THE MIDDLE EAST AS A REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX: CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE JDP RULE

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ABSTRACT

THE MIDDLE EAST AS A REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX: CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE JDP RULE

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This thesis aims to contribute to the debates on the Justice and Development Party (JDP) era Turkish foreign policy by putting Turkey into the regional security complex theory and examines changes and continuities of Turkey’s traditional cautious, relatively “passive” role and “relative indifference” stance towards the Middle East security complex. Hence, the framework of analysis is the regional security complex theory, attributed roles and role changes of Turkey within regional security complexes. This study, with a historical perspective and within the framework of the regional security complex theory, questions continuities and changes in the JDP period Turkish foreign policy, and comes to the conclusion that in the JDP era, Turkey’s role is going beyond the insulator state function to the “interface logic” which adopts a loose form of geographical boundaries.

Keywords: regional security complex theory, insulator states, Turkish foreign policy
ÖZ

BÖLGESEL GÜVENLİK KOMPLEKSI OLARAK ORTA DOĞU:
AKP DÖNEMİ TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA DEVAMLILIK VE DEĞİŞİM

Vural, Ebru
Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları Anabilim Dalı
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Sevilay Kahraman

Aralık 2010, 137 sayfa

Bu tez, Türkiye’yı bölgesel güvenlik kompleksi teorisi içerisinde yerleştirerek Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) dönemi Türk dış politikası tartışmalara katkıda bulunanı amaçlar ve Türkiye’nin Orta Doğu güvenlik kompleksine karşı geleneksel ihtiyatlı, görece “pasif” rolü ve “görece kayıtsız” duruşundaki devamlılık ve değişimi inceler. Bundan dolayı, analizin çerçevesi bölgesel güvenlik kompleksi teorisi, Türkiye’ye bölgesel güvenlik komplekslerinde atfedilen roller ve rol değişimleridir. Bu çalışma, tarihsel bir çerçeve içerisinde, AKP dönemi Türk dış politikasındaki devamlılık ve değişimi sorgular ve AKP döneminde Türkiye’nin rolünün yalıtkan devlet fonksiyonundan geçiş koğrafi sınırlar biçimini benimseyen “arayüz mantığına” doğru gittiği sonucuna varır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: bölgesel güvenlik kompleksi teorisi, yalıtkan devletler, Türk dış politikası
To the memory of my dear grandmother,

Ayşe Kol
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGNA</td>
<td>Turkish Grand National Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Recent debates on Turkish foreign policy are mainly gathered around the nature, transformation and the so called “axis” of Turkish foreign policy after the Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power in 2002. Indeed, while in the first era of JDP government arguments on Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy was salient, in the second era of JDP government debates have moved towards the questioning the characteristics of Turkish foreign policy especially towards the Middle East. Since then, Turkish foreign policy was primarily presented through Turkey’s late period of active involvement in the Middle East region\(^1\) alongside its challenging relations with the EU and US. These developments, in turn, raised further questions on the “axis shift” in Turkish foreign policy: whether Turkey’s recent period of active involvement in the Middle East means abandoning its traditional foreign policy approach which was often characterized as cautious and mainly adopted non-involvement in the regional conflicts; whether the Middle

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\(^1\) It is important to point out that Middle East is a problematic concept in international relations literature; although today it is a broadly accepted term it reflects a Western point of view. Actually the term Middle East was first used by English at World War II when they entitled their troop units in Egypt as “Middle East Commandership”. Before that, Near East was used to describe that region. Both of the terms reflect the European perspective which takes Far East as reference point; meaning much closer than Far East yet still belongs to east. Therefore which countries should be considered within the region “Middle East” is sometimes not clear. In fact, Middle East in its broadest meaning starts with Morocco in the West and reaches out Ethiopia in the South, on the other hand which countries should be considered within the Middle East changes from time to time. (Sander, 2006, p. 220).
Eastern connection of Turkish foreign policy presents an alternative to the European or Atlantic connection of Turkish foreign policy; whether the rhetorical changes in foreign policy making in the JDP era could bring parallel changes in the practice of Turkish foreign policy; whether the possibility of an axis shift could unfold overtime as Turkey gets favorable results from its involvements in Middle Eastern affairs, but it experiences problems in its relations with the US and the EU or not.

The literature on the nature of the JDP’s foreign policy orientation has divergent points but it can be grouped under four main lines. First line of arguments highlight populism and pragmatism in the JDP era, the second line of arguments explain transformation through Europeanization, the third line of arguments perceive of Turkey’s engagement with the Middle East as neo-Ottoman revival, and the fourth line of arguments basically reflect how the JDP itself frames its foreign policy.

Tarık Oğuzlu, Fuat Keyman, İlter Turan, Nur Bilge Criss, Nicholas Danforth and Emiliano Alessandri’s arguments on the JDP foreign policy highlight pragmatism and populism, and in this sense do not perceive the JDP’s foreign policy as “shift of axis”. Criss (2010) sees the JDP’s foreign policy as not “changing sides”, in her view policies to neighboring regions are based on the past establishments and the change in Turkish foreign policy did not start in the JDP era but much earlier, so these policies cannot be presented as “new”. Principles of Turkish foreign policy under the JDP rule which are presented by Ahmet Davutoğlu as “strategic depth”, “zero
problem policy”, “pro-active foreign policy”, soft power instruments of Turkey… so on are wrapped form of populism. Nicholas Danforth (2010) evaluates Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East through pragmatism and stresses on the importance of interests rather than ideologies in conducting Turkish foreign policy and argued that domestic identity is “overemphasized” in analyzing Turkish foreign policy. In this sense, he sees continuity of interests in the pragmatic approach in conducting foreign policy from Atatürk to Özal and the JDP era. Like Danforth, Turan (2010) evaluates prevailing considerations of the JDP as economic and living in peace as changes of Turkish foreign policy not ideational factors such as Islam. Tarık Oğuzlu (2008) evaluates the change in Turkish foreign policy as Middle Easternization meaning growing significance of the Middle East in Turkey’s relations with the West, namely the EU and US. In this sense, Oğuzlu does not see the Middle Easternized foreign policy as “shift of axis”, but adopting a much more pragmatic approach in relations with the US and EU. Oğuzlu interprets this development as “inevitable” because of new threat perceptions. Like Oğuzlu, Keyman (2009) perceives an active role of the JDP government as “rational decision” taken at the global context and Turkey is not represented as an Islamic country but as a nation-state which responds to the global changes. He points out the needs to examine the JDP’s foreign policy in the sense of whether it is realistic and sustainable or not. According to report of the International Crisis Group (2010), activist regional policies of Turkey were seeded before the JDP’s rise to power but until the end of the 1990s there was no Middle East vision of Turkey. This report adopts the view that
activist regional policy which is especially trying to be realized in the Middle East has not changed the traditional westward direction of Turkish foreign policy; Turkey’s increased role in the Middle East is complementary and dependent on its ties with the Western allies. Emiliano Alessandri (2010) also adopts the view that the change in Turkey started with the Özal era, and with the end of the Cold War which was perceived by Turgut Özal as an opportunity for Turkey, and evaluates the JDP era’s foreign policy as continuation of Turkey’s quest for a new place in the post-Cold War era, not as “shift of axis” for the reason that transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy does not undermine its Westward orientation.

The second line of arguments on transformation in Turkish foreign policy is established upon Europeanization but at some points in different forms. Ziya Öniş has written articles on Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy and made assessments on the momentum of Europeanization process. Besides Öniş, Meliha Benli Altunışık, Mustafa Aydı̈n and Sinem Açıkmeşe also wrote articles that used Europeanization to understand the JDP era in Turkish foreign policy. Öniş (2008) identifies the early years of the JDP government as the “golden age of Europeanization” both in the domestic and foreign policy realms. He sees Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy as the increasing use of “soft power” through the adoption of the EU’s foreign policy tools in the relations with other countries. However, in Öniş’s view, suspension of “key chapters” in membership negotiations with the EU, led the JDP government to perform a policy of “loose
Europeanization”, after 2005, which implies the loss of momentum in membership negotiations. Later on, Öniş (2009) explained the change in the momentum with change and continuity in foreign policy approach of the first and second era of the JDP governments. In his view, proactive and multilateral approach of the country is the continuity element of the JDP governments, but there is a “shift in commitment” to Europeanization from “deep Europeanization” to “loose Europeanization”. However, although Turkey’s relations with the EU entered into a period of deadlock, this does not mean the abandonment of the whole European integration process (Öniş, 2010).

By Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy, Altunışık (2009) refers to the “internalization” of foreign policy norms of the EU (p.142). Use of “multilateral diplomacy”, “soft power”, “conflict management and resolution roles” (p. 149) in conducting the relations with the Middle East region is evaluated by Altunışık as Europeanization. In this sense, Altunışık interprets the nature of the involvements in the Middle East not contradictory to the EU connection of Turkey, but points out that the accession process to the EU is less referred to in relations with the Middle East after 2004. Aydın and Açıkmeşe (2007, pp. 263-264) points out that Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy is the “major framework” to understand the recent changes in the conduct of Turkish foreign policy, but domestic and other external factors should also be taken into consideration.
The third line of arguments evaluates the JDP era through neo-Ottomanism. In this sense, they mainly interpret the recent era in Turkish foreign policy as ideology motivated challenge to Kemalist foreign policy. According to Ömer Taşpınar (2008), neo-Ottomanism is the main motive for the JDP government which is described by him as the engagement and projection of influence to the former Ottoman dominions. In this regard, neo-Ottomanism represents a rupture to Kemalist understanding of non-involvement. Mediation and facilitation efforts of Turkey in the Middle East conflicts and Turkey’s participation in the UN forces following the Lebanon War in 2006, and holding the position of the leadership by a Turkish citizen in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) interpreted by him as part of the neo-Ottomanist revival. Nora Fisher Onar (2009) evaluates the neo-Ottomanist revival in the JDP era as a “strategy of consolidating Turkey’s position as a regional power” (p. 15). Both Taşpınar (2008) and Onar (2009) see Özal era as the precursor of the JDP era. In Soner Çağaptay’s view (2009), JDP’s perception of the world is through “regional blocs” and in practice the policies of the JDP mainly focused on the Muslim Middle East rather than embracing the Ottoman realm as a whole.

The fourth line of arguments totally reflects how the JDP perceives and presents its foreign policy. Ahmet Davutoğlu (2001), who is the main architect of Turkish foreign policy in the JDP era, argues that Turkey’s dominant governing elites (although not clearly stated, he refers to Kemalist Republican elites) estimated an “intra system peripheral role”, but it is not compatible with Turkish society’s
realities, historical accumulations and ideals, and expectations (p. 91). In this context, while he defines the reasonable foreign policy for Turkey’s identity and culture, he asserts the need for backbone and this can be achieved only by the legacy that Turkey acquired from the Ottoman Empire, and offers Turkey a “dynamic civilizational axis” (p. 93). Davutoğlu (2001) proposes counterargument to the “clash of civilizations” argument of Samuel Huntington (1993) based on the common values with neighbors. With regards to the shift of axis debates; Suat Kımkılıoğlu (2009a), who is the JDP Deputy Chairman for External Affairs, sees Turkey’s policies towards the Middle East as complementary to Turkey’s relations with the EU and the US; he perceives the policies of the JDP governments in the region as enhancing and enriching its relations with the EU and US. Prime Minister Erdoğan (2009) commented on “axis shift” debates by saying that “If there is any diversion from the axis it is the European diversion.” Bülent Aras (2009) argues that in the JDP era Turkish foreign policy has become dynamic and multidimensional and this is not confined to the Middle East region, and after Ahmet Davutoğlu became the Minister of Foreign Affairs Turkey’s involvement in the neighboring regions is “deepened” (pp. 127-136). İhsan Dağı (2008) argues that the “new activism” of Turkey does not create suspicions in the Middle East because of the increasing “soft power” of Turkey in the JDP era (p. 3).

These debates, grouped under four lines of arguments above, do not provide a theoretical aspect to Turkey’s recent activism under the JDP rule nor reflect a
specific theoretical framework for analysis. This thesis aims to contribute to the
debates on the JDP era Turkish foreign policy by putting Turkey into the regional
security complex theory and examines changes and continuities of Turkey’s
traditional cautious, relatively “passive” role and “relative indifference” (Buzan &
Weaver, 2003, p. 484) stance towards the Middle East security complex. Hence, the
framework of analysis will be the regional security complex theory, attributed roles
and changes in Turkey’s roles within regional security complexes. This study
questions continuities and changes in the JDP period Turkish foreign policy from the
perspective of regional security complex theory. Given to the debates on “axis shift”
in Turkish foreign policy, it is a timely quest to analyze the extents of continuities,
changes and its implications for Turkey and its neighborhood.

Looking from a historical angle, during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods
until the JDP rule, Turkey could be considered as one of the “insulator states” by the
regional security complex theory (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 41). Accordingly,
Turkey was positioned between three regional security complexes - Middle Eastern,
European and Caucasus - and insulating the conflict dynamics in these regional
security complexes necessitated Turkey to adopt some sort of foreign policy choices.
These choices mainly are the preservation of the status quo and implementation of a
relatively passive stance towards the Middle East in the face of the risk of being
dragged into regional conflicts (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, pp. 392-393). Although
Turkey faced some sort of diversions in foreign polices of insulator states as
observed in the Menderes period of the late 1950s and Özal period in the early 1990s, these can still be interpreted as change within continuity. The activisms of these periods had not created a path breaking effect in terms of insulator state role of Turkey. Moreover, in these periods, the primacy of the Western connection, transatlantic relations and relations with the EC/EU in formulation of the Turkish foreign policy was evident (Sander, 1998, p. 71). This thesis argues that during the JDP government period Turkey’s traditional “insulator state” position and the insulating function of Turkey between regional security complexes have been changing through the so-called “pro-active policies” of the JDP government. As argued by the regional security complex theory, insulator status depends on some balances that should be kept, and necessitated not directly involvement in regional conflicts like a pole of the regional security complex; otherwise insulator state may be “absorbed” into a regional security complex and gradually became a “pole” in it (Buzan & Weaver 2003: 487). Therefore, unlike the previous eras, in the JDP government era Turkey’s rhetoric and foreign policy practices are surpassing both the insular state definition of the theory and “change within continuity” conceptualization of this study, with regard to the early periods’ activism of Turkish foreign policy. Nevertheless, unlike “axis shift” debates, this thesis argues that it is too early to make judgments such as that Turkey is absorbed into the Middle East security complex and becoming pole in the Middle East security complex or as it is argued by Diez (2005) and Bengtsson, Turkey is now included in the European security complex because of the ongoing accession negotiations. The current state of
pro-activism can only be interpreted as initial steps; durability and consistency of Turkish foreign policy matter mostly in our current and future analysis.

Within this context, Chapter 2 of this thesis will set the theoretical background through the regional security complex theory and what kind of role is put forth in the regional security complex theory for Turkey will be asserted. In line with this, in the first part of Chapter 2, first, the reasoning to adopt a regional perspective to security will be discussed, since regional security complex theory is developed as an answer to the lack of the regional perspective of neorealist theory which takes states as the principal actors and neglecting the regional level in the analysis. Second, the main assumptions of the regional security complex theory will be put forward. In the second part of Chapter 2, the Middle East region as a regional security complex will be analyzed. First, what is meant by the Middle East security complex will be asserted, this part will continue with the evolution of the Middle East regional security complex through time and in the concluding section the growing salience of the Middle East regional security complex in the post-Cold War era will be revealed. In the third part of Chapter 2, the attributed role for Turkey in the regional security complex theory will be exposed since Turkey is perceived as “insulator state” by the regional security complex theory and insulator state will be taken as the model to make assessments of continuities and changes in Turkey’s position within the theory. Nevertheless, in order to enrich and provide a more insightful analysis Bengtsson’s (2010) contribution to the regional security complex theory and the relevance of
Turkey and the EU to the revisited analysis of the theory will be explored. The thesis argues that the recent era of Turkish foreign policy is going beyond the “insulating function” to the “interface logic” for Turkey since Turkey’s relations are becoming more complex than ever with both the EU and the Middle East.

As stated before, in this thesis the framework will be the regional security complex theory, and changes and continuities will be dealt as a part of drawing conclusions from Turkey’s position vis-à-vis this theory which is being an “insulator state”. In this context, a historical perspective will be adopted and conclusions will be drawn from the policies towards the Middle East security complex. So, in Chapter 3, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East security complex until the JDP era will be set forth. After briefly giving the early Republican era’s stance towards neighboring regions, changes and continuities vis-à-vis the insulating function of Turkey will be set forth from the Menderes government era, to 1960s and 1970s. Chapter 3 will continue with the Özal era and 1990s coalition governments when the Middle East region was strictly identified with security concerns. Turkish foreign policy evidently drifted from the insulating function in the beginning of 1990s under Özal, but if we have a look at the overall historical background of Turkish foreign policy until the JDP government, Turkey did not face serious drifts from the insulator state status. Mainly, changes in Turkish foreign policy can be interpreted as change within continuity which means that continuity elements prevailed in the general characteristics of Turkish foreign policy.
The focus of Chapter 4 will be on questioning the insulator status of Turkey under the JDP rule. In line with this, the first part of Chapter 4 will focus on the two main pillars of the JDP foreign policy: “neo-Ottomanism” and the “strategic depth doctrine”, with the aim of putting forth the relevance of these two concepts to the expected roles from the insulator states by the regional security complex theory. It is concluded that these two core foreign policy concepts of the JDP government’s foreign policy challenge the insulator state position of Turkey vis-à-vis neighboring regional security complexes.

As will be developed in the second part of Chapter 4, if we look the practices of the JDP government, it can clearly be seen that Turkey is increasingly involving in the Middle Eastern affairs through the propositions of “neo-Ottomanism” and the “strategic depth doctrine”. Even so, Turkey’s ongoing accession negotiations, despite entered into a period of deadlock in the time of this thesis is written, dignify Turkey’s relations with the EU-Europe. In fact, the whole practice of Turkish foreign policy’s different dimensions are gradually getting complex which makes it difficult to make assessments on Turkey’s insulating function. Turkey’s role change can now be assessed within the revised regional security complex theory which brought forward the “logic of interface” to the theory and adopts a loose form of geographical boundaries.
2.1. Why do We Need a Regional Perspective to Security?

Regional perspective is lacking in the realist paradigm which took “states” as the only “referent objects” in the analysis, since with regards to security issues, states have situated at the center of security formations in realist outlook. During the Cold War, realist outlook was dominant in analyzing the international interactions and as it is argued by Baldwin (1997, p. 5) security studies in the Cold War mostly focused on “military statecraft”, meaning that if an issue is not strictly related to military force then it was evaluated under “low politics”. In the Cold War era, superpower competition (the US and the USSR) infiltrated into almost all regions of the world. The so-called third world became a field where the US and the USSR, the two superpowers of the time, competed against each other on ideological and geopolitical grounds.
The end of the Cold War that came with the dissolution of the Soviet Union also marked the end of bipolar rivalry at the global level, but led to power vacuums in the Balkans, the Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia (Öniş, 1995, p. 59). Moreover, new security challenges during the post-Cold War such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growth of ethnic nationalism and extremism, religious fundamentalism, transnational organized crime and illegal migration coupled with a broadened security agenda. The new security environment of the post-Cold War era has attributed great significance to regions as security formations. This time existing deficiency of the realist paradigm to explain international interactions became salient, alongside other theoretical frameworks with the increasing concerns regarding regional orders and regional perspectives. According to Cottey and Foster (2004), the change in the power structure after the end of bipolar power structure in international politics resulted with new regional cooperation schemes such as ESDP and ASEAN. These new regional cooperation schemes reflected a flexible structure that comprised regions’ countries. With the widening of the security agenda to cross-border security issues such as terrorism, natural disasters, illegal migration, human and drug trafficking resulted with the emergence of a new security understanding based on the idea “regional solutions to regional problems” (Acharya, 2007, pp. 23-25). Kelly (2007, p. 200) put forward that, in the post-Cold War era intervention to the regional level is not a one-way top-down process. In the new era, regional states have room to maneuver that may end with affecting the extent of external powers’ involvement to the regions’ security
agenda, so that external involvement in regional affairs became a two-way and interactive process.

Mittelman (2000) on “new regionalism” points out that “the most important features of the new regionalism are its worldwide reach, extending to more regions, with greater external linkages” (p. 113). Söderbaum (2003, p. 3) holds the view that new regionalism has different shapes in different regions of the world, and it is not confined to a single region like Europe. New regionalism highlights the linkage between regionalism and globalization which was necessitated by the complexity of the post-Cold War environment compared to the Cold War environment. All these views from different points reflect the need for regional perspective.

As part of “new regionalism” and “new security studies”, Barry Buzan (1991) developed a theoretical framework which offered a regional perspective to security, namely the “regional security complex theory”. Regional security complex theory aimed to assert a regional dimension to international security. Regional security complex theory was mainly based on the argument that after the post-Cold War era international interactions would primarily be regionalized, therefore the need for regional perspective seemed now inevitable. After the Cold War, the importance of the regional level enhanced. What is more, the pattern of relative autonomy of
security relations\(^2\) within regional security complexes from the global level formed a different pattern than that of the bipolar power structure of the Cold War environment with the widening of the security agenda from military to non-military issues and broadening the security studies that would comprise referent objects other than states (Buzan, 2002, pp. 1-2). Regional security complexes are subsystems aiming to create a balance between the state level and the global level, and although regional basis has prevailed, regional security complex theory gives importance to the interplay between regional and global levels (Coşkun, 2006, p. 44).

2.1.2. What is a Regional Security Complex?

Regional security complex theory is a part of “new” security studies, which are developed with the aim of answering the security needs and deficiencies of “traditional” security studies (Bilgin, 2010, p. 72). “New” security studies first set forth the insufficiency of security studies of the Cold War that described security in a “narrow” sense which entailed prevention of contentions between two superpowers to turn into direct military conflicts. Nonetheless, according to new security studies this traditional understanding of security does not explain the “insecurities” in the world (Bilgin, 2010, p. 73).

\(^2\) By relative autonomy of security relations within regional security complexes, it is meant that there is an autonomous regional level security despite the impositions at the global level (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 187).
Security complex theory first brought forward by Barry Buzan in the book entitled “People, States and Fear” (1991) and aimed to set a conceptual framework to provide a critical understanding to security studies (Coşkun, 2006, p. 43). Regional complex is defined as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan, Weaver & De Wilde, 1998, p. 12). Within security regions, interactions between states (units) are characterized as deeply rooted and durable “security interdependence” within a “geographically coherent grouping” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 15). Geographically coherent groupings represent the boundaries of the regional security complexes today.

In the following years, Buzan and Weaver have modified regional security complex with the aim of providing a reliable framework to security analysis by taking into consideration the changing regional and global security structures through the newly emerging security threats. Buzan and Weaver (2003) defined it through the “securitization model” that is the interconnectedness of processes of “securitization” and “de-securitization” between units which makes these units dependent on each other in terms of security (pp. 44-48). Through the securitization model, security complex is defined as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or solved apart from the one another” (Buzan, 2003, p. 141).
“Securitization” is vitally important in the regional security complex understanding; in the case of “securitization”, “securitizing actors”, who make the securitizing move, present some sort of issues as “existential threats” to the “referent objects” who are presented as being threatened (Buzan, et al. 1998, pp. 25-32). As a result of this process, which can be called as “securitizing act”, the issue is included in the security agenda. In this sense, securitization is a “speech act”. Bilgin (2010, pp. 82-83) points out that by speech act discourse, problems do not spontaneously/autonomously constitute threats to security, actors “choose” to securitize them. Even so, drawing such kind of a conclusion is not a result of process of subjective but “intersubjective” assessment that occurred between securitizing actors and significant audience. Since, it is believed in the theory that if an issue is securitized then “emergency modes” such as resource transfer, curtailment of freedoms, methods that includes violence would be legitimized (Weaver, 1995; Stritzel, 2007, pp. 362-363; Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25).

On the other side, de-securitization is “the shifting of issues out of emergency mode”, so that they can be handled and solved in “normal” political procedures, but not with the emergency mode (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 24). “De-securitization” is removing that issue from the security agenda and does not define it with security terms any more. De-securitization does not mean “security” or “insecurity”, it refers that an issue or situation is no longer within the security conceptualization, and then it can be named as “a-security” (Coşkun, 2008, p. 99). From that point of view,
regional security complexes are aggregated securitization (and de-securitization) cases which are interlinked and confined to a geographical area (Buzan and Weaver, 2003). According to Bilgin (2010), the main contribution of securitization model to security studies is to provide a convincing explanation to transformation of the (Western) Europe following the World War II; removing the issues and relations - other than the survival of the states- from security agenda eliminated “military reflections”, in that way security was preserved without using military methods and consequently deter probable aggressors in a “security community” (pp. 81-81). So to speak, if taking out of the issues from security agenda through de-securitization become widespread; these issues would be dealt with normal political procedures rather than external measures.

Securitization and de-securitization processes bring in a social constructivist outlook to regional security complex theory. In this understanding, issues that are evaluated under the security agenda are socially constructed by securitizing actors through the securitization model. Accordingly, the definition of the process of security interdependence among actors defines security constellations\(^3\) which show the whole pattern of security interdependence including domestic, regional, interregional and global level interactions (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 491). For instance, through the regional security complex theory, security constellation of the Western Europe can

\(^3\) Security constellation is defined as “the whole pattern formed by the interplay among the sectors and levels of analysis in regional security” (Coşkun, 2008, p. 89) – domestic, regional, interregional and global level.
be defined as security community; the Middle East can be defined as conflict formation. The relevance of the securitization model beyond the European Union is putting forth a spectrum from security community to conflict formation so that it explains the security constellations within geographically coherent areas. These areas do not always imply cooperation, for instance in the Middle East security complex interdependencies do not denote cooperation but conflict; yet there is an obvious security independence that stretches from Morocco to Iran including Israel and Arab states (Coşkun, 2008, p. 91). Through the constructivist outlook, regional security complex theory takes the boundaries of the regions as socially constructed entities; however, this time the “imagination of togetherness” is problematized that is thought to tie the units together by this understanding (Bengtsson, 2010, p. 23).

While analyzing regional security complexes, there are some sort of criteria to be kept in mind. In a security complex, security interdependence is high between units within the region than security interdependence with units outside the security complex. Regional security complexes can be defined through “power relations” which are defined as “one fears whoever wields greater power” and “patterns of amity and enmity” (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 49).

As it is put forth above, regional security complex theory has a social constructivist outlook. Buzan and Weaver’s securitization model (the processes of securitization and de-securitization) is at some points overlapped with A. Wendt’s discursive
To explain abovementioned patterns Coşkun (2008) put these propositions together into a table in order to provide a framework for the perception of “others”:

Table 2.1 “Self” and “Other” in Regional Security Complex:
A Framework for Analysis (Source: Coşkun, 2008, p. 93)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Security Constellation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With “other”</td>
<td>Interdependence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Constellation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A. Wendt)</td>
<td>Among actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Enmity</td>
<td>Securitization</td>
<td>Conflict formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Rivalry</td>
<td>Normalization</td>
<td>Security Regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Amity</td>
<td>De-securitization</td>
<td>Security Community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Patterns of amity range from friendship to protection and support, whereas in patterns of enmity relations between actors are based on suspicion and fear (Coşkun, 2006, pp. 44-45). Patterns of amity and enmity are important in order to define a security complex, since if patterns of amity prevail in a regional security complex, then relatively intense security interdependence is set by “positive dependency” and ends up with “security community”. If patterns of enmity prevail, then relative intensity of security interdependence is set by “negative dependency” and end up
with “conflict formation” (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, pp. 489-491). Patterns of amity and enmity are perceived in the theory as constructed through “historical factors” such as long standing enmities (for instance between Greeks and Turks, Arabs and Persians, Khmers and Vietnamese) - and “common culture” which can be named as “civilizational area” such as Europeans, Arabs, South Americans (Coşkun, 2006, p. 41; Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 45) which set the identification of other. Besides these, if identification of other is neutral, security interdependence among actors will tend to rivalry which forms security regime through the process of normalization.

Positive forms of interaction such as those in the security communities are not the only way to address regional security. “Security complexes” are different from “security communities”. Security community deals with cooperative interaction among units; in security communities “there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their dispute in some other way” (Deutsch, 1957, p. 5). On the other hand, regional security complex deals with interactions that are both conflictual and cooperative. For example, we can talk about security communities in Europe or regarding the ASEAN countries, but as will be discussed in the next section, there is no such kind of security community in the Middle East region. The Middle East is defined as a region which is “perennial conflict formation” (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 187) in which fear and suspicion towards each other prevailed by the actors such as states (Arabs and Israelis, Arab-Persian hostility) and non-state actors (Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestine Liberation
Organization - PLO), so that in their interactions the use of violence is expected in political relations. However, in the case of the EU and ASEAN countries, the situation is completely different. Both for the member states of the EU and ASEAN, war, or in other words the possibility to use military force as a way to solve their problems, is out of question. In the case of NATO as a security community Greece and Turkey is excepted (Morgan, 1997, p. 36).

As can be seen from Figure 2.1, A. Wendt’s identification with “other” is important which explains the constructivist reasoning in the regional security complex theory. From Figure 2.1 it can be understood that security issues are not fixed but are results of a process called as securitization, normalization or de-securitization. In this sense, regional complexes are socially constructed through the practice of actors - state, non-state and transnational- in the security field (Bengtsson, 2010, p. 20).

Power relations are examined through four levels without focusing on neither of them; domestic level which reflects “domestically generated vulnerabilities”; vulnerabilities define security fears and may end up with perceiving threats from some sort of groups or states even if they do not have such kind of intentions, interstate relations within a geographically coherent grouping, interaction with other regions which is defined as relatively limited, and the interplay between global powers which are super or great powers and the security complexes (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 51). That is to say, besides regional powers acting at the regional
level, the “penetration” of super and great powers through making “security alignments” with the regional actors at the global level should also be taken into account, since all these affect the security dynamics in the region (Coşkun, 2006, pp. 44-45). There may be security interactions between regional complexes but most of the time the risk of spilling of one conflicting issue to other regional security complex is refrained by the “insulator states”, such as Afghanistan between the Middle East and South Asia and Turkey between the Balkans, Middle East and Caucasia (Buzan & Weaver, 2003). Yet, Turkey’s “key” insulating function is defined as between Europe and the Middle East security complexes by Buzan & Diez (1999, p. 47). Hence, through the lenses of regional security complex theory there are three formations in the world; regional security complexes, insulator states and global level powers which are super or great powers (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, pp. 483-490).

2.2. The Middle East as a Regional Security Complex

2.2.1. The Middle East Regional Security Complex

Security complexes have different agendas with regard to the question of how a particular regional security complex is formed. Buzan and Weaver (2003, p. 187) have characterized the Middle East security complex as “perennial conflict formation”, meaning that interdependencies in the Middle East security complex do
not imply cooperation, and defined by Coşkun (2006, p. 48) as a conflict-driven complex. In terms of “regional security complex theory”, Middle East is an example of turning of the decolonization process into conflict formation (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 216); however, its roots ought to be searched for in history. It remained as a region of “conflict” and “instability”, and accordingly, a regional security structure has not been created until that time (Coşkun, 2008, p. 89). Negative security dependency is at stake in the case of the Middle East region, since hostile ventures dominate interactions in the region and interactions based on enmity dominates system (Ayoob, 1999). Regional security regimes remained limited and the ability of outside actors to impose a regional security structure was constrained by the “complexity of the intraregional relations” (Coşkun, 2008, p. 92).

To understand the security dynamics in the region and accordingly the Middle Eastern security complex, the unique elements of the region that distinguish it from other regional security complexes and divergences within the region should be elaborated since the Middle East is complicated because of its own internal structure. Ethnically, in the states of the Middle East, Arabs constitute the majority of the populations; exceptions are Iran in which Persians are demographically dominant, Israel in which Jews are the majority and Turkey in which Turks constitute the majority of the population. At the same time, there are minority groups such as Kurds and Turcomans that are dispersed especially in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria.
In religious terms, Muslims are the majority in all of the states in the region except for Israel. Nevertheless, non-Muslim religious minorities such as Armenians, Maronites, and Orthodox are dispersed throughout the region’s countries. In addition to that, although Islam is often identified with the Middle East, there are also different sects of Islam in the region; the most salient one is the divergence between Sunni and Shi’a groups, besides that Wahhabis which is a religious group within Sunni sect of Islam live in Saudi Arabia; Druse and Nusairis are living in Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, which are defined as Mashreq countries (Hinnebusch, 2003, pp. 55-56). Ethnic and religious divergences are important in the identification of “other” which would help draw conclusions for types of security constellations. Region’s insecurities derive from these divergences of the region. There are also differences in the history of the region’s countries; for instance Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran were never colonized, but colonial powers, Britain and France, had existed in others for a long time, and there is the Ottoman legacy factor considering Turkey’s rule and relations within the region (Hinnebusch, 2003).

With regards to social and political aspects of the Middle East; rapid growth of population, inadequacy of water supplies, and rich oil fields are salient and are the main elements that determine the place of region in world politics. Oil reserves of the region are important to understand the region in terms of its strategic importance, great power interests on the region and state formation and state-society relations in the region (Sinkaya & Süer, 2010, p. 1). The gap between the cost of oil production
and its market price provides considerable wealth to the states with oil reserves and because of such kind of power resource; these states do not feel to get their legitimacy from the society. Such states are conceptualized as “rentier states” in the relevant literature and this kind of state formation is evident especially in the Gulf countries and the Saudi Arabia (Sinkaya & Süer, 2010, p. 10).

Following the World War I, new states emerged in the Middle East. The formation of the state structure of these states materialized under the supervision of external powers; with the exceptions of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran. European states determined all the basic elements of the state of the Middle Eastern countries such as the capital of the state, borders, and judicial, bureaucratic and military systems. Notwithstanding, for some countries like Egypt, this restructuring was realized as the continuation of the reform process that started in the Ottoman era (Sinkaya & Süer, 2010, p. 5). Involvement of external powers is important to mention in these processes because foreign intervention resulted in the creation of conflict dynamics in these countries. As it is exemplified by Sinkaya & Süer (2010, p. 5), for instance, Syria Nusairies, which was a minority group in the country, were used by French mandate in the formation of the military and bureaucracy. Strengthened by this, Nusairies played an active role in the coups that took place in 1963, 1966 and 1970. Today Syria is governed by the Esad family which is from this minority group. The system in Lebanon is artificially created by the European powers based on ethnic
identities; French mandate in collaboration with the Maronite Christians tried to
govern the country.

In order to examine coherently the complexity of intraregional relations, regional
security complex theory separates the Middle East security complex into three sub-
complexes; first one is “Levant” sub-complex which focused on Arab-Israeli
conflict, and it includes Israel and its Arab neighbors Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan
and organizations such as the PLO, Hamas and Hezbollah. Apart from the states
within the Levant sub-complex, states in other sub-complexes such as Iraq, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, and Tunisia are heavily engaged in Arab-Israeli
conflicts. This conflict is also noteworthy in inter-Arab relations since this conflict
has caused six major wars (1948-49, 1956, 1967, 1969, 1973, and 1982) and has had
impacts on pan-Arabism and accordingly Egypt’s quest for Arab world’s leadership
(Buzan & Weaver, 2003, pp. 190-1).

The second sub-complex is named as “Gulf” sub-complex which was formed after
the British withdrawal from the region (1971), main conflict characterization within
this sub-complex is rivalry between Iran, Iraq and the Gulf Arab states –Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman- leading by Saudi
Arabia. There are border problems between Iran and Iraq, Kurdish people living in
both states do not create harmony but rather create problems, and Shi’ite population
living in Iraq is also a great concern for both Iran, because of the fate of the Shi’ite
population, and Iraq, because of the probable provocation of Shi’ite population by Iran. Conflict between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the Gulf Arabs (grouped together into a strategic partnership in 1981 as the Gulf Cooperation Council) were mainly based on the price of oil and cross border oil resources (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, pp. 191-2). Although Levant sub-complex and the Gulf sub-complex are taken as different cores of the Middle East security complex, it should also be noted that there are overlapping issues too.

The last one is the “Maghreb” sub-complex which includes relations between Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Chad and Western Sahara but defined as the weakest one among the three sub-complexes. Morocco annexed Western Sahara in 1975, in turn Algeria and Libya supported Polisario front which was formed to fight against Morocco for the independence of the Western Sahara. Libya occupied Aouzou strip in 1973, and this created an uneasy relationship between Chad and Libya and as a response to Libya’s support for the Polisario front, Morocco backed opponents of Libya in Chad. Though Maghreb states got involved in Arab-Israeli conflict and conflicts in the Gulf, they are not as attached to the other sub-complexes as the two core sub-complexes of the Middle East security complex are (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 193). Since rich hydrocarbon resources of the region are significant for the involvement of external powers in the Middle East, this made the Middle East a strategic region. Oil reserves are also important because of its effects on the state formation and state-society relations (rentier states) in the states which have oil
reserves (Hinnebusch, 2003). Global rivalries over oil and gas resources in the region and global concerns over the stability of the energy routes\(^4\) and efforts of the superpowers to prevent the rise of a regional power are also important factors when considering involvement of the external powers. The US and the EU countries are highly interested in regions’ internal affairs together with Russia and China because of the geo-strategic and geo-economic potential of the region, for instance continuous flow of oil and gas resources is an important concern for the great and superpowers.\(^5\)

Another significant factor of external powers’ involvement in the Middle East is the Arab-Israeli conflict. The common threat denominator for the Arab world is Israel which creates security dilemmas in the region, and provides the most significant complex set of negative interactions which can be named as “Arab-Israeli conflict” and can be presented as the key point in the Middle East regional complex. There is a wide range of conflict dynamics in the Middle East region; Arab-Israeli conflict is defined as a “defining dynamic” of the Middle East security complex (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 190). Although this conflict is centered in Levant sub-complex, it links pan-Arab and pan-Islamic ideals in their conflicts with Israel and interconnect

\(^4\) It should be noted that ‘broader’ Middle East is named as “geography of chaos” and as pointed out by Ercolani (2005, p. 71) “geography of chaos” highly overlaps with the “map of oil”, which proves that there is close relationship between oil and security.

\(^5\) Oil can be called as ‘strategic resource’. This term is used by Ayoob (1999, p. 252) Oil resources, as strategic resource, were a powerful link of the region to the global economy, this powerful link resulted in a great super power interest during the Cold War, and continued after the end of bipolar structure of the global system (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 197).
sub-complexes together. Pan-Arabism mainly aimed the unification of the peoples and countries of the Arab world which reached its peak point in the Gamal Abdel Naser era in Egypt in the 1960s but gradually declined in the 1970s. On the other hand, by pan-Arab ideals forming of a unified Islamic identity is envisaged through common religious heritage. As an institutionalized form of pan-Arab ideal is the OIC.

Kurds living in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq are also another major conflict dynamic in the Middle East security complex. Iran has supported Iraqi Kurds, Iraq has supported Iranian Kurds, Syria has supported Kurds in Turkey and this resulted in interstate conflicts in the past. Besides that, inter-Arab rivalries aiming to get the Arab world’s leadership and to achieve pan-Arab ideals, conflicts based on Sunni-Shi’a split, ethnic, territorial and water disputes are also sources of regional insecurities (Ercolani, 2005).

The prevailing understanding in regional security complex theory is the importance of the geographical coherence; in this sense superpowers’ involvement in regional security complexes can be seen as going beyond geographical proximity understanding in security relationship with their power capabilities, since superpowers have worldwide interests and the capability to reach regional security complexes worldwide. Considering the status of the Middle East security complex vis-à-vis the superpowers, it took the form of penetration during the Cold War.
US and the USSR were rival powers to penetrate to the Middle East security complex through making alignments with the states of the region. They used local enmities between the states in the Middle East security complex (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 46).

Regional security complex theory makes a distinction of the superpower penetration into a regional security complex that external powers cannot reorganize or desecuritize or define a regional security complex, but mentions the unipolarity (the US-led order after the dissolution of the USSR) as an exception and takes the Middle East as an example after the bi-polar international security structure (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 47). In line with this argument of the theory, during the Cold War although both superpowers infiltrated into the region, yet they did not change the regional pattern of the Middle Eastern security complex, so the region’s own internal dynamics has given the Middle East security complex a “relative autonomy” in the sense that the end of bipolar rivalry did not result in much change in characteristics of relations in the Middle East security complex. Nevertheless, vital changes occurred in the Middle East security complex as a result of the Gulf War of 1991. For instance, with the declining Iraqi military strength the above mentioned rivalry within the Gulf sub-complex was affected, the US as the only remaining superpower became significant as an outside actor, as PLO supported the Iraqi government, the prestige of the PLO declined and this helped to launch of the Middle East peace process (Buzan & Weaver, 2003).
2.2.2. The Evolution of the Middle East Security Complex

The evolving characteristics of the Middle East security complex can be examined through three different time frames; from 1948 to the Gulf War of 1991, from the end of the Gulf War of 1991 to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and from 2003 to present. In this section, major developments that led to changes in the sub-systems will be mentioned in the abovementioned time frames.

The formation of the Middle East security complex goes back to the decolonization period between 1945 and 1948; after that period independent states became the majority in the region. The first main development in the Middle East security complex was the formation of the state of Israel in 1948, and following this development, Arab states Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq militarily attacked Israel. Formation of the state of Israel in 1948 in the Palestinian territory led to an increase in the US interests over the Middle East because of the influential role of the Jewish lobby in the US (Bilgin, 2005, pp. 76-77). With the formation of the state of Israel the conflict between Jewish immigrants and Palestinians became a regional conflict and had a profound impact on changing of the region’s dynamics, and as stated above became the defining dynamic of the Middle East security complex.

Britain, which was the dominant external power within the Middle East security complex at the time, began to be replaced by the US following the Second World
War, with the increasing significance of oil in the calculations of the US towards the region. This can be observed from the replacement of the British oil companies with the US oil companies in the region, and after the Suez crisis in 1956, Britain’s declining influence became more evident and the US started to be felt as the dominant external power. By the Eisenhower Doctrine declared in 1957, the US promised to provide military and economic aid to the states of the Middle East. It is important in the sense that it mainly determined the US strategy towards the Middle East which included Egypt, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states (Bilgin, 2005, p. 75). What is more is that the Soviet Union also perceived the Middle East as a potential area of influence and supported governments which were formed following the coups in Egypt, Iraq and Syria, which replaced traditional monarchies.

During the 1950s and continuing until the latter part of the 1960s were the golden years of Arab nationalism as an anti-imperialist response of the newly independent Arab states, which is identified with Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Naser. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, pan-Arabism which was headed by Egypt started to be questioned and lost its prominence following the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle Eastern affairs (Ajami, 1978, pp. 335-373), and Egypt as the leader of Arab Nationalism in 1979 became the first state that signed peace agreement with Israel in 1979.
Arab-Israeli Wars have been the major elements of the Middle East security complex, besides that Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and the first Gulf War between Iran and Iraq which lasted for 8 years starting from the 1980s had also affected regional balances. This war weakened the status of both Iran and Iraq in the region, and also led economically devastated Iraq to occupy Kuwait in 1990 with the aim of compensating its economic losses during the war (Sinkaya & Süer, 2010, p. 7). Following Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, the US and other Arab states cooperated with the US against Iraq which resulted in the demise of Arab nationalism. Nonetheless, during the 1990s Arab nationalism emerged under a new form: not threatening the sovereignty or the borders of the states but in the form of common anxieties, culture, language, and to some extent religion and as a response to increasing US presence in the region (Yamani, 2002, pp. 113-131).

2.2.3. The Significance of the Middle East Regional Security Complex in the post-Cold War era

With the end of the Cold War “security overlay” of the dominant powers, namely the US and the USSR, disappeared on the regions and as stated above, regions gained significance in security studies together with widening of the security agenda (Korkmaz, 2010). Nonetheless, the significance of the Middle East security complex is more salient than other security complexes following the Gulf War of 1990-91 and became so increasingly after the September 11 attacks. With the Gulf War of 1990-
91, the US became the dominant external power in the Middle East security complex. Increasing concerns of the US can be understood from the US President George Bush’s speech to the Congress following the expulsion of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait on the “New World Order” (Fawcett, 2005, p. 188). It can be understood from this speech that for the US, strategic resources of the region is a high security concern for the US. In this speech he stated that:

…Our commitment to peace in the Middle East does not end with the liberation of Kuwait...we must work together to create shared security arrangements in the region... our vital national interests depend on a stable and secure Gulf... The war with Iraq is over. The quest for solutions to the problem in Lebanon, in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in the Gulf must go forward with new vigor and determination. And I guarantee you: no one will work harder for a stable peace in the region than we will... (Bush, 1991)

This speech not only shows the increasing significance of the US in the region but also growing salience of the Middle East in the global security agenda. In line with the US commitments, its political and military presence in the region has increased. The US’s New Middle East vision had two main pillars: ensuring the Arab-Israeli peace and securing the oil flow from the region. As a part of this vision, the Middle East peace process began in 1991, aiming to ensure peace between the Palestinians and Israel and between Israel and other Arab states. As a success of this process Jordan signed peace agreement in 1994 with Israel: however, this initiative failed with Syria. By the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords, the PLO and Israel mutually recognized each other. “Declaration of Principles” laid out the basic principles on the
steps that arranged the withdrawal of Israel from Gaza and the West Bank. Nevertheless, the assassination of Yitzak Rabin in 1995, and rise of right wing parties in Israel impeded the peace process, el-Aqsa intifada in 2000 and the rise of Hamas further strained relations in the region (Shlaim, 2005, pp. 241-262). As a result, new Middle East vision of the US failed, but the salience of the Middle East security complex increased in the 2000s.

After 9/11 attacks, “international terrorism” was securitized by the US. The attacks to New York and Washington marked a new era for the Middle East security complex because the US under President Bush declared “War on Terror”, this can be coded in regional security complex theory as “securitization of international terrorism” (Coşkun, 2006, p. 45) and put into practice the Greater Middle East Project. This means that local conflicts which were previously mentioned as having an autonomous character will no longer be autonomous, since the Greater Middle East Project envisaged reordering of the Middle East which also means the total change at the Middle East security complex. The invasion of Iraq by the US in 2003 totally changed the structure of the Gulf sub-complex; the probable withdrawal of the US from Iraq in the future would create power vacuums in the Gulf sub-complex which may have region-wide repercussions. What is more if Iran develops nuclear weapons through its nuclear program, not only the total distribution of power would be changed in the region in favor of Iran but also the total structure of the region
would be changed and this would create additional security dilemmas at the regional and global levels.

2.3. Turkey and the Regional Security Complex Theory

Regional security complex theory not only provides a framework to observe the changes and continuities in region dynamics but also helps understanding the changes and continuities on the “insulating” function of states vis-à-vis different security complexes. Regional security complex theory takes Turkey as one of the unique cases within the theory, on the one hand it argues that Turkey is an insulator state according to theory, on the other hand mentions the interactions of Turkey with the security complexes that it is surrounded by, but at the end it concludes that Turkey is still an insulator state, meaning it still holds the main characteristics of the insulator states (Buzan & Weaver, 2003). Nonetheless, the arguments of Buzan and Weaver need more elaborate analysis within a historical perspective.

Turkey is located at a geographical position where it neighbors three conflict-driven regions: the Middle East, Caucasus and the Balkans. This position is named as “Bermuda Triangle” by Hikmet Sami Türk (former Minister of Defense), has defined Turkey’s security environment (Kazan, 2002, pp. 63-64) and this position has a name in the regional security complex theory as “insulator state”. The concept of an “insulator state” has nothing to do with having some sort of material and
immaterial resources that gives the state the capability to achieve its goals; it is
determined by the geopolitical status of the state, yet owing to insulator status they
have insulating functions and insulator states adopt some sort of foreign policy
choices accordingly.

According to theory, Turkey is an “insulator state” between the Middle East,
Caucasus (sub-complex of post-Soviet security complex formed after the dissolution
of the USSR) and the Balkans (sub-complex of the European security complex).
Turkey has intense interactions with all of these regional complexes but it is not a
“pole” in neither of them, meaning being one of the power centers in the security
complexes. Turkey’s interactions with the European security complex can be
subsumed as membership negotiations or process with the EU, its relations with
NATO and mainly the conflicts between Greece and Turkey. Turkey’s interactions
with the Middle East security complex can be evaluated through Turkey’s “military
links” with Israel, disputes over flow of water from Euphrates and Tigris rivers water
deriving from increasing use of Turkey through dam-building projects and water
pollution especially with Syria, hostilities deriving from the Kurdish population that
exist in both Turkey, Syria and Iraq, and reflection of historical competition between
the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire on to the present day Turkey and Iran
(Buzan & Diez, 1999, p. 51). With regards to interactions with the Caucasus sub-
complex and the ex-Soviet security complex, Turkey has cultural and political links
with the Turkic-speaking countries in Central Asia (Diez, 2005, p.172). Even so,
according to theory, interactions of Turkey with these regional security complexes are not strong enough to bring these interactions into one “coherent strategic arena” (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p.395).

Insulator states are “peripheral actors” in the surrounding security regions and their main function is defined as separating “other regional security dynamics from each other” (Buzan & Diez, 1999, p.47). They may have other roles but main function should remain as keeping regional security complexes apart in order to maintain its insulating function. Thereby, insulator states prevent “short-circuits” between the security dynamics of different regional security complexes (Buzan & Diez, 1999, p.52).

One main characteristic of the insulators is that they are not an active part to regional conflicts and they keep itself distant from the conflicts, therefore being “relatively passive”, and “absorbing” the energies of neighboring security complexes (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p.394). If we look at the traditional foreign policy of Turkey which is coded under the motto of Atatürk “Peace at home, peace in the World”, it totally fits this.

“Insulator states” are units in regional politics that separate regional security complexes from each other; thereby they prevent spillover effects of regional politics to other regional complexes and insulate conflicts and wars that occur in one region from other regions. On the other hand, the position of insulator states make them
vulnerable to changing dynamics within the neighboring security complexes, and they are faced with the risk of being drawn into regions’ conflicts they are surrounded by (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p.393).

Accordingly, Turkey had a cautious stance to developments in the neighboring regions and especially the Middle East; even at times when Turkey seemed to adopt a more pro-Arab stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the late 1960s and 1970s, it refrained from attaching itself directly to the conflicts. Turkey’s active policies under Özl’s vision in the beginning of 1990s, like attempts to establish links with the ex-Soviet Turkish Republics based on pan-Turkic ideals, and its active policy in the Gulf War of 1990-91, although served as temporary drifts from an insulator state, were not durable and consistent to be interpreted as shifting from insulating function. According to regional security complex theory, insulator states may lose balance between regional security complexes it has interactions with, and are slowly absorbed into one neighboring security complex, but this should be durable and consistent to be interpreted as a shift from being an insulator state (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p.487).

To sum up, Turkey’s status within the regional security complex theory as an “insulator” can be assessed through the patterns of relative security interdependence and indifference. The status of Turkey as an insulator of security complexes has not remained intact throughout Turkey’s republican history, but drifts from the insulator...
state position did not result in a total shift in Turkey’s insulating function within the regional security complex theory until the JDP government.

2.3.1. Revising the Regional Security Complex Theory

Regional security complex theory that is mainly developed by Buzan and Waeaver is revisited by Bengtsson (2010) by his inclusion of “the logic of interfaces” to the regional security understanding. Interface is a “relational identity-based concept which builds on the mutual recognition of two or more actors in interaction” (p.8). The logic of interface sees the regional security complex as composed of “a set of interfaces” both “internally” and “across” the boundaries of the complex (p.34). In the logic of interfaces, perceptions of the self, other and the context are vitally important. Through the “feed-back mechanisms” as a result of relationships, there is the potential to reframe of the self, other and the context (p.27).

The general logic of interface is framed as below figure;
Bengtsson (2010) defines the concept as “an interface is constituted by two actors or sets of actors through their respective recognitions” (p. 27). In this logic “actors are mutually constituted through their actions”. The concept of interface is “relational identity-based” (p.27). Interface is a perceptual process, and in this line of reasoning, two types of interfaces can be summarized. In the first type, mutual recognitions overlap to a great extent so do the perceptions expectations, obligations and rights. In the second type, disagreement on the perceptions of identity, expectations, obligations, rights prevailed. This kind of interface is exemplified by Bengtsson (2010) as political conflicts between governments and freedom fighters or terrorists which rest on who labels. Through this, Bengtsson (2010, p. 28) distinguishes “agreement interfaces” and “disagreement interfaces”.

Perceptions and perception of the identity of other is still important in the revisited analysis of the regional security complexes. However, in his analysis, Bengtsson
(2010, p. 32) uses B. Moller’s (2005) analysis on the distinctions of “Others” as “hostile Other”, “different Other” (neutral perception), “transient Other”, and adds “friendly Other” which is based on amity and identification of value compatibility. Based on this analysis, Bengtsson (2010) makes a distinction between interfaces. If interface is mainly based on hostilities, interaction is competitive and limited; if interfaces are based on perceptions of difference, interaction is also limited but with the understanding of “disinterest” towards different other. In transient interfaces, interactions are intense and involve the upgrade the common interests as in the friendship interface in which interaction includes the “further promotion of common values” (Bengtsson, 2010, p. 32).

How can the history and the current Turkey-Middle East relations be evaluated through Moller’s (2005) analysis on the distinctions of Others? In the early years of the Republican history of Turkey, the primacy of the relations with the West was highlighted by Turkish foreign policy elites. In those years, Turkey’s relations with the Middle East countries were kept limited; however, this was not because Turkey identified the region as “hostile Other”. Turkey’s understanding towards the region was disinterest in the region’s affairs after solving its basic territorial problems with the region’s countries which were at that time under European mandate. This identification did not remained intact until the JDP came to power, Turkey before the JDP era involved in the region’s affairs but with different kinds of identifications; for instance in the 1950s Turkey’s involvement in the region were seen as “pawn” of the
Western powers (Aydın, 2000, p. 113) this in the future led the Arab world identify Turkey as “hostile Other”. For this reason, Turkey had to work hard to transform this identification afterwards.

After the Gulf War of 1990-91 and throughout 1990s security considerations prevailed as regard the relations with the Middle East; Turkey’s relations with the region were strained because of the PKK problem and obviously Turkey was not identified as “friendly Other” by the region’s countries because of the conflicts based on the use of trans-boundary waters that originated from Turkey, border problems with Syria and Turkey’s strategic partnership with Israel. This kind of identification which can mainly be named as “hostile Other” started to be transformed at the end of 1990s and especially after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan (the leader of PKK-terrorist organization) and through the change in the rhetoric of foreign policy of İsmail Cem who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time. That is to say, change in the foreign policy practice did not happened all of a sudden in the Davutoğlu era; it started in the previous government’s period. In the JDP era, interactions are intense and positive, if we evaluate the relationship with the Arab countries and the countries that are members of the OIC interactions involve the upgrading of the common interests, so to speak in the JDP era Turkey-Middle East relations at most points fit “transient Other” with the exception of Israel.
The concept of power is also important in the logic of interfaces related with the importance of mutual recognition of actors in interfaces which is determined through a process in which material and immaterial resources of actors are significant. In its broadest meaning in international relations, power is the ability to affect outcomes; for instance actor A influences the decision of actor B and causes B to act in a manner that it would not have done or act without the influence of B. This shows that power is not dispersed equally throughout the world, some units (individuals, states, groups sharing the same interests) have superiority over others, and hence they are capable of having more influence within that system. In this line of reasoning, there can be “symmetrical” of “asymmetrical” power relationships between units. In symmetrical power relationships actors perceive each other as equal and the same in relative power terms. On the other hand, in asymmetrical power relationship the perception of actors rests on inferiority/superiority rather than the same in terms of relative power (Bengtsson, 2010, p. 34).

Within the framework of the interface logic there are 6 types of interfaces that are shown in the table below:
Table 2. Types of interfaces

(Source: Bengtsson, 2010, p. 35)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values/power</th>
<th>Symmetry</th>
<th>Asymmetry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: competition</td>
<td>Hostility</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: socialization</td>
<td>Convergence</td>
<td>Adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compatibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: integration</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in the table based on the values of incompatibility, compatibility and transition determine the kind of interaction, and with the process of symmetrical and asymmetrical power relationships the type of interface is determined such as hostility interface, resistance interface, convergence interface, adaptation interface, community interface and inclusion interfaces.

2.3.1.1. The Relevance of the EU and Turkey to the Logic of Interface

How can the EU be perceived in the logic of interfaces of the revisited analysis of the regional security complex theory? In relation, what is the relevance of the logic of interface in the case of Turkey? Before answering these questions, what is aimed by revisiting the regional security complex theory by Bengtsson (2010) should be clarified in the first place; Bengtsson (2010, pp. 8-10) first of all aimed to reconsider “the meaning of the boundaries”, and go beyond the “internal logic” of the regional
security complex as developed by Buzan and Weaver, contribute to the “logic of
cross-border relationships” which is most of the time not fully dealt with Buzan and
Weaver, thereby gave emphasis to the relations across the boundaries of the regional
security complexes through interfaces; this aim of Bengtsson is the starting point of
the logic of interface. By adopting a looser form of the concept of the region that is
adopted by Buzan and Weaver, Bengtsson (2010) examined the relationship with the
EU as core area and its surrounding areas such as post-Soviet interface,
Mediterranean interface, and Baltic interface. Enlargement policies and the European
Neighborhood Policy are mainly used by the EU in its relationships with the
surrounding areas. In the regional security complex theory as developed by Buzan
and Weaver, the EU in the form of security community is the focus point, and in
Bengtsson’s analysis (2010) interacting units of this security is mainly developed on.
With regards to the EU interaction in a regional perspective with the sub-complexes
of the Middle East security complex, while the Gulf sub-complex is not mentioned
because of geographical adjacency factor, the other two, the Levant and Maghreb
sub-complexes are mentioned because of their sea-borders with the EU as part of the
European Neighborhood Policy of the EU, whereas Turkey has been taken as a part
of the EU-led security complex because of the country’s candidate status (Bengtsson,
2010, pp. 11-13). Throughout his analysis, as the logic of interface assumes, he gave
importance to the recognition of the self, other and the context.
So, what can be said about the position of Turkey vis-à-vis the EU within the context of the regional security complex theory? As will be discussed above in detail below, Turkey is generally viewed as an insulator state by the theory; meaning its main function is insulating the conflict dynamics between different regional security complexes and “a peripheral actor in all of the security regions surrounding it” (Buzan & Diez, 1999, p. 47). In this kind of understanding, Turkey provides security insulation for the EU from the security dynamics of the Middle East and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) regions. What is more, “relative detachment” of Turkey from the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia is explained by the regional security complex theory as a result of its insulating function (Buzan & Diez, 1999, p. 51)

Through the reasoning of the regional security complex theory, Buzan and Diez (1999) argued that Turkey and the EU better look for other alternatives than full membership or rejection without challenging the systemic position of Turkey as “insulator”. Even so, at the Helsinki Summit in November 1999, Turkey was given candidate status to the EU. After many constitutional and legal reforms that has taken place in Turkey with the aim of bringing Turkey’s constitutional and legal system in line with the Copenhagen criteria, the EU in October 2005 has taken the decision to start full membership negotiations with Turkey. Under the light of these developments, the need to reconsider the systemic position of Turkey as insulator became visible (Diez, 2005, pp. 167-168). Besides the relations with the EU,
Turkey’s entanglements with the Middle East security complex should also be taken into account to revisit the insulating position of Turkey in the regional security complex theory for the reason that especially during the second JDP government Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East security complex is intensified. In the logic of interface, Turkey’s recognition of the European security complex and the Middle East security complex is vital along with the European and Middle Eastern countries’ perceptions of Turkey.

The debate can go into three directions; in the first one it can be discussed whether Turkey loses its insulator position between the regional security complexes and becomes a pole in one of them or maintains its strategic position of insulator. Second, the logic of interface can be argued to become more applicable in the case of Turkey; despite the fact that regional security complex theory assumes Turkey as an “insulator” within the theory. The probable third debate is related with the second one; Turkey in the end may become a regional power of its own and become a pole in a new security complex. As will be discussed, Turkey’s insulator position is challenged because of both of the interactions of Turkey with the Middle East security complex and the European security complex. Nevertheless, at the time of the writing of this thesis, it is not easy to assume a position for Turkey within the Middle East security complex or European security complex. The answers to the questions whether Turkey can be thought outside the European security complex, or the Middle East security complex and what if Turkey becomes a pole in one of them despite
regional security complex theory assumed a peripheral role for Turkey, is a timely quest. It has to include the feed-back mechanisms of the recognition of Turkey’s self-image in its neighborhood and Turkey’s image of the neighborhood which is beyond the scope of this study.
CHAPTER 3

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY WITHIN THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX UNTIL THE JDP ERA: CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES

The ultimate aim of this chapter is to evaluate main historical reference points of the Republic of Turkey concerning the Middle East, in order to find out the nature of connections between Turkey and the states within the Middle East security complex. Only then the nature of Turkey’s relations with the Middle East security complex during the JDP era can be understood properly. Throughout Turkey’s republican history until the JDP era, the insulating function of the country did not remain intact from the Menderes government to 1960s and 1970s and from the Özal era to 1990s coalition governments. Turkey’s relationship with the Middle East security complex was not static, on the contrary it had transformed through conjunctural changes; but the question is whether the changing Turkish stance towards the Middle East security complex means a shift from an insulator state to something else within the regional security complex theory.

3.1. The Early Republican Period

The founders of the Republic of Turkey aimed to develop a national state and a secular regime out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, they had to not
only secure the independence of the Republic of Turkey, but also strengthen the new region inside the country. This has two interdependent ramifications; first, the residual pieces of the Ottoman Empire had to be eliminated on domestic scene, second and related with the first one is its repercussion for the Middle East region; the region was a former Ottoman territory and thereby the peoples of these regions had historical and religious resemblance to Ottomans, which contradicted the newly founded regime’s perceptions (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983).

The Republic of Turkey’s affiliations with the region was limited in that era because of two main reasons; the newly founded regime’s perceptions were in contradiction with the regimes in the Middle East, and after World War I the Middle East region remained under mandate of European powers; Iraq and Palestine were decided to be left under British rule and Syria and territories of Lebanon were decided to be left under French mandate by the League of Nations (Kibaroğlu & Kibaroğlu, 2009, p.21). Therefore there were no actual Middle Eastern states at that time to establish relations with. In terms of regional security complexes, the Middle East security complex had not been formed yet. As it is put forward by Buzan and Weaver (2003), the Middle East security complex is turning of decolonization process to conflict formation (p. 216) and it dates back to the decolonization waves between 1945 and 1948 according to Buzan and Weaver (p. 188). Still, Turkey had to involve in the region’s affairs because of the principles set out by the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli).
Turkey conducted its foreign policy actions mainly in order to achieve the objectives which were set by a “National Pact” or “National Oath” called “Misak-ı Milli”. The first article of National Pact puts forward that “areas inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority, united in religion, race, and aim form an undersirable whole which cannot be divided really or by assumption for any reason” (Altuğ, 1989, p. 2). In this sense, National Pact identified Western Thrace, the Straits, the Sancak of Alexandretta and Mosul within the Borders of Turkey. Realizing the principles set out by the National Pact has been given high priority by the founders of Turkish Republic. Nonetheless, Turkey insisted on the principles of the National Pact to the extent that it did not risk the other significant principle of Turkish Republic which is the motto of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk “Peace at home, peace in the World”. To put it in a different way, it seems that Turkey found it useful from time to time to interpret National Pact in a narrow sense, rather than insisting on a broader sense and thereby taking the risk of going into another war which would have uneven consequences for itself and the neighboring security complexes. It was also for practical reasons for Turkey, because the new regime had to be consolidated inside and for this reason a peaceful environment would be favorable for the country. İsmet İnönü, successor of M.K. Atatürk, so strictly followed his motto “Peace at home, peace in the world” that, as Aydın (2000, p. 105) argues, the foreign policies of Atatürk and İnönü remained likewise in principle. In short, even in the early Republican period, Turkey

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6 For the summary of the National Pact see; TGNA (n.d).
adopted the kind of foreign policies of the insulator states and coded in Atatürk’s aforementioned motto.

Main involvements of Turkey in the Middle East in the early Republican period were the Mosul problem, the question of Alexandretta (Hatay) and the Saadabad Pact (1937). Mosul province was a disputed issue between Britain and Turkey, which could not be resolved at Lausanne Conference, and eventually left to be solved based on negotiations between Turkey and Britain. If the issue could not be settled within nine months after the Lausanne Peace Treaty came into effect, it was envisaged to be referred to the League of Nations. The Commission reported to the Council of the League of Nations in 1925 that Mosul should remain under British mandate and within the borders of Iraq; therefore accordingly, the League of Nations decided to give Mosul to Iraq on 16 December 1925 (Altuğ, 1989, p. 3). Despite its displeasure, Turkey obeyed the League’s decision. Consequently, in 1926, Ankara Treaty, which fixed the border between Iraq and Turkey, was signed between Britain and Turkey, and Mosul remained within the borders of Iraq.

For Turkey, as Mustafa Türkeş (1998) argues, Mosul was not primary and indispensible for Turkey when the National Pact was interpreted in a narrow sense. Türkeş (1998, p. 131) also mentions speculative scenarios, within which Turkey had taken into account probable British efforts to establish a Kurdish state. If Mosul remained within the borders of Turkish Republic, it would be a continuous risk for
Turkey. So, Turkey gave up Mosul to eliminate such a possibility. So, as the ultimate aim, Turkey did not take such a security risk, which would have caused region-wide results.

On the other hand, for Turkey the issue of Alexandretta (Hatay) was a diplomatic success, yet Turkey again insisted on its demands to the extent that it did not caused major conflicts. Special status was given to the Sancak of Alexandretta by the Treaty of Ankara, which was signed in 1921 between Turkey and France. The Sancak was within the borders of Syria and Syria was under French mandate. The issue was brought to the Council of the League of Nations in 1936, when France did not give the Sancak its independence. According to the decision of the Council of the League of Nations, the Sancak would be autonomous regarding domestic affairs with a special constitution for itself, which was accepted by the Council in 1937, but would be dependent to Syria regarding its foreign affairs; thereby the Sancak would be a “distinct entity” (Altunışık & Tür, 2005, p. 97). However, the Hatay Parliament declared its independence in its first meeting and stated that it is unified with Turkey on 13 July 1939. France and Britain did not object to this, since by the mid-1930s the international conjuncture changed; revisionist powers of Europe of the time, Italy and Germany, rose concerns for other great powers of Europe, France and Britain, geostrategic importance of Turkey had to be considered by these countries, and Turkey was successful to exploit the change of international conjuncture in favor of itself (Altunışık & Tür, 2005, p. 97).
In order to secure its eastern border, and create a secure environment for itself, Turkey played a leading role in the formation of the Saadabad Pact and signed the Pact in 1937 with Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. By the Saadabad Pact, the parties all agreed “to consult together in all matters of common interest and to commit no aggression against another’s territory” (Altuğ, 1989, p. 5). It was mainly a nonaggression pact. Another driving force behind signing Saadabad Pact may be fears of Kurdish rebellion which were not only considered by Turkey but also by Iran and Iraq.

These three cases show that security is the ultimate aim for Turkey. With regards to the Mosul issue, Turkey took the fears about Kurdish rebellion into consideration, which would be a continuous security risk for Turkey. In the case of the Sancak of Alexandretta, Turkey tried to exploit the changing international conjuncture and succeeded in that and after dealing with its border problems with the Middle Eastern neighbors, Turkey signed the Saadabad Pact with Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, which mainly aimed not to interfere in one other’s affairs.
3.2. The Menderes Government and the 1950s

3.2.1. The US’s Policy towards the Middle East Regional Security Complex during 1950s and Turkey

After the Second World War, the international order of the interwar years, which had been multipolar, transformed to a new kind of international system, in which two major powers – the US and the Soviet Union- came to the fore as superpowers. Traditional powers of Europe were weakened because of World War II and power vacuum in Europe was filled by the US and the USSR, and the “Soviet-American antagonism” shaped the post-war order (Clark, 1989, p. 168). As a repercussion of the Soviet-American antagonism on the Middle East security complex, the US mainly aimed to block Soviet penetration into the region and protect authoritarian traditional pro-Western regimes through the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), which was formulated after the Suez crisis. By the Eisenhower Doctrine, the US declared that it considers “the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Middle Eastern nations vital to American security” (Spanier, 1973, p. 90), and the US was ready to use armed force against any attempt to overthrow the pro-Western governments in the Middle East by pro-Soviet regimes (Spanier, 1973, p. 91). Beside these, the US also aimed to support and protect Israel and get access to the oil resources of the region (Halabi, 2008, p. 2).
Announcement of the USSR that they would not renew the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Non-aggression Pact, which had been signed in 1925, unless it would not be adopted to new realities of the international system which included the revision of the Monteux Convention, and territorial demands such as leaving Kars and Ardahan which are situated at the eastern part of Turkey to the Soviets, forced Turkey to align itself with the Western bloc (Aydın, 2000, p. 107). Along with the Soviet threat, Turkey also considered being a part of all Western organizations and formations as a proof of its Western identity. That is to say, Turkey perceived being modernized as equal to being westernized.

What is the implication of Turkey’s alignment with the Western bloc in the Cold War period in terms of regional security complex theory? This may be interpreted as challenging Turkey’s insulating function; however, during 1945-60, security considerations of Turkey and the US coincided at most points. In that era, Turkey postponed its policy of establishing a balanced relationship with all of the major powers and its non-alignment position, and established close economic and military ties with the US and thereby the Western bloc. The US became active in the European continent with Truman Doctrine (1947) and continued to actively involve in the continent through Marshall Plan (1948), which included Turkey and Greece.

Turkey attached itself to western community by seeking membership to all kind of Western institutions. Turkey was one of the founding members of the United Nations
in 1949, became a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1948 and the Council of Europe in 1950. In 1959, Turkey applied for associate membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), and became associate member in 1963, in order to establish further links with the Western bloc. Although EEC was economic in essence, Turkey’s political concerns should also be taken into account. In addition to these, Turkey also became a member of NATO (1952); it was the desire of Turkey to take advantage of Western security umbrella by being a member of NATO (Aydın, 2000, pp. 110-111). On the other hand, Aydın argues that Turkey’s quest for NATO membership was in connection with its economic concerns. According to Aydın (2000, p. 111), besides security concerns of the country, prevalent reason for Turkey to become a member of NATO lies in the “idea that its exclusion might lead to a decrease of US interest and subsequent reduction in American aid”. Karpat (1975, p. 115) adds one more dimension in Turkey’s full engagement with the US; Turkey viewed the US as a country who had “opposed to colonialism and imperialism”.

Turkey’s engagement with the Western bloc had repercussions for its relations with the Middle East. The situation for most of the Middle Eastern states and Turkey was different; Turkey and Iran played buffer role between the USSR and Arabic states in the region, therefore they were distant from the bloc politics and more comfortable than Turkey. The Arab states formed close relations with the Soviets in order to balance American influence and gain support against Israel. As a result of this, as
Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu (2003, p. 617) put it Turkey and the Arab states remained in the different sides of the Cold War.

Turkey perceived the Middle East through the lenses of the Cold War and its approach was characterized as being a “proxy” of Western powers’ interest, which was mainly caused by Menderes government’s policies during the 1950s. This caused Arab states, which were earlier under the Ottoman rule and under mandate of the European powers afterwards, to think of Turkish policies towards the region as realizing a new kind of imperialistic mission as a “proxy” and “pawn” of imperialist powers (Aydıñ, 2000, p. 113). This negative perception had negative ramifications on the future of the relations, when Turkey started to look for new opportunities in its foreign policy by the mid-1960s.

Threat perceptions of the most of the Middle Eastern states and Turkey were different and the two sides conducted their foreign policies accordingly. This resulted in negativity in respective recognitions of the both sides. Arab states did not perceive the USSR as a direct threat to themselves, according to their point of view, primary threat was coming from Israel, which was supported by the Jewish lobby in the US; therefore they stood aloof from the West. On the other hand, as newly independent states, it was not surprising for them to feel close to the USSR, which did not have an imperialistic history, unlike European powers. Therefore, they were skeptical about

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7 As colonial powers’ influence declined by the Suez crisis, the US is mainly implied by ‘Western powers’.
Turkish policies towards the Middle East, as Turkey recognized Israel in 1949 and its engagement with the Western bloc was evident (Sander, 2006, pp. 229-230). In this sense, the identification of the other was negative. Turkish efforts to establish the Baghdad Pact as part of the US policies doubled the negative image of Turkey by the states in the Middle East.

3.2.2. The Formation of the Baghdad Pact (1955)

Turkey aimed to bring together Middle Eastern states into an alliance aiming to confront Soviet threat. Before efforts to establish Baghdad Pact, there was the idea of establishing a Middle East Defense Organization under the control of Britain and in which Turkey would have played the leading role aiming to prevent penetration of the Soviets to the region⁸. It appears that in the case of the Middle East Defense Organization and the Baghdad Pact, the Western powers had misunderstood the Arab states’ perceptions, while Western powers aimed to confront Soviets. Egypt, for instance, refused to participate in such an organization perceiving it as a means to establish another form of British domination in the region (Karpat, 1975, pp. 115-6). Concerning the efforts to establish Baghdad Pact; Turkey and Britain failed to gather Arab states other than Iraq, which was at that time governed by pro-Western monarch; Turkey and Iraq signed a mutual cooperation agreement in 1955 and in the same year Britain, Iran and Pakistan joined the Pact. In those years, Turkey regarded

⁸ Thereby, Britain aimed to put Turkey into a Middle Eastern security alliance.
its efforts as a success, but the following years showed that it was not in favor of Turkish interests. Turkey, in line with the US policies in the region, aimed to build northern tier against the communist threat in accordance with the US view. One of the aims of Turkey was to receive financial aid by dramatizing the communist threat (Aydın, 2000, p. 108), but in the end it could not receive aid as much as it expected. What is more, these efforts contributed to the alienation of Turkey in the Middle East, and precipitated the spread of pro-Nasserite, pro-Soviet and accordingly anti-Western feelings in the region.\(^9\)

The developments which caused negative identification with other as a result of Turkey’s intention to preserve the West’s interests in the region during the Menderes era can be listed as follows; in 1956 Turkey supported Western powers concerning the Suez crisis, in 1958 it stood against the coup in Iraq like other Western bloc states, in the same year Turkey permitted of the use of İncirlik base regarding the Lebanon crisis. Turkey approached the Nasserist riots in Arab states as if they are Soviet’s attempt to penetrate into the Middle East region and acted as a staunch ally of NATO.

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\(^9\) After the Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact following the regime change after the coup, the Pact was renamed as Central Treaty Organization in 1959.
3.2.3. Phantom Pact with Israel (1958)

Phantom Pact is another significant development to reveal the characteristics of Turkish engagement with the Middle East in Menderes era, which was a top-secret alliance forged in 1958. During the Cold War, like Turkey, Israel also aligned itself with the US, and Israel was the only democratic and secular country in the region. Still Turkey was skeptic to form such a Pact because of the fear of Arab public opinion, which would augment negative perception. Nevertheless, as evaluated by Walker (2006, p. 71), there were three major reasons that pushed Turkey for such a move. First of all, Iraq, despite being a member of Baghdad Pact and had assured Turkey to vote in line with Turkey, voted against Turkey over the Cyprus issue in 1957. This was important because it showed Turkey that if Iraq had to choose between Turkey and Arab countries, it would choose the Arab side. Second, in 1958, Egypt and Syria established United Arab Republic, and this move raised concerns in Turkey about its being pro-Soviet and continue to include other Arab states, which would meant that Turkey stuck between Soviets and pro-Soviet United Arab Republic. Third factor was the regime change in Iraq in 1958. In addition, the establishment of the United Arab Republic and the fall of monarch in Iraq were perceived as destabilizing factors in the region. Even today, what exactly the Phantom Pact covered is not known, but it is widely accepted that the seeds of the strategic partnership that was established in 1996 is the Phantom Pact of 1958, so
Phantom Pact was the initial step of “military and intelligence cooperation” between Turkey and Israel.

3.3. Quest for Multidimensionality in Turkish Foreign Policy: Challenging insulator state with multidimensionality?

During the 1950s, Turkish foreign policy signified close engagement with the Western alliance; during the early years of the Cold War, Turkish security interests highly coincided with the Western interests in general and the US interests in particular. Nonetheless, Turkey experienced disappointment regarding the pro-Western and pro-American Foreign Policy. Though Turkey did not question its place in the Western alliance, it reexamined its opportunities and constraints in its foreign relations and quest for multidimensionality as a result of this. Turkey was disappointed by the US policy regarding the missile crisis between 1961-63, and the continuing Cyprus crisis and infamous Johnson’s letter of 1964, seemed to be powerful impetus for Turkey to reevaluate strictly West-oriented and one dimensional foreign policy (Aydın, 2000, p. 115). It paved the way to diversify its foreign policy in the form of reexamining opportunities and constraints for itself in pursuit of its own national interests. This can be seen in Turkey’s voting characteristics in the UN; for instance, regarding the Algerian independence, Turkey voted with the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN voting (Aydın, 2000, p. 125). Even so, Turkey did not change the direction of foreign policy; it did not alter its position in
the NATO alliance, but improved its bilateral relations with the Middle Eastern states, non-aligned countries and Eastern bloc, especially in economic terms (Aydın, 2000).

After 1964, Turkey actively searched for a more balanced foreign policy in the form of improving its relations with the Soviet Union, non-aligned nations and the Arab countries. This policy continued when Demirel came to power after 1965 elections. Bölükbaşı (2001, p. 158) evaluates the multi-dimensional foreign policy pursuit under Demirel government during 1965-1971 as follows; diplomatic initiatives should be given importance in order to strengthen the security of the country, Turkey is in need of additional economic resources for continuing economic development, friendly relations should be developed with the countries without taking into account their political regimes, seeking for support for the Cyprus cause.

With regards to Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East in this era, Turkey had to keep in mind some sort of elements. Turkey had to take the conflict formation characteristics of the Middle East into account, since instabilities in the region would have had negative effects on Turkey; moreover Turkey had bilateral disputes with the region’s countries. There were territorial disputes between Syria and Turkey; Syria did not recognize the Turkish-Syrian border after Hatay was annexed to Turkey. Disputes on water resources is also important concerning the relations with Syria and Iraq; Tigris and Euphrates Rivers are vital water resources for Syria and
Iraq, these two rivers are originated from Turkey and sharing of the water caused friction between Turkey and Syria and between Turkey and Iraq (Karpat, 1975, p. 111). The emergence of Israel in the Middle East region caused frictions and wars between Arabs and Israel, and seeded the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. Regarding Turkey’s relations with the countries in the Middle East, Turkey’s relations with Israel was also one of the determining factors and Turkey’s relations with Israel is closely related with Turkish foreign policy’s Western connection, especially the US.

By the mid-1960s new guidelines of Turkey’s Middle East policy were summarized by Bengio (2004, p. 57) as follows; efforts should be maximized for the rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states, relations with Israel should be at the expense of reconciliation efforts with the Middle Eastern states, and to achieve these goals, relations with Israel should kept as limited as possible. In this regard, Turkey suspended military cooperation with Israel in 1966 by dissolving the intelligence connection between Turkey and Israel, which meant putting an end to military aspect of the Phantom Pact (Özcan, 2003). The diplomatic representation of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic in 1965 and Somalia in 1966 rose to ambassadorial level. Turkey got involved in an economic and cultural agreement called Regional Cooperation for Development with Iran and Pakistan, which was established in 1964 (Aydın, 2000, p. 126). Still, Turkish efforts were not problematic; for instance, meetings on the Euphrates water ended in 1965 without positive results, and worsened when Syria introduced a land reform in 1966 leading to seizure of Turkish
citizens’ properties, in response to which Turkey closed the Turkish-Syrian border. Nevertheless, the parties took steps to solve the problems. For instance, in 1972 and 1973, Turkey and Syria exchanged high-level visits in order to discuss the conflicting issue of properties owned by Turks in Syria and by Syrian subjects in Turkey (Karpat, 1975, pp. 127-133).

No matter what had happened, Turkey did not want to act, which would be understood as undermining its commitment to the Western alliance, and improved its relations with the Middle Eastern states on cultural, economy and trade grounds. Turkey tried to base its relations to bilateral trade agreements which were dealing with economic issues rather than political matters. For example, Turkey rejected the offer of the King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to form an “Islamic Pact” aiming to form a cultural union and a Muslim Common Market, but signed a cultural agreement in 1966. Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel stressed that Turkey would only participate in meetings and agreements which were not political in essence or which would result in the political attachment of Turkey (Karpat, 1975, p. 128). As aptly pointed out by Karaosmanoğlu (1983), Turkey aimed to develop its relations with the Arabian countries mainly on bilateral basis; Turkey’s joining to the Islamic Conference can be interpreted as providing the country suitable arena to strengthen its economic relations and further its economic interests. So, Turkey’s overall quest was to normalize its relations with the states in the Middle East security complex in that era. As a part of this, Turkish attitude towards the Arab-Israeli dispute, which is
the defining element of the Levant sub complex, gradually changed by mid-1960s and continued to change in 1970s in favor of Arabs.

3.3.1. Changing Turkish Attitude towards the Arab-Israeli Dispute

Turkey was one of the opposing countries regarding the partition of Palestine territories in the UN voting in 1947, yet this did not refrain Turkey from recognizing the state of Israel in 1949 as the first Muslim nation (Hale, 2000, p. 125). Turkey perceived the existence of Israel as a means to contain Syria which did not recognize the annexation of Hatay to Turkey. As stated above, during the 1950s Turkey approached to region’s countries from the security outlook of the Western camp. When Turkey realized that it had to guard its national interest first and was not always convergent to that of the Western powers, it reevaluated its approach towards the region’s most important security consumer issue: “the Arab-Israeli conflict”. As Karpat (1975, p. 114) points out the change of attitude of Turkey towards the Arab-Israeli conflict was closely related with the deterioration of its relations with the US.

In the second half of the 1960s, it seems that Turkish attitude gradually turned into more pro-Arab, this was not only affected by the national interests of the country, but also by the concerns on gaining public support which at that time was strongly supportive of the Arabs. High-level visits were paid from Iraq and Saudi Arabia to Turkey and from Turkey to Tunisia in 1966, and such kind of visits had continued in
the following year. In the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 (Six Days War), Turkey did not allow the US to use İncirlik Military Airbase to support Israel. When Israel’s occupation of some parts of the Arab territories became clear, Turkey made it clear that “Turkey is against territorial gains made by the use of force”\textsuperscript{10}. Turkish attitude in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 symbolized the change of attitude; concerning the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, Turkey voted in favor of Yugoslav resolution which aimed the withdrawal of Israeli troops, but cautiously refrained from voting for the USSR resolution which aimed to call Israel “aggressor” (Karpat, 1975, p. 131; Aydın, 2000, p. 126).

At the end of 1960s, Turkey announced that military hardware would not be allowed by Turkey to NATO countries during the conflicts in which Middle Eastern states were involved (Karpat, 1975, p. 129). As strained relations between Arab countries and Israel were concerned, this announcement can be understood as Turkey’s commitment of not allowing to NATO’s military facilities in case of an Arab-Israeli War. In line with this announcement, Turkey did not permit the use of airbases to the US for inspection services and for refueling of US airplanes to help Israel during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 (Yom Kippur War), but it tolerated the Soviet airplanes’ flights in Turkish airspace (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, p. 163; Özcan, 2008, p. 94).

\textsuperscript{10} Speech made by Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (Aras, 1998, p. 119).
Nevertheless, Turkey was cautious about not being considered as a part of the conflict. In 1969, Turkey participated to the Muslim Summit Conference whose participants condemned Israel for burning al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem; still it opposed to join the decision which called for cutting diplomatic relations off with Israel at the Rabat Summit Conference (Özcan, 2003, p. 334). In 1976, Turkey officially recognized the PLO and allowed it to open an office in Ankara in 1979 (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, p. 171). Moreover, in the UN voting for resolution on “equating Zionism with racism” in 1975, Turkey supported the resolution. In 1980, when Israeli Assembly declared Jerusalem as the everlasting capital of Israel, Turkey reacted by lowering its relations with Israel to the second secretary level (Özcan, 2008, p. 112). Turkey’s change in attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict can be seen as satisfying public and gaining popular support, and as a means and a sign of its rapprochement with the Arab world, proving that Turkey would not be the supporter of all the acts of Western nations without putting its interests in the first place together with rising economic problems.

3.4. The Özal Era and the 1990s Coalition Governments

3.4.1. The US policy towards the Middle East in the 1980s and Turkey

The 1980s is called as the Second Cold War era in world politics, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in 1979 in Iran, which was pro-
Western before revolution, were perceived as threats by the Western bloc. These two events forced the US to re-evaluate its policy towards the Middle East and accordingly the geopolitical importance of Turkey. The future of Turkey as a NATO ally concerned the US; it was doubled with the domestic tension in Turkey. The military takeover in 1980 not only ended in a domestic tension between right and left wing groups but also relieved concerns for Turkey’s future in the Western bloc.

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, domestic transformation of the country started to be realized. At this time Turkey focused on internal transformation of the country, and its role was totally in line with the interests of the US. Two main examples of this argument can be Turkey’s full support to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force which was needed by the US at that time and the acceptance of the return of Greece to the military section of NATO without putting preconditions concerning the two states’ long-lasting disputes on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea.

After Özal became the Prime Minister of the first civilian government that was formed in 1983 after the 1980 coup d’état, Turkey focused on improving its relations with the Middle Eastern countries on economic basis, since Arab countries provided important markets for Turkish export products (Özcan, 2008, pp. 94-113). Turkey’s policy towards the Middle East in this period is described by Yavuz (1998) as “the aim of Turkey was buying oil, paying the money at the latest date possible, attracting foreign investment and increasing Turkey’s exports to those [Arab] countries”
On this basis, during 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War (mostly named as the First Gulf War), Turkey remained neutral and even participated in the mediation activities for the settlement of the dispute by peaceful means, but it took advantage of the trade opportunities that the war created for Turkey. Trade loss with the EC countries as a result of military overtake was compensated with the economic opportunities that the Iran-Iraq War created (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, p. 20). The US was also supportive for the rapprochement of Turkey with the Middle Eastern countries. The US considered Islam as compatible with the US interests in the region as a way to counter Soviet penetration in the region, and create pro-Western regimes like Turkey.

3.4.2. The Özal Era and the Early 1990s: Temporary Drift from Insulating Function

Özal served as the Prime Minister from 1983 to 1989 and as the President from 1989 to 1993. In the second term of his government, he tried to be influential on foreign affairs and changed the ministers frequently (Özcan, 2008, p. 95). Turkey’s foreign policy activism of this period started with the Özal government’s application for full membership to the European Community on 14 April 1987. As the President, Özal played a special role, he supported Turkey’s active participation in the Gulf War with the US-led coalition, he paid many foreign visits especially to the ex-Soviet Turkic Republics. As the president, he practiced proactive diplomacy and mainly rested on assertive foreign policy. Turkey asserted to be an exemplary country for the Central
Asian Turkic countries and wanted to act as the “big brother” of these states in the region, however failed to achieve its goals when it realized the continuing Russian influence in the region and unwillingness of region’s countries to be patronized by any other country.

Özal perceived the end of the bipolar structure of international system as an opportunity for Turkey. In Özal’s vision, Turkey was now freed from the constrains of the Cold War and would develop good relations with the ex-Soviet Turkish Republics, the Balkans countries, as well as the Arab Middle East, on many grounds including politics. In addition to that, Özal also wanted to show the Western states that Turkey was still a geopolitical asset for them. Within this international environment, Özal was in an effort to show that Turkey is vital to defend Western interests in the unstable regions (Laçiner, 2009). Özal’s policy in the Gulf War of 1991 can be evaluated under this vision of Özal; in the new environment after the Cold War, Turkey had to demonstrate that its strategic importance had not diminished. As Elanchenny (2008) puts forward, Özal did not see any contradiction in allowing US troops to Turkish territory, military bases to intervene Iraq and becoming a “major regional player” (p. 3). Still this policy provided Turkey with a temporary drift of its insulating function.

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, Turkey joined the US-led Western-Arab coalition against Saddam Hussein forces. Turkey under Özal’s
personal influence, provided the US-led coalition with the use of İncirlik military base to attack Iraq from north and blocked the use of Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline (Martin, 2004, p. 160) which was carrying 1.52 million barrels of oil daily (Laçiner, 2009). This signified a divergence of Turkey’s classical foreign policy practice of non-involvement in inter-Arab conflicts. Turgut Özal, with an idea of “betting one getting three”, positioned Turkey with the policies of the US president George Bush (Laçiner, 2009); however, in return, Turkey had major economic losses due to cutting of the oil pipelines, great dilemmas regarding power vacuum and the Kurdish presence in the Northern Iraq, which had repercussions for the rest of the 1990s in terms of security. Moreover, Turkey also participated in the economic embargo against Iraq and allowed the use of İncirlik military base for “Operation Provide Comfort” (precursor of “Operation Northern Watch”) (Martin, 2004, p. 160), which provided safe-haven for Kurds and also for the PKK terrorists in the Northern Iraq.

In the aftermath of the death of Özal in 1993, increasing terrorist attacks in Turkey resulted in security concerns to become dominant in the relations with the Middle Eastern countries. With the increasing presence of the military officials on the conduct of foreign policy of the country through the National Security Council (NSC), the relations with the Middle East were highly securitized. For Syria, Iraq and Iran, security concerns resulted in negative relations whereas with Israel security concerns affected the relations positively.
3.4.3. 1990s Coalition Governments: Total Convergence with Insulator State

Turkey was surrounded by unstable regions, newly independent states and ambiguities in the probable new world order. It was not easy for Turkey to establish policies to adapt to the rapidly changing international system and the new security environment. But it was obvious that Turkey had to reevaluate its foreign policy in accordance with the conjuncture and changing dynamics of the international system, since the parameters of the foreign policy making have changed.

With the end of the Cold War framework, concerning the security matters and decline of the importance of the military alliances, regional security complexes gained significance in the new era. In that kind of international environment Turkey put emphasis on regional developments in its foreign policy consideration and at the same time tried to show the Euro-Atlantic Community that Turkey is still important for them. Developments in the new era resulted with the diversification of Turkish foreign policy which was not confined to a single region.

Concerning the relations with the Middle East, intensification of the security agenda was significant. In the aftermath of the Second Gulf War of 1990-91, which had strong consequences for the region, Turkey faced with many dilemmas in its relations with the Middle East. Unlike the active non-involvement policy in the Iran-Iraq War during 1980-88, Turkey had active interactions with the Middle East
security complex in the 1990s; interventions in Northern Iraq territories, strained relations with Syria and strategic cooperation with Israel are noteworthy (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 397). Besides the Second Gulf War, another major development causing region-wide repercussions was the peace process in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

3.4.3.1. Relations Characterized through “Negative” Perceptions

Turkish perception of that Syria was increasingly supporting the PKK, despite the 1987 and 1992 agreements with Syria, was supported by the Turkish intelligence that Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was staying at the Beqaa valley, which is under Syrian control, which created great discomfort on the Turkish side. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war in 1998 because of Syria’s support for the PKK and insistence on not to expel Abdullah Öcalan from Syrian territories. At the peak point of tense relations with Syria, the Commander of the Turkish Land Forces Atila Ateş went to a province in Hatay that is at the Syrian border and on 15 September 1998, clearly threatened Syria by saying “Our patience has run out”, and Turkish army held a big military operation in Hatay. These implied that Turkey was ready to take military action against Syria. After a short time, with the diplomatic pressures of Egypt and Iran, Abdullah Öcalan was expelled from Syria and the PKK camps in Syria were closed. After negotiations with Syria, Adana Protocol was signed in 1998. By this protocol, Syria agreed that PKK camps will no longer be active in Syria and that Öcalan will never be sheltered in the Syrian territories again. Following this
protocol, from 1990s onwards, relations with Syria started to be normalized and improved in both political and economic fields (Hale, 2000, pp. 304-305).

After the Second Gulf War, Turkey mainly aimed to prevent the emergence of an autonomous Kurdistan in Northern Iraq and to prevent PKK’s use of Northern Iraq to commit terrorist activities in Turkey, since after issuing of no-fly zones in Northern Iraq central government lost its authority in the territories of Northern Iraq that created a power vacuum which was tried to be filled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which is led by Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which is led by Talabani—a situation that provided a chaotic environment for the PKK to strengthen itself (Robins, 2003, pp. 313-4).

At the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey cooperated with the Barzani and Talabani forces to attack to the PKK groups in Northern Iraq. Even so, with regard to cooperation with these groups, there was lack of trust on both sides—especially on the Turkish side towards the Kurdish groups—and this affected the success of operations (Robins, 2003, p. 327), and central authority in Baghdad was also not pleased by these military operations.

Turkey’s relations with Iran were also not as desired. Throughout most of the 1990s, Turkey-Iran relations were dominated by ideological differences and Turkey’s belief about that Iran has a desire for regime exportation. In addition to that, Turkey was
suspicious about Iran that it was supporting the PKK and radical Islamic organizations such as the Hezbollah despite the agreements between two countries. Iran was also accused of being behind the political suicides in Turkey (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2002, p. 580).

3.4.3.2. Relations with Israel (Strategic Cooperation with Israel)

As a result of shared security concerns and with the help of Madrid Peace Process that began in 1991, relations between Turkey and Israel went into an era of rapprochement in the 1990s. As stated by Altunışık (2000), Madrid Process “removed the last barrier to the betterment of the relations between Turkey and Israel” (p.60). In fact, the Middle East peace process created a positive atmosphere to upgrade relations with Israel, Turkey also aimed to get support of the Jewish lobby in the US and the EU to balance Armenian and Greek lobbies. Turkey was in search of friendships in the region, because of strained relations with Iran, Iraq and Syria. Moreover, the US was supportive of increasing relations with Israel, since the US needed strong friends in the Middle East for the abovementioned “new world order” (Erhan & Kürkçüoğlu, 2002, pp. 568-9). All of these factors played roles for Turkey to perceive Israel as a strategic partner in the region.

At first, Turkey developed relations in tourism, culture and education fields; many high-level visits took place in the first half of the 1990s and several agreements were signed during these visits. In 1996, several significant agreements were signed which
comprised high interests of the two countries; the Military Training and Cooperation Agreement, Free Trade Agreement, and Defense Industry Cooperation Agreements (Özcan, 1998, pp. 169-171). These altogether can be called as the “Strategic Cooperation Agreement”, and by this agreement the two countries agreed on the exchange of intelligence, joint military exercises, military visits, “Israel’s upgrading of Turkish fighter planes and tanks, Turkey’s granting of its airspace to Israeli training flights, as well as joint naval maneuvers.” (Del Sarto, 2004, p. 143)

Strategic cooperation with Israel had also implications for the relations with the region’s countries; close relations with Israel was perceived by Arab countries as an anti-Arab alliance (Del Sarto, 2004, p. 145). The discomfort of the Arab countries can be seen from the criticisms towards Turkey about the Strategic Cooperation Agreements with Israel towards Turkish President of the time Süleyman Demirel at the OIC summit in 1996.
CHAPTER 4

JDP GOVERNMENTS AND TURKEY IN REGIONAL SECURITY

COMPLEX THEORY: STILL AN INSULATOR STATE?

The “Justice and Development Party (JDP) entered the Turkish political scene on 14 August 2001, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan” (JDP, n.d.). The core cadre of the JDP was formed by the reformist wing of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), but ideologically and especially in foreign policy practice, they are more in line with the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi), in the sense that they do not seem to adopt anti-Western and anti-European stance of the former. In the general elections of 3 November 2002 JDP received %34 of the total vote and became the ruling party (JDP, n.d.). JDP’s coming to power as the ruling party marked the end of the era of coalition governments which was the characteristics of Turkish politics during the 1990s.

4.1. The Main Theoretical Pillars of JDP’s Foreign Policy as Challenging the Insulating Function of Turkey

Ahmet Davutoğlu was appointed as Foreign Minister on 1 May 2009, before that Yaşar Yakış, Abdullah Gül, Ali Babacan served as the JDP government’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, even before Ahmet Davutoğlu became the Foreign
Minister, he was seen as the “secret foreign minister” (Şeker, 2009) and “behind the scenes figure” (Sariibrahimoglu, 2009) in conducting the foreign policy of the JDP government as the R.T.Erdoğan’s chief foreign policy advisor from 2002-2009. The main guidelines of the JDP’s foreign policy were put forward by him, mainly aiming to replace the reactive foreign policy\(^{11}\) of Turkey by a proactive and multifaceted foreign policy.

Davutoğlu’s well-known book “Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position” which was published in 2001, set the theoretical background of the JDP’s foreign policy\(^{12}\), in other words foreign policy of the JDP is based on the so-called ‘strategic depth doctrine’ or as some use the “Davutoğlu Doctrine”\(^{13}\). Principally within the general framework of “Strategic Depth”, Davutoğlu wishes to provide a strategic repositioning of Turkey. In addition to that, despite the fact that it is not referred to by Davutoğlu or Erdoğan and strongly rejected by them\(^{14}\), it is widely accepted that JDP is performing a policy of neo-Ottomanism.\(^{15}\) Therefore as the main theoretical

\(^{11}\) Former Minister of Foreign Affairs İlter Türkmen (September 1980-October 1983) defined Turkish foreign policy as “reactive”; which is characterized as waiting other actors’ behaviors then guard its own stance (Şeker, 2009).

\(^{12}\) The footsteps of this doctrine was the article written by Davutoğlu named “The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)order” (1998).

\(^{13}\) As it is used by Grigoriadis (2010).

\(^{14}\) See, for instance, ("I am not a neo-Ottoman", 2009), ("Yeni Osmanlıcılık fikri", 2010) Davutoğlu (2010, p. 41) while defending the historical responsibility of Turkey as a successor state of the Ottoman Empire rejects the use of neo-Ottomanism as a term.

\(^{15}\) Some examples for such kind of arguments can be seen (Onar, 2009), (Taşpınar, 2008), (Walker, 2007), (Murinson, 2006), (Rubin, 2004), (Elanchenny, 2008).
pillars of JDP’s foreign policy, neo-Ottomanism along with Strategic Depth doctrine will be developed on.

4.1.1. Neo-Ottomanism

The roots of neo-Ottomanism go back to the Özl era, actually neo-Ottomanism is first pronounced by Cengiz Çandar in the beginning of 1990s (Onar, 2009). Çandar described Turgut Özal as “the Ottoman of the 21st century” (Sözen, 2008, p. 4). By the end of bipolar power structure in international politics, Turkey under Özl attempted to perform an assertive foreign policy with the aim of establishing ties with the ex-Soviet Turkic Republics, the countries in the Balkans and the Middle East, for the reason that neo-Ottomans perceived Turkey as the leader of the Muslim and Turkic worlds (Murinson, 2006, pp. 946-947). Islam and Turkic roots were seen as the common denominators that bring these countries together. In line with these, Özl put forward a “Turkish-Islamic synthesis,” which would provide Turkey a viable ground to be an active player in both the Muslim countries and Turkic speaking countries in Caucasia and Central Asia without any contradiction.

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16 Onar (2009) defines neo-Ottoman thinkers as “liberal, secular intellectuals” in Turkey who worked together with Özl to articulate neo-Ottomanism, but like the JDP era neo-Ottomanism as a way to define foreign policy was not accepted by the government circles at that time.

17 Though “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” intensified in Özl era, it is mainly injected by military junta after 1980 (Uzgel, 2010, p. 13). Its roots go back to arguments developed by “Aydınlar Ocağı-Hearths of the Enlightened Society” to counter leftist movements before 1980 (Laçiner, 2009).
As argued in the previous chapter, this era provided a temporary drift from insulating function of Turkey.

Originally, Ottomanism was first explained by Yusuf Akçurağlı in his “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset-Three Styles of Politics” article written in 1904 as one of the three main policies of the last period of the Ottoman Empire namely: (i) Ottomanism, (ii) Islamism, and (iii) Turkism. According to Akçurağlı, thought and practice of Ottomanism started in Mahmud II era as a response to nationalism waves following the French Revolution, developed during the Abdulmecid era, and reached its peak point in the Ali and Fuad Pashas era. Ottomanism aimed to form an Ottoman nation in a new meaning. Ottomanism refers to political movement in the 19th century which offered the creation of an Ottoman identity that embraces all ethnic, linguistic and religious identities in the Ottoman Empire, all the Ottoman peoples will be equivalent to each other with regards to rights and duties. Thereby, an Ottoman nation will be formed around a common homeland like the American nation. The main aim of the Ottomanism was to prevent separation movements inside the country with a new identity and citizenship definition (Karal, 1976). Çağaptay (2009) argues that 19th century Ottomanism sought for the reassertion of “the legitimacy of imperial rule on the basis of Islam”, which focused on all the Muslims.

Ottoman society was multi-ethnic and there was relative tolerance towards non-Muslim subjects. The multicultural formation of the Ottoman society provided it
with a pluralistic character and respect, tolerance and cooperation to the peoples living under the Ottoman rule (Criss, 2010, p. 14). On the other side, neo-Ottomans perceived Turkish Republic as established on the Kemalist foundations of “strict” secularism and unitary form of national identity which is described as “assimilative nationalism” by Taşpınar (2008, p. 5), under a strong form of nation-state.

Neo-Ottomanism can be considered as a challenge to the Kemalist understanding of state formation and foreign policy. Essentially, Kemalist foreign policy was cautious towards the neighboring regions, so it can be argued that under Kemalists, the kind of foreign policy that would be expected from Turkey would be one of “insulator states” of regional security complex theory that are extremely cautious to developments in neighboring security complexes and generally not actively involved in regional conflicts. Onar (2009) points out that Özal’s understanding of neo-Ottomanism required Turkey to establish links with the newly independent states with which Turkey has linguistic, religious or cultural ties, which contradicts the Kemalist elite’s perception of Ottoman Empire as “another country” that necessitated Turkey to cut off its ties with its Ottoman past. In contrast to neo-Ottomanism’s aspire to be an active player in the neighboring regions, Kemalist Republican understanding of foreign policy mainly had adopted the policy of non-involvement in the region’s affairs; in this sense Kemalists are criticized by Onar (2009) because of having a narrow understanding of foreign policy. To the extent that widening the narrow understanding of foreign policy through neo-Ottomanism would challenge
Turkey’s position as insulator state, since neo-Ottomanism forecast an active foreign policy for Turkey in the neighboring regions which were in the past within the Ottoman hinterland.

Davutoğlu (2001, p. 86) sees Özal’s policies as similar to those Ottoman Pashas’ who enhanced friendship with strong Western states in order to preserve Ottoman state’s integral unity. Accordingly, in Davutoğlu’s view, Özal tried to find harmony between internal and external conjunctures. The common elements of the 19th century Ottomanism and Özal’s approach are summarized by Davutoğlu (2001) as follows;

(i) reconfiguration of the state in order to adjust international conjuncture, (ii) endeavor to form a new political identity and culture by taking into consideration the effects of nationalist movements which threatens the unity of the state, (iii) adoption of eclectic behavior that is compatible with Western and traditional values in pursuit of new political culture, (iv) aiming to enter into European system; European system which is formed after the Congress of Vienna (1815) and the EU system which entered into a period of deepening by 1990s, (v) searching for compatible strategies with the UK and the US; after the Congress of Vienna with the UK which was the rising power and after the Cold War with the US which remained as the only superpower (p. 85).

Even so, Davutoğlu (2001, p. 90) criticizes Özal era’s neo-Ottomanist line for the reason that it was in a pragmatic manner and theoretically unprepared and it could not put into a theoretical base and remained at a “journalistic level”. Özal’s vision of foreign policy was shelved when he died in 1993 and the rising terrorist attacks
forced the country to focus on the security dimension while performing foreign policy towards the Middle East. As security was understood mainly as negative by Turkish foreign policy making elites, foreign policy practice during 1990s coalition governments totally converged with that of the insulator states. This explains the strained relations with Syria and Iraq and as well as Iran, and momentous relations with Israel during the 1990s.

According to Taşpınar (2008), neo-Ottomanism is an inspiration to engage and project influence at the former Ottoman hinterland as a reminder of Turkey’s “multicultural, Muslim, and imperial past”, in this line of reasoning, multiple identities can coexist. Nonetheless, while Davutoğlu commenting on the claims that the JDP foreign policy is motivated by neo-Ottomanism puts forward that Turkey, as a nation state in the modern sense, conducts its relations on an equal basis not as a big brother of the region’s countries (“I am not a neo-Ottoman”, 2009). It seems that Davutoğlu and the JDP officials worried about the use of the term neo-Ottomanism in the sense that it may create resentments in the former Ottoman territories and remind an imperial vision or Turkey’s acting as the ‘big brother’ in the neighboring regions. Nevertheless, Davutoğlu explains JDP’s regional perspective as “integration” (“I am not a neo-Ottoman”, 2009) which would result with Turkey’s inclusion in the Middle East security complex. What is more, they are not denying the propositions of neo-Ottomanism like the co-existence of multiple identities, the importance of multi-layered identities and pursuit of an active foreign policy, and
Turkey in regional politics is described by Kınıklıoğlu, who is the JDP Deputy Chairman for External Affairs, as the “rise of regional hegemon” (Kınıklıoğlu, 2007). Suat Kınıklıoğlu puts the JDP’s stance as follows:

There is a neo-Ottoman revival in the cultural field, and our citizens are eager to rediscover Ottoman life, culture, and practices. As Turkey is normalizing domestically, it is also reinterpreting its national historical narrative. This is a natural byproduct of consolidating our democracy. However, trying to paint our carefully constructed foreign-policy initiatives with imperialist overtones is not only a stark misrepresentation, but also does gross injustice to our well-intentioned efforts to stabilize our region (2009b).

In actual terms, despite the fact that neo-Ottomanism was a hotly debated issue as a way to challenge Kemalism and Kemalist foreign policy especially in the beginning of 1990s, it was not systemized into a coherent ideology until Davutoğlu; he systemized and reinvigorated this understanding. So, the reasoning of neo-Ottomanism has provided a theoretical underpinning as a way to challenge Turkey as an “insulator state.”

4.1.2. The “Strategic Depth Doctrine”

Strategic Depth doctrine mainly developed in the book named “Strategic Depth” (2001). In this book Davutoğlu mainly argues that the dominant understanding in Turkish foreign policy is problematic due to the fact that it turned its back on the Turkish society’s culture and civilization. Secularist modernist understanding of
governing elites rejected Islamic background and the values of Turkish people, and Turkish foreign policy which is shaped by this kind of understanding resulted with remote stand of Turkey to the region’s countries which are seen to him as close to Turkey in terms of culture and identity. Davutoğlu (2001, p. 91) argues that Turkey’s dominant governing elites (though not clearly stated he refers to Kemalist Republican elites) estimated a “intra system peripheral role”, this role is expressed by Suat Kınıklıoğlu (2007) as “satellite status” but it is not compatible with Turkish society’s realities, historical accumulations, ideals and expectations. Turkey faces an identity crisis and this derives from efforts of redefinition of the Turkish society. While he defines the reasonable foreign policy for Turkey’s identity and culture, he asserts the need for backbone and this can be achieved only by the legacy that Turkey acquired from the Ottoman Empire, and offers Turkey a “dynamic civilizational axis” (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 93).

Within the general framework of “Strategic Depth” (2001), Davutoğlu redefines power relations. For instance, he states that the security of Erzurum and Kars starts from Transcaucasia, the security of Edirne starts from the Balkans. In this sense, although he criticizes traditional Turkish foreign policy, the above mentioned argument is a reflection of traditional Turkish foreign policy which rests mainly on security concerns. However, he claims that by drawing advantage from culture and civilization; Turkey can attain these goals easier. On the one hand, he mentions hard core realist notions like power basins, security basins, energy corridor, energy hubs,
on the other hand, he develops on the importance of the notions such as Islam, culture, civilization.

Davutoğlu opposes the arguments that is manifested in “The Clash of Civilizations?” the article by Samuel Huntington (1993), and proposes the counterargument of insistence on the common values with neighbors. As a concrete example of this, “Alliance of Civilization Initiative” which was proposed by Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero under the UN can be given. As it is underlined by Balcı and Miş (2008, p. 392) it was a proposition of “Alliance of Civilization between the Western and the Arab and Muslim world”, in his (Zapatero) speech at the UN General Assembly he asserted the need to prevent the establishment of a new wall based on civilizational divergences that would replace “the Berliner Mauer”. Turkey was invited to cosponsor to the Alliance by Zapatero in 2005 and Erdoğan enthusiastically accepted the offer. Erdoğan, under the Alliance of Civilization Initiative, acted as the spokesperson of the Muslim world and highlighted the slogan of “say no to the clash of civilizations, and say yes to the Alliance of Civilizations” (Balcı & Miş, 2008, p. 394). Davutoğlu (2010) evaluates Turkey’s participation in the “Alliance of Civilization” initiative as the country’s contribution of the global order and global governance and interprets this initiative is a reflection of “a new approach in cultural order” (p.44). Turkey’s cosponsoring the Alliance of Civilizations initiative with Spain shows that it can be interpreted that Turkey’s perception of neighborhood is moving towards a positive one and Turkey is going beyond the “insulator state” and
moving towards an interface actor between the European and the Middle East security complexes, which denotes moving from the main function of insulator state as insulating the conflict dynamics of divergent regional security complexes.

According to Davutoğlu (2004), the strategic depth of Turkey is based on the geographical depth and the historical depth of the country. In his vision, Turkey has a regional responsibility emanating from its geography and history. In his definition historical depth is point at issue if a country is “at the epicenter of (historical) events” and geographical depth is part and parcel of historical depth, Murinson (2006, p. 952) defines historical depth as “Turkish embeddedness” in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East which derived from the Ottoman past. Davutoğlu asserts that Turkey is situated at the center of “geocultural basins”, of common culture and history that is inherited from the Ottoman Empire, and that this can act as facilitator for Turkey to establish close relationships with the countries in the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasia. The reason for stating ‘geocultural’ is attributing strategic importance to culture, the prefix ‘geo’ shows this. He implies that Turkey can use culture to amend and enhance the relations with the region’s countries, to maximize its interests, and to increase its effectiveness in the region. If the use of culture refers to that, then it would be called as ‘geocultural’.

Turkey ruled over a large territory for centuries and had interactions for a long time with various regions, therefore Turkey is partly a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian,
Turkey is not just any old Mediterranean country. One important characteristic that distinguishes Turkey from say Romania or Greece is that Turkey is at the same time a Middle East and Caucasus country. Unlike Germany, Turkey is a much a European country as it is an Asian one. Indeed, Turkey is as much a Black Sea country as it is a Mediterranean one. This geographical depth places Turkey right at the center of many geographical areas of influence (2001).

This speech gives a hint for repositioning of Turkey within the regional security complex theory; as an insulator state Turkey’s interactions were kept limited in general, though form time to time it was challenged only for short times, but this self-perception of Turkey position’s in a central place within its unique geography not at the periphery of divergent security regions. Nevertheless, from this, it cannot be concluded that self-perception of the JDP assumes Turkey in the Middle East security complex or in the European security complex, but an understanding which goes beyond the insulator state or a pole within a regional security complex-Turkey as an interfacing security actor. Projected multi-regional identities of Turkey are hints that Turkey is at least “perceived” as “interfacing actor”.

Davutoğlu argues that the former leaders of the Turkish Republic saw religious and historical continuities as impediments for efforts to create a Westernized secular state. He views the leaders of Turkish Republic’s cutting ties off with their Ottoman
past and cosmopolite culture as a deficiency, and if Turkey wants to overcome the problems that it faces in domestic and foreign affairs it should embrace its rich Ottoman past. This kind of understanding required Turkey to pursue active foreign policy. As Mustafa Türkeş (2008, p. 269) aptly points out, Davutoğlu sees as the main deficiency of Turkish foreign policy the lack of backbone (omurga eksikliği-omurga meselesi) for the reason that religious and historical continuity elements, which should be integral parts of foreign policy, were ignored by the Republican leaders. Türkeş (2008, p. 271) continues to argue that what Davutoğlu endeavors is to add an Islamic ideological backbone to balance of power policies of realist school. These kind of arguments are also pointed out by Uzgel (2010, pp. 357-380), he defined Davutoğlu’s vision in essence as “Islamist Realism”, he argues that Davutoğlu added classical realist paradigm to Ottomanism elements along with historical, religious/cultural items.

Davutoğlu (2008) evaluated Turkey’s new foreign policy under five principles in his article “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assesment of 2007”, by referring to past practices of JDP government. This article gives the main propositions of Strategic Depth doctrine in a nutshell. These can be labeled as the main pillars of the Turkish foreign policy under the JDP governments. First of all, in order to exercise influence on its neighborhood, Turkey needs to “balance security with democracy”. Democracy should not be hampered by the security concerns of the country. In his understanding it is a way to reveal the soft power potential of Turkey in its environs.
As it is seen, this is somewhat related with the domestic politics of the country by focusing the international implications, it envisages a domestic transformation. This principle implies for a peaceful solution for the Turkey’s long lasting Kurdish problem by separating the PKK terrorism with Kurdish cultural rights. Turkey’s domestic reform process that has started with the 1999 Helsinki decisions can be evaluated under this principle; “advancing democracy”.

The second principle is “zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbors”. According to this principle, zero-sum (win-lose) mentality of “aggressive” foreign policy, for instance towards Syria in the second half of the 1990s, is replaced by the win-win policy of the JDP government. Steps that are taken towards normalizing relations with Armenia and JDP government’s support for the UN-backed Annan plan can be evaluated under this principle. On the other hand, while Turkey is taking steps towards solving its problems, the relations with some other countries especially with Israel and Azerbaijan deteriorated due to Turkey’s efforts to “normalize” its relations with Armenia. So, in practice the JDP government does not seem to understand the fine tunes of Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, the possibility of successful implementation of zero problems policy should be questioned regarding Turkey and its neighbors. International relations is not just based on the bilateral relations of states, there may be third parties of the problems or some other problems may be attached to the problematic issue between the two states, so other states’
concerns and attached problems should also be taken into account and this is not easy most of the time.

The third principle is to “develop relations with the neighboring countries and beyond”. In his view, Turkey’s role in the neighboring regions should be constructive therefore Turkey should rely on soft power rather than coercive power. With the help of the Ottoman legacy, Turkey inherited from the golden age of the Ottoman Empire, it has the potential to exert (soft) power in the former Ottoman territories (Onar, 2009, p.11). By relying on soft power rather than coercive power on the Middle Eastern countries, and with the advancement of its soft power by the historical depth that Ottoman legacy provided, Turkey could act as a key regional and global player. Indeed, Turkey’s area of interests is not constrained by the neighboring regions but go beyond that; Turkey also pays attention to regions like Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America, for example in Turkey numerous Turkey-Africa summits were organized (Grigoriadis, 2010, p. 9). Davutoğlu in one of his speeches has stated “There is no diplomacy of a line, but there is the diplomacy of the superficies, and this superficies is the whole world” (“Davutoğlu: Hattı diplomasi yoktur”, 2010). These efforts are signs of Turkey’s aspiration to be a global player: Davutoğlu summarizes his envision of Turkey in 2023 as follows:

By 2023 when the country will commemorate the one hundredth anniversary of the foundation of the republic, I envision a Turkey which is a full member of the EU after having completed all the necessary requirements, living in full peace with its neighbors,
integrated with neighboring basins in economic terms and for a common security vision, an effective player in setting orders in regions where our national interests lie, and active in all global affairs and among the top 10 economies in the world (Davutoğlu, as cited in Bozkurt, 2010).

His approach reflects isolated perspective by ignoring holistic and relational approaches. Seen from this perspective, he evaluated Turkey’s future situation as autonomous from the system; neither the status of the US nor the EU or other rising great powers vis-à-vis each other and the system which comprises all these actors are forecasted. Although it is a very optimistic vision for Turkey’s future, two important components are missing in this vision; what kind of global and regional setting is expected by 2023 within which Turkey is envisaged, what kind of tools are planning to be used to reach these aims and whether Turkey has necessary economic capability to attain its goals. Without comprehensive answers for these questions Davutoğlu’s forecasts are no more than making a wish for the future. For this reason, this well-known and much quoted statement by Davutoğlu is in fact an overoptimistic and oversimplified notice of intent.

What is more, regarding the practice of the third principle and Turkey’s envisaged status in 2023 in the Middle East, the perspective of Arab countries’ should also be taken into account; is the dominant view regarding the Ottoman “imperial” rule over the Middle East perceived as positive or negative in the Arab capitals? Since as put forward in the revisited understanding of the regional security complex theory
“perceptions” and the “context” is also important which through feedback mechanisms determines the respective recognitions of the actors.

The fourth principle is “adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy”. Davutoğlu (2008) states that:

In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. As a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may be defined as a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character or culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional composition lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate environs (p. 78).

As stated above, Davutoğlu sees Turkey as partly a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country. Even so, in the Republican era of the country’s history, the “Western” dimension of foreign policy is emphasized, therefore what Turkey needs is to balance relations with other regions by rediscovering historical and geocultural depths that the Ottoman legacy provided for the country. Turkey as situated at the center of “geocultural basins”, is no longer in the periphery of Western security framework as it was perceived during the Cold War as being the wing country of NATO (a frontline country at the southern flank of NATO against Soviet expansionism), but in fact is situated at the center within its unique geography. Developments in the Middle East, Balkans, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia should be all concerned
by Turkey, therefore Turkey has additional responsibilities (“I am not a neo-Ottoman”, 2009). To put it another way, Turkey holds multiple regional identities and one of these identities should not be subordinated to others. These regional identities should not be competitive but complementary. Within this context, Turkey will seek for a multidimensional foreign policy in which it is the “central actor” with its unique identity. To the extent that the multidimensional foreign policy is realized, Turkey can be perceived through the logic of interface; however, if Turkey reduces its multiple identities to one and act according to its one regional identity, then it would disrupt the balance of relations between regional security complexes, and eventually Turkey would become a pole in one of the regional security complexes it is surrounded by. According to Davutoğlu’s understanding, Turkey cannot just have one regional identity because of geopolitical factors. Davutoğlu believes that in this new era of Turkish foreign policy the Western orientation of the country will be sustained, but the Eurasian and the Middle Eastern components will be added. Davutoğlu (2008) states that “Turkey’s engagements from Chile to Indonesia, from Africa to Central Asia, and from the EU to the OIC will be part of a holistic approach to foreign policy” (p. 96).

As a sign of it, despite Turkey’s former low-profile engagement with the OIC and relatively passive stance, active policy is followed in the OIC after the JDP came to power, for instance Abdullah Gul, in May 2003 at the OIC Summit in Tehran, made a speech to member countries in which he said that there is a desperate need for
reform in their countries and gave advice to Arab leaders on political participation, political openness and societal change in the following year by the “Istanbul Declaration” that is issued at the OIC Summit at Istanbul demands on spreading democracy was mentioned (Uzgel, 2010, pp. 36-37).

In Davutoğlu’s vision, Turkey’s relations with the Muslim world (the Middle East, Balkans and the North Africa) should not contradict its relations with the Euro-Atlantic community. In this sense, Turkey’s active foreign policy is not contradictory to its relations with the Euro-Atlantic community. Even Grigoriadis (2010, p. 9) argues that regionally active Turkey can be a more attractive candidate for the EU, and Onar (2009) states that liberals perceive JDP neo-Ottomanism as “added-value rather than alternative to Turkey’s European and Western vocation(s)”. On the other hand, Davutoğlu sees the EU membership as desirable for Turkey but not the only strategic orientation for the country, so the EU is not the only anchor for Turkey (Grigoriadis, 2010, p. 9). So we can come to the conclusion that Turkey asserts to form its own axis. Form this point of view, it can be concluded that Turkey is becoming an “interfacing actor” and moving beyond its traditional insulting function. These can be seen from the statements of by Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu argues that because of its Ottoman heritage Turkey has the potential to become the Muslim world’s regional power. Even so, according to Davutoğlu, the EU is not the only alternative and in Erdoğan’s words Copenhagen criteria can be replaced by “Ankara criteria” (Walker, 2007).
The fifth principle is “rhythmic diplomacy”. Rhythmic diplomacy is closely related with the third and fourth principle. In order to fulfill its self-perceived role Turkey should rely on rhythmic diplomacy. As stated above, according to Davutoğlu Turkey is a central power and a key global player having strategic depth derived from historical and geographic depths of the country. The strategic depth of Turkey allows it to pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy in world politics, and rhythmic diplomacy is a necessity for a country which claims to be a central power and is needed to strengthen a pro-active foreign policy. Davutoğlu argues that the world politics is dynamic and in order to perform a successful foreign policy “one needs to perform a constantly moving diplomacy. That is why I call it rhythmic” (Davutoğlu, as cited in Sözen, 2008, p. 16). In sum, these principles are connected to each other; a proactive foreign policy will be strengthened by a rhythmic diplomacy with the aim of zero problems with neighbors.

4.1.3. Evaluation of the JDP’s Foreign Policy within the Context of the Regional Security Complex Theory

Both Davutoğlu and other JDP officials stress on benign terms such as active diplomacy, effective multilateralism, zero problems with neighbors, pro-activism and soft power mechanisms of Turkey.¹⁸ Davutoğlu defined the foreign policy guidelines

¹⁸ Nur Bilge Criss (2010, p. 10) sees concepts that is used by Davutoğlu as wrapped form of populism of the JDP policies.
as a whole, and the JDP government took the advantage of single party government to perform these. This is an indication that JDP government perceives Turkey’s neighborhood as “neutral”. In the regional security complex theory, if identification with other is neutral, the actor feels potential threat “but seeks to resolve security problems” (Coşkun, 2008, p. 93). Nonetheless, in practice, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the problems regarding the accession negotiations with the EU because of the Cyprus issue caused Turkey’s membership negotiations with the EU enter into a period of deadlock. These have led to a decline of pro-American and pro-EU sentiments in the country, hence, the JDP government stressed the ties with the Middle Eastern countries aiming to get popular support inside the country, this kind of foreign policy would also help to increase the prestige of the Turkish government in Arab capitals if we take into account the repercussions after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 in the region. Besides that the Islamic background of the JDP has provided it a viable ground to perform its policies without much resentment in the Arab capitals. Nevertheless, the JDP administration seems to ignore the fact that the importance of an EU anchor is still significant for Turkey’s soft power in the surrounding regions, in other words the power of attraction and the power to get desirable outcomes in its relations with the region’s countries.

Taşpınar (2008) sees the JDP’s so called reengagement with the Middle East as the wish to be a regional superpower in the region. Although, as stated above, JDP officials continually express that they are not aspiring hegemonic relationship with
the region’s countries, as a contradiction with their arguments Suat Kınıklıoğlu, in one of his newspaper articles expressed Turkey as the “rising regional hegemon” in the Middle East. He says that: “Although there are still some who either are blind to the monumental transformation this country has undergone, Turkey has become a regional hegemon” (Kınıklıoğlu, 2007).

There is an ongoing rhetoric-practice gap in the JDP’s foreign policy; while the JDP increasingly points out that Turkey is a central actor in its unique geography at rhetorical level, in practice much of the energy is used to develop relations with the countries in the Middle East which became evident especially in the second JDP government era. So, what is the implication of this in terms of the regional security complex theory? It is evident that Turkey is challenging the insulator state position recently; however, how can Turkey now be analyzed through the regional security complex theory is not clear. While at the rhetorical level an active but balanced relationship with the countries in the neighboring regional security complexes assumes Turkey a role of interfacing actor, in practice the relations with countries at the Middle East security complex is prominent especially in the second era of JDP government. This may mean that Turkey is becoming a pole in the Middle East security complex, but at this time the relations of Turkey with the EU confuses of Turkey’s position within the regional security complex theory, since Turkey is assumed as a part of European security complex in Bengtsson (2010) analysis and
Diez (2005) argues that Turkey’s place in regional security complexes should be revisited because Turkey has started membership negotiations with the EU.

As the US became the dominant actor in the Middle East security complex especially after the Iraqi invasion, putting forth the relations between Turkey and the US in terms of the Middle East security complex is important. Turkey is part of the initiative aiming to region-wide “societal transformation”\(^\text{19}\) in the Middle East namely the “Greater Middle East Project”. In this sense, the JDP administration by exerting its power through using soft power instruments in the former Ottoman territories is serving for the imperialistic desires of the US. One aspect of the US-led Greater Middle East Initiative is region-wide democracy promotion in order to combat Islamist extremism and Turkey as a moderate Islamic democracy characterized as benign actor in international affairs would be a role model for the region’s countries. Regarding the relations with the US, Turkey’s status as a strategic partner is now replaced with a “strategic model”\(^\text{20}\); Turkey is presented as a role model both as a moderate Islamic country and as a benign actor in the region for the region’s countries in line with the project. Nonetheless, JDP is cautious not to cause resentments and preferred to be defined as “source of inspiration” rather than “model” (Uzgel, 2010, p. 38). In this context, the JDP government by implying to denote self-respecting stance towards the West, aims to strengthen its rising prestige

\(^{19}\) Uzgel (2010) points out that Greater Middle East Project does not aim to redraw the Middle East map but “societal transformation” (p. 33).

\(^{20}\) The term is used by Uzgel (2006) and (2010).
and accordingly regional influence, at the same time, as stated above at the OIC Summits gave advice to the OIC countries that they are in need of reform in their countries. In short, the changing perception of actors with the region’s countries resulted with a process of normalization which in terms of the regional security complex theory ends up with “security regime” as the character of the security constellation (Coşkun, 2008, p. 83).

All of the actors (including Turkish bourgeoisie) have their own agenda and their agendas have converging points. The perceived role for Turkey is not contradictory for the JDP to pursue its own interests too. For instance, Turkey’s pro-active policy helped Turkey to increase its weight in the region, but the JDP administration and Turkish entrepreneurs also have desire to win tenders on such as infrastructure building, and increasing its existence in the banking sector…etc.

For the time being, it seems that the JDP foreign policy just challenges the rhetoric of the US policy towards the Middle East. JDP is insisting on soft power, in contrast to the former neo-conservative administration of the US and hard liner Zionist wing of the Israeli government, in other words the contradictory point is the means. For instance, at the NATO Lisbon Summit of 19-20 November 2010, a new “Strategic Concept” was adopted and the need to adopt the alliance to the modern security environment is stated. At this Summit developing a new-Europe wide ballistic missile shield was also discussed. In the end, Turkey signed the Summit declaration; reservation of Turkey was not developing such kind of ballistic missile shield but
identifying Iran as a “threat” within the new security environment, and thereby not to cause resentment in Iran. In this respect, it is not proper to argue that Turkey is deviating from the Western axis or seeing the Middle East as an alternative its Euro-Atlantic commitment, since Turkey’s strongest engagement with the West is being under the Western security architecture, and there is no indication that Turkey has that kind of tendency. But, with regards to the regional security complex theory, Turkey’s recent reengagement with the Middle East as part of the neo-Ottomanist revival and strategic depth doctrine denotes Turkey is shifting from the insulating function. Although strategic depth offers assertive and proactive foreign policy towards the neighboring regions and even beyond that, in practice much of the activism of the JDP administration is used especially to develop relations with the Arab World and Iran though bilateral economic, cultural and diplomatic interactions (Onar, 2009, p. 13).

4.2. The JDP Governments and the Middle East Security Complex

The 9/11 (2001) attacks in New York and Washington had profound impact on the structure of the international system in 2000s, and marked the beginning of a new era. As radical Islamic movements had been seen as the responsible for these attacks, the change in the structure of the international system had significant impacts on the Middle East security complex. The US’s project named Greater Middle East Initiative shaped its policies towards the region, and became the base of main outside
intervention to the complex. It has two main pillars; first one “preemptive strike” which allowed the US to intervene to the countries which it perceived as threat to its security and second, in order not to allow the existence of safe havens for Islamic “terrorist groups” in the Middle East, the regimes in the region will be changed to moderate ones and it will be done by outside intervention if necessary. At this point, the JDP government and the US plans coincided, the JDP would be an asset for the US under the Bush government as a model which is thought to combine Islam, democracy and human rights. Nonetheless, the Greater Middle East Project seems defunct at the time for the reason that its main pillars of it are contradictory in themselves; rather than transforming to more moderate regimes, in Iran Ahmedinecad won elections against his more moderate counterpart and in Palestine Hamas won elections against El Fatah, which was supported by the West in general and the EU in particular.

Foreign policy of the JDP era embraces the understanding against the supposed “lack of backbone” of the mainstream foreign policy understanding of Turkey which is claimed by Ahmet Davutoğlu, and for this reason gives more importance to Islamic culture and identity. Accordingly, JDP government’s foreign policy practices seems mainly as establishing close relationship with the countries in Turkey’s proximity which are perceived as close to Turkey in terms of culture and identity.
First era of the JDP government foreign policy can be defined as seeking for legitimacy both at the domestic level and the foreign level by adopting European norms through Europeanization\(^{21}\) with the instrument of EU reform process. This era is mainly identified as Europeanization in domestic and foreign policies and evaluation of the first era of JDP government mainly rested on Europeanization claims.\(^{22}\) As a matter of fact, reforms in line with the EU expectations started before the JDP came to power, and JDP continued to make reforms in order to comply with the criteria that are set by the EU. What is more, JDP government also by adopting the EU path at the rhetorical level aimed to show that it renewed its outlook in the first era. In short, the EU was presented as “reference point” for reforms. In this sense, the reform process which paved the way for opening the accession negotiations with the EU, Turkey was assumed to be a part of European security complex in the first era of JDP government. The foreign policy was also argued as

\(21\) Europeanization can be thought as a process of change at the domestic level through the pressures caused at the EU level. As Radaelli (2000), points out Europeanization can be thought as de jure transfer of sovereignty from domestic level to the EU level. Europeanization is used by academics and researchers to understand the dynamics that lie beneath integration of Europe at the supranational and domestic levels.

\(22\) Europeanization is one of the mechanisms of European integration. In this line of reasoning, different understandings of researchers on European integration are reflected in their approach to Europeanization. Major (2005) summarizes these approaches in 3 categories; bottom up, top-down, and Europeanization as a cycle. In the ‘bottom-up approach’ focus is on the appearance and increase in the governance structures at the EU level. It means development of European institutions as a way to create a European center which would set new rules, practices and norms. This approach deals with the role of the Member States at the EU level. In the top-down approach the focus is on the adjustment of national policies which are affected by the developments at the EU level. Changes in both the institutions and polices at the national level are dealt with, which bring about convergence of national polices. In other words, it is a process of domestic change which is caused by the impact of European integration. The third conceptualization emerged from the bottom-up and top-down approaches. It sees Europeanization as a circle because in this view top-down and bottom-up approaches cannot be separated; both of them are believed to be in interaction. They are linked to each other, so Europeanization is an interactive process which is continuing and creates links between national and the EU levels.
Europeanized in the form that it adopted more conciliatory and softer approach like the EU’s understanding of norm diffusing.\textsuperscript{23} For instance, in the Cyprus case the JDP government frankly supported the UN-backed Annan Plan, and implied that Denktaş supported deadlock in Cyprus.

In the second era of the JDP government, Turkey’s involvements in the Middle East rather than relations with the EU attracted the attention of scholarly debates as well as some shallow debates which are largely shaped by being pro-JDP or against the JDP arguments. Accession negotiations with the EU entered into a period of deadlock because of the Cyprus issue, and relations with the Middle East came into prominence in the second era of the JDP government. In the second era of the JDP government the EU as “reference point” started to lose its prominence while the relations with the countries in the Middle East security complex became apparent.

In the second era of the JDP government, Turkey is increasingly involved in the Middle East security complex and this is sometimes realized at the expense of relations with the West - the EU and the US. Turkey at some points challenging the traditional foreign policy of the country such as Iran’s nuclear program, repeated statements that are calling some actions of Israel as “state terror”, Lebanon War (2006), Mavi Marmara incident (2010), etc. On the other hand, with regards to the actions there is no harsh challenge to the traditional foreign policy orientation of the

\textsuperscript{23} On Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy see, for example, Tekin (2005), Karakaya Polat (2006), Aydın&Açıkmeşe (2007), Altunüşık (2009), Öniş (2009).
country. For instance although 1st March 2004 decision of the Turkish Parliament was presented as “victory of democracy”, JDP leaders tried hard to make the resolution accepted by the Parliament and later on not the JDP government but the Turkish Armed Forces was accused for Turkish stance in Iraqi war of 2003. In addition, at the NATO Summit in 2010 Turkey insisted that Turkey does not perceive Iran as a “threat” but signed the Summit decision which envisaged development of ballistic missile shield. It can be concluded from the practices of the JDP government that though Turkey increasingly reengages itself with the affairs in the Middle East security complex, it does not turn in its back on the US and the EU and stays within the Western security architecture.

First of all, the relations with Syria started to be normalized with the signing of Adana Protocol in 1998, and following the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya in 1999, provided greater room for maneuver, but accelerated after the JDP came to power. High level visits were realized by the Turkish and Syrian sides during 2003 and for the first time in 57 years a Syrian President Bashar al-Assad paid an official visit to Turkey in January 2004, yet the first step was taken by Turkey before when Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer went to the funeral of Hafez al-Assad (father of Bashar al-Assad, former Syrian President). The Turkish-Syrian rapprochement is twofold; first one is as the two countries have citizens who identify themselves as Kurds do not want the establishment of a Kurdish state in the Northern Iraq, and they aimed to improve relations economic grounds and establish a free trade zone. In the
Sixth Turkish-Syrian Protocol in July 2003, bilateral agreements were signed in the fields of economy, trade, tourism and educational exchange and in January 2004 Syria recognized the “international legal framework” of the Turkish borders, which means recognizing that Hatay is within Turkish territories (Murinson, 2006, pp. 955-56). In line with the rapprochement with Syria, the JDP government also attempted to build positive relations with Egypt and Lebanon. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lebanon and Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri paid official visits to Turkey in 2004 and the two countries signed bilateral agreements. In addition to that, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak paid an official visit to Ankara in February 2004, (Raptoupoulos, 2004, p. 9), and in December 2009, “Egypt was added to the list of strategic partners in the military, social and economic fields” (Criss, 2010, p. 11).

Turkey’s relations with Iran are a little bit confusing for Turkish foreign policy’s Western connection. Iran had been accused by Turkish authorities for supporting PKK’s terrorist activities in Turkey for a long time, but in July 2004, Turkish President Erdoğan visited Iran and signed agreements covering economy and “joint commitment to security cooperation” against PKK and PJAK (Iranian branch of PKK). Besides that the JDP’s stance on Iran’s nuclear issue provides us with a suitable example that denotes that JDP does not totally turn its back to the West. In the case of Iran’s Nuclear Program, since at rhetorical level Prime Minister repeatedly made statements on the Western double standards regarding the nuclear
issues and seemed to lead broker role between Iran and the West. On the other hand, in practice Turkey refrains from antagonizing the US-led Western powers.

Sinkaya (2010, p. 67) points out that there are two primary reasons for Turkey’s interest in Iranian nuclear program; first of all some US-led Western countries pressured Turkey to cooperate against Iran and second, probable results of the Iranian Nuclear Program at the regional scale concerns Turkey. In addition to these two reasons, the escalation of confrontation between Iran and the US concerning the Iranian nuclear program after Iran’s secret nuclear facilities appeared in 2002 and Turkey’s quest to perform its active policy can be added. If Iran develops nuclear weapons through its nuclear program, then the distribution of power in the Middle East security complex would be changed to the advantage of Iran, since Iran will be a nuclear power and advance its deterrence capability. Alternatively, Iran’s occupation by an external power or putting sanctions against Iran like economic embargo will contradict Turkey’s strategic and economic interests. Turkey is dependent on Iranian gas and oil and is trying to develop economic relations; therefore any kind of instability in Iran is against Turkey’s interests.

Turkey is opting for soft instruments in the case of Iranian nuclear program like mediation efforts. Erdoğan declared in October 2008 that Turkey could mediate in

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24 See, for instance, Erdoğan’s statements on the subject: (“Erdoğan'dan ABD'ye İran eleştirisi”, 2008)

25 Davutoğlu’s statements on NATO’s envision to build balistic missile shield is a recent example to the issue: (“Davutoğlu'ndan füze kalkanına övgü”, 2010)
the conflict, but this was rejected by Iran until Mohammed El Baradey, Chief of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), proposed that Iran should store low-enriched uranium in Turkey (“IAEA Chief”, 2009), and Turkey’s positive response to the proposition of Baradey (Grove, 2009). As a result of Turkey’s mediation efforts together with Brazil\textsuperscript{26}, on 17 May 2010, Nuclear Exchange Agreement (or Uranium Swap Agreement) was signed aiming to relieve controversies in question about Uranium Enrichment Program (“Iran agrees to ship”, 2010).

Contrary to expectations, Uranium Swap Agreement did not relive controversies, but aggregated Western suspicions on Iran’s real intention; Iran is thought to aim developing nuclear weapons through its nuclear program and all these moves are just a way to save time to build nuclear weapons. Although Turkey at rhetorical level appears to challenge Western stance, as stated above, it signed the NATO Summit decision in 2010 that envisaged development of ballistic missile shield. Turkey based its opposition at the Summit on not to describing Iran as a “threat”, such kind of opposition is illogical because in Summit decisions of NATO the names of countries are not stated clearly, but it can be understood from the statements of French President Sarkozy that the threat is Iran. He said that “In France, we call a cat a cat. We all know we are talking about Iran.” (“Bizde kediye kedi deriz”, 2010)

\textsuperscript{26} Brazil is one of the temporary members of UN Security Council.
Turkey’s relations with Israel during the JDP era seemed to enter into a cooling period. Even before JDP came to power former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit named Israel’s attack on West Bank as “genocide” in 2002, Israel’s actions at the Gaza strip were described as “state terror” in March 2004. In 2006, Turkey hosted Khalid Mashal who was the leader of the military wing of Hamas and during Lebanon Crisis in 2006 which lasted for 34 days, Erdoğan again harshly criticized Israeli attacks and questioned the real intention of Israel, Turkey also attempted to bring the issue to international platforms and participated in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) which was established after the Crisis, Erdoğan again harshly criticized Peres at Davos Summit of the World Economic Forum in January 2009 concerning the crisis in Gaza. Most recently Mavi Marmara incident (2010) took place, an incident which resulted with the killing of 9 Turkish citizens by Israeli soldiers and Israel’s refusal to officially apologize from Turkey led another crisis between Turkey and Israel. On the other hand, despite abovementioned developments Turkey is not questioning the *raison d’être* of the agreements of 1958 (Phantom Pact) and 1996 (Strategic Partnership) which are the main pillars of the relationship between Israel and Turkey.

Another event which had said to have negative reflections on Turkey’s foreign policy’s Atlantic connection was the “March 1st incident”. It seems that that issue was a “parliamentary accident” rather than the “victory of democracy”, if we take into consideration the JDP government’s attempts to make the Resolution passed by
the Parliament and its approach after “the March 1st incident”. For instance, on February 2003, the Turkish Parliament voted for a decision that allowed the US to begin renovating military bases and ports for a possible Iraqi war shows the tendency. What is more, after the March 1st decision of the Parliament, on 20 March 2003, a motion that gave permission to the US military to use Turkish airspace for attacks against Iraq was passed (“Tezkere kabul edildi”, 2003).

With regards to the JDP government’s attitude towards Iraq, Turkey mainly aimed to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq; however, as stated by Grigoriadis (2010, p. 7), the containment approach is replaced by “engagement” after Davutoğlu became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. For instance, Davutoğlu visited Northern Iraq which was the first Turkish high official visit in October 2009. During his visit, he met with the President of Kurdish Regional Government Massoud Barzani and the Prime Minister Nehcirvan Barzani and “announced the opening of a Turkish consulate in Erbil” which is a major step for recognizing the Kurdish Regional Government.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The focus of this study has been the main principles and the driving forces of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East region in a historical perspective. The main objectives in this study have been analyze the Middle East as a regional security complex and examination of changes and continuities in Turkey’s traditional cautious, relatively “passive” role and “relative indifference” (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 484) stance towards the Middle East security complex, especially in the JDP era by putting Turkey into the regional security complex theory. It is argued in this study that, within the given theoretical framework of the regional security complex theory, Turkey’s main function as “insulator” between three regional security complexes -the Middle East, European and Caucasus- has been more or less remained as change within continuity until the JDP government era. The insulator state position of Turkey in the JDP era is challenged by the “pro-active policies” of the JDP government. Nevertheless, in order to understand the recent changes, first of all changes and continuities should be assessed in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East security complex, after that given the contours of the JDP foreign policy the subsumed role of Turkey as “insulator” in the regional security complex theory should be reevaluated. In this context, this thesis approaches JDP era foreign
policy with a critical perspective without naming the JDP era foreign policy as a “success” or “failure”.

As it is assumed by the regional security complex theory, “securitization” and “de-securitization” processes of units within regional security complexes are so dependent to each other that the security matters of these units cannot reasonably be analyzed separately from another within geographically coherent groupings. The character of the regional security complexes is determined by the patterns of amity and enmity and rivalry through negative, positive or neutral identification with other. As a result of this security constellation within this grouping is defined as “conflict formation”, “security community” or “security regime”.

The pattern in the Middle East security complex is named as “perennial conflict formation” (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 187) through analyzing the identification with other whereas European security complex is defined as security community. However, the world is not just composed of regional security complexes; there are also super or great powers acting at the global level and insulator states which refrain short-circuits of conflicting issues between regional security complexes. Global level powers may penetrate to the regional security complexes, yet these kinds of situations do not spoil the “relative autonomy” of security interactions at the regional level. Moreover, there may be security interactions between regional complexes, but
most of the time the risk of spilling of one conflicting issue to other regional security complex is refrained by the “insulator states”.

Turkey, despite its historical legacy especially in the Middle East “as the heartland of the Ottoman Empire” (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 187), Caucasus and the Balkans did not assume a role in neither of these regional security complexes. Its interregional position between these three regions is defined as “insulator” by the regional security complex theory. Unlike “buffer states” which are internal to regional security complexes and keep the power in the region apart, Turkey according to regional security complex theory is “located in the zone of indifference between regional security complexes” (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 483). In this sense Turkey is not a “core” actor in one of the regional security complexes but a “peripheral” actor which is relatively detached from the security complexes. Turkey has interactions with the Middle East, Balkans and the Caucasus security complexes, but these interactions do not alter the pattern of relative security indifference. In addition to that, Turkey’s interactions with these regional security complexes are not strong enough and meaningful to bring them together into one coherent geographical arena, rather it absorbs the peripheral conflicting energies of the neighboring security complexes. In line with the insulating position, Turkey had to adopt sort of foreign policy practices of insulator states. As an insulator state Turkey is being faced to drag into conflicts in the neighboring security complexes, because of that it is mainly a
pro-status quo power in regional affairs and adopted a relatively passive stance to the conflicts in these regions throughout its Republican history.

After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, Turkey’s insulating function was coded under Atatürk’s motto “Peace at homeland, peace in the world”. Turkey after dealing with its main border problems, which were the Mosul problem and the question of Alexandretta (Hatay), signed the Saadabad Pact with Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan in 1937 with which the signatory parties aimed not to interfere in one other’s affairs. That is to say, after solving its basic border problems Turkey became a pro-status quo power in regional politics. Yet, Turkey’s stance towards the Middle East did not remain intact which can be observed in the Menderes government era of 1950s. Turkish foreign policy in general was characterized as neutral and autonomous until the end of the World War II. Nonetheless, after 1947 its position started to converge with that of the West, in general, and the US in particular, Turkey opted for the Western security framework by joining NATO and approached the Middle Eastern issues from that outlook during 1950s. For instance, Turkey aimed to bring together Middle Eastern states into an alliance named the Baghdad Pact aiming to confront Soviet threat in 1955; supported Western powers considering the Suez crisis in 1956; and approached the Nasserist riots in Arab states like the Soviets attempts to penetrate into the Middle East region. Baghdad Pact can be evaluated as an attempt of the US to penetrate into the Middle East security complex by using Turkey as an instrument. Not surprisingly this approach raised great doubts in Arab
nations and Arab states viewed Turkey as if it was acting like the gendarmerie of the Western powers in the region.

As a result of this mainly negative perceptions prevailed in Turkey’s relations with most of the Middle Eastern states and respective negative perceptions of both sides had repercussions for the future of the relations especially when Turkey tempted to diversify its foreign policy in the 1960s and sought for rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states in line with diversifying of the foreign policy attempts in the 1970s. Neither in the 1960s nor in the 1970s had Turkey’s quest for multidimensionality in its foreign affairs reached the level of challenging the insulator function of the country. In those years, Turkey tried to keep the balance in its relations with the Middle Eastern neighbors and its relations with the Western alliance. Turkey from time to time drifted from its main function which was insulating between security complexes like in the Gulf War of 1990-91, yet these were just temporary moments. That is to say, diversions before the JDP government era can be evaluated as change within continuity since previous attempts did not create a path breaking effect in terms of “insulator state role” of Turkey.

During most of the 1990s, the relations with the regional countries were “securitized” with the increasing significance of the NSC on foreign policy behavior of Turkey. In this sense, the NSC was the securitizing actor and Turkish territorial integrity, national interests and Turkish society were the referent objects. As a result of inter-
subjective assessment between the securitizing actor the (NSC) and the audience (Turkish society) relations were highly securitized in which act of emergency mode prevailed rather than normal political bargaining processes. This explains the strained relations with Syria, Iraq and Iran on the one hand and momentous relations with Israel on the other. Nevertheless, the normalization process that started with the Adana Protocol in 1998 and the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, reached its peak point after the JDP came to power as the ruling party. In that era, the role of the NSC as the securitizing actor decreased in conduct of foreign policy. Foreign policy practices of the JDP government can be evaluated as the quest for neutral identification with the Middle Eastern states; as a result of this the relations have been taken out of the previous emergency mode and put into normal political bargaining processes.

Turkey has viewed the environment itself through the lenses of hard security, in the JDP era security outlook has not changed but now the negative perspective of security is replaced with positive perception with “neo-Ottomanism” and the “strategic depth doctrine” thereby taking advantage of the opportunities that are provided by the conjunctural changes. Neo-Ottomanism which inspired to engage and project influence at the former Ottoman hinterland as the reminder of Turkey’s multicultural and Muslim past, challenged to the Kemalist understanding of foreign policy. Davutoğlu, who is the architecture of the strategic depth doctrine, besides mainly adopting the propositions of the neo-Ottomanism, offered strategic repositioning of Turkey thereby challenged Turkey’s peripheral role in regional
security complex theory and offered Turkey a “dynamic civilizational axis” in which Turkey will be the central actor. In this sense, Davutoğlu offered a pro-active foreign policy for Turkey contrary to past practices.

Strategic depth offers assertive and proactive foreign policy towards the neighboring regions and even beyond that, but in practice much of the activism of the JDP administration is used especially to develop relations with the Arab world and Iran through bilateral economic, cultural and diplomatic interactions. The underlying motive in the change of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East is not just having a cultural-civilizational or security-regional stability aspects; the change arise as a combination of both. The JDP government seemed not totally ignore the regional stability aspect, yet gives importance to the cultural and civilizational affiliations with the Middle Eastern countries which originated from the Ottoman legacy. It should be kept in mind that, Turkey’s position may be challenged by the rise of intra-regional powers like Iran, if Iran develops nuclear weapons as a result of its uranium enrichment program then the regional stability would be more volatile and the regional balance would be in favor of Iran which may pose risks for Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the Middle Eastern neighbors.

The practices of the JDP government according to these two foreign policy pillars created a path breaking effect in terms of insulator state role of Turkey; but the perceived role of Turkey as proclaimed by Davutoğlu goes beyond the logic of being
an insulator state or being a pole in the Middle Eastern or European security complexes: it corresponds to the rise of Turkey as an axis power?. The new path for Turkey in the regional security complex theory can be related with the revisited version of the theory under the concept of “interface logic”. Yet, the path breaking effect in Turkey’s role does not imply that Turkey has become an anti-systemic power.

In the JDP era, path breaking effect did not just take place in Turkish foreign policy; the developments after the 9/11 events changed the structure of the Middle East security complex, earlier versions of involvement like penetration though making alignments were replaced with the US’ direct involvement in the Gulf sub-complex militarily. What is more, inter-regional relations have increased so much with the European Neighborhood Policy of the EU. This great power involvement in the region necessitated that regional security complex theory needed to be revisited which brought forward the “logic of interface” to theory and adopts a loose form of regional boundaries and gives more importance to the inter-regional relations. As a result, strict adherence to the factor of geographical adjacency in security interactions needs to be reconsidered. Under the original regional security complex theory developed by Buzan and Weaver, an inward looking approach to regional security complexes is prevailed, this, in turn, assigned cross-border relationships to a subordinated position in the analysis.
Turkey’s ongoing accession negotiations, despite it entered into period of deadlock in the time of this thesis is written, dignify Turkey’s relations with the European security complex and Turkey’s relations with the EU-Europe is also a risk factor for Turkey’s role in the Middle East security complex for the reason that Turkey’s role is also up to its close relations with the EU-Europe and its democratization process. On the other hand, Turkey has increasingly reengaged in the Middle East security complex and the respective recognition of other has changed in a positive direction in contrast to 1950s with the significance of civilian rule in foreign affairs which pave way to normalization of relations with the region’s countries. Yet, this does not mean that changing perceptions has ended up with positive identification with other; the parties still feel potential threats but seek to resolve security problems so that the relations entered into a period of normalization. In addition to that, Turkey’s quest to appear in the big picture of global politics as a global power rather than a regional power should also be taken into consideration. These three dimensions need more elaborate analysis than just discussing the traditional insulating state role of Turkey, and this can be done by applying the logic of interface to the Turkey-Middle East security complex relations; the type of interface as regards Turkey and the Middle East security complex is “transition” in which interaction denote socialization with changing perceptions of the both parties and as the result of symmetrical relationship it shows convergence characteristics of values.
To sum up, in the new era of Turkish foreign policy, the arguments of Buzan and Weaver (2003) on Turkey should be revisited. Interface logic is getting more applicable in the Turkish case rather than debating Turkey is getting a pole in the Middle East security complex or European security complex, by bringing cross-border relationships to the fore, adopting a loose form of geographical adjacency factor, and emphasizing respective recognitions of actors in interaction.
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