

THE POSSIBILITY AND LIMIT OF LIBERAL MIDDLE POWER POLICIES:
THE CASE OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD
THE MIDDLE EAST DURING THE AKP PERIOD

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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE POSSIBILITY AND LIMIT OF LIBERAL MIDDLE POWER POLICIES: THE CASE OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST DURING THE AKP PERIOD

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The main aim of this dissertation is to understand the change of Turkish state identity related to foreign policy behaviors after the collapse of the Cold War structure. The research question of this dissertation is why and how Turkey has constructed middle power identity, which is based on liberal foreign policies. This dissertation examines two main purposes. First purpose is to analyze AKP's liberalism based middle power policies from 2005 to 2010 toward the Middle East. In this dissertation, the liberal policies based on middle power are defined as implementing functional diplomacy, mediation role, niche diplomacy, coalition diplomacy, and norm diffusion. Second purpose is to understand the process of how the state constructs its policies. To that end, this dissertation takes notice of state identity, which is constructed by changes of circumstances, norms, state self-perception, and the perceptions of others. This dissertation assumes that the concept of middle power is one of Turkey's state identities in the area of foreign policy. Turkey's middle power behaviors make Turkey consciously aware of its middle power status. This dissertation analyzes the existence of two steps that are pathways for Turkey to understand itself as a liberal middle power in the international arena. The first step is to analyze the policies of Özal, Erbakan and Cem. The second step is to examine AKP's foreign policy experiences and ideas, especially the ideas of Ahmet Davutoğlu.

Keywords: Middle power, state identity, liberal policies, Middle East, prestige

ÖZ

LİBERAL ORTA GÜÇ POLİTİKALARININ OLASILIĞI VE SINIRI: AKP DÖNEMİNDE ORTADOĞU'YA YÖNELİK TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI

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Bu tezin ana amacı, Soğuk Savaş sisteminin çöküşünden sonra Türk dış politikası davranışlarında meydana gelen değişimi anlamaktır. Bu sebeple, Türkiye'nin liberal dış politikalara dayalı orta güç kimliğini niçin ve nasıl inşa ettiği sorusu bu tezin araştırma konusunu teşkil edecektir. Bu tez, iki ana konuyu incelemektedir. Birincisi, 2005'ten 2010'a AKP'nin liberalizme dayalı orta güç politikalarıdır. Bu tezde, liberalizme dayalı orta güç politikaları, fonksiyonel diplomasi, arabuluculuk, niche diplomasi, ortak diplomasi ve norm yayma politikalarının yürütülmesi olarak tanımlandı. Ortadoğu'ya yönelik Türkiye'nin liberal orta güç politikasının bu olgun döneminin bütün etkilerini inceleyebilmek için devlet politikalarının inşa sürecini anlamak mecburiyetindeyiz. Bu ise, tezin ikinci konusunu teşkil edecektir. Bu amaçla, Türkiye'nin devlet kimliğindeki değişim ve devamlılıklar dikkate alınacaktır. Devlet kimliği, uluslararası ve bölgesel şartlar, normlardaki değişimler, devletin öz algısı ve ötekilerin algıları tarafından inşa edilir. Bu tezde uluslararası alanda Türkiye'nin kendisini orta güç olarak görmesine yol veren iki safha analiz edilecektir. İlk safha, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Ortadoğu politikalarında tarihî ve kültürel ilişkileri önplana çıkaran "alternatif perspektifler"dir. Turgut Özal, Necmettin Erbakan ve İsmail Cem bu alternatif perspektifleri savundular. Hükümetlerin farklı mevkilerinde görev yapmış olsalar da sahip oldukları bu fikir, Türk dış politikasını dönüştürmeye sevk etti. İkinci safhayı ise, AKP hükümetinin 2005'e kadarki tecrübe ve tasarıları oluşturur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Orta güç, devlet kimliği, liberal politika, Ortadoğu, ulusal itibarı

To my beloved and my parents

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ix
LIST OF TABLES.....	xvi
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xvii
ABBREVIATIONS.....	xviii

CHAPTER

1. Introduction

1.1. Introductory Remarks.....	1
1.2. Purposes of This Dissertation.....	11
1.3. Theoretical Framework.....	13
1.4. Methodology.....	15
1.5. Contents of Dissertation.....	16

2. Framework of the Middle Power Identity

2.1. Concepts of Middle Power.....	19
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2.1.1.	Concepts of Middle.....	20
2.1.2.	Concepts of Power.....	23
2.1.3.	Realism Based Middle Power.....	26
2.1.4.	Liberalism Based Middle Power.....	28
2.1.5.	Constructivism Based Middle Power.....	31
2.2.	Identification Process of Middle Power Identity.....	33
2.2.1.	Construction of State Identity.....	33
2.2.2.	Turkey's Tradition Foreign Policy Style.....	36
2.2.3.	Material Change.....	37
2.2.4.	Norm Change in International and Domestic Dimensions.....	37
2.2.5.	Self-Perceptual Change.....	40
2.2.6.	Others' Perceptual Change.....	44
2.2.7.	State Interests.....	47
2.3.	State Foreign Policies.....	48
2.3.1.	Realist Policies.....	49
2.3.1.1.	Balancing.....	49
2.3.1.2.	Bandwagoning.....	51
2.3.1.3.	Neutrality.....	52
2.3.2.	Liberal Policies.....	54
2.3.2.1.	Functional Diplomacy.....	55
2.3.2.2.	Mediation.....	56
2.3.2.3.	Niche Diplomacy.....	57
2.3.2.4.	Coalition Diplomacy.....	59
2.3.2.5.	Norm Diffusion.....	61

2.4.	Chapter Conclusion.....	67
3. Historical Background		
3.1.	Continuous Foreign Policy Traditions.....	69
3.1.1.	Traditional Foreign Policy Ideas (1) Ottomanism.....	71
3.1.2.	Traditional Foreign Policy Ideas (2) Islamism.....	73
3.1.3.	Traditional Foreign Policy Ideas (3) Pan-Turkism.....	74
3.1.4.	Traditional Foreign Policy Ideas (4) Westernization.....	76
3.1.5.	Traditional Foreign Policy Ideas (5) Misakı Milli.....	78
3.2.	History of Turkish Middle Power Policies.....	79
3.2.1.	Middle Power Policies during the Period of Abdülhamid II.....	80
3.2.2.	Middle Power Policies from the Interwar Period to WWII.....	85
3.2.2.1.	Balkan Entente and the Saadabad Pact.....	85
3.2.2.2.	Active Neutrality during the World War II.....	89
3.2.3.	Middle Power Policies during Early Cold War Period.....	94
3.2.4.	Middle Power Policies during Detente Period.....	101
3.3.	Turkey and the Middle East.....	105
3.4.	Chapter Conclusion.....	109
4. Premise of Liberal Middle Power		
4.1.	Contributions of Turgut Özal.....	111
4.1.1.	Material and Norm Changes.....	112
4.1.2.	Liberal Economy and Economic Cooperation.....	113
4.1.3.	Strict Neutrality to Positive Activism toward the Middle East.....	116

4.1.4.	Institution-Buildings.....	120
4.1.5.	Challenge the EC Accession.....	121
4.1.6.	Neo-Ottomanism.....	122
4.2.	Necmettin Erbakan’s Contributions to Liberal Middle Power.....	125
4.2.1.	Pragmatic Behavior of the Welfare Party.....	126
4.2.2.	Pro-Islamic Foreign Policies.....	130
4.3.	Contributions of Ismail Cem.....	132
4.3.1.	Material Change and Norm Change.....	132
4.3.2.	Cem’s Idea of World State.....	133
4.3.3.	Regional Facilitator or Mediator.....	136
4.3.4.	Desecuritization between Turkey and Syria.....	138
4.3.5.	Prototype of Zero-Problem Policy.....	143
4.4.	Others’ Perceptions.....	145
4.4.1.	Western Perceptions.....	145
4.4.2.	Arab Perceptions.....	146
4.5.	Chapter Conclusion.....	147
5.	The Foundation of AKP’s Foreign Policy Identity	
5.1.	Learning from Experience.....	151
5.1.1.	Experience of 28 February in 1997.....	152
5.1.2.	Experience of EU Accession.....	158
5.1.3.	Experience of the Gulf Crisis.....	163
5.2.	Ideas of AKP’s Foreign Policy.....	166
5.2.1.	A Pragmatic Approach Based on Turkish Democracy.....	166

5.2.2.	The Idealist Approach Based on Davutoğlu's Idea.....	170
5.2.2.1.	Davutoğlu's Concepts on Civilizations.....	170
5.2.2.2.	Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth Theory.....	173
5.2.2.3.	Davutoğlu's Neo-Ottomanism.....	180
5.3.	A Case Study of AKP Foreign Policy: The Iraqi Crisis.....	183
5.4.	Change in Others' Perceptions.....	192
5.5.	Chapter Conclusion.....	193
6.	Realizing Liberal Middle Power	
6.1.	Functional Diplomacy.....	196
6.1.1.	Alliance of Civilizations.....	196
6.1.1.1.	Co-chairman of the Alliance of Civilizations.....	196
6.1.1.2.	Forum for International Stability.....	201
6.1.1.3.	Forum for Regional Stability.....	203
6.1.1.4.	The Problems of the Alliance of Civilizations.....	204
6.1.2.	Turkey as a Trading State.....	206
6.1.2.1.	Definition of Trading State.....	206
6.1.2.2.	The Case of the Levant Quartet.....	207
6.1.2.3.	The Case of the Relationships with GCC.....	211
6.2.	Mediation.....	214
6.2.1.	Turkey's Mediation toward Israeli-Palestinian Relations.....	215
6.2.1.1.	TOBB's Trials to Realize Ankara Forum.....	215
6.2.1.2.	The Instable Factors between Turkey and Israel.....	220
6.2.2.	Turkey's Mediation Efforts in Lebanon.....	222

6.2.2.1.	Chronology of Lebanon Crisis.....	222
6.2.2.2.	Turkey's Facilitator Diplomacy.....	226
6.2.2.3.	The First Process of Sending Military to UNIFIL II.....	229
6.2.2.4.	The Second Process of Sending Military to UNIFIL II.....	234
6.2.3.	Turkey's Mediation of Israeli-Syrian Relations.....	238
6.2.3.1.	Backgrounds of Mediation.....	238
6.2.3.2.	The Process of Indirect Talks.....	244
6.3.	Niche Diplomacy: TIKA.....	247
6.4.	Coalition Diplomacy.....	253
6.4.1.	The Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's Neighboring Countries.....	254
6.5.	Norm Diffusion: Greater Middle East Project and the OIC.....	261
6.5.1.	Turkish Norm Diffusion and Its Framework.....	261
6.5.2.	First Mode of Norm Diffusion.....	263
6.5.3.	Second Mode of Norm Diffusion.....	265
6.5.4.	Third Mode of Norm Diffusion.....	266
6.5.5.	Cases of BMENA and DAD.....	268
6.5.6.	Case of OIC.....	272
6.6.	Others' Perceptions.....	274
6.6.1.	Western Perceptions.....	274
6.6.2.	Arab Perceptions.....	276
6.7.	Chapter Conclusion.....	279

7.	Conclusion	
7.1.	Evaluation.....	282
7.1.1.	Middle Power Concept.....	282
7.1.2.	Material Change and Norm Change.....	283
7.1.3.	Self-Perceptual Change.....	284
7.1.4.	Others' Perceptual Change.....	287
7.1.5.	Turkey's Liberal Policies from 2005 to 2010.....	288
7.2.	Epilogue.....	292
7.2.1.	The Decline of Relationships with Israel.....	292
7.2.2.	Arab Spring as Another Material Change?.....	295
7.2.3.	Between the Hobbesian and Kantian Perspectives.....	296
	REFERENCES.....	300
	APPENDICES	
A.	APPENDIX.....	346
B.	CURRICULUM VITAE.....	347
C.	TURKISH SUMMARY.....	350

LIST OF TABLES

TABLES

Table 1	Differences between Realism and Liberalism middle powers.....	33
Table 2	Turkey's middle power approaches from the late Ottoman period to the end of the Cold War.....	110
Table 3	Contributions by Özal, Erbakan and Cem to liberal middle power	148
Table 4	Turkish-Iraqi trade (1985-1991)	164
Table 5	Trade volumes with Middle Eastern countries.....	210
Table 6	Trade volumes with Gulf countries.....	212
Table 7	Evaluation of Turkey's mediator roles.....	247
Table 8	The transition of Turkey's middle power policies.....	299

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES

Figure 1	Identification process of state identity (middle power).....	35
Figure 2	Route of norm diffusion.....	263

ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
ANAP	Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for Liberation of Armenia
BMENA	Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
CHP	Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
COMCEC	Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation
DAD	Democracy Assistance Dialogue
DEİK	Foreign Economic Relations Board (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu)
DEKA	Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
DSP	Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti)
EC	European Community
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GAP	Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi)
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
JUSMMAT	Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
KDP	Kurdish Democratic Party
MHP	National Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
MÜSİAD	Independent Industrialist' and Businessmen's Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OPC	Operational Provide Comfort
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan)
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

TBMM	Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
TEPAV	Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı)
TESEV	Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı)
TİKA	Turkish International Cooperation Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı)
TOBB	The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği)
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introductory Remarks

Turkey continues to be a force for peace and stability in the volatile region in which it is located. Especially in the course of the past 7 years, we have exerted every effort to settle all our differences with our neighbors. Thanks to this approach which we call “zero problem with neighbors” Turkey has made significant progress in resolving outstanding issues with its neighbors and greatly improved its bilateral relations. The problems in our region have global implications. Therefore, our constructive and peaceful regional policies serve not only own neighborhood but also global peace. However, even that we don’t consider sufficient. We aim to move from a relationship of passive good-neighborliness to one of active friendship and cooperation. The positive impact of this approach on regional and world peace is well appreciated by all our friends.¹

The fundamental aim of Turkish foreign policy during the post-Cold War period is the continuity of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s foreign policy principle “Peace at home, peace in the world”. But the style of Turkish foreign policy began to change. The speech quoted above by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the 64th session of General Assembly in the United Nations on September 24, 2009 showed this continuity of purpose and change of method clearly. For achieving the regional and global peace and stabilities for Turkey’s state interest, Erdoğan emphasized the change from passive friendship approach to active and positive good

¹ (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Uluslararasıkuruluslar/2009-Basbakan-Genel-Kurul-Ingilizce.pdf>), June 12, 2011 accessed.

neighborhood approach. Under the “zero problem policy” led by Ahmet Davutoğlu, several liberal policies are implemented to get friendship and prestige both in region and international society. But liberal foreign policies in Turkey were not the main approach as accomplishing its state interest.

After the establishment of Republic of Turkey, the core ideas of foreign policies had been marked by “Western” or “Westernization” policies, as well as balance-conscious policies directed at defending its territory and attaining the status of “European” country.² Westernization, on the one hand, has affected the elites’ identities and drove the modernization movement of the late Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the founders of Republic of Turkey experienced occupation by Western states firsthand. So, Westernization was framed by Turkish decision makers as the earnest desire and imperative to survive in the international arena. To do so, they had attempted to strike a balance among the forces of world politics with a focus on maintaining its national security. Hence Turkey made the first priority of its foreign policy on “peace at home”.

During the early Cold War period, the principle of Westernization and Soviet threat prompted Turkey to jump on the bandwagons of Western countries, especially the United States. Yet, the Johnson Letter, in which the United States warned Turkey not to intervene in Cyprus on June 4, 1964, shifted Turkish foreign policy from a Western bandwagon policy toward more of a balancing act between West, East and neighboring countries.³ After the Johnson Letter

² Meliha Benli. Altunışık, “Ne İslam Dünyası Ne de Türk Dünyası Bir Lider Arayışı İçindedir” in Habibe Özdal, Osman Bahadır, Mehmet Yegin (ed), *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası: Cilt 2*, Ankara: USAK Yayınları, 2010, p.3.

³ The Johnson Letter strongly warned then-Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü not to

incident, Turkey implemented passive multi-dimensional policies.⁴ However, the top priority of both bandwagon and balancing policies during the Cold War era was survival, the core idea of realism in international relations. In other words, realism based on foreign policy was the most important element in the continuity of Turkey's traditional foreign policies.

The concept of middle power also affected to Turkish realism based on foreign policies. Turkey was not so strong as great powers in international system, but it was not so weak as small powers. In international system, Turkey has been regarded as middle power or second ranked power. Middle powers were considered that it had no hope of winning a war with great powers in wartime without cooperation with other great powers.⁵ Hence Turkey had to choose balancing, bandwagoning, and neutrality as a way of achieving the status quo with its limitation of power during the Cold War period.

While continuing these policies in the post-Cold War period, four decision-makers who served as Prime Minister or Foreign Minister had tried to change the approach of Turkish foreign policy. These were Turgut Özal, Necmettin Erbakan, Ismail Cem, and Ahmet Davutoğlu. The end of the Cold War

intervene with Cyprus and to reconcile with Greece. In this letter, U.S. President Johnson used menacing rhetoric articulating "I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies".

⁴ Around the 1980, three events brought Turkey close to the United States again. These events were Iranian revolution, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the third military coup in Turkey. The Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy (DECA) signed on March 1980 was the symbol of this movement. Yet, Turkey did not play a positive role against Soviet Union and the Middle East region reflecting the Western interests unlike in the 1950s.

⁵ Martin Wight (edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad), *Power Politics*, Continuum: New York, 1978, p.65.

and the demise of the Soviet Union formed a global level turning point in international politics. Turgut Özal, who was the President at that time, tried to adapt Turkey to the new situation in world politics using its geopolitics, history, and ethnicity maximally. Soon after the Cold War, Özal chose the bandwagon policy toward the West, especially the United States. Example cases include the Gulf Crisis and subsequent Operation Provide Comfort regarding Iraqi Kurdish refugees.⁶ Özal had considered that the United States as a superpower would construct a unipolar system based on liberal democracy. By adopting bandwagoning policies, Turkey aimed to maintain good relations with the United States. As a number of ethnic conflicts erupted, Özal recognized that the post-Cold War era was a mixture of unipolar and multipolar. In particular, the Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus, and Balkan, which were neighbors of Turkey, were all regions the United States and the Western powers could not control as intended. Therefore, Turkey would have to take care of both the Western circles and its neighbors in order to secure its national interest.

Corresponding to this newly realized situation, Özal chose to follow a path of liberal policies in order to manage transitioning in world politics and to increase Turkey's influence on newly emerging states. These newly independent neighboring states needed economic partnerships and economic aids. Alongside this, the establishment of the Central Asia and Caucasian states in particular, as well as the predicament of Muslims in the series of conflicts occurring on the

⁶ Operation Provide Comfort was launched as a humanitarian operation focused on Kurdish refugees and returning them to their Iraqi homes. The main forces were the American air and ground forces. Meliha B. Altunışık, "Turkish-American Security Relations: The Middle East Dimension" in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (eds), *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, New York: Routledge, 2004, pp.157-158.

Balkan Peninsula stimulated Turkey's old identity anew.

The Turkic Summit, held in October 1992, and the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in December 1993 were typical examples of liberal approaches that characterized the Özal era. Turkey aimed at increasing trade, moving money and people and consolidating a sense of regional community through these sub-regional organizations. In addition, Özal made a full effort to join the European Community (afterward the European Union). The approaches toward European membership have increased the legitimacy of Turkish foreign policy, and prompted Turkey to adopt more liberal approaches. Consequently, Europeanization and foreign policies towards the surrounding newly independent states had partly changed back to traditional foreign policy identities. Yet, eventually Özal's attempted transformation from realism-oriented policies to liberalism-oriented policies did not break the traditional realist stronghold.⁷

Shortly afterwards, in the mid-1990s, Necmettin Erbakan who served as Prime Minister from June 1996 to June 1997 established the Developing-8 (D-8) on the basis of Muslim identity with the purpose of enhancing Turkish influence. Although approaching a different dimension of Turkish character in world politics, Erbakan also approved and adopted the identity change and community-building effort, like those of Özal. Institutional building or coalition is one of the important elements in liberal foreign policy.

DSP led by Bülent Ecevit put importance on the regional-centered foreign policy based on good relations with its neighboring states. Ismail Cem, who

⁷ Kemal Kirişçi, "The transformation of Turkish foreign: The rise of the trading state", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Vol.40, Spring, 2008, p.45.

served as Foreign Minister under the ANASOL-D and coalition of Democratic Left party, Nationalist Movement party and Motherland party (DSP-ANAP coalition) governments for approximately five years, played central role in implementing regional-centered policy.⁸ During Cem's tenure, Syria decided to send Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), into exile in accordance with the Adana agreement in October 1998, and Öcalan was arrested at the Greek embassy in Kenya. These events changed the atmosphere of regional and domestic politics.⁹ Another contribution to Turkish foreign policy by Cem was the acceptance to the status of candidate to membership in the European Union at the 1999 Helsinki summit. Normalization of relations with Syria and progress toward Europeanization were triggers of the "zero-problem policy" subsequently adopted by Justice and Development Party (AKP) government.

During Cem's service as foreign minister, the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred, exacerbating relations between Western countries and Muslim countries. After the 9/11 attacks, Cem attempted to mediate these deteriorated relationships. The OIC-EU joint forum on February 12-13, 2002 was the result of his effort. Unlike the setback resulting from Özal's attempt, Cem's efforts paved the way for later liberal and identity-based approaches. Yet, Özal, Erbakan and Cem did not completely change from realism based policies to liberalism based policies.

The AKP's majority victory in 2002 election was a turning point in both

⁸ ANASOL-D refers to the coalition government of the Motherland party, the Democratic left party and the Democratic Turkey party from June 1997 to January 1999.

⁹ Sükrü Elekdağ described these situations as "two and a half wars for Turkey" (Greece, Syria and PKK). The idea of two and a half wars for Turkey, as it were, which had been a dominant idea within foreign ministry and military, were solved. Sükrü Elekdağ, "2 1/2 War Strategy", *Perceptions*, March-May 1996, pp.33-57.

domestic politics and foreign policies.¹⁰ Unlike the previous Islamist parties led by Erbakan, the AKP has positively pursued the EU accession process and multi-dimensional diplomacy. Generally speaking, the foreign policies of the AKP have swung between two lines, a pro-Western pragmatic approach related to the traditional approach, and idealist approach. From the Iraqi War, which was initiated in March 2003 to the failure of “the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA)” in 2005, two approaches were competed. However, the failure of BMENA and the problems in the Turkish negotiation with the EU after 2006 even though accession negotiations had begun, gradually created a situation in which the idealist approach led by Ahmet Davutoğlu could take a central position in foreign policy. The main argument of his strategic depth is predicated on historical depth and geographical depth. Davutoğlu defines historical depth as a characteristic of a country that is at the epicenter of historical events. Geographical depth is a part of historical depth and indicates that Turkey’s place is at the center of many geopolitical influences. Though Davutoğlu’s strategic aims are based on realism thinking, his policies for achieving aims are based on liberalism.

This idealist approach has been implemented in the Middle East region and made an impact on regional politics, especially since 2005. In other words, the latter half of the 2000s was new golden age for Turkey’s Middle East policies. Oğuzlu described this period as the “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s foreign policy” giving priority to Middle Eastern affairs over maintaining good

¹⁰ In the general election held on November 2002, the AKP got 363 of 541 seats and became the single ruling party.

relationships with the West.¹¹ Among Turkey's Middle Eastern policy moves, the most impressive was Turkey's mediator trial between Syria and Israel in mid-2008. On April 27, 2008, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Syria to carry a message from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to the Syrian government. After a meeting with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, Erdoğan announced that Turkey was prepared to take on a mediator role between Syria and Israel to restart peace talks.¹² In reply to Erdoğan's remark, President Assad said that Syria was ready to cooperate with Turkey in order to resume the dialogue with Israel.¹³ The dialogue between Syria and Israel continued through four rounds of indirect talks through the mediation of Turkey. However, ultimately the results failed. Despite this failure, Turkey was praised for its mediator role by the international society.

Owing to the impact of its mediator role between Syria-Israeli in indirect talks, Turkey realized a series of Ankara Forums between Israel and Palestine and sending troops to UNIFIL II in Lebanon, which also showed Turkey's activism toward the Middle East compared to before. The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) took a leading role in this project along with the AKP government. TOBB has held several meetings for the purpose of deepening economic cooperation among Turkey, Israel and Palestine, and for developing industrial zones in Palestine since April 2005. Of these, the fifth meeting held on November 12, 2007 received massive attention from international

¹¹ Tarık Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.9, No.1, 2008, p.3.

¹² *Turkish Daily News*, April 28, 2008.

¹³ *Haaretz*, April 27, 2008.

society because of the attendance of both Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and was a crucial step toward the subsequent Annapolis summit. The Ankara Forums showed not only Turkey's activism toward the Middle East but also the new character of Turkey's foreign policy focusing on cooperation between government and civil society.¹⁴ When Lebanon Crisis happened in July 2006, Turkey also made effort to play a facilitator role for solving the problems. Turkey negotiated between Western and Middle Eastern countries, and decided to send troops to UNIFIL II.

Nevertheless, these idealist policies led by Davutoğlu have faced difficulties due to a series of crises with Israel since the end of 2008. These crises have brought two consequences. On the one hand, Turkish-Israeli relations have deteriorated both on the governmental and popular levels. On the other hand, Turkey has still been eager to adopt the status of active contributor in regional and world peace, although policy-makers have begun to show an affinity toward Arab countries. Also, Turkey is forced to choose difficult choices facing with Arab spring happened in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and other Arab states. Yet, the importance of Turkish activism toward the Middle East from 2005 to 2010 has not faded.

During the post-Cold War period, Turkey's power ability remains as a category of middle power in world politics. For example, Turkey's GDP and military expenditure are seventeenth in world ranking at the date of 2009.¹⁵ Yet, it

¹⁴ Cooperation between government and civil society in foreign policy is defined as track 2 diplomacy. This is not an alternative to track 1 (government led diplomacy) diplomacy, but complementary to it.

¹⁵ According to the World Bank, Turkey's GDP in 2009 was 614.603 billion \$.

is difficult to analyze Turkish foreign policy from the middle power status in international system. Alternatively, behaviors or performances became important factors for Turkey's middle power role like Canada, Australia and Japan. Liberalism policies and the contributions to regional and world stability and peace are typical middle power behaviors to increase prestige of middle power. But liberalist authors did not take care of the process of constructing middle power identity. Unlike other scholars, Neack emphasized, not being determined by the position in international system, but middle power is determined by self-identified by state.¹⁶ In other words, middle power is one of the state identities constructed by states' behaviors, especially liberal policies in world politics.

This dissertation examines "why and how Turkey began to construct middle power identity during the post-Cold War era through liberal policies, especially 2005 to 2010" as research question from the constructivism viewpoint. There is no research to examine AKP's foreign policy from the perspective of middle power identity. This research will be contributory to understand Turkish foreign policy during the AKP period.

(<http://www.worldbank.org.tr/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/TURKEYEXTN/0,,menuPK:361738~pagePK:141132~piPK:141109~theSitePK:361712,00.html>), August 5, 2011 accessed. Also, according to SIPRI's research, Turkey's military expenditure was 2.7% and 16.302 million \$. (<http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>), August 5, 2011 accessed.

¹⁶ Laura Neack, *The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era (second edition)*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008, p.162.

1.2. Purposes of This Dissertation

The main aim of this dissertation is to understand the change of Turkish state identity related to foreign policy behaviors after the collapse of the Cold War structure. The research question of this dissertation is why and how Turkey has constructed middle power identity, which is based on liberal foreign policies.

This dissertation examines two main purposes. First purpose is to analyze AKP's liberalism based middle power policies from 2005 to 2010. In this dissertation, the liberal policies based on middle power are defined as implementing functional diplomacy, mediation role, niche diplomacy, coalition diplomacy, and norm diffusion.

From 2005 to 2010, Turkish foreign policy, especially toward the Middle East seemed to be comparatively active in the history of Republic of Turkey, along with a period during the 1950s.¹⁷ Sayarı described Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern countries in the 1990s as "an era of considerable ferment", while Turkey's relationships with Middle Eastern states in the latter half of the 2000s can be described as "an era of considerable stability".¹⁸ Analyzing

¹⁷ For details on Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East during the 1950s, see Hüseyin Bağcı and Mehmet Şahin, "Doğu-Batı Arasında Demokrat Parti Dış Politikası", *Demokrasi Platformu*, Yıl.5, Sayı.17, 2009, pp.187-202, Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar* (3rd edition), Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2007, pp.37-102, Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler" in Baskin Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, İstanbul: İltişm Yayınları, 2001, pp.615-652, Ayşegül Sever, *Soğuk Savaş: Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Orta Doğu 1945-1958*, İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1997, and George Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945- 1971*, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and Hoover Institution, 1972, pp.49-84.

¹⁸ Sabri Sayarı, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXVI, No.3, 1997, p.44.

Turkey's liberal middle power policies from 2005 to 2010 toward the Middle East would answer why Turkey implement liberal middle power policies, not traditional foreign policies.

To study the full impact of mature era of Turkish liberal policies based on middle power toward the Middle East, this dissertation has to understand the process of how the state constructs its policies. This is the second aim of this dissertation. To that end, this dissertation takes notice of change and continuity in Turkey's state identity. State identity is constructed by international and regional circumstances, changes in norms, state self-perception, and the perceptions of others. This dissertation assumes that the concept of middle power is one of Turkey's state identities in the area of foreign policy. Turkey's middle power behaviors make Turkey consciously aware of its middle power status. This dissertation analyzes the existence of two steps that are pathways for Turkey to understand itself as a liberal middle power in the international arena.

The first step is so-called "alternative perspectives" toward the Middle Eastern policies in the post-Cold War period which have emphasized historical and cultural relationships.¹⁹ Özal, Erbakan and Cem held these alternative perspectives. They served different positions in each government, however, their idea urged the transformation of Turkish foreign policy.

The second step consisted of the experiences and ideas of the AKP government until 2005. The experience of the Iraqi crisis was the touchstone of

¹⁹ The phrase of "alternative perspectives" about Turkish foreign policy during the Post-Cold War period is used by Meliha Altunışık in contrast to "neo-traditional perspectives" which have downgraded the cultural aspects with the Middle East region. Meliha B. Altunışık, "Worldviews and Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.40, Spring 2009, p.178.

the AKP's policy toward the Middle East. Davutoğlu's ideas were also gradually legitimated after the Iraqi crisis. In other words, AKP's liberal middle power policies from 2005 to 2010 are not totally new behaviors, and these behaviors had been progressively built upon by earlier decision-makers. Vice versa, Turkey's liberal middle power policies have begun to decline after the deterioration of the relationships with Israel since the beginning of 2009.

1.3. Theoretical Framework

Constructivism is the main theoretical base of this dissertation. Understanding how social facts change and the ways these influence politics is the major concern of constructivist analysis.²⁰ In the respect of the issue areas of constructivism, Finnemore and Sikkink show 10 issues. These are global norms versus local effects, idea and power, identity and state action, mechanism and processes of social construction, norm entrepreneurs, international organization and law, epistemic communities, speech, argument and persuasion, structural configuration, bias toward progressive norm.²¹ Hence, how state identity is constructed is one of the main topics for constructivists.

As theoretical framework, this dissertation shows the ideal model of the identification process of state identity. Concerning the state identity, Wendt emphasized the self-understanding and other actors' perceptions to build state

²⁰ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol.4, 2001, p.393.

²¹ *Ibid*, pp. 396-404.

identity.²² International and regional material changes trigger the norm changes in international and regional level. These material and norm changes affect the change of self-perceptions and others' perceptions. In addition to this, tradition and legacy of foreign policies are also factors of state identity building.

The concept of middle power has been used in Turkey by some scholars and journalists. In many cases, their understandings of the concept of middle power are of middle-ranking powers in the international system, middle-developed countries, or the geographical middle between Europe and Asia or Europe and the Middle East. To take the case of Turkey, this recognition of middle power basically worked well from the reign of Abdülhamid II during the era of the Ottoman Empire to the end of the Cold War. Hale and Oran are the leading scholars to apply the middle power concept toward Turkey.²³ According to their middle power ideas, the main policies of middle powers are translated as power balancing, bandwagoning, and neutrality to maintain status quo.

But, Turkey has attempted to adopt a liberal approach since the end of the Cold War. Turkey is still a middle power in world politics, but the contents of this middle power have been transformed. Vice versa, liberal approaches have transformed Turkey's middle power identity into one analogous with those of Canada and Australia. In other words, Turkey has become a middle power both in self-identification and in others' recognition.

In this dissertation, liberal middle power policies are interpreted as (i)

²² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.224.

²³ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, London: Frank Cass, 2002, pp.1-11; Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2001, pp.29-33.

functional diplomacy, (ii) mediation, (iii) niche diplomacy, (iv) coalition diplomacy and (v) norm diffusion. This dissertation takes up the cases for five liberal middle power policies, especially toward the Middle East. It is because Turkey's Middle Eastern policies clearly reflect on Turkey's liberal policies as middle power from 2005 to 2010.

1.4. Methodology

Regarding methodology, this dissertation will primarily use an empirical research using document analysis and interviews, and centering around the behaviors of Turkey as a middle power. Especially from chapter 3 to chapter 5, the dissertation examines Turkey's foreign policy behaviors focusing some cases. The empirical research consists first of interviews and TBMM Zabıt Varakası (parliamentary official reports). These sources are the primary sources available for research on Turkish Foreign Policy. Personal interviews were conducted with politicians involved in foreign policy, diplomats, professors, and researchers. In addition to these, secondary sources, like newspapers, journals, and books, have been the sources of other useful information. Newspapers used for this dissertation are Hürriyet, Milliyet, Radikal, Yeni Şafak, Zaman, Turkish (Hürriyet) Daily News, and Today's Zaman. The journals Demokrasi Platformu, Insight Turkey, New Perspectives on Turkey, Perceptions, Turkish Policy Quarterly and Turkish Studies were also indispensable. Various other English and Turkish articles focused on Turkish Foreign Policy were used.

1.5. Contents of Dissertation

This dissertation consists of 5 chapters. Chapter 1 begins with a review of literatures on the concept of middle power, and presents an analytical framework for this concept. The works of Holmes, Holbraad and Wood are classics about the concept of middle power. In the 1990s, Cooper et al presented sophisticated middle power concepts in two important books, *Relocating Middle Power: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* and *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*. Among these classics, the works of Holbraad and Wood can be regarded as realist approaches. On the other hand, Holmes and Cooper et al are generally categorized under liberal approaches. But these previous works confused middle power with position, behavior and policy. This dissertation clearly classifies middle power concepts into realism, liberalism and constructivism. This research focuses in particular on constructivism, which emphasized on the epistemological position and liberal policies. Middle powers can coordinate to encourage trade with other countries, to make coalitions with regional and sub-regional organizations positively, to focus on minor issues on the agenda, to mediate between several states, to emphasize ideas, to diffuse norms to several regions, and finally to develop a pluralistic security community in the region.²⁴ These policies have developed and reinforced the middle power identity as a state identity.

²⁴ According to Karl Deutsch, security community is “one which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way. Pluralistic security community is one type of integration which constructed by legal independence of separate governments”. Karl W. Deutsch et al, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, pp.5-6.

Chapter 2 looks at the historical background of Turkish foreign policies, especially its middle power behaviors. Broadly speaking, there are three topics which need to be asked in this context. These are questions regarding traditional foreign political ideas about Turkey, middle power policy from the late Ottoman period to the end of the Cold War, and Turkish foreign policies toward the Middle Eastern countries. Of the traditional ideas about Turkish foreign policy, this dissertation deals with Ottomanism, Islamism, Pan-Turkism, Westernization, and Misakı Milli. In the Cold War era, the primary goal of Turkish foreign policy was to maintain the status quo as a middle-ranked power in international politics. Specifically, Turkey adopted realist policies like balancing act, bandwagoning and neutrality for this purpose, especially during the late Ottoman Empire period, the interwar period, the World War II period, the early Cold War period and the détente period. In addition to this, the grand theory of Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East during the Cold War period was to avoid intervention to the extent possible. The Middle East was not the first priority on the Turkish foreign policy agenda.

In Chapter 3, this dissertation takes up Turkish foreign policy during the 1990s, in particular, the policies of Özal, Erbakan and Cem. This is because Turkish state identity as a middle power seems to have changed during their tenure. They gradually started to adapt to the new circumstances in international politics with shifts in policy toward liberalism and state identity change.

Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 feature discussions on the AKP's foreign policies. Chapter 4 first provides an overview of the background of the AKP's foreign policy. It proceeds to examine Davutoğlu's ideas and their implications for

Turkish foreign policy, especially Turkish reactions to the 2003 Iraqi War. The focus of Chapter 5 is the AKP's active liberal policies. These include its behavior as a trading state, the Alliance of Civilizations as functional diplomacy, Turkey's third party roles as mediators, the activities of TİKA as niche diplomacy, improvement in relations with regional organizations, such as the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's neighboring countries as a coalition diplomacy, activities in the broader Middle East and the North Africa Initiative and in the OIC as norm diffusion. As Turkey has recently acted as mediator in many cases, this dissertation examines Turkey's mediation of Israeli-Palestinian relations, Israeli-Syrian relations, and Israeli-Lebanese relations, especially in the case of the Israeli attack on Hezbollah in July 2006. As a result, Turkish activities during this period can be understood well from the perspective of liberal middle power.

To sum up, this dissertation attempts to show three results. First of all, Turkish foreign policies from 2005 to 2010 are readily understandable from the perspective of constructivism. Secondly, during the post-Cold War period, Özal, Erbakan, Cem and other decision-makers in the AKP have promoted the adoption of alternative approaches for pursuing national interests or for showing the Turkish presence compared to that which came before. Thirdly, the concept of middle power has often been employed from the realist and liberalist perspectives, yet constructivism is an essential element of theorizing middle power.

CHAPTER 2

2. Framework of the Middle Power Identity

If one attempts to list (those) countries which have earned the designation of middle powers by performance beyond mere existence with intermediate-class statistics, one realizes how fleeting and intangible the status is.

John Holmes

The self-identified middle power internalized the idea of the middle power and began conforming their external behaviors to expectations...middle powers were self-defined as states that committed their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of international peace and order.

Laura Neack

2.1. Concepts of Middle Power

Concept of middle power had used in the context of power politics and realist school in international relations. Ranking in GDP, position in international system and the degree of development were used as a major of determination of middle power. Since the end of the World War II, foreign policy behaviors in both region and international circumstances, especially liberal policies, begun to get the important element of determination of middle power. Canada's functional diplomacy through the United Nations and Australian niche and coalition diplomacy were typical cases. Behaviors of "good citizen" in region and world politics led increase prestige of state and help to expand the influence of state. Realist scholars consider that middle power is the position or status in

international system. Liberalists, on the other hand, regard middle power as policies or behaviors. But this dissertation defines middle power as a state identity, which affects state's foreign policies and behaviors. In this chapter, this dissertation examines the roots and classification of middle power concept. Secondly, this chapter shows the process of how middle power identity is constructed. Thirdly, it focuses on liberal foreign policies based on middle power identity.

2.1.1. Concepts of Middle

This chapter investigates the middle power, which is a theoretical framework guiding this dissertation. The middle power combines the concepts of 'middle' and 'power'. The concept of the middle has been recognized to contain both the meanings of literal middle size and intermediacy since antiquity. But it was not until the end of the Middle Ages that Giovanni Botero clarified its privileged position in world politics in his *The reason of state* published in 1606. He insisted that middle-sized states had an advantage in surviving world politics because they had sufficient strength and authority without help from other powers.²⁵

Middle-sized states are the most lasting, since they are exposed neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy by their greatness, and their wealth and power being moderate, passions are less violent, ambition finds less support and license less provocation than in large state.²⁶

²⁵ Giovanni Botero (translated by P.J and D.P Waley), *The Reason of State*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956, p.4.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p.8.

On the other hand, the concept of the “intermediate” or “the golden mean” had been more epistemological concept and related to the study of ethics. In *Nicomachean ethics*, Aristotle stressed that the intermediate encompasses the best ethics or excellence:

...it is intermediacy between two bad states, one set of bad states is deficient, the other excessive in relation to what is required both in affections and in actions, whereas excellence both finds and choose the intermediate. Hence excellence to be, is intermediacy, but in terms of what is best, and good practice, it is extremity.²⁷

As he defined the intermediate status placed between honor and dishonor was greatness of soul, the behavior of this position recalls functionalism.²⁸ He also pointed out that the concept of middle “is also a mark of the great-soul person not to ask anyone for anything, or only reluctantly, but to offer his services readily, and to be grand towards those in the middle”.²⁹ This idea of intermediate is seen not only in classics of Western philosophy but also in classics of Confucianism. The *Doctrine of the mean* is one of the four classics of Confucianist thought. In this book, the intermediate was explained like this:

While there are no stirring of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the state of equilibrium. When those feelings have

²⁷ Aristotle (translated Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe), *Nicomachean Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p.117.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p.119.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p.150.

been stirred and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of harmony. The equilibrium is the great root from which grow all the human acting in the world, and this harmony is the universal path which they all should pursue. Let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish.³⁰

As in these writings, intermediate is related with virtue of activities. But the authors of the classics did not write about the intermediate role of state.

To sum up, the concept of middle is divided into the physical concept of middle size and epistemological concept of the intermediate. Although both evoke a sense of position in human society, the basis of each ideas is different. On the one hand, the concept of middle size is ontological. Ontology is defined as “the theory of being” and its central questions ask what is meant by existence, what exists, and what is the nature of existential entity.³¹ Ontology is the core concept of realism in both philosophy and international relations. On the other hand, the concept of intermediate has depended on epistemology. Epistemology is defined as “the theory of knowledge” and its central questions ask how we know what we know, and how we can know what is true.³² In the context of international relations, constructivists absorbed the idea of epistemology in their theories. Constructivists placed the importance not only on each country’s power, but also on each country’s intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity was the issue of interpretation.

³⁰ Confucius, *The Doctrine of the Mean*, Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2004, p.1.

³¹ Roger Gomm, *Key Concepts in Social Research Methods*, New York; Palgrave, 2009, p.114.

³² *Ibid.*

So how an actor interprets a situation, other actors' activities and ideas, and constructs its identity through behaviors are important.

2.1.2. Concepts of Power

Power, the oldest and the most disputed concept in political science, has several meanings. The Longman Dictionary defines, power primarily as control (the ability or right to control people or events), government (the position of having political control of a country or political administration), influence (the ability to influence people or elicit them strong feelings), authority/right (the right or authority to do something), and ability (a natural or special ability to do something).³³ In the theory of international relations, the concept of power can be classified into two meanings, position (based on authority and influence) in an international system, and the ability via its basic policies of exerting itself onto international politics for the diffusion of control or influence.

Concerning ability in relation to power, this can roughly be divided into tangible and intangible power. Typical examples of tangible power are represented as military power and economic power. In the words of Nye, these powers are called hard power. Intangible power, meanwhile, is rooted in the idea of Max Weber. Weber turned his attention to aspects of psychological influence toward people without using force.³⁴ After Weber's suggestion, Dahl, Lasswell, and

³³ (http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/power_1), June 2, 2010 accessed.

³⁴ Felix Berenskoetter, "Thinking about power" in Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams (eds), *Power in World Politics*, London: Routledge, 2007, p.4.

Kaplan inherited his influential psychological approach to the power.³⁵ In the context of international relations, soft power, structural power, smart power, and normative power are considered intangible powers for exercising or constructing new discourses or situations. Surprisingly, one of the ancestors of realism was Morgenthau, the first author to bring up soft power in the context of international relations. In *Politics Among Nations*, he pointed out that “when we speak of power, we mean man’s control over the minds and actions of other men”.³⁶ He insisted that intangible power, which creates influence not through material force but through psychology. He specifically addressed legitimate power, the exercise of which was morally or legally justified.³⁷ Influenced by Morgenthau, Nye defines soft power as following:

...getting others to want the outcomes that you want- co-opts people rather than coerces them. ... the ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority.³⁸

Strange’s structural power was not as famous as Nye’s soft power, but, it contributed to a new dimension to discourses on power. She divided power into

³⁵ Debates about power from Dahl to Michel Foucault had mainly dealt with intangible power.

³⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Fifth edition), New York: Alfred.A. Knopf, 1973, p.28.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p.30.

³⁸ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, 2004, pp.5-6.

relational power (traditional or material power) and structural power (diffusion of power). Put simply, rational power is tangible power, and structural power is intangible power. According to Guzzini, Strange's diffusion of power has two meanings.³⁹ On the one hand, the effects of power penetrate throughout the world. On the other hand, power holders include not only the sovereign state, but other actors. Strange pointed out not only the qualities of power but also described changes in the distribution of power. Recently, Nye advocated "smart power", which is "developing an integrated strategy, resources base, and tool kit to achieve American (states') objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power".⁴⁰ Specifically, this are means that a combination of military power, alliances, partnerships, and institutions important to establishing legitimacy. This is the unification of hard power and soft power. The concept of normative power is generally discussed in relation to the European Union. Diez and Manners define normative power as "a power that is able to shape conceptions of the normal. We can therefore identify such a normative power by the impact it has on what is considered appropriate behavior by other actors".⁴¹ In other words, the EU is the center of "universal" norm diffusion toward states within or neighboring with the EU. We can see the influence of Kant, especially his notion of universal history, in the normative power.

³⁹ Stefano Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The continuing story of a death foretold*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.181.

⁴⁰ Richard L. Armitage and Joseph Nye, Jr., *CSIS Commission on smart power: A smarter, more secure America*, Washington. D.C: CSIS, 2007, p.7 (http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf), June 5, 2010 accessed.

⁴¹ Thomas Diez and Ian Manners, "Reflecting on normative power Europe" in Berenskoetter and Williams (eds), *op.cit*, 2007, p.175.

The capability of power, including both tangible and intangible powers, aims to change other actors' behavior, attitudes, or thinking. Generally, tangible power tends to force change in someone's behavior by its threat or dignity perception. Meanwhile, intangible power tends to encourage change without enforcement and more peaceful ways. So, intangible powers take on normative character. These trends are reflected in policies of power. Early contributors talked about middle power in the context of tangible power. But middle powers Canada and Australia emphasized intangible power through liberal policies and behaviors. Intangible power especially triggers to increase prestige of state.

2.1.3. Realism Based Middle Power

Next, this chapter summarizes some previous works written about middle power theory. At first, we look at the work of Holbraad, who belonged to the English School of international relations, and who published *Middle Powers in International Politics* in 1984. This work approached the field of political thought about middle power and historically how middle powers have acted or worked in several international systems like the unifocal system, the dualistic system, the triangular system and multiple system. He dealt with political thought and the history of middle power, just as a scholar belonging to the English School of international relations. His analytical approach toward the middle power can be regarded by and large as an approach based in realism for two reasons. At first, his grasp of middle power depends on the international system. Until around the end of the World War II, the role of middle power had fundamentally related to great

power politics and the security fields in the balance of power system.⁴² But establishing collective security system for the United Nations transformed middle powers into important actors working in concert with the five great powers.⁴³ During the détente period, the middle powers behaved more freely as actors than before. The term ‘middle power’ started to include some neutral and non-aligned countries like Sweden, Yugoslavia and India in those days.⁴⁴ Holbraad thus placed the role of middle power in relation to the international system. Secondly, he classified middle powers with regard to the Gross National Product (GNP) ranking. He used the GNP index as a barometer for each country’s military and economic power. For him, the standard of middle was based on position of international politics. To sum up, his concept of middle power was based on position in the international system and the hard power of international politics.

The study of Wood is similar to Holbraad’s work. He reviewed the historical dimension of middle power and tried to define it using the GNP ranking. He considered countries ranked between sixth and thirty fourth position to be middle powers.⁴⁵ Additionally, he summed up the roles of middle powers in three points.⁴⁶ At first, middle power has taken initiative in the region or sub-region.

⁴² Carsten Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, London: Macmillan Press, 1984, p.68.

⁴³ *Ibid*, p.69. But the construction of the Cold War structure stopped effective collective operations suddenly.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p.70.

⁴⁵ Bernard Wood, *The Middle Powers and the General Interest: Middle Powers in the International System*, Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1988, pp.17-18.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pp.19-20.

Secondly, some middle powers can act as leader in functional domains in international organization, especially the United Nations. The third role is to contribute to stabilize or mediate conflicts. On the other hand, the problems of middle power were behaviors of free-riding or status-seeking in world politics. Only analyzing middle powers from the perspectives of their ranking and their roles in world politics, his approach was also based on realism. Yet, he mentioned the role of stabilizer and mediator as characteristics of middle powers.

Ehteshami and Hinnebusch described states that may rank in the international system as middle powers, and which can exercise their influence locally as “regional middle powers”.⁴⁷ Their classification was also based on rank in the international system. Yet the concept of regional middle powers are premised the status in the international system and sub-regional system. Generally, the concept of middle power had been considered with reference to international system. So regional power and middle power are different typologies.

2.1.4. Liberalism Based Middle Power

Holmes wrote an article titled “Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?” in 1966. His concept of “middlepowermanship” differed from the ranking or position based middle power concepts like those of Holbraad and Wood. According to Holmes, “the designation of middle powers by performance beyond mere existence with intermediate-class statistics, one realizes how fleeting and

⁴⁷ Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran: Middle powers in a penetrated regional system*, London: Routledge, 1997, pp.6-7.

intangible the status is".⁴⁸ To put it briefly, Holmes defined middle power not in terms of rank or position in world politics but by performance or behavior. His functional approach toward middle power is a prototype for a liberal middle power. Canada's mediator role within the United Nations was typical example.⁴⁹ Though Holmes considered Canada as the main target of middlepowermanship, Cox redefines middlepowermanship as following:

The middle power is likely to be in the middle rank of material capabilities, but it also stands in the middle in situations of conflict. It seeks to expand the area of common ground which will make it possible to curtail risk in the management of conflict...An ability to take a certain distance from direct involvement in major conflicts, a sufficient degree of autonomy in relation to major powers, a commitment to orderliness and security in inter-state relations and to facilitating of orderly change in the world system are the critical elements for fulfillment of the middle power role.⁵⁰

Like Holmes, Cox emphasized functional behavior, and applies it to other countries or NGOs. For example, he applies this concept to Japan. Holmes and Cox regarded the abilities of middle power not only in terms of hard power, but soft power in world politics as well.

Cooper et al attempted to relocate the concept of middle power in the

⁴⁸ John Holmes, "Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?" in John Holmes, *The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy*, Toronto: The Carleton Library No.49, 1970, p.18.

⁴⁹ For details on Canada's middle power policies in the UN, see, John Holmes, *Canada: A Middle-Aged Power*, Toronto: The Carleton Library, 1976.

⁵⁰ Robert Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan and future world order" in Robert Cox and Timothy Sinclair, *Approaches to world order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.244.

mid-1990s in line with Holmes's functional or behavioral definition. They classified middle power into four categories, the state's position in the international hierarchy, its geography, its normative roles or diplomacy, and its approach to middlepowermanship.⁵¹ They especially focused on middlemanpowership and denied the realist and structural approaches to middle power.⁵² According to them, within behaviors of middle power, initiative-taking, leadership, and 'followership' were important elements. They said that "middle power leadership and initiative-taking have been based on non-structural forms of power and influence associated with the imaginative and energetic use of their diplomatic capabilities".⁵³ In other words, they emphasized intangible power rather than tangible power. These intangible powers can not be explain from realist viewpoint. Three behaviors of middle power arise: catalyst, facilitator, and manager. The dictionary definition of catalyst refers to an agent that facilitates the occurrence of important changes or events. According to Cooper, the role of the catalyst is to provide the intellectual and political energy to trigger an initiative.⁵⁴ The main role of the facilitator to act is as organizer for agenda-setting, and to form of associational, collaborative and coalitional activities.⁵⁵ The third behavior is as mediator in the context of institution-building. The contents of

⁵¹ Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*, Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993, p.17.

⁵² *Ibid*, pp.17-19.

⁵³ *Ibid*, pp.23-24.

⁵⁴ *Ibid* , p.24.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*.

institution-building are not only the creation of organizations and regimes but also the development of conventions and norms.⁵⁶ The third party role mediating the conflicts of two actors is an important dimension for mediator, too. Cooper et al proceeded to the idea of middlepowermanship to particular role in the world politics. Yet, middle powers strive to gain not only the prestige of being considered a good citizen in world politics, but also prestige for their own national interest.⁵⁷

Scholars who focus on liberal middle power put importance on behaviors and functions in world politics. In quality of power, since the end of World War II and with Canada's positive activities in the United Nations with using soft power. Surely, we view one feature of middle power is commitment to international or regional problems as good world citizens. Yet, they do not detail the process of how some states become middle powers.

2.1.5. Constructivism Based Middle Power

With reference to the above in this chapter, realist and liberalist have attempted to bring sophistication to the concept of middle power. Regardless, we can be sure that scholars have confused middle power's position, and behavior with identity. The ideas of Holbraad and Wood are based on positions of both geography and international system. Hence behaviors of middle power are what positions make of it. They regarded the middle power in international politics as

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.25.

⁵⁷ Jennifer M.Welsh, "Canada in the 21st century: Beyond Dominion and Middle Power", *International Journal*, Vol.61, No.4, 2004, p.4.

pre-given, and did not mention the identity dimensions of middle power at all. The works of Holmes tied middle power to its behavior; middlepowermanship, but he considered this framework only to be applicable to Canada, Australia and the Scandinavian countries. In contrast to Holmes, Cox advocated a more extensive application of the framework of middlepowermanship. But Holmes and Cox concurred with the idea that middle power was not a pre-given state but something that could be attained. Hence there was space to consider identity, however, they did not delineate the path of identification to become a middle power. But generally, though describing the epistemological dimension of middle power as normative power and middlepowermanship, liberalists did not interrogate identity change. Constructivism is the main theoretical base of this dissertation.

Understanding how social facts change and the ways these influence politics is the major concern of constructivist analysis. From the epistemological viewpoint, position in world politics is one of the elements of state identity construction. Also, the attitude “behaviors of middle power are what positions make of it” is an issue of self-identification (self-understanding). Liberalists regard liberal behaviors as feature of middle power. On the other hand, this dissertation considers that middle power identity is the core of liberal policies, and vice versa liberal policies construct middle power identity. Hence, in this dissertation, the concept of middle power is treated as a state identity. Neack describes self-identified middle power as the following:

The self-identified middle power internalized the idea of the middle power and began conforming their external behaviors to expectations...

middle powers were self-defined as states that committed their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of international peace and order.⁵⁸

This dissertation shares Neack’s perspective on middle power as self-definition with Neack, and does not regard it as only realism-oriented like in the analyses of Hale and Oran, and liberalism-oriented like Holmes and Cooper etc. To examine the self-identification process of liberal behaviors oriented middle power is the core research topic of this dissertation. In what follows, this chapter explains components of construction of middle power as state identity.

Table1. Differences between middle powers

	Means of middle	Methodology	Means of power
Realism	Middle size/development in international system	Ontology	Hard power
Liberalism	Normative and constructive behaviors	Ontology	Soft power Smart power
Constructivism	State identity	Epistemology	Soft power Smart power

2.1. Identification Process of Middle Power Identity

2.2.1. Construction of State Identity

Referring to The Longman Dictionary, the meaning of identity is “the qualities and attitudes that a person or group of people have, that make them

⁵⁸ Laura Neack, *The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era (second edition)*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008, p.162.

different from other people”.⁵⁹ Some scholars also insist that establishing identity or identification processes requires the existence of others.⁶⁰ Distinguishing oneself from others is the fundamental element of identity. Wendt classified state identity into four types; personal identity, type identity, role identity, and collective identity.⁶¹ This dissertation mainly deals with collective identity. This is because state identification processes are regarded as one of the modes to establish collective identities. Regarding collective identity, the difference between state identity and national identity is problematic. National identity is to share a consciousness of “we-ness” among nations. This consciousness is important to establish and to sustain a (nation) state. National identity is also constructed historically and is apt to emphasize continuity. Meanwhile, state identity imposes itself on states’ self-identification and the perception of others. Historical processes and internalization are important elements of national identity, while, state identity is variable depending on environmental changes. In addition to the difference of national identity and state identity, state identity is classified into internal state identity and external state identity. Regarding foreign policy analysis, external state identity is important. According to Wendt, relations with self-understanding (identification) and identity are the following:

⁵⁹ The Longman dictionary of Contemporary English on line (<http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/identity>), October 13, 2010 accessed.

⁶⁰ For examples, see Nuri Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, New York: Palgrave, 2003, pp.74-76, Iver Neumann, *The Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, pp.1-37.

⁶¹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp.224-231.

Identity is at base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor's self-understandings. However, the meaning of those understandings will often depend on whether other actors represent an actor in the same way, and to that extent identity will also have an intersubjective or systemic quality.⁶²

In addition to this, each state has several state identities. And these identities classified as macro and micro identities, and as lasting and temporal identities. State identity is the main source by which states shape their interests and foreign policies in matters of priority, based on relationships with other actors.




Figure 1. Identification process of state identity (middle power)

On the other hand, state identity is constructed by material change, rules in international politics change and perceptual change in both self and others. Material elements and perceptual elements in both international and domestic politics encourage changes of state identity. Material change is the basis of

⁶² Wendt, *op.cit*, p.224.

perceptual change in international, regional and domestic areas. For these incentives of change, foreign policy makers construct/ reconstruct state identity. State identity is the main factor for realizing state interest. The mode of realizing state interest is through foreign policy behaviors. This dissertation assumes that middle power is a state identity and the root of foreign policy-making.

2.2.2. Turkey's Traditional Foreign Policy Style

Traditional or continuous foreign policies are important components for the construction of state identity as well as material change and perceptual change. This is because traditional or continuous policies are springboard for change and deliberation of state identity. Traditional or continuous foreign policies are some kinds of cultures for each country. We can see many cases in which contemporary foreign policies are based on improving traditional approaches. For example, Mead analyzes contemporary American foreign policy using four traditional foreign policies: Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian and Jacksonian.⁶³ Turkish foreign policy is always compared with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's "peace at home, peace in the world". Westernization and balancing policies are also Turkish traditional approaches. In addition to these, debates between Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism that characterized the late Ottoman period started again to affect Turkey in the Post-Cold War period.

⁶³ Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World*, New York: Routledge, 2001.

2.2.3. Material Change

Material changes are the first trigger for constructing state identity, following some key steps. Of course, substantive changes (e.g. the end of the Cold War, revolution) occurred at first. According to Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, the (international) environment exerts influence on actors in three points.⁶⁴ The first of these points is that environments make an impact only on the behavior (foreign policy) of actors. Secondly, environments affect the deflection of actors' identities, interests, and capabilities. Thirdly, environments exert influence on the existence of actors. Material change happens not only at the international level but also the regional and state level. Following these substantive changes, relative change or re-evaluation of international and regional norms, and position in international and regional system would begin.

2.2.4. Norm Change in International and Domestic Dimensions

Norm change, which occurs along with material change, affects the self-perception change. Firstly, we look back on the relationship between the concept of norm and international relations. On the topic of the norm, we naturally include ethical or moral factors when we use this word. In the field of International Relations, the norm has been an attractive topic for a long time. Traditionally, enlightenment thinkers like Charles Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques

⁶⁴ Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security" in Peter Katzenstein (ed), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p.41.

Rousseau and Immanuel Kant noticed norms for prohibiting war, and founders of International law like Hugo Grotius did research on the role of norms. After the establishment of the academics study of International Relations in 1919, the issue of norms was one of the most interesting matters for the idealists who aspired to find peace through international organization and to throw power politics away.⁶⁵ During the Cold War period, functionalist Haas dealt with norm as an important element for theory and reality of regional integration, especially among the European Community (EC). Meanwhile Hoffman and Beitz began to insist on the normative approach in international relations along with the idea of Rawls. Until the 1980s, normative matters had been generally treated in the area of liberalism and tightly bound to the concept of the moral. For liberalists, the idea is that norms and institutions are countermeasures to power politics. This trend (in which liberalist approaches dominated the norms issue) changed when the constructivist approach began to be noticed on the norm issue around the end of the Cold War. The constructivist approach is different from the liberal approach because constructivism has tried to do research not only norm themselves but also on their transformation, the modes of transformation, triggers of transformation, the impulse for transformation and the diffusion process.⁶⁶

Generally, norms are considered to be important because they serve the purpose of guiding behavior by providing motivations for action.⁶⁷ Bjorkdahl

⁶⁵ For a detailed idealists in the inter-war period, see David Long and Peter Wilson, *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

⁶⁶ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change" *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No.4, 1998, p. 888.

⁶⁷ Annika Bjorkdahl, "Norms in International Relations: Some conceptual and

classified norm definition into four perspectives.⁶⁸ First, she defined the rationalist perspective by which norms were regarded as standards of behavior, regulated obligations and rights. This perspective treated norms as rules and emphasized sanctions for compliance, which brought power into the analysis.⁶⁹ Second was the sociological perspective that was defined as the regularities, norms and uniformities in behavior. The third perspective was a normative one, and this definition is maybe the most famous and popular. And after the establishment of the study of International Relations, this normative perspective has been used as counterargument to power and interest. Raymond defined normative perspectives as stressing justice and rights through moral or ethical norms of behavior. This was based on the possibility of moral choice.⁷⁰ The fourth perspective was based on constructivism. For constructivist, norms are considered to be a set of intersubjective understanding and collective expectations regarding the proper behavior of states and other actors in a given context or identity.⁷¹ This perspective is different from others regarding the transformation of norms.

With respect to function, we can also divide norms into three types, the

methodological Reflections”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol.15, No.1, 2002, p.9.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, pp.13-15.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p.14.

⁷⁰ Gregory Raymond, “Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms”, *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol.41, No.2, 1997, p.217.

⁷¹ Bjorkdahl, *op.cit*, p.15.

regulative, constitutive and practical functions.⁷² Regulative norms mean order and rule for regulating behavior. Constitutive norms are giving the meaning to action and creating interest. Constructivism strongly focuses on this function because this approach comes along with room for interpretation and intersubjectivity. Practical norms combine with regulative norms and constitutive norms, which are institutionalized and adapted to everyday life. These norms prevail among particular sphere or people. In short, international/domestic norms might tighten the perceptions and behaviors of the relevant country. Here, the norm defines both regulations of foreign policy and the actor's intersubjectivity to its regulations.

2.2.5. Self-Perceptual Change

Perceptual change can be classified into self-perceptual change (perceptual change of policy makers in relevant countries) and other countries' (policy makers') perceptual change. The principal behaviors of self-perceptual change are adaptation and learning. Haas defined adaptation and learning from the viewpoint of the analysis of international organizations. According to Haas, adaptation refers to the changes in behavior as actors add new activities or drop old ones without examining the implicit theories underlying their programs.⁷³ Also, actors, for Haas's case, international organizations, have no purpose for adaptation. But this dissertation considers that states have purpose for adaptation

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, p.3.

to international/ regional change as actor. This purpose is to keep or defend national interests. So, adaptation behavior may be called one of the methods of realism. On the other hand, Haas described learning as behavioral change reflected in actors' programs or values.⁷⁴ The aim of learning is expanding their interests. Nye also described learning as a mode of perceptual change. He defined learning as developing knowledge by studying or experience.⁷⁵ Experiential learning is defined as a transformation of beliefs or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience.⁷⁶

According to Levy, there are three characteristics of the concept of learning.⁷⁷ First, people interpret historical experience through the framework of their own worldviews. Second, actors positively select information in line with their interpretations. Third, the learning process includes the will of transmission or teaching toward the interpretation of others. This third perspective means that the learning process is closely related to people's interpretation, or beliefs. Knopf made an effort to classify learning in international relations.⁷⁸ According to him,

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Joseph Nye Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S-Soviet Security Regimes", *International Organization*, Vol.41, No.3, 1987, p.378. Nye classified learning into simple learning and complex learning. His simple learning has the same meaning as 'adaptation' in this dissertation. And complex learning is relevant to learning in this dissertation.

⁷⁶ Jack Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield" *International Organization*, Vol.48, No.2, 1994, p.283.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, pp.283-284.

⁷⁸ Jeffrey Knopf, "The importance of international learning", *Review of International Studies*, Vol.29, No.2, 2003, pp.188-196.

there were three waves of learning in international relations. The first wave was rooted in liberal or progressive values, and empirical studies like those of Haas and Nye. The second wave focused on foreign policy analysis, especially experience as in Levy's study. The third wave was based on critical theory and constructivism, which treated the process of social learning, especially the works of Wendt and Checkel. Though Knopf divided Levy's argument and from the constructivist's works, Levy dealt with transmission and teaching interpretation to others as mentioned above. To sum up, learning is one way to change state cognition about identity. In this dissertation, the activity of social learning is dealt with using constructivists' approach, not the cognitive approach. So, individual and state (governmental) learning are objects of self-perceptual change in both international and domestic politics.

Since the end of the Cold War, a new trend in thought has gotten attention within study of international relations. This approach originated with the constructivists, but, other school's scholars have also recognized the effectiveness of these ideas.⁷⁹ Broadly speaking, there are three approaches to ideas. The first is the rationalist approach.⁸⁰ Considering ideas as analytical tools, rationalists absolutely regard ideas as a compensatory factor to explain interest and power. In other words, ideas are not always an analytical factor for explaining international

⁷⁹ For example, Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.

⁸⁰ Christian Reus-Smit summed up characteristics of rationalist approach into three parts. Firstly, the rationalist theory assumes political actors make decisions rationally. Secondly, the rationalist approach regards that actor's interests as pre-given. Thirdly, in the rationalist approach society is the place for actualizing its pre-given interest. In other words, rationalist theory ignores the factor of society as a place of mutual construction. Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism" in Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations (3rd edition)*, New York: Palgrave, 2005, p.192.

politics. Whether ideas become an important factor or not depend on the empirical question.⁸¹ The second analytical perspective is the cognitive approach. The cognitive approach uses ideas to explain causal effects in policy and to shape preference in world politics.⁸² They consider ideas to be important in order to make and implement policies. Yet, the cognitive approach does not give thought to construction and reconstruction between ideas and materials. In other words, the cognitive approach deals with ideas only as subject meanings. The third category is the constructivism approach, which emphasizes intersubjectivity, or mutually constructive processes between the self and others. To mutual construction, ideas play one of the main catalyst roles in this process. So ideas urge materials to change in the context of constructivism. Yet, early constructivists depreciated others' responses. After the 2000s, some scholars try to fill these shortfalls for unifying the theoretical toolkit.⁸³ Here this dissertation focuses on the constructivism approach. It is because newly ideas about foreign policy have been clearly affected by regional and world politics, and have changed the perceptions of others.⁸⁴ On the contrary, these changed perceptions would consolidate the new image of each state.

⁸¹ Nina Tannenwald, "Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol.7, No.2, 2005, p.18.

⁸² Andreas Bieler, "Questioning Cognitivism and Constructivism in IR Theory: Reflections on the Material Structure of Ideas", *Politics*, Vol.21, No.2, 2001, pp.94-95.

⁸³ For example, Ted Hopf tries to incorporate the cognitive approach into constructivism to analyze self and other relations more precisely. Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.

⁸⁴ Meanwhile, new ideas do not ignore the continuity of foreign policy tradition.

2.2.6. Others' Perceptual Change

In this dissertation, the notion of the others' perceptual change concerns with the role and image of changes. The national role is an important element of foreign policy's construction. The word "role" is the fundamental concept in sociology and is defined as "the way in which someone or something is involved in an activity or situation, and how much influence they have on it".⁸⁵ According to Holsti, role theory underscores the interaction between the role order of change and the role performance of the standing position:

Role prescriptions (orders) of the alter (change) may become parameters while attention is shifted to the "ego's" own conception of his position and functions, and the behavior appropriate to them in international circumstance... The perceptions, values, and attitudes of the actor occupying a position thus become the crucial independent variables in explaining role performance.⁸⁶

In the field of international relations, the national (state) role for foreign policy is the main target for the analysis of roles. The national role is constructed by the policy maker's national interest concept from domestic demands, state status (position), and the role order of change from international circumstance. Especially, for a "strong state" like Turkey, other actors' perceptions or demands

⁸⁵ (<http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/role>), January 15, 2011 accessed.

⁸⁶ K.J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.14, No.3, 1970, p.239.

influence on role construction.⁸⁷ The structure of strong state was difficult to change from inside. In other words, this is an image of suitable functions of its state toward, or in, the external circumstance.⁸⁸ The national role may transform according to the change of ideas of policymakers, international circumstances, and others' perceptions and demands.

Clearly, the role is the analytical subject for constructivism, which emphasizes the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality.⁸⁹ What is the difference between role and identity? Identity is defined as the qualities and attitudes a person or group of people has that make them different from other people.⁹⁰ Both concepts emphasized interaction between self and others. But, broadly speaking, identity is the self-consciousness, while role is more dependent on others' perceptions and demands. When we analyze the foreign policy of a super power like the United States, identity is a more suitable concept because of its influence over others. But if we focus on middle power or small power, we should consider the concept of role or coercive role in world politics, because these states don't have power in abundance and have generally been influenced by other countries. So this dissertation in essence treats the (national) role in international politics as other actors' perceptions, especially from

⁸⁷ Here, 'strong state' means that a strong center, including politicians and bureaucrats dominates a weak periphery. But this structure has also changed since 1980s. Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey" in Augustus Richard Norton (ed), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Vol.2, New York: Leiden, 1996, p.89.

⁸⁸ Holsti, *op.cit*, pp.245-246.

⁸⁹ Guzzini, Stefano, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.6, No.2, 2000, p.149.

⁹⁰ (<http://www.1doceonline.com/dictionary/identity>), January 15, 2011 accessed.

greater power and their requirements of a given state.

Image is also treated as perception of other countries. Boulding cited three elements constructing national image toward others. These were territory, hostility or friendliness, and strength or weakness of national power.⁹¹ Hostility or friendliness is, in a nutshell, a matter of the security of the relationships. Boulding defined national image as follows: “The national image is essentially a historical image, that is, an image which extends through time, backward into a supposedly recorded or perhaps mythological past and forward into an imagined future”.⁹² His definition is well-summarized, however, he didn’t describe the change of image in detail. National image may be changed by a change of international circumstance, a change of relevant state behavior (change of foreign policy or improvement of domestic politics), or government change. Compared with the concept of role, image is the perspective from small or lesser states.

Prestige is also important element for others’ perceptual change. The concept of prestige in international relations is not new. For example, Morgenthau and Frankel mentioned the concept of prestige during the Cold War period. Morgenthau said that the policy of prestige meant a policy of demonstrating power against other states psychologically, especially in the military dimension.⁹³ Frankel also pointed out that military power heightened prestige in international

⁹¹ Kenneth. E. Boulding, “National Images and International Systems”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.3, No.2, 1959, pp.123-124.

⁹² *Ibid*, p.122.

⁹³ Morgenthau, *op.cit*, p.79-80.

politics.⁹⁴ On the other hand, Frankel noted that the purpose of prestige would vary from time to time, and each state would evolve its own way of enhancing its reputation.⁹⁵ From a more constructivist perspectives, Bloom defined national prestige as “National prestige describes the influence that can be exercised or the impression produced by virtue of events and images that devalue or enhance national identity”.⁹⁶ Three scholars stressed the importance of states’ behaviors for the strength of their national prestige. Yet, Morgenthau and Frankel only considered the concept of prestige within power politics. On the other hand, Bloom focuses on the change of national identity through increasing national prestige.

2.2.7. State Interests

Regarding state interest, so many men, so many opinions. State interest, or more specifically (national) interest became popular after the publication of works of Morgenthau. Of course as one of the greatest classical realists, he emphasized on survival in anarchic international politics. Griffiths and O’Callaghan classified state (national) interest into three components.⁹⁷ First are the official policies by which decision-makers decide at the highest level meetings. Second is the realist approach, which focuses on survival among the anarchy. Third are “the rules for

⁹⁴ Joseph Frankel, *International Relations*, London: Oxford University, 1969, p.90.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ William Bloom, *Personal identity, national identity and international relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.84.

⁹⁷ Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan, *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, London: Routledge, 2002, pp.203-205.

its identification are given by tenets of the political process that have an independent normative value, those of democratic procedure".⁹⁸ Referring to George and Keohane, Wendt identified four approaches to state interest.⁹⁹ The first approach is realist. The second approach is autonomous decision-making, similar to the third approach of Griffiths and O'Callaghan. The third category is economic prosperity, which maintains the mode of production in a society and expands its resources. In other words, this is an emphasis on economic survival in an interdependent world. The fourth category is the collective self-esteem by which to express self-image toward others. If states can present a positive self-image, it may benefit foreign policy and vice versa. Giving consideration to these definitions, this dissertation adopts a definition of state interest as an inclusive idea of survival, autonomy, and collective self-images.

2.3. State Foreign Policies

As Welsh pointed out, middle powers are most often characterized by their tactics.¹⁰⁰ Realist approaches and liberalist approaches are main foreign policies of middle power.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, p.204.

⁹⁹ Wendt, *op.cit*, pp.235-237.

¹⁰⁰ Welsh, *op.cit*, p.6.

2.3.1. Realist Policies

Middle power policies are roughly divided into realist and liberal approaches. Tangible power easily connects with the realist approach. Realist school of thought emphasizes the human nature of selfishness (egoism) and the absence of an international governing body to produce safe and environment for world politics. Hence they assume an anarchic worst-case scenario of human nature, and from at perspective try to mitigate conflict. They seek a less dangerous world rather than a safe, just, and peaceful world.¹⁰¹ This idea is the starting point for both classical realism and structural realism. In this situation, survival is the most important for all states including middle powers. Basically, middle powers can choose three goals for survival; balancing, bandwagon, and neutrality.

2.3.1.1. Balancing

Balancing is the most common policy within realist approach, and is generally defined as behaving as an “ally in opposition to the principle source of danger”.¹⁰² This was the main policy for great powers in the Western balance of power system, especially employed by the United Kingdom during the 18th-19th centuries. Meanwhile, weak countries also recognized the importance of balancing. Wolfers argued that very weak countries might become active balancers in the

¹⁰¹ Morgenthau, *op.cit*, p.9.

¹⁰² Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power”, *International Security*, Vol.9, No.4, 1985, p.4. The terms balancing and bandwagon were first used by Arnold Wolfers.

hope that the equilibrium would make them more secure without provoking their stronger neighbors.¹⁰³ David described omni-balancing, with which authoritarian states in third world country respond against both internal and external threats.¹⁰⁴ Until the end of the Cold War, hard balancing, - small states dealing with the most powerful or most threatening countries through alliance -, was the mainstream form of balancing. But after the Cold War, the US emerged as the world's only superpower. Under a unipolar or semi-unipolar system, it is not necessary for other great powers to challenge the US with hard balancing methods. In this period, soft balancing approaches have increased in as a matter of foreign policy. Soft balancing is not a policy that creates alignments against the United States per se.¹⁰⁵ Soft balancing is a more indirect and multidimensional policy, especially in low political areas. Yeşiltaş summarized methods of soft balancing into four.¹⁰⁶ The first method is using institutions to control US activities. The second is denying territorial use. For example, a state rejects an offer from the US to use the bases within its country. The third strategy is to use economic strength to tame US policies. The fourth policy is to form alliances not in order to get material power but to acquire legitimacy from other countries.

¹⁰³ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, p.124.

¹⁰⁴ Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment", *World Politics*, Vol.43, No.2, 1991.

¹⁰⁵ Murat Yeşiltaş, "Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Case of the 2003 Iraq War", *Perceptions*, Spring-Summer, 2009, p. 31.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, pp.32-33.

2.3.1.2. Bandwagoning

Wolfers may have been the first scholar to use the word “bandwagon”. According to him, the bandwagon policy is as a strategy wherein “some weak countries seek safety by getting on the bandwagon of an ascending power, hoping somehow to escape complete subjugation once their powerful “friend” getting supremacy”.¹⁰⁷ Following Wolfers, Waltz described bandwagon as counter-policy of balancing in unilateral or bilateral periods. He said that “as soon as someone looks like the winner, nearly all jump on the bandwagon rather than continuing to build coalitions intended to prevent anyone from winning the prize of power”.¹⁰⁸

According to two pioneers, bandwagon is the policy generally adopted by weak countries during unilateral or bilateral periods. For more detailed analysis, Walt separates bandwagon behaviors into two types: offensive bandwagon and defensive bandwagon.¹⁰⁹ Offensive bandwagon means that relatively weak states try to reap the spoils of the dominant power’s victory. Therefore, this relationship is normally asymmetrical and is of weak or minor powers. On the other hand, the aim of defensive bandwagon is to appease or deter offensive activities threatening state or coalitions.

Schweller criticized Walt for focusing only on supposed security in world politics, not supposed profit. Not only Walt, but also Wolfers and Waltz failed to

¹⁰⁷ Wolfers, 1962, *op.cit*, p.124.

¹⁰⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House, 1972, p.126.

¹⁰⁹ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origin of Alliances*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987, p.27.

discuss the aims of the bandwagon precisely. Schweller divided the aims of the bandwagon approach into security and profit. He especially focused on Walt's offensive bandwagon and its profit-chased behavior. He theorizes jackal bandwagoning and piling on the bandwagon from the perspective of profit-chasing behavior. He used the metaphor of the jungle.¹¹⁰ Great powers are compared to lions, willing to pay high cost for stability in the jungle based on their high ability. The intention of lions is the maintenance of the status quo and stability in the jungle. Weak powers, meanwhile, are compared to lambs. The aim of jackal bandwagon strategy is profit, and the revisionist state breaks its status quo policy and tries to expand its influence with anti-system great powers in the international system. Piling on the bandwagon is a policy that the state pursues in order to keep the status-quo with pro-system great powers. Schweller discusses two types of bandwagon and provides some examples.

2.3.1.3. Neutrality

The third policy of realist diplomacy is neutrality. Caution is one of the core concepts of neutrality, yet surprisingly, many theorists do not define this point. In the Longman Dictionary, 'caution' is defined as "the quality of being very careful to avoid danger or risks".¹¹¹ But in this definition, the component of "quality" is ambiguous. In the context of the foreign policy of İnönü, Vanderlippe defined caution as "weighing all of the potential effects of every decision before making

¹¹⁰ Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In", *International Security*, Vol.19, No.1, 1994, pp.100-104.

¹¹¹ (http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/caution_1), November 10, 2010 accessed.

any commitment to the Great Powers, Allied or Axis”.¹¹² He considered caution to be a strategy for war avoidance. In this dissertation, caution is defined as “a diplomatic method for avoiding danger or risks in order to ultimately achieve survival in world politics through dispassionate and calculated decision-making”.

Falk et al. defined two kinds of neutralization: old neutralization and new neutralization. Old neutralization was explained to be:

a neutralized state is one whose political independence and territorial integrity are guaranteed permanently by a collective agreement of great powers, subject to the conditions that the neutralized state will not take up arms against another state, except to defend itself, and will not assume treaty obligations which may compromise its neutralized status.¹¹³

Meanwhile new neutralization was described as “a special international status designed to restrict the intrusion of specified state actions in a specified area”.¹¹⁴ New neutralization is regarded as a more active policy that can be employed by states. Old neutralization worked only in the balance of power system in Europe. Hence, this dissertation generally deals with new neutralization as a policy. New neutralization itself can be further classified into three versions. First, aggressive neutralization is in which the state expends maximal effort to avoid conflict. Second, passive neutralization is in which the state waits for a war

¹¹² John M. Vanderlippe, “A Cautious Balance: The Question of Turkey in World War II”, *The Historian*, Vol.64, No.1, 2001, p.63.

¹¹³ Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr, and Oran R. Young, *Neutralization and World Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, p.xi.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

to finish without putting forward a diplomatic effort. Third is the approach of functional neutralization, in which the state tries to terminate or mediate the conflict. The idea of the third type of neutralization is rooted in liberalism. At any rate, the primary aim of neutralization is to seclude a state or area from regional or international conflict.¹¹⁵

2.3.2. Liberal Policies

When considering liberal policies of middle powers, these can be roughly divided into the Canadian type and the Australian type. Canadian type takes functionalism or ethical behavior into consideration in policymaking. Canadian type of foreign policy suggests functional diplomacy and mediation. Australian type of foreign policy focuses on the regional activities with a goal of expanding its influence. Niche diplomacy and coalition diplomacy can be presented as Australian-style policies. According to Cooper et al., the amalgamation of foreign ministries and economic departments is important to the implementation liberal middle power policy.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, p.5.

¹¹⁶ Cooper, et al, *op.cit*, pp.34-36.

2.3.2.1. Functional Diplomacy

The functional approach is one of the foundations of the liberal approach, especially liberal institutionalism. In international relations theory, Mitrany first brought this idea forward in his ideas of “a working peaceful system”. Functionalist theory consists of two principles: First, regarding the idea of functionalism, it is possible to separate political associations or organizations from non-political associations or organizations. As this is a prior condition, the development of cooperation in non-political areas would become the basis of peaceful change. Mitrany explained this change as follows:

The functional approach emphasizes the common index of need. Very many such needs cut across national boundaries; not a few are universal, and an effective beginning for building up an international community of interest could be made by setting up joint agencies for dealing with these common needs.¹¹⁷

Hence Mitrany thought that international organizations with national freedom were beneficial for gathering the common need. Mitrany also demonstrated the process for peaceful change through international organizations.¹¹⁸ The first step occurs when some groups coordinate regarding technical or functional aims. The second step was to coordinate or organize of several groups of functional agencies. The third step is international planning for

¹¹⁷ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966, p.159.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, pp.73-75. Meanwhile, Mitrany doubted the efficacy of supranational organization as described by Ernst Haas.

functioning agencies. Finally, political authority controls the functional agencies in line with international planning.

Middle powers, especially Canada, have taken on positive roles in non-political or less-important political area within the United Nations. In other words, Canada has taken the initiative as a functional agency for peaceful change in the world. So, functional diplomacy can be defined as diplomacy in non-political or minor political areas through international organizations for achieving peaceful change to the world and region. Although active diplomacy in the UN is similar to functional diplomacy, this usage more broadly refers to activities including political area. Lobbying activities within the Security Council about important political issue are an example of the active diplomacy in the UN. Taking on important positions within the Security Council or other institution is typical active diplomacy.

2.3.2.2. Mediation

Zartman and Touval pointed out that middle powers and small powers use their mediation roles to increase their influence and prestige within the regional or global arena.¹¹⁹ Though there are a lot of theories of mediation regarding international conflict, this dissertation relies on the ideas of Bercovitch and Houston, and on Zartman and Touval's classifications. Bercovitch divides the

¹¹⁹ William Zartman and Paul Touval, "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era" in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds), *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, p.430. Mediation should also be understood as foreign policy, see, Saadia Touval, "Mediation and Foreign Policy", *International Studies Review*, Vol.5, No.4, 2003.

mediator's strategies into three categories. These are communication-facilitation strategies, procedural strategies, and directive strategies.¹²⁰ Communication-facilitation strategies are used most fluidly, yet are the last effective at easing tension. Generally, mediators try to take a fairly passive role, channeling information to another, facilitator. But in many cases, mediators do not establish firm legitimacy with the actors and work informally or secretly. Meanwhile procedural strategies are more formal and effective tools of mediation. A mediator can hold a meeting, announce information through media and pressure actors. Directive strategies have strong mandates to change or put forward negotiation among actors. Zartman and Touval separated the category communicator from facilitator.¹²¹ Communicator's roles were simply to carry message and to create communication opportunities for each other. This role is not a substantive contribution. The facilitator was a more substantive role, attempting to provide a common understanding about problems, situation and solutions.

2.3.2.3. Niche Diplomacy

Niche diplomacy is, as many have noted, a classic middle power strategy. The most important component of this strategy is objectivity in diplomacy. Gareth Evans, foreign minister of Australia from 1988 to 1996, wrote about niche diplomacy as the following:

¹²⁰ Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, "Why do they do it like this? An analysis of the factors influencing mediation behavior in international conflicts", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, No.44, Vol.2, 2000, p. 175.

¹²¹ Zartman and Touval, *op.cit*, pp.435-436. They also pointed out the manipulator role of the mediation. This role is same as Bercovitch and Houston's directive role.

...for a middle power, there will be a limit to the number of major issues that can be simultaneously pursued: selective niche diplomacy, while often good tactics, is also compelled by realistic necessity. ...Priority setting-involving careful balancing of the importance of national interests in question against the practical likelihood of their advanced-becomes extremely important.¹²²

Henrikson defined niche as “A primary implication of the ‘niche’ term is that the advantage or corner that a country may have by virtue of its favored situation, special competence, or unique product is more or less permanent”.¹²³ He additionally pointed out that location, tradition, and consensus are essential features of niche diplomacy. He showed that Australia selected three specific areas on which to focus its energies: human rights, the environment and development co-operation. Canadian scholar Evan Potter complained about the Canadian comprehensive middle power diplomacy and recommended more selective diplomacy for contribution to international society.¹²⁴

¹²² Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991, p.324.

¹²³ Alan Henrikson, “Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: the Global Corners of Canada and Norway” in Jan Melissen (ed), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2005, p.71.

¹²⁴ Evan H. Potter, “Niche diplomacy as Canadian foreign policy”, *International Journal*, Vol. LII, Winter, 1996/97, p.25.

2.3.2.4. Coalition Diplomacy

Australia has used coalition diplomacy well. The aim of coalition diplomacy is to build coalition with like-minded countries. Gareth Evans listed the activities of the Cairns Group (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay), APEC (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States) and Cambodian conflict (P5 members, Indonesia, Vietnam and the four Cambodian factions) as example for coalition diplomacy.¹²⁵ Coalition diplomacy is fundamentally multilateral in theory. According to Keohane, multilateralism has been defined as “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions”.¹²⁶ By his definition, both the number of states and the rules or regimes are important. Meanwhile Ruggie insisted that the particularity of multilateralism is following:

not merely that it coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states, which is something that other organizational forms also do, but additionally that it does so on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations among those states.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Evans and Grant, *op.cit*, p.323. Concerning Evans’s middle power policy, see Carl Ungerer, “The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy”, *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol.53, No.4, 2007, pp.538-551 .

¹²⁶ Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: an agenda for research”, *International Journal*, Vol.45, No.4, 1990, p.731.

¹²⁷ John G. Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution” in John G. Ruggie (ed), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p.7.

For building institutions, bargaining within coalition states is important. Regarding institutional bargaining, Young focused on the role of leaderships. He classified types of leadership into the subcategories of structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual leadership.¹²⁸ Generally, structural leadership is dependent on its material power. On the other hand, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership are dependent not on material power but on their behaviors. The behavior of entrepreneurial leadership are agenda setting, drawing attention to some particular issues, inventing policies to overcome bargaining obstacles, and facilitating deal-making, and other salient options.¹²⁹ Yet, entrepreneurial leaders are not neutral positions nor simple mediators, and they aim to benefits from this bargaining. Intellectual leadership means shaping the framework of thoughts like John Maynard Keynes or Jean Monnet.¹³⁰ In other words, intellectual leadership is an exhibition of the power of ideas. Concerning coalition-building, not only leadership but also followership is essential for success.¹³¹ Whether followers positively participate in a coalition or not is proof of how effectively this leadership style works.

¹²⁸ Oran R. Young, "Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions in international society", *International Organization*, Vol.45, No.3, 1991, p.288.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, p.294.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, p.298.

¹³¹ Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.106, No.3,1991, p.397.

2.3.2.5. Norm Diffusion

Norm diffusion is a policy based on liberal thought, however, constructivist thought also adopts it. In the late 1980s, some constructivist like Ruggie, Kratochwil, and Wendt gradually began to focus on norm-related issues. Norms are no easier to measure today than they were in the 1930s or 1960s, but conceptual precision is essential for both meaningful theoretical debate and defensible empirical work.¹³² Although constructivists' work in the early 1990s stressed norms, culture and identity influence, these didn't measure the different responses of actors to these influences. Some scholars like Checkel were quick to notice this, and to try to understand the different responses on different agents. Checkel pointed out that the issue was not only the different responses of states to the same international norms, but also the different mechanisms of internalized the international norms within the state.¹³³ So we have to seek a third way between absolute compliance with international norms and absolute emphasis on indigenous or local norms which are democracy and human rights. It focuses on struggle and change between transnational norms and local norms. In addition, when we consider norm socialization, the existence of norm entrepreneurs is also important. Basically norm entrepreneurs are actors who, dissatisfied with existing norms and rules in politics, often band together and try to change or transform

¹³² Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, *op.cit*, p.891.

¹³³ Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory", *World Politics*, Vol.50, 1998, p.348.

them.¹³⁴ According to Checkel, diffusion is defined as following:

By a standard definition, is the “transfer or transmission of objects, processes, ideas and information from one population or region to another”: or, as one popular text puts it, diffusion occurs when an “innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social system.”¹³⁵

When norms spread, the important question is how these norms adapt and transform, and by what process? These questions are the starting point for the constructivist approach to norms pioneered by Florini. She tried to analyze the norm issue using evolutionary theory as an analogy between genes and norms. According to her, norms can survive under conditions in which they are satisfactorily prominent in the norm pool, dependent on their relationships with other prevailing norms, and on the environmental conditions. Norm entrepreneurs like people or states promote the particular international norms in their own countries.¹³⁶ The environment, which actors confront, is also essential for the survival of norms. She classified norm diffusion in two ways. On the one hand, she presented vertical reproduction which is functionally a continuation of the norm. In this process, new generations try to fit the traditional norms. On the other hand, she discussed horizontal reproduction primarily emulating norms. Fundamentally, horizontal reproduction can spread norms much more quickly

¹³⁴ Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, *op.cit*, p.400.

¹³⁵ Jeffrey Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.43, 1999, p.85.

¹³⁶ Ann Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.40, No.3, 1996, pp.374-376.

because actors can select the fittest norm for their environment.

Although Florini pointed out the conditions of norm diffusion, she did not precisely delineate the steps or modes of the processes of diffusion. Finnmore and Sikkink made up this defect. They showed three stages of norm process: norm emergence, norm cascade and internalization. In first stage, the activities of norm entrepreneurs and organizational platforms are the central factors. Norms are actively built by agents with strong notions of what is appropriate or desirable behavior in their communities.¹³⁷ Their actions are directed toward keeping, changing or transforming norms when faced with the appearance of alternative to norm. Organizational platforms are also essential for emerging norms because norms are generally taken into through organizational platforms.¹³⁸ The main method at this stage is persuasion or explanation. When norm entrepreneur has persuaded a critical mass of states to become norm leaders and adopt new norms, they call this situation as “tipping point” of the first stage.¹³⁹ After the “tipping point”, applicable actors start to adopt new norms rapidly with (or even without) domestic norm change. During this time, the concept of socialization is essential for norm transformation:

In the context of international politics, socialization involves diplomatic praise or censure, either bilateral or multilateral, which is reinforced by material sanctions and incentives. States, however, are not the only agents of socialization. Networks of norm entrepreneurs and

¹³⁷ Finnmore and Sikkink, 1998, *op.cit*, p.896.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, p.899.

¹³⁹ *Ibid*, p.901.

international organizations also act as agents of socialization by pressuring targeted actors to adopt new policies and laws and to ratify treaties and by monitoring compliance with international standards.¹⁴⁰

Concerning socialization, state identity undergoes a noticeable change. The degree of the participation in the international sphere or events is an important factor in the change of states' identities. This is because the state receives pressure from other countries and international organizations in such situations. Thirdly, the stage of norm internalization is described as a powerful influence (behavior in accordance with the norm is not questioned) and is hard to discern (actors don't think critically over norms and their regulations).¹⁴¹ Finnemore and Sikkink emphasize the role of the norm entrepreneur here again. An entrepreneur, like professional in training, can become familiarized and take root among state and society. Legitimacy of norms in the international sphere is also an important factor for internalization.

Acharya focused on the regional adaptation and change of international norms. He pointed out that generally constructivists considered norm transformation as good global norms to prevail over bad local beliefs and practices.¹⁴² Against these discourses, he emphasizes the importance of indigenous norms and policies for reconstructing transnational norms after being faced with local norms. His key concept is localization, which he defined as the

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p.902.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, p.904.

¹⁴² Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norm Matters? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism", *International Organization*, Vol.58, No.2, 2004, p.239.

following:

Instead of just assessing the existential fit between domestic and outside identity norms and institutions, and explaining strictly dichotomous outcomes of acceptance or rejection, localization describes a complex process and outcome by which norm-takers build congruence between transnational norms (including norms previously institutionalized in a region) and local beliefs and practices. In this process, foreign norms, which may not initially cohere with latter, are incorporated into local norms. The success of norm diffusion strategies and processes depends on the extent to which they provide opportunities for localization.¹⁴³

For Acharya, on the one hand, norm diffusion is viewed as a result of adaptive behavior in which local practices are made consistent with an external idea. On the other hand, localization is a process in which external ideas are simultaneously adapted to meet with local practice. Localization is progressive, and reshapes both existing beliefs and practices and foreign ideas in the local context.¹⁴⁴ So this process contains an evolutionary aspect.

For the process of localization and its condition, Acharya delineates four dimensions. The first phase is pre-localization (resistance and contestation). In this phase, local actors resist the new external norms and doubt their effectiveness. If they suppose the external norms may potentially contribute to their current norms, some local actors may begin to adopt or learn these norms. This is the starting point of norm localization. Though they begin to adapt or learn new

¹⁴³ *Ibid*, p.241.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p.252.

norms, some existing norms remain strong.¹⁴⁵ The second phase is Local initiative (entrepreneurship and framing). Local actors try to establish a framework within which to integrate the new external norms.¹⁴⁶ If local society hails the new external norms, they may easily penetrate the new framework. The third phase is learning (grafting and pruning). Though Acharya used the term adaptation, this dissertation considers learning to be more suitable than adaptation in this context. External norms may be transformed to adapt with local norms and practices. External and local norms seek to find common ground for coexistence. In this process, selection is very important. But external norms are considered to be supplements to existing norms, not complete alternatives.¹⁴⁷ The fourth phase is amplification and universalization. New systems and practices emerge from the syncretic normative framework in which local influences remain clearly visible.¹⁴⁸ This step is the same as Finnemore and Sikkink's concept of socialization.

According to Acharya, there are three main forms of local responses to transnational norms. These are localization, resistance and norm displacement.¹⁴⁹ He insists that resistance makes no new tasks and instruments. Transnational norms and institutional models remain largely intact. Too much and sustained resistance leads to failure of norm transmission. Meanwhile, norm displacement creates new tasks and instruments. In addition, transnational norms are displaced

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p.251.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p.254.

and the norm hierarchy altered. Hence new institutions emerge, and transnational norm entrepreneurs play an important role in responding to these transnational situations.

2.4. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the analytical framework of dissertation. To survive in world politics, middle size powers traditionally tend to adopt one of three foreign policy strategies; power balancing, bandwagoning, and neutrality. From the view point of middle size, middle powers can only exercise limited power in world politics and are strictly tied to the international system. In other words, position in international system decides the behaviors and abilities of a middle-sized middle power.

The thinking of liberalism about middle power put importance on behaviors in world politics. For example, Holmes, Cox, and Cooper et al advocated this behavior-based middle power. Generally speaking, middle powers favor liberal policies because of their limited hard power, but they may attempt to strengthen their influence through soft power. Liberalists regard liberal behaviors as feature of middle power. On the other hand, this dissertation considers that middle power identity is the core of liberal policies, and vice versa liberal policies construct middle power identity. Hence, in this dissertation, the concept of middle power is treated as a state identity. Middle power is a matter of state identity, and is formed through internal and external transformations. Material change is the trigger of change in self-perception and the perception of others. And these perceptual

changes encourage the crystallization of state identity. Countries choose foreign policies alongside their state identities for reinforcement of their identities through liberal foreign policies like functional diplomacy, mediation, niche diplomacy, coalition diplomacy, and norm diffusion.

CHAPTER 3

3. Historical Background

3.1. Continuous Foreign Policy Traditions

The aim of this dissertation is to examine Turkey's middle power policies. As mentioned above, Canada, Australia and the Scandinavian countries are often described as middle powers. Considering its size and geography, the Republic of Turkey may be also fall into the position of middle power category. The classification of Turkey as a middle power, however, involves two particular characteristics compared to other middle powers. Firstly, the Republic of Turkey is the heir of the Ottoman Empire, which had been a great power from the 16th century to the 18th century. Hence, Turkey has the tradition and experience of a great power. The second feature is its strategic location. In the words, there is "strategic rents" based on its location. According to Barkey, strategic rents meant that "great powers are more likely to disburse funds and other resources to countries they deem critical to their own interest".¹⁵⁰ To analyze Turkey's middle power policies after the end of the Cold War, we have to understand the conventional principles of Turkish foreign policy. The central guideline of Republic of Turkey is "Peace at home, peace in the world". But this has been only one part of the foreign policy principles. Turkish foreign policies also include some Ottoman legacies about foreign policy as a successor of the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁵⁰ Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey and the Great Powers" in Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem, and Philip Robins (ed), *Turkey's Engagement with Twentieth Century*, London: Palgrave, 2010, p.241.

Ottomanism, Islamism, Pan-Turkism and Westernization were Ottoman psychological legacies for the Republic of Turkey.¹⁵¹ Apparently, Turkish foreign policies have been mixture of legacies. Bernard Lewis has written about Ottoman legacies as being guided by the following, voiced through the Republic's founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk:

Renouncing all foreign ambitions and all pan-Turkish, pan-Ottoman, or pan-Islamic ideologies, he deliberately limited his actions and aspirations to the national territory of Turkey as defined by treaty, and devoted the rest of his life to the grim, laborious, and unglamorous task of reconstruction.¹⁵²

Deringil also pointed out the similarity between the policies of neutrality of Sultan Abdülhamid II and İsmet İnönü.¹⁵³ Neutrality is one of the realism-oriented middle power policies. In that sense, Turkish middle power policy is also considered one of the legacies of the late-Ottoman foreign policy style. Meanwhile, Turkey leaned on Western countries after World War II because of the perception of threat from the Soviet Union. The joining to NATO in 1952 and establishing of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 were symbols of Turkey's pro-Western policy, which can be considered as a bandwagon policy. But these pro-Western policies were later declined in the early 1960s because of an

¹⁵¹ Şaban Çalış, "The Origins of Modern Turkish Foreign Policy: Ottoman Psychological Background", *Dış Politika*, Issue 3-4, 2001, pp.61-70.

¹⁵² Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey (second edition)*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, p.255.

¹⁵³ Selim Deringil, "Aspects of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdülhamid II and İsmet İnönü", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 4, Summer, 1984, pp.39-54.

increasing mood of detente and the emergence of the Cyprus dispute between Turkey and Greece. The Johnson letter incident in particular was the decisive event prompting Turkey's cool attitude toward the Western circle. Hence, Turkey shifted its policy from bandwagoning to multi-dimensional policy as a balancing policy until the 1980s, when the relationship between Turkey and the West, especially the United States, was tightly closed again. Though the end of the Cold War international political structure had a decisively deep impact on Turkish foreign policy, some basic policies and concepts, that have evolved little by little, have continued more or less intact into the AKP's contemporary foreign policy. In this chapter, this dissertation analyzes some traditional concepts about Turkish foreign policies, Turkish middle power behavior before the end of the Cold War, and Turkey's policies toward the Middle East will be analyzed.

3.1.1. Traditional Foreign Policy Ideas (1) Ottomanism

The root of the philosophy of Ottomanism originated in the activities of journalists like İbrahim Şinasi, Agah Efendi and Namık Kemal who were later called the "Young Ottomans (Genç Osmanlılar). They imported Western political thoughts, especially enlightenment ideas into the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵⁴ Ottomanism was defined as a principle of unity among component cultures with each *millet* comprising an equal part of a greater Ottoman nation for the

¹⁵⁴ Masami Arai, *Toruko Kingendaishi (Modern history of Turkey)*, Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 2001, p.77.

prevention of the Ottoman Empire from collapse.¹⁵⁵ Ottomanism is often considered to be a philosophy by which some intellectuals tried to arouse people's sense of citizenship, freedom, consciousness of the motherland, and equality. The Ottoman constitution of 1876 most reflected the principles of Ottomanism. Articles 8 and 9 are good examples of this. Article 8 defined Ottomans like this: "All subjects of the empire are called Ottomans, without distinction whatever faith they profess; the status of an Ottoman is acquired and lost according to conditions specified by law".¹⁵⁶ This article declared the establishment of the Ottomans people (Ottoman nationalism) and attempted to create a nation-empire.¹⁵⁷ In the meantime, Article 9 was a treatise on liberty and equality among Ottomans: "Every Ottoman enjoys personal liberty on condition of none interfering with the liberty of others".¹⁵⁸ But the dream of the nation-empire failed in the wake of rising ethnic nationalism and a movement advocating self-determination within the Ottoman Empire. Ottomanism was synchronized with an assimilation policy not only of the Ottoman Empire but also of Turks who made up the majority of the empire. This concept led to Pan-Turkism which rose in the early 20th century. Although it was the official ideology of the 1908 revolution, Ottomanism ended when Ottoman Empire was disrupted after World War I.

¹⁵⁵ Çalış , 2001, *op.cit*, p.61.

¹⁵⁶ (<http://www.worldstatesmen.org/OttomanConstitution1876.htm>), January 11, 2011 accessed.

¹⁵⁷ Here, nationalism means not ethnic origin but national or *millet* origin.

¹⁵⁸ (<http://www.worldstatesmen.org/OttomanConstitution1876.htm>), January 11, 2011 accessed.

3.1.2. Traditional Foreign Policy Ideas (2) Islamism

The idea of Islamism became dominant under Abdülhamid II. He used Islamism to establish legitimacy both against Muslims and against Western powers, mixing a traditional idea of Islam with modernization. The background of rising Islamism was a factor in the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. Abdülhamid II felt Britain was a threat.¹⁵⁹ At any rate, Abdülhamid II was one of the pioneers of political Islam, which was a method of counteracting Western imperialism. Generally speaking, political Islam is divided into 2 parts: fundamentalism (Salafism) and modernism. According to Roy, Salafism was used at the end of the 19th century to designate a reform movement initiated by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani.¹⁶⁰ His call for a return to the true tenets of Islam was a means of castigating the backwardness of the religious establishment rather than an appeal for the implementation of Sharia. On the other hand, modernism took in Western ideas and re-interpreted Islam adapted to the realities of the 19th century. Abdülhamid II was a typical modernism-oriented political Islamist. Basically, Ottomanism was a policy aimed at stimulating a sense of community among internal citizens. On the other hand, Islamism affected both internal and external Muslim-ness as counteraction against Western powers. The rise of Islamism or political Islam, including both Salafism and modernism was perceived as a threat by Western powers. After recognizing this feeling of Western threat, Abdülhamid

¹⁵⁹ Osman Okyar, "Turco-British Relations in the Inter-War Period: Fethi Okyar's Missions to London" in William Hale and Ali İhsan Bağış (ed), *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations*, North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1984, pp.66-67.

¹⁶⁰ Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, p.233.

II took care of the discourse of Islamism. He placed al-Afghani under empire surveillance in Istanbul to control his action.¹⁶¹ Because Abdülhamid II felt Western powers would deal with the Ottoman Empire more strictly than before for the sake of preventing Islamism. Both Abdülhamid II and al-Afghani focused on Islamism, but their ideas were broadly different. After Abdülhamid II's governance, Islamism lost momentum as a foreign policy method.

3.1.3. Traditional Foreign Policy Ideas (3) Pan-Turkism

Pan-Turkism is not based on a notion of Ottoman or Muslim citizenship, but of Turkish nationalism. Pan-Turkism became active when the Young Turks took power. According to Zürcher, the origin of Pan-Turkism can be found in the works of European Orientalist such as de Guignes, Cahun and Vambery, and it would also influenced Turks from the Russian Empire, including Tatars and Azeris.¹⁶² As Pan-Turkists from the Russian Empire, Hüseyin Ali Turan, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and Yusuf Akçura were famous. In particular, Akçura's 'Üç Tarzı Siyaset' (Three types of policy) was called the Communist Manifesto of Turkism.¹⁶³ This article compared Ottomanism, Islamism, and Pan-Turkism, and concluded that Pan-Turkism was the only way for the Ottoman Empire to survive Western imperialism. Ziya Gökalp was another famous Pan-Turkist whose body of work emphasized Turkish culture and civilization. He tried to mix Turkish cultural

¹⁶¹ Arai, *op.cit*, pp.99-100.

¹⁶² Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History (3rd Edition)*, London: I.B.Tauris, 2004, p.129.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*.

heritages with European modernization.¹⁶⁴

Enver Paşa was still another Pan-Turkist who advocated Turanism, a radical dimension of Pan-Turkism. Turanism attempted to unify not only Turkish-speaking people, but also to integrate Uralo-Altaic race.¹⁶⁵ He travelled through the Caucasus and Central Asia with the intention of unifying a Turkish ethnicity. In Baku, he established several Muslim groups along with Pan-Islamists and Turanists under the support of the Soviet government. But Enver's Baku visit was a complete failure, becoming one of the iconic Ottoman defeats. Furthermore, the Soviet government shifted its support from Enver to Mustafa Kemal after the Sakarya War in September 1921, and Enver was brought to Central Asia by Moscow government.¹⁶⁶ He was killed by Soviet force during battle in Central Asia in August 1922. Pan-Turkism was in its heyday from the Young Turk period to the end of World War I. But this grand idea rapidly lost support in the face of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and of Western attempts at occupation of Ottoman territory. Instead of Pan-Turkism, Mustafa Kemal's realistic approach, in other words, focused around securing Anatolia, got support from the populace.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p.131.

¹⁶⁵ For details on Turanism, see Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, London: Hurst & Co, 1995. Also concerning Enver's Turanist efforts, see Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "An Ottoman warrior abroad: Enver Paşa as an expatriate", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.35, No.4, 1999.

¹⁶⁶ Yılmaz, *Ibid*, p.54.

3.1.4. Traditional Foreign Policy Ideas (4) Westernization

The idea of Westernization started during the period of the Ottoman Empire, and it is an idea that affects Turkish foreign policy. İnalçık divided Westernization in the Ottoman Empire into three stages. The first stage of Westernization was enacted in cultural fields, especially in military dimensions such as naval construction methods, seamanship, gunnery, and tactics.¹⁶⁷ The main method of Westernization during this stage was “borrowing” from Western powers. The second stage of Westernization affected the military and intellectuals. During this stage, the Ottoman Empire did not only borrow but also engaged in “imitation”. For instance, the Ottoman Empire established a Western type of military school and employed European teachers.¹⁶⁸ Printing techniques also came from the West in this period, and books spread among Ottoman elites. The third stage was also stage of imitation but in the field of administration, and was represented by the Tanzimat . As I mentioned in the explanation of Ottomanism, the Young Ottomans were active during this period. On the other hand, Abdülhamid II, who opposed the activities of the Young Ottomans, addressed the improvement of the Foreign Ministry to satisfy Western standards.¹⁶⁹ Both intellectuals and the government recognized the necessity of Westernization. But these reforms could not prevent the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁶⁷ Halil İnalçık, “Turkey between Europe and the Middle East”, *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.3, No.1, March-May, 1998, pp.5-18.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ Feroz Ahmad, “The Late Ottoman Empire” in Marian Kent (ed), *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, London: Frank Cass, 1996, p.7.

Intellectuals and the military in the early Republican period understood necessity of Westernization for survival against the Western powers. The Treaty of Sevres signed in August 1920 impressed this upon them. The so-called “Sevres Syndrome” strongly affected the foreign policy principle in the early Republican period. Generally speaking, the implications of Sevres Syndrome can be divided into two. The first component is the threat of dismemberment of the territory. The Sevres Treaty, especially Article 27, was the plan of partition of the Ottoman Empire by the Allied Powers. This threat of dismemberment can be glimpsed through Turkish policies toward Kurd.¹⁷⁰ The second is in literal terms the threat of the West. Ahmed described the Treaty of Sevres as “merely the culmination of the so-called Eastern Question, the term used to describe the inter-imperialist rivalry concerning the division of the legacy of the ailing Ottoman Empire”.¹⁷¹ Also, in the words of Robins, “Many Turks, apparently from all walks of life, regard Sevres as a moment of clarity and insight into the real attitudes and intentions of the Western Europeans”.¹⁷² The solution Turkish decision-makers found to counteract the West was to proceed with Westernization and ultimately to be a Western state.

¹⁷⁰ Concerning this point, see Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, *Turkey at the crossroads: Ottoman legacies and a greater Middle East*, London: Zed Books, 2001, especially chapter 6.

¹⁷¹ Feroz Ahmad, “The Historical Background of Turkey’s Foreign Policy” in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (ed), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002, p.9.

¹⁷² Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*, London: Hurst & Company, 2003, p.104.

3.1.5. Traditional Foreign Policy Ideas (5) Misakı Milli

Misakı Milli (the National Pact) was Turkey's official statement of resistance against the Allied Powers after the defeat in the World War I and the breaking up of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, Misakı Milli was considered a guideline for a "Reconquista" policy. The first three articles described securing the territories in Arab majority regions, the "three vilayets" of Batum, Kars and Ardahan, and Western Thrace.¹⁷³ Article 4 advocated the security of Istanbul, the Marmara Sea, and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. This pact regulated contemporary Turkish territory settled by the War of independence and acts of diplomacy in the 1920s.¹⁷⁴ Article 5 and 6 addressed the defense of minority rights in Entente and European States, defining their economic, financial, and judicial freedom from the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷⁵

After winning of the war of Independence and establishing the Republic of Turkey, which can be described as a successful minimum Reconquista, Mustafa Kemal began to struggle to keep territories out of the hands of England, France and the Soviet Union, per the Treaty of Lausanne.¹⁷⁶ "For the Treaty of Lausanne was substantially an international recognition of the demands formulated in the

¹⁷³ Zürcher, *op.cit*, pp.138-139.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.139.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁷⁶ Concerning Turkish rapprochement policies toward England, Greece, Soviet and France, see Hale, 2002, *op.cit*, pp.56-73.

Turkish National Pact (Misakı Milli)”¹⁷⁷ In addition to the Misakı Milli, Baskın Oran points out that Kemal’s speech at the Parliament in December 1921 and statement of “peace at home and peace in the world” in November 1933 emphasized the status quo and did not pursue ambition and adventurism.¹⁷⁸ He broadly divides Turkish status quo policies into those aimed at keeping existing borders intact and those keeping the existing balance, although the first priority was keeping existing border.¹⁷⁹ But he imagined the Status Quo Powers as the only great powers to be satisfied with their status and power. It was difficult for a middle power like Turkey to maintain its territorial integrity when imperialism was still so prevalent.

3.1. History of Turkish Middle Power Policies

This dissertation considers that middle power as an external state identity of Turkey. Aras and Görener, and Murinson discussed the state identity of Turkey in the foreign policy dimension. Aras and Görener classified state identity into the categories of regional leader, regional protector, regional sub-system collaborator, global sub-system collaboration, example or model, and bridge.¹⁸⁰ Meanwhile

¹⁷⁷ Lewis , *op.cit*, pp.254-255.

¹⁷⁸ Oran (ed), *op.cit*, p.47.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pp.46-49. Morgenthau defined Status Quo Powers as those directed toward keeping power and not toward changing the distribution of power. Morgenthau, *op.cit*, p.21.

¹⁸⁰ Bülent Aras and Aylin Görener, “National role conceptions and foreign policy orientation: the ideational bases of the Justice and Development Party’s foreign policy activism in the Middle East”, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol.12, No.1, 2010, pp. 82-86.

Murinson focused on Turkish behaviors during 1992-1999, and categorized state identity as the garrison-state, like-minded or Westernistic state and secular state.¹⁸¹

The classification system put forward by Aras and Görener clearly considered the international system, and divided the role into global politics and regional politics.

The approach of Murinson was state-centric and did not mention the role of international arena. Middle power is defined as more collective and broader state identity comparable to those of Aras and Görener, and Murinson. Middle power identity is the source of particular foreign policies.¹⁸²

3.2.1. Middle Power Policies during the Period of Abdülhamid II

Hale used the concept of the middle power as a general framework in his book on Turkish foreign policy, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*. According to Hale, Turkey is a good example of how middle-sized powers have impacted the international environment.¹⁸³ He considered that late Ottoman Empire and subsequent Republic of Turkey fit into the international system in the category of a middle power. His concept of power is defined as “the ability to oblige other states to take actions which they would not otherwise have taken, and to resist

¹⁸¹ Alexander Murinson, *Turkey's Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan: State identity and security in the Middle East and Caucasus*, London: Routledge, 2010, pp.9-30.

¹⁸² Şaban Çalış, Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, and Hasan Kösebalaban dealt with the national identity of Turkish foreign policy. Şaban Çalış, *The Role of Identity in the Making of Modern Turkish Foreign Policy*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the University of Nottingham, 1996, Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, New York: Routledge, 2003, Hasan Kösebalaban, “Torn Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey and Japan”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.10, No.1, pp.5-30.

¹⁸³ Hale, 2002, *op.cit*, p.1.

pressure to do so from other states”.¹⁸⁴ Power is constructed by the mixture of military strength, economic resources and level of development. Basically, middle power states are vulnerable actors in world politics. They are largely affected by the activities of great powers and superpowers in international contexts, and are obliged to adopt defensive strategies such as the bandwagon policy, balancing policy or neutrality.¹⁸⁵ His concept of middle power is based on an ontological positioning in world politics and states’ ranking of both military power and economic power.

A similar approach towards middle power can be found in Oran’s work. His fundamental question about the analysis of Turkish foreign policy was how Turkey can be categorized in the international system. He considered Turkey to be a middle power, positioned between great and small powers and thus dependent on military and economic power.¹⁸⁶ According to Oran, the basic policies of middle powers are the balancing policy to negotiate the forces of great powers and the bandwagon policy toward creating alliances.¹⁸⁷ His concept of middle power is like that of Hale, based on realism.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p.2.

¹⁸⁶ Oran (ed) , 2001, *op.cit*, pp.29-30.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p.30.

¹⁸⁸ The approaches of Hale and Oran remind us of Stephen Walt’s analysis of Turkey. Walt, one of the students of Kenneth Waltz, advocates the “balance of threat” model for explaining alliance formation. According to Walt, an imbalance of threat occurs when the most threatening state or coalition is significantly more dangerous than the second most threatening state or coalition. The degree to which a state threatens others is the product of its aggregate power, its geographic proximity, its offensive capability, and the aggressiveness of its intentions. Alliance is chosen when a state’s potential allies are roughly equal in power

The prototype of Turkish middle power policies is formed during the period of Abdülhamid II. During this period, in accordance with Wight's assessment of the goals of minor powers (middle and small powers), Turkey tried to defend only limited interests.¹⁸⁹ Gradually, the Ottoman Empire began to decline after the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, and by the mid-18th century, the degree of decline that had taken hold was palpable. Abdülhamid II was the first sultan to understand the Ottoman Empire as a "Sick Man" facing a threat from the Western powers, including Russia. The perception of threat was a core source of his diplomacy. Regarding his diplomatic approach, Deringil mentioned that Abdülhamid II pursued peace and neutrality for survival through realistic policies.¹⁹⁰

The long term goal of Abdülhamid II was to rescue the Ottoman Empire from dependency on Great Britain.¹⁹¹ Meanwhile, the short term benefit for him was to prevent a Russian invasion of Ottoman territory. Russia and its successor state, the Soviet Union were an unremitting threat for Turkey. Russia emerged as a great power after Peter the Great took the throne. Peter the Great wanted to control the Black Sea and Turkish Straits to reach the warm seas. Successors of Peter the Great became influential in the Black Sea region, Moldavia and

against the most threatening state or coalition. In such a circumstance, a state will ally with the side where, it believes, is least dangerous. Walt takes up Turkey as a test case of alliance formation, and concludes that Soviet threat (the Soviet Union was smaller power than the United States) was the main cause of the Turkish alliance with West at least in the early period of the Cold War, until 1964. For detail, see Stephen Walt, "Testing theories of alliance formation: the case of South West Asia", *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No.2, 1988, especially pp.292-297. Except Turkey, he tested cases of Iran, India and Pakistan.

¹⁸⁹ Wight, *op.cit*, p.65.

¹⁹⁰ Selim Deringil, "Aspects of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdülhamid II and İsmet İnönü", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol.4, No.1, 1987, p.39.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*, p.41.

Wallachia.¹⁹² The Ottoman Empire and Russia battled thirteen times over the 19th century. In particular, Nicolas I aggressively tried to take control of the Ottoman Empire through Crimean War from 1853 to 1856. Russia also deeply penetrated into the Ottoman territory in 1877-78 causing revolts in the Balkan region and Bulgaria. As a result, that the Ottoman Empire lost Batum, Kars, and Ardahan in the Caucasus regions, and accepted the independence of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the autonomy of Bulgaria by the Treaty of San Stefano in March 1878. As Weisband described, Russia became the “archenemy” of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹³

However, with the support of Britain at the Berlin Congress held in June 1878, the Ottoman Empire recovered Batum, Kars, and Ardahan from Russia. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire accepted Cyprus “to be occupied and administered by England”.¹⁹⁴ In total, the Ottoman Empire lost two-fifths of its territory and one-fifth of its population during the 1870s. During this period, Russia’s southward expansion policy seemed to be the most vital threat for the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹⁵ Being at pains to secure the declining Empire’s interest from the Western powers, for a while Abdülhamid II needed to rely on support from them, especially Britain. In that time, Britain avowed itself to be a key player in the Balance of Power system and maintained a “Splendid isolation”. Meanwhile,

¹⁹² Ferenc A Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Turkish of Foreign Policy of Turkey*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, p.8.

¹⁹³ Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, p.20.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p.12.

¹⁹⁵ Ahmad, 2002, *op.cit*, p.10.

the British government understood the importance of the Turkish Straits and the Suez Canal to its national interest, and made an effort to secure them from other great powers through this support. This was the so called “Eastern Question”.

As some authors have pointed out, the Treaty of Berlin was the turning point after which Britain rapidly abandoned its policy of maintaining the unity of the Empire and thus the policy of non-interference in Ottomans’ domestic politics was no longer supported.¹⁹⁶ In this situation, Abdülhamid II had no other choice but to adopt status-quo policy for securing its territory. He looked for a more reliable security partner. His attempts to ally with Germany, Britain and even Russia failed because of the European balance of power. Recognizing Turkey as the real “Sick Man” of the imperial period, Abdülhamid II chose not passive but aggressive policies both in diplomacy and in cultural policy. He hesitated to join the war against Russia, despite the support of Britain in 1877.¹⁹⁷ Also he evaded war with Bulgaria in 1885 and Greece in 1897. Deringil described this avoidance of several wars as a policy of neutrality by Abdülhamid II.

It was perceived that he was prepared to make enormous sacrifices to secure the Ottoman Empire’s vital interests. If the Ottoman Empire lost some peripheral areas, the Sultan could focus on saving the Turkish Straits, the Middle East and the Anatolian regions. Concerning foreign policy, he may have been called a pragmatist or a realist. The realist dimension can also be seen in his cautious

¹⁹⁶ Ahmad, 1996, *op.cit*, p.5; Bilal Emre Biral, *The British Threat to the Ottoman Presence in the Persian Gulf during the Era of Abdülhamid II and the Responses toward it*, unpublished master thesis to the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University, 2009, pp.12-13.

¹⁹⁷ Deringil, 1987, *op.cit*, p.43.

character toward world politics, trying to avoid adventurism.¹⁹⁸ Abdülhamid II's diplomacy could be fallen under the evil school of realist thought.¹⁹⁹

With respect to the status quo policy, Abdülhamid II acted to show Western Europe a positive image of Ottomans through newspapers, journals and theaters, as well as some diplomatic efforts.²⁰⁰

3.2.2. Middle Power Policies from the Interwar Period to WWII

3.2.2.1. Balkan Entente and the Saadabad Pact

During the interwar period, the new Republic of Turkey endeavored to pursue status quo policies under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü. The fruits of foreign policy under Atatürk's diplomacy were the security of Turkish territory in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne. Meanwhile, İnönü's contribution to diplomacy was definitely to avoid involvement in World War II

¹⁹⁸ As an example of his avoidance of adventurism, Deringil referenced the Abdülhamid II's attitude to the Egyptian crisis in 1881-1882 and the Sudan issue as examples. *Ibid*, p.45.

¹⁹⁹ Wolfers roughly divided the tradition of realism into the schools of tragedy and evil. The evil school focuses on the human nature of selfishness and aggressiveness. Generally, realists deal with the great powers' policies as objects of realism, however, the extension of this logic treats to middle powers and small powers. The behaviors of the great powers originated in the naked desire to dominate other states, meanwhile the activities of the minor powers were considered struggles for survival in world politics. For survival, minor states basically adopted status quo attitudes. Arnold Wolfers, "The pole of power and the pole of indifference", *World Politics*, Vol.4, No.1, 1951, pp.41-42. For details on the classification between tragedy and evil in Realism, see Michael Spirtas, "A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory" in Benjamin Frankel (ed), *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, London: Frank Cass, 1996, pp.386-423.

²⁰⁰ Concerning cultural image projects in this period, see Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1998, especially, chapter 6 (Ottoman Image Management and Damage Control) and chapter 7 (The Ottoman Self Portrait).

through the use of active neutrality policies. Both Atatürk and İnönü adopted realist policies to pursue their survival, although, İnönü's task appeared to be more difficult. İnönü's war avoidance policies could be divided into two categories.

The first method of war avoidance is the signing of pacts with similar minor powers. This strategy originated from realist thinking. But the mode of diplomacy was liberal. Specifically, İnönü established the Balkan Pact and the Saadabad Pact during the 1930s. According to Barlas, there were three reasons Turkey and the Balkan region easy built coalitions (pacts).²⁰¹ The first reason was that they were geographically continuous. The states that joined the Balkan Pact shared a frontier. The second reason was that there were no stronger states in the region, either military or economically, other than Albania. The third reason was to do with the Ottoman legacy or image to the Balkan states, especially diplomatically. The Balkan states were likely to rely on diplomacy tied to their Ottoman heritage to avoid aggressor states. Turkey maintained its stance of equal status with the Balkan countries and took care not to give the appearance of Ottoman imperial attitudes.

In the early 1930s, Italy was potentially the most dangerous state to Turkey in the Mediterranean and the Balkan regions. Signing of the Treaty of Neutrality with Italy in 1928, however, Turkey was not satisfied with its security status in the Mediterranean and Balkan region. So, in order to satisfy its sense of security, Turkey signed a Treaty of Neutrality with Greece in 1930, then renewed its treaty with Italy in 1932. In the early 1930s, Turkey recognized that Greece, Yugoslavia

²⁰¹ Dilek Barlas, "Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Opportunities and Limits for Middle-power Activism in the 1930s", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.40, No.3, 2005, p.443.

and Romania had also pursued status-quo policies, while on the other hand Bulgaria and Hungary had ambitions for revision like Italy.²⁰² To secure itself against the revisionism of these states, Turkey encouraged pro status quo states to cooperate with them. At first, Turkey and Greece strengthened their Treaty of Neutrality concerning the defense of Thrace on September 14, 1933. Shortly afterwards, Turkey signed non-aggression pacts with Romania on October 17 and Yugoslavia on November 27.²⁰³ Consequently, Turkey, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia signed the Balkan Pact in February 1934, which attempted to stave off aggressive intervention and to secure territories in the Mediterranean and Balkan region. Turkey's miscalculation was not to include Bulgaria into this Pact. In addition, the emergence of Nazi Germany became a potentially new threat for Turkey. In Barlas' evaluation, the Balkan Entente was an ideal form of cooperation for a middle power like Turkey.²⁰⁴

During the same period, Turkey was also scrambling to secure its Eastern and Southeastern regions. Iran and Iraq shared Turkey's threat perception of Kurdish rebellions. As a result of this common threat perception, Turkey and Iran signed a separate frontier agreement in 1932.²⁰⁵ This agreement was expanded on July 8, 1937 when the Saadabad Pact was agreed upon between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan to secure against internal and external threats. With respect to the

²⁰² Hale, 2000, *op.cit*, p.61.

²⁰³ Dilek Barlas, *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929-1939*, Leiden: Brill, 1998, p.143.

²⁰⁴ Barlas, 2005, *op.cit*, p.449.

²⁰⁵ Hale, 2000, *op.cit*, p.62.

external threat, however, each country's recognition of the agreement was different. On the one hand, Turkey felt Italy to be a major threat at the time. On the other hand, Iran and Afghanistan considered Britain and the Soviet Union to be major potential threats.²⁰⁶ The aims of the Saadabad Pact were different among the various participating. As Palabıyık pointed out, this was a period shortly after the establishment of new governments in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. To legitimize their authority, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan found it necessary to construct good relationships with their neighbors.²⁰⁷ The Saadabad Pact suited this purpose. Meanwhile, Turkey's aim might be to take the leadership of the region.

Compared with these other countries, Turkey was further in the process of modernization and its state system was established. Turkey's aims were not only security against aggressors but also the expansion of its influence toward other countries. To expand its influence, Turkey acted as a coordinator in the establishment of the Pact. In 1934, Turkey attempted to act as mediator between Iran and Afghanistan to solve their border dispute. Concerning the border problem between Iran and Iraq, Turkey again accepted the role of mediator, and consequently, Iran and Iraq signed the border agreement on July 4, 1937.²⁰⁸ Turkey easily shared the same aims, in brief the status quo, with the other members of the Saadabad Pact. Ironically, the Balkan Pact and the Saadabad Pact

²⁰⁶ Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, "Saadabad Paktı (8 Temmuz 1937): İttifak Kuramları Açısından Bir İnceleme", *Orta Doğu Etütleri*, Cilt 2, Sayı 3, 2010, p.156.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p.168.

²⁰⁸ İsmail Soysal, "1937 Sadabad Paktı" in İsmail Soysal (ed) *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999, p.332.

were vulnerable because of the absence of a great power. “Revisionist” states (Germany, Italy and Japan) began implementing aggressive policies after Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1936. The Saadabad Pact’s aim was to prevent such revisionist states, although the effectiveness of the Pact was weak against the great powers’ interventions. Meanwhile, after the signing of the Balkan Pact, Turkey proceeded to discuss Mediterranean security with Italy, France, Britain, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Spain.²⁰⁹ Turkey hoped to organize Mediterranean entente to assuage Italian aggression. Fortunately, Italy was also willing to participate in this plan. However, Italy’s “half-ally” and one of the great powers, France was not interested in this plan. In the meantime, the British government emphasized the security of the Mediterranean at Locarno, including Romania and Yugoslavia into the entente, which may have been in conflict with the Balkan Pact.²¹⁰ Under these circumstances, Turkey did not take initiative in planning the Mediterranean pact.

Turkey’s endeavor to establish regional pacts was based on its status quo policy. In the late 1930s, İnönü took a liberal path toward realizing its vital interest in building the Balkan Entente and the Saadabad Pact. To put it simply, however, these pacts became fragile when revisionist states, especially Germany, gained power.

3.2.2.2. Active Neutrality during the World War II

The second type of policy advocated by İnönü was active neutrality based on

²⁰⁹ Barlas, 2005, *op,cit*, p.450-458.

²¹⁰ *Ibid*, pp.455-456.

balance and caution during World War II. After the beginning of World War II, İnönü's considerations were perceived to follow two major guidelines. The first was to avoid joining either the Allied or the Axis Powers. One reason for this was the memory of the tragic outcomes of World War I and the Turkish War of Independence, especially for decision-makers like İnönü, Numan Menemencioğlu, Rauf Orbay, Kazım Karabekir and so on. For them, these "negative lessons" were still vivid.²¹¹ Turkey was also still a relatively vulnerable national power. Soon after the establishment of the state and its domestic systems, the Turkish economy was developing under a five-year plan. The equipment of Turkish military was also out of date.²¹² This first aim, avoiding the war, was the priority until around the end of 1944. The second aim was not to miss the benefits of the postwar vision, and to achieve security from the victorious states. The Turkish government would therefore have to patiently wait and see how the war unfolded. Near the end of World War II, however, Turkey's priority changed from how to avoid the war to how to join the war without any cost.

From 1939 to 1942, Turkey practiced multidimensional policies toward Britain (and France), Germany and the Soviet Union. Against Britain and France, Turkey signed the Treaty of Mutual Assistance in October 1939. This treaty fundamentally aimed at defending the Mediterranean region against Italy and Germany (Article 2). But Protocol no. 2 permitted an exception. "...The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty cannot

²¹¹ Deringil, 1987, *op.cit.*, p.40.

²¹² For details about Turkish economic and military vulnerability, see Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An Active Neutrality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp.12-40.

compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union".²¹³

This exception came into effect when Germany attacked France in May 1940. This was why Germany signed the Non-Aggression Treaty with the Soviets in August 1939. In a stretched interpretation of Protocol no. 2, Turkey insisted that it could not attack states which had signed the Non-Aggression Treaty with the Soviets. In addition, as Vanderlippe pointed out, the Turkish armed forces and its equipment had not completed its modernization yet.²¹⁴ On the other hand, Turkey sought to maintain its relationship with Germany. Though Turkey was close with the Allied powers, the economic relations between Turkey and Germany still continued. Including Menemencioğlu and Fevzi Çakmak, some politicians who occupied important positions in government were pro-German. For Germany, this relationship was good leverage for pressuring Turkey to withdraw their support from the Allies.²¹⁵ Germany wanted to preserve Turkish trade lines, especially in chromite. Moreover, the German military was closing in near Western Turkey, and the Germans, as mentioned above, had signed a Non-Aggression Treaty with the Soviets, which created a potentially threat for Turkey. Under similar circumstances, Turkey and German had signed the Treaty of Non-Aggression on 18 June 1941. The Pan-Turkist faction also backed up the pro-German policy. The Pan-Turkist considered their ideal to be Turanism, which had a kind of affinity

²¹³ J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record: 1914-1956, Vol.2*, Princeton: D.Van Nostrand Company.Inc, 1956, pp.226-228.

²¹⁴ Vanderlippe, *op.cit*, p.66.

²¹⁵ Hale, 2002, *op.cit*, p.83.

with Nazi expansionism. A Turanist committee was established by Nuri Paşa and Zeki Velidi Toğan as leaders in July 1941.²¹⁶ Though supporting this circle officially, Germany did not take Turanism idea seriously.

Immediately after signing the Treaty of Non-Aggression with Turkey, Germany initiated Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Although Turkey refused to support the British side at that time, the German attack was the turning point regarding pro-Axis and pro-Allied neutrality. Most importantly, the Soviets, traditionally considered a potential Turkish threat, joined the Allied countries. Secondly, the United States signed an agreement with Turkey for cooperation on weaponry supplies and technical assistance.²¹⁷ Nevertheless, the İnönü administration had as yet hesitated to join the war. Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin strongly urged Turkey to participate in the war using both personal and official channels. Churchill was the most dedicated to bringing Turkey into the war. At the Casablanca Conference (January 1942), Adana Conference (January 1943), Quebec Conference (August 1943), Moscow Conference (October 1943), Cairo Conference (November to December 1943) and Tehran Conference (November to December 1943), Churchill insisted that Turkey should have joined the war, especially citing the Mediterranean and Balkan dimensions.²¹⁸ Roosevelt followed Churchill's insistence, but, Stalin changed his attitude toward Turkey at the Moscow conference.²¹⁹ Stalin gradually began to think about post-war

²¹⁶ Deringil, 1989, *op.cit*, pp.130-131.

²¹⁷ Vanderlippe ,2001, *op.cit*, p.68.

²¹⁸ *Ibid*, pp.67-73; Weisband, *op.cit*, pp.119-215; Deringil, 1989, *op.cit*, pp. 144-165.

²¹⁹ Vanderlippe , *Ibid*, p.72.

strategy, and reignited his interest in the Turkish Straits. So Stalin supposed that to aid the weapons to Turkey was the behavior of signing own death warrant.

It was not until 1944 that Turkey seriously began its support of the Allied Powers. Firstly, the attitude of the British government toward Turkey became cool because of the lukewarm Turkish talks. Secondly, as German power declined, Turkey's vital interests changed from avoidance of war to security in the post-war period. Specifically, the Turkish government decided to stop exporting chrome and to decrease the export of other materials to Axis states to below half the levels of the previous year.²²⁰ Following this, Turkey prohibited all E.M.S. and Mannheim-class vessels to pass Turkish straits.²²¹ Hence İnönü decided to force the largely pro-German Menemencioğlu to resign as Foreign Minister on 15 June. Ultimately, Turkey officially joined the war on 2 August 1945. This meant the end of Turkish neutrality.

In sum, İnönü and his colleagues pursued neutrality during the World War II. They recognized that Turkey's limited power comparative with great powers. At the same time, Turkish decision-makers understood that middle power could only survive through cautious and neutral policies during the war. During war time, it is difficult for middle power to choose liberal tactics. In this sense, the choice of İnönü's foreign policy was correct and succeeded in its goal of survival.

²²⁰ Weisband, *op.cit*, p.260.

²²¹ *Ibid*, pp.263-265.

3.2.3. Middle Power Policies during Early Cold War Period

The threat perception against the Soviet Union emerged again for Turkey after the World War II. On March 19, June 7, and June 18, 1945, Soviet foreign minister Molotov and Turkish ambassador to Moscow Selim Sarper discussed the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression signed on December 17, 1925. As Weisband pointed out, the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression did not succeed in satisfying Turkey that they were secure from the expansionist ambition of the Soviet Union.²²² What's more, suggestions by the Soviet Union encouraged Turkish paranoia. In the Soviet-Turkish meeting held on June 7, Molotov requested three points toward Turkish government; (1) Russia wanted to return Kars and Ardahan, which Turkey ceded in 1921, (2) Turkey should agree to establish Soviet bases on the Turkish Straits, and (3) the Montreux Convention should be revised on agreement of both countries.²²³ In October 1945, the Soviet Union began to build up their troops in Bulgaria.²²⁴ These moves were perceived as aggression by Turkey, which brought them closer to the American-centered Western camp. Britain and the United States were countries with the ability to protect Turkey against a Soviet threat. But Britain had begun to lose its power as the cost of World War II. So Turkey demanded the assistance of the United States. Former hegemon Britain also suggested that the United States defend Turkey as

²²² *Ibid*, p.28.

²²³ Bruce R Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, p.258.

²²⁴ Hale, 2002, *op.cit*, p.112.

an “imperial lifeline” or “strategic linchpin”.²²⁵

The Soviet presence in Iranian Azerbaijan in March 1946 was the turning point of the American Near East policy. After this incident, the United States took seriously the aid to Greece and Turkey in order to prevent Soviet influence. Using the battleship USS Missouri to transport the remains of former Turkish ambassador Mehmet Ertegün to Istanbul on April 6, 1946 was a symbol of the good faith of these policies, as were the subsequent military and economic aid packages granted by the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. This dissertation takes a more detailed look within US military aid to Turkey, as such military aid was indicative of Turkey’s bandwagoning policy to the United States.

The aging of military equipment was a consistent problem from the establishment of Republic of Turkey. As discussed above, this was used as an excuse to avoid World War II. Turkey needed to be in a position to negotiate for serious military improvement in order to stand against the Soviet Union’s aggressive policies after the end of World War II. Under these conditions, the U.S. government approved significant military aid to Turkey in financial, material and training dimensions. This dissertation particularly focuses on military training aid, since training aid means some U.S. soldiers came to Turkey and took direct control over a portion of the Turkish Armed Force. About two weeks before the Truman Doctrine was declared, British reports confirmed the necessity to train the Turkish military:

With regard to Turkey, the British Government takes the position that in order to bring the armed forces of Turkey into a reasonable state of

²²⁵ Kuniholm, *op.cit*, p.70.

preparedness a large measure of re-equipment and considerable training will be necessary.The British Government, however, is prepared to look after the needs of the Navy and the air forces provided satisfactory financial arrangement can be made (apparently the United States), and to furnish to Turkey additional military, naval and air advisers amounting some sixty officers for whom the Turkish Government has asked.²²⁶

These discourses were repeated among the U.S. government, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Edwin Wilson, who was the U.S. ambassador to Turkey after the enactment of the Truman Doctrine. These plans were formally approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on July 23 as Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Turkey (CAMAT). The guidelines of CAMAT were written in Article 2 of the letter of instructions to the Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Turkey.

You have on behalf of the United States supreme authority in Turkey over all such assistance, both civilian and military. You will act as Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, the personnel of which will be attached to the United States Embassy Ankara, and you will direct the performance by the Mission of all activities and functions which you deem necessary and proper to carry out the provisions of the Act of May 22, 1947, and the Agreement with the Government of Turkey.²²⁷

²²⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): Diplomatic Papers*, 1947, Vol. V: The Near East and Africa (Washington, D.C. 1971), pp.49-50.

²²⁷ *Ibid*, p.256. Details of CAMAT activities and functions were following: A) You will develop, in consultation with the Turkish authorities, programs of American aid to Turkey and will recommend such programs, including the terms and conditions upon which aid is furnished, to the Secretary of State, who will finally determine the programs after consultation with the heads of other interested Government departments. You will also recommend from time to time any changes in the programs which you deem necessary or proper. B) You will furnish information and other advisory assistance to the Turkish Government in connection with the carrying out of the aid programs and will disburse any funds available for assistance to Turkey which are allotted to the Chief of Mission. C) You will furnish full information to the peoples of the United States and Turkey, consistent with the security of the two countries,

Concurrently, in March 1948, the U.S. sent a training group and aid to Turkey. According to George McGhee, the contents of the training group were 51 civilians, 71 Army Group, 34 Air Force Group, and 13 Navy Group. They gave intensive training in the fields of supply, communications, ordnance, aircraft flight and maintenance, medical care, highway construction and machine operation and maintenance.²²⁸ CAMAT changed its name to the American Mission for Aid to Turkey (AMAT) in February 1949. AMAT was then reorganized into the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT: Ortak Savunma Yardım Kanunu) in October 1949.²²⁹ The JAMMAT Armies are sent to Istanbul (Field Training and Navy Force), Konya, Erzurum (Field Training Team) and Izmir (Air Forces).²³⁰ Again, JAMMAT changed its name to JUSMMAT (Joint United States Military Mission for Aid) in 1958. According to the handbook of JUSMMAT, its

concerning American assistance. This responsibility will include the making of arrangements with the Turkish Government for observation and reporting by the press and radio of the United States, and the preparation of basic material for inclusion in the reports of the President and the Secretary of the State to the Congress. D) You will observe performance by the Turkish Government of its assurances in the Agreement. You will suspend any or all assistance under circumstances in which you deem this to be required by the Act and you will report promptly any such suspension to the Secretary of State for final determination as to whether the Act requires withdrawal. Moreover, you are authorized to suspend any or all assistance and exercise any right of recapture to the extent you deem proper to carry out the objectives of the Mission.

²²⁸ George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets*, Houndmills: The Macmillan Press, 1990, pp.43-44.

²²⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): Diplomatic Papers*, 1949, Vol. V: The Near East, South Asia and Africa (Washington, D.C. 1977), p.1641. Major General McBride became chief of JAMMAT.

²³⁰ Nur Bilge Criss, "U.S. Forces in Turkey" in Simon Duke and Wolfgang Krieger (ed.), *U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970*, Boulder.CO: Westview Press, 1993, p.343.

roles are following:

- a) The Chief, Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT), is responsible for the proper planning, formulation, supervision and implementation of the Armed Forces of Turkey on tactical, technical, organizational, administrative, logistical and training matters in accordance with United States doctrine and procedures.
- b) The Army, Navy and Air Force Sections are responsible for advising the Turkish Army, Navy and Air Force respectively on the planning, formulation, supervision and implementation of the MAP (Military Assistance Program) ; also technical and tactical training in accordance with U.S. doctrines, programming, receipt and end item utilization of equipment required in support MAP.²³¹

Turkey would get the improvement of military skill and equipment through the U.S. aid. This aid program showed that Turkey completely jumped on the bandwagon of the United States. Unlike the bandwagon policies during the World War II period, Turkey was deeply committed to the U.S. and NATO policies as a “Cold War warrior”. But this bandwagon policy was a double-edged sword. It was likely that Turkey would have its sovereignty disturbed by U.S. armies for use as a NATO base. Turkish policy makers gradually complained about U.S.-dependent activities in Turkish territory.

The first indication of Turkey’s attitude change occurred during the Lebanon crisis of 1958. Facing this crisis, Turkey permitted the U.S. to use the İncirlik air base as a launching point for its operation in Lebanon. But this operation was

²³¹ *JUSMATT: A Brief History*, n.d. Courtesy of the JUSMMAT Protocol Office, Ankara. I obtained a copy of this booklet from Associate Professor Nur Bilge Criss. I express cordial gratitude to her.

outside of NATO activities.²³² The second such issue was the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to Çiğli base (Izmir). IRBMs, the so-called Jupiter Missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. Turkey and the U.S. agreed on the deployment of Jupiter missiles (SM-78) on September 18, and they were brought into Turkey on September 28, 1959.²³³ These agreement and conveyances were kept secret. Menderes and his foreign minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu accepted the deployment as deterrence against the Soviets, in line with the Menderes government's extremely pro-Western foreign policy. But this missile deployment was risk for Turkey to get into nuclear war. After the U-2 accident in which a U-2 spy plane that had launched from a Turkish base cracked up in Soviet territory in 1960, Turkey began to fear in earnest the possibility of Soviet attack against Turkey and subsequent war. This fear seemed to be being realized as Cuban crisis unfolded in October 1962. The Soviet Union deployed missiles with nuclear warheads to Cuba in retaliation against the Turkish Jupiter deployment, which was being prepared for usage. It is often said that October 1962 was the nearest the world had ever come to nuclear war. Bargaining with the Soviet Union, the U.S. ultimately decided to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey by April 1963. These negotiations were held without the presence of Turkish policy-makers. The fear of becoming involved in nuclear war and the disparaging attitude of the U.S. toward Turkey deepened Turkish suspicion.

The third and decisive factor in the deterioration of the Turkish-U.S.

²³² Hale, 2002, *op.cit*, p.129.

²³³ Nur Bilge Criss, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.20, No.3, 1997, p.99. According to Criss, this deployment project was planned from April 1956.

relationship was the Johnson Letter incident on June 5, 1964. Turkish Prime minister Ismet İnönü had planned for Turkey to intervene in Cyprus in order to defend the Turkish Cypriots people. At this time, Cyprus' president was Archbishop Makarios, who had lifted the constitutional quotas ensuring representation in the government by members of the Turkish minority. As Turkey prepared its reaction to Makarios, U.S. president Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to İnönü. Johnson said the following:

...I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far-reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your Government to consult fully in advance with us. ...I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies. ...I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.²³⁴

President Johnson warned İnönü that if Turkey intervened in the Cyprus, the U.S. would cease its support to Turkey with military and defense assistance against Soviet threat. This letter outraged Turkey and resulted in a change in the stance of Turkish foreign policy. The Cyprus issue and Johnson Letter violated Turkey's Misakı Milli and status-quo ideals. Both the government and public responded negatively. At this time, the international atmosphere of détente had

²³⁴ Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister İnönü, June 1964, as released by the White House, January 15, 1966, *Middle East Journal*, Vol.20, No.3, pp.386-387.

also reduced the Soviet threat of intervention in Turkish territory. Turkish foreign policies during the early Cold War period were totally bandwagon policies toward the West, especially the United States. But the deployment of Jupiter Missiles and the Johnson Letter caused Turkish foreign policy to shift from bandwagon to more balancing omni-directional diplomacy.

3.2.4. Middle Power Policies during the Detente Period

In the détente period, Turkey had gradually begun to construct relationships with Eastern Block and Third World countries, especially the neighboring Arab countries. In the early period of the Cold War, these countries were threats or potential threats to Turkey. Policy circles in Turkey considered rehabilitating relation with the Soviet Union was a choice between foreign policies in the age of détente. This rehabilitation started with the so-called “Khrushchev Letter” on June 28, 1960 to President Cemal Gürsel. Although this letter did not change bilateral relations suddenly, it opened the path to normalization.²³⁵ According to the preparation of the 1961 constitution, the labor party of Turkey was established as on February 13, 1961. This was one of the symptoms of Turkey’s attitude change toward the Eastern Bloc. Turkey and the Soviet Union signed the Culture and Science Cooperation on November 5, 1964. Afterward, Feridun Cemal Erkin, foreign minister at that time, declared that this cooperation was a turning point for both countries in normalization of their relationship.²³⁶

²³⁵ Erel Tellal, “1960-1980: SSCB’yle İlişkiler” in Oran (ed), *op.cit*, pp.773-774.

²³⁶ *Ibid*, pp.775-776.

From 1965 to 1969, a lot of high-level visits took place.²³⁷ At first, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromiko came to Ankara on May 17-22, 1965. Soon after Gromiko's visit, Turkish Prime Minister Suat Hayri Ürgüplü visited Moscow to discuss economic aid and the Cyprus issue. On December 20-27, Alexei Kosygin travelled to Ankara as the first visiting Soviet Premier. 1967 was a year of deepening bilateral relations. Turkey and the Soviet Union signed Economic and Technology Cooperation on May 25. Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel also visited Moscow. On November 12-21, 1969, Cevdet Sunay travelled to the Kremlin as the first visiting President of Turkey. In this way, relationships between Turkey and the Soviet Union rapidly recovered after the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cyprus Crisis. But Turkey did not fully trust the USSR. As Vali pointed out, abandoning claims of invasion of Turkey's territory, however, the Soviet government had the ambition to change the status of the Turkish straits.²³⁸ After 1976, Turkey and the Soviet Union nevertheless began military cooperation. From January 25 to February 6, 1976, Turkey sent its military to Georgia and Armenia to attend joint military maneuvers with the Soviets. In 1978, some politicians insisted that the USSR was no longer a threat to Turkey. But these close relationships abruptly ended following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. In the period of the "New Cold War", Turkey became close with the Western Bloc again.

From the late 1960s to the 1980s, Turkey began to court the Arab states for votes in various international forums and sought to rally support for Turkey's

²³⁷ *Ibid*, pp.776-778.

²³⁸ Vali, *op.cit*, p.212.

policy initiatives and the plight of Turkish Cypriots. Until 1964, Turkish Middle Eastern policies had been associated with the Cold War logic. Turkey behaved as the defender of the Northern Tier and supported Israel and pro-Western states and organizations. After 1964, however, Turkey's policies toward the Middle Eastern countries clearly changed. Representing this change, Hamit Batu's 1965 article published in the bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is often quoted. Here, Batu proposed that Turkey would have to establish good relations with Asian and African countries in cultural and economic dimensions. His proposed policy was called "benevolent neutrality" which attempted to move past each country's problems and acquire trust from other countries.²³⁹ As seen in Batu's article, Turkey carefully began to commit to Arab countries and organizations without intervention of domestic politics.

In the run-up to the Six-Day War in 1967, Turkey exhibited understanding of the Egyptian position and refused to join the group of "maritime powers" demanding the reopening of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. On the other hand, Turkey permitted Soviet ships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits.²⁴⁰ Following the Six-Day War, Turkey voted for approval of UN Resolution 242, which prescribed the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied during the war but asserted the right of all regional states to live within secure and recognized boundaries. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Turkey did not permit the United States to use Turkish military facilities to ship aid against Israel, but did allow the Soviet Union to resupply aircraft heading for Egypt and

²³⁹ Hamit Batu, "Türkiye'nin Dış Siyaseti", *Dışişleri Belleteni*, Temmuz 1965, Sayı 10, 1965, pp.23-26.

²⁴⁰ Vali, *op.cit*, p.214.

Syria, to use its airspace.²⁴¹ In the 1970s to 1980s, Turkey established close relations with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In January 1975, Turkey recognized the PLO as the exclusive representative of the Palestinians. In October 1979 Turkey permitted the PLO to open an office in Ankara. At last on November 15, 1988, Turkey recognized the new Palestinian state. Turkey's support of the new Palestinian state was meant not only as a demonstration of Turkey's friendship toward the rest of the Muslim world, but was also a show of support of an important step taken by the PLO toward a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. While in spite of a certain cooling in relations that came after Israel bombed Tunisia in 1985, Turkey began developing links with Israel, especially in commerce and tourism.

In addition to this, Turkey engaged with the activities of the Islamic Conference Organization in Rabat on September 25, 1969. This plan was initiated by King Faisal's idea of Islamic solidarity.²⁴² While supporting his idea, however, Turkey continued to monitor the situation. King Faisal was frustrated by other Muslim countries' dull response. But Hassan II, King of Morocco, invited Muslim countries including Turkey to Rabat and established an Islamic conference for the first time.²⁴³ Turkey hesitated to participate in the Rabat conference because Turkey was a secularist country. The Republican Peoples' Party opposed participation for this reason. Meanwhile, the Justice Party, which was ruling party

²⁴¹ Mahmut Bali Aykan, "The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy From the 1950s to the 1990s", *Middle East Studies*, Vol.25, 1993, p.97.

²⁴² Mahmut Bali Aykan, *Turkey's Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference: 1960-1992: The Nature of Deviation from the Kemalist Heritage*, New York: Vantage Press, 1994, p.64.

²⁴³ *Ibid*, p.65.

at the time, insisted on joining the Rabat conference to take initiative in the Middle East region. Consequently, as a compromise resolution, Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil participated in the Rabat conference. At this time, Turkey did not have any ambitions which affected a lot of Arab countries through Islamic-rooted organizations. But following the oil crisis and emergence of an Islamist party in Turkey led by Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey gradually committed to the OIC more and more from mid-1970s.²⁴⁴

Like this, Turkey shifted again from bandwagon to omni-directional policies. Omni-directional policies mixed balancing and neutrality. For Turkey, the factor that most influenced their alliances during World War II and the early Cold War period were threats of territorial intervention from other countries. In the détente era, Turkey felt the threat of its own territory and Cyprus' territory. The Jupiter missile incident and Johnson Letter revealed that the Western alliance was no longer trusted for Turkey comparative with 1950s. In addition to Western disparaging attitude, Turkey felt the Western attitude toward the Cyprus disputes was unfair and intervened on Turkish territory. Hence the Turkish government attempted to get the cooperation with other blocs and states.

3.3. Turkey and the Middle East

Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the goals of Westernization and ultimately to be a European country, as well as the pursuit of the tenet of “peace at home and peace in the world”, have been consistent aims of

²⁴⁴ *Ibid*, pp.75-76.

its foreign policy. In order to realize these aims, Turkey has pursued close relationship with European countries and the United States. On the contrary, the Middle East region, which had been part of the Ottoman Empire's territory in the past, came to be regarded as a symbol of backwardness and a zone of conflict for Turkish decision-makers.²⁴⁵ In the words of Karpaz, Turkey did not hesitate to criticize Islam and Arabic influences as major obstacles to its modernization project.²⁴⁶ To pursue Westernization was interpreted as abolishing Islamic and Arab traditions at the governmental level. In addition to this, Turkey's common image toward Arabs was that of "the deceitful Arab" following the experience of World War I. On the other hand, for Arabs, the typical image of Turkey was that of "the terrible Turk" representing the violent suppress or of Arabs and Arab nationalism.²⁴⁷ In a nutshell, Turkey and Arabs mixed like oil and water.²⁴⁸

After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, various areas of dispute with Middle East were over the issue of territorial annexations, specifically Mosul and Hatay (Alexandretta). Mosul, which was occupied by Great Britain, was of strategic importance for Turkey because of its oil field. Since talks between Turkey and Britain were deadlocked, the problem was referred to the League of

²⁴⁵ Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey's Security and the Middle East", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.62, No.1, 1983, p.167.

²⁴⁶ Kemal Karpaz, "Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations" in Kemal Karpaz (ed), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974*, Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1975, p.111.

²⁴⁷ Dietrich Jung, "Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Realities", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.10, No.1, 2005, pp.3-4. As Jung pointed out, this image was promoted by Arab nationalists. The discourse of "the terrible Turk" also had positive secondary interpretation as protector of Islam.

²⁴⁸ The exceptions were Iran and Iraq, which had also been in support of the "Northern tier". Both countries shared the threat perception from the Soviet Union with Turkey.

Nations.²⁴⁹ The decision of the League of Nations was that the Mosul region to be parted newly established Iraq was governed by Britain. On the other hand, Turkey received Hatay region from France in 1939. The Hatay region was used as bargaining chip between Turkey and France in the face of World War II. At first, France accepted the independence of Syria including Hatay in 1936.²⁵⁰ But as the Germans started to march into Eastern Europe, France conceded Hatay to Turkey without any scruples.

During the 1950s, as an exceptional case, Turkey deeply committed itself to Middle Eastern affairs under the administration of Adnan Menderes. Menderes used foreign policies toward the Middle East to secure reliance from the Western Bloc. So Turkey's deep commitment to the Middle East was strictly strategic, as a method of building its relationships with Europe and the United States. Showing positive attitudes toward the plans of the Middle East Command (MEC) and the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) launched by Britain, the Menderes government doubted British influence over the Middle East. Meanwhile, the US-led plan of alliance with the Northern Tier countries truly fulfilled Turkey's demands. This was because the U.S. was becoming leader or hegemon of the Western circle. Turkey took a leading role in the establishment of the Baghdad Pact between Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Britain on November 3, 1955.²⁵¹ The Baghdad Pact was a symbol of Turkey's bandwagon policies toward the West,

²⁴⁹ Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1991, p.22.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p.23.

²⁵¹ Concerning the process of forming the Baghdad Pact, see Ara Sanjian, "The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 33, No.2, 1997, pp.226-266.

however, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia fiercely opposed this pact.²⁵² The establishment of the Baghdad Pact was a triggering event of the 1956 Suez crisis and the subsequent establishment of the United Arab Republic by Syria and Egypt. Finally, three events brought the end of the Baghdad Pact and Turkish activism in the Middle East with Western support. The first event was the resignation of Iraqi foreign minister Nuri el-Said, who had been a staunch promoter of the Baghdad Pact. After his resignation, Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, which changed its name to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The second element was the collapse of the Menderes administration in 1960. The third element was the U-2 incident discussed above. The end of the Menderes administration and the U-2 incident accelerated Turkey's distancing from the West. As mentioned above, Turkey implemented a multi-dimensional policy after the Cyprus crisis, and committed to a relationship with Middle Eastern countries independent of the influence of the West. In addition, the economy was one of the major factors in Turkish-Arab relations after the oil crisis.

Sayarı delineated the four characteristics of Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East region during the Cold War period.²⁵³ These were (i) avoiding or minimizing involvement in Middle Eastern problems like the Arab-Israeli conflict, (ii) maintaining good relationships with all countries in the region, (iii) avoiding leading or active role in Middle Eastern politics, and (iv) having been the first country in the region to recognize Israel, Turkey gradually shifted its stance from pro-Israel to pro-Palestine. Karaosmanoğlu also pointed out five points of Turkish

²⁵² Karpat, *op.cit.*, p.118. According to Karpat, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia planned to establish the other defense pact against Baghdad Pact.

²⁵³ Sayarı, 1997, *op.cit.*, pp.44-45.

Middle Eastern policies.²⁵⁴ First of all, Turkey attempted to deal with Middle East affairs as “threats were minimized and economic relations were maximized”. Secondly, Turkey acted as mediator in Arab disputes. Thirdly, Turkey had to take care of security issues with Arab countries relative to the West. Fourthly, Turkey generally adopted a stance of noninterference in the internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries. Fifthly, Turkish nationalism has no relationships with religion. But last point has changed after the 1980s.

In short, having tried to maintain good relations with all Middle Eastern states and minimize involvement in their affairs, Turkey did not build reliable relationships with Middle Eastern countries nor break their negative image among Arabs.

3.4. Chapter Conclusion

Until the end of the Cold War, Turkish middle power policies had three major characteristics. First of all, the aim of middle power policies was to secure Turkish territory. Turkey used balancing, bandwagon and neutrality policies to maintain the status quo against revisionist states. In the 1930s, Turkey initiated the Balkan Entente and Saadabad Pact as a leading state in the region. This was regarded as coalition diplomacy with neighboring countries. Yet, the aim of this coalition-building was to secure its own territory. When Germany began its occupation of Eastern Europe, Turkey changed its coalition-building policy to bandwagon and active neutrality policies. Secondly, Turkey’s partners in its

²⁵⁴ Karaosmanoglu, *op.cit*, pp.166-167.

bandwagon policies were always Western great powers. In addition to this, no matter how bad relationships with West would become, Western countries took central positioning in Turkey's multi-dimensional diplomacy. Thirdly, material changes affected the Turkish middle power policies. Turkey was apt to use realist policies when its threat perception increased with changes in the international environment. Yet, while change of regional environment was not so important in changing Turkish middle power policies, these realist middle power policies gradually changed after the end of the Cold War.

Until the end of the Cold War period, the relationships between Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries were not so close, but neither were they very distant. Turkey was careful to maintain balance in the region and avoided intervening in the domestic politics of each country. The central issue between Turkey and the Middle Eastern states was security.

Table 2. Turkey's middle power policies from the late Ottoman period to the end of the Cold War

	The period of AbdülhamidII	Interwar period (1930s)	Interwar period (1940s)	Early Cold War period	Détent period
Realism	Power balancing	Power balancing	Power balancing Neutrality	Bandwagoning	Power balancing Neutrality
Liberalism	-----	Coalition diplomacy	-----	-----	-----

CHAPTER 4

4. Premise of Liberal Middle Power

Turkish liberal policies did not suddenly begin when the AKP took power. As some scholars point out, Turgut Özal and Ismail Cem were the heads of administrations practicing foreign policies that were forerunners of those of the AKP under Ahmet Davutoğlu.²⁵⁵ In addition, Necmettin Erbakan's idealist diplomacy also served as a foundation for the AKP. In this chapter, this dissertation focuses on the precursors to the AKP's liberal middle power policies in the 1990s, especially those of Özal, Erbakan and Cem. The state identity of liberal middle power began to emerge since the Özal government.

4.1. Contributions of Turgut Özal

Özal served as Prime Minister from 1983 to 1989 and President from 1987 to 1993. He was not an expert in foreign policy, but was "a pragmatic thinking economist".²⁵⁶ On the other hand, he was a promulgator of neo-Ottomanism, meaning he took on foreign policy from both pragmatic and idealist perspectives. At the same time, he was deeply committed to Middle Eastern affairs compared to previous leaders.

²⁵⁵ Altunışık, 2009, *op.cit.*, pp.178-185; Kirişçi, 2009, *op.cit.*, pp.42-46; Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles?", *Middle East Policy*, Vol.17, No.1, 2010, pp.120-122.

²⁵⁶ Hüseyin Bağcı, "Turgut Özal's foreign and security policy revisited" in *ZEITGEIST: Global Politics and Turkey*, Ankara: Orion, 2008, p.168.

4.1.1. Material and Norm Changes

When Özal served as President, the Berlin Wall was broken and the Soviet Union was dismembered. In other words, the Cold War structure was at an end. Cold War structure was a bipolar system, and this structure was strengthened by mutual distrust between the United States and the Soviet Union, the threat of nuclear wars and its deterrence, and ideological disputes. In the Cold War period, the international structure was (loosely) bipolar, however this structure changed the multipolar or unipolar structures in the post-Cold War period.²⁵⁷ Soon after the Cold War ended, it initially looked multipolar, but gradually a unipolar structure became predominant. Under a unipolar structure, the characteristics of relationships between superpowers and other countries are based on flocking, and hard work.²⁵⁸ Regarding the ideological dispute, the collapse of the Soviet Union was interpreted as a victory for liberal democracy.²⁵⁹ This mood of victory was reflected in George Bush's "new world order" speech after the end of Gulf War. Bush declared that the United States and other countries had tried to abolish needless weapons and bases, and strive to achieve a free world with a guarantee of human rights. In addition to this, the free market economy was admired as the

²⁵⁷ The period immediately after the end of the Cold War was regarded as having ushered in a multilateral situation in which the United Nations could take an effective role. But gradually, the United States assumed the role of single superpower and the international structure transformed into a unilateral one. Samuel Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.78, No.2, 1999.

²⁵⁸ Birthe Hansen, *Unipolarity and the Middle East*, Richmond: Curzon, 2000, pp.63-68.

²⁵⁹ Needless to say, Francis Fukuyama's *The end of history and the last man* was icon of this phenomenon. Francis Fukuyama, *The end of history and the last man*, Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1992.

ideal economy model. To paraphrase Ikenberry, the immediate period after the end of the Cold War was a “liberal moment”.²⁶⁰ But this liberal moment did not last long. Many regional conflicts or ethnic conflicts within states emerged in power vacuum areas like the Balkan region. Intrastate war or low intensity conflict were predominant modes of dispute.²⁶¹ As a result, many countries had to commit the regional affairs in ways they had not attended to during the Cold War period.

4.1.2. Liberal Economy and Economic Cooperation

With regard to the pragmatic dimensions, economic functionalism and relationships with Western countries were characteristics of Özal’s foreign policy. Özal attempted to shift the Turkish economy from an import substitution economy to a liberal market economy with Washington Consensus. In the transition to an export-oriented liberal market economy, the so-called “Anatolian Tigers” began to play an important role.²⁶² Anatolian Tigers were small- and medium-scale

²⁶⁰ John Ikenberry, “The restructuring of international system after the Cold War” in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp.547-548.

²⁶¹ Andreas Wenger and Doron Zimmermann, *International Relations: From the Cold War to the Globalized World*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, p.241.

²⁶² Kirişci, 2008, *op.cit*, p.43. According to Hosgör, there were two waves of industrialization of small- and medium-scaled enterprises in Anatolia. The first wave was happened in the 1970s, as planned by the State Planning Organization. The financial source of the first wave was made up of remittances from Turkish immigrants who went to Europe as laborers. But the first attempt failed due to lack of influence in the stock market. The second wave began in the mid-1980s and totally differed from the first wave from the standpoint of its relationship to the liberal market. Yet, remittances from Europe were a source of financial support for the Anatolian Tigers. Evren Hosgör, “Islamic Capital/Anatolian Tigers: Past and Present”, *Middle East Studies*, Vol.47, No.2, 2011, pp.344-345.

enterprises in Konya, Yozgat, Denizli, Çorum, Aksaray and Gaziantep.²⁶³ Businessmen among the Anatolian Tigers were generally forming a conservative and pro-Islamic middle class. They used religious and local networks to create a new business community that brushed up on business practices and learning skills to exploit the new market.²⁶⁴ The Anatolian Tigers, which sympathized with Middle East states based on shared religious identity, could engage Middle Eastern finances more easily than secular business groups. After taking the office of Prime Minister in December 1983, Özal established the Faisal Finance and Al Baraka Turkish Finance houses, which were Saudi Arabian fund, which were exempt from Turkish bankruptcy laws.²⁶⁵ This has made it possible for the Anatolian Tigers to connect with finance in the Middle East. In 1984, then-President General Kenan Evren was appointed director of the OIC's standing committee for economic and commercial cooperation. Furthermore, the establishment of MÜSİAD in 1990 accelerated the connection with the global Muslim business network.²⁶⁶ The February 28 process held in 1997 decreased the activities of MÜSİAD, however, with the success of the AKP, these activities soon

²⁶³ Ömer Demir, Mustafa Acar and Metin Toprak, "Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challenges", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.40, No.6, 2004, p.168.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid*, pp.168-169.

²⁶⁵ Birol A Yeşilada, "Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East" in Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tünay, and Birol A Yeşilada (eds), *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, Westport: Praeger, 1993, p.186. The Kuwait Turkish Finance house was also established in 1989.

²⁶⁶ Hoşgör, *op.cit*, p.348. For more information about MÜSİAD, see its website (<http://www.musiad.org.tr/en/Default.aspx>).

re-increased.²⁶⁷

Özal also emphasized the importance of the development of economic relations with Middle Eastern countries as a prescription for solving political problems. A symbolic policy was the peace pipeline project, under which Turkey attempted to supply waters from its rivers to Middle Eastern countries. Turkey advocated this project twice. The project was first proposed by Özal in 1986, with an estimated budget of 21 billion dollars, to transport water from Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers to the Arab States and Israel. But this plan was opposed by Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia.²⁶⁸ As a second project, the plan of shorter pipeline which started from Seyhan or Ceyhan and provided water to Syria, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian territories, was launched by the True Path Party government in October 1991, with an estimated budget of 5 billion dollars. But Syria refused to participate in the multilateral working group.²⁶⁹ Özal also increased the trade volume with the Middle Eastern countries, especially Iraq until the beginning of the Gulf crisis.

²⁶⁷ According to Hoşgör, MÜSİAD reduced its membership from 2900 to 2300, and suffered a boycott of products made by Islamic firms. *Ibid*, p.352.

²⁶⁸ George Gruen, "Turkish Plans to Export Water: Their Regional Strategic Significance", *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol.26, 2004, p.212.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p.212. Syria strongly opposed another of Turkey's water projects called the GAP project. This was the project that resulted in the construction of the Ataturk Dam in the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers. Ataturk Dam would be able to control Syrian and Iraqi water supplies.

4.1.3. Strict Neutrality to Positive Activism toward the Middle East

During the 1980s, Özal followed on the policies of balancing and neutrality, which had been characteristics of realist middle power, toward the Middle East region. For Turkey, the Iran-Iraq War was the biggest incident in the 1980s. Though Turkey did not specifically side with either Iran or Iraq, its priority was to reduce the PKK's power and to save the oil trade. Additionally, the Turkish military had made an effort to prevent the spread of Islamic revolution led by Khomeini from Iran. Hence Turkey tended to come off as pro-Iraq.²⁷⁰ Yet, Turkey pursued maintaining balance between Iran and Iraq, and from this balancing and neutrality, Turkey could increase its exports to both countries as well as its strategic importance within the Middle East region as "silent victor".²⁷¹ But it became difficult for Turkey to maintain a non-participant neutrality policy due to the collapse of the Cold War structure. For Turkey, instead of the Soviet Union, the Middle East became the major source of threat during the 1990s.²⁷² This threat was connected to domestic problems like those resulting from the PKK and the GAP project. The GAP project was a hydroelectric project that, from the mid-1980s, controlled the Tigris-Euphrates basin and aimed to develop the

²⁷⁰ Iraqi government allowed Turkey to implement several operations toward the Kurd in Iraqi territory in 1984, 1986 and 1987. Henri J. Barkey, "The Silent Victor: Turkey's Role in the Gulf War" in Efraim Karsh (ed), *The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications*, Houndmills: Macmillan, 1987, p.142.

²⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.133.

²⁷² Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Redefinition of Turkish Security Policies in the Middle East After the Cold War" in Ali Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (eds), *The Europeanization of Turkey's Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls*, Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004, p.215.

region.²⁷³ At the same time, engaging the Middle Eastern security problem was a strategic asset toward cooperation with Western powers, especially the United States. For these reasons, Turkey shifted its approach from balancing and neutrality policies toward the activism led by security issues.

As mentioned above, the traditional policy driving Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East was non-intervention. Yet, the Gulf crisis erupted soon after the collapse of the Cold War structure and seemingly marked a turning point for Turkish policy makers, at least for President Özal, to change Turkey's traditional non-interventionism. Facing with the Gulf crisis, Özal moved forward with the decision to deploy forces to Iraq because of his pessimistic outlook, whereby he believed the collapse of the Cold War structure meant losing Western protection and aid, and Turkey would have to make an appeal for its strategic importance again. For these reasons, Özal regarded the Gulf crisis as a golden opportunity for Turkey to display the value of its presence in world politics to Western countries like during the Korean War in 1950. But unlike Korean War, the Gulf crisis was unfolding in Iraq, a bordering country. Against Özal's expectation, the decision to participate in the Gulf crisis was protested by domestic actors, especially ministers. From October 1990 to January 1991, then-Foreign Minister Ali Bozer, then-Defense Minister Safa Giray, and then-Chief of National Security Council (NSC) General Necip Toruntay resigned in succession.²⁷⁴ They were

²⁷³ Ali Carkoglu and Mine Eder, "Water conflict: The Euphrates-Tigris Basin" in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişci (eds), *Turkey in world politics: an emerging multiregional power*, Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002, p.308.

²⁷⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, Ekim, 14&19, 1990; William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis" *International Affairs*, Vol.68, 1992, p.686.

reportedly frustrated with Özal's single-handed decision.²⁷⁵ Public opinion also opposed to the idea of sending an army to fight a neighboring Muslim country.

Özal was strongly affected by the unipolar structure and liberal nature of the moment. Shortly after the end of Cold War, Turkish decision-makers were afraid that Turkey would lose Western support because of the end of its role as "Cold War warrior". This anxiety promoted Turkey's pro-American policy, in particular the case of the Gulf crisis. A strong alliance with the United States was the single option for Turkey. Turkey had worked hard during the Gulf crisis to gain the reliance of the United States. Yet, Turkey began to deeply commit to Middle Eastern affairs and, especially after the emergence of the Northern Iraqi issue resulting from the Gulf crisis, began to be mistrustful of the United States.

Having risen up against Saddam Hussein's government after the Gulf crisis, the Kurdish minority in Iraq was counter-attacked. To escape the counter-attack, approximately 700000 Kurdish people living in Northern Iraq surged through the Turkish borders. Up until the Gulf crisis happened, the Kurdish issue had been a sort of glue of Turkish-Iraqi relations. The worst case scenario for Turkey would have been if the PKK and Northern Iraqi Kurdish groups united to construct their own state. Turkey was reluctant to protect them within their domestic borders, but acquiesced under international scrutiny.²⁷⁶ Refugee protections were implemented under the UN safe heaven project, and all refugees were returned to their homes by the middle of June. But Turkey had to engage with the Northern Iraqi issue as a component of its participation in Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), and to

²⁷⁵ Mustafa Aydın, *Ten Years After: Turkey's Gulf Policy (1990-91) Revisited*, London: Frank Cass, 2002, pp.29-32.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p.37; William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, London: SAQI, 2007, p.49.

maintain strong relations with the United States.²⁷⁷ Turkey thus had to tackle the Kurdish issue not only in domestic politics, but also in Northern Iraq. In Northern Iraq, there were two Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jelal Talabani. Since the PKK's terrorism increased in activity, Turkey doubted that Northern Iraqi parties cooperated with the PKK, and so agreed with Saddam Hussein to contain the Kurdish minorities around their borders. But after the Gulf crisis, situation changed in the regional politics, and Özal began to contact the KDP and PUK.²⁷⁸ While trying to reach an agreement regarding sanctions against PKK, negotiations between Turkey and both Kurdish parties finally broke down.²⁷⁹ Furthermore, the US support of Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq was unpleasant for Turkey.²⁸⁰ In 1995, Turkey implemented military operations against PKK within the territory of Northern Iraq.

The Gulf crisis changed these Turkish traditional approaches, at least the points of non-interference in the domestic affairs, non-interference in disputes among Arab states, maximization of trade and economic relationships, and Turkey's subtle role within the Middle East.

²⁷⁷ Altunışık, 2004, "Turkish-American Security Relations...", *op.cit*, p.161. Concerning OPC, see following article. Mahmut Aykan, "Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq, 1991-95, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.32, No.4, 1996, pp.343-366.

²⁷⁸ Hale, 2002, *op.cit*, p.308.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p.309.

²⁸⁰ This US policy was part of a "dual containment" strategy, which would contain both Iraq and Iran.

4.1.4. Institution-Buildings

The establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was the symbol of Özal's test of regional-building. The concept of the "Black Sea region" was created through the establishment of the BSEC. The BSEC was launched as a regional economic cooperation organization by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine in June 1992. For member states, the BSEC was considered not to be a countermeasure to the EU, but a complement of the EU. BSEC members cooperated in the areas of transportation, telecommunications, energy, environmental protection, agriculture, health care, science and technology and so on. In addition to economic cooperation functions, the BSEC has the role of regional security.²⁸¹ The declaration of the Istanbul summit, which was held in 1992, emphasized the goals of regional peace, stability and prosperity through promotion of good neighborhood relations among participants.²⁸²

Özal also enhanced the Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO) by inviting Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in 1992. In addition, Özal urged the free movement of people by softening visa requirements toward Greece and citizens of the former Soviet republics.²⁸³ Kirişci pointed out that the Middle East, save for the Syrian border through Hatay, was

²⁸¹ Ziya Öniş, "Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.49, No.1, 1995, p.59.

²⁸² (<http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/declaration/summit/Reports/Istanbul1992.pdf>), April 24, 2011 accessed.

²⁸³ Kirişci, 2008, *op.cit.* p.44.

not included in the flexible visa modification.²⁸⁴

4.1.5. Challenge of the EC Accession

Another pragmatic approach was represented in relationships with Western countries. The origin of the Turkish EU (EC) accession process can be traced back to Turkey's applications for associate membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in September 1959. Turkey subsequently signed the Ankara Agreement with the EEC in September 1963, but negotiations had long been stagnant when Özal applied for full EC membership on April 14, 1987. Özal supposed that if Turkey received a membership in the European Community, its status in world politics would become greater. In particular, he attempted to connect with the West not only through military alliances but also through economic ties.²⁸⁵ In this period, Turkish-EC relations deteriorated as a result of the military coup d'état in 1980. The EC criticized the coup as an infringement on human right. So promoting the respect for human rights became an iconic issue of Turkey-EC relations, along with economic liberalization. Özal began to address these challenges yet in 1985 the EC submitted a brief report declaring Turkey's human rights practice to be far behind the EC standards.²⁸⁶ The Özal government made its application to the European Commission of Human Right in January

²⁸⁴ Kemal Kirişci, "A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of "Soft Power", The Experience of Turkey", *European Journal of Migration and Law*, Vol.7, 2005, p.357.

²⁸⁵ Ihsan Dağı, "Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community in Turkish Politics: The Özal Years, 1983-87", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.37, No.1, 2001, p.18.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p.22.

1987. Consequently, the European Commission rejected Turkey's EC application on 18 December 1989. Still, Özal opened a new era in Turkish-EC relations. While sharing an agenda of Westernization with the Turkish military, Özal's Westernization goal was based on freedom, democratic liberty, and respect for human right.²⁸⁷

On the other hand, he knew the limits of efforts to prematurely become a member of the European community, and so he maintained a close relationship with the United States, which didn't consider Turkey's human rights record. These relationships were revisited after 1989, as the Cold War structure was losing its relevance. Özal appreciated George Bush's New World Order and indiscreetly supported the action of the United States because of its power and influence in world politics. He believed that the only way to continue enhancing relationships with Western allies, especially the United States was through Turkey's regional contributions to the Western agenda.²⁸⁸ This idea was the basis of Özal's pro-American policy when he was faced with the Gulf Crisis.

4.1.6. Neo-Ottomanism

After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the foreign policy ideas related with Ottoman Empire were ignored. However, the idea of Ottomanism was revised in the 1980s by both the left and right wings. On the one hand, the right wing emphasized Turkey's imperial legacy toward the

²⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p.30.

²⁸⁸ Sayari, 1997, *op.cit*, p.45.

Central Asian, Caucasus and Balkan states which were newly independent in the post-Cold War period.²⁸⁹ This new geopolitics emerged at the beginning of the 1990s, awakening Turkey to consciousness of Ottomanism. On the other hand, leftist used Ottomanism as countermeasure against Western imperialism.²⁹⁰

Özal's idealist foreign policy approach was characterized by neo-Ottomanism. He sympathized with the Turkish-Islamic synthesis launched by Aydınlar Ocağı. This idea was a mix of Turkish nationalism with Islam. Özal tried to apply the idea of Turkish-Islamic synthesis to Turkey's foreign policy. The concepts of neo-Ottomanism and the Second Republic were advocated by intellectuals and columnists who were close to Özal. Concerning the concept of neo-Ottomanism, Cengiz Çandar was the leading advocate.²⁹¹ After the end of the Cold War, he accompanied Özal on trips to the Balkan, Central Asia and the Caucasus, which seemed to deepen his commitment to the idea of neo-Ottomanism.²⁹² Neo-Ottomanism had a dimension of being a countermeasure against traditional Kemalist or Republican foreign policy which secured existing territory and avoided the expansionism.²⁹³ Yavuz summarized the main factors

²⁸⁹ In the Özal era, the main target of neo-Ottomanism was not the Middle East but the newly independent post-Soviet states. Yet, although they shared related ethnic background with Turks, Central Asia and the Caucasus were not territories of the Ottoman Empire.

²⁹⁰ Graham Fuller, *Turkey Faces East: New Orientations toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union*, Santa Monica: RAND, 1992, p.12.

²⁹¹ Meanwhile, Mehmet Altan was the leading advocate of the "Second Republic".

²⁹² Şaban Çalış, "Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler: Özal, Balkanlar ve Neo-Osmanlilik!" in İhsan Sezal/İhsan Dağı (eds), *Kim Bu Özal? Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, Ankara: Boyut Kitapları, 2001, p.418.

²⁹³ Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo-Ottomanism", *Middle East Critique*, Vol.7, Issue 12, 1998, p.25.

for the extension of Neo-Ottoman influence. The first factor was the emergence of a new liberal political and economic situation in Turkey, and the second was a growing skepticism of the West following the Cyprus issue, the Balkan turbulence and the European Commission's refusal of Turkish full membership in 1989.²⁹⁴ The features of Özal's neo-Ottomanism were pluralism (tolerance), shared Ottoman historical experience, and Islam. Neo-Ottomanism did not ignore contemporary boundaries and attempt to reunify the Ottoman system, but build a new conceptual framework within which a newly acknowledged commonality with neighbors would facilitate increasing Turkish regional influence.²⁹⁵

Yet, neighboring countries viewed the concept of neo-Ottomanism with cold eyes. For the Middle Eastern countries, Ottoman experience was still viewed as having a negative impact in the 1990s. These countries warned against the rise of the concept of neo-Ottomanism in Turkey. The essential failure of neo-Ottomanism with regard to Central Asia was made clear at the "Turkic summit" held on October 30-31, 1992. The aim of this summit was to show the solidarity of Turkic countries and the leadership of Turkey. However, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev and President of Uzbekistan Islam Kerimov questioned Turkic solidarity, and insisted on a strong connection between CIS countries.²⁹⁶ Indeed, the collapse of the Cold War structure opened opportunities

²⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p.22. Yet, as Uzgel and Yaramış pointed out, the United States backed up the idea of neo-Ottomanism toward the newly independent countries. İlhan Uzgel ve Volkan Yaramış, "Özal'dan Davutoğlu'na Türkiye'de Yeni Osmanlıcı Arayışlar", *Doğudan*, Mart-Nisan 2010, 2010, p.39.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p.40.

²⁹⁶ Robins, 2003, *op.cit*, pp.286-287.

to Turkey for strengthening its influence. However, Turkey still did not have political and economic resources necessary for fulfilling its political will.

Consequently, Özal's attempts to change Turkey's liberal foreign policy did not break the realist stronghold of traditional foreign policy.²⁹⁷ After the Gulf Crisis, Turkey was dragged into the Northern Iraq issue and the struggle against the PKK until 1998. Turkish Middle Eastern policy was highly security-centered. However, Özal's attempts to transform the liberal market economy and liberal foreign policy triggered changes that impacted Turkish foreign policy in the coming years.

4.2. Necmettin Erbakan's Contributions to Liberal Middle Power

Some influential politicians belonging to the AKP like Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç etc are ex-politicians from Welfare Party founded by Erbakan. In other words, Erbakan and his "National view (Milli Görüş)" formed the foundation of the core circle of the emerging AKP. Up until the split into the AKP and the Felicity Party in 2001, Erbakan had held influence over Erdoğan and Gül. With respect to foreign policy, the AKP's policies have been partially inherited from Erbakan's policy of pragmatism, especially relationships with West and Islamic-centered idealism.

²⁹⁷ Kirişçi, 2008, *op.cit.*, p.45. Yet, as symbolized by the resignation of the Chief of the National Security Council Necip Toruntay during the Gulf Crisis, the power balance of politico-military relations clearly changed from that of the previous period.

4.2.1. Pragmatic Behavior of the Welfare Party

A pioneer pro-Islamist politician, Erbakan established the National Order Party in 1970.²⁹⁸ Having become deputy prime minister during the 1970s, Erbakan's "National View Movement", which encompassed movements of culture, industrialization, social justice, and education, was not accepted by majority of Turkish citizens because of its clear pro-Islamic attitude and anti-Westernization.²⁹⁹ After founding the Welfare party, this trend gradually changed, and he made a great breakthrough in the 1990s.³⁰⁰ The Welfare Party received 19.7% in local election held on March 27, 1994 and also succeeded in posting pro-Islamic mayors in 29 cities including Istanbul and Ankara. Erbakan won 21.4 % of the votes following the general election held on December 24, 1995 and grasped 158 seats in Parliament. What's more, the Welfare Party joined a coalition with the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) in June 1996. Erbakan was Prime Minister from June 1996 to

²⁹⁸ The National Order Party was closed on 20 May 1971 after the second military coup. But after one year and a half, Süleyman Arif Emre, Erbakan's friend, founded the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) on October 11 1972. After the National Order Party was closed, Erbakan escaped to Switzerland. Emre thus took the initiative in the founding of the National Salvation Party. In October 1973, after the 1973 general election, Erbakan returned to his position. Again, the National Salvation Party was closed during the third coup in September 1980.

²⁹⁹ Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p.212.

³⁰⁰ The Welfare party was founded on July 19, 1983 by Ali Türkmen. In that time, the main pro-Islam politicians were banned and could not participate in political activity. In the local elections held in March 1984, the Welfare Party received 4.4 % of the total vote. In the 1987 general election, after Erbakan returned to Turkey, the Welfare Party received 7.16 % of the vote. After the third coup, Kenan Evren enacted a new electoral rule for stabilizing politics. Parties holding more than 10 % of the valid votes can take seats and participate in parliament. The Welfare Party thus had no parliamentary representation in the 1980s.

June 1997 under this coalition. According to Yıldız, the characteristics of the Welfare Party in domestic politics were the cessation of discourses on political Islam, and the efforts of Welfare Party to transform a mass-based party, especially involving the have-nots of Turkish society, was concentrated in the suburb of the big cities.³⁰¹ Dağı points out the international factors of their electoral success in the 1990s.³⁰² These are (1) the rejection of Turkey's full membership application in December 1989 by the European Community, (2) the end of the Cold War and the rise of the discourse of a clash of civilizations, (3) the tragedy that Muslims in Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh experiences.

Though the concept of National View has been unchanged, the motto of the Welfare party has sometimes changed. Until the 1987 general election, the motto had been "the national consciousness".³⁰³ But from the early 1990s, Welfare Party began to use the motto "just order", which focused on the normative sphere of Islamic thought. For example, social solidarity, the prevention of wasteful expenditures, justice in taxation, equal treatment of all in the allocation of state credits, and the abolition of interest.³⁰⁴ According to Yavuz, the theoretical supporters of this idea were Süleyman Karagülle and Süleyman Akdemir whose goal was the creation of a pluralistic, democratic, and free-market-based civil

³⁰¹ Ahmet Yıldız, "Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook", *The Muslim World*, Vol.93, 2003, p.195.

³⁰² İhsan Dağı, "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.6, No.1, 2005, p.26.

³⁰³ Yıldız, *op.cit.*, p.192.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

society.³⁰⁵ Erbakan published a booklet about the notion of just order, called ‘Just Economic Order’, in 1991. Just order was an idea used by Erbakan since the 1970s. Unlike national consciousness, just economic order emphasized the importance of social and economic policy. In the 1990s, social and economic policy based on fair income distribution was important. This is because the Welfare Party observed that the Islamic discourse was a limitation in the effort to win hearts and minds. Around the 1990s, the Welfare Party’s supporters could be separated into hardliners and softliners.³⁰⁶ Hardliners were core and traditional supporters who were generally described as religious fundamentalists. Softliners were floating or temporary supporters dissatisfied with the poor performance of the center-right parties. The Welfare Party attempted to absorb more and more people becoming a populist party. But Nakşibendi and Nurcu groups, early supporters of Erbakan’s party, opposed this transformation. For instance, Esat Coşan, Nakşibendi shaykh, criticized Erbakan as a betrayer of Muslims.³⁰⁷ Secondly, the proceeding globalization and the stagnant Turkish liberal economy that center-right parties promoted resulted in a lot of unemployed people. The Turkish nation was frustrated with the center-right party, and demanded more just and conservative ideas. The Welfare party filled this political vacuum in the

³⁰⁵ Yavuz, 2003, *op.cit*, p.221.

³⁰⁶ Ziya Öniş, “Political Islam at the Crossroads: From hegemony to co-existence”, *Contemporary Politics*, Vol.7, No.4, 2001, pp.284-285.

³⁰⁷ Yıldız, *op.cit*, p.196. At first, the Nakşibendi force rebuted Erbakan regarding his party’s policies in 1978. Korkut Özal, the brother of Turgut Özal, was the main member of this rebellion.

mid-1990s.³⁰⁸ In addition, Erbakan insisted that pursuing economic activities was consistent with Islam.³⁰⁹

Though the Welfare Party eased its insistence on Islamic discourse, Erbakan continued to tout anti-Westernism, and was outspokenly anti-Jewish. Erbakan exhibited clear hostility toward Europe on the basis that the history of mankind had been a struggle between Western civilization and Islamic civilization³¹⁰. These discourses are clearly different from insistences of the AKP.

Yet, Erbakan maintained good relationships with Western countries and Israel after coming to power. Turkey had proceeded positively in reinforcing the relationships with Israel during the 1990s. In particular, Turkey and Israel signed three agreements in February, August and December 1996.³¹¹ Despite his harsh criticism against Western countries and Jews, Erbakan did not take any steps to

³⁰⁸ Ziya Öniş, "The political economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey: The rise of the Welfare party in perspective", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.18, No.4, 1997, p.748.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid*, p.753.

³¹⁰ Burhanettin Duran, "Islamist redefinition(s) of European and Islamic identities in Turkey" in Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe (eds), *Turkey and European Integration: Accession prospects and issues*, London: Routledge, 2004, p.127.

³¹¹ The first was the Military Training Co-operation Agreement that was signed on 21-23 February 1996. The published parts of this agreement list areas of co-operation like the exchange of information in military training, exchanges of visits between military academies, joint training, the invitation of observers to other training exercises, port visits, and exchanges between military archives. The second agreement regarding co-operation in the defense industry field was signed on 26 August 1996. This agreement provided for technology transfer and training of technicians and researchers. Strategic dialogue was also included in this agreement. Thirdly, on 5 December 1996 both countries signed an agreement to modernize 54 of Turkey's F-4 Phantom aircrafts for 650 million dollars. Concerning the details of three treaties, see Meliha Altunışık, "The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era" *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.36, No.2, 2000, pp.181-189; Neill Lochery, "Israel and Turkey: Deepening ties and strategic implications, 1995-98", *Israel Affairs*, Vol.5, No.1, 1998, pp.45-62.

downgrade bilateral relations with Israel.³¹² What's more, Erbakan also toned down his opinions about Operational Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq. In short, Erbakan and the Welfare Party softened their insistence in order to become Turkey's ruling party.

4.2.2. Pro-Islamic Foreign Policies

Erbakan's foreign policy was pro-Islamic compared with those of center-right and center-left parties. His ultimate goal was to establish a "World Islamic Union". It was therefore necessary to establish five organizations: the United Islamic Nations, including non-governmental organizations, an Islamic countries equivalent NATO, an Islamic countries cooperative market, an Islamic countries customs union, and Islamic countries cultural union.³¹³ In the same article, he also presented six guidelines for Turkey's foreign policy. These were (i) Turkey had to consider the welfare of the world's Muslims, (ii) Turkey had to consider welfare not based on power but rights, (iii) Welfare would follow neither capitalist nor communist doctrine. Just economic order is necessary to realize public welfare, (iv) To get and defend Muslim's rights, Turkey had to take the initiative and establish a World Islamic Union, (v) The World Islamic Union would be established to eliminate unjust intervention (from the West or imperialists) and to provide rights to all peoples, (vi) Turkey's main aim was to

³¹² Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan", *Survival*, Vol.39, No.2, 1997, p.84.

³¹³ Necmettin Erbakan, "Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası Nasıl Olmalı?", *Yeni Türkiye*, Yıl1. Sayı 3, 1995, p.60.

establish good relationships and friendships, and to develop commercial relationships and solidarity with all countries and blocs.³¹⁴

His first trip after being inaugurated as prime minister extended from Iran to Indonesia. Included on his travel agenda was Libya, the regime of which was much-criticized by Western countries. He also made efforts to establish Development 8 (D8) defined a countermeasure against NATO and the EU. The D8 is composed of largely Muslim countries: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey. The plan to establish the D8 started at the seminar of the foreign policy commission on “cooperation in development” held in Istanbul in October 22, 1996.³¹⁵ The first meeting of foreign ministers was quickly followed on November 9 with talks about the foundations of the organization.³¹⁶ With the exception of Egypt, foreign ministers participated in a second meeting held in Istanbul the following January. At the second meeting, Ankara presented a list of D8 cooperation areas.³¹⁷ According to the D8 website, their objectives which were signed in June 1997 were as follows:

Peace instead of conflict, dialogue instead of confrontation, cooperation instead of exploitation, justice instead of double-standards, equality instead of discrimination, democracy instead of oppression. Thus D-8 objectives are to improve developing countries' positions in the world

³¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.61.

³¹⁵ (<http://www.developing8.org/about-d-8/brief-history/>), April 17, 2011 accessed.

³¹⁶ İhsan Dağı, *Kimlik, söylem ve siyaset: Doğu-Batı Ayırımında Refah Partisi Geleneği*, Ankara: Imge kitabevi, 1998, p.119. At first, member countries called this organization as “Muslim 8”.

³¹⁷ Robins, 1997, *op.cit*, p.94. Listed of cooperation areas were banking, equity markets and privatization through trade promotion, tourism and energy.

economy, diversify and create new opportunities in trade relations, enhance participation in decision-making at the international level, and provide better standards of living.³¹⁸

The D8 was finally established in June 15, 1997, however, Erbakan resigned as Prime Minister in the same month. The D8 had heavily depended on Erbakan's personal idea and initiatives, and found it difficult to carry on following his resignation. Two summits were held in Dhaka and Cairo in 1999 and 2001, but the D8 was ineffective until the AKP government turned its attention to the group.

4.3. Contributions of Ismail Cem

4.3.1. Material Change and Norm Change

The 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States marked an important milestone of international structure and norm change. This event clarified the weakness of superpower against terrorism. In other words, the limitations of the unipolar world political structure were revealed in the face of terrorism. Generally speaking, the 9/11 terrorist attack brought two norm changes. First, the war on terror became new international norm. Second, radical Islam became the newest threat to the West. As a result, moderately Islamic countries took on greater importance to the West.

Turkey reaped many benefits from these norm changes due to its own experience fighting terrorism, and as a moderately Islamic and secular country in

³¹⁸ (<http://www.developing8.org/about-d-8/brief-history/>), April 17, 2011 accessed.

a strategic geographic location.³¹⁹ Turkey had been fighting terrorism since the 1970s. During the 1970s, the Turkey's target of terrorist groups were Armenian terrorist groups like ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), and after the 1980s the PKK was its main enemy. Though Turkey's attacks against the PKK were criticized by the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights, Turkey had legitimacy for fighting a war against terrorism after 9/11, especially from the United States.³²⁰ Turkey was regarded as perfect role model for the Islamic World because it was the only Muslim country in the region with a secular system. Turkey's opening of the OIC-EU joint meeting in February 2002 was recognition of this. Third, the United States regarded Turkey as an important factor in the context of the war in Afghanistan from the perspectives of geography and because of its ties with Central Asian and Caucasian countries.³²¹ What's more, Turkey also received support for its EU accession bid from the United States.

4.3.2. Cem's Idea of World State

Ismail Cem served as Foreign Minister from June 1997 to September 2002. According to his *Turkey in New Century*, Cem emphasized four concepts in foreign policy. Firstly, his goal for Turkish foreign policy was to become a "world

³¹⁹ Hüseyin Bağcı and Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey's Strategic Future: Post-11 September Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited", *European Security Forum: A Joint Initiative of CEPS and the IISS*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003, p.19.

³²⁰ *Ibid*, pp.21-22.

³²¹ *Ibid*, pp.30-36.

state”. He defined world state as the following:

A world state, positioned among the major centers of the world and representing a unique blend of civilizational assets, historical experiences and strategic attributes. A world state, one that is not a sole importer of foreign science and technology but contributes as well to science and technology. One that is not a mere observer of others’ success stories but has its own achievements that sometimes make them envious as well. One that consistently develops its special relations with the regions with which it shares a common history.....³²²

According to Cem, firstly, Turkey was not only a European country or an Asian country, instead it was both a member of the European community and a role model in the Islamic community. Turkey was positioned in the “central place” in the historical geography of the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia.³²³

Second, Cem considered Turkey’s historical assets. With regard to its history, he criticized the lack of historical dimensions to the traditional approach of Turkey’s foreign policy analysis, and admired the experience of the Ottoman Empire. He understood the Ottoman period as having produced advantages in Turkey’s international relations. These advantages were stability, security and tolerance.³²⁴ Ottoman tolerance, by his explanation, included the presence of a non-threatened tolerant majority, minority groups with little cause for rebellion, an

³²² Ismail Cem, *Turkey in the New Century (2nd edition)*, Nicosia: RUSTEM, 2001, p.21.

³²³ *Ibid*, p.24.

³²⁴ *Ibid*, p.6.

environment of cultural interaction and cultural coexistence.³²⁵ He spoke of tolerance in domestic society, however, tolerance was also often quoted in the so-called neo-Ottomanism foreign policy discourse.

Third, Cem advocated economic cooperation and interaction. He thought that growing economic cooperation would reduce the possibilities of war and increase the possibility of peace among countries. This is typical functionalist thinking. He used the examples of the BSEC, the BTC oil pipeline, and the bordering countries initiative with Bulgaria and Greece. The bordering countries initiative was the cooperation of NGOs to stimulate economic activities.³²⁶

The fourth feature of Cem's foreign policy idea was the civilizational approach. As Uzgel point out, the AKP's idea based civilizational approach is inherited from Cem's policy.³²⁷ He also focused on the "synthetic" element in culture of civilization. He supposed that culture was the source of collective memory, of basic mindset, and of patterns of behavior.³²⁸ He divided culture into deep-rooted culture and shallow culture. Deep-rooted culture dated back to ancient Anatolia and the birth of civilizations. Anatolia is called the cradle of civilization. Probably, this perspective urged him to promote Turkey as the center or coordinator of surrounding civilizations. On the other hand, the shallow cultural perspective has characteristics of either rejection of some other cultures or

³²⁵ *Ibid*, p.51.

³²⁶ *Ibid*, p.141.

³²⁷ İlhan Uzgel, "Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele" in İlhan Uzgel and Bülent Duru (eds), *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, Ankara: Phoenix, 2009, p.363.

³²⁸ *Ibid*, p.10.

inferiority complex about others. At any rate, he emphasized that all of the civilizations in Anatolian history have together contributed to the shaping of contemporary Turkish society.³²⁹

4.3.3. Regional Facilitator or Mediator

Having used the four ideas mentioned above, Cem actually implemented three activities toward the Middle East as prototypes of the AKP's foreign policies. These were the OIC and EU Joint Forum, the Neighborhood Forum in the Middle East, and the rapprochement with Syria.

The OIC-EU joint forum held in Istanbul on February 12-13, 2002 was a brilliant diplomatic success for Cem. It is important to note that this forum was held only 6 month after the tragedy of September 11. Representatives from 76 countries, including 51 foreign ministers, attended this forum, and talked about a solution to the clash of civilization between Western and Islamic countries. In his opening speech, Cem pointed out that Turkey could see two different trends for 2002 after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On the one hand, differences based on culture and religion were emphasized as a result of a radical Islamist-led implementation of terrorism. On the other hand, Turkey could also see the solidarity which would overcome those differences with respect to cultural diversity and deepening mutual understanding.³³⁰ In sum, he wanted to express that 9/11 terrorism was unrelated to culture and religion. In line with Cem's opening speech, this forum

³²⁹ *Ibid*, p.12.

³³⁰ Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, *OIC-EU Joint Forum: Civilization and Harmony: The Political Dimension*, Ankara: Etki Yayıncılık, 2002, p.20.

was a place where attending actors could cooperate with members of multiple cultures and multiple civilizations. And all countries should follow a more universal standard based on respect for human rights and diversity, and prevention of terrorism.³³¹ He considered Turkey to be able to contribute to the implementation of war against terrorism based on its experience fighting a war against PKK terrorism.

Davutoğlu, valued the OIC-EU joint forum as a conference at which Western and Muslim states exhibited cooperative attitudes for the first time after the 9/11 terrorism.³³² Yet, he added that Turkey should have not remained in the role of bridge between Western and Muslim civilizations, and should have exercised foreign policy based on the new historical consciousness. A second OIC-EU forum was planned on October 4-5, 2004, but was not realized after the Netherlands, then the EU chairman state, opposed the forum.³³³

The Neighborhood Forum in the Middle East failed to be organized, yet this trial was useful for the stability of the Middle East, especially Iraq. Five principles toward Iraq guided this initiative: (i) Prevention of the reoccurrence of crises in the region, (ii) Preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity and political unity, (iii) Recognition of the need to address all questions that emerged following the Gulf Crisis of 1990/91, (iv) Elimination of terrorism in the region, and (v) Elimination

³³¹ *Ibid*, p.260.

³³² Ahmet Davutoğlu, "*Medeniyetler Buluşması ve Türkiye'nin Rolü*" in Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, İstanbul: KÜRE yayınları, 2002, p.198.

³³³ (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_p_no__126-october-1st_-2004_-eu-oic-joint-forum__p_.en.mfa), April 7, 2011 accessed.

of weapons of mass destruction.³³⁴ The fundamental idea behind the Neighborhood Peace Initiative was the realization of the peace through economic cooperation and confidence-building measures.³³⁵ To realize this initiative, Cem asked for cooperation from other Middle Eastern countries. Though Iraq, Iran and Jordan showed positive attitudes at this forum, Egypt strongly opposed this plan.³³⁶ There were two reasons why Egypt responded negatively to Turkey's neighboring forum. First, Egypt, as a leader among the Arab countries, did not desire Turkey to expand its influence in the Middle East. Second, Egypt mistrusted Turkey because of its strategic cooperation with Israel in 1996. In short, the plan for a neighborhood forum failed at this time, though it was realized under AKP government in order to prevent the Iraqi war.

4.3.4. Desecuritization between Turkey and Syria

The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998 was the visible turning point of Turkey's Middle East policy. Since the Gulf Crisis, Turkey had to commit to the Middle East region deeply as opposed to during the Cold War period. Yet, Turkey's approach toward the Middle East was of "security centered politics" based on its threat perception from the neighboring countries.³³⁷ Syria was

³³⁴ Cem, *op.cit*, p.80.

³³⁵ Cem pointed out five measures as confidence building measures. These were respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-use of force, inviolability of borders, and non-interference with internal affairs. *Ibid*, p.81.

³³⁶ *Hürriyet*, Mart 1/ 19/21, 1998.

³³⁷ Meliha Altunışık, "Güvenlik Kısılacında Türkiye-Ortadoğu ilişkileri" in Gencer Özcan

perceived to be one of the greatest threats to Turkey during the 1990s, along with Northern Iraq because of its support to the PKK. Syria and the PKK had shared a long history of cooperation. According to a secret report of the NSC, the relationship between the PKK and Syria began in July 1979, immediately after the PKK was established.³³⁸ The PKK held a meeting in Syria to plan attacks against Turkey from July 15-26, 1981 and on August 20, 1982.³³⁹ Syria provided financial, military and logistical support to the PKK until 1998. Abdullah Öcalan also seemed to personally deepen the relationship with Assad family. Syria's goal of playing the PKK card was a weight against Turkey's GAP project.³⁴⁰

Since 1996, Turkey began to take a stern line against Syria's support of the PKK. Turkey sent the memorandum to Syria on January 23, 1996 demanding it cut PKK support.³⁴¹ Then, in February 1998, Aykut Çetirge head of the Middle East department in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, visited Syria to reiterate this demand against the Syrian government.³⁴² Furthermore, Turkey once presented an ultimatum to Syria when then-Syrian Foreign Policy Advisor Adnan Omran visited Ankara on July 1, 1997. Undersecretary of Foreign Ministry Korkmaz

and Şule Kut (eds), *Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar: En uzun on yıl*, İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1998, pp.333-334.

³³⁸ Metehan Demir and Sezai Şengün, "İşte sabrımızı taşıran nedenler", *Hürriyet*, Ekim 8, 1998. The activities of PKK formally started from October 1978.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁰ Mahmut Bali Aykan, "The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish View", *Middle East Policy*, Vol.VI, No.4, 1999, p.175.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*

³⁴² *Ibid.*

Haktanır met Omran and presented him with a two-page letter about repairing the relationship between the two countries.³⁴³ But the Turkish side received no response from Syria. In short, Damascus did not take the Turkish recommendation to cut relations with PKK seriously.

Recognizing the ineffectuality of their diplomatic efforts, Turkey began to change its tactic of ruling out the use of force against Syria. Turkey clearly showed this attitude change beginning in October 1998. At the Turkish Grand National Assembly, then President Süleyman Demirel harshly criticized Syria in his opening speech:

With respect to Syria, we have observed clear hostility against Turkey. Syria aggressively continues to provide aid to the PKK terrorist organization. Despite our repetitive warnings, Syria has not stopped this aid. This is the last straw. We hereby inform the international community that we will not hesitate to retaliate against Syria.³⁴⁴

On the same day, the meeting of the National Security Council and a group of military generals was held, in which they confirmed their idea that “the time for diplomacy and dialogue has ended. If necessary, we can do anything, even a military operation”.³⁴⁵ Then-Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz shared the military’s ideas for action against Syria. Other coalition parties and opposition parties also supported this thinking. In other words, all Turkish political actors came together

³⁴³ *Hürriyet*, Ekim 3, 1998. Omran wanted to meet some military officers, however, military rejected his request.

³⁴⁴ *T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi Cilt 62, 1-inci Birlesim*, October 1, 1998.

³⁴⁵ *Hürriyet*, Ekim 2, 1998. In that time, the Turkish Air Force was ready to make a sortie from the Diyarbakır and Malatya bases.

on a hard line against Syria.

In response to Ankara's harsh attitude, Syria accepted Ankara's request for dialogue. Yet Syria denied providing aid toward the PKK, insisting that the reason for the deterioration of relations between the two countries was due to the close relations between Turkey and Israel.³⁴⁶ Concerning Syria's comment, the President and government reacted harshly. President Demirel was angered by Syria's attitude and indicated his support for a military operation. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Yılmaz warned Syria once more in meeting of the ANAP said "This is the final warning. Stop aid terrorists, obey the international agreement and end hostile activities against Turkey. We will not be satisfied with an empty answer but wait for a specific step toward rehabilitation between our two countries".³⁴⁷

At the ministerial meeting held the following day at a meeting of the Motherland Party, Prime Minister Yılmaz said that Syria had 45 days to give its answer.³⁴⁸ Faced with the crisis between Turkey and Syria, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak attempted to play a mediator role. He traveled to Turkey to negotiate with Demirel, Yılmaz and Cem on October 6. His attempt failed. The Turkish government showed that Turkey would not compromise on the issue of cutting relations between Syria and the PKK.³⁴⁹

By October 12, Turkey had reached new heights in its warnings. The Turkish

³⁴⁶ *Hürriyet*, Ekim 3, 1998.

³⁴⁷ *Hürriyet*, Ekim 7, 1998.

³⁴⁸ *Hürriyet*, Ekim 8, 1998.

³⁴⁹ *Hürriyet*, Ekim 7, 1998.

military began to prepare for a military operation of fifty thousand troops near the Syrian border to begin November 6.³⁵⁰ At last, Syria acquiesced to Turkey's request and signed the so-called "Adana agreement" on October 20. The Adana agreement was signed by Turkish deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ugur Ziyal and Head of Political Security for Syria Major General Adnan Badr Al-Hassan in Adana. In the Adana agreement, Turkey won four promises from Syria. These were (i) Syria would definitely not allow Öcalan to enter its territory, (ii) Other PKK members would also not be permitted to enter Syria, (iii) The Syrian government would not permit the PKK train in its territory, and (iv) Syria would arrest PKK members and send them to court. Syria would also give the PKK member's list in its possession to Turkey.³⁵¹ In addition, both countries established a hotline and diplomatic special representation for security.³⁵²

Öcalan could no longer stay in Syria and escaped to Russia. He was finally arrested at the Greek embassy in Kenya on February 15, 1999. Turkey and Syria had begun the trust-building process after the signing of the Adana agreement.³⁵³ In addition, the death of Hafiz al-Assad and the inauguration of Bashar al-Assad accelerated the deepening friendship between both countries. Turkish-Syrian relations in the 1990s were restricted to security problems based on threat

³⁵⁰ *Hürriyet*, Ekim 12, 1998.

³⁵¹ Minutes of the Agreement signed by Turkey and Syria in Adana (unofficial translation).

³⁵² *Ibid.*

³⁵³ Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, "From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations", *Security Dialogue*, Vol.37, No.2, 2006, p.238.

perception. For Turkey, Syria had been reluctant or distant neighbor, but this perception has drastically changed since the Adana agreement. Gradually, Syria has become a neighbor and confidant for Turkey.

4.3.5. Prototype of Zero-Problems Policy

The root of this change in perception by Turkey toward Syria was the region-centric policy advocated by Bülent Ecevit and Cem. Ecevit explained his foreign policy philosophy in a 1995 article. First of all, he described Turkey as having implemented peaceful foreign policy from the 1920s to until World War II.³⁵⁴ And the basis of this policy was to create and maintain good relationships with neighboring and nearby regional states, and so to share the security threat within the regions. In addition, states within the region cooperated with Western countries or other states to guarantee their regional security. For Ecevit, foreign policy during the interwar period was the ideal type of foreign policy. He did not positively evaluate Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War period because Turkey had no good relationships with its neighboring states. He regarded the post-Cold War period as a good opportunity to apply regional foreign policy. His idea was very similar to Davutoğlu's strategic depth. He evaluated Turkey as "a country that is not only both European and Balkan, but also both Mediterranean and Middle Eastern from the perspectives of history, geopolitics and culture".³⁵⁵

Turkey's multi-regionalism foreign policy during the 1990s was explained as

³⁵⁴ Bülent Ecevit, "Bölge-Merkezli Dış Politika", *Yeni Türkiye*, Yıl 1. Sayı 3, 1995, p.64. Concerning the details of Turkish foreign policy during the interwar period, see chapter 2.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p.69.

“Ankara’s principal objectives have been to maintain its geo-strategic importance in global politics, ensure regional stability, prevent ethnic conflicts from spilling over into its territory and gain new markets to fuel its strategy of export-based economic growth”.³⁵⁶

Yet, Ecevit’s regional-centered foreign policy gave priority to security issues. Turkey’s traditional multi-dimensional diplomacy or multi-regionalism was also strictly connected with security issues. This characteristic had not changed until the emergence of the AKP government. Öniş classified Turkey’s region-centric policies into two types. According to him, foreign policy during the 1980s and the 1990s could be labeled “coercive regional power” for being willing to depend on military force to gain status within the region.³⁵⁷ On the other hand, he labeled Turkey’s activities in which it played a constructive role in the Middle East and other Muslim states “benign regional power”. Benign regional power aimed at expanding economic and political relations with the surrounding region, and at being a model of economic development and democratic promotion.³⁵⁸ Öniş pointed out that the source of Turkey’s benign regional powers was domestic economic and political reform based on the EU negotiation process.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁶ Sabri Sayarı, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-Regionalism”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.54, No.1, 2000, p.180.

³⁵⁷ Ziya Öniş, “Turkey and the Middle East after September 11: The Importance of the EU Dimension”, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.2, No.4, 2003, p.2.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p.4.

4.4. Others' Perceptions

4.4.1. Western Perceptions

Lesser insisted that the Turkish role had shifted from barrier or frontier state against threats (especially the USSR) to bridge between East and West in his famous article "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West after the Cold War".³⁶⁰ After the Cold War period, the United States expected Turkey to act as regional stabilizer to the Middle East, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus in the areas of security and economy. In 2000, he reconsidered the Turkish role, and said that Turkey could act as model for both political and economic dimensions in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East beyond the bounds of the bridge metaphor.³⁶¹ In addition, especially for the United States, Turkey had been a "strategic partner" in security and energy issues after the Cold War. Bağcı explains the term "strategic partner" as following:

The term "strategic partner" is not restricted to referring to military affairs but rather it is a comprehensive concept which includes all areas of the two societies concerned. Turkey is the United States' strategic partner of because Turkey, as a democratic country, can indeed play the role of a model country, not only for the Caucasian

³⁶⁰ Ian Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War" in Graham E. Fuller and Ian Lesser (eds), *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, pp.99-140.

³⁶¹ Ian Lesser, "Beyond 'Bridge or Barrier': Turkey's Evolving Security Relations with the West" in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds), *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, Washington, D.C : The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000, p.205.

and Central Asian Republic, but also for the whole Islamic world.³⁶²

Lesser listed three reasons for the US's expectation of a strategic partnership with Turkey.³⁶³ First, US officials expected Turkey to be a more stable, prosperous, and Western-oriented partner. Second, US officials anticipated it to take on a positive role as a regional stabilizer, especially relating to the security dimension toward the Middle East and the Balkan states. Third, US officials expected Turkey would contribute to its freedom of action or its democratization plan.

4.4.2. Arab perceptions

During the 1990s, the central perceptions of Arab countries toward Turkey was still occupied by “terrible Turk” perception. The background of this phenomenon was the Arabs' threat perception for Turkey, specifically during the Gulf War, and the alignment between Turkey and Israel. Soon after the end of the Cold War, the Arab countries did not gain favor within the framework of Turkey's deeply regional commitment because of the negative image held over from the Ottoman period.³⁶⁴ As a result, Arab countries in the Eastern Mediterranean

³⁶² Hüseyin Bağcı, “Turkey as a strategic partner” in *ZEITGEIST*, p.442.

³⁶³ Ian Lesser, “Turkey and the United States: Anatomy of a Strategic Relationship” in Lenore Martin and Dimitris Keridis (eds), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002, p.85.

³⁶⁴ Ofra Bengio and Gencer Özcan, “Old Grievances, New Fears: Arab Perceptions of Turkey and its Alignment with Israel”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.37, No.2, 2001, pp.65-66.

worried about Turkey's new identity-seeking and clearly opposed its aggressive engagement with the Middle East. Yet, Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia, welcomed Turkey's commitment toward the Middle East, especially in economic arenas.³⁶⁵ The alignment between Turkey and Israel perplexed Arab countries, especially Egypt, Iraq and Syria, regarding their security policies.³⁶⁶ They tried to negotiate with Turkey to abolish Turkish-Israeli alignment. Meanwhile, the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement following the Adana agreement had softened Arab perceptions toward Turkey.³⁶⁷ Turkish-Arab relations were a major factor in the Peace Process between Israel and Palestine in 1990s.

4.5. Chapter Conclusion

According to Cooper et al., economic amalgamation at the bureaucratic level is the trigger for the implementation of liberal policies for middle powers. In the Turkish case, however, economic amalgamation did not occur at the bureaucratic level. In Turkey, Özal's leadership and reform of liberal economy were the triggers for the transition toward liberal policies. But Özal did not complete this transition because of regional instability and the threat of loss of support from the West. Eventually, Turkey succeeded in transforming its security priorities toward the Middle East after the signing of the Adana agreement with Syria. In addition,

³⁶⁵ Dan Tschirgi, "Turkey and the Arab World: Regional Partners or Rivals in 21st Century" in Mustafa Aydın (ed), *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Global Encounters and/vs Regional Alternatives*, Ankara: International Relations Foundation, 1998, p.113.

³⁶⁶ Bengio and Özcan, *op.cit*, pp.70-71.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p.78.

Turkey implemented a system of coalition diplomacy toward the Middle East region, gradually from the time Özal was in office until Cem. With respect to foreign policy, the AKP's policies have been partially inherited from Erbakan's policy of pragmatism and Islamic-centered idealism. By the period Cem was serving as foreign minister, Turkish self-perception was undergoing a transformation, while others' perceptions remained based in concerns for security and geographic strategy. Change in the perceptions of others toward Turkey would be realized under the AKP government.

Table 3. Contributions by Özal, Erbakan and Cem to liberal middle power

	Functional diplomacy	Mediation	Niche diplomacy	Coalition diplomacy	Norm diffusion
Özal	Putting importance on Economic factor	-----	Establishment of TİKA	BSEC Turkic Summit	Liberal economy EU accession
Erbakan	-----	-----	-----	D 8	Turkified Islam
Cem	OIC-EU summit	OIC-EU summit	-----	The Neighborhood Forum	EU accession Self-consciousness of transmitter

CHAPTER 5

5. The Foundation of AKP's Foreign Policy Identity

As mentioned in chapter 1, this dissertation argues that ideas and experiences construct or reconstruct state identity through foreign policy. State identity is a compound of internal and external dimensions. While focusing on the external dimensions of state identity, this dissertation also deals with internal dimensions as essential element of self-perception. In regards to the AKP's foreign policy, several experiences and ideas have affected the AKP's foreign policy.

There are four main aims which the AKP has tried to achieve through its foreign policy. First, the AKP has needed to protect from direct or indirect military intervention. Erdoğan, Gül and Arınç learned about the threat of military intervention by way of the February 28, 1997 process as members of Welfare party. In the foreign policy arena, the military could play an essential role in the situation of "two and a half wars" during the 1990s. Secondly, the AKP has pursued EU membership in pursuit of a prosperous national economy, promotion of democracy, and to be a model to the Middle Eastern states. The democracy promotion has contributed not only to the expansion of power among non-elite sectors of the nation, but also to limit the special status of the military. Third, the AKP has attempted to achieve regional stability. Turkey connects with Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central Asia, and serves as key political role in each. Fourth, the AKP has taken care to mind the balance between Islamic legitimacy toward the Middle East and being the most democratized country in the Middle East from the Western point of view. Davutoğlu paints a

picture of Turkish foreign policy as a “bow and arrow” in his *Strategic Depth*.³⁶⁸ According to him, how Turkey draws its bow in Asia (including the Middle East) will determine the distance that Turkey can shoot an arrow toward the Europe (and the US), and vice versa.

As Özcan and Usul argued, the AKP implements “changes within continuity” with policies from the Kemalist foreign policy framework described as “peace at home, peace in the world”.³⁶⁹ In other words, the behavior of foreign policy seemed not to have changed, though the ideas and aims of foreign policy have evolved. This chapter seeks to clarify the foundations of ideas and aims in light of the bitter controversy about the source of the AKPs’ and its foreign policy. The first part of this chapter deals with the experiences of the February 28 process, the Europeanization process, and the Gulf Crisis, which shaped the construction of the AKP’s policies in both world and domestic politics. The second and third parts focus more on the basic concepts of the AKP’s foreign policy. Looking at beginning of the AKP’s foreign policy, we can see two lines, a pragmatist and an idealist, which have mixed and competed with each other in certain cases. This competition has typically been seen in the process of the 1 March decision over whether to join the Iraq War or not. Consequently, Turkey decided not to enter the War. This decision changed perceptions of the Middle Eastern states dramatically, and was the touchstone of the idealist policies that were prevalent from 2005 to 2008.

³⁶⁸ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, İstanbul: Küre yayınları, 2001, p.562.

³⁶⁹ Mesut Özcan and Ali Resul Usul, “Understanding the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes within Continuity: Is Turkey Departing from the West?”, *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* Cilt 6, Sayı 21, 2010, p.110.

5.1. Learning from Experience

The AKP took the lessons and reflections from previous Islamist parties seriously. As looking at chapter 1, Levy summed up the concept of learning as interpreting historical experience through the framework of their own worldviews, selecting information that fits their interpretations, and including the will of transmission or teaching toward the interpretation of others.³⁷⁰ Levy's classification showed that the learning process is closely related with people's pre-conceived interpretations and beliefs. In the Turkish decision-making process, individual is the most influential factor.

This is clear when we analyze the foreign policy of Atatürk, İnönü, and Özal. In addition, in recent Turkish history, the advisors of the Prime Minister have received decision-making power. This trend started in the mid-80s under the Özal government.³⁷¹ This dissertation considers that experiential learning is divided into event-based and idea-based experiences. Event-based experiences would include the February 28 process, the EU accession process, and the process of related to "Gulf Syndrome". Meanwhile, idea-based experiences include the foreign policy ideas of Özal, Erbakan and Cem, as analyzed in chapter 3. Experience is the source of action. According to Laing, "personal experience transforms a given field into a field of intention and action. Only through action

³⁷⁰ *Ibid*, pp.283-284.

³⁷¹ Hüseyin Bağcı, "Cüneyd Zapsu: Advisor a la Turca" in *ZEITGEIST*, p.258.

can our experience be transformed”.³⁷² Whether such experiences are one’s “own” or those of “others” is another important distinction. Yet, needless to say, the impact of one’s “own” experience is rather more influential than those of “others”.

5.1.1. Experience of February 28 in 1997

Some scholars refer to the moves against the AKP on February 28, 1997 as the “Post-Modern Coup”. The Coup revealed the limits of Erbakan’s traditional Islamist policies and opened the door for revolt of younger generation against traditionalists within a pro-Islamic party. The Welfare Party adjusted its platform to focus more on populism and less on Islamism in the 1990s, but the military-backed Kemalist circle was not satisfied and threatened the Erbakan administration.³⁷³ It became clear that Islamic policies were targeted by Kemalist forces not only in the political sphere but also in the social and economic spheres.³⁷⁴

After the 1980 military coup, the influence of Islam expanded into the public and business spheres. Specifically, the Post-Modern Coup was a demanding 4 points to Refahyol Coalition government presented in 18 articles. These were (i) full implementation of the “Uniformity of Education” law, including the closure of imam-hatip school and religious seminars, (ii) prevention of anti-secular acts

³⁷² R.D. Laing, *The Politics of Experience*, New York: Pantheon, 1967, p.8.

³⁷³ Ihsan Dağı, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization”, *Central European University Center for Policy Studies*, Open Society Institute, 2002, p.17

³⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.19.

against the state and Kemalist traditions, (iii) the end of recruitment of Islamists into government work, and (iv) careful checks on Islamic-based economic activities.³⁷⁵ The February 28 incident was a symbol of the military's golden age of influence during the 1990s under the value of defending the secular and democratic Turkey under the framework of Unitarianism and Atatürkism.³⁷⁶ This Coup also encouraged a change in attitude among Islamic intellectuals. According to Dağı, Ali Bulaç, who was a famous pro Islam journalist, changed his project of Islamic state policy to a more liberal, modernized and Westernized Islamic policy.³⁷⁷ After 1997, he began to insist that Islamic thought had to react and adapt to issues of globalization, EU accession, democracy, and human rights. These changes among intellectuals might have contributed to the reconstruction of Islamic circles.

After the closure of the Welfare Party on January 16, 1998, Ismail Alptekin founded the Virtue Party. This was similar to the process by which the National Order Party became the National Salvation Party. Erbakan was the still pillar of

³⁷⁵ Hakan Yavuz, "Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.54, No.1, 2000, p.37. The full text of NSC meeting held on February 28 in English can be accessed in the following article: Niyazi Günay, "Implementing the February 28 Recommendations: A Scorecard", *Research Notes: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, No.10, 2001, pp.1-20.

³⁷⁶ Ümit Cizre and Menderes Çınar, "Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process", *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol.102, No.2/3, 2003, p.313. According to Aydın Hasan, the meeting of the National Security Council on February 28, 1997 lasted nine-and-a-half hours. Participating in the meeting were President Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tansu Çiller, Minister of the Interior Meral Akşener, Minister of Defense Turhan Tayan, Chief of General Staff - General İsmail Hakkı Karadayı, Army Chief - Hikmet Köksal, Naval Chief - Admiral Güven Erkaya, Air Force Chief - General Ahmet Çorekci, Chief of Gendarmerie - General Teoman Koman, and NSC Secretary-General - General İlhan Kılıç. Aydın Hasan, "Ortam Gerildi, Koltuk Gitti", *Milliyet*, February 28, 2000.

³⁷⁷ İhsan Dağı, "Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey", *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.13, No.2, 2004, p.144.

the party under the leadership of Recai Kutan, who was elected party leader in May 1998. But the party's insistence dramatically changed, especially its stance on the EU and Europeanization (or Westernization). For example, Kutan proposed the possibility of rearranging the movement of the National Outlook infusing it with Western ideas, like democracy and human rights.³⁷⁸ Kutan also suggested that the government needed to comply with the Copenhagen political criteria and make a sincere effort to join the EU.³⁷⁹ As a result of these actions, the Virtue Party exhibited a more moderate and tolerant attitude toward the EU and Europeanization compared with forerunners. In addition to the February 28 process and its aftermath, Erdoğan, then-mayor of Istanbul, was charged with violating the penal code in 1998. Since he was regarded as the political leader of a new generation, together with Abdullah Gül, many politicians in the Virtue Party were shocked by this decision. It may have been at this point that Erdoğan keenly realized the limits of National View-centered path, and the necessity to adopt Western concepts into a political platform in order to stand against Kemalism. Also during this period, pro-Islamist movement led by Fethullah Gülen began showing their support for EU accession, democratization, and the creation of new space for public opinion.³⁸⁰ Hence, the result of the February 28 process was restructuring of all pro-Islamist politics.

Regarding to the Turkish experience and the policies of the AKP, Öniş

³⁷⁸ Dağı, 2002, *op.cit*, p. 21.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p.22.

³⁸⁰ Hakan Yavuz, "Islam and Europeanization in Turkish-Muslim socio-political movements" in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds), *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.242.

pointed out five key lessons.³⁸¹ First, he notes that secularism was an essential factor in the preparation liberal democracy. According to Öniş:

There is no way that liberal democracy can take root in a Muslim society without a strong commitment on the part of the political elites to the principle of secular political order and firm constitutional safeguards that prevent a violation of the secular character of the state.³⁸²

Second, Öniş pointed out the Turkish experience with democracy from the 1950 emergence of the multi-party system, and emphasized that pro-Islamic parties had also learned lessons from the February 28 process. Third, the economic transformation and emergence of a substantial middle class of entrepreneurs and educated professionals is important. This shift made room for a new conservative middle class and bourgeoisie. Fourth, he pointed out the role of intellectuals and civil society organizations. These actors took on a more significant role from the 1990s. Fifth, external pressure from the EU was argued to be essential for deepening liberal democracy and for encouraging a change in attitude from pro-Islamic parties.

He also pointed out the economic factors contributing to the AKP's victory in the 2002 election.³⁸³ At first, he stressed that the AKP could absorb both the winners and losers of the neo-liberal globalization process. Moreover, the failure

³⁸¹ Ziya Öniş, "The Political Economy of Islam and Democracy in Turkey: From the Welfare Party to the AKP", Revised Draft-May. (http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~zonis/ONIS_FromWelfarePartytotheAKP.pdf), 2008, 12/5 download, 2005, pp.5-7.

³⁸² *Ibid*, p.5.

³⁸³ *Ibid*, p.16.

of either a center-right or center-left party was an essential element of the AKP's rise. These parties were unable to adapt and find effective solutions to the financial crisis and its effects. Öniş and Keyman argued that the issue that dominated the 2002 election campaign was the troubled economy, not the Kurdish question and political Islam, as in the 1990s.³⁸⁴ The AKP was perceived to be responsive to the needs of the urban local poor as economic actors. Öniş called the AKP as “conservative globalist” party. He defined globalist as a state or societal actor with an essentially positive attitude toward globalization and an understanding of opportunities for advancement within the system of state and society.³⁸⁵

In the 2002 election, the AKP won 363 seats and became the single ruling party.³⁸⁶ Özel summed four factors led to this landslide victory.³⁸⁷ First of all, he pointed out Turkish voters as believed they needed to punish the ex-ruling parties for their corruption and delinquencies. Examples of this included the Susurluk incident, which revealed strong ties between politicians and the mafias, and the financial crisis of 2001. The Turkish public strongly doubted the legitimacy of the ex-ruling parties. Secondly, in relation to the first point, many citizens voted for

³⁸⁴ Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations*, Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2007, p.163.

³⁸⁵ Ziya Öniş, “Conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists: political parties and paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey”, *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol.9, No.3, 2007, p.250. Meanwhile, he regards other center-right parties and the CHP as defensive nationalists who perceive globalization as a negative force on state and society.

³⁸⁶ In this election, only the AKP and CHP took seats. The CHP received 178 seats, including 9 independent deputies. Other parties received fewer than 10 % of the votes and could not acquire seats in parliament.

³⁸⁷ Soli Özel, “After the Tsunami”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.14, No.2, 2003, pp.81-82.

new parties like the AKP and the Young Party founded by Cem Uzan in August 2002, indicating a desire to change Turkish politics. The Young Party received 7.2% of the vote. The third factor was low voter turnout. Participation in the 2002 election marked the lowest rate 30 years.³⁸⁸ Fourthly, approximately half of vote was wasted vote because of the 10 % provision. To increase participation, the breakthrough of the social periphery, sometimes called Black Turks, would be an essential factor. The concept of center-periphery is a tool famously put forward by Mardin, for the analysis of the Turkish political landscape.³⁸⁹ The Kemalist elite, bureaucrats and military occupied the center, while the religious and conservative poor masses sat on the periphery. Since the beginning of the multi-party system, this structure has gradually transformed. But as advantages in the liberal economy reforms of the 1980s began to take hold, the center lost its advantage.³⁹⁰ The 2002 election clarified that the center (center-right wing) could not adapt to globalization and its influence. On the other side of this polarity, the so-called periphery took great advantages of the opportunities brought about by economic liberalism.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p.82.

³⁸⁹ Şerif Mardin, "Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics", *Deadalus*, Vol.2, No.1, 1973.

³⁹⁰ Ali Çarkoğlu, "Ideology or Economic Pragmatism?: Profiling Turkish Voters in 2007", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.9, No.2, 2008, p.321.

5.1.2. Experience of EU Accession

Though Turkey joined the European customs union in 1995, the EU accession process stagnated in the late 1990s as symbolized by Turkey's exclusion from the list of candidates for accession at the December 1997 Luxembourg meeting. But the European Council declared Turkey was a candidate based on the same criteria applied to all other applicant countries in Helsinki in 1999.³⁹¹ This decision encouraged Turks with regard to their relationship with the EU, especially the pro-Islamic young generation. They understood joining the EU and its process to be an effective way evading Kemalist intervention against their pro-Islamic party. Yavuz described this relationship in the following way:

...the EU process is being surprisingly championed by a political party of Islamic background, which seeks to enshrine civilian control over the military and freedom of thought and religion by, ironically, championing the liberal democratic basis of Westernization that the Kemalist Westernizers often chose to ignore.³⁹²

After the decision of Helsinki Summit decision, the words 'Europeanization' or 'EU-ization' replaced 'Westernization'. Diez et al. described the core characteristics of Europeanization as following:

First, Europeanization strictly speaking is EU-ization. It occurs in the

³⁹¹ Eric Faucompret and Jozef Konings, *Turkish Accession to the EU: Satisfying the Copenhagen criteria*, London: Routledge, 2008, p.43.

³⁹² Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.204.

context of, and can be seen as sparked off by, European integration. At times, the influence of the EU is very overt. ... Second, for the most part, Europeanization is a one-way street. While it is widely recognized that member states try to influence the ways in which European integration affects them, the very term implies increasing convergence, and is often taken to mean the imposition of particular policies, political structures or social identities on member states and their societies. All of these aspects of Europeanization have to do with the construction and spread of what have come to be regarded as 'European' norms regarding particular policies, political procedures or societal self-definitions.³⁹³

Aydin and Acikmese also classified Turkish Europeanization into three strategic approaches.³⁹⁴ The first approach is functionalist, as actors are accepted and regularized into a set of new norms, rules and practices put forward by European institutions. The second approach shed light on modes of domestic adaptation and transformation as Turkey worked to integrate the EU's new norms, rules and practices. The third approach is a constructivist approach that focuses on the interactive processes between the EU and member or candidate states. As Özcan pointed out, candidate countries are in a situation of power asymmetry with EU.³⁹⁵ Candidate states have to make the effort to join the EU, but have no real input into this process. So, domestic adaptation and transformation for the purpose of EU accession are the centers of the analysis for a candidate state. In the Turkish

³⁹³ Thomas Diez, Apostolos Agnantopoulos and Alper Kaliber, "Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society", *South European Society & Politics*, Vol.10, No.1, 2005, p.2.

³⁹⁴ Mustafa Aydın and Sinem A. Açikmese, "Europeanization through EU conditionality: understanding the new era in Turkish foreign policy", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol.9, No.3, 2007, pp.264-265.

³⁹⁵ Mesut Özcan, *Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East*, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008, p.30.

context, the relationships between the EU accession process and the pro-Islamic party and reform of the military's status are the major themes.

The Europeanization policies of pro-Islamist parties can be divided into three periods. Historically, the pro-Islamic parties led by Erbakan had taken a Euro-skeptic stance. Erbakan harshly opposed joining the EC and EU as processes by which Turkey would lose its autonomy only to be occupied by imperialists and Zionists.³⁹⁶ But around 1995, Erbakan began to soften his criticism of Europeanization.³⁹⁷ The second period was the age of Euro-enthusiasm. The Virtue Party and the AKP changed their Euro-skeptic stance after the Welfare Party's closure. The AKP in particular aggressively tried to advance EU reforms between November 2002 and October 2005. Öniş and Yılmaz called this period as "the golden age of Europeanization in Turkey".³⁹⁸ Turkey began to reform its domestic laws to fulfill EU criteria after the 2002 Copenhagen Summit. In December 2004, Turkey at last received the go-ahead to begin accession negotiations with the EU.

The AKP's politicians used its EU reform responsibilities to advance their own policies, especially those of economic reform, human rights and democratization. To sum up, the AKP administration understood the effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU accession process to its own reform agenda. Many

³⁹⁶ Ali Resul Usul, "The Justice and Development Party and the European Union: From euro-skepticism to euro-enthusiasm and euro-fatigue" in Ümit Cizre (ed), *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party*, London: Routledge, 2008, p.176.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p.177.

³⁹⁸ Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.10, No.1, 2009, p.13.

business associations, especially the Anatolian Tigers, backed up this trend.³⁹⁹ The population was over 70% in favor of joining the EU during this period. In addition to this, the US became a figure of hate for many in the Middle East, while European countries, especially Germany and France, came to be seen as promoting more prudent and multilateral approaches toward the Middle East politics after the Iraq War.⁴⁰⁰ The third period of the pro-Islamic attitude toward the EU has been fatigue. After the negotiation process began in October 2005, some scholars noted that when Greek Cyprus became a member of the EU in 2004 without any solutions to the Cyprus dispute, this was the negative turning point in the Turkish Europeanization process.⁴⁰¹ Cyprus became a member of the EU, and the special relationships advocated by Germany and France dismayed the AKP, understood as clear discrimination between Turkey and other countries. Furthermore, business community and military started to not support the EU accession.⁴⁰² EU member states also did not hesitate to express their attitudes to the Turkey's prospective EU membership. As of the beginning of 2011, more than half of the negotiation chapters are blocked by Cyprus and France. Nations in member countries have a negative image concerning Turkey's membership. As some scholars have pointed out, the stalemate in EU accession has been one of the

³⁹⁹ Usul, *op.cit*, p.180.

⁴⁰⁰ Keyman and Öniş, *op.cit*, pp.77-78.

⁴⁰¹ Atila Eralp, "The role of temporality and interaction in the Turkey-EU relationship", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.40, Spring, 2009, p.159.

⁴⁰² *Ibid*, p.162. In the business community, medium and small companies doubted that only big companies would get benefits from the EU accession. The military was also afraid of losing its power as a result due to EU accession further reform of negotiations.

reasons for the redirection of its foreign policy toward the Middle East region after 2005.⁴⁰³

Meanwhile, the accession process continues, with one of its key prerequisites being to decrease the Turkish military's privilege in both domestic politics and foreign policies. The military had been the main institution promoting EU accession at least until the 1999 meeting of the European Council held in Helsinki. When Turkey began to implement its Copenhagen criteria reforms, the military, especially the National Security Council, recognized the need to reduce their power. Ironically, the success of Europeanization, which military had wanted to realize, only be completed if the military's intervention in politics was reduced if not eliminated. The reduction of military power is clear in the 2000s. For example, the government firstly appointed Yiğit Alpoğan as Secretary General of National Security Council based on the seventh democratization package reform in August 2003.⁴⁰⁴ The arrest of Abdullah Öcalan and Turkey's non-participation in the Iraqi War also contributed to decrease the influence of military in foreign policy. In other words, Turkish foreign policy began a process of desecuritization in the 2000s compared with foreign policies of the 1990s.⁴⁰⁵ But this trend has changed since October 2005 when Turkey began negotiations with EU. In its "fatigue

⁴⁰³ For example, see Öniş and Yılmaz, *op.cit.*, p.13; Oğuzlu, *op.cit.*, No.1.

⁴⁰⁴ Gencer Özcan, "Facing its Waterloo in diplomacy: Turkey's military in the foreign policy-making process", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.40, Spring, 2009, pp.86-87.

⁴⁰⁵ Concerning details of Turkey's process of desecuritization, see, Özcan, *Ibid*; Metin Heper, "The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol.10, No.1, 2005, pp.33-44.

period”, the AKP government had slowed its reforms of the military.⁴⁰⁶ Yet, since around 2008, the AKP again began to speed up democratization and to pressure the military.

5.1.3. Experience of the Gulf Crisis

The experience of the Gulf crisis was referred to the decision making of Iraq War and other Middle Eastern affairs in AKP government. The origin of “Gulf Syndrome” was the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, especially relating the decision of Turkey’s participation in the crisis as a part of the US-led multinational force. Turkey’s critical participation in the Gulf crisis was a bitter experience which bore unexpected result. Gözen describes the legacies of the Gulf crisis as fourfold.⁴⁰⁷

First of all, the economic loss has already been pointed out. Iraq had been one of Turkey’s most important trading partners in the 1980s. Turkey was deeply dependent on oil import from Iraq. As shown in table 1, Turkey’s import from Iraq had increased after 1987. In 1989, Iraqi oil accounted for 63.8% of Turkey’s oil import.⁴⁰⁸ But this situation changed from the Gulf crisis happened. Four days after the start of the Gulf crisis, Iraq shut down one of the twin pipelines which

⁴⁰⁶ Ümit Cizre, “The Justice and Development Party and the military: Recreating the past after reforming it?”, in Ümit Cizre (ed), *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party*, London: Routledge, 2008, p.133.

⁴⁰⁷ Ramazan Gözen, “Causes and Consequences of Turkey’s Out-of-War Position in the Iraq War of 2003”, *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, Vol.36, 2005, pp.80-81.

⁴⁰⁸ Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kısılcacında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası*, Ankara: Liberte, 2000, p.51. First pipeline between Kirkuk and Yumurtalık was constructed in 1977, and second one was constructed in 1984. The negotiation about construction of third pipeline was continued before the Gulf War happened. *Ibid*, p.278.

exported oil from Kirkuk to Yumurtalık in Ceyhan.⁴⁰⁹ The next day, Turkey shut two pipelines completely. In addition to closing down the pipelines, Turkey was imposed upon to stop trade with Iraq and to freeze all assets in Iraq and Kuwait in response to UN Security Council Resolution 661.⁴¹⁰ Özal expected that the United States would make up Turkey's losses. Turkey additionally had to send emergency aid toward the crisis of Northern Iraq happened in March 1991.⁴¹¹

Table 4. Turkish-Iraqi trade (1985-1991)

	Export		Import	
	Value (thousand \$)	%	Value	%
1985	961,374	12.08	1,136,753	10.02
1986	553,273	7.42	768,703	6.92
1987	945,262	9.28	1,154,016	8.15
1988	986,118	8.46	1,436,502	10.02
1989	445,301	3.83	1,649,750	10.45
1990	214,501	1.66	1,046,532	4.69
1991	122,398	0.90	492	0.00

Source : Aydın, *op.cit*, p.9.

Consequently, Turkey did not receive enough economic compensation after the Gulf crisis to recover its losses. As table 4 shown Turkey's import from Iraq was experienced a sharp downturn. When he traveled to the United States on September 24, 1990, Özal was promised that the US would increase its imports

⁴⁰⁹ "Turkey and the Gulf Crisis: Chronology" in *Studies on Turkish-Arab Relation: Special Issue on Turkey and the Gulf Crisis*, Vol.6, 1991, p.161.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹¹ *The Washington Post*, April 8, 1991.

from Turkey.⁴¹² But after the Gulf crisis, USA rethought this decision on September 24, instead providing 282 million dollars in aid to Turkey.⁴¹³ This was far less than expected. Turkey also received some assistances from other countries, but short- and long-term losses related to the Gulf crisis were estimated at 9 billion dollars and 35 billion dollars, respectively.⁴¹⁴

Secondly, Gözen mentioned security problems, especially relating to being drawn into the Kurdish issue as mentioned above. Thirdly, Gözen pointed out a downshift in political development except regarding security issues. For example, EU accession efforts stagnated, as did the domestic economy, after the Gulf crisis. Furthermore, this period was the turning point during which the political influence of Özal and his Motherland Party (ANAP) declined. ANAP failed to carry the election of October 1991.⁴¹⁵ In other words, the Turkish public opinion clearly opposed Özal's single-handed power and his decisions relating to the Gulf crisis.

Gözen added the Turkey's misunderstanding of the United States was a legacy of the Gulf crisis. Turkey did not assume that the US would support the Iraqi Kurds as its partner after the Gulf crisis, learning the hard way that the US was not unconditionally pro-Turkey in Middle East politics.

These factors from Gulf Syndromes, and many politicians who experienced

⁴¹² Aydın, *op.cit*, p.28.

⁴¹³ *Ibid*, pp.54-55.

⁴¹⁴ Amikan Nachmani, *Turkey: Facing a New Millennium: Coping with Intertwined Conflicts*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003, p.24. The amounts of other countries' assistance are referred to in Gözen, 2000, *op.cit*, p.299.

⁴¹⁵ In 1991 general election, the True Path Party became the leading party with 27% of the vote. The Motherland Party became the second party with 24%.

the Gulf Crisis wanted to avoid following in Özal's footsteps before the Iraqi War broke out in 2003. The legacy of the Gulf crisis would affect not only Turkey's participation decisions for the Iraqi War, but also Turkey's grand strategies which are both pragmatic and ideal approaches toward the Middle East. According to Robins, Turkey's foreign policy principles toward the Middle East during the Cold War period focused on non-interference in domestic affairs, non-interference in disputes between Arab states, a certain degree of development in bilateral relations with all Middle Eastern states, continued fragmentation of the Arab state system, maximization of trade and economic relationships, separation from the Middle East based on Turkey's role in the Western alliance, and scrupulous balance between Israel and Palestine.⁴¹⁶ The Gulf Crisis interfered with the Turkish traditional guideline completely.

5.2. Ideas about the AKP's Foreign Policy

5.2.1. A Pragmatic Approach Based on Turkish Democracy

Here, this study deals with two ideas of the AKP's foreign policy and case study of competition between two lines. In foreign policy dimension, democracy or trial of democratization toward the Middle East countries were the most important method for bandwagoning policy toward the United States. In here, this dissertation sum up "conservative democracy" suggested by AKP government as political tool in both domestic and foreign policies. This idea was defined by

⁴¹⁶ Robins,1991, *op.cit*, pp.65-67.

Yalçın Akdoğan, advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan. According to him, the features of conservative democracy are three.⁴¹⁷ First, the foundation of this concept is the culture of reconciliation. Heper summed up this dimension of conservative democracy:

The JDP (AKP)'s conservative democracy as reflected in the maxims given above indeed aims at a successful reconciliation of past and present, tradition and modern, religion and state, society and state, Islam and democracy, conflict and consensus, order and freedom, morality and rationality, and global and indigenous.⁴¹⁸

Secondly, the idea of conservative democracy does not accept authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Thirdly, the legitimacy of conservative democracy is based on popular sovereignty and the rule of law. The root of conservative democracy is in the tradition of the center-right party from the Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes to the Justice Party of Demirel, and most recently of the ANAP of Özal. Regarding the concept of conservatism, Akdoğan described it in the following way:

However, by making conservatism the engine of change, the AKP has broken new ground in the history of Turkish politics. Furthermore, before the AKP, conservatism had not manifested itself in parties that stressed tradition, religion, social values, and the spiritual. ...In Turkey,

⁴¹⁷ Yalçın Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity" in Hakan Yavuz (ed), *The Emergence of A New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006, p.50.

⁴¹⁸ Metin Heper, "A Democratic-Conservative Government by Pious People: The Justice and Development Party in Turkey" in Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi (ed), *The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006, p.351.

conservatism is generally posited as a “political attitude” that insists on gradual change and the perpetuation of moral and family values....Conservatism as the AKP envisions it would play a positive role precisely because of its emphasis on conservative and gradual, rather than revolution and destructive, change.⁴¹⁹

It is said that the member of the AKP considers its ideas and activities to be similar to those of the Democratic Party and the Motherland Party, not to Erbakan’s parties.⁴²⁰ Yavuz pointed out that morality, family and ordinary change were the core sources of the Turkish version of conservatism based on Ottoman history and the idea of Islam.⁴²¹ The tight-knit of family was important rather than the individualism associated with the European lifestyle. The glorious Ottoman history, which was deemphasized by Kemalist circles still affected people’s cultural lives and ideas. The idea of Islam shared among Muslim was an effective catalyst for community-building. The AKP government considers community to be the device of prevailing democracy and gathering votes in an election. Turkish conservatism which was imposed on the cultural dimensions of individual life could coexist with a state-led Westernization project.⁴²² Meanwhile, the democracy pursued by the AKP emphasized tolerance, dialogue and respect

⁴¹⁹ Akdoğan, *op.cit*, pp.53-55.

⁴²⁰ Meanwhile, some scholars, like Ergün Yildirim, Hüsamettin İnaç, and Hayrettin Özler, point out that the DP and AKP have similar idea about social activity in society. But the DP’s leadership came from ruling elite. On the other hand, the AKP’s leadership is rooted in the lower- and middle-classes. This is a big difference between the DP and AKP. Ergün Yildirim, Hüsamettin İnaç, and Hayrettin Özler, “A Sociological Representation of the Justice and Development Party: Is it a Political Design or a Political Becoming?”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.8, No.1, 2008, p.11.

⁴²¹ Yavuz, 2009, *op.cit*, pp.93-96.

⁴²² *Ibid*, pp.83-84.

for Kurdish rights.⁴²³

Erdoğan suggests that conservative democracy incorporates universal values and serves as a source of contribution toward other countries.⁴²⁴ As a synthesis between liberal and conservative, conservative democracy relates to the Europeanization process. This relationship also contributes to the transformation of both the Kemalist state structure and the demands of Islamist circles.⁴²⁵ Other scholars described conservative democracy as “third way between neo-liberal and religious-conservative value”.⁴²⁶ According to Yavuz, the AKP membership described conservative democracy as “the outcome of the transformation of political Islam in Turkey with two key factors: the February 28 process and the Copenhagen criteria”.⁴²⁷ Probably the most important point is that conservative democracy became an effective method for a pragmatic approach toward good relationships with the United States and the EU.

⁴²³ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The case of the AKP*, London: Routledge, 2010, p.21.

⁴²⁴ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom” in Hakan Yavuz (ed), *The Emergence of A New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006, p.337.

⁴²⁵ Burhanettin Duran, “JDP and Foreign Policy as an Agent of Transformation” in Hakan Yavuz (ed), *The Emergence of A New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006, p.296.

⁴²⁶ Hale and Özbudun, *op.cit*, p.26.

⁴²⁷ Yavuz, 2009, *op.cit*, p.93.

5.2.2. The Idealist Approach Based on Davutođlu's Ideas

5.2.2.1. Davutođlu's Concepts on Civilizations

Ahmet Davutođlu is probably the most influential foreign minister in the history of the Republic of Turkey. His *Strategic Depth* published in 2001 has been considered the textbook of the AKP's foreign policy. Yet, his study of strategy is just one phase of his research areas. His ideas are constructed upon Islamic philosophy, an Islam-centered study on civilization, and strategic studies mainly focused on geopolitics and history. His Ph.D. thesis dealt with Islamic philosophy under the supervision of řerif Mardin, a well-known sociologist on the topic of Islam.⁴²⁸ Of course, his strategic studies are the most important component of the AKP's foreign policy, however, this dissertation reviews his studies on philosophy and civilization as the basis of his strategic ideas.

As a scholar of philosophy and International Relations, Davutođlu has been always conscious of the comparison between Islam and the West, and he has attempted to overcome the image of Islamic backwardness. In his philosophical ideas, ontological self-consciousness is the keyword for understanding the differences between the West and Islam. For Muslims, the concept of a hierarchy of beings and its relationship to Allah are essential elements for understanding ontological self-perception.⁴²⁹ Muslims clearly separate religious authorities and

⁴²⁸ Gürkan Zengin, *Hoca: Türk Dış Politikası'nda "Davutođlu Etkisi"*, İstanbul: İnkılap, 2010, p.38.

⁴²⁹ Ahmet Davutođlu, "Philosophical and Institutional Dimensions of Secularisation: A Comparative Analysis", in Azzam Tamimi and John Esposito (eds), *Islam and Secularism in*

socio-political authorities. Davutoğlu delineates the four characteristics of Muslim self-perception. These were (i) God is an absolute ontological existence and man epistemologically interprets text as God's teachings, (ii) a Muslim community is important to reinterpret the text, (iii) the historicity of text and prophecy leadership, and (iv) the strong link between the ontological and socio-political levels of existence of individual.⁴³⁰ Hence, for Muslims, God exists on a different level from human mundane life. This is a decisive difference from Western self-perception and consciousness of God. So secularization does not change the worldview of Muslims or the idea of God.⁴³¹ His ideas about the self-perception of Muslims can be seen in his writings on civilization.

His thinking on civilization was described in his article "Civilizational Self-Perception" published in the journal *Divan* in 1997.⁴³² The main argument of this article was that self-perception was the key element of success and most influential part of civilization.⁴³³ This article provided a counterargument against the Western-oriented "clash of civilizations" concept. At first, he classified self-perceptions of civilizations into five types: strong and rigid self-perception,

the Middle East, London: Hurst and Company, 2000, p.184. More detail about his comparison between self-perception of the West and Islam, see Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Alternative paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory*, New York: Lanham, 1994.

⁴³⁰ Davutoğlu, 2000, *Ibid*, p.184.

⁴³¹ *Ibid*, p.189.

⁴³² Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Medeniyetlerin Ben-idraki", *Divan*, 1997 No.1, 1997, pp.1-53.

⁴³³ Aysegül Taskapu, "Book Review: A key text to understanding the mindset of the architect of the new foreign policy: civilizational self-perception", *Turkish Review*, Vol.1, Issue 1, 2010, p.118.

strong and flexible self-perception, strong and local self-perception, weak and rigid self-perception, and weak and flexible self-perception. He particularly focused on the first and second types of civilizations. Western civilization was argued to belong to the first type, which had a sense of superiority and the motivation to conquer other civilizations.⁴³⁴ This type clearly divides civilization into the categories of self and other. Meanwhile, Islamic civilizations corresponded to the second type, which had the capacity to share its cultural characters with other civilizations.⁴³⁵ It is possible for Islamic civilizations to cooperate with other civilization through peaceful methods.

Secondly, he compared some elements of Western civilization and Islam civilization using Galtung's explanation about Western civilization. Galtung presented the characteristics of Western civilization from the view of the understanding of space, time, knowledge, the relationship between human being and nature, between human beings and God, and between human beings.⁴³⁶ Davutoğlu borrowed these six principles for the analysis of Islam's civilization. Concerning space, Western civilization aggressively conquered and colonized other civilizations. But Muslims considered Allah to govern all the places in the world, and the Umma, an imagined community among Muslims, expands into all of the space. So Islamic civilizations had not aggressively acquired colonies and

⁴³⁴ Davutoğlu, 1997, *op.cit*, p.15.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid*, p.17.

⁴³⁶ Johan Galtung, "Western Civilization: Anatomy and Pathology", *Alternatives*, Vol.7, No.1, 1981, pp.145-169.

had been able to coexist with other civilizations.⁴³⁷ With respect to time, Islamic civilization criticized the perception of a short and speedy timeline, and the linear view toward time. Instead, it supported the long time line and various views toward time.⁴³⁸ For knowledge, Davutoğlu emphasized that Islamic civilization could harmonize with knowledge of other civilizations, and criticized the predominant ideas of Western civilization.⁴³⁹ Regarding the relationships between human being and nature, between human being and God, and between human beings, his thinking was God-centered. In other words, Allah made this world and human beings were equal in all civilizations. Davutoğlu's perspective toward civilization is undoubtedly highly Islam-centric. In the beginning, he dealt with Western civilization and Islamic civilization as objects, and ignored other civilizations. Secondly, he clearly divided Islamic civilizations and Western civilizations, and insisted on the predominance of Islamic civilization.

5.2.2.2. Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth Theory

Davutoğlu's article "The Clash of Interest: An Explanation of the World (Dis) Order", which focused on how strategic studies can be seen by his pro-Islamic viewpoint. In this article, he first criticized Huntington's concept of the clash of civilizations and Francis Fukuyama's notion of the end of history. Secondly, he summarized the geopolitical theories of Mackinder, who advocated

⁴³⁷ Davutoğlu, 1997, *op.cit*, p.35.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid*, p.40.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid*, pp.41-42.

the idea of Heartland and Rimland and emphasized the importance of the Eurasian basin. Thirdly, he explained the importance and possibility of an Islamic world. According to him, the source of the Western threat against Islam in the post-Cold War period was the potentiality of geopolitics, geoeconomics and geostrategy.⁴⁴⁰ On the one hand, he denounced the Western threat perception toward Islam. On the other hand, he mentioned the potential of Islamic civilization. To sum up, whether influential toward his foreign policy or not, Davutoğlu's view of civilization is a highly Islam-centered one.

The idea behind Davutoğlu's "Strategic Depth" doctrine is also the key characteristic of the AKP's idealist approach. He suggests that Turkey should become a Muslim regional power, and advises of need to practice caution and to calibrate Turkish foreign policy based on strategic parameters set by great powers. Erhan articulates four points on the theoretical backgrounds of Davutoğlu's policy. Firstly, a core of Davutoğlu's policy is based on Immanuel Kant's idealism, which aimed for a no-war situation in world politics.⁴⁴¹ Also, Erhan notes the influence of Richard Falk on Davutoğlu's ideas.⁴⁴² As discussed below, idealist policies toward the Middle East was full-blown from 2005 to 2009. Secondly, Erhan points out that Davutoğlu put importance on historical perspective, or in Davutoğlu's words, historical depth.⁴⁴³ According to Davutoğlu, historical depth

⁴⁴⁰ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "The Clash of Interest: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order", *Perceptions*, Vol. II, No.4, 1997/1998, p.9.

⁴⁴¹ Çağrı Erhan, *Türk Dış Politikası'nın Güncel Sorunları*, Ankara: IMAJ yayınevi, 2010, pp.3-4.

⁴⁴² Personal interview with Prof. Çağrı Erhan, July 5, 2010.

⁴⁴³ Erhan, *op.cit.*, pp.4-6.

is defined as a characteristic of a country that is at the epicenter of historical events.

Third point of Erhan's argument is geopolitics, or in Davutoğlu's words, geographical depth. Geographical depth is a part of historical depth indicating that Turkey is at the center of many geopolitical influences. Treating Mackinder, Mahan, Haushoffer and Spykman as one instance, Davutoğlu argues that Turkey has to develop a genuinely multi-directional foreign policy by utilizing its geostrategic advantages. He refers to Turkey's contiguous "land basins", which includes the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East to describe Turkey's potential spheres of influence, and "maritime basins" enumerated by the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Caspian, as well as the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Basra as natural extensions. He notes that the concept of the continental basin allows Turkey to gain strategic depth in Asia, and project into Europe and Africa. His doctrine calls for an active engagement with all regional systems in Turkey's neighborhood. He argues that Turkey needs to rediscover its historic and geographic identity and reassess its own position vis-à-vis regional and global issues.

Erhan's most interesting indication is that Davutoğlu adopts an integration and security community model toward the Middle East. He points out that Davutoğlu sympathized with the ideas of Haas, Deutsch, Adler and Barnett.⁴⁴⁴

Erhan summarized the core of Davutoğlu's foreign policies, however, this dissertation adds other two factors. These are that the concept of civilization plays a prominent part in his theory. The second is the concept of Neo-Ottomanism.

"Turkey's foreign policy vision: An assessment of 2007", published in early

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid*, pp.10-12.

2008, clearly showed AKP's foreign policy aims with the benefit of his experience as chief advisor to the Prime Minister. This article is constructed in three parts. In the first part, he analyzes the Turkish role in world politics. According to him, in the Cold War era, Turkey had been considered a frontier country which was aimed at the defense of Southeast Europe against the Soviet bloc as a member of NATO.⁴⁴⁵ In early 1990s, a new notion of Turkey as a bridge country emerged. In this period, Turkey's primary objective was the maintenance of its own stability from the problems of neighboring countries, like the Gulf War and the series of Balkan crises.⁴⁴⁶ The discourses of "Bridge between East and West" or "From the Adriatic to Western China" were frequently used in books and articles published in the early 1990s.⁴⁴⁷ After September 11th 2001, Turkey's position in the world politics has been redesigned on both an ideational and a geographical basis.⁴⁴⁸ Turkey has become aware of being, and been looked upon as being a "central country" between multiple regions. In his own words, "Turkey holds an optimal place in the sense that it is both an Asian and European country and is also close to Africa through Mediterranean".⁴⁴⁹

In second part, he insists that Turkey adopts five principles under the AKP

⁴⁴⁵ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.10, No.1, 2008, p.77.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁷ For example, see Lesser and Fuller (eds), *op.cit* ; Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds), *Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.

⁴⁴⁸ Davutoğlu, 2008, *op.cit*, p.78.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

government.⁴⁵⁰ The first principle is a balance between freedom and security. When the Cold War ended, freedom became a focal point of the dominant international discourse. However, since September 11th, security issues have taken priority over many other issues. Yet, according to Davutoğlu, Turkey is truly an exceptional case in the post-9/11 era. Contrary to many other countries, Turkey has continued to increase the domain of its individual freedoms after 9/11 in accordance with its political reforms ascribed by the Copenhagen criteria. In another security arena, Turkey has been continuing its armed struggle against the PKK. On the other hand, the scope of individual freedoms by granted to the Kurdish people of Turkey in broadcasting and education rights in their mother tongue has increased enormously. The AKP government seems to be negotiating a fine balance between security and freedom. The second principle is the zero problem policy toward its neighbors. Turkey's relations with its neighbors, such as Bulgaria and Russia until the early 1990s, and with Greece, Iran, Iraq, and Syria until the late 1990s, had been quite problematic. But since the AKP took power, these relations have largely improved. The third point is to develop relations with the neighboring regions and beyond. Turkey's influence expands into the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. After five years of effort, Turkey has now become one of the most prominent voices in the related regions. The fourth principle is multi-dimensional and multi-track foreign policy. During the early period of the Cold War, Turkey by and large followed a mono-dimensional and mono-track foreign policy pointed toward the West. The main focus of Turkish foreign policy was security that was conducted by the state (mono-track).

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid*, pp.79-84. These five principles were clarified in *Radikal* newspaper in 2004. Davutoğlu, 2004, *op.cit*.

After the 1960s, Turkey changed its policy to one of ‘equidistance’, in other words, multi-dimensional policy. The central aim of multi-dimensional policy in this period was maintaining the status quo by keeping external pressures in equal balance, especially in the area of security. During the post-Cold War era wherein the international system became more dynamic, and issues were more diversified, in addition to security, Turkey also started to put more emphasis on economic and cultural relations. The main aim of multi-dimensional policy in the post-Cold War period is the expansion of Turkish influence toward all neighboring regions. Rhythmic diplomacy is the fifth principle. After the Cold War, the international context became pretty dynamic. If conditions are dynamic and one stands static, then one cannot adapt to the conditions. One needs to have a fluid and flexible diplomacy. This is rhythmic diplomacy.

The third part of the article deals with the actual achievements of foreign policy under the AKP government, especially relationships with Iraq and the EU. In conclusion, Davutoğlu emphasizes the need to focus on deepening democracy and regional stability in order to achieve an “international proactive position”.⁴⁵¹ The conclusion is a reemphasis of his determination as of 2008.

A newer version of Davutoğlu’s foreign policy ideas, which he articulated in a keynote lecture at Oxford University on May 1, 2010, also appeared in the journal *Political Reflection*.⁴⁵² The article published in 2008 focused on regional order and policy, but in contrast, this new article emphasizes global order. Here,

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid*, pp.95-96.

⁴⁵² Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkish Vision of Regional and Global Order: Theoretical Background and Practical Implementation”, *Political Reflection*, June-July-August 2010, 2010.

Davutoğlu first describes the historical transformation of global order, which is classified into the traditional world order, the colonial world order, the Cold War world order, and the Post-Cold War order with reference to geopolitics. In accordance with his structure, traditional geopolitics, global governance, global economic order and global cultural order are important elements in the age of Post-Cold War global order. Though technological developments have reduced the importance of geography and geopolitics, the end of colonialism and the collapse of the Cold War structure reflect on the importance of traditional geopolitics again.⁴⁵³ His emphasis on global governance and global economic order show his commitment to liberalism. Nowadays, the rule of global governance is not only about security, but also about freedom. He moves on to discuss the Turkish position in the Post-Cold War order from the perspectives of history, geography and diplomacy. The importance of history and geography are here described in the same language used in discussion of strategic depth. Second point is pro-active diplomacy which is a zero problem policy, increasing Turkey's regional influence and rhythmic diplomacy, which were mentioned in the 2008 article. Thirdly, he comments on Turkish regional policy. The ideals he expressed here regarding regional policy are largely the same as in the 2008 article. Yet, he uses highly political dialogue and emphasizes economic interdependence. He concluded his lecture with the followings:

...Our foreign policy is visionary; a vision based on human rights, historical continuity, geographical continuity, peace and stability, and

⁴⁵³ *Ibid*, p.39.

economic interdependence. This visionary approach, we hope that , contribute to the surrounding regions and to global peace.⁴⁵⁴

Until 2008, Turkey had mainly committed itself to regional stability. But it has focused itself on creating a role within the global arena since 2009.

5.2.2.3. Davutoğlu's Neo-Ottomanism

Neo-Ottomanism is one of the most controversial ideas associated with Davutoğlu's foreign policy. Some scholars evaluate neo-Ottomanism positively on the basis of an increase in Turkey's influence. Other scholars criticize neo-Ottomanism as symptomatic of an axis change in Turkish foreign policy. Decision-makers in the AKP's foreign policy have intentionally avoided using the term of neo-Ottomanism including Davutoğlu. In "Strategic Depth", indeed, Davutoğlu did not use this term either. Instead, he criticized Özal's brand of neo-Ottomanism as having lacked preparation and journalistic idea.⁴⁵⁵ Yet, he emphasized retaining historical continuity from the Ottoman period and its psychological impact on the Turkish nations. In considering the Ottoman legacy, he criticized Turkey's traditional strategy as being out-of-date in the Post-Cold War era, and called for a reconstruction of psychology, with this idea being a necessary component:

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.50.

⁴⁵⁵ Davutoğlu, 2001, *op.cit*, p.90. Nuri Yurdusev analyzed the continuity of the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey, especially in the foreign policy dimension. Nuri. Yurdusev, "Osmanlı Mirası ve Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine" in Osman Bahadır Dincer et al. (eds), *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri*, Ankara: USAK, 2010, pp.47-54.

The strategy of the state is not dependent on one external threat. This is a narrow perspective. Simply focusing on internal threats is also not enough to secure a state against rival states. In the Post-Cold War period, depths of history and geography have become dynamic in Turkey. And Turkey has to redefine and reapply its strategy for adapting to the international politics. In this period, using only the factors of institution, history and psychology toward domestic problems has been the greatest obstacle to developing the idea of strategy.⁴⁵⁶

He questioned the continuity of Kemalist-oriented status quo and realist-oriented foreign policy in the Post-Cold War period. And he urged to change the idea of foreign policy from the psychological dimension. Recently, Davutoğlu described the concept of neo-Ottomanism as “I have never used this concept and I do not think that Ottomanism could be a trend but if you want to understand the difficulties of responsibilities of Turks today, you have to understand the traditional concept of order.”⁴⁵⁷

Following this description, he commented that both people in Afghanistan and the Balkan region still keep in their minds of the notion of the Ottoman Empire. Ibrahim Kalın, foreign policy advisor to the current Prime Minister and the successor to Davutoğlu, considers the Ottoman legacy to be shared by people in Turkey and the regions that had belonged to the Ottoman Empire at an imagined level.⁴⁵⁸ Suat Kınıklıoğlu, deputy chairman of external affairs to the AKP, also

⁴⁵⁶ Davutoğlu, 2001, *Ibid*, p.63.

⁴⁵⁷ Davutoğlu, 2010, *op.cit*, p.41. He also showed his vision of neo-Ottomanism at Sarajevo on October 16, 2009.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibrahim Kalın, “Turks reconciling with their Ottoman Past”, *Today's Zaman*, August 19,

insists that neo-Ottomanism is a spontaneous revival in the cultural field.⁴⁵⁹

Taşpınar evaluates neo-Ottomanism as a more applicable foreign policy in the Post-Cold War period, as opposed to traditional policy. He summarizes the AKP's neo-Ottomanism based on three features. First of all, it is represented as "a more moderate version of secularism at home, and a more activist policy in foreign policy".⁴⁶⁰ He thinks that the AKP's neo-Ottomanism is not based on an imperial legacy but a peaceful multinational legacy of Ottoman Empire. Secondly, he supposes that neo-Ottomanism's active foreign policy contributes to regional peace and stability.⁴⁶¹ Thirdly, the AKP's neo-Ottomanism aims to act as a bridge between the Western and Islamic worlds.⁴⁶² He understands that the AKP carefully manages the balance between the Western and Islamic worlds. To sum up, he considers the AKP's neo-Ottomanist foreign policy as a sort of increasing soft power, both in Middle East regional and world politics. Özcan and Usul also evaluate the aim of the AKP's neo-Ottomanism as increasing soft power in the ex-Ottoman territories, rather than acting as a hegemonic power.⁴⁶³ Less optimistic than Taşpınar, Pope also evaluates the AKP's balance of policy between

2010.

⁴⁵⁹ Suat Kınıklıoğlu, "Neo-Ottoman Turkey?", *Today's Zaman*, December 4, 2009. But he also avoids using the word of neo-Ottomanism generally. Personal interview with Suat Kınıklıoğlu, January 13, 2011.

⁴⁶⁰ Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey's Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism", *Carnegie Papers*, No.10, 2008, pp.14-15.

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid*, p.15.

⁴⁶² *Ibid*.

⁴⁶³ Özcan and Usul, *op.cit*, p.117.

the Western and Islamic worlds with the term “Pax-Ottomana.”⁴⁶⁴

Uzgel and Yaramış commented that Davutoğlu criticized the Özal’s neo-Ottomanism in his strategic depth, however, ironically he had to use similar explanation for his practice of foreign policy under the AKP.⁴⁶⁵ In addition to this, they questioned that Davutoğlu’s center-periphery strategic idea in the Middle East region from the view of historical background. Especially after the 2009, many columnists commented that AKP’s neo-Ottomanism was symbol of axis change from West to (Middle) East.

5.3. A Case Study of AKP Foreign Policy: The Iraqi Crisis

The AKP’s first serious challenge in the Middle East region was the Iraqi crisis in 2003, especially the decision about deployment of troops as a party to the coalition of willing. This seemed to be a difficult test both for the AKP, which recently came to power, and the US government to negotiate regarding Iraq. This was because the AKP insisted on the deployment of Turkish forces to Iraq during the 2002 election campaign. With regards to the Iraqi crisis, the AKP’s foreign policy was passive by some reasons. Firstly, the AKP lacked experience as a ruling party at this stage. Though some politicians, like Abdullah Gül, had experienced as ministers under the True Path Party and Welfare Party coalition

⁴⁶⁴ Hugh Pope, “Turkey: Pax Ottomana”, *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2010, pp.161-171. Graham Fuller also points out the importance of the identity of the Ottoman period after 2002. But he does not use the term Neo-Ottomanism. Graham Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a pivotal state in the Muslim world*, Washington D.C, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008.

⁴⁶⁵ Uzgel and Yaramış, *op.cit*, p.41.

government, many politicians were facing their first imminent international crisis. Kardaş used the example of the appointment of Yaşar Yakış, a retired diplomat and with loose AKP connections, as Foreign Minister.⁴⁶⁶

Secondly, not only AKP politicians but for nearly all politicians were tormented by “gulf syndrome”, was mentioned above. Turkish politicians worried about a repeat of the ramifications from the Gulf Crisis, such as economic losses, exacerbated Kurdish problems and misperception of the US attitude. However, the ex-ANAP politicians, such as Abdülkadir Aksu, Cemil Çiçek, Vecdi Gönül, Ali Coşkun, Erkan Mumcu, Kemal Unakıtan, Hilmi Güler, and Binali Yıldırım supported a pro-American approach as Özal had.⁴⁶⁷

Thirdly, meanwhile, Turkey was still suffering the effects of a heavy economic crisis that had struck in 2001, and hoped to receive aid from the United States or corresponding international organizations.

Fourthly, the influence of public opinion had increased in the Post-Cold War era. The defeat of the ANAP in the 1991 general election was proof of this reality. Now, foreign policy is not only an activity of the elites but the platform of ordinary people to attempt to reflect their voice. Before the decision was made of whether or not to deploy, various groups took action against Turkish deployment.⁴⁶⁸ More than 90% of public opinion opposed to entrance to the Iraqi

⁴⁶⁶ Şaban Kardaş, “Turkey and the Iraqi Crisis: JDP Between Identity and Interest” in Hakan Yavuz (ed), *The Emergence of A New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006, p.322.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid*, pp.322-323.

⁴⁶⁸ Özlem Kaplan, *Justice and Development Party government's foreign policy during the Iraqi Crisis in 2003*, unpublished Master's thesis, Middle Eastern Technical University, 2005, p.41.

War. Pro-Islamist television channels like Kanal 7 or STV, and pro-Islamist newspapers Yeni Şafak, Vakit and Zaman contributed to public opinion of against the war.⁴⁶⁹ As a result, the AKP's approach to the Iraqi Crisis was cautious, involving some efforts to help prevent the war.

During this period, pragmatic and idealist factions were clearly divided and harshly vied to have their voices heard in the ongoing debates about deployment Turkish military toward Iraq. Erdoğan and his foreign policy advisors, including Cüneyt Zapsu, Egemen Bağış and Ömer Çelik, aspired to secure American support for the Turkish national interest.⁴⁷⁰ They thought that Turkey had no choice over whether or not they could avoid the war and support the US-led military in order to get benefits from them.⁴⁷¹ They established close relationships with some high-level officers within the Bush administration like Paul Wolfowitz, who promoted the war plan and regarded Turkey as a democratic model in the Middle East. Wolfowitz and assistant secretary of state Marc Grossman visited Turkey twice demanding cooperation with US-led Iraqi War.⁴⁷² In their second visit on December 3, 2002, soon after the Turkish general election, Wolfowitz and Grossman presented Turkey with a long list about the US requests. The important parts of their requests were the opening of several Turkish air bases for US use, the opening sea of its sea ports for US transport, the hosting of US

⁴⁶⁹ Gözen, 2005, *op.cit*, p.79.

⁴⁷⁰ Kardaş, 2006, *op.cit*, p.317.

⁴⁷¹ Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol.14, No,2, 2006, p.185.

⁴⁷² Their first trip was July 14-17 in 2002. Hale, 2007, *op.cit*, p.98.

forces at Turkish bases, the deployment of around 35.000 to 40.000 Turkish forces, and the permission to deploy 120.000 US and British combat forces within Turkey's territory near the Iraqi border.⁴⁷³ Wikileaks revealed that the US government requested seven points:

- (i) Resumption of military-to-military planning talks, (ii) Permission to conduct site surveys and begin site preparation of specified Turkish military facilities, (iii) Turkish participation in the development of the Northern option, (iv) Acceptance of proposed troop lists, including the role of possible coalition forces, (v) Removal of constraints on Operation Northern Watch, (vi) Approval of over flight rights, and (vii) Support if necessary, against terrorists in Northern Iraq.⁴⁷⁴

Wolfowitz went through a three-stage process with these requests.⁴⁷⁵ The first stage was to shake down the bases, ports and communications using US spectator teams. The second stage was to prepare the bases, ports and communications equipment for acceptance by US forces. The final stage was to station US air and land troops to the bases and ports. The first stage was realized on January 13 with the arrival of 150 US spectators.⁴⁷⁶ Wikileaks also clarified Turkey's redline, which was considered by the US government:

⁴⁷³ *Ibid*, p.187.

⁴⁷⁴ "Amerika'nın Gül'le Savaş Pazarlığı: Wikileaks orijinal Türkiye belgeleri", *Taraf*, Mart 18, 2011. Later, Gül said that the information on Wikileaks was not completely true. But the negotiation is considered to have roughly followed this outline. "Erdoğan, 1 Martta Devlete Yenildi", *Taraf*, Mart, 25, 2011.

⁴⁷⁵ Hale, 2007, *op.cit*, p.102.

⁴⁷⁶ *Hürriyet*, Ocak 13, 2003.

(i) The territorial integrity of Iraq would be preserved, (ii) There would be no independent Kurdish state, (iii) The rights and welfare of the Turcoman people would be protected, (iv) Iraqi national control of Kirkuk and Mosul would be retained, and (v) Iraqi national control of the nation's oil would be retained.⁴⁷⁷

The US government also provided a specific economic aid plan that it would provide for Turkey if Turkey would agree to join the War. These were following:

(i) 2 billion dollars per year for two years of some mix of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Economic Support Funds (ESF), (ii) 1 billion dollars in oil to be donated by other nations, and (iii) Up to 500 million dollars in local procurement by US defense forces.⁴⁷⁸

In addition to this aids, the US government pledged to ask Congress to provide more support if Turkey would fully commit to the war. However, lack of legitimacy was the single greatest obstacle for the pragmatist circle. UN Security Council resolution 1441 was called “quasi-multilateralism”, and many countries questioned its legitimacy except the United States.

Meanwhile, the foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister Gül was Davutoğlu. His Turkish-centered-multidimensional approach aspired to cooperation between Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries, and to be an active agent in attempting to prevent the war. He attempted to persuade Erdoğan and Gül not to join the Iraqi War.⁴⁷⁹ Specifically, Prime Minister Gül launched the Middle East

⁴⁷⁷ “Amerika’nın Gül’le Savaş Pazarlığı: Wikileaks orijinal Türkiye belgeleri”, *op.cit.*

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁹ Zengin, *op.cit.*, p.142.

initiative, through which it was discussed the prevention of the Iraqi War between the foreign ministers of Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Jordan on January 23, 2003.⁴⁸⁰ Having reflected this policy, Gül traveled to the Middle Eastern countries to speak with other heads of state.⁴⁸¹ On January 4, 2003, Gül visited Syria and Egypt. On January 11-12, 2003, Gül began a second round of travel to Saudi Arabia and Iran on a quest for a peaceful solution. In addition to cooperation with neighboring countries, Gül continued to try to persuade Iraqi regime until February 2003.⁴⁸² Also, the idealists used the lack of UN legitimacy and the strong anti-war discourses against Iraqi War as a reason for the rejection of the US request.⁴⁸³ By this stage, Davutoğlu's influence seems not to have penetrated sufficiently. Iraqi ambassador Solmaz Ünaydın also opposed entry into the Iraqi War. He was quick to cite the impact of Gulf Syndrome on Turkey's economy and EU negotiations as oppositional reasons.⁴⁸⁴

According to Kardaş, the predominance of the idealist or pragmatic philosophies volleyed back and forth several times.⁴⁸⁵ After establishing the AKP government, the United States at first supported idealist line and they took

⁴⁸⁰ Kaplan, *op.cit.*, p.58. With respect to this forum, we will discuss in chapter 5.

⁴⁸¹ Ali Balcı and Murat Yeşiltaş, "Turkey's New Middle East Policy: The Case of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's Neighboring Countries", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.XXIX, No.4, 2006, pp.20-21.

⁴⁸² Hale, 2007, *op.cit.*, p.105.

⁴⁸³ Yeşiltaş, 2009, *op.cit.*, p.43.

⁴⁸⁴ Solmaz Ünaydın, "Turkey's Policy toward the Middle East and the Question of Iraq", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.1, No.4, 2002.

⁴⁸⁵ Kardaş, 2006, *op.cit.*, pp.320-321.

decision-making foreign policy. But the US gradually shifted its support from the idealist line to the pragmatic line around the time of Erdoğan's Washington visit on December 10, 2002. During this visit, Erdoğan set out three conditions for Turkish participation in the war against Iraq. These conditions were clear support from Russia or France, and support from at least two Middle Eastern countries among Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria.⁴⁸⁶ Following loss of American support, Gül juggled the postponement of an attack on Iraq with the previous anti-war opinion within the both the Middle Eastern countries and among Turkish citizens domestically. Generally, center-right politicians had upheld the pragmatic approach, while Islamic party politicians who had come from the Kurdish regions supported cautious and idealist approaches. Yeşiltaş summed up Turkey's goal during the US negotiations as not to join the military activities without a UN Security Council Resolution, to delay a clear decision, and to try to maximize protections against the war should negotiations fail. The pragmatic and idealist line had different priorities in these negotiations.⁴⁸⁷ Zengin also pointed out five imperatives for Turkey that affected the decision of whether or not to join the war. These were to maintain good relations with the US, carry out negotiations with Iraq, carry out negotiations with regional states, take care of UN movements regarding Iraqi issues, and negotiation with reluctant great powers such as France and Russia against opening the Iraqi war.⁴⁸⁸ The pragmatic lines waited for UN legitimacy before participating in the coalition of willing. Their goal was

⁴⁸⁶ Zengin, *op.cit*, p.123.

⁴⁸⁷ Yeşiltaş, *op.cit*, p.44.

⁴⁸⁸ Zengin, *op.cit*, p.126.

maximum benefit from US. Meanwhile, the idealist lines stalled for time while they searched for more peaceful avenue.

From the beginning of February to March 1, 2003 marks the zenith of the international debates over the Iraqi war. Though Turkey's deliberation was separated into two parts, its tactics to delay the decision were most notable.⁴⁸⁹ The first deliberation over cooperation with the United States was held on February 6. The first item of deliberation was for US technocrats and military personnel to implement to necessities for modernization, development, construction and expansion of military bases, facilities and harbors in Turkey for three months.⁴⁹⁰ This agenda was passed in parliament with 308 out of 510 votes.⁴⁹¹ With this decision, Turkey agreed to advance to the second stage of cooperation about the Iraqi War. It was said that Turkish National Security Council's (NSC) attitude change affected to this decision. Having been negative toward the Iraq War until the end of January, the NSC in Turkey abruptly changed its attitude.⁴⁹²

In the meantime, the negotiation over compensation of economic losses was also pursued. Foreign Minister Yakış and Minister of State Ali Babacan visited the United States to discuss US economic compensation to Turkey.⁴⁹³ Turkey predicted it would absorb economic damage reaching approximately 21 billion

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p.133.

⁴⁹⁰ *T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi*, 32 nci Birleşim Şubat 6, 2003.

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid*. The votes of disagreement were 193, and votes of abstention were 9.

⁴⁹² *Hürriyet*, Ocak 31, 2003.

⁴⁹³ *Hürriyet*, Şubat 14, 2003.

dollars in the first year.⁴⁹⁴ The US would prepare approximately 4-6 billion dollars as compensation to Turkey.⁴⁹⁵ Also, Turkey would receive a maximum of 20 billion dollars in loan options. Yet there was a wide gulf between the two countries speculation.

The second deliberation to decide whether Turkey would formally participate in Iraq as a member of the coalition of willing was held on March 1. Items of deliberation on the agenda included whether to send Turkish military forces to foreign countries, to station other countries' militaries in Turkish territory for six months, and to move the destroyers to Turkey.⁴⁹⁶ The bill was rejected by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, with votes for approval 264, disapproval 250, and abstention 19.⁴⁹⁷ This result stood in stark contrast to Özal's decision during Gulf Crisis. Then-Prime Minister Gül and other AKP members could not explain the reasons for military deployment, and did not push AKP members to vote approval. It was said that many AKP members, including some ministers, voted for disapproval. This meant coalition of willing lost its plan for Northern operations. The US government was angry with Turkey and US-Turkish strategic relations deteriorated.

⁴⁹⁴ *Hürriyet*, Şubat 20, 2003.

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁶ *T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi*, 39 uncu Birleşim Mart 1, 2003.

⁴⁹⁷ Ratification of the bill required at least 267 votes. Also, at least 50 members of the AKP were said to have voted against the bill.

5.4. Change in Others' Perceptions

According to Gözen, the decision not to join the war reaped both positive and negative consequences.⁴⁹⁸ Positive consequences were first and foremost simply not being involved in the Iraqi chaos, preventing instability in domestic politics, improving Turkey's image in the world, especially the Middle East, and strengthening its ties with the EU. The negative consequence was its deterioration of the relationship with the US. Considering Turkey's Kurdish issues and economic losses, the US government was unable to propose effective countermeasures against Turkey's domestic opposition. In addition, Marc Grossman confessed that the US government could not effectively articulate its countermeasures against the PKK, the US plan after the war, or the benefits of deposing Saddam in 2005.⁴⁹⁹ After the decision of not to enter the Iraq War was settled, Turkey began to scramble to improve relationships with the United States. Davutoğlu also took care to monitor the European Union's opinion compared with the opinion of the United States. It was not easy to repair Turkish-US relations. This was because the US took a 'Kurds-first' policy after the end of the war.⁵⁰⁰ For the US, Iraqi Kurds were attractive actors for reestablishment of Iraq. The US wanted to avoid conflict with Iraqi Kurds and Turkey during the 1990s. So, US-Turkish relations remained delicate until the launch of the Greater Middle East Initiative.

On the other hand, Turkey's decision not to enter the Iraq War was

⁴⁹⁸ Gözen, 2005, *op.cit.*, pp.85-97.

⁴⁹⁹ "1 Mart öncesinde üç hatamız vardı", *Milliyet*, Ağustos 8, 2005.

⁵⁰⁰ Gözen, 2005, *op.cit.*, p.90.

appreciated by the Arab world.⁵⁰¹ Domestic actors like then-President Sezer and the NSC also received this decision positively. This decision has become a touchstone of the now fully-bloomed idealist policies from 2005 to 2008. Although Turkey's decision regarding the Iraqi War has been discussed with reference to whether or not it can be considered a soft-balancing policy or, it was certain that Turkish policy makers swung between pragmatic and idealist thinking during this period.⁵⁰²

5.5. Chapter Conclusion

In chapter 4, this dissertation analyzed the factors of the AKP's foreign policy. Experiences and ideas are important factors in the AKP's implementation of its foreign policy. Democracy and strategic depth defined by Davutoğlu are two core ideas from the early period. AKP's foreign policy approaches were divided into the pragmatic approach and the idealist approach. The pragmatic approach was effectively a bandwagoning approach toward the United States. Some AKP decision-makers, including Erdoğan, adopted this approach in the Iraqi crisis. They emphasized a conservative democracy that fit with the democratization to the Middle East led by the United States. The idealist approach was advocated by Gül and Davutoğlu. In contrast to the pragmatic approach, the idealist approach

⁵⁰¹ Zengin , *op.cit*, pp.149-150.

⁵⁰² Murat Yeşiltaş insisted that Turkey's behavior toward Iraqi War was soft balancing. Meanwhile, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth disagreed that Turkish policy was explained by soft-balancing. They explained that domestic political dynamics had a more critical impact on the Turkish decision. Yeşiltaş, *op.cit* ; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, pp.85-87.

put importance on relationships with neighboring countries and regional stability. Davutoğlu's "Strategic Depth" doctrine is the main characteristic of the AKP's idealist approach. He suggested that Turkey should cooperate with Middle Eastern neighbors, and that it needed to exercise caution and to calibrate Turkish foreign policy within strategic parameters set by great power.

For AKP decision-makers, the decision of whether Turkey would involve itself in the Iraqi War not was its first test in the foreign policy arena. The pragmatic approach and idealist approach were in a struggle for primacy during this decision-making process. Pragmatic thinkers supposed that Turkey had no choice to avoid war and had to support the US-led military activities in Iraq. Hence they tried to take benefits from the military activities and support for the United States. They established close relationships with some high-level officers within the Bush administration like Paul Wolfowitz, who promoted the war plan and regarded Turkey as a democratic model for the Middle East.

On the other hand, the idealist circle tried to prevent entering a war with other Middle Eastern states. Specifically, Prime Minister Gül launched the Middle East initiative, where he discussed the prevention of the Iraqi War with the foreign ministers of Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Jordan on January 23, 2003. They also criticized the lack of UN legitimacy to open up the war. They revisited the scars of Gulf Syndrome, especially the public's response against war. The first deliberation about technocrats and military personnel belonged to the USA, who would implement necessities of modernization, development, construction and expansion of military bases, facilities and harbors in Turkey being passed through the parliament on February 6, 2003. Yet, the bill about

sending Turkish military forces to Iraq was rejected on March 1. Before long, the idealist approach, based on liberal policies, would expand its influence over Turkish foreign policy. Davutoğlu has attempted to maximally capitalize on the existence geographical and historical legacy. In the next chapter, this dissertation will observe the AKP's fully-blown liberal policies under the ideas of Davutoğlu.

CHAPTER 6

6. Realizing Liberal Middle Power

Between 2005 and 2010 Turkish liberal middle power policies reached full bloom. These policies are broadly classified into functional diplomacy, mediation, niche diplomacy, coalition diplomacy, and norm diffusion. Of course, these policies did not begin in 2005, however, degree of commitment, effectiveness and impact were different from those of the previous periods.

6.1. Functional Diplomacy

In this dissertation, functional diplomacy is defined as “diplomacy in non-political or minor political areas through international organizations, especially the United Nations, for achieving peaceful change to the world and region”. This dissertation takes the Alliance of Civilizations and trading state in the Middle East as cases of Turkey’s functional diplomacy.

6.1.1. Alliance of Civilizations

6.1.1.1. Co-chairman of the Alliance of Civilizations

As mentioned in chapter 4, civilization is one of the core concepts used by Davutoğlu. Hence, the Alliance of Civilization project and the request for inauguration of a co-chairman by Spain offered a chance for Turkey. The Alliance

of Civilizations was established on July 14, 2005 as a new institution of the United Nations. The plan of this institution was first launched by Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero at the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly on September 21, 2004.⁵⁰³ The Spanish government advocated this institution in direct response to the suffering caused by the terrorist attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004. Spain and the UN sought to co-sponsor the establishment of the Alliance of Civilizations.

For them, Turkey was an attractive candidate to be co-chairman for several reasons.⁵⁰⁴ Firstly, Turkey has had experience against terrorism from the 1980s. Turkey's White Paper published in 1998 described its struggle with Armenian terrorist group like the ASALA, JCAG and ARA, and with Kurdish terrorist group PKK over the course 30 years.⁵⁰⁵ In the 1990s, PKK terrorism was a major threat both for domestic and for the international security of Turkey. Another tragic episode of terrorism had also struck Istanbul in November 2003. Spain and Turkey were of one mind in the fight against terrorism. Secondly, Turkey is a secular state, even though most of population is Muslim, and is a democratic state in the Middle East. These mixtures of both Western behavior patterns and Islamic traditions were attractive to the UN and especially to Spain as chair of the Alliance of Civilizations. Thirdly, as mentioned above, Turkey was the host country of OIC-EU Joint Forum. Though Turkish decision makers and the Foreign

⁵⁰³ (<http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/328/251/lang,english/>), February 10, 2011 accessed.

⁵⁰⁴ As Ambassador Mr. Rafet Akgünay, chief advisor of the Alliance of Civilizations, commented, the Turkish side did not have ambitions to be co-chair. After receiving the offer from Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero, Erdoğan agreed. Interview by e-mail with Ambassador Mr. Rafet Akgünay on March 29, 2011.

⁵⁰⁵ Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, *Beyaz Kitap: Savunma*, Ankara, 1998, pp.41-44.

Ministry considered the importance of the concept of civilization after the publication of the “Clash of Civilization”, 9/11 terrorism urged them to reflect on the impact of the concept of civilization on its foreign policy.⁵⁰⁶ Following a request by Zapatero, Prime Minister Erdoğan willingly accepted the position on June 13, 2005. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan clarified the initiative of the Alliance of Civilization on July 14, and finally declared the formation of a high-level group for the establishment of the Alliance of Civilizations on September 2, 2005.

The high-level group was constructed by 20 “wise men” including former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and John Esposito, a famous professor on the topic of Islam.⁵⁰⁷ Former Spanish Educational Minister Federico Mayor and Turkish State Minister Mehmet Aydın served as chairs of the high-level group. In order to formally launch the Alliance of Civilizations, high-level group held four meetings from 2005 to 2006. Their first meeting of high-level group was held in Palma de Mallorca, Spain from November 26-29, 2005. In this opening statement, Mehmet Aydın described the aim of the Alliance of Civilizations as following:

The Initiative aims to create an enabling atmosphere to contribute to the joint efforts which want to pass from a climate of “clash” through which we are going now, to a climate of “alliance” which is indispensable if

⁵⁰⁶ Interview by e-mail with Ambassador Mr. Rafet Akgünay on March 29, 2011.

⁵⁰⁷ Other members of the High-level Group are Seikha MozahBint Nasser Al Missned (Qatar), Mohamed Charfi (Tunisia), Ismail Serageldin (Egypt), Andre Azoulay (Morocco), Moustapha Niasse (Senegal), Desmond Tutu (South Africa), Hubert Vederine (France), Karen Armstrong (United Kingdom), Vitaly Naumkin (Russia), Arthur Schneier (USA), Enrique Iqlesias (Uruguay), Candido Mendes (Brazil), Nafi Sadik (Pakistan), Shobana Bhartia (India), Ali Alatas (Indonesia), Pan Guang (China).

<http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/160/197/lang,english/>, February 11, 2011 accessed.

we are in search of a peaceful co-existence.⁵⁰⁸

The first meeting of the high-level group clarified how to overcome the mentality of clash of civilizations. Erdoğan's speech was similar to Aydın's in his emphasis on the common values of humanity. The first meeting did not produce any specific outcome, though the UN, Spain, Turkey and the wise man group shared the ideas. They decided to focus on the political context, education, media, youth and immigration as major areas.⁵⁰⁹

The second meeting of the high-level group held in Doha from February 25-28 was overshadowed by the so-called Denmark cartoon incident, in which a Danish newspaper posted a satirical cartoon featuring the Prophet Muhammad. Before the second meeting, Erdoğan and Zapatero made a joint declaration about the cartoon crisis in order to ease the tension between the West and the Islamic world.⁵¹⁰ Also, UN Secretary General Annan invited several politicians including Turkish foreign Minister Gül to a meeting of the high-level group.⁵¹¹ As early as the second meeting of the high-level group, the Alliance of Civilizations produced the platform for reconciliation between Western countries and Islamic world. In this meeting, State Minister Aydın summed up the results of the cartoon incident as the result of centuries-old prejudices against Islam combined with several

⁵⁰⁸ (http://www.unaoc.org/repository/Aydin_firsthlg_statement.doc.pdf), February 11, 2011 accessed.

⁵⁰⁹ (<http://www.unaoc.org/repository/Second%20Meeting%20of%20the%20HLG%20-%20Prof.%20Aydin%20Opening%20Statement.pdf>), February 10, 2011 accessed.

⁵¹⁰ (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/opinion/05iht-edprimes.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=Erdogan%20and%20Zapatero%20%202006&st=cse), February 10, 2011 accessed.

⁵¹¹ *Turkish Daily News*, February 24, 2006.

influences related to the roots of Western colonialism.⁵¹² As Ali Balcı and Nebi Miş pointed out, the AKP government has positively supported the Alliance of Civilizations in several international meetings since the end of the second high-level meeting.⁵¹³

The third meeting, held in Dakar, Senegal from May 28-30, 2006 was not paid much attention by the Turkish media. But Mohammad Khatami's speech at this meeting should be considered an effective statement. Khatami, an advocate for dialogue between civilizations at the end of 1990s, articulated the preconditions for lasting peace as sharing and keeping justice, and a creating culture of understanding in the face of hostility.⁵¹⁴

At the fourth meeting held in Istanbul from November 11-13, 2006, the high-level group submitted its final report for institutionalization. During his presentation, Erdoğan said he regarded Turkey as symbol of the Alliance of Civilizations, and indicated the necessity of Turkey's EU accession.⁵¹⁵ The final report titled "Bridging the World's Divides" seemed also to have been influenced by Turkey. According to the report, "the need to build bridges between societies, to promote dialogue and understanding and to forge the collective political will to

⁵¹² (<http://www.unaoc.org/repository/Second%20Meeting%20of%20the%20HLG%20-%20Prof.%20Aydin%20Opening%20Statement.pdf>), February 10, 2011 accessed.

⁵¹³ Ali Balcı & Nebi Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.9, No.3, 2008, p.397.

⁵¹⁴ (<http://www.unaoc.org/repository/Third%20Meeting%20of%20the%20HLG%20-%20Pres.%20Khatami%20Message.pdf>), February 10, 2011 accessed.

⁵¹⁵ *Yeni Şafak*, Kasım 13, 2006.

address the world's imbalance has never been greater".⁵¹⁶ According to the report, a multi-polar perspective, the legitimacy of the UN system, human rights, tolerant attitudes toward the diversity of civilizations and cultures, eradication of poverty, the eradication of terrorism, the necessity of democratic government, and the importance of religion were guiding principles.⁵¹⁷ In addition to this, featured in report were policies towards Middle East and plans of action in some major arenas. The main fields dealt with by the Alliance of Civilizations were education, youth, migration, media and politics. The high-level group considered solving problems in these areas would most strongly encourage lasting peace in the world.

6.1.1.2. Forum for International Stability

According to the implementation plan of the Alliance of Civilizations, the functions of organization are to be (i) a bridge-builder and convener, (ii) a catalyst and facilitator, (iii) an advocator, (iv) a platform, (v) a resource center, for promoting the understanding and trust.⁵¹⁸ For implementation of these functions, each country formed a national strategy. Turkey advocates four concepts as the cores of its national strategy. These are (i) pluralism and diversity, (ii) friendship and cooperation, (iii) dialogue and understanding, and (iv) respect for human

⁵¹⁶ (http://www.unaoc.org/repository/HLG_Report.pdf), February 12, 2011 accessed, p.3.

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid*, pp.5-6.

⁵¹⁸ (http://www.unaoc.org/repository/implementation_plan.pdf), February 14, 2011 accessed, pp.5-6.

dignity and gender equality.⁵¹⁹ Turkey launched 76 projects in cooperation with Ministries, TBMM, municipalities and local authorities, NGOs and think tanks.

For Turkey, the Alliance of Civilizations is an attractive institution because of its contributions toward world peace. For the AKP government, the Alliance of Civilizations was an important institution through which it could exhibit the legitimacy of its power and influence. The Alliance of Civilizations was also a chance to achieve reconciliation and harmony between the West and Islam. According to Kılınç, the AKP wanted to exhibit itself as a model for the Islamic world for its balance of Islam and secularism.⁵²⁰ The AKP's ultimate aim has been to become global actor able to exert its influence to world politics.⁵²¹ For Turkey, the Alliance of Civilizations was a way to expand its influence on World politics. In addition, it was hoped that Turkey's proactive participation in the Alliance of Civilizations might turn international public opinion with regard to its EU bid.⁵²² The AKP government began to emphasize this point ever since the first forum of the Alliance of Civilizations in 2008:

Turkey doesn't wait for special bargaining or procedure from EU at all. But Turkey's EU accession will show whether the Alliance of Civilization is possible or not. Also Turkey's EU accession is the characteristic for world peace and discrimination in world politics. This is not the problem of polarization between different cultures and religions, but the problem

⁵¹⁹ (<http://www.unaoc.org/repository/turkeyplan.pdf>), February 14, 2011 accessed.

⁵²⁰ Ramazan Kılınç, "Turkey and the Alliance of Civilizations: Norm Adoption as a Survival Strategy", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.11, No.3, 2009, p.58.

⁵²¹ Interview with Suat Kınıklıoğlu, January 13, 2011.

⁵²² Balcı and Miş, *op.cit*, pp.401-402.

of a politics of agitation.⁵²³

Turkey's national strategies toward the Alliance of Civilizations were also consisted of similar elements:

The successful completion of Turkey's full accession into the European Union, which has been underway since 1963, will be a good example of the Alliance of Civilizations and of the coexistence of communities and individuals from different religions and cultures in a milieu of peace and tolerance.⁵²⁴

Jorge Sampaio, appointee by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as high representative for the Alliance of Civilizations, insisted that Turkey's EU entry would develop the Alliance of Civilizations.⁵²⁵

6.1.1.3. Forum for Regional Stability

The regional strategy launched in Sarajevo in November 2009 was an important policy of the Alliance of Civilizations. The regional strategy goals are the activation of regional cooperation and the development of a policy instrument.⁵²⁶ According to the report of the Sarajevo meeting, breaking down psychological walls, building relational bridges, and sharing designated spaces

⁵²³ *Zaman*, Ocak 15, 2008.

⁵²⁴ (<http://www.unaoc.org/repository/turkeyplan.pdf>), February 14, 2011 accessed.

⁵²⁵ *Yeni Şafak*, Nisan 28, 2010.

⁵²⁶ (<http://www.unaoc.org/docs/Sarajevo-Strategy-13december09.pdf>), February 15, 2011 accessed.

were major approaches to regional stability.⁵²⁷ Until now, specific regional strategy plans have been established in South Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Mediterranean.⁵²⁸ For the AKP government, regional strategies of the Alliance of Civilizations are affinity for its zero problems policy. In other words, Turkey implements the zero problems policy as a national and regional strategy through the Alliance of Civilizations. Attending the meeting of the Group of Friends of the Alliance of Civilizations, Davutoğlu explicitly emphasized regional strategies.⁵²⁹ He puts particular importance on the stability of the Mediterranean region through regional strategy of the Alliance of Civilizations.

6.1.1.4. The Problems of the Alliance of Civilizations

Regarding the problems of the Alliance of Civilizations, Balcı and Miş laid out six points.⁵³⁰ First of all, great powers in world politics like the United States, China and Russia do not consider the Alliance of Civilizations an important organization. Secondly, Arab states in the Middle East also do not react positively toward the project. Thirdly, the core countries of the Alliance of Civilizations including Turkey challenged the ambiguity of the definition of civilization.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁸ (http://www.unaoc.org/docs/RabatMeeting/Annex%205_Presentation%20on%20Regional%20Strategies.pdf), February 15, 2011 accessed.

⁵²⁹ (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/address-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-turkey-at-the-ministerial-meeting-of-the-group-o.en.mfa), February 15, 2011 accessed.

⁵³⁰ Balcı and Miş, *op.cit*, p.402.

Fourthly, the project of the Alliance of Civilizations was only focused on the West and Islam, without considering other civilizations. Fifthly, the major aims of the Alliance of Civilizations are huge and ambiguous. Finally, the Alliance of Civilizations was conceptually deeply dependent on the existing concept of the “Clash of Civilizations”, ironically. Clash of civilizations and the Alliance of Civilizations are based on same logic.

Indeed, the main aim of the Alliance of Civilizations is to reconcile the West with Islam. Behind its establishment were the OIC-EU forum, and since some of the world’s most egregious recent acts of terrorisms has happened in the United States, London, Madrid and Istanbul, both Western and Islamic civilizations were inevitably focused on a single issue.

In addition to the Alliance of Civilizations, Turkey became a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council at the election held on October 17, 2008. This was fourth chosen as non-permanent member in the United Nation Security Council for Turkey in history, and the term was from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2010.⁵³¹ During the term of non-permanent member, Turkey had put importance on the activities of counter-terrorism, discrimination against women, support to Least Developed Countries, and Iranian nuclear issue.⁵³² From the perspective of functional diplomacy, this was another contribution of Turkey.

⁵³¹ Turkey got the non-permanent member seat in 1951-52, 54-55, and 61. Since then, Turkey ran for non-permanent member seat three times, but these attempts were failed. Akif Kirecci, “Turkey in the United Nations Security Council”, *SETA Policy Brief*, No.28, 2009, p.3.

⁵³² *Hürriyet Daily News*, January 2, 2011.

6.1.2. Turkey as a Trading State

6.1.2.1. Definition of Trading State

The concept of the trading state defined by Rosecrance was applied to contemporary Turkish foreign policy.⁵³³ The trading state outlined a state that aimed to improve its status in international politics and allocation of resources in its domestic politics within the functional trading system.⁵³⁴ The background of the idea of the trading state is the world of interdependence. For Rosecrance, an interdependent world meant a world that produce functional trade situation within its territory. But Keohane and Nye advanced this and outlined the concept of complex interdependence whose main characteristics were multiple channels connecting society, an absence of hierarchy among issues, and a minor role of military forces.⁵³⁵

As discussed in chapter 3, Turkey underwent liberal economic reforms under Özal. Introducing a liberal economy was the trigger of the 2001 financial crisis, yet it was the same factors that resulted in the Turkish economic system receiving legitimacy in world politics. The AKP government continued Özal's policies

⁵³³ Kirişci, 2009, *op.cit.*

⁵³⁴ Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, New York: Basic Books, 1986, p.24. Rosecrance clearly divided the international system into the military-political world and the trading world. The important elements of the military- political world are power and territory. On the other hand, the characteristics of the trading world are supplying different services and products by each country, and creating an interdependent situation.

⁵³⁵ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr., *Power and Interdependence (3rd Edition)*, New York: Longman, 2001, pp.21-23.

regarding the Europeanization process as well. Many economy-oriented interest groups have taken a position from which they can affect foreign policy as a second track. The influence of the military was also limited as part of the Europeanization process. The military expenditure to Gross Domestic Product ratio has also been decreasing since 2002.⁵³⁶

Turkey was able to achieve the status of first country, transforming liberal economy in the Middle East region. Davutoğlu seems to consider economic interdependence a contributing factor to the achievement of peace and stability in the Middle East.⁵³⁷ In the Middle East region, Turkey began to take on the role among various regional and international economic demands by introducing its own experience of liberal economy. The Levant Quartet was a good example of how Turkey's handled its trading state.

6.1.2.2. The Case of the Levant Quartet

In the 1990s, Turkey considered security organizations or working group like the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) measure to be important in the Middle East. In the 2000s, Turkey began to impose on economic organizations. For example, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) became more active than ever before, and Turkey's relationships with GCC countries were accelerated.

⁵³⁶ (<http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>), May 4, 2011 accessed. According to the SIPRI database, the ratios of military expenditure to gross domestic product under AKP have been the following: 2002 (3.9%), 2003 (3.4%), 2004 (2.8%), 2005 (2.5%), 2006 (2.5%), 2007 (2.2%), 2008 (2.2%) and 2009 (2.7%). With the exception of 2009, the ration has continued to decrease.

⁵³⁷ Kirişci, 2009, *op.cit*, p.42. Kadri Kaan Renda, "Turkey's Neighborhood Policy: An Emerging Complex Interdependence?", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.13, No.1, 2011, p.104.

Among them, the establishment of the Levant Quartet was epoch-making. The Levant Quartet was established as a regional economic cooperation project on December 3, 2010. The basic ideas behind this cooperation were decided in a Turkey-Arab economic forum beginning in 2005. Previously, five Turkey-Arab economic forums had been held on the way to the establishment of the Levant Quartet.

The fifth Turkey-Arab forum was held in Istanbul on June 10-11, 2010. Prime Minister Erdoğan, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, General Secretary of the Arab League Amr Musa, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek, Chief of TOBB and DEİK Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, and Chief of Al-Iktisaad Wal-Aamal Group Raouf Abou Zaki joined the forum. Hisarcıklıoğlu discussed how Turkey and Arab states should approach issues like energy and water security in order to achieve perpetual peace from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea through the Persian Gulf. In order to achieve these aims, he emphasized the importance of economic cooperation. His idea was typical functionalism based on regional cooperation. Davutoğlu made note of the following. "From Kars in Turkey, to Morocco and Mauritania, from Sinop in Turkey to Sudan, from the Bosphorus to the Gulf of Aden, Turkish and Arab geographies own the most strategic belt in the World".⁵³⁸

The Levant Quartet aims at increasing amount of trade to 1.5 trillion dollars between Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan by 2015. MERCOSUR, ASEAN, COMESA and NAFTA have been used as models for the Levant Quartet. Specifically, the Levant Quartet set up 14 items: these were logistics infrastructure,

⁵³⁸ *Hürriyet Daily News*, June 11, 2010.

enterprise, financial service, regional investment, security of goods, energy security, free movement of people and goods, tourism, investment in construction project, activation of horizontal relations, construction and development of organizational capability, education and R&D, cultural transformation and cooperation with Third World countries.⁵³⁹ The founding countries hoped to involve Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Yemen, Oman and Bahrain as full members of the Levant Quartet.⁵⁴⁰ President Gül evaluated the Levant Quartet as follows:

In the near future, the border will work only administrative function. Security will develop in the Middle East region. Free movements of people, goods and capitals will be much easier than now. I believe that this cooperation will be effective for cooperation between private sectors. ...Like these, cooperation is the best step for our region.⁵⁴¹

Hisarcıkloğlu shared a similar perspective:

To establish a strong regional economy, reciprocal investments, a regional base, and humanitarian infrastructure are very important. ...Now we concern ourselves with the time of normalization in the Middle East. The Turkish business world strongly supports the government's "peaceful and prosperous Middle East" politics.⁵⁴²

⁵³⁹ (http://www.deik.org.tr/Pages/TR/DEIK_HaberlerDetay.aspx?hDetId=264&IKID=10), February 6, 2011 accessed.

⁵⁴⁰ *Hürriyet Daily News*, December 3, 2010.

⁵⁴¹ (http://www.deik.org.tr/Pages/TR/DEIK_HaberlerDetay.aspx?hDetId=264&IKID=10), February 6, 2011 accessed.

⁵⁴² (<http://haber.tobb.org.tr/ekonomikforum/2010/12/040-045.pdf>), February 6, 2011 accessed.

Table 5. Trade volumes with Middle Eastern countries US dollar at current prices billion

Year/	Flow	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Countries										
Iran	Export	0.333	0.533	0.810	0.912	1.066	1.386	2.029	2.024	3.042
	Import	0.920	1.860	1.961	3.469	5.626	6.613	8.199	3.402	7.644
Iraq	Export	----	0.829	1.815	2.748	2.589	2.811	3.916	5.125	----
	Import	----	0.112	0.467	0.458	0.375	0.644	1.320	0.952	----
Israel	Export	0.861	1.083	1.309	1.466	1.529	1.658	1.935	1.528	2.083
	Import	0.544	0.459	0.714	0.803	0.782	1.081	1.447	1.069	1.359
Lebanon	Export	0.183	0.147	0.234	0.195	0.240	0.393	0.664	0.686	0.619
	Import	0.041	0.071	0.147	0.144	0.126	0.116	0.178	0.107	0.228
Jordan	Export	0.114	0.148	0.223	0.286	0.321	0.389	0.460	0.455	0.572
	Import	0.018	0.013	0.012	0.026	0.009	0.011	0.025	0.020	0.042
Syria	Export	0.266	0.410	0.393	0.551	0.609	0.797	1.115	1.421	1.641
	Import	0.506	0.413	0.357	0.272	0.187	0.376	0.639	0.327	0.630

(References: Renda, *op.cit*, p.98; Website of Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?59f21ff8-791d-4e37-9f39-b4513dfe9399>), June 10, 2011 accessed).

As shown in table 5, Turkish trade volumes toward neighboring Middle Eastern countries have increased in the last 5 years. Davutoğlu regards business groups, like DEİK and TUSKON, as new actors in Turkish foreign affairs.⁵⁴³ Turkey's visa-free policy toward Middle Eastern states also contributes to the prosperity of Middle Eastern economies. Since 2009, Turkey has mutually lifted visa requirements with Syria, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Yemen. The visa-free policy improves economic and commercial cooperation with Middle Eastern states and strengthens Turkey's promotion of free-market and

⁵⁴³ Interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu "İş Dünyası artık Dış Politikanın Öncülerinden", *Turkishtime Gazete*, April-May 2004.

democracy.⁵⁴⁴ As another case of promotion, Turkey actively promoted the conclusion of economic financial agreement to other countries within the framework of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).⁵⁴⁵

6.1.2.3. The Case of the Relationships with GCC

The relationships between Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) can be described as nonexistent before the AKP government signed a trade and investment framework agreement with the GCC on May 30, 2005.⁵⁴⁶ For Turkey, the GCC is an attractive organization in economic fields. Turkey could secure the legitimacy to export its goods to the rich Gulf States. On the other hand, for the GCC, Turkey is an important country for its trades because of its membership of the Europe Customs Union.⁵⁴⁷ Both Turkey and the GCC states also share interests in political dimensions like the stability of Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and

⁵⁴⁴ Nilgün Arısan Eralp, "Turkey's visa policy: Has Turkey given up its demand of free movement in the EU?", *Hürriyet Daily News*, February 15, 2010. For details of Turkey's visa policy toward both the EU and the neighboring countries, see Kirişci, 2005, *op.cit.*

⁵⁴⁵ Within the ECO, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan signed an economic financial agreement in 2008. Other countries have not concluded negotiation on this agreement yet.

⁵⁴⁶ This study focuses not on Turkey's bilateral relations with each country but its relationships with the GCC. Most works dealing with the recent Turkish-GCC relations focus on bilateral relations. For example, Robert Olson, "Turkey's Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council from 2003 to 2007: New Paradigms?", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.19, No.3, 2008, pp.68-87; Lenore G. Martin, "Turkey and Gulf Cooperation Council Security", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.10, No.1, 2009, pp.75-93; Sean Foley, "Turkey and the Gulf states in the twenty-first century", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.14, No.3, 2010, pp.29-37.

⁵⁴⁷ *Turkish Daily News*, April 12, 2006.

Palestine-Israel conflict.⁵⁴⁸ To complete the FTA talks, Turkey and the GCC have met four times, although they have not yet reached an agreement.⁵⁴⁹ Turkey's cheap steel and iron seem to be the main problems between Turkey and the GCC for agreement on the FTA.⁵⁵⁰ In 2010, the joint economic cooperation committee was established to activate the FTA talks on 23 May.⁵⁵¹

Table 6. Trade volumes with Gulf countries US dollar at current prices billion

Year/ Countries	Flow	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Bahrain	Export	0.041	0.035	0.076	0.308	0.113	0.171
	Import	0.018	0.042	0.119	0.095	0.024	0.071
Kuwait	Export	0.210	0.219	0.221	0.492	0.211	0.395
	Import	0.041	0.056	0.090	0.080	0.184	0.214
Oman	Export	0.039	0.071	0.091	0.215	0.105	0.129
	Import	0.003	0.002	0.024	0.010	0.016	0.039
Qatar	Export	0.082	0.342	0.449	1.074	0.289	0.162
	Import	0.050	0.065	0.029	0.159	0.085	0.177
Saudi Arabia	Export	0.961	0.982	1.486	2.197	1.605	2.219
	Import	1.888	2.244	2.439	3.322	1.526	2.440
UAE	Export	1.675	1.985	3.240	7.975	2.898	3.340
	Import	0.205	0.322	0.469	0.691	0.667	0.698

(<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.tr.mfa?ff1be5b3-51d9-4c0a-99f5-291c33c39414>), June 10, 2011 accessed.

⁵⁴⁸ Şaban Kardaş, "Ankara promotes closer regional integration in the Middle East", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol.6, Issue 133, 2009.

⁵⁴⁹ *Today's Zaman*, December 26, 2010. The first round was held in Riyadh on November 15, 2005, and the second round was held in Ankara on April 13-14, 2006. The third round was held in Doha on February 26-27, 2008 and the fourth round was held in Ankara again on April 24, 2009.

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵¹ *Hürriyet Daily News*, October 18, 2010.

In addition to the FTA negotiation, Turkey and the GCC signed a strategic partnership in Jeddah on September 3, 2008. Turkey became the first strategic partner outside of the GCC countries. At that time, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan commented that Turkey and the GCC cooperated not only in the field of economy but also the fields of politics, the military and security.⁵⁵² Until the end of 2010, Turkey and the GCC twice implemented the Turkey-GCC foreign ministers high-level strategic dialogue. The first Turkey-GCC strategic talks were held in Istanbul on July 8, 2009. At this meeting, Turkey and the GCC agreed on twenty items of cooperation in all areas. The FTA has been the most important area between both sides, though security, especially countering terrorism, has also been a source of common interest. It was decided that the GCC countries should train at the Turkish international academy against drugs and organized crime (TADOC).⁵⁵³ The second Turkey-GCC strategic talks were held in Kuwait on October 18, 2010. Here, Turkey and the GCC agreed on the cooperation and establishment of working groups in the areas of trade, investments, agriculture, food security, transportation, energy, culture, health, tourism, education and environment.⁵⁵⁴ Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu mentioned the geopolitical advantage for GCC countries of reaching Central Asia and Europe through Turkey. In addition to this, he planned to improve the roads from Turkey to the GCC

⁵⁵² *Gulf News*, September 3, 2008.

⁵⁵³ Joint statement of the joint ministerial meeting of the GCC-Turkey high level strategic dialogue (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-of--the-joint-ministerial-meeting-of-the-gcc-turkey-high-level-strategic-dialogue-istanbul_-_turkey_-8-july-2009.en.mfa), February 26, 2011 accessed.

⁵⁵⁴ (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-davutoglu_nun-turkiye-kik-yukse-duceyli-stratejik-diyalog-ikinci-disisleri-bakanlari-toplantisinda.tr.mfa), February 26, 2011 accessed.

countries for the initiation of tourism.⁵⁵⁵

The visit of King Abdullah was the turning point of the close relationships between Turkey and GCC countries.⁵⁵⁶ In Strategic Depth, the GCC or GCC states are barely mentioned, however, Davutoğlu considers the GCC and its joining states necessity to the achievement of the stability of Iraq and for bargaining with Iran. In addition to this, cooperation with the GCC makes sense for Turkey's economically functional policies.

6.1. Mediation

In this dissertation, the roles of mediation are classified into communicator, facilitator, procedural role, and directive role. Communicator's roles were simply to carry message and to create communication opportunities for each other. Facilitator was more substantive role, attempting to provide a common understanding about problems, situation and solutions. Procedural roles are more formal and effective tools of mediation. A mediator can hold a meeting, announce information through media and pressure actors. Directive strategies have strong mandates to change or put forward negotiation among actors. This dissertation chooses Turkey's mediation toward Israeli-Palestinian relations, toward Lebanon Crisis, and toward Israeli-Syrian relations as cases.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁶ Martin, *op.cit*, p.76. Martin also mentioned that Gül's experience of staying in Saudi Arabia for 8 years affected the AKP's policy toward the GCC.

6.2.1. Turkey's Mediation toward Israeli-Palestinian Relations

6.2.1.1 TOBB's Trials to Realize the Ankara Forum

To improve the relations between Israel and Palestine, Turkey was prepared to organize conferences, create an economic zone, and maintain bilateral relations with each country. The most successful of these activities was the Ankara Forum with the initiative of TOBB in November 2007. This can be described as one of the success stories of public diplomacy and second track diplomacy. It was impossible for TOBB to launch the Ankara Forum without support from the government.⁵⁵⁷ According to TOBB's report on the Ankara Forum, TOBB undertook a series of Ankara Forums beginning in November 2003.⁵⁵⁸ The series of Ankara Forums are examples of typical second track diplomacy, in which think tanks, NGOs, and epistemic community efforts complement government policies. On November 19-20, Rifat Hisarcıklođlu, president of TOBB, separately contacted Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmet Kurey. TOBB sent letters to the Manufactures Association of the Israeli and Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture regarding cooperation in the implementation of the Ankara Forum. On the other hand, TOBB established the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV)

⁵⁵⁷ Interview with Esen Çađlar in TEPAV, April 7, 2011. Until 2005, generally speaking, the Turkish government did not provide aid to business activities in the Middle East. Hence Turkish business activities toward the Middle East were not organized and lacked certain mechanisms.

⁵⁵⁸ (<http://www.tobb.org.tr/AvrupaBirligiDairesi/Dokumanlar/Faaliyetler/ankaraforumu/ankaraforumu.pdf>), February 3, 2011 accessed.

as a supporting institution for its economic policies toward neighboring region.⁵⁵⁹ First, TOBB held meetings for economic cooperation with Turkey, Israel and Palestine in Ankara on April 27-28, 2005.⁵⁶⁰ Hisarcıkloğlu, Shraga Brosh, CEO of the Manufactures Association of Israel, and Ahmed Hashem Al-Zugahir, president of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, discussed the possibility of economic cooperation between Palestine-Israel-Turkey. The first Ankara Forum declared its objective “to be enabling business people’s contribution to the peace building process in Palestine through feasible projects”.⁵⁶¹ Specifically, the three associations aimed to remove obstacles to economic relations between Palestine and Israel in order to achieve security and stability between the two countries through the development of economic relations.⁵⁶² They also planned to cooperate in the areas of tourism, industrial investment, infrastructure, free movement of goods, and education.⁵⁶³ Industrial investment in Erez industrial zone and tourism were main topics at subsequent

⁵⁵⁹ TEPAV is an independent and non-partisan think tank. Regional integration activities are one of the pillars of TEPAV. Other than Ankara Forum, TEPAV implemented the expansion of business association networks and the Istanbul Forum with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Esen Çağlar, “Turkey’s economic transformation and role of organized industrial zones”, 2010, (http://www.ecocci.com/DC/PDF/19.04.201017_38Presentation%20on%20OIZ.pdf), March 20, 2011 accessed.

⁵⁶⁰ Bülent Aras, “Turkey and the Palestinian Question”, *SETA Policy Brief*, No.27, 2009, p.5. According to Esen Çağlar, economic expert for TEPAV, the year 2005 was important to start the Ankara Forum. Turkey recovered its economy from the 2001 financial crisis, and began to commit to international economic integration. In addition, Turkey appealed to its strategic importance toward the Middle East with respect to the EU. These situations backed up the project of Ankara forum. Interview with Esen Çağlar in TEPAV, April 7, 2011.

⁵⁶¹ (<http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/haberler/s/1900>), February 3, 2011 accessed.

⁵⁶² *Hürriyet*, Nisan 27, 2005.

⁵⁶³ (<http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/haberler/s/1900>), February 3, 2011 accessed.

second to fifth meetings.

At the second meeting held in Jerusalem on June 8, 2005, the organizations decided to set up working groups for the activation of tourism and the Erez Industrial Zone.⁵⁶⁴ Meetings of working groups were also held in addition to the Ankara Forum. Erez Industrial Zone had been explained as one of the few successful case of cooperation between Palestine and Israel since 1970.⁵⁶⁵ 187 companies were supported by and 5000 people in Gaza were employed in Erez.⁵⁶⁶ But the Israeli government decided to quit the Erez Industrial Zone over lack of security. In the 2000s, Israelis were sometimes attacked in the Erez area. TOBB Industrial Park Management Company (TOBB-BIS) has undertaken the trilateral project.⁵⁶⁷ This was the Turkey's domestic successes and experiences of organized industrial zones projects to apply other countries.⁵⁶⁸ Organized industrial zones in domestic politics were promoted after Özal's economic reform and newly emerging middle class. However transferring its knowhow, TOBB

⁵⁶⁴ (<http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/haberler/s/1009>), February 3, 2011 accessed. The members of working group of the Erez Industrial Zone were Güven Sak, Samir Y.S. Hazboun, and Dan Catarivas.

⁵⁶⁵ *Washington Post*, June 9, 2004.

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁷ (http://www.industryforpeace.org/TEPAV_brosur.pdf), 4 February, 2011 accessed. TOBB-BIS founded in November 2005 is the company which is "to develop and manage industrial and technology parks in Turkey and Turkey's surrounding region". According to its own report, the aims of TOBB-BIS are "to transfer the know-how of Turkish chambers to countries around Turkey in developing and managing industrial and technology parks". Another major goal is "to act as a catalyst in private sector development, while opening new avenues of growth for Turkish companies".

⁵⁶⁸ Interview with Esen Çağlar in TEPAV, April 7, 2011. Until 2010, there were 258 authorized organized industrial zones in Turkey, and 120 of which were fully working. Local chambers play important role to activate organized industrial zones. Çağlar, *op.cit.*

launched projects dependent on businessmen's requests and countries' situations.

According to Third Ankara Forum held in Istanbul on September 20-21 investment insurance and promotion activities in Erez Industrial Zone, as well as development processes in tourism sector were the main items of discussion.⁵⁶⁹ The establishment of 200 companies with 6000 Palestinian people to be employed after establishing stability in the region was a plan suggested for the Erez Industrial Zone.⁵⁷⁰ The fourth Ankara Forum, which was held in Tel Aviv on January 15, 2007 more than one year after the previous forum, focused on the importance of continuity in cooperation. At TOBB's initiative the fifth Ankara Forum was held in Washington DC on 30 March 2007. This meeting was meaningful because the US strongly backed the forum. In addition to US support, employment in the Erez Industrial Zone was due for upward revision from 2000 to 10000.⁵⁷¹ The sixth meeting held in East Jerusalem on September 4, saw the launch of a new project in the West Bank in parallel with the Erez Industrial Zone.⁵⁷²

The seventh meeting, held in Ankara on November 13, 2007 made widespread the contribution of the Ankara Forum. Here, members of Ankara

⁵⁶⁹ (http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/haber/1255425530r1448.Ankara_Forumu_3_Deklerasyon.pdf), February 4, 2011 accessed.

⁵⁷⁰ *Zaman*, September 22, 2005. TOBB does not limit organized industrial zone sector. All sectors can enter this project, if they wish. Interview with Esen Çağlar in TEPAV, April 7, 2011.

⁵⁷¹ (http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/haber/1282035658-3.Washington_Declaration.pdf), February 4, accessed.

⁵⁷² (http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/haber/1252654505r8838.Joint_Declaration_of_the_Sixth_Meeting_of_the_Ankara_Forum_East_Jerusalem.pdf), February 4, accessed.

Forum and the Turkish government succeeded in facilitating a meeting between Israeli president Shimon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. This meeting was positioned as a crucial step toward the Annapolis summit held on November 26-28 in Annapolis. In other words, the Ankara Forum played a role as a platform of Palestine-Israeli meeting. On the other hand, three chambers of commerce proceeded in the project of the West Bank Industrial Zone. These were (i) the project of the West Bank Industrial Zone, which would be started in the Tarkumya region by the Palestine government, (ii) the government should approve the project, and the TOBB-BIS companies should develop and acquire management status of the project, (iii) the Israeli government would sign a protocol on security for Palestinians and the passage of goods from Palestine, (iv) Israel would manage water and electricity infrastructure.

As discussed above, the Ankara Forums led by three business councils produced an opportunity for dialogue between Palestine and Israel, and for cooperation between three countries on a business area. Job creation for Palestinians was a particularly useful way to reduce poverty and prevent terrorism toward Israel. Undoubtedly, this trilateral forum is an important initiative for achieving prosperity. Sak emphasizes the uniqueness of the Ankara Forum's "plug away" approach to solving essential problems. According to him, the characteristics of approach are (i) well-functioning public-private dialogue mechanisms, (ii) concrete and local projects, (iii) interim solutions, (iv) engagement in transformational diplomacy.⁵⁷³ Projects of organized industrial zones have broadly granted three benefits to Palestine. These are (i) to attract

⁵⁷³ Güven Sak, "TOBB Industry for Peace Initiative: Revitalization of the Palestinian Industrial Free Zone", *TEPAV* (Power Point), 2006.

foreign companies, (ii) to cut the cost of labor, and (iii) to brush up the skills of Palestinians.⁵⁷⁴ These benefits contribute not only to the activity of the economy, but also to help create a peaceful situation in the region.

The series of Ankara Forum has not achieved concrete success yet. The Erez Industrial Zone project broke down because of regional instability. The project of Tarquima in the West Bank also had problems with respect to land classification (e.g. impossible to change from C status to B status), no existing industrial activity, and clashes between landowners.⁵⁷⁵ Now, the Ankara Forum focuses on the project of Jenin in the Northern West Bank. There are several reasons to pursue the project in Jenin. According to Sak, these are (i) the project would be on Palestinian authority confiscated land, (ii) the Jordanian-Palestinian company has worked in Jenin for 12 years, (iii) the area status of Jenin was changed from C to B by Israel, (iv) the German Development Agency provided financial support.⁵⁷⁶

6.2.1.2. The Instable Factors between Turkey and Israel

Meanwhile Turkey sometimes failed to improve relations between Israel and Palestine. The most famous incident was the visit of Halid Meshal to Turkey. On February 17, 2006, the Hamas delegation headed by Meshal visited Ankara and talked with some Turkish officials including Foreign Minister Gül. Though

⁵⁷⁴ Interview with Esen Çağlar of TEPAV, April 7, 2011.

⁵⁷⁵ (http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/haber/1280237547-8.State_Building_Process_in_Palestine_Some_Ideas_from_Industry_for_Peace_Initiative.pdf, slide 25), February 4, 2011 accessed.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid*, slide 25 and 26, February 4, 2011 accessed.

Erdoğan was the first Prime Minister to insist on giving a chance to Hamas, this trip surprised other countries' officials.⁵⁷⁷ Hamas won the Palestinian election in January 2006, however, Israel, United States and European Union did not approve Hamas. Davutoğlu was reportedly responsible for setting up the meeting in Ankara. But this visit was a risky mission, strongly opposed by Israeli officials. Ra'anan Gissin, spokesman for the Israeli Prime Minister, declared "Turkey is making a mistake that can deeply hurt bilateral relations" and "How would you feel if we got together with Abdullah Öcalan".⁵⁷⁸ The United States criticized the visit at both the official and unofficial levels.⁵⁷⁹ Furthermore, the Israeli attacks on Gaza from the end of 2008 to early 2009 and the Davos meeting at which Erdoğan condemned Shimon Peres before walking out on a moderated debate with him, resulted in a dramatic deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations.⁵⁸⁰ Since the Davos meeting, both countries have tried to mend their relations, but rift still exists.

As represented by the Ankara Forum and TOBB's initiative, Turkish government and sectors have worked hard for cooperation between Israel and Palestine.

⁵⁷⁷ Hüseyin Bağcı, "Tayyip Erdoğan and Hamas: Sharing common experience?" in *ZEITGEIST*, p.575.

⁵⁷⁸ *Turkish Daily News*, February 17 & 18, 2006.

⁵⁷⁹ For example, Arnold Beichman, a columnist with the Washington Times, harshly criticized the visit of Hamas.

⁵⁸⁰ Concerning recent Turkish-Israeli relations, see: İlker Aytürk, "Between Crises and Cooperation: The Future of Turkish-Israeli Relations", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.11, No.2, 2009, pp. 57-74, Gökhan Bacık, "Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from Turkey", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.11, No.2, 2009, pp. 31-41, Ofra Bengio, "Altercating Interests and Orientations between Israel and Turkey: A view from Israel", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.11, No.2, 2009, pp.43-55.

6.2.2. Turkey's Mediation Efforts in Lebanon

6.2.2.1. Chronology of Lebanon Crisis

Concerning Israeli and Lebanese relations, this dissertation takes up Turkey's attempts at mediation in order to resolve the July-August 2006 Lebanon Crisis. Lebanon Crisis began on July 12, 2006 when Hezbollah attacked Israeli military bases and Israeli villages near the Israel-Lebanon border using Katyusha multiple rocket launchers. At the same time, Hezbollah soldiers invaded Israeli territory around the borders. As a result of this attack, eight Israeli soldiers were killed and two soldiers were kidnapped by Hezbollah. Israel responded to Hezbollah through air-raids and bombings. Israeli Prime Minister Olmert wanted to demonstrate his authority to the Israeli public with a show of aggression. Hezbollah also wanted to strengthen its legitimacy, so the war became a good opportunity for both actors. Meanwhile, international society and the Middle Eastern countries sought to resolve the war. The United Nations, the United States, and Turkey made efforts toward a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. By mid-August, 1200 Lebanese were killed and 4000 were injured, notably including many civilians and children. Meanwhile, 160 Israelis were killed and 1500 were wounded.⁵⁸¹

At the G8 summit held in St. Petersburg on 17 July, the Lebanon War was a major topic of discussion. G8 leaders concluded with the following statement

⁵⁸¹ Tim Youngs and Claire Taylor, *The crisis in Lebanon (Research Paper 07/08)*, House of Commons Library, 2007, p.26. (<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2007/rp07-008.pdf>), December 7, 2010 accessed.

about Middle East peace and a solution to the Lebanon War:

In Lebanon, UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1680 address the underlying conditions that gave rise to this crisis. We urge the UN Security Council to develop a plan for the full implementation of these resolutions. We extend to the Government of Lebanon our full support in asserting its sovereign authority over all its territory in fulfillment of UNSCR 1559. This includes the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces to all parts of the country, in particular the South, and the disarming of militias. We would welcome an examination by the UN Security Council of the possibility of an international security/monitoring presence. We also support the initiation of a political dialogue between Lebanese and Israeli officials on all issues of concern to both parties. In addition, we will support the economic and humanitarian needs of the Lebanese people, including the convening at the right time of a donor's conference.⁵⁸²

In this way, the G8 countries emphasized the UN resolution and its role toward Lebanon. On July 21, then-US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave a speech about the Lebanon Crisis and advocated the concept of "New Middle East". Rice used this concept on the following context:

I think we are beginning to see the outlines of a political framework that might allow the cessation of violence in a more sustainable way, tied to UN Security Council Resolution 1559, tied to what is there in the G-8 summit statement. The elements are becoming quite clear. But I have no interest in diplomacy for the sake of returning Lebanon and Israel to the status quo ante. I think it would be a mistake. What we're seeing here,

⁵⁸² (<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2006stpetersburg/mideast.html>), December 7, 2010 accessed.

in a sense, is the growing—the birth pangs of a new Middle East.⁵⁸³

While, Rice criticized Hezbollah's attack on Israel and its negative influence for Lebanese government. After advocating this concept, Rice visited Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon. On July 26, the International Conference for Lebanon was held in Rome, and the United States, Canada, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, the European Union, and the World Bank attended this conference to discuss solutions to the Lebanon War. Representatives of Lebanon insisted on seven points for a cease-fire. Three of them were related to a demand for help from the UN and international society.⁵⁸⁴ Key to the Co-Chairman's Statement was the following:

The Rome Conference participants expressed their determination to work immediately to reach with the utmost urgency a cease-fire that put an end to the current violence and hostilities. That cease-fire must be lasting, permanent and sustainable.... An International Force in Lebanon should urgently be authorized under UN mandate to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in providing a secure environment. The Rome Conference pledged its support for Lebanon's revival and

⁵⁸³ "Secretary Rice Holds a News Conference", *The Washington Post*, July 21, 2006.

⁵⁸⁴ According to Youngs and Taylor, the Lebanese government demanded the following conditions for cease-fire. (1) A guarantee to release both Lebanese and Israeli prisoners and detainees through the International Committee of the Red Cross, (2) The Israeli army would withdraw behind the Israeli-Lebanese border known as the blue line, and would return Lebanese villagers to their homes, (3) A commitment from the Security Council to place the Shebaa Farms area and the Kfarshouba Hills under UN jurisdiction until border delineation and Lebanese sovereignty over them was fully settled, (4) The Lebanese government would control its territory with its own legitimate military, (5) UNIFIL would operate humanitarian and relief works in Southern Lebanon, (6) The UN would undertake the necessary measure to realize the Armistice Agreement signed in 1949, (7) It is necessary for Lebanon to help the international community in reconstruction. Youngs and Taylor, *op.cit*, p.24.

reconstruction.⁵⁸⁵

The executive committee meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference was held in Putrajaya on August 3, and resulted in the submission of the Putrajaya Declaration about the Lebanon War. In this declaration, OIC countries insisted on the cooperation for solving the Lebanon War, denounced the Israeli attacks against the Lebanese and the slow response of the UN Security Council, and demanded support for Lebanon from the international community.⁵⁸⁶ In addition to this, the ceasefire plan brought forward by Lebanon's government was inserted in declaration as well as Rome Conference.

The UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1701 was adopted on 11 August. The most important part of Resolution SCR 1701 was the role and improvement of UNIFIL. SCR 1701 called upon the legitimacy of Lebanese government and UNIFIL to achieve a full cessation in paragraph 2. SCR 1701 also demanded the improvement of UNIFIL's abilities as "In order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426".⁵⁸⁷

⁵⁸⁵ International Conference for Lebanon: Rome, July 26, Co-Chairman Statement (<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20Rome%20declaration%2026.07.06.pdf>), December 7, 2010 accessed.

⁵⁸⁶ (<http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/exec/PUTRAJAYA-Dec-Leb-en.pdf>), December 12, 2010 accessed.

⁵⁸⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8808.doc.htm>), December 7, 2010 accessed. Specifically, UNIFIL' works were (a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities, (b) Accompany and

During the Lebanon War, Western countries recognized the necessity of the cooperation of Muslim countries. Of course, Turkey is a secular country, however, Western countries focused on Turkey's cooperation by virtue of its 99% Muslim population. Erdoğan and Gül denounced the Israeli offensive attacks, and called on both sides and other Middle Eastern countries to initiate an immediate ceasefire and continued efforts.⁵⁸⁸ Davutoğlu visited Syria in order to speak with President Assad regarding negotiations with Hamas, and Gül attended the Rome Conference.⁵⁸⁹ Turkey also deployed evacuation efforts to extract Turkish citizens and other foreign tourists from Lebanon.

6.2.2.2. Turkey's Facilitator Diplomacy⁵⁹⁰

Prime Minister Erdoğan denounced Israel's aggressive policies toward Lebanon. At the same time, he questioned the US attitude toward Israel and the Middle East.⁵⁹¹ He criticized the US for holding up the Greater Middle East

support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2, (c) Coordinate its activities related to (b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel, (d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, (e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8, (f) Assist the Government of Lebanon.

⁵⁸⁸ *Turkish Daily News*, July 15 & 19, 2006.

⁵⁸⁹ *Turkish Daily News*, July 20, 2006.

⁵⁹⁰ For details of recent Turkish-Lebanese relations, see Veysel Ayhan and Özlem Tür, *LÜBNAN: Savaş, Barış, Direniş ve Türkiye ile İlişkiler*, Bursa: Dora Yayınları, 2009, pp.281-320.

⁵⁹¹ *Zaman*, Temmuz 16, 2006.

Project for freedom, peace and democracy in the region. But this trial did not succeed in developing the Middle East region, and Israeli attacks both toward Lebanon and toward Palestine opposed policies toward peace in the region. Erdoğan initiated efforts to solve the Lebanon War through contact with leaders of other states. At first, he spoke with Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Sinyora regarding a cease-fire. Sinyora responded that “Israel attacks civilians and destroys infrastructure. We are damaged from irrelevant incident”, and demanded Turkish help to achieve a cease fire.⁵⁹² Four days later, Syrian President Assad talked with Erdoğan, and together they demanded diplomacy in order to stop the war.⁵⁹³ Erdoğan promised to initiate diplomacy toward Middle East peace. Among the Middle Eastern leaders, Erdoğan tried to communicate with Bashar al-Assad and urged Iranian President Ahmedinejad to cooperate with the cease-fire.⁵⁹⁴ Syria and Iran have been considered the patrons of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Erdoğan probably thought that Turkey could exert influence toward Hezbollah through Syria and Iran. On 31 July, Erdoğan suggested an emergency meeting in Istanbul to discuss the relations between Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon.⁵⁹⁵

Meanwhile, Erdoğan also spoke with US President Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair via telephone and released a joint declaration with Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero of the Alliance of Civilizations. In this declaration, both

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*

⁵⁹³ *Zaman*, Temmuz 20, 2006.

⁵⁹⁴ *Zaman*, Temmuz 22, 2006.

⁵⁹⁵ *Zaman*, Temmuz 31, 2006 .

countries demanded the cease-fire and regional peace:

We believe that confrontation in the Middle East is not inevitable; on the contrary, peace is possible in the region. Moreover, the solutions have already been identified. We may need to review the approach to peace followed so far but it is imperative that we manage to put the peace process back on track as a matter of urgency.⁵⁹⁶

Foreign Minister Gül also insisted on the cease-fire by the initiative of international society. At the Rome International Conference for Lebanon, he emphasized UN leadership to stop the crisis. Gül said that Turkey was prepared to offer any kind of help to Lebanon and suggested sending the Turkish military to join an international force in his speech.⁵⁹⁷ He also pointed out that the Palestine problem was rooted in Lebanon, and doubted the attitudes of Western countries that did not recognize Hamas' authority in Palestine.⁵⁹⁸ On 3 August, a short article by Gül was published in the Washington Post wherein he insisted on US leadership in achieving democracy and a cease-fire in the region:

After all, my generation grew up with an image of the United States as standing for the revered values of democracy. It is sad that this image of a "kinder, gentler nation" is being tarnished as millions around the world watch in complete horror as events unfold in Lebanon. ...The hopes for the democratic transformation of the

⁵⁹⁶ Joint Declaration regarding the latest developments in the Middle East (<http://www.unaoc.org/repository/6071Joint%20Declaration%20of%20Prime%20Ministers%20of%20Spain%20and%20Turkey%20on%20Middle%20East.pdf>), December 12, 2010 accessed.

⁵⁹⁷ *Hürriyet*, Temmuz 27, 2006.

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

Middle East that we, together with the United States and other allies, have been painstakingly attempting to cultivate are being shattered, along with the lives of the people of the region.⁵⁹⁹

On August 7, Gül met with French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy and discussed the possibility of engaging in an international force to facilitate cease-fire.⁶⁰⁰

The Turkish government acted not only at the high level meeting but also at the practical level. Turkey opened Adana Airport for the transport of foreigners in Lebanon who wanted to return to their home countries. 2351 foreigners used Adana Airport for this purpose, and 830 stayed Adana hotels.⁶⁰¹ 641 Americans used the Port of Mersin and temporarily stayed at Incirlik Air Base.⁶⁰² The Turkish Red Crescent additionally sent totally 102 tractor trailer relief teams through 3 August.⁶⁰³

6.2.2.3. The First Process of Sending Military to UNIFIL II

During the Lebanon War, a hotly-debated topic was whether the Turkish military would be deployed by the UNIFIL or not. Before adopting the SCR 1701,

⁵⁹⁹ *Washington Post*, August 3, 2006.

⁶⁰⁰ *Zaman*, Ağustos 8, 2006.

⁶⁰¹ *Zaman*, Temmuz 25, 2006. 101 Argentines of Lebanese nationality, 470 Swedes, 186 Germans, 1447 Canadians, and 147 Brazilians went back, and 283 Brazilians, 325 Canadians, and 220 Australians stayed in Adana hotels.

⁶⁰² *Ibid.*

⁶⁰³ *Zaman*, Ağustos 4, 2006. This relief aids was delivered to 150000 Lebanese near the Syrian border.

Turkey attended the UN meeting to plan peace-keeping activities in Lebanon.⁶⁰⁴ Both Israel and Lebanon declared that Turkey was one of the best-equipped countries to facilitate a resolution to the crisis. As mentioned above, Lebanese Prime Minister Sinyora demanded Turkish help for the ceasefire. Israeli Prime Minister Olmert also suggested that the Turkish military should be included in the UNIFIL.⁶⁰⁵ After submitting SCR 1701, Erdoğan and Gül were positive regulating the possible deployment of the Turkish military to Lebanon if conditions were satisfied. According to Gül:

First of all, it is very important to ensure the ceasefire activity. In a month, a lot of Lebanese, many of them children, have been killed, and a lot of infrastructures have been destroyed. These tragedies grew out of hostility (toward Israel).Turkey will not say whether we can send military or not. If conditions are satisfied, we will send our military. We desire as few of our children as possible to go to Lebanon.⁶⁰⁶

Turkey's conditions for sending its military to the UNIFIL were (i) to guarantee perpetual ceasefire in the region, (ii) that the UN should submit a new decision on a peace-keeping force, (iii) not to guarantee peace but to protect peace, (iv) all countries must accept the establishment of a peace-keeping force.⁶⁰⁷ National Security Council, Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök and First General Yaşar Büyükanıt, also exhibited positive attitude on Turkish participation

⁶⁰⁴ *Turkish Daily News*, July 31, 2006.

⁶⁰⁵ *Zaman*, Ağustos 4, 2006.

⁶⁰⁶ *Zaman*, Ağustos 13, 2006.

⁶⁰⁷ *Zaman*, Ağustos 15, 2006.

in UNIFIL II. The meeting which was joined by some members of the government and the NSC was held on 13 August, and the discussion was about whether or not to send troops, and what size of force.⁶⁰⁸ They supposed that Turkey would send approximately 800 to 1200 troops.

Meanwhile, the opposition parties CHP and MHP, and President Sezer opposed the sending of the Turkish military to the UNIFIL. CHP leader Deniz Baykal pointed out the possibility of Turkish military becoming involved in conflict. Onur Öymen, a CHP politician and expert of foreign policy, said that Turkey should not participate in the UNIFIL before solving its domestic PKK terrorism problem. MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli also noted that the object of Turkish security policy was not Lebanon but PKK terrorism. But the words of President Sezer gave the AKP government its biggest shock. President Sezer declared his opposition to troop deployment at a hand-over ceremony for land forces. He made his comments to NTV reporter Ece Özbek. Their conversation unfolded as follows:⁶⁰⁹

Ece: Mr. President, what do you think about the issue of deployment of our troops against Lebanon?

Sezer: I oppose to sending our forces to Lebanon. We are not a safeguard against the national interests of other countries.

Ece: But Mr. President, the AKP government insists that the aim of sending forces is not war but to rescue civilians.

Sezer: Of course I am not against rescuing civilians. But I do not think that the aim of Security Council Resolution 1701 is (only) to rescue civilians.

⁶⁰⁸ *Hürriyet*, Ağustos 14, 2006. Participants to this meeting were Erdoğan, Özkök, Büyükanıt, Gül, Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül, Justice Minister and governmental spokesman Cemil Çiçek, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Tugan, Advisor to Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Ertuğrul Apakan, Chief of Planning and Discipline in the General Staff Commander Hilmi Akın Zorlu, Chief of Operation in the General Staff Commander Bekir Kalyoncu.

⁶⁰⁹ *Hürriyet*, Ağustos 26, 2006.

Ece: So you consider SCR 1701 not to be premised on ceasefire, don't you.

Sezer: Yes, the UN decision is not good. The aim of SCR 1701 is only to stop hostility between Israel and Lebanon.

Ece: In your opinion, will Turkish Armed Force remain outside the conflict?

Sezer: In wartime, militaries help civilians, while in the peacetime, civil organizations help civilians.

Ece: In this issue, is the problem only the ambiguousness of SCR 1701?

Sezer: It is not in Turkey's national interest to send our troops to the Lebanon War. I oppose to the opinion to send our forces to contribute to other country's national interest.

Ece: If the UN changes the SCR 1701, will you change your opinion?

Sezer: Before we discuss this issue, our government behaves as if it has made its decision.

Sezer did not have right to participate the vote on the troop deployment, but he aspired to change the atmospheres of parliament and among the nation by expressing his informal opinion. Many AKP politicians denied his influence on issue. For example, Parliamentary speaker Bülent Arınç criticized Sezer's behavior in the following terms:

Whether Turkey needs to send forces to the UNIFIL or not will be decided by our government. Secondly, the government's request to send forces will be judged by parliament. Concerning this issue, the influence and responsibility of Mr. President are nothing. The result of a vote in parliament will be published in Resmi Gazete. Resmi Gazete will not need the President's signature. This vote is not an issue open to veto by the President or the constitutional court. This is the procedure. Mr. President's ideas are a personal issue.⁶¹⁰

On the other hand, opposition parties used the opinion of the President as an excuse not to send Turkish troops. For instance, Erkan Mumcu, leader of the

⁶¹⁰ *Hürriyet*, Ağustos 26, 2006.

Motherland Party, said that opinion of President was important for everyone.⁶¹¹ In fact, the President's comments were influential in the decision-making process. On August 26, Erdoğan, Gül, and some members of the NSC convened another discussion of the size of troop to be sent. The 800-1200 troop figure that had been discussed at the meeting held on August 13, was decreased 200 at this meeting.⁶¹² Erdoğan and Gül began to more forcefully emphasize that the purpose of sending the military was not to join the battle but to save civilians.

The question of whether or not to send Turkish troops to Lebanon was still the hottest issue, when the AKP government began to cooperate with UNIFIL activities. Turkey declared it would open Mersin Port and Adana Şakirpaşa Airport for logistics.⁶¹³ Turkey also continued its facilitator role in the region. From 20 August, Foreign Minister Gül began a series of trips to Syria, Palestine and Israel. On 20 August, he travelled to Israel and met with Prime Minister Olmert, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Defense Minister Amir Peretz. Gül also met with the families of kidnapped victims. On August 22, Gül met with Syrian President Assad and Foreign Minister Velid El Muallim. Assad supported sending the Turkish military to Lebanon.⁶¹⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu also went to Syria and met with Hamas leader Halid Meshar, managing the regional balance.

⁶¹¹ *Zaman*, Ağustos 28, 2006.

⁶¹² *Hürriyet*, Ağustos 27, 2006.

⁶¹³ *Zaman*, Ağustos 19, 2006. Baki İlkin, Turkish ambassador to the UN, said “ if the UNIFIL needs to use more, we will be able to open another port and airport”.

⁶¹⁴ *Hürriyet*, Ağustos 22, 2006.

6.2.2.4. The Second Process of Sending Military to UNIFIL II

The AKP government held a ministerial meeting on August 28 and formally decided to send its military to Lebanon for a period of one year. The decision would be judged by parliament on September 5. Justice Minister and governmental spokesman Cemil Çiçek emphasized the importance of the UN Security Council and the peace in Lebanon.⁶¹⁵ The AKP government continued to call for cooperation with other countries, especially Arab states to solve the problem. On September 4, The OIC Youth Forum was held in Istanbul. Parliament Chair Bülent Arınç, Internal Minister Abdülkadir Aksu, State Minister Ali Babacan, Azerbaijan President İlham Aliyev, Prime Minister of Pakistan Shaukat Aziz, Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Ferdi Sabit Soyer, OIC General Secretary Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Chief of TOBB Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, and Istanbul Mayor Muammer Güler joined the conference. Arınç insisted on the importance of Turkey's role in the Middle East region. In the same day, TOBB, DEİK (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu) and the Turkish Red Crescent signed a protocol sending 8 civilians committees to Lebanon along with 5 million dollars in aid to Lebanon.⁶¹⁶

On September 5, though the TBMM allowed the deployment of Turkish troops to Lebanon under UNIFIL forces, the discussion and vote over deployment were highly-incendiary. At the TBMM discussion, Prime Minister Erdoğan insisted the "regional peace" in the Middle East and the legitimacy which UN

⁶¹⁵ *Hürriyet*, Ağustos 29, 2006.

⁶¹⁶ *Milliyet*, Eylül 4, 2006.

required support from Turkey.⁶¹⁷ He proposed three fundamental reasons why the AKP government would need to send Turkish troops.⁶¹⁸ The first reason was the urgent ceasefire and long-spanning mediation between Israel and Hezbollah according to UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The second reason was the solution of the regional crisis in the framework of Security Council Resolution 1701. The third reason was that Turkish troops would support peace-building rather than join the conflict. In addition to these reasons, Erdoğan regarded Turkey as a stabilizing factor in the region, and explained that the stabilization of Lebanon would contribute to Turkey's own security. He defined the task of Turkish troops as the following:

Turkey will send navies sufficient to guard the Eastern Mediterranean, and will permit the use of ports and airports for other countries that join the UNIFIL according to requirements and evaluations. The Turkish military shall educate Lebanese armies. Furthermore, Turkey will provide humanitarian assistance with securing by the military, border security, scout and other works by request of the government. We promise that our armies will not use force except in the above works until Israeli and Lebanese forces withdraw.⁶¹⁹

After the question and answer session with Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Gül also appealed to the necessity of sending troops to Lebanon. Compared to Erdoğan's speech, Gül's speech seemed to be affected by Davutoğlu's strategic depth idea. He emphasized the importance of security in the Eastern

⁶¹⁷ *T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi*, 124 üncü Birleşim (Olağanüstü), Eylül 5, 2006, p.8.

⁶¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid*, p.9.

Mediterranean region and of maintaining relationships with neighbor countries, as Turkey was the strategic linchpin between East and West. He, like Erdoğan had also done, articulated three reasons for sending troops.⁶²⁰ Firstly, the decision of UN Security Council had international legitimacy. Secondly, UNIFIL's aim was not peace-making but peace-building. Thirdly, all of countries which were directly affected by the Lebanon crisis clearly hoped for the joining of Turkish troops.

Egemen Bağış, one of the foreign policy advisors to Erdoğan at that time, made his speech after the question and answer session to Gül. He also emphasized three points: global peace, regional peace and Turkish national interests.⁶²¹ According to Bağış, Turkey under the AKP government had been a bridge of peace and dialogue between Western countries and the Islamic world. According to him, Turkey is the only state that can coordinate dialogue both with global powers and regional powers in the Middle East.⁶²² He regarded Turkey as both a regional and global actor. Hence he warned that if Turkey did not send troops to Lebanon, Turkey would face both a regional and global security threat.

The leading opposition party, the CHP, strongly opposed sending troops. For example, ex-diplomat Şükür Elekdağ criticized the "New Middle East" concept presented by Rice and the idea to send Turkish troops to Lebanon.⁶²³ The logic of his criticism was that the UN and the United States supported Israel not Lebanon

⁶²⁰ *Ibid*, p.34. Gül also pointed out that sending troops to Lebanon was a chance to appeal to other countries presented at the UN. This is because Turkey would announce its intention to run for one of the five UN nonpermanent council members in 2008, *Ibid*, p.37.

⁶²¹ *Ibid*, p.48.

⁶²² *Ibid*.

⁶²³ *Ibid*, p.14.

so if Turkey joined the UNIFIL, Turkey would lose the trust of the Arab countries. Another speaker, Onur Öymen, insisted upon three reasons to oppose sending troops.⁶²⁴ First, the Lebanese government wanted troops that would fight against Israel. Hence, if the Turkish military was sent to Lebanon, the possibility of involvement in the war would be high. Second, so-called leading Muslim countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia were not participating in the UNIFIL. Of the Arab countries, only Qatar joined. Third, he asked for an explanation as to why the AKP government should send an army to Lebanon without resolving its own ongoing PKK problem.

This discussion continued for six hours, and ultimately the proposal of the AKP government passed. The result was votes in agreement:340, votes in disagreement:192, and abstention:1.⁶²⁵ The UN and the United States admired Turkey's participation in the UNIFIL II. Details of the action were discussed in a meeting, including the Foreign Ministry, the General Staff, the Turkish Red Crescent Society, the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) and the Customs Department of Foreign Ministry.⁶²⁶ The plan of major contributions are (i) sending a naval force to patrol the eastern Mediterranean, (ii) to help training the Lebanon army, (iii) providing humanitarian assistance, and (iv) providing logistical support for other contributing nations by granting access to

⁶²⁴ *Ibid*, p.42.

⁶²⁵ *Ibid*, p.62. Six politicians in the AKP (Nurettin Aktaş, Halil Kaya, Sadık Yakut, İbrahim Hakkı Aşkar, Turan Çömez, and Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır) disagreed with the deployment in the vote. Furthermore, Bülent Arınç (meeting with the President of Kyrgyzstan), Nevzat Pakdil (acting Prime Minister), Akif Gülle (sick), Abdullah Çalışkan (sick), Vahit Kiler (sick), İsmail Alptekin (going abroad), Faruk Özak (going abroad), and Mustafa Ünalı (unspecified) were absent. Mehmet Emin Bilgiç abstained. *Hürriyet*, Eylül 6, 2006.

⁶²⁶ *Turkish Daily News*, September 8, 2006.

two Turkish ports (Mersin and Iskenderun) and two airports (Istanbul Sabiha Gökçen and Adana Şakirpaşa).⁶²⁷ Turkish land forces organized 237 soldiers and 24 civilians who started to work from September 20, 2006. Turkey decided to dispatch force to UNIFIL II not only to facilitate Israeli-Lebanon relations, but also for regional stabilization.⁶²⁸ Turkey showed a willingness to solve regional issue by peaceful means.

The AKP's policy toward the Lebanon Crisis was very positive and provided maximal effort to the cease fire. Turkey wanted to participate to the operation both for regional peace and stability. In addition to security matters, Turkey's multi track diplomacy and sending of forces impressive public opinion in the Middle Eastern region. It was also the first time TIKA to send aid directly to conflict zone for the purpose of constructing peace.⁶²⁹

6.2.3. Turkey's Mediation of Israeli-Syrian Relations

6.2.3.1. Backgrounds of Mediation

Turkey's success in initiating indirect talks between Israel and Syria in 2008 was the best example of its mediation policy in the Middle East. Israel and Syria's peace talks under US mediation had failed and ended in 2000. The vital problem

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁸ Meliha Altunışık, *Lübnan Krizi: Nedenleri ve Sonuçları*. İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2007, p.26.

⁶²⁹ (http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/rapor2006/en/report2006_1.pdf), January 20, 2011 accessed.

between Israel and Syria has been possession of the Golan Heights, which was annexed by Israel in 1981. The reason Turkey was able to play the role as mediator was because of its good relations with both Israel and Syria in the 2000s. But Turkish perceptions toward Israel and Syria were different. Turkish-Syrian relations had gradually gone through a process of “desecuritization” in the 2000s.⁶³⁰ In the 1990s, Turkey’s two biggest threats were political Islam and PKK terrorism.⁶³¹ Turkey doubted Syria on the issue of aid to the PKK. Meanwhile, Syria was concerned about Turkey as a threat in regional water issues, and had adopted a strategy of power balancing against Turkey by supporting Armenia, Greece and the PKK.⁶³² As discussing in chapter 3, relations between Turkey and Syria increased in tension in October 1998. After the crisis, both countries aligned under the Adana Accords then furthermore the death of Hafiz al-Assad made possible a change in Syria’s hard attitude toward Turkey. Turkey’s image in Syria transformed notably after the Turkish parliament’s rejection of the 1 March

⁶³⁰ Buzan and Waever defined securitization as the discursive process through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a political community regarding threat to a valued referent objective, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat. While desecuritization is defined as a process by which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.489 -491. Aras and Polat analyzed Turkey’s relations with Syria and Iran from this perspective. See Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, “From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol.39, No.5, 2008, pp.471-488.

⁶³¹ For detail of threats for Turkey during the 1990s; See İlhan Uzgel, “Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy, *The Turkish Yearbook International Relations*, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Uluslararası İlişkileri Bölümü, 2004, pp.177-211.

⁶³² Altunışık and Tür, *op.cit*, p.235.

motion on the Iraqi Crisis.⁶³³ Turkey and Syria shared a similar anxiety regarding the possibility of the establishment of the Kurdish state in the northern part of the Iraq.⁶³⁴ Mutual visits by dignitaries have been active in the 2000s, and economic relations have also increased.

On January 7-8, 2004, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad visited Turkey, and met with President Sezer, Erdoğan, Gül and Chief of Staff of the NSC Hilmi Özkök. Assad said “We have managed to transformation the situation from one of insecurity to one of security”.⁶³⁵ During this visit, Assad emphasized (i) Syria and Turkey opposed the building of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, and (ii) Syria hoped that Turkey would be a mediator between Syria and Israel. Meanwhile, Turkey (i) enthusiastically thanked Syria for its cooperation with the PKK operations, and (ii) insisted it stop its support for terrorist organizations. President Sezer officially visited Syria on April 13-14, 2005. The U.S. government vigorously opposed Sezer’s visit, but an undaunted Sezer continued to Syria and met with his counterpart Assad. President Sezer advised Assad to withdraw from Lebanon for not irritating Western states.⁶³⁶ It was said that Sezer’s visit made an impression on the Syrian nations. Assad traveled to Turkey again in October 2007.

Turkish-Israeli relations have been basically good since the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, Turkish-Israeli relations were consolidated with the progress of the peace process between Israel and Palestine, the modernization of Turkish

⁶³³ *Ibid*, p.244.

⁶³⁴ *Ibid*, p.241.

⁶³⁵ *Milliyet*, January 7, 2004.

⁶³⁶ *Hürriyet*, Nisan 14, 2005.

weapons and existence of “rogue states” among neighbors including Syria. Inbar pointed out that the two countries shared similar regional concerns regarding Syria, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the challenge of Islamic radicalism, and the geopolitical destiny of Central Asia in the 90s.⁶³⁷ But their good relationship was based on securitization, in other words a common threat perception. After the 2000s, incidents like Ariel Sharon’s visit to Al-Aqsa mosque and subsequent intifada, the delegation from Hamas that visited Ankara, and the 2007 Lebanon crisis led to difficulties in Turkish-Israeli relations. The AKP government had also begun to implement more pro-Arab policies. But this trend seems to have begun during the Ecevit government. Sharon’s visit to Temple Mount and the violence that followed, the Ecevit government announced it had decided to postpone joint Turkish-Israel-U.S. naval maneuvers that originally had been planned for November 2000.⁶³⁸ Then-President Sezer harshly criticized Israel and Sharon at the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting in October 2000. In addition, Prime Minister Ecevit declared that he fully supported the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and expressed willingness to send a contingent of the Turkish army to the West Bank to provide aid to Palestinian forces.⁶³⁹ He also described Israeli attacks on PLO positions in the

⁶³⁷ Efraim Inbar, “The Resilience of Israeli-Turkish Relations”, *Israel Affairs*, Vol.11, No.4, 2005, p. 592.

⁶³⁸ Leon T. Hadar, “Orienting Jerusalem toward Ankara or Cairo? Israel’s New Geostrategic Debate”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.12, No.3, 2001, p.10. The joint military exercise, code named Reliant Mermaid, had been conducted twice before 2000 according to the Military Training Co-operation Agreement that was signed in 21-23 February 1996.

⁶³⁹ *Ibid*, p.11.

West Bank as genocide against the Palestinian people in April 2002.⁶⁴⁰

Also, Erdoğan labeled the spring 2004 Israeli military operations in the southern Gaza town of Rafah as “state terrorism”. In addition to these Turkish criticisms, journalist Seymour Hersh, who had won the Pulitzer Prize reporting the abuse scandal in Abu Ghraib, wrote in *The New Yorker* magazine that Israeli military and intelligence operatives were active in Kurdish areas of Iran, Syria and Iraq providing training for commando units and running covert operations to destabilize the region.⁶⁴¹ What’s more, Israel’s newspaper wrote on December 1, 2005 that former Israeli security officials had secretly trained Kurds in anti-terrorism tactics in northern Iraq. The Israeli government denied the allegations of training Kurds.⁶⁴² According to Hersh, Israel’s goal was to build up Kurdish military strength in order to offset the power of the Shiah military and to create a base in Iran from which they could spy on Iran’s suspected nuclear-weapons-making facilities. Israel regarded the AKP as being unwilling to cooperate with Israel against Iran. Hence Israel looked for another ally in the region and its best candidate was the Kurds in northern Iraq.⁶⁴³ In contrast to the situation in the 1990s, Turkish-Israeli relations had become securitized. What’s more, the visit of Halid Meshar to Turkey in 2005 reinforced this securitization process.

⁶⁴⁰ *Hürriyet*, Nisan 17, 2002.

⁶⁴¹ Gary Younge, “Israelis using Kurds to build power base”, *The Guardian*, June 21, 2004.

⁶⁴² *Turkish Daily News*, December 6, 2005.

⁶⁴³ Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Clash of Interest over Northern Iraq Drives Turkish-Israeli Alliance to a Crossroads”, *Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, 2005, p. 262.

On the other hand, Turkey and Israel have made effort to maintain their relations. On November 24, 2004, Israeli Foreign Ministry Director General Ron Prosor visited Ankara to discuss bilateral relations and the situation in the Middle East after the death of Yasser Arafat.⁶⁴⁴ On January 3-5, 2005, foreign minister Gül visited both Israel and Palestine with the aim of restarting Peace Process. Gül commented “This visit is important for Turkey to show what can do to contribute to the peace process”.⁶⁴⁵ From that time, Turkey considered itself to be acting in a positive third party role in the Peace Process between Israel and Palestine. One week after Gül’s visit, Israel, Turkey and the US practiced conducted a joint, week-long naval exercise. This was the seventh three-nation “Reliant Mermaid” collaboration. On May 1-2, 2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Israel and Palestine. Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Sharon agreed to set up a hotline for intelligence information and discussed a new arms deal.⁶⁴⁶ The two countries agreed on a \$400 million deal to have Israel upgrade 30 of Turkey’s F-4 Phantom jets. Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül accompanied Erdoğan and arranged its defense cooperation. He also visited Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI). In 2005, both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister visited Israel and tried to recover entente positively.

⁶⁴⁴ *Turkish Daily News*, November 25, 2004.

⁶⁴⁵ *Turkish Daily News*, January 4, 2005.

⁶⁴⁶ *Turkish Daily News*, May 3, 2005.

6.2.3.2. The Process of Indirect Talks

Turkey had thus built a position for itself from which it could exercise influence on both Israel and Syria as a mediator. This process had been active since 2004, however, Turkey can be described as having taken the role seriously from the beginning of 2008 onwards.⁶⁴⁷ Having visited Turkey in January 2004, Assad requested Turkey's participation in the mediator role. Turkey's response was said that "we approved this proposal. But until now it is an illusion that you wait for some movement from us. Yet while we keep good relations with your country and Israel, we did not think that the two sides considered us as mediator".⁶⁴⁸ A secret conference was held to prepare the framework for indirect talks in Istanbul on February 28, 2008.⁶⁴⁹ Syria and Israel had reasons for accepting Turkey's mediator role. Syria had to start to reconnect with international society and to avoid the title of "rogue state". For Syria, Turkey was a good breakthrough to contact to Israel and the Western states. Meanwhile, Israel expected to deal a blow to the connection between Syria, Iran and Hezbollah.⁶⁵⁰

On April 27, 2008, Erdoğan visited Syria to carry an Israeli message to the Syrian government, and underlined that Turkey was prepared to mediate between

⁶⁴⁷ Meliha Altunışık, "Turkey's Change Middle East Policy", *UNISCI Discussion Papers* No.23, 2010, p.158.

⁶⁴⁸ *Hürriyet*, Ocak 8, 2007.

⁶⁴⁹ Altunışık, 2010, *op.cit*, p.158.

⁶⁵⁰ Kemal Kirişci, Nathalie Tocci, and Joshua Walker, *A Neighborhood Rediscovered: Turkey's Transatlantic Value in the Middle East*, Brussels Forum Paper Series, German Marshall Fund, 2010, p.9.

Syria and Israel to restart peace talks.⁶⁵¹ Syrian president Assad replied that Syria was ready to cooperate with Turkey and Israel.⁶⁵² In 2008, indirect talks between Israel and Syria under Turkish mediation began. There were four “indirect” meetings, meaning that delegations from Syria and Israel did not actually hold face-to-face meetings, instead Turkey transmitted their affirmations and ideas.⁶⁵³

On May 21, 2008, Israel and Syria formally announced the launch of their first indirect peace negotiations facilitated by Turkey.⁶⁵⁴ The Turkish Foreign Ministry said in a statement that both Syria and Israel agreed to continue dialogue within the framework of the Madrid Conference principles. It was said that Israel demanded Syria cut relations with Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. Meanwhile, Syria was insistent upon the return of the Golan Heights. Each party in the indirect talks sought to find out how the other side would compromise on these vital issues.

The second indirect talks were held on June 15-16, 2008. On the one hand, Ali Babacan, then-Foreign Minister, emphasized that “Turkey is acting as facilitator and Turkey is trusted by both of these countries”.⁶⁵⁵ But on the other hand, both Israel and Syria commented that they had no plans for direct talks nor full peace negotiations in 2008. The third round of talks was held on July 2, 2008

⁶⁵¹ *Turkish Daily News*, April 28, 2008.

⁶⁵² *Haaretz*, April 27, 2008.

⁶⁵³ *Turkish Daily News*, May, 22, 2008. In these indirect talks, the top Israeli delegates were Shalom Turgeman and Yoram Turbowitz.

⁶⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵⁵ *Turkish Daily News*, June 18, 2008.

and here the decision was made to extend Turkish-mediated indirect talks.⁶⁵⁶ In this period, Turkish Foreign Ministry Deputy Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioğlu was said to have joined the meeting. Before these talks, a bill declaring non-withdrawal from Golan Heights was approved in the Israeli parliament.⁶⁵⁷ This bill would have needed to pass a second and third stage approval in order to be made law, however, even the passing of the first approval left a negative impression on Syria. The subsequent fourth round of talks held on July 29-30, 2008 was not deemed successful. Though a fifth round was planned for August 2008, the talks failed to take place. Yinanç summarized the four rounds briefly.

The First round was dedicated to reaching an agreement on the framework in the fields of security arrangements, territory/border issues, normalization and water problem. The second round focused on refreshing the memories on past negotiations. And the third and fourth rounds began the proxy talks.⁶⁵⁸

Why did Turkey's mediation between Israel and Syria fail? Generally speaking, there are at least three reasons. Firstly, domestic politics in Israel were problematic, most notably allegations of corruption against Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Olmert used the indirect talks to recover his image, but the Israeli people didn't trust him. Secondly, Turkey acted in good faith in the mediation role, but it didn't have the same power of enforcement as a country like the United States.

⁶⁵⁶ *Turkish Daily News*, July 2 & 5, 2008.

⁶⁵⁷ *Today's Zaman*, July 2, 2008.

⁶⁵⁸ Barçın Yinanç, "Going solo between Syria and Israel", *Turkish Daily News*, August 6, 2008.

Turkey did not suggest alternative plans or make compromises on their behalves. Thirdly, the Gaza assault occurred in this period. Turkey attempted to take an effective third party role between both countries after the indirect talks failed. However, the Israeli attacked on Gaza at the end of 2008 decisively revealed the failure of Turkey’s mediator role. One week earlier, Prime Ministers Erdoğan and Olmert had discussed the possibility of direct talks between Israel and Palestine.⁶⁵⁹ The sudden Israeli attack on Gaza was interpreted as a betrayal by Erdoğan. Since this incident, Turkish government policies have steadily taken on a more pro-Arab attitude.

Table 7. Evaluation of Turkey’s mediator roles

	communicator	facilitator	Procedural approach	Directive approach
Syria-Israel	Applicable	Applicable	limited	-----
Lebanon Crisis	Applicable	-----	-----	-----
Palestine-Israel	Applicable	limited	-----	-----

6.3. Niche Diplomacy: TİKA

In this dissertation, niche diplomacy is defined as “the advantage or corner that a country may have by virtue of its favored situation, special competence, or unique product is more or less permanent”.⁶⁶⁰ In addition to this, location, tradition and consensus are important factor for niche diplomacy.

The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA)

⁶⁵⁹ Kirişci, Tocci, and Walker, *op.cit*, p.9.

⁶⁶⁰ Henrikson, *op.cit*, p.71.

was established as a branch of the Foreign Ministry in 1992 by the initiative of then-President, Turgut Özal. According to its annual report, the aim of TİKA is the following:

TİKA was established for the purpose of improving the cooperation in economic, commercial, technical, social, cultural and educational fields by means of projects and programs especially with the countries in which the Turkish language is spoken, Turkey's neighboring countries, and to help the advancement of developing countries.⁶⁶¹

Turkey's foreign aid programs were started in June 1985.⁶⁶² The first foreign aid was in the form of material aid to the Sahara region. Subsequently Turkey had contributed technical aid since 1987.⁶⁶³ Özal tried to expand the constructive image of Turkey toward the world and to help the promotion of Turkey's liberal democracy.⁶⁶⁴ As the annual report in 2009 described, the main target countries of Turkish aid programs are the states in which many Turkish speakers live, the neighborhood of Turkey, and the states in need of emergency aid. Yet, in the 1990s Turkey had only sent aids states of Turkish language speakers, specifically the newly independent republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Özal and succeeding President Süleyman Demirel had used TİKA to penetrate Turkish

⁶⁶¹ TİKA, *2009 Annual Report*, 2010, p.8.

⁶⁶² Musa Kulaklıkaya and Rahman Nurdun, "Turkey as a New Player in Development Cooperation", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.12, No.4, 2010, p.133. The first Turkish foreign aid package was 10 million dollars toward the Sahara countries.

⁶⁶³ T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, *Türkiye'nin İkili Dış Yardımları (1992-1996)*, 1998, p.1.

⁶⁶⁴ TİKA, *op.cit*, p.8.

influence in these countries. From the beginning, TİKA has been an indisputable soft power with its establishment of schools, providing of scholarships to students who wanted to study in Turkey's schools, and construction of infrastructures. The TİKA brochure published in 1994 explained its role as the following:

While taking responsibilities required by her strategic position, it would be realistic for Turkey to establish economic, commercial, technical, social, cultural and educational co-operation with all the countries in the region and especially with those who share a common Turkish culture.⁶⁶⁵

According to the report of Turkey's state planning organization, from 1992 to 1996 the recipient countries of Turkey's aids were Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, Albania and Egypt.⁶⁶⁶ But their efforts toward the Eurasian states eventually failed for several reasons. First of all, Turkey did not provide enough continuous support to Eurasian countries, as it was not equipped with a strong economy to act as regional hegemon in Central Asia as well as in Iran, the northern tier of the Middle East. The amounts of foreign aid gradually decreased from 1992 to 1996.⁶⁶⁷ Secondly, some countries did not look with favor on Turkey's increasing influence in Eurasia. The first Turkish-speaking states summit held in Ankara on October 30-31, 1992 clarified the different ideas between Turkey and the newly

⁶⁶⁵ TİKA, *TİKA* (brochure), 1994, pp.9-10.

⁶⁶⁶ T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı 1998, *op.cit*, p.9.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.* The total amounts of bilateral aids was approximately 1,182,000 dollars (1992), 282,000 dollars (1993), 53,000 dollars (1994), 148,000 dollars (1995) and 188,000 dollars (1996).

independent states. Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev in particular questioned the future development of cooperation among Turkic states and the Turkish initiative.⁶⁶⁸ Uzbekistan also expressed concern about the influence of some Turkish religious groups increasing in its territory. Thirdly, Turkey simultaneously underestimated the Soviet influence and overestimated Turkish nationalism in the Eurasian region. The newly independent states were still deeply dependent on the former Soviet Union.

The failure of this attempt at eastern orientation by Özal and Demirel negatively affected the activities of TİKA. Soon after its establishment, TİKA seemed to be an effective institution for the Turkish new activism in the post-Cold War period, but its presence had gradually waned by the late 1990s. Having adopted the idea of region- centric policy, Cem did not use the TİKA as a foreign policy tool. However, two important reforms were implemented in this period. Firstly, TİKA was shifted from the purview of the Foreign Ministry to the Prime Ministry in 1999 in an effort to increase effectiveness.⁶⁶⁹ With this position change, TİKA began to establish field offices. Secondly, the Turkish government unified all agent offices into TİKA in a new law approved in May 2001.⁶⁷⁰ TİKA thus became the only official aid agency in Turkey.

The watershed for TİKA was the emergence of the AKP government which came to power in October 2002. In contrast to the previous coalition governments,

⁶⁶⁸ Robins, 2003, *op.cit*, p.286.

⁶⁶⁹ Hakan Fidan and Rahman Nurdan, "Turkey's role in the global development assistance community: the case of TİKA", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol.10, No.1, 2008, p.103.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p.107.

AKP has actively promoted TİKA as a foreign policy tool. Furthermore, the AKP expanded TİKA's target areas to include not only the Turkish speaking states, but the Middle East and Africa.⁶⁷¹ The AKP expanded its projects, especially peace-building in Afghanistan and Iraq. Clearly, the AKP, particularly Ahmet Davutoğlu, put importance on TİKA to realize his zero-problems with neighbors. TİKA aligned with NGOs and public organizations in order to implement effective grassroots aid.⁶⁷² According to its 2009 annual report, TİKA had established field offices in Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Palestine, Pakistan, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.⁶⁷³ The regional distribution of expenditure in 2009 was: Caucasus & Central Asia 44.44%, Balkans & Eastern Europe 26.85%, Middle East & Africa 24.68%, and Far East 3.87%.⁶⁷⁴ The top five aid recipient countries were Afghanistan (20.61%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (6.76%), Palestine (5.47%), Lebanon (3.89%) and Georgia (3.76%).⁶⁷⁵

As mentioned above, the Middle East and African countries received 24.68% of TİKA's expenditures of donations in 2009. The breakdown of these

⁶⁷¹ Kulaklikaya and Nurdun, *op.cit.*, p.135.

⁶⁷² *Ibid*, p.140. TİKA cooperates not only with NGOs, but also with business groups. For example, TİKA played important role about TOBB's organized industrial zone project. Yet, TOBB has to rent lands from Palestine in order to advance the project. TOBB at first has TİKA rent land from Palestine. After that, TOBB rents the lands from TİKA. Interview with Esen Çağlar in TEPAV, April 7, 2011.

⁶⁷³ TİKA 2010, *op.cit.*, p.12.

⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.14.

⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p.15.

expenditures was: social infrastructure and services 78.41%, economic infrastructure and services 0.38%, production sectors 19.27%, multi-sector and crosscutting sectors 1.94%.⁶⁷⁶ Here, we focus on the field of social infrastructure and services because TİKA's aids to Middle Eastern countries focused on this field. The contents of the social infrastructure and services are education 27.36%, health 28.22%, water supply and sanitation 13.34%, government and civil society 23.28%, others 7.79%.⁶⁷⁷ Activities in Iraq and Lebanon were primarily in the areas of education and health. In Iraq and Lebanon, TİKA assisted with post-war aid efforts. For example, TİKA participated in the construction of Iraq's Baghdad Al Razi Hospital, and the Saida Turkish trauma and rehabilitation hospital in Lebanon.

Concerning Iraq, TİKA provided medicine, emergency food and tent to people in Telafar, who had suffered heavy damage from the war, as a partnership between the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Turkish Red Crescent Society in 2008.⁶⁷⁸ The aid to Palestine differed from the others. Firstly, Palestine was the third recipient country of aid, in which TİKA implemented 37 projects.⁶⁷⁹ Secondly, aid toward strengthening the central government was a secondary goal of the aid. Thirdly, the rate of health care aid was low. Instead, aid to the Palestinian police forces restructuring program and the Gaza well project were conspicuous investments. The priority of strengthening the Palestinian central

⁶⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p.145.

⁶⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p.144.

⁶⁷⁸ TİKA, *Middle East and Africa: Projects and Activities*, 2009, p.9.

⁶⁷⁹ TİKA, 2010, *op.cit.*, p.158.

government was high. The Palestinian police restructuring project has been funded between 2009 and 2011 to train the Palestinian police. According to the 2009 annual report, 26 training sessions in Turkey and 17 training sessions in Palestine were planned, and 285 officers will come to Turkey and 475 officers will travel to Palestine over the course of three years.⁶⁸⁰ The Gaza well project also contributed to peaceful social infrastructure. Because of the Israeli blockade in Gaza, it was difficult for Palestinians in some regions to access water. To solve this problem, TİKA provided water wells in Gaza Cebaliye and Han Yunus.⁶⁸¹ In this way, the feature of TİKA's aid in the Middle East may be described to contribute to the building or recover of a peaceful situation.

6.4. Coalition Diplomacy

The aim of coalition diplomacy is to build coalition with like-minded countries. Leadership and other country's followership were key elements of coalition diplomacy. Under the AKP government, Turkey has actively contributed to the establishment of regional dialogue and organization, and was engaged with existing regional organizations. Turkey played the central role in organizing the meeting of the foreign ministers of Iraq's neighboring countries and the Levant Quartet. Meanwhile, Turkey expanded its connection with the OIC and GCC. Yet the Levant Quartet and the relationships with GCC were taken up in the item of trading state, while the OIC was tasked with subsequent norm diffusion. So, this

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p.157.

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid*.

part focuses on Turkey's relations with the meeting of the foreign ministers of Iraq's neighboring countries.

6.4.1. The Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's Neighboring Countries

The meetings of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's neighboring countries were the earliest attempt of the AKP's coalition diplomacy. Though not sufficiently organized or institutionalized by conventional standards, these meetings were first specific foreign policy initiative led by Davutoğlu. The purpose of the first meeting was to prevent the opening of the Iraq war. By the second meeting, the war was underway and the aims changed to support for the stability of Iraq.

The first meeting was held on January 23, 2003 in Istanbul at the initiative of Turkey's Prime Minister Gül and Foreign Policy Advisor of Prime Minister Davutoğlu. Gül, Turkish Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Mahir, Saudi Foreign Minister Suud El Faysal, Jordanian Foreign Minister Mervan Muaser, Syrian Foreign Minister Faruk El Shara, Iranian Foreign Minister Kemal Harrazi, and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer attended the meeting.

Although all countries were of mind to prevent the Iraqi War, the reasons were different. Turkey was afraid of several things if the US attack on Iraq was realized. As previously discussed, Turkey did not want to see an expansion of Iraqi Kurdish power in Iraq.⁶⁸² Neither did Turkey desire any instability to disturb

⁶⁸² *Turkish Daily News*, January 25, 2003.

its developing regional economy, as it had after the first Gulf War.⁶⁸³ The AKP government was also attempting to negotiate its relationship with the US with a public opinion that strongly objected to the participation in the US-led war.⁶⁸⁴ Involving the US toward Iraq was the source of the disagreements with Syria, Egypt and Iran in the draft declaration, however. Similarly, Saudi Arabia also worried about the strengthening of Shite power in Iraq.⁶⁸⁵ On the other hand, Iran and Syria strongly opposed both a US attack on Iraqi territory and the existence of Israel in the Middle East.⁶⁸⁶ Syria and Egypt were reportedly fearful of the weakening of their authoritarian regime. Iran did not want a pro-American regime to emerge in the neighborhood. At the meeting, Turkey opposed the inclusion of a message to the United States, on which Iran and Syria insisted, and meeting remained at a stalemate. Under that situation, Jordan was said to make effort to mediate between three countries.⁶⁸⁷ As a result of Jordan's efforts, the United States was not mentioned at all in the joint declaration on the meeting. Instead, the joint declaration emphasized the legitimacy of the United Nations and the stabilization of the Middle East region with the following:

The Iraqi issue is a multilateral one, first and foremost affecting the whole region. It is therefore incumbent upon the U.N. Security Council to act in full recognition of this regional perspective put forth by us. We

⁶⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸⁴ Gareth Jenkins, "Keeping the peace", *Al Ahram Weekly*, Jan 30- Feb 5, 2003, No.623.

⁶⁸⁵ *Turkish Daily News*, January 25, 2003.

⁶⁸⁶ Salih Boztaş, "Bıçak Sirtında Barış Arayışı", *Aksiyon*, January 27, 2003, Sayısı 425.

⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

stand ready to cooperate with the Security Council in its pursuit of a peaceful solution. We would finally like to reaffirm that the actions to be taken by Iraq will represent a step toward the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, as stated in U.N. Security Council resolution 687.⁶⁸⁸

In addition to an emphasis on role of the UN, a peaceful solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict was built into the declaration at the insistence of Syria and Iran.

The second meeting of Iraq's neighboring countries was held on April 18, 2003 after the Iraqi war was underway. In addition to the six countries gathered at the first meeting, Kuwait and Bahrain joined the second meeting. At the second meeting, Foreign Minister Gül insisted on four points: the territorial integrity of Iraq, the establishment of order as soon as possible, humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people, and the protection of Iraqi cultural heritages.⁶⁸⁹ From the Western perspective, the meeting of Iraq's neighbors was seen as an anti-American and pro-Arab meeting. Guardian columnist Oliver Burkeman wrote that eight countries' foreign ministers demanded the withdrawal of the US-led coalition of the willing from Iraq, and supported the status of Syria.⁶⁹⁰ Pro-US countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait insisted that the US cooperate with regional countries to revitalize and promote democracy in Iraq.⁶⁹¹

⁶⁸⁸ "The Joint Declaration of Regional Initiative on Iraq", *Turkish Daily News*, January 25, 2003.

⁶⁸⁹ *Turkish Daily News*, April 19, 2003.

⁶⁹⁰ Oliver Burkeman, "Neighbours declare support for Syria", *The Guardian*, April 19, 2003.

⁶⁹¹ Balcı and Yeşiltaş, *op.cit*, pp.24-25.

Though Saudi Arabia and Kuwait canceled their participation, the 30th foreign ministers meeting of the OIC held on May 28, 2003 was counted as the third meeting of Iraq's neighbor countries.⁶⁹² With respect to the Iraqi issue, Foreign Minister Gül emphasized three points: the territorial integrity of Iraq, maintaining Iraqi stability in both domestic and regional politics, and protecting the natural wealth that should belong to the Iraqi people.⁶⁹³ Foreign Minister Gül reemphasized the importance of Iraqi integrity at this third meeting.

Turkey, Iran, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt participated in the fourth meeting held in Damascus. Unlike the previous meetings, the participation of Iraqi foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari was discussed here. On the one hand, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt requested the invitation of Zebari to the meeting. On the other hand, Iran and Syria insisted that Zebari should have participated in a separate, unofficial meeting. Turkey's position was that Iraq's neighbors should defer to an Iraqi decision. As a result of the late and unattractive invitation, Zebari did not participate on the meeting.⁶⁹⁴ Foreign Minister Gül repeated his position on the territorial integrity of Iraq and border security against terrorism. In addition, he urged other foreign ministers to promote their arguments through regional organizations like the EU or the Arab League.⁶⁹⁵ He also advocated for the neighboring countries' meeting to become an

⁶⁹² *Hürriyet*, May 28, 2003.

⁶⁹³ *Turkish Daily News*, May 29, 2003.

⁶⁹⁴ *Turkish Daily News*, November 3, 2003.

⁶⁹⁵ *Turkish Daily News*, November 4, 2003.

organization within the UN.⁶⁹⁶

The fifth meeting, held in Kuwait, was a breakthrough meeting because of the attendance of Iraqi Foreign Minister Zebari. At this meeting, Foreign Minister Gül noted that participants should have established the security organization in the region:

We should establish a new security umbrella in our region. We need to show that regional problems are solved by regional countries. Iraq's neighboring countries can play an important role for Middle Eastern security and welfare with Mediterranean countries and South Eurasia (Caucasus) countries. We have to prepare to take step forward to secure our own region. We have to learn from tragic wars and conflicts as European countries did from two World Wars. We can establish multi-dimensional security cooperation by our political decision. We should assume a heavy responsibility.⁶⁹⁷

Neighboring countries focused on Iraqi domestic politics during the sixth and seventh meetings more so than at previous meetings. At the sixth meeting, held in Cairo on July 22, 2004, neighboring countries, especially Turkey worried about the activation of terrorism in Iraq, especially in Kirkuk. It was because the PKK had announced the end of its ceasefire with Turkey, which had been ongoing for five years at this point.⁶⁹⁸ The seventh meeting held in Amman in January 2005 was focused on the upcoming January 30 Iraqi election. Turkey was afraid of the

⁶⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁷ Uğur Ergan, "AB gibi OB Kuralım", *Hürriyet*, Şubat 15, 2004.

⁶⁹⁸ *Turkish Daily News*, July 22, 2004.

“Kurdification” of Kirkuk in Northern Iraq, and supported Iraqi Turcoman.⁶⁹⁹ Foreign Minister Gül thus questioned the legitimacy of the election, the result of which served as a foothold for realization of Kurdish independence.⁷⁰⁰

The eighth meeting, held in Istanbul on 29 and 30 April 2005, did not draw out attractive comment or suggestion from Turkey. Here, Gül emphasized the importance of the territorial integrity of Iraq, border security, and the importance of the UN’s role in Iraq.⁷⁰¹ Yet, representatives of the UN, EU and OIC joined the meeting to exchange their opinions.⁷⁰²

Two topics were decided at the ninth meeting of neighboring countries. Firstly, Iraq’s neighboring countries demanded the gradual withdraw of the US army from Iraq after a certain degree of stability was achieved.⁷⁰³ Secondly, Iraq’s neighboring countries, including Turkey, harshly criticized the Israeli attack on Palestine.⁷⁰⁴

The tenth meeting was held in Cairo in May 2007. At this and subsequent meetings, not only did Iraq’s neighbors attend, but also representatives from the UN, EU, OIC, Arab League and D-8 participated in the meeting. The eleventh meeting was held in Istanbul again on November 5 of the same year. President

⁶⁹⁹ Hale, 2007, *op.cit.*, pp.138-139.

⁷⁰⁰ *Turkish Daily News*, January 7, 2005. The election of January 30 was the turning point for the Turkish policy toward Northern Iraq. Turkey started to approve Kurdish parties and declined its support from the Turcoman.

⁷⁰¹ *Hürriyet*, Nisan 30, 2005.

⁷⁰² *Zaman*, Nisan 30, 2005.

⁷⁰³ *Turkish Daily News*, July 10, 2006.

⁷⁰⁴ *Milliyet*, Temmuz 9, 2006.

Gül emphasized the anti-terrorism efforts around the Iraqi border and the establishment of regional organizations in the Middle East. Concerning the establishment of these regional organizations, he declared the following:

Human history is full of examples of the creation of new cooperation schemes and new politico-economic cooperation mechanisms, and the emergence of a new spirit of solidarity among the concerned parties who have put the past aside, after tragic wars, great misfortune and domestic turmoil. ... We need to get under way the internal dynamics in the Middle East region with the help of mechanisms developed within the region and by the regional governments. ... If sincere cooperation mechanism could be established among the regional countries, the ensuring welfare and development will carry our countries to a prosperous future.⁷⁰⁵

Turkey repeated its emphasis on Iraq's territorial integrity and border security at the twelfth and final meeting of Iraq's neighbors, held in Kuwait in April 2008.

From the long-term perspectives, between 2002 and 2010, the meetings of Iraq's neighboring countries were the first trials of diplomacy along the ideas of zero problems policies. At these meetings, Turkey began by trying to prevent the Iraqi War on the basis of regional security and stability in the Middle East. After the Iraqi war began, Turkey started to insist on the territorial integrity of Iraq, border security and establishment of regional security organizations. Behind these arguments was Turkey's desire to legitimize its anti-PKK efforts. Turkey also wanted to establish a solid organization for regional prosperity, though these meetings focused on security first and foremost. The AKP government gradually shifted from pragmatic line to idealist line as discussed above. The meetings of

⁷⁰⁵ Abdullah Gül, "Turkey wants to border a prosperous Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors", *Today's Zaman*, November 5, 2007.

Iraq's neighboring countries have declined in influence as a result of shifting policy ideas.

6.5. Norm Diffusion: Greater Middle East Project and the OIC

6.5.1. Turkish Norm Diffusion and Its Framework

Why does this dissertation take notice of Turkey as an actor in norm diffusion? This is because Turkey takes charge of its norm entrepreneur/transmitter role between Europe/ US and the Middle Eastern community. Here, 'norm transmitter' is defined not only as transmitting norms made by norm entrepreneurs, but also as adding its own influence through the transmission process. First of all, the European Union and the United States are norm entrepreneurs toward Turkey. Turkish Europeanization and cooperation with the United States are the first type of norm diffusion process. This process is clearly a top-down or vertical process. Turkish domestic norm adaptation is also important. Before Turkey tries to spread accepted norms, it has to transform these norms to fit easily into own context and those of the Middle Eastern countries. This is a secondary process of norm diffusion, which is defined as localized ("Turkified") norms. This is the advantage of a norm transmitter. The Turkish trial to spread localized norms to Middle Eastern countries is the third process of norm diffusion. Generally, in this process, Turkey uses regional organization, like the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA). As Finnemore and Sikkink described, the international

sphere or events are important for changing states' identities. Here, Turkified norms are accepted naturally or partly-transformed (Middle Easternized) for adaptation.⁷⁰⁶

What is the advantage of norm diffusion from Turkey to the Middle East Countries? When considering the norm diffusion toward the Middle East, we can find three modes of norm diffusion. The first mode is the approach directly pushed by European countries and the US. This way has not worked well due to rising anti-Americanism, especially after the 2003 Iraq War. The second is using moderate Arab countries, like Egypt or Saudi Arabia to promote democracy. This mode is also vulnerable for norm diffusion because these moderate countries also aren't satisfied with the norm. Egypt is typically authoritarian, and Saudi Arabia is a monarchy. The third mode is used by Turkey. Surely, the Arab people still carry some resentment against Turkey because of their domination during the Ottoman period. But comparative to that of the Cold War period, this tendency is decreasing. Turkey is the only Muslim country in the Middle East under the rule of secularism. Turkey has experienced a multi-party system since 1950.⁷⁰⁷ Hence, in my opinion, Turkey is suitable to be a norm transmitter in the Middle East region.

⁷⁰⁶ Yet, this is one pattern of Turkish norm diffusion. The behavior of trading states and the activities of NGOs and think tanks are effective for norm diffusion policies. Concerning more comprehensive ideas of Turkey's norm diffusion, see the following articles: Kemal Kirişci, "Turkey's Demonstrative Effect and the Transformation of the Middle East", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.13, No.2, 2011; Kemal Kirişci, "Diffusing liberal market and democratic values: Assessing Turkey's soft power in transforming its neighborhood", paper presented the American Political Science Annual Meeting, September 2010 (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1644657), February 14, 2011 accessed.

⁷⁰⁷ In November 1946, İsmet İnönü, second President of the Turkish Republic, declared that the main problem for Turkish democracy was the lack of an opposition party. This speech opened the multi-party system in Turkey. The Democratic Party won the May 1950 election, thus formally ending the single party system of rule. Zürcher, *op.cit* , p.211.




Figure 2. Route of norm diffusion

6.5.2. First Mode of Norm Diffusion

Europeanization process introduces new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning to which member states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their domestic practices and structures.⁷⁰⁸

The route of norm diffusion through Europeanization process begins in the EU and moves toward Turkey. The Turkish Westernization process started with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 under Kemal Atatürk. But the

⁷⁰⁸ T.A. Borzel and Thomas Risse, “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe” in K. Fetherstone and C.Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p.66.

Kemalist incarnation of Westernization was a state-centric imitation of European and American processes, so norm transformation or localization of norms was not as successful as hoped. Yavuz describes Kemalist Westernization as superficial, and draconianly imposed, modes of dress and decorum, and he insists that they failed to absorb the ideals of pluralism, democratic governance, and a form of secularism that allowed individuals to pursue their freedoms of conscience.⁷⁰⁹ This situation has clearly changed after the Helsinki summit in 1999, at which the European Council declared that Turkey was a candidate to join the EU, based on the same criteria as applied to all other applicants.⁷¹⁰ This decision encouraged Turkey to change its attitude toward the EU, especially the young pro-Islamic generation led by the likes of Erdoğan and Gül. Since coming to power, AKP has aggressively tried to advance its EU agenda. In 2002, the Copenhagen Summit was held, and Turkey began to reform its domestic policies to fit EU criteria. In December 2004, Turkey at last was granted the right to begin accession negotiations with the EU.

The AKP is the main norm acceptor and entrepreneur for Europeanization within Turkey. Europeanization has partly encouraged human rights, liberal economy, and democracy in order to shift the country to a more democratic course.

⁷⁰⁹ Yavuz, 2006, *op.cit*, p.229.

⁷¹⁰ Faucompret and Konings, *op.cit*, p.43.

6.5.3. Second Norm Diffusion

Here, this study focuses on the concept of conservative democracy as a target of localization. We have to check what factors within Turkey or AKP activities become localized to Western democracy. At first, the concept of conservatism in Turkey is major factor for its democracy as discussed in chapter 4. Although conservatism in Turkey has a tradition dating back to the Democratic Party during 1950s, Yalçın Akdoğan defines conservatism as a “political attitude that insists on gradual change and the perpetuation of moral and family values”.⁷¹¹ In the West, generally democracy has urged individualism and *Gesellschaft*. But, in Turkey, democracy is used in defense of traditional ideas and *Gemeinschaft*, as with a religious or ethnic community. Secondly, democracy should co-exist with Islam in Turkey. Although Turkish Islam is unique with respect to the legacy of Ottoman Empire, its relationship with secularism, experience of a multi-party system, influence of Sufism, and fusion of nationalism and conservatism, the idea of Western-originating democracy comes face-to-face with Islam here. Until the 1990s, Turkish democracy was called as “Military-led democracy”. But after the 2002 election, the AKP became the main actor for the promotion of democracy. Turkish Islamic parties have acted within secularism, however, and the experience and lessons of these parties may be used as reference points for Middle Eastern countries with regard to the notion of co-existence between democracy and Islam. Also, like MÜSİAD, Islamic-based pressure groups or NGOs are a consequence of the fusion between democracy and Islam.

⁷¹¹ Akdoğan, *op.cit*, p.55.

The details of conservative democracy were examined in chapter 4. Conservative democracy differs from liberal democracy and social democracy, which are rooted in Europe. Turkey has no such traditions with liberal or social democracy.⁷¹² A conservative democracy is also not a Muslim democracy. The AKP has tried to seek the Turkish model of democracy.

6.5.4. Third Mode of Norm Diffusion

Recently, Arab countries are interested in Turkish Europeanization reform as a reference.⁷¹³ Regarding AKP policy, Davutoğlu highlights three characteristics of diplomacy toward the Middle East. First one is its “zero problems with neighbors” mantra which motivates Turkey to maintain good relations with neighboring countries.⁷¹⁴ The second one is institutionalized regional engagement, like with the OIC, the initiative of Iraq’s Neighbors Forum, and Greater Middle East Initiative. The third one is its third party role in the region, especially the relationship between Syria and Israel. Here, this dissertation focuses on the second approach, institutionalized regional engagement for norm diffusion.⁷¹⁵

After the end of the Iraq War, many U.S. high level politician and scholars

⁷¹² Hasan Turunc, “Islamicist or Democratic? The AKP’s Search for Identity in Turkish Politics”, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol.15, No.1, 2007, p.89.

⁷¹³ Meliha Benli Altunışık, “The possibilities and limits of Turkey’s soft power in the Middle East”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.10, No.2, 2008, pp.48-49.

⁷¹⁴ Altunışık, 2009, *op.cit*, pp.186-187.

⁷¹⁵ For a detailed account of the Turkish third party role, see Altunışık, 2008, *op.cit*, and Gürkaynak Esra, “Turkey as a third party in Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Assessment and Reflections” *Perceptions*, Vol.12, No.1, Spring, 2007, pp.89-108.

often mentioned that Turkey could be model of democratization in the Middle East region. For example, Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense in that time, described both disappointment of Turkish behavior in Iraq War and expectation of Turkish behavior as democracy model in the Middle East:

Our strategic partnership has changed. It is no longer as it was before. In the past, this relationship was based on a military basis. Only military relations used to be discussed. This era is now closed. Military relations of course do exist but the new strategic partnership is not based on a military field but rather on democracy and politics.⁷¹⁶

Advancements based on EU accession are relevant to these discourses. Kirişci notes that Turkish accession to the EU might contribute to Middle Eastern stability and to a secular, modern and democratic form of governance.⁷¹⁷ After the September 11 and the Iraq War, both the EU and the US began to turn their attention to Turkey as a model for democratization.⁷¹⁸ The AKP administration also tried to apply the concept of reconciliation, which is a key concept of conservative democracy, and to promote political reform naturally toward the

⁷¹⁶ Mehmet Ali Birand “Turkish-US strategic cooperation changing”, *Turkish Daily News*, 31, January, 2004. In here, Birand supplemented with comment as “Turkey is now the new favorite of the Bush administration. Turkey is the sole example of the co-existence of Islam and democracy. Turkey, until recently, was a country that drew attention because of its geographical location. Now, its democracy is in the spotlight”.

⁷¹⁷ Kemal Kirişci, “Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy”, *MERIA*, Vol.8, No.1, 2004, (<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue1/kirisci.pdf>) December 1, 2008 accessed, p.39.

⁷¹⁸ Ali Tekin, “The Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Impact of Europeanization”, Paper prepared for workshop on *EU-Turkey Relations: Opportunities, Challenges, and Unknowns*, University of Pittsburgh, 2005, (http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/euce/events/turkey_eu/Tekin.pdf), February 15, 2011 accessed, p.6.

Middle East.⁷¹⁹ Here, this dissertation focuses on two activities of the Turkish government: the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD) in the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) and activity in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

6.5.5. Cases of BMENA and DAD

BMENA was a spotlight for promotion of Turkish democracy in the Middle East region after the Iraq War.⁷²⁰ The idea of BMENA was based on the promotion of democracy and good governance, building a knowledge-based society, and expanding economic opportunities, which were discussed at the 2002 Arab Human Development Report.⁷²¹ The specific plan of BMENA was clarified in the London-based Arabic newspaper *Al Hayat* on February 13, 2004.⁷²² Between June 8 and 10, 2004, BMENA was officially established at the G8

⁷¹⁹ Bülent Aras and Rabia Karkaya Polat, “Turkey and the Middle East: frontiers of the new geographic imagination”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.61, No.4, 2007, p.478.

⁷²⁰ Hüseyin Bağcı and Bayram Sinkaya, “The Greater Middle East Initiative and Turkey: The AKP’s perspective” in N. Goren and A. Nachimani (eds), *The importance of being European: Turkey, the EU, and the Middle East*, Jerusalem: The European Forum at Hebrew University, 2007, pp.165-177; Meliha Altunışık, “The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East”, *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol.27, No.1&2, 2004, pp.45-63; Nuri Yurdusev, “The Greater Middle East Initiative and Democracy in Muslim States: A Turkish Perspective”, *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.XVIII, No.2, 2006, pp. 73-94. And concerning the history and principle about BMENA, see (<http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RS22053.pdf>),(http://www.weltpolitik.net/attachment/0644a930ba1074b5cca2acd4809cbcd5/6878a855da2c86761b8b80333a6cc81c/20040607_bmei.pdf).

⁷²¹ (http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/regional/arabstates/RBAS_ahdr2002_EN.pdf), May 15, 2011 accessed.

⁷²² (http://www.ciel.usj.edu.lb/observatoire/dictators/gme_initiative_usa_en.pdf), May 15, 2011 accessed.

summit meeting on Sea Island, Georgia.

DAD was created at the first forum of BMENA in Rabat in December 2004 with the plans of establishing regional-specific enterprise and a microfinance training center.⁷²³ DAD was one of the central activities of BMENA, and Turkey became the sponsor of this initiative, along with Italy and Yemen. The aims of this activity were (1) to coordinate and share information and lessons learned through democratic programs in the region. But DAD considered the situation and circumstance of each country, and cooperated with local ownership, (2) to work to enhance existing democratic programs or initiate new programs, (3) to provide opportunities for participants to develop joint activities, (4) to promote and strengthen democratic institutions and processes, and capacity buildings, (5) to foster exchanges with civil society groups and other organizations working on programs in the region.⁷²⁴ DAD's areas of activity were (i) the participation of women in public life, and (ii) political pluralism and electoral process.⁷²⁵

To achieve this aim, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) became one of major civil society groups, along with No Peace Without Justice in Italy and the Human Rights Information and Training Center in Yemen. Before establishing the BMENA, Turkey hosted the “platform for Democratic Governance in the Islamic World” in Istanbul in April 2004. At this conference,

⁷²³ Jeremy Sharp, “The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: An overview”, *CRS Report for Congress*, 2005 (<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22053.pdf>), May 15, 2011 accessed, p.5.

⁷²⁴ (<http://scparalleforum.info/ena/docsdfls.php?action=view&newsID=1>), February 15, 2011 accessed.

⁷²⁵ (<http://www.maec.gov.ma/dad/docs/Rabat%20Paper%20edited.pdf>), May 15, 2011 accessed, p.1.

tolerance, justice, and participation were the main topics of discussion. Regarding democracy, three things were decided. These were (i) democratic decision-making processes that encourage the equal participation of men and women, (ii) accountable political parties that represent citizens' interests, and legislatures that are legitimized through democratic and transparent elections and genuine political competition, and (iii) a system of democratic governance that seeks to prevent corruption and strengthen the rule of law through mechanisms of transparency and accountability, freedom of information, and parliamentary and independent civil society.⁷²⁶

For promoting democratization in the BMENA region, TESEV and affiliated experts made three recommendations to the Turkish government: (i) to promote the monitoring and benchmarking to democracy within the region, (ii) to urge the participation of NGOs and to exchange experiences at the bureaucratic level, and (iii) to establish a democracy fund to support civil society and its regional networks.⁷²⁷

With respect to the DAD program, Turkey and TESEV particularly focused on the empowerment of women, and held symposiums in Istanbul and Ankara to this end. TESEV attempted to strengthen network within the BMENA region to solve the basic problems of women, including illiteracy, economic inequality, and lack of human rights. At the first symposium held in Istanbul on June 20-21, 2005, the discussed issues were how to relieve societal pressure related with the religion,

⁷²⁶ (<http://2005-2009-bmena.state.gov/rls/55661.htm>), May 15, 2011 accessed, p.5.

⁷²⁷ Burak Akçapar, Mensur Akgün, Meliha Altunışık, and Ayşe Kadioğlu, *The Debate on Democratization in the Broader Middle East and North Africa; A Civic Assessment from Turkey*, TESEV, 2004.

family and some biases, how to urge empowerment to women, how to stop violence against women, and how to the need for the socio-economical welfare of women.⁷²⁸ The main issue discussed at the second Istanbul symposium was to promote the United Nations Convention of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The third symposium held in Ankara on May 22-23, 2006 concluded with an agreement that DAD would aim to establish a regional Gender Institute.⁷²⁹ Eventually, BMENA's effort failed because of rising anti-Americanism and the chaos of Iraqi situation. The BMENA was US-initiated organization. Yet, TESEV continued its attempts to establish a regional gender institute in the broader Middle East and North Africa region. According to the TESEV's report, the main aims of the gender institute were (i) to gather data about gender to promote research, (ii) to build a network with civil society in the BMENA region, (iii) to establish a training center and a center for gender studies, (iv) to create a platform for advocacy and lobby action.⁷³⁰ To establish a gender institute in the BMENA region has not been realized until now, although Turkey and TESEV still continue to this project despite the end of the BMENA project.

⁷²⁸ *Democracy Assistance Dialogue: Women's Empowerment in the Broader Middle East and North Africa, 2005-2006 Conference Almanac*, (<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=92479>), May 15, 2011 accessed, pp.6-12.

⁷²⁹ *Ibid*, p.35.

⁷³⁰ *Feasibility Study: For a Broader Middle East and North Africa Gender Institute*, October 2009, (http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DPT/OD/YYN/9930genderENGkitapWebicin.pdf), May 15, 2011 accessed, p.14.

6.5.6. Case of OIC

The relationship of the OIC and Turkey started from 1969, when Turkey decided to participate in the OIC. Historically, Turkey sometimes contributed positively to the activities of the OIC. It did so, for example, after the Arab-Israel War in 1973, and during the period of Motherland Party government.⁷³¹ But the relationship was limited to its economic aspect, like the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (COMCEC). After the 2000s, this situation changed and Turkey began to contribute to political dimensions of OIC.

Firstly, Turkey participated in the OIC and EU Joint Forum on February 12-13, 2002. At that time, the Democratic Left Party was the ruling party and foreign minister Ismail Cem realized OIC-EU Joint Forum. Ecevit and Cem tried to create an opportunity for dialogue and reconciliation between the West and Muslim countries. These efforts were taken over by the AKP, and its policy of conservative democracy proved fitter than that of DSP.

Secondly, Turkish candidate Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu won the election for the position of Secretary General of the OIC at the Istanbul OIC foreign ministers' summit in June 2004. To this end, Turkey has transmitted its message of internality and externality comfortably compared against its experience in other periods. In addition to this, Turkey was able to establish a transparent democratic election within the OIC.⁷³² Also, the Istanbul Declaration, a resolution in pursuit

⁷³¹ Aykan, 1994, *op.cit*, pp.75-80 and pp.135-142.

⁷³² Fuller, *op.cit*, p.78.

of democratic government, was signed in this summit.⁷³³ This was the first open election in the OIC. Like with the AKP's conservative democracy, İhsanoğlu insisted on harmony and reconciliation. For example, he insisted the importance of dialogue in UN high level dialogue on inter-religious and inter-cultural cooperation for peace in October 2007:

Dialogue is the only way to understanding. It is indispensable in building bridges and as a means of communication between religions and cultures. It is a must in promoting awareness to the necessity of understanding, confidence building, and ushering the world toward peace, security and harmony.⁷³⁴

He also advocated these concepts in the forum held in Georgetown University:

Islam and the West could and should live and co-exist together in peace and harmony, as the common denominators that link them outweigh their differences. There are many facts which facilitate this reconciliation between Islam and the West.⁷³⁵

As with the activity of the BMENA, Turkey emphasized women's role in its development. Turkey was the host country of the first ministerial conference on women's roles in the development of OIC member states, held on 20-21

⁷³³ (<http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/31/31%20icfm-DECLARATION-eng.htm>), May 5, 2011 accessed.

⁷³⁴ (http://www.oic-oci.org/topic_detail.asp?t_id=1324&x_key=), February 15, 2011 accessed.

⁷³⁵ (<http://www.oic-oci.org/english/article/Preface%20ihsanoglu.pdf>), February 15, 2011 accessed.

November 2006. İhsanoğlu, Erdoğan and then-Turkish State Minister Nimet Çubukçu attended the conference, and four programs were discussed. These were national policies for empowerment of and eradication of the poverty of women, increasing opportunities for women to participate in both local and national politics, enhancing participation and access to education, and stopping domestic violence against women.⁷³⁶

6.6. Others' Perceptions

6.6.1. Western Perceptions

The United States experienced dilemma regarding Turkey's liberal policies from 2005 to 2010. For the United States, Turkey was an ideal model of moderate Islam based on a secular system and democratic statehood in the Middle East. US policy-makers regarded Turkey as a key country in the Broader Middle East project. On the other hand, the United States and Turkey had partly ceased to share interests towards the Middle East after the March 1, 2003. In other words, the Golden Age of Turkish-American relations were finished.⁷³⁷ As Mark Parris, former ambassador to Turkey, described that the view of Bush's national security team toward Turkey was "Turkey as a function of Washington's big ideas of the

⁷³⁶ (<http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/women/1st/OIC-REP-WOM-CONF-FINAL-06.pdf>), May 5, 2011 accessed.

⁷³⁷ Ian Lesser, "Turkey, the United States and the Delusion of Geopolitics", *Survival*, Vol.48, No.3, 2006, p.83.

moment”, and ignored Turkey’s national interest and public opinion.⁷³⁸ From 2005 to 2010, Turkey attempted to solve the Middle Eastern problems through liberal and soft ways to get the prestige from Arab leaders and nations as zero problem policies. Especially, the United States and Turkey have had different ideas about the future of Iraq, Hamas, and Iran. The United States did not approve the legitimacy of Hamas and Iran’s nuclear development. Around the end of the Bush period, the keyword of Turkish-US relations was “Who lost Turkey”.

Yet, the birth of Obama government was positive turning point for Turkey’s Middle Eastern policies. The Middle Eastern policies by George Bush administration were hard-line and unilateral action, and affected negative impact toward the Arab mass. On the contrary, Obama attempted to recover the U.S. image in the Middle East through oft ways like public diplomacy. From this view point, Turkey was attractive partner for Obama administration. Ibrahim Kalın, chief advisor to the Prime Minister of Turkey, emphasized this point:

President Obama needs to regain America’s credibility and repair its image in the world... Turkey’s unique geo-political location ties US interests to Turkey’s participation in key decision in the region... the overall outlines of the new Turkish foreign policy under the successive AK Party governments are in large part parallel to the new approach the Obama administration has formulated.⁷³⁹

When Obama visited to Turkey on April 6, 2009, he described Turkish-US

⁷³⁸ Mark R. Parris, “Common Values and Common Interest? The Bush Legacy in US-Turkish Relations”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.19, No.4, 2008, p.6.

⁷³⁹ Ibrahim Kalın, “US-Turkish relations under Obama: Promise, challenge and opportunity in the 21st century”, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol.12, No.1, 2010, p.106.

relations as “model partnership”.⁷⁴⁰ Obama emphasized “model partnership” again when Prime Minister Erdoğan visited the United States. Though the views of Hamas and Iran’s nuclear development are still different, AKP and Obama administration basically share the approach and way of transformations toward the Middle East.⁷⁴¹

6.6.2. Arab Perceptions

Regarding contemporary Arab perceptions toward Turkey, TESEV published substantial surveys. The first one was the report “Perception toward Turkey in the Middle East” published in 2009. A survey was administered amongst the people in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey, and some items are striking. First was the question “How do you think about following countries: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey?”.⁷⁴² Turkey received its most positive response from the Palestine people. The Syrian and Iraqi people contributed the second best responses.

Next, the question of “Whether Turkey’s mediation role between Palestine and Israel should be persist or not?”. The average rate of “yes” answer to this

⁷⁴⁰ *Today’s Zaman*, April 6, 2009.

⁷⁴¹ Yet, Turkish public opinion is still cool toward the United States. According to Transatlantic trend in 2010, the United States could only get 6% against the question of “With whom should Turkey act in closest cooperation?”. See (http://trends.gmfus.org/doc/2010_English_Key.pdf), p.24, May 19, 2011 accessed.

⁷⁴² Mensur Akgün, Gökçe Perçinoğlu, and Sabiha Seyücel Gündoğar, *Orta Doğu’da Türkiye Algısı*, İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2009, p.11.

question was 79%, with 89% from Palestinian people.⁷⁴³ Also, to the questions of “Whether Turkey should take a more effective role in Arab world or not?”, and “To what degree can Turkey contribute to peace in the Middle East?”, Turkey received high rates of approval and trust from Palestine and Syria.⁷⁴⁴

The question of “model of democracy” is very compelling. Frankly speaking, the discussion of the “Turkish model” has two faces. The first face is the Kemalist model of secularism. The second model is the blending of Islam and democracy that emerged during the AKP period. Concerning first model, perceptions of people in Arab countries were not so high. The highest rate was 73% in Palestine, and the second highest rate of approval was 72% in Syria.⁷⁴⁵ Turkey also received high rates from Palestine (74%) and Syria (72%) on the question of “Whether Turkey is a model mixture between Islam and democracy or not?”.⁷⁴⁶ In comparison with the secularist model, the mixture model received somewhat higher rates of approval from surveyed countries, except from Iraq (51%). In conclusion, this report revealed that Arab countries generally evaluated Turkey as a positive player in the Middle East, and do not look upon Turkey as a hegemonic force or threat in the region.⁷⁴⁷

TESEV published the same report in 2010. In the 2010 version, Turkey received 85% support on the question “What do you think about following

⁷⁴³ *Ibid*, p.17.

⁷⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p.18 and 20.

⁷⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p.21.

⁷⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p.22.

⁷⁴⁷ *Ibid*, p.26.

countries: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey?⁷⁴⁸ Turkey was the only country whose approval rating increased. The average rate of approval on the question of “Whether Turkey would become a model for Arab countries or not?” rose from 61% in 2009 to 66% in 2010, and “Whether Turkey is a mixture model between Islam and democracy or not?” also rose from 63% to 66%.⁷⁴⁹ In the 2010 version, TESEV gathered the reasons of “why Turkey can become a model?”. The main reasons were that it was a Muslim country (15%), that it was an economic success (12%), the mixture of democracy and Islam (11%), and the response to Palestine issues.⁷⁵⁰ Meanwhile, all those countries began to withdraw support from the ideas of Turkish EU accession. The influence of Turkey’s EU membership on Middle East politics also decreased from 64% to 57%.⁷⁵¹ Concerning the “Turkish model”, the Arab publics considered not the model of secular state but the model of an economically Muslim democracy to be their goal. As Altunışık commented, Arab perceptions are changing both at the state and public levels.⁷⁵² According to these two reports, Arab perceptions toward Turkey were basically positive, a big change compared against public opinion of the Cold War and early post-Cold War periods. Turkish image is changing or has changed from that of the “terrible Turk” to “the model

⁷⁴⁸ Mensur Akgün, Gökçe Perçinoğlu, Jonathan Levack and Sabiha Seyücel Gündoğar, *Orta Doğu’da Türkiye Algısı*, Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2011.

⁷⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p.12.

⁷⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p.13.

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid*, p.14.

⁷⁵² Meliha Benli Altunışık, *Turkey: Arab Perspectives*, TESEV Publications, 2010, p.14.

based on Islam, democracy and economy”.

6.7. Chapter Conclusion

Chapter 5 examines the cases of liberal polices based on middle power. From 2005 to 2010, Turkey had implemented liberal foreign policies at an unprecedented scale. These policies are broadly classified into five categories.

First category was functional diplomacy. This dissertation took up Alliance of Civilizations and trading state behavior as examples of this category. Turkey’s functional diplomacy through the Alliance of Civilizations is an example of its global level activities. Meanwhile, Turkey has acted as trading state in the regional level.

The second category was mediation. For five years, Turkey was connected to several regional conflicts between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Palestine. The indirect talks between Syria and Israel did not produce any specific result, but Turkey exhibited its good relations with both Israel and Syria, and made an appeal for its capacity to operate as a regional mediator. The most important outcome of the series of indirect talks was to raise Turkey’s prestige both in the region and in the international arenas. Turkey chose to take on facilitator policy, when faced with the 2006 Lebanon War. Gül and Erdoğan negotiated with other Middle Eastern leaders, and were welcomed by Lebanon and Israel alike because both countries had close diplomatic relationships with Turkey. It is mediator role between Palestine and Israel, however, was representative of a different approach than the other two cases. This is because

TOBB played a leading role between Palestine and Israel through a series of Ankara Forum. The Ankara Forums were second track diplomacy, in which think tank cooperates with the government. To sum up, Turkey's mediator role has been limited, but has contributed to a strengthening of its prestige in world politics.

This dissertation regards the arena of Turkish "niche diplomacy" in the Middle East as aid policy. After the Iraqi War, the perspective of Arabs toward Turkey was changing from the "Terrible Türk" stereotype to a more positive image. Turkey thus easily presented aid policy toward the Middle East. TİKA has been the main aid organization providing assistance in the field of social infrastructure and services, in particular education, health, water supply and sanitation, and government and civil society.

Coalition diplomacy was the fourth category of liberal Turkish foreign policy. To establish the Levant Quartet and the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's neighboring countries, and to expand the cooperation with the OIC and GCC were coalition diplomacy achievements for Turkey.

Norm diffusion was a policy by which Turkey transmitted several practices and policies to its Middle Eastern counterparts through institutional partnerships and arrangements. The DAD project in BMENA, led by the United States, was Turkey's first attempt at norm diffusion. Yet, this attempt failed because of rising anti-Americanism in the Middle East. In DAD, Turkey especially focused on empowering women, based on a TESEV project. After the failure of BMENA and DAD, TESEV has continued its norm diffusion policy in the field of empowering women. Turkey's another attempt to diffuse democracy has implemented through the OIC. The turning point for Turkey and OIC relations came with the choice of

Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu as Secretary General of the OIC in June 2004. As he emphasized the importance of harmony and reconciliation, Turkish prestige both in the OIC and in international society improved. Turkey was also the host country of the first ministerial conference on women's roles in OIC held on 20-21 November 2001.

These liberal policies have changed others' perceptions. Bush administration did not share the common view toward the Middle East, however, Obama administration regards Turkey's liberal policies toward the Middle East as parallel with American policies. From Arab perspectives, Turkish image is changing or has changed from that of the "terrible Turk" to "the model based on Islam, democracy and economy".

CHAPTER 7

7. Conclusion

The main purposes of this dissertation have been to examine Turkey's Middle Eastern policies from 2005 to 2010 from the perspective of the middle power concept, and how Turkey was constructed as a liberal middle power in world politics since the period of Özal. In addition to these major topics, this dissertation has also focused on the effectiveness of the middle power concept as an analytical framework for Turkish foreign policy.

7.1. Evaluation

7.1.1. Middle Power Concept

Middle power theory is a loose-framework. But it is appropriate for capturing dynamics of state activities. The characteristics of middle power framework are three. First of all, liberal middle power framework is based on constructivism. To implement liberal policies construct the middle power identity. So, middle power is not coercively defined in international system but positively to be by adopting liberal policies. Secondly, middle power framework encompasses both regional and international activities. Some scholars used regional power as analytical framework for AKP's foreign policies, however, these are not able to examine its policies in global level. Thirdly, middle power puts importance on soft power rather than hard power. Middle power aims to exercise its power and influence

through enriching international prestige. As a soft power holder in the region, Turkey was able to implement its liberal policies. We should remember Neack's comment about middle power as "Middle powers were self-defined as states that committed their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of international peace and order".⁷⁵³

7.1.2. Material Change and Norm Change

This dissertation attempted to show how Turkey constructed and was constructed liberal middle power. To realize the process of Turkey's liberal middle power policy identity, five material changes and norm changes taken place since the end of the Cold War. The concept of a norm can be divided into security norms and ideological norms. During the Cold War period, security norms were basically to do with state versus state conflict. Liberal democracy and communism were opposed to each other at the ideological level. The first material change took place at the end of the Cold War. This material change promoted related norm changes. The nature of the security norm changed from state versus states conflict to civil war and low-intensity conflict. Liberal democracy also became the ideological norm. The second material change was a regional one. As mentioned above, the Adana Agreement changed norm at the regional level. Low intensity conflicts were effectively prohibited between Turkey and Syria. The third material change followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. 9/11 terrorism prompted the war on terror at the level of security norms. As ideological norms changed,

⁷⁵³ Neack, *op.cit*, p.162.

anti-clash of civilizations efforts or dialogue between civilizations achieved legitimacy. The fourth material change was the Iraqi War and the management of post-war efforts. This war encouraged the reduction of low-intensity conflicts between Turkey and Iraq. At the ideological level, democratization became a powerful ideological norm, especially in the Middle East. The fifth material change was the failure of BMENA in the Middle East. This material change at the regional level clarified the limit of US-led policies and democratization.

These material changes consequently produced a geo-political space within which Turkey could grow as a liberal middle power. At the level of security norms, Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern countries were focused on desecuritization. It was possible for Turkey to talk with all of Middle Eastern actors. At the level of ideological norms, there remained a space for Turkey to diffuse liberal economy and democracy after the US led BMENA failed. This was because Turkey maintained close relationships and legitimacy with both the United States and Middle Eastern countries.

7.1.3. Self-Perception Change

All policy-makers clearly recognized limitation of Turkish power. They supposed that Turkey would exercise limited power effectively in order to increase its international prestige. They answered with the implementation of liberal behaviors of the type associated with Canada and Australia. Until the end of the Cold War, Turkey was a coercive middle power and could not help but adopt power balancing, bandwagoning, and neutrality approaches to ensure its

autonomy. But after the Cold War period, Turkey subjectively attempted to take on liberal middle power roles through its policies.

As noted above, Özal, Erbakan, Cem and Davutoğlu partly changed Turkish foreign policy behaviors. They partly improved traditional Turkish foreign policy ideas like Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turanism for expanding its influence toward domestic and international arena. Özal was a pioneer of alternative mode of liberal foreign policies. At the policy level, he implemented the introduction of liberal economy to Turkey, launching regional institutions like BSEC and the Turkic Summit, and the application for EC accession. These were the bases for functional diplomacy, coalition diplomacy and norm diffusion. In addition to this, Özal established TİKA and initiated aid policies toward the Central Asian and Caucasus regions. At the ideological level, Özal advocated neo-Ottomanism, based on the expansion of its influence to neighboring countries. This new ideology created room for liberal policies. In addition, like Abdülhamid II, Özal recognized Turkey's vulnerability and the necessity to adapt to new situations in world politics.

Erbakan's contribution to liberal middle power efforts was limited. At the policy level, he exploited coalition diplomacy toward Muslim countries. Yet, as had Özal, he positively engaged the Middle East region. He had sympathy for all the Middle Eastern countries except Israel.

Cem adopted functional diplomacy and coalition diplomacy. This was especially true while hosting the OIC-EU joint meeting led by the co-chairman of the Alliance of Civilizations during the AKP period. He also succeeded in achieving Turkey's candidacy for EU membership. At an ideological level, Cem

noted the importance of the geography of the center, and of historical assets, economic cooperation, and civilizational assets in his book *Turkey in 21st century*. Like Özal, he also aimed to increase influence toward external territories through liberal policies.

Davutoğlu pushed forward liberal policies more and more toward the Middle Eastern region. At the ideological level, he placed importance on civilizational, historical and geographical self-perceptions. These were interrelated concepts. The Islamic civilizational self-perception is able to cooperate with other civilizations through peaceful ways according to his philosophy. The Ottoman Empire was a good example of this model of Islamic civilization. Davutoğlu's version of neo-Ottomanism is not based on imperial legacy but on calling to mind the peaceful multinational legacy of the Ottoman Empire in order to realize regional stability.⁷⁵⁴ He used geopolitical and historical depth in his famous 'Strategic Depth'. But in actual foreign policy, Davutoğlu made full use of liberal policies to increase Turkish prestige in the world politics. As analyzed in chapter 5, Davutoğlu adopted policies of functional diplomacy, mediation, niche diplomacy, coalition diplomacy and norm diffusion. He was sensitive to, and quick to respond to the political vacuum that followed the failure of the United States' democratization policy. The Davutoğlu-led foreign policy from 2005 to 2010 truly satisfied this liberal middle power.

⁷⁵⁴ Taşpınar, *op.cit.* p.15.

7.1.4. Others' Perceptual Change

Others' perceptions are also important to the construction of middle power. Others' perceptions reinforce or request several roles to relating countries. The United States has exercised its influence against Turkey since the Cold War period. During the Cold War period, the US in essence demanded Turkey to be "the Cold War warrior" which meant the bulwark against the Soviet Union. When the Cold War ended, the United States continued to expect Turkey to behave as its regional arm, this time in the role of regional stabilizer toward the Middle East, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States requested Turkey to again serve as a model for the region. The change in the type of requests the US made of Turkey created the opportunity to adopt its liberal policies to its neighboring regions.

On the other hand, increasing Turkish prestige and regional reliance softened Turkish image in the Middle East. Desecuritization in the Middle East by virtue of the Adana Agreement and Turkey's decision of not to enter the Iraq war were turning points in Arabs perceptual change. The AKP's pro-Islamic roots were also useful in softening its image. Arabs more or less welcomed Turkey's liberal policies, perceiving them as being their benefits. In addition to change of Arab perspectives, Obama government in the United States attempted to recover the U.S. image in the Middle East through oft ways like public diplomacy. From this view point, Turkey was attractive partner for Obama administration.

7.1.5. Turkey's Liberal Policies from 2005 to 2010

From 2005 to 2010, Turkey implemented its liberal foreign policies at an unprecedented scale. These policies are broadly classified into five categories. The first category was functional diplomacy. This dissertation took up the Alliance of Civilizations and trading state behaviors as examples of this category. The Alliance of Civilizations showed Turkey's functional policy to the world. Erdoğan accepted the Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero's invitation for co-chairmanship of the Alliance in June 2005. Spain and Turkey sat on the high-level group for the establishment of the Alliance of Civilizations and contributed to its development. The implementation plans of the Alliance of Civilizations as a (i) a bridge-builder and convener, (ii) a catalyst and facilitator, (iii) an advocate, (iv) a platform, (v) a resource center, for promoting understanding and trust. Through the Alliance of Civilizations, Turkey presented itself as a reconciliatory force in the wake of the clash of civilizations being touted between the West and the Islamic world.

Turkey's functional diplomacy through the Alliance of Civilizations is an example of its global level activities. Meanwhile, Turkey has acted as trading state in the regional level. The background of the idea of trading state is defined by Rosecrance as interdependence in particular areas. The trading state outlined a state that aimed to improve its status in international politics and allocation of resources in its domestic politics within the functional trading system. Turkey took steps to establish of Levant Quartet to increase amount the trade volume between Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan on 14 issues. Regarding economic cooperation, the primary goal of strengthening relationships with the GCC was to

advance the FTA talks. Turkey and the GCC signed a strategic partnership agreement in Jeddah on September 3, 2008.

The second category was mediation. For five years, Turkey was connected to several regional conflicts between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Palestine. The indirect talks between Syria and Israel did not produce any specific result, but Turkey exhibited its good relations with both Israel and Syria, and made an appeal for its capacity to operate as a regional mediator. The most important outcome of the series of indirect talks was to raise Turkey's prestige both in the region and in the international arenas. While its influence was limited at the practical level, Turkey's attempts had a positive overall impact, and came to be recognized as a channel of mediation between Israel and Syria. Turkey acted as communicator between Syria and Israel. Turkey chose to take on facilitator policy when faced with the 2006 Lebanon War. Gül and Erdoğan negotiated with other Middle Eastern leaders, and were welcomed by Lebanon and Israel alike because both countries had close diplomatic relationships with Turkey. Unlike the case of the Iraqi War, Erdoğan put importance on regional relationships. This trend showed that the idealist approach led by Davutoğlu had fully penetrated the government. Turkey could use the Alliance of Civilizations as a platform to declare its ideas against international public opinion. Under the legitimacy of SCR 1701, Turkey decided to join the UNIFIL II to help prevent the war between Israel and Lebanon, again only after heated domestic discussion. Turkey contributed to the Lebanon Crisis as a communicator and facilitator. Mediator role between Palestine and Israel, however, was representative of a different approach than the other two cases. This is because TOBB played a leading role between Palestine

and Israel through a series of Ankara Forums. The Ankara Forums were second track diplomacy, in which think tank cooperates with the government. The main aim of the Ankara Forum meetings was to establish the industrial zone in Palestine, and to develop economic relations between Palestine, Israel and Turkey. This aim has not been achieved yet among these three countries. But the seventh Ankara Forum was attended by Israeli President Simon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. This meeting was a springboard for the Annapolis Summit. Regarding mediation between Israel and Palestine, Turkey acted as both communicator and facilitator. To sum up, Turkey's mediator role has been limited, but has contributed to a strengthening of its prestige in world politics.

This dissertation regards the arena of Turkish niche diplomacy in the Middle East as aid policy. Arab states, especially at the national level, have strong anti-American sentiments after the Iraqi War. It has been difficult for Western states to implement aid to Middle East countries as a result. On the other hand, it has been easy for Turkey to get involved with its neighboring regions because of its pro-Islamic government and its rejection of major military involvement in the Iraqi War. After the Iraqi War, the perspective of Arabs toward Turkey was changing from the terrible Türk stereotype to a more positive image. Turkey thus easily presented aid policy toward the Middle East. TİKA has been the main aid organization providing assistance in the field of social infrastructure and service, in particular education, health, water supply and sanitation, and government and civil society. Toward Iraq and Lebanon, TİKA assisted in easing the effects of the war by establishing hospitals. To Palestine, TİKA mainly facilitated the training of Palestinian police forces and the reconstruction of infrastructures. According to a

2009 report to TİKA, Palestine was the third aid recipient country for TİKA.

Coalition diplomacy was the fourth category of liberal Turkish foreign policy. To establish the Levant Quartet and the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's neighboring countries, and to expand the cooperation with the OIC and GCC were coalition diplomacy achievements for Turkey. As discussed above, the Levant Quartet and relationships with GCC were classified the behaviors of trading state for the expansion of economic cooperation in the region. The meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's neighboring countries focused on the prevention war and the maintenance of stability in Iraq and its neighboring regions.

Norm diffusion was a policy by which Turkey transmitted several practices and policies to its Middle Eastern counterparts through institutional partnerships and arrangements. As a norm transmitter, Turkey facilitates three processes. The first step is the Europeanization process. Through the Europeanization process, Turkey adapts Western-oriented norms and secondly transforms or localizes them to fit Turkey's social context. After these Western-oriented norms have been partially adapted, Turkey diffuses them toward other Middle Eastern countries. In this dissertation, we have focused on democracy as a norm. Turkey has changed its Western-oriented democracy to a conservative democracy which has been mixed with Turkish historical and cultural essences. Turkey has attempted to diffuse this localized norm toward the Middle Eastern countries. The DAD project in BMENA, led by the United States, was Turkey's first attempt at norm diffusion. Yet, this attempt failed, because of rising anti-Americanism in the Middle East. In DAD, Turkey especially focused on empowering women based on a TESEV

project. After the failure of BMENA and DAD, TESEV has continued its norm diffusion policy in the field of empowering women. Turkey's another attempt to diffuse democracy was through the OIC. The purposes of reinforcing relationships with the OIC were to strengthen the relationships with other Muslim states, especially countries in the Middle East, and to establish itself as the status of mediator between Western states and Muslim states. The turning point for Turkey and OIC relations came with the choice of Ekmelenddin İhsanoğlu as Secretary General of the OIC in June 2004. As he emphasized the importance of harmony and reconciliation, Turkish prestige both in the OIC and in international society improved. Turkey was also the host country of the first ministerial conference on women's roles in OIC held on 20-21 November 2001.

7.2. Epilogue: Can Turkey continue to Pursue Liberal Based Middle Power?

7.2.1. The Decline of Relationships with Israel

Turkish middle power has been deeply dependent on the situation of the Middle East and good relations with regional countries. In particular, good relations with both Israel and Palestine have been a major source of Turkey's soft power and its legitimacy as mediator in the Middle East. Up until December 22, 2008, Turkey sought to maintain its effective mediator role between Israel and Syria. Turkey's good relations and equal distance from each side made it an attractive candidate for both sides.⁷⁵⁵ On December 22, Erdoğan and Olmert

⁷⁵⁵ Çuhadar, *op.cit*, p.101.

discussed the possible restart of the indirect talks between Israel and Syria, and the cessation the Israeli military operation against Palestine, especially in the Gaza district.⁷⁵⁶ But only five days after discussions initiated, Israel began its armed attack on Gaza. The attack was described as a show of force by the Kadima party in order to demonstrate its hard-line attitude against Palestine. The ruling party Kadima was predicted to lose the February 2009 general election to the Likud party. The Israeli military attacks killed 1417 Palestinians including 926 civilians in Gaza between the end of 2008 and the beginning 2009.⁷⁵⁷ The Israeli aggression and lack of conciliatory attitude during this period angered and embarrassed Turkey. Erdoğan's harsh attitude toward Israeli President Simon Peres at the 2009 World Economic Forum held in Davos was memorable show of Turkish frustration. At the Davos forum, Erdoğan openly accused Peres with remarks like "Israel knows well how to kill children" and he abruptly left a joint panel in protest of Peres.

Erdoğan's words and actions against Peres were received enthusiastically in Arab nations, however, Turkey's legitimacy as a mediator was declining for the same reasons. What's more, Kadima, winning the 2009 election by a narrow margin, could not form a government by itself. Instead, a grand coalition was made along with the hard-line Likud Party, and Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister. Likud led the coalition and did not accept Turkey in the mediator role. In 2010, Turkish-Israeli relations continued to deteriorate. On January 11, 2010, Israel Deputy Minister Danny Ayalon invited Turkish ambassador Ahmet

⁷⁵⁶ *Zaman*, Aralık 23, 2008.

⁷⁵⁷ Hasan Kosebalaban, "The Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations: What is its Strategic Significance?", *Middle East Policy*, Vol.XVII, No.3, 2010, p.38.

Oğuz Çelikkol to the foreign ministry and insulted him publicly in Hebrew while also seating Çelikkol on a lower-level sofa.⁷⁵⁸ Turkish politicians accused Ayalon, who later sent a letter of apology to the Turkish Embassy in Israel. A subsequent crisis stemmed from controversial broadcasts of the Turkish TV drama “Valley of the Wolves”. The Israeli foreign ministry denounced a scene in depicting the Israeli Mossad kidnapping Turkish babies. The most tragic and damaging incident of the year occurred when the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara, loaded with volunteers and supply materials intended as aid to a blockaded Palestine territory and called the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” was attacked by Israeli naval commandos on May 31, 2010. Nine civilians (8 Turkish and 1 ethnically Turkish American) were killed. Turkish decision-makers described the incident as “state terrorism” (Erdoğan) and the “Turkish version of 9/11” (Davutoğlu).⁷⁵⁹

The Turkish mediator role had been useful for maintaining good relations between Israel and Arab countries. In other words, regional stabilization was a key to whether or not Turkey could be an effective mediator.⁷⁶⁰ A connection with Israel was valuable asset for Arab policy makers. The United States had supported Turkey as a successful model for the Middle East region, but the deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey was a difficult situation for the US. This difficulty was exacerbated when Turkey took on the role of mediating on behalf of Iran. Western countries’ trust in Turkey also began to deteriorate they suspected

⁷⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁹ *Hürriyet*, Haziran 1, 2010. Meanwhile, Israel insisted the Mavi Marmara ship was sent by a radical Islamic group from Turkey bringing supplies to Hamas. The Mavi Marmara ship was sent by İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri (İHH), which has its roots with an Islamist group. İHH has previously sent ships toward Palestine, which prompted Israel’s severe response.

⁷⁶⁰ Interview with Prof. Dr. İhsan Dağı, February 28, 2011.

Iran of developing nuclear weapons when Ahmadinejad declared Iran's intention to begin enriching uranium in 2006. On May 16, 2010, Turkey and Brazil signed an agreement with Iran to send uranium abroad for enrichment. But this agreement was no longer enforced after the UN Security Council resolution 1929, which was sanction toward Iran, was passed on June 9, 2010. As non-permanent member of UN Security Council, Turkey voted against sanction to Iran. These Turkish activities about Iranian nuclear issue have disagreed with the ideas of Western countries.

7.2.2. Arab Spring as Another Material Change?

A series of political upset in Arab countries happened in 2011 have affected positive and negative influence to Turkey's liberal middle power policies. When political changes happened in Tunisia and Egypt, Turkey's prestige in the Middle East region was drawn attention as "Turkish model", which mixed political Islam with democracy and liberal economy. At first, Prime Minister Erdoğan demanded President Hosni Mubarak to implement the reform in domestic politics. But the end of January, Turkish government changed its policy from urging reform to demanding the resignation of Mubarak.⁷⁶¹ Turkish government cautiously took care of the international public opinion to keep its prestige in the Middle East. Turkish government did the same tactics to the Libyan case.

For Turkey, the most difficult case is Syrian case. One of the triggers of the construction of liberal middle power identity was the desecuritization of relation

⁷⁶¹ *Hürriyet Daily News*, February 1, 2011; *Hürriyet*, February 12, 2011.

with Syria in October 1998. And Syria is an essential partner of Levant Quartet and a negotiator of Turkey's mediator role during 2005 to 2010. Turkey and Syria signed the visa free policy and opened their border. So, Turkish-Syrian relations will deteriorate, some parts of Turkey's liberal middle power policies will be dysfunction. Dysfunction of liberal middle power policy will decrease Turkey's prestige both in the Middle East and international society. Resecuritization with Syria has possibility of shifting Turkish liberal policies to more realist policies.

7.2.3. Between the Hobbesian and Kantian Perspectives

In 2006, Kirşci described Turkey's next challenge after EU negotiations started as one of expanding the "zone of democratic peace" for neighboring regions.⁷⁶² He employed Wendt's three classifications of political culture, especially Hobbesian and Kantian lines of thought. Put simply, Hobbesian-inspired thinking is characterized by mistrust and self-help in the international system. On the other hand, Kantian-inspired thinking is characterized by trust, pluralism and democracy in the international system. Kirşci insists that the ideas of Turkish foreign policy-makers have transformed Hobbesian thinking into Kantian thinking.⁷⁶³

Erhan also pointed out that Davutoğlu has led Turkish foreign policy toward a style of foreign policy reminiscent of Kantian ideas about the security community. According to Deutsch et al., the security community, which is "real

⁷⁶² Kemal Kirşci, *Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times*, Chaillot Paper No.92, 2006 (<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp092.pdf>), April 15, 2011 accessed, p.99.

⁷⁶³ *Ibid*, pp.100-101.

assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way” can be classified into the amalgamated security community and the pluralistic security community.⁷⁶⁴ The amalgamated security community is “the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation” like the United States.⁷⁶⁵ Meanwhile, the pluralistic security community is defined as community which is constructed by independent states. To establish security community is seen as the ultimate goal for Turkey’s foreign policy under Davutoğlu.

But it has been difficult to achieve this aim after the Middle East since Turkish-Israel relations have begun to deteriorate. Turkey would not have any motivation to return to the out of date realist middle power approach to repair this situation. This is because Turkish-Arab relations are well-maintained through functional diplomacy, coalition diplomacy, niche diplomacy, and norm diffusion. Turkey is thus disinclined to return to security-based non-interference policies.

Instead of Kantian and Hobbesian thinking, rationalist thinking within the classification by Wight seems to suit Turkey’s middle power policy. The theory of Rationalism is based on condition.⁷⁶⁶ Man is inclined to rationally judge his or her conditions. And to choose the rational path, prudence is essential. According to Wight, the pursuit of rationalism is expressed as “The great aim of statecraft, of

⁷⁶⁴ Deutsch, et al, *op.cit*, p.5.

⁷⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p.6.

⁷⁶⁶ Martin Wight, *International Theory: The three traditions*, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1992, p.13.

foreign policy, is to pursue and safeguard the national interest within the setting of a respect for the interests of others, or of international society as a whole".⁷⁶⁷

Turkey was able to adopt liberal policies and establish middle power identity in the political vacuum left after the US-Iraqi policy lost its potency. The core asset of liberal middle power is to achieve prestige, both on the international level and the regional level. Liberal policies implemented from 2005 to 2010 strengthened Turkey's prestige in global and regional politics.⁷⁶⁸ As mentioned above, the norms of international relations changed after the Cold War ended. Now, the demonstration of hard power is no longer a very effective way to heighten national prestige. On the other hand, soft power-based liberal policies became a more attractive approach for each state and each nation. As Bloom points out, national prestige affects national identity.

Realist middle power policies are effective for maintaining the status-quo, but they do not help or to take care of increase prestige in regional and international arenas. On the other hand, liberal middle power policies have the ability to enhance national prestige through their attractiveness and promotion of democracy and economic prosperity. Canada and Australia represent the classical examples of liberal middle power policy in action, and Turkey has been cultivating its own liberal policies and liberal middle power identity since Özal period. Hence, Turkey's middle power identity fully established from 2005 to 2010 depended on material change, norm change, self-perception change, and change in the perceptions of others of Turkey.

⁷⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p.126.

⁷⁶⁸ Interview with Prof. Dr. İhsan Dağı, February 28, 2011. He mentioned that Turkey's heightened status in international politics was a success of the AKP's foreign policy.

Table 8. The transition of Turkey's middle power policies

Periods	Until the end of the Cold War	1990-2002	2002-2005	2005-2008 (partly 2010)	2009-2011
Approaches	Realist middle power	Partly began to liberal middle power approaches	Struggles between realist and liberal approaches	Liberal middle power policies at peak	Partly decline of liberal middle power policies

From 2005 to 2010, Turkey could completely enjoy prestige internationally and, especially in the Middle East. This increasing prestige also strengthened the self-confidence of Turkey's liberal middle power. The deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations and misunderstanding between Turkey and Western countries about Turkey's mediator role, especially toward Iran, have dampened Turkey's liberal middle power effectiveness. As with Wight's comment about rationalism, Turkey prudently takes care of how it can achieve prestige from Arabs and Israel in the Middle East, and from international society in general. This is the only way for Turkey to take the initiative to establish security community in the Middle East.

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A. APPENDIX

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EDUCATION

2006-2007 Special student (Government scholarship of Republic of Turkey), Bilkent University (Ankara, Turkey), Department of International Relations.

2006- present Ph.D. student, Chuo University (Tokyo, Japan), Graduate School of Law (Major of Political Science).

2004-2006 MA, Chuo University (Tokyo, Japan), Graduate School of Law (Major of Political Science, The title of thesis is “The Process of Turkish Foreign Policy Decision Making during the Turgut Ozal Period: The Case of the Gulf War”).

2000-2004 BA, Chuo University (Tokyo, Japan), Faculty of Law (Major of Political Science).

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SCHOLARSHIP

2008-2011 The scholarship of Ph.D. program in the abroad (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan).

2006-2007 Government scholarship of Republic of Turkey

RESEARH INTEREST

Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East

Turkish Foreign Policy toward the United States

The Process of Foreign Policy Decision Making in Turkey

Theory of International Relations (Especially, Constructivism)

LANGUAGE SKILLS

Japanese (Native)

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Basketball, Tennis, Running, Walking, Darts, Cooking

C. TURKISH SUMMARY

Liberal Orta Güç Politikalarının Olasılığı ve Sınırı: AKP döneminde Ortadoğu'ya Yönelik Türk Dış Politikası

Bu tezin ana amacı, Soğuk Savaş sisteminin çöküşünden sonra Türk dış politikası davranışlarında meydana gelen değişimi anlamaktır. Bu sebeple, Türkiye'nin liberal dış politikalara dayalı orta güç kimliğini niçin ve nasıl inşa ettiği sorusu bu tezin araştırma konusunu teşkil edecektir.

Bu tez, iki ana konuyu incelemektedir. Birincisi, 2005'ten 2010'a AKP'nin liberalizme dayalı orta güç politikalarıdır. Bu tezde, liberalizme dayalı orta güç politikaları, fonksiyonel diplomasi, arabuluculuk, niche diplomasi, ortak diplomasi ve norm yayma politikalarının yürütülmesi olarak tanımlandı. 1950'lerin içindeki bir dönemle birlikte Türk dış politikası 2005'ten 2010'a, bilhassa Ortadoğu'ya yönelik olarak Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin tarihinde nispeten aktif bir görünüme sahipti. 2005'ten 2010 yılına Ortadoğu ve Türkiye arasında "gözle görülür bir istikrar dönemi" yaşandığı söylenebilir. 2005'ten 2010'a Ortadoğu'ya yönelik liberal orta güç politikalarının analiz edilmesi, Türkiye'nin niçin geleneksel dış politikalar yerine liberal orta güç politikalarını takip ettiğinin cevabını verecektir.

Ortadoğu'ya yönelik Türkiye'nin liberal orta güç politikasının bu olgun döneminin bütün etkilerini inceleyebilmek için devlet politikalarının inşa sürecini anlamak mecburiyetindeyiz. Bu ise, tezin ikinci konusunu teşkil edecektir. Bu amaçla, Türkiye'nin devlet kimliğindeki değişim ve devamlılıklar dikkate

alınacaktır. Devlet kimliđi, uluslararası ve bölgesel şartlar, normlardaki deđişimler, devletin öz algısı ve ötekilerin algıları tarafından inşa edilir. Bazı akademisyenler Türk dış politikasını analiz ederken Türkiye'nin devlet kimliđinin bazı unsurlarına dikkati çekmişlerdir. Orta güç kavramının dış politika alanında Türkiye'nin devlet kimliklerinden birisi olduđu bu tezde farzedilmiştir. Türkiye'nin orta güç davranışları, orta güç statüsünün bilinçli bir şekilde farkında olmasını sağlamaktadır. Bu tezde uluslararası alanda Türkiye'nin kendisini orta güç olarak görmesine yol veren iki safha analiz edilecektir. İlk safha, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Ortadođu politikalarında tarihî ve kültürel ilişkileri önplana çıkararak "alternatif perspektifler"dir. Turgut Özal, Necmettin Erbakan ve İsmail Cem bu alternatif perspektifleri savundular. Hükümetlerin farklı mevkilerinde görev yapmış olsalar da sahip oldukları bu fikir, Türk dış politikasını dönüştürmeye sevk etti. İkinci safhayı ise, AKP hükümetinin 2005'e kadarki tecrübe ve tasarıları oluşturur. Irak buhranı tecrübesi, AKP'nin Ortadođu politikasının mihenk taşıını teşkil etti. Buhran sonrasında Ahmet Davutođlu'nun fikirleri de giderek meşruiyet kazanmaya başladı. Diđer bir ifadeyle, AKP'nin 2005'ten 2010'a Ortadođu politikaları tamamen yeni politikalar olmayıp daha önceki siyasîler tarafından tedricen inşa edilmiş politikalarlardır. Buna mukabil, 2009 yılının başlarından bu yana İsrail ile ilişkilerin kötüye gitmesinden sonra Türkiye'nin liberal orta güç politikalarının güç kaybetmeye başladığı da bir gerçektir.

Konstruktivizm bu tezin ana teorik temelini teşkil etmektedir. Sosyal olguların politikayı nasıl deđiştirdiđini ve bunun politika üzerindeki etki biçimlerini anlamak konstruktivist analizin başlıca meselesini oluşturur. Devlet kimliđinin nasıl inşa edildiđi sorusu konstruktivistlerin ana mevzularından

birisidir. Devlet kimliđi ile ilgili olarak Alexander Wendt, öz algılayışın ve öteki âmillerin algılarının devlet kimliđinin inşasındaki yerini vurgulamıştır. Uluslararası ve bölgesel maddî deđişimler uluslararası ve bölgesel planda norm deđişimlerini tetikler. Bu maddî ve normal deđişimler öz algılayışlardaki ve ötekilerin algılarındaki deđişimlere tesir eder. Buna ilaveten, dış politika gelenek ve mirasları da devlet kimliđinin inşasında yer alan faktörlerdir. Teorik bir çerçeve olarak, bu tez, devlet kimliđinin teşhis edilmesi sürecinin ideal modelini göstermektedir.

Orta güç kavramı, Türkiye’de bazı akademisyenler ve gazeteciler tarafından kullanılmıştır. Çok defa, orta güç kavramından anladıkları uluslararası sistemde orta büyüklükte devlet, orta düzeyde gelişmiş ülke olma veya coğrafi bakımdan Avrupa ve Asya yahut Avrupa ve Ortadođu arasında orta mevkide bulunmadır. Orta güç kavramının bu şekillerde anlaşılması realist bir bakış açısını yansıtmaktadır. Türkiye’ye baktığımızda, orta güç kavramının bu şekillerde tanımlanışı esasen Osmanlı İmparatorluğu devrinde II. Abdülhamid saltanatından Soğuk Savaş’ın nihayetine kadar gayet işe yaramıştır. William Hale ve Baskın Oran, orta güç kavramının Türkiye’ye uygulanmasında önde gelen akademisyenlerdir. Onlara göre, orta gücün esas politikaları statükoyu devam ettirmek maksadıyla güç dengeleme, peşine takma politikası ve tarafsızlıktır.

Fakat Türkiye Soğuk Savaş’ın bitişinden sonra liberal bir yaklaşım benimsemeye teşebbüs etmiştir. Dünya politikasında Türkiye hâlâ bir orta güç olmakla beraber bu orta gücün muhtevası dönüşüm geçirmiştir. Aynı şekilde, liberal yaklaşımlar da Türkiye’nin orta güç kimliđini dönüştürerek Avustralya ve

Kanada'ninkine benzer bir hale getirmiştir. Başka bir deyişle, Türkiye hem kendi hem de ötekilerin teşhisinde bir orta güç haline gelmiştir.

Bu tezde, Türkiye'nin liberal orta güç politikalarını nasıl yürüttüğünü anlamaya yönelik olarak liberal orta güç politikaları ile i) fonksiyonel diplomasi ii) arabuluculuk iii) niche diplomasi iv) ortak diplomasi ve v) norm yayma kastedilmektedir. Bu tez, bilhassa Ortadoğu'ya yönelik beş liberal orta güç politikasını ele almaktadır. Bunun sebebi, Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu politikalarının, bir orta güç olarak yürüttüğü liberal politikaları en iyi şekilde yansıtmasıdır.

Bu tez beş kısımdan oluşmaktadır. Birinci kısım, orta güç kavramına dair literatür çalışmasıyla başlayıp kavramın analitik bir çerçevesini sunmaktadır. Holmes, Holbraad ve Wood'un eserleri orta güç kavramına dair yazılmış klasik eserlerdir. 1990'lı yıllarda Cooper vd. *Relocating middle power: Australia and Canada in a changing world order* ve *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War* isimli iki önemli kitapta orta güce dair sofistike kavramlar ortaya atmışlardır. Bahis konusu klasik eserler arasında Holbraad ve Wood'un eserlerinin realist bir yaklaşıma sahip olduğu kabul edilebilir. Buna mukabil, Copper vd. ve Holmes genellikle liberalist cephede tasnif edilmektedir. Mamafih, bahis konusu eski eserler, orta güç kavramını devletin statü, davranış ve politikasıyla karıştırmıştır. Bu tezde ise aksine, orta güç kavramları belirgin bir şekilde realizm, liberalizm ve konstrutivizm kategorileri altında tasnif edilmektedir. Bu araştırma bilhassa epistemoloji ve kimliği odak noktasına alan konstruktivizm üzerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Devletin kendi kimliğini nasıl inşa ettiği sorusu konstruktivistlerin ana meselelerinden birisidir. Bu tezde de, Türkiye'nin orta güç kimliğini liberal politikalar vasıtasıyla nasıl inşa ettiği sorusu ana araştırma

konusunu teşkil etmektedir. Orta güçler, öteki ülkelerle ticareti teşvik etmek, bölgesel veya daha küçük çaplı teşkilatlarla işbirliği yapmak, gündemdeki ikincil konuları ele almak, muhtelif devletler arasında arabuluculuk rolünü üstlenmek, bazı fikirleri seslendirmek, çeşitli bölgelerde norm yayma politikası yürütmek ve nihayet bölgelerinde bir çoğulcu güvenlik toplumu tesis etmek amaçlarıyla öteki devletlerle koordinasyon kurabilirler. İşte bu politikalar, orta güç kimliğinin bir devlet kimliği olarak gelişmesini ve güç kazanmasını sağlamaktadır.

İkinci kısım, başta Türk dış politikasında orta güç davranışları olmak üzere Türk dış politikasının tarihî arkaplanına göz atmaktadır. Genel olarak, bu çerçevede dikkate alınması lazım gelen üç konu bulunmaktadır. Bunlar, Türk dış politikasına dair geleneksel siyasî fikirler, Osmanlı'nın son devrinden Soğuk Savaş'ın nihayetine kadar olan orta güç siyaseti ve Ortadoğu ülkelerine yönelik Türk dış politikaları gibi konulardır. Türk dış politikasına dair geleneksel fikirler bahsinde bu tez Osmanlılık, İslamcılık, Turancılık, Batılılaşma ve Misak-ı Millî gibi konulara temas etmektedir. Osmanlı'nın son dönemlerinden Soğuk Savaş'ın nihayetine kadar Türk dış politikasının temel hedefi, uluslararası politikada orta büyüklükte devlet olarak statükonun devam ettirilmesine çalışmaktır. Spesifik olarak Türkiye bilhassa Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun son devrinde, iki savaş arası dönemde, İkinci Dünya Savaşı esnasında, Soğuk Savaşın başlangıç döneminde ve yumuşama döneminde statükoyu devam ettirebilmek maksadıyla tarafsızlık, güç dengesi ve peşine takma politikalarına başvurdu. Bu politikalara ilaveten Soğuk Savaş boyunca Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu'ya yönelik başlıca dış politikası müdahalede bulunmaktan mümkün mertebe kaçınmak olmuştur. Ortadoğu bu dönemde Türk dış politikası gündeminde birinci planda bir önceliğe sahip değildi.

Üçüncü kısımda, özellikle Özal, Erbakan ve Cem dönemlerindeki politikalar olmak üzere 1990'lı yılların Türk dış politikaları ele alınmaktadır. Zira adı geçen siyasîlerin görev yaptıkları dönemlerde Türkiye'nin devlet kimliği değişime uğramış görünmektedir. Bu siyasîler politikada liberalizme kayarak ve devlet kimliğinin değiştirilmesine yönelerek uluslararası politikanın değişen şartlarına Türkiye'nin intibak etmesi için çalışmaya başladılar.

Dördüncü ve beşinci kısımlarda, AKP dönemindeki Türk dış politikası üzerine yapılan tartışmalar öne çıkarılmaktadır. Dördüncü kısım öncelikle AKP dönemi dış politikasının arkaplanına genel bir bakış sunduktan sonra Davutoğlu'nun fikirlerini ve bu fikirlerin Türk dış politikası için ne anlama geldiğini ve bilhassa 2003 Irak Savaşı'na karşı Türkiye'nin reaksiyonunu incelemeye geçmektedir. Beşinci kısımda ise üzerinde durulan konu AKP'nin aktif olarak takip ettiği liberal politikalarıdır. Türkiye'nin ticaret devleti davranışları ve Medeniyetler İttifakı'ndaki rolü fonksiyonel diplomasının, üçüncü devlet sıfatıyla üstlendiği roller arabuluculuk politikasının, TİKA bünyesindeki faaliyetleri niche diplomasının, Irak'a Komşu Ülkelerin Dışişleri bakanları toplantısı gibi bölgesel girişimlerle işbirliğini geliştirme gayretleri ortak diplomasının, Genişletilmiş Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika Girişimi çerçevesindeki ve İKÖ bünyesindeki faaliyetleri norm yayma politikalarının örnekleri olup bunlar AKP'nin liberal politikaları içinde yer almaktadır. Netice itibariyle, Türkiye'nin bu dönemde takip ettiği politikalar, liberal orta güç perspektifinden bakıldığında daha iyi anlaşılacaktır.

1. Maddî ve normal değişimler

Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden bu yana Türkiye'nin liberal orta güç olma sürecini gerçekleştirecek beş maddî ve normal değişim meydana gelmiştir. Norm kavramı güvenlik normları ve ideolojik normlar olmak üzere ikiye ayrılabilir. Soğuk Savaş esnasında güvenlik normları esasen devletler arası ihtilâflar ile alakalıydı. Liberal demokrasi ve komünizm birbirine ideolojik planda zıttı. İlk maddî değişim Soğuk Savaş'ın sonunda meydana geldi. Bu maddî değişim, ilgili norm değişimlerini zorunlu kıldı. Güvenlik normunun mahiyeti değişti ve devletler arası ihtilâf yerine iç savaş ve düşük yoğunluklu çatışmalar güvenlik normunun içeriği haline geldi. Ayrıca liberal demokrasi de bir ideolojik norm haline geldi. İkinci maddî değişim bölgesel bir değişimdi. Adana Anlaşması, normu bölgesel planda değişime uğrattı. Düşük yoğunluklu çatışmaların Türkiye ve Suriye arasında fiilen durdurulmasına karar verildi. Üçüncü maddî değişim, ABD'deki 11 Eylül terörist saldırılarını takiben meydana geldi. 11 Eylül terörizmi, teröre karşı savaşın güvenlik normları planında yapılmasına sebep oldu. İdeolojik normlar değişirken medeniyetler çatışması karşıtı gayretler veya başka bir ifadeyle medeniyetler arası diyalog çalışmaları meşruiyet kazandı. Dördüncü maddî değişim Irak savaşı ve savaş sonrasındaki çalışmaların yönetimidir. Bu savaş Irak ve Türkiye arasında düşük yoğunluklu çatışmaların azaltılması gayretlerini cesaretlendirdi. İdeolojik planda, bilhassa Ortadoğu'da demokratikleştirme faaliyetleri kuvvetli bir ideolojik norm haline geldi. Beşinci maddî değişim ise Genişletilmiş Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika Girişimi'nin (BOP) Ortadoğu'da başarısız oluşudur. Bölgesel plandaki bu maddî değişim, ABD tarafından

yürütülen politika ve demokratikleştirme faaliyetlerinin sınırını belirginleştirmiştir.

Netice olarak bahis konusu bu maddî değişimler, Türkiye'nin bir liberal orta güç olarak tebarüz etmesine imkân verecek bir jeopolitik ortam yarattı. Güvenlik normları planında Türkiye, Ortadoğu ülkeleri ile ilişkilerinde güvensizleştirme üzerine yoğunlaştı ve bu durum Türkiye'ye bütün Ortadoğu aktörleri ile masaya oturmasını mümkün kılacak bir pozisyon sağladı. İdeolojik normlar planında ise, ABD'nin yürüttüğü BOP'un başarısız olmasıyla liberal ekonomiyi ve demokrasiyi yaymak için Türkiye'nin lehine uygun bir boşluk oluştu. Türkiye'nin bu boşluktan istifade etmesini mümkün kılan şey ise, ABD ve Ortadoğu ülkeleriyle arasındaki yakın ilişkisi ve sahip olduğu meşruiyeydi.

2. Öz algı değişimi

Bütün siyasîler Türkiye'nin sınırlı gücünün farkındaydılar ve uluslararası itibarını arttırmak için bu sınırlı gücü verimli bir şekilde kullanması gerektiğini düşündüler. Bu amaçla Kanada ve Avustralya ile ilişkilendirilen tarzlardaki liberal politikalar yürüttüler. Soğuk Savaş'ın sonuna kadar baskıcı bir orta güç olan Türkiye'nin özerkliğini emniyet altına almak için güç dengesi, peşine takma ve tarafsızlık politikaları yürütmekten başka çaresi yoktu. Fakat Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Türkiye, takip ettiği politikaları vasıtasıyla orta güç rolünü üstlenmeye bizatihi teşebbüs etti.

Dikkat çekildiği üzere, Özal, Erbakan, Cem ve Davutoğlu Türk dış politikası davranışlarını kısmen değişikliğe uğrattı. Osmanlıcılık, İslamcılık ve Turancılık

gibi geleneksel Türk dış politikası ideolojilerini ulusal ve uluslararası alana yönelik olarak Türkiye'nin etki sahasını genişletmek için kısmen geliştirdiler. Politika planında, Özal KEİ ve Turkie Zirvesi gibi bölgesel kuruluşları tesis ederek ve AT'ye üyelik başvurusunda bulunarak Türkiye'nin liberal ekonomiye girişini sağladı. Bunlar, fonksiyonel diplomasi, ortak diplomasi ve norma yayma politikası için temel teşkil etti. Buna ilaveten, Özal TİKA'yı kurdu ve Orta Asya ve Kafkas bölgeleri için yardım politikaları başlattı. İdeolojik planda Özal komşu ülkelerin üzerinde Türkiye'nin etki sahasını genişletmeye dayanan neo-Osmanlılığı destekledi. Bu yeni ideoloji liberal politikalar için uygun zemini hazırladı. Bunun yanında, aynen II. Abdülhamid gibi Özal da Türkiye'nin hassasiyetini ve dünya politikasındaki yeni şartlara intibak etmek ihtiyacını fark etti.

Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği(KEİ)'nin kurulması Özal'ın bölgesel kurumsallaştırma politikalarını hayata geçirme denemelerinden birisi olması bakımından sembolik bir öneme sahipti. "Karadeniz bölgesi" kavramı KEİ'nin kurulmasından sonra ortaya atıldı. İstanbul Deklerasyonu'na taraf olan Azerbaycan, Bulgaristan, Gürcistan, Ermenistan, Moldova, Romanya, Rusya, Türkiye, Ukrayna ve Yunanistan'ın 1992 yılında Boğaziçi Bildirisini yayımlamasıyla bir bölgesel ekonomik işbirliği teşkilatı olarak tasarlanan KEİ'nin kuruluş aşamasına geçildi. Üye devletler KEİ'yi AB'ye bir karşıt ağırlık olarak değil AB'nin bir tamamlayıcısı olarak gördüler. KEİ üyeleri ulaşım, iletişim, enerji, çevre koruması, ziraat, sağlık hizmeti, bilim, teknoloji ve daha birçok konuda işbirliği çalışmaları yürüttüler. Bir ekonomik işbirliği teşkilatı olarak gördüğü vazifenin yanında KEİ, bölgesel güvenliğin sağlanmasında da rol

üstlendi. Bahis konusu İstanbul Deklerasyonu'nda bölgesel barış, istikrar ve refaha dostane komşuluk ilişkilerinin geliştirilmesi yoluyla erişilmesi hedefi vurgulandı.

Özal ayrıca Ekonomik İşbirliği Teşkilatı'na (EİT) Azerbaycan, Kırgızistan, Tajikistan, Türkmenistan ve Özbekistan gibi ülkelerin üye olmasını sağlayarak teşkilatın gücünü arttırdı. Bunun yanında Yunanistan ve Sovyet vatandaşlarının tabi olduğu vize şartlarını yumuşatarak kişilerin serbest dolaşımını teşvik etti.

Erbakan'ın liberal orta güç teşebbüslerine katkısı sınırlı oldu. Politika planında, ortak diplomasiyi Müslüman ülkelere yönelik kullandı. Yine de, Özal'ın yaptığı gibi, Ortadoğu bölgesinde olumlu bir şekilde faaliyette bulundu. İsrail hariç bütün Ortadoğu ülkelerine karşı sempatisi vardı.

Erbakan başbakan olduktan sonra İran'dan Endonezya'ya uzayan ilk yurt dışı seyahatini gerçekleştirdi. Ziyaret edeceği ülkeler arasında Batılı ülkelerin rejimini sıklıkla eleştirdiği Libya da vardı. Ayrıca NATO ve AB'ye karşıt ağırlık oluşturması amacıyla Gelişen 8 Ülke(D8) teşkilatının kurulması için gayret sarfetti. D8, Bangladeş, Endonezya, İran, Mısır, Malezya, Nijerya, Pakistan ve Türkiye gibi Müslüman nüfusun çoğunlukta olduğu ülkelere oluşmaktaydı. D8'in kurulmasına yönelik ilk adım, 22 Ekim 1996 tarihinde Türkiye'nin davetiyle İstanbul'da gerçekleştirilen "Kalkınmada İşbirliği Konferansı" yla atıldı. Bu konferansı takiben gerçekleştirilen hazırlık mahiyetindeki dışişleri bakanları toplantılarından sonra 15 Haziran 1997'de D8 resmen kuruldu. Hazırlık mahiyetindeki dışişleri bakanları toplantılarının ikincisinde Ankara, D8'in işbirliği alanlarını gösteren bir liste sundu. D8'in resmî internet sitesine göre, Haziran 1997'de kabul edilen D8'in hedefleri şunlardır.

Temel hedefi sosyo-ekonomik kalkınmayı mümkün kılmak olan D8 bu hedefini; savaş değil barış, çatışma değil diyalog, sömürü değil işbirliği, çifte standart değil âdil düzen, ayrımcılık değil eşitlik, tahakküm değil demokrasi gibi prensiplere bağlı kalmak suretiyle gerçekleştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

D8'in Haziran 1997'de resmen kurulmasından hemen sonra aynı ay Erbakan başbakanlık görevinden istifa etti. D8, Erbakan'ın şahsî tasarı ve inisiyatiflerine fazlaca bağımlı haldeydi ve bu istifa D8'in işlerini zorlaştırdı. 1999 ve 2001 yıllarında sırasıyla Dakka ve Kahire'de iki zirve toplantısı yapılsa da D8, AKP hükümetinin dikkatini tekrar bu gruba çevirmesine kadar atıl kaldı.

Cem, fonksiyonel ve ortak diplomasiyi benimsedi. Cem'in dışişleri bakanlığı döneminde Türkiye'nin AB'ye tam üyeliği Helsinki Zirvesi'nde tescil edildi. İdeolojik planda Cem *Turkey in the 21st Century* kitabında merkez coğrafyasının, tarihî değerlerin, ekonomik işbirliğinin ve medenî değerlerin ehemmiyetine dikkat çekti. Özal gibi Cem de liberal politikalar vasıtasıyla dışarıya karşı Türkiye'nin nüfuzunu arttırmayı amaçladı.

Cem, Haziran 1997'den Eylül 2002'ye kadar Dışişleri bakanlığı görevini yürüttü. *Turkey in the 21st Century* kitabında dış politikada dört şeyi önplana çıkardı. Bunlardan ilki, Cem'in dış politika hedefi olan "dünya devleti" olma idealiydi. Cem'e göre Türkiye ne sadece Avrupalı ne de sadece Asyalı idi; bunun yerine hem Avrupa toplumunun bir üyesi hem de İslam dünyası için bir model ülke konumundaydı ve Türkiye tarihî Balkan, Kafkas, Ortadoğu ve Orta Asya coğrafyasının "merkez noktası"nda yer almaktaydı.

Cem, saniyen, Türkiye'nin tarihî değerlerini öne çıkardı. Türkiye'nin tarihine dair, geleneksel Türk dış politikası analizlerinin tarihî boyuttan yoksun oluşunu

eleştirdi ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun dış politika tecrübesini takdir ederek Osmanlı devrinin, uluslararası ilişkilerde Türkiye'nin lehine birçok avantaj yarattığını ileri sürdü. Bu avantajlar istikrar, güvenlik ve hoşgörü kavramlarıyla izah edilebilir. Osmanlı hoşgörüsü Cem'e göre, tehditten uzak hoşgörülü bir çoğunluğun ve isyan etmekten uzak bir azınlığın, kültürel etkileşim ortamının ve kültürel birlikteliğin varlığı olarak anlaşılmalıdır. Cem, ülke içi toplumsal hoşgörüden bahsetse de, hoşgörü kavramına neo-Osmancı denilen dış politika anlayışında da sıklıkla başvurulmuştur.

Salisen, Cem, ülkeler arasında savaş ihtimalini azaltacağı ve barışı mümkün kılacağı düşüncesiyle ekonomik işbirliği gayretlerine destek verdi. Bu düşünce tarzı, fonksiyonalist yaklaşımı yansıtmaktadır.

Cem'in dış politikada önplana çıkardığı dördüncü fikir, medeniyetçi bir yaklaşım taşımaktaydı. AKP'nin sahip olduğu medeniyetçi yaklaşım Cem'den devralınmıştı. Cem, ayrıca, medeniyet kültüründeki "sentetik" unsura dikkati çekti ve müşterek hafızanın, temel zihniyetin ve davranış kalıplarının kaynağı olarak kültürü gösterdi. Kültürü, köklü ve sığ olmak üzere ikiye ayırdı. Köklü kültür, antik Anadolu'ya ve medeniyetlerin doğuşuna kadar geriye uzanmaktaydı. Anadolu medeniyetlerin beşiğiydi. İşte muhtemelen bu bakış açısı Cem'i Türkiye'yi medeniyetlerin merkezi olarak görmeye sevk etti. Diğer taraftan, sığ kültürel perspektif ise diğer kültürlerin yok sayılması veya öteki kültürlere karşı aşağılık kompleksi taşımak gibi özellikleri yansıtmaktaydı. Cem, herhalükarda Anadolu tarihinde adı geçen her medeniyetin, şimdiki Türk toplumunun şekillenmesine katkıda bulunmuş olduğunu vurguladı.

12-13 Şubat 2002 tarihlerinde İstanbul'da yapılan İKÖ-AB ortak forumu, Cem için büyük bir diplomatik başarı oldu. Burada önemle hatırlanması gereken bu forumun 11 Eylül'den yalnızca 6 ay sonra toplanmış olmasıdır. 76 ülkenin 51 dışişleri bakanı ve ülke temsilcilerinin katılımıyla gerçekleşen bu forumda Batılı ülkeler ve İslam ülkeleri arasındaki medeniyetler çatışması sorununa bir çözüm bulmak için müzakereler yapıldı. Açılış konuşmasında Cem, 11 Eylül terörist saldırılarını takip eden 2002 yılı için iki farklı eğilimin varlığına dikkat çekti. Bir taraftan radikal İslamcı grubun yürüttüğü terörizmin neticesinde kültürel ve dinî farklılıkların öne çıkarılması. Diğer taraftan ise kültürel çeşitlilik ve karşılıklı anlayışın önplana alınmasıyla bahis konusu farklılıklarla başa çıkmayı mümkün kılacak dayanışmacı eğilim. Cem, kısaca, 11 Eylül terörizminin dinî ve kültürel unsurlarla alakalı olmadığını göstermek istedi. Cem'in açılış konuşmasına paralel bir şekilde bu forum, katılımcıların farklı kültür ve medeniyetlerin üyeleri ile işbirliği yapmalarını mümkün kılan bir platform mahiyetindeydi. Cem, forumda bütün ülkelerin insan haklarına ve farklılıklara saygı ve terörizmin önlenmesi temelinde daha evrensel bir kritere göre hareket etmesi gerektiğinin altını çizdi. Cem, teröre karşı savaş konusunda, PKK ile mücadelesinde edindiği tecrübeler sayesinde Türkiye'nin teröre karşı mücadeleye katkıda bulunmaya yeterli ve hazır olduğunu düşünmekteydi.

Liberal politikalara ilaveten Cem'in dışişleri bakanlığı sırasında Türkiye ve Suriye arasında cereyan eden Ekim 1998 buhranı, Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu politikasında bariz bir dönüm noktası oldu. Soğuk Savaş döneminde olduğunun aksine, Körfez buhranını takiben Türkiye, Ortadoğu bölgesine bilfiil müdahil olmak mecburiyetinde kaldı. Böyle olmakla beraber, Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu

meselelerine yaklaşımı komşu ülkelerden algıladığı tehditlere göre belirlenen güvenlik merkezli bir siyaset mahiyetindeydi. 1990'lar boyunca Türkiye'nin en ziyade tehdit algıladığı ülkeler arasında Suriye vardı. Kuzey Irak da PKK'ya verdiği açık desteği sebebiyle Türkiye'nin tehdit olarak gördüğü ülkeler arasında Suriye'nin yanında yer aldı. Türkiye ve Suriye, Adana Anlaşması'nın imza edilmesini müteakiben karşılıklı güven inşa etme sürecini başlatmıştı. Hafız Esad'ın ölümüyle yerine Beşar Esad'ın geçişi, iki ülke arasındaki dostane ilişkilerin derinleşmesini hızlandırdı. 1990'lı yılların Türk-Suriye ilişkileri tehdit algıları tarafından şekillenen güvenlik problemleriyle sınırlı kalmış ve Türkiye'nin gözünde Suriye uzlaşmaz ve dostluktan uzak bir ülke olarak görülmüşse de Türkiye ve Suriye arasında ilişkileri güvensizleştirme anlamına gelen Adana Anlaşması'nı takiben Türkiye'nin Suriye'ye yönelik algısı köklü bir değişim geçirmiş ve zamanla Suriye dost ve güvenilir bir komşu haline gelmiştir.

Davutoğlu, liberal politikaları giderek daha çok Ortadoğu'ya yöneltti. İdeolojik planda, medenî, tarihî ve coğrafi öz algılayışlara önem atfetti. Bunlar birbiriyle ilişkili kavramlardır. İslam'ın medenî öz algılayışı, İslamî felsefeye göre, diğer medeniyetlerle barışçı yollardan işbirliği yapmaya elverişlidir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu bu tarz İslamî medeniyetin iyi bir örneğiydi. Neo-Osmanlıcılığın Davutoğlu versiyonu emperyal bir mirasa değil bölgesel istikrarı gerçekleştirmek amacıyla Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun barışçı, çok uluslu mirasına dayanır. Meşhur "Stratejik Derinlik"inde jeopolitik ve tarihî derinliği kullandı. Mamafih, fiilen dış politikasında Türkiye'nin dünya politikasındaki itibarını arttırmak için tamamen liberal politikalara başvurdu. 5.kısımda tahlil edildiği üzere Davutoğlu fonksiyonel diplomasi, arabuluculuk, niche diplomasi, ortak diplomasi ve norm

yayma politikalarını benimsedi. ABD'nin demokratikleştirme politikasının başarısız oluşunu takip eden siyasî boşluğa karşı Davutoğlu hassastı ve hızlı tepki verdi. 2005'ten 2010'a Davutoğlu tarafından yürütülen dış politika bu liberal orta gücü tatmin edici nitelikteydi.

Davutoğlu'nun 2008'in başlarında yayımlanan "*Turkey's foreign policy vision: An assessment of 2007*" başlıklı makalesi AKP'nin dış politika anlayışını açık seçik bir şekilde göstermektedir. Bu makale üç kısımdan oluşmaktadır. İlk kısımda, Davutoğlu, Türkiye'nin dünya siyasetindeki yerini analiz etmektedir. Davutoğlu'na göre, NATO üyesi olarak Türkiye Soğuk Savaş döneminde Güneydoğu Avrupa'nın Sovyet bloğuna karşı müdafaa edilmesini amaçlayan bir cephe ülkesi olarak görülmüştü. 1990'lı yılların başlarında ise, Türkiye'ye köprü ülke rolünü atfeden yeni bir fikir ortaya çıktı. Bu dönemde Türkiye'nin başlıca hedefi, Körfez Savaşı ve bir dizi Balkan buhranları sebebiyle kendi istikrarını muhafaza etmeye çalışmaktan ibaretti. 1990'larda yayımlanan kitaplar ve makalelerde Türkiye için, "Doğu ve Batı arasındaki köprü", "Adriyatik'ten Çin Seddine Türk dünyası" ve benzeri söylemlere sıklıkla başvuruldu. 11 Eylül 2001'den sonra Türkiye'nin dünya siyasetindeki konumu, fikrî ve coğrafi temelde yeniden tasarlanmıştır. Şöyle ki, Türkiye, çok sayıda bölge arasında "merkez ülke" olmanın ve böyle görüldüğünün farkına varmıştır. Davutoğlu'nun ifadesiyle: "Türkiye, hem Asyalı hem de Avrupalı bir ülke olması ve aynı zamanda Akdeniz kanalıyla Afrika'ya da yakın olması bakımından optimal bir mevkiye sahiptir."

Davutoğlu ikinci kısımda, AKP iktidarı altında Türkiye'nin beş dış politika prensibi benimsemiş olduğunun altını çizmektedir. Birinci prensip, özgürlük ve güvenlik arasında denge tesis etmektir. Soğuk Savaş'ın nihayete ermesinden sonra

uluslararası planda özgürlük söylemi hakimiyet kazandı. Buna mukabil, 11 Eylül'den sonra güvenlik meseleleri önplana çıkarak diğer meseleler karşısında öncelik kazandı. Buna rağmen, Davutoğlu'nun dediğine göre, 11 Eylül sonrası dönemde Türkiye tamamen istisnai bir duruma sahiptir, zira pek çok ülkenin aksine Türkiye, 11 Eylül'den sonra da Kopenhag kriterlerinin zorunlu kıldığı siyasî reformlarla uyum içerisinde, bireysel özgürlüklerin alanını genişletmeye devam etmiştir. Güvenlik konusunda ise Türkiye, bir taraftan PKK'ya karşı silahlı mücadelesini sürdürürken diğer taraftan Türkiyeli Kürt halkına bahsedilen haberleşme alanındaki özgürlüklerin ve ana dilde eğitim hakkı gibi bireysel özgürlüklerin çapı muazzam bir surette genişletilmiştir. Bu bakımdan AKP hükümeti, güvenlik ve özgürlük arasında iyi bir denge tutturmayı başarmış görünmektedir. Davutoğlu'nun altını çizdiği beş prensipten ikincisi Türkiye'nin komşularına yönelik sıfır problem politikasıdır. 1990'lı yılların başlarına kadar Türkiye'nin Bulgaristan ve Rusya ile 1990'ların sonlarına kadar Yunanistan, İran, Irak ve Suriye ile ilişkileri problemliydi. Fakat AKP'nin iktidara gelişinden sonra bu ilişkiler geniş çapta iyiye gitti. Türkiye'nin AKP iktidarı altında benimsediği üçüncü prensip, komşu bölgeler ve ötesiyle ilişkileri geliştirmek olmuştur. Türkiye'nin etki sahası, Balkanlardan, Ortadoğu, Kafkaslar ve Orta Asya'ya kadar uzanmaktadır. Beş yıllık gayretlerden sonra bugün Türkiye söz konusu bölgelerde önde gelen aktörlerden birisi olmuştur. Dördüncü prensip, çok boyutlu ve çok yönlü diplomasi. Soğuk Savaş boyunca Türkiye genel itibariyle Batı'ya dönük tek boyutlu ve tek yönlü bir diplomasi takip etmiştir. Türk dış politikasının temel meselesi devlet eliyle güvenliğin sağlanmasıydı(tek yönlü). 1960'lardan sonra ise, Türkiye'ye dış politikasında "eşit uzaklık" politikasına diğer bir

ifadeyle çok boyutlu diplomasiye geçti. Çok boyutlu politikanın esas amacı, bilhassa güvenlik alanında haricî baskıları eşit bir şekilde dengelemek suretiyle statükoyu muhafaza etmektir. Güvenlik konularına ilaveten, uluslararası sistemin daha dinamik hale geldiği ve meselelerin daha çeşitlilik kazandığı Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Türkiye, ekonomik ve kültürel ilişkilere daha çok önem vermeye başladı. Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş sonrası çok boyutlu politikalarının temel hedefi, bütün komşu bölgelerde kendi etki sahasını genişletmektir. Davutoğlu'nun sözünü ettiği beş prensipten sonuncusu ritmik diplomasi. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında uluslararası sistem oldukça dinamik hale geldi. Şartların dinamikleştiği bir zamanda statik kalmaya çalışmak, yeni şartlara intibak etmeyi imkânsız kılar. Böyle zamanlarda akışkan ve esnek bir diplomasiye ihtiyaç vardır ki bu da ritmik diplomasi.

Makalenin üçüncü kısmı, AKP iktidarı altında başta Irak ve AB ile ilişkiler olmak üzere Türk dış politikasının bilfiil kazanımlarıyla ilgilidir. Makalenin netice kısmında Davutoğlu, Türkiye'nin "uluslararası planda proaktif bir mevki" kazanabilmesi için demokrasiyi ve bölgesel istikrarı kalıcı kılmak üzerine yoğunlaşmak gerektiği hususunu vurgulamaktadır. Davutoğlu'nun netice kısmında söyledikleri 2008 itibariyle sahip olduğun kararlılığın yeniden vurgulanışıdır.

Oxford Üniversitesi'nde 1 Mayıs 2010 tarihinde ana konuşmacı olarak verdiği derste dile getirdiği fikirler Davutoğlu'nun dış politikaya dair fikirlerinin daha güncel versiyonunu sundu ve konuşması aynı zamanda *Political Reflection* dergisinde çıktı. 2008 yılında yayımlanan makalesi bölgesel düzeni ve bölgesel politikayı önplana çıkarırken, bu son makalesi aksine global düzene vurgu

yapmaktadır. Bu son makalesinde Davutođlu, ilk olarak, global dzenin tarihî dñüşümünü tarif ederek bu dñüşümü, geleneksel dünya dzeni, kolonyal dünya dzeni, Sođuk Savař dzeni ve Sođuk Savař sonrası dünya dzeni řeklinde jeopolitiđe atıf yaparak tasnif etmektedir. Davutođlu'nun bu tasnifine uygun olarak, Sođuk Savař sonrası global dzeninde, geleneksel jeopolitik, global yñetiřim, global ekonomik dzen ve global kùltürel dzen gibi unsurlar öneme sahiptir. Teknolojik geliřmeler cođrafya ve jeopolitiđin önemini azaltmıř olsa da kolonyalizmin sona eriři ve Sođuk Savař yapısının çöküřü, jeopolitiđi tekrar gündeme getirdi. Davutođlu'nun bahis konusu global yñetiřim ve global ekonomik dzen üzerindeki vurgusu liberalizme bađlılıđını göstermektedir. Günümüzde, global yñetiřim sadece güvenlikle deđil aynı zamanda özgürlükle de alakalıdır. Davutođlu, devamında, Türkiye'nin Sođuk Savař sonrası dünya dzenindeki konumunu, tarih, cođrafya ve diplomasi perspektiflerinden ele almaktadır. Bu makalesinde tarih ve cođrafya faktörlerinin önemini vurgularken kullandıđı dil, *Stratejik Derinlik* kitabındaki üslubun aynısını taşımaktadır. İkinci olarak, Davutođlu, bahis konusu makalesinde proaktif diplomasiye temas etmektedir. Sıfır problem politikası takip etmek, Türkiye'nin bölgedeki etki sahasını genişletmek ve ritmik diplomasi yürütmek anlamına gelen proaktif diplomasiye 2008'deki makalesinde de deđinmiřti. Son olarak, Türkiye'nin bölgesel politikası hakkındaki fikirlerini ileri sürmektedir. Bölgesel politikaya dair bu makalesinde söyledikleri 2008'deki makalesinde ileri sürdükleriyle aynı olmakla beraber bu makalesinde daha siyasi bir üslup kullanmakta ve ekonomik bađımsızlıđa vurgu yapmaktadır. 2008 yılına kadar Türkiye gayretlerini bölgesel

istikrara adanmışken, 2009'dan itibaren global planda kendisine bir rol biçmeye yoğunlaşmıştır.

3. Ötekilerin Algıları

Orta gücün inşasında ötekilerin algıları da önemlidir. Ötekilerin algıları, ilgili ülkelerin muhtelif rollerini pekiştirir veya bu ülkelere çeşitli roller oynamalarını talep eder. Soğuk Savaş döneminden beri ABD, Türkiye üzerinde nüfuzunu kullanmıştır. Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD esasında Türkiye'nin Sovyet bloğuna karşı siper vazifesi görmesi anlamına gelen "Soğuk Savaş savaşçısı" olmasını istedi. Soğuk Savaş sona erdiğinde Türkiye'den ABD'nin bölgedeki kolu olarak hareket etmesi yönünde beklentisi devam etti ve bu defa ABD Türkiye'ye Ortadoğu, Balkanlar, Orta Asya ve Kafkaslarda bölgesel istikrar sağlayıcılık rolü biçti. 11 Eylül'den sonra ABD Türkiye'nin bölge için tekrar model ülke vazifesi görmesini istedi. ABD'nin değişen tarzındaki istekleri Türkiye'nin komşularına yönelik kendi liberal politikalarını takip etme fırsatını yarattı.

Diğer taraftan, Türkiye'nin artan itibarı ve bölgedeki güvenilirliği Ortadoğu'da Türk imajını yumuşattı. Adana Anlaşması yoluyla gerçekleştirilen Ortadoğu'da güvensizleştirme teşebbüsü ve Türkiye'nin Irak savaşına girmeme kararı Arapların algı değişiminde dönüm noktaları idi. AKP'nin İslamcı kökeni de Türkiye'nin imajının yumuşamasında faydalı oldu. Araplar Türkiye'nin liberal politikalarını kendi lehlerine olduğunu düşünerek az veya çok hoş karşıladı.

4. 2005'ten 2010'a Türkiye'nin liberal politikaları

2005'ten 2010'a Türkiye liberal dış politikalarını görülmemiş bir çapta yürüttü. Bu politikalar genel olarak beş kategoride tasnif edilmektedir. İlki fonksiyonel diplomasiydi. Bu tezde, Medeniyetler İttifakı ve ticaret devleti davranışları, bu kategorinin örnekleri olarak ele alınmıştır. Medeniyetler İttifakı, Türkiye'nin fonksiyonel politikasını dünyaya gösterdi. Haziran 2005'te Erdoğan İspanya Başbakanı Zapatero'nun İttifak'ın eş başkanlığı davetini kabul etti. Türkiye ve İspanya, Medeniyetler İttifakı'nın kuruluşunda Yüksek Düzeyli Grupta yer aldı ve İttifak'ın gelişimine katkıda bulundu. Medeniyetler İttifakı'nın uygulama planına göre İttifak, güven ve anlayış ortamının geliştirilmesi için; bir köprü vazifesi görecektir, katalizör, kolaylaştırıcı, destekleyici ve medeniyetler ittifakı çalışmalarının merkezi olarak faaliyet yürüten bir platform olacaktır. Medeniyetler İttifakı vasıtasıyla Türkiye, İslâm dünyası ve Batı arasında medeniyetler çatışması çığırkanlığının yapıldığı bir zamanda kendini uzlaştırıcı bir güç olarak sundu.

Medeniyetler İttifakı yoluyla yürüttüğü fonksiyonel diplomasi Türkiye'nin global düzeydeki faaliyetlerinin bir örneğidir. Bu arada Türkiye bölgesel düzeyde ticaret devleti olarak faaliyet yürüttü. Ticaret devleti fikri, Richard Rosecrance tarafından belirli alanlarda karşılıklı bağımlılık olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Ticaret devleti, uluslararası politikada statüsünü ve ulusal düzeyde kaynak dağılımını fonksiyonel ticaret sistemi içinde geliştirmeyi amaçlayan bir devleti tarif eder. Türkiye Levant Dörtlüsü'nün kuruluşuna öncülük ederek Suriye, Lübnan ve Ürdün'le arasında 14 hususta ticaret hacmini arttırmayı amaçladı. KİK ile ilişkilerin güçlendirilmesi gayretlerinin başlıca hedefi FTA(Serbest Ticaret

Bölgesi) müzakerelerini ilerletmekti. Türkiye'nin KİK ile ilişkileri ticaret devleti politikaları çerçevesinde düşünülmelidir. 3 Eylül 2008'de Cidde'de Türkiye ve KİK bir stratejik ortaklık anlaşması imzaladı. İKÖ ile ilişkilerin güçlendirilmesinin sebebi ise bilhassa Ortadoğu'daki diğer Müslüman ülkeler ile ilişkileri güçlendirmek ve Müslüman ülkeleri ile Batılı ülkeler arasında arabuluculuk statüsü tesis etmekte.

İkinci kategori arabuluculuk olup Türkiye beş yıl boyunca İsrail ve Suriye, İsrail ve Lübnan, İsrail ve Filistin arasında birçok bölgesel ihtilâfla bağlantılıydı. İsrail ve Suriye arasındaki dolaylı müzakereler belirli bir netice doğurmasa da Türkiye hem İsrail hem de Suriye ile iyi ilişkiler sergiledi ve bölgesel arabulucu olarak vazife görme yeteneğini ısrarla ileri sürdü. Bir dizi dolaylı müzakerelerin en önemli neticesi Türkiye'nin uluslararası ve bölgesel alanlarda artan itibarı oldu. Uygulamada etkisi sınırlı kalsa da, Türkiye'nin teşebbüsleri genelde olumlu bir etkiye sahip oldu ve Türkiye İsrail ve Suriye arasında bir arabuluculuk kanalı olarak görülmeye başladı. Türkiye, Suriye ve İsrail arasında temas sağlayıcı bir rol oyandı. 2006 Lübnan Savaşı ile karşı karşıya kaldığında ise kolaylaştırıcılık rolünü üstlendi. Gül ve Erdoğan diğer Ortadoğu liderleriyle zorluk çekmeksizin müzakere edebildiler ve Türkiye'nin İsrail ve Lübnan ile yakın diplomatik ilişkileri sayesinde her iki ülkeye ziyaretleri esnasında aynı derecede kabul gördüler. Irak savaşında olduğunun aksine, Erdoğan bölgesel ilişkilere önem atfetti. Bu eğilim, Davutoğlu'nun öne sürdüğü idealist yaklaşımın hükümete tamamen nüfuz etmiş olduğunu gösterdi. Türkiye, uluslararası kamuoyuna kendi fikirlerini beyan etmek için Medeniyetler İttifakı'nı bir platform olarak kullanabildi. Türkiye, Güvenlik Konseyi 1701 kararına dayanarak İsrail ve

Lübnan arasında savaşı önlemek için yurtiçindeki uzun tartışmalardan sonra UNIFILII(Birleşmiş Milletler Geçici Görev Gücü)'e katılmaya karar verdi. Türkiye, Lübnan krizinin çözümüne temas sağlayıcı ve kolaylaştırıcı olarak katkı sağladı. Filistin ve İsrail arasında arabuluculuk rolü ise diğer iki olaydan farklı bir yaklaşımı temsil etti. Bunun sebebi, TOBB'un bir dizi Ankara Forum'ları vasıtasıyla Filistin ve İsrail arasında oynadığı öncü rol idi. Ankara Forumları, think tank kuruluşları ve hükümetin işbirliği içinde bulunduğu bir gayri resmi diplomasi örneğiydi. Ankara Forum toplantılarının temel amacı, Filistin'de bir sanayi bölgesi kurmak ve Türkiye, İsrail ve Filistin arasında ekonomik ilişkileri geliştirmektir. Henüz üç ülke arasında bu amaca ulaşılmış değil. Bununla beraber, yedinci Ankara Forum'a İsrail Başkanı Simon Peres ve Filistin Başkanı Mahmud Abbas katıldı ve bu toplantı Annapolis zirvesi için bir sıçrama tahtası oldu. İsrail ve Filistin arasında arabuluculukla alakalı olarak Türkiye hem temas sağlayıcılık hem de kolaylaştırıcılık rolünü oynadı. Kısaca, Türkiye'nin arabuluculuk rolü sınırlı kalmakla beraber dünya politikasındaki itibarını güçlendirmesine katkı sağlamıştır.

Bu tezde, Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu'da yürüttüğü niche diplomasi yardım politikası olarak telakki edilmektedir. Irak savaşı sonrasında Arap ülkelerinde bilhassa ulusal düzeyde güçlü bir Amerika karşıtı hissiyat mevcuttu. Bu sebeple, Batılı devletlerin yardım politikalarını yürütmesi zor olmuştur. Buna karşılık, İslamcı hükümeti ve Irak savaşında büyük çaplı askeri bir müdahaleyi reddetmesi sebebiyle Türkiye'nin komşularıyla ilişki kurması kolay olmuştur. Irak savaşı sonrasında Arapların Türkiye'ye bakışı korkunç Türk tipinden olumlu bir imaja

dođru deđişiklik gösteriyordu. Böylece Türkiye yardım politikalarını Ortadođu'ya kolaylıkla sundu.

TİKA özellikle eğitim, sađlık, su dağıtımını ve tesisat olmak üzere sosyal altyapı ve hizmetler alanında başlıca yardım teşkilatı olmuştur. Irak ve Lübnan'da hastaneler kurarak savaşın etkilerini hafifletmeye yardım etmiştir. Filistin'de ise, daha çok kolluk kuvvetlerinin eğitime ve altyapının yeniden inşasına yardım etmiştir. TİKA'ya dair 2009 yılında yayımlanan bir rapora göre Filistin TİKA yardımlarından yararlanan üçüncü ülkedir.

Ortak diplomasi, liberal Türk dış politikasının dördüncü kategorisini teşkil etti. Levant Dörtlüsü'nün kurulması, Irak'a Komşu Ülkelerin Dışışleri Bakanlarının toplantıları ve İKÖ ve KİK(Körfez İşbirliği Konseyi) ile işbirliği alanlarının genişletilmesi Türkiye'nin ortak diplomasi kazanımlarıdır. Levant Dörtlüsü ve KİK teşkilatlarından ticaret devleti kısmında, İKÖ'den norm yayma kısmında bahsettik. Irak'a Komşu Ülkelerin Dışışleri Bakanları girişimi ise, Irak ve Irak'a komşu bölgelerde savaşın önlenmesi ve istikrarın devam ettirilmesi üzerinde yoğunlaşmıştı.

Norm yayma, Türkiye'nin Ortadođu'daki muhataplarına kurumsal ortaklık ve düzenlemelerle birçok politika ve uygulamalarını aktardığı bir politika aracı oldu. Türkiye norm yayıcı olarak üç süreci kolaylaştırmaktadır. İlki, Avrupalılaştırma sürecidir. Avrupalılaştırma süreciyle Türkiye Batılı normları benimsemekte ve daha sonra bunları Türkiye'nin sosyal şartlarına uyması için dönüştürmekte veya başka bir deyişle yerelleştirmektedir. Söz konusu Batılı normların kısmen benimsenmesinden sonra ise Türkiye bu normları Ortadođu ülkelerine yaymaktadır. Bu tezde, bir norm olarak demokrasiye yoğunlaştık.

Türkiye Batı yönelimli demokrasisini, tarihi ve kültürel bağlarıyla iç içe geçmiş bir muhafazakâr demokrasiye çevirdi. Türkiye bu yerleştirilmiş normu Ortadoğu ülkelerine yaymak istemiştir. ABD tarafından yürütülen BOP(Genişletilmiş Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika) girişiminin Demokrasi Destek Diyalogu projesi Türkiye'nin norm yayma politikasının ilk teşebbüsü oldu. Fakat bu teşebbüs Ortadoğu'da yükselişe geçen Amerika karşıtlığı sebebiyle başarılı olamadı. DAD(Demokrasi Destek Diyalogu) ile Türkiye TESEV'in bir projesine dayanarak bilhassa kadınları güçlendirmek üzerine yoğunlaştı. DAD ve BOP girişimlerinin başarısız oluşundan sonra bile TESEV kadınların güçlendirilmesi konusunda Türkiye'nin norm yayma politikasını devam ettirmiştir. Türkiye'nin bir başka demokrasi yayma girişimi İKÖ vasıtasıyla oldu. İKÖ ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin dönüm noktası Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu'nun 2004 yılında İKÖ genel sekreterliğine seçilmesi oldu. İhsanoğlu, uyum ve uzlaşmanın önemini vurgularken Türkiye'nin hem İKÖ hem de uluslararası toplumdaki itibarı arttı. Türkiye ayrıca 20-21 Kasım 2001 tarihlerinde İKÖ'de kadının rolü konulu ilk bakanlar düzeyindeki konferansa ev sahipliği yaptı.

5. Global ve bölgesel politikada Türkiye'nin itibarının artırılması

2005'ten 2010'a yürütülen liberal politikalar Türkiye'nin global ve bölgesel itibarını arttırmıştı. William Bloom ulusal itibarı şu şekilde tarif ediyor: "Ulusal itibar, olaylar ve tasavvurlara bağlı ortaya çıkan ve ulusal kimliği alçaltan yahut yücelten intibadır veya kullanılabilen nüfuzdur." Bugün artık sert güç gösterisi ulusal itibarı arttırmanın en etkili yolu olmaktan çıktı. Buna karşılık, liberal

politikalara dayanan yumuřak gc kullanımı her bir ulus ve devlet iin daha cazip bir yol haline geldi. Liberal orta gc politikaları demokrasi ve ekonomik refahın geliřtirilmesi yoluyla ve çekicilięi sayesinde ulusal itibarı yükseltme yeteneęine sahiptir.