THE PROBLEM OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN KANT'S *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON*

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ABSTRACT

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CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

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The self-knowledge has been a central problem throughout the history of philosophy, but it has remained, as Kant also declares, as the "most difficult" of all tasks of reason. In this study, I scrutinize the grounds of this difficulty and search for the answers to the question "what can we comprehend about the notion of self from a Kantian standpoint?" In this respect, this study is a reading of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* with the focus of the problem of self-knowledge. We can see that this concept has a very substantial role in Kantian philosophy but it is not easy to derive a complete theory therefrom. He asserts three different conceptions of the self: the phenomenal self (the self as appears to oneself), the transcendental subject (the self as a transcendental condition of knowledge), and the noumenal self (the self as the free agent of one's actions). The problem is that there is no unity among these conceptions, and thus they do not have a common ground to indicate the existence of *the self* as a distinct unique entity. This study examines this problem along with the fundamental arguments of transcendental philosophy.

Keywords: Kant, self-knowledge, subject, transcendental, apperception.

ÖZ

KANT'IN *SAF AKLIN ELEŞTİRİSİ*'NDE
BEN-BİLGİSİ PROBLEMİ

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Ben-bilgisi felsefe tarihi boyunca merkezi bir sorun olmuştur ancak bu sorun, Kant'ın da ifade ettiği gibi, aklın ödevleri arasından "en zoru" olarak kalmıştır. Ben de bu çalışmada, bu zorluğun temellerini inceledim ve "Kantçı bir çerçeveden ben nosyonu hakkında ne öğrenebiliriz?" sorusuna yanıt aradım. Bu bağlamda bu çalışma, Kant'ın *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nin, ben-bilgisi sorununu merkeze alan bir okunmasıdır. Bu kavramın Kantçı felsefede son derece yüklü bir role sahip olduğunu görebiliriz fakat Kant'ta eksiksiz bir benlik kuramı bulamayız. Kant üç ayrı benlik anlayışı öne sürer: fenomenal benlik (kendine göründüğü haliyle ben), aşkınsal özne (bilginin bir aşkınsal koşulu olarak ben), ve numenal benlik (davranışlarının özgür faili olarak ben). Sorun, bu kavrayışların arasında bir birlik olmamasıdır ve dolayısıyla bu benlikler apayrı ve yegâne bir şey olarak bir *ben*'in varlığına işaret edebilecek ortak bir zemine sahip değildirler. Bu çalışma da, aşkınsal felsefenin temel argümanlarıyla birlikte, bu sorunu incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kant, ben-bilgisi, özne, aşkınsal, tamalgı

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1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to scrutinize Kant's masterpiece *Critique of Pure Reason*[1] on the topic of self-knowledge. In this respect, the initial question of this scrutiny is "what is *self* in transcendental idealism?" However, this is a very intricate matter. Through any study concerning the main issues in *Critique*, it can be noticed that the self has a very weighty role in Kantian metaphysics. Thence, one can think that there should be a lucid answer to the above question, and that if there is not such an answer, this philosophy is incomplete. But before getting such conclusions about a system of philosophy like Kant's, which is so constituted that it is difficult to understand any assumption in it without grasping it as a whole, the matter is to be analyzed thoroughly, and it is to be clarified why the philosopher put it in such and such a way. Indeed, there is not any direct answer to the question of whatness of the self since, first of all, this query arises from ontological concerns and the questions of this domain are to be faced with some boundaries in Kantian philosophy. For, what is searched for in ontology is in most cases the essence of a thing apart from its accidental properties, and free from its changes in time.[2] In other words, the questions arisen from this area are, for example, "what is a thing by

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[1] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 1781-1787), translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan, 1963. The indications of quotations and references are placed in the body of the text only for this work. As usual, they are displayed by page numbers of the original book with the letters of A and B for first and second editions, respectively.

[2] There can be some objections to this terminology from, for example, Heideggerian ontology which does not acknowledge an essence, *i.e.* a thing frozen in time, and takes rather the temporality of things as primary. But this thesis is a study of the history of philosophy in which, including Kantian perspective, the ontological investigations are commonly in accord with the above description.

itself, in itself, because of itself?" or "what makes a thing that thing?"…etc. and these are the questions Kant forbids to theoretical reason, along with other interests of ontology until his time, such as, the existence of God, the immortality of soul and the infinity of cosmos. In *Critique*, his very first statement is that human reason has a propensity to the above questions which "it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer." (Avii)

We can ask "to what extent can we have knowledge about a thing from a Kantian angle?" and the answer is that, in a nutshell, we can have knowledge about something not in the way as it is in itself (*Ding an sich*), but as it appears to us. In this respect, Kant thinks that we should leave the questions whose targets are things as they are in themselves aside *in order to make room for knowledge*. He states that "the proud name of an Ontology" must "give place to the modest title of a mere Analytic of pure understanding" (A247/B303) since

> the most the understanding can achieve *a priori* is to anticipate the form of a possible experience in general. And since that which is not appearance cannot be an object of experience, the understanding can never transcend those limits of sensibility within which alone objects can be given to us. Its principles are merely *rules for the exposition of appearances* (My emphasis) (A246-247/B303).

Kant's interests in *Critique of Pure Reason* revolve around these *rules for exposition of appearances*, that is, the conditions of experience in general. Furthermore, these conditions, according to him, lie in the structure of the human mind. Although this standpoint does not ask the world in the way *as it is*, it can be said that there is an ontological claim regarding the totality of the objects of experience, which is entitled 'nature,' arisen from the fundamental principle of transcendental philosophy, according to which the laws of nature are given by the understanding. To put it another way, it is possible to think that this viewpoint does have an underlying ontological assumption that the structure of the nature is set by the human mind (*Gemüt*). What Kant exercises in *Critique* is how this composition works, and this is a query of another domain of philosophy named 'epistemology.'

It is a matter of interpretation to argue whether this work of Kant is based on an ontological claim, or it introduces merely an epistemological system.[3] The focus of this thesis is not the name of the area in which the *Critique* serves. The question posed through this study is "what can we comprehend about the existence of self from a Kantian perspective?" This is a search, from the angle of one of the most influential philosophers, for any ground, if there is one, of what it means to be a human. In the history of philosophy, there have always been such enterprises to investigate the closest thing to us: the existence of ourselves, though it may be the hardest investigation of philosophy because of the limitations of the mind, as Kant claims. In Aristotle's expression, "[p]erhaps … the cause of the present difficulty is not in the facts but in us. For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all."[4]

Now, why such an inquiry? Or even, why is it a problem? Indeed, it is not a matter of life and death; we can and do live without such investigations. Einstein says "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them."[5] Indeed, how we think affects how we live, how we experience the world we live in. But, can it be possible to change the kind of thinking? It is hard to say. And yet, it is possible to participate to such a venture to explore, and change maybe, the grounds of the way of our thinking, though there would not be much to gain at once. In our era, the question "who am I?" has been a trendy theme in songs, movies,

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[3] Heidegger, for example, thinks, in accord with his approach about ontology, that what Kant makes in the *Critique* is exactly an ontology. (See, Martin Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, translated by Reginald Lilly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991, and *Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics*, translated by Richard Taft, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. Concerning Heidegger's interpretation on Kant, see also Paul Gorner, "Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant in Husserl and Heidegger" in *A Companion to Kant*, edited by Graham Bird, Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2006, p.500-512, esp. p.507) As a different interpretation, Allison states that Kant's transcendental idealism is just a result of the assumption that the human mind has some conditions which are in Allison's terminology *epistemic conditions* as opposed to the *ontological* ones which are the conditions of the things as they are in themselves. (Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983, pp.10-13)

[4] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book II, Part I (993b/5-15), translated by W. D. Ross, from http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/metaphysics/, 2007, (Last updated on 25/08/2010).

[5] From, http://rescomp.stanford.edu/~cheshire/EinsteinQuotes.html, Copyright: Kevin Harris, 1995.

narratives. Since the Ancient times, we have been hearing the invitation "know thyself" (in Greek: *gnothi seauton*; in Latin: *nosce te ipsum*), we have ignored it, been disturbed by it or taken it as a way of life. Actually, there are lots of answers to the question "who am I?" related to our identities like our nations, jobs, associations with other people, languages we speak, religions we believe, and these affect our thinking style. The question which thousands of years of the history of philosophy left unsolved is "what am I?" or "what is the ground of my being human?", paraphrasing in accordance with the approach of this thesis, "what is it that I say myself?" I take this question as an ontological investigation and argue that Kant struggled with it in *Critique of Pure Reason,* though he concluded that there is no answer from a theoretical framework. To put it once again, the primary question of this study is therefore "what can we grasp about the *self* from a Kantian framework?"

In the context expressed above, there is a preparative chapter concerning Kant's critique of metaphysics and the historical background of the problem of self-knowledge. The first section of this chapter is designed for an entrance to *Critique of Pure Reason* in order to understand Kant's initial concerns. In other words, I discuss here what problems trigger Kant to establish a critical system in philosophy. In the second section, the core of the problem of self-knowledge is discussed along with the approaches of some philosophers who have influence on Kant regarding this problem. Then, Kant's approach regarding the self is familiarized. The third chapter is intended for a synoptic presentation of *Critique*. My purpose with this chapter is not to give a complete report for this work of Kant's but to deliver a collection of essential concepts and assumptions of transcendental philosophy which will support us to have a handle on the central theme of this thesis. In this respect, this chapter is divided to three sections, which are named after a selection of some divisions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "Transcendental Aesthetic," "Transcendental Analytic" and "Transcendental Dialectic." The contents of these sections are orientated to the main motive of this study for the reason that, as indicated previously, the notion of self has a central role in transcendental

philosophy and in order to comprehend this role, we should have a general idea on this philosophy. And only after the status of the notion of the self is grasped, it will be possible to inspect transcendental philosophy in terms of the problem of self-knowledge. The fourth chapter examines Kant's accounts of the self in different contexts. In the first section, its role in transcendental philosophy, more precisely in Kant's epistemology, as he introduces in the Deduction, is elucidated. This role is in general articulated through the doctrine of "transcendental unity of apperception." In this section, therefore, I generally refer to this notion. The second section concerns, as stated in the Paralogisms, what we cannot infer from the concepts of the self, the soul, the substance, and the 'I.' Kant's purpose with the Paralogisms is to criticize Rational Psychology, which is attributed to Cartesian ontology. In this section, therefore, the arguments of this critique are presented. In the third section of this chapter, I discuss the outcomes of these accounts of the self which have been gathered from the Deduction and Paralogisms. And, at the end of this study, I give a brief report what has been said and set the final words.

2

APPROACHING THE SELF

2.1. Kant's Problem: Metaphysics with Delusions

What is the difference between fanciful stories of a dreamer and metaphysical systems of philosophers? In *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, this question is posed by Kant in a cynical way.[6] He compares the phantasms of a theosophist[7] with the assumptions of traditional metaphysics. If metaphysics is a domain in which the philosophers speak of unexperiencable things like spirits, how can we make a distinction between this so-called philosophical discipline and some delusions of a mystic? Where is the line, if there is one, separating them? Kant complains about this ambiguous point of separation: "The borders of folly and wisdom are marked so indistinctly that one can hardly walk long in the one region without making at times a little digression into the other."[8] The spiritualists take the existence of spirits for granted. However, if metaphysicians take the same path, that is, if they do not regard the fact that there is no indication for such beings in the objective nature, there remains no difference between metaphysical systems and dreamlike stories.

Kant declares his position against spiritual concepts: "And now I lay aside this whole matter of spirits, a remote part of metaphysics, since I have finished and am done with it."[9] He finishes his work about *it* by stating that the philosophical

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[6] Immanuel Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics* (*Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik*), 1766, translated by E. F. Goerwitz; edited and introduced by Frank Sewall, London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.Lim., 1992.

[7] Emmanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772) was a scientist, philosopher, Christian mystic, and theologian. When he was fifty-six, he enunciated that his eyes were opened by God and he could see spirits, heaven, angels and daemons. (See, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emmanuel_Swedenborg.)

[8] Kant, op.cit., pp. 95-96.

[9] Ibid., p.90.

knowledge on this matter can be obtained only "in the negative sense, by fixing with assurance the limits of our knowledge, and convincing us that all that is granted to us is to know the diverse manifestations of life in nature and its laws."[10] For, to attain knowledge about the mysterious nature of spirits in the positive sense, "no data can be found in the whole of our sensations … therefore we have to resort to negations for the sake of thinking something so entirely different from everything sensuous."[11] For Kant, metaphysics needs to be saved from these delusions which lie on the assumption that we are in a position to be able to gain knowledge about spiritual nature.

> Human reason was not given strong enough wings to part clouds so high above us, clouds which withhold from our eyes the secrets of the other world. The curious who inquire about it so anxiously may receive the simple but very natural reply, that it would be best for them to please have patience until they get there.[12]

By the time Kant wrote *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* (1766), fifteen years before the first edition of *Critique* (1781), the direction of Kant's philosophical journey had started to fall into place. In 1764, he had tried to answer the following question which was for a competition organized by the Royal Academy in Berlin: "Are the metaphysical sciences capable of the same evidence as the mathematical sciences?"[13] Kant's dissertation[14] was honored by the committee and pressed alongside the winning essay.[15] Kant's divergence from traditional metaphysics started budding by this

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[10] Ibid., p.89.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., pp. 121-122.

[13] See, http://www.manchester.edu/kant/Helps/Writings.htm#PrizeEssay.

[14] "Inquiry concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality", in *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*, pp.243-275 (Immanuel Kant, translated and edited by David Walford, in collaboration with Ralf Meerbote, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.)

[15] "On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences" by Moses Mendelssohn, in *Philosophical Writings, 1729-1786***,** pp.251ff. (translated and edited by Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.)

work.[16] He initiates his words by stating that if the referred problem is to be solved properly, a certain approach must be taken by the *higher philosophy*. For him, in order that the metaphysics is possible as a science, its concerns should remain in the limits of nature.

> The true method of metaphysics is basically the same as that introduced by *Newton* into natural science and which has been of such benefit to it. *Newton's* method maintains that one ought, on the basis of certain experience and, if need be, with the help of geometry, to seek out the rules in accordance with which certain phenomena of nature occur.[17]

However, traditional metaphysicians close their eyes to this constraint. In one of Kant's letters (1772)[18] written to Marcus Herz,[19] we can see that his interests had departed from those of traditional metaphysicians. He mentions here a work which he was going to write with the title of *The Limits of Sensibility and Reason*, and which was the harbinger of *Critique of Pure Reason*. One of the most fundamental concerns of the critical philosophy was uttered by Kant in this letter:

> I noticed that I still lacked something essential, something that in my long metaphysical studies I, as well as others, had failed to consider and which in fact constitutes the key to the whole secret of metaphysics, hitherto still hidden from

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[16] "Inquiry concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality", in *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*, pp.243-275 (Immanuel Kant, translated and edited by David Walford, in collaboration with Ralf Meerbote, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.)

[17] Kant, op.cit., p.259.

[18] Immanuel Kant, *Correspondence*, translated and edited by Arnulf Zweig, Cambridge, U.K., New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp.132-137.

[19] Marcus Herz (1747-1803) was a Jewish German philosopher and physician. He had an important role in the Jewish Enlightenment of the late eighteenth century. Herz became Kant's student in the University of Königsberg, for a short time. They were trusted friends whose letters to each other have been regarded as having philosophical importance. (See, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markus_Herz, and *Correspondence*, pp. 581-582.)

> itself. I asked myself this question: What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 'representation' to the object?[20]

This question, which was going to wait for a decade to be answered, is a starting point to understand Kant's general approach in metaphysics. He is asking about the objects but not regarding their whatness like the most philosophers hitherto. His focus is on the question of 'how': How can a representation refer to its object? How can we have judgments about objects? For Kant, it should be this problem on which metaphysics focuses if it is to be a science. But how is metaphysics possible in such a way? Or is it possible at all? And this is the initial question of critical philosophy:

> My intention is to convince all of those who find it worthwhile to occupy themselves with metaphysics that it is unavoidably necessary to suspend their work for the present, to consider all that has happened until now as if it had not happened, and before all else to pose the question: "whether such a thing as metaphysics is even possible at all?"[21]

Now, it is time to enter *Critique of Pure Reason* wherein Kant establishes a system arisen from this fundamental question. At the first pages of the second edition, we encounter a motto which originally belongs to Francis Bacon:

> De nobis ipsis silemus: De re autem, quae agitur, petimus: ut homines eam non Opinionem, sed Opus esse cogitent; ac pro certo habeant, non Sectae nos alicujus, aut Placiti, sed utilitatis et amplitudinis humanae fundamenta moliri. Deinde ut suis commodis aequi . . . in commune consulant, . . . et ipsi in partem veniant. Praeterea ut bene sperent, neque Instaurationem nostram ut quiddam infinitum et ultra mortale

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[20] Kant, op.cit., p.133.

[21] Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*: *That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science***,** with Selections from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, revised edition, translated and edited by Gary Hatfield, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.5. The *Prolegomena* is written by Kant two years after the first edition of *Critique of Pure Reason* as he was disappointed by the poor recognition of his earlier work. In *Prolegomena*, he explains the main purposes and conclusions of his critical project through, he says, an *analytic method* which takes the road from something dependably known to the principles, as opposed to the *synthetic method* of the *Critique* which starts from the principles and works in the pure reason itself (*Prolegomena*, pp.13, 25-26, 28).

> fingant, et animo concipiant; quum revera sit infiniti erroris finis et terminus legitimus.[22] (Bii)

It is not very common among interpreters of Kant to annotate his usage of this motto but worth mentioning because it seems to be chosen delicately and to lend itself to the purpose of his project.[23] By this quotation, Kant calls his reader to be a participant of his plan which promises a practical service rather than a theoretical estimation ("it is not an opinion to be held, but a work to be done. … I ask [men] … to come forward themselves and take part."). This service is not beyond the limits of the potential of humankind ("nor to imagine that this … is a thing infinite and beyond the power of man"). Instead, it puts an end to the blunders in dreaming of exceeding those limits ("it is in fact the true end and termination of infinite error"). The initiative phrase "*De nobis ipsis silemus*", (*i.e.* "Of myself I say nothing", or it can be rendered as "I leave myself out of account") means that the method of this

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[22] This aphorism was excerpted by Kant from Bacon's preface of his work *Instauratio Magna* (Great Renewal), of which the famous *Novum Organum* (New Instrument, 1620) was the second and the most important part. Its translation to English as rendered by Robert Leslie Ellis and James Spedding (in *The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon*, edited by John M. Robertson, Freeport, N.Y., Books for Libraries Press, 1970) is as follows (extracted with only Kant's selections):

> Of myself I say nothing; but in behalf of the business which is in hand I entreat men to believe that it is not an opinion to be held, but a work to be done; and to be well assured that I am laboring to lay the foundation, not of any sect or doctrine, but of human utility and power. Next, I ask them to deal fairly by their own interests … to join in consultation for the common good; and … to come forward themselves and take part ... Moreover, to be of good hope, nor to imagine that this Instauration of mine is a thing infinite and beyond the power of man, when it is in fact the true end and termination of infinite error.

[23] See Onora O'Neill "Reason and Politics in the Kantian Enterprise" in *Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy*, pp.50-80, esp. pp. 53-55 (edited by Howard L. Williams, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992). O'Neill states that Kant's usage of this motto, as a first announcement of the repudiation of Cartesian starting point, saves him from a paradoxical position:

> To reject an autobiographical starting point in the text would backfire, since it would emphasize, and so tacitly endorse, that starting point. Explaining why one is not going to talk about oneself is self-defeating. Kant resolves this problem deftly by quoting Bacon's requests to his readers. He says nothing of himself: even what he says about speaking of oneself is said by another and said outside the text. … This is a first step in setting Cartesian beginnings at a distance. (Ibid, pp.54-55)

work will not be the kind that Descartes used.[24] In this respect, he is growing away from Cartesian method and getting closer to a more Humean one.[25]

Now that we abandoned the method of introspection as a starting point in search of the knowledge about reason and thinking, where should we begin? The motto invites us to a practical work which promises to terminate the errors of reason. Thus, first of all, these errors of reason are to be recognized and thereby eliminated, and this task is to be undertaken by the reason itself: "It is a call to reason … to institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws. This tribunal is no other than the *critique of pure reason*."[26] (Axi-xii)

As stated earlier, the initial question of this "*critique of pure reason*" is the possibility of metaphysics as a science. This tribunal is therefore responsible to examine metaphysics and determine its shortcomings in the way of becoming a science. Mathematics and natural sciences have already entered upon "the sure path of science" but this is not the case for metaphysics (Bx-xv). It is delusional since the reason is encumbered by its own destiny of seeking answers to some questions by exceeding beyond all its abilities (Avii). The human reason itself has a strong propensity toward asking these questions which are so important and indispensable

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[24] In the first edition, we can encounter some statements which are not yet subjected to this elimination. For example, in the preface Kant states that "I have to deal with nothing save reason itself and its pure thinking; and to obtain complete knowledge of these, there is no need to go far afield, since I come upon them in my own self." (Axiv) In the second edition, he leaves this attitude completely behind. (See O'Neill, ibid, p.55)

[25] Kant's position between these two standpoints is a delicate matter especially about his account of self. Kant does not endorse Cartesian argumentation as a starting point but when it comes to the identity of self, he defends a Cartesian position against Hume's celebrated denial of self-identity. I will discuss this matter in turn.

[26] The word 'critique' is a French word that has several origins: in Middle French, it means "one who passes judgment" derived from a Vulgar Latin word *criticus* (a judge; literary critic), and from two Greek words *kritikos*, (able to make judgments), and *krinein* (to separate; decide). (http://www.etymonline.com/) It seems that Kant uses the whole root of the word in such a way that in critical philosophy, the main task is *to separate* the legitimate judgments of reason from the illegitimate ones through the reason itself having the role of being *a judge* which *passes judgment*.

for human life that "we prefer to run every risk of error rather than desist from such urgent enquiries, on the ground of their dubious character, or from disdain and indifference." (A3/B7) It has been of the greatest importance to seek answers concerning these "unavoidable problems set by pure reason," which are about "*God, freedom,* and *immortality*." (Ibid.) That is why, metaphysics has allegedly been "the Queen of all the sciences"[27] (Aviii) and "[t]here has always existed in the world, and there will always continue to exist, some kind of metaphysics" (Bxxxi). But there is a dilemma: the objects of these problems cannot be found by experience and nothing can be an object of a science unless it is experienceable and so verifiable. According to Kant, however, "the Queen" has hitherto worked with these objects. For, "once we are outside the circle of experience, we can be sure of not being *contradicted* by experience. The charm of extending our knowledge is so great that nothing short of encountering a direct contradiction can suffice to arrest us in our course" (A4/B8).

Hence, metaphysical judgments have been produced without the help of experience. These judgments are the results of purely conceptual analyses (Bxiv), which is a method used by *dogmatism* with a premise that

> it is possible to make progress with pure knowledge, according to principles, from concepts alone; … and that it is possible to do this without having first investigated in what way and by what right reason has come into possession of these concepts. Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason, *without previous criticism of its own powers*. (Bxxxv)

Conceptual analyses give us nothing more than tautologies, and this formula cannot be a method of a science. This sort of procedure is doomed to remain as "a merely random groping, and, what is worst of all, a groping among concepts." (Bxv) But

[27] O'Neill interprets the usage of this metaphor as a sexist standpoint (op.cit., p. 55). Indeed, as Kant likens the metaphysics to a *Queen* not a *King*, it can be argued that Kant attributes femininity to the property of being a delusional authority in which the reason "does not merely fail us, but lures us on by deceitful promises, and in the end betrays us!" (Bxv).

dogmatic metaphysicians have not been aware of these shortcomings related to their methods and they have promised to expand knowledge in this course. However, to enter upon "the highway of science" (Bxii), metaphysics has to be delimitated, that is, the boundaries of its domain should be determined. Otherwise, we keep falling into the trap of illusions in this field which, Kant says,

> has rather to be regarded as a battle-ground[28] quite peculiarly suited for those who desire to exercise themselves in mock combats, and in which no participant has ever yet succeeded in gaining even so much as an inch of territory, not at least in such manner as to secure him in its permanent possession. (Bxv)

Thus, the reason has to be limited and thereby qualified. What it can know without the help of experience has to be determined (Axvii), then the erroneous part must be excluded from metaphysics. This is a transcendental critique, the service of which "ought properly to be only negative, not to extend, but only to clarify our reason, and keep it free from errors" (A11), and the focus of which is not "the nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but the understanding which passes judgment upon the nature of things; and this understanding … only in respect of its *a priori* knowledge." (A12-13/B26) Now, let's understand what *a priori* knowledge is.

In opening sentence of *Critique*, Kant emphasizes that the source of our knowledge is experience (A1-B1). But right after that, he adds that there must be an *a priori* source in our faculty of knowledge since "[e]xperience tells us, indeed, what is, but not that it must necessarily be so, and not otherwise. It therefore gives us no true universality" (A1). An *a priori* judgment is distinguished from an empirical or *a posteriori* one by the criteria of necessity and strict universality (B4). If a judgment

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[28] This metaphor has also been known from Plato's *Sophist* where he discusses the essence, or the meaning of 'being.' Plato uses this metaphor in a way which is reminiscent of Kant's usage such that in both, it is a criticism about the philosophers who had produced judgments in ontology or in metaphysics until their time: "There appears to be a sort of war of Giants [philosophers] and Gods going on amongst them; they are fighting with one another about the nature of essence." Plato, *Sophist*, (246a), translated with an introduction by Benjamin Jowett, from http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/p/plato/p71so/index.html, 2004, (Last updated 29/08/2010).

presents such criteria, that is, if there is no exception of this judgment, "it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely *a priori*." (Ibid.)

The judgments consisted in metaphysics are not only *a priori*, but they have to be synthetic, as well.[29] "For its business is not merely to analyze concepts which we make for ourselves *a priori* of things, and thereby to clarify them analytically, but to extend our *a priori* knowledge" (B18), which can only be done through synthesis. Kant says, "[b]y *synthesis*, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge." (A77/B103) It is an activity of human understanding that plays a fundamental role in grasping knowledge: "Synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or *a priori*) is what first gives rise to knowledge. … It is to synthesis, therefore, that we must first direct our attention, if we would determine the first origin of our knowledge." (A77-78/B103) From the synthesis of an *a priori* manifold, there arises 'synthetic *a priori* knowledge' which is an innovative notion for the history of philosophy, and has an indispensible place in transcendental idealism.

According to Kant, the examples of synthetic *a priori* can be found in all theoretical sciences as principles (B14). First of all, "*[a]ll mathematical judgments, without exception, are synthetic*", as well as they are *a priori*, since, for example, in the proposition 7 + 5 = 12, "the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing save the union of the two numbers into one, and in this no thought is being taken as to what

[29] In every judgment, there can be two kinds of connection between the subject and the predicate: analytic and synthetic (A6-7/B10-11). Through combinations of these relations and the two sources of knowledge mentioned above (experience and the faculty of knowledge: namely, *a posteriori* and *a priori*), we have three types of judgment (not four because an analytic judgment cannot be *a posteriori*): (i) Analytic *a priori* which has a conceptual necessity, that is, the predicate is found in the subject, and the negation of a judgment of this kind would result in a logical contradiction, (ii) Synthetic *a posteriori* which is to be derived from experience so that judgments of this kind are contingent, and (iii) Synthetic *a priori* which is not derived from experience, and therefore, it is necessary and universal, but it also expands our knowledge, that is, the predicate cannot be found in the subject.

that single number may be which combines both." (B15) This also holds for the propositions of geometry;

> That the straight line between two points is the shortest, is a synthetic proposition. For my concept of *straight* contains nothing of quantity, but only of quality. The concept of the shortest is wholly an addition, and cannot be derived, through any process of analysis, from the concept of the straight line. (B16, 1st)

Moreover, "*[n]atural science (physics) contains* a priori *synthetic judgments as principles*." (B17, 2nd) Kant gives two instances of such judgments: "in all changes of the material world the quantity of matter remains unchanged" and "in all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal." (Ibid.) He says that both propositions are synthetic and *a priori*. For,

> in the concept of matter I do not think its permanence, but only its presence in the space which it occupies. I go outside and beyond the concept of matter, joining to it *a priori* in thought something which I have not thought *in* it. The proposition is not, therefore, analytic, but synthetic, and yet is thought *a priori*; and so likewise are the other propositions of the pure part of natural science. (B17-18)

And the examples of pure mathematics and pure science of nature, as successful sciences, will shed light on the possibility of metaphysics as a science (B20-21), "a science whose every branch may be cut away but whose root cannot be destroyed." (B24) As stated above, metaphysics also "consists, at least *in intention*, entirely of *a priori* synthetic propositions." (B18) In this respect, Kant modifies the main problem of the *Critique* as "How is synthetic *a priori* knowledge possible?" He states that "[t]he critique of pure reason …. carries the analysis only so far as is requisite for the complete examination of knowledge which is *a priori* and synthetic." (A14/B28) But indeed, how is it possible that a judgment is both *a priori* and synthetic? Kant refers to this problem as a mystery whose "solution can the advance into the limitless field of the knowledge yielded by pure understanding be made sure and trustworthy." (A10) Or it is an "unknown = X which gives support to the understanding when it believes that it can discover outside the concept A a

predicate B foreign to this concept, which it yet at the same time considers to be connected with it" (A9/B13). According to Kant, unfolding this mystery will yield the ground for metaphysics in the way towards the true science.

What are synthesized in a synthetic *a priori* judgment are *a priori* concepts, *i.e.* categories, and *a priori* intuitions, *i.e.* space and time. Thus, in *Critique*, the main task is to show these elements, and thereby to show how these judgments are possible. "Transcendental Doctrine of Elements" which occupies a significant part of the *Critique* is assigned for this task. I will mention these elements, and how they compose a judgment in their turn.

Kant thinks that previous philosophers could not discover this synthetic *a priori* ingredient of our knowledge, and this is what was missing from their systems.

> That metaphysics has hitherto remained in so vacillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction, is entirely due to the fact that this problem, and perhaps even the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, has never previously been considered. Upon the solution of this problem, or upon a sufficient proof that the possibility which it desires to have explained does in fact not exist at all, depends the success or failure of metaphysics. Among philosophers, David Hume came nearest to envisaging this problem, but still was very far from conceiving it with sufficient definiteness and universality. (B19)

Hume has a great impact on Kant towards critical philosophy, especially with his approach regarding causality. As an example of synthetic *a priori* knowledge, Kant repeatedly mentions the concept 'cause' and the propositions related to it, such as, "Everything which happens has its cause" (A9/B13). He is in agreement with Hume that causal relation (*principium causalitatis*) cannot be derived from experience since what we observe through experience are only two events following each other, not a link between them.[30] But for Hume, it cannot be *a priori* either. He

[30] The problem about the origin of causal relation has not yet had a conclusive solution. Is it an objective feature of the nature or an attribution we make to the relations of the things in the nature?

thinks that the causality is a reasoning which grows through 'custom' or 'habit' such that since we observe similar events in the same order so many times, we reach the idea of a causal connection.[31] According to Kant, on the other hand, the source of the concept of 'a cause' "cannot be experience, because the suggested principle has connected the second representation [a cause] with the first [that which happens], not only with greater universality, but also with the character of necessity, and therefore completely *a priori*" (ibid.).

Moreover, the proposition "Every event has a cause" cannot be analytic, since the concept 'cause' is not derived from the concept 'event' so that this proposition is synthetic. In *Prolegomena*, Kant discusses this problem more comprehensively. He first acknowledges that Hume's skepticism is insightful, and then states that this problem is more general than the one about the origin of causality.

> I tried first whether *Hume*'s objection might not be presented in a general manner, and I soon found that the concept of the connection of cause and effect is far from being the only concept through which the understanding thinks connections of things *a priori*; rather, metaphysics consists wholly of such concepts.[32]

And these "through which the understanding thinks connections of things *a priori*" compose the fundamental rules of nature. In experience, whatever is there with a necessity and strict universality is given from the faculties of mind. This tells us that the objects of experience must conform to the human cognition without an

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This is still an enigmatic question for philosophical studies. And the relation between Hume and Kant on the problem of causality has a great importance in the history not only of this discussion but also of philosophy in general. Graciela and Friedman state "understanding the relationship between the two philosophers on this issue is crucial for a proper understanding of modern philosophy more generally." (Graciela De Pierris, Michael Friedman, "Kant and Hume on Causality," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition)*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/kant-hume-causality/.)

[31] David Hume, *An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, edited with an introduction and notes by Peter Millican, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, and *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by David Fate Norton, Mary J. Norton; editor's introduction by David Fate Norton, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.104.

[32] Kant, *Prolegomena*, op.cit., p.10.

exception, that is, the fundamental laws of nature are given by the cognitive faculties. In other words, objectivity is not derived from the objects but given by the subject. And this indicates a drastic change in the very bottom of metaphysics:

> Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them *a priori*, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. (Bxvi)

Kant refers here to *Copernican Revolution* that led to a radical change in our view concerning the universe. Now, what he is suggesting us is to change our view concerning the relation between objects and our knowledge about objects. Henceforth, what we should think of an object of experience is something that the subject of experience makes possible, instead of something that the subject of experience conforms. If knowledge must conform to the objects, then all knowledge would have to be derived from experience, but then *a priori* knowledge would be impossible (Bxvii). Thus, such knowledge which is all derived from experience cannot be objectively and universally valid, since "common experience teaches us that it is so; not that it must be so." (A31/B47) And the conditions of this relation between experience and reason are the subject-matter of the "critique of pure reason [that] will contain all that is essential in transcendental philosophy." (A14/B28)

Now, before getting a comprehensive idea of what transcendental philosophy is, let's understand the essence of the problem of self-knowledge, and see how the problem is transformed with Kant.

2.2. The Problem of Self-Knowledge

As a philosophical term, 'self-knowledge' is generally used in reference to the knowledge of mental states, but in some contexts, it refers to the ontological character of an enduring self, or to the criteria of personal identity.[33] The word 'self' is used in allusion to a variety of words in respect to the context, such as, substance, soul, consciousness, mind, person, the 'I,' and ego. We use it in our ordinary language very commonly but in philosophy, there is a need for rendering an account concerning what it means. In the history of philosophy, we can see a number of accounts about self-knowledge in its different meanings mentioned above. I will discuss some of these accounts in a while.

There are also some approaches to the self also in the history of psychology. The behaviorism, for example, defends that all acts of all organisms including those attributed to the mind can be explained in terms of behaviors. At the beginning of twentieth century, John B. Watson argues that the consciousness is not a phenomenon that can be proved, and there is no need to use it.[34] The Gestalt School, on the other hand, emphasizes the unity of perception and argues that the totality of human experience is more than its parts. Thus, this discipline embraces a 'phenomenological' approach about human being taking the subjective domain into prominence.[35] It is worth to mention that the advocates of this standpoint are influenced by Kant such that they argue that the perception is not a passive receptivity rather there is an active role of the perceiver in experience.[36]

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[33] See Brie Gertler, "Self-Knowledge," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition)*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/self-knowledge/>.

[34] *A History of Modern Psychology*, Duane P. Schultz, Sydney Ellen Schultz, Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2004, pp.289ff.

[35] Ibid., pp.357ff.

[36] Ibid., p.360.

In the history of philosophy, it is fair to say that the self-knowledge has commonly been an essential problem since the beginning to the present-day. It was probably the first announcement of an inquiry about the self in philosophy when Heraclitus said "I have inquired of myself."[37] But it was with Socrates and Sophists that the investigations about human beings became a central problem of philosophy. In Plato, the knowledge of the soul is the basis of true knowledge (*episteme*); that is, the 'truth' is inherent in the soul, and the body, the source of the opinion (*doxa*), is the cage of the soul.[38] There is, evidently, a dualist approach to the human being here, which has presented itself in a variety of ways since Plato. Though we encounter most commonly this aspect of his philosophy, Plato's concerns were about more of a life way which is to be leaded by the phrase "know thyself." In this manner, the soul which is the most separate from the body, and so the most in itself (*aute kath auten*), is the soul of a person who realizes their proper end (*telos*) in a complete sense.

Aristotle takes the soul as a staggered thing and the bodily functions constitute its first stage. This means that, at first, Aristotle does not embrace a dualist approach based on a distinction between body and soul. But when it comes to the stage of the mind, he distinguishes these parts of the soul since the mind, the intelligent part of the soul, exists only potentially and cannot be composite of more than one thing.[39] In this sense, the soul is the form and thus, the cause of a thing. He says,

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[37] Sources: Diogenes Laert. ix. 5.: "And he (Heraclitus) was a pupil of no one, but he said he inquired of himself and learned everything by himself." Plutarch, adv. Colot. 20, p. 1118: "And Heraclitus, as though he had been engaged in some great and solemn task, said, 'I have been seeking myself.' And of the sentences at Delphi, he thought the 'Know thyself' to be the most divine." (*Heraclitus of Ephesus: The Fragments of the Work of Heraclitus of Ephesus on Nature and Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae*, translated by G. T. W. Patrick, I. Bywater, Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 2006c, p.104.)

[38] See the dialogues of Plato, esp. *Republic* and *Phaedo*.

[39] Aristotle, *On the Soul* (Greek *Perì Psūchês*, Latin *De Anima*), Book III, Part 4 (429a/20-25), translated by J. A. Smith, from http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/a8so/, (Last updated on 25/08/2010).

> Suppose that the eye were an animal-sight would have been its soul, for sight is the substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except in name-it is no more a real eye than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure.[40]

Thus, the soul is the whatness or the essence (*ousia*) of a human being. If we combine this definition of the soul with Aristotle's substance ontology, we can say that the soul corresponds to the 'primary substance.' In *Metaphysics*, Aristotle himself declares that "the soul of animals (for this is the substance of a living being) is their substance,"[41] and he concludes that "the soul is the primary substance and the body is matter, and man or animal is the compound of both taken universally."[42] That is to say, the soul carries all properties and alterations of a "man or animal" while it remains as *itself*. The word 'substance' is derived from *hypostasis* (in Greek) and *substare* (in Latin), which means 'underlying thing.' This kind of ontological accounts based on the concept of 'substance' had survived until Kant.

2.2.1. The Subject of the Modern Age; *Cogito, Ergo Sum*

Towards the modern age, the substance that belongs to a human being became the subject of knowledge. The time of Descartes was the time of the growth of the scientific method, and Descartes played his role as the philosopher of his age. The first of the chief four laws of the method which he determines is "never to accept anything as true that [we do] not know to be evidently so."[43] This is the law of the scientific knowledge which has to be clear and distinct. That is why this viewpoint

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[40] Aristotle, ibid., op.cit., Book II (412b/15-25).

[41] Aristotle, Metaphysics, op.cit., Book VII, Part 10 (1035b/15).

[42] Ibid., Book VII, Part 11 (1037a/5).

[43] Rene Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, in *Discourse on Method and The Meditations*, translated with an introduction by F. E. Sutcliffe, London, England: Penguin Books, 1968, p.41.

is based on doubt about whole ideas and concepts. The solipsistic argument about the existence of the external world, whose traditional solution is judged by Kant as the "*scandal of philosophy*" (Bxxxix), is arisen from the expectation that the knowledge has to be unquestionable. In our everyday life, we live with an assent that there is an external world outside of our inner states, but philosophy has to give a solid account whether it is *real*, or not. Descartes finds the answer in a combination of the subjectivity and the idea of God. His initial concern is to find a firm ground for philosophy on which a system can be established, and the method is the doubt to the full extent so much so that the suspicion goes to the existence of the self, or the 'I'.[44] Then, he *realizes* that the fact that I doubt is something that I cannot doubt. And, since doubting is a kind of thinking, I am thinking, as well. There comes "*Cogito, ergo sum*," namely "I think, therefore I am,"[45] from the argumentation that the fact that I think shows definitely the fact that I exist. In the Second Meditation, Descartes asks about the whatness of this 'I', the existence of which he has proven. He argues that only *cogitatio* is bounded inseparably with *ego* since I can still have doubts about the existence of my body. Thus, I exist as non-bodily, as a thinking being. The thinking is an attribute of me that "alone cannot be detached from me. *I am, I exist*: this is certain; but for how long? For as long as I think, for it might perhaps happen, if I ceased to think, that I would at the same time cease to be or to exist."[46]

However, the question of the Second Meditation has not been answered:[47] "But what, then, am I? A thing that thinks. What is a thing that thinks? That is to say, a thing that doubts, perceives, affirms, denies, wills, does not will, that imagines also,

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[44] Note that the doubt has only a methodical usage here, not a ground for skepticism.

[45] *Discourse on Method*, ibid., p.53. This exact phrase appears only in this work of Descartes.

[46] *The Meditations*, ibid., p.105.

[47] Kim Atkins states on this matter that "[w]hile Descartes may well still insist that the argument from doubt shows that we can each know ourselves as thinking beings, it does not shed any light on the substantive question of *Meditation II*, which is the question of 'what I am, I who am certain that I am.'" ("Commentary on Descartes" in *Self and Subjectivity*, Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2005, p. 9.)

and which feels."[48] But whatever these acts are may as well be attributed to a body, that is, the thinking can be a feature of the body since we do not know what exactly the thinking is. The question is, as phrased in the Second Set of Objections to Descartes: "The position so far is that you recognize that you are a thinking thing, but you do not know what this thinking thing is. What if it turned out to be a body which, by its various motions and encounters, produces what we call thought?"[49] In the correlated text, namely the Second Set of Replies, Descartes gives a definition of 'thought' (*cogitatio*):

> I use this term to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are *immediately aware of it*. Thus all the operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are thoughts; a voluntary movement, for example, originates in a thought but is not itself a thought.[50] (My emphasis)

Thus, this attribute of 'I', namely the thinking that proves the existing, corresponds to being conscious of the contents of thinking. That is, what is put to the center by Descartes is self-consciousness, self-reflective activity concerning activities of the mind, not body. Descartes ascribes the *immediate awareness* to the thought, since it does not include those which we may think we are aware of but, we may as well be day-dreaming;

> I may not, for example, make the inference 'I am walking, therefore I exist', except in so far as the awareness of walking is a thought. The inference is certain only if applied to this awareness, and not to the movement of the body which sometimes – in

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[48] *The Meditations*, op.cit., pp.106-107.

[49] *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. II., translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984-1995, pp. 87-88.

[50] Ibid., p. 113.

the case of dreams – is not occurring at all, despite the fact that I seem to be walking.[51]

Three years later, in *Principles*, he asserts that "if I say 'I am seeing, or I am walking, therefore I exist', and take this as applying to vision or walking as bodily activities, then the conclusion is not absolutely certain."[52] For this kind of awareness is contestable, *i.e.* not *immediate* in this sense.[53] It is thinking and thinking alone which is beyond dispute so that we can take it as the indicator of the existence of which this thinking belongs. And we can move forward to the other principles of philosophy.

Hence, the *Cogito* is the first principle of philosophy on which the others will be established. Descartes' argumentation proceeds to the proofs of God's existence which are generally arisen from an alleged conceptual necessity.[54] After that, he advances that since God does not play with us because of being perfect, we can be sure that there is an external world. Consequently, there are three substances, respectively: *mind* (*res cogitance*), as the subject, *God*, as an epistemological tool between other substances, and *matter*, or *body* (*res existence*), as the object.

In this context, it can be said that the epistemological concerns outshine over the ontological questions. The issues of the latter are entered to the service of the former ones. And in this context, the subject is enthroned such that it is the mere

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[51] Ibid., p. 244. Descartes gives this explanation as an answer to Gassendi's objection that if Descartes can infer his existence from his thinking, he "could have made the same inference from any one of [his] other actions, since it is known by the natural light that whatever acts exist." (the Fifth Set of Objections, ibid., p.180)

[52] Ibid., vol. I., p.195.

[53] See, *Descartes's Theory of Mind*, Desmond M. Clarke, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p.185.

[54] One is entitled ontological proof which argues that since God is 'perfect' in definition, but it cannot be so without existence; thus, God must exist. And the other is also related to the idea of perfectness. It maintains that this idea cannot be produced by us as we are not perfect; thus, it must be given by God which is perfect itself.

source of whole certainty. All knowledge, even about the existence of God, is comprehended through the subjectivity.

2.2.2. Locke's Account of Personal Identity

The problem of personal identity refers to the question how we remain the same despite many physical and psychological changes in our lives.[55] Thus, what is searched for here the condition, or the conditions of identity of a person through time, that is, it is a query for the temporal existence of the self. More precisely, the question of this discussion is "what criterion provides the continuity between the person A at time t_1 and B at time t_2?" It can be said that in these approaches to the self, or person, the concept 'substance' is abandoned as a condition of continuity through time. There is more of a materialistic approach here that does not take any immaterial substance, namely soul, into account. What is searched as a criterion of identity is found generally in the physical and/or psychological continuities.

The British Empiricist John Locke is regarded as the first philosopher putting the epistemological problem "what can we know?" to the center of philosophy.[56] He also has a significant place in the political philosophy. And it is widely accepted that Locke was the first philosopher who poses the question about the basis for personal identity.[57] He highlights the concept 'person' and takes it as a *forensic* notion "appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent

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[55] This problem occupies a significant place in some studies of contemporary analytical philosophy. See for the most prominent examples of this topic, the works of Sydney Shoemaker who maintains a Lockean psychological continuity, Bernard Williams who defends a bodily criterion for personal identity, and Derek Parfit who argues that the personal identity is not what matters in life.

[56] In Locke's epistemology, human mind is a blank table, a *tabula rasa* shaped by experience. And there are only two sources of all knowledge: sensation and reflection.

[57] See, Andre Gallois, "Identity Over Time," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition)*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/identity-time/>.

Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery."[58] This is possible only through personal identity over time because without it, a person cannot be judged, rewarded or punished for what he/she has done; thus there would not be a sound sense of law, morality, and religion.

Locke gives a definition for the concept of 'person': it is a thinking, self-reflective *Being* that "can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places."[59] Locke asks about the basis of this ability, in Atkins' expression: "what makes a subject (or 'I') of a set of perceptions and actions at one time the same subject of a set of perceptions and actions at another time?"[60] If it were an immaterial soul that provides the basis for temporal continuity, then we should ask what provides the continuity of this soul. Besides, we can think for men lived different ages to have the same soul and so to be the same man, or for a man to be a *hog* after his life time, as the soul is a thing that can transfer among bodies.[61] However, the body cannot be a criterion for identity, either. For, throughout a life of a person, the body can have a variety of changes. Besides, the moral responsibility cannot be related to the body, it is connected with the *agent*, namely, a psychological aspect of a person.[62] So what is the basis for personal identity over time? There is a clue in the above definition of the concept 'a person.' What connects the past of a person to the present is the consciousness of being *the same thinking thing, in different times and places*; "which it (the person) does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive."[63] Thus, it is nothing but the consciousness of the personal

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[58] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, edited with a foreword by Peter H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p.346.

[59] Ibid., p.335.

[60] Atkins, "Commentary on Locke", op.cit., p.20.

[61] Locke, op.cit., p.332.

[62] See Atkins, loc.cit.

[63] Locke, op.cit., p.335.

identity over time that yields a criterion for personal identity over time.[64] But what Locke means by the term 'consciousness'? Here are two passages where we can find a definition:

> since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls *self*; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists *personal Identity*, *i.e.* the sameness of a rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that *Person*; it is the same *self* now it was then; and 'tis by the same *self* with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.[65]

> If the same *Socrates* waking and sleeping do not partake of the same *consciousness*, *Socrates* waking and sleeping is not the same Person. And to punish *Socrates* waking, for what sleeping *Socrates* thought, and waking *Socrates* was never conscious of, would be no more of Right, than to punish one Twin for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such Twins have been seen.[66]

From these excerpts, it is understood that the reference of the term 'consciousness' is to the *memory*. For, what provides a person to be responsible for their actions consists in the remembering those actions as one's own. Thus, for Locke, the memory which is a kind of psychological continuity is the criterion for personal identity over time. Moreover, it is the basis of our knowledge of our own existence, as well. He agrees with Descartes such that the knowledge of the existence of the subject 'I' is clear and distinct. He even says "If I doubt of all other Things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own *Existence*, and will not suffer me to doubt of

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[64] There clearly seems a circular explanation here. This is a well-known objection to Locke's argumentation made by Bishop Butler and Thomas Reid, which argues that Locke's account of personal identity "presupposes what it is supposed to explain." (Atkins, op.cit., p.21)

[65] Locke, loc.cit.

[66] Ibid., p.342.

that."[67] But according to Locke, it is *experience* that yields us this plain and certain intuition of our existence. Thus, while Descartes puts the knowledge of the self to the basis of his argument, in Locke, experience precedes this knowledge. In such a way that, I can think myself as an existing thing as far as I remember my experience the moment before and so attach it to now. In order to be conscious of my existence, I have to be a thing that "can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places."[68]

2.2.3. Hume's Bundle Theory of Self

The Scottish empiricist David Hume was to have an objection to this very ground of the existence of the self. He begins his discussion about personal identity with introducing this so-called unquestionable idea of self: "There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our *self*; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity."[69] However, "from what impression could this idea [of *self*] be derived?"[70] This is a question, for Hume, which "is impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity."[71] Every *real* idea is supposed to stem from an impression, and there is no such impression for the idea of *self*. For, this idea necessitates a persisting impression since the self, if there is any, is to exist in this manner, but we cannot find such an impression. From this reasoning, Hume concludes that "there is no such idea."[72] His renowned argument from introspection

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[67] Ibid. p.618.

[68] Ibid., p.335.

[69] Hume, "Of Personal Identity," in *Treatise*, op.cit., p.164.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

presupposes that if there is any knowledge of self in Cartesian sense, there should be an impression of it found by introspection.

> For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.[73]

The blunder of positing a self is a result of taking consecutive impressions as if they were appearances of a substratum. Hume declares his position strikingly against the notion of self:

> If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I call reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.[74]

And he states his celebrated "Bundle Theory" which is very hard to defeat: "I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."[75] In fact, there is no such idea of a persisting substance for any kind, for Hume. Like in the thought of causation, we associate things that have resemblance, regularity and spatiotemporal contiguity, and we assume that there is an identity between impressions of these things. This is

[73] Ibid, p.165.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

a propension of mind that results from the innate principles of association through the power of imagination.[76]

> The relation facilitates the transition of the mind from one object to another, and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated one continu'd object. This resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake, and makes us substitute the notion of identity…. Thus we feign the continu'd existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption: and run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to disguise the variation. … [O]ur propension to confound identity with relation is so great, that we are apt to imagine something unknown and mysterious.[77]

It is clear that Hume is against all kinds of substance ontology[78] which argues that the sameness of things through time is because of some kind of substratum (*substantia*) underlying all properties (*accidens*) of things. According to Hume, we cannot have knowledge of any enduring substance as there is no perception of it. What we perceive is nothing but the properties. "We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it."[79] Kant agrees with Hume in the sense that we cannot derive the idea of substance (or of self) from experience, but he does not throw away the ideas of this kind.

2.2.4. Kant's Critical Approach to the Notion of Self

As it has been stated, for Kant, though the knowledge begins with experience, there are *a priori* conditions in the mind which determines experience. Thus, knowledge arises from two sources: *a priori* concepts of the mind (*categories*), and sensible

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[76] See Atkins, "Commentary on Hume", op.cit, 35.

[77] Hume, op.cit., p.166.

[78] Or "substrate view", see Atkins, loc. cit.

[79] Hume, op.cit., p.16.

intuitions. Besides, we cannot grasp any knowledge from these two components if we absolutely separate them from each other (A51/B75). That is to say, in order for the possibility of knowledge, these concepts and intuitions have to play their role together. For Kant, this constraint is what makes ontological investigations impossible. He claims that the traditional metaphysicians are mistaken by the assumption underlying their systems that it is possible to produce knowledge from concepts, and concepts alone. Kant classifies and criticizes these mistaken arguments in the "Transcendental Dialectic" which is a *logic of illusion* (A293/B349), and which will be expounded in the following chapters. One of the sections of "Transcendental Dialectic", named "Paralogisms" (A341/B399), is about *fallacious syllogisms* concerning the concept 'substance.' Kant's criticism here is based on the above assumption that the concepts are "mere *forms of thought*, through which alone no determinate object is known." (B150) For Kant, these arguments are the false indications about the 'I' derived from the illegitimate use of the category of *substance*.

As cited above, Kant had a negative position about the concept 'soul' in the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, where Kant ridiculed the metaphysics by comparing it with fancy stories of a mystic. These fantasies were mostly about spiritual beings. In "Paralogisms," Kant accuses metaphysicians once again for speaking of the same beings. The focus of the condemnation is here entitled Rational Psychology, the father of which is Descartes. One the one hand, Kant agrees with Descartes that there is a consciousness of self. But, on the other hand, for Kant, this does not tell us about the whatness of this self. According to Kant, *Cogito, ergo sum* is an erroneous argument since the proposition "I think" cannot be an evidence for the existence of the self; it is only a manifestation of the *transcendental unity of apperception*, or the unity of consciousness which is the principle that accompanies all representations and guaranties that they "belong to one self-consciousness" (B132). However, this consciousness does not correspond to any persisting substance; it is a mere logical necessity. This unity of self-consciousness, which is demonstrated by the proposition "I think", is an important part of the answer of the

question "*how* are we able to know?" As stated earlier, for Kant, as for Locke, this question is at the center of philosophy. And indeed, the question 'how' is more suitable for scientific method. Thence, in Kant, the 'whatness' loses its importance and answerability. What we have about our *self* in a theoretical framework is only self-consciousness; and Kant states, "[t]he consciousness of self is … very far from being a knowledge of the self" (B158). In this structure, the topic of self-knowledge in reference to the question of 'what' has to be left out of the account.

Nevertheless, although his position against "the self as substance" converges to Hume's, Kant does not think that the idea of self is a fictitious fabrication of the imagination. First, we have to recall that in the preface of second edition, Kant states that his *Critique* teaches "that the object is to be taken *in a twofold sense*, namely as appearance and as thing in itself." (Bxxvi) The object in the former sense is subject to the conditions of experience, such as, the principle of causality. And, the same object in the latter sense, *i.e.* in itself, is free of these conditions. We cannot have any knowledge regarding the object in itself but we can think about it. When it comes to the term 'self,' this diversity becomes tripled, in Atkins' phrasing: "first, a purely logical notion of 'I' in apperception; second, a 'phenomenal self' – one's sense of oneself as one appears to oneself; and third, the 'noumenal self' –the necessary *thought* of oneself as the agent of one's own actions, which is implied in morality."[80] Hence, unlike Hume, Kant does not think that there is no self, identity of a person over time, or immortality of soul. He has a fundamental purpose in isolating these matters from what we can know in an objective fashion. The self in the third sense, *i.e.* the agent of actions, comes into prominence in the field of morality or the practical domain. Kant puts his viewpoint concerning the meaning of 'the practical' as: "By 'the practical' I mean everything that is possible through freedom." (A800/B828) We may not understand the content of freedom but "[m]orality does not, indeed, require that freedom should be understood." (Bxxix)

[80] Atkins, "Commentary on Kant," op.cit., p.48.

The moral principles cannot be derived from experience since we cannot derive what *ought to be done* from what *is done* (A319/B375):

> Whoever would derive the concepts of virtue from experience and make (as many have actually done) what at best can only serve as an example in an imperfect kind of exposition, into a pattern from which to derive knowledge, would make of virtue something which changes according to time and circumstance, an ambiguous monstrosity not admitting of the formation of any rule. (A315/B371)

Hence in Kant, the subject is not free in the field of experience, though it constitutes the experience. Like all possible objects of experience, all subjects of experience are also governed by the conditions of the knowledge. Kant places the principles of practical domain beyond the limits of experience, so that they are no more a matter of proof or disproof. In Copleston's words, "the truths that there is a spiritual soul, that man is free and that God exists no longer rest on fallacious arguments which afford for those who deny these truths; they are moved to the sphere of practical or moral reason and become objects of faith rather than of knowledge."[81]

As a result, the soul as a free-agent has immunity from the effects of experience, like causal determinism. Since it is not a possible object of experience, the soul cannot be an object of empirical knowledge. The subject can know itself as an object of experience like it knows any other object. We are, as subjects of our experience, unqualified to obtain a synthetic *a priori* knowledge of our *self*. Without referring his name, Kant addresses the question of Descartes' Second Meditation:

> If anyone propounds to me the question, 'What is the constitution of a thing which thinks?', I have no *a priori* knowledge wherewith to reply. For the answer has to be synthetic–*an analytic answer* will perhaps *explain what is meant by thought*, but beyond this cannot yield any knowledge of that upon which this thought depends for its possibility. For a synthetic solution, however, intuition is always required; and

[81] Frederick Charles Copleston, *A History of Philosophy Vol.6*, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964, p.28.

> owing to the highly general character of the problem, intuition has been left entirely out of account. (A398) (My emphases.)

An analytic answer which Kant mentions in this passage is what Descartes gave. As it can be recalled, Descartes answers related objection to his argument through *explaining what is meant by thought*.[82] And according to Descartes' definition it refers to a consciousness which for Kant does not provide any answer to the question "what is a thing that thinks?"

I will clarify the above issues related to the problem of self-knowledge in Kant in their turn.

[82] *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, op.cit., p. 113.

3

KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a compendium of fundamental concepts and presuppositions of transcendental philosophy as long as they help us to have a handle on the main subject of this thesis, namely self-knowledge. First of all, it must be noted that in Kantian terminology, there is an ambiguity in the references of the term 'transcendental.' In its general meaning, it refers to a special kind of knowledge not of objects but of the *a priori* mode of knowledge about objects (A11-12/B25), while the term 'transcendent' refers to that which is beyond experience, and thus which is unknowable for us (A296/B352-53), namely the thing in itself. Kant states that "*transcendental* and *transcendent* are not interchangeable terms." (A296/B352) However, shortly before this comment, he says that the "transcendental employment of a concept in any principle is its application to things *in general and in themselves*." (A238/B298) This means that, the *transcendental* employment of a concept can refer to a *transcendent* object. Patricia Kitcher states that "[a] category is employed 'transcendentally' if it is employed beyond the limits of experience."[83] But, as she puts, this is the secondary meaning of the term 'transcendental.' In its primary meaning, "[s]omething is transcendental if it concerns our manner of knowing objects, in particular, the nonempirical origins of cognition."[84] Despite its ambiguity in some passages, Kant's obvious definition for the term 'transcendental' is one of the important pieces of the puzzle of *Critique of Pure Reason*, such that he names his philosophy after this term: "I entitle *transcendental* all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with

[83] Patricia Kitcher, *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, p.184.

[84] Ibid.

the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*. A system of such concepts might be entitled transcendental philosophy." (A11-12/B25)

Thus, the term *transcendental* refers not to the knowledge of objects itself, but to the knowledge of the *a priori* mode of knowledge of objects. In other words, the scope of transcendental philosophy is limited to the second order knowledge concerning how *a priori* knowledge is possible. But, this does not mean that all modes of *a priori* knowledge are transcendental.[85] Kant makes this differentiation in another context:

> Neither space nor any *a priori* geometrical determination of it is a transcendental representation; what can alone be entitled transcendental is the knowledge that these representations are not of empirical origin, and the possibility that they can yet relate *a priori* to objects of experience. (A56/B81)

One other essential piece is the new meaning of the term 'objectivity' which arises from the *Kantian-Copernican Turn*. What is new here is the assumption that the one and only ground for the objectivity is the subjectivity. This perspective is related to the new approach to the problem of external world that whether it is *real* or not. One of the Kant's eminent passages is directed against this inquiry until his time: "it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us … must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof." (Bxl, fn.)

Thus, the terms 'reality' and 'objectivity' no longer refer to anything outside the subjectivity. When Kant calls something 'objective' or 'real' in empirical sense,[86]

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[85] From the translator's note: "As the term 'knowledge' cannot be used in the plural, I have usually translated *Erkenntnisse* 'modes of knowledge'" *Critique of Pure Reason*, p.42, fn.1.

[86] The term 'real' in transcendental sense refers to something which cannot be an object of experience. In other words, if something is transcendentally real, it is beyond the limits of experience, that is, it is a reality about things in themselves.

he means something which is in the field of subjective determination. Besides, the term 'subjectivity' has also a new content; it does not refer to something peculiar to some specific person, nor to something arbitrary. On the contrary, it expresses the lawfulness of human mind which is the single ground of knowledge.[87] To come to the point, in transcendental philosophy, the sphere of metaphysics is from now on therefore the sphere of subjectivity. In his surviving notes (*Reflexionen*), Kant writes down: "What we can discover through a metaphysical investigation is not regarding the object but regarding the subject which has the conditions which constitute the object."[88] Then, a metaphysical investigation in regards to transcendental philosophy only seeks the possibility of *a priori* conditions of the faculty of knowledge which is not derived from but governs experience. And *Critique of Pure Reason* "has to guarantee, as following from principles, the completeness and certainty of the structure in all its parts. It is the system of all principles of pure reason." (A13/B27)

At this point, Kant introduces us two divisions of the *Critique*: "a *doctrine of the elements*" and "a *doctrine of the method of pure reason*" (A15/B29). In line with the purpose of this thesis, I will generally remain in the limits of the former, *i.e.* "Transcendental Doctrine of Elements," which has two parts that are somehow related to the different faculties of the mind. The first part is "Transcendental Aesthetic" which deals with the scope of the *sensibility*. This is the subject-matter of the following section. The second part is "Transcendental Logic" which has two subdivisions, and these are the titles of the third and fourth sections of this chapter, respectively: "Transcendental Analytic" and "Transcendental Dialectic." The former handles the role of the *understanding* and the latter concerns about the *illusions* arisen from the *reason*. There is one other faculty, namely *imagination*, which has a role of mediating between *sensibility* and *understanding*. There will be

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[87] See for a detailed interpretation on the concept of 'subjectivity' in Kant, Ernst Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought*, translated by James Haden, Michigan: Yale University Press, 1983, p.150ff.

[88] Immanuel Kant, *Notes and Fragments*, edited by Paul Guyer; translated by Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, Frederick Rauscher, Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.136.

a subsection in the third chapter about this faculty and its role in the processes of grasping knowledge. The theoretical knowledge springs from these powers of the mind, which all have quite different roles in the domains of the second and the third critiques.

3.1. Transcendental Aesthetic

In the beginning of "Transcendental Aesthetic," Kant presents the most immediate relation of a mode of knowledge (*eine Erkenntnis*) to the objects, namely, *intuition* which *sensibility* provides us (A19/B33). Since all objects of knowledge must be intuited by us, directly or indirectly, sensibility is the only way an object can be given to us. At this point, we are introduced by another important term that carries a new meaning in Kantian philosophy, entitled *appearance* (*Erscheinung*): "The undetermined object of an empirical intuition" (A20/B34). The term still corresponds to the one side of a distinction: to the sensible object as opposed to the only thinkable one as it does in the Ancient distinction between opinion (*doxa*) and truth (*episteme*). But, in transcendental philosophy, unlike 'doxa,' the term 'appearance' does not refer to a confliction with the reality. As stated, the reality is what we experience through appearances in the objective world. Thus, what is real cannot be quite different from appearances. According to Kant, therefore, an appearance is not an erroneous semblance, and it is not an *illusion* (*Schein*), either. For Kant, illusion arises when appearances are confused with things in themselves (B69). And this confusion originates particularly from a fallacy concerning the status of the *forms* of appearances. To illustrate, in ancient conception of appearance, especially in Plato, the form comes from the domain of *episteme* which is in a quite different plane. But for Kant, appearances have both matter and form in themselves:

> That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its *matter*; but that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in

> certain relations, I term the *form* of appearance …. [which] must lie ready for the sensations *a priori* in the mind (A20/B34).

Since transcendental philosophy deals with the *a priori* grounds of knowledge, that *form of appearance* furnished by sensibility is the main subject-matter of "Transcendental Aesthetic."

> In the transcendental aesthetic we shall, therefore, first *isolate* sensibility, by taking away from it everything which the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing may be left save empirical intuition. Secondly, we shall also separate off from it everything which belongs to sensation, so that nothing may remain save pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which is all that sensibility can supply *a priori*. In the course of this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition, serving as principles of *a priori* knowledge, namely, space and time. (A22/B36)

Thus, the pure forms of sensibility, the pure forms of intuitions, are space and time *in* which all appearances are given to us in certain relations. The limited human mind can know nothing but appearances ordered in space and time. Space is the form of outer sense. It provides me with the awareness of that the objects are outside of me. Time is the form of inner sense. I am, as an *empirical self*, aware of the succession of perceptions as *mine* in the pure intuition of time. All representations and the consciousness of them must be temporal.

Kant's point of view regarding the status of space and time is the vertebrae of critical philosophy. At the time, there were two main standpoints on this matter. The first one is *substantivalism*, held by Newton, which takes space and time as independent, absolute entities. The second, defended by Leibniz, is *relationalism* which propounds that space and time are derivative concepts. Kant's view on the

status of space and time was fed by both conceptions, and at the same time raised against them. In "Metaphysical Exposition"[89] of the concept of space, he asks:

> What, then, are space and time? Are they real existences? Are they only determinations or relations of things, yet such as would belong to things even if they were not intuited? Or are space and time such that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of our mind, apart from which they could not be ascribed to anything whatsoever? (A23/B37-38)

The second question refers to the *absolutist*, or *substantivalist* conception of space and time, namely Newtonian doctrine. By the third question, Kant means the *relationalist*, or Leibnizian standpoint. And, as it is clear, the last one is an expression of what is the status of space and time in transcendental idealism: "they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of our mind, apart from which they could not be ascribed to anything whatsoever."

The main purpose in "Transcendental Aesthetic" is to get to the bottom of "the general problem of transcendental philosophy: *how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?*" (B73). These judgments, as stated earlier, do not have their origin in mere experience, or conceptual analysis. Thus, neither any concept, nor any sensible object can be the place that we should seek for the conditions of the possibility of a synthetic *a priori* judgment. Space and time play the role of being grounds for synthetic *a priori*, which is presented in geometry and mathematics: "Time and space, taken together, are the pure forms of all sensible intuition, and so are what make *a priori* synthetic propositions possible." (A39/B56) In this wise, space and time constitute the foundations for the certainty of mechanical and mathematical sciences.

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[89] Kant states that "[b]y *exposition (expositio*) I mean the clear, though not necessarily exhaustive, representation of that which belongs to a concept: the exposition is *metaphysical* when it contains that which exhibits the concept *as given a priori*." (A23/B38) That is, in metaphysical expositions, it is shown that the representations of space and time are *a priori* intuitions. He assigns "Transcendental Expositions" to exhibit the possibility of synthetic *a priori* is based on space and time; "I understand by a transcendental exposition the explanation of a concept, as a principle from which the possibility other *a priori* synthetic knowledge can be understood." (A25/B40)

In "Metaphysical Expositions," Kant *exposes* the conceptions of space and time in transcendental philosophy item by item. In brief, they must be *a priori*, not empirical, and pure intuitions, not discursive concepts. They are not, therefore, derived from the relations of things. And we cannot think them as apart from our subjective conditions, meaning they are not in any relation to the things in themselves. That is, space and time do not have an absolute or transcendent reality.

In the "Elucidation" of the concept of time, there are objections against two opponent views concerning the ontology of space and time mentioned above. Kant reviews these approaches and states that they both have handicaps along with their advantages (A39-41/B56-58). The *substantivalism* which holds space and time as absolute realities has the advantage that it keeps the field of appearances open for mathematical propositions (A40/B57). The *relationalism* has an advantage of not being limited by the conditions of space and time in seeking the reality of objects since, according to this view, they are abstracted from the relations of things. This view held by *metaphysical students of nature*, however, is committed to deny apodictic certainty of mathematical science (A39-40/B56-57). For, what can be drawn from relations is merely a general character of things but not such a certainty.

The former view, defended by *mathematical students of nature,* is more challenging for Kant, especially in the case of space. This standpoint holds that absolute space is independent from measurable bodies, or as Newton calls, from relative spaces. Newton inferred this outcome from the laws of motion which are *inertia*, *force* and *conservation of energy*. And for him, it was clear that these laws required that there be a space besides the moving bodies. To illustrate, according to the law of inertia, a moving body follows straight lines unless stopped by a force. Kennedy comments that "[i]f the theory is correct, these straight lines must exist. There must be, in addition to moving material bodies, a geometric space that houses them."[90]

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[90] J. B. Kennedy, *Space, Time, and Einstein*, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal & Kingston, Ithaca, 2003, p. 108.

In 1768, Kant himself defended the absolutism of space and he made an argument for it: *incongruent counterparts*.[91] However, in the time of *Critique*, he had objections to the view of the absolute space for having transcendental reality. Kant holds the Newtonian inferences from the laws of motion, as the laws of appearances, but certainly in terms of the transcendental idealism. The absolute space in Kantian physics becomes, as Paul Guyer puts, "the framework of human intuition."[92]

However, the challenge has not been overcome, yet. Henry Allison raises a significant question: why cannot space be twofold, both the condition of human knowledge and the condition of things in themselves?[93] He says that things in themselves are unknowable to us, so we cannot say that they are not spatial or temporal.[94] N. K. Smith also introduces this problem, as asserted by Trendelenburg,

> Kant recognizes only two alternatives, either space as objective is known *a posteriori*, or being an *a priori* representation it is subjective in origin. There exists a third alternative, namely, that though our intuition of space is subjective in origin, space is itself an inherent property of things in themselves.[95]

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[91] The argument of *incongruent counterparts* can be referred by the term 'chirality' which is a feature of asymmetry. In physics, it refers to an object differs from its mirror image (see, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chirality). The problem is where this difference comes from. They are *counterparts* having the same size and shape, such as, right and left hands, or the letters p and q, yet they are *incongruent* not being able to occupy each other's space; the right and left gloves cannot be exchanged. This cannot be about the relations of these things (see, Kennedy, op.cit, pp.126-132). Much before the time of *Critique*, Kant used this argument as a proof of absolute space, independent of all matter "has a reality of its own." ("Inaugural Dissertation," in *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*, op.cit., pp. 373-416). About thirteen years later, he takes the argument of *incongruent counterparts* as a proof of that "space in general does not belong to the properties or relations of things in themselves" (Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, translated by Michael Friedman, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.19)

[92] Paul Guyer, *Kant*, New York, NY: Routledge, 2006, p.160.

[93] Allison, op.cit., p.108.

[94] Allison, ibid., 111.

[95] Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.113.

The implication of this passage is that *a priority* of space is not sufficient to prove that it is not in any relation to things in themselves. That space is *a priori* form of outer sense does not show us anything concerning things as they are in themselves. Thus, it is possible that space is the form of things in themselves, as well. There seems a wide discussion on whether or not this possibility can be disproved. In terms of the Kantian philosophy, if space and time are also an existence in relation with things in themselves, they must be both empirically and transcendentally real. Frankly, this possibility is not compatible with the fundamental assumptions of transcendental idealism. Yet, to accept that space and time are not transcendentally real as self-evident[96] is not also compatible with the method of critical philosophy. It must be shown that the idea of any relation between space and time to the things in themselves is fallacious.

In Allison's terms, space, as an *a priori* form of human experience, is an *epistemic condition*, and if it is taken transcendentally real, it would be an *ontological condition*.[97] Thus, the question is whether or not these conditions are mutually exclusive. Allison argues that there is sufficient material in "Transcendental Aesthetic" to prove transcendental ideality of space. He says "[t]he ideality thesis is therefore really a consequence of Kant's claim that space and time are epistemic conditions."[98] This means that the reason why space and time are not transcendentally real is that they are epistemic conditions. Newtonian space and time is understood by Kant as a confusion of epistemic conditions with ontological ones and "this is equivalent to the confusion of appearances with things in themselves."[99] However, this may not be satisfactory, and the objection may still be hold: why not are space and time both epistemic and ontological conditions? Kant has two arguments against this objection:

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[96] According to Vaihinger, Kant does so. Smith, op.cit., p. 113.

[97] Allison, op.cit., p. 109.

[98] Ibid., p.114.

[99] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

(i) Those who take space and time as absolute, subsistent entities are obliged to admit that space and time are "two eternal and infinite self-subsistent non-entities … which are there (yet without there being anything real) only in order to contain in themselves all that is real" (A39/B56). To illustrate, were space something over and above moving bodies, as held by Newtonian view, it would be immovable, because of not being a material body. Thus, it could not be experienced. In Kant's words from another text, "space without matter is no object of perception."[100] Thus, it is not empirically real, that is, it is not anything at all. Then, "it becomes impossible for us to prevent everything being thereby transformed into mere *illusion* …. even our own existence … would necessarily be changed with it into sheer illusion" (B70-71). From this point of view, it can be said that once something is thought as transcendentally real, it should be denied as having empirical reality. For, then it cannot be an object of experience being independent from the conditions of mind that constitute experience. Thus, by denying transcendental reality of space and time, empirical reality is insured. And thereby, the reliability of natural sciences which work with the empirical objects is guaranteed.

(ii) If things in themselves were spatiotemporal, since there would remain nothing unconditioned by space and time, human intuition could be in a position that it could intuit the things as they are in themselves. But this belongs to *original intuition*; sensible intuition "is not such as can itself give us the existence of its object—a mode of intuition which, so far as we can judge, can belong only to the primordial being." (B72) Furthermore, God would also be spatiotemporal (B71) as conditioned by space and time, and its intuition could not be *intellectual-original*; but it could be sensible as it is for human beings. And, also the God would be an object of sensible intuition, which is impossible (B71). It would not be, then, God at all. Thus, it can be said that Kant also protects God's existence in this way.

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[100] *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, op.cit., p.98.

The critical system's main work is to purify metaphysics from all illusions. And, as stated earlier, at the bottom of this work, the limits are to be acknowledged between what can be known and what can be merely thought, the limits that space and time constitute.

> It is, therefore, not merely possible or probable, but indubitably certain, that space and time, as the necessary conditions of all outer and inner experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuition, and that in relation to these conditions all objects are therefore mere appearances, and not given us as things in themselves which exist in this manner. (A48-49/B66)

To sum up, Transcendental Aesthetic shows that space and time are transcendentally ideal, that is, they are nothing apart from our subjective conditions; and empirically real, that is, they are not mere illusions, they have empirical reality, a reality which subjective conditions constitute. The transcendental ideality of space and time is a fundamental construction of transcendental idealism which guarantees the empirical reality of space and time, and therefore, the empirical reality of all possible objects of experience. Thus, the "Transcendental Aesthetic" has a substantial place in *Critique of Pure Reason*.

3.2. Transcendental Analytic

"Transcendental Aesthetic" has dealt with the elements of knowledge without which no object can be intuited. In "Transcendental Analytic," Kant elucidates the other elements, namely the concepts "without which no object can be thought" (A62/B87). He states, "transcendental analytic … is a logic of truth. For no knowledge can contradict it without at once losing all content, that is, all relation to any object, and therefore all truth." (A62-63/B87) The empirical reality of objects has been proved in the Aesthetic, now it's the turn for the concepts. That is to say, the empirical reality and validity of concepts will be demonstrated, and thence, that

the objects can be thought through concepts of understanding will be proved in this part of the *Critique*.

3.2.1. Understanding: The Faculty of Rules

Sensibility and understanding are two main sources of knowledge (A50/B74). As stated above, the former is the capacity of receptivity through which objects are given to us; the understanding is, on the other side, the faculty of concepts through which those objects are thought by us. Kant states "Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought." (A51/B75) Thus, intuitions and concepts, pure or empirical,[101] are two fundamental ingredients of all our knowledge which are inseparably related to each other: "It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts." (Ibid.) And it should be noted that "[t]hese two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise." (Ibid.) In this union, while sensibility plays its role as a passive receptivity, the understanding is an active faculty. This act of understanding is to judge in a spontaneous fashion by means of concepts (A68/B93). We can speak of an object and a concept in an action of judgment which ensures the conceptualization of the object. And judgment arises through the unification of representations in consciousness. Thinking in general is nothing but judging, so that, Kant states, "we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments, and the *understanding* may therefore be represented as a *faculty of judgment*." (A69/B94)

[101] An intuition or a concept is empirical when it contains sensation; and if it contains only the form of the thing which is intuited or thought, it is pure. Empirical intuitions and empirical concepts are possible *a posteriori* while the pure ones are possible only *a priori* (A50-51/B74-75).

An act of judgment is to be synthetic. For, there is a manifold of pure *a priori* intuition given in space and time and an empirical manifold is given to us through sensibility, and in order to be judged or grasped, any manifold, be it pure or empirical, needs to be organized in a certain way which is entitled as *synthesis* (A77/B102). This is the function of understanding on which the concepts rest, while intuitions *rest on affections* (*Affektionen*). A function means, Kant says, "the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation." (A68/B93) This synthetic act of understanding is thus a second order representation: "Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it." (Ibid.) Only by means of a judgment, which is a *higher* representation, we can discover the relation between a representation and its object (A69/B94).

Kant characterizes understanding (*Verstand*) in a variety of different ways: "as a spontaneity of knowledge (in distinction from the receptivity of sensibility), as a power of thought, as a faculty of concepts, or again of judgments" (A126). And, besides all these, Kant states, it is most essentially the *faculty of rules* which is, in this respect, "always occupied in investigating appearances, in order to detect some rule in them." (Ibid.) These rules, however, are not found in nature by themselves, "on the contrary, they have to confer upon appearances their conformity to law, and so to make experience possible." (Ibid.) The act of understanding is, therefore, more than devising rules: "it is itself the lawgiver of nature," without it, nature "would not exist at all." (A126-127) Although empirical laws do not derive their origin from understanding, all of them are only special determinations of the laws that emanate from it. Thus, the nature is the "synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to rules" of understanding (ibid.), and Kant puts that

> such synthetic unity [of nature] could not be established *a priori* if there were not subjective grounds of such unity contained *a priori* in the original cognitive powers of our mind, and if these subjective conditions, inasmuch as they are the grounds of the possibility of knowing any object whatsoever in experience, were not at the same time objectively valid. (A125-126)

Therefore, the human mind knows that there is an external world, since it is the one that constitutes that world: "Thus the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle *nature*, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances; had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there." (A125) In other words, my experience shows that I live in a world which is determined by the laws of the understanding of my species. From this designation of the nature, or the world, a much demanded conclusion can be drawn: natural sciences have objective validity since they are based on the synthesis of pure understanding. There is no more a justification problem for external world since the subjectivity itself is the very source of the objectivity of that world. However, this argument itself needs a justification, which is the central concern of the Deduction.

3.2.2. Transcendental Deduction

In their chapters of Analytic, all three critiques[102] have a deduction which is responsible for a justification, entitled as necessary in their own sphere of influence, respectively, of pure concepts of understanding, pure practical principles of practical reason and pure aesthetical judgments of taste.[103] In this respect, Kant initiates the deduction of the first *Critique* with an analogy of judiciary:

> JURISTS, when speaking of rights and claims, distinguish in a legal action the question of right (*quid juris*) from the question of fact (*quid facti*); and they demand that both be proved. Proof of the former, which has to state the right or the legal claim, they entitle the *deduction*. (A84/B116)

"Transcendental Deduction" has become one of the most controversial chapters of the *Critique*. For first of all, it has many complex arguments which can be, and have

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[102] *Critique of Pure Reason* (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 1781-1787), *Critique of Practical Reason* (*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, 1788), and *Critique of Judgment* (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 1790).

[103] For a brief information, see Howard Caygill, the entry of "Deduction" in *A Kant Dictionary*, Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Reference, 1995, pp. 151-153.

been, interpreted in many ways.[104] Paul Guyer states concerning this problematic character of this section of the *Critique* that "the deduction, which should have been the keystone to the triumphal arch of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, never amounted to more than a disjointed summary of significantly different strategies."[105]

Secondly, one of the most fundamental struggles of the first critique is processed in Deduction: the justification of the pure concepts of understanding, namely the categories.[106] In this respect, two essential issues of the *Critique* are discussed: objective reality and objective validity of concepts. Kant has already delivered this value of the Deduction in the first preface:

> I know no enquiries which are more important for exploring the faculty which we entitle understanding, and for determining the rules and limits of its employment, than those which I have instituted in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic under the title *Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding*. They are also those which have cost me the greatest labor—labor, as I hope, not unrewarded. (Axvi)

It is the deduction of the categories, a demonstration of that how concepts relate to objects, that knowledge is necessarily conceptual. In other words, that the categories can be applied to the objects of experience is justified here.

> Now among the manifold concepts which form the highly complicated web of human knowledge, there are some which are marked out for pure *a priori* employment, in

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[104] There is even an approach to it, named 'patchwork theory,' which implies that the Transcendental Deduction could have been an aggregation of arguments that were written at different times. The most prominent defenders of this theory are Hans Vaihinger, Erich Adickes and Norman Kemp Smith. See for further, Georges Dicker, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge: An Analytical Introduction*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. p.93ff.

[105] Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.73.

[106] Kant derives the table of categories (A80/B106) from the table of judgments (A70/B95) which is established through abstracting *the function of thought in judgment* from *all content of a judgment*, and taking *only the mere form of understanding* into account (ibid.). To put it briefly, they both have four classes, corresponding to each other's in the same order: quantity, quality, relation and modality.

> complete independence of all experience; and their right to be so employed always demands a deduction. For since empirical proofs do not suffice to justify this kind of employment, we are faced by the problem how these concepts can relate to objects which they yet do not obtain from any experience. (A85/B117)

Thus, this is a difficulty which is peculiar to the concepts of understanding, and which therefore, "we did not meet with in the field of sensibility" (A89/B122). Kant defines this difficulty as "how *subjective conditions of thought* can have *objective validity*, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects." (A89-90/B122) That is to say, "Transcendental Deduction" deals with revealing the conditions of that the objects of experience are thinkable by concepts. In a word, *Copernican Revolution* is proven here; that is, it is justified that objects must conform to the conditions of human mind.

Before getting into the details of this justification, another important point should be cleared about the Deduction. It is open to many debates for another reason that it has several important differences between two editions of *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the preface of the second edition, Kant says that he found this section of the first edition as doubtful (Bxxxviii), and he rewrote it. Later, these two different deductions of the first and the second editions[107] have been qualified as the subjective and objective deductions, respectively. Though he is not clear about which passages belong to one or the other, Kant himself uses these descriptions in the preface of the first edition to differentiate two sides of A-Deduction from each other: "The one refers to the objects of pure understanding, and is intended to expound and render intelligible the objective validity of its *a priori* concepts." (Axvi) He qualifies this objective side of enquiry as more essential to his purpose than the subjective side which "seeks to investigate the pure understanding itself, its possibility and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests; and so deals with it in its subjective aspect." (Axvi-xvii)

[107] From now on, I will call them shortly A-Deduction (1781) and B-Deduction (1787).

Kant was dissatisfied with A-Deduction probably because of the subjective side of it, since it, according to him, "is somewhat hypothetical in character" (Axvii) and, he thought he "would appear to be taking the liberty simply of expressing an *opinion*, in which case the reader would be free to express a different *opinion*." (Ibid.) And therefore, this part of the deduction might fail to convince the reader (ibid.). From this point of view, although there is no explanation of this sort, we can assume that the B-Deduction does not have a subjective side. Patricia Kitcher comments on this matter that

> I think Kant denigrated the first edition Subjective Deduction because he realized that his psychological speculations lacked proof and because he dimly saw that this type of psychological story could not be necessary, without seeing exactly how much of this material presented necessary features of all mental life, and how much presented accidental features of human cognition. In the second edition, the discussion of mental states and processes is remarkably abstract, and there is no apology.[108]

Now, to be able to follow the justification of the Deduction mentioned above, we need to get into detail on how knowledge arises from appearances.

3.2.2.1. The Threefold Synthesis

Kant suggests a method to justify the objective validity of the pure concepts of understanding: "If we can prove that by their means alone an object can be thought, this will be a sufficient deduction of them, and will justify their objective validity." (A96-97) We should thus show how an object of intuition is represented in an act of judgment which is an act of synthesis, through which representations are to be related to one another. "If each representation were completely foreign to every

[108] Patricia Kitcher, "Kant on Self-Identity", *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 91, No. 1 (Jan., 1982), pp. 41-72, p.52.

other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise. For knowledge is [essentially] a whole in which representations stand compared and connected." (A97) Thus, the synthesizing action is a *sine qua non* for knowledge. In A-Deduction, Kant introduces this act in three steps, as a "*threefold synthesis*," which "point to three subjective sources of knowledge" (ibid.): "[i] the *apprehension* of representations as modifications of the mind in intuition, [ii] their *reproduction* in imagination, and [iii] their *recognition* in a concept." (Ibid.)

i. The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition

Kant states that "[w]hatever the origin of our representations … they must all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus finally subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. In it they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation." (A98-99) Every representation is therefore a representation of a manifold only in so far as the temporal order can be distinguished (A99). The unity of this intuition is established through the *synthesis of apprehension* without which the manifold of successive moments cannot be held together. Time, as the form of all representations, has this fundamental role. Experience is not an aggregation of the isolated moments; it flows through time as a manifold. And, "[i]n order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold … it must first be run through, and held together. This act I name the *synthesis of apprehension*, because it is directed immediately upon intuition" (ibid.).

"What is first given to us is appearance" (A120) which, in order to be an object for us, must be combined with one another through the synthesis of apprehension. However, it can only be performed by an active faculty. Therefore, this faculty cannot be sensibility. The transcendental faculty of imagination comes into play here and its action, "when immediately directed upon perceptions, I entitle apprehension. Since imagination has to bring the manifold of intuition into the form of an image, it must previously have taken the impressions up into its activity, that is, have apprehended them." (Ibid.)

ii. The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination

The synthesis of apprehension however cannot produce the regularity of perceptions by itself. It must be combined with the synthesis of reproduction. Thus, "there exists [another] subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside the subsequent perception to which it has passed, and so to form whole series of perceptions. This is the reproductive faculty of imagination, which is merely empirical." (A121)

The imagination is pure if it is in relation with only the pure manifolds of space and time. And it is reproductive when there is an empirical content in the synthesis. It synthesizes intuitions, reproduces representations *under* the management of the concepts of understanding. Thereby, *now* is to be with past, past can be thought in *now*. Kant gives to the faculty of imagination a role of intermediating between sensibility and understanding; it is invoked as a bridge between the concepts and objects.[109] Thus, the transcendental faculty of imagination has a central role in synthesizing knowledge: "Synthesis in general … is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever" (A78/B103).

iii. The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept

In this last step, the whole synthesis is brought together under the concepts of understanding. This occurs through the consciousness of this synthesis.

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[109] In Kantian terminology, imagination has a variety of roles changing in virtue of the context. In the *Critique of Judgment*, for example, we encounter a faculty of imagination which is quite different from it as introduced in the context above. It is an extraneous matter here, but worth to mention albeit briefly. In an act of aesthetic judgment, the faculty of imagination occurs in a free interplay with the understanding, whereas they are in a lawful connection in respect to theoretical knowledge. The imagination is here not reproductive but productive. To illustrate, in the face of a beautiful object, the imagination makes us experience it only *now and here, as if* it were creating this object. Thus, in this context, there is no relation to past or future or to a causal necessity in the temporal succession. (See, Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, translated, with an introduction, by Werner S. Pluhar; with a foreword by Mary Gregor, Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub. Co., 1987.)

> If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless. For it would in its present state be a new representation which would not in any way belong to the act whereby it was to be gradually generated. The manifold of the representation would never, therefore, form a whole, since it would lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it. (A103)

At this point, Kant lays out his doctrines about the transcendental object, the transcendental apperception and the relation between them. These notions are necessary to yield a satisfactory justification for the relation between concepts and objects, which is the most important target of the "Transcendental Deduction." The following section is designated for the former notion, namely transcendental object, and there will be a section about the transcendental apperception onward.

3.2.2.2. Transcendental Object

The notion of 'transcendental object' is mentioned only in A-Deduction. However, it has an importance for the purposes of the deduction in general, the foremost of which is to prove the objective validity of knowledge. As stated, the problem of the relation between a representation and its object is very central to the critical investigation. To form a satisfactory answer to the question "How does a representation refer to its object?" first of all, as Kant states, "we must make clear to ourselves what we mean by the expression 'an object of representations'." (A104) Even though it has also been translated to English as 'object,' Kant uses here the word *Gegenstand* which means, in Kantian terminology, an object which is not yet formed by pure intuitions, or unified by concepts while an *Objekt* is the one intuited, or known by us with a unity.[110] The former is the correspondent of the

[110] These words are not strictly separated throughout the critique. Kant sometimes employs them even as synonyms. But we can deduce the above definitions from the passages where Kant wants to underline the distinction between an *Objekt* and a *Gegenstand*, namely, the object of knowledge in

latter. That is to say, a *Gegenstand* is an object which is not yet an *Objekt* (of knowledge), an object of representations which is not a representation itself.

A fundamental question, addressed by Kant, arises from this point: "What, then, is to be understood when we speak of [a *Gegenstand*] corresponding to, and consequently also distinct from, our knowledge?" (Ibid.) and apparently, "this [*Gegenstand*] must be thought only as something in general = *x*, since outside our knowledge we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding to it." (Ibid.) In other words, since we cannot look from the other side of experience, we cannot see that which is *corresponding to, and consequently also distinct from* our representations. We need the concept of 'an object' in order to think that the knowledge is not imaginary or irregular. In so far as the knowledge relates to a *Gegenstand* whose concept can and "must be thought only as something in general = *x*", all modes of knowledge harmonize "with one another, that is, [they] must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object." (A104-5) Paul Guyer states that Kant "defines the general concept of an object that is distinct from our representations, but is yet not assumed to be a thing in itself, as the concept of

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general and the reciprocal of it in experience. It will be more clear to show Kant's employment of this kind with an example in its original language:

> Wir haben oben an den Begriffen des Raumes und der Zeit mit leichter Mühe begreiflich machen können, wie diese als Erkenntnisse a priori sich gleichwohl auf Gegenstände notwendig beziehen müssen; und eine synthetische Erkenntnis derselben, unabhängig von aller Erfahrung, möglich machten. Denn da nur vermittelst solcher reinen Formen der Sinnlichkeit uns ein *Gegenstand* erscheinen, d. i. ein *Objekt* der empirischen Anschauung sein kann, so sind Raum und Zeit reine Anschauungen, welche die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände als Erscheinungen a priori enthalten, und die Synthesis in denselben hat objektive Gültigkeit. (My emphases)

English translation:

> We have already been able with but little difficulty to explain how the concepts of space and time, although *a priori* modes of knowledge, must necessarily relate to objects, and how independently of all experience they make possible a synthetic knowledge of objects. For since only by means of such pure forms of sensibility can an object [*Gegenstand*] appear to us, and so be an object [*Objekt*] of empirical intuition, space and time are pure intuitions which contain *a priori* the condition of the possibility of objects as appearances, and the synthesis which takes place in them has objective validity. (A89/B121-122)

the ‘transcendental object’ of experience.”[111] Indeed, in analysis of this section, we see that the concept of ‘an object’ in general is nothing but the concept of the ‘transcendental object’ of experience.

The problem of the relation between a representation and its object has its source in the need of objective validity. Had Kant ignored this, he would have been committed to a Berkeley’s kind of subjectivism. He was aware of the necessity of a justification of the objective *reality* corresponding to our knowledge. We can know things merely as they appear to us but “we must yet be in position at least to *think* them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.” (Bxxvi) In this context, the transcendental object meets this need; it is employed as a hinge of objective validity of knowledge which demands that there be a reality independent from us, a reality that exists intersubjectively. But this concept of the ‘transcendental object’ of experience cannot be an object of experience itself since, as Kitcher puts, it “cannot contain anything definite but refers only to the necessary unity of an object”[112] and the experience of an object arises “only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition.” (A105)

At this point, Kant introduces another necessary condition of the knowledge which will be a topic of another section onwards: *transcendental apperception* (*transzendentale Apperzeption*) (A106-107). It is the transcendental ground of “the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions” (A106), and thus it is the transcendental subject that underlies “the concepts of objects in general, and so of all objects of experience.” (Ibid.) After clarifying the transcendental apperception, Kant employs the term ‘transcendental object’ as follows,

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[111] Paul Guyer, “Transcendental Deduction of The Categories” in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, edited by Paul Guyer, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp.123-160, p.145.

[112] Patricia Kitcher, op.cit., p.73.

> Now … we are in a position to determine more adequately our concept of an *object* in general. All representations have, as representations, their object. … Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately. … But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representations, which in turn have their object –an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is, transcendental object = *x*. (A108-109)

Since this object cannot be intuited, and since the "pure concept of this transcendental object … in reality throughout all our knowledge is always one and the same"[113] (A109), it is linked merely with the necessary unity of consciousness, that is, the unity of transcendental apperception (A109), or transcendental subject. In the chapter "Phenomena and Noumena", Kant mentions once more this relation between transcendental object and the unity of apperception:

> All our representations are … referred by the understanding to some object; and since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to a *something*, as the object of sensible intuition. But this something … is only the transcendental object; and by that is meant a something = X, of which we know … nothing whatsoever, but which, as a correlate of the unity of apperception, can serve only for the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition. (A250)

It seems that the transcendental object and the transcendental subject are two sides of experience whose relation to one another guarantees the objective validity of the knowledge. However, both of them are unknown to us. Despite this unknowability of the transcendental object, it should not be confused with the thing in itself. Kant states that "[t]he object to which I relate appearance in general is the transcendental object, that is, the completely indeterminate thought of *something* in general. This cannot be entitled the *noumenon*; for I know nothing of what it is in itself, and have no concept of it." (A253) The thing in itself cannot be related to the sensibility

[113] It is not plural but this does not mean that it is singular since the application of the concept of singularity, as well as plurality, occurs only *in* and about space and time where counting can occur. Thus, 'one and the same' refers to the meaning of being non-empirical.

whereas the transcendental object "cannot be separated from the sense data, for nothing is then left through which it might be thought" (A250-251). I will return this issue concerning the transcendental subject in the following chapter.

3.3. Transcendental Dialectic

As cited earlier, Kant introduces the "*critique of pure reason*" as "the tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions" (Axi). The former part of this task, *i.e.* "assuring the lawful claims of reason," has been achieved in the previous chapters of *Critique*. In other words, in pursuit of Kant's project, metaphysics is possible as a science insofar as it is the metaphysics of objective experience and this science has been established in "Transcendental Aesthetic" and "Transcendental Analytic." In "Transcendental Dialectic," the undertaking of the tribunal is to be completed in its negative sense. That is to say, the illegitimate use of the reason is to be demonstrated here, and "all groundless pretensions," arisen from this usage, are to be dismissed by the critique.

The term 'dialectic' has its own history which has been considered as identical to the history of philosophy.[114] The beginning of this history is commonly ascribed to Ancient Greece. The word originates from the Greek word *dialektike* (*techne*) which means the art of philosophical discussion. Kant argues that this ancient art "was never anything else than the *logic of illusion*." (A61/B86) It is a kind of logic since the general logic is in play here, and it is an illusion since there is a mistaken usage of this logic. For Kant, the general logic is "merely a *canon* of judgment" (A61/B85). When it is used as an *organon*, like in the ancient conception, it is "always a logic of illusion." (A61/B86) This twofold usage –true and illusory– is in

[114] Barbara Cassin (ed.), *Vocabulaire Européen des Philosophies*, translated by M.K. Jensen, Paris: Le Robert & Seuil, 2004, p. 306. See also, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectic.

effect for transcendental logic, as well.[115] In its true way of application, that is, when it is used as a canon, we have "a logic of truth" called "Transcendental Analytic" (A62/B87). When it is taken as an organon, there is "a *logic of illusion*" (*eine Logik des Scheins*) called "Transcendental Dialectic" (A293/B349).

Illusion (*Schein*) is among the cornerstone concepts upon which the transcendental idealism is built.[116] Kant had started to investigate the source of illusory thinking in *Dreams* (1766). According to him, people like a spirit-seer "place the phantoms of their imagination outside of themselves"[117] and his primary concern was the question "how is such a delusion possible?" In the Dissertation (1770), he called "illusions of understanding" as "*hybrid* axioms" since they spring from a "confusion of what belongs to the understanding with what is sensitive"[118] and he started to seek a "touchstone" to weed out these "*subreptic axioms*" from the "genuine judgments."[119]

In *Critique of Pure Reason*, we can see Kant's advanced doctrine of illusion. Here, he emphasizes that *illusion* means neither *probability* nor *appearance*. For *probability*, he says, "is truth, known however on insufficient grounds, and the knowledge of which, though thus imperfect, is not on that account deceptive" (A293/B349). And *illusion* should not be confused with *appearance* either since the latter is the object of empirical intuition, *i.e.*, it is related to the senses and

> truth or illusion is not in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it, in so far as it is thought. It is therefore correct to say that the senses do not err -- not because they always judge rightly but because they do not judge at all.

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[115] The difference between the general logic and transcendental logic lies in the distinction between pure and empirical thoughts. In transcendental logic, all knowledge with empirical content should be excluded, thus, it should contain "solely the rules of the pure thought of an object" (A55/B80).

[116] See Howard Caygill, the entry of "Illusion" in *A Kant Dictionary*, op.cit., pp.243-245.

[117] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, op.cit., p. 77.

[118] "Inaugural Dissertation" op.cit., p.408.

[119] Ibid.

> Truth and error, therefore, and consequently also illusion as leading to error, are only to be found in the judgment, *i.e.* only in the relation of the object to our understanding. (A293/B350)

However, the laws of understanding do not produce such error by themselves either. "Thus neither the understanding by itself (uninfluenced by another cause), nor the senses by themselves, would fall into error." (A294/B350) Since the sensibility and the understanding are the only springs of our knowledge and neither of them by itself cannot be the ground of illusion, there must be a source in between: "error is brought about solely by the unobserved influence of sensibility on the understanding, through which it happens that the subjective grounds of the judgment enter into union with the objective grounds and make these latter deviate from their true function." (A294/B350-351)

There is another distinction that we should bear in mind. In Dialectic, what is dealt with neither an "empirical (*e.g.* optical) illusion" (A295/B351) or a logical illusion (of formal fallacies) (A296/B353). Here, "we are concerned only with *transcendental illusion*, which exerts its influence on principles that are in no wise intended for use in experience" (A295/B352), and which is to be found only in a judgment, as just stated. In the case of transcendental illusion, there is a difficulty with which we are not confronted in other kinds: "That the illusion should, like logical illusion, actually disappear and cease to be an illusion [when attention is brought to bear], is something which transcendental dialectic can never be in a position to achieve." (A297-298/B354) This is because a transcendental illusion is "*natural* and inevitable" to human reason (A298/B354). "There exists, then, a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason … [which] even after its deceptiveness has been exposed, will not cease to play tricks with reason" (A298/B354-355).

In *Dreams*, Kant started to contemplate concerning the proper metaphysics which should be "the science of the boundaries of human reason."[120] He has fulfilled and presented this projection in the previous parts of the *Critique*. In Dialectic, the modes of transcendence of those boundaries by the reason, namely the types of illusion, are to be detected. Now, let's understand what the reason stands for in the system of transcendental philosophy.

Kant's transcendental idealism, as empirical realism, limits our knowledge to the empirical world. This world, or nature, is the object of experience, meaning it is the object of theoretical knowledge, but it is itself as a whole cannot be an object of any experience. Theoretical knowledge is about nature of particular and contingent experience which is insufficient to comprehend the totality of experience. However, reason demands that nature be a whole system, not an aggregation of parts. Pure intuitions of sensibility, pure concepts of understanding, and the unity of consciousness determine the nature with universal necessity and objective validity. And, the transcendental ideas of reason guide us to comprehend the totality of experience. These ideas are 'the soul,' 'the world' and 'the God.'

Kant pursues Plato's treatment of the concept of 'idea' concerning the transcendental ideas of pure reason in such a way that they cannot be found in nature by means of experience. He states that "Plato found the chief instances of his ideas in the field of the practical, that is, in what rests upon freedom, which in its turn rests upon modes of knowledge that are a peculiar product of reason." (A314-315/B371) Indeed, in the dialogues by which Plato exposes his theory of ideas, he follows the concept of virtue, as in the *Meno*, or the moral truth, as in the *Republic*. Kant asserts that "[f]or Plato ideas are archetypes of the things themselves," (A313/B370) and in Plato's epistemology, the authentic knowledge (*episteme*) is the knowledge of these ideas. In other words, the knowledge in Plato's terms becomes a manifestation of the things in themselves. This is certainly unacceptable

[120] Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, op.cit., p.113.

for Kant, but as stated above, he is in agreement with Plato: the ideas cannot be derived from experience. He says "I understand by idea a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience." (A327/B383)

Transcendental ideas, or the concepts of pure reason, have a crucial role in gaining knowledge. As mentioned above, reason demands totality, and this is why its function, Kant states, "in its inferences consists in the universality of knowledge" (A321/B378). This demand of reason is for the *unconditioned*. In Kant's words:

> The transcendental concept of reason is, therefore, none other than the concept of *totality* of the *conditions* for any given conditioned. Now since it is the *unconditioned* alone which makes possible the totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned, a pure concept of reason can in general be explained by the concept of unconditioned, conceived as containing a ground of the synthesis of the conditioned. (A322/B379)

And there are three types of *unconditioned* corresponding to three types of inference:

> The number of pure concepts of reason will be equal to the number of kinds of relation which the understanding represents to itself by means of categories. We have therefore to seek for an *unconditioned*, first, of the *categorical* synthesis in a *subject*; secondly, of the *hypothetical* synthesis of members of a *series*; thirdly, of the *disjunctive* synthesis of the parts in a *system*. (A323/B379)

Transcendental ideas, namely soul, world and God, are in accordance with these *unconditioned* unities: "the *first* containing the absolute (unconditioned) *unity* of the *thinking subject*, the *second* the absolute *unity of the series of conditions of appearance*, the *third* the absolute *unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general*." (A334/B391) Besides, these ideas compose the subject-matter of three transcendental doctrines, respectively: psychology, cosmology, and theology. And "each of these sciences is an altogether pure and genuine product, or problem, of pure reason." (A335/B392)

The ideas of pure reason are transcendental as they exceed the limits of experience in pursuit of the *unconditioned*. Thus, we do not have the aid of experience here since through experience we cannot find any object of a transcendental idea. For this reason, Kant claims, we can have no concept of *a purely transcendental idea* (A338/B396). Ascribing a *reality* to the transcendental ideas is a result of a *necessary syllogism* by an inference "from something we know to something else of which we have no concept, and to which, owing to inevitable illusion, we yet ascribe objective reality." (A339/397) Kant calls these inferences *pseudo-rational* even though they arise from "the very nature of reason." (Ibid.) And he differentiates three kinds of dialectical syllogism corresponding to three ideas: the transcendental *Paralogisms*, which will be discussed in the following sections, the *Antinomy* of pure reason, and the *Ideal* of pure reason. Now, it's time to get into detail of Kant's account of self that we can infer from the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

4

THE SELF IN CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

4.1. The Self in Deduction

So far we have some evidence that although Kant does not have a prosperous account about the existence of the self, this concept has a substantial role in his transcendental philosophy. This role, which is introduced mostly in Deduction, is generally expressed through the doctrine of 'transcendental unity of apperception' and thus what we can grasp about Kant's account of self in the first *Critique* is inseparably tied with this notion. It is possible to find a great number of studies on apperception in Kantian literature, since it is widely accepted that it occupies a very central place in transcendental philosophy. However, there is not much agreement among interpreters on what this notion stands for.

Transcendental unity of apperception is, in a few words, the unity of consciousness which generates the representation "I think" that must *accompany* all my representations (B131). It is "*a priori* ground of all concepts," and by this means, it stands as the necessary ground of the objective unity of experience (A107). However, when we ask the question about its whatness, we are left in dark. Douglas Mann uses a metaphor to emphasize this inscrutability of the unity of transcendental apperception: "it is the black box of Kant's Critique, the impenetrable monolith about which little can be said. … We cannot know anything about it except that it exists and that is must be one."[121]

[121] Douglas Mann "Kant's Theory of Time and the Unity of the Self", *South African Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 15, Issue 2 (May, 1996), pp. 51-59, p.8 (in the downloaded version).

Despite its problematic character, Kant's intention with this doctrine is to unravel some problems which have been essential to the philosophy in general. José Luis Bermúdez states that the domain to which the unity of apperception is related is significantly broader in scope than Kant exercises: "The problems which Kant attempts to solve with the unity of apperception remain of central interest to philosophers concerned with self-consciousness and personal identity."[122]

To begin with, it should be comprehended more profoundly what is the role of this unity in Kantian framework, and what problems it is invoked to solve. In Deduction, Kant introduces transcendental apperception as the unity of consciousness which generates the representation "I think". He says that "all necessity, without exception, is grounded in" this condition (A106) thanks to which I have the awareness of that experience is my own. It is the *original* and *transcendental* condition "which makes experience itself possible" (A107). It has therefore an exceptional importance in grasping any kind of knowledge:

> It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me … All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found. But this representation is an act of *spontaneity*, that is, it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it *pure apperception* … or … *original apperception*, because it is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation '*I think*' (a representation which must be capable of accompanying all other representations, and which in all consciousness is one and the same), cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation. The unity of this apperception I likewise entitle the *transcendental* unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of *a priori* knowledge arising from it. (B131-132)

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[122] José Luis Bermúdez, "The Unity of Apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason", *European Journal of Philosophy* 2 (Dec., 1994), pp. 213-240, p. 213.

Experience in general must have a simple unity and all modes of knowledge arisen from experience must connect with each other through this unity of experience. The service of transcendental apperception is here in the ground of this unity;

> There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible. This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name *transcendental apperception*. That it deserves this name is clear from the fact that even the purest objective unity, namely, that of the *a priori* concepts (space and time), is only possible through relation of the intuitions to such unity of consciousness. (A107)

It is a transcendental condition, without which neither an object can be thought, nor can I be aware of myself, since only by means of this condition both a unity is given to the representations in intuition and awareness is furnished to me. That is to say, the unity of transcendental apperception is the ground of the unity of both object and subject. It can be said that this unity is the subjective ground of objective conditions of which an *Objekt* corresponds to a *Gegenstand*, since the form of outer intuition, *i.e.* space, does not yet supply any knowledge by itself; it just provides the manifold for a possible knowledge, which can arise solely in a connection to the synthetic unity of consciousness:

> To know anything in space (for instance, a line), I must *draw* it, and thus synthetically bring into being a determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (as in the concept of a line); and it is through this unity of consciousness that an object (a determinate space) is first known. The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all knowledge. It is not merely a condition that I myself require in knowing an object, but is a condition under which every intuition must stand in order *to become an object for me*. For otherwise, in the absence of this synthesis, the manifold would *not* be united in one consciousness. (B137-138)

It should be rephrased here that ‘the concept of an object’ is one of the conditions of the possibility of objectivity. When we say “the object in general”, we speak of all

possible objects of experience, but not such experience of 'the object in general'. Objectivity is not something that can be experienced, and that is why we need 'the concept of an object in general,' namely 'transcendental object.' As stated in the relevant section, this *object* is related to nothing but the transcendental unity of apperception which belongs to one consciousness. Thus, as it has been already indicated in several ways, the conditions of objectivity lie in subjectivity. In such a manner that our experience is not a chaos since it includes regularity in the organization of which the faculty of judgment plays a crucial role. The function of this faculty is a synthetic act through which a *Gegenstand* is grasped as an *Objekt*. This act, as we have seen, processed through the *threefold synthesis*: in the first step, a manifold of representations is given to sensibility; in the second, it is reproduced by imagination; and in the third, this manifold is united under the concepts of understanding, namely categories. This last step occurs by the mediation of the objective unity of consciousness which is entitled transcendental unity of apperception. Kant says,

> *Understanding* is, to use general terms, *the faculty of knowledge*. This knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an object; and an *object* is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is *united*. Now all unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge; and upon it therefore rests the very possibility of the understanding. (B137)

The possibility of the objective reality and validity of the concepts, and thereby, the objective unity of experience is thus based on the transcendental unity of apperception since it is the mediation between an object and a concept: "The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object." (B139) The apperception is, therefore, the ground on which the unity of an object and the unity of the judgment related to that object are based. It is *the highest point of the human*

knowledge "to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself." (B134 fn.)

Kant repeatedly emphasizes that transcendental apperception must not be confused with the empirical one. Since it is the ground of the objective unity of experience, "through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object" (B139), the transcendental unity of apperception is "entitled *objective*, and must be [thus] distinguished from the *subjective* unity of consciousness" (ibid.), namely empirical consciousness which is a *determination* of *inner sense* whose form is time. In almost all passages where Kant speaks of "empirical apperception", his intention is to underline that it is not transcendental or pure consciousness. As we can recall that there was a similar distinction in the preface of second edition. He mentions there that we should take the self in a *twofold sense* in just the same way we take objects as appearances and things in themselves (Bxxvii). This distinction is necessary when it comes to the morality. We need freedom in order that we can take moral responsibilities, and act according to the practical principles. This is possible only through a self which is not subject to the law of nature (Bxxviii). But the 'I' of the apperception corresponds to neither phenomenal nor noumenal self (B422-423fn.), in a parallel manner that the transcendental object is neither an object of appearance (phenomenon), nor a thing in itself (noumenon). I will return this issue in the following sections.

Thus, morality is not the reason here that we should distinguish the transcendental consciousness from the empirical one. Empirical consciousness is one of the places *in* which the *three subjective sources of knowledge* play their representing roles: "*Sense* represents appearances empirically in *perception*, *imagination* in *association* (and reproduction), *apperception* in the *empirical consciousness* of the identity of the reproduced representations with the appearances whereby they were given, that is, in recognition." (A115) Thus, it has a fundamental role in grasping knowledge: it accompanies the perceptions so that I am aware that I perceive. Through this consciousness, I recognize that what I perceive now is the same as what I perceived

a moment before (*the identity of reproduced representations*) and thereby, the *phenomenal self* is apprehended. But we must not confuse it with the transcendental consciousness, or let say 'apperceptive self.' For, the empirical consciousness does not have a necessary unity since "[w]hether I can become *empirically* conscious of the manifold as simultaneous or as successive depends on circumstances or empirical conditions. Therefore the empirical unity of consciousness … itself concerns an appearance, and is wholly contingent." (B139-140)

Hence, the empirical consciousness cannot deliver the necessary unity to the manifold of representations. What it accompanies is inner appearances which are always in a flow: "Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances." (A107) Here, Hume's renowned words recur to the mind: "I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."[123] It is clear that Kant takes over the flag from Hume in the context that the introspection does not provide a way to detect the identity since there is nothing permanent in inner self. However, in transcendental philosophy, what Hume calls "a bundle or collection" becomes the "phenomenal self" with a consciousness named *inner sense* or *empirical apperception* (ibid.).

However, "[w]hat has *necessarily* to be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data. To render such a transcendental presupposition valid, there must be a condition which precedes all experience, and which makes experience itself possible." (Ibid.) From these words, we can infer that Kant thinks, contrary to Hume, that there is a *fixed and abiding self*, and it *presents itself* as *numerically identical* through time. This *self* corresponds to the *transcendental apperception* which is "pure original unchangeable consciousness"

[123] Hume, "Of Personal Identity", in *Treatise*, op.cit., p.165.

(ibid.). The problem is that although the transcendental apperception corresponds to a *fixed and abiding self*, it does not provide us with any knowledge of (it)self. I know that there is one and the same self throughout my experience but I do not have any knowledge about it. Thus, Kant's doctrine of transcendental apperception tells us that there is a self but it admits nothing about its existence. In other words, it exists but to say that it exists in such and such a way is problematic.

As stated in the first chapter, the consciousness of my having an experience is not a self-knowledge, in Kant's words, "[t]he consciousness of self is … very far from being a knowledge of the self" (B158). The question arises: how can I be conscious of myself and not know at the same time the way of existence of myself? A passage from *Critique* can be illuminative:

> The 'I think' expresses the act of determining my existence. Existence is already given thereby, but the mode in which I am to determine this existence, that is, the manifold belonging to it, is not thereby given. In order that it be given, self-intuition is required; and such intuition is conditioned by a given *a priori* form, namely, time, which is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable [in me]. Now since I do not have another self-intuition which gives the *determining* in me (I am conscious only of the spontaneity of it) prior to the act of *determination*, as time does in the case of the determinable, I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of the determination; and my existence is still only determinable sensibly, that is, as the existence of an appearance. But it is owing to this spontaneity that I entitle myself an *intelligence*. (B158fn.)

My existence is *given* but it is not *determinable* since what is responsible (*determining*) to *determine* in me is this very existence. In other words, since "prior to the act of *determination*," there is no other *determining* in me (as "another self-intuition"), I cannot *determine* the mode of my existence. In order to *determine* this *spontaneous* existence, I need to intuit it. However, there is no such intuition for human kind independent from sensibility (A51/B75). I am an *intelligence*, but I do not have *intellectual intuition* only which can *determine* its *spontaneous* act of

determining. And that is why, "I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being." Such an intelligence which does not have an *intellectual intuition* "therefore, can know itself only as it appears to itself in respect of an intuition which is not intellectual and cannot be given by the understanding itself, not as it would know itself if its *intuition* were intellectual." (B159) Thus, an intuition of self can only be empirical through inner sense which provides a knowledge of subject as an object, *i.e.* as an appearance. That is to say, the subject cannot intuit itself as a *thinking* thing, but only as a thing which is *thought*, *i.e.* an object. Kant indicates a difficulty to differentiate the thinking subject and the subject as an object.:

> How the 'I' that thinks can be distinct from the 'I' that intuits itself, … and yet, as being the same subject, can be identical with the latter; and how, therefore, I can say: "I, as intelligence and *thinking* subject, know myself as an object that is *thought*, in so far as I am given to myself [as something other or] beyond that [I] which is [given to myself] in intuition, and yet know myself, like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself, not as I am to the understanding" -- these are questions that raise no greater nor less difficulty than how I can be an object to myself at all, and, more particularly, an object of intuition and of inner perceptions (B155).

Following this passage, he argues that it must be "easily shown" how the subject can be an object to itself: "If, then, … we admit that we know objects only in so far as we are externally affected, we must also recognize, as regards inner sense, that by means of it we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected *by ourselves*." (B156) Moreover, Kant argues, just as the knowledge of an outer object is dependent on the conditions of mind, the knowledge of an inner sense that of the *phenomenal self* is linked to the knowledge of something outside. He mentions this interdependency in the preface of the second edition:

> [T]hrough inner *experience* I am conscious of *my existence* in time (consequently also of its determinability in time), and this is more than to be conscious merely of my representation. It is identical with the *empirical consciousness of my existence*, which is determinable only through relation to something which, while bound up with my existence, is outside me. This consciousness of my existence in time is

> bound up in the way of identity with the consciousness of a relation to something outside me, and it is therefore experience not invention, sense not imagination, which inseparably connects this outside something with my inner sense. (Bxl.fn.)

This passage connotes that just as all representations must necessarily be related to a consciousness, the *empirical consciousness of my existence* is bound up with a representation of something outside me. Thus, for Kant, there is no empirical consciousness without a consciousness of an object.[124] And, the identity of self-consciousness cannot be drawn from empirical consciousness. For, since it always, "concerns an appearance, and is wholly contingent" (B140), there is always a flow of representations and no identity between their consciousnesses. A significant role of transcendental unity of apperception, as a purely logical condition, is here to enable me to think that there is an identity of self-consciousness, that I have numerical identity through this flow of representations. But I cannot *determine* the bearer of this identity, since I can know myself solely as I appear to myself which by itself does not provide self-identity. Underlining for the last time: transcendental unity of apperception provides not a knowledge but a consciousness of itself since,

> in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a *thought*, not an *intuition*. Now in order to *know* ourselves, there is required in addition to the act of thought, … a determinate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given; it therefore follows that although my existence is not indeed appearance (still less mere illusion), the determination of my existence can take place only in conformity with the form of inner sense … Accordingly I have no *knowledge* of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself. (B157-158)

Now, I turn to the readings of some Kant scholars on the topics of 'transcendental apperception' and 'the self' in the Deduction. There is a variety of studies on these notions that it would exceed the dimensions of this thesis to refer to all of them. I

[124] The roots of the motto of phenomenology can be found here: "the consciousness is always a consciousness of something."

will mention mainly a few prominent interpretations. In doing this, I will look for the answers to the question "What does the doctrine of transcendental unity of apperception tell us about the self in Deduction?" The readings of Patricia Kitcher and Henry Allison seem to be a good selection because we can depict some distinctions among their approaches.

Patricia Kitcher, who is a well-known Kant interpreter, examines Kant's project in the *Critique* under the title of "Transcendental Psychology,"[125] which is "the psychology of the knowing mind."[126] Regarding the difficulty in comprehending Kant's doctrine of the self, she states that "[t]he problem with Kant's views about the self is that he has too many of them because the self has too many roles to play in his system."[127] She describes the featured notions of the self in the *Critique* as follows:

> Officially, the *Critique* maintains that there are two selves or that the self may be viewed from two perspectives. From one perspective, it is understood as "phenomenal" or "empirical," "passive," subject to natural laws, and hence unfit to be the object of moral criticism. According to the other, the self is "noumenal," completely unknown and unknowable, but morally evaluable.[128]

According to her, it is more justified to take the two perspectives on the self than the two-self theory.[129] However, there is a problem concerning the transcendental unity of apperception, which generates the representation "I think", and thereby provides the identity of self-consciousness: it does not settle into this two-perspective theory. Kitcher claims that Kant

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[125] See Kitcher, *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*.

[126] Ibid., p.21, fn.75 (p.235).

[127] "Kant on Self-Identity", p.41.

[128] *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*, p.139.

[129] Ibid., p.139, fn.54 (p.257).

> occasionally entertained hopes of using the spontaneity of apperception to make a case for transcendental freedom. Although that project is abandoned in the *Critique*, the possibility of transcendental freedom is still supposed to be established by the phenomenal-noumenal distinction. The problem is that apperception falls on the wrong side of this distinction, and so threatens to undermine its point.[130]

Since the noumenal aspect of self cannot be known, the doctrine of apperception must only be related to the phenomenal self and, Kitcher argues, there is "no coherent alternative."[131] She states that "[i]f the phenomenal—noumenal distinction is exclusive and exhaustive, then the transcendental psychology must be about the phenomenal self, and so empirical, for the straightforward reason that no positive doctrines can be noumenal,"[132] and since it is at the heart of this psychology, the unity of apperception is not something which is disparate from empirical apperception. However, there must be a justification for why Kant entitled this doctrine as "transcendental apperception" and insisted that it must be distinguished from the empirical one. In Kitcher's account, that the unity of apperception is transcendental means that the synthetic connection of mental states is a *necessary* condition for knowledge in general.[133] She says that

> the "unity of apperception" refers to the fact that cognitive states are connected to each other through syntheses required for cognition. "Apperception" does not indicate any awareness of a separate thing, a "self," or even that different cognitive states belong to a separate thing, a "self." Rather, they belong to the unity of apperception in being connected by syntheses to each other.[134]

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[130] Ibid., p.139.

[131] Ibid., p.140.

[132] Ibid., p.22.

[133] Patricia Kitcher, "Apperception and Epistemic Responsibility," in *Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy: Essays Presented to Jonathan Bennett*, pp.273-304 (edited by J. A. Cover and M. Kulstad, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990), pp.278-279.

[134] *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*, p.105.

From this point of view, Kant's usage of the doctrine of apperception seems to be vain. For, empirical apperception should cover the required connection between cognitive states as it is "in the *empirical consciousness* of the identity of the reproduced representations with the appearances whereby they were given, that is, in recognition." (A115) But, Kitcher has a suggestion on how we should read Kant's views about self and the doctrine of apperception. According to her, Kant had an underlying purpose in establishing an account of self and positing the doctrine of apperception in this course: he wanted to develop an answer against Hume's denial of the self-identity.[135] And concerning this interpretation of her, Kitcher thinks that "by using this handle we can make sense of many of Kant's remarks about the self and the 'transcendental unity of apperception' that are unintelligible on other interpretations."[136] Indeed, this reading seems to be useful in dealing with some difficulties with the transcendental apperception. For, it sustains that this doctrine is designed for a purpose that we cannot see in the *Critique*.[137] Through the submission of the idea of apperception, Kant makes an argument against Hume that there is an identity of self through time although we cannot introspect toward it. But why did he come up with such a doctrine against Hume? What is the first order purpose of it? Kitcher states that

> Kant needs the principle that different mental states belong to a continuing being for the deduction of the categories; indeed, he needs a stronger principle that this connection of mental states in a self is a necessary feature of our experience. He would have no hope of "deducing" the categories unless he can offer a reply to Hume's denial of all real connection among mental states.[138]

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[135] See, in her book *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*, pp.91-116 (Chapter 4 'Replying to Hume's Heap'), and p.138; her articles "Kant on Self-Identity" as a whole, esp. pp.41-42, and "Kant's Paralogisms" (The Philosophical Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, Oct., 1982, pp. 515-547), pp.522ff.

[136] "Kant on Self-Identity," p.42.

[137] Kitcher supportably argues that Kant knew about Hume's 'bundle theory' though he did not mention it in the context of apperception. See, "Kant on Self-Identity," pp.41-43.

[138] Ibid., 52.

Furthermore, according to her, the above suggestion concerning the motive of the doctrine of apperception can be leading to a plausible account of self in Kantian framework.[139] And clearly, this account primarily concerns an identical self, *i.e.* a necessary connection between mental states that Hume rejected. Kitcher states that

> Kant appreciated the force of Hume's point about the difficulty of imputing existential connections among mental states. I think that he also felt he understood why Hume had failed to produce a correct account of personal identity. After noting that we cannot establish the presence of an abiding self through introspection, he points out that this method is incapable of producing the desired result.[140]

Indeed, as stated earlier in this section, Kant agrees with Hume that we cannot grasp a "fixed and abiding self" through introspection (A107). And, according to Kitcher "Kant will try to establish existential connections among mental states by arguing that this is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience,"[141] and will use the doctrine of apperception as the exposition of this necessary connection. Thus, this doctrine is "about the primary attribute of thinkers that is necessary for cognition."[142]

Kitcher also thinks that the notion of apperception must be something which differs from the self-consciousness. For, she argues, while Kant affirms that there must be a connection between mental states, we may not be conscious of some of them. Indeed, as she points, there are some phrases in *Critique* supporting this distinction, for example: "As *my* representations (*even if I am not conscious of them as such*) (my emphasis) they must conform to the condition under which alone they *can* stand together in one universal self-consciousness"[143] (B132) "That is, he

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[139] Ibid., p.42.

[140] Ibid., p.52.

[141] Ibid., p.53.

[142] *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*, p.94.

[143] The phrase "one universal self-consciousness" seems to refer to the *necessary* identity of self through representations for all species with the ability of knowledge. That is, "one self-

acknowledges that we may have cognitive states and not be conscious of them as such."[144] Then, Kitcher defends a reading that highlights the "ownership" aspect of the idea of apperception.[145] She thinks that Kant's "own distinctive recognition that cognitive states are and must be unified that stands behind the ownership thesis. Ownership and unity are not separate issues for Kant. Any possible cognitive state must be unified or unifiable with others—and so belong to an *I think*."[146]

Thus, from this point of view, the doctrine of apperception is designed to indicate an identical self which *owns* empirical mental states. And be it further enacted that the unity of apperception is, in Kitcher's account, *synthetic*. Indeed, this can be inferred from the Subjective Deduction of the first edition (A117), and Kitcher takes this side of the Deduction into consideration as she stated.[147] In criticizing Allison's reading of the analyticity of the first part of Deduction, which I will mention in a while, Kitcher argues that "[i]f the first part of the Deduction is merely an analytic argument … it could never make a contribution to the second. …. In fairly sharp contrast to Allison's account, I take the entire Deduction to be a synthetic argument."[148] And as a last point, she states that "the transcendental unity of apperception can function only as a *conclusion* of the Deduction"[149] (my emphasis).

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consciousness which is universal." As another comment on this expression, Allison states that the term universal "is here equivalent to transcendental, because it constitutes the 'logical form of all knowledge.'" (*Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p.142)

[144] "Apperception and Epistemic Responsibility," p.274-275.

[145] Ibid.

[146] Ibid., p.278.

[147] "Kant on Self-Identity" p.41, *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*, p. 186. For the difference between two Deductions concerning whether the principle of apperception is analytic or synthetic, see Guyer, "Kant on Apperception and *A Priori* Synthesis," (*American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Jul., 1980), pp. 205-212).

[148] *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*, p.172.

[149] "Kant on Self-Identity," p.58. See also *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*, pp.186-187.

In a nutshell, given the above analysis of Kitcher's that this unity is in the phenomenal side of the self, the transcendental apperception corresponds to empirical self. With the title of 'transcendental,' it only guarantees a necessary condition that the representations belong to one self which can only be phenomenal. And, it does not supply any distinct self-awareness and does not therefore correspond to the self-consciousness since that the representations must belong to one self does not mean that one has to conscious of them. I will discuss this interpretation of Kitcher in the following sections.

Henry Allison, who is another influential commentator of Kant, regards the apperception as an *analytic* principle[150] and a *premise* of the Deduction.[151] He does not deny that Kant introduces it as synthetic in some passages of the A-Deduction but he thinks that Kant's emphasis on the analyticity of the principle of apperception in B-Deduction (B135-138) is correct,[152] and takes this to be a key to understand B-Deduction as a whole.[153]

Allison's well-known interpretation on Kant is to read the phenomenal-noumenal distinction as *one world* with *two aspects*,[154] according to which Kant's transcendental distinction is between "a *consideration* of a thing as it appears and a *consideration* of the same thing as it is in itself."[155] And, as mentioned earlier, Allison thinks that Kant's transcendental idealism is based on the supposition that

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[150] *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp.137-140, and "Apperception and Analyticity in the B-Deduction" pp.41-52.

[151] "Apperception and Analyticity in the B-Deduction," p.49.

[152] *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p.144, p.137, fn.17 (p.353). In "Apperception and Analyticity in the B-Deduction," Allison makes another comment on this difference between two deductions:

> This is not, however, to suggest that the two versions of the Deduction operate with two radically distinct conceptions of apperception. At bottom, it is one and the same conception operative in both versions, but the A-Deduction appeals to it in what might be termed its "schematized" form and the B-Deduction its "pure" form. (p.46)

[153] "Apperception and Analyticity in the B-Deduction," p.41.

[154] *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p.8, 35ff, 240ff, etc.

[155] Ibid., p.241.

human mind has certain conditions which are, in Allison's terminology, *epistemic conditions*, of the things as they appear, contrasted with the *ontological conditions*, of the things as they are in themselves.[156] In this scheme, transcendental apperception must be an *epistemic condition* since it is presented as a necessary principle of the experience. Allison states that Kant's "canonical formulation of this principle," which is as follows, constitutes the "real starting point of the B-Deduction."[157]

> It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition. All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found. (B131-132)

The analyticity of the apperception is, according to Allison, implied in this passage in such a way that this possibility of the accompaniment by the "I think" is found in the concept of "my representations." He states that "[a]ny representation for which this [the accompaniment by the 'I think'] is not possible is *ipso facto* not a representation for me."[158] What is analytic here is the necessity of this possibility, namely the principle of apperception, not the whole inferences of the apperception itself, as Kant states, "[t]his principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself, indeed, an identical, and therefore analytic, proposition [although] it reveals the necessity of a synthesis of the manifold given in intuition, without which the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness cannot be thought." (B135)

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[156] Ibid., pp.10-13. He also distinguishes *psychological conditions*, such as, habit.

[157] *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* (2004) (Revised and Expanded Version, New Haven: Yale University Press), p.163.

[158] *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p.137.

Allison asserts that "the claims about apperception and its necessary synthetic unity are supposed to be derived analytically from the concept of thought or, more precisely, from the concept of discursive thought."[159] He understands the principle of apperception as an assertion of the necessity of "the possibility of becoming reflectively aware of an identical 'I think' with respect to each of my representations."[160] He discloses this necessity on the basis of a logical requirement of a single subject in a single complex thought. Let me take those passages as a whole where Allison makes an illuminative interpretation on Kant's doctrine of apperception:

> The point is simply this: since a single complex thought logically requires a single thinking subject, it follows (1) that it must be a numerically identical 'I think' that can be reflectively attached to each of the component representations taken individually, and (2) it must (necessarily) be possible for this thinking subject to be aware of the numerical identity of the 'I think'. The latter is a necessary condition of the possibility of a number of discrete representations being united in the thought of a single subject as its representations, and, a fortiori, of its constituting a single complex thought. In other words, if representations *A*, *B*, and *C* are to be thought together in a single consciousness, … then the I that thinks A must be identical to the I that thinks B, and so forth. In addition, if the subject is to be conscious of these representations as collectively constituting a unity, then it must also be possible for it to become conscious of its own identity as subject with respect to the thought of each of these representations.[161]

According to Allison, "[t]his is still analytic."[162] And pursuing this analysis, he states that "the unity of consciousness is correlated with the consciousness of unity (it takes one to know one)."[163] He clarifies this point by a passage from Kant:

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[159] "Apperception and Analyticity in the B-Deduction," p.45.

[160] *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p.140.

[161] Ibid., p.138-139.

[162] Ibid., p.139.

> We are conscious *a priori* of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can even belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations. For in me they can represent something only in so far as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and therefore must be at least capable of being so connected. (A116)

The question is what it means to be "conscious *a priori*." Allison argues "that this must be taken merely as Kant's rather clumsy way of referring to the awareness of something as necessarily the case" and "[t]he problem, then, is to determine what it is that we are aware of in this manner."[164] According to him, a possible reading is "what we are aware of is not numerical identity; it is rather the 'fact' that this identity must be presupposed as a necessary condition of knowledge. This implies, at most, the possibility of such consciousness, certainly not its actuality or necessity," and he states, only this interpretation "is compatible with the Second Edition, where Kant emphasizes the analyticity of the apperception principle in all its forms."[165] Thus, in Allison's reading, the unity of consciousness reveals a necessity which is the possibility of consciousness of the unity, *i.e.* the identity of the self. He states,

> This necessity is based on the premise that having a thought involves the capacity to recognize it as one's own. Since a thought which I (in principle) could not recognize as my own would *ipso facto* not be a thought *for* me, and since a thought which is not a thought for me could not enter into my cognition.[166]

And he takes "this claim to be obviously analytic."[167] Referring mostly to Kitcher's reading, Allison says that what "has prevented most interpreters from taking Kant at his word" on the analyticity of apperception, is the problem "how can an analytical

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[163] Ibid.

[164] Ibid., p.140.

[165] Ibid.

[166] "Apperception and Analyticity in the B-Deduction," p.47.

[167] Ibid.

truth, even a uniquely complex one such as the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception, serve as a fundamental premise of the Transcendental Deduction?"[168] And he argues that "an analytic first principle can contribute to a synthetic or progressive argument, yielding a synthetic *a priori* conclusion,"[169] which can be understood in terms of the "reciprocity between the synthetic unity of apperception and the representation of an object (the unity of consciousness and the consciousness of unity)."[170] For, this reciprocity is the ground of the objective validity of the categories and the conformity of the objects of sensibility to them, and as we can recall, these are the intended conclusions of the Deduction.[171]

To sum up, in Allison's account, the transcendental apperception refers to the possibility of consciousness of an identical self; a "consciousness which we have of ourselves as knowers, engaged in the activity of thinking."[172] But this consciousness of the self, cannot be achieved, or objectified, "because it must always be presupposed as already on the scene, doing the objectifying."[173] Allison infers this unfeasibility from the spontaneity of apperception.[174] And he states this nonability of objectifying is equal to the unknowability of the existence of self as a thinking subject.[175] The subject of apperception is the transcendental subject, and it is, Allison argues,

> the counterpart of the transcendental object. Just as the latter is the concept of the bare form of an object (the concept of an "object in general"), which is all that remains for thought when abstraction is made from sensible content through which an actual object can be represented, so the former is the concept of the bare form of a

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[168] Ibid., p.49.

[169] Ibid., p.51.

[170] Ibid. See also, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp.144-148.

[171] "Apperception and Analyticity in the B-Deduction," p.51.

[172] *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 274.

[173] Ibid., p.278.

[174] Ibid., pp.274-278.

[175] Ibid., 278.

> thinking subject (a logical subject of thought or "subject in general"), which is all that remains when abstraction is made from the content of inner sense.[176]

Thus, we cannot derive an existence of the self from "this empty or formal concept."[177] This negative relation between "I think" and "I exist" is generally linked with Kant's critique of Rational Psychology in Paralogisms, which I will discuss in the following section. And in the section after that, I will return the interpretations of Kitcher and Allison.

4.2. The Self in Paralogisms

Kitcher states that "here [in Paralogisms] Kant strives to clarify what the doctrine of apperception does not say, by explaining the inherent limitations of the analyses that transcendental philosophy can provide."[178] Indeed, in "The Paralogisms of Pure Reason," Kant presents transcendental apperception in respect to its negative aspect, *i.e.* what we cannot infer from it. He begins with scrutinizing "the concept or, if the term be preferred, the judgment, 'I think'" which is

> the vehicle of all concepts, and therefore also of transcendental concepts, and so is always included in the conceiving of these latter, and is itself transcendental. But it can have no special designation, because it serves only to introduce all our thought, as belonging to consciousness. (A341/B399-400)

By means of this representation, we are able to make a distinction between two kinds of objects: "'I', as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am called 'soul'" and "[t]hat which is an object of the outer senses is called 'body'." (A342/B400)

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[176] Ibid., p.283.

[177] Ibid.

[178] *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*, p.182.

Kant points at Rational Psychology, most likely Descartes and his followers, as responsible for the Paralogisms. According to him, it is a science based on the *pseudo-rational* inferences from the sole proposition "I think," such as, the argument that the soul is a simple and immortal substance. However, for Kant, we have no right to draw such conclusions. "We can assign no other basis for this teaching than the simple, and in itself completely empty, representation '*I*'; and we cannot even say that this is a concept, but only that it is a bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts." (A345-346/B404)

There are four kinds of Paralogism: of substantiality, of simplicity, of personality, and of ideality. Kant introduces the fallacies in these Paralogisms as *sophisma figurae dictionis* (ambiguous middle). In this kind of logical fallacy, the middle term is used in different senses in the premises and the argument is concluded as if there is no such difference. Thus, it is a kind of "equivocation" fallacy.[179] In the case of Paralogisms, the term is used in transcendental sense in the major premise, and empirical sense in the minor premise and the conclusion (A402). Kant demonstrates this fallacy through the first kind of Paralogism where the conclusion "I am a *substance* as a thinking soul" is deduced from the proposition "I think." This syllogistic argument is as follows:

> That, the representation of which is the absolute subject of our judgments and cannot therefore be employed as determination of another thing, is substance.
>
> I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments, and this representation of myself cannot be employed as predicate of any other thing.
>
> Therefore I, as thinking being (soul), am substance. (A348)

Interpreting in terms of the ambiguous middle, here,

[179] For example, "all heavy things have a great mass; this is heavy fog; therefore this fog has a great mass." (from, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_fallacy#Equivocation.)

> in the paralogism of substantiality, the concept of substance is a pure intellectual concept, which in the absence of the conditions of sensible intuition admits only of transcendental use, that is, admits of no use whatsoever. But in the minor premiss the very same concept is applied to the object of all inner experience without our having first ascertained and established the condition of such employment *in concreto*, namely, the permanence of this object. We are thus making an empirical, but in this case inadmissible, employment of the category. (A403)

Here, the 'I' as only a logical subject is taken as a permanent soul. N. K. Smith states that the proposition "I think" "expresses the merely logical relation of a subject to its predicates."[180] Ignoring this constraint, Rational Psychology confuses appearances and things in themselves, representations and the objects they represent: "Inference from the nature of representation to the nature of the object represented is entirely illegitimate."[181] In order to make such an inference legitimately, there should be a manifold of intuition. In other words, if the concept *substance* had an objective content, we could have a synthetic knowledge leading to such inferences. On the other hand, the substance is just a pure category, and "pure categories, and among them that of substance, have in themselves no objective meaning, save in so far as they rest upon an intuition … In the absence of this manifold [of intuition], they are merely functions of a judgment, without content." (A348-349)

The second kind of Paralogism is about the simplicity of the soul:

> That, the action of which can never be regarded as the concurrence of several things acting, is *simple*.
>
> Now the soul, or the thinking 'I', is such a being. Therefore, etc. (A351)

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[180] N. K. Smith, op. cit., pp.457-458.

[181] Ibid.

Here, there is a fallacy that results from a syllogism, as in the first kind. That is, it is concluded from the logical unity of "I think" to its reality, and it is also illegitimate. This is because neither the simplicity of the soul, nor the necessary unity of the subject, can be proved by concepts. Such simplicity cannot be demonstrated by experience, as well. For, as Kant says, "experience yields us no knowledge of necessity." (A353) And the proposition "I think"

> is not itself an experience, but the form of apperception, which belongs to and precedes every experience; and as such it must always be taken only in relation to some possible knowledge, as a *merely subjective condition* of that knowledge. We have no right to transform it into a condition of the possibility of a knowledge of objects, that is, into a *concept* of thinking being in general. (A354)

The proposition "I am simple" must be seen as an immediate inference of apperception, but a merely logical one, through which we can derive no actual simplicity. That is, Kant thinks that this inference is just a tautology like it is in the *cogito, ergo sum*. It is only related to the condition of our knowledge but does not concern any given object of experience:

> It is obvious that in attaching 'I' to our thoughts we designate the subject of inherence only transcendentally, without noting in it any quality whatsoever—in fact, without knowing anything of it either by direct acquaintance or otherwise. It means a something in general (transcendental subject), the representation of which must, no doubt, be simple, if only for the reason that there is nothing determinate in it. (A355)

The logical simplicity of the 'I' does not, therefore, enable us to extend our knowledge; "even the fundamental concept of a *simple nature* is such that it can never be met with in any experience, and such, therefore, that there is no way of attaining to it, as an objectively valid concept." (A361)

The third kind of Paralogism is about personal identity over time:

> That which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times is in so far a *person*.

> Now the soul is conscious, etc.
>
> Therefore it is a person. (Ibid.)

Here, Rational Psychology takes the unity of apperception as giving us our identity throughout our existence –even before birth and after death. However, this way of thinking also confuses a mere logical condition with actuality. With Paul Guyer's interpretation, "[o]nce again the property of a sign has been confused with an alleged property of the thing signified."[182] There is, thus, an invalid conclusion. What the premise tells us is an identity but merely of representation, not of person. I am conscious of myself through time which is the form of inner sense; I am conscious of myself as thinking being through the transcendental apperception. However, from these, we cannot validly infer that I exist as a person as time passes. Kant makes his point by an analogy between substances and balls that pass their motion on by hitting each other, and with this analogy,

> we can conceive a whole series of substances of which the first transmits its state together with its consciousness to the second, the second its own state with that of the preceding substance to the third, and this in turn the states of all the preceding substances together with its own consciousness and with their consciousness to another. The last substance would then be conscious of all the states of the previously changed substances, as being its own states, because they would have been transferred to it together with the consciousness of them. And yet it would not have been one and the same person in all these states. (A363-364, fn.)

We can hold "the concept of personality" only in the transcendental domain, that is, it is related to nothing but the unity of apperception. However, "we can never parade it as an extension of our self-knowledge" because "this concept revolves perpetually in a circle, and does not help us in respect to any question which aims at synthetic knowledge." (A366)

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[182] Guyer, *Kant*, op.cit., p.136.

In the fourth Paralogism, "the external world problem" is in question:

> That, the existence of which can only be inferred as a cause of given perceptions, has a merely doubtful existence.
>
> Now all outer appearances are of such a nature that their existence is not immediately perceived, and that we can only infer them as the cause of given perceptions.
>
> Therefore the existence of all objects of the outer senses is doubtful. (A366-376)

Here, Kant introduces once again his transcendental idealism, *i.e.* empirical realism, which is "the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves," (A369), and this idealism is designed as opposed to empirical idealism, *i.e.* transcendental realism, which "interprets outer appearances … as things-in-themselves, which exist independently of us and of our sensibility" (ibid.). As indicated before, Kant does not solve the problem of the existence of external things, but he dissolves the distinction between external and internal in the traditional meaning. His transcendental idealism is a *dualism* which should be understood only in the empirical sense:

> That is to say, in the connection of experience matter, as substance in the [field of] appearance, is really given to outer sense, just as the thinking 'I', also as substance in the [field of] appearance, is given to inner sense. Further, appearances in both fields must be connected with each other according to the rules which this category introduces into that connection of our outer as well as of our inner perceptions whereby they constitute one experience. (A379)

Hence according to the transcendental idealist, matter is not something that is quite separate from the subject. "For he considers this matter and even its inner possibility to be appearance merely; and appearance, if separated from our sensibility, is nothing." (A370)

To conclude, the general point of Paralogisms is that Rational Psychology misinterpreted the unity of apperception and took it as an intuition of the subject as object. "But this unity is only unity in *thought*, by which alone no object is given,

and to which, therefore, the category of substance, which always presupposes a given *intuition*, cannot be applied. Consequently, this subject cannot be known." (B422) It has been indicated Kant's emphasis on that the 'I' of apperception is not phenomenal self for the reasons elaborated above. It is not the noumenal self either for the term transcendental in 'transcendental subject' does not refer to something transcendence, but it is about the conditions that make experience possible. If we take it as a thing in itself, then we fall into the 'Paralogistic traps.' Although Kant identifies it with the noumenal self in one passage (A492/B520), insofar as I am aware of, he does not embrace this kind of equivocation in general. We can infer from Kant's general approach that the 'I' of apperception stands as a logical necessity but "[t]hrough this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = *X*." (A346/B404) It is merely the "transcendental object of the inner sense" (A361) interconnected with the transcendental object of the outer sense (A109, A250).

3.3. An Overview of the Problem of Self-knowledge in Kant

It is a well-known fact that Kant paved the way for German Idealism and it is also, even not uncommonly, argued that he played a key role in the historical grounds of analytic philosophy, as well. This variegation of Kant's historical influence springs from his multidirectional concerns. The problems of Kant's account of self may well be analyzed in the light of the rainbow of ideas arisen from this spectrum. First of all, as it can be recalled that he had a twofold concern about the notion of self: to find a ground for morality and to establish the foundations for scientific knowledge. The problem is that the possible theories for these two domains are conflicted to each other. For, a solid doctrine for the former can be found through positing a self which is free in its practical actions and that of the latter should include a principle of causality that the self has to be subjected, that is, not free.

It is attributable to this confliction that Kant does not have one flourishing account of self. And for the same reason, he has at least two conceptions of self that are mutually exclusive arisen from the phenomenal-noumenal distinction. The self in the phenomenal domain can be an object of knowledge while the noumenal self is only intelligible, that is, it is unattainable through faculties of knowledge. In Kant's words,

> In its empirical character … [the] subject, as appearance, would have to conform to all the laws of causal determination. To this extent it could be nothing more than a part of the world of sense, and its effects, like all other appearances, must be the inevitable outcome of nature. … In its intelligible character (though we can only have a general concept of that character) this same subject must be considered to be free from all influence of sensibility and from all determination through appearances. Inasmuch as it is *noumenon,* nothing *happens* in it; there can be no change requiring dynamical determination in time, and therefore no causal dependence upon appearances. (A540-541/B568-569)

This means that we can know ourselves as how we appear to ourselves not as what we are and this restriction provides the ground for morality because there remains an aspect of the self which is only intelligible and not subjected to the conditions of knowledge: "And consequently, since natural necessity is to be met with only in the sensible world, this active being must in its actions be independent of, and free from all such necessity." (A540/B569) It is fair to say that there is freedom of self since the self does not know it in a theoretical manner. Kant states, "[m]orality does not, indeed, require that freedom should be understood." (Bxxix) This does not mean, however, that we have no knowledge concerning the practical domain; there is indeed a kind of knowledge which is practical: "theoretical knowledge may be defined as knowledge of what *is*, practical knowledge as the representation of what *ought to be*." (A633-B661) Thus, the practical knowledge corresponds to the knowledge concerning our choices between actions, the knowledge of what we should or should not do. In other words, it is the knowledge of what is right or wrong. Furthermore, Kant defines another distinction between theoretical and

practical modes knowledge with regard to the relation to their objects: "either as merely *determining* it and its concept … or as also *making it actual*. The former is *theoretical*, the latter *practical* knowledge of reason." (Bix-x) Thus, the conditions of these modes of knowledge have substantively different grounds. Kant thinks that the solution of the problem "whether freedom and natural necessity can exist without conflict in one and the same action" (A557/B585) is found in this difference: "since freedom may stand in relation to a quite different kind of conditions from those of natural necessity, the law of the latter does not affect the former, and that both may exist, independently of one another and without interfering with each other." (Ibid.)

The practical laws should have a different ground from the theoretical domain also because what *ought to be* cannot be cognized theoretically; it has no ground in nature: "When we have the course of nature alone in view, '*ought*' has no meaning whatsoever." (A547/B575) We can see only phenomenal appearances of the '*ought*,' namely the visible actions of the self, "to which the '*ought*' applies" but then again "they can never give rise to the '*ought*'" (A548/B576). Thus, we can never experience the '*ought*,' according to which we act *freely*. And accordingly, we cannot experience our free self; what can be witnessed merely its manifestations, *i.e.* actions and thoughts. In other words, we can observe our moral selves only in the empirical domain which does not yield a theoretical knowledge of them. For, otherwise, it would be subjected to the conditions of knowledge, determined by the principle of causality, and thus could not be free.

The morality is the *positive* outcome of the *Critique* whose results are "merely *negative*" (Bxxiv). That is to say, Kant reconciles the mechanism of nature with the free will through taking the self, or the soul in a twofold sense: as an appearance and as a thing in itself: "In this way freedom and nature, in the full sense of these terms, can exist together, without any conflict, in the same actions, according as the actions are referred to their intelligible or to their sensible cause." (A541/B569)

However, this twofold doctrine of self does not exhaust the notion of self in Kantian philosophy. We encounter another conception of self in *Critique of Pure Reason* that stands as opposed to the phenomenal self. Thus, there is, again, the phenomenal self, which can be named in a sense 'me' of the empirical consciousness; and there is the 'I' of apperception corresponding to a spontaneous mental activity. While the former is "one of the appearances of the sensible world" (A546/B574), which can be found through introspection, the latter has a quite unique place in cognition, which can be achieved only through philosophical contemplation.[183] Let's retrace our steps briefly on the doctrine of apperception and look for the answer to the question "what does it stand for?"

Kant intends with this doctrine to solve a critical problem in transcendental epistemology: the problem of the identity of self-consciousness, which is a problem because it cannot be obtained through introspection. What we experience through ordinary reflection is empirical consciousness, which is subjected to the form of inner sense, *i.e.* time, that is to say, it always occurs in connection with a flow of perceptions which take place in time. There cannot be found a "fixed and abiding self" in this flux (A107). The transcendental unity of apperception is invoked to fill this gap. In this respect, Kitcher's interpretation which holds that the doctrine of apperception is a response to Hume's denial of identity seems to lend itself to Kant's purposes with this notion. Indeed, while generating the "I think," the unity of apperception proposes a conception of self which is identical over time.

Kitcher also seems accurate that the 'I' of apperception does not settle into the picture of Kant's featured twofold account of self, which is established in terms of the distinctions between phenomenal and noumenal aspects. First of all, it stands as a transcendental condition of experience, and the noumenal self has nothing to do with this domain. From this point of view, Kitcher takes the apperception as a synthetic principle and equates it with the phenomenal self. She states that its

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[183] See, Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, op.cit., p.274.

transcendentality refers to merely the *necessity* of an identical self because Kant asserts it as a necessary condition for knowledge. On the other hand, Kant also maintains that the unity of transcendental apperception should not be confused with the empirical one. For, the former must be isolated from the sensibility, otherwise in the judgment "I think," thinking and intuiting would be engaged as it is for intellectual intuition. Kant is decisive on this matter: for human kinds, there is no such intuition independent from sensibility (A68/B93).

Here we should reiterate, albeit briefly, how Kant defines the principle of apperception. The transcendental apperception is "the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge" (B135); it is the ground that the nature, which is in fact an "aggregate of appearances," can be designated as "the object of all possible experience," and this is why, the unity of apperception "can be known *a priori*, and therefore as necessary." (A114) It is a condition "under which every intuition must stand in order *to become an object for me*." (B138) This means that the transcendental unity of apperception cannot be captured through experience, since it should be already present in the ground of any possible experience. Thus, the 'I' of apperception cannot be the same as phenomenal self because the latter is an object for me and the former is the ground for anything *to become an object for me*. For, in order for there to be an empirical consciousness, there should be a persisting self throughout experience which cannot be found in this consciousness. This necessary principle of identity cannot be synthesized through any sensible phenomena, such as, those of inner sense; it must be given as a transcendental condition.

Hence, when it comes to the question whether the apperception is synthetic or analytic, Allison's interpretation seems more suitable with Kant's own statements. Though there are some passages in *Critique* that suggest otherwise (that the apperception is synthetic), Kant's conception of the identity of self is presented as an analytic principle. Kant states that despite being the ground of all synthesis, the proposition "I think" is itself analytic: "For it says no more than that all *my* representations in any given intuition must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as *my* representations" (ibid.).

There is certainly a difficulty to place the 'I' of "I think," or the transcendental subject, into the scheme of twofold perspective of the self. It cannot be phenomenal because it cannot be intuited. Besides, this would contradict the arguments of both the Deduction and the Paralogisms. Although Kant mentions transcendental subject as a thing in itself in a one passage (A492/B520), it cannot be noumenal, either. First of all, the purpose of Paralogisms is to criticize the Rational Psychology for equating the 'I' with the noumenal self. If it were noumenal, then a transcendental condition of experience would have a transcendent reality. But, for Kant, transcendental conditions are not things as they are in themselves, they are *a priori* principles that composes experience. A transcendentally real being, namely a noumenon, cannot have an epistemological role in this manner.

The principle of apperception is expressed through the judgment "I think" which "can have no special destination" because, Kant states, "it serves only to introduce all our thought, as belonging to consciousness." (A341/B399-400) Thus, it is an analytic principle which reveals that all representations belong to one self-consciousness. "It means a something in general (transcendental subject), the representation of which must, no doubt, be simple, if only for the reason that there is nothing determinate in it." (A355) It is the correlation of transcendental object of experience (A250) which also "must be thought only as something in general = *x*" (A104).

Thus, the subject of apperception has a unique place in transcendental idealism, without which there can be no knowledge at all. Kant uses this doctrine to solve the problems of self-identity and self-consciousness that had remained as problematic issues till Kant. It seems reasonable to say that because of their intricate character, these problems will persist being fundamental to the philosophy, and, since it is supposedly a solution to them, the doctrine of the transcendental apperception remains difficult to unveil. But, if we simply take it as an empty, logical condition of experience, and leave those passages that suggests otherwise aside, despite the risk of embracing a kind of "patchwork theory," then it becomes clearer. For, then, we can see that the unity of apperception stands merely for a principle which holds

that there is an identical self over time. We are conscious of it but we can have no determinate knowledge about it because there is nothing to be known in it: it is just a necessary condition without content.

Thus, we cannot gain any knowledge about 'the self' through transcendental apperception because it has no content. We cannot apprehend 'the self' through phenomenal self because it is always in a connection with inner sense that has no enduring entity in it. The moral self cannot give us a self-knowledge in a theoretical sense either because if it were an object of knowledge, it would not be free. As a result, there is no side of Kant's accounts of self that can provide a theoretical mode of knowledge about the self.

Kant is an empiricist to the extent that we can have knowledge about the self only as an object of experience. But unlike empiricists, he does not think that the whole conception of self can be exhausted by any empirical knowledge. Here he converges to the rationalists declaring that there is an *a priori* self-consciousness of the subject, *i.e.* the 'I' that thinks. But unlike rationalists, he does not think that we can have knowledge about this 'I'. Thus, Kant's accounts of self in epistemology emphasizes both aspects of the notion of self. On the one hand, there is empirical self as an object, which is subjected to the form of time, and on the other hand there is a transcendental subject, which is free from the time. And, we cannot have knowledge about this subject since the knowledge can only arise from temporal relations. Consequently, there always remains a mysterious aspect of the conception of self in Kant. Whenever we try to unveil its covers, we slip it through our fingers. Even in practical domain, the practical mode of knowledge yields a consciousness of the moral self which has no theoretical certainty, for what can be an object of knowledge are the actions of the self, but not its own content.

5

CONCLUSION

Here I will conclude the thesis with an outline of what has been stated so far. The aim of this thesis is, as expressed in the introduction, the problem of self-knowledge in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. In this respect, the primary question of this thesis has been formulated as "what is self in Kantian philosophy?" And I took this question as an ontological problem. However, as it has been revealed that although the notion of self has more than one essential role in his philosophy, Kant has no prosperous account for self-knowledge. Thus, I rephrased the question as "to what extend can we have knowledge about the self from a Kantian angle?" The *Critique* says that the knowledge about anything, including the self, is possible not in the way *as it is*, but as it appears to us. But why is that? In order to answer this question, we should understand "how we are able to know" which is the directive question of transcendental philosophy.

In the second chapter, I made an entrance to Kantian philosophy and to the problem of self-knowledge in two separate sections. In the first section, Kant's initial concerns that carry him to a critique of metaphysics have been presented. As we can recall, Kant was unconvinced by some arguments of metaphysicians which are mostly about spiritual nature. According to him, the possibility of metaphysics should be questioned first. This is crucial because metaphysics, which has been "the Queen of all the sciences," is related to the most important questions concerning the meaning and value of human life, and of the world we live in. On the strength of this prominent status of this discipline, some arguments have been produced without an adequate validation. There is a need for a criterion to judge these judgments of metaphysical systems. And according to Kant, this criterion is found only in the pure reason itself. If metaphysics is possible at all, it has to be in the limits of the pure reason. Thus, pure reason has to be criticized, what it can know

without the help of experience has to be determined. This is a transcendental critique of pure reason, the outcome of which is to be only negative, not to extend, but only to shed light on our reason, and keep it from illusions. Therefore, the inquiry of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is not in relation to the knowledge itself but the knowledge about knowledge, namely the second order knowledge concerning how *a priori* knowledge is possible.

Thus, the subject-matter of metaphysics is the conditions and limits of knowledge and among them, the synthetic *a priori* knowledge have a significant role. The central question of Kant's critical project turns to "how are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?" This inquiry is fundamental to the purposes of *Critique* because these judgments are the grounds of what Kant describes through the metaphor of *Copernican Turn*: the knowledge does not conform to the objects but governs them. This is the ultimate declaration of transcendental philosophy, and the conditions of this relation between knowledge and objects are clarified in the *Critique*.

In the second section, the core of the problem of self-knowledge with its historical traces has been expounded. With Descartes, the subject is carried to the ground of all knowledge. In Locke, the problem of personal identity comes into prominence. And according to Hume, the concept of self is not a real idea because there is no impression for it. We can see inspirations of these philosophers in Kant's accounts of self. He is influenced by Descartes that there is a self-consciousness which precedes experience. But unlike Descartes, Kant thinks that we cannot infer the immortality of soul from only the presence of consciousness. More fundamentally, Kant thinks that the inference from the "I think" to the "I exist" is an illusion. In this respect, the influences of Hume and Locke come forward. Both philosophers are empiricists with whom Kant agrees to some degree. Like Kant, they deny the connection between the consciousness and an immaterial substance. In Paralogisms, he criticized fallacious arguments arisen from a misapplication of the concept of substance as the subject of thoughts. It can be said that with Kant, the subject is de-substantialized. But unlike Hume, Kant does not think that there is no self-identity.

The doctrine of apperception is invoked to assert the identity of self-consciousness through experience. However, it does not provide a self-knowledge. In order to understand why, Kant's transcendental philosophy should be grasped in more detailed.

The third chapter is a synopsis of transcendental philosophy, the purpose of which is to give a handle in approaching to the main problem of this thesis. The first section is about "Transcendental Aesthetic" which concerns the most immediate relation to objects, namely, intuition which sensibility provides us. The pure forms of sensibility are space and time in which all appearances are given to us in certain relations. We can know nothing but appearances ordered in space and time. Space is the form of outer sense which provides me with the awareness of that the objects are outside of me. Time is the form of inner sense, by means of which I am aware of the succession of perceptions as mine. This is the empirical consciousness of the way in which one appears to oneself. The stress of transcendental idealism is mainly on the status of space and time. They are transcendentally ideal, that is, outside the subjective domain, they are nothing. But they are real in the empirical sense, namely, they are not mere illusions and for this reason, transcendental idealism is also named as empirical realism.

In the second section, I have clarified the general context of "Transcendental Analytic," which is mainly about the functions of understanding. Kant characterizes understanding as the faculty of rules. It is "the lawgiver of nature" without which, nature "would not exist at all." (A127) Thus, the nature is the "synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to rules" of understanding (ibid.). The subject knows the reality of external world, since it is the one which gives the objectivity to that world. The terms 'reality' and 'objectivity' no longer refer to something different from the subjective determination. The object is possible only by means of the constitution of its representation in accordance with concepts. This relation between an object and a concept is possible only through an act of judgment, which arises from the unification of representations in consciousness. Thinking in general is nothing but judging. Kant asserts that "we can reduce all acts

of the understanding to judgments, and the *understanding* may therefore be represented as a *faculty of judgment*." (A69/B94) But, the validity of the concepts of understanding should be justified, which is dealt with in the Deduction. In order to achieve this justification, it is to be proven that an object can be thought only through a concept in a judgment. A judgment is an act of synthesis, which is introduced by Kant as "*threefold*": "[i] the *apprehension* of representations as modifications of the mind in intuition, [ii] their *reproduction* in imagination, and [iii] their *recognition* in a concept." (A97)

After demonstration of how an object is unified by synthesis, Kant presents two other notions that are required for the justification of concepts: transcendental object and transcendental apperception. The former refers to the concept of "an object in general" which provides us to think that there is an object (*Gegenstand*) *corresponding to, and consequently also distinct from our knowledge* (A104). The latter notion, *i.e.* the transcendental apperception is subject-matter of following chapter.

The third section pertains to the "Transcendental Dialectic," in which the illegitimate use of the reason is criticized. Pure intuitions of sensibility and pure concepts of understanding are the conditions of experience. Theoretical knowledge is constituted under these conditions. But, this knowledge is about particular and contingent experience, and this is insufficient to comprehend the totality of nature. The reason demands that the nature be in one piece, not a collection of parts. The transcendental ideas of reason guide us to get the totality of experience.

Pure reason is always in pursuit of three types of unconditioned unity. The transcendental ideas are in accordance with these unities. In Kant's arrangement, the first is the idea of 'soul' and it contains the absolute unity of the thinking subject. The second is the idea of 'world' and it is the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance. And the third is the idea of 'God,' and it is the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general. These ideas compose the subject-matter of three transcendental doctrines: psychology, cosmology, and

theology. However, there can be no object in experience corresponding to any of these ideas. Ascribing a reality to them is only a result of a syllogism but not experience. This is an inference which, in Kant's words, "from something we know to something else of which we have no concept, and to which, owing to inevitable illusion, we yet ascribe objective reality." (A339/B397) There are three kinds of dialectical syllogism: the Paralogisms, the Antinomy, and the Ideal of pure reason.

In the fourth chapter, I have elaborated and construed the main problem of this study, namely, the problem of self-knowledge in *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the first section, Kant's account of self in Deduction has been analyzed. In Deduction, Kant deals with the problem of objective validity of knowledge. In this context, the notion of self has a twofold function which arises from the distinction between empirical and transcendental. The former is the empirical self which can be an object of knowledge, and which is grasped through empirical consciousness as it can be intuited through inner sense. But it is not the self as it is in itself because it is a part of phenomenal world. There is a paradox here, that is, as Kant states, the inner sense

> represents to consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. For we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly *affected*, and this would seem to be contradictory, since we should then have to be in a passive relation [of active affection] to ourselves. (B152-153)

Here, "to avoid this contradiction," the transcendental side of the self, namely, "the faculty of *apperception*," is introduced by Kant as distinguished from this *psychology of inner sense* (B153). The transcendental self is the 'I' that thinks while the empirical self is the intuited 'me.' Thus, there are two distinct spheres of the self and their consciousnesses which are necessary for cognition; "in intuition … can a manifold be given; and only through *combination* in one consciousness can it be thought." (B135) We need both conceptions of self because the empirical consciousness cannot provide the necessary unity for the manifold of representations and the manifold cannot be given through the 'I' of apperception

(ibid.). Through empirical consciousness, I become aware of the succession of perceptions, and in so doing, I grasp my phenomenal self. Through the transcendental consciousness, I become aware of my identity throughout this diverse experiential data. It is the ground of all knowledge but when it comes to itself, the knowledge becomes impossible, since it has to be already present on the platform in all acts of knowledge. This would be like looking at a special kind of mirror, which provides a transcendental reflection, but as previously stated, this would be possible only through an intellectual intuition which cannot be a power in our human constitution.

The topic of the second section is "The Self in Paralogisms." Here, we encounter the negative aspect of the transcendental apperception. The general point of Paralogisms is that Rational Psychology misinterpreted the unity of apperception and took it as an intuition of the subject. This approach confuses appearances with things in themselves. According to Kant, Rational Psychology infers from the proposition "I think" that the soul is a simple and immortal substance that has personal identity. This reasoning is illegitimate because this proposition is merely logical. In order to make such inferences legitimately, we need a manifold of an intuition about it. Kant states that the unity of apperception "is only unity in *thought*, by which alone no object is given, and to which, therefore, the category of substance, which always presupposes a given *intuition*, cannot be applied. Consequently, this subject cannot be known." (B422)

In the final part of the fourth chapter, an overview of the problem of self-knowledge in Kantian philosophy has been presented. Besides of the distinction between empirical and transcendental, the concept of the self is divided in another fashion which occurs through the distinction phenomenal-noumenal. The former is the empirical self which is mentioned above. The latter is a topic of entirely different domain: the morality. In other words, the self as noumenal is the agent of its actions. This twofold account of self is required since the moral principles cannot be derived from experience, and the phenomenal self which is a part of experience cannot be regarded as a free agent of actions in accord with these principles. This is

the reason why Kant propounds the requirement of the distinction between empirical and intelligible characters of the self. The former is the object of knowledge so that it is an appearance among other appearances whereas the latter is the subject of its actions; it should be free from any determination of appearances. Since it is not a possible object of experience, the self in the latter sense cannot be an object of empirical knowledge. Thus, the subject can know itself as it appears to itself like any other possible object of experience. We are, as subjects of knowledge, unqualified to obtain a synthetic *a priori* knowledge of our *self*.

Thus, what we can grasp about the Kantian self is divided to three. First, there is phenomenal self: the self as appears to oneself, second, the thinking subject as a transcendental condition of knowledge, and third, the noumenal self as the free agent of one's actions, as implied in morality. However, despite these diverse accounts of the self, we cannot obtain any knowledge about it. It is not possible through the 'I' of apperception because transcendental subject is only an epistemic condition without content. We cannot derive an objectively valid and universally necessary conception about a persistent self through phenomenal self since the consciousness according to inner sense is always in connection to a flow of perceptions which is always contingent. That the intelligibility of our moral selves as free agents would not yield a theoretical confidence concerning our being so. As a result, there is no aspect of Kant's accounts of self that can provide a theoretical self-knowledge.

It can be inferred that in transcendental philosophy, the only knowledge that has objective validity and universal necessity is the knowledge of possible objects that are given to us through outer sense:

> Although both are appearances, the appearance to outer sense has something fixed or abiding which supplies a substratum as the basis of its transitory determinations and therefore a synthetic concept, namely, that of space and of an appearance in space; whereas time, which is the sole form of our inner intuition, has nothing abiding, and therefore yields knowledge only of the change of determinations, not of any object

> that can be thereby determined. For in what we entitle 'soul', everything is in continual flux and there is nothing abiding except (if we must so express ourselves) the 'I', which is simple solely because its representation has no content, and therefore no manifold (A381).

Thus, we merely know that there is a thing that thinks, but nothing further. That is why the psychology cannot enter upon the sure path of science; "the empirical doctrine of the soul" cannot provide a proper ground for a science because "the phenomena of inner sense" have only one dimension, namely, time.[184] There is no enduring entity in the flow of inner appearances of the soul, thus, there is not any possibility for a synthetic *a priori* knowledge about it.

As it can be seen, this thesis has a negative conclusion with regard to the self-knowledge in a theoretical framework. The problem is that although there appears to be different accounts of what it means to be a self, there is no unity among them. This is probably an inevitable difficulty given the fundamental arguments of transcendental philosophy. For, the answers of these accounts to the question what the self is (an object, a subject and a moral agent) do not have a common ground to indicate the existence of the self as a distinct unique entity. In Paralogisms, Kant states,

> Indeed, it would be a great stumbling-block, or rather would be the one unanswerable objection, to our whole critique, if there were a possibility of proving *a priori* that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, and that consequently (as follows from this same mode of proof) personality is inseparable from them, and that they are conscious of their existence as separate and distinct from all matter. … Upon closer consideration we find, however, that there is no such serious danger. (B409)

One of the aims of *Critique of Pure Reason* is to show that "there is no such serious danger," and it is quite convincing. For, Kant's exclusion of the concept of substance or the soul as an immaterial entity from theoretical domain has its

[184] *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, op. cit., p.7.

grounds: they cannot be objects of experience. On the other hand, he asserts that there is a *positive* outcome of this *negation* of the inferences of rational psychology: the possibility of freewill despite the natural causality.

According to Kant, the reason faces three questions which he deals with in three critiques: What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope? (A805/B833) The first question, which is purely theoretical, is the matter of the first critique, and answered through drawing a line between knowable and unknowable. The answer of this question can only be "*negative*, warning us that we must never venture with speculative reason beyond the limits of experience." (Bxxiv) Through this limitation, the second question, which is purely practical, can be answered in a way that has a positive value (ibid.). The practical domain, *i.e.* the domain of freedom is related to the moral life of human beings, which is the topic of the second critique, the *Critique of Practical Reason*. As stated previously, these two domains of the theoretical and practical modes of knowledge are to be isolated from each other, and in the third critique, the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant builds a bridge between the theoretical and the practical spheres of reason. Here, the main issue is the reflection on the purposiveness of nature, which is possible only if we think *as if* the nature, in its parts and whole, is designed by an intelligent architect according to a plan. This is a demand of reason to cognize nature as a whole with its particulars.

This effort to reflect on nature as it is in itself is exclusively linked with the pursuit of the moral law, *i.e.* the highest purpose of the human being. The third question "What may I hope?" is finally answered: the nature as a whole and everything in it are oriented towards an *ultimate purpose*, which cannot be in nature itself:[185]

> Now if things in the world, which are dependent beings with regard to their existence, require a supreme cause that acts in terms of purposes, then man is the final purpose of creation. For without man the chain of mutually subordinated purposes would not have a complete basis. Only in man, and even in him only as

[185] *Critique of Judgment*, op.cit., p. 313 (426).

> moral subject, do we find unconditioned legislation regarding purposes. It is this legislation, therefore, which alone enables man to be a final purpose to which all of nature is teleologically subordinated.[186]

However, there is a requirement for man to be the ultimate purpose: he has to pursue the final purpose imposed by the moral law, *i.e.* the highest good in the world.[187] This pursuit is possible for man in having *culture* (the cultivation of man's nature) according to which the nature organizes itself.[188] Thus, the nature could be such that it is arranged for the realization of our highest purpose. As a result, I can *hope* that the nature is oriented to yield my purposes, so that I can *hope* to the extent that I am worthy of happiness in so far as I pursue the moral law. Although this realization can never be completed, there can be a *hope* for an approximation at best. The final purpose of nature could be reflected as such, which our finite understanding cannot comprehend.

As a final point, it should be stated that Kant's critical philosophy has opened some doors in the history of philosophy. First of all, he phrased some questions in his own way which has led his successors to grasp the nettle. As regards the main problem of this thesis, for example, although it was not his primary concern, the question "What does it mean to be a human?" gained an importance with him. After two hundred years from Kant, we keep asking the question of what it means to be a human in one way or another. However, though our responses to this inquiry revise the question by some contributions, it seems to remain as an interminable investigation.

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[186] Ibid., p.323 (435-436).

[187] Ibid., p.318 (431).

[188] See, the translator's introduction of *Critique of Judgment*, ibid., pp.lxxxiii-lxxxiv.

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