NATIONALITY POLICIES IN POST-SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

DENİZ DİNÇ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
EURASIAN STUDIES

SEPTEMBER 2010

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

NATIONALITY POLICIES IN POST-SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN

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M.A., Eurasian Studies

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September 2010, 141 pages

This thesis attempts to analyze the continuity of nationality policies of Kazakhstan between Soviet and post-Soviet periods. As for the Soviet past the Soviet template of nationality policies was deeply rooted in Kazakhstan. Considering the Soviet template of nationality policies, this study conceptualizes the structure of it as first among equals under Russian hegemony. With regard to post-Soviet period, this thesis claims that the nation building policies were not born out of its ashes contrary to the mainstream arguments. This study aims to reveal how the post-Soviet nation building in Kazakhstan is still proceeding along with the Soviet template. Evaluating nation building process of independent Kazakhstan, this study emphasizes the rising titular hegemony of Kazakhs. In other words, this study attempts to analyze the transformation of first among equals taking into account the ethnic and civic aspects of nation-building oscillations.

Keywords: Nation building, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Nationalism, Soviet Union

ÖZ

SOVYET SONRASI KAZAKİSTAN'DA ULUS POLİTİKALARI

Dinç, Deniz

Yüksek Lisans, Avrasya Çalışmaları

Tez Yöneticisi : Doç. Dr. Mustafa Şen

Eylül 2010, 141 sayfa

Bu tez Kazakistan'ın ulus politikalarındaki sürekliliğini Sovyet ve Sovyet sonrası dönemler arasında analiz etmeye çalışmaktadır. Sovyet geçmişine baktığımızda, Sovyet şablonu ulus politikaları Kazakistan'da derince kök salmıştır. Sovyet şablonu ulus politikalarını düşününce bu çalışma, ulus politikalarının şablonunun yapısını Rus hegemonyası altında eşitler arası birinci olarak kavramsallaştırır. Sovyet sonrası dönemle ilgili olarak, ana akım argümanların aksine ulus inşa polikaları küllerinden doğmamıştır. Bu çalışma Sovyet sonrası dönemde Kazakistan'daki ulus inşasının Sovyet şablonuyla birlikte nasıl ilerlediğini aydınlatmayı amaçlar. Bağımsız Kazakistan'ın ulus inşa sürecini değerlendirirken Kazakların yükselen yerli hegemonyası vurgulanır. Başka bir deyişle, bu çalışma ulus inşa süreci salınımlarının etnik ve sivil yönlerini göz önüne alarak, eşitler arası birincinin dönüşümünü analiz etmeye çalışır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulus İnşası, Orta Asya, Kazakistan, Milliyetçilik, Sovyetler Birliği

To My Grandfather,

Niyazi Dinç

(1931-2010)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASSR   Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

LAD   Union of Slavic Unity

NEP   New Economic Policy

SSR   Soviet Socialist Republic

RSFSR   Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

USA   the United States of America

USSR   the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan reluctantly declared her independence at the end of 1991.The republic's independence was neither the result of secessionist demands, nor an organized national liberation movement.[1] Without any doubt, a lot of reasons were underlying under this reluctance to be independent. First of all, Kazakhstan was the most ethnically heterogeneous republic among the Soviet Union republics. She includes intensive Russian population and the titular population was below the 50% ratio according to the last Soviet census. Moreover, the country has a large territory covering 2,727,300 km² areas which leads to her 9th rank in the world for territory size.[2] In contrast with the territory size the country has only 16.1 million inhabitants.[3] Kazakhstan is neighbor to Russia with her longest border. Kazakhstan also has boundaries with China who is one of the most significant powers in the world. The Russian population intensifies generally in the North parts of the country. Even though there is a trend of rising Kazakh population in the northern regions, Russians still compose of the majority in most of the northern parts. Kazakhstan turned into a deportation center in the Soviet era. Most of the dissidents and deported nations were sent to Kazakhstan. Therefore, Koreans, Uyghurs, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Germans from east to west, various kinds of nations and ethnic groups can be seen in Kazakhstan.

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[1] Sally N. Cummings, (2005). *Kazakhstan Power and the Elite*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

[2] Mayhew B., Plunkett R., & Richmond S., (2000). *Central Asia*, Victoria, Lonely Planet Publications, p. 165.

[3] http://www.eng.stat.kz/Pages/default.aspx

This situation raises Kazakhstan to a special position for transition studies because nationalism became more important after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia proved the failure of the optimists who expects the end of nationalism. In contrast to Yugoslavia who witnessed the bloody conflicts in the break up process, the Soviet Union dissolved more peacefully. The bloody ethnic conflicts were seen generally in the Caucasus. In this context, some western observers who were expecting ethnic conflicts, particularly from Kazakhstan, failed again. Nevertheless, what is certain is that just as in Yugoslavia, nationalism presumably was the most important determinant of the break up in the Soviet state.

The Post-Soviet transition is explained by taking into account of three main points in the literature. These are nation building, state building and transition from command to market economy. In this thesis nation building policies specifically for Kazakhstan will be focused. Nation building studies are very interesting due to multiethnic multicultural structure of Kazakhstan. However, Eurasian Studies literature is problematic because of cold war era stereotypes. Nevertheless, more objective and liberal works have been published since the last decade. Another problematic issue regarding this thesis is being a foreigner in Kazakhstan. Above anything else, writing a thesis for a different country is very complicated process in comparison with natives of that country. Native persons are directly under influence of the policies of their country. Sometimes they even can easily affect the policies. However, for a foreigner it is a difficult process to follow the daily political changes. Nevertheless, this is not a totally hopeless position, sometimes remaining outside can provide opportunities to identify ongoing processes of inside. A foreigner can protect himself/herself from the

mobilization of official ideology, and criticizing the policies of the ruling elites is not so risky for foreigners, in comparison to the natives.

This thesis will attempt to highlight the neglected points in the literature. Our main argument concerning the nationality policies of Kazakhstan is the continuity with the Soviet past. The evaluation of nationality policies of Kazakhstan can be considered as continuity rather than rupture from the Soviet heritage. The approaches that reduce the Soviet heritage to a colonial rule perceive the Post-Soviet nation building as a process that born out of its ashes. In other words, these approaches highlight the negative impact of Soviet heritage to the titular nationalism due to the suppression of national culture, language and history.[4] Without a doubt these approaches are to some extent right. For instance, culture and art was under the control of central socialist ideology in the Soviet Union. National heroes, important national figures were integrated to the system along with the distortion of their national cores. Nevertheless, in general sense, the promoters of negative impact approaches produced their arguments with the need of western states in the cold war era, so these works contain a lot of stereotypes and problematic political evaluations. In this context, the academic dimensions of the works of negative impact promoters are controversial as well. In contrast to the negative impact promoters, this thesis will analyze how the Soviet nationality policies created and consolidated titular nationalisms. Beyond this point, how Kazakhstan adapted and sustained the Soviet nationality policies template in the post-Soviet period will be explored.

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[4] See for example, Martha Brill Olcott,(1987). *The Kazakhs*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California ; Taras Kuzio, (2001). "Nationalizing states' or nation-building? A critical review of the theoretical literature and empirical evidence", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol 7, No: 2,pp.135-154.; Martha Brill Olcott, (1993). Kazakhstan: a republic of minorities, in I. Bremmer & R. Taras (Eds.). *Nation and politics in the Soviet successor states*. pp.313-330. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

The Soviet template is a good bridge to understand the post-Soviet transition since the infrastructure of the template was not challenged in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan. In this context, as for the Soviet past, I argue that after the initial oscillations of the foundation of the Soviet Union concerning the nationality question, the nationality policies of the Soviet Union stabilized with the concept of ''Russians first among Equals''.[5] In other words, this system also can be labeled as ''Brotherhood of nations under the Russian leadership''. Indeed, the Soviet elites aimed to reach a supra national identity that is popularly mentioned as ''Soviet Man''. Despite the significant progress in order to reach this supra national identity, the results of attempts were buried under the soil with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In other words, territorially linked ethnic codification model of the Soviet nationality policies undermined the supra national identity, ''Soviet Man''.[6] Therefore, the Soviet Union nationality policies should be criticized in terms of developing and consolidating nations rather than suppressing them.

As for the post-Soviet period of Kazakhstan, this thesis will examine the oscillation of ethnic and civic nation building policies. The main argument of this thesis for the post-Soviet period is the increase of Kazakh ethno-nationalist identity at the expense of Russians. The titular hegemony of the post-Soviet period can seriously be explored in Kazakhstan. Initial years of the independence witnessed the exclusive ethno-

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[5] Terry Martin, (2001). *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939,* New York, Cornell University Press.

[6] Rogers Brubaker, (1994). "Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account", *Theory and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp.47-78.

national Kazakhification policies. Soon after putting off the shock of the post-Soviet chaos, as the Kazakhstani elites should have discovered the destabilizing aspects of ethnic policies, they turned into more prudent, civic policies. Nevertheless, the Kazakh face of nation building policies were conserved as a result of the continuity with the Soviet template.

This thesis is organized in two main parts with four body chapters. The second and third chapters will focus on nationality policies in the Soviet era. The other two chapters will examine post-Soviet era nationality policies. First chapters of the two main parts focus on theoretical framework and second chapters will focus on the implementations of nationality policies in order to enable the theoretical chapters to become concrete.

The second chapter attempts to analyze the formation of Soviet nationality policies. In the first part of the chapter, Marxist nationality theories are debated in order to explore the ideological background of the Bolsheviks. In the second part of the chapter, self determination rights discussions of Bolsheviks are argued along with the demarcation of borders debates. This thesis attempted to challenge to the main stream argument of ''divide and rule'' of Soviet studies literature by claiming that issue of drawing borders is much more complicated process which should not be reduced the simple ''divide and rule'' approach.[7]

The third chapter highlights the reflection of Soviet nationality policies on Kazakhstan in a historical perspective. I touched upon the emergence of Kazakh intelligentsia, and I also emphasized how they were integrated into and liquidated from

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[7] Yunus Emre Gürbüz, (2007). *Caught Between Nationalism and Socialism: The Kazak Alash Orda Movement in Continuity*, Ankara.

the Soviet Union. The other parts explain important turning points of ethnic structure of Kazakhstan. The events like collectivization process, Virgin Land Campaign and December events of Alma-Ata will be examined respectively.

The fourth chapter that analyzes the theoretical framework of post-Soviet nation building process will focus on ethnic and civic aspects of nation building of Kazakhstan. "Multiple reethnification" model of Holm-Hansen will be used as an efficient argument to understand the ongoing nation building process.[8] The post-Soviet nation building process will be analyzed in two periods: Shifting from ethno-nationalist policies to more civic ones. I will argue that in the final look despite the increase of civic intensive nation building policies, the ethnic policies are still proceeding in favor of Kazakhs. In this context, the transformation of first among equals from Russians to Kazakhs will be theoretically explored in this chapter.

The fifth chapter emphasizes the concretion of nationality policies in independent Kazakhstan, the way third chapter does. The important aspects of nation building such as language, demography-citizenship, state symbols, minority controls and reactions will be analyzed respectively. Furthermore, I will try to argue the ethnic and civic dimension of nation building aspects along with the transformation throughout time.

The sixth chapter concludes with an overview of evolution of nationality policies in Kazakhstan along with the significant theoretical points.

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[8] Jorn Holm-Hansen, (1999). "Political Integration in Kazakhstan", In Pal Kolsto, (Ed.) *Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An Investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan*, pp.153-226. , Colorado, Westview Press.

CHAPTER 2

FORMATION OF SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICIES

This chapter attempts to analyze the theoretical background of Soviet nationality policies, and formation of Soviet nationality policies in the era of Lenin and Stalin. The heritage of Lenin and Stalin eras are significant because general concept of Soviet Union's nationality policies was embodied in the period of both Soviet leaders. For instance, the borders and federative administrative units which are constructed in the period of Lenin and Stalin generally remained stable up to the dissolution. Therefore, to understand better the reasons of implementation of nationality policies in the Soviet Kazakhstan, which is analyzed in detailed way in the third chapter, theoretical focus of this chapter gains importance. Rather than focusing on the events and implementation of nationality policies, the chapter focuses on main debates on the theoretical context such as nationality question debates among key Marxist thinkers, and border drawing debates whether it includes ''divide and rule'' policies or another components beyond the limits of ''divide and rule''. This chapter also aims to show the major differences between the eras of Lenin and Stalin which reached the top deviation angle taking into account the implementation of nationality policies. Within this context, rising centralization of Soviet state apparatus in the Stalin period is touched upon as a reason of how a state who implemented affirmative action policies turned into a totalitarian state that even punished some of her nations.

2.1. Legacy of Classic Marxist Approaches on National Question

Needless to say, Marxist ideology overemphasizes class struggle as a revolutionary determinant in the progress of mankind. With regard to the explanation of

the progress of societies, they use the conceptualization of basic and super structure. According to Marxism, basic structure which is pointed out as a mode of production or economic relations determining super structure which is explained as cultural or ideological relations of societies. Indeed, the division of basic and super structure is a controversial issue among Marxists.[9] However, what is obvious from the writings of Marx and Engels is that both of the philosophers attempted to write a grand theory which explains all the developmental stages of societies taking into account class relations and mode of production. On the other hand, the priority of a grand theory neglected significant issues such as a state theory and a nationalism theory. Definitely, it can be seen, for instance, within some arguments of philosophers, explaining the state as a simple tool of bourgeoisie or explaining nationalism as a temporary phenomenon which will be abolished in the stateless, communist society. Considering Marx and Engels in terms of the national question, it cannot be identified a stable approach for both philosophers. Particularly, early writings of Marx and Engels were overwhelmingly influenced by Eurocentric and cosmopolitan beliefs.[10] Yet, post-1848 period is an important alteration point for the philosophers. Therefore, Avineri investigates nationalism issue of Marx and Engels in two periods: Pre-1848 and Post-1848.[11]. As Löwy and Munck pointed out, Irish independence issue which was debated after mid

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[9]See for example, Ellen Meiksins Wood, (2003). *Kapitalizm Demokrasiye Karşı:Tarihsel Maddeciliğin Yeniden Yorumlanması,* İstanbul, İletişim Yayıncılık, p.37-42.

[10] Ephraim Nimni, (1991). *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis*, Worcester, p.12.

[11] Shlomo Avineri, (1991). "Marxism and nationalism", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 26, No. 3/4,,pp. 637-657.

1860s is a crucial alteration point of the philosophers, as well.[12] In the light of the turning points, I consider that it can be a good idea to reveal the philosophers' arguments on nationalism in three parts which are Pre-1848 period, the period between 1848 and 1865, and post-1870s.

2.1.1. Marx and Engels on the National Question in the pre-1848 period:

In this period, writings of the philosophers can be labeled as Eurocentric and cosmopolitan. The arguments of the philosophers were maturated in their famous work ''Communist Manifest''. Marx and Engels were admirers of the revolutionary character of bourgeoisie in its extermination of feudal economic relations[13]. According to the philosophers, the capitalist mode of production was unifying the world market, and this should be seen as a progression for the communist society. Bourgeoisie was not only unifying the world market but also abolishing local customs, traditions, and creating a new world culture. Consequently, nations were seen as a kind of local assets of customs and traditions which have a limited life due to the growth of bourgeoisie.

> National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding to them[14]

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[12] Ronaldo Munck, (1986) . *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism,* Avon, the Bath Press, p.15.

[13] Karl Marx and Frederic Engels, (1988). *The Communist Manifesto.*In Frederic L. Bender (Ed.), New York, Norton Company Inc, p.57.

[14] Marx and Engels 1988: 59.

The admiring account of the revolutionary function of bourgeoisie resulted in the neglect of nationalism and economic reductionism.[15] Moreover, this kind of progressive understanding of history even legitimizes imperialism. For instance, Marx approved the invasion of India by Britain because the British invasion abolished pre-capitalist mode of production, and it could leap India to the capitalist economic relations. Eurocentric evolutionary tendency of Marxism, however, is incomparable to the capitalist way of Modernization. At least, Marx condemned the massacres and the barbarian aspects of capitalism.[16]

> England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in India, was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.[17]

2.1.2. Breaking point of 1848 on the Nationalism Perception of Marx and Engels

The failure of 1848 revolutions led Marx and Engels to revise their optimistic view of nationalism. The philosophers realized that the reason for the split between democratic, liberal and social forces engendered the increase of nationalist sentiments. Therefore, philosophers turned into an instrumentalist view of nationalism. According to philosophers, there were historic nations such as England, France and Germany. However, there are some nationalities such as south Slavic nations, labeled by Engels as non-historical nations, which could not have internal dynamics to achieve to become

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[15] Michael Löwy, (1988). *Fatherland or Mother Earth? Essays on the National Question,* London, Pluto Press, p.20.

[16] Löwy 1998: 18.

[17] Lenin, V.I. and Stalin, J., V., (2006). *Marksizm ve Ulusal Sorun,* İstanbul, Evrensel Basın Yayın, p.176.

nations.[18] Not only in Europe, but also in the third world, the philosophers thought in the same manner that civilized nations must annihilate the non-historic nationalities. Annexation of the large areas of the third world was in the interest of civilization.

> Or is it perhaps unfortunate that splendid California has been taken away from the lazy Mexicans who could not do anything with it? That the energetic Yankees by rapid exploitation of the Californian gold mines…for the first time really open the Pacific Ocean to civilization…[19]

Considering the French invasion of Algeria, Engels believed in the same points, and he supported the invasion.

> The conquest of Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilization. We may regret that the liberty of the Bedouins of the desert has been destroyed; we must not forget that these same Bedouins were a nation of robbers[20]

2.1.3. Considerations of Marx and Engels in the era of Post-1860's: Irish Break

1860's were the turning point for the philosophers. By the year 1860's, Marx had supported Irish in the Irish-English conflict. According to Marx, the independence of Ireland was necessary not only for the Irish, but also for the English because a nation which suppresses another one must never be asserted as free. For Marx, if the English and the Irish continued to live together, the hatred of the English against Irish would continue because the English supposed that the Irish decreased the wages in the country, and they were the reason for poverty.[21]

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[18] Munck 1986: 12.

[19] Munck 1986: 13.

[20] Löwy 1988: 17-18.

[21] Umut Özkırımlı, (2008). *Milliyetçilik Kuramları: Eleştirel Bir Bakış,* Ankara, Doğu Batı Yayınları, p.50.

Munck and Löwy emphasize the Irish independence issue as a total break of the philosophers from their past assumptions on nationalism.[22] However, Nimni does not approve of these arguments. According to Nimni, Poland and Ireland were considered as historic nations by the philosophers; as a result of this, both of the philosophers supported the independence of two countries. In other words, Nimni insists that both of the philosophers remain in their same position on the division of the nations regarding their developmental level as historic-progressive or non-historic and reactionary nations.[23]

Avineri puts forth a third different type of argument in this context. Avineri mentions that Marx and Engels supported the independence of Poland because of the Russian tsarist threat. Poland was supposed as a buffer zone country by the philosophers.[24]Therefore, Marx and Engels strongly supported the resistance of Poland against ''backward Russian Empire''. However, taking the Irish issue into account, Avineri preferred to remain silent.

At this point, Petrus supported similar arguments with Nimni. He emphasizes both of the philosophers' progressive perception on nationalism[25]

> In fact, to avoid a greater danger the spread of Pan-Slavism, dominated by reactionary Russia Marx and Engels actually advocated permanent Germanic control over some South Slavic peoples. On the other hand, the Polish nationality in Eastern Europe, and the Irish nationality in Western

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[22] Munck 1986: 15-20.

[23] Nimni 1991: 26-37.

[24] Avineri 1991: 637-657.

[25] Joseph Petrus, (1971). "Marx and Engels on the National Question", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 33, No.3, pp.797-824.

Europe, had each developed a substantially strong dominant class that actively struggled for a national independence from foreign control.[26]

What can be deduced from Avineri, Munck and Löwy is that in contrast to Nimmi's accusations of economy reductionism of Marxism, Avineri, Munck, Löwy imply the autonomy of the politic sphere of Marxist tradition.

Briefly, Marxist approaches on nationalism are subordinated to class struggle, and there can be seen tactical changes of the philosophers when it comes to the national question. The opinions of Marx and Engels were changed owing to the increase in the nationalist sentiments among European countries. What remains stable in the opinions of the philosophers is that nationalism and nations are bourgeoisie phenomena, and they will disappear with the rise of communist society. In other words, nationalism is seen as a growth of the product of bourgeois nation states that compete with each other. That is why, nationalism was perceived as a temporary phenomenon, and it was argued that the eventual supremacy of proletariat would bring an end to all national differences.[27]

2.2. Debates on Self Determination Rights among Marxists before Bolshevik Revolution

At the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th centuries, Marxists got a vague heritage from the founders of their ideology. The heading of revolutionary movements toward the east engendered harsh debates among Marxists thinkers on the national question. Particularly, ethnically diverse empires like Russia and Austria-Hungary encountered with the rising ethnic national issues in their countries. In this context,

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Jeremy Smith, (1999). *The Bolsheviks and The National Question, 1917-1923*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, p.8.

Austrian Marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer conceptualized extraterritorial national cultural autonomy. On the one hand Lenin and Stalin basically supported territorial regional autonomy and the nations' right of self determination, Rosa Luxemburg approached nationalism with a negative manner, and she disapproved of the separation of small nations from the big entities, on the other.[28].

As for Luxemburg, she strongly refused the independence of Poland from Russia. According to Luxemburg, the industrial development of Poland merged with Russia. Russian market was also necessary for the industrialization process of Poland. Consequently, Polish proletariat and bourgeoisie got some benefit from the annexation of Poland by Russia. She also emphasized that the ones who insisted for the independence in Poland were pre-modern nobility and petty bourgeoisie. Furthermore, Luxemburg replied Marx's harsh criticism of the Tsarist Russia. She highlighted that at the beginning of 20th century, Russia was not a backward country anymore, as Marx has depicted. In contrast to the negative manner for the independence of Poland, she supported the secessionist movements in the Ottoman Empire. According to Luxemburg, Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs and Armenians had reached relatively high degree economic, social, cultural developmental level superior to Turkey.[29]

In the light of all these economy-centric understanding of nationalism is obviously seen in the arguments of Luxemburg. However, as Löwy claimed in the year 1914, methodologically she revised her economy-centric nation perception.[30] At this point,

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[28] Smith 1999: 11-19.

[29] Löwy 1998: 32.

[30] Löwy 1998: 33.

what is significant is that unlike Kitschy, she also encouraged the guarantee of cultural and education rights of minorities in the multiethnic states.[31] To concretize, national autonomy was a wise solution for Poles who populated distinct area intensively. However, as for Jews, who were spread throughout different parts of Russia, solution of national autonomy for the national question would not work. She objected to Bauer's non-territorial autonomy as the solution of dispersed nations or nationalities in a multi-ethnic country, and thought that non-territorial cultural autonomy would lead to weakening of the brotherhood of proletariats.[32] In this context, she supported educational and linguistic guarantees for non-territorial national groups.[33]

Briefly, Luxemburg was opposed to separation of small nations from the big ones. She was skeptical about the fact that small nations could be pawns in the imperialist hegemonic capitalist system, and nationalism could engender the weakening of international solidarity of the proletariat. Therefore, she was sensitive about the acceptance of Bolsheviks' arguments of self determination and Bauer's arguments of non-territorial cultural autonomy. This does not mean that she has economic-deterministic arguments which totally neglect cultural sphere. In contrast, the educational and linguistic guarantees of dispersed nations and national autonomy arguments for the oppressed nations prove her position concerning national question.

Other influential figures on the nationalism debate among Marxists are Austrian Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. According to Umut Özkırımlı, Otto Bauer was the most

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[31] Smith 1999: 13.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Smith 1999: 14.

important person who approached a nationalist theory not only among Marxists but also among the other thinkers in the period he lived.[34] Bauer basically defined nation as the unity of fate. His solution to the nationality question was embodied on the base of non-territorial cultural autonomy which basically guaranteed the demands of nations in multi-ethnic states.[35] His main aim was to break down national tensions in a fully democratic way. Within this context, Bauer claimed that territorial autonomy theories could not explain the Jewish community or Afro-Americans. Therefore, for Bauer the most important characteristic which made up a nation was, as it was mentioned above, unity of fate.[36]

In contrast to Luxemburg, Stalin and Lenin, Bauer perceives nations as a permanent phenomenon which is not peculiar to capitalism. As Renner and Bauer mentions, ''the triumph of socialism would result in an increasing differentiation of nations rather than a merging of nations.''[37] If the nations are to survive, their rights should be protected even for non-territorial national groups. Bauer's arguments lead to the representation of ethnic groups in the states' administrative units and parliaments.[38]

Certainly, Bauer formulated his non-territorial cultural autonomy arguments under the influence of Austria-Hungary Empire. In this context, I should open a parenthesis that Austria-Hungary Empire is a good example of Gellner's nationalism perception.

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[34] Özkırımlı 2008: 53.

[35] See for example, Otto Bauer, (1992). "Ulus konsepti" eds. Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode, *Avusturya Marksizmi*, İstanbul, Kavram Yayınları

[36] Löwy 1998: 47.

[37] John Glenn, (1999).The *Soviet Legacy in Central Asia,* New York, Palgrave, p.73

[38] Gürbüz 2007: 82-83.

According to Gellner, industrialization process engenders nationalism. In the light of Austria-Hungary Empire, industrialization resulted in the migration from rural areas to city centers. Therefore, poor people of peripheries, not after a long time, recognized that they spoke different language dialects from their bosses.[39]

Concerning Bolsheviks, Lenin and Stalin generally defended the same arguments which can be summarized in the motto of ''self-determination rights to the nations''. In 1913, Stalin finished his famous work ''Marxism and the National Question''. In his work, Stalin provides the respond of Bolsheviks to the non-territorial cultural autonomy arguments of Bauer. Stalin was a supporter of Lenin's general position on the national question, and he was encouraged by Lenin in his attack towards Austrian-Marxists.[40]

Stalin defines nation in terms of four items, which are territory, language, economic life and physiological make up.[41] According to him, Bauer's definition of nation encourages nationalism which was seen as a backward bourgeoisie phenomenon by the Bolsheviks as well. Furthermore, Stalin was worried that nationalist feelings could cover class struggle.

> At this difficult time Social-Democracy had a high mission – to resist nationalism and to protect the masses from the general "epidemic." For Social-Democracy, and Social-Democracy alone, could do this, by countering nationalism with the tried weapon of internationalism, with the unity and indivisibility of the class struggle. And the more powerfully the

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[39] Ernest Gellner, (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, cited in Gürbüz 2007: 84.

[40] Gürbüz 2007: 82.

[41] Lenin-Stalin 2006: 14.

wave of nationalism advanced, the louder had to be the call of Social-Democracy for fraternity and unity among the proletarians of all the nationalities of Russia. And in this connection particular firmness was demanded of the Social-Democrats of the border regions, who came into direct contact with the nationalist movement.[42]

Stalin emphasizes that nation is not a coincidental temporary union of masses; on the contrary, it is stable and historical.[43] At this point, Lenin realized that by defining nation as a stable, historical phenomenon and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture, Stalin was, to some extent, influenced by Bauer's definition of nation which he disapproved strictly.[44]

Nevertheless, the most significant point where Stalin opposes Austrian-Marxists is Bauer's definition of nation which is defined as unity of fate. Stalin asserted that Bauer's arguments conceptualized nation as a mystical and supernatural character, and this could not explain the division of Jews into different language groups which could not understand each other.

> Bauer's point of view, which identifies a nation with its national character, divorces the nation from its soil and converts it into an invisible, self-contained force. The result is not a living and active nation, but something mystical, intangible and supernatural. For, I repeat, what sort of nation, for instance, is a Jewish nation which consists of Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian, American and other Jews, the members of which do not understand each other (since they speak different languages), inhabit different parts of the globe, will never see each other, and will never act together, whether in time of peace or in time of war?[45]

At this point one of the counter arguments from Austrian-Marxists against Stalin is that the emphasis on territory and the nation conceptualization of Stalin could not explain dispersed nations such as Jews. Moreover, Stalin's overemphasis on territory

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[42] Joseph Stalin, (1954). *Marxism and the National Question,* Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, p.312-313.

[43] Lenin-Stalin 2006: 12.

[44] Smith 1999: 18.

[45] Stalin 1954: 300-381.

retains oppression risks for minorities.[46] Indeed, after the end of the nativization (*korenizatsiia*) policies in 1930s, Soviet official nationalism merely encouraged affirmative action policies or nativization for SSRs (Soviet Socialist Republics), which led to the neglect of ethnic minorities in SSRs.[47] Within this context, although Lenin and Stalin, on the theoretical concept, generally share the same arguments on the nation matter, there can be found some risky seeds of oppression to ethnic minorities even in the most democratic work of Stalin.

Nevertheless, the work of Stalin deserves democratic label because he mentioned the self-determination rights to nations without reservation. He also strictly opposed the external interventions for the right of a nation who determines its own destiny.

> The right of self-determination means that only the nation itself has the right to determine its destiny, that no one has the right to forcibly interfere in the life of the nation, to *destroy* its schools and other institutions, to *violate* its habits and customs, to *repress* its language, or *curtail* its rights. This, of course, does not mean that Social-Democracy will support every custom and institution of a nation. While combating the coercion of any nation, it will uphold only the right of the *nation* itself to determine its own destiny, at the same time agitating against harmful customs and institutions of that nation in order to enable the toiling strata of the nation to emancipate themselves from them.[48]

When it comes to Lenin, his famous work ''the right of nations to self determination,'' which was written in 1914, determines Bolsheviks mainstream approaches on nationalism. The effects of the work have a deep impact on Soviet Union nationality policies. Lenin took the notion of Marx that ''a nation which oppresses

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[46] Smith 1999: 19.

[47] Martin 2001: 450-452.

[48] Stalin 1954: 321-322 (Italics original).

another cannot be free''. He was involved in polemics with Rosa Luxemburg on the issue of independence of Poland. [49]

Lenin experienced the Russian oppressions on non-Russian nationalities in the Tsarist era. His policies on national question were totally reverse of the tsarist policies. Lenin emphasized territorial autonomy and voluntarily secession rights of nations from Russia. Indeed, Lenin was opposed to the division of nations, which was taken from the heritage of Marx. As it was emphasized, Marxists' main aim was to unify nations rather than to divide them. Lenin was worried that ethnic tensions could interrupt world socialist revolution. Therefore, he was totally open to compromise for every national-ethnic issue. In this context, the right of secession is similar to the right of divorce, and as Lenin mentioned ''the right of divorce is not invitation for all wives to leave their husbands''.[50]

At that point, Lenin supported his arguments depending on some western countries. Switzerland, for instance, was a sample country who achieved brotherhood among her nations by giving fully democratic rights to her nations. As a respond to the doubts of peaceful implementation of separation, Lenin put forth Norway as an example nation who was peacefully separated from Sweden in 1905.[51] In this context, to implement self determination properly, for Lenin, the oppressor nations' socialists must

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[49] Ibid.

[50] Glenn John 1999: 74.

[51] Lenin-Stalin 2006: 75.

give voice for the separation of the oppressed one, while the socialists of oppressed nations must give voice to the unity of workers.[52] .

All in all, the proposition of Lenin was to foster national cultures and to create national autonomies, national schools, national languages which would break down the national distrust, and in the long run, he expected that the divergence of nationalities would be abolished. Lenin's final aim was to create ''Soviet man'' as a super identity of all Soviet citizens. At this point, federation was an important administrative structure for the national plans of Lenin. As Yuri Slezkine pointed out ''for Lenin the surest way to unity in content was diversity in form''.[53]

2.3. Bolshevik Nationality Policies from Revolution to the Stalin Era

Soon after Bolshevik revolution was achieved, Bolsheviks declared the declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia on 21st of November 1917.[54] The declaration provided four principles loyal to the Bolshevik assumptions on the national question: 'equality and sovereignty of the people of the Russian Empire; the right of nations to self-determination; abolition of all privileges based on nationality or religion; freedom and cultural development of national minorities'.[55]

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[52] Lenin-Stalin 2006: 75-128.

[53] Yuri Slezkine, (1994). *''The USSR as a Communal Appartment or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism''*, *Slavic Review*,vol. 53, No. 2, pp.414-452.

[54] Victoria Khiterer, (2004). "Nationalism in the Soviet Union", James R. Miller (Ed.). *Encyclopedia of Russian History*, New York Macmillan,, p.1000.

[55] Ibid.

The continuity between theoretical concept on nationality policies and its implementation can be obviously seen during the initial years of Soviet Union up to Stalin's harsh collectivization campaign. For instance, loyal to the self determination right to the nations, the demarcation of borders was not drawn immediately. Bolsheviks waited for the decisions of Finland and Poland who chose the separation from the Soviet State.[56]

At this point, Terry Martin defined nationality policies of Soviet Union in 1923-1939 as affirmative action policies. As Martin pointed out, Soviet State not only created dozens of large Soviet republics but also ten thousands of national territories scattered across the entire expanse of the Soviet Union.[57] In each territory, the national language was declared as the official language. Soviet government financed mass production of books, journals, newspapers, movies, folk music ensembles, and other cultural outputs in the mother tongue of non-Russians. Soviet government also attempted to create national-elites for the non-Russian nations. Consequently, it can be said that Soviet government opened every path for even simple tribes to consolidate their national consciousness. Martin defined these policies, which are called as indigenization or *Korenizatsiia* in the Russian, as an incomparable example in the world. Nothing comparable to it had been attempted before, with the possible exception of India. No multiethnic state subsequently marched the scope of Soviet affirmative action.[58]

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[56] Gürbüz 2007: 94.

[57] Terry Martin, (2001). "An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Imperialism",In Ronald Grigor Sunny and Terry Martin, (Eds.) *A State of Nations:Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.67-82.

[58] Ibid.

There are two controversial arguments about the origin of *Korenizatsia*. However, these two arguments approve of the translation of the world in English as ''indigenization''. One of them asserts that "*Korenizatsia* is a word stemming from the word 'root', and it actually means rooting. Still, as Martin points out, it is derived not directly from the stem *koren,* which means root or rooting, but from its adjectival form *korenoi* as used in phrase *korennoi narod* (indigenous people).[59]

Loyal to the nativization policies and the Bolshevik concept of nation with territory, the nationalities were designated to administrative units ranging from SSRs (Soviet Socialist Republics), Autonomous SSRs (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics), down to regions, oblasts and finally to officially non-delimited units.[60]

Indeed, Bolsheviks did not have a homogenous agenda on the implementation of *korenisatsia* policies. Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, famous revolutionary founder of the Bolshevik secret police, *cheka*, were close to more centralized policies in comparison to Lenin. Therefore, in some particular places like Georgia, Ukraine, and Central Asia, Bolsheviks encountered harsh debates among themselves. For instance, one of the significant debates between Lenin and Stalin was whether to approve of the autonomy and self determination right of the Central Asian nations. According to Lenin, in cases lacking capitalist mode of production, like Central Asian tribes, the modernization process in its internal dynamics would produce proletariat; so proletariat's ideology would secure these countries from the conservative ideas of mullahs. Therefore, in

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[59] Suny-Martin 2001: 67-82.

[60] Aydın Özgül, (2006). *Nation Building Policies and Their Impact on Russion Minority in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan,* Ankara, p. 37.

contrast to Stalin's interventionist ideas, Lenin supported territorial autonomy and self-determination right to traditional Central Asian countries as well.[61]

Another important debate occurred in Ukraine. Lenin prepared a proposal called ''Soviet Sovereignty in Ukraine'' which aimed to flourish Ukrainian language and compelled the attempts to make Ukrainian language secondary. The proposal also facilitated the confiscation of cereals in favor of peasantry.[62] By the way, the proposal was sent on December of 1919 to the special conference of Bolsheviks on Moscow. The timing of the proposal was important as it was near the end of strict war communism policies of Bolsheviks. In the years between 1917 and 1921, Bolsheviks implemented war communism policies as a result of the difficulties of the civil war. Bolshevik requisition of grains was unbearable for the peasants. Most of the people died as a result of hunger. As a secret police service of Bolsheviks, *Cheka* reported 118 separate peasant uprising occurred in the period of civil war and war communism.[63]. Ukrainian Bolshevik leaders Rakovski and Bubnov, on the other hand, deprecated Lenin's proposal. Basically, they claimed that Lenin's proposal increased the importance of Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover, Soviet collectivized farm mission of the Bolsheviks had to be implemented properly rather than giving concession to the peasantry.[64]

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[61] Gürbüz 2007: 91.

[62] Edward Hallett Carr, (2006). *Bolşevik Devrimi 1917-1923,* İstanbul, Metis Yayıncılık, p.281.

[63] David MacKenzie and Micheal W. Curran, (2002). *A History of Russia, the Soviet Union and Beyond,* USA, Wadsworth Thomson, p.444.

[64] Carr 2006: 282.

In the Georgian case, Lenin also contradicted with Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. In short, Stalin prepared a proposal called ''Project of a Resolution Concerning the Relations between RSFSR and the Independent Republics''. His proposal was to subordinate Transcaucasia states to RSFSR in status of Autonomous Republics, although Armenia and Azerbaijan accepted the proposal while Georgia deprecated. At this point, Lenin strictly accused Stalin and forced him to revise his proposal. Nevertheless, the revision did not satisfy the Georgian opposition, and eventually the Central Committee of Georgian Communist party resigned to protest Moscow.[65] Lenin supported Georgian side in the dispute between Georgia and center. He strictly criticized the centralist, inclined Bolsheviks, Stalin, Ordzhonikidze and Dzerzhinsky in that although they were non-Russians, they acted like Russian nationalists. Moreover, he mentioned that " it is known that assimilated non-Russians always overdo in the matter of hundred per cent Russian attitudes." [66] Eventually, Lenin's pressure worked, and Georgia gained SSR status.

The cases mentioned above of Central Asia, Ukraine and Georgia revealed that there was a serious opposition to the Lenin's decentralized federative arguments and the right of self determination to the nations. Pipes pointed out that indeed, Lenin's high prestige opened the way to implement his ideas on the national question because most of the party members joined the party after the revolution (97.3 per cent), and

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[65] Gürbüz 2007: 101-105.

[66] Vilademir Ilich Lenin, (1966). The Questions of Nationalities or 'Automization', *Lenin Collected Works*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, vol. 36, pp. 605-611, quoted in Gürbüz 2007: 103

overwhelming proportion of the newly joined party members were Russians who were not ready to understand Lenin's democratic views on the nationality issue.[67]

2.3.1. Debates on Demarcation of Borders

Concerning the issue of drawing boundaries, some western scholars such as Olivier Roy, Richard Pipes, Alexander Benningsen, and Helene Carrere d'Encausse asserted that Bolsheviks drew the boundaries superficially to divide certain nationalities in order to rule them quite easily. These arguments of ''divide and rule'' were very popular particularly in the cold war era.

D'Encausse claimed that ''Giving equal rights to each nation was also thought of as a means to break up some large groups united by special bonds. Such was the case for the Moslem people of the Caucasus and Central Asia, who since the beginning of the century, had been trying to unite on the basis of common languages .''[68] She also added that there was a tendency in Caucasia to use Arabic alphabet, and in Central Asia different Turkish speaking groups aspired to use Djagatai language in order to attain Turkic political unity. However, Bolsheviks thwarted these pan-Turkic and pan-Moslem attempts or dreams by intervening and dividing the regions and increasing the differences of Turkic-Moslem nationalities.[69]

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[67] Richard Pipes, (1968). *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923,* Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, p.277.

[68] Helene Carrere d'Encausse, (1995). *The Nationality Question in the Soviet Union and Russia,* Stockholm, Scandinavian University Press, p.22.

[69]d'Encausse 1995: 22.

Likewise, Roy believes that Soviet government promoted the emergence of ethnic identities without at the same time achieving the fusion of nations which was the Bolsheviks' main aim.[70] According to Roy, promoting ethnic differentiations and creating new languages and nations was a strategically political agenda which could be witnessed even in tsarist Russia.

> The first purpose, apart from the determination to curb Russian nationalism, was to block the possibility of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic movements developing. This meant differentiating individual ethnic groups from each other and rooting them within the framework of a nation-state, following the same logic of ethnicisation which was in operation in the late tsarist period. But this general principle did not explain all the concrete choices which were made. These were geared to a variety of strategic and political considerations which were liable to alter through time.[71]

Territorial division of nationalities also brought Russia as a mediator of the conflicts of Central Asian neighbor countries. As Roy pointed out, making Russia as a mediator actor in the region was the great victory of Stalin taking into account to the control of the region.[72]

The counter arguments emphasized that Bolsheviks did not have a well defined, decisive political agenda concerning demarcation of boundaries. Furthermore, Bolsheviks didn't have enough power to suppress a wide ranged rebellion after the civil war had finished. Consequently, the border drawing was a more complex issue beyond the limits of ''divide and rule'' policy.

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[70] Olivier Roy,(2000). *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations*, New York, New York University Press, p.54.

[71] Roy 2000: 66.

[72] Roy 2000: 73.

As Gürbüz pointed out there were already differences among different social groups. With regard to Central Asia, Bolsheviks relied on tribal affiliations, and they sought the support of local cadres. Therefore, national demarcation issue was a multi-dimensional issue which was progressed by the negotiations of Bolsheviks with the local powers of Central Asia.[73]

> The nationality policies of the Soviets were not a one-dimensional process set from the beginning. It was the product of long discussions, based on ethno-territoriality, the right of self-determination, economic sustainability, and also divide and rule policy. Additionally, there were a variety of actors, such as the resistance movements to the Bolsheviks, i.e. Basmachis or National Union of Turkistan, moderate nationalist cooperating with the Bolsheviks, nationalist communists, such as Turar Ryskulov[74]

2.4. Soviet Nationality Policies in the Stalin Era: From Nativization to Deportations of Nations

The Stalin era nationality policies can be examined in three periods. One of them is the nativization period which coincides with the New Economic Policy period of 1921-1928. These policies can be labeled as affirmative action policies which Martin asserts. The years from beginning of 1930s to 1939 can be labeled as *''Russians' First Among Equals''* period. Eventually, the abolition of affirmative action policies can be periodized by the deportation of nations prior to and after the Second World War.[75]

As it was stated Stalin had centralization tendencies even when Lenin was alive. The debate on Georgian case worried Lenin. Stalin's autonomy policy for non-Russian

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[73] Gürbüz 2007: 80.

[74] Gürbüz 2007: 81.

[75] Suny-Martin 2001: 67-82

nations rather than federation was defeated by the high prestige of Lenin. However, when he captured power after Lenin had died, the Soviet federation and the right of nations to secede became a mere scrap of paper. Moscow became the exclusively decision making center of the USSR.[76]

Stalin as a general secretariat of the Bolshevik Party used his bureaucratic position in the party and captured the power. He legitimized his ruling by giving reference to Lenin. The working process of the soviets was paralyzed by the interventions of the center. Newly emerged bureaucracy in the institutions consolidated. Indeed, Lenin had fears about bureaucratization and already declared it in his book, *State and Revolution*. According to Lenin, Vanguard party model which was mentioned in his pamphlet *what has to be done* must be used temporarily.[77]. Under the tsarist suppression, Lenin chose a strict party model organized from top to bottom. Bolsheviks probably might have no space to resist the tsarist secret police. However, temporary party model of Lenin was internalized by the Bolshevik cadres. Soviet administrative units had gradually begun to be embodied in the authoritarian structure. What Stalin made after having gained power was to worsen and spread this sensitive party model deeply to the institutions of the Soviet Union. The party model of *what has to be done* frozen as a state official policy.[78]

As for nationality policies, Stalin was generally loyal to the policies of Lenin in 1920s. Nativization (*korenizatsiia)* policies were implemented properly. This was the golden age of non-Russians in the Soviet century. Soviet type nation-building process

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[76] Moshe Lewin, (2008). *Sovyet Yüzyılı,* İstanbul, İletişim Yayıncılık, p.48.

[77] Gürbüz 2007: 110-114.

[78] Ibid.

which Stalin also mentioned ''as socialist in content national in form'' resulted as a great flourish of non-Russian nations. By the years of nativization, Soviet policy had actually called sacrifice of Russians in order to provide the growth of Non-Russians' nation building processes. Majority of Russian territory was given to the non-Russians, and traditional Russian culture was symbolized as an oppression culture.[79]

Collectivization policies resulted in a lot of uprisings particularly in the non-Russians territories. Therefore, Stalin determined to heighten the centralization policies. Especially, politburo was decreased to start a terror wave against ''bourgeois nationalists of Ukraine and Belorussia.[80] In the similar vein, Basmachi uprisings widely enlarged throughout Central Asia.

Affirmative action policies were revised at the beginning of 1930s. The striking point of the revision was that thousands of minor national territories were abolished in 1930s. However, larger 36 territories, SSRs and autonomous SSRs were strengthened in 1936. Most of these territories remained the same till the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[81]

Russian nationality and traditional Russian culture which was seen as a great danger because of the tsarist oppression heritage began to be rehabilitated in 1934. Furthermore, by 1936, Russian nationality had surpassed beyond the equalization of

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[79] Suny-Martin 2001: 67-82.

[80] Martin 2001: 26.

[81] Suny-Martin 2001: 67-82.

other nations. It rose to the rank of '*'First Among Equals*''. The situation was announced in the official communist party newspaper *Pravda.*

> All the peoples of the USSR, participants in the great socialist construction, can take pride in the results of their work. All of them from the smallest to the largest are equal Soviet patriots. But the first among equal is the Russian people, the Russian workers, the Russian toilers, whose role in the entire Great Proletarian Revolution, from the first victory to today's brilliant period of its development, has been exclusively great.[82]

As Martin further emphasized in the same context, although the new policy did not insist forced cultural and linguistic Russification, it paved the way for the promotion of bilingualism and re-engineering of non-Russian languages.[83] The rapid replacement of the Latin alphabet by the Cyrillic should be considered in the same context.[84]

> The Latin alphabet which was not used in Russia itself, offered the additional advantage of not giving this change an imperial stamp. But at the end of the 1930s, the very rapid replacement of the Latin alphabet by the Cyrillic revealed an effort to bring diverse languages closer to Russia, at least with regard to written form. It also suggests that a general process of cultural Russification had begun[85]

By 1938, a new national principle had been declared by the Politburo which was called ''friendship of people''. All non-Russian not only were required to learn Russian language in order to communicate with nations within Soviet Union, but also they were required to learn Russian culture and be familiar with it.[86] It seemed that Stalin was regretful about the nativization policies which he thought were result of emergence of

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[82] Martin 2001: 452.

[83] Suny-Martin 2001: 67-82.

[84] d'Encausse 1995: 26.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Martin 2001: 461.

the bourgeois national tendencies. In this context, he reversed the nativization process; at least, he promoted Russian as an interethnic communication language in the Soviet Union. Friendship of people seemed to turn the Russians into an elder brother of the other nations. As for non-Russian territories, the Russian population skyrocketed in 1930s compared to 1920s.[87] Martin perfectly summarized the situation by giving reference to Benedict Anderson, who mentioned that the friendship of the people was the imagined community of the Soviet Union.[88]

2.4.1. Deportation of Nations

During the great purges of Stalin, Soviet state apparatus turned into a war machine in the peace time. Some statistics claimed that 1.372.392 people were arrested, and out of 681.692 people among them were executed. According to Khrushchev's statistics which he declared in a secret meeting to the center community of the communist party of the Soviet Union, more than 1.5 million people were arrested, and 680.692 people were executed by shooting.[89]

As for deportation of nations, it was implemented shortly after the social trauma of Stalin's great purges. It can be observed that Soviet affirmative action policies were totally abolished. The treatment of deported nationalities was seen as a kind of genocide in the western literature. [90] At this point, Stalin's deportation policies can be seen in two ways, which were called preventive and punitive deportations. Deportation of Volga

[87] Martin 2001: 460.

[88] Martin 2001: 461.

[89] Lewin 2008: 140.

[90] Özgül 2006: 38.

Germans and Meskhetians was the example of the preventive, and deportation of Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechen, Ingush, Balkars, and Crimean Tatars was the example of the punitive deportations.[91] Volga Germans were the first deported nation (September of 1941), and Meskhetians were deported with the reason of security. Stalin was surely anxious about Soviet nations' the collaboration prospect with Nazis. Germans were deported because they were related to the enemy, while the Meshketians were related to a possible future enemy regarding the collaboration prospect with Turkey.[92] After 1935, revival of Russian nationalism proved that the concept of othering was reproduced in USSR. The striking point for punitive deportations was that these nations were totally deported whether their individuals were related with the collaborations with Germans or not. For instance, most of the Crimean Tatars also fought against the Nazis. Furthermore, the government also rewarded them with honor medals. Nevertheless, they were all together forced to leave their territories. That a similar fate had also struck the Kalmyks, the Balkars, and the Karachai was surmised from the fact that their autonomous units had also vanished from Soviet maps. The Kalmyk Autonomous Socialist Republic had simply vanished along with its people and capital city Elista. The impact of deportations concerning culture was a disaster. The books which were written in the native language of deported nations were burned, cultural institutions of deported nations were destroyed, and eventually their language was converted to primitive non-written languages.[93] After the death of Stalin, with the help of de-Stalinization campaign

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[91] Isabelle Kreindler, (1986). The Soviet Deported Nationalities: A Summary and an Update, *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp.387-405.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Ibid.

of Khrushchev, these deported nations were generally rehabilitated. Consequently, most of them returned to their home territories. However, punishment of a nation's members without considering whether they were innocent or guilty engendered a serious trauma in the memory of the society.

Marxist heritage which Bolsheviks influenced from was a progressive ideology that neglected nationalism. As Calhoun points out Marx was very optimistic and he did not expected the reactions to capitalism could occur on the religious or nationalist base[94]. In this context, Bolsheviks found their own path to solve the nation matters. On the theoretical concept, they created a federative democratic solution which gives the initiative to the each nation or ethnic group to decide on their own path. Each nation, even small ethnic groups, found the chance to improve their languages and cultures. However, ''socialist in content and national in form'' model of nation building structure of the Soviet Union turned into an authoritarian direction in the 1930s. Stalin was not loyal even to his initial works, as he wasn't to Lenin's works, on the national question. Therefore, affirmative action policies which are implemented in 1920s were dropped and new era emerged as ''Russians first among Equals'' in 1930s. The rising importance of Russian nation merged with bureaucratic and centralist structure of the Soviet State which engendered serious nationalistic grievances that are concretely seen in the Gorbachev era. Despite the fact that Bolsheviks thought of nationalism as a temporary phenomenon, the ethnic policies of Bolsheviks which merged with territorial division of nations consolidated the national sentiments of the nations that formed the Soviet Union.

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[94] Craig Calhoun, (2007). *Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

CHAPTER 3

IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONLITY POLICIES IN SOVIET

KAZAKHSTAN

In the second chapter, this thesis mainly highlighted the theoretical debates and construction of Soviet nationality policies in the era of Lenin and Stalin. This chapter particularly focuses on the important events which had deeply influenced the Soviet type nation-building of Kazakhstan. The events are examined in a historical perspective. In the light of theoretical debates of the second chapter, the implementation of events on the Kazakhstan case in specific are examined. This chapter also does not neglect the pre-Soviet heritage of Kazakhs. Indeed, as for Kazakhstan case the nation building could not be limited to the Soviet and Post-Soviet times. Hence, in the first part of the chapter the emergence of nationalist consciousness among Kazakhs is issued. In the second part, the important events regarding nationality policies in the Soviet era will be attempted to analyze.

3.1. The Emergence of Nationalist Consciousness among Kazakhs

In this part, the impact of pre-Soviet heritage on the emergence of national consciousness among Kazakh elites will be examined.

3.1.1. Nomadic life style of Kazakhs

Before examining the emergence of national consciousness among Kazakhs, the social and economic conditions of Kazakh society should be examined. The widespread beliefs in literature assert that Kazakh Khanate established at the end of the 15th and the

beginning of the 16th century.[95] The origin of Kazakhs is uncertain, and the name ''Kazakh'' also remains a debatable issue. Prior to 16th century the word Kazakh was perceived beyond the limits of ethnic terms. As Vasilii Radlov points out the word ''Kazakh'' means as ''wanderer, freeman, vagabond and tramp''.[96] Another scholar, Steven Sabol, maintains that one of the 19th century source asserts that the word stems from Tatar origin and means ''steppe-person.[97]

Another argument from scholar Vasili Bartold is that Kazakh ethnical identity stems from the Uzbeks who had abandoned the authority of Abulkhair Khan and several Turkic tribes who lived near the region.[98] Kazakhs appeared as a distinct group after the Nogai-Uzbek-Kazakh union had dissolved.[99]

By the mid-sixteenth century, Kazakhs divided into three *zhuz* or hordes a sub-national identity which still continues in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan. The '*'Uly Zhuz''* (Great Horde) occupies the southeast region of today's Kazakhstan territories including *Syr Darya* and some surrounding areas. '*'Orta Zhuz''* (Middle Horde) involves the center and northern eastern parts of Kazakhstan. '*'Kishi Zhuz''* (Little Horde) occupies

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[95] Ali Deniz Usta, (2007). *The Reconstruction of the Past in the Process of Nation Building in Kazakhstan,* Ankara, p.33.

[96] Steven Sabol, (2003). *Russian Colanization and the Genesis of Kazak National Consciousness,* New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.15.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Sabol 2003: 16.

[99] Sabol 2003: 15.

the territories of north western parts or Kazakhstan, between the territories of lake Aral and Caspian Sea.[100]

The pastoral life style of Kazakhs depended on livestock production and migration in search of pastures.[101] Kazakhs continued the historical nomadic heritage of Central Asia which is very sensitively depended on internal and external political, economic and climatic conditions.

> Pastoral nomadism was, and is, a historical fact that was constantly in flux depending upon various pressures (political, economic, climatic, etc.) being exerted internally and externally. The Kazaks were pastoral nomads whose social, economic and political structures were tightly interconnected to their specific way of life and to 2500 years of Central Asian nomadic heritage.[102]

The nomadic life and social conditions of Kazaks between the 15th to the 18th centuries were similar to the Mongols of 11th and 12th centuries and other nomads who preceded the Mongols. This comparison also reveals that the nomadic way of life is a kind of static life which is not open for the fundamental alteration of societies.[103]

> A nomadic society is stagnant. It does not, and cannot, as a pastoral nomadic society, develop any further. It constitutes a sociological cul-de-sac, or, to use the expressive Russian word, a tupik.''[104]

Akiner underlines that from prehistoric times up to the collectivization campaign of the Soviet period, for over two millennia, inhabitants of Kazakh lands followed a

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[100] Mehmet Saray, (2004). *Kazakların Uyanışı,* Ankara, Tika Yayınları, p.30.

[101] Sabol 2003: 10.

[102] Sabol 2003: 11.

[103] Ernest Gellner, (1984). 'Foreword' in Anatoly Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, 2nd edn, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, pp (i-xx), quoted in Dave 2007: 29.

[104] Ibid.

nomadic way of life which is still an embedded fundamental element of national self image despite the fact that it is no longer a living tradition.[105]

Considering the economic sustainability of the nomadic life, the internal dynamics of nomadic economy prevents financing an army for a longer period. Therefore, most of the nomadic societies are very vulnerable for the invasions and incursions of other nomadic societies, and particularly of the settled societies.[106]

As for the particularities of Kazakh nomadic society that distinguish it from the other nomadic societies, it can be said that Kazakhs had a Turkish type of mix livestock including sheep and horse which is different from the horses based Mongolian type and sheep based Tibetan type of livestock.[107] One of the important points of the nomadic culture of Kazakhs is that Kazakhs were expected to know their ancestors at least to seventh generation. A Kazakh who knows his/her ancestry up to 40 generations achieves the highest status in the Kazakh society.[108]

3.1.2. Russian Colonization and the Effects for Kazakhs

In the 19th century, England achieved the control of India and Afghanistan, and Central Asia remained buffer zone between Russia and England. The rivalry of two empires over influence in the region, which was one of the main factors determining

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[105] Shirin Akiner, (1995). *Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, p.12.

[106] Dave 2007: 28.

[107] Sabol 2003: 11.

[108] Dave 2007: 33.

world history, is known as the ''great game'' denoting the rivalry over influence in the region.[109]

In the 1860's, Tsarist Russia was to a great extent feudal. However, primitive textile industry was developing which resulted in Russia becoming dependent on cotton. Russia had covered raw material deficit by the exportation of cotton from the USA. However, the civil war in the USA cut the cotton exportation to Russia, and this was the trigger point for the invasion of Central Asia. Emancipation of the serfdom in Russia in 1861 also indirectly fastened the occupation of Central Asia, because former serfs were in trouble finding free land to work in Russia. Combination of these reasons mentioned above caused the occupation of central Asia. Eventually, Tsarist colonial rule was established in the region towards the end of 19th century.[110]

As for Russian separation specifically in the Kazakh territories, the cooperation with the Russians and Kazakh hordes began in the beginning of 18th century. As a result of the limitation of stable army presentation Kazakh hordes, which were necessary in coping with different enemies, asked for help from the Russian Tsars. Little horde, Middle and Great Hordes swore loyalty to the Russian Tsar in 1731, 1740 and 1742 respectively at the expense of the border protection of the Tsarist regime.[111]

As it was underlined above, Russian colonization in Central Asia and Kazakhstan skyrocketed after abolishment of the serfdom in 1861. Tashkent, Samarkand-Bukhara

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[109] Reuel R. Hanks, (2005). *Central Asia: a global studies handbook,* Santa Barbara California, ABC-CLIO, Inc, p.179-180.

[110] Hanks 2005: 25-26.

[111] Dave 2007: 35.

and Kokand were conquered by the Russian Tsardom in 1865, 1873, 1876 respectively. The control of territories of the Little and Middle Hordes were already achieved before the Tsarist conquest of significant centers of Central Asia. Following the Russian conquest in the Central Asia, the control of Elder horde was also eventually was subjugated to the Russian Tsardom.[112]

The discontent among the Kazakh society had increased day by day because of the lack of sufficient pastureland for herd grazing. Especially the northern parts of Kazakhstan had already begun to be dominated by the Russian peasants at the beginning of the 20th century. Hence, the shortage of accessible pasturelands impoverished the Kazakh society.[113] The land problem and new comer Russian peasants became the primary political agenda of the newly emerged Kazakh intelligentsia.

The year 1916 resulted with a big violent uprising against the Tsarist Government. Russia encountered the difficulties of the World War I and demanded 250.000 soldiers in order to work in the back military service of the Russian army.[114] Moreover, Tsarist government increased the rate of the taxes in Kazakhstan. As Olcott mentions, it was not surprising that Kazakhs reacted strongly to the demands of 1916 draft edicts of Tsarist regime.[115]

The uprising quickly spread to most of the Kazakh cities, and Kazakhs could achieve initial success against the Russian army. However, Russian forces surpassed the

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[112] Ibid.

[113] Olcott 1995: 100.

[114] Saray 2004: 134.

[115] Olcott: 1995.

uprising, particularly with the help of Russian army which is located near Turkestan.[116]

Saray claims that approximately 150 thousand Kazakhs died in the turmoil of the 1916

uprising.[117]

3.1.3. The Emergence of Kazakh Intelligentsia and Alash Orda Movement

Most of the liberal nationalist intellectuals founded Alash Orda movement in 1905.
The leader of the movement was Alikhan Bukeikhanov who would be the first president
of independent Kazakh state in 1918[118]. After being organized as a party, Alash Orda
movement supported the White Army against Bolsheviks. However, as the civil war
continued they changed sides and supported the Bolsheviks. According to Gürbüz, Alash
Ordists had taken part in Soviet type of modernization until their partial purge before the
collectivization process started in 1928.[119] The movement was to be totally eliminated in
the great purges of Stalin.

Alash Orda party was not merely an organization which attracted all the
intellectuals of the Kazakhstan. Indeed, there were two competing elites in 1910. As it
has been highlighted above, one of them is Alash Orda who was open European values
and modernization. The other was the traditional intellectuals who were educated in
madrasas. Alash Ordists were overwhelmingly located in Orenburg and the traditional

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[116] Saray 2004: 135.

[117] Saray 2004: 136.

[118] http://www.bookrags.com/history/bokeikhanov-alikhan-ema-01/

[119] Gürbüz 2007: 279.

elites were located near Turkestan and Central Asia.[120] Both types of intellectuals were multilingual who spoke Russian, Arabic, Turkish, and Persian fluently.

Needless to say Alash Ordists had a strong influence on the political life of Kazakhstan rather than the traditional elites. The weak influence of Islam in Kazakhstan compared to the other Central Asian communities resulted in the creation of an easy hegemony on the politics of Kazakhstan for Alash Ordists.

During the 1905 revolution, Alash Ordists did not push for a radical opposition agenda against the Tsarist regime. The leaders of Alash Orda believed that the demands of Kazakhs could be achieved compromising with the tsarist regime. However, political demands of Alash Ordists from the tsarist regime were radicalized in the period of 1916 revolt.[121]

Alash Ordists celebrated the February revolution of 1917. Alash Ordists should have considered that the Provisional Government of Russia could lift the oppression against the non-Russians. By the way, Russian Tsardom was famous for its apartheid legacy against non-Russian nations. In other words, as the famous motto clearly describes, the tsarist regime was *prison of nations or people*.[122]

What Alash Ordists primarily demanded from the Provisional Government was territorial autonomy or independent federative state with the equal rights among other

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[120] Sabol 2003: 43.

[121] Sabol 2003: 139.

[122] Gürbüz 2007: 20-25.

nations under the Tsarist rule.[123] However, Bolshevik revolution broke the proposals of the Alash Ordists. Surely, there were some socialists or the members who had leftist tendencies and political positions among Alash Ordists such as Akhmet Baitursynov, but most of the members were not ready for the Soviet type of modernization process of Kazakh community. Therefore, Alash Ordists founded Alash Orda Government in 1917 and supported the anti-Bolshevik white army against the Bolsheviks. Another reason for the support of whites of Alash Ordist can be said to be the white army presence at Orenburg, which is the center and capital of Alash Orda Government.

When Bolsheviks began to change the fate of the civil war in their own favor, Alash Ordists shifted their side and cooperated with the Bolsheviks against the whites. The difficulty of Bolsheviks' defeat was obviously an important reason of the side changes of Alash Ordists, but it is not the mere reason. The Russian Chauvinist and apartheid policies of the Tsarist commanders of the white army also engendered the end of support for the whites.[124]

Bolshevik policy of ''*the right of self determination to nations*'' also attracted Alash Ordists. They began to consider that they could continue the modernization or nation building process in the soviet type. Bolsheviks were Marxists and their modernization project was different from the liberal type of Modernization. However, it is worth following the path of Bolsheviks because the modernization model of

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[123] Dave 2007: 47.

[124] Gürbüz: 2007: 63.

Bolsheviks, as it was seen in the second chapter, was ''*socialist in content and nationalist in form*''.[125]

During the *New Economic Policy* period, which was an economic policy proposed by Lenin to prevent the economy from collapsing by allowing some private ventures such as small businesses and shops along with the governmental control of banks, foreign trade and large industries Alash Ordists lived their golden age.[126] Most of them were recruited to key positions in Kazakhstan. Some of them were also recruited to the administrative structure of Kazakhstan. Alash Ordists overwhelmingly served their soviet republic on the cultural base. However, their influence weakened in time. During the collectivization period, some of the members of Alash Orda liquidated. Their total liquidation from the Kazakh political life was completed at the end of 1930's by the great purges of Stalin.[127]

3.2. Nation Building Process in the Soviet Kazakhstan

So far the pre-Soviet heritage of Kazakh society has been highlighted. In this part, I will emphasize nationality policies in the Soviet Kazakhstan.

3.2.1. Nationality Policies under the NEP Era 1921-27

As soon as Alash Ordist participation had ended, the autonomous republic of the Kazakhs was established in 1920. Kazakhstan was upgraded as a union republic in

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[125] Gürbüz: 2007: 132-144.

[126] Ellis, Elisabeth Gaynor and Anthony Esler,(2007). *Revolution and Civil War in Russia, World History; The Modern Era*. Boston, Pearson Prentice Hall, p.483.

[127] Gürbüz 2007: 3.

1936.[128] Nativization campaign called ''*Korenizatsiia*'' started in the initial years of the Lenin era, and it covered the years of NEP period. Keeping their promises of the Bolsheviks, Kazakh language was declared official language of the republic. Leaders of the Alash Orda movement were overwhelming appointed to the cultural fields. They also took position in administrative units of the State.[129]

One of the striking debates considering the initial years of the Soviet state is demarcation of boundaries, as it was underlined in the second chapter. Briefly, western scholars like Pipes, Benningsen, d'Encausse and Roy generally claim that the borders particularly in Central Asia were drawn in order to prevent the unification of Turkic Muslim tribes.[130] However, there were already some differences among tribes. According to Gürbüz, not only Bolsheviks but also local elites had not pre-determined a decisive political agenda in terms of demarcation of the boundaries. There are different ideas among Bolsheviks and local elites. Furthermore, Bolsheviks did not have sufficient power to control and to force the local elites for their agenda. Therefore, the boundaries were established in the process of bargaining by Bolsheviks with local elites.[131]

Stalin, as the general secretariat of the Bolshevik Party, used his bureaucratic position in the party and captured the power in 1924. He legitimized his rule by giving reference to Lenin. Therefore, affirmative action policies and democratic political

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[128] Pauline Jones Luong, (2002). *Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia:Power, Perceptions, and Pacts*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, p.92.

[129] Gürbüz 2007: 74-131.

[130] d'Encausse 1995: 22.

[131] Gürbüz 2007: 277-302.

atmosphere of the Soviet Union gradually disappeared. The working process of the soviets (in the local language *kurultay*) was paralyzed by the interventions of the center. Newly emerged bureaucracy in the institutions consolidated. What Stalin did after having gained power was to worsen and spread bureaucratic state structure to the institutions of the Soviet Union. Eradication of Alash Orda movement might be explained in this context. Stalin was always suspicious of non-Russian elites most of whom participated in Bolsheviks after the October revolution. That's why Stalin stopped the democratic process of *kurultays* and controlled the Kazakh Autonomous Republic by the loyal cadres which were appointed from the center.[132]

3.2.2. Collectivization or Liquidation of Nomadic life in Kazakhstan

Stalin decided that the new economic policy was insufficient to increase the industrialization process. Therefore, he ordered to shift collectivization without comprehensible planning and the consequences of the collectivization were disastrous. To illustrate, settled peasants were pressured to collectivize and nomadic Kazakhs were forced to settle and to join the collective farms.[133] Results of the collectivization were failure. Many nomads killed their own animals rather than giving them to the State. Cattle numbers in Kazakhstan dropped from 36000 to 5000 in the initial years of collectivization. Similarly, wheat production decreased dramatically. Pre-collectivization

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[132] Ibid.

[133] M. Rywkin, (2000). *Moscow's Muslim Challenge,* the USA, M. E. Sharpe, Inc, p.45.

sized herds were restored only in the Khrushchev era.[134].Most of Kazakhs fled to China and most of them died in the pre-mentioned chaos.

The result was that the Kazakhs lost approximately 1.5 million of its population. According to Kazakh scholars Tatimov, Kozybaev and Abylkhozhin, collectivization in the years between 1929 and 1933 resulted in the death of 2.3 million Kazaks. Indeed, the incredible loss of Kazakh population can be obviously sought by the data of the Soviet census. They show that the Kazakh population had dropped sharply from 3.6 million (3,637,612) in 1926 to 2.1 million (2, 181520) in 1937.[135] The data of the 1937 census also include the Kazakh population who fled from forced collectivization, which is approximately equal to 65o, 000 people.[136]

Through neglecting of life loss, the collectivization policies achieved of its aims. In 1929 there were only 7.4 per cent of Kazakhs who had been sedentarized. However, the number of Kazakhs settled in collective farms reached 95 per cent by 1933.[137]

The collectivization policies were implemented by Filip I. Goloshchekin who is a Ukrainian Jew appointed as the first secretary of Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1925 by Stalin. The perception of Goloshchekin and Stalin recognized no difference between the *kulaks* (rich peasants) and *bai* (rich nomads who owned large number of livestock). Therefore, anti-kulak campaign which is implemented in the same period in Ukraine was duplicated to Kazakhstan in order to abolish the nomadic life.

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[134] Rywkin 2000. 46-47.

[135] Dave 2007: 56.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Dave 2007: 55.

This should be one of the reasons of the traumas of collectivization. Indeed, as Baitursunov states, the nomadic life of Kazakhs was more close than the sedentary nations, because the hierarchies among the nomads were not strict and well organized compared to the sedentary nations. In other words, there was not a bigger difference between an ordinary nomad and a *bai* compared to the difference between an ordinary peasant and a *kulak*.[138]

Despite the tragedic shift of the economic system, it seems that scattered uprisings did not occur in a systematic way. As I have pointed out in the second chapter, this might be the success of Stalin who suppressed the opposition with a detailed plan, rather than prepare the society for collectivization.

Stalin's centrist policies which took into account nationality question finally resulted with deportation of the nations. Volga Germans were particularly deported to the Kazakhstan in 1941. Stalin was conscious about the collaboration of Volga Germans with Nazis. That's why the deportation of Volga Germans can be labeled as preventive deportation, as it was stated in the first chapter.[139] The period of Stalin can be evaluated a total deviation of self determination right principle of Lenin. As for Kazakhstan case, nationalist movement Alash Orda were totally eliminated at the end of the great purges of Stalin, and the ethnic structure of the Kazakhstan began to change by the new comer nations which were the victims of the deportation.

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[138] Dave 2007: 55.

[139] Isabelle Kreindler 1986: 387- 405.

3.2.3. Virgin Land Campaign and Nationality Policies in the Period of Khrushchev

Concerning the nationality issues, Khrushchev changed the balance of ethnic structure in Kazakhstan. Khrushchev period also can be identified as a relaxation from the autocratic Soviet regime under the cult of Stalin. Khrushchev made public most of Stalin's crimes to the Communist party members which shocked the communist elites. As Khrushchev told, the communist party under the Stalin rule used the press, radio, literature, art, music, the cinema and theater as a sharp ideological weapon of the party.[140]

During the destalinization campaign of Khrushchev, most of the intellectuals, poets, artists who had been previously banned were rehabilitated. After Stalin's death, prominent Soviet writers found the chance to criticize the bureaucratic corruption, sincerity and the tensions between generations.[141]

The important event which changed the balance of ethnic population and which would affect the nation building process of Kazakhstan, was the Virgin land Campaign of Khrushchev. As Martha Olcott points out, the Virgin Land Campaign affected the Kazakhs more than any other Soviet policy decision, with the possible exception of collectivization.[142] Khrushchev wanted to use northern Kazakh steppes and Siberia for the grain production. By the way, the name of the campaign reveals the Moscow centric

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[140] Ronald Grigor Suny, (1998). *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States,* New York, Oxford University Press.

[141] Suny 1998: 405.

[142] Olcott 1995: 224.

view of Soviet government to the Kazakh lands. In other words, Kazakhs had used these lands as pasturelands for generations, therefore they were not virgin for centuries, but the perception of the modernist center was not open to assert events on multi dimensional perspective.

More than 6 million Russians and Ukrainians were sent as farmers. Giant state capital was expended to produce grains with the aim of becoming independent in the global market in terms of grain cultivation. However, limited initial success was followed by serious erosion as the thin layer of fertile soil began to vanish.[143] Most of the Slavic population settled down in the northern parts of Kazakhstan and became the majority not only in the northern parts, but also in the whole Kazakhstan.

Regarding the language policy, Khrushchev made educational reforms to elevate the knowledge of Russian language among non-Russians.[144] In the second chapter, we have mentioned that affirmative action policies were to be totally abolished in the middle of the 1930s. By 1938, Russian received the obligatory second language status. By 1959, the Soviet education law granted parents the freedom to choose the language of instruction of their children. In other words, it was not obligatory for non-Russian parents to send their children to the native-medium schools anymore.[145]

Khrushchev also allowed Russians in non-Russian republics who did not wish to study the local language the choice of not to. At this point Suny claims that a double

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[143] Rwykin 2000: 46.

[144] Suny 1998: 410.

[145] John Glenn 1999:83.

standard for language learning was enforced: everyone had to learn some Russian as a second language, but non-Russian speakers were not obliged to learn another Soviet language, even if they lived in a non-Russian republic.[146]

The language reforms and elevation of Russian language most probably had the deepest influence in Kazakhstan among Soviet Republics. Most of the Kazakhs sent their children to Russian medium schools in order to get better career opportunities. Hence, Kazakh language started to disappear even in the daily life of the Kazakhs. Indeed, Kazakh's influence had already been decreasing after the end of *Korenizatsiia* (nativization) by the mid 1930s. Higher education in Kazakhstan was completely in Russian and no emphasis was placed upon learning Kazakh.[147]

The division of Kazakh society was consolidated in Khrushchev era. For educated Russian-speaking Kazakhs, Kazakh became a kind of backward rural language. The hostility between rural migrants and educated Kazakhs when they encountered in the urban places could be witnessed even in 1940s. Joma Nazpary also draws attention to the hostility between rural and urban Kazakhs in his work.[148] Kazakh nationalists of today's independent Kazakhstan also humiliate Russian speaking Kazakhs, by giving reference to Chingiz Aitmatov, as ''Mankurts''. Aitmatov states the term in his popular novel ''The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years'' Briefly, in one part of the novel a Kazakh mother is searching for her captive son. When she finally accomplishes to find

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[146] Suny 1998: 410.

[147] Dave 2007: 65.

[148] See for example, Joma Nazpary, (2002). *Post-Soviet Chaos: Violence and Dispossession in Kazakhstan,* London. Pluto Press.

her son it is too late. Her son has already lost his memory as a result of torture by the enemy nomadic Chinese tribe, Juan Juans.[149]

> Mankurt is a widely used metaphor to convey the loss of ethnic identity and native language, and has become synonymous with being russified. It refers to a mythical character in the novel by Chingiz Aitmatov who could not remember his ancestry, cringed at efforts made to activate his memory, and preferred a passive, secure existence devoid of any painful memories. Seidembekov used the term mankurizatsiia to denote a de-ethnicization, cultural amnesia, the loss of group solidarity symbolized by the Kazakh aul, the demise of the rich oral tradition of the nomads, and above all, the erasure of genealogy and memory which were central to a nomadic identity.[150]

3.2.4. The Rising Status of Kazakhs under the Brezhnev-Kunaev Period

The new leadership under Leonid Brezhnev reversed some of radical reforms of Khrushchev. Destalinization campaign slowly downed and cadre rotation policy in the republics of Khrushchev was abolished. On the contrary, ''stability of cadres'' policies was imposed in the Soviet Republics[151].

Brezhnev is an affiliated figure in the country for the Kazakhstan case. He served as a first secretary of Kazakhstan SSR in 1955-56. Therefore, he knows the loyal cadres in Kazakhstan in detail. DinMukhamed A. Kunaev was one of the trusted political figures for Brezhnev. Hence, he was appointed as the first secretary of Kazakhstan, and Kunaev worked 22 years covering the whole period of Brezhnev. Soon after, Kunaev's personal link to Brezhnev led him to control the communist party apparatus of Kazakhstan. As a result of Kunaev's close relations with Brezhnev, Brezhnev allowed

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[149] Chingiz Aitmatov, (1998). *The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.

[150] Dave 2007: 51.

[151] Suny 1998: 422.

him to be selected to politburo by 1971.[152] Hence, Kunaev achieved the status of first Muslim in the Politburo. During his long period in power, Kunaev also managed to construct a clientalist network which is overwhelmingly dominated by loyal Kazakhs.

Coming from Elder horde origin, Kunaev also protected the people from Great Horde, and recruited them in the administrative structures. Patron-client relationship which emerged in the Brezhnev era constructed a kind of hierarchical web which led the elites to gain benefits. In other words, Kunaev was bound to Moscow-Brezhnev, and loyal Southern Kazakhs of a different range of strata were bound to Kunaev and his close bureaucratic web.[153]

> The fortuitous location of the capital Almaty in the Kazak dominated south and the territory of the Elder Horde had already created propitious conditions for Southern Kazaks to gain access to major positions in the party and administrative structure in the capital. Furthermore, even in practical terms, it was easier for a southerner to obtain higher education or employment, and consequently a residence permit in Almaty, than for a Kazak from more distant regions.[154]

Martha Brill Olcott reveals the increase of Kazakh participation in government. In 1964, only 33 percent of the members of the Council of Ministers were Kazakh whereas in 1981 60 percent of the posts were dominated by Kazakhs. In the period of Kunaev, Kazakhs were occupying most of the key posts such ministers of heavy industry, agriculture, and construction. Under Kunaev rule, someone from the Kazakh origin also appointed as head of the KGB.[155]

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[152] Dave 2007: 84.

[153] Dave 2007: 86.

[154] Ibid.

[155] Olcott 1995: 244.

Indeed, Kazakhs' participation in the administrative structure should not be exaggerated. Kunaev worked well with Russians and, as Olcott points out, he rewarded them, but not at the expanse of the careers of his co-nationals. The daily life of Kazakhstan was dominated with Russian language and although Kazakhs were being appointed in state structure, the power of Kazakhs was decreasing day by day. Most of urban Kazaks forgot even the grammatical structure of their native language. As for the economy of Kazakhstan, rather than livestock-breeding economy and rising influence of ethnic Kazakhs in the State structure, the rest of economy was overwhelmingly controlled by ethnic Russians. Kazakhs were rarely recruited in cereal crop production, metallurgy, and industry.[156]

3.2.5. December Incidents of 1986: *Zheltoqsan*

When Gorbachev took over the Soviet power, he recognized that economic stagnation, corruption, bribery and all kinds of inefficiency were consolidated in the Soviet republics. Therefore, Gorbachev thought of reforming the Soviet Union with the policies of Glasnost and Perestroika. The attempts with the Glasnost are to raise the socialist democracy and lessen the influence of consolidated bureaucracy among Soviet Republics. As for the resolution of economic inefficiency, the NEP era economic policies of Lenin were put as a proper way of to solve economic problems of the Soviets. Therefore, Gorbachev attempted to change the corrupted state elites in the Soviet Republics. The events or riots in Almaty were triggered with the replacement of Kunaev with Kolbin, who had a Russian ethnic origin.[157]

Zheltoqsan means ''December'' in Kazakh and represents the events of 17 December 1986. The supporters of Kunaev gathered in the streets of Almaty the day

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[156] Olcott 1995: 242.

[157] Reuel R. Hanks 2005: 179-180.

after the official declaration of the replacement. The protestors were overwhelmingly university students asking why a foreigner who does not know Kazakhstan is appointed to the head of the state. Ethnic mottos also were heard among the demonstrators such as ''Kazakhstan is the country of Kazakhs'', ''One rule the Kazakhstan must be Kazak'', ''Kolbin go back to the Russia'', ''Stop the dictatorship''[158]

The army forces suppressed the protestors violently. Official accounts reported two deaths and 2,400 arrests, of which only 99 were brought to trial, with two young Kazakhs sentenced to death for their participation in the riot.[159] However, the reality is estimated to be far more than the official declarations. Speculations in public assert that at least tens of people died in the riot. Furthermore, fifty-eight participants may have been executed in subsequent months.[160] Indeed, the exact number of the victims is still unknown. The details of the case have never been made in public.[161]

Zheltoqsan turned into a myth in the nation building process of Post-Soviet Kazakhstan. A nationalist organization inspired by December events took the name Zheltoqsan to identify itself. Zheltoqsan also found the place of the tragedies of Kazakh society such as liquidation of Alash Ordists, forced collectivization, famines; virgin land campaign…Tragedies became a good tool for the nation-building at the same time because it increases the power of nationalism. Taking into account the Kazakhstan case some of the scholars claims that Zheltoqsan engendered the ethnic revival of the

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[158] Saray 2004: 188.

[159] Olcott 1995: 252.

[160] Olcott 1995: 253.

[161] Azamat Sersembayev, (1999). Imagined Communities: Kazak Nationalism and the Kazakification in 1990s, *Central Asian Survey*, vol.18, No.3, pp.319-346.

Kazakhs. However, counter arguments claim that Zheltoqsan, was instrumental for uprising of Kunaev supporters wanting to continue the status quo which is beneficial for them. However, what is certain is that Zheltoqsan whether it includes more or less nationalistic aims; it is the prominent tool for the Nation-building process. This can be witnessed by the Nazarbaev's position in the events. Bhavna Dave claims that Nazarbaev had distanced himself from Kunaev during the 1986 protests for his own political survival and to secure Gorbachev's patronage. However, after the independence he emphasized the importance of the events on his speeches, and he claimed that he supported the incidents in 1986.[162]

To be brief, what can be seen from the Soviet experiment is that nomadic Kazakhs modernized under the Soviet rule. However, modernization engendered Russian hegemony particularly taking into account the language issue. Indeed, the need of interethnic language among Soviet people naturally raised the influence of Russian. Nonetheless, the Soviet style state building process which was stated as ''socialist in content nationalist in form'' also opens to use local languages on every dimension of official and daily life of Soviet citizens.

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[162] Dave 2007: 90.

CHAPTER 4

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF NATION BUILDING

STRUCTURE OF POST-SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN

In the previous chapters, the Soviet style nationality policies in Kazakhstan were examined. Soviet Heritage was significant in order to understand post-Soviet nationality policies which are labeled prevailingly as "Nation Building" in the literature. Some western scholars conceptualize the Soviet heritage as a negative impact taking into account the nation building process. According to these approaches the Soviet Union simply paralyzed and terminated the nation building and nationalizing process of various ethnic groups and nations. Therefore, the new independent republics were born out of their ashes. In contrast to these kind of ''Negative Impact'' arguments I claim that there is a strong continuum between Soviet era and Post Soviet era regarding nationality policies. In other words, the nation building process which was already started in the Soviet period with the socialistic content continued in the post Soviet period within a different content. Particularly for Kazakhstan even the Soviet template was not changed with the exception of enhancing hegemony of the titular nation, Kazakhs. Hence, the basic alteration point is the transformation of *first among equals*. After analyzing the theoretical nation building aspects, the post-Soviet nation building structure of Kazakhstan will be examined.

4.1. Nation Building Theory

The nation building concept became popular in 1950s and 1960s. It was very important for the security and development issues of the third world countries and

strongly related with their target of western modernization.[163] Nation building concept primarily describes the consolidation of modern nation state which is distinct from the various forms of traditional states such as medieval feudal, dynastic, church states and empires.[164] The concept is rarely connected with the emergence of western nations since they are conceived as the communities who had already achieved to become ''nation''. Indeed, the static priori of ''completed nation'' concept for western countries is problematic and contested with the counter argument that nation building even in western countries is a dynamic process and reproduces itself in everyday life.[165] In this context, the orientalist perception of nation building concept can be widespread seen among western scholars.

Modernization theories, both its Marxist and liberal variants, put forth western template for underdeveloped countries in order to reach western developmental level. Needless to say dependency and world system theories are radical reactions against to the modernization theories which present prerequisite cut of core and periphery in order to reach the development. Beyond the scope of development theories the link between nation-state and capitalism serves explanatory ideas to understand the importance of nation building in the modern era.

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[163] Jochen Hippler, (2007). "Ulus İnşası Konseptleri ve Teorik Yönleri 1. Şiddetli Anlaşmazlıklar, Anlaşmazlıklardan Kaçınma ve Ulus İnşası: Terminoloji ve Politik Konseptler", In Jochen Hipler , (Ed.) *Ulus İnşası*, pp.5-21, İstanbul., Versus Kitap.

[164] Pal Kolsto, (1999)." Nation Building and Social Integration Theory", In Pal Kolsto, (Ed.) *Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An Investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan,* pp.44-62, Colorado, Westview Press.

[165] Kuzio 2001: 135-154.

Ellen Meiksins Wood claims that the distinction between economy and politics which is unique for capitalist mode of production necessitates nation states for integration to global capitalism. Therefore, nation states as extra economical actors of capitalism are indispensable for dissemination and sustention of capitalist relations.[166] At this point, state building, nation building and economic integration are significant factors of transition from pre-capitalist relations to capitalist mode of production. Indeed, these factors are key elements of the transition of Post-Soviet countries as well. The nation building concept which began to be forgotten in the late 1970s rose again with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

As Pal Kolsto also emphasizes in 1970s, debates on Nation building took a new turn taking into account nation building or nation destroying approaches. As for Walker Connor's nation destruction argument, he claims that the nation building literature was dominated with various kinds of antagonistic social cleavages but completely ignored ethnic diversity. Connor claims that only 9 per cent of states in the world could be regarded as ethnically homogeneous. In other words, nation building meant assimilation into larger society and eradication of ethnic peculiarities.[167]

Another striking argument of Connor about nation building is the critique of active engineering in nation building. Connor believes that active social engineering in nation building is very often counterproductive because produces ethnic revivalism. In this sense complete assimilation of ethnic minorities had largely failed all around the world even in the consummate nation building of Western Europe and most of the time resulted

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[166] Ellen Meiksins Wood, (2003). *Sermaye İmparatorluğu*, Ankara, Epos Yayınları, p.18.

[167] Kolsto 1999: 46.

with ethnic backlashes. Wayne Norman seeks an alternative of nation building in the similar vein with Connor.

> If the centralist nation-building project is designed to assimilate national minorities, there are in fact very good grounds for thinking that it is likely to be counterproductive: it will fuel a minority nationalist project that is much more likely to be appealing to members of the national minority. Weinstock (1999) has suggested we look elsewhere for a basis for solidarity within multinational, divided societies: rather than looking to promote a common identity, we should look instead for policies and institutional arrangements that will inspire trust between the communities. In other words, trust building might be an alternative to nation building, at least for majority nationalists trying to hold together their multinational state.[168]

As for essence of ''nation'' concepts, Connors' arguments can be considered as a starting point in terms of nationalism theories. Connor asserts that nation is the ultimate extended family. With this regard a common origin of the members of a nation hardly is proven. Although a nation is very frequently established with diverse ethnic sources, the belief in one common genetic origin is considered by the members of the nation. The belief in a common genetic origin can usually be shown to be pure myth. Nevertheless, adherence to this myth has remained a prerequisite for every nation.[169]

As Pal Kolsto points out Connor's understanding of nation later developed in two different ways as modernist approach and ethno-symbolist approach.[170] Indeed, primordialist approach can be added to these two interpretations of nation concept although it has very limited plausibility in the academic world.[171] Key thinkers of

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[168] Wayne Norman, (2006). *Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-Building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State,* New York, Oxford University Press, p.69.

[169] Connor Walker, (1994). *Ethnonationalism. The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, p.92-94.

[170] Kolsto 1999: 46.

[171] Özkırımlı 2008: 81.

Modernist approach, Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Erich Hobsbawm, Tom Nairn are united under the argument that nations and nationalism are product of modernization process and therefore, they are the gifts of the recent history. According to this argument, simply, nationalism creates nations or nations do not create nationalism. Ethno-Symbolists are united under the emphasis on the ethnic origins of nations. As for primordialists, they saw the nations simply as natural phenomenon which stem from antiquity.[172] In this context, it will be good idea to mention the basic arguments of nationalism theoreticians.

One of the important nationalism theoreticians Benedict Anderson defines modern nations as ''imagined communities''. He emphasizes the role of print capitalism as a trigger effect of the perception change of the world. According to Anderson nations are imagined political communities, and they have limits and sovereign features.[173] They are limited because every nation has some living space and boundaries. They are sovereign because they born on the era of enlightenment that destroyed the legitimization of dynasties and finally no matter whether they have inequalities and exploitative relations, the nation is perceived with deep feeling of camaraderie and fellowship among their members.[174]

Anderson also differentiates himself from the other key modernist nationalism theoreticians, Gellner and Hobsbawn. The imagination concept of Anderson goes beyond the arguments of invention and fabrication. The nation should not be merely

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[172] Özkırımlı 2008: 81-82.

[173] Benedict Anderson, (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, , London, Verso Press, p.6.

[174] Özkırımlı 2008: 182.

defined as false consciousness of invention and fabrication owing to the arguments of Gellner and Hobsbawm.[175]

Eric J. Hobsbawm considers nations and nationalism as a product of social engineering and emphasizes artificiality and invention features.[176]As for Hobsbawm national consciousness is prevalent and concrete example of invented traditions. Nations emerged along with the increase of political movements at the end of 19th century. Indeed, executive elites invented the concept of nation against to the threat of people who wanted to participate in political life in mass democracies. In other words, mass political movements of 19th centuries forced the elites to control the masses instrumentally by inventing nations.[177]

Hobsbawm highlights the link between territorial and institutional dimensions of nations, in other words, territorial-state dimension. State elites most of the time create new traditions, new histories which is compatible with their political agendas. Hence, as it was stated before, Hobsbawm cites nationalism creates nations, not the reverse.[178]

Hobsbawm's main criticism on Gellner's work is that Gellner's top down modernization model does not enough pay attention to the evaluations from bottom movements or masses. Hobsbawm claims that although his arguments are also essentially constructed on the top of elite perspectives, it is necessary to analyze the feelings, hopes, needs of ordinary people in order to understand nation and nationalism.

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[175] Anderson 1991: 6.

[176] Eric J. Hobsbawm, (2006). *Milletler ve Milliyetçilik: Program, Mit ve Gerçeklik*, İstanbul, Ayrıntı Yayınları, p.24.

[177] Özkırımlı 2008: 148.

[178] Hobsbawm 2006: 24.

Gellner's neglect of ordinary people's emotions, feelings, closes the path to figure out nations and nationalism properly.[179]

Similarly to Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner defines nationalism as a modern phenomenon. Gellner simply constructs a strict distinction between modern and pre-modern societies.[180] He further emphasizes that nations are emerged under the unification of one superior culture with the rise of modern state. Hence, modern state supports the selected culture by standardizing language and education system. In other words, the superior culture in the modern era is sovereign and identifies the society consistently with paradigms of superior culture.[181] In this context, as Gellner points out, modern man does not devote loyalty to kings, territories or beliefs anymore, instead s/he shows loyalty to the one superior culture.[182]

Gellner highlights the significance of industrialization as a dynamic force of modernization.[183] Industrialization necessitates division of labor or specialization. These, complicated working structure of industrial society requires a central organism which controls the society with the above mentioned instruments of standard education and language. In other words, state building requires nation building or creation of nations. What can be deducted from Gellner's theory is that industrialization is the trigger force of consolidation of modern state and nations.

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[179] Hobsbawm 2006: 25.

[180] Özkırımlı 2008: 164.

[181] Özkırımlı 2008: 165.

[182] Ernest Gellner, (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Blackwell, p.36.

[183] Gellner 1983: 57.

Gellner's nationalism theory is mainly criticized as being extremely functionalist regarding the over highlights to the role of industrialization. As Özkırımlı highlights, Gellner explains nationalism as a mandatory element for industrialization. With this regard, Gellner's arguments are problematic in terms of rise of national consciousness and nationalism of non-industrial societies. For instance, Gellner's nationalism theory could not explain the rise of Balkan nationalism at the end of 19th century.[184]

Another important criticism of Gellner is that Gellner could not adequately explain the nationalist passions. Indeed, not also ethno-culturalists but also modernists share this criticism. Gellner is most of the time accused of becoming cultural and materialist reductionist since he omits the magic and passion of nations and nationalism.[185]

At this point Anthony D. Smith's arguments are significant. Rather than modernist and primordial conceptualization of nation, Smith opens a third path in the literature, albeit his arguments are more close to the primordialist understanding of nations. The main thesis of Smith is that modern nationalism cannot be understood by disregarding past ethnic societies and affiliations. In the formulation of most of the national societies, ethnic components can be encountered. That's why; the emergence of nation should be analyzed in a long period time which involves centuries.[186]

> While agreeing with the modernists that nations as we know them are recent phenomena, Smith insisted that they have a long prehistory, evolving out of ethnic cores of the conglomerate of ethnic groups existing in earlier ages,

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[184] Özkırımlı 2008: 176.

[185] Hobsbawm 2000: 25.

[186] Özkırımlı 2008: 218.

some developed into would-be nations aspiring for nationhood and a state of their own, with a few eventually acquiring it.[187]

Smith highlights myths, symbols, memories and common ancestry of ethnic communities. His claim is that these features exist both in modern and pre-modern times. What modern nationalism did is the change of interpretation of pre-modern existing features of ethnic communities.[188] In this context, ethnic identity, even if it suffers under imposition of the radical alterations, still ménages to survive. In other words, ethnic identity is so powerful to adapt new radical circumstances.[189] Ethnic identity, cultural past is *sine qua non* to ensure national unity, to cherish and legitimize nation. Therefore, national unity is established via myths and symbols of one particular identity.[190]

Despite the fact that a lot of criticisms have been reviewed for Smith in terms of his over emphasis on ethnic core and the sustainability of ethnic identity arguments, he retains the term nation building introduced by earlier, modernist school of thought. Consistently, his neoprimordialist conceptualization of nation, cultural, symbolic myth making aspects of nation building were revived and came forth in the literature.[191]

4.2. Items and Tools of Nation Building

So far, the emergence and main lines of nation building concept taking into account nation and nationalism theories has been explained. In this context, Jochen Hippler's ranking of three basic components of nation building widely open doors to

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[187] Kolsto 1999: 47.

[188] Anthony D.Smith, (1986). *The ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, Basil, Blackwell.

[189] Özkırımlı 2008: 220.

[190] Özkırımlı 2008: 222.

[191] See Kolsto 1999: 47 and Usta: 2007: 5-8.

understand the concept. As for Hippler, a successful nation building includes three components. These are: ''Pervasive and uniting ideology, social integration, functioning state apparatus''[192]

Nation building necessitates an integrative ideology to mobilize all the layers of a society. This ideology aims to create or consolidate a nation as a prerequisite part of the ideology. The structure of the ideology could be inclusive or exclusive, in other words, more civic or more ethnic; there is no necessity for an ideology to remain purely national. The structure of ''socialist in content national in form'' Soviet nation building process is a good example for this. At this point the important thing for the success of the ideology is the integration capacity of transiting sub national identities into the national ones. Indeed, sub national loyalties cannot easily break the stability unless they jump into the prominence in front of national identity.[193] Thinking through Kazakhstan case, horde fragmentations are embedded into the Kazakh national identity. Horde fragmentations, for instance, are not problems unless they begin to play active role with regard to social economic aspects of the country. Furthermore, national fragmentations should not be a problem in a multinational state. The one can identify himself/herself from middle horde, Kazakh of a Kazakhstani citizen of Kazakhstan.

Second prerequisite of a successful nation building is social integration. Sub national identities must be convinced to feel as a member of a particular national identity. Hence, communication is important in this conviction process. Mass media plays key role with the integration of the societies under a national identity. Economic

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[192] Hippler 2007: 12.

[193] Hippler 2007:13.

and transportation infrastructure are also prerequisite for social integration of nation building process. Briefly, physical and economic conditions must be supported with mass media for social integration.[194]

The third item of the nation building is functioning state apparatus in a particular territory. State building, as I emphasized earlier, is essential core of a successful nation building process. State building depends on a functioning financial system, nationwide organized police organization and law system, and organization of administrative institutions. State also should maintain monopoly of force in order to guarantee its sovereign position in a particular territory of nationhood.

State Institutions and political leaders use different kind of tools in order to reach a pre-determined national consciousness. This could be emerged both in a liberal or non-liberal way. Moreover, it can vary from country to country and from time to time. Nevertheless, still common governmental tools to mould national identity can be found as Norman asserts.[195] Official language policy is the most important tool of the governments. At the same time, it reveals the liberal or non-liberal dimension of nation building policies. Citizenship rules, core curriculum in schools, compulsory military service are other important tools which determine the shape of nation building as well. In this sense, the compulsory military service operates like a school for patriotism. Curriculum of the schools transmits national consciousness together with its inclusive or exclusive character to the younger generations. The reactions of the ruling elites to the immigrants are also strongly linked with the nature of nation building. Furthermore,

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[194] Hippler 2007: 14.

[195] Norman 2006: 45.

Mythologizing about patriotic wars; adapting national symbols and holidays; renaming streets, towns, buildings and geographical features, and control of national media; promotion of sports in international competitions embody national identity and consciousness and reproduce them in everyday life[196] In the chapter 4, nation building policies of Post-Soviet Kazakhstan are elaborated in detail taking into account the nation building tools mentioned above. Before the shift on the fifth chapter, the structure of nation building process of Kazakhstan should be mentioned on theoretical dimension.

4.3. Nation Building Structure of Post-Soviet Kazakhstan

In this part of the chapter, we will attempt to explore basic features and the model of nation building in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan.

4.3.1. The Impact of Soviet Heritage

In the previous chapters, formation of Soviet Nationality policies and it's implementations in the Soviet Kazakhstan were reviewed. Before examining the details of Nation Building model of Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, I would like to argue the details of strong continuity between Soviet era and post-Soviet era taking into account of Nationality policies of Kazakhstan. Simply, increasing status of the titular nations at the expense of Russians is specific not only in Kazakhstan but also all around the post-Soviet space. Therefore, rising nationalism of titular nations engendered with rising ethnic tensions in the region. As for Kazakhstan case, initial ethno nationalist policies were converted to more liberal nationality policies in the second half of the 1990s. Likewise, the pressure of European Union to the Baltic countries resulted with

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[196] Norman 2006: 46-47.

attenuation of ethno-nationalist policies and advances the rights of Russian minorities in the Baltic States. Despite the fact that the attenuation of ethnic oriented nationalisms occurred by reason of external and internal dynamics, both in the Baltic and Central Asia the ethnic tensions did not result with bloody ethnic conflicts. In this context, it would be better to look at Soviet past and identify points of ethnic tension which still deeply affect the post-Soviet period.

As Roger Brubaker points out the Soviet Union used two models of nation building which are defined as "Territorial-Political and Ethno cultural-Personal models". The two models are indeed incongruent and embedded disintegrative aspects.[197] Particularly, ethno cultural institutionalization of nationhood consolidated nationalism in contrast to the modernist-Bolsheviks expectations.[198]

> Institutionalized definitions of nationhood, I argue, not only played a major role in the disintegration of the Soviet state, but continue to shape and structure the national question in the incipient successor states[199]

The Soviet Union codified national identity of each citizen, and created ethno-national base administrative units. From autonomous republics to the autonomous oblasts each nation is linked with a certain territory. Indeed, this type of social engineering necessitates primordialist conceptualization of nation concept. The national consciousness was developed only in the Baltic States at the beginning of 20th century. As for Central Asia and Caucasus the national consciousness newly began to develop with the attempt of limited number of national intellectuals. For instance, Alash Ordists

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[197] Brubaker 1994: 47-78.

[198] Ibid.

[199] Ibid.

in Kazakhstan was far behind to become a mass movement at the beginning of the 20th century. Hence in some cases, Soviet Union even converted some ethnic groups to the nation that most probably did not achieve to develop as a nation in the natural progress of history. Briefly, in contrast to cold war arguments of '' prison of nations'' Soviet Union did not only allow the use of mother tongue, national education and cultural rights. In some cases, invented and in most cases consolidated infant nations.[200]

Institutional codification of nations provides privileges in the border of titular nations. Positive discrimination policies are implemented to the native people in variety of spheres of life. Particular titular nations are privileged to be appointed to the administrative bases and to be selected to the higher education institutions. However, important disadvantages were waiting the Soviet citizens out of the border of the titular territories. There are not so many gaps to escape from the disadvantages of national identity since it is written to the passports and other bureaucratic documents.

> The practice of fixing nationality in each citizen's internal passport on the basis of parentage rendered an inherently liquid identity into a solid commitment to single ethnocultural group. Young people with parents who had different national designations on their passports were forced to choose one or the other nationality, which then became a claim to inclusion or an invitation to exclusion in a given republic. In some cases people could opportunistically change their nationality officially, or change their names, to ease their situation in the national republics.[201]

A parenthesis should be added concerning the status of Russians in the Soviet Union. Russian was de facto lingua franca of the Soviet Union. That's why Russians

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[200] Martin 2001: 15-20.

[201] Ronald Grigor Suny, (2001). Contemporary Issues in Historical Perspective, Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 73, pp.862-896

enjoyed their privileges both inside and outside of the RSFSR. In other saying Russians have an extra territorial cultural autonomy in the Soviet Union.[202]

> Under the Soviet regime, the public status, linguistic privilege, and cultural facilities enjoyed by Russians throughout the Soviet Union meant that Russians tended to think of the entire Union rather than only the Russian Republic as "their" national territory.[203]

Yuri Slezkine concretizes the status of Russians in the USSR. He describes the Soviet Union as a communal apartment. Inside this apartment every nation of the Soviet Union has their separated flats, but the entrance and hall of the apartment, in other saying, communal parts of the whole apartment are dominated by Russians.[204]

The significant thing in the USSR concerning Nationality policies is the repression of nationalism in the titular nations as well. Nation building, consolidation of nationhood in the titular nations has some limits. Even the titular republics have a lot of rights including the secession from the union. These rights remained as a script of paper. In reality, the autonomous republics were strictly controlled by Moscow. The center did not permit the growth of political nationalism in the autonomous republics. Nationalism, nation building should be constructed "in form''. The content was already reversed for the imposition of the socialist ideology and brotherhood of nations which is embedded to the ideology as well. The ethnic tensions of Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet states strongly related with this above mentioned context. The imposition of political nationalism along with the support of already gained nation building infrastructure of Soviet heritage seriously alienates non-titular nations in the post-Soviet era.

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[202] Brubaker 1994: 47-78.

[203] Ibid.

[204] Slezkine 1994: 414-452.

The Soviet regime, then, deliberately constructed the republics as national polities "belonging" to the nations whose names they bore. At the same time, the Soviets severely limited the domain in which the republics were autonomous. They institutionalized a sense of "ownership" of the republics by ethnocultural nations, but they limited the political consequences of that sense of ownership. Ethno-cultural nations were given their own political territories, but not the power to rule them. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the sense of ethno national entitlement and ownership of national territory persists, but is now joined to substantial powers of rule. Successor state elites can use these powers to "nationalize" their states, to make them more fully the polities of and for ethno-cultural nations whose names they bear. This can do by promoting the language, culture, demographic predominance, economic welfare, and political hegemony of state bearing nation. Such policies and programs of nationalization, oriented to an ethno-cultural nation distinct from the total population or total citizenry of the state, are likely to be politically profitable and in some cases politically irresistible in the new sates, in considerable part because of the institutionalized expectations of "ownership" that the successor states inherited form the Soviet nationality regime.[205]

Brubaker's conceptualization of ''nationalizing states'' is related with the autonomous republics. When Stalin came to the power *koranizatsiia* policies stopped. The regime of Stalin neglected subautonomous ethnic identities. Within this context, assimilation occurred at the expense of nations or ethnic groups that could not gain the autonomous republic status. As for Autonomous SSRs the return of *Korenisatsiia* policies after Stalin era, resulted consolidation of national elites. Brezhnev permitted national communists to remain in the power for many years. Tatar communist party leader Talbaev ruled the country for 20 years. Likewise Kunaev ruled Kazakhstan for 24 years. Both of the leaders built up cohesive Tatar and Kazakh national elites recruited to the administrative status. What can be deduced with the long term native elite power in the ASSRs is that by the last decades of Soviet power nationalities experienced an

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[205] Brubaker 1994: 47-78.

unprecedented degree of local autonomy.[206] Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika policies lifted the pressure of Moscow on the autonomous SSRs and engendered the nationalist expressions to embody under the newly emerged ecological and the other democratic institutions.[207] Simply nationalist movements effectively used the relatively autonomous structure of Glasnost and played an important role on the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Concerning continuum of Soviet heritage in the post-Soviet states "path-dependency" should be stated as an explanatory concept of post-Soviet transition. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, economic and democratic liberalization promoters anticipated a fast transition in post-Soviet countries. However, most of the expectations failed particularly concerning liberal democratization. Neo-liberal policies began to be implemented under authoritarian leaders of the transition states. It is obvious that neo-liberal policies even not compatible with liberal democracies as a result of a rising technocratisation and rising the division of economy and politics. Nevertheless, regarding transition countries, the Soviet institutional heritage still affects the future policies of transition countries. In other words, institutional legacies of the Soviet Union limit the range of current options taking into account of institutional transition of post-Soviet states.[208]

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[206] Ronald Grigor Suny, (2001). Contemporary Issues in Historical Perspective, Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 73, pp.862-896.

[207] Ibid.

[208] Klaus Nielsen, Bob Jessop, and Jerzy Hausner , (1995). "Institutional Change in Post-Socialism", In Jerzy Hausner, Bob Jessop, Klaus Nielsen, (Eds.) *Strategic Choice and Path-Dependency in Post-Socialism: Institutional Dynamics in the Transformation Process,* Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, pp. 3-44, Vermont.

The state socialist developmental path of the Soviet Union was instituted in a particular time and tends to be reemerged in a distorted content in the transition period. At this point, *path dependency* must not to be understood merely institutional determination of past or status quo. Indeed, social and economic alterations have already started in the post-Soviet space within an unexpected return of the past.[209] For instance, as it is stated above, economic liberalization with the neglect of democratic liberalization is one of the concrete examples of path dependency admitting the disputes of even economic liberalization to what extent liberal in the post-Soviet states in comparison with western countries.

Path dependency concept can be seen on the nationality policies as well. For instance, Mainly the Soviet template of nationality policies is seen within a different context in transition countries. As for Kazakhstan taking into account of nationality policies, the distortion of path dependence is not strong. To large extent the Soviet model remained the same. However, this time the path dependence of Soviet nationality policies closes the doors for the implementation of western-liberal multicultural models of nation building.

4.3.2. Oscillations of Post-Soviet Nation Building Models of Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan attracted much attention regarding nationality policies in the post-soviet studies literature. The country has multi ethnic structure that is the home of 140 different ethnic groups, and at the same time as a titular nation, Kazakhs could not passed the 50 per cent ratio of population according to the data of the last Soviet census.

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[209] Ibid.

Before analyzing the details of the nation building policies of Kazakhstan in the next chapter I would like to argue that initially independent Kazakhstan's nationality policies were implemented predominantly with the ethno-nationalist context. The ethno-nationalist nation building policies in favor of ethnic Kazakhs alienated Russians and Russophones along with the paralyzed economic conditions of the country that would be resulted with the massive out migration of Russians. With this regard, Kazakhstani elites soon after realized that strict ethno-nationalist nation building policies are not compatible with Kazakhstan. Hence, in the second half of the 1990s, the elites turned into the former Soviet template. Cultural development of all the ethnic groups and nations has been supported as a state ideology. However, as Soviet era internationalism had a Russian face, post-Soviet Kazakhstani nation building has a Kazakh face.[210] In other words, our main argument is that nation building structure of Kazakhstan oscillates from ethno-nationalist nation building model to more civic-multiethnic one. Initial ethno-nationalist nation building structure was attenuated to more civic one soon after the elites had realized the difficulties of ethno nationalist policies in a multinational and multiethnic state. In this context, I share the arguments of Edward Schatz and Ronald Grigor Suny that more civic nation building policies which are implemented in the last decade still remains the ethno nationalist dimensions in favor of Kazakhs.[211]

4.3.2.1. Ethno-Nationalist Nation Building

After the confusion of the dissolution of the Soviet Union Kazakhstani elites quickly adapted to the new paradigms of the global order. Former communist party

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[210] Suny 2001: 862-896.

[211] See Edward Schatz, (2000). The Politics of Multiple Identities: Lineage and Ethnicity in Kazakhstan, *Europe-Asia Studies,* Vol. 52, No. 3, pp.489-506 and Suny 2001: 862-896.

leader Nazarbayev rose as a national leader. Ethno-nationalist Kazakh way of nation building quickly began to be implemented along with the massive state interventions. Justification of this ethnic policies were simple ''Kazakhs suffered so much with the collectivization and Russification policies of the Soviet State, there must be a compensation period in order to recover the Soviet heritage and revival of Kazakh language and culture must be targeted in the Kazakh's own lands. ''

> Claims made in the name of a 'core nation' or nationality, defined in ethno-cultural terms, and sharply distinguished from the citizenry as a whole. The core nation is understood as the legitimate 'owner' of the state , which is conceived as the state of and for the core nation. Despite having 'its own' state, however, the core nation is conceived as being in a weak cultural, economic or demographic position within the state. This weak position- seen as a legacy of discrimination against the nation before it attained independence-is held to justify the 'remedial' or 'compensatory' project of using state power to promote the specific (and previously inadequately served) interests of the core nation.[212]

Although President Nazarbayev took a more liberal position than the Kazakh nationalists, he never hid his Kazakh nationalist approach to the Nation building. In a major policy statement in 1993 he states that after the bankruptcy of the Soviet Union a new ideology should be found by turning cultural tradition and historical cultural roots. Furthermore, an energetic state intervention required to develop the titular nation.[213] However, at the same time, Nazarbayev's more moderate sentences can be found as a reaction of extremist Kazakh nationalists. The arguments of Kazakh nationalists remind apartheid regimes. As Jonathan Aitken points out, Nazarbayev's more civic position is important to restrain extremist, even in some cases apartheid demands of Kazakh nationalists.

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[212] Brubaker 1994: 47-78.

[213] Suny 2001: 862-896.

Some locally born Members of Parliament tried to create a constitution in which only native Kazakhs would enjoy full political rights. These nationalists proposed amending the constitution to exclude non-Kazakhs from the highest offices including the Presidency and the Chairmanship of the Supreme Council of Ministers. Nazarbayev, whose first appointee to the cabinet as his Prime Minister was an ethnic Russian, Sergei Tereschenko, was horrified. ''I had to decisively repulse such pseudo patriots'', recalled the President. ''Time and again I reminded these Parliamentarians that the constitution we were devising had to unite the people, not divide them on the basis of their nationality.'' [214]

Indeed, the perception of territory linked to ethnicity lies behind the ethno-nationalist understandings of Kazakh nationalists. Without any doubt, as it was mentioned before, this is the reflection of the Soviet heritage. This perception at the same time comprises hazards of emergence of apartheid perceptions of nationality concept. At this point another example is given by Holm-Hansen on the basis of State demography report. State Demography Institution of Kazakhstan conceives the out migration of Russians and Germans as natural process. The institution evaluates that Russians and Germans returned the prosperous Fatherland where they feel ethnically and traditionally more comfortable.[215]

At this point, the vicious circle of ethno-nationalist nation building rises. The out migration of Russsophone society, majority whom was composed of managers and technicians, worsened the economic conditions which were already in crisis. Beyond this point, the already implemented ethno-centric policies did not attract attention of Russian speaking urban Kazakhs. Most important part of Kazakhification of the language remained on discourse. Regarding implementation nothing significant proceeded. At this juncture, concessions from the ethnic nation building began. In order to spread Kazakh

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[214] Jonathan Aitken, (2009). *Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan*, London, Continuum Books 2009, p.119-120.

[215] O demograficheskoi 1996, 58 cited in Holm Hansen 1999: 169.

language the elites began to focus on ethnic Kazakhs rather than endeavoring to assimilate of whole society by Kazakh language.[216]

4.3.2.2. Civic Nation Building, Multiple Reethnification Model and Kazakhs First Among Equals

Edward Schatz attributes the softening of ethno-centric nation building policies to the need of technocrats.[217] The necessity of skillful labor or the recognition of the splitter effects of ethno-nationalist policies, or the other reasons, what is certain is that the post-Soviet nation building process of Kazakhstan transformed more civic policies in content. In fact, this transformation can be labeled as the return to the Soviet model. Coherently with the Soviet model, the cultural developments of all nations living in Kazakhstan are supported by the State.

Holm-Hansen defines this new civic weighted nation building model as multiple reethnification. Consistently with this model ''peoples of Kazakhstan'' (*Kazakhstani narod*) arguments were developed. The historical, cultural, religious values of ethnic groups or nations were represented under the school curriculums. In this context, various heroes of ethnic groups or nations were honored.[218]

The model of multiple reethnification or in other saying peoples of Kazakhstan model of nation building was more advanced than the ethno-nationalist model. However, it is much behind of a civic nation building process which unites the citizens under a

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[216] Schatz 2001: 489-506.

[217] Ibid.

[218] Holm-Hansen 1999: 171-172.

supra-Kazakhstani identity. In fact, this supra unified identity models remind some of western nation building processes. However, it might be efficient to keep in mind that most of western nation building processes followed the ethnic weighted model as well.

Kazakhstani elites, indeed, approach ''peoples of Kazakhstan'' model instrumentally. Atomization of nations with the support of state led ethnification policies paves the way to divide and differentiate the Slavic population from themselves, and by this way, decreasing the Russian hegemony among Slavic minorities are targeted.

> The policy of multiple reethnification does not seek to cleanse the people of solely Kazakh ethnicity. Rather, all ethnic groups, Poles, Koreans, and Germans, etc., are expected to find their ''roots'' irrespective of the time which has passed since their forefathers ceased to speak anything but Russian. In the rivalry between Kazakh and Russophone cultures in Kazakhstan universal reethnification must be regarded as an attack on the cross-ethnic Russophone identity.[219]

Despite the fact that the nation building model of Kazakhstan resembles the Soviet model, the deficiency of ideological glue can be felt. The Soviet model was targeting to reach a super national identity which is called ''Soviet Man''. Indeed, to some extent the Soviet Union achieved the consolidation of this super national identity. In this context, the most significant problem of multi reethnification structure of Kazakhstan's nation building is the lack of super national ideological concept. President Nazarbayev presumably noticed this and put forward the concept of ''*Eurasianism*''. With regard to *Eurasianism* Kazakhstan has been meeting and fusion place for various nations. With the concept of *Eurasianism* the elites endeavor the integration of all ethnic groups and nations, at the first instance Russians and Kazakhs.[220]

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[219] Holm-Hansen 1999: 172.

[220] http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006233761/assembling-a-civic-nation-in-kazakhstan.html

Another argument of the government of Kazakhstan is the attribution to the integrative role of Kazakh culture among various cultures of the multiethnic and multinational structure of the country. As for Kazakh elites learning and speaking of Kazakh is precondition in order to reach and secure the interethnic peace and harmony.[221] In this context, despite the rising civic dimension of the second period of the nation building, we need to say that still the structure of Nation building were not purified from the ethno-nationalist policies. Furthermore, still the aim of the elites is to Kazakhify rather than to Kazakhstanify.[222] Therefore, Kazakh identity has a priority even in the multiple reethnification way of the nation building. In this context, the conceptualization of the Soviet heritage which embodies on the motto of *Russians First among Equals* has been converted to *Kazakhs First among Equals* in the Post Soviet era.

> The Kazakh state was imagined as a caring kind mother; Kazakhs were envisioned as a generous, hospitable people who opened their arms to other peoples. Kazakhstan, then were the first among equals was a place where many nationalities could coexist[223]

Likewise, Edward Schatz points out the Kazakh face of the civic dimensional nation building process. On the other hand, Schatz claims that rising Kazakh nationalism induced the revival of subnational affiliations. In fact, this is a paradox because Kazakh nationalism strengthens the subethnic identities, regional differentiations, -concretely the division of three hordes, *zhuzes*, that are structurally embedded to itself.[224]

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[221] http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006233761/assembling-a-civic-nation-in-kazakhstan.html

[222] http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006233761/assembling-a-civic-nation-in-kazakhstan.html

[223] Suny 2001: 862-896.

[224] Edward Schatz, (2004). *Modern Clan Politics: The Power of ''Blood'' in Kazakhstan and Beyond,* Seattle, University of Washington Press, p.11-13.

Indeed, the arguments of Schatz are exaggerated. Schatz does not take into account of the unification of Kazakh subnational identities under Kazakh nationhood via the experiment of the long Soviet rule. This reality was even been mentioned by President Nazarbayev as well.

> The obvious fact that it was precisely in the first years of Soviet power that we got the chance to form a republic on our native territory, which during the preceding century was under threat of being divided up and parceled out among tree regions? We were able to restore the integrity of the country, to officially define and consolidate its borders, and, in this way, to institute the legal basis for the establishment of our independent republic of today[225]

Suny argues that Kazakhstan proceeds in her own nation building way along with the ambiguity of how the subnational, national and supranational affiliations will affect each other. This ambiguity proceeds along with the prudent policies of Kazakhstani elites.[226] The relatively liberal policies of Kazakhs first among Equals model of nation building and strong central minority control, which will be mentioned in the next chapter, seem to finish the ethnic conflict expectations at least for the near future. On the other hand, Kazakhstani elites seem lost to construct a national identity beyond the codification of ethnicity.[227]

To sum up, as for the ethnic and civic components of the post-Soviet nation building process it can be seen that after the implementation of initial ethnic weighted nation building policies, the nation building process transformed into more civic one that is very similar with the Soviet template, and this thesis prefer to label this process with the conception of Kazakhs first Among Equals. The hegemony of the ethnic identity

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[225] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 2 October 1992 , quoted in Holm-Hansen 1999: 171.

[226] Suny 2001: 862-896.

[227] Holm-Hansen 1999: 173.

remains stable in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Especially identity cards play important role to mark the citizen's ethnic identity. Not only on the identity card level but also in the various places of bureaucracy the ethnic codification policies are implemented which induce the consolidation of ethnic identity at the expense of a unified Kazakhstani identity. Although rising economic growth with the help of financial boom, oil and natural gas revenues wave the ethnic issues aside, just like the Soviet Union, ethnic codified nation building of Kazakhstan is fragile against all kinds of destabilizing national mobilization.

CHAPTER 5

NATION BUILDING POLICIES IN THE POST-SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN

In this chapter concrete examples of the nation building policies of post-Soviet Kazakhstan will be examined. I will attempt to analyze ethnic and civic components of important nation building tools such as demography and citizenship, language, state symbols, and finally the relations of important minorities with the government will be emphasized.

5.1. Demographic Diversity and Citizenship

As it was analyzed in the previous chapters, Soviet legacy induced an ethnically diversified society in Kazakhstan. As for the trend of ethnicities in the table 1, what can be obviously seen is that according the last census of the Soviet Union, Kazakhs slightly surpasses the demographic ratio of Russians. However, taking into account all Slavic population Kazakhs are still minority in their ancestral lands. The proportion of Kazakhs in 1998 surpassed the psychological limit by 50.6 percent. The meaning of excelling this limit is that Kazakhstan is not only quantitatively but also qualitatively more of a homeland of the Kazakhs.[228] Therefore, the governments of Kazakhstan strongly supported the immigration of Kazakhs into the homeland. Although Kazakhstan needed a skilled population which was overwhelmingly constituted by Russians during the initial years of the independence, Kazakhstani elites permitted the emigration of skilled Russian population, particularly to Russia. Indeed, this situation of ''ownership of the

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[228] Holm-Hansen 1999: 158.

country'' is not exclusive for Kazakhstan. It is a common reflex of post-communist

countries, not only in the USSR but also in the former Yugoslavia as well.

> Post-communist constitution-makers opted for the concept of a privatized
> ethnic state: a state which is the virtual property of the majority nation (in
> the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issue is a state whose co-owners are
> three nations proclaimed constitutive nations). From the constitutional-legal
> point of view, there are two types of citizens in these states: members of the
> title-holding nations and 'others'. This duality implies a difference between
> owner and non-owner groups of the state[229]

> Emigrations of Russians and Russophones of other ethnic backgrounds had started

in these circumstances. The reactions against ethno nationalist policies of Nazarbayev

regime engendered the frustration for the future among the Slavic population.

> The predominant factors that pushed Russians to take the exit route were the
> anticipation of a deterioration of their political and cultural status following
> the elevation of Kazakh as the state language, and accompanying belief that
> their children would grow up as 'second class citizens' in the new Kazakh-
> dominated state.[230]

> Almost a quarter of Kazakhstan's Russian population went back to the Russia.

According to Russian sources, 1.1 million Russians left the country from 1988 to 1998.

Likewise, Kazakh sources claim 1.5 million Russians left the country from 1992 to

2000.[231]

Number of skilled workers between the years 1985 and 1993 declined 44.2 percent

as a result of the departure of the Russian population. In some oblasts the losses were far

greater than in others. For instance, Karaganda, Almaty and Astana lost 35.1, 65.4, and

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[229] Dragica Vujadinovic, (2009). *Serbia in the Maelstrom of Political Changes*, The Faculty of Law, Belgrade ,University of Belgrade Center for Publishing and Informing, p.49.

[230] Dave 2007: 128

[231] Martha Brill Olcott, (2002). *Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise*, Washington D. C., Carnegie Endowment-The Brookings Institution Press, Washington D. C., p.175

50.5 percent of skilled work force respectively. However, immigrations of Russians were still continuing as well. From 1991 to 1998, some 375,378 people immigrated to the Kazakhstan which was the beyond of the governmental quota of 250,000. As Olcott claims that about half of the incoming Russians were former emigrates and the other half consists of Russians from neighbor Central Asian countries.[232] According to 1993 official statistics non-Kazakhs composed 75.8 per cent of work force. Needless to say, these en masse emigrations of Russians/Russophones damaged the fragile transition economy of Kazakhstan.[233]

Concerning Russian emigration, Holm-Hansen points out a different argument rather than Bhavna Dave. He mentions that the reason behind emigration was paralyzed economic conditions.

> A survey carried out in 1994 among people who had decided to emigrate from Kazakhstan sought to determine the factors that would make the respondents change their mind and return. 48.6 percent said that they would stay if the economic situation improved; 44,8 percent would do the same if ''convincing guarantees for the future of children were given.'' 27.1 percent said that a halt to all ethnic discrimination would made stay. 22.7 percent mentioned ''double citizenship'' and 17.7 percent ''Russian as state language'' on an equal footing as Kazak. Only 3.2 percent said they would emigrate anyway.[234]

Briefly, predominant factors that lead Russians to emigrate can be deduced with the combination of these two factors: Deteriorated economic conditions and loss of hopes to live as equal citizens of a civic country.

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[232] *Rossiskaia gazeta*, April 23, 1997, p7, quoted in Olcott 2002: 176.

[233] Sarsembaev, 1999: 319-346.

[234] Holm-Hansen: 1999: 162.

Table 1: Ethnic Trends in Kazakhstan

Ethnic	1926	%	1959	%	1970	%	1989	%
Kazakhs	3,713,300	57,10%	2,787,300	30%	4,234,100	32,60%	6,534,600	39,70%
Russians	1,279,900	19,60%	3,972,000	43%	5,521,900	42,50%	6,227,500	37,80%
Ukrainians	860,8	13,20%	761,4	8%	933,4	7,20%	896,2	5,50%
Uzbeks	213,4	3,20%	135,9	1%	216,3	1,70%	33,2	2,00%
Tatars	80,6	1,20%	191,6	2%	285,6	2,20%	327,9	1,90%
Germans	51,1	0,70%	660	7%	858	6,60%	957,5	5,80%
Others	301,7	5%	786,5	8,50%	959,4	7,20%	1,487,500	7,30%
Total	6,500,800	100%	9,294,700	100%	13,008,700	100%	16,464,400	100%

Source: Rafis Abazov (1999) Central Asia's Conflicting Legacy and Ethnic Policies: Revisiting a Crisis Zone of the Former USSR, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 5, no. 2 pp. 62-90

By contrast allowing Russians to emigrate, consistent with the ethno-nationalist Kazakhification policies, Diaspora Kazakhs have been encouraged to return to Kazakhstan. According to estimation, around 4.1 million ethnic Kazakhs are currently living abroad. 1.5 million in Uzbekistan, 740,000 in Russia, 70,000 in Turkmenistan, 80,000 in Mongolia, 1.5 million in China, 30.000 in Afghanistan and 25,000 in Turkey. In the 1990's approximately 170,000 Kazakhs migrated to the country. The reason of emergence of the Kazakh Diaspora can be seen as a product of two distinct political transformations as Darieva points out, Demarcation of borders of Soviet Kazakhstan, and Collectivization policies of Stalin era.

> One occurred in the 1920s, when the Soviet national Republics were established in Central Asia, which involved introducing and demarcating new borders pursuing a policy of indigenization. The second development derives from the effects of the genocidal policy pursued toward Kazak nomads during Stalin's repression and Soviet Union's forced

collectivization of the 1930s, a time when many Kazak families fled to Uzbekistan, Mongolia or China.[235]

Up to the year 2005, approximately 300,000 Diaspora Kazakhs were granted the citizenship of Kazakhstan.[236] The similarity between ethno-nationalist German and Kazakh structure citizenship can be easily seen taking into account of Diasporas returnees. Regardless of the skills of ethnic Germans and Kazakhs, they were privileged with the citizenship rights and State subsidies as a result of the conception of the Diasporas as primordial owners of the home land.[237]

The resettlement of Kazakh Diaspora prevalently occurred in the Northern parts of the intensive non-Kazakh population, coherently with the governmental strategy of increasing Kazakh population in the region. However, Diaspora returnees encountered so many obstacles in order to adapt to modernized Kazakh culture. Most of returnees were conceived to be very conservative, backward, and less skilled by Kazakhs. Lack of Russian knowledge among new comers also complicated the adaptation process. Diaspora immigration revealed how seventy year of Soviet rule completely changed the pre-modern traditions of Kazakh society.[238] Initial enthusiasm to the new comers among Kazakhs most probably turned into suspicion and hesitation as a result of big gap of cultural differences.

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[235] Tsypylma Darieva, (2005). "Recruiting for the Nation: Post-Soviet Transnational Migrants in Germany and Kazakhstan"*, In Erich Kasten, (Ed.) Rebuilding Identities: Pathways to reform in Post-Soviet Siberia*, pp.153-172, Berlin, Dietrich Reimar Verlag.

[236] Ibid.

[237] Darieva 2005: 167.

[238] Olcott 2002: 177.

5.2. Language Policies

Language issue is very sensitive and at the same time one of the most significant determinants of the nation building process, particularly in a multiethnic and multinational country like Kazakhstan. At this point, Kazakhstani elites initially attempted to support and spread of Kazakh language as a state language. Consistently, with the initial ethnic dominated nation building process, the widespread position of Russian language was tried to be restricted especially in the state apparatus and bureaucracy. Therefore, the elites conceptualized the promotion of Kazakh as a compensation process which was a respond to the neglect of Kazakh language during the Soviet era. Bhavna Dave mentions that the promotion of local language as a compensation process is a common tendency of post-colonialist elites.

> In the post-soviet sphere, as in many post colonial states of Asia and Africa, there was a compelling cultural justification and popular support for designating the indigenous language as the state language in place of the established colonial lingua franca. Leading national elites, who had typically been educated in the colonial language and lacked a proper facility in their native or national language, sought to overcome their won cultural hybridity and insularity and also to attain popular support and legitimacy by embracing policies in support of the dominant indigenous language[239]

Indeed, this kind of arguments such as ''remedial process of indigenous-Kazakh'' seems a bit problematic since this kind of arguments equalize the soviet rule, something like a colonial regime. Nevertheless; the lingua franca of Russian was an obvious fact in the Soviet Union. Despite the promotion of other local languages with the nativization process, the usage of language and its spread was in favor of Russian language, the lingua franca, in the USSR compared, not only with Kazakh but also the other

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[239] Dave 2007: 98.

languages. Hence; as a result of Soviet modernization, Russian language was deeply

rooted in Kazakhstan. These roots could be seen inside the urban-rural dilemma of the

Kazakhs. Most of urban Kazakhs prefer to use Russian even among family members.

Even the ones who use both Russian and Kazakh in daily activities can easily switch to

Russian because of the lack of proficiency of Kazakh. As for ethnic Russians, only

below than 1 per cent could speak Kazakh efficiently.

> Only a small part of the citizenry is able to use Kazakh as a working
> language. Even among ethnic Kazaks operational knowledge of Kazakh is
> far from universal. In a survey made in 1994 revealed that only 13 percent of
> the respondents said that they were able to speak, read, and write Kazakh
> fluently.[240]

The fluency of Russian among ethnic Kazakhs created a dilemma. This dilemma

emerged particularly on the debates of defining state language. Most of urban Kazaks

felt that they would be also discriminated by Russians by the strengthening of Kazakh in

the public domain.

> Interestingly, the sense of discomfort caused by the language regulations in
> the state administration was less among ethnic Russians than among Kazaks.
> In one survey from 1994, 21 percent of the Kazaks said that the
> requirements of the language Law had caused problems for them personally
> in their professional work. Only 17 percent of the Russians were of the same
> opinion despite the fact that only 2 percent of them have a command of
> Kazakh.[241]

In this context, definition of state language turned into an arena of the clash of

different interests. For instance, Kazakh nationalists strove to define Kazakh language as

sole state language. They strongly opposed the determination of Russian as an official

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[240]Murat Arenov and Sergei Kalmykov, (1995). Sotsiologicheskie zametki o iazykovoi situatsii v respublike, "*Mysl*, 3, pp.49-52 cited in Holm-Hansen 1999: 180.

[241] Murat Arenov and Sergei Kalmykov, (1995) O sytuacji jezykowej w kazachstanie (uwagi socjologiczne), *Eurazja* (Warszawa) 2,3, pp.38-42 cited in Holm-Hansen 1999: 180.

language similar with the official base of Kazakh. Russians and Russophones tried for the acceptance of Russian as state language with Kazakh. Nazarbayev and other Kazakhstani elites tried to find a third way, a kind of solution of compromise with two opposite arguments of defining the state language.

Indeed, there was a data of the decision of Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan concerning the state language debates. The Supreme Soviet passed a law in 22 October 1989 which defines Kazakh as the state language and Russian as interethnic official language along with Kazakh. However, after the independence proponents of Kazakhification or ethno-nationalist nation building claim that Kazakh is still a minority language even among ethnic Kazaks.[242] In another words, proponents mention that Kazakh language and culture encountered multiple discrimination in the Soviet era and now it needs a kind of affirmative action in order to strengthen its position. Hence, equalizing Russian as an official language along with Kazakh means that the dire condition of the Kazakh language would continue and its position would be diminishing in the independent Kazakhstan.

> As one prominent politician remarked, 'we cannot miss the fact that although the Russian people endured totalitarian repression, they never suffered national oppression, instead feeling themselves representatives of the great nationality while the Kazakhs felt both totalitarian and colonial oppression.[243]

As for Russian proponents, multiethnic structure of the people of Kazakhstan, and the deep roots of Russian language among people requires promotion of Russian to the same status with Kazakh on the legal base. Furthermore, proponents claim that Russian

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[242] Holm-Hansen 1999: 178.

[243] Schatz 2001: 489-506.

language is one of the most important languages in the world, and following the universal civilization in Russian is much easier comparatively with Kazakh. In this context the striking point is that proponents of Russian mentions that with the decrease of Russian influence, most of Russophones, including Russian speaking urban Kazakhs in the country would suffer with the adjustment of the Kazakh language. However, if Russian remains as state language with Kazakh no one will encounter with language problems.

Nazarbayev and Kazakhstani elite opted the third way in these debates. Nazarbayev supported Kazakhification, but at the same time he considered the ethnic peace and balance of the multiethnic society of Kazakhstan. In this context, he limited the demands of ethnic Kazaks but he also did not fully satisfy the demands of Russian speakers as well. Therefore, the situation of language in the 1993 constitution to large extent copied from 1989 Soviet constitution.[244]

> Although Nazarbayev has consistently supported recovery of the Kazakh Language, he has eschewed extreme positions. For example, even as a champion of Kazakh as the sole state language, he took issue with a reference in the 1989 draft language law that called for Russians to serve ''along with''(*nariadu s*) Kazakh; upon Nazarbayev's insistence, along with in the law was replaced ''on par with''(*naravne s*)[245]

As for 1995 constitution, the language issue converted into more civic discourse. This time Russian alhough is not a state language, elevated to the same point with Kazakh on the legal base. Article 7 of the constitution declares that first,that the Kazakh is the state language of the country, second that ''in the state institutions and local self-

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[244] William Fierman, (2005). "Kazakh language and prospects for its role in Kazakh groupness", *Ab Imperio* No. 2.,pp.393-423.

[245] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*. 23 Sep. 1989, cited in Fierman 2005: 411, italics original.

administrative bodies the Russian language shall be offically used on equal grounds along with the Kazakh language'', and third that ''the state shall promote conditions for the study and development of the languages of the people of Kazakhstan''[246]

What can be deduced from the constitution of 1995 is that in constrast to nationalist Kazakhs' demands, the position of Russian language is officially apporoved as lingua franca. The first preamble of article 7 symbollicaly affirms Kazakh sovereignity and ethnic character of the nation building process.[247] The third preamble of law also sends referance to multiple reetnification dimension of Nation building process[248] Furthermore, preamble 1 and 3 can be read as restriction attempts of the lingua franca, Russian.

Prior to the 1993 constitution the decree on education stipulated that by 1995, all state and official communication were to switched to Kazakh. In April 1995, parliament, consistent with the relaxation of language policies, endorsed Nazarbayev's proposals which postpones 15 years of the requirement for all state employees to be proficient in Kazakh.[249]

5.2.1. Implementation of Language Law

There was a big gap between rhetoric and implementation regarding the implementation of language laws. Indeed, although Kazakh language was strongly supported by the government, the promotion of Kazakh was not satisfactory for the

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[246] http://www.cmseducation.org/wconsts/kazakhstan.html

[247] Dave 2007: 101.

[248] Holm-Hansen 1999: 171-173.

[249] Dave 2007: 101.

government of Kazakhstan. Hence, the realities and rhetoric proves how the promotion of local language against lingua franca is big challengeable process. Year by year government softened the ethnic Kazakh structure of the language laws. In this context, implementation of language law can be divided into two spheres. The period from independence to 1998's involved the most ethnic policies regarding the implementation as it was mentioned in the fourth chapter.[250] In this period, the elites tried to spread the use of Kazakh language even among non-Russians. However, soon after realizing the impossible goal of language conversion among non-Kazakhs government focused on non-Kazakh speakers among ethnic Kazakhs.[251]

If persons look at the details of the government attempts to promote Kazakh, first of all the *Quzag Tili* organization is seen. The status of *Quzag Tili* remains under the status of civic society organizations. However, it works like an official unit of the state bureaucracy.

> *Quzag tili* has enjoyed governmental support and subsidies in performing numerous routine grassroots functions, including linguistic policing and vigilantism in the absence of legal mandate.[252]

Consistently with the state efforts on promoting Kazak language according the official statistics ' ' the number of monolingual Kazakh-medium secondary schools increased by about 28 percent in the period 1989-96, while the number of Russian-medium schools decreased by approximately 37 percent in the same period. As Schatz mentions 'a similar rise was witnessed in the proportion of Kazakh-medium secondary

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[250] Schatz 2001: 489-506.

[251] Ibid.

[252] Dave 2007: 109.

students, from 30.2 percent to 44.7 percent in 1986-96, while the proportion of Russian-medium students declined from 67.3 percent to 52.2 percent'.[253]

According to most of the specialists, Kazakh medium education lagged behind Russian medium education. Therefore, Kazakh-medium schools could not turn into an attraction center not only among non-Kazakhs but also Kazaks as well. Kazak promotion attempts can be witnessed in the student profile of the most important education center of Al-Farabi' Kazakh State University[254]. Almost 80 percent ethnic Kazak students reflect that non-Kazakhs did not demand state universities anymore.[255]

Legal requirements of law on languages also require 50 percent TV broadcasting in Kazakh language. However, this target could not be accomplished even in ethnic-Kazak dominated southern part of the country. Similar with broadcasting failure, most of the time the official documents are translated, contrary to the aim of the government, from Russian to Kazakh. Indeed, there were almost no state documents which existed in Russian but not in Kazakh.[256]

The lacks of administrative coordination, combined with the paralyzed economic-social life are also the most significant reasons of the failure of Kazakh language promotion. Most of the targets remained as symbolic discourse of the government and soon after the government began to give concessions to Russian speakers.

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[253] Data reported in Igor Savin, *" Spetsifika osushchestvelniya i rezul'taty kul'turno-yazykovoi obrazovatel' noi politiki v Kazakhstane",* unpublished paper, (Shymkent branch, Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences, 1998), qouted in Schatz 2001: 494.

[254] *Interview*, Erbol Sha'merdenov, Director, Department for the Development of Languages (Astana), 15 September 1998, cited in Schatz 2001: 489-506.

[255] Ibid.

[256] Ibid.

Careful not to incur the displeasure of Russian-speaking Kazakhs ın the state bureaucracy, the ruling authorities have refrained from introducing any measure that would require Kazakh language proficiency tests for jobs in the government and state sectors, and admissions to vuzy, or the mandatory introduction of Kazakh language courses for government officials. Proposals by ardent supporters of Kazakh in the early 1990s to introduce a list of governmental jobs and specializations requiring fluency in Kazakh were also scrapped. Article 23 of the 1997 Law on Languages states that such a list can be set up in accordance with the laws of the republic, but no such list has been proposed since. Other clauses in the draft Law on Languages had proposed that ethnic Russians working in government and state boards be given 10 years (by 2006) to prepare for a switch to Kazakh at all official levels, Ethnic Kazakhs would be given five years (by 2001). These proposals were rejected by the upper house of Parliament. There is no mandatory requirement to know Kazakh by a certain deadline.[257]

These concessions given to the Russians-Russophones reveal that the state refrains from the agenda of Language transformation in order to avoid social conflicts and strengthens the polarization of people on the base of language.[258] Therefore, social discontent of Russian and Russophones decreased at the end of 1990s comparatively between the initial years of the independence. With the softening policies in favor of Russians- Russophones, the lack of Kazakh proficiency proved that will not engender any problem concerning gaining employment in the key fields of economy such as banking, transport, communication and industries.[259] Nevertheless, proficiency in Kazakh still provides privileges for the progress in the high level bureaucracy and at the same time political exclusion. Furthermore, subethnic identities were also mobilized by these Kazakh requirements in the bureaucracy.

The requirement of demonstrating language proficiency is a ready tool for political exclusion. The emphasis on Kazakh language proficiency works to benefit of those from the Great Horde who are more likely to be fluent in

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[257] Dave 2007: 107-108.

[258] Dave 2007: 117.

[259] Dave 2007: 112.

Kazakh, and it places not only Russians but also many Middle Horde and Small Horde Kazakhs at a competitive disadvantage.[260]

To sum up, language policies on the discourse level had an ethno-nationalist character after the independence. However, the realities and multinational demographic structure of the country did not allow this kind of Kazakhification process. Most of government intentions did not realize, therefore, government had to refrain from the Kazakhification process and gave concessions to the Russian-Russophone society. Therefore, at the end of 1990's the language policies stabilized in a more Civic concept. Not only merely for Russian, the government also liberalizes the use and education with mother tongue of other minorities coherently with the multiple ethnification process. Most of arguments claim that the elite of Kazakhstan supported ethnification in order to decrease the Russian language influence. In other words, government supports minority ethnification with an instrumental aim. What is certain is that whether it is instrumental or not, the result of policies are compatible with civic nation building policies. Nevertheless, within this ethno-nationalist turn civic policies also provides a privileged position for Kazakh. Kazakh with the position of state language strongly supported by the government, and state language position of the country have legitimized Kazakh to deserve and need directly or indirectly state aid by the government.

5.3. State Symbols as an Important Mirror of the Nation Building

State symbols simply reveal the nationality policies of one country whether it includes more civic or more ethnic components. Therefore, it is significant to zoom on the details of the state symbols and make their implications clear. As for Kazakhstan

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[260] Olcott 2002: 118.

case briefly what can be said that state symbols reflect Kazakh nationality and its culture. At this point, narrowly focusing on state symbols, which are basically national flag, national emblem and national flag, one can even think that the state of Kazakhstan mono-ethnic oriented nation state.

The key state symbols such as national flag or national anthem also facilitate the reinvention of nationalism and solidarity among people. They are similar to glues which bind the past, present and future. Therefore, state symbols are so powerful to represent the events and their interpretation for a particular nation.[261]

Facing state symbols in the daily life targets their internalization among people. Needless to say that, this internalization process is mobilized by elite led nation building process. If elite led ethnic-nation building implements to the multi ethnic societies, most of the times this internalization processes fail. To be clear, state symbols become the conflict arena along with hegemonic nationalism and the non-hegemonic ones. Most of the time the tension which is created by state symbols becomes trigger points of the bloody ethnic conflicts or civil wars.

5.3.1. National Flag of Independent Kazakhstan

Flag is the ultimate symbol of nation and it exits everywhere and in every situation. Flags can be easily seen in Public gatherings, schools, religious and military institutions. Therefore, ideological apparatus of the state most of the time are colored by flags. Flags can give important clues about the state structure and nation building process

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[261] Usta 2007: 119.

of one country.[262]   As for Kazakhstan case, in the era of Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was using almost the same as the flag of Soviet Union, a horizontal blue stripe near the bottom was the mere difference. The new flag after independence which was designed by Shaken Niyazbekov and it was officially adopted in June 1992.[263]

The constitution of Kazakhstan states that ''National Flag of the Republic of Kazakhstan is a rectangular piece of cloth of sky-blue color bearing (in its centre) a design of the sun with rays, with a soaring eagle underneath. All along the flagstaff there runs a vertical band of national ornament. Images of the sun, its rays, the eagle and the ornament are of golden color. Width/length ratio of the flag is 1: 2.[264]

These features of the flag are indeed, deprived from Kazakh nation and symbolize Kazakh history, traditions and customs.[265] For instance, blue is historically the color of banners of Turkic-Mongolic people.[266] According to Turkic-Mongolic traditions blue also represents ''East''. Hence, using blue color in the flag represents Eastern culture. However, as Niyazbekov mentions blue color also symbolizes peace, tranquility and well being. The golden eagle is also a significant element of nomadic way of life of Kazakhs similar with the golden sun. Symbols of nature and animals are very important for Turkic-Mongolic nomads. At this context, eagle, for instance, represents

[262] Anthony D., Smith, (2001). *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Polity Pres, Cambridge, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, p. 528, cited in Usta 2007: 121.

[263] http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1355334/flag-of-Kazakhstan.

[264] http://www.azkrk.kz/eng/gossim/flag/.

[265] Utku Özer, (2006). Dynamics of Post-Soviet Nation Building: Experiences of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijcan, İstanbul, p. 70.

[266] http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1355334/flag-of-Kazakhstan.

independence, freedom, dignity, boldness, power, courage, nobility.[267] At the same time, the sun and golden eagle also indicates universal civic concepts. For example, the golden sun in the flag symbolizes life, wealth and plenty as well. Ornaments on the left which are also golden colored derives from Kazak folklore and is compiled from carpet and fabric figures.[268] However, these ormanents also includes universal meanings as well.

Figure 5.1: National Flag of Republic of Kazakhstan
Source:http://www.akorda.kz/en/president/state_symbols/national_flag_of_the_republic_of_kazakhst an

What can be deduced from the flag of Kazakhstan is that the symbols of the flag derives from Kazak history, customs and traditions. However, these symbols at the same time include universal meanings as well. At this point, the nation builders of Kazakhstan refrain from the direct ethno-nationalist symbols. For instance, the other Central Asian states use crescent which is an obvious symbol for the titular muslim nations in the

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[267] Özer 2006: 71.

[268] Ibid

region. Kazakhstan is the mere state in the region who does not use crescent on the flag. Therefore, we can mention that multi ethnic character of the country was not forgotton on the background. However, this could not easly delete the ethno-nationlist symbols in favor of Kazaks on the flag of Kazakhstan.

5.3.2.National Anthem of Kazakhstan

National anthems as an official song of a country provide some clues about the nationality policies as well. In a similar position with the flag, national anthems are played in public ceremonies, sport contests, and international meetings. National anthems reinforce creation of national identity and national consciousness. Furthermore, they are also important to motivate patriotic action and legitimization of the authority. Therefore, concerning these factors of national anthems to mobilize people, national anthems should be closed to the discriminatory music or lyrics.[269]

National anthem of Republic of Kazakhstan was adapted in 4 June 1992. The music which was composed by M. Tylebayev, E. Brusilovsky, L. Khamidi in the Soviet era retained, but the lyrics were changed. New lyrics were written by M. Alimbayev, K. Myrzaliyev, T. Moldagaliyev and Z. Danibayev. The lyrics of the national anthem changed in 2006 again. This time Nursultan Nazarbayev also edited the lyrics of the new national anthem. The new lyrics are an edited version of ''My Kazakhstan'' which is a patriotic song written in 1958 during the virgin land campaign. The lyrics of old and new national anthem of the Post-Soviet Kazakhstan are put respectively.[270]

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[269] Usta 2007: 121.

[270] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthem_of_the_Republic_of_Kazakhstan .

The old National Anthem

We are a valiant people, sons of honor
And all we've sacrificed to gain our freedom
Emerging from malicious grip of fate, from hell of fire
We scored a victory of glory and success.

Choros:

Sour high up in the sky, oh, eagle of freedom
Call up to harmony, agreement and accord!
For hero's might and strength is in the nation
Just as the unity is nation's razing sword.

While honoring our mothers and respecting
The cream of cream of our rising nation
We welcomed all ill-starred and struck by ruin…
Our homeland, the steppe, a sacred cradle
Of friendship and accord
Gave all a shelter and a hearty refuge.

Choros:

We've overcome the hardship
Let the past serve bitter lesson
But ahead we face a radiant future.
We bequeath our sacred legacy implying our mother tongue
And sovereignty and valour and traditions
So clearly cherished by our forefathers
As true mandate to future generations.

Choros:

The New National Anthem:

Golden sun in heaven,
Golden corn in steppe,
Legend of courage -
It is my land.
In hoary antiquity
Our glory was born,
Proud and strong
Is my Kazakh people

My country, my country,
As your flower I'll grow,
As your song I'll stream, country!
My native land - Kazakhstan!
I've a boundless expanse
And a way, opened in future.
I have an independent,
United people.
Like an ancient friend
Our happy land,
Our happy people
Is welcoming new time.

Both of the lyrics overwhelmingly include ethnic references to the Kazak tradition and culture. Concerning the older national anthem, although it mentions some words for ''agreement and accord'' in the initial parts, the last part of the lyrics includes strong ethno-nationalist references for Kazakh nation. What is mentioned as ''Mother Tongue, Forefathers, Traditions'' are obviously implies Kazakh nation. Therefore, this exclusive lyrics are coherently changed with more civic referenced national anthem ''My Kazakhstan''. However, the new one still includes ethnic references to the titular nation, and although it is much more civic than the older one it is not appropriate for a multi ethnic state.

> When the lyrics are considered, in general, it can be said that the anthem is emphasizing the Kazakh people, land (with words of "my native land") and symbols(golden sun and steppe are words related with Kazakh traditions). The only lyrics that can be denoted as inclusive and civic are; "I have an independent united people…" So, while the melody's being the same with the Soviet one and the words being inclusive make the anthem inclusive and civic, its being in Kazakh language and using ethnic terms in the first two parts make it ethnic. In general, the anthem can be denoted as ethnic and exclusive[271]

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[271] Usta 2007: 122.

5.3.3. National Emblem of Kazakhstan

The national emblem of Kazakhstan is a picture of ''shanyrak'' which is cupola of a ''Yurt''.[272] *Yurt* is traditional house of nomads and it also stands for homeland. Circle shape of *Shanyrak* is associated with life and eternity. *Shanyrak* symbolizes well-being of family, peace and calmness. A sky-blue background which irradiates, in the form of sun rays, *uyks* (supports) set off by wings of mythical horses.[273]

Figure 5.2: State Emblem of Republic of Kazakhstan
Source:http://www.akorda.kz/en/president/state_symbols/national_emblem_of_the_republic_of_kaza
khstan

The national emblem is composed of two colors: golden and sky-blue. The lower portion of emblem bears an inscription ''Kazakhstan'' in the form of Cyrillic alphabet.

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[272]

http://www.aqorda.kz/en/president/state_symbols/national_emblem_of_the_republic_of_kazakhstan.

[273]

http://www.akorda.kz/en/president/state_symbols/national_emblem_of_the_republic_of_kazakhstan.

Mythological horses with wings and horns symbolizes courage, wisdom and strong. Horses are an important element for nomadic Kazakh past throughout time. The sky-blue color is also associated with ''sky god'' for Turkic-Mongolic nomads. At the same time, sky-blue color is symbol of aspiration to the peace, consent, friendship and unity with all people.[274]

Briefly, what can be deduced from coat of arms is that the emblem overwhelmingly consists of elements from Kazakh customs and tradition similar with the anthem and the flag of the country. Therefore, these three basic state symbols contain the tension between civic and ethnic structure of the nation building process.

5.3.4. National Holidays of Kazakhstan

National holidays are also significant component of nation building process and they reveal the nature of the nation building as well. Concerning Kazakhstan national holidays some of them derive from Soviet Era and some of them were created in the independence period. In 2007, religious days of Islam and Christian Orthodoxy were declared as official holidays. Therefore, the most common two beliefs in Kazakhstan officially promoted. The officially holidays and their implications are zoomed below:

16th of December is the ''Independence Day'' and most probably the most important national day. The Independence Day also commemorates Almaty riots of 16th of 1986, ''Jeltoqsan''. Despite the fact that Almaty riots didn't have a nationalist aim, they are used as a useful tool for the ethnic revival of Kazaks or ethno-nationalist dimension of nation building process.

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[274] http://www.akorda.kz/en/president/state_symbols/national_emblem_of_the_republic_of_kazakhstan.

1st of January is the new years day, and 7th of January is the Orthodox Christmas. ''Kurban Bayramı'' or festival of Sacrifice (one day) is also an official holiday in Kazakhstan. Hence, significant days of two big beliefs are represented among national holidays.[275]

8th of March ''International Women's Day'' is another national day. 1st of May is the Kazakhstan's people unity day. These two national days are the heritage of Soviet era. In this context, they include civic, universal, modern characters. Particularly, although 1st of May is distorted from its universal, real meaning of ''International Labor day'', the universal civic character of the day are remained with the expression of ''People's Unity Day''. Another important national day from Soviet Era is the ''Victory Day'' which marks capitulation of Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union. ''Great Patriotic war against fascism, Victor Day'' is an official holiday not only in Kazakhstan both also the other former Soviet Republics except for the Baltic SSRs[276].

''Nauruz Meyramy'' which is celebrated 21st of March stems from Kazakh tradition as well. Similarly with the other oriental nations, the *Nauryz Meyramy* represents arriving of the spring, renewal, the birth of new life, love and beauty, rising of nature and equalization of night and day. *Nauruz* stems from Persian Language and it means 'the new day''. Furthermore, *Nauruz* has also another meaning in Kazakh which is called ''Ulys Kuni'', meaning the first day of the New Year or ''Ulystyn Uly Kuni'', meaning the great day of the people.[277] *Nauruz* was the only official holiday up till the

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[275] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakhstan.

[276] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakhstan.

[277] Özer 2006: 75.

declaration of other religious holidays in 2005. Therefore, oriental references of *Nauruz* and its position as the mere religious oriented public holiday up until 2005 emphasizes Kazakh ethno-nationalist character of the nation building process.

The relocation date of the capital city from Almaty to Astana on the 6th of July in 1998 is also public holiday, and named as ''Capital city day''. 30th of August, approval of 1995 Constitution is public holiday as well. Generally considering public holidays as compared with state symbols, more universal civic structure of national days can be seen. At least in 2007 Orthodox Christmas promoted as an official holiday with Kurban Bayrami, festival of sacrifice. Therefore, the sole religious referenced holiday for Kazaks was balanced with the promotion of sacred day of Christian Orthodoxy. The other national days stem from Soviet past, needless to say, they include universal and unity characters for Kazakhstan. Still the other national holidays from post-soviet period such as constitution day, capital day etc, disregarding the Independence Day which commemorates ''Jeltogsan'' have Kazakhstani particularities as well.[278]

5.4. Centralized Minority Control and Minority Reactions

Although Kazakhstani elites generally mention that Kazakhstan is a multinational and multiethnic state, they do not consider minority issues beyond the context of "security". Indeed, regarding state reactions to the minority rights in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, it can be simply seen that "Security context" is a widely seen approach against minority demands.[279] However, most of cases show that there is almost no

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[278] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakhstan.

[279] Will Kymlicka, (1995), *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, New York Oxford University Press, p.18.

example of which is successful by suppressing minority demands. On the contrary refusal of minority demands most of the time results with brutal bloody conflicts which goes split from the nation state. For instance, the centralized interventions of Milosevic regime in the former Yugoslavia was a trigger point of the dissolution of the country. Likewise India and Pakistan division was fastened by Nehru who refused Cinnah's federative plan. Similarly Bangladesh declared independence from Pakistan as a reaction of imposition of Urdu language and imperialistic policies of Pakistani elites in Bengal.[280]

However, in west, ethnic issues were considered concerning multicultural citizenship rights. Minority issues are linked with equal citizenship and justice in west. As Kymlicka mentions that in Canada individual liberties combined with group rights creates a citizenship identification which excludes race and ethnic origin.[281]

Regarding Kazakhstan, with a big minority population things get more complicated. As it was mentioned before, by reason of ethno-nationalist policies of the elites almost third of Russian population migrated from Kazakhstan. Most of them were skillful workers, engineers or administrators in the Soviet era. Needless to say, these migrations of Russians or Russophones damaged the economy. Particularly, lack of skillful labor force created problems when the economy started to grow in the last decade. In this chapter, we will focus on how Kazakhstani elites manage to control minority demands and ethnic tensions among citizens.

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[280] Feroz Ahmad and Jacob M. Landau, (2004). "Sonuç: Ulustan Kopuş", In Willem van Schendel & Eric J.Zürcher, (Eds.) *Orta Asya ve İslam Dünyasında Kimlik Politikaları: 20.Yüzyılda Milliyetçilik, Etnisite ve Emek*, pp.279-296, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları.

[281] Kymlicka 1995: 27.

Most of western scholars expected brutal conflicts in Kazakhstan similar with the trend in Balkans, Transcaucasia and Transdniestria.[282] However, with the exception of Transcaucasia the dissolution of the Soviet Union was generally peaceful. Almaty events in 1986 were also exaggerated as the ethnic revival of the Kazakhs by western scholars.[283] The expectations of westerners failed, and none of brutal ethnic conflicts happened in Kazakhstan. This could be seen a success for a Multinational state, particularly who have more than 100 ethnic groups. However, the loss of Russophone population is at the same time failure for the state that is in need of labor force. Lack of ethnic conflicts must not mask the ethnic tension behind. As Olcott mentions, right now Kazakhstan is a divided society. Before explaining the government control on minorities we should also focus on the ethnic tension and divisions in Kazakhstan. [284]

5.4.1. Ethnic Tensions in Kazakhstan

Non-Kazakh citizens of Kazakhstan had serious anxieties about their future because of Kazakification policies. After independence step by step titular nation enhanced its influence on bureaucracy. Non-Kazakhs in the high and middle positions of State bureaucracy are replaced by Kazakhs in a systematic way. Although non-Kazakhs composed 42 percent of the population they achieved the majority representation in the state parliament. Moreover, 75 percent of university students consist of ethnic Kazakhs as well. The Kazak supremacy in the state institutions and universities was considered

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[282] Dave 2007:119.

[283] Dave 2007: 118.

[284] Olcott 2002: 172-173.

the primary reason of corruption by non-Kazakhs.[285] As Nazpary states non-Kazakh population in Kazakhstan, at least in the first decade of independence, consider themselves as discriminated by the Kazakh elites. In other words, Kazakh elites wanted to impose the titular hegemony. In this context, however, the titular hegemony supported by Kazakhification policies has contradictions on its own. First of all, as it was highlighted in the language part of the chapter, urban Kazakhs speak Russian language and they have very poor knowledge to speak Kazakh. However, Rural Kazakhs, similar with Kazakh elites speak Kazakh. Indeed, before ''Perestroika'' there were rarely Kazakhs in the city centers. The reason behind this is that Kazakhs wanted to live with their relatives and in that time it was difficult to get permission to reside in the cities. By reason of Perestroika economic policies Kazakh kolkhozes regressed and smashed. Hence, the people, working in Kolkhozes had to migrate to the city centers. The students who are coming from rural areas to study in the cities and foreign immigrants are also added to this Kazakh speaker ethnic Kazakh population.[286] There is a constant inflow of rural Kazakhs into the country's cities, and some estimate that more than two million people moved into urban areas during the 1990s".[287] Needless to mention, Conservative-traditionalist culture of Rural Kazakhs clashed with urban modern culture of Russophones. Moreover, Most of rural Kazakhs who were living predominantly in the south part of the country brought new polarization with the Russian-Russophone citizens mostly living in the North.

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[285] Nazpary 2002: 147.

[286] Nazpary 2002: 158.

[287] Olcott 2002: 190.

The worst life conditions were seen among rural Kazakhs because they were tenants of urban dwellers and they had difficulties to arrange money for expensive rent prizes. Houses were privatized in 1992. Most of the Russians and other urban dwellers gained the ownership of their houses with the privatization process. This basic tension between rural immigrants and urban dwellers reveal that sometimes class contradictions are relevant with ethnic conflicts. In other words, ethnic tension between rural Kazakhs and Russians are embedded with class contradictions. The biggest victims of neo-liberal policies, rural-immigrant Kazakhs, restricted within the chaotic political economic conditions accuse Russians with still exploiting them in their own lands. As Nazpary points out, rural Kazaks strongly supports the outmigration of Russians in order to get rid of them, ''the reasons of their poverty''[288]. Indeed, this kind of racist fascist arguments against Russians are not only particular for Kazakhstan. The dissolution of welfare state with the implementation of neo-liberal policies increased the reactions on the dimension of nationalism and fundamentalism with the exception of Latin America in which the reactions against neo-liberalism occurred in the class base.

Another important point concerning the ethnic tension is the struggle for the control of urban areas. Rural immigrants from south organized under gangs and used violence against non-Kazaks in order to control particular places. Urban Kazakhs supported non-Kazaks in this conflict. However, these gangs were sometimes backed by state institutions such as police or courts. The gangs who are also using subethnic networks and state institutions legitimizes their pressure by patrimonial discourse that

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[288] Nazpary 2002: 159.

''Kazakhstan is their ancestral lands''[289]. However, these types of ethnic Kazakh nationalism and Kazakhification policies also strengthen anti-Kazakh nationalism even among other Turkic-Muslim nations. Turks, Azerbaijanis, Uygurs, Uzbeks, Tajiks takes initiative in favor of Russians. The images of Kazakhs are negative on the eyes of Turkic or Muslim nations. They consider themselves in the same position and in the same side with Russians/Russophones against Kazakhs.[290]

I should admit that these ethnic tensions were powerful and unique to the initial years or in the first decade of independence. Along with economic growth and partial abolishment of Kazakhification policies the ethnic tensions were decreased. However, this does not mean that above mentioned ethnic tensions were totally evaporated. Kazakhstan is still a divided society with the management of sustainable ethnic tensions.

5.4.2. Territorial Gerrymandering to Strengthen Central Control on Minorities

Kazakhstani government and accordingly other post-soviet states did not change the Soviet template regarding the minority question. All kinds of federalism and autonomy demands were refused. Kazakhstan was conceptualized as a nation-state having with multi ethnic groups. Kazakhstani elites are seen ostensibly with equal distance to all ethnic groups. However, all the equal ethnic groups were controlled under titular hegemony. In this context, Russian dominated border regions in North and East part of the country was a big challenge for the Kazakhstani government. Nevertheless, Kazakhstani government achieved to control Russian dominated regions via strict control of various state facilities which did not cause any remarkable opposition.

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[289] Nazpary 2002: 174.

[290] Nazpary 2002: 172.

The Kazakhs had established a firm control over their Russian-dominated bordering regions, acquiring a dominant share in all governmental, administrative and state-controlled positions even before securing a clear majority status. What is remarkable is that all this happened without any visible conflict, social upheaval or ethnic mobilization.[291]

The soviet ethnic system did not provide any minority or titular status to Russians. Although the other nations have their own communist party structure, national academy of sciences, national operas and theatres, Russians lacked these institutions. Therefore, the dissolution of the USSR left Russians indefensible against the titular nations. In this context, for instance, Nazarbayev regime legitimizes the rejection of federalism or cultural autonomy by sending references to the Soviet legacy. Indeed, federalism in some cases can be considered as a threat for independence or annexation with the neighbor compatriots. Kazakhstani elites generally put this argument as an explanation of refusal of federalism in the Russian dominated parts. However, fierce control of minorities in some cases also fastens the break off from the nation state. In this vicious circle, Kazakhstani elites first tried to change the demography of oblasts in order to enhance centralized control on Russian regions and cities by increasing Kazakh population. During the years between 1994 and 1997 Russian dominated regions were merged with neighboring Kazakh dominated regions.[292]

The oblast of East Kazakhstan and North Kazakhstan had Russian majorities (Russians forming 62 and 66 per cent of the total population, with the Kazakh share at 18.6 and 27.2 per cent respectively), whereas Aqmola, Kokshetau, Qostanai and Pavlodar had a plurality of ethnic Russians. The Semei (previously called Semipalatinsk) oblast, with 54 per cent Kazakhs, was merged with East Kazakhstan, 67 per cent Slavic and the Zhezkazgan oblast, containing 49 per cent Kazakhs, was unified with Quraghandy (Karaganda), 63 per cent Slavic. Parts of Kokshetau (the Kokshetau town and the surrounding areas) were incorporated within Aqmola and North

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[291] Dave 2007: 119.

[292] Dave 2007: 122.

Kazakhstan. Similarly, the Qostanai oblast was enlarged to include parts of Torgai. The changes, affecting all Russian-dominated border regions (except Pavlodar), enlarged the size of these oblasts and increased ethnic Kazakh share in the reconstituted units. The decision was presumably guided by the calculations that the larger size of the reconstituted oblasts and a higher Kazakh share would serve as an antidote to potential secessionist claims. The end result was that the Kazakhs formed clear majorities in all the reconstituted regions.[293]

As a result of gerrymandering policies, the 1999 census reveals that Kazakhs gained the majority in all neighboring oblasts to the Russian Federation. The relocation of capital from Almaty to Astana (formerly Aqmola) must be examined with this above mention gerrymandering policies.

5.4.2.1. Capital Relocation

Kazakhstani government implemented the gerrymandering process by changing the capital from Almaty to Astana permanently with an official decision made in 1994. The decision was implemented in December of 1997. The reasons of the relocation were explained in the following way. First of all, Almaty which is located in the south eastern corner of Kazakhstan was geographically far away from the center of Kazakhstan. Moreover, Almaty is also far from the industrial centers in the north. Secondly, Almaty has exhausted its growth limit because of surrounding mountains; the city would not enlarge easily anymore. Thirdly, the city was already suffering with weather pollution, and fourthly Almaty is situated on earthquake zone.[294] Finally Taking into account of ''security'', the location of Almaty is not proper for a capital city. Almaty is located next

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[293] Ibid.

[294] Usta 2007: 132.

to the Chinese border and instable relationship with China until late 1990s, as a result of border problems, leaves Almaty vulnerable against the threat of China.[295]

As Schatz points out, capital moves are risky and expensive strategies. For instance, Although Nazarbayev claimed that state budget would not be spent for capital relocation, 400 billion dollars at least had already been spent, and still the expenses were rising up. Most of the dissenters to the capital move claim that it is an-ill timed strategy while the county was suffering with economic crisis; in other words, decreasing industrial output, rising unemployment, collapsing health care and education system.[296] Nevertheless, Nazarbayev regime was enthusiastic to take initiative concerning the capital move. Strengthening Kazak identity in northern parts and increasing central control on the Russian dominated regions were the irresistible temptation process for Kazakh elites. By doing so, they were planning to reduce the irredentist or autonomous claims of Russophones. To large extent Kazakhstani elites accomplished to control Russian dominated regions.

Capital relocation also serves to control sub ethnic identities as well. Nazarbayev and his predecessor Kunayev belonged to Great Horde which is dominant in southeast part of the country. The areas in the middle and northern part of the Kazakhstan are concentrated by Middle Horde. Therefore, capital move strengthens the alliance between Middle and Great Hordes. The alliance also pressures Little Horde, which is

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[295] Edward Schatz, (2003). *When Capital Cities Move: The Political Geography of Nation and State Building,* Working Paper No: 303, in The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame, p.15.

[296] Schatz 2003: 1.

concentrated on the oil and gas rich west part of the country, (*Kishi zhuz*) to remain loyal to the subethnic peace.[297]

Another point in terms of capital relocation is that it is a trend in post colonial situations. Most of the third world countries moved their capital after the Second World War. Brazil, Mauritania, Pakistan, Botswana, Libya, Malawi, Belize, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Germany, Kazakhstan, Malaysia are the countries who changed their capitals. The common point among capital relocated countries is that almost all of them have a multi ethnic composition of ethnic structure and these countries are also considered as third world countries. Indeed Kazakhstan from a second world country has a similar multi ethnic structure with African countries. In other words as Schatz claim that ''Kazakhstan's cultural heterogeneity more closely resembles the African mean than it does the Eurasian mean.''[298]

Shortly, rather than the official reasons for the capital move, the basic political reasons on background are escalation of the state bureaucracy in minority dominated regions and controlling minorities from their radical demands which would be probably occurred like irredentism or autonomy.

5.4.3. Minority Reactions

Kazakhstani government approaches minority demands with doubt. Indeed, the soviet legacy did not have a minority conception similar to western liberal countries. The soviet nationality policy simply was constructed on the ''brotherhoods of equal nations''

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[297] Schatz 2003: 18.

[298] Schatz 2003: 21.

At this point, The Kazakhstani elites continues to use the same soviet template regarding the nationality issue. For instance, Russians in Kazakhstan do not want to consider themselves as minorities although their statuses are much worse than the minorities in western liberal countries.[299]

Coherently with soviet nationalities template, minority rights were provided on the dimension of ''culture 'in post-soviet Kazakhstan. As long as minorities pursue the non-political way of identification, they are even officially supported by the government. National centers are established to develop cultural heritage of their national communities. However, Kazakhstani government officially recognizes only one national cultural center. By doing so, they aim to weaken and deter the radicalization possibility of minority institutions. Kazakhstani government strictly controls the minorities. Political demands of minorities are strictly pressured and punished by the government. The ethnic management in Kazakhstan is controlled by ''Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan'' (*Assembleia Narodov Kazakhstana*). The assembly is the primary tool of the control mechanism of minority demands. In other words, the institution integrates a variety of minorities into the official system. The representatives of the nations are selected by the officially recognized national cultural centers. Needless to mention, these people are opted with reconciled people with the government. Therefore, Kazakhstani government creates its own depoliticized minority population through national cultural centers and the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan.

> The national-cultural centers and the Assembly lack a juridical status, legislative powers or political influence and are mainly designed to reward 'loyal' minority spokespersons and representatives with status and symbolic

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[299] Dave 2007: 131.

power. Instead of serving as channels for articulating minority claims, they provide a surrogate institutional infrastructure for symbolic representation and co-optation of notable non-titular figures. A crucial obligation of the Assembly is to display loyalty to the President, support his ethnic policy, and refrain from political activity or any form of ethnic entrepreneurship.[300]

As for minority reactions against the state policies, it will be more explanatory to focus on important minorities respectively. The state of belonging to Kazakhstan is very different among Russians, Germans, Koreans, Uygurs and Ukrainians. The common point of these minorities is that all of them have kin states or autonomous state, for the case of Uygurs outside of Kazakhstan. Therefore, the situations of these minorities are better than the minorities who lack a kin state outside of Kazakhstan. However, this situation at the same time is more complicated particularly for Russians who have a neighbor kin state, Russia.

5.4.3.1. Russians

Although Russian population was anxious about their future in Kazakhstan the discontent of future did not create any serious Russian minority movement. The government strategies of control added with ineffectual administration of ethnic Russian organizations and lack of external support of co-ethnics from Russian Federation were the main reasons of the failure of the emergence of political ethnic Russian movement. Furthermore, large scale emigration also effectively weakened Russians' contentious movement.[301] Therefore, Russians in Kazakhstan reluctantly accepted their marginalized status comparatively with the Soviet era. The ones who refused this weakening status has

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[300] Dave 2007: 131-132.

[301] Natsuya Oka, (2006). "The 'Triadic Nexus' in Kazakhstan: A Comparative Study of Russians, Uighurs, and Koreans", In Ieda, Osamu et al., (Eds.) *Beyond Sovereignty: From Status Law to Transnational Citizenship?*, Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, pp.359-380.

already out-migrated generally to Russian Federation which is almost equal to one quarter of Russian population in Kazakhstan ,as it was examined before.

At the initial years of the dissolution of Soviet Union, secession of the Russian dominated northern parts of Kazakhstan was expressed by intellectuals and politicians. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Nobel Prize winner writer, for instance, points out that particularly northern parts of Kazakhstan and other Russian dominated peripheries should incorporate with Russia in order to create ''Great Russia''. The sentiments of Solzhenitsyn were also shared with Russian nationalist groups, Cossack organizations and the Russian state Duma's Committee on Ties with Compatriots Abroad. However, there was neither endorsement of Russia's ruling elites nor Slavic leaders of Kazakhstan to materialize Solzhenitsyn's dreams. On the contrary, these kinds of speeches legitimized Kazakhstani government's fierce minority control policies.[302]

Slightly after independence in 1992, Russians organized a rally in Ust-Kamenogorsk. (The capital of the East Kazakhstan Oblast) 15000 people gathered and demanded self-government on the bases of Language, Culture and Exploitation of raw materials. Dual citizenship status was also voiced.[303] Russians organizations, most importantly ''LAD'' (Movement of Slavic Unity), campaigned against the 1993 and 1995 constitutions for the interests of Russians. The status of Russian language and dual citizenship issue were the key points of the opposition campaign. However, the

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[302] Dave 2007: 123-124.

[303] Oka 2006: 359-380.

effectiveness of LAD decreased when the leaders of the movement, Aleksandra

Dokuchaeva and her successor, Viktor Mikhailov left the country respectively.[304]

As for Cossack movements the Kazakhstani government finally achieves to create

fractions among the Cossack minority organizations. The strategy of dividing the

minority movements were criticized by the similarity of imperialistic divide and rule

policy.[305]

> Kazakhstani officials successfully exploited the personal and ideological rivalries
> among Cossack leaders, which led to the formation of two rival Cossack
> organizations. The Union of Semirech'e Cossacks, headed by Viktor Ovsiannikov,
> has received the tactical support of the Kazakhstani authorities, whereas the
> Semirech'e Cossack group, headed by Gennadii Belyakov, has remained closely
> associated with Russkaia obshchina (Russian Community)[306].

In 1998, Association of Russians, Cossacks, Slavic organizations of Kazakhstan

was established. However, it did not work properly due to the internal disputes. [307] After

2003, the Kazakhstani government intensified its pressure in order to deter all of the

radical sentiments among Russian organizations. Russian Federation and Russian

Orthodox Church in Almaty also supported the government to convert the Russian

organizations wholly to the homogenous pro-regime apparatus.[308] In this context, border

delimitation which is signed in 2005 between Russia and Kazakhstan reveals that Russia,

even if more powerful under Putin regime, did not meddle with minority issues of

Kazakhstan. Moreover, they fully support the Nazarbayev regime regarding the minority

issues as well.

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[304] Ibid.

[305] Dave 2007: 134.

[306] Dave 2007: 135.

[307] Oka: 2006: 359-380.

[308] Ibid.

5.4.3.2. Uyghurs

The minority statuses of Uyghurs are interesting because Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Province is part of People's Republic of China. China most of the time is blamed of human right abuses and suppression claims by international society. The ethnic tension between Chinese and Uyghurs complicate the status of Uyghur citizens in Kazakhstan. Simply Kazakhstani government is reluctant to take any burden at the expense of any tension with China. Therefore, the government bans Uighur independent movements and denies asylum seekers from China.[309] In this context, Shangai Cooperation Organization is very significant. The organization gives responsibilities to the partner states to take action against Extremism, Separatism and terrorism. As a result of economic ties and international agreements between China, the Kazakhstani government, indeed, do not have enough manoeuvre fields for its minority reactions concerning the status of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province. Moreover, Kazakhstani government is apprehensive about Islamic radicalism and irredentist territorial demands of Uyghurs. Ethno-territorial living space of Uyghurs dominantly covers South East part of Kazakhstan and Xinjiang Province. At this point, there are no demands such as independence or autonomy inside Kazakhstan among Kazakhstani Uyghurs. Nevertheless, some observers suspect irredentist and separatist demands.[310]

Kazakhtani Uyghurs are culturally Russified and they have ambivalent national feelings. As Natsuka Oka mentions few Uyghurs do not dream of having their own states. They have sympathy for their co ethnics who are suffering by Chinese

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[309] Ibid..

[310] Ibid.

suppression. However, they feel uncomfortable regarding the supportive activists of Xinjiang., Kazakhstani Uyghurs are not so much tolerant even for activists who refuse violence for political pressure on China. Kazakhstani Uyghurs are anxious about the increase of prejudices against their community as a result of these political activities.[311]

5.4.3.3. Germans

The traces of German Diaspora can be sought from the second half of the 18th century since Catharine the Great invited to Germans to cultivate and colonize the lands of the eastern parts of the Russian Empire. Important population of German Diaspora was resettled to Russia and north part of Kazakhstan. Furthermore, the deportations of Germans, particularly from the Volga region to Siberia and Kazakhstan, increased the German population in the region. As a result of German emigration to Kazakhstan Germans became the third most populated ethnic group. The 1989 census reveals that Germans composes 5.8 per cent population of Kazakhstan.[312]

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, most of the Germans living in Kazakhstan migrated to Germany. German laws which enables citizenship status the ones who have German ancestry facilitated and fastened this migration trend. Therefore, almost three fourths of Kazakhstani Germans migrated to Germany.[313] The 1999 census of Kazakhstan indicates that the population of Germans dropped from 5.8 percent to 2.4 percent in one decade.[314] Needless to say the background of the out-migrations of

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[311] Ibid.

[312] Olcott 2002: 249.

[313] Dave 2007: 133.

[314] http://www.rferl.org/section/Kazakhstan/158.html.

Germans from Kazakhstan is the socio-economic benefits of Germany. However, migrated German community encountered serious adaptation problems into the German social cultural life.

In this regard, it can be said that Germans of Kazakhstan are overwhelmingly Russified society and almost none of the new generations could able to speak German albeit the older generations who have proficiency of German language.[315] In this context, The migrated Germans who could not be adapted to the western German culture build a new minority identity that have strong ties with their old homeland and kin structures. In other words, migrated Kazakhstani Germans could not cut off the spiritual belonging ties of the old home land.[316]

5.4.3.4. Koreans

The Korean Diaspora in Kazakhstan was the victim of Stalin's deportations too. Indeed, the deportation of Koreans is the first massive ethnicity based transfer committed in Soviet Union. Almost entire population of Koreans (171,781 people) forcefully moved from Russian Far East to Kazakhstan in October 1937. The justification of the deportation was to stop the Japanese espionage penetrations in to the *Far Eastern Krai*. (Far Eastern Krai or Territory was an administrative subdivision of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic during 1926-1938.[317]

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[315] Dave 2007: 132.

[316] Darieva 2005: 170.

[317] Pavel Polyan, (2007). The Great Terror and deportation policy, *Demoscope Weekly*, No. 313-314, pp. 10–31.

Another important point is that prior to the deportation of Koreans, there was an attempt to invent Korean Autonomous Soviet Socialist republic in 1926. However, this attempt could not succeed because of the intense opposition of local Russians against the Autonomous republic of Koreans. Local Russians feared for the competition for land and were anxious of potential rising tension with Japan. Nevertheless, Koreans gained their oblast administrations, cultural rights and mother tongue education similar with the other nations of the Soviet Union.[318]

As for independent Kazakhstan period, Koreans of Kazakhstan are mainly associated with South Korea. The significant trade links between South Korea and Kazakhstan fastened the connection of Kazakhstani Koreans and their co ethnics from South Korea. At this point, the influence of North Korea was negligible. The developmental supremacy of South Korea easily consolidates the countries' hegemony on Korean Diaspora.[319]

The identity and citizenship conception of Koreans are different than Russians and Uyghurs.[320] Koreans voluntarily accepts non-native status and titular versus non-titular paradigm of ethno-nationalism. Moreover, they are indebted to ''hospitable Kazakh people'' who allow them to reside their ''own lands''. In this context, Koreans become the symbol of ideal minority on the eyes of Kazakhstani elites. Association of Koreans of Kazakhstan never abstains to demonstrate its pro-Nazarbayev position. Some of top

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[318] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deportation_of_Koreans_in_the_Soviet_Union.

[319] Oka 2006: 359-380.

[320] Ibid.

members of the cultural organization gained representation in the parliament via *Otan* (Fatherland) which is the biggest pro-Nazarbayev party in Kazakhstan.[321]

Briefly, Koreans of Kazakhstan are never conceived as a threat for the Nazarbayev regime. The members of Korean association were promoted by the government. Consistently with the multiple reetnification nation building models of Kazakhstani elites, the education in Korean language and the use age of the language has been supported by the government. The government facilitates Korean Peninsula's, particularly South Korea, penetration to Kazakhstan to enhance Korean cultural identity. Another important point with this regard is that the Korean Diaspora was reluctant to out migrate to Korean peninsula. The Russian speaking Koreans were physiologically bounded with Kazakhstan and did not take radical steps generally such as leaving the country.

5.4.3.5. Ukrainians

The roots of the Ukrainian Diaspora in Kazakhstan derived from the second half of the 18th century. The first comers were "Haidamaks", a rebellion group which was consisted of paramilitary Ukrainian and Cossack peasants. *Haidamaks* were involved in the ethnic cleansing against Catholic Poles and Ukrainians in the peasant uprising of 1768. Therefore, Russian Government exiled them to the North parts of Kazakhstan. Rather than exile, the peasants seeking for more land emigrated Kazakhstan at the end of the 19th century. This movement escalated with Russian Prime minister Stoypin's land reforms. By 1926 according to the Soviet Census, Ukrainians of Kazakhstan reached

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[321] Ibid.

860,000 persons. During the collectivization period, approximately 60,000 Ukrainian Kulaks from western territories of Ukraine deported to Kazakhstan as well. Indeed, this deportation is particular, because Ukrainian Catholics from Western territories had been exiled first time. The deportation of Western Ukrainians continued before and during the Second World War.[322]

According to 1989 census of Kazakhstan Ukrainian population consists 5.4 percent of the total population. However, the 1999 census reveals that the population of Ukrainians declined to 3.7 per cent.[323]

As for post-soviet period, we can simply observe that similar with Korean and German Diasporas, Kazakhstani Ukrainians are generally a Russified community. Nevertheless, Kazakhstani government, coherent with the reetnification policies for minorities, supports the development of Ukrainian culture and language. Kazakhstani Government funded a Ukrainian newspaper and currently 20 Ukrainian Culture Centers that sponsor Sunday schools, choirs, folk dancing groups operating throughout the country. In addition, Astana hosts a Ukrainian high school.[324]

Indeed, Kazakhstani elites promoting of Ukrainian culture is not specific only for Ukrainians. As it was mentioned in previous chapters, the promotion of minority languages and culture has a background mission which aims to decrease the hegemony of Russians and Russian language on the other minorities. Therefore, not only

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[322] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainians_in_Kazakhstan.

[323] Andrew Wilson, (1999). *"*The Ukrainians: Engaging the 'Eastern Diaspora' ", In Charles King, Neil Melvin, (Eds.) *Nations Abroad*., Westview Press, pp.103-132.

[324] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainians_in_Kazakhstan.

Ukrainians but also other small minorities promoted coherently with the background mission of Kazakhstani elites. Nazarbayev's speech at the founding meeting of Assembly of Peoples reveals the goal of decreasing the hegemony of Russians by promoting the other minorities.

> The President often plays the role of protector of the ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, i.e. the smaller ones. At the founding meeting of the Assembly of Peoples in March 1995 the President emphasized the role of the non-Kazak, non-Russian parts of the population, which , according to the President , amount to 20 percent of the population. In order to reach this figure he was obliged to include Belarusians and Ukrainians as non-Russians, which is a dubious maneuver in Kazakhstani setting. In addition, he also had to disregard the fact that most Diaspora nationalities have been thoroughly Russified. Germans, Poles, and Koreans have to attend language courses to be able to speak their mother tongue.[325]

In this context, as for Ukrainian minority organizations, cultural centers, most of them are dominated with Western Ukrainians. Indeed, consistent with the historical division of Ukrainian Diaspora, this is not surprising that most of the Ukrainian minority organizations consist of members of western Ukrainian origin. These catholic dominated members of Ukrainians are more willing to differentiate themselves from the Slavic Orthodox movements. Hence, the government's aim of instigation of differences of the Slavic movements precisely serves on behalf of the government concerning the Ukrainian Diaspora division.[326]

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[325] Holm-Hansen 1999: 212-213.

[326] Dave 2007: 134.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this thesis the evaluation of nationality policies in Kazakhstan has been analyzed. The continuity from Soviet to Post soviet nationality policies was emphasized as the most important determinant which shapes the post soviet nation building of Kazakhstan. In this context, it is argued that soviet nationality policies are at the same time valid for soviet type nation building policies particularly for the titular republics. Nation building policies can be implemented in various kinds of ideologies. Hence, as for Soviet past, soviet style nation building, creates new nations and consolidates the old ones along with the reflection of "socialist in content national in form" concept.

Indeed, Bolsheviks had limited knowledge concerning nationalism. They were enthusiastic to consider nationalism as a temporary bourgeois phenomenon. The classical heritage of Marxism also inspired the Bolsheviks to conceptualize nationalism in an instrumental manner. Therefore, the national minorities and, the nationality question in the socialist ideology were generally considered to have a strategical impact on class relations. In this context, the classic Marxist conceptualization of nationalism is incoherent and overwhelmingly ad hoc.[327]

As for the structure of the soviet style nation building policies, the argument of Terry Martin named ''Russians first among Equals'' is accepted. The concept that Russians were first among equals was not a predetermined strategy for the Bolsheviks. It was invented under the Stalin rule and even declared officially. In the initial years of

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[327] Kymlicka 1995: 72.

Bolshevik rule, Soviet nations found more space to develop cultural and ethno-territorial institutionalization by Lenin's more tolerant policies. With the nativization program of the Bolsheviks the titular educational system and national cultural institutions were created coherently. While the Bolshevik government was sponsoring the ethno cultural revival of nations of the Soviets simultaneously they were pressuring Russian nationalism as well. In the era of *Korenizatsiia* policies, Bolsheviks were skeptical and intolerant about the possibility of increase of Russian nationalism. However, everything began to change with the start of collectivization policies. Stalin did not only remove the pressure on Russian nationalism but also supported the Russians consistently with the concept that the Russians were first among Equals. *Korenizatsiia* policies not applied to the small nations that could not gain union republic level during the Stalin period. SSRs and ASSRs were promoted other small ethnic groups under the titular nations, and forced them to accept titular nations' institutional structures and Russian dominance. Russian language became the inter-ethnic language of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Russians were enjoying the mere nation with similar rights to extra territorial autonomy rights out of RFSR.

Close connections with Russians and Kazakhs as a result of geographic location and historical relations merged with the multinational alteration of the demography. Therefore, Kazakhstan became one of the most Russified union republics of the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that Kazakh language and culture were promoted by the Soviet state, the multinational demographic structure of the country naturally forced the primary usage of Russian language that is the lingua franca of the Soviet Union. As a result, urban Kazakh society was rapidly Russified and, they even began to prefer to speak Russian language in the private sphere.

The dissolution of the Soviet State forced Kazakhstan to reluctantly declare independence in 1991. Kazakhstan was deeply connected with Russia and she had approximately the same Russian population as the titular nation Kazakhs in the time of independence. Therefore, nationalizing trend among post-Soviet nation states in favor of titular nationalities was much more complicated for Kazakhstan in that the titular nation could not gain the majority population in the initial years of independence. However, things changed quickly. Kazakhstan began to implement ethno-nationalist policies in favor of Kazakhs. Post-soviet economic conditions and the life standards of people quickly deteriorated. As for nationality issues, the dissolution of the Soviet Union created identity problems not only among minorities but also among Kazakhs as well. In this chaotic atmosphere, most Russians who were skeptical on the various issues for the future of Kazakhstan preferred to migrate. Most of the emigrants were the skillful technicians or managers who were crucial for the economic development of Kazakhstan. In the fourth chapter, it is explained the initial ethno nationalist policies began to be softened particularly after the acceptance of Russian language as an official language. Therefore, the nation building policies were analyzed from two aspects: One of these is ethno-nationalist nation building policies and, the other one is civic dimensional nation building policies. No state with pure ethno-national or civic components exists since Kymlicka points out that every nation building has both ethnic and civic components.[328] Therefore, it is not easy to label the two parts pure ethnic or civic nation building. However, what is certain is that the status of Kazakhs has increased at the expense of Russians. At this point, it is acknowledged that the Russian face of soviet type nation

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[328] Will Kymlicka, (2008)." Sonuç: Milliyetçiliğin Geleceği",In Umut Özkırımlı (Ed.) *21. Yüzyılda Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, pp.159-166

building converted into Kazakh face in the post-Soviet time. With the exception of the initial ethno-nationalist dreams, Nazarbayev regime simply duplicated the multinational soviet template and tried to adopt this into the post-Soviet period. As Holm-Hansen mentions the Kazakhstani elites supported multiple reethnification process in order to decrease the hegemony of Russians as well. Moreover, there is no coherency between rhetoric and implementation concerning nationality policies of post-Soviet Kazakhstan. The rhetoric remains more civic however the implementation goes on more ethnic.[329] Kazakhstani elites spent much more energy to Kazakhify the country rather than to Kazakhstanify. President Nazarbayev's invitation ''Eurasianism'' instead of ''Soviet Man'' concept could not take enough attention and could not solve the identity problem just like the Soviet Union.

In the fifth chapter by analyzing various tools of the nation building theory the ethnic or civic components of the nation building structure was revealed. The language and demography issue, state symbols and minority relations were analyzed. State symbols of Kazakhstan derived from the elements of traditional Kazakh culture. In this sense, state symbols involve ethnic components. The elites of Kazakhstan attempted to control minorities in various ways. Territorial Gerrymandering was one of the most important tools in this context. First of all the capital relocated from Almaty to Astana with the aim of increasing the central authority in the north Russian dominated regions. Kazakhstani governments also carried out administrative divisions particularly in the north regions. Demographically Russian dominated regions merged with Kazakh dominated regions. Hence, the intensive Russian population of North Kazakhstan

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[329] Usta 2007: 145.

decreased. As a result of Gerrymandering policies, the titular nation, Kazakhs achieved to be in the majority status even in the most Russian dominated northern regions. The Kazakhstani government was also intolerant to the political representation of nations or ethnic groups. Western style of minority conceptualization was never mentioned, and Kazakhstan was shown as a unity of equal nations by the elites. Even though the elites supported cultural development of ethnic groups or minorities, they strictly suppressed the political demands of these people. Particularly, Russian dissidents were strictly punished. Moreover, the government did not allow public meetings and rejected various kinds of minority demands from secession to autonomy. The government only allowed the representation of loyal minorities in the Assembly of Nations. Indeed, the Assembly of nations integrated non-Kazakh population into the official state approach of minorities. The minority demands or representation out of official ideology were strictly controlled and punished. As a result of softening ethno-nationalist policies and central control of minorities, the Kazakhstani government managed to impose its official agendas regarding nationality issues. The alteration of "first among equals, from Russians to Kazakhs" seems to be accepted by public opinion, since there was not an important confrontation from particularly Russian minorities against the official nationality policies of the elites.

To sum up, post-Soviet elites of Kazakhstan adopted the Soviet template of nationality issues with Kazakh face. The hegemony of Russians was transformed into the hegemony of Kazakhs after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In this thesis, this alteration was analyzed and, both the Soviet and post-Soviet period nationality policies were examined in a historical perspective. The Soviet heritage contrary to the expectations instigated the ethnic nationalism among Soviet citizens. Although the

Soviet template contains risks for the future due to the ethnic codification of nation building policies, the belonging of Kazakhstan did not develop. Hence, it will be very difficult to create solidarity among citizens under the possible worse social and economic conditions. In this context, in order to minimize the ethnic conflict risks, what wise to do is creating a civic inclusive Kazakhistani supra identity under which all the citizens can be united easily. Nevertheless, it should be stated that the ethnically codified nationality concept of the Soviet heritage is much better than the exclusive ethno-national policies in terms of ethnic harmony and peace.

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
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