

TURKEY'S DEFENSE POLICY MAKING PROCESS AND  
ITS EFFECTS ON WEAPONS PROCUREMENT

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **TURKEY'S DEFENSE POLICY MAKING PROCESS AND ITS EFFECTSON WEAPONS PROCUREMENT**

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This thesis explains Defense Policy Making process and its effects on weapons procurement in Turkey. Main focus will be on the institutions which shape, to various degrees, Turkey's defense policy and weapons procurement decisions. Thesis analyzes institutions like the National Defense Ministry, Council of Ministers, General Staff, Parliament and the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, and places them in a historical context. Following a historical background, functions and authorities of these institutions are analyzed from a perspective of Constitutional Law. Actual conduct of the legal process, relations of institutions with each other, and their behavior are also examined. In order to demonstrate the Defense Policy Making and weapons procurement processes, case studies that reflect different possibilities of outcomes are highlighted.

Keywords: Defense Policy Making, Weapons Procurement, Civil-Military Relations

## ÖZ

### TÜRKİYE’DE SAVUNMA POLİTİKASI YAPIMI VE SİLAH TEDARİKİNE ETKİLERİ

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Bu çalışma Türkiye’de Savunma Politikası yapım sürecini ve silah tedarikine etkilerini incelemektedir. Türkiye’nin Savunma Politikası ve silah tedarikini farklı ölçülerde etkileyen kurumlar tezin odak noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, Bakanlar Kurulu, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Meclis ve Savunma Sanayi Müsteşarlığı gibi kurumlar incelenmiş, ve tarihsel bir perspektife yerleştirilmişlerdir. Tarihsel arka planın ardından, kurumların işlev ve yetkileri anayasa hukuku çerçevesinde ele alınmıştır. Yasal süreçlerin pratikteki işleyişleri, kurumların birbirleri arasındaki ilişkiler ve davranış şekilleri de incelemeye dahil edilmiştir. Savunma Politikası yapımı ve silah tedarik sürecini göstermek için, farklı sonuçlar veren örnek olay incelemelerinden faydalanılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Savunma Politikası Yapımı, Silah Tedariki, Sivil-Asker İlişkileri

To My Family

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SSM	Undersecretariat of Defense Industries
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
US	United States
AKP	Justice and Development Party
CHP	Republican People's Party
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
PPBS	Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
TESEV	Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
CUP	Committee for Union and Progress
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
CNU	Committee of National Unity
MGK	National Security Council
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TRT	Turkish Radio and Television Corporation
MSYK	Supreme Council of National Defense
MİT	National Intelligence Organization
DECA	Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
DIDSAC	Defense Industry Development and Support Administration Chairmanship
OYAK	Military Solidarity Organization
DSP	Democratic Left Party
EU	European Union
TLF	Turkish Land Forces
MGSB	National Security Policy Document
TOBB	Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges
OYTEP	Ten Years Procurement Plan
MİLGEM	National Ship Project
ANAP	Motherland Party
JİTEM	Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terrorism Department
TMYK	Supreme Council for the Struggle Against Terrorism
DYP	True Path Party
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
DGM	State Security Court



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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This thesis is about the defense policy-making in Turkey and its effects on weapon procurement, rather than defense policies it followed and its defense expenditure. As such, it attempts to explain factors that influence Turkey's defense policy and weapons procurement decisions other than those more commonly analyzed, like geopolitics; relative military, economic and cultural power with regard to rival or friendly countries; power distribution on the international arena; regime type and cultural identity. The main focus of the thesis is the official structures of the state which are tasked with shaping the country's defense policy and with equipping its armed forces. Their establishment, functions, powers, conduct, relations of different institutions with each other will be discussed in order to answer the following set of questions:

- What is the historical background on which Turkey's current defense policy making institutions rest? Turkish Republic's institutions are successors of those in the Ottoman Empire, and politicians as well as the military carried their experiences to the new regime. Experiences, habits, intra-institutional power relations are transferred to the Republic, and an assessment of practices in the Ottoman Empire is necessary to better understand the basis of defense policy-making today. The experience of Cold War also had a significant effect upon Turkey's defense policy choices, however not to the degree of determining its details. The thesis, as consistent with its theme, will show that Turkey regulated its defense more a result of choices decision-makers made within the context of the

Cold War, and not as a result of an “inevitable” or a “foreign imposed” policy.

- Which institutions have more weight on formulating Turkey’s defense policy? There are two axes on which this question can be answered. One is the division between military and civilian leadership. The other, which seems more important in the quality of policy-making process, is between the executive and the legislative. Thesis will analyze these axes mainly by giving the constitutional context for functions and powers of institutions. It is within the constitutional boundaries that institutions operate, and we will see that extension beyond those boundaries also has effects on inter-institutional power relations as well as the policy outcomes.
- To what degree are there disparities between institutions’ (those with the function of formulating and implementing defense policy) influence with regard to their legal standing and their actual impact? Actual influence of an institution on defense policy can not be realistically assessed with regard to its legal duties. Capacity, experience, willingness to lead, characteristics of top seat officials and their own political agenda are all important factors that shape defense policy.
- What is the rationale behind important weapons procurement decisions Turkey makes? This question covers two aspects of weapons procurement; determination of needs and sources. Type of weapons to be procured is, ideally, a reflection of the defense policy a country follows. An ideal example is the case of Taiwan. The country’s main defense problem, that of deterring or stopping a Chinese invasion before receiving help from the United States, (itself result of a political will to stay independent from the mainland) can be addressed in two ways, which lead to different weapon types to be procured. One is focusing on types of weapons that have symbolic purposes, to show that the United States is ready to intervene in favor of Taiwan on the event of an invasion attempt; the other is for

actually arming the country in anticipation of a Chinese attack.<sup>1</sup> While the former view requires purchase of high visibility weapon platforms, the latter puts emphasis on less visible support systems and softwares that can increase warfighting capability. Source selection was largely a prerogative of the General Staff, but other institutions play an increasing part in recent years.

- What are the effects of policy-making structures on the outcome of defense policies? While the main focus of the thesis is institutions and leaders, the outcomes of their interaction are also treated to show them in action. The question is important in underlining the effects of flawed or paralyzed policy-making structures, especially in contexts where most visible causes of failure (inadequate technology, insufficient numbers of men) do not explain defeats in war or failures of countering threats.
- What is the current state of weapons procurement process, in the light of changing structures of defense policy-making? Thesis will include the latest developments in Turkey's weapons procurement process, and it will place the current trend in its historical context.

The thesis is divided into four chapters and subsections to answer these questions. Chapter one clarifies the meaning of terms used in the title of the thesis, treats basic assumptions the thesis will proceed upon, makes an overview of related literature in international publications and in Turkey. Defense policy is defined first, as well as its relation with a country's foreign and security policy. Outlines of the conceptual process to formulate defense policy, as well as its basic elements are included in this section. A classification is underlined to see different aspects of defense policy as structural defense policy, strategic defense policy and defense policy in crisis situations.

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<sup>1</sup> Michael D. Swaine, "Taiwan's National Security, Defense Policy, and Weapons Procurement Processes", RAND Monograph Report, 1999.

An analysis of defense policy-making requires proper definition of actors. The justification for the institutions or leaders to be analyzed is given in this chapter, though it has no claims on having determined a “correct” approach. Institutions are preferred in the thesis rather than social, political or professional groups (such as “business elite”, “social-democrats”). Individuals are included in the thesis to the extent that their leadership or lack of it changes policy outcomes. The international context is also treated to see how domestic actors respond to foreign influences. Turkey has passed from different stages of international security structures, from a constant security dilemma in the Ottoman period to a relatively more stable location as part of a multi-lateral alliance with a dominant military and political power, finally towards integration with a major political power. Each period had its own diverse sub-periods, but their specific circumstances are taken into consideration only when it is necessary to assess their impact (or lack of it) on Turkish defense policy-makers.

This chapter also defines the particularities of weapons procurement in general. It will be seen that defense market rules largely differ from other types of goods or services because of heavy government involvement, high technology, massive costs and long project schedules. These often complicate building up new weapons industries, especially for economically weak or vulnerable countries like the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. First chapter also explains the birth of studies on defense policy and defense policy-making, as well as discussions on defense policy making in the international academia. The need to include defense in Political Science was voiced in the United States on the brink of its entry in the Second World War. Not only social scientists, but the military too felt the need to bring in civilian expertise to organization of defense, and in 1960s civilians already acquired supremacy in defense policy-making. Discussions about defence in the U.S. focus largely on the proper balance between expertise and politics in determination of defense policy. Defense Policy studies in Turkey are new and they put more emphasis on Military’s influence in Turkish politics.

Second chapter will cover the defense policy-making and weapons procurement from the period of Sultan Selim III in 1789 to the foundation of the Republic in

1923. Selim III is chosen as start of the modernization efforts on defense policy-making because of its radically different approach to institutional reform from its predecessors. Excerpts from Sultan's decrees in 1839, 1856 and Constitutions of 1876 (along with its revised form in 1909) and 1921 will be presented. Despite the fact that the Ottoman Empire established many institutions to organize defense and weapons procurement, former hierarchical relations rendered decisions of these obsolete. Powerful individuals dominated defense policy-making in the Ottoman era after 1909. Control of the defense budget by the Parliament became a matter of dispute from the very outset of Turkey's first true experiment with a form of constitutional monarchy after 1909. After 1913, control of defense policy was retained solely by Enver Pasha, the Minister of War.

Ottoman Empire's weapons procurement will be highlighted in view of its heavy reliance on foreign expertise and state funding. It will be stressed that the Ottoman Empire was by no means dependent on weapons production to Western states, at least until the beginning of the eighteenth century. Finding themselves in a constant war situation and rapid technological change in weapons production in the West, Ottoman Sultans had mainly two choices to adapt. One was to import high quality of weapons from abroad, and second was to kick-start a domestic weapons industry. It will be seen that while the second option was tried at first, financial difficulties, pressing wars, but most importantly, single handed decisions by Sultan Abdulhamid II played an important role to switch to the first option.

During the Republican era the institutionalization for defense policy-making continued and became more complex with the addition of coordinating bodies like the National Security Council (MGK). Until 1982, authorities of the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and the Parliament on defense policy-making were concentrated more on the executive, and towards the General Staff within the executive. MGK will receive a special attention in the thesis since it brings the government and the military together for consultations, enabling assessment of their impact separately. Cold War's influence on Turkish defense policy-makers will also be included in this Chapter, from the point of their adaptation to different stages of the bipolar political-military confrontation.

Weapons procurement after the declaration of the Republic in 1923, despite some minor developments in domestic production until Turkey's entry in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) followed the former patterns of import, prevalent in the Ottoman era. Weapons procurement practice was not questioned by governments or the Parliament, and this period was one of total dominance of the General Staff on defense policy as well.

Chapter Three is concerned with the practical side of the defense policy-making in contemporary Turkey. Interviews are widely used in this section to have an insight into the complexities of decision-making process. It is here that we discover that the reason for Military dominance in defense policy-making is not the assertiveness of the Military. It is rather the reluctance of Parliamentarians, but also structural problems of staff and allegiance to party leaders that hinder individual Parliamentarians' entry into defense decision-making. Weapons procurement came under greater civilian control with the establishment of the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries (SSM), although it still has very limited power in determining the specifications of weapons to be procured. Relations of the SSM with the General Staff depend largely on the attitude of the Chief of General Staff, but also to the increasing expertise of the SSM in building more complex weapons systems. Two case studies are used to demonstrate the practical side of weapons procurement, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), which are used by the Turkish Armed Forces to counter the threat posed by terrorist groups, and the decision to meet Turkey's fighter plane needs solely from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Consortium, rather than choosing a combination of F-35s and Eurofighter Typhoons.

Last Chapter will continue with case studies. Policy-making in Turkey's fight against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism, which reached to a scale large enough to be considered as a defense matter, is analysed. It will be seen that despite the large scope of functions the Turkish Military has compared to its European counterparts, it was with the decision of various governments that the Turkish Military became more involved in the fight against the PKK. Internal restructuring of the Turkish Military in the mid-1990s and the subsequent plans



to reform the Military, especially the Land Forces until the 2014, were also decided by the General Staff, after studies it conducted. Lastly two defense policy decisions under crisis situations will be analyzed, from the perspective of expertise vs. politics. Both during the Gulf Crisis in 1991 and in the Iraqi War in 2003, not only military, but also civilian bureaucrats played a lesser role in the outcome than did Politicians.

It is clear that the defense policy-making in Turkey does not receive enough inputs from civilian actors in the government, academy and the civil society. An important factor limiting the civilians' contribution to the defense policy is regarded as the weight of the Turkish Military in domestic politics. However, a desire on the part of the Military (which retains a legal position more powerful than any of its counterparts in Europe) to exclude civilian interference in defense policy-making is not the main factor explaining the absence of politicians in this domain, or weapons acquisition. First argument of the thesis is that the lack of expertise and accumulation of knowledge is the main reason why Turkey's defense policy is formulated within a very narrow circle within the state. Defense policy-making in Turkey is not hampered by a supposed preponderance of the Military on the political scene, so much as it is by a lack of interest and experience on the part of elected officials, particularly the Parliament deputies, on defense organization of the country. Habits and a willingness to cede defense realm to the Military make render that field an exclusive area for the Turkish Military.

Second argument of the thesis is that analyzing the Turkish defense policy-making solely from perspective of military-civilian duality is not an ideal perspective. It will be seen that even in the periods when civilians are more active than the military, decisions are made in an *ad hoc* manner, without sufficient or misguided knowledge on the matter at hand. This is not to assert that evaluation of threats and related creation and use of military forces should be left at the hands of the military only because it is trained for this purpose. On the contrary, it will be argued that the expertise and knowledge on defense matters should be disseminated to the legislative branch, academics, think-tanks, media and to the

wider public in general. Sound Parliamentary monitoring must be established in order to create a sounder defense policy-making. But it will be seen that the current election regulations and agenda of most of deputies prevent accumulation of expertise on defense matters.

Although there are not sufficient written materials to analyze these questions to the depth they are analyzed in other country's contexts (the United States, for example), a reading of Turkish military's history gives important clues. It has to be noted however, that while much treated theme of Turkish Military's influence in domestic politics can hint on some aspects of defense policy-making, the thesis is mainly concerned with the opposite: That of civilians' and legislative body's participation to defense policy-making. Other than materials on the Turkish military, history of the Ottoman Empire as a history of state modernization contains valuable information on the defense policy-making structures. Texts on Turkish Constitutional Law are widely used to specify legal functions and powers of each institution. Graduate and Doctoral theses from various universities contain important information on development of Ottoman institutions of defense. Another important source is books written by journalists, who often publish interviews and informal discussions with top level state officials, generals and academics. Memories of statesmen and retired soldiers were also useful in assessing which institution or leader had a dominant, leading, or influential role in some of the critical defense decisions Turkey have taken. Last but not least, thesis includes original interviews with Justice and Development Party (AKP) deputy and Chair of NATO Parliamentary Assembly Turkish Group and former Undersecretary of Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) Vahit Erdem, AKP deputy and spokesmen of the National Defense Committee Dr. Nurettin Akman, Deputy Undersecretary of the SSM Dr. Faruk Özlü, Professor at Bilkent University's International Relations Department Associate Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu, Director of Force Planning and Development Department of General Plans and Policies Division of the General Staff Lieutenant Colonel Bora Önen and Hürriyet defense reporter Özgür Ekşi.

## CHAPTER 2

### STUDY OF DEFENSE POLICY MAKING

Defense policy is derived from a country's foreign and security policies, and it is one of the tools necessary for implementing them. Defense policy in turn has its own components. A relatively new domain of studies in Turkey, academic studies in defense policy and its making started during the Second World War in the United States.

#### 2.1 – Definition of Defense Policy and Defense Policy Making

Defense policy can be described as “a course of action or conduct, as defined by senior executive leadership, intended to influence and determine decisions, actions, and other matters relating to the conduct of military affairs, consistent with the nation's security strategy.”<sup>2</sup> Defense Policy is about the creation and use of forces.<sup>3</sup>

The primary task of defense policy is first to define the objectives of defense, and the creation of the means necessary to attain those objectives.<sup>4</sup> Defense goals of a country is a function of the values and interests of the nation, an analysis of its security environment, its security objectives, security strategy, defense missions, and finally its defense ambitions. An analysis of the security environment is an assessment of prominent security threats emanating from its neighbors as well as

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<sup>2</sup> Todor Tagarev, “The Art of Shaping Defense Policy: Scope, Components, Relationships (but no Algorithms)”, *The Quarterly Journal*, Spring-Summer, 2006, Vol. 5, No.1.

<sup>3</sup> Foerster Schuyler, N. Wright Edward, “Twin faces of defense policy”, in *American Defense Policy* (edited by John F. Reichart, Steven R. Sturm), Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1983, p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

the global trends in security matters. For example, Turkish Defense Ministry, in its latest White Paper issued in 2000, assesses the security environment as follows:

Turkey is located at the center of the triangle formed by the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, where the new threats and risks are concentrated. Turkey is in a region where the interests of the global powers and formations intersect. This situation, stemming from Turkey's geostrategic location has not changed until the present and will not change in the twenty-first century. It is evaluated that the importance and place of Turkey in the new world order will become even more strengthened.<sup>5</sup>

Security objectives define the state of affairs which the country wants to achieve concerning the security environment. United States National Security Strategy issued in 2006 states that:

It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.

Security strategy provides a clear, realist, and effective concept of the use of diplomatic, economic, military and other instruments of power in order to achieve a nation's security objectives, from which defense missions are derived. Thus, targets of Turkey's Defense Policy are:

To contribute to peace and security in the region and to spread this to large areas, to become a country producing strategy and security that could influence all the strategies aimed as her region and beyond, to become an element of power and balance in her region and to make use of every opportunity and take initiatives for cooperation, becoming closer and developing positive relations.<sup>6</sup>

The military component of the security objectives are also referred to as the defense missions, which describes the roles for the country's armed forces. Turkey's military goals are "Deterrence, Military Contribution to Crisis Management and Intervention in Crises, Forward Defense and Collective Security." Lastly, the defense policy specifies the number, scale, and the number of operations its armed forces are expected to conduct. Although Turkey's latest White Paper does not provide the aforementioned detail, the famous article written

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<sup>5</sup> <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GNPP/html/pdf/p4c1.pdf> Accessed at 30.06.09

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

by retired Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ, “2 and a1/2 War Strategy,” stated in 1996 that the Turkish Military has to be able to conduct two full scale campaigns, and another war of lesser scale in order to maintain its deterrence role against Greece, Syria, and be prepared for a being prepared for a “half war” that might be instigated from within the country.<sup>7</sup>

The large scope of defense policy requires an analysis of the subject matter to specify the exact component of the defense policy it will try to explain. A proposition to categorize the components of the defense policy is formulated by Randall B. Ripley. Determination of the defense policy involves three subsets of policies, namely structural, strategic, and crisis policies.<sup>8</sup> According to the classification, structural policies and programs are concerned with weapons procurement, as well as deployment and organizing military personnel and material, “presumably within the confines and guidelines of previously determined strategic decisions.” Decisions for individual weapons systems, deployment of bases, and determination of the size of reserve military forces are all examples of structural policies. Strategic policies involve military and foreign relations with other countries, and determination of the appropriate force mixture. Randall states, in line with the American concerns of force structure, that the “ratio of ground based missiles to submarine based missiles, to manned bombers, foreign trade tariffs and quotas for specific goods and nations, arms sales to foreign nations, as well as the level of forces deployed overseas” are examples of strategic defense policy’s content. Lastly, crisis policies respond to immediate and grave problems which appear suddenly. This thesis is concerned mainly with the question of which institution or official seat is more influential in each policy area.

The subject name defense policy-making implies that countries do not define their defense policies as a unitary rational actor. Rather, defense policy is an outcome

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<sup>7</sup> Şükrü Elekdağ, “2 and a1/2 War Strategy,” *Perceptions*, Volume 1, March-May 1996. <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume1/March-May1996/212WARSTRATEGY.pdf> Accessed on July 31, 2009.

<sup>8</sup> Randall B. Ripley, “Congress and Foreign and Defense Policy: An Overview and Research Agenda”, *Mershon Center Quarterly Report*, Vol 13, Summer 1988.

of interactions between various public and private actors. The state structure harbors a multitude of institutions, each with its standard operating procedures.<sup>9</sup> A study of the defense policy-making necessarily must first answer to certain questions that are encountered in studies on other public policy subjects, “like actor designation, types of power relations to be considered, and the time period to be covered.”<sup>10</sup> The actor designation in defense policy-making may range from the international system, or the nation state as a block, to the domestic political system, public and private institutions, down to the individuals. Two mistakes to be avoided in actor designation are under-generalization, (to see too many and atomized actors) and over-generalization (taking units not united in their behaviors as one group). A pure focus on the international setting, domestic institutions or individuals can miss important factors. Description of the international context usually makes up a significant portion of analysis of defense policies of countries, but the subject matter of the thesis requires identifying whose interpretation of the security environment is most influential in taking defense decisions. An analysis of institutions as actors in defense policy making depends on their ability to produce a unified influence upon the policy. Thus, on the one hand, the institutions like the SSM will be taken as a unitary actor, as no matter the differences of opinion within its individual departments a decision taken by the SSM is an input for the defense policy.

Behaviors of institutions are a function of their organizational missions, and their distinct culture. Organizational missions are explicitly stated in the laws or charts founding them, and specify their domain of authority.<sup>11</sup> Organizational culture, which determines the ways in which the institution interprets its official duties, have a great influence on the decisions it makes. Similarly in defense policy-making, institutional tendencies or the propensity of organizations to behave primarily according to previously established practices contributes to the final

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<sup>9</sup> Graham Allison, Philip Zelikow, *Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Second Edition, Addison Wesley Educational Publications, 1999.

<sup>10</sup> Frederick W. Frey, “The Problem of Actor Designation in Political Analysis”, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 2, January 1985, p. 130.

<sup>11</sup> Allison, Zelikow, op. cit. in note 9, p. 167.

defense policy outcome and implementation. Existing organizations and their existing programs thus constrain behavior in the next decision to be taken. These tendencies and constraints add up to form an organizational culture, coupled with a distinct identity. Successor generations filling institution's ranks inherit the culture. An emphasis on organizational culture and identity is useful in making sense of an institution's motivations that influence how it interprets its legal mission. It would be misleading to consider organizations as mere separate units producing different elements of one public policy decision according to their own rules and identity. Despite the fact that every institution has a unique set of legally defined objectives, each is at the same time involved in a competition and/or a bargaining process, seeking to increase or at least protect its domain of authority. Therefore a particularly strong government, (who for example has secured a firm majority at the Parliament) may have a broader impact upon the structural defense policies.

The individuals will be taken into consideration only when personal management styles bring a significant impact on the influence of defense decisions within the country.<sup>12</sup> Alternatively, incompetence or low motivation of an individual occupying an important position (like a defense minister) can effectively negate any influence of the particular institution he is running.

These interactions take place within a regional and global context that act as a variable on domestic political actors' decisions. International security setting has particularly heavy impact on defense-policies of countries where domestic political actors are obliged to pay particular attention to threats emanating from that setting. Turkey's defense White Paper in 1987 starts explaining Turkey's defense policy by diagnosing the international security setting as follows: "The polarization between western and eastern blocks, centered around the U.S. and the Soviet union forms the framework of political military situation in the world."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Robert McNamara, the United States Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968 is a good example, as will be shown in the next subsection.

<sup>13</sup> Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, *Defense White Paper*, Ankara, 1987.

Analyzing defense policy making in a country thus requires an appreciation of various actors' threat perceptions within a country. Although Turkey is a NATO ally, not all domestic political actors were easy with Turkey's commitment to the alliance. Which security perception "wins," and taps required resources for defense preparations, forges alliances, shapes the force structure, or determine force levels, is a function of political superiority of the actors with regards to other domestic actors.

Besides political considerations in shaping defense policy and weapons procurement, the nature of the defense market also compels a more advanced decision-making system than one where military is the only expert. First, in defense market there is only one buyer, the government. Price is usually not an overriding factor, product and quantity is often determined by the government, and promises of performance are usually more important to other considerations, like domestic production. Second, major weapons systems development is a complex process. They usually try to achieve designs never made before, using components never tried. Production is of low volume, compared to markets outside the defense market, and this process is placed in a context of fast developing technologies.<sup>14</sup> Threat assessments cover ten to twenty years. A new weapons design has to take what the potential enemy can develop in the future, and try to perform better. In essence, a new design is competing with another one which may yet to be developed by an adversary.<sup>15</sup>

## **2.2. Defense Policy Studies in the United States and Israel**

The need to include the study of defense policy and defense policy-making in the agenda of political scientists first appeared in the early 1940s in the United States, which started to question its military capabilities as the likelihood that it might

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<sup>14</sup> Ronald Fox, *The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition*, Harvard Business School Press, 1988, p. 10.

<sup>15</sup> Inattributable interview with a retired Rear Admiral/Upper Half, Ankara, May 2009.



join the Second World War increased.<sup>16</sup> “A study of the military potential of the United States would in and of itself be of enormous importance to the body of knowledge available to social scientists and to the responsible officers of the government.”

An initial hesitation marked the inclusion of civilian theorists from the academy to formulation of national security policy, which was largely understood in terms of the use of military means at the end of the Second World War. Gene M. Lyons note that many scholars were:

wary of venturing into a new field where there were few guidelines, where access to information was limited by the requirements of security classification, and where there was still a question of professional respectability. There was also some skepticism about using materials developed by government agencies without being able to be critical about their contents. There was, moreover, a constraint about even approaching the agencies, particularly the military establishment for assistance in gaining access to documents, for fear of getting involved in security clearance of incurring an obligation to defend a particular view.<sup>17</sup>

Aaron Wildavsky stresses that the traditional role of the military in preparing the national defense is based on its experience in the field, naturally shared by very few civilians expert in theorizing. However, Wildavsky suggests, the nature of defense policy’s main subject in the U.S. during the post Second World War era, namely avoiding a nuclear war, makes it imperative that abstract models be used in order to “avoid the experience we do not wish to have.”<sup>18</sup> In studying defense policy and how it is constructed, the participants have to be specified and given motives and degrees of rationality, or irrationality. In the beginning, actions and reactions are given and decision-rules for generating new alternatives are specified. Different possibilities are then played out to observe the results that

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<sup>16</sup> Earle, Edward Mead, “National Defense: A Program of Studies,” *The Journal of American Military Institute*, Vol. 4, No. 4, Winter 1940, p. 200.

<sup>17</sup> Gene M. Lyons, “Growth of National Security Research,” *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 3 August, 1963, pp. 489-508.

<sup>18</sup> Aaron Wildavsky, “Practical Consequences of the Theoretical Study of Defense policy,” *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Twenty-Fifty Anniversary Issue, March 1965, p. 91.

take place. “Confirmation” of a kind may be sought through historical analogy.<sup>19</sup> Wildavsky notes that the American military soon grasped the need for abstract modeling to prepare the national defense, and “whereas civilians studying defense policy amounted to a few people in the 1930s, in 1960s the number reached to hundreds.”<sup>20</sup> Lyons noted that “what was once left largely to the military is now a rich vineyard to be worked by scholars, scientists, journalists, and statesmen.”<sup>21</sup> The accumulation of knowledge in the defense policy making was encouraged by civilians influential in the process, like U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara one of the most known examples.<sup>22</sup>

Hundreds of scholarly articles were written on defense policy-making since. Their content varies greatly, but recurring themes tend to center around three subjects: A descriptive and detailed account of the external security environment, institutions responsible for defense decision-making, their constitutional powers, and their relations to each other.

Another major debate as to how decision-making in defense should be studied is about determining a balance between a focus on expertise in defense policy-making on the one hand, and politics of defense and weapons procurement on the other, (effect of conflicting interests and objectives on the defense policy outcomes, as well as questions regarding accountability and transparency). Snyder argues that defense policy-making is a “matter of factual analysis, informed

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<sup>19</sup> “When experience means disaster, the world of theory is the only one appropriate for the study of nuclear war.” Ibid., p. 91.

<sup>20</sup> “The military have had to recognize the importance of abstract thought. They have begun to train their own defense intellectuals in universities, war colleges and research corporations.” Ibid., p. 101.

<sup>21</sup> Gene M. Lyons, op. cit., p. 489. “Much of what is written is polemical... But much that is written is a solid contribution of national security research to both scholarship and policy-making.”

<sup>22</sup> Charles H. Longley, “McNamara and Military Behavior”, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 18, No. 1, February, 1974, p. 7. pp. 1-21. Robert McNamara, American Defense Secretary between 1961 and 1968. “He introduced Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) into the Defense Ministry, a five-year framework for budget planning. By introducing cost-effectiveness and systems analysis to the Pentagon McNamara required that underlying assumptions be identified, quantified as to cost, projected over time, and compared with alternative approaches to the same problem.”

prediction, and logical deduction, although value questions cannot be entirely excluded,” and that there is an objectively determined “best” defense policy. Snyder challenges the view that politics and bargaining will produce a policy closer to the “logical imperatives of the national interest than an authoritative decision by one man... whose interests and outlook are truly natural.”<sup>23</sup> Mayer and Khademian point however, that the argument is in fact on the proper balance between expertise which should be politically neutral, and accountability and control, just like in any other public policy area.<sup>24</sup>

The main problem is one of multiple principals, each of whom has a say in choosing the goals to be achieved. Legislators, the President, the Office of the Secretary of Defense a service officials all have some claim on programs and there is no assurance that the demands they will make will be consistent... Some will insist that accountability must be maintained, even at inefficiently high costs. Some principles have a preference for procuring weapons as cheaply and as quickly as possible, even if it means sacrificing some performance, while others insist on the most advanced technology, even at the price of buying fewer units.<sup>25</sup>

Mayer and Khademian advocate oversight of defense procurement, closely inspecting which agent of the procurement process does what, as opposed to an outcome based evaluation method.

Parliaments receive a special attention here, and their impact is measured by the number and content of their legislation on defense, the quality of discussions they house on defense policy and weapon procurement as well as the defense budget and their control over Defense Departments and the Military.

Robert McNamara, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the General Motors before his appointment as the Defense Secretary in the Kennedy Administration,<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Glenn H. Snyder, “The Politics of National Defense”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 6, No. 4, December 1962, p. 371.

<sup>24</sup> Kenneth R. Mayer, Anne M. Khademian, “Bringing politics back in: Defense Policy and the Theoretical Study of Institutions and Processes”, *Public Administration Review*, Vol 56. No. 2, March – April, 1996, p. 182.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 185.

<sup>26</sup> John F. Kennedy, 35th President of the U.S. (1961-1963)

implemented the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), which Kennedy later asked to be implemented in other departments of the government. PPBS, which will be explained in larger detail in the Chapter 3 Section 2, is used also in preparation of the Turkish defense ministry's budget.

Third theme is the role of political culture on defense decisions. Charles P. Freilich, Israel's Deputy National Security Advisor until 2005, focuses on the external security environment and internal political system in his article "which presents a first of its kind typology of Israeli national security decision making process."<sup>27</sup> He concludes that the proportional representation system<sup>28</sup> allows political and ideological considerations cloud the judgments on vital defense issues such as major weapons systems<sup>29</sup>. On the other hand, Israeli Defense Force (IDF) uses an analytical problem-solving perspective, for example by considering purely military ramifications of various options for a peace settlement and objectives to political influences on weapons procurement<sup>30</sup>. Another variable Freilich concentrates upon is the "culture of consultation". Israeli political leaders, themselves experienced soldiers and statesmen, hold on contempt the experts who prioritize complexities rather than action.<sup>31</sup>

### **2.3. Defense Policy Studies in Turkey**

While Turkey also faced concrete security threats, in form of territorial demands from the Soviet Union, and terrorism during and after the Cold War, no comparable trend developed with regard to scholarly works on defense policy formulation and weapons procurement. Ali Karaosmanoğlu noted that:

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<sup>27</sup> Charles D. Freilich, "National Security Decision-Making in Israel, Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 4, Autumn 2006, p. 635.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 639.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 645.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 661.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 654.

Domestic studies on defense policy of our country are virtually non-existent. Moreover, the lack of expert politicians in defense matters hampers production of detailed and concise academic works which would enrich the intellectual development in the field...It is necessary to note that an overly broad definition of “secrecy” pushes intellectuals interested in security and defense matters to an unnecessary hesitancy.<sup>32</sup>

Mustafa Kibaroglu pointed at the low number of academics working on defense, and its structural reasons:

The prime reason for the lack of academic expertise in Turkey is a belief that defense is domain of a select few. There are a lot of reasons which deter academics from researching this subject. MGK<sup>33</sup> is the most important body which steers the defense policy. Sharing the content of MGK meetings is subject to legal penalty. The defense policy is crafted entirely by state’s hand in Turkey. Better examples of this include Western states, where individuals or think-tanks and institutes which earned trust of state work together on projects. State officials must provide academics, who would not abuse the information they acquire, with enough materials to conduct academic research.<sup>34</sup>

There are signs that defense policy is increasingly becoming an area of interest for academics and journalists. One example is the book titled “National Defense: Strategy, Technology, and Warfare” written by Dr. Sait Yilmaz.<sup>35</sup> the book covers a wide range of introductory elements to the study of defense policy, including definitions of defense, defense planning, defense policy making processes in NATO, the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Russia, China. Latest Almanacs by Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) on “Democratic Oversight of Security Sector” provide valuable information and data with regards to decision-making mechanism on security and defense. The emphasis on TESEV’s Almanacs<sup>36</sup> is given to the preponderance of the Military in Turkish Politics and its implications on defense policy. Institutional changes

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<sup>32</sup> Ali Karaosmanoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Savunması*, Dış Politika Enstitüsü, Ankara, 1987, p. 3. More details on the question of secrecy will be given in Chapter 5.

<sup>33</sup> National Security Council (MGK) will be explained in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

<sup>34</sup> Interview with. Mustafa Kibaroglu, Ankara, June 2009.

<sup>35</sup> Sait Yilmaz, “Ulusal Savunma: Strateji, Teknoloji, Savaş”, Kum Saati Yayınları, Istanbul 2009.

<sup>36</sup> Ed. Ali Bayramoğlu, Ahmet İnel, *Almanac Turkey: Democratic Oversight and Security Sector*, TESEV, Istanbul, July 2009. Ed. Ümit Cizre, *Almanac Turkey 2005, Security Sector and Democratic Oversight*, TESEV, Istanbul, September 2006.

like submitting the General Staff directly to the Defense Minister, rather than the Prime Minister receives special emphasis on more democratic defense policy-making in TESEV studies. The approach of this thesis is therefore different, as it will focus more on the reluctance of civilian to participate in defense policy-making and its structural reasons.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **HISTORY OF DEFENSE POLICY-MAKING AND WEAPONS PROCUREMENT IN TURKEY**

Ottoman Empire's military was based on a system of conquest and distribution of soil to agents appointed from the center in return for taxes and locally trained military units. As the system deteriorated, the need for a larger and professionally trained standing army became a necessity. The efforts of various Ottoman Sultans to implement reforms suggest that the military decision-making was not systemic; it was undertaken in an *ad hoc* manner, despite existence of consultative bodies formed by high-ranking officials. Weapons procurement had to catch up with the quality and quantity of production in Europe, and the choice between different strategies open to the Ottoman Empire was a prerogative of Sultans until 1909. Republican period built upon defense policy-making institutions of the Ottoman Empire. After initial attempts to start a domestic defense industry, massive American aid enabled decision-makers to ignore capacity building in domestic arms production as well as.

#### **3.1. Defense policy-making and weapons procurement in the Ottoman Empire**

##### **3.1.1. Military modernization efforts under Selim III**

Until the foundation of the *Serasker* in 1826, Ottoman Empire's first Ministry of War, structural reforms for the Empire's defense were largely dependent on the

initiatives of the Sultans, who in turn depended on Viziers<sup>37</sup> and high state officials for consulting. The first fundamental reforms in the military sphere belong to the reign of Selim III.<sup>38</sup>

The efforts for substantial military reform in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman era came as a result of successive failures to adapt old institutions into new military technologies and techniques, prompted by defeats in the Balkans against Russians. The treaty of Küçük Kaynarca<sup>39</sup>, signed on July 21, 1774 after the Ottoman-Russian War that started in 1768, brought Russia to the Black Sea, enabled it to control Crimea which was separated from the Ottoman Empire, and gave it rights to intervene in juridical matters concerning Christians within the Ottoman Empire. The war of 1768-1774 reflected the deficiencies in decision-making and war administration system of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>40</sup> The Grand Viziers had the duty of commander-in-chief during Ottoman military campaigns. Short tenure of Viziers and their lack of military experience hindered effective use of military forces.<sup>41</sup> During the campaign of 1769, most Viziers had no military experience as they were educated in the Palace. Moreover, the conduct of armies was under responsibility of two grand Viziers, one in the battlefield, the other at the Palace, complicating decision-making:

Although the Grand Vizier had a complete command on the battlefield, two chanceries, one in battlefield accompanying Grand Vizier and the other in

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<sup>37</sup> Highest ranking counselor to the Sultan. As a rule the Ottoman Vezirate included the high military command. Gustav Bayerle, *Pashas, Begs and Effendis: Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire*, The ISIS Press, Istanbul, 1997, p. 156.

<sup>38</sup> The difference of Sultan Selim III's reforms from earlier attempts to rejuvenate the Empire's military capability is that for the first time a reform effort based on the idea of "returning to pure ways" (Sharia) was discarded in favor of adopting European style institutions.

<sup>39</sup> Küçük Kaynarca is the name of a village on the right bank of the river Danube near Silistre.

<sup>40</sup> Metin Bezikoğlu, "The Deterioration of the Ottoman Administration in the Light of the Ottoman Russia War of 1768-1774", Master's Thesis, Master of Arts in Bilkent University, 2002, p. 53.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha (30 April, 1765- 7 August 1768) Silahdar Hamza Mahir Pasha (7 August-20 October 1768) served just one month, Yağlıkcızade Mehmed Emin Pasha (20 October 1768- 12 August 1769) ten months, Moldovancı Ali Pasha (16 August-12 December 1769) five months, İvaz-zade Halil Pasha (12 December 1769-25 October 1770) almost eleven months, Silahdar Mehmed Pasha (25 October 1770-11 January 1771) three months, and for the second time Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha 11 January 1771- 4 August, 1774.



Istanbul under the control of substitute Grand Vizier in Istanbul were also effective in decision-making. Disagreements between the two different decision centers caused confusion and negatively affected the campaign. As a result of absence of effective leadership and command the army suffered bitter defeats before the Russian troops.<sup>42</sup>

Large scale military organizational overhaul however, did not come until after Selim III's efforts to compel the Janissaries adopt Western weapons and Western style military training were frustrated during the War of 1787-1792.<sup>43</sup> The Ottoman army was in a state of neglect and decay, rendering it inferior to European armies by the time Selim III acceded to throne on April 6, 1789.<sup>44</sup> Selim III's first reform attempt was to convene *Meşveret* (consulting), an advisory body composed of senior state officials and army bureaucrats.<sup>45</sup> *Meşveret* produced nothing except to repeat that a strict adherence to Sharia was necessary to save the Empire.

As the final decision-maker on administrative affairs of the country, Selim III's will and character was the single most important factor in the decision to start, and later abruptly end, *Nizam-ı Cedid*,<sup>46</sup> the new infantry force of the Empire similar to those in Europe. The idea was brought to the Sultan's attention by Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha, who assembled a group of renegades captured during the war against Russia in 1791 to train with captured Russian weapons

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>43</sup> The Russian Empress Catherina II's desire to establish a Greek State was the prime reason for the restart of hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.

<sup>44</sup> Stanford J. Shaw, "The Origins of the Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of the Sultan Selim III", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 37, September 1965, No. 3, p. 291. Janissaries were not powerful enough to defeat the European armies, but retained enough power to upset any reform attempt in the military sphere, as there was not any other standing army loyal to Sultan that could defeat them.

<sup>45</sup> Ali Rıza Şimşek, *Osmanlı Ordusunda 18. ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Yapılan İslahat Çalışmaları ve Bu Çalışmalarda Yabancı Uzmanların Rolü*, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Sakarya University, 2006, p. 94.

<sup>46</sup> The term *Nizam-ı Cedid*, "the New Order," is sometimes used to refer to all administrative, financial, and military reforms during the reign of Selim III, between 1789 and 1807. To Selim III and his contemporaries, *Nizam-ı Cedid* meant only the new army created separately from the rest of the standing army. Stanford J. Shaw, "The Nizam-ı Cedid Army Under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807".

according to European style maneuvers, while he was still on the field against the Russian army.<sup>47</sup> On his return, Yusuf Pasha showed the new corps to Selim III outside Istanbul to avoid reaction of the Janissaries. The Sultan was impressed by the massed firepower, and ordered in March 1792 to proceed with the training of the new army, keeping his decision secret from the Imperial Council. Only in May 1792 did the Sultan reveal his design to the Council, which decided on the administrative structure of the new army on May 14. According to the decision taken by the Council, direction of the new army was given to Mustafa Reşid Pasha, who assumed both duties of running the new treasury, *Irada-ı Cedid*, (new revenue, formed on March 1, 1793 to finance *Nizam-ı Cedid*) and the *Ta'limli Askeri Nazırı* (supervisor of trained soldiers). Reşid Pasha successfully raised new revenues to support the new army and demanded officers from French Ministry of War to train soldiers.<sup>48</sup> The *Nizam-ı Cedid* was announced officially only on September 18, 1794, two years after it came into existence, in order to ensure that it is strong enough to defeat the Janissaries. Selim III decided to announce the army and confront the expected resistance of the Janissaries only after ordering, in 1793, two hundred officials to draft reports on the necessary administrative, financial and military reforms.<sup>49</sup> Only 22 reports were presented to the Sultan, thirteen of which were prepared by civilian bureaucrats, and five were written by the members of the *Ulema*. Selim III decided to opt for the radical reformists, who thought that the reform of the Janissaries was impossible and a new army was necessary. *Nizam-ı Cedid* expanded to two regiments by 1799, totaling 4.317 men and provincial governors were ordered to recruit and train soldiers according to *Nizam-ı Cedid* style. One of the nine governors who actually fulfilled the order, Abdurrahman Pasha of Karaman, launched a military conscription system throughout Anatolia in 1802.

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<sup>47</sup> Shaw, op. cit. in note 36, p. 292.

<sup>48</sup> The title *Ta'limli Askeri Nazırı* was subsequently transferred to the supervisor of the cannon corps for more efficiency in late 1801. *Defterdar-ı Irada-ı Cedid* retained his financial and administrative duties concerning the *Nizam-ı Cedid*.

<sup>49</sup> Şimşek, op. cit. in note 36, p. 98.

Though the new army was employed with success against the French in 1799,<sup>50</sup> Selim III kept it mostly in Istanbul, yielding to the pressure of the Janissaries.<sup>51</sup> The most fateful event spelling the end of *Nizam-ı Cedid* reform occurred in 1805, when Ismail Ağa of Rusçuk captured Edirne in reaction to Abdurrahman's efforts to conscript men in the Balkans for the new army. Instead of ordering Abdurrahman to attack and eliminate the resistance, Selim III dismissed Abdurrahman Pasha and appointed the leader of Janissaries, Ibrahim Hilmi Pasha, as the new Grand Vizier. In the face of another Janissary revolt in 1807, Selim III dissolved *Nizam-ı Cedid*. The message for the successive reformers of the Ottoman Military was clear: the armed opposition of the Janissaries must be eliminated first if an efficient army was to be built. The remaining soldiers from the new army formed the core of the new army of Sultan Mahmud II, the *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye*.

### 3.1.2. First Defense ministry of the Ottoman Empire, *Serasker*

Mahmud II ordered a convention of senior state officials to agree on a new military unit on May 25 1826. The convention included the Ağa of the Janissaries and agreed on establishment of a new military unit along European lines, with the necessary fatwa. Janissaries rebelled on June 15 1826 as expected, but this time Mahmud II had secured the support of cannon units, and annihilated the Janissaries, strongest opposition to Ottoman reform, with cannon fire.<sup>52</sup> Mahmud II founded the first defense ministry of the Ottoman Empire, *Seraskerlik*, with a decree on June 18, 1826, along with a new army, *Asakir-i Mansurei Muhammediye* (Victorious Muslim Soldiers).<sup>53</sup> The first *Serasker* was Ağa Hüseyin Pasha who in

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<sup>50</sup> 700 *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers were sent to Gaza in 1799 to defend the fort against the French army led by Napoleon Bonaparte. Two years later, 2000 *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers, together with a British contingent, forced a French army to surrender in Alexandria.

<sup>51</sup> Shaw, op. cit. in note 36, p. 303.

<sup>52</sup> Şimşek, op. cit. in note 37, p. 157.

<sup>53</sup> [Bahaddin Alpkın, Yücel Yükselcan](#), *Milli Savunma Bakanlığı'nda 150 yıl 1826-1976*, Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Yayını, Ankara, 1976, p. 1. *Serasker* received additional duties from the Janissaries like firefighting, police duties and public order in Istanbul. With growing centralization, police duties of the *Serasker* were transferred to another institution, *Zabtiye Muşiriyerti* in 1846.

his office combined the tasks of the commander in chief and war minister. *Serasker* was directly responsible to the Sultan after a regulation issued in 1835, and was equivalent of *Sadrizam* and *Şeyhülislam* in the bureaucracy. He was the top military administrator of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>54</sup>

Despite the foundation of a ministry to organize the Army, political maneuverings and court politics beset meaningful structuring of the army from its onset, as Mahmud II was directly involved in appointments to high ranking positions above Brigadier-general (*Mirliva*).<sup>55</sup> The most blatant example of bringing an inexperienced state official to a position of top military responsibility was the promotion of Said Mehmed Ağa, an attendant of the Sultan (*Mabeyinci*) as a brigadier-general of cavalry in 1833. Five years later he became the *Serasker*. The highest Ottoman military ranks were thus filled with the ruling elite and its favorites.

The war effort against Russia in 1828 was beset by rivalry of two top state officials, the new *Serasker* Hüsrev Mehmed Pasha, and the Grand Vizier Selim Mehmed Pasha. Selim Mehmed appointed Ağa Hüseyin Pasha, who was removed from *Seraskerlik* the previous year for reason of insufficient knowledge of warfare, as the Independent Commander-in-Chief (*Müstakil Serasker*), of the main Ottoman army (Imperial army) that was sent to fight the Russians, despite traditionally the Imperial army is led by the Grand Vizier in person. Moreover, Selim Mehmed Pasha and Hüsrev Mehmed Pasha both appointed proxies to the army in the field to exercise control over Ağa Hüseyin Pasha. Hüsrev sent Halil Pasha as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief (*Ordu Seraskeri Kâimmakamı*) to Hüseyin Pasha's camp. A rival of the latter, Şaib Efendi, was sent by the Grand

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Muşiriyet became a ministry in 1870. Glen W. Swanson, "The Ottoman Police", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 7, No. ½, January - April, 1972, p. 253.

<sup>54</sup> Uğur Ünal, "Sultan Abdülaziz Devri Osmanlı Kara Ordusu: 1861-1876", Doctoral Thesis Gazi University, Department of Contemporary History, p. 76.

<sup>55</sup> Avigdor Levy, "Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II's New Ottoman Army, 1826-39", *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, January, 1971, p. 30. Serasker was responsible for appointment to lower ranks.

Vizier as the superintendent of the Imperial Army (*Ordu Nâzırı*) by the Grand Vizier. Şaib Efendi reported that:

neither one of the military leaders are capable of exercising command. Hüseyin Pasha is too ignorant to be Chief of Staff, and Halil too effeminate to be a soldier.<sup>56</sup>

The need to appoint officers trained in warfare did not prompt the Sultan to found a military official school until 1834. The haphazard nature of the decision to establish a school that would train the officers is an evidence of the state of neglect the military apparatus of the Empire was in, and to the inefficiency of the *Serasker* as an institution.<sup>57</sup> Namık Pasha, who later became the founder of the School of Military Sciences (*Mekteb-i Ulûm-u Harbiye*), discussed the defeat of the Ottoman Army against the Egyptian forces with Marshal Maison<sup>58</sup> in Paris. Maison's answer is worth quoting:

Since the entire world confirms and admits the superiority of the Turks over the Arabs in regard to courage and bravery, the recent defeat was not a result of cowardice...on the part of the Ottoman troops. Muhammad Ali has long trained his army and especially his officers with new military sciences, using the services of European instructors. But you do not have European instructors and at present not even a military school and senior and junior officers are appointed from among the educated and uneducated sons of dignitaries and from the slaves of the Viziers. The real reason for your defeat is this ignorance and lack of schools.

Namık Pasha tried to convince Mahmud II to found a new school after sharing the conversation with him. Sultan agreed with Namık Pasha, despite objection from the *Serasker* Hüsrev Pasha, who argued that two new regiments could be maintained with the money necessary to establish an officer school. The school

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid. 37.

<sup>57</sup> By 1834, there were engineering and mathematics schools established by foreigners in the Ottoman Empire. The mathematics school was opened in 1734, but was shut down due to fear of a Janissary revolt in 1740. Mustafa III reopened the school in 1763. *Mühendishane-i Bahri Hümayun* was opened in 1773 to train navy personnel, and *Mühendishane-i Sultani (Mühendishane-i Berri Hümayun)* after 1795) was founded by Selim III in 1790 to train artillery personnel.

“Though it led a rather tenuous existence for many years, the School of Mathematics (*Hendesehane*), founded in 1734 under the supervision of Bonneval, developed under Selim III and Mahmud II into a military Land Engineering School (*Mühendishane-i Berrî-i Hümayun*) and a Naval Engineering School (*Mühendishane-i Bahrî-i Hümayun*).” Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>58</sup> “Commander of the French expeditionary force which in 1828 had replaced the Egyptian troops in Greece.” Ibid.

was founded in the summer of 1838, but was plagued by insufficient training materials, books, infrastructure, and instructors. Ottoman armies in 1839 were thus composed of several independent corps whose movements were not coordinated at all.

Another important institution set up by Mahmud II was the Military Council, (*Dâr-i ûrâ-yi Askerî*) in 1837. The Military Council was a branch of the *Seraskerlik*, and it was responsible for meeting the requirements of the army, (except the artillery) like armaments, equipment, clothing and payments. Its duties also included managing tenders for purchases and sales, quality control, comparison of prices, and submit list of promotions to the Sultan.<sup>59</sup> It was this council which proposed that a five-year military service be introduced. The proposal was included in the Imperial Edict of Gülhane, declared in 1839.<sup>60</sup>

During Sultan Abdülmecid's reign (1839-1861) Ottoman Empire's first conscription system, based on lot drawing, was introduced with a decree in 1843. In the same year, Ministry of Imperial Ordinance (*Meclis-i Tophane-i Amire*) was founded to organize the artillery equipment and production.

*Seraskerlik* was separated in two during *Sadrazam* Fuat Pasha period, (1863-1866) under Sultan Abdülaziz's reign (1861-1876), into *Bâb-ı Seraskerî*, which maintained the general direction of the army under Fuad Pasha, and *Harbiye Nezareti*, which was charged with running bureaucratic affairs. But this separation was subsequently abolished.

A major problem of the *Serasker* was that the efforts of its various branches were not coordinated. Departments responsible for organizing the Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Logistics were not guided in any way by a common principle, or a common policy. Each was responsible for regulating its own operations in peace

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<sup>59</sup> Ünal, op. cit. in note 46, p. 82.

<sup>60</sup> Erik-Jan Zürcher , "The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practise", *International Review of Social History*, No. 43 (3), 1998, p. 439.

and war. No one had the knowledge or concern for plans to train officials, privates, animals, and organize vehicles and armaments in war and peace.<sup>61</sup> After Abdülaziz, *Seraskerlik* was abolished and the Ministry of War (*Harbiye Nezareti*) was founded. But the ministry was abolished two years later. The Ministry of War was finally established only after 1908. During Abdülhamid II's reign, between 1876 and 1909, the Sultan bypassed all institutions in determining defense policy and preparation of the Ottoman army.<sup>62</sup> He similarly reduced the influence of British military officers, as Britain separated Cyprus from Ottoman Empire in 1878 at the Berlin conference. Abdülhamid II was under a constant fear of a military coup, and he banned training with live rounds, and even limited training by German officers, who he hoped could bring Germany's favors for the Ottoman Empire. However Sultan even restricted authority of von der Goltz<sup>63</sup> on necessary reforms and more importantly he banned all training maneuvers.

The political turmoil and struggle for governmental power in the Empire prevented an institutional approach to defense policy-making. Decisions on war and peace as well as its conduct were left at the hands of a few or most of the time only one individual often to disastrous results.

The next phase in the Ottoman Empire's administration came as a result of the student opposition to Abdülhamid's regime<sup>64</sup> which had turned into a police state

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<sup>61</sup> Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, op. cit. in note 45, p. 3.

<sup>62</sup> While the bureaucracy concerned with the Army remained in place, the 1876 Constitution (*Kanun-i Esasi*) Article 7 stated that "Among the sovereign rights of His Majesty the Sultan are the following prerogatives...he concludes treaties with the powers; he declares war and makes peace; he commands both land and sea forces; he directs military movements." In 1909 the Constitution was revised, and the same Article read "the command of the military and naval forces; the declaration of war and the making of peace" is Sultan's "sacred prerogative."

<sup>63</sup> Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, a German Colonel whose book "The Nation in Arms" influenced the Prussian-German and Ottoman army organization, was invited to Istanbul as Inspector-General of the Ottoman army, its deputy Chief of the General Staff. He stayed in Istanbul until 1895. William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, Routledge, London and New York, 1994, p. 28-29.

<sup>64</sup> While Abdulhamid II is usually considered a suppressive dictator, his investment in official schools ironically ensured that a modern class of officers grew in number large enough to challenge his style of rule. During his reign, number of primary schools doubled, number of *Rüşdiyes*, or military high schools quadrupled. Ottoman University (Dar ül-Funun-i Osmaniye) was opened in 1900 with four faculties of religious studies, mathematics, natural sciences and literature. Hale, op. cit. in note 54, p. 28.

where opponents were suppressed. The revolution of 1908 was brought about by the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), whose core was the Ottoman Union Society, a secret organization founded by four students of the military medical college in 1889. Their aim was to bring a Constitutional regime to the Empire. Another organization Ottoman Freedom Society, brought together the triumvirate which would have absolute power between 1913 and 1918, namely Mehmet Talat (a postal officer in Salonika and a former member of CUP in 1890s), Major Ahmed Cemal and Captain Enver. Ottoman Freedom Society merged with CUP, but the control of the organization passed into the hands of these three.

Even after Abdülhamid II ceded to revolutionaries' demands to declare the Constitution on July 23, 1908, the government was still headed by old politicians.<sup>65</sup> The sweeping change arrived as a result of a counter-revolution attempt by *alaylı* officers, Muslim religious students under leadership of a dervish.<sup>66</sup> Mahmut Şevket Pasha, commander of the Third Army, took over Istanbul from counter-revolutionaries on April 27, 1909. Abdülhamid II was deposed by the Parliament and replaced by Mehmed Reshad, who in effect had no power to rule.

The attitude of the Mahmud Şevket Pasha towards politics was an example of the pattern of military civil relations that was to trouble Turkey for the years to come. Mahmud Şevket Pasha believed in the necessity to keep the army out of politics, but he was sucked into the political game to “protect the law and restore order.”<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 38. Mehmed Said Pasha was the head of government from July to August 1908, and was replaced by Mehmet Kâmil Pasha. Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, who was regarded as a pro-CUP politician, succeeded Kâmil Pasha in February 1909. Note that at the time the CUP revolutionaries considered themselves too young to assume power directly in the cabinet, despite CUP's large majority at the Parliament.

<sup>66</sup> Hafız Dervish Vahdeti was the founder of Society of Islamic Unity.

<sup>67</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999, p. 67. “The soldier was obliged to meddle because of the inability of politicians to protect law and order. Even if there was no military dictatorship, the influence of the military in politics increased in the Empire.”



He became the sole arbiter in defense matters thereafter. As the commander of the martial law in Istanbul, as well as the Inspector-General of the First, Second and Third Armies, commander of all soldiers in Istanbul, European provinces, and Western Anatolia, he had the last word on practically all issues, including of course, defense. At this time the CUP had no real power. As the Inspector General of three armies, a post which he created himself on May 18, 1909, Şevket Pasha was exempt from the control of the Minister of War and the Cabinet. Şevket Pasha refused to let Finance Ministry to monitor and inspect the defense expenditures. In an attempt to bring Şevket Pasha under government control, Hakkı Pasha, who replaced Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha as the *Sadrizam* in 1910, included the Inspector General in his cabinet as the Minister of War. But the power of the military over politics grew even more. The Ottoman army had the largest share of the Empire's budget, and the constant threat of war made administrative reform attempts in areas other than the military obsolete. Calls of Finance Minister Cavit Bey to invest in areas more productive than land and naval forces were not heeded. On June 16, 1910, Şevket Pasha defended the Military budget in front of the Parliament, arguing that the deputies should leave their political convictions aside when voting for the military budget. The Parliament ignored Cavit Bey's warnings about the dire situation of the Empire's budget, and voted in favor of Şevket Pasha's proposal.<sup>68</sup>

Cavit Bey attempted once more to monitor and inspect the military budget by establishing an inspection department at his ministry. Şevket Pasha resigned from his cabinet post rather than to give in to budgetary inspection. A CUP delegation convinced Şevket Pasha return to the cabinet, on the condition that the military budget was exempt from inspection. A similar cabinet crisis erupted in 1911, this time between Nail Bey, the new Finance Minister, and Şevket Pasha, who still resisted showing the military budget to inspectors. All disputes over the monitoring of the budget lost their validity when Italians declared war upon the Empire on September 29, 1911 to annex Tripoli.

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<sup>68</sup> Şevket Pasha asked for 9.5 million golds plus 5 million golds of credit for extraordinary expenditures, an amount equal to one third of the whole state budget.

The Unionists in the cabinet forced Şevket Pasha to resign on July 10, 1912 after the anti CUP *Halâskar Zabitan* (Savior officers) rebelled. Under threat of a coup d'état however, the Grand Vizier Said Pasha had to step down, and a new cabinet independent from the CUP was formed.

It has to be noted that the above disputes and irregularities in defense decision-making organization were directly responsible for the disastrous defeats in subsequent battles. The Balkan War that started in October 1912 and pitted Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro against the Ottoman Empire, was a case in point. The defense plans to conduct a war in Macedonia were rendered useless because of the political upheaval in the ministry of War. When asked about whether the defense plans were ready, Nazım Pasha responded that “there are some plans left from the time of Mahmut Şevket Pasha. I will find and analyze them.” Nazım Pasha moreover ignored the advise of Mahmut Şevket Pasha and von der Goltz (who had returned to the Ottoman Empire at that time) to wage a defensive war.<sup>69</sup> The plans were never used, the unorganized Turkish army was defeated, and Balkan forces arrived as close as 65 km to Istanbul.<sup>70</sup>

After the first Balkan War, CUP<sup>71</sup> ruled the country not through its party at the Ottoman Parliament, but relying on the most influential triumvirate within the party, Enver, Talat, and Cemal.<sup>72</sup> Enver Pasha was the Minister of War and

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<sup>69</sup> Hale, op. cit. in note 54, p. 43.

<sup>70</sup> Ahmad, op. cit. in note 58, p. 143.

<sup>71</sup> Enver, the chief of Staff of the Strategic Reserve in Istanbul, led the Raid on the Sublime Port (*Babi-Ali baskını*) on January 23, 1913, which left Nazım Pasha killed. Şevket Pasha reassumed the Ministry of War, but was shot dead on June 11 by the CUP opposition. Martial law was established again in İstanbul, and all liberals were arrested or sent into exile. When Bulgaria started fighting in June 1913 against Greece, Serbia over the lands conquered in the First Balkan War and left Edirne undefended, Enver and Talat forced the government to order an attack on the city, eventually recapturing it. Enver convinced the Grand Vizier Mehmet Said Halim Pasha (a CUP member with little independence from the CUP committee) to appoint him the Minister of War on January 1, 1914. Enver brought Cemal Pasha as the minister of Navy, and Talat as the minister of Interior. Hale, op. cit. in note 54, p. 44-45.

<sup>72</sup> Dankwart A. Rustow, “The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic”, *World Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 4, (July 1959), p. 516.

deputy Commander in Chief, (commander in chief nominally being the Sultan) and he led the secret alliance negotiations with Germany, (concluded on August 2, 1914) that pushed the Empire to the Great War, with the knowledge of only three cabinet members.<sup>73</sup> Similarly, Enver kept secret from the Grand Vizier and most of Cabinet members his orders to Admiral Souchon<sup>74</sup>, to open hostilities against the Russians.

The opening of hostilities without the knowledge and consent of the Grand Vizier and a majority of the ministers naturally caused an uproar at the Porte and dangerous dissensions in the committee of the Ittihad ve Terakki Party. The situation was aggravated by a temporary split in the ranks of the very ministers and party officials who had been involved in, or known of, the preparation of the raid. Unlike Enver, who had been the central figure in the plot, Cemal (Minister of Navy), Talât (Minister of Interior), and Halil were greatly annoyed that Souchon had carried the attack all the way to the Russian coast; they had expected the clash with the Russians to occur on the high sea, where Ottoman provocative intent would have been far less evident.<sup>75</sup>

Enver thus had a dominating influence within the Cabinet, and pushed the Empire into war along German ranks despite the opposition of other figures in the cabinet. The conduct of the Ottoman Armies during the Great War was plagued by similar arbitrary rules of Enver Pasha. The decision to open a front in the Caucasus and surround the Russian army by leading an expedition over the Sarıkamış mountainous region was entirely his scheme, over objections from other officers, like General Liman von Sanders, another German military advisor in the Ottoman

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<sup>73</sup> Ulrich Trumpener, "Turkey's entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities", *Journal of Modern History*, December 1962, Vol. 34, December 1962, No. 4., p. 371. pp. 369-380. "In 1914, the committee included about forty leaders of the Party of Union and Progress, among them several cabinet ministers. The exact relationship between this body and the official organs of the government is rather obscure, but there is some evidence that the decisions of the Porte tended to reflect the majority opinion in the committee."

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 369. "Upon their arrival at the Straits on August 10, 1914 the German cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" had been officially incorporated into the sultan's navy by a bogus sale, and Souchon had been appointed commander of the Ottoman fleet. Although the two cruisers were given Turkish names, they retained their status as ships of the German imperial navy..."

<sup>75</sup> Ulrich Trumpener, "Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 189.

Empire. Direction of the third army in Sarıkamış expedition in December 1914 was at the hands of Enver Pasha.<sup>76</sup>

During the War of Independence conducted by the National Assembly in Ankara, between 1920 and 1922, a National Defense Minister (*Milli Müdafaa Vekaleti*) was included in the cabinet of ministers. Another ministry was set up for post of General Staff (*Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Vekâleti*). The commander in chief was the coordinator between these two ministries. General Staff was responsible for training, maneuvers and intelligence services of the armed forces, while the National Defense Ministry directed mobilization, logistics and administration of the armed forces. National Defense Ministry resumed its duties after the declaration of the Republic in 1923.<sup>77</sup>

### **3.1.3. Weapons Procurement in the Ottoman Period**

The Ottoman Empire largely produced its own weapons in state owned factories, in state owned dry-docks, forgeries for cannon, factories for muskets and saltpeter works by copying Western technology and bringing foreign experts. Contrary to the general opinion, the Ottoman Empire was largely self sufficient in armament and ammunition production until the early nineteenth century<sup>78</sup>, when the rapid technological change in Europe, dire financial situation of the Empire and incessant wars imposed a difficult dilemma on decision-makers between purchasing with speed the state-of-the-art weaponry from Europe, or catching up with Europe in terms of production speed and quality, a much more expensive and slow ordeal. As will be seen, the uncoordinated and *ad hoc* nature of weapon

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<sup>76</sup> Liman von Sanders, *Türkiye'de Beş Sene*, Yeditepe Yayınevi, İstanbul, December 2006, p. 59.

<sup>77</sup> Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, op. cit. in note 45, p. 7.

<sup>78</sup> Jonathan Grant, "Rethinking the Ottoman 'Decline': Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries", *Journal of World History*, Vol. 10, No. 10., 1999, p. 182. pp. 179-201. Grant states that from the fifteenth century to the beginning of nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire was a "third-tier" producer, which copied and produced existing Technologies but did not acquire the process of innovation.

acquisition in the nineteenth century, and personal judgment of Ottoman Sultans were decisive factors for the start of dependency on foreign weapon suppliers.

In the sixteenth century, Ottoman Empire had a tremendous capacity to produce its own ships. Right after the Battle of Lepanto<sup>79</sup>, the French ambassador reported on May 8, 1572 that the Ottoman docks had built 150 galleys in five months. Similarly, the Venetian *bailo*, Gianfrancesco reported in 1585 that:

The naval forces which the Great Turk uses to defend his empire are vast and second to none in the world. He has an enormous number of galleys in his dockyard and he can turn out more whenever he wants, because he has plenty of wood, iron parts, skilled workers, pitch, tallow, and all the other things needed. True, at present they do not have at hand all the armament they would need to outfit the as yet uncompleted galleys, much less those the Grand Signor has ordered made, and they are short of cotton sailcloth and other things. But his resources are so great that if he wanted to he could quickly assemble what he needs; he has already begun to attend to this.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman navy was still comparable with the Venetian forces, as observed by Henry Grenville.<sup>80</sup> But a comparison with Venetians was not enough to prove supremacy over Britain and France, who secured the main naval activities in the Western Mediterranean during the second half of the eighteenth century. The state-owned armament production system proved its limits, as manpower, financial and material sources as well as expertise had to be provided by the Empire's center, making improvements dependent not on a sound competitive system, but on the quality of leadership and availability of resources.

Towards the end of the seventeenth century, reforms initiated by Mezamorto Hüseyin Pasha ensured that the Ottoman Empire achieved the technological shift from oar-powered to sail powered galleons. But a lack of resolve in reforms caused the size of the Navy to be limited. It took the initiative of Selim III to bring the Ottoman naval power close to that of Britain and France, at least in the Mediterranean. Due to mainly financial difficulties but also to lack of technical

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<sup>79</sup> Battle of Lepanto, (1571) was a clear defeat for the Ottoman Empire, whose 80 vessels were sunk and 130 captured, out of its 230 galleys.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., p. 188.

leadership, the naval construction yards were not working.<sup>81</sup> Selim III ensured that Naval production facilities were brought to European standards. Two wooden dry-docks were replaced by three stone ones, and five new ship-building forms were constructed.<sup>82</sup> Selim III's reforms were successful, as Ottoman dry-dock produced forty-five modern fighting ships between 1789 and 1798.

Selim III also initiated a modernization program for artillery production, relying on foreign machinery and expertise.<sup>83</sup> This expertise was absorbed into the Empire mainly by accepting skilled Europeans who defected from their countries before 1780s, but formal missions to transfer technology were arranged later on.<sup>84</sup> Factory machinery was imported from Britain and France, and cannon founders were sent by France. However, these facilities had a limited productiveness, because of lack of skilled and sustained leadership in their administration. Moreover, the employment of foreign specialists, a regular practice established long before Selim III, had some deficiencies, like being dependent on international political developments that meant interruptions in modernization efforts. Whereas between 1795 and 1798 every arms factory but the one in Hasköy was under guidance of two Frenchmen, Aubert and Cuny, they had to be replaced by Swedish and English after the French invasion of Egypt. Rivalries between foreign advisors and low level of competence of many foreign advisors hindered their effectiveness.<sup>85</sup>

The pattern of State owned factories which used foreign experts to operate was valid for the gunpowder production as well. The state built factories, financed them, and directed them through commissioners it appointed. Central government directed and monitored production, transporting, collecting, and use of gunpowder. The improvements in the quality and quantity of gunpowder came as a result of

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<sup>81</sup> Şimşek, op. cit. in note 37, p. 118.

<sup>82</sup> Grant, op. cit. in note 56.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p. 193.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 200.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., p. 198.

direct impetus from the central government. In the last decades of the eighteenth century, Ottomans were still using a gunpowder formula of sixteenth century, compared to Europe where more stable gunpowder was in common use. The reform during Selim III's reign ensured that the Ottoman Empire catch up with its European rivals. In the summer of 1794, Tevki'i Al Ratik Efendi modernized existing powderworks, and European equipment was brought for gunpowder factories, (*Baruthane*). Additional improvements in gunpowder factories under guidance of Mehmed Şerif Efendi and British gunpowder experts ensured that the Ottoman Empire became self-sufficient in gunpowder production after 1795.<sup>86</sup>

When Mahmud II ascended the throne, the Ottoman Navy was struck by lack of personnel trained in technical matters.<sup>87</sup> Greeks formed most of the Ottoman navy, and they joined the Greek rebellion in 1821. Mahmud II ordered recruitment of Muslim soldiers, and on March 31, 1826, constructed another dockyard as an addition to the older built by Swedish engineers under Selim III's rule. Ottoman Empire managed to build a galleon of 128 cannons, *Mahmudiye*, and a frigate of 64 cannons, *Şerefresan*. Ship construction was entirely dependent upon foreign expertise, and the choice for its source depended largely on the state of international relations of the Empire. Mahmud II was forced to turn to the United States for Navy modernization when the British and the French burned the Ottoman fleet in Navarin in 1829. In order to benefit from the steam-powered ships, the Sultan signed an agreement with the United States on May 7, 1830. A secret clause in the agreement that guaranteed American technical aid in Istanbul dockyards was ruled out by the American Senate, on the grounds that "it could lead to conflicts and difficulties on the foreign policy of the United States."<sup>88</sup>

The American government nevertheless promised the Sultan that technical aid would proceed, and sent Henry Eckford, a naval engineer, to Istanbul along with American shipbuilders. Forster Rhodes, who replaced Eckford, built *Nusratiye*

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid., p. 196.

<sup>87</sup> Şimşek, op. cit. in note 44, p. 166.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., p. 167.

galleon in 1835, and the first Ottoman steam-powered ship, *Eser-i Hayır* on November 26, 1837, followed by *Mesir-i Bahri* in 1839. Financial difficulties weighed heavily after 1830s however, and the Ottoman Empire gradually became dependent on imports. Despite the dire financial situation of the Empire, 70 percent of total revenues were allocated to the army during 1830s.<sup>89</sup>

The Ottoman State continued to own and operate all of the armament production sites in the country. Ministry of Imperial Ordnance, an independent body from the *Serasker*, was responsible for the production, repair, and supply of weapons, administered Zeytinburnu factory, as well as powder mills in Istanbul and Anatolia. It had defense, communications, and supply departments and was charged with training personnel and defending the straits.<sup>90</sup> As the financial situation of the Empire deteriorated, the armament factories remained short of meeting Ottoman military's demand. The most viable alternative in the face of pressing wars was import of state-of-the art weaponry from Europe, a choice that proved its effectiveness in the face of Russians at the war of 1877-1878. Ottoman army used French, British, and German guns in its regiments, while the German Krupp guns formed the backbone of the army's firepower. With regard to infantry rifles, the United States appeared as the ultimate choice on the eve of the war, since this country was considered to produce the best rifles, and be able to meet the huge Ottoman demand.<sup>91</sup> After the war, the share of the United States from Ottoman armament imports disappeared. It has to be noted here that the Russian response was starkly in opposition to the Ottoman one in the face of an impending war. Ottoman choice rendered it totally dependent on foreign exports, while the Russians endeavored to establish a modern indigenous military industry. Although in the War of 1877 the Ottoman arms were thus superior to that of the Russians, in

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<sup>89</sup> Jonathan Grant, "The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914", *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 66, No. 1, January 2002, p. 12.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>91</sup> Ottoman State had 600.000 Snider rifles, 80.000.000 Snider cartridges by 1875. Ottoman army also had 50.000 American Winchester repeating carbines. Before the war broke out, Ottoman Empire ordered 600.000 Martini Peabody repeater rifles from the Providence Tool Company in Rhode Island.



the long term the domestic production of the Ottoman Empire was greatly damaged by the choice of armament import.

Dependency on Naval equipment was even more apparent, as the rapid technological change that rendered the first steam-powered ironclads obsolete could not be fully brought to the Empire, due to financial restraints. Purchase of fighting ships from Europe thus became the most assured way for maintaining good weapons, as opposed to building the necessary infrastructure to build ships domestically. When the Russian fleet destroyed the Ottoman fleet in Sinop in 1853, the central government bought the first warships from abroad.<sup>92</sup> Between 1859 and 1868, thirty ships were imported, compared to thirteen produced domestically. The result against the Russians in the 1877 War was similar as in land forces. Ottoman navy was considered superior to the Russian fleet before the war. The Ottoman defeat was due to the quality of the Ottoman naval leadership than to its equipment.<sup>93</sup>

As seen in the previous section, the Ottoman administration developed several offices to create, organize, equip and direct its armed forces, as well as military schools. Lack of trained personnel and dependency on foreign expertise were endemic to these institutions, which already had the burden of financial deficiencies. During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, from 1876 to 1909, these institutions' influence on providing the state with armaments was shadowed by the Sultan, who feared a military coup against his reign and used weapon imports as a foreign policy tool. The Navy had played an important part in removing his predecessor Abdülaziz from the throne and Abdülhamid II ordered the navy stay anchored in the Golden Horn. As a result the ships purchased during the reign of Abdülaziz rusted at anchor. When the navy was ordered to sail out of the Golden Horn, boilers of ironclads *Mesudiye* and *Hamidiye* blew up.

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid., p. 17. "Ottoman Empire bought eight vessels from Britain and France in 1854 and paid the amount from foreign loan."

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

Abdülhamid II was the direct responsible for the decision to prefer weapon imports over domestic production, and he aptly used competition between the foreign armament companies against each other. Abülhamid II preferred German firms over British, French and Americans for equipment of the army. A case in point which demonstrates Abdulhamid's supremacy in weapons procurement decision making in this era was the adaptation of a new rifle system in 1887. An Ottoman military commission considered a choice between German Mauser and British Martini rifles. Despite the objections of the *Serasker*, Abdulhamid signed an agreement with the Mauser, and considered the decision "his own act and deed." As consistent with his fear of a military coup, however, the new rifles stayed in boxes for years. German influence also increased with Abdulhamid's favoring von der Goltz. Goltz was subject to *Serasker* like every other German military official, but in 1889, after he threatened to leave the Empire because of the ban on military maneuvers, the Sultan made him directly subject to himself with the right to address reports to him.

### **3.2. Defense Policy-Making in the Republican Era: Institutions**

Constitutional developments on defense policy-making after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 will be analyzed in this section. The founders of the Republic have endeavored to remove political influence from the army, by retaining control on defense policy determination and implementation in the civilian domain. Although the Chief of General Staff had a higher status than its European counterparts, especially after the 1982 constitution, the final word still belonged to civilian politicians in defense matters. National Security Council (MGK), created in 1961, gained a major ground in the formulation of defense policy with the 1982 Constitution. Still, the reasons for preponderance of the Military in defense decisions were civilians' negligence of defense matters, who, despite all the duties bestowed upon the General Staff and the MGK General Secretariat with the 1982 Constitution, was the final arbiter in defense matters. The actual implementation of the policy-making process will be studied under the next section.

On March 3, 1924, the ministry for Chief of Staff was turned into a *Riyaset* of Chief of Staff. Chief of Staff retained its duties to direct armed forces' maneuvers, training, and intelligence. Defense ministry was still responsible for the budget, logistics, and administrative affairs concerning the armed forces. At the end of the Second World War, in 1945, General Staff *Riyaseti* was responsible directly to the Prime Minister, in order to better coordinate massive mobilization efforts. The only period when the Turkish Defense Ministry was placed over the General Staff at the institutional hierarchy started in 1949. National Defense Ministry's 1979 publication on its history states that the law<sup>94</sup> aimed to increase efficiency of the defense service by combining the Defense Ministry and General Staff, and adopt contemporary states' principles of organization.<sup>95</sup> The Law designated the National Defense Ministry for preparation of the army for war, as well as its administration in peace and war. The General Staff was subordinate to the minister. In May 1949, Land, Air and Naval forces Commands were established. Legal supremacy of the ministry over the General Staff was short lived, however, and a law passed on 1970 stipulated that the Chief of Staff is responsible for his duties directly to the Prime Minister.

Turkey's subsequent Constitutions maintained the notion of Governmental responsibility for defense before the Parliament, but gradually elevated the status of the General Staff by strengthening its position within the MGK, whose own area of responsibility grew to unprecedented levels.

### **3.2.1. Defense Decision-Making in the 1961 Constitution**

Article 110 of the 1961 Constitution stipulated that the Council of Ministers is responsible for providing for the national security.<sup>96</sup> Council of Ministers conducted its duty according to rules established by the legislative body and

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<sup>94</sup> Law number 5398, passed on May 30, 1949 and entered in effect on July 1, 1949.

<sup>95</sup> MSB, op. cit. in note 45, p. 9.

<sup>96</sup> The term National Defense was replaced with National Security in the 1961 Constitution, to reflect the broader agenda the National Security Council had.

within the limits of the Constitution. Council of Ministers was responsible to the Parliament for the national security and preparation of the Turkish Armed Forces for war, as written under the section “Executive” of the Constitution. It has to be noted that the 1961 Constitution speaks of the “power” of the legislative and judiciary, while it regulates the “function” of executive, which can also be understood as duty<sup>97</sup>. The “power” to legislate enables legislative institutions, namely the National Assembly and the Senate which together formed the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), to make laws on any subject they deem appropriate. “Function” of executive however, means that a government can only act on areas derived from the Constitution, and by a specific function given to it by law.<sup>98</sup> The distinction between the terms reflected the concern to limit the power of the executive, as the governments were considered susceptible to enact laws that disrupted the democratic nature of the regime.<sup>99</sup>

The term “function” also means that the Council of Ministers cannot abstain from taking necessary measures to provide national security and prepare the Turkish Armed Forces for war. It has to be noted that the original ownership of the “function” of providing national security was the legislative in the 1961 Constitution.<sup>100</sup> But since a legislative body cannot fulfill and execute this function on its own, it transfers the function to the executive body. TGNA’s power in providing for the national security thus lies in its authority to monitor government’s activities. But the most important power of the TGNA was to declare a state of war in cases deemed legitimate by the international law, and exclusive of cases rendered necessary by international treaties to which Turkey is

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<sup>97</sup> Translation of Sadık Balkan, Ahmet E. Uysal and Kemal Karpat for the Committee of National Unity (*Milli Birlik Komitesi, MBK*), used the term “function” as an English translation of *görev*, the Turkish word which can also be translated as “duty.” MBK translation used “power” as English of *yetki*. This thesis uses the translation submitted to the MBK in 1961.

<sup>98</sup> Tayfun Akgüner, *1961 Anayasasına Göre Milli Güvenlik Kavramı ve Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayını, 1984, İstanbul, p. 99.

<sup>99</sup> The coup was launched against the Democratic Party, considered to have abused its executive powers.

<sup>100</sup> This is still the case under the 1982 Constitution.

a party, or by rules of international comity, to send Turkish expeditionary forces to foreign lands and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey.

The President of the Republic shared its duties to provide national security with the Council of Ministers, by presiding over the Council of Ministers and the MGK. President represented the supreme military command, “which cannot be separated from the moral existence of the Parliament.” The Article 110 of the 1961 Constitution<sup>101</sup> was inspired from the Article 40 of the 1924 Constitution that wanted to separate actual command of the army from politicians.<sup>102</sup> Council of Ministers either directly convened to fulfill its duty on national defense, bearing in mind the report of the MGK, or it tasked the Defense Ministry for the duty.

Defense Ministry was responsible, according to a law promulgated basing on the Article 110 of 1961 Constitution, for a portion of the duty to prepare the Armed Forces for war. Article 110 also stated that the Defense Ministry is tasked with conducting political, administrative and technical aspects of national defense. In assessing the real power for defense policy-making, we have to note that the Constitution brought double responsibility to governments and ministers concerning their duties. While the Defense Minister, as the chief of its own ministry’s administration, is responsible for his own ministry’s activities, the totality of the council holds a collective responsibility for the general policies of the government. Therefore no minister can evade the political responsibility of fulfilling the duties given to the Council of Ministers by the Constitution,

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<sup>101</sup> Article 110 of the 1961 Constitution: “The Office of the commander in chief is integrated in spirit in the Turkish Grand National Assembly and is represented by the President of the Republic. The council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for ensuring national security and preparing the armed forces for war. The Chief of Staff is the Commander of the armed forces. The Chief of General Staff shall be appointed by the President of the Republic upon his nomination by the Council of Ministers and his duties and powers shall be regulated by law. The Chief of General Staff is responsible to the Prime Minister in exercise of his duties and powers.”

<sup>102</sup> Ismet İnönü explained the reason for the separation during Parliamentary discussions on the Article. “We separated the command from politics. Would you like a responsible minister for the direct command? There used to be one, the minister for general warfare. We left him out to separate the army from politics.” Ibid., p. 129.

including of course the Prime Minister who was responsible for coordinating the activities of ministers and conducting the general policies of the government.<sup>103</sup>

Chief of General Staff held the Supreme Command of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), in its technical, strategic, and military sense. He was appointed by the President, upon proposal of the Council of Ministers. Chief of General Staff was responsible to the Prime Minister in fulfillment of his duties and powers. This means that the political leadership has the final say on security and defense affairs. Chief of Staff had to work together with the National Defense ministry. There is a hierarchical relationship between the Prime Minister and the Chief of General Staff in the 1961 Constitution, as the latter did not head an autonomous institution, like the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT). “The law on duties and authorities of the Chief of General Staff”<sup>104</sup> stipulates that the Chief of General Staff determines the principles, priorities, and main programs for personnel, intelligence, operation, organization, education, training and logistic services.

MGK (*Milli Güvenlik Konseyi*) has entered the Turkish political structure with the 1961 Constitution’s Article 111. Its predecessor, the Supreme Council of National Defense (*Milli Savunma Yüksek Kurulu, MSYK*) was established with a law dated 1949, two years after National Security Council was created in the U.S.

MSYK “was tasked with implementing the massive National Defense, which is the primary duty of the state.” It prepared the principles of the National Defense Policy, determined every responsibility which will befall on private and public persons concerning National Defense, submitting those principles to authorities, and investigating the execution of those policies. MSYK had no permanent personnel.<sup>105</sup> Several similarities existed between the MSYK and its successor MGK. Both institutions had the President as their “natural president.” They were both chaired by the President of the Republic, or in his absentia, the Prime

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., p. 131.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., p. 135.

<sup>105</sup> Tayfun Akgüner, op. cit. in note 76., p. 188.

Minister who is charged with organizing national defense. The cabinet would elect MGK or MSYK members among candidates nominated by the Prime Minister. National Defense Minister and Chief of General Staff were members of the MGK and MSYK. MGK and MSYK prepared the principles of the national defense policy that would be followed by the government, as well as the plans for national mobilization and ensure its implementation if necessary. MSYK used to convene at least once a month. It had a general secretariat, and the general secretary was appointed by a cabinet decision among candidates proposed by the national defense minister, who had to consult the Chief of General Staff before determining the candidate.<sup>106</sup>

There were three differences between the MSYK and the MGK. First, the MSYK was established by a law, but the MBK<sup>107</sup> gave it a Constitutional standing, letting its exact formation to a law. The fact that MGK members were determined by law meant that the Council of Ministers and the TGNA had the final word on the weight of civilians in the Council. Second, the term “Defense” was replaced with “Security”, giving the body a broader agenda. Third, armed forces representatives of the military were added into the council along with the Chief of General Staff by Article 111.<sup>108</sup> The law on that established the MGK, promulgated in 1962, included State Ministers, Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers of National Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Transportation, Labor, and others which may be called by the Prime Minister. The law designated force commanders as force representatives. MGK’s duty was to “communicate the requisite fundamental recommendations to the Council of Ministers with the purpose of assisting in the making of decision related to national security and coordination.”

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<sup>106</sup> Prof. Rona Aybay, “Milli güvenlik Kavramı ve Milli Güvenlik Kurulu”, *Ankara Ü.S.B.F. Dergisi*, 1978, Vol. 33, No. 1.

<sup>107</sup> MBK was one of the two bodies that created the 1961 Constitution. The other was the Assembly of Representatives. MBK was composed of Military, and it had the last say in the formulation of the Constitution’s Articles. MBK and the Assembly of Representatives together formed the Founding Assembly.

<sup>108</sup> 1961 Constitution’s Article 111 that created the MGK was placed under the “National Defense” section, which was under “Council of Ministers”, which in turn was included in the “Executive” section.

The Military intervention of 1971 altered the function of the MGK. The first change brought by the constitutional change (entered into force on September 20, 1971) was inclusion of “force commanders,” into the MGK, whereas earlier Military was represented by “armed forces representatives.”<sup>109</sup> Second change is that the MGK started to “recommend to the Council of Ministers the necessary basic views for decisions to be taken in connection with national security and coordination,” whereas it “communicated” them in the earlier version.

It is evident that the constitutional changes of 1971 did nothing to alter the consultative character of the MGK. Its function was to advise to the government. Moreover, a substantial portion of the cabinet was included in the MGK<sup>110</sup> where decisions were taken with majority, with only four military members. MGK of 1961 Constitution, even with 1971 changes, must be considered as an expertise committee of the cabinet of ministers. MGK’s duty was to prepare principles of the national security policy, and help the council of ministers to alter these policies. The word “coordination” in the Constitution’s Article 111 meant that ministers and military were expected to discuss the political and military nature of the matters on agenda. MGK’s authority is to (after constitutional changes of 1971) “advise” necessary opinions to the Council of Ministers. Despite the large domain of consultancy given to the MGK, the Constitution of 1961, even after changes in 1971, clearly places the MGK, a civilian dominated board where decisions are taken with majority voting, at an advisory role.

Despite the last word given to the council of ministers which can overrule MGK decisions, it can not be argued that the MGK had no influence. Akgüner argues that MGK decisions had political and moral influence, even if they did not have a judicial effect. He gives two reasons for MGK’s political influence. First is the fact that a large part of the Council of Ministers used to take place in MGK, where decisions required a majority vote. It is difficult to imagine a group of

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<sup>109</sup> Thus the practice of including the Force Commanders as Force Representatives acquired a Constitutional base.

<sup>110</sup> At least ten ministers were present at MGK meetings. Ibid., p. 80.



ministers voting in favor of a MGK decision and refute it in a cabinet meeting. Second, the MGK is a specialized body, with expertise on security affairs. Ignoring its decisions, Akgüner argues, could have political consequences. But the most illustrative instance where a MGK decision seemed to have a judicial influence on the council of ministers was perpetuated by the government itself. When the U.S. imposed an embargo on military aid it delivered to Turkey in February 1975, then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit announced the advisory decision of MGK as a governmental decision, even before it was discussed at the council of ministers. The second striking incident where the government itself undermined its own authority in favor of the MGK occurred in 1972. After an oil platform construction on the Marmara Sea started in accordance with the regulations of the Oil Department Presidency, MGK stated that the construction was against development principles, governmental policy, the national oil policy and military strategy. In response to a cancellation case that was opened against the decision of the government to stop the oil platform construction, the Prime Ministry stated that “the government can not choose not to conform to the decisions of the MGK, a constitutional body.”<sup>111</sup> Government’s defense obviously conflicted with the Constitution, which did not order the government to consider MGK decisions as legally or politically binding rules.

### **3.2.2. Defense Policy-Making in the 1982 Constitution**

The Constitution of 1982 reflected the reactions against a weak executive that was held responsible for failing to prevent the country from drifting into chaos before the 1980 military coup. The executive became a “power” as well as a “function”, to be implemented by the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers, in accordance with the Constitution and laws. The Council of Ministers was still held responsible individually and collectively responsible from the conduct of government policies to the Parliament.

The Article 118 brought sweeping changes to the composition and function of the MGK. MGK now included the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the

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<sup>111</sup> Tayfun Akgüner, op. cit. in note 76, pp. 224-225.

Ministers of National Defense, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy and the Air Force and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic. The fact that it is the Constitution that determined the composition of MGK made it difficult for the Parliament to give the Council a more civilian bent. MGK further submitted “to the Council of Ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the national security policy of the State. The Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council...” Agenda of MGK was determined by the President of the Republic, taking into account the proposals of the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff. Even if the 1982 Constitution gave MGK a very large domain on which it can state its opinions, and even if the Council of Ministers have to take MGK’s decisions as a priority agenda item, it still left the final decision on defense matters to the Council of Ministers.

The 1982 Constitution, when assigning duties to defense institutions, stipulated that a wide range of duties of the ministry of national defense would be subordinated to the direction and principles formulated by the General Staff.<sup>112</sup> It has to be noted that the defense policy according to the same article, still is to be determined by the Council of Ministers.

Chief of Staff preserved the wide range of duties it had been given under the 1961 Constitution. General Staff is responsible for overall command and control of the Armed Forces and effective conduct of military operations and the level of combat readiness of the armed forces to the Prime Minister. As we have seen, the Chief of Staff also sets the principles concerning a wide range of duties that the Ministry of

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<sup>112</sup> The ministry “carries out the political, legal, social, financial and budget services of the National Defense functions; and for carrying out the services of Recruitment in peace and war, Procurement of weapons, vehicles, equipment, logistic materials and supplies, Defense Industry, Health, Construction, real estate, housing and infrastructure (NATO Security Investment Program) and Financial and inventory account auditing, within the framework of the principles, priorities and main programs determined by the Turkish General Staff, in accordance with the defense policy of the Armed Forces decided on by the Council of Ministers.” Law number 1325 on the Establishment and Function of the Ministry of Defense, July 31, 1970.

National Defense has to fulfill. The 1982 Constitution states that the “The Turkish General Staff and the Ministry of National Defense are in close coordination in the fulfillment of their own duties.”

Turkish Gendarmerie is under the direction of Interior Ministry in time of peace, and is considered part of internal security forces. Gendarmerie is part of the Land Forces in time of War.<sup>113</sup> General Staff also prepares the National Security Policy in effect, despite the fact that it is the Prime Minister’s responsibility to do so. The document is presented to the Council of Ministers for approval through the MGK. National Military Strategic Concept is also prepared by the General Staff and presented to the Prime Minister through Supreme Minister Council (*Yüksek Askeri Şura*).<sup>114</sup>

Finally, as consistent with 1961 Constitution, Constitution stipulated in Article 92 that the the power to authorize the declaration of a state of war in cases deemed legitimate by international law and, except where required by international treaties to which Turkey is a party or by the rules of international courtesy to send Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey, is vested in the Parliament.

National Intelligence Organization (MİT) was created by a law in 1965. MİT’s duties are to produce military, political, economic, commercial, financial, industrial, scientific, technical, biographical, and psychological intelligence relevant to National Security on the state level; distribute this intelligence to the Prime Minister, the National Security Council, and necessary official agencies; provide coordination between all departments and institutions occupied with intelligence; take measures to conduct psychological warfare, and counter foreign intelligence.” Its personnel included military officers, and until 1992, MİT was headed by a retired or active military officer. General Staff is responsible for its

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<sup>113</sup> Turkish Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper 2000*.

<sup>114</sup> Hale Akay, “Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Kurumsal ve Askeri Boyut”, in *Almanak Türkiye: 2006-2008 Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim*, (ed. Ali Bayramoğlu, Ahmet İnel), TESEV, p. 134.

own intelligence unit, which also participates at the National Intelligence Coordination Council, established by the Article 8 of the law of MİT.

### 3.2.3. NATO and Turkey's Defense

Influence of NATO on Turkey's defense posture results in part from the fact that most high-ranking military officers served in the NATO headquarters and in the United States.<sup>115</sup> The U.S. considered Turkey as the "most important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East against Soviet Union's military or ideological expansion."<sup>116</sup>

NATO strategy aimed to prevent Soviet Union's physical influence in Europe by establishing a common defense system, and take measures to deter a Soviet attack. During 1950s, NATO depended on United States massive retaliation concept, which stated that any infringement upon NATO soil by Soviet Forces would be met by a massive nuclear response.

...in the event of general war, the primary tasks of the NATO forces would be, while surviving the enemy's initial attacks, to retaliate immediately with nuclear weapons from the outset and to contain the enemy's onslaught without any intention to make a major withdrawal. To be able to carry out these tasks successfully, even in the face of a surprise nuclear attack, and to meet other threats to NATO security, the following measures are required:

a - Fully effective nuclear retaliatory forces of all services, provided with all the necessary facilities and capable of the destruction of an aggressor in any circumstances, must be maintained and protected. Effective implementation procedures must be provided that will ensure the availability of nuclear weapons at the outset of hostilities...<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey", *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 1, Fall 2000, p. 209.

<sup>116</sup> Aylin Güney, "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From "Cold-War" to "War on Iraq", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 341-359, September 2005, p. 342.

<sup>117</sup> "Final Decision on MC 48/2: A Report by the Military Committee on Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept", *NATO Strategy Documents 1949 – 1969*, May 23, 1957, pp. 322-323.

Turkey felt relatively secure under this type of simple strategy.<sup>118</sup> The defense decisions were left to NATO, and Turkish decision-makers did not feel the need to develop defense planning capabilities outside the NATO framework. This had serious implications on Turkey's defense during the next stage of Cold-War strategy of the alliance, namely the "flexible response."

Turkey had an out-moded defense structure at the end of the Second World War, and its defense was set back even more with the advance of technology and the new strategic direction NATO had. Developments of the Soviet Union's conventional military capabilities and emergence of nuclear parity rendered traditional deterrence strategy of massive retaliation obsolete, and required NATO to adopt the flexible response strategy. NATO Defence Planning Committee's Ministerial Session on December 4, 1969 adopted the MC 48/3, which superseded the MC 48/2, as guidance for measures to implement the new strategic concept for NATO.<sup>119</sup> The emphasis of the new military strategy was on following points:

- The requirement for adequate conventional forces and for improving capabilities for non-nuclear operations while maintaining NATO's nuclear capability. This should include achieving optimum dual capability, especially in air forces, and the flexibility to employ these forces in non-nuclear operations.
- The concept of forward defense with echeloning in depth in suitable tactical locations and tactical mobility with effective forces-in-being.
- The concept of flexibility in response to aggression, with provision for a variety of response options depending upon the size and scope of the aggression; namely, direct defense, deliberate escalation and general nuclear

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<sup>118</sup> Cengiz Okman, "NATO Stratejileri ve Türkiye Bakımından Sonuçları", in *Türkiye'nin Savunması* (ed. Ali Karaosmanoğlu), Dış Politika Enstitüsü, Ankara, 1987, p. 84.

<sup>119</sup> "Final Decision On MC 48/3: Measures To Implement The Strategic Concept For The Defence Of The NATO Area," MC 48/3(Final), December 8, 1969, *NATO Strategy Documents 1949 – 1969*, p. 392.

response, one or more of which should be used in any specific contingency.<sup>120</sup>

Flexible response strategy increased the importance of NATO wing countries, the main site of military maneuvers in case of a conventional war. Evidently the new situation put a great burden on Turkey, as “Turkey is the only NATO target for a possible Soviet amphibious threat in the Black Sea.” However Turkey was hardly ready to face the Soviet military challenge: “Both Greece and Turkey will have to rely heavily on rapid external reinforcement of their forces should aggression occur on their territories.”<sup>121</sup>

The new strategic direction of NATO thus gave its member states more responsibility, as they were asked to be ready for a conventional war with the Soviet Union, and gave them possibilities for more influence in NATO defense planning. However, Turkish defense policy-makers did not prepare themselves for the new security structure. “The initiatives in that regard were launched by external actors and Turkey found itself on the path to ‘flexible response’ in a somewhat automatic way.”<sup>122</sup>

It took a military aid embargo from the U.S. to prompt Turkey start developing its own Strategic Concept. It was again the Military, however, which took over the task. General Staff prepared its first National Military Strategic Concept in 1974. Its outlook was still NATO oriented:

As late as 1997, military planners in the Turkish General Staff were still working off the National Military Strategy Concept developed in 1985 to evaluate threats to Turkey. The underlying framework of the concept was inherently defensive in its outlook, based on conventional force-on-force

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<sup>120</sup> Ibid., p. 376.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., p. 371.

<sup>122</sup> Okman, op. cit. in note 115, p. 85.

calculations with nuclear considerations relegated to broader NATO or American spheres.<sup>123</sup>

### **3.2.4. Weapons Procurement During the Republican Period**

Turkey's weapon procurement efforts were directed towards increased domestic production with the declaration of the Republic. The General Directorate of Military Facilities was set up in 1921, and a series of state owned small armaments workshops were opened throughout 1920s and 1930s. First private armament producer of the Republic was the "Nuri Kılıgıl", who produced pistols, mortars, explosives and ammunition and provided the country with armement during the Second World War.<sup>124</sup> Turkish aviation industry was also set up in 1926 with Turkish Aeroplane and Motor, (*Tayyare and Motor Türk A.Ş.*). Establishment of Turkey's nucleus aircraft industry was facilitated by Polish engineers granted assylum in Turkey during the Second World War.<sup>125</sup>

Weapons acquisition was an unquestioned practice during the Cold-War. Under the political-military conditions of the Cold-War, the U.S.-Turkish military alliance developed fast, and soon Turkish Military was oriented towards meeting NATO defense needs. United States had a dominating position as Turkey's armament source, starting from the end of the Second World War, when Turkish armed forces lacked the knowledge on modern weapons. Between 1946 and 1952, the United States provided over one billion dollars in equipment aid to Turkey, as well as training.<sup>126</sup> The choice of weapons was hardly subject to a comprehensive

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<sup>123</sup> Michael Robert Hickok, "Hegemon Rising: The Gap Between Turkish Strategy and Military Modernization", *Parameters*, Summer 2000, p. 107.

<sup>124</sup> Efsun Kızmaz, Turkish Defense Industry and Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, Master's Thesis, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, September 2007, p. 55.

<sup>125</sup> Ömer Karasapan, "Turkey's Armament Industries", *Middle East Report*, No. 114, January – February 1987, p. 26.

<sup>126</sup> Knox Helm, "Turkey and Her Defense Problems", *International Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 4, October, 1954, p. 437.

planning by civilians or the military. Between 1950 and 1970, Turkish General Staff prepared lists of equipment it demanded from United States, which also sent weapons to Turkey in its own prerogative, when it put new models of weapons into service. Often the TAF needs were determined by the U.S., and it even provided Turkey with the information on when to replace which spare parts.<sup>127</sup> Turkish governments did nothing to alter the course of this dependency, or upstart an academic or official institution which could serve as a basis for training in the domain of defense policy-making.

The realization of the dangers of total weapons procurement dependence on another country came unexpectedly after Turkey launched Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974 to stop ethnic cleansing of Turks on the island, using its Guarantor rights. American Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, cutting the military aid.<sup>128</sup> Turkey realized the need for diversifying the source of military equipment, as well as starting its domestic arms production, obsolete since early nineteenth century.

Turkish military alliance was revived with the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, and the revolution in Iran. Turkey and the U.S. signed a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, (DECA) on March 29, 1980. The U.S. promised \$2.5 billion in five years, obtained access to 26 facilities. An important change from the first period of Turkish American defense cooperation in the 1950s was the emphasis Turkish decision-makers placed on the “Turkish nature” U.S. military installations in Turkey.<sup>129</sup> Between 1950 and 1991, the United States

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<sup>127</sup> Mehmet Ali Birand, *Emret Komutanım*, Milliyet Yayınları, Istanbul, 1987, p. 366.

<sup>128</sup> Turkey responded by closing down all American military facilities, like airbases, naval installations, early warning radar stations and intelligence gathering facilities directed towards the Soviet Union. Güney, op. cit. in note 115, p. 343.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid. “Foreign Minister Hayrettin Erkmén stated that the joint installations involved in a new defense cooperation agreement being negotiated with the U.S. were not foreign bases but installations of the Turkish Republic. They were not to be used for the purpose of US defense but for NATO defense.”



Military aid totaled \$9.4 billion, \$6.1 billion of which was in grants and \$3.3 billion was in a concessional basis.<sup>130</sup>

### **3.2.5. Establishment of SSM: Domestic Industry**

The fundamental change in Turkish weapons procurement policy arrived with the liberalization of the Turkish Economy in the 1980s. Then Prime Minister Turgut Özal, a former World Bank officer, was the main impetus behind the plan. Turkish capital Ankara became a frequent visiting location for representatives of Western weapons companies during initial stages of privatization efforts. Özal's appointees pushed the liberalization process, like Vahit Erdem, chairman of the Defense Industry Development and Support Administration Chairmanship, (DIDSAC) created in January 1986. The board of DIDSAC was comprised of the Prime Minister, Chief of General Staff, Force Commanders, State Planning Organization (DTP) officials.

There was bureaucratic resistance to these liberalization efforts, both civilian and military. DIDSAC was given control over the independent funds of Air Force Foundation, the Naval Foundation, and Ground Forces Foundation, whose funds were estimated to be \$600 million. There was considerable resistance to transfer of Forces 'independent funds to DIDSAC. State owned Machinery and Chemical Industries Establishment also objected to privatization of its parts. Desire of the Military also had a large presence in the Turkish economy with Military Solidarity Organization (OYAK) founded after the 1961 Military coup to provide for financial security to military officers. Thus the military had a stake in preventing further privatization. Opposition parties, like the Democratic Left Party (DSP) argued that dominance of private sector in defense production would submit Turkish military strategy to foreign influence.<sup>131</sup> This resistance led to a March 1986 decree to prohibit private sector from producing lethal equipment.

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid., p. 357.

<sup>131</sup> Karasapan, op. cit. in note 124, p. 28.

However, the force of liberalization proved irresistible. In 1987, 50 private companies have announced plans to enter the defense sector.<sup>132</sup>

DIDSAC's name was changed to Undersecretariat for Defense Industries in 1989. It had a legal personality enabling to have its separate budget, and directly connected to the Ministry of National Defense. Its main duty was to provide TAF's requirements and produce all kinds of weapons, vehicles, and equipment needed in Turkey, to the extent that doing so is possible and economical. The Turkish Defense industry retained its overall direction of importing the best or affordable defense items from Western states. Until 1990, SSM and the National Defense Ministry preferred direct procurement, referred to as "off-the-shelf purchase model" to arm and equip the Turkish Armed Forces.<sup>133</sup> The efforts throughout 1980s and 1990s enabled increased level of domestic production, but this production was mainly under foreign license and with foreign cooperation. It is only after year 2000 Turkey started to switch to domestic design, engineering and system integration.<sup>134</sup> As of January 2009, SSM conducts around 250 defense projects concerning land, air, sea, electronic and rocket/missile defense.

SSM's authority was extended by a recent legislation that went into effect in July 2008. According to the new system, defense projects start with submission of a written demand of the requesting office to the SSM.<sup>135</sup> A Project Group is formed according to the nature of the request. Project Group consists of Undersecretariat personnel, as well as technical, tactical, and logistical branches of the requesting Office, referred to as the Project (Military) officer. Following the request of TAF through the General Staff to the SSM, the projects are launched with the decision of the Defense Industry Executive Committee. Defense Industry Executive

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> İbrahim Sünnetçi, "The Turkish Defense Industry: Dramatic Transformation Under the Guidance of SSM," *Military Technology*, April 2009, p. 96.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. "The Pedestal Mounted STINGER (PMS), MilGem corvette, VOLKAN tank-fire control system, FIRTINA SP and PANTER towed 155mm howitzers are some of the well-known products procured using this strategy."

<sup>135</sup> Council of Ministers decision, July 8, 2008. Accessed at <http://www.resmigazete.org/tarih/20090708-2.htm>.

Committee's permanent members are Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, National Defense Minister, the Undersecretary of Defense Industries, and it can include the Force Commander relevant to the projects under discussion, and high-ranking SSM officers. The Committee is the final arbiter on major projects, and other defense projects it considers within its domain. SSM is able to offer research and Development Projects at the National Defense Executive Committee without General Staff's request. SSM is able to determine the method of procurement tender, except the ones involving only one source, where a National Defense Executive Committee decision is necessary. In projects involving only one source, Project starting and election decisions can be united in a single decision, if the Committee allows it. One source option is applicable to situations as required by national interest, secrecy, monopoly of technological capability, standardization, and meeting urgent operational needs. SSM has a large say in defense procurement projects, as it can accept or reject proposals, choose to evaluate them or ignore them, request new proposals, or cancel the tender, without incurring any responsibilities. National Defense Executive Committee can choose to award the Project to any contractor candidate. Tender process starts when the SSM announces request for proposals, either on its website or sends documents to contractor candidates. SSM can demand a correction of the request for proposals if it contains technical errors or shortcomings. SSM can also ask a revision of proposals if it deems it necessary for the public interest. SSM evaluates the proposals and prices, and presents the results at the National Defense Executive Committee, which designates maximum source levels for the projects, as well as the winner of the tender. SSM evaluates at its own will, request by the contractor for extra sources, provided that they remain below the level set to the Project by the Committee. The Committee decides to free extra credits to the contractor. The Committee has a greater role in government to government sales and in international consortiums, and it can determine a Project as such at its beginning.

We can see that the pattern of importing major requirements from Western States and holding ownership of existing weapon production facilities in public sector was the prevalent model in the Turkish as well as the Ottoman practise. This began to change only with the liberalization of Turkish economy in 1980s. The

Military had the final decision on which weapons to buy and where to buy them from. But this was mainly due to a decision to contend with NATO defense planning, and disinterest of civilians. As Özal government demonstrated however, it is the Council of Ministers, and ultimately the Parliament which steers the weapons procurement decisions in Turkey.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **CONTEMPORARY DEFENSE POLICY-MAKING**

This chapter will build on the legal perspective on the distribution of duties and authorities explained in the previous chapter. Stating the legal framework is only a part of explaining the defense policy-making. Power relations, institutional habits, and politics, while not completely independent from legal definitions of duties and authorities, play a significant role in who actually makes defense policy. The alterations in powers of defense institutions were prompted by developments in Turkey's European Union membership process. Though the military seemed to lose much of its prerogatives concerning defense in the National Security Council and National Security Council General Secretariat, the determination of defense policy still remains at the hands of the General Staff. Changes in weapons acquisition came only gradually, and the Military still dominates the decision-making mechanisms. The actual implementation of defense policy making will show us that the reason of military dominance in defense policy making is not the assertiveness of the Military, or its presumed desire to bar defense policy making to civilian authorities, but a conscious delegation of defense policy to the Military by governments.

## **4.1. European Union Accession Process and Institutions in Shaping Defense Policy**

Turkey's EU accession process prompted major transformations on the defense sector, reducing Military's certain prerogatives.

### **4.1.1. National Security Council**

Until its area of responsibility was trimmed down in accordance with the EU regulations adopted after 1999, when Turkey was given the status of EU candidate country at the European Council Helsinki Summit, MGK had stated opinion to governments on a wide area subjects, extending far beyond the realm of defense and security.<sup>136</sup> Constitution was amended to reflect the democratization process in the defense decision-making mechanisms and bringing them closer to practices in the European Union (EU) countries. The Constitutional amendments to Article 118 on the establishment of MGK in 2001 increased the number of civilians at the MGK by adding Justice Minister and deputy Prime Ministers. Amendment also decreased the tone of MGK's duty. MGK now submits its decisions to the Council of Ministers, which evaluates (the word 'priority' was deleted) decisions of the MGK concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of society.

In 2003 the Secretary for MGK General Secretariat would be a civilian. The following year, the function of the MGK General Secretariat to follow up

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<sup>136</sup> Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "An anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Economy", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 2, January 1997, p. 158. "The concrete decisions of the council cover an unprecedented spectrum: determining the curriculum in schools; regulating television stations' broadcasting hours; abolishing the penal immunity of members of parliament from the (Kurdish) Democracy Party; closing down certain prisons and television stations; making bureaucratic appointments of the ministry of public works in the southeast; postponing the termination date of military service for current conscripts."

implementation of its decisions was abrogated.<sup>137</sup> The Secretariat can not conduct national security investigations on its own initiative. It neither can control directly the special funds it receives, prime minister having exclusive control over them. Further changes concern the internal restructuring of the NSC, with a substantial staff reduction and the abolition of some units. In August 2004, a senior diplomat was appointed as the first civilian Secretary General of the MGK by the President upon the proposal of the Prime Minister in accordance with the changes introduced in July 2003. Frequency of MGK meetings were reduced to once every two months, except when it is summoned by the Prime Minister or the President.

#### **4.1.2. General Staff**

Despite the Constitutional regulations that confer the Council of Ministers to shape the defense policy, the General Staff during the Cold War and in 1990s had the final word in defense matters in practice. The General Staff prepares the defense plans and formulates the defense budget. It prepares the political military framework, and together with the Foreign Ministry, (which has only a secondary influence) evaluates the threats, determines relevant armament requirements, force structure and signs military agreements. General Staff shares the defense policy with governments at the National Security Council, where civilians mostly listen and contend with what is presented.<sup>138</sup>

Restructuration of the Turkish Military on more convenient lines to the fight against the PKK was an initiative launched by the Military. “Force 2014” (Kuvvet 2014) reform<sup>139</sup> was prepared by the Land Forces Command and the General Staff. Force 2014 calls for 20 to 30 percent of reduction of size of the Land Forces. Then chief of the General Staff General Yaşar Büyükanıt stated that:

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<sup>137</sup> More specifically, the phrase “*the Ministries, public institutions and organizations and private legal persons shall submit regularly, or when requested, non-classified and classified information and documents needed by the Secretariat General of the NSC*” was deleted.

<sup>138</sup> Mehmet Ali Birand, op. cit. in note 125, p. 350.

<sup>139</sup> Andrew McGregor, “Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey’s Arms Industry in the 21st Century”, Jamestown Foundation, June 2008, p. 6.

The main purpose of the TLF in the future will be to reach a force structure that will enable us to respond to conventional and asymmetrical risks and threats; to conduct operations day and night in any environment and situation; to take decisions more swiftly than any adversaries; and to have available weapons with longer ranges than those of our adversary.

Still in Büyükanıt's words, TLF will be:

smaller; trained for each mission; capable of fighting in high and low intensity conflicts; rapidly deployable, sustainable and survivable; and capable of conducting joint and combined operations. The force will possess adequate firepower; sufficient air-defence systems; and effective command and control systems.

A constant reminder of the Military's position within Turkish politics is Article 35 and Article 85/1 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, which stipulates that TAF has the duty to protect and preserve the Turkish Republic on the basis of the principles referred to in the Preamble of the Constitution, including territorial integrity, secularism and republicanism.<sup>140</sup> European Union Progress Report 2004 also cautions the civilian authorities to:

fully exercise their supervisory functions in practice, in particular as regards the formulation of the national security strategy and its implementation, especially concerning relations with neighbouring countries, as well as the control of the defence budget.<sup>141</sup>

#### **4.1.3. The Executive Branch: President, Government and the Ministry of National Defense**

Though the Constitution clearly gives the function and authority to prepare the country's defense to the Government, in practice there are hardly any structural defense policy recommendations from the government. One significant attempt from a government to shape the National Security Policy Document, (*Milli Güvenlik Siyaset Belgesi, MGSB*), which identifies the threats to national security, sets priorities among threats and defines strategies to counter them, came in January 2005. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a letter to the MGK

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<sup>140</sup> The European Commission, *Regular Report 2004 on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, October 6, 2004, p. 23.

General Secretariat which stressed the responsibility of the government for Turkish national security before the Parliament.<sup>142</sup> The MGSB is formulated by the MGK General Secretariat with contributions from the Presidency, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the MİT. The document must be approved by ministers to go in effect. Progress report 2005 suggests that:

It was subsequently requested that the MGSB be shortened and kept to its essentials. According to the news, the government and the MGK held opposing views in relation to the content of the document. Hence, related debates were postponed in the MGK meeting of 23 August 2005. In the meeting of 24 October 2005, the document was approved with the inclusion of various issues by the General Staff.

Defense ministers are even more ineffective to influence the defense policy. Former Defense Minister Zeki Yavuztürk (December 13, 1983 – December 21, 1987) stated in an interview in 1986 that the General Staff establishes the priorities and presents the requirements and needs" so that "tasks are carried out by the Ministry of Defense according to the principles, priorities and major programs as determined by the general chief of staff."<sup>143</sup> Moreover, Defense Minister relies on military experts at his ministry for the formulation of policies. Those experts, however, are dependent on the General Staff for their Professional advancement, rendering them open to influence from the General Staff rather than the Defense Minister.<sup>144</sup> Nothing has changed since 1970, when Defense minister Ahmet Topaloğlu complained that in the Ministry of Defense, he is the only civilian person.

But civilians proved themselves quite influential when they decided to use authority granted to them by the Constitution. President Turgut Özal appointed in 1987, General Necip Torumtay as the Chief of General Staff, although Land Forces Commander General Necip Öztörün was the candidate favored by the incumbent, General Necdet Üruğ. Torumtay stated in his memoirs that “[the

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<sup>142</sup> European Commission, *Turkey 2005 Progress Report*, Brussels, 9 November 2005, p. 13.

<sup>143</sup> Sakallıoğlu, op. cit. in note 132, p. 159.

<sup>144</sup> Interview with defense reporter at Hürriyet, Özgür Ekşi, Ankara, July 2009.



decision] was a deliberate act to prove the supremacy of civilian authority. It was announced by a denigrating statement by the President. The decision brought a sour air to myself and the Military.”<sup>145</sup> Özal had the desire to “normalize” civilian military relations by his decision: "Since 1960, no civilian government has appointed the general chief of staff itself. The position has been filled by automatic succession. From now on, this is going to be normalized. Governments should appoint the Chief of Staff themselves according to merit."<sup>146</sup>

On the financial side, two major reforms were undertaken to establish oversight mechanisms. In December 2003, extra-budgetary funds of the National Defense Ministry were included in the budget by an amendment to the Law on Public Financial Management and Control. The Defense Industry Support Fund was opened to the inspection of the Court of Auditors. The phrase “*state property in possession of the Armed Forces in accordance with the principles of secrecy necessitated by national defence*”, that defined exemption from Court’s functions, was deleted in May 2004.

The implementation of the auditing is yet to be achieved. The Court of Auditors can carry *expost* audits of military expenditure. Nearly 25 percent of all military accountancy offices were audited in 2007. The following year, the Court of Auditors ruled that it has a mandate to audit the SSDF. However, the Court is still unable to audit assets belonging to the Military due to pending adaptation of relative legislation on the Court of Auditors.<sup>147</sup>

#### **4.1.4. Parliament**

Despite the Constitutional regulations set up in 1924, 1961 and 1982 which hold the government responsible for defense before the Parliament, the latter is ill equipped to respond to defense planning and weapons procurement decision. As

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<sup>145</sup> Necip Torumtay, *Necip Torumtay’in Anıları*, Milliyet Yayınları, Istanbul, August, 1994, p. 88.

<sup>146</sup> Sakallıoğlu, op. cit. in note 132, p. 162.

<sup>147</sup> Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2008 Progress Report, p. 9.

we have seen, the Constitutional amendments after 2001 strengthened civilian dominance in defense policy-making, but lack of expertise in the field meant that the Military is the arbiter on defense matters. It is not the relative overweight of the Turkish Military in domestic politics as compared to its European counterparts, but a set of institutional habits that limit the participation of the Parliament in defense policy-making. Vahit Erdem, NATO Assembly President and former Undersecretary of Defense Industries stated that the foremost reason why the Parliament is ineffective on defense policy is habitude. Security matters are never discussed at the Parliament, “it is discussed at the National Security Council level.”<sup>148</sup>

The weakness of the Parliament in shaping of defense policy is in part due to the dependence of deputies on their party leaders’ will to be elected in the next elections.

“A deputy will first think whether he will be placed on the top of the election list by his party leader at the next general elections. He will also want to be placed in the committees. Therefore he will refrain from stating his own opinion. The result is a lack of Parliamentary culture, where deputies serving long periods in the Parliament can gain expertise on the domain of their committees.”<sup>149</sup>

The lack of sufficient knowledge on defense policy is also due to a lack of trained personnel and experts who would be tasked to provide the deputies with sufficient knowledge about the agendas of the committees they serve in. “The National Defense Committee has only one expert and two secretaries. That committee is going nowhere with this staff.”

Parliamentary discussion on defense budget and weapons procurements is almost non-existent. Parliament approves defense budget without any opposition:

The reason for this automaticity stems more from the lack of interest of politicians than the assertiveness of the military. Turkish politicians have not, as a rule, professed great interest and inclination towards involvement

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<sup>148</sup> Interview with Vahit Erdem, July 2009.

<sup>149</sup> The electoral lists are prepared according to the will of the party leader, with deputy candidates on higher lists having a greater chance of being elected from their electoral district.

in the technicalities of defense policy. They usually take office without knowledge of military strategy and weapon procurement issues. Thus, in most cases, the advice provided by the members of the TGS plays a determining role. A growth in the role of civilian politicians in defense policy and budgeting would then depend to a great extent on the improvement of their interest and knowledge in defense matters and on the creation of civilian research institutes of defense policy.<sup>150</sup>

Prospects for a change on the capacity of the Parliament to bring informed contributions to the defense policy is at this moment weak, as there is no discussion at the Turkish Parliament about the weakness of its intellectual output.<sup>151</sup> Moreover, we will see in Chapter 5 Section 1 and 2 that the Military cedes the decision to government and the Parliament when these take initiative on defense matters, as well as to civilian bureaucrats with necessary expertise.

#### **4.1.5. National Defense Committee**

National Defense Committee, set up on April 27, 1920, even before the Turkish Republic was founded on October 29, 1923, is a permanent committee of the Parliament. It examines the draft laws and law proposals concerning national security, defense, civilian defense and military service. The Committee now has 25 members, 16 from the party in power AKP and others from opposition parties. Committee members are mainly former public finance experts, but there are no defense experts are in defense committee except perhaps one, Sabahattin Çakmakoglu, a former Minister of National Defense and a graduate of National Security Academy.

Interview with the spokesperson of the National Defense Committee AKP deputy Nurettin Akman suggest that the discussions are bleak at the Committee, often including no more than statements of good will.<sup>152</sup> Dominant attitude among the

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<sup>150</sup> Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu And Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Defense Reform in Turkey", in *Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*, East West Institute, New York, 2003, p. 22.

<sup>151</sup> Interview with Vahit Erdem, July 2009.

<sup>152</sup> Interview with AKP deputy and spokesman for the National Defense Committee Nurettin Akman, Ankara, July, 2009.

Parliamentarians in general, including the National Defense Committee, on the lack of oversight over defense spending is of neglect and aloofness, according to Akman. “Most members of the committee are in just for the sake of belonging to a committee.” Among 29 draft laws and proposals currently at the committee,<sup>153</sup> most are about employee personnel rights, compensatory payments to the personnel. The committee completed its reports on 25 draft laws and proposals, all of them concerning personnel rights and obligatory service durations for non-commissioned and commissioned officers. Parliamentary committee does not properly fulfill its functions; it does not draft reports about defense agreements signed by the government with other countries. A legal change to render the Committee more effective in defense matters can only be brought to the Parliament’s agenda by the government, and then by securing opposition parties’ consent, according to Akman.

Vahit Erdem similarly stated that the Defense Committee is considered as a symbolic committee.

#### **4.1.6. National Intelligence Organization**

Intelligence organizations in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey were mainly directed against internal political actors, and they were under the direction of the Military until 1990s.

MİT’s participation to national defense decision-making was hampered by appointment of high level military officers who were not intelligence experts, as the undersecretary of the organization. From 1927 to 1965, seven presidents of Directorate of the National Security Service were from the military, three civilians being appointed during the Democratic Party rule between 1950 and 1960<sup>154</sup>. Between 1965 and 1992, all twelve undersecretaries of MİT were military officers. As a consequence, during 1960s, MİT’s efforts were gradually directed

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<sup>153</sup> Turkish Grand National Assembly website: [www.tbmm.gov.tr](http://www.tbmm.gov.tr), accessed on, July 10, 2009.

<sup>154</sup> Ecevit Kılıç, “Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı”, in *Almanak Türkiye 2006 - 2008, Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim*, (Ed. Ali Bayramoğlu, Ahmet İnsel), TESEV, July 2008, p. 244.

from collecting intelligence about foreign countries' potentially damaging activities directed against the country to hunting down separatists and communists.<sup>155</sup> Former deputy undersecretary of the MİT Hiram Abas, in a letter he wrote to then President Turgut Özal in 1990, that MİT must collect information that can help steer the country's foreign policy, but the organization instead turned into a police force especially after 1969. "Intelligence services do not have the duty of protecting the regime against the people in democracies; therefore they need not be close to the military."<sup>156</sup>

The first civilian undersecretary of the MİT after 1960 was former Ambassador Sönmez Köksal, appointed by then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in 1992.<sup>157</sup> Köksal's successor Şengal Atasagun, appointed as the undersecretary of MİT in 1998, was the first civilian from within the MİT to run the organization. Atasagun remained in seat until 2005 when he demanded his retirement, and again succeeded by a civilian, Emre Taner, who still runs the organization. Taner is a political science graduate and had served in MİT since 1967. Taner met Öcalan in İmralı Prison where he is held, (with authorization from the government). Taner also visited Selahaddin City to discuss the PKK problem with Messoud Barzani, contrary to earlier discussions with the Kurdish leader which took place in Ankara.

## **4.2. Contemporary Weapons Procurement**

Current weapons procurement has the following legal distribution of functions: Council of Ministers decides the general strategy, Defense Industry High Coordination Board is responsible for guiding directives, the Defense Industry Executive Committee is responsible for final decision-making, the General Staff

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<sup>155</sup> Mehmet Eymür, *Analiz: bir MİT Mensubunun Anıları*, Milliyet Yayınları, İstanbul, 1991, p. 57.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>157</sup> Ecevit Kılıç, op. cit. in note 33, p. 243.

is the requirement generator, and SSM is responsible for procurement and development of domestic defense industry.<sup>158</sup>

Although the Council of Ministers has to set the overall direction of weapons procurement, in practice it is only the General Staff who decides what to buy. “General Staff determines the threats Turkey faces, and prepares ten year plans for weapon acquisitions. General Staff sends these requirements to the SSM, the procurement agency. The SSM determines the technical requirements of a weapon system demanded by the General Staff, which can fulfill the deployment requirements. SSM also evaluates possible financing methods, prices at the international market, and it assesses how that project can benefit the Turkish defense industries.” The SSM Undersecretary then explains the possibilities at the Defense Industry Executive Committee. Relevant force commander and other SSM experts may also join the meetings. Capabilities of the weapon system, its price, the contribution of the domestic industry are all taken into consideration. Vahit Erdem told that: “Decisions are taken with a consensus. During my term at the office; I did not witness any significant tensions between the participants.”<sup>159</sup>

Despite the air of consensus prevalent during Committee meetings, weapons procurement process of Turkey is hit by some problems that reduce the system’s efficiency. “Basic research and development projects are not based on real requirements and R&D and procurement activities are not coordinated under a central unit.”<sup>160</sup> A report by Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) report titled “Main Problems of Turkish Defense Industries and Proposals for Measures,”<sup>161</sup> stated that the requesting agency and the manufacturers do not coordinate their work. “Since the military forces,

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<sup>158</sup> Göksel Korkmaz, *An An Analysis Of Turkey’s Defense Systems Acquisition Policy*, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 2009, p. 39. Accessed at [http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/MBAPR/2009/Mar/09Mar\\_Korkmaz\\_MBA.pdf](http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/MBAPR/2009/Mar/09Mar_Korkmaz_MBA.pdf)

<sup>159</sup> Interview with Vahit Erdem, Ankara, July 2009.

<sup>160</sup> TOBB, “Türk Savunma sanayi Sektör Raporu,” June 2008, p. 16.

<sup>161</sup> TOBB, *Türk Savunma Sanayii’nin Ana Sorunları ve Bu Sorunlara İlişkin Çözüm Önerileri*, Ankara, 2002.

procurement agencies, and manufacturers do not work together, the problem is particularly acute in defining the requirements for weapon systems.”<sup>162</sup>

Before proceeding, it has to be said that the problems between military staff and engineers over the feasibility of design are by no means peculiar to Turkey’s procurement system. In the United States, despite a large amount of public scrutiny, Congressional oversight, and deep-rooted PPBS practise, billions of dollars were lost because of inconvenient requirements of weapons systems passed by insistence of the military. The American B-1 bomber, whose design started in 1960s is a case in point. B-1’s development plan included a mission design to fly at supersonic speed at high altitude, and conduct low-altitude bombing runs. The two demands were conflicting, but the Air Force insisted on them.

To achieve high-altitude supersonic flying capability together with low altitude maneuverability, the B-1B incorporates a moveable wing that sweeps back at high speeds to cut drag. The bulky, heavy (and costly) wing carry-through structure seriously compromised the B-1B2s entire design, including the plane’s low altitude bombing mission: fully loaded B-1Bs proved unable to maneuver as intended during low-altitude penetration.

President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) tried to end the program; the American Air Force’s insistence caused the administration of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) to purchase 100 B-1s. The planes were never used to this date, though no less than \$30 billion was spent on them.<sup>163</sup> John Alic states that the “examples of inappropriate requirements – arbitrary and unrealistic, unstable and constantly changing, and often both- can be cited almost endlessly.”

The solution is for better integration of different agencies concerning the weapons procurement, which is yet to emerge. In practice even the SSM does not participate enough at the preparation of Ten Years Procurement Plan (OYTEP),

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<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> John A. Alic, *Trillions for the Military Technology: How the Pentagon Innovates and Why It Costs So Much*, New York, 2007, pp. 103-104.

prepared by the General Staff. Deputy Undersecretary of the SMM Faruk Özlü clearly makes the point:

We had no contribution to [preparation of] OYTEP until 2006. In 2006, SSM was invited to the preparation works, which are conducted at the General Staff. But we have no determining power. Force commanders and the General Staff have the last word. SSM expresses its opinions on technical matters [concerning projects] involved in OYTEP. “We conduct feasibility works on areas demanded by the General Staff and send them our conclusions. That is out all our contribution. Our views are on whether the projects that will be included in OYTEP can be manufactured domestically.

#### **4.2.1. Decision to Award Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to Israel**

Negative implications of this insufficient exchange were manifest in the purchase of *Heron*s, UAVs Turkey decided to buy. Turkey had awarded a \$183 million contract, in April 2005, to Israel's IUP partnership of IAI and Elbit for an off the shelf purchase of 10 medium-altitude, long-endurance UAVs, eliminating the U.S. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. from the bid.<sup>164</sup> The main reason why the U.S. firm was eliminated was SSM's demand to integrate ASELSAN made electro-optical payloads (Aselfir300T)<sup>165</sup> on the UAVs. Two Heron UAV's delivered to Ankara in late November 2008 by Israel were not successful however. ASELSAN's filler is much heavier than standard electro-optical payloads, necessitating the strengthening of the Heron UAV engines.

SSM also demanded the contractor to make UAVs fly at an altitude of 30.000 feet, and remain airborne for a maximum of 40 hours. The delivery was due in 2007, and still there is no certainty that they will be delivered in 2010. Account of Faruk Özlü and journalist Özgür Ekşi reveal the mishaps at decision making in Turkey's weapons procurement projects.

We signed a contract with Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), and it started design, development, and prototype stages of a domestic UAV project. Meanwhile, Military opened a tender for UAVs. We demanded that the

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<sup>164</sup> Lale Sarıbrahimoğlu, “Turkey's Military Procurement Dilemma with Israel”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 6, Issue. 99, May 22, 2009.

<sup>165</sup> The optical device which enables UAVs to see their targets.



night vision optic ASELFil300T system be installed on the new UAV design.<sup>166</sup>

The demand of the SSM was due to its definition of duty, namely ensuring development of domestic technologies. SSM wanted to install ASELSAN's electro-optic payload on a world wide accepted system, so that the future sales by the Israeli firm will allow it to export the product worldwide. Moreover, SSM planned to purchase the UAVs through Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAİ), to enable it acquire new capabilities by working with the Israeli firm on UAVs. The result was that the UAV tender, which started in 2005 as an off-the-shelf project, was changed by these two demands. "That is why there are delays. ASELSAN's pod was larger, reducing the altitude and range available to it."<sup>167</sup>

Ekşi asserted the contradictory nature of Military's and SSM's requirements from the UAVs.

When SSM issued a call for proposals for UAV's acquisition, it demanded that the vehicles have the ability to ascend to 30.000 feet, a realistic demand. Turkey's southeast is a mountainous region, and lower flying UAV's run the danger of being heard by the target and of failure to observe an adequately large area. Higher flying UAV's can be controlled from greater distances, as the elliptic shape of the earth can prevent signals from reaching the vehicle if it fails to reach an adequate height.

So far the requirements of the Military were feasible, as was verified by Özlü. But the demand to install ASELSAN electro-optical payload jeopardized the project. Ekşi stated that the weight was the main problem:

The problem is that ASELSAN's observation pods were first developed for ATAK Helicopters, and they are big and heavy for a UAV. Installation of ASELSAN's observation pod on to UAV is possible only on the vehicles nose, which complicates the design of the existing aircraft.

Özlü stressed that the circumstances at the time of the decision compelled them to go with the Israeli firm, even though the Americans withdrew from the project.

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<sup>166</sup> Interview with SSM Deputy Undersecretary Faruk Özlü, Ankara, July 2009.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

We first looked whether 30.000 feet is possible. There are UAVs which can reach 30.000 ft, but there are no ASELSAN installed UAVs that can reach that high. TAI, ASELSAN, and the AUIP all agreed that such an UAV was possible. Americans refused, I think they evaluated the technical risks correctly.

The UAV Project is now requires a penalty to be imposed on TAI by the SSM. “TAI was supposed to foresee those delays. We can give now monetary penalty to TAI, and it has to incur the penalty to the Israeli firm.”

Parliamentary oversight on the UAV issue was very cursory. “CHP deputy Atilla Kart raised a question at the Parliament. The information he provided is mostly useless, and irrelevant to the subject. If a Parliamentarian can not ask true questions, he can not get right answers.”<sup>168</sup>

The relationship between the SSM and the General Staff suggest that the pattern of Military dominance in the decision what to buy and where to buy it from changes, but only gradually. Özlü stated that:

The user demands a perfect system. But there are economic and technical limits. If we determine some unfeasible attributes in design, we notify them. There are times they accept our opposition. If not, the requirements are determined according to their will. There are two possibilities if their will is reflected on requirements. Either we lower the level of our specifications, or the project is delayed. *One of the main reasons of delays of our projects is this.* TSK does not want a ready made item. It specifies its own needs and demands an appropriate product. Sometimes budgetary reasons or technological limits prevent what they want. The project groups include military and civilian personnel. The needs of the military are thus reflected on the project. SSM never questions whether the Military really needs it, our focus is on the availability of domestic production if it is cost effective. Domestic design and development takes more time, but the military demands it fast.

Relations began to change with the Chief of General Staff General Hilmi Özkök, who despite facing similar security challenges with his predecessors, gave more room to SSM to implement its domestic production plans.

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<sup>168</sup> Interview with Özgür Ekşi.

The Turkish Military is very receptive to our position since the last six years. The change is mainly due to the character of former Chief of Staff General Hilmi Özkök (2002-2006). His successor General Yaşar Büyükanıt remained too short at the office to change the course, and the current Chief of Staff İlker Başbuğ has a similar approach to domestic production as Özkök. ATAK helicopter project is a case in point.<sup>169</sup> Despite the fact that they need it urgently in the southeast, they did not insist on foreign procurement. They consented to wait for the period of design.

Özlu stressed that the SSM has now a large room for maneuver in determining the defense procurement decisions. Despite the fact that formal authority rests with the Prime Minister, a permanent member of the Defense Industries Executive Committee, he lets the SSM say the last word. “For the last five years, the political authority, meaning the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister, never refused a proposal of the SSM.” Özlu noted that:

I never heard Prime Minister refuse anything we offered during the Defense Industry Executive Meetings. He comes, listens, and signs our proposals, and always supports us. The support of the military and politicians means that if there is something wrong, it is civilian bureaucracy’s fault.

The main factor in SSM’s ascendancy in weapons procurement in the last five years as compared to earlier periods is the new capabilities it gained in design of main battle tanks,<sup>170</sup> and ships for its Navy.<sup>171</sup> “Turkish defense industry is

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<sup>169</sup> ATAK Helicopters will include Turkish designed components, basing on the original helicopters built by Italian defense company Augusta-Westland. “For the tactical reconnaissance and attack helicopter requirements of the Turkish Land Forces, contracts between SSM, TUSAŞ (TAI), AGUSTAWESTLAND and ASELSAN have been signed on 7th of September 2007. It is planned to have the initial flight tests before the end of the year. The first helicopter will be delivered to TLF in mid 2013.” Turkey’s Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning, Submitted at OSCE Forum 2009, p. 30.

<sup>170</sup> The National Tank Project: “The objective of the project is to meet the requirements of the Turkish Land Forces for main battle tanks by utilization of local infrastructure and capabilities to the maximum extent. OTOKAR(Turkish Company) will design, develop, produce and test ALTAY Tank Prototype(s) by taking technical support and assistance in necessary areas from ROTEM (Republic of Korea). The contract was signed between the parties in 2008 and the Project Implementation Schedule has been initiated on 15 January 2009. The Conceptual Design Stage is expected to be concluded in 2010.” Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>171</sup> The National Ship Project (MİLGEM): “The project covers the acquisition of 8 (+4 optional) Patrol and Anti-Submarine Warfare Ships (MİLGEM) through local design and construction in order to meet the reconnaissance, surveillance, target identification, early warning, defence of base and harbours, anti submarine warfare, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air warfare and patrol requirements of Turkish Naval Forces. The first ship “HEYBELİADA” designed and constructed

production oriented. Turkey has now gone beyond that, to design its own weapons and create its own licenses.” This claim suggests that a new pattern have just began to emerge in weapons procurement, in addition to directly importing weapons from the West, and producing weapons based on foreign technology, expertise, and license, two prevalent patterns since the Ottoman era. “Turkey has undergone a transformation in defense industries; of course with technical support from abroad, since 100 percent domestic production is never cost-effective.”

There is still one exception to civilian weight in weapons procurement, namely the determination of needs for TAF.

The military is still conservative on that domain. It determines the type of weapons to be purchased. We need more experienced civilians on that domain, so that the military’s assessment of threats and determination of needs are based on a more comprehensive analysis. When the military sees a civilian as well informed as they are, they are willing to listen. There are project officers [from the military] in every SSM project. If the SSM officer knows what he speaks about, the military officer usually yields to his guidance. Defense spending is directly related to threats. Political authority has to decide who is a friend and who is an enemy. But the political authorities in Turkey, since they do not have sufficient knowledge in the area, can not be influential. Politicians leave this area to the Military, who is the determinant in this subject. Our Prime Ministers do not have an expert body or institution that can help him on defense matters.

Özlü also stated that the SSM budget is open to all Parliamentarians, despite the common perception that it is indeed under cover. “SSM officers present the budget at the Parliament’s Budget and Planning Committee. But most of the time, the Committee does not direct questions on the individual items of the budget.”<sup>172</sup>

The question of secrecy deserves a special treatment to point out a structural reason for the lack of increased expertise in Turkey. Ekşi, Kibaroglu, and Özlü agreed that the scope of secrecy in Turkey is too large, but this result not from a

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by Istanbul Naval Shipyard as a prototype has been launched on 27 September 2008. The keel of the second ship “BÜYÜKADA” was laid on the same date. HEYBELİADA will be commissioned in 2011.” Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>172</sup> Interview with SSM Deputy Undersecretary Faruk Özlü, Ankara, July 2009.

desire of the Military to keep the defense policy closed to civilians. It is rather a feeling of insecurity at the lower ranks that most documents, which contain no sensitive information, are kept secret. As Özlü stressed:

The procedures concerning secrecy are of NATO standards, but the problem is implementation. The regulation states that information that can give serious damage to the country if obtained by a hostile state. In Turkey, the Military and the Defense Ministry have an absurd sense of secrecy. Which information's leak will damage the country is a question to be answered by the individual official or military officer producing the document. Information in the knowledge of the whole world is sometimes classified as secret.

#### **4.2.2. Decision to buy F-35 JSF over Eurofighter Typhoon**

The U.S-led F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)<sup>173</sup> and Europe's Eurofighter Typhoon<sup>174</sup> were in an intense competition from the early 2005 to sell around 100 fighter planes to Turkey.<sup>175</sup> Two options emerged for Turkey, which was about to make the largest defense agreement in its history with \$10 billion 700 million. Parliament was utterly absent in the decision, except for a Parliamentary discussion on May 23, 2008, two years after Turkey had already chosen to participate in the JSF. CHP deputy leader Onur Öymen noted the possibility of participating at the Eurofighter Typhoon project as well, while CHP deputy Önder Sav emphasized the need to obtain data sources of the planes' computers in order to be able to define mission specifications independently from the consortium's main partners, namely the United States.

News reports in 2006 suggested that the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, concerned with European Union accession process preferred a combined solution that would include purchase of a number of Eurofighter Typhoon planes, just like

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<sup>173</sup> JSF is produced by American defense company Lockheed-Martin with [United Kingdom](#), [Italy](#), [the Netherlands](#), [Canada](#), [Turkey](#), [Australia](#), [Norway](#), [Denmark](#) and [Israel](#).

<sup>174</sup> Eurofighter Typhoon is produced collectively by Germany, Italy, Spain, and United Kingdom. It is presented as both an Air Superiority fighter and Air-to-Surface strike plane. Accessed at: [http://www.eurofighter.com/et\\_tp\\_po.asp](http://www.eurofighter.com/et_tp_po.asp)

<sup>175</sup> Turkish Daily News, October 27, 2006.

the SSM. Özlü suggested that institutional tendencies to “buy American” in the Turkish Air Force was a factor in the final decision to proceed with JSF:

SSM’s combined option was rejected by the Turkish Air Force. Institutional habits of Turkish Air Force were largely determinant on the choice of JSF. TAF has a predilection to prefer American systems. They receive American training, use American bases, they have a NATO culture. They perceived JSF as a continuation of F-16. Turkey thus agreed to buy 100 (plus an optional 16) planes. The media reports that the choice of JSF reflected a high priority given to the fight against terrorism over aerial confrontation with Greece over the Aegean are not accurate.

Similarly, Ekşi argued that the “Turkish Air Force has an institutional tendency to choose American platforms in fixed winged aircraft and the Ministry of Defense can have no objections to that.”

#### **4.2.3. Preparation of the Defense Budget**

Interview with the officer responsible for preparing Turkey’s OYTEP, Lieutenant Colonel Bora Önen suggests that contribution of civilian defense experts can be beneficial.

Distribution of responsibilities would be useful; we cannot do everything on our own. In fact, Turkey’s weapons procurement process is under the direction of the Council of Ministers, who is responsible for directing the overall policy. The documental hierarchy is all there.

Turkey implements the PPBS in defense planning with a 20 years period and updated as necessary.<sup>176</sup> The process starts with the preparation of National Security Policy, which is supposed to be determined and implemented by the Council of Ministers, with inputs from the Ministries of National Defense, Foreign Affairs and General Staff. The National Military Strategy is prepared by the General Staff with regards to the National Security Policy. Under guidance of the latter document, each Force Command prepares its own operational concepts, tactical concepts and sub-concepts. PPBS starts with the identification of the Operational Requirements, without any attention to the financial restrictions. It is

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<sup>176</sup> Turkey’s Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning, Submitted at OSCE Forum 2009, p. 10-11.

the General Staff, which jointly evaluates these requirements and decides on them. OYTEP is the Programming phase, where the General Staff allocates resources to Forces. Each force then prepares three year budget proposals, to be approved by the General Staff and forwarded to the Ministry of Defense, to be included in the government budget, later to be voted by the Parliament.<sup>177</sup> Though the government is at the top of this hierarchy, and the Parliament has the final say, it is the General Staff, for lack of civilian experts, which dominates preparation of all documents in the documental hierarchy. MGSB which has to be prepared by civilian officials is under the guidance of the military. “MGK has to prepare the MGSB. From my personal experiences I can tell that the lack of civilian expertise necessitated filling positions at the MGK General Secretariat with retired soldiers, at least until mid 1990s.”<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> Ibid., “Turkish Armed forces is currently conducting 2010-2029 cycle and in the stage of preparing the 2010-2019.”

<sup>178</sup> Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Bora Önen, Ankara, July 2009.

## CHAPTER 5

### STRATEGY AND CRISIS DEFENSE DECISION-MAKING IN PRACTICE

The result of focusing too much on civilian-military balance in the defense decision-making is to ignore the important argument on the proper balance between expertise and policy. The pattern is apparent in Turkey's fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) a terrorist organization that desires to create a state in Turkey's South Eastern region,<sup>179</sup> as well as in foreign policy crises that have a close relation with country's defense. During Turkey's struggle with the PKK civilian authorities let the military take over the fight, sometimes to the

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<sup>179</sup> PKK's leader Abdullah Öcalan confirmed that his aim was to found an independent Kurdish State within Turkey's borders, at his testimony taken by prosecutors from the Second State Security Court (DGM) in Ankara on April 3, 1999. He argued, however, that he changed his mind after 1993, when "events showed that independence is not a realist goal." However, subsequent PKK Congress decisions between 1994 and 1999 emphasized an independent Kurdish state within Turkey's borders. Decision of the Second State Security Court in Ankara on the Öcalan Case, <http://www.belgenet.com/dava/gerekce12.html>.

There are examples of similar disparities between Öcalan's declarations and his subsequent actions: In 1988, Öcalan had a proposition of a "Turkish-Kurdish federation", instead of an independent Kurdish State. Mirella Garletti, "The Kurdish Issue in Turkey", *The International Spectator*, Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1999. In August 2009, Öcalan made a declaration through his lawyers that Kurds in Turkey must have their own "army, parliament, judiciary, education system," though at the same time refuting he wants a separate Kurdish state. *Milliyet*, "Öcalan'ı Kimse Çözemedi", 18.08.2009.



latter's reluctance. In many critical phrases of crisis management situations, political considerations override the expertise opinion set up by the General Staff and Foreign Ministry.

### **5.1. Turkey's Fight Against the PKK from Perspective of Strategic Defense Decision-Making**

Turkey's PKK problem can not be considered as a purely internal matter, (that would be addressed by regular law enforcement institutions like the Police and the Gendarmerie) as the terrorist organization's extensions reach to Northern Iraq, Northern Syria, Iran, and Europe. Nor can it only be considered as terrorism in the sense of urban terrorism frequented in Europe. The scale of attacks conducted by the PKK can reach hundreds of armed men, using weapons sometimes more sophisticated than the Turkish military itself. Turkish recruitment system, as will be seen, is heavily influenced by considerations of the fight against terror. Therefore, Turkish defense establishments have always considered the PKK problem within their domain of authority, rather than the Interior Ministry.<sup>180</sup> This section will analyze the interaction between Turkey's institutions charged with defense decision-making, and the measures taken against terror. Parallel to the plan of earlier chapters, first the legal framework of Turkey's fight against PKK terror will be treated. Determination of anti-terrorism strategies will be stated next, followed by an analysis of the contributions of different actors to the defense policy related to the internal threat. It will be seen that the measures against terrorism are taken in an *ad hoc* manner due to state institutions' inability to coordinate effectively, at least during the first years of the rising terror. Threat

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<sup>180</sup> The fight against other sources of terrorism, like leftist DHKP-C, TİKKO, etc, as well as İBDA-C and Hizbullah, religiously motivated terrorist organizations, was largely conducted by the Police, and the Interior Ministry. İhsan Bal, *Terörizm Terör, Terörizm ve Küresel Terörle Mücadelede Ulusal ve Bölgesel Deneyimler*, USAK Yayınları, April 2006, ANKARA; Andrew Mango, *Türkiye'nin Terörle Savaşı*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2005, passim.

assessment, evaluation of appropriate responses, methods of their implementation and final decision were sometimes done by individuals on their own initiative when there is any.

Between 1979 and 2002, most areas hit by terror, namely Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Şırnak, Tunceli, and Van were under the state of emergency, a Constitutional situation whereby the powers of the executive are extended.<sup>181</sup> A state of emergency in a region enables the Council of Ministers to issue decrees with force of law, and take measures that go beyond the Constitutional guarantees on rights and freedoms, though those measures cannot violate the “core” of the rights.<sup>182</sup> A decree so issued at the Official Gazette must be submitted to the Parliament the same day for approval. A state of emergency can be declared by the Council of Ministers, meeting under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic, after consultation with the National Security Council, in the event of the emergency of serious indications of widespread acts of violence aimed at the destruction of the free democratic order established by the Constitution. In order to better coordinate activities in the region under state of emergency and give the responsibility of the fight against PKK to civilian authorities, the law on Establishment of a Governorship of State of Emergency Region in 1987 was enacted. Between 1984 and 1987 the Military, (Seventh Corps Command in Diyarbakır and Eighth Corps Command in Elazığ) was in charge of the fight against terrorist groups in the South and South East Anatolia.<sup>183</sup> With the end of the martial law<sup>184</sup> in 1987, security measures were implemented by the Gendarmerie Security Corps

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<sup>181</sup> Murat Yıldırım, *PKK Terör Örgütüyle Mücadelede Türkiye'nin Askeri Gücünün Kullanılması (1984-2004)*, Master's Thesis, Kara Harp Okulu Savunma Bilimleri Enstitüsü Güvenlik Bilimleri Ana Bilim Dalı, Ankara, 2005, p. 87.

<sup>182</sup> “Core” of a freedom represents the boundary beyond which any further restrictions render it obsolete.

<sup>183</sup> Yıldırım, op. cit. in note 139, p. 88.

<sup>184</sup> Constitution Article 122: “The Council of Ministers, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic, after consultation with the National Security Council, may declare martial law in one or more regions or throughout the country for a period not exceeding six months, in the event of widespread acts of violence which are more dangerous than the cases necessitating a state of emergency... The Martial Law Commanders shall exercise their duties under the authority of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff”

Command based in Diyarbakır, under the authority of the Governorship of State of Emergency Region. The idea to set up a regional government that combines several provinces first came during the military rule period between 1980 and 1983. MGK, under supreme authority of then General Kenan Evren, tasked a committee which included experts from the State Planning Department to prepare a plan to combine provinces under a few regional governorships. Government of Bülent Ulusu, despite having received from the Consultative Assembly the authority to put the Project in effect by a decree with force of law,<sup>185</sup> left the implementation to the new civilian government. Motherland Party (ANAP) President and Prime Minister Turgut Özal discarded the idea of regional governorships, and choose to form only one instead.<sup>186</sup>

It was again the government of Turgut Özal which evaluated the intelligence on PKK camps right across the frontier, gathered by the Military and the MİT. Özal however, did not take PKK's assault on Şemdinli and Eruh<sup>187</sup> as a serious indication of terrorist threat that had already organized in Syria and South East Turkey.<sup>188</sup> Martial Law Coordination Commander Lieutenant General Nevzat Bölügiray stated in his account of PKK activities during the Özal governments that already in 1982, Gendarmarie intelligence spotted PKK camps across the Syria and Iraqi borders. Bölügiray requested MİT to verify Gendarmarie's intelligence, and argued that MİT had no knowledge of the camps at the time.<sup>189</sup> But without orders from Özal, terrorist threat was treated as ordinary criminal affair, since the intelligence that hinted upcoming of a low intensity conflict were not evaluated

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<sup>185</sup> There would be eight regional governorships, based in Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir, Adana, Diyarbakır, Kayseri, Konya and Trabzon.

<sup>186</sup> Radikal, "Eyalet Değil Süper Vali", 02.03.2007.

<sup>187</sup> Districts of Hakkari and Siirt respectively, on the South East Anatolia. One soldier was killed and twelve were wounded during the attacks conducted by dozens of PKK terrorists in broad daylight.

Soner Çağaptay, Duden Yeğenoğlu, "Left-Wing Monster: Abdullah Öcalan", FrontPageMagazine.com, January 6, 2006, accessed at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/opedsPDFs/43c2dd11a309d.pdf>

<sup>188</sup> Fikret Bilâ, *Komutanlar Cephesi*, Detay Yayıncılık, İstanbul, Kasım 2007, p. 21.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

correctly. Threat assessment, the first step of defense policy, was neglected by the government. However, PKK decided to move its members in Turkey as early as 1982, from Lebanon where they received military training.<sup>190</sup>

In 1987, as military law was lifted by the Parliament and State of Emergency was imposed under civilian authorities,<sup>191</sup> PKK roamed freely in the region. Civilian authorities' accounts suggest that the negligence on the part of central government rendered the fight against PKK obsolete, since only police and ill-trained gendarmerie stood against terrorist activities.<sup>192</sup> Developments on the field necessitated participation of all institutions tasked with providing the country's defense. But a relaxed state of mind seemed to have captured the government. Interior Minister Mustafa Kalemli argued in 1988 during a parliamentary session that "security forces in nine provinces under State of Emergency are in complete control of their regions. Despite the fact that some incidents occur in isolation, they do not carry a threat potential yet."<sup>193</sup> Between 1987 and 1991 PKK was exercising huge influence in South Eastern cities upon people, and particularly shopkeepers. During the same period General Staff was not the main institution conducting operations against the PKK. Interior Ministry, through the State of Emergency Governorship led the fight, by using the Gendarmerie, supported by Land forces if help is requested. Police, special operations units and village guards were the main security apparatus used in the fight against terrorism. Village guards were a response to the attacks of the PKK on populations of scattered villages in mountaneous regions, which were difficult to protect simultaneously. A law passed in 1985<sup>194</sup> enabled villagers to arm themselves and participate at Gendarmerie's operations.

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<sup>190</sup> Nihat Ali Özcan, *PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi) Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yöntemi*, ASAM Yayınları, Ankara, 1999, p. 90.

<sup>191</sup> The first governor of State of Emergency was Hayri Kozakçıoğlu, a former district governor and Police chief. Kozakçıoğlu remained as the State of Emergency Province governor until 1995.

<sup>192</sup> Mehmet Ali Kışlalı, *Güneydoğu'da Düşük Yoğunluklu Çatışma*, Ümit Yayıncılık, Ankara 1996, p. 179.

<sup>193</sup> Yıldırım, op. cit. in note 139, p. 82.

<sup>194</sup> Amendment to the Law of Villages No. 442, Article 74, law No. 3175, March 1985.

Moreover, the propaganda in favor of the PKK which spread in refugee camps in South East Turkey in 1989 was not stopped despite specific orders from the chair of MGK and President of the Republic Kenan Evren. Özal was praised in these propaganda meetings attended even by Parliamentary deputies. The decision-making apparatus so clearly defined in the Constitution, was in utter paralysis. The government finally prepared a dossier to lift Parliamentary immunities for 26 deputies, but the proposal was never voted at the general assembly. Kenan Evren “ordered” their trial at MGK, but “it was impossible to get prosecutors and judges to act. There was nothing to suggest that the state was against the situation.”<sup>195</sup> MGK’s inefficiency at that time verifies the argument that the 1982 Constitution, despite the large prerogatives it gives to the Military, determined the government as the final authority. Kenan Evren’s account of MGK meetings is a good example:

They always refer to MGK. Everything is spoken in MGK. Sometimes a recommendation is given to the government, sometimes not. There is not even a sound recording, besides what MGK General Secretary notes. There are no stenographs, nothing. How many recommendation decisions are taken? How many of those are implemented?<sup>196</sup>

Government completely withdrew from the decision-making process in practice when Özal became the President on November 9, 1989, and left his seat to Yıldırım Akbulut. “When Akbulut uttered an opinion on the fight against terror, Özal would intervene the next day and make a conflicting remark. Politicians left South East to the mercy of fate, leaving security forces to fend for themselves.”<sup>197</sup>

Inadequacy of the gendarmerie and police forces to fight the PKK raised the question of General Staff’s involvement in the struggle, but the State of Emergency meant that the military could not act. The irregularities in the decision-making process meant that the initiative passed on the military, but by

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<sup>195</sup> Kışlalı, op. cit. in note 150, pp. 182-183.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid., p. 212.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

governments' consent. Former Chief of General Staff (1990-1994) Doğan Güreş stated in his interview with Journalist Fikret Bilâ that despite his request to declare a military law, governments insisted on civilian control. But governments preferred use of army rather than the Gendarmerie. Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel<sup>198</sup> consented to delegate all authority in practice to Güreş, who started taking decisions without consulting the President Turgut Özal, Demirel, or MGK. "Demirel was content. None of the governors in the region opposed me, they cooperated perfectly."<sup>199</sup>

However the initiative of General Güreş was an *ad hoc* approach, as the lack of an explicit authority to the General Staff meant that military was reluctant in some cases to let use of air forces in support of operations, or send troops across the border without a Parliamentary permission to raid PKK camps. "Messages after messages for support were unheeded by the General Staff, who was not legally given the duty to operate. Gendarmerie Security Corps tried to change the situation to no effect."<sup>200</sup>

Authorities of the governor of State of Emergency were transferred to provincial governors in 1992, and Gendarmerie forces filled the ranks of Provincial Security Commands, whose demarcation corresponded to provinces. Governors were the supreme legal authority in conducting operations against the PKK. The choice of State of Emergency instead of Military Law was prompted in part by a concern to appease criticisms on Turkish democracy from Europe.<sup>201</sup>

Equipment and training of the gendarmerie for the struggle against terrorism was hindered during the 1980s by institutional habits, a refusal to adopt foreign expertise and a conflict between decision-making offices. First was evident in the attempts to train the gendarmerie according to low-intensity-warfare.

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<sup>198</sup> Demirel was Prime Minister between 20 November 1991 and 16 May 1993, and President of the Republic between [16 May 1993](#) and [16 May 2000](#).

<sup>199</sup> Bilâ, *op. cit.* in note 147, p. 74.

<sup>200</sup> Kışlalı, *op. cit.* in note 150., p. 183-184.

<sup>201</sup> Yıldırım, *op. cit.* in note 139, p. 81.

An American officer who was tasked with training the Police and Gendarmerie for the fight against the PKK was not well received by the General Staff at all. For long years, low-intensity combat warfare was not learned.<sup>202</sup>

The military perceived the necessity to switch to guerilla warfare and organize accordingly, as well as to pass to “area supremacy” concept during Güreş’s term in office. The manner in which Güreş tells his experience of implementing Special Forces units in Turkey is reminiscent of Namık Pasha who founded the School of Military Sciences in 1838 after a visit to Paris where he consulted a French officer. Güreş told Bilâ that he:

[I] decided to analyze how the British Special Air Service is trained. I phoned the British Chief of Staff, who was my friend. He accepted and together with the British Defense Minister we inspected the Special Forces. I asked for his help to establish a Special Forces Command, and he accepted. I also went to the United States to see Delta Force.<sup>203</sup>

The first Special Forces Command was founded in 1992, replacing the Special Warfare Department with the decision of Güreş. The new department was under direct command of the Chief of Staff. It should be noted that there was nothing new about the concept of low-intensity conflict and relevant force structure to conduct it. American field manuals already defined the LIC as a political-military struggle under the level of interstate warfare, which requires use of political, economic, intelligence and military means.<sup>204</sup> American military had already formed Special Operations Forces, Green Berets, SEAL, Delta force before Turkey felt the need for them. Nor was there any wide scale public debate to launch a comprehensive policy to deal with terror.

During Demirel’s Presidency, Military gained more power in the fight against the PKK as a result of Demirel’s and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller’s<sup>205</sup> directions. Demirel stated that though some military officers were anxious to let the civilian

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<sup>202</sup> Kışlalı, op. cit. in note 150.

<sup>203</sup> Bilâ, op. cit. in note 147, p. 47.

<sup>204</sup> Kışlalı, op. cit. in note 150., p. 25.

<sup>205</sup> Prime Minister between [June 25, 1993](#) and [March 6, 1996](#)

authorities fight terrorists inside Turkey, leaving the Military only for border watching purposes, he insisted on Military's involvement.

But intra service rivalries plagued new cooperation efforts at the top of the civilian bureaucracy. Çiller had given the direction for the formation of a high-ranking committee by MİT undersecretary Sönmez Köksal, Special Forces Commander of the Chief of Staff Major General Fevzi Türkeri and Chief of Police Department Mehmet Açar and their officers. A press leak concerning the meetings spelled the end of the trilateral mechanism.

MİT began directing its efforts against the PKK with the specific orders given by Demirel to the first civilian Undersecretary of MİT, former Ambassador Sönmez Köksal in 1992. The intelligence overhaul started by Köksal refreshed the technical equipment and increased the intellectual capacity by consulting universities on counter-terrorism. Another practice to overcome the disorganization of the decision-makers was the weekly meetings between senior officers from the General Staff, Foreign Ministry and MİT.<sup>206</sup>

But the uncoordinated efforts of disparate state institutions meant that personal initiative was necessary, as was the case in adapting to the low intensity conflict, in order to execute some of the most evident procedures in the fight against terror. Activities of the PKK were coordinated from its leadership in Syria and Lebanon (at the time under Syrian control) where training camps housed hundreds of PKK members. The fact that another country was harboring the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and other terrorists mean that the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff had to be involved in what was to be considered in part, a defense related problem. Foreign Ministry, the General Staff and MİT continued their coordination in the form of weekly meetings after 1992, to determine possible courses of action against the PKK and present them to government. On one of the meetings it was decided to demand extradition of Öcalan officially from Syria.

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<sup>206</sup> Murat Yetkin, Kürt Kapanı: Şam'dan İmralı'ya Öcalan", Remzi Kitabevi, Ankara, Ekim 2004, p. 19.



Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry Ambassador Gündüz Aktan was chosen to draft the text of the official request. When Aktan demanded the Syria file from the Middle East Department of the Foreign Ministry, he realized that there was no official demand or even a warning sent to Syria concerning Öcalan, who was in that country for at least eleven years.<sup>207</sup> The first note to Syria which provided the PKK with training camps and shelter was delivered to Syrian Embassy in Ankara on January 23, 1996.

Office of the President of the Republic gained more influence on the fight against terror as a result of weak governments during the latter part of the 1990s. The coordination between the General Staff and the government was at its lowest level during government of Tansu Çiller with the leader of Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) Necmettin Erbakan.<sup>208</sup> President Süleyman Demirel emerged as the prominent figure in shaping country's counter-terrorism policies, as the government was struggling with the effects of the February 28 process, which was the culmination of Military's mistrust to the Islamic minded Erbakan. Every Thursday Demirel used to convene the Chief of General Staff, the Prime Minister, and Undersecretary of MIT, and request detailed briefings from the Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>209</sup>

The process to issue a threat and prepare TAF for an eventual war with Syria suggests that decisions are taken with a consensus, though the individual political weights of decision-makers also influence the outcome. It was Chief of Staff General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu which ordered preparation of an Action Plan against Syria, which detailed economic, military and psychological measures, their dates of implementation. Demirel not only adopted the plan, but also took lead in its exercise. Thus Demirel set the tone of the threat he issued to Syria during his inauguration speech at the Parliament on October 1, 1998. He also chose to skip

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>208</sup> The coalition of RP and True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi, DP*) popularly named as Refahyol, remained in power between [28 June 1996](#) and [30 June 1997](#).

<sup>209</sup> Ibid. 57.

the issue totally during the MGK meeting the previous day, surprising then Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, who was in favor of a lower tone.<sup>210</sup> Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz gave full support to Demirel, he even considered President's words less threatening in tone than necessary. Anxious to secure the support of the United States against Syria, Demirel, along with Chief of General Staff General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu and National Defense Minister İsmet Sezgin, requested that land forces be sent to Kosovo in support of the NATO operation, as opposed to Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, who insisted that Turkey's contribution to air mission was enough.<sup>211</sup> It was again Demirel who determined Turkey's position during the attempts of mediation by Egyptian President Hüsnü Mübarak between Turkey and Syria.

We have noted that the low-intensity-conflict has political and psychological aspects, which renders solely military means obsolete in dealing with the threat. However, as the new government of Tansu Çiller chose to give priority to tougher measures against terrorism,<sup>212</sup> stating that she had a "list of businessmen helping PKK." Süleyman Demirel at the time confessed that the "state can get out of the routine."<sup>213</sup> The consequence was strengthening of Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terrorism Department (JİTEM), which was founded by former Gendarmerie Force Commander General Hulusi Sayın between 1981 and 1985.<sup>214</sup>

However JİTEM's actions were not controlled by Parliamentarians or by the government, and soon the fight against terror turned into a hunting of any pro-Kurdish writer, businessmen or anyone deemed a valid target for "confessors",

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<sup>210</sup> Ibid. 93. Demirel stated that the first time idea of threatening Syria on Öcalan occurred to him during his meeting with Syrian President Hafız Assad in 1993 in Damascus. "I spoke with him for 4.5 hours. I told him that Öcalan is in Syria. He ignored what I said." Ibid., p. 191.

<sup>211</sup> Turkey had sent seven planes to Kosovo in support of implementation of the flight ban over the region.

<sup>212</sup> Murat Yetkin, "Kürt Meselesinde Kara Kutular Açılıyor", Radikal, June 12, 2004.

<sup>213</sup> Serhan Yediğ, "Bir Var Bir Yok, Hem Var Hem Yok: JİTEM", Hürriyet, November 2005.

<sup>214</sup> Kutlu Savaş, "Susurluk Raporu", 1998. accessed at <http://akgul.bilkent.edu.tr/Dava/susurluk/kutlu/p1.html>,

former PKK members used as hitmen by JITEM, according to the Susurluk report prepared by then Chairman of Prime Ministry Inspection Board Kutlu Savaş. “These actions impaired the overall effort (fight against terror). The abovementioned developments which brief the period after 1993 is a reflection of top level state officials.” Testimony of a confessor used in executions reveal the failure of public institutions to implement the Constitutional duties concerning defense and security.

By that time an illegal formation known as JITEM was formed. We had the authority to execute anyone we suspected of being associated with the PKK. Instead of delivering these people to justice we secretly executed them. We sometimes received orders to that effect.

Moreover, Savaş’s report suggests that the conflict between security institutions were directly responsible for impairment of their efforts against the terror threat. “It is well known that there were serious problems between public institutions. The basic problem was the exposure of Police, MİT and Gendarmerie to the public because of their covert operations, to the point of hindering their work.”<sup>215</sup> As a result even the Land Forces refused to participate in joint operations with them, since they were regarded as a liability. General Staff requested their withdrawal from South East in 1997.<sup>216</sup>

The deficiencies of decision making mechanisms cause corruption and increased abuses of human rights, as can be seen by the conduct of a part of Gendarmarie forces in the region. According to İbrahim Cerrah, Professor at the Turkish Police Academy, institutional deficiencies are the primary cause of Gendarmarie’s recourse to extra-judicial means in the fight against terror. The personel can act in the name of some “higher ideals” like the need to protect the state and the nation,<sup>217</sup> and is virtually exempt from inspection. Cerrah states that there is a

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<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> [Gareth Jenkins](#), “Turkey Overhauls Its Counter-Terrorism Policy”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 5 Issue. 198, October 16, 2008. Information is based on Jamestown interviews in teh Soueth Eastern Turkey between 1995 and 1997.

<sup>217</sup> Andrew McGregor, “Turkey’s Gendarmarie”, *Terrorism Monitor*, Jamestown Foundation, Volume VI, Issue 22 u November 25, 2008, p. 11.

Professional solidarity resulting from Professional socialization and a tacit agreement among the members of the Gendarmerie not to testify against a colleague except under extraordinary circumstances. The result is a security apparatus exempt from civilian oversight, as recorded by the EU Progress Report on Turkey. “No progress has been made on enhancing civilian control over the Gendarmerie when engaged in law enforcement activities.”<sup>218</sup>

A more structured policy-making mechanism in the fight against terror is under consideration at the moment. A statement issued on October 15, 2008 by the Supreme Council for the Struggle Against Terrorism (*Terörle Mücadele Yüksek Kurulu*, TMYK), a body which resumed to convene in 2005 after being silent since 1997, noted that the Interior Ministry would be restructured to facilitate coordination of Turkey’s anti-terrorism efforts. The decision was taken only after 23 officers and privates were killed by a PKK attack in early October 2008, and at the request of the General Staff.<sup>219</sup> TMYK brings together the Prime Minister (who chairs the meeting) Chief of General Staff and other military representatives, Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, as well as the Undersecretary of MİT. But the new institution is likely to give Interior Ministry, (who was already the main responsible in the fight against terrorism but yielded its duties to the Military in practice) more say in the fight against terrorism.

The new Undersecretariat for Public Order and Security (*Kamu düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı*, popularly known as the Undersecretariat for Counter-terrorism) will have the primary task of coordinating efforts in the fight against terrorism, conducting studies to develop policies and strategies, monitor their

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<sup>218</sup> Commission of the European Communities, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, Brussels, 2008, p. 10. accessed at [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press\\_corner/key-documents/reports\\_nov\\_2008/turkey\\_progress\\_report\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf)

<sup>219</sup> Gareth Jenkins, “Turkey Overhauls Its Counter-Terrorism Policy”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 5 Issue. 198, October 16, 2008.

implementation, evaluate intelligence conveyed by intelligence units, provide strategic information to security institutions, and conduct public relations.<sup>220</sup>

Undersecretariat will not have operational duties, but the extent of its functions mean that if put in practice with sufficient staff, it will lead other institutions. It will be able to request information from any state institution, including the General Staff, the Foreign Ministry, MİT, the Gendarmerie and the Police Department. The undersecretariat will serve under the Interior Minister, who will receive the status of deputy Prime Minister. Undersecretariat will have a central body and provincial body. Its staff will number 94, comprising legal experts, analysts, programmers, translators, data collecting and controlling managers, statisticians, sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists. Its main task will be to ensure coordination of security policies with social and economic policies, through Provincial Social Study and Project Directorates to be appointed to 81 provinces. Undersecretariat will be able to set up expertise committees for research upon approval of the Interior Minister. The draft law for the establishment of the new undersecretariat was sent to the Parliament on May 12, 2009, and was approved by Internal Affairs Committee eight days later. The Law envisages a Board for Coordination of Struggle Against Terrorism, comprised of undersecretaries of Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Public Order and Security, MİT, Head of the Police Department, second Chief of Staff, Commander of the Gendarmerie, and Commander of the Coastal Guard, under the presidency of the Interior Minister. The Board will coordinate institutions relevant to counter-terrorism. During the writing of thesis it was still pending for final vote at the Parliament.

The Undersecretariat can become a turning point in the decision-making against terrorism if it can tap the intellectual capacity of the country, and ensure that lessons learned with experience during 1980s and 1990s are not lost.<sup>221</sup> Thus, while the inclusion of anthropologists and psychologists reflect crystallization of

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<sup>220</sup> Draft Law on Duties and Establishment of the Undersecretariat for Public Order and Security, approved by the Council of Ministers for submission to the Parliament on May 5, 2009.

<sup>221</sup> Fatih Uğur, Nursel Dilek, "Terörle mücadelede nerede yanlış yapıyoruz?", *Aksiyon*, No. 723, October 13, 2008.

the idea that fight against terrorism has extra-military dimensions, the new coordinating body must keep a record of best practices of past years as well. Already the ineffective use of Special Forces, inability to sustain the experienced staff in the ranks and a general loss of “counter-terrorism memory” plague anti-terrorism efforts.<sup>222</sup>

After 25 years since the first large scale assault of the PKK on Eruh Şemdinli on August 15 1984, Turkey is yet to forge a new decision making structure to end terrorism. Different phases of the struggle against PKK terrorism suggest that a heavy reliance on military measures is not only a cause of Turkish Military’s influence in politics. The final choice on the strategy have always been vested in governments, but lack of interest, capability, and experience hindered adaptation to methods of fighting against terrorism. According to President of the International Strategic Research Institution (USAK) Sedat Laçiner, one of the most important mistakes of Turkey in its fight against various terrorist groups is the lack of institutional mechanisms to collect and transfer experiences gathered during long years.<sup>223</sup>

## **5.2. Execution of Defense Policy in Crisis Situations**

Turkish decision-makers’ actions during the Gulf Crisis in 1991 and Iraqi War in 2003 will be analyzed in this section. As parallel with the argument of the thesis, civilians are again the final arbiters of decisions, to the point of ignoring expertise opinion of official institutions, civilian or military alike. The policy choices of governments during the Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraqi War in 2003 enables us to monitor how the decision-making on defense can be influenced by disagreements within and between the executive branch and the legislative. Turgut Özal was the supreme authority in the executive branch during the Gulf Crisis in 1991, and had an extraordinary influence on the government to the detriment of Yıldırım Akbulut, Prime Minister who was considered a weak figure. In 2003, AKP was in government and had 363 seats at the Parliament out of 550, but majority of

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<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

deputies had different views than the government who wanted to see the motion passed (Prime Minister Abdullah Gül was regarded as occupying his seat temporarily at that moment, until the AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was reelected as a Siirt deputy to enter the Parliament).

### **5.2.1. Defense Decision-Making in Crisis Situations: Gulf Crisis in 1991**

Turkey's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the outcome of a policy-making system that lacked proper communication between decision-makers in the executive branch, especially the President Turgut Özal and then Chief of General Staff General Necip Torumtay, who resigned on December 3, 1990. At the outset of the crisis, when former President of Iraq Saddam Hussein launched the invasion on August 2, 1990, General Staff took measures against a possible Iraqi infringement of Turkish territory and a possible refugee crisis, by moving a portion of land and air forces to the South East Region.<sup>224</sup> The appropriate stance against the invasion was discussed at the MGK on August 3. MGK decision was that Turkey would not close down the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline or takes any steps against Iraq.<sup>225</sup>

The decision may have been prompted by an estimate of early diffusion of the crisis. But Saddam did not pull his forces out of Kuwait, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 661, passed on August 6, to impose an economic embargo on Iraq brought the first challenge to Turkish decision-makers. Özal, notwithstanding the reticence of Foreign Ministry, Parliament and public opinion to stay out of the war, ordered closure of the pipeline unilaterally.

Torumtay criticised the manner in which the decision was taken rather than the content of the policy in his memoirs. He was anxious about the possible tensions the decision might cause with Iraq, and the necessity of taking appropriate border

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<sup>224</sup> Troop levels were increased to 120.000 on the Iraqi border, pinning eight Iraqi divisions in northern Iraq.

<sup>225</sup> William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis", *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 4, October, 1992, p. 683

monitoring, intelligence and extra security measures. “I, as the Chief of Staff responsible to the Prime Minister for defense of borders, was not notified of the decision. I learned it from TRT.”<sup>226</sup>

The Gulf Crisis created the possibility of implementation of defense plans different from existant ones. General Staff thus started to prepare for possible scenarios with the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and submitted views to the President and the Prime Minister. But the President took decisions without any regard to them. Four months after the crisis began; the General Staff did not take any order on how to prepare for the situation in the Gulf. Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut remained silent in policy discussions and the government did not present any propositions.<sup>227</sup>

Three problems confronted Turkey beyond that point. Would Turkey open a second front from northern Iraq as part of land battle? Would Turkey send land or naval forces with the coalition troops who fought the Iraqi army? Would Turkey open its air space for missiles, war and cargo planes to coalition forces? It was certain that these policy options required defensive and diplomatic preparations. Özal wanted to send troops to fight against Saddam Hussein in the Gulf, but a strong opposition from the opposition True Path Party (DYP) leader Süleyman Demirel, opposition Social Democrat Populist Party led by Erdal İnönü and a group of ANAP deputies led by Mesut Yılmaz<sup>228</sup> prevented this. Özal had no choice but to consent, since sending Turkish troops to foreign countries requires a Parliamentary voting. Parliament consented to give government the authority to send troops abroad and receive foreign troops in Turkey. Özal had bypassed all state institutions during the crisis, by shaping his decisions by speaking to coalition leaders, especially the American President George Bush. Foreign Minister Ali Bozer resigned in October 1990, in protest of Özal’s direct communications with the American President George Bush, by bypassing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Two other incidents led to resignation of Torumtay. First was the decision of Özal to appoint Torumtay as a “contact point” for U.S. operations in Iraq, without the General’s knowledge. Second reason came after a high-level meeting

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<sup>226</sup> Necip Torumtay, op. cit. in note 114, p. 102.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid., pp. 108-109.

<sup>228</sup> Mesut Yılmaz was a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, but had resigned in February 1990, the reason was shown as interference of the President in his ministry’s affairs.



between the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Defense Minister on the Gulf crisis. Torumtay was not invited to the meeting. An unsigned Council of Ministers decision to implement further security measures was sent to Torumtay after the meeting on December 2, 1990. Torumtay gave his resignation the next day, due to “irregularities in the decision-making process.” On January 17, 1990, merely a day before the air attacks on Iraq begun, the Parliament permitted the government to allow use of İncirlik Air Base by coalition forces against Iraq.

The contrast of Torumtay’s views with those of former Defense Minister Ercan Vuralhan can easily be observed:

The President has taken the matter into his own hands personally. There were some who could not fit into this coordination. Ministers and the Chief of General Staff have resigned...We have to confess that the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and the General Staff remained in a traditional structure...In this structure, the decision making goes up through different levels, then presented to the government. But the crisis has shown us that Turkey must discard this traditional structure. A structure where reporting, view submitting and order receiving system works faster is necessary. During the crisis, President Turgut Özal provided that coordination.<sup>229</sup>

Özal commented that the Chief of Staff was “putting the breaks on.” We see that the General Staff had only a limited influence during the Gulf Crisis. Özal’s desire for a more active participation in the war was prevented by the opposition at the Parliament, rather than the Military. Only choice left for the Chief of General Staff was to resign, in the face of political practice he deemed inappropriate.

### **5.2.2. Defense Decision-Making in Crisis Situations: Parliamentary Vote for the March 1 2003 Motion**

Another example revealing the impact of civilians, this time of the legislative branch, was the March 1, 2003 Parliamentary motion to allow deployment and passage of U.S. troops in Turkey towards northern Iraq, in order to force a regime change in Baghdad. March 1 voting at the Parliament was preceded by an intense negotiation period with the United States. At the time of the voting, it was agreed

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<sup>229</sup> M. Hulki Cevizoğlu, *Körfez Savaşı ve Özal Diplomasisi*, Form Yayınları, Ankara, 1996, p. 247.

with the United States that Turkish troops (31.000 troops) would enter northern Iraq, be allowed to engage PKK terrorists as pleased, monitor distribution of arms to Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, have complete control over air strikes that would be conducted by the U.S. from air bases in Turkey, U.S. personnel in Turkey would be subject to Turkish jurisdiction in cases of penal proceedings, Turkish troops would advance 40 km into northern Iraq and secure border crossings.<sup>230</sup>

The fallout of the March 1 decision of the Parliament to refuse the motion contaminated bilateral relations not only on the diplomatic level, but on the level of other state institutions as well. Head of the Turkish Parliament Human Rights Commission Mehmet Elkatmış accused the United States of conducting genocide in Iraq, and an AKP deputy Faruk Abacıoğlu suggested dissolution of Turkish-American Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group. Likewise U.S. defense policy makers did not take remedy of relations for granted. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith stated that the appreciation of relationships beyond government officials and down to the public in general is crucial, if the relations are to be sustainable, during a speech at the Council of foreign Relations in February 2005. He also implicitly argued that AKP lets foment of anti-Americanism. "We hope that the officials in our partner countries are going to be devoting the kind of effort to building popular support for the relationship that we build in our own country."<sup>231</sup>

Prior to voting, rumors that the U.S. would supply Kurdish groups with heavy weaponry, arguments that the U.S. troops would not leave Turkish territory (labeled as "ignorant talk" by then retired Chief of General Staff General Hilmi Özkök, who was on duty during the crisis) and a negative attitude against the U.S., labeled "enemy" by main opposition CHP deputy Önder Sav at the Parliament influenced the public opinion, which was already adverse to the idea

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<sup>230</sup> Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, Doğan Egmont Yayıncılık, İstanbul, March 2008, p. 47.

<sup>231</sup> Michael Rubin, "A comedy of errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Spring 2005. Accessed at <http://www.meforum.org/701/a-comedy-of-errors-american-turkish-diplomacy>

of war. Important point is that a considerable number of deputies were unaware of the details of the agreement with the U.S. Then Ambassador Deniz Bölükbaşı, who was the chief negotiator for Turkey in formulation of the motion, found to inform only a handful of deputies, informally, of the content. He was not allowed to speak during the voting session on March 1.

At the end 264 deputies voted in favour of the motion, 250 voted against it and 19 deputies abstained. The motion required three more votes in favor to pass, and then Parliament Speaker Bülent Arınç declared the motion rejected.

The analyses on the aftermath of the voting suggest that the Parliament, owner of the function to provide national defense, acted independently of the government, in stark opposition to matters concerning domestic affairs. AKP deputies denied garnering support for the motion among their colleagues. AKP leadership was not aware of the potential vote losses, as it considered the 44 “no” votes to accept United States Military personel to modernize bases in February the maximum limit of loss. Another possible factor for the decision, according Rubin, was encouragement from Kurdish businessmen and President of the northern Iraqi Regional Administration Messoud Barzani for some deputies to vote against the motion.<sup>232</sup>

We see that the General Staff remained within its Constitutional duties to prepare policy options for the government. The final decision was sent to the Parliament for voting, and the despite the Military’s demand, the motion failed. At every stage the civilian authority played the main role in shaping of defense policy in a crisis situation, like we saw during the 1991 Gulf crisis. Parliamentarians were not fully informed of the consequences of a “no” vote, and their decisions were based on a mixture of party politics, opposition standing against the government, religious identity, a consideration for the constituency, and public opinion. Despite the fact that the bureaucracy (both civilian and military) conducted a

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<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

scrutinous preparation of likely scenarios, the problems in conveying the content of those preparations were problematic.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSION**

A close look at how the defense policy-making works in practice reveals that the civilian vs. military debate fails to explain how the decisions are taken. It is difficult to ascertain that Turkish Military's position in Turkish domestic politics is the main reason for the unequal footing on which defense policy making rests. Although Turkish Constitutions emphasized the supremacy of civilian authority in the defense sector, elected officials have deliberately given the Military exclusive authority on defense matters, until very recently.

Turkish defense policy making structures are rooted in reformation efforts in the Ottoman era. Not only institutions which dealt with day-to-day management of Ottoman military were established before the foundation of the Republic, but the habit to let a select few dictate the defense policy was also inherited from the Ottoman period as well. Until 1909, Sultans had the supreme authority in defense matters, as well as in weapons procurement. Figures who took final defense decisions (Abdulhamid II, Şevket Pasha, Enver Pasha) had relied more on their own views about preparation and conduct of warfare, rather than relying on contribution of various defense institutions like the Ministry of War. It was also during this period that we observe silence of the Parliament on defense related questions and its tendency to approve defense budgets uncritically.

A combination of foreign purchases along with efforts to rejuvenate the domestic production marked the first part of the eighteenth century, but Ottoman Empire's finances could not be sufficient to import latest production techniques. Finally,

weak roots of Turkish defense industry can be traced not to an inevitable backwardness of the Ottoman Empire in defense technologies, but rather to a lack of resolved leadership to obtain those technologies, or to an outright choice of subduing country's defense policy to its foreign policy (Like Abdulhamid II did).

Heavy involvement of the Military in politics in the last stages of the Ottoman Empire incited the founders of the Republic to separate Military from the Politics. This meant that the General Staff would be directly responsible to the Prime Minister. Lack of civilian expertise, coupled with fear of involvement of civilian government officials and the Military into each others' domains made sure that governments stayed out of defense policy and relevant weapons procurement decisions. General Staff retained responsibility for direction of armed forces' maneuvers, training and intelligence. Even the MİT's direction was under control of the General Staff, until 1990s. Defense Ministry acted as an institution which provided the needs of the General Staff, as determined by the latter. It has to be noted that the influence of the Military in Defense Policy does not stem from the fact that the General Staff is directly under Prime Ministry, as opposed to other NATO nations where it operates under the Defense Ministry. General Staff was under the direction of the Defense Ministry between 1949 and 1980 in Turkey, but its influence did not diminish, nor that kind of regulation led directly to increased expertise in different sectors of the civil society (universities, the media, etc.).

Cold War had little influence to reverse this trend. On the contrary, both during the prevalence of doctrine of massive retaliation, which put less emphasis on conventional weapons, and during the period of gradual response, which required a significant boost in conventional military power, Turkish defense planners relied too heavily on NATO plans. This is important to note, since the concept of warfare during the early stages of Cold War included the concept of massive mobilization, a lesson learned from the Second World War. All human and material potential of the country would have to be prepared to meet the threat of a Soviet intrusion, the question clearly exceeded far beyond the scope of military operations. Needs thus were not enough to change the well established routines.

Turkish Parliaments or assemblies which drafted Constitutions always gave the final word on defense matters to the Council of Ministers (and to the Parliament in the case of a decision to declare war and to approve the defense budget). The role of the Military increased consistently with the increase of power of the executive branch of the government. The scope of activities which the MGK was tasked to monitor was increased, and culminated in the long list of activities of the MGK General Secretariat after the 1982 Constitution was adopted.

Real power in defense policy-making rested in the Military so long as civilians allowed it. Defense policy concerning crisis situations provides us with the best example. Rather than a military vs. civilian divide, a focus on expertise vs. politics (concerning foreign policy as in the case of Abdulhamid II and Germans, or domestic politics like the Parliament's attitude during the Iraqi War) is a more useful tool in analyzing which institution has more weight on defense policy. An illustrative example for the effects of diffusion of expertise on defense policy-making is given by Wildavsky, according to whom increased policy options is one of the benefits:

The rise of the defense intellectuals has given the President of the United States enhanced ability to control defense policy. No longer is he dependent for advice on the military. He can choose among defense intellectuals from the research corporations and the academies for alternative sources of advice. He can install these men in his own office.<sup>233</sup>

The trend was in the opposite direction in Turkey, where there was bureaucratic resistance to get involved in defense policy. Torumtay states that in Annapolis Naval School in 1981, he met with civilian officers from American State Department and other Departments who were taking courses on massive mobilization at various Military institutions.

Officials were conducting decision-making exercises on matters concerning their Departments in the event of a total war. Despite the fact that similar exercises are organized in Turkey at the National Security Academy, and despite the fact that the General Staff requests high-level

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<sup>233</sup> Wildavsky, op. cit. in note 18, p. 102.

officers from ministries, the civilian personnel taking part in these courses are of low-level, some of them have no future in their relative ministries, or are waiting for retirement. In Wargames prepared by these academies, Prime Ministers, Ministers and other high-level officers are elected and they are trained in decision-making before and during a war. Most of the civilian personnel are then appointed to irrelevant positions. During the Gulf Crisis in 1990, the prevalent opinion was that war is conducted only by soldiers and preparations for war, even an offensive war, would take a short time. Warlike ideas were coupled with a desire to reduce the defense budget for the year 1991.<sup>234</sup>

The tendency of civilians to let defense policy as an exclusive zone of the Military was more accentuated in the fight against terrorism. Though the legal responsibility to fight terrorism was clearly given to civilian authorities, like governors and ultimately to the Interior Ministry which controls the Gendarmerie in times of peace, governments dragged the Military in the struggle against terror. It is not the involvement of the Military itself (which was only logical given the level of the threat), but the apparent delegation of all initiatives regarding the matter to the Military that prevented accumulation of relevant knowledge and experience on counter-terrorism. The new Undersecretariat of the Ministry of Interior, (pending vote at the Parliament), seeks to remedy this problem.

The necessity to establish an Undersecretariat for Public Order and Security is due to the “coordination problems between various institutions of the state tasked with counter terrorism” according to the law that determines the Undersecretariat’s functions. The law also rightly states that strategies against terrorism should include those that are conducted in foreign countries as well as inside the country. However, the structure of the Undersecretariat, as it currently is, contains certain elements that may hinder its effectiveness.

On the one hand, the new Undersecretariat will have no authority to direct the operations undertaken by security forces, and it will be tasked to make and execute plans to ensure public support for the struggle against terrorism on the other. However, the conduct of security forces on the ground has an important impact on the perception of the public over counter terrorism operations of the

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<sup>234</sup> Torumtay, op. cit. in note 144.

state. Moreover, the law tasks the new undersecretariat with ensuring coordination of various state institutions responsible for the struggle against terrorism. But since the new organization is an undersecretariat, and is run by the Interior Minister, it will have equal or lesser status in practice with other well established organizations with the MIT, and the General Staff, (both directly answer to the Prime Minister) who have their own intelligence sources. It is by no means guaranteed that the new undersecretariat will be able to collect relevant intelligence from other state institutions. It is also not guaranteed that advises of the new undersecretariat will have any influence over the conduct of security forces. Despite these potential setbacks, the fact that the new undersecretariat will have the duty to collect data from domestic and foreign sources on terrorism promises to increase civilian and military expertise in the area and ensure continuity and sustainability in political decisions.

Dissemination of expert knowledge to different institutions will also mean that they will be able to fulfill their duties on defense more aptly. But this requires an understanding that defense policy need not be dominated by the military, and that it need not be cloaked under secrecy. The same holds true for weapons purchases, as exemplified by the SSM. As the expertise of SSM's staff and the complexity of projects it undertakes increases, the Military is willing to let the SSM have the final word. Similar developments will ensure that the defense policy making process will include informed discussions within the public opinion, in opposition to current practices where defense policy and weapons procurement are considered as a public policy domain reserved for state elites.



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