O.İNCİ

THE OSTRACISING OF THE UNLIKE IN H.G.WELLS'S *THE TIME MACHINE*, *THE ISLAND OF DR. MOREAU* AND *THE INVISIBLE MAN* BASED ON A PESSIMISTIC INTERPRETATION OF T.H.HUXLEY'S *EVOLUTION AND ETHICS*

ORKUN İNCİ

SEPTEMBER 2009

METU 2009

THE OSTRACISING OF THE UNLIKE IN H.G.WELLS'S *THE TIME MACHINE*, *THE ISLAND OF DR. MOREAU* AND *THE INVISIBLE MAN* BASED ON A PESSIMISTIC INTERPRETATION OF T.H.HUXLEY'S *EVOLUTION AND ETHICS*

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ORKUN İNCİ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH LITERATURE

SEPTEMBER 2009

Approval of Graduate School of Social Sciences

_____

Prof. Dr. Sencer AYATA

Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

_____

Prof. Dr. Wolf KÖNIG

Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

_____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Dürrin ALPAKIN MARTINEZ-CARO

Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Nursel İÇÖZ (METU, FLE) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Dürrin ALPAKIN MARTINEZ-CARO

(METU, FLE) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Nil KORKUT (Başkent U., AMER) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Orkun İnci

Signature :

ABSTRACT

THE OSTRACISING OF THE UNLIKE IN H.G.WELLS'S *THE TIME MACHINE*, *THE ISLAND OF DR. MOREAU* AND *THE INVISIBLE MAN* BASED ON A PESSIMISTIC INTERPRETATION OF T.H.HUXLEY'S *EVOLUTION AND ETHICS*

İnci, Orkun

M. A., Program in English Literature

Supervisor : Assist.Prof.Dr. Dürrin Alpakın Martinez-Caro

September 2009, 119 pages

This thesis analyses the ostracising of the unlike as social criticism in H.G.Wells's *The Time Machine*, *The Island of Dr. Moreau* and *The Invisible Man* against a background of T.H.Huxley's cosmic pessimism in his work *Evolution and Ethics*. The thesis claims that Wells puts mankind's future on an ever darkening line of evolution, or in other words devolution. Wells, although he is an admirer of Huxley, shows a more sceptical and cynical attitude in the assessment of the capabilities and nature of mankind. The three novels constituting the subject of the present study bears the stamp of this scepticism in increasingly pessimistic degrees.

Keywords: Social Criticism, Ostracism, Cosmic Pessimisim, T.H.Huxley, H.G.Wells

ÖZ

H.G.WELLS'İN *ZAMAN MAKİNESİ*, *DR.MOREAU'NUN ADASI* VE *GÖRÜNMEZ ADA*M ADLI ROMANLARINDAKİ TOPLUMDAN FARKLI OLAN KİŞİNİN DIŞLANMASININ T.H.HUXLEY'NİN *EVRİM VE AHLÂK* ADLI YAPITININ KARAMSAR BİR YORUMUYLA İNCELENMESİ

İnci, Orkun

Yüksek Lisans, Yabancı Diller Eğitimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç.Dr. Dürrin Alpakın Martinez-Caro

Eylül 2009, 119 sayfa

Bu tez H.G.Wells'in *Zaman Makinesi*, *Dr.Moreau'nun Adası* ve *Görünmez Adam* romanlarında farklı olanın toplumdışına itilmesini T.H.Huxley'nin yapıtı *Evrim ve Ahlâk* temelinde irdelemektedir. Tez Wells'in insanoğlunun geleceğini gittikçe kararan yönde bir evrim çizgisine ya da başka bir deyişle bir gerievrim çizgisine oturttuğunu iddia etmektedir. Wells her ne kadar Huxley'nin bir hayranı olsa da insansoyunun yeterliliklerinin ve tabiatının değerlendirilmesinde ondan daha şüpheci ve güvenmezci bir yaklaşım gösterir. Bu çalışmanın konusunu teşkil eden üç roman bu şüpheciliğin damgasını karamsarlığı gittikçe artan ölçülerde taşımaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Toplumsal Eleştiri, Dışlanma, Evrensel Karamsarlık, T.H.Huxley, H.G. Wells

To My Love

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude for Assist.Prof.Dr. Dürrin Alpakın Martinez-Caro for her continual support and guidance, and her invaluable advice in all stages of my studies.

I would also like to express a similar gratitude for Assoc.Prof.Dr. Joshua Bear who is certainly one of those people who has made the successful completion of this program possible for me.

I would also like to express my gratitude for Prof.Dr.Nursel İçöz for her guidance at crucial moments when my work began to digress from its course.

I would also like to express a gratitude for Assist.Prof.Dr. Nil Korkut for kindly accepting to be a member of the jury.

I would also like to express a gratitude for Mrs. Patricia Bilikmen whom I fondly associate with my English studies at METU ever since her blissful classes of my first term at the Department of Basic English.

Finally I would like to express my gratitude for my wife, Özlem Kahraman İnci, who supported me unconditionally through all those long years of study and my parents Ruksan and Selâhattin İnci and elder brother Aşkın İnci for making me the man I am.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In *The Time Machine*, *The Island of Dr. Moreau* and *The Invisible Man* H.G.Wells deals with the ostracising of the unlike as a critique of the human society. Wells, in those novels, does not try to offer solutions on a social basis to the problems he states, as it is, he sees those problems literally inescapable, treats them with a deterministic outlook and makes pessimistic deductions although his expression of all these is tinted with a certain degree of ambiguity.

The present work will first study the ostracising of the unlike in three of H.G.Wells's early scientific romances, *The Time Machine*, *The Island of Dr. Moreau* and *The Invisible Man*. Next, it will examine the causes of this ostracising as given by Wells in an evolutionary reading of those novels and in accordance with his deterministic view of the human condition and his pessimistic conclusions. It will then study the consequences of the said ostracising as reflected by the increasingly more desperate acts of the protagonists of those novels.

The genre science fiction, maybe due to the utopian standing of many a sample of it or due to their having technological and scientific advancements or possibilities as the focus of interest, is usually considered an optimistic genre. This is seemingly valid even for the work of Wells himself in the 1930's which in Hillegas's words (1967)

> came to connote a utopia filled with super-gadgets, mechanical wonders, run by an elité of scientists and engineers for the good of the people…[and t]he application of science had almost automatically brought this heaven on earth, which was inhabited by a finer race of human beings, who had inevitably evolved to their state of near perfection (p.16).

In actual fact, science fiction need not always talk of useful scientific possibilities or of a utopian blissful future and "[n]either in spirit nor in detail are Wells's stories and romances at all similar to this commonly accepted notion

of the Wellsian vision" (pp.16-7) or of science fiction in general. There are also various pessimistic ramifications to the possibilities it introduces and Wells delved into those pessimistic branches in his early romances, that is, his early scientific romances belong in this latter group. As Nicholson (1979) notes

> It is surely significant, that the man who preached progress more eloquently than anyone else should be the one who had the most vivid vision of cosmic accident, and who realised that civilisation is a frail thing as human life, and that the destiny of the whole earth, no less than that of the least of its inhabitants, hangs by a thread (p.32).

In the early scientific romances, we must repeat, that Wells did not preach progress, nor did he ever leave the pessimistic tone save for a few occasional slips towards an ambiguous optimism in them, or in Hillegas's words (1967)

> knowledgeable commentators have long since been aware of the darkness which actually permeates much of the early science fiction—the stories and the great scientific romances like *The Time Machine*, *The Invisible Man*, *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, *The War of the Worlds*, and *The First Men in the Moon* (p.17).

The early science fiction novels of H.G.Wells cover a spectrum spanning from the apparent creation of monsters to their being in fact outcasts and therefore victims, then onwards to a critique of the society for its ostracising of the unlike; from the introduction of a cosmic nature and cosmic pessimism in Huxleyan terms to the ruling out of a bright future for (mainly the western) Man based on the complacent assumptions of the western mind.

The ostracising of the unlike plays a central role in Wells's criticism of the society which in its turn adds to his pessimistic perspective of the period. The unlike in our context is a member or group of the society which for some or other reason is treated as an alien. This treatment is in almost always undeserved and in a most cases ends up in a vicious circle since the unlike character or characters tend to retaliate which makes him/her/them the more disliked. The unlike character is usually superior to the rest of the society in some respect as in the cases of the unorthodox scientists in these three novels who evoke

feelings of jealous envy in fellow scientists and ordinary men alike. The unlike character refuses or fails to react in the same way to the events of life as the ordinary members of the society. Willingly or unwillingly he/she makes his/her difference felt. As the society tries to kerb the features it sees acting against its integrity in its members a clash of interests presently ensues. The unlike is cast out from the society and marginalised. The vicious circle we talked about is thus formed and in most cases the tension rises until the destruction or the complete estrangement of the unlike. Griffin, Moreau and Montgomery are obvious examples of the former whereas the Morlocks and Prendick belong to the latter group.

The existence of social criticism in Wells's early science fiction novels is supported by Hillegas's (1967) view that "science fiction, such as is represented by the great anti-utopias, always makes a significant comment on human life: it is a vehicle for social criticism and satire" (p.8) but Wells does not simply try to give social messages through the use of satiric utopia or anti-utopia. His message is mainly a pessimistic one in applied cosmic pessimism. In Batchelor's view there is an inherent pessimism and an expectation of the downfall of humanity in Wells's early work:

> The secret to the wide success of his early works of fiction…is rather their intrinsic, mundane effortless pessimism, their unrelieved conviction that privileged society and the British Empire's great works were doomed, that European hubris was an invitation to a fall, and that all civilization and truth would come to nothing (p.ix).

This is why we claimed at the beginning that Wells does not try to offer solutions on a social base to the problems but instead he treats them with a deterministic outlook and makes pessimistic deductions. Therefore, the tone of the narrative in these three novels passes from partly pessimistic and mainly anti-utopian in *The Time Machine* towards darkly pessimistic in *The Island of Dr. Moreau* and *The Invisible Man*.

It is, in that case, not appropriate to mark those early scientific romances solely as social criticism, but they must also be termed as applied cosmic pessimism in the Huxleyan vein. Furthermore, with this latter aspect they act as

forerunners of twentieth century dystopias. What more befitting example can be found than *The Time Machine*'s world of the year 802701 with its Eloi and Morlocks—as in Hillegas's (1967) description of the *anti-utopia*—for "a sad, last farewell to man's age-old dream of a planned, ideal, and perfected society, a dream which appeared so noble in Plato's *Republic*, More's *Utopia*, Andreae's *Christianopolis*, and Bellamy's *Looking Backward*"(pp.3-4) after all?

In his preface to *Seven Famous Novels*—a 1934 collection consisting of *The Time Machine*, *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, *The Invisible Man*, *The War of the Worlds*, *The First Men in the Moon*, *The Food of the Goods* and *In the Days of the Comet*—Wells draws an outline of the style he used in the early scientific romances which without the need for any further reference summarises the literary method he applies:

> They are all fantasies; they do not aim to project a serious possibility; they aim indeed only at the same amount of conviction as one gets in a good gripping dream. They have to hold the reader to the end by art and illusion and not by proof and argument, and the moment he closes the cover and reflects he wakes up to their impossibility.
>
> In all this type of story the living interest lies in their non-fantastic elements and not in the invention itself…The thing that makes such imaginations interesting is their translation into commonplace terms and rigid exclusion of other marvels from the story.
>
> …
>
> As soon as the magic trick has been done the whole business of the fantasy writer is to keep everything else human and real (p.vii).

He also differs from writers such as Jules Verne in that he does not especially try to create stories of the future with the plot centred about persons as simply individuals. Wells rather writes on general conditions although the plot is woven around one or more characters:

> So soon as the hypothesis is launched the whole interest becomes the interest of looking at human feelings and human ways, from the new angle that has been acquired. One can keep the story within the bounds of a few individual experiences…or one can expand it to a broad criticism of human institutions and limitations (p.viii).

To quote Norman Nicholson (1950),

> *The Time Machine*, *The Wonderful Visit*, *The First Men in the Moon* and *The Invisible Man* are all books concerned with the adventures of a central character, but Wells wanted to write less of individual men than of mankind (p.35).

This can also be seen in Vernier's (1977) statement that in the scientific romances "the emphasis falls on man, not as an individual character defined through his relationship with other individuals, but on man as a representative of his species" (pp.72-3). This statement can be extended to cover the Morlocks and Eloi of *The Time Machine* and the Beast Folk of *The Island of Dr. Moreau* for they are either (seemingly) direct descendants of man as in the two stated human races of *The Time Machine* or stand for a parody of mankind as the Beast Folk of *The Island of Dr. Moreau*.

When Wells's explanation on his use of miraculous element in science fiction—which we quoted above—is combined with Nicholson's and Vernier's words on his emphasis on man as a representative of his species, Hammond's (1979) words may be seen as a corollary:

> …To Wells the novel was a vehicle for the discussion of ideas, and although this became much more evident in his later works the serious intent was there from the very beginning.
> It should also be noted that the strain of pessimism which runs through much of his later work was already apparent in his earlier writings, from the 1890s onwards (p. 14).

It is true that Wells conveyed social messages and discussed ideas through his novels but as we stated above his stance in them was increasingly pessimistic, at least in the three scientific romances we are dealing with. As centred around those two main foci (social criticism and cosmic pessimism), Wells's early science fiction can be studied in several strata, one of them being anti-utopia and another horror fiction.

As stated above Wells, does not anticipate a bright future for humanity in his early work. In Bergonzi's (1976) view, "[b]efore the turn of the century Wells's visions of the future were apocalyptic, even terrifying" (p.3). Likewise, his approach to the utopian works has elements of mockery if not contempt

against this genre. His attitude may best be expressed in the latent mocking tone he makes the Time Traveller adopt on utopian works:

> And here I must admit that I learned very little of drains and bells and modes of conveyance, and the like conveniences, during my time in this real future. In some of these visions of Utopias and coming times which I have read, there is a vast amount of detail about building, and social arrangements, and so forth. But while such details are easy enough to obtain when the whole world is contained in one's imagination, they are altogether inaccessible to a real traveller amid such realities as I found here (*The Time Machine* p.34).

Wells's science fiction is not optimistic as Jules Verne's optimistic fantasies are, nor are they mainly about future optimistic possibilities. According to Hillegas (1967),

> in the nineteenth century, a period of astonishingly fertile scientific activity and of technological developments which completely changed the conditions of human life, science fiction began to flourish…[and] the most important development of science fiction appeared in the writings of Jules Verne. In a sense, Verne prepared the way for Wells (p.10).

In the same preface to *Seven Famous Novels* Wells himself notes how the comparison is literally incongruous:

> These tales have been compared with the work of Jules Verne…As a matter of fact there is no literary resemblance whatever between the anticipatory inventions of the great Frenchman and these fantasies. His work dealt almost always with actual possibilities of invention and discovery, and he made some remarkable forecasts. The interest he invoked was a practical one; he wrote and believed and told that this or that thing could be done, which was not at that time done. He helped his reader to imagine it done and to realise what fun, excitement or mischief would ensue. Many of his inventions have "come true". But these stories of mine collected here do not pretend to deal with possible things; they are exercises of the imagination in a quite different field. They belong to a class of writing which includes…the story of *Frankenstein*… (p.vii).

As Wells notes that his early writings belong to a class that includes *Frankenstein* it may be argued that the creation of monster characters (or species in the case of Morlocks) was part of his early style and therefore, he was not far from horror fiction in the essence of his product.

According to Richard Bleiler (2006), horror fiction is akin to science fiction for he states that "as *Frankenstein* has shown there is sometimes a very fine line between the classifications of science fiction and horror fiction, and H.G.Wells must be included in the camp of writers who created several enduring monsters" although he "is traditionally and very reasonably considered a pioneering writer of science fiction" (pp.356-7).

The name of Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* comes to the fore in more than one critic and Wells also makes a reference to it in classifying his own work. Indeed there is a relation between his work and *Frankenstein*. Still, Wells (1934) draws a line of distinction between his early science fiction and the *Frankenstein* group for he states that

> the writer of fantastic stories…must trick [the reader] into an unwary concession to some plausible assumption and get on with his story while the illusion holds. And that is where there was a certain novelty in my stories when they first appeared. Hitherto, except in exploration fantasies, the fantastic element was brought in by magic. Frankenstein even, used some jiggery-pokery magic to animate his artificial monster" (p.viii).

For that reason Robert Louis Stevenson's Mr.Hyde is more akin to Wells's monster characters. As Middleton (1999) notes, "Stevenson's novella was first published by Longmans, Green in January of 1886" (p.ix) and relies on science merely while bringing to daylight the second self in him:

> Enough, then, that I not only recognised my natural body for the mere aura and effulgence of certain powers that made up my spirit, but managed to compound a drug by which these powers should be dethroned from their supremacy, and a second form and countenance substituted, none the less natural to me because they were the expression, and bore the stamp, of lower elements in my soul (*The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* p.43).

We believe that in neither *Frankenstein* nor *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* the use of the horrifying character is mainly aimed at evoking superficial disturbance in the reader by the exposition of outwardly horrifying elements and acts of monstrosity. The same certainly holds for Wellsian characters. In Bergonzi's (1976) view, "he found the prospect of

disturbing his readers satisfying" (p.3), but not for the mere satisfaction of having offered monsters of differing sizes and shapes.

Both Frankenstein's creature and Mr.Hyde are outcasts. They are treated as the scum of the earth but the one's real misfortune is to be so singularly unlike the rest and the other's committing the deeds overtly which the society at large does covertly. In those two works, the common men are shown not to be so free from evil as in the case of the father whose daughter Frankenstein's creature had just saved and who turned on the poor brute with stones, or as in the case of Mr.Enfield—who, on his way back possibly from covert pleasures, comes across Mr.Hyde's trampling over a little girl, who happens to be let out by her family at three o'clock in the morning in an infamous corner of the town—freely owns his and the doctor's and the family's—and still, that not without reason anyhow—"desire to kill [Hyde]" (*The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* p.5). The whole group is there at an awkward hour of the day, with awkward reasons, but it is Mr.Hyde that goes beyond the border of condoned evil and is cast out.

Wells's Morlocks, Moreau, Beast Folk, and Griffin characters are among those unacceptable monsters and their likeness to the creature of Frankenstein and to Mr.Hyde are deeper than outward acts of monstrosity just as in fact the said two characters are not superficially monstrous, either. These novels, Wells's early science fiction among them, do not talk of monsters that are responsible for all the bad things in the world. On the contrary, these "monsters" are either scapegoats, outcasts, or the dark inner nature of man and voice both social criticism and cosmic pessimism. Vernier (1977) effectually describes Wellsian (cosmic) pessimism:

> Thus space stands in various relationships to the human observer, but Wells always emphasizes its permanence: evolution will change man, the Earth will slowly become cooler and eventually die, but the cosmos will still be there, and it is the one reality men may apprehend. The stars are the unknown and, in Wells's fiction, they constantly remind the characters of the vanity of human enterprises against the background of cosmos (p.80).

On the other hand, certain themes seem to be walking in the footsteps of certain other works all including a certain degree of social criticism and part of which too do not seem to offer any social solutions at all. In this respect, the works of certain Russian writers which make certain deductions and do not necessarily offer solutions[1], more than the utopian science-fiction works seem to be akin to the mood reflected by the early scientific romances. These writers and works include Dostoyevski, Turgenyev and Tolstoy.

The themes of the outcast and pessimism are themes that keep recurring in the novels of 19th century Russian novelists as in Bazarov's indifference towards death in Turgenyev's *Fathers and Sons*, or in its closing words on flowers resembling that of *The Time Machine*'s, or as in Levin's musings under the vast eternal dome of the sky in Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*, or in Prince Andrey's lofty sky themes in the Battle of Austerlitz in his *War and Peace*, or in protesting Raskolnikov's in Dostoyevski's *Crime and Punishment* or Ivan Karamazov in *Brothers Karamazov*.

The claim of the present study is that Wells, as a student and an admirer of the English biologist Thomas Henry Huxley, was influenced by Huxley's lecture "Evolution and Ethics", or what James Paradis (1989) calls his "celebrated lecture 'Evolution and Ethics,' which he delivered at Oxford University the afternoon of May 18, 1893" (p.3), and in these three novels he wrote (apart from the others which he wrote during the same period and that seem to have the same imprint, but that are out of the scope of the present study) in the wake of that lecture, he goes over Huxley's idea that although Man as a species is expendable and that he has to battle a cosmos hostile to his existence, he may yet make good use of his time on the face of the earth irrespective of its length and win this battle, or at least, keep the upper hand for a longer time. Wells is dismayed to see this ascendancy arguable and too short and Man unequal to the task, yet he still wavers before the harsh decision of writing off humanity as irredeemable as reflected in the overall ambiguous tone of those works.

[1] Not in the sense that they had no influence on social events but in the sense that they do not offer any specific way of behaviour to the society and therefore are not mouthpieces for propaganda.

This is not to say that Huxley put forth a deluded or delusive picture of a golden age for a progressively evolving humanity. On the contrary, Huxley's main line of thought can be said to be quite pessimistic as he stresses the necessary existence of a downward route for mankind and the existence of a powerful enemy to the ethical elevation of man in the shape of an innate cosmic nature. In *Evolution and Ethics* he effectively states that species are expendable by saying "[t]hat which endures is not one or another association of living forms, but the process of which the cosmos is the product, and of which these are among the transitory expressions" (*Evolution and Ethics* p.4). Indeed he thinks that Man must and will sometime pass away; still he is interested in the duration and quality of the period Man treads the earth. In the closing paragraphs of his *Evolution and Ethics*, Huxley (1894) gives an illuminating summary of his overall perspective:

> The theory of evolution encourages no millennial anticipations. If, for millions of years, our globe has taken the upward road, yet, some time, the summit will be reached and the downward route will be commenced. The most daring imagination will hardly venture upon the suggestion that the power and the intelligence of man can ever arrest the procession of the great year.
>
> Moreover, the cosmic nature born with us and, to a large extent, necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely ethical ends. Ethical nature may count upon having to reckon with a tenacious and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts (*Evolution and Ethics* p.85).

Yet he also holds out hope for the future of humanity irrespective of its duration:

> But, on the other hand, I see no limit to the extent to which intelligence and will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence, for a period longer than that now covered by history. And much may be done to change the nature of man himself (*Evolution and Ethics* p.85).

What Huxley concludes is that the "cosmic process should be opposed in the interests of Man" (*Evolution and Ethics* p.78) and that effort for a bettering of the race is worthwhile. In Hughes's (1977) words

> Aware that "Eden would have its serpent" when he speaks of the administrator's "garden," he yet has hope of combating the beast on the high ground of an act of ethical repudiation. He seems less than conscious that "Satan, the Prince of this world," holds sway over the only empire Huxley, the agnostic, publicly admitted of. Wells, on the other hand, does not raise the image of ethical man. In the scientific romances, Wells keeps to the image of biological man and holds true to its implications. Man, vulgar and stoic and opportunistic…may best survive by means of his adaptability, in its quality neither bestial nor simply rational but human—as long as man survives all (pp.66-7).

The Huxleyan impact on H.G.Wells's scientific romances is not a verbatim application of Huxley's words and thoughts in his works. Wells cannot be said to be directly reflecting his professor's thoughts. Unlike Huxley, Wells holds out no hope in the final analysis. Huxley set an example for young H.G.Wells but this was not without the addition of Wells's authentic ideas. Vernier (1977) shows where Wells practically differs from directly reflecting Huxley's thoughts in the 1890's and therefore in his scientific romances:

> The ethical inference seems clear: neither nature nor science must be left uncontrolled and unchecked if man wants to avoid catastrophes, but the emphasis, in Wells's science fiction, is hardly on the moral and social consequences, as stressed by T.H.Huxley. The Wells of the 1890s was certainly less interested in conveying an explicit message than in shocking his readers out of their complacence, and this meant resorting to literary devices and offering a homogeneous vision of the future. In fact, all the ethical points raised by Huxley are present, but translated into a vision (p.75).

Unlike Huxley who was trying to convey the gist of the evolutionary thought, Wells was interested in conveying his art mainly. Hence does he dote upon Griffin like a stricken victim and does side with him in his tragic final battle, hence does he end Prendick a recluse (partly a broken man), hence does the narrator in *The Time Machine* keeps the shrivelled flowers and end his words as they are. Hence, it is not easy, furthermore, wise, to draw direct interpretations from his early works and treat *The Time Machine* simply as an attack on human complacency and *The Island of Dr. Moreau* and *The Invisible Man* as parables of mad scientists or the dangers of a science without moral qualms.

Like Huxley, Wells thinks that a summit will be reached and downward walk must begin. In David Hughes's (1977) words, "for Wells, as for Huxley,

the upward course entails the downward" (p.51). Yet this cosmic nature is what Wells, much to his chagrin, finds to be lacking a potential for rising unlike Huxley. For Wells, that downward course may be quite near:

> Even now, for all we can tell, the coming terror may be crouching for its spring and the fall of humanity be at hand. In the case of every other predominant animal the world has seen, I repeat, the hour of its complete ascendancy has been the eve of its entire overthrow (as cited in Vernier, 1977 p.77).

According to Vernier (1977) "[t]he fact that evolution meant a constant progress towards death seems to have struck Wells as something at once inescapable and unacceptable" (p.81). This can be thought of as a main source of ambiguity in Wells's early scientific novels. In fact, both Huxley and Wells introduce a certain degree of ambiguity in their view of the human condition. The point Wells differs from Huxley is the final hopelessness, the stronger taint in the ambiguity towards pessimism. According to Huxley (1894), "nobody professes to doubt that, so far forth as we possess a power of bettering things, it is our paramount duty to use it and to train all our intellect and energy to this supreme service of our kind" (*Evolution and Ethics* p.79). Wells seems to doubt it. West (1976) summarises the situation although *The Invisible Man* is not included in his short list:

> What he ultimately does not believe in is the ability of the human animal to live up to its ideals. *The Time Machine*, *The Island of Dr. Moreau* and *When the Sleeper Wakes*, all state this idea quite bluntly (p.17).

Therefore, the deterministic settling of man's lot on the face of earth notwithstanding his incongruous effort to change his fate is the source of the dismay and this dismay is the source of the increasing pessimism in those novels. The effort is incongruous because it is against the physical laws Man is subjected to. Man is part of the society he lives in. A society is driven by the simple expedient of following nature's example for survival and like Moreau, who, while talking about himself states that "[t]he study of Nature makes a man at last as remorseless as Nature" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.134) is

remorseless. He is also aware that this is natural. Society follows nature's example, so it is as remorseless as Nature. Man is part of the society and is likewise remorseless although he may not wish to be so.

This deterministic ruling out of any other possibility, this failure of the ethical man, therefore, gives rise to Wells's pessimism that found vein in those early scientific romances. Man, torn between a necessity to be ruthless to survive and a desire to become an ethically refined creature is in a painful dilemma.

Wells, thus seeing the dilemma, does not turn a deaf ear to the 'mitigating circumstances' in Man's plight. Indeed, in his early romances he makes a criticism of society in its treatment of unlike elements and of creating individual outcasts or groups of them but this social criticism is not a uniform condemnation of the society and covers a partial condoning of it in that Wells sees Man as part of a community, an element incapable of a totally free will. To cap it all, Man is inherently expedient if not evil, making an ethical evolution very hard to attain. Wells's ambiguous approach to Man's lot in each of these three novels arises from his understanding of this dilemma and the desire to communicate the maddening inescapability of Man's plight. It is, after all, not easy to say that Wells simply condemned the cosmos for making Man selfish, nor is it directly possible that he condemned society for its behaviour towards the unlike; his stance bears the signs of a lack of final verdict.

The rising pessimism in Wells's social criticism is reflected through the narratives' increasing pessimism in these three novels and another aim of this study is to examine the reactions of the three protagonists along with some of the other major characters of these three novels, depicting their position in that atmosphere of increasing pessimism. The claim of the present study is to show the gradual passing of the atmosphere from the vaguely hopeful in *The Time Machine*, through the absent-mindedly thoughtful in *The Island of Dr. Moreau* towards the overtly vengeful in *The Invisible Man*.

When compared to the two other novels *The Time Machine* ends in a rather hopeful, that is, vaguely hopeful tone. As Michael Foot (1996) notes, "[t]he love of Weena, the love of womankind, however transient, redeems the

whole prospect" (p.32). The hopeful note can be observed, at least on the narrator's part, in the closing lines of the story and he still holds out hope for the future in his final word:

> But to me the future is still black and blank—is a vast ignorance, lit at a few casual places by the memory of his story. And I have by me, for my comfort, two strange white flowers—shrivelled now, and brown and flat and brittle—to witness that even when mind and strength had gone, gratitude and a mutual tenderness still lived on in the heart of man (*The Time Machine* p.76)..

Prendick in *The Island of Dr. Moreau* begins to see Man both as a victim to illogical laws and as a low creature acting on the impulses of a dark innate characteristic which together lead to his becoming a recluse and Griffin in *The Invisible Man*, having seen how very mean man can become, comes to loathe Man and his doings.

The other main characters (Moreau, Montgomery) or groups (the Morlocks, the Beast Folk) are not outside the scope of this study. In most cases—such as Dr.Moreau's cornered position in his life in England resembling that of Prendick's in the 'dingey' case—other characters' lot form the basis, the infrastructure or the background of that of the protagonists.

That Wells produced increasingly pessimistic narratives in those scientific romances with their protagonists gradually driven to loneliness and despair can partly be attributed to his position in the English society of his time and to his approach to the question of aloofness or being cast out in the context of the debates of his time. The present work will also shortly study some of the contemporary debates that took place before or around the times those works were written to establish, if possible, a sound relation between the said debates and the said three works.

As it is, our claim is that these three novels act as a criticism of the society in general and the increasing pessimism in them reflects a certain mood of its times and of Wells himself during that period, and that Wells, during the 1890's, was definitely a pessimist[2], and was reflecting his own views in his

[2] In fact, he was never far from being so. Anthony West (1976), in a biographical study points to this fact in answer to the claims that "the extreme pessimism of his last writing and

works. Once so claimed it becomes necessary to study the roots of the said mood and its reflections in its relevant background.

Bernard Bergonzi (1961) notes in *The Early H.G.Wells: A Study of the Scientific Romances* that a "sketch of the intellectual background of [Wells's] early work must be supplemented by some account of the literary context in which it takes its place" (p.15). This former issue—a sketch of the intellectual background of his early work—may be considered, indeed, to be partly the subject of the present work but our subject being a study of Wells's early work, and not his intellectual background, we will adapt Bergonzi's words to fit our case by saying that a study of the early literary work of Wells must be supplemented by some account of his intellectual background and will be acting accordingly. In this background must be lying at least some of the reasons of the increasing pessimism in those novels. Quoting J.R.Hammond (1979) at the beginning of his *H.G.Wells Companion* will here be quite of service:

> What were the forces which helped to mould him [H.G.Wells] as a man and as a writer? In order to answer this question it is necessary to consider briefly his life and background, and the influence of his environment on the formulation of his ideas (p.4).

The Huxleyan influence on Wells is dominant. Like David Y.Hughes (1977) who, "[s]ince H.G.Wells considered his study of Darwinian biology under T.H.Huxley to be the foundation of his world view," takes that influence for granted, we also "shall here assume that influence as a fact" (p.48).

As the making of the content Englishman and optimistic science and progress worshipper were quite similar, so were the rude awakenings they would have to face had they chosen to do so. The awakening had long been part

---

utterances…were…an abandonment of a superficial optimism in the face of those realities of which his coming death was a part" (p.10) by what seems to be a most plausible explanation:

> I cannot now agree that his final phase of scolding and complaining at human folly represented any essential change in his views at all. What happened as his powers declined from 1940 onwards was that he reverted to his original profoundly-felt beliefs about the realities of the human situation. He was by nature a pessimist, and he was doing violence to his intuitions and his rational perceptions alike when he asserted in his middle period that mankind could make a better world for itself by an effort or will (p.10).

of many a scientist's life. In their view if science was undermining customs and was to dethrone religion the corollary was not necessarily a *scientific* Garden of Eden on Earth which was to be attained *some day* by being ardent worshippers of science. This reeked too much of religion. To them evolution was not necessarily a pro-human force making things better for mankind.

Huxley (1894) notes this generalised interpretation of evolution as a progressive development and points how an opposite interpretation was forthcoming:

> The word "evolution", now generally applied to the cosmic process…[t]aken in its popular signification…means progressive development, that is, gradual change from a condition of relative uniformity to one of relative complexity; but its connotation has been widened to include the phenomena of retrogressive metamorphosis, that is, of progress from a condition of relative complexity to one of relative uniformity (*Evolution and Ethics* p.6).

So, there were, if we are permitted to make a general classification, in the scientific circles in England in those times—categorically speaking—at least two camps discussing the future of mankind, those believing in a better future and those disbelieving it, or some even believing in a worse future. Some intellectuals' main line of thought in the evaluation of the future of mankind ran (at least with the proviso that it is applied to more or less select groups of people) in more hopeful tunes and others', maybe because they were less partial towards any select groups, spoke in more hopeless terms. John Stuart Mill, Thomas Babington Macaulay and Herbert Spencer may be put in the former camp though they do not necessarily form a unit of some sort and Thomas Hardy and Joseph Conrad with their darkish estimates of mankind may be counted as members of the latter. So another topic comes to the fore: the debate among intellectuals between evolution and devolution. Paradis (1989) summarises the situation in his essay on T.H.Huxley's "*Evolution and Ethics* in its Victorian Context":

> It is well to recall that Huxley wrote *Evolution and Ethics* at a time when it was not clear what role, if any, the forces of science had to play in the framing of social policy—a peculiarly modern ambiguity…[W]riters like Herbert Spencer and Walter Bagehot had broadly integrated popular biology and

> contemporary anthropology with social argument, often through the vehicles of comparison and metaphor. At the same time, the natural sciences had undermined many traditional cultural assumptions concerning the natural order, causing politicians, clergy, and intellectuals alike to re-examine the sources of social, intellectual, and moral authority (p. 4).

That undermining is one of the main drives of the pessimistic outlook of intellectuals like H.G.Wells. With doubts raised about the uniqueness of mankind in a universe tailor-made solely for his benefit, the necessity of a benign God doting upon, or at least, giving him a trial before admittance to Heaven, was removed. In that age writers like Thomas Hardy were writing of heaths seemingly intent upon ruining its inhabitants'[3] lives as in *The Return of the Native* (1878) or of lives on blighted stars[4] as in *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* (1891). The ruling power in the universe now had the possibility of being a hostile one let alone an indifferent one. Thence was also removed the necessity of a Creator trying to improve the prospects of the apple of his eye, his so-called beloved creation Man or that of a natural ruling power (for disbelievers' taste) trying to add to the abilities of its selection, mankind. Be it creation or natural selection, Man was becoming a mere instrument in a huge canvas which was, to cap it all, not at all necessarily in the formation of a harmonious picture. And this acknowledgement was no source of especial joy to Man.

According to Mitchell (1900),

> The newspapers and the reviews were full of the new subject; political speeches and sermons were filled with allusions to it. Wherever educated people talked the conversation came round to the question of evolution. Were animals and plants the results of special creations, or were they, including

[3] Egdon Heath, the setting for Thomas Hardy's 1878 novel *The Return of the Native*

[4] 'Did you say the stars were worlds, Tess?'
'Yes.'
'All like ours?'
'I don't know; but I think so. They sometimes seem to be like the apples on our stubbard-tree. Most of them splendid and sound—a few blighted.'
'Which do we live on—a splendid one or a blighted one?'
'A blighted one.'
''Tis very unlucky that we didn't pitch on a sound one, when there were so many of 'em!' (*Tess of the d'Urbervilles* pp.33-4)
...
''Tis because we be on a blighted star, and not a sound one, isn't it, Tess?' murmured Abraham through his tears. (*Tess of the d'Urbervilles* p.36)

> man, the result of the gradual transformations of a few simple primitive types evolving under the stress of some such force as Darwin's natural selection? To many people it seemed to be a choice between a world with God and a world without God; and the accredited defenders of religion gathered every force of argument, of misrepresentation, conscious and unconscious, of respectability, and of prejudice to crush once for all the obnoxious doctrine and its obnoxious supporters (pp.119-20).

With the idea of a harmonious picture, a grand design in everything that takes place or which exists coming to naught, not only theology but also science received a nasty blow. Man had not tried to shift his ascendants from angels to apes solely to find an aimless mess and void. The self-assumed elité being, Man, with his much boasted capacity for thinking and self-confirmed assumption of possessing reason was now to find himself to be—by the agency of this very capacity and this very confirmation—a mere pawn in a goalless game quite expendable to crown it all. This was too much of a blow for the pride of scientifically oriented intellectuals and the geocentric theologians alike. Man had overreached his target and undermined his own throne. To the famous interrogative of mankind demanding why the universe was made, not for any particular reason, much less for *your* sake was the blunt indigestible reply looming unmistakably from below the horizon.

As Chalmers Mitchell (1900) notes,

> Huxley was absolutely right in his prediction as to the magnitude of the prejudices to be overcome before evolution became accepted, and for the next thirty years of his life he was the leader in the battle for Darwinism. It was natural that the new views, especially in their extension to man himself, should arouse the keenest opposition (p.111).

Whatever the digestive solution may have been, a deduction became obvious for many an intellectual: Man is but a short passage in the history of the universe and he is quite expendable. Yet there seems to be no definite plan in the universe, there is only waste, trials and errors, and all for nothing. The mood following this understanding was expressed via various intellectual tendencies. Nihilism, fatalism, determinism, and pessimism stressed by the terms fin de siècle, fin du globe, fin de race, hostile universe, malign power, indifferent God came to the fore.

Here we will shortly be talking about the terms *fin de siècle*, *fin du globe*, *fin de race* then a hostile universe, a malign power, an indifferent God for a better understanding of the mood of the era among intellectuals. We shall refer to Bernard Bergonzi (1961) for a condensed description of these *terminal* terms:

> In its widest sense *fin de siècle* was simply the expression of a prevalent mood: the feeling that the nineteenth century—which had contained more events, more history than any other—had gone on too long, and that sensitive souls were growing weary of it. In England this mood was heightened by the feeling that Queen Victoria's reign had also lasted excessively long. But at the same time, no one knew what the coming twentieth century was going to bring, though there was no lack of speculation. The result could be described as a certain loss of nerve, weariness with the past combined with foreboding about the nature. The *fin de siècle* mood produced, in turn, the feeling of *fin du globe*, the sense that the whole elaborate intellectual and social order of the nineteenth century was trembling on the brink of dissolution. *Fin de siècle* was not confined to art or aesthetics; its wider implications affected moral and social and even political attitudes and behaviour (pp.3-4).

To this mood Bernard Bergonzi attributes H.G.Wells's early writings. Bergonzi (1976) keeps this initial explanation in his introduction to *H.G.Wells; A Collection of Critical Essays*:

> Wells began his literary career in the 1890s, and the course of his later development, whether in fiction or in discursive writing, was fixed in a certain *fin de siècle* mould…The final years of the nineteenth century were intensely formative for Wells. They were, on the one hand, a period of *fin de siècle* anxieties about the future, to which Wells gave colourful form in the local or global catastrophes of *The War of the Worlds* and *The Time Machine* (*H.G.Wells; A Collection of Critical Essays,* Introduction pp.2-3).

In the case of H.G.Wells, the social, political and economic events, the talk of socialism, the religion versus science debates, the debates of evolution versus devolution, his own experiences in life, his aloofness in the birth pangs of an artist and finally his hero T.H.Huxley's ideas can all be said to have combined for an outcome in the shape of scientific romances. The vigilance for the end of something, be it the world or mankind, nevertheless, dominates Wells's early writings. According to Bergonzi (1961), "the fin du globe myth…was a dominant element in Wells's early work" (p.5). He furthers this claim later on in his comments on some of the early scientific novels by saying that

> the intellectual components of the *fin de siècle* … dominate Wells's novels and stories of the nineties. The preoccupation with the future first appears in *The Chronic Argonauts*, a fragment of a novel Wells wrote at the age of twenty-one, and is sustained in *The Time Machine* and, less interestingly, in *When the Sleeper Wakes*. The transvaluation of values is evident in *The Island of Dr.Moreau* and *The Invisible Man*, while the *fin du globe* motif is predominant in *The War of the Worlds* and several short stories (p.15).

We had claimed above that the events and places of his time must have had influenced Wells. Vincent Brome (1951), while speaking about the London young Wells came to study at, states that

> [i]t was a London of beautiful mansions and grey slums, of leisured men and women determined to preserve their ignorance of the social underworld intact, and working people who only dimly apprehended that God had not irrevocably cast them for their lot. Despite the unemployment and depression abroad, solid British business men spread themselves spaciously, certain of their right to do just as they pleased and supremely unaware of any threat to their security, because supremely unimaginative (39).

This description of the London of the 1880's seems to describe the day's (and for that matter, today's) world of the oppressor and the oppressed leading to an exchange of roles which Wells satirically drew in the world of 802701 of *The Time Machine* with its Eloi and the Morlocks. Wells can be claimed to have been affected by what he saw. According to Foot (1996), "[o]ne part of *The Time Machine*'s satire arising from the tumults of the time portrayed what could happen if the war between the classes was allowed to develop and intensify" (p.30).

Then comes the effect of the concept of evolution and Huxley's views on that subject. Vernier (1977) summarises the effect of the concept of evolution on young H.G.Wells with particular reference to the Huxleyan effect:

> The impact of the theory of natural evolution on his mind is well-known: it was first felt when he attended the lectures of T.H.Huxley, at South Kensington, in 1884 and 1885, and, ten years later, evolution was to provide him with the fundamental theme of his "scientific romances" and any of his short stories (p.70).

The Huxleyan effect on H.G.Wells dates back to 1884 when Wells studied biology under Thomas Henry Huxley in his first year at the Normal School of Science. Lovat Dickson (1969) summarises the case:

> An official letter from the Department of Education [had come], offering him a studentship at the Normal School of Science in South Kensington with a bursary of a guinea a week, leading on possibly to a degree as a Bachelor of Science. To give oneself to learning and to be paid for it! To sit under such famous men as Professor Huxley, Darwin's friend and defender, and Norman Lockyer, the astronomer, who taught at the Great Gallery of Iron on Exhibition Road (p.27).

Wells came to London intent upon becoming a man of science in Huxley's footsteps. In his autobiographical work of 1934 Wells stresses how "[t]hat year [he] spent in Huxley's class, was beyond all question, the most educational year of [his] life…[and how he] worked very hard indeed throughout that first year" (*Experiment in Autobiography*, p.161). Vincent Brome (1951) notes the longevity of this devotion and respect:

> Wells found in T.H.Huxley a figure into whose likeness as a great scientist he desired to step from the moment of meeting. Hero-worship, rabid and unashamed, began and lasted far into the life. Huxley's teaching gripped and held his imagination. (p.36).

That Wells indeed found an ideal in Huxley can be seen in this respectful tone of 40 years later and the frame of mind that still follows in his master's footsteps. That most educational year of his life, in his own words, "left [him] under that urgency for coherence and consistency, that repugnance from haphazard assumptions and arbitrary statements, which is the essential distinction of the educated from the uneducated mind" (*Experiment in Autobiography* p.161).

Hammond (1979) also notes the influence of Charles Darwin, Thomas Henry Huxley and Wells's own scientific education on the formation of his intellectual background:

> It is interesting to note one or two dates in relation to Wells's life. Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published in 1859, *The Descent of Man* in 1871, when

> Wells was five. Huxley's thought-provoking book *Man's Place in Nature* had appeared in 1863….in 1884…he was awarded a scholarship of one guinea a week at the Normal School of Science, South Kensington, now the Imperial College of Science and Technology. For three years he studied physics, chemistry, geology, astronomy and biology—the latter under the inspiring tuition of T.H.Huxley (p.10).

Bergonzi (1961) notes how "*The Island of Dr Moreau* received a generally hostile reception" (p.8). According to Michael Foot (1996), "nothing prepared his [Wells's] readers for the ferocity of *The Island of Dr Moreau* (p.36)". Then again, while studying *The Wonderful Visit* Bergonzi (1961) talks of "the far more ferocious satire of *The Island of Dr.Moreau* which was to outrage many critics the following year" (p.90). He notes, though in a comparison with the said work that "[b]oth works show, in varying degrees, the influence of Swift, whom Wells had been reading and whom he was always to admire" (p.90). According to Foot "[b]oth *The Wonderful Visit* and *The Island of Dr Moreau* owed much to the Swiftian guidance to which HG [Wells] said he had reverted in the first years of the decade. The second is often accepted as more Swiftian than the first" (pp.35-6).

In an age with class struggle (the oppressed and suppressed classes of workers against their oppressors the wealthy) at its heyday and scientific developments with their heavy toll on human complacency (the fall from grace, from the idea of the uniqueness of planet earth to being a mere speck of dust in a vast universe, from the assumption of angelic origin to a descent from—and to—the ape) aspirations both in class and racial levels began to become incongruous. In those surroundings H.G.Wells's stance becomes both unnamed misanthropy and a desire to better mankind, likewise, both scientific optimism and pessimism. This stance is in fact ambiguous from the beginning and remains for his desire of the heart remains to see a bettered race while his intellect bids him to acknowledge its impossibility.

Day by day there arises more reason for Wells to believe this impossibility and these three novels from this perspective form a line of increasing pessimism. Putting aside the questionability of linearity in Wells's own pessimism throughout those years, successive examples of this increasing

pessimism will be studied herein. The topics will include the themes of devolution instead of evolution, of human selfishness and human complacency and the following deterministic outlook seeing in Man only a doomed animal with an evil nature. Whether man turns evil when his suppressed animal nature finds a way out or whether Man is inherently evil with the animal inside weak and helpless is an ambiguous and debatable issue. Wells's introduction of the ambiguous in all of the three works directs our discussion and treatment of the same subject with a similar ambiguity.

To quote Huxley (1894), "[u]nfortunately, it is much easier to shut one's eyes to good than to evil" (p.73). Although we may tend to believe that Man is innately evil and will be tempted more often than he is elated, there is more than enough that he does that can be named good which makes a negative verdict too strong and unjust while likewise to pass him as good will be too much of a favour. The protagonist of George MacDonald's ghost story "Uncle Cornelius His Story" speaks in ambiguous tones to his nephew and nieces on the existence of ghosts:

> I beg your pardon. You suppose wrong. It would take twice the proof I have ever had to make me believe in them; and exactly your prejudice, and allow me to say ignorance, to make me disbelieve in them. Neither is within my reach. I postpone judgement (p.132).

Let us then follow suit in admitting that neither conclusion on Man's nature is within our reach and accordingly postpone judgement and then let the works speak for themselves.

In the final analysis, we must repeat that Wells's attention is drawn in these three novels mainly to the prevalent ostracism in the society exerted on the unlike. Believing this attitude to be injust yet seeing that it stems mainly from the immutable laws of nature he despairs. This despair leads to his deterministic explanation of life and to a pessimistic outlook on mankind's prospects for the future.

CHAPTER 2

THE OSTRACISING OF THE UNLIKE IN *THE TIME MACHINE, THE ISLAND OF DR. MOREAU* AND *THE INVISIBLE MAN* AND A PESSIMISTIC EXPLANATION OF ITS CAUSES

Commencing our discussion on ostracism and how determinism and pessimism as reasons for it are employed in *The Time Machine*, *The Island of Dr. Moreau* and *The Invisible Man* with Huxley's (1894) words of a most deterministic vein will be quite of service in the appreciation of the pessimistic direction their implications—for that matter, that of the like material within reach—must have given to Wells's line of thought:

> So far as that limited revelation of the nature of things, which we call scientific knowledge, has yet gone, it tends, with constantly increasing emphasis, to the belief that, not merely the world of plants, but that of animals; not merely living things, but the whole fabric of the earth; not merely our planet, but the whole solar system; not merely our star and its satellites, but millions of similar bodies which bear witness to the order which pervades boundless space, and has endured through boundless time; are all working out their predestined courses of evolution (*Evolution and Ethics* pp.6-7).

These words, making up the parts of Huxley's cosmic pessimism, along with the rest of his lecture constitute the base for the pessimism pervading Wells's early work. The effect of Huxleyan cosmic pessimism is continually stressed in Hillegas's (1967) work as in the words

> In Huxley's philosophy of evolution there is an element of grave doubt about the outcome of the cosmic evolutionary process—his "cosmic pessimisim"—which was exactly suited to Wells's aesthetic and didactic purposes in the stories and scientific romances written in the 1890's. And it is this "cosmic pessimism" which inspired the details in the scientific romances (chiefly *The Time Machine*, *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, *When the Sleeper Wakes* and "A Story of the Days to Come," and *The First Men in the Moon*) (p.19).

Or again while talking on Wells's attack on human complacency:

> The detached Wellsian imagination, obsessed by the Huxleyan cosmic pessimism, led Wells in the 1890's to produce two categories of attack on human complacency…The second category…consists of works anti-utopian in their assault on optimism (p.19).

The present study refuses to treat the H.G.Wells of the 1890's through the veil of the widely and wrongly attributed meek optimism. If one thing is certain, it is that H.G.Wells in the early scientific romances was anything but optimistic. Before going on to the study of the early works of Wells Bergonzi (1961) remarks

> In considering these works, it will be necessary to modify the customary view of Wells as an optimist, a utopian and a passionate believer in human progress. The dominant note of his early years was rather a kind of fatalistic pessimism, combined with intellectual scepticism, and it is this which the early romances reflect. It is, one need hardly add, a typically *fin de siècle* note" (p.22).

Anthony West (1976) rejects the widely accepted notion of an H.G.Wells that turned pessimist when his optimism was faced with a rude awakening to the realities of the world and states that "[t]he diffuseness and looseness of much of Wells' writing, and the tone of a great deal of his occasional journalism, lends itself to this distortion of his basic ideas" (p.11). The same tone with the addition of Wells's self-effacing commentary as in the preface to the 1934 compilation named *Seven Famous Novels* understandably forms an ideal basis for an academically safe yet schematic treatment. This is at least the case for the orthodox interpretations of Wells's early work. It is indeed all too easy to see in Wells's case an optimist turned sour in the face of two world wars, the atom bomb and the like ready reasons as in the explanation of the frustration of the western intellectual of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, those ready reasons were at work in the study of Wells's early work, too.

To quote Wells in the Time Traveller's easy initial explanation of the Eloi's world; "[v]ery simple was [those orthodox criticisms'] explanation, and plausible enough—as most wrong theories are!" (*The Time Machine* p.28). West's (1976) following words stand as a refutation of these superficial approaches:

> [T]he fact remains that the body of work which bears his name contradicts these assumptions about his views, and the reader who undertakes to examine all of his writing scrupulously is in for a number of surprises. Wells received a scientific education and he never fell into the fallacy of confusing the Darwinian conception of evolution with the idea of progress" (p.11).

According to J.R.Hammond (1979), "few writers have been so misunderstood or have been judged so widely on the basis of hearsay. He was, of course, very much more than a writer of scientific romances and humorous novels. He himself regarded his early literary efforts as 'droppings by the way'" (p.3). This well-meaning words paying tribute to Wells's writing, maybe inadvertently, regard the scientific romances in a lighter view and they give the message that the scientific romances, after all, should not be the criteria to evaluate Wells. Hammond's general attitude is, ironically, what he seems to be lamenting in the general approach to Wells's work: Hammond himself also seems to misunderstand Wells by being uneasy about the popularity of the scientific romances by assuming them to be works suitable for the taste of "the popular mind" for whom Wells's "fame and reputation rest primarily on a handful of stirring scientific romances" (p.3). Here Hammond falls into the common pitfall in the treatment of H.G.Wells's literary output. In effect, what Hammond says equals that H.G.Wells may be thought to be misunderstood, but this is because his work is evaluated in the light of his early scientific romances which are popular and have some stirring elements in them, and that is all.

Wells's early work is now treated as a light-hearted narrative of a slightly unhinged—as in the case of the Time Traveller—or sometimes a mad scientist—as in the cases of Moreau and Griffin—usually bringing about his own deservedly violent end, now as the outcome of science devoid of ethics resulting in catastrophe, or the would-be results of the categorising of mankind as working and ruling classes.

Those orthodox approaches possibly owe much to Wells's (1934) words in the preface to *Seven Famous Novels* stating that *The Time Machine* is "a glimpse of the future that ran counter to the placid assumption of that time [i.e., the late 19th century] that Evolution was a pro-human force making things

better for mankind" (*Seven Famous Novels* "Preface" p.ix) or that "*The Island of Dr. Moreau* is an exercise in youthful blasphemy…[and] *The War of the Worlds* like *The Time Machine* was another assault on human self-satisfaction" (*Seven Famous Novels* "Preface" p.ix). *The Invisible Man* is not even talked of. Once Wells himself uttered those words it was only a matter of time that critics should see the light and began treating those works in unison as "a youthful blasphemy", "assault on human self-satisfaction" and so on. This is not to say that they do not contain blasphemy, and a youthful one at that, or they do not possess elements of the said assault: *The Time Machine* indeed deserves to be named, as Philmus (1969) notes, "a vision which Wells characterizes as running 'counter to the placid assumption'" (p.530) and *The Island of Dr.Moreau* has indeed blasphemous elements. Likewise, *The Invisible Man*, which at first may seem unlike *The Time Machine* and *The Island of Dr.Moreau*, is, with its abundant sampling of human selfishness (not that of Griffin but that of the society and the scientists) and intolerance to otherness, also an attack on human complacency.

We must begin by saying that the ready light treatment of the early scientific romances owes much to Wells's own seemingly deliberate anti-propaganda, nay smearing, directed at them in his later years. As Robert Philmus stresses in his 1969 article "'*The Time Machine*': Or, The Fourth Dimension as Prophecy",

> [t]he statements that H.G.Wells gave out in the twenties and thirties about his early "scientific romances" or "scientific fantasies," as he alternately called them, are not sympathetic to the spirit of these works written before the turn of the century. In general, he makes them out to be slighter in substance or more tendentious in tone than the serious reader coming upon them now would find them (p.530).

The reasons for such self-effacement are outside the scope of the present work. Instead, we shall give samples of this anti-propaganda which act as a suitable shield for many a critic from behind which to forward formulated interpretations in "the outcome of amoral science", or "a mad scientist getting

his due" themes was quite comfortable. This jumping into the bandwagon is the furore.

Once the author of those works himself paves the way for a ready treatment of those works it is quite understandable that many a critic should cheerfully follow suit with the security of referring to the writer's own words to support their cause. Apart from the obvious irrelevance of a necessity of taking the author's one certain interpretation of a certain work as the sole one, that critics relying on Wells's words of the 1930's on his scientific novels of the 1890's seem to forget that there is a time span of nearly forty years in between and that the author need not necessarily be thinking the same way and that he may be trying to manipulate the approach to his early works with the frame of mind, with the world view of his later years which in Wells's case should especially be taken into consideration. Wells, as many critics seem fond of repeating, often changed his mind on various subjects, contradicting his former words about one topic in his later products.

Norman Nicholson (1950) in his work *H.G.Wells* claims for *The Island of Dr.Moreau* "[t]hat which makes this book so different from the rest of Wells is that it exploits to the full his understanding of the ruthless in human behaviour and [that e]lsewhere we get only glimpses of this" (p.31). When taken to be a covering one, that remark quite fits the atmosphere of the book indeed. Yet Nicholson goes on to single out Moreau himself as a scapegoat and instead of noting the varieties in the book on human nature's vices he seems content to conclude that "Dr.Moreau is so detached from all but his scientific pursuits that he has become a monster far more revolting than the creatures he invents" (p.31). Interestingly, it is the critic himself that decides the Beast Folk should be monstrous and the critic himself again who (self-assumedly) *honours* them by deigning to rank them less revolting than Moreau. Interestingly, again this singling out of the absent-minded scientist as the source of all evil in *The Island of Dr.Moreau* and in *The Invisible Man* is a much beaten track among literary critics. John Calvin Batchelor (1984) in his preface to the volume *The Time Machine and The Invisible Man* notes how "there developed a sport best called Wells-shooting" (p.x). Similarly, there seems to have developed a sport called

Moreau shooting and Griffin shooting in the evaluation of *The Island of Dr.Moreau and The Invisible Man*.

After all, H.G.Wells's early novels may indeed be popular and they may indeed have some stirring elements in them, but those traits need not blur the merits of those works. There is heavy social criticism in all those works and Wells, more than anything else, examines and questions the ethics of Man acting as part of the society. To quote Bergonzi (1961),

> I want to suggest that Wells's romances are something more than the simple entertaining yarns they are generally taken to be—though without, of course wishing to deny that they are admirably entertaining (p.16).

Each of those three novels covers a spectrum of unlike characters and those unlike characters range from entire social classes to different races. Nevertheless, they have one unlike figure in common: The Unorthodox Man of Science. In each case this unorthodox man of science is either the protagonist or a major character of the book, sometimes both as there are more than one men of science in *The Island of Dr. Moreau*: Prendick, the protagonist for one (though Moreau may have a low opinion of him as a man of science[5]), and Moreau, one of the major characters, along with Montgomery both of whom are men of science. The Time Traveller of *The Time Machine* and Griffin of *The Invisible Man* are samples of the protagonist as a man of science. In each case this man of science suffers ostracism in the hands of indifferent and sometimes hostile members of the society and the scientific society, too, just as Man suffers in the hands of an indifferent and sometimes hostile universe.

The distrusted unorthodox scientist is not only distrusted by his fellow men but disliked by brother men of science, too. This existence of distrusted unorthodox men of science in each of those three novels brings to mind Charles Darwin's, Thomas Henry Huxley's and of certain other scientists' with similar views being left out in the cold by the scientific society of England during the 1860's as Chalmers Mitchell (1900) notes:

[5] "It may be, I fancy, that I have seen more of the ways of this world's Maker than you,—for I have sought his laws, in *my* way, all my life, while you, I understand, have been collecting butterflies" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.133).

> Sir Richard Owen, in many ways, was at that time the most distinguished anatomist in England. … In the particular matter of species, he was known to be by no means a firm supporter of the orthodox views. When Darwin's paper was read at the Linnæan Society, and afterwards when the *Origin* was published, the verdict of Owen was looked to with the greatest interest by the general public. For a time he wavered, and even expressed himself of the opinion that he had already in his published works included a considerable portion of Darwin's views. But two things seemed to have influenced him: First, Wilberforce, the Bishop of Oxford, and Sedgwick and Whewell, the two best-known men at Cambridge, urged him to stamp once for all, as he only could do, upon this "new and pernicious doctrine." Secondly, combined with his great abilities, he had the keenest personal interest in his own position as the leader of English science, and had no particular friendship for men or for views that seemed likely to threaten his own supreme position. In a very short time he changed from being neutral, with a tendency in favour of the new views, to being a bitter opponent of them (pp.115-6).

The first years of the debates of organic evolution were years of torment for men of revolutionary ideas. The ostracising of the scientist with novel ideas again and again appears in those three novels.

Batchelor (1984), in his introduction to the volume *The Time Machine and The Invisible Man*, names those works as "shrewd *tour de forces* by a young writer who was attempting to portray his feelings of curiosity for his craft and anxiety for his career through the prism of the written word" (p.xv). He goes on to say that those two novels "were written in a fever by a man fleeing his past and intimidated by his future" (p.xvi) and concludes that the protagonists in those books may be interpreted as young H.G.Wells's thoughts and emotions incarnate:

> …the unnamed Time Traveller in *The Time Machine* is more akin to a new writer speculating about the future than he is to a scientist. And Griffin, the albino chemist in *The Invisible Man*, is less a rendering of a mad scientist than he is a clever illustration of what the fiction writer feels each day before his growing manuscript: that he or she is alone in a room; that no one sees or cares about him or her…
>
> This is not to suggest that Wells at any point repressed his power of invention in these two novels in order to present his own experience of writing them….Wells was alone, ambitious, desperate to triumph, and pursued by phantoms. He pounded out these books, and indeed all his work, with the experience of his own life in the disguise of storytelling (p.xvi).

With the hindsight of those words, it may be claimed that Wells's acute understanding of the ostracising of the unlike in the shape of cast out characters

in his novels is strengthened in the partial alienation of artists, intellectuals in general and himself in particular. Wells examines how the scientist is treated as an unlike and distrusted and sometimes cast out member with acts of violence by the society and, more tragically, by his fellow scientists and explains the reason lying behind the distrust in all three of those books:

> It is a mistake to do things too easily. The serious people who took him seriously never felt quite sure of his deportment; they were somehow aware that trusting their reputations for judgment with him was like furnishing a nursery with egg-shell china (*The Time Machine* p.11).

The same mistake is made by Moreau and especially by Griffin. The serious people, in the shape of ordinary men of science, are loath to admit them to their circle as fellow scientists of higher degree. Dr.Kemp browsing in ordinary fields of ordinary science is infuriated at Griffin's unfathomable success. His vigour in the hunting of the Invisible Man and his later attempt to get Griffin's notebooks invite further explanation than a superficial pretext of saving humanity from a dangerous madman.

2.1. Steps of Ostracism in *The Time Machine* and its Causes

The ostracising of the unlike in *The Time Machine* is paramount in the cases of the distrusted scientist, the Time Traveller, and the cast out working classes, the Morlocks, but there are occasional examples of ostracism given as if in passing.

2.1.1. The Time Traveller as a Distrusted Scientist

The Time Traveller, the antagonist of *The Time Machine* is an unlike character with different surroundings as places of alienation. He is the unlike among his friends and among the people of the future alike. The expectation of being ostracised wherever he goes is so strong that he is on the alert for any signs of this ostracism both in the future and in his own drawing room.

The Time Traveller's fear of being the alien element, for instance, is so strong that in the first minutes of his life's dream of visiting a distant age he can first think of nothing but safely returning to his own time. This, on the other hand, is the understandable fear of the unlike in his/her new surroundings:

> I looked up again at the crouching white shape, and the full temerity of my voyage came suddenly upon me. What might appear when that hazy curtain was altogether withdrawn? What might not have happened to men? What if cruelty had grown into a common passion? What if in this interval the race had lost its manliness, and had developed into something inhuman, unsympathetic, and overwhelmingly powerful? I might seem some old-world savage animal, only the more dreadful and disgusting for our common likeness—a foul creature to be incontinently slain.
> … I was seized with a panic fear. I turned frantically to the Time Machine, and strove hard to readjust it. … I felt naked in a strange world. I felt as perhaps a bird may feel in the clear air, knowing the hawk wings above and will swoop. My fear grew to frenzy (*The Time Machine* pp.18-9).

As an undercurrent which in fact paves the way for his alienation in any society, here the Time Traveller also makes felt his low esteem for Man's capacity to overcome his vices such as cruelty. His expectation is that cruelty, which is in his time more or less an individual vice, may become a common trait. The anticipation of being slain directly as a foul creature, on the other hand, was already voiced by one of the listeners of the Time Traveller on his introduction of the idea of time travel in the previous gathering:

> "It would be remarkably convenient for the historian," the Psychologist suggested. "One might travel back and verify the accepted account of the Battle of Hastings, for instance!"
> "Don't you think you would attract attention?" said the Medical Man. "Our ancestors had no great tolerance for anachronisms" *(The Time Machine* p.6).

This expectation of being misunderstood may be said to be based on the Time Traveller's personal experience. The Time Traveller as a man of science is a distrusted unlike among his friends, too:

> I think that at that time none of us quite believed in the Time Machine. The fact is, the Time Traveller was one of those men who are too clever to be believed: you never felt that you saw all round him; you always suspected some subtle reserve, some ingenuity in ambush, behind his lucid frankness. Had Filby shown the model and explained the matter in the Time Traveller's words, we should have shown *him* far less scepticism. For we should have

> perceived his motives; a pork butcher could understand Filby. But the Time Traveller had more than a touch of whim among his elements, and we distrusted him. Things that would have made the frame of a less clever man seemed tricks in his hands (*The Time Machine* pp.10-11).

They are so indifferent and distrustful that most of them do not deign to come the following Thursday: "The Psychologist was the only person besides the Doctor and myself who had attended the previous dinner" (*The Time Machine* p.11). It is remarkable that apart from the narrator who may be a writer indeed as he is "to meet [a] Richardson, the publisher at two" (*The Time Machine* p.74) on the day of their final meeting, only men of science make their reappearances, and that, may be partly from envy. The demagogue Filby (like bishop Wilberforce, the Bishop of Oxford against Huxley), the very Young Man, the Provincial Mayor seem to have lost interest in that scientific debate after blurring it in the first place, especially Filby. Again men of topical interests, one editor, one journalist apart from the Silent Man keeping a modest interest who can be thought of as ordinary man serving the refined ends of the elité at times:

> The Time Traveller pushed his glass towards the Silent Man and rang it with his fingernail; at which the Silent Man, who had been staring at his face, started convulsively, and poured him wine (*The Time Machine* p.14).

And he is still disbelieved, distrusted by his own contemporaries and friends, too. The complacent humanity still regards him, after his voyage to the future, as unreliable. It is remarkable that even the narrator who is closest to believing his story repeats the Time Traveller's very words for himself, that the ripeness of humanity has not been reached yet and keeps a hope alive. The Time Traveller returns to the future for relics of the truth of his vision: He is lost in the attempt.

2.1.2. Man exploiting Man: The Working Class Driven to Under-world in *The Time Machine*

Although an exclusion of the debates of foreign politics of the England of the 1890's from a study of the works written in the era may at first sight seem awkward it will be seen on closer inspection that the novels we are dealing with concentrated mainly on the social debates and home politics of the period and the ones between religion and science. Foreign politics is undoubtedly introduced in *The War of the Worlds* personified by the Martians standing for rival nations. Germany, for one, a formidable rival with its *Weltpolitik* was looming from the east apart from other European major powers and the United States of America—that had already risen or were about to rise—and the unlucky parts of the world which had hitherto been devoured mainly by Great Britain under various disguises were now claimed with as strong an envy by the newly risen and rising powers. The protagonist's following words testify to the reference to foreign politics in the novel apart from the obvious criticism of British colonialism at the expense of poorer nations of the world:

> The Tasmanians, in spite of their human likeness,[6] were entirely swept out of existence in a war of extermination waged by European immigrants, in the space of fifty years. Are we such apostles of mercy as to complain if the Martians warred in the same spirit? (*The War of the Worlds*, p.311)

It was written at a time when Great Britain and Germany became rivals over the control and sharing of the world (with other major European powers and the United States of America) and incidents such as the Samoa conflict, the naval race between the two nations seem to have drawn Wells's attention to the looming aggression. Yet those same lines can be taken as a direct and criticising reference to Huxley's colony parable in *Evolution and Ethics*.

The traveller feels disappointment in finding the Eloi to be silly creatures. The second step to reality is painful and the Morlocks come onto the

[6] That the Tasmanians should only be *likened* to humans is a topic of interest in its own right. It is a point that implies what evolution may have really meant to the European: if we have descended from apes we Europeans must be the furthest from them in comparison with any other "semblances" of Man.

stage. In Bergonzi's (1961) words, "[b]ut it is not long before he becomes aware that the Eloi are not the only forms of animal life left in the world" (p.51). "Nevertheless, he is orthodox enough in his analysis to assume that the Eloi, despite their physical and mental decline, are still the masters and the Morlocks—as he finds the underground creatures are called—are their slaves. It is not long before he discovers that this, too, is a false conclusion" (p.52). The Time Traveller when he learns of the existence of the Morlocks begins to produce theories on "how this second species of Man" (*The Time Machine* p.40) as he names them came about. He talks of "the splitting of the human species" (*The Time Machine* p.41). What follows is in fact a heavy criticism by Wells of the society in its oppression of the working classes:

> At first, proceeding from the problems of our own age, it seemed clear as daylight to me that the gradual widening of the present merely temporary and social difference between the Capitalist and the Labourer, was the key to the whole position. No doubt it will seem grotesque enough to you—and wildly incredible!—and yet even now there are existing circumstances to point that way. There is a tendency to utilize underground space for the less ornamental purposes of civilization; there is the Metropolitan Railway in London, for instance, there are new electric railways, there are subways, there are underground workrooms and restaurants, and they increase and multiply. Evidently, I thought, this tendency had increased till Industry had gradually lost its birthright in the sky. I mean that it had gone deeper and deeper into larger and ever larger underground factories, spending a still-increasing amount of its time therein, till, in the end— ! Even now, does not an East-end worker live in such artificial conditions as practically to be cut off from the natural surface of the earth? (*The Time Machine* p.40).

Nevertheless, the Time Traveller, who himself suffers acts of ostracism takes part in ostracising both in his approach to his servants and his instinctive dislike of the Morlocks. He is sympathetic towards the Eloi who were like him and beautiful from the beginning

> He struck me as being a very beautiful and graceful creature, but indescribably frail. His flushed face reminded me of the more beautiful kind of consumptive -- that hectic beauty of which we used to hear so much. At the sight of him I suddenly regained confidence. I took my hands from the machine (*The Time Machine* p.20).

The Morlocks, on the other hand, who are blaringly unlike him, are physically repulsive to him from the beginning:

> `I do not know how long I lay. I was roused by a soft hand touching my face. Starting up in the darkness I snatched at my matches and, hastily striking one, I saw three stooping white creatures similar to the one I had seen above ground in the ruin (*The Time Machine* p.45).

His feeling is akin to hate even at first meeting and soon turns to hate towards them although, at least on the first meeting, they had provoked no retribution:

> I felt a peculiar shrinking from those pallid bodies. They were just the half-bleached colour of the worms and things one sees preserved in spirit in a zoological museum. And they were filthily cold to the touch. Probably my shrinking was largely due to the sympathetic influence of the Eloi, whose disgust of the Morlocks I now began to appreciate (*The Time Machine* p.43).

Yet, as Hammond (1979) notes, "the Time Traveller is regarded by the Morlocks," themselves once outsiders "as an intruder from outside, is treated with suspicion and contempt" (pp.82-3). It is true that the Morlocks themselves are not sympathetic towards the Time Traveller and the Time Traveller's repulsion for them is not simply a physical one, nor is it groundless. Still, although understandable, the stark contrast between the scenes of physical contact between the Time Traveller and the two species is worth noting. The appearance of the Eloi, after an initial fear, gives him no trouble. Their touch is not repulsive. They are, after all, physically like him:

> He came a step forward, hesitated, and then touched my hand. Then I felt other soft little tentacles upon my back and shoulders. They wanted to make sure I was real. There was nothing in this at all alarming (*The Time Machine* p.20).

Servants can be thought of outcasts, too. They are present for the needs of the upper classes and unseen otherwise as stated in "the Time Traveller hated servants waiting at dinner" (*The Time Machine* p.13). Although The Time Traveller seems to criticise the people of the future for enlarging the gulf already existing between the classes of society he is no different in benefiting from the status quo. Wells thus shows the Time Traveller's indifference to members of the working classes thereby criticising the upper-classes. Though in later years much have been said on his disliking working classes here at least it can be

thought that he, to quote Brome (1951), "born of lowly parents, trapped in a dungeon of lower-class stupidity…[and] not of the fortunate" (p.13) was raising an objection:

> He reached out his hand for a cigar, and cut the end. "But come into the smoking-room. It's too long a story to tell over greasy plates." And ringing the bell in passing, he led the way into the adjoining room (*The Time Machine* p.14).

Likewise he stresses the Time Traveller's partiality for meat by which he criticises the Time Traveller himself in that he may not have much to say against the Morlocks. After all, it is the Time Traveller himself that explains the Morlocks as desperate under-world people turning man-eaters.

According to J.R.Hammond (1979), "[i]t is…clear from many internal indications that Wells had a satirical intention in mind when writing *The Time Machine*" (p.80). He goes on to state that

> one could go further and argue that this is true of all the scientific romances—that he was in fact using science fiction as a device to attack many of the widely held and prevalent beliefs, attitudes and assumptions of his time. Viewed from this standpoint *The Time Machine* and *The War of the Worlds* are both warnings against the complacent assumption of the inevitability of progress (p.80).

In Batchelor's view, "the Time Traveller…[is] an inventive genius and political pessimist" (p.xvii) which can be taken to be quite descriptive of Wells himself. Batchelor states that *The Time Machine* has answers to the

> questions [that] are also a working out of Wells's own beliefs concerning his own world of 1895 [and that] Wells was a socialist in the 1890's, and saw the industrialized world dividing itself into the Haves and Have-nots (p.xix).

In the light of these words, the satirical intention becomes obvious. The Time Traveller's initial assumption of Man's future as one of a united, happy and triumphant humanity serves the purpose of making the contrast between that utopian future and the realities of nineteenth century England and the whole world plainer. The sarcasm reaches a climax in "One triumph of a united

humanity over Nature had followed another" (p.26) and is accentuated by the mocking tone in the 'united humanity'. The later refutation of each these assumptions strengthens the latent sarcasm in those words. That the Time Traveller, who, as the narrator states, "thought but cheerlessly of the Advancement of Mankind, and saw in the growing pile of civilization only a foolish heaping that must inevitably fall back upon and destroy its makers in the end" (*The Time Machine* p.76) should come to utter those words of 'millennial anticipations' which Huxley talked of makes the criticism of Wells the more distinct. It is the rich that after all benefits from any advancement:

> I grieved to think how brief the dream of the human intellect had been. It had committed suicide. It had set itself steadfastly towards comfort and ease, a balanced society with security and permanency as its watchword, it had attained its hopes—to come to this at last. Once, life and property must have reached almost absolute safety. The rich had been assured of his wealth and comfort, the toiler assured of his life and work. No doubt in that perfect world there had been no unemployed problem, no social question left unsolved. And a great quiet had followed (*The Time Machine* p.65).

But the rich then got their due:

> It is a law of nature we overlook, that intellectual versatility is the compensation for change, danger, and trouble. An animal perfectly in harmony with its environment is a perfect mechanism. Nature never appeals to intelligence until habit and instinct are useless. There is no intelligence where there is no change and no need of change. Only those animals partake of intelligence that have to meet a huge variety of needs and dangers.
>
> So, as I see it, the Upper-world man had drifted towards his feeble prettiness, and the Under-world to mere mechanical industry. But that perfect state had lacked one thing even for mechanical perfection—absolute permanency (*The Time Machine* p.65).

This lack of absolute permanency in Man's proceedings seems to haunt Wells's thought throughout *The Time Machine*. Indeed this is the sunset of humanity, but the sun never shone over a united and happy humanity. The denial of even a tranquil sunset to humanity makes the deterministic and pessimistic interpretation of Man's lot the more distinct.

Wells then turns literally to Huxley's garden parable talking in referential tones to *Evolution and Ethics*. Huxley thinks that a happy state for

the gardener can be attained and kept so long as conditions do not change beyond the limit that can be controlled by Man:

> The gardener…restricts multiplication; provides that each plant shall have sufficient space and nourishment; protects from frost and drought; and, in every other way, attempts to modify the conditions, in such a manner as to bring about the survival of those forms which most nearly approach the standard of the useful, or the beautiful, which he has in mind.
>
> If the fruits and the tubers, the foliage and the flowers thus obtained, reach, or sufficiently approach, that ideal, there is no reason why the status quo attained should not be indefinitely prolonged. So long as the state of nature remains approximately the same, so long will the energy and intelligence which created the garden suffice to maintain it. However, the limits within which this mastery of man over nature can be maintained are narrow. If the conditions of the cretaceous epoch returned, I fear the most skilful of gardeners would have to give up the cultivation of apples and gooseberries; while, if those of the glacial period once again obtained, open asparagus beds would be superfluous, and the training of fruit trees against the most favourable of south walls, a waste of time and trouble (*Evolution and Ethics* pp.14-5).

Wells takes this warning to realisation and refutes it with respect to both the energy and intelligence of the gardener and that of the state of nature which works against the garden. The Time Traveller's words run first in Huxley's cautious tones while conveying his first impressions of year 802701:

> After all, the sanitation and the agriculture of to-day are still in the rudimentary stage. The science of our time has attacked but a little department of the field of human disease, but, even so, it spreads its operations very steadily and persistently. Our agriculture and horticulture destroy a weed just here and there and cultivate perhaps a score or so of wholesome plants, leaving the greater number to fight out a balance as they can (*The Time Machine* p.26).

The state of nature with an inclination to remain unchanged, the survival of the fittest, the adamant reaction of nature to human manipulation are all present in the above lines, yet the Time Traveller goes on in confident tones allowing for a future where the mastery of man over nature is possible:

> We improve our favourite plants and animals—and how few they are—gradually by selective breeding; now a new and better peach, now a seedless grape, now a sweeter and larger flower, now a more convenient breed of cattle. We improve them gradually, because our ideals are vague and tentative, and our knowledge is very limited; because Nature, too, is shy and slow in our clumsy hands. Some day all this will be better organised, and still better. That is the drift of the current in spite of the eddies. The whole world will be intelligent, educated, and co-operating; things will move faster and faster

> towards the subjugation of Nature. In the end, wisely and carefully we shall readjust the balance of animal and vegetable life to suit our human needs (*The Time Machine* p.26).

Wells, by first making us believe that it did, strikingly rebuffs it by showing the reality to be otherwise. He depicts the tragic end. He begins in Huxley's optimist tones owning that humanity is only in the beginning phase and he finishes in stating that Huxley's pessimistic warning has come true. Huxley keeps his hope for the future. Wells rules it out by his tragic revelation.

After the initially optimistic possibilities voiced by the Time Traveller ignorant of realities in his first days in 802701, the pessimistic realities begin to creep in. Wells then takes what was a possibility for Huxley to certainty and the gardener, Man, turns into a feeble creature and nature which imbued Man with greed and expedience takes back its own in the shape of the revenging Morlocks. They are both the endemic species attacking the garden walls and products of a struggle for survival:

> Again, the exclusive tendency of richer people—due, no doubt, to the increasing refinement of their education, and the widening gulf between them and the rude violence of the poor—is already leading to the closing, in their interest, of considerable portions of the surface of the land. About London, for instance, perhaps half the prettier country is shut in against intrusion. And this same widening gulf—which is due to the length and expense of the higher educational process and the increased facilities for and temptations towards refined habits on the part of the rich—will make that exchange between class and class, that promotion by intermarriage which at present retards the splitting of our species along lines of social stratification, less and less frequent (*The Time Machine* p.41).

2.1.3. The Laws of Evolution determine the future: No Bright Future to the Frustration of Complacent Man

According to Vernier (1977), "[i]t was undoubtedly part of Wells's purpose to emphasize the dangers lurking in the future in order to fight a general complacence he found unbearable" (pp.76-7). Wells himself notes it in his preface to *Seven Famous Novels* as we quoted elsewhere. Michael Foot (1996) approaches the self-complacency case and the ascribed attack on it from a different perspective. He concentrates on the Victorian complacency which does

not include mankind in general. It is focused on the western nations, or rather, on England mainly. According to him,

> [o]ne reason for the sudden, stunning success of *The Time Machine* was that it did touch the Nietzschean chord in the spirit of the age: the mood which rejected absolutely Victorian triumphalism, the still-prevalent view that the England of that time deserved to spread its empire wider and wider. The prophecies of *The Time Machine* stripped bare these delusions (pp.30-1).

The years prior to the 1880's had seen fierce debates between the self-assumed men of God and the men of science. P. Chalmers Mitchell (1900), in his almost contemporary work *Thomas Henry Huxley; A Sketch of His Life and Work* which he modestly calls "simply an outline of the external features of his life and an account of his contributions to biology, to educational and social problems, and to philosophy and metaphysics" (p.v) provides a minute summary of those fierce debates:

> [B]iological science was partially prepared; the mutability of species and the orderly succession of organic life were in the air. But the application of the doctrine to man came as a greater shock to civilised sentiment than would have occurred a century earlier. It came as a disaster even to the clearest and calmest intellects, for it seemed to drag down to the dirt the nobility of man. Out of the fierce flame of the French Revolution, there had come purged and clean the conception of man as an individual and soul. As this century advanced…all that was best in philosophy and in political practice seemed bound up with a lofty view of the unity of mankind (p.111).

Wells (1934), on contemplating upon "the fundamental magnificence of Darwin's and Huxley's achievement" (*Experiment in Autobiography*, p.162) sarcastically summarises the situation in England at the end of religion versus science debates on Evolution in the second half of the nineteenth century:

> They put the fact of organic evolution upon an impregnable base of proof and demonstration so that even the Roman Catholic controversialists at least ceased to vociferate…and discovered instead that the Church had always known all about Evolution and the place of man in Nature, just as it had always known all about the place of the solar system in space. Only it had said nothing about these things, because it was wiser so (*Experiment in Autobiography* p.162).

With the fervour of the debates concerning evolution thus abated the debates over the place of man in the Universe began to arise. For some intellectuals there was reason to be hopeful and they were optimistic about the future of Evolution and of Man, or the outcome of Evolution for Man. According to Hammond (1979), to them (among them many a man of science, too) "[t]he closing years of the nineteenth century were years of widespread optimism—an optimism accentuated by the popular idea that, in the light of Darwin's teachings, the only vista opening out for man was one of progress" (p.81). The outcome of those debates for them was the adoption, even the entrenchment of certain ideas, world views and beliefs. A new religion can be said to have emerged: the religion of science. This term, when applied to the ardent followers of science is not inappropriate in that they now began to worship science instead of religion, yet when an idea becomes dogma it becomes indisputable therefore unscientific as it is against the nature of science to be dogmatic. So it was for liberal thought too. As Nicholson (1950) puts it,

> there was a danger that liberalism would solidify into something as dogmatic as anything that had been known before, or on the other hand that it would waste away into mere complacency. The cult of reason, which had risen largely in reaction to the dogmatism of the Middle Ages and which in the Elizabethan period had a great sweep and fling about it, was now hardening into a sort of wire puzzle. Life and thought were being mechanised. When one of the most popular theologians of the day wanted an analogy for the created universe he could think of nothing more organic than a watch. God—if there had to be a God—was a mathematician (p.17).

But this dogmatic attitude and idyllic optimism, the dethronement of religion for the benefit of science with an ardent, passionate adherence to which there was always to come about all that is useful and progressive for mankind did not convince all intellectuals. This approach in fact did not exclude a geocentric, or rather Man-centric explanation of the Universe. In this approach, only *Nature* was replacing *God* with benevolent intentions and was *effecting* a universal order instead of *creating* one, mainly, if not wholly for the benefit of Man.

> We also know modern speculative optimism, with its perfectibility of the species, reign of peace, and lion and lamb transformation scenes; but one does not hear so much of it as one did forty years ago; indeed, I imagine it is to be met with more commonly at the tables of the healthy and wealthy, than in the congregations of the wise. The majority of us, I apprehend, profess neither pessimism nor optimism (*Evolution and Ethics* p.78).

Huxley, with the above words in his *Evolution and Ethics* voices an outcry against the sheepish optimism of the era for people of blind fate in the progress of mankind (although it does not, in the same manner, tend towards a ruthless pessimism). This optimism, like the criteria for being counted as belonging to mankind, is not much different in essence from the optimism of the Englishmen Vincent Brome (1951) notes in his H.G.Wells biography:

> Englishmen remained curiously convinced that they were the Lord's anointed, that right would prevail even though their gods—Dickens, Darwin, Gladstone—were shifting their courses. The staid mid-Victorian period was about to give place to the more restless late Victorian, the upper classes would soon be living rather deliberately *fin-de-siècle*, the lower classes already showed signs, alarming signs, of truculence and Queen Victoria approached the zenith of her power with the just right touch of divinity (p.39).

In the words of William Leadford, the antagonist of Wells's 1901 novel *In the Days of the Comet* the content were honest in their contentedness:

> The thing that never entered my head in those days was that a large proportion of the rich were rich in absolute good faith. I thought they saw things exactly as I saw them, and wickedly denied. But indeed old Mrs. Verrall was no more capable of doubting the perfection of her family's right to dominate a wide country side, than she was of examining the Thirty-nine Articles or dealing with any other of the adamantine pillars upon which her universe rested in security (*In the Days of the Comet* p.896).

The attack on human complacency may be interpreted as the 'Western complacency' that always puts itself in the centre of all action. Even the words Wells puts into the Time Traveller's mouth—a man of science—stress the confident assumptions of superiority prevalent in the western mind. About the technological developments the westerners effected as utopian developments he speaks in Huxleyan tones:

> Conceive the tale of London which a negro, fresh from Central Africa, would take back to his tribe! What would he know of railway companies, of social movements, of telephone and telegraph wires…Then, think how narrow the gap between a negro and a white man of our own times, and how wide the interval between myself and these of the Golden Age! (*The Time Machine* p.34).

Huxley says the same in *Evolution and Ethics* without any apparent disdain for the western society for these, nay he gives *useful* advice. He treats the process as a scientific fact only and as with instructive parts on biology:

> The process of colonization presents analogies to the formation of a garden which are highly instructive. Suppose a shipload of English colonists sent to form a settlement, in such a country as Tasmania was in the middle of the last century…The colonists proceed to put an end to this state of things over as large an area as they desire to occupy. They clear away the native vegetation, extirpate or drive out the animal population, so far as may be necessary, and take measures to defend themselves from the re-immigration of either (*Evolution and Ethics* p.16).

He makes no inclusion of men as he does in his immediately following words. He proceeds thus:

> In their place, they introduce English grain and fruit trees; English dogs, sheep, cattle, horses; and English men; in fact, they set up a new Flora and Fauna and a new variety of mankind, within the old state of nature (*Evolution and Ethics* p.16).

In this passage, at least, he does not include men, English men, to be more precise, in the animal kingdom. The native people, on the other hand, seem to be part of the Fauna. It may be that he tries to approach the colonising process as a matter of fact attempt of men, that is, English men, conquering nature. He continues the simile in the same vein and includes approval and warning:

> Under the conditions supposed, there is if they are slothful, stupid, and careless; or if they waste their energies in contests with one another, the chances are that the old state of nature will have the best of it. The native savage will destroy the immigrant civilized man; of the English animals and plants some will be extirpated by their indigenous rivals, others will pass into the feral state and themselves become components of the state of nature. In a few decades, all other traces of the settlement will have vanished (*Evolution and Ethics* p.17).

Wells does not regard the same way with Huxley questions of subduing nature. He may be said to be criticising Huxley also in his early work notwithstanding any possible judgement on his own high opinion of the western races and especially the English race of the years to come. Wells's approach seems to be that of his antagonist's in *The War of the Worlds* as we quoted elsewhere: "Are we such apostles of mercy as to complain if the Martians warred in the same spirit? (*The War of the Worlds*, p.311). Actually, the introduction of the Morlock reign by Wells may be thought to be an answer to the placid assumption and the complacency of the westerners.

The geocentric explanation of the world is Europe centred. The evolutionary explanation is Europe centred for, after all, be it a descent from the ape then it is the European that went the furthest from it. The Time Traveller's answer to the Very Young Man is full of sarcasm directed at the self-elevated European races that put so much value on their self-written history. The passage on the possibilities of time travel as conceived of by the 'westerner' can be interpreted as mocking the ostentatious self-named 'Western' values:

> "It would be remarkably convenient for the historian," the Psychologist suggested. "One might travel back and verify the accepted account of the Battle of Hastings, for instance!"
> "Don't you think you would attract attention?" said the Medical Man. "Our ancestors had no great tolerance for anachronisms."
> "One might get one's Greek from the very lips of Homer and Plato," the Very Young Man thought.
> "In which case they would certainly plough you for the Little-go. The German scholars have improved Greek so much."
> "Then there is the future," said the Very Young Man. "Just think! One might invest all one's money, leave it to accumulate at interest, and hurry on ahead!" (*The Time Machine* p.6).

A coined history with the forced acquiescence of certain accounts adorned with ostensibly deep yet non-existing roots with a greed treating scientific findings as a means for speculation hardly offers a basis to take pride in. It nevertheless does and Wells mocks this complacency. The attack on human complacency is indeed a critique of Mankind in general, but criticism of the stated sort must be treated as criticism of the western society and particularly

the English society who sees itself at the top of the western world in addition. In 1894 Wells talks of the extinction of man:

> No; man's complacent assumption of the future is too confident. We think, because things have been easy for mankind[7] as a whole generation or so, we are going on to perfect comfort and security in the future (as cited in Vernier, 1977 p.77).

The Time Machine is generally treated as a novel picturing a future quite unlike the complacent western assumption of it as a happy world. In Hammond's (1979) words "[i]n retrospect [*The Time Machine*] can be seen as an assault on the complacent assumptions of evolutionary theory" (p.81). This general consensus owes much to Wells's (1934) words that *The Time Machine* is "a glimpse of the future that ran counter to the placid assumption of that time [i.e., the late 19th century] that Evolution was a pro-human force making things better for mankind" (*Seven Famous Novels*, p.ix).

On the other hand, many a critic treat *The Island of Dr.Moreau* and *The Invisible Man* as parables of science without morals bringing about hazardous results. Yet this hazardous results concept fits better in the case of *The Time Machine*. Nicholson's (1950) covering statement on Wells's early work thus becomes—maybe inadvertently, too—a most appropriate interpretation of Wells's intention in *The Time Machine*:

> Wells was aware from the first that the development of scientific knowledge was not in itself any guarantee of progress, and many of his romances are based on the idea that science, divorced from humanity and from the wisdom that sees beyond the first line of consequence, may bring disaster to mankind. Several of his romances are warnings of what may happen if technological development gets out of hand, and others deal with the destruction of civilisation by cosmic catastrophe (p.32).

It is indeed mainly from despair that the Morlocks became what they have become. But this fact is generally ignored even by the sensitive Time

[7] Maybe for the Western countries more or less. This may owe to the fact that Vernier (1977) notes that "Wells did not become aware of the actual existence of pain and suffering as a cardinal component of man's plight before the Second World War" (p.83).

Traveller. But the Laws of Evolution determine the future and the Eloi become the new underdog.

According to Bergonzi (1976), *The Time Machine* "presents a vivid picture of humanity in full decline and even, in the end, of the extinction of life on the great globe itself" (*H.G.Wells; A Collection of Critical Essays,* Introduction pp.2-3). The Time Traveller regrets seeing mankind degraded into sheep and predators. Daylight people are fools, night-time people are predators and he sadly ascribes the cause to class struggle, which is in fact the ostracising of the working classes:

> I do not know how long I sat peering down that well. It was not for some time that I could succeed in persuading myself that the thing I had seen was human. But, gradually, the truth dawned on me: that Man had not remained one species, but had differentiated into two distinct animals: that my graceful children of the Upper-world were not the sole descendants of our generation, but that this bleached, obscene, nocturnal Thing, which had flashed before me, was also heir to all the ages (*The Time Machine* p.39).

2.2. Steps of Ostracism in *The Island of Dr. Moreau* and its Causes

It must be noted that Huxley's closing lines stating that "much may be done to change the nature of man himself" (*Evolution and Ethics* p.85) are echoed in Wells's works as in the closing lines of *The Island of Dr. Moreau*:

> There it must be, I think, in the vast and eternal laws of matter, and not in the daily cares and sins and troubles of men, that whatever is more than animal within us must find its solace and its hope. I hope, or I could not live. And so, in hope and solitude, my story ends (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.182).

Yet, though they cannot be said to be satirising Huxley's words, they certainly have a high pitch of sarcasm directed towards humanity and, as noted above, there is rather dismay in those closing lines at seeing mankind so unequal for the task Huxley talks of. The continual and finally complete reversion of the Beast Folk in the book, implying to the scientifically inclined readers that contrary to their expectation that Man who had evolved into this—in their view—assumedly high place in the universe was in fact quite expendable and

prone to degradation must have been unpalatable. Bergonzi (1961) effectively states it:

> *The Island of Dr.Moreau*, if my reading of it is correct, is a version of the 'island myth' which conveys a powerful and wholly imaginative response to the implications of Evolution. And this, I think, accounts for its generally hostile reception…Wells's book shows us a world in which animals can be changed into men at the command of the quasi-divine scientist, and then, after his power has been removed, can be seen to regress to a distorted version of their original shape. There is no essential difference between man and animal, nothing which cannot be affected by surgical manipulation. This would certainly have been offensive to Wells's more traditionally minded readers (pp.111-2).

Actually, there was worse in *The Island of Dr Moreau* than implying for Man an animal origin. It implied that Man is inherently bad and selfish. *The Island of Dr Moreau* abounds in samples of innate badness of Man and his unrelenting malignity towards his kin. This inherent selfishness is one of the main reasons of all the acts of ostracism in the novel. According to Hammond (1979),

> *The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896)* was one of Wells's most pessimistic works. It is a grisly parable of the beast in man, and a grim reminder of the animal nature which lurks beneath the thin veneer of civilisation (pp.14-5).

The opening chapters of the novel seem to support this idea without having recourse to allegory as it does in the later chapters which we will study in due place. We are shocked to see how soon that thin veneer is gone once dear life is at stake, and how soon the educated Prendick joins the other two men in a deadly struggle for the preservation of his life. The scene of three men fighting literally to eat one another is a prevision of what is to come later in the book and is stressed in the closing address of Prendick to the reader.

In Nicholson's (1950) words, "[t]hat which makes this book so different from the rest of Wells is that it exploits to the full his understanding of the ruthless in human behaviour and [that e]lsewhere we get only glimpses of this" (p.31). Nicholson means the ruthlessness of Moreau but limiting that trait to the outcast Moreau would be oversimplification. The ruthless in human behaviour,

or the ruthlessness in human nature, is not limited, nor in fact is it represented in Moreau's personality. Almost all characters or character groups are studied one by one throughout the book by Wells.

Almost with his first sentence of his narrative Prendick introduces the subject matter in his own personality. He, with calculated calm, speaks words of pragma, selfishness and expedience deliberately and freely. He does not care to make his comments more humane by words of affected sadness. Instead, he freely owns the usefulness of the loss of a man's life without having recourse to lies. Downright, the theme of mankind's innate badness, or at least his pragmatism begins to show itself. He draws a cold yet minute picture of the event—although years later in his memoirs—by the words

> I must state that there never were four men in the dingey,—the number was three. Constans, who was "seen by the captain to jump into the gig," luckily for us and unluckily for himself did not reach us. He came down out of the tangle of ropes under the stays of the smashed bowsprit, some small rope caught his heel as he let go, and he hung for a moment head downward, and then fell and struck a block or spar floating in the water. We pulled towards him, but he never came up (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.79).

Still, the varnish of humanity had not yet vanished altogether. He now carefully lays all the facts of the case as they are. Just as he had not refrained from talking of the 'luck' of Constans's loss, he adds (only to make the account more accurate, not to acquit himself of any accusation of cold-heartedness) that they at the same time "pulled towards him, but he never came up" (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.79). Furthermore, he claims that Constans was in the luck in fact for dying a quick death: "I say luckily for us he did not reach us, and I might also add luckily for himself, for there were only a small beaker of water and some soddened ship's biscuits with us" (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.79). The 'luckily-for-himself' structure is repeated in the subsequent narrative of the famishing days in the dingey as if to irritate the reader in his varnished civilised ways that were not tried at Destiny's hands by his following words: "It is quite impossible for the ordinary reader to imagine those eight days. He has not—luckily for himself—anything in his memory to imagine with" (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.80).

Once the said varnish is gone Prendick is quite pragmatic in adapting a self-preserving attitude. He tries to see the result of the lots complied with by siding with Helmar against the sailor (of course he had beforehand refused to draw lots for fear of drawing the lethal one but becomes active to help kill the unlucky sailor):

> The lot fell upon the sailor; but he was the strongest of us and would not abide by it, and attacked Helmar with his hands. They grappled together and almost stood up. I crawled along the boat to them, intending to help Helmar by grasping the sailor's leg (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.80).

That first chapter of the novel is only a preparation of the stage for the following action. In that first chapter especial stress is made on mankind's nearness to losing his civility when tried by privations. It is only a matter of time and surroundings that the beast should revive in Man. The reversion of the Beast Folk is only a repetition of that. With one difference though, they had not claimed or boasted of civility in the first place, either.

Apart from the selfishness or maybe complementing it, lack of empathy comes to the fore as another main cause of the ostracism in *The Island of Dr Moreau*. Pain, which every creature is so willing to avoid, is ignored in any other creature. Bergonzi (1961) claims that in *The Island of Dr Moreau* "the possibilities of pain are explored with nightmarish intensity" (p.96).

Man is so selfish that he is mute to tears and pain whenever and wherever he can manage it. At the very least, he is sensitive to pain when he can safely play the sensitive. The silence of man to pain when he can literally or figuratively block his ears is suggested in Prendick's case of the puma:

> The crying sounded even louder out of doors. It was as if all the pain in the world had found a voice. Yet had I known such pain was in the next room, and had it been dumb, I believe—I have thought since—I could have stood it well enough. It is when suffering finds a voice and sets our nerves quivering that this pity comes troubling us. But in spite of the brilliant sunlight and the green fans of the trees waving in the soothing sea-breeze, the world was a confusion, blurred with drifting black and red phantasms, until I was out of earshot of the house in the chequered wall (*The Island of Dr Moreau* p.104).

The indifference to, nay, finding some relief in others' pain gets only plainer in time. After the Leopard Man's chase, the wailing of the Puma comes as "a positive relief" (*The Island of Dr Moreau* p.112). Now Prendick cares no more about the suffering puma; "[his] drowsy tranquillity had gone" (*The Island of Dr Moreau* p.105). This points both to the changeability of human emotions, to the superficiality of them and to their being directly influenced by physical circumstances (the pain extant in the Universe does not cross Man's mind so long as he does not directly witness or suffer from it). Mankind is here detested for his showy feelings. Virtue flourishes in more or less secure surroundings.

When Prendick was immune to physical threats he was sensitive to aural pain, once his own safety was at stake general good and others' pain was forgotten; empathy was lost in this "positive relief" (*The Island of Dr Moreau* p.112). At that sound Prendick "gathered together all [his] strength and began running again towards the light. It seemed to [him] a voice was calling [him]" (*The Island of Dr Moreau* p.112). When "the crying of the puma" (*The Island of Dr Moreau* p.102) turns to "the crying of the man" (*The Island of Dr Moreau* p.112) Prendick's anxiety for personal safety increases after a temporary lull effected by drugs. Prendick freely admits that "[t]he thought of a return to that pain-haunted refuge was extremely disagreeable, but still more so was the idea of being overtaken in the open by darkness and all that darkness might conceal" (*The Island of Dr Moreau* p.109). This deafness to suffering theme is in fact repeated (or rather, proceeded by) Moreau's gagging his ears to fellow-creatures' pain. Then again a larger scale is brought forth by the pain countenanced by, first the society towards Moreau and beast-men and then by God and the Universe towards the creation. Hence, throughout the work a bombardment of bitter facts ensue.

Man's deafness to others' suffering can be explained by his selfish nature which directs him to care for his personal safety before anybody else's. Huxley (1894) ascribes it to inheritance in a plainly explanatory passage:

> [M]en agree in one thing; and that is their innate desire to enjoy the pleasures and to escape the pains of life; and, in short, to do nothing but that which it pleases them to do, without the least reference to the welfare of the society into

> which they are born. That is their inheritance (the reality at the bottom of the doctrine of original sin) from the long series of ancestors, human and semi-human and brutal, in whom the strength of this innate tendency to self-assertion was the condition of victory in the struggle for existence (Evolution and Ethics p.27).

This ancestral line is sped up in *The Island of Dr. Moreau* with the introduction of laboratory made species which are, as Vernier (1977) stresses, the results of Wells's "insistence not on the evolutionary process but on the mutations it brings about" (p.74) and the desire to escape pain is echoed in the Beast Folk's repeated reference to the inescapability of it once they committed a crime:

> "Evil are the punishments of those who break the Law. None escape."
> "None escape," said the Beast Folk, glancing furtively at one another.
> "None, none," said the Ape-man,—"none escape. See! I did a little thing, a wrong thing, once. I jabbered, jabbered, stopped talking. None could understand. I am burnt, branded in the hand. He is great. He is good!"
> "None escape," said the grey creature in the corner.
> "None escape," said the Beast People, looking askance at one another.
> "For every one the want that is bad," said the grey Sayer of the Law. "What you will want we do not know; we shall know.
> Some want to follow things that move, to watch and slink and wait and spring; to kill and bite, bite deep and rich, sucking the blood. It is bad. 'Not to chase other Men; that is the Law. Are we not Men? Not to eat Flesh or Fish; that is the Law.
> Are we not Men?'"
> "None escape," said a dappled brute standing in the doorway.
> "For every one the want is bad," said the grey Sayer of the Law. "Some want to go tearing with teeth and hands into the roots of things, snuffing into the earth. It is bad."
> "None escape," said the men in the door.
> "Some go clawing trees; some go scratching at the graves of the dead; some go fighting with foreheads or feet or claws; some bite suddenly, none giving occasion; some love uncleanness."
> "None escape," said the Ape-man, scratching his calf.
> "None escape," said the little pink sloth-creature.
> "Punishment is sharp and sure. Therefore learn the Law. Say the words. (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* pp.122-3)".

This accentuated repetition of the inescapability of pain by almost all the members of the society points out the central role pain and its avoidance plays in the shaping of the Beast Folk's life. It symbolises man's pitiful lot; of being pained by the knowledge of the inescapability of pain which is so much desired

to be kept away from. The dilemmatic part of it is their predilection to inflict pain on others.

Finding pleasure let alone relief in others' pain is studied by Wells also in *The Wonderful Visit* written before *The Island of Dr. Moreau*:

> 'The strange thing,' said the Angel, 'is the readiness of you Human Beings—the zest, with which you inflict pain. Those boys pelting me this morning——'
> 'Seemed to enjoy it,' said the Vicar. 'I know'.
> 'Yet they don't like pain,' said the Angel.
> 'No,' said the Vicar; '*they* don't like it.'
> …
> ...Everyone seems anxious—willing at any rate—to give this Pain. Everyone seems busy giving pain——'
> 'Or avoiding it,' said the Vicar, pushing his dinner away before him. 'Yes—of course. It's fighting everywhere. The whole living world is a battle-field. We are driven by Pain. Here. How it lies on the surface! This Angel sees it in a day!' (quoted in Bergonzi p.96).

Man likes inflicting pain yet avoids pain to himself with a decided lack of empathy. This explains why the Eloi once drove the Morlocks underground, why Moreau was cast out of society, why his men were disliked, why Griffin was hated, reviled.

2.2.1. Dr.Moreau and Montgomery as Outcasts

Dr.Moreau is both an indifferent creator just like, according to Beauchamp (1979), "God … amorally experimenting with creation" (p.411) but also a victim. He is the victim of an unsupportive scientific community, subject to an unfeeling society's indifference, or rather, malignity in his being made an outcast with all his positive science and real value. Prendick's remembrance of Moreau's case is quite explanatory:

> "The Moreau Horrors." The phrase drifted loose in my mind for a moment, and then I saw it in red lettering on a little buff-coloured pamphlet, to read which made one shiver and creep. Then I remembered distinctly all about it. That long-forgotten pamphlet came back with startling vividness to my mind. I had been a mere lad then, and Moreau was, I suppose, about fifty; a prominent and masterful physiologist, well-known in scientific circles for his extraordinary imagination and his brutal directness in discussion.
>
> Was this the same Moreau? He had published some very astonishing facts in connection with the transfusion of blood, and in addition was known to be doing valuable work on morbid growths. Then suddenly his career was closed. He had to leave England. A journalist obtained access to his laboratory

> in the capacity of laboratory-assistant, with the deliberate intention of making sensational exposures; and by the help of a shocking accident—if it was an accident—his gruesome pamphlet became notorious. On the day of its publication a wretched dog, flayed and otherwise mutilated, escaped from Moreau's house. It was in the silly season, and a prominent editor, a cousin of the temporary laboratory-assistant, appealed to the conscience of the nation. It was not the first time that conscience has turned against the methods of research. The doctor was simply howled out of the country. It may be that he deserved to be; but I still think that the tepid support of his fellow-investigators and his desertion by the great body of scientific workers was a shameful thing. Yet some of his experiments, by the journalist's account, were wantonly cruel. He might perhaps have purchased his social peace by abandoning his investigations; but he apparently preferred the latter, as most men would who have once fallen under the overmastering spell of research. He was unmarried, and had indeed nothing but his own interest to consider (*The Island of Dr. Moreau.* pp.100-1).

It seems that the use of "howled" is intentional. It is very much ironical to see men act like beasts in a book where beasts are made men. Wells cleverly uses it. This casting out by the society, furthermore, its countenance by fellow scientists is not without indications of jealous envy. The casting out of the unconventional scientist is one example of the society's impatience with the different: a prying journalist who is after scandal rather than restive in his conscience, an ostensibly horrified society in fact as cruel in their treatment of animals now feigning disgust in vivisection, and a greedy and jealous scientific community turning their backs on a better fellow out of spite as in the case of Darwin-Huxley versus Owen clash. The same will later be applied to Griffin in *The Invisible Man* in the shape of a fellow scientist, Dr.Kemp, then trying to become a member of the Royal Society. Kemp in *The Invisible Man* repeats the offence.

Even Prendick's first notion is of suspicion:

> Yet surely, and especially to another scientific man, there was nothing so horrible in vivisection as to account for this secrecy; and by some odd leap in my thoughts the pointed ears and luminous eyes of Montgomery's attendant came back again before me with the sharpest definition. I stared before me out at the green sea, frothing under a freshening breeze, and let these and other strange memories of the last few days chase one another through my mind.
>
> What could it all mean? A locked enclosure on a lonely island, a notorious vivisector, and these crippled and distorted men?... (*The Island of Dr. Moreau.* pp.101-2).

Bergonzi (1961) states that "Moreau is both a traditional and contemporary figure, and his most obvious literary progenitors are Mary Shelley's Frankenstein and Stevenson's Jekyll-Hyde"(p.106). Moreau is a Frankenstein indeed, but he is also Frankenstein's creature and likewise, he has traits of a Dr. Jekyll and a Mr. Hyde both. Those comparisons—more important, though less stressed, than simply fitting into the widely acclaimed, widely accepted roles they occupy as the scientist swaying between sanity and insanity—exemplify the victimised outcast inherent in both Mary Shelley's and Stevenson's works repeated in *The Island of Dr.Moreau* as Moreau v. Beast Folk, Moreau v. Society and the like relationships. In fact all those *monsters* are victims of social and physical surroundings.

Ironically, even on the island he supposedly controls Moreau feels bound to explain his case to Prendick, an orthodox and insignificant man of science. That orthodox man of science, with his first appearance on the island, derails the system. As in most cases, the man of novel ideas has to step back before the blatantly ignorant traditional man:

> And yet this extraordinary branch of knowledge has never been sought as an end, and systematically, by modern investigators until I took it up! Some such things have been hit upon in the last resort of surgery; most of the kindred evidence that will recur to your mind has been demonstrated as it were by accident—by tyrants, by criminals, by the breeders of horses and dogs, by all kinds of untrained clumsy-handed men working for their own immediate ends. I was the first man to take up this question armed with antiseptic surgery, and with a really scientific knowledge of the laws of growth.
>
> Yet one would imagine it must have been practised in secret before. Such creatures as the Siamese Twins…And in the vaults of the Inquisition. No doubt their chief aim was artistic torture, but some at least of the inquisitors must have had a touch of scientific curiosity... (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.131)

Yet the ordinary man when not on his ground feels awe in the presence of the real scientist and, of course, there is scientific pride in Moreau's deigning to narrate his story to Prendick, the pride of the outcast in making a noble return to his snobbish fellows:

> "Now be quiet, while I reel off my physiological lecture to you."

> And forthwith, beginning in the tone of a man supremely bored, but presently warming a little, he explained his work to me. He was very simple and convincing. Now and then there was a touch of sarcasm in his voice. Presently I found myself hot with shame at our mutual positions (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.130).

Montgomery's case runs on similar lines but differs in essence. He has no particular pursuits like Moreau, nor is he indifferent to the joys of London life. He is talented yet aimless. He has nowhere to go and that is a theme to be repeated in Prendick's wanderings. Unlike Prendick, Montgomery has recourse to drink yet:

> He wandered into a maudlin defence of the Beast People and of M'ling. M'ling, he said, was the only thing that had ever really cared for him. And suddenly an idea came to him.
> "I'm damned!" said he, staggering to his feet and clutching the brandy bottle.
> By some flash of intuition I knew what it was he intended. "You don't give drink to that beast!" I said, rising and facing him.
> "Beast!" said he. "You're the beast. He takes his liquor like a Christian. Come out of the way, Prendick!"
> "For God's sake," said I.
> "Get—out of the way!" he roared, and suddenly whipped out his revolver.
> "Very well," said I, and stood aside, half-minded to fall upon him as he put his hand upon the latch, but deterred by the thought of my useless arm. "You've made a beast of yourself,—to the beasts you may go."
> He flung the doorway open, and stood half facing me between the yellow lamp-light and the pallid glare of the moon; his eye-sockets were blotches of black under his stubbly eyebrows.
> "You're a solemn prig, Prendick, a silly ass! You're always fearing and fancying. We're on the edge of things. I'm bound to cut my throat to-morrow. I'm going to have a damned Bank Holiday to-night." He turned and went out into the moonlight. "M'ling!" he cried; "M'ling, old friend!"
> (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.161).

He was an able doctor, as Prendick notes after his arm was broken by the puma:

> "Great God, Prendick!" he said, not noticing that I was hurt, "that brute's loose! Tore the fetter out of the wall! Have you seen them?" Then sharply, seeing I gripped my arm, "What's the matter?"
> "I was standing in the doorway," said I.
> He came forward and took my arm. "Blood on the sleeve," said he, and rolled back the flannel. He pocketed his weapon, felt my arm about painfully, and led me inside. "Your arm is broken," he said, and then, "Tell me exactly how it happened—what happened?"
> I told him what I had seen; told him in broken sentences, with gasps of pain between them, and very dexterously and swiftly he bound my arm meanwhile.

> He slung it from my shoulder, stood back and looked at me (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.154).

He could have become a famous doctor but had to leave all the joys of life behind seemingly inadvertently:

> "Why am I here now—an outcast from civilisation—instead of being a happy man enjoying all the pleasures of London? Simply because—eleven years ago—I lost my head for ten minutes on a foggy night" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.89).

The strange human necessity for finding an outcast reveals itself in Prendick's instinctive search for an outcast figure in Montgomery once he comes to human terms by ceasing to be a shipwrecked passenger and becoming a Londoner when Montgomery talks of London life with envy. Prendick now gets the upper hand and finds it in his capacity to treat Montgomery (in his mind) as an outcast of some sort. After all, one party in any group has to be made the outcast, which the deterministic ways of the world commands:

> Montgomery produced some cigars.
>
> He talked to me of London in a tone of half-painful reminiscence, asking all kinds of questions about changes that had taken place. He spoke like a man who had loved his life there, and had been suddenly and irrevocably cut off from it. I gossiped as well as I could of this and that. All the time the strangeness of him was shaping itself in my mind; and as I talked I peered at his odd, pallid face in the dim light of the binnacle lantern behind me (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* pp.88-9).

2.2.2. The Plight of the Beast Folk: Belonging Nowhere

The first signs of the unhappy lot of the Beast Folk are seen on board *Ipecacuanha*, the ship that rescues Prendick. There Montgomery's attendant (yet unknown to the reader to be of the Beast Folk) is continually harassed by the ship's captain and crew. This attitude seems to owe much to the creature's being taken as some sort of negro or black man as seen in Prendick's comment "The black hesitated before them" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.85). The sailors' reaction to the captain's "deliver[ing him] a tremendous blow between the shoulder-blades with his fist" and [t]he poor devil['s going] down like a felled

ox, and [his] roll[ing] in the dirt among the furiously excited dogs" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.85-6) is to make the most of the situation by way of entertainment. They do not try to save him from the dogs, instead, on seeing the group they shout "to them as though it was admirable sport (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.86). Montgomery, whom we saw to be feeling an affinity towards the Beast Folk, is incensed at such brutish behaviour and owns it angrily by shouting at the captain, "Your sailors began to haze the poor devil as soon as he came aboard" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.87). And although he had vented his anger on his attendant beforehand we can feel this to be out of sympathy for him:

> "Confound you!" said Montgomery. "Why the devil don't you get out of the way?"
> The black-faced man started aside without a word. I went on up the companion, staring at him instinctively as I did so. Montgomery stayed at the foot for a moment. "You have no business here, you know," he said in a deliberate tone. "Your place is forward."
> The black-faced man cowered. "They—won't have me forward." He spoke slowly, with a queer, hoarse quality in his voice (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.84).

The Beast Folk, so to speak, are an eyesore to all humans in the novel except the two outcast scientists Moreau and Montgomery. Moreau's case is ambiguous. He feels a professional interest in and the creator's or father's care for them in their creation which later on fades. All the while Montgomery feels an affinity for them which Prendick disdains:

> My first friendship with Montgomery did not increase. His long separation from humanity, his secret vice of drunkenness, his evident sympathy with the Beast People, tainted him to me. Several times I let him go alone among them (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.153).

Just as the Beast Folk cannot return to the company of the ordinary beasts of their origin, their new kinsman Prendick also loathes them. Prendick pities them only when he gets to comprehend their plight while Moreau, as we stated above, develops a dislike for them as soon as he has done with them, or in Beauchamp's (1979) words, "[i]n contrast to Prendick's sympathy for the Beast

Folk, Moreau feels only contempt, they are but ignominious failures of his continuing experiment" (p.414). Prendick indeed understands their painful existence and the effectual ostracising they are subjected to although in their case the alienation and torment is mainly felt from within instead of an ostracising by fellow animals:

> Poor brutes! I began to see the viler aspect of Moreau's cruelty. I had not thought before of the pain and trouble that came to these poor victims after they had passed from Moreau's hands. I had shivered only at the days of actual torment in the enclosure. But now that seemed to me the lesser part. Before, they had been beasts, their instincts fitly adapted to their surroundings, and happy as living things may be. Now they stumbled in the shackles of humanity, lived in a fear that never died, fretted by a law they could not understand; their mock-human existence, begun in an agony, was one long internal struggle, one long dread of Moreau—and for what? It was the wantonness of it that stirred me.
> …the things were thrown out to live a year or so, to struggle and blunder and suffer, and at last to die painfully. They were wretched in themselves; the old animal hate moved them to trouble one another; the Law held them back from a brief hot struggle and a decisive end to their natural animosities (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.152).

As Beauchamp (1979) notes, the Beast Folk are in pain for their creator is "ineptly bungling the attempt at a wholly rational being, callously abandoning his failures to inhabit the island of this world, neither rational enough nor animal enough to find peace, rough-hewn, confused, tormented, abortions in the image of a creator" (p.411).

2.2.3. Prendick: The Continual Alien

Prendick is a drifter in life just as the boats at the beginning and end of the book imply. These driftings symbolise his belonging nowhere. He drifts until in the end of the book he becomes a recluse in the English countryside. To the calm of the countryside he reaches after certain attempts of establishing roots to himself in none of which he succeeds. In fact, after what he has seen on the island as caricature of the society of men he loses his desire to belong to human community and willingly becomes an exile in the downs. His story has many parts in common with Lev Tolstoy's Andrey character in *War and Peace*. His

drifting in the dingey and the scene of his being found by the ship *Ipecacuanha* resembles Andrey's lying supine in Austerlitz Battlefield after his wounding with the difference that Andrey tries to attract attention for he wants to live the life which he now sees in a different light. Here are the two scenes respectively:

> And even as I lay there I saw, with no more interest than if it had been a picture, a sail come up towards me over the sky-line. My mind must have been wandering, and yet I remember all that happened, quite distinctly. I remember how my head swayed with the seas, and the horizon with the sail above it danced up and down; but I also remember as distinctly that I had a persuasion that I was dead, and that I thought what a jest it was that they should come too late by such a little to catch me in my body.
>
> For an endless period, as it seemed to me, I lay with my head on the thwart watching the schooner (she was a little ship, schooner-rigged fore and aft) come up out of the sea. She kept tacking to and fro in a widening compass, for she was sailing dead into the wind. It never entered my head to attempt to attract attention, and I do not remember anything distinctly after the sight of her side until I found myself in a little cabin aft (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* pp.80-1).

The similar scene in *War and Peace* reads

> He listened, and heard the sound of approaching horses, and voices speaking French. He opened his eyes. Above him again was the same lofty sky with clouds that had risen were still higher, and between them gleamed blue infinity. He did not turn his head and did not see those who, judging by the sound of hoofs and voices, had ridden up and stopped near him.
>
> …
>
> He knew it was Napoleon—his hero—but at that moment Napoleon seemed to him such a small insignificant creature compared with what was passing now between himself and that lofty infinite sky with the clouds flying over it. At that moment it meant nothing to him who might be standing over him, or what was said of him; he was only glad that people were standing near him, and only wished that they would help him and bring him back to life, which seemed to him so beautiful now that he had to-day learned to understand it so differently. He collected all his strength, to stir and utter a sound.
>
> …
>
> Prince Andrew remembered nothing more; he lost consciousness from the terrible pain of being lifted onto the stretcher… (pp.310-1).

These experiences are the starting points for an inner revolution for both characters in that they both "withdraw [themselves] from the multitudes…" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.182.) In both scenes there is a reference to the sky and in both cases the sky is a source of peace:

> I spend many of the clear nights in the study of astronomy. There is—though I do not know how there is or why there is—a sense of infinite peace and protection in the glittering hosts of heaven. There it must be, I think, in the vast and eternal laws of matter, and not in the daily cares and sins and troubles of men, that whatever is more than animal within us must find its solace and its hope (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.182).

Prince Andrey's reflection runs in parallel lines:

> So insignificant at that moment seemed to him all the interests that engrossed Napoleon, so mean did his hero himself with his paltry vanity and joy in victory appear, compared to the lofty, equitable, and kindly sky which he had seen and understood, that he could not answer him.
>
> Everything seemed so futile and insignificant in comparison with the stern and solemn train of thought that weakness from loss of blood, suffering, and the nearness of death, aroused in him (pp.312-3).

The reference to the stars and sky as a source of serenity is an oft repeated theme in Wells's early scientific romances as Prendick's closing words testify or as the Time Traveller's vigilant night under starlit sky shows: "Looking at these stars suddenly dwarfed my own troubles and all the gravities of terrestrial life" (*The Time Machine* p.51). This turning of one's face heavenwards will be returned to in the next chapter while talking of the despair of the antagonists and of the serenity the sky offers.

The alien or alienated character of Prendick that will finally take him to "the broad free downland" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.181) begins to be felt in the second chapter of *The Island of Dr.Moreau* in which we see a series of revelations of differing selfish forces. He is not easily admitted to any group he joins mentally. Prendick and his fellow-sufferers in the dingey of the *Lady Vain* had revealed themselves in the first chapter kin to ferocious beasts with the varnish of civilisation worn out after the privations of several days and Montgomery's first address to Prendick alludes to this fact with his inquisitive remark: "You were picked up in a boat, starving. The name on the boat was the *Lady Vain*, and there were queer marks on the gunwhale" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.81).[8] He then remarks "But,…you know I'm dying to hear of how

[8] Note that in the Garden City Publishing Company, 1896 edition at http://www.gutenberg.net the same passage reads:

you came to be alone in that boat" along which Prendick thinks he "detected a certain suspicion in his eyes" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.82).

Montgomery's suspicion of foul play (maybe of murder, too) on Prendick's part in the queer mark (or blood-spot) business will become somewhat hypocritical when later on we learn of Montgomery's job as an assistant to the vivisector Moreau. He selfishly suspects Prendick of foul play, in a sense ostracises him, where he himself is literally red-handed. He also shows signs of selfish pride in his making his role clear in saving Prendick:

> "You were nearly dead," said my interlocutor. "It was a very near thing, indeed. But I've put some stuff into you now. Notice your arm's sore? Injections. You've been insensible for nearly thirty hours."
> I thought slowly. (I was distracted now by the yelping of a number of dogs.) "Am I eligible for solid food?" I asked.
> "Thanks to me," he said. "Even now the mutton is boiling." (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.82).

Elsewhere "[h]e seemed anxious to lay stress on the fact that [Prendick] owed [his] life to him" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.103). His insistent and rather impatient behaviour to learn about Prendick's possible (would-be) role in some sort of bloodshed may point to his desire to acquit himself of any guilt he connects himself to the vivisectioning on the Island of Dr.Moreau by finding some other criminal. On the other hand, Prendick is quite aware that he owes his life to those unfeeling monsters of sailors and this man Montgomery with his odd ways: "This man, it seemed to me, had come out of Immensity merely to save my life. To-morrow he would drop over the side, and vanish again out of my existence" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.89). But Montgomery refuses to provide this feeling of belonging:

> "…you have saved my life.
> "Chance," he answered. "Just chance."
> "I prefer to make my thanks to the accessible agent."
> "Thank no one. You had the need, and I had the knowledge; and I injected and fed you much as I might have collected a specimen. I was bored and wanted

---

"You were picked up in a boat, starving. The name on the boat was the *Lady Vain*, and there were **spots of blood** on the gunwhale."
"Spots of blood" was replaced by "queer marks" or vice versa. This change increases the import of the sentence by showing it to be reconsidered by Wells for some reason.

> something to do. If I'd been jaded that day, or hadn't liked your face, well—it's a curious question where you would have been now!"
> This damped my mood a little. "At any rate," I began.
> "It's chance, I tell you," he interrupted, "as everything is in a man's life. Only the asses won't see it! Why am I here now, an outcast from civilisation, instead of being a happy man enjoying all the pleasures of London? Simply because eleven years ago—I lost my head for ten minutes on a foggy night."
> He stopped. "Yes?" said I.
> "That's all."
> We relapsed into silence. Presently he laughed. "There's something in this starlight that loosens one's tongue. (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.89).

As if to show the truth of Montgomery's 'chance' theory and to make it felt that he is but a pawn in destiny's hands or in hands that do not ask for his permission Prendick is left passive in the determination of his fate: whether he was to remain on the ship or be disembarked upon Moreau's island: "So I waited passively upon fate, and the work of transferring Montgomery's possessions to the launch went on as if I did not exist" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.93). This scene is also reminiscent of man's inability in changing the flow of things and the Universe's indifference to Man in its proceedings.

Once on the island, Prendick, while he kept his belief in the sanity of the race, was praising mankind and instinctively avoiding the Beast Folk:

> My one idea was to get away from these horrible caricatures of my Maker's image, back to the sweet and wholesome intercourse of men. My fellow-creatures, from whom I was thus separated, began to assume idyllic virtue and beauty in my memory...I avoided intercourse with them in every possible way (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.153).

The casting out of the different or the unlike is apparent even in the outcast Prendick's behaviour and yet so near the surface that Prendick with all his repulsion for "that grotesque ugliness [which] was an invariable character of [the] islanders" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.105) finds, or rather, tries to find, solace in the "thought that the man [he] had just seen had been clothed in bluish cloth, had not been naked as a savage would have been" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.106) after he sees a *creature*, "a man, going on all-fours like a beast" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.105) who bows its head to water and sucks up his drink. Ironically, a naked savage in western senses is, at first at least, more likely to invoke repulsion in Prendick than a clothed man that is going on

all-fours or that has "legs … scarcely half the length of his body" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.105).

Wells seems to deride this schematic assessment of civilisation in western terms. The superficial western understanding of civilisation and the western mind going to some foreign land with a self-assigned civilising mission with its clothing the local people thinking itself and its clothed way of life superior is thus derided further ironically when in the following morning of his seeing a man going on all-fours to get food Prendick himself is deposited upon all-fours (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.113). There is mockery buried in this humorous scene: To get food you all have to go on all-fours, after all.

In a similar vein of accepted norms, at first, Prendick feels akin to, feels an affinity to the ape man (then not as yet known to him): "I did not feel the same repugnance towards this creature which I had experienced in my encounters with the other Beast Men" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.117). But then the ape-man, later on, becomes a bore. At first he was a companion then he becomes a burden, partly a rival and mostly a mirror reflecting Man's unimportant schemes with the nearest kinship and similarity. The intuition, the knowledge of this similarity at first makes Prendick feel better. He later on sees only a farcical repetition, an ugly recollection, a rude remembrance, a reflection of Man's acts on the ape-man's part. After the first happy impressions the ape-man proves himself a fool:

> The creature was little better than an idiot. I tried to make out what he meant by that, and it seems I bored him. After another question or two he suddenly left my side and went leaping at some fruit that hung from a tree (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.118).

He feels scorn for the ape-man for his readiness to obey follies, a reminder of the clergy with its whims of the most insane kind: "At last that song ended. I saw the Ape-man's face shining with perspiration" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.121). Prendick's interrogative asking the ape-man his time in the island recalls to mind of Man's time on the face of the earth and his progressive years, ages with his description fitting the description of the ages of Man:

> My ape-like companion trotted along by my side, with his hands hanging down and his jaw thrust forward. I wondered what memory he might have in him. "How long have you been on this island?" said I.
> "How long?" he asked; and after having the question repeated, he held up three fingers (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.118).

In the end the Ape Man proves himself to be the silliest of all, which is a mockery aimed at the complacent Man:

> The Monkey-man bored me, however; he assumed, on the strength of his five digits, that he was my equal, and was for ever jabbering at me,—jabbering the most arrant nonsense. One thing about him entertained me a little: he had a fantastic trick of coining new words. He had an idea, I believe, that to gabble about names that meant nothing was the proper use of speech. He called it "Big Thinks" to distinguish it from "Little Thinks," the sane every-day interests of life. If ever I made a remark he did not understand, he would praise it very much, ask me to say it again, learn it by heart, and go off repeating it, with a word wrong here or there, to all the milder of the Beast People. He thought nothing of what was plain and comprehensible. I invented some very curious "Big Thinks" for his especial use. I think now that he was the silliest creature I ever met; he had developed in the most wonderful way the distinctive silliness of man without losing one jot of the natural folly of a monkey (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.174).

This is related both to the unhappy remembrance of one's past and witnessing for what insignificant gains man must have so laboriously evolved. This was the gain, after all, this stupid Law with a jabberer of 'big-thinks'. Then Prendick sees a parody of mankind in the misshapen bodies of the Beast Folk and the likeness alienates him from mankind:

> A strange persuasion came upon me, that, save for the grossness of the line, the grotesqueness of the forms, I had here before me the whole balance of human life in miniature, the whole interplay of instinct, reason, and fate in its simplest form. The Leopard-man had happened to go under: that was all the difference. (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.151-2).

Seeing all these Prendick becomes indifferent to Man's ways:

> In those days my fear of the Beast People went the way of my personal fear for Moreau. I fell indeed into a morbid state, deep and enduring, and alien to fear, which has left permanent scars upon my mind. I must confess that I lost faith in the sanity of the world when I saw it suffering the painful disorder of this island. A blind Fate, a vast pitiless Mechanism, seemed to cut and shape the fabric of existence and I, Moreau (by his passion for research), Montgomery (by his passion for drink), the Beast People with their instincts

> and mental restrictions, were torn and crushed, ruthlessly, inevitably, amid the infinite complexity of its incessant wheels. But this condition did not come all at once: I think indeed that I anticipate a little in speaking of it now (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.152).

2.3. Reasons for Ostracism in *The Invisible Man*

The Invisible Man practically opens with Griffin's call for sympathy: "In the name of human charity" (*The Invisible Man* p.185). The novel is a long and sad series of its denial to Griffin. He does not get it when he arrives at Iping, he had not got it before, and he does not get it later on. He is the outcast.

Only Mrs.Hall, the inn-keeper and for practical reasons, and so long as she gets money from him, shows signs of respect for him. From the beginning she tries to pry into his affairs and it is she that grows a dislike for him for all her own intrusive manner:

> "Will you get me some matches?" said the visitor, quite abruptly. "My pipe is out."
> Mrs. Hall was pulled up suddenly. It was certainly rude of him, after telling him all she had done. She gasped at him for a moment, and remembered the two sovereigns. She went for the matches.
> "Thanks," he said concisely, as she put them down, and turned his shoulder upon her and stared out of the window again. It was altogether too discouraging. Evidently he was sensitive on the topic of operations and bandages. She did not "make so bold as to say," however, after all. But his snubbing way had irritated her, and Millie had a hot time of it that afternoon (*The Invisible Man* p.189).

And this respectable lady gives vent to her anger on her maid which was in the first place provoked by her own incongruous curiosity. She invents reasons for entering his room:

> Mrs. Hall agreed, and then noticed he had his bag with him. "Now you're here, Mr. Teddy," said she, "I'd be glad if you'd give th' old clock in the parlour a bit of a look. 'Tis going, and it strikes well and hearty; but the hour-hand won't do nuthin' but point at six."
> And leading the way, she went across to the parlour door and rapped and entered (*The Invisible Man* p.190).

On seeing these continual intrusions Griffin feels bound to make an explanation to prevent further annoyance:

> "I should explain," he added, "what I was really too cold and fatigued to do before, that I am an experimental investigator."
> "Indeed, sir," said Mrs. Hall, much impressed.
> "And my baggage contains apparatus and appliances."
> "Very useful things indeed they are, sir," said Mrs. Hall.
> "And I'm very naturally anxious to get on with my inquiries."
> "Of course, sir."
> "My reason for coming to Iping," he proceeded, with a certain deliberation of manner, "was ... a desire for solitude. I do not wish to be disturbed in my work. In addition to my work, an accident—"
> "I thought as much," said Mrs. Hall to herself.
> "—necessitates a certain retirement. My eyes—are sometimes so weak and painful that I have to shut myself up in the dark for hours together. Lock myself up. Sometimes—now and then. Not at present, certainly. At such times the slightest disturbance, the entry of a stranger into the room, is a source of excruciating annoyance to me—it is well these things should be understood." (*The Invisible Man* pp.191-2).

But this explanation before Mr.Teddy Henfrey only leads to an arousel of curiosity which is precipitated by Griffin who notices his intentions:

> Being constitutionally of a curious nature, he had removed the works—a quite unnecessary proceeding—with the idea of delaying his departure and perhaps falling into conversation with the stranger.
> …
> He looked up as if to take aim with that introductory shot. "The weather—" he began.
> "Why don't you finish and go?" said the rigid figure, evidently in a state of painfully suppressed rage. "All you've got to do is to fix the hour-hand on its axle. You're simply humbugging—" (*The Invisible Man* p.192)

This rebuke, which is in fact only deserved in Mr.Henfrey's case, causes Mr.Henfrey to begin smearing him the moment he leaves the inn and he calls him ugly which is one of the first utterances of annoyance at Griffin which he certainly did not deserve and paves the way for a hostile reception of Griffin at Iping:

> And again "Can't a man look at you?—Ugly!"
> And yet again, "Seemingly not. If the police was wanting you couldn't be more wropped and bandaged."
> …
> And he proceeded to give Hall a vivid description of his grotesque guest. "Looks a bit like a disguise, don't it? I'd like to see a man's face if I had him stopping in *my* place," said Henfrey (*The Invisible Man* p.193).

When combined with Griffin's introvert behaviour and apparent dislike of company, his being a man of science turns into a reason for distrust and he is soon branded as a nuisance in the neighbourhood and undeserved grudge begins to be felt against him. Beginning from his arrival at Iping his affairs attract attention and he is disturbed. Even before his name was associated with some acts of burglary nearby, he was somehow disliked. It may be that he necessarily attracted attention with his secret ways but he was positively disliked for what he had not done after all:

> It was inevitable that a person of so remarkable an appearance and bearing should form a frequent topic in such a village as Iping. Opinion was greatly divided about his occupation. Mrs. Hall was sensitive on the point. When questioned, she explained very carefully that he was an "experimental investigator…
>
> Out of her hearing there was a view largely entertained that he was a criminal trying to escape from justice by wrapping himself up so as to conceal himself altogether from the eye of the police. This idea sprang from the brain of Mr. Teddy Henfrey.
>
> …this theory took the form that the stranger was an Anarchist in disguise, preparing explosives…
>
> Another school of opinion followed Mr. Fearenside, and either accepted the piebald view or some modification of it...Yet another view explained the entire matter by regarding the stranger as a harmless lunatic. That had the advantage of accounting for everything straight away.
>
> Between these main groups there were waverers and compromisers…
>
> …
>
> But whatever they thought of him, people in Iping, on the whole, agreed in disliking him (*The Invisible Man* pp.200-1).

The non-existence of human charity and the lack of empathy in society for the real man of science, Griffin is thus quite noticeable. They revert to making fun of him behind his back before long:

> His irritability, though it might have been comprehensible to an urban brain-worker, was an amazing thing to these quiet Sussex villagers…They drew aside as he passed down the village, and when he had gone by, young humourists would up with coat-collars and down with hat-brims, and go pacing nervously after him in imitation of his occult bearing. There was a song popular at that time called "The Bogey Man"…whenever one or two of the villagers were gathered together and the stranger appeared, a bar or so of this tune, more or less sharp or flat, was whistled in the midst of them. Also belated little children would call "Bogey Man!" after him, and make off tremulously elated (*The Invisible Man* pp.200-1).

After this self-provocative preparation for the hostility the Iping mob, as it is now proper to name it, is mentally ready for violent action under the command of some leader. Dr.Kemp, who was a young ambitious man of science silently working for a fellowship of the Royal Society, becomes this leader, turning overnight into a man hunter. And all the while he is faced with none of Griffin's privations, sufferings and trials, nothing whatsoever to provoke such a quick turn:

> In the early evening time Dr. Kemp was sitting in his study in the belvedere on the hill overlooking Burdock. It was a pleasant little room, with three windows—north, west, and south—and bookshelves covered with books and scientific publications, and a broad writing-table, and, under the north window, a microscope, glass slips, minute instruments, some cultures, and scattered bottles of reagents. Dr. Kemp's solar lamp was lit, albeit the sky was still bright with the sunset light, and his blinds were up because there was no offence of peering outsiders to require them pulled down. Dr. Kemp was a tall and slender young man, with flaxen hair and a moustache almost white, and the work he was upon would earn him, he hoped, the fellowship of the Royal Society, so highly did he think of it (*The Invisible Man* pp.239).

Griffin, the antagonist of *The Invisible Man* is not alienated as Bergonzi (1961) claims "from the reader" (p.118). On the contrary, as Batchelor (1984) notes, the reader's sympathy is always with Griffin:

> The fall of the invisible man from beleaguered mystery to naked fugitive follows a sad, hurtling course. And when, through a series of twists, the invisible man is shot…and finds refuge in another, neighboring village, one's sympathy is still oddly with him (p.xxi).

A parallel can be drawn between the character Griffin and Hardy's Tess, whom in Irving Howe's (1994) words (quoted by Jack Heppner in his review of *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*) "Hardy watches over Tess like a stricken victim. He is as tender to Tess as Tess is to the world. Tender and helpless…". "Tender to the world" does not seem to describe Griffin, but he is a victim nonetheless. He only returned the favour. His helplessness is not funny nor is he a fool that simply got his due. His helplessness should be of a heart-rending kind and pitiful. If he fails to invoke such feelings even today and even among critics it is unfortunate for the recipients who fail again and again to treat him as a poor

stricken victim. Though it is not generally noticed, Wells himself dotes over Griffin like a stricken victim. In the final passages the pathetic tone becomes more and more noticeable: “There was, I am afraid, some savage kicking. Then suddenly a wild scream of ‘Mercy! Mercy!’” (*The Invisible Man* p.304) but he gets none. And the closing passage of the killing of Griffin becomes pathetic: “When at last the crowd made way for Kemp to stand erect, there lay, naked and pitiful on the ground, the bruised and broken body of a young man about thirty” (*The Invisible Man* p.305). Wells indeed dotes upon Griffin like a stricken victim and that not without reason, too. In fact, Wells defends himself in Griffin’s person. Batchelor’s (1984) following words explain the situation:

> It is impossible to conclude this tragedy of science without a sense that Wells, the author was crying out in despair at being so different himself—a man with an imagination and talent that kept him from being comfortable in the Britain that had created him (p.xxii).

Bergonzi (1961) ascribes it to “young Wells’s own identification with a highly romanticized kind of scientist-magician” (p.120). Over the dead body of Griffin Wells cries for himself, his alienated self as an artist.

The reader countenances (if he/she ever does) the killing of Griffin only with the cunning expediency, with the self-preserving awareness and with the proviso that Griffin’s death is to the benefit of the society which he/she, after all, is also part of. In fact, Bargonzi (1961) also owns it: “Griffin, at the point of his death, has become a scapegoat figure hunted out of society” (p.120).

This destruction of the scapegoat, the unlike for, assumedly, common good constitutes maybe the foremost theme of the novel. In the fervent ostracising of Griffin by the society and finally in getting rid of him by murder, in Batchelor’s (1984) words, “it is clear that it is unacceptable in Iping to be that different” (p.xxi) and Wells criticises this intolerance to the unlike which is so violently expressed by the society. The members of the society which should have no business with Griffin turn to hunt him. Almost everyone is ready to fight him from the beginning. People turn out from houses to kill the Invisible Man at the end of the book. People who do not know him wants to kill him:

> Kemp got up. "*You* didn't do any shooting?" he asked.
> "Not me," said his visitor. "Some fool I'd never seen fired at random. A lot of them got scared. They all got scared at me. Curse them!—I say—I want more to eat than this, Kemp." (*The Invisible Man* p.249).

Even Kemp, turns a hunter overnight. For what makes Griffin so universally disliked Hammond's (1979) explanation seems to be a plausible answer:

> Indeed, the final sequence in which the Invisible Man is kicked and beaten to death by a mob intent on retribution recalls the scene[9] in 'The Country of the Blind' when Nunez is surrounded by blind men intent on capture. In each case it is the *otherness*, the departure from the accepted norms of behaviour, which leads to persecution: invisibility in the one instance, sightedness in the other (p.90).

Finally, Griffin, with frustration prepares to retaliate:

> "By Heaven, Kemp, you don't know what rage *is*! ... To have worked for years, to have planned and plotted, and then to get some fumbling purblind idiot messing across your course! ... Every conceivable sort of silly creature that has ever been created has been sent to cross me.
> "If I have much more of it, I shall go wild—I shall start mowing 'em (*The Invisible Man* p.283).

The otherness, the intolerable otherness in *The Invisible Man* is perceived by some critics including Wells's son, Frank Wells. Foot (1996) claims that "*The Invisible Man* soon became as well known as *The Time Machine*. Apart from all its other strange attributes, his new machine had a heart" (p.37) then he quotes Frank Wells's words which he thinks of as "[a]nother of Frank's most engaging introductions, written in 1953" (p.37) and which we shall repeat here:

> To HG it was the effect that the scientific progress would have on the world, and the way in which people would react to the coming wonders that was of greatest importance. In *The Invisible Man* he goes even deeper by studying the effect on the individual. He restates the sad and relentless cruelty of the mob to

[9] The scene in which Simon was killed in Wiliam Golding's *Lord of the Flies* seems to be an exact re-enactment of the killing of Griffin. Interestingly, a similar scene takes place in Lev Tolstoy's *War and Peace*. In each three cases the society is led to violent action by the provocation of a person in a leading position, by Dr.Kemp, Jack and Rostopçin in *War and Peace* who orders the mob to kill a youth, Vereşagin, respectively.

> the unusual, to the hunchback, the cross-eyed, the monster or the pathetic simpleton. He lays before us the despair and loneliness of the mob's victim, the schism between the desperate frightened individual out of joint, and the close unthinking mutually protective herd (quoted in Foot p.37).

Interestingly, that mob is provoked by the scientist, the elité Kemp who had in the first place had no grudge to bear against Griffin except an involuntary and non-violent intrusion at his home one night. For what retribution he was so bent upon hunting down Griffin is dubious and academic jealousy if not personal envy comes plausible to the ear. Griffin brushes aside Kemp's weak work effortlessly and rightly enough:

> He stared at it in infinite perplexity. "This is—this must be—hypnotism. You have suggested you are invisible."
> "Nonsense," said the Voice.
> "It's frantic."
> "Listen to me."
> "I demonstrated conclusively this morning," began Kemp, "that invisibility—"
> "Never mind what you've demonstrated!—I'm starving," said the Voice, "and the night is chilly to a man without clothes" (*The Invisible Man* p.248).

Griffin had inflicted no harm on that man with the gun at the public house, or on the navvy that possibly gave a deadly blow to him in the tumult. They were not defending the society but enjoying the comfort of lawful killing. Iping people had no reason to bear malice against the stranger in the first place. The reason for this intense dislike and chasing of Griffin may be the desire for the preservation of status quo in the society. Griffin with his presence is taken as a threat to the society. The society responds by annihilating this unlike character. The self-righteous mob theme echoed in Wells's work, was handled in Huxley's (1894) *Evolution and Ethics*:

> Experience certainly does not justify us in limiting the ruthlessness of individual "saviours of society"; and, on the well-known grounds of the aphorism which denies both body and soul to corporations, it seems probable (indeed the belief is not without support in history) that a collective despotism, a mob got to believe in its own divine right by demagogic missionaries, would be capable of more thorough work in this direction than any single tyrant, puffed up with the same illusion (Evolution and Ethics pp.22-3).

2.3.1. Griffin Hunted by a Fellow Scientist

While talking about the distrusted scientist in *The Time Machine* we had quoted the narrator's comparison of the Time Traveller with Filby. Here again, there is a Filby, this time in the shape of a rank and file scientist Doctor Kemp who had great aspirations for "the work he was upon would earn him, he hoped, the fellowship of the Royal Society, so highly did he think of it" (*The Invisible Man* p.239). It is Doctor Kemps who will receive fellowships of the Royal Society, who will be respected and listened to by eager policemen and people.

Moreau was cast out of the society before the very eyes of men of science with jealous envy as the probable reason for their desertion. Griffin is an outcast for the same reason. Dr.Kemp, while possibly producing cheap claptrap which was to secure him a place in the Royal Society, is suddenly and somewhat rudely faced with a magnificent discovery and an eminent scientist beside whom he is only a grammar school student. This rude awakening or the rude reminder of a fact which must be felt by Kemp is sure to provoke him and it does. The traitor Kemp is outwardly driven by a motive which is ostensibly noble, the good of the society and mankind but apart from the fact that the said society offers a record far from innocent towards unlucky Griffin, Kemp gives himself away in his zest for the hunting of the Invisible Man with a chase including powdered-glass and dogs which repulse even the long job-hardened chief-of-police, Adye for its overt cruelty. Adye feels bound to say that it is very unsportsmanlike which the bloodthirsty Kemp reacts to with uncommon retorts with doubled persistence. Only at the end when the broken Invisible Man cries for mercy does he relent somewhat and that, maybe too, with showy grandeur. His later eagerness to secure Griffin's books reveals his greed for this uncommon knowledge which he shamelessly aspires to when he had done nothing to develop it.

On the other hand, Dr. Kemp whose sole scientific act throughout the novel is preparing powdered glass becomes a temporary leader to the society. Griffin is denied a fair chance for his discovery and ordinary men like Kemp

count as scientists and go after fellowships of the Royal Society. He, in his turn, envies and smears Griffin.

Griffin, on the other hand, is tactless, he gives himself away at the beginning, he does not plan his future, he does not literally try to exploit his findings, he has lofty ideals, but he is not a man of the world:

> The more I thought it over, Kemp, the more I realised what a helpless absurdity an Invisible Man was—in a cold and dirty climate and a crowded civilised city. Before I made this mad experiment I had dreamt of a thousand advantages. That afternoon it seemed all disappointment. I went over the heads of the things a man reckons desirable. No doubt invisibility made it possible to get them, but it made it impossible to enjoy them when they are got. Ambition—what is the good of pride of place when you cannot appear there? What is the good of the love of woman when her name must needs be Delilah? I have no taste for politics, for the blackguardisms of fame, for philanthropy, for sport. What was I to do? And for this I had become a wrapped-up mystery, a swathed and bandaged caricature of a man!" (p.282).

He gives himself away naively during his stay with Kemp. Apart from giving him the particulars for his weaknesses he trusts him with his childish imprudence:

> Oh, God! How I want sleep!"
> "Why not?"
> The Invisible Man appeared to be regarding Kemp. "Because I've a particular objection to being caught by my fellow-men," he said slowly.
> Kemp started.
> "Fool that I am!" said the Invisible Man, striking the table smartly. "I've put the idea into your head." (*The Invisible Man* p.250).

2.3.2. Griffin Disliked by Critics

There is a long list of critics paying tribute to the mad scientist parable while commenting upon *The Invisible Man*. The dangers of unethical science and the mad scientist are safeguards in the approach to Griffin's misfortunes. It is such a well beaten track and the topic got so much into the rut that it is almost impossible to find a single piece of criticism missing the opportunity to pour scorn on the unfortunate Griffin.

Batchelor's approach is one of the few exceptions and points out the plight of the unlike in relation to young Wells's own despair:

> Griffin, the albino chemist in *The Invisible Man*, is less a rendering of a mad scientist than he is a clever illustration of what the fiction writer feels each day before his growing manuscript: that he or she is alone in a room; that no one sees or cares about him or her… (Batchelor, p.xvi).

As stated above much of the criticism runs more or less in the same vein. A mad scientist intent upon personal benefit wages war on society. There are even comments that show him to have killed his father which is not the truth for Griffin sadly relates the event to Kemp by "the money wasn't his and the old man killed himself". And Kemp does not even listen to him.

Ironically, this ready, orthodox criticism is much like a repetition of the society's condemnation of Griffin. Even this may be enough to show the real intent of young H.G.Wells or his mood in writing the piece to be otherwise. Of course, Wells's own later condemnation of those early works acts as an initiator of this ready formula but in the world of literary criticism where the author's downright and prompt refusal is not seen as enough for not attributing meanings into his/her words why should one singular author's implied thoughts of forty years later and in a much different context should be taken as the sole determiner of the following criticism?

We shall first exemplify the common forms of this commentary. In Hammond's (1979) view, "*The Invisible Man* is a parable illustrating the dangers inherent in the misuse of science" (p.80).

This mad scientist with malign purposes intent upon the subordination if not destruction of his own race tale like so many other tales of the prejudiced western mind is so frequently told that it has now become quite difficult to view the novel from a different perspective.

That quite short 'reign' of terror at the end of the book, that short period when Griffin seemed to go berserk (and that not without reason, too) is so exaggerated and so much stressed that those parts are now taken to be the novel's whole content and they mislead the readers into acquiescence; hence arises the long-drawn reign of the misinterpretation of Griffin's sad story. Batchelor's (1984) words support our view:

> The revelations in the last half of the book are shocking and tragic. One is not entirely satisfied that the invisible man, Griffin, a university chemist, has damaged his mind by dosing himself with strychnine. There remains the suggestion that his true fault is that he has been consumed, and poisoned, by his own ambition, and that the world is not prepared to reward a man, no matter how successful, who does not fit in or look like the rest of us (pp.xxi-xxii).

Instead, the world chooses to reward men of ordinary output, men like Kemp. This, in fact, explains Dr.Kemp's uncommon vigour in hunting Griffin down. There is such a hostility, such one dimensional approach to Griffin as criticism that the approach itself becomes ostracism and deserves studying:

The entry for *The Invisible Man* in the "H.G.Wells Dictionary" Hammond (1979) includes in *An H.G.Wells Companion* is quite typical in its assessment of the book. It reads as follows: "Scientific romance, published in 1897. Griffin, a scientist, discovers the secret of invisibility and embarks on a reign of terror, culminating in his own death" (p.44).

Such an accentuation of such a side issue in a work purporting to be a *companion* to H.G.Wells and that the critic should choose to use such a superficial assessment is disappointing. When even sympathetic critics like J.R.Hammond do not go further than repeating a common chant it is not difficult to understand why *The Invisible Man* is treated so. The Law of *The Island of Dr. Moreau* peeps in here: Not to change the accepted norms, not to rock the boat, that is the law, are we not men?

According to Hammond (1979), "*The Invisible Man*…[is a] serious parable about human behaviour. What is demonstrated in this short allegory is the truism that without social morality men are less than human: that power without moral control is dangerous and irresponsible" (p.90).

If by being human Hammond means being the *homo sapiens* he is quite right. Without a social morality men may not be counted men. The ailing point in this assumption is that social morality is ethically correct behaviour. As we shall study in the following pages Griffin wages war on humanity, if that should be the name, only when he is cornered and after he was cast out of the society basically because of his differing behaviour from the normal imposed by the

society. Hammond's (1979) own words testify to it immediately after his above-cited words:

> The sympathy of the reader is in fact with Griffin for much of the action of the novel: it is only when he runs amok and embarks upon a reign of terror that he forfeits our understanding and becomes an outcast, an enemy to be hunted down and cast out of the fold (p.90).

CHAPTER 3

DESPAIR AND COMING TO TERMS WITH LIFE (EVOLUTION) OR FAILING TO DO SO

> I desired love and fellowship, and I was still spurned. Was there no injustice in this? Am I to be thought the only criminal, when all humankind sinned against me? Why do you not hate Felix, who drove his friend from his door contumely? Why do you not execrate the rustic who sought to destroy the saviour of his child? Nay, these are virtuous and immaculate beings! I, the miserable and the abandoned, am an abortion, to be spurned at, and kicked, and trampled on. Even now my blood boils at the recollection of this injustice (*Frankenstein* p.213).

These words of Frankenstein's creature before the dead body of his creator are useful in understanding the position of the Wellsian outcast in the early scientific romances. These words stand for what the said outcast goes through in his always lonely and mostly heart-rending life.

In all three novels ignorant people of differing social strata and periods harass the unfortunate outcasts for some reason or other. Even Dr.Kemp, the man of science who is supposedly more logical than the rest, like the frantic rustic in Frankenstein turns to destroy what he did not comprehend in the first place and never came closer than jealous envy:

> "I'm an Invisible Man. It's no foolishness, and no magic. I really am an Invisible Man. And I want your help. I don't want to hurt you, but if you behave like a frantic rustic, I must. Don't you remember me, Kemp? Griffin, of University College?"
> "Let me get up," said Kemp. "I'll stop where I am. And let me sit quiet for a minute" (*The Invisible Man* p.247).

The Time Traveller in *The Time Machine* is not literally an outcast in Victorian society; he is rather aloof in his acts being a scientist of extraordinary fields of interest. He becomes an outcast in that alien society of 802701 later on and likewise casts himself out of the society of his time in that he chooses to return to 802701. Prendick in *The Island of Dr.Moreau* begins his journey as an ordinary student of science collecting butterflies in Moreau's words. He is an

outcast on the island from the beginning and ends up casting himself out in the so-called world of men on his return from that island. Griffin in *The Invisible Man* begins his story an outcast and dies branded as an enemy of mankind.

There is an increasing pessimism in the reactions of the protagonists, i.e., The Time Traveller, Prendick, Griffin and the other major characters alike; their alienation becomes more and more tangible. The Time Traveller can be said to turn to romantic acts of proving his case and is lost in the vast void of time, Prendick becomes a recluse withdrawing himself from the society of men, professing to have nothing to do with them, cleaning his hands off mankind, Griffin wages war on society, dies in protest and violently in the hands of the society. In Hammond's (1979) words "Naked, hungry and bitterly cold, Griffin becomes increasingly a hunted and isolated figure: a loner at war with society" (p.89).

This increasing pessimism is supported by and supports the view that man is mean or at least unequal to a task of evolving with an ethical ideal and these all reflect the pessimism, the low view of the author upon the nature of man and his future, shortly, his deterministic outlook. This is partly the author's own alienation from the society of his time (the artist's alienation) and his own pessimism. This is a reflection of Wells's own alienation, his intellectual's aloofness on his early work.

The casting out of the unlike when thought of as a survival method of the community becomes understandable in an evolutionary reading, yet, on the other hand, this—being a pure act of expedience—clashes with the ideal of reaching the ethical man and is unacceptable. Man, with its obvious expedience as in the hunting of Griffin, proves himself to be, or proves his community to be, himself as a political creature to be (creature of a polity), innately bad, or at least, incurably unethical, unequal to any task of creating an ethical race of man.

The outcast's reaction is increasing pessimism and alienation. He is driven to extremes and the society is largely to blame for this. The aloofness, the alienation of the antagonist increases with exasperatingly more and more hostile acts of ostracism and that leads to an increasing pessimism in those novels.

The reaction of the sufferer differs for each case but in each case the sufferer is driven to despair. Another main cause of this despair is the understanding of the futility of any act to escape from one's fate. This inescapability is studied through Morlocks' agony which is expressed symbolically in their desperate attempts to escape from the fire, The Time Traveller's fatal decision to return to the future in *The Time Machine*, through the painful reversion of the Beast Folk, the tragic deaths of Moreau and Montgomery and in the self-imposed exile of Prendick in *The Island of Dr.Moreau*, through Griffin's waging war on a hostile universe and choosing to die in protest. All these acts of despair stem from a basic consideration of Wells: Man's assumed and real place in the Universe and the incompatibility of those two.

This theme is discussed in *The Island of Dr. Moreau* in the fourteenth chapter of the book under the title "Doctor Moreau Explains". The dominance of chance in the Universe as we have seen to be accentuated in the novel—as in Montgomery's answer to Prendick on his saving his life—plays a major part in Wells's approach. Wells seemingly treats a topical question of late nineteenth century in that chapter. Bergonzi's (1961) comment that "the meaning of the novel is to be found…in one of the profoundest intellectual preoccupations of the second half of the nineteenth century: the implications of Darwinism" (p.100) supports this view. Bergonzi (1961) then notes "with Moreau's explanation the dominance of chance in his universe is emphasized"(p.105) and quotes from the book the following passage:

> But I asked him why he had taken the human form as a model. There seemed to me then, and there still seems to me now, a strange wickedness for that choice.
>
> He confessed that he had chosen that form by chance. "I might just as well have worked to form sheep into llamas and llamas into sheep (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.132).

Bergonzi thus draws our attention to a very strange fact: With the above paragraph Wells reminds us of the chanciness of Mankind's evolving into the 'ruler', so to speak, of the world, he reminds how Evolution just by chance

supported Man to rise. There is mockery for the self-assumed greatness of Man here. God simply picked him by chance, in fact, He did not even bother to *choose* him. He just came in the way. Man with his faculty of thinking, with his much boasted *mind* has become what he became just by chance. This *chance* is not the chance Huxley excludes as an explanation of evolution. This is the chance that arose *Man* to ascendancy—if ascendancy means a rather free exploitation—over the face of the world for a finite time. In West's (1976) words,

> [i]t is impossible to believe in progress if you believe in a universe in which mind figures as a local accident, and which by its nature cannot support any permanent moral order or indeed any permanent thing.
>
> That Wells was deeply committed to this view is evident from his first novel" (pp.11-2).

The corollary to this view is the understanding that no bright future is awaiting mankind. This is naturally a blow to human self-contentedness. A dominant species which is dominant just by chance is naturally expendable and can be exchanged for other dominant species. From the Creator oriented perspective the same holds: The Creator is so indifferent that He did not care, in fact, who it was that came to 'rule' *His* creation, He was simply interested in the creation process. Man, with all his assumptions that the Universe was created solely to his interest, which he so ambitiously and assiduously taught through his religions was but a chance choice and he was but a creature that would as well be exchanged for any forthcoming species. This was a theme we saw in *The Time Machine* and here is the continuation of it.

The same wickedness theme is followed in Wells's *In the Days of the Comet* in Leadford's asking for an answer from God or in the 'The Great Inquisitor' scene in Dostoyevski's *Brothers Karamazov* in Ivan's expostulatory remarks.

What comes so painful to Man with the introduction of Man's new place in the Universe with the findings of modern science is the pointlessness he faces with the vacuum created by his dethronement. If, he wonders, I am expendable

why was I created, hence the fury and rebellion follows. The end of the rebellion is sometimes coming to terms and sometimes failing to accept the reality.

As Bergonzi (1961) notes, "[f]or the brutish islanders, it appears, Moreau is God" (p.103). Prendick "is right in imputing a self-assumed God role to Moreau…He appears …as God: not the traditional God of Christian theology, but the sort of arbitrary and impersonal power that might be conceived of as lying behind the evolutionary process (pp.104-5). Hence is introduced an arbitrary, impersonal power, an indifferent God theme:

> "But," said I, "the thing is an abomination—"
> "To this day I have never troubled about the ethics of the matter," he continued. "The study of Nature makes a man at last as remorseless as Nature. I have gone on, not heeding anything but the question I was pursuing; and the material has—dripped into the huts yonder. It is nearly eleven years since we came here, I and Montgomery and six Kanakas. I remember the green stillness of the island and the empty ocean about us, as though it was yesterday. The place seemed waiting for me (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.134).

The directness of the comparison above thus is made clearer. Here is the Creator in action not heeding the outcome, or if he does, *he* believes in the *natural* selection simply letting the fittest survive. Personal pain is nothing. Like the Creator—or maybe *unlike* Him—he despairs of the outcome. He despairs because he also is, after all, the weak humane and human creation, a subject of the Almighty, failing to effect any significant change in the process of evolution.

> "So for twenty years altogether—counting nine years in England—I have been going on; and there is still something in everything I do that defeats me, makes me dissatisfied, challenges me to further effort. Sometimes I rise above my level, sometimes I fall below it; but always I fall short of the things I dream (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.136).

Yet the ambiguity prevalent in the work is seen here. Moreau, directly after telling Prendick that he chose the human form by chance adds that he thinks that

> there is something in the human form that appeals to the artistic turn of mind more powerfully than any animal shape can. But I've not confined myself to man-making. Once or twice—" He was silent, for a minute perhaps. "These years! How they have slipped by!" (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.132).

This may owe to—apart from the practical reason of seeing an experimental "limbless thing, with a horrible face, that writhed along the ground in a serpentine fashion…[which] was immensely strong, and in infuriating pain" and that began killing that made it undesirable for Moreau so he sticks to the human form—Moreau's inner belief that Man is superior to the beast and the beast will be elated by being made Man.

In *The Time Machine* the "some other species" possibility was introduced. In *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, by showing in the closing chapters of the book animal men akin to men and men only beasts in disguise, the protagonist refutes theories praising Man as the ultimate creature in the universe, carrying disbelief in Man and his bright future into a loss of faith where in *The Time Machine* The Time Traveller had tried to change or make palatable the outcome and develops the pessimism one step further.

Hence becomes the easy treatment of *The Island of Dr. Moreau* (and *The Invisible Man* for that matter) simply as "science without ethics is dangerous" an oversimplification, even a convoluted argument. An examination of Huxleyan ideas would be a better description in general. For instance, Huxley's garden parable is referred to in Prendick's walk in the forest. This seems to have a symbolic meaning:

> I stopped just in time to prevent myself emerging upon an open space. It was a kind of glade in the forest, made by a fall; seedlings were already starting up to struggle for the vacant space; and beyond, the dense growth of stems and twining vines and splashes of fungus and flowers closed in again (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.106).

As symbolised in the race of living things for life in the above scene in *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, the dead are quickly forgotten. New species like new seedlings will come in and fellow coexistent species will take no heed of one specific species's disappearance. They will be minding their own business trying to conform to the new conditions.

Then in these three novels one message comes to the foreground: One, at first, must come to terms with that reality. The progress of the protagonists points to

that fact. The Time Traveller cannot face it after all (he somehow tries to change it). Prendick does face and does come to terms ending up in avoiding the company of man living a recluse. Griffin is angry with the emptiness and partly refuses to come to terms with it as his rebellion and death signify. There is a taint of fieriness, some impatience in the Time Traveller. This common trait of the men of science in these three novels increases in degree: "I had the hardest task in the world to keep my hands off their pretty laughing faces. It was a foolish impulse, but the devil begotten of fear and blind anger was ill curbed and still eager to take advantage of my perplexity." (*The Time Machine* p.31).

3.1. Results of Ostracism in *The Time Machine*

3.1.1. The Scientist in Despair: Mankind walking to its Doom

On commenting upon *The Time Machine* Hammond (1979) describes it as

> certainly one of Wells's most pessimistic works, and almost rivals *The Island of Doctor Moreau* in its utter hopelessness of outlook. Written when its author was a young man in his twenties, one might have expected his first novel to be a work of youthful optimism. Wells, after all, had studied biology under the great T.H.Huxley and might have been supposed to take a more hopeful view of the human future. Instead, the work is one of almost unrelieved scepticism and holds out little prospect of happiness for mankind (p.81).

It is not easy to say that the increasing pessimism in those novels is directly related to Wells's own mood but it is understandable that the antagonists is mouthing his messages. The Time Traveller as the ostracised scientist is one of the messengers in that sense. The Time Traveller closes his story on his voyage to the year 802701 with the following words:

> "I know," he said, after a pause, "that all this will be absolutely incredible to you. To me the one incredible thing is that I am here to-night in this old familiar room looking into your friendly faces and telling you these strange adventures." He looked at the Medical Man. "No. I cannot expect you to believe it. Take it as a lie—or a prophecy. Say I dreamed it in the workshop. Consider I have been speculating upon the destinies of our race until I have hatched this fiction. Treat my assertion of its truth as a mere stroke of art to

> enhance its interest. And taking it as a story, what do you think of it?" (*The Time Machine* p.72).

These words reflect his mood in general. He does not expect to be believed. In fact, even if his travel was indeed a story he would be telling the truth about the future and his words would then be a warning. They still would be ignored. He, after all, is the distrusted scientist.

> The Editor stood up with a sigh. "What a pity it is you're not a writer of stories!" he said, putting his hand on the Time Traveller's shoulder.
> "You don't believe it?"
> "Well—"
> "I thought not."
> The Time Traveller turned to us. "Where are the matches?" he said. He lit one and spoke over his pipe, puffing. "To tell you the truth ... I hardly believe it myself. ..." (*The Time Machine* pp.72-3).

The prevailing mood in the closing lines of *The Time Machine* is one of despair:

> He, I know—for the question had been discussed among us long before the Time Machine was made—thought but cheerlessly of the Advancement of Mankind, and saw in the growing pile of civilisation only a foolish heaping that must inevitably fall back upon and destroy its makers in the end. If that is so, it remains for us to live as though it were not so. But to me the future is still black and blank—is a vast ignorance, lit at a few casual places by the memory of his story (*The Time Machine* p.76).

But still, *The Time Machine* holds out hope in the narrator's—not being a man of science probably—general attitude. Michael Foot (1996) draws our attention to the flower episode and the existence of "Weena, the one enduringly sympathetic character whom the Time Traveller encounters in the whole of his voyage, and the one whom he enlists as his last word to restore some faith for the future[10]" (p.32). He concludes by saying that

> to remove [Weena] altogether would be to destroy the balance which the hard-pressed author of *The Time Machine* had so carefully drawn. And, if the all-consuming cruelty which mankind could be incited to inflict was one

[10] Michael Foot attributes this last word to the Time Traveller when we know that it is the narrator who utters those words.

> governing moral which had to be deduced, it was no less worth noting how gentleness and compassion could still reappear (p.32).

Putting aside the existence of Weena and what she stands for, reading the book in logical terms, the real reason for the devolution, inevitability of what is to come, futility of human wishes are expressed in the rest of the book, setting the stage for *The Island of Dr.Moreau*. Why there is devolution, why it is inevitable, and why, furthermore, the species are expendable are studied. The Neanderthal has gone, why should the homo sapiens be spared? And to what all the living matter comes to, after all will be nought but a vast black void after, say, thirty or three hundred million odd years. Yet species have got nothing to do with it, that is, they have no guilt in that they are powerless to modify the tide of the events let alone change it altogether. The frustration, the despair sets the stage for a further work of despair: *The Island of Dr.Moreau*.

The Time Traveller's despair is furthered by what he witnesses at the Palace of Green Porcelain. Seeing natural history before him decaying "though the inevitable process of decay that had been staved off for a time" (*The Time Machine* p.54) and nature "with extreme sureness if with extreme slowness at work again upon all its treasures" (*The Time Machine* p.54) is a disheartening experience enough. Finding "decaying vestiges of books [that]...had long since dropped to pieces, and every semblance of print…[to have] left them" (*The Time Machine* p.56) comes as a finishing touch:

> Had I been a literary man I might, perhaps, have moralized upon the futility of all ambition. But as it was, the thing that struck me with keenest force was the enormous waste of labour to which this sombre wilderness of rotting paper testified. At the time I will confess that I thought chiefly of the Philosophical Transactions and my own seventeen papers upon physical optics. (*The Time Machine* pp.56-7).

Seeing the vanity of human wishes, of the futile piling up of knowledge, seeing for himself a literal realisation of the views he holds—as the narrator tells us at the end as what he had long since been holding—and that there is indeed "in the growing pile of civilisation only a foolish heaping that must inevitably fall back upon and destroy its makers in the end" (*The Time Machine* p.76)

comes as a blow to him. His despair increases on seeing the end of not only mankind but of the whole life on earth with an impending destruction of the world itself.

The Time Traveller is frustrated at mankind's foolishness, he partly blames the Eloi but his sympathies are still with them against the Morlocks. His approach is somewhat superficial. He hates the Morlocks, does not try to understand if they are the outcome of suppression applied by the Eloi-like former ruling classes. He is typically human in reacting against the ostensible evil. Bergonzi notes the same attachment: "The Traveller's potential attachment to the Eloi and their world is strengthened when he rescues the little female, Weena, from drowning and begins a prolonged flirtation with her" (p.50)

In Hammond's words (1979), "In the final analysis, then, the mood which dominates *The Time Machine* is one of stoicism: life, for all its pains and disappointments, for all its injustice and unhappiness, is to be endured" (p.82). Actually, this theme is valid especially for Prendick's frame of mind at the end of *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, too.

3.1.2. A Vicious Circle: Masters turned Slaves, Slaves turned Masters

The Time Machine is also concerned with another aspect of the social agenda: the oppressed working classes and their oppressors. This is given in the novel through a future community of masters and slaves in an identical community of the oppressor and the oppressed with solely an exchange of roles, i.e., the former masters surface people now become slaves whereas the former slaves the underground people become masters. The flow of time has changed only the roles, not the mentality.

The Morlocks are examples of a 'successful' revenge, subjugation inflicted in retaliation for former subjugation experienced, a turning of tables on former masters. The upper class seems to have deserved this end in this particular case. But the Morlocks are no different in their expedience; they have just exchanged places and the ethical ideal has again failed. The Time

Traveller's approach is ambivalent. His sympathies are overtly for the Eloi yet he feels remorse for the pitiable race of Morlocks, too. He does not sympathise with them but he understands them. In the final analysis he is ready to fight against the Morlocks but he pities them, too. As we quoted in the last chapter Huxley holds that

> For his successful progress, throughout the savage state, man has been largely indebted to those qualities which he shares with the ape and tiger; his exceptional physical organization; his cunning, his sociability, his curiosity, and his imitativeness; his ruthlessness and ferocious destructiveness when his anger is roused by opposition.
>
> But, in proportion as men have passed form anarchy to social organization, and in proportion as civilization has grown in worth, these deeply ingrained serviceable qualities have become defects. After the manner of successful persons, civilized man would gladly kick down the ladder by which he has climbed (*Evolution and Ethics* pp.51-2).

And that he gladly did. As the Time Traveller marks that he was to be taught otherwise, the kicking of that ladder has proven too expensive a mistake for the Eloi's forefathers.

> Seeing the ease and security in which these people were living, I felt that this close resemblance of the sexes was after all what one would expect; for the strength of a man and the softness of a woman, the institution of the family, and the differentiation of occupations are mere militant necessities of an age of physical force; where population is balanced and abundant, much childbearing becomes an evil rather than a blessing to the State; where violence comes but rarely and off-spring are secure, there is less necessity—indeed there is no necessity—for an efficient family, and the specialization of the sexes with reference to their children's needs disappears. We see some beginnings of this even in our own time, and in this future age it was complete. This, I must remind you, was my speculation at the time. Later, I was to appreciate how far it fell short of the reality (*The Time Machine* p.25).

Huxley's words when combined with Wells's above interpretation of the dampening of the militant traits in an atmosphere of security for the Eloi provide an answer to the question of evolutionary or devolutionary change. It was devolution, after all, since the dampening of those unwanted traits in the civilised man did not bring about a lasting happiness to him:

> …the balanced civilization that was at last attained must have long since passed its zenith, and was now far fallen into decay. The too-perfect security of

> the Upper-worlders had led them to a slow movement of degeneration, to a general dwindling in size, strength, and intelligence. That I could see clearly enough already. What had happened to the Under-grounders I did not yet suspect; but from what I had seen of the Morlocks—that, by the by, was the name by which these creatures were called— I could imagine that the modification of the human type was even far more profound than among the "Eloi," the beautiful race that I already knew (*The Time Machine* p.42).

The pessimistic line of thought which was already innate in the Time Traveller awakes after the first idyllic impressions and does not leave him thereafter as he sees the end of life in year thirty million odd in addition to the misery of 802701:

> The great triumph of Humanity I had dreamed of took a different shape in my mind. It had been no such triumph of moral education and general co-operation as I had imagined. Instead, I saw a real aristocracy, armed with a perfected science and working to a logical conclusion the industrial system of today. Its triumph had not been simply a triumph over Nature, but a triumph over Nature and the fellow-man. This, I must warn you, was my theory at the time…My explanation may be absolutely wrong. I still think it is the most plausible one (*The Time Machine* p.42).

Although the Time Traveller introduces with his words a certain doubt as to the truth of his theory, he maintains that this is the most likely one to the end. When the Eloi are thus thought of as a race suppressing the Morlocks as a race they can be compared to the homo sapiens which annihilated the Neanderthal to become the sole ruler of the world. In Huxley's (1894) words

> Man, the animal, in fact, has worked his way to the headship of the sentient world, and has become the superb animal which he is, in virtue of his success in the struggle for existence (*Evolution and Ethics* p.51).

To treat his fellow brother as an enemy to be rooted out, to take him so much for granted as a subservient race—as did the forefathers of the Eloi possibly—may have been seen as another victory in homo sapiens's casebook, but as it is, the Morlocks prove too hard an antagonist. The complacent feeling of security and abuse of fellow men do the upper classes no good. Furthermore, although a balance may have been reached it must have been a precarious one. The danger was not rooted out although mechanisms for parrying it were

shelved. After a period of seeming security it returns, for the Eloi, with redoubled deadliness:

> The Upper-world people might once have been the favoured aristocracy, and the Morlocks their mechanical servants: but that had long since passed away. The two species that had resulted from the evolution of man were sliding down towards, or had already arrived at, an altogether new relationship …[and] the old order was already in part reversed. The Nemesis of the delicate ones was creeping on apace. Ages ago, thousands of generations ago, man had thrust his brother man out of the ease and the sunshine. And now that brother was coming back—changed! Already the Eloi had begun to learn one old lesson anew. They were becoming reacquainted with Fear (*The Time Machine* p.48).

What is more, the Morlocks do not only stand for the suppressed working classes of England. They stand as a race, to quote the words of the antagonist of Wells's another scientific romance, "who stood for all the disinherited of the world" (*In the Days of the Comet* p.897) and turning tables on their former 'masters' is their righteous revenge. When seen in this light the Eloi's painful existence under the Morlock yoke is only due retribution:

> Then I tried to preserve myself from the horror that was coming upon me, by regarding it as a rigorous punishment of human selfishness. Man had been content to live in ease and delight upon the labours of his fellow-man, had taken Necessity as his watchword and excuse, and in the fullness of time Necessity had come home to him. I even tried a Carlyle-like scorn of this wretched aristocracy in decay. But this attitude of mind was impossible. However great their intellectual degradation, the Eloi had kept too much of the human form not to claim my sympathy, and to make me perforce a sharer in their degradation and their Fear (*The Time Machine* pp.52-3).

It must be noted that herein we talk in wealthy late nineteenth century Europe's terms in the present study which has nothing to do with the rest of the world which those oppressors subjugated. Wells's talking about *fin de race* in that sense may be related to European races again but we believe it will be saner to think of it in broader terms and that all three approaches, that the human race is coming to an end, or that the wealthy oppressing the working classes are overthrown, or that the wealthy races oppressing the subjugated races are overthrown may be traced in *The Time Machine*. When the following works *The Island of Dr. Moreau* and *The Invisible Man* are also taken into consideration it

will be wiser to free Wells from regional, racial concerns and take him to be talking about Man generically.

Wells, by showing the descendents of today's ruling classes (and races) to be mere sheep in the hands of a newly arisen ferocious race reminds the content English reader his mindless crime on his fellow men (both the working classes and the parts of the world then living under the westerners' oppression) and warns him against a possible exchange of roles. That the Time Traveller's sympathy should be with the Eloi and against the Morlocks can be interpreted as his siding with the ruling classes of today.

This exchange of roles is also representative of Wells's deterministic approach to Man's future. As we quoted elsewhere this is the downward road. Man could not keep his ascendancy over nature. That this should owe much to his betrayal of fellow men and his one time accomplice in the controlling of nature reveals a weakness in his character: expedience which leads him to pursue his own ends.

The Morlocks seem to have taken the upper hand in their relation with their former masters but theirs are nevertheless not lives to be envied. They live in an Under-world with daylight denied to them:

> So, in the end, above ground you must have the Haves, pursuing pleasure and comfort and beauty, and below ground the Have-nots, the Workers getting continually adapted to the conditions of their labour. Once they were there, they would no doubt have to pay rent, and not a little of it, for the ventilation of their caverns; and if they refused, they would starve or be suffocated for arrears. Such of them as were so constituted as to be miserable and rebellious would die; and, in the end, the balance being permanent, the survivors would become as well adapted to the conditions of underground life, and as happy in their way, as the Upper-world people were to theirs. As it seemed to me, the refined beauty and the etiolated pallor followed naturally enough (*The Time Machine* pp.41-2).

They may even be serving the Eloi inadvertently:

> The Eloi, like the Carlovingian kings, had decayed to a mere beautiful futility. They still possessed the earth on sufferance: since the Morlocks, subterranean for innumerable generations, had come at last to find the daylit surface intolerable. And the Morlocks made their garments, I inferred, and maintained them in their habitual needs, perhaps through the survival of an old habit of service. They did it as a standing horse paws with his foot, or as a man enjoys

> killing animals in sport: because ancient and departed necessities had impressed it on the organism.

In that sense they resemble the Beast Folk of *The Island of Dr.Moreau*. The sense of leading meaningless lives of torment, a theme to be repeated again and again in Wells's early work seems to make its debut in *The Time Machine* through the plight of mankind, and in the shape of ugly Morlocks deservedly pitiable in their agony although less conspicuous than the beautiful Eloi who are the assertively more sympathetic sufferers.

We shall again refer, for an effective summary of the Morlocks' plight, to Leadford's words, who in *In the Days of the Comet* laments his fate and confronts God in a rather histrionic address:

> "Why am I here only to suffer ignominies?" I asked. "Why have you made me with pride that cannot be satisfied, with desires that turn and rend me? Is it a jest, this world—a joke you play on your guests? I—even I—have a better humour than that!"
>
> "Why not learn from me a certain decency of mercy? Why not undo? Have I ever tormented—day by day, some wretched worm—making filth for it to trail through, filth that disgusts it, starving it, bruising it, mocking it? Why should you? Your jokes are clumsy. Try—try some milder fun up there; do you hear? Something that doesn't hurt so infernally."
>
> "You say this is your purpose—your purpose with me. You are making something with me—birth pangs of a soul. Ah! How can I believe you? You forget I have eyes for other things. Let my own case go, but what of that frog beneath the cart-wheel, God?—and the bird the cat had torn?" (*In the Days of the Comet* pp.897-8).

Those words explain the wanton suffering on earth as expressed in all of the three early romances we are studying, as words—treated as they are as juvenile blasphemies and with a certain contempt by an older and changed Leadford, who in his tower in a happily changed world could well nigh have talked of earthly bliss—quite striking, too. As it is, *The Time Machine*, *The Island of Dr.Moreau* and *The Invisible Man* herald no such tower.

Morlocks, who in the first place had evoked infinite disgust and a desire to kill in the Time Traveller, become for him, during the fire he himself caused, helpless creatures to be pitied:

> And now I was to see the most weird and horrible thing, I think, of all that I beheld in that future age. This whole space was as bright as day with the reflection of the fire. In the centre was a hillock or tumulus, surmounted by a scorched hawthorn. Beyond this was another arm of the burning forest, with yellow tongues already writhing from it, completely encircling the space with a fence of fire. Upon the hill-side were some thirty or forty Morlocks, dazzled by the light and heat, and blundering hither and thither against each other in their bewilderment. At first I did not realize their blindness, and struck furiously at them with my bar, in a frenzy of fear, as they approached me, killing one and crippling several more. But when I had watched the gestures of one of them groping under the hawthorn against the red sky, and heard their moans, I was assured of their absolute helplessness and misery in the glare, and I struck no more of them (*The Time Machine* pp.62-3).

The poor creatures frenziedly run to and fro, trying to escape a death that is in fact inescapable crying all the while for help that will never come:

> At last I sat down on the summit of the hillock, and watched this strange incredible company of blind things groping to and fro, and making uncanny noises to each other, as the glare of the fire beat on them. The coiling uprush of smoke streamed across the sky, and through the rare tatters of that red canopy, remote as though they belonged to another universe, shone the little stars. Two or three Morlocks came blundering into me, and I drove them off with blows of my fists, trembling as I did so (*The Time Machine* p.63).

The Time Traveller, on seeing this frightful fix the Morlocks fall into, moans for the sake of all living things which are thrown into the nightmare of life itself. In this horrible burning of the helpless creatures he beholds the suffering of humanity in the hands of a universe or God intent upon punishment be it in the shape of devolution or hell:

> For the most part of that night I was persuaded it was a nightmare. I bit myself and screamed in a passionate desire to awake. I beat the ground with my hands, and got up and sat down again, and wandered here and there, and again sat down. Then I would fall to rubbing my eyes and calling upon God to let me awake. Thrice I saw Morlocks put their heads down in a kind of agony and rush into the flames. But, at last, above the subsiding whitening and blackening tree stumps, and the diminishing numbers of these dim creatures, came the white light of the day (*The Time Machine* p.63).

3.2. Results of Ostracism in *The Island of Dr.Moreau*

Nature gets back its own, and reversion cannot be stopped. This theme is exemplified again and again in *The Island of Dr.Moreau* through cases of different characters in the book:

> A blind fate, a vast pitiless mechanism seemed to cut and shape the fabric of existence, and I, Moreau (by his passion for research), Montgomery (by his passion for drink), the Beast People, with their instincts and mental restrictions, were torn and crushed, ruthlessly, inevitably, amid the infinite complexity of its incessant wheels (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.152).

The Island of Dr. Moreau, both as a novel and an island, abound in outcast figures. The experience on the island is painful for all parties. For the Beast Folk, it is agony and reversion, for Moreau and Montgomery, it is tragic death. For Prendick, it is a tormenting eye opening. According to Hughes (1977),

> Wells's scientific romances have the form of quests (or would-be conquests) where the revelation of the limits of the human condition—expressed in terms of the garden—is brought about heuristically through the eye-opening of initially blinded narrators (p.67).

3.2.1. Prendick as a Recluse

The eye-opening Hughes (1977) talks of is most conspicuous in Prendick's case:

> On Moreau's island, Prendick, comfortable amateur of biology and former student of Huxley's, comes to feel the whole game of life may be a mere matter of the chance interplay of irrational constraints and compulsions (p.66).

The irrationality, blind-fate, chance were paving, all along the book, the way for the final commentary of Prendick on man's lot which Hughes partially quotes: "I must confess that I lost faith in the sanity of the world when I saw it suffering the painful disorder of this island" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.152).

The rude awakening, the contrast is made the more striking by Moreau's despising words:

> "Then I am a religious man, Prendick, as every sane man must be. It may be, I fancy, that I have seen more of the ways of this world's Maker than you,—for I have sought his laws, in *my* way, all my life, while you, I understand, have been collecting butterflies" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.133).

The book opens with a shipwreck passage with Prendick in the dingey of the *Lady Vain* with two other passengers. According to Bernard Bergonzi (1961) "[t]he incident has nothing to do with the narrative that is to follow, but it sets the emotional tone of the whole work, by demonstrating the savagery of nature, even—or especially—human nature, and by showing that survival can depend on pure chance" (p.101). The 'savagery of human nature' is a very appropriate term for the case and it constitutes a major theme of the present study but the incident, although physically outside the narrative that is to follow, has much to do with what is to come and in this incident, and although the chance nature of survival is also stressed, it is the despair theme rather than the chance that comes to the fore with the hindsight of the following chapters. It must be noted that Prendick returns to that very dingey when he is forced by the angry captain of the *Ipecuancha* off the Island of Dr.Moreau The ship, we learn, is sunk later which means that the dingey in the second incident, after all, saved Prendick's life once more. While unloading Moreau's goods at the island, in Bergonzi's (1961) words,

> the drunken captain becomes extremely hostile to Prendick, and refuses to take him any further…But Moreau, who is supervising the unloading of the menagerie, refuses to take him, so Prendick is once more cast adrift in the dinghy. The chapter in which this takes place is headed 'The Man who had Nowhere to go'. He is thrust out of the world of men…but has not yet been accepted into Moreau's private world (p.102).

Bergonzi thus seems to ascribe Prendick's ultimate alienation from fellow men to his being once to Moreau's private world. In our view, the casting out of Prendick serves some other purpose apart from those purposes which may

all be partially valid. Being thrust out of Man's world may not be the singular, nay, the main theme here. Despair is the main one.

The existence of a dingey of the *Lady Vain* and Prendick's return to it signifies Man's helpless position in the Universe and his vain pride. Prendick had once forgotten his place as a collected passenger and had been rude to the captain, now he is made to remember his place: "Abruptly the cruelty of this desertion became clear to me" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.93). As he himself admits "[h]unger and lack of blood-corpuscles take all manhood from a man" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.93). In the end, he is once more adrift, this time in the dingey of the *Ipecuancha* this time to drift back to humanity a changed man. Hammond (1979) summarises Prendick's final condition:

> In this story, Wells is gently nudging the shoulder of the reader and asking him to see that the ostensible world of civilisation is in truth Doctor Moreau's Island writ large. In the closing pages Prendick succeeds in escaping and returns to England, but he cannot bring himself to admit that there is any fundamental difference between the seeming men and women about him and the Beast Folk (p. 86).

Prendick becomes a recluse in the end. He sees the Beast Folk's dilemma and their common likeness in their desperate battle with sin and innate nature. Nothing can be made to change the general flow of things on the face of earth, and though there are different scales, different surroundings, the problems are the same. There is nothing new under the sun.

> Then I look about me at my fellow men. And I go in fear. I see faces keen and bright, others dull or dangerous, others unsteady, insincere; none that have the calm authority of a reasonable soul. I feel as though the animal was surging up through them; that presently the degradation of the Islanders will be played over again on a larger scale. I know this is an illusion, that these seeming men and women about me are indeed men and women, men and women for ever, perfectly reasonable creatures, full of human desires and tender solicitude, emancipated from instinct, and the slaves of no fantastic Law—beings altogether different from the Beast Folk. Yet I shrink from them, from their curious glances, their inquiries and assistance, and long to be away from them and alone (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.181).

A total salvation may not be possible and he is pessimist on that score but he is not totally hopeless, he believes in individual bettering, he lives in peace with positive science and literature as companions.

3.2.2. Moreau as a Disillusioned Creator

Dr.Moreau, was in forced exile and if his ways became more and more remorseless[11] this is partly because he was not allowed to conduct his experiments within the society. His experiments cannot simply be explained as sadistic acts of a mad scientist. He does not take pleasure in their pain, he is just remorseless.

Moreau may be said to be acting monstrously because he gives pain with sheer indifference but he also is a victim because he is prey to the laws of nature. The attempt on Moreau's part is trying to control Nature and change the tide of Evolution, marking a change. He had, in fact, long since despaired yet had gone on.

Huxley (1894) concludes the prolegomena of his *Evolution and Ethics* with a sad but effective summary of man's lot on the face of earth:

> [Man,] so long as he remains liable to error, intellectual or moral; so long as he is compelled to be perpetually on guard against the cosmic forces, whose ends are not his ends, without and within himself; so long as he is haunted by inexpugnable memories and hopeless aspirations; so long as the recognition of his intellectual limitations forces him to acknowledge his incapacity to penetrate the mystery of existence; the prospect of attaining untroubled happiness, or of a state which can, even remotely, deserve the title of perfection, appears to me to be as misleading an illusion as ever was dangled before the eyes of poor humanity.
>
> That which lies before the human race is a constant struggle to maintain and improve, in opposition to the State of Nature, the State of Art of an organized polity; in which, and by which, man may develop a worthy civilization, capable of maintaining and constantly improving itself, until the evolution of our globe shall have entered so far upon its downward course that the cosmic process resumes its sway; and once more, the State of Nature prevails over the surface of our planet (*Evolution and Ethics* pp.44-5).

[11] "The study of Nature makes a man at last as remorseless as Nature" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.134).

Doctor Moreau's explanation seems to rely partly on Huxley's words. In this sense, Moreau resembles, not conflicts with Huxley after all. He begins his explanation with a forthwith dismissal of the adopted profession of shock Prendick exhibits:

> "You admit that the vivisected human being, as you called it, is, after all, only the puma?" said Moreau. He had made me visit that horror in the inner room, to assure myself of its inhumanity.
> "It is the puma," I said, "still alive, but so cut and mutilated as I pray I may never see living flesh again. Of all vile—"
> "Never mind that," said Moreau; "at least, spare me those youthful horrors. Montgomery used to be just the same" (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.130).

The adopted "shocked appearance" of Prendick, it must be called, for it is really adopted as he is not far, and had never been either, from either the countenancing or the practice of cutting or mutilating. As referred to elsewhere in the present work Prendick admits that he was prepared to cut to pieces, maybe even vivisect a fellow man for want of food in the dingey of the *Lady Vain* and that he could have stood pain in the next room had it been only dumb. Moreau points to the very same fact:

> For it is just this question of pain that parts us. So long as visible or audible pain turns you sick; so long as your own pains drive you; so long as pain underlies your propositions about sin,—so long, I tell you, you are an animal, thinking a little less obscurely what an animal feels (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.132).

He does not seem to have an especial grudge directed towards any one institution or person, yet he bears a grudge for the lack of sympathy that kept him off his track and that had detained him, not also that but that had made an outcast of him eleven years ago:

> He was silent, for a minute perhaps. "These years! How they have slipped by! And here I have wasted day saving your life, and am now wasting an hour explaining myself!" (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.132)

He unveils the sinful nature of man yet even when doing this he does not seem to hate men, or make himself seem immaculate, he simply explains.

> "But," said [Prendick], "I still do not understand. Where is your justification for inflicting all this pain?[12] The only thing that could excuse vivisection to me would be some application—"
> "Precisely," said [Moreau]. "But, you see, I am differently constituted. We are on different platforms. You are a materialist."
> "I am *not* a materialist," I began hotly.
> "In my view—in my view (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.132).

He then goes on to explain they only and superficially differ on the question of pain. Thence onward the pessimist begins to reveal itself through the expostulation of the disappointed and distracted man of science; Dr.Moreau becomes the voice of cosmic pessimism with his outrage against the existence of pain on the face of earth:

> …This pain—"
> I gave an impatient shrug at such sophistry.
> "Oh, but it is such a little thing! A mind truly opened to what science has to teach must see that it is a little thing. It may be that save in this little planet, this speck of cosmic dust, invisible long before the nearest star could be attained—it may be, I say, that nowhere else does this thing called pain occur (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* pp.132-3).

Then he winds his way towards the immutable laws of evolution:

> But the laws we feel our way towards…Why, even on this earth, even among living things, what pain is there?"
> …
> Pain is simply our intrinsic medical adviser to warn us and stimulate us. Not all living flesh is painful; nor is all nerve, not even all sensory nerve. There's no taint of pain, real pain, in the sensations of the optic nerve. If you wound the optic nerve, you merely see flashes of light,—just as disease of the auditory nerve merely means a humming in our ears. Plants do not feel pain, nor the lower animals; it's possible that such animals as the starfish and crayfish do not feel pain at all. Then with men, the more intelligent they become, the more intelligently they will see after their own welfare, and the less they will need the goad to keep them out of danger. I never yet heard of a useless thing that was not ground out of existence by evolution sooner or later. Did you? And pain gets needless (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* pp.133).

The indifferent creator (or nature) takes the stage in his following words:

[12] A quest for justification constitutes a theme of *In the Days of the Comet* as invoked in"Your purpose, your purpose with me" passage. The Great Inquisitor scene in *Brothers Karamazov* as a whole can be taken to be one of justification seeking.

> And I tell you, pleasure and pain have nothing to do with heaven or hell…Pain, pain and pleasure, they are for us only so long as we wriggle in the dust.
> "You see, I went on with this research just the way it led me. That is the only way I ever heard of true research going. I asked a question, devised some method of obtaining an answer, and got a fresh question. Was this possible or that possible? You cannot imagine what this means to an investigator, what an intellectual passion grows upon him! You cannot imagine the strange, colourless delight of these intellectual desires! The thing before you is no longer an animal, a fellow-creature, but a problem! Sympathetic pain,—all I know of it I remember as a thing I used to suffer from years ago. I wanted—it was the one thing I wanted—to find out the extreme limit of plasticity in a living shape."
> "But," said I, "the thing is an abomination—"
> "To this day I have never troubled about the ethics of the matter," he continued. "The study of Nature makes a man at last as remorseless as Nature" (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* pp.133-4).

But despair, ultimate despair awaits him:

> …I have gone on, not heeding anything but the question I was pursuing; and the material has—dripped into the huts yonder. It is nearly eleven years since we came here, I and Montgomery and six Kanakas. I remember the green stillness of the island and the empty ocean about us, as though it was yesterday. The place seemed waiting for me (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* pp.134).

3.2.3. The Beast Folk as a Parody of Mankind

Bergonzi (1961) states that "[o]ne day the tormented puma breaks loose and kills Moreau (just as Frankenstein's death was brought about by the monster he had created)" (p.109) and concludes, "[n]ow that their god is dead, the humanized beasts abandon their allegiance to the Law and commence their slow but inevitable reversion to the animal condition" (p.109). The abandonment of the allegiance to the Law we had seen in the novel before and that more than once, too. In the dingey episode which was assumed to have nothing to do with the narrative to follow the three men in the boat had abandoned, quite abruptly, too, the law that prohibits the killing of a fellow man let alone the eating of him as food. The captain of the *Ipecuancha* had forgotten the law that prohibits the effectual killing (by abandoning him amidst the ocean by force) of a fellow brother.

The Beast Folk's abandoning of the Law is just an innocent repetition of what Man has been doing for ages. Therefore, the main point about this reversion need not be looked for in the plain reversion of the Beast Folk. It is rather the return of the native in Nature and the despair of the living things in the realisation of Nature's order. Nature gets back its own and reverts the beasts, all of them, Man included. All creatures despair in that outcome. They know they cannot avoid this. Neither the Beast-folk nor men, nor any other creatures can act otherwise. They are stuck in some prison, they are helpless. Furthermore, in some cases Moreau, in some cases religion, in some cases the Universe aimlessly torture them.

The place of man—as we studied in the earlier parts of this work—in a hostile (or at least, indifferent) universe brings about another result in Beauchamp's (1979) words: "the inevitability of the 'sin' that operates so vividly in Moreau (p.411)". The Beast Folk are not outcasts in the sense the Morlocks are (except in the case of Montgomery's servant on board the ship). They are not forced to extremes by the ostracising of the society they reside in. According to Beauchamp (1979), "Moreau's creatures, while restrained by the Law, are incapable of internalizing it completely, instinct wars with injunction, and Sin is the conflict of the two factors". The Beast Folk are "Sinners" all, furtive backsliders in thrall of the flesh "This Law they were perpetually repeating," Prendick discovers, "and—perpetually breaking" (p.414). Hammond (1979) effectively summarises the Beast Folk's lot:

> The Beast Folk evolve a travesty of human civilisation, including a parody of religion ('the Litany of the Law') and the fear of Hell ('the House of Pain'), monogamous marriage, and a strict code of behaviour and decorum. The attempt to educate them and maintain respect for law and decency is a continual struggle against animal traits and instincts, a constant battle against deep seated emotions and cravings. The effort to build a rational life is only a mockery, a flimsy façade behind which the animal characteristics try to reassert themselves (p.85).

This is an expression of Man's everlasting dilemma of owing his succession to his animal traits, like the destruction of the weaker rival, which he

puts into disuse in civilised society. Huxley (1894), in his colony parable states that

> within the colony, the enforcement of peace, which deprives every man of the power to take away the means of existence from another, simply because he is the stronger, would have put an end to the struggle for existence between the colonists, and the competition for the commodities of existence, which would alone remain, is no check upon population.
>
> Thus, as soon as the colonists begin to multiply, the administrator would have to face the tendency to the reintroduction of the cosmic struggle into his artificial fabric, in consequence of the competition, not merely for the commodities, but for the means of existence (*Evolution and Ethics* pp.78-9).

"In *Evolution and Ethics*," notes Bergonzi (1961), "Huxley had observed that Man had kept his ascendancy by the qualities of the ape and the tiger, but that in civilized society these were seen as defects" (p.112) All the while, as Huxley (1894) notes, "there is a general consensus that the ape and tiger methods of the struggle for existence are not reconcilable with sound ethical principles" (*Evolution and Ethics* pp.52-3). This is a most trying dilemma for Man. The beast in Man made him ascend, made him a man, but ascension requires the suppression of the beast; civilisation claims refinement. Wells spent a considerable time on this dilemma in his early work. Hammond (1979) studies Wells's approach to the subject:

> What was his motive in writing this story? He is asking the reader, firstly, to recognise man for what he is: an animal removed from the ape and ox by an immeasurable process of evolution and many centuries of moral training and education. Man was superficially a rational being but he possessed immense potential for evil if the animal within him was allowed to conquer the rational. The bestial trait manifested itself in violence and anger, and all education must necessarily be a modification and a sublimation of these primitive elements. Any retrogression towards his ancestral past was to be sedulously guarded against, for he was all too prone to revert to his animal nature and give way to treachery and hatred. These characteristics flashed out in storms of anger and fear, in ugly moods of violence and lust. For much of life they remained dormant, but they could burst out and consume the whole being with uncontrollable force.
>
> Secondly, through his fable of the creatures on Doctor Moreau's island, Wells is drawing attention to the unhappiness of much of human life. Driven by fear and pain, tormented by intolerable desires, the Beast Monsters blunder through their squalid existence, fretted and constrained by rigid laws. The purposelessness and folly of their lives moved and distressed Prendick, just as Wells was bored and exasperated by the blind stupidity of man's existence (p.87).

And then to see that many centuries' work is overcome and destroyed in a couple of days as in the dingey case where ostensibly civilised men become cannibals overnight is despairing. Prendick's later assessment of his fellow men prone as the Beast Folk to insurmountable foolish laws not a step distant from becoming immoral and amoral is also despairing. Putting the blame solely on the animal trait is quite easy. Yet, civilisation is also rising at others' cost with selfishness. If the rational part is being human then it is the human trait not the animal one that acts with expedience and annihilates the Neanderthal as a rival. If man owes its rise and ascendancy to the animal trait of killing and being cunning to annihilate his rivals then it becomes shamefacedness to blame those animal traits which brought Man so much gain. West (1976) notes that in the Victorian era "t]he conventional picture…was…of a conflict between mind and man's animal nature, with the virtues seated in the intellect and the defects in the instincts and the animal behaviour patterns" (p.12). According to him, "unlike Victorian moralists [who] were inclined to believe" (p.12) virtue is "innate in the intellect" (p.12), Wells holds

> that morals and ethics have their basis in man's behaviour as a social animal…The intellect on the other hand is amoral and ultimately recognizes the single value of efficiency, so that a continuation of the line of development that had made man a reasoning animal might ultimately make him more callous, indifferent, and cruel, and not more moral (pp.12-3).

The inevitable sin awakes (actually, it was long since awake) on the Island of Dr.Moreau by the awkward introduction of the rabbits by Montgomery but through Moreau's approval:

> His procedure with the rabbits was singular. I waded in with him, and helped him lug one of the hutches ashore. No sooner was that done than he opened the door of it, and tilting the thing on one end turned its living contents out on the ground. They fell in a struggling heap one on the top of the other. He clapped his hands, and forthwith they went off with that hopping run of theirs, fifteen or twenty of them I should think, up the beach.
> "Increase and multiply, my friends," said Montgomery. "Replenish the island. Hitherto we've had a certain lack of meat here" (*The Island of Dr. Moreau* p.97).

Hammond (1979) quotes from the same paragraph and rightly concludes: “Once pointed out, the satire and sarcasm are plain for all to see” (p.86). Especially the part ‘slaves of no fantastic Law’ is mocking religion and Hammond (1979) notes the same: “Some of the most savage satire is reserved for the parody of organised religion” (p.86).

3.3. Results of Ostracism in *The Invisible Man*: Griffin Dies in Protest

It must be a satirical intention on the part of the author to call an insignificant, calculated man of scholarly ways with cheap claptrap as the sole product that nevertheless makes him an eligible candidate to the Royal Society as a “Doctor” while the discoverer of invisibility is simply named the Invisible Man. It is likewise ironical that Dr.Kemp should assume the role of the saviour of society while Griffin is named the enemy of it. Wells successfully manages to give the conflicting notes, so successfully that *The Invisible Man* critics act almost in unison to treat the former of those characters as the friend and the latter as the foe which we tried to show in the previous chapter.

Griffin, in reality, is the epitome of the outcast and the recipient of infuriating injustices. He is expelled from the society and he is literally annihilated because he is the unlike and a formidable rival opposing society’s ordinary yet expedient ways. The dream Griffin has after his father’s funeral is a prevision of his end:

> "'You also,' said a voice, and suddenly I was being forced towards the grave. I struggled, shouted, appealed to the mourners, but they continued stonily following the service; the old clergyman, too, never faltered droning and sniffing through the ritual. I realised I was invisible and inaudible, that overwhelming forces had their grip on me. I struggled in vain, I was forced over the brink, the coffin rang hollow as I fell upon it, and the gravel came flying after me in spadefuls. Nobody heeded me, nobody was aware of me. I made convulsive struggles and awoke (*The Invisible Man* p.274).

All his plans are thwarted at their beginnings. The story he tells Kemp, which goes unheard for Kemp was busy scheming against him is a series of

injustices, misfortunes and privations. Many a man with lesser talents as in the case of **Dr.**Kemp lead easy lives of luxury:

> I finished ordering the lunch, told the man I should be back in ten minutes, and went out exasperated. I don't know if you have ever been disappointed in your appetite."
> "Not quite so badly," said Kemp, "but I can imagine it" (*The Invisible Man* p.282).

To tell the truth, he is the last man that can imagine it for he is a man of comfortable standards:

> In the early evening time Dr. Kemp was sitting in his study in the belvedere on the hill overlooking Burdock. It was a pleasant little room, with three windows—north, west, and south—and bookshelves covered with books and scientific publications, and a broad writing-table…(*The Invisible Man* p.239)

On the other hand, Griffin always feels the heavy hand of necessity and hardship on his collar:

> I had to do my work under frightful disadvantages. Oliver, my professor, was a scientific bounder, a journalist by instinct, a thief of ideas—he was always prying! And you know the knavish system of the scientific world. I simply would not publish, and let him share my credit. I went on working; I got nearer and nearer making my formula into an experiment, a reality (*The Invisible Man* p.257).

Here fury must have begun creeping in with nobody helping, everyone trying to hamper him. His is a Raskolnikov case; just wanting a fair share in the riches so that he may go on working which again and again he is denied. He is always alone: “I was alone; the laboratory was still, with the tall lights burning brightly and silently. In all my great moments I have been alone” (*The Invisible Man* p.258). It is quite ironic to witness Kemp ostentatiously offering a hand in Griffin’s difficulties advising him to publish his work:

> Why dream of playing a game against the race? How can you hope to gain happiness? Don't be a lone wolf. Publish your results; take the world—take the nation at least—into your confidence. Think what you might do with a million helpers—" (*The Invisible Man* p.286).

Kemp's co-operative capabilities, however, do not seem able to cross even the English Channel. He is so calculating in his manner that even when he is trying to distract the Invisible Man so that he may be caged he cannot bring himself to go further than taking only the nation into confidence. Even with this 'publication' he deserves a place in the *Royal* Society. The unjust advantages Griffin is accused of preparing to make use of would then be used in Kemp's scientific cooperation by one nation to gain advantages over other nations. Dr.Kemp's orthodox approach to Griffin's findings and his seemingly casual offer for the application of invisibility to *common* good in *The Invisible Man* will thus make our notion clearer.

The scene is so carefully balanced that Dr.Kemp's wording those very ideas—apart from seeking selfish benefit from Griffin's results—partly to stifle the voices of fellow-orthodox men coming to capture the novelty seems to reflect the herd's stifling the unorthodox voices in any parody of good-intentions for the benefit of the safely novel idealists. The herd and especially its shepherds do not want stray sheep. Griffin, of course, was not offering a world union of free people. To the contrary he was offering, in his own words, a reign of terror, but in this he was earnest, much more so than Kemp. Here is a man supposed to be the epitome of selfishness yet the man standing for the ostensibly moral values is no better than him, only the spectators, just like Kemp himself, benefit from Kemp's argument so they unite and enforce their argument as moral and just.

Griffin is a guileless man of science. He is too easily irritated at the injustice of the world for, in fact, he is not a man of the world. At the end of the book when he seemingly wants to have a reign of terror he is far from the cool calculated frame of mind that would be necessary for such an undertaking. Kemp, on the other hand, could have imposed a reign of terror if he could have but got the chance as is evident in his fishing for Griffin's books after his death questioning Marvel on the subject.

The difference between Kemp's and Griffin is apparent in Griffin's excited and emotional reaction to Wicksteed's death. Kemp, on the other hand, is again calculating. The existence of a blood stained victim in both cases and

Kemp's reaction who is **not** renowned for a so-called irascible temper or egotism is far more indifferent than that of the supposedly 'blood-thirsty', unfeeling and egotistic Griffin's:

> The abandonment of the rod by Griffin, suggests that in the emotional excitement of the affair, the purpose for which he took it—if he had a purpose—was abandoned. He was certainly an intensely egotistical and unfeeling man, but the sight of his victim, his first victim, bloody and pitiful at his feet, may have released some long pent fountain of remorse which for a time may have flooded whatever scheme of action he had contrived (The Invisible Man p.292).

Kemp, after all, in the scene that Griffin is killed is only showily caring:

> "Get back, you fools!" cried the muffled voice of Kemp, and there was a vigorous shoving back of stalwart forms. "He's hurt, I tell you. Stand back!"
>
> There was a brief struggle to clear a space, and then the circle of eager faces saw the doctor kneeling, as it seemed, fifteen inches in the air, and holding invisible arms to the ground. Behind him a constable gripped invisible ankles.
>
> "Don't you leave go of en," cried the big navvy, holding a blood-stained spade; "he's shamming."
>
> "He's not shamming," said the doctor, cautiously raising his knee; "and I'll hold him." His face was bruised and already going red; he spoke thickly because of a bleeding lip. He released one hand and seemed to be feeling at the face. "The mouth's all wet," he said. And then, "Good God!"
>
> He stood up abruptly and then knelt down on the ground by the side of the thing unseen. There was a pushing and shuffling, a sound of heavy feet as fresh people turned up to increase the pressure of the crowd. People now were coming out of the houses. The doors of the "Jolly Cricketers" stood suddenly wide open. Very little was said.
>
> Kemp felt about, his hand seeming to pass through empty air. "He's not breathing," he said, and then, "I can't feel his heart. His side—ugh!" (*The Invisible Man* p.304).

Griffin seems to think of a world with a kind divine justice prevailing, and this is why it is not wanton killing that he wants do:

> "And it is killing we must do, Kemp."
> "It is killing we must do," repeated Kemp. "I'm listening to your plan, Griffin, but I'm not agreeing, mind. *Why* killing?"
> "Not wanton killing, but a judicious slaying (*The Invisible Man* p.285).

But after finally seeing a traitor in the shape of a college friend his frustration overwhelms him and giving up all his lofty piecemeal plans with his

fatal inaction he utters a battle cry of a hunted, cornered animal and wages a war he is bound to lose. He meets death in Bazarov-like indifference of Turgenyev's *Fathers and Sons*. In Hammond's (1979) words, "[n]aked, hungry and bitterly cold, Griffin becomes increasingly a hunted and isolated figure: a loner at war with society" (p.89). He had long since been an alien among his fellow men now finally he chooses to walk disgustedly out. After so many untoward happenings, mischief against him he, in effect, gives up living by not leaving the country when he had as yet the time:

> One wonders what his state of mind may have been during that time, and what plans he devised. No doubt he was almost ecstatically exasperated by Kemp's treachery, and though we may be able to understand the motives that led to that deceit, we may still imagine and even sympathise a little with the fury the attempted surprise must have occasioned. Perhaps something of the stunned astonishment of his Oxford Street experiences may have returned to him, for he had evidently counted on Kemp's co-operation in his brutal dream of a terrorised world. At any rate he vanished from human ken about midday, and no living witness can tell what he did until about half-past two. It was a fortunate thing, perhaps, for humanity, but for him it was a fatal inaction (*The Invisible Man* p.289).

This fatal inaction, this turning sour, this waging war on humanity is Griffin's coming to terms with life and death. He becomes rebellious and chooses not to live. Griffin's death contains a reproach towards society. "Mercy! Mercy!" he cries, but he is never given that mercy. At the beginning of the novel he had wanted sympathy as his afore-quoted utterance "in the name of human charity" testifies but he was not given that charity. Being an outcast all the time he dies calling in vain for mercy. His words about his invisibility are resounding enough in explaining his sad lot: "It's strange, perhaps, but it's not a crime. Why am I assaulted by a policeman in this fashion?" (*The Invisible Man* p.215)

Griffin's final acceptance of death willingly, his death-wish, and his frame of mind would have been expressed in Thomas Hardy's following words in *Desperate Remedies* in the closing chapters of the book:

> 'I am now about to enter on my normal condition. For people are almost always in their graves. When we survey the long race of men, it is strange and still more strange to find that they are mainly dead men, who have scarcely ever been otherwise (p.438).

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

This thesis has analysed the ostracising of the unlike as social criticism in three of H.G.Wells's early scientific novels, *The Time Machine*, *The Island of Dr. Moreau* and *The Invisible Man* as based on the cosmic pessimism permeating T.H.Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*. Our claim was that Wells used social criticism as a medium for the communication of his deterministic outlook and pessimistic deductions concerning the future of mankind. We have, in the evaluation of Wells's stance towards the problems of his age, relied on an evolutionary reading of these three works. Such an evolutionary reading has channelled the present study into viewing those works from an evolutionary perspective, that is, it has led to an approach based upon the dictates of necessity in nature.

We have tried to show herein that Wells based his outlook in his early scientific romances on the said dictates of necessity and therefore studied the human nature from a negative perspective which rules out the attainment of the ethical Man. Likewise, we have tried to show that this ruling out of the attainment of the ethical man stems from elaborating upon the cosmic pessimism T.H.Huxley employs in the explanation of Mankind's future on the face of earth. Our claim was that Huxley, although deeply pessimistic in *his* assessment of the chances of mankind for a happier future, nevertheless held out hope for he saw it within the compass of human capabilities to defeat or at least temporarily check the forces working (though basically inadvertently) for the uprooting of Man. Wells held out no hope in the early scientific novels. He took the possibilities Huxley talked of to their deterministic conclusions. In each case the deterministic conclusion was either a realisation of some pessimistic interpretation or a proof of some inescapable outcome of human nature. In fact, Wells treated pessimistic possibilities as inescapable results in the nature of things.

It has been one of our aims in the present study to show H.G.Wells's literary output in the 1890's was running on a pessimistic line concerning the future of mankind and that this pessimistic line owes much to Wells's background as a science student working under the influence of the renowned English biologist Thomas Henry Huxley. We have tried to prove that there is a direct link between Huxley's thoughts on evolution and Wells's approach to the same subject. We believe that our claim is verified on the account of the abundant sampling in Wells's said three works of Huxley's thoughts in *Evolution and Ethics*.

Our main sources of reference in this study were H.G.Wells's early scientific novels. As they study more or less similar subjects of the late nineteenth century problems of England almost all the early scientific novels in the volume *Seven Science Fiction Novels* served as a basis for the present work. T.H.Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* was another milestone we based our study on. Since horror fiction was not part of the scope of the present study, references to Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* or to R.L.Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr.Hyde* were limited to an accentuation of the similarity on the part of Wells's work to those works. Likewise, direct reference to the works of the nineteenth century Russian novelists was nominal. Certain biographies on H.G.Wells (among them his autobiography) and the studies of his early work constituted the mainstream of references or our work. As it has been one of our claims that much of the criticism of Wells's early work was based on clichéd interpretations we tried to include excerpts from Wells's own work disproving those samples of the orthodox approach. We believe this purpose has been served by the inclusion of quotations from Wells's work along with our comments pointing to their inadequacy in the explanation of the author's intentions.

Our main aim was of course to offer an interpretation of these three scientific romances as a critique of the English society of the late nineteenth century and to show the deterministic and pessimistic shape Wells's line of thought took during that period. We believe these points were verified by the increasing pessimism and satire as exemplified in the present study.

Throughout the present work we have studied first the acts of ostracism in H.G.Wells's three of the early scientific romances *The Time Machine*, *The Island of Dr. Moreau* and *The Invisible Man* then the reasons for it and its consequences. During this study we referred to Thomas Henry Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* whenever the occasion arose. Prevailing feelings in those works are pessimism and a disbelief in mankind's ability to prepare a bright future for itself. Our claim has been that the said pessimism was supported by Wells's belief that mankind is but a toy in the hands of destiny and is thus expressed in deterministic tones throughout those novels.

Wells's main theme in each of these three novels seems to benefit, if not directly emerge from Huxley's garden and colony parables or metaphors. According to Hughes (1977), "since [Wells's] plot outlines approximate to extreme limiting cases of the possibilities of evolution, the stories emerge as elaborations and realizations of the aesthetic and didactic potentialities of T.H.Huxley's and Darwin's garden" (p.66). Hughes (1977) therein also states that "[i]n the scientific romances, the presiding metaphor is biological: a garden; the self-ordering garden of nature" (p.48). The garden metaphor in which Huxley (1894) states that "a small patch of soil…cut off from the rest by a wall; within the area thus protected, the native vegetation was, as far as possible, extirpated; while a colony of strange plants was imported and set down in place" (p.9) concludes with the deduction that

> if the watchful supervision of the gardener were withdrawn, and the antagonistic influences of the general cosmic process were no longer sedulously warded off, or counteracted…[a] century or two hence, little beyond the foundations of the wall and of the houses and frames would be left, in evidence of the victory of the cosmic powers at work in the state of nature, over the temporary obstacles to their supremacy, set up by the horticulturist (p.10).

Huxley comes to the conclusion that nature gets back its own. As Hughes (1977) states, "[w]ith all his powers, the administrator bows to the forces of nature within and outside of man" (p.64). This sets the main axis of Huxley's approach to evolution. With the conclusion that nature gets back its

own to oppose the cosmic process may be frustrating. It is that frustration that these three novels study. Yet, in Wells's view nature need not bother much to get back its own. Wells is more pessimistic than Huxley. The serpent is ever-ready.

These three novels are the more pessimistic for they are all attempts at opposing the cosmic process all of which came to naught. *The Time Machine*, with the idiotic race of invalid Eloi and the dexterous yet malicious race of Morlocks, signifies the failure of man's society which, never really successful in the establishment of a balanced system, went headlong down. The novel, in general, seems to symbolise Wells's apprehension that the topmost position of a civilisation is the beginning of its downfall.

In *The Island of Dr. Moreau* the gardener Moreau is frustrated even at the attempt. The moment he just slackens the grip of his hand nature reclaims its own. Though he hardly owns it, Moreau is sadly aware that his attempt is futile:

The case of *The Invisible Man* is the plight of the other, the unlike. Huxley (1894), with his colony parable in the prolegomena to his *Evolution and Ethics*, introduces, by way of simile, "some administrative authority, as men are to their cattle…set over the colony, charged to deal with its human elements in such a manner as to assure the victory of the settlement over the antagonistic influences of the state of nature in which it is set down" (*Evolution and Ethics* p.17). This administrative authority is, "in order that no struggle for the means of existence between these human agents should weaken the efficiency of the corporate whole in the battle with the state of nature" (*Evolution and Ethics* p.18), to enforce some

> arrangements by which each would be provided with those means; and would be relieved from the fear of being deprived of them by his stronger and more cunning fellows. Laws, sanctioned by the combined force of the colony, would restrain the self-assertion of each man within the limits required for the maintenance of peace. In other words, the cosmic struggle for existence, as between man and man, would be rigorously suppressed; and selection, by its means, would be as completely excluded as it is from the garden (*Evolution and Ethics* p.18).

This is one explanation of the intolerableness of otherness which we studied in the previous chapters. In all three books the otherness was seen to be

intolerable to the society but that effect is felt the strongest in *The Invisible Man*. In *The Invisible Man*, and in any human community this administrative authority is the canons and laws of the society, or, shortly, the society itself. As Huxley (1894) states,

> The most rudimentary polity is a pack of men living under the like tacit, or expressed, understanding; and having made the very important advance upon wolf society, that they agree to use the force of the whole body against individuals who violate it and in favour of those who deserve it (*Evolution and Ethics* pp.56-7).

This is the main reason for the killing of Griffin. It must be noted that the protagonists along with most of those main characters and groups are cast out of the society they reside in for some reason, to some degree and for differing reasons. The degree of ostracism increases along with the increasing pessimism in these three scientific romances.

Yet, the overall mesh of relations is ambiguous as in the Time Traveller's being both an outcast and an ideal member of different circles. All these possibilities are interwoven in the Wellsian ambiguity to effect the inevitability of the flow of events.

There is an apparent dislike, a lack of sympathy prevalent in all the three novels for the unlike. The said dislike owes much to a visual repulsion as in the case of the Time Traveller's disgust towards the Morlocks and the ungainly sight of the stranger in *The Invisible Man* is effective in shaping his disrepute in Iping. But visual repulsion, or repulsion by sight is the most conspicuous in *The Island of Dr.Moreau*. This may be the repulsion of one's disliked past. Huxley holds that

> For his successful progress, throughout the savage state, man has been largely indebted to those qualities which he shares with the ape and tiger; his exceptional physical organization; his cunning, his sociability, his curiosity, and his imitativeness; his ruthlessness and ferocious destructiveness when his anger is roused by opposition.
>
> But, in proportion as men have passed form anarchy to social organization, and in proportion as civilization has grown in worth, these deeply ingrained serviceable qualities have become defects. After the manner of successful persons, civilized man would gladly kick down the ladder by which he has climbed (*Evolution and Ethics* pp.51-2).

Chalmers Mitchell (1900) states while noting Huxley's alien position in the scientific circles that

> The dogmatic world saw in it nothing but a deliberate and malicious assault upon religion. The Church of England in particular was beginning to recover from a long period of almost incredible supineness, and there was arising a large body of clergy full of faith and zeal and good works, but quite unacquainted with science, who frankly regarded Darwin as Antichrist, and Huxley and Tyndall as emissaries of the devil (pp.111-2).

Here is Huxley now as the Time Traveller, with a story to be discredited, now as Moreau to be cast out, now as Griffin to be made a scapegoat. This is why scientists like Huxley and Darwin can then be thought of as the outcast scientists handled in Wells's early work.

According to Chernysheva (1977), "[i]n his later work, Wells…would found his artistic system firmly on determinism" (p.37). This characteristic is in fact present in his early work, too. Vernier (1977) states that

> In [Wells's] view, man's main fault lay not in any natural viciousness but in his inability to realize the fact that (as Huxley had pointed out) the survival of the fittest did not necessarily imply the survival of the best…He saw man as a creature subjected to the blind forces of evolution (p.87).

In Vernier (1977) view, "the Time Traveller yields to the fascination exerted by a dying world;…Prendick's experience leads him to complete despair…The intellect is constantly shown as leading to inhuman behaviour: Griffin and Moreau are both endowed with more than ordinary intellectual faculties" (p.77). Yet, in essence all the standings are ambiguous. Despair is the main drive; in despair the protagonists (mainly) act. The Time Traveller is identified with the narrator at the end and tries (although vainly) to do something, Prendick finds solace in solitude and science and literature (bright windows, better part of mankind), Griffin wages war somewhat inadvertently. He had yet attempted to be understood and accepted. He turns sour seeing men hating, betraying him, dies in protest.

With implications of an evolution that does not bring progress to mankind Wells seems to claim that devolution is awaiting the human race. The

most appropriate closing words of a study on increasingly darker aspects of Man's plight on the face of the earth will therefore be Montgomery's dying words:

"The last, the last of this silly universe. What a mess—" (*The Island of Dr.Moreau* p.165).

REFERENCES

Batchelor, J. C. (1984). Introduction. In H. G. Wells. *The time machine and the invisible man*. (v-xxiii). New York: Penguin Books USA Inc.

Beauchamp, G. (1979). *The Island of Dr. Moreau* as Theological Grotesque. Papers on Language and Literature 15.4 (Fall), 408-417.

Bergonzi, B. (1961). *The Early H.G. Wells: A Study of The Scientific Romances*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Bergonzi, B. (1976). The Time Machine: An Ironic Myth. In B. Bergonzi (Ed.). *H. G. Wells a collection of critical essays*. (39-55). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Bleiler, R. (2006). The Monster. In S. T. Joshi (Ed.). *Icons of Horror and the Supernatural:An Encyclopedia of Our Worst Nightmares*. Greenwood Press.

Brome, V. (1951). *H. G. Wells Biography*. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

Chernysheva, T. (1977). The Folktale, Wells, and Modern Science Fiction. In D. Suvin & R. M. Philmus (Ed.). *H. G. Wells and modern science fiction*. (35-47). London: Associated University Presses.

Dickson, L. (1969). *H. G. Wells His Turbulent Life and Times*. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd.

Dostoyevski, F. M. (1992). Tr.: Taluy, N. Y. *Karamazov Kardeşler*. İstanbul: Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları.

Dostoyevski, F. M. (1992). Tr.: Beyhan, M. *Suç ve Ceza*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.

Foot, M. (1996). *H. G. The History Of Mr Wells*. London: Black Swan.

Golding, W. (1996). Tr.: Urgan, M. *Sineklerin Tanrısı*. İstanbul: Adam Yayınları.

Hammond, J. R. (1979). *An H.G. Wells Companion*. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.

Hardy, T. (1912). *Desperate Remedies*. London: Macmillan and Co.Ltd.

Hardy, T. (1994). *Tess Of The D'Urbervilles*. London: Penguin Books Ltd.

Hillegas, M. R. (1967). *The Future as Nightmare: H.G.Wells and the Anti-utopians*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hughes, D. Y. (1977). The Garden in Wells's Early Science Fiction. In D. Suvin & R. M. Philmus (Ed.). *H. G. Wells and modern science fiction*. (48-69). London: Associated University Presses.

Huxley, T. H. (1894). *Evolution & Ethics*. London: Macmillan and Co.

MacDonald, G. (1992). Uncle Cornelius His Story. In M. M. Cox & R. A. Gilbert (Ed.). *Victorian ghost stories*. (130-149). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Middleton, T. (1999). Introduction. In R. L. Stevenson. *The strange case of dr Jekyll and mr Hyde*. (vii-xx). Kent: Wordsworth Editions Ltd.

Mitchell, P.C. (1900). *Thomas Henry Huxley; A Sketch of His Life and Work*. New York:The Knickerbocker Press.

Nicholson, N. (1950). *H.G. Wells*. London: William Clowes & Sons Ltd.

Paradis, J. (1989). Evolution and Ethics in Its Victorian Context. In J. Paradis & G. C. Williams (Ed.). *T. H. Huxley's evolution and ethics with new essays on its Victorian and sociobiological context.* (3-56). New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Philmus, R. M. (1969). “The Time Machine”: Or, The Fourth Dimension as Prophecy. PMLA, 84, 530-535.

Shelley, M. (1994). *Frankenstein*. London: Penguin Books Ltd.

Stevenson, R. L. (1999). *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*. Kent: Wordsworth Editions Ltd.

Suvin, D. (1977). Intrduction. In D. Suvin & R. M. Philmus (Ed.). *H. G. Wells and modern science fiction*. (90-115). London: Associated University Presses.

Tolstoy, L.N. (1993). *Anna Karenina*. İstanbul: Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları.

Tolstoy, L.N. (1997). *War and Peace*. London: Penguin Popular Classics.

Turgenyev, İ. S. (1997). *Babalar ve Oğullar*. İstanbul: E Yayınları Klasik Dizi.

Vernier, J. P. (1977). Evolution As a Literary Theme in H. G. Wells’s Science Fiction. In D. Suvin & R. M. Philmus (Ed.). *H. G. Wells and modern science fiction*. (70-89). London: Associated University Presses.

Wells, H. G. (1934). *Experiment In Autobiography*. New York: The Macmillian Company.

Wells, H. G. (1934). In the Days of the Comet, *Seven science fiction novels*. (817-1016). New York, Dover Publications, Inc.

Wells, H. G. (1934). Preface. In H. G. Wells. *Seven famous novels*. (vii-x). New York: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc.

Wells, H. G. (1934). The Food of the Goods, *Seven science fiction novels*. (621-816). New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

Wells, H. G. (1934). The Invisible Man. *Seven science fiction novels*. (183-306). New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

Wells, H. G. (1934). The Island of Dr. Moreau. *Seven science fiction novels*. (77-182). New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

Wells, H. G. (1934). The Time Machine. *Seven science fiction novels*. (1-76). New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

Wells, H. G. (1934). The War of the Worlds. *Seven science fiction novels*. (307-454). New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

Wells, H. G. (1934). The First Men in the Moon, *Seven science fiction novels*. (455-620). New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

Wells, H.G. (1894, September 25). The Extinction of Man. *Pall Mall Gazette.*

West, A. (1976). H. G. Wells. In B. Bergonzi (Ed.). *H. G. Wells a collection of critical essays*. (8-24). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.