NIETZSCHE'S CRITICISMS OF KANTIAN MORALITY

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_____

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık

Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts

_____

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam

Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

_____

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Barış Parkan

Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Doç. Dr. Halil Ş. Turan	(METU, PHIL)	_____
Yrd. Doç. Barış Parkan	(METU, PHIL)	_____
Doç. Dr. Ertuğrul R. Turan	(AU, DTCF)	_____

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Name, Last name : Başta Başar Binici

Signature :

ABSTRACT

NIETZSCHE'S CRITICISMS OF KANTIAN MORALITY

Binici, Başta Başar

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The purpose of this study is to explain and evaluate Nietzsche's criticisms of Kantian morality. Kantian morality has greatly influenced western moral thought. Nietzsche's criticisms focus on the scientific and universal character of this philosophy. This work focuses on the ideas of 'freedom', 'autonomy', 'individual virtues' and 'morality as a science'. In order to understand and analyze Nietzsche's critiques, his epistemological criticisms are also evaluated.

Keywords: Nietzsche, Kant, morality, autonomy.

ÖZ

NİETZSCHE'NİN KANT AHLAKINA DAİR ELEŞTİRİLERİ

Binici, Başta Başar

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

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Bu çalışmanın amacı Nietzsche'nin Kant ahlakına dair eleştirilerinin açıklanması ve değerlendirilmesidir. Kant Ahlakı, Batı ahlakını büyük ölçüde etkilemiştir. Nietzsche'nin eleştirileri, temel olarak Kant ahlakının bilimsel ve evrensel yapısını hedef almaktadır. Bu çalışma,' özgürlük', 'otonomi', 'bireysel erdemler' ve 'bilim olarak ahlak' fikirleri üzerinde yoğunlaşmıştır. Nietzsche'nin eleştirilerinin açıklığa kavuşması için, epistemolojik eleştirileri de değerlendirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nietzsche, Kant, ahlak, otonomi.

To My Father

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A	The Antichrist
BGE	Beyond Good and Evil
C.Prac.R	Critique of Practical Reason
CPR	Critique of Pure Reason
GM	On the Genealogy of Morality
GS	The Gay Science
GW	Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals
HH	Human All Too Human
LE	Lectures on Ethics
MM	Metaphysics of Morals
TI	Twilight of the Idols
WP	The Will to Power
Z	Thus Spoke Zarathustra

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

With the inevitable rise of Enlightenment, some major branches of philosophy became object to criticisms. Preceding philosophers were establishing many ontological and epistemological doctrines without clearly and deeply analyzing validity and legitimacy of their arguments. Kantian philosophy as typical of Enlightenment tradition systematically evaluated and criticized the main frames of philosophy. His main intentions were to give legitimacy to the claims of knowledge, and to build up an objective moral framework. Dogmatic structures of philosophy of Middle Age were target to his critiques. A legitimate field for knowledge, a legitimate field for morality, and a legitimate field for faith were demonstrated by Kant.

Kantian morality has widely influenced contemporary European society. The rule following structure of Kantian morality has shown itself in every possible area of social practice. The superiority of laws over rulers, and the idea of following the laws even when they are of no use or harm are characteristics of European norms that are inherited from Enlightenment philosophy (especially Kant).

Before Enlightenment, religious authorities and their moral doctrines had prevailed Europe. When Marx declared religion as the opium for people, he was well aware of the dogmatic structure of the sovereign philosophies of Middle Age. Yet with British empiricists (specifically with Hume), the possibility of certain knowledge and the possibility of deriving morality from knowledge were thought

to diminish. Kant tried to answer skeptical claims while not falling into the dogmatic slumber of medieval metaphysicians. In this respect, Enlightenment thinkers rationalized main branches of philosophy. Rationalization brings dividing of and systematization. According to Kant, everything that is thought to be indubitable (i.e., knowledge, religion, morality) has to be evaluated by *critique*:

> Our age is a genuine age of **criticism,** to which everything must submit. **Religion** through its **holiness** and **legislation** through its **majesty** commonly seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they excite a suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public examination.[1]

The new way of thinking (i.e., bringing all claims under reason's examination) opened a new era where reason took the place of old authority (God, the king, church). Individualization of religion is a consequence of Enlightenment ideology in this sense.

While Enlightenment tradition seems to bring many revolutions with it, everything under the sky stood still. Although God lost his authoritative power, the power itself did not diminish but grow stronger with the claims of certainty concerning human reason's judgments.

> All are free to dance and amuse themselves, just as, since the historical neutralization of religion, they have been free to join any of the countless sects. But freedom to choose an ideology ... everywhere proves to be freedom to be the same.[2]

In this quotation, Adorno and Horkheimer claim that what Enlightenment promises as freedom is being condemned to choose among similar ideologies. In Middle Age, people were ruled like a herd in the sense that they were subject to the laws created by the ruling authority (i.e., king, pope, etc.). Yet, Enlightenment ideology asked for self authorization.

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[1] CPR, Axi, p.100

[2] Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, Theodor W., *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Trans. Edmund Jephcott, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, p.135-136

When Kant shifted the ground for morality from god to human reason, a great revolution seemed to take place at first sight. Beneath the surface of this revolution, old rotten ideals of Platonism, asceticism and Christianity were hidden according to Nietzsche.

My aim in this thesis is to try to demonstrate and evaluate Nietzsche's criticisms of Kantian morality.

Nietzsche's criticisms, at first sight, appear to be made from an exterior point of view. This is partly because of his style. He uses metaphors instead of systematically developing arguments with premises and conclusions. When he talks about Kantian morality, he often uses metaphors of Christianity, nihilism and Chinese character of Kantian moral doctrine. He does not systematically evaluate and criticize Kantian morality, but his criticisms are spread among his major works. Yet, when carefully demonstrated, Nietzsche's criticisms consist of well-constructed arguments addressing the 'dogmatic slumber' of Kant's moral agent.

The philosopher, who criticizes, owes its main ideas and grounds to the criticized views. In this respect, the main difference concerning morality between these two philosophers lies in their views about autonomy, freedom and responsibility. The main reason that leads Nietzsche to reject any moral doctrine and Kant to establish a scientific morality is that Kant thinks that the idea of freedom is sufficient for building up morality since it leads to the idea of responsibility. On the other hand Nietzsche regards freedom as an illusionary idea stemming from responsibility.

For both philosophers, morality is in close relation with moral agent's table of values. According to Kant, "if all worth were conditional and therefore contingent, then no supreme practical principle for reason could be found anywhere."[3] Building up of a scientific morality (i.e., a morality with laws equally obligatory for every rational being) needs a value table in which all worth is not

[3] GW, 4:428, p.37

relative. On the other hand, for Nietzsche, all worth are relative, and no supreme moral principle can be found.

In the second chapter, I try to explain and analyze main themes, concepts and principles of Kantian morality. Nietzsche's criticisms are mainly addressed to the arguments in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, so the second chapter is mostly concerned with Kant's arguments in this book. I will try to focus on his arguments concerning binding structure of morality through its establishment as a science. Specifically, I explain main aspects concerning the scientific understanding of morality, the universality and the objectivity of the moral law and the certainty about Reason's authoritative power and arguments about equality of rational beings under moral law.

In the third chapter I try to analyze and evaluate Nietzsche's criticisms concerning Kantian Ethics. Nietzsche's criticisms mainly address *Christian* aspects of Kantian morality. Nietzsche accuses Kant for building up a life-denying theory with dogmatic acceptance of Christian norms. On the other hand, for Kant, Christians' motives for moral acts are not pure since their motivations stem from self-interest (i.e., salvation, heaven). Thus, I first evaluate main differences and similarities between Kantian morality and Christian norms.

Secondly, I try to present ontological views of Nietzsche to understand his criticisms accusing Kant for relying on Christian understanding of transcendence (i.e., morality relying on the *unknown*, other world). 'Will-to-power', Nietzsche's understanding of *becoming* (processes constituted by *forces*), and his ideas concerning rationality are to be briefly explained and analyzed in order to have a clearer understanding about his criticisms.

Thirdly, I try to point out some of Nietzsche's criticisms concerning epistemological and ontological views of Kant in order to understand the relation between his epistemology and morality. Then, I analyze why Nietzsche thinks that Kantian morality (and also Christianity) relies on *skepticism*. This leads to Nietzsche's criticisms concerning rationalization of morality as a science with a universal, obligatory law.

Fourthly, I present Nietzsche's major arguments behind his understanding of autonomy which is the keystone of Kantian morality. I try to investigate Nietzsche's criticisms regarding the Kantian autonomous moral agent as 'the automaton of duty'.

Nietzsche asserts that Kant's categorical imperative is necessarily hypothetical. Throughout the last sections of this thesis, I try to argue that Kantian morality is either self-referential or hypothetical. Nietzsche's criticisms also lead to the idea that even if Kantian morality is universal and scientific, the question 'why should I be moral' is ignored by Kant.

CHAPTER 2

KANTIAN MORALITY: MAIN CONCEPTS, PRINCIPLES, AND KEY IDEAS

2.1. Introduction:

Kantian philosophy has been a turning point in the history of philosophy. Many great philosophers of later ages owe their philosophical kernel to Kant. Among many books and articles he wrote, three critiques have inspired modern and post-modern discourse: *the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment.* In these three critiques, Kant divides and analyzes fundamental principles and methods for questions corresponding to them. Rationalization of knowledge and morality are key ideas of the Enlightenment thinkers. In this respect, Kant's first two critiques were written to demonstrate the possibility of certain knowledge with indubitable content and a scientific morality with universal obligatory laws.

The first *Critique* tries to answer the question "How can I know?" Many analytical thinkers (such as philosophers of Vienna Circle) are inspired from this work. Kant's project is to show that knowledge is possible while Hume's skeptic claims about knowledge were believed to end the possibility of knowledge. Kant defined a limited field for knowledge and claimed that knowledge is valid only through this limited field (i.e., phenomena). In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant claims that he is 'limiting knowledge in order to make room for faith [i.e.,

morality]'[4]. Thus, the Kantian project involves rationalization of morality through the phenomenal world in which laws of nature [i.e., causality, laws of physics, etc.) works.

The second *Critique* deals with the response to "what ought I to do?" In *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant defines fundamental concepts and search for fundamental principle for morality. For Kant, that limited structure of knowledge allows the idea that freedom (which is not experienced through phenomena) is possible. The idea of freedom of moral agents leads to the idea that the moral agent is responsible for his acts. That is why Kant thinks that the possibility of freedom (idea of freedom as not being contradictory to knowledge) is sufficient for establishing morality.

Kant's *Critiques* try to answer Hume's skeptical arguments about impossibility of knowledge concerning the relations among the objects of experience and the impossibility of deriving 'what ought to be done' from 'what is'. Nietzsche and his post-modern followers are not satisfied with his answers since they think establishing a (scientific) system with absolute certainty is impossible. In this respect, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze criticizes Kant's project in the Critiques:

> … opposition between project [of the critique] and results (moreover between the general project and the particular intentions) is easily explained. Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to the limit, a conception which saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves; a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to morality, but not morality itself. Thus total critique turns into the politics of compromise: even before the battle the spheres of influence have already been shared out. Three ideals are distinguished: what can I know? what should I do? what can I hope for? Limits are drawn to each one, misuses and trespasses are denounced, but the uncritical character of each ideal remains at the heart of Kantianism like the worm in the fruit: true knowledge, true morality and true religion. What Kant still calls -- in his own terms – a fact: the fact of morality, the fact of knowledge…[5]

[4] See CPR, Bxxx, p.117
[5] Deleuze Gilles. *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* London and New York: Continuum, 1986, p.89-90

As we mentioned, Kant tries to establish a scientific morality. The law of this science is 'law of freedom'.

In the preface to *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant talks about three sciences: 'physics, ethics and logic'.[6] In *the Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant divides objects of experience into two: material and formal. The material part concerns the given data independent of the subject. The formal part, on the other hand, includes objects' having form by categories of understanding. According to Kant, these concepts (i.e., categories) of the understanding are a priori and thus universal. Likewise, Kant divides sciences into two kinds according to the origin of their objects. Logic is a formal science in the sense that it has no empirical part and solely deals with formal principles of reason. The object of logic is 'universal rules of thinking' without any reference to objects of experience. Physics, on the other, hand is the material science (material in the sense that it deals with objects of experience, i.e., nature) whose laws are *laws of nature*. Yet, in the *Groundwork*, he deals with another material science, namely, ethics whose law is *law of freedom* (i.e., freedom to obey the moral law). While the expression "law of freedom" may sound like an oxymoron, Kant is here talking about the science of prescribing a law for our actions when we are free—i.e., under the absence of external laws determining our actions.

This division may be familiar from ancient Greek Philosophy and Aristotelian Medieval Philosophers such as Aquinas, but as Kant is an Enlightenment thinker, this distinction is cast in a totally new framework. We can identify here at least two main concerns of Kant as is typical of Enlightenment philosophy: (1) a preoccupation with science as having universally acceptable principles … (2) a desire to make room for morality/to create a special place for human beings in nature which is otherwise explained in completely mechanical and causal terms.
In order to clarify Kant's main concerns about morality, in this chapter, we will explain fundamental concepts and principles of Kantian morality as he states in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

[6] See GW, 4:387-4:389, pp.1-2

2.2. Ethics as a Science

2.2.1. Science as Universal

It is well-known that Kant's epistemology was developed in response to the challenge posed by Hume's skepticism. Hume's inductive skepticism, especially with regard to cause and effect led to *skepticism* about scientific laws in general since scientific laws are based on establishing relations of cause and effect. Hume claimed that we can only know the objects in experience but cannot know the relations (i.e., laws) among these objects since the relations are not given in experience. Kant responded via the "synthetic a priori" (a type of judgment not properly identified by his predecessors)[7] which enabled him to argue that although things as they are in themselves are unknown to us, we can know them as they appear to us. His rather complicated analysis of validity and possibility of synthetic a priori propositions can be very briefly summarized as follows. Sense data are given to our intuition and we apply space and time as forms of intuition to these data which are the material parts of intuition. Then, these representations are brought under categories of the understanding which constitute judgments concerning these representations. Since the forms of intuition and concepts of the understanding are a priori, the judgments related to them are also a priori. A synthesis is made during both composing the representation and the judgment about the representation; therefore, the judgment is synthetic a priori and claimed to be valid as a proposition of knowledge. These claims are true since they are a priori. As the synthetic a priori is independent of experience but also constitutes the experience, it provides a basis for the objectivity of knowledge. These claims are also not tautological (i.e., they give new information such as the proposition '5+7=12' gives new information which is not given through an analysis of the terms '5', '+' and '7') since they are synthetic according to Kant. Therefore causality is not given us through the inner nature of objects (things-in-themselves), but constituted by the mind itself. Knowledge claims concerning

[7] See CPR, B10-B19, pp.141-146 for Kant's arguments concerning synthetic *a priori*

causality are valid since we cannot grasp nature otherwise. Therefore, laws of nature given in terms of causality are valid and secured by synthetic a priori propositions.

In thus demonstrating the objective validity of scientific laws based on causality, Kant retains the Enlightenment's understanding of (phenomenal) nature as a causal network. In other words, nature remains as something which can be brought under laws which the mind can understand. Kant claims that his revolution in the epistemology is similar to Copernican Revolution in astronomy; that is, the origin of the validity of knowledge shifts from objects of experience to the subject.

2.2.2. Spontaneity of Reason

Again as is typical of the Enlightenment thinkers Kant is unwilling to situate human beings inside the causal network of nature. *Humanism* is characteristic of the Enlightenment ideology and Kant's philosophy of practice. Kant gives so much value to reason that he claims humans (or rational beings) to be invaluable and consequently rejects that the spontaneity of authoritative reason originates within the phenomena. For him, reason is spontaneous (and causa sui) and this spontaneity stems from the noumena which is the name for the unknown. Since the concept of causality, like other categories of reason, does not apply to the noumenal realm, the fact that reason stems from the noumena does not have to imply a cause-effect relation between reason and something else. Kant thus manages to place human reason outside the causal network; it is free from the causality and has self-authority. Part of Kant's motivation here is to make room for morality by assuming that the will is free. By assuming the will as free, reason becomes morally responsible and thus morality becomes possible. Kant's humanism contains human reason as obedient to the moral laws. The rule following characteristic of rational beings is seen as their freedom stemming from reason's superior transcendental structure.

2.2.3. A priority/Universality of Morality

One of Kant's main aims while building up metaphysics of morals is to maintain objectivity of principles of morality in the sense that they do not depend on subjectivity or arbitrariness of any reason or any empirical case. In order to maintain this objectivity he purifies principles of morality from feelings, emotions, etc. Anything that is solely subjective, and a posteriori, and thus not universal cannot be basis for the objectivity of the supreme moral principle. For Kant, objectively valid propositions must be a priori—either analytical or synthetic a priori.

A posteriori terms cannot be terms belonging to objectively valid propositions. In other words, if the supreme principle of morality is to be claimed, it should be universal and objective and thus inevitably a priori. We take the term *a priori* to mean that which is constitutive of experience here, that is, as what remains when we remove all empirical parts of experience; in Kant's words, "pure". Kant's answer to Hume's skepticism involves this distinction. His answer to Hume's scepticism is that knowledge is possible only if the subject creates the objects of knowledge in the ways that it understands them. Thus, for Kant, whereas the matter (i.e., sense data) of objects of experience is given, the form is created by the understanding and these objects come under laws of reason (i.e., laws of physics for objects of nature). Thus, the relations are given by our own reason to the phenomena. The *a priori* part (the pure part) grants the objectivity and universal validity of these laws.

As we mentioned, Hume claims, the experience cannot give us 'what ought to be done'; i.e., what ought to be done cannot be inferred or derived from experience. On the other hand, Kant searches for a universally acceptable basis for morality as a science; he examines the a priori foundations for morality. Without reference to universal, a priori concepts, it is impossible to end up with laws [of morality], without which morality would not be a science but rather a subjective speculative discourse depending on the arbitrary character of experience.

Ethics as a material science has two parts: an empirical part and a rational part. The empirical part is the subject of moral anthropology (which deals with how people do act and not with how they ought to act. The answer to the latter question (how they ought to act) cannot be found in reference to experience since all judgments inferred from experience are a posteriori claims that do not contain necessity (i.e., obligation). The rational part, which is the subject of pure metaphysics, involves a priori rules and concepts of morality, and deals with how people ought to act.

Kant's main concern in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and in *the Critique of Practical Reason* is *pure* morality (*morals*) which has nothing to do with experience. Thus he tries to clear away the empirical part of metaphysics of morals and to search for a priori principles of pure reason.

2.3. Practical Reason: The Will

In *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant clarifies and analyses the concepts of morality for the "search for and establishment *the supreme principle of morality*."[8] To search for the supreme principle, Kant begins with the concept of the *will* (practical reason) which is the subject of a decided, chosen act: "*Will* is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational"[9]

As we mentioned, morality is a science and like other sciences (i.e., physics), it has its own laws. For Kant, a *law* is a rule of reason which is universal. If we search for the origin of the universal law in the empirical framework we will only end up with subjective rules. A moral law to be a law necessitates absolute certainty otherwise it would rather be a practical rule.[10] The basis of such a law cannot be sought in the nature of man or his environment (phenomenal world) but

[8] GW, 4:392, p.5
[9] GW, 4:446, p.52
[10] See GW, 388v-389, pp.2-3

in the a priori principles of reason itself. Objects of experience are empirical and cannot be a universal ground.

In *the Groundwork to Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant draws attention to the close relation between being rational and acting in accordance with the concept of laws. "Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will."[11]

Any being which is not rational inevitably acts in accordance with laws (i.e., laws of Nature). In other words, non-rational beings act from desires and instincts which are predetermined by the influence of objects of experience). A rational being, on the other hand, has the faculty to choose its own set of motives; that is, they can choose obey or disobey the moral law. This faculty is the will according to Kant. In other words, rational beings have the capacity to choose their motivation to act while irrational beings just follow the given motivations.

Kant accepts human reason as the authoritative ground of morality (like god's role in Christian morality).When morality is at stake, the supreme authority is nothing other than the practical reason (or will itself): "Since *reason* is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason."[12] Thus, for Kant, will is the faculty whose acts are performed due to the practical necessity originated from the law of morality. It is important to note that the practical necessity "originates" from laws of morality, but this is not a logical derivation since an act is not a proposition.

[11] GW, 4:412, p.24. Note that Kant indentifies having rational capacity to choose to follow the law with having a will in this quotation.
[12] GW, 4:412, p.24

2.3.1. Good Will

If the reason (more specifically, the will) chooses to do a certain act in order to perform a duty, it is called "a good will". In other words, a "good will" is a will which acts from the obligation of the moral law. Kant's key idea here is good will's being *causa sui*: A will that has its own cause for being good is *unconditionally* good. Its goodness does not depend on experience or practice; that is, the criteria for the will's being good are not external:

> It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will. Understanding, wit, judgment and the like, whatever such talents of minds may be called, or courage, resolution, and perseverance in one's plans, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable for many purposes, but they can also be extremely evil and harmful if the will which is to make use of these gifts of nature, and whose distinctive constitution is therefore called character, is not good. It is the same with gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even health and that complete well-being and satisfaction with one's condition called happiness, produce boldness and thereby often arrogance as well unless a good will is present which corrects the influence of these on the mind and, in so doing, also corrects the whole principle of action and brings it into conformity with universal ends not to mention that an impartial rational spectator can take no delight in seeing the uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced with no feature of a pure and good will, so that a good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition even of worthiness to be happy. [13]

Many moralists hitherto thought happiness to be the criterion of morality. They found the ultimate 'virtue' to be happiness which is empirical. According to Kant the purpose (criteria) of a good will cannot be happiness (or well being, survival, etc.). He rejects this criterion because of two reasons. The first reason is that if these ends (i.e., happiness, survival, well being, etc) were the purpose we would not need reason as a means to perform these ends (or to attain this purpose--happiness), but instincts would be sufficient to maintain them.[14] The second reason is that happiness is an empirical term and violates the purity (i.e., not depending on objects of experience but belonging to the subject) of the fundamental moral principle to be established. In this respect, emotions or

[13] GW, 4:393, p.7
[14] See GW, 4:395, pp.8-9

instincts cannot be the basis of morality either, since they violate the goodness of the will (because the *will* would be good conditionally --the criteria would be external-- dependent upon emotions and instincts). Happiness is an empirical concept that violates the purity (a priority) since everyone becomes happy of different experiences and therefore, happiness cannot be an objective basis (or purpose) for the will, but rather subjective:

> ...it is a misfortune that the concept of happiness is such an indeterminate concept that, although every human being wishes to attain this, he can still never say determinately and consistently with himself what he really wishes and wills. The cause of this is that all the elements that belong to the concept of happiness are without exception empirical, that is, they must be borrowed from experience, and that nevertheless for the idea of happiness there is required an absolute whole, a maximum of well-being in my present condition and in every future condition.[15]

All other things such as emotions, character, well-being, etc. are good conditionally, depending on the goodness of the will's being good. In other words, their being good is contingent on some consequences, attainment of some purposes, etc. which, as Kant claims, are good for many purposes but may also be evil and harmful if the will is not good. Yet the goodness of the will is not dependent on its practice; thus, the harmful consequences of a practice of a good will does not detract from its goodness. This will is good in itself; the pragmatic aspect of good will does not affect its goodness:

> A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is to be valued incomparably higher than all that could merely be brought about by it in favor of some inclination and indeed, if you will, of the sum of all inclinations. Even if, by a special disfavor of fortune or by the niggardly provision of a step motherly nature, this will should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing and only the good will were left (not, of course, as a mere wish but as the summoning of all means insofar as they are in our control) then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has its full worth in itself. Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add anything to this worth nor take anything away from it. Its usefulness would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it more conveniently in

[15] GW, 4:418, p.28

> ordinary commerce or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet expert enough, but not to recommend it to experts or to determine its worth. [16]

Since practice is not the criterion for being good, then it is the motivation that leads to the practice, according to Kant. Given that the criterion cannot be external, he thinks that the motivation should be from the will itself. The will can be good in itself since it has the capability to act voluntarily in accordance with the laws which are established by practical reason itself. The good will has its goodness within itself and with no reference to anything except itself. This means that it is good neither because it attains happiness nor because its ultimate purpose is perfection nor because it searches for virtue, but because it chooses its own criteria to be good.

2.3.1.1. Motives

In searching for supreme principle of morality, Kant examines two aspects of this principle; namely, subjective and objective. Both are important since the subjective part (the maxim) determines the moral worth by voluntarily being in accordance with the objective part (the law):

> A maxim is the subjective principle of volition; the objective principle (i.e., that which would also serve subjectively as the practical principle for all rational beings if reason had complete control over the faculty of desire) is the practical law.[17]

Maxim as the subjective principle is the motive through which the will is driven to act. If the agent's motive is anything other than to obey the moral law (such as happiness, self-love or self-interest, salvation, etc.), even if the act is in conformity with the moral law (that is, if duty is done by the motivation of desire to perform that duty without considering the enjoyment or feeling or situation

[16] GW, 4:394, p.8
[17] GW, 4:401, p.11

brought by the consequence), then the maxim is not pure and the act motivated by this impure maxim does not have moral worth:

> ...an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon, and therefore does not depend upon the realization of the object of the action but merely upon the principle of volition in accordance with which the action is done without regard for any object of the faculty of desire. [18]

On the other hand the objective principle is the law itself. The will should choose to obey the law for the sake of the law itself. To understand this statement, we should analyze Kant's ideas about law and autonomy (the latter is to be explained in the second part of this chapter). Here consciously and voluntarily obeying the rule is at stake, not acting in accordance with the law. Thus, acting in accordance with the law is necessary but not sufficient, acting for the sake of following the laws is necessary. This is important since for Kant goodness of a will is related with the reason's being self-obedient.

If an action is done contrary to the moral law it is an immoral act since it is not in accordance with the objective principle (law). Kant claims that the moral worth of an action which is in accordance with a moral law can be evaluated only if it is done from duty, not for the sake of self interest or not in conformity with duty (those acts would be amoral). Here evaluation of the subjective principle (that is, maxim) is at stake; that is not the consequence but the intention is the criterion.
While introducing concepts of morality, he also criticizes preceding approaches to morality to for being subjective and to having their origin in self-love rather than autonomy (or respect to for the law).

For example, if someone tells a lie to his friends, it would be immoral. If he doesn't tell a lie, his act is either moral or amoral depending upon the motive (the genuine intention that leads to the performed act). If he does not tell a lie because he does not like telling lies or he does not want to tell a lie to his beloved people who are close to him, this act is amoral because his motivation does not stem from

[18] GW, 4:399-4:400, p.13

the law (i.e., do not tell lies) itself but the motivation is self-love or love to friends. His act would be moral only if he does not tell a lie because the law says so. In other words, the purity of the will is spoiled by desires (i.e., self interest), emotions (i.e., acting for happiness), practical interest about consequence, etc.; this purity cannot be attained when one's motive is other than to follow an obligation (or to perform duty).

What Kant is doing in this discussion of motives is meta-ethics, not normative ethics. In other words, he is not trying to tell people to try not to enjoy the morally right acts that they are performing or to suppress their love for the people towards whom they are acting morally. Rather, he is trying to identify the moral kernel of an act that is in accordance with duty; he is trying to find wherein among the motives the *moral worth* of the action really lies; that is, he is trying to *define* morality.

2.3.2. The Categorical Imperative

Kant puts forth various formulations of the moral law. In these formulas he tries to show how a maxim can be a universal, objective law.

A moral law is necessarily expressed in the form of an imperative: "The representation of an objective principle [which is *law*], insofar as it is necessitating for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative."[19] An imperative is a proposition which asserts an act as necessary or obligatory. There are two types of imperatives; namely hypothetical and categorical imperatives. For Kant a moral law should and can only be constituted in the form of a categorical imperative, not hypothetical ones: "If duty is a concept that is to contain significance and real lawgiving for our actions it can be expressed only in categorical imperatives and by no means in hypothetical ones."[20]

[19] GW, 4:413, p.24
[20] GW, 4:425, p.34

Kant states that there is only one categorical imperative. He gives various formulations of the categorical imperative. At this point it is better to put forward Kant's first two formulations, that are namely;

Universal Law Formulation: "*act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law*."[21]

Law of Nature Formulation: "*act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature*."[22]

In the first formulation, the universality of moral law is emphasized. In the second, Kant underlines will's command's being obligatory (necessary) to itself.

Kant's insistence on categorical imperative stems from his belief in objective basis of morality. This objective basis necessitates assumption of a certain, fixed table of values otherwise the laws of morality become subjective due to each subject's own table of values and thus would not be valid for every rational being. "...if all worth were conditional and therefore contingent, then no supreme practical principle for reason could be found anywhere."[23]

A formal analysis of imperatives is required to decide their objectivity. Hypothetical imperatives are in the form of *"if you want x, then you ought to perform y". On the other hand* the categorical ones are uttered in the form *"you ought to perform y"*. The "*if you want x*" part spoils the purity of the maxim since it puts a purpose(*x*) to the will and y would be performed not because of respect for the law (that is to perform for the sake of duty only) but because of desire (or self-interest) to attain the purpose.

Here, (in the case of hypothetical imperatives) for Kant, a triple problem arises. First, the reason (or the good will whose purpose is nothing other than what the duty orders) is not taken as the supreme authority (or end); that is, the action is not

[21] GW, 4:421, p.31
[22] GW, 4:421, p.31
[23] GW, 4:428, p.37

good in itself but good conditionally. The good is identified as "x", the external purpose to be attained, and reason is taken as a means for desire to attain this end. Although both categorical and hypothetical imperatives command to "*perform y*", the hypothetical imperative is concerned with the matter of the action and with the end connected to the action while the categorical imperative is concerned solely with the form of the action and the principle from which the action arises.

The second problem is that in the hypothetical form, the purpose, 'x', necessarily defines the means (y) to attain it. This situation may cause a devaluation of other rational beings to be [inevitably] considered as a means to attainment of purposes for morality. Since, for Kant, every rational being is equal under laws of morality and has immeasurable value they deserve to be seen as end in itself not as a means only. If the law is in the form of a hypothetical imperative, any agent that follows the law necessarily takes other rational beings as means. For example, if we take the sentence 'if you want to be happy, help other people' as a law of morals, by helping people we treat people only as a means to self-happiness and since the end is pre-given we cannot here treat them as ends also.

The third problem that arises concerning hypothetical imperatives is that the action (perform y) that belongs to such imperatives cannot be universalizable since the purpose to be attained is subjective and cannot be the basis for a universal, objective principle. For example, someone may well not perform y if he does not want to attain x. Thus, a moral law cannot be in the form of hypothetical imperative since its necessity depends on one's willing to attain x. As the purpose (x – for example happiness or prudence) inevitably is a term borrowed from experience, it cannot serve as constitutive of an a priori principle.

> On the other hand, the question of how the imperative of *morality* is possible is undoubtedly the only one needing a solution, since it is in no way hypothetical and the objectively represented necessity can therefore not be based on any presupposition, as in the case of hypothetical imperatives.[24]

[24] GW, 4:419, p.29

In his analysis of an imperative, Kant also draws attention to the existence of the categorical imperative:

> Only we must never leave out of account, here, that it cannot be made out by means of any example, and so empirically, whether there is any such imperative at all, but it is rather to be feared that all imperatives which seem to be categorical may yet in some hidden way be hypothetical.[25]

Although one may seem to follow the duty of the categorical imperative (for example the command not to lie), the actions which the imperatives command may be done from some motives (i.e., 'fear of disgrace', survival instinct, etc.) other than to obey the law. Hypothetical imperatives are not compatible with the purity of the subjective principle, since the source of motivation is pre-given. Therefore, Kant claims that the investigation of the categorical imperative by empirical means is impossible, and it should be a priori.

2.4. Freedom

"…freedom would be that property of such causality [the will] that it can be efficient independently of alien causes determining it..."[26]

Freedom is the basis on which Kant builds up his metaphysics of morality. Kant does not take freedom as acting ultimately free (this is negative freedom for Kant), but as choosing to obey self-made laws since reason has the power to constitute laws. Kant defines (positive) freedom as voluntarily acting [i.e., performing duty] without taking any external causes as a motive for an action: "a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same."[27]

In *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,* Kant uses the phrase 'free will' referring to practical reason's capacity to choose a maxim. Yet, in *Metaphysics of*

[25] GW, 4:419, p.29
[26] GW, 4:446, p.52
[27] GW, 4:447, p.53

Morals, he claims that being 'free' is not a predicate of the will but of the capacity of choice[28] Since the "choice which can be determined by *pure reaso*n is called free choice"[29], we will refer this freedom as freedom of the will in the following parts of this essay.

As the will is defined as good by its being obedient of to itself, defining such a will as "free" may seem counter-intuitive to some. Since everything is given, freedom (as Hegel claims) of a subject can be proven by the negation of what is given. The moral laws which are constituted by may be pre-given as well. Therefore, defining freedom as identical with obedience is a claim that should be argued well. Yet, Kant does not think that there is a problem in defining freedom via limiting the will. What the free reason wills is limited by what it ought to will. The reason determines its own limits, and this so-called self determination is considered as its freedom. It can well be argued that freedom cannot be just defined as self-obedience but self rebellion (such as resisting one's own way of life; for example not performing an act that is certainly moral for you but immoral for others) may belong to it as well. Yet, since Kant thinks that the table of values is fixed and certain, laws that are derived by the reason following his formulations are taken as objective and universal.

Therefore freedom of the will is defined as voluntarily following a duty in which the laws are self-established by the same will. Freedom is the key concept since existence of morality necessitates it; that is talking about how people ought to act would be nonsense without presupposing those moral agents as free; that is, a non-free agent inevitably acts in accordance with laws and has no freedom to choose which rules to obey but his will is just predetermined in each situation that he acts in.

[28] see MM, 6:213-6:226, pp41-46
[29] MM, 6:213, p.41

All other speculative concepts (like God and immortality) which are related with morality (as key concepts) depend on the idea of freedom their possibility is established by existence of freedom which has its reality in the moral framework:

> Now, the concept of freedom, insofar as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, constitutes the keystone of the whole structure of a system of pure reason, even of speculative reason; and all other concepts (those of God and immortality), which as mere ideas remain without support in the latter, now attach themselves to this concept and with it and by means of it get stability and objective reality, that is, their possibility is proved by this: that freedom is real, for this idea reveals itself through the moral law.[30]

Being free grants the possibility of the categorical imperative. If reason belongs to noumena (i.e., if its spontaneity arises independently of the causal nature of phenomena) then there may be categorical imperative that does not contain hidden purposes, given effectiveness (i.e., self-interest, fear, etc.) of empirical data. Therefore the concept of duty which is to be followed consciously requires being rational (i.e., having the spontaneous faculty to choose freely even if there are emotions, instincts and occasions that affects our desires).

2.4.1 Human Dignity

In the *Groundwork,* Kant puts forward various formulations of categorical imperative. The formula of the End in itself (Humanity formula) is based on the dignity of rational beings: "*So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.*"[31]

Kant defines dignity as being immeasurable concerning its value.

> In the kingdom of ends everything has either a *price* or a *dignity*. What has a price can be replaced by something else as its *equivalent*; what on the

[30] C.Prac.R, 5:4, p.3
[31] GW, 4:429, p.38

> other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity.[32]

Kant claims that all needs and inclinations of human beings has a price in this regard:

> What is related to general human inclinations and needs has a *market price*; that which, even without presupposing a need, conforms with a certain taste, that is, with a delight in the mere purposeless play of our mental powers, has a *fancy price*; but that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is, ***dignity***.[33]

He defines dignity as having an inner worth observing that which has an exterior worth has a relative worth, 'market price'. A rational being as 'End-in-itself' has an interior worth (dignity) not comparable to any other worth.

Given that human beings are seen as rational and autonomous (i.e., capable of moral reasoning and thus having a good will and since good-will is only thing that is "good without qualification" (unconditionally good) human beings are ends-in-themselves for Kant:

> Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings and is *in turn* bound to respect every other.
> Humanity itself is a dignity: for a human being cannot be used merely as means by any human being (either by others or even by himself) but always be used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that this dignity (personality) consists, by which he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not human beings and yet can be used, and so over all things. But just as he cannot be himself away for any price (this would conflict with his duty of self-esteem), so neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary self-esteem of others, as human beings, that is, he is under obligation to acknowledge, in a practical way, the dignity of humanity in every other human being. Hence there rests on him a duty regarding the respect that must be shown to every other human being.[34]

[32] GW, 4:434, p.42
[33] GW, 4:435, p.42
[34] MM, 6:462, p.255

Kant takes the end-in-itself aspect of human rationality and places it at the basis of his table of values. Kant's table of values is fixed in the sense that there are some values such as human dignity that are not relative. This idea leads to the understanding of egalitarianism which claims all human beings as equal. This is 'is the supreme limiting condition of the freedom of action of every human being' [i.e., in every action other rational beings should be considered as ends-in-themselves].[35]

For Kant, the other definition of freedom (absolute freedom) is negative since it does not respect other rational beings as equally rational (i.e., having a good will) and this may cause the other wills to be seen merely as a means to be moral. Therefore, will of every rational being is equally regarded as a will which is equally capable of making universal moral law.

2.4.2. Autonomy

The equality of all human beings *qua* rational beings capable of moral reasoning enables Kant to combine the individual nature of self-legislation (obeying self-made laws) with the universal and objective nature of morality which he tries to demonstrate.

Kant names this formula as the formula of autonomy and claims that:

> …the will is not merely subject to the law but subject to it in such a way that it must be viewed as also giving the law to itself and just because of this as first subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author).[36]

Thus, the subject who obeys the law is also the subject who makes the law and this subject voluntarily acts in accordance with the representation of the law because the subject itself creates it. *Being law onto itself* is the motto of autonomy:

[35] GW, 4:431, p.39
[36] GW, 4:431, p.39

> In accordance with this principle [of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law] all maxims are repudiated that are inconsistent with the will's own giving of universal law. Hence the will is not merely subject to the law but subject to it in such a way that it must be viewed as also giving the law to itself and just because of this as first subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author).[37]

Kant does not give the formula of autonomy as an imperative in the *Groundwork*. Yet, in the *Lectures on Ethics* the formulation is given in form of the imperative: "So act, that by the maxim of your action you may present yourself as a universal legislator."[38] The law giver character of Reason is praised by Kant and the will is considered to be determining its own causality (i.e., necessity to perform a duty).

As expressed in the subtitle of chapter 3 of the Groundwork, "the concept of freedom is the key to explain autonomy of the will" for Kant: "we must presuppose it if we want to think of a being as rational and endowed with consciousness of his causality with respect to actions."[39]

For Kant, autonomy can ground the categorical imperative as the form of moral law. This is because autonomy necessitates self authority and excludes alien causes (such as emotions, desires, and self-love) from being motives for our acts and is related with the purity of moral law. This purity cannot be attained in the hypothetical imperatives since in those, an external purpose (a purpose other than to follow a self assigned duty) is assumed to be attained by reason. The subjective principle (maxim) is pre-given and the validity of the law depends upon empirical concepts and thus the law is in the form of synthetic a posteriori. A categorical imperative, unlike a hypothetical one, does not stem from subjective inclinations but rather from reason's authority:

> Thus the principle of every human will as a will giving universal law through all its maxims…would be very well suited to be the categorical imperative by this: that just because of the idea of giving universal law it is

[37] GW, 4:431, p.39
[38] LE, 27:518, p.281
[39] GW, 4:449, p.54

> based on no interest and therefore, among all possible imperatives, can alone be unconditional; or still better, by converting the proposition, if there is a categorical imperative (i.e., a law for every will of a rational being) it can only command that everything be done from the maxim of one's will as a will that could at the same time have as its object itself as giving universal law; for only then is the practical principle, and the imperative that the will obeys, unconditional, since it can have no interest as its basis.[40]

On the other hand if the will is to have its basis for the law at any source other than itself (i.e., at *the characteristics of its objects*), this will's activity is heteronomous. Autonomy is the character of a will which chooses to obey self-made universalizable laws. Thus, the will acts autonomously when it determines itself immediately as Kant claims; that is, it wills self-assigned duty which consists of universalizable laws. The will acts heteronomously when it determines itself (acts accordingly) mediately through some other empirical concepts derived from experience (i.e., acting from principles of happiness or perfection, acting for sake of god, promise of heaven, salvation, etc.):

> Wherever an object of the will [that is, what the reason wills] has to be laid down as the basis for prescribing the rule that determines the will, there the rule is none other than heteronomy; the imperative is conditional, namely: if or because one wills this object, one ought to act in such or such a way; hence it can never command morally, that is, categorically.[41]

Reason must have its basis --for act-- in itself only if it is to be autonomous; any external basis that is assigned to the will as a purpose to be attained violates autonomy. Without assertion of autonomy the concept of duty cannot be taken as the supreme principle of morals, for, then only some interest to external means or ends are taken as supreme principles. Autonomy principle arising from the freedom of the will necessitates the laws to be established in the form of categorical imperatives rather than hypothetical ones in this respect.

2.4.3. The Possibility of Freedom

[40] GW, 4:432, p.40
[41] GW, 4:444, p.50

2.4.3.1 Freedom as an Idea: Reason vs. the Understanding

For Kant, urgency of building up the science concerning laws of freedom (that is, morals) comes from the possibility of freedom. In fact, the possibility of morality necessitates the assumption of freedom (of the moral agents). Given that we live in a world which has laws (of causality), and the phenomena operate under these laws, *freedom,* if it is to be possible at all, must be placed is beyond the field of phenomena—i.e., beyond the field of knowledge.

In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant tries to answer the question how knowledge is possible and establishes limits of knowledge in order to put an end to endless speculations about knowledge and also to establish the possibility of metaphysics of practice. One of Kant's main concerns is that if knowledge is limited, then beyond these limits, the possibility of faith (and also practical philosophy, i.e., morality) arises.

Accordingly, in the first critique, Kant claims that he is limiting knowledge in order to make room for faith [and for metaphysics of practice, morality, etc.]. He accuses preceding philosophers to be dogmatic metaphysicians since they made epistemic claims on objects (like god, soul, and things in themselves) that they do not experience.

According to Kant, these assumptions are made not as claims of knowledge but made in view of the fact that they are practically necessary (like the concept of freedom which Kant assumed for morality).

With the intention of defining the limits of knowledge, Kant makes a distinction between Reason and the Understanding. Understanding as a faculty is spontaneous but needs sensibility to act upon, while reason can act without sensibility (i.e., it can create ideas like freedom without any sensibility or concepts of understanding about freedom therefore its *causa sui*. This makes the

assumption of freedom of the reason —the assumption from which Reason's (specifically spontaneity of reason) belonging to the noumena is inferred— practically legitimate. If Reason is not regarded as belonging to noumena, freedom cannot be at stake since the *will* would be affected by laws that affect appearances and the will (as a faculty to choose its own motivations) would be empirically determined (i.e., by empirical necessity of desires and emotions).

For Kant, we (in fact, our reasons) have a drive to fulfill (or unify) our knowledge. Since our knowledge has limits, Reason tries to transcend these limits, and makes metaphysical claims about the existence of God, souls and substances, etc. From the perspective of theoretical knowledge, this attempt to go beyond limits (into the field of noumena) is not valid, because Reason can have no knowledge of the objects which the understanding did not give their forms.

Nonetheless, Reason does not only consist of the theoretical part but also has a practical part. Practical reason (which is the will for rational beings) assumes unknown concepts (i.e., freedom) for practical necessity (in order to be able to talk about validity of moral judgments or more precisely of morality). In *the Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant asks how knowledge is possible without dealing with whether it is possible or not. Likewise, in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, he looks for how morality is possible. He does not question whether it is possible or not. He claims that morality's possibility (i.e., possibility of freedom not as a concept of understanding but as an idea of reason) is sufficient to search for morality and to build up metaphysics of morality as a science.

Freedom is an idea that requires reason to determine itself independently of the causal framework; that is to say, Reason determines itself spontaneously.

Kant thinks that spontaneity of reason (i.e., its not being determined by or within the empirical framework but realizing its activity upon this framework) is a clue for accepting it as free. Yet, since freedom is not a relation that we can experience (since freedom is not an attribute of phenomena), Kant claims that we cannot (and

do not have to) prove its existence or claim its objective reality. Since there are two fields (noumena and phenomena), Kant tries to show that reason's freedom (stemming from noumena) does not contradict with the causal nature of the phenomenal framework (i.e., phenomenal self). As Kant claims in *the Critique of Pure Reason*:

> Now, suppose that morality necessarily presupposes freedom (in the strictest sense) as a property of our will, citing *a* priori as **data** for this freedom certain original practical principles lying in our reason, which would be absolutely impossible without the presupposition of freedom, yet that speculative reason had proved that freedom cannot be thought at all, then that presupposition, namely the moral one, would necessarily have to yield to the other one, whose opposite contains an obvious contradiction; consequently **freedom** and with it morality (for the latter would contain no contradiction if freedom were not already presupposed) would have to give way to the **mechanism of nature**. But then, since for morality I need nothing more than that freedom should not contradict itself, that it should at least be thinkable that it should place no hindrance in the way of the **mechanism of nature** in the same action (taken in another relation), without it being necessary for me to have any further insight into it: the doctrine of morality asserts its place and the doctrine of nature its own, which, however, would not have occurred if criticism had not first taught us of our unavoidable ignorance in respect of the things in themselves and limited everything that we can **cognize** theoretically to mere appearances.[42]

In other words, Kant's concern is not to show that freedom is but he assumes it (since it cannot be object of understanding and cannot be claimed as part of our knowledge) in order to be able to talk about morality. Since morality is not a branch of epistemology it does not need inference rules of logic. The inference of an act from propositions talking about that act is not logical. This is an Aristotelian argument about constituting morality. While premises (of inferred moral laws) are propositions, the conclusion is an act (a command of reason, not a proposition); and propositions cannot imply acts but can only imply other propositions.

Kant does not claim that freedom's necessity for morality is a logical necessity but rather a practical one. Since freedom is not an object of knowledge, this idea

[42] CPR, Bxxix, p.116

can be taken only if we can show that this assumption does not contradict with our knowledge. This is how Kant makes room for morality. Therefore, what Kant intends to show is that the causal nature of phenomena which is the efficient cause of phenomenal objects (that is, of phenomenal nature and of phenomenal self) does not contradict the presupposed idea of freedom of the will since their fields are separate. The concept of causality is applied to phenomenal objects (i.e., this concept is valid only for phenomena) while the idea of freedom belongs to the noumena by claiming that the reason's spontaneity belongs to noumena. In other words, we experience only the phenomenal world and its laws are laws of causality, but our freedom may very well have its origin in the noumena (i.e., noumenal self):

> …as regards mere perception and receptivity to sensations he [Reason] must count himself as belonging to the *world of sense* [phenomena], but with regard to what there may be of pure activity in him (what reaches consciousness immediately and not through affection of the senses [this is the spontaneity of reason]) he must count himself as belonging to the *intellectual world*.[43]

At this juncture, freedom has nothing to do with the causal laws of nature (i.e., laws of physics). It is an idea about self-motivation of the will, not about efficient cause of the body upon which the will performs its acts. This is claiming that reason is spontaneous in the sense that its activity is not depended upon any external cause but is *causa sui* for its activity. Therefore, taking freedom as an idea for the will's self determination (i.e., not being determined by alien causes – reason's spontaneity arising from noumenal self) does not contradict with the causality of objects of understanding (i.e., phenomenal self).

Kant claims that freedom cannot be defined clearly, i.e., we cannot give a basis for it, since:

> Freedom, however, is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can in no way be presented in accordance with laws of nature and so too cannot be presented in any possible experience; and because no example of anything

[43] GW, 4:451, p.56

> analogous can ever be put under it, it can never be comprehended or even only seen. It holds only as a necessary presupposition of reason in a being that believes itself to be conscious of a will, that is, of a faculty distinct from a mere faculty of desire (namely, a faculty of determining itself to action as an intelligence and hence in accordance with laws of reason independently of natural instincts).[44]

Freedom is taken as an idea not as a concept of understanding since we cannot prove it theoretically (i.e., we cannot experience freedom and freedom cannot be applied to phenomena as a concept). We cannot derive it from other concepts since it is not a synthetic concept. Therefore, Kant does not take freedom as an a priori concept (even if it is not a posteriori either) but presupposes it as an idea and tries to show that this idea does not contradict with knowledge, i.e., mechanism (causal character) of the phenomenal world, the knowledge of which is certain. If knowledge were what is at stake, articulation of an object which cannot be an object of any possible experience would be nonsense. Yet, morality for Kant is based upon a priori concepts and he considers that it may have its basis outside the field of possible experience. Kant states this explicitly in *the Critique of Pure Reason* where he writes:

> Hence, although the supreme principles of morality and the fundamental concepts of it are *a priori* cognitions, they still do not belong in transcendental philosophy, for, while they do not, to be sure, take the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, of the desires and inclinations, etc. , which are all of empirical origin, as the ground of their precepts, they still must necessarily include them in the composition of the system of pure morality in the concept of duty, as the hindrance that must be overcome or the attraction that ought not to be made into a motive.[45]

[44] GW, 4:459, p.63
[45] CPR, B29, p.151

2.5. Conclusion

For Kant, the possibility of freedom is sufficient to claim the existence of morality.

Existence of the limits of theoretical philosophy seals a field for theoretical reason whereas at the same time being aware of the existence of the limits opens a field (beyond these limits) which can be assumed as a ground to act upon. The existence of morality cannot be inferred from existence of the unknown as claiming that it does not exist (as a science which has laws) cannot be inferred from it either. In other words, these limits grants the possibility (without which morality would be nonsense) of debates about practice. Kant supposes that such a science's (*morals* as we mention above) possibility is a sufficient (in the practical sense) reason to search for making it actual. Hegel's evaluation of Kant's attempt for differentiating separate fields for knowledge and faith can be summarized in his claim that realizing the limits is already going beyond them. His arguments about existence of freedom and morals are circular in the sense that both concepts presuppose and necessitate the other:

> We take ourselves as free in the order of efficient causes in order to think ourselves under moral laws in the order of ends; and we afterwards think ourselves as subject to these laws because we have ascribed to ourselves freedom of will: for, freedom and the will's own lawgiving are both autonomy and hence reciprocal concepts, and for this very reason one cannot be used to explain the other or to furnish a ground for it but can at most be used only for the logical.[46]

Kant is well aware of this circularity and claims that one concept cannot be used to establish ground for the other one since they are 'reciprocal concepts'. From the limited structure of our knowledge Kant infers possibility of freedom which is the basis for morals if taken as a science.

[46] GW, 4:450, p55

The most lucid and dogmatic dream of Enlightenment (and thus of Kant) —the reason as the absolute authority— stems from believing that reason is superior to appearances (and superior to feelings, emotions, desires, instincts, etc.) and this dream inevitably forces Kant to claim that morals can be build up as a science which consists of objective laws made by this authoritative reason. Those laws cannot be grounded on empirical basis and their consequences, usage or applicability are not taken into consideration since they are a priori. Kant is talking about field of practice but excludes the *practice* –since the term practice implies an act and its consequences—in order to assign objective criteria. Yet, he does not question whether such criteria exist or not. He takes reason as domesticating instincts and emotions.

The legitimacy of taking reason (which is abstracted from all experience) as the basis of morality is itself a moral choice in the sense that the basis very well dictates the matter and the form of moral principles. Inference of morality from freedom of thought (purification from desires, instincts) neglects the importance of animal side of man and sees man just as a calculating machine in the so-called practical area. Without emotions and desires, we could not give meaning to our lives; in fact the practical area would be in no worth since experience in that area consists of the feelings that accompany the actions performed. Kant tries to establish an intersubjectively acceptable *scienc*e which puts end to most discussions. Universalizing a law inevitably depends on the value we give to the ingredients of the law. For instance, universalizability of the imperative "you ought not to kill anyone" depends on the worth we give to life and the contradiction between killing and regarding people(invaluable) as ends in themselves may well be removed by assuming that respect to any rational being has nothing to do with reasons being experienced or not(i.e., death). Since morality's basic principle comes from the 'unknown', all other concepts that are based on the principle may be reinterpreted arbitrarily depending on one's web of values and meanings.

CHAPTER 3

NIETZSCHE'S CRITICISMS

3.1. Introduction:

As we claimed in the previous chapter (chapter 2) of this thesis, Kant tries to show how morality is possible. Nevertheless, Nietzsche thinks that Kant does not question the ingredients (i.e., laws) of morality but dogmatically accepts a modified version of Christian codes. He thus criticizes Kant for being a theologian, observing that Kantian morality is a continuation of Christian morality (and asceticism).

The following passage from *Antichrist* aptly summarizes the gist of Nietzsche's critique of Kant, so it may be best to begin by identifying and discussing the main points Nietzsche makes in this dense excerpt:

> Why all the rejoicing over the appearance of Kant that went through the learned world of Germany, … why the German conviction still echoing, that with Kant came a change for the better? The theological instinct of German scholars made them see clearly just what had become possible again. . . . A backstairs leading to the old ideal stood open; the concept of the "true world," the concept of morality as the essence of the world (--the two most vicious errors that ever existed!), were once more, thanks to a subtle and wily scepticism, if not actually demonstrable, then at least no longer refutable... Reason, the prerogative of reason, does not go so far. . . Out of reality there had been made "appearance"; an absolutely false world, that of being, had been turned into reality. . . . The success of Kant is merely a theological success; he was, like Luther and Leibnitz, but one more impediment to German integrity, already far from steady.[47]

[47] A, §10, p.9

Here Nietzsche identifies three main points by virtue of which Kantian philosophy does not constitute a real break with the Christian tradition: 1) the concept of the true world, 2) the concept of morality as the essence of the world, 3) the element of faith concealed through a 'wily skepticism'. In this chapter we will try to explain these three points one by one.

First, we will analyze the relationship between Kantian morality's law and Christian norms; that is why Nietzsche accuses Kant to be a secret Christian. Secondly, I will investigate the concept of 'true world' and the relationship between Kant's ontology, epistemology and morality. Then, I will explain why Nietzsche favors this-worldly attitudes and relies on body while Kant bases his theory upon reason which he thinks is separate from body. To make Nietzsche's criticisms concerning Christianity of Kantian morality clearer I will briefly explain the major points of his ontological and epistemological views. Lastly, I will examine Nietzsche's main criticisms about the will (i.e., unity of the will and of the self) and autonomy which is at the very heart of both philosophers' moral views. To begin with, we should analyze why Nietzsche regards Kant as a 'cunning Christian' by examining the similarities and differences between Kantian and Christian moralities.

3.1.1 Kant, Enlightenment and Christianity

There are specific differences that we cannot deny between Kantian morality and Christian morality. The main difference lies in the justification of the norms. In other words the motivation to perform moral acts is grounded in a different way in Kantian morality than it is in Christianity. The motive is no longer god or salvation but the moral law itself. Any action performed to attain heavenly salvation is amoral for Kant even if it is in accordance with the moral law. As we mentioned in chapter 2, Kantian morality does not consider any external motive for an action to have moral content. The only motive that is considered moral is to obey the law for the law's own sake.

For Christians, moral norms are pre-given by God, and moral duties are followed for the sake of salvation. Yet, for Kant, God cannot be basis for *morality*; that is, the Kantian critique subjects even god's imperatives to rational scrutiny by trying to demonstrate their universalizability. The very derivation of moral laws is left to reason alone.

By taking reason as the sovereign, the ultimate ground of morality is shifted from god's will to practical reason's capacity to create moral laws. The Kantian project involves a rationalization of morality by developing a critique of moral concepts in order to maintain morality as a science. Since God is not an object of experience or cannot be intuited immediately, it cannot be the basis (i.e., for the derivation of his morality's fundamental principle) for a scientific morality. Reason's spontaneity (and the will's being good in itself) is the only source we can take as a ground for deriving moral norms. Kant's steadfast belief in his understanding of autonomy is the reason why he regards human reason to be the active subject of its own self-determination – any external source is contrary to autonomy; that is, for Kant, reason is obedient of itself only.

However, even though it may seem as if the basis of moral norms has shifted from the perspective of god to that of human beings, we find no observable differences in 'how one ought to act'. Practically, this is not a genuine revolution but a re-grounding (re-derivation) of the same norms by a different kind reasoning. In other words, although the perspective has changed, what is seen from that perspective remains unchanged. Nietzsche uses phrases such as "new name for the old unknown" in this sense. In his essay *Nietzsche, Hume, and the Genealogical Method*, David Couzens Hoy says:

> Notice that Nietzsche speaks of "our new 'infinite,'" of the world becoming infinite for us "all over again." He realizes that the thought of infinite interpretations [concerning reality which is unknown through experience] could tempt us to "deify again after the old manner this monster of an unknown world"[48]

[48]Hoy, David Cousens. "Nietzsche, Hume, and the Genealogical Method", Editor Schacht, Richard. in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, p.255

In his article '*The 'End' of Kant-in-Himself: Nietzschean Difference*, Peter Fitzsimons claims that Nietzsche criticizes the establishment of this new ground (human reason) for morality for following an attitude that is similar to the establishment of god as a placeholder for the unknown: "Nietzsche criticized Kant as a 'cunning Christian' in that a leap of faith was… required into the realm of transcendent reason."[49] Fitzsimons draws attention to the point that Kantian ideas about human reason as the keystone of morality are in fact not well grounded and that Kant needed a certain ground such as god to build up morality as a science.

As we mentioned in the previous chapter, Kant does not and cannot prove that human reason's freedom brings a self-authoritative character with it since freedom cannot be a predicate of the phenomena but it is an idea about a transcendent realm which cannot be experienced and is not an object of knowledge. In the *Gay Science*, Nietzsche claims that:

> After Buddha was dead, they still showed his shadow in a cave for centuries… God is dead, but given the way people are, there may still for millennia be caves in which they show his shadow.[50]

Here we can interpret god's death as god's not being a source of values for practice anymore. The Christian worldview and morality allowed for a high degree of anthropocentrism as man was said to be "created in God's image". Having been created in God's image, Christianity regards human beings superior to other beings which do not have godly attributes. With the Enlightenment, god's certainty became subject to criticisms so Enlightenment thinkers had to search for new ideals which could still take humanity as the keystone. In other words, even with the death of god, Enlightenment thinkers were unwilling and unable to let go of the anthropocentrism afforded by the Christian worldview. They no longer used god to ground morality (or other philosophical ideas) upon, but they still tried to establish a new concept which will serve the same function that belief in god did in Christianity.

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[49] Fitzsimons, Peter. "The 'End' of Kant-in-Himself: Nietzschean Difference". *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 39: (2007), 559–570

[50] GS, §108, p.109

Many of the ideals which are created by the Enlightenment place human beings' rationality at the center. The idea of rule following and the idea of the rulers' being subject to the laws that they themselves create are derived through the anthropocentricism which claims that the origin for sciences (natural sciences, political and moral sciences) must be searched for within the field of human reason. Kant also takes human reason as the core of his philosophy for which the fundamental principle had been transcendent beings (i.e., god, forms, substance, etc) for hundreds of years.

Nietzsche argues that this anthropocentricism that shifts the perspective from that of god to that of human beings is just a transvaluation of the old ideal (god) and not a genuine revaluation. Kant brought human reason as the placeholder of dead God which can no longer be indubitable ground for philosophical ideas.

In this respect, Kant just brought a new term in place of an old core term which could not be used anymore for Enlightenment thinkers who claim human beings as the *sovereign* – "the vicious dream called *humanism*.

The difference between Christian understanding of moral norms and Kantian morality lies in the justification of the norms (i.e., Kant's deriving norms from reason alone) does not mean much for Nietzsche since it does not bring much difference in the pragmatic (practical) aspect (i.e., the codes do not change). Although god is refused to be regarded as the producer of the obligatory moral laws and gets through 'the hammer' of the Kantian critique as not being an object of possible knowledge, the pre-established codes are passed and accepted without being subject to the critique; that is ingredients of morality are examined but morality itself is dogmatically accepted to exist:

> The mistake of the more subtle among them [Christian moralists] is that they uncover and criticize the possibly foolish opinions of a people about their morality, or of humanity about all human morality – opinions about

> its origin, religious sanction, the myth of the free will and such things – and then they think they have criticized the morality itself.[51]

Here Nietzsche argues that while Kantian critique of morality evaluates some ideas about laws and fundamental principles of morality and many concepts of it, it did not question morality (i.e., the possibility of morality as universal) itself. As mentioned above, Enlightenment thinkers had the intention to rationalize every branch of informative discourses (i.e., branches of philosophy, social sciences). For Kant, rationalization of morality necessitated morality as a science with universal laws. For the moral law to be obligatory for everyone, it should be based on objective and universal standards. Subjectivity violates the purity and the universal aspect of moral science, so he was in search for objectively valid propositions to build morality upon as a science.

But although Kant talks about scientifically establishing morality, his science comes to be dogmatic because of this acceptance of and faith in Christian norms without evaluating their emergence and origins.

3.1.2 The Concept of the 'True World'

Nietzsche's criticism of Kant as a follower of Christian theology is also based on the fact that Kant makes use of most of the same terms and concepts used in Christian morality (and also in ascetic theories of morality) as if they have universal meanings or as if they refer to simple facts that do not change.

In this respect, according to Nietzsche, Kant makes a methodological mistake in defining moral a priori concepts. Kant uses a priori terms ignoring the fact that they have arisen in the evolution of language. Nietzsche thinks that those concepts have a history, and their contemporary meanings have altered. In his essay *Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche on the Morality of Pity*, Cartwright draws attention

[51] GS, §345, p.203

to the point that Nietzsche's criticisms of Kantian morality involve criticisms about Kant's adoption of certain terms and fundamental principles as reasonable or a priori without referring to the fact that they were 'moral prejudices' of preceding doctrines, and claims:

> …one of his [Kant's] tasks in the Groundwork involves the analysis, clarification, and justification of the common person's moral judgments. By providing the ultimate standard for moral judgments, Kant hopes to ground firmly and formalize those things the common person at some level, already recognizes, in order to spare him or her confusion. Nietzsche's point is, however, that what Kant saw as the source of the practical principles a priori present in reason is nothing but the product of the moral prejudices of our Judeo-Christian culture: there is nothing, he argues, either a priori or reasonable about these things.[52]

This methodology is specious since definition belongs to naming of unhistorical facts only whereas the terms and concepts which are constitutive of moral frameworks are historical. May, in Nietzsche's Ethics declares;

> For Nietzsche, a decisive feature of morality is to deny our determination by history—not, as it were, through a simple misunderstanding, but through its central ambition to transcend temporality and suffering, an ambition which demands an absolute and unhistorical grounding for human life and ethics.[53]

Defining moral concepts and building principles over them in a sense forces us to ignore the historicity of the concepts and forces us to use the mistaken meanings to serve for building up fundamental principles for the moral theories that we have.

For Nietzsche, meaning (if understood as a given definition) does not capture practice or it does not refer to a fixed situation since the meaning that is actually in use is in flux and changes throughout history and among different cultures: "The form is fluid, the meaning [Sinn] is even more so…"[54] When Nietzsche

[52] CARTWRIGH David E. "Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche on the Morality of Pity" *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1984), pp. 83-98
[53] May, Simon. *Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on 'Morality'*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999, p.22
[54] GM, "Second Essay", §12, p.51

claims that "only something which has no history can be defined."[55], he draws attention to the fluid character of meaning in the sense that anything that has a history (i.e., that changes throughout its history) has not a fixed meaning but one that changes and evolves over time.

Nietzsche accuses the moral theorists of making use of the mistaken concepts as if they are referring to fixed realities ignoring the question of how and why they arose and came to have the meanings that they do at a certain time and place. For example in the first essay of the *Genealogy*, he explains how the concept of "goodness" had originally arisen among the masters as referring to the legitimacy of their acts or way of life but it was taken by the slaves upside down by referring it as the negation and rejection of the master's actions. Thus 'good' came to mean the opposite of what it originally meant.

This attitude to conceptualize the ingredients of experience is what Nietzsche refers to as one of the "idiosyncrasies of the philosophers" in *Twilight of the Idols.* He accuses philosophers of finding and using fixed concepts as if they signify *beings*. He likens this attitude of "dehistoricizing" terms and giving them fixed meanings to Egyptians' making mummies to challenge the decaying effect of time. Both turn something *becoming*, dying, etc. into an unhistorical *being*. He claims that they ignore the fact of change and look as if they have the perspective of god (as Middle Ages theologian philosophers define god's point of view as fixed to be known by all).

Nietzsche claims that this way of understanding causes the philosopher to idolize the concept, building various philosophical doctrines which reject the fact of change by accepting the fixed characteristics of the idols:

> For thousands of years, philosophers have been using only mummified [i.e., fixed, dehistoricized] concepts; nothing real makes it through their hands alive [i.e., the reference of the words are taken as if they are immobile as dead]. They kill and stuff the things [i.e., what the concepts

[55] GM, "Second Essay", §13, p.53

> designates] they worship … They see death, change, and age as well as procreation and growth as objections, --refutations even.[56]

In fact, meanings' being in flux stems from the fact of change according to Nietzsche.

Since what meaning refers is not a static being, it chances and is in becoming; thus is a process. For the sake of intelligibility humans use the meanings as if they can play the role what they refer plays. In this respect they take the fixed meanings by analyzing and dividing the process into intelligible parts (i.e., analyze under concepts, names, etc.) and regard those parts as if they have reality on their own without the process in which they have functions. Rationalization leads to the separation of a many-faceted process into many parts and regarding the separated parts as if their existence is independent of the process.

In this sense, in the *Will to Power*, Nietzsche claims that thinking is not a separate activity but the philosophers separate it from the process which it belongs to for conceptualizing the reality.

> "Thinking," as epistemologists conceive it, simply does not occur: it is a quite arbitrary fiction, arrived at by selecting one element from the process and eliminating all the rest, an artificial arrangement for the purpose of intelligibility-
> ...
> first an act is imagined which simply does not occur, "thinking," and secondly a subject-substratum in which every act of thinking, and nothing else, has its origin: that is to say, both the deed and the doer are fictions.[57]

Here Nietzsche accuses epistemologists to be in an illusion while thinking that the concepts they 'invented' for simplicity refer to anything real and/or capture the structure of reality. In other words, they believe their linguistic frameworks to be referring to reality whereas consciousness itself has emerged for the sake of communication, not for capturing the world. As Nietzsche says:

[56] TI, "Reason in Philosophy", §1, p.167
[57] WP, §477, p.264

> … consciousness actually belongs not to man's existence as an individual but rather to the community- and herd-aspects of his nature; that accordingly, it is finely developed only in relation to its usefulness to community or herd … each of us, even with the best will in the world to understand ourselves as *individually* as possible, 'to know ourselves', will always bring to consciousness precisely that in ourselves which is 'non-individual', that which is 'average'; that due to the nature of consciousness ... our thoughts themselves are continually as it were *outvoted* and translated back into the herd perspective.[58]

According to Nietzsche, thinking that the world is fixed since it is captured through the concepts by reason leads to claim that the senses which intuit change are deceptive since reason makes use of fixed concepts when forming judgments about the world. Thus there has been a hierarchy created between reason and the senses. It leads to the placement of reason which can have a so-called "fixed" reality above the senses as challenging them and fixing the errors caused by them. The attitude of accusing the senses as deceptive is exemplified by Plato who calls upon people to release themselves from 'the tyranny of the senses'. For Plato, what the senses tell us cannot be reality that is knowable since sensible objects change and the object of knowledge must be unchanging. Thus, Plato divides the world, reality into two parts; the sensible (which is a lie since objects of sensibility change and are not absolute) and the rational (i.e., what Nietzsche calls as concept of the 'true' world in the above quotation).

Throughout the history of philosophy, knowledge has been understood in this way: as the judgments' having correspondence in reality (which is thought to be external to the mind). But with the emergence of Kant's theoretical philosophy, the source for resemblance is considered as the mind's conforming to the objects of knowledge. Kant claimed that knowledge (in the Platonic sense with undoubted content) is possible through the idea that the objects of experience must conform to the mind's way of conceiving. Although the fundamental principle has shifted as Kant regards his new way of thinking as 'the Copernican revolution' —that is objects must conform to the subjects not vice versa–, the limited knowledge itself

[58] GS, §354, p.213

is still taken as fixed and reason is still taken as the agent for knowledge. Now the sensible world (things for us, things as they appear to us) wherein change continues to exist can be the object of knowledge since the mind gives its form. But now, there is also a world which cannot be experienced and is not an object of possible knowledge; namely the noumena (things in themselves). Kant was thus able to shift the object of knowledge and admits the sensible world into the realm of knowledge by using reason as the guarantor but the twofold structure of reality is taken for granted. He admits that the object of knowledge is what we experience and thus, he admits the experienced world (i.e., the nature) as real for us. Yet his theory of knowledge and thus his ontology still depend on the idea about truth as judgment's corresponding to experience; that is, the emphasis is on how we come to know objects of experience. With a critique of theoretical reason, he thinks that we give the form (and relations) to the world experienced. With Kant, the world becomes the world-for-reason in the sense that we experience the world through the mind's concepts which capture objects accordingly and condemn us to see the world through them only.

While Kant uses reason as the guarantor of truth and knowledge, Nietzsche claims that it is reason, not the senses that lie at the bottom of the deceptions about idealization of knowledge:

> What we do with the testimony of the senses, that is where the lies [i.e., about reality or the world we live in] begin, like the lie of unity, lie of objectification, of substance, of permanence … 'Reason' makes us falsify the testimony of the senses. The senses are not lying when they show becoming, passing away, and change…[59]

According to Kant the mind gives objects of experience their forms. Accordingly we analyze objects of experience under categories. Nietzsche does not regard reason as the tool for knowledge. However, he thinks that reason inevitably interprets reality through fixed concepts. In this respect, as many philosophers after Kant admit we do not immediately understand the world but interpret it through the concepts (or categories) we have and even interpret the sense data

[59] TI, "Reason in Philosophy", §2, pp.167-168

from the point of view constructed with these concepts. Nietzsche emphasizes the fact that it is not our senses deceiving us when they show *the change* but reason tells a *lie* when it conceives and interprets the world through fixed concepts as not changing. Thus the problem of knowledge arises when knowledge is thought to be taking place in reason. For the senses no such problem exists since senses do not perceive by concepts (or categories). Nietzsche thinks that senses intuit the experience independent of mind's concepts but when it comes to form judgments about experience these intuitions are interpreted under fixed concepts. For Nietzsche, the idea of 'true world' defined as transcendent is a superstition.

In the third chapter of his book *Nietzsche*, Richard Schacht states:

> Whatever needs the idea of the existence of a 'true world' of 'being' transcending 'this world' of becoming and change may answer to, therefore, and however understandable its emergence in the course of the development of human thought may be, Nietzsche considers it to be completely untenable philosophically.[60]

Philosophers' and especially Kant's interpreting *the world* as 'appearances' by using fixed concepts leads to what Nietzsche calls the other 'idiosyncrasies of the philosophers', namely using the most general (and thus most empty) concepts as fundamental ones.

> The other idiosyncrasy of the philosophers is just as dangerous: they confuse what comes first with what comes last. They take what comes at the end…, the 'highest ideas', which means the emptiest, most universal ideas, the last wisps of smoke from the evaporating end of reality – and they put it at the beginning, as the beginning. But again, this is just their way of showing respect: the highest should *not* grow out of the lowest, it should not grow at all … Moral: everything from the first rank must be a *causa sui*. It is an objection for something to come from something else, it cast doubt on its value. All the supreme values are of the first rank, all the highest concepts, Being, the Unconditioned, the Good, the True, the Perfect – none of these could have become, and so they *must be causa sui.*[61]

[60] Schacht, Richard. *Nietzsche*, London and New York: Routledge, 1983, p.159
[61] TI, "Reason in Philosophy", §4, p.168

When a concept is used in the derivation of a fundamental principle of any theory there is a danger (caused by using mis-established concepts) of establishing the validity of the arguments that lead to the theory by that fixed concept. Nietzsche criticizes philosophers to search for a fundamental principle which is *causa sui* since they are looking for primal causes which are the core for their systems. This is the error when the concept of God is used in Christian Morality as *causa sui*. God's in-itself character (i.e., being causa sui) leads the Christian philosophy to infer that all other affects are caused by the god. Regarding an object of experience as more valuable than others can be understood as an aesthetical attitude. Giving an object a function that is not given in the experience but constituting the experience due to that function is an aesthetical decision about the object. In this respect, Kant has an aesthetical attitude that requires an uncaused cause when he declares goodness of the will as causa sui. Then, he builds up his moral theory upon this principle that the will should be regarded as good in itself without referring any exterior criteria. Taking a mis-established concept as the constitutor of fundamental principles undermines the reliability of the principle since the validity of the principles depends upon analysis of the meanings of the terms within it.

3.1.3. The Body

The body which ascetics (and Christians, and Kant) claim to refuse and underestimate is also the basis for the reason upon which they build up their perspectives. Enlightenment thinkers evaluate human reason to be authoritative in the sense that their theories rely on the singularity of the self, and reason as belonging to this single self. There are complex processes, feelings, desires, will, thinking at play in our body. Yet, these philosophers reduce all this complexity to a mystical singularity (I) as if all processes need a single, inseparable ground (i.e., substance) to come into existence. This way of thinking leads to the idea that there is a single ego that can be responsible; that is, the self is a conscious moral agent. Responsibility leads to the idea of freedom of the reason observing that

responsibility necessitates being able to choose freely: "People were considered 'free' so that they might be judged and punished- so that they could be guilty."[62]

Kantian morality is based on the assumption that the moral agent' capacity to choose is free and this single 'I' can isolate itself from environmental causes and can think independently of its experiences. This is in a sense alienation from what we live, experience. We experience multiple forces at play but assume a ground for the forces as if we posses and create these forces themselves. Reducing a complex structure to one of its ingredients leads to defining that ingredient to be primal, determinative.

In *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche emphasizes the importance of the body: "…the awakened, the knowing one says: body am I through and through, and nothing besides; and soul is just a word for something on the body."[63] Thus, he thinks that we are constituted of only our bodies; i.e., the body is our only ground for experience. All other grounds such as soul, reason, feelings, will, etc. are constitutive of the body and do not have independent existences. Nietzsche claims that the body constitutes what we call as "I" [Ego]; that is the "I" is nothing without considering it as a part (or a process) of the body. To understand this criticism we should evaluate what it criticizes; i.e., the concept of the self in Descartes' and Kant's philosophies.

3.1.4. The Self as Ego in Descartes and Kant

For Descartes, the existence of the 'I' is indubitable in the sense that if 'I think' then the 'I' which thinks exists. Descartes is known to be a foundationalist rationalist philosopher. His main epistemological attitude is to show, against defenders of the skeptic claim that knowledge is impossible, that we can have knowledge if we find an undoubted basis to build up our knowledge claims on. In the *Meditations* he tries to find a certain, indubitable truth to base other truths upon it. In order to find such a basic truth, he begins with mistrusting everything

[62] TI, "Four Great Errors", §7, p.181
[63] Z, "On the Despisers of the Body", p.23

(external world, sense data, God, etc) that has been thought to be real until he finds his ultimate ground ─'I think'; and then he tries to establish the existence of the outer world.

In this respect he tries to establish a truth that is valid independently of any doubt; namely, if there is a deceiver then 'I am deceived therefore I exist'. In the second *Meditation* he claims that whatever 'I' do, 'I think', and if 'I' think then a thinking 'I' exists (Cogito ergo sum). This claim is based on a scholastic (and thus Aristotelian) understanding of substance[64]; that is, if there is a quality (or activity) then there is a holder (or possessor) of that quality (or activity) underlying the quality itself.[65] Actually when Descartes asserts the existence of an 'I', this 'I' is not derived through logical rules but grasped as an immediate intuitive truth when Descartes states: "...I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind"[66] However, as Nietzsche implies, there would have to be a logical derivation if the 'I' is conceived as the actor of thinking activity. Nietzsche thinks that the 'I think' is a major assumption since we connect a process (i.e., thinking) in our body with another one (i.e., 'I') as if the first one is a predicate of the second one.

After having found an immediate truth Descartes begins to analyze the content of the 'I'. He asks what this 'I' is and claims that the 'I' is a thinking thing that doubts, thinks, etc. Thinking is not an accidental property of the 'I' but the essence of it. The body (or the external world) may be a result of being deceived but existence of 'I' as a thinking substance is certain according to Descartes. Therefore 'I' can know the mind better than the body.

In the Sixth *Meditation* he claims that mind is a substance whose essence is thinking, that is distinct from external things' (bodies') being—i.e., material

[64] St. Agustine also have a similar argument : "If I doubt, if I love..., then I exist..." which he thinks is sufficient to justify a basic truth against sceptics.
[65] See Nietzsche BGE, "On the Prejudices of Philosophers", §16, pp 16-17 for criticism of Descartes' 'cogito ergo sum' as having an unprovable assumption that properties belong to substances.
[66] Descartes, R. *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, "Med. 2", AT:7:25

substance whose essence is extension. To understand this we should keep in mind what Descartes thinks of substance. Substance, for Descartes, is that which requires nothing except itself in order to exist (in fact mind and body are substances that require nothing except god in order to exist, and god is the only substance that requires nothing but itself). Accordingly, ideas (or the content of thought) are not substances but the modes of the thinking substance, and so they require some thinking substance to exist. Thus, Descartes thinks that there is a transcendent self which is more than the sum of its attributes; that is, the thinking thing is more than the sum of the ideas, representations, etc (or is not thinking activity itself but the *mystical* possessor or actor of that activity).

David Hume, preceding Nietzsche, believed that the singularity of the 'I' is an invalid derived idea. Experience does not give the singularity of the ego within but just gives separate processes that we habitually think to emerge from an enduring ego. For Hume, we cannot immediately intuit our existence as a continuing simple self (i.e., self-identity) but have successive impressions about ourselves. Accordingly the inner sense cannot give us a unitary self. In the essay *Kant on Self-identity*, Kitcher summarizes Hume's view as

> A mind is a collection of different perceptions [according to Hume], which are connected by certain relations that lead us to mistake a succession of different existences for one enduring object. [67]

Although the singularity and continuity of the self cannot be proven, Kant regarded that it is an epistemological necessity to claim that the knower 'I' is identical with the 'I' who experiences in the process of making judgments about experience. In the transcendental deduction A edition, he regards 'I' as the transcendental ground for experience. He claims that if there is an experience that will be object of knowledge for an 'I', then the 'I' is the ground upon which the experience takes place. In the B edition, being aware of Hume's criticisms about the Cartesian self, Kant talks about the singularity of I as an epistemological necessity. He thinks that the 'I' that experiences is identical with the 'I' that

[67] Kitcher, Patricia, "Kant on Self-Identity." *Philosophical Review*, 91(4): (January 1982), pp.41-72.

knows the ingredients of that experience (i.e., 'I' having representations of its experience and having judgments concerning those representations). He claims that this identity is necessary for knowledge. Although Kant thought that he answered the Humean question, his answer is valid only if we can possess ideal knowledge which Nietzsche claims to be an illusion stemming from differentiating the ego (the agent who will know) from the external world (the object to be known).

Kantian morality necessitates a single 'I' behind all acts; i.e., reason as having spontaneity. Kant thinks that reason is independent of the complex structure of the body and acts freely. Being taken as a simple unity, this "I" becomes the grounding basis of the philosopher's idea's about morality and epistemology. This idea made room for the thought of an immortal soul and served as a keystone for the doctrines that refuse the life we live in this world by regarding it as transient (to the other immortal world). Thus, the role of the body is underestimated and soul (and reason for Kant) became more valuable. Yet, According to Deleuze, Nietzsche claims that body is superior to mind (what we call as consciousness) as 'algebra is superior to the multiplication table':

> This entire phenomenon of the body is … as superior to our consciousness, to our spirit to our conscious ways of thinking, feeling and willing, as algebra is superior to the multiplication table.[68]

He draws attention to the relation between body and mind (or will, or consciousness) by referring to the similarity of it to the relation between algebra and multiplication table. Nietzsche thinks that all we call mind, willing, feelings, self (Ego), instincts are processes that belong to the body and do not have reality without the body.

According to Nietzsche, the body which Kant claimed not to be the basis for morality because of its empirical origin contains reason itself. Thus, what Kant

[68] Deleuze Gilles. *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* London and New York: Continuum, 1986, p.42

takes to be the author of moral laws' derivation (reason, the will) is traced as a process in the body by Nietzsche.

All conceptualizing of different aspects and feelings of the body as fixing the becoming of the body by regarding its parts as beings, nonetheless separates intermingled processes as if they came up on their own (or as if they could have reality without interacting other processes). This attitude brings misconceptions such as ego, soul, pure reason, etc. as separate beings. Philosophers of morality base their wishful thinking about moral principles upon the validity of these misconceptions. For Nietzsche, body is the only ground to have practice upon; that is we live in this mortal world which we interact with through our body which, in turn is not a singularity (i.e., self, I, soul, etc) but a complex constituting many complexities.

3.2 Morality as the Essence: Methodological Critique

3.2.1 More Psychology

As we claimed Nietzsche accused Kant for using fixed mis-established concepts in the construction of his metaphysics of morals. Kant tries to carefully define and use fundamental concepts since he thinks that a critique should not leave any proposition unquestioned and it should be built up on universally acceptable principles.

Deleuze says: "Kant is the first philosopher who understood critique as having to be *total* and positive as critique. Total because "nothing must escape it"; positive, affirmative, because it cannot restrict the power of knowing without releasing other previously neglected powers."[69] Nietzsche finds the Kantian critique to be incomplete since there are some criticisms that *escape* it. These missing parts can be identified by making use of Nietzsche's method of genealogical criticism. Not

[69] Deleuze Gilles. *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* London and New York: Continuum, 1986, p.89

only the ground (i.e., fundamental principles, concepts) of moral theories are taken into the field of Nietzsche's critique but also the historicity of the concepts and their procedures of emergence are taken into account. Beyond the questions regarding what a specific concept means, he asks questions regarding how we came to make use of them and what are they for us.

Kant questions neither how these concepts emerged nor what role they play in our lives. Therefore, Nietzsche regards Kantian critique to be incomplete; Kant evaluates morality from a limited perspective; that is Kantian morality actually does not meet the criteria to be a total critique.

Evaluation of morality should not only involve an evaluation of the arguments that lead to that morality or of its concepts and principles, but also of the historicity behind the theories coming on the scene; that is evaluation of morality also as a sign language of the moral theorists' life: "in short, even morality is just a sign language of the affects!"[70]

Nietzsche, in his criticisms of moralities, emphasizes the psychological conditions behind various moral systems. He asks and tries to answer questions such as why a specific moral system has arisen and looks for the answer in certain social and historical conditions under which certain moral systems arise. But he also digs deeper into human psychology and explores what a moral theory can tell us about those who constitute it as well as who accept it. As we will see later, he even extends this psychological analysis towards constructing what could almost be called an 'ontology' around his idea of will-to-power.

> There are moralities that are supposed to justify their creator in the eyes of others, and other moralities that are supposed to calm him down and allow him to be content with himself; still other moralities allow him to crucify and humiliate himself. He can use some moralities to take revenge, others to hide, and still others to transfigure himself and place himself far and away. There are moralities that help their creator to forget and others that

[70] BGE, §187, p.77

> let him – or something about him – be forgotten. Many moralists would like to wield power and impose their creative whims on humanity…[71]

Nietzsche does not stop at evaluating a moral theory by examining its codes or the principles that lead to those codes or their consequences. He takes the psychological and genealogical facts behind these codes into consideration; that is he analyses the moral theory on the basis of the psychological motives (conscious and mostly unconscious motives) which play a crucial role in the derivation of the codes within.

3.2.2 Motives

In BGE, Nietzsche talks about the origins of actions.[72] He identifies three stages. He claims that in the pre-historical ages (the first stage) people were interested in the consequences of actions, but for a long period the origin of action has been of concern (the second stage). Evaluating the consequences of actions to determine their value was, in Nietzsche's words, a "pre-moral" attitude since this evaluation was not concerned with the subject who acts but solely concerned with what the act brings about. Nietzsche names the historical period as the "moral" period since:

> "… over the course of the last ten millennia, people across a large part of the earth have gradually come far enough to see the origin, not the consequence, as decisive for the value of an action."[73]

The basis for the evaluation of moral worth shifted from the consequence of the action to the origin (i.e., motive) where the act arises. Nietzsche believes that the origin is just too superficial to be considered as the ultimate ground in gauging the moral worth of an action:

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[71] BGE, §187, p.77
[72] See BGE, §32, pp.32-33
[73] BGE, §32, p.32

> Today, when we immoralists, at least, suspect that the decisive value is conferred by what is specifically unintentional about an action, and that all its intentionality, everything about it that can be seen, known, or raised to "conscious awareness," only belongs to its surface and skin – which, like every skin, reveals something but conceals even more?[74]

Searching for the motive of an action as the decisive for its worth has a danger of concealing the genuine motive behind the decision for the moral norms. Nietzsche thinks that the ground of moral worth cannot only be evaluated superficially through the motive that is thought to be bringing the action about. Rather a complexity of inner and exterior forces is at stake.

Nietzsche regards the motive to be superficial as the criterion of moral worth since the idea of moral worth and hierarchy among moral acts are inherited from trade relations in the history. Similarly, in the *Genealogy*, he claims that most of the concepts used in moral theories have come on the scene due to the certain experiences that took place among some trade relations (i.e., promise, loan, debt).

> Buying and selling, with their psychological trappings, are older even than the beginnings of any social form of organization or association: it is much more the case that germinating the sensation of barter, contract, debt, right, duty, compensation was simply transferred from the rudimentary form of the legal rights of persons to the most crude and elementary social units… man soon arrived at the great generalization: 'Everything has its price: everything can be compensated for' – the oldest, most naïve canon of morals relating to justice, the beginning of all 'good naturedness', 'equity', all 'good will', all 'objectivity' on earth.[75]

Here, Nietzsche explains how the measuring and comparing aspect of trade relations became dominant in the social relations in such a way that the concept of comparison became a regulative means to compare and measure social being's processes. Moral concepts like 'good will' were arrived at with a method of comparison which is a habit coming within the economical framework. The idea about comparing worth of different values, and the idea about regarding actions

[74] BGE, §32, p.33
[75] GM, "Second Essay", §8, pp.45-46

which seems similar as if they were identical are both inspired from what man saw in his environment.

In this respect, there seems a similarity between Kant and Nietzsche. Both approach the performance of moral actions via the motives in their own ways. Kant (and also Nietzsche) tries to show that most motives which seem innocent stem from self-love, self-interest, etc. As Jeffrey Downard states in his essay *Nietzsche and Kant on the Pure Impulse to Truth*, for both philosophers the issue is to purify the motive that leads to a moral act.[76] Kant tries to purify the motive from emotions. Yet Nietzsche thinks that trying to overcome an emotion is done by the motivation of another emotion: "The will to overcome an affect is, in the end, itself only the will of another, or several other, affects."[77]

We may claim that like Kant, Nietzsche makes a critique of morality but with a more extended frame.

3.2.3. Reactions to Traumas

Generally, a trauma may be understood as a reaction of the body to unexpected situations. Thus, by 'trauma', "I mean" the experiencing of something that one cannot integrate into one's standing in the world and the unconscious reaction of a body to that experience. We conceive the world through the concepts and categories of mind. In this respect, we do not intuit the world immediately. If we could, it would be traumatic in that we could not construct any relation between sense data and ourselves. These concepts and categories of the mind are also practical and involve "value-tables". We build up our lives on tables of values, which bring goals, purposes, ends and means to those ends with them. Life consists of constructing value tables and willing their objects.

[76] Downard Jeffrey, "Nietzsche and Kant on the Pure Impulse to Truth", *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies,* Issue 27: (Spring 2004), pp. 18-41
[77] BGE, §117, p.65

Immediate interaction with anything which cannot be understood (in the sense that it cannot be considered within any previously established category and table of values) leads to a trauma. Life has its meaning for the one who lives by the very structure of their table of values. The table of values determines one's goals in life in the sense that those goals that are deemed more valuable are favored. There are some goals (such as being able to have self-mastery and thus making promises) that are so valuable that when not accomplished the meaning of life is lost.

When we face a situation that violates our most basic values, the meaning of life (i.e., purposes, etc) diminishes. Our body does not know how to react since the violating situation is unfamiliar. Construction of a new table of values is necessitated since the old table does not work. Thus, the body reacts to that trauma by searching for urgent solutions. For example, when people became slaves of masters, their tables of values which ask for individual life were violated. Their bodies which are the only way that they interact with the world became obedient to their masters. Their table of values became otiose (superfluous) for them. The idea of the denial of the body has emerged as a reaction to this trauma which is caused by not being able to possess a value (i.e., their body).

To illustrate an example for reactive constitution of table of values, as explained above the Christian conceptions of good and evil have arisen among slaves who cannot wield power. As they could not manage to live their life in the way the masters lived, they reacted to the masters' life enhancing lifestyle. They brought the masters' table of values upside down, and they constituted their table of values as a reaction to the masters'. We call this way of constituting way of life as reaction since while the masters constituted their value tables by their sentiments (i.e., they followed their own instincts, desires, etc.), the slaves constituted them in the way that Nietzsche calls resentment. The psychological mechanisms underlying asceticism are even more complicated. Nietzsche thinks that ascetics

could not manage to have mastery in their lives; they are not able to enjoy life. So they came to construct a theory (asceticism) that denies life itself. He thinks that this attempt to deny life has a hidden intention to have mastery over life itself by claiming that it is ignorable and deniable, and therefore not valuable.[78] That is, the traumatic experiences stemming from not being able to wield power lead to serious reconsiderations about life and about rules to follow.

As we mentioned above Nietzsche claims that morality is also a sign language; that is the genuine motivation behind decision of those moralities that are formed by psychological reactions to "traumas".

In other words, traumas stem from one's being unable to cope with the world given his own table of values.

3.2.4. Will-to-Power

As Hegel claims, the will is definable with its object; that is a will is will to an object. According to Nietzsche, the will is merely will-to-power. The only unchanged object of the will is power; that is whatever we will; we will it as a means to power. For Nietzsche, beings act in accordance with their will to power. Philosophers often talk about the will (i.e., God's will, good will, etc) as the motive of an action. Nietzsche emphasizes life struggle in his theory of will-to-power. He claims that all affirmative and negating acts are done due to this will-to-power. To illustrate, a servant becomes a servant not because he doesn't want to have power but because he has 'secret' intentions to be a master. In this respect, the act of the denial of any mastery (as a means to will-to-power) is motivated through the idea of having mastery over that mastery. This is related with the table of values. When we deny something, we put it at a lower level in the hierarchical system of values we have. Thus, we manage to get away from the reactive feeling which arises when our will cannot attain something valuable that it wills. Will to

[78] Nietzsche actually sees asceticism as a very peculiar and sinister manifestation of will to power. I will come back to this point later.

power plays role in all our choices such as epistemological, moral, ontological theories, religion, etc. It plays role in human as a rational being as well as human as an animal. All instincts such as survival instinct are related to it.

As mentioned above, life consists of constructing value tables and willing their objects. When the willed objects are not attained or attainable, life itself becomes the object of the will in the sense that a specific lifestyle cannot satisfy one's will. This situation is what we referred to as a trauma. There, the unsatisfied person is forced to construct new table of values but since his body is infected by a disease he chooses the shortcut (like cutting of an diseased arm or leg) for curing. The shortcut is that if his will cannot be satisfied in that life, he wills to deny life itself. This is what Nietzsche calls nihilism.

Nietzsche often accuses life-denying moralities of being nihilistic in the sense that they choose to will not to live instead of not willing to live. The will to power takes place even in a life denying moral theory since it tells how to live a denied life (i.e., they have claims like live but don't do that, but not like don't live, kill yourself): it is not possible not to will. The ascetic ideal of not willing anything is impossible, because life is will-to-power.

3.2.5 Truth

The concept of truth is important in evaluation of a moral system since the truth values of the judgments within are evaluated through the definition of truth.
Thus, even an epistemological theory is not 'innocent' if we keep in mind that as the constitutor of a perspective for contemplating the world, it entails some moral obligations that are based on the fundamental concepts of that perspective. Deleuze states:

> Nietzsche, in his domain as in others, thinks that he has found the only possible principle of a total critique in what he calls his "perspectivism": there are no moral facts or phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of

> phenomena; there are no illusions of knowledge, but knowledge itself is an illusion, knowledge is an error, or worse, a falsification.[79]

When Christians interpreted actions' moral worth, they made some derivations from Christian theology's theories about god and his goodness. The 'moral interpretation of the phenomena' led them to take something (god) they believe to exist and derive their epistemological web according to what they can know about it.

This situation is obvious regarding Kantian system. Hegel claims that being at the limits is already surpassing it. Deleuze claims that Kant releases his real thoughts in the third critique where he talks about objects of his faith (ideas beyond the limit of knowledge such as idea of teleology of nature, idea of god, soul, etc) by claiming the 'as if' nature of these ideas. Although Kant claimed to determine the limits of possible knowledge, he built up his moral theory by creating an epistemological framework and took his fundamental concept (idea of freedom) from the possibility that there is an unknown field. Plato also built his ethical doctrine upon the hierarchical structure of his epistemology and ontology. Aristotle's conception of *phronesis* stems from the epistemological idea that logical reasoning (i.e., rules) is applicable to propositions only. When an epistemologist makes claims about what we can know he also defines a certain field which is beyond doubt.

The undoubted field for knowledge affects and determines practice by constituting norms grounded by the concepts and undoubted propositions which reorganize our table of values. Even the 'truth' itself has side effects in our organization of the table of values. Thus, when Nietzsche questions the role of the categorical imperative beyond its being true or not, he is raising questions about how it determines our way of life, what it brings with itself.

In this respect, making definitions of core terms should be taken into account seriously since any theory's validity relies on the legitimacy of those definitions.

[79] Deleuze Gilles. *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* London and New York: Continuum, 1986, p.90

Nietzsche takes into account the pragmatic aspect of moral theories and their ingredients beyond their validity. By pragmatic aspect, I mean the practical outcomes and the psychological and the historical origins of the theories; that is the answers for the questions such as 'what these theories are for', 'why they have arisen', 'what their roles are for our lives' and 'why we need to believe in them'. Here, Nietzsche's attitude when he criticizes Kant in regarding validity and legitimacy of his moral theory is similar with the attitude of the pragmatist (Dewey, James, etc) with respect to their epistemology, that is they regard the role of a theory in our lives as the constitutive of its truth value. The truth is no longer defined as mind's judgments' corresponding to external reality, but taken with respect to practical aspects of the judgments.

The process of definition fixes the relation between the term and the meaning of the term. When we use concepts in our judgments, the truth values of the judgments (such as what we regard as laws in morality) depend on meaning of these concepts. Therefore, definition of a term (or a concept) as if it signifies a fixed *being* binds the outcome (i.e., practice) of the concept (i.e., practice) to a single, fixed perspective since in an argument the premises (which use such concepts) imply the conclusions.

This can be well understood if we remind ourselves of a criticism of Nietzsche's about one of the most important concepts (i.e., synthetic a priori) of Kantian philosophy. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche argues that while Kant evaluates (but cannot answer sufficiently) the question of 'how synthetic a priori judgments are possible', he ignores a more important question: "Why is the belief in such judgments necessary?"[80] Nietzsche pragmatically thinks that beyond the possibility of these judgments, we need to ask why we are in need for such a possibility; that is their roles should be evaluated regarding their necessity (in their emergence) not only for epistemology but also for life.

[80] BGE, §11, p.13

Thus, for Nietzsche, *truth* is not to be evaluated according to its being true (Nietzsche does not believe in traditional definition of truth – i.e., a proposition's corresponding to a fact, he thinks such truth is an illusion) but its role in our life should be taken into consideration. Soysal, in his dissertation *Nietzsche's Perspectivist Epistemology: Epistemological Implications of Will to Power,* states:

> Through his criterion of truth, Nietzsche emphasizes the provisional character of truth. That is, all of our beliefs and ideas must be taken as true in so far as they enhance our power. This means that there are no absolute truths that would enhance our power and life eternally. Since the world of power quanta is dynamic and an ever-changing one, truths concerning it must be dynamic too...every change in the world requires new and fresh interpretations, and every new interpretation means a change in the world.[81]

The value of a statement or a theory or a doctrine depends on the very pragmatic aspect of it. As Soysal claims, the pragmatic aspect questions merely how the believed (or chosen) propositions affirms and enhances life, and what they bring to life. Nietzsche says:

> We do not consider the falsity of a judgment as itself an objection to a judgment; this is perhaps where our new language [i.e., our new methodology] will sound most foreign. The question is how far the judgment promotes and preserves life, how well it preserves, and perhaps even cultivates, the type.[82]

He claims that we regard such propositions (which can never be proved to be true in the full sense of the word) as true because of their roles in life preservation, self-affirmation, etc.

[81] Soysal Soner. *Nietzsche's Perspectivist Epistemology: Epistemological Implications of Will to Power*, Phd. Dissertation: METU, 2007, p.159
[82] BGE, §4, p.7

3.2.6 Life Affirmation - Life Enhancement

Nietzsche considers life denying moralities such as asceticism, Christian morality, etc. to be symptomatic of a disease. As we claimed in 3.2.5, He prefers a definition of dynamical truth which favors life enhancement.

Nietzsche in this sense favors value-tables that are life affirming and life enhancing. He accuses life-denying theories for being pathological because they limit the enhancement of life. In this respect, Nietzsche criticizes Christianity's demands:

> From the beginning, Christian faith has been sacrifice: sacrifice of all freedom, of all pride, of all self-confidence of the spirit; it is simultaneously enslavement and self-derision, self-mutilation. There is cruelty and religious Phoenicianism in this faith, which is expected of a worn-down, many-sided, badly spoiled conscience. Its presupposition is that the subjugation of spirit causes indescribable pain, and that the entire past and all the habits of such a spirit resist the absurdissimum presented to it as "faith."[83]

Here Nietzsche accuses Christian norms to be demanding self-sacrifice, determining a limited field for freedom as choosing to obey the imperatives of god. The self, beyond all its possibility to enhance its life, is made the obedient voluntarily. The table of values is not established by the self due to its own needs stemming from its own experiences. Yet the table is pre-established by god. The choosing mechanism is determined respectively. With religions (and with most of the moral doctrines which asks for self-sacrifice of the will), the genuine objects of the will (i.e., what it desire actually) are objected and the will is defined as good only if it refuses its own needs such as sexual desires, etc. Limitation of the desires, which are body's reactions as it needs something, is characteristics of all religions' demands for faith of religions as well as for accepting moral doctrines such as Kantian morality.

[83] BGE, §46, p.44

Through analyses of the etymological and genealogical origins of moral concepts (i.e., such as conscience, bad conscience, will, good, evil, justice, etc.) Nietzsche evaluates some fundamental concepts through their historical relations with concepts (i.e., revenge and resentment, etc) that have arisen as reactions to traumatic situations. Nietzsche reveals that these concepts are neither a priori as Kant puts it since they are not unhistorical nor reasonable since their validity is contextual (i.e., they have role in surviving the traumatic experiences).

In BGE, Nietzsche asks:

> Apart from the value of claims like 'there is a categorical imperative in us,' the question remains: what do claims like this tell us about the people who make them?[84]

He claims that moral theories apart from their concepts and principles also reveal the will to preserve and promote life or will to power as mastery over life itself (i.e., denying life). In short, will to power is at stake in construction of theories about how to live. When Kant tries to show that his propositions are 'true' he ignores the fact behind his decision there is a motivation that leads him to consider his theory to be 'true'.

3.2.7 Active and Reactive Forces

As we claimed in 3.2.2, Nietzsche's understanding of 'motive for an action' is wider than Kant's understanding in the sense that Nietzsche also questions what makes one to believe that his act is moral. All processes of body, even processes regarding moral decisions take place by what Nietzsche calls *forces*. To better understand Nietzsche's critique of Kant we need to more closely examine Nietzsche's understanding of life and what is bodily in terms of his "ontology" of will-to-power. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze presents an account of

[84] BGE, §187, p.77

Nietzsche's ontology in terms of forces which constitute the body and its ingredients such as consciousness and the self. Therefore, in this part of my thesis, I will heavily rely on Deleuze's interpretation.

According to Deleuze, Nietzsche's concept of body is not just limited to the human body, but whenever two forces interact they form a body:

> Every relationship of forces constitutes a body –whether it is chemical, biological, social or political. Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body whenever they enter into a relationship.[85]

Descartes and his followers conceived the body as a substance whose primary attribute is extension while for Nietzsche it is an organization formed by an interaction of forces. Body is not solitary or separated from the processes within itself as the preceding philosophers claim but a sum of its processes which occur by unequal forces. The unequal forces are of two kinds; i.e., active (dominant) and reactive (interior, dominated) forces.

Deleuze defines reactive forces as follows:

> Interior forces are defined as reactive; they lose nothing of their force, of their quantity of force, they exercise it by securing mechanical means and final ends, by fulfilling the conditions of life and the functions and tasks of conversation, adaptation and utility.[86]

Reactive forces are defined as interior (dominated) not because they are not determinative of the body but since their existence is related with reaction to external conditions, stimulants, forces. Yet, they are defined as dominated since their existence emerges as a reaction to something. The reactive force is defined by the object that it reacts to. They play a role in our survival in the sense that they determine the ends required for survival, and the means to attain that end. Therefore, they are also at play in (reactively emerged) moral theories. For example, asceticism's (and Christian morality's) goals (such as life denying) are ends determined by reactive forces and their codes are the means to attain those

[85] Deleuze Gilles. *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* London and New York: Continuum, 1986, p.40
[86] Deleuze Gilles. *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* London and New York: Continuum, 1986, p.40

ends. 'Consciousness', 'memory', 'habit', 'nutrition', 'reproduction', 'conservation' and 'adaptation' are all reactive according to Deleuze's interpretation since they all are acts that are directed at some objects.

On the other hand, the activity of an active force is unconscious since consciousness is reactive. Consciousness can be labeled as a reaction because of several reasons:

1) In the most general sense, consciousness is reactive because it is only by virtue of an object outside it that it is consciousness. Consciousness is always consciousness *of* an object

2) In his book *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche claims that consciousness has developed as a reaction to the failure to externalize the instincts (to realize the instincts in the world):

> All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards –this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his 'soul'. The whole inner world [also reason] … was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth, and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's instincts was obstructed.[87]

3) Consciousness has developed for the need to communicate (among the *herd*); therefore, it is not the faculty whose purpose is to 'know'. Nietzsche claims that the world we think we know via consciousness is inevitably false since in conscious activity we translate what we experience individually to the language that has meaning to the community. Thus, the reality that comes to consciousness (the world we are aware of) is superficial; its judgments are constituted by general concepts within language. Therefore whatever we claim to know, since we empty the content of the experience is false:

> …due to the nature of *animal consciousness,* the world of which we can become conscious is merely a surface- and sign-world, a world turned into generalities … that everything which enters consciousness thereby becomes shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark…[88]

[87] GM, "Second Essay", §16, p.57
[88] GS, §354, p.213

Consciousness in this respect is not a suitable tool to attain knowledge (i.e., to understand reality): "We simply have no organ for knowing, for 'truth': we 'know' (or believe or imagine) exactly as much as is useful to the human herd, to the species".[89] Therefore, it is just a misused tool for a need of human animal to communicate among its herd.

The other types of forces that are at play in the body are active (dominant, superior) forces. Since they are unconscious it is difficult to define them via objects. They are dominant in the sense that they dominate reactive forces. Thus, reactive forces become forces when they enter into a relationship with the active ones. This implies that the ends and means of active forces are not pre-given but created by these forces themselves when they interact with the reactive ones.

For example, the *laisser-aller* (letting go) is an idea that Nietzsche often talks praising. This idea is constituted by the dominance of active forces which dominate the reactive forces that react, and let the situation not determine. In *laisser-aller* the will and desire are motivated ignoring the conditions that are reacted; they are actively created within one's own determination of his life as an individual. Life puts some ends (values) to itself independently without heeding the inner voice which is charged with experiences. These forces are at stake when Nietzsche talks about 'noble' purposes that transform the table of values:

> For Nietzsche, as for energetic, energy which is capable of transforming [i.e., what I think of when I use the phrase 'determining its own way of life'] itself is called "noble". The power of transformation, the Dionysian [which is unconscious] power, is the primary definition of *activity*."[90]

Both active and reactive forces determine our way of life. Nietzsche does not advocate a complete letting go of the reactive forces and just following the active ones since the reactive forces play crucial roles in survival. The main point he criticizes about reactive forces is that in following a doctrine [i.e., Christian morality, or Kantian] that is shaped by the role of reactive forces, our active forces

[89] GS, §354, p.214
[90] Deleuze Gilles. *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* London and New York: Continuum, 1986, p.42

do not dominate our emerged reactive ones but they interact with the reactive forces that have emerged for someone else or for some other situation. This is what we referred to when we talked about the role of using fixed concepts. Those concepts or solutions which are taken from previously established moral theories do not bring any advantage since they had emerged as reactions to some specific cases which are of no need for the ones who has not experienced them. Their needlessness makes them harmful in the sense that they determine the ways we live through a perspective so that they limit our lives to the horizon that is the viewpoint of that perspective.

Perhaps Nietzsche shares the idea of historicity with Hegel in this respect. In the *Reason in History*, Hegel says:

> Each period is involved in such peculiar circumstances, exhibits a condition of things so strictly idiosyncratic, that its conduct must be regulated by considerations connected with itself, and itself alone. Amid the pressure of great events, a general principle gives no help It is useless to revert to similar circumstances in the Past. The pallid shades of memory struggle in vain with the life and freedom of the Present.[91]

The reactions needed for survival and life-affirmation are contextual and relative for each individual (or culture), and taking (or accepting) pre-given codes [i.e., other's perspective] for granted [as 'true'] is disadvantageous for life affirmation in the sense that the acceptor's needs are different and he should find his own means and ends.

Thus, Nietzsche claims that Kant makes a harmful error when using the concepts inherited from the Christian morality:

> One more word against Kant as a moralist. A virtue needs to be our *own* invention, our *own* most personal need and self-defence: in any other sense a virtue is just dangerous. Whatever is not a condition for life *harms* it.[92]

[91] Hegel, *Reason in Philosophy*, Accessed August 8, 2010 from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/history2.htm#009
[92] AC, §11, p.9

3.2.8. Autonomy

Although autonomy is important for Nietzsche, his understanding of autonomy is different from Kant's. Cartwright explains the basic difference between these two philosopher's ideas about autonomy:

> Kant held that … autonomous agents are self-controlling because they determine their own actions… Nietzsche does not conceive of autonomy as implying the denial or suppression of one's emotions. He avoids the separation of reason from emotion, a bifurcation associated with Kant. Nietzsche does not advocate the denial or suppression of our emotions or inclinations as springs or motives of our actions. Rather, he advocates the focusing, controlling, and directing of these forces for specific aims.[93]

Thus, for Nietzsche autonomy does not consist of an active force's ignoring reactive forces but autonomy implies active force's directing the reactive ones. He does not separate the ingredients of the process (or the motives which lead to an action) that lead to a moral action; that is he does not ignore emotions, instincts, etc that are within the process. As Cartwright mentions, for Nietzsche, autonomy is guidance of these blind forces not performing acts due to laws (categorical imperative) which are constituted ignoring these forces.

Thus, for both Kant and Nietzsche, autonomy is basic regarding morality but Nietzsche denies free-will, and puts forward life affirming drives.

> ...the *sovereign individual*... having freed itself from the morality of custom, an autonomous, supra-ethical individual (because 'autonomous' and 'ethical' are mutually exclusive)"[94]

Here Nietzsche claims that while Kant argues his morality to be based on autonomy, self-legislation and freedom, he ignores the fact that he characterizes human beings as obedient also. Since the categorical imperative is not pure and

[93] Cartwright David E. *Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche on the Morality of Pity*, From Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1984), pp. 83-98
[94] GM, "Second Essay", §2, p.37

the laws are not created solely by the reason itself, the self cannot be referred as freely self-commanding. Therefore, the only freedom we can talk about is freedom of obeying. When Nietzsche declare ethical and autonomous as mutually exclusive, if we take autonomy as self-legislation, he draws attention to the fact that ethical lifestyle contains pre-given laws, and defines the path to follow (i.e., the laws are given, not constituted by the self). Here, ethical means becoming obedient of a set of rules, laws while autonomy means creating the laws, rules on its own. Therefore, these two are mutually exclusive in the sense that autonomous subject is supra-ethical (i.e., does not follow a specific set of rules, but acts spontaneously by creating his own rules).

Here, it seems as if Kantian moral agent's perspective is different from Christian's in the sense that the Christian laws are pre-given by god while Kantian morality's laws are constituted by the reason. Yet, they all see the same laws from the same point of view with a slight difference that obedience is not necessary because of existence of a superior being (god) but it stems from the obedient nature of the agent. This nature becomes universal with Kant; that is Kant thinks that all rational creatures has the capacity to obey (i.e., follow a rule voluntarily).

3.2.8.1 Universal Morality vs. Individual Virtues

In obeying a universal law, self-determination is inhibited; the self is made to obey some set of values which are not formed by one's own experiences in the sense that it is determined by an external set of beliefs:

> The most basic laws of preservation and growth require the opposite [of Kant's understanding of 'virtue']: that everyone should invent his *own* virtues, his *own* categorical imperatives[95]

[95] A, §11, p.10

It may be objected that for Kant morality is by no means an external set of beliefs. The whole point of Kant's autonomy formulation of the categorical imperative is to tell each individual to be his own law giver. As seen in the previous chapter, it is the *a priority* of moral reasoning that makes it possible for it to be universal. But Kant's strategy here would not satisfy Nietzsche for two interrelated reasons. First, as we saw in section 3.1.2 Kant's reliance on reason is a misconception founded on the illusion of "real world". Secondly, the universality of moral reasoning is guaranteed by the *a priority* of reason which means that all external factors (the emotions, the body, etc) are to be ignored. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the body is the ground of reason. Kant ignores the role of body in practical life.

For Nietzsche, whereas the body has its own reactions, the moral worth of an action (i.e., whether it is morally right to do or not) is verified by the feeling of pleasure which for Kant cannot be basis for evaluation since it depends on experience. In fact, for Kant, the feeling of pleasure as a satisfaction of a desire violates the purity of the moral law; that is, an action which is done for the sake of feeling of pleasure (for example, helping others because it makes you happy) is evaluated as amoral. Kant saw pleasure as subjective since everyone has his own objects that please him. Thus, pleasure cannot be a measure for universal (objective) laws' validity. Yet; Nietzsche thinks that the moral worth of an action is contextual and depends on the individual's own experiences; the feeling of pleasure is a sign that he acts due to his own needs since pleasure emerges from satisfaction of a desire (i.e., being pleased):

> The instinct of life compels us to act, pleasure proves that the act is right: and the nihilist with the intestines of a Christian dogmatist saw pleasure as an objection… what could be more destructive than working, thinking, feeling, without any inner need, any personal choice, any pleasure? as an automaton of 'duty'? It is almost the recipe for decadence, even for idiocy … Kant became an idiot.[96]

[96] A, §11, p.10

Although Kant claims his metaphysics of morals to be including autonomy (i.e., creating the laws to obey), Nietzsche's accuses the Kantian moral agent to be an automaton of duty. This is because Nietzsche thinks that the Kantian subject do not create his own laws due to his own needs (which creates a feeling of satisfaction –*pleasure*—when satisfied), but accepts pre given moral laws (i.e., laws of Christianity) which he reexamines dogmatically (i.e., not genealogically). Since the moral law does not emerge from personal needs (or desires), the feeling of pleasure does not accompany obeying that laws.

Another point that Nietzsche often criticizes about Kantian morality is the egalitarian attitude of it. For Kant every rational being is equal under the moral laws and everyone's worth is immeasurable. When Nietzsche calls Kant 'Chinese', he refers to his ideas about equality and universality. When Kant saw moral laws as universal and valid for every rational being, this idea leads to the conclusion that everyone's virtue is unique. As we mentioned Nietzsche is individualist in the sense that everyone has his own way of life (virtue) and it is attained by following the signs of the body (such as pleasure) and responding its needs.

Nietzsche criticizes Kantian ideas about universalizability of self-created laws to be stemming from selfishness (self-love). He says:

> You admire categorical imperative within you? This 'firmness' of your so-called moral judgement? The absoluteness of the feeling, 'here everyone must judge as I do'? Rather admire your *selfishness* here! And the blindness, pettiness, and simplicity of your selfishness! For it is selfish to consider one's own judgement a universal law, and this selfishness is blind, petty, and simple because it shows that you haven't yet discovered yourself or created yourself an ideal of your very own – for this never be someone else's, let alone everyone's, everyone's![97]

Kant regards rational beings as equal and thinks that the laws of the moral science is same for everyone since they are independent of experience which is subjective. Nietzsche thinks that here Kant regards the subjects as unhistorical. He claims that

[97] GS, §335, pp.188-189

there are some mechanisms behind the act of constituting a moral law and this mechanism is unique for everyone and every case.

The attitude that regards all men as equal under the moral law, fixes man to be stable, immobile against his psychological and social evolution, and brings a necessary condition of the past to the future where it may no longer be necessary – it denies historicity. As we mentioned, moral concepts and codes have emerged due to some reaction to traumas in order to preserve life. When these codes are taken to be ultimately good (i.e., ought to be done everywhere, every time), they are expected to be used by others who do not have such traumas and have other ways of how to deal with life. When the established norms are used in other contexts, they do not serve for survival (or other reasons of their emergence) but make the agent who accepts the codes deny a possible way of life (his current life without those norms). This attitude is similar with giving the pills of a certain disease to someone who is healthy, and claiming that those pills are vital for survival.

Thus, everyone should have his own virtues according to the needs of his body. Yet, the body is not a singularity separated from the mind or the soul but a complex ground of experience for Nietzsche. As we claimed, a body is constituted of forces (at least two forces that are active and reactive). Kantian morality on the other hand necessitates a single 'I' behind all acts; i.e., reason as having spontaneity. He thinks that reason is independent of the complex structure of the body and acts freely.

3.2.8.2. The Will

For Nietzsche, the concept, *will*, is an illusion stemming from the prejudice that there is a single Ego behind all acts of a rational organism. We believe that we are the subjects (agents) of our acts. This is a grammatical error when we interpret a

process through our concepts with our language which by its very nature presumes a subject behind any act. If there is an act, then there is a substance by virtue of which the act raises up. Nietzsche claims that when we utter about the act of raining as 'it rains', we utter as it there is an 'it' performing the act of raining. We are constituted of many facts such as desires, emotions, inner voices, instincts, reason; these facts are interrelated. We sometimes take one of these facts to be the only cause of our actions. When Kant claims that the will is the motivator of all rational beings, he interprets the will as the cause of our acts. According to Nietzsche what we call 'Ego' is a multiplicity of indifferentiable processes, and 'Ego' consisting of many processes is not a single substance as the ground of those processes as it is in the Cartesian philosophy.

Nietzsche claims that there is not a single willing that is to be regarded both as commanding the object of the will and obeying that command. Rather the will is a complexity.

> Although 'will' is a single word, it is not a unity (i.e., simplicity) but a multiplicity of complex feelings, desires, thoughts and even bodily reactions that accompany the thought that the will includes: "in every act of willing there is … a plurality of feelings … accompanied by a feeling of the muscles that comes into play through a sort of habit as soon as we "will". Just as feeling – and indeed many feelings – must be recognized as ingredients of the will, thought must be as well."[98]

We thus see that Nietzsche presents here a detailed analysis of what is called the will as follows: Feelings (which are also multi-layered), thoughts, action...
The feelings that constitute the will consist of at least the feelings that motivate us towards the object (i.e., affirming of the object) that is willed and the feelings that motivate us away from it (which is at stake when we will negating of an object) and even the feelings about these feelings (the feelings as "towards" and "away from").

[98] BGE, §19, p.18

Among the thoughts that are elements constituting the process of the will is a commandeering thought without which the will cannot be talked about since it is this thought that separates the complexity that we call "the will" from being a mere feeling and relates it with the action: "the will is not just a complex of feeling and thinking; rather, it is fundamentally an affect: and specifically the affect of the command."[99]

Nietzsche thinks that in the process of the *will*, there are two thoughts; a commandeering thought that calls us to act what we will, and an obeying thought that realizes the commandeering thought's imperatives. "All willing is simply a matter of commanding and obeying … of a society constructed out of many "souls"…"[100]

Nietzsche claims that these two thoughts are taken as if they are single (since it is believed that there is a single ego that obeys and commands). This fallacy leads to the idea that self is the moral agent.

The will is caused by commanding and not the vice versa. With the commandeering thought that dictates the desired objects to be affirmed or negated, the feeling of desire becomes the will. The will is not just a feeling to an object but contains the means for the satisfaction of the feeling; i.e., relating the desire with the action that leads to satisfaction of that desire. The commandeering thought is such a thought that related a desire to some means to satisfy that desire. The satisfaction is realized by action done by an obeying thought. These are all distinct inner voices. When Hume claimed that willing to do something is not sufficient for realization of the purpose that is willed, he was probably trying to express a similar thought. For example, willing to open a window is not sufficient to open it; obeying that command and acting to open the window is required. These thoughts are not identical (or from same origin) since the obeying thought brings the act with it while the commandeering one tries to relate the desire to its object.

[99] BGE, §19, pp.18-19
[100] BGE, §19, p.19

This effect of the command is a double effect; namely, commanding and obeying. The will has a duality regarding this issue, duality that for to speak about a person who wills, we can talk about a commandeering part and an obeying part of this person as two distinct inner voices. Nietzsche claims that we are accustomed to bring this duality (i.e., duplicity of instincts) into simplicity (i.e., "I" -- the single Ego). Ignoring this duality and reducing it into a delusional simplicity leads us to believe the command accompanying the will to be taken for granted as a necessity since the subject and the object of the command are taken as if they are one.

This identification and reducing multitude to singularity causes man to consider himself as possessing a free will.

> "Freedom of the will" – that is the word for the multi-faceted state of pleasure of one who commands and, at the same time, identifies himself with the accomplished act of willing. As such, he enjoys the triumph over resistances, but thinks to himself that it was his will alone that truly overcame the resistance.[101]

Nietzsche thinks that free will is an illusion stemming from misconception of some processes of the body. A will is necessarily bound to the feelings of the objects that are willed. Its relation to the feelings towards the object determines the will as strong or weak but not as free: "The "un-free will" is mythology; in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills."[102]

Nietzsche thinks that even the categorical imperative (which is a 'cruel path to nihilism' like moral asceticism)[103] is not pure (since Kant makes metaphysical assumptions for morality) given that the Kantian *will* is an illusion.

[101] BGE, §19, p.19
[102] BGE, §21, p.21
[103] See GM, "Second Essay", §6, pp.41-43

3.3. Wily Skepticism: The Element of Faith in Kantian Morality

Nietzsche accuses Kant's philosophy to be similar to the theologian's ideas that consider god as the basis for explanation of everything in the sense that Kant comes out with the concept noumena which is for Nietzsche a new name for old problem of the unknown (the problem which Christians answered with God, Schopenhauer with "veil of Maya"). Nietzsche often considers scepticism to be at stake in this evaluation in the sense that although the unknown (i.e., freedom stemming from things in themselves, noumenal self) cannot be shown, its possibility is not objectionable. Kant shares the idea that freedom cannot be known with the skeptics, but he claims that unfreedom (i.e., causal or determined nature of reason) cannot be known either. Yet, he builds up a doctrine of morals from the unobjectionable character of the possibilities within the unknown. Thus he uses concepts whose validity cannot be evaluated in (premises of) the judgments of his moral theory and because of this the judgments' are neither analytic nor synthetic a priori.

According to Nietzsche Kant based his morality on the concepts he derived from his epistemological framework in this respect:

> The true world unattainable, unprovable, unpromisable, but very thought of it [gives birth to] a consolation, an obligation, an imperative. (basically, the old sun but through fog and scepticism; the idea become elusive, pale, Nordic, Konningsbergian.)[104]

By the old sun Nietzsche refers to the named unknown (i.e., neo-platonic highest form—sun and Christian theology accepts a modified version of this ontology). He claims that Kantian (Nietzsche refers as Konningsbergian) ontology is resurrection of this old ideal less powerfully by taking advantage of the arguments of skeptics: '*if not actually demonstrable, then at least no longer refutable*'.

This attempt does not only bring the unknown with it but also some old derived judgments and concepts from it are conserved and taken without questioning.

[104] TI, "How the How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable", p.171

Although the ontological structure seems to have changed, the language remains the same as before. The very structure of this language determines the validity of propositions. In this respect Kantian morality is inferred from an ontological structure that is similar to the traditional one.

Thus, another similarity concerning the moralities of Kant and Christianity is that they make the same mistake; that is to infer actions to be done necessarily (i.e., obligation – Nietzsche often uses the term 'true' instead of obligatory when he talks about what the theologians tell of morality) from existence of false (in the sense that it cannot be proved but just invented as a word for the unknown for some pragmatically purposes) grounds (god or noumena). Thus, when Nietzsche accuses the Christian theologians of being liars whenever they utter moral statements, he claims that the derivations of their judgments are done from false, unprovable premises.

He criticizes in this respect Kantian synthetic a priori judgments which are at the very ground of Kant's epistemological and moral theories as we discussed in the second chapter. He claims that although Kant asked how synthetic a priori judgments are possible, (1) he did not give a satisfactory answer; that is he just claimed this possibility to be based on some faculty (i.e., capability of a part of our reason), (2) he did not ask a meta question, that is, why we need a concept like synthetic *a priori* or more precisely why we need truth.

Nietzsche thinks that Kant's answer (i.e., synthetic *a priori* as a capacity of some faculty) says nothing about why such a faculty exists but just gives a metaphysical (in the bad sense that Kant ascribes to the word 'metaphysics' answer, just like the Christians' evaluation of their skills as a gift from god (or like Newton's theory of gravity which claims that objects drop since there is gravity – but what is gravity is remains is unanswered) and just invents a metaphysical term (faculty) to name a source for a concept that he needed to ground the possibility of knowledge upon. For Nietzsche, Kant and his followers did not discover that faculty we have but *invented* a faculty in order to claim that knowledge is possible

through it. Nietzsche considers this answer insufficient since it answers its question in a circular manner in the sense that it contains what is asked and does not actually explain anything; that is Kant's arguments for the existence of synthetic a priori does not extend information in the answer beyond the information contained in the question:

> 'By virtue of a faculty' – he [Kant] had said, or at least meant. But is that really – an answer? An explanation? Or instead just a repetition of the question? So how does opium cause sleep? "By virtue of a faculty," namely the virtus dormitiva – replies the doctor in Moliére, quia est in eo virtus dormitiva, cujus est natura sensus assoupire. [Because there is a dormative virtue in it / whose nature is to put the senses to sleep][105]

Nietzsche claims faith to be pathological since it makes the believer ignore his life affirming forces (maybe because he failed to have a life that he enjoys, etc.) and to obey to a false concept. Perhaps Nietzsche's point can be made clearer if we remind ourselves of the famous quote of Baudelaire from *Fusées* (1867): "God is the only being who, in order to reign, doesn't even need to exist." This sentence does not only claim that god does not exist when people believe in god, but also emphasizes the fact that this unknown concept has a decisive role for people who build up their table of values on the basis of it; that is it defines god as sovereign. As we mentioned, Nietzsche claims that when theologians talk about truth, what they utter is necessarily false since:

> I wage war on this theologian instinct: I have found traces of it everywhere. Anyone with the theologian blood in his veins will approach things with a warped and deceitful attitude. This gives rise to a pathos that calls itself *faith*: turning a blind eye to yourself for once and for all, so you do not have to stomach the sight of incurable mendacity. This universally faulty optic is made into a morality, a virtue, a holiness, seeing-*wrong* is given a *good* conscience, - other types of optic arenot allowed to have value any more now that this one has been sanctified with names like 'God', 'redemption', and 'eternity'.[106]

[105] BGE, §11, p.13
[106] A, §9, p.8

Since they build up ‘virtue’ on epistemologically false assumptions which they take for granted, their virtue is nothing but a set of beliefs that limit their horizon, potential. In choosing their own way of life, their judgments depend upon false premises and mistaken fixed concepts which are *de facto* historical but are believed to be certain independent of context.

3.4. Conclusion

In this chapter we tried to demonstrate Nietzsche’s main criticisms concerning 3 main points (which are similar with Christian understanding of morality) of Kantian morality; (1) criticisms concerning the idea of ‘true world’, (2) morality as the essence of the world, (3) element of faith in the *scientific* morality.

As we claimed, Nietzsche favored life enhancement via autonomy. His conception of autonomy is the main reason that he rejects Kantian morality and regards it as a continuation of Christianity.

He claims that Kantian autonomous agent does not determine itself, but condemns itself to moral prejudices of some previous moral systems.

As we mentioned in 2.4 of this thesis, for Kant, autonomy stems from the positive definition of freedom; that is the autonomous individual voluntarily obeys the laws constituted by his reason. We claimed that Nietzsche criticizes Kant in this respect that the laws which Kant thinks to be created by the reason freely are dogmatically accepted laws of Christianity and asceticism. Thus, Nietzsche thinks that Kantian moral agent is not autonomous but obedient.

The moral agent is the obedient of the categorical imperative which is just a ‘cruel path to nihilism’ observing that it has the life denying characteristics of the

Christian and ascetic moralities. Nietzsche thinks that the moral imperative is always hypothetical in the sense that the law emerges as a reaction to some trauma. The categorical imperative is in fact in the form of 'If you want to survive x, then do y". Kant thinks that its structure is just 'do y' since he ignores the circumstances under which that imperative emerged. The laws of Kantian morality are similar to the laws of Christianity and those laws have emerged as reactions of slaves to their master's morality. They (Christians, ascetics) refuse the way their masters live since they are not able to become masters; that is they chose to deny the life that a master lives. They did not identify themselves on their own but defined themselves by reacting to a specific way of life. Thus, they created and accepted ascetic moral laws. Although Kant thinks that his morality is based upon self-legislation, and thinks that he clearly defines and uses moral concepts, his moral philosophy just reproduces the laws of older moralities.

By accepting the self as the obedient of a pre-constituted obligation, the moral agent accepts a reactive force which does not serve for his life but created by someone else for survival. For Nietzsche, everyone has his own needs according to his experiences. When the active force interacts with the reactive force which has emerged as a need of the self, we can talk about autonomy. But when the interacted reactive force emerges as a process of another body, the self become the member of a herd (community) and does not have individual existence in this respect.

Kant thinks that since the reason evaluates the law, it creates the law on its own. Yet, for Nietzsche, the law is evaluated through the fixed concepts; its historicity is ignored and thus it does not emerge as a need of the body. The self becomes obedient of an external law:

> (perhaps even Kant himself) want to make it clear through their morality that "the worthy thing about me is that I can obey – and it should be the same for you as it is for me![107]

[107] BGE, §187, p.77

Nietzsche was well aware of the facts that choosing a specific morality or even referring an act as moral are themselves moral decisions:

> Your judgment, "that is right," has a prehistory in your drives, inclinations, aversions, experiences, and what you have failed to experience; you have to ask "how has did it emerge there?", and then also, "what is really impelling me to listen to it?[108]

Throughout the ideology of Enlightenment, while the moral agent (subject) is regarded as following innocent, pure laws created by itself, the subject is not created by itself but its whole ideology (i.e., mechanisms of decision, perspective) is formed unconsciously and in this formation external causes are at stake. Therefore, the laws that are thought to be created by the reason are not original creations. Miller in *The passion of Michel Foucault* draws attention to this basic difference in the attitude to man's nature: "Kant's original anthropological question –What is man? – is transformed implicitly into Nietzsche's question: How did I become what I am…"[109]

Nietzsche criticizes Kantian concept of autonomy to be weakly constructed in the sense that the decisive mechanism is not self-created but the reason's decisions depends how it (the reason or the will) is constructed and shaped by its experiences, history, and education, etc. although Kant states that the will is affected not determined by empirical impulses, desires, etc. In contrast, Nietzsche thinks that these forces not just affect but unconsciously determine what we believe. Kant ignoring this historicity behind moral decisions claimed the obedience of the reason to itself to be self-legislative and not dependent to alien (external) causes.

[108] GS, §335, p.187
[109] Miller James. *The Passion of Michel Foucault* Harvard University Press, 2000, pp143-144

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Nietzsche regarded Kantian morality as a continuation of Christianity. Although Kant's attitude towards morality (specifically his criteria and methodology) differs from the Christian understanding of morality, the duties assigned were similar.

It may be objected that the similarity between Kantian duties and Christian norms is coincidental since Kant redefines moral terms before using them. Nevertheless, Adorno and Horkheimer claim that the Enlightenment's efforts to rationalize philosophy and "demythologize language" are "relapses into magic".[110]

Throughout this thesis, we tried to demonstrate and evaluate Nietzsche's criticisms of Kantian morality observing that Kant's account for scientific morality is not established through a 'total critique'. Specifically, those criticisms focused on the dogmatic aspects of Kantian morality. Furthermore, Nietzsche also accused Kantian morality for being a life- denying theory.

Nietzsche's ontological criticisms about the unity of the self and the separation and conceptualizing of parts of the processes of the body are well grounded. Although he sometimes accuses Kant of using *skepticism* in demonstrating his arguments, Nietzsche's ontological criticisms themselves parallel the skeptic arguments of the British Empiricists. In many aspects, he shares Hume's ideas concerning what is given in experience. However, here arises a fundamental difference between usages of the skeptic arguments. Kant tries to demonstrate the

[110] See Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, Theodor W., *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Trans. Edmund Jephcott, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, p133

validity of his arguments concerning the existence of morality using the skeptical arguments about the field of the unknown. From the unknown he derives obligations. Since the unknown is not determinative itself as it is not known, any fixed implications of it cannot be claimed to be scientific or objective.

Nietzsche criticizes Kant for ignoring the roles of emotions, instincts, drives in morality. The role of the body is underestimated. Nonetheless, Kant's main concern is to build up a scientific morality which has universal, objective obligatory laws. Kant has rejected most of the ingredients (i.e., emotions, desires, etc) since they are of empirical origin and cannot be used for objectively acceptable moral norms. He does not claim that feelings are immoral but rather thinks that they are not pure observing that their usage as the motive for moral acts leads to a subjective understanding of morality. Emotions, desires or any empirical origin for metaphysics of morals would yield in violation of the objectivity of morality. Kant searched for a priori (pure) fundamentals for morality. Yet, Nietzsche's criticisms still work here since Nietzsche thinks that universal, objective standards for 'what man ought to do' are impossible. The main difference that leads Kant to the choice for a priori principles of morality and Nietzsche to refuse normative morality is that Kant believes in establishment of scientific morality

As Hill suggests, Kant's understanding of objective moral law implies that moral actions are identical in each case.[111] Kant regards acts, emotions, feelings as if they are similar or identical without regarding the contexts of their emergence. Hill thinks that identity is required for the rationalization of Kantian morality. In this respect he analyses and divides the world under concepts which bring the idea of identity. For Nietzsche the idea of identity is a superstition coming from regarding *becoming* as *being*. In *Human All Too Human* he claims that artists cannot picture life since life is in flux: "Something in course of becoming cannot

[111] See Hill, R. Kevin. *Nietzsche's Critiques: the Kantian Foundations of his Thought*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003, pp.207-208

be reflected as a firm and lasting image, as a 'the', in something else in course of becoming"[112]

Scientific establishment of social norms (i.e., morality) is the dream of the Enlightenment. With the success of Newtonian Physics and its explanatory power, many philosophers admired the scientific attitude towards any kind of information. The belief in truth which was shaken by the disbelief in religious authority retook its seat by Newton's success. Nietzsche draws attention to the fact that all epistemologists begin with claiming that previous attempts for knowledge were false: "Belief in truth begins with doubt as to all truths believed in hitherto."[113] Nietzsche claims that truth is something to be believed not self proven. He thinks that all philosophers of knowledge's suspecting previously accepted truths is a clue that there is no certain 'truth' but 'truth' is an invention. Yet the Enlightenment thinkers ignore this fact and try to establish philosophical sciences.

Nietzsche on the other hand clearly uses skeptic arguments to show that the unknown cannot be a good basis for obligation. Nietzsche's attitude is negative in this sense that he rejects the idea that 'what ought to be done' can be inferred from 'what is'; on the contrary, for Nietzsche, 'what ought to be' implies 'what is'. Does not the form determine the content? Kant claims that he is talking about the form of the moral law not its content but that form clearly determines its content and he is indirectly talking about the matter of the moral law. In this respect, Nietzsche got a point when he accuses laws of nature as well as moral laws to be superstition.[114]

Kant and the German idealists can be viewed as the most effective followers of the attitude of scientification of morality which has an obligatory character similar to religion's obligations. As we discussed in the previous chapter, accepting a specific ontology leads to the establishment of a table of values depending on it. The table of values chosen brings the hierarchy among the values and thus leads us to take some of the values as fundamental as if they have their worth in

[112] HH, "Volume II Part One", §19, p.218
[113] HH, "Volume II Part One", §20, p.218
[114] See HH, "Volume II Part One", §9, p.216

themselves but not for us. Nietzsche, emphasizing the fact that all values are relative to the point of view, does not suggest any specific table of values to be chosen necessarily. As an alternative, he claims that the tables are relative for each individual and they should be taken into consideration due to each individual's own needs. A perspective is a point of view which is constituted by certain concepts defined through evaluation of the table of values. Since Kant claims that his system necessitates a certain table of values (otherwise 'all worth would be conditional' and could not be the ground for the science of morals), his moral system asks for commitment to a fixed perspective. Nietzsche does not only criticize the components of the Kantian perspective but also rejects the commitment of oneself to a certain perspective as if it is the only way to live through. Evaluating rationality as what is most valuable and regarding it as sufficient and necessary for the establishment of morality is a dogmatic aspect of the Kantian perspective according to Nietzsche.

As we mentioned in chapter 3.2, Kant regarded critique as 'total' and all-covering. However, Nietzsche's genealogical criticisms seem to go further since he asks the question concerning not only the concepts and principles of morality but also morality itself. In this sense, Nietzsche seems to complete or take further the Kantian critique of morality since he asks some genuine questions which Kant himself did not ask or answer but dogmatically accepted.

The Kantian conception of the objectivity of the moral law leads to the idea of egalitarianism since the objective law is equally valid for every rational creature. Desiring every rational being to be as rational as Kant in the sense that they all will and must create the same law for morality obscures the purity of the moral law as Nietzsche claimed. As we mentioned in the previous chapter, Nietzsche criticized Kant for his desire to see every rational being as obedient as himself. Nietzsche's criticism is a way further than Kant's arguments about equality under laws observing that the desires concerning everyone (i.e., defining objectivity as implying intersubjectivity) is a hidden motive behind the decision of morality.

When Kant talks about the sublime feelings aroused by his morality as on a par with contemplating the stars in the heavens, he talks as if his understanding of

freedom brings the same sublime feeling with the conception of free-floating, unlimited freedom of the individuals:

> Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.[115]

But in fact what causes this sublime feeling in Kant is not the universality of the moral law, but self-dedication. In self-dedication, in voluntary commitment to a ground without hesitation, there is an aspect that is to be respected. Dedication to a moral doctrine also requires accepting the perspective constituted by the doctrine. Nietzsche accused the binding force of morality to be life denying. In this sense, dedication leads to a limitation of searching for new perspectives, values, *truths*, etc. The self denies all its possibilities and hence becomes a static follower sacrificing his potential to what he believes in. He idolizes the doctrine as sublime and admires it. Nevertheless, this feeling is not the one we feel when we think of ourselves as free. A positive definition of freedom as Kant suggests is in this sense not what we think of as freedom and not the freedom we want when we claim that we are (or should be) free.

When Nietzsche praised the autonomy of human beings (or rational creatures), he addressed the individual freedom to determine the means to will to power, not the freedom of a nation, society, etc. Kant's resolute belief in freedom leads to the idea about the existence of morality.

Nietzsche's attitude to give origins of moral acts and the genuine motivation behind building up of moralities is similar to Kant's aim to purify the motive for moral acts.

As we claimed above, Nietzsche's aim is to go further than Kant does in the *Critique*. He analyzes motives not just behind moral acts of any theory, but also behind choosing of a specific theory.

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[115] C.Prac.R, 5:161-162, p. 133

The question 'what ought to be done?' (if it is supposed to have an answer) clearly presupposes that there are some actions that ought to be done. The answer concerning the word 'what' does not contain what those actions are done for. Kant claims that moral acts should be done for the law's own sake. Yet another question arises: what is the moral law for? If it is just for its own sake (i.e., if it is not for regulating of a healthy society) why should we just follow it? Kant claims that the laws should be followed because we are rational, we can have objective moral law and law by its very definition necessitates commitments and obligation. The law's definition cannot be a reason for following it up. Still the question remains: why should I follow obligatory laws whose functions are not given.[116] If the function of the moral law is for the society's sake (or as Aristotle thinks of politics as the regulator of rules for living together among society) then it is in the hypothetical imperative form. Each society's goodness is relative to its culture. A universal law for all societies cannot be established. Any objective law for all societies is impossible since all societies have their own webs of beliefs, own tables of values and there are not any moral norms that can be objective for the well-being of any society. If it is not for the good being of the social framework why should one follow a law beyond the feeling of freedom to choose and obey? If the law is to be obeyed for just its own sake and not to be constructed as a response to the needs of social life, then why did Kant want every rational creature to follow it? Freedom could be well understood as not obeying the self made obligatory laws. Establishing an objective morality is itself a moral (or an aesthetical) decision in this sense.

In this respect, the question concerning the morality itself (i.e., why I should be moral) addresses two difficulties about Kantian morality. When Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined within a logical system[117], it led to the idea that a theory cannot be proven while its theorems can be within the system.

[116] If functions of the law (i.e., what the law is for) is given then the law's purpose would be defined and the law becomes hypothetical imperative for Kant.
[117] See Alfred Tarski, 1983, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" in Corcoran, J., ed., Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics. Indianapolis: Hackett.

In this sense, Kantian morality is itself either hypothetical or self-referential. Nietzsche emphasizes this aspect of it and attacks the arguments considering Kantian morality as certain as a natural science (which is also not indubitable according to Nietzsche). Another question arises here, even if morality is proven to be universal, is that sufficiently binding?

Nietzsche's criticisms of Kantian morality may seem superficial at first sight since Nietzsche's language in criticisms appears as if he criticizes from an external point of view and as if he does not give credit to Kant's awareness in grounding of the arguments. As we analyzed the criticisms, we saw that Nietzsche's criticisms are also well grounded and aim the kernel of Kantian morality (i.e., its being scientific, objective, etc.)

For Kant, Reason is supposed to be the authoritative of practical area (i.e., morality) without applying to any external or empirical ground.

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