

THE ROLE OF LOBBIES IN THE US-ISRAELI RELATIONS: (1948-2008)

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF LOBBIES IN THE US-ISRAELI RELATIONS: (1948-2008)

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The US-Israel relations were based on the US political and strategic interests in the Middle East. The beginning of relations resulted from the Israel's strategic importance for United States to contain the Soviet sponsored-communism and its location to easy access oil reserves. The bilateral relation, especially after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, was transformed into a special relation. However, following the election of George Bush as President of the US, the US-Israeli relations rose and reached its peak in the 8-year period of his Administration. For that reason, this thesis aims at analyzing the role of the Jewish lobbies, in the context of the US-Israeli relations from 1948 to 2008, particular focusing on the Bush Administration period.

This study tries to answer the question of to what extent does the Jewish lobby influence foreign policy or to what extent does the Jewish lobby has the relative strength of influence than other ethnic groups or lobbies in the US foreign policy-making process is another aim of this study.

This thesis argues that the Jewish lobby has been highly affectively to influence the US foreign policy-making process. In addition, it also argues that the US foreign policy is based on importance of presidency and therefore it is impossible to explain American foreign policy without highlighting the personality and belief system of Presidents.

Keywords: U.S-Israeli relations, U.S' foreign policy, Jewish lobby, George W. Bush

ÖZ

LOBİLERİNİN ABD-İSRAİL İLİŞKİLERİNDEKİ ROLÜ: (1948-2000)

Berdibek, Muhammed

Yüksek Lisans, Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Bölümü

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ABD-İsrail ilişkileri ABD'nin Ortadoğu'daki stratejik ve siyasi çıkarlarına dayanmaktadır. İsrail'in Sovyet destekli komünizmini kuşatması için uygun olan stratejik önemi ve İsrail'in petrol rezervlerine kolay ulaşılabilir konumu ikili ilişkilerin doğmasını sağlamıştır. Fakat 1967 Arap-İsrail savaşlarından sonra ikili ilişkiler özel ilişkilere dönüşmüştür. George Bush'un ABD başkanı olduğu sekiz yıllık dönemde, ikili ilişkilerin boyutu artarak değişmiş ve zirveye ulaşmıştır. Bu nedenle, bu tez 1948-2008 arasında, özellikle Bush döneminde, ABD-İsrail ilişkilerinde Yahudi lobilerinin rolünü analiz etmeyi hedeflemektedir.

Bu çalışmada, bir taraftan ABD dış politika karar mekanizması sürecinde Yahudi lobilerinin rolü incelenmekte diğer taraftan da Yahudi lobilerinin ne ölçüde ABD dış politikasını etkilemekte olduğu ve bunda diğer etnik grup ve lobilerden nasıl ayrışmakta olduğu sorularına yanıt aranmaktadır.

Söz konusu araştırmada, ikili ilişkilerin kuruluşu her ne kadar ABD'nin ekonomik ve siyasi çıkarlarına dayansa da, Yahudi lobilerinin ABD dış politikasını etkilemekte ne kadar etkili olduğu savunulmaktadır. Ayrıca, ABD dış politikası "Devlet Başkanının" önemine dayandığı için Başkanın kişiliği ve inanç sistemini aydınlatmadan ABD dış politikasını anlamının imkansız olduğu savunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: ABD-İsrail ilişkileri, ABD Dış Politikası, Yahudi lobisi, George W. Bush

To Memet Kılıç and Zeynep Dinçer

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis analyzes the role of ethnic lobbies in the US foreign policy by looking at the influence of the Jewish lobby in the US-Israel relations. United States of America has been created by large waves of immigration across the world in the 19th century and the effects of these groups have been increasing during the 20th century. George F. Kennan asserted that "there have been numerous instances since the Second World War where ethnic minorities have brought pressures with the idea to influence foreign policy on behalf of what they perceive as the interests of their former mother country".¹ Likewise, according to Tony Smith, ethnic groups play a larger role in the making of US foreign policy than is widely recognized². This thesis argues that among the other influential ethnic groups including the Armenians, Greeks, and the Cubans, the Jews have been the most successful one in influencing the US foreign policy decision-making process.

Like all ethnic groups, the Jewish communities of the US have connections outside of the country and aims to influence the US foreign policy in line with the interests of Israel. The connection between the American Jewry and Israel based on mutual relationship where the American Jewry is regarded as an integral part of Israel and Israel is seen as home for the American Jewry is often emphasized. Jewish lobby as an ethnic lobby plays a very important role in the making of American foreign policy toward Israel. In this context, the Jewish lobby tries to frame the US foreign policy decision-makers in order to emphasize the centrality of Israel. The Jewish lobby not only provides information and policy analysis in line with Israeli interests but also gives policy oversight to lead foreign policy-makers to take decisions in favor of Israel.

¹ David M. Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul, *Ethnic Lobbies and U.S Foreign Policy*, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2009), p.8

² John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (New York: London Review of Books, 2007), p.9

As mentioned in the beginning, this thesis aims at analyzing the role of the Jewish lobby in the U.S-Israeli relations between 1948 and 2008. The research question of this thesis is how the Jewish lobby influences the American foreign policy process and what is the role of the Jewish lobby in the making of U.S foreign policy toward Israel. The thesis starts with 1948 that was the date of the formation of the State of Israel and the establishment of official U.S-Israeli relations and ends with 2008 that was the end of the George W. Bush administration period.

For detailed analysis of the role of Jewish lobby, in first chapter, we will try to answers the questions of who makes American foreign policy and how the American foreign policy making process works. Even though the Congress became much more active in the 1970s, Presidents play a key role in the shaping of U.S foreign policy. Therefore, this thesis will argue that U.S foreign policy is based on the importance of the presidency and therefore it is impossible to explain American foreign policy without highlighting the personality and belief system of the Presidents. Thus, in this thesis, the role of lobbies and the Jewish lobby as a case study will be analyzed chronologically through the president's periods by focusing on their personality as well as their belief system. This thesis will demonstrate that especially the Reagan and George W. Bush periods have been important when the Jewish lobby was strong. The thesis argues that their personality and belief system played an important role in this.

After examining the governmental structure of the U.S in the context of importance of the presidency, the thesis will also highlight the reasons that led lobbies to become successful foreign policy actors. In this context, three main explanations for this can be provided. As will the argued in details in Chapter 1, firstly, the presidential system enforces separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches and so the lobbies find channels to contact and reach effective personalities. Secondly, the judicial system in the US enhances the power of lobbies and finally, the United States has developed a peculiarly open form of democratic pluralism, allowing groups with shared interests and values to access many points in the policy making process and to compete for influence over national

policy. These three factors are equally important in leading the lobbies to become one of the determinant foreign policy actors.

To answer the question of to what extent does the Jewish lobby influences foreign policy or to what extent does the Jewish lobby have the relative strength to influence US foreign policy-making process when compared with other ethnic groups or lobbies is another aim of this study. According to Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, for ethnic groups, there are seven primary factors: organizational strength, membership unity, placement, and voter participation, salience and resonance of the message, push on an open door, strength of opposition, permeability of and access to the government, mutually supportive relationship that determine the relative strength of influence of an ethnic interest group. Therefore, in this thesis, we will apply these factors to the Jewish lobby.

In that context, we believe that the first two factors should be much more emphasized. During the general and local elections, the Jews participated at higher rates than all ethnic groups. Terry supported this idea by claiming that “of all ethnic groups in this country, Jews take the most active interest in elections and vote more assiduously than almost any other population group. They also contribute heavily to campaigns and engage actively at both the national and state levels”³. Even though the overall Jewish population is the 2.2 ratio in the United States, Jews are demographically centered in the metropolitan areas that are highly important for the political parties. Jews are centered in four key states with significant Jewish populations accounting to 128 of the 270 electoral votes needed to win the elections. In addition, Sheshkin underlines that Jews are important for political parties because they are concentrated within certain congressional districts. With most elections being decided by less than five percentage points, Jews do have the ability to affect outcomes in those areas. These same geographic concentrations

³ Janice Terry, U.S. Foreign Policy in *The Middle East: The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups*, (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p.10

result in Jews being elected to State and local offices out-of-proportion to their number.⁴

Moreover, Jewish Lobby has very powerful organizational and professional lobbying apparatus. Since Jews founded many institutional organizations, such as, the American Jewish Congress, Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), the Israel Policy Forum (IPF), the American Jewish Committee, the ADL, the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, Americans for a Safe Israel, American Friends of Likud, and Women's Zionist Organization of America they have been able to affect US foreign policy. Additionally, there are several umbrella organizations that are interested in different issues across the US. Issues related with religion are under the control of Synagogue Council of America, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council regulate societal relations, National Council for Labor Zionist was founded to deal with workers, American Zionist Federation focuses on general issues about American Jewry, issues about youth is the specialty of North American Jewish Youth Council. These organizations come together each month in the President's conference. In addition to these two factors, which must be emphasized other factors are also important. Having organizational strength and higher voter tendency Jewish lobby has been highly effective to influence public opinion, promote policies that the government already favors, establish relations with members of legislative and executive branches and finally campaign against the anti-Israeli voices.

In addition, the Jewish lobby as an ethnic lobby has been highly successful to build larger coalitions with other Pro-Israeli groups, including Christian Zionists and Neo-Conservatives. Christian Zionists, Dispensationalists or Millennialists believe in the dispensation theology that traces back to the early 19th century and the teaching of John Nelson Darby. Nelson Darby preached a fundamentalist interpretation of the Bible and brought many Protestant Evangelicals together in

⁴ Terry, p.93

1878 calling for the restoration of Jews to a homeland in Palestine.⁵ These theological studies were later interpreted by William Blackstone. Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu describes William Blackstone as a leading Christian Zionist and acknowledges that the movement pre-dates the modern Zionist movement by fifty years.⁶

Dispensation theology centered Jews for the fulfillment of biblical prophecy, because God has a covenant with the Jewish people that is eternal, exclusive, and cannot be abrogated.⁷ According to John Nelson Darby, the history of humanity can be divided into seven periods or dispensations which began with the Garden of Eden and would end with the Armageddon and he regarded the last dispensation, Armageddon, would be an unavoidable military clash on the plains north of Jerusalem. Believers will be raptured or lifted up to watch the battle beside Jesus.⁸ Those remaining on earth will experience seven years of tribulation, or overwhelming suffering, during which an Antichrist will emerge and the word will move towards final battle.⁹ This cannot happen, however, until Jews re-establish biblical Israel and rebuild the temple in Jerusalem. Therefore, in the eyes of Christian Zionists, Israeli efforts to extend its territory to Judea and Samara, is obligatory to be supported. According John Hague, pre-eminent contemporary Christian Zionists, by providing prophetic signs of the end of times by referring the Bible that the rebirth of Israel (Isaiah 66:8-10), the return of the Jews to Israel (Jeremiah 23:7-8), the end of Gentile control of Jerusalem (Luke 21:24) and the reunification of Jerusalem under Israeli control from 1967, claimed that the return of Christ is imminent.¹⁰

⁵ Lee Marsden, *For God's Sake: The Christian Right and US Foreign Policy*, (New York: Zed Books Ltd 2008), p.179

⁶ Benjamin Netanyahu, *A Place among the Nations*, (New York: Bantam Books. 1994),p.16

⁷ Old Testament,(Genesis 12:1-7; 15:4-7; 17:1-8) see in www.devotions.net/bible/ see also in www.overlordsofchaos.com/html/christian_zionism.html

⁸Michael Thomas, *American Policy Toward Israel: The Power and Limits of Beliefs*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p.45

⁹ Marsden, p. 181

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 182

Other pro-Israeli groups that the Jewish lobby aligns are the Neo-conservatives. Neo-conservatism which traces its roots to the leftist and socialist ideology that associated with the Marxism and first generation of neo-conservatives are mainly originated in New York and most are the Jews who have been traditionally identified with the liberalism. During the 1960s, the first generation of neo-conservatives including Irwing Kristol, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Norman Podhoretz focused on foreign policy issues and played key roles in the shaping of the neo-conservative movement. In the context of the Middle East, having regarded Israel as the key tenet of neo-conservatism, neo-cons are strong supporters of Israel. In addition to Israel's importance to the US interests, neo-cons came to believe that the Jewish state's ability to survive is directly linked to the survival of the Jewish community which is also linked on American military capabilities.

In chapter two, to explore the role and influence of the Jewish lobby in the US-Israeli relations, the thesis will go through the historical context that shaped the US-Israeli relations to the end of the Cold War. Even though the United States recognized Israel within 11 minutes after its declaration of independence relations have not always been very close. During the 1950s, the United States adopted a policy of even-handedness in the Arab-Israeli conflict, because it tried to limit the power of the Soviets in the region and did not want to hamper its easy access to oil reserves. In 1957, after the proclamation of the Eisenhower doctrine, the US foreign policy shifted closer to Israel. During the 1960s, the US-Israeli relations became warmer and matured. President Kennedy, for the first time in the US history, mentioned about "Special Relations" and appointed a full-time aide to maintain contact with the US Jewish community in this period. The victory of Israel over Arabs in the 1967 War is the beginning of a new era in the US-Israeli relations from many perspectives. Following the 1967 war, first of all, the US elites began to regard Israel as a strategic ally in the Middle East and the Johnson administration increased the amount of economic and military assistance to Israel. Parallel with this development, the Jewish lobby began to build coalition with Christian Zionists and

mobilize American public opinion. During the 1970s, the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations maintained the US's relations with Israel in favorable manners.

During the 1980s, the Jewish lobby, Christian Zionists and Neo-Conservatives gathered for the common cause of supporting Ronald Reagan. Being the first ideological president because of his association with strict anti-communist, Christian Zionist and Neo-Conservative ideologies, Ronald Reagan had a deep emotional sympathy towards Israel. In that period, it is not hard to claim that Reagan supported and protected Israeli interests almost without reservation. Therefore, in that period, Reagan Administration maintained the grant aid to Israel at \$3 billion annually, implemented a Free Trade Agreement and granted Israel major non-NATO ally status in 1988.

In chapter three, the thesis will analyze the US-Israeli relations from the end of the Cold War to 2000. It will be argued that compared to the Reagan administration, there has been a relative decline in the US-Israeli relations during the first Bush administration and the Clinton administrations. With the end of the Cold War, President Bush believed that the regional instability in the Middle East harmed U.S's interests in that area. For that reason, the Bush administration (1989–1993) aimed to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, but due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait postponed the negotiations. During the campaign against Iraq, President Bush refrained from any support from Israel as it could jeopardize the US- Arab relations. For some writers, this is an indication of the diminishing importance of Israel for the US interests. Even though the Clinton Administration generally sided with Israel in the Oslo Peace Process, it is difficult to see very close relations with Israel.

Chapter four of the thesis mainly deals with President Bush's personality and the role of the Jewish lobby in that period. The thesis argues that following the election of George W. Bush as President of the US, the US-Israeli relations became closer and reached its peak during the eight-year period of his Administration. Two reasons have contributed in the strengthening of the US-Israeli relations under

George W. Bush: his personality and the strong influence of the Jewish lobby. After 9/11 attacks in particular, with the role of the Jewish lobby and its joint alliances with the Christian Zionists and Neo-conservatives, President Bush adopted a pro-Israeli foreign policy.

The thesis concludes by arguing that the Jewish Lobby, as an ethnic lobby, plays a significant role in the shaping the US foreign policy and relations with Israel. This role has changed under different Presidents, mainly due to their personalities and the belief systems. The administrations of Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush especially stand out as periods when the Jewish lobby has been most influential.

CHAPTER 2

THE ROLE OF LOBBIES AND THE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The representatives from the thirteen former colonies founded the United States of America in late 18th century. From this date to the Pearl Harbor attacks in 1941, US adopted the policy of isolationism in international relations. This policy was institutionalized in the 1823 Monroe Doctrine: “National weakness relative to European powers and the republican ideological belief that the United States should serve as a model for the rest of the world and focus on internal progress rather than external interactions”¹¹, became main reasons for the continuation of isolationism during the 19th century. In the beginning of 20th century, even though there had been a few steps towards terminating the foreign policy of isolationism as in the case of Wilson’s decision to declare war against central powers (Germany, Austria and Hungary), the real transformation occurred when the Japanese attacked on Pearl Harbor in 1941. This was the beginning of a tremendous transformation in American foreign policy from isolationism to internationalism. Today, the United States holds the capacity of penetrating all regions in the world; some commentators went as far as by claiming that “America affects, directly and indirectly, the lives of every individual, community and the nation on planet”.¹² Because of its centrality in international relations, an analysis of American foreign policy is essential. The questions of who makes American foreign policy and how the American foreign policy making process works become principal aspects of such an analysis.

2.1. The US Governmental Structure and Foreign Policy Actors

The particular structure of the US government plays a key role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. In the context of governmental structure, the specific actors have enormous role in the formulation of American

¹¹ Daniel Deudney and Jeffrey Meiser, “American Exceptionalism” in *U.S. Foreign Policy*, eds. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.35

¹² Kylie Baxter and Shrahram Akbarzadeh, *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roots of Anti-Americanism*, (London: Routledge 2008), p.1

foreign policy. Thus, foreign policy evolves out of a complex interplay¹³ among the executive branch: The president, cabinet officials such as the Secretary of State, and advisors of the presidents such as the national security advisers and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the legislative branch: Members of the United States Congress—both Senate and House of Representatives. Because of the governmental structure, the question of who makes foreign policy has been a central debate among different observers, commentators and political scientists. There are several studies maintaining that the roles and relative influences of the two branches in the policy-making differ from time to time. One study classified the period 1789-1829 as one of Presidential initiative; 1829-1898 as one congressional supremacy, and 1899 through the post-World War II period as one of growing presidential power¹⁴. During and after the Cold War, despite the fact that we have witnessed the growing power of the Congress, presidents maintained their key role in the making of American foreign policy.

2.1.1 President and the Executive Branch

The primary focus of America's foreign policy-making systems lies with an executive infrastructure of departments and agencies whose roots and authority are drawn from initial grant of constitutional power to the presidential office¹⁵. Accordingly, the President shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States...shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States...and shall have power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors¹⁶. Nevertheless, given powers by the constitution, presidents can take decisions in the context of his subjective understandings. Therefore, the belief system of presidents or their personality, past experiences, values turn out to be leading elements of the American foreign policy. The doctrines (Truman Doctrine, Nixon Doctrine and Bush

¹³ Janice Terry, U.S. Foreign Policy in *The Middle East: The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups*, (London: Pluto Press, 2005),

¹⁴ Ernest Simone, *Foreign Policy of the United States, Volume I*, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2000), 5.

¹⁵ Michael Foley, "The Foreign Policy Process: Executive, Congress, Intelligence" in *U.S. Foreign Policy*, eds. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2008), 111

¹⁶ The United States Constitution, available at www.usconstitution.net (accessed on 16 December 2010)

Doctrine) in addition to the US strategic interests, echo, as it can be understood from their names, presidents' personalities and mindsets. For that reason, for many, "it seems impossible to explain the direction of American foreign policy without highlighting the personality traits and beliefs of the current President".¹⁷

Even though, as the chief executives, Presidents "have sought to make explicit what in their view was implicit in the creation of an executive branch of government";¹⁸ the members of executive branch are able to affect the foreign policy-making process. Throughout the evolution of foreign policy, the power of government agencies in the executive branch such as Secretary of State Department of State, Pentagon, CIA, and in particular, close advisers and the National Security Council involve in the foreign policy-making process as in the case of Ronald Regan and George W. Bush Presidency in particular. After its creation, the National Security Council (NSC) which was formed under President Truman to advise and assist the president on national security and foreign policies¹⁹ has been highly effective in matters of national security and foreign policy issues. Brzezinski considers the Council to be responsible for the architecture of with the state department performing the acrobatics of foreign policy.²⁰ Indeed, under some administrations, the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger in Gerald Ford's presidency, the National Security Adviser, Brzezinski acts as the main architect of implementation of foreign policy. For that reason, Schmidt claimed that since American foreign policy behavior follows from decisions made by elites, the individual source prompts us to investigate the characteristics and idiosyncrasies unique to the decision makers.²¹

¹⁷ Brian Schmidt, "Theories of US Foreign Policy" in *U.S. Foreign Policy* eds. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.10

¹⁸ Michael Foley, "The Foreign Policy Process: Executive, Congress, Intelligence" in *U.S. Foreign Policy*, eds. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2008), 113

¹⁹ Its attendees are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. See in National Security Council in www.whitehouse.gov

²⁰ Terry, p.4

²¹ Schmidt, p.10

2.1.2 The Legislative Branch

The Legislative Branch²², which comprises the House of Representatives and the Senate that formed United States Congress, was delegated responsibilities and duties by the Founding Fathers. According to section 8 of Article 1, the Congress is assigned to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, to declare war²³, and also to provide and maintain a navy, to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia and finally to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.²⁴ Especially the upper house: the Senate has right in the constitution to ratify or disapprove all international treaties of president's appointments; presidents have to appoint ambassadors to other countries with consent of the Senate.²⁵ Therefore, both houses of the US congress play an important role in the foreign policy-making process. For many observers, due to its domestic focus, the Congress effect is minimal as the legislatures branch is apt to acquiesce to executive initiatives.²⁶ For some, the Congress yielded much of its foreign policy authority to the president during the 1950s and 1960s, the Congress became much more active in foreign affairs in the 1970s in large because of the unpopular Vietnam War and it remains an important force in the making of foreign policy²⁷.

2.1.3 Lobbies in the Policy-making Process

The foreign policy behaviors of the US have been one of the most important debates in the literature of international relations theories. Since the realist argument claims that rational states will act in their self-interest and focuses on the role of the international system in shaping of American foreign policy, ignores the role of

²²The House of Representatives is made up of 435 elected members, divided among the 50 states in proportion to their total population The Senate is composed of 100 Senators, 2 for each state. See in "The Legislative Branch", www.whitehouse.gov

²³The war powers Act of 1973 has given important leverage to the Congress to declare war. See in Ibid

²⁴ The United States Constitution, available at www.usconstitution.net

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶M.Paul and Paul, p.6

²⁷James M. Lindsay, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy*, (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 141

domestic sources inside the countries in the foreign policy-making process. Domestic political environment surrounding the governmental foreign policy making system in the United States includes variety of elements that have the potential to affects policy outputs.²⁸ And therefore, it is not hard to claim that these nongovernmental elements are assumed by many to have a significant impact on the course of the government's foreign policy activities²⁹. Thus, lobbies and societal forces inside the country have great effects on the shaping of policy-making process. Therefore, it is obligatory to explore the reasons that led lobbies became successful foreign policy actors. There are mainly three explanations for this.

First of all, the presidential system enforces separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. According to Terry, operating within the constraints of the system, lobbyists manipulate and utilize the prevailing cultural milieu, first gain access to, and then convince, policy-makers to adopt policies that are favorable to their specific agendas.³⁰ The election of presidents and representatives are two separate events. Even though the presidents are less vulnerable to manipulations of lobbies, they know the importance of lobbies to pass their agenda in the Congress. Members of the Congress, focused on elections or re-election, naturally emphasize domestic issues of local concern-even in the foreign policy arena.³¹ Therefore, legislators representing districts with high Jewish populations are likely to be strongly pro-Israel.³²

In addition to the presidential system, federalism—which entails decentralization of political power to states and local governments—encourages lobbies. Decentralization gave an important leverage to a greater variety of interest groups and also further weakens the party system, because the social and economic diversity of the 50 states make strict party discipline difficult³³. Thus, for winning the

²⁸Khalil Marrar, *the Arab Lobby and US Foreign Policy: The Two-State Solution*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 27

²⁹ Ibid, p. 27

³⁰ Terry, 29

³¹James Meernik and Elizabeth Oldmixon, *Internationalism in Congress*, 452, available at, <http://prq.sagepub.com>

³²Ibid, 453

³³R. Allen Hays, “*The Role of Interest Groups*”, www.ait.org.tw

election, candidates of political parties (Republican, Democrats or independents) in general and local elections needs lobbies to gain relative advantage over other candidates and parties.

Secondly, the judicial system in the US enhances the power of lobbies. The right to attempt to influence the legislation is based on the First Amendment to the Constitution, which says, Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press the right of the people 'to petition the government for a redress of grievances.'³⁴ From their emergence in 19th century, Lobbies as a form of petition have mushroomed in the United States. Therefore, the U.S. began the process of regulating lobbyists with the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, requiring that lobbyists register with the government and report contributions and expenditures.³⁵ The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 also defined the lobbyist. Accordingly, a lobbyist is defined as an individual or organization whose job is to influence the passing or defeat of legislation and who receives money for that purpose³⁶. By 2010, there are 12, 048 lobbyists with \$ 2.61 billion spending.³⁷

Finally, the United States has developed a peculiarly open form of democratic pluralism, allowing groups with shared interests and values to access many points in the policy making process and to compete for influence over national policy.³⁸ Hence, the lobbies, compared to other countries, face with less restrictions to challenge the foreign policy. From its early days, ideological and economic divisions among people in the US were praised by the Founding Fathers. The early divisions named a faction defined by Madison, a number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or majority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the

³⁴ Ibid, 62

³⁵ Terry, 29

³⁶ Ibid 29

³⁷ *Lobbying Database*, www.opensecrets.org

³⁸ Michael Thomas, *American Policy Toward Israel: The Power and Limits of Beliefs*, (London and New York: Routledge 2007), 11

permanent and aggregate interests of the community.³⁹ Economic and ideological divisions of factions shifted to organizations with the racial, religious and ethnic lines in the later times. Thus, the early role of factions was transformed into the role of ethnic lobbies. These three reasons that mentioned above were equally important that led lobbies became one of the determinant foreign policy actors.

2.2 The Ethnic Lobbies in the United States Foreign Policy

Lobbies, which can simply be defined as organizations not only trying to direct government policies and action but also manipulating public opinion on behalf of their interests, originated in the 19th-century when individuals would gather in the lobby outside of a legislative chamber in hopes of meeting the Congressmen personally and persuading them to take a certain position on pending legislation in the United States.⁴⁰ Since then, lobbies have become one of the important actors affecting both domestic and foreign policies of the U.S.

There are several motives (ideological, environmental, moral, commercial or ethnic) for the establishment of lobbies. Because of their importance US-Israel relations, the ethnic lobbies have been underlined throughout this thesis. As a type of lobbies, an ethnic interest group or ethnic lobbies established along cultural, ethnic, religious or racial lines by an ethnic group for the purposes of influencing the foreign policy of their resident country in support of the mother country. Since United States of America is created by the large waves of immigration across the world, the effects of these groups have increased particularly during the 20th century. George F. Kennan asserted that there have been numerous instances since the World War II where ethnic minorities have brought pressures with view to influencing foreign policy on behalf of what they perceive as the interests of their former mother country⁴¹. Likewise, according to Tony Smith, ethnic groups play a larger role in the making of

³⁹Seth P. Tillman, *the United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 63.

⁴⁰*The Role of Lobbyists in Millennium Politics*, www.politicalmath.com

⁴¹M.Paul and Paul, p.4

US foreign policy than it is widely recognized.⁴² To better understand the importance of ethnic lobbies, the following part will look at the role of ethnic lobbies.

2.2.1 The Role of the Ethnic Lobbies

Nearly all ethnic groups, like the Armenians, Greek and the Jews have connections outside of the United States and aim to influence US foreign policy in line with their specific agendas. The role of ethnic lobbies can be defined in a number of ways. According to Ambrosio, the ethnic lobbies primarily seek to influence foreign policy in three ways: Framing, information and policy analysis, policy oversight. Framing refers to the attempt by interest groups to place an issue on the government agenda, shape perspectives of that issue and influence the terms of debate.⁴³ In that context, the missions of lobbies are to work on the basis of agenda that led policymakers to make decisions on behalf of their lines and their mother countries. Framing is closely connected to the role of ethnic groups as information providers. Especially on the regional issues, lacking certain knowledge, bureaucratic staff and politicians mainly rely on the information that provided by the ethnic lobbies. Therefore, it is not difficult for ethnic lobbies to direct decision makers and public opinion to take decisions that are beneficial for their agendas. Moreover, interest groups closely monitor government policies pertaining to their agenda and react to those policies through the dissemination of supplementary information, letter-writing campaigns call for hearings or additional legislations, support and oppose candidates.⁴⁴ These three roles allow the groups to have an impact on the early stages of decision-making process.

Depending on their roles, ethnic lobbies can hold the ability to eliminate the number of disadvantages in trying to influence foreign policy making process. According to Quandt, there are mainly four disadvantages for ethnic lobbies for affecting the foreign policy process. First, there may be internal divisions that

⁴² Mearsheimer and Walt, p.7

⁴³ Thomas Ambrosio "The Ethnic identity groups and U.S. foreign policy" in *The Ethnic Identity Groups And U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Thomas Ambrosio, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p.5

⁴⁴ Ibid, p.5

weaken their effectiveness. Second, they are unlikely to have their sources, in money and information that would allow them to present their case effectively. Third, lobbyists have a strong tendency to seek out those who already agree with them rather than trying to make converts. Fourth, lobbyists are vulnerable to counter pressures, especially from the powerful federal bureaucracy.⁴⁵

2.2.2. Israel's Foreign Policy and the Role of the Jewish Lobby in the United States

Because of facing of a series of security challenges, Israel has been searching for support of global powers in the context of its national and defense strategy. Therefore, the Zionists have intensified relations with US not only important for strategic reasons, but also her constituting the huge number of Jewish population. Because of complexity to determine the Jewishness⁴⁶ and lack of ethnic census that based on ethnicity in the United States, it is difficult determine the official size of Jewish population. However, some major Jewish organizations in Israel and the United States, such as United Jewish communities, Jewish Agency for Israel sponsor the counting the number of Jews. The National Jewish Population (2000-01) and the American Jewish Identity Survey estimated 5.200.000 and 5.340.000 Jews living in United States, respectively. If we based on both surveys, the total number of Jews made up about %40 of world Jewry. However, it just constituted 2.2 percent of US population.⁴⁷

To explore the significance of role of the Jewish lobby, it is obligatory to keep in mind that the traumatic historical context and distinctive political culture throughout the history created consciousness of being Jew. Therefore, since the

⁴⁵ Thomas, p.60

⁴⁶“Because of Israeli needs for the population growth, the Law of Return was enacted in 1952 to give any Jew the right to immigrate to Israel and become a citizen. However, the question of who is Jew became the real challenge in the eye of Zionist Elites. Therefore, to end the discussion, in the law of return, Jew is defined in three ways that “Jew as a person who was born of a Jewish mother or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion.” See in Law of Return(5710-1950),<http://www.mfa.gov.il>

⁴⁷ The United Jewish Communities report on the National Jewish Population Survey (2000-01), Israel Connections and American Jews, 2000-01, See also in Sergio Della Pergola, World Jewish Population, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2010, www.jewishdatabank.org,

establishment of Israel, the founding elites, Zionists, have been aware of the importance of the state of Israel for the Jews and the Jews for Israel. For that reason without understanding the political culture and historical context, it would not be enough to understand the domestic and foreign policy of Israel. The consciousness of being a Jew⁴⁸, pervades thought, feeling, belief, and behavior of the Zionist elite and most Israeli in the political realm. They perceive the Jewry as world of people of which Israeli are an integral part. Israel regarded as the voice, the representative, and the defender of Jews in distress anywhere. On the other hand, this created an expectation that world Jewry will reciprocate with massive and continuous support for that segment of the people resettled in the homeland. David Ben Gurion declared that world Jewry is the only certain reliable ally of Israel and therefore, and suggested that it is not important what the goyim (nations) say, but rather what the Jews do.⁴⁹ And also Ben Gurion emphasized the interdependence of State of Israel and world Jewry:

Thus, on the relationship between Israel and Jews of the world, and the representative and catalytic role assumed by the new state, he remarked “the two groups are interdependent. The future of Israel-its security, its welfare, and its capacity to fulfill its historic mission-depends on world Jewry. And the future of world Jewry depends on the survival of Israel The state ensures.... A life of sovereign freedom for the entire Jewish people... the state has become the pillar on which the unity of Diaspora Jewry now rests. The state is also product of that unity.”⁵⁰

⁴⁸Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p.53 From David Ben Gurion’s speech that “You see, were Jews without a definition for the last 3,000 years and we will remain so. There are several definitions but the thing existed before any definitions were given to same thing .By one definition the Jews are a religious community, there are number of Jews who accept that definition. There is definition that Jews are nation, and there are number of Jews who accept that definition. There are Jews without any definition. They are just Jews. I am one of them I do not need any definition. I am what I am”.

⁴⁹*Ibid*, p. 29-31 “With relentless consistency Ben Gurion has declared that Israel is indissolubly bound up with Jewry. This is Israel’s primary and principal bond, prior to all other attachments and ties, vital her life and soul, her character and future. The state was made by and for the Jewish people. That is its title to life and since the Jews are a world people, Israel is the state of and for a world people; it is something beyond citizenship and sovereignty”.... “Israel is a Jewish State. The only Jewish State in the World, it was re-established deliberately by the Jewish people as a Jewish solution to the Jewish problem, which has scarred the history of mankind for over 2,000 years. This is the cardinal feature dominating all Israel’s policy, domestic and foreign. This makes Israel unique. Without full appreciation of this elemental factor, it is impossible to understand Israel or any aspect of Israel’s policy-domestic or foreign”.

⁵⁰*Ibid*,p.31

In the mutual relationships, Jewish lobby, in a given responsibilities, has been highly successful to help Israel to fulfill historic mission. One part of the explanation for “Israel’s success in achieving American support is its separate penetration, with the help of its domestic allies, of all levels of the policy-making process”.⁵¹ It also has been, as posited by Keohane, whether directly with diplomatic relations, working relationships inside relevant bureaucracies and organized domestic group support in the Congress or indirectly through labor, eleemosynary and religious organizations, the media and policy institutes, the political parties and political campaign organizations.⁵²

The Jewish lobby directly entering of all levels of the policy making process, has framed the US foreign policy and has constantly sought to improve its mission of: pressuring policymakers to make decisions that favor Israel. By information and policy analysis, the Jewish lobby emphasize Israel centrality for American interests particularly vis-à-vis Arab parties but also against communist during the Cold War and terrorism after its end; then lobby works with activists and thinkers that have dealings in government, academics, the media and private business involved in the Middle East affairs as giving policy oversight.⁵³ Finally, the task for the Jewish lobby is also manipulating decision-making process to direct the decision makers to support Israel in material level: Military and financial aid.

2.3 The Relative Strength and Influence of the Jewish Lobby

The relative success of the Jews led us to answer the question of to what extent does the Jewish lobby influence foreign policy or to what extent does the Jewish lobby has the relative strength of influence than other ethnic groups or lobbies in the US Foreign policy-making process. There are several studies conducted about the ethnic lobbies and their influence of foreign policy making process. According to Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, for ethnic groups, there are seven primary

⁵¹ Thomas, p.253

⁵² Ibid, p.253

⁵³ Marrar, 56

factors⁵⁴ determined relative strength of influence of an ethnic interest group. In each case, the Jews have had the advantageous position, when compared the other ethnic groups. In the following part, this chapter will look at these seven primary factors to show how these apply the Jewish lobby.

2.3.1. Organizational Strength

To pursuit their objectives, ethnic lobbies use multiple channels to try to influence foreign policy making process. Therefore, it is essential for ethnic groups to have organizational and professional lobbying apparatus to finance resources. “If one could equalize all other factors it could be said that interests which are supported by organizations have a better chance of success than interests which do not enjoy the participation of organizations.”⁵⁵ Jewish community has been highly skillful in organizing across the all countries. Since Jews founded many institutional organizations⁵⁶, such as, the American Jewish Congress, Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), the Israel Policy Forum (IPF), the American Jewish Committee, the ADL, the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, Americans for a Safe Israel, American Friends of Likud, and Women’s Zionist Organization of America has affected or manipulated U.S.’ foreign policy.

Additionally, there have several umbrella organizations that interested in different issues across the US. Issues related with religion are under control of Synagogue Council of America, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council regulate societal relations, National Council for Labor Zionist was founded to deal with workers, American Zionist Federation general issues about American Jewry, issues about youth was specialty of North American Jewish Youth Council.

⁵⁴These factors are that Organizational strength, Membership unity, placement, and voter participation, Salience and resonance of the message, push on an open door, Strength of opposition, Permeability of and access to the government, mutually supportive relationships. Ambrosio, p.5

⁵⁵ Harmon Zeigler, *Interest groups in American Society* (Engle Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1964), 32 quoted in Watanabe, 69.

⁵⁶ Pro-Israeli groups are highly successful to spread their membership across the U.S.: As in the cases ;AJC 50,000, Women’s Zionist Organization of America 325,000, Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) 45,000, JWV 100,000, American Jewish Congress 40,000 and National Council of Jewish Women 100,000. Tayyar Arı, Abd’de Lobciliğin Dış Politikaya Etkisi Ve Türk Lobisi, 23, www.tayyarari.com/download/lobi_avrasya.doc

These organizations, each month came together in the Presidents conference. These organizations each month came together in the president's conference.

2.3.2 Membership Unity, Placement, and Voter Participation

The second way to understand the power or relative strength of ethnic groups, it must be based on the group's electoral implications. During in general and local elections the Jews participated at higher rates than all ethnic groups. Terry supported this idea by claiming that of all ethnic groups in this country, the Jews take the most active interest in elections and vote more assiduously than almost any other population group. They also contribute heavily to campaigns and engage actively in work both the national and state level⁵⁷. Especially during the election of Congress and President, Jewish lobby support or oppose the candidates by letter, telephone, fax, e-mail campaigns that favor of their agendas.

Even though the overall Jewish population is the 2.2 ratio in the United States, the Jews demographically centered the metropolitan are that highly important for the political parties. The Jews centered key four key states with significant Jewish populations account for 128 of the 270 electoral votes needed to win: California (55), New York (31), Florida (27), and New Jersey (15). Adding the next five states with large Jewish populations bring 84 additional electoral votes: Illinois (21), Pennsylvania (21), Ohio (20), Massachusetts (12), and Maryland (10)⁵⁸ Therefore, this explains the 13 Jews in Senate and 30 Jews in the House of Representatives in 2006.⁵⁹ In addition, Sheshkin posited another reason makes Jews important for political parties that Jews are concentrated within certain congressional districts. With most elections being decided by less than five percentage points, the Jews do have the ability to affect outcomes in those areas. These same geographic

⁵⁷ Terry, p.10

⁵⁸ Steven Windmueller, "Are American Jews Becoming Republican? Insights into Jewish Political Behavior", *Jewish Political Studies Review*, No.509 (December 2003), p.2 See also in www.jcpa.org/

⁵⁹ Ira M. Sheskin, "American Jewish demography: Implications for US-Israel Relations", in *US-Israeli Relations in a New Era: Issues and Challenges after 9/11* eds. Eytan Gilboa and Efraim Inbar, (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), p.93

concentrations result in Jews being elected to elected State and local offices out-of-proportion to their number.⁶⁰

The Jewish Voting Trends

The Jews in the United States of America mainly associated with the liberal and leftist ideas and thinking. From our point of view, this is the result of the Jewish historical experiences and sufferings in the autocratic regimes. For that reason, Jews has tended to vote for Democrat Party. As it would be seen in the table of Jewish votes in the Presidential elections in (Appendix A), Jewish support for Democrat party is around the % 70; sometimes it has gone to % 90. Because of importance of Jewish votes for Democrat party, candidates in the election periods and later after becoming the representatives or presidents has carry out the missions in accordance with demands of Jewish lobby. In contrast, a Jewish voting pattern for Republican Party is around the %20-25. Even though the Republicans has got very limited supports from the pro-Israeli groups, because of ideological and religious reasons support Israel in any case almost unconditionally.

2.3.3 Salience and Resonance of the Message

To generate sympathy and gain support in the US ethnic lobbies must be able to influence public opinion. For that reason, the Jewish lobby has been highly effective to influence public opinion. Pro-Israel groups have been able to conduct campaigns of intimidation and misinformation in order to strengthen the strategic alliance between the US and Israel and to make it seem as if the two countries' friendship as existed from time immemorial.⁶¹ In addition to their impressive access to the media, plentiful financing, sharp public relations skills, and unified support of the Jewish communities of the United States, Pro-Israeli pressure groups are much more consistent and persistent in information campaigns to provide officials with publications that present the Israeli point of view. They devote considerable time,

⁶⁰ Ibid,93

⁶¹ Marrar,p.269

energy and money to depicting Israel in the most favorable terms.⁶² For example, the AIPAC regularly have sent Facts and Myths by pro-Israeli writers to White House officials and politicians to present the Israeli point of view.

2.3.4 The Similarity with Elite Perceptions

Even though the American democracy has been associated with pluralism throughout the history, decisions regarding both domestic and foreign policies are controlled or manipulated by elites that shape policy-making. Therefore, ethnic interest groups will be more successful if they promote policies that the government already favors. According to Noam Chomsky, no pressure group will dominate access to public opinion or maintain consistent influence over policy-making unless its aims are close to those of elite elements with real power.⁶³ Being victims of political system throughout the history, the Jews came to understand the necessity of engaging political elites to influence the political and social ideas in behalf of their physical, social and economic well-being.⁶⁴ Therefore, during the Cold War era, the Jewish lobby effectively represented Israel as a natural ally to contain the Soviet-sponsored communism and protect the oil resources. For many American supporters, in the Cold War era Israel had been as an essential, strategically in an unstable region, the bulwark against communism and radical nationalism in the Middle East.⁶⁵ Since the ending of the Cold War, the Israeli lobby posits that the American–Israeli alliance finds itself united against a common enemy: Islamic terrorism.⁶⁶

2.3.5 Permeability of and Access to the government

Another important aim of ethnic lobbies is to gain relative advantage through gaining access to the government. In the US Constitution, there is no exact role for

⁶² Terry, p.31

⁶³Chomsky Noam, *Fateful triangle: the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians*, (London: Pluto Press,1999),p.62

⁶⁴ Windmuller,p.2

⁶⁵ Thomas,p.12

⁶⁶ Marrar,p.269

the executive or legislative branches for shaping the US foreign policy-making process; thus, agendas of the President and the Congress can conflict. Therefore, the growing assertiveness of the Congress was important because the Congress is institutionally more responsive to interest group pressure than is the executive branch.⁶⁷ Therefore, one of the major tasks for ethnic lobbies is establishing new alliances with member of the Congress. Lobbyists can sometimes be successful on the basis of close, personal relationship with just one powerful senator and representatives.⁶⁸ For example, Scoop Jackson as a member of the Congress has constantly served in the pro-Israeli lines. Even though the presidents are relatively immune from pressures from the domestic sources, they need ethnic lobbies to manipulate public opinion and gain support for their designs. For example, Thomas also argued that the executive branch is less susceptible to lobbying than the legislative branch; presidents have often understood the necessity of the pro-Israeli lobby in the passing of their agenda in congress.⁶⁹

2.3.6. The Strength of Opposition

Another way to analyze the relative power of ethnic groups is measuring their strength in opposing to decisions or plans that would not harm their and mother countries' agenda. In that matter, the Jewish lobby has been a very powerful lobbying apparatus to silence the anti-Israeli voices. According to Marrar's claim, those who criticize Israeli policy in any sustained way invite painful and relentless retaliation, and even loss of their livelihood, by pressure by one or more parts of Israel's lobby.⁷⁰ Even any criticism about the Israel foreign policy has been silenced by the weapon of anti-Semitism. Another issue that the Jewish lobby has been successful in is preventing gains for Arab or Palestinian sides in Arab-Israeli conflict.

⁶⁷ Thomas, p.14

⁶⁸ Terry, p.30

⁶⁹ Marrar, p.56

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.57

Pro-Israeli lobbyists and interests groups any gain for the Palestinians or the Arabs would mean a loss for Israel.⁷¹

2.3.7 Mutually Supportive Relationships

There is general agreement that lobbyists have major impacts on domestic legislation, Congressional votes and, through personal contacts and financial contributions, to political parties and individual parties⁷². While ethnic interest groups need policy makers to pass their agenda in the Congress or gain support in the executive branches, policymakers also need the ethnic interest groups because ethnic interest groups may provide a host of valuable resources to policymakers, including information, votes, and campaign contributions⁷³. In other words, weak party loyalty enhances lobbies influence, both during elections, when their financial support can be critical, and afterwards, when groups that supported the winning candidate become closely involved in policy making.⁷⁴ Because of their organizational apparatus, information campaigns, higher tendency to vote, contributing the campaign of political parties, influencing public opinion, it is not difficult for the Jewish lobby to move into mutually supportive relationships.

2.3.8 Joint alliance with religious and ideological groups

In addition to several factors counted above, it is impossible for ethnic groups to direct the US foreign policy-making process unless they establish coalitions with other ethnic groups or religious groups. Therefore, the Jewish lobby made efforts to establish coalitions with other religious groups such as the Christian Zionists and ideological groups like neo-conservatives. These new alignments were used effectively by the Jewish lobby on the issue of Israel. Therefore it is not hard to claim that the domestic support of Israel goes well beyond the boundaries of Israeli

⁷¹Terry, Ibid, p.28

⁷² Terry, p. 29

⁷³ Ambioso, p.10

⁷⁴The Role of Interest Groups, Allen Hays ,<http://www.ait.org.tw/>

and American Jewish lobbying groups.⁷⁵ Because among American moderate and liberal circles (and often among conservatives as well) there is a strong sentiment to see Israel as in the image of the US that democratic, progressive, and western in outlook. Some American fundamentalist groups even regard Israel as the fulfillment of biblical prophecy⁷⁶

In this thesis, all factors mentioned above will be taken in an account but first two will be more emphasized. Because of those factors inside the United States of America and the organizational factors that Jewish lobby, compared with other ethnic groups, has been the most influential one in the US for shaping the foreign policy-making process. Therefore, in the following two chapters, we will try to explain the US foreign policy behaviors in the regional and international context and explore reasons that led the establishment and improvement of the US-Israeli relations. To better understand, we will search for the multi-dimensional roles of foreign policy actors, the roles of Presidents, the Executive and Legislative Branches and Jewish lobbies, in particular.

⁷⁵ Mohammad K. Shadid, *The United States and the Palestinians*, (London: Biddles Ltd. Guildford and King's Lynn, 1981), p.176

⁷⁶ Shadid, 176

CHAPTER III

THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL IN THE COLD WAR ERA: THE INFLUENCE OF THE JEWISH LOBBY

With the ending of World War II, particularly after 1947, we have witnessed the emergence of a new balance of power between the US and USSR. It also dated the beginning of the Cold War. After the Suez Canal crisis 1956, England and France were replaced by those two new powers. Following that moment, the US and USSR began to combat in many different areas to make alliance, spread their ideologies and control the energy resources. During the Cold War, the Middle East had possessed very significant place because of its geostrategic position and enormous oil reserves. Hence, the main significance of the Middle East came from its key position for American political, economic, and security interests. Therefore, US governments and leaders sought for strategic partners or alliances, like Israel, to contain Soviet expansion and in order to ensure easy access to oil. Thus, the evolution of America's relationship to Israel has been determined primarily by the changing role that Israel occupied in the context of America's changing conceptions of its political-strategic interests in the Middle East.⁷⁷

3.1 The Beginning of Relations: The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations

Harry Truman became the new president of the US after Franklin Roosevelt's death in 1945. Even though Israel's creation and survival were inevitable, and there had been no amount of State Department opposition, British obstruction, or Arab military force could have prevented it, President Truman extended US recognition to three year later⁷⁸. In these early years, he made it clear that he did not like the idea of any state established on racial or religious lines, something he felt was at odds with US pluralism and secularism.⁷⁹ However, in addition to Israel's strategic importance,

⁷⁷ Chomsky, p.61

⁷⁸ Kathleen Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy (Updated Edition with a New Afterword)*, (California: University of California Press, 1999), p.62

⁷⁹Ibid, p. 64

the domestic political considerations in the eve of presidential elections, the role of pro-Zionist advisers and President Truman humanitarian concerns that resulted the guilt of horrifying holocaust case in the Nazi Germany, led the US vote for the partition plan in 1947 and recognize the declaration of independence of State of Israel in 1948.

By domestic political considerations, we mean the role of Jewish organizations. By 1948, membership in the various US, the Zionist organizations had grown to just under one million-from about 150.000 in the middle of World War II.⁸⁰The American Jewish Community, during the 1940's, established several religious and social organizations, such as the American Zionist Emergency Council (AZEC) later evolved American Zionist Council and the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), in support of the programs of Zionism and the State of Israel. These organizations, in that period, began to use multiple channels to have direct communication with high-rank executive branch officers, Presidents and legislators in congress. During the Truman Presidency, these Zionist organizations played crucial role by framing the public, press, congress and White House by the rightness of the formation of state of Israel. As a result, between the 1947 and 1948, the White House received 135.000 telegrams, postcards, letters, and petitions on the Palestinian issue.⁸¹In addition to these efforts, the Jews were highly successful in using multiple channels of media. With the pro-Israel newspapers, such as the Nation and the New Republic, the Jews aimed to build sympathy toward Israel and antipathy against Arabs, in respectively.

While the Jewish organizations worked harder to convince President Truman, President's pro-Zionist advisors inside the government had a strong impact on the recognition of Israel's independence. Actually in the period of Harry Truman presidency, his advisors and the members of cabinet had conflicting opinions about

⁸⁰Evan M Wilson, *Decision on Palestine: How the US came to Recognize Israel* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p.17

⁸¹Lawrence Davidson, *America's Palestine: Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood* (Florida: Florida University Press, 2001), p. 186

the recognition of the State of Israel. On the one hand, Secretary of State George Marshall, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and other influential members opposed the recognition of the State of Israel. According to them, the recognition of Israel would jeopardize relations with the Arab countries and endanger to reach Arab-oil reserves. On the other hand, others, the Truman's electoral adviser Clark McAdams Clifford, David Niles adviser for minority affairs, Max Lowenthal-Clifford's legal advisers on Palestine who had extensive contacts in Zionist organizations, had a strong impact on the President Truman's recognition of the State of Israel. They would also by referring the importance of the importance of Jewish vote for forthcoming elections, tried to convince Harry Truman to recognize Israel.

Indeed, the President Truman was also aware of importance of the Jewish votes in forthcoming election that New York with its forty-seven electoral votes was seen as the key state in the presidential election...the Jewish votes in New York counted for 55 percent⁸². After getting %75 Jewish votes in the presidential election, his statement; "I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents"⁸³ clarified why he supported the foundation of the State of Israel.

In addition, when it turned out to be that Israel would declare its independence and no matter what the United States did, President Truman recognized the State of Israel. In that, strategic reasons also became important that win the hearts of possible ally for the Cold War battle against Soviet Union. Another reason for the recognition of Israel which is based on moral consideration that the responsibility that was not taken in the eve of the Nazi Holocaust led US supported Israel as an effort to relieve a national sense of guilt.⁸⁴ Later, reflecting on his role,

⁸²Ritchie Ovendale, *The Origin of the Arab-Israeli Wars*, (New York : Longman,1992),p.125

⁸³Intelligence Squared US, *The U.S. should step back from its special relationship with Israel*, February 9, 2010, <http://intelligencesquaredus.org/>

⁸⁴ The Report prepared by Step Toward Peace in Israel and Palestine www.pcusa.org/

Truman remarked himself as a Cyrus⁸⁵.⁸⁶ But it should be emphasized that his reflections was not on the ground of ideological and religious ones.

Following the recognition of the state of Israel, due to fear of Soviet expansion, US governments were exceedingly cautious for not deteriorating relations with Arab countries and so not to limit achieving oil reserves. Therefore, US's position seemed to be as relatively neutral between the Arabs and the Jews. The US maintained its position during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, by providing neither troops nor arms to Israel. Furthermore, the United States put an arms embargo on Israel in the ongoing the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the two terms of under the Republicans, the Eisenhower administration, the relations with Israel were balanced. Indeed, during his administration, President Eisenhower kept distance from any interest groups that had limited access to White House, and worked with the pragmatist advisers, like Secretary of State Foster Dulles. Eisenhower and his close friends have not emotional attachment with Israel. Therefore, in that period, the overriding US's concern in the Middle East Eisenhower administration was to take an activist position in pursuing overlapping objectives that prevent Soviet penetration of the area and maintain guaranteed access to oil supplies, and the administration⁸⁷. In certain diplomatic crises, as in the case of the Sinai War, that was resulted the Israeli-British-French military action as a reaction to nationalization of Suez Canal by Arab Nationalist Gamal Abdul Nasser, as John Huges, indicated that Eisenhower gave strict orders to the State Department that they should inform Israel that we would handle our affairs as exactly as though we did not have a Jew in America. The welfare and best interests of our own country were to be the sole criteria on which we have operated.⁸⁸ When David Ben-Gurion, after capturing Sinai Peninsula, declared that he would not further recognize 1949

⁸⁵* The name of the Persian King who had liberated Jews from their Babylonian exile some 2500 years earlier.

⁸⁶Robert J. Lieber. America and Israel after Sixty Years, Democratiya -- web journal, 2008:149, see also in www.dissentmagazine.org

⁸⁷Christison, 98

⁸⁸Emmet John Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years* (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 26

armistice agreements, President Eisenhower maintained his impartiality by threatening to block all public and private aid to Israel. As a response, Ben-Gurion quickly backtracked, agreeing in principle to withdraw in exchange for adequate assurances of Israel's security. In his diary, President Eisenhower clearly stated that to take sides could do nothing but to destroy our influence with all the parties.⁸⁹ It is decidedly important to emphasize that Eisenhower who took oval office in 1953, was the first president who played card of the economic aid which started in 1949, with a \$100 million export-import Bank loan, reached amount of \$ 86 million as first real one in 1952.⁹⁰

After Suez Canal crises, the balance of power between France and England shifted toward the balance of power between the US and USSR in the Middle East. In this system, the US and USSR raced for gaining the support of ally countries. In 1957, President Eisenhower by pro-claiming the Eisenhower doctrine to support nations as a response to Communism threats shifted American foreign policy toward countries, like Israel, in favorable manner. After the overthrow of pro-western monarchy of Iraq and collapse of the Baghdad Pact led Americans to accept Israeli view that a powerful Israel would be a strategic asset for the U.S, serving as a barrier against threats to American interests from radical Arab nationalists who might gain support from Soviet Union⁹¹. Ben-Gurion described Israel's possible role to President Eisenhower, "I do not want to exaggerate my estimation of our ability. I am aware of our limitations in material resources and man-power... nevertheless I can say that it is within our power to help...in those countries".⁹² In 1958, Ben-Gurion-led Labor Government performed Israel 'ability' by supporting US for stabilization of crises in Jordan and Lebanon. Following the limited shift toward Israel, Israel evaluated in the context of zero-sum equation.

⁸⁹Christison, p.97

⁹⁰M.Sharp Jeremy, *U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel*, (Congressional Research Service, September 16, 2010:21)

⁹¹ Ibrahim Ibrahim, *The American-Israeli Alliance: Raison D'état Revisited*, (*Journal of Palestine Studies*, University of California Press. 1986), p.24

⁹²Itamar Rabinovich, "Pre-1948 to the Present" *Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations*, eds. Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz, (Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press, 2008), p.197

3.1.1 The Jewish Lobby During the 1950's

During the 1950's, Pro-Israeli and the Jewish organizations mushroomed in the United States. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) which evolved out of American Zionist Council and was founded in 1954 by I.L. Kenen, (who has extensive lobbying for Zionists during 1940's, became first formal pro-Israeli lobbyist in the United States) has grown into a 100,000-member national grassroots movement described by the New York Times as the most important organization affecting America's relationship with Israel.⁹³ In the establishment of AIPAC, there had been the core efforts of Abba Eban who was Israel's first ambassador to the United States. According to Abba Eban, the key to Israel's strength and prosperity lay with US public opinion.⁹⁴ Indeed, AIPAC and other Jewish organizations, was highly successful to gain support of public opinion by framing press, movies, and other mass media channels. In addition to public supports, pro-Jewish lobbyists worked harder to penetrate to all level of governmental structure, the Congress, White House, and the Senate for gaining support of governmental elites. After few years, by producing strong relations with members of congress, advisers in the Executive branch, the Jewish lobby emerged as one of the important foreign policy actors in the United States.

3.2. The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations: the Special Relations

During presidential elections in 1960, presidential candidate J.F. Kennedy, who had emotional attachment to Israel, got considerable financial support by the Jewish organizations and received 80 percent of the Jewish vote. As a result, when he took over the oval office, the traditional balanced foreign policy toward Israel and the Arabs altered. US relations with Israel became warmer and matured. As Kathleen

⁹³ What is AIPAC, <http://www.aipac.org>

⁹⁴Christison, p.101

Christenson claimed, the warm and enduring nature of the US-Israeli tie essentially began with Kennedy.⁹⁵

During the administration of President Kennedy, many developments occurred in the first time in line of the Jews and Israel. First of all, Kennedy was the first president that mentioned the US-Israeli relations in the context of special relations: "The United States has a special relationship with Israel in the Middle East really comparable to that which it has with Britain over a wide range of world affairs...I think it is quite clear that in case of an invasion the United States would come to the support of Israel".⁹⁶Second, Kennedy became the first president to appoint a full-time aide to maintain contact with the US Jewish community, thus giving the Jewish leaders, Israel embassy officials, and the pro-Israeli congressmen immediate access to White House.⁹⁷ Third, Kennedy was the first president to sell arms to Israel in accordance with Israeli request to purchase Hawk anti-craft missiles. This treaty established a pattern of military cooperation that intensified over the years, yielded to strategic defense agreement of 1988. The formal treaty signed in 1963 between parts.

After the assassination of Kennedy, Johnson became the new president and the relations with Israel also improved. After Johnson took office, when a visiting Israeli diplomat told that Israel had lost a great friend, President Johnson said you have found a better one.⁹⁸Indeed, his personal sentiments toward Israel were warm and admiring. Ambassador Julius Holmes also believed that to all appearances he genuinely liked the Israelis he had dealt with, many of his closest advisers were well-known friends of Israel, and his own contacts with the American Jewish community had been close through his political carrier. ⁹⁹The Jews have possessed highly important position in White House, such as Harry McPherson, a special counsel

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 106

⁹⁶J.F Kennedy told Foreign Minister Golda Meir in meeting in U.S. Mearsheimer and Walt, p.25

⁹⁷Christison, p. 107

⁹⁸I. L. Kenen, *Israel's Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington* (New York: Prometheus, 1981), p. 173

⁹⁹ William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and The Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p.23

given the Jewish portfolio, Eugene Rostow, undersecretary for political affairs at the state department. President Johnson not only guaranteed Jewish access to privileged status, but also increased the military assistance to Israel. One of the main reasons behind was that through the 1960s, the American intelligence regarded Israel as a barrier to Nasserite pressure on the Gulf oil-producing states, a serious matter at the time, and to Russian influence.¹⁰⁰ Since, in the late 1950s and through the 1960s, Arab nationalism was regarded as the inspiration of Soviet communism.

Even though, throughout his administration, President Johnson adopted pro-Israel policies, he was criticized, by supporters of Israel for not taking a stand in support of Israel in a certain crises. The 1967 war is case in point. Toward the end of his administration, in the Middle East, the tension increased after the Israeli raid on the Jordanian town in 1966 and the air battle that resulted in the downing of six Syrian MiGs. The certain events were the signal for the third Arab-Israeli war. Because Johnson was in trouble in Vietnam and the United States did not want to be perceived in the Arab world as a co-conspirator with Israel, as Britain and France had been in 1956, he did not involve in the 1967 War. However, he let “Israel handle matters itself by giving yellow light”.¹⁰¹

3.2.1 The 1967 War and the Beginning of a New Era

Despite the fact that many researchers claim that the United States did not support Israel through the 1967 war, this claim is challenged by some researchers. According to Stephen Green, America’s role in that war was to go a remote section of the Negev Desert to provide tactical reconnaissance support for the IDF against the Arabs. The mission was to be top secret.¹⁰² As a conclusion, Israel gained the victory by occupying Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan heights that raised issue of the occupied territories. In 1967, the U.N issued the Resolution 242 by

¹⁰⁰Chomsky, p. 67

¹⁰¹According to some, yellow light was the signal of support of attack; it easily turned to green light. See in Quandt, p. 40-41

¹⁰²İbrahim, p.25

adopting the principle of 'Land for Peace' principle. The issue of the occupied territories and Israeli settlement became the major obstacle in the each peace process.

The 1967 War not only was the watershed in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was also the beginning of a new era for the US-Israeli relations in many ways. First of all, Israel's victory over Arab States led US officials and analysts to begin to view the Jewish state as a major regional power, with assets and capabilities that could advance US interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.¹⁰³ Therefore, Israel turned out to be the significant reason for US in involving the Middle East, in addition to containing Soviet Russia and reaching or protecting oil reserves.

The second one is transformation of absolute amount of U.S. economic and military assistance to Israel. After averaging roughly \$ 63 million annually from 1949 to 1965 (more than 95% of which was economic assistance and food aid), average aid increased to \$102 million per year from 1966 to 1970.¹⁰⁴ It must be noted that by the exception of selling of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles in 1962 and 200 M48A tanks in 1964, it was France not US, that was the main supplier of weapons to Israel.¹⁰⁵ The reason behind that in the 1950s and early 1960s, Egypt antagonized France by providing arms and training for Algeria's war for independence against France. By 1967 war, US replaced France and became the main arm providers of Israel. It was maintained in 1968 with the Congress declaration that it was committed to maintaining Israel's "qualitative military edge" in the face of Soviet rearmament of the Arabs.

Christian Zionism

In addition to transformation of the US-Israeli relations, the Jewish lobby, after the 1967 war, the 1973 war in particular, succeeded to build larger coalitions with Evangelical Protestants, those called Christian Zionists, Dispensationalists or

¹⁰³Eli E. Hertz, The U.S.-Israel Special Relationship, <http://www.mythsandfacts.com>

¹⁰⁴Mearsheimer and Waltz, p.26

¹⁰⁵ The Nuclear reactors of Israel were built with the direct support of France, See in Ovandeale, p.52

Millennialists whose dispensation theology traces its back to the early 19th century and the teaching of John Nelson Darby. Nelson Darby preached a fundamentalist interpretation of Bible and brought many Protestant Evangelicals brought together in 1878 calling for the restoration of Jews to a homeland in Palestine.¹⁰⁶ The teachings of Nelson Darby influenced two prominent Preachers in Dwight L. Moody and Billy Sunday and led them to contribute the formation of Christian Zionism. These theological studies were interpreted by William Blackstone; author of *Jesus is Coming* in 1878. Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu describes William Blackstone as a leading Christian Zionist and acknowledges that the movement pre-dates the modern Zionist movement by fifty years.¹⁰⁷

Dispensation theology centered the Jews for the fulfillment of biblical prophecy, because God has a covenant with the Jewish people that is eternal, exclusive, and cannot be abrogated.¹⁰⁸ According to John Nelson Darby, the history of humanity can be divided into seven periods or dispensations which began with the Garden of Eden and would end with the Armageddon and he regarded the last dispensation, Armageddon, would be an unavoidable military clash on the plains north of Jerusalem. Believers will be raptured or lifted up to watch the battle beside Jesus.¹⁰⁹ Those remaining on earth will experience seven years of tribulation, or overwhelming suffering, during which an Antichrist will emerge and the world will move towards final battle.¹¹⁰ This cannot happen, however, until Jews re-establish biblical Israel and rebuild the temple in Jerusalem. Therefore, in the eyes of Christian Zionists, Israeli efforts to extend its territory to Judea and Samara, is obligatory to be supported. According John Hague, pre-eminent contemporary Christian Zionists, by providing prophetic signs of the end of times by referring the Bible that the rebirth of Israel (Isaiah 66:8-10), the return of the Jews to Israel (Jeremiah 23:7-8), the end of Gentile control of Jerusalem (Luke 21:24) and the

¹⁰⁶ Lee Marsden, p.179

¹⁰⁷ Benjamin Netanyahu, *A Place among the Nations*, (New York: Bantam Books. 1994),p.16

¹⁰⁸ Old Testament,(Genesis 12:1-7; 15:4-7; 17:1-8) see in www.devotions.net/bible/ see also in www.overlordsofchaos.com/html/christian_zionism.html

¹⁰⁹ Thomas,45

¹¹⁰ Marsden, 181

reunification of Jerusalem under Israeli control from 1967, claimed that the return of Christ imminent.¹¹¹

3.3 The Nixon, Ford and Carter Presidencies

After the 1968 elections, having received only %15 percent of the Jewish votes, President Nixon felt no sense of indebtedness to the Jewish lobby and the Jewish community. But, for him, US global interests necessitate maintaining the relations with Israel. His opinion was clearly defined in a 1970 memorandum to Henry Kissinger. According to this memorandum, US interests are basically pro-freedom and not just because of the Jewish vote. “We are for Israel because Israel in our view is the only state in the Middle East which is pro-freedom and an effective opponent to Soviet expansion”.¹¹²¹¹³

On the other hand, from his earlier days, having thought that taking side with Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict would harm US struggle with USSR by letting Arabs States to move toward Israel, President Nixon aimed to be cautious to pursue policy of even-handedness in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, President Nixon aimed to strengthen relations with the US allies and weakened the Soviet allies, but not on behalf of Israel. Since, President Nixon guaranteed Israel’s security by maintaining Israeli military superiority over the Arabs.¹¹⁴

In contrast, during the Nixon administration, his key policy advisors also had different opinions on how to precede talks between Israel and the Arabs. According to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, the US should advocate strong backing for Israel, until Arabs decided to break the relations with Moscow. In contrary, the Secretary of State William Rogers, US should follow the policy of

¹¹¹ Ibid, 182

¹¹² Christison,p.130

¹¹³In his speech he said: Americans admire a people who can scratch a desert and produce a garden. The Israelis have shown qualities that Americans identify with: guts, patriotism, idealism, a passion for freedom. I have seen it. I know. I believe that. See in A Eli E. Hertz, The U.S.-Israel Special Relationship, <http://www.mythsandfacts.com>

¹¹⁴Christison Ibid, 126

evenhandedness by pressuring Israel to facilitate diplomatic success. Quandt believed that what came to be seen as a great battle between Kissinger and Rogers was also, apparently, an unresolved debate within Nixon's own mind.¹¹⁵

In his first years, on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict, he preferred to work with Secretary of State William Rogers who prepared the Roger plan to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict in peaceful manner. Even though the Roger Plan of 1969 would bring only minor adjustments with exception of calling for Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders, the Jewish lobby, AIPAC in particular, angered with and protested the plan by bringing fourteen hundred Jewish leaders from thirty one states to Washington in January in 1970. The lobbyists were able to see 250 congressmen, almost half the entire Congress.¹¹⁶ As a result of campaigns, President Nixon called off the Roger Plan.

With the failure of the Roger Plan and the successive role of Israel in the Jordanian crises that blocked Soviet backed Syrian efforts to support the Palestinians who aimed to overthrow King Hussein, seemed to confirm the correctness of Kissinger belief that strong Israel was in the interests of the United States. For that reasons, Israel was regarded strategic Asset and bilateral relations with Israel flourished in all level of cooperation. While for fiscal years 1968, 1969, 1970 U.S. provided economic and military in amount of \$25, \$85, and \$30 million, respectively.¹¹⁷ Sharp also reported that in 1971, the US extended amount of credits to Israel by reaching total \$634.5 million, including military loans of \$ 545 million and congress first designated a specific amount of aid for Israel in legislation. Economic assistance changed from project aid, such as support for agricultural development work, to a commodity import program (CIP) for the purchase of US good.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵Quandt, p.59

¹¹⁶Christison, p. 137

¹¹⁷Ibid, p.133

¹¹⁸ Sharp,p.21

3.3.1. The Yom Kippur War and Camp David

The break out of the Roger Plan and unsuccessful long-standing peace efforts escalated tension in the Middle East. In 1973, Syria and Egypt's plans to recapture lost territories of 1967 war, led the Yom Kippur War. During the war, Nixon government signaled to side with Israel by sending military assistance to Israel, "sent everything it could fly to get the equipment to Israel".¹¹⁹ Because of the support of the United States to Israel, OPEC decided to reduce oil production up to 70%. When Nixon asked congress for \$ 2.2 billion for emergency aid for Israel, this decision triggered a collective OPEC response¹²⁰ and OPEC put an embargo. Because of fear of Soviets Russia's influence on Arab Countries and the West's¹²¹ dependence of oil reserves led US work with USSR for peace negotiations. The result was the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 that was not only the call for cease-fire to end Yom Kippur War, but also call for general implementation of Resolution 242. Following resolution 338, the U.N. started the initiative of the Geneva Conference of 1973 with US and USSR Kissinger articulated his step-by-step strategy and stated that the goal of the conference was peace and the immediate need was to strengthen the cease-fire by accomplishing a disengagement of forces as the essential first step toward implementation of UN 242.¹²² Finally, Kissinger's strategy worked and Israel signed disengagement agreement with Egypt and promised for disagreement agreement with Syria in 1974. A few months later, with the exception of Libya, OPEC members lifted the embargo.

The 1974 Watergate scandal led to Nixon's resignation on August 9, 1974 and Gerald Ford became president. In his period, Kissinger was again in charge in foreign policy because of Ford's focus on domestic policy and inexperience in

¹¹⁹Ovendale, p.22

¹²⁰George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (New York: Duke University Press. 1990),p.130

¹²¹ Western Europe and Japan began switching from pro-Israel to more pro-Arab policies. This change further strained the Western alliance system, for the United States, which imported only 12% of its oil from the Middle East (compared with 80% for the Europeans and over 90% for Japan), remained staunchly committed to backing Israel. The percentage of the US oil which comes from the nations bordering the Persian Gulf has remained steady over the years, with a figure of a little more than 10% in 2008.

¹²² Quandt, p.141

foreign policy. The outcomes of his shuttle diplomacy gave another result. The Sinai interim agreement was signed between Israel and Egypt in 1975, as part of the Geneva Conference process 1974. According to article one of agreement, the conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means....to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.¹²³In same year Sadat visited US and in 1976 abrogated its treaty of friendship with Russia.

In 1977, when Jimmy carter became president, he appointed Cyrus R.Vance as the Secretary of State and Zbigniew Brzezinski as the National Security Advisor. This period provided for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Firstly, oil situation began to stabilize and second, Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Israel, proved to his inclination toward peace. Third, the tension between Soviets and US decreased. It seemed everything was suitable for peace negotiations in the Middle East. At the meeting on February 4, 1977, the policy review Committee of the National Security Council agreed to recommend to the president that the Middle East should be dealt with as a matter of urgent priority and that Secretary of Vance should go to the area immediately to begin discussion on procedures and substance.¹²⁴ Carter took advice and began his work to final solutions for Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Alliance of Likud Party and Christian Zionists

The Knesset election of 1977 changed the situation dramatically. First time in the Israel history, after 1948, Labor party lost the elections and rightist Likud Party under leadership of Meacham Begin came to power. The rightist Likud Party, under Meacham Begin, had irredentist ambitions to extend the Israeli territories by supporting the Jewish settlements in Gaza, West Bank and Jerusalem and reluctant to withdraw to pre-1967 lines. Even though Likud's irredentist policies seemed to be a major obstacle on the way of peace process, it was welcomed by the Christian

¹²³ Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt September 4, 1975, <http://www.knesset.gov.il>

¹²⁴Quandt,p.180

Zionist Organizations and leaders. Even though Menachem Begin was suspicious about Christian Zionists¹²⁵, he saw the alliance with Christian Zionists as accelerating his territorial ambitions over Biblical Israel. Therefore, Prime Minister Begin clearly told reporters that “I tell you, if the Christians fundamentalists support us in Congress today, I will support them when the Messiah comes tomorrow”.¹²⁶

During late 1970's and early 1980's Christians Zionists organizations including Bridges for Peace (founded in 1978), International Christian Embassy Jerusalem (founded 1980), and the most important one is the organization known as The Moral Majority turned out to be important actors of U.S. domestic and foreign policy. The Moral Majority which was founded by Jerry Falwell, aim to mobilize the Christian Church on behalf of moral and social issues and encourage participation by people of faith in the political process¹²⁷ and developed into one of the largest bloc within the Republican Party. The Israeli interests were highly important component for the Moral Majority that came into being in 1979, following the official visit of Jerry Falwell, was invited by Menachem Begin, to Israel in 1978. Having known the importance of Jerry Falwell for promoting Israeli interests to U.S. government and public, Begin awarded Falwell Jabotinsky Centennial Medal.¹²⁸ When Israel unilaterally bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, American Christian Zionists, under leadership of Falwell, rally a campaign for supporting Israeli unilateral action.

In the Middle East peace process, from onwards of 1977, President Carter played highly important role to bridge Egyptian and Israeli differences that concluded with the set-up of Camp David accords that include two framework agreements were signed by Israel and Egypt. Even though first framework, A Framework for Peace in the Middle East was major failed because of Begin's intransigence that was supported either by Jewish and Christian Zionist organization,

¹²⁵ “There is concern that anti-Semitism has been a feature of Christian Zionist thought and that Jews are seen as pawns to be manipulated in fulfillment of dubious biblical promises that will hasten the second coming of Christ” See in Marsden, p.189

¹²⁶ Thomas, p.47

¹²⁷ Rammy, M.Haija, *The Armageddon Lobby: Dispensationalists Christian Zionism and the shaping of U.S. policy toward Israel Palestine*, p.77 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals>

¹²⁸ That was given by the State of Israel to a person who is considered a lifetime friend of the Nation. Ibid, p.77

the second of two frameworks, Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, concluded the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. With strong support of Congress, Carter administration provided large economic and military aid to Israel and Egypt. To facilitate a full and formal cessation of hostilities and Israel return of the Sinai Peninsula provided a total of \$7.5 billion to both parties in 1979. The special international Security Assistance of Act of 1979 provided military and economic grants to Israel and Egypt at ratio of 3:2, respectively.¹²⁹ Even though Carter achieved the success limited with Egyptian-Israel peace treaty, he failed to solve conflict between Israeli and Palestinians.

3.4 Reagan: Ideological Warrior

While the United States was growing in power in the Middle East, the developments in 1979 such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the occurrence of the hostage crises following the Iranian revolution, challenged the American interests in the Middle East. These crises traumatized the American Public opinion and contributed to the defeat of President Carter in 1980. It also reignited negative perceptions of Islam among Americans and of America among Muslims.¹³⁰ In 1981, following the Carter's presidency, Ronald Reagan became the new president of the US. Ronald Reagan was the highly different than his predecessors in many ways. Firstly, he was known as the strict anti-communist and anti-Soviet. According to Lewis, "a deeply convinced ideological warrior against world communism, totally suspicious of Soviet intensions, Reagan was the United States' first true ideological president. He saw the world struggle in stark terms: good versus evil, democracy versus dictatorship, allies and friends versus enemies"¹³¹. During his presidential election campaign in 1980, Ronald Reagan had already underlined his approach toward USSR by saying that let's not delude ourselves. The Soviet Union underlies

¹²⁹M. Sharp Jeremy, *U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel*, Congressional Research Service, September 16, 2010, p.22

¹³⁰ Michael C. Hudson, "The United states in the Middle East", *International relations of Middle East* ed. Louise Fawcett ed. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.324

¹³¹Samuel.W. Lewis, "The United States and Israel: Constancy and Change", *the Middle East: Ten Years after Campe* d. David. W. B. Quandt, (Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1988), p.248

all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there would 'not be any hot spots in the world.'¹³²

Second, Ronald Reagan was the first true president that associated with the Christian Zionist ideologies. Reagan told a group of Jewish leaders that "Israel was the only stable democracy we can rely on in a spot where Armageddon could come... We must prevent the Soviet Union from penetrating the Mideast...If Israel were not there, the US would have to be there"¹³³.For that reason, he saw Israel only reliable friend of the US against Soviet expansion, after the Iranian revolution in 1979 in particular, in the Middle East, because of its democratic values and military power. In his eyes, the fall of Iran has increased Israel's value as perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the United States can truly rely.¹³⁴ Moreover, for him, Israel had privileged status and it is moral obligation to support: "I've believed many things in my life, but no conviction. I've ever held has been stronger than my belief that the United States must ensure the survival of Israel"¹³⁵. Third, due to his association with neo-conservatism, first time, in the US history neo-cons held key positions and became of the leading actors in the US foreign policy. Therefore, understanding neo-conservative ideology or movement led us to better understand their impact on the foreign policy outputs of the US foreign policy.

Neo-Conservatism

Neo-conservatism¹³⁶ which is referred to as an ideology, or a movement, for Irving Kristol, a persuasion that advocate a distinct set of foreign-policy actions based on a particular interpretation of international politics, while acknowledging that neo-conservatism is a contemporary manifestation of enduring themes in US

¹³²Quandt, p. 248

¹³³ Christison,p.196

¹³⁴ Thomas, p.60

¹³⁵"I've believed many things in my life, but no conviction I've ever held has been stronger than my belief that the United States must ensure the survival of Israel" Ibid,p.58

¹³⁶ The term was coined by socialist Michael Harrington as a derisive term for leftists and liberals who were migrating rightward" and the first intellectual embrace that term is the Irving Cristol and therefore, he was called as the father of neo-conservative movement.

foreign policy history.¹³⁷ Neo-conservatives synthesized fierce anti-communist and a strong nationalist ideology that backed by a powerful military and an assertive, internationalist leadership aimed at defeating communism.¹³⁸

Indeed, the movement traces its roots to the leftist and socialist ideology that associated with the Marxism and first generation of neo-conservatives are mainly originated in New York and most are the Jews who have traditionally identified with the liberalism. In their eyes, while liberalism seemed to allow for advancement of Jews in an open, secular society... Conservatism represented traditional Christian anti-Semitism.¹³⁹ Stalin applications toward minorities, like Jews, in 1930's and 1940's and the Campus unrest, the New Left, the counterculture, the Black power movement, the excesses of Great Society, the hostility of the left to Israel and the left's weakening opposition to Communism and the Soviet Union¹⁴⁰ led Jewish academicians and intellectuals whose became the leading the neo-conservatives, move to the right in late 1960s. During the 1960s, the first generation of neo-conservatives that Irwing Kristol, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Midge Decter, and Norman Podhoretz published two important magazines. *The Public Interest* (in 1965) edited by Irwing Kristol that based on arguments on US domestic, social and economic arrangements and *Commentary* (in 1960) edited by Podhoretz that focus on foreign policy issues, played key role for the advancing of the embryonic neo-conservative movement.¹⁴¹

According to Roger and Ritchie, neo-conservatism emerged from the Democrat Party¹⁴² in the 1970s in response to both the liberal Democrat contention that the United States should scale back its overseas commitments following the

¹³⁷ Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam*, (New York : Routledge, 2007), p.139

¹³⁸ Ritchie and Rogers, p.139

¹³⁹ Stephen J. Sniegoski, p.25

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 26

¹⁴¹ Yuen Foong Khong, "Neo-conservatism and the Domestic Sources of American: the role of ideas in Operation Iraqi Freedom" eds. Steve Smith and Timothy Dunne in "*Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*", (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 254

¹⁴² In 1960s, even though, with the exception of some neo-conservative intellectuals, neo-cons had remained the loyal democrats.

Vietnam War and accept America's relative decline in international politics and the conservative Republican realpolitik exercised by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that favored accommodation though peaceful co-existence with the Soviet Union.¹⁴³ The 1972 elections, in particular, was the turning point in the evolution of Neo-conservative movement. Before and during the election, in his speeches, that Democrat Presidential Candidate George McGovern opposed to American military involvement in Vietnam¹⁴⁴ and the continuation of the Cold war and aimed to cooperate with the Soviet Union, "the McGovern candidacy epitomized the degeneration of the American liberalism. McGovern's world view, like his slogan-Come Home, America- was defeatist, isolationist and guilt-driven"¹⁴⁵ Therefore, neo-conservatives improved relations with hard-liner politicians, like the Senators Scoop Jackson and Daniel Patrick Moynihan.

In the context of the Middle East, having regarded Israel as the key tenet of neo-conservatism, neo-cons were strong supporters of Israel. For the neoconservatives, Israel represented the kind of hard-hitting anti- Soviet realism in foreign policy that they felt the United States had abandoned in the 1970s. Viewing the Arab-Israeli conflict from a globalist perspective, they heavily promoted the idea that Israel was a vital Cold War ally of the United States and that the Palestinians were tools of the Soviet Union in its campaign of international terrorism¹⁴⁶. And Palestinian nationalism, in this view, had no legitimacy, being only a Soviet invention, and because Israel was so important to U.S. interests, its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza actually served those interests, Christison also believed.¹⁴⁷ In addition to Israel's importance to U.S. interests, neo-cons came to believe that the Jewish state's ability to survive-indeed, the Jewish community's will survive was

¹⁴³Ritchie and Rogers,p.139

¹⁴⁴ McGovern said: The current dilemma in Vietnam is a clear demonstration of the limitations of military power. ... [Current US involvement] is a policy of moral debacle and political defeat. ... The trap we have fallen into there will haunt us in every corner of this revolutionary world if we do not properly appraise its lessons. Ibid, p.139

¹⁴⁵Sniegowski, p. 32

¹⁴⁶Christison, p.198

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, p.198

dependent on American military strength and its challenge to the Soviet Union, the primary backer of Arab countries in the Middle East.¹⁴⁸

During the Carter administration, neo-conservatives mostly have been the loyal democrats. However, for neo-cons, Carter was unwilling to perceive Soviet Russia as a great threat and pursued politics in the peace process not on behalf of Israel. Moreover, when United States representative, Donald McHenry in the U.N., supported Security Council resolutions that declared Jerusalem to be occupied territory, it led the Jewish outrage and Jews protested. Because of these reasons, neo-Cons abandoned the Democrat Party and supported the republican nominee, Ronald Reagan.

Indeed, neo-conservatives had a significant impact on the election of Ronald Reagan as president. According to Steven Hayward, Ronald Reagan would not have been elected and would have been able to govern us effectively without some of the prominent Neo-conservatives who joined Republican Side.¹⁴⁹ In addition, his warm relations with and owing debt to neo-conservatives, during the his Administration, many neo-conservatives held key positions and had direct effect effects on U.S. foreign policy behavior, including Jeane Kirkpatrick, an academic who became U.S. ambassador to the UN; Richard Perle, who became an assistant secretary of defense in Reagan's administration and was a former aide to one of the Senate's greatest Israeli supporters, Senator Henry Jackson; Elliot Abrams, like Perle a former Jackson aide, who became assistant secretary of state first for human rights and later for Latin American affairs; Max Kampelman, a founder of JINSA, which had been formed in the 1970s to bring Israel's security concerns to the attention of Defense Department Ronald Reagan officials, who became Reagan's arms-control director; Richard Schifter, a cofounder of JINSA who was appointed assistant secretary of state for

¹⁴⁸Sniegoski, Ibid, p. 33

¹⁴⁹Sniegoski, p.37

human rights in late 1985; and Richard Pipes, a Soviet-affairs expert who joined the National Security Council staff.¹⁵⁰

During that period, President Reagan's relations with Jewish community were admiring and warm. His friendship with the Jewish community predated his political life in the Hollywood that based on the emotional sympathy toward Jews as the victim of Holocaust. Due to his emotional empathy, Reagan gave warm messages before the 1980 elections to the Jewish community by emphasizing the importance of Israel. As a result, Reagan broke the traditional patterns of American Jewry that tended to vote just around the 20 percent for Republicans in the national elections by winning the around the 40 percent of Jewish votes.¹⁵¹ Consequently, the infrastructure of the Republican Jewish Coalition came into being. Republican support for Israel became entrenched.¹⁵²

In the first years of Reagan Administration, there had been sharp disagreement with Israel over Israel's actions, including Israel and AIPAC's opposition to the sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Israel's bombing an Iraqi nuclear reactors in 1981, bombing raids on Beirut during the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 in which Israel violated the 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement¹⁵³ by using the US-provided military equipment in the attacks on that later was defined as legitimate self-defense. However, the bilateral relations between U.S. and Israel dramatically flourished and furthermore many economic and military agreements signed. On 11.30.1981, the US and Israel signed the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States and the Government of Israel on Strategic Cooperation.¹⁵⁴ They formed Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) and the

¹⁵⁰ Christison, p.198

¹⁵¹ For detailed information see in *Jewish Vote in Presidential Elections*, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/>

¹⁵² Marshall Breger, *Reagan: Big Steps Altered Jewish Politics*, published June 11, 2004, <http://www.forward.com/>

¹⁵³ "Agreement limits the use of American military equipment to defense only. The Arms Export Control Act states that the United States may stop aid to countries which use U.S. military Assistance for purposes other than legitimate self-defense". See in Carol Migdalovitz, *Israel: Background and Relations with the United States*, Congressional Research Services, Updated may 18, 2006

¹⁵⁴ "This memorandum of understanding reaffirms the common bonds of friendship between the United States and Israel and builds on the mutual security relationship that exists between the two nations. The parties

Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAP) in 1983 aimed to establish strategic cooperation to enhance national security of both countries against terrorism and Soviet expansionism. This was the beginning of unusual closeness between U.S. and Israel. Also in his second term, the relations were maintained in the context of economic and security agreements. The United States maintained grant aid to Israel at \$3 billion annually and implemented a Free Trade Agreement in 1985¹⁵⁵ that resulted in the elimination of all customs duties between the countries and a 200 percent increase in Israeli exports to the United States.¹⁵⁶ Israel was granted major non-NATO ally status in 1988 that gave it access to expanded weapons systems and opportunities to bid on US defense contracts.

Throughout his eight-year presidency, the administration's frame of reference was almost entirely Israel-centered. Since Jewish lobbies, Christian Zionist, neo-Conservatives inside and outside government gathered on the same table for common cause. During the 1980s, AIPAC, under the Thomas Dine, with the membership of Evangelical Christians, grew immensely by quadrupling its budget and increasing its propaganda effort.¹⁵⁷ Thomas Dine extended its relations with member of Congress and the effect of the Jewish lobbying apparatus increased. This also realized by two Israeli journalists that by the mid-1980s, the lobby became so powerful and so ambitious that it even attempted openly to exert influence on the staff choices of presidential candidates. Moreover, as early as a year and a half before the 1988 election, almost all the several Democratic and Republican candidates had already submitted to interviews with AIPAC to answer questions about their policy positions on the Middle East.¹⁵⁸

recognize the need to enhance strategic cooperation to deter all threats from the Soviet Union to the region. Noting the longstanding and fruitful cooperation for mutual security that has developed between the two countries, the parties have decided to establish a framework for continued consultation and cooperation to enhance their national security by deterring such threats to the whole region". See in www.mfa.gov.il

¹⁵⁵ Clyde R. Mark, *Israeli-United States Relations*, Congressional research Center, Updated November 9, 2004: CRS-2

¹⁵⁶ Thomas, p.4

¹⁵⁷ Christison, p.220

¹⁵⁸ According to these two Israeli journalists, "Congress became so pro-Israeli under AIPAC's tutelage in this period, embraced virtually every legislative initiative suggested by the lobby. Lobby officials boasted, probably without exaggeration that any legislation important to Israel started with a dependable base of two hundred supporters in the House and up to forty-five senators. Members of Congress relied on AIPAC as a source of

Additionally, under the coordination of AIPAC, the number of pro-Israeli PACs increased. In the 1980 election cycle, there had been ten pro-Israel PACs. In the 1982 cycle there were 40, and contributions rose from \$414,400 to \$2,027,200. In the 1984 cycle, there were 81 PACs contributing nearly \$3.8 million. In the 1986 cycle, the numbers grew to 94 PACs and at least \$4.6 million.¹⁵⁹ And the effectiveness of pro-Israeli PACs was multiplied. First of all, they focused on close races involving key supporters and opponents, or where the incumbent held a key committee position and second, they focused on the Senate, where most foreign policy issues were determined; and finally unlike almost any other issue area, there was no meaningful opposition.¹⁶⁰

Moreover, the lobbies not only were making efforts in the executive and legislative branch, but also were influencing U.S.'s media in favor of Israel. In 1983, after Sabra and Shatila massacres in Lebanon the American Jewish Congress organized a conference in Jerusalem to seek ways to improve the Israeli image. According to Christison, in this conference, members of American Jewish Congress aimed to launch a *hasbara*, or propaganda campaign to sell Israel to the U.S. media and also "the themes to be emphasized were Israel's strategic value to the United States, as well as its affinity with Western culture and values, its security problem and physical vulnerability, and its fervent desire for peace in contrast to the Arabs' supposed opposition to peace".¹⁶¹

Upon coming to office Reagan asserted that the settlements were legal and Israel had a right to construct new ones. Towards the end of the Reagan administration, the U.S. opened the dialog with PLO with the Shultz Initiative in 1988. Christison argued that the Reagan administration had no choice but to begin a dialog with the PLO because the intifada launched in 1987 and international support and sympathy it brought the Palestinians gave the PLO confidence to launch a major

information on all issues related to Israel and the Middle East, often asked AIPAC to draft speeches, and consulted the lobby group on pending legislation, including annual budget bills". Ibid, p.220-221,

¹⁵⁹ Thomas, p.99

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, p.99

¹⁶¹ Christison, p.223

peace initiative in late 1988, openly and explicitly granting Israel's recognition following the, accepting UN resolution 242 and denouncing terrorism.¹⁶² The relations seemed to decrease but Reagan was still characterized by the pro-Israel organizations as the most pro-Israeli president ever.

In addition to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the global context, the year that Reagan left the oval office, the Berlin Wall, the symbol of the Cold War, collapsed. This collapse signaled the new era in global affairs. In different ways, almost each US president made substantial contributions to the outcome. Several presidents shared a common understanding of the long-term threat posed by Soviet Communism. However, according to Brezenski, Ronald Reagan “articulated a more explicit challenge in all these domains to Soviet aspirations and pursued it with political determination and an effective popular appeal. The cumulative impact helped push Gorbachev’s ongoing perestroika into a general crisis of the Soviet System.”¹⁶³

¹⁶² Christison, p.196

¹⁶³ Brezenski, p.11

CHAPTER IV

THE BILATERAL RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR TO 9/11: THE ROLE OF THE JEWISH LOBBY

During the Cold War, the guiding principle of the US foreign policy was containment of the USSR. The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the gradual dissolution of the USSR in 1990-1991 were testimonies of the US victory in the bipolar world. A prominent columnist, Charles Krauthammer, defines the new era as the Uni-polar moment¹⁶⁴. With transition to a new system, the US began to search for a new strategy and vision in global affairs. In this new era, the US became the sole global power and US presidents began to act as the sole global leaders whose options varied from isolationism to internationalism. George W. Bush, the first president of the post-Cold War era, pursued an internationalist strategy identified as the New World Order. This concept refers to “a new partnership of nations has begun, and we stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment... Out of these troubled times...a new world order can emerge...in which the nations of the world, east and west and south, can prosper and live in harmony”.¹⁶⁵ For implementation of the New World Order, the most important task for the President is to handle the peaceful dissolution of the USSR. The US government was highly cautious about the risks emerging with the falling of Soviet nuclear arsenal into unreliable hands as a result of the formation of 15 new republics that separated from the former USSR.

These developments also had peculiar implications in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Soviet Union not only deprived the Arab states, like Iraq and Syria, of the Soviet military and political support against Israel, but also eliminated the key basis for strategic cooperation with Israel. Many intellectuals and politicians began to criticize the unconditional support for Israel and question the importance of Israel for US national interests. For some, even if Israel was a valuable ally during

¹⁶⁴ John Dumbrell, “America in the 1990s: Searching for purpose”, in U.S. Foreign Policy eds. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 91

¹⁶⁵ Speech to joint session of Congress (11 September 1990), as quoted in *Encyclopedia of Leadership* (2004) by George R. Goethals, Georgia Jones Sorenson, and James MacGregor Burns, p. 1776

the Cold War, this ended with the collapse of the Cold War. According to the Middle East historian Bernard Lewis, whatever value Israel might have had as a strategic asset during the Cold War that value obviously ended when the Cold War itself came to a close.¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, Bernard Reich notes that Israel is of limited military or economic importance to the United States . . . It is not a strategically vital state. And Similarly, Robert Art underlines that Israel has little strategic value to the United States and is in many ways a strategic liability and As the Cold War receded into history, Israel's declining strategic value became hard to miss¹⁶⁷.

3.1. George H.W. Bush Administration

Before taking office in 1989, President George Bush served as the director of the CIA, head of the American Diplomatic Mission to China, and ambassador to the United Nations. Consequently, he was very experienced in foreign policy. He represented moderate and pragmatic and non-ideological wing of the Republican Party. “George H.W. Bush was the conservative but in the sense of Edmund Burke, as one political thinker quoted Bush’s speeches that changes in institutions or policies should be incremental, sweeping ideological commitments was dangerous.”¹⁶⁸ In addition, President Bush had no relations with Jewish lobbies, including Christian Zionists and neo-conservatives in prior to the coming presidency as Thomas claimed, unlike Reagan, George H.W. Bush did not have strong ties to the Evangelical movement and also Bush was disdainful of neo-conservatives and they would have no voice in the administration.¹⁶⁹ His key advisers—national security advisor Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State, James Baker—mirrored President Bush as a pragmatist and non-ideological person with no emotional attachment to Israel.

¹⁶⁶ Mearsheimer and Waltz, p.58

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, p.58

¹⁶⁸ Thomas, p.134

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, p.135

4.1.1 Initial Perceptions about Israel

Due to his personality, President Bush had a tendency to pursue policies that were not contrary to U.S. national interests. For him, regional stability is more important than anything including security of Israel. President Bush saw western access to Gulf oil and sea lanes, not the security of Israel, as the fundamental regional national interests¹⁷⁰, and therefore, he aimed to improve relations with moderate Arab Countries to strengthen US's involvement in the Gulf region. Also President Bush was aware of the critics that blame the strong ties between the US and Israel for the hatred towards the US in the Arab and Muslim world. Dennis Ross, the principal Middle East negotiator for President Clinton, agreed with the critics that no issue evokes more anger or a deeper sense of injustice throughout the Middle East than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.¹⁷¹ This situation induced the Bush government to create a new order in the Middle East by eliminating the roots of the problem: the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Unlike Reagan administration, George Bush administration did not pursue policies in the same line with Likud Government. The first signal had already given by Secretary of State James Baker to AIPAC's audience on May 22, 1989, that Israel should abandon its expansionist policies, are mark many took as a signal that the pro-Israel Reagan years were over.¹⁷² And also in March 1990 Bush himself declared that the foreign policy of the United States says we do not believe there should be new settlements in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem.¹⁷³ A few weeks later, while the U.S. government was paving the way for peace between Arabs and Israel, the Persian Gulf Crises of 1990-1991 diverted all attentions.

¹⁷⁰ Thomas, 137

¹⁷¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower*, (Cambridge: Basic Books, 2007), 74

¹⁷² Mark, CRS-3, in his speech, James Baker told that "For Israel, now is the time to lie aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of a greater Israel...Forswear annexation. Stop settlement activity...Reach out to Palestinians as neighbors who deserve political rights.

¹⁷³ Brzezinski, Ibid, 74

4.1.2. The First Gulf War

After an eight-year war with Iran, Iraqi economy was devastated by an enormous debt that reached \$40 billion dollars. Since they felt threatened by the Iranian Revolution, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had provided Iraq with billions of dollars of loan during the Iran-Iraqi war. With the end of the war, while Iraq expected Kuwait to write off the debt for his protection of Kuwait from Iran, Kuwait demanded full repayment from Iraq. This angered Saddam Hussein who already saw Kuwait as a rightful domain of Iraq and he invaded Kuwait. As a result, 39 days later, the United States established a large coalition among Arab States and started the Operation Desert Storm. The operation began with a massive air bombardment on January 16, 1991 and continued with the driving out of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and induced Saddam to accept a cease-fire on March 3, 1991.

Indeed, following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the US started to exert effort for improving relations with Iraq in the absence of Shah's Iran. During the 1970s, the US-backed Iran as the protector of traditional Arab monarchies against Iraq who formalized its close ties with the Soviet Union by signing a 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and becoming a recipient of Soviet armament. However, after the collapse of Shah in 1979, American foreign policy shifted in support of Iraq. Iraq was removed from terrorist states list in 1982, and diplomatic relations with Iraq, which had been severed after 1967, were restored by 1984. In mid-1980s, the U.S. began strongly supporting Iraq against Iran until Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

The improvement of relations between Iraq and the US disturbed Israel and pro-Israeli groups. Israel regarded Saddam as one of the most immediate threats to its security due to Saddam's support for the Palestinian organizations like PLO and his mass destruction weapon system. Hence, Israel and pro-Israeli groups began deteriorating the rapprochement between the US and Iraq. For that purpose, Israel and neo-conservatives in the US aimed at restoring the relations between the US, Israel, and Iran. According to Robert Dreyfuss, within the Reagan administration, a

small clique of conservatives, and neoconservatives, were most intimately involved in the Iran-contra initiative, especially those U.S. officials and consultants who were closest to the Israeli military and intelligence establishment.¹⁷⁴ For Trita Parsi neoconservatives were masterminding a rapprochement with Khomeini's government.¹⁷⁵ In the late 1980s, after the collapse of Berlin Wall in particular, the pro-Israel groups in the US covered the media and government circles and made Saddam persona non Granda. For example, Mortimer Zuckerman titled its June 4, 1990 cover story about Saddam as "The World's Most Dangerous Man."¹⁷⁶ The Bush administration, however, firmly resisted efforts to alter its relationship with Iraq.

The long-standing objectives of neo-conservatives and the pro-Israel lobby were realized when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Israel was ecstatic at the reversal in American policy toward Iraq, which vindicated Israel's claim of the threat posed by Saddam. When Saddam began to move toward Kuwait, Neoconservative Charles Krauthammer compared Saddam to Hitler.¹⁷⁷ Like Krauthammer, other influential Neo-conservative writers such as Perle, Frank Gaffney, Jr., A. M. Rosenthal, William Safire, emphasized in the *The Wall Street Journal* that America's war objective should not be simply to drive Iraq out of Kuwait but also to destroy Iraq's military potential, especially its capacity to develop nuclear weapons.¹⁷⁸ The idea of Neo-Cons ensemble Israel's fundamental objective is to destroy Iraq's military power and eliminate a regional rival. Furthermore, On December 4, 1990, Israeli foreign minister David Levy reportedly threatened the US ambassador, David

¹⁷⁴Sniegowski, p. 63

¹⁷⁵Ibid, p.63

¹⁷⁶ Sam Hussein and Jim Naureckas, Zuckerman Unbound, January/February 1993. www.fair.org

¹⁷⁷What makes him truly Hitlerian is his way of dealing with neighboring states, in chilling echo of the 1930s, Iraq, a regional superpower, accuses a powerless neighbor of a deliberate policy of aggression against Iraq, precisely the kind of absurd accusation Hitler lodged against helpless Czechoslovakia and Poland as a prelude to their dismemberment. Sited in Sniegowski, 67

¹⁷⁸The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, "Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000," "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm," <http://www.israeleconomy.org/strat1.htm>.

Brown, and said that Israel would do this itself that if the United States fails to attack Iraq.¹⁷⁹

During the war, when Saddam sent provocative Scud missiles targeting the Israel, as Brezinski assume, Bush feared that an Israeli counterstrike would cause the Arab participants to defect from the anti-Saddam coalition. Therefore, in return for their forbearance, the Israelis were granted \$650 million in emergency aid, beyond their \$3 billion annual military aid package¹⁸⁰. Bush administration was highly successful in convincing Israel to not to retaliate. In return, the position taken by U.S. policy toward Iraq was highly welcomed by Israel. We are benefiting from every perspective, said Yossi Olmert, the director of the Israeli government press office and continued that of course, we can lose big if Saddam decides to attack us next. But at least the rest of the world now sees what we have been saying all along.”¹⁸¹ However, for some, U.S.’s reluctance to keep Israel in anti-Saddam coalition also testified the decline of Israel’s strategic importance. According to Bernard Lewis,” the change in Israel's strategic value was clearly manifested in the Gulf War ...when what the United States most desired from Israel was to keep out of the conflict; it meant that Israel was not an asset, but an irrelevance”¹⁸².

At the end of the war, in contrast to Jewish lobbies’ and Israel’s view that a destabilized, fragmented Iraq would enhance Israel’s relative regional power, the Bush administration kept Saddam in power. Actually, President George H. W. Bush hoped that Saddam Hussein’s regime would collapse in the aftermath of the Gulf War. However, after it became clear that the Iraqi leader was going to stay in power, the administration altered a policy of containment to keep the regime in control.¹⁸³ On the other hand, for Dunbrell, Bush’s reasons for allowing Saddam to remain in power-primarily concern for the integrity of the allied Gulf coalition and for the

¹⁷⁹ Andrew Cockburn and Leslie Cockburn, *Dangerous Liaison: The Inside Story of the U.S.A-Israeli Covert Relationship* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), p. 350-51.

¹⁸⁰ Brzezinski, p.75

¹⁸¹ Jackson Diehl, *Gulf Crisis Boosts Israeli Confidence over Relations with U.S* Washington Post, (August 5, 1990, A-13)

¹⁸² Mearsheimer and Waltz, p.59

¹⁸³ Ritchie and Rogers, p.79

limited UN mandate, as well as the desire to avoid involvement in prolonged and unpredictable Iraqi nation-building-were coherent.¹⁸⁴

4.1.3 The 1991 Madrid Conference and the Middle East Peace Process

On March 6, 1991 shortly after the cease fire Bush issued public statement announcing his intention to seek comprehensive peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, he emphasized the long standing US position that peace must be based on U.N Resolutions 242 and 338 and provide both right of the Palestinian and security and recognition of Israel.¹⁸⁵ The conclusion was the set-up of the Madrid Peace Conference.

In the Madrid Conference, as his administration did not want to face any problems in possible peace solutions, Bush first took all measures to bring all parts around the same table. For Bush an aggressive settlement program enabled by American funds emptied UNSCR 242 of meaning and made it impossible to persuade Arabs to participate in an American-sponsored peace process.¹⁸⁶ Therefore, the Bush administration threatened the Likud Party of ending the settlement but the Israeli side was reluctant to freeze the settlement. Ariel Sharon, the Housing Minister, stated Israel has always built, is building and will in future build in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. In May 1991, Secretary Baker harshly condemned the Jewish settlements in testimony before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee and asserted that he did not think that there was any bigger obstacle to peace.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴John Dumbrell, p.99 "When Saddam Hussein upset the balance of power in the Middle East by invading Kuwait in 1991; the elder Bush went to war not to create a new configuration in the region but to restore the status quo ante. And it was precisely out of the same overriding concern for stability that, having achieved this objective by driving Saddam out of Kuwait, Bush then allowed him to remain in power".

¹⁸⁵William B. Quandt, p.360 following the first Gulf War, in the joint session of Congress said: "We must do all that we can to close the gap between Israel and the Arab states and Palestinians... A comprehensive peace must be grounded in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and recognition, and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would fail the twin tests of fairness and security. The time has come to put an end to Arab-Israeli conflict"

¹⁸⁶Thomas,p.140

¹⁸⁷Ritchie and Rogers,p.79

In mid-1991, Shamir demanded a 10\$billion loan guarantee while refusing to halt the construction of settlements. President Bush not only obtained congressional approval for a 120-day freeze on pertinent legislation but also imposed an embargo on a loan guarantee for Israel, which lasted until Shamir lost the 1992 elections and was replaced by Yitzhak Rabin of the Labor party.¹⁸⁸ The pressures of President Bush outraged the pro-Israeli lobby. This is the first Administration to openly threaten to cut aid to Israel and... This is also the first Administration to tie aid directly to Israel's willingness to conform to U.S. policy demands: unless the West Bank is barred to Jews who want to move there, no loans will be guaranteed to help Soviet Jews start new lives, Safire claimed.¹⁸⁹ In later period, due to pressures from the Jewish lobbies and Labor Party's approve of the partial construction freeze in the occupied territories and pressure from Democrats in Congress and 1992 Democratic presidential nominee Bill Clinton led Bush to capitulate and approve the loan guarantee¹⁹⁰.

Because of his position towards Israel and his pressure for acceptance of the settlement freeze, a New York Times pro-Israel columnist, William Safire, defined George Bush as less sympathetic president in the four decades about Israeli concerns, since the establishment of Israel. She also argued that "Mr. Bush has long resisted America's special relationship with Israel. His Secretary of State, James Baker, delights in sticking it to the Israeli right. His national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and the Chief of staff, John Sununu, abet that mind – set".¹⁹¹

4.2. The Clinton Administration and Initial Perceptions about Israel

In 1993, Clinton became the new president after Bush. Since the new president represented liberal internationalism, he was careful about choosing his

¹⁸⁸ Brzezinski, p.75

¹⁸⁹ William Safire, "Bush versus Israel," New York Times, March 26, 1990, p. A-17.

¹⁹⁰ Stephen Zunes, The Bush Administration & the Israeli-Palestinian Stalemate, October 1, 2001, <http://www.fpif.org>

¹⁹¹ William Safire, Ibid

from liberals such as the National Security adviser Anthony Lake, the Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. President Clinton, during the presidential election campaign of 1992, adopted a fairly standard position of supporting the Madrid Peace Talks on the Middle East, but criticized Bush and Baker for one-sided pressure on Israel.¹⁹² As a result, Clinton received higher voting ratio from the Jews than any Democratic candidate since Franklin D. Roosevelt. According to Jewish Congress, 80 percent of American Jews voted for Bill Clinton compared to 11 percent for former President George H. W. Bush who got 35 percent votes of Jews. Thomas underlined the role of Jewish votes in election that Jews made up 75 percent or more of Clinton's margin of victory in five key states; in two, Georgia and New Jersey, they provided multiples of his winning margins.¹⁹³ In addition massive Jewish support, the chief Jewish lobby, AIPAC backed Clinton and had numerous supporters in the campaign and that Clinton would put their people in key positions when he entered office.¹⁹⁴ On the other hand, it should be emphasized that the support of some neo-conservatives shifted towards Clinton during the presidential campaign because of the Bush administration's cautious realist foreign policy based on a balance of power between the world's great nations¹⁹⁵ and Clinton's appeal to neo-conservatives thanks to his support for the neo-conservative idea that promotion of democracy should be the central feature of American foreign policy.¹⁹⁶

4.2.1 Oslo Records and the Middle East Peace Process

During his first term of presidency, the first major task for President Clinton was routing the George Bush initiative in the Madrid Peace Process to Oslo Peace Process. Due to the peace process, in 1993, Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of

¹⁹² William B. Quandt, p.361 "A specific point of criticism was the \$ 10 billion loan guarantee program to which had attached to conditions".

¹⁹³ Thomas, p.159

¹⁹⁴ Ritchie and Rogers, p.79

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p.141

¹⁹⁶ Sniegowski, p.67

mutual recognition and signed declarations of principles. According to framework agreement, Israel would transfer West Bank and Gaza to the PLO and after 5 year transition period, they would proceed with negotiations on the final status. According to Quandt, faced with these very different goals in the negotiations, the Americans firmly sided with the Israelis, insisting that small practical steps needed to be taken first to be followed by agreement on a transitional period, and only later on the final status issues that were uppermost in the minds of the Palestinians”.¹⁹⁷ However, throughout the peace process, the Clinton administration seemed to coordinate the pace and agenda of the talks closely with Israel, ignoring the Palestinian concerns. The Palestinians’ address the issue of the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories and the status of Jerusalem some years earlier was repeatedly postponed by the United States.¹⁹⁸ In a similar vein, the United States has long treated Israeli security as the primary focus of the negotiations.¹⁹⁹

Furthermore, Clinton administration maintained the aid flow to Israel. Following the Israel visit, President Clinton offered \$100 million in aid for Israel’s anti-terror activities, another \$200 million for the Arrow anti-missile deployment, and about \$50 million for an anti-missile laser weapon.²⁰⁰ The pro-Israeli policies of Clinton led him took 78 percent of the Jewish votes in 1996.²⁰¹ Decision of Clinton administration was saluted by Netanyahu at a Joint Session of the United States Congress as in the following words: With America’s help, Israel has grown to be a powerful, modern state. ...But I believe there can be no greater tribute to America’s long-standing economic aid to Israel than for us to be able to say: we are going to achieve economic independence²⁰².

¹⁹⁷ William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and The Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967*, (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p.326

¹⁹⁸ Stephen Zunes, *The United States and breakdown Israeli-Palestinian peace process*, <http://www.mepc.org/>

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid*

²⁰⁰ Mark, CRS-4

²⁰¹ Jeffrey S. Helm Reich, *The Israel Swing Factor: How the American Jewish Vote Influences U.S. Elections*, <http://www.jcpa.org/>

²⁰² Ralph Nader, *Congress, Israel and U.S. National Security*, <http://www.counterpunch.org/>

4.2.2 The Failure of Camp David II

As a part of Oslo peace process, Clinton succeeded in bringing the Palestinians and Israelis together in 1998 to sign Wye Memorandum. Israel also received a \$ 1.2 billion military grant. Israel suspended implementation of Wye Memorandum because of President Netanyahu's claims that the Palestinian violated the agreement by threatening to declare a state. However reality was different than what he claimed. "Much of the U.S.. money in support of the supposed "implementation" of the 1997 Wye River Agreement has been earmarked to build these so-called bypass roads, placing the U.S. in violation of Article 7 of the UN Security Council Resolution 465, which prohibits member states from assisting Israel in its colonization drive"²⁰³. Israeli aggressive behavior on behalf of more Israeli settlements brought the Oslo Peace Process to a dead-end. As a last chance, in 2000, parties were gathered in Camp David Summit under President Clinton's leadership. The conclusion was the breakout of Camp David. Clinton and Sharon regarded Arafat as the main responsible of failure of Oslo Peace Process.

4.2.3 Dual Containment- the US's Iran and Iraq Policy and the Role of the Jewish Lobby

In his first term, in addition to the involvement of Clinton administration in the peace process, President Clinton also formalized the containment policy in the name of Dual Containment. The policy of Dual Containment was prepared by Martin Indyk, who first outlined the strategy in May 1993 at the WINEP and then implemented it as director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council. The main objective of this policy was to contain and isolate Iran and Iraq in order to prevent their political ambitions and economic and military developments. It was presumed that they were the most powerful threats to American hegemony in the region. Accordingly, Iran and Iraq caused political

²⁰³ Stephen Zunes, *The Bush Administration & the Israeli-Palestinian Stalemate*, (October 1, 2001) <http://www.fpif.org>

uncertainty because of political, military, and economic support to radical groups, including Hezbollah and Hamas. Besides, it was common belief that Iraq had mass destruction weapons and Iran was searching for ways to produce mass destruction weapons. In the early years of post-Cold War era, prominent neo-conservatives such as Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz—who later gained key positions in George Bush administration—reflected their world view in the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance arguing that the overriding post-Cold War priority should be preventing the re-emergence of a new rival that could dominate a region vital to US interests.

After the Islamic Revolution, Iran became the major threat to Israel. Following the end of the Cold War, Israel aimed to put its interest in a similar way with those of the US interests against Iran. Even before the declaration of the policy of dual containment pro-Jewish Groups and Israeli governments supported US interests regionally and globally and especially with regards to Iraq and Iran.²⁰⁴ According to Mearsheimer and Walt, the hope was that the United States would see Israel as a bulwark against Iranian expansionism, much the way Israel had been treated as a bulwark against Soviet influence in the Middle East.²⁰⁵ In parallel to the policy of dual containment, in 1995, President Clinton imposed comprehensive sanctions on Iran based on The Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act, prohibiting all commercial and financial transactions with Iran. One year Later, Congress adopted the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act.²⁰⁶

On the other hand, by emphasizing the issue of the Iraqi problem, Roger observed Clinton's containment policy as comprising three objectives established by Bush: UN inspections to disarm Iraq's WMD and dismantle its WMD programs; economic sanctions to prevent Iraq rebuilding its conventional military and WMD

²⁰⁴ Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres started claiming that Iran was a growing threat to both Israeli and United States, See detail in Mearsheimer and Walt, p.286-301

²⁰⁵ Ibid, 286

²⁰⁶ "The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 imposes new sanctions on foreign companies that engage in specified economic transactions with Iran or Libya. It is intended to: Help deny Iran and Libya revenues that could be used to finance international terrorism; Limit the flow of resources necessary to obtain weapons of mass destruction". See in <http://www.fas.org/>

forces; and continued readiness to use military force to enforce the no-fly zones and to punish Iraqi intransigence if necessary.²⁰⁷ With the policy of the Dual containment, it looked like President Clinton would not go in line with the long-standing neo-conservative objective of using force to change the regime. Neo-conservatives, when the Republican Party took control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives in 1994 congressional elections, with help of legislators who close with Jewish lobby and neo-conservative began to push Clinton to alter the policy of dual containment. In neo-conservative eyes, the result of Clinton's failing containment, they argued, Saddam Hussein would be able to dominate the Persian Gulf, so an aggressive policy of regime change was the only effective solution. These criticisms reflected and supported those made in Congress.²⁰⁸

In 1996, an Israeli think tank, the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, whose member were prominent neo-conservatives and Christian Zionists, issued a policy of memorandum called: A Clean Break. This new strategy for securing realm for the Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud Party claimed that Israel has no obligations under the Oslo agreements if the PLO does not fulfill its obligations²⁰⁹. They propose on Clinton administration, in spite of dealing with Peace Process, to strike Syrian military targets and remove Saddam Hussein from power. In 1997, prominent neo-conservatives formed the most important neo-conservative organization; The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) was founded in 1997 by second generation of Neo-conservatives William Kristol, Donald Kagan, Robert Kagan, Elliott Abrams, John R. Bolton, R. James Woolsey, Wolfowitz, Perle, Cheney, Khalilzad, and Rumsfield. The statement of principle proposed that U.S. should advance its interests by force if necessary and exercise the power.²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ Ritchie and Rogers, p. 25-26

²⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 44

²⁰⁹ Louise Faucet, p.300

²¹⁰ Ritchie and Rogers, p.44 "We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities". "Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise."

Following the foundation of the PNAC, neo-conservatives rallied in Congress to gain support Republican and Democrat members to adopted aggressive policy toward Iraq. Neo-conservative was on rise when Saddam Hussein insisted that Iraq no longer possessed WMD or WMD programs and did not allow 1998 UNSCOM inspectors to control mass destruction weapon system and UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq. As a response, In October 1998, 27 senators signed a letter encouraging the President to take military action against Iraq and Congress pass the Iraq Liberation Act in October 1998 to compel the administration to promote regime change to an explicit goal of its Iraq policy. Clinton signed the Act ²¹¹and announced his administration's full support for the objective of regime change in Iraq. The United States and the UK responded in December 1998 with Operation Desert Fox, a four-day bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD sites.

Initially, President Clinton²¹² was reluctant to use force for the regime change for two reasons. First of all, Clinton suggested that if we take military action, we can significantly degrade the capability of Saddam Hussein to develop weapons of mass destruction and to deliver them, but that would also mark the end of UNSCOM. So we would delay it, but we would then have no oversight, no insight, and no involvement in what is going on within Iraq.²¹³ Due to pressures inside by pro-Israeli groups, Clinton supported his way to deal with Iraq. Without a strong inspections

America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership”

²¹¹ “The Act called for the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime: ‘It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime. The bill was passed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 360–38 and approved by unanimous consent in the Senate. Clinton signed the bill into law on 31 October 1998”.

²¹² In December 1998 Bolton summed this up in the *Weekly Standard*: [Clinton’s] embarrassing failure in November to punish Iraq militarily illuminates two broad and profoundly disturbing themes of his foreign policy. The first is his near-compulsive unwillingness to use decisive military force to achieve critical American objectives, even when conditions are nearly ideal. The second is his addictive adherence to multilateralism, reflected here in his continued preference for U.N. weapons inspections over the elimination of Saddam Hussein’s regime. See in John R. Bolton , *Our Pitiful Iraq Policy* , *Weekly Standard* Monday, (December 21, 1998)

²¹³ Clinton is also wondering that would also seriously undermine the credibility of the United States, if we turn our backs on his defiance, the credibility of U.S. power as a check against Saddam will be destroyed . . . if Saddam can cripple the weapons inspections system and get away with it, he would conclude that the international community, led by the United States, has simply lost its will. He will surmise that he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction. And some day, make no mistake; he will use it again, as he has in the past. Ritchie and Rogers, 29-32

system, Iraq would be free to retain and begin to rebuild its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs in months, not years.²¹⁴ It is absolutely necessary there be inspections in Iraq the best solution for containing Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction is to have the inspectors on the ground. There is no adequate substitute for that, Cohen forcefully agreed.²¹⁵ So the policy of dual containment is successful. According to two specific reports, Saddam Hussein was no longer a threat to his neighbors and is not seen as a threat to his neighbors. That's largely because of the containment that we have carried out. The United States was keeping Saddam Hussein successfully trapped 'in a strategic box' regardless of whether or not he readmitted UN inspectors.²¹⁶

However, even though by the beginning of 1998 the Clinton administration still considered Iraq a significant threat to US vital interests and regional security in the Middle East. The Clinton administration continued to implement a strategy of containment until it left office at the end of 2000. Towards the end of the administration in 2000 these three objectives were supplemented with provision of humanitarian relief and a long-term strategy of regime change, and re-labeled 'containment-plus'.

After coming to power, President George W. Bush made it clear that he would not involve in any Arab-Israeli initiatives. But in his 2000 speech on the NSC, President Bush explained his position and stated: "we are going to tilt it back toward Israel. And we are going to be consistent. Clinton overreached, and it fell apart. That is why we are in trouble".²¹⁷ And he continued that "if the two sides do not want peace, there is no way we can force them".²¹⁸ Rather than involving in the Arab-Israeli conflict, he preferred to deal with rogue states, like

²¹⁴ Clinton announces Iraq strikes, (12/07/2008) <http://news.bbc.co.uk>

²¹⁵ Ritchie and Rogers, 26

²¹⁶ Due to reports based on the claims of Department of Defense Spokesperson Kenneth Bacon and Secretary Albright, Ritchie and Rogers (26-32)

²¹⁷ William B. Quandt, p.390

²¹⁸ Ibid, p.390

Iran and Iraq. The US's disinterest in the Arab-Israeli conflict continued until the 9/11 attacks.

CHAPTER V

THE US-ISRAELI RELATIONS UNDER GEORGE W. BUSH: THE ROLE OF THE JEWISH LOBBY

*God bless Israel, and God bless America*²¹⁹

George W. Bush

The US-Israel relations were based on the US political and strategic interests in the Middle East. In other words, the beginning of relations resulted from the Israel's strategic importance for the United States to contain the Soviet sponsored-communism and its location to easy access oil reserves. The bilateral relations, especially after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, were transformed into special relations. In following years, even after the diminishing the strategic importance of Israel, in the post-Cold War era, the US-Israeli relations continued to be regarded as a special relation. Jewish lobbies or pro-Israeli interests groups had tremendous effect on the shaping of this special relationship between the two countries. Following the election of George Bush as President of US, the US-Israeli relations rose and reached its peak in the 8-year period of his Administration. Two reasons contributed in the strengthening of the US-Israeli relations: George Bush's personality and the strong influence of Jewish lobby. After 9/11 attacks in particular, with role of the Jewish lobby and its joint alliances with the Christian Zionists and neo-conservatives, President George Bush adopted the pro-Israeli foreign policy.

5.1 The Bush Administration: Initial Perceptions about Israel

Without exception, all U.S. presidents have had or aimed to build close relations with Israel since its establishment. However, no US president in the history has been the more successful than President George W. Bush in establishing the exceptional special relations with Israel. After launching his nomination in March

²¹⁹ Remarks by President Bush from Jerusalem, (May 14, 2008), in his speech by stating special bond between U.S. and Israel he concluded with that sentence.

2000, one of Bush's first speeches was held in the AIPAC conference. In this conference Bush emphasized Israel's specialty for the US. He said: "America and Israel have a special friendship. In fact, it's more than a friendship. America and Israel are brothers and sisters in the family of democracy, natural allies – natural allies in the cause of peace".²²⁰ In the same speech, he declared his unconditional support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict,

I recognize the importance of the peace process and the key role that the United States can play. But my support for Israel is not conditional on the outcome of the peace process.... America's special relationship with Israel precedes the peace process. And Israel's adversaries should know that in my administration, the special relationship will continue, even if they cannot bring themselves to make true peace with the Jewish state."²²¹

While President Clinton made efforts to reach out comprehensive peace in the Arab Israeli conflict by bringing all parts into table, President George Bush had disinterest to deal with the peace process. Therefore, in his most of speeches before and after the election, President Bush implied that he would set position toward Israel. Indeed, At Bush's first, speech on National Security Council in 2001, he set his position toward Israel that we are going to tilt it back toward Israel. And we are going to be consistent. Clinton overreached, and it fell apart. That is why we are in trouble.²²² And he continued that if the two sides do not want peace, there is no way we can force them.²²³ In other words, due to this hands-off approach, he directly favor of stronger part, sometimes a show of force by one side can really clarify things²²⁴.

During the Bush administration, we witnessed an exceptional rise of the US-Israeli relations. There have been several reasons to be counted that led this exceptional rise. First of all, President Bush's personality had direct impact in strengthening the US-Israeli relations. Second, the Jews living in the US have had strong lobbying apparatus, contribute the improvement of relations. Finally, the

²²⁰ *Candidate George W. Bush on Israel*, (May 22, 2000), see in the www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² Quandt, p.390

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 390

²²⁴ Stephen Spector, *Evangelicals and Israel: The Story of American Christian Zionism*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.238

distinct hawkish groups-Neo-conservatives inside Bush administration had been the major influential groups to role in the decision-making of foreign policy shifting toward Israel.

5.1.1 President Bush and the Christian Zionism

One of the most important factors affecting the change in the US-Israel relations is President Bush's personality that became principal guide for his decisions in foreign policy-making process. At the age forty, her daughter Laura asked her father George Bush if he could remember the last day he did not have a drink. This question provoked him to answer the question if he could continue to grow closer to the Almighty, or if alcohol was becoming his God. For months, his Scripture readings had clarified the nature of temptation and the reality that the love of earthly pleasures could replace the love of God.²²⁵ The result was a total transformation to a born-again Christian. However, it is hard to associate his Christianity with an evangelical or a dispensationalist theology. Land calls him a mere Christian in C.S. Lewis's sense: Bush believes in the lordship of Jesus, the Crucifixion, the resurrection, and other elements of faith that have been common to nearly all Christians.²²⁶

George Bush had long-standing relations with the evangelical Christians that began during his father's unsuccessful re-election campaign in 1992. After 8 years, when George Bush ran for presidency, around 40 percent of George Bush's vote in the 2000 elections came from Christian Zionists.²²⁷ In return, the leading members of the Christian Right were granted privileged access to the president and his advisers.²²⁸ Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security adviser Condoleezza Rice, chief speech-writer Michael Gerson, Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Chief Political Adviser Carl Rove, Attorney General John Ashcroft and other key aides shared Bush's conservative Protestant faith; many staffers came from major

²²⁵ George W.Bush, *Decision Points*, (Washington D.C: Virgin Books,2010),p. 1-2

²²⁶ Spector, p.206

²²⁷ Marsden, p.193-195

²²⁸ Ibid, p.195

Christian Right Organizations.²²⁹ As a result, this strange fundamentalist sect is menace to the world and furnish the Bush government with rationale for punish evil²³⁰ that Edward Said wrote in Al-Ahram in 2002. “There is good and evil in the world, and that faith obligates him to fight the evil.”²³¹ In later times, Bush’s public expressions suggest that his faith based on acceptance of Christ and a personal experience with God. In 2000, his candid speeches make clear that his decisions are consciously guided by his understanding of God’s will.²³²

5.1.2 President Bush, the Jews and Israel

The second reason for Bush’s liaison toward Israel based on the domestic considerations that President Bush was aware of importance of the Jewish lobby, the presence of the Jewish voters in swing states, their large contributions of electoral campaigns. The American Jewish community has been overwhelmingly the democrats and support of the Jews for Republican generally have not exceeded 20 percent and so George Bush also received only the 19 percent of the Jewish votes. Therefore, Bush wanted to wean the American Jewish community from their traditional loyalty to democrats.²³³ Even though he adopted pro-Israeli policies, he was only able to raise the ratio of the Jewish votes for around 5 percent.²³⁴ In addition, President Bush would also aim to receive Jewish political donations. Since the Jewish donors provide about half of the funding for Democrat candidates and Jews had never provided more than 20 percent of total amount.²³⁵ After President Bush’s pro-Israel policies, first time in the history, Republicans received the highest percentage of the Jewish political donations, which was 42 percent of all donations.

According to some, another reason for Bush’s support for pro-Israel groups and state of Israel lied in his personal relation with Ariel Sharon. George Bush, prior

²²⁹Thomas, p.178

²³⁰Spector, p.207

²³¹Thomas, p.177

²³² Ibid, p.177

²³³Spector, Ibid,245

²³⁴ Jewish Vote in Presidential Elections, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/>

²³⁵Ibid, p. 245

to being president, visited only three countries: Mexico, China, and Israel. The Republican Jewish Coalition, which supported the policies of Prime Minister Netanyahu, organized a trip for Republican governors, in 1998.²³⁶ During this trip, George Bush met with Ariel Sharon. Sharon gave him a helicopter tour and Bush expressed his admiration for all that Israel had been able to accomplish, telling Sharon If you believe in the Bible as I believe in the bible, you know extraordinary things happen.²³⁷ Later in his campaign memoir, Bush described that trip as one of the Christian-Jewish-Israeli fellowship.²³⁸ When Bush was elected as President of the U.S., Sharon was one of the first foreign leaders to congratulate him.²³⁹

Additionally, his long-standing relations with the Jewish lobbies signaled his future behaviors about Israel. Following the 2000 elections, the American Jewry²⁴⁰ had been staffed in key places in the Bush administration. Therefore, the American Jewry had direct effect on the American foreign policy outputs, especially on the issues relating Israel. In 2004, in his address to the AIPAC policy conference, President Bush testified the role of AIPAC to build the US-Israeli special relations: “For more than 50 years, the United States and Israel have been steadfast allies.

²³⁶ Marc Perelman, *Governors' Trip Cemented Bush's Bond with Sharon*, March 28, 2003, <http://www.forward.com/>

²³⁷ Spector, 241

²³⁸ Thomas, 184

²³⁹ Spector, 241

²⁴⁰ Elliott Abrams Director of the National Security Council's Office for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations Jeffrey Berkowitz (2005-2006) White House Liaison to the Jewish Community and then office of presidential scheduling Stuart Bernstein Ambassador to Denmark , Brad Blakeman White House Director of Scheduling Josh Bolten (2006-) Chief of Staff Nancy Brinker Ambassador to Hungary and then chief of protocol for the State Department Michael Chertoff Head of the Justice Department's criminal division Douglas Feith (2001-2005) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy , Ari Fleischer (2001-2003) White House Press Secretary David Frum (2001-2002) White House Liaison to the Jewish Community Blake Gottesman President's personal aide Jeremy L. Katz (2007-) White House Liaison to the Jewish Community Daniel Kurtzer (2001-2005) Ambassador to Israel Frank Lavin Ambassador to Singapore Jay Lefkowitz (2001-2004) Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of the Domestic Policy Council , I. Lewis Libby (2001-2005) Chief of Staff to the Vice President , Ken Mehlman White House Political Director John Miller Director, State Department Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons , Michael Mukasey (2007-) Attorney General Noam Neusner (2004-2005) White House Liaison to the Jewish Community Mel Sembler Ambassador to Italy Martin Silverstein Ambassador to Uruguay Cliff Sobel Ambassador to the Netherlands , Tevi Troy (2003-2004) White House Liaison to the Jewish Community, Paul Wolfowitz (2001-2005) Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dov Zakheim (2001-2004) Undersecretary of Defense (Controller), Jay Zeidman (2006-2007) White House Liaison to the Jewish Community

AIPAC is one of the reasons why. ...You've worked tirelessly to strengthen the ties that bind our nations -- our shared values, our strong commitment to freedom".²⁴¹

5.1.3 Bush and the Neo-conservatives

Furthermore, neo-conservatives inside and outside the Bush administration took a decisive role to accelerate the rise of relations. Neoconservatives had been out of government since 1994, and they had little power than.²⁴² Then, as Thomas stated Neoconservative intellectuals, in their years out of power before the 2000 election, had proposed a foreign policy agenda involving concepts like regime change, benevolent hegemony, uni-polarity, preemption, and American exceptionalism that came to be hallmarks of the Bush administration's foreign policy.²⁴³ During Bush administration, with the exception of Powell, Bush's choices for his national security team seemed to come more from the conservative ranks of the Republican Party than its moderate wing—more Reaganite than Bush I.²⁴⁴ Even though neo-conservatives have located very important place in the Bush administration²⁴⁵, but it does not mean that President Bush is a neo-conservative. During the first months of his administration, neo-cons tried to manipulate Bush foreign policy decisions until 9/11. These attacks gave very substantial chance for neo-conservatives to persuade Bush to adopt transformative policy. The American people need to know we're facing a different enemy than we have ever faced. The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy, Bush stated.²⁴⁶

²⁴¹ President Bush's Address to the AIPAC Policy Conference, (May 18, 2004)

²⁴² Thomas, p.179

²⁴³ Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*, (New haven and London: Yale University, 2006), p.4

²⁴⁴ Quandt, p.386

²⁴⁵ Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams at the NSC. Cheney staff Scooter Libby, David Addington, Eric Edelman, John Hannah, William Lutti, Working for Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were Douglass Feith, Stephen Cambone, Dov Zakheim and Peter Edelman. Richard Perle was chair and Eliot Cohen a member of the Defense Policy Board.

²⁴⁶ Saul Landau, *The Pre-Emptive Empire: A Guide to Bush's Kingdom*, (London, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2003), p.154

5.2. The 9/11 Attacks and its Effects

The 9/11 attacks, which Bush saw the event as a turning point, changed everything for the United States. Following September 11, noted Thomas Ambrosio, the Bush administration assumed decisive control over the US foreign policy, with some describing a return to an ‘imperial presidency’.²⁴⁷ President made his famous speech of “war against terrorism” against radical Islamism. Following then, he adopted the criteria that countries and leaders would be judged as either with us or against us. In his memoirs, George W. Bush explained the situation how he got the decision: “I also drew from my faith, and from history, I found solace in reading the bible, which Abraham Lincoln called the best gift god has given to man. I admired Lincoln’s moral clarity and resolve. The clash between freedom and tyranny, he said was an issue which can only be tried by war, and decided by victory. The war on terror would be same”.²⁴⁸

The position taken by the Bush, gave important leverage to Jewish lobby and other pro-Israeli Groups. Indeed, 9/11 attacks gave AIPAC and other pro-Israel lobbying organizations a renewed sense of purpose and combating terrorism became common principle for American and Israeli interests. In 1981, AIPAC’s chairman stated unless you can always translate your proposal in terms of what’s in America’s interests you are lost.²⁴⁹ Although Ambrosio define the Bush period as “imperial presidency”, President needed Pro-Israeli groups, such as AIPAC which have been powerful in the congress, to pass legislation for war on terrorism.²⁵⁰ After 9/11 attacks, the Jewish Lobby worked so impressively to equate Palestinian actions with Al-Qaida terrorism. WINEP's executive director, Robert Satloff, no country has suffered more from the same sort of terrorism that hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon than Israel.²⁵¹ Accordingly, the executive member of JINSA says, U.S.-

²⁴⁷Brzezinski, p.75-76

²⁴⁸W. Bush, p.140

²⁴⁹Marrar, p. 71

²⁵⁰Ibid, p.72

²⁵¹Mearsheimer and Walt,p.60-61

Israel strategic cooperation is a vital component in the global security equation for the United States.²⁵²

From the moment of 9/11 Sharon also had been working on Bush to persuade him that they were facing same threat: international terrorism. “Sharon played the president like a violin: I am fighting your war, terrorism is terrorism. Sharon did a masterful job”.²⁵³ President Bush in his memoirs explained how he appreciated this call and defined Sharon as a leader who understood what it meant to fight terror.²⁵⁴ The position taken by the Bush administration after 9/11 was only the beginning of a long series of events that helped pro-Israeli pressure groups make the case to the president and members of Congress that the Palestinians ought to be included as targets in the struggle against terrorism.²⁵⁵ According to them, Palestinian terrorism and Al-Qaida terrorism were of the same family, even if a direct organizational or operational link did not exist between them²⁵⁶ and therefore, now that the United States had been attacked by a terrorist organization, it should understand the nature of the challenge Israel faces²⁵⁷.

In 2002, after the suicide attack in Netanya in Israel 29 Jews died and 170 were injured, Sharon responded with Operation Defensive Shield. Bush criticized and warned Sharon not to exceed limits. Later, he backed away because of the lobbies’ protests. Indeed, in those days, the white house received over 100.000 emails generated by the Christian right protesting Bush’s criticism of defensive shield. After the protests, House Resolution 392 declared and condemned terrorist activities of Palestinians and Arafat because of its supports to terrorist acts.²⁵⁸ In the same year, documents seized by Israel from offices of the Palestinian Authority demonstrate the crucial financial support the Palestinian Authority continues to

²⁵² Ibid, p.50

²⁵³ Jonathan Cook, *Israel and the Clash of Civilizations: Iraq, Iran and the Plan to Remake the Middle East*, (London: Pluto Press, 2008), p.33

²⁵⁴ W. Bush, p.145

²⁵⁵ Marrar, p.71

²⁵⁶ Itamar Rabinovich, *Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs 1948*, (New Jersey: Prince Town University Press, 2004), p. 187

²⁵⁷ Ibid, p.187

²⁵⁸ Ibid, p.187

provide for terrorist acts, including suicide bombers.²⁵⁹ Furthermore, the PNAC whose members were mostly neo-conservatives, in 2002, send a letter to Bush to legalize Israel efforts to fight against terrorism. “Comparable to communism or Nazism regimes were allies or targets depending on their relationships with those labeled terrorists; and Israel was an ally in Bush’s war against evil”.²⁶⁰ They are aiming to equate Bin Laden to Arafat. This was highly successful and led Bush to the conclusion that Unless Arafat was removed from power; there would be no prospect for a political settlement.²⁶¹

In 2003, Sharon took the decision to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza aiming to eliminate demographic threats of Palestinians, finished in 2005. However, his decisions were criticized both inside and outside the country. Even though throughout his presidency, President Bush had the thriving relations with Christian Zionists, President Bush’ critics for Operation Defensive Shield and supporting the unilateral Gaza Disengagement, created tension between him and Christian Zionists. When Sharon got the stroke in 2006, Christian rightist Leader Robertson suggested the prime minister was being punished for dividing God's land, a reference to the August pullout from the Gaza Strip and four West Bank settlements.²⁶²

The overall conclusion was the gaining support of allies in the line of war with terrorism, to invade Afghanistan and he succeeded. For the first time in NATO’s fifty two-year history, the members of the alliance voted to invoke Article 5 of the charter: an attack on one is an attack on all.²⁶³ A huge coalition under control of Bush was ready to fight the war on terror on the offense and the first battleground would be Afghanistan”.²⁶⁴

²⁵⁹Benjamin Netanyahu, *Expressing solidarity with Israel in its fight against terrorism*, www.netanyahu.org

²⁶⁰ Thomas, p.180

²⁶¹ Rabinovich, p.191

²⁶²*Israel pulls plug on Pat Robertson deal*, www.msnbc.msn.com, January 11, 2006

²⁶³W. Bush, p.141

²⁶⁴*Ibid*, p.190

5.3. The Bush Doctrine (National Security Strategy)

“The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations... Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.”

President Bush West Point, New York, June 1, 2002

The 9/11 attacks led to war on terrorism and redefinition of American foreign policy and its National Security Strategy referred to Bush Doctrine²⁶⁵ that is based on his doctrinal record of its own thinking on grand strategy in the form of speeches and policy statements such as the president’s state of the union and inaugural addresses, his West Point and American Enterprise Institute speeches and the National Security Strategy of the United States.²⁶⁶ According to many observers, there has been great effect of Neo-conservatives on the shapes of Bush doctrine. Monten described the Bush Doctrine as the operationalization of neo-conservatism and George Bush as articulating primarily neo-conservative logic and language, with the views of the President constituting a hybrid of the alliance of neo-conservatives and assertive nationalist.²⁶⁷ This doctrine mainly based on the broader definition of terrorism that the United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. “The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism— premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents”.²⁶⁸

The second feature of this doctrine relied on the idea of fighting with states or people who harbor terrorists and provide support for terrorism. “The United States

²⁶⁵ Bush Doctrine, the first time used by Charles Krauthammer pointing a radical change in U.S. foreign policy following the Bush administration policies of unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM treaty and rejecting the Kyoto protocol

²⁶⁶ Fukuyama, p.3

²⁶⁷ Ritchie and Rogers, p.157

²⁶⁸ The National Security Strategy, September 2002, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/>

will make no concessions to terrorist demands and strike no deals with them. We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them. Today our enemies have seen the results of what civilized nations can, and will, do against regimes that harbor, support, and use terrorism to achieve their political goals”.²⁶⁹ On the National Security Strategy, the fight with terrorism was detailed: Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the terrorists’ ability to plan and operate.²⁷⁰

The third feature is by unilateral pre-emptive action.²⁷¹ According to President of the U.S. will try to gain support of international community to destroy the threat, if not, Bush administration will defend the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.²⁷²

In his speeches, President Bush also explained his intend to spread the war of terrorism across the world, Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces continue to hunt down the Taliban and al-Qaida. But it is not only this battlefield on which we will engage terrorists. Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia.²⁷³ Furthermore, in his state of the Union address, he directly gave signal of invasion of Iraq. Iraq, Iran and North Korea as axis of evil: states like these, their terrorist allies

²⁶⁹ So they will be disrupted and destroyed terrorist organizations “by direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors”. See in The National Security Strategy, September 2002, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/>

²⁷⁰ *The National Security Strategy*, September 2002, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/>

²⁷² Ibid

²⁷³ Ibid

constitute an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of world.²⁷⁴ Even though he gained support for invasion of Afghanistan from the United States, various administration officials, beginning with the president himself, made clear that the United States would proceed against Saddam regardless of the views of its allies.²⁷⁵

With the adoption of Bush Doctrine, the long-standing objectives of the Jewish lobbies and State of Israel, including the removal of regional threats: Saddam's Iraq, Iran and Syria, seemed to be realized in the Bush administration. Therefore, in following part, we would generate the role of Jewish lobbies and Israel in the post-2002 foreign policy behavior of Bush Administration by focusing of the invasion of Iraq, the tension between the US, Israel, Syria and Iran and finally the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

5.3.1. The 2003 Invasion of Iraq

The Bush administration based its case for war with Iraq on three arguments. First argument based on the idea that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and was in the processing of building more. The idea was supported by intelligence reports that one intelligence report summarized the problem: Since the end of inspections in 1998, Saddam has maintained the chemical weapons effort, energized the missile program, made a bigger investment in biological weapons, and has begun to try to move forward in the nuclear area.²⁷⁶ Following the NIE conclusion in 2002 that Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked; it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade²⁷⁷ President took the case to the United States declaring that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents and warned that Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to

²⁷⁴Patrick Tyler, *A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East--from the Cold War to the War on Terror*, (New York: Fsgbooks, 2009),p.540 See also in George Bush ,p.233

²⁷⁵Fukuyama, p. 2

²⁷⁶ Bush, p.229

²⁷⁷Ibid, p. 240

enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year.²⁷⁸

Second, the assumption that linked Iraq to Al-Qaida Iraq and other terrorist organizations became the one of the main reason of invasion. According Bush, in the beginning he was eager to resolve the problem diplomatically, unless I received definitive evidence tying Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 plot, I would work to resolve the Iraq problem diplomatically.²⁷⁹

Third, that Iraq was a tyrannical dictatorship from which the Iraqi people deserved to be liberated. Before the a few days of invasion, Bush turned to Don Rumsfeld secretary I said for the peace of the world and the benefit and freedom of the Iraqi people; I hereby give the order to execute operation Iraqi freedom. May God bless the troops?²⁸⁰ Promotion of democracy has been also long-standing objectives of Neo-cons. Therefore, this created common sense for Bush Administration and Neo-cons. Exporting and defending democracy is considered an obligation, the moral duty of a unique and exceptional country, and path to long-term security, and Charles Krauthammer argued in 2004, the spread of democracy is not just an end but as means, an indispensable means for securing interests.²⁸¹

5.3.1.1 The Role of Israel in the Iraqi War

Even though the Israel elites and people²⁸² had welcomed the idea of regime transformation in Iraq, it should be emphasized that Israel did not initiate the campaign for war against Iraq. As will become clear, it was the neoconservatives in the United States who conceived that idea and was principally responsible for pushing it forward in the wake of September 11.²⁸³ Nonetheless, according to Waltz

²⁷⁸Bush Certainty on Iraq Arms Went beyond Analysts' Views www.iraqwararchive.org/

²⁷⁹Bush, p. 323

²⁸⁰Ibid ,325

²⁸¹ Ritchie and Rogers, 145

²⁸²It should be also noted that Israeli Jews was favor of invasion Iraq .According poll taken in February 2003 found that 77, 5 percent of Israeli Jews wanted the United States to invade Iraq.

²⁸³Mearsheimer and. Walt, 234

and Mearsheimer, Israel did join forces with the neoconservatives to help sell the war to the Bush administration and the American people, well before the president had made the final decision to invade.²⁸⁴

Indeed, it was known that neo-cons have transformative agenda for regime change in Iraq. Thus, the issue of invasion Iraq even before the 9/11 had been on the table, the PNAC sent a public letter to then-President Bill Clinton stating:

We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War. In your upcoming State of the Union Address, you have an opportunity to chart a clear and determined course for meeting this threat. We urge you to seize that opportunity, and to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world. That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power. We stand ready to offer our full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor.²⁸⁵

Neo-cons staffing in key position in the Bush administration made enormous efforts to provoke or persuade Bush to invade Iraq. Even before 9/11 attacks, there was plenty of talk about Iraq and Saddam Hussein, along with plans for building a missile defense system to help protect against attacks from rogue states.²⁸⁶ After few days of 9/11, at one point, deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz suggested that "we consider confronting Iraq as well as Taliban. Before 9/11, Saddam Hussein's brutal dictatorship was widely considered the most dangerous country in the world. The regime had a long record of supporting terrorism, including paying the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. "Dealing with Iraq would show a major commitment to antiterrorism don Rumsfeld said.²⁸⁷

For neo-cons Afghanistan was not a very impressive arena in which to display American power. But also for them, the lessons of 9/11 were not simply that a small band of extremists could attack America, but also a wake-up call for an even

²⁸⁴Ibid, 207

²⁸⁵ Letter to President Clinton on Iraq, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/>

²⁸⁶Quandt ,p. 391

²⁸⁷Bush ,p. 189

more threatening future.²⁸⁸ In November 2001, Richard Perle argued that taking out the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq would send an unmistakable signal to other outlaw regimes, for him U.S. could deliver a short message, a two-word message: You're next.²⁸⁹ After the war with Iraq, the Bush administration began to deliver precisely this message to Syria. The expectation was that Damascus would take America's hint and change its ways.²⁹⁰

Jewish lobbies gave the substantial supports to American policy of invasion of Iraq. There are lots of speeches that prove Jewish lobbies' effect on Bush to invade Iraq. AIPAC is to support whatever is good for Israel, and so long as Israel supports the war, so too do the thousands of AIPAC lobbyists who convened in the American capital,²⁹¹ said Nathan Guttman. "Israel's security certainly was going to war with Iraq, particularly for staunch Zionist like Abrams and Feith; it was never mentioned publicly by Bush and his inner circle."²⁹² Like his father, George W. Bush urged Israel not to involve invasion of Iraq, because he was already under criticism of traditional Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia.

5.3.1.2 The Post-Iraqi Situation

After the Iraqi war, the American credibility around the world decreased and world perceptions about the US turned out to be highly negative. The US argument was that Iraq has mass destruction weapons were not testified by international observers. President Bush also professed that Members of the previous administration, John Kerry, John Edwards and vast majority of congress had all read the same intelligence that I had concluded Iraq had WMD. Nobody was lying. We were all wrong.²⁹³ For reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S's government bureaucracy, Wolfowitz explained after the war, we settled on the one issue that

²⁸⁸ Rabinovich, p.394

²⁸⁹ Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, (New Jersey: Brookings Institution, 2005), p.173

²⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 173

²⁹¹ Mearsheimer and Walt, p.62

²⁹² Quandt, p.401

²⁹³ Bush, p.262

everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason.²⁹⁴ Argument that linked Iraq with Al-Qaida could not be testified and the promotion of democracy also was the total failure. On the other hand, Israel welcomed the invasion of Iraq. After the early year of invasion of Iraq, which was concluded with the collapse of Saddam regime, Sharon speech was the testimony for eagerness of Israel that our relationship with White House has never been so good.²⁹⁵ Furthermore, Ehud Olmert has claimed that Iraq without Saddam Hussein is so much better for the security and safety of the State of Israel.²⁹⁶ Nevertheless, for some, the invasion of Iraq has created unexpected side effect that Iran which is the most powerful states in the Gulf spread its power all across the Middle East. Since the elimination of her influential rival following the America invasion in March 2003, the balance of power disappeared. Therefore, Iran collaborated with Shias in Iraq and has links to several of the dominant Shia factions in Iraq, giving it far more influence over Iraq's evolution than it possessed when Saddam Hussein ruled in Baghdad.²⁹⁷

5.3.2 Syria: the Next Target?

The US and Israel has regarded Syria as the one of most important threat for their national security interests and accusations for Syria have been similar with Iraq and Iran. Accordingly, in addition to her long-standing ties with terrorist organizations and hosting members of Islamic organizations, it has also active chemical and biological weapons. For more than a quarter century, moreover, Syria had exercised de facto control over much of Lebanon—including the Beka'a Valley, which was home to an amalgam of terrorist groups waging war on Israel.²⁹⁸ Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terror organizations had offices in the Syrian capital, though ostensibly only to support their media and public relations efforts.²⁹⁹ And

²⁹⁴Daalder and Lindsay, p.156

²⁹⁵Quandt, Ibid,p. 401

²⁹⁶Inbar, p.134

²⁹⁷Mearsheimer and Walt, p.54

²⁹⁸Daalder and Lindsay, p.173

²⁹⁹ Ibid , p.174

Damascus, according to the State Department's annual terrorism report, continued to permit Iranian resupply, via Damascus, of Hezbollah in Lebanon.³⁰⁰

According to Mearsheimer and Waltz, the intention for invasion of Syria was mostly resulted from the ambitions of Israel. Syria's ability to create trouble rests mostly in its support for a number of terrorist organizations, notably Hezbollah, but also Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Indeed, Hamas leader Khaled Meshal lives in Damascus. All of these groups (Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas) threaten Israel, but unlike al Qaeda, none of them—including Hezbollah—directly threatens the United States.³⁰¹ Therefore, the main motivation behind the invasion of Syria has Jewish lobby and State of Israel. Although President Bush did not include Syria in his infamous "axis of evil," but it is often depicted as a "rogue state" that threatens important American interests.³⁰² In 2002, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee was also promoting legislation to formally place Syria on the "axis of evil". Paul Wolfowitz declared that "there has got to be regime change in Syria," and Richard Perle told a journalist that "we could deliver a short message, a two-worded message: You're next."³⁰³

Another accusation for Syria was based on the idea that Syria supports anti-American insurgency in Iraq and gave the permission the members of Saddam's regime pass through Syria. But there is little hard evidence that Damascus is providing support to the Iraqi insurgents, which is surely why the Bush administration has mainly made that charge against Iran, not Syria.³⁰⁴ The Syrians must not allow for Baath Party members or Saddam's families or generals on the run to seek safe haven and find safe haven there, Bush declared. And continued that we expect them to do everything they can to prevent people who should be held to

³⁰⁰ Alfred B. Prados, *Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues* Ivo, CRS Report for Congress, Updated July 27, 2006. See also in James M. Lindsay, p. 175

³⁰¹ Mearsheimer and Walt, p.265

³⁰² Ibid , p.263

³⁰³ www.republicansforhumility.com/rhetoric.html

³⁰⁴ Mearsheimer and Walt, Ibid,p.255

account from escaping in their country. And if they are in their country, we expect the Syrian authorities to turn them over to the proper folks.³⁰⁵

Sharon Government also hoped that the US would regard Syria as serious threat, especially after March 2003. Sharon called President Bush to put strong pressure on Syria in order to prevent President Assad to cut its supports for Hamas and Islamic Jihad, push Iran's revolutionary guards out of the Bekka valley in Lebanon, cease cooperating with Iran, remove Hezbollah from the Israeli-Lebanese border and replace it with the Lebanese army, and eliminate Hezbollah's missiles aimed at Israel.³⁰⁶ As soon as Baghdad fell in mid-April 2003, Israeli leaders began urging the United States to concentrate on Damascus and to use its unmatched power to change the regime's behavior, or perhaps the regime itself.³⁰⁷

As reasons counted above, Neo-Cons inside government aimed to push Bush to invade Syria. The Pro-Israelis inside the government collaborate with Israel and the Jewish Lobby. Donald Rumsfeld, not only reportedly ordered the military to review contingency plans for a possible war against Syria, but also was the first to raise the specter of military action against Syria. In late March, he accused Damascus of a hostile act by shipping military supplies to Iraq.³⁰⁸ Additionally, Neo-cons, Douglas Feith and William Luti, were assigned to write a briefing paper making the case for war against Syria. At the White House, Bush's spokesman, Ari Fleischer warned Damascus not to harbor Iraqi fugitive leaders, read from a CIA report to Congress detailing Syria's extensive efforts to acquire ever more deadly chemical and biological weapons, and reminded reporters that Syria had long been included on the U.S.'s list of states that sponsor terrorism. Syria, Fleischer suggested, needs to seriously ponder the implications of their actions.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁵Daalder and Lindsay, p. 174

³⁰⁶Mearsheimer and Walt, Ibid, p.272

³⁰⁷Mearsheimer and Walt, p. 272

³⁰⁸Stephen Zunes, *Talking Points on Recent Concerns Raised by Bush Administration Officials Regarding Syria*, [http://stephenzunes.org/April 14, 2003](http://stephenzunes.org/April%2014,%202003)

³⁰⁹Mearsheimer and Walt, p.272

Even though on April 10th, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told Congress, the Syrians are behaving badly. They need to be reminded of that, and if they continue, then we need to think about what our policy is with respect to a country that harbors terrorists or harbors war criminals, or was in recent times shipping things to Iraq.³¹⁰ Bush never really intended to go to war against Syria. I have no specific operation in mind at this point in time, Bush told a small group of reporters on April 22. And similarly, he said I can't think of a specific moment or a specific incident that would require military action.³¹¹ Fortunately, by late April, Syria had closed its borders with Iraq and handed over to US authorities Iraqi fugitives who had entered the country. Therefore, the tension between the US and Syria somehow decreased.

5.3.3. Iran vs. Israel

After the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has emerged as a new actor to be evaluated as threat to Israel and American interests. During 90's, the US policy had been the containment of Iran as well as Iraq. However, Isolation had not produced any significant changes in Iran's behavior. George Bush, in his pro-election speeches, gave the signal of transformation of the US foreign policy toward Iran. After invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, in his speeches, he implied Iraq as new as target. Bush speech on Aqaba meeting shows how he was impressed with his tasks and continues to go along the same way of war of terrorism. God told me to strike at al Qaeda and I struck them, and then he instructed me to strike at Saddam, which I did, and now I am determined to solve the problem in the Middle East. If you help me I will act, and if not, elections will come and I will have to focus on them³¹².

Bush Administration's aim to deal with Iran has been its support of terrorism and its nuclear program and its support Shia insurgency following the invasion of Iraq. Actually the State of Israel and the Jewish lobby has been very active to push

³¹⁰Daalder and Lindsay, p. 174

³¹¹Ibid, p.174

³¹²Quandt, p.404

Bush Administration to regard Iraq as next step for regime change. Israel have seen the Iraq as existential threat that “Iran is seeking to master the full nuclear fuel cycle, which would allow it to build nuclear weapons if it so chose. It is also developing missiles that could deliver nuclear warheads against its neighbors, including Israel”.³¹³ Rumsfeld predicted that Europe would be more threatened than the United States. Israel, of course, represents the ultimate target in the Middle East—and is seen as an outpost of democracy, progress and Western values, Rumsfeld stated.³¹⁴ Iran will not be able to strike the American homeland with nuclear missiles anytime soon, but any weapons it might develop could be used against the US forces stationed in the Middle East, or against European countries.

In the wake of the invasion of Iraq, Israel considered Iran a greater threat than Iraq. As Israel’s Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer stated in an interview with the Washington post in February 2002: Today, everybody is busy with Iraq. Iraq is problem... But you should understand if you ask me, today Iran is more dangerous than Iraq.³¹⁵ That is why they aimed to regime change in Iran. Neoconservatives inside and outside the administration have been urging an active effort to promote regime change in Tehran. Reports of possible covert actions have surfaced in recent weeks.³¹⁶ In addition, Neo-conservatives outside the administration push Bush to deal with Iran as next target in the war of terrorism. Accordingly, William Kristol in weekly Standard: “The next great battle will be for Iran, which he maintained, is the tipping point in the war on proliferation, the war on terror, and the effort to reshape the Middle East”.³¹⁷ According to him, the success of Bush doctrine and future of safe world go through the invasion of Iran. On the outcome of the confrontation with Tehran, more than any other, rests the future of the Bush Doctrine--and, quite possibly, the Bush presidency--and prospects for a safer world³¹⁸. Fortunately, even though Bush declared that we will not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon.

³¹³Mersheimer and Walt, p.280

³¹⁴Daalder and Lindsay, p.480

³¹⁵ Inbar, p.131

³¹⁶Mearsheimer and Walt, p.292

³¹⁷William Kristol, *the End of the beginning*, <http://www.weeklystandard.com>, (May 12, 2003, Vol. 8, No. 34)

³¹⁸Ibid

Iran would be dangerous if they have a nuclear weapon.³¹⁹ He later altered his attitude toward Iran by stating that no, we just expect them to cooperate, and we will work with the world to encourage them to cooperate. We have no military plans.³²⁰

In 2005, Neo- Conservatives they send letter to congress to increase military infrastructures to involve in all around the world. “We can afford the military we need....We do not propose returning to a Cold War-size or shape force structure. We do insist that we act responsibly to create the military we need to fight the war on terror and fulfill our other responsibilities around the world.”³²¹ President George W. Bush said on February 16, 2005:

Iran has made it clear that they do not like Israel, to put it bluntly. And the Israelis are concerned about whether or not Iran develops a nuclear weapon, as are we, as should everybody. Clearly, if I was the leader of Israel, and I listened to some of the statements by the Iranian ayatollahs that regarded the security of my country I’d be concerned about Iran having a nuclear weapon as well. And in that Israel is our ally, and in that we have made a very strong commitment to support Israel. We will support Israel if their security threatened.³²²

The Iranians also maintained that they need nuclear weapons to deter Israel even though they know Israel poses no threat to them. For Iranians, it is also a matter of justice that they should have as much right to nuclear weapons as the U.S., Israel and any other countries.³²³

The Israel leaders’ worrisome about the Iranian nuclear facilities and Ahmadinejad’s call for the psychical destruction Israel as stating “wipes Israel off the map, had alarmed the Pro-Israel circles. Therefore, throughout this period in 2005 and into 2006, some consideration was also given to possible military action against Iran. “The rhetoric was increasing about the need to go blow up the Iranian nuclear facilities.”³²⁴ The idea ignited by Donald Rumsfeld. Fortunately, following the year of

³¹⁹David E. Sanger, *Bush Says U.S. Will Not Tolerate Building of Nuclear Arms by Iran*, <http://www.nytimes.com>, (June 19, 2003)

³²⁰Daalder and Lindsay,p.185

³²¹*Letter to Congress on Increasing U.S. Ground Forces*, www.newamericancentury.org

³²²Iran and Hezbollah <http://www.theisraelproject.org/> For further detail look at Michael G. Bard, *Will Israel Survive*, (New York :Palgrave Macmillan,2007),70

³²³G. Bard, 78

³²⁴Brandley Graham, *By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld*, (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2009), 619

2006, American foreign policy shift different direction. Following the failure of European negotiations with Iran about nuclear ambitions, “Rice had decided to push for a dramatic shift in approach in which the United States would enter into broad-based talks with Iran. The move was conditioned on Iran ceasing its enrichment and reprocessing efforts”.³²⁵ However, President George W Bush had assured the Israeli government that he may be prepared to approve a future military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities if negotiations with Tehran break down.³²⁶ This change clearly observed in the Bush speech that Military action remained a last resort, though surgical strikes against known facilities would only temporarily derail Tehran’s nuclear program.³²⁷ According to Fukuyama, It seems relatively clear that the Bush administration in its second term has itself sidelined regime change through preemptive war in its foreign policy. In the case of the other two members of the axis of evil, Iran and North Korea, the administration has signaled that it does not intend to use military force to bring about regime.³²⁸

5.3.4 The Invasion of Lebanon

Lebanon has posed diverse ethnic and religious groups that have different ties with different countries and so turn out to be are of proxy war between “Syria and Israel” and “Iran and Israel”. Following the Hezbollah attack an Israeli patrol along the border and abduct two soldiers, Israel invade Lebanon in 2006. Before the invasion some authorized members of Israel visited White House and their aim was getting green light from the US to back Israel’s decision. The Jewish Lobby was highly affective to put pressures on members of the Congress to support Israel. In the congress, the Democrats and Republicans competed to show that their party, not the rival one, was Israel’s best friend.³²⁹ And latter resolution was testimony to that “the

³²⁵Daalder and Lindsay, 618

³²⁶ Uzi Mahnaimi, President George W Bush backs Israeli plan for strike on Iran, www.timesonline.co.uk, (July 13, 2008)

³²⁷Daalder and Lindsay, p.187

³²⁸ Fukuyama, p.3

³²⁹Mearsheimer and Walt, p.311

House of Representatives passed a strongly worded resolution condemning Hezbollah and supporting Israeli policy in Lebanon.”³³⁰

When Israel invaded Lebanon in 2006, the concern is that any activities by Israel to protect herself will weaken that government. Having said all that, people need to protect themselves. There are terrorists who will blow up innocent people in order to achieve tactical objectives, said president Bush³³¹. Moreover, after the invasion of Lebanon, the US used its veto power to block Security Council decision which would accuse Israel by using disproportioned use of force. In same year, after the invasion of Lebanon by Israel, President Bush declared that it is no coincidence that two nations that are building free societies in the heart of the Middle East — Lebanon and Iraq — are also the scenes of the most violent terrorist activity.³³² Actually this words clearly show that Bush wink the invasion of Lebanon. According to Mearsheimer and Waltz, there was incredible effect of neo-conservatives on the invasion of Lebanon. Even after 9/11, waited a chance to destroyed Hezbollah, Adam Shatz who is an open advocate of preemptive war against Syria and Hezbollah, a position favored by neoconservatives in and close to the Bush administration³³³

³³⁰ Ibid , p.311

³³¹ Jim Rutenberg, Bush gives Qualified support for Israel’ strikes, *www.nytimes.com* ,(July 14, 2006)

³³² Bush links Lebanon to war on terror, *www.msnbc.msn.com*, Aug. 19, 2006

³³³ Mearsheimer and Walt, p.310

CONCLUSION

The American foreign policy behavior and the bases of the US –Israeli relations have been a matter of question in the international and regional context. For that reason, several studies have been conducted to discover the bases for the establishment and improvement of the US-Israeli relations. Some of these studies analyze the relationship from a US perspective. They argue that in this relationship the US has been acting in line with its national interests and Israel emerges as a reliable ally for implementing these interests (political and economic) in the Middle East. Furthermore, during the Cold War, Israel not only played a key role to contain and prevent the spread of Soviet-sponsored communism over the Middle East but also guaranteed the US's access to Arab oil reserves. In the post-Cold war era, Israel maintained its strategic position for the US interests to block the regional terrorism and control the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

However, from our point of view, by ignoring the role of non-governmental elements, especially the Jewish lobby, it is difficult to capture the dynamics in the establishment and continuation of the US-Israel relations. For that reason, in order to explore the role of the Jewish lobby, first of all, this thesis tried to answer the question of who makes American foreign policy and how the American foreign policy making process works. Having explored this, it was argued that even though the particular structure of the US government plays a key role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and the specific actors (Executive and Legislative Branches) have important role in its formulation, Presidents have a larger and key role in shaping of the US foreign policy. In other words, the US foreign policy is based on the importance of the presidency and therefore it is impossible to explain American foreign policy without highlighting the personality and the belief system of the Presidents. The importance of presidency in the US foreign policy led us to analyze the role of lobbies under each President's administration. This enabled us to see the changes and continuities under each period and determine the main factors that affected the strength of the lobbies under each President. It is observed that

especially under two Presidents – Reagan and George W. Bush – the role of the Jewish lobby has been very prominent in the making of foreign policy. The thesis argues that this was mainly because of the personalities and the belief systems of these two Presidents.

After examining the governmental structure of the US in the context of importance of the presidency, the thesis tried to highlight the reasons that led lobbies to become successful foreign policy actors. There are three reasons explaining the success of lobbies: Firstly, the presidential system enforces separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches and so lobbies can find channels to contact and reach effective personalities. Secondly, as argued in details in Chapter 2, the judicial system in the US enhances the power of lobbies. Finally, the United States has developed a peculiarly open form of democratic pluralism, allowing groups with shared interests and values to access many influential contacts in the policy making process and to compete for influence over policy. All these three factors are important to understand the success of lobbies in general and the Jewish lobby in particular.

After this point, the thesis continues by looking at the role of the Jewish Lobby and how it affects US-Israeli relations. Through the role of the Jewish Lobby, it is argued, US foreign policy has been more favorable to Israel. Looking at the Israeli foreign policy, the prominence of security concerns is striking. The Israeli argument regarding the security challenges it is facing makes it to search constantly for the support of global powers. This constitutes an integral part of Israel's national and defense strategy. Therefore, from its independence onwards Israeli elites have intensified relations with the US not only for strategic reasons, but also because of the large number of Jews living in the US. Moreover, the thesis aims to answer the question of to what extent the Jewish lobby influences foreign policy or to what extent the Jewish lobby has a relative strength in comparison with other ethnic groups or lobbies in the U.S. foreign policy-making process. According to Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, for ethnic groups, there are seven primary factors to

affect foreign policy processes: Organizational strength, Membership unity, placement, and voter participation, Salience and resonance of the message, push on an open door, Strength of opposition, Permeability of and access to the government, mutually supportive relationships. These factors determine the relative strength of ethnic lobbies in general and the Jewish lobby in particular. The thesis underlined that looking at each of these factors; the Jewish lobby enjoyed an advantageous position in comparison with other ethnic groups.

Indeed, since the establishment of Israel, the Jewish lobby channeled American public opinion and led the decision makers to address Israel's crucial role for the US. In the following initial decades after Israeli independence, the role of the Jewish Lobby in the US-Israeli relations had been limited. Particularly following the 1967 War, the impact of the Jewish lobby for improving the relations increased. According to Mearsheimer and Walt, since 1967, the deeply committed supporters of Israel have managed not only mobilize most of the American Jewish community but have helped win American public opinion, in general, to support Israel and its policies in the region almost without reservation.³³⁴ Steven T. Rosenthal agrees with this view and suggests that "since 1967 . . . there has been no other country whose citizens have been as committed to the success of another country as American Jews have been to Israel".³³⁵ The Jewish lobby has been very effective in convincing the Americans that the US and Israeli interests are essentially identical.³³⁶ Even after the diminishing of the strategic importance of Israel in the post-Cold War era, the US-Israeli relations continued to be regarded as a 'special relation'.

As thesis indicated, following the election of George W. Bush as the President, the US-Israeli relations deepened and reached its peak in the eight-year period of his administration. Two reasons contributed in the strengthening of this relationship: George W. Bush's personality and the strong influence of the Jewish lobby. After 9/11 attacks in particular, through the role of the Jewish lobby and its

³³⁴Mearsheimer and Walt, p. 115

³³⁵Steven T. Rosenthal, "Long Distance Nationalism: American Jews, Zionism, and Israel," in *the Cambridge Companion to American Judaism*, ed. Dana Evan Kaplan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 209.

³³⁶Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby And U.S. Foreign Policy*, p.1, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/>

alliances with the Christian Zionists and neo-conservatives, President George Bush adopted a deeper pro-Israeli foreign policy.

At the end of his administration, Bush remarked that Israel “should be confident that the United States will never abandon its commitment to the security of Israel as a Jewish state and homeland for Jewish people”.³³⁷ FOOTNOTE!!!! Thus, he maintained his commitment toward Israel and, according to some observers his administration had been the most pro-Israel government ever. Furthermore, American public opinion was also in favor of Israel as a special ally during his era. According to the Rasmussen report, around 90 percent of Americans saw Israel as either ‘somehow ally’ or an ‘ally’. (See in Appendix B)

On the other hand, Bush’s attitudes toward Israel had been welcomed by the Israeli government elites and public opinion. The Israelis consistently approved of the US leadership and held favorable views of the Bush administration. According to a Gallup poll of May 2007, 66 percent of an Israeli sample approved the US leadership, and only 24 percent disapproved. In the May 2007 ADL/BESA/MM survey, an overwhelming majority of 73 percent of Israelis thought that Bush’s attitudes toward Israel were friendly.³³⁸ When Bush left White House in 2008, Netanyahu thanked his attribution to Israel with the following words: “For the greatest challenge of the time, President Bush was the right man and the right time in the right place. For that I am sure history will judge him more favorably”.³³⁹

This thesis argued that the Bush administration has been the most pro-Israeli government than the any other US government before and the role of the Jewish lobby has been prominent in this. However, the role of the Jewish lobby in the future of the US-Israeli relations is a matter of question. Therefore, the assumptions of the thesis about the role and effect of the Jewish lobby during the Bush Administration should be tested in the Obama administration to reach further analysis.

³³⁷ Clyde R. Mark, *Israeli-United States Relations*, <http://www.policyalmanac.org>, Updated October 17, 2002

³³⁸ Efraim Inbar, p.62

³³⁹ *Farewell to President Bush: he bravely stood up to the greatest challenge that he faced and was victorious* <http://netanyahu.org/> (January 20, 2009)

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Table 1

(Jewish Vote in the Presidential Election)

Year	Candidate	% of Jewish Vote		Year	Candidate	% of Jewish Vote
1916				1968		
	Hughes (R)	45			Nixon (R)	17
	Wilson (D)	55			Humphrey (D)	81
1920					Wallace (I)	2
	Harding (R)	43		1972		
	Cox (D)	19			Nixon (R)	35
	Debs (Soc)	38			McGovern (D)	65
1924				1976		
	Coolidge (R)	27			Ford (R)	27
	Davis (D)	51			Carter (D)	71
	La Folette (Progressive)	22			McCarthy (I)	2
1928				1980		
	Hoover (R)	28			Reagan (R)	39
	Smith (D)	72			Carter (D)	45
1932					Anderson (I)	14
	Hoover (R)	18		1984		
	Roosevelt (D)	82			Reagan (R)	31
1936					Mondale (D)	67
	Landon (R)	15		1988		
	Roosevelt (D)	85			Bush (R)	35
1940					Dukakis (D)	64
	Wilkie (R)	10		1992		
	Roosevelt (D)	90			Bush (R)	11
1944					Clinton (D)	80
	Dewey (R)	10			Perot (I)	9
	Roosevelt (D)	90		1996		
1948					Dole (R)	16
	Dewey (R)	10			Clinton (D)	78

Table 1 Continued

	Truman (D)	75			Perot (I)	3
	Wallace (Progressive)	15		2000		
1952					Bush (R)	19
	Eisenhower (R)	36			Gore (D)	79
	Stevenson (D)	64			Nader (G)	1
1956				2004		
	Eisenhower (R)	40			Bush (R)	24
	Stevenson (D)	60			Kerry (D)	76
1960					Nader (G)	<1
	Nixon (R)	18		2008		
	Kennedy (D)	82			McCain (R)	22
1964					Obama (D)	78
	Goldwater (R)	10				
	Johnson (D)	90				

APPENDIX B

Table 2

(The answers to question of Is Israel an ally of the United States, an enemy of the United States or somewhere in between?)

	December 2008	July 2010	Aug 2010
Ally	63%	58%	60%
Enemy	3%	5%	4%
Somewhere in between	27%	32%	31%
Not sure	7%	5%	6%