

PRESS DISCOURSE IN TURKEY AS AN AGENT OF DISCRIMINATION  
TOWARDS THE NON-MUSLIMS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRESS  
COVERAGE OF THE 1934 THRACE EVENTS,  
1942 WEALTH TAX AND 6/7 SEPTEMBER 1955 RIOTS

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## **ABSTRACT**

**PRESS DISCOURSE IN TURKEY AS AN AGENT OF DISCRIMINATION  
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SEPTEMBER 1955 RIOTS**

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The purpose of the study is to focus on the press discourse in the representation of the non-Muslims in the news reports, editorials and columns based on the case studies of the 1934 Thrace Events, 1942 Wealth Tax and 6/7 September 1955 Riots. The aim is to critically analyse the ideological representation of the non-Muslims in the Turkish press through critical linguistics and discourse analysis.

Keywords: Non-Muslim Minorities, Turkish Press, Discourse Analysis.

## ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DEKİ GAYRİ-MÜSLİM AZINLIK KARŞITI BASIN SÖYLEMİ:  
1934 TRAKYA OLALARININ, 1942 VARLIK VERGİSİNİN VE 6/7 EYLÜL 1955  
OLAYLARININ BASINDA YANSIMASININ ELEŞTİREL ANALİZİ

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Tezin amacı Türkiye’de basının gayri-Müslimleri temsil ederken kullandığı ayrımcı dili saptamaktır. Bunun için gayri-Müslimlerin hayatlarında üç önemli olay olan ve 1934 Trakya Olayları, 1942 Varlık vergisi ve 6/7 Eylül 1955 Olaylarının bu dönemlerde ana akım kabul edilen gazetelerin haber, başmakale ve köşe yazılarında ayrı ayrı olmak üzere eleştirel söylem analizi yapılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Gayri-Müslimler, Türk Basını, Söylem Analizi.

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This research aims to assess trends and shifts in the portrayal of the non-Muslims in the Turkish press in three historical periods, 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, through three case analyses, the 1934 Thrace Events, the 1942 Wealth Tax and the 6/7 September 1955 Riots. The focus will be on the ideological framework adopted in the representation of the non-Muslims within which they are excluded from ‘our’ community and subjected to discursive discrimination. However, the press cannot be studied in isolation but should be studied within the socio-historical context under which it operates and is also the product of. Therefore, I will analyse the historical processes in which the exclusion of the non-Muslims had taken. A particular attention will be paid to the nation-building processes and homogenisation policies which, I believe, lie at the root of the exclusion of the non-Muslims from the ‘Turkish nationhood’. It was in this process that Turkish national identity was defined in opposition to the non-Muslim identity and the boundaries of national identity were drawn.

In the analysis of the historical processes a narrow focus was adopted at the expense of a detailed historical account of the 1920s and 1930s, mainly comprising of the processes of the construction of the national-identity and the events that directly affected the status of the non-Muslims. The same limited approach was applied in the analysis of the 1940s and 1950s. One of the most important shortcomings of such a focus was to

neglect the international dimension, which, in all three events, had a definitive influence on the political processes. Therefore, historical explanations should be read with this limitation in mind.

It is against this historical background that the main question of this thesis can be addressed which is the role of the press in the reproduction, normalization and habitualisation of the discourse of exclusion of the non-Muslims. The media representation of minorities or reproduction of the exclusion can take variety of forms. I will focus on the ideological representation involving assumptions about the non-Muslims, including the denial of their 'lived experiences' and the re-construction of the non-Muslim identity on the basis of their communal identities. Such denial and reconstruction serve to emphasise the non-Muslims' difference from 'us', thus contributing to the discursive reproduction of the 'Turkish nationhood' from which non-Muslim identity is excluded (Ferguson 1998, 1- 4).

Moreover, the representation of the non-Muslims in the press, which involves categorisations, stereotyping and attributing to the non-Muslims' essential identity qualities, further contributes to the marking of the non-Muslims as 'others' by emphasising their difference from 'our' community, thereby naturalising and rationalising their exclusion.

In the historical context of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, newspapers were considered to be an important medium of communication. Although radio was widely listened to it was under the control of the state, which did not allow the representation of a wide range of opinions. Consequently, newspapers came to the fore as one of the most significant institutions in forming national consciousness and public opinion on vital issues. They played a significant role in shaping the public perception of the issues involving the non-Muslims.

Newspapers will not be taken here as merely transmitting information and offering interpretation of the events to the reader, but they will be viewed as offering the ideological representation of the events. In this sense they are ‘a site of ideological struggle’ where the competing views struggle to make their definitions of the events become dominant (Trew 1996, 155-6). As the most important part of the newspapers, news is taken to contain embedded ideological meanings that reflect the values of the dominant ideology. I will use a selection of analytical tools drawing upon the work of Ferguson, Fairclough, van Dijk, Trew and Fowler in the analysis of the construction of the press representations – news reports, editorials and columns- and their ideological implications. Thus the linguistic and discursive analysis of the news reports, editorials and columns primarily based on the structural features of the texts. These structural features are taken to be identifiable and important for the construction of meaning. However, these texts are not studied in isolation but in their socio-historical context involving interpretation. Then the textual analysis is complemented with interpretation, which will enable us to make sense of the production and reproduction of the symbolic representation of the vital issues in their historical conditions of existence (Thompson 1990, 21 in Ferguson 1998, 47; Fowler 1996).

Using these analytical tools I will conduct the critical analysis of the press discourse in its coverage of the 1934 Thrace events, the 1942 Wealth tax and 6/7 September 1955 Riots. The analysis of the news reports, editorials and articles in the regular columns is conducted in Turkish and are translated into English by the researcher. The linguistic tools to analyse the press discourse have been selected on the basis that the same grammatical rules applied both in English and Turkish and the resulting meanings are the same.

The newspapers are selected on the basis that they represented a wide range of point of views and were part of the mainstream media. Another criterion for the selection of the newspapers is based on the ideological leanings of the newspapers. Traditionally the main division in the Turkish press had been between pro-government and opposition

press, the latter until recently always being less in number than the former and its opposition being usually limited to opposing certain government policies. In other words ‘opposition’ within the mainstream press in three decades under question did not involve a radical critique of the nature of the state, government or the ruling class. Nevertheless in the historical context of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, opposing the government policies was an exceptionally audacious act, and the opposition journalists and the newspapers often suffered the consequences.

The second consideration in the selection of the newspapers has been their continuity in the following two decades, which allows us to see how persistent the newspapers as institutions in their approach towards the non-Muslims. However, when this was not possible, since the life span of many dailies in Turkey was shorter than a decade and only a few newspapers met these criteria,<sup>1</sup> newspapers are selected on the basis that they had the editors or the lead writers or columnist writers who had written for other newspapers in the previous decade. These lead writers and columnists usually had reputations of being pro-government or opposition to government with a considerable readership loyalty. Some of these writers actively worked as journalists at least in the two decades and some in all three decades under analysis, including Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Velit Ebuzyyya, Refii Cevat Ulunay, Refik Halit Karay, Ahmet Emin Yalman, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, Enis Tahsin Til, Zekeriya and Sabiha Sertel who were associated with opposition while Falih Rıfkı Atay, Yunus Nadi, Nadir Nadi, Necmettin Sadak, Kazım Şinasi Dersan, Hakkı and Rasim Us, Ragıp Emeç and Va-Nu were associated with pro-government during the single party era. Their contributions, as well-known journalists and commentators, will provide us with valuable insight about the role of the journalists as part of the intelligentsia in shaping public opinion over the issues involving non-Muslims. Other newspapers were selected on the basis that they played a

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<sup>1</sup> According to Kocabaşoğlu it is not possible to determine the duration of the 42 per cent of the newspapers (74 newspapers) in Istanbul and 47 per cent of the provincial newspapers between 1919 and 1938. The available data shows that in the same period, 47 per cent of the Istanbul and 36 per cent of the provincial newspapers had less than five years life span. Only 8 per cent (14 newspapers) lasted more than ten years and only 4 newspapers had reached a 20 year of publication life. Only *Cumhuriyet* which was first published in 1918 still exists today (Kocabaşoğlu 1981, 98-99, fn.3).

significant part in the events under discussion. For example *Hürriyet* newspaper is selected for its role in propaganda over the Cyprus issue and *Istanbul Ekspres* for its sensational headline on 6 September, which substantially contributed to the negative propaganda against Greece in 1955.

Press cannot operate free from constraints imposed upon individual and institutions alike by the dominant power relations in society, by economic relations of domination and subordination and by social arrangements. With this concern in mind before analysis of the press coverage of each of the three events, chapter II aims to provide a historical context in which media operated and shaped by the social, economic and political circumstances. It will explore the Turkish nation building process and the consolidation of the nation state. The fundamental reforms carried out in this process, in order to create a homogeneous nation suitable to the new state, will be one of the main concerns of the chapter since the status of the non-Muslims was largely determined by the concern of the elite in relation to their mission to create the society anew. In other words the homogenisation policies will be analysed in terms of their implications for the non-Muslims. A particular attention will be paid on the definition of citizenship and debate around what constituted the citizenship in order to highlight the discrepancies between the legal definition and practical application for despite the legal equality the non-Muslims suffered social inequality. I will then briefly analyse the Milli Şef (the National Chief) years in relation to its economic policies leading to the introduction of the wealth tax which was considered to be part of the policy of Turkification of the economy and as such politically motivated. Similarly, the early years of the Demokrat Party (Democrat Party - DP) will be analysed in relation to the policies, namely the populist nationalism, that led to the 6/7 September riots.

Chapter III begins with a brief outline of the critical work carried out especially in Britain to highlight the main problems in the representation of the disadvantaged groups in the news media. Having identified the main problems in representation of the disadvantaged groups in the news media I will outline the main analytical tools selected

to conduct the discourse analysis of the news texts, editorials and columns in my case analysis drawing mainly on Fowler's work but also benefits from the Ferguson, Fairclough, Trew and van Dijk. Using the analytical tools provided by the critical linguistics and discourse analysis I will analyse the three historical cases, the 1934 Thrace Events, the 1942 Wealth Tax and the 6/7 September 1955 Riots.

Chapter IV analyses the press coverage of the 1934 Thrace Events, the 1942 Wealth Tax and 6/7 September 1955 Riots. In each case news reports, editorials and comment columns are analysed separately. Analysis of the news reports aims to reveal the extent to which they are based on the official sources and contribute to the reproduction of the official point of view of the events, categorisation of the participants and the explanation of the events involving transformations and other linguistics and discursive strategies which are used in the ideological representation of the non-Muslims. Editorials are analysed first how they explain the events and whether they rely on the official point of view in representing the events. Secondly, they will be subjected to critical inquiry to the extent that they adopt argumentative strategies to convince the readers to take up a certain position, an ideological one, recommended by the editors, towards the events or towards the participants. Comment columns are analysed for their contribution in explaining the events involving an ideological point of view and their attempt to persuade the readers to accept this point of view. Columns are subjected to the critical analysis to the extent that they contribute to shaping the perception of the readers about the events, the participants involved in the events and the categorisations of the participants.

## CHAPTER 2

### **TURKISH NATION-BUILDING PROCESS, EMERGENCE OF THE IDEOLOGY OF NATIONALISM AND HOMOGENISATION POLICIES**

In this chapter I will try to explain some of the crucial moments in the process of the Turkish nation-building process which, I believe, will shed light upon the historical conditions that shaped the status of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. The chapter will begin with a brief account of the late Ottoman period and the emergence of nationalism as an ideology first in the Balkan territories and later among the Muslim Turks, led by the Young Turks who became the first nationalists and inspired the later generations of nationalist elite<sup>2</sup> including the Kemalists. The period beginning with the National Independence War and continuing with the emergence and consolidation of the nation-state will be analysed in terms of the external and internal dynamics that shaped the nationalist ruling elite's vision of society involving homogenisation of the populations based on the Turkish Muslim culture and Turkish language, excluding the non-Muslims. The Milli Şef and the early DP years will also be considered as continuation of the homogenisation policies but with more emphasis on the economic aspect which came to the fore.

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<sup>2</sup> Elite refers to high ranking social groups. Ruling elite is used to refer to the political elite whose power resided in controlling the administration and military force. Instead of 'ruling class', 'ruling elite' is used because the power of the ruling elite was not based on ownership of property although they were active in economic field during the high tide of statism in the late 1930s and 1940s.

This historical outline will help us to better understand the conditions that shaped the press and determined its operations. The role of the leading elite and the journalists in contributing to the discourse of exclusion with regard to the non-Muslim minorities will be better understood if read in this historical context.

## **2.1. Emergence of the Ideology of Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire**

The ideology of nationalism emerged in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the Balkan provinces in the territories with Christian populations. These ‘late developed nationalisms’ and the nation-building in the Balkans and later in many Asian and African countries differed from its classical phase in Europe where it was the result of spontaneous social and economic developments in which the interpenetration of the state and capital replacing the feudal relations of production led to the emergence of nation-states. In the undeveloped world nation-states emerged when capitalist relations had already established itself as the world economic system and drew the undeveloped countries into the network of market relations through imperialism and colonialism (Callinicos 1987, 171). The emergence of the nationalism in many undeveloped countries was the result of the struggle against colonial or imperialist rule which usually took the form of national liberation struggle led by the new middle classes. Nationalism as an ideology was successfully used by the middle classes to mobilise the populations behind the national cause (ibid).

Nationalist ideology among the Turks did not emerge until after the Balkan Wars (1912). In its first emergence the Young Turks, the ruling nationalists, were not enthusiastic supporters of Turkism as an ideology, their main concern was the salvation of the state.<sup>3</sup> They defended Ottomanism, which was based on the principle of the

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<sup>3</sup> Before the Young Turks there were a series of serious reform attempts in the Ottoman Empire beginning with the reforms by Selim III (1789-1807) and continued during the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839). These early attempts were initiated to modernise the administration and military by adopting the Western techniques. Tanzimat reforms (1839-1865) introduced political reforms, followed by the Young Ottoman period (1865-1876) introduced administrative and political reforms which continued during the Young

İttihad-ı Anasır, the unity of all the Ottoman subjects. It was only after the loss of the Balkan territories that the Young Turks adopted Turkism as an ideology to defend the rights of Turks, the 'real owners' of the Ottoman land, and introduced administrative, social and economic reforms to strengthen the state weakened after the nationalist movements in the Christian territories, the 1804 Serbian revolt and the establishment of the Greek state in 1832 followed by Serbian and Bulgarian independence in 1878.

The idea of Turkism was beginning to be influential in the thinking of the nationalist elite when the coup led by Enver Pasha seized power with a coup in 1913. The Young Turks revolution was considered to be the victory of nationalists in the Ottoman politics (Isyar 2005, 345). The elite's resentment against the nationalist movements not only of the Christian millets<sup>4</sup> but also of the Albanian and the emerging Arab nationalisms made nationalist ideology an attractive alternative for the Muslim Turks organised around the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (the Committee of Union and Progress -CUP) (Okutan 2004, 65). However, the CUP saw the biggest threat for the unity and the security of the state coming from the non-Muslims, especially those in the border areas. Therefore, in an attempt to prevent the partition of the Empire by foreign powers and weaken the social basis of any independence movements by the Christian minorities, the CUP set out a plan to eliminate the non-Muslim populations. In 1913, non-Muslim villages in the Eastern Thrace were destroyed and this strategic region was cleansed of threats from the non-Muslims. In 1914, the Greek villages in the Aegean Sea districts were attacked by the CUP backed bandits. In 1914 the CUP targeted Jews of Russian origin in Phalestine and were only stopped when the USA and German embassies intervened (Kaiser 2005, 126-8). In 1915 the CUP ordered the Teşkilatı Mahsusa (the secret service), to destroy Armenian villages on the Russian border, fearing a Russian

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Turk period (1913-1918) (İnalçık 1964, 55-6).

<sup>4</sup> 'Millet' in Arabic means community, used in the Ottoman Empire to denote the closed communities based on religion, sect, linguistic and ethnic groups which organised its own economic, administrative and civic issue affairs. The Muslim millet was the dominant element in the Ottoman Empire in which Turks, Albanians, Pomak, Bosnians, and after the 16th century Arabs and Caucasus Muslims were included (Ortaylı 1986, 996-7). The Tanzimat Reforms (1839) ended the millet system.

invasion. In May, the cabinet approved the Armenian forced expulsion, and between May and August 1915 the majority of the Armenian population of Anatolia was either expelled or massacred. The forced expulsion was followed by the confiscation of the Armenian property; the government issued various acts on the liquidation of the property of the Armenians, including that belonging to the religious foundations (Kaiser 2005, 135-150).

The economic programme of the CUP involved other reforms. Ultimately the economic programme aimed to develop a national economy less dependent on foreign capital, facilitating the conditions for the Ottoman Muslims to take control of the economy, replacing the non-Muslims<sup>5</sup> for the Ottoman bourgeoisie was composed predominantly of Christians neither considered as ‘national’ nor trusted by the government (Okutan 2004, 203).<sup>6</sup> In this context, one of the first acts of the CUP was the enactment of a 1913 Law which gave economic privileges to Turkish investors and traders, giving them economic advantage over non-Muslims’ and end thus ending the Europeans’ domination with the objective of developing industrial capital dominated by the national bourgeoisie (Akçam 1995). It was followed in 1914 by the abolishment of capitulations –economic privileges given to the Europeans- as a first step to gaining economic independence.

The CUP’s Turkification of economy continued with the decision to force the non-Muslims to form partnership with the Turks. The non-Muslims were compelled to form partnership in order to get through the legal requirements which clearly favoured the Muslim Turks (Oran 1993, 59, 60). The intention was to encourage the emergence of a national bourgeoisie by forcing the non-Muslims to share their business expertise with the Muslims. The ultimate aim was to create a national bourgeoisie actively supported by the state because the elite and ruling party saw the liberalism as a useful economic

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<sup>5</sup> Except Jews who were considered part of the national bourgeoisie of Istanbul by the CUP (Keyder 1989, 94).

<sup>6</sup> CUP executed its Turkification programme resolutely on a population of 66 million with 22 different millets (Oran 1993, 51-55).

ideology of the comprador class and a tool of imperialism. Trade seemed to be the most suitable economic activity under which Muslim businessmen would prosper, which was possible due to the war conditions under which even a simple regulation privileging Muslim traders would have a significant impact (Keyder 1989, 89) <sup>7</sup> and the CUP did exactly that, ignored the speculative activities of the Muslims hoping that they would get a chance in capital accumulation under war conditions where the free market conditions did not function. Thus, it was through the political decisions of the CUP government that played a significant role in transferring businesses from the non-Muslims to Muslims. Moreover, government itself took an active part in the economic activities, establishing factories where only Muslim Turks could be employed (Isyar 2005, 346- 7). The CUP government went even further in that direction and called for a boycott of the non-Muslim businesses and products in 1913 (Okutan 2004, 203).

Meanwhile the continuous migration from the Balkans and the Caucasus reaching half a million by 1923 <sup>8</sup> changed the composition of the population of Anatolia considerably, while the Christian population was reduced to the lowest ever level. <sup>9</sup> Among these immigrants the newly emerging Turkish nationalism found a fertile ground in which to prosper. Furthermore, the Balkan defeats created one of the greatest traumas among the Muslims, when, as Çağaptay explains, “the Empire lost 69 percent of its population and 83 percent of its territory within few months”, exaggerating the perception of threat from both within and without among the Muslims Turks, while creating a sense of common destiny among them (Çağaptay 2006, 6). Thus, the perception of threat has become the part of the popular nationalist political discourse to this day. The new Muslim migrants had a strong sense of self-identification with Islam, as they believed

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<sup>7</sup> Keyder argued that these reforms, more specifically the abolishment of capitulations and tax exemptions for foreigners in 1914, weakened the state economically hence posed a threat to its sovereignty instead of being beneficial (Keyder 1989, 88).

<sup>8</sup> Çağaptay mentions that more than 7 million immigrants came to Anatolia from various parts of the Ottoman Empire between 1856 and 1914 (2006, 5).

<sup>9</sup> In 19th century Christians were one third of Anatolia, by 1913 it became one-fourth (Çağaptay 2006, 6).

that their religion was the reason for their prosecution. They also began to accept Anatolia as the fatherland which strengthened their loyalty to the 'land', the 'country' (ibid.). A significant number of these migrants were from the educated middle classes and peasants. The former were ready to take positions left by the non-Muslims and believed that the nationalist Turkish politics offered the best way to achieve it. As Keyder argues it was the Muslim traders and the land owners who pursuing their own interests under the nationalists flag that gave nationalism a social base (Keyder 1989, 114- 5). Turkification was continued in other areas, the imposition of the Turkish language and a single education system were the most important measures which affected the Christian, Arab and Albanian populations (Lewis 2002, 219). The ruling elite believed that a strong state was possible with a homogenous population intolerant towards the ethnic, religious and linguistic differences (Kasaba 1998, 23).

The ideological foundation of Turkism was provided by the nationalist publications. *Turkish Fatherland* (Türk Yurdu), for example, published in 1913, claimed to be the first real Turkish nationalist journal, declared that its objective was to publish scientific articles on the history of the Turks. The organisation of the Turkish Hearths stated that they aimed to glorify the Turkish race and published articles and organising public lectures to reach this aim. Another organisation founded in 1913 was the Turkish Force Committees (Türk Gücü Cemiyetleri), which aimed to cultivate the new Turkish citizens (Isyar 2005, 347). The main purpose of these publications and the intellectual activities was to construct Turkishness as the basis of, and as essential to, the definition of the nationhood and citizenship. The Young Turks' attempts to save the state failed after the defeat in the World War I. The members of the CUP were either exiled or involved in the local resistance movements in Anatolia against the occupying forces. However, their vision of society and the state were shared by their 'heirs' – the Kemalists- who carried their reforms further in the coming decades.

## **2.2. Turkish National Independence War and the Establishment of the Turkish Nation- State**

The Turkish nationalist struggle for independence against the European powers intending the partition of Anatolia began after the World War I defeat. The Mudros Armistice was signed on 30 October 1918 followed by occupation of various parts of the country by the Allies (Kili 2001, xix, 7, 17). Mustafa Kemal met leading military commanders including Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) and Colonel Refet Bele in Amasya to decide the strategy to be followed in the course of the organisation of the local resistance against the foreign occupation (Kili 2001, 25). What came to be known as the Amasya Declaration (22 June 1919) was an important document considered to be fundamental in the foundation of the nation-state. The declaration emphasised the national will and the salvation of the nation and country as the foremost objectives, and the nation was called take responsibility to unite and defend its own independence (Lewis 2002, 247).

The next step in the organisation of the resistance was the Erzurum Congress on 23 July 1919. One of the most important decisions taken at the congress was to resist any idea of the partition of the Eastern provinces. It was stated in the declaration that all the Muslims that lived in these provinces were brothers who were united by common origin, shared values and mutual responsibilities (Kili 2001, 40, 42). Thus, the first official documents of the National Liberation War were concerned with the criteria of membership of the new society and Muslimness as the common value, and it was believed that this would unite the population of Anatolia. Defining the Muslims as the legitimate inhabitants of the country within the national borders the Congress document excluded the non-Muslims from the new state in the process of formation. The congress also issued a statement declaring that any claim for autonomy or privileged status by the Armenians or the Greeks would be considered as irredentist and was to be strongly

resisted, but their life and property rights would be guaranteed <sup>10</sup> (Kaya 2004, 147, 152).

The second major step was the Sivas Congress on 4-11 September 1919 attended by delegates from all over the country. <sup>11</sup> Territorial integrity and national independence were emphasised as the main objectives to be achieved through an armed action against the occupying powers (Lewis 2002, 248-9; İğdemir 1969, 34-36, 113). The non-Muslim minorities' status was an important concern of the delegates at the Sivas Congress. Mustafa Kemal made it clear that the National Independence struggle was against both the occupying states and the Greeks and the Armenians who demanded privileged status, and he stressed that no demand of this kind would be tolerated (Oran 1993, 44). Muslims were considered as brothers who were bound with shared identities and values in the declaration (İğdemir 1969, 113). Thus Muslimness was re-emphasised as the main criterion for belonging to the nationhood. Non-Muslims' demands for autonomy or a privileged status were also discussed at the Amasya Talks on 20 October 1919 and it was declared that any attempt to partition Anatolian land or any idea of mandate would be considered as a threat to the national unity and would be resisted (Kili 2001, 56).

Mustafa Kemal's emphasis on the Muslim population as the legitimate population of the Anatolia had significant consequences for the non-Muslims. It became clear that the

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<sup>10</sup> Kaya argued that these articles were particularly designed to prevent the Armenian terror and provocation in the East. Mustafa Kemal took other measures to prevent further incidents between the Armenians and the Muslims in the eastern provinces such as prohibiting the entry of the Greek and Armenian newspapers into Anatolia (Kaya 2004, 147, 152).

<sup>11</sup> The delegates began taking an oath never to revive the Committee of Union and Progress and addressed the Sultan. According to Akçam there was consistent propaganda in the foreign press against the CUP that they were active in Anatolia and continuing to attack the Armenians and Greek minorities. Also during the Paris Talks Lord Curzon insisted that Turks should be punished for Maraş massacre. Ankara was aware of these and Mustafa Kemal, during the National Independence War, published a declaration and assured the Armenians and other non-Muslim minorities that their lives and property were under protection and after the occupation of Istanbul sent a warning to provinces that any violence against the non-Muslims, especially to the Armenians, would be punished (Akçam 2005, 77-80).

founding fathers of the new state and society did not perceive the non-Muslims as a 'natural' part of the community let alone a desirable one.<sup>12</sup>

The last Ottoman Assembly was held on 12 January 1920 and approved the National Pact on 28 Jan 1920. The National Pact declared opposition to partition and mandate and demanded the territorial integrity and national independence along with the wishes of the nationalists.<sup>13</sup> This was a significant development for the parliament which acknowledged the idea of 'territorial nation-state based on Turkish nation'. The legitimate population of this nation state was defined as the Ottoman Muslim majority, 'united in religion, in race and in aim' lived within the national borders (Lewis 2002, 352-3).

Istanbul was occupied on 16 March 1920, and on 11 April, the occupying forces appointed Damat Ferit as Prime Minister and closed the Assembly. On 19 March, Mustafa Kemal sent a government decree to the provinces, governors and the army corps asking them to elect delegates to convene the National Assembly on 23 April. Mustafa Kemal opened the new Assembly on Friday with prayers taking the oath to protect the Sultan and the Caliph, the nation and the fatherland. Kili argued that Mustafa Kemal's decision to open the Assembly on Friday with prayers, and his declaration that it was their duty to protect the Sultan Caliph was tactical, as he was aware of peoples' loyalties to Islamic values and the Sultan Caliph therefore he needed to acknowledge that loyalty (Kili 2001, 66-8). Mustafa Kemal's action to take the oath in the name of the Sultan Caliph was a tactical move in another sense, as Baskin Oran argues, to balance his radical decision to equate 'nation' and 'fatherland' along with the ranks of the Sultan and these would be equally cherished and defended (Oran 1993, 141).

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<sup>12</sup> No non-Muslim delegate was invited to either of the congresses. Out of 168 MPs only one MP was of Jewish origin and none from the Armenian and the Greek (Kaya 1989, 151).

<sup>13</sup> The Kemalists and sympathisers had won a majority and among the new members were some from the nationalist camp in Anatolia including Rauf Bey (Lewis 2002, 250).

Mustafa Kemal acknowledged the representation of Muslim groups in the National Assembly on 1 May 1920 at the Grand National Assembly: “The assembly is not composed only of Turks, or Cherkessks or Laz or the Kurds but it was composed of all these Anasır-ı Islamiye” (Köker 1995, 15; Okutan 2004, 77; Oran 1993, 141). He previously stressed that Turks and Kurds were true brothers who had united to protect the Caliph and defeat the enemy in 1919 when the British were suspected of inciting the Kurds. He was also careful to use ‘Türkiye Milleti’ and not ‘Turk Milleti’ during the independence war years (Oran 1993, 139). The acknowledgement of the identity of ethnic Muslims of Anatolia, the Cherkessk, Laz and Kurds, seemed purely out of political necessity, for the nationalist elite saw this coalition as vital for the national independence struggle, especially against the Armenians in the East, considered as the common threat to all Muslims (ibid 136, 138). In actual fact, during the national independence war the coalition between the nationalist elite, local notables and the peasants was formed against the Christian minorities. The local notables and traders threatened by the non-Muslims’ economic strength gave its support to the nationalists. In fact the first resistance groups emerged where the local Muslims’ interests were threatened by the Christian minorities and the Greek and the Armenian bandits. It seems that, in the absence of a nationalist motivation, an ‘anti-minority’ stance mobilised predominantly Muslim populations, especially in the Eastern and Western provinces (125, 164).

### **2.2.1. The Lausanne Treaty and the Non-Muslims**

After the Turkish victory against the Greeks, the Lausanne Treaty of Peace with Turkey and the Accompanying Straits Conventions were signed on 24 July 1923 indicating that Turkey was a member of the world community of states and recognised by them as such. Also, non-Muslims’ status as minority was legally recognised and the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey was concluded at Lausanne.

The Lausanne Treaty regulated the non-Muslim minority rights under articles 37 to 44. The Lausanne Treaty was privileged against the domestic law if conflict occurred. According to Oran, in the 1920s the international standard regulation of the minority rights only recognised race, language and religion as the basis of minority status. Lausanne narrowed the definition of minority and only non-Muslims were granted minority rights.<sup>14</sup> (Oran 2004, 62). Article 39/1 granted non-Muslims the same political and civil rights as the Turkish Muslim citizens; Article 40 granted the non-Muslims right to establish schools and other charitable, religious and social institutions and manage them at their own expense. Article 41 allowed the non-Muslims' children to be instructed with the medium of their own language. However, the government could make teaching of Turkish language obligatory in these schools. Article 42, the Turkish government took measures to settle issues with regard to family law or personal status and the government was made responsible in protecting synagogues, churches cemeteries and other religious and charitable establishments. Article 43 stated that non-Muslims should not to be forced to act against their faith or religious observances. Article 44 stated that the provisions were under the guarantee of the League of Nations and could not be modified without the assent of the majority of the council of the League of Nations (Hurewitz 1956, 122- 3).

According to the Agreement of the Exchange of Populations, Istanbul and Western Thrace were exempted from the exchange. The Patriarchate remained in Istanbul and its responsibilities were confined solely to religious affairs. On 1 May 1923 the exchange process began, at the end of which approximately 1,100,000 Greeks and 350,000 Muslims were exchanged (Baran 2003, 108).<sup>15</sup> Only 110.000 Greeks remained in Turkey after the exchange, while the Muslim population was increasing due to the continuous immigration from the Caucasuses (Oran 2004, 5).

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<sup>14</sup> In Lausanne 'non-Muslim' did not specify only the Armenian, Greek and the Jews. The term was a general meant to include all non-Muslims such as Suryanis and Yezidis, but only the Armenians, Greek and the Jews were given minority status in practice (Oran 2004).

<sup>15</sup> In Aktar figures are 400.000 Muslims and 1.200.000 Greeks (Aktar 2000, 17).

During the Lausanne talks there were heated discussions at the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. Many deputies opposed granting non-Muslims special status or privileges. Some deputies demanded a total exchange of populations ‘to get rid of the potential traitors’. In a speech addressed at the Grand National Assembly on 2 March 1923, the head of the Turkish committee for the exchange of populations at Lausanne Rıza Nur, said that after the exchange, no minority would be left in Turkey and the problem of minorities would be solved permanently (Aktar 2000, 41). Discussions at the Assembly showed that there was a strong belief among the deputies that non-Muslims’ privileged status played a significant part in the disintegration of the Empire.<sup>16</sup> Deputies argued that the non-Muslims misused their privileges and were involved in separatist movements, thus contributing to the disintegration of the Empire. For some deputies the non-Muslims represented treachery and were often suspected of spying and collaborating with the enemy (Okutan 2004, 70-71; Lewis 2002, 357). The Turkish nation was defined as composed of Muslims who were bound together with common values based on religion and tradition in the foundation documents.

The exchange of populations was one of the most decisive steps in homogenisation of populations after the Balkan and World War I, 1912-1922 and the Armenian forced expulsion in 1915 (Aktar 2000, 23).<sup>17</sup> Turkey saw minority issues in terms of the end of the interference of the Western countries in Turkey’s domestic affairs via minorities. Therefore, solving the ‘problem of minority’ was closely linked to Turkey’s sovereignty (Aktar 2000, 43). The exchange of populations thus served a double function, the homogenisation of Turkey’s population was almost complete, and in terms of

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<sup>16</sup> Dr. Rıza Nur, who was in the Turkish Committee at Lausanne and during the talks on Lausanne at the Grand National Assembly, on 2 March 1923, he said that they accepted the exchange of populations and it would be carried out by force, after which there would be no minority left in Anatolia. When the deputies asked him about the remaining Armenians and the Jews he said ‘...but how many Armenians are left...Jews have not created any problems so far, as you know the Jews are the kind of people accept whatever direction you take them to. But I would say it would be better if they did not exist’ (Aktar 2000, 42).

<sup>17</sup> Between the Balkan and the World War I around 150.000 and 200.000 Greek immigrated to Greece and thousands of Muslim from Balkans to Turkey, (Aktar 2000, 29).

economics, encouraged by Ankara, the Turkish Muslims began to replace the Greeks in trade and small business.<sup>18</sup>

### **2.2.2 Establishment of the Republic of Turkey and the Question of Citizenship**

The leading nationalist elite believed the creation of a nation was only possible with a nation-state. Moreover, according to them, a strong nation state could only be created by a conscious action for which nationalism as an ideology was the most important guide. The ruling elite initiated a series of administrative reforms which strengthened the ability of the state to carry out the reforms with ease. The abolishment of the Sultanate (1922), the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey (1923) and the abolishment of the Caliphate (1924) were the first major steps to secure national sovereignty. The new Constitution was passed on 20 April 1924, in which executive and legislative powers resided in the National Assembly. Although the judicial authority belonged to the independent courts, in practice the Assembly had control over the judiciary (Kili 2001, 205). This gave state immense power to carry out the reforms. Yet, this was a challenging task for the Kemlists, perhaps the most challenging was, shifting peoples' loyalties from the old institutions, the Sultan and the Caliph, to the new ones, the state and nation. The creation of the national-state in Turkey, involving the imposition of a standard citizenship, aimed to achieve this. Kemalists believed that citizenship would provide people with an identity powerful enough to replace the old loyalties. Nationalist ideology played a significant role in transforming individuals' loyalties and the idea of citizenship was developed to ensure that the individuals tied to the state and nation with membership involving both legal status and 'feeling of belongingness' (Üstel 1997, 126-128).

However, emphasis on one aspect of common identity necessarily alienated the rest of the population who identified themselves in ethnic or religious terms. While

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<sup>18</sup> According to Keyder, before the WWI the population of non-Muslims was %20, after the war it was %2.5, a drop from one in five to one in forty (Keyder 1989, 67; Aktar 2000, 24).

Muslimness was the main criteria defined as the legitimate identity of the population during the National independence war, as revealed in the foundation documents, after the mid-1920s and throughout the single party period (1923-1945), the definition of citizenship had a number of changes, depending on the historical conditions and socio-political circumstances. There was always a difference between the legal definition of Turkish citizenship and what took place in practice where the ethnic criterion, being ethnically Turk, was pronounced as the 'real' criteria for belonging to the Turkish nation by the ruling 'elite' and a section of the intellectuals.

The ethnic definition of citizenship discriminates between citizens who are naturalised had received their rights from the state by law as opposed to citizens by birth who received their rights from the nation (Isyar 2005, 350). In other words, as opposed to civic nationalism, which emphasises the territorial principle, citizenship, participation and civic education, ethnic nationalism emphasises common race, culture or language as the basis of solidarity and national identity (Aktar 2004, 24- 5).<sup>19</sup> Whichever is chosen as the criteria for belonging to the nation by implication excludes those left outside of the established criteria and the initial definition with serious consequences. According to Smith, there is a significant difference between the criteria of language and ethnicity as the basis of nationhood. Nationalism defined in terms of language and culture is an inclusive type whereas nationalism defined in terms of ethnicity is an exclusive type, since ethnicity could not be acquired' (Smith 1986, in Parekh 1995, 43). Another important criterion, religion, could be both inclusive and exclusive depending on the nature of the religion (Parekh 1995, 43).<sup>20</sup>

The Turkish national identity was defined on the basis of citizenship which did not discriminate between people of different ethnic origin or religious background. Article

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<sup>19</sup> Ethnic nationalism takes various forms especially in countries where there is a lack of common ethnicity. Smith (1986) mentions the ethnic nationalisms in many Asian and African countries in this category.

<sup>20</sup> Even a religion in theory accept conversion in practice this principle may not bring about an equal treatment as the treatment of the Jewish converts (Dönme) during the implementation of the Wealth Tax showed.

88 of the 1924 Constitution defined Turkish citizenship on the basis of civic criterion. The constitution stated that all the people of Turkey, regardless of ethnic origin and religious beliefs, were considered as Turkish. There did not seem to be any problem in the legal definition, the problem arose when belonging to the ‘nationhood’ was defined in terms of common language –Turkish- and cultural values were connoted as Islamic values.

During the discussions at the Assembly some deputies opposed to the definition of non-Muslims as Turks. Hamdullah Suphi, one of the leading nationalist figures, claimed that for centuries non-Muslims kept their separate identities and under the Republic they would remain the same, besides, he argued since non-Muslims had harmed the state in the past, they might harm the new state (Akın 2006, 86-7; Çapar 2005, 405). Hamdullah Suphi argued that minorities by aspiring separatism and insisting on speaking their own languages cannot be expected to be given equal status with the Turkish citizens (Çağaptay 2003, 168). Despite some opposition the article changed, in line with Hamdullah Suphi’s argument, and it was read as ‘the people of Turkey regardless of religion and race are Turkish as regard citizenship’. According to Ergun Özbudun this meant ‘to accept the citizenship rights of the minorities but not recognising them as Turks socially’ (Özbudun 1997, 66) or as Wimmer put it, legal acknowledgement of the non-Muslims’ citizenship did not entail social acknowledgement as the criteria of belonging to the nation (Wimmer 2002, 58).<sup>21</sup>

The criterion of religion as applied during the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey was the basis of exchange. The Turkish speaking Christians of Anatolia were exchanged with non-Turkish speaking Muslims of Greece. Similarly the Gagavuz Turks’ demand to immigrate to Turkey was refused on the basis of their Christianity whereas Laz and the Bosnians were accepted because they shared Islamic values. However, especially after the 1925, the Sheikh Said Rebellion, Muslimness was replaced by Turkishness as one of the primary criteria for belonging to nationhood. The

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<sup>21</sup> See (Yeğen 2002) for detail on the difference between legal definition of Turkishness and its application in daily political practices.

difference between the ideas of ‘being a Turkish citizen’ and ‘being a Turk’ was emphasised. While the former was defined on the basis of the civic identity, the latter was defined by ethnic identity. This did not mean that Muslimness was excluded altogether from the definition of nationhood or was considered less significant. Quite the contrary ‘Turk always meant Muslim Turk’ (Yıldız 2001; Lewis 2002, 357). Muslimness was still important but not in itself sufficient to define the national identity, and in fact, Muslimness was considered as a value system rather than a faith by the Kemalists (Çağaptay 2006, 15). According to the Kemalist vision of modern society religion was confined to the individual conscience and as strict secularists, their emphasis on religion was the result of the need to compromise with the masses that were deeply religious and traditional. In fact, when Mustafa Kemal announced Islam as the state religion he was acting as a tactician, as he later admitted.<sup>22</sup> Even though ‘Muslimness’ as a value system<sup>23</sup> not as a faith, was part of the criterion for belonging to the nation, in whatever form, emphasis on Islam or Islamic values excluded non-Muslims from the nationhood. Thus, two opposing definitions of citizenship have existed side by side, citizenship defined by territorial or civic nationality on the one hand and the ethnic nationality emphasising Turkish ethnic origin on the other. As Çağaptay points out, political membership of the state and ethnic membership of the nation were based on different criterias, the separation by the members of the government between ‘Turks-by-law or ‘citizenship’ and the ‘Turks-by-nationality’<sup>24</sup> which ‘institutionalised the gap’ between the two definitions (Çağaptay 2006, 15).

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<sup>22</sup> When Kılıçzade Hakkı Bey, at the press meeting in Izmit, asked Mustafa Kemal what he thought about state religion he said that Islam was the religion of the new state but he did not see Islam as an impediment to development but he later admitted that that he tried to avoid the question about religion but when the journalists insisted he acknowledged the importance of religion in order not to alienate the masses (Arar 1997, 61).

<sup>23</sup> The Kemalists expected that the autochthonous Anatolian Muslims –Kurds, Arabs, Lazes, and Georgians- would assimilate to Turkish culture because they shared the same history with the Turks. Kemalists enforced the language and education reforms in the hope that the minorities would identify themselves with the Turkish culture (Çağaptay 2006, 16).

<sup>24</sup> Çağaptay mentioned that Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (1892-1943) the minister of justice between November 1924 and September 1930, used this distinction in his speeches (in Çağaptay 2006, 15).

As mentioned above, the 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion<sup>25</sup> was one of the pivotal events that led to the Republican elite to revise the criteria for belonging to the nationhood, shifting the emphasis from Muslimness to Turkishness. The ruling elite adopted a more ‘militant secularism’ which confined religion within the individual consciousness.<sup>26</sup> Turkish citizens were therefore those who spoke Turkish, brought up according to the Turkish culture and who were loyal to republican ideals (Yıldız 2001, 16).

The outbreak of the rebellion convinced Mustafa Kemal of the need for the creation of a homogeneous nation state with the Turks as its main component. Any claim for religious, ethnic or linguistic privileges was considered intolerable, and was prevented through legal means or crushed by force. At the end of 1924 and especially after 1929, Kemalist nationalism became increasingly discriminatory against ethnic and religious claims. Keyder argues that this was not a consistent characteristic of Kemalist nationalism but neither was it a minor one (Keyder 1989, 118). The elite were not, however, resolute defenders of the ethnic origin, for example, Atatürk emphasised the ethnic component of citizenship at the same time he argued that minorities would become part of the Turkish nationhood if they genuinely adopted Turkish culture and become ‘truly Turks’ (Kadioğlu 2001, 13). This shows the elite’s ambivalent attitude to the definition of the nationhood, their choice of emphasis was, by and large, determined by the political and historical circumstances. Even deputies such as Hamdullah Suphi argued that non-Muslims could become citizens if they ‘abandon their language and

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<sup>25</sup> In February 1925 a Kurdish rebellion broke out in the eastern provinces led by the Sheikh Said of Palu. (Lewis 2002, 266). The rebellion spread to fourteen provinces in one week and seized Diyarbakır which was considered to be the capital city by the Kurds. Oran mentions that between 1924 and 1938 there were 18 rebellions in Turkey 17 of these were in the east of Turkey. There was only one rebellion in the west, the Menemen Incident (23 December 1930) (Oran 1993, 211- 2, fn.348). The introduction of the ‘Law for the Maintenance of Order’ gave extraordinary power and authority to the government, renewed in 1927 and stayed in force until March 1929 when it was finally abolished. The ‘independence tribunals’ were set up which gave the government extraordinary power to eliminate the political opposition as well as authority to impose severe punishment on the rebels (Lewis 2002, 266; Oran 1993, 213). After 1925 for twenty years –except a short period in 1930- a legal opposition party was not possible.

<sup>26</sup> There seemed to be other political concerns for underlying the ‘religious’ rather than the ‘ethnic’ character of the rebellion, which was to prevent any possible reaction against the reforms that were underway, the abolishment of the Caliphate (1924) and the adoption of the Civil Code (1926) (Oran 1993, 213).

their Armenianness and Jewishness' (Çağaptay 2006, 15). However, the criteria of 'genuine adaptation to Turkish culture' was interpreted differently by different sections of the elite, sometimes rather arbitrarily and personally, in which cases it was not easy to fulfil these requirements, which varied according to the speaker and the circumstances. Moreover, even if the non-Muslims tried to adopt Turkish culture and language, this did not guarantee their 'membership' to the nationhood as will be seen during the 'Citizen Speak Turkish Campaign'.

Despite occasional fluctuation in attitudes of the ruling elite, ethnic Turkishness increasingly became part of their discourse and they often asserted the distinction between the 'legal Turkishness' and the 'real Turkishness' (Peker in Çağaptay 2006, 45; Saraçoğlu 1942, 31; Saraçoğlu 1943, 48; Bozkurt in Tunçay 1981, 311).<sup>27</sup> This emphasis on ethnicity and race could be interpreted as a sign of Republican elite's failure to unite an essentially heterogeneous population on the basis of a Republican ideal citizenship. Increasingly ethnic and racial aspects were incorporated into the definition of citizenship and became part of the Turkish national identity (Yıldız 2001, 17). This ambivalence is part and parcel of 'the logic of nation-building' (Parekh 1995, 36) which excluded diverse identities, religious affiliation and languages. All these diverse identities were expected to be denounced in favour of the one defined officially to be qualified to belong to the nationhood. Bringing any of these diverse identities forward was perceived as a challenge to the national unity. The ruling elite then prevented these diverse values and identities to turn into political demands either by force and legal restrictions<sup>28</sup> or through the promotion of the official cultural values for

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<sup>27</sup> Nişanyan pointed to the "Turkist" origin of some of the leading cadre of the Republican elite including Mustafa Kemal, Recep Peker, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Dr. Reşit Galip, Samih Rifat, Sadri Maksudi Arsal, Yusuf Akçura, Yusuf Ziya Özer, Fuat Köprülü, Şemsettin Günaltay, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Vasıf Çınar and more (1995, 140).

<sup>28</sup> The most common examples for the discriminatory practices were the entrance requirement for military schools and to be eligible for grant to go to the European universities were only granted to the ethnic Turks (Oran 2004, 88). Non-Muslims renounced the Article 42/1 of the Lausanne Treaty which gave the non-Muslims right to marry with religious ceremony. But when the Swiss Civil Code was adopted in 17 February 1926 the government made the official marriage ceremony compulsory and demanded the non-Muslims to comply with the new law (Bali 1998, 81) despite the fact that these demands violated the Lausanne (Oran 2004, 68; Okutan 2004, 112). Oran argued that government forced

the elite believed that ethnic purity and homogenisation of the population were the most efficient ways to contribute to the strength and the cohesion of the state (Isyar 2005, 346; Yıldız 2001; Aydın 1993, 225). Thus, especially in the 1930s and 1940s the ruling elite of the new Turkish Republic required from its citizens loyalty to the nation and a nation state based on the idea of Turkishness which involved the adoption of the Turkish culture and language. Any claims for ethnic or religious recognition by the non-Muslims or non-Turks were considered as a threat to the national unity. The minorities were expected to assimilate into the Turkish culture, speak Turkish, adopt Turkish names and abandon their ethnic, linguistic and the religious identities.<sup>29</sup> Despite the elite's pragmatic approach towards ethnic base of nationhood resulting from the political requirements of the time, two components had always been part and parcel of Turkish citizenship, Turkishness and Muslimness both of which excluded non-Muslims. The following part will focus on the Republican reforms with a particular focus on the homogenisation policies and their consequences for the non-Muslims.

### **2.2.3. Kemalist Reforms**

The question of legitimacy or the state's ability to establish loyalty and obedience of the citizens was a serious issue for the Republican elite, challenged by the different loyalties of diverse groups. While in Europe economic and social changes undermined the traditional loyalties and gradually led to political and social change -the most importantly universal suffrage and equality- (Hobsbawm 1991; Callinicos 1987), in Turkey, in the absence of economic and social change, the state was actively involved in economic as well as social and political change. The Western-educated middle class ruling elites adopted positivism and science in an attempt to reach the levels of Western civilization. In the absence of economic development<sup>30</sup> they introduced superstructural

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the non-Muslims to give up that right (Oran 2004, 68). Also see Levi (1998, 73) for the processes that led Jews to denounce the Lausanne rights.

<sup>29</sup> See Yeğen (2006, 47-55) for the ramification of assimilation politics for the Kurds.

reforms in the legal and cultural fields <sup>31</sup> which would, they believed, bring about changes in economic and social structure (Oran 1993, 259, 60).

However, the Republican reforms involved forced civilisation, imposing reforms on a population who viewed them as alien and a threat to their way of life and in some cases actually rebelled against the government's attempt to implement them by force <sup>32</sup> (Oran 1993, 267). The difficulty caused by the fact that the government insisted on implementing reform in the superstructure while the infrastructure remained feudal. The Kemalist modernisation project was an authoritarian project imposed from above to create a modern western society, a process which embodied a contradiction in that while the reforms aimed to create modern western citizens, implementing standardisation and homogenisation policies prevented democratisation and individual self-expression (Timur 1994), because the homogenisation of population denied the legal existence of different identity claims. Although claim of ethnic, linguistic or class recognition were suppressed by force or through legal means, the ruling elite were aware that force alone would not ensure compliance sought and consent of the citizens. The Republican reforms in the 1920s and the 1930s, particularly the attempts to homogenise the populations aimed at ultimately moulding a new type of citizen, a Republican citizen, who was loyal to the republican values, in other words, secular western values. To achieve these reforms a series of changes were initiated into the education system. The

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<sup>30</sup> In 1923 Atatürk inherited a country with economy of 145 million foreign trade and 60 million deficit, no proper infrastructure no significant number of skilled labour (Oran 1993, 70).

<sup>31</sup> Other reforms included the replacement of Friday with Saturday and Sunday as the weekend (2 Jan 1924); abolishment of the pious trusts (vakıf) and Islamic Law and shutting down of Medresses (Shariat) and putting religious high schools under the Ministry of Education (2 March 1924); closing down of dervish lodges (30 Nov 1925); adopting Gregorian calendar and solar clock and dropping the lunar calendar (1926); adopting a secular civil code (17 February 1926); annulment of the Shariat courts (4 October 1926); eliminating from the constitution the declaration that Islam as Turkey's state religion (10 April 1928) and the replacement of the Arabic Alphabet with the Latin Alphabet (1 November 1928), (Çağaptay 2006, 13-4).

<sup>32</sup> Atatürk reforms met with considerable challenge by the peasant population who saw any reform attempt only beneficial for the rulers and burden for them. Oran mentioned 23 rebellions between May 1919 and June 1921 (Oran 1993, 72, fn.69). These 'counter-revolutionary' rebellions mostly had religious themes (Oran 1993, 73).

standardisation of the school system, the Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu (the Law of Unification of the Education) in 1924 was an attempt to centralise the education system under the Ministry of Education. The Latin alphabet was adopted in 1928, the Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti (the Turkish Language Research Society) was established in 1932 followed by the publication of the *Türk Tarih Tezi* (Turkish History Thesis) in 1930 and the *Medeni Bilgiler* (Information about Civilisation) in 1930 (Çağaptay 2006, 50, 55).

These reforms contributed to the reproduction and dissemination of the ideology of nationalism and the idea of the Turkish Republican citizenship. Education reform was a significant step in the homogenisation of the populations. One of its primary functions was to teach citizens new values such as the love of the fatherland, learn to be ‘useful’ for the nation and other values that related to being ‘ideal Turkish citizens’. Atatürk actively engaged in the process of creating new citizens through various civic education courses under the names of Malumatı Vataniyye (Information about Motherland) in 1924, Yurt Bilgisi (Information about Motherland) in 1927 and the Vatandaşlık için Temel Bilgiler (the Main Principles of Citizenship) (İnan 1933, 7, 9; İçduygu, et.al. 2000, 187). At the National Education Congress on 16 July 1921, Atatürk stated that national education meant an education system compatible with national values, national culture and national history not influenced by ‘foreign’, ‘eastern’ or ‘western’ values. On March 1, 1922, he stated that the aim of the national education was “to give skills to citizens to fight against the enemy who may threaten Turks’ culture, tradition and belief in the future” (in Okutan 2004, 163, fn.323 and fn.324).

Language <sup>33</sup> reform was a particularly important reform developed further by the Kemalist elite as it had been by the nationalist elite before them. Akçura argued “those who do not speak their mother tongue are destined to perish” <sup>34</sup> (Akçuraoğlu 1982).

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<sup>33</sup> In 1927 with a population of 13,542,795 and 86.42 percent spoke Turkish, and 13.58 percent spoke other languages (Çağaptay 2006, 14).

<sup>34</sup> Yusuf Akçura believed that the most important mission for the new rulers was to do with the question of language and history. Turks in the Ottoman Empire, although they were the fundamental group, their language and history, were not treated as important. The language was a hybrid language impossible to

Thus, the importance of language for ‘national unity’ had been acknowledged by the nationalist intellectuals since the Young Turks.<sup>35</sup> As well as being fundamental to the homogenisation process language reform was part of the modernisation process aiming to break ties with the Islamic past and adopt the modern western secular values.<sup>36</sup>

The Republican elite saw the language as a fundamental part of the national identity. On 18 February 1931, Atatürk spoke at the Adana Turkish Hearths meeting emphasising the language as the most important assets of a nation. He said:

He who identifies himself as Turkish has to speak Turkish. If he claims that he belongs to Turkish culture and society without speaking Turkish he is not to be believed. There are more than twenty thousand non-Turkish speaking citizens in Adana. If the Turkish Hearths tolerate this, it will go on more than hundreds of years. Gentlemen, what would be the consequence of this? During a crisis these people could collaborate with others who speak different languages and may act against us. The duty of the Turkish Hearths is to make these people real Turks who are already Turkish citizens (Bali 1998, 171-2).

Citizen Speak Turkish campaign was an extreme measure aimed at forcing the non-Muslims and also the non-Turkish speaking Muslims to adapt the Turkish language and culture. The campaign was initiated by the student union of the Law Faculty on 13 January 1928. The minorities were urged to speak Turkish, to ensure that linguistic unity was seen as one of the fundamental principles of the nation-state. Some members

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understand and impossible to learn to read and write for many ordinary Turks. The problem of language needed to be solved in order to give the necessary education and the manner to people which were the fundamental objective of the new regime (Akçuraoğlu 1982).

<sup>35</sup> The role of the language in the homogenisation process was realised by the Young Turks who introduced language reform in education and business. In 1915 the Union and Progress Party passed “a language reform bill” which enforced Turkish as the language of business, official writings and book keepings. As a result of this law foreign companies began to employ a certain number of Turks in their commissions as envisaged by the CUP which also announced that it would give financial support to business owned by the Muslim Turks (Keyder 1989, 90; Okutan 2004, 204- 5, fn.454).

<sup>36</sup> A campaign for purification of the language to rid of the Arabic and Persian influence was launched by the ruling elite and supported by the intellectuals continued throughout the single party period.

of the minorities reacted to the campaign and insisted on speaking their own language, especially speakers of Arabic, Armenian, Bosnian, Greek and Hebrew. However, pressure on the non-Muslims and non-Turks sometimes made it difficult for them to speak any language publicly other than Turkish (Okutan 2004, 182, 183).

The complaints about Jews speaking languages other than Turkish were raised on many occasions by the leading members of the CHP.<sup>37</sup> At the CHP's fourth congress in 1935, İnönü urged everyone to speak Turkish and warned minorities that if they wanted to live in Turkey they had to speak Turkish.<sup>38</sup> Everyday, the newspapers printed pure Turkish words, urging the readers to use them instead of Ottoman ones. There were reports about attacks on non-Turkish speakers, which became an issue in the foreign embassy correspondances at the time. Dozens of reports were sent to the USA by the Istanbul and Izmir consulates related to the incidents of speaking languages other than Turkish in public (NARA, 867.4016/1021).<sup>39</sup> Skinner also mentioned that anti-foreign demonstrations took place in Istanbul led by the university students, which were inflamed by the speaking foreign languages in public (NARA 867.4016/1022, 1933). During the Citizen Speak Turkish Campaign, Jews became one of the main targets of attacks and insults as they spoke French or Ladino in public. Speaking 'foreign' languages, instead of Turkish, was taken as an insult and ungratefulness of the Jews

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<sup>37</sup> Ruşen Eşref's (Ünaydın), Atatürk's executive secretary and journalist, speech on 7 June 1934 at a parliamentary session quoted by Çağaptay (2006, 58).

<sup>38</sup> According to the 1935 census Turkish was the first language in the country spoken by 13,899,073 people, Kurdish was the second, spoken by 1,480,246 people. In addition, Arabic spoken by 153,687; Greek by 108,725; Circassian by 91,972; Laze by 63,253; Armenian by 57,599; Georgian by 57,325; Judeo-Spanish by 42,607; Pomak by 32,661; Bosnian by 29,065 (of whom 4,452 spoke the Serbian and Croatian variants); Albanian by 22,754; Bulgarian by 18,245; Crimean by 15,615; Spanish by 12,424; Abkhaz by 10,099; Romani by 7,855 and French by 5,381 (Çağaptay 2004, 93).

<sup>39</sup> There were dozens of correspondances between the American Consulate Skinner and his government. For example in one occasion he reported 'Turkish students attacked offices of *Pera* branch of the Compagnie Internationale des Vagon Lits because the new director, an Italian, insisted that one of his employees speak French instead of Turkish' (From Charles H. Sherill to the Secretary of State Washington from the embassy at Istanbul (feb.28, 1933) another report by Skinner (867.4016/1032) on August 2, 1934 (Jews 13), NARA 867.4016/1021).

against the Turks. Foreigners, Greeks, Armenians and Arabs were also the target of insults during the campaign.

The Sun Language Theory was a step further in the direction to create a national consciousness. It was announced at the Third Turkish Language Congress, held in Istanbul, 24-31 August 1936, its main claim was that Turkish was the source of all major languages (Çağaptay 2004, 90-1). Despite the unfounded nature of these claims, as Ahmet Cevat Emre pinpointed, it served well in the creation of a national identity (quoted in Okutan, 2004: 104) for Turks to be proud of. Despite the legal definition of Turkish citizenship, the ‘Turkish History Thesis’ and the ‘Sun Language Theory’ seemed to favour ethnicity, though not in the sense of pure blood race (Çağaptay 2004, 97).

These reforms introduced by the republican elite aimed to create a homogenous nation-state in which people would, as Benedict Anderson argued, ‘imagine’ themselves the part of the community even though the members of each community would never know each other ‘nevertheless they live in the minds of each other as their fellow members’ and there exists a ‘deep, horizontal comradeship’ despite the existence of inequality in each nation (Anderson 1991, 6-7; Yörük 2001). Thus, the language and education reforms were significant steps in this direction aimed to build a collective consciousness among the citizens who would tie together around common culture and imagine themselves to be sharing the same ideal. The ideological intervention of the nationalist elite continued in the 1930s, initiating research into ancient Turkish history as an attempt to create a common past for the Turks, involving an ‘invention of tradition’.

The Turkish History Thesis was developed to demonstrate the uniqueness of the Turkish civilisation<sup>40</sup> and ‘de-constructed’ the past to suit the needs of the republican

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<sup>40</sup> Akçura, the founder of Turkish nationalism, complained that the Ottomans tended to teach the Turkish history from the settlement of the Ottomans around Bursa and the historians did not go beyond the time of the Ottomans. Akçura criticised the continuation of this attitude even after nationalism was the dominant ideology among the Christian millets of the Empire and in Europe (Akçura 1982).

ideals. In 1931 Mustafa Kemal had founded the Society for the Study of Turkish history the principal aim of which was to promote interest and research in the national history of the Turks, as distinct from exclusively Ottoman history. A particular attention was paid to the pre-Islamic period of Turkish history. The first Turkish Historical Congress was held in Ankara in July, 1932 (Hedt 1954, 26). The Turkish History Thesis was developed in order to research the glorious past of the Turkish race. A great deal of effort seems to have been spent linking the Turkish history to the ancient Sumerian, Greek and the Egyptian. Such a link would enable the elite to distance the Turkish past from the Islamic past and to prove that Turks had a civilisation older than the Ottomans, and as such, had been the source of other civilizations. This was interpreted as an attempt by the ruling elite to be on equal terms with the modern civilised nations.<sup>41</sup>

In the first years of the Republic of Turkey, this official interpretation of history was strictly controlled by the CHP and the governments and no other research was allowed by individuals or the institutions.<sup>42</sup> The aim was to carry out manipulation from a single centre.<sup>43</sup> One of the most important contributions of the History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory was to help mould the Turkish national identity endowed with superior qualities with roots in the ancient world. The purpose was to create a strong admiration

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<sup>41</sup> According to Aydın there was also a political reason behind the Turkish History Thesis which was to justify Turkish inhabitation in Anatolia when the Wilson Principles brought the “majority condition” in areas where the status of the region was in dispute. It seemed that the government did not want any legal problem regarding the majority issue while the independence war continued. This would also enable the government to prove that Turks were the first comers to Anatolia thus to prevent the Armenians’ and the Greeks’ land claims (Aydın 1993, 227-8).

<sup>42</sup> In 1934 Language Congress, when an academician presented an opposite view to the ‘official language thesis’ he was stopped by Kazım Karabekir from proceeding and Atatürk left the conference hall in protest. It was reported that he was dismissed from his university post (*Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 20 August 1934).

<sup>43</sup> The Turkish History Research Committee was a branch of the Hearths and the Main Themes of Turkish History was published by the society. The Turkish Hearts Society first worked as a CUP organisation and later adopted the non-Pan-Turkish ideology. It was closed in 1931 but opened again under the CHP. After the closure the same cadre established the Turkish History Study Society. The Society organised the first history congress and took the name Turkish History Association. The Turkish Hearts were re-organised and re-named as Halkevleri (People’s Houses) under the CHP in 1932 (Aydın 1993, 227).

for the fatherland and a history that would ensure the loyalty of the people (Aydın 1993, 227-8). Peoples' houses were planned precisely for that purpose. They were established to educate people, to raise their literacy level and consciousness to enable people to appreciate the reforms. In his speech in the opening ceremony of the People's Houses and Rooms in 1931 Reşit Galip said: "Islamism or Ottomanism cannot be the guiding principles for the modern Turkey. Throughout history Turks established the highest civilisations wherever they inhabited. It is time now to gain confidence and remember the past glories and go forward. The only way to recover the glorious days is through nationalism" (in Çeçen 1990, 115-116).

The mission of the People's Houses was to disseminate the nationalist ideology among the masses, to teach them the meaning and purpose of the reforms and how to be suitable citizens for the new republic.<sup>44</sup> The elite was aware that force alone was not enough in getting people accept the reforms they had to be convinced that the reforms were to their benefit. İnönü said 'I believe People's Houses are going to be more effective than the military force in achieving the national unity' (ibid 107). He envisaged that this would make nationalist ideology more powerful. The enormous amount of resources, time and effort allocated to the activities of the People Houses<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> This also involved transforming the space in the towns and cities to remind people of republic and not the recent Ottoman past. Almost in every town and city square statues and busts of Atatürk was constructed; pictures of Atatürk and others were displayed in schools and public offices; every morning the school children sang the national anthem and recited the national oath. The anniversaries of the national celebrations, such as the proclamation of the republic and the establishment of the Grand National Assembly, anniversaries of major war victories, the independence of every town and city and all the reforms were celebrated with extravagance. All these became repeated in regular intervals which functioned as "flagging" or 'reminders of nationhood and nation to citizens where they belonged to and who they were' (Billig 1995, 8). The aim was to show that all these reforms and institutions were meaningful to people and make people feel part of a nation to be proud of with. These efforts were ultimately served the symbolic domination and strengthening of the hegemony of the nationalist ideology and turn it into a 'common sense' (Çetin 2004, 349, 351). It thus prevented the competing ideologies for nationhood becoming expressed or to contest the republican ideals.

<sup>45</sup> The peoples's houses had different types of activities organised in language history, literature, fine arts, acting, sports, social aid courses, library and publishing, village, history and museum branches and aimed to find the talented people to take part in these activities. In 1935 it was reported that in peoples' houses 782 plays and other shows watched by 294 thousand people. 776 concerts attended by 137 thousand people. 636 movies were shown watched by 296 thousand people. 1503 conferences followed by 322 thousands people. 740 special nights organised 233 thousand people participated. 23 exhibitions were organised and 34 thousand people went. 36 national products day was organised 224 thousand people

shows that Kemalists had a complete faith in being able to educate people into modern way of life and creation of secular republican citizens, but only with the guidance of government and the CHP. A circular was sent to CHP local offices to set up local branches of the People Houses. They were warned to be sensitive about people's sensitivities and make the People Houses gathering places otherwise they would lose reputation in the eyes of the people (Peker 1933). Therefore, the activities of the Houses were strictly monitored in order to prevent any 'undesirable' ideas or activities occurring. Recep Peker, the CHP General Secretary, sent a circular on 16 March 1932 warning the local branches to report any communist propaganda occurring in their areas<sup>46</sup> (ibid). These activities organised by the People Houses aimed ultimately at transforming the cultural life and create modern republican citizens as well as foster the support for the reforms.

These reforms carried out by the governments throughout the 1920s and 1930s were carefully designed to promote 'Turkish cultural values' as defined by the ruling elite to further homogenisation. This also involved a series of legal regulations which privileged the Turks against the non-Muslims. The government confiscated the non-Muslim religious trust properties in 1936. The Act No. 2007 passed on June 11, 1932, allowed only Turks to enter certain professions.<sup>47</sup> The interior minister Şükrü Kaya urged the employers to obey the new regulation and not to employ the foreigners in the

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went. 1867 sports days were organised 48 thousand people went. 564 trips organised 31 thousand went. 495 village trips organised 21 thousand went. 291 festivals 624 thousand people participated and 1370 night out organisation 398 thousand people participated. The number of books was 107 and 625 people used the libraries. Social organisations were: 103 peoples' houses organised 360 congresses with 44 thousand participants, 187 balls with 28 thousand participants, 295 festivals with 40 thousand guests, 240 wedding ceremonies and 211 tea parties participated by 46 thousand people (Çeçen 1990, 125, 128, 152).

<sup>46</sup> On 16.3.1932 another official note was sent by the CHP to the local branches about the publication of Mücadele newspaper. The report mentioned that the paper was owned by an unemployed Üzeyir Efendi and had similar views with *Yarın* being pro-worker and peasant rights and opposing the CHP, which indicated that the paper was the puppet of the 'dark forces'. Local offices were warned to be aware of the dangerous activities and strengthen the national resistance against them (Peker, R. 1933, in Birikim 10, February 1990, p. 87).

<sup>47</sup> Among these jobs were photographer, barber, interpretation to travellers, construction, iron and wood industry, book keeping, driver, construction work, watchmen, doorkeepers and servants in inns, hotels, bars, cafes, singers in casino, veterinary and chemists (Aktar 2000, 120-125).

occupations specified in the law.<sup>48</sup> The civil servants act passed on 15 March 1926 by the TBMM, only Turks could apply for the civil service jobs and the Act 1219 was passed on 11 April 1928 required all doctors to be the graduates from the Istanbul Darülfünun Medical Faculty and to be Turks. The 1931 Press Act brought new restrictions on press and also made it difficult for the non-Muslims to own publishing houses, requiring a high school or graduate diplomas from the ‘foreigners’ and where the diplomas were from foreign schools fluent Turkish was required. The laws that prevented those who collaborated with the enemy during the war to enter the publishing business (Çağaptay 2003) were all part of the Turkification process that targeted the non-Muslims.

The Settlement Law 2510 enacted on 14 June 1934 (Resmi Gazete, 1934)<sup>49</sup> was another important step in homogenisation of the population.<sup>50</sup> The objective was to resettle the population according to their ‘loyalty to the Turkish culture’, ‘Turkish race’ and ‘Turkish ethnies’. The government planned to settle the Pomaks and the Bosnians in the regions considered loyal to Turkish culture despite the fact that they were not ethnically Turk nor did they speak Turkish (Koçak 2003, 139-141). They were welcomed as immigrants because they were Muslims who shared cultural values. The law was a striking example of the ethnic and racist practices of the government.

The ruling elite also attempted to restrict the legal rights of the non-Muslims which were under the guarantee of the Lausanne. A government decree in 1924, prohibited religious propaganda in schools and any display of religious symbols, including the cross, in schools or the school books (Akin 2006, 89-90). Similarly while the Ministry of Education granted the non-Muslims’ right to educate their children in their mother tongue, on 21 June 1924, the regulation No.1339 Article 8 stated that in the minority

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<sup>48</sup> According to Aktar (2000, 126) 9000 Greek (Rums) lost their jobs and left Turkey.

<sup>49</sup> It was published in the Official Gazette on 21 June 1934, No.2733.

<sup>50</sup> Atatürk signed the government decree No.9831 on the appointment of the Thrace General Inspectorate on 8 April 1934 (BCA. 030.08/43.19.16).

schools no 'foreign' head teacher or director could be appointed except by the Ministry of Education. This regulation was later re-interpreted and a 1926 circular by the Ministry of Education requiring the Turkish language teachers in the minority schools to be selected from the native Turkish speakers (Çapar 2005, 409- 411) and appointed by the Ministry of Education. Greek was prohibited as the language of instruction in 1927 in Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) in non-Muslim minority schools (Oran 2004, 109, fn.93).

In conclusion, from the first years of the National Independence War, and throughout the 1930s the ruling elite's attempt to establish and consolidate the nation state dominated by the homogenisation policies. The main difficulty was that Turkey did not have a homogeneous population. On the contrary, the population consisted of diverse groups of people with different ethnic, religious and linguistic backgrounds. The ruling elite used many different strategies involving both 'force' and 'consent' to homogenise these diverse populations under common culture and language which was not always welcomed by these groups. Every time the ruling elite faced a new challenge from these linguistic or ethnic groups, they used ever more authoritarian means to impose the homogenisation policies. The non-Muslims, whose membership to the nationhood was always conditional, were often the target the homogenisation policies.

### **2.3. The Milli Şef (National Chief) Years**

The early years of the National Chief era was marked by World War II and resultant economic crisis and the introduction of the Wealth tax. In order to deal with growing economic problems, the government decided to intervene in economic activities, confiscating mines and factories to make them more profitable. The state's active involvement in economy meant expansion in public sector and growing state expenditure which was exaggerated by the government decision to keep a large standing army hence an extra burden on economy.

National defence spending increased from just under 164 million TL in 1939 to approximately 543 million in 1943 and to 710 million in 1944 (Ökte 1987, 3; Metinsoy 2007, 55). The government financed the public sector spending through borrowing from the treasury and credit from England, worth 15 million Sterling which further increased the money in circulation and inflation (Timur 1991, 24).

National Defence Law passed in 1940 allowed the government to intervene in economic activities and allowed the central bank to pump money into the system to finance the increased public sector expenditure, leading to a serious rise in inflation. Between 1938 and 1944 the paper money in circulation rose from 219 million TL to 995 million TL (Timur *ibid.*). When Saraçoğlu came into office in July 1942 he lifted the price control and prices rose sharply (Ökte 1987, 10) with serious effects such as an increase in the cost of living, and severe shortages in basic commodities, hence the emergence of hoarding, speculation and black market (Keyder 1989, 154-5).

One of the more serious consequences of the state involvement in the economy was the enormous power the bureaucracy gained in the process, especially the authority to sign bilateral trade agreements, led to abuses of the system by the civil servants who gained financial benefits by turning a blind eye to certain illegal trading activities and encouraging speculation by the traders. The infamous 'war rich' emerged as a result of these economic policies (Keyder 1987, 51). The Wealth tax was enacted under these conditions to tax those whose wealth exceeded TL 5000 and annual income exceeded TL 2500. Initially, the tax payers were divided into Muslims (M) and non-Muslims (G) but later the Dönme (D) (Jewish converts) and foreigners were added, but the latter was to be taxed at the same rate as the Muslims. The non-Muslims' and Dönmes' tax assessments were planned to be three times higher than the Muslims and Foreigners but when the tax was carried out non-Muslims were made to pay ten times more than the Muslims (Ökte 1987, 34-5). The tax was also applied to non-Muslim peddlers and the private salary earners which revealed its discriminatory nature against the non-Muslims as these people's earnings did not exceed the limits proposed by the law (30).

Moreover, the tax was assessed not on the basis of profit or annual income but on the basis of the entire wealth of the tax payers who were predominantly non-Muslims. This led many commentators to claim that it was designed to transfer wealth from the non-Muslim bourgeoisie to the Muslim ones as part of the Turkification of the economy (Melen in Koçak 1986, 507; Aktar 2000, 138; Kuyucu 2005, 361; Bora 2006, 89; Boratav 1974; Kocak 1986, 506).

It seemed that there was a tacit consensus among the the bureaucracy and the industrial bourgeoisie aiming to end the domination of the non-Muslims in trade and economy (Bora 2006, 89; Timur 1991, 25). Their resentment of the non-Muslims' domination in trade and commerce was exaggerated under the influence of racist ideologies current at the time and a degree of sympathy existed among the ruling elite and the bureaucracy towards the Axis states, with their racist, nationalistic ideology during the war (Keyder 1987, 51; Aktar 2000, 209).

The intellectual scene <sup>51</sup> also reflected this close encounter with the Nazis. In the 1940s the national identity was defined along lines of “race” and “ethnicity”. The Prime Minister Saraçoğlu in several occasions defended ethnic Turkism claiming that Turkishness was a matter of blood as well as culture and conscience (Ayın Tarihi, 1-31 August 1942). During the implementation of the Wealth tax he argued that his government was determined to fight against the mentality that was inherited from the Ottoman Empire where people served their own interests rather than the Turkish nation. His address was clearly aimed at non-Muslims. Saraçoğlu made it clear that the government expected the non-Muslims to show their ‘loyalty’ to this nation or otherwise, he argued, the government was determined to ‘eliminate’ mentality of these

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<sup>51</sup> The years between 1939 and 1944 were also the golden years of the Turkist (Türkçü) publications. New Turkist nationalist figures Reha Oğuz Türkkan, Orhan Seyfi Orhon, Yusuf Ziya Ortaç with the old nationalists Zeki Velidi Togan, Hasan Ferit Cansever, Rıza Nur and Nihal Atsız developed the racist Turkish nationalist discourse further (Okutan 2004, 82). The government's toleration towards the Pan Turanist currents ended when the leading Turanists were prosecuted in 1944 which ended on 29 March 1945 with ten convictions. The case was reopened and these men were released on 31 March 1947 (Koçak 1986, 228).

men (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 January 1943). The tax was implemented with determination despite all the controversy surrounding it. The tax liquidated the wealth of many non-Muslims and around 30,000 Jewish and 20,000 Orthodox Christian citizens emigrated after the Wealth Tax affair (Okutan 2004, 195). The Wealth tax was finally abolished on 15 March 1944.<sup>52</sup>

The case of Twenty-class<sup>53</sup> military service was another anti-minority act. The government, between the 1st and 15th of May, 1941, called back to military service Jewish, Greek and the Armenian males between the ages of 18 and 45 who were discharged of military duty, to work on road building or other activities not involving carrying arms (Bali 1998a).<sup>54</sup>

After the war with the changing international conditions, the defeat of fascism and the democratic principles becoming widespread in Europe, forced the CHP to allow an opposition albeit a controlled one.<sup>55</sup> The CHP was also under pressure from within the country with increased opposition to its authoritarian rule, the CHP was ‘forced’ to hold a general election in 1946. The election result showed that the CHP lost its traditional base of support while the opposition gained considerable support (Keyder 1989, 160).

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<sup>52</sup> Brown commented that Wealth tax was abolished when Germany was defeated and the government was trying to strengthen the relations with the Allies. In fact, just before President İnönü met Churchill and Roosevelt in Cairo in 1943 the tax defaulters were allowed to return from Aşkale labour camps (1987, vii).

<sup>53</sup> See Bali for the testimonies of the non-Muslims served in the twenty-class troops (1998a).

<sup>54</sup> Under the single party rule the minorities served in the military. However, the 1939 regulation prevented minorities to use guns and employed only under Turkish officers or employed in logistic services. Moreover, they were allowed to pay to reduce the eight months service to six months (Okutan 2004, 136).

<sup>55</sup> Indeed, Bayar presented the party programme to İnönü and gave him guarantee on the principles of secularism, education and foreign policies. This shows that the DP was established by the approval of the Milli Şef (Timur 1991, 21). However, the establishment of the DP was not smooth. In 1945 a motion was submitted by four members of the parliament demanding more democratic rights, which was negotiated on 11 June 1945 in the CHP General Council but was rejected. When Köprülü and Menderes of these four wrote in daily *Vatan* about the motion they were expelled from the CHP. Later Refik Koraltan and Celal Bayar joined them to form a group (Timur 1991, 18, 19). On 7 January 1946 the DP was established officially by the members of the ‘motion by four’.

The CHP alienated the bourgeoisie because of its economic policies, the poor were always under heavy taxation and also suffered from authoritarian rule and a section of the bureaucracy and intellectuals also withdrew their support from the CHP and the National Chief (Timur 1991, 24, 25).

#### **2.4. The 1950 Election and the Demokrat Party (DP) in Office**

The Democrat Party was the product of these economic and social conditions explained above. It was the first democratically elected government which also ended the National Chief period and the continuous CHP rule since 1923.<sup>56</sup> The DP administration significantly transformed the nature of Turkish politics. It was the breaking point of the coalition among the ruling elite, between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie and the end of the coalition between the ruling military-civil intellectuals, and their model of the administrative structure. In other words, the DP's election ended 'elite politics' (Keyder 1989, 163).

In this sense it was the 'victory of the 'periphery' over the elitist CHP as indicated in the DP's popular election motto of Enough is Enough! It's Nation's Turn to Speak!' (Timur 1991, 39). The victory of the DP represented a shift in the class struggle. The newly emerging bourgeoisie supported the DP to advance its interests in the face of the deepening economic crisis. Although the founding members of the DP claimed that they were not a party of one class but the party of all people, and despite the popular support from the military-civil bureaucracy, intellectuals and the poor, the DP was based on economically dominant classes. In fact the DP waged a war against the administrative class and its ideology of 'statism' and as a result, the bureaucracy lost its class status, bourgeoisie becoming the dominant class (Timur 1991, 39; Keyder 1989, 176).

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<sup>56</sup> In the general election on 14 May 1950 the DP won 408 seats out of 487, the CHP 69, the MP (Millet Partisi) 1, and the Independents 9 seats. The DP won 53.3 per cent of the votes whereas the share of the RPP's votes stayed at 39.9 per cent (Çavdar 1996, 21).

The economic programme supporting export-oriented agricultural sector and private capital under the right international conditions brought success to the DP in the first years in office. These favourable condition led to an export boom and a seventy per cent increase in land under cultivation beginning in 1947 (Pamuk and Owen 1998, in Keyder, *ibid.*). The result was a radical transformation in the agricultural sector. In an attempt to restructure the economy and meet the peasants' demands, the government subsidised agriculture by providing cheap credit opportunities and adopted low price policy for agricultural inputs. These measures increased the peasants' purchasing power which in turn led to the increase in demands for industrial products in the domestic market. Moreover, the use of tractor in agriculture increased the amount of cultivated land hence an increase in production with extra credit available provided by the Marshall Plan the countryside was economically and socially in transformation between 1950 and 1960 (Çavdar 1996, 57). Rapid increases in the agricultural outputs led to rising incomes for all sectors of society, which helped to maintain the integrity of the DP's populist coalition of peasants, merchants and landlords. Thus, the DP-led economic policy was a response to the newly emerging bourgeoisie, who considered the non-Muslim cosmopolitan bourgeoisie as a threat to their own advancement (Keyder 1989, 176-8).

One of the most important consequences of this transformation was the increase in domestic migration from countryside to cities. Urban population reached 5, 224 million in 1950 (Oktay 1987, 48, 83). The population growth rate of the urban regions of Turkey jumped from 2.25 per cent to 5.57 per cent between 1950 and 1955, whereas the figures for the rural areas show a decline from 2.15 per cent to 1.74 per cent. The percentage of people living in rural areas declined from 81 to 77 per cent of the total population in the same period (İçduygu and Sirkeci 1998, 249–54). The three largest cities of Turkey –Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir- were preferred by these immigrants. According to İçduygu, in 1955 there were roughly 50.000 shantytowns (*gecekondu*) with a total of 250.000 inhabitants in Istanbul, and by 1960, the number increased to

1,200,000. Between 1945 and 1955 the population of Istanbul grew from one million to 1.6 million (İçduygu and Sirkeci 1998, 252).

From the 1950s onwards, this ‘new proletariat’, as Keyder named them, emerged as a very powerful social force in transforming the Turkish political scene and an extremely important target of populist policies (Keyder 1987, 51-2; Keyder 1989, 189, 190). The weight of the newly migrated urban population in the political discourse reflected itself in the emergence of the populist nationalist discourse adopted by the DP, despite its increased vote in the 1954 general election. It seemed that the DP used the populist nationalism as a response to the economic difficulties caused by the crisis in the world economy after a sudden collapse in the price of primary goods and the bad weather conditions leading to an eleven per cent decrease in per capita income (Keyder 1987, 133). The government continued with its inflationary policies which caused economic hardship for the salaried and the urban poor (Kuyucu 2005, 372, 134; Eroğul 1987). Economically stranded, the DP turned to a more authoritarian rule adopting harsh measures against the opposition and the press (Alemdar 1996, 130).<sup>57</sup> In 1951, the members of the Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye Komünist Partisi - TKP) were arrested. In 1953 the university teaching staffs were prohibited from joining political parties and in the same year the property of the CHP was confiscated, in 1954 the village institutes were closed down and the National Party (Millet Partisi –MP) was banned (Timur 1991, 31, 34, 39).

The DP’s approach to the non-Muslims was positive in the first years in office. The non-Muslims supported the DP in the general election and six non-Muslim deputies

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<sup>57</sup> A relatively more pluralistic scene that existed for the press in the first year of DP in office but it was short lived. The government maintained a partial support towards the pro- DP press. The left wing press was under increasing pressure. Between March 1954 and May 1958, 1161 journalists were prosecuted and 238 were convicted (Oktay 1987, 48, 50-51). The Other anti-democratic measures were adopted by the government in 1954: a separate regulation was drawn concerning press and broadcasting crimes, in 1956, a new law was drawn to prevent publication of news on party group meetings, in 1957 state had the monopoly to import paper and in 1958 state had monopoly on the distribution of the official announcements and advertisements. These measures were used to put more pressure on the press. It increased the paper prices but let special allowances for pro-government press the opposition press was suffered under these economic strains (Gevgilili 1983, 221).

served in the parliament between 1950 and 1957. There were other developments; the government allowed four year higher education in the Heybeliada Seminary in 1951 and the Jewish community were given permission to elect their own chief Rabbi in 1953. However, these positive developments were overshadowed by the 6/7 September 1955 riots.

The political circumstances leading to the 6/7 September riots were related to the DP's economic policy and its adoption of a populist nationalism. At the basis of this populist nationalism lay the resentment against modernisation which began to be formulated as part of the political discourse of the right wing populism in the 1950s. The DP mobilised both the opposition against the elitism of the CHP and conservative-liberal opposition to the modernisation with radical right wing populism than it needed. This new variant of nationalism went beyond the confines of the 'modernist – conservative nationalism' and assumed the characteristics of a 'reactionary nationalism'. Thus, the nationalist religious ideologues directed their resentment against the westernist bureaucratic elite, cosmopolitanists, communists and the non-Muslim minorities who were held responsible for the alienation created by modernisation. These groups were presented 'foreign' elements and as 'threats' to the pure national essence represented by the Anatolian people (Bora 2006, 91).

The 1955 6/7 September riots were the result of the formentioned economic and political circumstances. In order to deal with the growing tension over the Cyprus issue and the deepening economic problems, the DP increased the dose of populist manipulation of religious and national sentiments of the discontented population. In the mobilization of the masses against the Greeks the government used nationalist discourse with xenophobic and racist tones with the support of the nationalist press and the ultra radical student unions to rally for the Cyprus cause<sup>58</sup> on 6 September, which turned into

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<sup>58</sup> In 1950 when the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuad Koprulu, was asked his opinion on the Cyprus issue he openly stated that Turkey did not have a Cyprus problem (Armaoglu 1963, 25; Çavdar 1996, 54). The relationship between Turkey and Greece were stable they even signed the Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia in 1953. Greece took the Cyprus issue to the United Nation demanding a right to self determination for Cyprus as response to the growing discontent among the Greek Cypriots against the

a riot. The position of the Greeks of Istanbul (Rums) was compared to the Cypriot Turks especially in terms of economic wealth and freedom which made the Greek minority a target of nationalist hatred.<sup>59</sup> The non-Muslims, especially the Greeks, were targeted both because of their religion and their wealth. The Greek minority in Istanbul were assumed to be siding with the Greek Cypriots during the Cyprus crisis because of their shared religion (Kuyucu 2005, 366). After the 6 September riots many Greeks and non-Muslims left Turkey, the number fell to 20.000 between 1955 and 1960 (Kuyucu 2005, 376).

The non-Muslims were once again the target of resentment because of their religion and economic position. Despite the government's adoption of the Turkist-Islamist ideology, which reflected the sensitivities of the Anatolian countryside and the new urban poor, the class base of the DP was the Anatolian bourgeoisie, one of the main beneficiaries of the economic 'opportunities' became available after the 6/7 September riots. The economic space became available for the Anatolian bourgeoisie after the immigration of the non-Muslims after the 6/7 September riots enabled them to enter the Istanbul business circles and compete in the world market. Thus the claim that the DP mobilised the masses to end the economic domination of the non-Muslims seems to have been justified (Bora 2006, 92; Kuyucu 2005, 374). Most important of all non-Muslims

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British rule. It was then the relations between Greece and Turkey became antagonistic as Turkey strongly opposed to this scenario. In October 18, 1955 Makarios was elected as the head of the Greek Orthodox Church. He aimed to make the politics of Enosis, accession of Cyprus to Greece, as his foremost aim in office. Greek government in August 20, 1954 appealed to the arbitration of the UN with a self-determination claim for Cyprus. When the UN rejected the motion protests began in Cyprus against England. Makarios, the Archbishop of Cyprus supported the organisations like EOKA which launched terrorist attacks against the British officers, the Greek collaborators and Turkish civilians. The growing tension led the British to hold a Tripartite Conference in London convened on 29 August 1955. The UN refused to discuss the issue. Following this decision protests began in Cyprus against England. The protesters attacked the English shops and the police. In response to these demonstrations Cyprus is Turkish Society organised a demonstration in London with two thousand strong (Akın 2006, 128, fn. 312).

<sup>59</sup> The Greek community was begun to be targeted by the nationalist press throughout August 1955 when there was rumours that the Cyprus talks would begin in London. The Fener Patriarch Antenegros was called to condemn EOKA and Makarios. The press continued to intimidate the Patriarch and Greek community over the issue which often assumed the form of a threat. The Greek community in Istanbul became a trump card for the radical National Turkish Student Union, Cyprus is Turkish Society and the nationalist press (Akın 2006, 118, see also fn.284, 285, 286, 287, 288; Çavdar 1996, 54).

became the easy target of the discriminatory nationalist politics led by the government despite the initial positive attitude towards the non-Muslims.

## **2.5. Elite, Ideology of Nationalism and the non-Muslims**

The above discussion aimed to provide a historical context within which the status of non-Muslims was shaped. This historical and social context will enable us to account for the role of the ruling elite and journalists in the reproduction of the nationalist discourse of exclusion. The ruling elite, and the opposition within the elite, voiced their suspicion of the non-Muslims which found expression in the discriminatory policies they adopted.<sup>60</sup>

As has been mentioned above, the ruling elite marked out the non-Muslims as the ‘other’ of nationhood, treating them as ‘foreign’ elements. Although their perception of the non-Muslims was partly shaped by the experiences of the wars since the Balkans and the loss of large territories as a result of the nationalist movements of the mainly Balkan millets, what seems to be the underlying reason for their exclusion of the non-Muslims from the ‘imagined community’ of Anatolia was the hegemonic domination of nationalism among the ruling elite, the newly emmigrated Muslims of Balkans and the Caucasuses, the new middle class composed of the civil servants and military officials, the landed Anatolian bourgeoisie who replaced the non-Muslims in trade and small business and the intellectuals.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> For example Kazım Karabekir, on 20 November 1940 at a CHP group meeting, asked the party members what sort of measures would be taken against the non-Muslims if Istanbul was occupied by the enemy. He was concerned about the possible attitude of the Armenian, Greek and the Jews. He suggested that Turks should be dominant in Istanbul and non-Muslims suspected of spying should be transferred to a suitable place in Anatolia. At the CHP party group meeting on 21 August 1940 Kazım Karabekir justified his proposal “...because where a non-Muslim community there is a spy inn” (Bali 1998, 173). See also for Saraçoğlu’s speech on ‘Turkishness (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 January 1943) and the talks among the deputies on what consisted of the identity of ‘Turk’ during a parliamentary session in February 1924 (Çağaptay 2003, 168). Also the reports by the Thrace General Investigator İbrahim Tali gives an idea about their perception of the non-Muslims (in Koçak 2003, 140, 141, and 143).

<sup>61</sup> The new middle class intellectuals consist of the public servants, salaried employees and the members of the learnt professions who were educated in the Western institutions and committed to the modern way

The middle class intellectuals and the ruling elite, from civil and military bureaucracy and the men of letters, had a leading role in the nationalist movement against the occupying forces and western powers during the National Independence War (Oran *ibid*, 37). After the war they were at the forefront of the modernisation of society. The middle classes saw the nation-state as the modernising force in a society where economy was feeble, the bourgeoisie absent or weak and the vast majority were peasants. The state became the modernising agency actively taking part in the economic, social and cultural restructuring processes. A homogeneous nation-state was the ideal for the ruling elite in their attempt to modernise the society in the western model rather than a multicultural society, which was, as they believed, responsible for the destruction and final collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Such belief made them defend homogeneous society with more passion and determination (*ibid*; Isyar 2005, 346; Aydın 2001, 226).<sup>62</sup> Moreover, as Fritsche argued, a potential traitor or an enemy has always been part and parcel of the nationalist ideology as a way of securing the national unity. In fact, if there is no 'real' enemy one is created (Fritsche 1991, 65).

This variant of nationalism, based on homogenisation policies, involved the creation of a national identity based on common cultural values and ideals which were seen vital for the national unity. These values were defined either with reference to Turkish culture and language or religion or ethnic origin. Although the ruling elite was not always resolute on all these principles and their emphasis on one or the other criterion

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of life. Those who were in a position of controlling the state apparatuses initiated reforms in the absence of bourgeoisie and acquired a leading role (Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay). Journalists and writers are part of the intellectuals who contribute to the transmission and criticism of ideas.

<sup>62</sup> Some members of the elite and the journalists are exceptions. For example Fuat Köprülü, Halide Edip and Hilmi Ziya Ülken who did not adopt an hostile attitude towards the non-Muslims. However, although these were highly respected members of the intellectuals their ideas were opposed to the official ideology and were marginalised (Bora 2006, 84).

Nesim Şeker mentioned a debate about the future of the state among the intellectuals and journalists took place in the press in 1919. Ahmet Emin Yalman argued in 1919 (*Vakit*, October, 21) that under Ottomanism Turks, Kurds, Armenians and Greeks could enjoy equal rights. While Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver), Ahmet Ferit (Tek), Ahmet Refik (Altınay) (*İfham*, October, 22), opposed him insisting that Christian minorities should be left outside of new Turkey and the rest would be considered Turks (Şeker 2005, 170-2).

as the fundamental part of what constituted nationhood and national identity was determined by the social and historical conditions, their idea of what was not included within the nationhood was quite conclusive: they excluded the non-Muslims.<sup>63</sup>

Thus, beginning with the Young Turks, the ruling elite adopted various methods to reduce or assimilate the non-Muslim population. Such strong feelings against non-Muslims, especially in times of crisis and external and internal threats, real or imaginary- easily turned into outright accusation of the non-Muslims' involvement in the 'fifth column' activities. This was the case during the implementation of the 1934 Settlement Law, the World War II and during the Cyprus crisis and the 6/7 September riots. As the above discussion have shown, the treatment of the non-Muslim minorities was exclusionary throughout the four decades we briefly analyzed beginning with the National Independence War and continued until the election of the DP. Throughout these decades the non-Muslims were the 'other' of what 'Turkishness' stood for, regardless of the governments' ideological leanings.

The hegemony of the Turkish nationalism, particularly its notion of the Turkish national identity based on 'Turkishness' and 'Muslimness' despite the varying weight of one or the other depending on the ideology of the government seemed to have shaped the perception of the ruling elite and the intellectuals of what consisted of the nation which has been exclusive of the non-Muslims. Before analysing the press treatment of the non-Muslims we should consider journalists as agents, as the producers of the discourse of exclusion.

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<sup>63</sup> Mustafa Kemal in a speech on 19 September 1921 at the Grand National Assembly informing the deputies about the ongoing war said: "as you all know tolerance to Christians has been part of our tradition and religious belief. The best sign of this tolerance is that you can find a Christian even in the smallest village in our country and they are better off than Muslims, live in peace and affluence. If they were treated badly and faced injustice they would not be living as they do today... However, it is necessary to prevent the Christian minorities who show their ingratitude to this land they live and attempt to harm our nation by the encouragement of the outside forces" (in Öztürk 1981, 601).

## 2.6. Journalists, Ideology of Nationalism and the non-Muslims

For the purpose of this study, the power and the role of the journalists in the discursive reproduction of the idea of nation-state, the definition of nationhood, national identity and what constitutes the national interest and their contribution to the establishment of the hegemony of these conceptions are crucial. As Bourdieu argues, the power of the words lies not in their intrinsic qualities but in the belief that they are uttered by authorised spokespersons (Bourdieu 1991, 170), or as Austin puts it the power of the words stems from the fact that the authorised spokespersons are those who “execute action by uttering statements” (Austin in Thompson 1991, 8). Therefore, we need to account for the power of journalists. However, it must be noted that this power is conditional and depends on the specific historical conditions in which the media operates. To talk about the discursive power of the media and the journalists about certain vital issues of national concern is possible if there is a consensus among the elite, primarily politicians, professionals and academics (van Dijk 1992).<sup>64</sup> In what follows, we will try to analyse the nature of the relationship between political authority and the press in Turkey during the single party era and in the early years of the DP.

At the beginning of the National Independence War, Mustafa Kemal assigned the press role to influence public opinion in favour of the Anatolian movement and to inform the public about the activities of the Kuvayi Milliye (National Forces) and he set up *İradeyi Milliye* in Sivas in 1919, and *Hakimiyeti Milliye* and the Anatolian News Agency in 1920 (Gürkan 1998, 34). During the Armistice Years, throughout the National Independence War years and in the early years of the establishment of the Republic, the Turkish press became an arena of ideological struggle divided into two opposite camps (Kaya 2009, 237).

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<sup>64</sup> Yet, the consensus among the elite does not necessarily imply that the journalists would have complete power to influence public perception, for this media should be the main source of peoples’ knowledge and there should be a weak opposition (van Dijk 2000, 36-37). Even then the reception practices of the audience should be taken into account. Nevertheless, under certain conditions as above media –and journalists- may be a powerful source of influence shaping the perception of the audience on certain issues.

After the establishment of the Republic the years of political strife began among the ruling elite. The scores settled between the major sides, the Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (The Progressive Republican Party -TpCF) and the Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası, with the victory of the CHP. Mustafa Kemal eliminated the opposition through the Independence Courts set up after the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925. During that time the Press, became an arena of political struggle divided between the Istanbul and Ankara, the former was usually represented the opposition and the latter pro-Ankara. The enactment of the Peace Law on 4 March 1925 ended the limited press freedom. Journalists were arrested and tried for high treason. <sup>65</sup> As Kocabaşođlu argues, these measures against the press were exaggerated and unnecessarily harsh (Kocabaşođlu 1981, 110). It seems that they had a symbolic meaning in that they showed that the government intended to intimidate the opposition and send the message that it would not be tolerated.

The concern over the Sheikh Said Rebellion, the Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Free Republican Party- SCF) and assassination attempt on Mustafa Kemal served as a pretext government to impose tighter rules on the press, curb civil liberties and the freedom of the press. The new Press Law was introduced under these conditions on 25 July 1931. Article 40 prohibited any movement or publication sympathising with the Sultan, caliphate, or with communism-anarchism. The law also prohibited the publication of stories about thieves, rebels, suicides that might set bad examples. The most important was article 50 which stated that publications endangering the general politics of the state could be stopped or banned by the decision of the council of ministers. What made the article controversial was the ‘difficulty’ or the arbitrary nature of determining exactly what ‘state’s general politics’ consisted of (Kocabaşođlu 1981, 111-112; Cumhuriyet Basını 1998, 129; Koç 2006, 22).

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<sup>65</sup> Tanin, İleri, Son Telgraf, İstikbal, Vatan, Millet, Yeni Alem, were closed; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Ahmet Emin Yalman, Ahmet Şükrü Eşmer, Suphi Nuri İleri, İsmail Müştak Mayokan from Istanbul press and Abdulkadir Kemali, Edip Bey, Gündüz Nadir Bey from the provincial press were arrested.

Governments continued to limit the freedom of the press through legislation and indirectly through other means, such as directly dictating to the editor what to write and what to avoid. At the General Press Congress on 25 May 1935, new clauses were passed to institutionalise the influence of the political authority (Gürkan 1998, 92). The most important of which was to give the professional press organisations authority to ban journalists from practicing their profession. The political authority was thus able to restrict the freedom of the press through the deputy journalists acting as ideologues of the CHP (Kocabaşoğlu 1981, 111). Amendments in 1938 restricted press freedom even further, with requirements for licences and other new conditions for those who wanted to enter the printing business.<sup>66</sup>

During the Second World War imposition of martial law also restricted press freedom with the exception of *Ulus*, the official newspaper of the CHP, the press was under strict control (Gürkan 1998, 89).<sup>67</sup> Current affairs issues considered important by the government were dictated to the newspapers through the Basın Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü (Press and Broadcasting General Directorate -1933). Occasionally the Prime Minister called for press briefings and gave instructions to the journalists what to write (Nadi 1964, 40). In spite of this, the newspapers, especially *Tan*, *Vatan*, *Akşam* and *Tanin*, however limited, continued with their criticisms (Gürkan 1998, 53). Basın Birliği (the Press Union -1938) gave a considerable authority to government to control the press until the end of the WWII. The Press General Directorate was brought under the Premier's Office in 1940, to ensure a strict control over the press during the war years (Güvenir 1991, 49, 59, 209). The 1950 Press Law No. 5680 brought more freedom but these liberal principles were scrapped in 1954.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> The newspapers compelled to get licence before publication. Article 9 made it compulsory for the newspapers to deposit a certain amount of their capital before starting publication. Article 12 made it forbidden for the infamous persons to publish newspapers or to take up responsible positions, since the 'infamous' was not defined government could use it to suit its needs by not allowing those who were not close to the government to enter the print business. Article 38 prohibited the publication concerning the non-disciplinary incidents in the high schools and at the universities in order to prevent the spread of sensational news (Iskit 1939, in Gürkan 1998, 88).

<sup>67</sup> See for the number of newspapers was closed (Gürkan 1998, 51).

<sup>68</sup> According to the Press Act 6334 of 1954 publication of private life and family was a crime to be

As the above discussion has revealed the Turkish press was not operating under the optimum conditions. They were closely monitored by the political authorities who were determined to control the flow of information and dissemination of ideas. The opposition press continued to be critical of governments throughout the decades under discussion. However, these criticisms had limits, the extent of the ability to criticise is summed up by Yunus Nadi “We are representatives and the defenders of the republic... We actively worked for this end... Provided that this fundamental idea is kept in mind we can say for sure that our newspaper is neither a government nor a party newspaper” (İnuğur 1999, 107).

The opposition press, especially during the single party era but it also applied to the DP period, had no fundamental argument over the nature of state and the idea of progress defended by the ruling elite. As Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın argued when arrested under the martial law in 1925, in response to the question asked by the head of the Independent Court Ali Çetinkaya why he wrote nothing on rebellion or on the reactionary movements, stated that he kept silent to serve the government in the hard times. He protested the court for questioning his silence and suspecting his loyalty to the state. He said “Am I not a Republican? Am I not a secularist? Or am I not the supporter of progress or democracy? How can you complain about me? You should let the reactionaries and monarchists complain about me” (İnuğur 1999, 117- 8). As the testimonies of these leading journalists showed, until the end of 1940s, as Kaya argues, with the exception of the radical left wing press, newspapers had the mission of leading society to achieve modernisation and progress, even though they disagreed over the nature of the methods (Kaya 2009, 237).

The majority of the leading journalists put the security of the state and national unity first before the individual rights or freedom of the press, which were of secondary concern compared to the national unity and security. The journalists in the three periods analysed seemed to have shared with the ruling elite the same fundamental principles

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punished and the publication of stories related to the individuals’ personal and family life was prohibited (Gevgilili 1983, 221).

about the nature of the rule and of society. This was partly related to the fact that journalists were among the ruling elite throughout the single party era in the Republic of Turkey. During Atatürk's presidency, 40 journalists served as deputies in the parliament (Kocabaşođlu 1981, 112) and they were also well represented in the DP government. According to Frey, regarding the rate of re-election as a deputy, journalists (2.41 %) came second only to military officers (2.52 %) between 1920 and 1957 (Frey 1965, 127-133; in Kocabaşođlu 1981, 113).<sup>69</sup>

The close link between the journalists and the ruling elite dated back to the second half of the nineteenth century when the Turkish press emerged as part of the modernising project of the state and was assigned the role of a modernising agent and educator by the ruling elite, this was adopted by the press without question; in fact, the press was considerably effective in explaining and teaching the merits of the reforms to the public during the reform movements of 1876 and 1908 (Kocabaşođlu 1993, 1).

Journalism had previously been a secondary job for skilled literary men, civil servants and the politicians but it became a new profession when the literacy level increased and this new profession offered job prospects for the newly emerged intellectual middle class in the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century (Lewis 2002, 462; Gürkan 1998, 69). They were closely associated themselves with and in fact worked for the state.

Journalists in the early republic also came from the lower middle class background, just as the ruling elite, who were educated in the Western education institutions and closely identified themselves with the state (Kocabaşođlu 1993, 1). They shared the same idea

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<sup>69</sup> Yunus Nadi from Cumhuriyet, Anadolu'da Yeni Gün served in the I, II, III, IV, V, VI terms; Celal Nuri İleri from İleri, I, II, III, IV, V terms; Mahmut Soydan from Milliyet, Tan served in the II, III, IV, V terms; Falih Rıfki Atay from Halkimiyet-i Milliye served in the II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII terms; Hakkı Tarık Us from Vakit,(Kurun), Son Saat served in the II, III, IV, V terms; M. Asım Us from Vakit (Kurum served in the III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII terms; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın from Tanin, Fikir Hareketeri (journal) served in the V, VI, VII, VIII, IX terms; Ferit Celal Güven from Yeni Adana, Türk Sözü served in the III, IV, V, VI, VII terms, Haydar Rüştü Öktem from Anadolu and Duygu served in the II, III, IV, V, VI, VII terms (Kocabaşođlu 1981, 112).

of development and shouldered the duty to educate people and transform society along the lines of Western civilisations. In fact, as Bozdağ argues, since its emergence the education function of the press has been more important than the function of informing public. Thus columnists have always been the dominant characteristic of the Turkish press (Bozdağ 1992, 195, in Gürkan 1998, 74) even today the Turkish press is dominated by the columnists, which are considered to be an outdated practice in the western press (Kaya 1999).<sup>70</sup>

Both the journalists and the ruling elite shared the same objectives regarding the nature of the state, about the nature of the authority and government and the ultimate aim of reaching the level of western civilisation. Journalists often defended the state policies in the name of progress or the national interests even if they contravened the individual rights. In fact, they agreed with the ruling elite that if the interest of the state or the nation required, individual rights should be sacrificed. The individuals were thus expected to behave in accordance with the requirement of the greater interests of the country (Kocabaşoğlu 1993, 1).

When a disagreement occurred within the ruling elite and between the pro-government journalists and the ‘opposition’ journalists, it was over the means of carrying out the reforms to reach the ultimate aim of western civilisation and progress. As Yalman argues although the journalists disagreed about the means to achieve progress they always kept in mind the fundamental question of ‘how the country could be protected and developed (in Koloğlu *ibid*, 98). One of the most important conflicts occurred between the government and the journalists were over the issue of Caliphate. When Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın (a republican) (*Tanin*), Ahmet Cevdet Oran and Ömer İzzettin (*İkdam*), Velid Ebuziyya and Hayri Muhiddin Bey (*Tevhidi Efkar*), (Koç 2006, 83) defended the caliphate they were thinking the ‘interests’ of the country, which would be

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<sup>70</sup> According Yalman the lead writers and editors, whose function was to provide interpretation of the event, were considered to be the pride of newspapers until 1930s (Yalman in Koloğlu 2006, 97).

best served if the caliphate as an institution was remained.<sup>71</sup> The journalists went so far as to defend the restrictions on the freedom of the press if the security and the survival of the state were in question and any opposition to this, whether –within the press or by the political parties- was labelled as high treason (Oktay 1987, 39).<sup>72</sup>

Despite the ‘responsible’ attitude of the press, governments throughout these decades imposed strict controls on the press. Most of the time, conflict occurred between the ruling elite and the journalists because the governments refused to tolerate even the slightest criticism. Any alternative opinion defended by the journalists to solve the problems of the country was treated by the governments as an indication of a serious opposition and threat to their rule (Kocabaşoğlu 1993, 1). Therefore the function of the press was not act like a ‘fourth estate’, a ‘watchdog’ against the abuse of power by the authorities (Kocabaşoğlu 1993, 1). Rather, journalists acted as ‘organic intellectuals’<sup>73</sup>, forming a vital part of the ‘historic bloc’, in the hegemony of nationalisation as one of the crucial aspects of the Turkish modernisation.<sup>74</sup> Journalists in the single party era

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<sup>71</sup> Even Arif oruç, the most militant member of the Babiali, directed most of his criticisms to the misuse of power by the politicians, see Tunçay (1991, 58- 62, 95- 100).

<sup>72</sup> For example Vedat Nedim Tör, the Press General Director, in a 1935 brochure, stated that the main duties of the CHP press were to exercise moderate criticism, to be loyal to the party discipline and principle and propagate the Kemalist principles. The main slogan of the pro-CHP press was ‘patriotism is not about telling the weaknesses of the state to public’ (Kocabaşoğlu 1981, 113). According to Falih Rıfki Atay the sole objective of the Turkish press was to defend the revolution. Every journalist was free to adjust his pen in accordance with the republican laws (Falih Rıfki Atay, *Ulus* 11 December 1937 in Gürkan, 1998: 83). Asım Us from *Vakit* (14 July 1931) argued that 95 per cent of the TBMM composed of the members of the CHP therefore to attack CHP was to attack the TBMM. (Koç 2006, 16). Ahmet Yalman believed that when the DP came to power the freedom of the press was realised. He supported the government during the dispute between the government and the press in 1953. He labelled the opposition press being hysteric and accused them of being the mouthpiece of the communists. Or Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın defended the attack against Tan and the Sertels in the name of national interests in 1945 (Oktay 1987, 43).

<sup>73</sup> Gramsci “every class creates one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields (SPN, 5). The intellectuals do not form a class but each class has its own intellectuals. Thus the capitalists create (ibid, .92) alongside themselves the industrial managers and technicians, economists, civil servants and the organisers of a new culture and of a new legal system. Gramsci calls these organic intellectuals as distinct from traditional intellectuals. According to Gramsci every rising class finds categories of intellectuals already in existence; these traditional intellectuals seem to represent an historical continuity and tend to put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the ruling class (SPN, 10; Simon 1991, 97).

and in the first years of the DP functioned as ‘organic intellectuals’<sup>75</sup>, acting as deputies or agents in organising the nationalist hegemony in civil society (Gramsci 1971, 60).

It could be argued that nationalism as an ideology was crucial in building of such a ‘bloc’ which was possible through forging a ‘collective will’ by a process of ‘intellectual and moral reform’ which created a common conception of the world. A cultural-social unity ‘through with a multiplicity of dispersed wills with heterogeneous aims’ were welded together with a single aim, as the basis of an equal and common conception of the world’ (Gramsci 1971, 349; Simon 1991, 61). The ideology of nationalism here functioned as a cement binding together a bloc of diverse social elements and the journalists, as part of the new intellectuals, were organically linked to the ruling elite as ‘active participants in practical life, as constructor, organiser and permanent persuader...’(Gramsci 1971, 10; Simon 1991, 97). We can argue then that the journalists played a significant part in the ideological struggle to found a new common sense comprising national values defined by the republican ruling elite.

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<sup>74</sup> According to Yörük (2008) in order to understand the Turkish modernisation process better it should be analysed as comprising westernisation, secularisation and nationalisation, dominance of each determined by specific historical conditions.

<sup>75</sup> For a discussion of intellectuals and their role in the reproduction of ideology Eric Olin Wright (1975), Bourdieu (1971), Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1980).

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **3. THEORETICAL FRAME FOR A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEWS MEDIA**

I have, so far, tried to outline the historical background in order to analyse and make sense of the Turkish press discourse on the non-Muslim minorities in chapter IV. However, before proceeding with the case studies some methodological clarifications may be necessary.

I will attempt to outline the theoretical and conceptual clarification of the main linguistic and discursive tools used in the critical analysis of the news texts, editorials and columns. I hope to explain how through employing linguistic and discursive strategies, the press was able to exert its power over and impose a certain ideological perception of minorities through discourse and discuss the consequences of such representations for the minorities; a point will be explored in detail in the chapter IV. Before this, a brief overview of the tradition of the critical approaches in the news media studies in its early days may be necessary to shed light upon the dominant trends in the mainstream media representations of minorities as well as the main concerns of the critical media studies based on mainly the British media analysis tradition.

### **3.1. A Brief Historical Account of the Representation of Minorities in the News Media**

The late eighteenth-century bourgeois newspaper was considered to be a high point in the history of press representing the triumph of liberalism. It was at this time that newspapers emerged as professional establishments after the end of direct censorship and the financial constraints (McQuail 2005, 30). The press,<sup>76</sup> as the ‘true organs of the public sphere’<sup>77</sup> (Habermas 1989) earned this reputation as the guarantor of the political democracy functioning as the ‘Fourth Estate’<sup>78</sup> (Sparks 1992, 297-281). The ‘prestige press’ acclaimed its title by being independent from the state and the vested interests existed at the time. It was these characteristics that made the press a respectable institution in political and public life (McQuail 2005, 30). Its role as the ‘former of opinion’, ‘voice of the people’, ‘the voice of the national interests’ and as ‘the main agency instructing public on the main issues of the day’ led to an assumption that ‘there was a direct link between press, liberty and the extension of the political democracy’ (Sparks 1992, 280).

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<sup>76</sup> Because the first media was the print media the ‘original’ press theory was concerned with the role of the journalism in the political process which was the concern of a variety of liberal thinkers including Thomas Paine, John Stuart Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville (McQuail 2005, 169).

<sup>77</sup> Habermas, argued that this period ended with the commercialization of the press since around 1830. He described what was emerged as the ‘re-feudalization’ of the public sphere, in which political life was increasingly conducted as a private matter between the state and powerful corporate actors (in Sparks 1992, 281 and Habermas 1989, 181-90).

<sup>78</sup> The term fourth estate was reputedly coined by Edward Burke in the late-eighteenth century England to refer to the political power possessed by the press on a par with the other three estates of power in the British realm: Lords, Church and Commons. The freedom of the press was consisted of freedom to report and comment on deliberations, assemblies and act of government. This freedom was the cornerstone of representative democracy and of progress. All the revolutionary and reformist movements from the eighteenth century onwards inscribed liberty of the press on their banners and made use of it in practice to advance their cause. In this particular, mainly Anglo-American tradition of thought, freedom of the press was closely linked with the idea of freedom of the individual and with the liberal and utilitarian political philosophy (McQuail 2005, 169).

As the most important part of the newspapers news reports has been the main focus of attention. The liberal idea of the freedom of the press laid great emphasis on the news media for its role in providing access to the expression of divergent ideas, which was considered to be the precondition for the development and enlightenment of the citizens, and vital for the functioning of the liberal democratic system. Although liberal view has come to accept that a degree of subjectivity is involved in the selection and presentation of news it holds the claim that the range of views presented in the newspapers are so wide that the readers are exposed to a variety of point of views from among which they 'freely' accept one. This conception is based on the liberal idea of a plural society, where competing forces and ideas struggle for domination in a competitive political environment. In such circumstances, where all points of views are freely expressed, the readers receive an immense amount of information, knowledge and different points of views allowing the formation of opinion on certain vital issues.

The liberal account of the media and the freedom of the press have been subject to criticisms since the rise of the mass culture as early as the mid-nineteenth century. More radical criticisms <sup>79</sup> began to appear in the early and mid-twentieth century when other media especially film and radio became popular and often used for propaganda purposes. Even the 'fundamental' principle of liberal media, the principle of objectivity, was viewed as suspicious. Schudson defined objectivity as 'a way of thinking more than about the truth or what is more reliable' and as such serves the reproduction of the dominant ideological meanings (Schudson 1978 in Campbell 1995, 20). Or, as Hartley puts it, these principles serve "naturalising the dominant ideology and winning the consent for hegemony" (Hartley 1982, 56, 61).

The concern by the mid-twentieth century especially in Britain over the representation of the disadvantaged groups in the news media and the degree of influence these

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<sup>79</sup> The well-known criticism of the Frankfurt School in the early twentieth century was concerned with the ideological role of the mass media in capitalist societies. According to Adorno and Horkheimer mass culture was a debased culture, a product of monopoly capitalism which was repressive in nature. Such culture played a significant role in producing a totalitarian state in which "even the illusory advantage of inner freedom of the individual was lost" (Adorno, and Horkheimer 1977, 374).

representations exerted on audience led to the emergence of many valuable studies conducted by the media researchers.<sup>80</sup> These studies revealed that race issues in particular dominant theme in the early media studies, and were represented in terms of ‘violence’ and ‘riot’ with no mention of the racism existing in these respective societies. Especially in the news coverage of the ‘black’ issues –which were predominantly about violence- the blacks’ involvement in violence was depicted as a group characteristic, while the whites’ racist attacks were treated as individual cases of violence. In this way, the news media avoided focusing on the social causes of violence and political causes of racism existing especially in Britain at the time (Cottle 2000, 9).

The Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies, notably the works of Stuart Hall represented the growing interest in media coverage of disadvantaged groups, in particular blacks in Britain in the 1970s. One of the most important researches carried out at the centre was Hall’s study of the news on ‘mugging’ (Hall et al. 1978). This study showed that what was called in the news as the ‘mugging crisis’ in the 1980s in which the blacks were criminalised and ‘mugging’ was represented in terms of ‘moral panic’, the news media representation avoided the issues of discrimination and racism which existed in the British society. Hall came to the conclusion that the news coverage of the blacks was characterised by the ‘negative problem oriented portrayal’ in which police violence against the young blacks was either ignored or dismissed (ibid).

The Glasgow Media Group (GMG) researches were another important development in media studies, focusing on the representation of the disadvantaged groups in the British news media. The GMG’s analysis of the BBC’s coverage of the miners’ strike revealed that, despite the assumption of objectivity of the BBC, the news representation was a biased account of the strike in favour of the powerful. Although the analysis mostly

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<sup>80</sup> Some examples are Miles (1984) studied the 1958 ‘race riots’ in Britain, Butterworth (1967) health scares, Hartman and Husband (1974) race relations and Fiske (1994) the inner city disorders who came up with similar conclusion that these representations carried significant ideological implications for the disadvantaged groups (in Cottle 2000).

focused on the visual representation of the events, it paid considerable attention on the language used in the news. The framework was established by the BBC news coverage in which the strike was not debated in terms of politics, but in terms of whether the left was using the strike to blackmail the government. The news coverage, by focusing overwhelmingly on the question of the powers of the unions reduced the importance of all the other political questions. This kind of representation served the employers who were attempting to significantly reduce the power of the unions and damage their reputations. Thus, the news reporting by 'highlighting', 'selection' and 'endorsement' gave credibility to the account of the employers over the workers (GMG 1995, 164-5). In terms of visual representation, 'bias' was more 'obvious', although both parties were given equal time of appearance, the fact that the government members were interviewed in institutional settings which implied authority and power, while the workers were interviewed in a chaotic setting with noise in the background, which implied the disorder that strikes were generally associated with (ibid).

One of the most important findings of the GMG researches was that the 'key vocabulary' media adopted to define and present the information was usually used by the audience to think about the world around them be that of minorities, blacks or the single parents. Such perceptions were further enhanced in the absence of the alternative sources of information or the lack of it (Philo 1995a, 41).

Campbell (1995) analysed 'new racism' in the American media and found that media's under-representation of minorities contributed to their invisibilities and the sense of otherness, overlooking the complexities of the minorities and marginalising their communities. The appearance of what he called the 'enlightened form of racism' or 'new racism' where a few prominent minority figures were pointed to as an indication that no racism existed in the United States was in fact the continuation of the representation of the stereotyped images of the blacks. Campbell argued that this type of 'positive' representations of blacks in the American media 'created an impression of black social advantage and undermined the black claims on white resources' (Campbell

1995, 7-9). The media representation of blacks was socially constructed, one-dimensional and distorted. More specifically, blacks were represented as having essential character qualities, implying that they were incapable of change and transformation, and as such these representations were an expression of deep racist perceptions. These representations had a significant impact on setting the agenda for public discourse and contributed to the formation of the public opinion of the blacks in the USA (ibid, 29-30).

In his analysis of the news coverage of the Northern Ireland, Hartley related to the issue of terrorism, and discovered that news discourse functioned to suppress alternative possibilities of meaning and tended to emphasise the 'normal usage' of the 'signs'. He argued that news about the Northern Ireland 'was not about what was going on there but it was about producing social knowledge and cultural values' (Hartley 1982, 18). In this sense, news 'contributes to the climate of opinion to the horizons of possibility and to the process of marking the limits of acceptable thought and action' (56). As the classic example, the choice of the term 'terrorist' or 'freedom fighter' shows that to describe an event in either of these terms is to establish 'facts' about the event and affirm one definition over the 'alternative' ones which may have serious ideological implications for the readers who make sense of the events through these choices that are daily circulated and reproduced in the media. Thus the power of the news media partly stems from the fact that the news media naturalises what is in fact a particular point of view and translate the main contradictions in society, such as class divisions, into other forms. This is one of the most crucial roles the news media plays, by setting the agenda, defining issues and drawing the framework within which the issues of race, ethnicity or any other marginal groups are represented and issues related to these groups are made sense of (24). It is in this sense that Hartley, following Hall (1980) defines language as an arena of class struggle (ibid).

More recently, Ian Law has analysed different ways racism appeared in the British press. In his analysis he discovered that racial categorisations provide publicity for

racist views, racialising the immigration debates, spreading scare stories about the 'invasion' of bogus refugees, focus on illegal immigrants as threat and attempts to defraud the state and tax payers, criminalising minorities by picturing them as welfare scroungers or a law-and-order problem. This has been dominant approach in the British media, especially in the 1970s and 1980s (Law 2002, 38-9). He argues that only recently, since the late 1990s, has the picture begun to change. In his analysis he found ambivalent cases where both anti-racism and racism appeared in the news coverage of the blacks in the British media. News coverage of the race issues was more sympathetic to race victims and less hostility or ridiculing the race-relations characterised the coverage (ibid, 75). However, despite improvements, news coverage on rape issues was often linked to the idea of tendency of the black youth to rape, despite anti-racist statements that appeared in the news. Thus, there was ambivalence in the news coverage of rape and black youth; while prompting anti-racist statements and contributing to the confrontation of real social problems, it also contributed to the cultural reservoir of racist ideas (107).

In her analysis of the news coverage of homeless in the 1990s British media, Wykes found that the homeless were depicted as 'mad', 'bad' or 'dangerous'. News reports focused on the extreme behaviours implied that all homeless people were disruptive or dangerous. Moreover, the reports implied that these people actually chose to live on the streets, and avoided questions which would link homelessness to the government's housing and health care policies (Wykes 2001, 119). Similarly, reports about single parents depicted them as burdens on councils related to the provision of housing. The single mothers' application for council housing created a moral myth that diverted attention from the issue of commodification of housing and implied that they were not really one parent families but 'abandoned', 'bereft' or 'in flight' parents. The single mothers' claim for housing was presented as 'girls being rewarded for being pregnant' which was an ideological agenda for linking the single parents, especially single mothers, to the housing problem. Moreover, single mothers were presented as

signifying the collapse of the personal morality, whereas in fact statistics shows most single mothers had been married and were in employment (ibid, 124).

Where does this leave the reader? Firstly, the way the readers make sense of the news text or any media text is not pre-determined. Volosinov's work on the popular discourse in Russian literature shows that all utterances and signs may be accented towards a particular meaning depend on the context of the utterance and the speaker (Volosinov 1973).

Hall argues audiences should not be seen as passive dupes who accept the media messages as given. On the contrary, audiences engage in negotiating the meaning in the media messages rather than passively absorbing them. They bring to the act of reading and understanding of media messages their own culture and history, which may contradict the intended purpose of the message. However, as Hall states the producers of the media texts will always encourage the audience to decode the messages along the hegemonic framework (Hall et al. 1978).

The claim that the media messages have powerful influence on the members of the audience was contested from another angle by de Certeau, who argued that audience members, far from passively absorbing media messages develop various 'tactics' and 'strategies' and 'make use' of the media messages, for their own individual purposes other than those intended by the producers. Thus audiences develop alternative readings of the media messages which may be in opposition to its initial purpose (de Certeau 1988, 172).

This research does not take the audience members as passive recipients of the media messages, but as people who bring their own experiences into the act of reading and in the interpretation of media messages. Their conditions of life and personal experiences play significant roles in the way they receive and make sense of the messages which may be contradictory to what was intended. In the absence of alternative sources of information perception of the audience is likely to be influenced by the media

representation, however disputable the degree and the measurement of the influence might be.

However, it should not be concluded from the above discussion that bias is necessarily the result of a conscious choice by the press. Although, it may also be the case and some conscious decisions result in bias representation of certain groups in the news media, structural constraints play a significant role in the process of production of the media texts. First of all, newspapers as economic institutions are constrained by economic pressures which range from tax policy, to employer employee relations. There are also institutional and ideological constraints. Journalists may not be completely free of constraints by editorial and institutional pressures to represent radical or alternative views in the newspapers. Journalists' socialisation could also be influential in the news selection and representation processes. Journalists and the individual reporters are socialised into the routine of journalism through the framework provided by the newspaper institutions or the 'field', as well as the routine of journalistic conventions of writing the news.

The criteria of news selection or what is considered as newsworthy <sup>81</sup> events are determined by the conventional journalistic principles agreed by professional journalists. Thus, newsworthiness is not the result of some intrinsic qualities of the events which cause them to be chosen as news. Newsworthiness is also closely related to the social and economic concerns of the age which determine the content of the newspapers. For example newsworthy issues are assessed on the basis of their relevance to the national or public 'interest'. The fact that this interest coincides with the interest of the dominant economic and political forces is a function of their power but the presentation of national interest usually implies that it is the 'fact of life'. However,

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<sup>81</sup> According to Fowler the conventional journalism relies on the following criteria of newsworthiness: frequency; threshold, (absolute intensity and intensity increase); un-ambiguity; meaningfulness (related to cultural proximity and relevance); consonance (predictability and demand); unexpectedness (unpredictability and scarcity); continuity; composition; reference to elite nations; reference to elite people; reference to persons (is also a socially constructed value); reference to something negative (Fowler 1991, 1-2).

there is usually a gap between what is claimed as a national interest and the needs of the people, although these shortcomings are presented as a consequence of a particular government, politician or ill-management (Hartley 1982).

Journalists' relation with the news sources also constrains individual reporters. Reporters work in certain journalistic fields such as parliament, the police, magazines, universities, business and economy, workers and unions, sport, local councils, foreign news, or provincial news. They report not as journalists who objectively analyse and report the situation but as those who report the dominant views in the field. They become integrated into the hegemonic power of these fields and report the news from this point of view. Parliament and political party reporters report the words of MPs and the politicians, the police reporters the words of the police officers, the economy reporters the words of the business people and so on (Kayhan 1991, 86). News come from the official sources, from government, local authorities, police, court, political parties, already encoded with certain values and perceptions and are reported, reproduced, by the reporters only with small changes (van Dijk 1993, 254; Inal 1996).

The concerns of the readership also play a significant role in the news selection and presentation. Newspapers have to take into account their readership in order to make their paper readable. This is not to claim that the content of the newspaper is wholly determined by the readers' choices. As the above discussion indicates there are various economic, social, ideological and professional factors at work that shape newspapers' content. However, the fact that the readership of a particular newspaper is distinguished from another indicates that the readers find the style and content of that particular newspaper preferable. The production of the news texts, the writers' choice of words and style, is therefore partially determined by the addressee, by the consideration of how these would be understood by the readers. In this sense, as Hartley argues following Volosinov, meaning is produced dialogically between speaker, text and the reader (Hartley 1982, 25).

Although these influences imply strong structural constraints on the journalists, on how they frame the events hence the outcome, it does not imply that the journalists are completely controlled by these constraints. Journalists always have choices in using one set of categories rather than others to describe events or chose lexis to identify the persons involved in the news. That is to say, journalists have to be taken as agent in the reproduction of the discourse, however limited and constrained their choices might be, professionally, institutionally and ideologically.

Finally, media in general and news media in particular are subject to contradictions and inconsistencies in their operations, like capitalist system under which they operate and therefore their influence is determined by these specific conditions. However, despite constraints, the media remains one of the most powerful institutions contributing to the maintenance of the capitalist system. It is a site where a symbolic struggle takes place over the definition of the social world which ultimately serves the dominant interests.

In the following section there is an analysis of the specific forms that this struggle takes in the news reports, editorials and comment columns.

### **3.2. Critical Linguistics and Discourse Analysis of the News**

Critical linguistic analysis takes news as discourse according to which news is not about reflecting social reality but is the social construction of reality (Fowler 1991, 1).<sup>82</sup> Moreover, it holds that news is written from a particular point of view and the way ideas

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<sup>82</sup> Fowler takes Halliday's functional linguistics as the most suited model in the analysis of the news texts. The theory of functional linguistics proposes that language serves three functions; ideational, interpersonal and textual. Ideational function enables experiences of the individuals in the world to be embodied in language. Experience includes individuals' internal worlds and their consciousness, their beliefs and their knowledge. Secondly language serves an interpersonal function. Speaker is able to express his/her comments, attitudes and evaluations. Thus through interpersonal function representations of social relations and identities could be analysed. Finally textual function is concerned with the creation of text. Through textual function discourse becomes possible because the text produced by a writer is recognised by the reader. According to the functionalist linguistic theory the nature of the language is closely related to the demands we make on it. In other words the nature of the language is determined by the functions it has to serve which are largely shaped by specific cultures. Thus, the particular form taken by the grammatical system of language is closely related to the social and personal needs that language is required to serve (Fowler 1991, 32, 69).

are expressed reflect a choice since there are different ways expressing the same idea thus, choosing one particular way indicates an ideological significance (ibid, 4). Accepting that news embodies values requires a critical inquiry to decode the texts. Critical linguistics or discourse analysis provides us with tools to carry out such an inquiry. Critical means ‘it is an enquiry into the relations between signs, meanings and the social and historical conditions which govern the semiotic structure of discourse, using a particular kind of linguistic analysis’ (5). The starting point of the critical analysis of the news discourse is the analysis of the linguistic structure of the text in order to reveal a certain representation of the world is moulded in the news text through syntax and vocabulary and other linguistic and discursive strategies (10).

In other words, critical analysis aims to reveal the underlying ideology in the news representation of particular groups, events and social relationships which is of vital importance since news discourse consists of the readers’ daily experience of language (Fowler 1991, 8-9). Taking linguistic analysis as discourse analysis involves critical analysis of the grammatical and discursive structures of the media texts. Discourse is taken here to mean “systematically organised modes of talking and statements which give expression to meanings and values of an institution” and following Foucault, Fowler uses the following definition of discourse:

Discourse define, describe and delimit what it is possible to say and not possible to say (and by extension what it is possible to do or not to do) with respect to the area of concern of that institution, whether marginally or centrally. A discourse provides a set of possible statements about a given area, and organises and gives structure to the manner in which a particular topic, object, process is to be talked about. It provides descriptions, rules, permissions and prohibitions of social and individual actions (Fowler 1991, 41, 43).

Language as discourse, therefore, requires the study of language in its communicative context, which means the study of language in social and historical context. In other words, language adapts to the context which enables it to convey social meanings. For

example, the way a lecture is organised is different to a public speech, even if on the same subject and this requires taking into account the reader or listener. These adaptations of language through extra structure and extra meanings are responses to the text's communicative function. Through extra structuring of discourse –not limited to the structure of text- a reflection of complex process of interaction between people and social forces and the reflection of personal purposes and social statuses in communication is possible. It is through extra structuring and meanings that speaker or the writer is able to persuade, inform or denigrate others (ibid, 93). It is through this capacity of the language of extra structure that different genres, distinct styles by writers, and the formation of culturally significant discourses are possible (Fowler 1996, 94).

Writers use various discursive and linguistic devices to make available to readers extra levels of meanings than the physical components of the sentences allows for. That means that any analysis of media text has to distinguish between text and discourse in order to see communication beyond the confines of syntactic and semantic structure, and to see it as a discursive process which is a complex process of linguistic interaction between the people producing and comprehending texts (ibid, 110). Taking language as discourse, moreover, implies that taking into consideration of extra-linguistic factors such as the interaction between the structure and participants, the actions they perform through uttering texts and context of discourse. Critical analysis focuses on how these extra linguistic factors are reflected in the text and are mediated through discourse (111).

The methodology employed in critical analysis involves studying the language and the discursive structuring of the text to reveal how minorities are categorised, stereotyped and their identities are essentialised. From a vast amount of linguistic and discourse analysis a set of categories have been selected which best suited the purposes of this study, to reveal how, through discourse and language racist assumptions about the non-Muslims were naturalised so as to emphasise their differences and hence their exclusion

from 'our' community. It is through these strategies that a certain view of the world, relationship between people and the nature of the social world are represented as common sense, hence their ideological representation (Fairclough 1995; Cottle 2000, 7-8).

Critical linguistic and discourse analysis of the media texts will enable us to identify the linguistic and discursive strategies used in this process of ideological representation. It focuses on the choices made in coding the events, the processes defined and participants represented. These choices are ideological in so far as they are the result of a systematic tendency in news reports and indicate power and domination (Fowler 1991). For example, leaving agency and responsibility unspecified, or transforming of an active sentence into passive, which involves rewording and grammatical change carry ideological significance, for in each case meaning is altered since such changes lead to either the deletion or backgrounding of information. Alternatively, rhetorical devices are used, such as vagueness, which works to conceal responsibility of the agents' negative actions, overcompleteness which adds irrelevant details or other strategies such as presuppositions, concealments, euphemisms, blaming victims, positive self-presentation or negative other presentation which imply underlying meaning and ideologies (van Dijk 1985).

As far as the media representation of the events, issues related to minorities which involve categorisations, essentialising identities and stereotyping are considered to be part of the ideological struggle of the ruling classes to produce and reproduce the dominant relations of power. It is in this context that language is politicised, became "power-bearing to extend or defend the interests of its discursive community" (Fiske 1994, 3). Discourse here assumes 'a terrain of struggle' with various discourses battling for dominance by repressing, invalidating and marginalising competing discourses (ibid, 5). For example nationalist discourse will attempt to cast off multiethnic society as unnatural and a threat to national unity.

### **3.2.1. Ideology**

An account of ideology is an indispensable part of media studies. Considering the fact that there exists a number of competing definitions and conceptions of ideology, this needs clarification. In the early media studies the concept of ideology implied ‘false consciousness’ used by Marx and Engels in the German Ideology. Ideology as false consciousness implies that human behaviour is determined by class interests and true consciousness corresponded to this interest otherwise it was false consciousness (Marx 1968; Callinicos 1987 147-8). Another conception of ideology in Marx is the dominant ideology which implies that masses accept the dominant ideology which functions to cement the social order in the interest of the ruling class (ibid).

The most important critique to these conceptions of ideology came from Gramsci, who argued that human beings are capable of judgement and develop a conception of the world. He introduced the conception of dual consciousness or contradictory consciousness to explain the inconsistent attitudes of the working class (Gramsci 1971, 368). Ideology will be used here to refer to “that aspect of human condition under which human beings live their lives as conscious actors in the world that makes sense to them to varying degrees” (Therborn 1980, 2). This conception of ideology includes both everyday notions and experience and elaborate intellectual doctrines both consciousness of social actors and the institutionalised thought-systems and discourses of a given society. These are taken “as manifestations of a particular being-in-the-world of conscious actors of human subjects rather than as bodies of thought or structures of discourse” (ibid). Therborn argues that this conception of ideology, in text or utterance, allows us to focus on the operations of ideology in the formations and transformation of human subjectivity (ibid). It follows that to see the functioning of ideology as ongoing processes allows us to explain how they interpellate or address the reader and “unceasingly constitutes and reconstitute who we are”. This means that a number of subjectivities are acted out in the life-time of individuals (ibid, 78). Although the individuals may have several subjectivities, they only respond to one at a time. In

addressing the reader, therefore, “ideologies differ, compete and clash not only in what they say about the world we inhabit but also in telling us who we are in the kind of subject they interpellate. And these different interpellations of what exists are usually connected with different interpellations of what is right and what is possible for such a subject” (78-9). According to Therborn, this is best exemplified in a situation when a worker responds to a strike call. He or she may be “addressed as a member of a working class, as a union member, as a faithful employee, as a father or mother, a good citizen, as a communist, anti-communist, as a catholic and so on” (ibid). The kind of response of the worker to such an address “has implications for how one acts in response to the strike call”. Therefore the ideological struggle is not fought out solely between competing world-views but it is also “a struggle over the assertion of a particular subjectivity” (ibid). Therborn further notes “the statement that ideologies interpellate subjects” means that the former are not received as something external by a fixed and unified subjects. To the extent that a particular interpellation is received, the receiver changes and is reconstituted (ibid). Such conception of ideology qualifies people for conscious social action (Callinicos 1987, 147).

Ideology often works through common sense. Gramsci outlines the main characteristics of historically-produced common sense as ‘it is the conception of the world which is uncritically absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the average man is developed. Common sense is not a single unique conception, identical in time and space. It is the 'folklore' of philosophy, and, like folklore, it takes countless different forms. Its most fundamental characteristic is that it is a conception which, even in the brain of one individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is (Gramsci 1971, 419; Hartley 1982, 102).

Thus, following Hall we can argue that media use of common sense conceptions help us to make sense of the world in meaningful terms and experience the world familiar, and rule out other explanations (Hall et.al. 1978).

Common sense explanations enabled the expression of ideological point of view in the texts through embedding into them values, beliefs and propositions. However, these expressions are not always explicit but often in the form of implicit assumptions which are naturalised and appear as common sense assumptions, and as such, contribute to the production and reproduction of existing power relations and domination (Fowler 1996: 165). The idea of ‘right’, ‘duty’, ‘patriotism’, ‘national interest’ or ‘national unity’ which may serve to conceal the political acts that may affect the positions of the privileged who usually tend to legitimate their privileged positions in the name of national and common interest. The press use discursive strategies and linguistic codes which may ‘embody ideologies in so far as they interpret the world along this line of national interest which serves the reproduction of the existing relations of domination (Trew 1979, 3; Fowler 1991, 69). The definition of the national interest also involves a conception of threat against the national interests, including internal threat from minorities. It is the definition of the ruling elite reflecting their values and beliefs which are reproduced by the news as a consensual value and as such contribute to the reproduction of the existing relations of power and domination (Fowler 1996, 51; Trew 1979, 3; Fairclough 1995, 15, 45).<sup>83</sup>

Consensus is linked to the concept of hegemony which explains how the ruling elite maintains its positions of privilege by winning the consent of the ruled (Gramsci 1971). Hegemony depends on a combination of force and consent but it is most effective when consent is obtained through the unquestioned and unconscious acceptance of ideology by the governed (Althusser 1971, Hall 1978). Hegemony is accomplished through the agencies of the superstructures –the family, education system, the churches, the media

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<sup>83</sup> Fairclough mentioned the persuasive aspect of discourse and argued that it should be separated from the ideological aspects. He explained the difference between the two as follows ‘... A (documentary) will typically adopt a particular point of view on its topic and use rhetorical devices to persuade audiences to see things that way too. Ideologies, by contrast, are not usually ‘adopted’ but taken for granted as common ground between reporter and/or third parties and audience, without recourse to rhetorical devices’ (Fairclough 1995, 45).

and cultural institutions, as well as the coercive side of the state- the law, police, the army, which also in part works through ideology (Hall et al. 1978).

Common sense allows the powerful to maintain their position. It does not imply, however, that hegemony is secured, quite the contrary, it is always open to contestation. Since ideological struggle involves the processes of ‘disarticulation and re-articulation of the given ideological elements’ among other competing discourses for hegemony then it follows that hegemony has to be continually renewed (Gramsci 1971; Hall, *ibid*).

Critical analysis concerns with the ways through which discursive and linguistic structures and strategies essentialise the identities of the minorities, categorise the relationship between the minorities and ‘us’ in a way that normalises the relationship and integrates it into the perceived ‘common sense’, with serious ideological consequences. These consequences include justification and exclusion of the minorities from ‘our’ community and vindication or mistreatment of the minorities on the basis that ‘they’ are different from ‘us’ and that ‘their’ interests are defined in opposition to ‘ours’. Thus, the way the experiences of the groups and individuals are accounted for in the press or the way the participants are categorised and identified carry ideological significance if they involve a choice of representation in one way rather than another. This choice affects the participants’ contribution to their subordination within the existing relations of domination, which ultimately serves the reproduction of the dominant relations of power<sup>84</sup> (Fowler 1991, 90).

Does the claim that media reproduces dominant relations of power indicate complicity between the media or the press and the dominant political interests? Although the

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<sup>84</sup> Fairclough warns that media texts may function ideologically in social control and social reproduction; but they also operate as cultural commodities in a competitive market, are part of the business of entertaining people, are designed to keep people politically and socially informed, are cultural artefacts in their own right, informed by particular aesthetics; and they are at the same time caught up in, reflecting and contributing to, shifting cultural values and identities (Fairclough 1995, 47-48).

possibility of the existence of such complicity cannot be dismissed, the relationship between the media and the government, and the media and economic interests is variable. Occasionally the media and the government and media and capital may be in direct conflict and the state may not have an interest in controlling media under all circumstances (Fairclough 1995, 45). Usually, complicity exists between the media and the government and the media and the economic interests on matters considered to be vital for the existence of the social and economic relations of privileges and dominations. The most important function of the media is to naturalise the 'terrain on which different sectional ideologies can contend' rather than functioning as a tool for the dominant social classes (Hartley 1982, 53). In this sense, news ideology tends to generalise and translate opinions and ideas in order to limit the controversy over the nature of the rule or the state and the government or the parliamentary system or over the definition of national interest defined as universal and any challenge against these is labelled as deviant or criminal (ibid, 61).

What the media most successfully does, therefore, is to grant the dominant definitions of the world or events the status of what is commonly thought and accepted, thereby contributing to the reproduction and domination of these definitions. That is to say, the political is translated into the commonsense by means of the dominant definitions of how things are naturalised (Hartley 1982, 63, 106). For example the mainstream press during the Wealth Tax affairs in 1942 and 1943 represented the tax payers as black-marketers and war profiteers who tried to evade the tax. When they failed to pay the tax and were sent to the labour camps it was justified on the grounds that they were guilty of cheating the government and therefore faced the consequences. Since the language is an arena for class struggle, this struggle is realised in the making of the news when the multi-accental potential of the sign is closed by framing the event in a way which implies the way that particular event is to be understood. Framing the wealth tax in the language of national interest and define those who pay the tax as loyal to national cause and those who fail to pay the tax as 'disloyal' is a case of 'encoding a preferred

reading' in the news structure (Hall 1980, 172) as well as a case of exclusion of competing discourses.

### **3.2.2. Power**

The media analysis has to account for the power relations and domination. Media representations involving stereotyping, discrimination, exclusion or definition cannot be adequately accounted for without a conception of power. Foucault's definition of power as 'a more-or-less organised, hierarchical, co-ordinated cluster of relations' (Foucault 1980, 198, 199, Ferguson 1998, 61) is widely used in the media studies to emphasise the fact that power does not always emanate from a single point. However, media analysis cannot do away with the form of power that concentrated and the structures of relations within which power can exist. Media analysis has to account for both conceptions of power and to recognise the significance of structures and relations of power (Ferguson 1998, 61).

Power is a social resource consisting of money, influence, knowledge and status, which is unequally distributed and which enables person(s) with power to control the actions and liberties of others. Individuals and groups associated with privileged social classes and institutions have access to media resources and use their power to impose their definition of the situation when their interests require, thereby imposing and reproducing the social meanings to construct reality (Ferguson 1998, 61, Tuchman 1978, 208). For example newspapers' representation of the 6/7 September attacks as "a rightful protest by youth' is a discursive strategy to background or delete the affected participants and foreground the demonstrators" right to protest, ultimately serving to conceal the anti-minority nature of the demonstration. The use of such discursive strategies is an indication of unequal power relations as it involves the newspapers' decision to disseminate certain information while suppressing other. In this case "news becomes a social resource itself constructed in a way to limit an analytical

understanding of contemporary life hence its ideological character” (Tuchman 1978, 217).

Another manifestation of the power of the press is to employ linguistic and discursive strategies to limit access to less powerful while presenting the views of the powerful as consensual view, neutral and without contestation. This is closely related to the access to media to express one’s opinions and views, which are closely related the social power. Although in theory all groups or even individuals could find a means through which to express their opinions and views, in reality, however, it is not possible that every individual or all groups are able to use media channels to express their opinions. It is an extremely common practice of conventional journalists to ask the opinions and views of the economically, politically and culturally powerful because they are important news sources for the journalists. The result is that the views of the powerful are expressed more frequently and they are represented as the primary sources in many cases (Fairclough 1995, 2, 5, 40, 55; Fowler 1991, 105, 109).

Discourse and language can both be forms of domination when they are used to limit the freedom of opinion and action of others, to manipulate others in order to change opinions in one’s own interest, or to bring about the delegitimation or the denial of the claims of others (Van Dijk 1993:, 251-253). In its extreme form, newspapers use discursive power to enact symbolic violence involving the use of derogatory vocabulary, dehumanising phrases, vilification, abusive words or marked expressions in their coverage of minorities. Bourdieu defines symbolic violence as where “one class dominates another by bringing their own distinctive power to bear on the relations of power which underlie them and thus by contributing to the domestication of the dominated” (Bourdieu 1991, 168).

### **3.3. Discursive and Linguistic Strategies Employed in the Critical Analysis of the Newspaper Texts**

We now turn to discursive and linguistic categories are used in the analysis of the treatment of the non-Muslims in the news reports, editorials and the comment columns. In this paper, I have selected the conceptual categories provided by critical linguistics and discursive analysis that would best reveal the ideological representation of the non-Muslim minorities in the press coverage of 1934 Thrace Events, the 1942 Wealth Tax and the 6/7 September 1955 Riots. These linguistic and discursive strategies are employed by the producers of the news texts, editorials and the commentators and lead to marginalisation, essentialisation, stereotyping and categorisation of the non-Muslims and mark them out as ‘others’. Such a strong emphasis on ‘their’ differences from ‘us’ legitimates discrimination against and abusive treatment of the non-Muslims in the press. Critical analysis of such representations is carried out in this research ultimately aims to challenge dominant racist assumptions widespread in the mainstream media about the non-Muslim minorities.

#### **3.3.1. Representation**

The representation of an event first of all is an indication of what is excluded, which carries ideological significance in so far as that this exclusion is formulated under the influence of dominant interests. Representations may be ideologically significant when the representations of minorities involve incomplete and partial representation of ‘their’ stories but detailed and complete representation of ‘ours’. Critical analysis of the news texts will reveal the power of the language and discourse in the construction of one-sided, partial and ideological view of the events (Fowler 1991; Fairclough 1995; van Dijk 1992).

### **3.3.2. Other**

The concept of 'other' is used implicitly in the media to highlight 'their' deviant behaviour and 'our' 'normal' behaviour. 'Our' behaviours and ways of life are always presented in positive terms as acceptable and related to 'our' national characteristics thus normalising 'our' way of life through discursive and linguistic strategies, while 'they' are presented as deviant, different and in negative terms to serve to discredit their behaviours, and statements (Ferguson 1998, 173). The press representation of the 'other' and the 'deviant' is usually based upon unquestioned assumptions, often implicit, about 'their' essential characteristics while 'our' way of life is idealised<sup>85</sup> (Hall 1981, 28, 52; Hartley 1982, 83; Ferguson 1998, 80).

In the media representations the concept of 'other' is used as a means to measure what is normal with which the 'self' is identified. Thus, the 'other' is essential in imposing meaning onto self defined in relation to the 'other'. It must be noted that the self and other are never singular or unitary and are likely to change places and relative ideological weight as identities are formed, adjusted or destroyed, and as power relationships are contextually and historically changed (Ferguson *ibid*, 82).

### **3.3.3. Categorisation**

Categories which carry ideological significance are implicit in the texts while the alternative ones are absent or understated. For example, the use of 'personalisation' instead of 'social' explanation is ideologically significant. Similarly using categories of 'us' and 'them' in events involving government is an ideological choice linked to power relations (Fowler 1991, 104). Also the choice of certain lexical items, such as 'loyalty',

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<sup>85</sup> Concept of difference did not have negative connotation in the work of structuralist thinkers, especially that of Saussure, who emphasised the binary oppositions as essential in the creation of meaning. As the classic example indicates the concept of 'blackness' makes sense in comparison to its opposite of white. According to the structuralists the concept of difference is essential in establishing the meaning. However, according to Bakhtin meaning is socially negotiated, and it is the result of a kind of dialogue between two or more speakers (Hall 1997, 223-79).

‘treason’ or ‘national interest’ by the press implies that they are part of the natural order of things.

Categorisations by allocating subject and object positions to participants, usually minorities and other disadvantaged groups are assigned object positions, implicitly suggest that these categories natural and they ‘habitually saturate discourse common sense’ (ibid, 105). Moreover, object categories are usually not permitted to speak with their own voices, while the views of the desired group, are represented as common sense, which generally leads to the marginalisation of the less powerful and reproduction of the dominant views (6, 7). Categories are also used to marginalise ‘their way of life’ to discredit and discriminate ‘their point of view’ while valuing ‘our way of life’.

The most serious implication of discrimination in discourse is the constant rearticulation of a link between a certain type of expression and a category of referent by means of which discourse causes these socially constructed categories to become perceived as common sense. Especially in editorials and columns, categorisation is often used in a derogatory way “to imply associations and dissociations with the underlying abstract paradigms of the discourse”. These abstractions in discourse imply values and relationships that underpin a particular world view presented by the newspaper as the way things are or should be (6, 99). The classification of migrants as a deviant group, use of awkward lexicalisation for women, marked expressions, use of diminutives and juvenile to address women and the use of de-humanising and abusive nouns are part of the discursive strategy adopted by the editorials and columns reveal the underlying values and impose a certain relationship which indicates power and discrimination (93).

In the editorials, some general proposition about social relations are directly affirmed or stated in quotations of accessed voices. More often however, they are implied or presupposed rather than directly stated. For example, debates on national interest are usually based on a set of underlying propositions about sacrifice, patriotism, outside

enemy, treason, loyalty and so on. This key vocabulary represents the categories the press use to refer to issues related to national interest, and by using these categories, as if they are fundamental terms and natural categories, the press contributes to the dominant definitions of these terms (54-57).

#### **3.3.4. Stereotyping**

Stereotypes are mental categories help people to sort out experience and make sense of events. Although newspapers' use of categorisation and stereotyping seem to be out of the necessity of helping readers to make sense of events, they are in fact commonly associated with oversimplified and automatic interpretations. Their frequent and unquestioned use in the press inhibits understanding and as a result, 'thought becomes routine, uncritical and discourse becomes prejudicial' (Fowler 1996, 26). For example, newspapers use of categories and stereotypes, such as 'patriot' versus 'traitor', 'native' versus 'foreigner' help the reader to comprehend these events. Stereotypical categories generally give substance to home-centric views that people project to make sense of the world around them. Newspapers play a fundamental part in this process of construction (ibid: 18).

#### **3.3.5. Agents**

Participant position is the first clue to the ideological working of language in the news reports. It signals whether the agent is given a responsible position or is back-grounded in order to conceal his/her responsibility in the action. The choice of active or passives enables such structuring of the syntactic ordering thus shifts the meaning of the clause. The media's role in promulgating the argument of individual responsibility has important ramifications; by shifting the responsibility from the responsible party to an action or to another person, it is able to make an ideological choice to alter the focus of a news topic and divert attention from what is relevant to what is irrelevant or vice versa (7).

### **3.3.6. Active and Passive**

The active form is chosen when the focus is on the agent of the action, implying clear responsibility. Passive transformation enables 'patient' position to occupy the syntactic subject position is associated with an agent. The term 'patient' is used to refer to the role of an affected participant who/which is human or at least animate and who has something done to him/her. Preferring passives in linguistic constructions functions in reorienting the story and changing focus from the responsible agent onto the victim. One of the most important ideological functions of passives is that it allows parts of the clause, the agent, to be deleted, leaving responsibility unspecified (Fowler 1991, 77-79; van Dijk 1993, 276-7).

### **3.3.7. Transitivity**

Transitivity could be taken here as a proposition about the world, in which an event, situation, relation or attribute is predicated on certain participants. This makes options available in mentioning agents, assigning agents action position and the patients' subject position. These choices indicate suppression of other choices which may be ideologically significant (Fowler 1991, 71-75).

### **3.3.8. Syntax**

Syntactic analysis is concerned with position and sequence of elements rather than their propositional meanings and functions. Syntactic ordering of a clause is significant in that it provides alternative phrasing wherever various alternatives are possible. Alternative phrasing may be associated with different values (Fowler 1991, 54-57). As Fairclough states the linguistic processes of grammatical change and alternative phrasing are also processes of struggle when they involve refusing alternative ways of representations (Fairclough 1995, 27).

### **3.3.9. Lexicalisation**

Lexical choice carries ideological significance since, as Fowler argues, there is always a different way of expressing an idea, therefore, there must be a reason for a particular choice of expression (Fowler 1991, 4). For example, naming and categorisations allows the setting of boundaries and relationships. The use of awkward and derogatory lexicalisation, diminutives or prejudicial categories in addressing the minorities and the disadvantaged groups “will reveal who has the authority in society and who has less power. For these respective positions will determine the positions of agents and patients or the subject and object positions in discourse” (ibid, 94-96). Since understanding also involves readers’ recognising the values embedded in the text. It is through, this ‘a mental model’ that the readers make sense of the text while the writers choose linguistic style to satisfy that model. Establishing understanding between the reader and writer is possible through the vocabulary patterns, such as special key words. In this way the newspapers enlist the readers’ cooperation to the ideas presented (40-41). Alternatively, emotive language is often adopted in the editorials and comment columns to dramatise the events which usually carry strong evaluations. Such discursive strategies enable writers to project special values on the subject of discourse (210).

### **3.3.10. Nominalization**

Nominalization is a form of transformation in which verbs and adjectives function as nouns which structurally alters the syntax. The most important consequence of using nominalisation is that ‘unwanted information’ may be deleted through such transformations. Generally, the agency position is deleted by nominalisations with the serious ideological consequence of not specifying responsibility in order withhold information considered undesirable. Nominalization is frequently used in the areas of power relations to conceal information about the powerful actors. Nominalization of processes and inanimate items in subject position instead of humans imply a

mystificatory process involved in the events thereby concealing the responsibility of the agency (79).

### **3.3.11. Reification /Euphemisation**

Reification as a discursive strategy used to give processes and qualities the status of things. The assumption that things have power over individuals makes the human beings powerless in the face these powers (Tuchman 1978, 213). Euphemisation as a discursive strategy elicits a positive value of what is being described. One example is the naming police violence or murder by a policeman ‘the maintenance of order’ (Ferguson 1998, 51).

### **3.3.12. Accessed Voice**

Access is a reciprocal relationship between people who are privileged in society such as politicians, government members, civil servants, professionals and the media. Because of their positions in society media expects and receives their statements as the source of many happenings; and these individuals thus receive access to media to express their views and opinions more often than any other groups of people or individuals. Frequent use of the accessed voices by the press discourse causes the views and styles and ideological perspectives of the privileged to become more dominant and familiar (Fowler 1991, 21, 79). Moreover, frequent use of access voices leads to undermining the patients’ point of view or preventing opportunities for them to express their opinions. Ordinary people or minorities in our case study rarely have access to the media to express their opinions unless actually involved in the events. Thus, having access to media means having a privilege to decide to what is worth expressing and by whom, and as such it is an ideological choice (Fowler 1991, 79-81).

### **3.4. Editorials and Columns**

Editorials are planned and structured so as to express and convey the opinions of the newspapers about recent news events. Editorials usually discuss a single event or issue each day and implicitly signal that the newspaper attributes particular social or political significance to such an event. Editorials' assignment of relevance to events and issues exhibits underlying structures of dominant attitudes and ideologies. Positions defended by the editorials are not personal opinions but manifestations of more complex, socially shared and dominant ideological frameworks that embody institutional relationships and power. Thus, although the editorials use personal styles in what they represent they are in fact framed by institutional voices. Newspapers aim to achieve an ideological task by presenting an institutional view in the form of a personal thought casually expressed in editorials (Fowler 1991, 47-48). Editorials are not formulated in strictly fixed schemes however conventionally editorials are structured in three steps; defining and evaluating the events, and concluding with recommendations (van Dijk 1993, 273).

Columns share the same formulation, but the style is more casual and personal than the editorials. Column writers also define events, make recommendations and persuade the public but as individual writers who assign themselves the position of self-claimed authority assumed to be shared by the readership. In some cases editorials and columnists views may be in conflict with each other. Columnists are sufficiently free of institutional constraints to able to express their personal views. However, there is a limit to their 'freedom' from the institutional constraints. Individual columnists may disagree with the editorials on certain issues but generally they are unable to radically challenge the newspapers' position on the fundamental issues related to the state, nation, rights and duties of citizens and so on. The following discursive and linguistic strategies are used in editorials and columns which imply ideological significance in discursive use.

### **3.4.1. Argumentation**

Editorials and columns tend to be argumentative and arguments are dramatised by the dialogical use of rhetorical questions with real or constructed opponents. Irony, metaphors, comparisons, understatements or overstatements and contrasts are used to strengthen the argumentation to defend the opinion presented. Editors and columnists claim authority to persuade readers to the correctness of the argument using rhetorical didactic forms which presuppose power difference (van Dijk 1992; Fowler 1996). Editorials also address the political elite for the purpose of giving advice or in order to attack or defend their position (ibid.).

### **3.4.2. Consensual View**

Journalists take for granted a hierarchical system of power and authority in a class society. Views and opinions of authorities are privileged and consulted first, thus allowing them to set the tone of the debate, provide the framework within which to report the issue of the day. These views then presented as shared by all the population and the government officials speaking on behalf of the population (Philo 1995a, 49-52; 1995b, 177). The ideological significance of the using consensual 'we' is to accomplish a linguistically engineered group solidarity which may have economic or political motives depending on the circumstances. The consensual 'we' is also frequently used by the column writers to appeal to people's feelings, reminding them of the national pride especially in times of crisis, to call people to unite behind the government in the name of national unity and against any potential enemy <sup>86</sup> (Fowler 1991, 40-41). The use of consensual 'we' ignores the existence of different points of views and interests and as a discursive strategy promotes consensual view of society. Since in any society there exists no 'consensual we', it is based on a false assumption. In this sense, it is

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<sup>86</sup> This, however, cannot happen without the constructive if unconscious cooperation of the reader bringing his or her knowledge of the discourse model into the reading activity. Editorials use linguistic options which must satisfy mental models of readers who make sense of the text.

more concerned with values and beliefs than actual facts. It is a discursive strategy to marginalise 'them', repress divergences in the name of 'majority' which is in actual fact a minority. For in reality these divergences comprise the 'majority', whereas what the press preaches are the consensual values adopted by an elite group, a small but powerful section of society (Fowler 1991, 50-51, 210; Hartley 1982, 83).

It must be stated that purpose of consensus is not solely confined to the content of particular statements but it goes deeper into abstract sets of values, such as the nature of the economic, political and social arrangements, and about the values of rights and freedom. The role of the press in the legitimation of these consensual values is immense and it is the task of critical analysis to reveal the 'modes of expression' of these values. These modes are essentially based on positive legitimating values of 'us' and negative illegitimate values of 'them', which creates a boundary between the two. Tolerance vs. intolerance, responsibility vs. irresponsibility, honesty vs. corruption and openness vs. secrecy are some of the most relevant dimensions for our purpose (Fowler 1991, 52).

The mass media have a critical role in the 'battle of ideas' over how our society is to be explained and how the power relations within the society are justified. Press use of the consensual view serves to legitimate the elite view of the existing social relations. It either ignores altogether or marginalises the inequalities by representing them as threats to 'our' national unity. In this way alternative views about society are discredited and dominant views are made common sense.

### **3.4.3. Modality**

This is an interpersonal element of functions of language. The interpersonal is the mediation of personal roles and social relationships. Modality can be regarded as comment or attitude explicit or implicit in the linguistic stance taken by the speaker/writer towards themselves and the subject-matter. We can distinguish the following comment types such as truth, obligation, likelihood, certainty, regret, grant

permission, desirability (Fowler 1991, 63, 85; Fairclough 1995, 27-28). Modality has the insistence of a speaker who has assumed a position of authority which includes a claim to know what is inevitably going to happen, and qualified with knowledge that enables passing of judgement (Fowler 1991, 63).

#### **3.4.4. Generic Statements**

These are descriptive propositions supposed to be true of any instance to which they refer. Generic statements claim a total or a definitive knowledge of a particular topic, and as such are authoritarian. Some generic sentences have proverbial overtones which encode what is taken to be common sense wisdom. The common sensical and authoritarian tone of the generic statements' ideological significance is that they close the inquiry for further debates and discussions (Fowler 1991, 39).

#### **3.4.5. Rhetorical questions**

Rhetorical questions are frequently used in the editorials and the columns with the assumption that the reader responds correctly. It is a "linguistically engineered group solidarity which requires constructive or unconscious cooperation of readers to bring his knowledge of discursive model" (Fowler 1991, 39-40). Metaphors, comparisons, parallelism (repeated questions), alliterations are other rhetorical strategies used to emphasise the contrast between 'us' and 'them' which enables positive self presentation and negative other presentation (van Dijk 1993, 278).

#### **3.4.6. Intertextuality**

Intertextuality used in editorials and news reports is an important outcome of the dominance of accessed voices in the media. the reliance of news reports on the documents, figures, statements and assessments of the official and prestigious sources as the only accounts of the events contributing to the reproduction of the attitudes,

jargons and arguments of the official sources thus became propaganda tools of the politicians, governments or powerful institutions. Thus, in deploying intertextual use of accessed information, newspapers reproduce the attitude of the powerful while neglecting the opinions and views of other, less powerful, groups and organisations (Fowler 1991, 23). As Fowler notes, this process takes place automatically, largely determined by institutional arrangements, and the political positions of the newspapers, and partly by the institutionalisation of the journalists, rather than as a consciously planned act or the result of a consciously thought out plan (ibid, 24).

### **3.4.7. Conversation**

Conversation implies co-operation, agreement and symmetry of power and knowledge between the participants. Addressing someone in a conversational mode imply that there is an agreement between the participants on the basic reference points on the topic. Conversation functions in the editorials and the columns as a ‘reality generating’ factor, and is used to construct the illusion that the text is co-produced by writer and reader based on the shared knowledge about the world that taken for granted and about the reality that does not have to be proved (Fowler 1991, 57-61). Thus, the ideological function of conversation is to naturalise the terms in which reality is represented and the categories those terms represent. Such a familiar style enables newspapers to express familiar thoughts on which assumptions on consensus can be built on. As a discursive practice and strategy, it is used by the powerful to “recruit people as audience and manipulate them socially and politically” (Fowler 1991, 48).<sup>87</sup> Moreover, conversational style enables abstract political ideas such as ‘consensus’ and ‘law and order’ to work in an indirect way as categories and relationships in the newspaper discourse.

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<sup>87</sup> Fairclough thinks otherwise. He sees the conversational discourse practice as a real shift in power relations in favour of ordinary people. Because, he argues it represents a degree of cultural democratisation, as it helps to democratise the relationship between the press and the audience by making it more accessible to people raising the status of the language and experience of ordinary life by recasting science in their terms to a degree and rejecting the elitism and mystification which go along with science/politics as authorised specialists talking technical language (Fairclough 1995, 13-14).

I have outlined above the main framework for the analysis of the press discourse on the non-Muslim minorities in the cases of the 1934 Thrace Events, the 1942 Wealth Tax and the 6/7 September 1955 Riots in the following chapters.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **4. A CRITICAL INQUIRY INTO THE PORTRAYAL OF THE NON-MUSLIMS IN THE TURKISH PRESS**

Having defined the main analytical tools and the framework of linguistics and discourse analysis above I will attempt to use these methods in the analysis of three cases, the 1934 Thrace Events, the 1942 Wealth Tax Affair and the 6/7 September 1955 Riots. These events have been considered three of the most important events in the lives of the non-Muslims in Turkey who were victims of each event facing forced expulsion, property confiscation and attacks. After each of these events, non-Muslim communities fled Turkey en masse. The three events took place in the three important decades in the history of the Turkish Republic, and each of these incidents marks a turning point. Therefore taking into account the historical context in our analysis will enable us to make the press treatment of the non-Muslim minorities intelligible.

This framework will enable us to trace the continuities and discontinuities in the journalists' approach of the non-Muslim minority issues over the three decades. Taking into account such a broad historical period we will be able to draw meaningful conclusions from the press treatment of the non-Muslim minorities. We will be able to evaluate contribution of the press in the production and reproduction of the dominant perception of the non-Muslims which will reveal the close encounter between the political authorities and press. Such an approach will help us to reveal the role of the press in circulating categorical and stereotypical representations of the non-Muslims,

drawing boundaries of identities and defining ‘them’ and ‘us’ and thus discursively reproducing the exclusion of the non-Muslims from ‘our’ community thus its role in making the ‘otherness’ of the non-Muslims as common sense knowledge.

#### **4.1. A Critical Analysis of Newspaper Coverage of the 1934 Thrace Events**

The 1934 Thrace Events is the first case I will conduct critical linguistics and discourse analysis of the press coverage based on the news, editorial and column texts by *Zaman*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Son Posta*, *Akşam*, *Haber*, *Vakit* and *Hakimiyeti Milliye*.

Critical approach used here draws predominantly on critical linguistics analysis as discourse analysis, developed by Fowler and other discourse analysts, such as Dijk, Ferguson, Trew and Fairclough as explained in the chapter above. The critical analysis of the newspaper texts are based on the news reports, editorials and columns appearing in the newspapers between the 5th and 15th of July, 1934 covered by *Zaman*, *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Akşam*, *Son Posta*, *Vakit*, *Hakimiyeti Milliye* and *Haber*. Each newspaper’s coverage of Thrace events in news reports, editorials and columns is analysed separately in order to reveal the role of each genre in the ideological representation of the events involving the Jewish minority because each genre employed different linguistic and discursive strategies.

The news coverage set out the framework in which the events were represented and reported, largely determined by the ‘source’ definition and views, by İsmet İnönü’s and Şükrü Kaya’s statements. Various discursive and linguistic strategies were used in the news reports through which Thrace events were represented from the point of view of the official sources while alternative explanations were denied or mitigated.

In the analysis of the news coverage of the Thrace Events I classified the news reports according to their focus on the particular aspects of the events. The initial reports were concerned with the explanation of the Thrace events. These reports were heavily relied

on access voices and official sources and intertextually used these explanations in order to explain the events. The sub-titles, foreign influence, accessed voices and intertextuality and it is a local incident exaggerated by the Jews' panic were the dominant themes of the official explanations which were weaved into the news texts to account for the events. A considerable amount of news reports appeared on the returning Jews to Thrace. These news reports were highly evaluative for they used to 'prove' the official assessment of the events as insignificant and caused by panic.

These news reports drew the framework along the official explanations. They involved transformations through which focus of attention was shifted from the attacks on Jews to Jews who were made accountable for the events. Under the sub-titles of economic rationale for the explanation of the Thrace events and Jews' migration, assimilation of the Jews into Turkish culture, the reversal of charges: focus on Jews' dominance in trade and in search of an agency, the Thrace events were made sense in terms of Jews' identity and their economic 'dominance'. Jews were given agency position, by a reversal of charges, who caused resentment among the locals which led to the events. The readers were called to make sense of the events in this new context.

Under the sub-titles, the victims' account, and consulting the community leaders' views, stereotypical images of the Jews were reproduced. Categorisation of Jews along their communal identities was used in the news reports to make sweeping generalisations about them. These reports involved essentialist definition of non-Muslim identities to emphasise their differences from 'us', to de-legitimise their existence and to question their loyalty for 'our' country and their right to belong to 'our' community. Individual Jews were denied access to express their experiences during the events. This was a strategic move which enabled the newspapers to consult the leading members of the Jewish community in Istanbul to speak on behalf of the Thracian Jews. Finally, under the sub-titles consensual view and final reports news focused on the ramifications of these events for Turkey. The government's report on the Thrace events was presented as

a sign of government's determination to solve the problems, reproducing the consensual view of society.

Editorials functioned to explain the events, to answer questions about why the events happened and offered reasons and recommended action. The significance of editorials is that they are the voices of the newspapers as institutions which address the public, but more than that, they address other elite and the government and are analysed according to the criteria of definitions, explanations and moral dimensions. The editorials' coverage of the Thrace events had serious ideological signification for they involved the redefinition of the events which involved categorising and stereotyping Jews and the relationship between Jews and the local Thrace population.

Finally, the comment columns are analysed according to their function of explaining the issue –the event- and attempting to persuade the readers to accept the argument presented in the column. Column writers appealed to readers as persons with authority endowed with knowledge and wisdom and invited the reader to accept their point of view as the most reasonable one. They share common structural features with editorials but the personal voice dominates the columns.

#### **4.1.1. A Brief Account of the 1934 Thrace Events**

The Thrace events began in May with boycotts of the Jewish businesses which eventually turned into attacks on the Jews' houses and shops and intimidating and threatening the Jews to leave Thrace (Bali 2008; Aktar 2000). According to Bali when the attacks and threats were intensified in Edirne Jews visited the governor to express their complaints. However, the governor of Edirne told them that the government did not approve of the boycotts but he did nothing to stop them (Bali 2008, 137). The Jewish community leaders also petitioned, signed by 100.000 Jews, the Prime Minister on 22 May to express their concern over the anti-Semitic *Milli İnkılap*, (1 May 1934), which led anti-Semitic campaign in Thrace (Bali 2008, 138).

According to eye witnesses, (Bali 2008, 3) rumours about the upcoming events had been going on for weeks before the events took place but many Jews ignored them. Threats and attacks continued in June in Çanakkale, Edirne, Kırklareli, Tekirdağ, Uzunköprü, Çatalca, Lüleburgaz, Babaeski, Çorlu. Jews' shops and houses were looted, windows were broken and Jews were threatened. When the events became intensified 1500 Jews migrated to Istanbul in June (Akın 2006, 99-100). In Çanakkale Jews, 1.500 and in total, faced attacks and abuse, their houses were broken into, goods were confiscated, shops were ruined and the community leaders were threatened to leave Thrace for good, by 25 June a significant number of Jews migrated to Istanbul (Bali 1999, 53). The disturbances in Çanakkale, Keşan, Uzunköprü, Kırklareli, and Edirne were intense between June 28 and July 4 (Bali 1999, 52).<sup>88</sup>

The worst events took place in *Kırklareli* including rape, cutting fingers and using weapons. In fact, after few hours of the events the entire Jewish population of Kırklareli left (Bali 2008, 185-6; Aktar 2000). According to the eye witnesses the events took place on the night of 3 July 1934 when a group began to raid the houses in the Jewish neighbourhood throwing stones at windows and breaking into the houses. Students, local merchants, soldiers –without guns- civil servants and villagers joined them later (Karabatak 1996, 7-8; Aktar 2000, 73). 65 houses were attacked. The next day threats and harassments continued. A Greek national merchant complained that he was threatened to sell his shop which was worth fifteen thousand, for only fifty liras. On 3 July 1934, the police asked the Jews to leave Edirne in 48 hours (Bali 1999, 52).

According to Bali Thrace events were planned and well organised but the organisers wanted it to be seen as if it was a spontaneous act. The events took place at the same

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<sup>88</sup> A well known story told at the time while Atatürk was touring the region with Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and the Foreign Office Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras accompanied Iran Shah Pehlevi on an official visit to Çanakkale between 25 and 26 June (Ayın Tarihi 1934, 2), a Jewish man –nicknamed Deli Salamon- approached Atatürk and complained that they were not wanted in Thrace. Atatürk asked him who did not want them. Salamon said “people”. Then Atatürk said “if people did not want me, I would have to go” (mentioned in Akın 2006, 100; Levi 1992; Levi 1996, 13; Bali 2008; and Aktar 2000, 72). Levi argues that despite Atatürk’s answer he interfered in the events when Gad Franko and Mişon Ventura visited Atatürk, it was then that the attacks were stopped (Levi, 1996, 15).

time of the traditional Kırkpınar Wrestling Championship on 3 July 1934, thus, the organisers of the Thrace events managed to bring groups to Kırklareli without attracting any attention (Bali 2008, 193).

On the day of 3 July 1934 Thrace was crowded by the spectators came to watch the Kırkpınar. After the competitions, as people began to leave, a group of people began to gather around Jewish neighbourhood without being noticed by the locals. These groups waited till night and attacked Jews' houses. In the morning of the July 4th around 400 Jews mounted on the Istanbul train to run away from the attackers. (Bali 2008, 187).

What was suspicious about it was that the regular train was ready waiting for Jews with extra 12 cars added, instead of three cars which the train usually had, which showed that these events were planned and the outcome was expected (Bali 2008, 187).

News about the Thrace events appeared in *Times* in London on 4 July 1934. It was reported that the Settlement Law of 2510 divided the country into three administrative districts to force non-Turks to re-settle for economic, military, political and cultural reasons and as a result Jews were moving in large groups from the Eastern Thrace and Çanakkale. *The Daily Telegraph* and French newspapers also had reports on the Jewish migration (Aktar 2000, 73).

Prime Minister İnönü delivered a speech at the Grand National Assembly on 5 July and denounced Thrace events and anti-Semitism. He argued that anti-Semitism was not Turkish and the Thrace events occurred because of foreign influence. He assured the Jews that every citizen in Turkey had equal rights and their rights were under the protection of law. Press reports appeared on the 5th July in *Akşam* and on the 6th July in the rest of the newspapers.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> According to Bali no reports appeared in the Jewish press either. For example, except the Prime Minister İnönü's speech in French there was no news report in Hamenora, the periodical published by the respectable Jewish organisation Bene Berith Society. *La Boz De Orient* praised the government's declaration and said that the officials knew that not even one Jew betrayed the Turkish republic or worked

#### **4.1.2. Critical Analysis of the News Reports on the Thrace Events**

The news reports on 1934 Thrace events appeared in the newspapers on 6 July 1934 except *Akşam* newspaper which published the Prime Minister's speech at the Grand National Assembly on 5 July 1934 concerning the Thrace events. Reporting on Thrace events continued until 15 July when the government published a report after investigating the events. The newspapers were searched from May 15 to July 30.

##### **4.1.2.1. Drawing the Framework and Defining the Thrace Events in the News Reports**

The first news report on the Thrace events was reported on the 6th July (1934) in *Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Son Posta, Haber, Vakit, Hakimiyeti Milliye, Zaman* with the exception of *Akşam* which reported them on 5th after the acknowledgement of the Prime Minister of the events in a speech to the National Assembly. In his speech, as reported in the newspapers, he said:

I have received information that some Jewish citizens have had to leave their homes in Thrace because of some local attacks. Every individual in Turkey is under the protection of the republican laws. Anti-Semitism is not Turkish; from time to time it enters into our country from without but it leaves as soon as it enters. The last event is this kind of an event but we will not allow such actions to take place in Turkey. I was informed about the incident as soon as I arrived in Ankara and I ordered an instant investigation. The attacks are stopped. Our citizens who migrated to Istanbul are free to return. Those responsible are under arrest and will be punished. Today I have sent the Interior Minister to Thrace. The attackers will be severely punished (*Akşam*, 5 July 1934; 6 July 1934 *Zaman, Cumhuriyet, Hakimiyeti Milliye, Son Posta, Milliyet, Vakit and Haber*).

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as a spy. The cultural problem was to be solved soon through the establishment of Turkish Cultural Unions (Bali 1999, 43).

The Republican elite have claimed that Turkey was one of the rare countries where Jews were welcomed and tolerated and tolerance towards non-Muslims has always been part of the Turkish culture. In this sense the Thrace events were an ‘awkward fact’ that the official ideology had to deal with and so these attacks had to be accounted for ideologically. As Trew argued “when the systems of ideas or ideologies face awkward fact they are either denied, written off or, if they are serious, they have to be interpreted as expected to occur” (Trew 1996, 97-98).

The press played a significant role in dealing with the awkward facts through linguistic and discursive transformations (Trew, 1996: 98) which changed the original story from being an attack against Jews into an insignificant incident occurring as a result of foreign influence. The news reports implied that the foreign influence was effective because of the special conditions in Thrace namely that Jewish dominance in economy and trade. Peoples’ resentment against Jews made it easy for foreign anti-Semitic movements to find reception. Thus the official explanation of the Thrace events was reproduced by the newspapers presenting them as ‘factual’ information.

Anti-Semitism cannot be defined as a movement in Turkey. It is not a common ideology, what is common is law and order.

What is the reason for anti-Semitism? Is it anti-Semitism similar to Germany, and in some parts of Europe? I don’t think it is the case in Turkey, because, all citizens in Turkey have equal rights under law. There cannot be racism and anti-Semitism in Turkey’. Şükrü Kaya Bey’s speech guaranteed that if there was an attack those who committed it would be punished. This proves the goodwill of the government and demonstrates that anti-Semitism will not spread in Turkey. Yesterday, Jewish refugees from Thrace said that they might go back to the Thrace because they had received hopeful news that peace was established there and everyone was going back to their daily life and business (*Milliyet*, 7 July 1934).

The report used the Interior Minister’s definition of the events as not anti-Semitic. The mention of the case of Germany was a discursive strategy inviting the readers to

compare the cases of Turkey and Germany where anti-Semitism was openly defended. The report used highly evaluative language in praising Şükrü Kaya's speech as a sign of the 'good will' of the government which in itself proved that anti-Semitism did not exist in Turkey or in Thrace. The claim that Thrace was safe to return to indicated complete faith and trust in the government's authority, for such a claim was based on the Interior Minister's declaration not on factual information on the ground or based on the newspapers' investigation of the case.

Are Turkey's Jews being insulted?

In the last few days a rumour has been going around: the Jews in Thrace, especially of Edirne and Çanakkale, were apparently being attacked and forced to migrate.

We have heard this chorus before, during the Balkan and World Wars. The enemy of the Turkish motherland have gone so far as to carry negative propaganda against us, which have we had suffered a lot.

Now we are being blamed as if there is a Jewish expulsion. As the Prime Minister İsmet Pasha said to the Anatolian Agency, "in Turkey there is the rule of law and anyone who breaks the law faces punishment, so anyone faced coercion should complain, this is their right".

We like to believe our Musevi citizens, who have been settled in our country for centuries, do not take any notice of these rumours. There is no reason that our Jewish citizens should not go on with their lives.

What we would like our Musevi citizens to do, as with all our other citizens, is to show maximum loyalty to this country they live in. (*Haber*, 5 July 1934.).

This report dismissed the claims that Jews' were being insulted and implied the existence of a foreign conspiracy by referring to the Balkan Wars and World War I. the report used a 'source' definition of the events as 'truth' not as 'points of view' of politicians or 'one point of view' among others, and as such, reproduces the official definition as natural and common sense. The news reporter uses deictic 'we' speaking on behalf of Turks and advises Musevi citizens to show their loyalty indicating a power difference between the addresser and the addressee thus placing the latter is in a position of having to 'prove' their loyalty. Defining 'we' as in a position of having the

power and the authority to demand loyalty from the Jews necessarily delegates the addressee into a subordinate position. The further deictic use of 'our country' delegates the Jews to a guest position.

#### **4.1.2.2. Foreign Influence**

The news reports took up the Prime Minister's assertion that anti-Semitism was not Turkish and explained the occurrence of the Thrace events as a result of the influence of the foreign anti-Semitic movements. The government's emphasis on the 'foreign influence' was a strategic move to disclaim responsibility for the events and to prevent implicating the Thrace events with socio-political and economic circumstances. The outside 'threat' a well known disclaimer helped the government to disown any responsibility in the prevention of the Thrace events (van Dijk 1993).

However, in order for the foreign movement to be influential it needed to be accepted by some part of the population or certain socio-economic circumstances should be suitable for such influences to take hold. The news reports introduced the 'Jews' dominance in trade' and the 'local resentment' as a 'natural' outcome to explain why anti-Semitism, although temporary, found reception in Thrace. This framework enabled the news reports to delete the actors, the attackers, involved in the attacks from the news reports and change the framework of the events being discussed. The focus became the unequal trade relations and their consequences. This new causal explanation required new actors, the Jews, to be focused on.

The press reports did not question or present an alternative view to the Prime Minister's linking the Thrace event to outside influences. The argument of foreign influence became the main topic of the news reports which served as a background to the main agency involved in the attacks against the Jews. 'Over-emphasis' on the influence of the foreign country was a discursive strategy used to transfer responsibility to an outside 'abstract' enemy in order to prevent asking questions about racist and discriminatory

policies and practices against non-Muslim minorities in the region. This, in a sense depoliticised the Thrace events. *Akşam* reported what Şükrü Kaya and İbrahim Tali said before their departure to Thrace:

What is the nature of the Thrace Incident?

We received information that the Jews have migrated from Edirne in groups. We will investigate the real nature of the incidents. Anti-Semitism cannot take root in Turkey, even though it is sometimes from outside. All the citizens in Turkey are under the protection of Turkish law without any discrimination. The international and domestic politics of foreign countries cannot influence the politics of our country (*Akşam*, 7 July 1934).

The Thrace events introduced the ‘migration of Jews’ as a discursive strategy, enabling the topicalising of the issue of migration to background the causes of migration. The outside influence as a favourite theme enabled the Minister and the press to background the agency involved in the attacks and to deny government or official responsibility or neglect in the occurrences of the events. It diverted attention from the domestic issues that played a role in the events, for any link to social and economic factors in the events would necessarily have involved the role of the political authority in these arrangements with serious ideological implications that might have revealed discrimination against non-Muslims.

*Cumhuriyet* asked “Why the Jews from Thrace are coming?” and quoted Şükrü Kaya saying:

It seems that Jews are coming because of some negative propaganda, but after my investigation I will take necessary measures... All the natives and foreigners in Turkey are under the protection of law... Anti-Semitic movements mostly seen in foreign lands sometimes enter our country, but we always try to protect our citizens from such ideas... Ideas and problems of foreign countries cannot and will not be influential in our country. Our domestic politics go on according to our own interests...Anti-Semitic publications and provocation will be dealt with in the courts and by the government...

I would like to remind those who use such trivial incidents to suit their interests that if they are citizens they are doing no good to their country, if they are foreigners they are not friends of this country... (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 July 1934, Appendix 1).

The Interior Minister repeated the same assertion that the Prime Minister made about the causes of the Thrace events, that is the negative propaganda carried out by outside forces and foreign ideas were to blame. The use of nominalizations and passives shifted the attention from ‘who did the attacks’ to processes, ‘the outside forces and ideas’ as being responsible in the events. The outside influence and provocation factors were simply asserted by the government officials and reproduced by the press as factual information without giving any evidential proof for the claim. The outside influence was one the favourite themes of the ruling elite, as a ‘threat’ coming from outside forces might be readily accepted by the population without questioning its truth. In the final part of the speech the Interior Minister warned those –the Jews- if they make a big issue out of such ‘trivial incidents’ their loyalty would be suspected. Citizens were expected to fully trust the government, the official explanation of what had happened and not to question it. Any complaining would be associated with betrayal and therefore the citizens were expected to behave responsibly towards the government.

#### **4.1.2.3. Accessed Voices and Intertextuality**

Newspapers depend for news on official sources, especially on domestic affairs, international relations and crime news. News from official sources comes to newspapers already determined by the values and world views of those sources and they are printed with only small changes. The result is the dominance of the ideological perspectives of prominent people such as government members, judges, police, politicians and the members of the parliament with the use of official reports, inquiries, court proceedings, speeches and declarations of government members as the main sources (İnal 1996). The newspapers’ deployment of the language of these institutions leads to the reproduction of the point of view of these elite thus undermining or ignoring the point of view of the affected participants (Fowler 1991, 23).

In the first news reports the press frequently used accessed voices intertextually to define the events and set the tone, as it were, on the events to be discussed. The Prime Minister's and later the Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya's speeches and quotes were the main sources of news reports. Their claims and assertions about the causes of the events were presented as uncontested and unchallenged 'facts' about what had happened. The Prime Minister emphasised the role of a foreign influence in the occurrence of the Thrace events as the most important factor and it became the main topic in the news reports defining the events. The foreign influence was related to the issues of national unity and national interest which will be discussed in the national interest section below.

The use of accessed voices in the news coverage of non-Muslim minorities was excessive. While privileged access was given to political authorities in the news coverage, the unprivileged victims' accounts were mitigated, undermined, discredited or totally ignored by the newspapers. *Cumhuriyet* first asked "why are the Jews from Thrace coming?" and answered "Şükrü Kaya Bey said that the Jews are coming to Istanbul because of some propaganda" (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 July 1934). *Akşam* quoted İsmet Pasha saying "I have received the information that some Jewish citizens had to leave their homes in the Thrace because of some local attacks" (*Akşam*, 5 July 1934). Similarly, *Zaman* reported he prime minister as saying "I have been informed that about a hundred Jews came to Istanbul. The Jews came because of some local disturbances" (*Zaman*, 6 July, 1934). *Hakimiyeti Milliye* reported that Şükrü Kaya and the Thrace General Investigator, İbrahm Tali, were appointed by the Prime Minister to go and investigate the reasons why Jewish people were leaving Thrace in groups, and before they departed to Thrace, Şükrü Kaya said "According to our information the Jews are coming to Istanbul because of negative propaganda" (*Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 7 July, 1934, see Appendix 4). *Son Posta* announced that the problem would be solved shortly because Şükrü Kaya and İbrahim Tali Bey had gone to Thrace. Şükrü Kaya, before he departed to Thrace, said: 'The Jews claimed that they were intimidated and attacked,

however, it is understood that the Jews of the Thrace overreacted to an incident caused by negative propaganda' (*Son Posta*, 7 July 1934,).

The lexical choice of defining what happened in Thrace as 'events' ('olay') not as attacks or looting, ('saldırı' or 'yağma') is discursively significant, for if it was called an attack, the Jews would be in the position of victims. However, in an 'event' it is not obvious who is involved or who the victim and the guilty are. The news reports, editorials and comments avoided the term 'attack' throughout the eleven days of the newspaper coverage of the Thrace events. After the first, day newspapers covering the news reports presented the Thrace events under the headline "Jewish Problem" or "Jewish Migration" ("Yahudi Meselesi", "Yahudi Muhacereti").

#### **4.1.2.4. Undermining the Thrace Events: It is a Local Incident Exaggerated by the Jews' Panic:**

The Thrace events were described as local events to reduce their severity and to deny the fact that they were well organised and occurred throughout Thrace. Facts and figures were used to undermine the seriousness of the events, for example, by 'proving' that the number staying was greater than the number migrating.

On the Jewish problem

Jews who came from Thrace

Those committed a crime were sent to court

Concerning about the Jews who came from Thrace, the Prime Minister has ordered an inquiry and is waiting for the result of this inquiry to get the full information about what had happened. Our Interior Ministry received the news about the Jews who came to Istanbul but have not got any detailed information about what had happened in reality. Our ministry's report will reveal the nature of the incident after the investigation carried out by the officials in the area. However, there is a belief that this incident is local and cannot be linked to the incidents in Çanakkale and Edirne. As the president said

whatever action is carried out in breach of the law, the responsible will be brought to trial (*Milliyet*, 6 July 1934).

The headlines “On the Jewish problem” and “Jews who came from Thrace” have strong negative connotations about the Jews, especially in the mid-1930s, when the newspapers were full of news about Germany and debates about the ‘Jewish Problem’. The lexical choice of the ‘Jewish problem’ associates Jews with negative actions and problems.

The headline omits the agency and the possible causes of the incidents, by emphasising “Jews who came from Thrace” thus placing the initiative on the Jews for the action of migration, as actors decided to migrate, to Istanbul. However, what is omitted or not said in the sentence is significant because it separates the cause from the result and only emphasises the result. What is omitted is the fact that Jews migrated after being attacked and threatened by the locals in Thrace. The omission carries ideological significance in hiding the agency and bringing the victims into the position of agent, thus making them responsible for the action, that is it was the Jews who came from Thrace, not that they were forced to migrate because of the actions of the locals.

Although the reporter has mentioned that “we don’t really know what happened” he did not hesitate to warn the readers not to link the Çanakkale and Edirne incidents. To claim that these two events cannot be linked requires detailed information about these two cities. The news report goes further than this and states that “there is a belief that it is a local incident”. The reader is not told whose belief this is. The passive voice suggests that government officials or the newspaper believe that it is a local event while the PM’s statement is used to assure the readers that whoever disobeys the law will be punished. Emphasising the law and order aspect of the events reduced it to a petty crime and dislocated the events from their political and ideological context. By using PM’s statement intertextually, the report depended on the official text ideologically and reproduced the official points of view of the Thrace events.

The locality of the Thrace events was initially stated by the Prime Minister on the 5 of July “I have been informed that about a hundred Jews came to Istanbul because of some local disturbances” (*Zaman*, 6 July 1934) and was repeated by other government members, especially Şükrü Kaya and Kazım Karabekir. Newspapers emphasised the locality of Thrace events throughout the fifteen days of coverage of the Thrace events. As the *Milliyet* headline shows “anti-Semitism: a few individuals’ acts which are not related to an organisation cannot be generalised as anti-Semitism. What is common and general is: law and discipline” (*Milliyet*, 7 July 1934). The claim was strengthened by the Jewish citizens’ assertion that “all *Musevi* citizens of our city believe that anti-Semitism cannot exist in Turkey” however, this assertion was made by the Jews in Istanbul on behalf of the Thrace Jews not by the Thrace Jews themselves (*Milliyet*, 8 July 1934).

*Akşam* reported:

1300 Jewish families in Edirne, only a small group, 100-150 families, came to Istanbul...the government’s prevention was met with appreciation by the Jewish community. And the migration from Edirne has stopped... Except in some parts of Thrace there has never been any such anti-Semitic incident occurring in Turkey, which shows that the incidents are local (*Akşam*, 8 July 1934).

This news report tries to prove the ‘insignificance’ of the migration with figures. Using numbers and showing the wide gap between those who remained in Edirne and those who migrated seems to be enough proof for the ‘unseriousness’ of the events. There is also a false claim that except in Edirne, Lüleburgaz and Kırklareli, no such events took place in Thrace. It is a discursive strategy to conceal the fact that it was a Thrace wide event, involving attacks against the Jews.

It is understood that the Thrace Jews (Yahudiler) have shown an overreaction to propaganda by some individuals who are not part of an organised group. In fact the migration is not widespread.

Because from Lüleburgaz nine out of 50 families, from Edirne 200 families out of 1000, from Uzunköprü 95 and from Kırklareli 100 families came to Istanbul. Yesterday 15 families came. They said that they were insulted. However, those who did not come to Istanbul telegraphed the Jews who came to Istanbul and called them back saying that as a result of the government's taking control of the situation the problems was solved (*Son Posta*, 7 July 1934).

In order to prove that only a small number of Jews migrated, and to make the argument credible, a reporter introduced the numbers of Jews who migrated and who stayed, the latter being the higher, which was supposed to prove that the events were not an organised activity. The press presented the first 'facts' about the events as defined by the official point of view and contributed to its reproduction by presenting it as an impartial account of the events. News reports did not focus on the actual events but through various discursive strategies diverted attention from the events, reproducing the official definition and explanations of the events daily.

#### **4.1.2.5. Return**

News reports about the returning Jews strengthened the claim that Jews came here because of their panic not because of the serious threat they faced. The news reports indicated that after İsmet Pasha's speech, Jews began to return this is a discursive strategy presupposing government authority and power as absolute.

Our Musevi citizens who came from Thrace realise that they overreacted to the events and were oversensitive about what had happened and slowly began to calm down and to return to their towns... (*Haber*, 8 July 1934).

After the government's explanation, 15 families returned and there are others ready to return (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 July 1934).

Thrace Jews are returning: All the Jews in our city have absolute belief that anti-Semitism cannot happen in Turkey.

The Jews are content: According to our information, the Jews began to return to Thrace after the involvement of the government in the incidents. Some Jews claimed that they were seriously threatened and came to Istanbul. There are 400 Jews in Istanbul (*Milliyet*, 8 July 1934).

News reports presented the ‘return’ news as proof that anti-Semitism could not happen in Turkey. The hyperbolic use of “all the Jews in our city” gave the impression that there was a widespread agreement that anti-Semitism could not happen in Turkey. The use of “claim of some Jews” in the last sentence is a lexical choice to imply doubt about the Jews claim in contrast to the first sentence “all the Jews in our city”. The government’s control of the situation is emphasised to imply peoples’ trust in the government

12 families returned, other Jews said that they wished to wait for the result of the investigation. It is understood that the Jews are overreacted to these trivial local incidents and came here but will return one by one. Yesterday, they received news from the Jews in Kırklareli telling them that they could return because the government had taken control of the situation (*Milliyet*, 9 July 1934).

The report uses a definite number, 12 families, to highlight and be more specific about the information that families began returning after the government’s involvement, while only referring vaguely to those who wished to wait until the investigation was completed. This is a discursive strategy to exaggerate the information which serves ‘our’ purpose while preferring to be vague about the un-preferred information. In fact, this information was given but discounted by the next sentence because it claimed that Jews would return one by one.

Jews regret migrating

They are returning

The government’s attempts to investigate the incidents in Thrace... the Jews are secure enough to return. The Jews began to regret that they migrated and began to return. Yesterday five families returned. Some families are waiting for Friday’s low fares train

to return. About 1800 Jewish migrants came to Istanbul and over 200 have returned. Just over 1600 migrants remain in Istanbul (*Zaman*, 11 July 1934).

And,

So far 1500 Jews have come to Istanbul and 15 families have now returned. Last night, 7 families -30 people- who were from Kırklareli and Edirne returned. The Jews who remained in Thrace wrote to the Jews who migrated to Istanbul to return to their homes and go on with their business and work. That is why almost all those who migrated Jews are making necessary preparations to return (*Zaman*, 13 July 1934).

A strong emphasis that Jews regret migrating to Istanbul is re-emphasised to imply that this is an ongoing process and Jews will go back, although some are waiting for the low fares on Friday. By focusing on the Jews willing to return after they have been assured by their relatives that the government has taken control of the situation is a discursive strategy to highlight the preferred information and over complete it and try to reduce the significance of the dispreferred information. In both the reports above the fact that the returned families are far less than the ones that stayed in Istanbul is a dispreferred information which was mentioned but reduced in significance by the explanation that the Jews in Thrace assured the Jews who migrated to Istanbul about the safety of Thrace. This is taken to mean that Jews will return soon.

#### **4.1.2.6. The Economic Rationale for the Explanation of the Thrace Events and Jews' Migration**

Economic reasons for migration became the focus of news reports. As part of the discursive strategy, economic explanations minimised the attacks as the reason for migration and focused on the Jews' dominance in the economy. It was an ideological choice to link the Thrace events to economic conflict between the two communities. Nominalization migration served to delete the agency, those responsible for the attacks, and focused on the Jews who migrated for economic reasons not because of the attacks. This involved bringing the characteristics of Jews to the foreground in order to imply that the economic motive was influential in the Jews' migration.

It is understood that many Musevis came here to find jobs

The Jews who came to our city by making a few small incidents as an excuse are now gradually returning.

The first reason for their migration seems to be related to economic conditions. Many Jews migrated to find jobs here. Others who came because of trivial incidents are ready to return. Many Jews migrated for economic reasons, because in Thrace, some of the economic activities, such as farming, milk processing and cheese making once only performed by Jews, have been taken over by Turks, which has made the Jews unemployed. They said that there was no other work for them to do in Thrace therefore they came to Istanbul to find work. Most of the migrants have already found work and that is why they will not return to Thrace. They came to Istanbul when the foreign artisans left Turkey and occupied their posts. Now many Jews are working as street peddlers, manufacturers and as shopkeepers (*Zaman*, 12 July 1934).

This news report begins with the evaluation of the Thrace events as the “Jews used a few trivial incidents as excuses for migration” which undermines the Jews’ claims and their traumatic experiences. This is a clear indication of the power difference and the resulting discrimination against Jews by reducing the Thrace wide attacks into a few trivial incidents. The sentence also implies that Jews as ‘natural traders’ lost their hold in Thrace and came to Istanbul, also contributing to the stereotypical representation of Jews who, as a community, share similar characteristics and the same interests. The claim that the Jews ‘actually came here to find new jobs’ is proved in the statement that “many Jews found jobs especially as artisans and shopkeepers vacated by the foreign artisans” and their ‘excuses’ would be revealed as false. In the sentence, although not explicitly stated, it is implied that as ‘natural traders’ Jews had managed to engage in various trading occupations such as shop keepers and street sellers in the course of a week!

In Uzunköprü the Jews began to boycott the Turks since the 20th of June. The Turks then decided to form cooperatives and organised themselves. Jews saw that they could not get their way, there was no bread to win here and decided to migrate. Today there

are no Jews left in Uzunköprü except a woman who newly gave birth. None of the migrated Jews returned. In Kırklareli only one or two small incidents happened. The Interior Minister took the necessary measures and took control of the situation. The governor was withdrawn. No Jew remains in Çanakkale and Gelibolu. Edirne Jews, after Şükrü Kaya Bey's arrival, decided that they had no bread to earn here and one by one sold their properties and migrated to Bulgaria and Istanbul. Edirne Jews are about 6000 and over 1000 are gone (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 July 1934).

According to this report the economic boycott by the Jews and the Turks' forming of cooperatives had been an ongoing conflict between the two communities in Uzunköprü. The news report only states that it had been going on since 20th June without detailing the underlying economic and social conditions that led to such conflicts. No explanations were provided as to whether the local authorities had attempted to reconcile the problem between the two sides. The Kırklareli incidents were described as one or two small incidents, despite the fact that the most serious incidents took place in Kırklareli as explained above in the historical background. The statement that the removal of the governor of Kırklareli from his office and the explanation that there was no serious incident in Kırklareli contradicts each other but no explanation was provided on the issue.

It was only rarely that the news reports mentioned the immigration of Jews to foreign countries, as in this case which stated that the Jews migrated to Bulgaria and Istanbul because they, decided by their free will with "their own decision", to migrate to find work.

The recent news from Edirne shows that rumours about a mass migration are exaggerated. Not because of any attack or threat but because of economic reasons, some of the Jews left Edirne and came to Istanbul. The latest economic crisis destroyed the hopes of the Jews who believed that by staying there they would not make the savings they were hoping to. The remaining Jews are going about their business as usual (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 July 1934).

In this news report, attacks and threats against Jews as the reasons for migration was reduced to rumours and economic reasons were presented as more adequate reasons for migration. Explaining migration in purely economic terms denies the anti-Semitic nature of the events and, as such, reproduces the stereotypical image of the Jews as being solely economically driven which was often repeated in the right wing publications dominant in the 1930s.

#### **4.1.2.7. Assimilation of Jews into Turkish Culture**

In some news reports it was implied that there is a link between the Thrace events and Jews' who were not being properly assimilated into Turkish culture or Turkified. This claim was introduced through the statements of the Jewish community leaders as part of the explanation for the Jews' migration and the problems the Thrace Jews faced.

What is the nature of the Thrace Events?

Muiz Kohen "From now on the Jews should truly become Turks"

What does Moiz Kohen Bey say?

On the migration of the Jews Tekin Alp (Moiz Kohen) Bey said: I was very concerned about the migration of the Jews from Thrace. As the Prime Minister says anti-Semitism is not Turkish. This is a Christian fanaticism. When four hundred years ago our Jewish brothers expelled from Spain the only door open to them was in Turkey. Lately some Hitler lovers emerged and tried to bring this foreign current into Turkey but people regretted it. But there are opportunistic men everywhere. From now on there is only one objective for the Turkish Jews which is to get rid of the traditions left over from the Ottomans and truly become Turks. It is difficult to distinguish a Jew from an Italian in Italy or English person in England, in the very near future it will be impossible to distinguish a Jew from a Turk in Turkey. From now on the ideal of the Jews is to raise Hikonsfiltler, Yetaşnolar, Ayaştayalar, and Bergsonlar in their countries (*Akşam*, 7 July 1934).

Muiz Kohen also described the Thrace events as the migration of Jews, not attacks against Jews. The rhetorical question asked in the headline about the 'real' nature of the

Thrace events is answered by Muiz Kohen as “the Jews should truly become Turks”. The ideological implication of this local coherence is that if Jews are not Turkified then it is ‘understandable’ that they may be the target of attacks for the reason that they have not properly adapted to Turkish culture and continue living like Jews, not as Turks. This explanation for the causes of the Thrace events is a discursive shift in responsibility from the agent to a process through the use of nominalization. In this way, the attackers were not mentioned and the focus of the news became the victims, not the attackers.

The historical origin of anti-Semitism, the Jews’ expulsion from Spain by the Christians and their acceptance by the Ottomans, was cited in order to prove that anti-Semitism could not exist in Turkey, acknowledging the official definition of the Thrace events from a credible source. The sentence “from now on the objective of the Jews...” implies a Jewish responsibility for the incidents. It is not explicitly expressed but these lexical choices in the sentence imply the dominant views about the Jews that they had not become part of the Turkish community and, as such, they understandably caused resentment among the local population. In this case what they should do now is ‘truly become Turks’ not in appearance but ‘truly’. This last sentence appeals to the mental models and the underlying beliefs that existed in society about the Jews who had been accused of resisting assimilation into Turkish culture and insisting on speaking a foreign language –French and ancient Spanish- instead of Turkish.

This information is not stated, but “from now on Jews should truly become Turks” required background information concerning the accusations that the minorities only in appearance assimilated into Turkish culture but it was necessary that they should now ‘truly’ become Turks. The reporter clearly appeals to the readers’ knowledge and their perception about the Jews to complete the meaning of the sentence.

The word ‘truly’ implies that the Jews in order to avoid prosecution acted as if they had adopted the Turkish culture but in reality they deceived us. This theme is one of the common themes in nationalist discourse about Jews that they were the great pretenders

infiltrating us, pretending to be like one of us, yet they were the most dangerous because they could not be identified. This argument was defended by Atilhan in Milli İnkılap which was popular in the 1930s.

Jews will be Turkified

The head of the Culture Union said this will become reality

We talked to Tekin Alp Bey, the head of the Cultural Union; on the migration of the Jews he said “I have heard this unpleasant event from all the Turkish citizens. This incident, however, once again showed the high characteristic of Turkishness and a direction for the future for the Musevis. As our prime minister declared to the world, ‘anti-Semitism’ is not a Turkish characteristic. It is a Christian belief, because the Jews crucified Jesus and since then Jewish means ‘the God killer’ in the eyes of the Christians. The church encouraged this hatred against the Jews and caused many atrocities throughout the centuries. This hatred has been ingrained in the consciousness of almost all Christians for centuries.

Although humanitarian and civilised values prevent such incidents, nevertheless they occasionally surface under the guise of economic reasons. But the source is the same: the Christian belief. It is for this reason there has been any anti-Semitic incidents in Turkey. In fact, four hundred years ago when our forefathers were prosecuted in Spain the only open door was Turkey.

One wonders, then, what would be the cause of these incidents. Lately, some Hitler lovers emerged in Turkey. They have tried to bring this alien idea into Turkey. They published their ideas which were met with contempt by the majority of Turks, but there are selfish men everywhere. As will be revealed by the government investigation, they took advantage of some opportunities and caused these attacks.

As everyone knows, the Turks showed their disapproval of these incidents. There has been no one I know who does not show his hatred for what has happened. This shows that Turkish nationalism is not discriminative but tolerant. Both the general sentiment and the declaration of the prime minister show the place of the Jews in this country. From now on there is only one objective for the Turkish Musevis in this country; to get rid of the Ottoman tradition and become Turkified. Since in England or in Italy it is not possible to distinguish a Jew from an Italian and an English person in public life, very soon in Turkey it will be difficult to distinguish a Jew from a native, real Turk. From

now on, the ideal of the Jews will be to raise Bikonsfilt's, Yatsano's, Einstein's and Bergson's in this country.

This is the aim of the Cultural Union, spread around the country. With the help of the government and the CHP we will reach this aim soon (*Vakit*, 7 July 1934, Appendix 2).

Muiz Kohen stated that these incidents showed a future direction for Jews and he mentioned the direction for Jews to be Turkified or assimilated into Turkish culture. Such an assessment implies that Jews' being the target of attacks was related to the issue of adaptation to Turkish culture.

This is Muiz Kohen's more detailed statement about the Thrace events. This *Vakit* report highlighted the fact that anti-Semitism is a Christian tradition which was confirmed by one of the leading members of the Jewish community. His praise of Turkish hospitality and absolute denial of any current in Turkey related to anti-Semitism contributes to the official point of view, once again confirmed by Jews themselves. Although these historical 'evidences' are irrelevant in relation to the Thrace events, as discursive a strategy they are used to remind of 'our' positive qualities and 'others' negative qualities. The reader is then expected to compare the vast difference between the exile of the Jews in thousands from Spain and the act of "a few cunning people formed around an anti-Semitic magazine" in Thrace.

In order to diagnose an illness one has to know the causes. To do this we have to work hand in hand. We agree with Mr Mişon Ventura and Mr Tekin Alp's declarations. The Turkish Musevis should come close to Turkishness and be Turkified (*Haber*, 8 July 1934).

The *Haber* report used the analogy of the illness to define the case of Jews for not adapting to Turkish culture and prescribed Turkification as its treatment. The implication of such an analogy is that Jews have caused the locals' resentment against them because of their failure to adapt to Turkish culture, this makes the resentment and

the subsequent attacks justified, but the cure, the ‘Turkification’ of Jews, will end these sorts of events.

#### **4.1.2.8. Reversal of Charges: Focus on Jews’ Dominance in Trade and Business**

The attacks were increasingly referred to in vague terms almost no news report mentioned individuals’ and families’ experiences. The Jews dominance in trade and business began to be mentioned frequently as a cause for the locals’ resentment of Jews. However, these resentments were presented as if personal grievances and generalisations were avoided in order to deny the anti-Semitic nature of the events. Instead the news reports focused attention on the panic of few Jews who caused other Jews to migrate. Focus on Jews led to a reversal of charges, where Jews were blamed for causing resentment among locals and creating a fuss over trivial incidents. Through a discursive transformation, the Jews’ panic was made responsible for their migration, not the attacks against them. This is a significant shift in the causal explanation of the events in which the topic became the Jews migration, not the attacks, and the agents of the events the victims, not the attackers.

*Cumhuriyet* reported:

Despite the telegraphs they received from their relatives and neighbours assuring them that there was no danger for them to return the Jews insisted on waiting for the result of Şükrü Kaya Bey’s investigation. We find this difficult to understand and are puzzled by it, because all that happened in Thrace was two broken windows and a few trivial threats which, after the government’s interference, stopped, no problems were left...it was not right to migrate because of a business affair between a few people in the first place...the best thing they could do after they telegraphed the prime minister was to wait for the response. If they waited in silence and did not make a noise there would not be a case of anti-Semitism. In fact, there is no anti-Semitism in Turkey. Therefore, there is no reason why the Jewish citizens should not return (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 July 1934).

The Jews insistence on waiting for the result of Şükrü Kaya Bey's investigation was questioned by the news report with no hesitation in expressing a personal opinion, that the reporter was puzzled with the Jews decision to wait for the result of the investigation, because the word of the Interior Minister, that there was no threat in Thrace for the Jews to return should have been enough proof for them to wait silently for the response. The report re-defines the Thrace events involving "two broken windows" and "a few trivial threats", the lexical choice of "two broken windows" to describe the region-wide attacks is to undermine the attacks and express doubts about their seriousness. Reducing the Thrace events into a simple business affair between a few people is a discursive strategy to delegitimise the Jews claims about the attacks as threats to their lives which led to their migration to Istanbul and elsewhere. Defining events in terms of a business problem devalued the Jews claims and discredited those Jews as individuals who could judge what a threat was and what was not.

The news report draws the boundaries for acceptable and unacceptable responses from the Jews right at the beginning. The right to tell the victims how to behave when attacked and threatened signals a power difference between the addresser and the addressee. The reporter's accusation of the Jews for 'making noise' and 'creating chaos' was an enactment of symbolic violence over the Jews through the use of abusive language and diminutives.

#### We Wonder

The migration of the Thrace Jews to Istanbul caused some fear in business circles. The Jews who came from Edirne told their relatives in Istanbul that they were intimidated and they had to come to Istanbul. They asked if there was any danger around here. They fear that anti-Semitism has begun in Turkey because they do not know what really happened in Edirne and the Thrace (*Zaman*, 7 July 1934).

The Jews' own account of the incidents were discredited by the false assertion that "they (Istanbul) Jews don't really know what happened there" and panicked unnecessarily. The victims' accounts were undermined and their testimonies were

discredited. The reporter resented the fact that the Jews caused anxiety among the Istanbul Jews, influencing business.

The next report in *Zaman* was also concerned with the effect of the migration on Istanbul Jews:

The Jews might have faced intimidation because of their attitudes towards the natives of Thrace in their business dealings. This is an ordinary petty crime. The government will take the control of the situation shortly. What we wonder about is why these incidents have affected the Istanbul Jewish community and why they panicked from such a trivial incident and the migration of a few. As the prime minister said, there is not and cannot be anti-Semitism in Turkey. We advise the Jews of Istanbul not to panic, because there is nothing to panic about (*Zaman*, 8 July 1934).

In this news reports a new cause was introduced to explain the Thrace events. The news report began with an emotional address speaking on behalf of everybody and using the deixis 'we' to state that it was a shocking development that the migration of Jews caused panic in Istanbul because this was not related to being Jewish and it was not an anti-Semitic movement.

The Istanbul Jews were told that their panic was unnecessary and groundless because of the reason that "Jews faced intimidation because of their attitude towards the natives of Thrace in their business dealings". The ideological significance of the use of passive was to bring Jews and Jewish business dealings into the focus of attention. The passive was used to background the agency which intimidated the Jews. The agency, the attackers, were made less significant by the reversal of charges in which the Jews became the agent for another action; the Jews' attitude towards the natives. The Jews were accused of their attitude towards locals which established causality between the attitude and intimidation.

Their position of being victims of the events transformed into actors controlling the business activities and attracting resentment. This discursive strategy of a reversal of charges had serious ideological implications for non-Muslims. It reproduced the prejudicial and stereotypical view about Jews that they dominated the trade or business wherever they settled. Their dominance in trade was 'necessarily' detrimental to the locals' interests, hence the resentment by locals as a 'natural' reaction to the non-Muslims. This reasoning justified the Thrace attacks as an outcome of the locals' resentment and reaction.

The news report, on the one hand categorises the all 'Thrace Jews' and made the whole community responsible for creating resentment among the native people, trying to explain the Thrace events in terms of a petty crime over business dealings was a contradiction in terms, to say the least. This was a discursive strategy used to deny the nature of the Thrace events as anti-Semitic, by trying to prove that there is a logical explanation for this 'petty crime' that the Jews caused the problem so it could not be anti-Semitism. Moreover, relating the Jews with trading problems was another discursive strategy to appeal to the readers' mental models about the Jews who, in the popular consciousness, dominated trade and business and become rich wherever they settled.

The strict separation of locals/Jews was used to emphasise the polarisation between the two groups of people. One was local or native who belonged to this land but the other, Jew, did not. Naturally, those who were the real owners had the right to show their reaction. This was a strategic move to shift the argument onto a different level which requires a suitable causal explanation in which the Jews became the responsible party in the Thrace events because of their dominance in trade, causing resentment among the local population.

#### **4.1.2.9. In search of an Agency: Vagabonds, Some Local Youth, a Few Senseless People**

Only on few occasions the agency, who committed the attacks, looted the houses and threatened Jews, was identified as attackers in the news reports. The agency position went through a number of changes with the first news reports focusing on the influence of outside forces in the events and thus shifting the focus of attention from the actual individuals who committed the attacks to outside forces. The ideological significance of giving the agency position to outside forces is that these forces need not be specified and detailed, only vague references would do the job just as well since outside and inside enemies were part of the popular political discourse in Turkey so that the reader would readily accept these propositions. Thus, transferring the agency position to outside forces is a discursive strategy which helped the newspapers to delete the agency, the attackers.

In some news reports, ‘youth’ who acted unconsciously and irresponsibly were introduced as being responsible in the attacks.

There is no anti-Jewish movement among the people of Uzunköprü; and the incident is the work of a few senseless persons (*Akşam*, 9 July 1934)

And,

According to our information, a group of youth warned people not to shop in the Jewish families. The Jews panicked and migrated...Those who are involved in the anti-Jewish incidents do not belong to any organisation and it is certain that they acted individually. In fact, there is no widespread incident in Thrace except in these two cities (*Akşam*, 7 July 1934).

The ideological significance of these lexical choices needs to be stated clearly. By making the ‘overexcited youth’ responsible for the attacks is to make the act understandable since youth may easily be provoked. The name ‘youth’ also carries naivety and innocence and usually mature adults forgive youth. Assigning reasonability

to youth also justifies their behaviour because youth usually acts from a quick temper and spontaneously and not in a pre-mediated way. The implication of this lexical choice to provide a coherent explanation for the motives of agents is that it reduced an organised and pre-mediated action into an instant, a sudden and spontaneous action of youth.

‘Youth’ implies innocence, unconsciousness, ill-considered and un-planned behaviour. This is also a well known disclaimer used to de-emphasise the ‘bad behaviour’ of the responsible agents and thus avoid further specification about the attackers. Thus the attacks were half excused as they were committed by ‘a few youth’. Words like ‘they’ and ‘youth’ are used to avoid any concrete link with the local identifiable individuals because using pronouns turns the agents into abstract individuals without any specific characteristics, hence identification impossible.

Before the investigation of the Thrace events began, the press did not hesitate to pass a final judgement on the events, it was a petty crime committed by few vagabonds.

It is not right to associate a couple of improper behaviours with systematic anti-Semitism. They are the unlawful behaviour of a few people. They are not systematic actions (*Vakit*, 8 July 1934).

The ideological significance of the lexical choice of a few vagabonds as the agency carrying out the attacks was that it prevented linking the events to an organisation and made it an ‘incident’ which happened without planning. This lifted the event from the political context and associated it with petty crimes committed by ‘vagabonds’.

For there is no need to make a thorough logical explanation for a criminal act of vagabonds, they might be acting out of personal grievances or they might be jealous or they might even be just drunk. Since the actions of vagabonds are hardly predictable, security forces and local government officials could be made accountable.

The Jews might have faced intimidation because of their attitude towards the natives of the Thrace in their business dealings. This is an ordinary petty crime. The government will control the situation shortly (*Zaman*, 8 July 1934).

Describing the Thrace events as a petty crime is to undermine it and make it a trivial incident as if a row happened between a few people over a personal matter and is nothing to do with Jews as a group being the target thus concealing the political and ideological character of the attacks, because petty criminals cannot be associated with politically motivated organised actions.

Are Turkey's Jews being insulted?

In the last few days a rumour is going around: the Jews in Thrace, especially of Edirne and Çanakkale, were apparently being attacked and forced to migrate (*Haber*, 5 July 1934).

And,

As a result of some unimportant incidents, some Jews came to Istanbul and the government began an investigation immediately. The first part of the investigation is completed and the government recalled the governor of Kırklareli, Fuat Bey, as the investigation officers discovered mismanagement... (*Zaman*, 11 July 1934).

There is no answer to the questions of who carried out the attacks, raided the houses, broke the windows and threatened the Jews. Referring to the events in a vague and general way and in the passive was a linguistic device to separate the action from the actor. Using general pronouns instead of specific names or the special characteristics of the actors was common in the news reports. This is a general tactic used in news reports to weaken the link between the actor and his action. Naming the actors and inquiring into their motives puts the story in context, which enable the readers to make connections between the power relations in society. By unidentifying the actors, the news reports isolate the case from its political and social context and turn it into an instance that may happen anywhere in the world, as part of the everyday life. In doing so the news reports prevents the readers from questioning the wider relations of power

in society, questions which decide what and why and who benefits from these arrangements.

#### **4.1.2.10. The Victims' Account: Delegitimation**

The Jews were not treated as legitimate witnesses, to be given space to explain what had happened or to speak with their own voices. The Jews' migration, as a result of attacks, insults and threats were mitigated or ignored and instead their 'fear' or 'haste' was presented as the causes of their migration. The Jewish community leaders' account of the Thrace events was represented as what really happened.

In the reports on the 1934 Thrace events, the victims' accounts of the events were not given any space, except on two occasions when the victims' views were presented with their own voices. The report below was presented by *Vakit* reporter who overheard a conversation between two Jewish migrants about the Thrace events in a café. He joined in the conversation but concealed his journalist identity. It is the first example of the Jews' own account of the events.

The *Vakit* reported:

It is understood that the Jews panicked unnecessarily

Those who came from Thrace said they came because their houses were stoned"

Yesterday one of our reporters met by chance at a restaurant at Sirkeci three Musevis who escaped from Kırklareli. These three Musevi were talking between themselves about the incidents in Thrace and telegraphed their relatives about what had happened. Our reporter was at the restaurant and overheard the conversation between them and asked them why they came to Istanbul. The two of them spoke to the reporter, one a shopkeeper and the other a grain trader. They said:

**Musevis:** On the night of July 3, at nine in the evening, some people threw stones at our houses and broke all our windows. We ran to the fields and came here the next day.

**Reporter:** Who stoned your houses and broke your windows.

**M:** We don't know. We did not see anyone in the dark. We were scared and left our houses.

**R:** Was anyone being raped, beaten up or killed?

**M:** No, no such things happened. We did not even see anyone, but only us.

**R:** Did you not complain to the government?

**M:** No we did not. We ran to save our lives and came here, we left everything behind.

**R:** What made you believe that your lives were in danger? Did anyone say anything to you, did anyone threaten you?

**M:** No, no one threatened us. Until the night of July 3, we did not know anything until our houses was attacked with stones and the windows were broken.

**R:** If you were not threatened before, how could you believe that your lives were in danger just because your windows were broken?

**M:** It was easy to believe that our lives were in danger because there was almost no house left without broken windows. How could we not believe we were not in danger then?

**R:** If your houses were stoned and windows were broken and it was dark, was it not more dangerous for you to go out to the fields and mountains in the dark?

**M:** No, we did not go to the fields or to the mountains we went to our neighbours, because we did not want to be alone in our houses.

**R:** Did not you see anyone?

**M:** It was dark, we did not see anyone.

**R:** But you said before that you ran to the fields and mountains and now you are saying that you went to neighbours. Which one is true? Either you are not telling the truth or you don't know what really happened?

**M:** Sir, if we did not fear for our lives we would not have left our houses and come here. I did not even get a jacket they gave me this one in Istanbul. There had to be a danger, wouldn't there? We do not really know what we are doing anyway. That is why we came to Istanbul.

**R:** Is Faik Bey the governor of Kırklareli?

**M:** Yes.

**R:** Is Faik Bey a kind of man who would allow such things happen?

**M:** Sir, Faik Bey was like a brother to us. We were all together, days and nights".

**R:** Then, how has it happened?

M: How can we know? (*Vakit*, 7 July 1934).

The headline states that the Jews panicked unnecessarily and the next sentence proves it the Jews said they came because their houses were attacked with thrown stones. The ideological significance of reducing the whole of the Thrace events, in which intimidation, attacks and threats, forcing at least 3000 Jews to migrate to Istanbul in a couple of days, to 'stone throwing and broken windows' is more than trivialisation of the events. It depoliticises and prevents socio-political and ideological explanations, by associating the events with a trivial petty crime of throwing stones. These assertions undermine the Jews' claims by giving less and incomplete information about the events, marginalises them and discredits their accounts, reducing the systematic and serious attacks to a petty crime.

The witnesses were vague about the actors involved in the attacks. The significance of this witness account is that the 'unidentifiability' of the agents is proved once more, this time by the victims. The inconsistent and confused states of mind of the migrants and their confessions that "they don't really know what they are doing", not being able to give any details about the events and their inability to give a 'valid' reason for their migration discredited their account and strengthened the judgement made in the headline that "the Jews panicked unnecessarily".

The report proved that the local governor acted responsibly. This could be an answer to the accusations of the foreign newspapers that there might have been local officials involved in the events. The interview confirmed the official account of the events, proving the journalist's claim that Jews did not really know what they were doing. The interview revealed many inconsistencies in the explanations of the Jews which contributed to discrediting the Jews' account and underlining the claim by the reporter that Jews migrated because of ill-founded panic.

On 9 July the headlines announced the return of the Jews “The migrants are returning to Thrace” and “The government measures secured the Jews’ safety” (9 July 1934, *Akşam*. It was reported that a Jewish man, Salamon Efendi from Uzunköprü, told his story to *Akşam*:

10 families from Lüleburgaz out of 50 families came to Istanbul. Two men provoked the events. The villagers who were threatened by these men refused to shop from our stores. This caused panic among us and because of this reason we migrated. People and villagers were not happy with this boycott. The mayor of Uzunköprü and the Chief Gendarmerie Officer protected us and to whom we were grateful to them. We would like you to write this in the paper. When we complained, the mayor immediately sent the gendarmes to ensure the security of our neighbourhood. The mayor told us that his duty was to protect our lives and property... There is no anti-Jewish movement among the people of Uzunköprü; and the incident is the work of a few senseless persons (*Akşam*, 9 July 1934,; *Vakit*, 10 July 1934).

This was one of the two reports where the victims told their story. Salamon Efendi’s testimony confirms the official view. The statement that only two men provoked the boycotts is compatible with the official view that it was the work of a few people which is an account which undermines the Thrace events and their significance by explaining that it was the provocation of only two people. There are inconsistencies in the claim, if it was only two men involved in the events and if the villagers were not supporting them then there should not be any reason for migration. This was remedied by Mr Salamon’s ‘taking responsibility’ by claiming “it caused panic among us...this is the reason we migrated”. This undermines the severity of the attacks, giving no specific details of the events but focusing on the mayor’s determination to stop the attacks and to protect lives, underlined by Mr Salamon’s insistence that the mayor’s efforts should be mentioned in the newspaper. In the last sentence, the mention of “a few senseless people” as being responsible for the attacks and the underlying claim that “there is no anti-Jewish movement among the people of Uzunköprü” was quoted to avoid giving any detailed

information about the attackers but instead vague descriptions about them to marginalise them and dissociate them from the people of Uzunköprü.

#### **4.1.2.11. Our Musevi Citizens and the Jews of Thrace: Denial of Access and Consulting the Community Leaders' View**

In some of the news reports, influential and well known Jewish community members were quoted on the Thrace events. However, they were not quoted merely for their personal opinions about the events but were also asked to speak on behalf of the Jews who migrated. Their evaluation of the events was the same as the official explanations; the leading members of the Jewish community confirmed and emphasised the official point of view.

The newspaper's quoting these men was significant in another sense in that they were delegated to the role of spokespersons for the Thrace Jews. This indicates that they were separated from the Thrace Jews in the newspapers' perception. The latter were denied access to speak with their own voices and express their opinions and hence, they were denied individuality and independence because speaking through community leaders implied that they lacked initiative. It also signalled the power of the newspapers to deny access to the less powerful and unprivileged while the powerful and influential were entitled to their own opinion, as well as the right to speak on behalf of others.

No problem

Nesim Taranto Efendi, a Musevi trader, said "some families came to our neighbourhood. There is not really a problem. We were also panicked when we heard about the incident in Thrace but we were sure that there was some misunderstanding. This is also confirmed by the speech of İsmet Pasha. Also news from Ankara revealed that a few people who disturbed the Jews were taken to court (*Son Posta*, 6 July 1934).

Nesim Taranto's judgement that there was not really a problem is based on his assessment of the case through speaking to the migrants who came to his

neighbourhood. His judgement on the Jews' migration that it was all about a misunderstanding not only undermines the events but also discredits the Thrace Jews as credible witnesses; even though they experienced the attacks, their accounts of the events were not mentioned. Nesim Taranto confirms the official view and, by showing complete faith in the government, contributed to the reproduction of the official point of view, faith in authority and the impartiality of the government.

When the Thrace Jews were referred to, they were addressed as only members of the Jewish community, and except in one news report, they were not named. The ideological significance of this discursive strategy is to imply that they acted as a close community and had unique characteristics different than 'ours'. The ideological significance of emphasising the group identity of the Jews was that it served to justify the claims that Jews were traders by nature and their activity benefited their own community. The leading community members were named and addressed by their titles such as the lawyer, trader and were allowed to speak on behalf of their community ordinary Jews were not allowed to express their opinions about their experiences.

What does Mişon Ventura, one of our well-known Musevi Citizens, say?

As has been mentioned before, there is no anti-Semitism in Turkey. There may be some occasional incidents but obviously these are not important. The law will definitely take care of everything. We have news about a small reaction in Babaeski yesterday... these people came to our city. The government, with the help of some local patriots, stopped the attacks immediately (*Haber*, 7 July 1934).

To refer to the attacks as 'incidents' and in passive forms is to delete the agents and imply some mysterious forces at work causing "occasional incidents". The focus here again is to prove anti-Semitism cannot happen in Turkey because the government will not allow it, this case shows the government controlled the situation.

Some newspapers' lexical choice of the possessive pronoun 'our' and a more positive term 'Musevi' in their address to Istanbul Jews and 'Jews of Thrace' when referring to

the Thrace Jews is to categorise the Thrace Jews as members of a community first and foremost, all sharing the same interests and all behaving the same way. This categorisation is compatible with the encompassing statements about the Thrace Jews when they were blamed for causing resentment among the locals because of their dominance in trade.

A Jewish trader Marsel Franko was quoted saying that “the incident is only a local one and with the government’s prompt response, the problem was solved there and then. This shows that anti- Semitism does not exist in Turkey” (*Son Posta*, 8 July 1934).

#### Professor Mişon Ventura Bey’s Declaration

Professor Mişon Ventura said, regarding the Turkish Jews (Musevis), that in some parts of Thrace we have heard about the incidents against the Jews. These are illegal and rare and are not in any way part of an organised activity. Turks have expressed their concerns about these incidents as much as Jews. Turks have always appreciated the loyalty of the Jews. The Prime Minister’s speech at the Lausanne conference showed this appreciation.

The history is full of examples of the close relations between the Jews and the Turks. In fact there are no conditions for the emergence of anti-Semitism in Turkey. The Interior Minister himself is investigating the incidents (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 July 1934; *Vakit*, 8 July 1934).

The declaration of Mr Ventura and Mr Franco confirm the official statements by stating that the Thrace events are local and cannot be considered as an organised action. Mişon Ventura’s emphasised that the Thrace events were rare occasions and had nothing to do with anti-Semitism which is proved by the fact that Turks have appreciated Jewish loyalty...

Most of the Musevis insist:

Mişon Ventura Bey, a university professor and a famous lawyer, about the migration of the Thrace incident said that these problems should not be cause of an overreaction. It is impossible for an anti-Semitic action to take place in Turkey. History is witness to this.

The incidents in Thrace are local and rare. The sympathetic feelings of the authorities towards the Musevis in Turkey are well known. İsmet Paşa's speech to the Grand National Assembly is a typical example of this...." (*Haber*, 7 July 1934).

The leading members of the Jewish community expressed complete faith and trust in the government to control the situation. However, they did not speak on behalf of the Thrace Jews but in place of them, their statements and claims contradicted and discredited the Thrace Jews claims of being attacked and threatened for which reason they had to migrate. The leading members' claims that there was a misunderstanding and these were only small incidents, taken care of by the government, helped to reproduce the official point of view and, as a discursive strategy, contributed to the reproduction of the unequal relations of power.

#### **4.1.2.12. Consensual View**

The news reports focused on the Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya's visits to the region. Each visit is described in detail, with special emphasis on the crowd cheering the Interior Minister in every town and city he and the commission members went to. These were interpreted in the news reports as signs of support for the government. This support demonstrated 'our' national unity and an answer to the enemy intent to divide 'us'. However, no detailed explanation shedding any light on how the events had happened was reported on the outcome of the Interior Minister's investigation in these cities

Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya came to Kırklareli with the General Investigator. The local people, civil servants, soldiers and gendarme divisions gathered on both sides of the street to greet the Minister and the general investigator (*Vakit*, 8 July 1934).

The news reports focused on these visits because, according to the press reports, the visits of the commission members in the cities of Thrace turned into ceremonial occasions by the people who paid their tribute to the Interior Minister. The newspapers

devoted considerable space to the descriptions of the cheering people waiting for the commission members at the train stations to show their gratitude to the Interior Minister and express their loyalty to the Republican principles. Details of people waving flags and chanting slogans were presented as demonstrations that national unity was intact and consensus was solid.

Şükrü Kaya met with the governor of Edirne, the security officer, the public inspector and the CHP representative, the councillor, the chief gendarme officer, police and the local businessmen. The interior minister thanked the councillor and went to the council building and on his way he was cheered by a crowd of local people. People shouted “Viva Ghazi” and once again declared their loyalty to Ghazi and to the republic (*Son Posta*, 9 July 1934).

These are interpreted as signs of the strength of the nation and loyalty of the citizens to the government and the state. These reports carried evaluative descriptions about the importance of this support for the government because it was a sign of national unity. Thus the news reports resembled government manifestations calling for national unity and unconditional support for the government and the Republican principles.

The news reports about the events, investigations and arrests were wrapped up skilfully within the discourse of the threat against national unity which left no gaps for the readers to fill. Since one of the main causes of the Thrace events was outside influence and outside interference support for the government was the best answer to the outside enemies and forces.

#### **4.1.2.13. Final Reports Closing the Case: The nature of the Anti-Jewish Incidents**

The prime Minister's office published a report on the Thrace incident investigation on the 14th July, 1934. According to the report:

Anti-Jewish sentiments began in the Thrace during the First World War, the Armistice years and the National Liberation War. During the first years of the republican period it stopped but with the spread of anti-Semitism around the world and especially in Europe the anti-Jewish sentiments entered Turkey. The latest anti-Jewish publications further encouraged the hostile feelings between the Turks and the Jews against one another. The anti-Semitic wave is widespread in Europe and has also entered Turkey and anti-Semitic publications created confusing feelings and encouraged mutually hostile opinions between these Turks and the Jews. The government does not see it necessary to repeat negative opinion because its duty is to solve the problems between its citizens...among these complaints one could see all the economic, national and political arguments against the Jews besides ones that specific to the Turkish case. In the case of Turkey, anti-Semitic publications reported that the Jews had been living in this country and insisting on speaking foreign languages and having foreign cultural practices. Among the Turks there is the suspicion that some of the Jews might be spying in these de-militarised zones (*Hakimiyeti Milliye, Zaman, Cumhuriyet, Ikdam, Son Posta, Milliyet*, 15 July 1934, published the whole report, Appendix 3 and 4)

After the publishing of the official report on 15 July, 1934 the Thrace case was closed for the newspapers. The predictions were proved by the report made at the beginning of the investigation by the members of the government and the newspapers. Thus the readers did not suspect that anything was missed or left out in the reports. All the questions on the issue were asked and answered. It was an act of a few troublemakers or few locals carried out under the influence of outside forces as a result of the peoples' resentment of Jews' dominance of trade in Thrace. Nevertheless, the government successfully handled the case and instantly carried out an investigation, found the perpetrators, arrested them and showed the world that the Turkish government would not allow such harmful ideas to take root anywhere in the country. The Jews regretted this misunderstanding and returned to their homes. They stated that Turkey was a safe heaven for them through the words of leading members of the Jewish community.

#### **4.1.2.14. Assessment**

No individual stories or personal accounts were reported although we read from the newspapers that the Jews who migrated were staying in Jewish hospitals, schools and Synagogues in Hasköy, provided by the Jewish community. Denying individual members opportunities to speak about their experiences prevented an alternative representation of the Thrace events in terms of individual sufferings such as people leaving everything they worked for behind in fear, having to sell their shops and possessions for much less than their true value. Clearly this is a discursive strategy to prevent the readers to feeling sympathy for them. Instead the news reports undermined the attacks by implying that they were local incidents overreacted by Jews.

News reports reproduced the government's account of the events. The whole process created an opportunity for the government to declare to the world that Turkey was strong, to show the enemies that peoples' support and trust was behind the government, which was an indication of the loyalty to the republican principles. In the news reports, the press used the politicians' evaluations of the incidents as a prelude. The politicians' speeches and declarations emphasised the existence of enemies both from within and without whose intention was to conspire against national unity and peace in Turkey.

#### **4.1.3. Editorials on the 1934 Thrace Events**

Editorials on the events in Thrace appeared in *Milliyet* and *Zaman* and also in *Vakit* and *Cumhuriyet* the latter pair both providing two editorials each. No editorials on the Thrace events appeared in *Akşam*, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, *Son Posta* and *Haber*.

Editorials are written about the most important event of the day according to the ideological and stylistic conventions of that particular newspaper. In that sense, although they are written by an individual writer the editorials' voice is institutional rather than personal. Editorials predominantly address politicians and other elites as

much as the reading public. They usually advise to authorities as much defend or attack them. Editorials do not have a fixed style, however, there are three common characteristics related to their main functions. These are definition, explanation and evaluation or moral (van Dijk 1993). In the description of the events, editorials are not restrained by the 'objectivity' criteria and often editors describe events in evaluative terms. The strict separation of the editorials from the news section is intended to mark clearly the comment section from the factual information, the news section. Thus news is associated with 'facts', but editorials with opinions.

According to Fowler "what makes newspaper editorial distinctive is not that they offer values and beliefs but that they employ textual strategies which foreground the speech act of offering values and beliefs" (Fowler 1991, 209). Editorials' representation of subjects is always a structuring process involving values and implicit propositions which are continuously articulated as discourse. In other words, editorial representation always involves a certain point of view (Fowler 1991, 208).

In relation to the Thrace events, the most important function of editorials is an indirect view of the ideological framework that supports the definitions and explanations in relation to minorities. However, the ideological, political and economical function of editorials is determined by the historical context (Fowler 1991, 39; van Dijk 1993).

Editorials will be analysed in terms of their definition, explanation and recommendations in relation to the events in Thrace. All these stages are ideologically significant in the sense that they imply a certain point of view and recommend action informed by values of editorials. In order to defend their point of view, editorials use various argumentative and discursive strategies which will be analysed below.

#### 4.1.3.1. Critical Analysis of the Editorial Coverage on the 1934 Thrace Events

Whose Fault is it? On the Jewish problem (*Zaman*, 7 July 1934)

A well known Nasreddin Hoca story goes that one day Hoca's donkey was stolen. He complains to his neighbour and the first neighbour says "it is your fault Hoca you should have locked the gate of the stable. He goes to a second neighbour to complain he also says "it is your fault Hoca you should have had a night watchman. Hoca goes to a third neighbour when he begins to blame him, Nasrettin Hoca began screaming "hey, for God's sake, isn't it the fault of the thieves at all?"

When we read the news about the Jews' complaints about the intimidation and attacks this story came to our mind. We don't yet know why the Jews are leaving Thrace and what really happened. We have learnt from the Prime Minister's speech that necessary measures have been taken and the government has taken control of the situation. The speech has showed that the government is conscious of its responsibilities and has declared the superiority of law and ensured all citizens that they are under the protection of law without any discrimination. After this speech the Jewish citizens must feel a relief. Because they know that the government will protect the rights of all citizens if they are violated. This is the official side of the problem. However, the problem should be analysed from another point of view. We have to state that we have no personal information of what had happened in the Thrace.

All we know is from the government's declaration that some Jews migrated from Thrace. There is a sensitive point here. Why were the Jews forced to migrate for no reason? As the Prime Minister told there is no anti-Semitism in Turkey. They may face discrimination in other countries but this has never been the case in Turkey.

However, why should anyone harm them if there was no reason? As the saying goes there is smoke without fire, if there is no reason something as serious as migration would not occur. We have to confess that our Jewish citizens have been never caused any big problem in Turkey (*Zaman*, 7 July 1934, Appendix 5).

*Zaman* editorial "Whose Fault is it?" begins with a Nasrettin Hoca story, a popular comic story with 'a ready made point of view' implicates the Jews responsibility in the occurrence of the events. Thrace events were referred to as "Jews' leaving Thrace".

This was a discursive transformation and a strategic move to background the attacks causing the migration while highlighting Jews' complaints about the attacks. It thus gave the active position to Jews as the complaining party. In this way, the agency responsible for attacks and their intimidation of Jews is omitted, and the attention is diverted to the consequences of the act, the migration of Jews.

Nasrettin Hoca functioned as common sense wisdom and highlighted what was obvious to common sense and it appealed to readers to acknowledge the obvious truth that 'thief' must be guilty too. It was then implied that Jews must have done something to cause the intimidation and attacks. In stating that there was insufficient information about what really happened the editor was expressing doubt about the Jews' claims and migration. The previous complaints of Jews about the attacks and intimidation and their act of migration were thus discredited as providing sufficient 'information' about Thrace events. Since there was not adequate information to explain why the events happened the editorial focused on the available information, the government's determination to stop the events, protection of law and order and the rights of all citizens to reduce the role of anti-Semitism as a cause. The Prime Minister's statements are quoted to indicate the government's determination to control the situation and as an indication that anti-Semitism would not exist in Turkey. The editor adopted the main propositions in the official explanation of Thrace events and contributed to their reproduction. The views of the powerful authorities were taken as irrefutable proofs of the impartiality of law or any sort of discrimination against the Jews.

The writer by accepting the Prime Minister's statements presenting the facts and as an account of the whole story, ideologically aligned himself with the political authority. The Jews' opinions and views on the point were considered irrelevant, since their complaints were dismissed. The writer's use of modal expression that Jews must be feeling relief is a sign of a self-assumed authority on the part of the writer to pass a judgement about the situation and speak on behalf of Jews.

In the statement of official sources, the Prime Minister, is given the credit as stating the absolute truth. The Prime Minister's declaration that anti-Semitism cannot exist in Turkey is taken to be as "fact" and with a strategic move used to induce people to accept this position as the fact. Although the editor admitted that he did not personally know exactly what happened in Thrace, he does not hesitate to pass the judgement that Thrace events were not anti-Semitic, as proved by the statement of the Prime Minister. The ideological significance of such alignment with the political authority is that it presupposed an absolute submission to the political authority, no objection to be expressed about the official statement even if it seemed contradictory, and absolute trust in the law and its fairness. This also implies the recommendation of editor, to have faith in government's impartiality towards all its citizens and its determination to stop the events.

Thrace Events – Mehmet Asım, *Vakit*, 9 July 1934

The Interior Minister is in Thrace, delegated by the Prime Minister to investigate the nature of the Jewish migration. Although he has not finished his investigation the nature of the case is more or less clear from the statements of those who came to Istanbul.

There is no religious or political hostility towards the Jews in Turkey. What is more likely is that the anti-Semitic propaganda which comes from outside the country and triggered the individual hostilities caused by economic reasons or this propaganda is taken advantage by those who hoped to benefit from the exodus. Therefore the latest events should be considered the result of these.

If the families from Kırklareli, Çanakkale, Edirne and Gelibolu could see the case like this they would not leave Thrace and it would not become an issue. Not only did those who left their houses not consider this, but also they believed the propagandists and agitators, who claimed that their migration was result of a government decision. Because of this false belief they left their homes.

It is known that migrations of this sort effect the others, to see families leave in panic makes other follow them. That is why if some families have left because of some agitation and propaganda, it is obvious that the others have followed them because they saw others leaving.

The migration process proves our theory. It began in Çanakkale, one day later it began in Gelibolu, then in Edirne and finally in Kırklareli.

There is no need to use deceitful ways, provocateurs to throw stones to the houses, break the windows and scare people, as the Prime Minister's speech in the Assembly has made it clear. Every citizen in Turkey is under the protection of the Republican law and anti-Semitism is not a Turkish characteristic. The government will not allow these sorts of acts to take place within Turkey's borders. Those responsible for these incidents will be severely punished. We are glad to say that the Jewish intellectuals have been wise and appreciate it. Tekin Alp and Mişon Ventura Bey's interviews on the incident are enough proof of this. Whatever happens now on will prove our case (*Vakit*, 9 July 1934).

The Thrace events were referred to as a Jewish migration, which shows the editorial's focus is on the outcome of the events. Although the investigation not completed the editor concludes the case by arguing that the nature of the incident is not related to anti-Semitism but occurred partly because of foreign propaganda. The causal relation is established by emphasising the role of the foreign influence, which found response in the individuals' hostile attitudes because of economic reasons. Thus, the official definition is intertextually used by the editors to define the event and establish the main framework for understanding the events in Thrace.

Editor used various argumentative strategies to reduce the seriousness of the events. The Jews were blamed for migrating and not ignoring the events as the work of few agitators, and also believing the propaganda that the events were organised by the government. The editor discredits Jews' claims by asserting that they left because of panic rather than because they were attacked, insulted and threatened. As a discursive strategy, it enables the editor to shift responsibility onto the Jews for migrating and making it an issue.

The Jews were blamed for believing the agitators' propaganda that the attacks were organised by the government. In this way editors focused on Jews for believing this and

not on the claim itself, which was totally dismissed as propaganda. The editor stated that government was powerful enough to implement its policies, and if it was necessary to transfer people it would do so through legal rather deceitful means. The editor expressed a complete faith and trust in government to implement laws and prevented pursuing such claims further.

The Prime Minister's speech was quoted to emphasise that anti-Semitism could not happen in Turkey as proof and a fact of the matter shared both by editor and the leading Jewish community members. Thus the editor reproduced the official definition of Thrace events and explained away any rumours implicating government members in the events. The ideological significance of such strategy is the contribution of editors to the unquestionable impartiality of political authority and the government's unbiased attitude towards all citizens in Turkey. The editorial advised everybody to have faith in the government and its determination to punish the responsible which is presented as the common sense attitude which is also confirmed by the leading Jewish community members.

The Jewish Problem in Turkey from the Point of View of Government, by Mehmet Asım, *Vakit*, 16 July 1934

The press release based on the report by the Interior Minister about migration of Jews from Thrace has made all too clear the Jewish problem in Turkey.

The style of the declaration is admirable. Because in this sort of declaration what we have used to see is to use general statements, with no details about the events and undermine it with the intention of cover it up. The Prime Ministry's declaration has revealed all the information about the migration of Jews from Edirne and Thrace which has been unknown so far. The event has been investigated and explained objectively and impartially, as expected from the government.

If there are things the report did not mention this is to help to solve some problem between the citizens and thus avoid some of the insulting expressions, as it was explained in the report. This will not in any case to be considered to be a shortcoming about the intention and effect of the declaration.

There are thirteen thousand Jews in Edirne and Thrace, so far three thousand of these have left Thrace. This is not to say that three thousand is insignificant, but the fact that ten thousand remain in Thrace shows the government authorities had no role. The only thing the authorities did was to prevent the provocation and abuse. In fact the soldier who was martyred was trying to stop the few thieves attacking the Jewish houses. His death is sad but it is an indication of the government's serious effort to stop the incidents. The capture of those responsible with some arrested and the return of the seventy five percent of the stolen goods are all indicate that government has done everything on its part.

In terms of the reasons/the objective behind the Jewish migration and if they still continue the government declaration show us that: The complaints by both the Turks and the Jews during the events have all the characteristics of anti-Semitism with its political and economic justifications. This shows that anti-Semitism is an import from outside. There is one specific reason specific to Çanakkale and Edirne that is the insistence of the Jews there to continue to speak a foreign language and practice a foreign culture. Also there is the belief that some of the Jews have been spying in this de-militarised district.

In our opinion, cause of anti-Semitism among the Turks is the latter more than the former, because it is easy to fight against an outsider which has no real base in the country. When Turkey tries to fight against such movements, the Jews should play their part as well. It is their responsibility to eliminate whatever causes the latter movements. Lately some work was done by Jewish intellectuals to try to help spread Turkish culture and language among the Jews. These works should continue with sincerity. However, to undermine the claims of spying in the de-militarised zone as unfair and ill-founded is not enough, because in some cases suspicion and opinions are as effective as the truth. That is why the Jews should learn the Turkish language and accept Turkish culture and at the same time avoid from engaging in activities that might create suspicion (*Vakit*, 16 July 1934, Appendix 6).

The government was praised for its determination to solve the problem. The editorial, in an attempt to prove that government was not involved in the events documents the 'positive' actions such as arresting suspects and returning the stolen goods. Even the death of a soldier was presented as an indicator of government's determination to stop

the events. Although it is accepted that complaints from the locals had their origin in anti-Semitic behaviour, this behaviour was attributed to outside influences.

It seems that the issue of speaking foreign languages came out as one of the reasons for locals' resentment against Jews in the government report that the editor mentioned it as a significant cause of anti-Semitic reaction. The Jews were advised to speak Turkish, adapt to Turkish culture and warned to keep away from activities which may seem suspicious and be associated with spying. Ideological implication of such an explanation is that Jews' speaking foreign languages is sufficient cause for locals' suspicion, this also makes them a target of anti-Semitic reaction but the editorial asserted that it was the responsibility of Jews to prove their trustworthiness. The implication of such an explanation for Jews is that their position in society is illegitimate as long as they continue speaking foreign languages and not adapting to Turkish culture they will be suspected spying or other suspicious activities. This also implies that Jews can only be trusted and considered as part of "our" society if they meet the language and culture requirement. These requirements were presented as legitimate demands and the editor identified himself with the local people of Thrace, and thereby justified reactions against Jews if they did fail to comply with these requirements.

On the reaction against Thrace Jews by Yunus Nadi, *Cumhuriyet*, 16 July 1934

Finally the government published the report about the incidents that took place in Thrace. The report showed that the government took all necessary measures and took the situation under its control. The first thing should be made clear is that whatever reason and motive might have caused the incidents, they are nothing whatsoever to do with the government and the state. Instead since the news of the events came out the government showed a prompt response and stopped any further events happening while at the same time trying to find those who committed these crimes. The official report also shows that the Interior Minister took the necessary precautions in the region.

The burglary and vandalism in Kırklareli is regrettable. The government, however, explained that any such vandalism and intimidation between the citizens will not be

allowed. Government has found 75 per cent of the stolen goods and these were returned to the owners. We learn from the government's report that there are over 13 000 Jews in the Thrace. 3000 of them came to Istanbul...

It is seen as the strong intimidating the weak. The Jews are a minority in Turkey. The Jews in our country came from other countries where they were under threat and fled those countries in fear of their lives. This hospitality of the Turks has been remembered with gratefulness, and no one has any right to ruin this reputation with a total opposite of hospitality.

In order to solve the economic problems, we need ways other than force and violence. We, all the nation, are conscious of the fact that we need to solve the economic problems. The government and the state are most conscious of securing the superiority of law and careful about the violation of the law.

For centuries, the Jews have not learned Turkish and have been considered as foreigners. We are sure that the Jews are also aware of this fact. Government's declaration indicates the Jewish intellectuals' efforts in this direction. However, the language problem cannot be solved through violence and force.

In short, the local incidents in Çanakkale and the Thrace are not legitimate in any way and no one can justify them. The government's efforts and measures to control these local incidents have been suitable to our honour and ethic for which we are grateful (*Cumhuriyet*, 16 July 1934, Appendix 7).

The editor expressed his absolute conviction that the government report revealed the whole truth about Thrace events and cleared the name of government.

The editor mentions some of the findings in the report and expresses his condemnation especially on Kırklareli event, the most violent one. As part of the editor's argumentation strategy to reduce the severity of 'our' negative actions he reminds the reader that Jews came here to escape from prosecution and found a hospitable environment, thus emphasising 'our' good qualities. 'Our' people were advised to act according to 'our' well-known quality of hospitality which also indicates that 'they', Jews, are guests, found a refuge in 'our' country. Deictic 'we' to imply that, as the whole nation, 'we' think the same, and he has the authority to speak on behalf of the nation, indicating that there is a consensus among the members of the nation on how to

solve the economic problems. He thus implied that Thrace events were related to economic problems. The government's determination to implement law and punish those violated the law was praised.

The editorial mentioned the 'language problem' and implied that Jews refused to learn Turkish had made them foreigners for centuries. He did not, however, approve of solving the language problem through violent means. Although he did not justify the violent reaction against Jews, because of the language issue he nevertheless presented it as a legitimate concern. Although the events were condemned as illegitimate ways of expressing grievances the editorial defining them as local events reduced their perceived severity. Finally, by praising government in controlling the events and solving the problem, the editor expressed his faith and trust in government.

For Judaism by the Siirt Deputy Mahmut, *Milliyet*, 26 July 1934

He complains how the smallest incidents in Turkey were blown out of proportion in Paris. "The good works never find a voice here", he says, for this you need an active propaganda this is why some governments have propaganda departments. The first impression was that the anti-Jewish attacks were organised by the government and these incidents were not local but widespread. They thought that what is happening in Germany is being repeated in Turkey. It is not for us to discuss what is happening in Germany but we know one thing which is the fact that in Kemalist Turkey these movements cannot find a ground. First, because of the principles

We Turks are loyal to the principle of peace in the world affairs and in the internal affairs. We have forgotten the sorrows and rage of armistice years. We have cleaned off the accounts with the Greeks and the Armenians. Whatever terrible things happened is nothing to do with the Republican regime. The responsibility of the wrongdoings lay with the Ottoman statesmen. We have had no problems with the Jews. This is the truth. This is also because there is no economic, political or ethical reason for the emergence of anti-Semitism in Turkey.

It was difficult to explain this simple truth to the well-established Jewish community here in Paris. Thanks to the Prime Minister's speech and the official report on the Thrace events the enemies of Turkey were denied an excuse to attack.

In any country these sorts of extraordinary incidents may happen but if the governments are strong enough they can take control of the situation and there will be no problem. We have every reason to think the Turkish state was strong. However, even on a wide and well designed stairs one may slip. The Thrace incidents should be considered such an exception and should not be associated with the characteristics of the intelligent, hard working Thrace population. We are told here that there were very rich and talented Jews looking for a safe country to invest in. All around the world there were Jews who occupy the highest positions in state posts as was the case in France and the USA (*Milliyet*, 26 July 1934).

The editor mentions the widespread belief in Europe that Thrace events were part of anti-Semitic movement in Turkey. He asserts that anti-Semitism cannot find a ground in Turkey because 'peace' is the most important principles of the Kemalist Turkey. His mentioning of armistice years and the national independence war is significant in the sense that although he asserts that "we" have forgotten the sorrows of those armistice years, by mentioning this he refreshes the memories in relation to the Jews', Armenians' and Greeks' 'betrayal'. These were recalled to imply that despite these experiences, the Republican regime had opened a new book with regard to non-Muslims. Like the politicians the editor has always perceived a threat from an enemy from both within and without, and he recommended that, as citizens, our belief in the government's strength to resolve the situation was a good answer to the outside enemy.

#### **4.1.3.2. Assessment**

The editors' definition of the events involved a summarising description based on the news reports (van Dijk 1992). In editorials above, the events in Thrace were defined as a security and a law and order issue, which was solved by the government's prompt action. Editorials used the official sources' definitions of the events as an accurate

account of events and adopted the main propositions made by the Prime Minister and the Interior Minister. In particular, the Prime Minister's emphasis that anti-Semitism is not a Turkish characteristic was understood by the editorials as demonstrating government's firm position against anti-Semitism.

Editors explain the events to account for the causes of the events and reasons for action. They develop an argument to explain why it occurred? They use opinion statements to develop their argument and in order to explain the events editors selected some dimensions as more significant and excluded others. Such selection entails a redefinition of the events, carried out according to the editor's cognitive model of the situation (van Dijk 1992). The opinions stated in the editorials explanation sections were not the personal opinions of the individual writer but "manifestations of more complex, socially shared and dominant ideological frameworks that embody institutional relationships and power" (van Dijk 1993, 231).

In the case of Thrace events, the editorials' focus was not on how to explain the events but more to explain why they were not important. Therefore a particular attention was paid to prove 'non anti-Semitic character' of the events. Anti-Semitic explanations were strongly opposed and the events were defined in relation to outside influence which had only a limited influence on 'some' people and it would "...from time to time enters into our country from without but leaves as soon as it enters" because "anti-Semitism is not a Turkish characteristic" (*Akşam, Cumhuriyet, Son Posta, Milliyet*, 6 July 1934).

The Jews' dominance in trade was an answer to the question why outside influences were able to find reception in Thrace. Foreign anti-Semitic influence found reception among the local Thrace population who had been resentful of the fact that Thrace Jews have been controlling trade and thus denying opportunity for locals. Focus on Jews entailed essentialist definitions of Jews' characteristics and the explanations involved references to the peculiarities of Jewish community. These were discursive strategies

developed by editors to deal with an ‘awkward fact’ of the anti-Semitic nature of the Thrace events.

Editorials went a step further in the reproduction of the official explanations and in order to prove that Thrace events were ultimately related to the Jewish community’s peculiar characteristics, they provided “historical evidence” for Jews’ natural inclination for trade and subsequent problems they faced throughout history since the times of Christ. At this stage the editorial explanations included anti-Semitic arguments while at the same time trying to deny its existence in Turkey.

Editorials used various argumentative moves to discredit alternative explanations for the Thrace events, especially those in foreign newspapers, which suggested the involvement of local government officials and the CHP in the organisation of Thrace events. While some editorials admitted that some local officials might have involved in the events, they immediately asserted that the determination of the government and the interior minister to find those responsible and bring them to trial. The involvement of high ranking officials in the events were neither evaluated on moral ground, nor led to questioning the political nature of the events or in terms of power abuse or as signs of any systematic discrimination against Jews. Instead their arrests were interpreted as showing government’s determination to bring to trial all those, even the high officials, involved in the events.

This means that what was focused on editorial reveals about the hierarchical structure of the cognitive model of the ethnic issues. Because what is omitted or excluded from the summary is as significant as what is selected and focused on (van Dijk 1985). Editorials excluded describing the attacks themselves and those involved in the attacks and their motives and instead, focused on Jewish dominance in trade as causing to locals’ resentment, hence, the Thrace events. They focused on historical explanations in order to establish the fact that Jews’ dominance in trade was an ongoing problem throughout history. Such a framework enabled reversals and the Jewish community

became the agency responsible unequal trade relations, hence the locals' reaction to it. These strategies reflected the ideological presuppositions of the editorials and their role in the perpetuation of anti-Semitic and racist beliefs (van Dijk 1993, 243).

Editorials usually make straightforward recommendations and give advice to the elite, government or the public (van Dijk 1992). Editorials defined what was considered acceptable and unacceptable complaints and thus prevented the expression of non-Muslims grievances against the local officials or groups involved in the attacks. Any criticism or complaints implying officials' involvement were considered un-patriotic and editorials advised Jews to show their loyalty to this country and act sensibly.

The non-Muslims were recommended to speak Turkish and adapt to Turkish culture, have faith in law and order and the government. These recommendations took the form of threats in the case of Thrace Jews, who were warned that if they continued alienating the Thracian people, speak foreign languages or resist adapting to Turkish culture, then anti-Semitism may take hold reception among the locals.

The editorials denounced the Thrace event as damaging the reputation of Turkey. Editorials contributed to reproduction of the definition of national interest and national unity as defined by the government and normalised and legitimated it by presenting it as an uncontested and neutral definition. Alternative points of views were either given no space or if mentioned, discredited. The editorials thus played a significant role in representation of Thrace events from the point of view of government in relation to national interests and contributed to the reproduction of relations of domination by representing the views of the ruling class as natural, uncontested and shared by the entire nation.

The enemy within and without theme was presented in a way such that national unity and national interest were endorsed and re-endorsed. The national interest and outside enemy themes were employed by the editorials to prevent complaints about the

government or the local officials. If the ‘national interest’ is in question, individuals are expected not to complain about any wrong-doings but show their support for the government and motherland. The argument about national interest and national unity was also employed by the editorials to prevent discussion of the Thrace events in relation to minority rights or violation of rights, because the issues of national interest and national unity downgraded other any issue, including individual and minority rights.

The underlying value in the idea of national unity and national interests is that the state and the government are fundamental part of this system, which must be defended at any cost and the reputation of state should be protected. Citizens’ loyalty and faith in government and the law is essential in the name of national unity and national interests. The consensual view is reflected in the newspapers is the politicians’ view of society. The newspapers use the pronoun ‘we’ frequently to imply a consensual view, the idea that there is no division in society and interests are common is expressed in the newspaper discourse to call people unite behind the government, especially in times of crisis. Consensus assumes that government defends everyone’s interest equally that there is no division between people, and that law is equally applied to everyone.

#### **4.1.4. Critical Analysis of the Columns on the 1934 Thrace Events**

A Jewish Question? by Felek, *Milliyet*, 10 July 1934

No reasonable person can think that there is a Jewish question in Turkey, because since their expulsion from Spain Turks have been hospitable towards the Jews. Especially, last year by accepting Jewish scientists exiled from Germany we have showed them that we are secular and moderate men. If there were some local incidents in Thrace it is absurd to consider it as the general attitude of the Turks against the Jews (*Milliyet*, 10 July 1934).

The ‘historical’ evidence presented is to prove that anti-Semitism can ‘only’ happen in Christian countries. The Ottoman Empire’s hospitality is emphasised by mentioning the

expulsion of Jews from Spain and their acceptance by the Ottoman state. Turkey's acceptance of Jewish scientists from Germany and İsmet Pasha and Şükrü Kaya Bey's speeches were presented to prove Turkey's hospitality towards Jews.

However, there is an important point that needs to be stated: Humanity will not forgive the Jews. What the humanity does not forgive is the fact that the Jews under any condition and circumstances earn more than others. During the time of the Prophet Moses, the Jews were exiled from Egypt and eventually found a land in Palestine under the mandate of the British, although they did not govern the country themselves, they have been trading there for 40 centuries. This trading ethic which has penetrated into the veins and the blood of Jews for forty centuries is partly the result of the curse Jews were subjected throughout history. When the Jews become rich whichever country they lived in, these nationalities become hostile to the Jews (*Milliyet*, 10 July 1934,).

The writer accepts the underlying reason for these countries' anti-Semitic politics as economic struggle for domination, however, he presents anti-Semitic policies in relation to a nation's superiority or inferiority, which is the typical of racist assumptions about the Jews. The implication of such an argument is that it is natural that the Jews have been the target of resentment wherever they live because of their 'natural' drive to earn wealth. However, they were not attacked in Turkey because of the superior characteristics of the Turks, unlike Germans, Spanish or Russian. This is another discursive strategy to mention others' negative actions to enable the reader to compare the two and see the differences and thereby reduce the importance or seriousness of the Thrace events.

However, did those countries where anti-Jewish sentiments turned into anti-Jewish politics, prosper such as the Russian, Spanish or the German? There may be the case that in some of the countries in Europe for the economic inefficiencies, social conditions and terrible competition the existence and the influence of the Jews were blamed. These countries conceal their struggle for economic superiority by eliminating a race which dresses up in nationalist identity claims. However, Turks are not such a nation (*Milliyet*, Felek, 10 July 1934).

Through this discursive strategy the readers are invited to accept the argument presented in the column both about the historical explanations and its relevance for the Thrace. The column writers, through categorisations and historical stories about the emergence of Jewish characteristics, established a false causality between being a Jew and dominance in trade or economy. These so-called ‘historical’ evidences and the pseudo-scientific language used in the columns to prove the Jews differences from ‘us’. The ideological significance of such a strategy is that if the reader finds this explanation adequate they may also find the representation of Jews as credible which naturalises these categorisations of Jews and justifies the exclusion of Jews from ‘our’ community on ‘historical’ grounds. It was also a discursive device to appeal to readers’ mental representations of Jews -the deep-seated racist discourse about Jews- to be able to make sense of the Thrace events. Such a perception of Jews led columnists to justify the locals’ resentment and reaction and establish a framework to debate the Thrace events, in terms of Jews’ domination in trade and their characteristics and not in terms of the specific socio-political context it emerged in Thrace and the role of the political authorities.

As the joke goes a Jew bought a ticket and opened the Torah and prayed the God that if he won he would give ten per cent of the lottery to the synagogue. After the draw he did not win. The next time he went to a Greek Church prayed the God if he won the lottery he would give ten per cent to the Church. He asked the priest to pray for him. The priest told him that the God is great and this time his wish would be granted. After the prize draw the Jew won the lottery. Papas waited for him to give ten per cent to the Church but the Jew never came close to the Church. The priest found Nesim and asked him the ten per cent. The Jew said to priest “my god knows me well, so he knew that if I won the lottery I would not give the ten per cent to the synagogue. Your God is a little naïve because he does not know me (*Milliyet*, Felek, 10 July 1934).

Derogation and abusive statements signal unequal power relations between the writers and addressee indicating that column writers has authority to judge, accuse and even abuse Jews.

Jokes and stories are used to offer the reader a ready made point of view. Categorisation of Jews as money lovers and dishonest is typical of these categories and stereotypes. This joke implies a power difference and also power abuse. The writer has the authority and power to make degrading jokes about Jews as part of his argumentation in the column to persuade the readers to accept his point of view and interpret the Thrace events in line with his opinion. The joke contributes to the prejudicial representation of Jews and reproduces the racist discourse.

Jewish Events by Selami İzzet, 8 July1934, *Vakit*

Christians and the Jews have not been on good terms for centuries. They always have problems with each other and this has never changed since the crucifixion of Jesus. The Christians have been hostile to the Jews who have crucified their God. Anti-Semitism is the outcome of this hatred.

The Thrace incident has caused sorrow for everyone. The migration of Jews to İstanbul as a result of the propaganda has caused regret for everyone. İsmet Pasha declared in the Assembly that the guilty would be punished and Şükrü Kaya bey went to Thrace to investigate the incidents...This is the most important proof that we are not enemies to the Jews (*Vakit*, Selami İzzet, 8 July1934).

İsmet Pasha's and Şükrü Kaya's denunciation of the Thrace events are taken to indicate the absence of anti-Semitism in Turkey. The editors' complete trust and faith in the government imply a national consensus and national unity behind the government. The ideological alliance of government and the columnists the wholly accepting attitude towards the political authority presuppose a neutral and strong government. Such a discursive strategy prevents asking questions about the political authority and conceals the political nature of decisions and practices of the politicians. It thus contributes to the perception of authority and existing relations of domination as natural and common

sense hence the reproduction of the dominant rule and mould opinions in the direction of the established beliefs about the nature of the political authority.

A common attitude among the column writers in explaining the Thrace events were it was the outcome of Jews' dominance in trade and the local population's resentment against them. Establishment of such causality between the Jews' domination in trade and Thrace events had serious ideological implication such as the association of Jewish dominance in trade with their 'natural' characteristics, as compatible with typical stereotyping of the Jews. This was part of an argumentative strategy by the column writers to convince the readers that throughout history Jews faced problems wherever they settled in because of this 'natural' inclination to trade.

Jewish-ness and Judaism by G.A., *Milliyet*, 15 July 1934

The Jews had been considered a nation neither in history nor today. Beginning with the time of the Beni Israel when they lived like a tribe, their history in their holy book, which was not only read by the Jews but many different tribes in history, is full of the sorrow and disaster for the Jews.

However when the Jews were dispersed and began living among other nations, the disasters did not end. The disaster in Spain might be forgotten but the one in Germany has been going on only in the last two years.

If you ask the Jews, these disasters are caused by religious discrimination. In fact, while the other tribes believed in different gods and respected them, the Jews believed only one god and this might have caused hostility of the other tribes. The old disasters might be attributed to religious reasons but what about the new ones? In the last two years the Germans have not been mentioned any religious reason for not wanting the Jews.

It is quite naïve to consider all Jews as coming from the Sámi race and Beni Israel. However, while this might be naïve for others if they defend this opinion, the Jews themselves defend this view. In the world, while all the races have been mixed over the centuries, only the Jews claim that they stayed pure despite the fact that they live in almost all countries. Zionism and its aim to ...all the Jews in Israel is the result of this claim which caused new disasters for the Jews (*Milliyet*, by G.A., 15 July 1934, Appendix 8).

This is another ‘historical’ explanation provided by G.A. in *Milliyet*, who through reversal, argued that it was Jewish claims to be a distinct race that caused resentment wherever they live. The writer’s arguments have anti-Semitic overtones with regard to the interpretation of Jews’ having a history ‘full of sorrows and disasters’.

From the writer’s point of view, the ideology of Zionism is the cause of the ‘disasters’ Jews faced in Germany and other countries, and also a well known anti-Semitic argument against Jews, which reverse the charges and makes the Jews themselves responsible agents for attracting reaction of the local populations. Categorisation of Jews as acting the same with no different opinions about them as ‘proved’ historically has serious ideological implications. If Jews, as shown by the writer, faced resentment throughout history because of their insistence on seeing themselves as a distinct race, then it is ‘natural’ that they should face discrimination as a community. It is also significant that the writer blamed Jews for being discriminated against because of Zionism in Germany, where the fascists made exactly the same claim for the Arian race.

Can Turks be anti-Semitic? by Va-Nu, *Haber*

Our republican regime is absolutely and totally opposed to such practices as shown to everybody by the speeches and actions of the honourable İsmet Paşa and Şükrü Kaya Bey”.

Can Turks be anti-Semitic?

This action against the Jews both in the past and recently has been considered as unjust by the ninety nine per cent of the Turks I know of. The Musevis who escaped from Spain and came to Turkey were not harmed in any way for centuries. We understand that anti-Semitism is to do with Christian fundamentalism which goes nineteen hundred years back to a time when the churches prayed to take the revenge of a crime against Christ. Our republican regime is absolutely and totally opposed to such practices as shown to everybody by the speeches and actions of the honourable İsmet Paşa and Şükrü Kaya Bey (*Haber*, Va-Nu, 8 June 1934).

The title ‘Can the Turks be anti-Semitic?’ is a rhetorical question to which the answer ‘no Turks cannot be anti-Semitic’ is presupposed. Rhetorical questions as a discursive strategy ‘used to achieve linguistically engineered group solidarity’ which requires constructive or unconscious cooperation of reader to bring his knowledge of discursive model in and agree with the editorial assumption’ (Fowler, 1991: 219).

Here, in the nominalizations ‘this act’, the agent position mystifies the act committed by an unknown, unidentified force. By claiming that ‘this act’ is denounced by a hyperbolic ninety nine five percent of the people, the writer knew that he was emphasising the positive qualities of the Turks. The local syntax structure enabled coherence after praising the Turks, the writer introduced the well known example of Jews exodus from Spain and reminded readers of Turkish hospitality for centuries, thus strongly emphasising ‘our’ good qualities. The writer vilifies Christianity, an arch enemy of the Jews, appealing to irrelevant information to effect the emotions of the Jews to remind them who the real enemy is. After emphasising the bad qualities of the real enemy who was after a revenge for thousands of years, ‘our’ exemplary behaviour is re-emphasised ‘our republican regime oppose such practices’ which is demonstrated by the actions of Prime Minister Ismet İnönü and the Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya by carrying out an investigation. All these are strategies to background the agency and deny responsibility.

We should think of the Thracians by Ebuziyya Zade, *Zaman*, 13 July 1934

...However, this migration should direct our attention to a more important fact about the Thrace. We have been concerned more than enough with the migration and return of a few Jews. The prime Minister made a strong speech about this and sent the interior Minister to the region. All of these are what an honourable government does.

However, beyond all these noise, the most important thing to consider is the state of the Thracian people. While the immigration news was followed with excitement no one asked what the people of the Thrace thought, what they wanted, under what conditions the Thracian people lived in this most precious but most dangerous part of the Turkish

homeland? However, for all the Turks, these questions and what they point to are more important than few people moving around for economic reasons.

In all these problems and incident, only the native Thracian people have been poorly treated. They are the ones who face the danger of war. They sit on a time bomb. Political feuds explode near them and in their own land they cannot earn a piece of bread to survive. By accident one day when they finally say “allow me to earn now” they are told to sit back and not to disturb anyone (*Zaman*, Ebuziyya Zade, 13 July 1934, Appendix 9).

Column writer explained Thrace events in terms of Jews’ dominance in Thrace which necessarily involved the repercussions of this domination for the local people of Thrace who were represented as the ‘real’ victims. Such a discursive strategy frames economic affairs in terms of personal or communal strengths and weaknesses.

The relationship between the two communities was dichotomised by the underlying belief that ‘their’ interests and ‘our’ interests do not coincide. The implication of such a dichotomous representation of two communities had serious ideological underpinnings in the context of 1930s. Jews were blamed for dominating trade in the region, thereby creating disadvantaged economic circumstances for the locals, who were prevented from engaging in fair competition. The locals’ resentment was justified and Jews’ legitimacy as part of the ‘our’ society was questioned. The ideological significance of such a discursive move was to prevent questions over economic policies of the government, world economic crisis, and wider relations of power.

The transfer of the agency position to Jews and the victims’ position to the Thracians eliminated the actors responsible from the explanations. The ideological significance of transferring Jews into actor position is to focus attention on their characteristics.

It is easy to sit in Istanbul and benefit from its beauty, fun and wealth and scream about a small trivial incident which nothing more than a few traders coming to Istanbul and returning...

Would those enjoying their lives and shouting now go to Thrace and defend it and endanger their lives if Thrace faces a threat... Not only here, but there in Thrace any of those making money but not leaving a tiny space for the people of Thrace to work, would they sacrifice a few drops their blood, or let alone blood, a few pennies of their earnings to defend Thrace against the enemy? (*Zaman*, Ebuziyya Zade, 13 July 1934).

Jews' reactions to the Thrace events were discredited by the assertion that all fuss and the scream was about "few traders coming to Istanbul and returning". By describing the reactions of Jews as shouts and screams, the writer degrades their importance and delegitimizes the Jews' right to complain. Mentioning Istanbul Jews' affluence and wealth implies a privileged community who only benefit themselves and contribute not a penny to the country where they live and make their wealth. The rhetorical questions are contrastive comparisons between 'us', who sacrifice everything for the motherland and 'they' who live in affluence in this land and take advantage of its benefits but sacrifice not a penny for it. The use of the metaphor of blood is to heighten the degree of sacrifice between 'us' and 'them'. For centuries 'we' spilt 'our' blood for this land and to protect it against the enemy and 'they' occupy this land in order to harvest its wealth. The counterfactual and the rhetorical question "if the enemy threatened..." is used to dramatise the issue and as part of the conversational style to create a space for the reader to occupy, however, the writer assumes the reader will respond as expected.

The columnist exaggerated the 'we' qualities while discrediting 'they' qualities, with the aim of normalising the division between 'us', the majority and real patriots, and 'them', a minority, representing only their own interests (van Dijk 1995).

Jew cannot be deceived by Selami İzzet, *Vakit*, 13 July 1934

The Jews panicked unnecessarily and left Thrace. They created a huge commotion for nothing. They sold their property and goods for almost nothing and left.

Their shops were full of goods which were sold for almost nothing. It was a heartbreaking scene. We could not make sense of their rush. Why were they in such a hurry we could not understand.

We just watched them to leave.

The next day it became clear why they were in a hurry.

After farewells, when the new owners entered the shops to check the goods, they understood the reason for all the fuss and hurry. We were in shock. I am sure you will be shocked when you read this. Except for one all the boxes on the shelves were empty! Empty! The Jews created all the fuss and noise when they were leaving, they sold nothing for nothing. They sold the empty boxes pretending they were full of goods.

I thought it was only me, so I ran outside in shock and saw the others who had also been deceived.

Do you understand at least one of the reasons for this commotion?

When I read this letter, I remembered an article by Ercüment Ekrem Bey. While his friend was looking through his grandfathers old notebooks, he wondered about the low prices of food and other goods and says:

They say that when a Jew becomes poor he brings back his old books of lending (Yahudi züğürtleyince eski defterleri karıştırırmış).

If you ask me Jews should not bring back the old books otherwise they will be deceived.

No, Jews cannot be deceived! (*Vakit*, Selami İzzet, 13 July 1934, Appendix 10).

Categories help to encode representation of experience and values. Fowler argues that “our mental dictionary stores ideas in sets structured around certain formal logical relationships such as oppositeness, complementarity, inclusion, equivalence” (Fowler, 1991: 54). When used regularly and in appropriate situations these categories help language users to become familiar with the meaning of the words. Newspapers use these categories as the key vocabulary as if natural and fundamental (Fowler, 1991: 57).

Jews were defined by their communal identities, with no individual, class or gender differences that mattered; with no differences of opinion or conflict among them, who all shared the same characteristics and acted in the same way. They were not alluded to by their names and no specific information is given about them. The ideological significance of such discursive strategy is to prevent representation of Jews as ‘normal’ individuals with ordinary lives like ‘us’ who might have suffered the consequences of

the attacks like an ordinary person would have done. Representation of Jews only as members of a community is to deny them the position of an individual with different and sometimes conflicting interests and with initiative. Such representations led the column writers to make sweeping judgements and overgeneralisations about Jews, and contributed to the reproduction of prejudices and stereotypes about Jews which may prevail in society at large. It was also a discursive strategy to deny a space to individual experiences, the personal stories of Jews who underwent tragic episodes during the Thrace events. Citing the 'historical' stories in relation to Jews' characteristics is a discursive strategy to provide over-complete and irrelevant negative categorisation of Jews in order to de-legitimise their actions.

Jews were stereotyped as rational economic calculators with natural inclination in trade. Through using explicit categories about the non-Muslims, the press helped to normalise the existing prejudices against non-Muslims. The press played an important role in the reproduction of the already existing discourses against minorities. However, it is not necessarily the case that the press always played on existing prejudices, or to put it, another way, it does not necessarily mean that press representation of stereotypes are always based on existing prejudices in society. There may be cases where the press itself constructs stereotypical representations, although this may take a long time to evolve into a social value.

Categories are used as if they are natural categories. Column writers frequently used categories in their representation of Jews, defined them by their ethnic differences and attributed certain fixed characteristics and demarcated them from the natives, from 'us'. By categorising the Jews as a peculiar community with its own way of life as different from 'ours', whose interest is not compatible with 'our' interests, the press contributed to the stereotypical public perception of Jews as a rich close-knit self-serving community. Phrases such as "Jews cannot be fooled" and "to bring back the old books" are evaluative, prejudicial, racist and anti-Semitic addresses.

I was talking with a Jew with Rumeli accent. I asked him where he was from, he said from Edirne. He told me that he used to own a shop in Edirne but sold it and came to Istanbul. He sold bits and pieces to survive. He said that he was happy that things were calm in Thrace. He added 'God permit we will return. God save İsmet Pasha and Şükrü Kaya Bey...' When I left I admired the man's speed in adapting to the circumstances. He has just come to Istanbul and straight away found bits and pieces to sell on the streets (*Haber*, Va-Nu, 10 July 1934).

This is an interview – one of the two direct contacts with the Jews by the journalists-conducted with one of the Jewish migrants. The writer's comments reinforce the stereotypical image of Jews who could adapt to any circumstance and with 'natural' ability to trade and earning money had no difficulty in surviving. The focus here is on the man who can rapidly adapt to any situation, not on man who lost his shop and was trying to survive through petty trade. Such a discursive strategy prevents the reader empathising with the man, and instead focuses on his ability, which reinforces the existing prejudicial beliefs about Jews. Such a discursive strategy prevents readers' empathy, instead focusing on the ability to trade, which reinforces exiting prejudices about Jews, that they are naturally inclined to trade and, thus, can always overcome difficult situations.

Categories were also used for Anatolian peasants. They were categorised as poor but dignified and ready to sacrifice everything for the state. These categorisations used to mark 'our' qualities and positive assets from 'their' negative qualities. The ideological significance of such categorisation is to imply national consensus among 'us' about 'our' government.

Jewish Problem and Turkey by Mümtaz Faik, *Milliyet*, 8 July 1934

Is the reason for the attacks anti-Semitic? However, anyone with common sense would know that these incidents cannot be anti-Semitic because if it was so the Jews would not come to Istanbul instead they would leave Turkey and immigrate to different countries... When anti-Semitism began in Germany they immigrated to Palestine or other countries not to Berlin. One has to pay attention to the fact that these citizens are

now very comfortable in Istanbul and are equal before the law, as all Turkish citizens are. It is obvious that these incidents and migration of the Jews only happened in Thrace and it seems that these are local incidents with no organised movement. Any Jew who breaches the law will know that the criminal act will be punished same as for anyone who does any wrong to them will know that they will be prosecuted if they act unlawfully (*Milliyet*, by Mümtaz Faik, 8 July 1934).

The column writer strongly denied that the Thrace events were anti-Semitic. The 'locality' of the events was presented as proof that they were not anti-Semitic. Another claim defended by column writer was that Turkey's reputation as one of the most hospitable countries for Jews made it impossible for an anti-Semitic movement to emerge in Turkey. The reader is reminded of the other countries' negative actions against Jews in order to highlight 'our' past positive actions. These historical examples were taken to be signs of tolerance of Turkish people and state towards Jews in the past and in the present.

However, we have a right to demand that they should feel these cultures in their hearts and conscience. The mentality of Ferdinand I' Aragon and Isabelle de Castile who forced Jews and Muslims to convert to Catholicism in Spain can find no place in Turkey. Philippe first invited the rich Jews to Spain to trade in the champagne markets but when the markets ended he expelled them and confiscated their jewellery and money. This is not the behaviour of the Turkish state, which has an honourable place in the twentieth century, and had been honourable throughout history. There is no need to talk about this from the point of view of the issue of race. The government has taken the necessary measures and this would surely satisfy the Jews. Those who have been involved in the incidents should settle complaints and their grievances through the courts, in the knowledge that they will receive a fair hearing. They should be sure that the justice of the Turks is higher than the Justice of Suleyman (*Milliyet*, Mümtaz Faik, 8 July 1934).

In the case of the Thrace events the 'us' and 'them' dichotomy is a frequently used to emphasise positive self-representation and negative other representation. The

distinction is also made between belonging and not belonging to our community, which is often expressed in terms of integration or adaptations (Fowler 1991, 16; van Dijk 1995). The adaptation problem was related to speaking Turkish. Jews were accused of resisting adaptation to Turkish culture by insisting on speaking foreign languages and not learning Turkish properly. The assertion that qualification for being part of 'our' community is linguistic and cultural implies that the linguistic and cultural diversity of the Jews separated them from integrating into Turkish culture.

Column writer stated their requirements which would qualify Jews to be part of 'our' community, to speak Turkish and to adapt to Turkish culture. The right to demand is a significant indication of authority of the column writer over Jews, as well as qualifying 'us' as a genuine part of the society and 'they' as less genuine in relation to the requirements to adapt.

Jews are reminded of their flight from Spain and the hospitality of the Turks for centuries in order to make them appreciate this country. The historical examples are part of the discursive strategy to give irrelevant details which contribute to 'our' good actions and deny any significance to the Thrace events. The issue becomes one of comparing the past good and bad actions of governments and analysing the present event in the light of this information, which is again a discursive move to avoid linking Thrace events in the present socio-political context.

Jewish Events by Selami İzzet, *Vakit*, 8 July 1934

In fact it is clear that the Jews been panicked unnecessarily. The reason for this, I assure you, is language-less-ness, that means not being able to speak Turkish.

Can there be anything comparable to the sorrow and shame one feels when one sees those who have been living and earning their livings on this land for centuries and who have accumulated wealth with the money of this country use translator to petition government?

We hear that some citizens come from Edirne and Kırklareli because their houses were attacked and their shops have been closed. They are in fear. You ask where they stay

and you are answered with broken Spanish and French. Neither can you ask about their problems properly, nor can they explain them. Those responsible for these incidents will be captured. The rights of the Jews will be given”, however, they should not forget that the religion of the Turks is the Turkish language and economy. We will not tolerate crucifixion of these. We won’t!

We just hope that the Jews should forget about the Ottoman traditions and become Turkified. The Turks have always shown their good will. How about them? (*Vakit*, Selami İzzet, 8 July 1934).

Jews were warned for concentrating on business and trade only with partners from their own communities thus preventing any entry into this tightly-knit community by Turkish tradesmen. The Jews were subjected to columnist’s hate speeches especially on the language issue which was associated with Jews’ ungratefulness. The column writers focused on the issue of language representing the most important division between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

The Jews’ inability to speak intelligible Turkish was criticised by the column writer was a typical of ‘hate speech’<sup>90</sup> warning to the Jews that they were tolerated and looked after by this nation, yet they showed their ingratitude by insisting on speaking foreign languages, hence not adapting to ‘our’ culture. The rhetorical question about Jews’ not being able to petition the government in Turkish despite the fact that they had been living and earning on the land for centuries invited the readers to a judgement. The response is common sense as implied by the following statements about the difficulty of Jews to explain their problems in Turkish.

The column ends with a threat. Like Christians who never forgave Jews for crucifying Christ, hence anti-Semitism, if Jews “crucify Turkish language and economy”, then anti-Semitism in Turkey will be inevitable. With an argumentative move the writer justifies anti-Semitism of Christians and implies that Jews are the causes of anti-Semitism, which is again reproduction of racism against the Jews. The writer clearly

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<sup>90</sup> Timms defines hate speech as “...the association of specific minority groups with criminal behaviour...and the accusation that their activities were eroding national identity” (Timms, 1999: 10)

marks out Jews outside 'our' community by identifying himself 'we' as Turks and 'they', Jews expected to prove their goodwill to become part of 'us'.

What do the Jews say? by Va- Nu, *Haber*

To be fair, I have to add that the few hours I spent among the Jews I had the impression that, except two, many of them spoke an unintelligible Spanish or French with a tone that hurt one's ears. It must be added that one of the reasons for their treatment in their neighbourhood is do with their resistance to the Turkish culture (*Haber*, Va- Nu, 6 July 1934).

The casting aspersions on the Jews' accent are one of the common practices in the 1930s Turkey which is overexaggerated by the writer and presented as one of the reasons of their ill-treatment by their neighbours, hence the justification of the Thrace events. The comment includes both warning and advice. To prevent any reaction Jews are advised to adapt to Turkish culture. Speaking Turkish is presented as one of the criteria that Jews should meet to become part of this community.

#### **4.1.4.1. Assessment**

Column writers explained the Thrace events in accordance with the views of the government. Accessed voices are used as the main sources of information which were taken to be the only account of the events. These officials had the privileged access and an advantage to define the event and its parameters. By representing the official view as neutral, common sense and the sole account of the Thrace events, the press reproduced the official definitions, claims and prepositions about the events, actors involved, their relations and the nature of authority. This reproduction of the official account also entailed reproduction of the existing relations of power and domination. The columns' ideological function therefore was to reproduce the wider beliefs and values about authority and power as natural and as the way things were. Jews are not wanted anywhere in the world because they cause deprivation of the locals when they settle. This is a racist rhetoric often expressed by the nationalist ideologies, were used by the

columnists to justify discrimination and racist prejudices against Jews, thus have contributed to the legitimation of racist conceptions about the Jews.

The columnists framed the Thrace events in terms of national interests thus reproduced the official account the events. The Prime Minister's speech was used intertextually or in quotes in the articles repeatedly as the only valid explanation of the events. The columnists were concerned with how much damage these events would cause to the reputation of Turkey abroad. Their argumentative strategies geared to convince the reader that an absolute loyalty to the government and trust in its ability to solve the problem would be the best answer to the conspirators who aim to damage the reputation of Turkey. The citizens –especially the Jews- were required to show their loyalty and do not complain or overreact to the events but to show absolute trust in the government. The columnists often called to show their loyalty thus implying that they had the authority to test the loyalty of the Jews and the Jews were in need of proving their loyalty.

The columnists denied the anti-Semitic nature of the Thrace events and re-defined the Thrace events as Jewish migration. The discursive strategy of defining the events as Jewish migration helped the journalist to shift the argument where the actions of the Jews became the topic. Such a discursive strategy allowed the transforming responsibility from the attackers to Jews who had to migrate because they caused economic threat to the locals, hence the resulting reaction against them. Such an account of the events reproduced the common stereotype and racist conceptions about the Jews that they controlled the trade and business in Thrace only benefiting their own community and leaving no space to local people to take chance in business. This explanation was confirmed by the official reports which provided the rationale for the press to transfer responsibility from the agents committed the crime to Jews for being dominant in trade.

The column writers' explanation of Thrace events had serious ideological implications for the positions of Jews in Turkey. One of the functions of these columns was to provide an explanation for the Thrace events to help the readers to make sense of the events in terms that was presented by columnists, to establish a framework to discuss the events and naturalise and make them common sense. Column writers mainly focused on Jews and their characteristics as the causes of resentment in Thrace and led them to search for the historical roots of Jew' differences. Religious mythology and anti-Semitic arguments were used to prove Jews' differences, hence the justification of Thrace events. Jews' acceptance into 'our' community was tied to various requirements, speaking Turkish being the most important.

Column writers assumed authority to decide who belonged to the nation and who did not and what were the requirements of belonging gave them immense power to mould the criteria to be applied to any situation. For example, Jews' overreacting to the threats and complaining about the attacks could be considered as criteria for loyalty to nation and hence qualification for belonging to 'our' community. Column writers' use of various discursive strategies thus delegitimated Jews as equal members of 'our' society through discrediting their statements, ignoring their complaints, and questioning their status in society.

The columnists categorised and stereotyped the Jews. Their focus on the Jews' engagement in trade was to emphasise the essentialist characteristics of the Jews who were supposedly traders by birth or 'a curse and a gift' given to them by God which made them rich wherever they settled and caused the poverty of the local populations. The column writers invoked these ancient myths and stories about the Jews to justify the locals' reaction and attacks against the Jews thus reproducing the racist preconceptions about the Jews.

Such a discursive strategy delegitimated the economic activities of the Jews hence their existence as a legitimate part of the community since 'their' economic activities were

detrimental to the interests of the ‘natives’ the ‘real owners’ of this land. The columnists’ emphasis of ‘difference’ or the ‘deviance’ of the non-Muslims justified the discourse of exclusion of the Jews from ‘our’ community. Thus the columnists exercised symbolic violence on the non-Muslims by denying them a legitimate status as citizens of the Republic of Turkey and confining them the status of ‘guest’ whose existence was just bearable and as guests they were obliged to prove their loyalty to the state and nation to deserve to be on this land. This request was emphasised by the columnists when the news appeared that the Jews were suspected of spying. It was also a strategy to invoke the days of the National Independence years when the non-Muslims’ names were often associated with spying and fifth branch activities. The columnists, thus, further contributed to the reproduction of the stereotypical images of the non-Muslims and delegitimated their status within the society. Column writers addressed Jews from the position of an authority implied power difference which manifested itself in the use of derogatory comments and racist jokes about Jews. As such they contributed to and reproduced discrimination and the existing prejudices against Jews.

#### **4.2. A Critical Analysis of the 1942 Wealth Tax**

The Wealth tax is the second case I will attempt to analyse as another instance, after the 1934 Thrace Events, where the subject of the press discourse is the non-Muslims. Through critical analysis of the news reports, editorials and comment columns I hope to reveal continuities in the press treatment of the non-Muslim minorities in a different historical context. After a brief summary of the wealth tax which is mainly based on the book by Faik Ökte, *the Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax*, I will conduct my inquiry in the news reports, editorials and columns using the same analytical tools used in the previous chapter.

I classified the news under the topics of the introduction of the tax where the news reports were analysed according their focus such as introducing and defining the Wealth

tax and justification of the tax: the language of facts and figures. These news reports incorporated the official definition of the tax either weaving the statements of the Prime Minister's into the news text or quoting him in length to highlight his justification of the tax. It was also involved printing lengthy news reports displaying figures to show the wealth of the tax payers which served to justify the tax and helped to reproduce the official explanations. The use of figures provided the rationale for the tax through the language of numbers. In the second category I analysed the news under the sub-titles of 'us' and 'them' and petitions of complaints. These news reports used strong evaluative language in their representation of the tax-payers who were happened to be predominantly non-Muslims as the names printed in the newspapers showed. The tax payers were accused of consciously evading the tax which was interpreted as indicating their ungratefulness for 'this' country. Thus, these news reports presented a dichotomous view of 'us' and 'them', categorising the non-Muslim tax payers as 'others' who used the benefits of this country at the expense of 'us'. Under the third category I classified the news reports under the sub-titles of property confiscations and labour camps. These new reports embodied very aggressive tone towards the tax defaulters who were sent to the labour camps and whose properties were confiscated. The tax defaulters were vilified in these news reports as 'traitors' who were blamed for cheating the government not to pay the tax hence the ideological representation of the non-Muslims.

Editorials were selected to be representative of the newspapers' approach towards the wealth tax. The columns were selected also to be representative of the each column writer's point of view but at the same time reflecting the general approach towards the tax among the columnists. Editorials and columns will also be analysed to the extend that they reflected the official view of the events and the main argumentative strategies they adopted to convince the readers to accept the point of view they presented thus contributing to the neutralisation of the official account.

#### 4.2.1. A Brief Account of the Wealth Tax

The architect of the Wealth tax <sup>91</sup> was the Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu and the Finance Minister Fuat Ağralı. <sup>92</sup> Other men took part in the tax assessment and execution of the tax was the Director of Finance of Istanbul Faik Ökte, Istanbul Governor Lütfü Kırdar, the CHP representatives and the head of the Board of Inquiry Şevket Adalan, the Finance Inspector Mehmet İzmen and the assistant Finance Director Muhittin Gürün (Ökte, 1987: 18). The wealth tax was passed on 12 November 1942, Law No.4305. Its purpose as stated in the preamble was to tax those who exploited the difficult economic situations but did not pay the tax (25). The Prime Minister Saraçoğlu in an interview by the Times declared “the law will be applied without any concession for those who have been benefiting from the hospitality of this country and have become rich yet hesitate to do their share of duty for this country” (Ayn Tarihi, 1943).

The tax was directed to those with wealth exceeded TL 5,000 and whose annual income exceeded TL 2,500. Other categories added to this such as the joint stock companies, contractor agents, large farm and real estate owners which were to be taxed separately (Ökte, 1987: 29-30) but the exact amount for the each taxpayer to be assessed by the local assessment boards. The peddlers and private salary earners were also included as tax payers the latter two were to be applied only to the non-Muslims not to the Muslims (35). However, the finance inspectors began to assess the tax payers’ wealth not their income.<sup>93</sup> The legal duration for the payment of the tax was two weeks. The payments had to be made in cash. After two weeks 1 per cent fine for the first and 2 per cent for

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<sup>91</sup> See the TBMM commission report on 13 November 1942 (BCA. 030.10/135.970.08).

<sup>92</sup> Ökte argues that he was later informed by some deputies that the bill was debated in a secret party session and despite some objection it was defended by the Prime Minister Saraçoğlu enthusiastically who blamed the non-Muslims with hoarding and war-profiteering. According to Ökte at the meeting the Prime Minister promised the deputies that Turks were not to be taxed, but later when some Turks were also listed as tax payers these deputies expressed their dissatisfaction that they were assured by the Prime Minister that Muslims were exempted from the tax. According to Ökte including some Turks into the lists of tax payers was a façade as if it was a uniform fiscal measure (Ökte 1987, 23).

<sup>93</sup> Ökte argued that he and Adalan suggested Ankara not to impose the tax on Muslim salary earners and peddlers. Government approved their suggestion, see Ökte (1987, 35).

the second week was to be imposed on the tax payers. At the end of a month if the tax was not paid the tax payers' and his/her next of kin property to be confiscated and the tax payer to be sent to the labour camp. The defaulters' property to be sold at public auctions (Ökte 1987, 25).

A commission was set up to assess the individuals' taxes on the basis of the information given by the finance inspectors who listed the Greeks, Armenian and the Jewish taxpayers separately according to the information they gathered from 'the national banks, the Republican Peoples' Party Offices, the Security Directorate and the reliable Istanbul merchants' (ibid: 32). According to Ökte information gathered were rather inadequate based on insufficient data either with conflicting or grossly exaggerated figures by the Security Directorate or the Republican People's Party (ibid).

The lists of the tax payers were divided into two, the Muslims (M list) and the non-Muslims (Gayrimüslim or the G list). Later foreigners (E list or Ecnebi) and dönmes (D list for the Sabbatayan sect of Jewish converts to Islam) were added to the list. Dönmes paid about twice as much as Muslims, non-Muslims up to ten times as much. Foreigners on instruction from Ankara were to be assessed at the same rate as Muslims (Brown: 1987: xi). According to Ökte he and Adalan agreed to impose a tax on the non-Muslims two or three times over the Muslims based on the article 34 of the Profit Tax Law No.2395. However, in the Ankara lists 'the non-Muslims were taxed five or ten times the amount levied on Muslim Turks. The new rates were set by the Premier Saraçoğlu himself'. The final lists were published and the number of Istanbul taxpayers amounted to 62,675 with tax assessments of TL 349, 988, 922 (Ökte 1987, 34-35).

There was no right to appeal against the tax based on the Article 11 and the Article 13 of the Tax Law No.4305. Those who failed to pay the tax were liable to arrest and deportation to the labour camps. Article 14 prevented the recovery of the property based on claims of leasing rights or holding in pledge. Only exception to this rule was the

cases of error of fact and duplication. After the publication of the lists petitions protesting the assessments totalled 24,316 (ibid, 21, 51).

On 12 January 1943 a decree approved by the Council of Ministers regulated the forced labour for the failure to pay the tax. These were selected from the Greeks, Armenians and Jews who were taxed over TL 50,000 and have not paid 30 per cent of their liabilities (68). Special provision for exemption from forced labour was made for people over the age of 55, government and municipal functionaries and women, foreign residents, salary earners and those who was taxed below TL5, 000 (72). Around 1400 non-Muslims were sent to the first labour camp in Aşkale in Erzurum. The deportees were obliged to work in the camps until they paid the entire tax.<sup>94</sup> However, the number of tax defaulters was so high that the government officials were unable to organise despatch all of them, instead the payment deadline was extended first by ten days towards to end almost by a year and a half, which caused an inequality among those who were sent to the camp and those had extensions. Neither Muslim Turks nor foreign would be sent to forced labour camps. Twenty one persons died at the end of this tax affair (64). The tax payers' properties were confiscated at the same time they were dispatched to the labour camps (67). Movable and immovable properties were confiscated and sold at public auctions. Some banks offered credits in exchange of the properties. Ökte argued that the Emlak bank gained great advantage from the loans and achieved profits equal to its entire capital within a year and a half. Another institution profited from the auctions of the tax payers' property was the National Reinsurance institution which bought valuable properties cheap in exchange of the clear off the taxes (75). The wealth tax was abolished on 15 March 1944 by Law No.4530. The defaulters were released from their forced labour and the tax was written off. At the end of the wealth tax 62, 675 taxpayers paid total TL 349, 988, 922 (65).

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<sup>94</sup> Ökte noted the unrealistic calculation and mentioned that in order a defaulter to pay his TL 100, 000 in tax he had to work over 250 years in the camps to clear his debt (Ökte 1987, 25, 26).

#### **4.2.2. Critical Analysis of News Coverage of the 1942 Wealth Tax**

Critical analysis of the Wealth Tax is based on the coverage of the news reports, editorials and the columns appeared in *Cumhuriyet, Tan, Ulus, Akşam, İkdam, Vatan, Dünya, Milliyet, Vakit and Tasviri Efkar* between November 12, 1942, when the tax was passed in the parliament and March 15, 1943, when the news on the dispatches of the tax defaulters to the forced labour camps was abound.

##### **4.2.2.1. Introducing and Defining the Tax: News Sources and Official Definitions**

Prime minister declared that the main objective of the tax was to tax the wealth of the big farmers, traders and land owners. A commission of six including the governor or the mayor, the district revenue officer and the director of the finance and other four from the chambers of trade and agriculture and the council were selected to assess the appropriate tax for each tax payer. He also stated that the time between declaration of the tax assessments and the payments was kept short in order to avoid misuses, two weeks for announcement and two weeks for collection. After the time limit tax payers obliged to pay one per cent fine for the first week and two per cent for the second week. At the end of the second week if the tax payers did not pay the tax would face property confiscation or work in the labour camps until the tax is fully collected. The Prime Minister stated that the other main objectives of the tax were to reduce the money in circulation, meet the needs of the country, revalue the Turkish liras, end speculations and ensure price moderation.

The extraordinary price rises has been the result of shortage of consumer goods and imports, the inadequate regulation and especially the unsatisfied greed and ambition. Above all else money in circulation is very high and it causes inflation. We need to withdraw some of this money through taxation. According to the ranks of importance first the merchants, rent and profiteers and large farm owners will be taxed.

During the war the merchants earned a great deal by taking advantage of the war conditions. That is why they will pay the higher tax.

These people belong to a certain group and class and everyone knows what they do in business. Therefore we do not hesitate to tax their wealth in accordance with the assessment made by a commission (applause).

Since we set the limit above five hundred as we are protecting the poor and the weak. During our investigation we were shocked to find out how certain groups of merchants and businessmen found many intricate ways to evade tax. We will take necessary measures to prevent such occurrences in the future (bravo chants).

The second tax assessment will be based on the owners of halls, warehouses, hamams and large buildings. Their owner will be taxed if their rent is above 2500 Liras.

The third tax assessment is based on the the farm owners. The farmers will be taxed to only five per cent of their wealth. 500 TL tax will not in any way affect their business.

A commission of six will assess the individuals' tax (*Ulus*, 11 November 1942, Appendix 11).

This speech constituted the main framework the newspapers reported the wealth tax. The main contentions of the speech were reproduced by the news reports intertextually or through quotes by accessed voices. The prime minister firmly stated that the greed of the merchants, traders, and large farm owners were responsible for war profiteering and they had to pay some of the profit back as tax to the government. The fact that the Prime Minister warned the public in advance about the acts of mischief to foul the government he thus labelled some of the tax payers to be suspected of attempts of tax evasions. Objections to the tax were also considered as attempts to evade the tax. Moreover, in the government declaration it was stated that the assessments were just and not beyond the financial power of the tax payers, a statement coming from the government prevented objections to be expressed against the tax, discrediting any legitimate and reasonable criticism to be raised against the tax or the individual assessments.

The official sources introduced the tax as a necessary measure to reduce inflation, price rises and solve the problem of shortage of consumer goods, above all to stop the 'unsatisfied greed' of the traders and merchants. The initial news reports on wealth tax embedded the official statements and reports into the news reports. The intertextual use of the official declarations in the news reports especially the prime minister's speech

involved his definition of the causes of the economic problems, his explanation of the rationale for introducing the tax and his categorisation of the tax payers. The official account of the tax is thus daily repeated and reproduced in the news reports.

...The price rises have been the result of decrease in production, import deficit and but most of all the unsatisfied greed. Today the money circulation exceeded the normal limits and we have to withdraw a certain amount of that money as tax. We have to impose tax on the war profiteers who doubled their income. This tax is designed for a temporary period. There are three groups that included in this area who are traders, landowners, farmers and rentier land owners. The traders earned extraordinary profits during the war years and we do not hesitate to tax their income (applause) (*Tan*, 12 November 1942).

The statement categorised the wealth tax payers as war profiteers whose wealth, it was claimed, would be taxed without hesitation. Such focus on tax payers' greed was an evaluative statement aimed to appeal to the readers' emotions at a time when people were suffering from food shortage, poverty and black market. Under these circumstances the claim that tax was imposed on speculators, greedy and blackmarkeeters was enough for the justification of the tax and to be perceived as a means to achieve social justice for the low income and the poor.

According to the government programme basic food stuff will be given to the low waged. The Wealth tax will be imposed on excessive earnings (*Vatan*, 12 November 1942).

The government will tax the extraordinary earnings

The civil servants will be given clothing material and shoes

Coal prices will not rise for household use

The low income citizens will not be left in despair

At an afternoon meeting the Wealth Tax passed in the parliament with 349 votes. Some of the members spoke about the sacrifices of the traders during the national independence war.

The Prime Minister said ‘Dear friends, we exempted from the tax persons who earn below 500. We have come across many tactics of those who want to evade the tax. We are in search of new ways to prevent tax evasions occurring in the future (applause). The second group we want to impose tax on is the owners of hamams, hotels, halls and apartments. However if their profit does not exceed 2,500 liras they will not be taxed. The third group is the big farmers who can easily pay 500 liras without an effect on their business. This amount will not exceed five per cent of a farmer’s property (*Ulus*, 12 November 1942).

The headline announced the wealth tax and the sub headlines followed it as the consequences of the wealth tax. By announcing the wealth tax and listing the ‘positive’ impact of the tax was a discursive strategy to imply that the tax has already benefited the low paid. Although the tax was just introduced no collection was being made the news report by stating that coal prices would not rise and the low income would not be in despair implied that these would be the impact of the tax thereby associating the tax with ‘social justice’. This discursive strategy helped to justify the tax by associating it with fairness and justice, deleted the government’s responsibility in the economic problems and focused attention on the wealthy who were solely associated with war profiteering. The implication of such framing of the tax was that associating the tax with justice and fairness labeled any criticism against it as suspicious and was easily discredited.

The ideological significance of associating the poverty of “us”, civil servants and the low income with war profiteers was to implicate the poverty with war profiteers and prevented asking questions about structural problems in economy that lead to poverty and low income. The war profiteering could be only part of the problem or the result of structural weaknesses of economy not the causes of all economic problems as implied in the news report above. In order to avoid the questions about wider relations of power including the economic and political power the report implied a strong link between the economic problems and the war profiteering, criminalising the tax payers.

The New Wealth Tax Law was passed in the parliament yesterday.

The Grand National assembly experienced a very important day today. The speech of the Prime Minister Saraçoğlu impressed the members of the Assembly and it was a – grand- speech suited to a statesman.

Today in the midst of uncertainties widespread, the speech of the Milli Şef supporting the government’s policies gave an assurance to the people (*Tan*, 12 November 1942).

Prime Minister’s speech was represented as the accurate view of the economic problems Turkey was going through. His diagnoses of the ‘problems’ were quoted or intertextually used as factual information rather than an opinion, a point of view. The support of the President signaled that there was consensus and unity at the top of the government hierarchy about the tax.

The Wealth tax will contribute TL 200 million to the treasury (*İkdam*, 13 November 1942).

Under the social circumstance this law is an historical phenomenon that is ilham edildi by a determined will and a national enthusiasm... (*Ulus*, 17 November 1942).

The Wealth tax was represented as a cure for all economic ills. News reports focused on the contribution of the tax to the treasury and as the most rational and adequate measure taken by government and met with approval.

The most important thing about the wealth tax is that it is just, it is productive and it is efficient and the result will be seen quickly. In this way the negative consequences of the price rises will not be on the poor citizens’ shoulders but on the rich (*Vatan*, 13 November 1942, Appendix 12).

This was the official explanation about the tax which was weaved into the news report and was treated as factual information rather than as opinions of the politician. The report used evaluative language and asserted the positive aspect of the tax which was

not being collected yet. By explicitly stating that the tax would benefit the poor not the rich it reproduced the ‘us’ and ‘them’ categorisations implying tension between the two.

#### **4.2.2.2 Justification of the Tax: the Language of Facts and Figures**

Lists of figures and numbers appeared in the newspaper pages from the display of lists in the finance offices on 18 November 1942 and continued in January, February and March 1943. The figures and numbers are considered as hard facts and as such they were effective in creating a sense of accuracy and precision.

Istanbul will pay 344 million tax...in Ankara 16,658,800 and in İzmir 26,701,766 tax paid... (*Tan*, 17 December 1942).

Antakya lists are published. The amount in total is 3.235.140 TL. Iskenderun 1.002.200 TL., Antakya 947.850, Kırıkhan 764,800, Reyhaniye 333.590, Dörtyol 171.100 TL., Yayladağı 8.000 and Hassa 7,600 TL. (*Tan*, 16 December 1942).

In Istanbul 2 people 2 million, one person 1,5 million and 9 people will pay between 1 and 1,5 million tax (*Tan*, 18 December 1942).

The tax payers were characterised as rich, who as the Prime Minister stated ‘everyone knew’ were the non-Muslims. When the lists were displayed the names of the tax payers revealed that the tax was imposed on the non-Muslims or the reverse, by implication it turned out that the non-Muslims were ‘the rich’, ‘war profiteers’ and ‘black marketeers’. Therefore the news reports were stereotyped and vilified the tax payers.

In Ankara, Arımaras oğlu and Fuat Baban 300.000, Burla brothers and Saiti Franko 200.000 are assessed to pay (*İkdam*, 17 December 1942,).

Printing long lists of tax payers and tax figures proved the wealth of the tax payers and justified the tax. It was thus legitimate to impose tax on those who made excessive wealth during the war. The names of the tax payers frequently appeared in the

newspapers which confirmed the widespread perception that non-Muslims were involved in blackmarketeering during the war and made their wealth illegitimately.

#### **4.2.2.3 Us and Them**

Government members asserted that paying the wealth tax was equal to serving the country. Equation of the tax and loyalty to the nation and state was reproduced in the news reports on a daily basis. In this the tax payers were categorised as ‘they’ whose loyalty was depended on their paying the tax and ‘us’ the rest of the society whose loyalty was not in question. Moreover, ‘we’, the peasants and the poor, have sacrificed everything for the nation and state in wars, in hard times and are still ready to do whatever is required of ‘us’ while ‘they’ took advantage of ‘our’ good intentions and have served ‘their’ own selfish interests. The ‘us’ category represented the positive values such as tolerance, good intentions while ‘they’ category represented negative ones such as ill-intention and selfishness, even treason.

Wealth tax is imposed because of the economic needs and it’s certain that other countries will adopt a similar tax.

Turkish peasants have been sacrificing everything for the benefit of the country during the war and whenever the government asked them they do the same without complaint and with pride. But some groups, traders, have turned a deaf ear to the call of the government and took advantage of the government’s tolerance. That is why this law had to be applied. We have to accept that some of the requirements of this law are hard. But we are ready to make things easy for those with good intentions, and if there is a mistake it will be corrected (*Akşam*, 21 January 1943).

Press reports’ use of the categories and stereotypes in representing the tax payers had serious ideological implications. The tax payers, besides being defined with their self-serving and ungratefulness these characteristics were presented as ‘natural’ part of their identity. Citing historical examples was a discursive strategy to remind the readers of the persistent behaviour of the tax payers, equals to non-Muslims. By overgeneralising

‘our’ positive values by implying that whenever there was a ‘national crisis’ and a ‘national problem’ ‘we’ were always united behind ‘our’ government who represented ‘our’ common interests, to emphasise ‘their’ negative values and differences from ‘us’ and implied that ‘they’ looked after their own interests and took advantage of ‘our’ hospitality.

This made the position of the non-Muslims illegitimate and suspect since paying the tax and supporting the government’s tax policy was equated with serving the country and loyalty to the nation, any failure or delay in paying the tax or any criticism against the tax by implication was equated with disloyalty and ungratefulness. Moreover, reminding the non-Muslims that ‘we’ tolerated ‘them’ implied unequal power relations between ‘us’ and ‘them’. It put ‘us’ in a powerful position to demand of ‘them’ to show their loyalty to our country. The ideological implication of such a discursive strategy was that the non-Muslims were considered as ‘outsiders’ or not one of ‘us’. They were expected to prove their loyalty whenever a question arose over the issue of it. Paying and not paying the wealth tax was such a case non-Muslims were expected to show their gratefulness to this country and nation.

The tax payers’ opinions and views or objections were not found a place in the news reports except when their views confirmed the official point of view.

Last night we telephoned the tax payers levied to pay the highest amount of tax. Barzilay who was charged with 2 million wealth tax said “we would not even think of avoiding the opportunity to serve our country. The amount is high but we recognise that every individual has different duty to the motherland. Some guard the national borders and others, when necessary, sacrifice all their wealth in the service of motherland. The latter is also our company’s duty...we will do whatever is required of us at whatever cost.

Manufacturer Ali Bezmen talked to the reporter in joy and said “we live in a peace of heaven, since we benefit from such advantages than we will shoulder the burden for it. Of course no one would like to be asked to give money...but this money will not be

spent on ordinary things. We keep a large army and we are being kept from a devastating fire (war) thanks to this army” (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 December 1942, Appendix 13).

The above interview with two non-Muslims confirms the dominant view that non-Muslims did not serve in the military. The wealth tax was presented as a debt of those who did not serve in defence of the country a chance to pay their debt. The two non-Muslims’ interviews confirm this view. Such a discursive strategy served a double function here. First, one of the common complaints about non-Muslimism that they did not serve in the defence of country was ‘acknowledged’ by the non-Muslims themselves. Secondly, the ‘requirement’ that the non-Muslims should contribute to the well being of this country by paying the wealth tax was accepted by the non-Muslims’ themselves as a legitimate demand. It was confirmed again in the words of Ali Bezmen “it is our duty to serve this country economically”. Paying the tax without complaint was taken to be a proof that they cared for ‘this’ country.

The statement also reproduced the rationale for the tax defended by the government. His praising of government’s policy and decision to keep a large army on foot as a rational decision was an argumentative strategy, implied consensus view of society that the government’s decisions was in the national interest. The significance of representation of political decisions as non-political was that it prevented asking questions about government’s policies and be critical of them. The two men’s complete trust in government’s decision contributed to the reproduction of the government’s authority and justified the tax.

Tax payers were given the agent position when the news were related to tax evasion or attempts to hide goods. News reports implied that tax payers had the money but waited until the last minute with the hope that they may find a way to evade it. Therefore news reports openly recommended tax payers to pay the tax and was not fouled by these hopes. This confirmed the suspicion about the ‘ill-intention’ of the tax payers and allowed wholesale judgements about the tax defaulters. This veiw was emphasised by

the lexical choice of ‘those who do not want to pay the tax’, indicating that the tax payers decided not to pay the tax which showed their ill-intentions.

In a *Cumhuriyet* report tax payers were warned:

Those who do not pay Wealth tax by tomorrow will be subject to asset law. Tax payment ends by tomorrow evening. Those who fail to pay the tax by tomorrow will be paying 1 percent fine for the first week and two percent for the following week. Failure to pay the tax by the end of two weeks the tax payers will be subjected to the property and asset collection law (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 January 1943).

An evaluative language was used in the following report about the Greek schools to strengthen the widespread perception that non-Muslims tried various ways to evade the tax.

Some Greek minority schools did not pay the wages of teachers using the wealth tax as an excuse. One of our well known manufacturer Moris was arrested. He has been living in Istanbul and made a good saving but in order to avoid the 150.000 tax he left Istanbul and was arrested by the police after they became suspicious of his behaviour. He was just about to go to Suriye (*İkdam*, 5 January 1943).

The property sale will begin on Tuesday morning of those who did not pay the tax. Every day tax collection rises. We are in the last two days of the varlık tax payment and yesterday all the finance offices were crammed with people. The other day the amount of money was collected in our city was 10.960,147. Previous day the amount was over 7 million, the 3 million difference in just one day shows that the people want to pay their tax before the legal time requirement is over (*Akşam*, 1 January 1943).

Some property owners are trying to evade the tax. The land and property registry offices were warned about these attempts. Some of the varlık tax payers have found ways to evade the tax like selling their property to their relatives...The authorities have taken new precautions to prevent these attempts (*Ulus*, 18 November 1942).

The figures were a discursive choice to indicate objectivity since the numbers represented facts and rationality. Their presence in the text ruled out the suspicion of bias and assured impartiality and objectivity. Tax payers were warned to pay their tax within the required time for otherwise their property would be confiscated and they would be sent to the labour camps. Even these threats and warnings were made in legal terminology to give the impression that these were part of the legal procedure not political choices which were ideologically determined. Any delay in paying the tax or any opposition against the tax was taken to be as tactics to evade the tax. The non-Muslims were stereotyped as who preoccupied with their own selfish desire. The implication of such a discursive strategy was to discredit objections of the non-Muslims to the tax assessments no matter on what basis. Thus the official standpoint was reproduced.

The news reports presented the tax defaulters' behaviour in terms of 'their interest' v.s. 'our interest' thereby reproducing the status of the non-Muslims outside boundaries of our community. Stereotypical representation of the non-Muslims with wealth and selfishness served to contribute to the common popular perception of the non-Muslimism as wealthy, not benefiting 'our' society but serving their own selfish interests. The column writers defined non-Muslims in terms of wealth, affluence, selfishness in opposition to Muslim Turks "us" who were poor, noble and self-sacrificing.

#### **4.2.2.4 Petitions of Complaints**

A number of newspapers reported that the tax payers were petitioning the government and objecting to the tax assessments. Complaints of tax payers against the tax were dismissed and presented as suspicious attempts to evade the tax.

There have been so many applications to the tax offices. These personal applications have increased our work load and kept our officers busy. Some try to prove that their

assessment is too high and try to cheat the tax offices into letting them pay less tax... we advice our citizens to pay their tax in the required times (*Tan*, 30 December 1942).

Such an approach confirmed the perception of tax payers with cheating and speculation. Note the evaluative language used in the news reports on the complaints which reproduced the official point of view. Such a discursive tactic prevented any legitimate complaints to be voiced or find a space in the news reports instead it framed them within the discourse of 'their' tactic to evade the tax and prevent "our" civil servants doing their work. Moreover negative representation of the tax payers further contributed to the reproduction of the stereotypical images of the non-Muslims who did not want to pay the tax and resorted to all sorts of ways to evade the tax.

Sheets of petitions are being sent to the Finance Ministry

The petitions concerning the wealth tax amounted to 3000 and they were all given a number and a list is been drawn up to sum up their content. They will be sent to the Finance Ministry; a commission will be set up to investigate the claims in the petitions (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 January 1943).

The tax payers in Istanbul paid 2 million yesterday

The wealth tax payment with one percent fine continued and the total amount rose to 2,162,000 which do not include Saturday' total. Some tax payers petition the government offices and think that their claims will be investigated. But their petitions will not prevent execution of the tax therefore paying the tax will be to their benefit (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 January 1943).

Although the first news report gave the impression that the petitions were taken into account by the government the later report asserted that the tax payers' petitioning the government to review the amount they were allocated was a way to evade the tax. The reporters repeated the official point and reproduced their allegations against the tax payers. These accusations were presented as facts thus prevented any alternative reading of the complaints.

Some ‘technical’ difficulties were mentioned to imply that practical difficulties prevented the officials in dealing with all the petitions thus finding a ‘rational’ explanation for the government’s hesitation to respond to the petitions.

According to an officer from the government there is no possibility to investigate any of the claims by the tax payers in Istanbul. The tax payers insistently filed their complaints and petitioned the government demanding a re-examination of their tax assessments. These attempts are all a waste of time because there is no office in Istanbul to deal with these complaints. Even if there was a technical mistake, any excess will be refunded. Therefore, tax payments should not be avoided because of these vain complaints and false allegations (*Akşam*, 10 January 1943).

Regulation is ready to send the defaulters to the labour camps. Objection to the tax is a waste of time (*İkdam*, 30 December 1942). Petitions won’t stop confiscations (*İkdam*, 12 January 1943). A mistaken thought! To send the petitions from Assembly to the Ministry is only a formality. It won’t stop the procedure (*İkdam*, 14 January 1943).

Petitions reached to 4.000. Finance Minister set up a commission to deal with these complaints (*Akşam*, 2 January 1943). 2000 petitions are read by the commission. The claims are refused (*Akşam*, 13 January 1943). Tax collections will not be suspended because of the petitions (*Ulus*, 14 January 1943).

#### **4.2.2.5 Labour Camps**

In the final days of the tax payment news reports began to mention the print news on labour camps, the destinations and the preparations. The news reports explicitly stated that those who did not pay the tax will be sent to labour camps. In these news reports non-Muslims were delegated to agent positions to emphasise that they consciously decided not to pay the tax therefore ended up being sent to the labour camps. Sometimes passive forms used to background the officials’ and the government’s act of sending the tax payers to the camps. The same applied to the news reports on confiscation of the non-Muslim property. These reports were structured in a

way to establish a strong causal link between consciously deciding not to pay the tax and being sent to labour camps or confiscation of property.

The tax payers who did not pay their tax will be sent to labour camps at the end of one month period.

A guideline, which is beeing drawn up to make the necessary arrangements for the labour camps, is being prepared by the exchange office and will be sent to the cabinet to be viewed. The first group to be sent the camps will be those who did not pay anything so far. The transfer and destinations will be organised by the highest political authority (*Tan*, 23 December 1942).

According to the article 12 of the Wealth Tax Law: if the tax payers do not pay the tax within one month after the publication of the lists they are obliged to work in the public work suitable to their physical strength and ability (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 January 1943).

The list of those who did not pay any amount is on display and if they do not pay their tax in ten days their property will be confiscated (*İkdam*, 7 İkincikanun 1943).

The tax office has listed the tax payers who did not pay anything for their debt and did not show any good will. On 19 January the confiscation and auction sales begins (*Akşam*, 15 January 1943).

To send the Tax payers to construction sites does not mean that confiscation procedure has stopped.

In our city 623, 533 liras 73 kuruş tax is paid yesterday. The grand total is 59.020.316. The process of confiscation of movable and unmovable property began. After 17th January the tax payers will be sent to labour camps to pay the tax.

It is being claimed that the fact the tax defaulters were sent to labour camps that the confiscation procedure will not apply in their cases, this is a complete misunderstanding. The confiscation procedure and the sending the tax defaulters to the labour camps will continue until the whole amount has being paid (*Akşam*, 8 January 1943,).

It is implied in the news reports that the tax defaulters' decision not to pay the tax was the reason they were sent to Aşkale. Usually in news reports on dispatches agentless passives were used as the most preferred form of official discourse to background the agency. The authorities, civil servants or the members of the government, who organised the dispatches, decided the locations of the labour camps deleted from the sentences. Passives and nominals were used to conceal the agents and highlight the process, as if an automatic process was taking place without human decision, only a matter of formal process.

The decree passed in the Assembly regulating the transportation of the tax defaulters to work camps.

On 16 January confiscations and on 17 January transportation of the tax payers to the work sites begin. The necessary preparations are being made.

Sending the defaulters to labour camps does not mean that they will not pay their taxes. The new regulation allows confiscation of the property of the tax payers in order to pay their tax debts. The tax payers will earn 250 kuruş daily, 60 kuruş will be reduced for income tax and crisis tax, half of 190 will be reduced for their tax debt and the other half will be spent on food and for accommodation (*İkdam*, 9 İkcincikanun 1943).

Within fifteen days rules will be applied to tax payers who will be paying their tax through physical labour. All the tools are ready, such as spade, wedge, shovel and cart. Transportation to the work sites will begin on 17th January (*Akşam*, 9 Kanunisani 1943). The work sites are: Hasankale-Erzurum-Aşkale road construction, Tercan-Erzincan –Kemah-Refahiye road constructions (*Akşam*, 10 Kanunisani 1943).

The necessary arrangements are made in the designated towns and cities. The tax defaulters will work in groups composed of a hundred people and will be paid 250 kuruş daily wages. 125 kuruş of this 250 will be reduced for their tax debt. These tax payers are most likely to work on the Zigana and Kop mountains and along the Kars, Erzurum and Sivas railways to clear the snow off the main roads (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 January 1943).

The report above was written in passives informing the readers about the stages of the application of the tax, as a style it is instructive, implying formality. The figures given in the report about the tax payers' daily earnings in the camps and the reductions from it indicated that the process was well planned and rationally organised. However, even a simple calculation would show that these reductions from the tax payers 'earnings' in the camps would not pay off their tax debt, would not even come close to it. But the point was to show that government was determined to apply the law whatever it took even if it was economically inefficient. It was also a warning to the tax defaulters that there was no escape from the tax.

On the day to dispatches to Aşkale it was reported that "tax payers rushed into the tax offices to pay the tax" which 'proved' the previous prediction of the newspapers that the tax defaulters did have the money but wanted to wait until the last minute just in case if the government stepped back and decided not to send them to Aşkale. The news reports explicitly stated that it was the decision of the tax payers not to pay the tax that led the government with no choice but to apply the law and send them to labour camps. The reports thus framed left no room for a reasonable doubt to be raised against the decision to send the tax payers to Aşkale.

Therefore no news report appeared which expressed the point of view of the tax payers who were despatched to labour camps.

32 tax defaulters were sent to Aşkale yesterday

Some of them told their relatives to pay their debts

Taranto and Leon Nur Aslan paid their 500.000 tax and were released.

Some of the tax payers, who were on their way to Aşkale, told their relatives to pay the tax (*Akşam*, 28 January 1943).

As seen in the above in many news reports on despatches to labour camps the names of the deportees, predominantly non-Muslim, were clearly stated to further contribute to the reproduction of the dominant perception of the non-Muslims with excessive wealth

and tax evasion. The fact that a tax payer, non-Muslim, told their relatives to pay his dept on his way to labour camp was to confirm the prediction made earlier by the Prime Minister that the tax payers would find many intricate ways to evade the tax. The sentence implies that the tax payer had the money but waited until the last minute to evade the tax. However, when he was dispatched to the camp then he had no choice but to pay the tax. Thus the story of Leon Nur Aslan and other in the camp used in the news reports to prove that the non-Muslims have all the money, but choose not to pay the tax.

#### Wealth Tax Defaulters

The second convoy is sent to Aşkale

38 Varlık tax defaulters who did not pay the tax or did not show any good will to pay the tax were sent to Aşkale on the Ankara train in the third class compartment.

A tax payer's ticket costs 25 liras and 47 kuruş. This is paid by the security department, but it will be refunded by the tax payers' daily wages when they began to work in Aşkale.

The names of tax payers transported are

1- Morhmo Moris Pesah debt 200.000 paid 20.400

2-Asador Gidutyán debt 400.000 paid 54.417

3-Elia Mende debt 350.000 paid 25.000

4-Yeşuva Mende debt 350.000 paid 19.000

5-6-7-İlia Pesah, İsak Levi Coşkun, Yuda Zuvulun dept 300.000 paid 12.691

8-İsak Niyego dept 600.000 paid 82.775

9-Mengi Şakar dept 360.000 paid 10.545

10-Salamon Çiprut dept 450.000 paid 45.562

11-Yaşuva Eskinazi dept 225.000 paid 10.205

12-Yedvart Yervant dept 255.000 paid 9.367

13-Teodori Meopolldokls dept 200.000 paid 8.700

14-Mirat Miratoğlu dept 800.000 paid 58.337

15-16-Yasef Bahar and Boher Bahar brothers' dept 160.000 paid 500 liras;

17-Artin Dedeyan dept 180.000 paid 9.500;

18-Vahram Yavruyan dept 200.000 paid 85.790;

19- Agop Kazancıyan dept 150.000 paid nothing;

20-Berç Mardiros Erkurt dept 5000 paid 145 liras,

- 21-Rafael Ell dept 120.000 paid 2.300,
- 22-Yuda Leon Bahar dept 120.000 paid 2.650,
- 23-Davit Motola dept 125.000 paid 2.136,
- 24-Artin Ayvazoğlu dept 120.000 paid 6.213,
- 25-Andon Marinos dept 120.000 paid 4.079...(Akşam, 13 February 1943, Appendix 14).

The definition of ‘good will’ was changed in time. At the beginning, if a tax payer paid at least a small amount of his debt it was considered a good will. Later, however, the definition of the good will was completely changed and it meant payment of the full amount of the tax.

The above list appeared in the newspapers frequently. The list clearly displayed the wide gap between the amount of tax paid and the debt. The numbers, as facts and accurate account of the case through which the readers were expected to make their mind and reach a judgement about the tax payers whose names were listed on the left. If read together with the above new reports about the good will of the tax payers than it implicated that if these tax payers had all these wealth and only paid a piece meal worth of tax then ‘naturally’ their good will was doubted. Moreover, they deserved to be sent to Aşkale and have their property to be confiscated.

A threatening language was used which showed an unequal power relations between the addresser and the addressee. The tax payers were constantly warned to pay their taxes for otherwise the consequences would be heavy for them (Akşam, 13 February 1943).

Prime Minsiter’s Declaration: the Wealth tax is a necessity. Administrative flexibility and conditions of payments will be made easier for those who prove their good will to pay the tax. But the law will be applied with full force on the tax defaulters who became rich by exploiting the hospitality of this country and refuse to pay their dept (Akşam, 21 January 1943).

47 companies, some work houses, household goods are being confiscated. 18 tax payers were sent to Kadıköy waiting to be dispatched. The names of those to be sent to Aşkale are Arşak Çuhacıyan (cotton tread trader), YerminaVaron (drapery trader), Samoel Yarman (iron factory owner), Garbis Baykar (trader), Nehma Pesar (trader), Yasef Pezalto (trader), Şekip Adut (lawyer), Gat Franko (lawyer)... These tax payers' debt is over 200.000 they will stay in Kadıköy and will be sent to Aşkale tomorrow or the day after (*Akşam*, 22 January 1943).

The Prime Minister's assurance to the tax payers that if the tax payers showed good will then the government would ease the payment process was an evaluative judgement which implied that paying the tax was only depended on the good will of the tax payers and gave them full responsibility of the consequences of not paying the tax. The second sentence in the first paragraph is crucial in which the Prime Minister explicitly stated that tax defaulters were the war rich and exploited our hospitality. Then his threat to the tax payers that they would face their property being confiscated and being sent to labour camps as the consequences of not paying the tax was justified. The second paragraph revealed the identity of the war rich and their occupations. The vague description of the tax defaulters as those who breached the hospitality of this country in the first paragraph was qualified in the second paragraph by revealing the names and the occupations of the tax defaulters.

The second list will be published today

Confiscations continued yesterday

The previous day 1.5 million was paid

While the tax payers were sent to aşkale they told their relatives to pay the tax, so it seems that soon they will be released.

Gad Franko was given some kolaylık, but he hesitated and was therefore sent to Aşkale. He then put the Bahtiyar Han on sale. Sümerbank wants to buy it for 500.000. Gad Franko did not sell it because of 50.000 TL difference between the offer and what he wanted, but he could not find any other buyer. The tax office will auction the Han (*Akşam*, 29 January 1943).

It was implied in the above report that tax payers were rich, but did not want to pay the tax. Then when they were sent to the camp they realised that there was no escape from it and that the government was determined not to tolerate anyone who did not show any good will. It was implied in the report that the case of Gad Franko confirmed the official predictions about the tax payers' tactics to evade the tax.

The property of those whose debt is the highest and who is ill-intentioned will be confiscated first (*İkdam*, 18 January 1943).

The reporter alleged that the tax payers whose debt was high, yet did not pay the tax indicated the ill-intention of the tax payers. In this case the reporter used a revengeful tone in addressing the tax defaulters which indicated an unequal power relation between the addresser and the addressee, hence the legitimation of confiscation of the property of those who were ill-intentioned.

Those who did not want to pay the wealth tax

The amount tax collected last night was 1,530,848 and so far 102,749,339 tax collected in Istanbul. The properties of those who declined to pay the tax still been confiscated and is been sold in auction halls. Yesterday, the properties of lawyer Şekib Abdut's and Simon Kayserliyan were auctioned (*Ulus*, 29 January 1943).

In addition in Mahmutpaşa in the warehouse of Çuhacıyan some weaving machines, in Akrebiye Han some sacks and other things belonging to Ropen Adolf, in Fincancılar, fabric belonging to the Samuel Kazazine, and some household goods of the tax payers from Kadıköy and Beyoğlu were sold today. Today lawyer Gad Franko's household goods in his apartment, Cümbüş in Ayaspaşa, will be on sale. Yesterday there was a jewellery sale in the Sandal Bedesten.

The Finance Directorate prepared a list of the defaulters who will be sent to a new camp in Demirkapı. Those who did not pay tax are: Mirad Muradoğlu (timber trader), Canik Versel (mine owner), Todor Teopolidis (flour trader).

These tax payers will be sent to Erzurum Aşkale on Friday coming. The number of tax payers will be sent to Aşkale is 600. The government will designate new areas for the others (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 February 1943).

The confiscated goods and property will be on sale tomorrow

The jewellery of tax payer Değirmenci Kozmato will be on sale on Thursday. A piece of jewellery thought to be TL 40. Among his other belongings there were a medal worth 200 liras, a broche worth 100 liras, a ring worth 9000 liras, a lady watch worth 1000, a diamond broche worth 4000, elmas ring for 400 liras, a bracelet a work of art and with green stones worth 35 liras.

The auction hall is crammed with people mostly women.

Each piece of jewellery is marked with Galata M.Ş meaning that they are confiscated by the Galata tax office (*Akşam*, 27 January 1943).

At the end of January and at the beginning of February news reports focused on tax defaulters.

News reports on tax defaulters were re-defined as tax evaders, those who did not pay the tax or those who did not show good will to pay the tax. The lexical choice to name the tax payers as ‘those who did not want to pay their tax’ involved evaluation and accusation which did not allow any other reason, a reasonable one, that might prevented the tax payers paying their debts.

Exposing the amount of wealth of the well-known figures from the non-Muslim community prevented an alternative reading of ‘not payment’, instead confirmed the view that ‘they’ intentionally evaded the tax or attempted to evade it. Listing of luxurious goods and jewellery further justified the tax in the eye of the reader and discredited the tax payers’ objections to the tax.

#### **4.2.2.6 Assessment**

The official account constituted a framework that was reproduced by the news reports repeatedly throughout the five months this study covered. Thus the attitude of the political authority to impose its account of the tax as the natural account was reproduced by the news reports in the papers that were analysed. The political authority defended the tax in the name of national interests and those who were selected as tax payers were obliged to pay their debt to the state by paying the tax. Failing to pay the tax was associated with disloyalty. The economic crisis, especially food shortage and the shortage of primary goods were seen as the result of the black marketeering therefore tax was associated as a ‘cure’ to the economic problems caused by black market. Appropriate discursive strategies employed to narrow the interpretive framework for understanding the wider issues related to economic crisis and only focused on war-profiteers hence the taxpayers. The absence of background information enabled presentation of a uniform account of the wealth tax linking the taxpayers to the blackmarket, food shortage and other economic difficulties. Thus the tax was easily associated with social justice, which made any potential challenge to the tax as illegitimate and marginal.

Categorisations and stereotyping of the non-Muslims were often used in the news reports on tax defaulters and property confiscations. The non-Muslims were given agency position in these reports who ‘did not pay the tax’ which as a discursive strategy and linguistic device contributed to the existing negative perception of the non-Muslims.

#### **4.2.3 Editorials on the 1942 Wealth Tax**

Editorials’ on the wealth tax reproduced the official explanations and presented the wealth tax as a necessary measure introduced under the war conditions. Editorials’ explanations also justified the tax as a means to ensure social justice and defined it as an

economically rational decision. Thus the official account was defended as the only valid account of the tax.

Wealth Tax and Social Justice by Zekeriye Sertel, *Tan*, 17 December 1942

All states suffered from the shortages of primary goods and economic crisis during the war. England took the necessary economic measures at the beginning of the war and imposed a 75% income tax. Even the president Roosevelt, in a country rich like America, confiscated earnings above 25 thousand dollars and imposed a heavy tax on incomes below this level. Totalitarian countries took more radical decisions.

We are not in war, but suffer the consequences of the war. The need to keep a strong standing army has increased the government spending. Food and other consumer goods shortages have appeared. While all these were going on some citizens took advantage of the war conditions and accumulated great wealth.

Wealth Tax is nothing more than a debt of those who did not pay their share during the war.

Those businessmen who went to bed last night in peace and are content with the wealth they accumulated during the war will find themselves in the ranks of the ordinary people when they wake up today and see the tax lists.

This editorial defined all those enlisted wealth tax payers as war profiteers. It was asserted that “they” did not do what was required of them during the war but they could not escape from it now and would taste what it was like being an ordinary person. The revengeful tone adopted by the editor used to vilify all the tax payers. The writer made his judgement from a position where he had authority and knowledge assert his views without qualifying them with evidence.

The wealth tax was presented as a common practice even in developed countries in times of war thus its legitimacy was confirmed, hence the reproduction of the official view of the tax.

It is not right while those who risk their life to guard our motherlands’ borders and sacrifice everything, while others do not risk anything and on top of that took advantage of this secure environment to accumulated wealth. It is no

justice to send some people to wait death while at the same time giving privileges to others (*Tan, Zekeriye Sertel, 17 December 1942, Appendix 15*).

This was a well known populist nationalist discourse about the non-Muslim minorities that they did not serve in the military but benefitted from the secure environment provided by Muslim Turks who waited death at the national borders. Although the editor did not explicitly identify these two groups as the non-Muslims and the Muslim Turks, it was a common knowledge known by everybody who did serve in the military and who did not. Thus the editor's use of argumentative style to convince the reader about the justness of the tax reproduced the deep-seated prejudices about the non-Muslim minorities.

The wealth tax is a way to ensure social justice. While the government called some under arm, the business and trade men were invited to contribute some of their wealth in the name of the security and independence of the country. Today the tax payers will find out only a piece of how much they owe to this country and they will not hesitate to pay their due (*Tan, Zekeriye Sertel, 17 December 1942*).

The idea of being indebted to this country was an intertextual use of official view of the non-Muslims. The popular political discourse constantly reminded the non-Muslims that they were guests and for staying in this country they were indebted to the state and to the nation. The editor did not explicitly state it, but by implying the well-known dichotomy of "some contributes with arms some others with money" he referred to the non-Muslims. He added that it was only a small amount of what 'they' really owed this country which was another common complaint about the non-Muslims that although they made their wealth in this country and lived in affluence they should at least pay in return a small amount of their debt.

All the citizens who live in this country in peace and security have to pay their share and do their duty. Today it is the businessmen who are called to pay their debt. This is all what is it about (*Tan*, Zekeriye Sertel, 17 December 1942).

Paying the wealth tax was associated with loyalty to the state and as a discursive strategy it helped to strip the tax of its economic and political context. It was transferred into a symbol of loyalty to the nation and the state and ultimately a test case qualifying them to deserve to be part of 'us' or not. Once the wealth tax became a duty, a way of paying one's debt to the nation and the state it was hardly debated in terms of its economic rationality. Although some figures were provided by the editorials to show that it was to cure the economic problems they were generalisations rather than serious calculations to convince the reader that the tax could solve the economic problems.

The effect of the wealth tax, lead article, by Zekeriya Sertel, *Tan*, 18 December 1942

The wealth tax will definitely affect our economic and social structure...All over the country the lists of debtor businessmen and the amount of tax allocated to them are drawn and published. About one hundred thousand debtors will pay half a million tax. 100 thousand out of 18 million own the wealth of this country. It is the case in every country in England and America the higher the wealth is in few hands. What is important for us is in our country wealth is divided among only 100 thousand out of 18 million.

The first result of the wealth tax is that it liquidated the wealth of a small rich minority of 100 thousand who lived in affluence while the 18 million suffered. The wealth tax by dispersing this wealth led to social justice, because these rich people accumulated their wealth during the war through black marketeering. That is why this excess wealth is belong to the society and through wealth tax the society took it back and justice is ensured.

The writer explicitly states that those listed as tax payers were war profiteers. He claimed that tax would lead to social justice even before the tax was collected and without knowing how the tax revenue would be distributed. Implication of his

prediction about the outcome of the tax was that he had a complete faith in government's decision that the tax would ensure 'social justice' and the tax revenue would be equally distributed in society. Such an argumentative strategy reproduced the political authority and its legitimacy and the consensual view of society and the political authority that government's decisions were in benefit of whole society. An argumentative style was adopted to 'demonstrate' the inequality caused by war profiteers –wealth tax payers- which was supported by the rhetorical use of contrastive comparison between 100 thousand and 18 million to highlight the striking difference to appeal to the peoples' 'common sense' in order to see the 'injustice'. It was simply asserted in the editorial that wealth tax would bring social justice and the judgement was not qualified. The readers were invited to accept the position of the editorial that since the government was working for the benefit of the whole country then the tax would benefit the whole society. This was the attitude of the government members when they introduced the tax and this editorial reproduced it by intertextually using their argument in his explanation of the tax.

The wealth tax returned the excess money in circulation which caused inflation back in the state. The government debted to pay the war expenses, but now since the wealth tax is in force the government does not need borrowing.

What is important in a country is not individual wealth but national wealth. Individual wealth cannot be and should not be at the expense of national wealth. If the nation suffers economic hardship and only a small privileged class is rich this is an illness to be cured and the wealth tax is this cure. Therefore as can be seen the wealth tax will affect not our economic life but also our social life (*Tan, Zekeriya Sertel, 18 December 1942*).

Categorisation of all the tax payers as privileged class whose wealth was made at the expense of the national wealth was the reproduction of the official explanation. The editor used the conversational style and mundane metaphors like 'illness' and 'cure' to appeal to peoples' common sense. Naming the 'small privileged class' as an illness is a common racist rhetoric about a comprador bourgeoisie namely the non-Muslims. The

vilification of the tax payers with deliberate intentions to cause the poverty of the nation was another common racist perception about the non-Muslims which was to be ‘cured’, a metaphor used by the radical nationalists and the Nazis, and it was an example of hate speech.

A Talk about the Wealth Tax, by Zekeriya Sertel, *Tan*, 24 December 1942

The Republican government has never reversed any of its decisions and no law is withdrawn after being passed in the Grand National Assembly. The Capital tax law will be applied like all the other laws. What this country expects from its citizens is to pay what they owe to the state with gratitude. Those who resorted to deception will pay dearly this time.

Istanbul is still busy with the rumours around the Wealth Tax. Some of the tax payers find tax assessment reasonable and are happy about it. However, those traders who have evaded paying their taxes are complaining the high tax assessments on the basis that they find their share too high to pay.

These sorts of people think that they would find a way to evade the tax or at least avoid paying a part of it. They are the sources of the gossip going around about the tax lately. They may hope to gain from these gossips to evade tax instead of trying to find ways to pay their tax.

Some of the citizens have not understood the meaning of the tax yet...

In order to enlighten these citizens we would like to give the following explanations. The Wealth tax decree will not change and will be applied without any modifications. The law is in force already, the property of some tax payers was confiscated in some places. That is why the rumours about the modification of the law are ill-founded.

The amount assessed for each citizen is the final and could only be changed in accord with the law. As it stands now none of commission or the institution can alter the law. The assessed tax amount has to be paid. Every citizen should bear this in mind and should find ways to pay their tax.

The government has shown its good intentions and has taken some measures to make it easy for the citizens to pay their tax. It has solved the bank credits and allowed the sale of the immovable properties. Now those who own property will be able to sell their property and pay the tax (*Tan*, Zekeriya Sertel, 24 December 1942).

The writer blamed the tax payers who complained about their tax assessment rate with dishonesty and their attempts as tricks to evade the tax. His claim that no law under republic has ever been reversed was a discursive strategy shifted the attention from the tax assessment rate of the 'unfair complaints'. He thus attempted to establish a link between complaining about the tax and questioning the authority of the government and justness of the republican law. As a strategy it depicted the opposition to tax as illegitimate and discredited the complaints as attempts to republican laws. To equate objections to tax as objections to republican laws prevented any criticism of the tax. As part of his argumentative strategy the writer attempted to convince the reader to accept the opinion he defended as the only reasonable one and contributed to the reproduction of the official account.

The consensual view of government was asserted in the article that the government was making it easy for the tax payers to get loan from the bank if needed. It was presented as a sign of government's good will. He, however, did not mention that the tax payers had to give all their property and savings to the banks in return for a loan. What he suggested was that the banks were doing a favour which was in fact a complete transfer of wealth. As such it gave the false impression that the interests of the tax payers had been looked after by the government thus reproducing the consensual view of political authority as protecting the interests of its citizens without any discrimination.

The banks will give avans to traders for the goods they have. In this way many traders will be able to get some amount from the banks for the goods they bought cheap and hoped to sell dear.

The tax payers are obliged to pay their assessed amount to the finance departments within fifteen days. But if desired they may pay it whenever they get money in exchange of their merchandise thus be able to pay their taxes in instalments within fifteen days... ( *Tan, Zekeriya Sertel*, 24 December 1942).

The writer had already defined the traders' characteristics. Reminding the readers that they were related to the black market thus passed his judgement about the tax payers

preventing them to tell their stories. The assertion that the tax payers ‘bought cheap and hoped to sell dear’ was vilifying them while representing government’s attempt as a sign of good will since the government was doing a favour to the tax payers by allowing the banks to buy their property.

In short the republican government has never reversed its decision and taken back any law passed in the Assembly. Like every other law this law will be applied with determination. The duty of the Turkish citizens is to pay their debt with gratitude. Those who may attempt to deceive will face the government’s fist (*Tan, Zekeriya Sertel*, 24 December 1942).

The threatening tone is used to warn the addressee and a didactic form was used to persuade the reader to act according to his recommendation both strategies presuppose power difference between the addressee and the addressed. The duty of the Turkish citizens was represented as natural and common sense what was in fact political and ideological.

When the state call us to duty, by Falih Rıfıkı Atay, *Ulus*, 27 December 1942

Government has drawn a plan for the tax payers to pay their taxes easily.

Bank credits are being arranged to prevent low price sales.

Tax as social justice

It is time to stop to make false allegations, avoidance and other selfish games to evade the tax and do their duty to state. Varlık tax is introduced not to prevent the effects of economic crisis but as a tax to find the best and just solution to the crisis.

The tax payers’ complaints were being discredited as selfish and dismissed as false which implied that the writer had knowledge to make a judgement about their falseness. The tax payers were not given any say to defend themselves and state their grievances. Editor asserted his views about the tax without any justification. By associating the tax with social justice he appealed to the people’s emotions and reproduced the official account of the tax hence consensual view of government that decision taken by the government were in the benefit of the whole society.

The Wealth tax set an example for justice, *Cumhuriyet*, 6 January 1943

Since the establishment of this state the first time traders and industrialists are called to make sacrifices...As the Milli Şef said in his last speech all the Kuvayi Milliye and the defence of the occupied towns and cities are financed by the villagers and the peasants with money, with life, with goods...Today in the war do we know how the villagers and the peasants have been paid for the grain? The shortage of food how many families have been destroyed...These peasants and the villagers sacrificed all they had when the state called them to duty without thinking...

Our villagers sent their young man to military service and shouldered the burden. Those varlık tax payers who think that working in road works is akin to a death sentence should know that this work is already been done by the villagers.

The Milli şef said “always remember that this state is established by big sacrifices”. Since the establishment of this state the towns and cities have never made any sacrifices for the state. Do these people even think of how it is to give forty per cent of the wealth to the state as the villagers do? Villagers give 25% of their grain to feed the cities.

The rich of the cities have this opportunity of varlık tax not only to do their duty to state, but also to tell people ‘yes we are one of you, we deserve to be citizens’.

We are in a struggle and will win it either with money, by sacrificing our wealth or with our lives.

The tax payers were advised to pay their debt to the state implied that it was a sacred duty to be obeyed without question. Categorising the tax payers as ‘they’ who lived in affluence and took advantage of the secure life to make money provided by “our peasants and villagers” was the reproduction of the dominant perception about the non-Muslims that they lived on the ‘real owners’ of this country, the peasants, without making any sacrifices themselves. This argumentative strategy highlighted ‘their’ negative behaviour while emphasising ‘our’ positive sides which was strengthened by a figure.

The editorial also reproduced the consensual view of society by asserting that whenever the state needed something the peasants and villagers sacrificed everything for the state

and the country. This was presented as the common sense view acknowledged by everybody. The rhetorical question aimed to involve readers' participation into this judgement. The reader was assumed to respond correctly, "No, they would not". The deictic 'we' was used to show the writer's solidarity with the peasant while distancing himself from the tax payers, 'they'.

The editorial was explicitly stated that wealth tax payers had to prove they were part of 'us' by paying the tax. It was a chance for them to prove that they deserved to be citizens of this country. The vocabulary of 'us' and 'them' drew a clear line between the two, those whose loyalty has never been doubted because of their continuing sacrifice for the country and those whose loyalty was suspected since they have not shown their gratitude for this country.

The finance office is being criticised for some of the inadequate methods it uses which do not meet the needs. The new tax which reformed our social life will reform those old rules. Some of the methods of the finance office has been criticised for being inadequate to meet the needs. If those old rules are reformed together with this new tax which revolutionised our social life would prove useful.

The reason for the enthusiastic acceptance of the wealth tax all over the country is because the principle idea in its preparation was social justice. The rich and the poor all have seen that when the high needs of our fatherland required the state does not rub hands as was the case in the moulded frame of the old financial rules.

As expected from a revolutionary spirit of the regime the citizens, who have not used to such duties, are called to contribute a certain amount to their wealth to the service of this country (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 January 1943).

The editor's equating the tax with social justice and praising the government's imposition of the tax suitable to a revolutionary government justified the tax and represented it as an indication of a strong government taking what was its due.

Editor's lexical choice of using 'rub hands' not bending in front of anybody as in the old times was part of the strategy to dramatise the situation and remind the readers of the recent past when the Ottoman state was financially depended on the European credits

to finance the state expenditures. Conversational style used to compare the old times with the new one the former was negatively presented and discredited while the new regime was praised for its determination to impose the tax as expected from a revolutionary government. By implication it could be interpreted that since almost all the tax payers are non-Muslims a revolutionary government will not bend in front of them but will take what 'they' owe this country. The writer by referring to the late Ottoman period, when the government was financially dependent on the European countries, reminds the reader and the elite that revolutionary government ended such subordination and now as a rightful authority demanded from the citizens to contribute what was their due. The contrastive comparison between the old times and the revolutionary time contributed to the reproduction of the legitimacy and authority of the government. Conversational style and the use of colloquial speech of 'hand rubbing' was part of his argumentative strategy aiming to involve readers' participation by allowing them to bring their knowledge and experience into the act of reading, especially about the non-Muslims during the war time to form a judgement about the issue in question.

Not a sacrifice but a duty! Falih Rifkî Atay, *Ulus*, 16 November 1942

After the publication of the Varlık Tax lists those who earned extraordinary amounts because of war began to whine about it. How could they pay this amount? Even if they sold their shops they would not pay the amount...they will hand over the key and finish this business...and they tell tales about their situation. Do they expect that when people bought one kilo of rice at a price of 180 kuruş and lived on daily basis will sympathise with those who complain to pay their taxes out of their thousands and millions?

Handing over the key is not the issue here. Rather the question a tax payer obliged to pay 30 thousand changed over the 10 thousand worth of goods in his shop. It is necessary to look at the issue from this angle.

The complaints by the tax payers were dismissed as mere pretence. They were labelled as cheaters. The figures were compared to prove the incomparability of the two sides, on the one hand those who lived on a daily basis with 180 kuruş rice and those who had

millions but complained about the tax. The tax payers were categorised again as cheaters. By asking the rhetorical question the editor aimed at readers' emotional involvement and to appeal to the readers' common sense to answer the question correctly, "of course we do not expect those who live on a daily basis would sympathise with those earn millions but whine about a tax".

The editor uses evaluative language when he mentioned their complaints and dismissed them as tales.

The war is avoided as a result the exemplary strength of the Turkish nation. But the war conditions encouraged those ambitions like a poisonous gas sneaking into hearts and minds of them. There are of course honest traders...who might have earned extra profit because of price mechanisms... but there are those who juggled with price labels, did stock piling and mingled with books...would we allow these lighting their cigarettes with a grand to ruin our money? (*Ulus*, 16 November 1942, Appendix 16).

The metaphorical use of poisonous gas described the war profiteers and the tax payers' ambition. Thus 'their' negative qualities were emphasised to discredit them. The war rich defined as tax payers were also blamed for conspiring against 'our' money. Asking the rhetorical question if 'we' would allow the war rich to ruin 'our' money the editor spoke on behalf of everybody in the nation, consensual view of society, and the question was asked to make people emotionally charged and accept the position of the writer, the answer was assumed to be the right answer.

Let's make it clear that what is noble about the last regulation is that it is not for one group or to the other. It aims to regulate the national income and national wealth, to value our money, and to regulate extraordinary war earnings (*Ulus*, 16 November 1942).

The editor defined the tax in the interest of nation, as part of the strategy of consensual solidarity the editor stressed that the tax was introduced to value 'our' money. Thus his

argumentative strategy aimed to contribute to the legitimation of the tax and reproduce the government's claims.

We do not want to make people poor. The government will make necessary arrangements for those who have difficulty in paying the tax. If today some people are called to make sacrifices they should not take it as a sacrifice they should see it as their debt. Because any sacrifice will be beyond such a debt. And when it comes to that this nation will know how to make sacrifices (*Ulus*, 16 November 1942).

Editor categorised 'they' as others who were not aware of the meaning of sacrifice but only 'this' nation knew the sacrifice. The deixis of 'this' was used to distinguish the difference between 'they' who were only asked to pay their debt and 'this nation' which made real sacrifices. The deictic use helped the writer to identify with 'nation' as a whole to imply that the nation was united in hard times behind the government. 'They' were called to do their duty and pay their tax they were not expected to sacrifice anything because they did not know the real meaning of sacrifice.

The editor did not spell out what was this real sacrifice was involved. However, it was and is part of the common nationalist rhetoric repeated daily in the newspapers that 'our' poor peasants and villagers lost their lives during the war and shared their grain while "they" were making money. The writer used these popular preconceptions about the non-Muslims and contributed to their reproduction through intertextual use.

Saraçoğlu, New Measures, Wealth Tax, by Şükrü Ahmet, *İkdam*, 12 November 1942

The Wealth tax is a new expression of the Turkish reforms. It gave a sense of relief to nation. Those stock pilers, black marketeers who have been sucking the blood and life of this nation will give back to this nation what is stolen from this nation with times over and will never attempt ever again to damage the life veins of this great nation.

The lexical choices and the metaphors aimed to appeal to the emotions. The tax payers and the war profiteers were equated; they were dehumanised and degraded to the blood

sucking creatures that damaged the life veins of the whole nation. Such categorisations of the tax payers were commonly used by the right wing nationalists against the non-Muslims were repeated here in relation to tax to appeal to the emotions of the readers and involve them to make sense of the event in these terms and categories. Above all else it was also a characteristic of hate speech.

The Wealth Tax is only a small part of the sacrifice. Because everything is for the motherland, by Şükrü Ahmet, *İkdam*, 18 December 1942

The sacrifice Turkish Motherland Wants, the Wealth Tax is only a small part of the sacrifice. Because everything for the motherland.

The Turkish citizens have not sacrificed anything since the war started. In the fourth year of the war they have a chance to make a small sacrifice the government requires.

As everyone knows the tax is not for everyone but for the wealthy.

The objectives of the tax are to value the currency, to eliminate the effect of war through the participation of people, to ensure equal opportunity and risk among the people, to take what is the state right from the wealth of those who have made great wealth during the war without doing their duties, to withdraw money from the market and develop economy...

In order to realise these objectives the tax is in force.

We have no doubt that everyone will pay what is due to them.

The world is in chaos and what we need most is be alert and do everything to protect Turkey. All the citizens should sacrifice everything to protect the highest interests of the motherland.

The Wealth tax is only a part of this sacrifice.

There is nothing so natural to take some of the wealth of those who without giving anything to the state made massive wealth during the war; it is the right of the state to take some part of this profit. Which right could be higher than this one?

The tax payers were defined as cheaters and war profiteers. Their wealth was illegitimate and naturally the state had a right to take what belonged to it. Such logical coherence and reasoning left no room for any other interpretation. 'Us' and 'them' were clearly marked in opposition to each other. The rhetorical question was asked to involve

the readers in the interpretation and come to conclusion which was only a common sense, “of course there is nothing higher than this right”.

The lead article, by Abidin Daver, *İkdam*, 23 January 1943

The tax payers sent to Aşkale and their property is confiscated because they did not pay anything towards their tax.

The Istanbul tax payers had a vain hope and so far did not pay their taxes. Istanbul tax payers will pay 255 million tax but this has not been so far paid. As our Prime Minister Saraçoğlu said Turkish peasants and villagers have shouldered the heaviest burden of wars. But some people, traders, have taken advantage of freedom but when the government called for duty they had abused the government’s toleration.

That is why the Wealth tax had to be introduced. It is for sure that some of the clauses of this law are heavy. However, those tax payers who showed their good intentions and proved that they are good citizens the government will make things easier.

However, for those who took advantage of the hospitality of this country and became rich but who turned their back at it and declined to do their duty at a critical moment this law will be enforced in full force...

Those who took advantage of hospitality of this country are the non-Muslims who have been defined as guests who were expected to show their gratitude...

The law was enforced in full force as the prime Minister said. It is true that some of the requirement of the law are heavy but it is caused by the rich who ignored their duty. And it is also they who are invited to go to work camps and whose property is confiscated (*İkdam*, Abidin Daver, 23 January 1943).

The tax payers were accused of being responsible for having themselves sent to the camps because they did not pay the tax would naturally go to camps and their property would be confiscated. The use of the discursive strategy of reversal of charge the writer deleted the government as agent which ruled that the tax payers to be sent to the labour camps. By such strategy the tax payers occupied the agent position and they ‘decided’ to go to the camps, as if out of their choice with no external force or because of the circumstances. The deletion of the government from the agent position again when referring to the confiscation, the writer used agentless passives to dissociate the

government as responsible agent decided to confiscate property. Instead the subject whose property was confiscated became the agent who caused their property to be confiscated. This, as a discursive strategy, deleted the government as agent with negative action. The subject of the action was given the agent position to imply that it was the tax payers' decision not to pay the tax.

The Wealth tax and its importance in social life, *Cumhuriyet*, 17 December 1942

The Turkish peasant while working in the fields in poverty yet gives whatever is earned to the state, when Mehmetçik protected this land, this nation and when people were suffering, those who only lived to make money and have attempted all the tricky ways to avoid the tax and thus they created the conditions for this tax. If they did not take this way at the beginning of the war and sacrifice on their principle that 'profit is everything' and if they were satisfied with a reasonable profit they would not be in this position now.

This style is typical of hate speech, the editor used colloquial words to create a sense that it was obvious to everyone that the tax was the outcome of way 'they' acted with greed to make more money and did not act reasonably. The tax payers were criminalised who were attributed conscious action and decision. They were accused of acting with ill-intention to avoid the tax. The comparison of the Turkish poor peasants with the rich tax payers –the non-Muslims- highlighted 'our' positive values and actions and their negative ones.

But those who worship for money did not realise their duty to this country...

Now the iron hand of the law will grab their neck. The law will take from them what they did not want to give willingly.

Paying the tax was presented as an indication of loyalty to this country. If those who did not act in according to the law to pay their duty then they would face the consequences. The use methaphor created a sense of familiarity which would move the readers to

judgement; “yes, if they don’t obey the law it is natural that they will be punished”. Such a discursive strategy prevented any question asked about the justness of the tax.

The Wealth tax aims to distribute the sacrifice equally to all people and it is far sighted and is a just law in the conscience of nation. The Wealth tax payers’ lists have been prepared and in Istanbul the commission members have been working day and night to complete the lists.

Those who had not suffered from the consequence of the war or had little difficulty but quite opposite took advantage of the war and made enormous wealth at the expense of all nation (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 December 1942).

The tax was justified as a response to the injustice created by the rich by exploiting the condition of war and accumulating wealth at the expense of the nation which was a consensual view of society by which it was implied that the writer spoke for the nation and these opinions he expressed shared by all the people.

Tax and law are the same things because without law no tax can be collected. Law is an expression of national conscience. The wealth tax should be considered as a precaution to prevent the daily problems. This law is made with a noble aim to bring an order to our country in accordance with changing conditions in the world.

We did not enter the war but had experienced the negative consequences...while the low-paid citizens shouldered the heaviest burden of economic crisis and sacrificed everything they had a small minority lived in no or little difficulty in fact they took advantage of the situation...

This is the reason for the Wealth tax...The debt of those who breathe this clean air cannot be measured by wealth?

We do not want anyone among us who does not realise that (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 December 1942).

#### **4.2.3.1 Assessment**

The editorials reproduced the official definition of the events either intertextually used the main arguments put forward by the authorities or quoted their speeches and declarations in their articles as the only valid account of the economic crisis and the wealth tax. Editors re-defined the issue in terms of a group of people- the tax payers or the non-Muslims- who were responsible for war profiteering hence the resulting economic crisis and the tax was introduced to ensure the social justice, taking from the war profiteers what they took from the nation and state during the war.

National issues as defined by the political authority reproduced by the editors without any questioning, thus giving it publicity and neutral appearance to what was actually politically defined. The use of national interest was strategic choice for no one could argue against anything if it is in the national interests. The editors and column writers stated that the tax was introduced by the government in the interests of the country to overcome the economic problems caused by the war and by those who used war conditions and made huge profits. The emergence of the black market and the food shortage was implicated to these extra legal economic activities of the war-profiteers now the tax payers. Such a discursive strategy contributed to the reproduction of the government authority and prevented questioning the tax policy by providing an explanation for the causes of the economic problems hence justifying the tax. The 'national interest' framework the tax was introduced and debated aimed to close the alternative readings possible thus preventing the questions to be asked about the government's handling of the economic crisis or to be critical of its economic policy including its public spending strategies or mismanagement of the economy.

#### **4.2.4. Critical Analysis of the Columns on the 1942 Wealth Tax**

Protect the interests of the treasury during the sale of confiscated goods, by Abidin Daver, *Cumhuriyet*, 18 Şubat 1943

The property of those who insist not to pay the wealth tax began to be confiscated by the Finance Office. It is right and normal to apply the necessary measures for those who pay 200 TL instead of the 200 thousand TL they are required to pay, as if to make fun of the law.

The agency position was given to the tax payers who according to the writer insisted on not pay the tax therefore they deserved to be subject to property confiscation, note the revengeful tone of the sentence. The figures introduced to dramatise the difference between what the tax payers' debt was and how much they paid. This enabled the writer to vilify the tax payers who undermined the tax hence, the justification of the confiscation. The writer left no room for an alternative explanation of the tax payers' not paying or not being able to pay the tax.

When the properties and other belongings of the tax debtors are being confiscated there are some point needs to be paid attention.

Sometimes the civil servants tend to sell what is regarded a set, piece by piece. For instance if something a 70-80 piece dinner set worth 250 liras is sold piece by piece. The total was less than the original price which is a loss for the exchange office...

There are two disadvantages: first the confiscated workplace does not pay ordinary tax which means treasury will lose and the second if this method goes on after a short while there will be shortage of some goods in the market which might lead to price rises...

The last point is especially important to bear in mind to protect the interest of the treasury not the interest of those with ill-will who did not pay their wealth tax...

Instead of selling these goods in the shops piece by piece is there no way to transfer the shop someone else or appoint a civil servant to sell these goods with the price set before the wealth tax. Are these not better ways to protect the interest of the exchange in the long term?

The language of formality indicated that the writer was talking about an ordinary process of exchange which involved no human suffering. The style he adopted was of a responsible journalist cared for the 'national interest' and in order to warn the authorities about possibility of mismanagement that would cause financial loss for the

treasury. His mentioning of the worth of the price of a dinner set was a cue to the readers to make sense of the process in terms of excessive wealth of the taxpayers. He prevented any sympathy for the tax payers whose household goods were on sale including dinner sets by warning the civil servants to observe the interest of the treasury not the 'interest' of the ill-willed tax defaulters.

Useless Wealth, by Refik Halit Karay, *Tan*, 17 December 1942

I have written several times before...those who became servant to their ambition never find peace and prosperity... I saw those who lived in palaces, ate well, lived well and did not care about the needy. They thought it was their right to live in richness. This was in 1918.

But after a year in 1919 I saw these people even the Sultans in poverty... They ended up in the old peoples' houses and in need of five quid...

That is I have seen the wealth accumulated unrightfully fly away like dust...

For sure our father land needs wealth but not just any wealth but the wealth earned honestly. I salute those who today contribute full heartedly to the prosperity of father land...

The writer used a conversational style to imply that the opinions expressed were 'common sense' agreed by people, part of their popular attitude against the rich that their greed should not do them any good because they did not earn their wealth honestly. Therefore the unjustly accumulated wealth was destined to perish. By implication the writer pointed to the tax payers who also made ill-gotten gains and as the experience of the writer showed it was also destined to perish but this was the fault of the tax payers'. The negative consequences were all of their own making. The story told by the writer functioned to draw a conclusion and a ready made point of view that the tax payers made their wealth unjustly and they had to face the consequences.

On Wealth Tax, by Ulunay, *Tan*, 24 December 1942

Yesterday newspapers put an end to all the gossip, speculation, comments and empty words.

The Wealth tax payers will pay their taxes and so they should.

When I have seen millions, thousand besides the names of my citizens I felt proud, but shocked that we have this many rich! As the saying goes 'How do you know yourself know others'.

I am penniless and think the others the same. It seems some that some people wrap their bodies with gold leaf like Kregüs.

Then it is now time to open the wallets.

Their wealth, waste, dissipation, needles swagger have tired our eyes, heart and our mouths.

We had been hearing things like

-have you heard such and such spent eight thousand last night?

-how so, for a good cause?

-no, he lost it in bezique gamble.

Then if someone does not hesitate to give heaps of money for the playing cards then he should not hesitate to pay wealth tax. But things are not happening in this way: when four queens appear on a poker table all wealth is being bet without hesitation but when it comes to a national, social and economical debt only way chosen was to evade it.

As they say trade is a sort of deception that a man with ten million cannot find a hundred thousand in an instant. But every night at the bezique table when the dozens of banknotes are piled on the table somehow this capital comes out of its hiding place (24 December 1942, *Tan*, Appendix 17).

The style is conversational aiming to get the reader to participate in an ongoing 'conversation' between the writer and the reader. The use of public idioms aimed to heighten the effect of the claims made in the article and appeal to the readers' common sense. The tax payers were categorised with affluent life style and excessive wealth. The rumour about the gambling and how much they spent on the gambling table exaggerated the negative portrayal of the tax payers who preferred to spend millions on gambling instead of paying their tax and exercise their duty, which served the vilification of the tax payers as tax evaders and cheaters. Characterisations of the tax payers with dissipate life style and swagger was an example of hate speech adopted by the writer against the tax payers. The gambling story served to prove the popular saying about the traders that

those own millions did not find few hundreds ‘in an instant’ was nothing but a mere deception since these people found millions on the gambling table ‘in an instant’.

If this state and this nation did not need such a tedbir the wealth tax would not exist.

The bill is voted in the Assembly that represents the nation and passed unanimously which makes it more meaningful. That is why there cannot be any question or doubt about the tax.

The writer reproduced the consensual view of society and the state by implying that the tax was voted in the assembly which received an unanimous vote which showed that ‘everybody’ the ‘whole nation’ needed and demanded the tax. The writer thus contributed to the reproduction of the legitimacy of the parliament as the highest authority to decide what was in the national interest and in the benefit of all. Equating the tax with national interest prevented any criticism against the tax or would be discredited as being against the national interest.

Stereotypical representation of the wealth tax payers as selfish lot indulged in richness at the expense of the patriotic majority who had sacrificed everything including their lives for this country and nation exaggerated ‘their’ negative and ‘our’ positive representation while justifying the prejudicial categorisation of the non-Muslims. It was also an example of hate speech against the non-Muslims or the wealth tax payers.

All these millionaires made their wealth thanks to this country. Accumulate wealth in trade is usually by chance or by skill. Since they have this skill, if I were in their place I would reserve a hundred thousand for myself and give the millions to fatherland.

If a man has only a thousand liras wealth he cannot reserve a hundred liras and give the nine hundred. Because no business is possible with a hundred liras, it is just spending money. But a hundred thousand liras is an enough capital for a man who knows how to do business.

Then, give gentlemen! Give! (*Tan*, Ulunay, 24 December 1942).

‘These millionaires’ is a hyperbolic number used to exaggerate the wealth of the tax payers. Using vague description of ‘these millionaires’ could be interpreted as if there were tens of them or that all the tax payers were millionaires. In either case ‘wealth’ was highlighted.

The deixis use in this country was used to separate the tax payers from being ‘natural’ part of ‘this country’, to remind them that ‘this country’ gave them a chance and opportunity and to become rich and to become millionaires therefore what was expected of them was to show their gratitude. The categorisation of the wealth tax payers as ‘they’ who did not appreciate the hospitality of ‘this nation’ signalled the non-Muslims and the well-known accusation against them that they made their wealth because they took advantage of the war conditions while ‘our’ nation suffered the consequences of war and the resultant black market.

The use of millionaires became more meaningful and ideologically significant if we consider the assertion below which stated that despite the fact that ‘they’ were given all these chance they fabricated all the excuses to evade the tax when this country needed, although they were expected to pay ‘only’ a small amount out of their millions. The difference between ‘millions’ and ‘small amount’ was significant in the sense that millions as a more specific figure gave an accurate image about someone’s wealth but ‘small amount’ was a vague description it could be anything under a million. These were rhetorical devices used to dramatise the difference between the wealth and the tax assessment. Conversational style adopted by the writer as part of his argumentative strategy was to convince the reader that the tax consisted of only a small amount of the tax payers’ wealth, what was omitted was the ‘actual amount’ of tax.

The Wealth Tax gave us a relief, by Selami İzzet Sedes, *İkdam*, 20 November 1942

The Wealth tax is a proof of our existence. We are not a state or a government just existed yesterday, we are not obsequious people of the Empire of near past. We won’t let our blood to be sucked, we won’t allow our skin to be peeled, and we won’t allow anybody to take advantage of us or our government, let this be known.

I see you, little pale rich citizen? You! Why are you in rush, after working for so long on this land under the flag of foreign countries? Don't worry rich citizen no one takes all your wealth. Are you sure you have paid your tax since you owned property? Did you pay the legal rate from your earnings to the state? Don't you have any money hidden from the state?

Come on rich citizen, list all your tax debt you have been turned a blind eye for years, then count the tax you are obliged to pay today but count them all.

How about you, others, you should not hurry. With your devious language, foreign blood, showing a nice face to those close to you and a nasty to others, I have nothing to do with you. So why are you in panic? You found life and livelihood on this land, we are not after it. But we are a little short of blood we want some blood from you... But don't panic, it is our blood we want back, keep yours...

The Wealth tax gave us a relief. It gave us our life back. Especially when we hear that there are many real Turkish children who does not object to Wealth tax and say "I earned 300.000 in three years, 150.000 is worth to give as tax" then we take a deep breath (20 November 1942, Sedes, *İkdam*, Appendix 18).

The writer equated the wealth tax with national pride and honour. The contrastive comparison between the Empire and the Turkish government reminded the readers that the inside enemy caused the economic collapse of the Empire. The use of mundane metaphors like 'blood sucked' and 'skin peeled' and rhetorical devices which already existed in popular perception about, predominantly non-Muslims, who collaborated with the enemy, with the foreign countries and led to the collapse of the Empire. The writer asserted that all these were because the government was weak but today the government would not tolerate these 'blood suckers' because it was strong enough to impose the wealth tax which was in fact a proof of the existence of such a state.

The following rhetorical questions addressed to wealth tax payers or the non-Muslims challenged them, blamed them and degraded them. The tax payers were accused of hiding their money in order not to pay their tax. They were also accused of dishonesty and cheating which were presented as characteristics of 'them'. The writer's style was typical of hate speech in addressing the 'others' as those with 'devious language'

signalled the non-Muslims. Because the non-Muslims were often accused of speaking a Turkish with a foreign accent which, according to the right wing nationalists, was disrespect for the country. The non-Muslims were reminded that they made their wealth on 'this land' and 'we' as the real owners of 'this land' want what we deserved. Note the ideologically potent categories used to mark out 'they' as different from and subordinate to 'us'. 'Our' positive presentation was heightened by the exemplary behaviour of the real Turkish sons and daughters who gave half of what they earned as tax without hesitation unlike 'them' who earned wealth on this land yet resorted to various kinds of tricky to evade the tax.

Our national revolution dominates the trade and business, by Hayri Muhiddin, *İkdam*, 8 January 1943

There is one section among the minorities that represent the worst part of the degenerated Ottoman spirit. They are minority within minorities who have not reconciled with the Turkish spirit yet. We have heard some rumours that after the wealth tax they dared to fire only their Turkish servants which is a sign of their hatred. This would be the last attempt of the Ottoman minority spirit to sabotaj the Turkish Republican minority spirit.

Not only the few scraps of dirt from the past but everyone on this motherland should know and they definitely will see that the pure and noble Turkish spirit which has been envied by the world will become dominant in the life of this motherland sooner or later. We have cried out so many times at this corner that the Ottoman spirit, which is suffocating, degenerate and lack of national conscience, dominates our trade and market.

And we have seen that this looting has caused a dispeakable anarchy never seen before. They have dragged under foot not only the national conscience but also the human conscience as if they were born on this land only for wealth, as if they are the citizens of money blinded with the ambition of wealth.

We have written several times at this corner that in trade and business Turkish spirit should be dominant....

In this country, like in every other country, except for the national conscience no establishment, no individual can breathe.

The rumour mentioned by the writer that the minorities made Turkish servants redundant was used as a discursive strategy to reverse the charge. It was not the minorities who were the victims, of the wealth tax, but 'we' were since 'they' acted like they used to under the Ottoman Empire as a privileged class. The ideological significance of the example was that it was chosen to heighten the dramatic effect the non-Muslim minorities' domination in economy and trade. Their employment of the Turkish servants used to emphasise their economic power and privilege. After the wealth tax, as presumed by the writer, they realised they were losing their privileges and the first thing they did was to fire their Turkish servants, a sign of their hatred of 'us'. In addressing the non-Muslims the writer used one of the most degrading and insulting words of 'scraps of dirt' as part of his hate speech. He reproduced the racist perception about the non-Muslims that they dominated the economy but he assures the reader that they would be replaced by 'pure noble Turkish spirit', which was a common racist rhetoric at the time.

#### **4.2.4.1 Assessment**

The wealth tax was about imposition of a heavy tax on the non-Muslims which was transformed by the press into a debate about national interest and a test case for the non-Muslims to prove their loyalty to the Turkish nation and the state. Thus, the tax was stripped off its economic and political context and was sentimentalised. The tax payers were categorised as war-profiteers who became rich at the expense of 'us' who were always ready to sacrifice everything for this state and the nation. While 'our' positive qualities were simply assumed without a need to prove 'their' negative qualities were stated explicitly or implied by the reference to their 'illegitimate' wealth. Associating non-Muslims with privileges and undeserved wealth positioned them in a vulnerable position which de-legitimated their reaction against the tax.

In the right wing populist nationalist discourse the question of loyalty was closely associated with the non-Muslims since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire they were suspected of collaborating with the 'enemy' as the 'fifth arm' to conspire against the national unity. Therefore not paying the tax by the tax payers composed of predominantly by the non-Muslim populations was interpreted as non-Muslims' conspiracy to cause economic destruction of Turkey.

The columnists used the consensual view of society by a continuous reference to 'we', 'our' civil servants and peasants. 'We' were presented as honest, patriotic people who had proved these qualities in wars, in economic hardships and in paying taxes whereas 'they', the tax payers, war profiteers, used the advantages of war and became rich at the expense of 'us'. They appealed to the emotions of the readers by reminding them that 'they' used our hospitality and exploited 'us' during the war and now, refused to show their gratitude by paying the tax. The tax payers were then clearly marked out as 'others' different from 'us'. The style adopted by the column writers was typical of hate speech by vilifying the tax payers repeatedly.

The excessive use of derogatory vocabulary in the columns signalled unequal power relations. The column writers had the power to impose symbolic violence on the non-Muslims. They wrote from the authority representing the people of this country whereas the non-Muslims were treated as 'others' who had to prove their loyalty to the state and country to deserve to live on this land. The non-Muslims treatment as 'guests' who always needed to show their gratitude to the host county also indicated imbalance of power between the addresser and the addressee the former in a position to impose its definition of what constituted the loyalty and who properly belonged to this country.

#### **4.3. A Critical Analysis of the Press Coverage of the 6/7 September Riots**

The final case I have analysed is on the press coverage of the 6/7 September 1955 Riots based on the news reports, editorials and columns by *Akşam*, *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Son*

*Posta, Hürriyet, Ulus, Istanbul Express, Tan and Dünya* between 6 September and 30 September. Discourse analysis of the news, editorials and columns will reveal the similarities in the press treatment of the non-Muslim minorities under a historical context radically different from the single party era. After a brief historical account of the 6/7 September Riots I will proceed with the analysis of the press discourse on the riots.

I have classified the news reports according their common themes in introducing and explaining the events. Under the titles setting the framework and defining the event and use of official news sources news reports are analysed to what degree they incorporated the official explanations as the only legitimate account of the events. The news reports analysed under the titles of demonstrations as genuine protests by youth expressing their anger and a communist conspiracy represented transformations. These news reports shifted the focus of news from attacks on the Greek and non-Muslim lives and property to the 'motives' of the demonstrators as a genuine protest and on communist provocation as the 'real' causes of destruction. Under the title of we are the real victims: our national wealth is destroyed, represented a reversal of charges in order to background the victims of the riots to 'us' thereby mitigating the riots. Under the, government is in control: damages will be compensated and obeying the government authority in the name of national interest and national unity, news reports promoted consensual view of society. Finally, under the titles of explanations by the youth organisations and mobs, looters and respectable demonstrators, news focused on the separation of 'genuine' demonstrators from the provocateurs and looters who were associated with the communists.

Editorials and columns are analysed first how they explained the events and to what extend they used the official explanations as unquestioned account of the riots. One of the most common features of the editorials and columns in the previous two cases have been to promote consensual view of society, therefore in the analysis below editorials and columns will be analysed for their contribution to the consensual view of society

and reproduction of the existing relations of power and categorisations of the non-Muslim minorities.

#### **4.3.1 A Brief Historical Account of the 6/7 September Riots**

On the 6th of September 1955 the news at 1 pm on TRT radio broadcasted that a bomb exploded near Atatürk's house in Salonica. In the afternoon at 4, the pro-government paper, the *Istanbul Ekspres*, printed a second edition which put the news on the front page in bold font. Riots broke out on the night of the 6th of September 1955, in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. In Istanbul a crowd began to gather in Taksim shouting "Cyprus is Turkish! It will remain Turkish!" The demonstration was led by the National Turkish Student Union and the Cyprus is Turkish Society whose representatives in addressing the crowd in Taksim declared that anyone who dared to touch Atatürk's sacred house will pay a heavy price. They led the crowd to the Istiklal Street where mostly the Greek, Armenian and Jewish minority businesses were concentrated. In a short time beginning with the Greek owned shops, but later all the minority owned shops, schools and churches, synagogue and cemeteries were destroyed or damaged, all the goods and fabrics were thrown into the street.

Soon after, other main squares in the city were filled with protesters from all over Istanbul. The crowd went to Şişli, Karaköy, Boğaziçi, Perşembe Pazarı, Sirkeci, Haliç, Beyazıt, Gedikpaşa, Kumkapı, Yenikapı, Samatya, Yedikule and they attacked the minority owned shops and also destroyed the offices of the Greek newspapers *Empros*, *Tahidromos*, and *Apoyevmatini*. The Greek Embassy in Istanbul and the Greek Patriarchate were cordoned off by the police and the gendarme (Akın 2006, 118-9).

According to the official report 4214 houses, 1004 warehouses, 73 churches, 1 synagogue, 2 monasteries, 26 schools and 5317 other buildings including factories, hotels and bars were attacked or burnt down (Güven 2006, 48).<sup>95</sup> The number of

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<sup>95</sup> For other estimates, see Güven (2006, 48-53) and Dosdoğru (1993, 100).

people who were killed and injured varies according to different sources. Some sources reported 3 people were killed (Dosdoğru 1993, 100) while others reported 11 or 15 killed. There were also an unknown number of women raped (Güven 2006, 55)<sup>96</sup> and men were circumcised (Nesin 1987: 26).

In Izmir a crowd gathered in Konak Square and went to the International Fair, the demonstrators fetched the Greek flag from the flagpole and burned it. They set fire to the Greek stand and from there attacked the Greek Embassy and set fire to it. 6 NATO officers' houses were raided and looted. In Buca and Bornova the Greek owned houses were attacked. Two Greek boats were attacked and a Greek church was burned down. When the crowd began to attack the Greek ships the army interfered and stopped them. A curfew was declared after 8 pm. According to the official reports at the end of the riots 14 houses, 6 warehouses, 1 pension, 1 church Greek stand at the fair, the Greek Consulate building and the British Culture Institute were attacked. 7 people were seriously injured and 50 others received slight injuries. The total damage cost 475.500 in Izmir (ibid, 39, 42).

In Ankara the students gathered in the Ankara Law Faculty and the Political Science Faculty but there was any violence because police intervened early and there were not many Greek or non-Muslim in Ankara. The crowds gathered in Samsun, Bursa and Adana, and Eskişehir, but these were brought under control before they turned violent (43).

The government declared martial law and control was ensured by midnight when the army seized the streets. After the riot 6000 people were arrested. The government and the press declared the communists were guilty. This was followed by the declaration of the Prime Minister who claimed that the communists turned the patriotic demonstration into a communist plot. Around 40 ex-convict communists and left wingers were arrested and detained without a trial (Dosdoğru 1993). The government fabricated

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<sup>96</sup> See Güven (2006, 55, fn.159, 161) for witness testimonies and the NARA reports.

accusations against them and held them in prison for months. They were freed after four months when their innocence was proved.

Although the controversy over the causes of the 6-7th September riots still continues, it is now accepted by many researchers that the DP provoked and was involved in the organisation of the protests. The riots were also pre-planned as revealed through the witness testimonies and in the court (Tarih ve Toplum 1986, 26, 178) During the trial of Adnan Menderes in the military court after the 1960 coup the case of the 6/7th September riots was submitted to the court. Dosdoğru who followed the trials argues that in the light of testimonies <sup>97</sup> and the evidence that the DP allowed the demonstrations in order gain leverage against Greece during the Tripartite London Conference on the future of Cyprus. The trial also revealed that a bomb was planted near Atatürk's house by the Turkish secret service ordered by the government. The court found Menderes and the Foreign Office Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu responsible for the 6/7th September riots (Tarih ve Toplum 1986, 178; Dosdoğru 1993, 96, 104, 107, 121; Akın 2006, 121).

#### **4.3.2 A Critical Analysis of the 6/7 September Riots in the News Reports**

Critical analysis of the news reports, editorials and columns will be conducted on *Akşam*, *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Son Posta*, *Hürriyet*, *Ulus*, *Istanbul Express*, *Tan* newspapers between September 6th and 30<sup>th</sup>, 1955.

##### **4.3.2.1 Setting the Framework and Defining the Event**

The 6/7th September riots were described by the press as a reaction by people, especially the youth, whose pride was injured by the attacks against the Cypriot Turks and bombing of Atatürk's house in Salonica. Defining the event as a reaction by ordinary people to the unjust treatment of the Turks in Cyprus justified the police

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<sup>97</sup> For an account of witness testimonies see Dosdoğru (1993, 49).

inaction against the so-called rightful protest. The lexical choice of defining the events as protests or demonstration had important ideological significance for if the events were described as riots then it would require police intervention because riots are civil disorders (Trew 1979, 100). Instead, the news reports defined the events in terms of a rightful protest of the 'youth' against the bombing of Atatürk's house and the first news reports mainly focused on the 'noble cause' of the demonstrators in such a framework the destructions were of a secondary concern and explained as caused by outside forces. The news reports were explicit about the fact that demonstrators acted for a reason not caused by themselves but by the Greeks over the issue of Cyprus and bombing of Atatürk's house, the provocateurs, mainly communists, who caused the destructions. Defining the event as a communist provocation set the framework in which the events were reported in the following days. 'Communist threat' opened up discussions about the national interest, national unity and the communist threat to these. This was often repeated in the news reports as a discursive strategy which backgrounded the actual riot through providing the categories such as national security and unity within which the events were made sense of.

#### **4.3.2.2 Use of Official News Sources**

The government issued a declaration on the 6/7 September riots in which it was stated that the demonstrations were organised to protest at the provocations in Cyprus over which people were very sensitive. When the news about bombing of Atatürk's house was spread it triggered off the mass protests. What started off as a student protest for a 'just cause' to show the World and Greece the anger and frustration of the youth turned into riot and looting provoked by the 'communists'.

The explosions in the garden of Atatürk's house and the Turkish Consulate in Salonica on the 6th of September which was printed in all the newspapers on the 7th of September, except the Istanbul Express, which run a second edition on the 6th of September and announced the news in a bold banner headline:

Our Ata's House was damaged by a bomb

This damned event took place early in the morning has aroused frustration

At first the Greeks tried to hide the news

According to the Ankara and Istanbul radio broadcasts four minutes past midnight a bomb exploded in our beloved Atatürk' house and caused large destruction.

Although there are no human casualties, the insult against the memory of sacred Atatürk has caused a big sorrow in our country (*Istanbul Express*, 6 September 1955, Appendix 19).

The use of value laden vocabulary is a discursive strategy involves evaluation especially the over-use of deictic 'our' Atatürk with the aim to appeal to the readers' emotions and get the readers identify with 'us'.

The bomb thrown at Atatürk's house exploded in the heart of the Turkish nation. When the citizens heard the news at 18.30 yesterday they began to march towards the Istiklal Street chanting the slogans "Cyprus is Turkish" and "Death to the bombers of the Atatürk's house". At first it seemed like a small demonstration, after 19.00 it spread to other parts of the city and the small groups grew bigger like a snowball.

The fire brigade, police and gendarmeries cordoned off the Greek consulate after seeing this (*Hürriyet*, 7 September 1955, Appendix 20).

In Izmir sad events took place last night.

After the news about the bombing of Atatürk's house is spread and caused anger. People gathered to protest this who was already agitated over the Cyprus issue went to the Greek stand in the Izmir fair and destroyed it. They ripped up the Greek flag. The attempts of the governor of Izmir tried to calm down the crowd and stop the demonstrators failed. When the events got out of hand the fire brigade arrived at the scene and sprayed the demonstrators with water cannon to stop them. Despite this the demonstrators managed to get to the Greek consulate and set fire to the building. 2 people were seriously injured with another 12 receiving slight injuries (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 September 1955).

It is stated in the news report that bombing of Atatürk's house caused the anger in order to justify the next part of the report which is about the demonstrations and protests. The demonstrations and the supervening violence and looting were thus causally linked to the bombing of Atatürk's house and the Cyprus issue. Such a causal explanation implies that the demonstrations and the riots were a 'spontaneous' reaction to the bombing of Atatürk's house by people who were already tense over the provocations on the Cyprus issue. It functioned as a discursive device to topicalise the information concerning Cyprus and the bombing. To define riots as a protest to bombing of Atatürk's house was used as a discursive strategy to prevent people asking questions about the demonstrators, or question their motives or indeed suspect their motives. The news is so structured that readers are led to focus on the protest aspect of the demonstration while it became easier to omit the riot aspect of the demonstration. What the news reports implies is that there is nothing so natural that people protest bombing of Atatürk's house, thereby setting the frame so tight as not to allow any alternative reading of the report possible. For example from these news reports the reader would not sense that the demonstrations were pre-planned and well-organised for some time in advance. Thus syntactic structuring of the sentences allowed bringing certain topics into focus which is usually the preferred information while at the same time the non-preferred information is left in the background or deleted.

The Bombing of Atatürk's house in Salonica last night caused anger

Sad events took place in Istanbul and Izmir last night

Bombing Atatürk's house in Salonica caused a national upheaval in our city and all over the country. After the news spread across the city through various ways, some agitated youth began to march to Taksim, others joined on the way carrying Turkish flags and 'Cyprus is Turkish' placards and they gathered in Taksim (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 September 1955).

The news reports' emphasis on youth as the 'agent' is a lexical choice to imply spontaneity, quick temperament and naturalness of action. Thus, the act of violence although severe, like burning the Greek flags, churches and attacking the Greeks, then is

justified and made understandable by the youthfulness of its participants and their motivation in expressing their anger and frustration.

Martial Law declared in Istanbul and Izmir

While the London Conference is in progress Greeks bombed Atatürk's house

One bomb out of the two that were planted in the garden exploded

17 windows of the house and 40 of the Consulate are broken

The police arrested 6 suspects in relation to the bombing (*Ulus*, 7 September 1955).

To implicate all the Greeks with bombing of Atatürk's house was an ideological choice, which categorised all Greeks as if against Atatürk, or rather 'our Atatürk'. Such a discursive strategy used to reinforce the pre-existing negative opinions about the Greeks while serving the function of appealing the readers' emotions through which to make sense of the events in terms of 'they' the Greeks and 'us' the Turks and the antagonistic relationship between the two.

The insult that caused the events

A bomb exploded in the garden of our beloved Atatürk's house. No one injured but windows were broken. The Greek police began investigation. 5 arrested. The Greek Interior Minister gave a statement and said "I don't believe a genuine Greek would do this" (*Dünya*, 7 September 1955).

The insult against Atatürk's house in Salonica caused sad events. Martial law declared in Istanbul and Izmir

Many workplaces are ruined in our city.

Fire set in Greek Churches, some attempted to take advantage of the chaos and began looting. Demonstrations continued after midnight. Damage is huge. Some injured.

The Istanbul Radio news at 13.45 about the bombing of our sacred Atatürk's house in Salonica caused anger and agitation all over the country as in Istanbul. The news spread so quickly that one newspaper reprinted it again in its evening addition thus adding to the anger that was already there.

The groups began to march in the streets shouting their anger and carrying “Cyprus is Turkish” placards and Atatürk posters. The groups gathered at Taksim (*Son Posta*, 7 September 1955, Appendix 21).

Focusing on the bombing of the Atatürk’s house in both reports above were used to establish a causal link between bombing and what followed it, which as a discursive strategy, made the result ‘natural’ and ‘common sense’. Thus, the readers were not ‘allowed’ to question the logical reasoning that established in the sentence, “the demonstrations were a protest –indeed a just one- against bombing of Atatürk’s house”.

In the *Son Posta* report passives, in the second sentence in bold, were used to background the agency, those who set fire to churches, and being vague about the looters in the rest of the sentence. Using active sentence in the last sentence of *Son Posta* report was a discursive strategy to underline the positive action of the group who carried Atatürk’s posters, which legitimated their action, whereas in the first part of the news the link between the demonstrating groups and the destruction, the negative action of the group, was relegated by the use of passives to the background.

How did the demonstrations take place?

Istanbul yesterday experienced one of the most exciting days. Thousands of people were walked to take the revenge of bombings of Atatürk’s house in Salonica.

The events began at 17 hours and ended at 2.30 when the government announced martial law.

The events began when people heard that Atatürk’s house was bombed in Salonica, youth and people began to protest in many neighbourhoods, these protests spread to other districts and people began to attack the Greek churches. The demonstrations spread all over the city afterwards (*Akşam*, 7 September 1955).

The riot is described here as revenge by the angry youth in reaction to bombing of the Atatürk’s house and the address was Greeks, their churches and the shops. The lexical choice of ‘revenge’ carries evaluation in explaining the motive of the rioters for a just cause as attacking Atatürk’s house was considered to be an insult to Turkish nation and

the national hero. Then the demonstrations were justified and the readers were led to make sense of the events within these framework. Moreover, categorisation of the Greeks as ‘they’ and Turks as ‘us’ had serious ideological implication that ‘them’ being Greek and ‘us’ Turks guided the behaviour of each thereby ‘normalising’ the nationalist discourse with an implicit assumption that ethnic identity was the most important determinant of the actions of the individuals, a unifying as well as a dividing factor.

The government declared martial law after the events in our city and Izmir  
Bombing Atatürk’s house in Salonica caused the destruction of Greek shops in our city.  
When the police could not stop the events the military is called out to stop the riots caused by provocations over the issue of annexation of Cyprus to Greece.  
Peace is returned to the city and the tanks are at the street corners.

Some provocateurs burnt down Greek churches

The Prime Ministry said “martial law is declared in Istanbul and Ankara in accordance with the article 80 of the constitution when those prompted by the Cyprus issue and the bombing of Atatürk’s house in Salonica disobeyed the government declaration, acted in a concerted fashion, attempted at looting and arson (*Tan*, 7 September 1955).

Both the news report and the Prime Minister’s statement established a causal link between the riots to the Cyprus issue and the bombing. Although the violence was condemned by the Prime Minister the fact that he established a causal link between the Cyprus issue and bombing and the riots, he justified the motive of the demonstration since ‘our’ citizens and youth retaliated upon the insult by the Greeks against ‘our’ national values.

#### **4.3.2.3 Demonstrations as Genuine Protests by Youth Expressing Their Anger**

In the news report the demonstrators’ good intentions and noble cause was emphasised very often. The news reports separated the ‘destructors’ from the ‘demonstrators’. It

was these destructors who caused the looting whereas the demonstrators were there for a noble purpose to protest the bombing of Atatürk's house.

During all these it has been observed that the demonstrators did not take anything from these shops and the opportunists were not allowed.

Toward 21 the groups were more crowded and agitated. It was observed that in some places the crowd was seized by the mob.

These groups joined the crowd in Kurtuluş and attacked the churches, the security forces tried to stop them with gun.

The demonstrators began in good faith but some incendiary groups joined them and managed to canalise it in a different direction and they succeeded (*Son Posta*, 7 September 1955).

The statement that the demonstrators did not take anything from the shops was to underline the positive actions of the rioters. Then one might easily infer that destructing the shops was a 'noble' act, not looting which was an opportunist act. This, as a discursive strategy, was employed to dissociate the actions from the agents and divert attention to looting thereby to transfer responsibility from rioters who destructed the shops to the so-called looters who joined the demonstrations later with the aim to provoke the demonstrators and pillage the shops. Additional information was offered to enhance the positive presentation of the demonstrators that they did not allow the opportunists to pillage the shops.

#### **4.3.2.4 A Communist Conspiracy**

After the riots the government declared that it was a communist set up. The communists took advantage of the already tense and agitated public over the Cyprus issue and the bombing of Atatürk's house provoked the demonstrators who were protesting the Greek agitation and caused violence. The Prime Minister said that the demonstration started as a modest and reasonable protest by the students who wanted to show their reaction to the above events, but was seized by the communists who turned the demonstrations into

destruction. This official declaration was quoted or embedded in the news reports in defining the cause of the riots. Such a framework compatible with the existing preconceptions about communism was reproduced in the news reports as well as editorials and columns as a discursive strategy repressing alternative explanations in favour of the official one.

These unconscious actions which attempt at the highest benefits of the country although destroyed some national wealth in actual fact caused an irreparable loss and damage to our Turkish citizens whose rights are under the guarantee of our Constitution (*Istanbul Ekspres*, 7 September 1955).

The country came under a heavy communist conspiracy and destruction  
We regret to say that mostly our Greek citizens' shops have been vandalised.  
It can be said that last night Istanbul and country faced a heavy communist conspiracy and shock (*Akşam*, 7 September 1955).

The Greek official declaration

Athens: Those who did this is not a true Greek

After this abject insult against our beloved Atatürk our friend the Interior Minister from the Greek government issued a statement in which he said: the Greek government will compensate the damage. A search is begun to find the responsible. Whoever did this cannot be a true Greek.

Meanwhile those in Athens seriously suspect a possible communist involvement in this event. The Greek police began searching the suspected persons and arrested five. Another possibility considered is this being a conspiracy.

This may even be the work of EOKA members under the instruction of Makarios.  
(*Istanbul Express*, 6 September 1955).

Bayar called the assembly to convene in emergency. It is understood that the events are a communist set up. The losses will be compensated (*Son Posta*, 8 September 1955).

Interrogation of the provocateurs

As stated in the government declaration those responsible for communist provocations in the last nights' events are arrested.

Meanwhile the leading members of those groups, including the Cyprus is Turkish Society demonstrated with good intentions is also being questioned (*Son Posta*, 8 September 1955).

The government declaration asserted that the events were a communist conspiracy was taken in the news report as factual information not an opinion or a point of view which as a discursive strategy closed the news for alternative readings and interpretations.

An explicit use of evaluative vocabulary about the interrogation of the members of the Cyprus is Turkish Society and doubting remark about their questioning was an indication of power relations. The reporter by asserting that the members of the Cyprus is Turkish Society began demonstration with good intentions and by implying doubt about their questioning exonerated the group and the demonstrators of the ill-will and malicious action and reproduced the official point of view. Whereas in the first sentence unquestioned assumptions about the communists who were identified as provocateurs did not need to be proved since it was a taken-for-granted 'truth' which was grounded on deep seated suspicions about the communists as internal enemies which was also confirmed by the President and high officials.

#### Reds Unmasked

Ringleaders of the provocations aimed to leave Turkey with no friends

33 ex-convict communists who took advantage of the national feelings of the citizens are arrested after an investigation continued till morning; they are handed to the military in Selimiye. While the reactions to the 6 September continues the government officials continue serious investigations, so far 2137 who were identified to have involved in the events who are under arrest.

Communist provocation is seriously investigated

The fact that destructions began all at the same time in various neighbourhoods of the city show that it was a set up. It may also be possible that the bomb in Salonica was planted by the communists. It is understood that the communists aim to cause

destruction and leave Turkey without friends (*Istanbul Expres*, 9 September 1955, Appendix 22).

There are ex-convict communists among the arrested

The total arrested 2124. Provocateurs are being caught one by one. People inform the police of the looters and stolen goods in their neighbourhoods. 229 arrested in Izmir.

The investigation has been continuing to find those responsible for the attacks on Tuesday night. Yesterday more than a hundred provocateurs were arrested. 30 of these are ex-convict communists. These are handed over to the martial law officers.

As the government declaration stated it is confirmed that the communists were involved in the provocation therefore investigation is extended in that direction (*Son Posta*, 9 September 1955, Appendix 23).

33 communist provocateurs are arrested

It is understood that the red saboteurs caused the sad events in Istanbul and Izmir

The investigation continues, the authorities arrested 2137 who were in one way or another involved in the events (*Dünya*, 9 September 1955).

Yesterday we walked around the streets from Karaköy to Yenimahalle, from Şişli to Tünel. We spoke to the citizens whose shops were damaged. We learnt very well how the red provocateurs -those not one of us- took advantage of our national excitement and anger and played a leading role to turn a genuine demonstration of the nation into a disaster (*Istanbul Ekspres*, 9 September 1955).

The world will know the guilty

At the historical meeting of the Assembly martial law is extended for six months

Menderes said: if the enemy came in enemy clothes this would not happen. We will compensate the material damage. As for the spiritual damage we will compensate it by revealing that the event is not Turkish.

Köprülü said: Destruction of the places of worship is an absolute proof that the event is the work of the communists (*Istanbul Ekspres*, 13 September 1955).

Communist provocateurs/against the Turkish national interests couplet is a discursive strategy used to invoke the populist nationalist rhetoric about internal and external threats against the national unity of Turkey. As a well known discursive strategy it has always been used to call citizens to unite behind the government, its use here was to divert attention from the victims of the riot and the riot itself.

The frequent use of categories such as ‘threats to national unity’ especially by the neighbours, ‘inside’ and ‘outside enemy’ who are ready to conspire against ‘our’ national interests is a strategy to help ‘habitualise’ (Fowler 1996, 105) discourse of nationalism and the perception of ‘national interest’ and the existence of a constant threat. Thus communist conspiracy against ‘our’ national interests was habitualised and maintained by constantly rearticulating it as an internal threat to ‘our’ national interests by the communists and their outside collaborators. This discursive strategy of overgeneralisations, about the communists, had the function of discriminative language go unnoticed.

#### **4.3.2.5 We are the Real Victims: Our National Wealth is Destroyed**

Reversal of charges is another discursive strategy to focus on ‘our’ loss and mitigate theirs. To implicate the national interest to the destruction of the non-Muslim property was to exaggerate ‘our’ loss. It was also a discursive strategy to conceal the fact that the non-Muslim minorities and their business were the targets. The use of Turkish citizens instead of non-Muslim citizens and the irrelevant information that their rights were protected by the constitution was part of the strategy to conceal the fact that the attack was against the non-Muslims, especially the Greeks.

This unconscious act was an attempt to the interest of the country and national wealth. It destroyed the wealth of our Turkish citizens -whose rights are protected by the Constitution- to an irreversible degree. Our citizens’ losses will be compensated as would be expected from the responsible government (*Akşam*, 7 September 1955).

#### 4.3.2.6 Government is in Control

To secure law and order necessary measures will be taken. When the events were at their height the government announced an emergency state but when the control is secured emergency status is lifted (*Akşam*, 7 September 1955).

After the incidents the security forces under the authority of the martial law have been investigating the incidents in every part of the city and assessing the damage at the same time. The prime minister and the president have visited the severely destructed places and they were briefed by the governor and the police chief.

Interior, Justice and the Finance Ministers were also present at the visit.

The president stood in front of cinema in Istiklal Street and said to the crowd gathered around him there is no such incident in the history of the Turkish nation like this one. Please go back to your homes. This is our sorrow. The government will compensate the damage (*Dünya*, 8 September 1955).

A consensual view of government is reproduced by focusing on the positive action of the government rather than on any possibility of government negligence in controlling or preventing the riots. Government's decision to compensate the damages was topicalised in almost all the news reports implying concern and determination of the government to compensate the damages. As such it contributed to the reproduction of the government authority as being in control of the situation.

Istanbul Ekspres talked to the victims of the sad events

The aggrieved citizens are happy about the government decision of aid

The largest store owners of Beyoğlu said: "It is the right decision. We are pleased."

The bank debts will be deferred. Government made an allocation for the repairs.

The government decision to compensate the damages caused during the events which affected all the conscious citizens, caused a great excitement among the victims of the event.

The life in the streets is turned to normal. Everyone is going about their business. 90 percent of those whose shops were destroyed are encouraged by the government

decision to work hard to get back their business going. The satisfaction is great (*Istanbul Ekspres*, 9 September 1955).

Although *the Ekspres*' lexical choice of victim is significant in referring to the owners of the destroyed shops, its effect is reduced by the optimistic quotes by the inhabitants of *Beyoğlu*. *Ekspres*' hyperbolic use of 90 per cent was misleading in two senses first the clearing up process was still in process and the government decision to compensate the damages had not yet materialised. Thus the lexical choices of 'encouraged' and 'satisfaction' signal evaluation rather than reflecting the opinions of the 'victims'. Although in the news report it was stated that the reporter spoke to the victims what was quoted as the victims statements was selected to emphasise the positive representation of the government.

Those who were aggrieved from the 6 September events request from the government that the second instalment of their income tax to be postponed and their maturing liabilities not to be protested. Cheap credit will be available for those who were aggrieved.

The prices of the construction material will be kept at the margin

Glass import is allowed

Damages will be compensated

Work continues to repair the factories, small factories, houses, shops, warehouses which were damaged as a result of the regrettable events took place on the night of 6 September (*Akşam*, 10 September 1955).

A draft bill is drawn to compensate the losses

The government published a declaration stating that all the sacrifices will be made to compensate the losses (*Son Posta*, 10 September 1955).

The listing the measures that were taken or to be taken by the government in the *Akşam* report implied that government was in control of the situation and determined to compensate the losses which was interpreted as a sign of good-will. In the last sentence by vaguely referring to the riots as regrettable events mitigated the severity of the

destruction and focused on the ‘wish-talk’ of the government authorities as if the actual work had begun on the damaged property. In the *Son Posta* report government’s determination was underlined by the use of word ‘sacrifice’, which was in fact exaggeration and positive representation of the government.

#### **4.3.2.7 Obeying the Government Authority in the Name of National Interest and National Unity**

The newspapers embedded the government statements into the news reports calling the audience to unite behind government by obeying its orders in the name of the national unity. Government’s position is thus reproduced, its decisions, political in nature, are taken to be neutral and made in the name of national interests. As a discursive strategy it prevented any opposition to government’s decision and action since if a decision or action defined in terms of national interests any opposition to it was necessarily defined being against the national interests. It thus reproduced the government authority and contributed to the maintenance of the existing power relations and domination as national interest ‘required’ all citizens to be united behind the government.

Peace is restored

Security of life and property is ensured in our city thanks to the measures taken by the government and executed by the martial law commandment.

As citizens it is our duty to inform the nearest police station or the military quarter if we see any provocation.

For the high interests of our country we have to help to keep peace and be calm and obey the law to help the government’s operations (*Istanbul Ekspres*, Second Edition, 8 September 1955).

No interview was carried out with the Greeks or the non-Muslims to allow them to express their grief or opinion about what had happened. The above extract from the *Istanbul Express* is a carefully selected piece on the government decision to compensate the losses about which no one can express a negative opinion.

Martial law in Istanbul and Izmir

For the public peace martial law will continue except in Ankara

After the events a martial law was declared in the midnight but in the morning a government declaration announced that the martial law was lifted.

Yesterday afternoon cabinet met in Istanbul and decided to extend the martial law in Istanbul and Izmir and lifted in Ankara.

Inönü recommended everyone to be calm: The insults have been terrible. We share the grief of our citizens who faced insults. We believe that majority of the population in Istanbul share this view. In order to ensure order every citizen should help the authorities. Only then we compensate what seems to be a national disaster (*Ulus*, 7 September 1955).

Inönü's call for people to be calm and obey the authorities as coming from the opposition leader is a further contribution to the reproduction and maintenance of the government authority in the name of national interest. What is implicit is that despite the criticisms of the opposition directed to the government, the underlying message is that since 'we' faced a 'national disaster' 'we' should unite behind government and help it to get over the disaster. The ideological significance of such a support is that the elite consensus over the 'national issues' and over the fundamentals of the politics is reproduced.

#### **4.3.2.8 Explanations by the Youth Organisations**

These declarations were reported without any interference by the reporters. The significance of it was that they were given a chance to express their opinion when they were among the suspects and the organisers of the demonstrations who were also involved in the looting and riots. Its significance becomes more obvious if we consider the fact that the newspapers denied the same opportunity for the communists who were also accused of causing the riots and violence. The Cyprus is Turkish Society and Turkish National Student Union was thus given a space to argue their case and 'clear' their name.

### The Cyprus is Turkish Society Declaration

After the bombing the great saviour Atatürk's house Cyprus is Turkish Society issued the following declaration to the Turkish public and the Greek nation

This historical city in the Western Thrace is for us still our land where Atatürk's house and Consulate are located, also according to the international law it is Turkish land.

That is why for the Cyprus is Turkish Society this insult is against our national unity and it is the last straw on a camels back. The society declares that 9 September is the national warning day for the Greeks and let the Greek know that our patience is running short.

The Greek officials instead of punishing the guilty as a lesson they claim that the attackers were not Greek. Even this claim suggests a Greek officials' involvement in the events.

The Greek officials and their supporters wherever they are, if they do not come to their sense, they will face a retaliation that shadows the 1922.

Dear citizens

Greeks seem to have forgotten the September 1922 when they invaded our fatherland when it was weak, they brutally killed our wives, brothers and sisters, martyred our fathers. They now project their hatred towards our beloved Atatürk's house in Salonica. The Cyprus is Turkish and will remain Turkish whoever thinks the opposite will pay it dearly (*Ulus*, 7 September 1955).

The statements issued by the Youth

The Cyprus is Turkish Society published a statement yesterday. In the statement it was said that Atatürk's house is located in the land of the Turkish Consulate therefore according to the international law they are part of the Turkish land and this attack is considered to be against the unity of the Turkish fatherland...they claimed that the Greek authorities were involved in the event. People are being warned to be alert (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 September 1955).

The aggressive populist nationalist claim in *Ulus* report that Salonica will remain a Turkish land is explicitly stated. Threatening Greeks was justified in the name of national honour. Overcompleteness was used to include the sad memories from the

days of the Independence War between Greece and Turkey in 1922 as a strategy to emphasise the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, and to remind ‘us’ of the Greeks’ past deeds. This discursive strategy contributed to the reproduction of the nationalists’ definition of who was the enemy and justified nationalists’ hatred of the ‘enemy’ hence their politics to deal with the enemy.

In *Cumhuriyet* report the explanation by the Cyprus is Turkish Society that the attack against the consulate was against “our” national unity and the emphasis that on the international law made their argument sound and reasonable. Ironically enough the Greek consulates were attacked in Istanbul and Izmir on the same day.

#### **4.3.2.9 Mobs, Looters and Respectable Demonstrators**

The news reports made a clear separation between the demonstrators and the mob who pillaged the destructed shops. Demonstrators’ act was associated with a rightful act of protest for a national cause whereas the mob caused destruction with ill-intention to harm the national interest by damaging the reputation of Turkey. The news report below from *Hürriyet* appeared in other newspapers also. Its significance is to associate the looting with petty criminals and sever any link between them and the demonstrators hence the ideological implication of denying political character of the looting which was against the non-Muslims.

Five badstands, one glass table, carpets and enormous amount of fabric found in Asmalı Mescit in the house of madam madame Melahat (a well-known madame who runs a brothel) (*Hürriyet*, 10 September 1955).

Two Greeks made their houses a depot for stolen goods  
Yani Torta and his brother Kosta who live in Fırın Road in Tarlabası made their houses a depot for stolen goods (*Akşam*, 9 September 1955).

The news report about the Greek looters appeared in other newspapers was significant in that it reinforced the attempt to define looting as a ‘petty crime’ with no political motivation which was even committed by the Greeks themselves.

3 military courts in our city and one in Ankara and Izmir each were established  
The courts will hear the cases of 3 thousand looters who were identified for committing looting in the night of the events.

Political police began investigation of the red network. 30 thousand worth of goods are found in the houses of 2 Greek citizens.

13 who did not obey the prohibitions are arrested (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 September 1955).

10 looters from Istanbul arrested in Ankara

10 people who were involved in looting in Istanbul came to our city on a train are arrested in Ankara. One of the looters had 12 watches and 25 thousand liras and the other 9 thousand liras (*Son Posta*, 10 September 1955).

60.000 liras and 100.000 liras worth of watches and jewellery is under the police protection

Demonstrations began at 18 pm and continued until morning. The looters began to take advantage of the situation, although difficult the policemen took control of various parts of the city caught hundreds of thieves who were lifting the goods which were all over the street and in the destroyed shops.

60 000 TL is found on the convicts who after the demonstrators attempted to steal the goods. The money is kept in the police safe (*Hürriyet*, 8 September 1955).

Focusing on the stolen goods and arrests of the thieves allowed the case to look like a petty crime divorced from its ideological character that it was carried out against the Greeks in particular and the non-Muslims in general. Naming two Greek looters among the arrested contributed to de-politicisation of the act of looting in order to underline that it was a petty crime.

#### **4.3.2.10 Assessment**

The 6/7 September riots were defined and explained in the news reports in accordance with the official statements and government declarations. The official definitions of the events focused on the provocations rather than the actual events, riots and the victims of the riots, the non-Muslims. It was asserted that the communists were involved in the events and they turned a rightful protest into a riot and destruction. These explanations were quoted in length in the news reports as factual information and causes of the riots. People were called to unite behind the government in the name of national unity against the conspirators and enemies. The press reports reproduced the nationalist paranoia of Turkey being under a constant threat which gave the government exclusive right to use any means to protect the country.

Despite the fact that 6/7 September riots were a devastating attack on mainly Greek but also the non-Muslims life, property and business, it was a well-organised attack which was officially backed as later became clear, the riots were defined by the government as a rightful demonstration by the youth reacting against the 'injured national pride' caused by the Greek provocations which was reproduced by the news reports daily. Thus the linguistic structure of the news texts made all the concessions and excuses for those who were responsible for the attacks.

For the discursive analysis what is excluded from the news coverage is as important as what is included. The deletion of the agents, the organisers of the demonstration, was a choice had significant ideological implications. The agency problem was solved by treating the demonstrators and the looters as two separate groups. The first group composed mainly of the Turkish youth demonstrated to protest the Greek provocation in Cyprus and the bombing of Atatürk's house in Salonica. The press coverage credited the demonstrating youth for acting on a noble cause. The second group was defined as provocateurs, namely the communists, who 'sneaked into' the demonstration to provoke the demonstrators, and it was this group caused destruction and looting. Adoption by

the press such discursive strategies as deleting the agency and transferring the news story from riots into communist plot had significant ideological implications. The political ideological significance of the violence, targeting the non-Muslims in general and the Greeks in particular was concealed. Instead, the press focused on the material destruction caused by the looters to the national economy thus by reversal of charge declared that 'our nation' was the victim which was compatible with the explanation of the riots as communist plot attempting to damage Turkey's reputation abroad and peace and security inside. Thus the press coverage of the 6/7 September riots reproduced the consensual view of society through intertextual use of the official arguments.

### **4.3.3 Editorials**

The 6/7 September riots were awkward facts for the dominant ideology which always claimed that the Turkish people were one of the most tolerant nations towards minorities especially towards the non-Muslim minorities and Turkey was one of the countries where mosques, churches and synagogues could coexist side by side. Another important proof of the Turkish tolerance was the privileged life style the non-Muslims had in Turkey especially in Istanbul. Therefore in order to explain the riots against the non-Muslim property and places of worship the government defined the events as a reaction to the attacks against the Turkish national interests and to the sacred values of Turks. Such attacks provoked anger among youth who expressed their anger in a 'noble and dignified' manner. This explanation was taken up by the editors and column writers in their respective corners and reproduced in a more sophisticated and sometimes in a provocative style.

The agent provocateurs or the communists were claimed to set off the violence. Once violence was explained as a communist conspiracy it necessarily made it an issue of national concern, a matter of national sovereignty and national unity. By the end of the week there was little mention of demonstrators or the destruction they caused or the insult against the Greek community, instead the riots were reported in a new context of

national interest and national unity. This description of the events prevented asking questions and the scrutinising the destruction caused by the demonstrators to the Greek owned property, attacks on the non-Muslims' property and life.

The 6/7 September Riots were a devastating attack on the mainly Greek but also to non-Muslim shops, churches, workhouses. It was an organised and orchestrated attack which later became clear had received official backing. Both the political discourse and the press discourse, although condemning the riots, explained the events in the context of 'injured national pride' related to Cyprus events and bombing of the Atatürk's house. Later the debate was transformed into a discussion about national unity and national interest and by this stage no further mention of agents or their intentions were discussed again as the causes of the riots.

The most important function of the editorial coverage of the 6th September events was their political and ideological functions. They reproduced the dominant view of the events and helped to reproduction of government authority by influencing and persuading the readers to accept the views presented. Editorials also played a significant role in promoting the consensual view of society by calling people unite behind the government in the name of national interest and unity.

Events in Istanbul and Izmir, by Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Dünya*, 8 September 1955

Since the news about spread that the Cyprus Church sponsored secret organisation will massacre the Turkish people in the island and youth (here) are agitated. May be this secret organisation wanted to terrorise the London conference, we don't know. Although there was no massacre on the day the island Turks had been in fear and in Turkey's Turkish people were over excited as they were concerned about the Turkish Cypriots.

The 6/7 September riots was an awkward fact, as an attempt to ruin the business and community life of the Greeks and the non-Muslims to a degree to end their existence destroying and burning their schools, churches and cemeteries in the non-Muslim

neighbourhoods of Istanbul which had to be explained and made sense especially when the official nationalist discourse took pride in being one of the most tolerant countries towards the non-Muslims. It was provided in the second day of the events in the declaration of the Prime Minister who accused the communists of provoking the demonstrators and turning a modest and noble demonstration into a riot, the editorials took up the issue further and redefined the events as a communist conspiracy against the national interest and national unity thereby changing the focus from riots to conspirators and to their motivation. This discursive strategy enabled press to contribute to the reproduction of the official view of the events and defend the subsequent measures taken by the government against the communists without any question. Editorials made sense of the awkward fact by redefining the events as the result of communist conspiracy thereby shifting the focus on the most important consequence of communist conspiracy, threat to national unity and interests.

The Istanbul youth wanted to show their reaction to the world and attempted to organise a demonstration. They got permission from the authorities. The meeting was going to take place on the 7th of September. They asked the authorities to pay extra attention and take necessary measures as they were suspected provocation at the meeting (*Dünya*, Falih Rıfki Atay, 8 September 1955).

To depict the riots as demonstrations organised by the youth to show their reaction to the world signals a strong evaluation on the part the writer who approve and sees the ‘demonstrations’ as legitimate. The ideological significance of referring to the demonstrators as youth is to imply ‘innocence’ which is further enhanced by the responsible actions of the youth as they got permission from the authorities and even warned the authorities for a possible provocation.

On 6 September when the news about the bombing of the Atatürk’s house was reached then the demonstrations began. It was not a bomb, but a dynamite stick and it was not thrown to Atatürk’ s house but to the garden between Atatürk’s house and the Turkish consulate.

The Greek government believes that this is the work of those who want to destroy friendship between Greece and Turkey. They think that those who are responsible are not Greek. An investigation is set up to find the guilty. But news about bombing reached Istanbul and Izmir and people were agitated already.

At the beginning it started as a youth demonstration with no bad intention but suddenly it was seized by the street provocateurs. These provocateurs were well organised and there is no doubt that we Turks are the victims of a plot since the provocateurs aimed to ruin the international reputation of Turkey, to separate it from the friends, to harm the economy of the country. And there is no doubt that there are red agents among the leading figures involved in the events (*Dünya*, Falih Rıfki, 8 September 1955).

This editorial gave the Greek government credit for handling the case of the bombing properly. By mentioning that it was a dynamite not a bomb and it exploded in the garden not in the house he implies that the story is exaggerated. However, by defining the demonstration an innocent protest by the youth with no ill-intention imply strong evaluation and justification. He skipped the riots and destruction involved in the demonstrations and by a reversal asserted that ‘we’ are the real victims since ‘we’ will suffer the consequences of this plot of the ‘red agents’. The editorial by reproducing the official explanation of the event as a communist plot contributed to the redefinition of the events in these terms and shifted the focus on national unity and interest and threat to them.

Yesterday people crossed the streets in tears when they saw all goods that filled the streets, the goods that were bought in foreign currency which were savings made by the sacrifices of the people. They were all primary goods. They will not be easily substituted. There will be shortage in the market...

We cannot know what would have happened if the lootings were not stopped by the military just in time. We won't know it. Not only frenk and Greek but Turkish shop owners are also damaged.

Like the youth, the government and the political parties must have seen that turbulent streets cannot be controlled and the danger of taking the national issues to the streets (*Dünya*, Falih Rifki, 8 September 1955).

Atay, as part of his argumentative move to define the events as against ‘our’ national interests, brought into focus the economic damage the event caused. In order to deny the anti-minority nature of the riots he asserted that the Turkish shops were damaged as much as the Frank and the Greeks. This shift of focus functioned to deny or background the experience, loss and trauma of the Greek and the other non-Muslim communities. Although, in the last sentence the writer hinted at the government involvement in the organisation of the demonstrations he did not explore the point any further. It was written to advise the authorities and the youth to be responsible over the issues of national concern and not to exploit it.

To be caught unaware, lead article, *Cumhuriyet*, 10 September 1955

It is now understood that as a result of the provocations related to the Cyprus case and the latest bombing of Atatürk’s house which upset the Turkish general public and the youth from universities who with all the good intentions organised a meeting to show their reaction to the other side.

The Cyprus case and what took place in that terrible night should be separated. There was a design behind the attempt to hide behind the Cyprus curtain and ruin the city from one end to the other. The aim was to turn the Muslim Turk against the Greek Turk, poor against the rich and ultimately Turkey to Greece which is what exactly the Russian agents wanted to. Let’s admit they succeeded that night.

Their success shows that they have a well established network in this city...(Cumhuriyet, 10 September 1955).

The editor of *Cumhuriyet* simply asserted that what took place was a communist set up. Instead of naming the event as riot or destruction he used a vague definition to refer to the event as “what took place” which allowed the writer to avoid mentioning the actors involved in the riots and severity of the destruction. In order to persuade the reader that what took place was caused by communist provocation he listed the ramifications of the

events for Turkey using the populist right wing nationalist discourse about communist threat and conspiracy against Turkey's national interest and unity.

Dynamited Foundations, by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Ulus*, 11 September 1955

The leader of the Greek Liberal Party Papa Andreou referring to the latest events said that the foundation of the Greek-Turkish friendship is being dynamited. We take these words with regret. Papa Andreou is one of the statesmen personally witnessed the Turkish friendship towards the Greeks. When Greece was under the Nazi occupation he had to leave Greece to go to Egypt, on his way he stopped in Turkey and witnessed the sorrow the Turkish people felt about their neighbour. Turkey showed its support by secretly giving weapon and artillery to Greeks despite the shortage.

The writer used discursive strategy of completeness which allows irrelevant negative categorisation of Andreou in order to discredit him for not appreciating the friendship he received from Turkey. By giving this irrelevant information shifted attention from the riots and destruction to Greeks who received friendship and support from Turkey in the hard days but do not appreciate this and to 'we' always give a helping hand to a neighbour in stress. This is part of the argumentative strategy to stress the positive self-presentation of 'us' and the negative presentation of 'them'. Then the reader will use this 'background' information when they make sense of the riots, bombing and Cyprus.

...It is this mentality that dynamited friendship. It is impossible to think that the bomb in Salonica would not cause a reaction in Turkey. If Athens act with emotions and does not keep calm and investigate the event then regrettable things may happen. Athens has acted responsibly so far, the situation is regrettable but not hopeless. Everything depends on the attitude and skill of the Athens (*Ulus*, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, 11 September 1955, Appendix 24).

By nominalization, Athens made responsible, since one only regrets own actions, for what might happen in the future. If Athens does not solve the case then it should expect retaliation against bombing of Atatürk's house. Threatening tone implies power and authority over Athens, the Greek government, which is warned not to be 'emotional'

and advised to act 'responsibly'. The writer adopted a paternalist tone to address the Greek government indicating 'their' immaturity and weakness thereby contributing to the existing prejudices against the Greeks. He also contributed to the reproduction of the dominant framework of the events as reactions to bombing.

...When we think of the disorder took place in the streets of Istanbul and Izmir only way to describe it is a national catastrophe. The riot and insult are made only against the Turkish nation but nobody else. At first sight it may seem that it was a just reaction against bombing of Atatürk's house and the Cyprus issue. But if one thinks widely he will see that the matter is more complicated and may cause serious consequences for the fatherland.

It would naturally be expected that the news about bombing of Atatürk' house cause rage and anger. The demonstrations and meetings would naturally follow it. But the security forces would use all the means, the tear gas, baton to prevent the any serious insults.

But it did not happen in that way. A sudden massive destruction and aggression began in different parts of Istanbul. A big illegal army began to act not known who they were, how they were organised and who gave them orders? They had thick sticks, pickaxe and iron bars...who gave them the addresses of the shops and houses? Who organised and supplied equipment for this destruction? (*Ulus*, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, 11 September 1955).

The writer named the event as disorder and as against the Turkish nation in order to persuade the reader to make sense of the events in terms of national interest and threats against it, he asked a number of questions which indicated a plot by an inside enemy, a well organised and supported by possibly outside collaborators, to attempt to the 'Turkish national unity' and 'national interest'. He thus reproduced the official jargon about the communist threat hence the attitudes of those in government. This framework contributed to the dominant preconceptions about what the national interest, national threat and inside and outside enemies thereby narrowed the interpretive framework for understanding politics and power relations around the definitions of national interests. Any alternative view was either denied access or was marginalised.

The latest events by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Ulus*, 12 September 1955

On the face of it, it seemed to be against the Greeks, but Jewish, Armenian and Turkish shops and warehouses were also destructed.

It seemed at first that these groups were only destroying the goods but they were joined by a second group which began looting. There is no doubt that the idealist group is intimidated and withdrew. The degree and the scale of destruction are so big that perplex us.

We have to think who would benefit from this disorder because this event will affect the course of our national life.

One thing is certain Turks did not and will not benefit from the 6 – 7 September disaster. If Turkey has a reputation it is because it follows Atatürk guidance which was based on the adoption of the spirit of the Western civilisation and progress in peace...

This ferocity, this meaningless disorder is more than incendiarism aiming to destroy our reputation. In order to regain our reputation, in order to appease the anger in the western world against the burnt down churches we have to work very hard. The enemies will not forget this and carry their negative propaganda.

In order to conceal the fact that the rioters primarily targeted Greek shops the Yalçın mentioned destruction caused to the Jewish, Armenian and the Turkish shops. He distinguished the demonstrators from the looters the former named as 'idealist group' only destroyed the shops but did not touch the goods, which was a positive action according to the logic of the argument, and the latter group named looters who caused the biggest destruction. The writer's lexical choice of idealist group for the rioters is significant since it carries a positive connotation and implies justification of the demonstrator's action. As a discursive strategy it transforms responsibility from demonstrators to a group about which no specific information is provided but by implication it pointed to the communists whose involvement is not doubted.

...We should wait the result of the investigation calmly and show the world the aptitude of the Turks that no matter under what conditions we must keep calm and find a

solution to the hardest problem without sacrificing our national unity and solidarity (*Ulus*, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, 12 September 1955).

Making the national reputation and the national unity and solidarity at stake is a strategy that implies that the events were attempts against ‘us’, against ‘our national unity’ which is compatible with the nationalist tone adopted by the government and reproduced by the editors and the columnists in their definition of the riots. As a discursive strategy it naturally backgrounds the riots and the victims of the riots. The frequent use of deictic ‘we’ implies a consensual view of society which is political but used by the writer to imply as if they are naturally shared by every one of ‘us’. The use of modals, ‘should’ and ‘must’ indicate power and authority of the writer who knows what is best for ‘us’ expects us to accept his argument presented in the article.

Editorial, *Vatan*, 8 Sept 1955

...yesterday's incidents caused so much financial damage and they are not that or this persons' but are the wealth of this nation...the national wealth will suffer from this...All the world is watching us. We have to show them Turkish temperance. We should not be provoked...

The editor of *Vatan* used the lexical choice ‘yesterday’s incidents’ in referring to the riots had the function to mitigate the severity of the riots, because, incident implies a more spontaneous action which conveys a different picture of the event. By focusing on the aspect of the financial loss ‘this nation’ the writer deleted the political aspect of the riots and by making ‘this nation’ the victim of the event deletes the victims of the riots, Greeks and non-Muslims, from the picture. ‘We’ are advised to act in a way suitable to ‘our’ reputation of ‘Turkish temperance’ which suggests that what happened was rarely compatible with the Turks’ reputation and only happened because of provocation. As a discursive strategy it transforms the responsibility to things, provocations, and others, to the provocateurs –here the bombers. The use of the modals such as ‘should’ indicates the writer’s confidence in making predictions and offering solutions.

#### **4.3.3.1 Assessment**

Editorials made a clear separation between the youth demonstrated to protest bombing of Atatürk's house and the Greek provocations. It was the communist provocations during the demonstration that caused looting and destruction. Topicalisation of provocation enabled the transformation of the issue from being an attack on non-Muslim property and lives to a conspiracy to national unity since the communists' ulterior motive was to damage the reputation of Turkey abroad. The editorials often called people to unite behind the government to deal with the problems and thus reproduced the government authority and the existing power relations.

#### **4.3.4 Critical Analysis of the Columns on the 6/7 September Riots**

The nation that needs pitying, by İlhan Cemal, *Tan*, 7 September 1955

One of the presidents of France Poincare in his memoirs complains how the human weaknesses penetrate into the international relations and law. According to the writer these weaknesses appear in the simple primitive nations which have not reached a high political discipline.

Quoting a well-known writer as part of the discursive strategy functions to enhance the authority of the writer as a wise and well-read man to offer his opinions to the readers. It also functions by offering a ready-made point of view cuing readers about the common prejudicial attitude against the Greeks.

It seems as if, Pioncare saw Greece in the second half of the twentieth century in his memoirs written 35 years ago. This weak nation attempted to invade Anatolia at the end of the World War I because of its inferiority complex for living under the Turkish rule for centuries.

It has tried different regimes in vain. They did not appreciate the benefit of friendship with Turks which was the biggest success in their entire political history. Under the influence of hatred and revenge they attempted to satisfy their feeling of inferiority

under the guise of Cyprus but when they understood the uselessness of the way they followed then they attempted to insult Atatürk's house.

The writer's explanation of the event about the aggression of the Greeks caused by their inferiority complex for living under the Ottoman rule is a discursive strategy of irrelevant negative categorisation of the participants in order to delegitimize their opinions. This, as a well-known right wing nationalist rhetoric of hate against Greece was reproduced by the writer in order to persuade the readers to make sense of the events within the context of nationalist discourse. He used 'us' and 'them' categorisations to emphasise 'our' positive qualities and 'their' negative ones.

What do the Greeks want? Even the Athenians do not know the answer to this question. The latest mess shows that Greece will be wise and admit that the path they followed was mistaken. Or it insists to hold onto a discredited thesis that is not accepted by the world then Athens will shoulder the burden for putting the peace in the Middle East in danger.

The Greek nation is a race has suffered the consequences of its thoughtless adventures. This time it needs to be accepted that the bomb is exploded in the head of the Greek commission in London before it did in Salonica in the memories of Ata as the insincere Greek thesis is destroyed by a Greek bomb (*Tan*, İlhan Cemal, 7 September 1955, Appendix 25).

The diminutives and derogatory vocabulary used in addressing the Greeks indicate power difference the relationship of inferiority and superiority. As part of and the spokesman of the superior community of Turks the writer has a right to address the inferior Greeks in a manner as if a superior advising his inferior to act responsibly.

Why 6 September happened? by Bülent Ecevit, *Ulus*, 12 September 1955

6 September will go down to history as a day of catastrophe. That day the reputation of Turkey is harmed, the citizens security is violated, a minority group is inflicted harm as their priests being raped and churches burnt down thereby a dangerous dualism is created between the Turkish citizens. Turkish case is weakened in the Cyprus issue. The

friendship between Greece and Turkey is put in risk and an unrecoverable economic damage is being caused.

The writer followed an argumentative strategy in order to convince the reader about negative consequences of the events for the reputation of Turkey abroad and weakening its hands over the Cyprus issue. His focus on the damage on economy and on the Turkish-Greek relations was a way to highlight 'national interest' which necessarily mitigated the violence against the Greek and the non-Muslim communities.

This is the only column among all the comments have been analysed which explicitly stated that the attacks were also against the Greek minorities and it violated their rights. However, this point is not pursued further and below the writer claimed that the attack was against 'us', against 'our' national wealth as much as the Greeks. Although the writer acknowledged that the Greeks were the target of the attacks he immediately mitigated the severity of the attacks by claiming that they were more against the national interests.

The demonstrations that took place in different places at the same time indicate that they were well organised, calculated and interlinked. As the government declaration stated 'last night the country faced a communist incitement and design' it shows that government sees it a strong possibility.

In fact these attacks were as much against our national wealth as our Greek citizens indicate a strong communist plot either in its preparation or in the later stage.

The vast majority of the people participated in the demonstrations are not responsible what had happened. They were unconsciously made to accomplice in this crime.

It is asserted by the writer that communists were responsible for the riots beyond doubt since anyone or group conspiring against 'our' national interest must necessarily be linked to the communist plot, a well-known nationalist rhetoric and the official explanation reproduced which claimed and still does that Turkey was and is under constant threat by external forces conspiring against 'our' national unity and national

interest. Denying any responsibility on the part of the demonstrators in the events is part of the populist rhetoric about ‘our’ innocent people who went on a demonstration with ‘good-intentions’ with a noble cause but were used by the provocateurs. He thus contributed to the official explanation embedding in the text as part of the argumentative style.

He advised the authorities about the possible organisational security weaknesses that caused inability of the security forces to stop the events. Security issue introduced as another dimension in order to explain the events which favours a law and order concern over the political-ideological dimension.

What is our worry is the security weakness. This weakness is nothing to do with shortage of staff or deficient work. If there is a weakness it is to do with security forces’ spending effort to focus on inefficient areas.

If one considers how Turkey’s geo-political situation creates a great barrier for the expansion of communist aspirations then nobody can doubt that the communists will do whatever they can to establish secret organisations. The security forces by spending too much effort and time to control some activities only limit democracy thereby allow opportunities for the communism which is the real and hidden danger.

The fact that the provocateurs found a ground for their activities in the two modern cities indicates some problems in our social structure. Besides economic problems, fanaticism and the lack of toleration are among the first problems in our social structure. The only way to get rid of all these problems is through establishing an order based on human rights (*Ulus*, Bülent Ecevit, 12 September 1955, Appendix 26).

The writer also mentioned problems in the social structure which provided an additional dimension in his explanation of why the events took place, but he also made some general points about lack of toleration and did not detail his argument. His call for the government authorities to establish an order based on human rights was not substantiated with further discussion.

The responsibility falls on each one of us today, by K. Şinasi Dersan, *Akşam*, 9 September 1955

There is nothing so natural that Turkish people and the government showing that they care about a hundred thousand Turks live in Cyprus. When there was an attempt to change the administrative structure in the island, the youth first and then followed by the Turkish citizens attempted to let the world know what was happening in the island of course in a dignified and civilised manner.

He explained the event as a natural reaction of the Turkish people to the Cyprus issue. As a discursive strategy defining the event as a reaction to Cyprus issue shifted the focus on Cyprus as a national concern. The Government's position is praised hence its authority is reproduced. The ideological significance of this style is that the implicit assumption made about the nature of the political authority as the legitimate representative of the national interests which contributed to the reproduction of the existing power relations and authority.

Moreover, the writer's absolute trust and confidence in government's handling of the Cyprus issue was a sign of consensus over national issues. The writer did not need to explain what aspect of the Cyprus policy of the government was a success he, writing from a position of an authority with wisdom, only stated his assertion and judgement on the issue.

The Prime Minister in a clear statement, as known by everyone, expressed the Turkish opinion on the issue before the conference. What is in our advantage is that when the clamour caused by the agitators in Greece and Cyprus the Greek government showed indolence and hesitancy in handling the case, whereas the Turkish government and Turkish people managed the situation well which is praised by the civilised world. Turkey acted seriously and in a dignified manner as opposed to the impropriety of the other side.

When the unfortunate events took place in Salonica, Turkish citizens, already tensed and unstrung over these provocations, were strained further.

If we had shown the same dignified reaction we so far had kept when Atatürk's sacred memory was insulted, we would not be facing the unpleasant events we see today with sorrow (*Akşam*, K. Şinasi Dersan, 9 September 1955).

The writer's effort to explain why the events occurred focused on the causes of frustration of the public led him to give a detailed account of the preferred information on Cyprus hence the justification of the anger of the people. The riots and destruction in Istanbul and Izmir were not named but only referred to vaguely as the 'unpleasant event' as a lexical choice and discursive strategy it deleted the agency and mystified the event as if it happened by ill-luck hence the name 'unfortunate event'. The writer affirmed that 'we' have always acted in a dignified manner despite the 'others' provocations with the exception of this last 'unpleasant event'. As a discursive strategy these presuppositions about 'us' and 'them' were used to imply that they were natural categories (The responsibility falls on each one of us today, by K. Şinasi Dersan, *Akşam*, 9 September 1955).

What is expected of us, by Şevket Rado, *Akşam*, 8 September 1955

The Greek Turkish friendship has been damaged as result of the few radical Greeks' unconscious behaviour. They crated the Cyprus problem out of nothing, as if this is not enough these few senseless dodgy Greeks dared to place a bomb in Atatürk's house without realising that it is the symbol of Turkish homeland and Turkishness. They did not realise that attacking Atatürk's house is to attack the Turkish hearthland. This stupid and villainous insult has caused a heavy damage. The responsibility rests on the shoulders of those who made an attempt against the relationship between the two countries.

Bombing of Atatürk's house is causally led to the damage the relationship between Turkey and Greece and only vaguely to damage in Istanbul. While he named the agency in relation to the bombing he was vague about the agency involved in the Istanbul riots. As a linguistic device and discursive strategy nominalization of the action of bombing an agency position which causing 'heavy damage' functioned to delete the agency, who

actually did the heavy damage. To define what had happened in Istanbul as ‘heavy damage’ is used to mitigate the events and reduce its severity.

...Wherever the provocation came from they caused unpleasant results. But whatever happened is happened, it is now time to ask our people and youth to go back to our traditional dignity and maturity

We have to accept that a difficult task is waiting for the government. Now we have to remember the official statement that all the citizens are responsible to help the government.

These events will attract attention not only in our country but abroad. Before anything else the prestige of our nation is in question.

Wherever the provocation came from they have caused unpleasant consequences.

Our nation which has gone through the hardest tests of history with success and achieved great glories with honour now should keep calm and courageous as a castle of national unity against the new provocations of the saboteur. There is no doubt that from the oldest to the youngest all Turks will do their duty till the end. Our fatherland expects this from us today and our national interests requires it (*Akşam*, Şevket Rado, 8 September 1955).

The emotional vocabulary used to dramatise the event which was further strengthened by the writer’s comparing of ‘our’ good will and the ‘their’ insult. The most important thing is to protect the prestige of the country, its superiority is stated as self evident given its past glories. In order to explain how such an event happened in this country the writer referred to it as an anomaly, an exception which happened out of a sudden burst of reaction but nevertheless it was for a right cause. He was vague about the details of the riots as a strategy to shift the talk to a preferred topic of national reputation and national interest.

People are advised to be calm in the face of any provocation. Although it is not explicitly stated by advising ‘our people’ to keep their continence implies that they were provoked during the events. Nominalization of provocation in the agent position

mystifies the process as if things happened spontaneously without any planning. As a discursive strategy it also helped to delete the agency, the rioters, from the account.

We should accept that the government faces a big difficulty in dealing with the situation and it is our duty as citizens to help the government. The events that took place will be reacted to not only in our country but also abroad. Above all else what is at stake is the prestige of our fatherland (*Akşam*, Şevket Rado, 8 September 1955).

By appealing to the readers to help the government is the reproduction of consensual view of society which is further enhanced by nominalization our country which demands from us to be calm. As a discursive strategy nominalization enabled the writer to strip the call from its political character and conceals the writers' attitude.

We are right to worry, by Sadun Tanju, *Vatan*, 7 September 1955

No one, let alone the Greeks, can claim that Turks are not sincere. The 500th Anniversary of Istanbul, the Dodecanese islands, the Western Thrace are all known...

Not to remind our small neighbour their sorrow five hundred years ago we celebrated our biggest victory under the sounds of mehter (janissary band of musicians) we bear our pearl like 12 Dodecanese islands which are so obvious as the sun that are part of the mainland to stay in Greece thinking that we wont get harm from a friend. How about that our true motherland the Western Thrace?

The Western Thrace Turks who have been leaving motherland... and the Greeks are hanging the cross on the homes of Turks for centuries.

We are right to suspect about what will be the outcome of this? How would we know that they are not working towards to say one day "we are the majority in Istanbul", why should not we believe that tiniest Greece is not after rabid imperialist aims (*Vatan*, Sadun Tanju, 7 September 1955).

The conversational style and the rhetorical questions used in this column assume the readers' agreement on the opinion presented. As discursive strategy rhetorical questions aims constructive or unconscious cooperation of the readers through bringing their knowledge in reading the text. The use of derogatory vocabulary and diminutives by the

writer in referring to Greece reproduced the aggressive nationalist discourse about Greece, 'our' lost lands, or rather the land that was handed to a neighbour by the Turks. However, by explicitly stating that they were part of 'our' motherland and that he could not bear seeing the cross hanging in the homes of Turks had serious ideological implications. As the reproduction of aggressive nationalist discourse it degraded Greece as a sovereign country and challenged its legitimacy. Moreover, by explicitly stating the possibility that the Greek minority might engaged in fifth arm activities conspiring against Turkey's national interests in collaboration with Greece to serve its imperialist aims was the vilification of the Greek minority and a typical of hate speech.

The protest by the Student Union, by Şevket Rado, *Akşam*, 10 September 1955

It is natural that the enlightened Turkish youth show their reaction to the national events. Before the regrettable events took place on 6 September it was a demonstration where the youth showed their love for Atatürk but when the outside groups joined the demonstration it took the form of a blind looting.

We already mentioned yesterday that these kinds of events can never be thought or done by the enlightened youth as the Student Union explained yesterday that they were not involved in the events and they condemned it.

The National Student Union did the right thing by explaining to the world and to the Turkish public that they condemned the events because those who does not realise why the demonstration started at the beginning and how it ended can accuse the enlightened Turkish youth.

The writer defined the demonstration as the rightful act of the Turkish youth for the love of Atatürk which legitimates the demonstration. He used the euphemism 'regrettable event' to refer to the riots which as discursive strategy reduced the severity of the events hence his choice of not naming the events as riots or destructions or attacks. Moreover, mentioning the event only in passing allowed the writer to background the riots and focus on the demonstration as a rightful act. To define demonstrators as Turkish youth implies innocence as well as patriotism and to define their aim to show their love for Atatürk an aim compatible with patriotism cannot be disputed hence it is 'natural'. He

advises the readers not to mix the youth with the looters who later joined the demonstration and caused the damage.

After defining the demonstration as a patriotic act of Turkish youth he mentions the statement by the Student Union, the organiser of the demonstration, who denied any involvement in the riots. As part of the argumentative strategy the writer defined the demonstration as a patriotic act by the Turkish youth who in the later paragraph referred to as National Union of Students which is a rhetorical trick which implies that National Union of Students represents Turkish youth. Moreover, their statement is taken to be credible without any question despite the fact that in the same days that the union was under suspicion and some of the stolen goods were found in the houses of the members of the national student union. The writer thus contributed to the reproduction of the nationalist discourse about the event being a patriotic act.

Is not it the fault of the thief? by Va-Nu, *Cumhuriyet*, 9 September 1955

...as the story goes, yes it is my fault but isn't the thief faulty at all? We are in similar situation.

This city is ours...it is our fault to cause the damage...the angry crowd should not destroy the neighbourhoods...it is our fault...the national treasury is ruined, they were bought with our money with, they are the product of our labour and hard work, we should not allow it to be ruined.

Yes we felt shame when the news reached the foreign countries...

But reason and conscience relapses after a point. It is part of our duty to find an explanation for how the crowd got out of control. Therefore we want to ask: isn't it the fault of the thief at all?

Writer quotes the well-known Nasrettin Hoca and Thief humorous story to imply common sense wisdom that those caused harm must be guilty as much as those who did not take the precautions. The use comics and stories as discursive devices functions as 'ready-made' point of view which used by the writer to imply that the 'real' guilty, Greek fundamentalists' provocations, should not be taken out of the sight by focusing on the damage and destructions. Although he acknowledged that these destructions

were regrettable his focus on the financial damage to ‘our’ city and ‘our’ national treasury mitigated the non-Muslims’ losses.

...Didn’t’ the Megola Idea sympathisers count that that some of their fellow Christian blood brothers lived in villas? How many times they threw stones to the Turks’ houses and villages in our generation and ruined our houses in Rumelia, Anatolia, Dodecanese islands, in Crete and continuously threatened us?

We admit yes it was a big mistake to allow agitated people to take the streets. But isn’t it the fault of those who caused all these disasters and problems even in this generation despite the friendship of the Turks? For Gods sake let’s give the right of the Turks to Turks and Greeks to Greeks (*Cumhuriyet*, Va-Nu, 9 September 1955, Appendix 27).

The rhetorical question and colloquial style ‘created a space for the reader to occupy’ and respond correctly to the question asked. The writer identified the bombers, was not stated in the text the writer assumes that the reader will know, as the sympathisers of the Megola Idea is a strategic move to underline the extremity and violence of ‘they’. It also allows the writer to define the conflict between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in chauvinistic nationalistic terms which is further enhanced by a list of ‘their’ bad actions against ‘us’ in Rumelia, Anatolia, and Dodecanese islands and in Crete. By mentioning the ‘lost lands’ of the Ottoman Empire writer reminds the readers of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire for which the Christian millets were blamed. Categorisation of Greeks as Christians and asserting that the Greek minority in Istanbul and the Megola Idea sympathisers are blood brothers is an aggressive right wing nationalist rhetoric, used to justify the attack against the Greek community in Istanbul. Moreover, by mentioning the wealth of ‘them’ the writer contributes to the existing prejudiced conception of the non-Muslims as wealthy which also makes them the target of hatred. This piece is also a typical of hate speech by justifying violence against ‘them’ because of their Christianity and Greekness they were the same as the Megola Idea sympathisers. Also implicit in these categorisations was an underlying proposition about identities defined in the vocabulary of nationalism as the in the final sentence Va-Nu underlined ‘incomparability’ of Turks to Greeks.

Turkish police and municipal police, by Şükrü Kaya, *Hürriyet*, 14 September 1955

...The rumours that the police did not fulfil their duty caused a fear, shame and anger in the conscience and mind. As expected in such events this rumour spread from mouth to mouth and was almost becoming a public opinion. The spread of such a terrible opinion was a sign that there were more terrible things to come. Because of the fall of a nation and destruction of a state begins with decay of police and security forces and the break down in the law and order. That is why the assurance by the Prime Minister Menderes at the special meeting in the assembly that the police and the security forces did their best during the events was a consolation to the hearts and minds, as was his assurance that damages would be compensated.

The nation, has been waiting in pain and apprehension, has seen that the reputation and honour of the Turkish police and the security forces, which has never been doubted, is cleared in the face of these events.

Thanks to the Prime Minister that the minds and hearts have been relieved of this terrible suspicion.

The suspicion over the police inaction during the riots was explained by the writer as a 'rumour'. The Prime Minister dismissed such accusations as false which was treated by the writer enough assurance that the security forces did their duty. As part of his argumentative strategy to call people to unite behind the government and assure the readers that the government was in control and the law and order was secured, he reproduced the consensual view of society.

The Turkish nation's guarantee, M. Nermi, *Yeni Istanbul*, 13 September 1955

It is understandable why the foreign countries admire us. We respect the rights we give guarantee and compensate the damages done to them. The cause of the damage is not important but the result, the loss, is what counts because it is the loss of national savings. Our aid politics could be example to other countries. That is why we should not look at the ruin left after street frenzy but to focus on the aid we carry out for the just causes. Everyone can trust now their life and property security is under the guarantee of the Turkish nation.

The writer exaggerated 'our' good qualities by emphasising the government decision to compensate the losses. The overcomplete details about our qualities like "the world admire us", as assertions, was used by the writer to focus on the government aid while he was dismissal of the causes of the event which mitigated the severity of the events by reducing it to simple physical destruction caused by few looters and deleted the victims of the riots and destructions. Thus, incompleteness and vagueness about what happened to the victims, as part of a semantic property of argumentation dominant in the columns, used to get readers to focus on the view presented in the column as the reasonable one since it involved the national interest.

A sad lesson, by Cemal Refik, *Akşam*, 11 September 1955

In the announcement by the National Union of Students the enlightened youth expressing their sorrow on the events of the 6th September and the arrest of few ex-convicts for provocation shows the role of felonious motives in the deliberative provocation in these ugly events.

As a just and rightful expression of feelings the demonstrations began in a dignified manner but became used by the opportunists. Then the ignorant, unreasonable and unconscious were carried away by the provocation of these opportunists and seized by the mood of the crowd and participated in the looting.

The noble act and slogans of the enlightened youth turned into a means of destruction by this unconscious crowd. The destructions in the Tünel and İstiklal Street are the work of this crowd.

The government is taking the necessary cautions against these, the duty of the citizens is to be extra sensitive to protect our national interests, not to act under any provocation and help out the government...

The writer's presentation of the National Union of Students one of the organisers of the meetings, as 'enlightened' youth who organised the meetings for a just cause gave credit to this organisation as acted on a noble cause. The announcement made by the students was also interpreted as a sign of noble and responsible act and showed that the destruction was caused by "others" who took advantage of the meeting. His argumentative strategy build around to convince the reader to separate the two, the

organisers of the demonstration, the enlightened youth, who acted on noble motive and those opportunist provocateurs took advantage of the crowd. The writer thus reproduced the official discourse of the events and advised the readers to be supportive of the government against provocations, which showed that there was a consensus on the causes of the events that it was the work of provocateurs.

The sources of danger, by Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Vatan*, 12 September 1955

What needs to be done is first to destroy the communists' nests who attempt to threaten our national sovereignty.

Second, to provide more security in the cities to stop any event before they got out of control.

Third, to act responsibly and take into consideration the national interests and to stop politically motivated ambitious and harming attacks on government, which is under a heavy responsibility inside the country and outside.

The writer did not even leave a doubt but asserted that the communists were a threat to “our” national sovereignty. This was an often repeated accusation by the members of the government, including the Prime Minister, Premier and the Minister of the Foreign Office which reproduced by the writer. His treatment of criticism against government as ‘politically motivated’ was used to discredit any criticisms against the government. It is part of the argumentative strategy which implied a consensual view of society.

Moreover, his focus on the security aspect of the event is an ideological choice to associate the event as a petty crime which was to background its political nature as an anti-minority event.

#### **4.3.4.1 Assessment**

The column writers reproduced the official explanations either by long quotes or through intertextual use of the main arguments by the government members. They treated the 6/7 September riots as communist conspiracy and thus transferred the discussion on the national interest and national unity. Topicalisation of the national

interest and the national unity as a discursive strategy allowed the newspapers to background the riots and their organisers. This strategy was also used as reversal of charges thereby the Turkish nation was victimised as being under threat by inside and outside enemy, hence the reproduction of the right wing populist nationalist discourse.

The column writers in their treatment of the 6/7 September riots used stereotypical representation of the Greek minority and categorised them as the 'other'. Associating the Greeks of Istanbul with Greece and Cyprus justified the violence used against them as retaliation to violence in Cyprus against the Turkish Cypriots and bombing of Atatürk's house in Salonica. The treatment of the Greek minority as part of 'them' - Greece, Cyprus- had an important ideological implication which was to reproduce the discourse of exclusion and naturalise their otherness.

Some column writers categorised Greeks and the non-Muslims as 'other', as a privileged group of people which was the reproduction of the populist nationalist preconception of the non-Muslims. These categorisations used to interpret the events in terms 'our interests' vs. 'their interests'.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

This study aimed to reveal the role that the press played in the reproduction of the exclusion of the non-Muslims from the Turkish nationhood. The main focus has been on the discursive and linguistic processes and strategies adopted by the press in the representation of the non-Muslims in its coverage of the 1934 Thrace events, the 1942 Wealth Tax Affair and the 6/7 September 1955 riots. In order to account for the role of press in the reproduction of the exclusion of the non-Muslims, critical analysis of the press discourse was complemented with the analysis of the socio-historical context in which press existed and functioned.

In terms of socio-historical context in which the status of the non-Muslim identity was shaped, the emergence of the Turkish nation-state and the accompanying idea of national identity have been analysed. Beginning with the organisation of the national resistance throughout the Independence War and the establishment and the consolidation of the nation-state the non-Muslims were excluded from the definition of the Turkish nationhood.

Although the Turkish nation-state building process displayed similar characteristics of the late developing nation-states in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries,

the peculiar historical conditions, discussed above, shaped the nature of the state and society that emerged as a result. The variant of nation state embraced by the leading revolutionary elite, civil-military bureaucrats and new intellectuals was based on a homogeneous nation-state as the best form to save the state and achieve progress to reach the western civilisation.

This historical context in which the nation-state emerged in Turkey which was crucial in understanding the circumstances under which national identity was defined as well as inclusion to and exclusion from this identity was determined. It was through these processes that the status of the non-Muslims was determined. This chapter included a discussion of the class basis of the ruling elite and journalists who contributed to the production and reproduction of the discourse of exclusion of the non-Muslims in their respective positions.

The role of the journalists in dissemination of the dominant ideology of nationalism and the idea of nation-state was explained in this historical context. For the critical analysis of the press discourse, 'who said it' is as important as 'what is being said'. Consequently, the journalists' role was discussed as agents, as the producers of the discourse of exclusion. The analysis of the class base of the journalists and the ruling elite was focused on with the intention to explore the nature of the relationship between the journalists and the ruling elite and how this alliance had contributed to the exclusion of the non-Muslims from the 'nationalist imagination' in Turkey.

In the second chapter the merits of the critical linguistics and discourse analysis was outlined which were chosen to reveal the ideological representation of the non-Muslims embedded in the news texts, editorials and the columns. It followed by the introduction of the discursive and linguistic tools employed to conduct the critical analysis of the press discourse in its coverage of the 1934 Thrace events, the 1942 Wealth Tax and the 6/7 September 1955 Riots.

Critical analysis of the news reports in the chapter four has revealed that the news did not reflect what was taking place in Thrace but was a constructed account to impose a certain point of view. I have used linguistic and discursive analysis to reveal the subtle ways the news were constructed to give an ideologically informed account of the Thrace events. Through the use of transformations, active-passive and nominalisations news reports focused not on the event itself but on the victims of the events. Thus, the initial story of Jews who were attacked and had to migrate to Istanbul, became the unequal trade relations between the Jews and the locals and the Jews' dominance in trade causing resentment among the locals. This framework enabled journalists of stereotypical portrayal of Jews. Thus, contrary to the newspapers claim that news reports contain no evaluations, through linguistic and discursive strategies a certain view of events was represented while the alternative explanations were denied access.

The editorials on the Thrace events reproduced the official definition of the events, that anti-Semitism would not take place in Turkey. They reproduced the consensual view of society by showing absolute solidarity with the government and its handling of the Thrace events. The column writers also showed their solidarity with the government and reproduced official explanations of the events. They explained the events in terms of Jews' dominance in local trade and the reactions of the locals which involved categorisation and stereotyping of Jews. They were defined strictly as a close religious community in which plenty of ancient myths were used. As the members of the religious groups, they were presented as sharing the same opinion and values, which were often defined in opposition to 'us', to 'our' values and national interests.

Critical analysis has revealed the discursive strategies used in the newspaper texts to emphasise Jews' difference from 'us' hence justification of the Thrace events as locals' reaction to Jews. There were also explicit accusations against Jews who resisted assimilation into Turkish culture. Thus, especially editors and columnists called Jews to adapt to Turkish culture hence contributed to the reproduction of the nationalist discourse of homogenisation.

The analysis of the 1942 Wealth tax has shown that the tax was presented as a result of economic problems created by the non-Muslims who accumulated wealth 'illegitimately', which was not used for the benefit of 'this country' therefore the tax was imposed as a result of the black market, hoarding and speculation caused by the non-Muslims' economic activities during the war. The economic benefits of the tax were highlighted in the news reports which were then linked to the issue of national interests which were originally defended by the Prime Minister and reproduced by the newspapers. Thus, the official point of view was weaved into the newspapers discourse in the presentation of the tax. Their jargon and definitions were set the tone in the Wealth tax debate. Thus, the critical analysis has shown that news on Wealth tax was ideologically constructed based on the official account of the tax.

Critical analysis of the news reports has revealed that the newspapers used various linguistic and discursive strategies, such as active-passives, nominalizations, lexicalisation and syntactic restructuring, to transfer the news on wealth into a matter of loyalty vs. disloyalty. The majority of the tax payers were the non-Muslims as revealed in the lists of taxpayers printed in the newspapers which were accompanied stereotypical representations of the non-Muslims using lexis, categorisations and derogatory vocabulary. The non-Muslim identity was essentialised and usually defined in opposition to what 'real' Turkishness consisted of. The Turkish characteristics are assumed and not stated clearly, it was confidentially asserted in opposition to the non-Muslim identity which invoked a set of negative traits. What came out predominantly from these categorisations and stereotypical representations of the non-Muslims was that the non-Muslims' were a self-serving community whose loyalty to this land was suspicious. They also became the target of abusive and aggressive language especially by the columnists of the selected newspapers.

The analysis of the 6/7 September Riots has revealed that the news reports reproduced the official account of the riots by incorporating the Prime Minister's explanations. In

the analysis of the 6/7 Riots I used the tools provided by the critical linguistics and discourse analysis such as transformations, accessed voices, active-passive, nominalizations and lexical choices through which the anti-minority nature of the riots were concealed and the story was transformed into story of provocation by the communists. Even after the suspicions arose about the involvement of the government in the organisation of the protests, editors and columnists expressed their unconditional support of the government in the name of national unity and national reputation. They called citizens to unite behind the government in the name of the national interest, reproducing the consensual view of society and the government authority.

The 'us' and 'them' dichotomy determined the press representation of the non-Muslims, especially the Greeks, and 'the rest of us' were appeared as the two sides of the conflict. The Greeks of Istanbul were associated with the Greeks of Cyprus and of Greece. The press skilfully used these dichotomies in its presentation of the 6/7 September riots through which the readers were expected to make sense of the riots.

The following concluding remarks may be made as an outcome of this research. In every society ruling elite seek to establish its authority through force and consent which involves building alliances and securing legitimacy for its rule. Press has been one of the most important institutions in the nation-building processes through circulating the discourses of the dominant ideology, contributing to naturalise hegemony and helping to conceal the hidden power relations.

Nation-building also crucially involves constructing identities, creating a sense of belonging to a community which underpins legitimate hegemonies as well as drawing the boundaries of exclusion. Media plays a central role in representations of these legitimate and illegitimate identities through circulating ideologies, myths and stories.

It is in this context that the press has played a critical role in the single party era and in the early 1950s in Turkey. The power of the press in defining who belonged to the

nation and who did not was drawn from their close ties with the ruling elite. The press thus contributed to the official definition of the nation-state, reproduced the elite consensus on what constituted nationhood through the dissemination of these ideas in the discourse of the press, thus making them common sense.

From its emergence in the late Ottoman Empire and in the early Republican period, the leading members of the press closely associated themselves with the state. They were among the ruling elite, many served as deputies in the parliament, were employed in high status government posts and benefited from their close ties with the ruling elite. Those journalists in the opposition, despite exiles, imprisonment and pressure imposed upon them by the political authorities also served in the government posts and as deputies, shared the fundamental principles about the nature of the state and society. The conflicting relationship between the opposition journalists and the pro-government(s) journalists and the ruling elite, rather had the characteristics of inter-elite rivalry. When the DP won the election many journalists who were uncompromising critics of the single party period became enthusiastic defendants of the DP. The coverage of the 6/7 September riots in the press showed that press, opposition and pro-government alike, rallied behind the government in the name of national interests, against the internal and external enemies. When the reputation of Turkey was in question, the press continued to write 'sensibly' on issues of 'national concern' as defined by the ruling elites under whatever government in office.

Therefore, the freedom of the press which was essential in liberal ideology to the role of the press, in forming public opinion and informing people on current affairs, was sacrificed in the name of national interests or the national unity which were ideologically defined. The press, positioned itself on the side of the state, saw the individual rights or group rights for that purpose, of secondary concern, if at all, if the 'national interest' was at stake. Especially in its coverage of the three cases analysed, the press defended the restrictions on individual freedom. Even restrictions on the

freedom of the press was accepted and defended by a significant portion of the members of the press, who argued that the national interest required these restrictions.

Thus, press by repeating the typical complaints which had been made against the non-Muslims since the emergence of the Republic of Turkey, even since the Young Turks, reproduced the homogenisation policies that had been the official policy of the Republican Turkey, and the boundaries of nationhood drawn accordingly with special emphasis on the cultural assimilation and linguistic unity. By constructing and reconstructing the notion of a unified nation-state with homogenous people and disproportionately representing this dominant notion, the press contributed to the discursive reproduction of 'we' while excluding 'others' outside these definitions.

Therefore, the press played a significant role in circulating the discourse of exclusion and its normalisation through subtle linguistic and discursive strategies employed in its representation of the non-Muslims in the three cases analysed.

Thus, the press' treatment of the non-Muslims as 'others' contributed to the production and reproduction of the prejudicial and stereotypical perception of the non-Muslims. The ideological significance of press representation of the non-Muslims was that the readers most probably made sense of the events through the information provided by the press and their perception of the non-Muslims were largely shaped by the evaluations carried out by the press. Although it is impossible to determine the degree of influence exerted on the readers' perception of the non-Muslims through the press representation, it, nevertheless, could be inferred that by preventing the alternative explanations and representations to reach the audience, the dominant ideological representation of the non-Muslims, in the three cases analysed, was reinforced. Dominant representations and categorisations, then, stood a good chance to be responsible for the perception of the readers.

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*İkdam*

*Vatan*

*Akşam*

*Ulus*

*Dünya.*

**1955**

*Hürriyet*

*Cumhuriyet*

*Istanbul Ekspres*

*Vatan*

*Dünya*

*Milliyet*

*Tan*

*Son Posta*

*Akşam*

## **APPENDICES**

**Trakyadaki Museviler niçin geliyorlar?**

# Dahiliye Vekili tahkikat için Trakyaya gitti

**Şükrü Kaya Bey, yahudilerin bazı propaganda yüzünden İstanbula geldiklerini söylüyor**

Dahiliye Vekili Şükrü Kaya Bey dün Ankaradan gelmiş, Pendikte tren den inerek Yalovaya geçmiş ve Gazi Hazretlerine arzi tazimat ettikten sonra şehrimize gelmiştir.

Şükrü Kaya Bey refakatinde İkinci Umumi Müfettiş İbrahim Tali Bey olduğu halde dün akşamki trenle Edirne ve hareket etmiştir.

## Şükrü Kaya Beyin beyanati

İstanbul 6 (A.A.) — Bu akşam Trakyaya hareket eden Şükrü Kaya Beyefendi muharrimize aşağıdaki beyanatta bulunmuştur:

«Başvekil Paşa Hazretlerinin emirleriyle Büyük Millet Meclisindeki son nutuklarında bahsettikleri yahudilerin Trakyadan İstanbula grupça gelmeleri esbabını yerinde tetkik etmek üzere Trakyaya gidiyorum. Bizim bildiğimize göre hâdise

(Mübadi dördüncü sahifede)



Dahiliye Vekili Şükrü Kaya Bey

(7 July 1934, Cumhuriyet)

## Trakyadaki yahudiler niçin geliyorlar?

(Birinci sahifeden mabat)

bazı propagandalar yüzünden yahudilerin İstanbula gelmeğe başlamalarıdır. Hâdisenin hakikî mahiyeti yerinde daha iyi görüleceği gibi her halde işin icap ettirdiği tedbirleri alacağım, hükûmetime arzedeceğim. Türkiyede yerli ve yabancı herkes Cumhuriyet kanunlarının himayesi altındadır. Türk kanunları bu memlekette her vatandaşın hakkını ve hürriyetini hiçbir fark gözetmeden korur. Kemalist Türkiye'nin en büyük vazifesi bu kanunları tatbik etmektir. Yabancı yerlerde görülen antisemistlik cereyanları bazan bizde de makes buluyor. Bir defa daha İstanbulda Türk efkârı umumiyesine arzettiğim gibi biz memleketimiz, vatandaşlarımızı başka memleketlerde cereyan eden böyle fikirlerden ve aksülâmellerden daima masun bulundurmak isteriz. Hiçbir memleketin dahili siyaseti ve dahilî münakaşaları bizim memleketimizin iç işlerine tesir edemez ve etmemelidir. Bizim iç siyasetimizin esası kendi şartlarımıza ve kendi kanunlarımıza göre cereyan eder. Yahudiler aleyhinde bu yolda neşriyatta ve telkinatta bulunanları yola getirmek, Türk ka-

nunlarını tatbikle mükellef olan hükûmetimize ve mahkemelere aittir.

Benim her zaman ve herkes için şeflerimden aldığım emir ve direktif budur. Ufak tefek hâdiseleri bilinmez maksatlarına lehte ve aleyhte alet etmek isteyenlere vatandaş ise memleketlerine iyilik etmeyeceklerini, yabancı iseler bu millete dostluk etmeyeceklerini bir kere daha hatırlatmayı bir vatanî borç bilirim.»

### Şehrimize gelen Museviler

Son günler zarfında Trakyadan şehrimize bazı Musevi aileleri gelmiştir. Bunların ekserisi Çanakkale ve Edirne'den, bir kısmı da Gelibolu, Uzunköprü ve Lüleburgazdan gelmişlerdir. Evvelki gün de Lüleburgazdan bir kafile gelmiş, Sirkeci'deki otellere yerleşmiştir.

Gelen Museviler eşyalarını da birlikte getirmektedirler. Bazıları ticarethanelerinin bütün eşyalarını yük vagonlarına yükleterek getirmişlerdir.

Şehrimize gelen Museviler bazı taziyikata maruz kaldıklarını ve bunun üzerine İstanbula gelmeğe mecbur olduklarını söylemektedirler.

(7 July 1934, Cumhuriyet)

# Yahudilerin lüzumsuz telâşa düştükleri anlaşılıyor

## Kırklarelinden gelenler evleri taşlandıği için kaçtıklarını söylüyorlar

Bir mahalrede bulunan bir Kırklareli'den İstanbul'a gelen bir kişi Marmel de Şişli'de bulunan bir mahalrede yaşadığını söyledi. Bu kişiye mahalredeki Yahudilerin lüzumsuz telâşına ve evleri taşlanmasına ilişkin olarak sorular soruldu. Bu kişiye göre, Yahudilerin lüzumsuz telâşına ve evleri taşlanmasına ilişkin olarak sorular soruldu. Bu kişiye göre, Yahudilerin lüzumsuz telâşına ve evleri taşlanmasına ilişkin olarak sorular soruldu.

### Dahiliye vekili dün akşam Trakya'ya gitti

#### Şükrü Kaya Bayın heyvanatı



ŞÜKRÜ KAYA BAY

Dahiliye Vekili Şükrü Kaya Bay dün akşam Ankara'dan gelmiş ve Pazar'da bulunan bir mahalredeki Yahudilerin lüzumsuz telâşına ve evleri taşlanmasına ilişkin olarak sorular soruldu. Bu kişiye göre, Yahudilerin lüzumsuz telâşına ve evleri taşlanmasına ilişkin olarak sorular soruldu.

Bu mahalredeki Yahudilerin lüzumsuz telâşına ve evleri taşlanmasına ilişkin olarak sorular soruldu. Bu kişiye göre, Yahudilerin lüzumsuz telâşına ve evleri taşlanmasına ilişkin olarak sorular soruldu.

# Yahudiler Türkleşecek!

## Kültür birliği misal, bu kararın hakiki ve feli zarfetin tahakkuk edeceğini söylüyor

Yahudilerin Türkleşmesi Millî meselesi değildir. Türk Millî Birliği, Şişli'de bulunan bir mahalredeki Yahudilerin lüzumsuz telâşına ve evleri taşlanmasına ilişkin olarak sorular soruldu. Bu kişiye göre, Yahudilerin lüzumsuz telâşına ve evleri taşlanmasına ilişkin olarak sorular soruldu.


Millî meselelerimizin birisi değil, bir hedef göstermeye çalışarak, bütün dünyaya ilim olanlığıyla ve feli zarfetin tahakkuk edeceğini söylüyor.



Takin Alp Bay


(7 July 1934, Vakit)

APPENDIX 3



(15 July 1934, Haber)

## APPENDIX 4



(16 July 1934, Cumhuriyet)

Yanakkasada ve Kuratara para muh-  
tehasına kadar Trakyada on üç bin  
küsür Musevi nüfusu olduğunu da hü-  
kûmetin tebliğinden öğreniyoruz. Bun-  
ların üç bin kadarı İstanbula gelmişler  
ve muahharen de tekrar yerlerine dön-  
mekte bulunmuşlardır. Kim geri git-  
mek isterse buna hiçbir kimsenin mü-  
maneatı ihtimali yoktur. Hükûmet Cum-  
huriyet kanunlarının bütün vatandaşla-  
ra temin ettiği hukuku teyit eylemiştir.

Hâdiselerin menşei hakkındaki hü-  
kûmet tetkikleri dahi vaziyeti olduğu  
gibi izah etmektedir. Mesele, dünya-  
nın şurasında burasında görülen yahudi  
aleyhtarlığının hakiki veya hayali  
bazı sebeplerle ve o sebeplerin mahallî  
ve mevzii telkinlerle bizim memleke-  
timizin bir kısmında patlak vermiş ol-  
masından ibarettir. Bunlar içinde ya-  
hudi aleyhtarlığının her yerdeki ikti-  
sadi sebeplerini burada dahi varit far-  
zetmek mümkündür. Ticaretle melûf  
olan Musevinin saf köylü ile teması mu-  
rabahanın bütün şekillerini ve bütün  
neticelerini ortaya çıkarır. Malûmdur  
ki Rurya ile Romanyadaki Musevi a-  
leyhtarlığı bilhassa bunu ileri sürmek-  
le maruftur. Bizde fazla olarak Muse-  
vinin asırlardır iyi bir türkçe konuş-  
muyacak surette Türk kültüründen u-  
zak kalmakta devam etmiş olmasının  
yahudi aleyhtarlığı yapmağa kalkışmış  
olanlara kuvvetle kullanılıp iyice isti-  
fade olunacak bir delil vazifesini görmüş  
olduğu ve böyle olunca gayrias-  
keri bir muntakanın emniyeti de artık  
kolaylıkla ileri sürülebilmiş bulunduğu  
anlaşıyor. Maksat ve saik antisemi-  
tikdir. Bu fikir ve maksatla harekete  
geçenlerin kendi işlerine yarayacak her  
vasıtayı mubah görmüş olduklarına  
hükmetmek lâzım geliyor.

Ancak Cumhuriyet Türkiyesinde  
herkes keyfine gelen fikri düşünmek-  
te hür olmakla beraber gene herkes  
her düşündüğünü bizzat kendisi tat-  
bika kalkışmakta o kadar hür değildir.  
Teşkilâtı esasiyemiz devlet otoritesini  
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinde top-  
lanmış ve Büyük Meclisin emniyet ve  
itimatına mazhar hükûmetin eline tev-  
di etmiştir. İcra vazifesi münhasıran iş-  
te bu hükûmetindir. Bu hakikatten gaf-  
letle iyi bir iş yapıyoruz diye kendi ken-  
dilerine harekete geçenler herşeyden  
evvel devlet otoritesine karşı hür-  
metsizlik etmiş olurlar, ve zaten bu o-  
toritenin herşeyi yerli yerinde tutmak

(16 July 1934, Cumhuriyet)

## Trakya'da Musevilere Yapılan Hareket Hakkında

(Başmakaleden mabat)

hasebile kuvvetlinin zayıfı merhamet - sizce vurup ezmesi şeklinde görünme - sidir. Museviler bizde de azlık halin - dedirler. Hususile bizdeki Museviler vaktile başka bir memlekette taziyik ve tazip görerek kan ve ateş içinden ka - çıp kurtulabilen insanlardır ki biz ken - dilerine işte o vaziyette ilticagâh ver - mistik. Türkiye Musevilerinin bu tari - hi hatırayı hafızalarında minnetle muha - faza etmekte olacaklarını farz ve kabul etmemeğe sebep yoktur, ve bizim vak - tinde büyük bir centilmenlik olan bir hareketimizi şimdi o hareketin tam zıd - dila bertaraf etmeliğimize mahal ve cevaz olamaz.

İktisadî şeraitin ıslahı çaresi cebir ve siddetten başka birşeydir. Bütün milletçe o yolda bergün bir adım da - ha katedilen milli bir şuur yolundayız. Devletçe halk hukukunun her türlü istisnalarla karşı azamî korunmasını temin edecek kanunlar yapıyoruz, ve mil - letçe aynı korunmanın azamî tahak - kullunu temin edecek teşekküllere en

büyük ehemmiyeti atfetmekte bulun - yoruz.


Asırlardır türkçe öğrenmemiş olan Musevilerin bu itibarla memlekette hâ - lâ yabancı gibi görünmeleri fiilbakika son zamanlarda kendilerinin de dilkat ettiklerini zannettiğimiz bir meseledir. Bu mesele bu sütunlarda bütün şümül ve ehemmiyetile müteaddit defalar mevzuu bahsedilmiştir. Hükümet teb - liği Musevi münevverlerinin bu yolda - ki mesaisini samimiyetle taysif ediyor, ki bizce de öyle olmamak için sebep yoktur. Nihayet dil meselesinin halli çaresi de cebir ve şiddet olamayaca - ğında ittifak edebiliriz.

Hulâsa neresinden bakılırsa bakılsın Çanakkale ve Trakya'daki mahalli ve muvakkat hâdiseleri meşru değil, hatta mazur görmeliğimize imkân yoktur, ve hükümetin tetkikleriyle tedbirlerin'in bu tamamen mevzii hâdiseleri milli şan ve şerefimize lâyık bir surette tas - fiye etmiş olduğumu memnuniyetle ve iftiharla görmüş bulunuyoruz.

YUNUS NADI

(16 July 1934, Cumhuriyet)

## APPENDIX 5



(7 July 1934, Zaman)

... bir az Musevî vatandaşların telâş-  
... nen Musevî tabiidir. Çünkü  
... zail olacağı yüksek bir sesle  
... şvekil Paşa yüksek bir sesle  
... rkiyede her fert, Cumhuriyet  
... nularının emniyet ve muhafazası  
... ndadır. Şikâyet sahiplerinin ad-  
... ye müracaatle haklarını arama-  
... nı tavsiye ederim,, diyorlar. Bu,  
... selenin resmî cihetidir ve bütün  
... meket bu beyanat üzerine hü-  
... metin bu gibi meselelerdeki nok-  
... nazarını ve bütün tebaanın hu-  
... unu sıyanete nekadar ehemmiyet  
... ğini, hiçte şüpheyeye mahal bi-  
... miyacak surette öğretmiş oluyor.  
... Fakat meselenin bir de efkârı  
... miyemiz noktai nazarından tablile  
... vacı vardır. Bir kere şu ciheti  
... daha tekrarlıyalım, ki bu Trak-  
... muhacereti hakkında hususî ma-  
... tımız yoktur. Bütün bildikleri-  
... hükûmetin tebliğinden öğren-  
... erimizden ibarettir. Bu tebligat-  
... öğrendiğimize nazaran Trakya-  
... bir hayli Musevî vatandaşımız  
... et etmişler veya hicrete mecbur  
... mişlerdir.

Burada nazik bir nokta var.  
... ba durup dururken Musevîler  
... kyadan neye hicret ettiler, veya  
... ete mecbur kaldılar? Başvekil  
... nın meclisteki beyanatında çok  
... l söylediği veçhile Türkiyede  
... (Yahudi aleyhdarlığı) cereyanı  
... tur. Musevîler zaman zaman dün-  
... n bütün medenî memleketlerinde  
... eya çok tazyika maruz kalırlar.  
... nız Türkiyede hiçbir vakit böy-  
... ürettep bir tazyik görmemişler-  
... Binaenaleyh durup dururken  
... cyada kendilerine karşı herhan-  
... ir sui muamele edilmiş olmasına  
... al verilemez. Fakat diğer ta-  
... n (ateş olmayınca duman ol-  
... rüzgâr esmeyince yaprak kı-  
... amaz) meselleri mucibince hiç-  
... sebep ve saik olmayınca da  
... muhaceret gibi mühim bir  
... e zuhur edemez.

Musevî vatandaşlarımız, eski-  
... eri siyaseten memleketimizde  
... gaile çıkaran veyahut hiçbir  
... çıkarmamış olan yegâne bir  
... dur. Bunu bilâ tereddüt iti-  
... ederiz. Fakat buna mukabil

Devamı 7 : ZAMAN

(7 July 1934, Zaman)

## APPENDIX 6

**Hükümet bakımından Türkiye'de Yahudi meselesi**

Trakya'da Yahudi muhacereti meselesini hususi surette tahkik ve tetkik eden Dahiliye Vekili Şükrü Kaya'nın raporu üzerine hükümetin matbu tebliği Türkiye'deki Yahudi meselesini bütün çıplaklığı ile açıkladı. Bu itibar ile tebliğin yazılı ve sözlü hakikaten şayanı takdirdir. Çünkü bu gibi resmî tebliğlerde umumiyenin öteden beri gördüğü gibi alıştığı zihniyet, hâdiseleri mümkün olduğu kadar küçültmek ve tafsihiyle hiç temas etmeksizin basma kalıplar ile her şeyi örtbas etmektir. Halbuki Yahudi meselesi hakkında Başvekâletten verilen bu tebliğ Çanakkale ve Trakya mıntakasına da görülen Yahudi muhaceretinin tahmini kadar meçhul kalmış noktaları birer birer ortaya dökmüştür. Hâdiseleri bir hükümet otoritesine yakınlıkla tahlil etmiştir.

Sayet hükümetin söylemediği bazı hakikatler varsa bu da — yine tebliğde bahaten kaydedildiği veçhile — vakıflar arasındaki geçimsizliği beşerî tedavî etmek maksadiyle karlı bazı ithamkâr ifadelerden ibaretir. Bu ise tebliğin maksadı ve neşri üzerine hiç bir suretle müessir olacak bir noksan değildir.

Çanakkale ve Trakya mıntakasına on üç bin kadar Yahudi nüfusu vardır. Şimdiye kadar bunların üç binini yerlerinden ayrılmış. Üç bininin yerlerinden, yurtlarından ayrılmış olması ehemmiyetsiz olmamak üzere geriye kalan on bin Yahudi bugün gene meskenlerinde bulunuyor. Bu şunu gösterir ki, antisemitizm içinde zuhur eden hâdiseler üzerinde müdahale eden makamların hiç bir müdahalesi olmamıştır. Bu müdahale ancak bir tahakkuk unsurlarının tecavüzlerini önlemek yolunda vuku bulmuştur. Çanakkale'de bir takım soyguncuların Yahudi meskenlerine tecavüzlerini menetmek için çalışırken bir Türk jandarmasının müdahalesi olması elim, fakat hükümet kuvvetleri lehinde kaydi iktiza eden bir hâdisedir. Diğer taraftan vazife yolda ihmalleri görülenler hakkında müdahale yapılmaması, soyguna uğramış mülklerin bir kaç gün içinde yüzde yüzü beşinin bulunup çıkarılması, nispeten mütecasirlerinin mahkemeye vermesi gene hükümet cephesinden istenen her şeyin yerine getirildiğini gösterir.

(16 July 1934, Vakıf)

## Hükümet bakımından Türkiyede Yahudi meselesi

(Başmakaleden devam)

yede görülen antisemitizm cereyanının daha ziyade hariçten gelen propagandalar tesiri ile uyanmış bir hareket olduğuna delâlet eder.

Yalnız fazla olarak Çanakkale ve Trakya mıntakalarına ait bir hususi yet daha var. Bu da oralardaki Yahudilerin yabancı dil ve harsta kalmakta ısrar etmeleri ve içlerinde gayri askerî mıntakalarda memleketin emniyeti için zararlı ve casus adamlar bulunduğu hakkında zanlar mevcut olmasıdır.

Bizce Türkler arasında antisemitizm cereyanını doğuran bu sebepler arasında birincilerden ziyade ikinci kısım daha mühimdir. Zira memlekette kökü olmaksızın hariçten gelen propagandaların tesirini bertaraf etmek kolaydır. Binaenaleyh Türkiyede bazı mahdut mıntakalarda kendini gösteren antisemitizm cereyanlarına karşı tedbir alırken bizzat Yahudilerin de kendi hesaplarına bu ikinci sebepleri izale etmeğe çalışmaları lâzım gelir.

Son zamanlarda Yahudi münevverleri arasında Türk dilini ve Türk harsini umumiyetle Yahudilere benimsetmek için bir faaliyet başlamıştır. Bu faaliyette samimî olarak devam etmekte büyük faydalar vardır. Fakat gayri askerî mıntakalarda memleketin emniyeti aleyhine zararlı ve casus adamlar bulunması rivayetlerine karşı sadece "haksız ve isbatsız" olduğunu ileri sürmek kâfi olmasa gerektir. Çünkü bazı ahvalde zanlar ve şüpheler tesir itibariyle hakikatten farksız neticeler verir. Onun için Yahudiler bir taraftan filen Türk dilini ve harsini benimsemek için çalışmakla beraber diğer taraftan en küçük zan ve şüphe uyanı dıracak vaziyetlerden de çekinmeleri lâzımdır.

**Mehmet ASİM**

(16 July 1934, Vakit)



(10 July 1934, Milliyet)

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ler belki vardır. Lâkin Türkler onlardan değildirler.

Biraz da lâtife lâzım ya! Size bir Yahudi fıkrası: Bir Yahudi bir tayyare bileti almış ve Tevratı açarak dua ettikten sonra eğer piyangoda kazanırsa Sinagoğa yüzde onunu vereceğini Allaha karşı taahhüt etmiş.. Piyango çekilmiş, Yahudi bir şey kazanmamış ertesi keşide de bir daha bilet almış, bu sefer mahallesindeki Rum kilisesinin papazına müracaat ederek demiş ki:

— Papas efendi! Keçende bir bilet aldım. Yüzde onunu Sinagoğa nezrettim. Bir şey çıkmadı. Bu sefer size geldim. Yüzde onunu kiliseye vadediyorum. Bakalım, sizin Hiristos bir şey yapabilecek mi?

Papas hemen Yahudiye ümit vermiş:

— Hiç merak etme! Bizim Allahımız cömerttir. İstedğine nail olursun.

Bu seferki keşidede Yahudiye 2000 lira çıkmış.. Papas birkaç gün beklemiş. Gelen giden yok. Gitmiş Yahudiyi bulmuş; ve sormuş:

— Nesim! Allah versin! Piyangon çıktı. Bak bizim Allah nasıl cömerttir. Sizininki gibi değil. Lâkin hâlâ kilisenin yüzde onunun vermedin? Yahudi cevap vermiş:

— Affedersin papas efendi ama, sizininki biraz safça imiş! Bak bizim Allah beni tanır, hiç aldandı mı? Lâkin Hiristos, vereceğim sandı da piyangoyu çıkarttı. Gene yaşasın bizimki! Daha akıllı!

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(10 July 1934, Milliyet)

## APPENDIX 8

### Yahudilik ve musevilik

Mutlu kavimlerin tarihi yoktur. derler. Galiba, Yahudilerin — o sözün aksine olarak — gayet uzun ve gayet heyecanlı bir tarihleri bulunduğudur, bu kavim ne tarihte, ne de zamanımızda mutlu bir kavim sayılamamıştır.

Daha Beni İsrail diye ayrıca bir kavim olarak yaşadıkları zamana ait olan, ve mukaddes kitap adile Yahudi olmayan bir çok kavimlerin de okuduğu, tarihleri yukardan aşağı Yahudilerin başlarına gelen felâketlerin hikâyesile doludur.

Halbuki bu felâketler Beni İsrailer dağılarak başka kavimlerin aralarına yayıldıktan sonra da bitmemiştir. İspanyadan sürülmeleri felâketi, aradan asırlar geçmiş olduğundan dolayı, unutulmuş olsabilesi Almanyada başlarına gelen felâkettenberi daha iki sene geçmemiştir.

Gerek kendi başlarına olarak başardıkları, gerek sonradan başka milletlerin aralarına yayıldıktan sonra böyle devam eden felâketlerin sebebini kendilerine sorarsanız, bunun hep din ayrılığından ileri geldiğini söylerler.

Vakîâ Yahudilerden başka kavimlerin hepsi hayallerinin doğurabildiği kadar ilâhlar icat ederek herbirine ayrı ayrı hürmet gösterirken, Yahudilerin bir tek ilâh tanıyarak başka kavimlerin rahatını bozmuş olmaları kendilerinin başlarına gelen felâketlere bir sebep sayılabilir. Sonrada, Dizraelinin dediği gibi, tarihte en büyük Yahudi olan İsa'yı tanmamaları pek ayıp olmuş ve bundan da başlarına felâketler gelmiştir.

Eski felâketleri böylece din ayrılığına atfetmek mümkündür. Fakat yeni felâketler için ne demeli? İki senedenberi Yahudileri kendi memleketlerinde istemi yen Almanlar, bizim işittiğimize göre, hiç bir vakit din ayrılığından bahsetmemişler yalnız ırk ayrılığını ileri sürmüşlerdir.

Bu zamanda Almanyadaki, hattâ bütün dünyadaki Yahudilerin hepsini hâlâ Sam ırkından ve İsrail oğullarından saymak hayli büyük bir safıktır. Fakat başkaları için bir safık sayılacak olan bu yanlış fikri devam ettiren Yahudilerin kendileridir. Bu dünyada bütün ırklar birbirlerine karıştığı halde, İsrail oğullarının o kadar ayrı ayrı memleketlerde, başka hiçbir ırkla karışmadan saf halde kaldığını iddia edenler gene Yahudilerin kendileridir. Siyonizm adile hâlâ İsrail oğulları sanılan bütün Yahudileri bir araya toplamak ümidile ortaya çıkan — ve Yahudiler için yeni felâketlere sebep olan — fikir de o iddianın bir neticesidir.

Musevi dini vakîâ Yahudiler arasında çıkmıştır. Fakat sonradan başka birçok kavimler arasında da Musevi dinine girmiş olanlar pek çok olmuştur. Şimdi Musevilik vakîâ kapalı bir dindir, yalnız kendilerini İsrail oğullarından sanan kimselere münhasır kalmıştır. Yahudiler dinleri için propaganda yapmazlar, Yahudi olmayanları Musevilğe kabul etmezler.

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(15 July 1934, Milliyet)

Fakat tarihte her vakit öyle olmamıştır. Daha Hıristiyanlık çıkmadan önce, Suriyede, Mısırdaki, Arabistanda İsrail oğullarından olmayan kavimler arasında, bilhassa Rumlar arasında pek çok kimseler Musevi olmuşlardır. Meşhur Yahudi tarihçisi Yosef, bir aralık Şam şehrinde bütün kadınların Musevi olduklarını yazmıştır. Bu söz mübalâğa da olsa Suriyede birçok hükümdarların bütün familyalarile birlikte Musevi dinine girdikleri bilinmektedir. Müslümanların peşinde İspanyaya giden ve oradan bütün Avrupaya ve Afrikaya yayılan Museviler arasında elbette birçok böyle Rumlar ve Araplar da vardır.

Kendisi Yahudi olmamakla beraber Yahudi tarihini derin tetkik etmiş olan meşhur Fransız filozofu Ernest Renan Fransada Pariste, — Orléans,ta Clermat,ta birçok yerlilerin Musevi olduklarını ilâve eder. Rusyanın cenup taraflarında — ki Hozar Yahudilerinin Karait musevilerinin de Türk ırkından oldukları — belki Yahudilerden başka — herkesçe malumdur.

Yahudiler kendi başlarına gelen felâketlere sebep yalnız din ayrılığı olduğunu sanarak din propagandasını çoktan beri kesmişler, fakat bu sefer dünyadaki Musevilerin hepsini İsrail oğullarındanmış gibi göstererek başka bir ayrılık icat etmişlerdir.

Halbuki hakikatte bugün dünyada İsrail oğulları denilebilecek bir kavim yoktur. Her kavmin arasında Musevi dininde bulunan adamlar vardır. Fakat bu adamlar, arasında buldukları kavmin

(15 July 1934, *Milliyet*)

## APPENDIX 9

*Yeumî makale*  
**Biraz da Trakyalıları düşünsek!**  
*Birinci sahifeden devam*

İstanbulun binbir eğlenceli, binbir güzellikleri içinde yangelip oturmak ve sonra üç beş tüccar ve esnafın gidip gelmesi gibi nihayet pek fazla ehemmiyeti haiz olmıyan bir hâdiseyi vesile ederek barbar bağırarak kolaydır, fakat yarın o güzel Trakya beşinci defa bir tehlikeye maruz kalırsa bu yangelip oturanların, barbar bağırmanın içinde kaç kişi hudutlara koşup göğsünü düşmana siper ittihaz eder, hele orada yalnız bol bol kazanıp yerli ahaliye iş yapmak imkânını bırakmıyanlardan yine kaç kişi Trakyanın müdafaası için bir damla kanını, hayır kanını değil, bir santim parasını bile feda eder? işte biz de bu suali soruyoruz, ve bu suale cevap verecek kaç baba yiğit çıkacağını da merakla bekliyoruz.

Bütün bu meseleler de, bu hâdiselerde zavallı olan yalnız Trakyanın yerlisidir. Her an harp tehlikesine o maruzdur. Barut fiçilerinin üzerinde oturan odur, siyasi gürültüler yine onun başında patlar ve nihayet iktisaden de kendi toprağında bir lokma ekmek kazanıp yemesine bile müsaade edilmeyen yine odur. Kazara bir gün aklı başına gelip te (müsaade edin de kendi yurdumda biraz da ben kazanayım) diyince (haksızlık etme, rahat otur) hitap ve itabına duçar olan da yine odur.

Görülüyor, ki Trakya meselesi, bir de bu cepheden değilince ortaya insanı cidden müteessir ve bi huzur edecek çok acı hakikatler çıkıyor.

Binaenaleyh muhaceret meselesi üzerinde fazla ısrar etmeyelim. O sahifeyi kapayalım. Trakya'da bizim için düşünülecek daha çok mühim hayat meseleleri vardır.

Türkiyeyi Avrupalı yapan Trakya'dır. Balkan misakını Trakya sayesinde aktettik. Avrupa siyaseti üzerinde gür sesimizi işittirmek ve dinletmek Trakya sayesinde mümkün oluyor ve nihayet bize (Balkanların ve binaenaleyh bütün Avrupanın sulh bekçisi) unvan şerefini kazandıran yine Trakya'dır.

İşte biz Türkler için Trakya bundan ibarettir. Bundan başka Trakya meselesi bilmiyoruz ve başka gürültü de dinliyemeyiz.

*Ebüzziya Zade*

(13 July 1934, *Zaman*)

## APPENDIX 10

— VAKIT 13 TEMMUZ 1934 —

### SOHBETLER

#### Yahudi aldanmaz

Edirneden bir mektup aldım. Mektubun imzasını tanıdım. İtimadım vardır. Sözüne inanılır; bunun için, pek az yerlerini değiştirip neşrediyorum:

“Bura Yahudileri, yok yere telâşa düşüp kaçtılar. Yok yere hercümerce uğradılar. Ortalığı boşuna şamataya boğdular. Ayak üstü, mallarını satıp savdılar.

“Yapılan satışlar yürekler acısıydı. Rafları kutu kutu mal dolu koca dükkânlar, yok pahasına, alanın elinde kaldı... Vatandaşlarımızın bu telâşına bir türlü mana veremedik. Arkalarından, mahzun mahzun baka kaldık. Nedeni bu derece telâşları?..

Bu telâşın sebebini, ertesi günü anladık.

“Yeni mal sahipleri, Yahudilerden aldıkları dükkânlara girip te, ayak üstü, helâllaşıp sahip oldukları malları tasnife başlayınca, bu telâşın, yaygaranın, şamatanın manası anlaşıldı.

“Hepimizin ağzı bir karış açık kaldı. Bu mektubu okurken, sizin de, bizim kadar şaşacağınızda eminim: Dükkân raflarında bulunan kutulardan bir tanesi, dolu, diğerleri boştu. Bomboştu. Yahudiler, gider ayak, ortalığı telâşa verip, yok pahasına, yoku satmışlardır... Mal diye, boş kutulara para almışlardır...

“Ben bunu yalnız kendi başıma geldi sandım. Dışarı fırladım. Benim gibi, daha bir kaç kişiye aynı oyunun oynandığını gördüm.

“Gürültünün bir sebebini anladınız ya?..”

\* \* \*

Bu mektubu okurken, Ercüment Ekrem Beyin bir yazısı hatırıma geldi. Bu arkadaş, dedesinin cep defterini karıştırmış, o zamanki eşya ve yiyecek fiyatlerinin ucuzluğu karşısında duyduğu hayreti anlatıyor ve diyor ki: Yahudi züğürtleyince eski defterleri karıştırır, derler. Bana kalırsa Yahudi eski defterleri karıştırmasın aldanır....

Hayır, Yahudi aldanmaz!

Selâmi izzet

(13 July 1934, *Vakit*)





**Gece yarısından sonra**

**En yüksek varlık vergisi ödiyecek olanlarla mülâkat**

**Maruf tacir Ahmed Kara «içtimai adalet bakımından böyle bir tedbire ihtiyac vardı»**

Varlık vergisini en fazla yüksek ücretten verecek olan bazı vatandaşların dün gece telefonla evlerinde aradık. Kendisine iki milyon lira vergi tahakkül eden aramızda Burdoy Ahmed bîre pan-ları söyledi:

«- Vatan hürmetinden kaçınmak akla-muzdan geçmez. Süphesiz yok ki, ödemeye mecbur olduğumuz para, az bir para değildir. Fakat, vatan davasında ferî-ye düşen vazifelerin ayrı olduğunu da biliyoruz. Kimi, Allah emrinde hu-dudları teklif, kimi memleketin so veya bu hizmetinde bulunur, kimi de, arast-geldiği zaman, servetini vatan uğruna seve seve feda etmek mevkîinde kalır. Bu sonuncu vazife bir çok emsallimîr ehlî bizim firmamıza da düşmüştü. Bu hizmete, nekadur ayrı olarak önem seve seve katlanacağız.»

Manifaturacı Halûk Ali Bezman mu-harririni telefonda çok nazî bir sesle karıştırmış ve varlık vergisi intibahlarını bir kaç kelime içinde şöyle anlatmıştır:

«- Biz, bir banyo kenetinde yığıyo-ruz. Bu cennetin nasıl nimetlerinden istifade ediyorsak, elbette ki kulluğuna da katlanacağız. Vakâf, kendilerinden para istememeli hiç kimsenin hoşuna gitmez. Fakat bu verdiğimiz para, ne havaya harcansak, ne de gelişigüzel şunun bu-nun kesesine girecek bir para değil-dir. Devletimiz, büyük bir ordu besliyor. Korkuncu bir yangın bîre çok yak-layan ateşler, ancak bu ordunun müda-

(Arkast Sa. 3, sâifin 5 te)

**Alman harp tebliği**

**Toropetz kesiminde**

**Çevrilen Rus kuvvetleri imha edildi**

Belin 18 (s.a.) — Alman Ordularının umumî karargâhının tebliği:

Dün, Terek cephesinde Sovyet har-puçları püskürtülmüştür. 24 düşman hücum arabası tahrib edilmiştir. Alman - Rusen birlikleri, Volga ile Don arasında hayvâ müdafaa edilen bir çok düşman mahallîni hücumla zaferatmış-lerdir. Sovyet kara taarruzları knâh kayıblarla püskürtülmüştür.

Toropetz'in cenub batısında sarılan düşman kuvvetleri imha edilmiştir.

Düşman, 25 santepriden 15 ilkköşüne kadar 3000 den fazla asker, 328 hücum arabası ve 227 top kaybetmiştir. Sov-yetlerin insanca kayıpları 14,000 kişiye baliğ olmaktadır.

(17 December 1942, Cumhuriyet)

**Varlık vergisini ödemeyenler**

## İkinci kafile akşam Aşkaleye gönderildi

Varlık vergisi borçlarını ödemeyen, ikinci kafile için de 1/2 niyet gösterimlerinden 30 kişilik bir kafile dün akşam hareket eden Ankara ekspresine Aşkaleye sevkedilmiş bir vagonla Aşkaleye gönderildi. Bu vagon Demirkapı kampından hareket eden arabaya iskelesine getirilmeli ve burada bekleyen Haydarpaşaya geçirecektir. Borçlular bugün Ankara'da trenlere trenlere aktarılacak şekilde Aşkale yoluna devam edeceklerdir.

Bir borçlunun bileti 25 lira 47 kuruştur. Bir vagon için 967 lira 87 kuruş bileti parası emniyet müdürlüğünde bulunan Demiryolları vergisine tutulmuş ve mükelleflerine bildileri bulunmaktadır. Bu para tierde borçluların gündeliklerine mahsup edilecektir.

### Sevkedilen mükellefler

Dün akşamki trenle sevkedilen 38 borçlunun isimleri şunlardır:

- 1 - 200 bin lira borcuna mukabil 10.400 lira veren Morimo Moris Pesah.
- 2 - 400 bin lira borcuna mukabil 84.417 lira veren Asador Gidutyan.
- 3 - 250 bin lira borcuna mukabil 28 bin lira veren İla Memde.
- 4 - 350 bin lira borcuna mukabil 10 bin lira veren Yaşuva Mendu.
- 5 - 6 - 7 - 300 bin lira borçlarına mukabil 12.001 lira veren İla Pesah.
- 8 - 800 bin lira borcuna mukabil 80.773 lira veren İsak Nişego.
- 9 - 300 bin lira borcuna mukabil 10.545 lira veren Mengi Sakat.
- 10 - 450 bin lira borcuna mukabil 45.502 lira veren Salamon Çıprut.
- 11 - 225 bin lira borcuna mukabil 10.285 lira veren Yaşuva Eskinazi.
- 12 - 255 bin lira borcuna mukabil 2.267 lira veren Vedvanı Yervant Kunter.
- 13 - 200 bin lira borcuna mukabil 8.700 lira veren Teodorı Mçopolidokli.
- 14 - 300 bin lira borcuna mukabil 55.330 lira veren Mirat Miraloğlu.
- 15 - 16 - 180 bin lira borçlarına mukabil 500 lira veren Yasef Bahar ve Bohor Bahar kardeşler.
- 17 - 180 bin lira borcuna mukabil 5.500 lira veren Artin Dedeşyan.
- 18 - 200 bin lira borcuna mukabil 80.790 lira veren Vahram Yavruyan.
- 19 - 150 bin lira borcuna mukabil hiç tediyede bulunmayan Agop Kanacıyan.
- 20 - 5000 lira borcuna mukabil 145 lira veren Berç Mardiros Erkunt.
- 21 - 120 bin lira borcuna mukabil 1.300 lira veren Rafael Eli.
- 22 - 120 bin lira borcuna mukabil 2.600 lira veren Yuda Leon Bahar.
- 23 - 125 bin lira borcuna mukabil 2.135 lira veren Davit Motola.
- 24 - 120 bin lira borcuna mukabil 9.213 lira veren Artin Ayvazoğlu.
- 25 - 120 bin lira borcuna mukabil 4.279 lira veren Andon Marinos.
- 26 - 60 bin lira borcuna mukabil 1.450 lira veren Hayim Motola.
- 27 - 28 - 120 bin lira borçlarına mukabil 330 lira veren Yozgi Sismanoğlu ve ortağı Hristo Manlyadis.
- 29 - 150 bin lira borcuna mukabil 14.500 lira veren Agop Bahadır.
- 30 - 150 bin lira borcuna mukabil 2.370 lira veren Leon Murhan Sarıyan.
- 31 - 120 bin lira borcuna mukabil 5.500 lira veren Dimitri Sandoçtoşu.
- 32 - 30 bin lira borcuna mukabil 6.845 lira veren Elyazar Mendu.
- 33 - 90 bin lira borcuna mukabil 4.507 lira veren Moşe Peço.
- 34 - 12 bin lira borcuna mukabil 715 lira veren İzzah Adato.
- 35 - 180 bin lira borcuna mukabil 15.807 lira veren Petro Karaettimoğlu.
- 36 - 90 bin lira borcuna mukabil 4.557 lira veren İsak Naom.
- 37 - 150 bin lira borcuna mukabil 11.701 lira veren Zera Horaaacucyan.
- 38 - 120 bin lira borcuna mukabil 1.350 lira veren Mase Ayanak.

### Yatırılan para

Perşembe akşamı maliye tahsil gübelerine yatırılan varlık vergisi miktarı 1.188.876 lirası 43 kuruştur. Bunun tahsilat yekünü 111.830.299 lirası 87 kuruştur.

## DİKKATLER:

### Bir tek piyes 3016 lira vergi verirse...

Elimize bir hesap geçti: Şehir Tiyatrosunda son haftalar içinde oynanan «İflâs» piyesi 7356 lira hasılat temin etmiş. Bunun 3016 lirası edisime olarak kesiliyor. Müterekme geri kalanın % 5 i veriliyor.

Telif suretinde yazılan piyeslerin mübдилeri, gerçi, azıcık daha fazla bir yüzde alırlar; lakin yine de fazla edilsin: Halktan 8 - 10 bin lira toplatacak derecede ilgilendirci bir piyes bulacaksınız, yazacaksınız, kerk yaracaklar, ekserisini reddedcekler, kırk yılda bir kabul ettirecekler, muvaffakiyetle oynayacaklar; münekkütler seni yerdan yavuracak, fakat halk beğenecek, müterekme lirası vergiye gidecek, müterekme ve müellif de ancak ondan sonra 200 - 300 lira alacak!...


«- Niçin iyi eser yazmağa he-lenenler çıkmıyor? un bir cevabı bu olsa gerektir.

Bu münasebette de bir kere ha israr ediyoruz:

Tiyatrolar, konserler, bu de-ğir vergiler altında ezilmeme Milli kültür halkı için!

(13 February 1943, Akşam)

APPENDIX 15



(17 December 1942, Tan)

## APPENDIX 16

**Fedakârlık da bir vazife olur !**

**Fatih Rafik A T A Y**

İçimizden birçoğuna: "— İyi hükümet ne demektir?" diye sorsalar, "— Vergisiz idare etmek sanattır!" cevabını vermekten hiç olmazsa hoşlanırdık. Devlete, çok defa, isteniyerek ve zorlanarak, öderiz. Vergi kaçırmanın, yahut, vergi hafifletmek için bir türlü tertip yapmanın pek ağır bir ahlak suçu olduğu çok künselen aklına bile gelmez. Büyük şehirlerimizde kaç tüccarın hakiki kazancı gösteren bilesiz defter tuttuğunu zannedersiniz? Müstesnalar şüphesiz vardır, bunların sayıları çok bile olsa kanun saymak bir müstesna ahlakı mı olur? Türk ticaretinin Türkiye Hükümetine verdiği kazanç payı, sadaka ölçüsünde değildir. Harptenberi milyonlar kazanıldığına konuşmaları arasında bilmeden yoktur; bunu yalnız Hükümet resmen bilemez. Kar nisabeti faturalar üstünde tesbit edildiği için, yabancı memleketlerden sayılı firmalara gelen boş fatura tonları yakalanmamış mıdır? Ticarethane defterlerini teltik edenleri, daima, bütün vurgunların kitaba uydurulmuş olduğunu görürler.

Halbuki müstesna zamanlarda, vazife olarak, vergi borcunu tamam ödemek de kafi gelmez. Mali fedakârlık lazımdır. Harbeden devletler, gelir ve kazancın üstünden vergiyi yüzde 75 gibi görölmemiş bir nisbete doğru çıkarmışlardır. Buna rağmen açık olduğu vakit, bunu gene vatandaşlar istikrazlarla Hazne'ye ödemek zorundadırlar. Büyük Britanya İmparatorluğu vatandaşlarının bu harp için ne kadar fedakârlık etmiş olduğu rakamlarla öğrenildiği vakit herkes hayret içinde kalacaktır. Bütçenin ihtiyacı var, enflasyon tehlikesi var, hepsini önleyecek tedbirler, her tarafta, bir kaynağa, vatandaşlar fedakârlığı kaynağına dayanmaktadır.

Harbeden veya harp sıkıntısı çeken memleketlerde, evvelâ, harp kazancı denen şey âdeta menedilmistir; sonra da tabii gelir ve tabii kazanç, hiç bir devirden misli görülmiyen vergilere bağlanmıştır. Bizde bunun tamamıyla aksi görüldüğünü söylemekle hiç yanlışlığa düşülmez; kanunların menettiği fazla harp kazancı, kanunlarla mücadele edilerek, bu memleket imkânlarının haddi üstünde, keseleri doldurmuştur. Türkiye'de harp zenginleri üremiş, türemistir; fakat Devletin istiklâl müdafaası masrafları bu sınıftan başkalarının sırtına yüklenmiştir.

İkinci dünya harbinde tarafsızlığın, müspet bir istiklâl müdafaası mânasına geldiğini herkesin bilmesi lâzımgelir. Hatta harp içinde olanlar de-recisinde ordu masrafı yapmaktan çekinenlerin, yani, tarafsızlıklarını silâhları ile müdafaası edemeyecek olanların harpdışı kalmak için hiç bir inancaları yoktur. Önce zihinlerimize koyacağımız şey, varımızla yoğunuzla istiklâl müdafaası masraflarını karşılamak zorunda olduğumuzdur. Önce zihinimize koyacağımız şey, harp zengini olmak hiç bir vatandaşın hakkı değildir.

(Sönu 4. Üncü sayfa)

(16 November 1942, *Ulus*)



## Günün Tenkidleri

### Varlık vergisi

### yüzümüzü güldürdü

Yazan: SELÂMI İZZET SEDES

**D**erin, geniş rahat bir nefes daha aldık; e'ğercinimizi şişire şişire, teneffüs cihazlarımızın alabildiğine işlete işlete, varlık havamız, darlık ortasında bile hüsne ve birlik havasını içimize sindire sindire rahat, geniş, der'in bir nefes daha aldık; gü-nüllerimize su serplidi. Varlık vergisi, varlığımıza da bir delili dir. Biz dünin devleti, b'z dünin hükümeti, b'z yakın mazideki dünki imparatorluğun zelli top-

luluğu değ'lin; ne kanamızı emdiririz, ne de der'm'i yitirdürürüz; bizim sirtımızdan, yani hükümetin sırtından, yani devletin sırtından b'ş kimse geçemez, geçemeyecektir de... Bu herkese böylece malûm olsun!

Seni biraz şüphelidi; görüyorum zengin vatandaş? Enebi devletin bayrağı altına sığınıp bu topraklarda senelerden beri iş gören kişi, neden biraz telâşlısın?

(Devamı 4 üncü sayfada)

**GÜNÜN  
TENKİTLERİ**

*(Her tarafı 1 inci sayfada)*

Özülüp sürülme zengin vatandaş. Eliden varını, yağunu alan yok. Emlak sahibi oldun olalı, devlete kanunî vergin; tam ve noksanı olarak verdiğine emîn misin?.. Kazancının kanunen verilmesi lâzım gelen vergisi'ni sandığını sandıma'na verdin mi acaba? Devletten esirgediğin para yok mu?..

Haydi zengin vatandaşım, babacan ol... Senelerdenberi esirgediğin vergilerin hesabını çıkar, sonra birde bugün vereceğin vergiyi hesapla, gene sen karşındır!...

Ya siz ötekiler, hele sizler, siz hiç telâş etmeyin. Çıpralık diliniz, yabançı insanınız, adamına yılısan, tam adamına somurutan yüzünüzle hepimizle hiç bir ilgimiz yoktur. Böyle fiilen ne diye telâş ediyorsunuz?.. Bu topraklarda kanlanıp canlandınız; burada gözümlük yok, yalnız biz biraz kanımız kaldık, sizlerden biraz kan istiyoruz.. Bunun için telâş etmeğe lüzum yok. İstediklerimiz gene kendi kanımızdır. Kendi kanınız kendinizin olsun...


Varlık vergisi yüzümüzü güldürdü Bize yeniden hayat verdi. Hele varlık vergisine itiraz etmeyen meselâ: "Ben üç senede üç yüz bin kazandım, yüz elli bin' feda olsun!" diyen öz Türk vatandaşlarımızın çokluk olduğunu duyuyoruz ve bunu duydukça derin, geniş, rahat bir nefes daha alıyoruz.

(20 November 1942, İkdam)



(6 September 1955, *Istanbul Ekspres*)

APPENDIX 20



(7 September 1955, *Hürriyet*)



(7 September 1955, *Son Posta*)



( 9 September 1955, Istanbul Ekspres)

# Yakalanan tahrikçiler arasında sabıkalı komünistler bulunuyor

**SABİKALARI İZLENİMLİ**

Yakalanan tahrikçiler arasında sabıkalı komünistlerin bulunduğu öğrenildi. Bu kişiler, tahrikçilerin faaliyetlerinde aktif rol almış ve hapis cezasına çarptırılmış. İnceleme devam ediyor.



**YAKALANAN TAHRIKÇİLERİN İZLENİMLİ**

Yakalanan tahrikçilerin arasında sabıkalı komünistlerin bulunduğu öğrenildi. Bu kişiler, tahrikçilerin faaliyetlerinde aktif rol almış ve hapis cezasına çarptırılmış. İnceleme devam ediyor.

### İl genel meclisi seçimleri

İl genel meclisi seçimleri için çalışmalar başlatıldı. Seçim süreci hızla ilerliyor. Tüm adaylar için gerekli önlemler alınmıştır. Seçim sonuçları yakında açıklanacaktır.

### Kıbrıs Türkleri Gençliği Kapatıldı

Kıbrıs Türkleri Gençliği kapatıldı. Karar, güvenlik ve istikrar için alınmıştır. Bu kararın gerekçeleri açıklanmıştır. Devletin güvenliği ön plandadır.

(9 September 1955, Son Posta)



(11 September 1955, *Ulus*)

# Dinamitlenen temel

İzmir'de yapılacak yeni binaların temelleri dinamitlenerek yer altına gömülecektir. Bu işlemin yapılmasıyla binaların temelleri yerden 10-15 metre derinliğe kadar gömülecektir. Bu işlemin yapılmasıyla binaların temelleri yerden 10-15 metre derinliğe kadar gömülecektir. Bu işlemin yapılmasıyla binaların temelleri yerden 10-15 metre derinliğe kadar gömülecektir.

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
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
(11 September 1955, Uluş)



(7 September 1955, Tan)



APPENDIX 27



(9 September 1955, Cumhuriyet)

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ir.

— Ajanlar, vak'aların tafsilâtını harice verdiler... Uzaktakilere karşı da büsbütün mahcub düştük... Çünkü propagandacılar dünyamız başka yerlerinde böyle taşkınlıklar olmazmış gibi bire bin katacaklar.

— Kabahat bizim.

— Tarih müvaceshesinde de kötü duruma düştük...

— Kabahat bizim.

Fakat akıl ve vicdan, bir noktada, ne de olsa tepesiyor. Ve istetik, cüleden çıkarılmış kulabaklarımızın müdafianasını yapmak da, hafifletici sebebler bulmak da gene bizlerin istifa kabul etmez ödevlerimiz, görevlerimiz arasındadır.

Onun için, uzağa, yakına, derinden anlamak istiyene ve istemeyene soruyoruz:

«— Peki ama, hürsün hiç kabahati yok mu?»

Megalo idacılar, arkadaş ve düşmanlarından ehemmiyetli bir kısmının sırça köşkte oturduğunu beşablamışlar mıdır? Türkün evini köyünü şu nesil içinde kaç kere taşladıktan; ve Rumelide, Anadolu'da, Giritte, Oniki adada dâmlarımızı başımıza geçirdikten sonra da gene bizi türlü tehdidlere, taldirganlıklara maruz bırakmıyomuşlardır? Kıbrısımıza çengel takımları mıdır? Atatürkün evini ve konsolosluğumuzu bombalamışlardır mıdır?

Anladık: Türkiye halkından bir kısmını ve dolayısıyla Türkiye halkının topyekûnunu bu derece sarara sokmak büyük kabahattir.

Fakat yalnız bu nesil boyunca -Türkün dostluk gayretlerine rağmen- başımıza kaç belâdan sonra kaç belâ daha acan, kaç zafleden sonra kaç galle çıkaran komünistlerin de hiç kabahati yok mu?

Allah için söylenin... Türkün hakkı Türkte verilsin... Yunanus hakkı Yunana verilsin... Herkes kendi samur kürkünü giydirsin.

(Yâ-Nâ)

(9 September 1955, Cumhuriyet)

## TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Medyanın azınlıkları temsil etme biçimleri üstüne siyaset bilimi ve medya çalışmalarında sıkça vurgu yapılmaktadır. Her ülkenin koşullarına göre farklılık gösterse de genelde kabul gören kanı, en iyimser bakışla, azınlıkların medyada yanlış temsil edildiğidir. Çünkü ayrımcı ve ırkçı temsiller de yaygın olarak medyada yer almaktadır.

Bu çalışmanın çıkış noktasındaki amaç Türk basınında Gayri-Müslimlerin temsilini üç tarihsel örnek olay bağlamında, 1934 Trakya Olayları, 1942 Varlık Vergisi ve 6-7 Eylül 1955 Olayları ve üç tarihsel dönemde, 1930'lar, 1940'lar ve 1950'ler, incelemektir.

Bu tarihsel arka plan Gayri-Müslimlerin basında temsilini anlamak için bir zorunluluktur, çünkü basın var olduğu siyasal, toplumsal ve ekonomik koşulların bir ürünüdür. Dolayısıyla içinde bulunduğu siyasal ve toplumsal koşullar basını şekillendirmektedir nasıl ki basın da bir güç olarak bu koşulların şekillenmesinde bir paya sahipse.

Ancak tarihsel arka plana bakarken bazı sınırlandırmalar yapmak gerekti. O nedenle tarihsel arka plan açıklanırken özellikle milli devletin oluşma ve bunu takip eden millet yaratma süreçlerine odaklanıldı. Tarihsel arka plan değerlendirilirken 1930'lar, 1940'lar ve 1950'ler sadece milli kimliğin oluşmasını etkileyen olaylar ve politikalar çerçevesinde değerlendirildi. Kapsamlı bir dönem analizi bu çalışmanın asıl amacı basındaki söylem analizi olduğu için feda edilmiştir. Bu sebeple okuyucunun dönem analizlerini değerlendirirken bu sınırlılığı göz önünde tutması gerekmektedir.

Her dönem ağırlıklı olarak Gayri-Müslimlerin yasal ve toplumsal statülerinin şekillenmesi çerçevesinde ele alındı. İlk dönemde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun parçalanma süreci öncesi olaylara yer verildi. Bu dönem İmparatorluk sınırları içinde, özellikle Balkanlarda, milliyetçi akımların ortaya çıkmalarından dolayı önem arz etmektedir. Milliyetçi akımların Hıristiyan milletler arasında ortaya çıkması ve bu milletlerin Osmanlı'dan bağımsızlıklarını ilan edip kendi milli devletlerini kurmaları sürecinde Müslüman Türkler arasında da milliyetçi ideoloji yavaş yavaş kök salmaya başladı. Milliyetçi ideolojinin Müslüman Türkler arasında yaygınlaşması özellikle 1913'de başlayan Balkan ve 1914'te başlayan Birinci Dünya Savaşlarını takip eden göçlerle tabanda güç kazanmasıyla olmuştur. Çünkü Anadolu'nun Hıristiyan nüfusu göçler ve mübadelelerle azalırken Balkanlardan ve Kafkaslardan gelenlerle Anadolu'nun Müslümanlaşması hızlanmıştır. 1908'de iktidarı ele geçiren ve 1913'ten itibaren gücünü pekiştiren İttihat ve Terakki Komitesinin izlediği Türkleştirme politikalarının asıl hedefi Gayri-Müslimlerdi ve bu dönemde özellikle Ege'deki Rumlar göçe zorlanarak ve Doğu Anadolu'daki Ermeniler ya göçe zorlanarak ya da katledilerek sayıları azaltılmıştır. İttihat ve Terakki Komitesinin izlediği ekonomi politikaları da ağırlıklı olarak Gayri-Müslimlerin tekelinde olan ekonomik gücün ve varlığın Müslümanlara geçmesini sağlayacak düzenlemeler içermekteydi. Ancak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Birinci Dünya Savaşından yenik çıkmasıyla İttihat Terakki iktidarı da son buldu. Savaş sonrası imzalanan Mondros Mütarekesi (30 October 1918) ve takip eden işgal dönemi Osmanlı devletinin artık sonunun geldiğinin habercileriydi.

Mustafa Kemal'in liderliğinde başlayan Kurtuluş Mücadelesi Türkiye için yeni bir dönemin başlangıcı oldu. Bu dönem incelenirken kapsayıcı bir tarihsel incelemeden ziyade Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasında dönüm noktaları sayılan Amasya Tamiminin ilan edilmesi (22 June 1919), Erzurum (23 July 1919) ve Sivas (4-11 September 1919) Kongreleri gibi tarihsel olaylara ve Cumhuriyetin ilan edilmesinden sonra, reformların uygulanması dönemlerine, bu gelişmelerin gayri-Müslim azınlıklar açısından ne anlama geldiği çerçevesinde bakıldı. Çünkü Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasında ve Cumhuriyet'in ilanını

takip eden yıllarda Mustafa Kemal ve etrafındaki yönetici elitin kurmaya çalıştıkları yeni ülkede gayri-Müslimlerin statüleri de belirmeye başlamıştı.

Kongreler sırasında dile getirilen kaygılar ışığında söylenebilir ki yönetici elit Müslümanlardan oluşan bir birlik temelinde oluşan yeni bir devlet tasarlamaktaydı. Gayri-Müslimlerin mal ve can güvenliklerinin korunacağı garantisini verilirken Gayri-Müslimlerden gelecek herhangi bir ayrıcalık talebine karşı şüpheyle yaklaşılmaktaydı. Bunun en belirgin kanıtı gayri-Müslimlerin kongrelere temsilci göndermesi istenmez.

19 Martta Mustafa Kemal her bölge valilerine bir bildiri göndererek bölgelerinde seçecekleri temsilcileri 23 Nisan'da toplanacak olan meclise göndermelerini ister bu temsilciler arasında da Gayri-Müslimler yoktur. Mustafa Kemal, 1 Mayıs 1920'de Büyük Millet Meclisine hitaben yaptığı konuşmasında meclisin sadece Türklerin değil, Çerkeslerin, Lazların ve Kürtlerin yani bütün Müslümanların meclisi olduğuna vurgu yapar. Hatta meclisi Cuma günü dualar eşliğinde açar. Bütün bunlar aslında yeni devleti oluşturan kesimlerin taleplerinin bir yansımasıdır. Çünkü Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasında yönetici elit, toprak sahipleri ve köylüler arasında kurulan birlik gayri-Müslimlere karşı kurulmuştu, özellikle ticaret erbabı kendi çıkarlarını gayri-Müslimlerin ekonomik gücü karşısında korumak için ve yönetici elit gayri-Müslimlerin yabancılarla işbirliği etme olasılığına karşı. Görünen, bu dönemde Müslümanlık temelinde bir birlik sağlanmıştı.

Lozan Antlaşmasının imzalanması(24 Temmuz 1923) Türkiye'nin diğer devletler tarafından yeni bir devlet olarak statüsünün tanındığı anlamına geliyordu. Lozan aynı zamanda Yunanistan ve Türkiye arasında nüfus mübadelesi yapılması kararının alındığı tarihi bir an olarak da tarihe geçti. Nüfus mübadelesi sonunda Türkiye'den yaklaşık 1, 100,000 Rum Yunanistan'a, yaklaşık 350,000 Müslüman da Türkiye'ye göç etti.

Türkiye'de kalan Rum, Ermeni ve Yahudilere Lozan Antlaşmasıyla azınlık statüsü tanındı. Buna göre adı geçen azınlıklar kendi dillerinde eğitim hakkı başta olmak üzere kendi dini gereklerine ve kültürlerine göre yaşayabileceklerdi.

Lozan görüşmeleri sırasında Büyük Millet Meclisinde milletvekilleri uzun tartışmalar yaşanır, aralarında Lozan'da mübadele komisyonu Türk tarafı temsilcisi Rıza Nur'un da olduğu birçok vekil gayri-Müslim azınlıkların Türkiye'de kalmasına karşı çıkar ve toptan bir mübadele önerir. Meclisteki tartışmalar gayri-Müslimlere karşı ayrıcalık verilmesi fikrinin milletvekilleri arasında makul karşılanmayıp tam tersine bu ayrıcalıkların gayri-Müslimlerin tarafından Türkiye aleyhine kullanılacağı inancının hakim olduğunu gösteriyordu.

1923 Nüfus mübadelesi, Balkan ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı ve Ermeni tehcirinden sonra gayri-Müslim nüfusun dramatik olarak azaldığı ve nüfusun homojenleştirilmesinin en önemli aşamalarından biri olarak önem taşımaktadır. Mübadele de gösterdi ki yönetici elit yeni bir ulus yaratmanın ön koşulunun bir ulus-devletle mümkün olduğuna ve bu sebeple Anadolu'nun gayri-Müslim nüfusunun azaltılmasını düşünüyordu. Gene bu düşünceye göre ulus devletin gücü devletin aktif olarak ulus yaratmada rol oynaması ile mümkün olabilirdi bu sebeple de yönetici elit devletin yapısını şekillendirmek için kendini olağanüstü yetkilerle donatıp, gerekli reformları uygulamaya koydu.

İlk önemli adımlar Saltanatın kaldırılması (1922), Cumhuriyetin ilan edilmesi (1923), ve Halifeliğin kaldırılması (1924) ile atıldı. Yeni Anayasa 20 Nisan 1924'te kabul edilince de yasama ve yürütme güçlerini elinde topladı. 1924 Anayasasınının 88. maddesi Türk ulusuna aidiyeti din, dil ve ırk farkı temelinde değil 'vatandaşlık' temelinde tanımladı. Ancak, pratikte, özellikle yönetici elitin konuşmalarında ulusa ait olmanın en temel koşulları olarak dil ve kültür birliği öne çıkıyordu. Kültürden kasıt ise Müslümanlıktı. Dolayısıyla yasal tanım ve uygulama alanında bir ikilik ortaya çıkıyordu, diğer bir deyişle yasal haklar toplumsal alanda bu hakların uygulandığı anlamına gelmiyordu.

Ancak Müslümanlığa yapılan vurgu, 1925 Şeyh Said isyanından sonra azalmaya ve Türk etnik vurgusu öne çıkmaya başladı. Artık Türklük tanımı, en azından pratikte, Türk kültürüne ait olma ve Türkçe konuşma şartını içermekteydi. Bu Müslüman

olmanın bir kıstas olmaktan çıktığı değil ama Müslümanlığın bireysel bilince indirgendiği bir anlayışın kabul gördüğü anlamına geliyordu. Ulusal kimliğin tanımlanmasında yönetici elitin takındığı bu kararsız tutum büyük oranda tarihsel koşullardaki değişmelerle açıklanabilir.

Bir modern ulus yaratma projesi olarak Kemalizm Batının kurumlarını alarak ve üst yapıda yapacağı değişikliklerle medeni uluslar seviyesine çıkmayı hedefliyordu. Ulus devlet bunun çerçevesiydi ve ekonomik olarak güçsüz olan devleti üst yapısal reformlarla Batılı devletlerin gelişmişlik seviyesine erişmeyi hedefliyordu. Bunun için de otoriter bir yöntemle yasal ve kültürel reformlar tepeden inmece bir şekilde uygulamaya geçirildi.

En önemli reformların başında eğitim sisteminin standartlaştırılması geliyordu bunun için 1924'te Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu Kabul edildi, böylece eğitim Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı altında merkezi olarak kontrol edilmeye başlandı. Latin Alfabesinin 1928'de kabul edilmesi ve 1932'de yayınlanan Türk Tarih Tezi ve 1930'daki Medeni Bilgiler modern milli vatandaş yaratmanın aşamaları olarak görülmelidir. Çünkü bu reformlar sayesinde yetişecek olan yeni yurttaşlar hem ülke sevgisini öğrenecek, kültürel değerleri tanıyacak hem de aynı eğitim sisteminden geçtikleri için biz duygusuna sahip olacaklardı. Atatürk'ün kendisi de bu sürece Afet İnan'a yazdırdığı Malumatı Vataniye (1924), Yurt Bilgisi (1927) ve Vatandaşlık için Temel Bilgiler (1933) kitaplarıyla katkıda bulundu.

Homojen bir toplum yaratmada başvurulan zoraki tedbirlerin en önemlilerinden biri 'Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş' kampanyalarıydı. 1928'de bir grup hukuk fakültesi öğrencisi tarafından başlatılan kampanyanın asıl hedefi gayri-Müslimlerdi fakat Arapça ve Kürtçe konuşanlar da kendi dillerini konuştuklarında baskılara maruz kaldılar. Türkçe konuşmanın vatandaşlığa kabul edilmenin en önemli koşullardan biri olduğu bu dönemde 'Güneş Dil Teorisi' (1936) geliştirildi. Buna göre Türkçe bütün ana dil

gruplarının kaynağıydı. Bilimsel dayanaklardan yoksun olsa da ‘Güneş Dil Teorisi’ ulusal bilincin yaratılması için önemli bir adım olarak görülmüştü.

Özellikle ‘Güneş Dil Teorisi’ ve ‘Türk Tarih Tezi’ homojen bir ulus yaratmak ve ulus-devlet içinde yaşayan halkın kendini toplumun bir parçası gibi ‘hayal’ etmesi için düşünülmüş ve devlet tarafından desteklenmiş projelerdi. Özellikle Türk Tarih Tezi Türklerin Osmanlı’dan önce de üstün bir uygarlığa sahip olduğu vurgusuyla hem Türklük bilinci aşılarmaya çalışılıyor hem de Türkiye devletinin diğer medeni devletler gibi köklü bir tarihi oluşuna vurgu yapılıyor. Bu yanıyla da geçmiş şimdinin ihtiyaçlarına göre yeniden yaratılmış oluyordu.

Kültürel birlik yaratmada en önemli reformlardan biri 1931’de Halkevleri ve Halkodalarının açılmasıydı. Amaç Kemalist reformları halka anlatmak ve aynı zamanda da birçok alanda yapılan kültürel aktivitelerle modern bir yurttaş yaratmaktı. Ancak, buradaki modernliğin sınırları vardı ve o da yeni cumhuriyet rejiminin ihtiyaç duyduğu yurttaş kategorisine uygun olarak çizildi. Bu reformların gayri-Müslimler açısından önemli sonuçları oldu. Çünkü gayri-Müslimler Türk kültürüne adapte oldukları ve Türk dilini konuştukları sürece kabul görüyor, kendi dillerini konuşup kendi kültürel pratiklerini hayata geçirmekte ısrar etmeleri durumunda da dışlanmayla karşı karşıya kalıyorlardı.

Homojenleştirme politikaları 1932’de çıkarılan ve bir takım mesleklerin icrasının gayri-Müslimler tarafından yapılmasını yasaklayan kanun ve 1934’ de çıkarılan İskan Kanunuyla daha da ileri aşamalara taşınmış oldu. Bu kanuna göre, Türkiye’nin bölgeleri yeniden iskana tabi tutuldu ve burada kıstas Türk kültürüne bağlılık olarak belirlendi. Diğer bazı yasal düzenlemelerle gayri-Müslimlerin memuriyete, orduya girmelerine kısıtlamalar getirildi. Bunlardan en önemlisi 1926’da kabul edilen devlet memurluğu için kıstaslarını belirleyen kanundu.

Bütün bu düzenlemeler ve reformların hayata geçirildiği 1920'li ve 1930'lu yıllar nüfusun homojenleştirilmesi politikaları çerçevesinde ele alındı ve bu politikaların gayri-Müslimlerin toplumsal ve yasal statülerini nasıl etkilediği üzerinde duruldu. Türk ulusal kimliğinin oluşturulması, nüfusun homojenleştirilmesi eğitim, dil ve kültür alanında yapılan çeşitli reformlarla koşut giderken Gayri-Müslimler de Türk kültürüne asimile olmaları ve Türkçeyi günlük hayatlarında konuşmaları konusunda giderek artan baskılara maruz kaldılar. Bu bağlamda düşünüldüğünde Türk kimliğinin 'öteki' si gayri-Müslimlik olarak düşünülebilir.

Milli Şef yıllarını değerlendirirken sadece Varlık vergisine götüren süreçler ele alındı. Özellikle izlenen ekonomik politikalar İkinci Dünya Savaşı koşulları tarafından şekillendi ve 1940'da Kabul edilen Milli Koruma kanunuyla devlet aktif olarak ekonomik faaliyetlerin içine girdi. Bunun en önemli sonucu kamu harcamalarının artması oldu. Sürekli bir seferberlik hali dolayısıyla askeri harcamaların doruk noktasında olduğu bu dönemde kamu harcamalarındaki artış hazinenin yükünü artırdı. Yüksek enflasyon, ihracattaki kısıtlamalar ve artan karaborsa ekonomik problemlerin artmasına sebep oldu. Varlık vergisi bu ekonomik koşulların bir sonucu olarak hükümetin hazinenin yükünü hafifletmek için çıkarttığı bir kanun olarak duyuruldu.

Varlık vergisi kanununa göre varlığı 5000 TL ile geliri 2500 TL'yi aşanlar Varlık vergisi vermekle yükümlüydü. Vergi mükellefleri Müslüman (M) ve gayri-Müslim (G) olarak ayrıldı daha sonra bunlara Dönme (D) eklendi. Plan aşamasında gayri-Müslimlerin Müslümanlardan üç kat vergi vermesine karar verilmesine rağmen uygulamada gayri-Müslimler neredeyse Müslümanlardan 10 kat daha fazla vergi vermekle yükümlü kıldılar. Daha da ileri gidilerek daha önce belirlenen varlık sınırlarının altında geliri olan gayri-Müslimler de vergi vermekle yükümlü tutuldular.

Bu haliyle düşünüldüğünde Varlık vergisi gayri-Müslimlerin ekonomik alandaki konumunu zayıflatmayı amaçlayan, ekonominin millileştirilmesinin bir parçası olarak görülebilir. Nitekim, Varlık vergisi sonunda gayri-Müslim nüfusun önemli bir kesimi

varlıklarını değerlerinin çok altında elden çıkarmak zorunda kalarak Türkiye'den göç etmiştir.

Savaş sonrası dönemde faşizmin yenilmesi ve demokratik prensiplerin güç kazanmasıyla Türkiye'de de muhalefete izin verilmiş ve 1946'da çok partili hayata geçilmesi yönünde çok önemli bir adım atılmıştır. Demokrat Parti'nin 1950'de seçilmesiyle birlikte tek parti dönemi sona ermiştir. DP'nin iktidara gelmesi Türkiye'deki yönetici elitin içinde yeni koalisyonların oluştuğunu göstermiştir. Anadolu kökenli muhafazakar yeni zenginler, köylü kesim ve askeri ve sivil bürokrasinin bir kesimi DP'yi desteklemişlerdir. DP iktidarı bürokrasinin egemenliğine son verip izlediği liberal ekonomik politikalarla burjuvazinin egemenliğinin yolunu açmıştır.

DP'nin izlediği ekonomik politikalar kısa bir dönem ekonominin canlanmasına sebep olmuş, tarımda artan verimlilik köylülerin alım gücünü artırmış ve köyden kente göçü hızlandırmıştır. Bunun en önemli sonucu ise şehirlerin nüfusunun hızla artması ve işsizlik olmuştur. Dünya ekonomik krizi, fiyat artışları ve bunların yanında kötü hava koşulları dolayısıyla tarım ürünlerinde kıtlık ekonomik problemlerin daha da armasına sebep olmuştur. Üstelik dış politikada Kıbrıs sorunu DP'yi zorlamaktadır. 1954 seçimlerine bu ortamda giren DP popülist milliyetçi bir söylem benimsemiştir.

DP'nin artan ekonomik ve sosyal sorunlardan bunalan toplumun kesimlerine seslenirken dini temaların ve zenofobik tonun ağır bastığı milliyetçi bir söylemi benimsemesi ve Kıbrıs meselesini de bu çerçevede sunması 6/7 Eylül Olaylarının ortaya çıkış sebeplerini düşünürken göz önünde bulundurulması gereken faktörlerdir.

Buraya kadar anlatılan tarihsel arka-planın gayri-Müslimlerin Türk basınında temsil edilme biçimlerini anlamamıza yardımcı olacağı varsayılmıştır. Çünkü basın içinde olduğu sosyal, siyasal ve ekonomik koşulların bir ürünüdür ve bu koşullar basının toplumda nasıl bir işleve sahip olacağını da büyük ölçüde belirler.

İşte bu çerçevede Türk basınının gayri-Müslimleri milli kimlikten dışlayan, ötekileştiren ve bu söylemi yeniden üretip nasıl normalleştirdiği daha iyi anlaşılabilir. Bu çalışmanın esas amacı Gayri-Müslimleri temsil ederken basının kullandığı ideolojik söylemleri araştırmak olduğundan Gayri-Müslimlerin farklılığına vurgu yapan, onları “biz”den ayıran özelliklerinin öne çıkarıldığı basının söylem taktikleri ve stratejileri üzerinde duruldu. Türk basınının gayri-Müslimleri temsilinin söylem analizinde üstünde durulacak en önemli nokta ise basının gayri-Müslim kimliğini “biz” in karşısında ve “biz” den farklılıkları çerçevesinde ya da grup aidiyetleri çerçevesinde ve özcü yaklaşımlarla tanımlaması içermektedir. Bütün bu söylemsel stratejiler sayesinde basın gayri-Müslimlerin farklılıklarının normalleştirilip günlük dilin gramerine yerleşmesine katkıda bulunarak ulusal kimliklerin oluşması sırasında ve sonrasında bu kimliklerin pekiştirilmesinde ideolojik bir işlev yüklenmektedir.

Basının ulusal kimlik tanımını yeniden üretme ve yaygınlaştırması üstüne durulurken basının önde gelen temsilcilerinin ideolojik duruşlarını ve iktidarı temsil eden elite ilişkilerinin de analize dahil edilmesi önem arz etmektedir. Bu bağlamda gazeteciler entelektüellerin bir alt kademesi olarak görülmüş ve iktidarla olan sıkı bağları göz önünde tutularak gazetecilerin ‘organik entelektüeller’ işlevini yerine getirdikleri üzerinde durulmuştur. Organik entelektüel olarak gazetecilerin en temel işlevlerinin ise homojen bir topluluğun milli devletin olmazsa olmaz koşulunu içeren Türkiye’deki milliyetçi ideolojinin sağduyu düzeyinde yaygınlaşmasını sağlamak olduğu savı tartışılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Bu çerçevede, basının 1934 Trakya Olayları, 1942 Varlık Vergisi ve 6-7 Eylül 1955 Olaylarını haberleştirirken ve yorumlarken iktidarların söylemlerini yeniden üretmesi üzerinde duruldu. Ana akım basından örnekler seçilirken de hükümet karşıtı ve hükümet yanlısı basının iktidarın söylemlerini yeniden üretmek konusunda benzerlikleri ve farklılıkları ortaya konmaya çalışıldı. Bunun için ilk önce seçilen gazetelerin her dönemde, 1934, 1942 ve 1955, ana akım Türk basınına temsil eden gazeteler olmasına ve hükümet yanlısı ve karşıtı olan gazetelerin bu seçilen gazeteler arasında olmasına

özen gösterildi. İkinci bir nokta bu gazetelerin bu üç dönemde, ya da en azından iki dönemde, yayın hayatında olmasına dikkat edildi. Ancak Türkiye’de basılan gazetelerin yayın hayatının oldukça kısa olması sebebiyle, birkaç istisna dışında, gazeteler sürekli kapanıp, el değiştirdiğinden önde gelen başyazar, editör ve köşe yazarlarının yazdığı gazetelerin seçildi. Böylece, en azından Türk basınının önde gelen gazetecilerinin bu üç dönemde üç örnek olayda aldığı tavır ortaya serilmiş ve bu tavırda bir süreklilik olup olmadığı anlaşılmış olacaktır. Her üç dönemde öne çıkan ve önemli okuyucu kitleleri olan yazarlar arasında Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Velit Ebuziyya, Refii Cevat Ulunay, Refik Halit Karay, Ahmet Emin Yalman, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, Enis Tahsin Til, Zekeriya and Sabiha Sertel hükümet karşıtı ve genel olarak hükümete muhalif basının temsilcileri olarak seçilirken, özellikle tek parti döneminde, Falih Rıfkı Atay, Yunus Nadi, Nadir Nadi, Necmettin Sadak, Kazım Şinasi Dersan, Hakkı and Rasim Us, Ragıp Emeç and Va-Nu de, gene tek parti döneminde, daha çok hükümet yanlısı olarak bilinen gazetecileri temsil ettikleri düşünülerek seçildi.

Basının söylem analizi yapılırken eleştirel dil ve söylem analizini çalışmalarında kullanan Fowler (1991, 1996), Trew (1996), Ferguson (1998), Fairclough (1995), ve van Dijk (1996)’dan yararlanılmıştır. Adı geçen yazarlar medyada, özellikle de basında azınlıkların temsiline farklı boyutlarını incelemişlerdir. Özellikle haber metinlerinin incelenmesinde ‘haber’ bilgi ileten değil olayların ve durumların ideolojik temsil edildiği bir tür olarak ele alındı. Bu anlamda haber farklı ve çatışan dünya görüşlerinin dominant hale gelmeye ve olayları da bu dünya görüşü çerçevesinde sunulmaya çalışıldığı bir mücadele alanına dönüşmüştür. Böylece ana akım medyada ‘haberler’ dominant ideolojiyi ve bu ideolojiye ait değer yargılarını yansıtmaya işlevini görmektedir.

Eleştirel söylem analizi, haber metinlerinde, başyazı ve köşe yazılarında, açıkça ifade edilmeyen ama metnin içine gizlenmiş ideolojik anlamları ortaya çıkartmak için bize gerekli olanakları sunar. Bu dil ve söylem taktikleri ve stratejilerinin çözümlenmesi bize hem azınlıkların basında nasıl temsil edildikleri hakkında ipucu verecek hem de bu taktikler sayesinde basının azınlıklara karşı kullandığı ayrımcı dilin nasıl normalleştirip

sağduyu düzeyinde yaygınlaştırdığını göstermemize yardımcı olacaktır. Aşağıda açıklanan kavramlar haber metinlerinde gayri-Müslimlerin ideolojik temsilini ortaya çıkarmamıza yardım edecek dil ve söylem stratejilerinden bazılarıdır.

İlk başta ‘temsil’ sorunu vardır. Haber olarak neyin seçildiği neyin haber değeri taşımadığı gerekçesiyle dışarıda bırakıldığı belli bir karar mekanizmasının olduğunu düşündürür bize. Genellikle haber olarak seçilen olaylar yerleşik çıkarılara hizmet eder, sıradan insanların hikayeleri ve düşünceleri herhangi bir olaya doğrudan katılmışlarsa bir haber değeri taşır. Temsilde ikinci önemli nokta haberin ‘nasıl’ verildiğidir, çünkü azınlıklarla ilgili haberler genellikle yanlı, eksik ya da yönlendirici olabilmektedir. Burada dikkat edilmesi gereken hikayenin ya da olayın ne kadar ‘bütünsel’ verildiği olmalıdır. Diğer bir deyişle haber toplumsal ve siyasal bağlamı içinde mi veriliyor yoksa toplumsal bağlamından soyutlanarak mı veriliyor sorusu eleştirel söylem analizi açısından büyük önem taşır.

Haber metinlerinde, köşe yazıları ve başyazılarda azınlıklar temsil edilirken ne derece ‘öteki’leştiriliyor, eleştirel söylem analizinin dikkat çektiği başka bir söylem stratejisidir. Genellikle, azınlıklar temsil edilirken ‘normal’ olmayan yanlarıyla ya da ‘biz’den farklılıkları çerçevesinde temsil edilirler. Bu temsillerde dikkat çeken nokta ise ‘biz’in ise pozitif, ‘onlar’ ın ise negatif yanlarıyla haberde temsil edildiğidir. ‘Onlar’ hakkında çoğu önyargılara dayalı ve ‘onların’ kimliğini deşışmeyen, kökçü temellerine vurgu yapan bir anlatım hakimken ‘bizim’ değerlerimiz yükseltilir. Dolayısıyla kimlikler sürekli yeniden üretildiği için medyanın ‘biz’ ve ‘onlar’ kategorilerini nasıl tanımladığı, bunlara hangi değerleri atfettiği ve bütün bunların adı geçen gruplar ve bireyler için ne gibi siyasi ve toplumsal sorunlar yarattığı eleştirel söylem analizi açısından incelenmesi gereken bir durum olarak karşımıza çıkar.

Azınlıkların kategorize edilip tek tipleştirilmesi gene eleştirel söylemin haber metinlerini incelerken dikkat çektiği bir söylem stratejisidir. Azınlıkların temsilinde en dikkati çeken noktalardan biri ‘onların’ farklı hayat tarzlarına vurgu yapan bu yanlarıyla ‘bizim’ grubumuzdan ayrı olduğunun altını çizmektir. Eğer azınlıklar negatif bir olayla

habere konu olmuşlarsa işte ‘onların’ bu farklılığı öne çıkarılır. Burada ima edilen şey ‘onların’ zaten farklı olduğu ve bu ortaya çıkan problemin de bu farklılıkla ilintilendirilmesi gerektiğidir. Bazı durumlarda kategoriler ırkçı yan anlamlar da taşır ve azınlıkların toplumdaki dışlanmasının olumsuzlanmasını önerir.

Azınlıkların habere konu olurken aktif mi yoksa pasif öge olarak mı yer aldığı diğer bir önemli noktadır. Çünkü aktif pozisyon eylemi gerçekleştiren ya da duruma göre inisiyatif sahibi olmayı çağırırken pasif pozisyon eyleminden etkilenen ve inisiyatif kullanamayan bir durumu ifade eder. Azınlıklarla ilgili haber metinlerinde, köşeyazılarında ve başyazılarda genellikle dikkati çeken nokta eğer ‘biz’ pozitif bir eylemde bulunmuşsak habere aktif özne olarak konu oluruz ama eğer negatif bir eylemde bulunmuşsak pasif cümlelerle ‘bizim’ kimliğimiz ya arka plana itilir ya da metinde tamamen çıkartılır. Azınlıklar içinse bunun tam tersi bir durum geçerlidir. Eğer azınlıklar negatif bir eylemin öznesiyseleler metin aktif cümlelerle kaleme alınır ama eğer pozitif bir eylemin öznesiyseleler genellikle pasif formlar haberde baskın olur. Pasif cümlelerin ağırlıklı olmasının en önemli sonuçlarından biri herhangi bir olay ve durum anlatılıyorsa sorumluluğun kime ait olduğu bilinemez ve sanki görünmez ya da doğal süreçler sonucu bu olay oluyor izlenimini verir.

Eleştirel söylem analizinin üstünde durduğu diğer önemli kategori sözcük seçimidir. Çünkü bir olay ve durum değişik şekillerde anlatılabiliyorsa, seçilen anlatım tarzının bir amacı var demektir. Bir olayı ve durumu haberleştirirken ya da yorumlarken seçilen ifade tarzı olayı aktarmaktan ziyade belli bir bakış açısından olayı aktarmayı amaç ediniyorsa burada seçilen anlatım ideolojik bir işlev görüyor demektir. Bunun en çarpıcı örneği azınlıklardan bahsederken kullanılan aşağılayıcı, küçültücü ya da önyargı ifade eden bir anlatım tarzı kullanmaktır. Bu kullanım aynı zamanda toplumdaki güç ilişkisinin bir göstergesidir. Basının azınlıkları haber konusu yaparken tercih ettiği dil de toplumdaki güç dengesinin bir göstergesi olarak bize önemli ipuçları verecektir.

Özne konumunu olaylara ve süreçlere transfer etmek başka bir söylem stratejisi olarak önemlidir. Bu strateji sayesinde istenmeyen bilgiler anlatımdan çıkartılır. Böylece bilginin ya da haberin istenen kısmı yayınlanırken istenmeyen kısmı saklanır. Bu strateji sayesinde toplumdaki güç ilişkileri gizlenir ve sanki olaylar ve süreçler kendi doğal akışları içinde olageliyormuş izleniminin verir. Böylece herhangi bir olayda, eğer güçlü aktörler söz konusuysa, sorumluluk gizlenir ve süreçler ve tanımlanamayan mistik sebepler sorumlu olarak gösterilir.

Üstünde durmak istediğimiz diğer bir strateji haber kaynakları ve bu kaynakların fikirlerinin haberin içeriğini ne derece etkilediğidir. Çünkü medya ve ayrıcalıklı sınıflar arasında karşılıklılığa dayanan bir ilişki vardır ve bu ilişki hem neyin haber yapıp yapılmayacağını hem de kimin görüşünün uzman görüş diye alınacağını belirler. Haber kaynakları haber verirken sadece bilgi ve 'haber' vermez haberi kendi bakış açılarından kendi profesyonel ya da ideolojik yargıları ve terimleriyle şekillendirip verirler. Bu yanı sıra da haberler belli ideolojik görüşlerin yansımasıdır. Özellikle azınlıklar habere konu olduğunda eğer haber kaynağı azınlıkların kendileri değil onlar hakkında fikir yürüten başka kişiler ise burada ideolojik bir sebep aramak gerekir. Çünkü azınlıkların fikirleri sorulmuyorsa ya kendileri fikir beyan edecek düzeyde görülüyorlar ya da fikirlerinin azınlıkların kendileri tarafından açıklanması sakıncalı görülüyor anlamı çıkabilir. Her iki durumda da toplumda daha güçlü olan kesimler azınlıklar hakkında söz söyleme ve fikir beyan etme hakkına sahip olduğunu gösterir.

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