving from this quotation, it might be stated that nationalism is a regime of truth where the state aims to produce truth about her citizens for the welfare of her own. Additionally, as it is mentioned in conscription section, nationalist discourse produces the truth that each and every citizen of the state should serve for the state as his/her duty. As Foucault suggests, “truth isn’t outside power or lacking power” (Foucault, 1997: 88), it is rather used as a means to produce knowledge about social reality and the subject. Thus, the crucial point is that self-conscience aims to have one’s own truth in order to attain and produce his/her own knowledge about his/her own being. One’s ability to constitute his/her own truth about social reality and his/herself would also be seen as his/her capability to attain his/her autonomy. In this respect, the act of conscientious objection as a way of resisting to modern power bears the possibility of creating individual autonomy, which is much related with the possibilities of the
self. Still, we need to look at what kind of implications that the objector comes across in the militarized society.

4.3.2. Reason of Conscientious Objector vs. the “Reason of the State” as a “Power over the Life” of Individual

As we have discussed, the main motive of the conscientious objector is to resist the state and the militarized form of society that s/he lives in. In doing so, s/he has the consciousness that his/her both bodily and mental existence is under the threat of modern power which turns him/her into subject by imposing him/her the idea of going to the battlefield as a soldier. Modern power does this form of subjectification by employing universal laws such as every citizen have rights and duties towards the state and every citizen should act in accordance with the public good. However, these universal laws imprison individual to “particular personhoods”. So that, the objector would be a subject of the war and subjugated by the nationalist discourses. In this respect, by resisting to the implications of modern power such as by refusing to be a soldier, objector tries to have the autonomy by using his own authority over his life. In order to see, how an individual is subject to modern power, we should have a rereading of the relation between the conscientious objector and the state and the military, which are targeting the life of individual and take away his/her ability to attain his/her definition of the self.

The technology of power employed by modern state over the life of individual can be characterised with the sovereign power. In other words, it can be
claimed that modern state follows the technique of sovereign power in ruling its citizens by laying claim on the lives of its citizens. But the crucial point is that by following the sovereign power the modern state claims right to decide on life and death of its citizens. Conscripting armies in this respect, would be an adequate example where the body of the individual becomes an object of war through making him a soldier. Recall that from the 17th century onwards changing mechanisms of power have led to the sovereign power to control the social body by using the tactics of regulation and control. In this respect, the state’s power over the individual would be pursued in two ways, which are the one that seeks the docility of the body that is called disciplinary and the other that deals with the regulation of the activities of population and administering the life of the individual, which is called bio-power (Foucault, 1978: 139). The case of modern conscription might be given as an example where the reason of the state uses military conscription as a governmental technique for regulating the lives of citizens regarding the duty of military service. In this respect, Foucault examines the recruitment strategies during seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as one of the governmental strategies of modern state. At this very point, recruitment (or modern conscription) was serving the constitution of militarized society where the strategy of recruitment can be seen for Foucault as a means for “the deployment of a permanent military apparatus (dispositif)” that embraces:

[first] professionalization of the soldier, setting up a military career; second, a permanent armed structure that can serve as the framework for exceptional wartime recruitment; third, an infrastructure of back-up facilities of strongholds and transport; and finally, fourth a form of knowledge, a tactical reflection on types of manoeuvre, schemas
and attack, in short an entire specific and autonomous reflection on military matters and possible wars (Foucault, 2007: 305).

In this way, modern state and the military became inseparable parts and state would have the right to decide on war.

In this respect, modern power that targets the lives of individuals occurs in various ways. The first and the utmost occurrence can be given with the existence of governmentality of the state, which follows the militaristic organization of society. “Militarism could be defined as the moulding of everyday life by military structures and practices formed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the system” (Göregenli, 2009: 37). Militarism needed to be investigated in order to understand how modern subject is constituted as a docile being in militarized society. In order to comprehend the modern subject (as a possible soldier) who lives in militarized society, Foucault’s thoughts on “docile bodies” in his piece Discipline and Punish (1975) would be useful. For him in the army individual turns out to be a machinelike being by losing his autonomy though he is the object of individualizing techniques. He summarizes the soldier as a docile body as such:

By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into automatism of ‘habit; in short, one has ‘got rid of the peasant’ and gave him ‘the air of a soldier’ (Foucault, 1975: 135).
Related to the quotation above, it is clear that the military organization applies disciplinary power over the body, soul, thoughts and even the conduct of the individual and aims to transform the individual as a docile being. Foucault adds that “the disciplined soldier” follows the rules ordered to him and his docility is a result of his obedience (Foucault, 1975: 158-165). In this way, docility of soldier makes him/her fighting in the battlefield without questioning the command of the army/the state. Thus, the obedience of the soldier leads him being ready to kill and to be killed where the conduct of the state overcomes the conduct of the individual. The crucial question that should be asked at this point is: how is it possible that an individual can be ready to kill and to be killed? From the Foucauldian point of view, it would be because of the role of disciplinary society. In this regard, the institution of military as an apparatus of disciplinary power plays significant role in the creation of disciplinary society. Such that, for Foucault, the army:

guaranteed civil peace no doubt because it was a real force, an ever-threatening sword, but also because it was a technique and a body of knowledge that could project its schema over the social body. […] There was a military dream of society; its fundamental reference was not to the state of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, not to the primal social contract, but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights, but to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic docility. (Foucault, 1975: 168–169).

In this respect, I claim that militarism can be seen as a means of spreading out the disciplinary power to each and every sphere of society. From this point of departure, it might be argued that militarized society is a reflection of disciplinary society.
Regarding the parallelism between disciplinary and militarized society I would claim that the objector does not only refuse to serve in the military but s/he also refuses the militarized society and its implications over his/her life. By this act of refusal, the objector mainly opposes individualizing and normalizing techniques of disciplinary power. At first glance, these two techniques seem to be aiming to control the body of soldier by employing disciplinary mechanisms over the body of soldier and it is true. It is the body which is targeted by the techniques of disciplinary power. As I have asserted in previous chapters that since the classical age body has been a target for power. As it can be seen from the example of the docile body of soldier, it is clear that the first aim of the disciplinary power is to control the body. The aim of controlling the body does not necessarily aim to train the body, it rather tries to improve the techniques of individuality that is to say inventing the new technologies of individualization by using quite delicate coercion. This coercion indents the movements, gestures and attitudes of individual (Foucault, 1975: 136-7). From now on individual is seen as a place of calculations or as Foucault puts it: “the human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it” (Foucault, 1975: 138). In this sense, the aim of creating docile bodies bears subjugation of individual by using individualizing techniques over his/her body at the first instance. Docility of the body is only the visible effect of disciplinary power. For Foucault discipline that is exercised on body has two effects first one is the subjection of the individual as we have dealt above and second one is attaining the knowledge about the ‘soul’ of the individual (Foucault, 2007: 235).
The military drill can be useful in order to understand the relation between the docility of soldier’s body and his/her knowable and thus controllable soul. The soul of the individual from my point of view, plays crucial role both for the state (as a reflection of modern power) and the objector who aims to resist against the implications of modern power over his/her individuality. In his book *Discipline and Punish* (1975), Foucault depicts how modern power changes its target from body to soul. Besides, we have discussed that disciplinary power works in a hidden way where it uses the technique of training individual rather than implementing a strict set of concrete power over him/ her. That is to say “instead of bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass, it separates, analyses, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient single units” (Foucault, 1975: 170). So that, disciplinary power aims to make individuals in so doing, it annihilates their ability to create autonomous and unique self.

In this context, the case of rotten report in Turkey can be given as a remarkable example. I argue that the report connotes interrelated technologies of power. Rotten report, at the first instance seems to be related with the notion of ‘masculinity’ such that in Turkey accomplishing military service plays a crucial role in ‘becoming man’ and thus, showing one’s masculinity publicly. Besides that, military service requires the mental and physical healthiness of “the male candidate” (Biricik, 2009: 112). From my point of view, the case of rotten report displays the disciplinary technology that the state employs. It demonstrates how calculable man is constructed by normalizing judgement which follows “the order that the disciplinary punishments must enforce is of a mixed nature: it is an
‘artificial’ order, explicitly laid down by a law, a programme, a set of regulations” (Foucault, 1975: 179). Such that, before bearing arms, every possible soldier undergoes various medical tests. These tests include various measurements such as the measurement of blood pressure, height and weight of the candidate while he is naked (Biricik, 2009: 112). Nevertheless, the medical examinations that candidate soldier undergoes would change if he declares that he is homosexual. In this respect the verbal declaration is not satisfactory for the state or military institution. “The candidate must provide evidence of the extent of this ‘disease’ in his life [such that he needs to have] pictures taken during the sexual intercourse and a rectal examination carried out at the surgery unit of the hospital” (Biricik, 2009: 112). If one is reported as ‘rotten’, he would be subject to several punishment and mechanisms of exclusion in his social environment such as family and work. In addition to the disciplinary power that individual have been encountering, with the implications of medical tests over the body of the candidate, the notion of bio-power comes into scene by taking control of the life of individual as a biological being (Foucault, 2003: 246). Bio political policy of the state to that extent, aims to

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20 “The observation methods, documents and evaluation methods employed by modern Turkish military medicine can be briefly summarized as follows: photographs taken during sexual intercourse ‘providing’ that the applicant is passive (applicants face must be visible); rectal examination to determine whether the applicant has engaged in anal sex as well as to determine the elasticity of the anal tonus; possibly repeated interviews, which may be attended by more than one doctor and take between one minute and one hour; and personally tests such as the Rorschach Inkblot Test and the Minnesota Multiple Personality Inventory (MMPI). If, despite all these examinations, the doctor or the committee of doctors cannot reach a decision regarding the applicant’s psychosexual condition, he may be kept for one to three weeks under surveillance at the psychiatry clinics of military hospitals (also known as ‘pink wards’), in most cases isolated from other patients. In some cases these examinations and procedures may be repeated annually for three years under the presumption of the possible ‘recovery’ of the applicant” (Biricik, 2009: 113).
regulate and administer the life of individual. While following the aim of regulation, the governmental reason of the state evolves to “the right of the social body to ensure maintain, or develop its life” (Foucault, 1978: 138). That is why the state aims to ‘normalize’ the abnormalities of the individual such as his homosexuality or refusal to serve for the military. In this respect, the prior target of the state is no more the individual itself but the whole possible recruits. It is clear that the state as a form of modern power does not only apply the disciplinary technology of the body over its citizens but also it employs the regulatory technology of their lives. In this regard, ‘normalization’ of the society under the gaze of state becomes raison d’être of modern power. The striking point is that through the operations of modern power the (militarized) society is constituted like a panoptic model where “it functions as a laboratory of power” (Foucault, 1975: 204) that aims to “to train and to correct individuals” (Foucault, 1975: 203).

A striking example of conscientious objection for the bio political policy of the state is the case of Osman Murat Ülke. He refused to serve in military for the pacifist beliefs when he “was called up for military service”. “He called a press conference in İzmir in 1995 and publicly burnt the call-up papers. A year later he was arrested and charged by the military prosecutor” (Boyle, 2009: 214). He was arrested and sentenced for fine and ten months of imprisonment because of his desertion and “persistent disobedience”. During the processes of his imprisonment, he refused to “join the regiment and refus[ed] to wear a uniform” (Boyle, 2009). He has been discharged since 1998, but he has been experiencing the ‘civil death’:
He has lived with the knowledge that he could be arrested at any time. He has no official address and has broken off all contact with the state authorities. He has been sheltered by the family and of his fiancée, with whom he has been unable to contact a legal marriage. He has also been unable to recognize the child born from their union as his son. In effect the court said that his clandestine life, which he had been forced to live in order to follow his conscience, was a form of civil death (Boyle, 2009: 215).

From this point of departure, the objector’s act of refusal of military service connotes the refusal of modern power’s gaze over his/her life. At the same time, this refusal does not only mean objecting the military service but it is his objection of the subjectifying implications of modern power that annihilates his/her ability to attain his/her autonomous self. Although bio power aims to sustain life rather than aiming the death of the disobedient subject, since the ultimate purpose is to provide and preserve the welfare of the militarized society, it may cause the ‘civil death’ of the individual in the course of this purpose.

4.3.3. Conscientious Objection as a Form of Resistance and Creating the Ethics of Self

For Foucault during seventeenth and eighteenth centuries bearing arms was mostly seen as a voluntary act. However, with the appearance of recruitment as a policy of the nation state, resistances, refusals and desertions have appeared as a reaction against the recruitment policy of the state. According to him, desertion could be seen as an ordinary act. However, with the appearance of “waging war” as an obligation for the citizens and with changing characteristics of military service
from ordinary profession/voluntary act to an ethical responsibility of the citizen for his/her country, being a soldier turns out to be “a form of political and moral conduct” (Foucault, 2007: 198). As it is indicated previously, the political and moral conducts of individual are constituted by governmental technologies of the state such as imposing the disciplinary mechanisms onto the body and soul of individual. In this respect, the state aims to construct individual as an artefact who sacrifices him/herself for the salvation of the nation and thus, who follows the “public conscience” rather than his/her own conscience. At this point, desertion for Foucault turns out to be an act of insubordination. Thus, refusing to serve and refusing to bear arms for him can be seen as a form of “moral-counter conduct” which at the same time refuses the social values as Foucault puts it: “a certain obligatory relationship to the nation and the nation’s salvation, as a refusal of the actual political system of the nation and the nation’s salvation, as a refusal of the relationship to the death of others and oneself” (Foucault, 2007: 198). The act of objection, at this point might be associated with one’s care of him/herself and thus, one’s attempt of creating a self-ethics rather than accepting the state’s moral/ethical values over his/her life.

Recall that, Foucault underlines that the struggles against modern power are about the “government of individualization” (Foucault, 2000: 330). Care of self, in this regard, is a reflection of resistance where the individual tries to overcome the techniques of individualization that have been aiming to transform the individual into an obedient subject. In this manner, conscientious objection might be understood as a form of resistance where it represents the recalcitrance of the
subject who does not want to be the object of individualizing and normalizing techniques in a militarized society. In this manner, the objectors in Turkey have been denoting their refusal of militarized society by organizing National Tourism Festivals (Milliturizm Festivalleri) since 15th of May 2004, which is also known as International Conscientious Objectors Day. The main objective of these festivals is drawing attention to militarist policies of the state that get into everyday life of individuals by claiming right on taking care of the individual life. In these festivals, objectors visit the militarist places where they both protest and declare their conscientious objection to military service (Altınay, 2006: 56)\(^2\).

From this point of departure, it may be argued that objector’s refusal of both military service and militarized form of society is an attempt of creating him/herself “as a moral subject of his [/her] own action” (Foucault, 1997: 352). Besides, the reason that I prefer to use this example is to underline the fact that the objectors craving to have the mastery of themselves by rejecting the implications of the nation-state as a form of modern power. To this extent, from my point of view, the festivals can be given as an example of “taking care of oneself” where individuals/objectors demonstrate their own moral values and creating a self-ethics about themselves. Foucault emphasizes the main motivation of resistance movements are power struggles, which questions both the location and “statues of individual” (Foucault, 1982: 330). In this respect, the act of conscientious objection is a result of one’s questioning of his/her status in the relations of power which have

\(^2\) For detailed information, see Altınay’s essay, “Militarizm’den Milligösteri’ye Türkiye’de Anti-militarizmin Yeni Yüzleri”. See also, www.savaskarsitlari.org for detailed programme of the festival.
been taking place in society. Consequently, the objector, as Foucault argues, “attack[s] everything that separates the individual” (1982: 330) in order to detach him/ herself from the constructed identity which is imposed upon him by nation-state. In this respect, from Foucauldian point of view, conscientious objection can be seen as an attempt of creating the ethics of self (self-conscience) by refusing the state’s governmental technologies that are imposed upon the individual. From my point of view, Stirner’s theory of ownness is also crucial in understanding the act of conscientious objection as a form of resistance where individual would have the possibility of attaining his/her autonomous self. In this context, I will discuss the objection from Stirnerian viewpoint.

4.4. Stirner on Conscientious Objection: The Possibility of Ownness

Although Stirner did not write on the case of conscientious objection, from my point of view, it is clear that every word that he spent on the social system, which he lived in, would indicate that he would be an objector, too. As it has been shown in previous chapter, Stirner’s main problematic was attaining one’s Ownness as a practice of freedom and autonomy. It can be claimed that the act of conscientious objection as a way of resistance against the implications of modern power over the individual is not only towards the institution of military but also towards the ‘militarized society’. In this respect, it might be said that Stirner’s endeavour to create an alternative individual would overlap with the conscientious objector in many ways. From this point of departure, I am going to deal with the act
of conscientious objection in relation with Stirner’s concept of *might* and I will claim that the conscience of individual is the place where s/he materialises his/her selfhood in it by rejecting any external power over his/hers and by having his/her own conception of power. Conscientious objection, in this sense, is an attempt to create the sphere for one’s own might and it also is the possibility to attain one’s Ownness.

### 4.4.1. Stirnerian *Might* and Conscientious Objection

We should begin by claiming that Stirner’s ego has its own moral value, which is the ability to use one’s *might*. Driven from this statement, I will discuss conscience as an alternative place where one establishes his/her refusal of the social morality and social order. This means, by attempting an objection, the objector declares that his/her norms about the world are above the norms of the state and society. As Childress mentions, in his essay “Appeals to Conscience”, the objectors “fear the loss of selfhood, integrity, and wholeness in the anticipated judgement of the future self’s acts, and they express this fear in several dramatic ways...” (1979: 321). This fear of loss would be seen as a fear of one’s own might where one’s loss of might also means the loss of autonomy. The crucial point here is, the objector would have the might or the power of his own if and only if s/he would exist as being his/her own. However, the state or the military as a form of modern power destroys one’s right to use his/her power over his/her life. At this point, conscientious objection as an expression of desire to use one’s own might could be
seen as moral stance. One of the best definitions of conscientious objection would be taken from Kiılınç, who says:

As the bearer of the integrity of the self, conscience refers to a ‘value’ that originates from and depends upon the subjectivity of the individual. Viewed in this light, conscientious objection is the expression of a moral stance taken for the sake of preserving one’s selfhood, moral integrity and subjective value (Kiılınç, 2009: 62).

From this point of departure, it is obvious that there has been a conflict between the moral claims of the individual and the state. The state as an institution of modern power claims right on individual morality by imposing him/her the “collective value” (Kiılınç, 2009: 62) of society. In this regard, conscientious objector declares his/her refusal where his/her law of self contradicts with the law of society. For grasping the relation between the conscientious objection and the implications of the theory of Ownness, we should look at how state and military act on the individual.

4.4.2. Modern Nation-State as a Humanist Form of Power and Conscientious Objector

According to Stirner, humanist form of power imposes individual duties such as being “Man”. The modern nationalist- state on the other hand, imposes to the individual being the citizen of the state at the first hand and following that it also imposes its “citizens” being a soldier and fighting in the battlefields as a duty of the nation which is sacred from the moral understanding of the state and society.
Additionally, the sacred duty of securing the state detaches the individual from his/her individuality and imposes him/her only being a soldier, like the discourse of “Every Turk is born a soldier!” Yet, we have seen that being a soldier has been a duty of the state for a long time in history since it is written in the Code of Hammurabi. The crucial problem for the objector is that the policy of conscription of the state is an abuse of individual’s freedom. However, from the point of view of modern nation-state because “the guarantor of a nation’s freedom is the state” (Aydn, 2009: 31), it has the power to conscripting armies. In doing so, the state uses the ideology of nationalism as a sacred motivation to secure the borders of the state and to fight for the welfare of the nation. Thus, military service has taken its character of “sacred duty for citizens” to their countries in nationalist discourses. This might be seen as a reflection of state ideology with the “inclusion of military service in the spheres of rights and duties”. Nationalism in this respect legitimises the duty of military service on the discourse of homeland where the duty of military service could not promise the citizen any individual benefit at all (Aydn, 2009: 18).

From the perspective of the state, individual is constructed as a political subject and detached from his/her own way of being. Driven from this point, individual refuses the given identity of being a soldier because it prevents his/her capacity to create his/her own self. In doing so, the state uses the discourses of “the right” and “duty” which are seen as a threat to might (the power) of individual for Stirner. For him, “right is the spirit of society. If society has a will, this will is simply right: society exists only through right. But, as it endures only exercising a sovereignty over individuals, right is its sovereign will” (Stirner, 1995: 166).
Following this statement, he emphasizes that all forms of right are the foreign law for the ego. The right, in this sense, is no more than a limitation over the individual ego. The free society would be impossible, if the notion of right continues to exist. Militaristic society can be given as an example at this point: a society which relies on a form of regime where the will of the state determines the will of its citizens. From this motive, conscientious objector resists to the “subordination of the free will” by the sovereign or the will of the state (Kılınç, 2009, 69-70). Hilal Demir as a woman conscientious objector declares that “... I WANT to be happy and live freely as myself in a world without wars, without violence of any kind, without authority and without boundaries (Altınay, 2009: 99). In this sense, Stirnerian theory of the ego is analogous to the conscientious objector where the objector could not live with the values of militaristic society and has his/her own value of him/herself. By imposing being a soldier for the citizens, modern nation-state detaches the individual from his/her uniqueness whereas the individual has the capacity to decide on his/her own being. Another threat of the state on individual’s uniqueness can be given as normalization practices that it uses against the objector who refuses to fight for the sacred ideals. Now, let me briefly summarize the normalization strategies of modern state.

Since the era of World Wars up to now, refusing to fight for the state is seen as an abnormality from the eyes of the state. As it is indicated, refusal of military service has been punished in some ways such as imprisonments, forced migrations and even with death penalties. However, the most striking example is the curative technologies of the state over the objector. The disobedient individual is seen as an
abnormal person where the reason of the state could not comprehend the reasons why the one escapes from and even insurrects to social norms. The deviation from social norms is defined as a kind of personality disorder (Bröckling, 2008: 285). However, from Stirnerian perspective it is nothing to do with illness it can be comprehended as a way towards creating an alternative self, the ownness. Tausk defines the deserters as the ones who are disposed to the act of disobedience against the authority (Bröckling, 2008: 290). The state in this case, uses the curative means in order to normalize the individual by sending the deserter or the objector to the mental hospitals (Bröckling, 2008). For Stirner, curative techniques that are called healing can be seen as another form of punishment which (Stirner, 1995:213) targets the Ownness of the individual. Such targeting annihilates the self-mastery of the individual. In order to have better understand the importance of the notion of self-mastery for the objector, let me now look at the relation between the Ownness and conscientious objection.

4.4.3. Conscientious Objection as a Form of Resistance and the Possibility of Ownness

The importance of Stirner’s theory of Ownness for the act of conscientious objection is driven from the reasons behind this act. One can be an objector because of his religious beliefs, his unwillingness to be in the battlefield or his refusal to state authority but the crucial thing is that for the objectors refusing the military service is justified in same words: because the duty of serving for the military
violates “the inner harmony or integrity of the self” (Wiberg, 1985: 360). However, from Stirnerian point of view, militaristic form of society erodes creative potentiality of life by constructing individual as a docile body and obedient mind. In this sense, society, as Stirner argues, does not let individual having his/her individual will and his/her own understanding of freedom. In this respect ownness as a self-mastery could be seen as a way to have one’s own freedom. The notion of insurrection, as explained in previous chapter, thus, can be used as analogous to the act of conscientious objection.

We have seen that insurrection is a way of refusal of the fictitious identities that are imposed by modern power upon the individual. In the case of conscientious objection, the person does not want to be defined as a potential soldier. On the other hand, because the conscientious objection appears at the point where there is a conflict between individual moral concerns and public morality, insurrection can be defined as a way of detachment from the militarist social system. For instance, Pietro Pinna an Italian objector declared his objection in 1973 by saying:

CO is a focal point of antimilitarist action. By its witness of living adherence to the idea, it operates as a major focus of debate and mobilization. In the wider revolutionary strategy, CO offers a fundamental indication, i.e. the assumption of responsibility, of autonomy and personal initiative; it serves as point of reference, as paradigm, for the extension of the concept of ‘conscientious objection’ in any other sectors of social life (Speck, 2009: 122).

In relation to the declaration of Pinna, Stirner’s theory of alternative association that is called Union of Egoists would also be relevant for realizing the act of objection
as a movement that aims to have an alternative society other than the militaristic one. Reminding that the union is a kind of alternative association, wherein the individual could enter in voluntarily and would not subject to any binding contracts. Conscientious objection, on the other hand, is a style of life that aims to perform self-governing practices which are excluding and even clashing with the morality of the state.

It is indicated previously that Union of Egoists insinuates an alternative association before the society in order to attain one’s Ownness. In this manner, I would claim that there is a relation between the logic behind conscientious objection movements\(^{22}\) and Union of Egoists in various ways. First and foremost, they both follow the aim of attaining alternative society where members of the associations craving to realize their autonomy by using their own might/ will/ power. Regarding the philosophy behind the individual act of conscientious objection and the movement, at first glance, like Union of Egoists, objectors form their movement/ groups by sacrificing nothing at all. Although the motives behind the refusal of the objectors vary depending on political, moral or religious reasons, excluding the religiously motivated objectors, the movement is formed as a result of individual conduct of the objector where the objectors mainly agree on refusing military service and militarized form of society.

\(^{22}\) I do not prefer to discuss conscientious objection movements in a detailed manner. Names of the some movements can be drawn up as War Resisters International, Forum voor Vredesactie in Belgium, Alternativa-militarista in Spain, Savaş Karşıtları in Turkey. For detailed information please visit, www.wri-irg.org
For instance, during the Vietnam War, anti-conscription protests or resistances against the draft have organized around the issue of “attacking the disliked war”. So that, it was a kind of organized political protest with a self-justifying ideology, “a collective sense of purpose, and a program for action against the government”. As an instance, during the war “the primary tactic of the anti-conscription movement was public renunciation of the draft system. Potential draftees were encouraged to avoid registration and induction and to publicly return or destroy the draft cards they were legally bound to carry” (Useem, 1973: 4). It can be claimed that the resisters have established an alternative association where “for a year shared social events, internal education projects, communal living, and newsletters” which enables the members to live accordingly their own will (Useem, 1973: 6). The crucial point that should bear in mind is like in the Union, the objectors act individually without having any duty towards each other. Their solely aim and duty is to attain their Ownness and thus freedom by using the movement (like it is in the Union) as a means to create an alternative self.

Regarding the parallelism between the motivation of the objector and the ego that searches his/her autonomy, it might be claimed that the personal autonomy is the sine qua non element of the Ownness or in other words the freedom that the one has. So that, in order to attain freedom to be his/her the objector able to use his/her might. The act of objection, in this sense, is to reject the right of the state which imposes being soldier and serving for the sacred ideals of the state and nation. In so doing, the objector detaches from the involuntary dependency of the state and militarized form of society. Still, attaining one’s Ownness by refusing to
serve in military would be open to debate in terms of the motive behind the objector and the society that the objector lives in. In the closing section, I will deal with possibilities of the self by overviewing the possible views of Foucault and Stirner on conscientious objection as resistance to modern power.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This study on conscientious objection can be seen as an attempt to examine it as a case of resistance to modern power exercised by state and military in specific and its implications (as the policy of conscription) on individual. In this manner, I tried to explicate that the act of conscientious objection overlaps individual’s (objector’s) endeavour of creating an autonomous self in militarized society characterised by universal male conscription. In this context, Foucault’s conceptualization of modern subject and his work on ‘power over life’ have been employed. Also, Stirner’s theory of the ego has been discussed in relation with the act of conscientious objection and the possibilities of conceiving an alternative self.

The discussion on conscientious objection demonstrates that by refusing military service and militarized society, the objector seeks to follow the guidance of his/her own definition of conscience. In so doing, the objector creates his/her ethics of self rather than embracing the morality of the state and society. In this manner, following Foucauldian conceptualization of the ethics of care of self and Stirner’s notion of Ownness, it may be argued that from both Foucauldian and Stirnerian accounts, conscientious objection can be seen as an attempt of creating one’s own self with an individualistic motivation in most of the refusal acts to military service. At this point, one’s eagerness to have an ethics of self and having his/her
own unique self may also be seen as a form of resistance to modern power as Foucault and Stirner suggests in their works. Nevertheless, it is seen that the possibilities of attaining self in militarized society would vary from Stirnerian and Foucauldian accounts depending on certain differences in their conceptualization of modern power and modern subject in relations with the implications of modern power in the forms of the state and the institution of military.

Considering the Foucauldian genealogy of modern subject, it is argued that for the individual attaining the knowledge of self plays crucial role in caring him/herself. In this way, by having the knowledge about oneself, individual can reach mastery of his/herself. However, following the Foucauldian genealogy it is seen that modern subjects are not autonomous, we as subjects are determined in history in various ways by the techniques of power. Still, the possibility of having the knowledge about oneself enables us to attain an alternative self. Regarding the claim that “only autonomous forms of life genuinely challenge configurations of power” (Thompson, 2003: 114), it is argued that conscientious objection as a refusal of both military service and the implications of militarized society over individual can be seen as an attempt of creating a form of self ethics.

For Foucault, modern power which follows the humanist regime confines individual to particular identities. In so doing, humanism underlines “the idea of universal necessities in human existence” (Foucault, 1982:11). In this respect, as it is indicated, Foucault criticises the “Enlightened Man” who is inhered to act according to the rules of public good. To this extent, Foucauldian conceptualisation of humanist regime enables us to understand how nation-state and military
institution as the reflections of modern power which have been using the nationalist discourse as a regime of truth advises to individual being a soldier is the right and the duty of being citizen. At this point, individual’s act of refusal to serve in military can be understood as an attempt of liberating oneself from the particular identity of being a soldier which is imposed on him by modern power. In this way, it is argued that individual tries to attain his/her own identity by refusing the one that is given by the will of the state. With the act of refusal, the objector follows his own conscience by limiting and controlling the form of power which aims to impose the discourse and truth claim of the state. Besides that, by refusing to serve in military, the objector also refuses the implications of modern power over his/her life.

However, regarding the Foucauldian theory of “power over life”, one’s craving to attain autonomous self would be problematic in relation to create a space for self-constitution of the subject. The possibility of attaining/constituting one’s own self has been lacking by the technologies of power that are operated over the life of individual. These technologies, on the one hand, follow the individualizing techniques of disciplinary power which are deployed by military institution and aim the docility of the body of soldier and on the other hand, they aim the regulation and administration of the lives of individuals by deploying bio-power. The modern conscription as a governmental technology of the nation-state can be shown as a reflection of the regulative and administrative character of the bio power. Within the process of encountering the reality of conscientious objection, the state as a form of modern power embraces the idea of sustaining and maintaining the life of
individual by imposing selective services or non-combatant duties in the military. On the other hand, although bio politics of the state sustains and maintains the lives of people, it also convicts the objector into the position of “civil death” by recalling his/her rights. In so doing, although power maintains the physical life of the individual, at the same time, it represses the life of the individual in most of the spheres of life. In his respect, individual’s eagerness of creating and realizing one’s self would be questionable because whether s/he is an effect of power remains as a crucial question.

At this very point, the relation between resistance and the possibility of creating one’s own self gains importance in terms of the act of conscientious objection. Following Foucault’s claim that “discipline organizes analytical space” (Foucault, 1979: 143), the reason behind the militarized form of society has also been organizing both the body and the soul of the individual as a calculable space. Disciplinary power to that extent seeks individualization in order to calculate and normalize the individual. In the case of conscription, military organization applies disciplinary power over the body, soul and even the conduct of the individual and in this way, it aims to transform the individual into docile being in order to attain the obedient subject. To this end, power over life that has been operated on the lives of individuals encloses one’s ability to realize oneself. Conscientious objection as an individualistic act of refusal of modern power tries to create untouched place for the self which is free from the effects of modern power.

For Foucault, the main problem is to liberate individuals from the individualizing techniques of the state in general and from the state in particular
(Foucault, 1982: 336). In this respect, the possibility of resistance comes into prominence where the objector seeks his/her freedom in order to realize him/herself. However, one’s liberation from the technologies of power that have been operating upon individual cannot be possible at all. In this manner, although for Foucault there have been a “permanent possibility of revolt” in the relations of power, freedom for him “is not a matter of liberation”. In this context, “to seek the subject of liberation is to misunderstand the functioning of modern power” (May, 1993: 119). In this respect, the question “Does the conscientious objector have (the consciousness of) freedom to resist?” should be asked. It is argued that for Foucault free individual is the one who realizes the “field of possibilities” for resistance. In this context, the objector sees his conscience as the possible place for creating his freedom. However, from Foucauldian viewpoint, s/he cannot liberate herself/himself from the technologies of power that have been operating on him/her.

Still, from Foucauldian point of view, it might be argued that an attempt of creating an alternative self instead of being constituted as an effect of power, would be possible by refusing what we are (Foucault, 1982: 331). In this regard, as it is argued in previous chapter, the objector’s refusal of normalizing techniques of power and reason of the militarized society can be seen as a form of resistance against modern power.

It is argued that the act of conscientious objection from Stirnerian point of view is an attempt of attaining one’s Ownness in order to have his/her autonomy. The act of refusal is at the same time meant excluding the norms of society where the ego has his/her own moral values. In this manner, the objector refuses the values
of militarized society and nation state because s/he sees that the ability to use his/her own *might* is under the threat of power which is external to him. It is seen that the nation-state as humanist form of power, eradicates the autonomy of individual by rendering him soldier and engaging in war as his/her sacred duty towards the nation. Thus, the case of conscientious objection draws a parallelism with Stirner’s theory of egoism which follows the idea of being against all forms of sacred ideals.

To this extent, it is argued that the refusal of military service of the objector connotes his/her ability to use his/her *might* against the implications of modern power. As a result, the objector is the creator of his/her conscience and s/he has the ability to have autonomy. By following the conscience of his/her own, the objector enters into the process of Ownness where it means to be able to be free even in the most oppressive situations that one’s ownness is a kind of freedom which starts with the individual *might*. On the other hand, it is argued that in order to realize one’s Ownness and enable to practice the freedom, there need to have an alternative association which is called the Union of Egoists. Following this, it is argued that Stirner’s alternative association might be helpful to understand conscientious objection movement as a reflection of this association where the objector is recognized as someone against the militarized form of society. Regarding the fact that “Ownness is to reject the value of community in all its forms” (Stirner, 1995, xxviii), the objector rejects the nationalistic values of the state and society; s/he is still able to join an alternative collectivity.
It may be argued that the Union of Egoists is a reflection of mutual agreement between the egos where the movement of conscientious objectors have been also struggling with the militarized society. However, from Stirnerian viewpoint, the movement can be conceived as a means for individualistic motivation of creating an autonomous and unique self. However, from Foucauldian reading of Stirner, it might be claimed that the objector could not have chance to create his own self as a power-free space where the individual is determined in the relations of power and as an effect of power. In this sense, considering the difference between the conceptualisation of power in Foucault and Stirner we would have various results towards the possibility of attaining the self. It is argued that Foucault defines power not as a possession; he defines power with its relational and fluid character. It is relational in terms of its exercise in a social body and it is fluid to the extent of its non-hierarchical model of implication (Smart, 1988). Unlike Foucauldian definition of power, for Stirner power is the property of the “ego”. In this respect, Stirnerian conceptualization of might as individual’s power can be given as an example where the individual arises as both the creator and source of this power. Thus, while Foucault would interpret the act of objection in a sceptic manner where he would argue that the act of objection can be seen as a form of resistance, he would also claim that it may not necessarily lead to the objector to the realm of liberty. On the other hand, Stirner might be more optimistic than Foucault, where the act of conscientious objection can be seen as a practice of individual power (might) against the modern power in the form of the state that is external to the individual will.
In conclusion, this thesis demonstrates that the case of conscientious objection can be seen as an instance of resistance to modern power. The examination of Foucault’s conceptualizations of disciplinary/normalized society have shown that the objector’s attainment of self might be problematic depending on the claim that the objector may also be the artefact of modern power. This is because Foucault claims that individual’s behaviours and the society that s/he lives in are the very products of modern power. Besides that, it might be claimed that reason of the state over the life of objector steals his ability to create his ethics of self by employing regulative and administrative technologies over his life by rendering him to “civil death” because of his refusal. In this sense, for Foucault although conscientious objection would not guarantee one’s liberation from modern power, it might be seen as an attempt of creating self ethics through resisting the implications of modern power. From Stirnerian account, the act of objection would not be seen in all types of objection but only in the absolutist/total objection which rejects the entire implications of the state and militarized form of society.
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