MAKING OF NEW ISLAMISM IN TURKEY
TRANSFORMATION OF THE ISLAMIST DISCOURSE FROM OPPOSITION
TO COMPLIANCE

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes the transformation of Islamism from an anti-systemic and oppositional force to a compliant and submissive political ideology. The thesis locates the approach towards established political and economic relations at its centre. The thesis argues that the transformation, which led to formation of the Justice and Development Party, has begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s. To give the contours of this transformation, the thesis presents a detailed analysis of anti-systemic and systemic phases of Islamism in Turkey. The thesis tries to demonstrate this transformation through focusing on the major debates within the Islamist intellectual circles. The study suggests thinking the transformation of Islamism together with themes such as neoliberal globalization, postmodernism and multiculturalism. The thesis points out that, Islamism of the 1970s and 1980s, which can be considered as a form of Third Worldist populism has been gradually transformed into an ordinary, conservative ideology.

Keywords: new-Islamism, Islamist intellectuals, AKP, neoliberalism, postmodernism

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'DE YENİ İSLAMCILIĞIN OLUŞUMU
İSLAMCI SÖYLEMİN MUHALEFETTEN UYUMA DÖNÜŞÜMÜ

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Bu tez Türkiye'de İslamcılığın sistem karşıtı ve muhalif bir güçten uyumcu ve itaatkâr bir siyasal ideolojiye dönüşümünü incelemektedir. Tez yerleşik siyasal ve ekonomik ilişkilere tavrı merkezine oturtmaktadır. Tezin iddiası, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin kuruluşuna yol açan söz konusu dönüşümün 1980'lerin sonu ve 1990'ların başında başladığıdır. Bu dönüşümün hatlarını çizebilmek için tez İslamcılığın sistem karşıtı ve sistemik dönemlerinin ayrıntılı bir analizini sunmaktadır. Tez, söz konusu dönüşümü dönemin İslamcı entelektüel çevrelerindeki temel tartışmalara yoğunlaşarak göstermektedir. Çalışma İslamcılığın yaşadığı dönüşümü neoliberal küreselleşme, postmodernizm ve çokkültürlülük temaları ile birlikte düşünmeyi önermektedir. Tez, bir tür Üçüncü Dünyacı popülizm olarak ele alınabilecek 1970'lerin ve 1980'lerin İslamcılığının adım adım sıradan, muhafazakâr bir ideolojiye dönüştüğünü iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: yeni-İslamcılık, İslamcı entelektüeller, AKP, neoliberalizm, postmodernizm

Üç Kızkardeş
Gürşen, Güzin ve Hülya'ya

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Setting the Problem

The basic objective of this study is to analyze the discursive transformation of Islamism in the 1990s. 'Transformation' basically refers to a shift *from* radical perception of existing political, social and cultural relations *to* a rhetoric of accommodation with the existing socio-political order. As the title suggests, transformation of Islamist discourse in the 1990s refers to transition from a discourse of opposition to a more compliant outlook. Keeping in mind the problems with the category of Islamism, and the plurality of Islamist groups, I will try to show contributions of various Islamist establishments to this discursive shift. Within this inquiry, the relationship(s) between Islam(ism) and capitalism, and more recently neo-liberal free market ideology will occupy a central place. Among many Islamist groups, I will mainly focus on independent Islamist intellectuals gathered around influential journals of the period.

The problem of the relationship between Islam and capitalism has been a matter of attraction and dispute for many researchers from various disciplines. Some asked the question whether Islam, as a religion shall be considered as hindering the development of capitalist institutions, patterns and capitalist entrepreneurial habitus; whereas others focused on the specific articulations that have, or have not, been achieved at various Islamic geographies. The debates on Islam, and the socio-economic system that has been outlined by it (if there is 'one'), mostly are haunted

by the inquiry of the presence or absence of *Protestant Ethic* in Islam that could or would not pave the way for capitalist development.[1]

At the heart of the assumptions regarding the relation between Islam and capitalism were curiosity and concern regarding the "inability" of Islamic societies to record "desired" capitalist economic and social development; and Islam's (in)capacity to 'progress'. This inquiry has not only been carried by "outsiders" who have tried to understand and claim the *uniqueness* of Islamic societies; but the Islamist *ulama*, and researchers and ideologues of the Islamic lands also have endeavored to find out what made Islamic societies different from their Western counterparts. Some came up with "lists of absences"[2] that focused on the impossibility of the symbiosis between Islam and capitalism (and 'democracy', 'civil society', and so on), while others endeavored to prove that Islamic societies do not lack what their Western counterparts possess.

Islamism in its earliest phase emerged as an accommodative political ideology which insisted on the progressive nature of 'genuine Islam' (as opposed to its degenerated versions). The 'modernist Islam' of the period aimed at establishing a synthesis between modernity and Islam. Whereas, as we will see below, in the twentieth century, a new generation of Islamist ideologues replaced the question regarding the compatibility of Islam with modernity and capitalism with a conscious denial of such an inquiry. They had, like most of their Western counterparts, underscored that Islam and capitalism have never been, and will never be compatible. What made their statement distinctive was their deliberate and moral denial of modernity and capitalism, and its domestic and international expressions. Thus, what was at stake was no more a problem of 'capability' or 'possibility' but a moral and political issue to be dealt with. The Islamism of the revivalists presented an anti-systemic character which radically challenged the existing political, social and economic relations.

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[1] Among dozens of studies on the issue especially a specific report is worth mentioning since it has been located into the center of the debate by many researchers: *Islamic Calvinists: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia*, (ESI, Berlin-Istanbul, 19 September 2005).

[2] Simon Bromley, *Rethinking Middle East Politics*, (University of Texas Press: Austin, 1994).

These points are especially important for the Turkish experience, since they provide us with invaluable insights regarding various transformations of political Islam throughout the twentieth century. It is the major contention of this dissertation that the current state of Islamism could only be apprehended within a broader historical perspective, which takes into account the changes and paradigm shifts in Islamist ideology. This inquiry will also require focusing on the intellectual sources of *Islamism(s)* of different periods. In the second chapter I will present a thorough analysis of different periods and different manifestations of Islamism in Turkey.

In the Turkish context, while 'opposition' and 'confrontation' were the key terms of Islamism of the 1970s and 1980s, the dominant current within Islamism, especially in the second half of the 1990s, has gradually moved itself to an accommodative line through a tacit acceptance of the existing rules of the game. Several domestic and international developments played their part in this process of transformation such as the change in social composition of Islamic sectors, emergence of Islamic bourgeoisie, neoliberal globalization, and advent of postmodern theories. The February 28th process further encouraged Islamists to re-consider their basic assumptions regarding state-society relations, the course of political action, and viability of an Islamic economy. The transformation of Islamism in the 1990s did not denote a mere change in some 'ideological' elements; but the very stance of Islamism regarding 'the system' had shifted. Concepts such as capitalism, democracy, globalization, and the West have been redefined within a reformed framework. All these developments were culminated in the formation of the Justice and Development Party in 2001.

Transformation of the Islamist discourse in the 1990s brings some assumptions about political ideologies to the fore. Firstly, it points to the fact that political ideologies are not rigid and inflexible teachings that are formed and crystallized in a vacuum. On the contrary, political ideologies can be considered as a terrain on which a firm struggle over the fixation of meanings take place. Islamism is not an exception to this argument. Related with the first, Islamism, as a political ideology, should and cannot be analyzed in an essentialist manner. The questions regarding

the relationship between religion and politics do not have fixed answers. In other words, the relation between Islam and politics cannot be considered solely in predetermined-theoretical terms. A historical-empirical analysis is needed to decide what kind of articulations is achieved between Islam and politics in which historical and social settings. This will help us to avoid essentialist generalizations regarding the political expressions of Islamism.

In trying to understand transformation of Islamism in Turkey in the 1990s, I see it necessary to present a thorough analysis of the dominant Islamist paradigm of the previous decade. I call this period as the *period of revival*, which roughly dates back to the 1970s which was characterized by the birth of an Islamic political party and by the appearance of a group of Islamist intellectuals that consciously endeavor to establish Islamic ideology as an independent political and ideological force in Turkey. Islamic revival, of course, was not peculiar to Turkish geography, as was the transformation. The pioneers of Islamic revival in Turkey were highly influenced by figures from various Islamic geographies such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Abu'l-a 'la Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Ali Shariati. These figures promoted the emergence of Islamism as a conscious, independent and comprehensive political ideology in Turkey –an ideology that endeavored to regulate spiritual, social and political aspects of life.

As for the figures of Islamic revival in Turkey, a profound distaste with capitalism and its economic, political and cultural manifestations; insistence on the political and social –in other words "anti-secular"– nature of Islam; call for abandoning the inferiority complex regarding the relationship between Islam and Western modernity; urgent need for dissociating Islam and Islamist movements from right or left wing political and ideological influences; and disturbance felt with maintenance and continuation of the *status quo* were the fundamental ideological and political premises. The revivalist discourse divided the political sphere into two antagonistic camps: the forces of Islam and that of *kufr*. In this dichotomization, the West is considered as the evil incarnate, and the victory of the forces of Islam could only be achieved through a total annihilation of the evil. This

is why in the third chapter I have analyzed the revivalist discourse as a form of Third Worldist populism.

However, the anti-capitalist and anti-modernist confrontational Islamic discourse of the Islamic revival was to be replaced by, what Asef Bayat calls "the post-Islamist turn" in the last decades of the century.[3] For the reasons I will discuss in the following chapters, I preferred the label of 'new-Islamism' to identify the Islamism of the new period. It was a period in which a new generation of Islamist intellectuals –together with the old ones who started to re-position themselves– began to re-consider the established perception of concepts of Western origin like globalization, modernity, human rights, democracy, civil society, multiculturalism, and most importantly, global capitalism. The post-modern critiques of positivism, rationalism and the modern state occupied a considerable place in this process of re-consideration and self-criticism.[4] The ideological elements such as "democracy", "liberalism", "minimal state", "privatization" and "multiculturalism/multilegality" became the main elements of post-1990 Islamism; or the new-Islamist turn. I ask two simple questions regarding this transformation in political discourse: why and how? In other words, the objective of this study is to analyze the cornerstones and conditions of possibility of this discursive shift. This problem will require a theoretical and empirical consideration of formation and transformation of political discourses.

One of the theoretical concerns of this study is the conviction that ideologies of political and social movements do not change 'immediately' after dramatic events like February 28th or September 11th. There is no doubt that these traumatic events have great political, ideological and cultural consequences and implications. However, the transformation of a political ideology is an intricate and painful process which contains ruptures, contradictions, inner tensions, instabilities and

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[3] Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn, (*Stanford University Press: Stanford), 2007.

[4] See Mücahit Bilici, 'Küreselleşme ve Postmodernizmin İslamcılık Üzerindeki Etkileri,' in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005) and Ömer Çaha, 'Ana Temalarıyla 1980 Sonrası İslami Uyanış,' in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005).

hesitations. It requires reworking of basic hypotheses at distinct levels, and also requires plurality of centers to disseminate and test revised questions, propositions and novel terms. In the second chapter I will try to present the fluctuations within the Islamist discourse across time and space through focusing on different periods and actors of Islamism. The historical evolution of variety of Islamist groups will help us to better locate the new-Islamist turn.

As one of the subjects (and objects) of transformation of Islamism, Islamist journals in the 1990s played a crucial role in making of new Islamist discourse, or new-Islamism. An analysis of the Islamist intellectual production in this period will show us that the novel Islamist idioms, concepts, and concerns of the late 1990s and the 2000s were actually discussed, elaborated and debated by and within the Islamist journals. I have no intention to argue that the transformation of Islamism has been launched and sealed by these circles. Introduction of new concepts and idioms to Islamist agenda met with conflicting reactions. Some Islamist circles immediately embraced the call for change, and adapted to new paradigms of the contemporary world and formed new alliances (especially with liberal and second republican intellectuals). Some circles, on the other hand, accepting the need for change, were anxious about its direction. Rather than fully embracing the new rules of the game, they tried to take a balanced stand. Finally, there were the Islamist circles that identified the idea of change with betrayal to the fundamentals of the Islamist circles. In discussing the new-Islamist turn I will try to present the variety of positions within Islamism.

1.2. Methodology

The relationship(s) between Islam, politics and economy, as stated above, will occupy a considerable place in our inquiry. At the theological level, the question is about examining the core Islamic scripts, and finding out whether the words of *Allah* and/or the Prophet (*sunna*) promoted and sanctioned a specific economic or political regime: for instance, whether the core Islamic injunctions may be articulated with pillars of modernity or capitalism. The same questions can be extended to issues of democracy, human rights, secularism and so on. Both in

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Islamic and non-Islamic world these problems have been discussed (and still being discussed) in details.

Let me start with stating what this study is not about. First and foremost I have no intention to dwell on theological problems and questions regarding the place of politics or economy in Islam, or the relationship between the former and the latter. This topic is far beyond the ambitions of this study. This should not imply that I devalue these topics; however, I consider Islamism as a political ideology; as an ideological-discursive complex which produces subjects, lives in and through (social, political, and economic) practices/institutions and provides its followers with a sensible framework to give meaning to their actions, to achieve their psychic unity and 'sanity' and to realize their surroundings in a certain manner.[5] Thus, rather than analyzing religious scripts in and for themselves, or focusing on the function played by religion in making of social, political and economic structures; I intend to dwell upon the specific nodal points, articulations, moments of intersection, correlations and correspondences constituted in different socio-historical moments by the Islamist discourse. In other words, this study is about **Islamism**, not **Islam** itself.

Such an inquiry will also reveal the fact that there is no such thing as '*the*' relationship between Islam and politics or economics; that there is no single response to that question. On the contrary, there are various interpretations of the topic both within and outside Islam which are closely tied to alternative social and political projects of different spatial and historical settings. As I will show, there are significant differences between and tensions within alternative approaches to the issue of the relationship between Islam and existing sociopolitical system. Thus, rather than trying to find the "true" interpretation of the religious scripts, we

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[5] This particular perception of 'ideology' and 'discourse' is deeply inspired both by Gramscian and Althusserian schools. The terms I use throughout this text –like discourse, hegemony, subject, articulation, nodal points etc.- are not arbitrarily chosen. I will deal with these concepts and their significance for my study throughout the text.

must focus on the "truth regimes"[6] that are constructed by alternative hegemonic projects. As Asef Bayat stated in his stimulating study *Making Islam Democratic*:

> sacred injunctions are matters of struggle, of competing readings. They are, in other words, matters of history; humans define their truth. The individuals and groups who hold social power can assert and hegemonize their truths.[7]

According to Bayat, "resorting to literal meanings of scripture" would not take the researcher far, "not only because ambiguity, multiple meanings, and disagreement are embedded in many religious scripts, but because individuals and groups with diverse interests and orientations may find their own, often contradicting, truths in the very same scripts."[8] Thus, following Bayat's lead, our task should not be to discover the purest, the most authentic and appropriate interpretation of the religious teaching, but to find out which interpretation, through which articulations, and under which historical-social conditions prevail on others, and achieve to manifest itself as the 'true', or the sole 'legitimate' position. This is the moment when a position becomes hegemonic; since hegemony is the yardstick against which one measures the possibility or impossibility, and sense or nonsense of a given proposition. Hegemony is about the 'commonsensical' definition of the 'truth', 'the obvious', the truth which is already 'out there'.[9] Thus, "we need to examine the conditions that allow social forces to make a particular reading of the sacred texts hegemonic. And this is closely linked to group's capacity to mobilize consensus around their truth."[10] So our basic objective must be to explore the mechanisms through which a particular reading of Islamism prevails over others. This will also bring the question of transformation of political ideologies, since at

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[6] "Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements , the means by which each is sanctioned ; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true." Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77*, (Pantheon Books: New York, 1980), p. 131.

[7] Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic*, p. 4.

[8] *Ibid*., p. 5.

[9] See Slavoj Zizek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, Verso: London and NY, 1989; Michel Pécheux, 'The Mechanism of Ideological Misrecognition,' in *Mapping Ideology*, (ed.) S. Zizek, Verso: London and New York, 1994.

[10] Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic*, p. 6.

different junctures some interpretations will be accepted as the legitimate ones, and others will be ruled out.

The journey of Islam (as an ideological element) and Islamism (as an ideology) in Turkey provides a lively case study for analyzing these phenomena. Islam has always been an active political and social force throughout Ottoman-Turkish history. The role played by Islam became more and more complicated through formation of the Republic in 1923, and especially after transition to multi-party democracy in 1946.[11] At different junctures Islamism has been articulated to various political projects, and after a while presented itself as an independent political actor. Political Islam has evolved as Turkey went through major political and social transformations both at domestic and international levels. This study intends to focus two of these periods –periods of confrontation and accommodation–, and tries to understand how an established political discourse could reposition itself in the midst of major transformations.

In this study I will primarily focus on the works of independent Islamist intellectuals and intellectual circles for analyzing the discursive transformation of Islamism. Of course the figures and circles that I will deal with do not represent Islamism as a whole. They do not represent a single ideological position or a homogenous ideological bloc either. However, all of the figures that I have analyzed played a considerable role in making of dominant perception of Islamism of their periods. Rather than tackling with the questions regarding different interpretations of the religious message, I have applied a major dividing line with respect to differences in approaches to existing socio-political order.

1.3. Some Preliminary Remarks on 'Islamism'

Any analysis of Islamist political ideology has to tackle the question of the definition of the term "Islamism" itself. Unlike other political ideologies, it seems

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[11] The problematic nature of "Islam-state interaction" in Turkey is skillfully discussed by Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 'Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 28(2), May 1996.

really hard to define the limits of Islamism. The ambiguity arises not only from the absence of a shared definition of Islamism, and over-encompassing usage of the term; but also from the fact that the so-called representatives of Islamist thought do not recognize "Islamism" as a legitimate title to define their position.[12] While the term "Islamist" is preferred by the observers, the representatives of Islamic thought mostly prefer to be called as Muslims. This is why Michael E. Meeker in his article on Islamic thought in Turkey uses the term Muslim intellectual in line with an "anthropological preference for categories of self reference."[13]

Yasin Aktay notes that the problem of dual legitimacy surrounding Islamism can be considered as a troubling factor in delimiting the boundaries of Islamism.[14] The first problem refers to the illegitimate state of Islamist ideas and movements within the secular republican establishment. As Yıldız states:

> Due to the problem of social as well as political legitimacy of Islamic thought, Muslim thinkers and movements have adopted an indirect language. Accordingly, the demands motivated by Islamic sentiments have been expressed around such idioms as human rights, justice, democracy, freedom of religion and conscience, loyalty to the national religious character of Turkish nation, patriotism, and moral and familial values.[15]

The second problem of legitimacy arises from the denial of the label of Islamism. As stated above, the vast majority of the intellectuals and activists raise their objections to the labels of Islamist or Islamism, and tend to call themselves as Muslims. However, the term Muslim brings another ambiguity to the fore. When defined as a political identity, the term Muslim can imply a monopoly over

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[12] The meaning of the term has been debated by various researchers. For further information see, İsmail Kara, 'Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi İçin Bir Çerçeve Denemesi,' in *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi-I*, (ed.) İ. Kara, (Risale: Istanbul 1986); Yasin Aktay, 'Sunuş', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005) and Ahmet Çiğdem, 'İslamcılık ve Türkiye Üzerine Bazı Notlar', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005).

[13] Michael E. Meeker, 'The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey,' in *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, (ed.) R. Tapper, (I. B. Tauris: London, 1991), p. 189, emphases added.

[14] Aktay, 'Sunuş', pp. 15-17.

[15] Yıldız, 'Transformation of Islamic Throught in Turkey Since the 1950s,' in *The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic* Thought, ed. I. Abu-Rabi, (Blackwell: MA, 2006), p. 40.

"Islam." In other words, the term Muslim might have exclusionary implications, since it will refer to the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim. Therefore, it will not bear any differential value.[16] This is why in this study I use the term 'Islamism' –without any pejorative connotations– through 'disregarding' preference for categories of self-reference.

However, we still need a definition for Islamism, and we should fulfill this duty without falling into the trap of essentialism. By essentialism I refer to transhistorical and transgeographical fixations regarding the role played by religion in formation of political ideologies.[17] The usage of "political Islam" in literature can be shown as an infamous manifestation of such fixations. Following Aktay's inclusive definition we can define Islamism "as an identity or a perception that emerges at every point when political action meets the perception of Muslimness (*Müslümanlık*)."[18] Following this argument, regardless of differences in interpretation of Islam, any Muslim establishment that locates Islam at the heart of its political practice is Islamism.[19] Although this definition seems over-encompassing, it will help us to scrutinize on the points of intersection between Islam and "the political." Thus, we will not "discover" the essence of Islamism - which does not exist- but try to find out which discursive projects the Islamic themes are articulated to. As Sayyid states:

> Islamism is a political discourse and, as such, is akin to other political discourses such as socialism or liberalism. While no one would question that political discourses such as socialism include many varieties and many differences, it is still possible and valid to speak of socialism; it should be similarly possible to speak of Islamism. Islamism is a discourse that attempts to centre Islam within the political order.[20]

As we defined the sacred injunctions as "matters of struggle and of competing" readings we should avoid two assumptions: first, religious injunctions are rigid

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[16] See Aktay, 'Sunuş,' p. 16.

[17] For an anti-essentialist attempt for outlining Islamism, see Bobby Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the emergence of Islamism*, (Zed Books: London, 1997).

[18] See Aktay, 'Sunuş,' p. 18.

[19] *Ibid*., p. 18 and also see Sayyid, *A Fudamental* Fear, p. 17.

[20] Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear*, p. 17.

texts that are closed for further interpretation, and second, Islamism is a direct translation of religious injunctions to the ideological/political field. By Ayubi's words, there is nothing intrinsically 'political' about Islamism: "political Islam is a new invention – it does not represent a 'going back' to any situation that existed in the past or to any theory that was formulated in the past."[21] This approach will help us to trace the articulation of religious themes to different political/ideological projects at different spatial and historical settings.

Although there is an obvious relationship between Islam and Islamism, the nature of this relationship "cannot be discovered by reference to an Islamic essence."[22] Türköne asserts that the most important distinction between Islam as a religion and Islamism as a political ideology will be observed at the level of the sources of verification and legitimacy. Accordingly, in becoming an ideology, the ground of verification and legitimacy of a religion shifts dramatically. In our case, while Islam, as a religion, seeks its truth and validity in a transcendental confirmation, Islamism refers to a search for rational sources:

> In Islamism, the appropriateness of Islam to requirements of world and legitimacy is being defended through theses which address reason and which are in conformity with modern paradigms. The legitimacy is proved not through reference to a transcendental force, but themes related to the nature of things and requirements of the age. . . The belief of afterlife loses its importance for ideological Islam, and Islam becomes secularized.[23]

Thus, at specific moment of becoming a political ideology, religion enters the disenchanted realm of practical problems and issues. This is the moment when religious movements find themselves between the sacred "essence" of their teachings and the secular mode of action. By Cihan Aktaş's words, "Islamism is the name given to a wave which is formed by the concerns of living a religious life

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[21] Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, (Routledge: London and New York, 1993), p. 3.

[22] Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear*, p. 28.

[23] Mümtazer Türköne, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, (İletişim: Istanbul, 1996), pp. 26-27.

in the modern world, asking questions about this life and acquiring the equipment for answering the questions that we face."[24]

In addition to definitional problems, presence of various actors who claim a monopoly over Islam stands as another crucial issue. Rather than talking about *an* Islamism which is represented by a single agency there are various Islamist actors and Islamist positions. Thus, it might be more appropriate to talk about *Islamisms* rather than Islamism.

1.4. Organization of the Chapters

I will begin with a general evaluation of various manifestations of Islamism in Turkey. The first part of the chapter will be on the problem of periodization. I will analyze the venture of Islamism in Turkey under five distinct historical periods: modernist Islam, the period of forced withdrawal and retreat, the period of incubation, the period of confrontation and challenge, and finally, the period of accommodation. In making this periodization Islamism's level of ideological development and maturity, and its general attitude towards existing sociopolitical order is the central concern. In the second section I will tackle with variety of Islamist organizations in Turkey. In this section Islamist political parties (of the National Outlook Movement, and Justice and Development Party), religious communities and orders, Islamic NGOs and militant Islamist groups will be discussed.

While Islamism in Turkey can be analyzed under five distinct periods, this dissertation locates the last two periods at its center: the periods of confrontation and challenge, and of accommodation and compliance. Not only will the qualities of these two distinct periods, but the transition from the former to the latter itself be problematized. Although I will mostly focus on the change in the Islamist discourse, I will also try to present the social and political setting of this transition. The third chapter will try to explore the general characteristics of period of

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[24] Cihan Aktaş, *Bir Hayat Tarzı Eleştirisi: İslamcılık*, (Kapı Yayınları: Istanbul, 2007), p. xiii.

confrontation and challenge with reference to writings of prominent intellectual figures of Turkish Islamism who defined the Islamist agenda. In addition to individual intellectual figures like Ali Bulaç, İsmet Özel and Rasim Özdenören; *Girişim*, an Islamist journal that has been published in the late 1980s will be analyzed in a detailed manner. *Girişim* journal was especially important since it consciously and skillfully articulated the frameworks provided by the Islamists of various Islamic geographies to its political discourse. But also the members of *Girişim* circle became the organic intellectuals of the Islamist political movement in the following decade through participating into actual politics. Especially after the local elections of 1994, many of the figures that we saw in *Girişim*'s pages (later on *Yeni Zemin*) found themselves involved with active politics through occupying posts in new municipalities.

As we will see below, the Islamist revival in Turkey was highly influenced by translation of key texts by Islamist intellectuals who had worldwide reputation. So, in the third chapter, before closely analyzing the formulations of revivalist Islamist intellectuals in Turkey, I will try to give an outline of Islamic revival in the Islamic world with reference to ideas of key Islamist thinkers that had direct influence on Islamist intellectuals in Turkey. Although originated in completely different socio-historical settings, these figures and texts helped the Islamic thought in Turkey to gain dimension of universality, and played a considerable role in consolidation of Islamist ideology. It was through the writings of these figures that the revivalists of Turkey became equipped with ideological and political instruments to cope with the problems of the modern world and politicize Islam. Of course this analysis will be brief, and will focus on the most important figures such as Abu'l Ala Mawdudi (Pakistan, 1903-1979), Sayyid Qutb (Egypt, 1906-1966) and Ali Shariati (Iran, 1933-1977). In this chapter I will also try to develop a theory of Islamic revival in Turkey through reading it as a form of 'Third Worldist populism'.

In the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters of the dissertation I will present a detailed analysis of making of the new-Islamist discourse in Turkey. Firstly, I will focus on the intellectual background and global context of emergence of new-Islamist discourse. Intellectually, new-Islamism was influenced by new-theories of the

contemporary world that became popular especially in the late 1980s and 1990s. The most notable of these paradigms was postmodernism. Since transformation of Islamism cannot be considered without taking its global setting into consideration, in this chapter I will also deal with the problem of neoliberal globalization. I consider transformation of Islamism as a gradual neo-liberalization of Islamism. The fourth chapter argues that Islamists' increasing affiliation with paradigms of the contemporary world (globalization, postmodernism, post-Fordism, post-industrial society theses) acted as a catalyst in this process.

The fifth chapter tries to locate new-Islamism within the context of crisis of Turkish society and of Islamism. In other words, the chapter argues that new-Islamism can be considered as a response given by the Islamists to this double crisis. While the post-1980 was characterized by Turkish New Right's attempt at hegemony, the 1990s was characterized by a series of challenges to this attempt. The dislocating effects of the political, economic and cultural crises –together with the debates regarding the so-called crisis of modernity– casted doubt on already existing institutions, political movements and ideologies. Islamism, under the influence of these developments, began to reconsider its fundamental political and philosophical outlook. The independent Islamist intellectuals gathered around journals such as *Kitap Dergisi*, *Köprü*, *Yeni Zemin*, *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, and *Tezkire* were the primary actors in this period of reevaluation and self-criticism. The fifth chapter will both focus on the discourse of change that has been introduced by these actors, and on the actors themselves.

In the final chapter I will present a detailed analysis of the cornerstones of new-Islamist discourse. I have applied an analytical distinction between political and economic projects of new-Islamism. However, as I will show, the distinction is purely analytical and has no substantial referent. In other words, the political and economic projects of new-Islamism are deeply interconnected, and cannot be considered as essentially separate. Politically the new-Islamist discourse targeted the 'homogenizing' nature of the modern nation state, and proposed a post-modern and post-national state system based on a conglomerate of communities. Withdrawal of the Turkish state from political, cultural and economic spheres, and

promotion of the development of civil society has been pointed out as remedies to persistent economic and political crisis. The new-Islamist intellectuals developed a renewed interpretation of laicism which targeted state's monopoly over religion. They have also underlined the need for a new-constitution which was extensively inspired by liberal principles. The economic project of the new-Islamism, which was deeply related with the triumph of the Islamic sub-economy and Islamic capital, pointed to an articulation between Islamist and neoliberal themes. The economic successes of the Islamic sectors brought the questions regarding legitimization of wealth and capital accumulation to the agenda. Within this context the new-Islamist intellectuals have developed creative solutions to the problem. In this chapter I will focus on strategies of the new-Islamist intellectuals in details.

CHAPTER 2

ISLAMISM(S) IN TURKEY

The ambiguity surrounding the term Islamism might be eased through a detailed and historical exploration of various Islamist groups and establishments in Turkey. The previous chapter stressed the problematic nature of categories of 'Islam' and 'Islamism'. I have also noted that a historical and contextual analysis will prevent us from the pitfall of essentialism. Such an account must deal with the plurality of Islamist groups across time and space. Not only Islamism had different manifestations in different geographies, but also within a given geography the Islamist groups and establishments have experienced ideological and organizational transformations. The main objective of this chapter is to present this plurality.

Different stages of socio-economic development of Ottoman-Turkish society accompanied by different Islamist paradigms, establishments, and legal/illegal organizations. Especially the rapid modernization that Turkey has been experiencing since the second half of the twentieth century increased social mobility and ideological plurality; hence ideological crystallization and diversity of Islamist positions. Of course, the transformation of Islamism was not only limited to Turkey. In the Islamic world there were various tendencies and periods regarding the relationship between Islam and politics.

In order to fully understand the transformation of Islamist discourse in the 1990s, we must locate it into its historical setting. The basic objective of this chapter is to present historical and organizational variations and manifestations of Islamism in Turkey in the twentieth century. This will help us to see the place of new-Islamism

in overall development of Islamist political discourse in Turkey. The chapter is composed of two complementary but independent parts. In the first section I will deal with the question of transformation of Islamism through time, and the problem of periodization. Here I will try to pick out the distinctive traits of Islamism in a given period. The hegemonic (but of course not single) Islamist account of the period will be briefly outlined with reference to secondary sources. Noting the plurality of Islamist perspectives, and the ideological struggle among various Islamist currents to become the hegemonic interpretation, I present an analysis of the hegemonic paradigm within a given period. I try to analyze which problems, issues, figures, organizations, themes and idioms have dominated Islamism within that period? The second part, however, will focus on the Islamist agents themselves. Picking out the major formal and informal Islamist establishments in Turkish history, the basic objective is to present ideological, political, organizational traits and histories of Islamist actors in Turkey.

The major problem of this dissertation is to understand the transformation of Islamism in the 1990s, which was characterized by the move from a discourse of opposition and confrontation to that of compliance and accommodation. As I will show, the transformation was characterized by the loss of anti-systemic principle within the Islamist discourse. This transformation was also marked by move of Islamist actors from the margins of the society to its center.[1] Although the writings of the Islamist intellectuals constitute the main empirical data of this thesis, I will try to show that the transformation in Islamism is not limited with altering aspirations and concerns of the Islamist intellectuals or intellectual circles. The Islamist political parties, religious communities, Islamic civil society organizations, and even the militant Islamist groups gradually lost their anti-systemic impetus due to reasons that I will discuss in this chapter. We will be able to make sense of the transformation of Islamist intellectual discourse in the 1990s through taking these wider transformations within various manifestations of Islamism into consideration.

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[1] Here I partly refer to Şerif Mardin's seminal essay 'Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?', *Daedalus*, (Winter 1973). For a detailed critique of Mardin's framework see Fethi Açıkel, 'Entegratif toplum ve muarızları: 'Merkez-çevre' paradigması üzerine eleştirel notlar', *Toplum ve Bilim*, No. 105, 2006.

2.1. Islamism(s) in Turkey I: Periods of Turkish Islamism

Keeping aforementioned considerations regarding the problematic nature of the term 'Islamism' in mind, the evolution of Islamist thought and movement in Turkey will be considered over five distinct periods. For the purposes of my study, the periodization locates the attitude towards established socio-political order and modernization at its center. I have utilized texts of Islamist authors as much as possible for presenting the Islamists' perception of periods of Islamism in Turkey.[2] In other words, I have tried to introduce the 'insiders' views on the subject matter.

1. *The modernist Islam:* In this period the main concern for the Islamists was to "save" the Ottoman-Islamic establishment from dissolution. Islam was considered as the cement that could hold the Ottoman social and political edifice together. The positive attitude towards modernity and attempts to achieve an articulation between Islam and modernity are the main reasons behind calling this period as *the modernist Islam*.

2. *The period of forced withdrawal and retreat:* This period is characterized by the fierce struggle between Islamist and Kemalist forces, and eradication of Islam from public life through Kemalist reforms. The forced retreat of organized religion has been accompanied by state's efforts to develop an official version of Islam.

3. *The Period of Incubation:* In this period, Islamist movements could only find spaces of representation within right wing political parties. Both in organizational and ideological terms the Islamist movements were not mature enough to establish themselves as independent political actors.

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[2] I benefited especially from Ferhat Kentel's account in making this periodization, '1990'ların İslami Düşünce Dergileri ve Yeni Müslüman Entelektüeller,' in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005). Also see Yıldız, 'Islamic Thought,' p. 41; Bulaç, *İslam Dünyasında Düşünce* Sorunları, (İşaret: Istanbul, 1983) and 'İslam'ın Üç Siyaset Tarzı veya İslamcılığın Üç Nesli,' in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005); and Aktay, 'Sunuş'.

4. *The period of revival (confrontation and challenge):* This period is characterized by transformation of Islamism to an independent, confrontational and oppositional political ideology. In this period, especially through translation of the texts of global Islamic figures like Mawdudi, Qutb and Shariati, Islamism gained a universalist dimension. Especially after the 1979 Iranian Revolution Islamism "gained a new momentum . . . and challenged the supremacy of the Western model in intellectual, moral, and power terms by trying to capture the state and use it as a tool for Islamizing the society."[3] Anti-systemic and oppositional discourse is the most distinguishing feature of Islamism of this period.

5. *The period of compliance and accommodation:* A period which has been characterized by the responses given by the Islamist circles to global and domestic transformations, events and phenomena such as the fall of communism, globalization, the rise of post-rationalist and anti-positivist/post-modern philosophies, transformation of social composition of Islamist movement, 28 February 1997 and so on. In this period of "self-critique and reflection", the Islamists gradually left aside the oppositional and anti-systemic character of their ideology, and re-accommodated with the establishment under the common denominator of neo-liberal free market economy.

The discursive shift experienced in passing from period of *confrontation* to period of *accommodation* will constitute the central concern of my study. Before focusing on the details of this transformation, however, I will briefly present the contours of each period below.

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[3] Yıldız, 'Islamic Thought', p. 41.

2.1.1. The Modernist Islam

The history of modernization and Westernization in Turkey is that of a defeat. Having acknowledged the military and economic superiority of the West, the Ottoman reformers held the traditional institutions as the main responsible for backwardness, and acted accordingly. A series of reforms were launched primarily aiming at modernizing the war machinery, and the whole legal, political and social system afterwards. However, the second half of the 19th century witnessed emergence of a new type of intellectual who was critical of westernization policies, and suggested that it was not the religious teaching or institutions that lead to the fall, but, on the contrary, abandonment of the genuine religious injunctions was the main reason behind the decline of the Ottoman Empire. After losing a considerable part of her lands as a result of consecutive wars of the 18th and 19th century, the Ottoman lands presented a more homogeneous outlook, in which the majority of the population was composed of Muslims of different ethnic belongings. Thus, religion seemed as a viable ideological element to promote unity within what's left of the Ottoman territory. Even the Young Turks in opposition acknowledged the role played by religion in "social consolidation."[4]

For the early Islamists, Islam was an ideological element for cementing the Ottoman subjects at home. For the Muslims abroad Islam was considered as a tool for resisting expansionist policies of the Western powers.[5] As Berkes states:

> In the face of the material and communal successes of the non-Muslim *millets*, some asked also if the Turks, too, did not have an existence outside the state which had ceased to look like their state. At this stage, the questioners found in their Islamic heritage the only basis for unity. The Ottoman state would have to be an Islamic state in order to present that unity.[6]

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[4] Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2002), p. 14.

[5] *Ibid*., p.14.

[6] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in* Turkey, (Hurst and Company: London, 1998), p. 202.

The use of Islam as a foreign policy tool was first initiated by the Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Aziz, who reigned between 1861 and 1876.[7] This policy has also been appropriated by Abdul-Hamit II, who simultaneously carried on westernization programme and used Islam as a political weapon. The Islamist intelligentsia of the period found itself in betwixt and between the traditional structure which is on the verge of demise, and growing presence of the Western powers.[8] The recognition of the political, economic and technical superiority of the West made the Islamist movements assume a defensive and reactionary attitude. As Ali Bulaç, a leading Islamist intellectual in Turkey states:

> The pre-Republican Islamist currents had two basic properties: first, they were always "reactive"; and second, they were extensively influenced by Western ideas and systems both theoretically and practically. More or less one can see these qualities in Islamist movements that came to our day.[9]

The defensive attitude paved the way for emergence of an Islamist discourse which claimed that core Western values can already be found in Islam.[10] The Ottoman Islamists were not alone in their efforts. In Egypt, in his analysis on the differences between Christianity and Islam, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) presented a version of Islamic rationalism. In India Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) was searching the conformity of natural laws with Quran; and Mohammed Iqbal (1877-1938) was trying to reconcile Islam with modern science and philosophy.[11] The modernist Islam dynamically strived to renovate the religion, which meant reconciling religion with new findings of science.[12]

What the early Islamist endeavored to achieve was to "synthesize modernization with Islam and re-emphasize Islam as an essential basis of the Ottoman state and

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[7] Türköne, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, p. 33.

[8] See Bulaç, *İslam Dünyasında Düşünce Sorunları*, p. 45 and 'İslam'ın Üç Siyaset Tarzı.'

[9] *İslam Dünyasında Düşünce Sorunları*, p. 54.

[10] Ahmet Harputlu, 'İslamcıların Batı Tahayülü,' *Bilgi ve Düşünce*, 1, 2002, October, p. 24.

[11] Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, (Ülken Yayınları: Istanbul, 2005), p. 276; Charles Kurzman, *Modernist Islam: A Sourcebook*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002).

[12] Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce*, p. 277.

society."[13] Re-discovering the Islamic "essence" through adopting the Western science and technology was the "genuine" solution proposed by the Islamists of the period. The Japanese case was shown as a role model, since it presented a genuine synthesis between tradition and modern western science. So, the fundamental task of the Ottoman elite must have been to adopt Western science and technology through preserving genuine religious and traditional values.[14]

The complex interplay between Islam and nationalism constituted a part of this problematic –and to some extent paradoxical– relationship between Islam and modernity. More than attempting to synthesize Islam and modernization, Islamism, in its early years became a catalyst for political modernization through finding its expression as a "proto-nationalist" political ideology.[15] By Nikki Keddie's definition "Pan-Islam, which had its heyday in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, was an important step in the transition from Islamic to national loyalties."[16] In this period "Islam played an important role in the territorialization of the national consciousness . . . [which] . . . provided the groundwork for the growth of political nationalism in the guise of Islamism/Pan-Islamism."[17] For the Islamists of the period the line of distinction between Islam and nationalism was highly equivocal.

2.1.2. The Period of Forced Withdrawal and Retreat

The symbiosis between Islam and nationalism was dissolved with the fall of the Ottoman Empire and formation of the modern Turkish Republic. Although, during the War of Independence Islam was utilized as a source of legitimization and

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[13] Gökhan Çetinsaya, 'Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of Turkish Political Thought and "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" in Modern Turkish Political Thought,' *The Muslim* World, vol: 59, no: 3-4, (July-October 1999), p. 352;

[14] Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve* Siyaset, p. 26.

[15] See Nikki R. Keddie, 'Pan-Islamism as Proto Nationalism,' *The Journal of Modern History,* vol: 41, no: 1, 1969, March; Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset* and Tanıl Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali,* (İletişim: Istanbul, 1999), pp. 112-113.

[16] Keddie, 'Pan-Islamism,' p. 18

[17] Çetinsaya, 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis,' p. 353.

propaganda by the nationalist forces, finalization of the struggle meant the end of the so-called symbiosis. The new regime defined nationalism as a homogenizing principle; but Kemalist nationalism, as a principle, strived to divorce religious elements from definition of nationalism, and establish a secular understanding of the term.

The first years of the young republic has witnessed a series of reforms aimed at eliminating the importance of Islam in social and political life. The extensive reform programme was launched with the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922 and declaration of the Republic in 1923. Abolition of Caliphate in 1924 was one of the most important steps, which was followed by the abolition of the office of Seyh'ul-Islam. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, Shari'a Courts, religious shrines (*türbes*) and dervish convents (*tekke*) were closed down respectively. In November 1925 turban and fez were prohibited and replaced by Western style hat. In 1926 the Gregorian calendar was adopted with the Swiss civil code and the penal code from Italy. All courtesy titles (like *Bey*, *Efendi*, or *Paşa*) were abolished.

Zürcher notes that "together with the abolition of the sultanate and caliphate and the proclamation of the republic, these measures form the first wave of the Kemalist reforms"; and these reforms can be considered as "an extension of the Tanzimat and Unionist reforms, which had secularized most of the legal and educational systems."[18] With the adoption of European numerals in 1928, the change to from Arabic to Latin script in the same year, and removal of the article of the Constitution stating Islam as the religion of the state constituted the second wave of reforms aimed at complete secularization of society. By Mardin's words,

> To provide Turkish citizens with a new view of the world which would replace that of religion and religious culture, Atatürk sponsored a movement of cultural westernization which he equated with civilization. The alphabet was Latinized . . . for a time, the performance of oriental music in public was banned. A conservatory was established in Ankara, where opera, ballet and Western polyphonic music were taught. Western-

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[18] Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (I.B. Tauris: London and New York, 2004), p. 173. Also see, Binnaz Toprak, 'Religious Right', in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, (eds.) I. C. Schick and E. A. Tonak, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1987), p. 227.

style painting was encouraged by the government . . . In 1926 a statue of Kemal Atatürk was unveiled in Istanbul.[19]

The reforms caused dissent among the population[20] and the cases of resistance were severely punished by the Independence Tribunals. Zürcher notes that "under the Law on the Maintenance of Order nearly 7500 people were arrested and 660 were executed."[21] However, it is not an overstatement that these moves have not faced by organized resistance by the Islamist forces. By Çetinsaya's words:

> What was the position of Islamist and Turkist intelligentsia in the Kemalist era? For the Islamists, the defeat was absolute. They did not even try to challenge the Kemalist regime, unlike some conservative 'ulama and *tariqa*-based Islamic groups for a short while. . . There appeared only a secret Qur'an-teaching movement by conservative 'ulama, centered largely in remote areas of the Black Sea and Eastern Anatolia.[22]

Hakan Yavuz notes that Kemalist ideology was obsessed with "the security of secularism, which is manifested as fierce hostility to public manifestation of Islam."[23] As stated, the young Republic did not hesitate to repress and neutralize these hostilities. Yavuz adds that in the period between 1923 and 1950 three social institutions –family, neighborhood, and religious groups (Nakşibendi and Nurcu circles)– "became the only habitat for the preservation and reproduction of traditional values and identities."[24] Eradication of religion from the public space and repression of any religious protest caused the Islamism of the period to acquire a furtive character. In the following decades, the underground years of Islamism will constitute one of the building blocks of the Islamist discourse.

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[19] Şerif Mardin, 'Religion and secularism in Turkey', in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, (eds.) A. Kazancigil and E. Özbudun, (C. Hurst and Company: London, 1981), p. 217.

[20] See Cemil Koçak, *Tek-Parti Döneminde Muhalif Sesler*, (İletişim Yayınları: Istanbul, 2011).

[21] Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p. 173.

[22] *Ibid*., p.364.

[23] *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), p. 46.

[24] *Ibid*, p. 56.

2.1.3. The Period of Incubation

The end of the Second World War and the wave of liberalization within which Turkey found her place meant a change in attitude of the state towards religion. "The new post-war democracy of Turkey gave a much greater degree of freedom to all trends of opinion," states Bernard Lewis, "including of course the religious leaders, who now proclaimed more and more openly their hostility to secularism and their demands for an Islamic restoration."[25] With transition to multi-party system and the birth of the Democratic Party as a relatively strong rival which was sensitive towards religious feelings of the population and religious symbols, the CHP made some policy changes towards liberalizing government's strict containment of religion. The liberalization went further after the electoral victory of the DP after May 14, 1950. Although some critics held the DP responsible for the birth of "Islamic fundamentalism" and political Islam in Turkey, the liberal attitude of the DP towards religion can by no means named as Islamist. By İsmail Kara's words:

> When take a retrospective glance, we can easily state that "official Islamization" policies of the CHP before the 1950 elections or the DP in the post-election period lacked an ideological background. Even we can state that these policy measures aimed at officially controlling the unpreventable course of events.[26]

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Islamist currents could not present an independent ideological or political existence. Rather, they took their seats in existing right-wing political movements and mostly presented a nationalist-conservative outlook. In this period the center right wing political parties mobilized Islam through focusing on the "cultural" aspect of religion.[27] As the Islamist forces began to enter the public arena after its underground years, they posed Islamism firstly as a civilizational issue. The Islamists of this period focused on the so-called moral void that Turkish society has been experiencing due to

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[25] 'Islamic Revival in Turkey,' *International Affairs*, 1952, January, p. 40.

[26] İsmail Kara, 'Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Dini Yayıncılığın Gelişimi Üzerine Birkaç Not,' *Toplum ve Bilim*, 29/30, Spring-Summer, 1985

[27] Nuray Mert, 'Cami Gölgelerinden Gölge İnsanlara: Kültürel İslam Edebiyatı', *Tezkire*, No. 14-15, (Summer-Fall, 1998), p. 44.

waves of modernization and westernization. In this period the common denominators of 'anti-communism' and 'nation' stood as a meeting point for Islamist and right-wing politics. Nationalism functioned as a shelter for the Islamist protest, which, for Duran, caused emergence of a complex relationship –a state of debt–between Islamism and nationalism.[28] In other words, the secular idea of nation failed to fill the so-called moral void, and it could only be filled by establishing a unique synthesis between Islam and nationalism. For instance Nurettin Topçu's *Hareket* journal was an attempt to achieve that synthesis.

Born in 1909 in Erzurum, Nurettin Topçu carried his undergraduate and graduate studies in France. In his *Hareket* journal he tried to achieve a synthesis between Nationalism (which is based on territory-namely Anatolia), Anatolianism (*Anadoluculuk*), socialism, and Islam. He defended his case as an attempt to merge "a thousand years of Anatolian Muslim culture, customs, folklore, literature and arts; Sufism and philosophy of tariqas; and Islamic morality."[29] Within this amalgam, Islam is the most important dynamic that gathered nomadic Turks under the roof of a nation. For Topçu and *Hareket* journal, religion is not an element of culture, but its main determinant;[30] and the purpose of nationalism was to 'elevate the people to Islam.'[31] Like Topçu, other prominent Islamist intellectuals and currents of the period identified Islamist politics with Islamization of nationalism. We see this tendency in influential Islamist intellectuals like Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and Sezai Karakoç.

One of the first attempts to cut the umbilical cord of Islamism was the formation of the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*-MNP), which was short lived (banned) and followed by National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*-MSP). It was through the formation of the MNP/MSP that Islamists have asserted

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[28] Burhanettin Duran, 'Cumhuriyet Dönemi İslamcılığı', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, Y. Aktay (ed.), (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005) p. 133.

[29] Nurettin Topçu, 'Kültür ve Teknik', in *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi Vol. III*, (ed.) İsmail Kara, (Pınar Yayınları: Istanbul, 1994), p. 123. Lütfi Şehsuvaroğlu, Nurettin Topçu, (Alternatif Yayınları: Ankara, 2002), p. 64.

[30] Lütfi Şehsuvaroğlu, *Nurettin Topçu*, (Alternatif Yayınları: Ankara, 2002), p. 64.

[31] Hamza Türkmen, 'Hareket Dergisi (1939-1982)', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, Y. Aktay (ed.), (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005), p. 719.

themselves as autonomous and influential political actors. However, as I will discuss in details below, the founder of the MNP, Necmettin Erbakan, labeled the party's ideological position as the National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*), and never attempted to draw a clear demarcation line between Islamism and nationalism. To put it more appropriately, 'the National' has always been ambiguous and the movement benefited from this ambiguity.

2.1.4. Period of Confrontation and challenge

The period of confrontation and challenge, which corresponds to the late 1970s and the 1980s, exhibits a series of distinctive qualities when compared to Islamism(s) of the previous periods. In her study on two Islamist journals of the 1980s, *Girişim* and *İslam*, Ayşe Güneş-Ayata asserts that Islamism in this period presented a "radically different" outlook since the nature of Islamic revivalism has drastically changed. The genuine features of Islamism of the 1980s have been listed by Güneş-Ayata as such:

> First, this new movement in Islam is a result of popular reaction but its proponents intellectualize it much more fiercely than before . . . Secondly they are organized but not necessarily in political parties. Thirdly, although this is one of the rare periods when Islamic groups have been close to power (such as Nakşibendis in the Motherland Party government), direct attacks on the secular Turkish state, as well as demands for a totalistic Islamic state, have greatly increased. Fourthly, Islamic elements are introduced for the first time in Turkish republican history, especially under the influence of the Islamic revolution in Iran.[32]

Although Islamic revival of the period pointed Western modernity and its political, economic and cultural institutions and instruments as its main target, it is impossible to consider Islamic revival   (religious revival in general terms) without modernity itself. By this I refer to the role played by very modern instruments which were to turn the world into a "global village": that "revivalism generally reflects greater awareness of the existing world-system", and it was this awareness that prepared the conditions of existence of Islamism as a radical

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[32] Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, 'Pluralism versus Authoritarianism: Political Ideas in Two Islamic Publications,' in *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, (ed.) R. Tapper, (I. B. Tauris: London, 1991), p. 254.

political ideology.[33] Particularly the developments in communication technologies helped Islamists of various geographies interact with and influence one another. In Turkey, throughout the 1970s, translation of the key texts of Islamic literature (see Chapter 3) assisted in formation of a new Islamic consciousness which endeavors to go beyond traditional domestic political cleavages and to develop a universalistic vantage point.

2.1.5. The Period of Compliance and Accommodation

Throughout the 1980s Islamism has presented itself as a confrontationist political ideology which rested on dividing the political space into two antagonistic blocs, and proposing total Islamization of state and society as the cure to all social and political ills. The 1990s however can be considered as a turning point for the Islamist movements. Although vast majority of literature on transformation of political Islam points 28 February 1997 soft military coup as the main reason of this transformation, I argue that the transformation has multiple social, political, intellectual and economic dynamics which can be traced back to the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since I will deal with these factors in the following chapters in details, I will only point out some qualities of the new-Islamist discourse.

Firstly, the period of new Islamism points to a decrease in the level of confidence of the Islamist movements. In other words, to some extent, the Islamists begin to question their intellectual sources and unwavering truth claims. This is why it can be argued that this period is characterized by self-reflexivity and self-criticism. More important than that, the new period was characterized by the loss of anti-systemic principle in the Islamist discourse. While the previous phase of Islamism was mostly defined by "militant fundamentalists thinking in revolutionary terms," in period of compliance and accommodation "it is new social groups such as Muslim intellectuals, cultural elites, entrepreneurs, and middle classes that more greatly define the public face of Islam, thinking and acting in reformist terms."[34]

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[33] *Ibid*., p. 255.

[34] Nilüfer Göle, 'Islamic Visibilities and Public Sphere ', in *Islam in Public: Turkey, Iran, and Europe*, (eds.) N. Göle and L. Ammann, (Bilgi University Press: Istanbul, 2006), p. 4.

Finally, the transformation of Islamism in Turkey in the 1990s cannot be grasped without taking political, economic and ideological setting (at global and domestic levels) into consideration. Two key terms of this transformation were postmodernism and neoliberal globalization. These points will be discussed in details.

2.2. Islamism(S) in Turkey II: Islamist Groups

In addition to the periodical analysis of Islamism, we must also deal with ideological and organizational variations of Islamism in Turkey. This will help us to comprehend the plurality of Islamist positions, and to stress that there is not a monolithic expression of an inner religious essence. Through the advent of Turkish modernization process, Islamism in Turkey "diversified into a rich variety of social, political, economic, cultural and religious dimensions, manifesting itself in various organizations from religious orders to human rights associations."[35] Understanding this diversity is vital for properly locating the Islamist intellectual circles that I will analyze in the following chapter.

An overview of Islamism in Turkey will show us that there are roughly five different Islamist groups in Turkey:

  a. Political organizations: the political parties of the National Outlook Movement, and Justice and Development Party;
  b. Religious orders and communities: especially the Nakşibendi order and Fethullah Gülen's neo-Nur movement;
  c. Islamic NGOs (business associations, trade unions, human rights and charity organizations): MÜSİAD, HAK-İŞ, Mazlumder, Deniz Feneri Association;
  d. Militant Islamist groups: Hizballah, IBDA-C;
  e. Independent intellectuals and intellectual circles especially gathered around journals.[36]

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[35] Menderes Çınar and Burhanettin Duran, 'The specific evolution of contemporary political Islam in Turkey and its 'difference',' in *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and development Party*, Ümit Cizre (ed.), (Routledge: London and New York, 2008), p. 25.

[36] Partly derived from Çınar and Duran, 'The Specific Evolution', pp. 25-26.

Independent intellectuals and intellectual circles, and their intellectual sources will be exhaustively analyzed in the following chapters. In this chapter, I will present a general picture of Islamism in Turkey by briefly dealing with Islamist political parties, religious orders and communities, Islamist interest groups, and militant Islamist organizations.

2.2.1. Islamist Political Organizations: Political Parties of the National Outlook Movement

2.2.1.1. From the MNP to the MSP

Starting from transition to competitive electoral politics in 1946, religiously oriented electorate constituted a considerable part of center-right political constituency in Turkey. I have briefly noted the ideological traits of this period above. Major religious establishments –most notably religious communities and orders– "utilized" the center-right political parties as arenas of presentation. It was not until the formation of the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*-MNP) in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan, that these Islamist currents could own their platform to articulate and express their ideology. As Ruşen Çakır asserted, "up to that day the main strategy of the communities was first to guarantee their existence, and to utilize the benefits provided by the central authority for communities, more specifically the members of the communities."[37]

The formation of the MNP was in fact an outcome of a bi-dimensional crisis within the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*-AP). Firstly, since the confidence of Islamist groups had elevated through transition to multiparty democracy in Turkey, they demanded a bigger say in the process of political representation. This meant a power struggle within the AP, which, although takes a liberal attitude towards religion, still stands within the secular-modernist political tradition. Within this context the MNP could be considered as a coalition of Nakşibendi and Nurcu

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[37] Çakır, Ruşen 'Milli Görüş Hareketi,' in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, Y. Aktay (ed.), (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005) p. 545.

groups. It is a well known fact that Mehmet Zahid Kotku, the Sheikh of the Nakşibendi İskenderpaşa Convent, personally suggested formation of the MNP and lent his explicit support to the party.[38] However, National Outlook tradition cannot be considered as the political extension of these religious groups. There has always been a competition between political and religious authority within this coalition; and in the 1990s, this covert struggle became public with the strife between Necmettin Erbakan and Sheikh of İskenderpaşa Convent late Esad Coşan.[39] Yavuz asserts that the strife was, in fact, "the story of political authority's attempt to become independent from and transcend religious authority."[40]

The second factor that led to formation of an Islamic party was "economic." The clash within the AP manifested itself as a struggle between big industrialists, and small tradesmen and shopkeepers. This does not mean that the birth of the MNP was an "outcome" of the struggle between different fractions ('big' and 'petit') of Turkish bourgeoisie. On the contrary, MNP played a considerable role in formulation and articulation of the interests of these classes.[41] After being discharged from his post as the President of Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (*Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği*-TOBB), Necmettin Erbakan accused the government for following a development plan which favored a definite class, namely big industrial and commercial bourgeoisie; rather than an economic program which aims widespread economic development.[42] By Erbakan's words,

> The economic mechanism works in favor of big urban merchants, and the Anatolian merchants see themselves as the step child. . . The Union of Chambers fully operates as the apparatus of a comprador minority. The

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[38] Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, (Metis: Istanbul, 1990), p. 22.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 224; Ahmet Yıldız, 'Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook', *The Muslim World*, Vol. 93, 2003, p. 196.

[40] Hakan M. Yavuz, 'Milli Görüş Hareketi: Muhalif ve Modernist Gelenek,' in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, Y. Aktay (ed.), (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005), p. 597.

[41] The relationship between political parties and class interests is highly a complex one. For a classical text regarding the issue see Giovanni Sartori, 'From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology', in *Politics and the Social Sciences,* S. M. Lipset (ed.) (Oxford University Press: London, 1969).

[42] Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, (Dergah: Istanbul, 1975), p. 276; Tanel Demirel, *Adalet Partisi: İdeoloji ve Politika*, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2004), pp. 54-55; Sarıbay, *Türkiye'de Modernleşme ve Parti Politikası: MSP Örnek Olayı*, (Alan: Istanbul, 1985), p. 96, 98-99.

huge organization is under the control of comprador commerce and industry. So, we thought that we shall first enter the board of directors and transform the Union of Chambers into an organization that also serves the Anatolian merchants and industrialists.[43]

The social base of the party was consisted of small businessmen, tradesmen, peasants and provincial artisans; and the party, with its anti-big industrialist stance, attempted to articulate the whims and protests of these sectors.[44] The first National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*) experiment, namely the MNP, however, did not survive for long. The party was closed down in 1971 after the military intervention, and reappeared as the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*-MSP) in 1972 with almost no change in its party program. This cycle has been repeated throughout the history of the National Outlook Movement for several times. The third party of the National Outlook was the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*-RP) which was founded in 1983, three years after the closure of the MSP by the military junta. The Welfare Party was followed by Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*-FP) and Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*-SP) respectively.

'National Outlook' was the name that the new Islamist politicians gave to their movement. Erbakan was asserting that there are three major outlooks in Turkey: (1) the liberal outlook, (2) the leftist outlook, and finally (3) the national outlook. While the first two were "imported" ideologies which do not fit the cultural and historical specifics of the Turkish society, the national outlook stood as the only genuine alternative.[45] National Outlook was "a particular synthesis of religious and non-religious themes and represents an attempt to reconcile traditional Islam and modernism at the political level."[46] Binnaz Toprak states that "the ideology of the National Salvation Party was a continuation of at least a century of debate over Islam and the West."[47] The debate was over two possible roots of modernizing the

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[43] Sarıbay, *MSP*, pp. 98-99.

[44] Cihan Tuğal, *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challange to Capitalism*, (Stanford University Press: Stanford, Clifornia, 2009), p. 42.

[45] Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, p. 25.

[46] Yıldız, 'Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam', p. 189.

[47] 'Religious Right', in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, (eds.) I. C. Schick and E. A. Tonak, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1987), p. 227.

Ottoman Empire. Roughly, while the westernists argued that both Western technology and civilization must be adopted to modernize the empire, the Islamist bloc insisted on preserving Islamist traditions and cultural purity in process of modernization. "Like its predecessors," states Toprak "the National Salvation Party stressed that the decline of the Ottoman Empire had been the outcome of rejecting Islamic civilization in an effort to westernize."[48] Accordingly, the Turkish westernizing elite repeated the same mistake by equating development with abandoning the religious and cultural tenets of the Ottoman-Turkish society. They have disregarded the centrality of spiritual purity and integrity in achieving material development. Thus, following these insights, by Yıldız's words "a *zul-cenabeyn* (two-winged) understanding of development constitute[d] the core of the political discourse of the National Outlook movement: (1) "spiritual development" (Islam) and (2) "material growth" (industrialization)"[49]

The National Outlook Movement rested on the idea that material development could be achieved only through achieving spiritual development. Islam and nostalgic appreciation of Ottoman-Turkish establishment constituted the cornerstones of the discourse of spiritual development. Keeping the symbiotic relation between religion and nationalism in mind[50] the 'National' of the NOM had both religious (Arabic word *millet* refers to community of people who share the same religion) and nationalist connotations. "Religious nationalism," as "the protection of Muslim interests and the organizational realization of Muslim brotherhood at the global level",[51] may best describe the ideology of National Outlook. It can be argued that the double connotation of the term 'national' provided the NOM parties a considerable degree of flexibility and legitimacy, and NOM cadres skillfully and pragmatically utilized it.[52]

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[48] *Ibid.*, p. 228.

[49] Yıldız, 'Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam', p. 189.

[50] Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali*, p. 98.

[51] Yıldız, 'Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam'.

[52] However this should not mean that National Outlook is a "nationalist" movement. As Yıldız states "the rupture from nationalism in terms of political organization occurred with the establishment of NOP (MNP) and attained maturity in the process of the rise of political Islam accelerated by the Iranian revolution and strengthened by the idea of belonging to a global Muslim corporate existence (Muslim *umma*)." *Ibid.*, p. 189.

> The tradition of the National Outlook expressed its political view identified with Islam as *Milli Görüş* because of the fact that religious identity in politics has not assumed legal legitimacy in Turkey. In so doing, it took the advantage of the function of nationalism in Turkey as an umbrella for the articulation and expression of religious identity; it used a dual discourse by ascribing the national to the religious.[53]

Religious education, more specifically foundation of Imam Hatip schools, was addressed as one of the most important elements of spiritual development. The National Outlook "advocated the reaffirmation of a Moslem way of life . . . . [and] a right kind of educational policy was the most important vehicle for carrying out this goal."[54] Also in contradistinction to secularists' attempts to eliminate it, promoting religious education would also halt abuse of religion through raising consciousness of people regarding the religious issues.[55]

As stated, material development could not be achieved without moral development. Industrialization and a state-led development strategy were two crucial elements of the so-called material development myth. Industrialization is vital for survival of Turkey. However, the history of industrialization in Turkey points to two deficiencies: underdevelopment and dependency, and unevenness. Firstly, Turkish industry is dependent on Western industry in terms of technology. Secondly, industrialization is region and class specific, i.e. industrialization is limited with some regions and some social classes. As an alternative, National Outlook proposes an expansive industrialization strategy which paid a specific importance to Anatolian cities.

> It proposed to link its small-business base of support with the project of state-led heavy industrialization through the concept of the 'broad-based private sector.' This concept signified a corporation hat had a minimum of one hundred partners, each owning no more than a five percent share.[56]

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[53] *Ibid.*, p. 201

[54] Binnaz Toprak, 'Politicization of Islam in a Secular State: The National Salvation Party in Turkey,' in *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam*, S. Arjomand (ed.), (SUNY: Albany, 1984), p. 125.

[55] Erbakan, *Milli Görüş,* pp. 100-101.

[56] Haldun Gülalp, 'Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah Party,' *Muslim World*, vol. 89, No. 1, (January 1999), p. 27.

Since the motor force of this strategy is the genuine moral and material powers of Turkish society, industrialization would also bring economic and political independence from the Western imperialism. The most important part of this strategy is to address the cause in a faithful manner.[57] Toprak underlines the uniqueness of National Outlook's industrialization program as such:

> The National Salvation Party attempted to establish an interesting symbiosis between industrialization and culture by offering Islam as a psychological mechanism to ease the burden of rapid industrialization: it argued that Turkey would accomplish industrial growth without, however, passing through the traumas brought about by the capitalist model, with its inherent materialism.[58]

Science and technology will play a considerable role in accomplishing the desired developmental goals. Against the conviction that Islam is against science, National Outlook asserted that the foundations of the Western science and technology must be sought in advancements recorded by Islamic science. In this respect we can state that Erbakan's national Outlook still works within the problematic of the modernist Islam, which I have discussed above. By Erbakan's words, "Muslims gave countless services to sciences like geography, physics, chemistry, mathematics, and algebra."[59] It was during the Crusades that the Western powers transferred the Islamic science, without even understanding their core.

Hakan Yavuz asserts that Necmettin Erbakan has always built his political discourse on dichotomies like good and evil, beautiful and ugly, right and wrong, and justice and cruelty.[60] Within this dichotomous thinking, demonization of the West –with its economic, political and cultural/religious extensions– is central. The National Outlook Movement held the Western powers and Zionism responsible for disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and underdevelopment of Turkey. At many instances the demarcation line between critique of Zionism and anti-Semitism was blurred and anti-imperialism of the NOM was apprehended as

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[57] Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, p. 219.

[58] Toprak, 'Religious Right', p. 228.

[59] Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, p. 82-83.

[60] 'Milli Görüş Hareketi', p. 593.

being against all that is non-Islamic.[61] Anti-westernism of the National Outlook movement was accompanied by creation of Islamic counterparts of the Western organizations such as: United Nations of Muslim Countries as alternative to the United Nations (UN); Muslim Countries' Organization for Defensive Cooperation as alternative to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Muslim Countries Common Market Organization and Union as alternative to the European Union (EU); Muslim Countries Common Currency as alternative to Euro; and finally, Muslim Countries' Organization for Cultural Cooperation as alternative to United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).[62]

The National Outlook reduced laicism to freedom of consciousness and asserted that the concept has been misinterpreted and abused by the Republic. Especially, the article 163 of the Constitution, which outlawed any attempt for establishing a theocratic state and abuse of religious sentiments, has been severely criticized for equating laicism with hostility towards religion, particularly Islam.[63] The term has been interpreted as "the domination of non-believers over believers."[64] By Erbakan's words,

> We are going to be laic, which means we will not denounce anyone for their system of thought. The essence of laicism is the principle that no one can denounce another for her thought or faith. This idea is the expression of the guarantee of freedom of thought.[65]

However, as Sarıbay shows, there were many instances in which National Outlook cadres expressed their sympathy towards Shari'a and Islamic state. Accordingly, even though Erbakan and his followers seemed to interpret laicism as "freedom of religion and consciousness"; they had, in fact, a tendency towards establishing

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[61] Çakır, 'Milli Görüş Hareketi', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005), p. 570.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 566 and Özbudun, 'From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey', *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 3-4, (September-December 2006), p. 545.

[63] Erbakan, 'Milli Görüş', p. 52, 55-56 and Jacob M. Landau, *Türkiye'de Aşırı Akımlar*, trans. E. Baykal, (Turhan: Ankara, 1978), p. 273.

[64] Sarıbay, 'Milli Nizam Partisi'nin Kuruluşu ve Programının İçeriği', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005), p. 582.

[65] Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, p. 52

religion as a crucial reference in social and political life.[66] To put it more aptly, the National Salvation Party's political ideology was an amalgam of religious and secular elements. The party suggested the "Great Turkey" ideal could only be achieved through cultivation of pious citizens.

The National Salvation Party won 11.8% of the votes and 48 seats in October 1973 general elections. In 1977 the votes fell down to 8.6% with 24 seats in the parliament. Given the scattered nature of the votes among political parties throughout the 1970s, the MSP played a crucial role –a role which was disproportional with its general vote– in formation of several coalition governments: with the CHP in 1974; with the AP and the Republican Reliance Party in 1975 (also known as the First Nationalist Front); and finally with the AP and the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*-MHP) in 1977. The National Salvation Party used its bargaining power to the full extent and successfully formed its own cadres within the state. This process on the one hand "served for development of Islam in Turkey",[67] and helped the MSP to integrate with the system on the other.

Table 1. Percentage of Votes of Islamist Parties in Parliamentary and Local Elections (1973-2009)[68]

Year	Party	Votes (%)
1973	(parliamentary): National Salvation Party (MSP)	11.8
1977	(parliamentary): National Salvation Party (MSP)	8.6
1984	(local): Welfare Party (RP)	4.4
1987	(parliamentary): RP	7.2
1989	(local): RP	9.8
1991	(parliamentary): RP (in coalition with the MHP and IDP)	16.9
1994	(local): RP	19.1
1995	(parliamentary): RP	21.4
1999	(parliamentary): Virtue Party	15.4
2002	(parliamentary): Justice and Development Party (AKP)	34.3
2004	(local): AKP	41.2
2007	(parliamentary): AKP	46.5
2009	(local): AKP	38.5

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[66] Sarıbay, 'Milli Nizam Partisi', p. 583.

[67] Davut Dursun, 'Din-devlet ilişkilerinin 70 yıllık macerası,' *Yeni Zemin*, no. 2, February 1993, p. 14.

[68] Derived from Özbudun, 'From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy', p. 545.

As it can be seen in Table 1, the 1990s have witnessed a series of electoral successes for the National Outlook parties. The National Outlook parties fist in local, and then in general elections gained a considerable percentage of votes. As I will point below, they have even become the major coalition partner. However, the leap observed between 1999 and 2002 was surprising for many. In the following sections I will try to discuss the major dynamics of this success.

2.2.1.2. The Welfare Party

The triumph of Islamism will not be fully grasped without taking the post-1980 setting in Turkey, which provided Islamist establishments a favorable environment. On 12 September 1980 the Turkish Armed Forces took over political power. The Army justified the military intervention with state's inability to carry out its basic functions and persistence of anarchy. The maintenance of law and order and state authority was the motto of the National Security Council which nearly had unlimited power. The generals targeted the 1961 Constitution which was unquestionably more liberal when compared to its successor. Together with a new constitution, the Council issued a series of laws and regulations that would reshape the social, political, economic and cultural spheres.

The post-1980 adjustments were not limited with constitutional and legal arrangements. This peculiar break in Turkish history was to open up a new epoch, the Turkish New Right's attempt at hegemony.[69] In this attempt at hegemony, a formula called 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' which was developed by an intellectual establishment called the Intellectuals' Heart (*Aydınlar Ocağı*), was to provide the intellectual and moral grounds of the new authoritarian regime.[70] Mustafa Şen notes that "among other factors, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis has played a

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[69] Muharrem Tünay, 'The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony', in *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, (eds.) A. Eralp, M. Tünay and B. Yeşilada, (Praeger: London, 1993), p. 11.

[70] Erkan Akın and Ömer Karasapan, 'The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis', *Middle East Report*, No. 153, (July-August 1988), p. 18.

decisive role in the gradual rise of Turkish Islamism and the continuous swelling of the religious field."[71]

The Turkish-Islamic synthesis aimed at providing the junta with a moral program to hegemonize and universalize its position. The authoritarian-fascistic interpretation of Ataturkism was far from presenting an ideological content that will be appealing for the masses. Thus, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which was based on an articulation between nationalist, statist, authoritarian and Islamic themes was suggested as the spirit of the new regime by the military regime.[72] The Synthesis was based on an essentialized notion of Turkish culture which was a synthesis between Turkishness and Islam. However, this synthesis was not a simple amalgam. On the contrary, according to the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, the Turks could protect their national culture because they adopted Islam; it was the religion which gave Turkish culture its essence.[73] Accordingly,

> Islam is the precondition to being and remaining a Turk. Without Islam, Turkish culture would not be able to survive, but without Turks Islam would not be strengthened and disseminated. Turks voluntarily adopted Islam and very rapidly became its defender and vanguard. They have sublimated Islam and disseminated its message into Anatolia and the Balkans.[74]

The military regime's approach towards religion can be summarized by the formula "Turkey will not be religionist (*dinci*) but always be *dindar* (pious)."[75] While for the former, the extremists, religion comes first, even before nationality; the latter sees the priority of nationality but inseparability of national identity and religion. However, the aim of the program was not to establish an Islamic state, but

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[71] Mustafa Şen, 'Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Develpment Party', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (March 2010), p. 61.

[72] Bozkurt Güvenç, Gencay Şaylan, İlhan Tekeli and Şerafettin Turhan, *Türk-İslam Sentezi*, (Sarmal: Istanbul, 1991), p. 36; Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, *Devlet, ocak, Dergah*, (İletişim: Istanbul, 1999), p. 148.

[73] Güvenç et. al. *Türk-İslam Sentezi*, p. 41.

[74] Mustafa Şen, 'Transformation of Turkish Islamism', p. 61.

[75] Bora and Can, *Devlet, Ocak, Dergah*, p. 174.

"to shape individuals who are immune to appeals from the left and also do not threaten the secular basis of the republic."[76]

The years following the military intervention have witnessed the materialization of political, legal/constitutional and cultural projects of the Intellectuals' Heart and the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. For instance, the Intellectuals' Heart struggled for influencing the constitution making process mainly through presenting reports to authorities.[77] Central institutions of Turkish culture and intellectual life were reorganized in line with the major proposals of the synthesis. Formation of the Higher Education Council in 1981, which aimed at establishing a centralized and authoritarian university model was one of the most crucial moves of the military regime. In 1983 two institutions, Turkish Language Association and Turkish Historical Association, were closed down and replaced by Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History. All these institutions were parts of the new cultural restoration period. Maybe more important than this, whole national education system was cleared off traces of "humanism", which, according to the Intellectuals' Heart constituted the major threat to the well-being of the unitary Turkish state and homogenous society. Compulsory religious education became a part of the curricula of primary, secondary and high schools. Religious secondary schools and Quranic courses experienced a significant boom with official encouragement. All these developments provided the Islamists with a profitable environment to pursue their political and ideological goals.

In 1983, three years after banning of all political parties, including the MSP, the third National Outlook Party, the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*-RP) was formed. It will be problematic to argue that the RP unproblematically absorbed the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis to its programme. As I have discussed above, the tension between consciousness of nationality and that of *ummah* has always been an integral part of Islamist political identity in Turkey, at least at the level of political parties. That is why, as discussed above, the 'National' of the National Outlook

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[76] Akın and Karasapan, 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis', p. 18.

[77] Yüksel Taşkın, *Milliyetçi Muhafazakar Entelijansiya*, (İletişim:Istanbul, 2007), p. 254-66.

Movement presented an ambiguity, which increased the hegemonic capacity and comprehensiveness of the movement. Given the National Outlook Movement's ambiguous relationship with nationalism, it can be argued that the Islamist cadres highly profited from the post-1980 intellectual and moral arrangements. As I will show in the following sections, as the Islamists integrated more to the system they began to come to terms with the framework provided by the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis through forming a form of Turkish-Islamism.[78]

1989 local elections heralded the consecutive electoral successes of the RP in the 1990s. The party, with 9.8 of the votes, won Konya, Şanlıurfa, Sivas, Van and Kahramanmaraş municipalities. In the 1991 the RP formed an election alliance with the Nationalist Task Party (later replaced by the MHP) and Reformist Democracy Party. 19% of the votes in 1994 local elections staggered the country, and in 1995 general elections the RP became the first party with 21.4% of the votes.

Major domestic and international political, economic and social transformations of the 1980s deeply influenced the social base and political discourse of the Welfare Party. In his article on the rise and fall of the Welfare Party, Haldun Gülalp asserted that although the RP can be considered as continuation of the MSP there are significant differences between these two parties in terms of their party programs, ideologies and social bases. While both the MSP and RP underlined the importance of establishing a moral and just political, economic and social order, two movements diverge in terms of methods and conduits for achieving these goals. Both programs, for Gülalp, however, express the grievances of small businesses, and base their arguments on a critique of capitalism.

Capitalism, for both the MSP and RP is equated with "monopolistic big business, including both multinational corporations and domestically owned and government supported large industrial enterprises."[79] Private property, or profit

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[78] See, Mustafa Şen for a critical evaluation of transformation, 'Transformation of Turkish Islamism', passim.

[79] Gulalp, 'Political Islam in Turkey', p. 26.

making are, by no means, regarded as illicit. On the contrary, Erbakan himself repeatedly stressed the spiritual aspects of legitimate economic activity.[80] As I have stated above, the MSP established an internal relationship between material and moral development, and placed a distinct emphasis over heavy industrialization. Whereas, in the RP program the theme of industrialization is nearly absent.[81] The Welfare Party also differed from the MSP, which emphasized the importance of state initiative, by its emphasis over the role played by private initiative in economic development. Finally, while protecting the domestic market was the *raison d'être* of the MSP, the RP emphasized the need for opening the economy to global markets.[82]

The social bases of the Welfare Party also differed from that of the MNP/MSP line. As stated above, the social base of the National Outlook Movement in the 1970s was the traditional, provincial petty bourgeoisie. "The results of the 1973 and 1977 elections show that the NSP received the highest percentage of its votes in either the least developed, or the most rapidly developing areas of the country."[83] When the post 1980 market liberalism "unleashed entrepreneurial energies at every level,"[84] the traditional petty bourgeoisie benefited from the increase in "opportunity spaces"[85] emerged out of this outburst. The Welfare's constituency included "young middle class professionals, students, and the dispossessed in the metropolitan centers."[86] As against the rural-provincial character of the MSP, the Islamism of the RP was peculiarly urban.

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[80] *Milli Görüş*, p. 285.

[81] Gulalp, 'Political Islam in Turkey', p. 27.

[82] *Ibid*., p. 27.

[83] Toprak, 'Religious Right', p. 229.

[84] Çağlar Keyder, 'The Turkish Bell Jar,' *New Left Review*, No. 28, (July-August 2004), p. 64.

[85] Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, passim.

[86] Haldun Gülalp, 'Islamist Party Poised for National Power in Turkey', *MERIP*, No. 194/195, (May-August 1995), p. 54.

Just Economic Order[87] was one of the main texts that defined the ideological coordinates of the Welfare Party. The text was heavily influenced by the Islamist resurgence of the 1980s, especially by the emergence of independent and confident Islamist intellectuals and circles. Claiming to present a 'third way', which surpasses both capitalist and communist economic systems, the Just Economic order was presenting an "egalitarian petty-bourgeois paradise, an utopian society made up of individual entrepreneurs, whose activities are nonetheless regulated by a totalitarian state." [88] Although it has been argued that the text lacks a substantial logical consistency and continuity[89] it gives us many clues about the confrontational and oppositional logic of the RP's discourse. It was this confrontational and populist tone what made the Welfare Party's discourse appealing for the masses, especially the urban poor. Throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s the RP over-emphasized the urgent need for establishing a just economic and social order. The party, in line with the intellectual revival of the 1980s, did not hesitate to utilize leftist themes and concepts (like imperialism, exploitation, class etc.) to explain itself. However, the party had no chance to undertake such an arduous task neither in ideological and organizational terms, nor in terms of its social bases. The utopian ambitions of the RP faded as the party became more and more closer to and dependent upon the benefits of power. In 1991 general elections, the RP formed an election alliance with nationalist Reformist Democracy Party (*Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi*-IDP) and ultra-nationalist Nationalist Working Party (*Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi*-MÇP). The Intellectual's Heart put a great deal of effort in formation of this election alliance. One important outcome of the alliance was that it rendered Islamist and oppositional character of the Party doubtful, and pointed to the RP's willingness to become an actor (among others) of existing power relations.[90] For Yılmaz Çakır, a radical Islamist figure of *Haksöz Journal*:

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[87] Erbakan, *Adil Ekonomik Düzen*, (Istanbul, 2001).

[88] Gülalp, 'Political Islam in Turkey', p. 28.

[89] See Menderes Çınar, *Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak İslamcılık*, (Dipnot: Ankara, 2005); Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, and Gülalp, 'Political Islam in Turkey'.

[90] Ruşen Çakır, 'Türkiye İslamcılarının politik krizi', *Birikim*, No. 42, (October 1992), p. 32.

> First of all, the biggest threat that awaits the RP, which seems as an Islamic mission party, is becoming right-wing or conservative political establishment. In fact, this is the desire of organizations such as Aydınlar Ocağı or conservative-right wing newspapers like *Zaman* and *Türkiye*, which worked hard for the coalition or took part in it.[91]

In 1994 the RP issued a pamphlet called *Just Order: 21 Questions/21 Answers* in order the overcome the ambiguities surrounding the project and stressing its pro-private sector and pro-market orientation.[92] In 1994 Municipal elections the RP assumed offices in many important municipalities. Tuğal notes that the RP, in its initial years, by the help of its ideological impetus succeeded in increasing the quality of urban services and in staying free from corruption.[93] The increased popularity of the RP at local level brought the electoral victory of the 1995 general elections.[94] The RP formed a coalition government with the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*-DYP) of Tansu Çiller, who, at the time, was troubled with corruption accusations. The RP, rather than using its "ideological impetus" to fight corruption, founded a coalition government with the DYP based on covering up corruption files.[95]

2.2.1.3. '28 February' Process, the Birth of the FP and Transformation of Islamism

As the RP became the senior coalition partner, the fear of reaction became the primary concern for the secular establishment. A series of actions by Prime Minister Erbakan and some key figures of the RP both at local and central levels instigated this fear. For instance, Erbakan suggested the lifting the headscarves ban on female students and civil servants; organized an *iftar* meal for leaders of Sufi orders at the residence of the prime minister; frequently revived the necessity of

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[91] Yılmaz Çakır, 'Seçimin Ardından', *Haksöz*, No. 8, (November 1991); also see, İbrahim Turhan, 'İttifak ve Bazı Değerlendirmeler', *Haksöz*, No. No. 9, (December 1991).

[92] Cihan Tuğal, *Passive Revolution*, p. 50.

[93] *Passive Revolution*, p. 45.

[94] Yakup Kamalı, 'Bir Yıllık Refahyol İktidarında Refah'ın Karnesi', *Tezkire*, No. 13, (March 1998), p. 59.

[95] Cihan Tuğal, *Ibid.*, p. 45; M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, p. 241.

opening up more İmam Hatip Schools (İHL-*High Schools for Imams and Preachers*). Sensational remarks of prominent RP figures such as Şevki Yılmaz and Hasan H. Ceylan on Atatürk also stirred negative reactions.[96] Regardless of the 'reality' and 'urgency' of these developments, they have constituted a symbolic threat to secular establishment which was faced with immediate response. On 28 February 1997 the military intervened to politics through National Security Council's declaration of Islamist reactionism as number one security threat, and through "recommending" the government a set of policy measures. The military was not alone in its campaign; on the contrary achieved to mobilize "the former President Süleyman Demirel (1993-2000), the civil societal network of the secular establishment, media, and large sectors of the populace" against Islamic reactionism which accordingly "constitute[d] the chronic, if at times undetectable, malaise of the Turkish polity."[97] The policy measures of the February 28 process have been summarized by Cizre and Çınar as such:

> All primary and secondary school curricula were altered so as to emphasize both the secularist history and character of the republic and the new security threats posed by political Islam and separatist movements. Teaching on Atatürkism was expanded to cover all courses taught at all levels and types of schools. The secondary school system for prayer-leaders and preachers (*imamhatip*) was scrapped and an eight year mandatory schooling system was introduced. Appointments of university chancellors since 1997 were pointedly made from among staunch Kemalists. Teaching programs on Kemalist principles, the struggle against reactionism, and national security issues were also extended to top bureaucrats and prayer leaders. Finally, military institutions and personnel were actively involved in administering the programs.[98]

The Welfare Party was in no position to carry out these policies, since one of the major objectives of the intervention was to put the RP-led coalition government out of office. The military campaign succeeded in expelling Erbakan from power, and on 16 January 1998 the party was closed down by the Constitutional Court for constituting a threat to the secular establishment. Together with the closure of the

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[96] M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, pp. 242-243.

[97] Ümit Cizre and Menderes Çınar, 'Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process', *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 102, No. 2/3, (Spring/Summer 2003), pp. 310-12.

[98] İbid., p. 312.

RP, it can be argued that the military establishment aimed at reconfiguring the political landscape through following a radical secularization. For some other commentators, alongside political matters, 28 February could also be read as a manifestation of the clash between two competing blocs of the Turkish bourgeoisie: the big capital which had organic ties with bureaucracy, and 'newly rising social powers'.[99] The 'newly-rising social powers' referred to the entrepreneurial triumph of the Anatolian bourgeoisie, which will be discussed in the following sections.

After the RP's closure, the new home for the Islamists was the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*-FP). The Virtue Party was important in the sense that it pointed to the most important breaking point in the history of the National Outlook Movement. This breaking point was as important as the formation of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*-AKP) by the reformists within the NOM. The Virtue Party "was not a party of political Islam but a liberal-conservative party with a powerful "social state" inclination and a strong interest in nationalism."[100] By White's words, while the RP defined itself with reference to Islam, the FP strived to define itself with reference to politics.[101] Unlike its predecessor, the party wanted to be the representative of the center: regardless of their wants and problems, the target group of the FP was the people.[102]

'Real democracy', 'human rights and freedoms in the broadest sense', and 'the superiority of the will of the people' were the most recurrent and striking themes of party's vocabulary. "The party regarded basic rights and freedoms as inalienable rights of individuals and declared that realization of these rights depended on the complete implementation of the United Nations Universal

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[99] Bekir Berat Özipek, '28 Şubat ve İslamcılar', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, Y. Aktay (ed.), (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005), p. 641.

[100] Yıldız, 2003: 199.

[101] Jenny B. White, 'Islam and Politics in Contemporary Turkey', in *The Cambridge History of Turkey Vol. 4: Turkey in the Modern World*, (ed.) R. Kasaba, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2008), p. 372.

[102] Gérard Groc, 'Milliyetçilik, Sivil Toplum ve Dinci Parti: Fazilet partisi ve Demokratik Bir Geçiş Denemesi', in *Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik*, S. Yerasimos (ed.), (İletişim: Istanbul, 2001), p. 98.

Declaration of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, the Final Act of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, the Paris Charter for a New Europe, and other international legal norms." [103] This enthusiastic support for (previously condemned) Western documents and institutions was followed by the supposition that the European Union membership is the only viable option for consolidation of democracy in Turkey.

Unquestionably the 28 February process played a considerable role in transformation of Islamism in Turkey and transformation of Islamist politics. In his article on 'transformation of political Islam', Şaban Tanıyıcı labels 28 February process as an 'environmental shock' which caused the RP elite to change policies on a number of important issues.[104] The military intervention showed that challenging the fundamental principles of the system, most notably secularism, was a "dead-end."[105] Also, as Özipek notes, the Islamists of the period developed sympathy towards liberal intellectuals who stood for the rights of the Islamists and developed an anti-militarist stance.[106] Especially after the February 28th process the party tried to base its ideology on human rights, democracy, and rule of law. For instance, in their defense at the Constitutional Court, the Welfare Party based their arguments on liberal democratic concepts derived mainly from the Western literature.[107] Entries like 'civil society,' 'minimal state', 'globalization', 'global economic competition', 'integration to global markets' stepped into National Outlook's vocabulary.

The students of Turkish politics, almost without exception, attribute a paramount importance to 28 February process in transformation of Islamism in Turkey. Be it a 'shock', an external constraint or repressive measure pushing for accommodation, the researchers underscore that it was February 28 process that

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[103] Saban Tanıyıcı, 'Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: Islamist Welfare Party's Pro-EU Turn', *Party Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 4, (2003), pp. 474-5.

[104] 'Transformation of Political Islam', p. 465.

[105] Özbudun, 'From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy', p. 547.

[106] Bekir Berat Özipek, '28 Şubat ve İslamcılar', p. 645.

[107] Saban Tanıyıcı, 'Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey', pp. 477.

transformed Islamism. For instance İhsan Dağı notes that the Islamist intellectuals lost their "self-confidence and hope for the possibility of an Islamization of politics and society" in the late 1990s "when Islamist intellectuals encountered the power of the Kemalist/secular establishment as a result of the 'post-modern' national security coup of 28 February 1997."[108] Accordingly, post-Islamism, as Dağı calls it, "emerged partly in reaction to the policy of exclusion and elimination."[109] The excessive emphasis on 28 February process, however, fails to present an account of the direction of transformation itself. Why and how could the Islamist politicians and intellectuals, in such a short period of time, equip themselves with completely new ideological idioms and concerns? Why did not they develop a more radical and confrontational discourse, rather than a discourse of democracy? These questions cannot be answered only through exclusively focusing on the external factors such as 28 February.

The assumption that the Islamist discourse experienced transformation after a traumatic event ('28 February') will imply that the transformation had no social, political or intellectual background or history. However, as I will show in the following chapters, the transition from an antagonistic discourse of opposition to an accommodative discourse of compliance did not appear out of thin air. The ideological shift experienced in the National Outlook Movement in particular and Islamism in general must be related to social (the transformation of the constituency of the Islamist parties and movements), political (Islamists' march to power), economic (the rise of Islamic capital) and intellectual (entrance of new idioms and concerns into Islamist vocabulary) transformations that commenced in the late 1980s. Within this multi-faceted transformation, I give a special place to the new-Islamist[110] intellectuals who, in the early 1990s began to re-evaluate the basic premises of Islamist political ideology. By stressing the role of these figures I have no intention of attributing them a central role, or disregarding the

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[108] İhsan Dağı, 'Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey,' *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 13(2), (Summer, 2004), p. 138.

[109] *Ibid.*, p. 138.

[110] I do not use the terms 'post-Islamism' or 'new-Islamism' arbitrarily. For a discussion regarding these terms see Chapter 4.

importance of external factors such as the 28 February process. However, I contend that the transformation of Islamism in Turkey in the late 1990s will not be fully grasped without taking this historical period into consideration. In the following chapters I will focus on the conditions of possibility of the emergence of this new-Islamist discourse through presenting an intellectual and historical contextualization.

2.2.1.4. The Justice and Development Party

The theses that have been developed by the new-Islamist intellectuals throughout the 1990s first found their reflections in the formation of the FP and then the Justice and Development Party. In this dissertation I argue that the Justice and Development Party must be considered as the embodiment of political, economic and ideological project of new-Islamism. In other words, I argue that the party has 'ideologically' been formed in the early 1990s. Not only did the new-Islamist intellectuals contributed to transformation of Islamist discourse throughout the 1990s, they also personally took their place in making of the Justice and Development Party. The political and economic principles of the Justice and Development Party were formulated by the new-Islamist intellectual circles beginning from the early 1990s.

The Justice and Development Party was established on 14 August 2001 as a result of the divide between 'the traditionalists' (*gelenekçiler*) and 'the innovationists' (*yenilikçiler*) within the FP. After the Constitutional Court's decision to ban the FP in 2001, the traditionalists formed the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan's close associate Recai Kutan; and the innovationists formed the Justice and Development Party under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The party, from the beginning, rejected the claims that it was a continuation of the National Outlook Movement. On the contrary, the party tried to legitimize its position via a self-criticism of their Islamic past, which is

accompanied by a discourse of 'change.'[111] One the one hand leadership and high-rank party officers claimed that (through declaring that "they have taken off their National Outlook shirt"[112]) they have personally changed. On the other hand, the party claimed that through challenging the status quo it would bring the change that Turkish state and society have longed for decades.

Özbudun asserts that "the AKP appears to have successfully rebuilt the Özal ANAP coalition, bringing together former centre-right voters, moderate Islamists, moderate nationalists, and even certain segment of the former centre-left."[113] Just like Özal's ANAP the AKP was a 'mixture' of various right-wing political currents; but with one crucial difference. While the ANAP lacked a backbone to support its right-wing coalition, the AKP relied on National Outlook organization, relations and cadres.[114] By Yıldız's words,

> Islamism under the guise of 'conservative democracy,' however, also carries the JDP towards the center-right of Turkish politics, embodied by the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP), Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-JP) and Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-MP).[115]

The Justice and Development Party emerged as the sole political movement to present an 'exit strategy' for the organic crisis (see Chapter 5) that Turkish state and society have been experiencing especially throughout the 1990s. The crisis had complex political, social and economic dynamics and expressions which are well summarized by Açıkel as such:

> (i) the crises of the mono-cultural notion of citizenship . . . (ii) the crisis of staunch republican secularization . . . (iii) the crises of growth and redistribution strategies and the lack of transparent, efficient and accountable economic management, which seem to have been constantly undermined by clientelist and nepotist politicians and bureaucrats, (iv) the

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[111] Kenan Çayır, 'The Emergence of Turkey's contemporary 'Muslim Democrats'', in *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey*, Ümit Cizre (ed.), (Routledge: London and New York, 2008), p. 62.

[112] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[113] Özbudun, 'From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy', p. 546.

[114] Tanıl Bora, '2002 Seçimi ve Siyasi Güzergâh Problemleri: 2002=1950, 1983, 1995?', *Birikim*, No. 163-164, p. 30.

[115] Ahmet Yıldız, 'Problematizing the intellectual and political vestiges: From 'welfare' to 'justice and development',' in *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party*, Ümit Cizre (ed.), (Routledge: London and New York , 2008), p. 42.

crises of the Turkish left as *catalyst* and/or *multiplier effect* and its failure to produce tangible democratic solutions to those crises. [116]

However, the AKP's move towards filling the void on the center right[117] –a move which also gathered the support of the liberal, and even the socialist intelligentsia[118]– ended up with nearly most powerful governments of the multiparty era. The Justice and Development Party defined itself as a 'conservative democratic' political establishment, and seemed "hardly distinguishable from a liberal or conservative democratic party."[119] Elimination of all residues of confrontation from Islamism was the first step towards foundation of conservative democratic discourse. By Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's words, "radical styles and attitudes do not contribute positively to Turkish politics and compromise, integration and tolerance in politics instead of conflict and polarization is the road to be followed."[120] Conservative democracy supports change, in other words does not aim at preserving the status quo. However, the change must have an evolutionary nature and must happen gradually.[121] Conservatism underlines danger of change that brings decadence and degeneration. The moral boundaries of the AKP's conservatism are defined by religion. However, from the beginning the party declared that it is not the continuation of the National Outlook, and that it is not an Islamist political party. Again to quote from Erdoğan,

> The AK Party attributes importance to religion as a social value, but does not consider conducting politics on the basis of religion, transforming the state from an ideological point of view or organizing the society on the basis of religious symbols as a right strategy.[122]

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[116] Fethi Açıkel, 'Mapping the Turkish political landscape through November 2002 elections', *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 5, No. 2, (August 2003), p. 187.

[117] Yüksel Taşkın, 'AKP's Move to "Conquer" the Center-Right: Its Prospects and Possible Impacts on the Democratization Process', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1, (March 2008).

[118] Ahmet İnsel's article can be shown as an example to the socialist left's sympathetic engagement with the AKP. 'The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey', *The South Athlantic Quarterly*, 102:2/3, (Spring-Summer 2003).

[119] Özbudun, 'From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy', p. 548.

[120] For Erdoğan's speech, *International Symposium on Conservatism and Democracy*, (Justice and Development Party, 10-11 January 2004), p.

[121] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[122] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

With respect to the problem of religion, it can be argued that these statements are, at least at the level of rhetoric, present a complete denial of basic premises of the Islamism of the 1980s. It must be recalled that Erdoğan himself took his part in Islamist revival of this period as an Islamist politician, and at many instances expressed his devotion to Islamic cause. Many commentators interpreted the emergence of the AKP as the end of Islamism and triumph of a new Muslimhood model which "limits Islam in politics to ethical and moral aspiration of individual behavior and individual choice."[123]

Commitment to "market economy operating with all its institutions and rules" was the fundamental promise of the AKP.[124] For fulfilling this objective the function of the state in economy is defined as "a regulator and controller."[125] Thus, as opposed to National Outlook's statist economic development agenda, the AKP aims at minimizing the role of the state in economic life. Privatization is regarded as necessary for "a more rational economic structure," and increasing the international competitiveness is integral for carrying out "the structural transformations brought about by globalization."[126] The neo-liberal economic program of the AKP is accompanied by stress on democratization and enhancement of civil society. Turkey's accession to the European Union was regarded as one of the most important policy objectives for the AKP. In fact, at many instances democratization is conceived as a derivative or precondition of economic development. Erdoğan, after noting that "democracy is a regime based on dialogue, tolerance" adds in the following sentence that "*global competition, commerce* and the *network of international relations* requires *closed societies to open up* as soon as possible."[127]

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[123] Jenny B. White, 'The End of Islamism? Turkey's Muslimhood Model', in *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization*, (ed.) R. Hefner, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2005), p. 109.

[124] AKP, *Development and Democratization Program*, 2005, p. 36.

[125] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[126] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[127] *Conservatism and Democracy*, p. 7, emphases added.

The Justice and Development Party can be considered as an end product of a double crisis. The first one was the political and economic crisis which was especially intensified in the last decade of the twentieth century. The second was the crisis within the Islamist politics. The crisis of Islamism basically referred to inability of Islamist political agencies to articulate and meet the demands of the Islamist constituency. The AKP can be considered as an attempt to overcome this double crisis by firstly transforming Islamism into a centrist political ideology; and secondly, utilizing its organizational and ideological dynamism (which is backed by various sectors of society) for sustaining a neoliberal transformation in Turkey. The naïve optimism surrounding the studies on the AKP disregards this dimension; and evaluates the AKP around the axes of democracy/authoritarianism or Islamism/secularism.[128] The roots of the 'holy marriage' between neoliberalism and Islamism, as I will show, go back to the early 1990s. Most of the themes that are suggested by the AKP were already developed by a group of Islamist intellectuals, whom I call the new-Islamists.

It must also be noted that I do not consider the AKP as the endpoint of Islamist politics in Turkey. Since its inception the AKP recorded a series of surprising successes in national and local elections, and unquestionably presented the most stable governments of the Turkish history. The hegemony of the AKP both in Turkey and within Islamism seems intact at the moment, and the party is expected to win the following elections that will take place in 2011. However, in the first chapter, referring to Asef Bayat, I have underlined that the religious injunctions are matters of struggle and there are a variety of interpretations and readings. I have also added that it is the hegemonic struggle that defines which reading at a give time will be widely accepted. Currently, at the level or political parties there are two other Islamist actors that aim at challenging the AKP hegemony: the Saadet Partisi (*Felicity Party*) and the HAS Party (*Halkın Sesi Partisi-The Voice of the People*). Leaded by veteran politician Necmettin Erbakan, the Felicity Party is the continuation of the National Outlook Movement. The HAS Party, on the other hand, has been formed in November 2010 as a splinter party (from the SP) and

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[128] Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, 'Türkiye'de Neoliberal Otoriter Devletin AKP'li Yüzü', in *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, (eds.) İ. Uzgel and B. Duru, (Phoenix: Ankara, 2009).

aims at achieving an articulation between Islamist and socialist themes.[129] Although these actors seem far from posing a threat to AKP, the logic of hegemony underlies that politics is a field of constant battle and no war is won once and for all.

2.2.1.5. Power, Party Politics and Taming of Islamism

Sheri Berman asserts that taking part in political competition through formation of political parties has a taming effect on extremist political movements. There are three basic dynamics of this domestication process. Firstly, following Anthony Downs's "median-voter model" Berman asserts that "once parties commit to playing the electoral game, they find themselves to attract a majority or at least a plurality of voters, depending on the type of electoral system." Secondly, formal political competition forces these extremist movements to found highly complex bureaucratic organizations "capable of mounting public campaigns, raising and disbursing funds, and developing policies" rather than running traditional revolutionary and underground activities. Thirdly, as the "pothole theory" of democracy claims, obligation to deal with ordinary and daily problems of the citizens forces extremist parties to convince voters that they will be able to handle these problems, "deliver the goods or get the trash picked up."[130]

Asking the main dynamics of Welfare Party's appeal for the voters, Jenny B. White states that rather than abstract Islamist slogans, the issues such as pensions, affordable housing, healthcare and the environment were more critical. She also adds that "the RP municipalities brought some order to municipal services and seemed, on the surface at least, to be less corrupt than previous administrations. . . . streets were cleaner, buses ran more often and the rubbish was collected in a timely manner."[131]

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[129] Halkın Sesi Partisi Programı, http://www.hasparti.org.tr/page.aspx?key=program, last accessed on 10 December 2010.

[130] Sheri Berman, 'Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons from Europe', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (January 2008) p. 6.

[131] 'Islam and Politics', p. 370.

Likewise, Tanıyıcı, following Katz and Mair's framework, underscores that "party actors are more likely to appreciate constraints and limitations on policy-making when the party is in office. The fact that to be effective party elites need to work with coalition partners, civil servants and officials at other levels of government also limits and moderates their behavior."[132] Yalçın Akdoğan, who is known for his contributions to transformation of Islamism and formation of the AKP's "conservative democracy", highlights the role played by the RP in integration of Islamism to the system. According to Akdoğan,

> Although the Welfare Party (RP) displayed an image which supported Islamization or played role in dissemination of Islam in sectors of society that were out of reach of the religious communities, it played a significant role in taming of ideological opposition and its integration to the system. Like the party has evolved into a more liberal structure that defends free market economy (from the statist structure of its years of inception), its social base came to a point in conformity with the system, desiring compromise and tolerance (from a reactivity that rejects democracy and fundamentally criticizes the system). Articulation of Islamic rights as democratic rights and relocation of the struggle to democratic and legal platform are other important effects of the party.[133]

İhsan Yılmaz notes two major domestic factors that led to domestication of Islamist political ideology in Turkey. The first is the will to avoid confrontation with the strictly laicist establishment. The February 28th process in this sense had a direct influence on shaping of Turkish Islamism. The second factor for Yılmaz is the "emergence of a tolerant normative framework" which is a result of Turkey's pluralism. Yılmaz unconvincingly asserts that "the legacy of the Turkish political history, going back to Ottoman times, in terms of constitutional practice and democratic experience has contributed to the moderate and less reactionary nature of Turkish Islamism."[134] Yılmaz depicts Gülen community and his "competitive Islamic discourse" as an example, with forgetting the confrontationist discourse of Gülen in his years of vulgar anti-communism. I will discuss this point in the following section.

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[132] Saban Tanıyıcı, 'Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey', pp. 471-472.

[133] Yalçın Akdoğan, *AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi*, (Alfa: Istanbul, 2004), pp. 102-103.

[134] İhsan Yılmaz, 'Influence of Pluralism and Electoral Participation on the Transformation of Turkish Islamism', *Journal of Economic and Social Research*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, p. 57.

To sum up, the history of the Islamist political parties is also at the same time the history of Islamism's integration with the regime. The real problems and concerns of practical politics forced Islamists to think and act in accordance with the rules of the game. Especially the electoral achievements in the 1990s at both local and national levels were followed by increased involvement of Islamist sectors with fruits of power, which launched an irrevocable march towards the center.

2.2.2. Religious Orders and Communities

The religious orders (**tariqa**) and communities stand as significant collectivities that claim to represent the genuine and true form of achieving moral and religious purification. They also act as terrains on which the disciples (**mürid**) socialize, politicize, act with solidarity, and obtain their identity. In addition to the symbolic profits that the orders provide their followers, the material gains must be duly noted. Until their interdiction in 1925, the orders have played a significant role in economic, social, cultural and political spheres in the Ottoman-Turkish society.[135] By Mardin's words,

> In the Ottoman Empire *tarikat* played a major role as purveyors of local social services, as centers where the authority of lodge elders was used to sort out various local problems and also as educational facilities as well as channels between the rural population and the government.[136]

After a period of retreat and silence, the Sufi orders begun to recuperate in the 1950s through relative liberalization of the regime's tight policy of containing Islam in general. The following decades have witnessed the strengthening of the orders in ideological, political and organizational terms. This development, in fact, was not peculiar to Turkey only: revival of Sufism and related devotional movements accompanied the worldwide resurgence of Islamist and neo-

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[135] Halil İnalcık, 'Tarihsel Bağlamında Sivil Toplum ve Tarikatlar', in *Küreselleşme Sivil Toplum ve İslam*, (eds.) F. Keyman and A. Sarıbay, (Vadi: Ankara, 1997), p. 80.

[136] Şerif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi*, (SUNY Press: Albany, 1989), p. 185.

fundamentalist movements especially in the 1970s.[137] Sufism can be defined "in wide terms by applying it to anyone who believes that it is possible to have direct experience of God and who is prepared to go out of his way to put himself in a state whereby he may be enabled to do this."[138] Sufism, however, does not have a frozen meaning that crosscuts history, but throughout centuries the meaning, practices and rituals of Sufism and Sufi orders have changed. Originally pointing to 'renunciation' and withdrawal from the goods of the material world, the term 'Sufi', "from the middle of the ninth century . . . . came to be used increasingly as a technical term to designate a group of people who belonged to a clearly identifiable social movement in Baghdad based on a distinct type of piety."[139] "The early Sufis of Baghdad," states Karamustafa,

> . . . were most concerned with obtaining experiential knowledge (*ma'rifa*) of God, while distilling the reality of the Islamic profession of faith, ''There is no god but God,'' into their daily lives. Human life presented itself to them as a journey toward the ever elusive goal of achieving ''God-consciousness,'' an ongoing attempt to draw near God. In the Sufi perspective, human beings, viewed as servants of God, experienced such proximity to their Lord before the beginning of time. Before their creation, all human beings bore witness inspirit to God's Lordship on the Day of the Covenant.[140]

What, for centuries remained constant in Sufi tradition is the centrality of the spiritual leaders (*pir*s or *mursid*s) in transference (to put it more aptly, in leading the way to obtain such knowledge) of the so-called "experiential knowledge" (*ma'rifa*). For the mürids, book-learned knowledge (which is based on sacred scriptures of Islam) was secondary when compared to knowledge that has been derived from the (material and spiritual) interaction and communication with the Sheikh.[141] Hence the need for intermediary persons, practices and organizations to practice true religion: "According to the tariqa line of thought, human beings

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[137] Martin van Bruinessen and Julia Day Howell, 'Sufism and the 'Modern' in Islam', in *Sufism and the 'Modern' in Islam*, (eds.) M. van Bruinessen and J. D. Howell, (I. B. Tauris: London and New York, 2007), p. 8.

[138] Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1971), p. 1.

[139] Ahmet Karamustafa, 'What is Sufism?' in *Voices of Islam 1: Voices of Tradition*, (ed.) V. Cornell, (Praeger: London), p. 252.

[140] *Ibid.*, p. 253.

[141] Tayfun Atay, *Din Hayattan Çıkar: Antropolojik Denemeler*, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2004), p. 97.

cannot reach God and God's way on their own. They definitely need a guide, a *mursid*, who will lead the way."[142] Thus, *tariqas* rests on the assumption that the individual has a limited capacity when left alone; and it is this incapacity what makes the communal solidarity and organic unity among the followers integrating principles of the tariqa.[143]

The *tariqa*s (literally meaning 'ways') were "loosely organized bodies of pirs and murids" to implement "well-defined and even hierarchically controlled 'ways' of mystical discipline, each with its rituals, its chiefs, and its endowments."[144] Major objectives of the tariqa are to enrich the obligatory ritual regimes (such as the five daily prayers, fasting in the month of Ramadan, making the pilgrimage to Mecca when possible) of the believer through spiritual guidance; and to provide guidance to the seeker through teaching how to experience, feel and reach the divine Reality (*haqiqa*). Mysticism, as Trimingham underlines, was a "particular method of approach to Reality, making use of intuitive and emotional faculties," which could only be of use through appropriate guidance.[145] This training, "thought of as 'travelling the Path', aims at dispersing the veils which hide the self from the Real and thereby become transformed or absorbed into undifferentiated Unity."[146] Islam's Sufi tradition, however, cannot be equated simply with mysticism; Sufism presents different practice regimes and organizational frameworks varying with respect to different historical and geographical settings.[147]

Unsurprisingly, the advent of Sufism brought a divide within Islam. Firstly, while the religious orthodoxy concerned with outward, socially cognizable behavior, which is based on Quran and Sunna, and elaborated by the Shar'i ulama; the Sufi pirs concerned with the inward, experiential and personal life of individuals.[148]

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[142] Abdullah Manaz, *Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Siyasal İslamcılık*, (Ayraç: Ankara, 2005), p. 473.

[143] Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, 'Pluralism versus Authoritarianism', pp. 273-4.

[144] Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam Vol. II*, (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1977), p. 214.

[145] Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders*, pp. 3-4.

[146] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[147] Howell and Bruinessen, 'Sufism', p. 6.

[148] Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, p. 203.

Secondly, the ulama possessed religious knowledge, while the Sufis rested on mari'fah. Thirdly, the ulama concentrated on the prophethood (***nubuwwah***) of Mohammad, whereas the Sufis stressed his sainthood (***wilayah***). And finally, while the ulama highlighted and taught submission of humans to God's majesty (***jalal***), which is perfected in unity (***tawhid***), the Sufis pointed to love of God's beauty (***jamal***). Although Sufism claimed that outward and inward aspects of belief were indeed complementary; the divide, at some instances, turned into a fierce struggle of legitimacy and authenticity. In the following section I will deal with one of the most influential religious orders in Ottoman-Turkish history, the İskenderpaşa Convent.

2.2.2.1. The Nakşibendi Order

Sufi orders played considerable social, political, economic, cultural and educational roles in Islamic societies, including Ottoman-Turkish setting. Trimingham noted that orders were themselves a social power, and "frequently had a special relationship with social classes, regions, clans, or occupational groups."[149] As I have stated above, after a short period of retreat during the single party years, the orders began to reclaim their crucial position in the society. Although there are dozens of tariqas in Turkey, only some few reached a certain degree of political and social significance: Nakşibendis (also transliterated as *Naqshbandī*), İsmailağa Convent, Menzil Convent and Kadiris can be shown as prominent examples. Noting that Sufi Islam, particularly the Naksibendi tarikat, "played a distinctive role in the rise of religious revivalism and fundamentalism in Turkey," Sencer Ayata asserts,

> from the 1970s onwards, the numerous branches and lodges of the Naksibendi tarikat were able to develop powerful and active networks in business, politics, the mass media, and social and welfare services. The religious orders and communities that originated from the mainstream Naksibendi lodges, such as the Nurcu, Süleymancı, Işıkçı, and Fethullahçı, have far outstripped the parent organization in both their following and the scope of their activities.[150]

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[149] Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders*, p. 233.

[150] Sencer Ayata, 'Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 1, (Winter 1996), pp. 48-49.

The Nakşibendi order is a lively example proving the assumption that Sufism does not necessarily mean mysticism or withdrawal from material world. On the contrary, as Mardin underscores, "the sober, inwoven, inwrought, disciplined spiritual practices of this order" played a crucial role in its viability.[151] As early as in the sixteenth century, Indian Nakşibendi pir Ahmad Faruqi al-Shrindi (1563-1623) insisted that "dissolving one's early moorings through the quest for union with God is an incomplete ... exercise [and] the true believer has to return to earth and come to grips with the realities of the world."[152] It was basically the Shrindi effect in Nakşibendi tradition what brought involvement with realities of the world.[153] The traces of this attitude can be chased in the Nakşibendi tariqa's engagement with politics and economics. The Nakşibendi order also presents a case which exhibits how Sufi establishments become intertwined with modern life.[154] As against the conviction which considers tariqas as pre- or anti-modern establishments, especially the last four decades show that the tariqas functioned as organizations through which the *mürid*s are critically engaged with modernity, especially modern urban life. The symbolic and material economy of the tariqas, at different levels, provides the murids with a web of social, political and economic relations to survive, and even better their conditions in the modern world. By M. Esad Coşan's words education and salvation of Muslims in the corrupt modern environment is only possible through "qualified staff, cadres, financial power, efficient conduits, modern supplies and a broad timeframe."[155]

Nakşibendi figures like Said Nursi, Mehmet Zahid Kotku (founder of the İskenderpaşa convent), and Prof. Mahmud Esad Coşan (Kotku's successor and son-in-law) were distinctive in their ability to adopt and bend modern institutions, symbols and relations. Ruşen Çakır summarizes the basic tenets of Kotku's

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[151] Şerif Mardin, 'The Nakshibendi Order in Turkish History', in *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, (ed.) R. Tapper, (I. B. Tauris: London, 1991), p. 123.

[152] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

[153] M. Emin Yaşar, 'İskenderpaşa Cemaati', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul 2005), p. 340, see 8th endnote.

[154] Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, p. 12.

[155] M. Esad Coşan, 'Gayemiz', (September 1983), in *İslam Dergisi Başmakaleleri*, (Server Yayınları: Istanbul, 2007), p. 16.

strategy as such: firstly, Kotku utilized all gaps and opportunities provided by the official ideology for religious education of the masses. Building mosques, dormitories, dersanes, and providing scholarships for the students were the main activities of the convent to achieve this goal. Second, he personally kept in touch with daily economic, political and cultural issues of the country and encouraged his followers to do so. Last, he rejected militant Islamist strategies that consider the state as an enemy to be destroyed. On the contrary, his strategy regarding the state involved gradual Islamization of state through planting Islamist cadres in the bureaucracy.[156]

In her work on the Cerrahi order in Turkey, Fulya Atacan makes a distinction between two forms of orders: *"intermediary form"* and *"ideologically based"* orders.[157] Referring to influential Turkish sociologist Mübeccel Kıray's formulation, the *intermediary form* refers to emergence of institutions, establishments and relations in periods of rapid socioeconomic change, which neither belong to the traditional setting nor to the new structures.[158] The *ideology based tarikats*, however, "rely on an ideology of "Islam" that will help to transform "the lifestyles and relations" as a whole."[159] These tarikats differ from the traditional tarikat forms both in ideological and organizational terms. The classical tarikat structure is dissolved, and replaced by a new and "better" organizational model structured around Quran courses, dormitories, publishing houses, *dershanes*, and associations. Another distinctive feature of ideology based tarikats is their relation to economics and economic organizations: "their efforts to become autonomous and independent are associated with economic independency, and these tarikats made investments and started businesses in the name of tarikat interests.[160]

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[156] Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, pp. 22-23.

[157] Atacan, *Sosyal Değişme ve Tarikat: Cerrahiler*, (Hil: Istanbul, 1990), p. 17.

[158] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[159] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[160] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

Party formation, formation of foundations, Islamic publishing and formation of companies were four important moments and processes which contributed to the transformation of İskenderpaşa convent's identity.[161] In the sub-section on the National Outlook Movement I have noted that the National Oder Party has been formed through approval and guidance of Mehmet Zahid Kotku. Yaşar notes that such an engagement with politics has always been a matter of tension within the İskenderpaşa convent. The source of the tension was the contradiction between Kotku's discourse which devalues daily political concerns and the active support given to the National Outlook. Within this context, the clash between Erbakan and Coşan in the 1990s became public, and followed by the break of this tie. Yaşar notes that, despite its short term negative impacts, this development helped the convent to discard the tension between rhetoric and practice.[162]

Nakşibendi order, especially under the leadership of Mahmud Esad Coşan, gave specific importance to formation of foundations (*vaqfs*) which carry social and cultural tasks. Hakyol Foundation, Foundation of Science, Culture and Art (*İlim, Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı*) were accompanied by associations dealing with various topics from human rights to preservation of historical monuments.[163] Foundations and associations played a vital role in İskenderpaşa convent's strategy of containing the civil society. It can also be argued that the convent become more outward-oriented and liberal with the push of these organizations and new forms of relationships brought by them.[164]

İslam, İlim ve Sanat, and *Kadın ve Aile* were the journals that were published by the İskenderpaşa convent. The basic objective of publishing activities is explained by Coşan as the inadequacy of traditional activities and to reach as many people as possible:

> The education of the Muslims is the most important issue for us. We have seen that lectures, sermons, talks, conferences and seminars regarding this

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[161] Yaşar, 'İskenderpaşa', p. 328; Şaylan, *İslamiyet ve Siyaset*, (Verso: Ankara, 1987), pp. 92-93

[162] Yaşar, 'İskenderpaşa', p. 338.

[163] Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, p. 42.

[164] Yaşar, 'İskenderpaşa', p. 333.

> field are not enough. They cannot meet the needs and the demand. We cannot reach everywhere we want, every community that invites us. We have decided to launch a journal to make these happen.[165]

Various sources note that the circulation of *Islam* was around 100.000, which is an impressive number.[166] In addition to the İskenderpaşa convent's publication facilities, there were many other Islamist journals either published by other tariqas and communities, or by independent Islamist intellectuals: *Mektup, Altınoluk, Köprü, Sızıntı, Girişim* and many other Islamist journals which were published in the 1980s. Increase in the importance of publication facilities meant a crucial change for the part of the tariqas: through journals, the form and, to some extent, the content of the message delivered by mürsid have considerably changed. The mystic and spiritual experience of transference of practical knowledge was formalized through journal articles. Journals were the specific sites of tariqas' unique conciliation with modernity.

As stated, throughout their history, in addition to their spiritual tasks, tariqas also acted as social and economic solidarity networks. To fulfill these tasks, tariqas established their own economies, which varied in size and content depending on time and geography. Formation of foundations was one of the conduits for fundraising and distribution of goods. The tariqas, as the İskenderpaşa case shows, encourage their followers to establish economic links among themselves to minimize the risks and uncertainties of the markets. What distinguished the modern-urban tariqa approach to economic relations in the 1980s and 1990s was tariqas' emergence of an economic force itself. Tariqa's involvement with economics was no more confined with establishing a safe economic web among the murids. The convent itself became an economic actor through ownership of companies and holdings.[167] Especially the advent of Islamist municipalities

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[165] M. Esad Coşan, 'Gayemiz', p. 15.

[166] Erkan Akın and Ömer Karasapan, 'Turkey's Tarikats', *Middle East Report*, No. 153, (July-August 1988); Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*. Yaşar states that the circulation rose up to 150.000 for a period, 'İskenderpaşa', p. 334.

[167] Yaşar, 'İskenderpaşa', p. 338.

accelerated the process.[168] Server Holding, AK-TV, and Ak-Ra Habercilik ve Televizyon Yapım Anonim Şirketi were the major companies and holdings owned by the convent.[169] Yaşar notes that formation of companies caused erosion in identity of the community, since at many instances the economic activities were based on exploitation of community's resources (both organizational and human).[170]

Foregoing show us major *tariqa* establishments in Turkey skillfully adopted themselves to changing social, political and economic conditions. Within this integration process, they shifted their organizational and ideological tenets. However, they were not passive recipients; but, on the contrary, the vital actors that take part in shaping of the processes. Direct involvement in politics through assisting and guiding the formation of the National Order Party; formation of foundations and civil society organizations; utilizing modern communication technologies for delivering community's message; publishing journals, books and newspapers; formation of television channels, and most recently web sites; and incorporating the community, and even founding holding companies... all these developments irreversibly transformed the orders' identities. Firstly, over-engagement with the material world increased the tension within the communities. While the Sufi teaching preached the corrupt nature of real political and social relations; involvement of orders in these relations caused a confusion and tension among their constituencies.[171] Secondly, orders' affiliation with economics as an economic actor caused a perceptual shift regarding liberal economics. In order for these communities to continue operating, the old ideological frame of reference must be rearranged.[172] At the most basic level, the critical distance towards capitalism and free-market relations had to be replaced by an accommodative attitude. Tariqas were not alone in this transformation; developments such as

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[168] Faik Bulut, *Tarikat Sermayesinin Yükselişi*, (Doruk: Ankara, 1997).

[169] Manaz, *Siyasal İslamcılık*, p. 462.

[170] Yaşar, 'İskenderpaşa', p. 339.

[171] Özer Kızıltan's movie "Takva" (2006) tells the story of a *murid*, who loses his sanity because of this tension.

[172] Murat Yalnız and Adem Demir, 'İnancın Evrimi', *Newsweek Türkiye*, 04.10.2009.

formation of Islamic business organizations (MÜSİAD and other SİADs), the advent of Islamic bourgeoisie, and the ideological transformation of independent intellectuals all contributed to the so-called perceptual transformation of Islamist circles in general regarding capitalism and free market. It is my contention that Gülen community played a crucial role in this process, which will be discussed in the following section.

2.2.2.2. The Gülen Movement

One of the most effective and well known religious establishments of contemporary Turkey, namely Fethullah Gülen community, is worth noting here since the Gülen movement, which is "comprised largely of Turkey's rising entrepreneurial urban and provincial middle class, the businessmen, and merchants of Anatolian towns and cities,"[173] currently is the biggest and most influential religious network both in Turkey and abroad.[174] Fethullah Gülen movement is neither a reaction against the social injustice nor a movement of some socially excluded, deprived Muslim lower classes; on the contrary, the movement relies on upward social mobility, in which education plays an integral role.[175] The basic philosophy of the Gülen movement also consolidates this fact:

> Gülen's followers are much more organized than any other Islamic groups in Turkey. Educational, business and media networks are the foundations of a project of Golden Generation and a mission of making Turkey a powerful country among Islamics, but more precisely over Turkic states. It is the project of Muslim society with a powerful state.[176]

Nurcus in general and Gülen movement in particular supported free market economy and withdrawal of the state from economic and educational spheres in the post-1980 era. This strategy was in line with the interests of the newly rising

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[173] Erol N Gülay, 'The Gülen Phenomenon: A Neo-Sufi Challange to Turkey's Rival Elite?', *Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, No. 16(1), (Spring 2007), p.39.

[174] Helen Rose Ebaugh, *The Gülen Movement*, (Springer: New York, 2010), p. 4.

[175] Bekim Agai, 'Fethullah Gülen and His Movement's Islamic Ethic of Education', *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, No. 11(1), (Spring 2002); and Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*.

[176] Mücahit Bilici, 'The Fethullah Gülen Movement and its Politics of Representation in Turkey', *The Muslim World*, Vol. 96, (January 2006), p. 10.

Anatolian bourgeoisie, most of which in turn began to support, even finance the movement. The 'new opportunity' spaces[177] created by post-1980 transformation in Turkey have eagerly been embraced by the followers of Gülen community. By Gülay's words, Gülen's followers "fully embrace free market reforms and political liberalization to create businesses, build schools, publish journals, and accumulate religious and secular knowledge."[178] For Bilici Gülen community "is a successful example of a civil Islamic movement in the new global context."[179]

The importance given by the community to "tolerance and affection", for Bilici, makes Gülen movement unique when compared to other Islamist movements.[180] Despite the emphasis on tolerance and affection, it should be noted that Gülen's main concern is not rights and liberties, but to show that a particular version of Islam could exist within existing power relations as an influential actor. A culture of obedience to state and tradition is dominant within the movement's own organization and attitude towards the outside world. In Yavuz's terms, "there is an aspiration for a beehive beyond the reach of rebellion and especially critical thinking."[181] The strict hierarchy within the community, dominance of central decision-making and the cult of personality (Fethullah Gülen and Said-i Nursi) form the authoritarian frame of the community. As it has been stated by Mustafa Şen "Gülen himself sees the form of discipline prevailing in military barracks as one of the most important components of the light houses [which emanates from Gülen's conviction that] obedience, loyalty and complete submission to the commnunity's authority are essential conditions to make one a true believer."[182]

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[177] See Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*.

[178] Erol N. Gülay, 'The Gülen Phenomenon', p. 40.

[179] *Ibid*., p. 1.

[180] *Ibid*., p. 3.

[181] Hakan M. Yavuz, 'Neo-Nurcular: Gülen Hareketi', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, Y. Aktay (ed.), (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005), p. 306.

[182] Mustafa Şen, 'A Background for Understanding the Gülen Community', *Soziale Welt Sonderband*, Vol. 17, (2007), p. 339.

Like other Nurcu groups, Gülen movement rejects the reduction of Islam into a political ideology. That's why many radical Islamist groups condemn them for being 'passive'. However, since the main axis of the movement is the emphasis on the perpetuity of the state and nation, they think that any radical movement would disrupt the efforts of constructing an Islam-based national identity.[183] Especially after 28 February military intervention, Gülen's already pragmatic and pro-state attitude became even more explicit. He even supported 28 February, just like he had supported 12 September military intervention. During this delicate period, the community paid great effort to differentiate itself from other Islamist groups having trouble with the state.

In his writings, Gülen frequently speaks of *jihad*, yet this is a spiritual *jihad*, which is based on identity and character. As mentioned above "golden generation" would bring Islam and science together, and thus struggle with moral degeneration and positivism, which are major ills of our age. The objective of spiritual jihad is to construct the social network that will produce the "golden generation"; and that social network is composed of media institutions, schools, dormitories, private teaching institutions, universities, foundations, associations and "light houses."[184] One can find dozens of works which try to theorize, legitimize and advertise Gülen's mission. Yılmaz states that Gülen's Islam "is not a political project to be implemented," but "a repository of discourse and practices for the evolution of a just and ethical society."[185] By Gülen's words,

> Islam does not propose a certain unchangeable form of government or attempt to shape it. Instead, Islam establishes fundamental principles that orient a government's general character, leaving it to the people to choose the type and form of government according to time and circumstances.[186]

It is a fact that the moderate, and even in some cases statist discourse of Gülen community helped the 'organization' to create conduits of expansion without that

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[183] Hakan M. Yavuz, 'Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Nurculuk,' in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, Y. Aktay (ed.), (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005), p. 294.

[184] Hakan M. Yavuz, 'Neo-Nurcular: Gülen Hareketi', p. 299.

[185] İhsan Yılmaz, 'State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey,' *The Muslim World*, Vol. 95, (July 2005), p.396.

[186] Quoted in Yılmaz, 'State, Law, Civil Society', pp. 396-397.

much confrontation with the secular establishment. By Bilici's words, "for the Gülen community to generate legitimacy it had to assume a more nationalist discourse. A trade-off between (further) legitimacy and (further) nationalism reshaped the Gülen movement throughout the 1990's."[187] In this sense, nationalistic character is so prominent in the movement's discourse that it could even sometimes surpass Islamism. Nurcu movement, in general, is sympathetic to nationalism as long as it serves Islam; yet Gülen's nationalism and statism overrides that of Nur tradition.

Gülen's discourse articulates Islamic identity with the principle of a strong state. In this sense, he occasionally refers to the Ottoman legacy to remind the global, strong state tradition of the past, which is defined by İnsel as 'an imperial nostalgia'.[188] That is to say, Fethullah Gülen and his circle aim to be "strong", rather than making an Islamic way of life dominant. And to be strong, a strong state ruled by powerful cadres is necessary. In this sense, it is hard to argue that Gülen's discourse is that of the oppressed; the reason of his crying during the preachers or defining himself as 'kıtmir' is not to present himself as modest and humble; on the contrary, this "discourse of the oppressed" is a mild agitation to provoke by creating a sense of oppression.[189]

Gülen's nationalism is in fact an Ottoman-Turkish nationalism which relies on the notion of historical and cultural continuity. For Bayramoğlu, the most important aspect of Gülen movement is this emphasis on cultural continuity.[190] It has no racist tones, yet it still does not include Persians and Arabs. This has two reasons: firstly, Fethullah Gülen represents orthodox Islam, which is Sunnism, and secondly, for Gülen Iranian revolution is an example of abusing religion by

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[187] Bilici, 'The Fethullah Gülen Movement', p. 12.

[188] Ahmet İnsel, 'Altın nesil, yeni muhafazakârlık ve Fethullah Gülen,' *Birikim*, No. 99, (July 1997).

[189] Uğur Kömeçoğlu, 'Kutsal ile Kamusal: Fethullah Gülen Cemaat Hareketi,' in *İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri*, Nilüfer Göle (ed.), (Metis: Istanbul, 2000), p. 176. Kömeçoğlu gives the definition of "kıtmir" as such, "Kıtmir is the thin cover of date seed. Also it is the dog of Ashab-ı Kehf."

[190] Ali Bayramoğlu, *Türkiye'de İslami Hareket: Sosyolojik bir Bakış (1994-2000)*, (Patika: Istanbul, 2001), pp. 241-242.

politics. Furthermore, Arabs are accused of betraying the Ottoman Empire. Gülen persistently tries to differentiate Turkish Islam from them. For that matter, while most of Gülen's schools are in the Balkans and Central Asia, there are nearly none in the Arabian countries.[191]

The concept of *hizmet* (service) occupies a central place in organizational strategy of the Gülen community. *Hizmet* implies a need for continuous expansion. The community, through its activities in various fields, aims at establishing an infrastructure for realizing its material and spiritual goals. Recruitment and education of new Islamist intellectuals stands as one of the strategic tools for realizing this goal. Educational facilities of Gülen community are worth noting here since Gülen movement is primarily an educational project. Gülay notes that "today, there are more than 300 high schools and seven universities affiliated with the Gülen community, with 26,500 students and over 6000 teachers around the world."[192] He also adds 150 private schools in Turkey and Istanbul's Fatih University to this list. The main objective of his educational strategy is to "train and educate a "golden generation" equipped with modern knowledge which aims to regenerate Turkish-Islamic tradition on the basis of the nation-state."[193]

The lighthouses (*Nur dershaneleri* or *Nur Evleri*), which are "the places where the Nurcus assemble in order to read and discuss the works of Nursi, to perform religious duties and to talk about daily matters", plays a pivotal role in creation of Golden Generation.[194] The lighthouses are also instrumental in recruiting new members to the community. Bilici comments that "the schools formed by the community can be seen as attempts to change the map of intellectual life in Turkey."[195] The networks of the community is, however, is not limited with Turkey. The Gülen community formed strong networks abroad through opening

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[191] Hakan M. Yavuz, 'Neo-Nurcular: Gülen Hareketi', p. 297.

[192] 'The Gülen Phenomenon', p. 43.

[193] Hakan Yavuz, 'Neo-Nurcular: Gülen Hareketi', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005), pp. 298–299.

[194] Mustafa Şen, 'Gülen Community', p. 331.

[195] Bilici 'The Fethullah Gülen Movement', p. 12.

schools, establishing economic and cultural relations primarily in Central Asia. The activities abroad caused some to call the members of Gülen community as 'Muslim Missionaries' who aims at disseminating Islam and Turkism in these regions.[196]

Table 2. Worldwide Distribution of Schools of Fethullah Gülen Movement

Country	Number of schools	Number of pupils	Number of teachers from Turkey
Kazakhstan	29	5684	580
Azerbaijan	12	3023	338
Uzbekistan	18	3334	210
Turkmenistan	13	3294	353
Kyrgyzstan	12	3100	323
Tajikistan	5	694	107
Tatarstan	6	1802	217
Russia	5	323	63
Chuvashia	2	311	79
Bashkiria	3	462	88
Karachai	1	93	13
Crimea	2	218	47
Siberia	4	438	101
Dagestan	5	938	123
Georgia	3	244	48
Mongolia	4	442	85
Bulgaria	4	523	123
Moldavia	2	225	40
Romania	4	415	78
Albania	2	966	74
Bosnia	2	109	22
Macedonia	1	102	16
Iraq	4	184	26
Australia	5	718	37
Indonesia	1	41	18
Total	149	27,683	3209

Source: Bayram Balcı, 'Fethullah Gülen's Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam', Religion, State & Society, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2003, p. 156.

Surely, such a broad educational network requires a significant amount of financial base. Therefore, economy is another major field of activity for the Gülen community. In 1997, West Working Group (*Batı Çalışma Grubu*) of the Military noted that there are more than 4,000 pro-Islamic corporations in Turkey; also it has been added that around 203 out of 385 major corporations are affiliated with the Gülen community.[197] Bilici notes that the Community, with its expansionist

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[196] See, Bayram Balcı, 'Fethullah Gülen's Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam', *Religion, State & Society,* Vol. 31, No. 2; Pelin Turgut, 'Muslim Missionary: The Preacher and His Teachers', *Time*, 26 April 2010; and Toktamış Ateş, Eser Karakaş and İlber Ortaylı, *Barış Köprüleri: Dünyaya Açılan Türk Okulları*, (Ufuk: Istanbul, 2005), p. 13.

[197] Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity*, p. 91.

strategy in the economic field, is reminiscent of Protestantism.[198] Accordingly, "Gülen's "progress"-centric mentality seems o be partly inherited from the Early Nursi, who believed that "spiritual progress depends on material progress.""[199] Among corporations and holdings which are active in various economic sectors the notable ones are Asya Finans, Işık Sigorta. Gülen community is also active in the media sector and the major media institutions affiliated with community are *Zaman* newspaper, *Samanyolu TV*, *Burç FM-Dünya Radio*, *Aksiyon*, *Yeni Ümit*, *Fountain*, *Yağmur*, *Ekoloji* and *Da-Diyalog Avrasya*. Also in 1993 the entrepreneurs who are affiliated with the community formed Association for Solidarity in Business Life (İSHAD) and Businessmen's Association for Freedom (HURSİAD).[200] Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON) must be added to the list.[201]

The increasing affiliation of religious communities and orders with economic activities is a distinctive trait of contemporary Islamism. Faik Bulut notes that this process has been characterized by transformation of *mürids* into customers.[202] Although considering religious establishments solely in terms of personal-material profit has serious drawbacks, the utilitarian aspect of the phenomenon is becoming more and more important.[203] However, this involvement also gives birth to tensions within religious communities, and to criticisms. As I will show in the following chapters, the new-Islamist intellectuals will try to develop formulas to solve the so-called tension between spiritual and material aspects of these establishments.

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[198] Ahmet İnsel, 'Altın nesil, yeni muhafazakârlık ve Fethullah Gülen', *Birikim*, No. 99, (July 1997).

[199] Bilici, 'The Fethullah Gülen Movement', p. 14.

[200] Gülay, 'The Gülen Phenomenon', p. 45.

[201] Noting the limited knowledge about the Confederation Buğra and Savaşkan notes that "the Confederation is told to represent 150 entrepreneur association and 15.000 members. . . and the number of member workplaces increased from 9.600 in 2007 to 13.500 in 2009." Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, 'Yerel sanayi ve bugünün Türkiye'sinde iş dünyası', *Toplum ve Bilim*, No. 118, 2010, p. 104.

[202] *Tarikat Sermayesi.*

[203] Can, 'Yeşil Sermaye', p. 62.

To sum up, the Turkish Islamism of Gülen community, with its high dosage of nationalism, pushed its followers towards the center of the political spectrum. Nationalism, together with the stress on respecting the state authority and culture of obedience increased the legitimacy of Gülen community primarily before civil, political and official actors. This legitimacy was further consolidated by the community's successful networking activities in the economic field and in education and mass media. In other words, the Gülen community can be considered as one of the important factors that contributed to transformation of Islamism in the 1990s.

2.2.3. Islamic NGOs

The roots of the argument that Islam and civil society cannot co-exist goes back to Max Weber's investigations regarding the differences between the Western and Eastern civilizations. In his analysis of patrimonial authority, Weber was pointing to a set of absences that stood as impediments to development of 'intermediary structures' that would stand against unlimited and arbitrary power of the state: absence of rationality, middle class, private property in the land, and of political and legal stability.[204] Weber defined *Sultanism* as the extreme case of Patrimonialism and stated that it "tends to arise whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master."[205]

In his well-known account, Ernest Gellner brought Weber's argument one step further by arguing that Islam is one of the rivals of civil society due to (unlike Christianity) its resistance to secularization, and its completely social and political character.[206] However, Gellner's approach can be criticized on several grounds. Kadıoğlu notes that Gellner cannot read the dynamics of Islamic

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[204] Bryan S. Turner, *For Weber: Essays on the Sociology of Fate*, (Sage Publications: London, 1996), p. 267.

[205] *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, (University of California Press: California, 1978), p. 231.

[206] *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals*, (Penguin Press: New York, 1994).

societies well and confuses the causes with the outcomes. Also his approach is based on a monolithic reading which cannot see the internal divisions, plurality and conflicts within Islam.[207] Leaving aside the theoretical questions regarding the structure and functions of the civil society aside, the Islamists' growing presence in the field of civil society (or nongovernmental organizations to put it more aptly) falsifies Gellner's argument.[208] As stated by Duran and Yıldırım one may find both pro and anti civil societal tendencies within Islamism, "and the interaction between Islamism and civil society will be determined not by the principles of Islam but by the attitudes of Islamist elites."[209]

According to Nilüfer Göle, in the 1980s Turkey has entered a new phase in which the civil sphere begun to differentiate itself from the political sphere.[210] This process also meant the dissolution of the Jacobin imaginary which saw politics as a revolutionary action that would transform society once and for all; and its replacement by politics of 'present' issues. Accordingly, civil society and nongovernmental organizations played a great role in this transformation. As supporting this shift, revival of Islamism in the 1980s was accompanied and supported by the proliferation of Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Islamists have performed at various fields from human rights organizations to women associations; from culture and art foundations to charity organizations, and from businessmen organizations to labor unions. The Islamic NGOs acted as spaces of socialization and centers for building networks. They also played a vital role in consciousness raising, especially regarding the right-based problems of the Muslim population. For instance, Islamic nongovernmental organizations like AK-Der (Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hareketi-Women Against Discrimination), ÖZGÜR-DER (Özgür Düşünce ve Eğitim Hakları Derneği-Association of the Freedom of Thought and

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[207] Ayşe Kadıoğlu, 'Civil Society, Islam and Democracy in Turkey: A Study of Three Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations', *The Muslim World*, Vol. 95, (January 2005), pp. 25-6.

[208] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[209] Burhanettin Duran and Engin Yıldırım, 'Islamism, Trade Unionism and Civil Society: The Case of Hak-İş Labour Confederation in Turkey', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 2, (March 2005), p. 229.

[210] *Melez Desenler*, (Metis: Istanbul, 2000) p. 7.

Educational Rights), and MAZLUM-Der (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği-Organization for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed People) try to achieve an articulation between discourse of human rights, rule of law, equal treatment, and their Islamic identity.[211] However, this articulation is by no means unproblematic or monolithic. The plurality regarding the Islamist groups and standings finds its reflections in the civil society. The Islamic civil society organizations present variations according to (i.) their approach to the relationship between rights and religion (the issue of universalism and particularism), and (ii.) their perception of state (the level of "civilness" of the nongovernmental organizations).[212]

It can be stated that charity is the most important activity field for the Islamic NGOs in Turkey. In his book on conservative democracy, Yalçın Akdoğan notes several times that while the AKP believes in the importance on social roles of the state; the party also underlines the need to delegate these responsibilities to NGOs.[213] This is also in line with neoliberal approach towards social policy which pointed market mechanisms responsible in solving social problems. This was a process in which the language of rights was replaced by help; and responsibility by benevolence.[214] Islamic charity organizations played a crucial role in depoliticization of social policy measures and reducing social policy phenomenon to charity activities. Resting essentially on community networks, Islamic NGOs such as Deniz Feneri Association, Kimse Yok Mu Turkish Non-Governmental Organization, and İnsani Yardım Vakfı (Humanitarian Relief Foundation) played significant functions in this process.

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[211] Kadıoğlu, 'Civil Society'.

[212] For a lively discussion of this plurality see, Bahattin Akşit, Ayşe Serdar and Bahar Tabakoğlu, 'İslami Eğilimli Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005).

[213] *AK Parti ve Muhafakazar Demokrasi*, p. 15.

[214] Aziz Çelik, 'Muhafazakar Sosyal Politika Yönelimi: Hak Yerine Yardım, Yükümlülük Yerine Hayırseverlik', *İ.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, No. 42, (March 2010).

Two types of NGOs, Islamic business associations (such as MÜSİAD and other SİADs) and trade unions are also worth mentioning. The triumph of Islamic capital and Islamic business organizations will be discussed in the final chapter, since they played a crucial role in making of new-Islamism in Turkey. The Islamic labor confederation Hak-İş was founded in 1976 when the Islamist political party MSP was the partner to coalition government established with the CHP. The Confederation was founded in a period which was characterized by increased politicization of labour unions. Especially the influence of left wing political ideologies and legal/illegal groups was recognizable. Within such a milieu, "instilling a moral and virtuous outlook in workers was one of the main goals of Hak-İş."[215] The Confederation explicitly emerged as an extension of the National Outlook movement, which I have outlined above. Initially Hak-İş distinguished itself from other trade union confederations through stressing the complementarity of labour and capital. The Confederation stressed "the commonality of employer and employee interests on the basis of Muslim brotherhood."[216]

Six months after the 1980 military intervention Hak-İş, unlike DİSK, was allowed to recommence. This is why in the post-1980 period Hak-İş recruited many workers who were formerly affiliated with DİSK. The post-1980 period also pointed to a change in ideological and organizational composition of Hak-İş. For Özdemir, this transformation was closely related with the transformation of Islamist movement in general in the post-1980 era.

> In the post-1980 period we observe that the political establishment called Islamism entered into a new phase with its political party and other civil establishments. It expressed a dynamism which is distinctively intertwined with the institutions of modernity, and which rests on a dense intellectual accumulation and diversity. In the post-1980 period, Hak-İş and other groups and establishments that can be associated with Islamist movement, in line with the *civilizing, individualizing* and *rationalizing* spirit of the period, replaced its political modus which was based on *reflexes* with a style of political action which has been directed by deep-rooted themes in a more conscious manner: in this period, an increasingly

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[215] Burhanettin Duran and Engin Yıldırım, 'Islamism, Trade Unionism and Civil Society', p. 231.

[216] *Ibid*, p. 232.

depoliticized (in the positive sense of the term) and *autonomous* attitude became dominant in Hak-İş's identity.[217]

In 1986 Hak-İş even annulled the article of Hak-İş constitution declaring labour-employer brotherhood, and attempted to distance itself from Islamist political party of the period, the Welfare Party. In the 1990s non-religious issues such as "democratization, civil society and the development of political and social rights" have entered into Hak-İş vocabulary.[218] Also in the 1990s the Confederation became a member of ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) and ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation). Especially during the negotiations for ICFTU membership (between 1993 and 1997) Hak-İş needed to 'prove' its commitment to fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey such as republicanism, democracy and laicism.[219]

Throughout the 1990s MÜSİAD played an integral role in engaging Islamic constituency with themes and phrases of new economic order. In addition to its networking function, MÜSİAD was also effective in articulating political and cultural whims of these sectors. These points will be discussed in details in the final chapter. Hak-İş case underlined the crucial role played by Islam in making of a distinct type of trade unionism. Islam was always present in formation of Hak-İş and in its ideological and organizational transformation. However, the common denominator of Islam did not mean that these organizations (MÜSİAD and Hak-İş) did not have any conflicts. While MÜSİAD associated Islamic economy with informal employer-employee relations based on mutual trust, Islamic brotherhood and conscience; Hak-İş, by time, underlined the importance of 'formal' relations based on Islamic values of justice and fairness. In this sense, MÜSİAD-Hak-İş case shows us plurality of Islamic perceptions and organizations within civil society. However, it can also be argued that both cases, regardless of their differences, contributed to formalization and normalization of Islamism in Turkey.

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[217] Şennur Özdemir, 'Türkiye'nin Özgün Sınıflaşması: Müsiad ve Hak-İş', *Sivil Toplum Dergisi*, Vol. 5, No. 19, (July-September 2007), p. 68.

[218] Burhanettin Duran and Engin Yıldırım, 'Islamism, Trade Unionism and Civil Society', p. 232.

[219] For a story of the negotiations see, Yıldırım Koç, 'Hak-İş, Laiklik ve ICFTU Üyeliği', *Mülkiyeliler Birliği Dergisi*, Vol. 22, No. 206-209, (1998).

2.2.4. Militant Islamism: Armed Islamist Groups

Some Islamist groups in Turkey underlined their disbelief in methods of persuasion, and adhered to violent means for establishing an Islamic state and society. Rather than 'radical Islamist', I find the label of 'militant Islamist' for naming these groups, since their basic methods are armed struggle and assassination. The twentieth century Islamic revivalists provided militant Islamist groups with sources of legitimacy for resorting to violence as a strategy. Revivalists such as Hasan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb pointed the formation of an Islamist state as the basic objective for all Muslims. Especially translation of the works of Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb had a great influence on formation of militant Islamist groups in Turkey.[220] Shortly, for Qutb, violent overthrow of the existing un-Islamic regime is the fundamental responsibility for the Muslims.[221] The Islamic revolution in Iran was another factor that influenced Islamist groups in Turkey. Especially for the militant Islamist groups, the revolution underlined the historical possibility of radical, top-down Islamization of state and society, as opposed to strategies of gradual and peaceful process of political competition. The confidence of these groups immediately rose after the revolution. The revolution also provided the militant and radical Islamist groups a path and strategy to overthrow the existing regime and constitute an Islamic state.[222]

The roots of militant Islamism go back to *Hizb al-Tahrir* (Islamic Liberation Party), a radical Islamist group which was founded in 1952 in Jordan. The Turkish branch of *Hizb al-Tahrir* was founded in 1960 with the initiative of Jordanian university students of Ankara's Middle East Technical University. The Turkish branch experienced its most lively period under the leadership (between 1964 and 1967) of Ercümend Özkan, who was an influential Islamist figure of the 1960s.[223]

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[220] Çakır, *Derin Hizbullah*, (Metis: Istanbul, 2001).

[221] See especially Sayyid Qutb, *Yoldaki İşaretler*, trans. A. Keskinsoy, (Pınar: Istanbul, 2009); Çakır, *Derin Hizbullah*, pp. 20-23. I will deal with Qutb's influence on Turkish Islamist movements in the following chapter.

[222] Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, p. 155.

[223] Ali Bulaç, 'Hizbü't-Tahrir ve yeniden milli mücadele,' *Zaman*, 12.09.2005.

Hizb al-Tahrir declared its constitution as such: "*Hizb-al Tahrir* is a political party and its ideology is Islam. It works for reinstating the Islamic life through forming the Islamic State, and for spreading Islam to world through jihad."[224] Revocation of the Republic and reconstitution of the caliphate; establishing Shari'a as the sole source of sovereignty; abolishment of democracy; banning all un-Islamic political parties; foundation of heavy industry; withdrawal from the Western organizations; uniting the Islamic world under the flag of one Islamic state; instating Arabic as the official language of the state; and replacement of civil marriage by religious marriage were the major promises of *Tahrir*'s political program.[225] "Islamic state" and "Caliphate" stand as the two key terms within this revolutionary outlook.[226]

Tahrir was an illegal, but, by Erkilet's words, a transparent Islamist organization. It was illegal, because it was constitutionally impossible to found an Islamist political organization; and transparent because Özkan believed that, even under conditions of illegality, the organization must have openly declared its message to the masses.[227] However, it must be noted that Özkan's *Hizb al-Tahrir* distanced itself from violence, and prioritized consciousness raising activities.[228] The importance of *Tahrir* lied in its presentation Islam as an independent political ideology which must be represented by an Islamist political organization.[229] Özkan left the organization just some months after his imprisonment in 1967 for "attempting to bring an Islamic State Constitution to Turkey."[230] With his departure *Tahrir* loses its appeal and fades immediately in the following years. Currently *Hizb al-Tahrir* is led by Yılmaz Çelik, but the organization has no links with Ercümend Özkan's group. It has been anticipated that the organization

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[224] Manaz, *Siyasal İslamcılık*, p. 593.

[225] Manaz, *Siyasal İslamcılık*, pp. 593-594.

[226] Ali Bulaç, 'Hizbu't-Tahrir hakkında,' *Zaman*, 10.09.2005.

[227] Alev Erkilet, 'Ercümend Özkan', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005), pp. 684-685.

[228] Manaz, *Siyasal İslamcılık*, p. 594; Ahmet Dinç, 'Bir acayip hilafet yolcusu: Hizbuttahrir,' *Zaman*, 11.09.2005.

[229] Erkilet, 'Ercümend Özkan', p. 684.

[230] Ely Karmon, 'Radical Islamist Movements in Turkey', in *Revolutionaries and Reformers: Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East*, (ed.) Barry Rubin, (SUNY Press: New York 2003), p. 42.

currently has around 300 hundred supporters; most of whom are adolescents living in Central Anatolian cities, particularly Ankara and Kayseri.[231]

As stated above, the Iranian Islamic revolution had direct influences on Islamist movements in general and militant Islamism in particular. When compared to left and right wing political movements, the Islamist groups were the least injured after the September 1980 military intervention. Throughout the 1980s there was an abundance of Islamist books, translations, journals, and Islamist groups. Especially the Islamists found a welcoming environment at the universities and recruited militants for their causes.[232] In the 1980s, the militant Islamist groups were silent, but in the following decade, together with the PKK terrorism, militant Islamist groups and their actions became one of the most sensational topics of the agenda. In 1991 Turkish National Intelligence Organization (*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı-MİT*) listed the major militant Islamist groups in Turkey as such: the Turkish Islamic Liberation Army (İKÖ), the Turkish Islamic Liberation Front (TİK-C), Fighters of the Islamic Revolution (IDAM), The Turkish Islamic Liberation Union (TİKB), the World Shari'a Liberation Army (DŞKO), the Universal Brotherhood Front-Shari'a Revenge Squad (EKC-SIM), the Islamic Liberation Party Front (IKP-C), Turkish Fighters of the Universal Islamic War of Liberation (EIK-TM), the Turkish Islamic Fighters Army (IMO), and the Turkish Shari'a Revenge Commandos (TSIK).[233]

One of the most important radical Islamist groups in Turkey was Hizballah, which was founded in 1983 in Diyarbakir by Hüseyin Velioğlu. The roots of the organization, which was especially powerful in southeastern Anatolia, go back to a meeting in the Vahdet (Unity) bookshop in Diyarbakir in 1980. Hüseyin Velioğlu, Mansur Güzelsoy, Fidan Güngör, Ubeydullah Dalar, İhsan Yeşilırmak and Mehmet Ali Bilici, who were the most influential Islamists of the region, attended

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[231] Ahmet Dinç, 'Bir acayip hilafet yolcusu: Hizbuttahrir,' *Zaman*, 11.09.2005.

[232] Çakır, Derin Hizbullah, p. 33.

[233] Karmon, 'Radical Islamist Movements', p. 42.

this meeting.[234] At the time the Vahdet Bookshop was a meeting place for the radical Islamists who especially discuss possibility of an Islamic revolution in Turkey which resembles the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.[235] The first divide in this group has appeared between Güngör, who founded his own group gathered around Menzil bookshop in 1981. Velioğlu, however, established the İlim Publishing House in 1983. Manaz states that the divide between Menzil and İlim groups was a consequence of the divide in Iran between moderate and radical Islamists. While Menzil group of Güngör advocated a moderate political strategy which prioritized cultural struggle over armed struggle; Velioğlu's group underlined the immediate need for armed struggle against un-Islamic forces. It is with the advent of the radical wing in Iran that Velioğlu's İlim group became to be the dominant Hizballahi group in the Region.

Hizballah's first target was PKK. "Hizballah viewed the PKK's rivalry as an opportunity since by fighting this nationalist, secular-oriented force it could gain experience in armed struggle and appeal to those opposing the Kurdish organization."[236] Hizballah regards the PKK as the enemy of Islam, and accused it for attempting to constitute an atheist and communist Kurdistan.[237] In return, Hizballah has been named by the PKK as a paramilitary organization which is controlled by the state and foreign powers.[238] The struggle between Hizballah and the PKK reached to a level that between 1991 and 1995, 700 were killed on both sides.[239] The anti-PKK attitude of Hizballah caused state officials to assume a sympathetic attitude towards the organization.[240] It was after the intensification of the clash between PKK and Hizballah that two organizations begun to negotiate on cooperation against the Turkish state.[241]

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[234] Kürşad M. Atalar, 'Hizballah of Turkey: A Pseudo-Threat to the Secular Order', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 307.

[235] Manaz, *Siyasal İslamcılık*, p. 604-605.

[236] Atalar, 'Hizballah', p. 308.

[237] Karmon, 'Radical Islamist Movements', p. 46.

[238] Çakır, *Derin Hizbullah*, p. 55.

[239] Atalar, 'Hizballah', p. 308.

[240] Atalar, 'Hizballah', p. 308; Çakır, *Derin Hizbullah*.

[241] Karmon, 'Radical Islamist Movements', p. 46.

Çakır noted that most Islamist groups in Turkey defined Islam as their worldview, but did not develop any political or social strategy to be followed under existing conditions. As a result all groups claimed to represent the true Islam and called other Islamist groups to join their fronts.[242] At varying degrees sectarianism became the defining characteristics of these establishments. As one of the most sectarian Islamist organizations, Hizballah targeted major Islamist groups and individuals of the region. By Velioğlu's words, "either all groups will join us, or they will not stand in our way! Otherwise, we promise to wipe them all."[243] In the early 1990s Hizballah ran a series of attacks on Fidan Güngör's Menzil group and nearly erased the whole organization. Güngör was kidnapped by Velioğlu's group in 1995, and most probably was interrogated and killed afterwards. Likewise, Ubeydullah Dalar was beaten to death by a group of Hizballahi teenagers in 1993 upon Velioğlu's command. İhsan Yeşilırmak was shot in Batman in 1994.[244] In 1998 Velioğlu's Hizballah kidnapped and killed Islamist-feminist writer Konca Kuriş. The violent murder of Nurcu leader İzzettin Yıldırım, the founder of the Zehra Foundation, shocked especially the Islamist public since Yıldırım was a well-known and highly respected person in the region. After Yıldırım's death, in 2000, security forces launched a strike plan which ended with the death of Hüseyin Velioğlu. Two other key names of Hizballah, Edip Gümüş and Cemal Tutar were captured. In January 2001, the second Hizballah recorded a sensational act of terrorism, assassination of the police chief of Diyarbakir Gaffar Okkan, together with five other police officers. In the following years *Hizballah* disappeared from the region. Most recently it has been argued that the organization's new strategy is establishing civil society organizations in the region which are in competition with the Gülen community and Kurdish political groups.[245]

Another influential militant Islamist group was The Great Eastern Islamic Fighters Front (IBDA-C-*İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi*), which was led by Salih Mirzabeyoğlu (Salih İzzet Erdiş), who is also called as "Commandante." IBDA-C

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[242] Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, p.167.

[243] Çakır, *Derin Hizbullah*, p. 53.

[244] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[245] Adem Demir, 'Kürt "Hamas"ı mı?', *Newsweek Türkiye*, 26.04.2009.

was active since the middle of the 1970s but became more extremist and aggressive in the 1990s.[246] Underlying that the conditions for an Islamic revolution are set for Turkey, IBDA-C proposes armed struggle, more specifically guerilla warfare, carried through independent cells. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's *Büyük Doğu* journal and his Islamism is the basic ideological reference for IBDA-C. IBDA-C was deeply influenced by Marxist-Leninist revolutionary groups, especially Mahir Çayan's The People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C-*Türk Halk Kurtuluş Partisi Cephesi*).[247] Unlike Hizballah, IBDA-C publicized its ideology through publishing various journals such as *Ak-Doğuş*, *Karar*, *Beklenen Yeni Nizam*, *Aylık Dergi*, *Baran*, and *Furkan Dergisi*.[248] Assassination of Uğur Mumcu on January 24, 1993 by a car bomb; death of cinema critic and writer Onat Kutlar in 1994 by a bomb attack aiming Christmas celebrations, and most recently the attack towards the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul on July 9, 2008 were the sensational activities of the organization.

As seen, the militant Islamist organizations generally did not target military or security personnel. They also refrained from attacking top-ranked secular politicians. Their basic targets were the secular intelligentsia and media professionals, Jewish personalities, the Jewish community and Israeli diplomats.[249] As we have seen in the case of Hizballah, they also did not hesitate to attack other Islamist organizations especially in order to remain as the sole Islamist group within a defined territory. While Uğur Mumcu's assassination was a turning point for the secular public; İzzettin Yıldırım's violent murder changed the Islamic public's attitude towards militant Islamism.

To sum up, the militant Islamist organizations in Turkey gained power especially in the 1980s and launched their terrorist activities especially in the 1990s. Apart from organizational and ideological maturation of these organizations, the loss of authority of the state, especially in the southeast Turkey, contributed to advent of

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[246] Karmon, 'Radical Islamist Movements', p. 44.

[247] Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan,* p. 166.

[248] Manaz, *Siyasal İslamcılık,* pp. 596-600.

[249] Karmon, 'Radical Islamist Movements', p. 49.

militant Islamist groups. The 1990s was characterized by increased influence of the PKK activities in the region and to some extent the security forces utilized militant Islamist groups to balance the PKK activity in the region. The militant Islamists were also encouraged by the consecutive electoral victories of the Welfare Party. Ideologically the militant Islamists in Turkey were deeply influenced by the Iranian Islamic revolution: refuting the strategies of gradual transformation, they proposed the violent overthrow of the existing regime and government, and underlined the need for capturing the state. Since Turkey an un-Islamic land, uprising against the existing regime was a religious duty. However, rather than targeting army, politicians or security forces, these organizations mostly directed their weapons to easily accessible and unprotected intellectuals or civilians.[250]

2.3. Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to present plurality of Islamist groups in Turkey across time and space. The first problem was about periodization and I have analyzed the venture of Islamism in Turkey under five different periods. Afterwards I presented the plurality of Islamist groups through focusing on various Islamist establishments: political parties, orders and communities, Islamic NGOs, and militant Islamist groups. Both lines of analysis pointed to the fact that there is no 'Islamism' as such, but various manifestations of Islamist projections across time and space. Keeping this plurality and dynamism in mind will help us to avoid essentialist generalizations regarding the so-called 'nature' of the relationship between religion and politics. Also, presenting a general panorama of various Islamist groups will help us better locate the agents of transformation of the Islamist discourse.

The venture of Islamism from the earliest modernist Islamist currents to the most recent new-Islamist establishments underline the increasing importance of religion in Turkish society. However, on the other hand, as I have tried to point, the

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[250] Gaffar Okkan's case, of course was an exception.

increase in the importance of religion was accompanied by a peculiar transformation religion itself. After its inception, Islamism struggled to assert itself as an independent political ideology. For years Islamism established a relation of dependency with conservative right wing political parties and circles. Nationalism was one of the common denominators in this partnership. Islamism's emergence as an independent political ideology meant breaking this symbiotic relation and abandoning the articulation between religion and nationalism. As I will discuss in details in the following chapter, in the late 1960s and 1970s Islamism, under the influence of the Islamic revival in other Islamic geographies, began to assert itself as a confident, self-referential ideology. More than that, the Islamic revivalists in Turkey severely criticized Islamisms of the previous decades and embraced a confrontational political ideology. Islamism, especially in the 1980s built a discourse of opposition which was mildly anti-capitalist, anti-Westernist and anti-imperialist; and which called for a revolutionary transformation of state and society along the Islamic lines.

Aforementioned stories of various Islamist groups and establishments highlight abandonment of the Islamist discourse of opposition in the 1990s. The advent of the Islamist political parties; emergence of a new Islamic bourgeoisie and its organizations; proliferation of Islamic NGOs; and the fall of the militant Islamism pointed to increasing accommodation of Islamist collectivities to the establishment. The personal histories of individual groups underline the move of Islamist groups from the periphery of the society to its center. The dissolution of the anti-systemic imagination must be evaluated against this historical setting. The following chapters will present a detailed empirical and theoretical analysis of these general remarks.

CHAPTER 3

THE FORMATION OF ISLAMIST DISCOURSE OF OPPOSITION

For many researchers, the anti-systemic and confrontational character of the Islamist discourse of the 1970s and 1980s is an enigma. In this chapter I will provide a detailed analysis of oppositional Islamist political discourse in Turkey. Before dealing with the actors of Islamic revival in Turkey, however, I will briefly present the major figures of Islamic revival in the Islamic world; since these figures were the main inspirations of Islamists in Turkey. A systematic reading of the revivalist texts will show us that problems regarding modernity, capitalism, imperialism, Westernization, technology, state, and democracy lie at the heart of their inquiries. The replacement of existing socio-political system with its Islamic alternative was seen as the ultimate solution to all problems. I will show that the *jihadi* and anti-systemic ideology of the revivalists found its reflections within the Islamist constituency in Turkey.

The theories of the revivalist figures made a great contribution to formation of Islamism as a confident, anti-systemic and oppositional political ideology in Turkey. This is why I will focus on two key revivalist figures, Sayyid Qutb and Ali Shariati, whose texts were integral in this process. After a detailed analysis of these two figures, I will focus on writings of independent Islamist intellectuals in Turkey. In this thesis I argue that the anti-systemic Islamist ideology posed a challenge against the established order at four distinct levels: the challenge against inferiority complex and eclecticism; the challenge against the Western science and technology; the challenge against capitalism and imperialism; and finally, the challenge against the Western liberal democracy. With regard to all four levels, the

political universe of Islamism was dominated with the idea of replacing the current socio-political order through a top-down Islamization of the state and society.

The oppositional and anti-systemic character of the Islamist discourse in this period raised questions regarding possible articulations between Islam and socialism. The anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist elements of Islamism caused many to associate Islamism with left. However, as I will discuss in the final section of this chapter, the revivalist discourse must be read as a **Third World populism** which is based on simplification of the political space through symbolically dividing the society between the (Muslim) people and its other. The West, as the embodiment of evil, stands as the antagonistic other of the Islamist populist discourse.

3.1. Sources: The Pioneers of the Islamic Revival

In Turkey Islamism did not find itself in a position to stand as an independent political ideology and programme until the end of the 1960s. Until then Islamist political groups either stood as isolated and relatively insignificant communities, or formed alliances with conservative right wing political establishments. As junior partners of the alliances formed at both local and national level, the Islamist groups (most notably *tariqas*) enjoyed a relative organizational freedom, and fruits of political power in return for their support. This pre-ideological period, as I have called it, was characterized by localism (as opposed to universalism of the next period), which prioritized concern for survival.

As I have discussed in the previous chapter, the rapid socio-political transformation and modernization experienced in Turkey in the post-1950 era played a considerable role in assertion of Islamism itself as a viable political alternative. More than that, as gained momentum, Islamism entered into political arena as a transformative (to some extent revolutionary) ideology, and presented itself as a genuine perspective that would stand against the status quo and altogether transform the society. Islamist journals like *Düşünce* (Thought) which

was published between 1976 and 1980 by Ali Bulaç and his friends who split off Nurettin Topçu's *Hareket* (Movement) journal played a significant role in this process. When compared to *Hareket*'s nationalistic discourse, *Düşünce* presented a more *ummah* based, universalist, and anti-nationalist outlook. By Ünsal and Özensel's words, "*Düşünce* has been welcomed as the first systematic epistemological break from nationalism within Islam."[1]

Düşünce journal was not alone in its efforts. In addition to emergence of new intellectual circles, translation of basic texts of twentieth century Islamic revivalists also contributed to his process. It can be argued that the pre-ideological –and to some extend pre-political– state of Islamism in Turkey has been partly dissolved with the aid of translation facilities that were proliferated in the 1960s and 1970s. As the Islamist audience met with texts provided by the twentieth century revivalists, the localism begun to replaced by universal Islamist concerns and ambitions.

Translation of the key texts of Islamist thinkers and activists like the Egyptian Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), Sayyid Abu'l-a 'la Mawdudi (1903-1979) of Pakistan, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) of Egypt, and Ali Shariati (1933-1977) of Iran played a significant role in making of the Islamism of the period. Belonging to completely different social and historical settings, these figures played a central role in foundation of Islamism as a viable, confident and comprehensive political ideology in Turkey. Their formulations regarding regulation of state and society along Islamic lines, and their persistent efforts to eradicate the Western influence on Islamic societies and intellectuals helped shaping of a new Islamic perception. Firstly, they have rejected association of Islam with other political ideologies like nationalism, socialism or liberalism. This perception was distinctively ideological and political. Islam and Qur'an provided a "programme of political action" for them, not simply a moral guidance.[2] However, the efforts of the revivalists cannot

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[1] Fatma Bostan Ünsal and Ertan Özensel, 'Ali Bulaç', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005)

[2] Charles Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2005), p. 154.

be reduced to *re-citing* classical canonical texts. On the contrary, the revivalists, by Sayyid's words, presented "innovative and original reworking of canonical texts."[3] As we will see, they have developed a political theory of calling (*davet*), which was based on a creative (but not necessarily modernist) and partly-rationalist interpretation of *fiqh*.[4]

This new perception found its immediate reflections among the Islamist intelligentsia in Turkey. With the framework provided by the revivalists, the Islamist intellectuals in Turkey begun to cross domestic boundaries and embrace a more universalistic perspective. Survival paradigm was replaced by the search for becoming a decisive political actor which aims at Islamization of the state and society. They have also become more involved with the developments in other Islamic geographies. Their writings were functional in creation of an emotional affinity with Islamic movements in different countries.[5] It is only through forming such bloc (Islamic *ummah*) that the victory over Western evil powers could be sustained.

Islamism in the 1800s, by Rahnema's words, "was devoid of an ideological system with clear socio-political objectives and ideals, capable of mobilizing the people around a cause."[6] Islamism of the age either "looked back to the Islam of the forefathers (*salaf*) as a source of inspiration," or attempted to synthesize modern ideas with Islam, and insisted on already existence of modern ideas in Islam.[7] Sayyid Jamal al-din 'Al-Afgani's attempts to find a middle way between pure traditionalism and pure Westernism, and his call for reforming Islam by

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[3] Sayyid, *Fundamental Fear*, p. 11. Also see, Ayubi, *Political Islam*.

[4] See Mehmet Metiner's editorial articles, 'Fıkıh ve Fıkıh Tartışmaları Üzerine', *Girişim*, No. 14, (November 1986) and 'Çağdaş Davet Fıkhı-1', *Girişim*, No: 18, (March 1987), p. 2.

[5] Ünsal and Özensel, 'Ali Bulaç', p. 739.

[6] Ali Rahnema, 'Contextualizing the Pioneers of Islamic Revival,' in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, (ed.) A. Rahnema, (Zed Books: London and New York, 2005), p. xlv.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. xlv.

reinterpretation through use of "human reason, political activism, and military and political strength,"[8] can be shown as an example to this strategy.

It was Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, who targeted this dual strategy and "firmly rejected Europe's political, economic, and cultural inroads and hegemony and placed his emphasis on the formal implementation of Islamic law and the founding of an Islamic state."[9] "Muslims' deviation from 'true' Islam," was held by Hasan al-Banna as the main responsible for "Muslim weakness and vulnerability to European domination."[10] The Major problem of Muslims' approach towards religion was disregarding the social and political weight of Islam, and reducing it to a set of rites and rules that only binds individual conscience. Whereas, for al-Banna, "the solution to Egypt's political, economic, and cultural problems lay in return to Islam as a comprehensive order for all aspects of human existence. . . Islam offers the only path to happiness and fulfillment.[11]

Al-Banna's ideas deeply influenced Sayyid Abu'l-a'la Mawdudi, the founder of the Jama'at-I Islami, and one of the most prolific revivalist figures. Mawdudi's social and political thought rested on a "chiliastic and dialectic" reading of Islam which saw the battle between Islam and un-Islam (*Kufr*) as the driving force of history of the Muslim societies.[12] Making of an Islamic state was the major concern of Mawdudi. His preoccupation with the Islamic state and his insistence on the superiority of the Islamist state to western and socialist models distinguished his ideological outlook.[13] All the social problems pertaining to the lives of Muslims living under *Kufr* regimes were to be solved by establishment of

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[8] Nikki R. Kedddie, 'Sayyid Jamal al-Din 'al-Afgani'', in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, (ed.) A. Rahnema, (Zed Books: London and New York, 2005), p.12.

[9] Ali Rahnema, 'Contextualizing the Pioneers of Islamic Revival,' p. xlvii.

[10] David Commins, 'Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949)', in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, (ed.) A. Rahnema, (Zed Books: London and New York), 2005, p. 133.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 134.

[12] Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, 'Mawdudi and the Jama'at-i Islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice of Islamic Revialism,' in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, (ed.) A. Rahnema, (Zed Books: London and New York, 2005), p. 105.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

an Islamic order and an Islamic state which "would be run by a modern machinery of government: an elected president, president, a parliament, and an omnipotent judiciary."[14] Hence, Mawdudi's ideas on Islamist state rested on strategy of Islamizing the modern state.

Peter Demant states that *anti-apology*, *anti-Westernism, literalism, politicization*, and *universalism* are five principles that Mawdudi developed between the 1940s and 1950s. The first principle, 'anti-apology' referred to fundamentalism's self referential logic. It rested on the idea that Islam is capable of providing a self-sufficient ideology, and a programme for revolutionary political action. For Mawdudi, in order to sustain ideological purity as such, the Islamist must abandon traces of apology that have dominated the Islamism of the previous epochs. Anti-Westernism was the fulcrum of this self-referential logic. Muslims, according to Mawdudi, must define themselves in full opposition to the West and ideologies of Western orientation. The principle of literalism, as a response to modernist Islam's attempts towards softening religious injunctions, was based on literal appreciation of the religious inscriptions. Politicization underlined the 'political' nature of Islam, and insisted on Islam's command on social, political and economic spheres. Finally, the principle of universalism rested on the idea that Islam transcends geographical, national or ethnic divisions. Moreover, the universal character of Islam brought the idea of the necessity of expansion. Spreading the religion until every single human being accepts it was an imperative for the Muslims. In other words, since Islam was universally valid, it must have been imposed upon all.[15]

As we will see, aforementioned themes and concerns raised by the early revivalists were to be appropriated by influential Islamist intellectuals and activists of the following decades. Among them, two special names, Sayyid Qutb and Ali Shariati, played a vital role in making of twentieth century Islamism. As Mehmet Metiner, a known Islamist figure of the 1970s and 1980s, stated:

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

[15] Peter R. Demant, *Islam vs. Islamism: The Dilemma of the Muslim World*, (Praeger: London, 2006), pp. 99-100.

> Our religious and ideological sources of knowledge were composed of books written by authors and scholars that were affiliated with the Muslim Brothers movement. Also the works of Pakistani scholar Mawdudi. Afterwards, the books of post-revolution Iranian writers were added to the list. Such as Ali Shariati. [16]

The writings of the revivalists became 'signposts' for future Islamist generations, especially Islamist youth which called for Islamization of the state and society through Islamic revolutionary action. Although belonging to completely different social and historical settings, the influence of the revivalists crossed borders, and they became central intellectual and symbolic forces for Islamists in several countries including Turkey. This is why, in the following pages, I will deal with ideas of these figures.

3.1.1. Sayyid Qutb: An Islamist Critique of Capitalism

Born in 1906 in Musha, a village in upper Egypt's Ashur province, Sayyid Qutb is mostly considered as one of the most powerful intellectual figures of the twentieth century Islamic revival.[17] He was born in a period in which uprisings against British colonialism and Western influence became visible. "In this context," states Khatab, "Qutb's life witnessed the most significant phase of colonialism, political struggle and intellectual diversity in Egypt." [18] As we will see, this anti-colonialist and anti-Western milieu had a direct influence on Qutb's intellectual and political career. He wrote in an era in which the Egyptian society was dealing with the problems of post-colonial rule, underdevelopment, authoritarianism and rapid capitalist mobilization. The distaste he felt with the ills of the Egyptian society made him to propose Islam as the only cure for social and political maladies. In his view, "Islam seemed to have an answer to all current social and political problems,

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[16] Mehmet Metiner, *Yemyeşil Şeriat, Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, (Karakutu: Istanbul, 2008), p. 65.

[17] See, Sayed Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: the Theory of Jahilliyyah*, (Routledge: New York, 2006); Rahnema, 'Pioneers of Islamic Revival,' Charles Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy*; Peter R. Demant, *Islam vs. Islamism*.

[18] Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb*, p. 44.

as he defined them at the time. It also held out the possibility of establishing a harmonious and wholly integrated community."[19]

In addition to his works on political trajectories of Islam, he also owed his reputation to his affiliation with Islamist organization Muslim Brotherhood. Deeply influenced by Banna and Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb appeared as one of the most influential Islamist thinkers and activists of the twentieth century. Among others, influential works written by Qutb such as *Signposts on the Road*,[20] *Social Justice in Islam*[21] and *The Battle between Islam and Capitalism*[22] had great deal of impact on Turkish Islamists especially in the 1970s and the following decades. Published his most influential works in late 1940s while residing in Cairo, Qutb's ideas are worth mentioning since his reputation went beyond Egypt and he has become a source of inspiration for generations of Islamist intellectuals and activists worldwide. By Khatab's words, the basic concerns behind his works are "sufficiently universal interest to warrant an appeal not merely to the Middle East specialist but also to the thoughtful man or woman to whom social conditions throughout the world are of living concern."[23]

Most of Qutb' works were translated into Turkish; even some of them, especially *Social Justice in Islam*, has been translated and published by different Islamist publishing houses at different times.[24] Several Islamist journals of the time released special issues focusing on life and thought of Sayyid Qutb, his critiques regarding the ills and maladies of the Egyptian society in particular and modern capitalist and communist orders in general. His proposition of politicized Islam as

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[19] Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy*, p. 158.

[20] Sayyid Qutb, *Yoldaki İşaretler*, trans. A. Keskinsoy, (Pınar: Istanbul, 2009 [1964])

[21] Sayyid Qutb, *İslam'da Sosyal Adalet*, trans. B. Eryarsoy, (Ağaç Kitabevi Yayınları: Istanbul, 2008 [1949]).

[22] Sayyid Qutb, *İslam-Kapitalizm Çatışması*, trans. Yaşar N. Öztürk, (Birleşik Yayıncılık: Istanbul, 1995 [1951]).

[23] Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb*, pp. 115-116.

[24] We should also note that the original work has been re-formulated by Qutb himself in further editions. For a detailed account of the evolution of Qutb's theory through comparing various editions of *The Social Justice in Islam*, see William Shepard, 'The Development of the Thought of Sayyid Qutb as Reflected in Earlier and Later Editions of 'Social Justice in Islam'', *Die Welt des Islams*, vol: 32, no: 2, 1992.

the sole cure to these maladies, and the self-conscious Islamist position he has outlined have provided the Islamists of the world with basic ideological weapons to counter the so-called Western attacks.

Qutb's reinvigoration of the theory of *jahiliyah* –"the state of ignorance and false belief that prevailed before Mohammed"[25]–, and his application of the term for contemporary social orders, constituted the distinctive aspect of his outlook. For Qutb,

> today's world lives in a complete "jahilliyah" in terms of the dynamics that regulate the life, and in terms of the sources of the system . . . . This "jahilliyah" is based on an assault against Allah's authority in the world, especially against his "divinity". The concept of "jahilliyah" bases its authority to humanity, and makes some people others' god.[26]

The mankind, then, "has fallen into *jahiliyah* because men allow other men to rule over them, and those who ruled become their servants."[27] Contemporary *jahiliyah* uses modern methods to pursue its agenda: imperialism, corruption, exploitation, oppression, immorality, obscenity et. cetera. For Qutb, it is not only the Western world that suffers from the ills of the *jahiliyah;* but Muslims were also, either through ignoring or misinterpreting the message of Quran, living in a state of *jahiliyah*.

In Qutb's framework, the term *jahiliyah* turns into a powerful weapon to denote everything that is un-Islamic. The great chasm between Islamic order and *jahiliyah* brings the idea of inevitable clash between them. This is an "existential" struggle in which there can be only one victor.[28] Qutb's *Signposts on the Road* can be read as a manifesto of this sacred struggle, *jihad*. The religious battle, *jihad*, should not only be directed towards pagans or infidels, but also to governments which are Muslim but not Islamic.[29]

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[25] Demant, *Islam vs. Islamism*, p. 100.

[26] Qutb, *Yoldaki İşaretler*, p. 12.

[27] Shahrough Akhavi, 'The Poverty of Philosophy and the Vindication of Islamic Tradition', in *Cultural Trabsitions in the Middle East*, (ed.) Ş. Mardin, (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 141.

[28] Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy*, p. 157.

[29] Peter R. Demant, *Islam vs. Islamism*, p. 101; and Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy*, p. 155.

Like Mawdudi, Qutb firmly underscored the unity and comprehensiveness of Islam as a religion. Islam is a comprehensive teaching that orders immediate action. It was brought upon mankind "to command all stages and realities of life."[30] Any attempt towards relegating religion to a mere relationship between one's conscience and god is betrayal to the very Islamic ideals.[31] Drawing a distinction between material and spiritual realms is peculiar to the Western societies. Unlike Christianity, Islam cannot withdraw from the practical sphere to the sphere of individual conscience.[32] For Qutb, Islam,

> is not a 'system of theorems' which only deals with 'hypotheses'. It is a real method that only deals with the reality... This is why a "Muslim society" must be founded in which there will be no god other than Allah; in which the sovereignty belongs only to Allah, and which rejects all systems that accept the sovereignty of forces other than Allah.[33]

In other words, "separation between Islam and society is not in the nature of Islam."[34] "This religion," writes Qutb, "is a unitary whole with its transactions, legislation and administration."[35] "With its comprehensive reach and its total conception of human life Islam is both unique and uniquely compelling."[36] According to Qutb, Islam

> was a faith which would not only change the way in which the individual perceived and apprehended the world, but would simultaneously provide a programme of conduct which was, of moral necessity, a programme of political action.[37]

Those types of societies, which Qutb classified as opposite to Islam, have common views about the relationships between religion and the affairs of human life.[38] For a long time man has seen an enmity or irrelevance between the material and the

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[30] Sayyid Qutb, *Yoldaki İşaretler*, p. 39.

[31] *İslam'da Sosyal Adalet*, p. 8, 13.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[33] Sayyid Qutb, *Yoldaki İşaretler*, p. 40.

[34] Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb*, p.119 and Qutb, *İslam'da Sosyal Adalet*, p. 28.

[35] Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb*, p.14.

[36] Tripp, 'Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision', in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, (ed.) A. Rahnema, (Zed Books: London and New York, 2005), p. 163.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

[38] Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb*, p.117.

spiritual spheres. Mankind either have associated religion with entire withdrawal from material world, or disregarded religion or imprisoned it into the private sphere for the sake of this-worldly whims and needs. However, Islam, according to Qutb is the religion of conformity; is the art of finding the optimum, the balance between these two distinct spheres. It is the religion of unity between earth and heaven, religion and the world, soul and body and worshiping and universe.[39] This idea of unity is the source of Islamic law and injunctions in general and the rules regarding the implementation of the ideal of social justice in Islam.

Communism and capitalism are two major systems that Qutb has targeted in all his writings. At many instances he understates that the struggle between these two allegedly antagonistic ideologies is artificial, that they share common philosophical premises. This point is specifically important since it makes easier for Qutb to present the problems that Muslim world has been facing around the dichotomy of "Islam" versus "the rest." However, regardless of his attempts for proving the sameness of communism and capitalism his distaste with capitalism overrides that of communism. As we will see below, at many instances he accepts the parallelisms between communism and his Islamist social justice ideal. Specifically his critiques regarding capitalist exploitation and class inequalities show the affinity between his thought and socialism. However he carefully tries to overcome any ambiguity regarding his position and condemns any attempt at articulating communist ideas with Islamist ones. As we will see, Turkish Islamist intellectuals have inherited this attitude in the 1970s and 1980s.

The distaste with capitalism was a major trait of twentieth century Islamic revival. The Turkish Islamist intellectuals, as we will see, shared revivalists' distaste with economic, political and cultural manifestations of capitalist order. "This system," writes Sayyid Qutb, "has lost its chance to survive since it is against the nature of human existence; it does not have any superiority that will protect it from collapsing and give it a chance to live."[40] For Qutb capitalism is a social, economic

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[39] Qutb, *İslam'da Sosyal Adalet*, pp. 32-34.

[40] Qutb, *İslam-Kapitalizm Çatışması*, p. 11.

and moral order which drains the material and spiritual potentialities of human beings. For him even feudalism provided a better social system since, unlike the capital owner, the feudal lord was held responsible with subsistence and well being of his serfs.[41]

It can be argued that Sayyid Qutb's influential and poetic work *The Battle between Islam and Capitalism* mirrored the whims of a generation of Islamists. Qutb was not alone in his abhorrence of capitalism; many figures of the Islamist revival defined capitalism and imperialism as their major enemies, or their antagonistic other. The revivalists' critical stance towards capitalism came to a point that they began to be associated with socialist ideas and movements. For instance, in Turkey the Islamist movements' anti-capitalist discourse at many instances caused them to be labeled as 'green communists' by the right wing-conservative constituency. Metiner expressed his sympathy towards socialism as such:

> I can say that I was more sympathetic towards leftist theses through Prof. Sayyid Qutb's *Social Justice in Islam*, and the works of Ali Shariati, who closely knows the socialist philosophy and even stands within the Marxist paradigm and leans towards a sociological reading of Islam. This is why I felt myself closer to left, but with noting that the demands of the leftists can already be extensively found in Islam.[42]

The exploration and definition of capitalism and the capitalists is so important since ideologies and political identities are constructed through definition of an "excluded other", or a constitutive outside.[43] It can be said that the power of Qutb's definition comes from his self-consciously Islamic position which denies any affiliation with Western ideologies or traditional positions. The problems, the agents of and cures to those problems were all clear in his thought; that in this world of "blacks" and "whites" there was no space for a gray area. Discursive constructions, as I have discussed, will have validity as long as they provide their agents with a meaningful conceptual map and clear-cut identities. Qutb's success in clearly defining the line of demarcation between "us" and "them" explains why

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[41] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[42] Metiner, *Yemyeşil Şeriat Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, p. 77.

[43] See, Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, (Verso: London, 2005), p. 70.

his influence went beyond scholarly interest and why his thoughts have been perceived as guidelines for Islamist political action throughout the globe.

Capitalism, for Qutb, was not only a morally corrupt system; it also failed to provide productivity. Capitalism establishes an economic system in which the corrupt individuals become lazier and lethargic.[44] As for the myth of equal opportunities and competition, which is believed to motivate people for becoming more productive, Qutb accuses capitalism for working against the interests of the people. Thus, the losers of the system, who believe that moral attachment to work is nothing but stupidity, try to find their way through roguery and trickery.[45] Because, it is a fact that the more you work the more you live a life of misery. In this sense Qutb's political Islam relies on a populist reason that divides the society into two antagonistic camps; the (Muslim) people and the power bloc.

According to Qutb, the state plays an instrumental role in reproduction of capitalist system. His analysis of the capitalist system resembles instrumentalist theories, in which the state is seen as the machinery of a particular class, the capitalists. Qutb sometimes labels these sectors as 'the elites', sometimes 'the wealthy' and in some cases 'the bourgeoisie'. For Qutb, the so-called impartiality and neutrality of the state and the laws is just a myth. When compared to the power of the bourgeoisie and imperialist power centers, the state seems as an incapable and impotent entity.[46] Capitalist democracy is another myth for Sayyid Qutb. According to him in a capitalist system, the idea and practice of democracy (elections, parliament etc.) are only tools to deceive people. There is no chance that the sovereignty belongs to people; only and only the ones who hold the capital in their hands that decide.[47]

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[44] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[46] Qutb, *İslam-Kapitalizm Çatışması*, p.14.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 110.

Qutb's critique of capitalism is supported by his harsh critique of Western and Eastern imperialism. He underlines the organic ties between the "dictatorship of wealth" and Western imperialist powers.

> It seems that there is a natural agreement between the dictatorship of wealth and imperialism. They rely and feed on each other. The imperialist do not let the exploited people of their influence areas to benefit from the rights and freedoms; the very rights and freedoms that they endorse in their own lands. . . The exploiters at home share the same intention. . . The fear that a real Islamic government will bring absolute justice in administration and distribution of wealth made imperialism to fight Islam fiercely.[48]

Qutb also criticizes the capitalist system for pushing the people towards communism.[49] The existing injustices and the decadence that people face make communism a compelling political movement for the masses. Although the idea of equality and justice that communism introduces may seem attractive at first glance, the materialist and purely economic nature of communist propositions are severely criticized by Sayyid Qutb. However, for Qutb, there is not any essential difference between the communist and the capitalist blocs. They both try to get their share from the third bloc, what Qutb calls the "Islamic bloc."[50]

Following his criticisms of capitalism Qutb claims that it is neither capitalism nor communism that can bring salvation to the masses of the Islamic bloc. Only an order that has been founded following Islamic injunctions and regulation can stand as an alternative. Sayyid Qutb defines four problem areas, and discusses the solutions that Islam proposes: 1. *Failures regarding distribution of property and wealth*; 2. *Imbalance between labor and wages*; 3. *Inequality of opportunities*; 4. *Failures regarding working system and low-productivity*. All these problem areas are tied up to the question of social justice and its place in Islam. By Akhavi's words,

> that a doctrine of joint responsibility clearly inheres in Islam, Qutb suggests, may be seen from the numerous *Qur'anic* references to matters of inheritance, religious endowments, *jihad,* opposition to usury, general

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[48] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

admonitions against hoarding, antipathy toward greed, enjoinments that land should be placed at the disposal of he who tills it, etc.[51]

As Akhavi notes, the problems of **property** and **equality** occupy a central place in Qutb's discussion regarding the relationship between social justice and Islam.[52] It can be seen that Qutb's approach presents a quite unorthodox Islamist perspective which is deeply influenced by Western debates on social justice. In Qutb's understanding, Islam considers the world as the property of God; it is God who is the ultimate possessor of the material goods of the earth. However, the very same goods exist for benefit of the mankind. God has designed the earth and universe for man to utilize without exploiting and destroying it. For Qutb, unlike capitalism, Islam sees labor as the sole source of property; this is why Islam is against the *riba* (interest); since in *riba* the wealth accumulates without labor.[53] Yet, Islam rules out communism by its acceptance of private property as a right –however, a right which is not unconditional at all.

According to Qutb, private property is allowed as long as it is appropriated through legitimate means. Qutb adds that through a series of mechanisms Islam impedes over-accumulation and monopolization of wealth and capital.[54] However, in Qutb's perspective this right is not untouchable at all; the right of private property can be curbed in states of emergency:

> When there is an upheaval and needs become apparent, the wealth absolutely belongs to the society. Individual property can no longer be protected as it was. In these intervals, Islam gives the authority to the state as the primary representative of the society. . . Just as the state has the unconditional right of disposition of property in cases of external aggression; it has the right to engross private property (without hurting the normal social needs), in order to prevent internal turmoil.[55]

The extensive role that has been given to state in maintenance of law and order and the organic view of society set forth the anti-liberal character of Qutb's reasoning:

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[51] Akhavi, 'The Poverty of Philosophy', pp. 144-145.

[52] Akhavi, 'The Poverty of Philosophy', p. 149.

[53] *İslam-Kapitalizm Çatışması*, p. 55 and *İslam'da Sosyal Adalet*, p. 145.

[54] *İslam-Kapitalizm Çatışması*, p. 57 and *İslam'da Sosyal Adalet*, pp. 166-180.

[55] *İslam'da Sosyal Adalet*, p. 59.

> Islam accepts that all the damage that society sustains also will harm the individuals one by one. Hence it is the responsibility of the state to prevent individuals from hurting themselves.[56]

Within this organic theme, the state is also responsible for establishing an economically just order; this is why Qutb finds personal or communal charity un-Islamic. As it is known well, in Islamic law, *zekat* is the basic mechanism that stores a socially just and egalitarian regime. It is both worshipping and a responsibility. However, personal acts of charity (one's giving *zekat* to another) are un-Islamic since *zekat* must be distributed by the (Islamic) state.[57] The central role given to state in economic affairs is supported by Qutb's call for nationalization of key industries.[58]

> What they call today "nationalization of the institutions" is one of the basic principles of Islam. In our country, profiteering in urban, alcohol and oil industries, and privileges in institutions such as Canal Company, directorates of trolley car, electricity and waters are far from being Islamic.[59]

Sayyid Qutb locates the issues of social order and social justice ideal under the rubric of "Islamic thought regarding divinity, universe and humanity."[60] The ideal of social justice is one of the Islamic ideals which cannot be thought of without other injunctions. In Qutb's view, social justice ideal can only be achieved in a society which practices Islam in social, legal and economic spheres.[61]

For Qutb, communism's rejection of private property and its insistence of equating social justice with equality stand as the factors that impede economic dynamism. Qutb asserts that although for a Muslim the ultimate goal is to follow God's will through not sublimating the goods of earthly life; Islam does not call for withdrawing from possessions. As I have stated above, unlike Christianity or

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[56] *İslam-Kapitalizm Çatışması*, p. 60.

[57] *İslam-Kapitalizm Çatışması*, p. 59 and *İslam'da Sosyal Adalet*, p. 195.

[58] *İslam-Kapitalizm Çatışması*, p. 65.

[59] *Ibid.*, p.65

[60] Qutb, *İslam'da Sosyal Adalet*, p. 27.

[61] Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb*, p.117.

Buddhism, Islam, for Qutb aims at finding a balance: man's greediness and love for possessions is a given fact, and it is only within an Islamic society and through Islamic injunctions that these attributes can be mobilized for society's good.

> Islam gives importance to individuals' tendency to possess, and tries to reach the utmost productivity through benefiting from this tendency. But it renders this utmost productivity useful for the needs of society. With its given state, Islam is more just comprehensive and able than communism is. It is just, because it does not touch individual property unless necessary. Able, because helps individuals to work with all their efforts. It is more comprehensive since as well as it considers individual as existing for society, it considers the society existing for the individual.[62]

Since it is viewed as the source of accumulation and possession, labor "lies at the foundation of economic and social values."[63] However, while in capitalism labor process is exploitation *per se,* in communism it is only a compulsory mechanical process without any dynamism. However, in Islam, labor process is elevated to the status of worshipping and in an Islamic society the labor will earn its real value.

Related with above mentioned points, the phenomenon of stratification and emergence of economic classes with **unequal opportunities** and conditions is also condemned in Qutb's Islamic ideal. Here one specific point is important. While Islam is against stratification it does not rule out the fact that there are differences between individuals' capacities, skills or talents, and these differences will result in differences in wealth. For Qutb, unlike communism, Islam is not against emergence of such inequalities or differences. Or in other words, unlike communism, Islam does not propose an "arithmetic equality" in wealth.[64] What Islam opposes is the "differences in opportunities that arise from wealth, color, race or being descendent of a privileged family."[65]

The problem of **low-productivity** in capitalism and communism is associated with moral decay. Moral decay is exacerbated because of both material and spiritual

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[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

[64] *İslam'da Sosyal Adalet*, p. 42.

[65] *İslam-Kapitalizm Çatışması*, p. 67.

reasons. For Qutb, "Islam firstly erases the material causes of spiritual misery . . . and secondly fills the heart of the individual with faith that will help him/her with evils."[66] By this, human will reach peace and happiness through the only right mean other than accumulation of wealth or endless consumption.

To sum up, through his formulations, Sayyid Qutb made great contributions to formation of Islamism as a modern political ideology which has a 'say' in contemporary matters of Islamic societies. His firm critique of modernity and capitalism was supported by his revolutionary Islamism which proposed a total transformation of society and politics. It was his radical and uncompromising attitude what caused generations of Islamists to follow his revolutionary path.

3.1.2. The Struggle between Abel and Cain: Ali Shariati

Ali Shariati, who is mostly quoted as the ideologue of the Iranian revolution, was another key figure that deeply influenced Turkish Islamist intellectuals throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Together with originality of his corpus, directness and sharpness of his language has addressed the whims and aspirations of Islamists of various geographies including Turkey. The intellectual background of Shariati's works and the terms he borrows from Western schools of thought like Marxism, phenomenology and existentialism helped Islamist intellectuals adopt a modern terminology with modern concerns. According to Abrahamian, Shariati drew his inspiration from the Western philosophies as well as form Islam. For him, Shariati,

> devoted his life to the task of synthesizing modern socialism with traditional Shi'ism, and adapting the revolutionary theories of Marx, Fanon, and other great non-Iranian thinkers to his contemporary Iranian environment.[67]

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[66] *Ibid*., p. 72.

[67] Ervand Abrahamian, 'Ali Shari'ati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution,' *MERIP Reports*, no. 102, (January, 1982), p. 24

Here lies the importance of Shariati for Islamism. Right at the moment of "Islamic renaissance"[68] he reinterpreted Islam under the light of ""scientific" concepts employed by modern social sciences", particularly the European political theory. As Bayat asserts, this was an approach which could not have been developed by the traditional Islamist clergy of the time.[69]

One of the most genuine aspects of Shariati's political and social theory was his – at some cases arbitrary– usage of Marxist categories such as, "class exploitation", "class struggle", "classless society" or "imperialism". He was linking these concepts to the teachings of Shiite leaders such as Ali Imam Hussein, and Abu Zarr Ghafari, whom Shariati called the first "God-worshipping socialist."[70] The very socialist concerns could easily be found in Islamist philosophy for Shariati. "Unfortunately," writes Shariati "our youth thinks that the concept of revolutionary and anti-bourgeoisie piety is borrowed from the reformists and revolutionaries of the world. But, these are present in religious works."[71] Then, for Shariati, Islamism far from having any conservative connotations is a revolutionary ideology which implies a total cultural, political and socio-economic transformation of the existing system:

> Quran does not handle concepts of withdrawal from world, the fear of god and commitment to God's way and content only as spiritual and mystical concepts. On the contrary, Quran considers them as social, revolutionary and scientific concepts which manifest a specific and clear perspective of social and class structure, and which gain their significance within this context. We discover that the terms which are presented us as novel concepts are already the basic principles of our religion. The exploiters abstract these terms from their revolutionary and social contents and use them "to breed their own devout."[72]

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[68] "If you hear that I rely on religion you shall know that I rely on Islam. The Islam I rely on is an Islam which has been renovated, which consciously gained a new perspective and which rests on an Islamic renaissance." Ali Shariati, *Öze Dönüş*, trans. E. Okumuş, (Fecr: Istanbul, 2007), p. 18.

[69] Assef Bayat, 'Shariati and Marx: A Critique of an "Islamic" Critique of Marxism,' *Alif: Journal of Comparative Politics*, no: 10, 1990, p. 19.

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[71] Ali Shariati, *İslam ve Sınıfsal Yapı*, trans. D. Özlük, (Fecr: Istanbul, 2008), p. 27.

[72] *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

The revolutionary vision of Shariati did not only aim at establishing an Islamic state and society, but involved a total cultural and socio-economic transformation through which the existing hierarchical relations that rested on dependency and exploitation shall be eliminated:

> He often stressed that the Prophet Muhammad had come to establish not just a religious community but an *ummat* [community] in constant motion towards progress and social justice. The Prophet's intention was to establish not just a monotheistic religion but a *nezam-i towhid* [unitary society] that would be bound together by public virtue, by the common struggle for "justice," "equality," "human brotherhood" and "public ownership of the means of production," and, most significant of all, by the burning desire to create in this world a "classless society."[73]

According to Shariati, "the social and economic regime of Islam is practical socialism based on Khoda-Parasti (worship of God); it is the midpoint between the corrupt regime of capitalism and that of Communism, which is Esterakiyat-e Motlaq (absolute common ownership)."[74] In his critique of capitalism and imperialism Shariati interrogated Muslims' possible responses to the existing social and political order. He insists that a Muslim must seek for her national and cultural roots in order to develop a sound and meaningful resistance to aspects of capitalism such as: "the institution of private property, the commodification of labour, the alienation of individuals from their spiritual and moral selves, and the consumerism of a morally bankrupt society that only knew how to produce, counting merely the economic cost and not the cost to human sociability and the human spirit."[75]

Ali Shariati frequently quoted the story of the struggle between two brothers, Cain –who stood for exploitation, injustice and oppression– and Abel –who represented the oppressed, exploited and disinherited– to show the 'dialectic' of social struggles.[76] In a way, this framework resembled Marx's position in the *Communist Manifesto* which stated that "history of all hitherto existing society is the history of

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[73] Abrahamian, 'Ali Shari'ati', p. 26.

[74] Abedi, 1986: 230

[75] Charles Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy*, p. 159.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 160.

class struggle". Within this struggle Islam will side by 'the pole of Abel', which referred to the people, the subjects of domination.[77] In *Religion vs. Religion*, Shariati contends that Qur'an, in social matters, God and the people share the same front,[78] and the terms God and *al-nas* (the people) were almost used interchangeably.[79] "For instance," states Shariati, "when 'property of God' is commanded, it does not mean –God forbid!– that God needs property, like in pagan religions. The property of God, in fact means the property of the people."[80] Besides, a Muslim, for Shariati, must develop a modest life which does not prioritize the material fruits of this life. However, a crucial distinction that has been introduced by Shariati is worth mentioning here. Shariati criticizes two extreme attitudes of the Muslim in this world: on the one hand total withdrawal from the goods of life; defense of aristocracy, capitalism and money on the other.[81] Both extremes are un-Islamic for Shariati, since they are not considered within the totality of religion. One can find quotations in Quran or Hadiths of Prophet that support either position. But, according to Shariati, if one approaches the issue through grasping the whole picture she would realize that Islam prioritizes economy and economic achievement as a "social matter"; and praises modesty and withdrawal from material goods as a "personal matter."[82] Economy cannot be seen as secondary or trivial, since economic independence and strength provides a foundation for cultural and political independence.[83] In this system, comments Shariati, "Muslims will have great power for their religions as they acquire material wealth. The path to destruction of capitalism is acquiring material resources."[84] However, this should not imply that the Muslim can personally utilize this impulse for economic achievement.

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[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162; Ali Shariati, *İslam ve Sınıfsal Yapı*, pp. 123-126.

[78] *Dine Karşı Din*, trans. H.Hatemi, (İşatret: Istanbul, 2005), p. 52.

[79] Charles Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy*, p. 161.

[80] *Dine Karşı Din*, trans. H.Hatemi, (İşatret: Istanbul, 2005), p. 52.

[81] Ali Shariati, *İslam ve Sınıfsal Yapı*, p. 33.

[82] *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

[83] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

Both Sayyid Qutb and Ali Shariati played a pivotal role in establishing Islam as a radical political ideology which could present itself as a viable alternative to major political ideologies (capitalism and socialism) of the twentieth century. Qutb's and Shariati's projects were aimed at

> imaginative reconstruction of Islamic society which would avoid the neo-utilitarianism of the Islamic reformers, the barely disguised positivist economism of the Islamic financial writers, or the stark secular logic to which those who had pinned their faith on the nation state had been subjection.[85]

While a theory of contemporary *jahiliyah* was the starting point of Sayyid Qutb's framework, Ali Shariati developed his ideas on a Marx inspired theory of the struggle between the oppressors and the oppressed. Both writers, however, demanded a radical social, political and ideological transformation in their homelands and Islamic world as a whole. It was this distinctive call for aligning the society and state with Islamic principles that differentiated the Islamism of these figures. As I will discuss in the following section, major concerns and concepts of these figures has been enthusiastically appropriated and embraced by Turkish Islamist intellectuals of the late 1970s and 1980s. It was through appropriation of the problems, idioms, and categories provided these writers that the Islamist discourse of opposition has been formed.

3.2. Islamic Revival in Turkey: the Formation of the Islamist Discourse of Opposition

3.2.1. On Islamist Intellectuals and Methodology

The fourth period of Islamic revival in Turkey, *the period of confrontation and challenge*, pointed to birth of a new type of Islamist intellectual; whose basic ambition was "mobilization of Islamic discourse as an effective address of contemporary Turkish experience."[86] Consciously maintaining an exceedingly

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[85] Charles Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy*, p. 153.

[86] Michael E. Meeker, 'The New Muslim Intellectuals'. For an overall evaluation of Islamist intellectuals of the period also see, M. E. Meeker, 'The Muslim Intellectual and His Audience: A

critical attitude towards modernity and its institutions as a whole (and particularly towards Turkish modernization), the new Islamist intellectual was, in fact, an offspring of the achievements of Turkish modernization process itself. It is this hybrid relationship between modernity and his/her positioning what differentiated the new Islamist intellectual from earlier Islamist thinkers in Turkey.[87] A general profile of the Islamist intellectual of this period has been presented by Meeker as such:

> In general, the new Muslim intellectual in Turkey is always a writer who has published columns in newspapers, short articles in journals, or books consisting of collections of short essays. . . His writings are critical and reflective. He addresses a reading audience whose social and educational background is similar to his own. . . He may pronounce on political events past or present or insist on the principle of political activism, but he does not generally speak for specific tactics, groupings, or parties. . . He has had a serious, long-standing interest in Western literature, philosophy, or social history, and there are more references in his work to Western writers and scholarship than to Islamic authorities or sources, although the latter are not infrequently mentioned and are sometimes discussed in detail.[88]

As seen, the advent of the Islamist intellectual was closely related to prevalence of printing facilities that became central for the Muslims in Turkey especially in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Although one may find various Islamist journals like *Sebilürreşad* (1908-1966), *Serdengeçti* (1956-1958), and *İslam* (1956-1965) that were published in previous decades, the emergence of the new Islamist intellectuals was deeply related with increased social mobility, literacy and modernization experienced in the last three decades. This was a period in which one observed qualitative and quantitative change in profile of Islamic

New Configuration of Writer and Reader Among Believers in the Republic of Turkey', in *Cultural Transitions in the Middle East*, (ed.) Ş. Mardin, (Leiden: Brill, 1993); Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, 'Pluralism versus Authoritarianism'; Binnaz Toprak, 'Islamist Intellectuals: Revolt Against Industry and Technology,' in *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, (eds.) M. Heper and H.Kramer, I. B. Tauris: London, 1993; and İhsan Dağı, 'Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey,' *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 13(2), (Summer, 2004). A detailed account of Islamist intellectuals can be found in a recent study by Sena Karasipahi, *Muslims in Modern Turkey: Kemalism, Modernism and the Revolt of the Islamic Intellectuals*, (I. B. Tauris: London and New York, 2009). For a discussion of the effect of literacy and the media on Islamic identity see Hakan Yavuz's *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), Chapter 5.

[87] Meeker, 'The New Muslim Intellectuals,' p. 189.

[88] Meeker, 'The Muslim Intellectual and His Audience', pp. 153-155.

printing facilities and audience. The Islamic intellectuals performed in various fields including novels, poetry and playwriting. Following the argument that identity formation also must be considered as a narration, Kenan Çayır highlights the role played by Islamic novels of the 1980s and 1990s in forming of "new Muslim subjectivities."[89]

Consolidation of lively and colorful print culture did not only imply dissemination of new ideas among the Muslim audience. By Francis Robinson's words "printing attacked the very heart of Islamic systems for the transmission of knowledge; it attacked what was understood to make knowledge trustworthy, what gave it value, what gave it authority."[90] The advent and expansion of print culture altered the nature of the relationship between the "master and the disciple in the dissemination of knowledge."[91] The traditional vertical relationship between the master and the disciple which was based on oral transmission[92] was replaced by a horizontal dissemination and diffusion of knowledge. The introduction of print culture through books, journals, newspapers and pamphlets also meant that the disciples of Islam could gather information from plurality of sources. This, to some extent, ends up with construction of a more dynamic and reflexive Muslim identity.

Different from the older generations, and following the revivalists, the Islamist intellectuals have abandoned the question of accommodating the Western ideas and science/technology with Islam. The Islamist intellectuals underscored the culturally and ideologically encumbered nature of Western science and technology, and thus denied possibility of separating it from Western culture. For the Islamist intellectual, the question regarding the compatibility of Islamic and Western values must be abandoned at all. Accordingly, the Muslims and the

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[89] See Kenan Çayır, 'Islamic Novels: A Path to new Muslim Subjectivities', in *Islam in Public: Turkey, Iran, and Europe*, (eds.) N. Göle and L. Ammann, (Bilgi University Press: Istanbul, 2006); and *Türkiye'de İslamcılık ve İslami Edebiyat*, (Bilgi University Press: Istanbul, 2008), p. 16.

[90] Francis Robinson, 'Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, (February 1993), p. 234.

[91] M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity*, p. 107.

[92] "Muslims were always in doubt about writing . . . What this means is that person to person transmission was at the heart of the transmission of Islamic knowledge. The best way of getting at the truth was to listen the author himself." Robinson, 'Technology and Religious Change', p. 237.

Islamic world, in order to overcome their so-called "backwardness" and "underdevelopment", must introduce new concepts and paradigms. In other words, a viable Islamic political project could only be constructed through eliminating all residues of Western social and political thought.[93]

However, the conscious denial of the West and the Western paradigms did not imply ignorance of the West at all. Paradoxically, the new Islamist intellectuals, in their stern struggle with the Western modernity, become too much acquainted with concepts and paradigms of Western origin.[94] The figures that I will analyze below, most of whom have completed secular higher education institutions in Turkey, entered into a deep dialogue with the Western social sciences, especially the European social and political theory. The issues they tackle with, the form within which they handle those issues and the vocabulary they use resemble that of their secular rivals. In other words, as Meeker concludes, the Islamist intellectual "writes in a conceptual and semantic field that has considerable overlap with his secular counterparts. The cultural problems he addresses, the historical incidents he cites, the stereotypes of Turkish society to which he refers, fall within the boundaries of the political and cultural discourse of the urban, educated Turkish élite of the 1960s and 1970s."[95]

The Islamist intellectual is no more a romantic-conservative who tries to find symbolic expressions to degeneration in which Turkish society found itself in, and to propose epic solutions to those issues. Nor he/she confines social and political problems within the field of morality. He/she approaches domestic and global problems through philosophical and sociological glasses, of course within an Islamist outlook. The Islamist intellectual tries to understand the social, political and economic sources of the problems of Turkey in particular and the Islamic world in general. In doing so, the Islamist intellectual is aware of the fact that he/she also needs references that are not purely Islamic. Their writings are full of

[93] Hüseyin Okçu, 'İslamcılık Üzerine', *Girişim*, No. 20, (May 1987), p. 8.

[94] Shahrough Akhavi handles this paradoxical situation in Sayyid Qutb's works. See 'The Poverty of Philosophy'.

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 191.

direct or indirect references to the Western social and political theory, rather than to Islamic literature. As Güneş-Ayata states in her analysis on *Girişim* journal, the arguments of these intellectuals can easily be followed without any specific knowledge on Islam.[96] Similarly, Scott Morrison's evaluations regarding Islamist intellectual İsmet Özel are worth mentioning:

> Some of the sources Özel draws on, particularly in *Three Problems*, include Marquis de Mirabeau, Ernest Renan, philosophers and political thinkers such as John Locke, Galileo, Bertrand Russell, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Lenin, Nietzsche, Hegel, Alfred North Whitehead, Henry David Thoreau, and Nietzsche. Other figures featured in his work include Arnold Toynbee, Werner Heisenberg, and Claude Levi Strauss. Actual references to the Qur'an and the Sunnah are few, although Özel does employ ideas he attributes to Muslim thinkers, such as the fourteenth century thinker, considered by some as the founder of sociology, Ibn Khaldun, and Muhammad Iqbal, who participated in the founding of Pakistan, and who is now revered as a national poet and hero.[97]

To sum up, with their distinctively and consciously political stance, the formulations provided by the Islamist intellectuals are vital for comprehending the formation of Islamist discourse of the 1970s and 1980s. This section will present a thorough analysis of aforementioned generation of Islamist intellectuals who had great contributions in formation of Islamism as an independent, anti-systemic and oppositional political ideology. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, especially the 1980s have witnessed a striking proliferation in Islamic publishing sector. Sencer Ayata notes that in 1987, only in Ankara, he has identified some fifty different Islamist journals on the counters of bookstores and newsagents.[98] Likewise, the same period also witnessed a considerable increase in the number of books and pamphlets published by the new generation Islamist intellectuals.

The plurality of Islamist movements stands as a challenge against the researcher: which Islamist authors or which journals will be depicted as representing Turkish

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[96] Güneş-Ayata, 'Pluralism versus Authoritarianism.'

[97] Scott Morrison, 'To Be a Believer in Republican Turkey: Three Allegories of İsmet Özel', *Muslim World*, Vol. 96, (July 2006), p. 521.

[98] 'Traditional Sufi Orders On The Periphery: Kadiri and Nakşibendi Islam in Konya and Trabzon', in *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, (ed.) R. Tapper, (I. B. Tauris: London, 1991), p. 223.

Islamism as a whole at a given period? This question evokes another: is it possible to determine 'a sample' that will 'represent' the general characteristics of Islamism of the 1980s? As I have tried to discuss in the previous chapter, given the plurality of Islamist movements, any attempt for finding the 'accurate' representation will be problematic and misleading. However, plurality should not mean absence of common denominators; without which cannot talk of political ideologies as such. Thus, in this section, rather than attempting at melting various Islamist groups, journals and intellectuals at the same pot, I will try to underscore contributions of various Islamist intellectual currents in making of Islamism an anti-systemic and oppositional political ideology.

It must be stated from the outset that this section will not deal with Islamist intellectuals or ideologies per se. Rather, it will analyze their contributions to making of what one can vaguely call as the anti-systemic and oppositional Islamist discourse. Since my basic objective is to present the contours between the Islamist discourses of two different periods, my reading will be partly selective. In other words, I will not attempt discuss the internal conflicts, polemics, or deep philosophical and theological divisions within Islamism. Such a discussion is both beyond the reach of both my expertise and problematic.

In order to present the contours of Islamic discourse of opposition, I have focused on writings of a group of Islamist intellectuals who, I believe, played a significant role in making of Islamism. These figures were especially influential in construction of grassroots of Islamist politics. Michael Meeker asserts that in the process of rapid social and political modernization and urbanization some section of the youth traumatically experienced the friction between *Islamic and Eastern culture* of *Gemeinshaft* and *secular and artificial culture* of *Gesellshaft*. Expansion of higher education within the context of urbanization enhanced this friction. The writings of the Islamist intellectuals, in this context, addressed an identity crisis. For Ünsal and Özensel, the intellectual biography of Ali Bulaç, one of the most influential Islamist intellectuals in Turkey, can be read as a story of a migration from his hometown Mardin to Istanbul for studying at the university. Bulaç's was a one-way migration which was also the destiny of generations that will constitute

his audience in the following years.[99] His *Concepts and Orders of Our Time*, by Meeker's words, was "a mental map in an urban society and mass culture," and a guide to prove that Islam's "beliefs and practices remain a sufficient foundation for community in contemporary life."[100]

Ideologies and political discourses do not exist as externalities as attached to already constituted subjects, but play a constitutive role in making of them.[101] Following the insight that has been briefly discussed before, we can state that the formulations of the Islamist intellectuals contributed to making of what one may call 'the Islamist youth'. For Meeker, "in the course of having more direct contact with the West, some Turkish youths discovered their Islamic identity."[102] The Islamist intellectuals worked on these Islamic sentiments and played a vital role in construction of Islamist subjectivities: they have "managed to give voice to these young people and, in doing so, to make them aware of themselves as a distinct group among Turkish believers."[103]

In addition to figures like Ali Bulaç, Rasim Özdenören and İsmet Özel I have focused on one of the influential Islamist journals of the period *Girişim*, a monthly published under editorship of Mehmet Metiner.[104] I have chosen *Girişim* for several reasons. Firstly, *Girişim* stood as a relatively independent Islamist journal which claimed to stand over Islamist parties or communities. Launched in October 1985, the journal targeted the sectarian voices that try to dominate and fixate Islam; and claimed to present a platform that will "represent the reality with its plural dimensions from a Muslim viewpoint."[105] When compared to other Islamist journals of the period, *Girişim* partly succeeded in performing as a platform for

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[99] Ünsal and Özensel, 'Ali Bulaç', p. 740.

[100] Meeker, 'The New Muslim Intellectuals,' p. 201

[101] See, Paul Smith, *Discerning the* Subject, (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1988).

[102] Meeker, 'The New Muslim Intellectuals,' p. 196 and 'The Muslim Intellectual and His Audience', p. 161.

[103] Meeker, 'The Muslim Intellectual and His Audience', p. 161.

[104] For an analysis of two influential journals of the period, *Girişim* and *İslam* see Güneş-Ayata, 'Pluralism versus Authoritarianism'.

[105] 'Başlarken', *Girişim*, no: 1, (October, 1986), p. 1.

various Islamist voices. For instance, the most popular Islamist journal of the period *Islam*[106], a monthly periodical published in Ankara by the İskenderpaşa Convent with a 100.000 circulation presented a more monolithic outlook in comparison to *Girişim*. As it has been stated by Güneş-Ayata, the editors of *Islam* targeted a more homogenous audience "followers of the Nakşibendi order and graduates of Imam-Hatip schools and the Faculty of Theology."[107] However, despite the stress on multi-coloredness, there were two limits to *Girişim's* pluralism, "first, there must be an agreement on the basic principles of the Quran, Sunna and belief (*iman*). . . secondly, there should be no attempt to align the Muslim movement with the Western bloc, as they are incompatible."[108]

Second, as an independent Islamist journal *Girişim* played a significant role in radicalization of and politicization of Islam in the 1980s. *Girişim* articulated a distinct form of revivalism in which classical questions regarding the place of faith and religious practices in believers' lives are nearly absent. "What *Girişim* proposes is a 'political theory of calling (*davet*),'[109] which was guided by an innovative reworking of *fiqh*. The journal extensively dealt with political problems at both theoretical and practical levels. In doing so it tried to develop a realist Islamist strategy, which by no means implies "complying with the requirements of the age."[110] For *Girişim*, realism meant recognizing the social realities and peculiarities of Turkey, and developing political tools, strategies and concepts that will respond them. Realism does not mean nationalism, or denial of universalism; on the contrary, it is the only viable political strategy that will complete universalism.[111]

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[106] I did not exhaustively deal with *İslam* or the convent's other journal *Kadın ve Aile*; but I benefited from two recent collections of editorial articles authored by late Sheikh of M. Esad Coşan. *Başmakaleler-1: İslam Dergisi Başmakaleleri*, (Server İletişim: Istanbul, 2007), and *Başmakaleler-2: Kadın ve Aile Dergisi Başmakaleleri*, (Server İletişim: Istanbul, 2007).

[107] Güneş-Ayata, 'Pluralism versus Authoritarianism', p. 268.

[108] *Ibid*., p. 263.

[109] *Ibid*., p. 257.

[110] Mehmet Metiner, 'Çağdaş Davet Fıkhı-1', *Girişim*, No: 18, (March 1987), p. 2; and 'Çağdaş Davet Fıkhı-2', *Girişim*, No: 19, (April 1987), p. 2

[111] Mehmet Metiner, 'Çağdaş Davet Fıkhı-2', *Girişim*, No: 19, (April 1987), p. 2

Finally, most of *Girişim*'s contributors, in the following decades, occupied a considerable place in Islamist intellectual field. In a way, the journal can be considered as a school in which many Islamist intellectuals introduced themselves to the Islamist audience; especially the Islamist youth. As Metiner notes:

> One of the objectives of *Girişim* was to encourage our young and talented friends to write and increase their self-confidence through giving place to their products. In this way we aimed at preparing our friends to the future with their identities as writers. . . In this sense *Girişim* acted as a school in which many names became famous as writers.[112]

The period of revival, as I have asserted several times, differentiated itself from earlier (and as we will see, latter) periods with its distinctively and consciously anti-systemic character. As an independent and confident political ideology, Islamism, in this period, asserted itself as a political project that would transform the Turkish state and society along Islamist principles. Islamism asserted itself as a challenge: a challenge to secular, materialistic, capitalist Turkish republic; and called for eliminating all that is un-Islamic.

3.2.2. Four Challenges of the Islamist Intellectuals

During the research I have observed recurrence of some themes that defined the discursive boundaries of Islamism's anti-systemic position in the late 1970s and 1980s. In framing the borders of this position, I have focused on common concerns, problems, and objections raised by these figures. These themes can be listed as such:

1) *The challenge against the inferiority complex and eclecticism*
2) *The challenge against Western science and technology*
3) *The challenge against capitalism and imperialism*
4) *The challenge against Western liberal democracy*

By putting forward these four themes above, I do not claim to present a comprehensive picture of Islamism of the period. Rather, my basic objective is to define the moments of opposition displayed by Islamism to existing socio-political

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[112] *Yemyeşil Şeriat Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, p. 189.

relations. As I will show, the debates regarding these issues concluded that existing political, economic and cultural relations must be realigned according to Islamist principles. This was primarily a political process, and required immediate and radical political action. Backed by the confidence after the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979, this political process was aimed at revolutionary transformation of Turkish social, political and cultural edifice.

Anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism, as I will show, were the central elements of the Islamist dissent; and they were the first burdens to be abandoned in the following decade. At least, a revolutionary critique of capitalism was to be replaced by its revisionist version. In the second chapter I have suggested that this transformation was not only limited to the Islamist intellectuals; but a study of the various Islamic groups points out that Islamism gradually loses its revolutionary appeal in the last two decades. Of course this statement is not applicable to all Islamist groups in Turkey. A detailed analysis will show that there are still important Islamist circles and organizations that call for revolutionary transformation of society along Islamic lines. However, loss of revolutionary appeal can be considered as a dominant (not the single) tendency within Islamism. With the Islamists' increasing integration to the global markets, an Islamist discourse of economic and political independence rested on a strict anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism would not have the same level of response among the Islamist constituency, as it had before. Likewise, the electoral successes of the Welfare Party in the 1990s in local and general elections eroded the credibility of anti-democratic and anti-party discourse. But before telling the story of this abandonment we must fully understand what has really been abandoned. The following sections will submit an empirical and analytical analysis of the Islamist discourse of opposition.

3.2.2.1. The Challenge against Inferiority Complex and Eclecticism

> Questions regarding the reasons of backwardness and loss of influence of Islamic world have found two answers in the last two centuries. According to un-Islamic and anti-Islamic circles the basic reason behind Islamic societies' backwardness was Islam itself. Accordingly we should either all together abandon Islam, or practice some of its parts and reform it. Islamic injunctions that do not fit with the requirements of the age should be changed or softened. Islamists, on the other hand, proposes the direct opposite of this route. Muslims are backward because they do not practice Islam properly, and move away from their religion.[113]

Any comparison between the Western and Islamic societies frequently proceeded through listing the absences of Islamic societies (in comparison to their Western counterparts) in courses of their socio-economic and political development. 'The theory of absences', as Bromley calls it, evaluates the non-European (especially the Islamic) world in terms of what these societies lack.[114] Accordingly, there is a list of factors that prevented the non-European world's development: civil society, intermediary structures, the city, a protestant ethic and so on. Accordingly it was these missing European ingredients which caused the backwardness and uncivilized state of the Eastern societies. However, it was not only the West that embraced the problem of absences. Within the Islamic world there were also numerous attempts to 'prove' that – when approached from a different perspective – one can find 'the missing elements' in Islamic societies. The apologists insisted that the fundamental principles and institutions of the Western civilization could be found in Islamic societies. Ability of Islamic societies and Islam to adapt the requirements of 'the age' (the problem of contemporaneity/modernity) has been one of the most common expressions of this problem. Seemingly different from the former paradigm, it worked within the same paradigmatic framework with it. Regardless of insistence on 'absence' or 'presence', both explanations depart from the same proposition: the presence of an 'essence' that shall explain the differences and unevenness between the East and the West.

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[113] Hüseyin Okçu, 'İslamcılık Üzerine', *Girişim*, No. 20, (May 1987), p. 8.

[114] *Rethinking Middle East Politics*, pp. 4-5

The dividing line between the modernist problematic and the revivalists is the latter's conscious attempts to overcome the problematic of absence/presence. Nearly without exception, the revivalist Islamist intellectuals take the problem of contemporaneity/modernity as their starting point. What the Islamist revivalists in Turkey criticize is the apologetic tone surrounding the debate. They insist on the genuine, comprehensive and ahistorical nature of Islam as a religion; and its superiority over other teachings. Accordingly, the paradigm of contemporaneity/modernity must be rejected entirely and replaced by another one. Since Islam is a religion which is for each and every society and beyond time, asking whether Islam can be modern, or can cope with and adapt itself to the requirements of contemporary conditions will be a meaningless and detrimental inquiry. In his interview with Mehmet Metiner, İsmail Kara was noting that:

> At the end of the nineteenth century Renan argued that "Islam is not in peace with science and thus is an impediment to progress." Starting from Afgani nearly all Islamists tried to respond by telling "No, Islam is in peace with science." However, it was clear that Islam was not in peace with the science that Renan was talking about. Renan was referring to modern sciences, empirical sciences. This was the only science for him. Islamists could have found themselves in a more powerful ground if they could note that "Islam is not in peace with the science with the contemporary meaning of the term." In this way they could also have presented a proper Islamic stand and left a healthier heritage.[115]

What primarily distinguish this new generation of Islamist intellectuals from their predecessors are their deliberate and pertinacious efforts to overrule any attempts for accommodating Islam with western modernity. Binnaz Toprak, on writings of Ali Bulaç and İsmet Özel conclude that

> In Bulaç's and Özel's works, different from the earlier Islamic currents, the problem of contemporaneity of Islam is absent. The effort for re-creating a powerful Islamic civilization through technological development and industrialization has been altogether abandoned. The problems of the Turkish society are being searched beyond Westernization and contemporary science, technique and civilization are seen among the factors that stand on the way of establishing an Islamic order.[116]

[115] İsmail Kara, 'Çağdaş İslamcılık Hareketlerine Bakarsak İlk Göreceğimiz Şey Terakki Düşüncesinin Korkunç Hakmiyetidir', *Girişim*, No. 20, (May 1987), p. 13.

[116] Binnaz Toprak, 'İki Müslüman Aydın: Ali Bulaç ve İsmet Özel', *Toplum ve Bilim*, No. 29-30, (Spring-Summer, 1985), p. 149-150.

Göle asserts that in their search for an alternative paradigm the Islamists aimed at re-defining the Islamic "authenticity" without taking an apologetic stance towards Western modernity.[117] According to Ali Bulaç it was this apologetic tone that made Muslims ask wrong questions and come up with wrong conclusions. One critical mistake that Muslims have done throughout history was to 'respond' to the argument that Islam was a backward religion.[118] Islamists, instead of rejecting the question itself, tried to prove the "presence" of core values of the Western civilization in Eastern societies, and insisted that Islam is not an impediment to progress.[119]

According to the Islamist intellectuals, responding to claims of backwardness, and attempts for proving "civilized" kernel of Islam caused Muslims to play within the ground that has been set by their counterparts, and submit to the problematic of the "other." This logic also followed by using the methods (for instance 'technology') of the adversary through preserving cultural unity and purity. "Competitive Islam", states Abdurrahman Arslan "was mistaken in assuming that it will be able to conserve itself while fighting the adversary on the ground that has been defined by it, and through maintaining a distinction between the material and spiritual spheres."[120] Such a distinction is unacceptable for Islamism; since "obedience to god for a Muslim is both a material and spiritual issue."[121] The distinction made between the material and spiritual spheres also brought the idea of equipping the weapons of the adversary. The so-called weapons of the enemy were represented within an Islamic form –like Islamic banking, Islamic stock-market, Islamic share, Muslim businessmen, Islamic credit, etc. However, according to Arslan, the

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[117] İhsan Dağı, 'Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy and the West', p. 135; Nilüfer Göle, 'Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-elites', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 51, No. 1, (1997), pp. 53-54.

[118] Ali Bulaç, *Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler*, (Concepts and Orders of Our Time) (İz: Istanbul, 2007), pp. 11-12

[119] Ünsal and Özensel, 'Ali Bulaç', p. 742.

[120] Abdurrahman Arslan, *Modern Dünyada Müslümanlar*, (Muslims in the Modern World) İletişim: Istanbul, 2004, pp. 30-31. Arslan is a crucial name who has not abandoned his critical stance in the following decades. He can be considered as an influential name that represents the continuity in Islamist dissent.

[121] İsmet Özel, *Cuma Mektupları V, (*Çıdam: Istanbul, 1992), p. 18.

Muslims who embraced the modern forms could not see the inseparability of form from content:

> Within the process, each and every concept that has been produced in opposition and with reference to opponent's position resulted in entrapment of Muslims by secularism. Now the Muslim mind will protect the Islamic "form", but will begin to secularize its content. [122]

Secularization and internalizing modern contents are not the only undesired outcomes of the inferiority complex. It also caused the Muslims to blink the fact that Islam is an ahistoric teaching which cannot be interpreted either on basis of time, or according to competing vantage points. The effort for accommodating Islam to requirements of modern society, for Özel, is the major cause for Muslims' degeneration. [123]

Islam is not only beyond time and space, but also is a comprehensive teaching which is perfect and self-sufficient. Rasim Özdenören purports the ideological and philosophical purity and genuineness of Islam and underlines the need for overcoming the so-called "inferiority complex," both for religious and political reasons. His main concern is positioning of Muslims vis-à-vis the new concepts and currents of the new world order. The apologetic tone, for Özdenören, is not an issue of the past, but still contemporary Muslims try to find formulas for accommodating Islam with the paradigms of 'the new world order.' For Özdenören, in dealing with the concepts and issues of the new world order, Muslims must abandon the apologetic tone that has dominated the Islamic discourse for the last 150 years, which has endeavored to invent the Islamic substitutes for Western concepts and institutions.[124]

To sum up, the Islamist intellectuals, following the arguments of the Islamic revivalists depicted the apologetic tone of Muslims towards Western modernity and inferiority complex as their initial departing point. They have insisted that

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[122] Arslan, *Modern Dünyada Müslümanlar*, p. 32.

[123] İsmet Özel, *Üç Mesele: Teknik, Medeniyet, Yabancılaşma*, (Three Issues: Technique, Civilization and Alienation) (Şule: Istanbul, 2008), p. 21.

[124] Rasim Özdenören, *Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Sefaleti*, (The Misery of the New World Order) (İz: Istanbul, 2008), p. 52.

Islam could only present itself as a viable and confident political ideology if it could all together abandon questions regarding backwardness of the Islamic societies and advances of the West. Rather than asking whether Islam is obstacle to development, progress or civilization the very categories of backwardness, progress, modernity, contemporaneity and civilization must be interrogated from an Islamic point of view. Confidence of Islamism also brought a self-referential dimension to Islamism, which manifested itself in the revolt against any efforts to articulate Islam with other ideologies.

İsmet Özel claims that one of the manifestations of the feeling of inferiority of the previous Islamist generations was **eclecticism**. Failing to maintain Islam as a self-fulfilling, comprehensive and self-referential worldview, the former Islamist generations called other political ideologies for help, and turned Islam into an amalgam of various elements. By his words,

> The inferiority complex of the eclectic arises from inability to understand the comprehensiveness of Islam. When comprehensiveness cannot be understood, intellectual's trust to his mind steps forward. Within this confidence the concern for articulating the reasonable aspects of other thought systems to Islam, and making it allegedly more acceptable arise.[125]

The problem of *ideological articulation* lies at the heart of eclecticism. The revivalists deprecate any attempts for articulating Islam with modern political ideologies of the period, most notably socialism and liberalism. For the Islamist intellectuals, it is the comprehensiveness of Islam what renders any attempt for articulation and synthesis unnecessary and detrimental.[126] That's why one of the major concerns of the Islamist intellectuals of the 1970s and 1980s was to differentiate Islamism from right and left wing currents.

In Turkey, Islam has always been an integral element in formation of right wing ideologies. The role of early Islamism as a proto-nationalist ideology in formation of national consciousness has been briefly discussed above. The right wing

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[125] Özel, *Üç Mesele,* p. 50.

[126] *Ibid*., pp. 139.

political parties and movements (from extreme right to center) have always tried to articulate Islamic motifs, symbols, elements, and even establishments to their framework. Thus, in asserting Islamism as an independent political ideology in the 1970s and 1980s, Islamist intellectuals had to face the challenge of differentiating their path from *sağcılık* (rightism).[127] In doing this, the revivalists asserted a distinction between traditional Islam (which is mostly associated with the daily religious philosophy of the ordinary men and women, and mostly imbued with superstitions and false beliefs), and self-conscious Islamist ideology.

In their struggle for differentiating themselves from right wing political movements in Turkey, the revivalists defined **traditionalism and conservatism** as their major opponents. Meeker assets that in Bulaç's case, "Islam is not traditional, conservative or reactionary . . . it is a religion for all times and places which stands outside history."[128] Islamist intellectuals complain that for many centuries religious affiliations were associated with superstitions and false beliefs. Absence of a conscious encounter with this problem by the pious people is seen as one of the reasons behind this connotation.[129] Also, use and manipulation of Islam, especially by the conservative-right wing politics, caused the association of Islam with right wing conservatism. For Ali Bulaç although Islam cannot be considered without rules and values that can never be changed, this does not mean that Islam is a conservative religion. On the contrary, Islam is a religion which is against the status quo and in favor of change.[130] By Özel's words,

> If attachment to roots means attachment to custom a Muslim will treat this attachment with a grain of salt. Because Islam is not a bare traditionalism; but presents a unity of belief-thought-action.[131]

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[127] Ali Bulaç played a crucial role in this process of differentiation. In his *Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler* or *Bir Aydın Sapması: Türkiye'de Sağcılık ve Solculuk* (A Perversion of the Intellectual: Rightism and Leftism in Turkey) his basic objective is o achieve such a de-articulation. On the one hand he tries to dissolve the pre-established and presupposed symbiosis between Turkish right and Islamism; on the other hand, in criticizing right, he tries to maintain a distance between Islam and socialism. I will further deal with Bulaç's theses below.

[128] 'The New Muslim Intellectuals', p. 200.

[129] İsmet Özel, *Üç Mesele*, p. 25.

[130] İsmet Özel, *Üç Mesele*, p. 144; Yaşar Akgül, '"Müslümanca Düşünerek" "Yaşadığımız Günler"', (Days We Live Through Thinking as Muslims) *Girişim*, No: 4, (January 1986), p. 30.

[131] İbid., p. 59.

Traditional Islamic institutions, most notably the *tarikats* are targeted by the intellectuals of revival. For instance, in two special issues on Said-i Nursi[132] the *Girişim* authors criticize the Islamist group known as *Yeni Asyacılar* for claiming monopoly over the "most brilliant" Islamist scholar Said-i Nursi and for zealously following Süleyman Demirel and his True Path Party. For the *Girişim* circle, the support that has been given to center-right political parties (ANAP and DYP) is betrayal to the cause of Islam, since these political establishments are the representatives of the "evil" forces and since they use religion and religious sensitivities of the Muslims for their ends.[133]

The critique of *tariqas* and religious communities must be located within the wider framework of critique of traditionalism and conservatism. First and foremost, these institutions are severely criticized for their pragmatic and conformist stance which reduced religion and religious consciousness to defense and preservation of the *status quo*. Accordingly, due to absence of structures that are based truly on Islamic premises, several interest circles exploit religious affiliations and feelings of believers and inculcate them ideas that are for preservation of the status quo.[134] These establishments are knocked for claiming monopoly over Islam and for their sectarian outlook. In addition to that, they lack the elements of critique and auto-critique, which of course must stay within the limits of Islam. However, as it has been highlighted by many Islamist figures, the second half of the twentieth century is characterized by the birth of a "conscious" and "critical" Islamist ideology which is anti-conservative and revolutionary (in the sense that rejecting the status quo).[135] Accordingly, the Islamic revival is anti-conservative and anti-traditional in the sense that it depicts the genuine and pure Islam as its sole source; as opposed to variants of Islam as it has been transformed throughout ages with experience.

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[132] Vol. 7 on April 1986 and Vol.11 on August 1986.

[133] For instance, see Hikmet Gündoğan, 'Müstehcenlik mi, Seçim Yatırımı Mı?' (Obscenity or Election Investment?) *Girişim*, 6, March 1986.

[134] Ahmet Cemil Karasaç, 'Neden Eleştiriden Ürküyoruz? Yoksa...' (Why Are We Afraid of Criticism?) *Girişim*, 9-10, June-July, p. 42.

[135] İbid. 42.

The critique of *tariqa* or *communities* was, however, abandoned in the following decades. Above I have dealt with the transformation of communities and orders in this period –especially increase in their legitimacy and power. For instance Ali Bulaç, who was exceedingly critical of religious communities and *tariqas*, afterwards found himself within the network of Fethullah Gülen community. Most recently he wrote a book *Religion-City and Community: Fethullah Gülen Case*,[136] arguing the necessity of religious communities and community networks for coping with modern city. Bulaç's twist was not a mere strategic move but a manifestation of oppositional Islamist intellectual's becoming more and more conservative. Bulaç's latest homophobic comments that relate queerness with sadistic behavior, which can be considered as hate crimes; or his campaign against affirmative action can be shown as indicators of his mildly conservative framework.[137]

The revivalists did not only endeavor to dissociate Islamism from right wing ideological and political engagements, but they also had to tackle with the question of the relationship between Islamism and the left. Critical attitude of the Islamist intellectuals towards capitalist-modernity and the Western imperialism, and emphasis put by Islamist intellectuals on social justice ideal, as we will see below, evoked association of Islam with socialism. Shared assumptions and concerns between Islamism and leftism forced the Islamist intellectuals of the time struggle for proving the anti-leftist and anti-Marxist kernel of their political and ideological stand. As we will see in Islamist intellectuals' critique of capitalism and imperialism, the relationship goes beyond sharing common concerns. Many categories that are utilized in analysis of capitalist societies and imperialism are derived from Marxist literature. It is this affiliation with Marxist literature what makes the Islamist intellectuals endeavor to put forward their anti-Marxist position.

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[136] Ali Bulaç, *Din-Kent ve Cemaat: Fethullah Gülen Örneği*, Ufuk: Istanbul, 2007.

[137] See 'Özgürlüğün ve hoşgörünün kriterleri', *Zaman*, (16 May 2009) and 'Pozitif Ayrımcılık', *Zaman*, (28 April 2010).

At several instances *Girişim* authors underline the inappropriateness of associating Islam with competing political ideologies or philosophical systems. This criticism is mainly directed towards the Islamist circles which try to associate and articulate the so-called alien (western) ideologies, systems or institutions with Islam. "The fact that there are several ostensible and formal similarities between some systems of thought" writes Seçkin, "does not mean that they can be associated with, or, like some argue, can be married one another."[138] This claim for unity, coherence and independence is common for ideologies in general and it can be argued that this assumption is stronger for religious ideologies. Religious ideologies must stand for their originality and purity; and articulating religion with any contemporary political ideology is condemned by the religious orthodoxy. However, the ideal vision that is figured out by religious orthodoxy does not seem to apply in many instances. For the Islamist intellectuals a clear interaction with contemporary modern political and philosophical currents is observed.

Like many of his contemporaries, a regular author of *Girişim*, Hüseyin Okçu considers freemasonry, communism and the Jews as the main antagonists of Islamism.[139] But in the same article he accepts that socialists and Islamists target more or less the same societal sectors and they are in a fierce competition in winning these masses. The shared target group is mostly described as the '**losers of the system**'. "Islam," writes Okçu, "has always been a threat for the leftists; they know that Islam is their only rival and alternative."[140] He also adds that after 1980, Islam filled in the empty space that has been left by Turkish socialist movements.[141] In passages like this one can observe a relationship of love and hate with leftism. Marxism is condemned firstly for its materialistic outlook which defies religion and god, and secondly for its so-called "imperialistic" vision. But on the other hand, the shared enemy, namely capitalism (with its economic, political and philosophical aspects), makes these rival ideologies to approach each

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[138] 'İslam İle Demokrasi Arasında "Köprü" Olmak,' (Building a "Bridge" Between Islam and Democracy), *Girişim*, 5, February 1986, 36.

[139] 'İrtica Yaygaralarının Düşündürdükleri', (Considerations on Blusters of Reaction) *Girişim*, 2, November 1985, 6.

[140] İbid. 6.

[141] 'İrtica Yaygaralarının Düşündürdükleri', Girişim, 2, November 1985, 5.

other with sympathy. Yürekli's article on Karl Marx can be depicted as an example to that sympathy.[142] Accepting that Marx had originally depicted many maladies of capitalist relations of production, Yürekli states that his historical materialism which considered history as an outcome of class struggles rested fully on wrong assumptions. The sympathy felt towards Marxist literature can be observed in many other instances.

To sum up, the question regarding the relationship between Islam and socialism was whether an articulation between Islam and socialism is possible and legitimate. Although there were some marginal attempts for establishing such a synthesis (Islamic socialism), vast majority of the revivalists was determined to prove the ideological self-sufficiency of Islamism. For instance in his illuminating study on Islam's perception of socialism, *Socialism in an Islamic Point of View*, which has been a guide for Islamist audience for decades, Hüseyin Hatemi asserts that the term "Islamic socialism" could have made a sense if and only if Islam was an inadequate and insufficient "ideology."[143] On the contrary, Islam, as the only true religion which has remained intact, is the sole genuine inscription of the will of god, which is already definitive and in no need of perfection. Any attempt for articulating Islam with other ideologies or philosophical systems disregards this fact, and must be considered as an insult to the Islamic teaching itself. This goes both for right and left wing ideologies.

3.2.2.2. The Challenge against the Western Science and Technology

For decades, Islamist circles have been preoccupied with the problem of Western science and technology. Whether the Western technology could be transferred to and utilized by Islamic societies without doing any harm to cultural specifics of

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[142] 'Tarihi Sınıf Kavgalarıyla Açıklamak Ve Sosyalizmin Kaçınılmazlığı (!) Üzerine Düşünceler,' (Considerations on Explaining History with Class Struggles and Inesacapability of Socialism (!)) Mehmet Yürekli, *Girişim*, 3, December 1285. Also see Mehmet Eminoğlu, 'İslamcılık Akımının Amansız İki Düşmanı', *Girişim*, No. 20, (May 1987).

[143] Hüseyin Hatemi, *İslam Açısından Sosyalizm*, (Socialism in the Light of Islam) İşaret: Istanbul, 1988, p. 20. Hatemi's deliberate labeling of religion as "ideology" is worth noting. Elsewhere he states that he considers religion as "ideology, philosophy of life and ideal."

these societies lied at the heart of the problem. In other words, the question was about the neutrality of technology. Earlier Islamist generations advocated a position which insisted on cultural neutrality of technology. Accordingly, it was possible to progress through adopting science and technology of the West without embracing its culture. The revivalists, on the contrary, insisted on culturally and ideologically embedded nature of technology. Accordingly, it would not be possible for an Islamic society to protect its religious and cultural essence while adopting Western science and technology. Considering the Western technology as a form and filling that form with an Islamic essence (as the earlier generations tried to do) would not help, since the form itself cannot be separated from its cultural and philosophical background. By Yaşar Akgül's words,

> To a society which is ready to accept the Western civilization, Western technology will enter with its own program and culture. This is why the argument that "we shall adopt their technology, not their morals" will be unsupported. Because, the machine brings its culture and morality to anywhere it goes. The two cannot be separated.[144]

The revivalists consider technology as one of the biggest rivals to religion. To put it more aptly, the sublimation of technology and science rested on the background of unlimited confidence in human capacities. It is through the power that human beings acquired by technology that they have begun to consider themselves as 'creators.' And technology and science made the human beings consider themselves as the sole sovereign of nature and other human beings. Accordingly, it was through the mediation of the Enlightenment philosophers that science will provide a model for social thought.[145] Within this context, with the new "attitude" that has been developed by Newton and Galileo in the 17th century, nature has been reduced to an "object" which can be observed, measured and "utilized" by human beings.[146] Domination of men over men has been reinforced through domination of men over nature. "The modern age that we live in, and modern technology," states Atilla Özdür, "caused human beings to hesitate about the necessity of religion,"

[144] '"Müslümanca Düşünerek" "Yaşadığımız Günler"', (Days We Live Through Thinking as Muslims) *Girişim*, no: 4, January 1986, p. 35.

[145] Abdurrahman Arslan, *Modern Dünyada Müslümanlar*, p. 70.

[146] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

Modern technology eradicated the feeling of need for religion as a shelter: The result is clear. The human beings turned into numb creatures that tremble out of fear due to deaths they face; who ignores and passively watches the inequalities of income distribution and social injustices which cause these deaths, and even turns these killings into mass massacres.[147]

Unlimited confidence in human capacities brought "worshipping the power of machines and technology," which is labeled by Özel as idolatry of the modern ages:

Today it is not only the man on the street who considers electronic machines as omnipotent objects. At the same time the experts of these instruments are also within the religion of the machines.[148]

A series of questions had to be tackled by the Islamist intellectuals: What makes western science and technology wrong? Is it the technology itself or the philosophical background of Western technology that must be refuted? In other words, does the technology itself or the way it is being utilized make it wrong? Is it possible to develop an Islamic technology? According to the revivalists, at the foundations of Western science and technology lies a necessary rivalry between material and spiritual realms. İsmet Özel, in his important study *Three Issues: Technique, Civilization, Alienation* inquires the sources and consequences of this opposition. For Özel, "the Western civilization is the product of intellectuals who identify themselves with Prometheus,"[149] who stole fire from Zeus and gave it to mortals. For the Western intellectual, scientific activity and progress through science implies such a Promethean activity:

The Westerners always saw progressivism in conflict, always sought a Zeus to attack. He must attack, destroy and bear his own punishment. Hostility towards god rests on self-deity and manmade deifications. The Western philosophy has a Promethean nature. It conceives science as 'theft of fire.'[150]

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[147] Atilla Özdür, 'Sağ ve Sola Değişik bir Bakış,' (A Different Approach towards Right and Left) *Girişim*, no: 4, p. 22.

[148] İsmet Özel, *Üç Mesele*, p. 35.

[149] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

[150] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

In Özel's account, the organized resistance of the Church to scientific development, and the severe struggle between Christianity and science since the sixteenth century was one of the reasons behind formation of such a faulty relationship. In return to the hostile approach of the clergy, the Western scientist has located the hatred towards religion and religious institutions at the heart of her scientific activity. Eventually the Western intellectual came to a point of treating science and technology as a substitute to god and religion.[151]

For Özel, rapid development of the Western technology and its excessive power can only be comprehended through focusing on its historical conditions of emergence. By this, he highlights the relationship between capitalism and technological development. It was not the technological development which paved the way to Industrial Revolution; on the contrary, it was capitalism and the capitalists' search for profit which stimulated it. Among many inventions, the bourgeois only picked the ones that increased profitability, not the ones that might benefit humanity.[152]

Unlimited search for profit and use of technology in this search of course had its prices. Through time, rather than being a means to reach an end, technology, as a sublimated phenomenon, gained its own logic and had destructive effects on Western societies.[153] Although technology provided people with shelters to protect themselves from disasters etc. it also brought with it a series of catastrophes. The Challenger tragedy, argues Cihan Aktaş, has shown the dangers of unlimited faith in human capacities, and "the world," she states, "now turned into a space shuttle whose crew is in danger."[154] The Islamist intellectual warns us that in modern societies technological developments are mostly at the service of war industry, which brings humanity on the verge of destruction.[155]

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[151] *Ibid.*, p. 142.

[152] *Ibid.*, p. 181.

[153] Rasim Özdenören, *Müslümanca Düşünme Üzerine Denemeler*, p. 16.

[154] 'Teknolojinin İnfilakı,' *Girişim*, no: 6, (March 1986), p. 30.

[155] Fikret Yalçınkaya, 'İnsan, Teknoloji ve Savaş', *Girişim*, No. 14, (November 1986), p. 34.

The motor force of scientific and technological development was overconfidence in human mind. The Enlightenment ideal of founding heaven at earth could only be achieved by attaining the "common good", which could only be defined through rational calculation by human beings.[156] This was the only way of realizing human perfection. However, for the revivalists, the Enlightenment ideals of rationality, human perfection and progress fizzled out. Unlimited and unrestrained urge for human perfection and progress ended up with the danger of total destruction of humanity. Superiority of rational calculation evoked emergence of the most irrational and illogical phenomena of human history. The invention and use of the nuclear bomb, for Abdurrahman Arslan, pointed to the zenith of this irrationality:

> with this test modern human beings acquired the opportunity to achieve a total self-destruction; the world was preoccupied with becoming a nuclear "garbage dump" rather than a "heavenly place". Unfortunately the Enlightenment brought its own darkness.[157]

Environmental and material destruction was not the only catastrophic result of the Western technology. It was also responsible for formation of the new individual who has submitted herself to conformity provided by technology. Within this state of conformism, dissatisfaction and endless urge for consumption became the defining characteristics of this new typology. The new individual, now, refers to machines for the easiest calculations, getting dumber and dumber in this process. She knows a little about everything, without feeling an urge for going deeper.[158] Özdenören states that technology, in this sense, is responsible for distraction of moral and mental unity of the individual.[159]

However, we cannot conclude that Islamic revivalists are against technology in and for itself. It can be argued that for the Islamist intellectuals *there is nothing evil in technology itself*. It is not the technology that makes people unhappy,

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[156] Abdurrahman Arslan, *Modern Dünyada Müslümanlar*, p. 50.

[157] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[158] Yaşar Akgül, 'Yapılmış Bilgi, Kolay Bilgilenme,' (Ready Knowledge, Easy Information), *Girişim*, no: 5, February 1986

[159] *Müslümanca Düşünme Üzerine Denemeler*, p. 17."

materialistic or alienated, but the way technology is used. And the way it is being utilized will define the social and cultural outcomes of technology. In other words, it is not the science or technology that Muslims must keep away from, but a particular (the Western) understanding of it. According to İsmet Özel, as against the Western science which separated reason from being, and which saw a tension between science and religion, the Islamic vantage point propounds the inseparability of the two. Referring to the case of Prophet Idris, in Islam scientific activity is seen as one of the ways of endorsing god's commands.[160]

Murat Kapkıner inquires whether technology makes people unhappy, or people take refuge in technology because they are unhappy. He understates that technology or the age we are living in does not have anything to do with the happiness and peace of people. As long as the individual embrace her Muslim identity and strong conviction and belief, the adverse effects of technology will be nullified.[161] You can even import the Western technology if you are "ready" for it:

> If a society which will adopt technology already has a programme regarding the issue and use technology in line with its own value judgments, in other words, if it molds technology with its people it will be able to accomplish both. If we may say so, an "authentic technology" will be formed whose foundations will be constituted by that society's values.[162]

Developing an Islamic science and technology is also necessary for obtaining and maintaining economic independence of Islamic societies. Also, these elements are necessary for increasing competitive advantage Islamic nations in their rivalry with the Western and the Eastern blocs. In line with the criticism of Western science's inhumane and instrumental rationality; the urge for development of an Islamic science is stressed in many instances. As Ensari notes:

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[160] İsmet Özel, *Üç Mesele*, pp. 63-65.

[161] 'Şimdi Bir de Teknoloji,' (On Technology) *Girişim*, no: 4, January 1986, pp. 24-25.

[162] Yaşar Akgül, '"Müslümanca Düşünerek"', p. 35.

The Islamic countries must have their science in order to obtain economic, political and cultural independence. They must create a technology that will solve the problems regarding food, self-sufficiency, and economic transformation and defense issues.[163]

To sum up, the Islamist revivalists' over-critical stance towards the Western science and technology appears as one of their distinguishing traits. Unlike the earlier generations of Islamists who made the Gökalpian[164] separation between the Western technology and culture, the revivalists insisted on the inseparability of the former from the latter. Accordingly, wherever it goes, the Western technology and science will bring its cultural specifics with itself. The revivalists condemned the Western science for its materialist and rationalist origins, which caused the Western scientist and intellectual to conceive science as an activity against god and religion. Besides, the rationalist kernel of the Western science has been criticized for its irrational and destructive outcomes. In this sense, the revivalists' critique of the Enlightenment in general and the Western rationality in particular resembles "proto-postmodernism" of the Frankfurt School.[165] Finally, it is the Western science and technology which is refuted by the revivalists, not the science or technology itself. Scientific activity could bring real progress and prosperity if and only if it is not divorced from spiritual considerations. For the Islamist intellectual, scientific activity is acceptable if it is carried in harmony with religion. However, the Islamist intellectual is far from giving a detailed account of the nature of this relation.

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[163] Cavit Ensari, 'Ekonomik Kurtuluş İçin Bilimsel Politika,' (Scientific Politics for Economic Emancipation) *Girişim*, no: 1, October 1985, 24. "İslam ülkelerinin ekonomik, siyasal ve kültürel bağımsızlığa sahip olmaları için kendi bilimleri olmalı. Besin, kendine yeterlik, ekonomik dönüşüm ve savunma konularındaki sorunları çözecek bir teknoloji yaratması gerekir."

[164] As one of the most influential Turkish sociologists Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) made a distinction between culture and civilization. While the former was national and natural the latter was international and artificial. Gökalp aimed at achieving a synthesis between two.

[165] Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, *Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations*, The Guilford Press: New York, 1991, p. 225.

3.2.2.3. The Challenge against Capitalism and Imperialism

3.2.2.3.1. An Islamist Challenge against Capitalism

If one asks what would be the most important distinguishing trait between the Islamism of the 1980s and the 1990s, the answer, without doubt, would be two different periods' handling of problems of capitalism and imperialism. The Islamists in the 1970s and 1980s –deeply influenced by the pioneers of the Islamic revival– defined capitalism and imperialism as their main antagonists. Their distaste with capitalism and imperialism has reached to a point that they did not hesitate to utilize Marxist categories, mostly through the mediation of Ali Shariati, like 'class struggle', 'surplus value' and 'exploitation' in their critiques.[166]

Briefly, as a political, social and economic worldview, Islam was seen as a direct negation of capitalism both in practical and moral terms. First of all, the revivalists insisted that capitalism has stood for values (individualism, selfishness, profanity, consumerism and profit seeking) that are strictly ruled out by Islam. Secondly, for the revivalists, the practical outcomes of capitalist system are misery for the masses, irrationality, moral degeneration, political incompetency and formation of a modern caste system which is based on economic cleavages.

In their critique of capitalism, Islamist intellectuals try not to range themselves with the socialist alternative. Anti-capitalism of the revivalists by no-means implied endorsing the socialist alternative. At many instances the Islamist intellectual has stated that the main antagonism *is* between the Islamic Bloc and the West. Within this split, socialism, communism, capitalism or fascism, all were seen as variations of the same theme: by Ali Bulaç's words, "all three systems are contemporary phenomena which essentially deviate from the same source and

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[166] For instance Atilla Özdür's in his analysis of law in capitalist societies refer to 'base' and 'superstructure' analogy. He argues that in secular capitalist societies law is a superstructural institution. For Özdür, the people who deny capitalistic values, ideas and system mus be informed about the way this institution works. 'Hukuku Bilme Zarureti,' (The Necessity to Know About Law), *Girişim*, 7, April 1986.

culture."[167] However, the powerful critique provided by Karl Marx and Marxists that has been appreciated, and even in some cases borrowed by Islamist intellectuals.[168] For instance, Morrison notes that one can notice the Marxian influence in İsmet Özel's writings, especially in his formulations regarding the alienation of human beings in modern capitalist societies. For Özel, contemporary world has been dominated by commodity fetishism which "denotes the confusion of the *means* to living for the *ends* of life."[169]

In *Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler*, Ali Bulaç presents a series of definitions of capitalism. Capitalism, for him, can be defined as a system which is based on superiority and sovereignty of capital and the capitalists. It can also be defined as a system which is based on private property, and in which society is divided into two conflicting classes. In another definition, capitalism is characterized by private ownership of the means of production.[170] The idea of free, unlimited, unrestrained, unconditional and absolute profit is the motor force of the capitalist system. For Bulaç, despite capitalism, at least in rhetoric, defends self-regulating markets and principle of non-intervention, in its search of profit it might even support protectionist and statist measures.[171]

The critique of capitalism is a perennial theme for the Islamist intellectuals. However, what is striking in Bulaç's critique is the strategic importance granted to the term 'capitalism'. Capitalism, in Bulaç's Islamic discourse, performs as a nodal point to which most of the social, political and cultural problems are articulated to. It was capitalism which "caused big troubles to the world,

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[167] *Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler*, p. 14.

[168] Mehmet Yürekli, in his critique Karl Marx's theory of history gives him his due by emphasizing the originality of his work. Though criticizing the historical materialism of Marx, the respectful language of the article is worth mentioning. Even in his firmest criticisms Yürekli tries not to disrespect Marx's theoretical legacy. 'Tarihi Sınıd Kavgalarıyla Açıklamak ve Sosyalizmin Kaçınılmazlığı (!) Üzerine Düşünceler,' (Explaining History Through Class Struggles and Reflections on Inescapability(!) of Socialism) *Girişim*, no: 3, December 1985. Likewise Bulaç, in his analysis of capitalism, Ali Bulaç does not hesitate to refer Marx's analysis of commodity and private property. See, *Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler*, p. 38.

[169] Scott Morrison, 'Three Allegories of İsmet Özel', p. 518, 521.

[170] *Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler*, p. 24.

[171] *Ibid*., p.25.

impoverished people and countries, caused hunger in Africa, led the way to birth of communism and divided the world into blocs."[172] Capitalism, as "a highly expansive and exploitative system, gives rise to a vicious cycle of political reactions and countrereactions which do no alleviate but instead exacerbate the social ills from which they arise."[173]

Bulaç states that the backbone of capitalist economic system is interest.[174] Like Bulaç, Rasim Özdenören names capitalism as the "system of *riba* (interest)."[175] In Özdenören's account, *riba* is held responsible for all the structural maladies and deficiencies of capitalism. It has both practical and moral consequences. Accordingly, interest causes an increase in production costs, which increases the prices that results in decrease in demand; the decrease in demand, in turn, decreases production, which causes workers lose their jobs; to increase purchasing power of individuals, artificial means, like printing money, becomes necessary, which causes inflation. In a society which experiences unemployment and inflation, immoral acts and crime inescapably become an integral part of daily lives.[176]

For the Islamist intellectual, capitalism is not only an economic system; it also relies on a philosophical background which locates the individual to the center. The centrality of individual is not only a philosophical issue, but is deeply inscribed the way people live in the West in an **alienated and isolated** manner.[177] Individualism was based on the belief that the basic motives behind individual actions were self-preservation and profit. The Western philosophy departs from the conception of *homo economicus* who is,

> individualistic, and because of that every social teaching that will have the Western label will essentially be individualistic. It thinks that it secures the interests of society through securing individual self-interest. This man

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[172] Ünsel ve Özensel, 'Ali Bulaç', p. 745.

[173] Meeker, 'The New Muslim Intellectuals', p. 200.

[174] *Ibid.*, p.25.

[175] *Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Sefaleti*, pp. 99-100.

[176] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

[177] Rasim Özdenören, *Müslümanca Düşünme Üzerine Denemeler*, p. 14.

is greedy, and he wants to exploit the earth with its underground and overground treasures. Unending nonsatiation brings in a new morality that suits him. His basic motive is racing, feeling of superiority and dominating others. The modern understanding is a continuation and manifestation of this mentality.[178]

The conception of *homo economicus* envisages a society within which individuals are in a fierce struggle for increasing their profits. Given the search for more profit and dominance of hedonism at individual level, capitalist societies are pictured as an arena in which all is at war against all.[179] This individualistic framework has been supported by rationalism and humanism. Rationalism and humanism insisted on the centrality of human being and empowered the profane ground on which capitalism rose.[180] In contrast with capitalism, in Islamic philosophy, the human beings, as the creations of god, are considered as the caliphs of the earth and even the whole universe. The God has created the nature and creatures other than humans for humans' use. However, as Halid Seyfullah notes, this should not imply an unbounded exploitation. Accordingly, the human beings can and must not think that the world is given them for satisfying their needs and whims in an unrestrained manner. Far from being Islamic, this is the basic philosophical maxim of Western pragmatism. This line of thought has considered human beings as the genuine owners of the earth; and even in some cases this idea of superiority comprised the domination of human beings over other human beings.

> "The superhuman" in Western thought refers to absence of any factors that constrain the human beings; an unlimited freedom. However, Islam does not consider human as unattended; it has defined delimiting factors in line with the purpose of creation.[181]

For the Islamist intellectual the expression 'war of all against all' should not imply that the participants of this severe struggle have equal conditions, or equipped with same weapons. Özdenören states that although capitalism, in rhetoric, presented itself as the system of competition, the historical development pointed to an

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[178] *Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler*, p. 28.

[179] Ali Bulaç, *Bir Aydın Sapması: Türkiye'de Sağcılık ve Solculuk*, Beyan: Istanbul, 1989, p. 95.

[180] Rasim Özdenören, *Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Sefaleti*, p.134.

[181] 'İnsana Dair,' (Of Human Beings), *Girişim*, no: 9-10, June-July 1986, p. 46.

entirely different truth. Capital accumulation –which is considered as the basic objective of the capitalist entrepreneur– by time resulted in centralization of capital in the hands of big capitalists, and formation of monopolies nullified the capitalist ideal of competition in free markets.[182]

The most striking outcome of capitalism is emergence of a huge abyss between different socio-economic groups; and class struggle. Social stratification has reached to a point which resembled that of the feudal era:

> In the capitalist system which rests on a class structure, against the ***ferocious***, ***irresponsible***, ***spoiled*** and ***exploiting bourgeois*** class who owns the means of production stands the repressed and exploited proletariat which has nothing but their labor, and which serves the bourgeoisie even while consuming.[183]

On the one hand there is the minority of exploiters who hold the vast majority of capital; and dispossessed masses, the proletariat, who try to survive with their labor on the other.[184] This is one of the points that one can easily observe the Marxian influence on the Islamist intellectuals in Turkey. As I have previously noted, Ali Shariati's sociological theory which rested on the Marxian category of class struggle played a vital role in this mediation.

The relationship between capitalism and Islam is a crucial concern for the revivalists. Asking whether a Muslim can be capitalist, Özdenören concludes that articulating the two systems will be a grave mistake. Although there are some similarities between Islam and capitalism (as there are between Islam and democracy, see the discussion below), Özdenören calls for focusing on the fundamental philosophical premises of both systems. For instance, both systems approve private property and recognize the centrality of commercial activities. Likewise, both in Islam and capitalism, the entrepreneurial capacities of individuals are promoted. However, looking these similarities, one should not conclude that Islam is compatible with capitalism, or vice versa. For instance, Ali

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[182] *Ibid.*, p. 131.

[183] Ali Bulaç, *Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler*, p. 28, emphases added.

[184] *Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Sefaleti*, p.131.

Bulaç argues that capitalism is an outcome of historical conditions that are specific to Western societies; and at the heart of this system is the utmost belief in individuals' capacities and unrestricted whims.[185] The profane and individualistic character of capitalism, its denial of any divine authority and replacement of accumulation and profit motives with moral injunctions separates capitalism from Islam.[186]

> As it can be understood, some of the properties (freedoms of entrepreneurship, trade, city life, information, knowing the world, religion and conscience, and not being status quo) that liberalism (or capitalist system) appreciates are also pointed as Muslims' qualities. But the qualities or values that are listed do not make us call Muslim as liberal. Because, the meanings of these values will differ in capitalist and Islamic worlds.[187]

One of the important issues regarding the relationship between Islam and capitalism is the problem of wealth. Again Özdenören states that there is similarity between Islam and capitalism in the sense that both systems prefer wealth over poverty. However, the crucial dividing point is the 'meaning' attributed to wealth itself. While wealth is an end itself in Western capitalist societies, in Islam it is only a means for a better life and never been an objective.

> Muslims are encouraged to live a life in which knowledge is preferred to ignorance, wealth to poverty, and power to impotence. It is not wealth that is prohibited to the Muslims, but profiteering. . . On the other hand prohibition of interest and allowance of trade manifests the level of Muslims' commercial morality.[188]

After noting all these points, one should not conclude that the revivalists do feel sympathy towards socialist regimes. Noting that both capitalism and socialism are offspring of the same philosophical and historical tradition, Bulaç states that, far from being an alternative to capitalism, the socialist regimes have re-produced the maladies of capitalism with a socialist face. For instance, socialist regimes, which claimed to remove hierarchical relations in society, created new hierarchies based

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[185] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[186] *Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Sefaleti*, 148.

[187] *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.

[188] *Ibid.*, p.149.

on acquisition of political and bureaucratic power; and secondly, far from realizing the ideal of stateless society, socialist systems produced a huge, brutal state machinery.[189] As stated by Özel,

> The unquestionable and apparent dominance of capital in the capitalist world and the fact that socialist states do not fall short of capitalism in terms of "humanitarian" consequences are our most general observations.[190]

In sum, capitalism, as a system which is based on unquestionable supremacy of profit, unlimited right to property and capital accumulation, and interest is held responsible for moral and material degeneration of societies. Accordingly, capitalism as an economic system produces misery, huge inequalities, and a modern caste system; as a system of values, it means perversion, commodification of people (especially women), and endless urge for consumption; politically it implies a system in which the privileged minority, and centers of economic power also hold the political power; and finally, culturally it means homogenization of cultural differences under the common denominator of the West and Westernization.

3.2.2.3.2. Capitalism, Consumption and Luxury: An Islamist Call for a Moderate Life

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a transformation in the social bases of Islamist politics. On the one hand, rapid social mobilization and urbanization meant exposure of previously traditional sectors to modern urban life-styles. Commodification of several aspects of life and prominence of the concept of life-style seems as the most crucial aspects of urban life.[191] On the other hand, as we have seen in the story of the newly-rising Anatolian bourgeoisie, the Muslims needed to develop a new relationship with concepts like wealth and luxury. The religious-conservative sectors of the society begun to dress, reside and drive

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[189] Ali Bulaç, *Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler*, pp. 71-74.

[190] *Üç mesele*, 89.

[191] Fatma Karabıyık Barbarosoğlu, *Modernleşme Sürecinde Moda ve Zihniyet*, (İz: Istanbul, 1995).

different than they were doing before. The classical Islamic teaching which recommended modesty and called for refraining from conspicuous consumption, luxury and show-off was reinterpreted by the religious-conservative constituency. The terms 'Muslim bourgeoisie' or 'conservative bourgeoisie' have become original and common labels for naming these sectors. By the 1990s Islamic fashion shows became an integral part of Turkish popular culture. The tag of "Islamic" is now attached to each and every element of consumer culture: Islamic fashion, Islamic holiday inns, etc.[192]

Recently, in a TV programme,[193] former head of MÜSİAD Erol Yarar argued that conspicuous consumption plays a crucial role in religious solidarity system. Accordingly, it was through conspicuous consumption of the wealthy Muslims that their wealthiness would be manifested; and by this, the needy ones shall know from whom they might seek assistance. The logical twist presented by Erol Yarar shows how the meaning of a concept can be changed dramatically. In this section I intend to trace this twist by briefly focusing on Islamist revivalists' 'puritan' formulations on consumption, fashion and related matters.

For the Islamist intellectual the critique of consumption, showing off or luxury was a part of her wider critique of contemporary modern-capitalist societies; and in some accounts, of imperialism.[194] Accordingly, capitalism as a system is based on unlimited search for profit. This urge could only be achieved through selling what is produced. This objective could only be achieved through maintaining the dominance of the ideology of consumption. It is only though consumption that the individual in capitalist societies can realize themselves. Islamist intellectuals, especially throughout the 1980s, tried to challenge this ideological containment with their simple-pious alternative.

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[192] Mücahit Bilici, 'İslam'ın Bronzlaşan Yüzü: Caprice Hotel Örnek Olayı', in *İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri*, (ed.) Nilüfer Göle, (Metis: Istanbul, 2000)

[193] July 2009, *Teke Tek*, Haberturk, Fatih Altaylı, full recording of the program can be reached at http://www.fatihaltayli.com.tr

[194] Serap Yavuz, 'İslam Dünyasında Emperyalist Hareketler,' pp. 10-11.

> Increase of capital brought developments in investment. Increase in investment, on the other hand, was synonymous with increase in production. Increase in production mean appearance of many new products. In other words, it means an increase in the needs of the society. The human beings turned into greedy creatures who want to possess what they see, and who are in pain due to jealousy and complexes. . . A method to provide the continuance of consumption in a society of consumers: installment sale. Installment sale is a different method keeping a society which has nearly reached the level of satisfaction within the consumption circle.[195]

"Delicacy" states Cihan Aktaş, "is in simplification, purification and consolidation."[196] In her account, one of the main objectives of Islamism in the 1980s was to introduce an Islamic way of life which was simple, natural and slow, open to sincere relations, limiting consumption and based on labor.[197] This is why the Muslims of the period,

> had an understanding of life which was unicoloured, which absorbed the individual or made her invisible, and which accepted activities, interests, arts and crafts as long as they are in conformity with goals of Islamism, not for themselves.[198]

The consumer culture targets, invades and incorporates what is sacred, and secularizes religion by turning it into a commodity within the market; and the distinguishing feature of our times is, by Arslan's words, Muslims' eagerness to take part in this process.[199] Cihan Aktaş, with reference to Muslims' increased attention towards magazine, states that by taking their part in the game, Muslims are trying to prove and legitimize themselves at the expense of conflicting with their truths.[200] Against the Muslims' propensity to become a part of consumer culture, Yalçınkaya attributes a critical role to Muslim women: "Women's protest of consumption economy is indispensable for a Muslim way of life. We must

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[195] Fikret Yalçınkaya, 'Sömürgeci Tavrın ve Mr. Malthus'un Dünü ve Bugünü', *Girişim*, No. 15, (December, 1986), p. 34.

[196] *Bir Hayat Tarzı Eleştirisi: İslamcılık*, (Kapı: Istanbul, 2007), p. xvii.

[197] *Ibid*., p. xv.

[198] *Ibid*., pp. 16-17.

[199] *Ibid*., pp.33-34.

[200] 'Müslümanın Magazin Merakı,' (Muslim's Interest Towards Magazine), *Girişim*, no: 7, April 1986, p. 27.

remember that luxury hurts us more than the sword does."[201] Submission to consumerism, however, helps the Muslims make new discoveries:

> The function of mind here is to blind humans through heading towards the material world. Blinding or conformism of the consumer culture makes the Muslim to re-discover many things. She discovers how she deprived herself of material goods; and discovers one by one how the Muslims of the earlier period made great mistakes and could not properly understand Islam. In fact, this self-discovery is a transition to a model based on "free market economy". This is why they re-interpret and rename everything, the Muslims of the past and themselves.[202]

For the Islamist intellectual this process points to depart from the ideal of a simple and pure life to a hedonistic-consumerist Islamist lifestyle. The 'pure life' here refers to the life of the Prophet Mohammad, who continuously commanded the Muslims to pursue a modest life, and who aimed establishing a social order in which accessing the material goods will not be priority of the individuals.

3.2.2.3.3. Anti-Imperialism: An Islamist Challenge against the 'World-System'

The concept of "imperialism" plays a pivotal role in revivalists' analysis of modern capitalist societies. Imperialism –with its economic, political and religious-cultural faces– undeniably is the principal antagonist for the revivalist. Anti-imperialism, aligned with anti-Westernism has been located at the center of the Islamist intellectuals' discourse of opposition. Moreover, it can be argued that the Islamist intellectuals' critiques of capitalism and the West cannot be separated from their critique of imperialism. The Islamist critique of imperialism rests on a clear-cut distinction between 'the Islamic' and 'non-Islamic' blocs. As discussed in the previous chapter with reference to the National Outlook movement, anti-imperialism has mostly been covered as being opposed to everything that is un-

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[201] Fikret Yalçınkaya, 'Sömürgeci Tavrın ve Mr. Malthus'un Dünü ve Bugünü', *Girişim*, No. 15, (December, 1986), p. 35.

[202] 'Değişim, Haz, Özgürlüğü tüketimin dünyasında aramak,' *Birikim*, no: 152-153, December-January, 2001-2002, p. 121.

Islamic[203]: the rather simplistic and harsh dichotomy posed between "purely evil Western powers" and Islam dominates Islamist intellectuals' analysis of imperialism. The Islamist reason divides the world into two opposing camps, which are in a state of a constant warfare. Within this warfare, the condition of existence of one camp is other's destruction. As it has been articulated by Şeyhmus Durgun, "the real antagonism that we face is not economic or national," the struggle is between the right and the wrong, between the believers and the non-believers.[204]

İsmet Özel appears as one of the most articulate Islamist intellectuals who try to problematize imperialism and Turkey's place in the imperialistic 'world system' (as he calls it) from an Islamic point of view. His rather unsystematic and scattered analysis, which is also open to speculations and to conspiracy theories,[205] is based on an uneven division between central and peripheral forces, which together constitute the world system. "As we all know," writes Özel, "the place of a country within the world system defines its movement. Within the working of the system, while the metropolitan countries could move freely to protect their profits, the peripheral ones only can head towards where they have been directed."[206]

Özel tends to present an omnipotent and omnipresent 'supersystem' in which the options of resistance are so limited. It is only the Muslims who can construct a life outside the homogenized and standardized arrangements of the world system. The theoretical and practical strength of the term '*kufr*' provides the Muslims with the most powerful weapon against the system.[207] Aktay and Özensel highlight three qualities of Özel's 'world system' as such: firstly, it manifests a global totality which cannot be fragmented or dismantled; secondly, modern Turkey's socio-

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[203] See, Ruşen Çakır, 'Milli Görüş Hareketi', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005), p. 570.

[204] 'Bir Savaş Ki,' *Girişim*, 3, (December 1985), p. 29; also see 'Körfezde Küfür Tek Millet', *Girişim,* No. 23, (August 1987).

[205] Yasin Aktay and Ertan Özensel, 'İsmet Özel: Dostların Eşiğindeki Diaspora', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005), 782.

[206] İsmet Özel, *Cuma Mektupları V,* p. 77.

[207] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

political structure has gained its real character through articulation to this system;[208] and finally, 'world system' concept is mostly used synonymous with modernity.[209]

In Islamists' analyses regarding imperialism, the United States of America and Israel are mostly quoted as the main agents of contemporary imperialism. Especially the USA is mostly held responsible for the state of turmoil in third world countries; which caused emergence of an anti-American discourse in Islamist intellectuals' writings. Accordingly, the imperialistic aims of the USA bring (civil)-war, misery, hunger and genocides to these countries –especially the Islamic societies. A Middle East in turmoil, political chaos, and economic crisis... this is the Middle East that the imperialist powers sought for; "since a politically stable Middle East would not be safe for the imperialist powers."[210]

In addition to the US and Israel, "the imperialistic aims of the Soviet Union" are also condemned by the Islamist intellectuals. The basic objective of Soviet imperialism was to control and exploit the oil resources in the Arabian Peninsula; and control the natural gas reserves in Afghanistan. The Islamist intellectuals point out that there is no significant difference between capitalist and socialist imperialisms. Both are manifestations of the same economic, political and cultural logic.[211] They label the Soviets as a colonialist power and invite the Islamic world to join the war of independence in Afghanistan.[212] Thus, imperialism is an ideological and cultural issue was well as economic.

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[208] "The Republic of Turkey was born as a consequence of a bargaining; and because of this, every transformation that Turkey experiences has been threatening for the lords of the world system, and has been exhaustive for the agents of these lords... Starting even from the reign of Selim the Third, every operation to submit Turkey to the world system has brought the birth of forces that struggle to help Turkey stand on her feets." İsmet Özel, *Cuma Mektupları V*, pp. 79-80.

[209] Yasin Aktay and Ertan Özensel, 'İsmet Özel', pp. 989-790.

[210] Serap Yavuz, 'ABD Emperyalizminin Üzerine Vuran Işıklar', *Girişim*, No. 15., (December 1986), p. 7.

[211] Cihan Aktaş, 'Afganistan'da 6. İşgal Yılı', *Girişim*, No. 15, (December 1986), p. 12; Serap Yavuz describes the Middle East "as a battlefield of the Western and Eastern imperialisms." 'Ortadoğu'dan savaş kesitleri ve siyasal konjüktür', *Girişim*, No. 17, (February 1987), p. 18.

[212] Akif İnan, 'İslami Bağımsızlık İçin Bir Direniş Cephesi: Afganistan', No. 3, (December 1985), p. 7.

To achieve its imperialistic aims the USA uses all legitimate and illegitimate means, especially through its Central Intelligence Agency and other organizations.[213] The Shah rule in Iran that has been supported by the USA is shown as one of countless examples. The 'democratic' USA supported the despotic Shah regime because the strategic location of Iran, its natural resources and providing a secure environment for Israel were integral for American interests.[214] This was why the Iranian Islamic revolution constituted a great danger to the imperialist powers. It did not only imply a regime change; but a fundamental challenge to imperialistic world order.[215] Bora asserts that anti-American sentiments among Islamists proliferated especially after the Iranian Islamic Revolution.[216]

Anti-Zionism is another recurrent theme in Islamist intellectuals' anti-imperialist discourse. As the strategic partner of the USA, Israel is criticized for acting as an instrument of American imperialism. Accordingly, the basic function of Israel is to sustain America's dominance in the Gulf region and Mediterranean. Israel's occupation of Palestine is one of the most recurrent themes within this context. The critique of American and Israeli imperialism is supported by the call for forming a front against the forces of Zionism.[217] However, it can be argued that at many instances the border between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism is blurred. For instance Abdurrahman Dilipak blames the Jewish people for always siding with the 'wrong-doers' against 'the forces good.'[218] Or Yavuz identifies imperialism with a Jewish conspiracy.[219]

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[213] Hüseyin Okçu, 'Kan ve Çağrışım', *Girişim*, No. 18 (October 1986), p. 4.

[214] Serap Yavuz, 'ABD Emperyalizminin Üzerine Vuran Işıklar', p. 6.

[215] Hüseyin Öcal, 'ABD ve Yeni Bir Kovboyluk Denemesi', *Girişim*, No. 18, (March 1987), p. 6.

[216] Tanıl Bora, 'Türkiye'de Siyasi İdeolojilerde ABD/Amerika İmgesi', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık Vol. 3,* (ed.) Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2007), p. 161.

[217] Muammer Öztürk, 'Şeyh Şaban, Siyonist Yapıya Karşı Koymak İçin, Müslümanları Birlik Olmaya Çağırdı', *Girişim*, No. 6, (March 1986).

[218] 'Yeni Bir Dönemecin Eşiğinde mi?', *Girişim*, No. 18 (October 1986), p. 10.

[219] Serap Yavuz, 'İslam Dünyasında Emperyalist Hareketler ve Çağdaş Görüntüleri' (Imperialist Movements in Islamic World and Contemporary Manifestations), *Girişim*, No. 6, March 1986.

The Islamist intellectuals attack the Westernist governments in Turkey for developing strong economic and political ties with the USA and Israel, and playing a part in the USA's imperialistic project.[220] The Westernist elites in Turkey have been targeted by the Islamist intellectuals as collaborators of imperialist powers.[221] The Westernization policies are evaluated within the context of Western imperialism. For instance, Eminoğlu states that Turkish Westernization was not a spontaneous and natural process, but required the presence of Westernizing elite who acted as the servant of the imperialist Western powers.[222]

The defining features of the imperialist powers are pragmatism and hypocrisy. "When it comes to their interests," states Cihan Aktaş, "imperialism can be liberal in some places, and can promote slavery in another setting."[223] Pragmatism and hypocrisy are the structural qualities of the imperialistic world order. The fundamental fear of the West is losing its markets: "Stomach and pocket are the kiblah of the West. Markets and factories are its modern temples; and the engineers are its rabbis, priests and ecclesiastics."[224]

In his work *The Misery of the New World Order*,[225] Rasim Özdenören elaborates on a series of concepts that have either emerged or gained global significance in the late 1980s. His basic objective is to unravel the deadlock which Muslim world faces in cotemporary world while evaluating new world-wide developments.[226] In this important piece, concepts like globalization, imperialism, capitalism, democracy, human rights and liberalism are evaluated from a critical Islamist perspective. The importance of the work lies in its overly critical distance towards

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[220] 'Yeni Bir Dönemecin Eşiğinde mi?', *Girişim*, No. 18 (October 1986), p. 10.

[221] 'İslam Dünyasında Emperyalist Hareketler ve Çağdaş Görüntüleri' (Imperialist Movements in Islamic World and Contemporary Manifestations), *Girişim*, No. 6, March 1986.

[222] Mehmet Eminoğlu, 'İslamcılık Akımının Amansız İki Düşmanı', *Girişim*, No. 20, (May 1987), p. 16.

[223] 'Güney Afrika Sorunu', *Girişim*, No. 13, (October 1986), p. 9.

[224] Fikret Yalçınkaya, 'Sömürgeci Tavrın ve Mr. Malthus'un Dünü ve Bugünü', *Girişim*, No. 15, (December, 1986), p. 35.

[225] *Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Sefaleti*, İz Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2008 [1996]

[226] Özdenören states in the Preface that they wanted to title the book as *The Issues that Prepossess the Muslims against the New World Order* but they did not do so because of the length of the title.

the concepts and developments of emerging 'New World Order'. It will be useful for us to introduce and critically evaluate the basic propositions of Özdenören in understanding variety of Islamist positions regarding the developments of the globalized world. Özdenören states that while these concepts may seem neutral elements and natural requirements of the age called "globalization", they are, in fact, mere conduits for Western powers to extend their areas of political and economic influence. The discourse of globalization on the other hand tries to conceal the fact that imperialism endures with a new face. Globalization is imperialism *per se*; but with a crucial difference: "while the subjects of universalism and imperialism were known, globalization is presented as a concept devoid of any subject."[227] This is why, for Özdenören, it is harder to resist against globalization and to present an alternative to it.

In fact, it is not globalization itself that Özdenören opposes: "opening of borders, searches for duty-free commerce and questioning of notion of nation-state can, in fact, be considered as realization of a world that Muslims desire."[228] However, although at first sight globalization seems as a natural and spontaneous process, a process without subjects, in fact there are forces and powers that direct and manipulate it. So, it is a particular "way" of globalization what Özdenören opposes, not globalization itself. What the Muslims ought to do is to present an Islamic alternative through overcoming national differences and prejudices.

In Özdenören's conceptualization the New World Order refers to emergence of the United States of America as the sole superpower with the fall of the Soviet Union. He depicts the Gulf War (1990-1991) as the symbolic outset of this new era. Although before this war the world was in fact presenting a unipolar state, after this specific date this fact became obvious. The argument that bi-polarity has never existed is repeated in Özdenören's formulations. "Even before the fall of communism, and especially with the 'détente' process," writes Özdenören, "a political partnership, which was based on economic and commercial interests, has

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[227] *Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Sefaleti*, p. 19.

[228] *Ibid*., p. 19.

been established between these two worlds (capitalism and communism or the West and the East)."[229] This fact is consolidated by liberalization and structural adjustment process of the former Eastern Bloc. These countries, as they become more and more dependent on Western capital, began rapidly Westernizing all aspects of their lives.[230]

For the revivalists the primary victim of colonialist and imperialist policies is the Muslim world.[231] This argument is supported by the claim that imperialism cannot be considered solely in terms of economic and political relations. Of course the Western powers' search for raw materials, slaves, and later, new markets must be considered as the motor force of imperialism. However, ignoring the cultural-religious core of imperialist policies would be a mistake for the part of the Islamists. Ali Bulaç, in one of his important works *The Problems of Thought in the Islamic World* notes that the rivalry between the West and the East is, in fact, the rivalry between Christianity and Islam. Within this context, the Western powers' urge to suppress and exploit the Islamic world is, first and foremost, completely cultural and ideological: Batı, ateizmi ve dine karşı en acımasız yıkımları sürdürdüğü dönemlerde bile Doğu söz konusu olduğunda Hristiyanlık (sic.) bilincini hiçbir zaman kaybetmemiş, aksine her gün biraz daha güçlendirmiştir.[232]

According to Bulaç, given the cultural-religious weight of the phenomenon, anti-imperialism and defending independency must be the necessary and essential traits of Islamist intellectuals.[233] However, according to Bulaç it is really hard to argue that such a consciousness is common among the Muslims. It is the duty of the Islamist intellectual to analyze and understand imperialism –which is different from, and subtle when compared to colonialism– through taking into account its economic, political, cultural, philosophical and religious aspects. Likewise, İsmet Özel underlines the importance of approaching the problem as a civilization issue.

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[229] *Ibid.*, pp. 106-107.

[230] *Ibid.*, p. 98.

[231] Okçu, 'Kan ve Çağrışım', *Girişim*, No. 18 (October 1986), p. 4.

[232] *İslam Dünyasında Düşünce Sorunları*, p. 177.

[233] *Ibid.*, p. 180.

"In terms of economic analysis," Özel states, "on the one hand we see multinational corporations, monopolies and the imperialist West with its huge capital, and the people or nations that are struggling to free themselves from imperialist subjection on the other."[234]

Özel raises some crucial questions regarding anti-imperialist struggle of the Muslims: Shall the critique of imperialism be limited within the economic realm? Should the Muslims abandon critique of imperialism after eliminating economic exploitation and gaining economic independence? Where should the socialist states like Soviet Russia or China be located within this context? Özel responds by underlining that the struggle against imperialism cannot be reduced to the economic realm only: the Islamic Bloc must carry the war to philosophical, political, social and cultural fronts: "We need to offer a new life in order to oppose the world system. The new life must be based on new values."[235] In other words, the struggle against the West will mean nothing if we confine it within the limits of material issues such as economic nationalism.[236] Resisting imperialism also means resisting Western ideology, culture, and philosophy. Political and economic independence must be based on the independence of souls and minds. In İsmet Özel's framework, resistance must start from Turkey due to the country's peculiarities. For him, among the Islamic societies Turkey is the only country that has lived through the worst experiences of the world system; and it is only though Islamization of Turkey that one will be able to find a center against the world system.[237]

> When we say that Turkey's Islamic transformation will be the departing point of humanity's emancipation from the hegemony of world system, we mean that the deadlocks of the system reach its peak in our country, and the transformation that Turkey has experienced provides the most suitable ground for such emancipation.[238]

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[234] Özel, *Üç mesele*, p. 97

[235] Özel, *Cuma Mektupları V,* p. 20.

[236] Özel, *Üç mesele, p.* 98.

[237] Aktay and Özensel, 'İsmet Özel', p. 794.

[238] İsmet Özel, *Üç mesele*, p. 21.

Jihad was the key term in definition of Islamist challenge against the evil Western forces. One function of the Islamist intellectuals of the period was to inform the Islamist audience about the *jihad* fronts from all over the world. For instance, the third issue of *Girişim* journal was devoted to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On the disputed cover of the issue there was a photograph of a child holding an automatic rifle in his hand. Nearly all of the writers were calling for unity against the Soviet forces, and praising *jihadi* struggle against them. *Jihad* is not only as a military strategy, but a way to purify the souls of Muslims; to become closer to god.[239] Anti-imperialism, together with the consciousness of *jihad*, becomes the constituting element of Islamists' identity at the time.[240] While asserting the indispensability of Jihad and praising existing struggles *Girişim* journal underlined that *Jihad* must not mean uncontrolled and "meaningless violence" directed towards innocent civilians. Okçu, with regards to principle of 'eye for an eye' states that "if it is possible retaliation must be directed towards the persecutor. It is Pentagon, Mosad, CIA, Begin, Sharon, Reagan who must be punished; not ordinary citizen David, Abraham or Michael." (*sic.*)[241]

To sum up, the revivalists' critique of imperialism rests on a clear dichotomy between the Western and the Islamic blocs. Revivalists do not only refer to capitalist powers in their critique of imperialism; the socialist bloc has also been firmly criticized by them. Since both capitalist and socialist systems stem from the same philosophical core; and since "*kufr* is a single nation" the main struggle is defined as taking place between the Islamic and non-Islamic (*kufr*) worlds:

> The following years will gain their value through the growing struggle between the nation of Islam and that of idolatry. The clash between the nation of Islam whose problems diminishes day by they, who clarifies its tawhidi line, who turns to its roots, who is full of love of jihad and martyrdom, who grows, develops, becomes more powerful and launches

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[239] Ahmet Cemiş Karasaç, 'Nice Bin Şehitlerin Kanıyla Beslenip Büyüyen Bir Kıyam,' (A Resurrection That Has Been Fed By the Bloods of the Martyrs), *Girşim*, no: 3, December 1985.

[240] Serap Yavuz, 'İslam Dünyasının Siyasi Panaroması', (A Political View of Islamic World), *Girişim,* no: 2, November 1986; also see 'İslam Dünyasında Emperyalist Hareketler ve Çağdaş Görüntüleri' (Imperialist Movements in Islamic World and Contemporary Manifestations), *Girişim*, 6, March 1986.

[241] 'Kan ve Çağrışım', *Girşim*, No. 13, (October 1986), p.4.

new fronts; and the nation of kufr, who loses its power, who is confused and who cannot see what is beyond reality.[242]

Although one cannot talk of a definite Islamic bloc or a unity among Muslims, states Özdenören, the biggest threat to Western powers is the "Muslim masses." This is why political awakening of the Islamists occupies a significant place in the Western agenda; and the disturbance felt with this awakening increases the hostility felt towards the Muslims.[243]

3.2.2.4. The challenge against democracy

The apologetic tone of Islamism reaches to its peaks in Islam's encounter with the concept of democracy. For ages, Islamist thinkers tried to prove that democratic principles, institutions and practices, in the Western sense of the terms, existed in Islam. The anti-democratic tendencies in Islamism and the Islamic world have been evaluated as deviations from the original sources and genuine religious teaching. However, as we have seen, the revivalists deliberately and categorically criticized this "competitive" attitude. They have stressed the need for dissociating discourse of democracy from Islamism; and condemned any attempts for 'constructing bridges between Islam and democracy'.[244]

For the revivalists, democracy is not just a form of government or a way of administration; but a way of thinking; a way of thinking that is unique to Western societies developed throughout their historical, philosophical and ideological of development.[245] In other words, democracy cannot be considered as a neutral political method that can be appropriated by Islamic societies in an unproblematic manner. The historical past and fundamental philosophical premises of democracy point to a clearly un-Islamic way of government.

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[242] Hüseyin Okçu, 'İki Dünya', *Girişim*, no: 6, March 1986, p. 5.

[243] *Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Sefaleti*, pp. 107-108.

[244] Ahmet Seçkin, 'İslam ile Demokrasi Arasında "Köprü" Olmak', *Girişim*, no: 5, February 1986.

[245] Serap Yavuz, 'Demokratik Rejimler Tek Siyasal Seçenek mi?', *Girişim*, No. 14, (November 1986), p. 13.

Focusing on the historical roots of democratic practice Özdenören notes that democracy is the name given to the consensus between aristocracy, people and religious clergy. In other words, democracy can be considered as the endpoint of the struggle between these sectors of society. The ideal of democracy cannot be understood without taking this context into consideration.

> In the West democracy or laicism are not institutions that were founded through following an ideal. All these are products of a forced consensus in the social and political fields, and of a lifestyle which has been formed by the West (England, USA, France etc.) through living, experiencing and application.[246]

Secularism and democracy have developed together in the Western context. By stating that the sole source of sovereignty is the people, the idea of democracy endeavors to establish the dominance of "profane" mentality.[247] This is why a Muslim *cannot* be a democrat at the same time, since in Islam the source of sovereignty is the divine law which is inscribed by Allah. However, for Özdenören, this should not imply that the Muslims are alien to the ideas of freedom of thought or conscience. What is at stake here is whether the source of sovereignty will stay in human beings (as people or nation), or in revelation. "Democracy," states Özdenören, "responds to this question by noting that the source of sovereignty is human beings."[248]

For Özdenören, the basic principles of democracy are 'people's participation to government', 'existential and organizational rights of different opinions', 'majority rule and respecting the rights of minority', and 'securing fundamental rights and freedoms'. For him these principles are mere "ideals", they cannot be realized due to existence and dominance of privileged classes in Western societies. Structural deficiencies of the Western societies make these principles to stay only on paper.[249] In capitalist societies the social strata with higher political power will

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[246] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[247] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

[248] *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

[249] Seçkin, 'İslam ile Demokrasi Arasında "Köprü" Olmak', pp. 36-37.

eventually control the state machinery and administration.[250] Democracy, within this context is an ideological manipulation carried by 'dominant capital groups' to passivate 'large masses of people'.[251] The critics of democracy point to the fact that pluralist democratic systems work for the good of pressure and interest groups, and help them increase their power; not for the people as it has been argued.[252]

Following Gaetano Mosca's views on politics and political participation, Ali Bulaç concludes that far from being the rule of majority in Western democracies, only 2 or 3 percent of the whole population is in active politics, and political parties who gain only the % 15-20 of the votes find themselves in power. As stated by Guida, according to Bulaç, "liberal democracy is a perverse system that in reality represents just the small group of wealthy elites who have the tools to campaign and to acquire a good education. Despite rare examples, the working class cannot have the same opportunities."[253] Moreover, formation of public opinion and voters' choices are widely open to manipulation by mass media and lobbies.[254] As it has been shown by Mosca, majority of professional politicians in France, England and Italy (allegedly the most democratic countries of the world) are children, brothers, cousins or grandchildren of former politicians. In other words, Islamists criticize liberal democracies for forming a hereditary system of political profession.[255] Last but not least, according to Bulaç the liberal (negative) definition of freedom in the Western democracies is also another source of the crippled nature of Western democracies. For the Western liberal democrats freedom is only defined negatively; as freedom of consumption; in contradistinction to, for

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[250] Ali Bulaç, *Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler*, p. 32.

[251] Seçkin, 'İslam ile Demokrasi Arasında "Köprü" Olmak', pp. 36-37.

[252] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[253] Michelangelo Guida, 'The New Islamists' Understanding of Democracy in Turkey: The Examples of Ali Bulaç and Hayreddin Karaman', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3, (September 2010), p. 353.

[254] Karasipahi, *Muslims in Modern Turkey*, p. 76.

[255] *Ali Bulaç, Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler,* p. 32-33.

example, Dostoyevsky's definition which grasps democracy as the **ability** to live, travel and possess.[256]

In a similar vein Kenan Çamurcu criticizes the low level of politicization and participation in Western liberal democracies. Accordingly the basic objective of Western democracies is to create a (depoliticized) society composed of individuals who will "vote in the elections and turn back to their homes and works afterwards, without having any effect on the administration."[257] In Western democracies and Ottoman-Turkish polity, the masses are far from expressing their political desires and demands; since they cannot freely form their organizations to articulate them. Political parties, which are the basic conduits for the so-called "democratic participation" are far from meeting this need. In fact, the political parties can exist within democratic systems as long as they do not pose a threat to basic rules of the game. In other words, in democracies, political parties are functional if they are functional in absorbing any anti-systemic challenge to the order of things.[258]

The Islamist intellectual also criticizes the Western liberal democracies for the type of human it creates. Democracy in the Western societies only ends up with creation of opportunistic individuals who will try to utilize democratic conduits for their own ends.[259] This is a natural outcome of the centrality of *homo economicus* in the Western capitalist societies. As we have discussed above, the hedonistic individual who prioritizes his/her personal gain above everything would necessarily see political activity as a conduit for extending his/her profit.

Özdenören argues that even if we take the formal ideals of democracy as our starting point, Islam is not in contradiction with any of these principles. On the contrary, these ideals can only be realized within an Islamic society:

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[256] *Ibid.*, p. 33-34.

[257] Kenan Çamurcu, 'Türkiye'de Depolitizasyonun Evrimi', *Girişim*, No. 17, (February 1987), p. 40.

[258] Celalettin Vatandaş, 'Düşüncelerin Kendilerini İnkarı veya Demokraside Partileşmek', *Girişim*, No. 15, (December 1986), pp. 32-33.

[259] Fikret Yalçınkaya, 'Şirkin Toplumsal Etkileri Üzerine', (On Social Consequences of Evil), *Girişim*, no: 5, February 1986.

> It is true that Islam does not have any objections regarding the minimum requirements of democracy as listed above. It can even be argued that these principles become really operational in Islam . . . In addition to meeting all requirements of a democratic rule, Islam accomplishes another issue which could not be achieved by any democracies, people's right to choose their own law. Such an objective cannot survive even as an ideal within the limits of contemporary nation states.[260]

In a similar manner, Ali Bulaç underscores that concepts of 'right', 'responsibility' and 'freedom' have been defined in a completely different manner in Islam. For him, protection of religion, life, property, reason and generation are five fundamental rights guaranteed by Islam.[261] The basic objective of Islam, according to Bulaç, "is achieving total emancipation and independence of individuals and society in political, cultural, social and intellectual realms."[262] Accordingly if one really endeavors to reach the genuine and sincere definition of freedom or human rights, the place to look is not the hypocrite Western democracies, but Islam.

However, Özdenören and Bulaç warn us that these points are not raised to argue for the 'democratic' core of Islam, nor there can be articulation between Islam and liberal democracy. For the revivalists, as we have seen above, any attempt for reconciling Islam with any "-ism" will be a betrayal to the fundamental premises of Islam. Such attempts, for Özdenören, mainly aim at reconciling Islam with the new world order and establishing a tamed or domesticated Islam which has nothing to do with the idea of justice.[263] Likewise, Serap Yavuz points out that imposition of Western democracy to Islamic societies, far from introducing liberty to these societies, brought nothing but despotism.[264]

The concepts of the new world order like liberalism, capitalism, democracy and human rights, as we have seen, are considered as historically and geographically specific by Özdenören. In other words they cannot be regarded as models

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[260] *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85.

[261] Karasipahi, *Muslims in Modern Turkey*, p. 78.

[262] *Bir Aydın Sapması*, p. 31.

[263] *Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Sefaleti*, p. 70.

[264] 'Demokratik Rejimler Tek Siyasal Seçenek mi?', p. 13.

acquiring universal validity. As a consequence, in an Islamic geography like Turkey these concepts shall have no place. However, Özdenören argues, nearly the last 150 years of Ottoman-Turkish history is characterized by unending efforts to import these concepts. Beginning with the Tanzimat era, the basic objective of the Western powers and their collaborators at home was to repress the Islamic identity of the Ottoman-Turkish society. As the state and society moved away from the Islamic path and came close to the Western paradigm through introduction of concepts like democracy, liberal-capitalism and human rights, the colonization of Ottoman-Turkish state has been established.[265]

To sum up, the Islamist intellectuals direct a series of practical and foundational criticisms towards the idea and practice of Western liberal democracies. Firstly, they have noted that Islam and the idea of democracy are two externalities which have completely different historical or philosophical roots. Accordingly, against the secular-materialist core of the democratic teaching which considers the people as the source of sovereignty; Islam rests on the assumption that the only sovereign is the God, and man will live in a free environment through abiding to his authority. Historically, democracy must be considered as a conclusion of the class struggles within the Western societies, not a universal model or a norm. Thus, imposing such a historically and culturally specific rule to Islamic societies will eventually lead to emergence of despotic rules. Besides the foundational criticisms directed towards Western democracies, the Islamist intellectuals also state that democracies are even far from realizing their narrow formalistic goals. Far from presenting a participatory framework, the Western democracies are based on de-politicization of the masses through turning politics into a profession which could only be assumed by a small minority (elites). Oligarchic party structures play a considerable role in this process.

Although the Islamist intellectuals present a series of detailed foundational and practical problems of Western democracies, they do not present a clear picture of the Islamic rule. At many instances they refer to the Prophet's practices during the

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[265] *Ibid.*, pp. 167-168.

Asrı Saadet, most notably to shura (council); but they do not pose practical solutions regarding the Islamic rule in complex modern societies. The Islamist intellectuals' alternative to democratic rule will be shaped throughout the 1990s; but this time with an increased sympathy towards and appreciation of democratic principles.

3.3. Conclusion: Towards a Theory of Islamic Revival

After analyzing the four challenges of the Islamist intellectuals in Turkey, a fundamental question arises: How are we going to evaluate the political ideology of Islamic revival in Turkey? After a thorough analysis of the revivalists' formulations regarding Islamism's location within the system, we need a general theoretical account of their positioning. It is a fact that one cannot ascribe homogeneity to perspectives of various Islamist intellectuals, and there are divergences regarding various topics. However, homogeneity of political ideologies is mostly overrated. In other words, there is nothing more natural than existence of conflicts, controversies and differences among the intellectuals of ideologies –be it socialism, liberalism, or conservatism. The task of the researcher must be to dig out the common traits of a given ideological complex; to find out the unity and concord within dispersion.

While focusing on the secondary literature on the Islamist intellectuals in Turkey one comes across with a serious problem: the absence of any analytical account of the Islamist intellectuals. Most of the studies on the Islamist intellectuals list the ideas of these figures on certain issues and make some generalizations departing from these inputs. However, little energy has been expended to 'theorize' the formulations of the Islamist intellectuals. Moreover, most of the studies on the Islamist intellectuals miss the contribution of Islamist intellectuals in making of Islamist discourse in a given historical period. This task requires appropriately locating the Islamist intellectuals within their historical contexts and respective positioning with regard to other Islamist establishments.

Sena Karasipahi's *Muslims in Modern Turkey: Kemalism, Modernism and the Revolt of the Islamic Intellectuals* can be shown as the most recent and exhaustive example to a study that misses two dimensions noted above: analytical and historical approach. In her analysis, Karasipahi focuses on the writings of Islamist intellectuals such as Ali Bulaç, Rasim Özdenören, İsmet Özel and Abdurrahman Dilipak, and gives a detailed list of their propositions. However, Karasipahi leaves the reader alone with the ideas of the Islamist intellectuals without either coming up with analytical conclusions, or locating the Islamist intellectuals' contribution to its historical setting. This is clearly seen in her assertion that the ideas of the Islamist intellectuals have not gone a significant change in the last three decades. However, as I will show in the following chapters, one comes across with crucial paradigmatic and contextual shifts in writings of the Islamist intellectuals.

With no doubt the Islamic revivalists present a radical questioning of existing socio-economic and political relations, and propose an unclear and imprecise Islamic project as an alternative. In that respect the Islamism of the 1980s has been characterized by its anti-systemic and oppositional character. Capitalism, imperialism, liberalism, democracy, and technology were the most visited elements of the discourse of opposition. Anti-modernism and anti-Westernism were the nodal points of the discourse of opposition through which all these elements retrospectively acquire their meanings.

Utilizing some of the explanatory tools provided by discourse theoretical[266] approach will also help us to determine the relationship between Islamism and competing political ideologies. Does the anti-systemic character of Islamism have

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[266] By discourse theory I primarily refer to research programme outlined by figures like Ernesto Laclau, Stuart Hall and Chantal Mouffe. Recently I have discussed contributions of Stuart Hall to ideology and communication studies. See Burak Özçetin, 'İdeoloji, İletişim, Kültür: Bir Stuart Hall Değerlendirmesi', *Akdeniz Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Dergisi*, No. 13, (June 2010), pp. 139-161. However, I should also note that I do not share all epistemological and ontological assumptions of discourse theory. Following Jules Townshend, we need to make a distinction between 'thin' and 'thick' versions of discourse theory. The 'thick' version has a tendency to reduce political analysis to semantics, and presents a totalizing and all-inclusive master methodology. However, the 'thin' version considers discourse theory as a paradigm among other paradigms. The 'thin', or 'minor key' version of discourse theory "scales down the epistemological, ontological, explanatory and normative aspirations of the founders." 'Discourse theory and political analysis: a new paradigm from the Essex School?', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 1, (February 2003), p. 130.

any leftist or socialist implications? Or, what is the relationship between socialism and the Islamic revival? These questions must be addressed in order to locate Islamic revival in its proper place. Although there are some instances at which one can see the traces of Marxist or socialist ideas in Islamism of the period – especially through the mediation of Ali Shariati; Islamic socialism cannot be the appropriate label to identify the period. This issue brings us to the problem of populism. In his inquiry of Ali Shariati's relation to Marxism, Asef Bayat states that his theoretical stance can be shown as an example to "Third Worldist Populism." By the term Bayat means "an analytical and ideological framework which represents a blend of nationalism, radicalism, anti-"dependencia", anti-industrialism, and somehow anti-capitalism."[267] Although Bayat's assertion presents a productive starting point, he treats populism as an "amalgam of heterogeneous elements"[268], without focusing on the articulatory principle of the populist reason. Following Panizza I would like to rest on a "symptomatic" account of populism; which "understands populism as an anti-status quo discourse that simplifies the political space by symbolically dividing the society between 'the people' (as the 'underdogs') and its 'other'."[269] This Laclau inspired definition rests on the claim that the identity of both 'the people' and 'the other' are political constructs, symbolically constituted through the relation of antagonism. 'Antagonism' plays a key role in the "symptomatic" account of populism. It is based on the simplification of the political space, "replacing a complex set of differences and determinations by a stark dichotomy whose two poles are necessarily imprecise."[270]

Panizza notes that there are three different and competing readings of populism. The empiricist reading focuses on a set of positive definitional characteristics that would outline the basic characteristics of populism.[271] For instance Peter Wiles

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[267] Assef Bayat, 'Shariati and Marx,' p. 34.

[268] Ernesto Laclau, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, (Verso: London, 1979), p. 95.

[269] Francisco Panizza, 'Introduction: Populism and the Mirror of Democracy', in *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, (ed.) F. Panizza, (Verso: London and New York, 2005), p. 3.

[270] Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, (Verso: London and New York, 2005), p. 18.

[271] 'Introduction', p. 2.

notes that the major premise of populism is the belief in that virtue resides in the simple people. He also adds twenty four qualities of populism some of which are moralism, importance given to leadership, loose organization, loose ideology, anti-intellectualism, proneness to shortminded violence, defense of small capitalists, and traditionalism.[272] However, as Laclau notes, such an empiricist account is highly descriptive and lacks any unity: "nothing is said of the role played by the strictly populist element in a determinate social formation."[273]

The second approach links populism to certain historical period, to golden age of populism that has been experienced in Latin America "spanning from the economic crisis of the 1930s to the demise of the import-substitution-industrialization model of development in the late 1960s."[274] The major deficiency of this account is its inability to explain various populist experiences of various historical periods and geographies. The historical account turns populism nearly inscribes the term to social-genetics of the Latin American societies.

The theoretical roots of the final approach, the symptomatic account, can be found in earlier works of Ernesto Laclau. As early as in 1979, in *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, Ernesto Laclau questioned the unproblematic relationship assumed to exist between classes and their ideologies. Noting that "not every contradiction is a class contradiction," Laclau added that "every contradiction is overdetermined by the class struggle."[275] According to Laclau there are two forms of interpellation: "*class antagonisms*, which arise from the relationships of exploitation at the level of the mode of production; and *popular-democratic antagonisms*, which arise from the relations of dominance at the level of social formation."[276] The driving logic of populism is articulation[277] of popular

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[272] Peter Wiles, 'A Syndrome Not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism', in *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, (eds.) G. IIonescu and E.Gellner, (Macmillan: London, 1969), pp. 166-171.

[273] Ernesto Laclau, *Politics and Ideology*, p. 147.

[274] Panizza, 'Introduction', p. 3.

[275] Laclau, *Politics and Ideology*, p. 106.

[276] Jacob Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek*, (Blackwell: Oxford, 1999), p. 30.

democratic interpellations into class discourse. However, not all articulations of non-class interpellations to class discourse qualify as populism. For Laclau,

> . . . what transforms an ideological discourse into a populist one is a peculiar form of articulation of the popular-democratic interpellations in it. Our thesis is that populism consists in the presentation of popular-democratic interpellations as a synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology.[278]

Simplification of the political space by asserting a stark dichotomy between 'the people' and 'the power bloc' is at the same time an attempt for achieving an "ideological closure". Slavoj Žižek introduces the concept of social fantasy as a mechanism of achieving that closure which is impossible. The fundamental social fantasy, states Žižek, is constructed around the idea of a society which exists, but being always threatened by the "other." The "other" is seen as the main cause of dislocation, as if the elimination of it will bring the community which is longed for so long. As Žižek argues the bond linking together the members of a given community always implies a shared relationship toward a Thing, enjoyment incarnated: "this relationship toward the Thing, structured by means of fantasies, is what is at stake when we speak of the menace to our "way of life" presented by the Other."[279] It is the "other", with its excessive enjoyment inaccessible to us; that threaten our way of life, and responsible for our miserable condition. So, the demonization of the other is, at one and the same time, a way of coping with subject's constitutive void and the impossibility of the society.[280] Within this context I offer to read Islamism of the period of confrontation and challenge as a form of Third Worldist populism. Islamist populism of the 1980s appeals to this ideological strategy through positing a chasm between the forces of Islam and *kufr*.

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[277] Articulation can be considered as "a connection or link which is not necessarily given in all cases, as a law or fact of life, but which requires particular conditions of existence to appear at all, which has to be positively sustained by specific processes, which is not "eternal" but has constantly to be renewed, which can under some circumstances disappear or be owethrown, leading to the old linkages being dissolved and new connections –re-articulations– being forged." Stuart Hall, 'Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Sructuralist Debates', *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, Vol. 2, No. 2, (June 1985), p. 113.

[278] Laclau, *Politics and Ideology*, pp. 172-3.

[279] Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative*, (Duke: Durham, 1993), p. 201; also see, *Sublime Object of Ideology*.

[280] Ernesto Laclau and Lilian Zac, 'Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics', in *The Making of Political Identities*, (ed.) E. Laclau, (Verso: London and New York, 1994).

Every social, political and cultural phenomena is evaluated and interrogated under the rubric of this simple dichotomy. In the Islamist discourse of dissent *kufr* functions as a central nodal point which totalizes the discursive field through forming a set of equivalences. From the most structural and fundamental ills of the society to more trivial problems, all ideological signifiers are made equivalent to each other by reference to a common enemy.[281] The West, imperialists, the Westernizing bureaucracy; all are seen as the embodiment of the forces of evil, of *kufr*. It is only through realization of Islam that the chasm preventing society from becoming an organic whole will be eliminated. The four challenges of Islamism, (the challenge against inferiority complex; western science and technology; capitalism and imperialism; and western liberal democracy) gain their significance through this articulation. Also, it is this articulation what helps variety of Islamist positions to form a relative ideological unity, and present a political imaginary. Following Bobby Sayyid, in this discursive operation Islam functions as the master signifier, "as the most abstract principle by which any discursive space is totalized . . . it is not that a discursive horizon is established by a coalition of nodal points, but rather by the use of a signifier that represents the totality of that structure."[282] Considering the extensiveness of the category of Islam, the unity of the Islamist discourse and chain of equivalences could only be sustained through "an expression of the most general form of antagonism: the incarnation of evil . . . It is only trough the incarnation of evil that a multiplicity of differential elements are able to be concentrated in a single point."[283]

The four challenges of the Islamist intellectuals against inferiority complex; Western science and technology; capitalism, imperialism and hedonistic consumer culture; and to liberal democracy are the founding moments of Islamism of the 1970s and 1980s. These challenges were the elements of a Third Worldist Islamist Populist discourse which divided the society into two antagonistic camps: the

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[281] For 'chain of equivalences' see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (Verso: London, 1985), pp. 127-134; David Howarth, *Discourse*, (Open University Press: Buckingham, 2000), p. 107.

[282] *Fundamental Fear*, p. 47.

[283] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

Muslim people and its other. The Western powers abroad the Westernist intelligentsia; Westernist bureaucratic-military elite and comprador bourgeoisie were all evaluated under the label of 'other' as being equivalent to each other. Approaching Islamism of the 1970s and 1980s as a Third Worldist Populism will help us to better understand the relationship between Islamism, capitalism and socialism. In this ideological complex anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist elements gain their significance through their articulation to this populist discourse. It is probable that the dissolution (or transformation) of the populist principle in Islamism in the following years helped Islamism to adopt themes of neoliberal free-market ideology in a rather unproblematic manner. In the following chapters I will try to present the philosophical, social and historical terms of this transformation process.

CHAPTER 4

POST-MODERNISM, NEO-LIBERAL GLOBALIZATION, AND NEW-ISLAMISM

4.1. Intellectual Sources of New-Islamism in Turkey

The Islamic revival in Turkey in the late 1970s and 1980s, as I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, was influenced by major Islamist political thinkers and philosophers such as Qutb, Mawdudi and Shariati. The debates of the 1980s were full of references to these figures and their concerns: social and political nature of Islam; Islamization of state and society; Islamic revolution; liberation from *Jahiliyah*; anti Westernism, and the inevitability and necessity of *Jihad*. According to the revivalists the only viable Islamist path was the replacement of existing political, economic and cultural order with its Islamist alternative. This implied a radical shift in the existing social and political relations. However, by the end of the 1980s and the 1990s, the Islamist discourse has witnessed a gradual marginalization of these concerns and concepts. While the distinctive traits of the Islamist discourse of the 1980s were dissent and anti-systemic stance; the new-Islamist discourse of the 1990s, pointed to a gradual elimination of these traits.

The Islamism of the 1980s suggested a top-down Islamization of the society. In order to achieve this goal the state machinery must have been captured. The Islamization of the society was supposed to begin with the Islamization of the state. In this respect, the distance between the Jacobin political imaginary (which is based on the idea of social engineering) and Islamism was not that huge as it has been generally assumed. The starting point of the new-Islamism was the critique of the Islamist Jacobin imaginary. The new-Islamists have endeavored to abandon the

Jacobin imaginary proposed by the Islamist thinkers. In due course, references to Qutb, Shariati or Mawdudi were replaced with philosophical exchange with newly emerging currents which became popular in the last quarter of the twentieth century: most notably the postmodern critique of Western modernity and Enlightenment rationality; theories of globalization; debates over multiculturalism and advent of alternative modernities; and finally the exchange between new philosophical currents and Islamist philosophy, which found one of its most subtle expressions in Iranian Islamist thinker Abdolkarim Soroush.

The basic objective of this chapter is to present the conditions of existence of the new-Islamist discourse in Turkey. In order to do that, I will firstly focus on the intellectual sources that had direct or indirect influence in making of the new-Islamist discourse. I shall start by a brief evaluation of modernity and postmodernity. Rather than trying to present an extensive account of both terms I will highlight the points which are important for my overall argument. I believe that these two terms are crucial for a full understanding of the Islamist and new-Islamist political positions in Turkey. The second part of this section will be on Abdolkarim Soroush's hermeneutical reading of religious texts. I have no intention to point Soroush as the only figure who influenced the new Islamist intellectuals. There were many other important Islamist thinkers like Rashid Ghannoushi or Anwar Ibrahim who have influenced the Islamist intellectuals.[1] However, among his contemporaries, Soroush's approach presents an excellent case study which clearly represents the major shift in Islamist way of thinking. His hermeneutical reading of Quran and the *Sunnah*, and his stress on the fundamental openness of the religious script points to a shift from proto-postmodern Islamist critique of modernity to Islamist postmodernism.

The second section will focus on neoliberal globalization. This dissertation maintains that the transformations and variations within Islamism across time and space cannot be considered as if they take place in a vacuum. The passage from a confrontational Islamist discourse to an accommodative one will only be fully

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[1] See John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001).

grasped through thinking this transformation alongside with wider developments of the period. When one considers the overlap between the new-Islamist discourse and neoliberalism this relationship becomes more crucial. The new Islamist discourse of the 1990s can be considered as an attempt to articulate the Islamist discourse with basic premises of neoliberal economic and political project. Also, the Islamism of the last three decades has extensively benefited from the (economic, political and cultural) opportunity spaces provided by neoliberal globalization. Increasing integration of the Islamic capital to global markets, for instance, can be considered as one of the manifestations of this relation. These points make an overall discussion of basic premises of neoliberal ideology (its general characteristics and approach to politics) and manifestations of neoliberal-globalization crucial.

4.1.1. Some Notes on Modernity, Enlightenment and Postmodernity

Many accounts note that modernity refers to social, political, economic and cultural transformations that have emerged in Europe over the course of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries.[2] For instance, Marshall Berman divides "something as vast as the history of modernity" into three distinct phases:

> In the first phase, which goes roughly from the start of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth, people are just beginning to experience modern life, they hardly know what has hit them . . . . Our second phase begins with the great revolutionary wave of the 1790's. With the French Revolution and its reverberations, a great modern public abruptly and dramatically comes to life. . . . In the twentieth century, our third and final phase, the process of modernization expands to take in virtually the whole world, and the developing world culture of modernism achieves spectacular triumphs in art and thought.[3]

Abel Jenniere defines four revolutions that define the transition to modernity: *scientific revolution, political revolution, cultural revolution* and *technical and*

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[2] David R. Dickens and Andrea Fontana, 'Postmodernism in the Social Sciences', in *Postmodernism and Social Inquiry*, (UCL Press: California, 1994), p. 3.

[3] *All That is Solid Melts into Air*, (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1982), pp. 16-17.

industrial revolution.[4] Accordingly, Newton has launched the **scientific revolution** and his law of universal gravitation pointed to the divide between two worldviews. It was through Newton's scientific revolution that nature became an 'object' of science with its own laws and regularities to be discovered by the scientists; which resulted in dissolution of hierarchy of things, and organic unity between man and nature. Scientific revolution was also seen as the source of all other revolutions.[5] **Political revolution** implied a shift in basis of legitimacy of the modern state: from divine power to the people and the nation. *Enlightenment*, *Aufklarung* and *Lumieres* were the names given to **cultural revolution** in Europe. Secularization of thought, rationalization of all measures, a harsh critique of religious thinking and organized religion (Church and the clergy) were the distinctive traits of cultural revolution. Aiming at overthrowing the dominance of religion in all spheres of life, the Enlightenment philosophers, first, denounced the so-called integrating role of the religion by treating it as the source of all superstitions, false notions and preconceptions, and, second, saw the religious clergy as the main responsible of religious deceit.[6] Last, but not least, **industrial revolution** is characterized by abstraction of labor, which gave a greater autonomy to technical structure standing as the mediator between man and nature. Abstraction is, in fact, a result of mechanization of labor process.[7]

"The unifying thread of modernity," state Dickens and Fontana, "is the idea of progress, attained by a radical break with history and tradition, to bring about the liberation of human beings from the bonds of ignorance and superstition."[8] Progress was not only desirable, but also inevitable:

> The founding concepts of social science were intimately bound up with the Enlightenment's concept of *progress*, the idea through the application of reasoned and empirically based knowledge, social institutions can be

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[4] Jeannaire, 'Modernite Nedir?', in *Modernite Versus Postmodernite*, (ed.) M. Küçük, (Vadi: Ankara, [1993]2000), p. 97.

[5] *Ibid*., pp. 99-100.

[6] Jorge Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology*, (Hutchinson: London, 1979), p. 24.

[7] Jeannaire, 'Modernite Nedir?', p. 102.

[8] Dickens and Fontana, 'Postmodernism', p. 3.

created that would make men happier and free them from cruelty, injustice and despotism.[9]

Whereas, for the non-Western world, desired level of development and progress could only be achieved through a process of modernization cum Westernization. The superiority of the West over the Rest[10] is sustained through claims of universality of Western model of historical development. A new understanding of history has been developed through the advance of modernity: a linear history resting on the idea of progress. This linear understanding held the idea that history was marked by the 'progress' of humanity.

Modernity found one of its most powerful and assertive philosophical expressions and manifestations in the Enlightenment philosophy. "Enlightenment is man's exit from his self-incurred minority,"[11] wrote Immanuel Kant, and added that the call for using man's own intelligence was the defining moment, or the basic motto of the Enlightenment. Inability to use one's mind, intelligence or reasoning was the main reason behind the "self-incurred minority" of man, and the basic claim of the Enlightenment was to eliminate incapacitating internal and external factors, most notably the church. In history of ideas, Enlightenment pointed to a significant epistemological break: The period was also called as the *age of reason* "because the philosophy of that time emphasized reason and rationality over the speculative theology of the Church."[12] Descartes, in 'declaration of the Independence of Man', insisted that "we clear the decks for the reconstruction of knowledge on the basis of human reason alone."[13] By Krishan Kumar's words, this meant "a rejection of all past systems of thought. There had to be a new beginning, based on a new

[9] Peter Hamilton, 'The Enlightenment and the Birth of Social Science', in *Formations of Modernity*, S. Hall and B. Gieben (eds.), (Polity: Cambridge, 1992), p. 37.

[10] Stuart Hall, 'The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power', in *Formations of Modernity*, S. Hall and B. Gieben (eds.), (Polity: Cambridge, 1992)

[11] 'Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?', *Basic Writings of* Kant, A. W: Wood (ed.), T. K. Abbott (trans.), (The Modern Library: New York, 2001), p. 135.

[12] Aslam Farouk-Alli, 'The Second Coming of the Theocratic Age? Islamic Discourse after Modernity and Postmodernity', in *The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought*, (ed.) I. Abu-Rabi, (Blackwell: MA, 2006), p. 286.

[13] Krishan Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society*, (Blackwell Publishing: MA, 2005, Second Edition), p. 100.

method for searching out the truth."[14] The Enlightenment philosophers claimed to develop the basis of an objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art.[15] The terms that characterized the period were "reason, empiricism, science, universalism, progress, individualism, tolerance, freedom, uniformity of human nature, and secularism."[16] Philosophers argued that the social world was intelligible and once the laws guiding society are found, it can be controlled, shaped and administered.[17] The task of the philosopher was, firstly to define the universal laws that govern the society, and find out the universal moral standards that will be beyond space and time. This ambitious project was only possible through Enlightenment philosophers' "lust for knowledge"; by their introduction of a complete change in the mode of thinking which found one of its expressions in Diderot's *Encyclopedia*.[18]

As I will show in the following sections, in their evaluation of modernity and the Enlightenment, the new-Islamist intellectuals developed a partial and manipulative critique. Partial, since the new-Islamist intellectuals only focused on rigid interpretations and negative aspects of both modernity and the Enlightenment. Manipulative, because they did not draw any distinction between different periods and different layers of modernity, and treated the phenomenon as a homogenous historical and philosophical entity.[19] In this homogenization modernity, capitalism, modernism, Enlightenment, rationalism or positivism has been used arbitrarily and

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

[15] Dickens and Fontana, 'Postmodernism', p. 3.

[16] Farouk-Alli, 'The Second Coming of the Theocratic Age?', p. 286.

[17] Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve İslam*, (İletişim: Istanbul, 1994), p. 12.

[18] Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Enlightenment*, (Princeton University Press: NJ, 1979), p. 14.

[19] For instance, Jürgen Habermas argued that neoconservatism could not grasp the relationship between culture and society. The neoconservatives, for Habermas, failed to draw a distinction between society and culture, and *societal modernization* and *cultural modernization*: "Neoconservatism displaces the burdensome and unwelcome consequences of a more or less successful capitalist modernization of the economy on to cultural modernity. . . . Thus neoconservatism can directly attribute what appear to be hedonism, narcissism, and the withdrawal from competition for status and achievement to a culture which actually plays only a very mediated role in these processes." 'Modernity: an Unfinished Project', in *Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity*, (eds.) M. d'Entréves and S. Benhabib, (MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997), p. 43.

interchangeably. It is through this operation that the new-Islamist intellectuals have developed their post-modern or anti-modern critique of modernity.

In social sciences, 'postmodernism' can be defined as one of the most ambivalent and equivocal terms. The ambivalence does not only originate from variety of interpretations of postmodernism; neither from the complexity of the phenomena; but there is something intrinsic to the term that resists a clear definition and full closure. This is partly because the very attempt to limit, define and systematize the term will betray its most fundamental philosophical premises. After noting that finding a simple and uncontroversial meaning for the term 'postmodern' is impossible, Simon Malpas records that a "clear and concise process of identification and definition is one of the key elements of rationality that the postmodern sets out to challenge."[20]

Of course the critiques directed towards modernity and modernization had a long history which is not confined within the limits of postmodernist criticism. European romanticism, for instance, starting from late eighteenth century targeted the destructive nature of capitalist modernity. Within this clash "reason was opposed by the imagination, artifice by the natural, objectivity by subjectivity, calculation by spontaneity, the mundane by the visionary, the world-view of science by the appeal to the uncanny and the supernatural."[21] The earlier critics of modernity also pointed out the loss of faith in great ambitions of the project itself. The utmost belief in progress and development was questioned by Adorno and Horkheimer on the grounds that modernity introduced humanity with a new kind of barbarism:

> Myth turns into enlightenment, and nature into mere objectivity. Men pay for the increase of their power with alienation from that over which they exercise power. Enlightenment behaves toward things as a dictator toward men. He knows them in so far as he can manipulate them. The man of science knows things in so far as he can make them. In this way their potentiality turned into his own ends.[22]

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[20] Simon Malpas, *The Postmodern*, (Routledge: London and New York, 2005), p. 4.

[21] Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society*, p. 109.

[22] T. W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. J. Cumming, (Verso: London, 1997), p. 9.

The so-called crisis of modernity constitutes the point of departure of postmodern theories, and of 'postmodern condition.' Marcus and Fischer "define postmodernism as a "crisis of representation" where traditional standards no longer apply, implying both an epistemological and existential problematic in which present conditions of knowledge and experience are defined not so much in themselves as by what they come after, such as *post*industrial, *post*narrative, or *post*structuralist."[23]

The disillusionment with the ambitious "project" of modernity was the starting point for the postmodern theorization. Postmodernism presents a challenge to the epistemological, political, philosophical and cultural project of modernity. Postmodernism departs from the assumption that modernity, as a project, brought nothing but disaster to the human beings. Far from bringing emancipation to humankind, it introduced new forms of slavery. Denial of religion and tradition on the basis of rationality crippled the process of production, dissemination and transference of knowledge. The economic and political project of the Enlightenment ended up with world wars, mass destruction and the Holocaust.[24]

In *Postmodern Condition* Jean-François Lyotard defined postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives, and dissolution of grand narratives.[25] Grand narratives are the governing principles of modernity, and "bringing together all of the different narrative and metanarrative forms of a particular culture, grand narratives produce systematic accounts of how the world works, how it develops over history, and the place of human beings within it."[26] By Gülalp's words,

> [Postmodernism] rejects the pursuit of "grand narratives" and denies the possibility of acquiring comprehensive knowledge through "scientific" methods. For postmodernism, reason cannot be a reliable source of

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[23] Dickens and Fontana, 'Postmodernism', p. 2.

[24] See for instance, Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, (Cornell University Press: NY, 2000).

[25] *Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi, (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1984), p. xxiv.

[26] Simon Malpas, *The Postmodern*, p. 37.

knowledge because reason itself is a hegemonic project. Ultimate truth is impossible to attain because everyone has his/her own truth.[27]

For the purposes of this study, rather trying to present an extensive account of postmodernism I will point some crucial elements of postmodern theorizing. The elements listed below may also be considered as some of the building stones of the new-Islamist discourse. Postmodernist theorizing alters the status of knowledge, science, reality, reason, subject, morality, economics, politics and the state; shakes the safe grounds of science and scientific development by stressing the paradigmatic and cultural burdens of producing knowledge. The Enlightenment ideal of posing knowledge, science and education as antidotes to power is challenged by the postmodern argument that power is intrinsic to these phenomena.

Postmodernism questions the supposedly unproblematic relationship between the subjects and objects of science. It maintains that the privileged position of 'absolute truth' has been convulsed by the idea of 'truth regimes'. Postmodernism asserts that Reason could no longer be the only reliable source of knowledge; and it replaces the Cartesian subject of Enlightenment by divided, crossed and decentred subject borrowed from Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalysis. Accordingly 'the subject' has been replaced by 'subject positions'. Postmodernism deconstructs and problematizes the claims of universality, universal morality and equality, since the very ideas of 'impartiality' and 'universality' represents the interests of a privileged minority ('the West', 'the white', 'the male population'), and have been propounded for maintaining uneven power relations. It criticizes the modern state and modern political institutions for their disciplinary, homogenizing and totalitarian organization. Postmodernism opposes the Jacobin imaginary which claims to lead the way to Emancipation (with a capital E) of all, and insists on plurality of emancipating projects.[28]

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[27] Cited in Farouk-Alli, 'The Second Coming of the Theocratic Age?', p. 297.

[28] See David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, (Blackwell: Cambridge MA, 1990); Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, (Verso: London and New York, 2001) and Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, *Postmodern Theory*, (The Guilford Press: New York, 1991).

4.1.2. Postmodernism, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition

'Politics of recognition', or multiculturalism, appeared as the most salient political expression of post-modernist attack on Enlightenment claims of universalism and essentialism. In Turkey, one of the earliest projects of multicultural citizenship (the Medina Charter) has been proposed by the new-Islamist intellectuals. The debates around the Medina Charter and the idea of multiculturalism are significant since these debates are deeply connected to neo-liberal restructuring of politics. This will also bring the question regarding the overall relationship between the advent of postmodern theorizing and the rise of neoliberalism to the fore.

The advent of post-modernism elevated questions regarding the political representation and recognition of cultural groups to the top of the political agenda. Charles Taylor, in his seminal essay 'The Politics of Recognition' departed from the observation that "all societies are becoming increasingly multicultural, while at the same time becoming more porous."[29] The most fundamental question for multiculturalism was 'how to recognize the distinct cultural identities of members of a pluralistic society.'[30] Contemporary liberalism, for Gutmann, responded to this concern negatively through positing the necessity of neutrality, impartiality and impersonality of public institutions: accordingly, this "is the price that citizens should be willing to pay for living in a society that treats us all as equals, regardless of our particular ethnic, religious, racial, or sexual identities."[31]

The 'blindness' of public institutions to particularities, for Charles Taylor, can be traced back to the politics of equal dignity which could be associated with the writings of Rousseau and Kant. However, Taylor states that the politics of recognition, as proposed by Rousseau, "is simultaneously suspicious of all social differentiation and receptive to the homogenizing—indeed even totalitarian—

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[29] 'The Politics of Recognition', in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, (ed.) A. Gutmann, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1994), p. 63.

[30] Amy Gutmann, 'Introduction', in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, (ed.) A. Gutmann, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1994), p. 5.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

tendencies of a politics of *the* common good, where the common good reflects the universal identity of all citizens."[32] Rousseau's civic public rested on the idea of universal and impartial point of view of reason which deliberately excluded desire, sentiment, and the particularity of needs and interests.[33]

As noted by Will Kymlicka, the traditional model of 'citizenship-as-rights' aimed at promoting a common national identity amongst citizens. This is why T. H. Marshall emphasized that citizenship was more than just a certain legal status, but also "an identity, an expression of one's membership in a political community."[34] For Marshall, granting fundamentals social rights to citizens like health and education was to provide a source of national unity and loyalty. It was this attempt of creation of a national unity and common political culture deemed homogenizing by theorists of multiculturalism. Iris Marion Young, for instance, saw the ideal of impartiality and universal citizenship as one of the manifestations of 'Five Faces of Oppression', '*cultural imperialism*',[35] which refers to "universalization of a dominant group's experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm."[36] The ideal of impartiality does not only express "a logic of identity that seeks to reduce differences to unity,"[37] the claim of impartiality and universality is itself questionable.[38] As critiques of modern political theory shows, the so-called universal citizen is white, bourgeois male. Both Young and Taylor assert the progressive moment of the idea of universal citizenship in the historical struggle against exclusion and status differentiation: "It has made possible the assertion of the equal moral worth of all persons, and thus the right to participate and be included in all institutions and positions of power and privilege."[39] However,

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[32] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[33] Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1990), p. 108.

[34] Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), p. 328.

[35] Others are 'exploitation', 'marginalization', 'powerlessness', and 'violence'.

[36] Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, p. 59.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

[38] Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 44.

[39] Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, p. 159.

universal citizenship, for Young, is far from meeting the demands of recognition in a culturally plural milieu. To sum up, Young asserts that the principle of impartiality denies and represses difference in three ways:

    i.   First, it denies the particularity of situations

    ii.   Second, in its requirement of dispassion, impartiality seeks to master or eliminate heterogeneity in the form of feeling.

    iii.   Third, the most important way that the ideal of impartiality reduces particularity to unity is in reducing the plurality of moral subjects to one subjectivity.[40]

Behind the project of universal citizenship was the idea of autonomous, self-conscious subject who was responsible for his/her actions. The "exhilarating promise" of liberalism, Sandel puts it, poses the idea of isolated individuals who are, by Rawls' words, "self-originating sources of valid claims."[41] The Kantian tradition embraces the idea of human subject whose "aims, ambitions, desires, and so on" are located at a distance from and external to that very subject.[42] For Sandel, "freed from the dictates of nature and the sanction of social roles," the unencumbered self "is installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only moral meanings there are."[43] The fundamental failure of liberal ethic expresses itself in its location of the self "beyond the reach of its experience, beyond deliberation and reflection."[44] This faulty conception of the self disregarded the role of communal attachments and traditions in 'constitution' of identity. On the contrary, for Sandel, they adhered to "a set of implausible metaphysical views about the self."[45] By Mulhall and Swift's words,

> Sandel accuses Rawls of asocial individualism, in that for Rawls, a sense of community can at best describe a possible aim of antecedently individuated selves rather than a possible ingredient of their identity; in particular, the good of political community is at best participation in a

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[40] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

[41] Michael J. Sandel, 'Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self', *Political Theory*, Vol. 12, No. 1, (February 1984), p. 87.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[45] Amy Guttmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 14, No. 3, (Summer 1985), p. 309.

well-ordered system of cooperation for mutual advantage, a system to which the individuals that populate it are some way logically prior.[46]

This liberalism, according to Sandel, "must provide a framework of rights that respects persons as free and independent selves"; and because it "asserts the priority of fair procedures over particular ends, the public life it informs might be called the procedural republic."[47] Sandel criticizes the procedural republic and its metaphysical foundations not only for being faulty, but also bringing about social and political problems –erosion of the moral fabric of community as among one.[48] Sandel's communitarian critic came up with more conservative conclusions like stressing the role of community and traditions in making of identity and self; or depiction of the family as an ideal model of community.

Likewise, Taylor's critique of asocial individualism stresses the dialogical character of identity formation. He asserts that "we become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression."[49] Departing from Bakhtin's theory of dialogism, Taylor asserted that identity is constructed through the self's dialogical relations with others. This is why recognition plays a pivotal role in making of identity.

Starting from Freudian revolution, the twentieth century witnessed a series of attacks upon the idea of unified, self-referential, Cartesian subject. Developments in psychoanalysis, phenomenology, linguistics/semiology, and anthropology questioned the centrality of individual subject in making of social structures and historical change. Jacques Lacan's work, for instance, following the Freudian revolution, undermined the notion of a unified and consistent subject and underlined the role of language in formation of meaning, signification and

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[46] Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians*, (Blackwell: MA, 1996), p. 41.

[47] Quoted in Colin Farrelly, *Introduction to Contemporary Political Theory*, (SAGE Publications: London, 2004), p. 98.

[48] İbid., p. 98.,

[49] Charles Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 32.

identification.[50] Saussure's structural linguistics, Claude Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropology, and Althusserian Marxism pointed to the advent of structuralism and decline of individualistic explanations. Post-structuralism brought the relational character of formation of meaning and identities further by adding the unpredictability and fundamental openness of all signification processes. Theories of multiculturalism and politics of recognition benefited from these theoretical developments. The transcendental and unified subject of modern political theory was to be replaced by plurality of selves formed in and through different historical and cultural settings.

For multiculturalism, the historicity and contextuality of the subject elevated the problem of recognition as the central issue of political theory. "What is new," states Taylor, "therefore, is that the demand for recognition is now explicit. And it has been made explicit . . . by the spread of the idea that we are formed by recognition."[51] For Young such recognition will only be achieved through establishing a 'differentiated citizenship' as opposed to 'universal citizenship.' In differentiated citizenship the central place given to the 'unencumbered self', or 'atomistic individual' will be replaced by recognition of groups and group memberships as political actors. For Young this is the only way of achieving a comprehensive notion of justice which goes behind solely distributive concerns.[52]

It must be also noted that the picture I present above regarding communitarianism and multicultural citizenship rests on over generalizations. Kymlicka, for instance, asserts that "as with communitarianism and civic republicanism, multiculturalism is Janus faced: it has both a forward-looking or progressive side and a backward-looking or conservative side."[53] In his study he also notes various models of multiculturalism regarding political, social and cultural rights of 'national

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[50] Rosalind Coward and John Ellis, *Language and Materialism: Developments in Semiology and the Theory of the Subject*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1986), pp. 7-8.

[51] Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 64.

[52] See 'Equality for Whom: Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol. 9, 2001.

[53] Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, p. 368.

minorities', 'immigrant groups', 'isolationist ethno-religious groups', 'metics' and 'African-Americans'.

As I shall show below, Islamist response to the idea of universal citizenship and Turkish Republic's (failed?) attempts to establish proto-secular ideology of Turkish nationalism as common denominator of citizenship generated a conservative multiculturalist discourse. I find a final quotation from Kymlicka useful for contemplating upon meeting points between religious-conservatism and multiculturalism. This could also be read as a point underlining one of the intersection points between postmodern social and political theories, and Islamism.

> The idea of multiculturalism has at times been invoked by conservatives who fear that liberalism and individual autonomy are eroding the traditional customs and practices of thick cultural communities, and understanding their capacity to pursue a communitarian politics of the common good. Multiculturalist rhetoric of this sort is invoked by traditionalist elites to prevent change within their group, to limit exposure to the larger world, and to defend some essentialized notion of their 'authentic' culture or tradition. To a large extent, this is just old-fashioned cultural conservatism dressed up in the new language of multiculturalism, and manifests the familiar conservative fear of the openness, mobility, diversity, and autonomy that modernization and globalization entail. It is 'multicultural' in the sense that it accepts that there is a diversity of groups within the larger society, but rejects any notion of diversity or dissent within each group.[54]

For Habermas, communitarianism emphasizes the existing community too much and reduces politics to the ethical. He criticizes these models of political community on the grounds that they see community as too holistic and do not see how community, in so far as it is to be a foundation for citizenship, involves the transcendence of particular cultural tradition.[55] Likewise, Kenan Malik asserts that, postmodern criticism of universalism and call for multicultural politics is far from producing radical results as it promises. For Malik, postmodern hailing of difference, rather than deconstructing racial hierarchies and cultural differences, reproduces the racist/essentialist assumptions regarding the natural differences

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[54] *Ibid*., pp. 368-369.

[55] Gerard Delanty, *Modernity and Postmodernity*, (Sage Publications: London, 2000), pp. 122-123.

(thus hierarchy) between races and cultures.[56] Pierre-Andre Taguieff, in his critique of multiculturalism, blames the multicultural reason for reducing political issues to matters of cultural struggle. This is why, for him multiculturalism and politics of difference is increasingly associated with right wing discourse.[57] Likewise, Charles R. Hale contends that seemingly progressive postulates of the neoliberal governance (including recognition of cultural rights, strengthening and promoting of the principle of intercultural equality), when combined with neoliberal economic policies, work for neutralization of political opposition, and consolidates the racial hierarchy.[58]

Slavoj Žižek, in 'Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism' defines the relationship between the universe of Capital and the form of Nation state as 'auto-colonization which refers to a change in the nature of global capitalism. "We are no longer dealing with the standard opposition between metropolis and colonized countries," states Žižek, and adds that "a global company as it were cuts its umbilical cord with its mother-nation and treats its country of origins as simply another territory to be colonized."[59] This refers to a new era in which the colonizing power is no longer a colonizing Nation-State but directly the global company that, for Žižek, treats American or French people as it treats the population of Mexico, Brazil or Taiwan. Žižek considers the rhetoric of multiculturalism as the ideal ideological form of global capitalism, which "involves patronizing Eurocentrist distance and/or respect for local cultures without roots in one's own particular culture."[60] Meyda Yeğenoğlu notes that the originality of Žižek's framework lies in his definition of multiculturalism as

[56] Kenan Malik, 'The Mirror Of Race: Postmodernism And The Celebration Of Difference', in *In Defense of History: Marxism and the Postmodern Agenda*, (eds.) J. B. Foster and E. M. Wood, (Monthly Review Press: New York, 1997).

[57] 'From Race to Culture: The New Right's View of European Identity', *Telos*, No. 98-99, (Wİnter 1993-Fall 1994); cited in Nuray Mert, 'Cami Gölgeleri', p. 48.

[58] 'Neoliberal Multiculturalism: The Remaking of Cultural Rights and Racial Dominance in Central America', *PoLAR*, Vol. 28, No. 1, (May 2005).

[59] 'Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism', *New Left Review*, (Sep-Oct 1997), p. 43.

[60] *Ibid.*, 44.

"racism without a positive content." The racism of multiculturalism does not imply disregarding other cultures, but on the contrary,

> it respects and tolerates other cultures, but in respecting and tolerating the different, it maintains a distance which enables it to retain a privileged position of empty universality. It is this emptied universal position which enables one to appreciate (or depreciate) other local cultures. Thus multiculturalist respect for the particularity of the other is indeed a form of asserting one's own superiority and sovereignty.[61]

The insights provided by the critics of the multiculturalist reasoning will help us to better understand and locate the elements of post-modern Islamist theorizing. I will deal with these issues in the following chapters, especially in the section on the new-Islamist intellectuals' assertion of a civil society based on the Medina Charter and multilegal communities.

4.1.3. A Postmodern Approach to Religious Injunction: Abdolkarim Soroush

Contemporary Islamic theory in general, and new-Islamism in particular, owe much to Iranian Islamic philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush, who was born in 1945 in Tehran and who is still working on the social, political and philosophical aspects of religious knowledge. The innovative approach that has been developed by Soroush caused some commentators to refer to him as the Luther of Islam.[62] Roy Jackson stresses that "Soroush's familiarity with Western philosophical and political ideas, coupled with his knowledge of the Islamic sciences and modern trends in Islamic intellectual thought," made him one of the most important figures of contemporary Islamic philosophy.[63]

Abdolkarim Soroush is one of the prominent figures of contemporary Islamic philosophy, who insists on compatibility of Islam with terms of Western origin –

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[61] Meyda Yeğenoğlu, 'Liberal Multiculturalism and the Ethics of Hospitality in the Age of Globalization', *Postmodern Culture*, Vol. 13, No. 2, (Jan 2003), p. 11.

[62] Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, 'Introduction', in *Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000), p. xv.

[63] Roy Jackson, *Fifty Key Figures in Islam*, (Routledge: London and New York, 2006), p. 238.

reason, liberty, freedom and democracy. Rajaee notes that there has been two distinct phases of Soroush's intellectual venture. While in the first phase (from his student days to early 1990s) he was deeply preoccupied with the Islamic revival, especially Khomeini's ideological and political programme; the second phase started as he was the limits of the Islamic regime that brought religious despotism rather than freedom and emancipation. *Kiyan* journal became the arena for Soroush and his followers to disseminate his framework. In *Kiyan*,

> not only did Soroush continue with his criticism of the traditional narrative of religion, but he also launched his defense of "democratic religious government." By this he means a society in which religion and democratic principles operate in congruity. It is a society in which religion is needed "to guide people and be the final arbiter in cases of conflict," and yet is one that relies on democratic principles: a "social understanding of religion [is] combined with rationality for people's satisfaction."[64]

Soroush's approach, however, does not imply resurrecting the modernist Islam of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He does not argue that Islam must be "reconstructed" or "revived" in order to meet the requirements of modernity.[65] His exchanges with hermeneutical philosophy in the West, and philosophy of science, together with his masterful involvement with Islamic philosophy helped him to develop a dynamic approach which gives specific importance to 'interpretation of religious texts.'[66] Soroush "envisions the possibility and the desirability of secularization of an Islamic society without a concomitant profanation of its culture."[67] However, the term 'secularization' is used as synonymous with what is rational and scientific; not anti-religious.[68]

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[64] Farhang Rajaee, *Islamism and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran*, (University of Texas Press: Austin, 2007), p. 227.

[65] Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, p. 153.

[66] Soroush, *Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam*, p. 14.

[67] Sadri and Sadri, 'Introduction', p. xvii.

[68] *Ibid*., p. 238.

The distinctive aspect of Soroush's Islamic perspective is his innovative approach towards religious knowledge. For Soroush, "religious knowledge is effectively no different from knowledge in general";[69] which means that it is "incomplete, impure, insufficient, and culture bound,"[70] and "evolves along with other branches of human knowledge."[71] By Esposito and Voll's definition "Soroush's position is fundamentally one of caution: caution against confusing religion itself with the knowledge gained from the study of it."[72] The stress on incomplete character of 'religious knowledge', but not religion or revelation itself, opens up a possibility for developing a pluralist perspective within Islamic jurisprudence (*ijtihad*). The theory of contraction and expansion is based on drawing a distinction between 'religion' and 'religious knowledge, and "considers the latter as a branch of human knowledge, and regards our understanding of religion as evolving along with other branches of human knowledge."[73] The thesis of contraction and expansion insists on the "fundamental openness of a text or an event to a multitude of interpretations and a plurality of readings."[74]

> Yes, it is true that sacred scriptures are (in the judgment of followers) flawless; however, it is just as true that human beings' understanding of religion is flawed. Religion is sacred and heavenly, but the understanding of religion is human and earthly. That which remains constant is religion [din]; that which undergoes change is religious knowledge and insight [ma 'refat-e dini]. . . . Religion is in no need of reconstruction and completion. Religious knowledge and insight that is human and incomplete however, is in constant need of reconstruction. . . . Reason does not come to the aid of religion to complement it; it struggles to improve its own understanding of religion.[75]

As we will see below, the hermeneutical twist introduced by Abdolkarim Soroush is mostly celebrated by Islamist intellectuals in Turkey in the 1990s. Especially the theorists of pluralist, multilegal society project will embrace the distinction drawn

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[69] Roy Jackson, *Fifty Key Figures in Islam*, p. 239.

[70] Soroush, *Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam*, p. 32.

[71] *Ibid*., p. 33.

[72] Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, p. 155.

[73] Soroush, *Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam*, p. 33.

[74] *Ibid*., p. 7.

[75] *Ibid*., p. 31.

by Soroush between religious knowledge and religion itself. For instance, while defending his position in debates over the Medina Charter, Ali Bulaç asserts that Muslims believe in and are attached to revelation, but none can claim to reach the general, final and absolute truth regarding it. The Muslims, for Bulaç, at best hope that they will reach the truth through following the revelation, but cannot be sure to reach the truth itself.[76]

The most striking consequence of Soroush's hermeneutical revolution is dissolution of established ties between religion, ideology and politics. The partial and incomplete nature of religious knowledge is in conflict with reaching rigid conclusions regarding questions of appropriate political, social and economic religious order. Soroush calls for "the abandonment of Islamic "ideology" altogether, arguing that it hinders the growth of religious knowledge."[77] For Soroush religion cannot provide sufficient inputs for administrating a modern state.[78] Yet

> Soroush sees a place for Islam in politics. He argues that the only form of religious government that does not transform religion into an ideology or obstruct the growth of religious knowledge is a democratic one. . . He considers democracy a form of government that is compatible with multiple political cultures, including Islamic ones.[79]

If one of the most distinctive traits of Islamic revival in the second half of the twentieth century was ideologization of Islam; the twist provided by Soroush aims at reversing this process. In other words, Soroush attempted to de-ideologize religion by asserting that it cannot be a guide in defining the appropriate form of government. This was not because religion was incapable of doing this, but the incapacity of believers to touch the core of religious teaching. Soroush's framework presented a fundamental challenge to the Islamic revival which was based on the assumption that 'the' religious truth will pave the way for emancipation of the entire human race. This challenge found its reflections firstly

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[76] Ali Bulaç, 'Sözleşme temelinde toplumsal proje', *Birikim*, no. 40, August 1992, p. 61.

[77] Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, p. 155.

[78] *Ibid*., p. 155.

[79] *Ibid*., *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, p. 160.

in transformation of the Islamist discourse in Iran, which was welcomed by Asef Bayat as 'the coming of a post-Islamist society.'[80] Afterwards, Soroush has become an influential figure for the agents of change in other Muslim majority countries.

4.2. Global Context of New-Islamism: Neoliberal Globalization

4.2.1. Some Notes on Globalization

Many terms are in circulation in order to label the worldwide transformations that have taken place in the last quarter of twentieth century: 'globalization', the rise of the 'information society', or the 'network society.'[81] Although many agree on the fact that these transformations have been deeply influencing the states and societies; the extent and meaning of these transformations are matters of contention among the theorists.[82] The theories of globalization mostly underline the significance of rapid economic, political, cultural and technological developments and changes for the societies. Noting that globalization has an undeniably material aspect which can be identified by pointing flows of trade, capital and people across the globe, Held and McGrew state that globalization is facilitated by "different kinds of infrastructure – physical (such as transport or banking systems), normative (such as trade rules) and symbolic (such as English as a lingua franca) – which establish the preconditions for regularized and relatively enduring forms of global interconnectedness."[83] Within this context, globalization refers to a significant increase and condensation in worldwide interconnectedness.

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[80] 'The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society ', *Critique*, (Fall 1996).

[81] See Frank Webster, *Theories of the Information Society*, (Routledge: London and New York, 2006).

[82] Allan Cochrane and Kathy Pain, 'A Globalizing Society?' in *A Globalizing World? Culture, Economics, Politics*, (ed.) D. Held, (Routledge: London and New York, 2004), p. 6.

[83] David Held and Anthony McGrew, 'The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction', in *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction To The Globalization Debate*, (eds.) D. Held and A. McGrew, (Polity Press: Massachusetts, 2002), p. 3.

While some mark these transformations as epochal shifts which make us to reconsider our ontological and epistemological assumptions regarding states and societies; some warn us not to exaggerate these developments. For instance we have Immanuel Wallerstein's insistence that there is nothing significantly new in development of capitalism as a global system, whose roots can be traced back to the sixteenth century. Accordingly, capitalism is "an integrating world system which has an internal dynamic of development" and it needs to constantly "expand its geographical boundaries in order to combat the regular slumps to which it is prone."[84] Accordingly, what we face today is a new form of internationalism, not a complete paradigmatic shift.

On the other hand there is a huge literature stressing the revolutionary nature of globalization. For the proponents of the significance of globalization, the emergence of a global market that trespasses the state sovereignty; emergence of new kind international and transnational governmental and non-governmental organizations; revolutionary advancements in communications technologies; emergence and consolidation of global news networks; and increase in the mobility of goods, services, intellectual products and the people pointed to emergence of a completely different world. According to this position, the concept of globalization refers first and foremost to "a stretching of social, political and economic activities across frontiers such that events, decisions and activities in one region of the world can come to have significance for individuals and communities in distant regions of the globe."[85]

David Held defines three theoretical positions in the literature on globalization: globalism, inter-nationalism and transformationalism. Accordingly, the globalists argue that "we are living in an increasingly globalized age in which states are being subjected to huge economic and political processes of change."[86] The

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[84] Kate Nash, *Contemporary Political Sociology: Globalization, Politics, and Power*, (Wiley-Blackwell: UK, 2010), p. 48.

[85] David Held and Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, 'Rethinking Globalization',

[86] David Held, 'Introduction', in *A Globalizing World? Culture, Economics, Politics, (*ed.) D. Held, (Routledge: London and New York, 2004), p. 1.

globalists underline that, the epochal changes of the last quarter of the twentieth century shifted our ontological and epistemological assumptions regarding the state, society, identities and culture; and rendered the previous (modern) conceptual tools and frameworks redundant. From the globalists' perspective these changes erode the power and authority of nation states and turn them into "decision-taker" (as opposed to "decision maker") institutions. For instance Bauman underlines the weakening locality and immobility of states as opposed to liquidity and mobility of capital.[87] Although it does not seem feasible to pose an unproblematic opposition between globalization and the nation-state, these paradigms questioned the explanatory power of modern political referents such as nation-state, national identity, and national economy for the analysis of social and political change.[88] Globalization paradigm rested on the assumption that the last quarter of the twentieth century is marked by increased connectivity in political, economic and cultural realms. Especially the developments in information and communication technologies rendered increased connection between states, societies and cultures possible. For the globalization paradigm,

> globalization implies a distinctively new international order involving the emergence of a global economic system which stretches beyond the control of a single state (even of dominant states); the expansion of networks of transnational linkages and communications over which particular states have little influence; the enormous growth in international organization which can limit the scope for action of the most powerful states; the development of a global military order... which can reduce the range of policies available to governments and their citizens.[89]

According to the globalists, in addition to the eroding effects global economy, globalization also poses legal and political threats to state sovereignty in political and ideological terms. Accordingly, border and territory are two defining

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[87] Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, (Columbia University Press: New York, 1998). In his analysis, however, mobility is also a class phenomenon which bears unequal relations: while it means power and prestige for the transnational (mobilized) educated elite, it has devastating effects on the ones at the bottom (immobilized), or the excluded of globalization.

[88] Ergun Özbudun and Fuat Keyman, 'Cultural Globalization in Turkey: Actors, Discourses, Strategies', in *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World*, P. Berger and S. Huntington (eds.), (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), p. 296. For a critical reappraisal of globalization paradigm see Roland Robertson and Kathleen E. White, 'What is Globalization?', in *The Blackwell Companion to Globalization*, G. Ritzer (ed.) (Blackwell: Massachusetts, 2007).

[89] Leo Panitch, 'Globalization and the State', in *Socialist Register: Between Globalism and Nationalism*, R. Miliband and L. Panitch (eds.), (The Merlin Press: London, 1994), p. 62.

characteristics of the modern nation state. Within this Weberian definition "states can be understood as the cluster of institutions which claim ultimate law-making authority over a territory, and claim the monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion and violence."[90] Within this context, globalization is considered as a process which threatens and challenges the borders of nation states through "the rise of transactions and relationships that cut across borders and either do not accept or simply bypass the old arrangements and the controls associated with them."[91] International and transnational governmental and non-governmental organizations and their increasing importance are pointed as proofs for the emergence of a global civil society. Also, especially the twentieth century developments in international law implied significant changes in the nature of political and legal sovereignty of states.[92]

Following Held's classification, internationalists, however, underline that while there are significant changes in structure and functions of the nation states, this does not necessarily bring the decline of the nation state as such, since "states are building new institutions and responding in all manner of ways to the new challenges ahead."[93] Accordingly the perspective which observes a dichotomy between forces of 'globalization' and the nation-state fails to understand the intricate relationship between social classes, capital and the state.[94] As early as in the 1970s Nicos Poulantzas warned that regarding an inverse relationship between internationalization and state power refers to a crude economism. For Poulantzas,

> the problem we are dealing with, therefore, cannot be reduced to a simple contradiction of a mechanistic kind between the base (internationalisation of production) and a superstructural cover (national state) which no longer 'corresponds' to it... Now we have already seen that the

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[90] Cochrane and Pain, 'A Globalizing Society', p. 6.

[91] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[92] David Held, 'The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty Transformed?', in *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction To The Globalization Debate*, (eds.) D. Held and A. McGrew, (Polity Press: Massachusetts, 2002).

[93] David Held, 'Introduction', p. 1.

[94] Tarık Şengül, 'Siyaset ve Mekânsal Ölçek Sorunu: Yerelci Stratejilerin Bir Eleştirisi', in *Küreselleşme: Emperyalizm, Yerelcilik, İşçi Sınıfı*, (eds.) E. A. Tonak, (İmge: Ankara, 2000), p. 131.

internationalization of capital does not give rise to a genuine transnational merger.[95]

For Leo Panitch, as for Poulantzas, "the concentration of power by transnational capital did not take power away from the state; rather, the state intervenes precisely in this very concentration."[96] In addition to this, neither international/global nor national/local scales present a homogenous structure. According to Panitch the international system has been organized in such a hierarchical manner that it favors *some* states over others. Also the categories of nation and nation-state are used arbitrarily and superficially by the globalists. The domestic sphere is also characterized by a hierarchical order between contradictory classes, and the state itself must be considered as condensation of these struggles.[97]

For Held, differing from the globalists and internationalists, the transformationalists "argue that globalization is creating new economic, political and social circumstances which are serving to transform state powers and the context in which states operate."[98] Unlike the internationalists, the transformationalists accept that globalization points to emergence of significant changes; however, unlike internationalists and globalists they reject any simplistic explanation that unproblematically highlights a predetermined route of change. They rather focus on the dynamic and fluctuating character of globalization which bears threats as well as opportunities; limits as well as possibilities and deadlocks as well as new venues.[99]

Another crucial concern within the globalization literature is deeply related to my study: the relationship between globalization and local cultures, or localization. The major question here is whether globalization process is headed towards the creation of a homogenous 'global culture' or not. A group of theorists read

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[95] Nicos Poulantzas, 'The Internationalization of Capitalist Relations and The Nation State', in *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, (Verso : London and New York, 1975), p.78.

[96] Panitch, 'Globalization and the State', pp.66-67.

[97] *Ibid*, passim.

[98] David Held, 'Introduction', p. 1.

[99] Cochrane and Pain, 'A Globalizing Society', passim.

globalization as a homogenizing (economic, political and cultural) process which imposes its imperatives on local cultures, and observes a clash between global and local forces. George Ritzer's comments in *The McDonaldization of Society*[100] or Benjamin Barber's 'Jihad vs. McWorld'[101] can be considered within this group. Both positions focus on the homogenizing effects of globalization and evaluate the concept in terms of Americanization.

The critics of homogenization thesis focus more on the social, political and cultural effects of globalization; and stress its heterogenizing effects. It focuses firstly on the cultural and social character of globalization, and highlights the complex relationship between global and local forces. Rather than seeing a dichotomy between forces of globalization and local forces, the proponents of heterogeneity focus on the intertwined nature of the relation between two. For Arjun Appaduari, a prominent defender of heterogeneity argument, "what these arguments fail to consider is that at least as rapidly as forces from various metropolises are brought into new societies they tend to become indigenized in one or another way: this is true of music and housing styles as much as it is true of science and terrorism, spectacles and constitutions."[102] Likewise Roland Robertson opposes the dichotomous reading of the relationship between globalization and localities by asserting that "what is called local is in large degree constructed on a trans- or super-local basis. . . . Much of what is often declared to be local is in fact the local expressed in terms of generalized recipes of locality."[103] This is why, for Robertson, rather than talking about an unproblematic process of globalization, we must refer to explanatory power of the concept of 'glocalization'. Glocalization warns us to approach the relationship between global and the local as "being

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[100] *The McDonaldization of Society*, (Sage: London, 2011).

[101] "The tendencies of what I am here calling the forces of Jihad and the forces of McWorld operate with equal strength in opposite directions, the one driven by parochial hatreds, the other by universalizing markets, the one re-creating ancient subnational and ethnic borders from within, the other making national borders porous from without. They have one thing in common: neither offers much hope to citizens looking for practical ways to govern themselves democratically." 'Jihad vs. McWorld', *The Atlantic*, (March 1992).

[102] Arjun Appaduari, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1996), p. 32.

[103] Roland Robertson, 'Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity', in *Global Modernities*, (eds.) M. Featherstone, S. Lash, and R. Robertson, (Sage: London, 1995), p. 26.

different sides of the same coin"[104]; not as inevitably conflicting opposites. A similar stress can be found in Giddens' work *Modernity and Self-Identity* which argues that there is a dialectical relationship between the local and global; and "the concept of globalization is best understood as expressing the fundamental aspects of time-space distanciation. Globalization concerns the intersection of presence and absence the interlacing of social events and social relations 'at distance' with local contextualities."[105] The modern era, for Giddens, has been characterized by high level of "time-space distanciation" in which "the relations between local and distant social forms and events become correspondingly "stretched"."[106] For Giddens 'globalization' refers to this stretching process and can be defined as,

> the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical process because such local happenings may move in an obverse direction from the very distanciated relations that shape them.[107]

The insights provided by various currents of globalization theory will help us to better locate the Islamist response given to globalization in Turkey. The transformation of the Islamist discourse in the 1990s provides an illustrative case study of an articulation achieved between an indigenous political movement and forces of globalization. Kösebalaban asserts that contemporary Turkish Islamism "has emerged as the language of rapidly mobilizing societal forces seeking further opportunities in the global marketplace to become a force of modernization and Westernization."[108] What we observe in the Turkish case is the presence of an intricate relationship between *globalization*, *neo-liberalism* and *Islam*.

In the third chapter I have noted the troubled relationship between the 'world system' and Islamism and underlined the rigid anti-Westernist and anti-imperialist

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[104] Robertson and Kathleen, 'What is Globalization?', p. 62.

[105] Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, (Stanford University Press: California, 1991), p. 21.

[106] *The Consequences of Modernity*, (Polity Press: Massachusetts, 1990), p. 64.

[107] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

[108] Hasan Kösebalaban, 'The Impact of Globalization on Islamic Political Identity: The Case of Turkey', *World Affairs*, (Summer 2005), p. 27.

kernel of the Third Worldist Islamist populism. However, when we come to the 1990s the weight of anti-globalization and anti-Westernist discourse in Islamism started to experience a gradual decline. In this process, political Islam did not identify itself with an uncompromising denial of globalization, but, on the contrary, developed a position that aims at co-opting the global order, and of acquiring an advantageous position within it.[109] Thus, the-new Islamist discourse, in this sense can be considered as a product of negotiation between globalization and Islam. In the sixth chapter, I will analyze the role played by Islamic capital and Islamic business associations in emergence of this pro-globalization discourse. As Ziya Öniş states, "the professionals, the businessmen and the intellectuals whom we would classify as the rising 'Islamic bourgeoisie', are clearly benefiting from globalization and modernity, yet also feel part of the excluded by not being part of the real elite in society."[110] However, as we will see in the MÜSİAD case, while integrating themselves to global networks, the new-Islamist economic, political and cultural intellectuals/elites claimed to develop a genuine articulation. The new-Islamists argued that while Islam was globalizing it was globalizing in its own way. Rather than, for instance, submitting themselves to homogenizing effects of neoliberal globalization, they claimed to establish a synthesis which protected the ethical core of Islamic societies. The debates over *homo economicus* vs. *homo Islamicus* or *Islamic golden generation* were pointed at this fact. When one takes the basic tenets of the new-Islamist discourse taken for granted, she can easily conclude that Islamism resisted homogenizing effects of neoliberal globalization. However, a closer look will show us that new-Islamism, especially when it comes to appropriation of neo-liberal themes, can be considered as an ordinary right-wing political establishment which resisted to homogenizing effects of neoliberal globalization only at the rhetorical level. To make my position clearer I will explicate the major features of neoliberalism in the following chapter.

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[109] *Kimlikler Siyaseti*, (Metis: Istanbul, 2003), p. 12.

[110] 'The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective', *Third World Quarterly*, 18(4), 1997, p. 748.

4.2.2. Neoliberalism

As I have stated above, globalization is a complex process which has complex economic, political, cultural, and social faces. However, regardless of the labels, what lies at the heart of these massive transformations was the centrality of an enlarging and highly integrated global market which was rendered possible by the revolution in information technologies.[111] A highly integrated global market, however, should not lead to the illusion that economic globalization refers to a new set of relation between equal actors. However one cannot think in terms of classical imperialism in which the nation-states are the primary actors of transference of wealth and resources from peripheral countries to center; the theories of globalization tend to disregard the asymmetrical nature of economic transactions taking place in the global markets. Introducing an analysis of neoliberalism may help us overcome this difficulty.

Neoliberalism was an ideological response to the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state. The Keynesian model was held responsible for the economic, political, social and, according to the New Right, the "moral" deadlock that the Western capitalist societies found themselves in.[112] Keynesianism, by Bonefeld and Psychopedis' words did not present a third way between *laissez faire* capitalism and planned socialism; but an "ideological projection of a reformed and tamed capitalism."[113] Thus, "the re-discovery of (market-) liberalism during the 1970s was not a 're-discovery' as such, but involved, in fact, a return to basic principles without the ideological projections that Keynesianism presented."[114]

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[111] Ronaldo Munck, 'Neoliberalism and Politics, and the Politics of Neoliberalism', in *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*, (eds.) A. Saad-Filho and D. Johnston, (Pluto Press: London, 2005), p. 64.

[112] Clarke, Simon, 'The Neoliberal Theory of Society', in *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*, (eds.) A. Saad-Filho and D. Johnston, (Pluto Press: London, 2005), p. 58.

[113] Werner Boneleld and Kosmas Psychopedis, 'The Politics of Change: Ideology and Critique', in *The Politics of Change Globalization, Ideology and Critique*, (eds.) W. Bonefeld and K. Pyschopedis, (Palgrave: New York, 2000), p. 2.

[114] *Ibid.*,

It is definitely hard to give a clear definition of neoliberalism. On the one hand it is a set of economic policies which rests upon an unlimited belief in the rationality and domination of capital and market. Neoliberal project rested on the belief that "human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade."[115] The rational utility-maximizing behavior of the economic actors and the goal of capital sovereignty are at the core of the neoliberal theoretical construct. The underlying assumption behind the neoliberal economic philosophy is "that capital should be either unregulated or self-regulated."[116] According to this construct, the market is the only rational mechanism which could ensure an efficient distribution of resources; thus the government intervention is demonized for it stands against rationality, efficiency and liberty. Moreover, by Tonkiss' words "neo-liberal perspectives position the market as not only the crucible for economic success, but the basis for a larger social good: the economics of the market opens onto an ethics of the market wherein market choices are linked to wider personal and political freedoms."[117]

What we find in neoliberalism is a reassertion of the basic premises of the liberal political economy, which was the dominant paradigm of the nineteenth century.[118] In general terms, as a set of economic measures neoliberalism orders trade liberalization; liberalization of financial markets and financial movements; promotion and liberalization of foreign direct investment; legal security for property rights; competitive exchange rates; privatization of state enterprises; deregulation a disciplined fiscal policy; controlling wages; and redirection and disciplining of public spending. But more than that, as Munck asserts, neoliberalism is "a strategy for governance of the complex global world we now

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[115] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), p. 2.

[116] Subir Sinha, 'Neoliberalism and Civil Society: Project and Possibilities', in *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*, (eds.) A. Saad-Filho and D. Johnston, (Pluto Press: London, 2005), p. 165.

[117] Fran Tonkiss, 'Markets Against States: Neo-Liberalism', in *The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology*, (eds.) K. Nash and A. Scott, (Blacwell: MA, 2004), p. 251.

[118] Clarke, 'The Neoliberal Theory of Society', p. 57.

live in."[119] "It has established a new sociopolitical matrix that frames the conditions of political transformation across the globe."[120] Neoliberalism assumes major transformations in economic, social, political, cultural and ideological realms. It is this specific assertion what makes the phenomenon of neoliberalism and the neoliberal hegemony so hard to grasp. The complexity of the phenomenon has been underscored by Saad-Filho and Johnston as such:

> Neoliberalism straddles a wide range of social, political and economic phenomena at different levels of complexity. Some of these are highly abstract, for example the growing power of finance or the debasement of democracy, while others are relatively concrete, such as privatisation or the relationship between foreign states and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs).[121]

Though presenting a global feature there is not one neo-liberalism; in other words, the nation states accommodate various neoliberal strategies in relation to the "domestic constellation of political power and interests."[122] Even within given country, the neoliberal project can display variations and witness varying articulations throughout time. In Turkey, for instance, the neo-liberalized version of Islamism can be considered as one of the manifestations of this strategy. I will deal with the details of this process below.

Ronaldo Munck distinguishes two phases of neoliberalism. The first phase begins with the Pinochet Military coup in Chile in 1973 and the subsequent 'Chicago Boys' (a group of Chilean economists trained in University of Chicago and played extensive role in deployment of neoliberal policies in Chile) project. The first phase found its established formulations through the economic policies of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, and by Ronald Reagan in the United States:

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[119] Munck, 'Neoliberalism and Politics', p. 68; also see Wendy Larner, 'Neoliberalism: Politics, Ideology, Governmentality', *Studies in Political Economy*, No. 63, (Autumn 2000)

[120] Munck, 'Neoliberalism and Politics', p. 60.

[121] Alfred Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston, 'Introduction', in *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*, (eds.) A. Saad-Filho and D. Johnston, (Pluto Press: London, 2005), pp. 1-2.

[122] Subir Sinha, 'Neoliberalism and Civil Society', p. 165.

Taking their cue from Hayek and Friedman, Pinochet, Thatcher and Reagan used a strong state to 'roll back' state interference and consolidate free market mechanisms. This was the first stage of the neoliberal revolution, based on forcing a retreat from the Keynesian and developmental state political matrix. The labour market was to be 'deregulated' and labour made more 'flexible'. Management's 'right to manage' was to be restored in all its splendour and the market would not be allowed to suffer from 'political' constraints. While the paths towards neoliberalism were diverse – being shaped by historical context and political process – by the end of the 1980s it had become remarkably hegemonic, with previous welfare and development state models seeming archaic. This was when TINA had an awful truthfulness about it.[123]

Munck asserts that the second phase of neoliberalism began in the 1990s "committed to a 'roll out' of new policies rather than just a 'roll back' of the state" (2005: 63). In this phase the neoliberal policies presented a more 'positive' and proactive character. It aimed at achieving a social control and regulation of the now recalcitrant members of society such as migrants, single-parent families, prisoners and 'deviants' or socially 'excluded' members of society in the interests of the neoliberal *political* agenda.[124] This phase can also be considered as the generative phase of global neoliberalism, within which neoliberal *governmentality* came into prominence.[125]

As stated above, the utmost belief in market and capital rationality was backed up an aggressive critique of state involvement into the economic realm. However, as it has been underlined by many critics of neoliberal orthodoxy, it was not the state or state intervention that was ruled out. On the contrary, the states had an important role in promotion of neoliberal globalization. By Nash's words, "the development of global markets, including the privatization of what was previously public, would not be possible without detailed and extensive state regulation."[126] However, this time the state is being transformed in global governance. Against the explanations that pose an opposition between political and economic processes

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[123] Munck, 'Neoliberalism and Politics', pp. 62-63)

[124] *Ibid.*, pp. 63.

[125] See Larner, 'Neoliberalism' for "*neoliberalism as governmentality*" discussion.

[126] Nash, *Contemporary Political* Sociology, p. 46.

it must be argued that politics is an integral element in orchestration of these transformations. As it has been demonstrated by one of the greatest economic-historiographers of the twentieth century, Karl Polanyi, the so-called belief in the rationality of the self-regulating markets is a mere myth. Polanyi has criticized this market myth for continuously seeking to make a society in its own image. For Polanyi the economic history shows us that,

> the emergence of national markets was in no way the result of the gradual and spontaneous emancipation of the economic sphere from governmental control. On the contrary, the market has been the outcome of a continuous and often violent intervention on the part of government which imposed the market organization on society for noneconomic ends.[127]

Thus we can argue that neoliberalism did and do not aim at eliminating the state's involvement in economic sphere. Again to borrow Munck's formulation, "society is transformed in the image of the market and the state itself is 'marketised'. . . As the function of the state become reorganised to fit with the new global order, so the state begins to act even more clearly as a market 'player' itself and not a 'referee' as in the old national order of states."[128]

For Robert Cox and Travis Sinclair what is at stake is the reorganization of the state, not its destruction, both in internal and external terms. Firstly the states' role has been shifted from *protecting the national economies from the destructive effects of the external economic forces and movements* to promoting integration of domestic economies to global markets. Secondly, the agencies of the national governments which are assigned to orchestrate this adaptation process have become pre-eminent (ministries of industry or labor are now subordinate to ministries of finance). Finally, there is "a transnational process of consensus formation" by INGOs such as OECD, IMF and G7 that plays a great role in policy formulations of national governments. Departing from these evaluations Cox and Sinclair maintain that in neoliberal globalization "the state's role is therefore one

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[127] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, (Beacon Press: Boston, 2001), p. 258.

[128] Munck, 'Neoliberalism and Politics', p. 63.

of helping to adjust the domestic economy to the requirements of the world economy. The state is a transmission belt from world to domestic economy."[129]

Thus, neoliberal globalism does not promote 'private initiative' as a rule; as Saad-Filho and Johnston[130] states under the discourse of non-intervention and deregulation, neoliberalism involves extensive and invasive interventions in every area of social life. The discourse of deregulation occupies a considerable place in neoliberal programme, but what is really meant by deregulation is a different kind of regulation: it "imposes regulation that assures the separation of markets from social control."[131] To sum up, neoliberalism,

> imposes a specific form of social and economic regulation based on the prominence of finance, international elite integration, subordination of the poor in every country and universal compliance with US interests. . . Laws are changed to discipline the majority, restrict their rights of association and make it difficult to protest against the consequences of neoliberalism and to develop alternatives. The police, the courts and the armed forces are available to quash protests in the 'new democracies' such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Nigeria, South Africa, South Korea and Zambia, as well as in 'old democracies' such as France, India, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.[132]

4.2.2.1. Politics of Neoliberalism

Foregoing brings the place of the state, politics and democracy in neoliberal programme. As stated above, the first phase of neo-liberalism found its established and mature formulations under New Right governments. There is no doubt that New Right refers to a set of political, economic, social, cultural and ideological measures which goes beyond the concerns of neoliberalism.[133] But also there are

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[129] Peter Burnham, 'Globalization, Depoliticization and 'Modern' Economic Management' in *The Politics of Change Globalization, Ideology and Critique*, (eds.) W. Bonefeld and K. Pyschopedis, (Palgrave: New York, 2000), pp. 13-14.

[130] 'Introduction', p. 4.

[131] Arthur MacEwan, 'Neoliberalism and Democracy: Market Power versus Democratic Power', in *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*, (eds.) A. Saad-Filho and D. Johnston, (Pluto Press: London, 2005), p. 173.

[132] Saad-Filho and Johnston, 'Introduction', p. 4.

[133] Leslie Hoggart, 'Neoliberalism, the New Right and Sexual Politics', in *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*, (eds.) A. Saad-Filho and D. Johnston, (Pluto Press: London, 2005), p. 149.

close connections and overlaps between New Right and neoliberal agendas. Neoliberals and New Right politicians both rose upon an aggressive critique of Keynesian welfare state and the so-called 'dependency culture' thought to be generated by it. Neoliberal and New Right universe were composed of elements like individualism, choice, market society, laissez faire, and minimal government intervention in the economy. Also conservative themes such as strong government in non-economic domains, social authoritarianism, social-Darwinism, disciplined society, maintenance of law and order, hierarchy and subordination, and a cult of the nation, debasement and edging out of the segments of the population that were outside 'the norm' (like single mothers), defense of nuclear family and family values, and critique of moral decline of the previous decades were the overlapping themes shared by both currents.[134] As it has been asserted by Anna-Marie Smith, for Thatcher,

> . . .the welfare state's promotion of a dependency culture and the interference in the market on the part of the nationalized industries and trade union movement constituted the most serious threats to moral standards. Economic renewal, therefore, entailed a moral revolution: a return to individual responsibility, free market entrepreneurialism and British nationalism.[135]

As seen, the New Right ideology presents an articulation of liberal and conservative values. New Right ideology criticizes the welfare state provisions for they attacked fundamentally on individual freedom. However, the idea of individual as envisaged by neo-liberalism was an isolated one, solely pursuing her own self-interest. This point has found its expression in the famous proclamation of Margaret Thatcher "There is no such thing as a society. There are individual men and women, and there are families."[136] And freedom implied removal of impediments for market actors; but of course, not for all of the market actors, but the owners of capital, since one of the most important objectives of neo-liberal and New Right projects was to tame and discipline the working class.

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[134] Stuart Hall, *The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left*, (Verso: London and New York, 1988); Sinha 'Neoliberalism', Hoggart, 'Neoliberalism'.

[135] *New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality: Britain 1968-1990*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1994), p. 3.

[136] Clarke, 'The Neoliberal Theory of Society', pp. 50-51.

In November 1996, Cornelius Castoriadis says to Daniel Mermet that the most apparent characteristic of contemporary politics is its *insignificance*: "The politicians lack power . . . They do not have a programme anymore. Their only objective is to stay in their seats."[137] Neoliberalism, for many critics, envisages a political project which denies the fundamentals of political process. Bauman asserts that while liberalism, a century ago, was a revolutionary and progressive ideology, now only stands as an excuse for submission: "today, liberalism is reduced to the simple slogan of "there is no alternative." This politics applauds conformity, and there is no need for politics in order to achieve conformity.[138]

The necessitarian kernel of neo-liberal project reduces politics and political action to 'administration of things'. This is why Unger states that "the form of politics preferred by neoliberalism is relative democracy: democracy but not too much."[139] It can also be added that the form of politics preferred by neoliberalism is a relative politics: politics and political participation, but not too much. There are two related but different dimensions of this phenomenon. The first one is ideological, related with the neoliberal hegemony. Accordingly, any political action which questions the basic premises of neoliberal orthodoxy shall be ruled out for being irrational, unrealistic and inefficient. The neoliberal belief in smooth and rational self-operation of the markets brings distaste for political interference.

Friedrich August von Hayek saw capitalism as an endpoint of an evolutionary process; which makes anti-capitalist and solidarist ideologies as atavistic teachings. For Hayek any attempt for "engineering" that natural outcome would end up with totalitarianism. The spontaneous order of the market presents an unfathomable complexity for the human beings. Since our knowledge regarding the rules governing the market and society are necessarily incomplete, fragmented and episodic, no agency can claim to regulate or organize this complexity.[140]

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[137] quoted in Bauman, *In Search of Politics*, (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1999), p.12.

[138] *Ibid.*, 12.

[139] quoted in Munck, 'Neoliberalism and Politics', p. 66.

[140] John Gray, *Hayek on Liberty*, (Routledge: London and New York, 1989), pp. 20-26.

However, as stated above with reference to Karl Polanyi, politics is always in command for the very 'smooth functioning'. Thus, rather than ruling out politics at all, a particular political project is being presented as the sole option. The most common expression of this discourse can be found in condemnation of populist economic policies. Slavoj Žižek labels this process as post-politics, which stands as another form of degeneration of the political and which forecloses the political. In post-politics:

> the conflict of global ideological visions embodied in different parties which compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists…) and liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of interests, a comprise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus.[141]

Žižek's main target is the New Labour's post-political stance. According to this vision, the *good* ideas, in other words *the ideas that work*, must be evaluated and applied regardless of their ideological origins. However, political act proper is not deciding between ideas that work or do not work within a given framework, but "something that *changes the very framework that determines how things work*."[142] Chantal Mouffe's comment regarding the upsurge of right-wing populist and xenophobic movements in Europe, and particularly in Austria, is worth quoting:

> The displacement of the idea of popular sovereignty dovetails with the idea that there is no alternative to present order, and thus contributes to the creation of an anti-political climate that is easily exploited to foment popular reactions against the governing elites. We should realize that, to a great extent, the success of right-wing populist parties comes from the fact that they provide people with some form of hope, with the belief that things could be different. Of course this is an illusory hope, founded on false premises and on unacceptable mechanisms of exclusion, where xenophobia usually plays the central role. But when they are the only ones to offer an outlet for political passions, their pretence of offering an alternative is seductive, and their appeal is likely to grow.[143]

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[141] Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, (Verso: London and New York, 1999), p. 198.

[142] *Ibid.*, p. 199.

[143] Chantal Mouffe, 'The 'End of Politics' and the Challenge of Right-wing Populism', in *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, (ed.) F. Panizza, (Verso: London and New York, 2005), p. 56.

The second aspect of the problem is related with the uneven states of economic and political mechanisms. As stated above, one of the most prominent defining characteristics of neoliberal globalization is the prominence of freely circulating finance capital. Manuel Castells, in his work on information society, asserts that while the capital circulates freely, the politics stays desperately local; which means that the real power is rapidly becoming exterritorial. Thus,

> . . . with extant political institutions no longer able to slow down the speed of capital movements, power is increasingly removed from politics – a circumstance which accounts simultaneously for growing political apathy, the progressive disinterestedness of the electorate in everything 'political' except the juicy scandals perpetrated by top people in the limelight, and the waning of expectations that salvation may come from government buildings, whoever their current or future occupants may be. What is done and may be done in government buildings bears less and less consequence for the issues with which individuals struggle in their daily lives.[144]

The impotency of the governments and political actors in "deciding", and the purported unnecessariness of debating on "what is obvious" deepen apathy towards political action and creates a legitimacy crisis on the part of the rulers. Within this panorama the differences between political parties are flattened and anti-party and anti-political sentiments becomes the main phrases contemporary politics.[145] While neoliberal and New Right ideologues claim to represent themselves as the critics of totalitarian ideologies and perfect guarantees of freedom and democracy; their democracy is crippled with the absence of "the political." Even in some cases protection of freedom can give way to defense of anti-democratic, and even dictatorial measures (see Chilean and Turkish cases). Restrictions on political parties, repression of trade unions and workers' movements were seen as the prerequisites of this market-friendly democracy of neoliberalism. "What is remarkable, though, is the way in which this fundamentally conservative political vision of the neoliberals was successfully presented as progressive, even 'revolutionary'."[146]

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[144] Bauman, *In Search of Politics*, p. 19.

[145] See Ümit Cizre, *Muktedirlerin Siyaseti*, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2006), pp. 15-29.

[146] Munck, 'Neoliberalism and Politics', p. 65.

While neoliberalism pulls society away from democracy, its proponents often defend it as an instrument for the promotion of democracy. When the political process in a country is not democratic and political regulation of the market is used to create and protect the wealth and privileges of an elite, then deregulation – neoliberalism – can be readily associated with democracy. [147] As stated by MacEwan;

> Neoliberalism is the current ideology and policy programme that would further transform societies towards economic life characterised by market domination.. . . By removing as much activity as possible from the political realm and by erecting high barriers between the economic and political realms – in the name of protecting private property – the neoliberal programme makes democracy in the political realm of limited relevance to economic affairs. Democracy in the sense of universal suffrage and the associated rights of political involvement can exist, but the realm of political authority, the realm where suffrage operates, does not cover the central material aspects of people's lives. The insulation of economic affairs from political authority does not, however, mean that the state is weak. On the contrary, neoliberalism requires a strong state that can ensure the primacy of private property, preserve the dominance of markets over social control, and thus limit the operation of democratic power. Also, neoliberalism often requires a strong state, sometimes a dictatorial state, for its implementation.[148]

The place of citizen within neo-liberal project supports this post-political stance. Neoliberalism seeks to convert citizen into a consumer, which finds its expression in Munck's sarcastic phrase "I Shop therefore I am." While some argue that the decline of the significance of ideological divisions and 'meta narratives' opens up new spaces for emancipatory movements,[149] last three decades witnessed a gradual narrowing down of democratic public spaces, or *agoras* to use Bauman's phrase. It is not participating into political decision-making processes what defines citizenship, but the volume and quality of consumption is at stake here.

> The complex and empowering vision of citizenship in its classic democratic presentation was reduced, in the era of neoliberalism, to the power of the credit card and the pleasures of the shopping mall, realisable or not according to one's position in a sharply hierarchised class structure between and within nation-states. Even the 'political' notion of citizenship

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[147] MacEwan, 'Neoliberalism and Democracy', p. 174.

[148] *Ibid.*, p. 172.

[149] See Nilüfer Göle, *Melez Desenler: İslam ve Modernlik Üzerine*, (Metis: Istanbul, 2000).

became banalised, in practice reduced to infrequent and token visits to the polling booth – in any case a dubious indicator of democratic participation, given the dramatic decline in electoral turnout in many countries, not least the USA.[150]

After raising several critical issues regarding neoliberalism we have to tackle with the problem of ideological appeal of neoliberalism; namely, the neoliberal hegemony. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu once asserted that neoliberal discourse was not just one discourse among others, rather was a strong discourse. Neoliberal discourse is strong in the sense that it is so hard to question the validity and the truth of it:

> It is so strong and so hard to combat only because it has on its side all of the forces of a world of relations of forces, a world that it contributes to making what it is. It does this most notably by orienting the economic choices of those who dominate economic relationships. It thus adds its own symbolic force to these relations of forces.[151]

Neoliberalism is not a mere economic and political programme which has been launched by governments and imposed on society. On the contrary, the social practices and discourses of neoliberalism are deeply entrenched in *civil society*; variety of actors, most notably the organic intellectuals (from economists to organizational economic elites, journalists to non-governmental think thanks etcetera.) play a considerable role in forging and re-structuring of neoliberal hegemony. On the other hand, hegemony implies a terrain of struggle, a fierce competition between alternative projects of hegemony; thus, neoliberal hegemony "must be understood not as a fait accompli, but rather as an ongoing process of struggle and compromise through which the meaning of neoliberalism is both re-examined and reaffirmed."[152]

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[150] Munck, 'Neoliberalism and Politics', pp. 65-66.

[151] 'The Essence of Neoliberalism', Le Monde Diplomatique, (December 1998).

[152] Dieter Plehwe; Bernhard Walpen and Gisela Neunhöffer, 'Introduction: Reconsidering neoliberal hegemony', in *Neoliberal Hegemony: A Global Critique*, (eds.) Plehve, D., Walpen, B., and Neunhöffer, G., (Routledge: London and New York, 2006), pp. 1-2.

Borrowing Overbeek and van der Pijl's formulation, Sinha[153] asserts that a theoretical constructs become powerful when its key concepts can be used to analyze a variety of situations, when they can be used to create policy in a variety of domains and when they can generate generalizable institutional forms. Creation of hegemonic concepts and generalizable policies and institutional forms requires a relative fixity of meaning. As Munck states, "the struggle for hegemony waged by the neoliberal project was, at least in part, a struggle over meaning."[154] Thus, in order the dwell on the problem of neoliberal hegemony we must develop a conceptual framework regarding how ideologies work and what is the role played by ideologies in forging of hegemony.

Saying that the struggle for neoliberal hegemony is a struggle over meaning brings the question of "obviousness", which is one of the key mechanisms of ideological operations, comes to the fore. Breaking with the 'false consciousness' paradigm, Althusser asserts that "*ideology (as a system of mass representations) is indispensable in any society if men are to be formed, transformed and equipped to respond to the demands of their conditions of existence.*"[155] It provides the positions from which the individuals can act and represent themselves and others within the social totality.[156] However, the whole process of ideological operation (and making of subjects) is based on a certain kind of misrecognition; a misrecognition which is not eliminable since ideology is *eternal*— "that is, we must accept a certain delusion as a condition of our historical activity."[157] Althusser's move is so crucial for us since he questions the obviousness of meaning and obviousness of assuming subjectivity, and for he links the *constitution of meaning* to that of the *constitution of the subject*:[158]

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[153] Sinha, 'Neoliberalism and Civil Society'.

[154] 'Neoliberalism and Politics' p. 65.

[155] Louis Althusser, *Form Marx*, (Verso: London and New York, 2005), p. 235.

[156] Coward and Ellis, *Language and Materialism*, p. 74.

[157] Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology,* p. 2.

[158] Michél Pecheux, 'The Mechanisms of Ideological (Mis)recognition', in *Mapping Ideology*, (ed.) Slavoj Žižek, (Verso: London and New York, 1994), p. 148.

> Like all obviousness, including those that make a word 'name a thing' or 'have a meaning' (therefore including the obviousness of the 'transparency' of language), the 'obviousness' that you and I are subjects —and that does not cause any problems— is an ideological effect, the elementary ideological effect.[159]

This obviousness of the subject is a result of a short circuit, which Pecheux names as the 'Münchhausen effect', in memory of the immortal baron who *lifted himself into the air by pulling his own hair* —that is to say, the subject results as 'cause of himself.'[160]

What the Gramscian and Althusserian insights tell us is the fallacy of associating prevalence of neoliberalism with a mere conspiracy of neoliberal economic and political elites, or a with a sort of false consciousness. If we are to dwell upon such a complex global phenomenon we need an adequate conceptual and theoretical framework that will capture the intricacies of the problem. Also this framework must take different articulations of neoliberal discourse in different spatial and historical settings into consideration. Instead of a single, unified and ever-changing neoliberal project which is applied by respective countries, we need to think of "potentially quite distinct *neo-liberal hegemonic constellations*, which may be constructed at national, transnational, world-regional and global levels." Because,

> neoliberal historical power blocs inevitably feature distinct characteristics and constituencies, although intensified 'globalization' insures some important overlap. Over time, new historical power blocs may be formed through political struggle and these can alter the orientation and content of earlier hegemonic paradigms, but this process of change will be circumscribed by the achievements and institutional legacies of the previous social forces who were successful in establishing patterns of order and disorder that circumscribe tensions and social conflict leading to new dynamics. We thus propose to study the rise, maintenance and transformation of neoliberal hegemony by way of distinguishing different neoliberal hegemonic constellations in comparative perspective with the aim of identifying both commonalities and differences across space and time.[161]

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[159] Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans., Ben Brewster, (Monthly Review Press: New York, 2001), p. 116

[160] 'The Mechanisms of Ideological (Mis)recognition', p. 150.

[161] Plehwe et.al., 'Introduction', p. 3.

This last point is specifically important and closely connected to my study, since it will help us to read last three decades of Turkey's transformation under the rubric of *neoliberal constellations*. What we are faced is articulation of neoliberal discourse with distinct political and social projects. As Plehwe et.al. state "even if elements of neoliberal hegemonic constellations and historical power blocs weaken due to the electoral defeat of a neoliberal government or due to an economic (or financial) crisis . . . a range of internal and external stabilizing factors beyond political and economic power complexes can serve to defend, to maintain and to adapt neoliberal hegemony to new circumstances."[162] The story of the transformation of Islamism in Turkey can be read as the story of Islamism's greater integration and articulation with neoliberal economic and political project. So, the Justice and Development Party's emergence as the most 'successful' agent of neoliberal transformation in Turkey should not be seen as a coincidence. Rather, starting from the 1990s we observe a gradual (neo)-liberalization of the Islamist discourse. Of course this process was not only limited with change in rhetoric; but the same period witnessed 'opening' of the constituency of the Islamist politics to global economic, political and cultural developments, themes, and concepts. Keeping this framework in mind, in the final chapter of this thesis I will deal with the cornerstones of this process of transformation and articulation in details.

4.3. Conclusion: Postmodernism, Neoliberalism and Islamism

David Harvey starts his work *The Condition of Postmodernity* by the argument that "there is some kind of necessary relation between the rise of postmodernist cultural forms, the emergence of more flexible modes of capital accumulation, and a new round of 'time-space compression' in the organization of capitalism."[163] Harvey was not alone his association of postmodernism and contemporary capitalism. Frederic Jameson considered postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism in which cultural production "has become integrated into commodity production generally: the frantic economic urgency of producing fresh

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[162] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[163] Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, p. vii.

waves of ever more novel-seeming goods (from clothes to airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasingly essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation."[164] Likewise, Krishan Kumar notes that different theories of post-industrialism (the information society, post-Fordism, postmodernism) overlap one another; and the differences are related to emphasis. For Kumar the advancements in the information technologies and globalization are the common denominators for most of the explanations.[165]

All these stresses gain a specific significance when one considers the influence of theories of post-industrialism and globalization on making of the new-Islamist discourse. In other words, as I will show in the following sections in details, new theories of the contemporary world provided new-Islamism with powerful conceptual tools to develop their framework. In their critique of the modern state, debasement of ideologies, abandonment of oppositional/anti-systemic dimension of their thought, praising of entrepreneurial energies of Anatolian capitalists, integration to global markets and flexible production we see the traces of these theories.

Foregoing points especially bring the relationship between postmodernism and neoliberalism to the fore. I have no intention to argue that postmodernism is the ideological and aesthetic manifestation of neoliberal globalization. As I have tried to state above, one cannot talk of 'the postmodern' theory at all. However it is also a fact that there are many points of convergence between these two currents. It can be stated that some currents of postmodernism provided euphemisms, legitimizations and conceptual frameworks for the proponents of neoliberal globalization:

> The synchrony between the market offensive and a cofunctional postmodernist cultural sensitizing is noteworthy. . . . The discursive astuteness of postmodern neoliberalism resides in its effective articulation of euphemisms, which the interests of the centers of political and economic power, and of sectors identified with the "free"

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[164] Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, (Duke University Press: Durham, 2003), pp. 4-5.

[165] Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society*, p. 61.

economy, can use to cover themselves with an aesthetic aura that undoubtedly makes them more seductive. It is more attractive to talk about diversity than the market, about desire than the maximization of profits, about play than conflict, about personal creativity than the private appropriation of the economic surplus, about global communication and interaction than the strategies of transnational companies to promote their goods and services. It is more seductive to speak in favor of autonomy than against planning, or in favor of the individual than against the state (and against public expenditure and social welfare policies).[166]

In the case of new Islamism in Turkey there existed a peculiar relationship between Islamism and theories of globalization and postmodernism. It was at the end of the 1980s that a group of Islamist intellectuals started to become acquainted with postmodern ideas. Islamism's and postmodernism's shared distance towards modernity facilitated such an affiliation. At first, postmodern theories provided Islamism with additional weapons against modernity; afterwards, with material for a smooth transition from a discourse of opposition to that of compliance. For instance postmodern critique of metanarratives and ideologies presented a ground on which new-Islamist intellectuals began to question the emancipating value of political Islam. Postmodernization of Islam, in this sense referred to, by borrowing Roy's phrase, the failure of political Islam.[167] The Islamists' distaste for the transformative role of politics was in line with the political project of neoliberalism as discussed above. In this process the Islamists started to abandon their utopian discourse which rested on harsh dichotomies and promised emancipation for all for a new kind of Islamism which was less ambitious and less confrontational. Concepts like 'cultural Islam' or 'civil Islam' must be considered within this context. As I will show, what these concepts implied was reducing the 'political' to the play of 'cultural differences.'

Given the difficulty of drawing a clear demarcation line between neoliberal and postmodern critiques of the modern state, it will not be an exaggeration to state that postmodern critique of the modern state was the central point of intersection

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[166] Martin Hopenhayn, 'Postmodernism and Neoliberalism in Latin America', *boundary 2*, Vol. 20, No. 3, (Autumn 1993), p. 100.

[167] The Failure of Political Islam, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1994).

for neoliberalism and new Islamism in Turkey. When one considers the hegemonic position of 'state tradition' discourse both in the academia and society, the critique of the modern state served as a common platform for actors of different orientation. The new Islamist intellectuals in the 1990s found themselves aligned with neoliberal critics of the Turkish state who cite the known neoliberal themes such as minimization of the state and privatization. It must be noted the articulation achieved between Islamism, postmodernism and globalization was not peculiar to Turkey. Olivier Roy notes that by the effects of globalization the Islamist movements worldwide are turning into ordinary conservative political movements.[168] For instance, in his work on the transformation of Islamist discourse in Iran Farhang Rajae notes that,

> Since the early 1990s, globalization and the reconsideration of modernity in light of postmodern sensitivities have given rise to a fourth generation of politicians and thinkers, who defend modernity and advocate a "restoration" of both Islam and modernity. Indeed, the politics of Iran has become the battleground of the third and the fourth generations. For example, the presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) symbolized the ascendancy of the fourth generation, while the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 to that office symbolizes the ascendancy of the third generation.[169]

The schematic framework provided by Matrin Hopenhayn will be helpful in understanding the relationship and possible intersections between postmodernism and neoliberalism. For Hopenhayn, there is a relationship between the exaltation of market and of diversity since market is considered as "the only social institution that orders without coercion, guaranteeing a diversity of tastes, projects, languages, and strategies."[170] The critique of the vanguards is related to the denial of the transformational and emancipator role of politics, "unless the transformation is in the direction of privatization and deregulation." The critique of vanguards also means the critique of state planning and the regulation of the economy. The anti-political stance, as it has been discussed above, is supported both by postmodern and neoliberal critics. Hopenhayn also notes that the absence of an

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[168] *Globalized Islam: The Search For a New Ummah*, (Columbia University Press: NY, 2006), passim.

[169] Farhang Rajaee, *Islamism and Modernism*, p. xi.

[170] 'Postmodernism and Neoliberalism', p. 98.

emancipatory dynamics makes critique and questioning of "consumer society, waste, the alienation of work, the growing split between the industrialized and developing countries, social marginality, technocracy, or the way in which productive forces are misused" redundant. The critique of ideologies (most notably the Marxist and its humanist-socialist variants) and utopias (in particular the egalitarian utopias) makes concerns of equality or redistribution of social wealth and power into irrelevant.[171]

In the following chapters I will show how the themes of neoliberal globalization and Islamism overlapped. As I will point out, this discursive operation –which was based on displacement and cancelling of existing articulations and chain of equivalences, and re-articulation of the Islamist ideology to new discursive elements– was not a mere intellectuals' fantasy. On the contrary, it can be considered as an attempt to frame the social, political and economic transformations of the Islamic constituency especially in the post-1980 Turkey.

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[171] *Ibid.*, pp. 98-100.

CHAPTER 5

MAKING OF 'NEW ISLAMISM' IN TURKEY

5. 1. Winds of Change: Crisis and Reinventing Islamism in the 1990s

> World in general and Turkey in particular is experiencing a huge and deep transformation. Nearly everyone concur this point. Ideologies, doctrines or political philosophies that have been inherited from the previous century cannot motivate people anymore.[1]

> The route of demands for change in Turkey is for the benefit of us all. It is not possible to understand why the demand for a free environment without pressure, fear or taboos is seen harmful for Islam. Resisting these demands in the name of Islam does not make sense at all.[2]

> Men are changing, society is changing, institutions that maintain society are changing, and in line with these the traditional vision of the world is changing.[3]

It would not be an exaggeration to state that 'change' was one of the most recurrent themes in Islamist discourse of the early 1990s. As I have stated in the introductory chapter, ideologies and ideological signifiers are dynamic elements that are open to change and constant reinterpretation. Islamism and its discursive elements are not exempt from this principle. What made the transformation of Islamist discourse distinctive in the early 1990s was its self-conscious and self-reflexive character. Put another way, Islamism in Turkey have not only experienced a crucial discursive transformation in this period; it also has accomplished this through developing a conscious 'discourse of change'. The

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[1] Metin Emsal, 'İslam ve Çoğulculuk', *Kitap Dergisi*, No. 53, (July 1991), p. 3.

[2] Editorial, 'Yeni Zemin'den', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 3, (March 1993), p. 1.

[3] Ali Bulaç, 'Değişimin anlamı ve önemi', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 1, (January 1993), p. 17.

Islamists were aware of the reasons, dynamics and the route of 'change'; and rearranged their fundamental ideological proposals accordingly.

The point of departure for 'discourse of change' was major global and domestic developments which shook the grounds on which classical political and ideological actors were acting upon. Restructuring of global capitalism, the fall of the socialist regimes, the end of the cold war, neoliberal-globalization, and the rise of new philosophical currents (most notably postmodernism) were among the global developments that had direct or indirect influences on Turkish politics and culture. Alongside other political ideologies, Islamists were deeply influenced by these transformations at various levels. In the previous chapter I have dealt with some possible points of intersection between these developments, philosophical currents and Islamism. In this chapter I will focus on the place of 'discourse of change' in an emerging political discourse, the new-Islamism.

I consider new-Islamism as a response to, first, the hegemonic crisis Turkey facing especially in the 1990s, and second, to the crisis within Islamist ideology. After briefly analyzing the major dynamics of these crises, I will deal with the responses given to these crises by the Islamist intellectual circles. The section will be followed by a debate regarding the definition of transformation of Islamism. I will discuss labels such as 'political Islam', 'official Islam', 'civil Islam', 'post-Islamism' and 'new-Islamism'. In the fourth chapter I argued that theories of postmodernism played a crucial role in making of new Islamic identity, and I tried to present the contours of postmodern theorizing. In this chapter I will focus on appropriation of postmodern themes such as death of metanarratives, celebration of plural identities etc., by the new-Islamist intellectuals.

5.1.1. Turkey in Crisis

Aforementioned global transformations, without doubt, had grave implications for Turkey –a country, which was already experiencing socioeconomic and political upheavals especially throughout the 1970s; which ended up with violent suppression of all social and political actors by the military in 12 September 1980.

The military intervention aimed at achieving an extensive social and political transformation. The post-1980 adjustments were not limited with constitutional and legal arrangements. This peculiar break in Turkish history was characterized by, as Muharrem Tünay stated, the Turkish New Right's attempt at hegemony. According to Tünay, a shift towards and export promoted development strategy, the reconstitution of law and order, emergence of a new type of individualism, the progressively worsening income distribution, the formation of a New Right movement characterized this period.[4] The Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi-ANAP*) emerged as the most viable candidate to consummate this project. The New Right attempted at restoring a new hegemony, through not only aiming capturing the governmental power but also through securing spheres of hegemony: "schools, religious behavior, individuality, media and above all, the restoration of the necessary exploitation relation between capital and labour."[5]

The neoliberal structural-adjustment policies were at the heart of ANAP's project. 1980 pointed to a crucial shift in economic policies of Turkey and it pinpointed to the revised place of Turkey in the new international division of labour. The first major step of this adjustment was the infamous 24 January measures which have been formulated by economic adviser to Süleyman Demirel government, Turgut Özal. The program was consisted of liberalization of finance, prioritization of export oriented production, stimulating foreign direct investment, dissolution of organized labor force and privatization.[6] As stated by Sungur Savran, "as it is true for 12 September, 24 January is not only a date; it is one of the social foundations of today's Turkey."[7] The basic assumptions of the new economic program were based on the neo-liberal motto of "withering away the state" and getting its part in the globalizing economy.[8]

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[4] 'The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony', in *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, (eds.) A. Eralp, M. Tünay and B. Yeşilada, (Praeger: London, 1993), p. 11.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 12.

[6] See Taner Timur, *Türkiye Nasıl Küreselleşti?* (İmge: Ankara, 2004), pp. 49-77.

[7] 'Yeni-liberalizmin Tahakkümünde Çeyrek Yüzyıl: Eleştirel Bir Bilanço', web source, www.iscimucadelesi.net, 2005.

[8] Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Sağ Türkiye ve Partileri*, (İmge: Ankara, 1995), p. 163.

The 24 January measures and the following ANAP rule departed from a harsh critique of the "dead hand of the bureaucracy" and claimed to present a more dynamic outlook which fit the new requirements of the new international division of labour, and emerging global economic regime. The shift from import substitution industrialization strategy to export orientation –which required disciplining organized labor (and de-organizing the labor) for increasing comparative advantage– was one of the integral parts of this restructuring. However, this anti-statist economic stand did not include the liberalization and democratization of relationship between the state and the individual. On the contrary, anti-statist attitude of the New Right gave a considerable place to the state in maintenance of law and order, and in repression of any opposition movement (labor movement particularly) which threatened the 'well being of the state'.[9]

In Gramscian terms, New Right movement in Turkey, in spite of its all-inclusive rhetoric, was far from creating a *higher synthesis*.[10] ANAP's strategy was based on a constant marginalization and exclusion of the masses; and the accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects that required radical transformations rested on an extensively narrow social base.[11] Several dynamics played crucial roles in failure of the New Right hegemony. Firstly, the economic project of ANAP began to experience its limits in late 1980s, and Turkey, in the 1990s entered to a period of persistent and devastating successive economic crisis. Erinç Yeldan provides us with a general picture of Turkish economy of the period as such:

> At the turn of the 3rd millennium, the most visible aspects of the current Turkish political economy context are the persistence of price inflation under conditions of a crisis-prone economic structure; persistent and rapidly expanding fiscal deficits; marginalization of the labor force along

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[9] Hall, *The Hard Road to Renewal.*

[10] Gramscian concept of 'hegemony' cannot be thought in terms of ideological inculcation or class alliance. "Hegemony involves the creation of a *higher synthesis,* so that all its elements fuse in a 'collective will' which becomes the new protagonist of political action which will function as the protagonist of political action during that hegemony's entire duration." (Chantal Mouffe, 'Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci', in *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, (ed.) C. Mouffe, (Rotledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1979), p. 184; also see Christine Buci-Glucksmann 'Hegemony and Consent: A Political Strategy', in *Approaches to Gramsci*, (ed.) A. S. Sassoon, (Writers and Readers: London, 1982), pp. 117-118.

[11] Alev Özkazanç, *Siyaset Sosyololjisi Yazıları: Yeni Sağ ve Sonrası*, (Dipnot: Ankara, 2007), p. 68.

with the dramatic deterioration of the economic conditions of the poor; and the severe erosion of moral values with increased public corruption.[12]

Secondly, ANAP's all inclusive project of representing major political currents (nationalism, liberalism, social democracy and Islamism) was not sustainable since its political stance was based on total annihilation of politics itself. ANAP's basic claim was to introduce a "new" understanding of politics which is no longer tied up with any ideological 'prejudices'. Within this framework, all ideological divisions were criminalized and politics was reduced to 'administration of things' and mere technicality.[13] As I have discussed above, one of the crucial postulates of neo-liberal structural adjustment policies was drawing a 'clear' distinction line between economic and political spheres. Accordingly, the governments, regardless of their world vision, must follow a pre-determined economic adjustment plan and prevent political and governmental mechanisms from interrupting the 'smooth' working of the markets. Since ANAP, none of the influential political parties running for elections and governments did question this neo-liberal economic and political framework. Furthermore, in organizational terms, the post-1980 era, with the help of constitutional restraints, created political parties without any organizational ties with the society.[14] The new Political Parties Law provided central party organization and party leaders with unlimited and unrestricted power; which made local party politics more and more insignificant.

Moreover, within this new period, politics and political activity began to be conceived as being synonymous with corruption; even the Prime Minister of the period Turgut Özal in some of his historic speeches encouraged corruption. For him, regardless of being just or unjust, any activity should be supported if it was economically rational; even bribery, if making things easier and processes

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[12] Erinç Yeldan, 'Assessing the Privatization Experience in Turkey: Implementation, Politics and Performance Results', *Report Submitted to Economic Policy Institute*, Washington DC, (June 2005), p. 5.

[13] Tanıl Bora, '2002 Seçimi ve Siyasi Güzergâh Problemleri: 2002=1950, 1983, 1995?', *Birikim*, No. 163-164, 2002.

[14] See Ümit Cizre, *Muktedirlerin Siyaseti* on 'anti-party sentiment debate'.

smoother, was acceptable.[15] All these elements created a grave crisis of political representation, and distrust towards political parties (and politics in general).[16] Keyman and Öniş outline the dynamics and manifestations of Turkey's hegemonic crisis as such:

> During the 1990's . . . there emerged a simultaneous existence of transformation and crisis, mainly felt in the realms of politics, economics and culture. In this period, while there were societal calls for the necessary democratization of state-society relations, the development of civil society and sustainable economic development, the state and political parties faced a serious legitimacy and representation crisis, the economic realm has experienced a serious financial and governing crisis, the cultural realm was confronted by the religious and ethnic-based conflict. In fact, it was the identity-based conflicts, which have given rise to the process of the resurgence of Islam and the Kurdish question, marked the crisis-ridden nature of Turkish modernity and Turkish politics during the 1990s.[17]

Although the period of relative stability of the 1980s created an illusion of emergence of a new 'collective will', the 1990s witnessed a continuous struggle for (re)defining the limits of the 'social' and emergence of various alternative political discourses, most notably Islamism.[18] Nur Betül Çelik states that the revival of Islam as a hegemonic force in this period "showed that Kemalism's 'secular' and 'modern-western' subject-positions increasingly became less able to create and sustain popular consensus."[19] The dislocatory experiences of the period constituted a threat to identities of political subjects. 'Dislocation', here, refers to

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[15] See Coşkun Aktan, *Politik Yozlaşma ve Kleptokrasi*, (Afa: Istanbul, 1992) for political corruption and *kleptocracy* in Turkey.

[16] The last decade has witnessed shockingly high level of instability in voting behaviors. For instance, Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party), which gained nearly the 20 percent if general votes in 1999 elections and which leaded the coalition government between 1999 and 2002, in 2002 general elections only had approximately 2 percent of the votes. Or, Genç Parti (Young Party) of Cem Uzan, which has been formed only a few 'months' before the elections, with his neo-fascistic discourse and unbelievably groundless promises, won approximately 8 percent of general votes.

[17] Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations*, (Bilgi University Press: Istanbul, 2007), pp. 16-17.

[18] See Raşit Kaya, 'Neoliberalizmin Türkiye'ye Siyasal Etkileri Üzerine Değerlendirmeler ve Tartışma Ögeleri', in *Küreselleşme, Kriz ve Türkiye'de Neoliberal Dönüşüm*, (eds.) N. Mütevellioğlu and S. Sönmez (Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları: Istanbul, 2009).

[19] 'The Constitution and dissolution of the Kemalist imaginary', in *Discourse theory and Political Analysis*, (eds.) D. Howarth, Y. Stavrakasis and A. Norval, (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2000), p. 201.

the 'decentring' of the structure which "shatters already existing identities and literally induces an identity crisis for the subject."[20] However, for Ernesto Laclau, dislocations, which render the contingency of the discursive structure visible,[21] are productive as well as destructive. In other words, "if on the one hand they threaten identities, on the other, they are the foundation on which new identities are constituted."[22] The rise of Islamist and Kurdish nationalist identities can be considered within these terms. Keeping these points in mind, the following section will deal with the emergence of the new-Islamist political identity in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

5.1.2. The Islamist Response to the Crisis

For the new-Islamist intellectuals it was not only the outside world that was changing, but the Islamist discourse was also on the verge of a radical transformation. Given the major historical changes of the period, the transformation of Islamist discourse was not only necessary or desirable, but also inevitable. In 1991, Mehmet Metiner, a prominent figure of the Islamism of the 1980 (and the editor of *Girişim*) was noting that was complaining,

> Do the people have any idea about us; the people that we are, like leftists, always talking about? . . . For me, the people, whom we talk in the name of, do not know anything about us. We are so few. We are not even the marginal of this country. We publish journals (that only circulate 1000 or 2000), but cannot reach the people.[23]

Accordingly, Islamist alternative could present a viable option if and only if it could investigate, question and re-invent itself in accordance with global and domestic transformations. Islamism had to re-establish itself with a new vision in

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[20] David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, 'Introducing discourse theory and political analysis', in *Discourse theory and Political Analysis*, (eds.) D. Howarth, Y. Stavrakasis and A. Norval, (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2000), p. 13.

[21] Aletta Norval, *Deconstructing the Apartheid Discourse*, (Verso: London and New York, 1996), p. 13.

[22] Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, (Verso: London and New York, 1990), p. 39.

[23] *Kardeşlik Çağrısı*, (Risale: Istanbul, 1991), p. 76; also see Ruşen Çakır, 'Türkiye İslamcılarının politik krizi', Birikim, No. 42, (October 1992), p. 31.

economic, political, cultural, scientific and educational fields.[24] Otherwise, it would have been nothing but an archaic political stand which has nothing to say about newly rising phenomena of the new world order.

The transformation of Islamism in the 1990s introduced new paradigms, new concepts and new references to Islamist agenda. The basic purpose of this chapter is to closely examine the discourses of the major actors of this transformation process. Of course, the debates over the need for change and the direction of the so-called change was not running smoothly. The call for change has both been endorsed and denounced by different Islamist currents. Given the plurality of Islamist groups and of ideological currents in Turkey, presence of alternative Islamist strategies should not be surprising. The call for changing and re-inventing Islamism has been a bone of contention among various Islamist currents in the 1990s (and still is), which meant a struggle for hegemony within Islamism. The question was which of the existing Islamist perspectives will be accepted as the legitimate and true interpretation of divine revelation; or, who will claim the right to present itself as the true Islamist alternative? As I will show, while some Islamists insisted on the need for radical change of Islamism, others denounced the term as being synonymous with 'revisionism', 'heresy', or 'inconstancy'.[25]

Speaking as of today we can argue that the advocates of change appear as the victors of the struggle between different interpretations of Islam and Islamism. "As of today", since hegemonic struggle, and the struggle over fixation or definition of ideological elements, refers to a constant battlefield on which a war cannot be won once and for all. As I will try to point out, the hegemonic interpretation of Islamism does not mean that it is the only interpretation. Thus, showing the contours and clearly defining the sides of this struggle is crucial for understanding the transformation of the Islamist political discourse in the late 1990s.

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[24] Fatih Erdoğan, 'Değişimin Stratejisi', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 4, (April 1993), p. 63.

[25] Resul Bozyel, 'Değişim, İslam ve Müslümanlar', *Haksöz*, No. 1, (April 1991).

Underlining the importance of journals within Islamist publishing facilities in the 1980s, Ferhat Kentel notes that 1990s pointed to a vital break for these journals. While the project of constituting "an Islamic state" or "an Islamic society" was the fundamental objective of the Islamist journals in the 1980s, in the 1990s Islamist journals appeared as conduits for "investigating" and "debating" Islamist identity. By Kentel's words, in the 1990s,

> the Islamic movement needed to take into consideration very important experiences and respond to more complex and bigger problems. The Muslim intellectuals needed to re-consider the globalized world in which the nation-states take new forms and are being questioned; as well as Turkey which are affected with the waves of individualization and globalization.[26]

In the third chapter I have argued that the revivalist discourse of the 1980s can be identified as a version of third world populism which divided the political space into two antagonistic camps, and identified the west as the evil incarnate. The anti-systemic rhetoric found its drive in this simplistic political principle; and it was only through a radical restructuring of society and state and through annihilation of the enemy that this antagonism could be resolved.

The new-Islamist intellectuals also departed from an opposition. However, the poles of the opposition and the nature and dynamics of the relation between the poles have been re-inscribed. Following the New Right vocabulary, they have considered the political space as divided between two opposite camps: *the champions of change* and *the defenders of status quo*. Accordingly, while the former recognized the crisis of modernity in general, and ideological, political and economic crisis of Turkish political regime in particular; the latter camp insisted on keeping the things as they are. 'Change', 'the need for change', 'supporting change'... all these terms became the yardstick against which the viability of all political alternatives (Islamist or non-Islamist) were assessed. A 'new' Islamist outlook has been developed and the meanings of terms such as 'state', 'politics', 'economy', 'transformation/revolution', 'democracy', 'freedom', and 'Constitution' were contested, debated and re-defined within this context.

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[26] Ferhat Kentel, '1990'ların İslami Düşünce Dergileri,' p. 724.

This chapter will deal with the meaning attributed to change by different Islamist circles. Alongside with prominent Islamist intellectuals of the period, I will try to trace the phases and layers of the new Islamist discourse through scrutinizing influential Islamist journals of the time which present different Islamist outlooks: *Yeni Zemin*, *Bilgi ve Hikmet* and *Haksöz*. *Yeni Zemin* presented an extensively (neo)liberal and Özalist Islamist outlook, and played a significant role in making of new Islamism that laid the groundwork for formation of the Justice and Development Party in the late 1990s. The journal also became a platform on which prominent Islamist intellectuals exchanged ideas and experiences with their liberal and conservative counterparts. *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, when compared to the pragmatic and practical attitude of *Yeni Zemin*, presented itself as a deeply-thought attempt for locating Islam in the post-modern times. I have also dealt with *Haksöz Journal* in order to present the inner struggle within Islamism; and for pointing the existence of competing responses to changing global and domestic conditions. Alev Erkilet singles out *Haksöz* as one of the most prominent and long-running radical periodicals of the 1990s.[27] The journal, which is especially in an active dialogue with *Yeni Zemin*, is important since it intensely resists affiliation of Islamism with the concepts and the concerns of the new times. *Haksöz* can be considered as a continuation of the confrontational Islamist discourse of the 1980s.

As agents of making a new Islamism, I will begin by providing some information about *Yeni Zemin* and *Bilgi ve Hikmet* journals. The major structure of these journals, their scope and objectives and their audience will be briefly discussed. The detailed account of these journals will be the subject of the sixth chapter. After introducing these journals I will try to define the distinctive traits of new Islamist discourse through entering a critical dialogue with concepts such as 'civil Islamism', 'cultural Islamism' and Asef Bayat's 'post-Islamism'. As an alternative to these labels, I will offer the term 'new-Islamism' to describe the new Islamist discourse that began to emerge in the early 1990s.

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[27] '1990'larda Türkiye'de Radikal İslamcılık', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 - İslamcılık*, (ed.) Y. Aktay, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005).

5.1.2.1. *Yeni Zemin*: the Praxis and Pragmatics of Change

Mehmet Metiner's memoirs *Yemyeşil Şeriat Bembeyaz Demokrasi*[28] can be read as a quite lengthy and detailed manifesto of an Islamist intellectual who personally experienced the transformation of Islamism. As the editor of *Girişim*, he was one of the leading figures of Islamism throughout the 1980s. But by the early 1990s, the same figure appeared as a central figure of new-Islamist ideology.[29] In his memoirs, throughout 765 pages which are full of exhaustive (but very useful) details of his life, 'change', 'democracy', 'toleration', and ; 'pluralism' appear as the most recurrent themes. In fact, Metiner's detailed manifesto reflects the aspirations and feelings of a generation of Islamist intellectuals and politicians, who believe that previous methods of political struggle are out of date and new methods and approaches are needed. In this search, 'change' appeared as a magic wand that will cure all social, political and economic ills. In an interview, Metiner expressed the importance he gives to the concept as such:

> There are people who sincerely have doubts. *But we have changed*. Bülent Arınç, Abdullah Gül, Mehmet Ali Şahin... *they have changed*. Today we prove the *change* with the way we behave. But there are some people who argue that Erdoğan and his friends *have not changed*; they are the defenders of 'status quo'. They constantly question whether other people have changed or not. They are the ones who *need to change*. If they could have changed as much as we did, Turkey might have been an excellent example in her regions with her democratic republic.[30]

"Through pointing at the statist-*status quo* line of development which rules out change," writes Mehmet Metiner, "we were declaring that we are lining up with democratic change."[31] As an Islamist intellectual, Metiner was underlining the deadlock the Islamist politics faces. He is also aware that this deadlock is deeply related with social, political and economic transformations taking place both at

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[28] Mehmet Metiner, *Yemyeşil Şeriat Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, (Karakutu: İstanbul, 2008).

[29] I must note that I have no intention to point at some specific names and to make a "now-then" comparison, which I find a futile effort. Metiner is not crucial for he personally experienced an ideological transformation; but as one of the important figures of both (Islamist and new-Islamist) periods. His memoirs can be read as a personal record of this relatively rapid transformation.

[30] Interview with Neşe Düzel, 'Eskiden Taliban Gibi Düşünürdük', *Radikal*, 23 February 2004, *emphases* added.

[31] Mehmet Metiner, *Yemyeşil Şeriat Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, p. 531.

global and local level. He underlines the need for coming up with new solutions, new themes, new questions, to sum up, a new Islamist vision to overcome this deadlock. It was this urge what was the main reason behind publication of *Yeni Zemin*. It aimed to become one of the "New Grounds" on which a new Islamism will rise.

The first Issue of *Yeni Zemin* was published on 1 January 1993. The Journal was owned by Osman Tunç, who was the director of Nurcu *Zehra Foundation*.[32] Mehmet Metiner was the editor of the journal. Yalçın Akdoğan[33], who later became adviser to current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (AKP), was the assistant editor. In addition to publishing an article in each issue, Ali Bulaç was assigned as adviser to the journal. Later on, Davut Dursun[34], another regular author of the journal took over this duty. Ümit Aktaş, Kenan Çamurcu, Abdurrahman Dilipak, Davut Dursun, Ergün Yıldırım were among the members of the editorial board. Along with the Islamist writers, the journal frequently published articles or opinion pieces by non-Islamist –mostly liberal and conservative– intellectuals and politicians.

Yeni Zemin became a crucial intellectual force through its pragmatic approach to social and political issues of the Islamist agenda. When compared to other prominent journals of the time such as *Bilgi and Hikmet* and *Tezkire, Yeni Zemin* appeared as a journal of ideas and of actual politics. For instance, nearly every issue had a special investigation (e.g. 'constitution', 'military', 'Islamic state', 'privatization'), and these investigations directed clear questions –which required clear answers– to commentators. There were also independent articles, opinions on related or independent subjects. Again, nearly each issue hosted an open forum on various subjects (e.g. 'search for new political alternatives', 'Islamic movement

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[32] See the section on militant Islamism above for information on Zehra Foundation and its founder İzzettin Yılrıdım who was murdered by Hizballah.

[33] See Faruk Bildirici's interview with Akdoğan for his intellectual and political career, *Hürriyet*, (2 May 2010). "In 1993 we started to publish a journal named *Yeni* Zemin. *Yeni Zemin* was a journal within the Islamic community that stood for change, transformation and democratization."

[34] In 2005 Dursun was appointed as member of Radio Television Supreme Council (Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu-RTÜK); in 2009 he was appointed as the President of RTÜK.

and terror', 'Medina Charter', 'Sivas incidents'). When compared to *Bilgi ve Hikmet* and *Tezkire,* the articles are mostly clearer, shorter and easier to read, and the arguments are easy to follow.

As the quotation below shows, *Yeni Zemin* believed in its 'historical mission' and did not hesitate to advise the Islamist politicians. The contributors of the journal can be considered as ambitious intellectuals who endeavored to make a "real" difference –especially through influencing and giving direction to Islamist politicians. It can be stated that this was one of the feature that distinguished the Islamist intellectual stand of the 1980s and the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s, after the local electoral victories of the Refah Party, the Islamist intellectuals found the opportunity to take part in actual politics. They were assigned as advisers and officers in the RP municipalities and gained first hand political experience.

A long quotation from the first issue shall be useful, which, in fact, was the manifesto of the journal:

> *Yeni Zemin* is being published not as an additional new journal to an existing pile of journals, but for preparing a ground for an ***inevitable new formation***. It is being published to provide the Islamic thought and movement with ***a new departure point*** and powerful-solid ground. With this characteristic *Yeni Zemin* will unquestionably be the voice of ***a new mission***.
> The world is rapidly changing. Although with ambiguities and confusion for now, a new world is being formed. Radical changes taking place in the world is also deeply affecting Turkey and forcing for a process of change. Now everyone accepts that in Turkey ***the system of seventy five years has been blocked***. The new situation in Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and Balkans force the State of the Turkish Republic to re-make peace with its historical past, in other words with Islam. With this turning point in history social, cultural and political circumstances make ***re-structuring*** compulsory. *Yeni Zemin* is being published with the consciousness of fulfilling a historical mission in a country which faces with ***the necessity of change***. *Yeni Zemin* will line up with '*change'* within the struggle between ***central forces that represent the status quo*** and ***centrifugal forces that support change***.[35]

'The crisis of the 70 years old republic in a rapidly changing world'; 'an inevitable and necessary reconsideration of Islamic worldview'; 'making of a new Islamism'; 'the need for restructuring the Turkish state'; and finally, 'the historical mission of *Yeni Zemin*' are the highlights of journal's opening declaration. It is also striking that, the manifesto, rather than focusing on the domestic conditions, locates the "radical changes in the world" at the center of its political discourse. Thus, globalization and changing global conditions gains a specific importance. After stating the *raison d'être* of *Yeni Zemin*, the editorial introduces the ideological coordinates of the journal as such:

> *Yeni Zemin* is being published for opening a space for thinking again. *Yeni Zemin* will try to re-approach issues we have discussed-talked about before. Within this context it will embrace a liberalistic (*özgürlükçü*), pluralistic and tolerant Islamic point or view. This is why *Yeni Zemin* contends that monopoly and fanaticism does nothing but increase deadlocks. Because *Yeni Zemin* sees different and new approaches as prosperity needed for our intellectual life.[36]

Yeni Zemin, however, repeatedly stated that the journal was not a new political establishment. "*Yeni Zemin*," sates the editorial, "is not a mouthpiece of any political party, but will be glad to see that its truths are embraced by others."[37] However, the editorial added that *Yeni Zemin* would not hesitate to embrace the truth of others: "*Yeni Zemin* values *what* has been said, not by *whom*."[38] *Yeni Zemin* tried to accomplish this goal not only through articulating novel paradigms and concepts of the 1990s to the Islamist agenda; but the journal also served as a platform for discussion and deliberation between Islamist and other ideological currents. Among others, *Yeni Zemin* tended to form an alliance with a group of liberal intellectuals who were known as the Second Republicans (*İkinci Cumhuriyetçiler*). Afterwards the journal faced the accusations of leaving the Islamic path and becoming a liberal organ. As a response, the editors underlined that "*Yeni Zemin* is an Islamist journal. It considers Islam as the only alternative religion and worldview"[39], but also,

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[36] *Ibid*., p. 1.

[37] Editorial, 'Yeni Zemin'den', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 2, (February 1993), p. 1.

[38] *Ibid*., p.1.

[39] Editorial, 'Yeni Zemin II. Cumhuriyetçi mi?', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 8, (August 1993), p. 1

> *Yeni Zemin* is both a "journal of mission" and a "fair of ideas" in which different ideas can freely be discussed . . . . *Yeni Zemin* respects the ideas of others. *Yeni Zemin* considers ignoring the ideas of others, repressing opposition ideas, and worst of all, silencing different voices as a deadlock. It believes that intolerant moves in the name of Islam will increase the accusations and this will harm the Muslims. . . *Yeni Zemin* finds accusing the opponents with being "un-Islamic" or "apostate" useless and harmful.[40]

As it will be inferred from these lines, *Yeni Zemin* was severely criticized by radical Islamist Intellectuals of the period. *Haksöz School*[41]*,* one of the most prominent representatives of radical Islamism in the 1990s, judged the manifesto of *Yeni Zemin* as such:

> When we look at the journal's pages we feel that the claims of change and renovation and calls for freedom, pluralism and tolerance are in fact manifestations of a compromise and dissolution which refers to abandonment of tawhidi struggle. They sacrifice the Quranic injunctions for an ambiguous tradition and political pragmatism. *Yeni Zemin* authors, who, once responded to revolutionary sensitivities of the Islamic struggle, now, with the deadlock created by carelessness and egocentrism, rather than constructing Quranic concepts, try to prioritize social requirements of the dominant system through following the waves of liberalism and international trends.[42]

Ali Gözcü did not only criticize *Yeni Zemin* for its revisionism, but also the aggressive attitude of the journal towards other Islamist groups was a significant defect. He concluded that *Yeni Zemin*, rather than presenting a new ground for Islamist politics, is acting as an agent of "nationalists who hate revolutionary Islamists, of secularists, materialists, perverts, and the newly rising entrepreneur and capitalist class of post-1980 era."[43] As I will show, *Haksöz* journal, at many instances will criticize the new-Islamism of *Yeni Zemin* for acting as an anti-Islamic force.

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[40] Editorial, 'Hem "misyon dergisi" hem "fikir panayırı" olabilmek!!', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 7, (July 1993), p. 1.

[41] Elsewhere I have stated that the transformation of Islamist discourse by no means refers to disappearance of voices of opposition. *Haksöz* in this sense can be considered as a continuation of the confrontationist Islamist discourse of the 1980s.

[42] Ali Gözcü, 'Yeni Zemin Ne Düşündürüyor?', *Haksöz Dergisi*, No. 22, (January 1993).

[43] *Ibid*.,

To sum up, *Yeni Zemin* emerged as an influential Islamist journal which successfully articulated (neo)liberal themes with new Islamist concerns. In doing this, the journal approached the issues within a pragmatic framework. This pragmatic framework worked through dividing the intellectual and social site within two opposing poles: the status quo forces and the reformists. Islamists, with their renewed ideological framework and genuine concepts, became the promoters of change. I will deal with the details of this pragmatic and reformist outlook below.

5.1.2.2. *Bilgi ve Hikmet*: an Inquiry into the Philosophical Roots of Change

In 1993 Ali Bulaç[44], while he was also advising and contributing to *Yeni Zemin*, started to publish quarterly journal of culture and research *Bilgi ve Hikmet*. Twelve issues of the journal have been published between 1993 and 1995, and its circulation was between 3000-5000.[45] The journal was owned by İz Publishing house, which was (and still is) one of the biggest Islamic publishing houses of Turkey. Ali Bulaç was the chief editor and he was assisted by Abdurrahman Arslan. Kadir Canatan, Ömer Çelik,[46] Kenan Çamurcu, Ergün Yıldırım and Eyüp Köktaş were the regular writers of the journal. When compared to other Islamist journals of the period *Bilgi ve Hikmet* differs with its academic outlook. For instance, unlike *Yeni Zemin*, rather than trying to answer practical political questions and to deal with problems of the agenda, *Bilgi ve Hikmet* tries to handle the philosophical and theoretical roots, dynamics and implications of these problems. This concern finds its expressions in organization of the articles, most of which are long, detailed and with references to other scientific works.

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[44] I have underlined the importance of Ali Bulaç in formation of Islamist consciousness especially in the 1980s. As I shall show in the following pages, starting with the 1990s Ali Bulaç, in association with other new-Islamist intellectuals, began to present a different outlook which relied on Western social theory –most notably theories of postmodernism and multiculturalism– more.

[45] Ferhat Kentel, '1990'ların İslami Düşünce Dergileri,' p. 729.

[46] Ömer Çelik joined the Justice and Development Party, and became a member of the parliament in 2002 and 2007 elections. In addition to his parliamentary missions, he is currently advisor to the Head of Justice and Development Party Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

It can be stated that the problem of modernity is the major concern for *Bilgi ve Hikmet* authors. It defines itself as an Islamist journal which tries to develop an Islamist alternative to modernity. Nearly without exception, all issues of the journal dealt with subjects related with this problem. 'What is the Response of Islam to the Modern World?', 'Islam and Protestantism', 'Islam and Modern Identities', 'Islam and Modern/Nation State', 'What is the Formula of Living Together: Medina Charter', 'Religions' Projections of Future' are some of the investigations of *Bilgi ve Hikmet*.

Bilgi ve Hikmet problematized modernity, and more important than that, Muslims' attitude towards modernity. Accordingly, the modernist Muslim outlook, which has dominated Islamism in the last century, must be abandoned and the Muslims must get rid of every residues of modernism. *Bilgi ve Hikmet* writers do not only target the modernist Islamists of the early twentieth century; for them, the political Islamists and Islamic revivalists, seemingly anti-modern in their outlook, in fact, reproduce the modernist schemes.

The critique of modernism developed by *Bilgi ve Hikmet* contributed to formation of an authentic and indigenous postmodern discourse. The stance which can be called 'Islamist postmodernism', as I will discuss in details below, made vital contributions to transformation of Islamist discourse in the 1990s. The concepts of the older Islamist generations like 'Islamic state', 'Islamic society', and '*jihad*' were replaced by the stress on transcending the modern/nation state, pluralist society, fundamental openness of religious texts and plurality of interpretations of the divine revelation.

5.2. How to Define Change? Political Islam, Civil Islam, Post-Islamism and New-Islamism

I have repeatedly underlined that Islamism, or at least a significant current within Islamism, has begun to experience a transformation starting from the 1990s. The definition of this transformation, however, was an issue to be tackled with both for

the researchers and Islamist intellectuals themselves. Defining and labeling the change of the Islamist discourse required making comparisons between old and new aspects of Islamism. It was the axis and direction of so-called changes what caused emergence of plural and conflicting explanations, neologisms and labels. Ali Bulaç, for instance, approvingly labeled the transformation of Islamism in Turkey in the 1990s as passage from '*official*' to '*civil*' Islam. Bulaç's was a neologism, since by 'official Islam' he simply meant 'political Islam'. The central concern of official Islam, which was extensively a state-centered project, is 'political power'. Seizing the state power and state machinery is seen as the primary strategic goal by official Islam. "Due to this quality," states Bulaç, "it proposes a top-down Islamization" of society and politics. Civil Islam, on the contrary, is primarily a social project, not political or state-centered. 'Seizing the society' is the basic strategy of civil Islam. Different from official Islam which highlights the concept of 'sovereignty', civil Islam highlights the importance of participation. 'Change' and 'periphery' are the key concepts of civil Islam. Bulaç states that civil Islam believes in emancipating potential of "a pluralist social project based on religious, cultural and legal autonomy."[47]

In Bulaç's account, according to the proponents of official Islam –who recognize figures like Qutb and Mawdudi as their major inspirations– the Islamic world is "underdeveloped" and dependent upon the industrialized Western powers. The only way to overcome this state of backwardness is to record development in scientific, technological and economic spheres, and convert these achievements to political and military strength. For Bulaç, the official Islam proposes a development program, which gives a pivotal importance to a just distribution of wealth. The moral degeneration of the state and society will be surmounted without eliminating poverty and class differences, and the state will play a central role in this process. The official Islam asserts that it can Islamize knowledge and modernity. It believes in development and progress. This is why Bulaç labels official Islam as anti-laic but secular ("*anti-laik ama seküler*").[48] The official

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[47] Ali Bulaç, 'Dinlerin meydan okuyuşu: Entegrizm ve fundamentalizm', *Birikim*, no. 37, May, p. 27.

[48] *Ibid*.,

Islam, as it can be seen, refers to Islamism's period of confrontation and challenge. So in Bulaç's comparison (of old and new Islamisms) the transformation basically referred to democratization of Islam and acquisition of a participatory framework.

In a similar vein Ömer Çelik asserts that 'foundationalist' movement had two major concepts and concerns in mind: *jihad* and *madrasah*. Accordingly, key concept of '*jihad*' teaching in the modern times is 'state'. Capturing the state power and injecting an Islamic spirit to modern institutions seems necessary. "However," states Çelik, "the institutions cannot act independent of historical and mental frameworks that produce them."[49] This is why the *jihad* teaching, rather than problematizing modern state and modern institutions, only interested in who owned them. This meant nothing but Islamization of the "nation-state." For Çelik, the attempt for Islamization of modern nation institutions would only end up with modernization and degradation of religion itself.

Aforementioned points stress a significant shift in Islamist political strategy, which has been labeled and embraced by Nilüfer Göle as the passage from 'political' to 'cultural' Islam. Democracy versus authoritarianism, pluralism versus monism, and cultural concerns versus narrow politics defined the new oppositions posed by the new Islamism.[50] While the concept of 'cultural Islam' has been embraced by the new-Islamist circles, and welcomed as an indication of coming of a more democratic Islamist outlook; some others pointed out the that the so-called anti-status quo stand of 'cultural Islam', in fact, serves no one but the status quo forces themselves.[51]

If the reader recalls, one of the distinctive traits of the period of confrontation and challenge was Islamists' insistence of the ideological and political character of Islam as a religion and Islamism as a worldview. The Islamists of the period

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[49] Çelik, 'Modern İdrakın Tabii Hasılası', p. 76.

[50] Nilüfer Göle, 'Devlet Resmi İdeolojiden Arındırılmalı', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 3, (March 1993); and 'Çoğulculuk Toplumsal Hayal Gücünü Harekete Geçiriyor', *Kitap Dergisi*, No. 53, (July 1991).

[51] Mustafa Şahin, 'Ilımlı İslam, Ilımlılaştırılmış İslam, Paşa İslamı, Törkiş İslam', *Tezkire*, No. 14-15, (Summer-Fall, 1998); Nuray Mert, 'Cami Gölgeleri', p. 48.

consciously opposed any distinction made between cultural, official, civil, individual etc. aspects of religion. For the revivalists, Islam was the only source in arranging social, political, economic and cultural spheres. Any attempt to isolate social and political aspects of Islam from Islamism will make it a worthless political ideology. In the third chapter I have analyzed this stance under the headline of *the challenge against the inferiority complex and eclecticism.* Reconsideration of the ideological and political status of Islamism and reducing Islam to a cultural or individual matter by the new-Islamist intellectuals can be evaluated as the abandonment of this challenge. As I have shown in the second chapter the path opened by the new-Islamist intellectuals has been carried further by the new-Islamist politicians, which led to formation of 'conservative democracy'.

In fall of 1996, Asef Bayat published his article 'The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society' arguing that Iran was moving to a new "post-Islamist" phase, which was neither anti-Islamic, nor un-Islamic nor secular. The Islamist phase in Iranian politics referred to "a gradual Islamization of society," which was a process largely "enforced from above, often with violence."[52] "Islamism," notes Bayat, "should be seen in terms of a systematic attempt from above to Islamicize society and the economy."[53] Post-Islamism, however, raised criticisms towards the compelling quality of Islamism and tried to present a new strategy. Accordingly,

> post-Islamism is not anti-Islamic, but rather reflects a tendency to
> resecularize religion. Predominantly, it is marked by a call to limit the
> political role of religion. In contemporary Iran, post-Islamism is expressed
> in the idea of fusion between Islam (as a personalized faith) and individual
> freedom and choice; and post-Islamism is associated with the values of
> democracy and aspects of modernity.[54]

Bayat stresses that a number of social phenomena represent post-Islamist trend: Tehran municipality and its socio-spatial rationale; the Alternative Thought Movement (*Andisheh-ye Diger*) led by Abdolkarim Soroush; and finally surfacing

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[52] Bayat, 'The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society ', *Critique*, (Fall 1996), pp. 43-44.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

of a kind of Islamic feminism emerged within the framework of Alternative Thought Movement. The major cause behind post-Islamist trend was realization of the limitations and shortcomings of Islamist regime and imaginary. Exclusion of many groups from participation, insufficiency of Islamic economy, failure to fill the ideological void of the youths, and paradoxes of the Islamic state were the main reasons behind the failure of Islamist ideology.

A decade after 'The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society', Bayat revisited the concept in his inspiring work *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*. There Bayat asserted that post-Islamism "represents both a *condition* and a *project*."[55] As a *condition* it refers to "a phase of experimentation, the appeal, energy, and sources of legitimacy of Islamism are exhausted, even among its once-ardent supporters."[56] Both internal contradictions of Islamism, and societal pressure pushed Islamism to reinvent itself, but "at the cost of a qualitative change."[57] Post-Islamism is also a *project*, which was described by Bayat as such:

> . . . post-Islamism is neither anti-Islamic nor un-Islamic nor secular. Rather it represents an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty. It is an attempt to turn the underlying principles of Islamism on its head by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in place of singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scripture, and the future instead of the past. It strives to marry Islam with individual choice of freedom, with democracy and modernity (something post-Islamists stress), to achieve what some scholars termed an "alternative modernity."[58]

Bayat holds that post-Islamism is not an exclusively Iranian phenomenon, and in many other Islamic countries, including Turkey, one may observe the advent of post-Islamist movements.[59] However, when comparing Islamist movements in Turkey and Iran, it must be kept in mind that in the Iranian case post-Islamism is

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[55] Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic*, pp. 10-11.

[56] *Ibid*., pp. 10-11.

[57] *Ibid*., p. 11.

[58] *Ibid*., p. 11.

[59] For the usage of term see İhsan Dağı's 'Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey', *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, (Summer 2004).

extensively a response to a regime crisis. In other words, the fundamental catalyst of post-Islamism was the deadlock that Islamist regime found itself in. In Turkey, however, Islamism has never established itself as an official regime of the state. Although a peculiar interpretation of Islam (through Directorate of Religious Affairs-*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) has always been an integral part of official ideology, Islamism never occupied such a position. Not underestimating the crucial flows and interruptions of democracy, Turkey, since transition to multi-party democracy in 1946, established a *relatively* democratic and pluralist political and social system. In this sense, the contexts within which the Islamist movements are structured are noticeably different.

The difference of contexts also brings differences in basic motives behind advent of new-Islamist movements in Turkey. In the section on the rise of political Islam in the 1990s, I have highlighted the role played by the nascent Islamic bourgeoisie and Islamic middle-class in this success. New-Islamism in Turkey must also be read as Islamists' attempt to frame this success, to give meaning to transformation that Islamic sectors are experiencing, and finally, to legitimize Islamists' will to wealth, power and integration with global markets.[60] In other words, rather than seeing post-Islamism solely as an idealistic project headed towards individualization, democracy, human rights et cetera, we must take into consideration the power relations that it rests upon. In Bayat's perspective, the problem of democratization of Islamism is the yardstick against which the past and future of Islamist movements are measured. However, given the basic concerns of my study, 'democracy' or 'democratization' does not assume such a role. As I have stated, this study reads the transformation of Islamism in Turkey in the 1990s as the story of Islam's losing of its anti-systemic character and its transformation into an ordinary political ideology. This is why rather than 'post-Islamism'; I will use a less value loaded term 'new-Islamism' for describing the Islamism of the 1990s in Turkey.

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[60] Thus, 'new-Islamism' has affinities with Olivier Roy's usage of 'post-Islamism'. Roy, different from Bayat, considers post-Islamism as "privatization of re-Islamization", and stresses the corporate power in making of post-Islamism. See, *Globalized Islam*, pp. 97-8.

Birth of new-Islamism however did not imply disappearance of the confrontationist Islamist discourse. Against the new-Islamist attempts to establish a 'civil' and 'cultural' Islamism which had comparatively moderate political ambitions; the *Haksöz School* called for establishing Islam as the sovereign power:

> We, the Muslims, are the ones who desire to make Islam, instead of evil, dominant on earth. This goal is our duty as subjects. And in pursuit of this goal we are aware that we will experience the same things that have been experienced by former generations who pursued this goal. Poverty, unbearable hardships, fear, loss of life, property and products, all these will be with us in our travel. We will live Islam in this process and reach emancipation and happiness in this process.[61]

The manifesto of *Haksöz Journal*, which is full of discursive elements that resemble the Islamist discourse of the 1980s ('sovereignty of Islam', 'poverty and hardships', 'sacrifice', and 'final emancipation'), can be read as a reaction to post-modern attempts to establish a 'civil' or 'cultural' Islamism. Against the new-Islamist position that underlines the plurality of readings of the religious scripts and plurality of interpretations the *Haksöz Journal* underlines the 'oneness' of the message and Muslims' obligation to follow it:

> Our main objective with these quotations is to comprehend Quran as a whole, and transfer the truths of divine revelation to our thought and actions. There are many obstacles (created by false deities and evil powers) standing in the way to Guidance (*hidayet*), emancipation and happiness.[62]

The sources of the problems that all Muslims face, for *Haksöz*, is the *jahiliyah*. The most fundamental outcome of the *jahiliyah* is misreading the Quran. The official system of religious education in *İmam Hatip* schools and universities is partly responsible for misinterpretation of the religious injunctions. But more important than that, the Islamist circles who submit themselves to their private, narrow minded interests, and who are sided by the forces of evil is the main responsible. By these comments *Haksöz* primarily targets *Yeni Zemin* authors. Thus, it is the duty of *Haksöz Journal* to,

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[61] Editorial, 'Mesajı Anlamak, İslam'ı Yaşamak', *Haksöz Dergisi*, No. 1, (April 1991).

[62] *Ibid.*,

- search the ways for overcoming submissiveess, superstitions and imprudence that haunt Muslims beliefs; and also find the remedies to these problems.
- increase our ambition for struggle despite the efforts of tyrants, perverts and heretics, and form ways to disseminate the message without concessions.
- testify for the truth and show our attitude towards all kinds of polytheism, cruelty, exploitation, perversion and perverts. We should cherish Prophet Mohammad's revolutionary line of struggle.
- be the undaunted carriers of the consciousness of ummah against all kinds of regional, class based and nationalist obsessions.
- expose the jahili plans of perverts who try to conceal Allah's verses, who claim to be divine and who deceive with the name of god; and we should direct people towards tawhidi struggle and close our ranks.[63]

"The revolutionary path of the Prophet Mohammad" has been embraced by the *Haksöz Journal*. It was only through the revolting the domestic and foreign oppression that Muslims can earn the honorable life they deserve. And this revolt will not be a random uprising; but built on a tawhidi struggle.[64] Opposition of *Haksöz* circle (ad other Islamist actors) to the new-Islamist project also underlines the open ended nature of the process. In other words, it helps us to keep in mind that ne-Islamism does not point to 'end of history' of Islamism in Turkey; and that new-Islamism is a 'way' among others that somehow managed to become the hegemonic reading of Islam in a given historical period. However, this should not imply that its hegemony is eternal or undisputed. On the contrary, it has been (and is being) constantly challenged by Islamist and un-Islamic forces on several grounds.

5.3. Postmodernism and Making of New Islamism

> States with single culture, single religion and single nation are today being replaced by multinational, multi-religious and multicultural states. In the final analysis, the century we are in is no more the century of nationalism. In the postmodern period the world is heading towards bigger integrations.[65]

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[63] Editorial, 'Çıkarken: *Haksöz* Üzerine', *Haksöz*, No. 1, (April 1991).

[64] Fatma Adokur, 'Cemallettin Afgani ve Mücadelesi', *Haksöz*, No. 2, (May 1991).

[65] Osman Tunç, 'Ulus Devlet Tartışmaları', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 7, (July 1993), p. 69, ***emphasis*** added.

Islamism of the 1990s was marked by an excessive interest on problems of modernity, Enlightenment and rationality, and possible strategies to transcend these phenomena of Western origin. Why and how modernity pushed humanity into a widespread uncertainty which sheltered "chaos, fear and anxiety"?[66] What did modernity mean for the Muslims, and what kind of strategies –social, cultural, political, economic– can be developed to present an Islamist alternative? How the Islamist strategy will respond to attacks of modernity without reproducing, or Islamizing modernism itself? All these questions and the responses caused the new-Islamist intellectuals to align themselves with post-modernist critics of modernism. Either implicitly or explicitly the new-Islamist intellectuals benefited from post-modern and post-positivist concepts and frameworks. The modernist Islamist critique of modernism, as I have analyzed in the previous chapter, was to be replaced by a new grammar which is imbued with concepts and concerns imported from post-modernist critique of modernity. In due process, "the Islamists have articulated a striking postmodernist critique of such Enlightenment ideas as the hegemony of reason and of belief in unilinear progress and in human domination of nature."[67]

Demonstrating the cornerstones of new-Islamist critique of modernity, and new-Islamism's affiliation with post-modern theories is extremely important in many respects. First, the epistemological and philosophical arguments, and conceptual toolbox that have been borrowed from postmodern theories provided new-Islamism with effective arguments to deal with the problems of the (post)-modern world. Second, engagement with postmodern theories contributed to transformation of Islamist political strategy, and helped Islamism to accommodate with newly emerging paradigms and concepts of neoliberal globalization. Third, the alternative social, political and economic visions that have been proposed by new-Islamist intellectuals were deeply influenced by postmodern social and political theories. For instance the postmodernist critique of the modern state, as I

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[66] Bulaç, 'Modernitenin Seküler Sitesi'nde Kutsala, Hayata ve Tarihe Dönüş', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, no. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 19.

[67] Haldun Gülalp, 'Globalizing postmodernism: Islamist and Western social theory', *Economy and Society*, Vol. 26, No. 3, (August 1997), p. 419.

will show below, was coupled with articulation of neo-liberal themes such as deregulation, minimization of the state, privatization and so on.

Sarıbay notes that *postmodernism*, *civil society* and *Islam* are the most controversial issues of the 1990s, and adds that there is a subtle theoretical link between these three subjects. Associating postmodernism with the age of *cultural hegemony*, Sarıbay maintains the relationship between three terms by arguing that everyone's right to transform their lives into culture (postmodernity) necessitates a structure based on plurality (civil society); like every other lifestyle, religion (Islam in this specific case) has the right to transform itself into culture and legitimize itself within that structure (civil society).[68] The stress over culture and plurality of cultures meant disintegration and dissolution of old all-inclusive identities (like nationality) and replacement of them by communitarian bonds and micro-alternatives. The link that has been established between postmodernism and Islam was not only limited with Islamist intellectuals of Turkey. Anti-rationalist, anti-universalist, anti-subjectivist and anti-positivist premises of postmodern theories attracted the attention of Islamist intellectuals worldwide.[69]

Of course it was not only the Islamist intellectuals who dwelled upon these issues. Questions regarding the crisis of modernity merged with the debates over crisis of Kemalist political regime, and in the first half of the 1990s intellectuals of different origins found themselves in an active dialogue. Intellectuals of different fractions of the socialist left, second republican (*ikinci cumhuriyetçi*) and post-liberal writers,[70] Islamist intellectuals, and figures from the academia prolematized the modern Turkish Republic and its social, institutional and economic institutions.

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[68] Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve İslam*, p. 11.

[69] See, Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donan, *Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity*, (Routledge: London and New York, 1994); Aslam Farouk-Alli, 'The Second Coming of the Theocratic Age? Islamic Discourse after Modernity and Postmodernity,' in *The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic* Thought, (ed.) I. Abu-Rabi, (Blackwell: MA, 2006); Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve İslam* and Parvez Manzoor, 'Islam and the Crisis of Modernity', http://www.algonet.se/~pmanzoor/Isl-Cris-Mod-PM.htm.

[70] See, Necmi Erdoğan and Fahriye Üstüner, '1990'larda "Siyaset Sonrası" Söylemler ve Demokrasi', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Liberalism, vol 7*, Murat Yılmaz (ed.), (İletişim: Istanbul, 2005) for 'second republicanism' and 'post-liberalism'.

Mustafa Armağan, or instance, stated that postmodernism was attractive to Islamists because;

> (1) it shows the failures and limitations of modernism; (2) given the exhaustion of modernism, the postmodernist search for alternatives opens up an opportunity for Islam; (3) in their rejection of the secular uniformity of modernism, postmodernists freely borrow from tradition and religion which Islamists advocate; (4) the postmodernist emphasis on diversity and (5) the announcement of the death of 'meta-narratives' strengthens the hand of Islam in its struggle against modern 'isms' such as socialism, positivism or Darwinism.[71]

The Islamist post-modernist critique of metanarratives, however, will have to deal with the place of Islam among other metanarratives. In other words, the fifth point (that "the announcement of the death of 'meta-narratives' strengthens the hand of Islam in its struggle against modern 'isms' such as socialism, positivism or Darwinism") faced difficulties in facing other postmodern critiques which consider 'religion' itself as the biggest of all metanarratives. As a response, the new-Islamist intellectuals will argue that Islam is not a metanarrative *per se* since it does not impose its worldview or its sociopolitical order upon other communities. For instance, the Medina Charter has been pointed as a political project that recognizes plurality of narratives, as opposed to domination of single metanarrative. However, the unquestionable status of Islam within the Islamic community shows us that metanarratives are not transcended, but instead relativized for increasing the extent and scope of religious identity and religion based communities. I will discuss these points below.

Among Islamist journals of the 1990s especially *Bilgi ve Hikmet* (Knowledge and Wisdom) and *Kitap Dergisi* (Book Journal) were the influential intellectual circles that disseminated postmodernist arguments among Islamic audiences. Mücahit Bilici notes that in its earlier periods Islamist postmodernism presented a typical critique of modernity.[72] Among others, *Kitap Dergisi* was the most distinguished sample of this current. It was within this period that Islamists begun to quote prominent theorists of postmodernism such as Michel Foucault, Jean-François

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[71] Quoted in Gülalp, 'Globalizing Postmodernism', p. 429.

[72] Mücahit Bilici, 'Küreselleşme ve Postmodernizm', p. 803.

Lyotard, Edward Said, Ivan Illich and Paul Feyerabend. Throughout the 1990s the Islamic publishing houses translated many of these writers' texts, and also published a dozen of studies on postmodernism, hermeneutics, post-positivist philosophy of science and so on.[73] *Bilgi ve Hikmet* and *Tezkire* in the following years were so influential in developing an indigenous postmodern critique of modern world.[74]

Given the fact that the Islamic revivalists developed a powerful Islamist critique of modernity in the second half of the twentieth century, one may ask what distinguishes the Islamist critique of modernity in the 1990s. I will deal with this issue below in details. However, roughly the distinguishing feature of new-Islamism in the 1990s can be found in differences between modern and post-modern critiques of modernity. This point, as we will see below, has been underlined by the new-Islamist intellectuals. This is why I called the Islamist critique of modernity in the late 1970s and 1980s as 'proto-postmodern', rather than postmodern. After stating the need for change in Islamist politics, the new-Islamist intellectuals criticize previous generations for re-producing modern political mentality, and for attempting to Islamize modern political institutions.[75]

The new-Islamist critique of modernity underscores that, modernity, which promised mankind "the heaven in earth", turned the whole planet into hell itself.[76] Modernity brought systematic killing of people in highly modernized wars

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[73] Especially the Vadi Publishing House was prolific during this period: Peter Winch, *Sosyal Bilim Düşüncesi ve Felsefe* (he Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy) (Vadi: Ankara, 1994); Abdullah Topçuoğlu and Erol Göka, *Önce Söz Vardı Yorumsamacılık Üzerine Bir Deneme*, (In the Beginning There Was Only Word: an Essay on Hermeneutics) (Vadi: Ankara, 1996); Barry Barnes, *Bilimsel Bilginin Sosyolojisi*, (Sociology of Scientific Knowledge) (Vadi: Ankara, 1995); Jean-François Lyotard, *Postmodern Durum*, (Postmodern Condition) (Ara: İstanbul, 1990; Vadi: Ankara, 2000); Mehmet Küçük, *Modernite Versus Postmodernite*, (Modernity Versus Postmodernity-An Anthology), (Vadi: Ankara: 1993); Aytekin Yılmaz, *Modernden Postmoderne Siyasal Arayışlar*, (Political Searches from Modern to Postmodern) (Vadi: Ankara, 1996) Quentin Skinner, *Çağdaş Temel Kuramlar*, (The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences) (Vadi: Ankara, 1991); Zekiye Demir, *Modern ve Postmodern Feminizm*, (İZ: Istanbul, 1997), and Gianni Vattimo, Modernliğin Sonu Postmodern Kültürde Nihilizm ve Hermenötik, (*The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-modern Culture*) (İZ: Istanbul, 1999).

[74] Bilici, 'Küreselleşme ve Postmodernism', p. 802.

[75] Especially see the debate over modern state below.

[76] Ali Bulaç, *Din ve Modernizm*, (Yeni Akademi Yayınları: (Izmir, 2009[1993]), p.7.

supported by high-technology; it brought weakness and loneliness of human kind against modern apparatuses; and it brought militarism, hunger and ecological menaces. The end point of modernity, states Ömer Çelik, is nothing but disaster.[77] Developments like the advent of Enlightenment, French Revolution and Industrial revolution were the defining moments of modernity. All these developments, states Bulaç, "destroyed the hierarchical order of existence, and then, the universe abandoned its organic quality and acquired a mechanical identity."[78] The mechanical outlook brought a utilitarian attitude towards nature. Concepts like utility, productivity and rationality dominated human's approach towards natural existence.

In Western man's conquest of nature, science emerged as the most important conduit. Science was at work in finding a *meaning* and an *end* to physical universe, and also to flow of social life. By Ali Bulaç's words,

> The natural scientist suggested that the laws of nature, which has been defined as a huge machine, are inevitable and necessary, and thus the material nature and physical world can be determined, and this points to the objective of "progress as the driving force of history." The same conceptual model has been applied without modifications to the social life by the social scientists, and it has been concluded that the social life, as a whole, could be designed towards reaching a pre-determined objective. The progress in the physical sciences was also the purpose and goal of society.[79]

According to the new-Islamist intellectual, the belief that the certainty of physical sciences could be applied to social sciences was at the heart of the idea of progress. The social scientist was to find the immutable laws of social order and change. This search reduced society to a mechanical whole, which in turn transformed the ideational bases of human existence. Modern culture, states Ömer Çelik, drew the boundaries of 'good' with the world: it argued that we could reach the good in this world, that life will be better through rationalization and

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[77] Çelik, 'Modern İdrakın Tabii Hasılası', p. 80.

[78] 'Bir Arada Yaşamanın Mümkün Projesi: Medine Vesikası', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, no. 5, Winter 1994, p. 3.

[79] Bulaç, 'Medine Vesikası', p. 3-4.

discarding religion, and that the best order will be constituted some day.[80] As a result, modern culture labeled profane knowledge as the superior knowledge, and equated scientific knowledge –which in fact a special kind of knowledge– with the whole body of knowledge itself. In addition to that it equated its conclusions with happiness, which, in fact, is within the boundaries of "divine love and justice."[81]

The utmost belief and confidence on human mind rendered divine revelation unnecessary[82]; and it was supported by utmost belief in science: "since human mind understood the universe more and more, one day it could gather the knowledge to fully explain and contain it."[83] This is why postmodern Islamist critique of science and rationality frequently referred to critics of positivism such as Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn, who challenged the idea of linear and rational scientific development.[84] For instance Çelik stated regarding the claims to positivist science that,

> this was such a confidence that men believed to objective reality which has been accepted as the ultimate limit of knowledge . . . For me, when we consider Feyerabend's ideas and Kuhn's perspective, and, especially the relationship between processes of scientific revolution and political revolution, the assertion that we are coming closer to limits of objective reality (as it has been defined by Einstein) seems meaningless and impossible.[85]

For Bekaroğlu, this is the *modern-rational* society in which the sole definition of truth is "science". "If anything you do or say is supported by the latest scientific researches there will be no problem, you are superior and right. . . Only the useful and rational things must be done, not the good and beautiful ones."[86] Bekaroğlu insists that the history of the privileged status of science and reason in Enlightenment philosophy was the history of the struggle of nascent bourgeoisie to

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[80] Çelik, 'Modern İdrakın Tabii Hasılası', p. 68.

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 69.

[82] Mehmet Bekaroğlu, 'Antik Akıl ve Aydınlanma', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, No. 2, (Spring 1993), p. 126.

[83] Ömer Çelik, 'Modern İdrakın Tabii Hasılası', p. 68.

[84] Elaine Miller and Ferit Güven, 'Özgür bir toplumda Paul Feyerabend', *Birikim*, no. 37, (May 1992), pp. 43-47.

[85] Ömer Çelik, 'Modern İdrakın Tabii Hasılası', p. 68.

[86] Bekaroğlu, 'Antik Akıl ve Aydınlanma', p. 128.

free itself from repression of church and aristocracy. It is only through developing such a perspective that we could historicize Enlightenment rationality, and see the particularistic material motives behind the project.[87] Historicizing Enlightenment will also reveal the fact that Enlightenment rationalism is not the final stage in development of human intellect.

A crucial site of new-Islamist intellectuals' critique of modernity was their approach towards the modern-nation state. The new-Islamist intellectuals' postmodern critique of Western science and technology was conjoined by their critique of modern nation-state, which is seen as the institutional incarnation of Enlightenment's philosophical and scientific outlook. "In modern world," states Bulaç, "knowledge is power and you put it into service of political power and modern state, which is its apparatus, as long as you divide it into small pieces (i.e. professions and braches)."[88]

The new-Islamist intellectuals' critique of modernity in general, and the so-called "totalitarian" nature of the modern state in particular, had many in common with various currents of postmodernism. The affinity of Islamist debates to postmodern agenda has been underlined by Ali Bulaç as such:

> We, the Muslims can ask similar questions or share points of criticism with many secular people, laic intellectuals or critics of modernism. After all, when we talk of apparent symptoms of an illness many people can raise same issues. But it is highly possible that there will be differences in opinions regarding diagnosis and treatment.[89]

Thus, the argument of the new-Islamist intellectual was that the Islamist and postmodern critiques of modernity only meet at the level of diagnosis, not that of remedy. Accordingly, although postmodern theories bring many insights in analyzing the ills of the modern societies, they do not "present relieving messages, on the contrary, postmodernism invites us to "polytheism of the old ages", to

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[87] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

[88] Bulaç, 'Modernitenin Seküler Sitesi', pp. 19-20.

[89] Bulaç, 'Medine Vesikası', p. 8.

polytheist chaos and disorder."[90] In addition to that, post-modernism, "though criticizing the ideas of progress and linear history, in fact, gives much importance to these phenomena since it stresses the socio-economic and technological development."[91] In other words, for the Islamist intellectual, postmodernism reproduces the modernist narrative through seeing postmodernity as a superior level in historical development.

However, as I will show, the diagnostic meeting point between postmodernism and the new-Islamism influenced the very Islamist solutions to the problems of the modern world. The postmodern philosophical, epistemological, methodological and ethical propositions found their reflections in the new-Islamism of the early 1990s. Postmodern theories encouraged the Islamist intellectuals to develop their alternative societal visions that claim to transcend the modern alternatives. New-Islamism, in this sense, can be considered as postmodernization of Islam. This is the difference between proto-postmodern Islamist critique of modernism (of the 1970s and 1980s) and postmodernist new-Islamism of the 1990s. While the former utilizes postmodern arguments to develop its critique of Western modernity to develop its Islamic variant; the latter endeavors to build an Islamist alternative inspired by postmodern theories. As I have discussed, Abdolkarim Soroush's insistence on the fundamental openness of a text and hermeneutical reading of the religious scripts can be considered as one of the most important steps towards developing the postmodern new-Islamist discourse. In the following chapter I will discuss the cornerstones of the-new Islamist discourse in details with locating problems of postmodernism and neoliberal globalization at the center of the discussion.

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[90] Bulaç, 'Modernitenin Seküler Sitesi', pp. 19.

[91] Ali Bulaç, *Din ve Modernizm*, p. 180.

CHAPTER 6

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROJECT OF NEW

ISLAMISM

This chapter will present a detailed analysis of the new-Islamist discourse which was begun to be formed in the early-1990s. In my discussion I will focus on contributions of various Islamist circles in making of new-Islamist discourse. Islamist journals like *Yeni Zemin*, *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni* (Economics and Business Life Bulletin)[1] and other Islamist and non-Islamist intellectuals will be evaluated in terms of their contributions to making of the new-Islamist discourse. However, I have no intention to present this variety as a homogenous intellectual bloc. Rather than trying to present them as identical parts of a homogenous whole, I tend to analyze contributions of these various sources in making of the new-Islamist discourse. In other words, I will try to take the distinct levels and layers of formation of a political discourse into consideration.

I made a distinction between political and economic projects of new-Islamism and analyzed them distinctively. The distinction, however, is purely analytical, since it is so hard to draw a clear demarcation line between these two fields. The level of interaction between 'political' and 'economic' concerns and formulations makes it hard for the researcher to analyze these fields as distinct from each other. The new-Islamist critique of the modern state, for instance, which targets culturally and ideologically homogenizing aspects of the modern state, also targets state's intervention into the economic sphere. Within this context discursive elements

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[1] The journal was published between 1992 and 1993 for 18 issues by the İz Publishing house. Mustafa Özel, an Islamic economist who was also adviser to MÜSİAD, was the chief editor of the journal.

such as 'civility', 'autonomy', 'difference' and 'democracy' are skillfully articulated to 'free markets', 'privatization' and 'entrepreneurial dynamism'.

Minimization of the modern Turkish state lied at the heart of new-Islamist political and economic discourse. According to the new-Islamist intellectual, the modern state is the institutional embodiment of totalitarian tendencies of modernity. They consider the modern-nation state as an omnipotent political institution which is *totalitarian*, *homogenizing* and *interventionist*. Accordingly, the individual citizen, the constituting element of modern-nation state, is so weak and unprotected when compared to the omnipotence of the latter. Communitarian bonds and groupings are proposed as cures to anti-democratic nature of the modern states; however without touching upon 'authoritarianism within' the communities. The multicultural project of Medina Charter has been proposed as an alternative within this context. The opposition posed between civil and political spheres became the driving force of th new-Islamist political discourse.

The opposition posed between civil and political forces did not only have implications for 'political' and 'cultural' matters. The economic signifiers such as 'capitalism', 'market', 'acquisition of wealth', 'capital accumulation', 'exploitation', 'investment', 'profit', 'interest', 'social justice', and 'entrepreneurship' and 'bourgeoisie' have been reworked and redefined alongside this opposition. The 1990s were partly characterized by the new-Islamists' struggle over existing chains of significations that define the meanings of these terms.[2] The triumph of the Anatolian capital in the post-1980 export-oriented economic setting, and the birth of an Anatolian entrepreneurial class brought the issue of the relationship between religious values and economic activity to the agenda. The birth of Islamic business associations that will articulate the interests of these sectors was influential firstly for constructing and legitimizing the very 'interests' of these classes. The initial strategy of the new-Islamist intellectual was to re-produce the opposition between the so-called 'civil' and 'political' actors, and to count the Anatolian entrepreneurs in the former bloc, and to label the Westernist

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[2] See V. N. Volosinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, trans. Matejka, L. and Titunik, I. R., (Harvard University Press, 1973).

parasitic bourgeoisie in the latter. The new-Islamist intellectual underlined the legitimacy, and even desirability, of economic activity in Islamic economics. Ideal Islamic economic system, as opposed to capitalism, has been defined as a free-market economy in which the smallest economic initiative could survive under fair market conditions. The opposition between civil and political forces, thus, has been reproduced as the opposition between genuine (Anatolian) bourgeoisie and the parasitic Kapıkulu bourgeoisie; and between free-market system and monopolistic capitalism on the other. However, as I will show, the new-Islamist intellectuals experienced great difficulties in distinguishing their Islamic economic alternative from capitalism.

6.1 The Political Project of New-Liberalism in Turkey

6.1.1. Transcending or Minimizing the State: New-Islamist Critique of the Modern Nation-State

In one of his articles, Ali Bulaç was noting that we live in a period in which the modern nation-state has come to an end.[3] In fact, by his critique of the modern nation-state Bulaç was expressing the whims and expectations of a generation of Islamist intellectuals. As I have discussed above, two major paradigms in social sciences have dominated the agenda in the 1990s: postmodernization and globalization. Regardless of their reliability and validity, major assumptions of theories of globalization and postmodernization had major world-wide influences on social and political movements. In early 1990s, new-Islamist intellectuals skillfully articulated theories of globalization and postmodernization to their ideological agenda. One of the primary targets of globalization and postmodernism paradigms was the modern nation-state. Themes such as "erosion of the nation state" and "the crisis of the nation state" coupled with the debates regarding crisis of modernity, and became central concerns for new-Islamist intellectuals throughout the 1990s.

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[3] Ali Bulaç, 'Modern Devletin Totaliter ve Ulus Niteliği', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, No. 3, (Summer 1993), pp. 9-15.

The inquiry regarding the philosophical and ethical roots of modern nation-state was the starting point of post-modern, post-nation-state Islamist alternatives. Alternative paradigms (such as 'Medina Charter') proposed by new-Islamist intellectuals derived much insights from debates over Western modernity and its institutions, and new-Islamist intellectuals did not hesitate to record their ideological indebtedness to these debates. Also, the new-Islamist attacks against the modern state also caused forging of an alliance between theorists of (neo)-liberalization and the new-Islamists. While the Islamists of the 1980s were searching for the most effective path towards Islamic revolution and Islamic state; the new-Islamist intellectuals in the 1990s asked the questions "why Islam is not a theocracy"[4] and "why Islam should not have a state theory"; and pointed the modern nation state as the main responsible for ills of society. It was the 'modern' and 'nation' character of the state that caused all political, economic and cultural/religious troubles. The modern nation-state was attacked by the new-Islamist intellectuals since it was

- *a homogenizing totalitarian force which disregards cultural plurality, or multiculturality;*

- *an anti-democratic force which establishes tyranny of a majority (mostly an ethnic majority);*

- *an interventionist organ which relies on precision of social sciences and idea of progress, and tries to manufacture identical citizen subjects;*

- *an aggressive entity whose major motive is enmity against other nations.*

Throughout the 1990s 'limiting state power', 'minimizing the state', 'empowering civil society against the state', 'purifying the state from ideology', 'democratization of the *ceberrut devlet* (despotic state)' and 'privatization' became the most popular phrases among the new-Islamist intellectuals. The critique of the modern state –together with a harsh critique of Westernist state bureaucracy– occupied the central place in new-Islamist political discourse. In fact, anti-statism was not exclusively a new-Islamist phenomenon: starting from Özal's New Right project the critique of state and state bureaucracy has become a major concern for

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[4] Ali Bulaç, 'İslam Niçin bir Teokrasi Değildir?', *Kitap Dergisi*, No. 58-59-60, (December-January-February 1992).

the liberal, conservative and second-republican intellectuals and politicians. So, anti-statist discourse turned into a site on which new-Islamist and liberal-conservative intellectuals reproached each other.

In this section I will firstly present a detailed account of new-Islamist intellectuals' critique of modern nation state. Then I will focus on the solutions proposed by new-Islamist intellectuals to limit and transcend the modern nation state. The multilegal civil society project inspired by Medina Charter will be discussed in details. Also I will try to present the Islamist and left-wing criticisms directed towards the new-Islamist post-modern political project.

6.1.1.1. Homogenization, Totalitarianism and the Modern Nation-State

While for the Islamists of the 1980s modernity was identified with capitalist modernity, and the modern state was seen as an instrument of dominant classes to maintain and sustain the existing order; the new-Islamist intellectuals placed 'homogenization' at the center of their critique. Together with globalization paradigm's questioning of modern state's validity, new-Islamist intellectuals enthusiastically adopted Michel Foucault's critique of modern state. In their criticisms towards the modern nation-state, they frequently referred to insights provided by Foucault. The departing point for the new-Islamist intellectuals was the interventionist, disciplining and homogenizing quality of the modern state. Abdurahman Arslan, for instance, stated that homogenization and equation is the end point and logical conclusion of modern tradition. According to Arslan, modern tradition is hostile towards different types of organizations other than modern state, and equates each and every identity to homogenous, secular identity of citizenship.[5] This tendency of the modern state to homogenize differences constitutes its totalitarian moment: "this perspective cannot be open to any other type of organization other than totalitarianism."[6]

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[5] 'Peygamber Ümmetinden Ulus'un Devletine', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, No. 3, (Summer 1993), p. 27.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

Likewise, for Ali Bulaç, since achieving a rational order and homogenous culture are the basic objectives of modern state, it will not tolerate any options or alternatives to processes of standardization.[7] For Bulaç, traditional societies were stable and dignified in their sacred hierarchy; "since each element and community were defined by their own cultural codes, it was based on autonomy and relative plurality of differences."[8] Modern societies, on the contrary, lack any hierarchy and they are fixed for anonymity, dynamism and homogeneity. This is why it requires a central authority to set a complex order of communication and coordination; and why it must be an anti-pluralist entity.[9] In fact the basic concern for the new-Islamist intellectual is the assertion that the totalitarian modern state does not let different religious communities live according to their own laws and traditions. Rather, creation of a homogenous "mass society" lies at the heart of modernism.[10] For Bulaç, modernism,

> . . . it is not *unity within plurality* but an entirety which merges autonomous units and spheres into unity, and which destroys diversities which mean prosperity. The despotic modern state achives this through creation of the "mass society". "Mass", which means a huge cauldron in which the personal, the unique and different belongings are melted.[11]

New-Islamist intellectual considers homogenization of the subjects within a given territory as the foremost feature of modern nation state. According to Ömer Çelik, nation, as an abstraction, is a product of modernity: nation is the site on which state's homogenizing mission is inscribed.[12] Homogenization implies political, cultural and religious sameness among the population. Although modern age is labeled as the age of individualization, modernism aims at making individuals identical, as if they were produced in assembly-line.[13] However, the criterion upon which this sameness will rise shall be defined by unequal power relations. In other

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[7] Ali Bulaç, 'Modern Devletin Totaliter ve Ulus Niteliği', p. 9.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-13.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-13.

[10] Ergün Yıldırım, 'Modern Ulus Devlet', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, No. 3, (Summer 1993), p. 44.

[11] Ali Bulaç, 'Modern Devletin Totaliter ve Ulus Niteliği', pp. 9-13.

[12] Ömer Çelik, 'Devlet'in Modern Doğası: 'İyi' Siyaset'ten 'Etkin' Siyaset'e', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, No. 3, (Summer 1993), p. 32.

[13] Ömer Çelik, 'İnsanın Modern Kimliği: Evrenselcilik, Irkçılık, Cinsiyetçilik', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, No. 4, (Fall 1993), p. 9.

words, homogenization exercised by the modern nation-state is, in fact, annihilation of minority positions by the dominant codes of political, economic and cultural behavior: modern state is the tyranny of the majority over other social groups.[14] Islamist intellectuals explain the rise of ultra-nationalist and racist movements with this process of homogenization. For Çelik,

> Nation-state means maintaining the dominance of one law, ethnicity and region over others through state power. Thereby, when the society, which is becoming monotonous with modernity, as an outcome of its nature rejects modernity, the enemy is sought "within".[15]

Likewise, Ergün Yıldırım states that since the basic ideological motive of modern nation state is enmity, modernity is marked with constant feeling of insecurity.[16] The constant feeling of insecurity also brought the necessity of finding enemies to point at, attack and eliminate. Hence, we witness the rise of racist and neo-fascist movements in Europe. The moral void created by modernity cannot be filled with ideas of nationality or citizenship. The neo-fascist movements in Europe primarily exploit this gap through offering an image of purified society based on "racial uniformity, authoritarianism, limitations and repression."[17]

After stating that racism and sexism are among the most important problems of modern societies, Ömer Çelik maintains that these phenomena, far from being deviations from Enlightenment ideal of universality, are, in fact, logical conclusions of it.[18] The argument is as follows: it is true that Enlightenment have done a lot in overcoming classical forms of racial and sexual discrimination; however, the classical forms were replaced by their modern counterparts. The advent of capitalism and its colonialist/imperialist phase introduced modern slavery as a viable option to increase profitability, and, by Çelik's terms, surplus production. Likewise, new sexism introduced women to the labor market as cheap labor force. "Universalism," for Çelik, "was the way of incorporating everyone to

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[14] Yıldırım, 'Modern Ulus Devlet', p. 44.

[15] Çelik, 'Devlet'in Modern Doğası', p. 34.

[16] Ergün Yıldırım, 'Modern Ulus Devlet', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, No. 3, (Summer 1993), p. 45.

[17] Kadir Canatan, 'Mölln'den Solingen'e Avrupa'da Aşırı Sağcılık, Irkçılık ve Şiddet Hareketleri', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, No. 3, (Summer 1993), p. 69.

[18] Çelik, 'İnsanın Modern Kimliği', p. 10.

production process; racism, on the other hand, is the magic formula of protecting interests of capital both during production and consumption phases."[19] The modern-nation state was also instrumental in protecting interests of capital through setting goals and creating worldviews in accordance with economic rationality and rentability.[20]

The new-Islamist intellectuals maintain that the utmost belief of modernism in science and technology, and the idea of progress were the major points of legitimation for modern state in intervening people's lives. The modern state, different from its predecessors aims at controlling, managing and organizing people's lives, and does this through claiming a monopoly over the definition of right way of living and thinking. By Ali Bulaç's words,

> From the general and certain truths of modern science to making modern medicine absolute, from the use of technology to ordering of the daily life modern state imposes its secular and profane ideology as the single and absolute truth with the mediation of refined instruments and methods of modern science and technology. The education system, universities, judiciary, use of communication, bureaucracy, defense, legislation, institutions and assemblies do not only disseminate these truths to every corner of a single country, but to the last person on the earth.[21]

The new-Islamist intellectuals, as stated above, criticized Enlightenment's equation of scientific knowledge, which is a *part* of knowledge, with Knowledge itself, and condemned the claim that the rules governing society can be found with the precision of physical sciences. The Enlightenment ideal, which objectified society as an identifiable and controllable mass of things, required an extensively complex, centralized and specialized instrument for rational coordination: a gigantic and centralized organ which will inculcate rationality to society.[22]

Ömer Çelik asserts that the necessary relation established between modernity, nation and state elevated the modern state to an institution which has a historical

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[19] *Ibid*., p. 13.

[20] Ömer Çelik, 'Modern İdrakın Tabii Hasılası', p. 69.

[21] Ali Bulaç, 'Sözleşme temelinde toplumsal proje', pp. 58-59.

[22] Ali Bulaç, 'Modern Devletin Totaliter ve Ulus Niteliği', pp. 9-10.

and transcendental mission. "Totalitarian attitude of state and authoritarian charm of science," for Çelik, is the cement that holds this project together.[23] Modern science supervises the process of formation of the modern state.[24] Science is the *deux ex machina* that dominated every sphere of modern life.[25] In turn, modernity, which heralded science and reason against religion, created a new mystical entity: the modern state.[26] The new mysticism elevated positivism to the status of a philosophical religion; and nationalism to ideological.[27]

> The feeling of obedience created by the state as a 'myth' is more powerful than its physical powers. Just as the tribal magicians it derives power from metaphysical abstraction and mystifications, according to their scientific bases. The modern state rests on commitment to nation, modernity and land. All three concepts acquire sacred meanings in modern societies.[28]

The replacement of sacred order of things with unlimited 'faith' in rationality meant a transformation in ethical core of politics. For Çelik, modernity is characterized by passage from political philosophy to political science; in other words, replacement of questions regarding the 'good' with 'effective' politics. Freeing politics from any value judgments is the endpoint of modern political mentality, which found its masterful expression in Machiavelli's *Prince*.[29] The new-Islamist intellectuals called for minimizing the modern nation state through diminishing its role in cultural, political and economic affairs. Community and the market are two major candidates to fill the void left by the modern nation state.

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[23] Ömer Çelik, 'Devlet'in Modern Doğası', p. 31.

[24] Ali Bulaç, *Modern Ulus Devlet*, (Akademi Yayınları: İzmir, 2007[1995])

[25] Ömer Çelik, 'Devlet'in Modern Doğası', p. 37.

[26] Eyüp Köktaş, 'İslam, Modern Devlet ve Protestan Ahlak', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, No. 3, (Summer 1993), p. 58.

[27] Osman Tunç, 'Ulus Devlet Tartışmaları', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 7, (July 1993), p. 68.

[28] Ömer Çelik, 'Devlet'in Modern Doğası', p. 33.

[29] *Ibid*., p. 38.

6.1.1.2. Minimizing the Turkish State

> The centralist-bureaucratic structure that blocks the system must be removed. The power concentrated in the center must be re-distributed to the people through various instruments. This is what we mean by "minimizing the state."[30]

The philosophical investigations regarding the interventionist, totalitarian and homogenizing functions of nation-state in modern societies had direct actual political implications. History of Ottoman-Turkish modernization and the role played by state in this process has been located at the center of new-Islamist intellectuals' criticisms. Briefly, the Turkish state, according to new-Islamist intellectuals, presents many of above discussed qualities of modern nation-state. By Büyükkaymaz's words, "the Turkish State, as a result of the way it was formed, is an authoritarian state which intervenes every spheres of society under the guidance of an official ideology."[31] Briefly, for the new-Islamist intellectuals the Turkish state is,

- *totalitarian*: since it does not tolerate any alternative political or ideological perspective and imposes its own official ideology;

- *homogenizing*: since it aims at melting plural identities in the same pot of Turkish nationality;

- *interventionist*: since it acts as a monopolizing force in social, cultural and economic spheres.

The major target of the 'discourse of change', as I have labeled it, was modern nation-state and its aforementioned qualities. Davut Dursun was noting that "reeling developments and changes that we observe in our country and the world in the last decade have influenced traditional structures and existing organizations, and compelled them to reorganize themselves under the light of these developments." [32] The changing conditions force us to democratize state and

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[30] Mehmet Metiner, 'Rezzak Devlet'e Hayır', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 8, (August 1993), p. 15.

[31] Ahmet Büyükkaymaz, 'Amaç, devleti küçültmektir', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 8, (August 1993), p. 12.

[32] Davut Dursun, 'Devleti Küçültmek Özgürlük Sorunudur', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 8, (August 1993), p. 12.

cleanse it from ideology and violence.[33] Likewise, Metiner asserted that interventionist and prohibiting states are being transcended in many parts of the world: "the major move within contemporary world is towards 'democratization of the state'."[34] Within this framework, while it has been concluded that some structures were unnecessary, some needed reorganization; and in other cases the need for inserting new structures to the system has been stressed.[35] Among other institutions and structures, modern nation-state occupies the most critical space. The new-Islamist intellectuals are not satisfied with some minor modifications to the modern state. The whole structure, scope, ideology and functions of the state must be radically reformulated. For instance, Abdurrahman Dilipak provides us with a novel definition of state, which has close affinities with liberal tradition:

> . . . we call state the political, military, economic and legal structure that is formed by people to protect their own rights and laws, to secure their lives, properties and beliefs, and to carry out tasks that they cannot individually or as a community do. As a consequence of this definition, the reason of existence and source of legitimacy of the state is to protect human's rights and freedoms.[36]

In another article Dilipak asserts it is the state and its authority which must be limited, interrogated and held accountable, not the citizens. This is deeply related with the *raison d'être* of the state: to serve and protect the people. While people's service to the state is unrequited and complimentary; it is the state's obligation to serve the people.[37] However, in Turkey, the state has been idolized through being recognized as a sacred force which is above society and individual.[38] Idolization is, in fact, a consequence of secularization process, which divides universe into two distinct –material and spiritual– realms:

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[33] M. İhsan Arslan, (Mazlum-Der Genel Başkanı) 'Açıkoturum: Siyasette Yeni Arayışlar', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 2, February 1993, p. 23.

[34] Metiner, 'Rezzak Devlet'e Hayır', p. 15.

[35] Dursun, 'Devleti Küçültmek', p. 12.

[36] Abdurrahman Dilipak, 'Türkiye'de hiçbir zaman laiklik olmadı', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 2, February 1993, p. 17.

[37] Dilipak, 'İlah devlet öngören anayasa istemiyoruz', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 4, April 1993, p. 24.

[38] Mehmet Metiner, 'Toplum merkezli, özgürlükçü sivil bir anayasa', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 4, April 1993, p.4.

The idea of interventionist state is a conclusion of an understanding which objectifies the functions of Allah on earth at the level of political organization. The comprehension that "the earth shall be governed by us and the heaven by Allah" elevated the state to a divine status. "The state as God" considers intervening all businesses of its citizens as a necessity.[39]

Idolization brings excessive interference of the state in daily transactions of people. This is why spheres that directly interests social life, such as religion, politics, economics, education, culture etc. are monopolized by the state. Individuals, who must shaped the state, are being shaped by it.[40] The homogenizing tendency of the Turkish state becomes clear in its approach towards the Kurdish issue. The new-Islamist intellectuals, more specifically the *Yeni Zemin* circle, tried to develop a solution which rested on the unifying force of religion. *Yeni Zemin* contends that what turns the Kurds into a problem in the official ideology is denial of the existence of Kurdish reality and imposition of Turkness to each and every subject. The homogenizing attitude of the modern nation-state could only be overcome through acceptance of presence of plurality of ethnic belongings including Kurds, Arabs, Albanians, Circassians, Georgians, Lazs, Bosniaks, Romans, and Syrians. "We must replace the nation-state which denies existence of other nationalities with a multi-legal state of law."[41] Of course the common denominator of this society will be Islam.

Davut Dursun asserted that the Turkish state and republican governments, as typical examples of *totalitarianism*, in order to carry the society to a pre-determined level of development, defined each and every public work as state's duty. Dursun adds that the most important and dominant feature of republican society is its *completely political character*. By *political society* Dursun means a society in which everything is from a political point of view and determined by state authority.[42]

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[39] Metiner, 'Rezzak Devlet'e Hayır', p. 15.

[40] *Ibid*., p. 15.

[41] *Yeni Zemin*, 'Kürt Sorunu Tartışıldı', No. 1, (January 1993), pp. 48-9.

[42] Dursun, 'Devleti Küçültmek', pp. 12-13.

The critique of modern-nation state by the new-Islamist intellectuals was followed by a set of policy proposals towards curbing political, ideological, cultural and economic power of the modern state. In ideological terms the new-Islamist intellectuals asserted that the Turkish state must get rid of its ideological burdens. The Turkish state has an official ideology, and it imposes its official ideology on its citizens. Metiner states that a state which has an official ideology has no alternative other than being sanctioning and prohibitive.[43] Their call found its reflections within the liberal circles which are sympathetic towards new-Islamist claims.[44]

Another policy proposal is about economic activities of state, in other words **etatism**. The new-Islamist intellectuals contend that Turkish state's extensive presence in economy as an entrepreneur provides an influential motive for its interventionist agenda. Hence, privatization became a crucial topic of the new-Islamist agenda. Privatization, however, was not only linked with the idea of democratization, but, as I will demonstrate in details, economic rationality occupied a considerable place in the debates. New-Islamist intellectuals' bold statements regarding privatization and private initiative also meant a first step towards rapprochement between Islamism and neo-liberalism. According to the new-Islamist intellectual, privatization in economy must be followed by privatization in the religious/cultural field. State's attempt at monopolizing religion through formal organizations such as Directorate of Religious Affairs has been severely criticized by the new-Islamist intellectuals. Accordingly, although claiming to be a laic establishment, Turkish state, in fact, has never been and is not laic, since laicism means a clear separation between religion and state. These two points will be discussed below in details.

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[43] Metiner, 'Rezzak Devlet'e Hayır', p. 15.

[44] Nilüfer Göle, 'Devlet Resmi İdeolojiden Arındırılmalı', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 3, (March 1993), p. 48.

6.1.1.3. Transcending the Modern State: Medina Charter as the Possible Project of Living Together[45]

The first half of the 1990s witnessed the appearance of 'the Medina Charter' as the most prominent Islamist alternative to the modern nation-state. For the Islamist intellectuals, the crisis of modernity in general and of modern nation-state in particular, necessitated a new project that would transcend already existing political alternatives, including 'political Islamist' paradigms of the previous decades. The Islamist intellectuals, as I have discussed above, celebrated the worldwide dissolution of modernist imaginary, and tried to disseminate their vision of co-existence through projects supporting 'plurality of laws' (*çok hukukluluk*). However, the Islamists of the new period warned us to be vigilant about the risk of re-producing the modern state within an Islamist framework; a mistake that has been done by the Islamists of the previous periods. A renewed, dynamic ethical perspective, philosophical and aesthetic attitude is a necessity for the success of this project.[46]

> Today, in Muslim perception, the state does not pose a structural problem but is a problem of strategy regarding which force will hold state power. They follow a radical route in capturing the state but a revisionist line in remaking institutions. The legislation will be preserved through some minor changes, but we will be the ones who shall make laws. The schools will change to some degree but we will direct the schools and prepare the course books. We will occupy the wheelhouse. This will inevitably lead us to opportunism. Even behind very radical discourses one can see the presence of such opportunism. Medina Contract proposes itself as an alternative to this traditional structure.[47]

The new-Islamist intellectuals targeted Islamist circles which locate formation of an Islamic state at the center of their political and ideological outlook. The fundamental mistake of these circles is to conflate Islamic political order with theocracy, which is of Western origin.[48] Secondly, Islamization of state through

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[45] Bulaç, 'Medine Vesikası'.

[46] Abdurrahman Dilipak, 'Medine Sözleşmesi üzerine aykırı düşünceler', *Birikim*, no. 43, (November 1992), p. 27.

[47] *Ibid*., p. 26.

[48] Bulaç, 'İslam Niçin Bir Teokrasi Değildir?', p. 3.

keeping the modern 'form' will do nothing but reproduce modern forms of domination: homogenizing elements such as nationhood and citizenship will be replaced by religious domination and homogenization.[49] Such an outlook will turn Islam into another form of totalitarianism.[50] Medina Charter, within this context, provides an alternative framework for escaping totalitarianism. The Charter will minimize the state, and will help us to redefine the ideological and functional limits of the modern state:

> In this new model the state is not sacred and individuals do not devote themselves their souls to the state. The state acquires a new structure: It is organized as an institution that will serve its citizens. It will not generate values but act as a mediator in providing a healthy ground for maintenance and survival of values that are generated and determined by the civil society.[51]

It was Ali Bulaç who asserted that the Medina Charter would provide us some clues for constituting a pluralist social order,[52] which involves religious, legal and cultural autonomy.[53] Medina Charter was a binding document drafted by Prophet Muhammad which aimed at determining the relations between Muslims, the Jews and the pagans of Medina within the framework of a new kind of unity. By Rubin's words, "the document was drawn up with the explicit concern of bringing to an end the bitter inter tribal fighting between the clans of the Aws (Aus) and Khazraj within Medina. To this effect it instituted a number of rights and responsibilities for the Muslim, Jewish, and pagan communities of Medina bringing them within the fold of one community—the Ummah."[54]

The debate over viability of Medina Charter for constituting a pluralist setting was original and innovative in many respects. As I will show, through various contributions from various Islamist and non-Islamist intellectuals the Charter

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[49] Çelik, 'Modern İdrakın Tabii Hasılası', p. 76 and 'Devlet'in Modern Doğası: 'İyi' Siyaset'ten 'Etkin' Siyaset'e', p. 32.

[50] Ali Bulaç, *İslam ve Demokrasi*, (Beyan: Istanbul, 1993)

[51] Kadir Abdimamoğlu, 'Modern Anayasa Hukuku Açısından Medine Vesikası', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, No. 5, (Wİnter 1994), p. 43.

[52] Ali Bulaç, 'Medine Vesikası hakkında genel bilgiler', *Birikim*, no. 38/39, June-July 1992, p. 110.

[53] Bulaç, *İslam ve Demokrasi*, p. 11.

[54] Uri Rubin, 'The 'Constitution of Medina': Some Notes', *Studia Islamica*, No. 62, 1985, p. 6.

became the center of attention in the first half of the 1990s. By Çınar's words, the "*multilegal*" society project that Medina Charter proposed was, in fact, an Islamic policy of identity/difference.[55] The debate over the Charter was so appealing that even some prominent figures of the socialist left joined the debate through directing some friendly criticisms and contributions.[56]

The starting point of the Medina Charter was the chaotic nature of the relations between three social blocs, Muslims, Jews and Pagan Arabs at the time of the Prophet.[57] For Bulaç, existence of concepts and articles related to *murder*, *wounding*, and *blood money* reflects the turmoil and suffering caused by civil wars of decades. The most fundamental objective of the Charter was to establish the necessity of peaceful co-existence and other's right to live.[58] To achieve this goal, the project was based on recognition of each ethnic and religious group's cultural and legal autonomy. In spheres like "religion, legislation, judiciary, education, trade, culture, arts, and regulation of daily life et cetera, will be managed in accordance with each group's will; and every group will define itself through self-defined legal and cultural standards."[59]

The stress on autonomy of religious groups claims to change the founding principles of modern politics. Accordingly, the project replaces the ego-centric and individualist political perspective, which sees political structure as composed of individual wills, with a community based outlook. The main reason behind this is the conviction that individuals acquire their identities only in and through groups: for our case the religious communities. It is only through the mediating and

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[55] Menderes Çınar, 'Çok Hukuklu Toplum: Kamusal Alana Veda Mı? Otantik Kimlik Politikası Mı?', in *Küreselleşme, Sivil Toplum ve İslam*, E. F. Keyman and A. Y. Sarıbay (eds.), (Vadi: Ankara 1998), p. 228.

[56] Socialist monthly *Birikim* hosted the debate. Socialist, Islamist, liberal and conservative figures joined this surprisingly friendly debate.

[57] Bulaç, 'Medine Vesikası hakkında', p. 105.

[58] *Ibid*., p. 108.

[59] *Ibid*., p. 109.

securing nature of communities that individuals could freely express and realize themselves and resist against homogenizing effects of the modern state.[60]

> The Charter tosses aside the classical state-individual dichotomy in our definitions regarding constitutional law and locates the dialogue in social, political and cultural spheres among various legal communities at the center of political establishment.[61]

Bulaç notes that the religious and legal autonomy in question is secured with the 25th article of the charter: *The Jews have their religion and the Muslims their own. This also applies to their protectors and themselves.*[62] "Each social bloc is composed of individuals who believe in the same religion (law) and each individual contends that this religion (law) is binding only for individuals who follow that specific religion."[63] However, Prophet Mohammed, who played the central role in making of Medina Charter, and the nature of his role, has been a matter of controversy in debates over the Charter. The problem was related with existence or absence of a hierarchical relationship between different parties of the Charter. For instance, Bulaç noted that in this arrangement the Prophet did not act as a "Ruler". His position can be better described as a "Referee" who brought the parties of the charter together in a peaceful manner.[64] In other words, the Medina Charter was not a product of Prophet Mohammad's imposition: "it has been formulated through mutual negotiations and was a product of social consensus.[65] Likewise, Kadir Abdimamoğlu asserts that there was an ***equal, not hierarchical,*** relationship between groups that declare their laws. "None of the particular groups could dominate the other one and impose its law on it. . . The social blocs that rely on law could freely define themselves in ethnic, religious, ideological, and philosophical terms."[66]

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[60] Çınar, 'Çok Hukuklu Toplum', p. 239.

[61] Abdimamoğlu, 'Modern Anayasa Hukuku', p. 43.

[62] Bulaç, 'Medine Vesikası hakkında', p. 109.

[63] Abdimamoğlu, 'Modern Anayasa Hukuku Açısından Medine Vesikası', p. 43.

[64] Bulaç, 'Medine Vesikası hakkında', p. 109.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

[66] Abdimamoğlu, 'Modern Anayasa Hukuku', p. 43.

For Bulaç, the founding principle of Medina Charter is 'participation'. Unlike the totalitarian attitude of modern state, Medina Charter relies on the principle of voluntary participation of religious, legal, philosophical or political groups. Since groups that participate into social life are heterogeneous, each article must be a product of an overlapping consensus.[67] This consensus will constitute the basis of the pluralist society in which different systems of law co-exist.[68] If the reader recalls Bulaç's distinction between official and civil Islam in favor of the latter, Medina Charter is considered as an ideal model for the civil Islam that Bulaç had in mind.

The Turkish state's attempt to establish a monopoly over religion through imposing a particular (official) version of Islam to Muslims has been severely criticized by the new-Islamist intellectuals. Medina Charter has also been interpreted within this context. Dilipak argued that the Medina Charter would also solve the problem of laicism in Turkey by its assertion that "everyone has their own religion." The Charter, for Dilipak, asserts that "everyone shall live as they believe and express their opinions freely, and peacefully co-exist despite their differences."[69]

But, what will happen if any controversy emerges between different groups? Which legal authority, following which principles will have the authority to solve political, social and economic conflicts? Or, will there be any central authority that will regulate the relations between different groups? How will the issue of 'common tasks' will be solved? All these questions constituted the soft spots of Medina Charter project. The Charter, for Bulaç, "while delegating the issues such as judiciary, defense or declaration of war to a central authority (state?), leaves services such as legislation, culture, science, arts, economy, education and health to civil society."[70] According to the Charter, the administration is limited with taxation, judiciary and defense, and leaves the rest to the civil society. Thus the

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[67] Bulaç, 'Medine Vesikası hakkında', p. 108.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[69] Dilipak, 'Türkiye'de hiçbir zaman laiklik olmadı', p. 18.

[70] Bulaç, 'Medine Vesikası hakkında', p. 110.

Medina Charter implies the existence of a minimal state which will only undertake 'common services'. However, a detailed definition of these 'common services' was not made. The project also asserts that for solving any conflicts between blocs, or social groups, Supreme Courts will be established. The Supreme Courts will be composed of legal representatives of groups.[71]

The Islamists were not alone in their search for a new ideological framework. In the 1990s, concepts like 'civil society', 'despotic state', and 'democratization' also became key terms for socialist left. Accordingly, the class-based socialist strategy which aimed at capturing the state was replaced by socialist strategies stressing plurality of struggles and agencies. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffes's postmodern Marxist, or post-Marxist framework, which was developed in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*,[72] had crucial consequences for the socialist left in these years. Monthly socialist *Birikim* journal tried to develop an indigenous post-Marxist strategy which defined the despotic Turkish state and the military as its main antagonist. This is why the friendly debate between socialist figures and the new-Islamists regarding the Medina Charter was not surprising at all.

Ahmet İnsel noted that Ali Bulaç's "great and praiseworthy" attempts to develop an understanding of state which does not have an official ideology, to promote decentralized civil society and to enhance autonomy of and plurality within the civil society has one crucial flow. This flow is the idea and principle of 'Unity', which calls everyone to one and same Revelation. In other words, "Unity is a call for elimination of differences and it carries, at least as a tendency, the principle of achieving a homogenous society, even a homogenous universe within itself."[73]

Bulaç replies İnsel within a framework which has been deeply inspired by Soroush's stress on plurality of interpretations of Revelation. Firstly, Bulaç responds that Islam will only be binding upon the Muslims. "The ones who argue that Islamic model is totalitarian overlook this fact," states Bulaç, and adds: "Islam

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[71] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[72] Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*.

[73] Ahmet İnsel, 'Totalitarizm, Medine Vesikası ve özgürlük', *Birikim*, no. 37, May 1992, p. 31.

and Islamic law bind only the Muslims, not others and non-Muslims will not be asked to act in accordance with Islamic law."[74] Secondly, in such a pluralist project no one will claim that they reached a final and absolute truth of revelation. "The Muslims will *hope* that they will reach the truth through following the Revelation; however, they can never be *sure* that they reached the Truth itself."[75]

Taner Akçam notes that Medina Charter project "empties" the state, and replaces it with an organization that will only be responsible with coordination of problems that would emerge between different groups.[76] For him, likewise, the socialist should reconsider their obsession with the state, and abandon their commitment to the nation-state.[77] Although the Medina Charter provides us a fruitful framework for reconsidering the role of the modern nation-state, for Akçam, the weakness of the Charter arises from the absence of 'individual' in the project. Ignoring the individual, and over-valuing group identity states Akçam, were among the reasons behind the failure of the socialist regimes.[78] Finally, Akçam underlines that the anti-universalist and relativist tendencies seem as loopholes that would lead to a 'postmodern barbarism.' In other words, Akçam stresses the necessity for defining some universal standards and principles; since there will not be a Prophet Mohammad that every group will trust.[79] Dilipak suggests that this problem might be overcome through acceptance of some principles such as freedom of conscience and thought; security of life and freedom from torture; protection of human integrity and sacred things; protection of private property (which has been acquired through just means); and securing ecological balance and providing a secure environment for procreation.[80]

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[74] Bulaç, 'Medine Vesikası hakkında', p. 109.

[75] Bulaç, 'Sözleşme temelinde toplumsal proje', p. 61, *emphases* added.

[76] Taner Akçam, 'Türkiye için yeni bir toplumsal projeye doğru', *Birikim*, no. 42, October 1992, p. 12.

[77] *Ibid*., pp. 15-17.

[78] *Ibid*., p. 14.

[79] *Ibid*., p. 15.

[80] Abdurrahman Dilipak, 'Medine Sözleşmesi üzerine', p. 27.

6.1.1.3.1. Locating the Medina Charter: civil society, post-politics and neo-liberalism

'Minimization of the state', delegation of basic services to the 'civil society', and recognition of cultural and religious 'differences' seem as the major themes of the Medina Charter project. Especially in the last decade of the 20th century, these concepts have become dominant themes both at home and abroad. Islamist, post-liberal, Second Republican and liberal-socialist circles at home located these concepts at the centre of their agendas.[81] In these discussions civil society was "generally intended to identify an arena of (at least potential) freedom outside the state, a space for autonomy, voluntary association and plurality or even conflict."[82] The inflationary usage of the concept, however, brought many ambiguities and doubts regarding its usefulness.[83]

So far, in debates over the totalitarian character of the modern nation-state, privatization and Medina Charter, we have seen that the new-Islamist politics depicted the dichotomy between the state and the civil society as its departing point. I have no intention to go into details of the debate over civil society. However, posing such an unproblematic dichotomy between civil society and the state originates from a crucial epistemological error, which has grave political consequences such as the Medina Charter. This approach evaluates the state as the terrain of domination and (civil) society of freedom. In other words, it does not recognize the fact that the state itself is a social relation;[84] and separation of civil society from the state is a permanent object of social struggles.[85] Such an

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[81] Necmi Erdoğan and Fahriye Üstüner, '1990'larda 'Siyaset Sonrası' Söylemler ve Demokrasi'.

[82] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995), p. 242.

[83] Krishan Kumar, 'Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term', *Brithish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 44, No. 3, (September 1993)

[84] See, Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism*; Philip Corrigan (ed.), *Capitalism, State Formation and Marxist Theory*, (Quartet Books: London, 1980); Werner Bonfeld, 'Social Constitution and the Form of the Capitalist State', in *Open Marxism: Dialectics and History vol. I*, Bonefeld, Gunn & Psychopedis (eds.), (Pluto Press: London, 1992); and Galip Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s*, (Bilgi University Press: Istanbul, 2009), pp. 21-113.

[85] Simon Clarke, 'The State Debate', in *The State Debate*, S. Clarke (ed.), (Macmillan: London, 1991), p. 34.

approach, as it has been noted by Erdoğan and Üstüner, also "does not care about the authoritarian, patriarchal, fascistic etc. tendencies within the civil society."[86] The civil society (for Medina Charter case the 'community') is not a power-free terrain on which each actor achieves full realization, and freedom from oppression. On the contrary, as stated by Wood on despotic nature of the relations within the market, "coercion has been not just a disorder of 'civil society' but one of its constitutive principles."[87] Thus, Bulaç's assertion that individual will be protected from state's oppression through community's buffer-function leaves the problem of community oppression itself untouched.[88]

The Medina Charter project may also be criticized for its anti-political stance. This anti-political stance is one of the points of intersection between new-Islamist and neo-liberal political agendas. Above I have outlined the basic a-political propositions of neo-liberalism, and neo-liberal understanding of democracy. The starting point of neo-liberal politics was to draw a clear demarcation line between economy and politics. Within this general schema, politics is reduced to administration of things, to mere technicality. The Medina Charter overemphasizes minimization of the state and turns it into an instrument which will only have coordinative functions. This coordinative instrument will be responsible to handle 'common tasks', as Bulaç asserts,[89] which are seen as technical issues but can themselves be matters of political struggle. However, essentialization and freezing of communities and differences, in fact, assumes homogeneity within established groups themselves. In other words, Medina Charter, while stressing differences does not give credit to difference of opinions within groups or communities. By Menderes Çınar's words,

> Bulaç assume that problems will be solved through a model in which no authority will be able to claim power on society; a night watchman "state" which will "avoid getting involved" (*etliye sütlüye karışmayan*) in anything and communities living under that state. Maybe this is caused by

[86] Necmi Erdoğan and Fahriye Üstüner, '1990'larda 'Siyaset Sonrası' Söylemler ve Demokrasi', p. 664.

[87] Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism*, p. 255.

[88] This critique has also been discussed by the new-Islamist intellectuals. See, Kadir Abdiimamoğlu, 'Modern Anayasa Hukuku Açısından Medine Vesikası', p. 45.

[89] Bulaç, 'Medine Vesikası hakkında genel bilgiler', *Birikim*, no. 38/39, June-July 1992, p. 110.

Ali Bulaç's focus on pluralism in the private sphere rather than representation of differences in the public sphere. When we consider the complexities of the modern world, this lack of authority will have consequences such as the death of politics and of the political sphere.[90]

Radical Islamist circles, on the other hand, evaluated Medina project as a product of confusion among the Islamist intellectuals. Alp Işıklı, after noting that Ali Bulaç and his circle right in pointing at the political, cultural and economic crisis that the westernist Turkish state found itself in, asserts that referring to concepts like civil society and plurality of laws is a mistake "since Muslims are in no need of importing concepts."[91] Firstly, for Işıklı, civil society project as materialized in Medina Charter overlaps with the neoliberal agenda which targets the constraining effects of the state. Above all, he completely disagrees with Bulaç's interpretation of the Charter itself. Accordingly, while Bulaç interprets the Charter as an outline for a pluralist society with plurality of laws, in which every community's religion or atheism will be their own business; Işıklı states that such a consensus is out of question. "What is at stake here is a denial of all kinds of offers for reaching a consensus with the polytheists, not a defense of pluralist societal model."[92] As the sole legitimate holders of divine revelation and message, reconciliation is out of question. Işıklı also denounces Bulaç's project by stating that Muslims cannot give people the freedom to choose *kufr* or *polytheism*. It is the Muslims' duty to fight against dissemination of these phenomena. Finally Işıklı states that Ali Bulaç misses two vital aspects of the charter:

> First, in the city states, the political power was in the hands of Prophet Mohammad. Second, Islam, in the final instance, aimed at eliminating cruelty and *fitna* that was caused by *kufr*.[93]

Işıklı's objections can be shown as a proof of existence of completely different interpretations of a historical religious document and religious message. While the new-Islamist intellectuals insist on non-hierarchical nature of the relation between

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[90] Çınar, 'Çok Hukuklu Toplum', p. 248.

[91] Alp Işıklı, 'İkinci cumhuriyet, sivil toplum tartışmaları ve Müslümanlar', *Haksöz*, No. 18, (September 1992).

[92] *Ibid.*,

[93] *Ibid.*,

Muslims and non-Muslims, the radical Islamist view focuses on the Islamizing mission of the Charter under the political 'leadership' of Prophet Mohammad. The major divide, however, is between the unwavering belief in the oneness of truth and the new-Islamist's stress on plurality of interpretations. But, this liberal attitude does not rule out new forms of authoritarianisms as I have briefly discussed above.

6.1.2. From Ideological State to Democratic State:[94] New-Islamism on Democracy and Constitution

The new-Islamist discourse differentiates itself through its approach to the questions of democracy and individual freedoms. While Islamism, as I have discussed in the previous chapters, associated democracy as a concept and as a term with idolatry, and seen it as a tool of ideological manipulation; the new-Islamist intellectuals proudly underlines the democratic nature of their outlook. The new-Islamist outlook associates the notions such as accountability, civility, freedom, and openness with the concept of democracy. The modern state has mostly been criticized for its anti-democratic nature.

With the touch of liberalism, the new-Islamist intellectual asserts that in real democracies "individual constitutes the foundation (and purpose) of all economic, political and legal institutions. Without individual there is nothing. Is it possible to think about a family without individual, a society without individual, a military without individual, a religion without individual... and a democracy without individual?"[95] The new-Islamist intellectuals define a set of prejudices regarding the relation between Islam and democracy, and underline the need to overcome these prejudices. The first is the misjudgment that Islamist ideology, when it comes to power, will not recognize the right to live to its opponents. For *Yeni Zemin*, far from being essentially Islamic, this attitude is a characteristic of the

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[94] Mehmet Metiner, *İdeolojik Devleten Demokratik Devlete: Zamanın Ruhunu Anlamak*, (Beyan: Istanbul, 1999).

[95] Mustafa Kamalak, 'Anayasa, asker-sivil bürokratların değil milletin olmalı', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 4, April 1993, p. 10.

modernist western Jacobin imaginary which is oppressive and assimilationist. It is not Islam but the ideologies of 'nation state', 'Western life-style' and 'modern society' which are anti-democratic and totalizing.[96] Against these prejudices the new-Islamist intellectual insists that,

1. *Islam is not a theocracy*: there is a huge difference between Islam and Christianity in terms of both religions' approach to relationship between divine revelation and political authority; in other words, with respect to the problem of religious state. While in Christianity theologically and historically the religious clergy and the Church claimed their share in political sovereignty, in Islamic philosophy no one can claim to rule in the name of God. By Bulaç's words,

> . . . in divine terms the sovereignty belongs to Allah, but in legal and political terms Ummah or the people have the right to hold that sovereignty. Many Muslim writer, when stating that "Sovereignty belongs to Allah, not to people," they, consciously or unconsciously desire to establish a Christian (Catholic) theocracy in Islam. However, "sovereignty" of Allah is something; but someone's claim to rule in the name of Allah is something different. It is understandable that the proponents of this idea strongly oppose political freedom, pluralist society and participation; but it is not legitimate in Islamic point of view.[97]

2. *Islam does not propose a dictatorial regime:* according to the new-Islamist intellectuals the dictatorial regimes possess philosophical, political or ideological views that claim to represent a fixed, immutable and absolute truth; and they endeavor to impose this truth to society. Accordingly, single party era in Turkey or Shah Era in Iran were dictatorial regimes *per se*. These regimes tell people what and how to think, and how to live, get dressed and eat. According to the new-Islamist intellectuals, however, Islam is far from such totalitarian ideas.[98]

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[96] *Yeni Zemin*, 'Yaşadığımız tarih yeni bir sıçrama noktası olabilir', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 9, September 1993, p. 1.

[97] Bulaç, 'Özgürlük Üzerine', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 3, March 1993, p. 63.

[98] Bulaç, 'Sözleşme temelinde toplumsal proje', p. 58.

3. *Islam promotes freedom*: Islam believes that personality and ideas of human beings can only develop in a free environment. The first step towards freedom is getting rid of all false deities be it idols, class, party, the tyrant or idea and ideology.[99]

New-Islamism insists on the need for constituting an 'open society', in which no sectors of society will have immunities. This is the major precondition for overcoming the taboos of Turkey.[100] For Bulaç, it is the duty of Muslims to struggle for fundamental rights and freedoms, human rights, open society, political participation, freedom of association, freedom of thought and of expression etc. more than anyone else. This is also fundamental for development of Islam.[101] For the new-Islamist intellectuals, the Republic of Turkey is an anti-democratic state *par excellence*. Elements like the alienated nature of the Turkish state, the totalitarian attitude of a minority of Westernist bureaucrats, and the totalizing modernist attitude of the ruling elite constitute the anti-democratic framework of the Turkish state. Laicism for instance, which is wrongly associated with democracy –as if democracy cannot live in the absence of laicism– is considered as one of the manifestations of this anti-democratic outlook. By Dilipak's words, "the people who label themselves as laic are far from being democrats."[102]

Making of a new-democratic constitution stands as one of the most recurrent themes of new-Islamist democratic discourse. Since 1876, constitution making has been one of the most important and most debated political activities in Ottoman-Turkish polity. After 1876 Kanun-i Esasi, Turkey had four different constitutional periods following 1921, 1924, 1961 and 1982 Constitutions. For Metiner,

> All other Constitutions, except the one which was prepared by the First Assembly, have been totalitarian and authoritarian in character. In this regard, they have been 'imperious', 'interventionist', 'forbidder' and 'imposing', and became the main sources of social distress and crises.[103]

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[99] Bulaç, 'Özgürlük Üzerine', p. 62.

[100] Hikmet Özdemir, 'Resmi İdeolojimiz İflas Etmiştir', *Yeni Zemin*, no.2, February 1993, p. 34.

[101] Bulaç, 'İslam özgür bir ortamda gelişir', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 4, Nisan 1993, p. 73.

[102] Dilipak, 'Türkiye'de hiçbir zaman laiklik olmadı', p. 18.

[103] Metiner, 'Toplum merkezli anayasa', p. 4.

The new-Islamist intellectuals criticize these Constitutions (except the 1921 Constitution) for lacking popular support and legitimacy. Since these Constitutions are not outcomes of the national will, they cannot represent the people, and even cannot be accepted as legitimate legal documents.[104] The driving force behind constitution making in Turkey is Westernization. In fact, constitution making in Turkey has itself been a part of Westernization programme.[105] This is why it is not the people or political movements but the Westernist bureaucrats and military elite who made constitutions in Turkey; and why these documents are state centered.[106] These constitutions are state centered since their fundamental concern is the "continuity and survival of the state".[107] When compared to excessive power of the state, individual and society are left unprotected and impotent.[108] By Abdurrahman Dilipak's words,

> While the Constitutions must be the documents that depart from the ideals of peace, equality and freedom, and that define and limit the authority of the state; in countries like Turkey they were turned into documents that limit the society and "civilize" it. Because, it was not the people who made the Constitutions, but the military or the elites. Their first objective was to protect themselves.[109]

The new-Islamist critique of constitution making in Turkey is also a critique of the so-called modernist Jacobin imaginary of the Westernizing elites in Turkey. The main guiding principle of constitution making in Turkey has been "for the people against the people', which expresses "the sacred state's will to civilize (*adam etmek*) its poor people."[110] Sarıbay, in his contribution to constitution debate in *Yeni Zemin*, considers Turkish process as manifestations of constitution engineering. In other words, as a continuation of social engineering, constitution has been considered as the major conduit for social and political change and

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[104] Nazif Şahinoğlu, 'Anayasa, milletin inançlarına uygun hazırlanmalı,' *Yeni Zemin*, (April 1993), p. 16.

[105] İhsan Süreyya Sırma, 'Batu orijinli anayasalara hayır,' *Yeni Zemin*, no. 4, (April 1993), p. 9.

[106] Metiner, 'Toplum merkezli anayasa', p. 4.

[107] Sırma, "Batı orijinli anayasalara hayır," p. 12.

[108] Metiner, 'Toplum merkezli anayasa', p. 4.

[109] Dilipak, "İlah devlet öngören anayasa istemiyoruz", p. 24.

[110] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

advancement. Against such an engineering mentality, Sarıbay proposes his participatory democratic alternative, which will be the basis of a democratic constitution, as such:

> What I mean by democracy is participatory democracy which is not limited with the political system but is related to every spheres of the social life. In this democracy individual, as a political actor, is more essential than other organized groups and collectivities. Different from the representative democracy, elections is only a way of expressing preferences. Participatory democracy tries to open up avenues to increase citizens' opportunities for participating in collective decision making processes.[111]

As seen, the need for a new constitution has been underlined by the new Islamist and liberal intellectuals of the period. It must be also remembered that especially the post-1990 era has been characterized by a constant debate (by almost all sector of Turkish society) on the authoritarian character of the 1982 Constitution. The new-Islamist intellectuals actively participated in these discussions through bringing up substantial and practical solutions to the Constitution crisis. Abdurrahman Dilipak noted that for a lasting and serious constitution Turkey must choose between democratic and republican traditions; which also overlap with the choice between centralist and decentralist perspectives.[112]

According to the new-Islamist intellectual the new constitution must be a product of a consensus. Although constitutions are legal texts with high level of technical knowledge they have immediate effects on the lives of ordinary citizens. This is why not only all political parties that have a parliamentary group, but also all civil power centers must approve it.[113] It is only through running such a procedure that the new constitution will reconcile the state and the people.[114]

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[111] Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "Türkiye'de anayasa devletin hukuku olarak algılanmıştır," *Yeni Zemin*, no. 4, (April 1993), p.15.

[112] Dilipak, "İlah devlet öngören anayasa istemiyoruz", p. 26.

[113] Mehmet Metiner, 'Toplum merkezli anayasa', p. 4; Dilipak, 'İlah devlet öngören anayasa istemiyoruz', p. 25.

[114] Nazif Şahinoğlu, "Anayasa, milletin inançlarına uygun hazırlanmalı," *Yeni Zemin*, (April 1993), p. 17.

The new-Islamist proposals for a new constitution, in line with the political and economic project of new-Islamism, call for minimization of Turkish state. Mehmet Metiner notes that the new constitution must replace 'interventionist state' with 'arbiter state'; and 'sovereign state' with 'servant state'. The qualities of the democratic constitution proposed by the new-Islamist intellectuals can be listed as such:

> *i.* The state monopoly over religion –which is, in fact, against the principle of laicism– must be removed.
> *ii.* The state monopoly over economy, education, health, culture, etc. must be removed.
> *iii.* The constitution must not have unamendable[115] articles.
> *iv.* The role of military must be redefined in line with civil-democratic principles.
> *v.* The centralist-bureaucratic structure of the state must be curbed.
> *vi.* Freedom of thought must be promoted.
> *vii.* The people must be granted the right to elect their president. Arrangements for presidential system must be made.
> *viii.* All administrative procedure must be open to judicial review.
> *ix.* The parliament must be empowered.
> *x.* The Constitutional Court must be re-configured.
> *xi.* The deputies must take their oaths on Quran.

Dilipak notes that these measures are indispensable not only for consolidating democracy in Turkey; but also an integral part of Turkey's dream to become a member of the European Community.[116] Dilipak's stress is one of the earliest accounts of integrating with the European Community, which associates the process with democratization, civilization (*sivilleşme*) and economic prosperity. The transformation of perception of the West from 'evil incarnate' to a 'strategic ally for promoting democratization and economic development' is worth noting. In the following years, this point will constitute one of the major indicators of transformation of Islamism.

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[115] Article 1: The Turkish state is a Republic, Article 2: The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble. Article 3: The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish. Its flag, the form of which is prescribed by the relevant law, is composed of a white crescent and star on a red background. Its national anthem is the "Independence March. Its capital is Ankara. Article 4: The provision of Article 1 of the Constitution establishing the form of the state as a Republic, the provisions in Article 2 on the characteristics of the Republic, and the provision of Article 3 shall not be amended, nor shall their amendment be proposed. For the full text www.anayasa.gov.tr.

[116] Dilipak, 'İlah devlet öngören anayasa istemiyoruz', p. 25.

However, we must not hastily conclude that democracy has been unproblematically and smoothly embraced by the new-Islamist intellectuals. When compared to the articles in *Yeni Zemin*, *Bilgi ve Hikmet* took a more cautious stand towards integrating the elements of liberal democracy to the Islamist discourse. For instance Çelik underscored that while democracies aimed at creating the "good citizen", the main objective of Islam is to create the "good human being." [117] In other words there is a huge moral and philosophical divide between Islam and democracy. Democracy has also been criticized on more practical grounds. Şükrü Karatepe criticizes parliamentarian democracies on several grounds: firstly, the Keynesian welfare state in the West and the idea of welfare state in general resulted in state's involvement primarily in economy and afterwards every spheres of social life (like family, health, education and birth control) which resulted in strengthening of governments against parliaments; secondly, liberal democracies resulted in creation of a caste of technocrats who holds great power in their hands due to their expertise; thirdly, rigid party discipline and anti-democratic party structures casted doubt on contributions of political parties to democracy and resulted in loss of faith in political parties; and finally, personalization of power increased the role of subjective and partial judgments in decision making processes.[118]

Thus, following the aforementioned problems we can conclude that the new-Islamist intellectuals, in contrast to the anti-systemic Islamist challenge against democracy in the 1980s, embraced the fundamental principles of liberal democracies. Although some figures within the new-Islamist circle still had reservations about parliamentary democracies, the new-Islamist intellectuals have seen in democracy a potential that will increase the opportunity spaces for the Islamists. However, still we must keep in mind that community and communitarian participation in the so-called democratic mechanisms and the critique of the idea of modern citizenship is at the heart of the new-Islamist democratic project.

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[117] Ömer Çelik, 'Modern İdrakın Tabii Hasılası', p. 79.

[118] 'Batı demokrasilerinde Parlamento Krizi', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, No. 3, (Summer 1993), pp. 60-68.

6.1.3. Curbing the State's Monopoly over Religion: a post-Laic Republic?

The laic character of the Turkish state stands another problem area for the new-Islamist intellectuals. In their criticisms, the new-Islamist intellectuals problematize issues of secularism, laicism and their application in Turkish context. The new-Islamist intellectuals portray the Republic of Turkey as a Muslim country in which Muslims cannot practice their religions freely. As a logical conclusion of its modern character, the Turkish nation-state assumes a hostile attitude towards religion, and imposes ideology of positivism as the new religion. On the other hand, the Turkish state does not hesitate to 'use' and 'manipulate' Islam and Muslims through developing and disseminating an officialized, modernized and institutionalized version of Islam.

For Mustafa Kamalak The ambiguity surrounding the terms 'laicism' and 'laic' constitutes one of the most important problems in modern Turkey. Although the term entered to the Constitution in 1937 as one of the principles of the Republic of Turkey, it has not been properly and satisfactorily defined. For Kamalak, ambiguity brought abundance of interpretations, and caused many to identify laicism with anti-religiosity.[119] This is why, for Kamalak, the courts in Turkey could not develop a standard regarding the definition and punishment of anti-laic acts. Thus, according to him, for eliminating the arbitrariness surrounding the term, the principle of laicism must be clearly defined or completely removed from the constitution.[120]

Historical origins of laicism and its Western character render laicism a completely alien phenomenon for Ottoman-Turkish societies. Dilipak opposes the view that laicism focuses on the relationship between state and religion. As a phenomenon of Western origin, the fundamental conflict that led to emergence of the ideas of secularism and laicism was between the church and the state.

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[119] Mustafa Kamalak, 'Anayasa, asker-sivil bürokratların değil milletin olmalı', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 4, April 1993, p. 11.

[120] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

> Today, in the West, the debate is about the participation of the Church (in other words, a class which claims power in the name of religion) and the people who are not from that religion into power... When we consider that there is no clergy in Islam, laicism has no logical and philosophical equivalent. In Latin, laicism denotes the ones who are not from the clergy; it does not mean atheism.[121]

Thus, in the West, laicism has fundamentally different historical and philosophical foundations.[122] It may have a meaning and importance for the European societies who, for centuries suffered under theocratic rule and the Church's despotism. However, Metiner continues, in societies like ours, where one cannot find theocratic tradition, laicism is not meaningful or necessary. Because Islam is a religion

> by its very nature severely opposes imposing any kind of belief or constraining thoughts-sects. Most important of all, Islam has a content which envisages, in the proper senses of the term, free, pluralist and tolerant societal order.[123]

The new-Islamists note that the idea of laicism entered the Ottoman Empire with reform movements. In this sense, laicism was developed with the idea of reforming and renovating the Ottoman state and society. Following the Tanzimat movement of 1839, laicism meant thinking social, political and economic problems with non-religious references. However, laicism was not an end in itself, but was considered as an inevitable process to save the state.[124]

Against the general conviction which starts history of laicism with the history of the Republic of Turkey, Davut Dursun stressed that laicism had a longstanding history that goes back to the first half of the nineteenth century.[125] However, the Republican understanding of laicism differentiated itself from its earlier versions with its totalitarian outlook:

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[121] Dilipak, 'Türkiye'de hiçbir zaman laiklik olmadı', p. 17.

[122] *Ibid*., p. 18.

[123] Mehmet Metiner, 'Devlet, dinden elini çekmeli', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 2, (February 1993), p. 4.

[124] Davut Dursun, 'Laikliğin Türkiye'deki İşleyişi', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, no. 2, (Spring 1993), p. 99-100.

[125] Davut Dursun, 'Din-Devlet İşlerinin 70 Yıllık Macerası', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 2, (February 1993), p. 9.

Laicism, which has been imposed by the Republican People's Party that ruled the country from the formation of the Republic to 1950, has appeared as state's intervention into religious life of the citizens, giving a new shape to religion, restructuring the religion in line with values and measures of the official ideology, and turning religion into a legitimating ideology for state's actions. Although laicism has been defined in official documents and circles as separation of the affairs of religion and state, in practice this could never be realized. On the contrary, the state dominated the religion. [126]

In its critique of laicism, the new-Islamist discourse frequently brings forward the argument that Muslims of Turkey, who constitute the 99% of the population, are, in fact, the minority in Turkey. History of the late-Ottoman Empire and the whole Republic has been characterized by oppression of the Muslim population by the centralist civil-military elites, and in some cases other non-Muslim groups. According to me, although having some element of truth, this perspective was clearly based on exaggeration of the actual historical situation. With this ideological twist the new-Islamist intellectuals exalted themselves to the status of the 'wronged' of the Republic. In this narrative all political movements and ideological orientations other than Islamism targeted the belief and culture of the people. It is through this twist that the social has been divided into two distinct blocs: the wronged Muslims who are in favor of freedoms and liberties versus the totalitarian center.[127] For instance, according to Dilipak, for the Kemalists laicism was a "Trojan Horse to square up with Islam and Muslims."[128] For Dursun "during the *single party totalitarianism*, laicism was the main reason behind persecution of religion and religious people."[129] The distinguishing feature of the Kemalist Republic, according to new-Islamist intellectuals, was the hostile attitude of the civil and military bureaucracy to its people.[130] By Gedik's words, the founders of the Republic of Turkey clearly had an "anti-religious worldview."[131] For Albayrak,

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[126] Dursun, 'Laikliğin Türkiye'deki İşleyişi', p. 102. Davut Dursun, 'Din-Devlet İşleri', p. 11.

[127] See Fethi Açıkel, 'Entegratif toplum ve muarızları', for a critical evaluation of this narrative.

[128] Dilipak, 'Türkiye'de hiçbir zaman laiklik olmadı', p. 18.

[129] Dursun, 'Laikliğin Türkiye'deki İşleyişi', p. 103, **emphasis** added.

[130] Ümit Aktaş, 'Siyasal Denetleme Aracı Olarak Ordu', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 3, (March 1993), p. 24.

[131] Nuri Gedik, 'Dine karşı bir dünya görüşü kuruldu', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 2, (February 1993), p. 10.

from the beginning, the Republic did not give Muslims the right to live.[132] Restriction of religious education, replacement of Arabic letters with Latin alphabet, reduction of religion to a personal matter and curbing its social functions were some of the arrangements for containing religion in Turkey.[133] Relative liberalization in the 1950s did not bring a qualitative shift in the nature of the relationship between state and religion. The 1961 and 1982 Constitutions are also considered as continuation of containment policies.[134]

The Turkish state is not only against Islam, but also endeavors to establish a monopoly over Islam through officializing and institutionalizing it. In that respect, the Turkish state contradicts with the fundamental principle of laicism: separation of religion from state. For instance, according to Mehmet Metiner "the state elites who are the defenders of official ideology, in the name of laicism, follow an interesting policy . . . Turkey is an allegedly laic country; but in essence it is anti-laic and completely under dominance of a statist official ideology."[135] Laicism, in Turkish establishment's vocabulary, was synonymous with 'state religion'.[136]

For *Yeni Zemin*, Turkey claims to be a laic state, but laicism in Turkey is far from meeting the European standards. For instance, in a laic country education cannot be under monopoly of state. In Europe, for instance, alongside schools and universities giving laic education there are numerous religious schools and universities. The Church does not only have autonomous schools but possess many hospitals, publishing houses, newspapers and TV channels. Even there is Christian Democratic or Christian Social Democratic political parties.[137] All these evidences are posed against the statist and etatist character of Turkish laicism.

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[132] Sadık Albayrak, 'Müslümanca yaşama hakkı gasp edildi', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 2, February 1993, p. 12.

[133] Dursun, 'Din-Devlet İşleri', p. 11.

[134] *Ibid*., p. 16.

[135] Mehmet Metiner, 'Devlet, dinden elini çekmeli', p. 4.

[136] Editorial, 'Türkiye'de Baskı Altındaki Dinin Özgürleşme Talebi', *Yeni* Zemin, no. 2, (February 1993), p. 6.

[137] *Ibid*., p. 7.

"Turkey has never been a laic country" states Dilipak and adds, "laicism in Turkey has nothing in common with its Western version. What we have in Turkey is not laicism but a 'Kemalist theocracy'."[138] Accordingly, Kemalism is imposed as the new religion of the Turkish citizens. Since controlling religion was one of the basic objectives of the state, *Byzantism* appears as a more appropriate term explaining the Turkist case.[139]

New-Islamist intellectuals' critiques of laicism targeted a particular state institution, Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*), which was founded in 1924 and "designed for the interpretation and execution of an enlightened version of Islam –which could be termed "state Islam"– through its civil service personnel, notably imams."[140] For the new-Islamist intellectuals prevalence of an organization such as DİB is against the basic principles of laicism. DİB is also against laicism since it reduces religious commissaries to state officers. Even the 'highest' religious authority, the head of the DİB is appointed by the state.[141] By Kamalak's words,

> Laicism means isolation of state from religion and religion from state. But, at some instances the state can give support. But this should not make religious man the officers of the state. However, in our country, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which has personnel of 80.000 and a budget of billions of Turkish liras, is within the general administrative system. Besides, the organization, which needs to be impartial according to the constitution, is operating under a minister that is a member of a political party . . . . Treating religious man as state officers, and locating the Head of the DRA within the general administration conflict with the principle of laicism. The way to overcome this conflict is moving the DİB out of general administrative system.[142]

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[138] Dilipak, 'Türkiye'de hiçbir zaman laiklik olmadı', p. 18.

[139] Editorial, 'Türkiye'de Baskı Altındaki Dinin Özgürleşme Talebi', *Yeni* Zemin, no. 2, (February 1993), p. 7; Dilipak, 'Türkiye'de hiçbir zaman laiklik olmadı', p. 18.

[140] Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 'Parameters and Strategies', p. 238.

[141] Davut Dursun, 'Din-Devlet İşleri', p. 16.

[142] Mustafa Kamalak, 'Anayasa, asker-sivil bürokratların değil milletin olmalı', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 4, (April 1993), pp. 12-13.

Metiner states that there are two types of religions in Turkey, one is the official religion and the other is the religion of the people. [143] For Kadir Canatan, DİB is the official body of modernist Islam in Turkey, which is employed with disseminating an official religion that is in line with the requirements of modern nation state.[144] Promotion of official Islam, for Canatan, on the other hand, is against the interests of genuine Islam; because the state manipulates and utilizes Islam by DİB: "Official Islam is tightly dependent on the state in administrative and financial terms. This dependency naturally brings ideological and political dependency."[145] The functions of the Directorate are listed as such:

- *Legitimation*: official religion endeavors to provide alienated civil-military bureaucracy legitimacy.

- *Resistance*: official religion is used against circles who question the legitimacy of the state –especially against the radical Islam.

- *Integration*: official religion aims at providing a set of values to hold the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic social mosaic together. [146]

The new-Islamist intellectuals' solutions regarding the relations between state and religion are in line with their overall political program. As I have shown so far, 'the State' with a capital 'S' is considered as the primary responsible for all social, political and economic problems. The same goes true for the relationship between state and religion in Turkey. To sum up, the anti-religious and anti-Islam attitude of the Turkish state (personified in civil-military bureaucracy), coupled with attempts for developing an official religion are two major sources of crisis. Stating that Turkey has never been fully a laic country –in terms of separation of religion and state– the new-Islamist intellectuals called for radically reconstructing the relationship between state and religion.

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[143] Mehmet Metiner, 'Devlet, dinden elini çekmeli', p. 4.

[144] Kadir Canatan, 'Kapitalizm, Protestanlık ve İslam', *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, no. 2, (Spring 1993), pp. 39.

[145] *Ibid.*, pp. 39.

[146] *Ibid.*, pp. 40.

Within this framework, the state should no longer be a power controlling, supervising and shaping religion. The basic duty of the state is to provide a peaceful and free environment to its citizens to practice their religion freely. The state should neither dictate a particular religion nor be against any religion.[147] Following this logic, the religious services should no longer be state's task. "The state must withdraw from religion" says Metiner and "religious services must be left to the civil society."[148] *Yeni Zemin* editorial article summarizes the policy proposals of the new-Islamist intellectuals as such:

> Our view is that state should withdraw from religion and religion should be autonomous. Thus Directorate of Religious Affairs should be annulled gradually, official television programmes such as World of Belief should be stopped and the state should give up religious education in schools. Furthermore mosques and charity foundations should be let loose and religious groups and communities should be free to do their practices. . . . *In short, religious affairs should be left to civil society*. Of course, there may be some legal arrangements in order to prevent any chaotic situation.[149]

The new-Islamists' critique of Turkish state's attempts to monopolize Islam embraces the motto of "freedom to religion". In fact, this phrase can be considered as the constituting element of the democratic, anti-statist, anti-military (see below) and liberal outlook of new Islamism. However, as I have tried to point out several times, the new-Islamist intellectuals, at many instances tend to identify freedom with "freedom to religion"; that at some instances "the freedom of religion and religious activity" becomes the yardstick against which the level of democracy and freedom is defined. This attitude has the risk of reaching a narrow definition of freedom in which the demand for freedom in other fields by other actors can easily be discarded. This is why, today, the new-Islamist elites, who defined themselves as the major actors of democratic development in Turkey can easily become the enthusiastic defenders of authoritarian measures.

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[147] Davut Dursun, 'Din-Devlet İşleri', p. 16.

[148] Mehmet Metiner, 'Devlet, dinden elini çekmeli', p. 4.

[149] Editorial, 'Türkiye'de Baskı Altındaki Dinin Özgürleşme Talebi', pp. 7-8, *emphasis* added.

6.1.4. A New Role for the Military

For the new-Islamist intellectuals, curbing the political and economic power of the Turkish Military stands as one of the most crucial steps towards minimizing the Turkish state, and democratizing and civilizing Turkish politics. Ottoman-Turkish politics, according to the new-Islamist intellectuals, has been characterized by military's persistent interference to political and social developments. The long standing symbiotic relation between military and civil bureaucracy has become a structural feature of Turkish politics, which had deep political, social and economic roots. This symbiosis, for the new-Islamist intellectuals, resulted in the regime's alienation from society in particular and social realities in general. Hence, the regime of the military and civil bureaucrats turned into a crippled entity unable to respond the dynamic demands of the late twentieth century.

For Bulaç, roots of the deep chasm between the military and the civil bureaucracy go back to Ottoman military system. Ottoman recruitment system and the role played by the palace school caused isolation of the military-bureaucratic elite from the people. While the basic mission of the *kapıkulu* army was to defend the throne, the provincial troops were supposed to take part in wars and conquests: "Rumelia is prosperous, while Anatolia is devastated; the Anatolia produces and wars, while Rumelia rules."[150] The isolation and alienation of the military elite from the people was consolidated by the military's perception of people as masses to be herded.[151] "This perception," states Bahri Zengin, "is the biggest crime against humanity," and "is a continuation of Monarchical tradition which assumed to be equipped with divine powers."[152]

Bulaç states that in countries which have a longstanding tradition of state centered political society, the military has two important functions: firstly, military fulfills the function of carrying modernization policies; and secondly, it acts as an

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[150] Ali Bulaç, 'Savunma ordusu mu, rejim ordusu mu?' *Yeni Zemin*, no. 3, March 1993, p. 15.

[151] Bahri Zengin, 'Rejimi halka rağmen korumaya çalışmak monark geleneğidir', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 3, March 1993, p. 19.

[152] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

imperious instrument which ensures application of modernization policies with stability.[153] By Aktaş's words, since II. Mahmut, centralization and modernization of military structure were seen as major solutions to backwardness of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, military has been located at the center of the idea of progress and development. This 'obsession', for Aktaş, has been inherited by the ideologues and politicians of the early republic, and professors of the 1960s who supported military interventions.

> However, development and civilizing processes of a society and its prosperity is, as President Özal frequently emphasizes, directly proportional with an increase in freedom of thought and belief, and therefore with the harmony between state and society. In this sense, state should be considered as an organization for public demands rather than an abstract, oppressive entity. Yet, most of the time, as long as the force holding the power possesses a military controlling device, it uses this as a repressive device for its own power, instead of meeting the demands of the society.[154]

Although noting that it would be wrong to name the current system as a military regime or military republic, Hikmet Özdemir underlines the fact that the soldiers has a surveillance power over the regime, a power which is impossible to control. "The soldier watches the regime like a garrison guard, and intervenes with his arms when he believes it is "necessary"."[155] The military's interference into politics as an influential actor, is, in fact, secured by a legal and constitutional framework. Hikmet Özdemir notes that the '1920 Model' was based on subjection of military to civil authority; '1924 Model' was pointing to an independent General Staff; while in 1944 the Head of General Staff Military was liable to the Prime Minister, in 1949 a surprisingly bold arrangement organized the General Staff as a unit of Ministry of Defense. For Özdemir, during the period between 1920 and 1960 civil-military relations are designed to maintain the superiority of the former over the latter.[156] After 1960 military intervention, the hierarchy in this relationship has been reversed in favor of the military.

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[153] Ali Bulaç, 'Savunma ordusu mu, rejim ordusu mu?' *Yeni Zemin*, no. 3, March 1993, p. 13.

[154] Ümit Aktaş, 'Siyasal Denetleme Aracı Olarak Ordu', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 3, (March 1993), p. 22.

[155] Hikmet Özdemir, 'Resmi İdeolojimiz', p. 33.

[156] Hikmet Özdemir, 'Silahlı Kuvvetler-Sivil Otorite İlişkisi Üzerine', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 3, (March 1993), pp. 6-7.

Mehmet Altan, on the other hand, does not hesitate to call the Republic of Turkey as a "Military Republic." "We call it a 'Military Republic'", states Altan, "since the Republic of Turkey is founded by soldiers. 'Military and civil bureaucracy' shaped the economic and political structure according to their design."[157] Altan asserts that the Turkish state's etatist economic policies consolidate military and civil bureaucracy's political power. Likewise, Davut Dursun underlines the fact that the Republic of Turkey has been formed by the military, and cutting the military's ties with politics will be an optimistic (and impossible) expectation.[158] The new-Islamist intellectuals also contend that the Turkish military isolated itself from society through turning soldiers into a privileged 'social class'.[159] The political weight of the Turkish military must be considered together with soldiers' economic and social privileges. For Ümit Aktaş,

> Conditioned as an instrument of power outside and above the society the military is mostly isolated from the people and turned into an isolated institution with its own housing, social facilities, special clubs, mutual-aid organizations, vehicles, hospitals and schools.[160]

This stratification, for Dursun, causes the military to see itself as superior to people and politicians. For Dursun the military stands at the 'center' of the system, and the struggle between "center and periphery" originates from ideological and institutional position of military.[161] Due to its social and political position, the Turkish military despises and insults people's belief and culture within the boundaries of "a positivist ideological elitism."[162] The Turkish military considers any sign of cultural or religious autonomy as a threat to the fundamentals of the system. This is why the military defined secessionism and Shari'a as two major

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[157] Ahmet Altan, 'Askeri Cumhuriyet', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 3, (March 1993), pp. 9.

[158] Davut Dursun, 'Değişen Türkiye'de ordu, sistemin neresinde? ', No. 3, (March 1993), p. 25.

[159] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[160] Ümit Aktaş, 'Siyasal Denetleme Aracı Olarak Ordu', p. 24.

[161] Davut Dursun, 'Değişen Türkiye'de ordu, sistemin neresinde? ', No. 3, (March 1993), pp. 26-27.

[162] Ümit Aktaş, 'Siyasal Denetleme Aracı Olarak Ordu', p. 24.

enemies of the system, and saw these as sufficient reasons to intervene into politics.[163]

The new-Islamist intellectuals rightly point out that military's prevalence in Turkey is not only a political and institutional issue. By Bulaç's words, mainly, the problem is historical and cultural. Ottoman rule, states Bulaç, has been characterized by a thorough militarization of the society; and "like persons, the societies also have habits, and habits are not easily abandoned." The positive qualities attributed to soldiers and military has deep roots in collective consciousness of Turkish society. In education, sports, or even debates regarding clothing (veiling issue) we see the decisiveness of militaristic themes, symbols and concerns. This is why, for Bulaç, in order to diminish prevalence of military in Turkish political and social life, we must start by getting rid of all militarist cultural references.[164]

Finally, the suggestions of the new-Islamist intellectuals for minimizing the role of military in Turkish politics and society can be listed as such:

1. The first step of civil solution is to differentiate defense and internal safety issues; and to give responsibility to Internal Affairs and Defense Ministries. For maintaining law and order, the police and gendarme forces, which are under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, must be renovated and empowered; and all the tasks related to internal security must be delegated to this ministry.
2. Forces of Command and General Staff must be located under the roof of Ministry of Defense.
3. The complex and huge task of administering the Turkish military must be assumed by a new structure called Defense Committee. Headed by the Defense Minister, the committee will be composed of Deputy Defense Minister, Head of General Staff, Heads of the Forces (Air, Navy, Land) of Command, and other civil and military technicians.
4. Compulsory military service must be replaced by a system based on voluntary recruitment. Within this new framework military service and soldiership must be grasped as a *profession* not a hereditary cultural trait (as in the saying 'Each Turk born as a soldier!'). Professional military will also help modernization of the army.
5. Military units must be moved out of cities; and military facilities must be opened to public use.
6. Military spending must be subject to parliamentary supervision.[165]

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[163] Mehmet Metiner, 'Darbe hazırlayan müfsitlere çanak tutmayalım', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 8, (August 1993), p. 5.

[164] Ali Bulaç, 'Savunma ordusu mu, rejim ordusu mu?', p. 18.

[165] Hikmet Özdemir, 'Silahlı Kuvvetler', pp. 6-8.

The new-Islamist critique of Turkish military is an integral element of its anti-statist and civil discourse. In fact, the new-Islamist call for a democratic political order, freedom for religion, and curbing military power all coalesce in their critique of modern nation state. In the previous chapters I have argued that theories of postmodernity and neoliberal globalization played a crucial role in making of the new-Islamist consciousness. I have also added that the critique of the "excessive" political and cultural powers of the modern nation state cannot be considered as separate from the economic project of the new-Islamism. In the following section I will discuss the latter.

6.2. The Economic Project of the new-Islamism

6.2.1. Global Restructuration of Capitalism and Islamic Capital

Global restructuring of capitalism and the dramatic shifts in international division of labor, together with post-1980 political, legal and ideological transformations experienced in Turkey, created a profitable environment for Islamic constituency in Turkey. For Hakan Yavuz, who overtly embraces the post-1980 political and economic measures and the triumph of political Islam, the post-1980 Turkey marked a significant increase in *opportunity spaces* for various social groupings, and within this era Islamist movements found valuable conduits to augment their resources, scope and vision.[166]

The neo-liberal transformation of Turkey under the leadership of Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (ANAP), first and foremost aimed at liberalization of Turkish economy, and opening it to global markets. The effects of this move towards liberalization on Anatolian capital have been summarized by Demir et. al. as such:

> The process of opening the economy to the outside world began with the 'Özal Period,' an important starting point in the formation of

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[166] Hakan M. Yavuz, 'Opportunity Spaces, Identity, and Islamic Meaning in Turkey,' *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Q. Wiktorowicz (ed.), (Indiana University Press: Indiana, 2003).

Anatolian capital. Starting with this period, small- and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) at local levels have formed a new business community by improving their business practices, learning technology, and searching new markets. Even without direct support from the government, the advantages brought about by openness have triggered a process of production and capital accumulation in Anatolia.[167]

The process also meant a change in the relationship between state and big bourgeoisie in Turkey.[168] Until then, within the framework of state-centered economic policies "the road to money and wealth passed through government."[169] By Buğra's words,

> The role of the state in the Turkish economy has not only been much more significant than in Western developed economies, but it also has been more crucial than in many other late industrializing countries as far as its impact on private-sector development is concerned.[170]

By Özdemir's formulation, while the keywords for the Western ideal-typical capitalism are individual and free market, in Turkey these were society and bureaucracy.[171] Previously we have seen that economic policies guarding the big bourgeoisie, and the disturbance felt with these policies led the way to formation of National Outlook parties. The grievances of Anatolian petit-bourgeoisie were formulated by Özdemir as such:

> The middle-class' complaint is about state policies. State supported the big capital through subsidies and other policies and made things smooth for them. The problems faced by these relatively less-educated groups which are far from establishing good relations with bureaucracy, constitute another dimension of the matter. As a result, the Anatolian capital which has indeed powerful historical roots becomes weaker everyday in both traditional and modern senses, and is exposed to the destructive blows of capitalism.[172]

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[167] Ömer Demir, Mustafa Acar and Metin Toprak, 'Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challanges', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 6, (November 2004), p. 169.

[168] Ayşe Buğra, *Devlet ve İşadamları,* trans. F. Adaman,(İletişim: Istanbul, 1997).

[169] Demir et. al., 'Anatolian Tigers', p. 167.

[170] Ayşe Buğra, 'Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation By Two Turkish Business Associations,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 30, p. 523.

[171] Şennur Özdemir, *MÜSİAD: Anadolu Sermayesinin Dönüşümü ve Türk Modernleşmesinin Derinleşmesi*, (Vadi: Istanbul, 2006), p. 100.

[172] Özdemir, *MÜSİAD*, p. 60.

The ISI policies that favored the big Istanbul bourgeoisie were targeted by newly rising Anatolian bourgeoisie. The head of MÜSİAD, for instance, was accusing "the one dimensional import-substitution policy" for transforming Turkey's largest industrial enterprises into "domestic market parasites."[173] Together with the shift from ISI policies to export oriented industrialization strategies, the Anatolian bourgeoisie, by the help of its cultural and social peculiarities found itself in a highly profitable and dynamic environment.[174] Post-Fordist forms of flexible accumulation, which meant a rise in smaller-scale manufacturing, subcontracted production, piece work and most notably elimination of trade-union "threat" was one of the main motor forces of this process.[175] Informal communitarian bonds increased organizational flexibility of small and medium-scale firms, and helped them respond promptly to rapidly changing market parameters. The communitarian aspect of post-Fordism has been underlined by Piore and Sabel as such:

> In flexible production it is hard to tell where society (in the form of family and school ties or community celebrations of ethnic and political identity) ends, and where economic organization begins. Among ironies of the resurgence of craft production is that its deployment of modern technology depends on its reinvigoration of affiliations that are associated with the preindustrial past.[176]

Keyder contends that "market liberalization unleashed entrepreneurial energies at every level . . . [and] as Turkey exports gravitated towards labour-intensive manufactures a number of smaller Anatolian cities with craft traditions and non-unionized workforces, where households could be incorporated in subcontracting deals, began to emerge as regional industrial centers."[177] Recent studies on Anatolian cities underline their changing nature: "we are no longer

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[173] Erol Yarar, *A New Perspective of the World at the Threshold of the 21st Century*, (MÜSİAD: Istanbul, n.d.), p. 48.

[174] Yavuz, 'Opportunity Spaces', p. 272.

[175] Gülalp, 'Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey's Welfare Party', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 33, 2001.

[176] Quoted in Ayşe Buğra, 'Labour, Capital and Religion: Harmony and Conflict Among the Constituency of Political Islam in Turkey', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2, (April 2002), p. 191.

[177] Çağlar Keyder, 'The Turkish Bell Jar', *New Left Review*, No. 28, (July-August, 2004), p. 68.

faced with a space and living, which is identified with "underdevelopment", "traditionality" or "periphery".[178] On the contrary, Anatolia is getting more dynamic, differentiated; the cities are integrating with the world, globalizing and developing their middle classes.[179] The new international economic order, by Charles Sabel's formulation, pointed to a crucial change in the relationship between economy and its territory.[180] "The fabric of the local economy", stated Sabel, "is reinforced at the same time as local firms are more directly tied in international markets";[181] which meant a "renaissance of regional economies." As it has been underlined by 2005 ESI report, "a number of Anatolian trading centers, ranged along the old silk routes, have undergone an industrial revolution which has turned them into major manufacturing centers and players in the global economy."[182] Economic dynamism and capital accumulation in Anatolia also meant emergence of a new class of entrepreneurs. The newly rising conservative Anatolian bourgeoisie defined themselves as 'progressive conservatives'.[183] They were "loyal to religious values, but open to change" and had a high degree of economic rationality. The entrepreneurial vision of 'progressive conservatives' favored "capital accumulation using their own resources."[184] They came from a social base "with almost no experience of intermingling with the state elite"[185]; and they were not comfortable with state intervention in economy, since the state was considered as the natural ally of big Istanbul bourgeoisie. The driving force of economic development in Anatolia has become exports. The Anatolian capital is mostly comprised of small and medium sized enterprises which are outward (export) oriented.

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[178] E. Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı, *Kentler: Anadolu'nun Dönüşümü, Türkiye'nin Geleceği*, (Doğan Kitap: Istanbul, 2010), p. 12. Also see ESI Report, *Islamic Calvinists*.

[179] *Ibid*., p. 12.

[180] Charles F. Sabel, 'Felxible Specialization and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies', in *Post-Fordism*, Ash Amin (ed.), (Blackwell: Oxford, 1994), p. 104.

[181] *Ibid*., p. 103.

[182] ESI, *Islamic Calvinists*, p. 6.

[183] Demir et. al., 'Anatolian Tigers', p. 173.

[184] *Ibid*., p. 173.

[185] *Ibid*., p. 174.

It has been argued that the cultural traits of Anatolian cities played a crucial role in their economic success.[186] More specifically, Islam provided a moral background, or incentive in mobilization of these regions' potentials. The success stories of the Anatolian Tigers pointed to a particular articulation achieved between religion and economic development. Newly rising entrepreneurs, as we will see below in discussing MÜSİAD, deliberately expressed the role of Islam in formulating long-term objectives. The Islamic entrepreneurship claimed to be establishing an alternative economic system – Islamic subeconomy[187]– which will be exempt from the moral deficits and destructive effects of capitalism. According to Timur Kuran there are two major factors that led to development of Islamic subeconomy:

> 1) … the feelings of guilt experienced by industrialists, shopkeepers, and professionals trying to get ahead in societies where prevailing social standards of honesty and dependability fall short of their own personal standards. . . By holding an Islamic bank account, shopping whenever possible at Islamic stores, and donating to Islamic causes, an industrialist can achieve the feeling that he is doing his best to live as a good Muslim, despite the unfavorable social conditions. He can alleviate his guilt also by assuming an Islamic identity for his own business.
> 2) Islamic subeconomy helps its participants cope with the prevailing adversities by fostering interpersonal trust. Insofar as individuals do business within the networks of people who know and trust each other, they reduce the cost of negotiating, drafting, monitoring, and enforcing agreements; relative to people who must constantly guard against being cheated, they incur lower transaction costs. . . . The Islamic subeconomy enables these newcomers to establish business relationships with a diverse pool of ambitious, hard-working, but culturally handicapped people who, like themselves, are excluded from the economic mainstream.[188]

Briefly, the psychological factor of need for guilt relief and profitability of networks based on trust are active in formation Islamic subeconomy. Kuran stresses that Islamic subeconomy, far from being a source of inefficiency,

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[186] ESI, *Islamic Calvinists*.

[187] Timur Kuran 'Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy,' *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 9, No. 4, (Autumn 1995); and 'The Discontents of Islamic Economic Morality,' *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 86, No. 2, 1996.

[188] 'Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*,Vol. 9, No. 4, (Autumn 1995), pp. 167-169.

provides "palpable benefits that secular economic agencies and institutions are failing to provide."[189] Kemal Can, however, urges us not to exaggerate the ideological and cultural unity of Islamic capital:

> With a just reductionism, it is possible to divide "green capital" into three main categories: 1) Conservative-religious (sometimes even 'Islamist') businessman. 2) Religious order-community companies. 3) Multi-partner models. Yet, this general categorization displays only one aspect of the "green capital" phenomenon, which is the institutional structures directly participating in the economic life. Nevertheless this phenomenon has many aspects from organization to "re-emergence of class divisions", from "veiled high society" to over-flexible mode of production, from new public projects to new fatwas . . . So, just as every group have different pasts, characteristics and projects, they will continue to have different and interesting adventures.[190]

Kuran states that "although there is near-agreement that Islamic economics stands for limited property rights, Islamic economists differ greatly in regard to the specific limits they favor."[191] Some currents in Islamic economics calls for measures aimed at radical equalization, whereas others accept the legitimacy of accumulation of great wealth insofar as the property owner acts in line with basic Islamic rules such as delivering *zakāt* payments, and honest acquisition. In Turkish case, the legitimization and internalization of acquiring great wealth by Muslim entrepreneurs came to a surprising point that leaving aside an assumed contradiction between wealth and religion, some circles even elevated economic success to the status of religious duty.[192] Islamic business associations and new-Islamist intellectuals –through forming organic and tacit alliances and relations– played a considerable role in establishing this articulation.

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[189] *Ibid.*, p. 166.

[190] Kemal Can, '"Yeşil sermaye" laik sisteme ne yaptı?', *Birikim*, No. 99, (July 1997), pp. 59-60.

[191] Timur Kuran, 'Islamic Economics', p. 166.

[192] Ümit Kıvanç, 'İslamcılar & para-pul: Bir dönüşüm hikâyesi,' *Birikim*, No. 99, (July 1997), pp. 47-48. It can be stated that Turgut Özal and his Motherland Party (*ANAP*) played a crucial role in this marriage. Hasan Cemal in *Özal Hikayesi* (Istanbul, 1989) points to many instances in which Özal and his staff delivered speeches underlining the importance and appropriateness of capital and wealth accumulation in Islam.

6.2.2. MÜSİAD

MÜSİAD (The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) was founded in 1990 by a group of conservative Anatolian industrialists, and rapidly become a crucial business association which claims to represent economic interests of small and medium sized enterprises mainly located in Anatolia. The main objective of the Association was to "meet the demands of thousands of new entrepreneurs created by 'economic liberalization and foreign expansion' policies launched by Özal."[193] The overwhelming majority of the member companies were, as Buğra points, indeed formed after 1980.[194]

When compared to the biggest business association TÜSİAD (The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen), MÜSİAD was composed of small and medium sized enterprises from all over Turkey.[195] Lorasdağı notes that between 1990 and 1997 –the first period of MÜSİAD– the association endeavored to establish itself as a brand name in Anatolia; and its number of members reached its peak of 2900 at the end of this period. 28 February 1997 military intervention opened a new period for the association, in which the Islamist businessmen have adopted a strategy of accommodation and co-existence. The final phase starts with "institutionalization of the Association as a business association and civil society organization."[196]

What makes Islamic business associations (MÜSİAD and other SİADs) unique is the way that they combine an Islamic work ethic with the need for high technical educational attainment.[197] Islam is a beneficial source for MÜSİAD members both in economic and ideological terms: "Islam proves to be a very useful resource by

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[193] Ömer Bolat, *Medeniyet İdeali*, (Küre Yayınları: İstanbul, 2007), p. 7.

[194] Buğra, 'Class, Culture, and State', pp. 524-525.

[195] Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı, 'The Relationship Between Islam and Globalization in Turkey in the Post-1990 Period: The Case of MÜSİAD', *Bilig*, No. 52, (Winter 2010), p. 109.

[196] *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114.

[197] Yıldız Atasoy, 'The Islamist Ethic and Spirit of Turkish Capitalism Today,' *Socialist Register 2008: Reactions to Imperialism and Neoliberalism*, L. Panitch and C. Leys (eds.), (Monthly Review Press: New York, 2007).

instituting a communal bond of mutual trust among the members."[198] Economic success and the urge for capital accumulation have frequently been legitimized by stressing the sacred motives behind these material developments. For Erol Yarar, the founding chairperson of MÜSİAD, economic development is justified as a means to "get the consent of the Creator, Allah Subhanehu Teala."[199]

Ayşe Buğra notes that "in the particular case of MÜSİAD, the use of Islam has also contributed to a successful bridging of the association's narrow interest representation role and its wider class mission of social transformation."[200] However, MÜSİAD's commitment to Islam should not imply direct involvement or engagement with Islamist political and ideological establishments. Özdemir rightly notes that MÜSİAD members identify themselves with political parties that define themselves at the center of political spectrum, and distanced towards relatively unstable and unreliable parties like the Welfare Party.[201] Ömer Bolat, former chairperson of MÜSİAD defines the association as such:

> MÜSİAD is the name of a success story which represents the original values of our country's and nation's existence, indigenousness, production, richness, foreign expansion and the entrepreneurial power that springs from Anatolia.[202]

Erol Yarar is well aware of the role of globalization in success of the Anatolian bourgeoisie and presents MÜSİAD as an organization which will further integrate these sectors to global economy. Stating that "the unbelievably rapid developments in the telecommunications and the computer industries have transformed the world into a global village," Yarar underlines the necessity of Muslim people's "contribution" and "guidance" in this new world. This is the only way to overcome "existing political, economic and social disintegration of our country, as well as of the Muslim world at large."[203] Economic development becomes more urgent for

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[198] Buğra, 'Labour, Capital, and Religion', p. 144.

[199] Yarar, *A New Perspective*, p. 5.

[200] Ayşe Buğra, *Islam in Economic Organizations*, (TESEV: Istanbul, 1999), p. 25.

[201] Özdemir, *MÜSİAD*, p. 68.

[202] Bolat, *Medeniyet İdeali*, p. 2.

[203] Yarar, *A New Perspective*, p. 1.

the Muslim world since it has been marked with political and economic stagnation, technological backwardness, and inability to pursue necessary reforms.[204]

Denigration of finance capitalism and its speculative mechanisms, and proposing an economy based on production is another constituent of MÜSİAD's economic discourse. "The world has become the prey of casino capitalism and finance terrorism," Ömer Bolat notes, and adds that financial liberalization policies imposed upon developing countries are one of the sources of economic underdevelopment and instability.[205] According to Bolat, all social segments in Turkey have been suffering from economic reform process except the ones who rely on interest.[206]

Within this new economic system, restructuration of the state emerged as another necessity. Yarar notes that centrally-planned systems and the statist economic structures are being replaced by the private sector and free markets, and within this new liberalized milieu even the social security is being handled by private insurance companies and family networks. Accordingly, the services expected from the state are limited to areas such as:

> To maintain social harmony, secure national defense against external as well as internally destabilizing forces, and educate people to a limited degree. Moreover, the prohibition of unjust competition, maintenance of equal opportunities for all citizens, and supporting national companies at world markets, are also indicated in the new governmental functions.[207]

The new international economic order also meant a change in the relationship between power-blocs due to rise of East Asian economies. The Japanese and East Asian success stories were depicted as examples to follow. Strong state structures, long-term planning, foreign investment, clean administration, widespread education and training stressing national identity are seen as the most important

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[204] Bolat, *Medeniyet İdeali*, p. 46.

[205] *Ibid*, pp. 45-46.

[206] *Ibid*, p. 60.

[207] Yarar, *A New Perspective*, p. 10.

factors contributing to achievements of these economies.[208] MÜSİAD saw close affinities between East Asian model and Turkey since, for MÜSİAD, those countries successfully articulated economic rationality with traditional traits and institutions.

6.2.3. New-Islamism on Wealth, Capitalism, and Free Market Economy

Mustafa Özel, a prolific Muslim economist who underlines the importance of religion in economic development, and who became one of the most influential theorists of Islamic economy in Turkey, highlights the need for developing a legitimating framework, or an ethics for economic success. He notes that "without a morality (rather "spirituality") which will be embraced by the society as a whole, people cannot be productive and devote themselves to working life."[209] The relationship between religion, tradition and economic patterns gains a specific importance in this context.[210] Critically discussing theories of Max Weber, Werner Sombart and Karl Marx; Özel concludes that 'rationalistic' drives for economic success are not enough for providing impetus for capital accumulation and economic expansion. The economy in general and entrepreneurs in particular are in need of cultural and spiritual drives for successful economic performance.

In the previous chapters I have underlined that 'anti-capitalism' and 'egalitarianism' have been crucial elements of Islamist discourse especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, Muslim entrepreneurs' articulation to domestic and global markets stood as a crucial dilemma to be tackled with by Islamic sectors. MÜSİAD's efforts were significant in this process: it did not only effectively represent narrow corporate interests of Anatolian entrepreneurs, but also

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[208] *Ibid*, p. 16.

[209] Mustafa Özel, 'Tüketim Kapitalizmi ve Protestanlaşamayan Türkler', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 1, (January-February 1992), p. 31; also see Ömer Demir, 'İktisat Bilimi Kime Hizmet Eder', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 2, (March-April 1992), p. 49.

[210] Mustafa Özel, 'Kapitalizm, Hristiyanlık ve Yahudilik', in *Kapitalizm ve Din*, M. Ozel (ed.), (Ağaç Yayınları: Istanbul, 1993).

contributed to transforming these sectors into a class.[211] As organic intellectuals, the new Islamist intellectuals, either through working in collaboration with MÜSİAD or forming independent networks, played a substantial role in making of this class. In addition to periodicals and reports of MÜSİAD; independent intellectual circles (mostly Muslim economists and scholars of business administration) gathered around journals such as *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni* tried to develop an enabling spiritual and ideological framework for Muslim entrepreneurs' success. While following the urge for endless capital accumulation, launching new enterprises and changing his lifestyle, the Muslim entrepreneur needed to believe that he was not doing these for the sake of personal interest, but for the greater (spiritual) good. The new-Islamist intellectuals equipped the Muslim producers and consumers with influential ideological weapons to solve the dilemmas they faced.

The new-Islamist intellectuals adopted a **double strategy** for overcoming the so-called dilemmas: **on the one hand** they tried to prove the legitimacy of wealth in Islamic economy, by pointing to social and political goods of acquiring wealth for the Muslims as a whole. In addition to verses from the Quran that support their case; the life of Prophet Mohammad as a merchant and *hadith*s that are in favor of economic activity have recurrently been brought forward by the new-Islamist intellectuals as proofs to compatibility of Islam with acquisition of wealth. The **second line of** argument, which is based on a distinction between 'market' and 'capitalism', was more creative and innovative. Accordingly, Islam did not propose a capitalist economic order, on the contrary it is based on free market economy, which is completely different from and opposite of capitalism. These two points will be discussed in details.

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[211] This perception of class departs from E. P. Tompson's approach as formulated in *The Making Of English Working Class*, (Pantheon Books: New York, 1963). Also see, Pierre Bourdieu, 'Social Space and the Genesis of Groups', *Theory and Society*, Vol. 14, No. 6, (November 1985).

6.2.3.1. *Adam Zengin Olur Mu*? The New-Islamist Economists on Islam and Wealth

Anatolian bourgeois' motto of achieving "high morality and high technology"[212] which saw the "future in historical roots"[213] had to solve the problematic relationship between acquisition of wealth and Islam. Given the anti-capitalist discourse of the 'period of confrontation and challenge' which condemned accumulation of wealth and called for a moderate life (see Chapter 3), the new-Islamist intellectuals needed to construct a completely genuine legitimating framework. The formation of an Islamic bourgeoisie and bourgeois lifestyles were other issues to be tackled with.

Mustafa Özel noted that for Muslims, 'work', on the one hand, is as valuable as worshipping; but is "dangerous as hell" on the other. The departing point for Özel is the wrong conviction which is widespread among the Muslims that "a man cannot be wealthy and the wealthy one cannot be a man" ("*adam zengin olmaz, zengin adam olmaz*).[214] For Özel, far from being against Islam; the belief that there is a discrepancy between Islam and wealth is not only wrong but also 'intentional'. In other words, for Özel, it can be considered as a deliberate distortion which aims at preventing Islamic societies to achieve economic and political independence.

Mustafa Özel points out that the conviction that Islam is against capital accumulation and wealth has philosophical and historical roots. The former refers to the philosophical divide between two currents within Islamic theology: the divide between the proponents of *forbearance* and *gratitude*. While the former current extols poverty and withdrawal; the latter prioritizes wealth and material well being. The proponent of forbearance suspects acquisition of wealth, and considers any economic activity that result in capital accumulation illegitimate.

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[212] Yarar, *A New Perspective*, p. 47.

[213] Bolat, *Medeniyet İdeali*, p. 219.

[214] Mustafa Özel, 'Adam Zengin Olur Mu?', in *İş Hayatında İslam İnsanı: Homo Islamicus*, (MÜSİAD: Istanbul, 1994), p. 6; reprinted in *Birey, Burjuva ve Zengin*, (Kitabevi: Istanbul, 1998), p. 29.

However, there is a strong current within Islamic philosophy which considers capital accumulation legitimate as long as it has been succeeded by legitimate means. Following al-Ghazali, Özel notes that there are two major reasons behind the urge for accumulating wealth. The first one is the fear of future, which refers to the tendency of human beings to secure their material well being in the long run. The second is related to a crucial trait of 'human nature', *rububiyet*, which refers to drive to possess and dominate.[215]

The historical sources of the infamous opposition posed between Islam and material wealth can be found in Ottoman economic system which favored material well-being of the consumers rather than producers. Promotion of imports and demotion of exports was an integral part of Ottoman anti-mercantilist economic policy. Ottoman economic philosophy was also conservative in the sense that it aimed at preventing accumulation of wealth and formation of neither landed aristocracy nor domestic bourgeoisie.[216] As it was the case in pre-restoration Japan, economic activities (most notably commerce) were seen as disrespected occupations. Thus, according to Özel, the source of the opposition posed between acquiring material wealth and living a pious life is not only scriptural or religious, but also historical and sociological.

Özel insists that there is no contradiction between legitimate acquisition of wealth and Islam. On the contrary, Islamic social and economic system recognizes the freedom of economic actors within religious/moral boundaries. Ayşe Buğra notes that in spite of their clear stand against western rationalism, the MÜSİAD ideologues no way proposed mysticism as an alternative socioeconomic strategy. The first president of MÜSİAD, Erol Yarar discussed the issue as such:

> The mystical motto, 'one mouthful food, one short coat', was misconceived and opened way to sluggishness. As a result, motivation towards the world lost completely.[217]

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[215] *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

[216] Mustafa Özel, *Piyasa Düşmanı Kapitalizm*, (İz: Istanbul, 1995), p. 46.

[217] Quoted in Ayşe Buğra, *Islam in Economic Organizations*, pp. 26-27

Medina Market has been proposed as one of the proofs of Prophet Mohammad's – who himself was a merchant– positive attitude towards economic activities. Accordingly, Prophet Mohammad, who considers economic independence inseparable from political independence, following the Muslims' immigration from Mecca to Medina, ordered the formation of a marketplace called the 'Medina Market'. The Market was the first experience of Islamic economics in which the political authority aimed at preventing emergence of rentier economy and providing a profitable environment for producers and sellers.[218] The first thing the Market aimed was forming an independent economic transaction sphere that will be dominated by the Muslims and ordered in line with religious injunctions.[219] Although the Prophet, in many of his hadiths, defined marketplaces as "headquarters of evil", two rules introduced by the Medina Market rendered legitimate and moral economic transactions possible: that no one will occupy corners permanently in the market, and that no taxes will be imposed.[220] By Özel's words,

> Prophet Mohammad's decisive and dynamic stance should guide us in the face of the approaches that leave Muslims out of the economic life in the name of an idealized modesty. Showing patience to poverty is of course among the most prominent Islamic attitudes; but being thankful for wealth is also as important and even urgent in this "economic age".[221]

To sum up, the new-Islamist intellectual does not only underline the compatibility of economic activity with Islam; but also considers mystical attitudes towards economic activity as a plot against Islam. Thus, a framework is needed to stress the link between economic success the greater good of the Muslim community: a framework which will be eagerly adopted by the Muslim entrepreneur.

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[218] Mustafa Özel, *Birey, Burjuva ve Zengin*, p. 39.

[219] Cengiz Kallek, 'İktisadi-siyasi bağımsızlık ve Medine Pazarı', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 2, (March-April 1992), p. 4.

[220] Mustafa Özel, *Birey, Burjuva ve Zengin*, p. 39.

[221] Mustafa Özel, 'Sabredenler ve Şükredenler', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 2, (March-April 1992), p. 1.

6.2.3.2. Capitalism against Market/Market against Capitalism

> In postwar France a joke became common among leftist intellectuals: "There is something called socialism because there is a mass of people calling themselves socialists. However capitalism does not exist, since you cannot find one single person that calls herself a capitalist."
>
> Ulus Baker[222]

> *Having a pro-market stance means being in favour of a more egalitarian world.*
>
> Mustafa Özel[223]

The Medina Market, for Mustafa Özel, did not only prove that Islam promotes economic transactions; but also to the fact that "the economic order of a Muslim society could be described as a free competition system which is free from intervention."[224] The calls for price control were turned down by the Prophet on the ground that "it is Allah who defines the prices."[225] Supporting his arguments through hadiths that support the market definition of prices, Sınav contends that,

> In market economies in which products are made for the market and prices are determined according to demand and supply, the price that is determined in market conditions is called as the market price. Under conditions of absolute competition this price is unique. *Under the conditions of absolute competition market economy establishes its own balance and optimal resource distribution.*[226]

Thus, the invisible hand of market has been replaced by God's will alone. Competition is the key term for Özel, since he makes a Braudelian distinction between *market economy* which depends on competition and *capitalism* which relies on monopolies. While the former refers to entrepreneurial energies of 'civil' initiatives, the latter requires a huge 'political' device that will guarantee the

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[222] Ulus Baker, 'Kapitalizmi adlandırmak mümkün mü?', *Birikim*, No. 104, December 1997, p. 30.

[223] Mustafa Özel, *Piyasa Düşmanı Kapitalizm*, p. 15.

[224] *Ibid*., p. 39.

[225] Mustafa Özel, *Birey, Burjuva ve Zengin*, p. 39;

[226] Tahsin Sınav, 'İslam Ekonomisinde Serbest Rekabet', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 1, (January 1993), pp. 82, *emphasis* added.

monopolistic structure of the economy. For Fernand Braudel "the market spells liberation, openness, access to another world."[227] While economic life has been characterized by competition, "capitalism is being defined as the zone of concentration, the zone of relatively high degree of monopolization–that is, antimarket."[228] The Braudelian distinction between market and antimarket has been summarized by Immanuel Wallerstein as such:

> Economic life is regular, capitalism unusual. Economic life is a sphere where one knows in advance; capitalism is speculative. Economic life is transparent, capitalism shadowy or opaque. Economic life involves small profits, capitalism exceptional profits. Economic life is liberation, capitalism the jungle. Economic life is the automatic pricing of true supply and demand, capitalism the prices imposed by power and cunning. Economic life involves controlled competition; capitalism involves eliminating both control and competition. Economic life is the domain of ordinary people; capitalism is guaranteed by, incarnated in, the hegemonic power.[229]

According to Özel, who exactly follows the path opened by Braudel and Wallerstein, Islam proposes a market economy, not capitalism. As opposed to capitalistic-monopolistic enterprises (represented by Westernist bourgeoisie/TÜSİAD) the Anatolian entrepreneurs are considered as the representatives of the so-called market forces. Within this scheme the legitimacy of Anatolian entrepreneurs has been sustained through posing binary distinctions such as capitalism versus market, or Westernist pseudo-bourgeoisie versus Anatolian entrepreneurs. While the former terms of these oppositions referred to 'genuine' effort and dynamism of market forces (small and medium sized enterprises and entrepreneurs of Anatolia); the latter referred to forces of monopolization that used the state as a protective shield to guarantee their positions in the market and secure their profits. This is why the critique of modern state and call for privatization became important components of new-Islamist economic discourse.

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[227] Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Braudel on Capitalism, or Everything Upside Down', *Journal of Modern History*, No. 63, (June 1991), p. 356; also appeared in Turkish, 'Braudel'in Kapitalizm Tahlili: Herşey Tepetaklak', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 15, (September 1993).

[228] *Ibid.*, p. 356.

[229] *Ibid.*, p. 357.

In his work *Piyasa Düşmanı Kapitalizm* (Capitalism against Market) Mustafa Özel follows aforementioned Braudelian framework, and notes that great political economists of the previous centuries such as Adam Smith and Karl Marx were wrong in assuming that 'competition' is the normal state of capitalist economic order.[230] While a limited, manipulable and controllable competition is acceptable; capitalism is a system that intrinsically leads to monopolization of capital. So, the real opposition is not between capitalism and socialism, which, for Özel, are both monopolistic systems. While socialism refers to monopoly of bureaucratic organs of the state; capitalism means monopolization of the market by a couple of capitalists.[231]

Referring to statistical data regarding the ranking of industrial firms in developed capitalist economies Özel argues that we are living in "a post-industrial feudal era". By post-industrial feudalism, Özel refers to domination of markets by a minority of companies, as it is the case in developed industrialized countries like the Unites States of America, Germany and Japan. As stated by Özel,

> Is the 'feudal' characteristic of *new capitalism*, which minimizes competition if not rule it out at all, so obvious? Here are some examples: in the American manufacture industry the first 100 companies dominate one fourth of the whole industry; and this figure is about 40 percent in Germany. In the USA, about 2000 companies control approximately 80 percent of the resources of manufacture. In Germany 2000 companies employ half of the total labour-force and the other half is employed by 200.000 companies. . . . While 50 percent of exports and 60 percent of exports are carried out by nine general commercial companies in Japan, at least half of the Korean exports were handled by six or seven similar companies.[232]

As opposed to monopolistic 'new' capitalism, the old-style capitalism gives more place to competition, and its essential drive is 'zeal for achievement and fear of survival'. In the 'new' capitalism, on the contrary, the oligopolistic formations diminishes price competition, mutual trust, and results in moral degeneration.[233]

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[230] *Piyasa Düşmanı Kapitalizm*, p. 22.

[231] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[232] *Ibid.*, p. 37, *emphasis* added.

[233] *Ibid.*, p. 35-6.

The new capitalism generates an unjust environment both for small and medium sized enterprises (which depend on fair market competition) and for the citizens. However, many theoretical and ideological standpoints are mistaken for holding market economy responsible for injustices.[234]

When Özel applies the market/capitalism distinction to the structure of Turkish economy, the dominance of capitalistic and monopolistic tendencies is striking. Accordingly, the dominant historical role played by the state in establishing capitalism created a 'free' economic space that is dependent on bureaucratic control and protection. The late Ottoman efforts for creating a national bourgeoisie cum national economy, and Republican cadres' economic policies only resulted in creation of a parasitic and rootless westernist bourgeoisie. The stress on the parasitic and rootless character of Turkish bourgeoisie is crucial since it will constitute one of the bases of legitimation of the existence of Anatolian entrepreneurial class. In other words, the new-Islamist intellectuals, economists and businessmen constructed a legitimating framework for Anatolian capital and capitalists through posing a distinction between genuine entrepreneurs and parasitic Turkish bourgeoisie. At some instances the same distinction has been drawn with another terminological couple: the genuine bourgeoisie versus parasitic bourgeoisie. Most recently, founding President of MÜSİAD Erol Yarar's claim, in one of his interviews, that the Anatolian entrepreneurs constitute the 'genuine bourgeoisie' in Turkey is illuminating in this respect:

> Fadime Özkan: In Turkey, capital is created by the state. Yet, Anatolian capital developed in its natural course as in the West. So can we claim that these new capitalist are the real bourgeoisie of Turkey, at least conceptually?
>
> Erol Yarar: Definitely. For these are children of families which died in the fronts. Only after the Janissary organization is abolished and Turkish soldiers began to be recruited from the Turkish people, the control of commerce passed to the minorities. 19th century was already the century of wars; the Ottoman Empire de facto fought for 35 years. Then the Balkan and World War, and finally Çanakkale drained our ancestors. There were no men left to make commerce. The orphans had to become farmers; but when the population grew they become workers in the 1950s

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[234] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

and they were encouraged to make commerce by Özal in the 1980s. And in the 1990s, MÜSİAD globalized this notion.[235]

Noting the monopolistic nature of Turkish economy which has been consolidated especially during the planned economy and ISI periods, Mustafa Özel accuses Turkish economic regime for creating a *Kapıkulu* bourgeoisie that is completely dependent upon state. Since nurtured in a safe economic environment which is free from the pressure of market competition, Turkish *Kapıkulu* bourgeoisie lacks the urge for invention or innovation. The Turkish industrialization process is industrialization without technology. The Turkish economy, for Özel can be described as an 'ersatz capitalism' dominated by and ersatz bourgeoisie.[236]

> Comprador/arbitrager bourgeoisie is the one that accepts to be in the service of a foreign company and be its agency forever; it is not the capitalist that competes with its foreign opponents taking its strength from the productive power of the individual. If one characteristic of ersatz capitalism is being a-hundred-percent-dependent in terms of technology, another one is its dependency to and weakness vis-a-vis the political authorities inside.[237]

The essential reason behind the "mob-like" character of Turkish bourgeoisie is its absence of any roots. The *Kapıkulu* bourgeoisie ignored the religion and tradition, and replaced these values with a short-sighted lust for power and profit: "this is not capitalism, this is piracy."[238] "The sultanate of these forty thieves (*kırk haramiler*)" for Özel, can only be removed through forming alternative organizations," like MÜSİAD.[239]

Japanese and East Asian success stories have been pointed by the new-Islamist intellectual as models of economic development which skillfully articulated traditional values with economic rationality. MÜSİAD, too, evaluated Japanese

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[235] Erol Yarar'Türkiye'nin Gerçek Burjuva Sınıfı Biziz', interview with Faime Özkan, *Star*, 20.07.2009; http://www.stargazete.com/roportaj/yazar/fadime-ozkan/turkiye-nin-gercek-burjuva-sinifi-biziz-haber-202247.htm (last accessed on 9.7.2009)

[236] Mustafa Özel, *Piyasa Düşmanı Kapitalizm*, p. 52.

[237] *Ibid*., pp. 51-2.

[238] *Ibid*., p. 72.

[239] *Ibid*., p. 63.

and East Asian economic paths as the most appropriate models for Anatolian enterprises and entrepreneurs. Accordingly, unlike the Eastern societies, the civilization of the West could not establish its own social harmony.[240] The rational subject of Cartesian philosophy reduced every value to mere calculation and measurement, which turned *homo sapiens* into *homo brutalis*. This subject was turned into *homo economicus* in capitalist economic order, who "has transformed endless accumulation of capital into the sole goal of individual life."[241] The category of individual that has been proposed by this model is rational, selfish, utilitarian and only aims maximization of her profit.[242] This perception of economy and individual could only emerge through considering economic field as an independent sphere of activity which is devoid of other social relations and norms.[243] Islamic societies, on the contrary, will rely on *homo Islamicus* who blends economic rationality with Islamic morality. Different from *homo economicus*, who limits "benefit" and "satisfaction" with individual/selfish and material dimensions; *homo Islamicus* can be satisfied with helping others, and his understanding of benefit has eternal aspects.[244] According to Yarar, the whole economic system will be based on harmony of constituting elements; each element knowing its place. Achieving this harmony will only be possible through maintaining an efficient **solidarity between businessmen, labor, university and the State**.[245] However, the stress over solidarity rested on paternalistic assumptions regarding the relationship between labor and capital. Above I have noted the importance of post-Fordist production techniques for development of Anatolian capital. This importance has been also underscored by the new-Islamist intellectuals. Mustafa Özel, for instance, stated that while in Fordist production regime monotonous work patterns and high level of labor cycle resulted in workers resistance and strikes; the more flexible, dynamic and creative aspects of work

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[240] Yarar, *A New Perspective*, p. 50.

[241] *Ibid*, p. 51.

[242] Demir, 'İktisat Bilimi Kime Hizmet Eder', p. 48.

[243] Erol Özvar, 'Piyasa Ekonomisi ve Piyasa Toplumu', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 2, (March-April 1992), p. 50.

[244] Yusuf Balcı, 'İslam'da Çalışma İlişkileri', in *İş Hayatında İslam İnsanı: Homo Islamicus*, (MÜSİAD: Istanbul, 1994), p. 113.

[245] Yarar, *A New Perspective*, p. 49.

reduced this resistance and increased profitability.[246] Likewise, Yusuf Balcı highlighted the compatibility of Islam with post-Fordism:

> In the future society it seems that scale of enterprises will minimize, relations of production and work will be flexible (as in the pre-industrial society) and there will be a tendency towards re-individualization due to the new technologies. There is a tendency from collective relations to individual relations, from conflict to solidarity, from centralized and authoritarian structures to decentralization and participation. Atypical types of working such as part-time jobs, home-office jobs, tele-jobs became more and more prominent and widespread. All these basic qualifications are more appropriate to the structure and spirit of Islamic working relations than the system of industrial relations emerged in the industrial capitalist society. In the future information society which is similar to the pre-industrial society in many aspects, the effects of the religions will doubtlessly be far more than the industrial society.[247]

However, most accounts of flexible labor relations and East Asian miracle overlook the fact that the so-called economic miracles rested upon suppression of organized working classes, high rates of exploitation, environmental degradation, and authoritarian political rule.[248] Likewise, formal conduits like unions, collective bargaining and strike are not welcomed by the new-Islamist economists. First, all these conduits are seen as products of violent capitalism emerged after the industrial revolution, and have no place in Islamic economic orders. Second, different from capitalist system, in an Islamic economic order the relationship between capital and labor will not be based on contradiction, but on solidarity and friendship.[249] And last, in any case of controversy, the state will emerge as the referee to settle disputes between labor and capital.[250] By Buğra's formulation, MÜSİAD "adheres, rather, to a mode where workers' rights and entitlements, as well as responsibilities, are determined by informal and personal relations as opposed to redistributive/associative principles."[251]

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[246] *İş Hayatında Liderlik ve Strateji*, (Datateknik: Istanbul, 1998), pp. 131-2.

[247] Yusuf Balcı, 'İslam'da Çalışma İlişkileri', p. 115.

[248] Ergin Yıldızoğlu, *Globalleşme ve Kriz*, (Alan: Istanbul, 1996).

[249] Balcı, 'İslam'da Çalışma İlişkileri', p. 116.

[250] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[251] Buğra, 'Labour, Capital, and Religion', p. 195.

For Mustafa Özel, the Japanese success story cannot be understood with reference to European model and categories. It cannot be grasped through stating that the Japanese adopted Western technology but remained loyal to their traditions either.[252] On the contrary, the Japanese example pointed to reworking of rigid assumptions and convictions regarding economic field and economic activities. Before the Meiji restoration period, economic activities were disrespected by the society, which was epitomized by the opposition posed between Samurai spirit and that of the merchant. A process that partly involved 'invention of tradition' has reworked this opposition: the Samurai spirit was no longer posed against economic activity. On the contrary, the economic activity has been considered as an extension of the very Samurai spirit. The Japanese businessmen were considered as the "Samurais of the industrial age."[253]

As against the fundamental dogmas of Western entrepreneurship such as the urge for profit, competitive pursuit of personal wealth, and economic individualism; the individual entrepreneur of the Meiji period relied on self reliance, individual entrepreneurship and independent action.[254] The Samurai spirit "did not only determine the official policies of the Meiji era, but also became a sort of public behavior: a merry amalgam of militant patriotism and Confucian morality."[255] Religion played a crucial role in providing commitment to these major values. It provided powerful motivation and legitimacy for pursuing the political and economic goals.[256]

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[252] *Birey, Burjuva ve Zengin*, p. 72.

[253] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

[254] Özel, 'Tüketim Kapitalizmi', pp. 34-5.

[255] *Birey, Burjuva ve Zengin*, pp. 97-98.

[256] Robert N. Bellah, 'Japonya'da Din ve Modernleşme', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 8, (February 1993).

6.2.3.3. Making of Islamic Business Elites: "Are you a leader or an administrator?"

The Japanese economic development model also points to endless lessons for Turkish entrepreneurs. Tamam and Haenni depict the emergence of an Islamic business administration literature in the Islamic world, which played a significant role in making of new-Islamism. The Islamic management discourse, for the authors, smoothly articulates Islamization, globalization and depolitization, and focuses on personal development of the pious entrepreneur.[257] With the individualizing logic of this management discourse, the *'pious winners'* makes "efficient use of time, establishing powerful relations, development of communication skills and professional success become the new ideals."[258]

The role of *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni* in emergence of an Islamic managerial discourse in Turkey is worth mentioning here. The journal's editor Mustafa Özel's studies on 'leadership' and 'strategy' in business life[259] introduced a set of new terms and concerns to the agenda of Islamic entrepreneurs. Almost in each issue of *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni* there were articles on principles of business life, prominent qualities of effective leadership and efficient leaders, and personal and professional development. One may find dozens of translations on these subjects from worldwide known journals such as *Harvard Business Review*[260], *International Management*[261], *Worldlink*[262] and *Fortune*.[263] Creation of

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[257] Husam Tamam and Patrick Haenni, 'Dindar Winner'ların Gülüşünün Gölgesinde: Pozitif Düşünce ve Neo-Liberal Aklın Diğer Müslüman Kurnazlıkları', in *Siyasal İslam ve Liberalizm*, (ed.) A. Uysal, (Yakın: İzmir, 2009), p. 32.

[258] *Ibid*., p. 33.

[259] See *İş Hayatında Liderlik ve Strateji* (Datateknik: Istanbul, 1998) and *Yöneticilik Dersleri*, (İz: Istanbul, 1997).

[260] Hans H. Hinterhuber and Wolfgang Popp, 'Sadece bir Yönetici Misiniz Yoksa Bir Stratejist Mi?', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 2, (March-April 1992); Robert B. Reich, 'Küresel Yöneticiler: Kim Bu Adamlar?', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 4, (July-August 1992); William Taylor, 'Küresel İş Anlayışı', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 4, (July-August 1992).

[261] Paul Thorne 'İş Hayatında Sezginin Gücü: Salt Aklın Yeni Bir Eleştirisi', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 2, (March-April 1992).

[262] Pierre Casse, 'Liderlik Öğrenilebilir', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 6, (November/December 1992).

entrepreneurial "leaders" was the basic objective of Islamic management literature. The dynamic, global and flexible character of "new capitalism" is the starting point of Islamic management literature. Accordingly the last two decades of world economy were characterized by indeterminacy, uncertainty and constant flux of market forces. The rules of the "old paradigm" are no longer applicable to the business world: the "new paradigm" locates the humans (customers and workers) at the center of the universe, with prioritizing quantum physics, cybernetics, chaos theory, cognitive science and from the sacred traditions of the East and the West.[264]

The Islamic management literature rested on a distinction between leaders and administrators. Mustafa Özel notes that "leaders are the symbols of moral unity of society . . . . with their attitudes and discourses they articulate the values that hold society together."[265] Charisma, honesty, bravery, ability to handle risk, eagerness to take responsibility, and flexibility are the distinctive traits of 'leaders.'[266] Leaders, as opposed to administrators, do not follow the pre-established rules and codes. They make their own rules under constantly changing circumstances through following their intuitions.[267]

Flexibility is the key term for the Islamic management literature. Traditional, clumsy and multi-layered firms of old capitalism can no longer survive in new-capitalism, which is characterized by 'creative anarchy'.[268] Accordingly, pyramidal hierarchical organizations are being replaced by "federal corporation" between small-scaled units. "A new form of communitarianism" is being formed, states Mustafa Özel, which is manifested in private firms such as Yimpaş, İttifak

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[263] Michael E. Porter, 'Sanayi Liderine Nasıl Hücum Edilir?', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 9, (Mach 1993).

[264] Mehmet Şahin, 'iş Dünyası Yeni Bir Çağın Eşiğinde', *İktisat ve İş Dünyası Bülteni*, No. 1, (January-February 1992), pp. 10-11.

[265] *Yöneticilik Dersleri*, (İz: Istanbul, 1997), p. 41.

[266] Hinterhuber and Popp, 'Sadece Bir Yönetici Misiniz?', pp. 34-37.

[267] Paul Thorne 'İş Hayatında Sezginin Gücü', p. 45.

[268] Mustafa Özel, *Yöneticlik Dersleri*, p. 116.

Holding and Kombassan.[269] Table 2 summarizes the distinctions posed by Mustafa Özel between flexible post-Fordist production system and Taylorism/Fordism. It will be clearly seen that, post-Fordism, as opposed to Fordism, is assessed as advancement in production process.

Table 3. Fordism and Post-Fordism According to the New-Islamist ntellectuals

Fordism	Post-Fordism
Products, parts and tasks are overly standardized	Products, parts and tasks are changing; the products target different segments of market such as age, gender, income etc. Shelf-life of the products is far shorter.
Mass-production mechanizes labor process and unqualifies the workers	*Flexible production pushes workers for acquiring multiple skills*
Workers have no control on production process	Multi-skilled workers have more control over the production process
Wages are defined according to job definition, not worker	*Wages are defined according to qualities of workers*
Since mass-production requires mass-consumption, national markets are protected by a Keynesian state	Just-in-time production meets rapidly and constantly changing demands of market
Monotonous jobs and high levels of labor cycle results in workers' resistance and strikes	*Job security ends resistance and strikes*
High level of workers resistance decreases productivity	New technologies and flexible use of labor increases productivity and ends crisis

Source: Mustafa Özel, *İş Hayatında Liderlik ve Strateji*, pp. 131-2.

Foregoing points show how new-Islamist intellectuals and economists developed a legitimating framework for Anatolian capital. The distinction posed between market and capitalism helped Anatolian entrepreneurs to dissociate themselves rhetorically from capitalism but not from economic activity. Rhetorical, since as Alain Caille points out assuming such an economic sphere which will be free from the faults of capitalism, but which will be as efficient as (even more efficient than) capitalism, will be to no avail:

> Thus, one cannot make such a distinction – neither theoretically nor historically. It is not that a market existed first, and capitalism came after it. There is nothing but more or less developed, appears in small or bigger scales, more or less autonomous, or, on the contrary more or less socialized and regulated capitalism.[270]

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[269] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

[270] Alain Caille, 'Piyasa ve kapitalizm, hep aynı kavga', *Birikim*, no. 104, (December 1997), p. 63.

The market-capitalism distinction, the opposition posed between genuine and ersatz Turkish bourgeoisie, and rooted and rootless economic development fulfilled an ideological fantasy which rested on the idea of capitalism without capitalism. The new-capitalism, which, according to the new-Islamist intellectuals, refers to emergence of more competitive and flexible economic relations (in terms of production and consumption), which will also bring a more just social order. Competition and Islamic charity (*zekat*) are two 'market mechanisms' that will guarantee social justice.[271] The market system (or the new-capitalism) supposedly locates human energies and human beings at the center of economic activity. It promotes and encourages the creative potentials of the leaders and workers in an economy. Against the presence of a huge literature that underlines the destructive effects of 'new-capitalism' and flexible working relations on workers,[272] new-Islamist intellectuals insist on the benefits of 'the creative chaos' of new-capitalism. The utmost belief in market forces distanced the Islamist intellectuals from the state. Thus, social and political minimization of the state, as I have discussed above, must have been accompanied by curbing its economic power.

6.2.4. Curbing the State Power: 'State Tradition' and Privatization

> I think that state's withdrawal from the economic sphere could be an important step in overcoming the tradition of "intervening state". We have to "say good bye to" the state in every sphere of life.[273]

The distance between economic and political projects of new-Islamism cannot be easily separated. Given the centrality of the critique of modern Turkish state and state bureaucracy, the economic vision of new-Islamism can be considered as an extension of this criticism. In fact, as I have discussed in the previous chapters, demonization of the state and the 'dead hand of bureaucracy' has been the most fundamental building bloc of neoliberal free-market ideology and of Islamism. Within this context, as I have discussed above, postmodern critique of

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[271] Tahsin Sınav, 'İslam Ekonomisinde Serbest Rekabet', p. 82.

[272] For instance see Richard Sennett, *The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in The New Capitalism*, (New York, 1998).

[273] Metiner, 'Rezzak Devlet'e Hayır', p. 15.

homogenizing effects of the modern nation state (and of ideological/political narratives) paralleled with neoliberal critique of Keynesian welfare state (etatism in the Turkish case). The political project of new-Islamism was based on minimization of the state for opening up new opportunity spaces for sub-national identities and organizations like religious communities. This was in line with the neo-liberal proposition that there is an intrinsic link between market choices and wider political and personal freedoms.[274]

The economic project of new-Islamism, as it has been discussed above, aimed at creating a profitable environment for pious entrepreneurs. The dichotomy, however, is posed not only between the state and the civil forces. In addition to the Westernist bourgeoisie, the trade unions – which were defined as state-centered parasitic forces– were also considered as a crucial impediment to economic development and integrating to global markets. While in the 1980s, the Islamist discourse defined the economic sphere as a terrain of struggle between the unprotected and abused pious people and imperialist powers (with the aid of comprador Turkish bourgeoisie), the dichotomy is now has been posed between the ones that promote economic development and market dynamism, and the status quo forces (state, trade unions etc.) that stand as impediments to this dynamism. The key to understanding the transformation of Islamism, in my opinion, lies at re-definition of these frontiers.

In the last three decades, privatization of state economic enterprises (KİTs-*Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsü*) has been a burning issue in Turkish politics. The new-Islamist intellectuals, starting from the early 1990s appeared as the most enthusiastic proponents of privatization in Turkey. The advocates of privatization criticized the unproductive, highly centralized and politicized structure of the KİTs. Accordingly, "KİTs stand as the symbols of the despotic state of the 1930s-1940s . . . .and they act as the economic base of the 'establishment'."[275] The discourse of privatization was based on the opposition between *clumsiness* of state enterprises

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[274] See Fran Tonkiss, 'Markets Against States: Neo-Liberalism'.

[275] Ahmet Ertürk, 'Özelleştirme devleti küçültür mü?', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 8, (August 1993), p. 19.

and *dynamism* of private initiative. As I have briefly noted above, this opposition has been skillfully worked through the New Right policies of ANAP governments throughout the 1990s.

Etatism has always been an influential economic policy in Turkish history. Boratav notes that having inherited a highly handicapped and disarticulated economic structure from the Ottoman Empire, etatist economic policies seemed the only viable option for economic structuring and development for the young republic.[276] In the following years, etatism appeared as an integral economic policy to accomplish huge investments on the one hand, and a strategy to carry out capital accumulation. A crucial aspect of etatist economic policies in Turkey was the establishment of a peculiar relationship between state and business in modern Turkey. Ayşe Buğra in her seminal work *State and Business in Modern Turkey*[277] elaborates the symbiotic relationship between entrepreneurs and state bureaucracy, and asserts that Turkish bourgeoisie and entrepreneurs have always been dependent upon state both strategically and symbolically. Strategic dependence referred to creation of personal and organizational ties with state bureaucracy for protection, and symbolic dependence to allegiance to westernization project as put by military-bureaucratic elite. Leaving aside the theoretical problems embedded in her reading of state-society relations in Turkey, following Buğra, we can assert that big bourgeoisie in Turkey has mostly been a part of Turkish westernization process. A brief look at the quasi-anticapitalist rhetoric of National Outlook movement throughout the 1970s would show that this symbiotic relationship between the state and big bourgeoisie was one of the most popular themes for the Islamists. The new-Islamist discourse, on similar grounds, targeted this symbiotic relation, and, as stated above, posed a dichotomy between parasitic Westernist bourgeoisie (see discussion on Kapıkulu bourgeoisie above) and genuine Anatolian capitalists.

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[276] 'Kemalist Economic Policies and Etatism', in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, A. Kazancıgil and E. Özbudun (eds.), (Hurst and Company: London, 2006), p.156.

[277] *State and Business in Modern Turkey*, (SUNY Press: ALbany, 1994), *passim*.

The critiques regarding the modern nation-state in general and 'interventionist state tradition' in particular have become crucial topics for the Islamists in the 1990s. Privatization debate became a terrain on which Islamists, liberal Second-Republicanists, and (new)-right intellectual and politicians shared common concerns, propositions and terminology. Privatization was also a crucial topic for newly rising Islamic bourgeoisie, since they evaluated etatism also as a socio-cultural policy which excluded pious Anatolian entrepreneurs and favored Westernist big bourgeoisie. On the other hand, for the Islamic bourgeoisie, the requirements of new international division of labor rendered highly centralized economic policies such as etatism archaic. As stated by Erol Yarar, the founding president of MÜSİAD,

> Economic developments and the age of technology changed the elements of production and produced a dynamic and competitive atmosphere by giving prominence to productivity, flexibility, zero stocks, high quality, high technology and new markets. . . . Their bureaucratic structure and political decision-making instead of economic analyses made it impossible for the state economic enterprises to keep up with these new economic developments. The most obvious example of this fact is the economic collapse of the Soviet Union.[278]

The legitimacy of state economic enterprises has been questioned by the new-Islamist intellectuals on two major grounds: firstly, **the unproductive organization of these enterprises**; secondly, **the role played by KİTs in maintenance and reproduction of authoritarian and interventionist state tradition**. While for the former 'economic rationality' and 'private initiative' are the key phrases; the latter concern highlights concepts like 'democratization' and 'extension of the civil sphere'. In this section I will present the new-Islamist perspectives on privatization in details. Also I will demonstrate that this debate helped the new-Islamists to deeply internalize themes such as 'economic rationality', 'flexible production', 'competitive markets', 'comparative advantage', and 'foreign capital and foreign direct investment'. The new-Islamist discourse on privatization will show us how the Islamist discourse skillfully absorbed and internalized fundamental economic premises of the neo-liberal project.

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[278] Erol Yarar (Head of MÜSİAD), 'Önsöz', *KİT'lenme ve Özelleştirme Raporu*, (MÜSİAD Yayınları, October 1993)

"Now, what we face is a total decayedness in spheres where the state appears as a monopoly," states Davut Dursun, and arguments that associate this state of decadence with faulty or imperfect administration of these sectors are far from being satisfactory. Accordingly we must answer the question, "in which period did these state economic enterprises worked well? When could a patient face a decent treatment in state hospitals? In which period could the state schools give education which is in line with requirements of the age?"

> The problem is not only the administration of the state institutions, but it is a structural problem resulting from the very nature of these enterprises. These institutions work as the personal plantations of the bureaucracy and political elites.[279]

Dursun also states that an overview of the social sectors which oppose privatization in particular and minimization of the state in general, underlines the legitimacy of his position: "on the one hand we see Kemalist-Socialists who freely abused state facilities; *trade unions which pocket people's money without producing any good or service*; and on the other hand we see some Muslims who are afraid of impoverishing the state." New-Islamist discourse targets both workers and trade unions, and holds them accountable for the economic and political regression. Davut Dursun's words regarding the KİT workers are striking. The reader must note how the new-Islamist skillfully integrated New Right discourse on the 'parasitic' qualities of unionized labor.

> Methods and policies [of privatisation] could be discussed but *there is no point in bearing this burden millions of people in order to prevent a bunch of workers from losing their jobs*, as some circles advocate. We cannot forever agree for our taxes to be distributed to those workers as service pays.[280]

New Islamist intellectuals' attitude towards workers and trade unions is a crucial indicator of the chasm between different interpretations of Islamist politics in the 1990s. While the new-Islamist intellectuals were blaming the unionized workers for causing economic inefficiency; *Haksöz* writers were underlining the deprived conditions of workers in post-1980 Turkey. Criticizing the Islamists for not

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[279] Dursun, 'Devleti Küçültmek', p. 14.

[280] *Ibid.*, p. 14. In Turkish, "*birkaç işçi işten çıkarılacak diye milyonlarca insanın bu kambura katlanmasının hiçbir anlamı yoktur.*"

developing policies that meet workers' demands, Yılmaz Çakır highlights that the discourse which associates economic regression with high labor costs is nothing but an ideological manipulation. The driving motive of this anti-labour discourse, for Çakır, was the capitalists' interminable appetite for profit. Giving statistical data on the subject matter, Çakır claims to prove that workers' wages has nothing to do with economic problems.[281]

Davut Dursun's perspective regarding the state economic enterprises, in fact, provides us with an impressive case which presents general characteristics of his generation, whom I label as the new-Islamists. Dursun finds state's involvement in economy highly unproductive and adds that there is something 'genetically' wrong with this involvement. "The debate must start with the concept of the state," argues Dursun, and state's definition, position, functions, authority and duties, limits must be exhibited through historical and doctrinal argumentations.

> Is the state a legal body which makes investment, trades, control the whole education system and does banking, insurance business and business management? The whole point is about the basic functions we attribute to the state. Which public affairs is the state supposed to deal with alongside doing justice, undertaking security and defence services and giving infrastructural services? As Muslims, our first task is to discuss the state phenomenon and to reach a new understanding of state within the framework of our cultural and historical heritage and with regard to the contemporary developments. . . . It is not simply a matter of privatization, but a reinterpretation of the state and re-establishment of its functions, and most of all, bringing the society ahead of the state within this framework. A state-for-society approach, which gives priority to the society, not the state must be the understanding.[282]

The new-Islamist intellectuals considered etatism as an extension of Westernist bureaucratic elites' will to power. Accordingly, bureaucratic cadres, in order to pursue their objective of modernizing and Westernizing the state and society resorted to etatist measures. Özdenören states that etatism and closed economic system provided these cadres a fruitful ground to constitute and maintain a repressive political and social order. Etatism precluded the state and individuals

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[281] Yılmaz Çakır, 'Müslümanların İşçi Kıyımı ve Ekonomik Sömürü Karşısındaki Tavırları', *Haksöz*, No. 6-7, (September-October 1991).

[282] *Ibid*., p. 14.

from foreign expansion. Etatism also meant necessary presence of an official ideology and imposition of this ideology to the people.[283] For achieving this goal, etatist regime even tried to monopolize the cultural field through institutions such as "State Theaters" and "State Opera and Ballet Groups".[284] This is why privatization is not only an economic phenomenon. By Büyükkaymaz's words, it is a part of the strategy of great "Transformation" which will include privatization of fields such as education, radio and television.[285]

The centralist bureaucrats, for Yıldırım, by acting as agents of a self-sufficient and state-centered economic activity, in fact, established a 'socialist' regime.[286] In a similar manner, Özdenören criticized the architects of etatist economic policies for conflating etatism with socialism: far from presenting the qualities of socialism, "etatism, in fact is used as an instrument for nourishing small minority of rich."[287] "This regime," stated Yıldırım, "in line with the economic policies of Union and Progress, equated private initiative and foreign capital nearly with treason. Within this framework, private initiative, since it contains freedom in economic sense, has been evaluated as "reaction" (*irtica*)."[288] Here, Yıldırım unconsciously stresses the symbolic aspects of class formation. In other words, the opposition between statist and civil (centre and periphery, genuine and spurious/artificial etc.) economic forces has been an integral theme in making of pious/Islamic bourgeoisie in Turkey. As Yıldırım stated, in the modernist republican imaginary, "state/power which has been symbolized by civil servant individual (*memur birey*) wants the best for the people; however, private initiative and religion, which has been symbolized by trader and bearded individual always want the evil."[289]

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[283] Rasim Özdenören, 'Yabancı sermayeden korkulmamalı', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 8, (August 1993), p. 16.

[284] Ergün Yıldırım, 'Özel teşebbüs irtica olarak görüldü', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 8, (August 1993), p. 27.

[285] Büyükkaymaz, 'Amaç', p. 28.

[286] Yıldırım, 'Özel teşebbüs', p. 27.

[287] Özdenören, 'Yabancı sermaye', p. 16.

[288] Yıldırım, 'Özel teşebbüs', p. 27.

[289] *Ibid.*, p. 27. 'Memur bireyle sembolize edilen devlet/iktidar, halkın iyiliğini ister; tüccar ve sakallı bireyle sembolize edilen özel teşebbüs ve din ise kötülüğü ister.'

New-Islamist discourse of privatization also showed rapprochement between center-right wing politics and Islamism. Critical and distanced approach of Islamism in the late 1970s and 1980s was replaced with mutual *understanding*, *appreciation* and in some cases *eulogy*. For instance, according to the new-Islamist intellectuals, the Democratic Party (DP-*Demokrat Parti*) rule (1950-1960) was considered as a period of transition from a society of state officials to a society of entrepreneurs. During this period the existing power relations were dislocated, and many bureaucrats began to lose their genetic privileges.[290] However, the 1960 military intervention and following legal, political and economic arrangements halted and even reversed this tendency. After the 1960 intervention, military and civil bureaucracy regained their political and economic privileges through arrangements such as OYAK.

Turgut Özal and his ANAP is another illustrative case pointing to changing attitude of Islamism towards right wing political figures and parties. As I have illustrated above, in making itself as an independent political ideology Islamist intellectuals, in the 1970s and 1980s, put considerable effort to differentiate themselves from 'left' and 'right' wing political and ideological currents. Because of history of Islamism, which is marked by a symbiotic relationship with center-right wing political parties, eliminating rightist deviations was more critical and complex. However, in the 1990s, many shifts observed in agendas, concerns, and vocabulary of Islamism caused new-Islamist intellectuals reevaluate their basic propositions regarding right. I see a long passage on Özal from Davut Dursun illuminating:

> Even though the 24 January decisions taken to clear the way for the state which was locked and exhausted in the economic field in the 1970s and the following years; *12 September military intervention provided some partial improvements*, the emerging chaos could not be overcome because the state was not reorganized according to the new social and political circumstances. The Motherland Party administrations which took over the power after military government did some brave and important changes in this field and they realized some radical reformations in the relations of state-society even if not in terms of the minimization of the state. Yet, the brave decisions of the initial years could not be carried forward and

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[290] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

eventually stopped due to the resistance of the bureaucracy which benefited from the current situation and intervention of the conservatives. The Motherland Party administration's liberalization of economy turned out to be not the minimization of state but clearing the way for the private sector by keeping the state in its current form. Yet, no liberalization could be performed in political and cultural spheres.[291]

Immediately after the death of President and former ANAP leader Turgut Özal in April 1993, *Yeni Zemin* paid its respects through carrying him to journal's cover with a note *Sivilleşme Yarıda Kaldı* (civilization halted). The owner of *Yeni Zemin*, Osman Tunç was noting that two figures in Turkish political history, Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal tried to accomplish a huge mission: settling up with centralist, authoritarian Turkish state. For Tunç, "Özal was a figure who tried to destroy the things that the regime tabooed, idolized and sanctified."[292] In accomplishing this, Özal relied on a genuine method, "rather than applying a one-sided, repressive, prejudiced and stereotypical approach, he wanted to develop a **realist** and **pragmatist** project which takes society's every section's demands into consideration."[293]

According to Ümit Aktaş, Özal was a "silent revolutionary" which fought against *status quo* forces. For Özal, "freedom of belief, freedom of markets and freedom of thought" were the basic principles of his outlook.

> Late Özal is the one who, for the first time, claimed that "state is not a patriarch but the servant of the people"; criticized and undermined the sultan-subject kind of administrative relationship between the state and the society, and changed the elitist political-bureaucratic tradition.[294]

Radical Islamist circles, on the other hand, were critical of both Özal and his acclamation by Islamist intellectuals. Noting that Özal was the primary architect of post-1980 economic and political regime, Yılmaz Çakır evaluated Özal as an agent of "colonialist branches of international capitalism" IMF and World Bank.[295] The

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[291] Davut Dursun, 'Devleti Küçültmek', p. 13.

[292] Osman Tunç, 'Yarıda Kalan Koşu', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 5, (May 1993), p. 40.

[293] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[294] Ümit Aktaş, 'O, sessiz bir devrimciydi', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 5, (May 1993), p. 41.

[295] Yılmaz Çakır, 'Sistem Özal'ını Kaybetti', *Haksöz*, (May 1993).

military intervention and the following economic measures brought nothing but deterioration of income distribution:

> Turkey has been experiencing a period of increasing conflicts between the oppressors and the oppressed and increasing gap between the classes in favor of the oppressors since the last military intervention. And the Constitution of 1982 prepared by 12 September interventionists whose first aim was to protect the interests of the capital, has a great share.[296]

Likewise, *Yeni Zemin* writer İhsan Işık criticizes Özal's pragmatist political outlook and his submission to the United States' imperial agenda.[297] According to Çakır, far from being an anti-*status quo* force, Özal appeared just at a time when regime needed a restoration. He accomplished this restorative function within an allegedly 'reformist' framework.

> The system indeed refreshed and relieved from its useless burdens with Özal and his practices. And the way to pump "enough" fresh blood into the tissues of this wearied, battered system is provided with the thought and practice of bringing for tendencies together.[298]

The new-Islamist intellectuals praised figures like Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal for their persistent efforts for civilizing, democratizing Turkish state and society, and for their struggle against military-bureaucratic elite in due process. Privatization of state enterprises and utmost belief in dynamism and profitability of private initiatives was an integral part of the so-called civilizing process. As for the new-Islamist intellectuals, privatization has been identified by democratization and liberalization of Turkey. In particular, it meant curbing financial and economic sources of interventionist Turkish state. By Yavuz Kır's words, "privatization can be considered as a phase of overcoming interventionist state tradition, since state's insistence on irresponsible and huge economic activities is not compatible with democracy and prevents freedom of free economic initiative."[299]

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[296] Yılmaz Çakır, 'Müslümanların Tavırları'.

[297] İhsan Işık, 'Portre: Tugut Özal', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 5, (May 1993), p. 39.

[298] Çakır, 'Sistem Özal'ını Kaybetti'.

[299] Yavuz Kır, 'Serbest teşebbüs hürriyeti engellenmemelidir', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 8, (August 1993), p. 31.

In its investigations, *Yeni Zemin* mostly appeals to views of conservative and liberal politicians and intellectuals. For instance, the leader of BDP (*Büyük Değişim Partisi*-Great Change Party) Aydın Menderes was noting that minimizing the state in economic field is closely related with democratization. According to Menderes, since the state withholds the economic faiths of individuals, political democratization will have no meaning without accompanying economic liberalization.[300]

To sum up, for the new-Islamist intellectual privatization, firstly, meant a political and ideological process. It has been considered as an instrument for removing limitations on Islam imposed by the prohibiting state. It is through privatization that the monopolies will be removed and the state will be able to fulfill its **original functions** such as security, defense, and justice.[301] "In any field where private sector is better than (or as good as) the state, the economic activity should not be undertaken by public sector . . . State's duty towards people is to be compassionate, just and democratic; not to curb the freedom of private initiative."[302] By Metiner's words,

> Since breaking the state monopoly over fields such as religion, education, culture, etc. is a modern obligation, removing its monopoly over economy is also a necessity. If the state distributes livelihood as God, and takes away the freedom of speech from its citizens about the matters of the country, it is necessary to take away its "Benefactor" role. As long as the state distributes the livelihood, freedoms of the individual and the society will not expand. People benefiting from the state continue to be "slaves" "worrying about their livelihood". New regulations are needed for this ill individual-society-state relation to become compatible with the norms of rule of law.[303]

In addition to stressing the "intrinsic" relationship between privatization and democratization, the new-Islamist intellectuals also evaluated privatization of state

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[300] Aydın Menderes (BDP Genel Başkanı), 'Rekabet gücü artırılmalı', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 8, (August 1993), p. 36.

[301] Özdenören, 'Yabancı sermaye', p. 16.

[302] Kır, 'Serbest teşebbüs', p. 30.

[303] Metiner, 'Rezzak Devlet'e Hayır', p. 15.

economic enterprises from the standpoint of economic rationality. Three major reasons behind privatization policies were presented as such:

1) Political corruption in state economic enterprises, which, throughout many decades, were turned into degenerated and highly unproductive institutions open to politicians' manipulation and abuse.
2) Fiscal crisis that Turkish state faces, and the role played by KİTs in deepening of the crisis.
3) Necessity to bring Turkish economy into line with international economic competition; and incompatibility of highly centralized and bureaucratic structure of KİTs with this objective.[304]

The debate over privatization starts with the argument that etatism is against current economic realities both at domestic and global levels. For Kırcı, although state's involvement in economic activities mostly had positive results in the 19th century, 20th century was marked with the drawbacks of etatism.[305] Especially the last decades of the 20th century have shown us that a closed economic system – with involvement of the state into economy– brings highly unproductive results and cannot achieve desired economic development. [306]

Mustafa Özel states that privatization is primarily a global design and a global process. It is designed for maintaining flawless accumulation and circulation of capital, which is mainly concentrated in the hands of capital groups located at the center of world economy. Privatization is also a national process; since public companies, regardless of their historical role, became unproductive entities which are unable keep up with changing economic conditions and turned into sites of countless abuses. Özel states that privatization must start from privatization of private sector itself, which is highly dependent on state and speculative profit making.[307] Although Özel notes that privatization is neither good nor bad 'in itself'; and must be evaluated and carried carefully, the new-Islamist intellectuals

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[304] Yalçın Akdoğan, 'Özelleştirme günü kurtarma politikasına dönüşmemeli', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 8, (August 1993), p. 17; Soli Özel, 'Ekonomi tehdit unsuru olmamalı', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 8, (August 1993), p. 23.

[305] Kır, 'Serbest teşebbüs', p. 30.

[306] Soli Özel, 'Ekonomi tehdit unsuru olmamalı', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 8, (August 1993), p. 25.

[307] Mustafa Özel, 'Önce özel sektörü, sonra KİT'leri özelleştirelim', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 8, (August 1993), p. 18.

mostly consider privatization as one of the most important steps towards minimizing the state and overcoming its despotic character.[308]

Privatization of State Economic Enterprises has been enthusiastically defended by the new-Islamist intellectuals. For instance Mehmet Metiner advocated privatization of PTT (Postal Telegraph Telephone) for he considers state monopoly over communication harmful for unrestricted circulation of opinions. Likewise, limitations over private radio and television channels must be removed.[309] However, Özdenören notes that privatization is not only limited with KİTs; also health and education sectors must be privatized. For him, privatizing military to a degree can be considered.[310] By Ertürk's words "a program which will minimize the state will be meaningful if and only if it will give place to privatization of mosques and schools as much as state economic enterprises."[311]

The question of profitability of KİTs was also linked with competitive power of Turkish economy. Accordingly, privatization must be located within a greater economic program, which will structurally transform Turkish economy to become more competitive both in domestic and global markets.[312] "Since it is **inevitable** to structure the economy on competitive grounds both at domestic and global levels," the unproductive aspects of economy, such as KİTs must be abandoned.[313]

Competitive structure of Turkish economy, according to the new-Islamist intellectuals, could be maintained through curbing its **huge bureaucratic** and **highly centralized** establishment. "Economy," states Mürsel, "like it did not work in communism's centralist chain of command, did not work with a huge

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[308] Safa Mürsel, 'Devlet Ekonomiden Elini Çekmelidir', *Yeni Zemin*, no. 8, (August 1993), p. 22.

[309] Metiner, 'Rezzak Devlet'e Hayır', p. 15.

[310] Özdenören, 'Yabancı sermaye', p. 16.

[311] Ertürk, 'Özelleştirme devleti küçültür mü?', p. 19.

[312] Menderes, 'Rekabet gücü artırılmalı', p. 36.

[313] Mürsel, 'Devlet Ekonomiden Elini Çekmelidir', p. 22, **emphasis** added.

bureaucracy.[314] In addition to calls for redefining the role of the state, adhering to flexible methods such as subcontracting is seen as alternative solutions.

> Limiting or downsizing of the state's economic activities through privatization means the public to play a directive, instructive, supervisory and promoting role in the economic sphere. In other words, it does not limit freedom of free enterprise. An assessment of unproductiveness and ineffectiveness of state economic enterprises when compared to private sector will show us that minimization of the public sectors is the most effective solution. So in order to make state effective, the economic tasks must be handed over to **contractors** and **sub-contractors** under legal conditions in a competitive process.[315]

Privatization in particular and minimization of the state and liberalization of economy in general also brought discussions regarding the role of *foreign capital* in this process. While throughout the 1980s concepts like foreign capital and foreign direct investment were associated with imperialist states' will to colonize Turkey, the new-Islamist intellectuals stressed the necessity and desirability of foreign capital for achieving economic dynamism, competitive power and technological/qualitative advancement. The debate over foreign capital was also associated with new-Islamist critique of modern nation state. Stating that concepts like 'independence' and **'nation-state'** must be redefined, Rasim Özdenören notes that an efficient –but not gigantic– state can both control and secure foreign capital.**[316]**

Some of the new-Islamist intellectuals assume an 'indifferent' and cynical attitude towards foreign capital. Mehmet Metiner interestingly notes that "there is no need for fearing from foreign capital, since the system itself is foreign/alien."[317] Likewise Ahmet Ertük states that "as a Muslim selling KİTs to foreign capital is out of my concern." [318] "In a period, in which taking place in international or

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[314] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[315] Yavuz Kır, 'Serbest teşebbüs hürriyeti' p. 30, **emphasis** added.

[316] Özdenören, 'Yabancı sermaye', p. 16, **emphasis** added.

[317] Metiner, 'Rezzak Devlet'e Hayır', p. 15. In Turkish foreign and alien are met with single word '*yabancı.*'

[318] Ertürk, 'Özelleştirme devleti küçültür mü?', p. 19.

regional economic integrations is unfortunately inevitable, making distinction between national or foreign capital does not seem meaningful."[319]

Foreign capital was also considered as necessary since it was expected to introduce technological advancements and qualitative shifts in Turkish economy. For Mürsel concerns regarding profitability, employment and technology must supersede emotional reactions:

> I think selling the SEEs to foreign capital should not be a reason for an inferiority complex. One should consider the positive effects of the fresh capital or new technology brought by it on the nation's economy and employment. For the administrative and financial structures of the enterprises become more profitable and the production speeds-up both qualitatively and quantitatively by the help of the advanced technology of foreign capital. If the aim is economic productivity, then we should not consider foreign partnership with emotional and speculative reaction.[320]

Likewise, stressing the centrality of privatization in minimizing the state and freeing it from official ideology, Büyükkaymaz records that sale of enterprises to national or foreign capital will make no difference. In fact, Büyükkaymaz votes for foreign capital, since it is the most viable way of introducing advanced technology and qualified production to Turkish economy.[321]

It would be unfair to argue that the new-Islamist intellectuals had no reservations regarding privatization process. For instance Erol Kozak criticizes privatization discourse's association of productivity with private sector and unproductively with the state. For Kozak, privatization must not be considered solely in terms of profitability and economic rationality. He sees the opposition posed between private and public sectors as a dogma "that is disseminated through media which is under control of capitalist world."[322] Against criticisms underlining the bureaucratized nature of public economic sector, Kozak underscores that the so-called dynamic private companies themselves work through huge bureaucracies.

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[319] *Ibid*., p. 19.

[320] Mürsel, 'Devlet Ekonomiden Elini Çekmelidir', p. 22.

[321] Büyükkaymaz, 'Amaç', p. 28.

[322] Erol Kozak, 'Devlet ekonomide beceriksiz mi?', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 8, (August 1993), p. 20.

For him, Turkey's social, economic and political problems have much deeper roots and cannot be solved with slogan-like approaches like privatization or nationalization.[323] By Ertürk's words, privatization is not a magic wand that will fix all of our problems.[324]

Another concern for the new-Islamist intellectuals was about driving motives of privatization. Yalçın Akdoğan, for instance, warned that privatization policies should not be considered as pragmatic short term adjustments to 'save the day.' For Yalçın, on the contrary, privatization firstly is a long-term economic project aimed at increasing productivity, private initiative and market dynamism; secondly, a phase of overall project of minimizing and democratizing the Turkish state.[325] Finally, preventing emergence of private monopolies is a recurrent theme in new-Islamist discourse of privatization. Yavuz Kır finds trade unions' objections regarding the risk of emergence of business trusts and monopolies reasonable and calls for legal precautions.[326]

As seen, the discourse of privatization is an integral part of the new-Islamist economic and political discourse. On the one hand privatization is seen necessary for the sake of economic rationality. This line of argument problematizes the irrational and unproductive organization of the KİTs. The ideological and political support given to privatization is related with curbing the political power of the modern nation state. According to this argument etatism is one of the sources of the homogenizing and interventionist attitude of the Turkish state. On the other hand, privatization is considered as a process which will benefit the Anatolian capital through increasing the opportunity spaces to the so-called Anatolian tigers.

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[323] *Ibid.*, 21.

[324] Ertürk, 'Özelleştirme devleti küçültür mü?', p. 19.

[325] Yalçın Akdoğan, 'Özelleştirme günü kurtarma politikasına dönüşmemeli', *Yeni Zemin*, No. 8, (August 1993), p. 17.

[326] Yavuz Kır, 'Serbest teşebbüs', p. 31

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The "nature" of the relationship between Islam and politics is a bone of contention among the researchers. The question whether Islam envisages a certain political and economic system finds various answers. The culturalist responses attribute uniqueness to Islam through insisting on its 'purely political' character. Accordingly, Islam does not recognize a distinction between spiritual and material realms, and is closed to any secular political organization or interpretation. Since the political and ideological position of Islam has been fixed through rigid religious injunctions, the questions regarding the place of politics, economics, democracy, human rights etc. in Islam find predetermined answers. However, this approach fails in explaining the variety of Islamist positions through time and space, and cannot answer the question of transformation of Islamist political discourse. On the other hand, there is an alternative view which insists that Islam is not 'genetically' political, and that there is nothing intrinsically 'political' about it. Within this context, as Nazih Ayubi asserted, politicization of Islam is a new invention, and it does not point to vivification of the religious past, or going back to original religious teaching. This approach handles the relationship between Islam and politics as a social, political and ideological problem, not as a theological or cultural issue. It focuses on Islam as a political ideology which establishes different ideological articulations in distinct historical and geographical settings. This, however, requires approaching Islamism as a political ideology among others. Then, the meaning of Islamist politics, or the relationship between Islam and politics is a matter of ideological struggle. To use Voloshinov's phrase, what is at stake is a struggle over the (religious) sign; a struggle to determine which signification chains will be established under which historical and social

conditions. Thus, the Islamist political activity is not a reflection of the religious injunction. By Asaf Bayat's words the very "sacred injunctions are matters of struggle, of competing readings." It is the humans –in and through the hegemonic struggle– that define their truth. So, rather than finding the most genuine manifestation of the religious injunction, we must ask which interpretation, through which articulations, and under which historical-social conditions prevail on others, and achieve to manifest itself as the 'true', or the sole 'legitimate' position.

Grasping Islamism as a political ideology is important for overcoming the essentialist generalizations regarding the relationship between religion and politics. For the researcher, the questions regarding the place of democracy, human rights, capitalism, or accumulation of wealth in Islam are not primarily theological issues, but matters of historical-sociological analysis. In this dissertation, by focusing on Islamisms of different generations and establishments, I have tried to present the plurality of Islamist positions across time and space; and to present the ideological quality of Islamism by pointing out the specific articulations it establishes between various discursive elements. The dissertation problematized the transformation of Islamism in Turkey from an *anti-systemic* and *confrontational* political ideology to a *compliant* and *accommodative* one. I have located the attitude taken towards established sociopolitical relations at the center of my inquiry, and tried to understand the basic principles of the transformation of Islamist political ideology. In doing so, I did not point out these interpretations as the sole Islamic position of a given period, but the hegemonic position among a variety of conflicting and competing interpretations.

Given the plurality of Islamist positions, in the second chapter, I have tried to present the variety of Islamist positions in Turkey across time and space. Since the problem of 'transformation' was at the heart of my inquiry I have tried to analyze the distinct historical periods of Islamism in Turkey. I have also briefly analyzed various Islamist establishments in the following parts of the chapter. The periodization located the problem of Islamists' attitude towards established sociopolitical relations at its center. I have argued that Islamism in Turkey can be

analyzed under five distinct periods: *the modernist Islam*, *the period of forced withdrawal and retreat*, *the period of incubation*, *the period of revival (confrontation and challenge)*, and *the period of compliance and accommodation*. The major concern of the Islamists of the first period was to save the Ottoman Empire from disintegration; and they underlined the necessity of accommodating Islam with modernity. The second period, *the period of forced withdrawal and retreat* was characterized by elimination of Islam from the public sphere by the Kemalist cadres. In this period, a series of secularizing reforms following foundation of the modern Turkish state (and the Republic) aimed at cleansing the power of autonomous Islamist groups; and controlling Islam through official means. The following period, *the period of incubation*, however, was characterized by the regime's liberalization of its attitude towards Islam and autonomous Islamist establishments. In this period, Islamist establishments found opportunity spaces especially within right wing political parties to increase their domain. However, they were nor powerful enough to enter into the political scene as independent political actors. The following two periods, *the period of revival (confrontation and challenge)* and *the period of compliance and accommodation* were the major subjects of this dissertation. In this dissertation, by 'transformation' I refer to the passage from the former to the latter period.

In addition to periodization I have also dealt with ideological and organizational variations of Islamism in Turkey. I have analyzed Islamist political parties (the parties of the National Outlook Movement and the Justice and Development Party); religious orders and communities; Islamic non-governmental organizations; militant Islamist organizations, and independent Islamist intellectuals. As the major concern of this dissertation is to analyze the transformation of Islamism from a confrontational political actor to an accommodative force, I have tried to analyze the place of these establishments in this process.

The first party of the National Outlook Movement, the National Oder Party (*MNP-Milli Nizam Partisi*) was founded in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan as an outcome of the strife within the center-right Justice Party (*AP-Adalet Partisi*). It is known that one of the most influential religious orders of the period, the İskenderpaşa Convent

promoted the formation of the party. Indeed, the formation of the MNP pointed to an increase in confidence of religious establishments; in other words, it implied a passage from period of incubation to period of revival. The social base of the party was consisted of small businessmen, tradesmen, peasants and provincial artisans. The party raised on the grievances of these sectors through attacking upon the economic policies of the AP, which favor "big industrialists and big urban merchants." The MNP was followed by the National Salvation Party (*MSP-Milli Selamet Partisi*) in the 1970s; and after the 1980 military intervention by the Welfare Party (*RP-Refah Partisi*). The continuities and differences within the National Outlook Movement have been discussed in detailed in the dissertation. To put it very briefly, different from its predecessors, the social bases of the RP included young middle class professionals, students, and the dispossessed in the metropolitan centers. In other words the social base of the party became more urbanized due to rapid socioeconomic transformations experienced in Turkey in the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, the Welfare Party addressed the grievances of the traditional sectors that experience material and moral difficulties of urbanization. The party also endeavored to articulate the whims of the Islamic sectors that benefited from the post-1980 economic setting.

The 1990s have witnessed a gradual taming of the National Outlook parties. First, the electoral successes of the RP in local and general elections pushed the party to the center of the political spectrum. The written and customary rules of actual politics gradually turned the National Outlook parties into systemic forces. The 28 February process was another crucial blow to the confrontational discourse of the RP. Islamist actors faced with the truth that even the symbolic frontal attacks towards the sacred elements of the secular official ideology will be severely punished. The party, in the following years increasingly adopted discourses of democracy, human rights and a pro-EU stance. The formation of the Justice and Development Party pointed to condensation of this transformation process. The party, which claimed to present a break with the National Outlook Movement, brought this transformation to one step further through claiming to be a conservative democratic center-right political establishment. The party, following

the electoral success of 2002 general elections became one of the most influential actors in neo-liberal transformation of Turkey.

Differing from the vast majority of researches that relate the transformation of Islamism only with traumatic and path breaking historical events such as 28 September Process, the banning of the RP, or September 11th, I analyzed it as a gradual process which can be traced back to early 1990s. I argued that the cornerstones of the new-Islamist discourse were begun to be formulated in the early 1990s. The changing social composition of the Islamic constituency was the major dynamic of this process. Especially after the 1980s the Islamic sectors became increasingly urbanized, educated, and an Islamic elite begun to be formed. This process was supported by the emergence of Islamic subeconomy and triumph of the Anatolian capital. It was within such a milieu that existing Islamic categories, frameworks and vocabulary could not serve as a cognitive map for the Islamic constituency. The legitimating function of the Islamist ideology of the previous period was challenged by new developments and concerns. I have also underlined that integration of the Islamist circles with the system was not limited with the political parties. Historical evolution of the religious communities and orders, and the emergence of Islamic non-governmental organizations also played their roles in the process. The religious orders, especially in the post-1980 setting increasingly became intertwined with political and economic networks. I have evaluated İskenderpaşa Convent's increasing affiliation with political and economic fields, and Fethullah Gülen's aspirations to raise a Golden Generation within the context of Islamists' move to power. As I have discussed, the religious orders and communities highly benefited from the opportunity spaces created after the 1980 military intervention; and the inward looking and mystic dimension has mostly been sacrificed for material concerns. Islamic non-governmental organizations (or the civil society in general) further encouraged the liberalization of Islamism in the 1990s. The decline of militant Islamist groups within the same period also pointed gradual abandonment of anti-systemic and confrontational discourse within Islamism.

This dissertation has focused on the independent Islamist intellectuals of the last two periods of Islamism. In the third chapter I have presented an exhaustive analysis of confrontational and oppositional Islamist discourse in Turkey in the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, the Islamic revival in Turkey was not an isolated phenomenon but deeply influenced by the major figures of Islamic revival of the Islamic geography. The revivalist figures such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Abu'l-a 'la Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Ali Shariati played a great role in making of Islamism as an independent, anti-systemic and confrontational political ideology. Sayyid Qutb, for instance, with his theories of *jahilliyah* and *jihad*, called for total (and violent if necessary) Islamization of state and society as the only cure for all social and political ills of Islamic societies. He insisted on the political and social character of Islam and condemned any attempt to reduce religion to a personal matter. Also, his anti-capitalism and stress on social justice filled the anti-westernist confrontational discourse with a strong ideological content. Ali Shariati, the ideologue of the Iranian revolution, on the other hand, with his sociological approach towards Islamism, which was inspired by Marxian categories, stood as a bridge between Islamism and socialist ideas. Both Qutb and Shariati had a revolutionary outlook and demanded a radical social, political and ideological transformation in the Islamic world. In Turkey, translation of the key texts of the revivalists contributed to formation of a anti-systemic Islamist discourse of the 1970s and 1980s.

I have noted that the fourth period of Islamic revival in Turkey, *the period of confrontation and challenge*, witnessed the formation of a new type of Islamist intellectual. Although maintaining a distanced attitude towards modernity, the Islamist intellectual, in fact, was a product of Turkish modernization process. By Meeker's words they write in a conceptual and semantic field that has considerable overlap with his secular counterparts. The writings of the Islamist intellectuals provided a mental map for the conservative pious youths; and contributed to formation of what one may call the 'Islamist youth'.

I defined four axes, or four challenges, on which the Islamist confrontational discourse was built on: *the challenge against inferiority complex and eclecticism*; *the challenge against the Western science and technology*; *the challenge against capitalism and imperialism*; and *the challenge against liberal democracy*. These were the founding elements of the Islamist ideology which gave it an anti-systemic and anti-status quo character. The transformation of the Islamist discourse, which is the central problem of this dissertation, meant a gradual abandonment of most of these challenges.

The primary challenge of the revivalists in Turkey was against the *inferiority complex and eclecticism* of Islamism in Turkey. The revivalist in Turkey firstly targeted the apologetic tone of the earlier Islamist generations which tries to prove compatibility of Islam with modernity, and strives to articulate Islam with contemporary political ideologies of the period. This apologetic tone struggled to prove that Islam was not a "backward" religion, and was in conformity with the requirements of the age. Accordingly, behind the inferiority complex lied attempts to confine Islam within the limits of individual conscience. On the contrary, the Islamists insisted that Islam is a comprehensive religion which also regulates social, political and economic aspects of human life. The claim of comprehensiveness also brought the idea that Islam, as a self-sufficient religion and teaching, is in no need of establishing any kind of alliances or articulations with other ideologies. Thus, Islam cannot and mustn't seek any articulations with ideologies such as socialism, liberalism, conservatism or nationalism.

The second challenge was against the *Western science and technology*. For many decades, the dominant paradigm within Turkish intellectual circles, including the Islamists, made a distinction between technology and culture of the West. In other words, the Western science and technology was unproblematically embraced by the Islamist circles as soon as it has been isolated from its cultural background. The revivalists, however, problematized this rather smooth appropriation through questioning the cultural neutrality of the Western science and technology. The revivalist intellectuals stated that there is an intrinsic relationship between Western science and technology and Western culture. In other words, the Western science

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and technology will come to the Islamic world with its culture. Accordingly, in the West, science and technology are integral instruments for capitalists' urge for endless profit. In this process technology has turned to an end itself, and became the source of human beings' overconfidence in their minds. It has become a destructive force and assault against the idea of divinity. Islam, on the contrary, considers science as a way to become closer to god.

The challenge against capitalism and imperialism was the determining element of revivalists' anti-systemic discourse. The revivalists constructed Islamism as a mildly anti-capitalist and anti-Westernist ideology. By Meeker's words, "capitalism has been defined as a highly expansive and exploitative system" which gives rise to a "vicious cycle of political reactions and countrereactions which do no alleviate but instead exacerbate the social ills from which they arise." The system of *riba* (interest) is seen as the motor force of capitalism; and as the source material and moral decayedness. The *homo economicus*, the self-interested, profit seeking and egoist individual of capitalism lives in a society which is not in fact a society, but a conglomeration of isolated individuals who war against each other. Capitalism was not only criticized on moral grounds, but for its material deficiencies. Briefly, as an unorganized and chaotic system, it results in economic inefficiency and nonproductiveness.

According to the Islamist intellectuals, emergence of a huge abyss between different social classes is the major social consequence of capitalism. In capitalism, social stratification reached to a point that it resembles that of the feudal era. Although the Islamist intellectuals were not against private property and commercial activities, they have underlined the need for taking necessary precautions for preventing emergence of distinctive class differences. The Islamic state has been pointed as the central agency that will take these measures. A call for a moderate life was another precondition for maintaining social harmony and preventing social stratification.

Anti-imperialism can be considered as one of the building stones of anti-systemic discourse of Islamic revival in Turkey. But, the distinction between anti-

imperialism and anti-Westernism was mostly blurred. The Islamist critique of imperialism, or 'the World System', rests on a clear-cut distinction between the Islamic and non-Islamic blocs. Anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism were the constituting elements of the Islamist anti-imperialist discourse. However, both socialist and capitalist blocs are considered under the label of imperialist western powers. The anti-imperialist framework rests on a harsh dichotomy between Islamic and non-Islamic states, or between the Islamic and Western cultures. This dichotomy refers to a constant state of war in which the total annihilation of the antagonistic other is the only way out.

The final challenge of the Islamist intellectuals was against the *Western liberal democracies*. As opposed to earlier Islamist generations' efforts to prove the essentially democratic character of Islam, the revivalist intellectuals in Turkey categorically rejected the idea of liberal democracy. The revivalists insisted that democracy is not only a form of government or an administrative method. It is a way thinking, living and feeling which is unique to the Western societies, and a product of the history of the Western societies. The revivalists criticized the Western liberal democracies on moral and material grounds. While the former refers to the secular kernel of the idea of democracy which gives sovereignty to people, not the God; the latter criticism focuses on the discrepancy between promises and reality of democracy. Accordingly, against its claims, liberal parliamentary democracy in capitalist societies is the administrative system dominated by a small number of elites. The so-called 'sovereignty of the people' has never been realized in democracies due to structural deficiencies of the system. The revivalists' critique of democracy is accompanied by their critique of unequal class relations in capitalism and the instrumental nature of the capitalist state. Against the idea of democracy the Islamist intellectuals stress that sovereignty belongs to Allah, and early Islamic practices such as *shura* (council) are proposed as alternative to liberal democracies.

Foregoing challenges of the Islamist intellectuals presented a powerful critique of existing socioeconomic and political structures and relations. This is why I have argued that the Islamism of the period has been characterized by a mildly anti-

systemic discourse. I have analyzed the anti-systemic discourse of Islamism of the period as Third Worldist Populism. In this study I have rested on a symptomatic account of populism which understand populism as an anti-status quo force that simplifies the political space by symbolically dividing the society between 'the people' and its 'other'. Islamist populism of the 1970s and 1980s appealed to this ideological strategy through positing a chasm between the forces of Islam and forces of *kufr*. Each and every social and political phenomenon has acquired its meaning within this dichotomy. The West has been considered as the embodiment of forces of evil, the evil incarnate; and it was only though the elimination of these powers that the clash will end.

In this thesis I have argued that the transformation of Islamism in Turkey refers to gradual elimination of this anti-systemic, anti-*status quo* Third Worldist populism. Initially, the first principle (*the challenge against inferiority complex and eclecticism*) has been abandoned through making distinctions between civil, political, cultural and individual expressions of Islam. The claim that Islam contains all spheres of Muslims' life has been abandoned by attempts for depoliticizing Islam. In other words, following contemporary Islamist ideologues such as Albdolkarim Soroush, the new-Islamist intellectuals have stated that Islam does not propose a predetermined social and political system. Accordingly, the 'civil Islam', as opposed to the 'political Islam' of the earlier periods, abandoned the modernist Jacobin imaginary which has dominated Islamism for decades and which anticipated a top-down Islamization of the state and society. Also, the new-Islamist intellectuals, as I called them, did not hesitate to establish articulations with political ideologies of the period, most notably a Western style conservatism. Second, *the challenge against the Western science and technology* has been altogether abandoned through underlining the need for reaching the level of technological development in the West. This became especially clear with regards to the issue of increasing Turkey's competitive economic strength in the global economic system. The most striking move of the new-Islamist intellectuals was abandonment of *the challenge against capitalism and imperialism*. The challenge against capitalism has been replaced by the need for inserting an Islamic morality to economic transactions; and the challenge against imperialism by the necessity of

successfully integrating to global markets. Finally, *the challenge against democracy* has been replaced by the claim that, in Turkey, Islamist actors present the genuine democratic alternative against the *status quo* forces.

Postmodernism, multiculturalism and globalization were the major ideological inspirations of the new-Islamist intellectuals. As Mustafa Armağan stated, postmodernism showed the failures and limitations of modernism, and postmodernist search for alternatives opened up new opportunity spaces for Islam. The postmodernist attacks towards the secular idea of progress also encouraged the new-Islamist intellectuals to embrace basic postmodernist propositions. I have argued that demonstrating the cornerstones of new-Islamist critique of modernity, and new-Islamism's affiliation with post-modern theories is extremely important in many respects. The epistemological and philosophical arguments, and conceptual toolbox that have been borrowed from postmodern theories provided the new-Islamist intellectuals with effective arguments to deal with the problems of the (post)-modern world. Second, the postmodern theories increased the articulatory capacity of Islamism; and helped Islamism to accommodate with newly emerging paradigms and concepts of neoliberal globalization. The alternative social, political and economic visions that have been proposed by the new-Islamist intellectuals were deeply influenced by postmodern social and political theories. The postmodernist critique of the modern state, for instance, was coupled with articulation of neo-liberal themes to Islamism, such as deregulation, minimization of the state, privatization and so on.

Likewise, as for multiculturalism, there were significant parallels between Islamist and multiculturalist critique of the idea of universal citizenship (and stress on cultural diversity). The communitarian and conservative implications of multiculturalism provided a sound political ground for the Islamist circles. The neoliberal globalization, on the other hand, by its emphasis on unlimited freedom of market forces and by its harsh critique of regulatory functions of the state implied further opportunity spaces for the Islamic sectors. Also, the political project of neoliberalism –which is based on culturalization of political differences

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and depoliticization (reducing politics to administration of things)– was in line with the ambitions of the new-Islamist intellectuals.

New-Islamism was not an intellectual fantasy of a group of independent Islamist intellectuals but a theoretical response given to Islamists' move to power. By power I do not refer only to the political field in the narrower sense of the term. In post-1980 Turkey, Islam and Islamic societal sectors become more visible and influential in economic, social and cultural spheres. The debates regarding the triumph of the Anatolian capital and birth of an Islamic middle class pointed to increase in the economic and symbolic capitals of the Islamic sectors. The electoral successes of the Islamist political parties both at local and national levels throughout the 1990s increased the integration of Islamists with existing economic and political networks. The confrontational and radical outlook could no longer provide the 'pious winners' (or the ones expecting upward social mobility) with proper ideological motives and a valid legitimating framework.

I have also analyzed the new-Islamist ideology as a response to a double crisis: the hegemonic crisis Turkey faced in the 1990s and the crisis within Islamism itself. The period has witnessed the limits and failure of the new-Right's attempt at hegemony which has been launched in post-1980 Turkey under the leadership of Özal's Motherland Party (*ANAP-Anavatan Partisi*). As for the crisis within Islamism, in the 1990s the new-Islamist intellectuals began to question the sectarian and radical outlook of the Islamist political organizations and called for a more moderate outlook that addresses wider masses. New-Islamist intellectuals gathered around journals such as *Kitap Dergisi, Köprü, Yeni Zemin, Bilgi ve Hikmet, İktisat ve İş Dünyası* and *Tezkire* tried to develop a new Islamist outlook that is in conformity with the changing paradigms of the world. This is why 'change' was the central element of the new-Islamist discourse. The new-Islamist intellectuals presented themselves as the pioneers of change against the *status quo* forces that resist change. I have analyzed the political and economic projects of new-Islamism distinctively. The distinction, however, was for purely analytical reasons. In other words, the economic and political ambitions of the new-Islamist intellectuals were intrinsically linked to each other. Understanding this

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intertwinement is necessary for grasping the tensions and contradictions of new-Islamism.

The political project of new-Islamism located the critique of modern nation state to its center. According to the new-Islamist intellectuals, the modern nation state was *a homogenizing totalitarian force which disregards cultural plurality, or multiculturality*; *an anti-democratic force which establishes tyranny of a majority (mostly an ethnic majority)*; *an interventionist organ which relies on precision of social sciences and idea of progress, and tries to manufacture identical citizen subjects*; and *an aggressive entity whose major motive is enmity against other nations*. Minimizing or transcending the modern state was the main suggestion of the new-Islamist intellectuals.

The new-Islamist intellectuals accused the Republican project in Turkey for founding a totalitarian regime which intervened in every aspect of people's lives. According to the new-Islamist intellectuals it was the *modern* and *national* character of the Turkish state that did not recognize the right to live to alternative worldviews, most notably the religious identities. Theories of multiculturalism and communitarian critiques of liberal citizenship constituted the philosophical background of Islamist post-modern, post-national projects such as *the Medina Charter*. The post-national multilegal new-Islamist alternative aimed at reducing the role of the state as a coordinator between different communities; which was in line with the popular civil society/state opposition that dominated the intellectual agenda throughout the 1990s. The multiculturalist outlook also tended to culturalize significant political questions through replacing the modern citizenship with an essentialized notion of community. The political project of new-Islamism with its stress on minimization of the state and depoliticizing the public sphere was in conformity with neoliberal understanding of politics which was discussed in Chapter 4.

The new-Islamist intellectuals targeted the perspective which questioned the possible co-existence of Islam and democracy. On the contrary, they argued that Islam encourages a participatory democratic framework in which fundamental

rights and freedoms of individuals are fully protected. In this sense, Islam is even more democratic than the modern Western liberal democracies, which are only democratic in form. Thus, the denial of democracy has been replaced by the claim that Islam presents a genuine democratic alternative. The association of Islam with democracy has been supported by the arguments that Islam is not a theocracy; it does not propose a dictatorial regime; and it promotes freedom. The new-Islamist intellectuals proposed a radical democratic reform in Turkey which will start from curbing the excessive power of the state which was materialized in military and civil bureaucracy. In this democratization programme, the cultural hegemony of the state must be limited through removing the state monopoly over religion. They have stated that institutions such as Directorate of Religious Affairs must be abandoned and religious affairs must be handled with the civil society.

The new-Islamist intellectuals reinforced their democratic framework through proposing a new constitution. The principles of new constitution were listed as such: the state monopoly over religion –which is, in fact, against the principle of laicism– must be removed; the state monopoly over economy, education, health, culture, etc. must be removed; the constitution must not have unamendable articles; the role of military must be redefined in line with civil-democratic principles; the centralist-bureaucratic structure of the state must be curbed; freedom of thought must be promoted; the people must be granted the right to elect their president; arrangements for presidential system must be made; all administrative procedure must be open to judicial review; the parliament must be empowered; the Constitutional Court must be re-configured; and the deputies must take their oaths on Quran.

As for the economic project of new-Islamism, the new-Islamism was the name given to Islamist politics' gradual acceptance of the economic, political and cultural principles of neo-liberal globalization. The liberalization of Islamism, thus, primarily meant economic liberalization. The Islamic entrepreneurs complained about etatist economic policies of the Republic mainly due to their uneasy relations with the state, and they called for minimization of state's role in economy. The idea of economic minimization was intrinsically linked with the

idea of political minimization and democratization of the state. Theories of postmodernism and post-Fordism helped the new-Islamist intellectuals to depict a 'creative chaos' and 'dynamism' in neo-liberal capitalism –or, new-capitalism as they label it.

The new-Islamist intellectuals, especially the economists gathered around Islamic business associations (most notably MÜSİAD), firstly struggled to overcome the general conviction that Islam is against accumulation of capital and wealth. The new-Islamist intellectuals asserted that Islam is not against accumulation of capital, but against illicit ways of acquiring wealth. The conviction that "men do not become rich" is evaluated as a plot against Islamist societies aimed at pacifying the Muslims. The mystical motto of 'one mouthful food, one short coat' has been abandoned in favor of a more aggressive and materialist attitude towards economic activities. The new-Islamist intellectuals underlined that far from being un-Islamic, the economic activity is necessary for sustaining the well being of the Muslims. However, the new-Islamist intellectuals stated that the Muslim entrepreneur replaced the self-interested *homo economicus*, who has transformed endless accumulation of capital into the sole goal of individual life with *homo Islamicus*, who blends economic rationality with Islamic morality. But, far from offering an alternative economic system or an alternative economic mentality, the new-Islamist intellectuals only provided an alternative legitimating framework for capitalism and capital accumulation.

In legitimizing Islamic sectors' increasing affiliation with economic activities the new-Islamist intellectuals have referred to a pre- and anti-capitalist market fantasy which eased their problematic relationship with wealth and power. Accordingly, capitalism was a monopolistic economic system which is against markets and market competition. Market has been defined as an economic sphere in which all economic actors can materialize their entrepreneurial energies. Thus, the Muslim entrepreneurs and Islamic subeconomy are considered as representatives of market forces; not capitalism.

Curbing the excessive powers of the state was not only a political problem but also an integral part of the new-Islamist economic project. Following the (neoliberal) stress on the virtues of markets and the intrinsic link between market choices and wider political and personal freedoms, the new-Islamist intellectuals presented a systematic plea for privatization of the state economic enterprises. As I have underlined several times, the critique of the modern state and interventionist state tradition became the central themes of the new-Islamist discourse. Curbing the economic power of the state was seen inseparable from limiting its political and ideological powers. Privatization is also considered as inevitable for strengthening Turkey's position in the global economy. The new-Islamist intellectuals underline that it is through privatization that Turkey would attract foreign capital, import newest production technologies and increase its economic power.

The advent of flexible production system, which played a crucial role in the success of Islamic sub-economies, were welcomed by the new-Islamist intellectuals on the ground that it unleashed the economic energies of traditional entrepreneurs; and that it guaranteed a socially just and secure order. Community networks and Islamic civil society were pointed out as the social security measures that would replace the formal/official social security instruments. In other words, the idea of social justice, which was one of the integral elements of the anti-capitalist discourse of Islamist populism, has been abandoned in favor of the so-called market forces. The new-Islamist intellectuals stressed the importance of flexibility of production processes which requires the flexibility in the labor market. The new-Islamist market discourse strictly ruled out formal labor organizations and workers' right to strike. In an Islamic market order, the paternalistic relationship between labor and capital would render these initiatives obsolete. In this sense the new-Islamist social imaginary could be considered as a form of solidarist-corporatism which stressed the existence of different societal sectors that are in need of and complete each other. This is why the new-Islamist political program strictly rules out class-based politics as archaic phenomena of the old-capitalism.

The stress on economic and political liberalization of the Turkish state, the calls for development of civil society and embracing the discourse of democracy does not essentially mean democratization of Islamism. In other words, the new-Islamists' call for a democratic society is primarily aimed at expanding the opportunity spheres of Islamic sectors, and lacks a participatory dimension. Developing democratic conduits for improving political participation is not a concern of the new-Islamists'. In this sense they share the neo-liberal dislike of "too much democracy and politics", which shall bring politicization of cultural and economic issues. On the contrary, the new-Islamist outlook stands for culturalization and depoliticization of political problems. Political projects such as the Medina Charter primarily refer to this depoliticization process. Second problematic point is about the insistence of the cultural homogeneity and essential nature of cultural groups. While the new-Islamist intellectuals favored the freedom of communities, the essentialist nature of these communities left small room for plurality of opinions and identities within the communities. This is why when it comes to issues such as gender equality, positive discrimination or queerness, even the most liberal new-Islamist intellectual evaluates the problem in terms of 'pathology', 'sickness' or as threats to social harmony.

Aforementioned points underline that new-Islamism refers to the loss of anti-systemic and confrontational moment within the Islamist discourse. Although new-Islamism did not refer to abandonment of Islamist political ideology, it meant less Islamism and more conservatism. As the new-Islamists acquired more power they become more and more associated with and integrated to the 'establishment'. As they have plunged into economic, political, cultural and bureaucratic networks more, they have become more conservative and more ordinary. This ordinariness moved the new-Islamist intellectuals and politicians to the center of political spectrum. Keeping this point in mind will help us to understand the oscillation of the new-Islamist politics between authoritarian and democratic tendencies. Of course, the birth of the new-Islamism in the 1990s caused emergence of other Islamist positions that target the conformism of the new-Islamists. But, the last two decades pointed to consolidation of the hegemonic position of new-Islamism both within Islamist currents and among other political ideologies. This, however, does

not mean that new-Islamism is and will be the only Islamist alternative. The future of Islamism in Turkey and in other geographies will be shaped through the hegemonic struggle that will take both within Islamism and in respective geographies.

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APPENDIX A

TURKISH SUMMARY

Türkiye 2002 yılından itibaren İslamcı kimliğinden, bir diğer deyişle "Milli Görüş gömleğinden", sıyrıldığını ve "muhafazakâr demokrat" bir oluşum olduğunu iddia eden Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi tarafından yönetilmektedir. Gerçekten de gerek siyasal söylemi, gerekse dayandığı toplumsal ve düşünsel koalisyon ele alındığında AKP'nin "İslamcı" bir siyasal parti olduğunu sorunsuzca iddia etmek son derece güçtür. AKP gerek iktidara yürürken gerekse özellikle iktidarının ilk yıllarında ileri demokrasi, insan hakları, sivil toplum ve Avrupa Birliği'ne entegrasyon gibi temaları kendine referans noktası olarak belirledi. Elbette ki ekonomide liberal uygulamalardan taviz vermeyeceğinin garantisini iç ve dış iktidar odaklarına vererek. AKP'nin İslamcı bir siyasal oluşum olup olmadığı hakkındaki tartışma bir siyasal hareketi İslamcı yapan unsurun ya da unsurların ne olduğu sorusu ile yakından ilgilidir. Daha derinde yatan soru ise İslamcılığın ne olduğu ve İslamcılıkla İslam arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl kavranması gerektiği ile ilgilidir. Ben bu doktora tez çalışmasında Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin "yeni-İslamcılık" olarak adlandırılabilecek bir düşünsel arka plana dayandığını, bu düşünsel arka planın ise 1980'lerin sonunda 1990'ların başında inşa edilmeye başlandığını iddia ediyorum. "Yeni-İslamcılık" olarak adlandırdığım duruş ise sadece düşünsel ya da entelektüel düzeyde yaşanan bir dönüşüme işaret etmemektedir. Özellikle 1980s sonrasında bir yanda dünyada ve Türkiye'de yaşanan önemli gelişmeler; diğer yanda da İslamcı ya da dini-muhafazakâr toplumsal taban olarak adlandırılabilecek kesimin yaşadığı dönüşüm bahsi geçen düşünsel değişim ile birlikte ele alınmalıdır. *Yeni İslamcılığın Oluşumu: Türkiye'de İslamcı Söylemin Muhalefetten Uyuma Dönüşümü* başlıklı çalışmada İslamcı siyasal söylemde yaşanan bu değişimin ayrıntılı bir incelemesini sunmaya çalıştım.

Çalışma boyunca İslamcılığı her durumda siyasal ve söylemsel bir mesele olarak ele aldım. Gerek bir din olarak İslam, gerekse siyasal ve toplumsal bir proje olarak İslamcılık hakkında özcü, önyargılı ve temelsiz genellemelerden ve yargılardan kaçınmaya çalıştım. Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde belirttiğim üzere anlamın kuruluşu, terimlerin edindiği anlam ve bir siyasal söylemin yapıtaşlarının kuruluşunu bir mücadele sonucu olarak ele aldım. Bir başka deyişle, tarih-üstü ve özsel bir kategori olarak İslamcılığın "gerçek" toplumsal ve siyasal projesinin ne olduğunu soruşturmak yerine farklı tarihsel ve coğrafi uğraklarda, farklı İslamcı oluşumlarca ortaya konan "gerçeklik" iddialarını ve birbirine rakip iddialardan hangisinin geçer akçe ya da hegemonik kod olarak varlığını sürdürebildiğini sorgulamaya çalıştım. Bu kaygı beni İslamcılığın hem kurumsal hem de tarihsel olarak çeşitliliğini ele almaya yöneltti ve tezin ikinci bölümünde bir yandan genel olarak İslamcılığın farklı dönemlerine diğer yandan da farklı İslamcı kurumlara ve oluşumlara eğildim.

Çalışma Türkiye'de İslamcılık düşüncesinin farklı dönemlerinin olduğu, her dönemin hegemonik bir İslamcılık anlatısının olduğunu iddia etmekte ve özellikle İslamcılığın son iki dönemine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Bunu yaparken de genel bir İslamcılık tartışmasından ziyade İslamcılığın düzen ve sistem ile kurduğu ilişkiye yoğunlaşmaktadır. Bu ilişkinin önemli sacayaklarından biri olarak da İslamcı söylemle kapitalist sosyal ve siyasal düzen arasındaki ilişki ele alınmaktadır. Türkiye'de İslamcı düşüncenin son otuz yılı ele alındığında sistem, düzen ve kapitalizm eksenlerinde köklü bir dönüşüm yaşandığını görmekteyiz. Bu dönüşüm, İslamcılığın 1970'li ve 1980'li yıllardaki anti-sistemik, düzen karşıtı ve muhalif duruşundan vazgeçişinin ve daha uyumcu bir kimliğe bürünmesinin hikâyesi olarak ele alınabilir.

İslamcılık akımının Osmanlı-Türk tarihindeki ilk tezahürleri Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun selameti ve bekası sorunsalı ile şekillenmiştir. Ondokuzuncu yüzyılın sonu ve yirminci yüzyılın başlar itibariyle dağılmakta olan bir imparatorlukta muhtelif kurtuluş projelerinden biridir İslamcılık. İmparatorluğu bir arada tutacak olan tutkalın din/ümmet bilinci mi, milliyet/ırk mı yoksa Osmanlı millet sistemi mi olduğu sorusudur söz konusu olan. İslamcı siyaset bu soruya din

unsurunun ve ümmet bilincinin altını çizerek verir. Lakin dönemin İslamcılığının ayırt edici özelliği İslam'la çağdaşlık ve gelişme düşüncesi arasında kurulan ilişkidir. İlk dönem İslamcıları dinin terakkiye mani olmadığını, İslam ile bilim/bilimsel düşünce arasında bir çelişki olamayacağını vurgulayarak başlarlar işe. Bu savunu gerek Batı'nın gerekse ülkedeki Batıcı aydınların ve bürokratların İslam'a karşı takındıkları olumsuz tavra ve İslam'ı "geri kalmış" ve "köhne" bir din olarak tanımlamalarına bir tepki olarak ele alınabilir. İşte bu yüzden bu ilk dönem **modernist İslamcılık** olarak adlandırılabilir.

İslamcılığın ikinci dönemi ise erken Cumhuriyet dönemi ve tek parti dönemi ile örtüşür. Kemalist iktidara karşı gerçekleşecek herhangi bir kalkışmanın Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu ve İstiklal Mahkemeleri gibi sert önlemlerle bastırıldığı bu dönemde İslamcılık **zorunlu bir geri çekilme** sürecine girer. İslamcı muhalefet sert bir şekilde bastırılır ve ancak gizli cemaatler eşliğinde varlığı sürdürebilir. Resmi ideoloji sadece İslam'ı ve İslamcılığı resmi ve kamusal alandan temizleme gayretine girmemiş, aynı zamanda çeşitli kurumlar eşliğinde resmi bir İslam yorumunu yerleştirmeye çalışmıştır. Din ile devlet arasındaki bu karmaşık ilişki din ile devlet ilişkilerinin birbirinden ayrılması değil, dinin devlet üzerinde belirli bir kontrol ve belirleyicilik sahibi olması şeklinde süregitmiştir. İslamcılığın illegal statüsü İkinci Dünya Savaşı ardından gelen görece siyasi liberalizasyon süreci ve çok partili hayata geçişle birlikte değişmeye başlar. İlk adımlar Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nden gelmiştir. Din üzerindeki sıkı baskı merkez-sağ Demokrat Parti'nin 14 Mayıs 1950 seçimlerini kazanması ile birlikte daha da gevşemiştir. Lakin bu gevşeme bahsi geçen partinin İslamcı bir gündeminin olduğu şeklinde yorumlanmamalıdır. İslamcı gruplar ve oluşumlar, özellikle tarikatlar, genelde oy ve temsil pazarlığı üzerinden siyasal ve toplumsal temsil olanağı bulurlar. Bu durum kabaca 1960'ların sonuna kadar, İslamcı oluşumlar Necmettin Erbakan önderliğinde kendi siyasal partilerini ve hareketlerini kurana kadar devam eder. İslamcı hareket bir **kuluçka ve hazırlık** evresinden kendi ayakları üzerinde duran siyasal bir muhatap olma evresine adım atar. Dönemin belirleyici siyasi gücü Milli Görüş Hareketi çevresinde örgütlenen siyasi partiler (Milli Nizam Partisi ve Milli Selamet Partisi) ve oluşumlardır.

İslamcıların, Nakşibendilerin de etkisiyle bir siyasi hareket etrafında örgütlenmesi hem sosyoekonomik hem de düşünsel manada yaşanan bir dönüşümün parçasıdır. Necmettin Erbakan'ın 1969 yılında Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği Başkanı olması ve dönemin Adalet Partisi hükümeti tarafından başkanlıktan alınması aslında İslamcı siyasetin itici gücü olan Anadolulu küçük burjuvazisi, esnaf ve zanaatkâr kesimi ile büyük sanayi burjuvazisi olarak adlandırılabilecek olan İstanbul sermayesi arasındaki sürtüşmenin bir tezahürüydü. Erbakan ekonomik mekanizmanın büyük kent tüccarlarından yana işlemekte olduğundan, Anadolu tüccar ve sanayicilerinin kendilerini üvey evlat olarak bildiklerinden ve Odalar Birliği'nin tümüyle komprador bir azınlığın vasıtası olarak çalıştığından yakınmaktaydı. Erbakan'ın çizdiği bu çerçeve, Milli Görüş Hareketi'nin büyük burjuvazinin karşısında özellikle ithal ikameci politikalardan zarar görmüş Anadolulu küçük burjuvazinin savunucusu olacağının habercisiydi. Parti programında Milli Görüş'ün materyalist-kapitalist ve sosyalist-komünist sistemlere alternatif bir ekonomik programı olduğunun altı çiziliyordu. Kapitalizm karşıtlığı Erbakan liderliğindeki hareketin yer yer "sağdaki solcular" olarak adlandırılmasına sebep olsa da aslen kapitalizm karşıtlığından ziyade onun bir türüne muhalefet söz konusuydu.

Düşünsel anlamda ise İslamcılığın, merkez sağ siyasetin yedeğinde yer alan bir ideolojik akım olma özelliğinden kapsamlı bir toplumsal tahayyül olmaya yönelen dönüşümü söz konusudur. Bu süreçte özellikle yirminci yüzyılda İslam coğrafyasında yaşanan İslami uyanış sürecinin Türkiye'de İslamcı projenin olgunlaşmasında ve şekillenmesinde muazzam bir rolü olmuştur. Mısır, Afganistan, Pakistan ve İran'da yaşanan İslami uyanış ve güçlü İslamcı düşünürlerin ortaya çıkışı bu süreci pekiştirmiştir. Cemaleddin Afgani, Abul Ala Mevdudi, Seyyid Kutup ve Ali Şeriati gibi düşünürler İslam'ın bağımsız bir siyasal ideoloji olmasında önemli katkılarda bulunmuşlardır. 1960'lar Türkiye'sinde, özellikle çeviri faaliyetleri ile birlikte Türkiyeli İslamcı okurlar bu yazarlarla tanışmışlar ve İslam ile diğer ideolojiler arasında bir set çekme çabasına girişmişlerdir. Bu çaba en sarih ve doygun ifadelerini 1980 sonrası Türkiye'sinde bulacaktır. 1980 askeri darbesi özellikle sol-sosyalist muhalefetin ortadan kaldırılmasına yönelikti. 1980 sonrası sol ve bir nebze de sağ hareketler için

travma ve dağınıklık yıllarıyken, İslamcılar için ciddi fırsatların ortaya çıktığı bir canlanma sürecine karşılık gelmekteydi. Araştırmacılar darbe sonrası on yılın İslamcı entelektüel üretimin büyük bir çeşitlilik ve canlılık gösterdiği yıllar olduğunu vurgularken bu gerçeğin bir boyutunu vurgulamaktadırlar. Gerçekten de 1980 sonrası İslami toplumsal kesimler için hem entelektüel hem de sosyoekonomik anlamda önemli dönüşümlere gebe olmuştur.

1980 sonrası İslamcılığın gelişiminde rol oynayan önemli aktörlerden biri, Michael E. Meeker'in "Müslüman entelektüeller" olarak adlandırdığı kesim olmuştur: cumhuriyetin modern kurumlarında eğitim görmüş, Doğu ile olduğu kadar Batı ile de ilgilenen, Arapça veya Farsçaya ek olarak Batı dillerine hâkimiyeti olan ve seküler muarızlarıyla ortak bir kavramsal evreni paylaşan yeni bir entelektüel camia. Bu entelektüel grubu, İslamcılığın son yüzyılda savunmacı bir ideoloji olarak şekillenişine karşı bir eleştiri geliştirip İslamcılığı kendi ayakları üzerinde duran, herhangi bir ideolojiye eklemlenemeyecek (İslam sosyalizmi gibi) kapsayıcı bir düşünce ve değerler sistemi sunduğu konusunda ısrar etmişlerdir. Seyyid Kutup ve Ali Şeriati gibi düşünürler Türkiyeli İslamcıların bu arayışına rehberlik etmişlerdir. Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünde İslamcılığın Türkiye'deki sistem karşıtı duruşunu incelemeden önce biri Mısırlı diğeri İranlı bu iki düşünürün elverdiğince ayrıntılı bir tanıtımı yer almaktadır.

1906 yılında Mısır'da dünyaya gelen Seyyid Kutup'un düşüncelerinde Mısır'ın yirminci yüzyılın başlarında yaşadığı tarihsel-toplumsal çalkantıların izini bulmak mümkündür. Mısır'ın sömürge oluşundan kaynaklı ekonomik, siyasal ve toplumsal sorunlar Kutup'un sürekli değindiği temalar olmuştur. Yirminci yüzyıl İslamcılığının şekillenişine yaptığı en büyük katkı ise *cahiliye* analizi olmuştur. Kutup'a göre gerek İslam toplumları gerekse İslami olmayan toplumlar bir cahiliye evresini yaşamaktadırlar. Cahiliye ise Kutup tarafından kabaca Allah'ın ulûhiyet haklarına saldırı olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Kutup kapitalizm, emperyalizm, sömürgecilik, batı hayranlığı ve demokrasi gibi kavramları cahiliye analizi içerisine oturtmaktadır. Kutup'a göre cahili düzenin en temel dinamiği İslam'ın bireysel yaşama hapsedilmesidir. Oysa Kutup İslam'ın bireysel, toplumsal, siyasal, ekonomik ve kültürel alanların tümünü ilgilendiren kapsamlı

bir ideoloji olduğunu iddia eder. Bu çerçevede mevcut sosyoekonomik düzen kökten bir İslami değişime uğramalıdır. Cihat burada kilit kavram olacaktır. Kısaca Kutup İslamcılığı kapsayıcı ve devrimci bir ideoloji olarak kurgulayarak yirminci yüzyıldaki radikal İslamcı akımların kalkış noktalarından bir olmuştur. İran İslam devriminin ideologu olarak görülen Ali Şeriati ise Marksizmden devraldığı kavramlarla İslam'ın sosyolojik bir okumasına girişir. Marx'ın *Komünist Manifesto*'da bütün insanlık tarihini sınıf savaşımlarının tarihi olarak okumasından feyz alan Şeriati, insanlık tarihini Habil ve Kabil arasındaki mücadelenin tarihi olarak ele alır. Modern sosyalizmi Şiilikle sentezleme çabası olarak okunabilecek bu girişim İslamcılık açısından radikal politika açılımları olan yeni patikalar yaratmıştır. Şeriati de Kutup da İslam'ı salt bireysel ya da kültürel bir mesele olarak ele almamış, İslamcılık eleştirilerini mevcut sosyoekonomik ve siyasal yapının köklü bir eleştirisi olarak inşa etmişlerdir. Bu inşa süreci mevcut düzenin radikal bir yeniden yapılanmasını ya da devrimci bir dönüşümü içermesi bakımından önemlidir. Türkiye'de İslami uyanış süreci de bu devrimci uğraktan fazlasıyla etkilenmiştir.

Meydan okuma dönemi olacak adlandırılabilecek bu dönemin en ayırt edici özelliği İslamcılığın kendini muhalif ve düzen karşıtı bir siyasal hareket olarak kurgulamasıdır. İslam'ın modernite, çağdaşlık, demokrasi veya Batı bilimi ile uyumlu olup olmadığı sorusu, İslam'ın bu unsurlara cevabının ne olacağı sorusu ile yer değiştirmiştir. Yani İslamcılığın mevcut sosyoekonomik ve siyasal sisteme alternatifinin ne olacağı sorunu merkezi bir önem kazanmıştır. Bu çalışmada ben siyasi parti ağları ve tarikat/benzeri oluşumların dışında kalan İslami entelektüel çevrelerin üretimlerinden yola çıkarak bu söylemin temel yapıtaşlarını tartışmaya çalıştım. Ali Bulaç, İsmet Özel, Rasim Özdenören gibi önde gelen İslamcı yazarlara ek olarak bağımsız bir entelektüel grup tarafından yayımlanan *Girişim* dergisini de analizime dâhil ettim. Bu isimlerin ve çevrelerin seçilmesinin en önde gelen sebebi, hem dönemlerinde hem de sonraki dönemlerde İslamcı bilincin gelişmesinde oynadıkları önemli roldür. Elbette ki bahsi geçen isimler İslamcılığın yegâne temsilcileri değildir ve "belirli" bir İslamcılık algısına sahiptirler; lakin ben bu çalışmada çeşitlilikten, sürtüşmelerden ve çelişkilerden ziyade genel eğilimler

ve ortak noktalar üzerinde durdum. Bu okumanın sonucunda meydan okumacı sistem karşıtı İslamcı söylemin belirgin sacayaklarını şu şekilde sıraladım:

1. Aşağılık kompleksine ve eklektikliğe meydan okuma;
2. Batı bilim ve teknolojisine meydan okuma;
3. Kapitalizm ve emperyalizme meydan okuma;
4. Batılı liberal demokrasilere meydan okuma.

İslami uyanış kendinden önceki İslamcı düşüncenin en önde gelen problemlerinden birinin kendine güvensizlik ve özellikle Batı karşısında duyulan **aşağılık kompleksi** olduğunu vurgulamıştır. Buna göre İslam dünyasının neden geri kaldığı sorusuna verilecek her türlü cevap bu ezikliği yeniden üretmekten başka bir işe yaramayacaktır. Asıl yapılması gereken sorun kendisine meydan okumak, "gerilik" "ilerilik" ve benzeri kavramları kullanmaktan vazgeçmektir. Yapılması gereken Batı'nın gelişmişlik düzeyini yakalamak ya da İslam ve modernite arasında bir senteze girişmek değil, bizatihi bu kategorilerin ve kaygıların kendisini sorunsallaştırmaktır. İslami uyanış hem İslam coğrafyasında hem Türkiye'de bir ideolojik özgüven kazanma mücadelesi olarak da okunabilir. Özellikle Soğuk Savaş yıllarında politik alanın sağ ve sol ideolojiler arasındaki yarılma ile tarif edilmesi ve İslamcıların kendilerini genellikle sağda konumlandırmaları, kimi zaman sağ partilerin yedeği olarak işlev görmeleri İslami uyanışçılar tarafında sorunsallaştırılmaktadır. Ali Bulaç'ın *Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler*'de ve sonrasında *Bir Aydın Sapması: Türkiye'de Sağcılık ve Solculuk* adlı çalışmasında, ya da İsmet Özel'in *Üç Mesele: Teknik-Medeniyet-Yabancılaşma* ile yapmaya çalıştığı şey budur. Kabaca İslami uyanışçılar İslam'ın bireysel alana hapsedilecek bir din olmadığını, bireysel alana ek olarak toplumsal ve siyasal alanı da kapsayan emirler içeren bütüncü bir inanış olduğunu vurgularlar. Buna ek olarak bir din ve toplumsal/siyasal hayat kılavuzu olarak İslam'ın mükemmelliği, onu kendi kendine yeter bir ideoloji yapar. Yani İslamcılığın sosyalizm, komünizm, liberalizm vb. ideolojilerle eklemlenmelere ya da ittifaklara girişmesi yersiz bir çaba olacaktır.

Batı bilim ve teknolojisine karşı duruş Türkiye'de İslamcı uyanış dönemini önceki İslamcı paradigmalardan ayrıştıran önemli bir husus olmuştur. Doğuşundan itibaren İslamcılık ideolojisinin en önde gelen problemlerinden biri Batı bilim ve

teknolojisi karşısında takınılacak tavır olmuştur. Uzunca yıllar İslamcılar Batı'nın bilim ve teknolojisini almanın bir zaruret olduğu, lakin kültür ithalinden uzak durulması gerektiğinde hemfikirdirler. Lakin İslami uyanış kültür/medeniyet ya da kültür/teknoloji ayrımlarının geçersiz olduğunu, Batı biliminin kaynakları itibariyle tarihsel, kültürel ve felsefi bir arka plana yaslandığını vurgularlar. Buna göre Prometheus'un tanrılara karşı başkaldırışını başlangıç noktası olarak ele alan Batı bilim ve teknolojisi nereye giderse gitsin beraberinde kendi kültürünü, felsefesini de taşıyacaktır. Bilimi "ateş hırsızlığı" olarak algılayan Batı'nın karşısında İslam'ın bilimi Allah'a yakınlaşmanın bir aracı olarak ele alan çerçevesi konur.

İslami uyanış dalgasının 1970'li ve 1980'li yıllarda **kapitalizm ve emperyalizme** karşı giriştiği ideolojik taarruzun düşünsel ve sosyolojik kaynaklarının olduğu söylenebilir. Farklı toplumsal ve felsefi arka planlara yaslanmakla birlikte Seyyid Kutup ve Ali Şeriati gibi İslamcı düşünürlerin İslami anti-kapitalist, anti-emperyalist, sosyal adaletçi ve eşitlikçi bir ideoloji olarak ele almalarının Türkiye'deki İslami uyanış dalgası üzerinde derin etkileri olmuştur. Buna ek olarak toplumsal tabanı itibariyle (endüstrileşme karşısında kendisini güvensiz hisseden küçük müteşebbis, esnaf ve zanaatkârlar) İslamcılığın en azından büyük sermaye ve Batı kapitalizmi eleştirisi kitle mobilizasyonu açısından son derece verimli bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. İslami uyanış kapitalizmi ve emperyalizmi hem tarihsel ve toplumsal kaynakları hem de yol açtığı maddi ve manevi tahribat yüzünden eleştirir.

Batılı liberal demokrasi modeli İslamcı muhalefet tarafından birkaç ayrı noktadan eleştirilmiştir. İlk olarak demokrasi fikri egemenliğin kaynağını dinin dışında araması bakımından sorunludur. Egemenliğin kayıtsız şartsız Allah'ın olduğunu iddia eden İslamcı bakış açısının karşısına halk egemenliğinin konulması eleştirilir. Lakin İslamcılığın demokrasi eleştirisi bu nokta ile sınırlı değildir. Batılı liberal demokrasi uygulamaları aynı zamanda yeterince "demokratik" olmadıkları, daha doğru bir ifade ile iddia edildiği üzere halk egemenliğine dayanmadıkları için eleştirilir. Gerek liberal demokrasinin temel ilkeleri, gerekse modern devletin

egemen güçlerin bir aracı olduğu gerçeği halk iradesinin siyasal karşılık bulamamasına yol açar.

Bütün bu noktalar 1970'ler ve 1980'lere hâkim olan İslamcılığın kuramsal olarak nasıl ele alınması gerektiği sorununu beraberinde getirir. Ben bu tezde dönemin İslamcılığının bir tür Üçüncü Dünyacı Popülizm olarak ele alınabileceğini iddia ettim. Semptomatik bir okuma ile popülizmi siyasal alanı "halk" ve "karşıtı" arasında bölen, statüko karşıtı bir siyasal ideoloji, ya da siyaset mantığı olarak ele aldım. Buradan hareketle 1970'li ve 1980'li yılların İslamcı popülizmi toplumu Müslüman "halk" ile Batıcı, modernleşmeci ve halkına yabancılaşmış "iktidar bloğu" arasında ikiye böler; "Batı" bu bölünmede kötülüğün vücut bulmuş hali olarak algılanır ve "kurtuluş" ancak ve ancak düşmanın ortadan kaldırılması ile mümkün olacaktır.

Türkiye'de İslamcılığın 1990'larda yaşadığı ve benim yeni İslamcılık olarak adlandırdığım dönüşüm, İslamcılığın 1970'li ve 1980'li yıllardaki sistem karşıtı duruşunun aşamalı olarak ortadan kalkması olarak ele alınabilir. Yeni-İslamcılık İslamcılığın yukarıda bahsi geçen dört meydan okuma ya da dört eksen karşısındaki tutumunun değişimine işaret eder. Yeni-İslamcılar ilk olarak İslam'ın toplumsal, siyasal ve ekonomik hayatla ilgili düzenlemeler içerdiğini söyleyen kapsayıcı İslam algısının karşısına 'siyasal İslam', 'sivil İslam', ve 'kültürel İslam' gibi ayrımları koyarlar. Bir başka deyişle, önceki İslamcı nesiller İslamcı siyasal bir ideoloji olarak ele alıp modern Jakoben imgelemi yeniden üretmekten bir adım öteye geçememiştir. Nasıl ki modernleşmeci Jakoben hareketler toplumu tepeden aşağıya modernleştirilmesi ve medenileştirilmesi gerektiğini iddia ettilerse eski kuşak siyasal İslamcılar da toplum ve devletin tepeden inmeci bir şekilde İslamileştirilmesini arzulamışlardır. Yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller ise siyasal İslamcılığın karşısına 'kültürel' ya da 'sivil' İslam'ı koyarlar. Buna göre siyasal İslam'ın hedefi devleti ele geçirip toplumu topyekûn İslamcılaştırmak iken kültürel İslam toplumu hedef alır; siyasal İslam için hâkimiyet kilit kavramken kültürel İslam için katılım hayati önemdedir. Bu çerçeveyi kurarken yeni-İslamcılar Batılı ideolojik akımlarla ittifaklar ya da eklemlenmeler oluşturmaktan çekinmezler.

İleriki yıllarda olgunlaşacak ve AKP'nin resmi ideolojik çerçevesini oluşturacak olan 'muhafazakâr demokrasi' buna bir örnek olarak gösterilebilir.

İslami uyanışın aksine yeni-İslamcılık için Batı bilim ve teknolojisi bir sorun olmaktan çıkmıştır. Bilim ve teknolojide yaşanacak gelişme özellikle ekonomik gelişme açısından şiddetli bir şekilde vurgulanacaktır. İslami uyanışçılar Batı bilim ve teknolojisinin kapitalizmle olan ilişkisini eleştirel bir çerçevede ele alırken, yeni-İslamcılar için Batı'dan bilim ve teknoloji ithali –özellikle de ileri üretim teknikleri ve bilgi teknolojileri– küresel pazarlara güçlü ve sağlıklı bir şekilde eklemlenebilmek için desteklenmektedir. Kapitalizme ve emperyalizme meydan okuyuş ise, daha ayrıntılı bir şekilde göreceğimiz üzere, İslami kesimlerin ulusal ve küresel düzlemde artan ekonomik etkinliği ile orantılı bir şekilde ortadan kalkmıştır. İslamcılığın anti-kapitalist duruşunun yerini yeni-İslamcılığın kapitalizmi İslamileştirme ve insanileştirme girişimi almıştır. Bu girişim ekonomik ilişkilere İslami bir ahlaki arka plan kazandırma gayreti olarak da ele alınabilir. İslamcı anti-emperyalizm ve Batı karşıtlığının yerini ise küreselleşme ve küreselleşen dünyaya etkin eklemlenme almıştır. Son olarak, İslami uyanışın demokrasi karşıtlığının yerini yeni-İslamcılığın Türkiye'deki yegâne demokratik aktörün İslamcı güçler olduğu iddiası almıştır. Değişimden yana olan dindar kesimle statükocu Kemalist seçkinler arasındaki mücadele yeni-İslamcılığın demokratiklik iddiasının çıkış noktasını oluşturur.

Bu tezde yeni-İslamcı ideolojinin oluşumunda postmodernizm, çok kültürlülük ve küreselleşme öğelerinin oynadığı önemli rolleri ayrıntılı bir şekilde sergilemeye çalıştım. İlk olarak postmodernizm kuramları modernizmin sınırlarını ve eksikliklerini işaret etmesi bakımından yeni-İslamcı entelektüellerin gündeminde önemli bir yer edinmiştir. Postmodernizmin akılcılık ve sekülerizme karşı giriştiği mücadele ve ilerleme fikrini sorgulaması da yeni-İslamcı entelektüellerin ilgisini çekmiştir. Yeni-İslamcılığın modernite eleştirisinin genel hatlarını ortaya koymanın ve yeni-İslamcılık ile postmodern kuramlar arasındaki ittifakın muhtevasını kavramanın birçok açıdan önem taşıdığını iddia ettim. İlk olarak postmodern kuramların yeni-İslamcılara sunduğu epistemolojik ve felsefi argümanlar ve kavramlar yeni-İslamcılara (post)-modern dünyanın sorunları ile

başa çıkmalarını sağlayacak bir çerçeve sağlamıştır. İkinci olarak, postmodern kuramlar İslamcılığın diğer ideolojilerle eklemlenme kapasitesini artırmış; özellikle de yeni-İslamcılığın neoliberal küreselleşme sürecine uyum sürecini kolaylaştırmıştır. Yeni-İslamcılık tarafından önerilen alternatif toplumsal, siyasal ve ekonomik projeler postmodern toplumsal ve siyasal kuramlardan fazlasıyla etkilenmiştir. Örneğin, postmodern kuramların modern ulus devlet olgunsa yönelttiği eleştiriler yeni-İslamcılar tarafından benimsenmiş ve yeni-İslamcılığın devlet eleştirisi deregülasyon, devleti küçültme ve özelleştirme gibi neoliberal temalarla iç içe geçmiştir.

Postmodern toplumsal kuramın siyasal açılımlarından biri olarak ele alınabilecek çokkültürlülük ise yeni-İslamcı siyasal projenin önemli dayanak noktalarından birini oluşturmuştur. Çokkültürlü yurttaşlık fikrinin modern evrensel yurttaşlığa karşı meydan okuması çokkültürlülük ile cemaatçilik arasında olası ittifakların doğmasına yol açtı. Yeni-İslamcılar cemaatlerin asıl aktör olarak görüldüğü çok hukuklu toplum projelerini bu meydan okuma eşliğinde geliştirmişlerdir.

Neoliberalizm ise pazar güçlerinin özgürleştirici doğasına yaptığı vurgu ve devletin ekonomik alandan elini eteğini çekmesi gerektiği yönündeki ısrarı ile yeni-İslamcı siyasal söylemin ve ekonomik projenin düşünsel referans noktalarından biri olmuştur. Özellikle İslami sermaye olarak adlandırılan kesimin 1980 sonrası iktisadi liberalleşmeden ve devlet-sermaye ilişkisinin aldığı yeni biçimden fazlasıyla yararlandığı düşünüldüğünde neoliberalizmle yeni-İslamcılığın birlikteliği daha da anlaşır bir hal alır. Neoliberalizmin siyasal farklılıkları kültürel farklılıklara indirgeyen, depolitizasyon ve ideoloji düşmanlığından güç alan siyasal projesi ile yeni-İslamcılığın siyasal projesi arasındaki paralellikler de kayda değerdir. Bu açıdan bakıldığına yeni-İslamcılık, neoliberalizm, postmodernizm ve çokkültürlülük arasında sıkı ve karmaşık bir ilişkinin varlığından bahsetmek mümkündür.

Yeni-İslamcılık bir grup İslamcı entelektüelin düşünsel fantezisi olarak değerlendirilemez. Aksine, İslamcıların iktidara doğru yürüyüşlerine verilen bir tepki olarak ele alınmalıdır. Burada kastım kavramın dar anlamıyla siyasi iktidar

değil, toplumsal, kültürel ve ekonomik yaşamı kapsayan bir iktidara yerleşme durumudur. 1980 sonrası Türkiye'sinde İslam ve İslami kesimlerin siyasal, ekonomik, toplumsal ve kültürel alanlarda etkinliklerinin arttığını ve daha bir görünür olduklarını görmekteyiz. Anadolu sermayesi ve İslami bir orta sınıf gibi olgular etrafında dönen tartışmalar İslami kesimlerin ekonomik ve sembolik sermayelerinde ciddi bir artış olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Örneğin İslamcı siyasal partilerin 1990'lı yıllardan başlayarak yerel ve genel seçimlerde elde ettikleri başarı İslamcıların mevcut ekonomik ve siyasal ağlara dâhil etmiş ve iktidarın olanaklarına bağımlı İslamcı bir siyasal zümrenin ortaya çıkmasına yol açmıştır. Bu dönüşüm göz önüne alındığında geçmiş dönemlerin çatışmacı ve radikal düşünsel çerçevesi 'dindar winner'lara (ya da yukarı hareketlilik beklentisinde olanlara) geçerli bir meşruiyet zemini veya etkili bir ideolojik motivasyon sağlamaktan uzaktır. Bu minvalde yeni-İslamcılığı İslami kesimlerin maddi ve sembolik alanlarda kaydettiği gelişime bir cevabı olarak ele alabiliriz.

Ben bu çalışmada Türkiye'de yeni-İslamcılığın ortaya çıkışını aynı zanda İslamcı kesimlerin 1990'ları karakterize eden iki bunalıma verdikleri tepki olarak ele aldım. Bunlardan ilki Türkiye'nin 1990'lı yıllarda yaşadığı hegemonya bunalımıdır. Diğeri ise yine aynı dönem içerisinde İslamcı siyasetin içine düştüğü bunalım olarak ele alınabilir. 1990'lı yıllar, 1980 sonrasında Yeni Sağ'ın ANAP öncülüğündeki hegemonya oluşturma girişiminin sınırlarının görülmeye başlandığı bir dönem olmuştur. Ekonomik, siyasal ve kültürel alanda yaşanan bir dizi tıkanma bu hegemonya bunalımının kurucu öğeleridir. Bu dönemde İslamcı siyaset de ciddi bir tıkanıklık içerisindedir. Yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller siyasal İslam'ın sekter ve radikal çerçevesini hedef almışlar ve daha kitlesel bir hareketin oluşmasının olanaklarını tartışmaya başlamışladır. *Kitap Dergisi, Köprü, Yeni Zemin, Bilgi ve Hikmet, İktisat ve İş Dünyası* ve *Tezkire* etrafında toplanan yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller değişen dünyanın yeni sorunsallarına ve paradigmalarına uygun yeni bir İslamcı çerçevenin kurulabilmesi için uğraş verdiler. Karşılarına hem radikal İslamcıları hem de İslamcılık karşıtı çevreleri alan yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller için 'değişim' hayati önemi haiz bir kavram oldu. İşte tam da bu yüzden yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller bir önceki dönemin 'Müslüman halk''iktidar bloğu' karşıtlığını,

zamanın ruhuna uygun bir şekilde 'değişimden yana olan güçler' ile 'statükocu güçler' arasındaki çatışma olarak yeniden formüle etti.

Yeni-İslamcılığın siyasal ve iktisadi projelerini ayrı ayrı ele aldım. Lakin bu ayrıma özsel olmaktan çok tümüyle analitik gerekçelerle başvurdum. Bir başka deyişle, yeni-İslamcılığın siyasal ve iktisadi projeleri ve bu projelerin temel saikleri birbirinden ayrılmaz bir şekilde iç içe geçmiştir. Örneğin yeni-İslamcılığın siyasal projesinin çerçevesini çizen modern devlet eleştirisi aynı zamanda yeni-İslamcı iktisadi projenin de merkezinde yer almaktadır. Bu iç içe geçmişliği kavramak özellikle yeni İslamcı siyasi projenin gerilimlerini ve çelişkilerini kavrayabilmek açısından çok önemlidir.

Bahsettiğim üzere yeni-İslamcı siyasal proje modern devlet eleştirisini söyleminin merkezine oturtmuştur. Yeni-İslamcı entelektüellere göre modern devlet kültürel çoğulluğu ya da çokkültürlülüğü tanımayan tek tipleştirici totaliter bir güçtür. Modern devlet çoğunlukla etnik bir çoğunluğun azınlık üzerinde tahakkümü ve tiranlığı olarak ele alınabilecek anti-demokratik bir aktördür. Yine yeni-İslamcılara göre modern devlet, gelişme fikrine ve doğa bilimlerinin kesinliğine dayanarak özdeş vatandaşlar yaratma peşinde olan müdahaleci bir güçtür. Son olarak modern devlet, ulus tabanlı olması dolayısıyla diğer uluslara düşmanlık üzerinden beslenen saldırgan bir kurumdur. Görülüyor ki, yeni-İslamcılık postmodern kuramların da etkisiyle kapsamlı bir devlet eleştirisi geliştirmiştir. Bu eleştiri çerçevesinde modern devletin küçültülmesi ya da aşılması yeni-İslamcı siyasal projenin en önde gelen amacı olarak göze çarpmaktadır.

Yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller Türkiye'deki Cumhuriyet rejimini insanların hayatlarının her alanına müdahale eden totaliter bir rejim kurmakla itham ederler. Bun göre Türkiye devletinin modern ve ulusal niteliği alternatif dünya görüşlerinin yaşamasına izin vermemiştir. Bu sorun söz konusu olan dini kimlik olduğunda iyice derinleşmiştir. Yeni-İslamcılık modern devletin evrenselci, kapsayıcı ve buyurgan tavrına karşılık, *Medine Vesikası* gibi cemaatçi çokkültürcülük kuramlarından beslenen projeler öne sürmüşlerdir. Ulus sonrası ve çok-hukuklu yeni-İslamcı alternatif devletin yerine muhtelif cemaatler arasında koordinasyon

görevi üstlenecek bir üst kurulu yerleştirmeye çalışır. Modern devlet algısında devlete ait olduğu varsayılan yasa yapma ve uygulama ve sosyal adaleti sağlama gibi görevler yeni-İslamcı tahayyülde dini cemaatlere ya da sivil toplumun kendisine bırakılacaktır. Görüldüğü üzere, yeni-İslamcı devlet sonrası tahayyül, tüm dünyada özellikle 1980'lerin sonunda hegemonik bir konum elde eden sivil toplum/devlet ikiliğini kendine referans olarak almaktadır. Bu ikili karşıtlık içerisinde sivil alan demokrasi ve demokratik güçler ile özdeşleştirilirken, siyasal alan ya da devlet sivil alandan bağımsız bir baskı ve tahakküm unsuru olarak ele alınmaktadır. Çokkültürlü tahayyül aynı zamanda önemli siyasal meseleleri kültürel meseleler olarak kodlayarak kayda değer bir depolitizasyonu da beraberinde getirmektedir. Modern vatandaşlık kavramının yerini cemaat üyeliğinin aldığı bu yeni toplumsa tahayyülde özcü (*essentialist*) cemaat algısı gerek cemaat içi özgürlük sorunun rafa kalkmasına gerekse siyasal alanın daralmasına kapı aralamıştır.   Neoliberal siyaset algısının önde gelen iki özelliğinin (devlet eleştirisi ve siyasetten duyulan hoşnutsuzluk) yeni-İslamcı siyaset tarafından benimsenmiş olması özellikle kayda değerdir.

Muhalif ve çatışmacı İslamcılığın liberal demokrasi fikrine ve pratiğine karşı taviz vermez tutumunu not etmiştik. Yeni-İslamcılık açısından ise durum tam anlamıyla tersine dönmüş gibidir. İslam ile demokrasinin yan yana gelip gelemeyeceğini sorgulayan tavrın karşısına yeni-İslamcılar İslam'ın kişi hak ve özgürlüklerinin koruyan, katılımcı bir demokratik sistemden yana olduğunu iddia etmişlerdir. Hatta yeni-İslamcılara göre İslam demokrasinin sadece hukuksal düzlemde ya da kâğıt üzerinde değil tam anlamıyla uygulanabileceği yegâne sistem olarak göz çarpar. Yani demokrasinin bir küfür rejimi olduğu iddiası yerini gerçek demokrasinin İslam'da ve İslam'la var olabileceği iddiasına bırakmıştır. İslam'ın demokratikliği teması İslam'ın Hıristiyanlığın aksine teokratik bir düzen öngörmediği; diktatörlüğe izin ve cevaz vermediği ve temel insan hak ve özgürlüklerini koruduğu iddialarıyla desteklenir. Yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller Türkiye'de askeri ve sivil bürokrasinin varlığında ete kemiğe bürünen müdahaleci devletin küçültülmesine yönelik köklü bir demokratik reformun gerekli olduğunun altını çizerler. Bu demokratikleşme reformunun ilk ve önemli adımlarından biri devletin din üzerindeki tahakkümünün ortadan kaldırılması olacaktır. Dinin

Diyanet işleri Başkanlığı (DİB) gibi devasa bir devlet aygıtı tarafından tahakküm altına alındığını iddia eden yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller ya DİB'nin tümüyle ortadan kaldırılıp dini işlerin sivil topluma bırakılmasını ya da DİB'nin özerk bir kurum haline getirilmesini talep etmişlerdir. Böylelikle laiklik ilkesi tam anlamıyla hayata geçecek, din ile devlet işleri gerçekten birbirinden ayrılacaktır. Din adamları da devlet memuru olmaktan kurtulacaklardır.

Yeni bir anayasa önerisi yeni-İslamcı entelektüellerin demokratikleşme programının önemli maddelerinden biri olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır. Buna göre Türkiye'deki anayasaların temel problemi halk tarafından yapılmamalarıdır. Türkiye'de askeri darbelerin ardından kaleme alınan anayasalar sadece askeri ve sivil bürokrasinin çıkarlarını korumaya yönelik metinlerdir. Yeni anayasanın temel ilkeleri ise şu şekilde sıralanmıştır: devletin din üzerindeki tahakküme son verilmesi ve laiklik ilkesinin tam anlamıyla hayata geçirilmesi; ekonomi, eğitim, sağlık, kültür ve benzeri alanlarda devlet tekelinin ortadan kaldırılması; anayasada değişmez maddelerin olmaması; ordunun rolünün sivil-demokratik ilkeler uyarınca yeniden belirlenmesi; devletin merkeziyetçi-bürokratik yapısının gözden geçirilmesi; düşünce özgürlüğünün desteklenmesi; Cumhurbaşkanı'nın halk tarafından seçilmesi; başkanlık sistemine geçiş için gerekli hazırlıkların yapılması; tüm idari tasarrfuaran yagı denetimine açık olması; parlamentonun güçlendirilmesi; Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin yeniden yapılandırılması ve milletvekillerinin yeminlerini Kuran'a el basarak etmeleri.

Yeni-İslamcıların ekonomik projesine gelince, yeni-İslamcılığı İslami siyasetin aşamalı olarak neoliberal küreselleşmenin iktisadi, siyasal ve kültürel ilkelerini benimsemeleri olarak ele almak mümkündür. Yani, İslam'ın liberalleşmesi derken aklımıza ilk gelmesi gereken şey iktisadi liberalizmdir. İslami girişimci, devletle pek de iyi olmayan ilişkilerinden ötürü iktisadi devletçilikten son derece rahatsızdır. Hatta bu rahatsızlığın köklerinin Milli Görüş hareketinin toplumsal tabanını oluşturan Anadolulu küçük girişimci, küçük burjuva ve zanaatkârların mağduriyet söylemlerine dayandırmak mümkündür. 24 Ocak kararlarının arından iktisadi yama damga vuran İhracat Yönelimli sanayileşme politikaları ve dışa açılım süreci uzun yıllar İthal İkameci Sanayileşme modelinden gerektiği gibi

faydalanamayan İslami alt-ekonomiler için kazançlı bir ortam yaratmıştır. Dönemin hâkim ekonomik paradigmalarının da etkisiyle İslami kesim ekonomide devletin rolünü küçültmek ve pazarı genişletmek yönünde bir vurgu edinmişledir. Devletin ekonomiden elini çekmesi gerektiği fikri devletin genel olarak küçültülmesi ve demokratikleştirilmesi gerektiği iddiası ile birbirlerine içsel bir şekilde bağlıdır. Postmodernizm ve post-Fordizm kuramları ise tam da bu noktada yeni-İslamcıların neoliberal kapitalizmde 'yaratıcı bir kaos' ve 'dinamizm' görmelerini sağlamıştır.

Yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller, özellikle de İslami işadamı dernekleri etrafındaki yeni-İslamcı ekonomistler ilk olarak İslam'ın sermaye birikime ve de zenginliğe karşı olduğu yargısını aşmaya çalıştılar. Onlara göre İslam sermaye birikime değil, gayrimeşru ve İslami kurallara uygun olmayan sermaye birikimine karşıydı. "Adam zengin olmaz," bırakın doğru olmayı, İslam'a karşı girişilen bir komplonun, Müslümanları geri kalmışlığa ve fakirliğe mahkûm etmenin aracıydı. Bu noktanda hareketle "bir lokma bir hırka" deyişiyle temsil edilen mistik tavır yerini ekonomik ve maddi faaliyetlere karşı daha agresif ve maddeci bir tavra bıraktı. Yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller, Peygamberi tüccar olan bir dinde ekonomik aktivitenin yasaklanamayacağını, aksine Müslümanları salahiyeti için gerekli olduğunu vurgulamışlardır. Lakin Müslüman girişimcinin, sermaye birikimini hayatının yegane amacı olarak gören *homo economicus*'u, ekonomik faaliyeti İslami ahlak ile harmanlayan *homo İslamicus*'a dönüştüreceği iddiasını gündeme getirmiştir. Lakin gerek yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller gerekse MÜSİAD gibi İslami dernekler kapitalizme alternatif bir İslami alt ekonomi geliştirememiş, sermaye bikrimi ve kapitalizm için yeni bir meşruluk zemini sunmaktan öteye geçememişlerdir.

İslami kesimin ekonomik etkinliklere ve kapitalizme artan bütünleşmesini meşrulaştırırken yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller kapitalizm öncesi ve kapitalizm karşıtı bir piyasa fantezisine başvurmuşlardır. Buna göre kapitalizm, piyasanın aksine, piyasaya ve ekonomik rekabete karşı olan tekelci bir ekonomik sistemdir. Piyasa ise içerisinde yer alan tüm aktörlerin kendilerini ifade olanağı bulduğu bir alan

olarak tahayyül edilmiştir. Yeni-İslamcılara göre Müslüman girişimciler ve İslami alt ekonomi piyasanın bir parçasıdır, kapitalizmin değil.

Yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller için devletin küçültülmesi salt siyasi bir mesele değildir. Devletin küçülmesi, dönemin hâkim ekonomik paradigmalarına paralel bir biçimde yeni-İslamcı ekonomik projenin önemli sacayaklarındandır. Piyasaların ve piyasalarla siyasi ve kişisel özgürlük arasındaki içsel ilişkinin erdemlerini vurgulayan neoliberal çerçeveyi takip eden yeni-İslamcılar Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüslerinin özelleştirilmesi gerektiğini vurgular.

Bu çalışmada tekrar tekrar vurguladığım gibi modern devletin ve müdahaleci devlet geleneğinin eleştirisi yeni-İslamcı söylemin merkezi temalarıdır. Devletin ekonomik gücünün asgariye indirilmesi aynı zamanda onun siyasal ve ideolojik gücünü azaltmak için elzemdir. Özelleştirme aynı zamanda Türkiye'nin küresel pazarlarla bütünleşmesi için de gerekli görülmüştür. Yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller özelleştirme sayesinde Türkiye'ye sermaye akışı sağlanacağını, en son üretim teknolojilerinin ülkeye gireceğini ve böylelikle Türkiye'nin ekonomik gücünün artacağını öngörmektedirler.

Esnek üretim teknolojilerinin İslami kesimlerin ekonomik başarısında oynadığı rol birçok araştırmacı tarafından vurgulanmıştır. Yeni-İslamcı ekonomistler ve girişimciler de esnek üretim ilişkilerini gelenekselci girişimci kesim için faydalı olduğu gerekçesiyle desteklemektedirler. Ayrıca esnek üretim ilişkileri toplumsal adalet ve güvenliği sağladığı gerekçesi ile de savunulmaktadır. Kurumsal ve formel sosyal adalet mekanizmalarının yerine cemaat ağları ve İslami sivil toplum örgütleri toplumsal adaletin sağlanmasında temel aktörler olarak görülmüştür. Bir başka deyişle İslamcı popülizmin anti-kapitalist söyleminin en önemli öğelerinden biri olan toplumsal adalet piyasa mekanizması lehine feda edilmiştir.

Yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller emek piyasalarında esnekliği gerektiren post-Fordist üretim rejimini açık bir şekilde sahiplenirler. Yeni-İslamcı piyasa vurgusu her türlü formel işçi örgütlenmesinin ve grev hakkının karşısındadır. İslami bir piyasa düzeninde emek ve sermaye arasındaki paternalistik ilişkiler bu tür örgütlenmeleri

ve hakları gereksiz kılacaktır. Bu açıdan bakıldığında İslamcı toplumsal tahayyül toplumsal kesimleri birbirleri ile dayanışma içerisinde olan ve birbirini tamamlayan bir bütünün parçaları olarak gören dayanışmacı-korporatist bir çerçeve arz etmektedir. İşte tam da bu yüzden yeni-İslamcı siyasi program sınıf temelli politikaları arkaik ve toplumsal düzeni bozan zararlı eylemler olarak görür.

Türkiye'de devletin ekonomik ve siyasal olarak küçültülmesi, sivil toplumu geliştirmeye yönelik çağrılar ve demokrasi söylemi zorunlu olarak İslamcılığın demokratikleşmesi anlamına gelmemektedir. Bir başka deyişle yeni-İslamcıların demokratik toplum çağrıları esasen İslami kesimlerin fırsat alanlarını genişletmesine yöneliktir ve katılımcı bir boyut içermemektedir. Siyasal katılım yollarını genişletmeye ve çoğaltmaya yönelik herhangi bir çabanın varlığından söz etmek mümkün değildir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında neoliberalizmin siyaset ve demokrasiden duyduğu hoşnutsuzluğu paylaşırlar. Yeni-İslamcılar siyasal sorunları ve ayrımları kültürel meselelere indirgemek suretiyle siyasetsizleştirmenin yanında yer alırlar. Medine Vesikası gibi siyasal projeler bu depolitizasyon sürecinin ifadeleridir. İkinci sorunlu nokta ise kültürel grupların ve cemaatlerin homojen ve özsel birliktelikler olarak kurgulanması ile ilgilidir. Yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller cemaatler için özgürlük isterlerken, bu grupların özsel ve doğal olarak kurgulanmaları cemaat içinde özgürlük alanının daralmasına yol açmaktadır. İşte tam da bu yüzden günümüzde kadın-erkek eşitliği, pozitif ayrımcılık veya eşcinsellik gibi konular kendini demokrat olarak adlandıran yeni-İslamcı entelektüeller tarafından 'hastalık', 'pataloji', 'feminist otokrasi tehdidi' ve toplumsa ahenge saldırı terimleri ile ele alınmaktadır.

Yukarıda bahsi geçen noktalar İslamcı söylemde anti-sistemik ve çatışmacı momentin aşamalı olarak ortadan kalktığını göstermektedir. Her ne kadar yeni-İslamcılık İslamcı siyasal ideolojinin ortadan kalkması anlamına gelmese de daha az İslamcılığa ve daha fazla muhafazakârlığa ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Yeni-İslamcılar daha fazla iktidar elde ettikçe kurulu düzene daha fazla yerleşmiş ve düzenle daha fazla bütünleşmiştir. Mevcut ekonomik, siyasal, kültürel ve bürokratik ağlara daldıkça daha muhafazakâr ve daha sıradan hale gelmiştir. Bu sıradanlık yeni-İslamcı entelektüelleri ve siyasetçileri siyasal yelpazenin

merkezine doğru itmiştir. Bu noktayı akılda tutarak yeni-İslamcı söylemin demokrasi ve otoriteryanizm arasında salınan konumunu daha iyi anlamamıza yardımcı olacaktır. Elbette ki yeni-İslamcılığın doğuşu beraberinde farklı İslamcı tepkileri de getirdi. Özellikle yeni-İslamcıların kurulu düzene entegrasyonu ve konformizmi radikal İslamcı çevrelerce hedef alındı. Fakat son iki on yıl, özellikle de 2000'ler yeni-İslamcılığın hem İslamcı siyaset içerisinde hem de ülkede hegemonik bir pozisyon elde ettiğine işaret etmektedir. Elbette ki bu yeni-İslamcılığın yegâne İslamcı pozisyon olduğu ve olacağı anlamına gelmez. İslamcılığın hem Türkiye'de hem de diğer coğrafyalardaki geleceği hem İslamcılık içerisinde hem de ilgili coğrafyalardaki hegemonya mücadelelerinin ışığında şekillenecektir.

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Education

2004-2011	Ph. D. Program, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Middle East Technical University
2006-2007	Fulbright Scholar, the New School for Social Research, Department of Political Science, New York
2001-2004	Graduate Program, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Middle East Technical University
1996-2001	Undergraduate Program, Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University

Work and Research Experience

2001-2010	Research Assistant, Middle East Technical University Department of Political Science and Public Administration
2001-	Consecutive (English to Turkish-Turkish to English) translation in various projects
2006	Researcher, "The Monitoring of Social Impact in Biological Diversity Projects of GEF-SGP and Determination of Working Fields with Vulnerable Groups of SGP" (UNDP/GEF-SGP)
2005-2006	Researcher, "Cluster Analysis for Improving Co-operation between the NGOs and the Public Sector in Turkey" (EU Project)

2003-2005	"The Problems of Center Right Politics in Turkey", METU BAP Project (Supervised by Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ayata)
2005-2006	"Justice and Development Party within the Framework of 2002 General Elections", METU BAP Project (Supervised by Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ayata)
2003	Election (2003 General Elections) Observation Activity in Northern Cyprus with METU Election Study Group

Courses Taught

Introduction to Political Science (teaching assistant)

Turkish Politics and Political Structure (teaching assistant)

Administration of Turkish Foreign Policy (teaching assistant)

Workshop on Discourse Theory and Political Analysis (instructor - a 7 weeks workshop focusing on the exchange between discourse theoretical approach, studies on ideology/philosophy of language and political theory)

Publications and Theses

Democracy and Opposition in Turkey: Locating the Freedom Party, Master's Thesis, Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Feride Acar, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Middle East Technical University, 2004

"Hürriyet Partisi," (Freedom Party) (2005) in (ed.) Tanıl Bora, *Çağdaş Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Liberalizm*, (Political Thought in Contemporary Turkey, Volume 7: Liberalism) İletişim: İstanbul.

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"Medya, İktidar, İdeoloji: Bir Stuart Hall Değerlendirmesi," (Media, Power, Ideology: On Stuart Hall) *Akdeniz Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2010 Haziran

"Zigana Dağındaki Portakal Ağacı: Recep Peker, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi," (The Orange Tree on the Mountain Zigana: Recep Peker, Kemalism and Democracy, forthcoming) *Akdeniz Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi*, Fall 2010

Making of New Islamism in Turkey: Transformation of the Islamist Discourse from Opposition to Compliance, PhD Thesis, Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ayata, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Middle East Technical University, 2011

Book Reviews and Opinion Pieces

"Democracy in Modern Iran", Political Studies Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2011

"Egypt After Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World", Political Studies Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, May 2011

"Bakunin'den Lacan'a Uzun İnce Bir Yol", (Saul Newman's From Bakunin to Lacan) Birgün Kitap, April 17, 2010

"Sınıfın Aşındıran Derin Yaraları", (Richard Sennett's Hidden Injuries of Class and Corrosion of Character), Birgün Kitap, May 1, 2010.

"Ortada Bir Kavram: Popüler Kültür", (a general critique of literature on popular culture) Birgün Kitap, May 15, 2010.

"Kitap Raflarında Türkiye'de İslamcılık Cereyanı", (a general evaluation of books on Islam in Turkey), Birgün Kitap, September 25, 2010.

"Recep Bey'in Inkılap Dersleri", (a general evaluation of Kemalist political ideology), Birgün Kitap, October 9, 2010.

Presentations and Papers

"Richard Sennett`a Kulak Vermek: Kamusal Alan, Sınıf, Şiddet ve Kent Mekani," (Listening to Richard Sennett: Public Sphere, Class, Violence and Urban Space) paper presented in 9. Ulusal Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi (9th National Social Sciences Congress), December 7-9, 2005, METU, Ankara

"Türkiye'de Demokrasi ve Muhalefet: Hürriyet Partisi'ni Anlamak," (Democracy and Opposition in Turkey: Understanding the Freedom Party) paper presented at Ankara University, May 2005

"An Assessment of the Election Observation Activities: the Example of the TRNC," paper presented at The Third METU Conference on International Relations: Europe in a Changing World, together with METU Election Study Group, Turkey, May 24-26, 2004, METU, Ankara

"Türk Demokrasisini Anlamak: İdris Küçükömer ve Türkiye'de Sivil Toplumun Kökenleri", (Understanding Turkish Democracy: İdris Küçükömer and the Roots of Civil Society in Turkey), Paper Presented at 8th Social Sciences Congress, 2003 Ankara

"Zigana Dağındaki Portakal Ağacı: Recep Peker, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi," (The Orange Tree on the Mountain Zigana: Recep Peker, Kemalism and Democracy) paper presented at Young Political Scientist Congress held in İstanbul Bilgi University, October 2003, Istanbul

Awards and Scholarships

The Thesis of the Year Award, granted by Middle East Technical University Mustafa Parlar Foundation, 2005
Fulbright Scholarship, the New School for Social Research, Department of Political Science, New York (2006-2007)

Fields of Study

Turkish Politics
Islam and Politics
Ideology and discourse analysis