

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND GROUP ATTACHMENT:
INTERPLAY OF FREE-RIDING BEHAVIOUR AND PATRIOTISM

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ABSTRACT

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Conflict between self-interest and group-interest constitute a challenge for the individuals and the groups. The conflict should be resolved for a healthy maintenance of collective action; otherwise the free-rider problem is a likely result. This thesis is about the individual motivation loss -psychological aspect of free-rider problem- and its relation to group attachment –patriotism-. Free-riding is proposed to be related to patriotism; and guilt, shame and pride emotions. Experimental manipulations include an announcement and confederate condition. Patriotism is analysed within the framework of constructive and blind patriotism. An experiment –public goods game- measuring free-riding behaviour was conducted for the study. A total of 192 participants took a part in the experiment

(98 females and 85 males). Free-riding was found to be negatively related to constructive patriotism; but no significant relation to blind patriotism was found.

A look at the concept and development of “individual” and social capital theory is provided in order to help conceptualise the problem. Results and possible implications of the empirical findings are discussed. Implications are also discussed in a politically and culturally relevant way to Turkey.

Key words: Free-riding, collective action, constructive patriotism, blind patriotism, social capital, guilt, shame, pride, individual

ÖZ

KOLEKTİF EYLEM VE GRUBA BAĞLANMA: BEDAVACILIK VE VATANSEVERLİK İLİŞKİSİ

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Bireysel çıkar ve grup çıkarları arasındaki uyuşmazlık hem bireyler hem de gruplar için aşılması gereken bir engeldir. Bu uyuşmazlığın çözümü, kolektif eylemin sağlıklı bir şekilde devam ettirilebilmesi için önemlidir; aksi takdirde bedavacılık davranışı olası bir sonuçtur. Bu tez, bireysel motivasyon kaybı - bedavacılık sorununun psikolojik yönü- ve bu kaybın grup bağlanmasıyla – vatanseverlik- ilişkisi üzerinedir. Bedavacılığın, vatanseverlik, suçluluk, utanç ve gurur duygularıyla ilişkili olduğu düşünülmüştür. Duyuru ve ittifakçı (confederate) deneysel manipülasyonları kullanılmıştır. Vatanseverlik, kör ve yapıcı vatanseverlik çerçevesinde incelenmiş,

Bu tez kapsamında, bedavacılıđı ölçen bir -kamusal mallar oyunu- deney uygulanmıřtır. 98 kadın ve 85 erkekten oluřan, 192 kiřilik bir örneklem deneye katılmıřtır. Bedavacılık yapıcı vatanseverlikle negatif iliřki göstermiř, ancak kör vatanseverlikle herhangi bir iliřkisi bulunamamıřtır. “Birey”in geliřimi ve sosyal sermaye kuramı çerçevesinde sorun kavramsallařtırılmıřtır. Deneysel bulgular ve olası çıkarımları tartiřılmıřtır. Çıkarımların tartiřmasında Türkiye’nin siyasi ve kültürel yapısıyla da iliřkilendirme yapılmıřtır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Bedavacılık, kolektif eylem, yapıcı vatanseverlik, kör vatanseverlik, sosyal sermaye, suçluluk, utanç, gurur, birey

To my grandmother,

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The role of the “individual” in the modern societies and democracies is still ambiguous. It is even more ambiguous in a society like ours in Turkey. Certain forms of group attachment and requirements of collective existence might be in conflict. The vagueness of the individual might be interpreted as one reason underlying this conflict. Put it more clearly; being an individual and being a citizen (or member) might not coincide (Condor & Gibson, 2007) and this might bear contradictory attitudes and behaviours.

The present study intends to seek answers to questions stemming from these contradictions. Individuals should be mobilised for collective action and should be attached to their groups for the maintenance of the group. Although collective action does not depend on group attachment; group attachment is frequently used to mobilise individuals (Vandevelde, 1997). Problem arises when individual interests/motivations are conflicting with group interests/motivations.

Free-riding behaviour, as an individual motivation loss (Kerr and Bruun, 1983) to contribute to collective action; and patriotism, as a form of group attachment based on citizenship (and distinguished from nationalism) (Schatz, Staub & Lavine, 1999) are thought to be related in a way that represents the contradiction between individual vs. group interests. This thesis explores the relationship

between free-riding behaviour and patriotism. Personal features like shame/guilt orientation are thought to be related to free-riding.

1.1. Introduction

In order to be able to formulate a social psychological analysis of the group based problems, one needs to consider one of the main aims of the groups; collective production. The interpersonal vs. intergroup ends of the continuum that Tajfel and Turner (1986, p.74) draw for the analysis of intergroup behaviour; might also be drawn as the individual and the group. Humans are members to groups. They need to be part of the collective production (and groups) in order to maintain a stable community (Olson, 1965), and to remain fit in order to survive (Boyd & Richerson, 2009).

Through depersonalised perception (Hogg and Hains, 1996), in-group members are liked as embodiments of the group rather than as individuals. Hogg and Hains suggest that this kind of perception is influenced directly by identification with the group. We might expect that as the cooperation among individuals is essential for the maintenance of the group (McMahon, 2001), increase in the identification with the in-group should accompany higher cooperation among in-group members. Is that really so?

Where does the individual stand in relation to the in-group, out-group and other individuals? Where is the line between the individual and the citizen? Where does the privileges of individual end and citizen's responsibilities start, or is that how it works? Defining the group member becomes a question. Is the group member an

individual, a citizen, or something else? In order to understand the group member (the modern individual) and its actions, we need to look at the historical process of the definition of group member. As Rose (1996, p.3) puts it, our contemporary self has the benefits of capacities, rights and privileges; and costs of burdens, anxieties and disappointment. When we talk about group attachment and identification, what motivates individuals to feel attached to the group and cooperate with other individuals within the group?

In this thesis, I will be tackling these questions and empirically demonstrate how attachment to one's country can be understood from a holistic perspective. I will consider psychological, social and economic aspects that complete the picture of patriotism as a form of group attachment. While doing this, I will take a look at the concept of "individual" and try to define the individual in context. What is an individual, when and how did it come to be recognised as a separate entity, what are the cultural differences in the perception of it and where does it stand in our modern societies?

As I outline and produce thoughts on the individual, I will widen the scope and take a more distant look on the relations between the individuals. The individuals make up the group and the maintenance of the group requires the coordinated actions of the individuals. I will take a look at the concept of "social capital" here, in order to gain a better insight into the social organisation of actions through trust, norms and networks (Putnam, 1993, 167). After a look at how the social networks operate in modern society, I will take a closer look at how collective

action is organised and how the free-riding problem is permeated in our daily lives and in our whole economic and social organisation.

As well as the rational and functional ties with the group, the individual is also emotionally attached to his/her group. I will take a look at patriotism as a form of attachment to one's country and try to demonstrate how a holistic conception of patriotism includes many more aspects than merely the love for one's country. Building on the previous literature presented, I will try to show how (constructive) patriotism is a form of attachment that might include an awareness of "individualness" through taking part in collective production and other social organisation processes as an individual, as well as the identification and attachment aspects.

1.2. Individual

The individual that has the right to choose is an individual that has responsibility. The individuals are the actors of collective action and are active agents capable of social change (Gergen, 2003). Different cultures have promoted different self-construals (e.g. individualism vs. collectivism) and defined the individual differently (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Definition of individual varies depending on who defines it. Individual is not the same object for the state, religion, military, political parties etc. The importance attached to a social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) might be one factor that influences the perception of the individual.

1.2.1. Individual as the agent of modern age

Shaping the "individual" is thought to be achieved by certain means; through

“conduct of conduct” (Rose, 1996), ideology, technologies of the self (Foucault, 1988) and other mechanisms. Cold war and the ideological rivalry led into differing views on the role of the individual in the polarised world. Although I use the term individual, it is an inference and used for practical reasons. I believe “the individual” as a separate entity was ignored among the individualist-collectivist, eastern-western, capitalist-communist, self-others and many more distinctions made. The individual was regarded as ineffective, passive and erased faces (Kuçuradi, 1997). McMahon (2001) notes that although group output is not restricted to individual events; such combinations are aggregates of individual action, so (modern) individual is not necessarily an *erased face*.

The individual needs special attention before we go on to other topics like free-riding and patriotism, both of which attribute responsibility to the individual as a choosing entity. According to Rose (1996, p.2) technologies and techniques that hold personhood (individual as for our conception) together are identity, selfhood, autonomy and individuality and these define being human. The (modern) individual is characterised by freedom and freedom defines the norms, power relations and our selves (Rose, 1996, p.16). Individuals are “obliged to be free” and it limits the thinkable and governance through freedom is thus applied. Individuals are subjects of freedom and rather than a limitless horizon of thought, it gives a limit to the potential self-fulfilment of the active and autonomous individual. Besides, freedom provides a basis for how we construct our own selves through unfree individuals, such as the poor, homeless, mad or risky, by excluding them (Rose, 1996, p.16; Foucault, 1988, p.146). Furthermore, Luhmann

(1986) sees self-reference as a modern way of reconstructing the individual; and claims it might have been attractive among the century's political climate. According to him, the religion too was "individualised" and the salvation was asked for the self rather than for others. As Beck (2002) puts it, people desire "living their own lives" more than everything else. He asserts that people are less willing to obey commands and make sacrifices for the sake of others. He also states that the old mechanisms of nation state, family, class and ethnicity are in decline and we must find a new way of bringing out social order and cohesion, paying special attention to the rise of individual; who wants to control his/her life and is the central character of our age. Individuals are active managers of their lives bearing self-responsibility; and our societies are characterised by "conflictual coexistence" rather than by solidarity and obligation. Although individual has a positive connotation for the first time in history, the societal relations are complicated in the globalised pool of identities. Individual as a political actor is also in question, as the influences of the homogenous collective actors continue. Beck (2002) also emphasises the importance of self-reference like Luhmann (1986). Luhmann gives a historical analysis of the individual and states that there was no way to define individuality until the French Revolution and that labour and property were possible ways to set the individual in context within the social. The individual came to be recognised as the "subject" of his/her life and of the world.

1.2.2. Individual within the society

Luhmann (1986) indicates that the antithesis between the individual vs. society or individualism vs. collectivism is not welcomed in sociology. However, at this point we should question the relationship between the individual and society and how does the change in the conception of individual influence the society at large? Foucault (1988) asks the question; “How have we been led to recognise ourselves as a society, as part of a nation or state?”, when he produces thoughts on the political technology of individuals. It is a vital question pertaining to the quest for a thorough definition of individual. He goes on to mention J.P.Frank’s book called “*System einer vollstaendigen Medicinische Polizei*”. This book is prepared with the aim of presenting a detailed public healthcare programme for the first time. The importance of the book lies in the recognition of the individual by the state; now that the individual is something to be cared of. Yet, Foucault points out some contradictions. The time the healthcare plan (1779) is brought forward, is also the beginning of the French Revolution and huge massacres will follow. He uses the slogan: “Go get slaughtered and we promise you a long and pleasant life”. The slogan is not out of date. The human made disasters and human rights campaigns go hand in hand even today.

Therefore, the individual is seemingly a free entity; however individuals are connected to each other and to higher units (be it political or not), such as society, nation, tribe etc. Maalouf (1998, p.22) points out to the fact that although his diverse individual (identity) features relate him to many people in the world, his whole identity makes him a unique person. According to him, we should focus on

the similarities with others rather than differences we have. However, some individuals tend to be limited in scope with their attachment to their countries and as the in-group identification gets stronger, people tend to focus on the differences they have with others (Schatz and Staub, 1997).

Similar processes can be seen in diplomacy. Our age is the age of national interests and their conflicts most of the time. National interests are put ahead and this “rational” politics is taken for granted by individuals (Burchill, 2005, p. 13). Rose (1996) claims that in the liberal democracies, the meaning of life and the individual has been shaped by what he calls psy sciences. Liberty, autonomy and choice have been defined by these sciences in liberal democracies and being “free to choose”, subjects (individuals) have had to be free. According to him, “liberalism does not recognise freedom as a right of the individual; but the individual as the potential subject of freedom.” Individuals, in realisation of their limits of freedom, must do their parts and contribute to the system running. As mentioned before, individuals think the thinkable and contribute to the system as they are working for their own maximum self-fulfilment. Through this process, individuals invent their selves (Rose, 1996, p.17).

Hacking (1986) writes in a similar manner and argues that individual is “glorified as a theme” in the second half of the 20th century by the liberal democracies. He seems to agree with the discussion on the limits of freedom and the relative freedom of the individuals as the title of his article explains; “Making up people”. For him, the limits of freedom include the possibilities of action, not just the actions we have done, but the ones we might have done. The idea is similar to that

of Rose's (1996) idea that sees freedom as a sum of the possible actions, which is actually limited.

1.2.3. Individual vs. Citizen

The political actor of the modern age is the individual. An early study on modernisation by Alex Inkeles (1975) gives an idea on how the dominant (western) ideology defines a modern nation and the role of the individual. For Inkeles, the modern nation is built upon the active citizenship and modernity is acquired through individualisation process. In this large fieldwork, they use certain institutions as central to the definition of modernity, such as the factory, media and education, as well as the personal attributes such as; openness to experience, personal efficacy, autonomy and interest in public affairs. As such, they define the modern man as an individual as we understand; and as a responsible active citizen.

Condor and Gibson (2007) summarise the distinction made between the active vs. passive citizenship; pertaining to a question asked in the beginning of this thesis about the privileges of the individual and responsibilities of the citizen. Inkeles' (1975) definition of the modern man (active citizen) is part of the definition now; as the rights and status of the citizen are also included in the definition of (passive) citizenship. Besides, Condor and Gibson (2007) point out that national identity is not included in the definition of citizenship traditionally in England and they question that political participation might not necessarily be a prerequisite for responsible citizenship. Some respondents in this study use civic responsibility as a justification for not participating in traditional political processes.

Haste (2004), in her thought provoking article on constructing the citizen, asks if the aim is to create an informed citizen or efficacious citizen. Knowledge alone might not be sufficient to create the good citizen, as in the case of passive citizenship where knowledge does not turn into action. According to Haste (2004), “good citizen” is based on the “responsible citizen”. For her, responsibility is not a strictly clear term. Responsibility might refer to duty and obligation; to the other individuals and society at large, connection; interdependencies within the family and community, and judgement of principle; the morality in the form of conscience. The good citizen’s responsibility to any of these might be in conflict with another. Being responsible to personal ties might breach social norms and values of responsibility to collective good, or the principle might be in conflict with establishments of society. In terms of participation, the citizen then is not meant to be politically involved only; but civic participation is also a form of engagement. The antecedents of participation are thus a sense of agency and personal efficacy; and identification with the project (country/ nation in our case).

The reason I elaborated on the concept of individual and provided a background is the changing meanings of the content of the self and individual. The concept of self has been invented and has become an object to itself as Danzinger (1997) puts it. Becoming an object of self-scrutiny (Danzinger, 1997) and becoming an object of social-scrutiny as Foucault (1988) claims, - the individual not only being judged by the behaviour; but also by the intentions, beginning with the Christian confession tradition- the interdependence of the individuals have increased. The relation of the individual will be revisited later.

1.3. Social Capital

The emphasis on the individual in the western liberal democracies is not universal. As Ergun (1991) suggests for the Turkish case, society should be above the individual. The individual and individualism is not the same according to him and that Turkey is a country where individuality has not developed in the western sense. Thus, we should not hold the individuals completely accountable for their behaviour according to this line of thought and it brings the responsibility discussion into question. Social relations should not be analysed by taking the individual as the basis, according to this viewpoint.

The social organisation is made up of individuals and coordination and cooperation are essential for the maintenance of the society, as emphasised before. Responsibility here, refers to the responsibility of the position or role in the society; as Field (2008, p.2) puts it “responsibilities are defined in terms of a position rather than a person”. However, he goes on to explain that personal contacts are preferred over formal procedures to make things happen. Ties between the individuals and between individuals and institutions are thus crucial.

In modern societies, the ties between “strangers” in the society become essential and sustainable social relations are built upon the reciprocity principle (Cook, 2005). Putnam (1995) calls this “organised reciprocity” and sees it (and civic solidarity) as a precondition for socioeconomic modernisation. We are not talking about small and closed communities; but large and interconnected societies in the modern world; and in these new networked societies the traditional social control mechanisms do not apply. Cook (2005) puts forward that it is “trust” that works as

a social control mechanism; but it certainly carries the risk of defection and exploitation; or “opportunism” as she quotes from Williamson (1989, cited in Cook, 2005).

1.3.1. Defining Social Capital

“Features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.” This is how Putnam (1993, 169) defines the term social capital in his study of comparing the performances of regional governments in Southern and Northern Italy. He concludes that Northern regions were more successful and this success was due to the mutual relations between civil society and the institutions in this region. Although the term social capital has been pronounced and studied before Putnam, he brought it to public attention and made it a popular concept (Altay, 2007). Field (2008, p.3) argues that people tend to help those people that they know, or feel something in common or expect reciprocity; and thus people they trust. Building on this, cooperation to achieve mutual goals is easier if people share similar values, Field goes on to say.

Putnam (1995, 2000) later applied his study in Italy to the United States and claimed that people are becoming more and more disengaged from public life and the loosening bonds give less reason to people to cooperate and work for others. He explains that it is the behaviours that require collective action have declined in the US over the past decades and this type of behaviour is vulnerable to free-

riding and coordination problems. (Putnam, 2000, p.45). Putnam (2000, p.288) explains three central benefits of social capital as:

1- Social capital allows citizens to resolve collective problems more easily. Dilemmas of collective action (free-riding, prisoner's dilemma, tragedy of the commons) are best resolved by institutional mechanisms that have the power to ensure compliance with the desirable behaviour. Social norms and the networks that enforce them provide such a mechanism.

2- Trust in repeated interactions will also turn social capital into economic capital, wealth and economic advancement.

3- People with social capital develop better character traits; such as more tolerance, less cynical, more empathetic.

1.3.2. Social Capital and Collective Action

Social capital contributes to collective action (Putnam, 1993, 173). It provides the social control mechanisms to discourage free-riders and reinforce the norm of reciprocity through the flow of information about the actors (thus giving idea for future cooperation with the actor).

“Bowling alone” (Putnam, 2000) is a strong metaphor to emphasise the decline in civil society and associational activity in the US that brings people together. Civil society and civic engagement have been seen as key concepts paving the way to democracy, and western democracies and the USA have been role models to post-communist countries and other countries that work for democratization (Putnam,

1995). Everyday life examples of the benefits of social capital range from looking for a job to seek help when moving a house, and from seeking help in depression to asking for money when we need urgently. Putnam (2000) offers a distinction between bridging and bonding social capital. Bridging social capital brings socially diverse people together and creates links between individuals and institutions at a broader level. Bonding social capital reinforces in-group homogeneity and mobilizes solidarity among group members. Field (2008) emphasises that the excess of mutual informal cooperation might lead to discrimination against those outside of that network.

Social capital describes the ways an individual can become a part of the community, the ways an individual can feel s/he is an active and effective citizen. Perkins, Hughey and Speer (2002) argue social capital from a community psychology perspective and stress the importance of the individual level of analysis of social capital. Putnam's focus was on the macro analysis rather than the individual level of analysis; so Perkins et al. (2002) argue that the individual level of analysis should not be ignored. Perkins et al. (2002) suggest that there are formal and informal types of individual social capital. "Sense of community" (such as neighbouring relations, which are seen bonding type of social capital) is an informal social capital and "collective efficacy / empowerment" (citizen participation in community organisations, representing belief in the efficacy of formally organised action) is a formal type of individual social capital.

Participation is a key indicator of the decline in the community as Putnam (2000) points out. For him, participation is not only political participation (voting,

becoming a member of a political party, taking part in a demonstration etc); he uses many other indicators, such as being a member to local associations, volunteering, visiting and spending time with friends and neighbours and many other activities.

Sense of community and collective efficacy are two important variables that might shed light on participation. If one feels attached to the community s/he lives in (sense of community) and believes his/her efforts will contribute to the community's operations (collective efficacy); s/he might be more likely to participate in social and political processes. This is one of the premises of this thesis that will be explained in more details later.

1.3.3. Trust and Collective Action

A key component of social capital is trust that will help us understand how people participate and cooperate. (Field, 2008, p.69). Uslaner (2002) distinguishes between particularised trust –individual's own observation of a particular actor– and generalized trust – that extends to all individuals and institutions. Putnam's (1995, 2000) theory holds that (generalised) trust is an essential factor for civic engagement and participation. Muhlberger (2003) claims however that research does not support this expected relationship strongly. According to him, generalised trust might contain features that promote or inhibit participation. Trust in other people's participation might inhibit some people's own participation. Muhlberger (2003) suggest that political trust is a more reliable measure than generalised trust, especially considering political collective action.

Knack and Keefer (1997) put forward that trust and civic cooperation are associated with stronger economic performance. Besides, contrary to Putnam's theory, associational activity is not correlated with economic performance according to these authors. Their study based on the World Values Survey data¹ demonstrate that trust and norms of civic cooperation are stronger in countries with effective formal institutions (protecting property and contract rights) and in countries that are less polarized along lines of class or ethnicity. They claim that trust and mutual confidence is functional in high-trust societies in that it reduces the time needed on monitoring the processes (contracts, written agreements and other economic relations); whereas formal enforcement is needed more in low-trust societies.

Another important assertion Knack and Keefer (1997) have is the political effects of trust and civic norms. They claim that citizens with high levels of political knowledge and participation (civic-minded people) serve as potential checks to the government and this reduces the collective action problems such as low voter turnout. The authors go on to summarise the empirical findings and state that trust and civic norms of cooperation increase the possibility of voting and the perception of voting as a civic duty. Perception of voting as a civic duty is a crucial element of the "active citizen" (Inkeles, 1975; Condor and Gibson, 2007) discussed in the "Individual" section.

¹ WORLD VALUES SURVEY 2005 OFFICIAL DATA FILE v.20090901, 2009. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

Field (2008, p.24) summarizes the “rational choice theory” in economics; that individuals pursue their self-interests and social interaction is a form of social exchange. This theory has an individualistic perspective, in that it claims that individuals work for self-interests regardless of others. That is a serious problem for collective action. Coleman, in *Foundations of Social Theory* (1994), stress the social capital as a mean to how people actually cooperate, despite the rational choice theory’s assertions (and himself as a proponent of this theory). He brings together the individual and the collective in his understanding of social capital. Field (2008, p.11) states that social capital is the recognition of the “social” in the individual oriented economics approach. For Coleman, social capital is a public good and collective action is required to create that capital. Social capital is a public good; as individuals cannot be excluded from the use of it (non-excludability principle) and usage of the capital by one individual does not restrict the usage of other (non-rivalry principle) (Samuelson, 1954).

The individualised society should bring together an understanding of togetherness. Self-interested individuals are not expected to vote or contribute to the collective action according to the game theory (Tuck, 2008). If we want to make up “new” people (Hacking, 1986) or construct “new” citizens (Haste, 2004), we should recognise the importance of trust and cooperative norms. Strangers in modern societies depend on each other to maintain a social order and the importance of where one was born becomes less important within the concept of citizenship (Cook, 2005). However, as Uslaner and Conley (2003) notes, people who only feel integrated to their own (ethnic) community participate only in organisations

of their own (ethnic) community or fall off from civic life. These people do not tend to participate at issues regarding larger society they live in and the authors identify them as particularised trusters. Especially in societies with diverse ethnic groups, generalised trust should be created through strengthening the social ties among groups. Cook (2005) points out that these closed social networks damage the economic development as she notes how, many people still maintained these trust networks in Russia called blat (Boll, 1969), after the fall of Soviet regime.

1.3.4. Individualism and Social Capital

Individual(ism) has had a negative impact on the disappearance of solidarity and social ties among people according to some scholars and has been blamed to destruct the trust between people as Allik and Realo (2004) summarise. In their article investigating the relation of social capital to individualism-collectivism, they oppose the view that individualism is a reason for the declining trust, civic order and that it is harmful for the common good. Their analysis of the USA data shows that higher levels of social capital (using the indices of civic engagement and political activity) are associated with higher levels of individualism. Data from 37 countries around the world shows a similar pattern, a positive correlation between individualism and interpersonal trust is found. The authors note that the division of functions and roles in society unites people rather than separate them. Kimmelmeier, Jambor and Letner (2006) similarly provide evidence that volunteering and charity giving is higher in more individualist states in the USA and they reject the idea that cultural individualism is incompatible with community involvement. According to these authors, individualism is a set of

shared “collective” worldview; it is not merely made up of individual preferences; thus it can bring a community together. Another interesting finding from the study of Allik and Realo (2006) is that when the GDP per capita is controlled for, the relationship between interpersonal trust and individualism becomes insignificant, in the data of 37 nations. The authors note the strong relationship between wealth and individualism and argue that the increase in social capital might be a product of economic prosperity.

Income is positively associated with active participation (Allik and Realo, 2006; Fidrmuc and Gërkhani, 2007) and trust and civic cooperation are associated with stronger economic performance (Knack and Keefer, 1997); thus economic capital is not irrelevant to social capital. Fidrmuc and Gërkhani (2007) analyse the “Eurobarometer” data and the World Values Surveys of 1990 and 1996 and compare European countries on the levels of social capital. They find a difference between the Western European countries and Central/Eastern European countries and argue that low level of economic development, poorer institutions and more pervasive corruption might be antecedents of the low social capital in the Central/Eastern European countries. Low trust in formal institutions in Eastern countries is also interpreted as an important factor of less political involvement.

1.3.5. Social Capital in Turkey

Taking a look at how Turkey scores on cross-cultural investigations of social capital should provide valuable information. We cannot get a positive picture in terms of where Turkey stands in these measures. Trust seems to be strikingly low,

as well as civic participation and social capital in general in many studies (Erdoğan, 2005; Fidrmuc and Gërkhani, 2007; Norris, 2002). Erdoğan (2005) reports a study on Turkish youth's social capital and civic participation measures; and as expected, participation and social capital levels are low. Besides, a distinction cannot be made between civic and political participation; but participation might be perceived as a network; and generalised trust is associated with civic participation.

World Values Survey probably provides valuable data to interpret the Turkish case on the matters discussed so far. It is a regularly conducted study world-wide and has been applied in 57 countries in its last wave. Through a single question (Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?), score of (generalised) trust is obtained. 2007 data from Turkey reveals that % 4.9 of the participants answer this questions saying "most people can be trusted" and the remaining % 95.1 of the participants say "can't be too careful in dealing with people. On average, % 26.1 of all the participants globally think "most people can be trusted". Among 57 countries, Turkey is ranked as 56th.

Active participation and membership scores are quite low. % 0.8 of the participants state that they are active members of charitable or environmental organisations, % 2.3 of the participants state that they are active members of a political party. Inactive membership scores are slightly higher than active membership scores; but in general, the participation scores are quite low. % 75.2 of the participants state that they have voted in the recent parliament elections. %

93.9 of the participants are willing to fight for their country when needed. In another question, participants are asked to choose the priority of the country's leaders, by rating on a scale from 1 (top priority to help reducing poverty in the world) to 10 (top priority to solve my own country's problems). The mean score for Turkish participants is 8.1; slightly above the general mean (7.8), indicating a general tendency for people to put national interests ahead of world's problems. The indices and the cultural understanding of trust in this study might not exactly reflect Turkish culture; but the scores are still valuable as it gives a chance to make cross-cultural comparisons.

The reason I elaborated on the concept of social capital is that it provides a link between different levels of analysis. According to Field (2008), it brings together the individual experiences and everyday activity level with the level of institutions, associations and community. The connections which are essential are defined as capital and as such, the concept is useful to shed light on the way we locate the individual within the complex social relations.

1.4. Free Riding

In a larger scale, collective action at the societal level is complex and requires an analysis of group goals. Groups are made up of individuals. In order for the group to be able to move towards its goal, it has to motivate its members to work for the goal. According to Cartwright and Zander (1968), the group has a location and the location changes from time to time and certain locations are preferred over the others by all or some of its members. The preferred location is the group goal. The

crucial question concerning collective action is how do group goals are accepted (or rejected) by the individuals (members of the group)? Individuals have their goals and that requires their action, whereas group goals require collective action.

1.4.1. Free-Riding as a Group Phenomenon

The classical economic theory assumes that if members of a group have a common interest and if all group members are better off when that goal is achieved, then members of the group would work to achieve that objective (Olson, 1965). However, Olson challenges this notion and puts forward the idea that rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests (Olson, 1965, p.2) all the time. He clearly makes a distinction between personal welfare and group interests; and claims that individuals will not work towards group interests unless there are coercion mechanisms or other reasons to do so. According to him, there is an inconsistency between the idea of self-interested individuals and individuals working for the common group goals.

A group of people collaborate for a common purpose and individuals cooperating will have the sense that they are accomplishing something by that (Tuck, 2008, p.1). As the number of people collaborating increase, individual contribution becomes less important and thus; becomes more negligible. A single vote in an election is almost unlikely to change the result of the election. Sense of negligibility (Tuck, 2008) and dispensability (Kerr and Bruun, 1983) gives individuals incentives to free-ride on the efforts and contributions of others (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2009).

Every individual might have an incentive to free-ride and that poses a serious problem for collective action, because if everyone attempts to free-ride, there will be no “ride” eventually (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2009) or as Bornstein (2003) puts it, public good will turn out to be public “bad”. Albanese and Van Fleet (1985) define a “free-rider” as a person who obtains benefits from group membership, but does not bear a proportional share of the costs of providing the benefits. In the article “The Free Rider Problem” in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, it is discussed that a central component of “public goods” is that, once they are made available to the public, no individual can be excluded from the use or consumption of that good. Radio broadcasts, national defence and clean air are some examples of public goods.

1.4.2. Free-Riding as a Public Goods Problem

According to Festinger (1960), “the attraction of group membership is not so much in sheer belonging, but rather in attaining something by means of this membership”. As long as the individuals attain what they expect from the group in the form of public goods, they do not have instrumental reasons to contribute according to Olson’s (1965) view. Tuck (2008) states that the common assumption is that individuals agree to contribute if enough other members do so. However, he goes on to oppose this view and says that individuals might have expressive reasons to contribute beyond instrumental reasons. Individuals might believe that their vote is negligible in an election; but Tuck argues that as well as the vote’s practical efficacy, individuals might have an intrinsic satisfaction from contributing to the common good. Voting is a contribution to the common good of

electing a particular candidate and preservation of democracy. So, individuals are not irrational to contribute when their contribution is dispensable contrary to Olson's (1965) view, Tuck argues.

Early political theorists Machiavelli (1938) and Hobbes (1996) argue that people act on the basis of self-interest. They claim that a strong state is advantageous to everyone, as it creates an environment of trust in which people can interact with the expectation of punishment of defection (free-riding). As I discussed before, (institutional and generalised) trust is a crucial component of social capital (Putnam, 1993) and lack of trust is an important factor preventing the development of social capital and economic interactions among individuals. However, a strong state (referred to as strong and reliable institutions) guarantees that defecting individuals will be punished and economic initiations will not be discouraged with the fear of free-riding (Duit, 2010). The coercion mechanisms of the state are therefore the most effective way of preventing free-riding according to the theory of Olson (1965).

The state mechanism is essentially based on citizens. State is the legitimate authority that regulates the relations between individuals and provides public goods to individuals, so the state is expected to further the common interests of its citizens (Olson, 1965, p.6). Individuals have duties as citizens to the state. However, free-riding exists and has to be controlled by the state for a sustainable economy (Molander, 1992). Duit (2010) argues that if a country is lacking mechanisms for controlling free-riding, it is unlikely to sustain the desirable production level of public goods. Trust and institutional quality are two important

factors to control free-riding. Duit (2010) states that the quality of central state institutions such as; predictability, openness, fairness, impartialness, uncorruptedness, and adherence to the principles of rule of law are determinants of level of cooperation and free-riding at the individual level. Using the data from the World Values Survey, the author determines free-riding justifying norms and uses them as the free-rider index and expects it to be related to institutional and generalised trust. He finds that institutional trust is positively linked to generalised trust and negatively linked to free-riding norms.

1.4.3. Free-Riding in Turkey

Duit (2010) uses data from 68 countries including Turkey and finds no significant relationship between trust and free-riding norms for Turkey. Checking the Turkey data independently, an interesting pattern is revealed. Four statements are taken from the pool of questions, each asking to rate how justifiable the stated action is between 1 (not justifiable at all) and 10 (totally justifiable) and mean scores for Turkey and all countries are in parentheses respectively: Cheating government benefits (Mean: 1.6; 2.7), avoiding a fare on public transport (1.8; 2.7), cheating on taxes (1.3 ; 2.7) and accepting a bribe (1.3; 2.0). Considering the fact that many people do not tend to explicitly state how justifiable these norms are, mean scores of Turkey are still below the global mean. Mean score for the item “Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor” as an essential characteristics of democracy is 7.2 (out of 10 and the global mean being 6.6), indicating that most of the participants agree with the statement. Apparently, we do not have a chance to compare these attitude scores with actual free-riding behaviours. An interesting

correlation is observed however, between “cheating on taxes is justifiable” and “national pride” in Turkey data. Despite the low levels of variance in justifiability questions, the correlation is significant ($r = .06$, $p < .027$). Although it is a weak correlation, the pattern is interesting.

Citizens are required to pay taxes; it is the most convenient way of contributing to the collective action (Fafchamps, 2002). A study on the perceptions of and attitudes towards taxation in Southeastern Turkey show that feelings of fairness and conformity are important determinants on the perceptions of taxation (Çiçek, Karakaş and Yıldız, 2007). % 77.8 of the participants find the taxes heavy or very heavy. More than two thirds of the participants think the taxes are unfair; and the main reason for them to think so is the fact that the state is not able to tax certain sections of the society. % 51.1 of the participants do not see a direct relation between the taxes they pay and the public services they receive. Most strikingly, % 91.3 of the participants perceive that many citizens do not pay taxes at all (or pay disproportionately to their income) and that reduces the will to pay taxes and drives other citizens to tax evasion. Similarly, Carpenter (2004) shows that conformity is a crucial factor in explaining free-rider behaviour in a community. It is harder to prevent free-riding when the number of free-riders increase and are visible to the rest of the community. Although Carpenter is hesitant in generalising the laboratory findings to real life –where the interactions are much more complex- other people’s behaviour is an important clue for individuals’ decision-making. Pessimistic perceptions of the citizens in the Çiçek et al. (2007) study can be seen as an example of conformity.

1.4.4. Self-Interested (Rational) Individual Assumption

Free-riding on paying taxes or any type of contribution that will result in individual gain is an action based on self-interest (Olson, 1965). Henrich et al. (2005) challenge the self-interested individual model of classical economics (“selfishness axiom” as they call it) and do field experiments in small-scale societies around the world. More specifically, they define “selfishness axiom” as the “assumption that individuals seek to maximize their own material gains in interactions and expect others to do the same”. They find no society that they could argue that their behaviour is based on selfishness axiom. They state that although the self-regarding individual model has been true of many cases, it does not necessarily have to be true all the time. According to the “preferences, beliefs and constraints” approach of the authors, individuals select among alternatives by weighing each of them –preference- and this preference is subject to certain constraints. The authors claim that “fairness, sympathy and equity” are important for understanding “preference” and can be integrated with “pleasure, security and fitness”. Different societies develop different social equilibria, so preferences and beliefs are subject to variation from culture to culture. Human preferences are context dependant and are internalised. “Treating strangers equitably” might be a valued goal and not just because it leads to the attainment of a goal. Binmore (2005) criticises the study on the grounds that classical economics theory does not necessarily assume individuals act on selfishness axiom, and although individuals tend to maximise a utility, it is not necessarily income maximising. Despite the

criticism, Binmore accepts that the experimental contribution of the study is undeniable.

There are two important inferences that can be made from Henrich et al. (2005): First one is that altruism or selfishness can be imitated by children; which suggests that norms concerning collective action and free-riding are also context (culture) dependant and are internalised. Authors argue that economic and social institutions might influence individuals' preferences and beliefs. Therefore, Duit's (2010) finding that free-riding norms are influenced by institutional trust seems to support that view. Second one is that the choice behaviour in these studies are influenced more by local and group level variables than the individual level variables like demographics. Then, are individual differences (or an individual trait approach) not enough to explain free-riding behaviour? Can free-riding be explained better with group level variables if choice depends more on contextual factors than individual differences?

1.4.5. Types of individuals as economic agents

Fehr and Gächter (2000) put forward the idea that there might be different types of people acting altruistically, selfishly or reciprocally. Similarly, Fischbacher and Gächter (2006) provide empirical evidence that there are different types of economic agents in their experiment – free-riders (% 22.9), conditional co-operators (% 55 and triangle contributors (% 12.1) that are characterised by different social preferences and behave consistently among different situations. Their findings are on individual preference level, not aggregate level.

Conditional co-operators and reciprocal contributors are those individuals who reciprocate other individuals' contributions positively or negatively at any cost (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2006). In laboratory experiments or in real life, existence of free-riders causes strong emotional reactions among cooperating subjects and the negative emotions are likely to trigger willingness to punish (Fehr and Gächter, 2000a). When the subjects in public goods experiments are given a chance to punish free-riders, they are highly likely to do that even if it is costly to them. Thus, it is a common tendency that people are inclined to reciprocate other individuals' behaviour. It is shown that reciprocal subjects in an experiment are likely to improve cooperation levels, as they provide incentives – and pose threat- for the potential cheaters to behave cooperatively or less non-cooperatively (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Fehr and Gächter (2000a) show that when punishment of free-riders is allowed in the experiment, very high (even full) levels of cooperation can be achieved, while full defection (free-riding) can be observed when punishment of free-riders is not allowed.

Henrich et al.'s (2005) discussion that norms concerning collective action are context dependant are exemplified in the experiments with punishment conditions (Fehr and Gächter , 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2000a, Fischbacher and Gächter, 2006). Subjects, who normally free-ride in “no-punishment” conditions feel obliged to cooperate in “punishment” conditions; it means that they adapt to the norm of the minimal group. Reciprocity is different from cooperation, altruism or retaliation; in cooperation or retaliation, people expect a future gain from their

action, altruism is unconditional; but reciprocity is a response to others' actions – positive or negative- even in the absence of material benefits (Fehr and Gächter, 2000).

1.4.6. Social Capital and Free-Riding

The problem of how public goods are distributed and how collective action is maintained for the production of those goods is similar to how social norms are established and maintained (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). They define a social norm as “a behavioural regularity that is based on a socially shared belief of how one ought to behave, which triggers the enforcement of the prescribed behaviour by informal social sanctions.” They further suggest that a norm can be thought of like a behavioural public good, something which everyone should make a positive contribution –by following it- and enforce it to other individuals, even at some cost. Although the individual behaviour might vary, they argue that social norms are quite important in the regulation of collective action problems; such as tax evasion, abuse of welfare etc. and norms constitute constraints on individual behaviour beyond legal and explicit agreements.

Features of social capital mentioned earlier; social norms, trust and networks are thus quite crucial in predicting collective action problems and free-riding behaviour in a society. Putnam's (1995) “organised reciprocity” idealises the regulation of collective action in a society. For Olson (1965), Hobbes (1996), and Machiavelli (1938), people are self-interested. In Hobbes' words; “Every man is

an enemy to every man”. Therefore, organising the reciprocal contributions of individuals in a society is an extremely important challenge and necessity.

Tuck (2008) opposes the view of self-interested individuals of Olson (1956) and asserts that even if an individual’s contribution to a cooperative activity is insignificant (and has no instrumental reason to contribute), s/he might have other non-instrumental reasons to cooperate such as to express himself/herself or to be fair to fellow citizens etc. or enjoyment, satisfaction, feelings of belonging or self-worth (Karau and Williams, 1993). What might motivate some individuals to cooperate, although some others are taking advantage of their contributions?

Yamagishi and Cook (1993) argue that in generalised exchange situations –where resources are pooled and returned to contributors as public goods and everyone receives equal amounts regardless of their contribution- free-riding possibility always exists and involves a social dilemma situation. The authors state that the relationship between generalised exchange and social dilemma have been ignored and argue that the possibility of free-riding in generalised –pooled- group exchange has not been taken into account. They claim that individuals in another form of social exchange what they call “network generalised” exchange will be more cooperative than generalised group exchange. They empirically confirm this hypothesis, also show that high trusters are more cooperative than low-trusters and high trusters in network-generalised exchange are more cooperative than low trusters in the same situation. Network generalised exchange does not involve pooling the resource and equal distribution; but individual actors interact with

particular others in the same network and there is not necessarily a reciprocal relationship.

Yamagishi and Cook's (1993) findings might be interpreted as an indication of the importance of social capital on increasing the levels of cooperation and reducing free-riding in a group. Considering the findings that people tend to cooperate more with their in-group members (Foddy, Platow & Yamagishi, 2009; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000), it might be reasonable to assume that a network-generalised exchange would be more likely to increase cooperation. Both studies conclude that it is the expectation that fellow in-group member will behave altruistically and fairly that makes people trust and cooperate more with them rather than in-group favouritism. In-group bias in cooperation has brought together an assumption that in-group love (bias) goes hand in hand with out-group hate (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009). The authors test this assumption and find that in-group identification is related to in-group love, but not to out-group hate. Interestingly though, this effect has only been found among men. They explain this unconditional cooperation tendency of men through an evolutionary account of Gould's (1999,2000, cited from Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009) "display of solidarity". In mate selection, males prefer to join a group and prefer to avoid the conflict by displaying of a males' group solidarity. Therefore, their willingness to cooperate unconditionally with in-group does not directly lead to aggression or hostility towards out-group according to this explanation.

1.4.7. Self-Interest vs. Group Interest in Intergroup Situations

This rational goal for the group has to find roots in individual preferences in order to be effective. Bornstein (2003) points out to the tension between individual interests and group interests, especially in intergroup conflicts. A decision of war might be rational for a group, but it is not rational for its members. A single individual's contribution in a war is negligible; but its cost to the individual might be costly, even his life. For the group, the benefits obtained with winning the conflict are public goods and available to everyone whether or not contributed to the fighting of the war. Thus, the individuals have strong incentives to free-ride; but the group has to mobilise its members for success. The groups do it through mechanisms of solidarity, patriotism, group based altruism, collective group goals and common group identity (Bornstein, 2003; Halevy, Bornstein & Sagiv, 2008). In the process, punishment of free-riders is increased and out-group perceptions are manipulated. Halevy, Bornstein and Sagiv (2008) also find that in-group love and out-group hate do not have a reciprocal relationship; participants prefer to contribute to the in-group without harming the out-group. The effect increases when the participants are allowed to communicate.

Bornstein (2003) point out to an interesting dilemma that is similar to males' "display of solidarity" argument (Gould, 1999;2000, cited from Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009). In one of the experimental games they use (Inter-group Prisoner's Dilemma) participants face the choice of either free-riding or contributing to the in-group which means to harm the out-group at the same time. The author associates this experiment with the war example. If one party cannot mobilise

enough members, they are likely to lose the war; so it is a win for one party and lose for the other one. If both parties can mobilise enough members, they both lose, especially at the individual level. If both groups cannot mobilise enough members however (members of both groups free-ride), there is no war and no loss for both sides. Considering the finding that cooperation increases with communication (Halevy, Bornstein & Sagiv, 2008), a violent conflict or war could be prevented with both sides communicating to free-ride. At the individual level, the author argues that pacifists could be approached with suspicion. Although they might be of the idea of avoiding conflict, they are most of the time viewed as cowards.

1.4.8. Empirics of Free-Riding: Social Loafing and Correlates of Free-Riding

Steiner (1972) defines group productivity as a result of subtracting process loss from the potential productivity. Process loss might be either a coordination loss or motivation loss. Olson's (1965) collective action theory describes two key factors in the definition of free-riding behaviour: Individual efforts in a large group are less noticeable and individuals perceive their efforts as less effective with increasing group size. These economics based premises have been followed in social loafing research in social psychology (Karau & Williams, 1993). Latane, Williams & Harkins (1979) conduct three experiments and compare (same) individuals' task performances of the same task between an individual performance and group performance. They find that individuals' effort is reduced when working in a group compared to when they are working alone. The group

sum is significantly less than the sum of individual efforts. Besides, individual efforts decrease as the group size increases, because individuals' expectation of evaluation decreases. Their individual contribution goes unnoticed and unidentifiable. The resultant motivation loss has been termed social loafing; but originally the concept has been tackled by Ringelmann (1913). He found that individual force being exerted in a rope pulling game decreases linearly as the number of people increase in the game. Ingham, Levinger, Graves and Peckham (1974) test the Ringelmann effect in two experiments. They find a curvilinear decrease in individual contribution in a similar re-experimentation. In a second experiment, they seek to understand the cause of performance loss; whether it is coordination loss or motivation loss (Steiner, 1972). There is a single subject in each session pulling the rope with confederates (who exert no effort) and there is again a curvilinear decrease in performance. However, the authors attribute the performance loss to motivation loss, as coordination does not exist between the participants and confederates.

In their meta-analysis of social loafing literature, Karau and Williams (1993) define social loafing as the reduction in motivation and effort when individuals work collectively than when they work individually or coactively. Early evidence on group studies shows that groups are more effective than individuals, whereas individuals are more efficient than groups (Baron & Kerr, 2003, p.38).

Motivational loss; as a collective action problem at the individual level was empirically demonstrated by Kerr and Bruun (1983) in social psychology, opening a new path for research along with social loafing literature. They define

the motivation loss resulting from the perception that one's effort is dispensable for group success free-rider effects. In three experiments, they investigate the effects of group size and member ability on free-rider behaviour. They consider Steiner's (1972) task taxonomy and make differential predictions for each task type: conjunctive, disjunctive and additive task. Disjunctive task (which is also referred to as eureka task) might be accomplished with a single able member's contribution; conjunctive task requires that even the least able member of the group should contribute and in additive tasks, the group product is the sum of each member's contribution. Kerr and Bruun (1983) state that most social loafing studies have used additive tasks; so they differentially test conjunctive and disjunctive types of tasks (They do not expect a clear pattern for additive tasks). Their findings can be summarised as: As the group size increases, motivation to contribute decreases (resulting motivation loss is free-riding) in disjunctive and conjunctive tasks. In conjunctive tasks, high-ability members tend to free-ride; because their contribution will not directly bring group success as the least able members should succeed, too. In disjunctive tasks, low-ability members tend to free-ride; because a high-ability member's contribution is sufficient.

Kerr and Bruun's (1983) study provides experimental evidence on the motivational basis of free-riding and on the priority of individual interests when the individual contribution is negligible. Karau and Williams (1993) propose a model called "Collective Effort Model (CEM)" in order to explain the motivational basis of collective effort based on the individual level "expectancy value models of effort". Their model is based on the meta-analysis of social

loafing literature and they argue that the reason of social loafing is rooted in the different perceptions of contingencies between working individually or alone. When working individually, the contingency between effort and valued outcome are clearer and stronger; but the contingency is not as clear and strong when working collectively as the group's effort is decisive on the outcome. Kerr and Bruun (1983) also discuss that the non-contingency between effort and outcome in their experiments might be an instance of learned helplessness (Seligman & Maier, 1967) and state that participants "struggled" less in such a situation.

Karau and Williams' (1993) CEM is based on the expectancy value models which define motivational force as the combination of expectancy (that the effort will lead to performance), instrumentality (high performance is instrumental in obtaining valued outcome) and valence of outcome (how desirable the valued goals are). According to CEM, instrumentality in collective performance is determined by the perceived relationship between individual performance and group performance; group performance and group outcome; and group outcome and individual outcome. They model the complex contingency structure between effort and outcome in collective performance this way. The model clearly shows how complex the relationship between individual interests and group interests.

A clear difference between social loafing and free-rider effect however is *identifiability* (Kerr and Bruun, 1983). In social loafing, individual contributions to the group are not separately identifiable for each individual; so individuals can be said to "hide in the crowd" (Baron and Kerr, 2003). Williams, Harkins and Latané (1981) demonstrate that social loafing effect is eliminated when the

participant are told that their contributions are made identifiable. Social loafing is also observed to be reduced in a cohesive group (Karau and Williams, 1987). Free-riding effect is evident even when individuals' contributions are identifiable. Free-riding and social loafing are not strictly different concepts; both imply the reduced productivity of groups stemming from individuals' motivation losses. Free-riding is used in this thesis as it is built on an interdisciplinary background that helps explain other factors contributing to it. Identifiability factor makes it more significant at an individual level.

Conscientiousness and felt responsibility are negatively related to social loafing (Tan and Tan, 2008), similarly Tsai and Sackett (1997) report limited support that free-riding is negatively related to conscientiousness and collectivism. People perceived as of higher ability and low conscientiousness are more likely to be rated as free-riders when they perform poorly than people with low ability and high conscientiousness (Taggar & Neubert, 2008) and negative emotions are observed among observers towards those poor performers, actually who are normally known to be highly capable. When the individuals perceive that others in the group are free-riding on his/her efforts, they might reduce their efforts as a reaction, which is called sucker effects (Orbell and Dawes 1981). Sucker effect might lead a person to reduce efforts at the cost of personal gains, which is also against the utility maximising individual assumption (Abele and Diehl, 2008). Abele and Diehl demonstrate that Protestant Work Ethic is a moderator of sucker effects; specifically for those who believe in equity and ethical value of work; but not for those who believe that work should be rewarded in the long-run.

1.5. Patriotism

At an individual level, depersonalised perception (Hogg and Hains, 1996) of others and/or ourselves leads us to ignore the personal characteristics and rely on social identities. Group membership and the level of identification with the group can give rise to out-group derogation and to further discriminatory intentions (Schatz and Staub, 1997; Wagner, Christ and Pettigrew, 2008). Although the characteristic of group membership might vary, it is closely related to individuals' self processes (Staub, 1997) including self-esteem. People want to have and/or maintain positive (social) identities. Individuals will try to change their group membership or make their existing group more positively distinct (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) when they are not satisfied with their in-group. Social comparison (Festinger, 1954) makes it possible for individuals to evaluate in-group and out-group on domains that are central to their identity; thus evaluate their group membership for their self-concept. However, a strong national identity (especially if it is racialised) is not subject to social change or social mobility. Therefore, in order to maintain a sense of positive social identity, perceptions concerning the in-group should be organised in a manner through the available (sometimes imposed) explanations or created history myths (Altnay, 2004, Göregenli, 2008; Staub, 1997), through the explanations of the monopolised patriotism (Bar-Tal, 1997) and sometimes dissonance reduction strategies (Jordan et al., 2003) might be applied.

1.5.1. Nationalism and Patriotism

Nationalism is such an “explanation” that is not possible to change. National feeling, according to Kecmanovic (1996) is not given at birth; but it is social psychologically conditioned and develops in the course of existence. Nationalism is a western ideology that was spread to the world from Europe at the beginning of 19th century (Kedourie, 1993). It is a sense of national identification that puts one’s nation at the centre and assumes its dominance over the others (Hechter, 2000, Kosterman and Feshbach, 1987).

Kelman (1997) argues that nationalism and similar forms of group attachment are so powerful that they might lead individuals to behave in self-sacrificial manner for their group. They achieve that, because they appeal to two psychologically crucial dispositions of self-protection and self-transcendence. Similarly, Langman (2005) argue that nationalism allows nations to sacrifice their individuals when needed and individuals sacrifice themselves with proud for the unknown members of their community, for an imagined idea of nation. Self-sacrifice might usually be against class interests or self-interests of those individuals (Kelman, 1997; Langman, 2005). Langman (2005) also argues that through nationalism, individuals maintain a sense of recognition and dignity, empowerment and meaning. Individuals feel less powerless through identification. Self-protection motives gain a meaning with self-transcendence motives that refer to identification with the group that goes beyond time and space. This is achieved through myths most of the time.

Two related forms of group attachment; nationalism and patriotism are differentiated theoretically and empirically. Kelman (1997) points out that patriotism is much older than nationalism and is a more general concept, defining one's attachment to a unit, be it tribe, nation or community; and is not limited with nation-states. Nationalism and patriotism are regarded as two distinct elements of national identification. Pride, love for one's country and in-group identification are thought to be elements of patriotism; whereas nationalism is associated with out-group derogation, national superiority and dominance feelings and thoughts (Li & Brewer, 2004).

Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) empirically show that although nationalism and patriotism are correlated positively, they are distinguished in the predictions they make. Especially in intergroup situations, they argue that nationalism predicts negative out-group attitudes including hostility, but patriotism do not (Li and Brewer, 2004).

Blank & Schmidt (2003) argue that nationalism and patriotism differ in their predictions of attitudes towards immigrants. Nationalism predicts homogeneity of the society, blind obedience and excessive valuation of one's nation; whereas patriotism predicts tolerance for heterogeneity and critical distance towards the state and the regime. So, nationalists tend to support the idea of denigration of immigrants, but patriots tend to be more tolerant. Contrary to the uncritical nature of nationalism, patriotism involves conscience based questioning. If one believes that his/her country's actions are morally wrong, they tend to be against them. Figueiredo & Elkins (2003) similarly report that nationalism predicts negative

attitudes towards immigrants (but patriotism does not) and conclude that (national) pride does not have to turn to prejudice.

Worchel & Coutant (1996) uses self-interest vs. group interest clash in order to explain patriotism and nationalism difference. They argue that essentially both patriotism and nationalism share the will to enhance one's nation. According to them, patriotism consists of acts and beliefs based on securing the identity and welfare of the group without regard to either self-identity or self-benefit. Nationalism is differentiated in that impact of the nation's gains on the self become central. In that regard, the authors argue that patriotism is rather selfless, while nationalism is selfish. So, individuals support national welfare, because it will impact personal welfare. Of course, nationalism involves comparison of one's group with other groups and the idea that one's group should be best and dominant over the others. However, the authors also argue that patriotism and nationalism are not strictly different, individuals' attitudes might change contextually and both might have positive or negative consequences. They also speculate that individualist cultures might be more nationalistic and collectivist cultures might be more patriotic based on their argument.

Despite the conceptual and empirical variations of patriotism and nationalism, Özkırmı (2008) criticises the good/bad nationalism differentiation in the literature, as well as the nationalism/patriotism differentiation. According to him, they are different reflections of the same phenomenon. As a political scientist, his criticism is a theoretical one. However, Zick, Wolf, Küpper, Davidov, Schmidt and Heitmeyer (2008) put forward the idea that different forms of prejudices

might actually constitute one form of syndrome called group focused enmity. Following this idea, the reflections of the same phenomenon (Özkırmı, 2008) might have to do with the syndrome of group focused enmity.

1.5.2. Blind and Constructive Patriotism

An important distinction in this sense is blind vs. constructive patriotism (Schatz, Staub & Lavine, 1999). According to Schatz et al. (1999), constructive patriotism is characterised by political efficacy, information seeking and activism; whereas blind patriotism is associated with perceived threats to national security and perception of out-groups as threatening. Individuals are distinguished on these two domains of patriotism without reference to individual differences stemming from ideology and worldviews. Schatz and Staub (1997) propose that blind patriotism should be related to negative intergroup attitudes, building on the previous research and their empirical demonstration of the differentiation between blind and constructive patriotism. More specifically in Staub's view (1997), constructive patriotism is more than defending the identity of the group; it is constructing a positive identity for the group. Yet, blind patriotism is inflexible identification with and uncritical evaluation of the ingroup (Schatz and Staub, 1997).

Bar-Tal (1997) points out that, individuals differ in the level of patriotism. Level of identification with the nation and state, internalisation of patriotic values and their perception of the needs of the state and the nation are important predictors of patriotism according to him. Patriotism normally serves functions of utility,

cohesiveness and mobilisation. However in his words, some groups might monopolise the definition of patriotism and this results in blind attachment to the group.

1.5.3. Patriotism in Turkey

Distinction between nationalism and patriotism is not a common practice in Turkey. Beyond political affiliations, many individuals regard themselves as patriot or nationalist widely assuming they are the same phenomena. Bora (2003) distinguishes different types of nationalisms in Turkey as; official nationalism (Atatürk nationalism), Kemalist nationalism (ulusçuluk), liberal neo-nationalism, radical nationalism and Islamic nationalism. Bora argues that nationalism gained momentum since the end of 1980s in Turkey. Banton (2001) also states that the rise of nationalism since the end of 1980s as a result of the end of Cold War. However, Turkish nationalism seems to be complicated; as Bora (2003) argues, all types of nationalists in Turkey claim that their kind of nationalism is the “true” nationalism. Discourses of nationalism, Bora argues, has turned into a widespread exhibitionism and a symbol (an attachment taken for granted) beyond and out of political affiliations. The difficulty in differentiating nationalism and patriotism in Turkey despite the many types of nationalism might support the group-focused enmity hypothesis (Zick et al., 2008). Göregenli (2008) similarly argues that blind patriots of different motives share a common frame and that might lead them towards political action.

Taking another look at the results of the World Values Survey data in Turkey, we could get a better idea on certain indicators of citizenship, national pride and political action., Participants' first choice as the main aims of the country for the upcoming ten years is a high level of economic development (% 63.0) and strong defence forces (% 32.5) as the second choice. % 93.9 of the participants are willing to die for their country. % 38.5 of the participants are either very interested or somewhat interested in politics and % 75.2 of the participants have voted in the recent elections. Political participation questions reveal that % 52 of the participants say they would never sign a petition, % 63.9 say they would never join in a boycott and % 62.4 say they would never attend a lawful/peaceful demonstration. % 96.4 of the participants state that they are either very proud (76.3) or quite proud (14.2) of their nationality (There is an option to say I am not Turkish, % 5.4 of the results say "not applicable"). Finally, as for requirements of citizenship; % 90.4 of the participants state that "adapting the customs of my country", % 58.9 state that "having ancestors from my country", % 59.2 state that "being born on my country's soil", and % 94.7 state that "abiding by my country's laws" is either very important or rather important.

As can be seen in the national pride question, % 76.3 of the participants state they are very proud of their nationality (The mean for 57 countries is % 57.6), which is above the general mean. The mean scores for citizenship questions are also above the general mean scores indicating a coexistence of higher national pride and stricter requirements for citizenship than the mean score of all countries. Taken together, people have strict criteria for citizenship; believe that the country's main

aims are economy related, are highly proud of their nationality, willing to die for their country; but are avoiding political action.

1.6. Shame, Guilt and Pride

As self-conscious emotions, guilt, shame and pride are different expressions of success or failure, attributed to either self or others (Lewis, 1991). Experience of these emotions is based on self-evaluation and has social significance (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). According to Lewis' model (1991), shame and guilt are different expressions of failure. While failure is attributed to others in shame, it is attributed to self in guilt. Pride, however, is an expression of success attributed to self. Building on this, shame is thought to be a destructive tendency compared to guilt; because experience of guilt gives the person the chance to evaluate the failure and motivation for self-development. Shame, however is not functional in that regard. Shame is thought to be experienced in a social context where the individual is concerned with others' approval or evaluation; whereas guilt is thought to be experienced inwards accompanied with a personal evaluation of the self (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).

Öner-Özkan and Gençöz (2007) discuss that internal or external expressions of pride in cultures of honour, might explain the high levels of corruption in those societies. Mediterranean and South American societies –defined as cultures of honour- are cultures where pride is perceived concretely, in the form of a “good”. When one thinks s/he will not be caught, s/he can be engaged in those acts –e.g. bribe taking, cheating- giving, especially in the case of external pride expression.

Knack and Kropf (1998) report a study on the voting motivations; based on the relation of civic norms to cooperative behaviour. They state that as voting is seen as a public good, self-interested individuals are not expected to vote, according to the rational choice theory and they are likely to free-ride. Their findings suggest that stronger civic norms increase voting and other related cooperative intentions. Cooperative norms are applied either internally through mechanisms like guilt; or externally through shame or ostracism. Thus, based on their findings, they argue that those norms are not necessarily internalised, but they maybe be conformed in order to avoid social sanctions.

Coercion mechanisms actually assume that individuals have not internalised the norms to cooperate. As Knack and Kropf (1998) argue, people might cooperate without internalising the norms; to avoid sanctions. Considering Öner-Özkan's argument, avoiding sanctions might be the motivation in cooperating. It might be argued that the cultures of honour as mentioned –Mediterranean and South American- are also cultures with low levels of institutional trust (World Values Survey). Lack of institutional trust might lead individuals to think they can get away with what they have done, as institutional control mechanisms are not strict. It is thought that investigating shame/guilt/pride relevant to free-riding behaviour and patriotism might be relevant on those grounds.

1.7. Present Research

Group attachment has always existed, but the subject of the groups in modern day is the individual as was discussed in the “individual” section. The significance of

the individual has been discussed and individual's relationship with other individuals, institutions and the group has been discussed within the framework of social capital.

Banton (2001) explains that rational choice theory combines individual and collective level of analyses. Individuals' goals can either be achieved through individual or collective action. Public goods are provided to individuals as a result of coerced collective action, or by taxation. As well as the instrumental ties with the group, identification with the group is thought to be a cost-benefit estimate according to the theory and thus mobilisation of individuals for collective action is a matter of both individual motivations and collective necessities.

The individual is a citizen from the point of view of the state and the state needs to mobilise its citizens. Haste (2004) argues that responsibility is crucial in constructing "good citizens". She argues that responsibility of the individual to the society, family or conscience might be in conflict. So, individual interests might interfere with group-interests (e.g. contribution towards collective goals).

Leaders and governments find it difficult to achieve coordination of individuals for collective action, as this requires trust, so they rely on force or coercion, and manipulate the discourses (rhetoric) to increase cooperation (Banton, 2001). Vandeveld (1997) points out that as the state is providing public goods to its citizens, it does it through teaching patriotism. Based on the self-interested individual assumption, it is highly unlikely to achieve a full universal cooperation, so provision of public goods are restricted with national boundaries as smaller

units. Provision of public goods is therefore maintained by a community, sharing common sensibilities and intuitions and especially a common sense of justice. Therefore, Vandeveldelde argues that community feelings like patriotism become an essential element to prevent free-riding behaviour.

In the current study, based on the presentation of patriotism literature, patriotism as a form of group attachment will be examined in relation to collective action. At an individual level of analysis, free-riding behaviour in a laboratory setting will be experimented and its relationship to group attachment indicators will be examined.

To my knowledge, a systematic study in social psychology on the relationship between collective action problems (free-riding particularly) and group attachment (patriotism particularly) has not been conducted in Turkey. Given the data from World Values Survey, like the high levels of national pride, low levels of political and civic participation, and low levels of trust; this thesis aims to reveal any relationship that exists between free-riding behaviour and patriotism in Turkey.

Measuring patriotism was preferred in this thesis to nationalism; because patriotism is defined purely as an in-group attachment phenomenon; but nationalism involves intergroup comparison. Schatz et al. (1999) state that neither blind nor constructive patriotism items make explicit intergroup comparisons. Blind vs. constructive patriotism distinction of Schatz et al. (1999) is going to be used as a framework for patriotism. I predict that constructive patriotism is going

to be negatively related to free-riding behaviour; namely those who are more cooperative will also have more cooperative attachment to their country. Constructive patriotism involves questioning and criticism of current group practices aiming a positive change (Schatz et al., 1999). Similarly, blind patriotism is expected to be positively related to free-riding behaviour; namely those who are not cooperative will be uncritically attached to their country, and not contributing or criticising it even if they aim a positive change.

Based on Knack and Kropf's (1998) results and Öner-Özkan and Gençöz's (2007) arguments, I expect shame to be positively related to free-riding; and guilt to be negatively related to free-riding, as those who are more concerned with others' evaluation in case of failure (shame-oriented) might be expected to free-ride in the non-identifiable experiment situation. Those who value personal evaluations (guilt-oriented) are less likely to free-ride even when they are not identifiable. Besides, I expect constructive patriotism to be positively related to guilt and negatively related to shame; because constructive patriotism is based on critical attachment and blind patriotism is not. Guilt is a functional emotion in that, it motivates self-development; but shame is not functional in that sense. Blind patriotism is a form of unquestioning attachment, offering no possibility to criticize and suggestions for the improvement of the country. I also expect voting behaviour to be positively related to constructive patriotism; but negatively related or unrelated to blind patriotism; as voting is a pro-active behaviour aimed towards change.

Based on the literature presented, my expectations for the free-riding, patriotism, self-conscious emotions (shame, guilt and pride), voting and NGO participation relationship are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Free-riding is expected to be predicted negatively by constructive patriotism and guilt; and positively by blind patriotism and shame.

Hypothesis 2: Guilt, voting and NGO participation are expected to predict constructive patriotism positively; while blind patriotism free-riding and shame are expected to predict constructive patriotism negatively.

Hypothesis 3: Constructive patriotism (negatively) and pride (positively) is expected to predict blind patriotism.

As for the experimental part of the study, free-riding behaviour is going to be measured with a public goods game. The influence of a confederate, who will behave uncooperatively; and the influence of information of other participants' contributions will be investigated. Carpenter (2004) provide evidence that participants tend to free-ride (conform) observing the existence of free-riders in a group or react reciprocally (Fehr & Gächter 2000; Fischbacher & Gächter, 2006). In a repeated game design, participants have to distribute resources between a collective account and a private account. After each round, participants are either given information of others' contributions in an aggregate level or individualised level (Sell & Wilson, 1991). Sell and Wilson (1991) report that "individualised information" predicts higher contributions; namely less free-riding. Following

these findings, I make the following predictions for the experimental part of the study:

Hypothesis 4: Participants are expected to free-ride more in aggregate level of information than in individualised information (referred to as announcement in this study).

Hypothesis 5: Participants are expected to free-ride more in confederate sessions than no-confederate sessions.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

2.1. Participants

A convenient sampling has been applied in the present study. Participants were drawn among students of Introduction to Psychology (for students outside of Psychology), Social Psychology classes and others. Majority (% 92, 3) of the participants are undergraduate students. Participants were asked to write their names on the experiment schedule including dates and time. The data were collected in 12 days, 5 sessions each day. Participants were asked to put their names on a session available to them. Introduction to Psychology and Social Psychology students received extra bonus for their participation. The experiment was announced as an experiment on “Consumer Behaviour” and it was added that there is a possibility of earning between 10 and 40 TL based upon performance. Those who put their names on the experiment schedule were asked to provide the experimenter their contact details. The call for the experiment was a deception. For face validity purposes, examining consumer behaviour was presented as the purpose; instead of measuring “free-riding” which is the real purpose of the experiment. Besides, all participants were paid a standard show-up fee of 20 TL. Possibility of earning between 10 and 40 TL was emphasised to encourage the

natural response and actions of the participants in the experiment. Debriefing and payment to the participants were made after all the experiment sessions ended.

5 participants' data has not been used in the analysis, as they were unable to follow the instructions of the experimenter and breached the experiment rules. However, they were debriefed and been paid the standard show-up fee.

The experimental design of the study involved a confederate situation. Half of the experimental sessions were carried out with a confederate. Two different confederates took part in the sessions pretending to be ordinary participants. They were asked to conceal that they know the experimenter and it was checked before every session that the confederate does not know the participants in the session.

192 participants (98 females and 85 males) took part in the experiment in total. Their age range was between 19 and 28 ($M = 21,60$; $SD = 1, 63$). % 57, 9 of the participants indicated that they have lived in a big city, while % 22, 4 and % 17, 5 of the participants have lived in a city and town, respectively. Levels of education of the participants' parents were mostly university (% 38, 8 of the mothers and % 47, 5 of the fathers) and high school (% 26, 8 of the mothers and % 27, 3 of the fathers). % 74, 9 of the participants stated that they have voted in the recent elections (almost the same result with the World Values Survey data presented; % 75, 2). Finally, % 23, 5 of the participants reported that they are actively working in a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO).

2.2. Materials

2.2.1. Demographics: Participants were asked to fill in a set of standard demographic questions; such as age, sex, level of education, location of residence and parents' education. They were also asked whether they have voted in the recent election, their party preference and whether or not they work actively for an NGO.

2.2.2. Experiment related:

Instructions: After participants read and sign the consent form, they are asked to read the instructions of the experimental procedure. As it was advertised before, the instructions read as they are about to play a game on consumer behaviour and the amount of money they will win depend on to their own and others' performance. Participants are instructed on how they can use their resources and how their material benefits after the game will be calculated.

Manipulation check: Participants are asked 7 (or 6 questions depending on the experimental group they are in) questions to see if the experimental manipulations are understood correctly. Some of these questions read as; "In some instances, I have determined my own behaviour by comparing to others", "I think I have contributed enough for the group to reach the minimum limit" and "I could behave differently if others had known my contribution". 5 point Likert scale was used: 1- Never, 3- Sometimes, 5- Always. These items' relationships to actual free-riding scores were checked.

2.2.3. Patriotism: As stated before, Schatz, Staub and Lavine's (1999) "Constructive and Blind Patriotism" scale was used to measure differential patriotism scores. The scale distinguished between two types of group attachment; where blind patriotism is defined as an uncritical loyalty to the country and intolerance to negative criticism; and constructive patriotism is defined as a critical and questioning attachment to the country aiming at positive change. Blind patriotism is reported to be significantly and positively related to nationalism, national vulnerability perception, cultural contamination and selective exposure to information; and negatively related to political activism. Constructive patriotism is positively related to political efficacy, political information gathering, political interest, knowledge and behaviour. Both blind and constructive patriotism are orthogonally related to the mentioned constructs.

The original scale consists of 19 items. The authors removed one constructive patriotism item (13- Because I identify with the United States, some of its actions make me feel sad) because of their factor analysis criteria, leaving 12 blind patriotism and 6 constructive patriotism items (Item number 13 has been used in the current analysis). They report reliability scores of .88 and .67 for blind and constructive patriotism, respectively. There are 4 reverse items in the blind patriotism scale. 5 point Likert scale was used: 1- Don't agree at all, 2- Don't agree 3- Neither agree nor disagree 4- Agree 5- Totally agree.

The Turkish version of the scale was obtained from a study that reports alpha scores of .84 and .69 for the blind and patriotism subscales, respectively (Göregenli, Solak & İylikci, 2008). The Turkish adaptation does not include major

changes in the statements. Item number 4 “The anti-Vietnam war protesters were un-American” was translated as “Türk ordusunun eylemlerine karşı olanlar aslında Türkiye karşıtıdır.”; item number 8 “People should not constantly try to change the way things are in America” was translated as “Türkiye’nin genel politikalarını ve genel olarak sistemi ikide bir değiştirmeye çalışmamak gerekir.”.

Some blind patriotism items which assess uncritical attachment are “I would support my country right or wrong.”, “It is un-American (Turkish) to criticize this country .” and “I support U.S. policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country” Some constructive patriotism items read as “People should work hard to move this country in a positive direction”, “If I criticize the United States (Turkey), I do so out of love for my country.” and “I oppose some U.S. policies because I care about my country and want to improve it”

In the current study, an exploratory factor analysis has been conducted for this scale. Principal factor extraction and varimax rotation was carried out for 19 items. Rotated Eigenvalues revealed four subscales higher than 1 with % 41, 92 (% 13, 05, 11, 11, 10, 52 and 7, 24 respectively) of the cumulative variance explained. However, two items (12 and 18) did not load in any of the factors and they were removed from the analysis. A second factor analysis revealed a three factor solution with 41,284 (% 23, 63, 11, 98 and 6, 22 respectively) of the cumulative variance explained. This time, items number 5 and 7 constituted a third factor on their own; but that did not make sense theoretically; so they have been removed, too. A final factor analysis was run, this time with two factors with 41, 11 (% 27, 54 and 13, 58 respectively) of the cumulative variance explained.

After removing four items (5, 7, 12, 18), a two factor structure was formed. The first factor was the blind patriotism subscale consisting of 9 items with a Cronbach's alpha score of .86 and % 27, 54 of the total variance explained. Constructive patriotism factor included 6 items with a Cronbach's alpha score of .66 and % 13, 58 of the total variance explained. The reliability scores are consistent with the original scale (Schatz et al., 1999) and the Turkish version (Göregenli, Solak & İyilikci, 2008).

Items number 12 and 18 might have not worked well due to translation that seems to add an extra meaning to the statements. Item 12 reads as "We should have complete freedom of speech even for those who criticize the country" and it is translated as "Ne kadar ağır eleştiriler içerse de herkesi kapsayacak tam bir ifade özgürlüğü olmalıdır". The original item does not include the connotation of "heavy" criticism, a word that was used in the Turkish version. Item number 18 reads as "I express my love for America by supporting efforts at positive change" and it is translated as "Türkiye'ye olan sevgimi, sadece olumlu politikalara ve değişimlere yönelik çabaları destekleyerek gösteririm". Here, the translation includes the word "only". Although the translation is not wrong, the word "only" might have the connotation that "I only support the country in case of an effort to positive change and not at other times".

2.2.4. State Shame and Guilt (SSGS): The State Shame and Guilt Scale (Marschall, Sanftner, and Tangney, 1994) has been applied in order to distinguish between participants' shame, guilt and pride at the moment of experiment. The scale consists of 15 items, each subscale being measured by 5 items. There are no

reverse items. The authors report Cronbach's alphas of 0,89; 0,82; and 0,87 for the shame, guilt and pride subscales, respectively. The questions do not relate to any specific event, and ask participants to evaluate how they feel at the time. Some examples on the shame subscale are "I feel worthless, powerless" and "I want to sink into the floor and disappear"; examples on guilt are "I feel tension about something I have done" and "I feel like apologizing, confessing" and on proud are "I feel capable, useful" and "I feel pleased about something I have done". 5 point Likert scale was used: 1- Don't agree at all, 2- Don't agree 3- Agree somewhat 4- Agree 5- Agree a lot.

Three factors emerged in the exploratory factor analysis in the current study which might indicate construct validity. Varimax rotation was applied and % 51,51 of the total variance was explained by three factors; guilt (%21,60), shame (% 15,90) and pride (% 14,01). Item 8 (I feel like I am a bad person) was loaded higher on guilt (.55) than shame (.43); and item 1 (I feel good about myself) was lowest on pride factor (.29); but both items were included in subscales as was reported in the original study (Marschall et al., 1994). Reliability scores of each subscale were as follows: pride (0.76), shame (0.81) and guilt (0.80).

2.3. Procedure

The experimental sessions of this study took place at the Middle East Technical University Psychology Department's Observation Room. The experiment included two main phases. First, the public goods game was played in groups of 5 (although group size varied in some cases) which was instructed and conducted by

the author of this thesis. Second, participants were asked to fill in the questionnaire package.

Several experimental methods were consulted to design the public goods game (Abele & Diehl; Bardsley, 2000; Dufwenberg, Gächter & Hennig-Schmidt, 2008; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fehr & Gächter, 2000a; Foddy, Platow & Yamagishi, 2009; Kerr & Bruun, 1983; Kleiman & Rubinstein, 1996; Milinski, Sommerfeld, Krambeck, Reed & Marotzke, 2008; Tsai & Sackett, 1997; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009). Kerr and Bruun (1983) explicitly state that they aim to measure individual product, rather than group product. The task they use in their experiments is a physical one; blowing air and participants are told to maximise the group performance. Participants are given manipulated performance feedback; and the aim is to see the motivational loss (free-riding is defined as a motivation loss) caused by the performance feedback. Abele and Diehl (2008) use the “d2” concentration test with the task of crossing out certain patterns working on a paper full of letters d and p. The task is additive (Steiner, 1972) and the performance feedback is again manipulated. Some researchers use the public vs. private account distinction, in which participants are asked to choose to invest in either private or public accounts; private account referring to the free-riding tendency and the amount earned from the experiment is the sum of private and a share of the public account (Bardsley, 2000; Dufwenberg et al., 2008 and Kleiman & Rubinstein, 1996). Those researchers investigating cooperation in intergroup situations use minimal group paradigm and aim to see the different levels of cooperation with in-group or out-group members (Foddy et al., 2009;

Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009 and Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). Bardsley (2000); and Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000) use sequential and simultaneous play. In simultaneous play, participants make their contributions at the same time, giving them no chance to observe others' contributions. In sequential play however, there are certain number of rounds played and players can observe others' contribution patterns and the group's aggregate performance. Fehr & Gächter (2000; 2000a) employ a partner/stranger condition with an option to punish free-riders in the group aiming to see the influence of reciprocity. Tsai and Sackett (1997) measure free-riding with a self-report questionnaire.

Milinski et al. (2008) conduct public goods games, assuming global climate as a public good. They believe that climate change is a threat to the whole world and as such, it represents a typical public goods problem, to which 6 billion people should collaborate to prevent and it is again those people to benefit. Creating an analogy and a cover story, they design and apply a game. In this game, participants are given 40 Euros in their private account and they play a game of 10 rounds. In each round, they can invest 0,2 or 4 Euros of their money into a "climate account". If the climate account reaches to 120 Euros by the end of the game, the climate change is prevented; otherwise it cannot be prevented with % 90 of chance. Participants leave the experiment with the money left in their private accounts. They manipulate the probability of climate change across groups; but they find in the "% 90 condition", only half of the groups can reach the target of 120 Euros. Similar with the types of players (Fehr and Gächter, 2000;

free-riders, altruists and reciprocal players), they identify contribution options of 0, 2 and 4 Euros; free-rider, fair sharer and altruist, respectively.

As was outlined in the “Participants” section, participants came to the sessions thinking it is an experiment measuring consumer preferences and use of money. They were seated in the experiment room, on chairs sharing a table and facing the board. They were given the questionnaire package that includes a consent form, experimental instructions and questionnaires. They were asked to sign the consent form, read the experimental instructions and give the papers back to the experimenter. The instructions were verbally stated by the experimenter once again, and participants were asked if they had questions. The game was started when every participant reports a complete comprehension of the game.

The game consisted of 10 rounds, each being the same. Each participant was allocated an imaginary 20 tokens. The exact amount of money a single token corresponds to was not known by the participants. In each round of the game, they were asked to invest 2 tokens, finishing up all the tokens by the end of the game. They were presented with two options of investment: private account and public account. They could divide the 2 tokens in each round in any way they want: 2 tokens to private account, 2 tokens to public account or 1 to public and 1 to private account.

There were a total of 100 tokens in the game. Participants were told to view the group as a family; and as a family, they had a task to maintain the family. The task was to reach a minimum of 50 tokens in the public account. If they failed to do so,

they were told that they will earn no money at all, from the experiment. If they succeed in collecting more than 50 tokens, they will earn money. They were told that they will earn the whole money in their private account plus an equal share of the money in the public account ($\text{Private} + (\text{Public} / \text{Group size})$). Thus, if they manage to collect a minimum of 50 tokens, each participant would receive an equal share from the public account, regardless of their contribution. Therefore, it represents a typical public goods problem where no one is excluded from the consumption of the public good and everyone receives an equal share of the public good.

During the game, participants were not allowed to communicate and determine a common strategy. Everyone was asked to write their preferences into a piece of paper and the experimenter collected those papers at the end of every round. The experimenter made a note of all the contributions and announced them to the participants at the end of every round, in two ways: Either in an aggregated (Sell & Wilson, 1991) manner; where only the total amount of tokens collected in that particular round was announced; or in an individualised manner; where each participants' preference of investment was announced –how 2 tokens distributed among private/public accounts- without using the participant numbers (instead of names). In the aggregated condition, participants could only see the total amount of money collected; but in the individualised condition, they were able to follow the contribution patterns of each participant (although the names are not known), as well as knowing the total amount collected by the group.

In half of the experiments, there was a confederate. The confederate was instructed to contribute as little as possible. They were not asked to contribute “0”, as the participants could realise the existence of a confederate, especially in the individualised condition. In the individualised condition, confederates were instructed to contribute little, but not significantly differ from other participants’ general pattern. The main purpose of the confederates was to invoke conformity on the part of other participants.

A 2 (announcement: aggregated vs. individualised) x 2 (confederate vs. no confederate) research design was applied. A form of coercion (Olson, 1965) was applied in the experiment to induce cooperation. Any free-riding behaviour will be said to occur in the existence of coercion to cooperate. In every round, participants made their contributions in a simultaneous manner, but observing the contribution patterns after every round, their contributions in other rounds might be said to be of sequential manner (Bardsley, 2000; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). The type of the task is *additive* (Steiner, 1972), as all participants’ contributions are summed and determine the outcome.

The pre-experiment announcement that they could earn between 0 and 40 TL depending on their performance was in a way confirmed. If all the 100 tokens in the game would be invested in the public account, every participant would earn 20 tokens. In the reverse situation where no tokens collected in the public account; or they would fail to reach the minimum limit of 50 tokens, every participant would earn no money, at all.

After the experiment was completed, participants were given back the questionnaires and asked to fill in them. Confederates pretended to fill in the questionnaires until everyone finished doing so. They were thanked and told that they will be debriefed by the end of all the experiments.

Each participant's free-riding score was calculated using their contributions to public and private accounts. A "free-riding index" (FRI) was calculated by dividing the participant's contribution to private account by 20 ($\text{Private} / 20 = \text{FRI}$). FRI, thus varies between 0 and 1, 1 being the absolute free-rider, 0 being the absolute co-operator.

The number of groups varied, as some participants did not show up in the scheduled sessions. 95 (% 51,9) participants took a part in groups of 5, 50 (% 27,3) participants in groups of 4, 20 (% 10,9) participants in groups of 3 and 18 (% 9,8) participants in groups of 6. Although, participants were asked to put their names on the schedule, choosing a group in which there are no or few participants that they know; a majority of the participants (% 73,2) knew at least one person in their group. In the analysis, group size and acquaintance was controlled for. In total, 47 sessions were held. In 47 of those groups, 21 groups (% 44,68) had a confederate in the group and 26 groups (% 55,32) were in the individualised announcement condition. Taken together, number of participants in experimental conditions is presented in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1. *Frequency of participants in experimental conditions*

		Announcement		Total
		Yes	No	
Confederate	Yes	39 (21,30%)	33 (18,00%)	72 (39,30%)
	No	55 (30,10%)	56 (30,60%)	111 (60,70%)
Total		94 (51,40%)	89 (48,60%)	183

After all the sessions were completed, participants were given the debriefing forms and were paid the equal show-up fee of 20 TL.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Data screening procedures were conducted to check the assumptions of normality and linearity; missing values were dealt with. All sessions were conducted in the lab, under the observation of the researcher. Therefore, there was no missing value for the experimental application; all free-riding indexes were calculated for all participants (Except for the 5 participants left out of the analysis, mentioned in the Participants section). Remaining 187 participants' missing values on the questionnaires were replaced with mean scores, as they were less than % 5. A check on univariate and multivariate outliers suggested 4 outliers in total and they were removed from the analysis. The entire analysis was conducted with 183 participants.

In this section, the results of the study will be presented in three parts: a) Descriptives regarding the experimental process, b) Correlations between the variables and manipulation checks; c) Multiple regression analyses for the experimental hypotheses and other hypotheses.

3.1. Descriptives

Results of the experimental play indicate a general tendency of fair-sharing (Milinski et al., 2008). Distribution of frequencies of contributions in each round can be seen in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1. As can be seen, contribution of 1 token is

the most prevalent choice. Participants generally preferred to divide their allocated tokens fairly among private and public accounts. Private contributions of 1 (thus 1 contribution to public) seem to be fairly stable across rounds (Range between % 41 and % 56, 30). The mean scores for contributions to public account across

Table 3.1 Sums of frequencies of public and private contributions

Private Account							Public Account						
Round	0	Percent	1	Percent	2	Percent	Round	0	Percent	1	Percent	2	Percent
1	38	20,80%	103	56,30%	42	23,00%	1	42	23,00%	103	56,30%	38	20,80%
2	44	24,00%	90	49,20%	49	26,80%	2	49	26,80%	90	49,20%	44	24,00%
3	45	24,60%	95	51,90%	43	23,50%	3	43	23,50%	95	51,90%	45	24,60%
4	35	19,10%	97	53,00%	51	27,90%	4	51	27,90%	97	53,00%	35	19,10%
5	57	31,10%	82	44,80%	44	24,00%	5	44	24,00%	82	44,60%	57	31,10%
6	62	33,90%	79	43,20%	42	23,00%	6	42	23,00%	79	43,20%	62	33,90%
7	62	33,90%	89	48,60%	32	17,50%	7	32	17,50%	89	48,60%	62	33,90%
8	74	40,40%	75	41,00%	34	18,60%	8	34	18,60%	75	41,00%	74	40,40%
9	61	33,30%	86	47,00%	36	19,70%	9	36	19,70%	86	47,00%	61	33,30%
10	51	27,90%	82	44,80%	50	27,30%	10	50	27,30%	82	44,80%	51	27,90%

rounds (Figure.3.2) show that there is not dramatic changes of contribution between rounds.

Free-Riding Index (FRI) was calculated for each participant by dividing his/her total private contribution to the total amount of tokens allocated at the beginning (FRI = Private / 20). Free-riding scores ranged from .10 to .85 (M =, 47, SD =, 12). 33 participants' FRI was .50 which confirms the fair-sharing participants' inference (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.1 Sums of Frequencies of Private Contributions Across





Figure 3.2 Means of Contributions to Public Account Across Rounds



The coercion factor (reaching a minimum limit of tokens) seems to influence participants to free-ride less. Only 9 (% 19,12) of the 47 groups (comprised of 31 participants out of 183) failed to reach the minimum limit to earn money. 8 of those 9 groups were in confederate condition. 29 (% 61,7) groups succeeded to

reach the limit in the last round, 7 groups in the 9th round, 1 group in the 8th and 1 group in the 7th round.


Table 3.2 shows the frequencies of difference between the total amount of tokens collected in the public account and the minimum limit. % 73,10 of the participants collected an amount no different than the limit, 1 or 2 tokens more than the limit. The maximum amount of public account a group reached was 55 (where 100 is the possible maximum).

Table 3.2. Group total differences from the minimum limit

Above*	-14	-8	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Frequency	2	2	4	1	4	3	4	11	44	31	59	5	8	5
Percent	1,10	1,10	2	0,50	2	1,60	2	6,0	24	16,90	32,20	2,70	4,40	2,70

*Above the limit: Difference between the total public good and the minimum limit

Figure 3.3. Distribution of free-riding scores



3.2. Correlations

Bivariate correlations between the variables were presented in Table 3.3 and 3.4. The correlations are presented in two parts. The first part includes the correlations among the experimental variables that correlations to major study variables are not meaningful. As can be seen in Table 3.3, the variables included are Free-Riding, Announcement, Confederate, Group Size, Acquaintance -whether the participant knows someone in the group prior to the experiment or not-, Above the limit - difference between the total amount of tokens collected in the public account and the minimum limit.-, Shame, Guilt, Pride and manipulation check (mc) questions. Free-riding is negatively related to confederate ($r = -.144$, $p < .052$), but the correlation is marginally significant. Contrary to expectations, existence of confederates seems to be related to decrease in the level of free-riding. Confederate ($r = -.37$, $p < .01$) and announcement (individualised) ($r = -.24$, $p < .01$) conditions are associated with a decrease in the amount collected above the limit; indicating that more tokens were collected (above the limit) in the public account in no confederate and aggregate announcement conditions. Existence of an acquaintance in the group however, seems to be positively associated with public tokens collected above the limit ($r = .19$, $p < .01$). Similarly, existence of an acquaintance is associated with an increase in the amount collected in the public account in total ($r = .20$, $p < .01$) (Total public account variable not listed in the tables).

Correlations of manipulation check questions confirm the participants comprehended the procedures. In order to see if different confederates' behaviours

are consistent among sessions (as confederates were instructed to contribute significantly differently from the group, but no specific amount was dictated), each confederate's FRI was calculated. Confederates' level of free-riding is positively correlated ($r = .24, p < .01$) to group size. Confederates free-rode less when the group size is smaller. As an alternative to the calculation of FRI, a different method was utilised for manipulation check purpose. The FRI index ($\text{Private} / 20$) is an individualised estimate, ignoring the particular group's total performance. The alternative method takes into account how the other group members contributed to the public account. The amount of a participant's public contribution's share in the total public account is subtracted from an equal share of the participant's contribution $\text{FRI}_{\text{alt}} = (1 / \text{Group Size}) - (\text{Public} / \text{Public Total})$. FRI_{alt} is found to be negatively correlated to confederate condition ($r = -.27, p < .01$). FRI_{alt} is also found to be negatively correlated to group size when the "no-confederate" condition cases were removed ($r = -.29, p < .05$). These correlations indicate that free-riding decreases with the existence of confederates and in confederate condition, free-riding increases as the group size gets larger. FRI's correlation with confederate was marginally significant ($r = -.14, p < .057$); but FRI_{alt} 's correlation with confederate is stronger ($r = -.27, p < .01$). When the group performance is taken into account, influence of confederates are seen clearly – although contrary to expectations- but FRI is used in the analysis as the individual free-riding scores –regardless of others' contributions- are of interest and relevance.

FRI has been found to be significantly correlated with 3 (3,4,6,) of the manipulation check questions. FRI is positively correlated with question 3 "In

some instances, I have determined my own behaviour by comparing to others” ($r = .14, p < .05$) and question 6 “I could behave differently if others had known my contribution” ($r = .19, p < .01$). Taking others as reference seems to increase free-riding. Those who believe they have contributed enough for the group to reach the limit (Question 6) are likely to be free-riding significantly less than those who do not think so ($r = -.48, p < .01$). Question 2 “I have observed others’ behaviour during the experiment” is positively correlated with announcement ($r = .30, p < .01$), indicating that participants kept a track of the individualised announcements after each round. Question 3 and 6 that are positively correlated with FRI are negatively correlated with confederate ($r = -.17, p < .05, r = -.17, p < .05$ respectively). Taking others as reference seems to be more at work in no confederate condition. Participants believe they have contributed to the group goal more in confederate condition ($r = .18, p < .05$). Question 4 (I think I have contributed enough for the group to reach the minimum limit) is negatively correlated with “Shame” indicating those who believe they have not contributed enough are likely to be high in shame, thus confirming that shame is experienced rather in a social context where others’ evaluations are applicable.

Blind patriotism is positively related to pride ($r = .22, p < .01$), but contrary to expectations, it is positively related to constructive patriotism ($r = .28, p < .01$). It is also positively correlated with sex ($r = .16, p < .05$), indicating men are more likely to score higher on blind patriotism than women. Constructive patriotism is negatively related to free-riding ($r = -.19, p < .01$) and positively related to voting ($r = .23, p < .01$). As expected, those who have voted in the latest election and who free-ride less are associated with higher constructive patriotism.

Table 3.3. Correlations between experimental variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Free-Riding	-														
2. Announcement	,038	-													
3. Confederate	-,144	,045	-												
4. Group size	-,073	,000	,226**	-											
5. Acquaintance	-,131	-,119	,032	,164*	-										
6. Above the limit	-,164*	-,243**	-,376**	,164*	,193**	-									
7. Shame	,106	,024	-,096	,051	-,049	,033	-								
8. Guilt	,046	-,041	-,070	,012	-,064	,000	,621**	-							
9. Pride	-,142	-,034	,020	-,044	-,021	,018	-,491**	-,452**	-						
10. mc1	,034	,002	-,023	-,083	-,059	,112	-,139	-,147*	,188*	-					
11. mc2	,030	,307**	-,105	,057	-,080	-,107	,074	,039	,069	-,041	-				
12. mc3	,147*	,139	-,169*	,012	,002	,002	,114	,154*	,132	-,111	,408**	-			
13. mc4	-,481**	-,032	,183*	-,023	,007	,057	-,165*	-,113	,157*	-,039	,046	,013	-		
14. mc5	,132	,063	-,170*	,149*	-,040	,083	,048	,170*	-,025	,021	,192**	,170*	-,147*	-	
15. mc6	,193**	,001	-,171*	,067	-,091	-,041	,015	,144	-,053	-,044	,175*	,281**	-,110	,515**	-

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**.. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Note. Free-riding 0 = No free-riding 1 = Complete free-riding; Announcement 0 = Aggregate 1 = Individualised; Confederate 0 = No 1 = Yes; Group size = Range between 3-6; Acquaintance 0 = No 1 = Yes; Above the limit = Range between -14 and 5; mc = Manipulation Check.

Table 3. 4. Correlations between major variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Blind patriotism	1									
2. Constructive patriotism	,276**	1								
3. Free riding	-,039	-,195**	1							
4. Shame	,033	-,024	,106	1						
5. Guilt	,096	,113	,046	,621**	1					
6. Pride	,219**	,048	-,142	-,491**	-,452**	1				
7. Vote	,050	,235**	-,140	,060	,015	-,093	1			
8. NGO	-,100	-,010	,007	-,130	-,120	,127	,054	1		
9. Age	,030	,031	-,017	-,010	-,050	,055	,113	,033	1	
10. Sex	,161*	-,015	,104	,091	,081	-,069	-,067	-,025	,181*	1

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Note. Blind Patriotism 0 = Totally disagree 3 = Neither agree nor disagree 5 = Totally agree; Constructive Patriotism 0 = Totally disagree 3 = Neither agree nor disagree 5 = Totally agree ; Free-riding 0 = No free-riding 1 = Complete free-riding; Shame, Guilt, Pride 1 = Don't agree at all 3 = Partly Agree 5 = Agree a lot; Vote 1 = Yes 0 = No; NGO = Worked for an NGO 1 = Yes 0 = No; Sex = 1 = Female 2 = Male.

3.3. Regression Analyses

In this part, the hypothesised relationships are going to be tested with multiple regression analysis. Hypotheses that include relationships found to be insignificant in the correlational analysis are skipped and the regression analyses of those variables are not presented here (Except for Hypothesis 5 and 6 that include the experimental variables).

For the first part, a test of the hypothesis 1 is to be presented. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was run to see if constructive patriotism and guilt are significant predictors of free-riding. Age and sex were entered in the first step as a control factor. The results of the analysis show that age and sex were not predictors of free-riding; but the second step revealed that constructive patriotism and guilt explain % 4 of the variance together $F(4, 182) = 2,460, p < .05$ (Table 3.5). Constructive patriotism significantly predicts free-riding ($\beta = -.20, t = -2.711, p < .01$), but guilt fails to do so ($\beta = .06, t = .797, ns$).

Second part of the first hypothesis that blind patriotism and shame predict free-riding positively has not been found significant. The predictions of the thesis concerning the relationship between shame/guilt and free-riding thus have not been confirmed.

Table 3. 5. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis for other hypothesis 1

	B	β	t	Sig.	R ²	R ² Ch.	Sig. R ² Ch.	F
Step 1					,012	,012	,337	1,095
Age	-,003	-,036	-,484	,629				
Sex	,027	,110	1,463	,145				
Step2					,052	,040	,024	2,460*
Age	-,002	-,026	-,344	,731				
Sex	,025	,100	1,347	,180				
Cons. Pat. ¹	-,048	-,199	-2,711	,007				
Guilt	,010	,059	,797	,427				

DV: Free-Riding

¹Constructive Patriotism

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

As a test of the second hypothesis, predictors of constructive patriotism are to be tested. Blind patriotism, free-riding, guilt, shame, voting and NGO participation had been proposed as predictors. Age, sex, group size and acquaintance factors have been entered in the first step as control factors, because group size and acquaintance need to be controlled for when free-riding is in the equation. Results indicate that the set of variables thought to be predictors of patriotism account for % 17,7 of the variance $F(10, 182) = 3,687, p < .001$ (Table 3.6). Free-riding ($\beta = -.14, t = -1.949, p < .053$), blind patriotism ($\beta = .26, t = 3.642, p < .001$), voting ($\beta = .20, t = 2.764, p < .01$) and guilt ($\beta = .19, t = 2.085, p < .05$) significantly predicted constructive patriotism. Blind patriotism had a negative effect (reverse of expectations) on constructive patriotism. NGO and shame did not have the expected influence on constructive patriotism. Together with this analysis, a holistic understanding of constructive patriotism can be supported.

Hypothesis 3 is partially supported with constructive patriotism and pride as significant predictors of blind patriotism with % 15 of the variance explained $F(4, 182) = 7,948, p < .001$ (Table 3.7). Constructive patriotism ($\beta = .27, t = 3.887, p < .001$) and pride ($\beta = .22, t = 3.177, p < .01$) significantly predict blind patriotism; but again in a negative pattern which is the reverse of the expectations. Pride is an aspect that distinguished blind and constructive patriotism, as blind patriotism is interpreted as a form of national pride, while constructive patriotism is not related to pride.

Table 3. 6. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis for other hypothesis 2

	B	β	t	Sig.	R ²	R ² Ch.	Sig. R ² Ch.	F
Step 1					,008	0,008	,845	,348
Age	,013	,042	,540	,590				
Sex	-,031	-,030	-,389	,698				
Group Size	,050	,079	1,041	,299				
Acquaintance	,006	,005	,062	,950				
Step2					,177	,169	,000	3,687**
Age	,006	,019	,263	,793				
Sex	-,042	-,041	-,563	,574				
Group Size	,047	,075	1,044	,298				
Acquaintance	,009	,008	,112	,911				
Free-Riding	-,583	-,140	-1,949	,053				
Blind Pat.	,193	,260	3,642	,000				
Vote	,233	,197	2,764	,006				
NGO	,019	,016	,228	,820				
Shame	-,137	-,143	-1,593	,113				
Guilt	,126	,186	2,085	,039				

DV: Constructive Patriotism

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 3. 7. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis for other hypothesis 3

	B	β	t	Sig.	R ²	R ² Ch.	Sig. R ² Ch.	F
Step 1					,026	,026	,094	2,395
Age	,000	,000	,005	,996				
Sex	,222	,161	2,151	,033				
Step2					,152	,126	,000	7,948**
Age	-,010	-,024	-,347	,729				
Sex	,255	,185	2,625	,009				
Cons. Pat.	,361	,269	3,887	,000				
Pride	,243	,221	3,177	,002				

DV: Blind Patriotism

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

The correlations and the regression analysis indicate that the proposed relationship between free-riding and patriotism (constructive and blind) is partially supported. Free-riding is a (negative) predictor of constructive patriotism, however no significant relationship was found for blind patriotism.

The implications will be discussed later.

Finally, the experimental hypotheses were tested. The effects of experimental manipulations (announcement and confederate) on the levels of free-riding

were tested after controlling for the group size and acquaintance factors. Control factors were not found to be significantly influencing free-riding; however the pattern of “acquaintance” was worth considering. Although not significant, it makes a marginally significant prediction that having an acquaintance in the group might predict lower free-riding scores ($\beta = -.12, t = -1,657, p < .10$). Announcement does not significantly predict free-riding; and confederate makes a marginally significant prediction, like acquaintance ($\beta = .144, t = -1,913, p < .057$).

The experimental hypotheses were not confirmed. Announcement manipulation failed to influence free-riding and confederate had an (almost) reverse impact on free-riding. However, these findings will be discussed, as the coercion factor might have led participants to compensate for the loss resulting from confederates and the decrease in free-riding in confederate condition might be attributed to that.

Table 3. 8. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis for experimental hypotheses 5 and 6

	B	β	t	Sig.	R ²	R ² Ch.	Sig. R ² Ch.	F
Step 1					,034	,034	,183	1,576
Age	-,005	-,065	-,856	,393				
Sex	,028	,114	1,516	,131				
Group Size	-,010	-,066	-,881	,380				
Acquaintance	-,035	-,126	-1,657	,099				
Step 2					,055	,021	,149	1,703
Age	-,005	-,066	-,866	,388				
Sex	,031	,127	1,679	,095				
Group Size	-,005	-,035	-,463	,644				
Acquaintance	-,034	-,121	-1,587	,114				
Announcement	,010	,039	,531	,596				
Confederate	-,036	-,144	-1,913	,057				

DV: Free-Riding

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

This thesis aims to provide reliable experimental data to the interdisciplinary concept of “free-riding” from the viewpoint of social psychology. Based on the empirical findings, the thesis also suggests free-riding to be investigated inclusive to group attachment, as a potential link between the individual and group levels of analyses. Empirical findings of this study are going to be discussed in this section within the framework of the literature and the particular characteristics of Turkey. There are two questions of theoretical relevance to the study: “How do the groups motivate and mobilise its members for collective action?” and “How does the individual construct itself by maintaining a balance between cooperative/responsible behaviour and self-interested utility maximisation?” What inferences can be made from the findings assuming that individuals are active constructors of their selves, rather than passive socialisers (Haste, 2004); is asked in the second part of this section. Finally, the third section summarises the major limitations of this study and suggestions for designing future research on this subject and/or improving the current one.

4.1. Evaluation and Contributions of the Study

The evaluation of the study will be presented in two parts; first the experimental part will be evaluated; afterwards, the relation of other variables including the experimental (free-riding) one, will be interpreted.

4.1.1. Experimental Results

Group activity, whatever the size and context, is highly related to motivation. Presence of others might lead to motivation gains or motivation losses and to increased/decreased performance (Karau & Williams, 1993; Zajonc, 1965). Individual motivation loss on the group task due to dispensability and less perceived effectiveness/noticeability of one's effort has been called free-rider effects (Kerr & Bruun, 1983). Organized collective action faces the problem of individual motivation losses, if not the coordination losses (Steiner, 1972). Apparently, the performance criterion is not clear in the case of collective action. At a societal level, the state is bound to provide public goods to citizens on principles of non-excludability and non-rivalry (Samuelson, 1954). This results in one of the biggest collective action problems, as the individual interests clash with group interests many of the time (Individuals are better off when they do not contribute to the collective action). As a conflict between individual and group rationality, prisoner's dilemma is a commonly used game theoretical application of a two-person dilemma situation (Tuck, 2008). It drew attention in many disciplines and many experimental studies showed it might even be difficult for two people to cooperate. Free-riding problem is actually an *n-party* prisoner's dilemma (Buchanan, 1965; cited in Tuck, 2008) where individuals cannot be excluded from the public good, the good can be achieved with contributions of *K members* of the group, where *K* is less than all and individual utility is increased with free-riding (Pettit, 1986). Free-riding poses a serious problem in many group settings (e.g. Agricultural production: Gadzikwa, Lyne & Hendriks, 2007; Olson and Cook, 2008, Global Warming: Milinski et al., 2008) in a larger context; but has been demonstrated even in laboratory settings.

The experimental conditions in the current study resemble a public goods dilemma situation. Participants contribute to a public good together and they all benefit from the total public good in a non-excludable and non-rivalrous manner. The results of the current study show that participants can be generally labelled as “fair-sharers” (Milinski et al., 2008). Cooperation in this small-group setting proved to be motivated by reaching the minimum limit rather than reaching the maximum utility for the group.

Confederate condition aimed to test the impact of reciprocity with a mix of sequential and simultaneous game design (Bardsley, 2000; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). Decrease in free-riding (FRI_{alt}) in confederate condition ($r = -.27$, $p < .01$) indicate that participants worked to compensate for the (manipulated) free-riding in the group. This cannot be interpreted as an altruistic or group-utility maximising act, their action is out of self-interest, as they will not be able to earn at all if they cannot reach the limit. Contributions after the limit was reached confirm this view (Table 3.2). Thus, the expected effect of confederate condition could not be reached (almost reverse was found). Participants chose to compensate for free-riding, by contributing more to the public account, instead of being *suckers* (Abele & Diehl, 2008) or conforming (Carpenter, 2004) to confederates' behaviour.

As for the announcement condition, individualised announcement compared to aggregate announcement was predicted to induce less free-riding (Sell & Wilson, 1991). This effect has not been confirmed. The individualised announcement condition allows the participants to follow the contribution patterns of other players. Although they are not given out the names, (contributions presented under participant number) high percent of

acquaintances in the groups (% 73,2) might have increased the identifiability factor.

In the individualised announcement condition, participants might have attributed a specific participant number to a certain friend and believe that their own pattern might be predicted by their friends, too; thus, this might have reduced free-riding. Having an acquaintance was positively associated with more total public contributions ($r = .20, p < .01$) and more tokens collected above the limit ($r = .19, p < .01$). Although acquaintance is not related to free-riding significantly; at a group level, acquaintances seem to increase public contributions. Announcement condition's failure to trigger different free-riding levels might be due to the high number of acquaintances in the groups.

Apart from the acquaintance explanation, neither individualised nor aggregate conditions represent direct identifiability. So the lack of difference between the two conditions might be due to the perceptions of non-identifiability in both conditions.

Manipulation check questions also show that participants who state they would behave differently if s/he was made identifiable (²Question 6) and who behaved more reciprocally (²Question 3) scored higher on free riding ($r = .19, p < .01$; $r = .14, p < .05$, respectively). It seems that they would free-ride less if others had known their contribution; so it might be said that non-identifiability made them free-ride, which might explain the non-difference between announcement conditions. Those who determine their behaviour comparing to others seem to score higher on free-riding; but the effect is not due to the confederate condition,

²Question 6: I could behave differently if others had known my contribution

²Question 3: In some instances, I have determined my own behaviour by comparing to others

as the question (3) is negatively correlated to confederate condition ($r = -.17$, $p < .05$).

Although acquaintance condition was controlled for in the analyses, it was the case for the majority; which negatively impacts the experimental results.

Apart from the acquaintance condition, self-interested behaviour might account for the compensation of free-riding confederates. If participants had conformed to the confederates and free-rode, they would be in a position of *sucker*, which means to withdraw contributions as a reaction to free-riders. So, they might have ignored the free-riders and worked towards reaching the minimum limit.

4.1.2. Other results

Contrary to expectations and the literature, blind and constructive patriotism were found to be positively related to each other. Free-riding, as expected was negatively related to constructive patriotism; but no relation with blind patriotism was found.

Schatz et al. (1999) report a negative correlation between constructive patriotism and blind patriotism in the study they report the scale ($r = -.12$, $p < .01$ in Study 1; $r = -.09$, ns in Study 2). Similarly, they report that both measures correlate with national attachment positively, blind patriotism being correlated stronger than constructive patriotism, however. It would be expected that both constructs either do not predict each other or predict negatively, although they make differential predictions of related constructs.

Patriotic and nationalistic attitudes are subject to change depending on the context and external events (Li & Brewer, 2004) and every country has its own unique historical and cultural background. Similarly, Schatz and Staub (1997) draw attention to the fact that different evaluations of state institutions and

ideologies exist among patriots; so what people are patriotic towards is not the same for all patriots. This can be extended as; what people are patriotic towards might not be the same for people from different countries.

In summary, this study contributes to the literature in three ways: First, an experimental test of free-riding behaviour in a small-group situation, in Turkey has been provided. It might be argued that the public good situation, the minimum limit (coercion) to earn money, the incentive to free-ride and the non-excludable and non-rivalrous nature of the public good simulates a real-life situation. Despite some shortcomings of the methodology, a rare data to the Turkish social psychology literature has been provided.

Second, support for differentiating between forms of group attachment in Turkey has been provided, as the concepts of national attachment are diverse and complicated (Bora, 2003). More studies are needed in Turkey on the types of patriotism (blind and constructive), especially in the social psychology literature. A test of patriotism rather than nationalism provides valuable information, as it allows testing in-group attachment without necessarily referring to intergroup situations (Schatz et al., 1999).

Third, relating free-riding behaviour –which is an individual level behaviour in a group setting- to attitudes of group attachment and suggesting future research to explore this relationship, is another contribution. A constructive attachment to the country is of political and social significance these days in Turkey, as well as the definition and understanding of the “individual” within this context. The implications will be discussed in the next section.

4.2. Implications of the Study

Empirical findings of the study will be discussed here within the framework presented in the Introduction section.

4.2.1. Individual and Social Capital

The individual emerged as a modern historical figure in the last centuries. Foucault (1988) sees the publication of the first healthcare programme in France by the state, as a historical point in time; although the upcoming violence is accompanied. End of the 18th century witnessed the rise of the individual, as well as the rise of nationalism. The state might have recognised the individual; but through nationalism, they had new mechanisms and methods to mobilise the individuals. Role of the individual emerges here. As Haste (2004) describes, the responsibility of the “good citizen” to his/her self, community or conscience might be in conflict and these conflicts are cases where the individual is expected to choose freely and manage the conflict.

Relations between the individuals; and between the individual and the group produce its norms, trust and networks; namely its social capital (Putnam, 2000). In order for people to be able to be organised, to be effective as individuals and to use their maximum freedom (Hacking, 1986; Rose, 1996), they should be mobilised in a constructive manner. Social capital might be the method and the output to be increased at a societal level to make the individuals feel self-efficacious and able (Perkins et al., 2002). As seen in the public good experiments, trust is one of the key components to increase cooperation and attachment. Trust in other people, or in institutions are crucial for cooperative tendencies, as well as for economic development.

4.2.2. Object of Group Attachment: Patriotism vs. Cosmopolitanism

Patriotism is only one form of group attachment among others and probably one of the most convenient ones. If people are to be organised and mobilised around an abstraction, it is most likely to be the countries. As Vandeveld (1997) argues, community feelings like patriotism are used to prevent free-riding. However, patriotism is limited in scope and is not an effective factor in issues requiring international cooperation like global warming.

Parallel to this argument, there is a line of thought that discusses the universality and object of group attachment and endorse a *cosmopolitanist* view (Nussbaum, 1996). For Nussbaum, a cosmopolitan is *the person whose allegiance is to the community of human beings in the entire world* and it is the understanding that although a particular person is living in a particular location, s/he has to share the world with other citizens of other countries. She argues that through a cosmopolitanist view, we can recognise our moral obligations to the rest of the world and contribute to the solution of global problems where international cooperation is required. So she asks, if one is to defend a positive view/idea for his/her country, why is that restricted to the national boundaries? Brock & Atkinson (2008) support this view and claim that if national attachment satisfies psychological needs, cosmopolitanism can effectively satisfy same needs without necessarily entailing negative intergroup attitudes, especially in a time universal cooperation is essential.

Kateb (2006, p.4) on his critique of patriotism argues that a defence of patriotism is an attack on Enlightenment. He argues that patriotism and similar group-phenomena impose limits on the individuals by simplifying lives of individuals,

by tying their identity *to a structure of inclusion and exclusion, of questions and answers, of rites and ceremonies, of allowable and censurable fantasies.*

Kateb goes on to elaborate that patriotism is based on abstractions which continuously politicise and militarise people's lives. You can love a person without having to dislike other persons; but you cannot just love an abstract entity like a country without having to dislike others; because countries are by their nature in competition. Patriotism seems to be against (universal) moral principle that teaches restraint of self-preference; as it promotes self-idealisation and it is a radical form of group-thinking because it includes being armed. A good patriot does not want people in other countries to be patriots. He goes on to argue that a moral person has to choose between attachment to country and adherence to moral principle, especially in intergroup conflict situations like wars. Similar to what Halevy et al. (2008), point out about pacifists being labelled as cowards because they reject to give support to "patriotic" causes.

Kateb argues that at times, what is morally right for an individual might be against patriotic causes. Unless, patriotism is mobilised for a good cause, it leads to same negative consequences like nationalism according to Kateb.

He further puts that cosmopolitan view is not satisfying either, because it requires the love of all countries. He believes that it is not the countries to be loved, but it is persons and moral principles. Kateb (2006) argues that patriotism can be mobilised for a good cause as well as a bad one. But as it needs external enemies, it can only be instrumentally good which would be a rare occasion.

Similarly, Bar-Tal (1997) argues that individuals are not only responsible to their nations; but to the whole mankind.

4.2.3. Constructive Individual

The negative relationship found in this study between free-riding and constructive patriotism is of significance. A constructive patriot or a “constructive individual” is one that takes action, which constructs itself and its environment and becomes a part of it (Haste, 2004).

Schatz and Staub (1997) have found that blind patriots score higher on symbolic allegiance; whereas constructive patriots scoring higher on information gathering/involvement and social-political activism. The authors conclude that the blind patriots’ attachment to their country seems to be abstract, and the constructive patriots’ seem to be more concrete as they rate higher on domains such as information gathering and activism. The political activism of the constructive patriots is important. While blind patriotism is not related to political engagement, constructive patriotism is positively related to engagement (Schatz, Staub & Lavine, 1999). However as the authors point out, sometimes blind patriots might be in organised action against the government in that the government is behaving anti-patriotically. They distinguish criticism of the government from the criticism of the country, which is an important distinction. As Göregenli (2008) points out, the seemingly constructive activity of the blind patriots might help us understand the recent political atmosphere in Turkey. Ideology and the legitimate “discourse” are controlled by the nation state and patriotism is used as a legitimising myth in the militarisation process. As citizenship is concerned with the production and consumption of public goods, protection of the homeland and thus security is a public good and citizens are assumed to be in contract with the state regarding the use of legitimate power. The recent political activity of long-passive citizens in Turkey (claiming to be

patriots) might be interpreted as a criticism of the government rather than the country (or the state). Going back to the findings of the present study, we can find support to the civic nature of the constructive patriot. Taken together, constructive patriotism's moderate correlation with voting ($r = .23, p < .001$) and free-riding ($r = -.19, p < .001$) might be interpreted with a twofold explanation: The civic nature of those relationships is apparently helpful in defining a constructive patriot or an "individual to be constructed" in the modern Turkey, however the influence of blind patriotism is the other side of the coin that accompanies the first one. The model that was summarised in Table 3.6 helps define a constructive patriot in Turkey: Someone who free-rides less (e.g. pays taxes, follows the rules and regulations and contributes to collective action), votes (another form of public good), guilt-oriented (e.g. internalises the norms); but still a fairly blind patriot.

4.3. Limitations of the Study and Future Research

In this section, limitations and weaknesses of the current study are presented alongside suggestions for future research.

1- Testing the free-rider effects in the laboratory has certain shortcomings. One of the main problems is *generalizability*. Laboratory experiments are conducted in small groups; whereas the generalized cases involve communities of large sizes, Milinski et al. (2008) defines the global warming issue as a public goods experiment with 6 billion people. Tuck (2008, p.20) argues that cooperation in small group settings might seem reasonable, as the participants do not have high incentives to free-ride. So, individuals who might be prone to free-riding in real life might not reflect this tendency in the experiments.

As a small-group experiment, the current study faced similar concerns. The benefit of free-riding to the participants might have not been so big; so some participants might not have bothered to free-ride, considering the high acquaintance ratio. Participants believed they had the chance to earn between 10 and 40 TL. Although the amount is relatively high, they might have thought it was not big enough to “betray” their friends.

The free-riding scores in the current study followed a normal distribution; however it is not possible to check the reliability of free-riding in comparison to participants’ real life experiences.

2- Another limitation of the study is concerned with constructs that were not measured or manipulated. First, manipulation of reciprocity conditions could have provided valuable information. Second, possibility of punishment of free-riders might have significantly influenced free-riding scores. Especially, possibility of punishment options in confederate conditions could help to see the effect of conformity in a much better way. Third, emotional reactions towards free-riding would provide valuable insight into what emotions motivate or de-motivate cooperation (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2000a, Fischbacher and Gächter, 2006). Personality correlates of free-riding such as conscientiousness, openness to experience etc. could be examined, as well as shame and guilt.

3- Two variables that were controlled for in this experiment should be given a great deal of care and attention in future studies; group size and acquaintance. Group sizes should be kept stable in all sessions to prevent any undesired differences caused by that. In the current study, group sizes could not be standard due to participant absenteeism. When the rest of the group is

present at the lab, the session could not be cancelled with the lack of one or two missing participants. More importantly, participants in the sessions should either be arranged in a manner that they would be in a group of strangers or of as few acquaintances as possible. The stranger – partner group paradigm might be of good starting point to consider (Fehr & Gächter 2000; 2000a).

- 4- Computerised game methods could be applied to minimise the influence of process factors and to prevent the participants to see each other.
- 5- An intergroup situation could be applied to see the effects of group identification on cooperation as Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000) emphasise the importance of reciprocity in those experiments. People tend to cooperate with the ones whom they expect future cooperation, regardless of their group membership. Reciprocity is thus based on trust. So individuals can be cooperative with out-group members and uncooperative with in-group members. However, in a simultaneous game, where we cannot observe others' actions, we tend to rely on our in-group cues by showing a preference for the in-group. A minimal group paradigm could be applied and group attachment variables (e.g. patriotism) might be investigated in that context.
- 6- Another limitation of the study is that free-riding has been thought of as a purely economic concept and the design of the experiment relied on this assumption. However, other possible experiment options would include political scenarios and/or social participation and citizenship elements and vignettes that could improve the realism in the experiment.

4.4. Conclusion

The study and discussions reported in this thesis contribute to the understanding of variables in a universal level; offers new relationships and framework and provides data on cross-cultural differences of Turkey.

Free-riding behaviour is thought to be of significant importance and a serious social problem in Turkey. More empirical studies in social psychology and other related disciplines are definitely needed. The nature of Turkish patriotism is shown to have a different pattern than a western conceptualisation (Schatz et al. 1999).

Findings in the Turkish context do not necessarily mean these patterns are specific to Turkey. Same patterns of relationships might be investigated in other cultures. Social psychological perspective might produce valuable insights into the interplay between collective action and group attachment. Both are group phenomena and social psychology offers an integrative level of analysis to investigate the individual-group phenomena.

The cultural content is also of significance. The impact of acquaintances in this experiment might suggest that people are willing to cooperate with people they know. Collective action is based on cooperation with strangers in the society. Unless cooperation with strangers becomes a norm in this society, social and economic development is highly unlikely to accelerate.

Characteristics of culture of honour in Turkey (Öner-Özkan & Gençöz, 2007) might be a factor explaining collective action problems in Turkey, as well as free-riding norms. Norms of free-riding might be de-legitimised through mechanisms and methods of social capital. Assumptions taken for granted like a highly cohesive culture with high levels of solidarity could be re-considered.

Finally, a functional group attachment that includes love and identification, as well as cooperativeness and trust should be constructed. It should not be forgotten that every individual is responsible of the group's actions.

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APENDICES

APENDIX A: Manipulation Check Questions

1. Deney süresince rahat hissettim.
2. Deney süresince diđerlerinin davranışlarını gözledim.
3. Kendi davranışlarımı, diđerlerinin davranışlarına göre belirlediğim durumlar oldu.
4. Deney süresince grubun minimum limite ulaşmasını için yeterince katkıda bulunduğumu düşünüyorum.
5. Diđerlerinin benim katkımı bilmemesi, daha rahat hareket etmemi sağladı.
6. Diđerlerinin katkımı bildiği bir durumda, daha farklı davranabilirdim.

APENDIX B: Constructive and blind patriotism items

1. Bütün kalbiyle Türkiye'yi desteklemeyen insanlar başka bir yerde yaşamalıdır.
2. Türkiye hemen hemen her zaman haklıdır.
3. Haklı ya da haksız, her koşulda, ülkemi desteklerim.
4. Türk ordusunun eylemlerine karşı olanlar aslında Türkiye karşıtıdır.
5. Türkiye'nin politikalarını eleştiren ve bu yönde protesto gösterileri yapan insanların çoğu, iyi, doğru düzgün ve zeki insanlardır.,
6. Türkiye'nin politikalarının hemen hemen her zaman ahlaki açıdan doğru olduğuna inanırım.
7. Eğer başka bir ülke, iyi bilmediğim bir konuda Türkiye'nin politikalarına karşı çıkarsa, illa da ülkem diye Türkiye'yi desteklemem gerekmez.
8. Türkiye'nin genel politikalarını ve genel olarak sistemi ikide bir değiştirmeye çalışmamak gerekir.
9. Türkiye'nin politikalarını, sadece benim ülkem politikaları oldukları için bile desteklerim.
10. Dünyada Türkiye'ye karşı çok fazla eleştiri yapılmaktayken, bu ülkenin vatandaşları olarak bizler, ülkemizi eleştirmemeliyiz.
11. Bu ülkeyi eleştirmek Türkiye karşıtlığıdır.
12. Ne kadar ağır eleştiriler içerse de herkesi kapsayacak tam bir ifade özgürlüğü olmalıdır.
13. Kendimi Türkiye ile özdeşleştirdiğimden, bu ülkenin birtakım eylemleri beni üzmemtedir.
14. İnsanlar bu ülkenin kusurlarını görüp, olumlu yönde ilerlemesi için çalışmalıdır.
15. Eğer Türkiye'yi seviyorsanız, başka ülkeler ne der diye düşünmekten vazgeçip, bu ülkenin sorunlarını görüp çözmeye çalışmanız gerekir.
16. Eğer Türkiye'yi eleştiriyorsam bu, ülkemi sevmediğim anlamına gelmez.
17. Türkiye'nin bazı politikalarına karşıyım çünkü ülkemi düşünüyorum ve onun gelişmesini istiyorum.
18. Türkiye'ye olan sevgimi, sadece olumlu politikalara ve değişimlere yönelik çabaları destekleyerek gösteririm.
19. Ülkeme olan sevgim, kulağa hoş gelen ama özünde yanlış politikalara karşı konuşmamı gerektirir.

APPENDIX C: State Shame and Guilt Items

1. Kendimle ilgili iyi hissediyorum.
2. Yerin dibine batıp, yok olmak istiyorum.
3. Vicdan azabı, pişmanlık hissediyorum.
4. Değerli, kıymetli hissediyorum.
5. Önemsiz hissediyorum.
6. Yapmış olduğum bir şeyle ilgili gergin hissediyorum.
7. Yeterli, yararlı hissediyorum.
8. Kötü biriymişim gibi hissediyorum.
9. Yapmış olduğum kötü bir şeyi düşünmeden duramıyorum.
10. Onurlu hissediyorum.
11. Aşağılanmış, rezil edilmiş hissediyorum.
12. Özür dileyecek, itiraf edecek gibi hissediyorum.
13. Yapmış olduğum bir şeyden dolayı memnun hissediyorum.
14. Değersiz, güçsüz hissediyorum.
15. Yapmış olduğum bir şeyden dolayı kötü hissediyorum.

APPENDIX D: Demographic Information Form

Demografik Bilgi Formu

1. Katılımcı Numaranız: _____

2. Yaşınız: _____

3. Cinsiyetiniz: Kadın Erkek

4. Son mezun olduğunuz eğitim kurumu:

İlkokul Ortaokul Lise Üniversite/yüksekokul Yüksek L./doktora

5. Mesleğiniz: _____

a. Öğrenci iseniz;

i. Bölümünüz:

ii. Sınıfınız:

6. Hayatınızın büyük bölümünü geçirdiğiniz yerleşim merkezini işaretleyiniz.

Köy İlçe Şehir Büyükşehir

7. Annenizin eğitim durumu

İlkokul Ortaokul Lise Üniversite/yüksekokul Yüksek L. /doktora

8. Babanızın eğitim durumu

İlkokul Ortaokul Lise Üniversite/yüksekokul Y. lisans/doktora

9. Son seçimlerde oy kullandınız mı?

Evet Hayır

10. Bugün seçim olsa hangi partiye oy verirdiniz? _____

11. Aktif olarak çalıştığınız bir sivil toplum derneği var mı?

Evet Hayır

APPENDIX E: Consent Form

Gönüllü Katılım Formu

Bu çalışma ODTÜ Psikoloji Bölümü yüksek lisans öğrencisi Reşit Kışlıoğlu tarafından yüksek lisans tezi kapsamında yürütülmektedir. Tez danışmanı ODTÜ Psikoloji Bölümü'nden Prof. Dr. Bengi Öner-Özkan'dır. Bu araştırmada tüketici davranışları ile ilgili bir deneye katılmanız, deneyin ardından da bazı anket sorularını cevaplandırmanız istenmektedir. Katılımınız sonucunda size nakit ödeme yapılacaktır. Bu çalışmada, sizin bireysel davranışınız değil; grup olarak katılımcıların davranışıyla ilgilenildiğinden, sizinle ilgili herhangi bir bireysel çıkarım yapılmayacaktır. Katılım tamamen gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır ve katılımcılardan herhangi bir kimlik bilgisi istenmemektedir. Bu çalışma yoluyla elde edilen veriler kesinlikle gizli tutulacak ve sadece bilimsel amaçla kullanılacaktır.

Ankette katılımcılara zarar verecek ve onları rahatsız edecek ifadeler bulunmamaktadır. Ancak, herhangi bir nedenle soruları yanıtlamayı bırakmak ve deneyden ayrılmak katılımcının iradesindedir. Böyle bir durumda araştırmacıya bu durumu belirtmeniz yeterlidir. Anket sonrasında çalışmayla ilgili merak ettiğiniz sorular cevaplandırılacak ve bilgilendirme yapılacaktır. Katılımınız için teşekkür ederiz. Çalışmayla ilgili daha ayrıntılı bilgi almak için bizzat araştırmacıya (Reşit Kışlıoğlu, e137232@metu.edu.tr, 0505 396 65 65) ulaşabilirsiniz.

Bu çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katılıyorum ve istediğim zaman yarıda kesip çıkabileceğimi biliyorum. Verdiğim bilgilerin bilimsel amaçlı yayımlarda kullanılmasını kabul ediyorum. (Formu doldurup imzaladıktan sonra uygulayıcıya geri veriniz).

İsim Soyisim

Tarih

İmza

---/---/---

APPENDIX F: Experiment Instructions

Deney Yönergesi

Sayın katılımcı;

Az sonra tüketici davranışları ve para kullanım tercihleriyle ilgili bir çalışmaya katılacaksınız. Çalışma kapsamında, diğer katılımcılarla birlikte 10 turlu bir oyun oynayacaksınız, ardından da bir grup anketi yanıtlamanız istenecektir. Deney sonunda her katılımcıya, deneye katılımları nedeniyle belli miktarda bir ödeme yapılacaktır. Ödenecek para, kişinin kendi performansı ve diğerlerinin performansına bağlı olarak farklılık gösterebilecektir. Araştırmacı tarafından yapılacak hesap sonrası ödenecek miktar 10 ile 40 TL arasında olacaktır.

Oyun

Her katılımcıya bir “katılımcı numarası” verilecektir ve on (10) turdan oluşan bir oyun oynanacaktır. Her tur birbirinin aynıdır. Her katılımcı deneye hipotetik bir miktara karşılık gelen 20 jeton ile başlamaktadır. Gruptaki beş kişiyi bir aile gibi düşününüz. Ailenin bir üyesi olarak her turda bu jetonlardan bir kısmını yatırım olarak kişisel ya da ortak hesaba yatırmanız istenecektir. Katılımcının her turda iki (2) jeton yatırma hakkı bulunmaktadır ve bu iki jetonu istediği şekilde kişisel ya da ortak hesaba dağıtabilir. Her turda iki jeton da bir şekilde kullanılmalıdır. Örneğin;

Kişisel hesap: 1 jeton, Ortak hesap:1 jeton

Kişisel hesap: 0 jeton, Ortak hesap:2 jeton

Kişisel hesap: 2 jeton, Ortak hesap:0 jeton.

Her tur sonunda diğer katılımcıların katkıları (isim verilmeden) araştırmacı tarafından okunacaktır. On tur sonunda her katılımcı, kişisel hesaba yatırdığı para ve ortak hesabın eşit olarak dağıtılmasından payına düşen miktarın toplamı kadar parayla deneyden ayrılacaktır. Ancak katılımcıların deneyden para kazanarak ayrılmalarının koşulu, ortak hesapta minimum bir paranın toplanmış olmasıdır. Bu miktar 50 jeton karşılığı paradır. Ailenin bütçesinde bulunması gereken minimum miktara karşılık gelen 50 jetona ulaşamadığında katılımcılar para kazanamayacaktır.

Anketler

Oyun sonrasında her katılımcıdan demografik bilgi formu ve güncel konulara ilişkin tutumları içeren anketleri doldurması istenecektir. Bu anketlere katılımcı numaranızı yazmayı unutmayınız.

NOT: Çalışma süresince katılacağınız deney ve dolduracağınız anketler ile ilgili bilgileri lütfen çalışmaya katılacağınızı bildiğiniz diğer kişilerle paylaşmayınız. Bu çalışmanın sağlıklı sonuçlara ulaşabilmesi açısından çok önemlidir.

APPENDIX G: Debriefing Form

KATILIM SONRASI BİLGİ FORMU

Bu çalışma ODTÜ Psikoloji Bölümü öğrencilerinden Reşit Kışlıoğlu'nun Sosyal Psikoloji alanındaki yüksek lisans tezi kapsamında yürütülmektedir. Bu çalışma kapsamında, “özgür süvari etkisi” (free-rider effect) olarak tanımlanan kavram deneysel olarak test edilmektedir. Bu kavram, kolektif üretimden, herhangi bir katkıda bulunmadan yararlanılması gibi bir ekonomik temelli sorunun psikolojik analizini amaçlamaktadır. Test edilen gruplardaki davranış örüntüsünün, milliyetçilik, vatanseverlik ve gurur (utanç ve suçluluk) yönelimi değişkenleriyle ilişkili olduğu düşünülmektedir.

Batıda ekonomik ve toplumsal bir sorun olarak görülen özgür-süvari davranışının Türkiye örneğinde farklı bir algıyı tetikleyebileceği düşünülmektedir. Türk toplumunun kendi toplumsal dinamiklerinin, yardımlaşma ve birliktelik gibi değerlerinin ve farklı ekonomik yapısının da farklı etkileri olabileceği düşünülmektedir. Ekonomi ve siyaset algısının da Türkiye’de birbirinden bağımsız olmadığı, aksine iç içe olduğu düşünülmektedir. Bu bağlamda “özgür süvari” davranışının, adı geçen siyasi değişkenlerle olumlu ilişki içinde olduğu düşünülmektedir.

Bu çalışmadan alınacak ilk verilerin Mayıs 2009 sonunda elde edilmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Elde edilen bilgiler sadece bilimsel araştırma ve yazılarda kullanılacaktır. Çalışmanın sonuçlarını öğrenmek ya da bu araştırma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için aşağıdaki isimlere başvurabilirsiniz. Bu araştırmaya katıldığınız için tekrar çok teşekkür ederiz.

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Ödeme

Deneye katılımınız sonucu hak edeceğiniz para size araştırmacı tarafından belirtilen tarihte ödenecektir. Bu tarihte kişisel olarak araştırmacıdan imza karşılığı paranızı alabileceksiniz.

NOT: Çalışma süresince katılacağınız deney ve dolduracağınız anketler ile ilgili bilgileri lütfen çalışmaya katılacağınızı bildiğiniz diğer kişilerle paylaşmayınız. Bu çalışmanın sağlıklı sonuçlara ulaşabilmesi açısından çok önemlidir.