ISRAEL AND PALESTINE
FACE2FACE

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

ISRAEL AND PALESTINE
FACE2FACE

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Face2Face is a photographic project realized by JR, an undercover photographer and Marco, a technology consultant, in 2007 in the Middle East context. It consisted of taking the portraits of Israeli and Palestinian people who were doing the same job, printing them in huge formats and putting them on various unavoidable places in Israeli and Palestinian cities. The project was based on the idea that Israeli and Palestinian people were so much similar to each other, as if they were 'twin brothers raised in different families' but that they were not aware of that. Therefore, the artists decided to provide them with images of the other side which would make people be surprised, laugh, stop for a while and think about the other side once again. The artists hoped that such a reworking of the ideas about the other side would hopefully motivate people to enter into dialogue with each other, which would eventually end up in peaceful co-existence. This thesis sets this photographic project as its starting point. It focuses upon its conceptualization of dialogue, which is based on the idea of seeing the other from a new perspective, and compares it with Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of dialogue and Emmanuel Levinas's concept of face-to-face, which are based on the idea of disrupting the self. It then criticizes the project for its neglect of various dimensions which shape Israeli and Palestinian identities, such as diaspora, nostalgia and home and of the heavy burden of the past

on these two communities' present. As a result, the thesis focuses upon the concept of collective memory at length and then discusses photography at the service of collective memory. Another section is devoted to the analysis of Israeli and Palestinian collective memories. The photographic project *Face2Face* is discussed all throughout the thesis in terms of its failure to spot the crucial dimensions in Israeli-Palestinian context, no matter how well intended it was.

Keywords: Collective Memory; Nostalgia; History of Photography; Israel and Palestine; Activist Art.

ÖZ

İSRAİL VE FİLİSTİN
FACE2FACE

Çetin, İdil
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Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Meyda Yeğenoğlu

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Face2Face, JR lakaplı bir fotoğrafçı ve Marco adında bir teknoloji danışmanı tarafından 2007'de Orta Doğu'da gerçekleştirilmiş bir fotoğraf projesidir. Proje, aynı işi yapan İsrailli ve Filistinlilerin portre fotoğraflarının çekilmesi, çok büyük formatlarda basılması ve bunların, pek çok İsrail ve Filistin şehrinde, gözden kaçması mümkün olmayan yerlere asılmasından oluşmaktadır. Proje, İsrailli ve Filistinlilerin, farklı ailelerde yetiştirilmiş ikiz kardeşler kadar birbirlerine benzedikleri ama kendilerinin bunun farkında olmadıkları düşüncesi üzerine kurulmuştur. Bu nedenle, projenin sanatçıları, bu iki topluluğa öteki tarafa dair farklı fotoğraflar sunarak, onları şaşırtmayı, güldürmeyi, bir müddet durup öteki taraf hakkında yeniden düşündürmeyi amaçlamıştır. Projenin sanatçıları böyle bir yeniden düşünmenin, bu iki topluluğu, gelecekte barış içinde birlikte yaşamayla sonuçlanak bir diyaloğa girmeye motive edeceğini ummaktadırlar. Bu tez söz konusu fotoğraf projesini başlangıç noktası olarak seçmiştir. Projenin desteklediği, öteki tarafı başka bir şekilde görme fikri üzerine kurulmuş diyalog kavramsallaştırmasını inceler. Bunu, kendiliği bozundurma üzerine kurulu olan Mikhail Bakhtin'in diyalog kavramı ve Emmanuel Levinas'ın yüz-yüze kavramıyla karşılaştırır. Daha sonra, İsrail ve Filistin kimliklerinin kurulumunda önemli rolü olan diaspora, nostalji ve ev gibi pek çok konuyu dikkate almadığı ve bu iki

toplumun bugünlerinin geçmişlerinin altında ezilmekte olduğunu göz ardı ettiği için projeyi eleştirir. Bu nedenle, tezin geri kalanında, toplumsal hafıza kavramı ve fotoğrafın toplumsal hafızadaki rolü detaylı bir şekilde tartışılmaktadır. Bir diğer bölüm İsrail ve Filistin toplumsal hafızalarının incelenmesine ayrılmuştur. *Face2Face* fotoğraf projesi bütün tez süresince, ne kadar iyi niyetlerle gerçekleştirilmiş olursa olsun, İsrail-Filistin bağlamının kritik boyutlarını göz ardı etmesi dolayımıyla tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Toplumsal Hafıza; Nostalji; Fotoğraf Tarihi; İsrail ve Filistin; Aktivist Sanat

To my family

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Face2Face is a photographic project realized in the Middle East by JR, a photographer of French origin and Marco, a technology consultant of Tunisian origin. The project consisted of taking the portraits of Israelis and Palestinians, doing the same job, printing them in huge formats and putting them in various places on both Israeli and Palestinian sides. The motivation of the artists to produce such a project emerged during their visit to Middle East in 2005 and their subsequent realization of how similar Israeli and Palestinian people were to each other. However, the artists thought, these communities were not aware of that. According to them, the way which led to peace passed from breaking down the beliefs about how different the other party was. Therefore, they thought that if they could show the Israeli and Palestinian people the photographs of people from both sides, then they would themselves realize how much they looked alike. The project was grounded upon an optimistic belief that such a realization could change the way they thought about each other and could motivate them to enter into dialogue with each other. The project did not consist of simply shooting the portraits of people from both sides. The people who were photographed are asked to make funny faces. Furthermore, the artists used a 28 mm objective, which would deform the faces of the photographed and make them look even more amusing. The artists wanted to produce portraits of these people different from the usual representations of Israelis and Palestinians. They wanted to surprise the people who saw these portraits, to make them laugh and to cause them to stop for a while to rethink their ideas about the other side.

This thesis focuses upon this specific photographic project and its aim to motivate Israeli and Palestinian people to enter into dialogue with each other so that they can start to co-exist peacefully. The main argument of the thesis is that the artists of the project have depended upon a simplistic understanding of dialogue and have failed to see that the war that has been going on between the two communities

can also be interpreted in terms of a dialogue. Moreover, the artists' conception of dialogue is built upon the rationale of providing a new look to the other and, as such, it fails to see the necessity to disrupt the construction of the self in the process. Furthermore, it is argued in this thesis that the project neglects the various dimensions which shape the contemporary Israeli and Palestinian identities. For example, it does not take into account the fact that the present of both communities is haunted by their past, which determine the way they construct and represent the other party. As such, the project does not take into account the collective memories of both communities as well as various conditions, such as diaspora and nostalgia and home, which shape the current Israeli and Palestinian identities as well as their attitude towards each other.

The structure of the thesis will be as the following. In the second chapter, I will provide a thorough description of the project by initially situating it in what is called 'activist art.' Then, I will provide what the artists of the project have understood from the concept of dialogue. Next, I will specifically focus upon Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of dialogue and Emmanuel Levinas's concept of face-to-face and then compare these to the dialogue promoted by *Face2Face* in order to display on what grounds the conception of dialogue of the artists of the project remains simplistic. Finally, I will discuss how the photographic project fails to take the past and, especially, the collective memories of the two communities into account.

The third chapter is aimed at providing a comprehensive discussion of the concept of collective memory. For this end, I will initially discuss in this chapter the reasons for the revived interest in the concept of collective memory in academic circles and popular discourses. I will then limit myself only with the scholarly developments and describe the field of memory studies from a sociological perspective. Afterwards, I will provide a detailed analysis of the concept of collective memory, first by contrasting it to the concept of individual memory and then by explaining what I prefer to use this term over other 'types' of memory, which will be followed by a section on the relationship between history and memory. In the next section, I will initially focus upon the concept of nostalgia,

then discuss diasporic communities' relation to nostalgia and their conceptualization of home. These discussion will be useful for us in the fifth chapter on the discussion of Israeli and Palestinian collective memories. This chapter will end with a small section on the issue of the representation of memory.

The forth chapter will be about one of the forms of representing memory, that is, photography. However, before dealing with this relationship between photography and collective memory at lenght, I will initially focus upon the characteristics peculiar to photography itself, in order to be able to conceptualize it better. Later on, I will deal with the the issues of truth and fidelity in representation attributed to photography. To be able to articulated these points better, in this section, I will specifically focus upon documentary photography and the evidential nature of photography. In the next section, I will discuss the relationship between photography and memory in terms of the former's ability to support, to create and to challenge the latter. Finally, I will focus upon the photographic project *Face2Face* in terms of its (non)relation to the concept of collective memory.

In the fifth chapter, I will deal with the collective memories of Israelis and Palestinians. For this purpose, I will initially focus upon how the Arab and the Jew was first constructed as a singular group and then was split up into two by the Christian Europe. I will then pass on to a discussion of the Israeli collective memory, with reference to the import of Holocaust to the Middle East context, the concept of Eretz Israel and te way the Palestinians are represented in Israeli collective memory. The next section will be about the Palestinian collective memory, which will be discussed in terms of the *Nakba*, the way the Palestinians remember the past and construct themselves and the way the Israelis are represented in Palestinian collective memory. This chapter will end with a discussion on the construction of the Apartheid Wall between the two communities, beginning from 2002 onwards.

In the conclusion, I will turn once again to the photographic project *Face2Face* and discuss it with reference to the arguments put forward all throughout the thesis. I will initially emphasize some points of the project which can help us to associate it with interrupting the way both communities construct and

represent each other and with intervening to their collective memories. Then, I will discuss the various dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian question which are not taken into account by the artists and the simplistic conceptualization of dialogue of the project. I will finish this part of the thesis by mentioning a characteristic of the project peculiar to itself, that is, the question of the Western audience, which can help us to understand the project better.

CHAPTER II

FACE2FACE: AN ATTEMPT TO GENERATE DIALOGUE THROUGH ART

The adversary going on between Israel and Palestine for so many years has been the concern of people all around the world. The attitude towards the issue has ranged from a full support for a single party at the expense of other to holding up for the existence of two states with internationally recognized borders. Scholars, both within the community as well as those from other parts of the world, have studied the conflict, the history of the region, the cultures involved in the conflict and so on. Various international organizations have been interested in the issue and have tried to do something about it, by making declarations, issuing decisions or providing humanitarian help. Nation-states have adopted policies toward the region, mainly according to their own interests. Activist groups, from all over the world as well as Israeli and Palestinian ones, have tried to exert influence so that the conflict ends and that the two nations co-exist peacefully. Artists are not exempt from this list. Various Palestinian and Israeli artists, as well as many international ones, have generated artworks through various mediums to express their feelings about the conflict and their thoughts about how to solve it. The photographic project *Face2Face* is such kind of an artistic undertaking.

In this chapter, I will initially focus upon the concept of activist art and then pass on to a thorough discussion of the photographic project *Face2Face*. I will then focus upon what the concept of dialogue promoted by the artists of the project. Next, I will compare this conceptualization of dialogue to Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of dialogue and Emmanuel Levinas's concept of face-to-face. Finally, I will discuss on what terms the photographic project fails to take into account the past and various other dimensions which shape the current Israeli and Palestinian identities.

2.1 Art for Social Change

Although artists have generated works to protest the status quo and to influence social change all throughout history, it has been from 1960s onwards that there has been an increase in the number of artworks made specifically for this purpose. In order to be able to challenge the power relations existing in the society, to influence the masses' opinions and to cause them to take action, art started to be more and more decontextualized from the confines of the gallery and was made available for the public who did not frequented those places allocated only for the exhibition of "high art." The increase in the number of such works resulted in the consolidation of a separate branch of artistic undertaking, namely, activist art.

What is called activist art has its own characteristics. To begin with, activist art is not completely isolated from the art world and is not disconnected from the 'real world' either. On the contrary, activist art make use of the the aesthetic, socio-political and technological developments in order to be able "to challenge, explore, or blur the boundaries and hierarchies traditionally defining the culture as represented by those in power"[1] and to give voice and visibility to those who are in a disadvantageous position in the prevelant system. Moreover, according to Nina Felshin, a distinguishing feature of activist art is that it is generally process- rather than product-oriented in terms of its forms and methods.[2] What she means by this is not that the artwork that comes into existence at the end does not have any significance or does not convey any messages. Rather, she means that in activist art the artwork in its final form is not the sole important thing; the process of making it is similarly, even more, significant in that the making of the artwork does not only include the artist. What distinguishes activist art is public participation in the process of, in that the people about whose conditions the project aims to call attention are also the makers of the artwork, as they take part in various stages of its making, ranging from the decision to what to produce as an artwork to the

[1] Nina Felshin, "Introduction" in Nina Felshin (ed.), *But is it Art? The Spirit of Art as Activism*. Seattle: Buy Press, 1995, pp. 10.

[2] *ibid*., pp. 10.

application of the decisions taken before through participation. As such, in activist art, the art projects are realized *with* ordinary people *to* attract the attention of the social groups who are in similar position with them. They are further generated to draw the attention of groups who are responsible for the conditions of people who live in a disadventegous position and of groups who can participate in the endeavour to change these disadventegous conditions. In order to be able to turn ordinary people into participants, the activist artistic projects have to do preliminary research and have to collaborate with groups outside of the artworld, which will provide them contact with the people they want to reach as participants. Furthermore, activist art generally takes the form of temporal interventions in the sense that they are formed by performances or performance-based activities, media events, installations and exhibitions. These interventions, especially the exhibitions, are not confined into the walls of the galleries, but rather takes place in public sites which provides the opportunity to reach to a wider audience, by using various mainstream media techniques such as wheat-pasted posters, subway and bus advertising, bilboards, newspaper inserts and so on.[3] Furthermore, activist art is conceptualized in terms of generating conversation between the artist and the participants, as well as between the artwork and the audience, and, as such, is believed to be transforming all parties involved. Various terms have been used to be able to convey this dialogical dimension of artworks, such as 'conversational art,' 'dialogue-based public art,' 'relational aesthetic,' 'dialogue-based public art,' and so on.[4] In dialogical art, art itself is seen as a kind of conversation. The idea of conversation is conveyed both literally and metaphorically. In the literal sense, the dialogical art necessitates that the artist as well as the participants involve in dialogue to be able to generate the work of art. The work also generates dialogue between the audience as the main aim of such an artistic undertaking is to generate discussion and to alter the existing perceptions. In the metaphorical sense, on the

[3] *ibid*., pp. 11, 10.

[4] These terms cannot be used interchangeably; each of them are used to convey a different meaning, by putting the emphasis on a different process. As putting the difference between them is beyond the concerns of this thesis, I will not dwell upon the explanation of the terms.

other hand, the conversation refers to the relationship between the audience and the artwork in terms of comprehension and interpretation. As Grant Kester suggests, the purpose of dialogical art can be found at "the ways in which aesthetic experience can challenge conventional perceptions and systems of knowledge."[5]

Meeting all these criteria, the photographic project *Face2Face* is also an artistic activist endeavour and I will now turn to a thorough description of the project in order to be able to display this dimension.

2.2 The Photographic Project *Face2Face*

Face2Face is a photographic project realised by JR, an undercover photographer, and Marco, a technology consultant, of French and Tunisian origin, respectively, alongside with a group of people who have helped them in technical matters. *Face2Face* is part of a broader project called *28 milimèteres*, which is an artistic activist project, focusing upon other social and political issues such as the immigrants in France, the invisibility of women and the old. The idea to initiate *Face2Face* came about with JR and Marco's decision to go to the Middle East in 2005 in order to understand the reasons of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, as they put it. After traveling around various Israeli and Palestanian cities, JR and Marco came to realize that "these people look the same; they speak almost the same language, like twin brothers raised in different families."[6] Although this fact seemed obvious to them, they also realized that Israeli and Palestanian people were not aware of that. As a result, they decided to initiate a project which consisted of "taking portraits of Palestanians and Israelis doing the same job and positing them face to face, in huge formats, in unavoidable places, on both Israeli and Palestanian sides."[7] The construction of the project lasted from October 2005 to June 2006. In

[5] Grants H. Kester, *Conversation Pieces: Community and Communication in Modern Art*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2004, pp. 3. The aesthetic experience mentioned here is not in terms of facing beauty etc. as we are about to see.

[6] JR and Marco. *Face2Face*. Paris: Éditions Alternatives, 2007, pp. 12.

[7] *ibid*., pp. 12.

December 2006, they went back to the Middle East to take portraits. 41 people from both sides in total agreed on to be a model for the project. The portraits taken were posited on March 4, 2007 on the Palestanian side, and on March 7, 2007 on the Israeli side. Four Israeli and four Palestinian cities were chosen to exhibit the pictures. The photographs were put mainly on the Apartheid Wall of both Israeli and Palestanian sides, and in various other unavoidable places in the cities (see fig. 1 and 2). Later on, in June 2007, a book was released about the project, which contained the description of the project, the photographs and the testimonies of the photographed. Finally, in September 2007, a documentary about the project was released and it was exhibited in various places around the world alongside the portraits.

The creators of the project posited themselves as neither pro-Palestinians nor pro-Israelis, in the sense that they did not support the unilateral existence of either community at the expense of the other. Rather they were in favour of two nation-states, existing in peace with and independent from each other, with internationally recognized borders. According to them, it was not important to find which party was *the* guilty one because each made its own mistakes. They believed that the way leading to peace passed from the Israelis and Palestinians realization that they were fighting against people who were so similar to themselves to the extent that they looked as if they were twin brothers and sisters. Hence come the idea to initiate the project, which consisted of taking the portraits of the Palestinian and Israeli people with a 28 mm objective, which would deform their faces and make them look funny; hanging the photographs on various places around the cities by putting them face to face and "show[ing] the humor and humanity the two groups share[d]."[8]

In the trailer prepared for the presentation of the project, JR asserts that despite being neighbours, Israeli and Palestinian people see each other through the media. The everday, face-to-face contact between them almost does not exist. Deprived of personal contact, Israeli and Palestinian people have to depend on the images of the other provided for them by the newspapers, televisions, their government and so on. These images are used to consolidate the negative views

[8] http://jr-art.net

Figure 1: Portraits on the Apartheid Wall

Source: jr-art.net



Figure 2: Nuns Pasting the Portrait of the Priest

Source: jr-art.net

about the other side, in conformity with the discourse the government is upholding. It is true that there also exists alternative media which provides an alternative discourse about the other side in search for peace. However people from each side depend mainly on those other images to shape their ideas about the other side, as these are the ones they come across more frequently and as to find the alternative images necessitates an effort, which is not a difficult but mainly neglected labour. Henceforth, the image of the other portrayed only in negative terms is what turnes out to seem natural. The other side is seen only through the harm that it has caused and, as JR puts forward in the same trailer, "both [sides] ignore the sufferings and the fears of the other."[9]

Therefore, the creators of the project came up with the idea to provide an alternative and unfamiliar image of both sides. What they wanted to realize through their project was "to show the face of 'the other,' to surprise and have people think about things they believed they knew, to reveal the complexity, to show a resemblance in those expressions."[10] The people at home whom they talked about the project found it a crazy idea. The Palestinians believed that they would be shot by the Israeli soldiers and the Israelis were sure that they would be killed by Hamas. However, the project was initiated anyway. The people who were photographed were not selected according to some criteria in advance. Rather, the creators of the project went to people's places, introduced themselves as neither pro-Israelis nor pro-Palestinians but only as people who were in favor of peace, talked to them about the project and asked them for their permission to be photographed. If they refused, they tried to understand the reasons by asking questions and they tried to convince them although this sometimes caused long discussions and repeated visits to their places. However, at the end, and this is what JR claims in the trailer as the real crazy thing about the whole situation, they accepted, almost all of them, except one case of failure. 41 people were photographed in total, consisting of three religious leader and two actors, cooks, security guards, storekeepers, athelets, peace

[9] The trailer can be watched at http://www.face2faceproject.com

[10] JR, 'Face2Face', pp. 16.

activits, grocers, musicians, NGO workers, farmers, guides, students, lawyers, hairdressers, sculptors, taxi drivers, gas pump attendants, teachers and two kids. Therefore, we can say that all classes and all age groups were presented in the project. In the book of the project, the names of the photographed were also provided, although their surnames were kept secret as the project was technically an illegal one.[11]

The people who were photographed were not all partisans of peace. For example, in the book, one case is rapported in which the man who was photographed was a supporter of Hamas. Apart from that, the people who were photographed were also asked to say something, which were all written down in the book of the project. However, it seems that they were not asked to limit their opinions about this specific project or about the situation between Israel and Palestinian, as there are some people who said things completely irrelevant, such as proverbs which have nothing to do with what is going on. Although most of the photographed share the optimism of the creators of the project, some of them are very pessimistic about the situation, believing in no possibility of change and hoping that their children would be living in a foreign country in the future so that they would not be in danger. And there is a couple of cases in which the photographed said that it was necessary to fight back as they were the ones who were attacked. This is, I suggest, one of the most powerful sides of the project, namely, photographing people who are not optimistic about the situation or who do not believe in the possibility of a peaceful co-existence with the other side at all. The creators of the project described this situation in their book, in a little romantic way, as the overwhelming of the will of victory by the desire for peace, meaning that these people wanted peace deep inside, although they seemed like striving for war and their taking part in the project proved their willingness for the former.[12] Although I cannot name this situation as a triumph of an inner war between a desire for peace and for war by the former one, I still find it very significant in that these

[11] http://jr-art.net

[12] JR, 'Face2Face', pp. 17.

people agreed upon to take part in a project and to have their photographs to be put on various places, while facing a person from the other side; that is, although these people claimed that there was no chance for peace, either because there was no hope for change or because the other party would not give up attacking, they still took part in a project which claimed to have a position in favour of peace. They accepted their faces, which was paired with another face from the other side, to be seen by their fellow countrypeople as well as by the people from their other party. Henceforth, I think that their taking place in a project which aimed at changing people's perceptions, despite their claims that no such change was possible, is very significant. The creators of the project, mentioning the case of photographing the Hamas supporter, tell that initially the man refused to take part in the project. However, after a long discussion, he agreed upon his photograph to be taken and after the photographing and interviewing ended, he made a "peace and love speech," as the creators put it, which surprised them very much.[13] Although it is only naive to describe this case as an example of how the desire for peace inside the man overwhelmed the will to victory at the end, I think that this case is very telling in showing the ambivalent position of even those who do not believe in peaceful co-existence. I assume that this particular case, alongside with other people who have agreed upon to take part in the project, shows that these people do not fully believe in their negative views about the other side. The opinions of some of the photographed, who do not believe in the possibility of a peaceful co-existence with the other part, contradict their taking part in a project which is built upon a motivation to show people from both sides the reality of such a possibility. By blaiming the other side for the war, by putting all the blame on the other side, these people reproduce the prevailing discourses about how the other side is different from the self in that it is the other party which prevents a realistic solution by preventing to enter into a dialogue about what is going on. Nevertheless, they still accept to be photographed for a project which aims at showing people from both sides that they indeed look very much similar to each other, that neither side is *the*

[13] *ibid*., pp. 121. Which portrait belongs to the supporter of Hamas is of course kept as a secret by the creators of the project.

guilty one and that they should not be at war with people who are similar to them like their twin brothers. It is not that these people are not aware of the narrative within which their portraits will be presented to the public. The process of convincing these people to be photographed involves the description of the project as well as the position of the creators of the projects as neither pro-Palestinians, nor pro-Israelis. Therefore, I think that although the negative things some of the photographed have said about the other side reflect the dominant discourses prevalent in both societies in terms of putting the blame of war on the other side and in terms of favouring only their own party at the expense of the other contradicts their taking part in the project. I do not suggest, as the creators of the project does, that such a situation is an evidence to victory of a desire for peace which lies deep inside over war. However, I think that this situation is very telling in terms of displaying the ambivalent position of people from both sides.

The portraits taken were put on various places around Israeli and Palestinian cities (see fig. 3 and 4). No legal permission were taken for any of them. Although the creators of the project acknowledge that they were stressful for those photographs which would be put on the Apartheid Wall, they witnessed no intervention whatsoever either by Israeli soldiers or by Palestinians. When they realized that the Israeli soldiers in the watchtowers alongside the Apartheid Wall were only watching them, they even decided on dressing one of the towers. Other photographs were put in various places around the cities. Initially, they were putting the portraits on the privately owned buildings without permission, as well. However, after dressing a building with photographs, the artists of the project were arrested by the Israeli soldiers and were told that they had to get the permission of the owner of the building, because otherwise the owners would think that it was a provocation. It is after this incident that the artists decided to put the photographs on walls that belonged to nobody, such as on the walls of buildings in renovation, of empty advertisement spaces and on closed shops. Later on, they also started to put the photographs on privately owned buildings, such as houses and stores, but this time with permission from the owner. After a couple of days, all the inhabitants knew about the project, as the artists were carrying it in an overtly public way. After



Figure 3: Portraits in the Market Place

Source: jr-art.net



Figure 4: Portraits on the Street

Source: jr-art.net

a while, the local people started to identify them as the artists were wearing jackets on which the name of *Face2Face* was written. As such, people came to talk with them about the project wherever they saw them. The hanging of the photographs on the Apartheid Wall was declared to be a public event. But the artists said nothing neither in the book nor in the trailer about whether anyone from the local inhabitants showed up for hanging the portraits on the wall. The photographs and videos taken during the process when the portraits were put on the wall only show the artists hanging the portraits, while local inhabitants were watching. It is not possible to say from here whether nobody joined them or whether they were simply not shown while putting the photographs as this might cause a problem for them. However, even if nobody joined them during putting the portraits, it seems like nobody prevented them either. As can be seen from the photographs and the videos of the project as well as from what the creators said, the local inhabitants watched them and communicated with them about the project, but nobody caused any trouble (see fig. 5 and 6). The creators of the project also stated in the book that they did not face one single assault or threat, even by e-mail. What is very interesting about this situation is that although the cities from both sides were covered up with the portraits of people who were identified as enemies, no one objected to this. It is true that the artists did not go to places such as Gaza where the tension is highest and the reactions they would face in such places would probably be very different if they did. Nevertheless, the population who live in the cities they have chosen also consists of people whose lives are very much shaped by the enmity between the two societies, by the policies conducted and by the prevailing discourses about the devilish nature of the other side. Therefore, it was a surprise for the artists that no one caused any trouble witnessing the portraits of their enemies covering up the walls of the cities. Such a situation might be related with the fact that local inhabitants were confused about the people in the portraits. After a couple of days, everybody knew that a group of artists came from France, took the portraits of Israelis and Palestinians and were pasting them places all around the cities. Therefore, they knew that some of the portraits they were seeing belonged to Israelis. However, they were not able to identify who they were. The creators of the

Figure 5: Local Inhabitants While the Portraits are Pasted

Source: jr-art.net

Figure 6: Pasting the Portraits

Source: jr-art.net

project wrote in their book that when people came and started to ask questions, they often played "who is who?" with them, asking them to identify the people in the photographs as Palestinians and Israelis and that in the end people were very much surprised to find out how mistakenly they identified people.[14]

Overall, the creators of the project believed that the project "face to face" took the form of "face yourself" during the time they passed in Israel and Palestine. The taking of portraits was not simply taking of portraits. There were long conversations before, during and after the act and both party was in constant dialogue. The hanging of the photographs also generated dialogue as the local inhabitants came and talked to them. As such, the creators of the project believe that the spectators turned into actors, as well.[15]

2.3 Dialogue in *Face2Face*

The photographic project *Face2Face* is an example of activist art in which the principle of dialogue is essential. The artists and the photographed are in constant dialogue with each other. Dialogue occured first of all while the artists tried to convince people to agree on to model for the project; it continued during the shooting of the portraits as the artists tried to make the photographed feel comfortable; and it was also prevalent after the portraits were taken as the artists asked the photographed to share their opinion. Furthermore, the project is also aimed to create a dialogue between the audience and the photographs. Israeli and Palestinians are presented with photographs of people from both sides. The photographs of people from the other side are very much different from what they are used to see or belive to be. As such, coming across with a view of the other different from what one is used to might cause, and this is indeed what was intended by the project, the viewers to enter into a dialogue with the photograph, during which they might rework their ideas about the other side.

[14] JR, 'Face2Face', pp. 125.

[15] *ibid*., pp. 126.

The photographic project *Face2Face* was realized with the aim to show people from both sides how similar they are in reality. Such a realization, the artists hope, would give Israeli and Palestinian people a desire to enter into a dialogue with each other. The artists thought that the reason why there was no dialogue between these two communities was that Israelis and Palestinians differentiated themselves so much from each other, to the extent of dehumanizing the other side. Therefore, the artists believed, if Israelis and Palestinians would see how similar they were in reality, then they would be able to enter into dialogue, which would be carving the way which would lead to peace. Furthermore, the artists tried to provide for Israeli and Palestinian communities a different way to position themselves in relation to the other side. The photographs portrayed Palestinians and Israelis as if they were doing funny faces to each other as well as to the viewers. They displayed people from both communities as if they ceased being so serious about things going on and as if they were making fun of themselves and of the other side in a friendly way. As such, the artists tried to show people from these communities another way to inhabit the world and another way to render the relationship between them meaningful. Moreover, the artists hoped that people from both communities who would see these photographs would be surprised at first, then would laugh, stop for a while and think about the other side once more. They believed that seeing the other side in an unfamiliar way would result in reworking the ideas about how the other side is conceptualized. Henceforth, they believed, there would be the desire to enter into dialogue with the other side whom has been thought to be known so well, but whom is just realized to be unknown.

Although this motivation to generate dialogue on the part of the artists of the project is a well-intended one, the conceptualization of dialogue is a mainstream one in which different parties come together and talk. The artists of the project seems to have thought that it is enough for them to enter into dialogue, as if it is the final point that can be reached. However, they seem to forget that the adversary that has been going on between the two communities for so many years can also be conceptualized in terms of dialogue. The sufferings that each community caused for the other and the conflict that has been going on for years can also be thought as a

dialogue in which both communities tell what they think about each other. What differentiates this from the kind of dialogue supported by the artists is that the latter is a peaceful one. However, this kind of a dialogue falls short of the aim of the artists to transfrom the parties involved. In order for Israelis and Palestinians to be able to transform themselves in relation to the other side, the dialogue which is needed is not a simple one in which both parties come together and talk. Rather, the dialogue should serve for both communities the way they identify themselves as well as the other side. For this purpose, I suggest to turn to two philosophers, that is, Mikhail Bakhtin for the concept of dialogue and Emmanuel Levinas for the concept of face-to-face.

2.4 Mikhail Bakhtin and the Concept of Dialogue

The idea of dialogue as part of an artwork, which we have seen in the discussion on art for social change, is taken from Mikhail Bakhtin. Various artists who are involved in dialogical art explain their work with reference to him. When we look at the texts written by Bakhtin on the concept of 'dialogue,' we can see that Bakhtin did not analyze the everyday conversation, the actual speech taking place between two people.[16] His analysis of dialogue was indeed an ambivalent one as he used the concept with reference to two spheres distinct from each other; namely, linguistics and the analysis of novels. In the latter case, he used the concept to mean 'double-voicedness' existing in the novels, where the voices of the author and the hero intermix. In the former case, on the other hand, he used the concept to articulate a philosophical idea about the nature of language, about the production of meaning as well as of the self and the other.[17] In this section, I will only limit myself with the discussion of this former usage of the term, leaving the analysis of works of prose art out.

[16] Ken Hirschkop, *Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic for Democracy*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp.

[17] Sue Vice, *Introducing Bakhtin*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997, pp. 45.

Bakhtin is known for his criticism of the structuralist analysis of language, which is exemplified in the work. of Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussurean structuralism took language as an abstract system with a set of rules and structural principles. Bakhtin was rather interested in the materiality of the language, that is, the dialogue.[18] I think that Bakhtin's interest in dialogue has been misinterpreted by some scholars as they continued to understand this concept in Saussurian terms and argued that Bakhtin was concerned with *parole*, rather than *la langue* or that his main unit of analysis was the 'utterance.' However, such an articulation of Bakhtin's dialogue is only an injustice to what he is trying to articulate. Bakhtin's dialogue, as John Shotter and Michael Billig argue, is rather about our embodiment and the social relations that surround us.[19] Bakhtin was critical of splitting up of the language into two as "the system of a *unitary language*" and "the *individual* speaking in this language" and imposing them as inevitable structures on people.[20] Therefore, claiming that Bakhtin is interested in *parole* rather than *la langue* is a misunderstanding of what Bakhtin is trying to provide.

In everyday usage, dialogue is thought as a speech act taking place between two people. In such a conceptualization, there is utterance and reply. What distinguishes Bakhtin's understanding of dialogue from this everyday usage is the emphasis he puts on a third category, that is the relation between them. The relation is the most important part of the dialogue, because without it the utterance and the reply would remain isolated from each other. It is through the relation between them that the meaning is produced.[21] The significant aspect of the dialogue is not the speech act, nor the involvement of two persons, but rather the production of

[18] Joanna Lowry, "Negotiating Power" in Mark Durden and Craig Richardson (eds), 'Face On', pp. 15.

[19] John Shotter and Michael Billig, "A Bakhtinian Psychology: From Out of the Heads of Individuals and into the Dialogues between Them" in Michael Mayerfeld Bell and Michael Gardiner (eds), *Bakhtin and The Human Sciences: No Last Words*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1998, pp. 13.

[20] Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*. ed. by Michael Holquist, trans. by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981, pp. 269, original emphasis.

[21] Michael Holquist, *Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World*. London and New York: Routledge, 1990, pp. 39.

meaning. The meaning does not exist out of the dialogue. The utterances are always made *by* somebody *for* somebody. Henceforth, the meaning of the utterances "is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant."[22] It is from the relation between the utterance and the reply, between the addressor and the addressee that the meaning springs. The meaning does not reside in the word outside of the dialogue. According to Bakhtin,

> [t]he word in language is half someone else's. It becomes 'one's own' only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent . . . adopting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. Prior to this moment of appropriation the word does not exist in a neutral and impersonal language . . . , but rather it exists in other people's mouths, in other people's contexts, serving other people's intentions."[23] Henceforth, the meaning that one tries to convey through using words is not stable. The utterance, as Bakhtin puts is, "always creates something that never existed before, something absolutely new and unrepeatable.[24]

Henceforth, every dialogue and every meaning conveyed through this dialogue occur only once.

This unique and unrepeatable experience is also the only moment the self expresses and reveals itself. The 'self' that we have here is not an all-mighty individual who decides upon when and how to express itself. Rather the Bakhtinian self is in "absolute need for the other" in order to be able to give shape to its outward form.[25] For Bakhtin, self-consciousness is always based on otherness. This is because the self is not visible to itself. What is meant by this is that we are not capable of seeing ourselves as a whole and in order to be able to achieve a

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[22] "Introduction: Thinking Culture Dialogically" in Finn Bostad, Craig Brandist, Lars Sigfred Evensen and Hege Charlotte Faber (eds), *Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language and Culture: Meaning in Language, Art and New Media*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 9.

[23] Mikhail Bakhtin, 'The Dialogical Imagination', pp. 293-294.

[24] John Shotter and Michael Billig, 'A Bakhtinian Psychology', pp. 13. The quotation is taken from Mikhail Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (eds), trans. by, Vern W. McGee, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986, pp. 119-120.

[25] Deborah J. Haynes, *Bakhtin and the Visual Arts*. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 82.

perception of ourselves, we are in need of the other to accomplish this task.[26] Bakhtin describes this full visibility to the other with the phrase "surplus of seeing." What he means by this is that when the other looks at me he/she sees things which are constitutive of me but which are not visible to me. For example, from the position of where I stand, I am not able to see my whole body, my face, things which remained behind me and so on. This is only from the position of the other that the self is seen completely.

The existence of another consciousness does not have to be real, in the sense that the self does not necessarily have to meet the other in its corporeality. The self, according to Bakhtin, already always appraises and thinks of itself from the point of view of the other and it is only from this point of view that the self achieves an outward form. The self in Bakhtin is composed of another triad, very much similar to one in dialogue; namely, the center, the not-center and the relation between them.[27] To put it in another way, it is the relation between what is at the center and all that is not center that gives the self its final form. It is possible to say that the self in Bakhtin exists in three forms, which do not exist neither separately nor chronologically; namely, 'I-for-myself,' 'another-for-me' and 'I-for-another.' To describe them briefly, 'I-for-myself' refers to the singular place occupied by the self. 'Another-for-me' is used to describe that the others are always in relation to the self and never as they know themselves. 'I-for-another,' on the other hand, is used to refer to the final form given to the self by the other, hence, to the self's answerability. Bakhtin uses religious categories to describe two of these moments; namely, *dukh*, the spirit, for 'I-for-myself,' and *dusha*, the soul, for 'I-for-another.' *Dukh*, the spirit, refers to the inner life, which is experienced solely by the self and which is unknown to anybody else. The inner life of the self is characterized by unfinishidness and is open to change eternally. *Dusha*, the soul, on the other hand, is what is given to the self by the other. It is a consciousness which is granted to the

[26] Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*. trans. by Wlad Godzich, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984, pp. 95.

[27] We should not here before going any further that the self in Bakhtin is not absolute and does not have any ontological privielege. The self in Bakhtin is rather relative, with no claim to absolute privilege. See Michael Holquist, 'Dialogism', pp. 17.

self by another consciousness. This outer form given to the self by the other is also what can only be seen by the others. Henceforth, it is finalized and closed to some extent. The relation between the spirit and the soul is that the latter is the former the way it is seen *from outside*.[28] It is because the self is eternally unfinished in itself that it needs the other to reach to a final form, to be seen as completed to some extent.

According to Bakhtin, the self achieves self-consciousness only by revealing itself to the other, through the other and with the other's help. Isolating oneself from the other result, Bakhtin asserts, in monologism and, hence, in the loss of the self. Monologism occurs when the self does not involve in dialogue, when it remains deaf to the response of the other. The other in monologism is only an object of consciousness of the self. As such, the existence of another consciousness other than the self is denied.[29] Such a situation leads to the loss of the self because the self is incapable of having a coherent and finalized image of itself without an another consciousness. The way to counter this passes through dialogue. To be, for Bakhtin, means to communicate. As he himself puts it, "I cannot do without the other; I cannot become myself without the other; I must find myself in the other, finding the other in me (in mutual reflection and perception)."[30] The self which is born out of the dialogue through other is not similar with the other. The dialogue does not render the parties identical. Rather, in dialogue, both parties as well as the utterances they make remain different from each other and these differences are held together by the relation of dialogue.[31]

Bakhtin uses a special term in order to talk about 'relation,' namely, 'architectonics.' Although he does not provide a real definition of the term, he uses it in order to describe how unique parts are linked into a whole. What is meant by this more specifically is that the term is used to understand how the relationship

[28] Deborah J. Haynes, 'Bakhtin and The Visual Arts', pp. 60-62.

[29] Tzvetan Todorov, 'Mikhail Bakhtin', pp. 107. The argument of monologism in Bakhtin is generally brought forward for the discussion of totalitarian regimes.

[30] *ibid*., pp. 96.

[31] Michael Holquist, 'Dialogism', pp. 39.

between the self and the other as well as between the self and the world is constructed. Therefore, architectonics for Bakhtin is about the phenomenology of the relations between the self and the others.[32] The term 'aesthetics,' on the other hand, is perceived by Bakhtin as a sub-category of architectonics. While using this term, he does not focus upon beauty, as this is how this term generally understood, but rather on how humans perceive the others as well as the world around them, how they give form to their experience and how they shape these perceptions into a whole. In order to describe this aesthetic activity, he makes use of a specific term, that is, 'authoring.' Bakhtin believes that the self gives a shape to its experiences by authoring what it perceives, that is, by involving in creative activity as a result of which the experiences and perceptions are transformed into a synthesized whole.[33]

This act of authoring is used by Bakhtin both for the relations between the self and others and for the relations between the artist and his/her artworks. In his analysis of the relation the artist holds toward his/her artwork, Bakhtin involves in a very detailed discussion and introduces various new terms, whose description here, I think, will distract this chapter from its specific concern. For this reason, I will not involve in the discussion of how Bakhtin described the authoring activity of the artist, as the basic rationale of authoring is the same for each case. Henceforth, I will mention Bakhtin's belief in the transformatory power of the act of authoring, a belief which is not confined only to artists but to human beings in general. Deborah Haynes argues that in Bakhtin's handling the concept of authoring, we can realize a kind of Prometheanism in terms of believing in the fact that human beings are capable of changing the world when they are aware of their creative power. For Bakhtin, Haynes asserts, this promethean power was "the special province of the artist," as he believed that the artist creates a new vision of the world through

[32] Michael Holquist, "Introduction," in Mikhail Bakhtin, *Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays*. ed. by Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

[33] Deborah J. Haynes, 'Bakhtin and The Visual Arts', pp. 4.

his/her artwork and, as such, provides the possibility for the creation of new ways of thinking as well as of "a new human being."[34]

Among the various instances for a dialogue to take place, the most obvious one is the corporeal experience of the face-to-face encounter. This face-to-face situation which was tried to be created by the photographic project under scrutiny, is also a philosophical concept discussed by Emmanuel Levinas.

2.5 Emmanuel Levinas and the Concept of Face-to-Face

We come across the concept of 'face-to-face' in Levinas in his discussion of ethics. The ethics proposed by Levinas has nothing to do with the ethics traditionally practised by Western philosophy. Indeed, he repudiates this understanding of ethics as he believes that Western philosophy so far has ignored ethics altogether by turning it into a discourse for justifying and motivating certain kinds of behaviour. According to him, the conceptualization of ethics is an end result of the Cartesian-Kantian-Hegelian tradition which has dominated the Western philosophy so far, as a result of which everything that is discussed results eventually in 'ontology.' He believes that traditional ethics has been grounded in egoism in which the subject is posited as to whom all truth is made relative and in which one's relation to oneself is held as primary.[35] The ethics that Levinas discusses, on the contrary, is an ethics of responsibility, that is, an ethics based on the self's responsibility to the other.

According to Levinas, ethics is not a sphere of theoretical rules based on rationalizations in conformity with some belief systems. Ethics for him is fundamental upon which all other structures are grounded. It is a priori. It is not based on an abstract system of obligation. It is not an end result of philosophical thinking. Ethics for Levinas rather comes before philosophy, before the

[34] *ibid*., pp, 24. The reference is to Prometheus, the Greek God who created humans and was later chained to a mountain by Zeus because he gave us fire and the arts.

[35] Dermot Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology*. London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 320-21, 330.

establishment of abstract norms and rules. The self's responsibility towards the other is not solidified through a philosophical undertaking concerning the self's subject position. It is rather constituted in the "non-philosophical" experience. This non-philosophical experience refers to the experience of social relations which comes before the solidification of abstract rules and norms. It is the acknowledgment of the fact that we are born into a world of sociality and otherness which we have not chosen but which we cannot ignore either. It is this non-philosophical encounter which lies at the basis of ethics for Levinas. He uses a variety of terms to talk about this encounter such as saying, sociality, vulnerability, proximity, responsibility and, most famously, face-to-face.[36]

The face-to-face experience signifies for Levinas an encounter which exceeds all my knowledge. According to Levinas, knowledge means rendering the other intelligible in conformity with the framework of the self and anything that does not fit in the rationality of the self is distorted or left outside. Henceforth, knowledge turns the other into an object and exerts violation upon it. However, the other for Levinas is what exceeds my knowledge and totalisation. The other is what cannot be objectified.[37] The face-to-face in Levinas signifies this situation in which the encounter with the other does not fit into any kind of knowledge previously held about the other.

What is meant by 'face' has created great confusion. For some scholars, the term is taken to refer to the concrete presence of another person, as a result of which face-to-face encounter is perceived as a real event instead of an idea.[38] However, Levinas did not think of face-to-face relation taking place between two concrete beings as this would turn an ethical relation into an ontological one that Levinas was critical of in the first place. For Levinas, the face is rather something abstract. It is not a concrete entity. It cannot be characterised fully as it is what escapes sight

[36] Jeffrey T. Nealon, 'The Ethics of Dialogue: Bakhtin and Levinas', *College English*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Feb., 1997), pp. 132 and Benjamin C. Hutchens, *Levinas: A Guide for the Perplexed*. New York and London: Continuum, 2004, pp. 19.

[37] Dermot Moran, 'Introduction to Phenomenology', pp. 341.

[38] Michael L. Morgan, *Discovering Levinas*. New York: Cambride University Press, 2007, pp. 61.

and what exceeds one's knowledge and understanding. As Dermot Moran puts it, the face is used by Levinas to refer to "all those aspects of human personhood and culture which escape objectification, which cannot be treated in the manner in which we treat objects in the world."[39]

Like Bakhtin, Levinas identifies the self with otherness. The self for Levinas is founded through its experience with the other. He believes that "I" is nothing other than a response to the other. "I" is a signification without an identity; it does not belong to anybody. It is rather used when someone is responding to the other which addresses the self. For Levinas, all social action takes places within the sphere of the other. It is the presence of other which calls me to respond and it is my response to the other which defines me. The demands that the face of the other exerts upon the self and the response that the self gives transforms the self to such an extent that, as Benjamin Hutchens puts it, "one is no longer 'origin' of oneself."[40] The other does not have to do anything in order to receive a response from me. The existence of other, the face of the other is already a call for my response. The response in Levinas is not necessarily an affirmative one; even to say no or to ignore the other is a kind of response. It is true that the rhetoric of Levinas is built around hospitality and welcoming the other. However, this does not mean that there exists only one kind of response to the other. The face of the other inextricably necessitates a demand for ethics, as the self is responsible with responding to the other. For Levinas, ethics is the recognition that one must respond to the other. The response according to him, however, is what is appropriate, although he has never discussed how this appropriateness is regulated.[41]

The self is radically passive in its relationship with the other in the sense that the self cannot manage not to respond to the other when it encounters with the face and with its demands. This is why Levinas generally describes the self as being a 'hostage' of the other. What is more, the relationship between the self and the other

[39] Dermot Moran, 'Introduction to Phenomenology', pp. 347, 349.

[40] Benjamin C. Hutchens, 'Levinas', pp. 23.

[41] Dermot Moran, 'Introduction to Phenomenology', pp. 349.

is not reciprocal; rather, the other is prior to the self. There is something higher in the other which necessitates my recognition of certain commitments towards it. According to him, there is something enigmatic on the face of the other which calls for the self's responsibility.[42] Therefore, the self and the other does not occupy equal positions in their relationship with each other. As Levinas himself puts it,

> [i]n the relation to the other, the other appears to me as one to whom I owe something, toward whom I have a responsibility. Hence the asymmetry of the I-You relation and the radical inequality between the I and the you, for all relation to the other is a relation to a being toward whom I have obligations.[43]

Such a conceptualization of the self and other relation prevents the domination of the other by the self. By granting priority to the other and by defining the self as responsible to it Levinas provides an ethics in which one 'face' addresses another 'face,' as a result of which a "mutual respectful non-dominating recognition" is built.[44]

2.6 Dialogue in *Face2Face* Revisited

It is possible for us to discuss *Face2Face* in terms of insights borrowed from Bakhtin and Levinas. To begin with, the *Face2Face* project interferes with the construction of the self and other through generating dialogue. It portrays the Israelis and the Palestinians in a way that they are not familiar with; that is, it changes the way the other side is seen. Following the arguments of Bakhtin, we can claim that as the project alters the way the Israelis and Palestinians see each other, this will have an impact upon the way they will construct themselves in relation to the other and, henceforth, upon the relationship conceptualized between the two

[42] Benjamin C. Hutchens, 'Levinas', pp. 20.

[43] Emmanuel Levinas, *Alterity and Transcendence*. trans. by Michael B. Smith, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, pp. 101.

[44] Dermot Moran, 'Introduction to Phenomenology', pp. 347.

communities. The project was aimed to create a dialogue, first, between the audience and the portraits and then, hopefully, between the two communities. The artists wanted to show people from both side an image of the other, other than what they have used to see and, as such, to make people to think about the other side once again. As they themselves put it, "we want, at last, everyone to laugh and to think by seeing the portrait of the other and his own portrait."[45] The photographs of *Face2Face* does not contribute to the stereotypical views about the other. It does not create a typology of how the other looks. It rather portrays the other in an unusual way. As such, it can be conceptualized in terms of altering the way the self, the other and the relation between them are constructed. As these photographs aimed at presenting a new kind of relation between the Israelis and the Palestinians, one in which they were posited face-to-face and seemed to be making fun of themselves and of each other, they can be thought in terms of having an impact upon how these people positioned themselves in relation to the other and how they conceptualized themselves as well as the other.

Apart from that, the project brings these people face to face. This is the necessary condition for a dialogical experience. This is by facing the other that I can respond to the other. This is the face-to-face situation which is at the basis of my ethical stance towards the other. As I have already mentioned, Israeli and Palestinian people generally see each other through media. Their everyday contact has lessened even more since the establishment of the Apartheid Wall. The Palestinians who remained on the Israeli side, on the other hand, live in the margins of cities and as such do not have much contact with the Israeli people. Henceforth, the project brings these people face-to-face, a sitiuation with which they are not very familiar with. It is true that the face-to-face situation realized by this project is only an imaginary one. Nevertheless, it is still an encounter which refers to a different kind of closeness with the other side. It is one which might cause the viewers to stop, to laugh, to start to think and to address the other in a different manner. What is more, the way these people are brought face-to-face overflows the a priori ideas that the two sides have about each other. The images that they

[45] JR, *Face2Face*, pp. 12.

normally have about the other one is not funny faces with comic mimic laughing at them; the relation they have built with the other does not involve two persons doing funny faces at each other and laughing together. Therefore, the face-to-face situation provided by the project does not correspond to what these people already know about each other. Henceforth, it does not result in the violence of objectifying the other. On the contrary, it remains beyond what is already known and said; it is something new.

We have already seen Bakhtin's belief in the promethean power of the artist in terms of creating through his/her artwork new ways of thinking as well as a new human being. I think that this is what we have in the case of *Face2Face*, as well. I do not claim that the project created a new Israeli and a new Palestinian and that it redefined and established these identities anew. What I am arguing is rather that it aimed at creating a new Israeli and a new Palestinian for the other side, a new one compared to one which is thought to be known; it created a new look to the other and a new encounter with the other. The project provides images which exceed the representations already all too familiar. It does not support the prevelant narratives. It does not portray the other in a way which will back up what is known about them, what is remembered about them. It rather offers a new perspective which might result in the reworking of what is already known about the other. A Palestinian man argued, after celebrating the project as a useful one "to change mentalities," that "more precisely it is a project that presents what is happening in Israel and Palestine from a different angle, from what we see in the news."[46] It is this 'different angle' which alters the way the Israeli and Palestinian people think of each other.

Although it can be possible to draw more commonalities between the rationale of the project and the arguments of Bakhtin and Levinas, there is one major point which separates them from each other. In Bakhtin's dialogue and in Levinas's face-to-face, the self is conceptualized in terms of being open to the other. This openness is realized by interrupting and disrupting the self. As we have

[46] http://jr-art.net. there have been various exhibitions of the project in other countries as well, Switzerland being one of them. A tv program made a broadcast on the project and invited a Palestinian and a Israeli who live in Switzerland to share their comments.

seen both in Bakhtin and Levinas, the self is constructed through the other and, in fact, due to the other. It is by granting priority to the other in the identification of the self that the privilege of the self is broken and the openness to the other is obtained. It is the self which depends upon the other. In the dialogue promoted by the artists of *Face2Face*, on the other hand, the parties are brought into dialogue however they have been so far. It is true that the faces of Israeli and Palestinian people have been deformed by using a 28 mm objective. Such a deformation is crucial when taking into account the other projects of the photographer in which the subjects were again photographed from a very close distance but their faces were not deformed. Therefore, the photographer's deforming the faces of people is very crucial in this project. By deforming the faces, the photographer aimed at rendering the other side unfamiliar, that is, unfamiliar from what is already known. This realization of the unfamiliarity, however, also involves the realization of the similarity between the two communities. The photographer's aim to show people from both sides how similar they were to each other generates a kind of unfamiliarity as these people have always conceptualized themselves and the other side as too different from each other. However, in this project the emphasis has always been on realizing how different the other side was from what it is believed to be. It was seeing the other side from a new perspective which would bring the parties into a dialogue, according to the artists. Henceforth, the stress in this project was on altering the other and not the self. The dialogue, according to this project, was to occur because the other was seen to be different than it was thought of, that is, it was not as evil, as unkind and as hostile as it was believed to be. It was because of setting the wrong ideas about the other side aright that the parties would want to enter into a dialogue. The self, however, continued to be identical to itself in this process. It is as if there had to be no change in the way the self was identified, because it was because of the other side that there were no dialogue. Therefore, the project does not try to problematize the construction of the self and remains limited to a very simplistic conceptualization of dialogue in which different parties come together and talk. It does not problematize the fact that without disrupting the way the self identifies itself, the dialogue that would occur between two parties is

doomed to cease as a result of a single wrongdoing of the other party. However, it is through interrupting with the self-identicalness of the subjects that a dialogue can occur between two communities. It is not because of the other that a dialogue is to occur, but because the way the self positions itself in relation to the other. Therefore, the photographic project neglects the necessity to distrupt the construction of the self in the process of entering into dialogue with the other.

The artists of the project put too much emphasis on realizing of how similar the two communities were to each other, on getting to know the other side better and so on. By stressing these points put, they miss the crucial point that what is at stake is not to identify the other side better but rather to be able to cope with the self. The peace between Israeli and Palestinian people would not occur because they would notice favourable things about each other which had escaped their attention until that time, but because they would learn how to cope with themselves, how to identify themselves and how to respond to the other. The road that leads to peace does not pass from the realization of how similar both parties to each other, but from altering the way the self renders itself responsible to the other. Furthermore, the rationale of similarity is what was tried to be interrupted by Bakhtin and Levinas. The relationship between the self and the other is not to be built upon how similar or unsimiliar parties are to each other but how the self responds to the other. It is because all these points are neglected that the idea of dialogue in *Face2Face* remains simplistic.

2.7 *Face2Face* and the Past

Face2Face is a photographic project which is interested in what will happen from now on. It aims at providing images of people from both sides which are different from the usual depictions of Israeli and Palestinian people and, as such, it hopes to make people realize how similar they are to each other and, consequently, to motivate them to enter into dialogue with each other. This idea of dialogue is put by the artists as if the culmination point of the relationship between the two communities which will lead to peace. It is as if once these two communities enter

into dialogue with each other, then they would reach to peace. Such an optimistic and naive belief, however, neglects the fact that both communities' present is haunted by their past. Both Israeli and Palestinian communities are influenced by diasporic condition. It is true that Israeli community is not a diasporic community anymore. However, the 1800 years which have passed in diaspora have very much influenced the way they identify themselves, as we can see in their relationship to their land. The relation of Israelis to Eretz Israel today cannot be thought independent of their diasporic past. Palestinian community, on the other hand, is currently a diasporic community and its identity is very much shaped by nostalgia and homesickness. The photographic project *Face2Face*, however, does not pay any attention to these dimensions which influence the way the Israelis and the Palestinians identifies themselves and each other and it rather focuses only upon the lack of awareness of their resemblance. What is more, it does not pay attention to the the collective memories of both Israelis and Palestinians which are full of incidents and narratives which result in their taking certain positions towards the other side. Such a situation does not mean that there could be no peace between the two communities as they have gone through a lot of things. It rather means that without rendering justice for the things each side has suffered from on its part, without providing both communities with the opportunity to voice their memories and sufferrings and without interfering with the prevailing narratives which shape the current Israeli and Palestinian identities, there can occur no dialogue between the two communities only because they realize how similar they are to each other. It is true that rendering justice and interfering with the narratives will be realized through dialogue; it is not possible to change the way things are without entering into interaction. What we should rather problematize here in terms of the aim of the photographic project is its neglect of the burden of the past and of how both communities are haunted by the memories of the past which cause them to construct and perceive the other side in a certain way. The enmity between the two communities is not a result of the fact that they have forgotten how similar they were to each other. It is rather a result of the fact that they remember the past all too well and only in a certain way. Therefore, in order to be able to understand the

present reality of Israeli and Palestinian people, one should not neglect the past and build anything starting from the present, but should rather pay attention to the past and especially to the collective memories of Israeli and Palestinian people.

CHAPTER III

COLLECTIVE MEMORY

We are at a point in history where it is impossible to think of ourselves independent of memory. Although the concept of memory has been a major concern all throughout history, the emphasis attributed to it has gained greater significance with modernism as memory has been perceived as the defining moment of western subjectivity, distinguishing social beings from each other and anchoring them in their individual identities.[47] Starting from the mid-1970s and ending up with a boom in interest in 1990s, we have also witnessed a scholarly interest in the concept as it has started to be analysed by disciplines as diverse as sociology, history, anthropology, psychology, literature, education, philosophy and so on.[48]

The concept of memory has been handled for a very long time by thinking of it as a capacity belonging solely to individuals. It was only after a sociological approach towards the concept in the beginning of the 20th century that its relationship with communities has started to be analysed. It was from then on and in the years that followed that the scholarly interest in the study of memory resulted in the adding in front of it words as diverse as collective, cultural, communicative, official, vernacular, counter, and so on, all of which qualify the term 'memory' in a different sense, as a result of which 'individual memory' has become only another 'type' of memory. Although this extension from individual memory has many problematic sides, it has gained wide recognition in that we have started to perceive memory as having an *intrinsic* relationship to the collectivities to which the individuals belongs, the formation of the collective itself being conceptualized as a result of a tranmission of memory.

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[47] Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone, "Introduction: Contested Pasts" in Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone (eds), *Contested Pasts: The politics of memory*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 8.

[48] The scholarly interest in the concept of memory have not remained limited to social sciences, political science and the humanities. Although conceptualized very differently, we come across with the use of this concept in, for example, biology and computer technology, as in the case of genetic and cellular memories and of silicon chips, respectively.

The concept of memory has been used by different scholars to refer to very different things. Therefore, it is not possible to extract a general and common conceptualization of the concept by looking at these resources and one can easily lost within various layers of connotations in an attempt to do so. For example, the concept has been used in different studies to refer to things which are not necessarily in a direct relationship with each other, such as, political and strategic construction of the past, monuments, commemorations, remembrance of one's own past or handed-down experience, and so on.[49] Furthermore, scholars have used the concept of memory by adding different modifiers in front of it, such as cultural, popular, counter, and so on, sometimes without explaining what meaning they have attributed to that phrase and why they have chosen that phrase over other possibilities, which complicates the issue even more. Apart from that, those scholars who try to theorize the concept adopt various approaches towards it. For example, Patricia Fara argues that the connotations of the concept can ben regrouped into two clusters of meanings. According to this grouping, the concept of memory either refers to our ability to remember or to the thing remembered, corresponding respectively to a function of the brain and to an abstract thing, be it a feeling, an episode, or a person, which is remembered.[50] Other scholars, on the other hand, have dealt with the concept either in terms of recollection of the items of the past, by attributing it a capacity of stroage, or in terms of reconstruction of the past. Other various conceptualizations of the concept can be found in various resources on memory. Although there has been an increased scholarly interest in the concept in the 1990s, what we come across is a bulk of studies in which the concept being used in conformity with the scholar's intentions, without attempting to ground it on

[49] Marie-Claire Lavabre, 'For a Sociology of Collective Memory' http://www.cnrs.fr/cw/en/pres/compress/memoire/lavabre.htm

[50] Patricia Fara and Karalyn Patterson, "Introduction" in Patricia Fara and Karalyn Patterson (eds), *Memory*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 1-2.

a theoretical basis. Therefore, the concept of memory has remained, as Alon Confino rightly asserts, "more practiced than theorized."[51]

The aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive discussion of the concept of collective memory in order to be able to ground it on a solid basis. Consequently, this chapter will involve six sections. In the first section, I will talk about the various reasons of the increased interest in the concept of memory both in popular discourses as well as in the academic circles since the 1990s. In the next one, I will limit myself with the scholarly developments and discuss what the field of memory studies refers to, by mainly focusing upon the sociological perspective. Thirdly, I will pass on to an analysis of the concept of collective memory, which will initially involve a comparison to individual memory and, then, an explanation for why I have preferred this concept over other 'types' memory. In the forth section, I will touch upon the relationship between history and memory. Then, there will be a discussion on the concepts of nostalgia, diaspora and home, which will be useful for us again in the chapter on the Israeli-Palestinian question. Finally, there will be a very small section on the representation of memory, which will help us move towards the next chapter.

3.1 The Memory Boom

Although memory is a concept that has been dealt with all throughout history, it has been attributed varying qualities, different degrees of significance and also different meanings in different periods. Therefore, we will be mistaken if we think of memory as if it has gone through a chronological development over the centuries, neglecting the fact that what was understood from the concept differed significantly during antiquity, medieval age, Renaissance, modernity and late-

[51] Alon Confino, 'Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 102, No. 5 (Dec., 1997), pp. 1386.

modern period.[52] As exploring what differed in each epoch is not the concern of this chapter, I will only limit myself with the modern and late-modern understanding of the concept.

For close to a century now, the concept of memory has been widely handled. However, the 1990s have witnessed a significant rise in the interest in the concept, both in popular discourse and in academic circles. There are various reasons for this. To start with, according to Andreas Huyssen, this issue was related with the developments in technology which brought about an 'accelarated' understanding of life and which, as a result, collapsed our temporal order and our faith in modernity's discourse on progress by introducing feelings of instantaneity and simultaneity. As these developments altered our sense of time, there emerged a necessity to slow down what was going on around us and this necessity, according to Huyssen, revealed itself in the form of 'mnemonic' response.[53]

Developments in technology have had further impacts on memory in that the interventions as diverse as photography, phonography, cinema, radio, television, video and the Internet had both quantitative and qualitative impacts upon memory. Quantitatively, such interventions provided greater quantities of memory accessible, as there was not anymore any necessity to limit oneself simply with written and built materials. Qualitatively, on the other hand, they have altered the ways in which memory was experienced, because they allowed us "to relieve parts of the past" and to experience them again, by generating "the powerful illusion that it is actually possible to be in the presence of this past reality itself."[54] Other than these, the developments in technology also provided the storing of many written and visual archives electronically, so that the access to these archives were rendered much easier than before.

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[52] Micheal Rossington and Anne Whitehead, 'Introduction' in Micheal Rossington and Anne Whitehead (eds), *Theories of Memory: A Reader*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007, pp. 4, original emphasis.

[53] Andreas Huyssen, *Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia*. New York and London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 7.

[54] Paul Connerton, 'Cultural Memory', in Christopher Tilly *et al*. (eds), *Handbook of Material Culture*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006, pp. 318.

Another contribution to the 'memory boom' was the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The nation-states who gained their independence from the Soviet Union, tried to negotiate their pasts in an endeavour of self-definition, which were complex, conflicted and troubled. The end of Cold War, on the other hand, resulted in the revealing of the memories which were previously unavailable as new archives were brought to the daylight.[55] In addition to this, 1990s have corresponded to the fiftieth anniversaries of various major events in the world history, such as the end of World War II, the end of the Asia Pacific War, and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which have resulted in the eventuation of various acts of remembrance throughout the world.[56]

Another significant intervention which generated interest in memory was the debates around recovered memory syndrome in the early 1990s. The recovered memory syndrome actually generates at the level of the individual, which points to the remembering of the traumatic events, mostly about sexual abuse by the family members, at the later periods of an individual's life. Although there were also men who remembered events of the past that they had long repressed and have started to recover only, it was generally women who came to remember the traumatic events of their past with the help of therapy. Consequently, the early 1990s in the West, and especially in the United States, have witnessed increasing number of women who sued their parents, charging them of childhood sexual abuse. In response to this, the False Memory Syndrome Foundation was built in 1993 in Philadelphia, where parents came together to protest against the therapists and psychiatrists who caused their children to generate false memories. The Foundation argued for the suggestibility of memory and questioned the evidentary status of memory, stating that a false event can be fabricated in the memory. Although the discussions around recovered and false memory syndromes seem to eventuate at the level of the individual, Marita Sturken argues that recovered memories, no matter whether they are true or false, are indeed part of the collective memory. According to her, instead

[55] Micheal Rossington and Anne Whitehead, 'Introduction', pp. 5.

[56] Marita Sturken, 'The Absent Images of Memory: Remembering and Reenacting the Japanese Internment', *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique*, 5:3 (Winter 1997), pp. 687-688.

of seeing the claims of recovered memories as being tied only to particular individuals, we should see them as being situated in a "complex mix of narrative, displacement, shared testimony, popular culture, rumor, fantasy, and collective desire." She asserts that rather than focusing upon whether the claims about the recovered memory of the past events are fabricated or true, we should pay attention to the fact that, like all other memories, recovered memories are also part of "the memory landscape that we inhabit", which "cannot be separated from the images that circulate within popular culture."[57] As a result, the debates around recovered and false memories are very much related with the society that one lives in and also with the collective memory of the society, although this relationship is not emphasized by many people as the discussions generally evolve on an individual level and around the truthfulness or the falseness of the memories.

Apart from all these, there also exist an increase in the 'scholarly' interest in the concept of memory. This interest did not come out of the blue, but was rather influenced by various political developments such as the collapse of many repressive regimes worldwide which have left difficult legacies behind; an increased willingsness on the part of the nation-states to acknowledge their wrongdoings; and the rise of redress claims, of identity politics and of a politics of victimization.[58] Therefore, the scholarly contributions to the concept of memory have followed the political developments. One part of these scholarly contributions is related with an attempt to find out how best to remember the traumatic events that marked important turning points in history. One such example was the use of memory as a theoretical tool in the study of repressive pasts as in the case of Holocaust studies, as well as of the Truth and Reconciliation Commisions of South

[57] Marita Sturken, 'The Remembering of Forgetting: Recovered Memory and the Question of Experience', *Social Text*, 57, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Winter 1998), pp. 106, 117.

[58] Jeffrey K. Olick, "Introduction" in Jeffrey K. Olick (ed.), *States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations in National Retrospection*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003, pp. 4. The scholarly interest in the concept of memory have not remained limited to social sciences, political science and the humanities. Although conceptualized very differently, we come across with the use of this concept in, for example, biology and computer technology, as in the case of genetic and cellular memories and of silicon chips, respectively.

Africa, Guatemala and Chile.[59] The postcolonial studies also dealt with memory by focusing upon the handling the memory of the colonized by the colonizer, as well as the influence of memory in postcolonial nations. Another scholarly contribution is the impact of poststructuralism. Poststructuralism was related to memory studies with its emphasis on the unstability and undecidability of meaning and, hence, with its disbelief in a full recuperation of the past.[60] With its focus on the failure of the signifiers to produce a final, definitive meaning, poststructuralism altered the previous certainty about memory and the resulting uncertainty resulted in approaching memory from a different perspective, as it became clear that what the narratives of memory told was not definite and was understood differently in different contexts. Moreover, poststructualism also questioned the notion of 'objectivity' that historians attributed to themselves as a role and emphasized that the task of history-writing was not one of 'objectively' recollecting and narrating the past, but rather one of construction and interpretation of the past in conformity with where the historian stands ideologically. Such a discrediting of the task of history-writing resulted in an acceleration of an orientation towards memory studies, whose interpretative and constructive sides are recognized from the very beginning. The final scholarly contribution that I can mention here is the interpretative shift from the concept of "society" to "culture" in the academic circles beginning from the early 1980s. According to Alon Confino, the concept of society was based on a linear understanding of history, as a result of which it was seen as "developing forward along one temporal timeline and privileging social and economical topics interpreted in terms of their function and structure." The concept of culture, on the other hand, is based on a multi-temporal understanding of history in which the past and the present "commingle and coalesce, capturing simultaneously different and opposing narratives and privileging topics of representation and memory interpreted in terms of experience, negotiation, agency,

[59] Micheal Rossington and Anne Whitehead, 'Introduction', pp. 5.

[60] *ibid.*, pp. 9.

and shifting relationship."[61] Such a shift in the usage of the terms questioned the temporal order that was implied in the previous studies and resulted in an acknowledgment of the multiplicity of temporalities and, hence, a turn towards a concept which permitted the study of the past in such a manner; that is, memory.

All of these issues, in addition to many other not-that-much significant details which might have escaped my attention, have contributed to an increase in the interest in the concept of memory both in popular discourse as well as in academic circles. However, we should be aware of the fact that although the memory boom can be interpreted as a positive development because of the entrance of previously unknown or silenced issues into discussion, it also caused some people to be able to push some memories into darkness whereas to bring others into the forefront. For example, the narratives of the First World War helped some people in Europe to eschew memories of the Second World War, both on an individual and on a national level.[62] Overall, the scholarly exploration of the concept across various disciplines has become so widespread that today we can talk about an emerging field of 'memory studies', having its own academic journal ('History and Memory', since 1989 and, more recently, 'Memory Studies', since January 2008) and being extended special issues in others in addition to postgraduate programs opened in various universities.

3.2 Memory Studies

Memory studies is a field which cuts across various disciplines. Nonetheless, it is not possible yet to call the field an interdisciplinary one as the understanding of the term memory itself and the methodology which is applied for its study display discrepancies across disciplines. As a result of this lack of unity in approach in terms of definition and methodology, the field is only a multidisciplinary one in

[61] Alon Confino, "Memory and the History of Mentalities," in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (eds), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, New York and Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, pp. 82.

[62] Jay Winter, 'The Memory Boom in Contemporary Historical Studies', *Raritan*, Summer 2001, Vol. 21 Issue 1, pp. 63.

which what is common is only the problems studied or the topics interrogated.[63] Consequently, as Alon Confino rightly critizes, "[a]s a field of study, memory has a label more than a content."[64] This diversity within the field, which might result in enthusiasm, is also a source of confusion as the scholars from different disciplines who have involved in the study of memory offer distinctive, even incompatible, analyses under the same label. Therefore, memory studies is yet an emerging field which will form a coherent totality only in time. The academic journal *Memory Studies*, for example, which has only begun being published in January 2008 is a journal devoted to this aim; that is, to clear the field from miscommunications, to contribute to the formation of a common understanding and methodology, and to highlight and deliberately negotiate the divergencies of the disciplines in terms of backgrounds and assumptions.[65]

Just as the field of memory studies is yet en emerging field, it is not possible to talk of a single history of the study of memory, either. It can be said that each discipline has its own history of introducing memory within its own field as a concept or as an analysing tool. Given that the concept has been and is being studied by various disciplines, I will limit myself with providing a history of a sociological study of memory.

The evolution of a sociological analysis of the concept of memory occured within the French scholarly environment up until 1990s. The first such analysis of memory is attributed to Maurice Halbwachs who first coined the term 'collective memory' and used it systematically in his work, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, published in 1925. His basic contribution was introducing a connection between a social group and memory and discussing that each social unit, limited in space and time, had its own memory. After the First World War, Halbwachs met Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, who were very much interested in his work, and he became

[63] Henry L. Roediger, III and James V. Wertsch, 'Creating a new discipline of memory studies', *Memory Studies*, Vol 1(1), 2008, pp. 9.

[64] Alon Confino, 'Collective Memory and Cultural History', pp. 1388.

[65] Andrew Hoskins, Amanda Barnier, Wulf Kansteiner and John Sutton, 'Editorial', *Memory Studies*, Vol 1(1), 2008, pp. 5.

a member of the editorial board of the journal, *Annales d'histoire économique et sociales*, founded by Febvre and Bloch in 1929. Febvre and Bloch's interest in the study of memory actually constituted only one important part of their endeavor to explore a new kind of history which was not about the history of states and kings, but rather about the structures, social and economic, of a society and its 'mental tools', that is, the way people understood their past and their world by using their systems of beliefs and collective emotions. As such, Febvre and Bloch were indeed interested in the history of collective representations, of which memory constituted only one part. Pierre Nora was also a member of Annalistes, though of a later generation. His researches took place in the 1970s and 1980s. Although he was conscious of the traditions of the school and although his efforts for a new kind of history took the Annales as its starting point, the school had already lost its domination and cohesiveness at the time he was writing. Therefore, despite the fact that there was a certain connection between previous works and Nora's researches, Nora transformed the study of collective representations into one specifically focusing upon the collective representation of the past, that is, upon memory. His seminal work, *Les lieux de mémoire*, took memory as the fundamental departure point from where he tried to provide a new kind of history. We can say that up until the end of the twentieth century, the study of memory remained limited to France, not only in terms of the scholars, but also in terms of the subject issues and examples that were brought forward. But since the 1990s, the study of memory has become international and transnational in its scope, and, as such, the interests, origins and historiographical foundations stopped being limited to France and became worldwide. From then on, subjects not only limited to the realities of France but those which were as diverse as the Holocaust, new approaches to nation-state and to nationhood, questioning of the official histoies and the emergence of postcolonial and gender studies, and so on, influenced the study of memory.[66]

At the moment, what memory studies has almost turned into is an accumulation of a multitude of analyses of issues related to memory around the whole world. What distinguishes memory studies and what makes it necessary as a

[66] Alon Confino, 'Memory and the History of Mentalities', pp. 77-79.

separate field are not the infinite number of topics that fall within the range of the concept of memory, but rather the way the already-studied themes are specifically conceived and the methodology used in approaching them which result in an exploration of subjects that were not studied before. Although there does not exist a unity in terms of the definition of the concept of memory and although memory is used to refer to differing things in different studies, the common denominator of all conceptualizations has to do with "the ways in which people construct a sense of the past."[67] The empasis on 'people' and on 'construction' has not only contributed excessively to our historical knowledge, but has also extracted new information about the past and, as such, provided information about the topics which were unknown before.

Another significant contribution of memory studies was to reveal the relations of power within a society by looking at the ways the past was invented, constructed and appropriated. The researches carried by memory studies have resulted in posing the question "who wants whom to remember what and why."[68] The power relations in a society that the field of memory studies reveals do not exist only in terms of instructing a segment of the society in terms of how to remember, but also in terms of shaping the things to be remembered. Furthermore, the field does not limit itself to a discussion of how people were exposed only to certain narratives of the past are, but also whether and why people rejected these narratives or not.

Memory studies has also been influential in the discussion of identity issues. As Jan Assmann states, "[m]emory is knowledge with an identity-index, it is knowledge about oneself, that is, one's own diachronic identity, be it as an individual or as a member of a family, a generation, a community, a nation, or a cultural and religious tradition."[69] In recent years, we have witnessed that the identity debates of marginalized or discriminated groups have revolved around the

[67] Alon Confino, 'Collective Memory and Cultural History, pp. 1386.

[68] *ibid*., pp. 1393.

[69] Jan Assmann, "Communicative and Cultural Memory" in *Cultural Memory Studies*, pp. 114.

issue of identity, to the extent that "memory is valorized where identity is problematized."[70] The concept of memory was effective for such groups in discussing that the concept of identity is not monolithic and that identities are rather heterogeneous. Consequently, the political and ethical dimensions of the constructions of the past have come to the forefront and minority groups pursued their struggles for their rights by putting the emphasis on their memory.

Despite all of these merits, memory studies does not have a clear focus yet. As I have already said, the field is a collection of stories narrating different cases from all around the world. We might say that the lack of discussion about the theory and methodology has been compensated to a certain extent in recent years as there appeared some articles criticizing this situation and offering certain conceptualizations. However, as Confino states, the field's problems, approaches and objects of study have not been systematically analysed yet.[71] I think that one of the most significant contributions will be to answer the question that put forward by Confino, which will also help to consolidate the significance of the field itself. To quote the question at lenght, "if the study of memory focuses creatively on how people construct a past through a process of appropriation and contestation, is the real problem not, perhaps, that people construct the past by using the term "memory" at all?"[72]

3.3 The Concept of Collective Memory

As I have already said in various instances, the concept of memory has been used by different scholars to refer to different things. Furthermore, scholars use the concept of memory by adding different modifiers in front of it, sometimes without explaining what meaning they have attributed to that phrase and why they have

[70] Allan Megill, "History, Memory, Identity," *History of the Human Sciences* 11/3 (1998), 40, cited in Wulf Kansteiner, 'Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies', *History and Theory*, Vol. 41, No. 2. (May, 2002), pp. 184.

[71] Alon Confino, 'Memory and the History of Mentalities', pp. 79.

[72] Alon Confino, 'Collective Memory and Cultural History, pp. 1403.

chosen that particular one over other possibilities, which further complicates the issue. I prefer to use the concept 'collective memory', the reason of which I will explain later in this section by contrasting it to other alternatives. For the time being, I will try to provide a definition of the concept. For this purpose, I will initially discuss its relation with the concept of individual memory.

3.3.1 Individual Memory and Collective Memory

Memory is indeed a capacity of individuals. All coinages which refer to the memory of a group is an extension from individual memory, collective memory being no exception. In this relationship, the abilities and capacities of the individual mind is extended to the workings of a group. However, this relationship which is built between the individual and the collectivity on the grounds of memory is highly problematic and is criticized by some scholars, sometimes to the extent that the use of the concept of collective memory is announced as 'deterioration' by scholars such as Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam. These two scholars emphasize the problematic nature of all the terms which are qualified by the word 'collective,' including the concept of collective memory. According to them, such usages are misleading, as they expand capacities which eventuates only on an individual level to a collective one. They further claim that the concept of collective memory is indeed an example of degeneration and deterioration instead of sophistication, as they believe that this concept is just another vague and ambiguous term which actually corresponds to the previous studies on myths, customs and traditions. Consequently, they assert that the usage of the concept of collective memory can only be justified on a metaphorical level as a general code which is beyond of all these previous studies.[73] It is true that the study of 'collective memory' borrows terms from individual memory without any revision and, consequently, imagines the concept of collective memory through the characteristics peculiar to individuals. However, this does not necessarily lead us to the needlessness of the concept of collective memory, but

[73] Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam, 'Collective Memory – What Is It?', *History & Memory*, Spring/Summer 1996, Vol. 8, Issue 1, pp. 34, 40.

rather points to the lack of a methodology for its study. Hence, what is problematic, I suggest, is not the concept itself, but rather the way it is used. As Wulf Kansteiner rightfully claims, "the threshold between the individual and the collective is often crossed without any adjustments in method," and, as a result, "collectives are said to remember, to forget, and to repress the past."[74] Such a lack of adjustment in method does not necessarily justify the futility of the concept, but rather points to its misuse and the need for a revision.

When it comes to the second part of Gedi and Elam's argument, on the other hand, it is true that the study of collective memory can be realised with reference to the construction of myths, customs and traditions. However, it is not limited to this. It is true that the concept of collective memory is an umbrella term which covers, not only myths, customs and traditions, but also monuments, historiography, conversational remembering, configurations of cultural knowledge, commemorations, autobiographies, and so on. Following from here, we can agree with Gedi and Elam on the issue that collective memory is a vague and ambiguous concept. However, we should also be aware of the fact that it is specifically this umbrella quality of the concept which also renders it promising; it is with the help of the use of a concept which is at the intersection of various issues that we are able to see the functional, analogical or metaphorical relationships between them and to benefit from the stimulating dialogue occuring between disciplines as diverse as psychology, history, sociology, and literary studies, and so on.[75] Henceforth, we can rightfully claim that the concept of collective memory corresponds to much more than a simple metaphorical extension that Gedi and Elam suggests. On the contrary, the concept helps us to realize, as Kansteiner asserts, the "shared communications about the meaning of the past that are anchored in the life-worlds of individuals who partake in the communal life of the respective collective."[76] The significance

[74] Wulf Kansteiner, 'Finding Meaning in Memory', pp. 186.

[75] Astrid Erll, "Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction" in *Cultural Memory Studies*, pp. 1.

[76] Wulf Kansteiner, 'Finding Meaning in Memory', pp. 188.

of the concept of collective memory lies in its reference to the social context and its impact on the structuring of memories.

This last point is what proves that the relationship between individual memory and collective memory is not one-way in which the latter is just an extension of the former on the social level, as reference to the social context reminds us that memory is not only individual but also collective. What I mean by this is not that collectivities can also remember and forget just like individuals do, but rather that our individual memories are not isolated from the narratives of the surrounding culture. As Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone assert, "memory, though we may experience it as private and internal, draws on countless scripts and bits of knowledge and information from the surrounding culture, and is inserted into larger cultural narratives."[77] Therefore, there exists a two-way relationship between individual memory and collective memory; whereas collective memory is embedded in and represented by individuals, individual memories come into being within a social context and, hence, are influenced by the systems of representations of that context. Consequently, individual and collective memories do not exist separately from each other in an isolated manner, but rather are intertwined together. Alessandro Portelli, while trying to differentiate between collective memory and individual memory, gives the example that whereas a collective massacre generates collective memory, the murders taken individually results in individual memories.[78] Although such a differentiation might seem just at first sight, it indeed does not do justice to the relationship between individual and collective memories by taking them as if they were isolated from each other and neglecting how individual memories are shaped in relation to a social context and how the representation of collective memory is embedded in individuals.[79]

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[77] Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone, 'Introduction', pp. 5.

[78] Alessandro Portelli, "The Massacre at the Fosse Ardeantine: History, myth, ritual, and symbol", in *Contested Pasts*, pp. 34.

[79] The argument that individual memories are shaped in relation to a social context does not necessarily mean that they are always in conformity with the narratives of the context. Individual memories might also contradict the dominant narrative of a certain issue; still, their articulation is realized in relation to it, that is, in the form of opposition. Such a confrontation between the

3.3.2 Collective Memory

Before going into a discussion of the concept of collective memory itself, it will be beneficial first to briefly mention what kind of a social group we are referring to when we speak of collective. Traditionally, what used to come to mind when speaking of a collective was the nation-state and its citizens. However, critical scholarly discussions on the modernity's spatial and temporal order have revealed how the nation-state has been constituted as the reference point in terms of which any kind of belonging in time and space has been measured. As a result, the significance of other types of collectives to which individuals belong has been underscored. This shift in perception is also related with the fact that state-bound identities are not as powerful as they used to be and they are competing with local and supranational identities. Consequently, collectivities have ceased to be understood only in terms of nation-states. However, collectivities are not defined only with reference to other comprehensive criteria such as ethnic and racial basis, either. Even smaller social groups can constitute collectivities, as we can conceptualize them with reference to family, gender, work and occupation, age groups, sexual orientation, and so on. Although there also exist collective memories which might encompass all these social groups, in certain cases we can see that certain groups have their own peculiar memories and in some other cases we can see that different groups might put emphasis to differing sections of a narrative shared by all groups. However, it is necessary to emphasize here that the collective memories of distinct groups are not formed in isolation and by themselves, but rather are constructed in relation to, that is, in communication with, each other. The members of these collectivities, on the other hand, adjoin themselves with a multiplicity of groups, which, at the end, results in a multiplicity of memories. We

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individual and the collective does not necessarily render the individual as powerless in relation to a structure bigger than himself/herself. On the contrary, as Carrie Hamilton states, "certain personal memories highlight, when read against collective memories, the selections and silences of the latter." Carrie Hamilton, "Memories of Violence in Interviews with Basque Nationalist Women" in *Contested Pasts*, pp. 121.

can inversely claim that in order to belong to a social group one has to remember, as "[r]emembering is a realization of belonging, even a social obligation."[80]

Not all memories are treated as collective memories. A memory that is shared across all the members of a collectivity cannot be simply called a collective memory, either. Neither does collective memory come into existence by the accumulation of various individual memories. It is rather what is at the crossroads of individual memories and what serves the function of providing the community with a sense of identity. Providing "representations of the past in the minds of members of a community that contribute to the community's sense of identity"[81] is the distinguishing character of collective memory. This is through collective memory that members of a collectivity build an awareness of belonging and identity. This identity nexus is what distinguishes collective memory from a simple knowledge of the past. If information about the past does not contribute to the formation of a sense of group identity, then the members of a collectivity cannot call the past as theirs. Memory provides communities with a sense of continuity in a world in which subjectivity is both fragmented and fractured.[82] Moreover, whereas knowledge about the past refers to the progressive accumulation which never ends, forgetting and selectivity are important dimensions of memory; memory is the gathering together of the stories of the past which are relevant to the formation of a certain identity. Furthermore, whereas knowledge tends towards generalization and standardization and has universalistic orientations, collective memory is meaningful only for a certain group.[83]

The multiplicity of memories that I have mentioned above, taken together with the identity-nexus of collective memory, help us to understand how the members of a shared collective memory are individuals who have different, even

[80] Jan Assmann, 'Communicative and Cultural Memory', pp. 114.

[81] David Manier and William Hirst, "A Cognitive Taxonomy of Collective Memories", in *Cultural Memory Studies*, pp. 253.

[82] Vijay Agnew, "Introduction" in Vijay Agnew (ed.), *Diaspora, Memory and Identity: A Search for Home*. Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2005, pp. 9.

[83] Jan Assmann, 'Communicative and Cultural Memory', pp. 113.

competing, interests and motivations and how people hold competing identities at one and the same time, such as, as Confino describes, "local and national, Zionist and religious, good parents as well as devoted Catholics and Vichy fascists who sent Jewish children to the camps."[84] As individuals belong to groups distinct from each other, their identities are constructed as a mixture of the memories and values of these groups. As a result, individuals who might have competing memories about a certain issue might become the members of another group and share a common memory.

Memory is generally thought as having a direct relationship with experience; it is claimed that it is through experiencing certain events that we have memories of them.[85] Although this argument holds true for most cases, it is not able to explain by itself how come individuals also possess collective memories of events that they themselves did not experience. Different scholars have used different terms in order to be able to explain this situation. For example, Celia Lury argues that in our modern societies, as a result of the technological developments and of sites of popular culture such as film and television, we are face to face with the collapse of the distance between the occuring of an event and its representation and also with "the endless recycling of the past" which is put in front of us again and again in many occasions. Henceforth, she has coined the term 'prosthetic memory' in order to refer to "a mediated access to a past that individuals have not themselves experienced creating 'memories' that transcend space and time."[86] Alternatively, Jürgen Reulecke makes use of the concept of generation and its variations in order

[84] Alon Confino, 'Collective Memory and Cultural History', pp. 1399.

[85] This relationship between memory and experience is also the basis of the truth-claim of the proponents of collective memory, as they argue that we can know how a certain event has really occured by asking to the witnesses of the event as they are the only people who can truely recall what has really happened. Such an understanding, for example, lies at the basis of oral history studies. Trauma studies also makes use of this argument as it tries to help individuals who have experienced traumatic events and then repressed their memories about them to reveal themselves and, as such, to recover. I will deal with the truth-claim of collective memory supports in the following section, while discussing collective memory's relationship with history.

[86] Paula Hamilton, "Sale of the Century: Memory and historical consciousness in Australia" in *Contested Pasts*, pp. 138-139, with reference to Celia Lury, *Prosthetic Culture: Photography, Memory and Identity*. London: Routledge, 1998.

to explain the same event. He argues that the term 'generation' has recently come to be understood in the humanities and social sciences as referring to a group whose members have been born and grown up "in the same formative historical era," and as such, share a generational identity. He uses the term 'generationality', on the other hand, to discuss the peculiar dimensions of this identity and states that it refers both to the common characteristics collectively claimed by the members of the same generation as a result of shared experiences and to the characteristics ascribed to this same group from the outside by the members of other generations. Lastly, he uses the term 'generativity' to discuss the relationship between distinctive generationalities in terms of whether generations transfers their peculiar mental problems to the successive age groups.[87] Finally, we can also mention the term 'post-memory' coined by Marianne Hirsch to discuss the memories which are not experienced personally but which are rather transferred from somewhere else. Hirsch coined the term initially to discuss the intimate familial context in which the memories of the parents are transferred to their children, but the term is later used for discussion at a collective and cultural level, as well. What she means by this term is "the experience of those who grow up dominated by narratives that preceeded their birth, whose own belated stories are displaced by stories of the previous generation, shaped by traumatic events that they can neither understand nor re-create."[88]

Despite having different degrees of sophistication, the terms coined by all these there scholars help us to understand howcome individuals hold memories of events that they did not themselves experienced. According to Andreas Huyssen, this temporal distance between the event occuring and the rememberers is beneficial in that it has freed memory from just the facts and has helped us to become aware of the constructed nature of collective memory through various discourses and layers

[87] Jürgen Reulecke, "Generation/Generationality, Generativity, and Memory" trans. by Sara B. Young, in *Cultural Memory Studies*, pp. 119, 122.

[88] Marianne Hirsch, 'Projected Memory: Holocaust Photographs in Personal and Public Phantasy' in Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe and Leo Spitzer (eds), *Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present*. Hanouver and London: University Press of New England, 1999, pp. 8.

of representation,[89] an issue which is not possible to be realized by simply limiting oneself to the relationship between memory and experience. Memory is not the recording of the past, but rather an endless reconstruction of the past. Hence comes the issue of the timeline of the act of memory. Although memory is always of a past event, the act of memory is always the present. What is meant by this is that as what we call collective memory is an endless reconstruction of the past, these reconstructions are realized in the present according to the political and strategic realities and necessities of the present. It is indeed this shifting relationship between the past and the present that we call collective memory and not a mere knowledge about the past. It is the present which conditions how and what we remember. Consequently, not only collective memory does not take place in the past, but neither there exists a pure memory which is free of the frames of the time and space of the social context in which the rememberers live.

I can now explain why I choose the term collective memory instead of many other possible usages. In the sociological literature on memory, the mostly encountered modifiers for the word memory are official, communicative and cultural, among many others. My intention is to provide a brief definition for each term and then discuss their disadvantages compared to the concept of collective memory.

The term official memory is used, as can be guessed, to refer to memories which are mostly generated by the governments and other civic institutions in order to provide people with a patriotric, sacred and timeless sense of the past. In this memory, the past is not taken in its complex form, but is rather idealized, aiming "to neutralize competing interpretations of the past that might threaten social unity, the survival of existing institutions, and fidelity to the established order."[90] In this kind of memory, what, how and why to remember is decided by the officials and handed down to people. Consequently, official memory can be seen as just another 'institution' of the nation-state, which serves the function of turning people into

[89] Andreas Huyssen, 'Twilight Memories', pp. 256.

[90] Robert Burgoyne, "From Contested to Consensual Memory: The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum", in *Contested Pasts*, pp. 210.

ideal citizens. My conception of the concept of official memory is that it is not very different from the official task of history-writing. It is true that official memory does not necessarily deal with just facts, but is mostly interested in the generation of myths. It is also true that official memory includes a commemorative dimension, encouraging ritualistic acts, which do not have a place in the official history-writing. However, they are the same, I think, in the sense that they are the products of the same discursive environment, aiming to serve the same function. Apart from that, the concept deals only with the fabrication of memory on an official level and does not take into account the memories produced by individuals themselves.

The concept of communicative memory, on the other hand, is used to refer to the memories based on everyday communication. Such memory is not generated by any specialists and is not propped up by any kind of institution; it is rather constituted in everyday interaction and communication. Consequently, this memory survives only for a limited amount of time, which is described as eighty years, which correspond to three subsequent generations. This kind of memory is learned by its participants in time with language and social competence. As there are no specialists which generate this kind of memory, every individual can participate in it diffusely, although their knowledge might differ from each other.[91] Although the use of the concept of communicative memory is useful with its reference to the informal, it is not able to explain the possession of memories of very distant events by generations who have not experienced them by themselves, who, in some cases, have not even known any person who did so. Furthermore, as the concept is limited with everyday interaction and communication, it does not help us to understand the complexity and the ambiguity of the endless reconstructions of the past and the discursive systems as well as the layers of representations which influence these constructions.

Finally, the concept of cultural memory is defined broadly as "the interplay of present and past in socio-cultural contexts."[92] Its difference from the

[91] Jan Assmann, 'Communicative and Cultural Memory', pp. 114.

[92] Astrid Erll, 'Cultural Memory Studies', pp. 2.

communicative memory lies in its distance from the everyday. The knowledge contained by the cultural memory have two aspects; namely, "the formative one in its educative, civilizing, and humanizing functions and the normative one in its function of providing rules of conduct."[93] The participation in the cultural memory, on the other hand, is not diffuse as in the case of communicative memory, but it is instead highly differentiated; the contributions which might be made by the ordinary individuals are not very much valued compared to those made by specialists. Actually, the concept of cultural memory shares many of the characteristics of the concept of collective memory, especially with its reference to the formation of a social identity. Nevertheless, the reason why I prefer the latter concept to the former is that I think that in the latter we see a much direct reference to a collective identity, whereas in the second the emphasis seems to be more like on socio-cultural contexts. As I think that the critical feature of memory is its influence on the formation of a collective identity, I favour the concept of collective memory.

Before ending this section, I would like to mention two criticisms which are directed at the usage of the concept of collective memory and which, I think, we should keep in mind in order not fall into this trap. The first one of these criticisms has to do with the fact that while talking about collective memory, scholars usually fail to take into account the issue of reception. Individuals, taken one by one, might not be significant in the fabrication of the collective memory. However, as Iwona Irwin-Zarecka rightly criticizes, they "are perfectly capable of ignoring even the best told stories, of injecting their own, subversive meanings into even the most rhetorically accomplished 'texts' – and of attending to only those ways of making sense of the past that fit their own."[94] Although the issues of how the past is reconstructed and represented are important dimensions of collective memory, what is equally significant is the issue of why this past is received or rejected. It is only

[93] Jan Assmann, 'Collective Memory and Cultural Identity', trans. by John Czaplicka, *New German Critique*, No. 65, Cultural History/Cultural Studies (Spring-Summer, 1995), pp. 132.

[94] Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, *Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994, pp. 4.

by paying attention to this issue that we can understand why some narratives of the past fail whereas others survive and why people prefer a certain image of the past over another one.[95] Another criticism directed towards the concept of collective memory is its pressuposition for "homogeneity, consistency, and predicability."[96] Although collective memory might recognize differences on an individual level or among different collectives, the differences fade away when it comes to a certain collective which is conceived as having a single 'I' speaking. Therefore, we should be aware of these two criticisms while studying with the concept of collective memory.

3.4 History and/vs Memory

The relationship between memory and history is conceptualized very differently by different scholars. The common approach is to posit memory and history in two distinct camps and to think of them as if they refer to two opposite kinds of relations with the past. According to this view, "[w]here history is concerned, memory increasingly functions as antonym rather than synonym; contrary rather than complement and replacement rather than supplement."[97] Maurice Halbwachs and Pierre Nora are the two important figures who support such a strict distinction. To begin with Halbwachs, he admits the fact that "history is a collection of the most notable facts in the memory of man." However, he makes a crucial distinction between history and memory in that, according to him, the history that we are taught in the schools and that we learn from the books "are selected, combined, and evaluated in accord with necessities and rules imposed on the groups", whereas the memories of the same events are kept as a living trust by those groups. For him, the memory is developed continuously and, as such, it has "irregular and uncertain boundaries", whereas history has "clearly etched

[95] Alon Confino, 'Memory and History of Mentalities', pp. 81.

[96] Wulf Kansteiner, 'Finding Meaning in Memory', pp. 193.

[97] Kerwin Lee Klein, 'On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse', *Representations*, No. 69, Special Issue: Grounds for Remembering. (Winter, 2000), pp. 128-129.

demarcations." Other than this, he states that in history, we see the existence of the past and the present as two distinct and "neighbouring historical periods", whereas, when memory is concerned, "the past no longer exists" in that the past and the present are enmeshed together. Furthermore, he claims that there exist several collective memories; each event might be remembered differently by different social groups and in different social contexts. When it comes to history, however, there exists only one and unitary history. Related with this is the issue that whereas "memory requires the support of a group delimited in space and time", history does not need such group in that it is recorded in official documents. According to Halbwachs, history does not exist until a group who remembers the past ceases to exist. He declares that when the group cannot remember the memories of the past anymore, or when every member of the group who was a witness of the past dies, then there generates the necessity to write the history of the past.[98]

Other than Halbwachs, Pierre Nora also argues that memory and history are in fundamental opposition. Nora makes a differentiation between premodern and modern periods and allocates memory to the first period and history to the second. His argument is that premodern societies used to live within memory and did not make any clear cut distinction between the past and the present, whereas modern societies put distance between themselves and the past as a result of the accelaration of life brought about by industrialization and modernization; as such, the past started to be experienced in an artifical way, through sites of memory that were built, whereas in the premodern period, societies used to live in environments of memory. According to Nora's conceptualization, "modern consciousness of the past [is] 'historical' rather than memorial; it is a consciousness whose only recourse is to represent and invent what it is no longer able deeply and spontaneously to experience."[99] For him, "[m]emory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and

[98] Maurice Halbwachs, '*From* The Collective Memory', trans. by Francis J. Ditter, Jr and Vida Yazdi Ditter, in *Theories of Memory*, pp. 139, 130, 142, 143, 140, respectively.

[99] Nancy Wood, *Vectors of Memory: Legacies of Trauma in Postwar Europe*. Oxford and New York: Berg, 1999, pp. 19. See also Wulf Kansteiner, pp. 183.

forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived." As a result, memory is a very actual phenomenon. History, on the other hand, is a reconstruction of what happened in the past and what no longer exists. Therefore, it is no more than a representation. According to Nora, memory "only accomodates those fact that suit it" and leaves behind what does not serve to the coherency of what is remembered, whereas history, being "an intellectual and secular production, calls for analysis and criticism." Moreover, memory, for Nora, concerns only the group that it binds, whereas history belongs to everyone, and also to no one due to its claim to universal authority. Lastly, he states that the relation between history and memory is not merely one of opposition, but also of conflict in that "[h]istory is perpetually suspicious of memory, and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it."[100]

Although it is possible to agree with Halbwachs and Nora on certain points, their arguments have many flawed sides, as well. Halbwachs, for example, ignores the fact that collective memory is also a result of a process of selection and construction and that it is also composed according to the necessities of the groups in the present. Moreover, the temporal difference that he draws between history and memory is built on the impossibility of a simultaneous existence of both of them, whereas the widespread scholarly discussion on what distinguishes history from memory is itself an example of their temporal co-existence. Nora, on the other hand, does not take into account the fact that memories are reconstructions of what no longer exists, either. Furthermore, he does not pay attention to the fact that what was understood by memory in the premodern period was very different from the modern one. Therefore, his discrediting of memory in the modern period by contrasting it to an earlier understanding does not really hold in that he indeed compares two different conceptualizations refered by the same word; a change in the way we perceive and experience memory does not mean that there does not exist memory anymore. Other than that, the arguments of Halbwachs's and Nora's,

[100] Pierre Nora, *From* Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Mémoire*. trans. by Marc Roudebush, in *Theories of Memory*, pp. 145-46, 146, 146, 146, respectively.

taken together, are also very problematic in that they attribute to memory a quality of authenticity and they nostalgically conceptualize a 'privileged access' to a 'lost world' through memory.[101] Such an interpretation of memory ignores the fact that memory is not a pure transmitting of the events of the past, but is rather a reconstruction which has its own reasons and purposes. As James E. Young asserts, "[m]emory is never shaped in a vacuum; the motives of memory are never pure."[102] Let alone the political and strategic motives which aim at providing a certain way of understanding the past, the goal of producing a collective identity which will provide people with a sense of commonnes is itself a significant function of memory. Apart from this, it is also very crucial to emphasize that memory is not the 'truer' way of remembering the past than history, because what is remembered and how is remembered are crucial aspects of the functioning of memory, and as such, memory can be as much constructed, structured and structuring as Halbwachs's and Nora's understanding of history. Finally, to label the memory as the site of authenticity may lead us to associate it with ethno-racial groups, although this was not an argument articulated by Halbwachs and Nora themselves. Still, the distinction that they put between the hegemony of the history and the memory of the groups may lead people, and indeed did, as Klein criticizes, to a "tendency to employ memory as the mode of discourse natural to the people without history."[103]

In an attempt to dissolve the opposition between history and memory, Astrid Erll suggests to conceptualize them as 'different modes of remembering'. She claims that the endless reconstruction and the need for the representation of the past result in a variety of ways to remember the same events. However, what she does in the later parts of her argumentation is to subsume history as just another mode of memory.[104] Even if she had not did that, we could still oppose to her suggestion as

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[101] John Frow, '*From Toute la Mémoire du Monde*: Repetition and Forgetting', in *Theories of Memory: A Reader*, pp. 150.

[102] James E. Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993, pp. 2.

[103] Kerwin Lee Klein, 'On the Emergence of Memory', pp. 144.

[104] Astrid Erll, 'Cultural Memory Studies', pp. 7.

she coins history and memory with the same word, that is, remembering, as history is not a way of remembering the past; it can rather be said at most to be another way of *referring* to the past.

I think that what we need while conceptualizing the relationship between history and memory is not to produce any kind of antagonism between them, nor to suggest a ceasefire, but simply to offer their commonalities and divergencies.

In terms of what they have in common, we can initially mention the fact that both of them construct the past in conformity with certain motives. The handling of the past is selective in both of them in that some events, which might be considered for some people as equally significant with great events of the past, are left in silence. Furthermore, we can claim that the narratives produced by both of them are a kind of imposition on the people who are exposed to them. This situation is beyond dispute in the case of history, in which the past is analyzed and narrativized by the specialists and offered to individuals for digestion. In the case of collective memory, on the other hand, it is true that individuals might be considered to have more influence on the narratives constructed and the memories remembered. However, the end result is still one single narrative offered to the all members of a collectivity. Not all the members of this collectivity share this memory and they might have memories of their own, not only individually but also as a group of people. However, what we have in the end is not another collective memory for the same group, but a form of countermemory, which is in most cases doomed to remain marginal. Finally, we can argue that both memory and history act in the present. Although their subject matter is the past, the reconstruction of that past is realized in the present and according to the necessities of the present.

This relationship between the past and the present, however, is what distinguishes memory and history from each other, as well. For history, although the past is studied through the frames of the present, the two temporalities are clearly differentiated from each other in that the former is an object of study in the present. When it comes to memory, on the other hand, these two temporalities are enmeshed together. There is again a sense of pastness and presentness, of course, but memory acts as a mediator which structures our relationship with them in a fluid

way. This is why whereas history can study its object of study critically, memory cannot maintain a critical distance between the present and the past. This issue is related with how the past is handled by history and memory. Although both of them deal with past events, history takes these events as facts and interprets them, whereas memory's relation with these events is more than a desire to record them; it rather involves relations of fantasy and wish. Here comes the issue of truth. History is an act whose relation with the events of the past is based on generating truth-claims. We can refute a historical writing by proving with historical evidence how it is mistaken in dealing with the past. When it comes to memory, on the other hand, truth is not a criteria we can judge memory with. Involving elements of fantasy and wish, the events of the past might be remembered as different from what they actually are. More than that, memories might be of things which have never happened in reality. Such a factual innacuracy does not render memory irrelevant or invalid. It rather points out to the fact that memories "tell their own history of political fantasies and frustrations" and that they "often offer assute political analysis by revealing the disappointments and disillusionments."[105] The issue of truth also reveals itself in the fact that memory is indeed formed against the truth-claims of history. This does not mean, as I have already said, that memory provides a truer version of the past, but rather means that whereas history tells *the* truth about the past, memory shows how different the past can be conceived and interpreted than the narratives imposed on individuals. We can argue that the narratives of collective memory claim to display how the past has really happened, but the fact that differing memories exist for different groups and that all these memories exist simultaneously show us the fluidity of what the past really is. This is in this sense that memory can be claimed to have an adverse attitude towards the hegemonic discourse in a society. It is true that there also exist historical writings which are aimed at contesting what the official history tells and that there are memories which act as another coercive tool of the powerful. Still, the "ontologically fluid"[106]

[105] Carrie Hamilton, 'Memories of Violence', pp. 122.

[106] Marita Sturken, 'The Absent Images of Memory', pp. 688.

character of memory, the simultaneous existence of different registers of memories and their representation of alternative conceptions of the past consign an adverse attitude to memory compared to history. The issue of reception is also very significant in this adversary. Individuals might not agree with what is told in historical texts. However, as history-writing is a task of the specialists, there is not much they can do to change them. Moreover, the study of historical events are not determined according to the demands and wishes of individuals; rather, the events worth remembering and which should be remembered are offered to people. In the case of memory, on the other hand, reception is a determining issue in that narratives which are not supported by individuals cannot survive. Individuals prefer certain images and stories of the past over others, whose selection might change according to the necessities of the time. A final word on the divergence between history and memory can be said on the issue of self-actualizing. I think that in the case of history, although we can also think of historical sites, the main form of history's self-actualization is narrative. Memory, on the other, can be actualized and embodied, I think, in various forms, narrative being one of them alongside diaries, voice records, memorials, rituals, commemorative acts, songs and photographs, and so on. Furthermore, whereas history has always a public dimension, memories might also remain private.

What we should emphasize finally is that although there clearly exist distinctions between them, and although at certain times it might be politically significant to emphasize these distinctions, as memories can run against the official history, we should not posit memory and history in strict opposition. Not only this, but we should also consider these two "to be entangled, each pulling forms from the other."[107] Rather than covering areas that are totally distinct from each other, memory and history are, indeed, intertwined, in that they are nourished from each other and also the passage from one to the other is not as clearly demarcated as it is traditionally suggested. The survivors of an historical event, which is necessary for the intergenerational transference of the memories of that event, is also influential in the writing of the history in that it is through their testimonies that the details of

[107] *ibid.*, pp. 688.

the events have ben revealed and the atrocities were made visible, an obvious example being the Holocaust and the testimonies of the survivors. It is true that history can function in the absence of the survivors, and that sometimes, the presence of the survivors might be harmful for the historical narratives if it generates opposition. Still, as Sturken suggests, "history making also accords them a very particular authority as the embodiment of authentic experience."[108] The relationship between memory and history is not only one way, in that history can also influence the personal memories. This can happen in two senses; in a positive sense, the detailed information provided in the historical narrative can help one to better remember the events, or to fill the gaps in his/her memory; in a negative sense, the emphasis upon certain aspect of the events and the ignorance of certain other parts may cause individuals to forget some of their memories in time, as this is only some of their memories that are backed up.

3.5 Nostalgia

A thorough analysis of the concept of memory requires that we pay attention to various other concepts as diverse as witness, testimony, absence, distance, tradition, nostalgia and forgetting.[109] Each of these concepts are very significant in their own way in order to be able to elaborate more on various aspects of the concept of memory. Forgetting, for example, is a concept which occupies a significant place in memory studies, as it is argued that forgetting is at times a strategic venture necessary for the memory work. The claim put forward by Ernest Renan, that is, "[f]orgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for [the principle of] nationality"[110] is a widely quoted one by scholars who focus upon the politics of memory. Although all of these

[108] *ibid*., pp. 688.

[109] Ann Hua, "Diaspora and Cultural Memory" in *Diaspora, Memory and Identity*, pp. 197.

[110] Ernest Renan, "What is a nation?", trans. by Martin Thom, in Homi k. Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration*. London and New York: Routledge, 1990, pp. 11.

concepts, each in its own way, open up new spaces for discussion regarding the concept of memory, for the concerns of this thesis, I will only focus upon the concept of nostalgia.

When we leave the memories of traumatic experiences out, we can say that remembering the past almost always includes longing for what was as well as what might have been. This is why nostalgia is a vital element of memory work. As we have already seen, memory is not about the past but more about the present and the future. The narratives of the past are reconstructed according to the discourses of the present which are always related with the projects about the future. Therefore, what the past means in the present is always subject to change. Svetlana Boym, for example, mentiones in her book a contemporary Russian saying which claims that "the past has become much more unpredictable than the future."[111] However, in some cases, what determines the discourses of the present and the projects about the future is the longing we have towards the past. What I mean by this is that the nostalgia we have towards the past in terms of what was or what might can influence our plans about the present and the future. It is also as a result of incorporating such a longing into our narratives and discourses that, as Sinead McDermott asserts, "we can suspend the past and ultimately change its meanings in the present."[112]

Nostalgia is a word derived from two Greek roots; namely, *nostos*, meaning return to home and *algia*, meaning longing or painful condition, and is used to describe a longing for a home which no longer exists or which has never existed. Although the word has become today a "catchall term for all forms of sentimental longing or regret," as Aaron Santesso states, the term has indeed a history throughout which its definition has changed radically.[113] Nostalgia was first coined as a medical term by the Swiss doctor Johannes Hofer in 1688 in order to describe

[111] Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*. New York: Basic Books, 2001, pp. xiv.

[112] Sinead McDermott, 'Memory, Nostalgia and Gender in "A Thousand Acres."' *Signs*, Vol. 28, No. 1, Gender and Cultural Memory (Autumn 202), pp. 405-406.

[113] Aaron Santesso, *A Careful Longing: The Poetics and Problems of Nostalgia*. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2006, pp. 15.

the situation of the Swiss mercinerary soldiers who were far away from home and who were longing for the home. Nostalgia, according to Hofer, was a physical experience whose course in the body remained mysterious. The symptoms of the disease were as diverse as nausea, loss of appetite, high fever, pathological changes in the lungs, brain inflammation, cardiac arrests, marasmus and a disposition to suicide. Although how it incapacitated the body was unknown, being a disease, nostalgia had its cures; leeches, opium and a journey to the Swiss Alps were believed to soothe the sypmtoms.[114] Nostalgia, which continued to be defined as a curable disease in the 18th century, has turned into an incurable modern condition in the 20th century.

In its modern conceptualization, nostalgia has turned into a form of longing of a more abstracted kind. What characterizes nostalgia in its modern form is a general desire for the past. Therefore, what has started to be emphasized more in this modern understanding of nostalgia is not a place where one cannot be anymore, but rather a time which has passed. As such, what is dreamed to be revisited in nostalgia is not a place, but rather a time. This is why nostalgia, in the modern period, has started to be used more and more in terms of a longing for childhood, for 60s, or, more generally, for good old days. This shift of emphasis from space to time in defining nostalgia has to do with the modern conception of time. In the modern life, the individuals experience time as accelerated and fragmented and, henceforth, are in need of slower rhythms of life. Nostalgia appears at this instance, enabling individuals to suspend the time which runs so fast and providing them with continuity, tradition and social cohesion.[115] This argument is similar to the claim put forward by Andreas Huyssen, which I have examined above, about the rise of interest in the concept of memory caused by a necessity to slow down the rhythms of life. Such a resemblance in terms of where the two concepts originate from, however, does not render their simultaneous existence obsolete, as they refer to different things. Although both concepts are about looking at the past, what

[114] Svetlana Boym, 'The Future of Nostalgia', pp. 4.

[115] i*bid*., pp. xv, xiv, 16.

distinguishes nostalgia and memory is that the former is loaded with a sense of loss and longing.

Santesso suggests that "[n]ostalgia is first and foremost a response to a present lack, need, or desire."[116] It is because of this lack in the present that we long for what we have lost by turning towards a time in the past which we believe we did not have that lack. This dimension of loss and longing in nostalgia is very much evocative of Freud's work on mourning and melancholia. According to Freud, mourning and melancholia are two kinds of reactions we give when an object of love is lost, not only when it dies or disappears but also when it ceases to be an object of love. This object, for Freud, can either be an individual or some abstraction, such as one's country, freedom, ideal, and so on, which has taken the place of another individual. What distinguishes mourning and melancholia is that in the latter the loss is withdrawn from consciousness. What Freud means by this is that, in melancholia, although the individual is conscious of the loss of an object of love, he/she does not know what is lost in it. In mourning, on the contrary, there is nothing unconscious about the loss. Therefore, in this case, the individual can displace in time his/her love onto a new object of love, whereas in melancholia the individual cannot find a new object to which to transfer his/her libido.[117] I think that both of these reactions towards the loss can be applied to nostalgia. Nostalgia, being a response to a lack in the present, is to turn towards the past in which what has been lost was not missing yet. Therefore, in nostalgia, the object of love which is lost is spatially and temporally displaced.[118] The reaction towards the loss, which might be real as well as imaginary, might take the form of mourning or melancholia; that is, the individual might become nostalgic about the past because of an object-loss, whether or not he/she is conscious of what is lost in it. I further suggest that these two forms of reactions towards the loss can be argued to be

[116] Aaron Santesso, 'A Careful Longing', pp. 189.

[117] Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia" in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XIV*. trans. and ed. by James Strachey *et all*., London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1957, pp. 243-249.

[118] Svetlana Boym, 'The Future of Nostalgia', pp. 38.

manifest in two forms of nostalgia. As I have already said, nostalgia can either be about what was or what might have been in the past. Although both of these forms might involve reconstruction of the past to a certain extent, the latter one, being more about unrealized opportunities, is more close to phantasy. These unfulfilled possibilities regarding the past, which are always articulated according to a belief of an insufficiency in the present, might be argued to take the form of melancholia, as narratives about what is believed to be lacking involve phantasy, which is composed of conscious as well as unconscious elements. Apart from that, the loss which defines nostalgia is not limited to the personal history of an individual. Individuals can be nostalgic about a time which they did not experience, which, therefore, they do not remember themselves but which they reminisce as a result of the memories transferred to them from their parents. In this case, an individual would not know what is really lost and where to look at to find it. Such a situation leads nostalgia to be, as Boym argues, to be less and less curable.[119]

Nostalgia as a concept has become the subject of criticisms and is claimed to be 'reactionary,' 'escapist,' 'inauthentic' and as a 'simplicification of the past.' Cristopher Lasch, for example, denounced the nostalgics as sentimentalists who are afraid of the future and of facing the truth about the past. Raymond Williams also criticized the concept as an opiate which helped people to avoid a critical examination of the status quo and to take refuge in an ideal past.[120] Nostalgia is thus seen as freeing people from responsibility and as providing them with a guilt-free homecoming.[121] On the other hand, however, other scholars perceived nostalgia from a much positive perspective. Maurice Halbwachs, for example, argued that the 'escape from the present' that nostalgia provides us with is one of its greatest virtues. Nostalgia, for him, freed individuals from the constraints of time and enabled them to emphasize the positive aspects of the past selectively. Such a focus

[119] *ibid*., pp. 6.

[120] Christopher Lasch, 'The Politics of Nostalgia', *Harper's*, (November 1984), pp. 65-70 and Raymond Williams, *The Country and The City*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, cited in Leo Spitzer, "Back Through the Future: Nostalgic Memory and Critical Memory in a Refuge from Nazism" in Mieke Bal *et al.*, 'Acts of Memory', pp. 91.

[121] Svetlana Boym, 'The Future of Nostalgia', pp. xiv.

upon only the positive experiences about the past, therefore, set a model of creative inspiration, as a result of which individuals found the impulse to change the conditions of today by looking at the idealized past.[122]

Svetlana Boym argues that although longing is a universal condition which influences every individual who is affected by the modern experience of time, nostalgia can be divisive; that is, although *algia* is what is common in all of us, *nostos* is what divides us.[123] According to her, there exist two kinds of nostalgia which correspond to either the *nostos* or the *algia* dimensions of nostalgia; namely, restorative nostalgia and reflective nostalgia, respectively. The restorative nostalgia puts emphasis on the return to home and attempts to reconstruct the lost home in a transhistorical manner. The nostalgics which fall within the range of this category do not think of their project as nostalgic, but rather about truth and tradition. Restoration, which comes from *re-staure*, that is, re-establishment, stress a return to the original condition. In this type of nostalgia, a perception of 'us' against 'them' is central. As such, it is nurtured by narratives of conspiracy in the sense that a 'them,' which conspire against 'our' homecoming is constructed, against which 'we' should conspire to restore 'our' community. Reflective nostalgia, on the other hand, grounding upon the longing dimension, wishfully delays homecoming. It is not interested in absolute truth or in the reestablishment of statis. *Re-flection*, suggesting new flexibility, is rather about mediation on the passage of time. The past is not seen as a perfect snapshot of the present, as in the case of restorative nostalgia, but is rather seen as opening up a space for a multitude of potentialities of historic development.[124] Therefore, I think that what mainly differentiates restorative nostalgia from reflective one is that in the former being nostalgic about the past and dreaming to go back to that original condition is one and the same thing. The latter one, on the other hand, is an example of being nostalgic about the

[122] Leo Spitzer, 'Back Through the Future', pp. 92.

[123] Svetlana Boym, 'The Future of Nostalgia', pp. xiii, xv.

[124] *ibid*., pp. xviii, 43, 49-50.

past, but not wanting to acquire the same condition, by constantly postponing returning back.

3.5.1 Diaspora Communities Desiring Home

As I have already mentioned, in the modern period, nostalgia is articulated mainly through a reference to a past time. However, this does not mean that its space dimension has completely faded away. On the contrary, the desire to go back to home, which once or never existed, continues to be a crucial characteristic of nostalgia, especially when it is deployed as a political tool in nationalist discourses. As we have just seen, restorative nostalgia itself is built upon a narrative of going back to home, whether real or imaginary. Such a narrative is mostly prevelant among communities uprooted from their home and dispersed all around the world.

The word diaspora comes from the Greek preposition *dia* meaning 'across' and the verb *speiro*, meaning 'to sow' and it approximately means 'scattered seeds.' The word is used to describe, as Ann Hua asserts, "the dispersion of a group of people from a centre to two or more peripheral places, as well as to the collective memory and trauma involved in such a dispersion."[125] Traditionally, the word has been used to refer to Jewish and Armenian communities living around the world. In recent years, however, with an increase in global displacement of people and with the expansion of the literature on diaspora, various other communities have started to be studied in terms of the diasporic status, as well, the Palestinians living abroad being one example. However, we also see a tendency in the scholarship on diaspora in terms of applying the concept uncritically and unreflexively to refer to any context of global displacement and movement, as a result of which the term has started to share meanings with words as diverse as immigrant, expatriate, overseas community, exile-community, refugee, guest-worker and ethnic-community.[126] Henceforth, the term 'diaspora' has increasingly come to be mistakenly used as a

[125] Ann Hua, 'Diaspora and Cultural Memory', pp. 193.

[126] *ibid*., pp. 194.

metaphor signifying a global condition of mobility whatsoever,[127] neglecting the fact that "being grounded is not necessarily about being fixed [and that] being mobile is not necessarily about being detached."[128] Not every mobile community is a diaspora; neither every settled one falls outside of it. There are certain criteria to be meet for a community to be considered as diasporic. In his seminal article, James Clifford argues that one significant characteristic of a diasporic community is that it has a history of dispersal; the members of the community have been uprooted from their lands against their own will and hold strong collective memories of this dispersal as well as of the home they left behind. According to him, most of the diasporic communities feel alienated in the country where they presently live and therefore have a strong desire to return home. In cases where they do not have problems with the host country, they still have an ongoing support for their homeland. Finally, he asserts that the identity of the members of this diasporic community are shaped with reference to their dispersal as well as their desire to go back home.[129]

The 'homeland' has become a key figure in defining diaspora. It is perceived to be a central characteristic of diaspora which grants its members a shared identity. However, one should be aware of the fact that "it is not necessarily [the homeland], but the lack of it which defines diasporic communities.[130] According to Clifford, the identity of a diasporic community is shaped by "a shared, ongoing history of displacement, suffering, adaptation, or resistance."[131] Therefore, I think that although a shared narrative about returning to home is also a significant characteristic of diasporic communities, this only occurs as a result of a previous

[127] Helena Lindholm Schulz, with Juliane Hammer, *The Palestinian Diaspora: Formation of identities and politics of homeland*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 8.

[128] Sara Ahmed, Claudia Castañeda, Anne-Marie Fortier, Mimi Sheller, "Introduction" in Sara Ahmed *et al*. (eds), *Uprootings/Regroundings: Questions of Home and Migration*. Oxford and New York: Berg, 2003, pp. 1. The quotation cited here is in italics in its original.

[129] James Clifford, 'Diasporas', *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 9, No. 3, Further Inflections: Toward Ethnographies of the Future (Aug., 1994), pp. 305.

[130] Helena Lindholm Schulz, 'The Palestinian Diaspora', pp. 10.

[131] James Clifford, 'Diasporas', pp. 306.

experience of displacement. Despite being a very central characteristic of diasporic communities, the narratives about going back home come to fore only when these communities are uprooted from their home. Therefore, it is their being displaced from their homeland, that is, the lack of a homeland, which gives the members of a community their identity of belonging to a particular place in the first place. Fawaz Turki, for example, writing on the Palestinian identity in exile argues that "it was in the land of others, in the place where it was not, that Palestinians found their peoplehood. For the Palestinians did not truly become Palestinian until their country was dismembered and its population scattered to that state of having escaped. Our name was born in exile, not the homeground."[132] Therefore, it is an experience of being dispersed from a land which grant people a shared identity.

The desire to go back home comes subsequently. According to Rosemary Marangoly George, home is a place of "select inclusions and exclusions" and "a way of establishing difference."[133] This is where one belongs and where one excludes the outsiders. A home is recognized as such both from within and without. The concept of home is used to refer both to the intimate familial context as well as a larger geographical place such as a village, a city or a country. The desire to go back to home of the members of a diasporic communities corresponds both to the territories from where they have been uprooted as well as to the homes they have left behind. However, the home does not always refer to an actual geographical place, as it might be an imaginary one, fixed in mental landscape.[134] The narratives around home articulated by diasporic communities involve elements of phantasy. Home is described as a lost paradise, where everything was beatiful and abundant, where there was close intimacy among the inhabitants and where they used to feel secure. Such a depiction of home may not really correspond to an actual reality. The members of a diasporic community which feel alienated in their host country may

[132] Fawaz Turki, *Exile's Return: The Making of a Palestinian American*. New York: Free Press, 1994, pp. 160, cited in Helena Lindholm Schulz, 'The Palestinian Diaspora', pp. 184.

[133] Rosemary Marangoly George, *The Politics of Home: Postcolonial relocations and twentieth-century fiction*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1999, pp. 2.

[134] *ibid*., pp. 11.

desire to return to an idealized home. They reconstruct their home, which they have left behind or which they have never lived in, as a place they desire to inhabit in the future. This past- and future-home corresponds to whatever they lack in the present and to whatever they think they have lost once they were uprooted. Henceforth, such idealizations of home tend to neglect that there also existed unequal relations of power back at home and that, at times, home was a place which included unhappy, dangerous, alienating and violent things as well as love and security.[135]

Home for people who are actually uprooted from their lands and for their children who were born in diaspora refers to different things. For people who have gone through the actual experience of displacement, home refers to a concrete and palpable place which is remembered. Having personally experienced the uprooting does not mean that the memories of this first generation regarding the home does not involve any construction; home which was left behind is also reconstructed and idealized by people who used to live there. For the subsequent generations, on the other hand, home is more of an image, constructed as a result of post-memories, that is, of memories transmitted from their parents. As such, the generations who were born in diaspora do not have a memory of the home left behind or the history of their displacement, but they rather commemorate it through what they learn from the stories their parents told them.[136] That the generations born in diaspora do not have a concrete relationship with the home left behind does not mean that they do not feel nostalgic about home, that they do not have a desire to return or that their desire is less real than their parents'. Having grown up with narratives of displacement and of home, the generations born in diaspora can equally be homesick about a home which they have never inhabited. Moreover, as we have just seen while discussing the concept of nostalgia, the generations which commemorate the past according to the memories transmitted to them from their parents, do not

[135] Alison Blunt, *Domicile and Diaspora: Anglo-Indian Women and the Spatial Politics of Home*. Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005, pp. 6.

[136] Efrat Ben-Ze'ev, "Transmission and Transformation: The Palestinian Second Generation and the Commemoration of the Homeland" in André Levy and Alex Weingrod (eds), *Homelands and Diasporas: Holy Land and Other Places*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005, pp. 123.

know what has been really lost with displacement. As they have not experienced the displacement personally, the stories that they listen provide them with only a fragmented narrative, out of which they have to configure a home by themselves. Therefore, the nostalgia these subsequent generations feel towards the past and towards the home left behind refers to a loss which is not conscious. As a result, their feeling of lack might be much deeper than that of their parents, as they do not know where exactly to look for the cure.[137]

3.6 The Representation of Memory

When talking about memory, we should be careful about not to assume that the past is simply there in memory; it must rather be articulated to become memory.[138] This means that the past must be representated in one form or another to occupy a place in memory. Such a representation might take a lot of forms, such as autobiographies, memoires, novels, voice records, monuments, museums, memorials, photographs and so on. The representation of the past is not always realized with reference to the 'original' event; it might rather be a representation of a representation, meaning that a certain representation of the past might take as its model the meaning already produced by another representation. Therefore, representations of the past are not necessarily authentic, but replications of each other.

[137] I should put here as a disclaimer that what we call a diaspora is not necessarily a monolithic unity, the members of which share the same desires and aspirations. There might exist differences among the members of a certain diaspora, in the sense that some of them might feel attached to the host countries they are currently living in and might feel more secure there compared to their home country. Although they might still have nostalgic views about their homelands, they might still choose not to return back there. Or else, some of the members of a diaspora, whose identity are very much shaped by hybridity, might feel that they have more than one homeland, that is, the home country left behind and the host currently currently lived in, and therefore might compensate the nostalgic feelings they have towards their home country by transferring them to their host country. Finally, diasporic condition is not necessarily one in which all we can say about its members are negative things, as the members are paralyzed from experiencing displacement. On the contrary, for some of its members, this diasporic condition might have very positive connotations and might refer to a creative condition.

[138] Andreas Huyssen, 'Twilight Memories', pp. 3.

The conflicts over what the past means often correspond to conflicts over how the past should be represented. Although the representations already carry the meanings which they come to represent, they also add to this process of producing meaning. Therefore, we always witness conflicts about what kind of a monument should be erected and where, which artefacts should a museum display, which anectodes should be included in the writing of a memoir, which photographs of the past should be excluded from exhibiton.[139]

It is true that experiencing an event and remembering it in representation is not the same thing; there unavoidably exists a fissure between them. But instead of ignoring this fissure or condemning it, we might also see it as a potential place for artistic and cultural creativity.[140]

In the chapter that follows, I will focus upon one such form of representing the past, namely, the photograph, which has a peculiar relation to the past and to memory as it is taken as the most "natural" and "immediate" representation of them.

[139] Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone, 'Introduction', pp. 1.

[140] Andreas Huyssen, 'Twilight Memories', pp. 3.

CHAPTER IV

PHOTOGRAPHY AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY

Most of the scholars who have assigned themselves the role to study the history of photography start their account by examining the technical developments leading to the invention of photography, discussing the true inventor of the medium, for which they have to choose between Nicéphore Niepce, Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre and William Henry Fox Talbot, and mentioning that it was in 1839 that the invention of photography was announced to the world, first in France, then in Britain. From here on, they continue to discuss the subsequent manifestations of the medium as if they are founded on the story of invention of photography.[141] Some scholars, who do not necessarily form an homogeneous group, limit themselves to a modern formalism by talking about the history of photography in relation to art history and positing the continuities with as well as the discrepancies from the previous forms of representation. Some others, on the other hand, which we can group under the label of postmodernism assert that photography as such has no identity and that it can be studied only in relation with broader political and ideological forces.[142]

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[141] Geoffrey Batchen, *Each Wild Idea: Writing, Photography, History*. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 2002, pp. 3.

[142] John Tagg, for example, states that photography can never function outside of the discourses or functions for which it is put to use. Similarly, Alan Sekula believes that it is 'a cacophnoy of competing discourses' which give meaning and social value to photography. Victor Burgin, on the other hand, is interested in photography's relation with the sphere of cultural production in which the meaning of the pictures is disseminated in relation with the contexts in which it is shown. Moreover, he prefers theorizing photography "by theorizing looking at photography" as he believes that the look always includes the history of the subject. Abigail Solomon-Godeau, to end with, considers photography as operating in a larger structure than itself and states that the photographic meaning, which is already bound by the impositions of culture, history, language, and so on, is produced at the moment representation and reception. For her, the history of photography is not the history of remarkable men or pictures, but rather the history of photographic uses. See Geoffrey Batchen, *Burning With Desire: The Conception of Photography*. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1999, pp. 5-12; Sabine T. Kriebel, "Theories of Photography: A Short History" in James Elkins (ed.), *Photography Theory*. New York and London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 32; and Abigail Solomon-Godeau, *Photography at the Dock: Essays on Photographic History, Institutions, and Practices*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.

The conceptualization of photography in such terms has many problematic aspects. To begin with, describing photography in terms of where and when it began reduces the political and cultural identity of the photograph to a story of origin. As Jacques Derrida discusses it, such a preference provides one with the opportunity of "returning 'strategically,' ideally, to an origin or to a 'priority' held to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order to then think in terms of derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc." Such a 'strategical return' enables one to avoid more philosophical questions, such as, for example, 'what is photography?' and to "circulate within concepts that are seldom criticized and move within evidence which always seems self-evident."[143]

When it comes to the accounts which discuss photography in terms of art history, on the other hand, we see that photography is being compared and contrasted with previous forms of visual representation, mainly with painting. Accordingly, it is handled by either being criticized for not being artistic enough or by attaining a higher representative power. In either case, photography is being dealt with in relation to previous picture-making forms and its characteristics are posited only in terms of such comparative terms with reference to other visual art forms where the main points of emphasis are stylistic elements. Moreover, as a result of such a linear narrativization in which photography is posited as a subsequent form of representation, we generally witness a developmental logic, photograph being an achievement of the Western culture's struggles for centuries for manual, visual and conceptual skills. According to this view, previous forms of visual representation as well as the visual forms of representations of other cultures are held as inferior to the level the Western world has attained. For example, perspective in painting was invented only in the 15th century in the West and became a norm of painting in time. Therefore, the previous forms of paintings which did not include perspective as well as the artworks created by other cultures who did not know about perspective has come to be seen as inferior to the works of art currently generated in the West. It is believed that the West has carved the way

[143] See Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976), 28, cited in Geoffrey Batchen, 'Each Wild Idea', pp. 3.

for "the 'correct' ways of viewing the world" and set the level to be attained.[144] As such, the camera and the image it produced is used as a new pedagogical instrument to teach the others how to see and to represent the world.

Finally, when it comes to postmodern scholars, we see that they have positioned themselves in opposition to formalist understanding, which perceived photography as having a gixed and autonomous identity and analyzed photography only with reference to its formal artistic elements. Believing that photography does not have a identity in itself which we can study with reference only to itself, postmodern scholars shifted the focus from a rhetoric of art to issues of function and use in politics. Consequently, in contrast to the formalists who locate photograph's identity with (its own) nature, they argue that photography should be conceptualized in relation to the culture which surrounds it. Therefore, postmodernists prefer to talk about multiple photographs in contrast to the essentialist descriptions of *the* photograph. However, Geoffrey Batchen brilliantly shows in his analysis that, postmodernist stance, despite its claims, ironically holds an essentialist understanding of photography, by identifying photography, not with nature this time, but with culture. As such, postmodernism itself, which tries to evade the binary oppositions, chooses one side of the duality to the other.[145] Other than that, postmodern scholars perceive photography as being just an other tool of power politics inherent in a culture. Therefore, they study photographs with reference to what role they play in society, what meaning certain photographs convey and what discourses they support while neglecting which others. Batchen criticizes postmodernists for having such an instrumental view of photography, for simply positing it as a vehicle for transfering power, maintaining no power of its own other than the power vested by the apparatuses which use it. Power, perceived as an

[144] Terence Wright, *The Photography Handbook*. London and New York: Routledge, 2004, pp. 2.

[145] Geoffrey Batchen, 'Burning With Desire', pp. 12-20. I should re-emphasize here that the essentialist position that Batchen discusses, which identifies photography with nature, is not limited to those scholars who handle photography in terms of the 'nature' of the medium. The 'nature'alists that he refers to encompass a broader group which sees the photographic image as an imprint, a trace of nature itself, instead of as construction. Burning with desire, 194. Batchen displays in his analysis that even the name photography (*photo*; light (sun, God, nature) and *graphy*; writing (history, humankind, culture)) includes in itself the tension and the necessity to choose between one of the 'essences' inherent in the name. Batchen, 'Burning With Desire', pp. 101.

autonomous entity, is conceptualized by postmodernists as external to photography. Photography which is imagined as operating in broader social and political forces is conceptualized as if passively waiting to be deployed with meaning from outside.[146]

I share Batchen's argument that photography "is simultaneously material and cultural, manifested as much in the attributes of the photographic object as in its contextualization."[147] In what follows, I will not provide any origin story, neither a formalist discussion of photography, nor a simple cultural outlook, as it is not my aim for this chapter to give any detailed information on these issues. Rather, my account will be one which includes both the material and the cultural dimension of photography. I will initially discuss some of the characteristics of photography, not because I assume that these features provide photography an essence, but rather because they are significant traits which will help us to understand the further discussions both in this chapter as well as in the following chapters. In this section, I will also provide a detailed look to two issues, namely, the portrait and the audience. Later, I will mention the fidelity in representation attributed to photography and the issues of truth and reality in photography, with reference to evidential nature of photography and documentary undertaking. Next, I will turn to a discussion of photography's relation to memory. I will finish this chapter by discussing the photographic project *Face2Face*'s relation to collective memory.

4.1 Photography

Geoffrey Batchen, in his own analysis of the history of photography, focuses on the emergence of a discursive regularity for a desire to photograph in the West in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Not only those whose name is mentioned with the invention of the medium, but various 'proto-photographers', as he names them, were part of a rapidly growing need, which was to end up in

[146] Geoffrey Batchen, 'Burning With Desire', pp. 188-194, 'Each Wild Idea', pp. ix.

[147] Geoffrey Batchen, 'Each Wild Idea', pp. ix.

photography, at a specific historical and cultural conjuncture.[148] When one studies the endeavours of all these proto-photographers and of Niepce, Daguerre and Talbot, one sees that their aim in constructing the medium was not to invent a brandnew mode of representation, but rather to be able to fix the images formed by the camera obscura.[149] However, even if this was not an initial aim, the invention of the medium irreversibly altered the nature of representation itself, to the extent it has transformed our perception of reality and the photograph has become synonymous with fidelity in representation. The representation that is provided by the photograph has been equated with immediacy, erasing the process of its coming into existence. The materiality of the photograph itself has generally been ignored and the photograph is almost always perceived as a window to the world, being evaluated in terms of the subject it depicts. As such, the representation that the photograph provides has been understood to be generated only by its referent. This is why Roland Barthes assumes that no matter what it grants to vision, a photograph is always invisible in the sense that it is not what we see; it is the referent that one is immediatly struck by looking at a photograph, perceiving the latter as co-natural with the former.[150]

According to Barthes, the referent of the photograph is not the same as the referent of other systems of representation because of the "emanation of *past reality*" in the photograph. What he means by this is that the referent of the photograph is of the object that is put before the camera, which makes the referent not an *optionally* real thing, but a *necessarily* real thing. As such, when we look at a photograph, and this is the *noeme* of the photograph according to Barthes, we cannot deny the fact that the object *has been there*. Hence, in the photograph, we

[148] Geoffrey Batchen, 'Burning With Desire', pp. 52.

[149] Hubert Damisch, 'Five Notes for a Phenomenology of the Photographic Image', *October*, Vol. 5, Photography, (Summer, 1978), pp. 71.

[150] Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*. trans. by. Richard Howard, London: Vintage, 2000, pp. 6, 76. According to Barthes, "the referent adheres. And this singular adherence makes it very difficult to focus on Photography.", pp. 6.

witness the superimposition of reality and of the past, from where it gains, according to Barthes, its evidential force.[151]

When we leave behind the issue of what the photographic representation refers to and turn towards a new one, that is, why people photograph and why people keep and look at photographs, i.e. what the photographic activity encompasses, it is possible to point to some motivations. It can be argued that photograph provides people with protection against time by offering them a substitute for what is no more left and by compensating the losses in their memory. Photography also contributes to the communication among people in that it provides a common ground where people can relieve past moments together. Photographic activity has also an impact of proving oneself on the part of the people who take photographs by enabling them to demonstrate their technical mastery and artistic intentions and by making them feel powerful by their own recreation. Other than that, photography gives social prestige to the taker as an evidence of personal achievement in the form of journey or event or as technical prowess. Finally, photography provides people with distraction and escape from the difficulties of the daily life.[152]

According to Susan Sontag, one of the most significant results of photogtaphic activity has been to generate an anthology of images through which we can hold the world in our heads.[153] As a result of photographic activity, we came to know the world through the images that are produced. What is the significant point in this activity is to accept the world itself as an object. The issue here is not one of building a relationship with the world by taking it as an object, but rather one of acknowledging from the very beginning that the world stands there, on its own, as an object, external to us, hiding its true essence which should be revealed with

[151] *ibid*., pp. 76,77, 88, 89.

[152] Pierre Bourdieu *et al*., *Photography: A Middle-brow Art*. trans. by Shaun Whiteside, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, pp. 14-15.

[153] Susan Sontag, *On Photography*, London: Penguin Books, 1977, pp. 3.

the photographic activity.[154] As such, instead of the world being perceived just an anthology of images, the world and anything under the sun have been seen as an object which can be captured by the camera. Such a belief leads us to think that the number of the things that can be photographed is infinite. However, Pierre Bourdieu shows that "[n]othing *may* be photographed apart from that which *must* be photographed" and as such that photographic activity cannot expand infinitely. According to him, photography cannot capture things other than those approved by social norms. The photographs of objects or persons are not perceived as things or individuals. They are rather seen as depictions of social roles. Following from here, he argues that the content of photography is limited only to the roles and subjects approved by society, and as such, cannot be unlimited.[155]

I will now provide a more detailed discussion of two subheadings which occupy a significant place in the photographic literature, namely, the portrait and the audience.

4.1.1 Portrait

The portraiture occupies a significant place in the history of photography in that, with its celebration of the individual, it coincided with the construction of the modern subject. However, at the very beginning of the photographic activity, the portrait-photograph was seen as only a possible future use of the medium, instead of being its primary aspiration.[156] This should have been mainly because of the technical inadequacy of the medium at that time, as the camera of the day required a long time of exposure to be able to fix the image. Hence, it was not possible for

[154] Jean Baudrillard, "Yokokuş Sanatı", trans. by Hüsamettin Çetinkaya, in *Fotoğraf Neyi Anlatır*. İstanbul: Hayalbaz, 2007, pp. 133.

[155] Pierre Bourdieu, 'Photography', pp. 23, 34. There have been photographic projects which contradicts Bourdieu's views. Diane Arbus, for example, photographed those people who lived on the margins of the society, those people we are not accustomed to see even their pictures, let alone encountering them in our daily life. Nevertheless, such photographic undertakings are very rare and it is true that the logic of the photographable remain within the logic of what is acceptable by the society.

[156] Geoffrey Batchen, 'Each Wild Idea', pp. 17.

people to sit for such a long time in front of the camera without moving. The solution that was found was a to put a metal clamp, hidden from the view of the camera, behind the sitter and to make the sitter's head stand still with that clamp.[157]

Having one's own portraiture, before the invention of the camera, was a luxury which was limited only to the rich. The photograph, on the other hand, enabled the different segments of the bourgeoisie's desire of equality and representation to be met. The popularization of the photographic activity, the opening up various photograph studios, the technological innovations of the subsequent years which enabled smaller prints, and, hence, lower prices, and so on, democratized the portrait-photograph further and carried the photography to the wider public.[158] Allan Sekula argues that the portrait photograph functions both *honorifically* and *repressively*. He states that the portrait photograph subverted the privilege of the bourgeoise of a ceremonial presentation of the self in the painting form and proliferated the honorific conventions downward, to other classes. But, on the other hand, the portrait was attributed a role in the medical and anatomical illustration, as well as in police records. As such, the photograph was used to establish and to delimit the other to a terrain by both defining "the generalized look," that is, the typology, and "the contingent instance of deviance and social pathology."[159] The two functions of the portraiture was both related with the belief that the face of the subject photographed revealed something about the inner self. When it comes to the honorific function, the portrait was perceived as providing the

[157] http://rleggat.com/photohistory/history/portrait.htm. Robert Leggat adds that this technique was not peculiar to photography, but was rather used in conventional portraiture, as well. Therefore, as Batchen states, in the beginning of the photographic activity, "if one wanted to look likelife in the eventual image, one had to pose as if dead." Geoffrey Batchen, *Forget Me Not: Photography and Remembrance*. Amsterdam: Van Gogh Museum; New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2004, pp. 17.

[158] Gisèle Freund, *Fotoğraf ve Toplum*. trans. by Şule Demirkol, İstanbul: Sel Yayıncılık, 2006, pp. 55-56.

[159] Allan Sekula, 'The Body and the Archive', *October*, Vol. 39 (Winter, 1986), pp. 7. This 'other' includes not only the others in a society, but also the distant others, such as the colonial subjects. Sekula further states that "in a more general, dispersed fashion, in serving to introduce the panoptic principle into daily life, photography welded the honorific and repressive functions together. Every portrait implicitly took its place within a social and moral hierarchy. The *private* moment of sentimental individuation, the look at the frozen gaze-of-the-loved-one, was shadowed by two other more *public* looks: a look up, at one's "betters," and a look down, at one's "inferiors.", pp. 10.

personality of the individual, which is reflected on facial expression and gesture, and which, thus, can be read on the surface of the photograph. However, the same process of coming to the fore of a hidden truth prevailed in the case of the portrait photographs of the persons who are thought to be members of a certain type, that type being whether a sub-section of humanity or the whole of humanity itself.[160] In that case, the portrait was used, for example, to taxonomize the ill and the insane, to make a chart of the criminal, to classify the distant other, or else, to display the common humanity in all subjects despite their differences as is the case in exhibitons such as *The Family of Man*, and so on.

Consequently, we can say that the portrait photograph is an undertaking which plays with the double sense of the term 'subject,' celebrating, on the one hand, the sovereignty of the individual, and pointing, on the other hand, to being subject to a normalizing discourse.

4.1.2 Audience

When dealing with photography, one cannot overlook the issue of reception. The reception of the photograph is significant as much as its production, circulation and uses in determining the image's meaning, importance and value. The photograph is rendered meaningful by its audience. More than that, the photograph is meant for an audience.

The audience of each photograph is different. The content and the form of the photograph determines the audience of the work. The audience of a photograph which is shown in an art gallery is not necessarily the same as of a picture shown in a newspaper. This is why Martha Rosler defines the audience as a "shifting entity whose composition depends not only on who is out there but on whom you want to reach with a particular type of work, and why."[161]

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[160] Celia Lury, *Prosthetic Culture: Photography, Memory and Identity*. London and New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 46.

[161] Martha Rosler, *Decays and Disruptions: Selected Writings, 1975-2001*. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 2004, pp. 28.

The intelligibility of the photograph is historical; the same photograph can be interpreted differently by audiences of different periods of time. As such the photographic process of representation is never totally complete.[162] Moreover, it depends on the viewer's acquiantance with the signs of visual representation. The photograph, because of the belief in its fidelity in representation, is generally equated with a universal language. However, this is not really the case as different cultures have different systems of visual representation. The perspective, for example, which is believed to enhance the objectivity of the image, is a peculiarly Western invention and is not necessarily copied by other cultures. Henceforth, each and every photograph is generated according to a certain system of representation, which will be intelligible only to those who are familiar with it. Furthermore, the reception of a photograph is contingent upon the knowledge provided by the image, such as political, aesthetic, cultural and so on. As such, the photograph seems to be presenting itself to the look of several people which might co-exist in one single individual. Still, the knowledge invested in the image will be meaningfull for only those viewer who have information about it.[163]

The content of the image does not guarantee in any way how the audience will respond. Those photographs with a social dimension, such as documentary photographs, for example, who are meant to result in a certain reaction in the viewer does not necessarily end up like this. Whereas the viewer might be expected to take on action as a result of a photograph, for example, the viewer might not feel such a necessity and might rather content oneself with simply admitting that the incorrigible exists.[164]

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[162] Terence Wright, 'The Photography Handbook', pp. 84.

[163] Roland Barthes, *Image Music Text*. Trans. by Stephen Heath, London: Fontana Press, 1977, pp. 46.

[164] Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*. London: Penguin Books, 2003, pp. 88.

4.2 Truth and Objectivity

One of the most common beliefs concerning photography, since its very invention, has been that it is a record of reality. As such, the photographic representation has been held as if synonymous with truth and objectivity. As I have already mentioned, the photograph is stated to refer to the past reality of a thing, its *having-been-there*. This supposedly evidential nature of the photograph, which offers the proof of the existence of that thing in the past, has been taken as its truth value. However, what is generally overlooked in this relationship between photography and realism is that the photograph, instead of recording reality, indeed changed the very idea of realism itself by becoming the norm for the way we see things around us;[165] a limited view of the things around us put in a frame and reduced in two dimensions has become the criteria of realism. It is true that in today's world the belief in the photograph's ability to represent the world objectively has decreased, mainly as a result of the wider acquiantance with the fact that photographs might be manipulated and of the widespread existence of digital images, some of which being completely fictious, having been generated with the help of computers. The belief in the objectivity of the camera was, therefore, more prevelant in the years following the invention of the medium. But still, even today, the belief in the photograph's objectivity has not been completely erased and we still take photographs, especially those with a social dimension, such as news photography, war photography, documentary photography, and so on, as depicting reality objectively.

The main reason for this coinage of photography with objectivity is that it is through mechanical means, the camera, that the photographic image comes into existence. Earlier forms of visual representation, the painting being the main, was highly dependent upon its creator. The photograph, on the other hand, which was invented at an era in which positivism held sway, was perceived as exempt from any influence and deficiency of the human agency and, as such, was seen as a neutral medium of representation. The photograph was believed to come into

[165] Susan Sontag, 'On Photography', pp. 87.

existence with the click of the shutter of the camera. Such a correspondance erases the process of its making and the existence of its maker and the photograph apperas to be self-generated, to be creating itself.[166]

This mechanical nature of the medium coincided with the conceptualization of the notion of truth itself. Truth has been perceived as that which is beyond representation, as an idealization of pure thought itself, which is beyond any mediation, any language and any frames of space, time or culture. The solution to the question how can truth be grasped if it is beyond representation was historically seen to be in the realm of language; not the written language, but the spoken language, as Derrida has displayed, which was thought as a purer, and hence, truer expression of thought than the written language which is considered as inevitably derivative, as a sign of a sign. This is because of the emphasis put on non-mediation for the expression of reality that the photographic medium, since its invention, has been accorded a truth-value. As the camera did not mediate in generating the representation, it was thought that it was the objects, the nature which was leaving their imprint on the photographic paper.[167]

Today, we might not believe that nature, when captured by the camera, is living a trace of itself on paper. We might find the argument, articulated in the nineteenth century, that photography was a "species of natural writing, by God's own hand with the very fingers of his light"[168] as a naive belief. We might laugh at those nineteenth-century figures in the West who were afraid of the photograph because they believed that the act of photographing captured a layer of their soul and turned it into a print. We might call those tribesman, those who were shown their own photographs by Western psychologists to understand how they

[166] Martha Rosler, 'Decays and Disruptions', pp. 224. André Bazin asserts that "a]ll the arts are based on the presence of man, only photography derives an advantage from his absence." André Bazin, 'The Ontology of the Photographic Image', trans. by Hugh Gray, *Film Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 4. (Summer, 1960), pp. 7.

[167] Scott McQuire, *Visions of Modernity: Representation, memory, time and space in the age of camera*. London: Sage Publications, 1998, pp. 30 and Cornelia Brink, 'Secular Icons: Looking at Photographs from Nazi Concentration Camps', *History & Memory*, Vol. 12, No. 1, (Spring/Summer 200), pp. 139.

[168] Scott McQuire, 'Visions of Modernity', pp. 31.

understood them, primitive as they have perceived their pictures as stolen spirits.[169] We might not trust the camera just because it is a machine; we might be well aware of the involvement of the human agency in this mechanical act as we know that someone took a certain photograph and chose a specific framing and angle. All of these might not be our criteria today for believing in the objectivity of the photograph. But still, even today, it is very easy to forget that photographs are interpretations, rather than statements of the world. Even if we might be acquianted with the idea that photographs are the points of view of the photographer, it is easy to fall into the trap of seeing them as records of reality.

The main reason for such a delusion is that in photograph there is an overlap between the eye of the photographer, of the camera and of the spectator[170] and when one sees a photograph one can easily think that the print is just like what that person would see if he/she had been there. Therefore, the reason why we believe in the reality of the photograph is that we believe in the existence of a pre-photographic reality. When we look at a photograph and think that the naturalness of the world has been captured by the camera, we tend to forget that the things shown by the camera are objects which are already in use in the production of meaning and that photography has no other option than operating upon them.[171] Henceforth, without problematizing the 'naturalness' of the things we see around us, we believe in the reality of the photograph which shows things 'as they are.' But, more than that, we still perceive photographs as depicting reality because we are taught so. Even if they are not apparent, the realist photograph has its own formal rules. We have a difficult time in accepting the reality of a photograph taken from a queer angle, for example, or one that is highly aestheticized, being one of the most articulated criticisms for documentary photography. The photographs that appear to us as real have certain formal rules such as choosing a straight rectangular frame and a frontal view, which we are not aware of anymore. We have forgotten that the reality of a photograph is

[169] Terence Wright, 'The Photography Handbook', pp. 173.

[170] Abigail Solomon-Godeau, 'Photography at the Dock', pp. 180.

[171] Victor Burgin, "Photographic Practice and Art Theory" in Victor Burgin (ed.), *Thinking Photography*. London: Macmillan, 1982, pp. 47.

not generated automatically, but rather is a result of cultural convention, that this reality effect of the photograph has been brought into existence by certain institutions and by their use of the photograph for certain purposes.

The belief that the photograph portrays reality objectively also has the consequence of seeing it as a form of universal language. Acquiantance with the formal strategies of visual representation, to the extent of not being aware of them anymore, results in a misjudgement that every person in the whole world will understand a photograph in the same manner. The fact that the way different cultures might perceive the world around them differently, that the things around us might be deployed with different meanings and that the way different people might choose to represent them might show discrepancies are forgotten for the sake of a wholehearted belief that the photograph depicts reality. Henceforth, the photograph might be seen as another tool of the West for superimposition on and homogenization of other cultures.

I will now turn to a brief discussion of two subjects in which the truth value of the photograph is highly praised; namely, the use of the photograph as an evidence and the documentary photography.

4.2.1 The Photograph as Evidence

Barthes's discussion of the *having-been-there* nature of the photographic representation implies the idea that evidentiality has an ontological relation to the medium. However, photography's construction as an evidence is a result of complex historical relations. It is at the time of photography's invention that we should look for the construction of this relation.

The invention and proliferation of photography coincides with the endeavours of consolidating the capitalist state, which necessitated the restructuring of the whole society. Such a reconstruction was based on the establishment of a "new regime of truth" and was realized by the application of "microphysics of power," both aiming to create a docile and obedient society required by capitalism for the orderly operation of everday life. The necessity for surveillance of the

society entailed the production of a new kind of knowledge, which in turn generated new forms of power.

The nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of new disciplines or the significant transformation of already existing ones, such as pscyhology, psychiatry, physiology, biology, anatomy, criminology, sociology and so on. All these disciplines took the body as their domain of expertise and carried investigations on and about it. The investigations resulted in the generation of new forms of power. These developments were also accompanied by the emergence and reconstruction of new disciplinary institutions, such as the prison, the factory, the schools, the asylum, hospitals and so on.[172] Photography played a significant role in the tasks conducted by these disciplines and institutions; it provided the experts with an archive of an entire social terrain, individuals positioned within it.[173] For example, the photograph started to be used by the police force as an identification for the criminals and as the records of the events later to be used as proof. It also helped the experts to make a photographic archive of a typology of people such as the criminal, the ill, the insane, and so on.[174] The colonized other was also a part of this attempt of classifying people, as the anthropologists started to use photography as to document their study on these people. Consequently, the photograph used by these institutions provided a proof for the tasks they were conducting. The knowledge gained through these photographs also generated justification for new forms of power.

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[172] John Tagg, *The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories*. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988, pp. 5,6 and Scott McQuire, 'Visions of Modernity', pp. 37.

[173] Allan Sekula, 'The Body and the Archive', pp. 10.

[174] This endeavour was influenced by physiogynamy and phreneology, which emerged in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, respectively, and which believed that we could understand the inner character of an individual by looking at the surface of his/her body. Physiognomy focused on the profile of the head and on the various parts of the face, such as the forehead, eyes, ears, nose, chin, and so on, and believed that we could make generalizations about the characters of individuals by looking at a loose concatenation of these features. Phrenology, on the other hand, analyzed the impact of the topography of the skull in the mental faculties of the individual. *ibid*., pp. 10-11.

Today, we might not be using a photograph as an evidence of a typology of people with certain features, at least not overtly. But photograph still plays a very significant role as evidence. It is still used by the police as an identification for the criminal and as a record of crime scene. It is used in the courts as proofs. It is used to show how a certain event happened and how it looked afterwards.

Naming a photograph as an evidence renders the medium as a transparent depiction of reality, as if the way we perceive the world and its photographic representation are one and the same. It also renders it transparent in the sense that the institutions that provide these photograph display them in certain contexts and put them forward by charging it with a certain truth value. As such, we tend to see them as a truthful representations of a certain reality. We will, for example, immediatly recognize an individual, who is represented with a typical frontal photograph of police record, with a number adhered to his/her hand, as a criminal. Apart from that, the photograph does not become an evidence of something by itself. In order to be seen as an evidence, the thing that it shows should be first named as an event. Such namings are always ideological.[175] The truth-value of a photograph as an evidence is generated when we forget to problematize the naming of event and the context where the picture is displayed and when we forget that the photograph is always a *re*-presentation, a reconstruction.

4.2.2 Documentary Photography

Documentary photography is another arena where the truth-value of the photograph is emphasized and where the reality effect of the picture is acknowledged by the viewers almost without questioning. Documentary photography refers to that photographic activity which is factual and which carries a humanistic motive, the camera being pointed towards that part of the world which is not as lucky as those who have the luxury of looking at those photographs. It is the kind of picture-taking activity in which the *having-been-there* nature of the photographed is hoped to result in the insertion of ameliorative measures.

[175] Susan Sontag, 'On Photography', pp. 19.

The evidential nature of the photograph is also significant in documentary photography in that it visually proves that a certain event has taken place, and as such, makes the event more real. Through these photographs, we are ensured of the conditions of the rest of the world, of the everday reality of certain peoples' lives. The documentary photography, it is said, serves the function of explaining man to man, of providing understanding and tolerance towards the people whose conditions are worse than ours.[176] However, the way this is realized is not neutral at all, as it is believed.

To begin with, the documentary photography is built upon the logic of providing information about the powerless to the powerful, powerful in the sense of not being subjected to the same bad conditions. Hence, the documentary undertaking is a reproduction of class and ethnical differences. We should add that the powerlessness of those who are photographed does not only generate from the fact that they live under certain conditions which worsen their lives, but also from the fact that they are only displayed in the middle of these conditions, uncapable of altering them through struggle.[177] The portrayal of the powerless is thus realized by representing them as passive subjects, incapable of speaking or acting, but only of being looked at, although the discourse that accompanies these photographs is giving voice to these people, avoiding the questions of who is giving and what is the gift. The people on the images remain unheard in that they are made to be part of a certain narrative involuntarily. Furthermore, there exists certain formal strategies for documentary photography. For example, Trinh T. Minh-Ha points to the fact that the documentary practice of the so-called primitives represented these people with 'straight', frontal images, which is different from the way metropolitan people are photographed, and asks whether this difference in representation a sign of the respect for the other, or whether of a compliance with the discourse of the master, who defines the other as different in the first place, and henceforth, of concealment

[176] *ibid*., pp. 111.

[177] Martha Rosler, 'Decays and Disruptions', pp. 15
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of complicity with power under the guise of respect.[178] This act of representing the other as different involves the act of representing all others as the same. Erasing their individual differences and also the discrepancies in their conditions or in the reasons of their conditions, all those people are portrayed as if a big unlucky family. The faces fade away, only a certain perspective remains. When one tries to recall the documentary photographs concerning Africa, for example, one will not be able to bring to his/her mind a certain photograph, but rather a general one in which a naked mother is shown with a baby in her arms and a couple of naked children around her, with dirt around the body, all looking back at the camera, no matter what the subject matter of the photograph is, such as war, or famine, or a disease. As a result, such iconic images come to represent certain parts of the world for us. Other than all of these, the documentary photograph does not explain the reasons of the deprivations these people are exposed to; it just shows them. We, as spectators, are expected to look at those photographs and weep in the face of them; we do not question who caused these injustices in the first place.[179] More than this, we also forget that we are not shown all the injuries and injustices in the world, but only some of them, those that do not threaten our own conditions or oppose to our own ideology.[180]

The documentary photograph is locked in a paradox. The documentary undertaking has presented itself as operating beyond the systems of representation of the status quo. Despite this fact, the activity of documentary photography is in conformity with the very system which it aims to transcend. The representations of

[178] Scott McQuire, 'Visions of Modernity', pp. 136, taken from Trinh Minh-Ha.

[179] John Hutnyk, 'Photogenic Poverty: Souvenirs and Infantilism', *Journal of Visual Culture*, Vol 3, No. 1 (2004), pp. 80.

[180] I should add here as a disclaimer that we should not charge documentary photography off completely, as at certain cases the crucial point is the availability of image. It is true that most of the images produced under the heading of documentary photography falls within the rationale I have just described above. However, at some other cases, documentary photography turns out to be a crucial undertaking as it provides us with images from parts of the world about which we have no information. Documentary photography can bring to daylight images of sufferings and miseries which are kept as a secret, such as, for example, in totalitarian images. Therefore, documentary photography is a very crucial undertaking when the issue of availability of image comes to the forefront.

the documentary photography results not in revolutionary politics whatsoever; the images that it produces does not end up with the undertaking of any realistic act of changing the conditions of the injustices. The availability of a vast of amount of documentary photograph only increases familiarity with grievances of others, making them look ordinary, comforting us of our own situation. Documentary photography does not end up in people's taking action. I think that there are two main reasons for this. First of all, these photographs which are supposed to convey discomfort in us and motivation for action fail to do so because the photographs are evidence of the fact that someone else, the photographer, has judged and reflected for us, and has acted instead of us; what is left to us is not action, but simply acknowledgment.[181] Second, the documentary photograph still remains within the logic of what it tries to opposes as it aims for a 'truer' representations of the facts of life, those which we are not shown by those who are in power; it fights for truth, in favour truth. By doing so, it ignores the fact that truth is itself produced by a certain political, economic and institutional regime; it does not problematize the construction of what we understand of 'truth'and the separation existing in our societies between 'true' and 'false' representations. That is, instead of fighting for the possibility of constructing a new politics of truth, it remains and works within the existing regime of truth.[182] It is at this point that we might introduce Bertolt Brecht and Walter Benjamin's belief about how to transform documentary photography into a political tool. Brecht and Benjamin think that reproducing reality does not say anything about that reality and that therefore the photograph should be something constructed, something set up.[183] As I have already mention, the camera is turned towards a world which is already constructed by values and meanings, which we understand as reality. Reproducing this reality means remaining within the borders of the regime of truth which creates that reality. Although the aim of these reproductions of this reality is, this time, to call for

[181] David Levi Strauss, *Between the Eyes: Essays on Photography and Politics*. New York: Aperture; London: Thames & Hudson, 2005, pp. 81.

[182] John Tagg, 'The Burden of Representation', pp. 61.

[183] Abigail Solomon-Godeau, 'Photography at the Dock', pp. 182-183, 188.

action, it fails to do so, because what these photographs achieve is ensuring us of the existence of certain injustices, which we are well aware without seeing the photographs as well. The documentary photograph provides us with a visual evidence of the atrocities taking place somewhere, and that's all.

We should also keep in mind that documentary photography, which is built as a genre in 1920s, became popular and was consolidated during the developing state liberalism and consequent reform movements in the early twentieth century. One of the most popular documentary undertakings in the history of documentary photography is surely that of the Farm Security Administration's (FSA) mobilized by New Deal agencies in 1930s in order to photograph the urban populations of the north and east in order to reveal how they have been influenced by the existing economic crisis. FSA turned 'poverty' and 'deprivation' into both the target and instrument of their undertaking and produced photographs which were to be used for surveillance, transformation and control, as the rhetoric behind that documentary activity was to consolidate and to legitimize the measures which were taken by New Deal agencies by making poverty and social disintegration visible in conformity with the reformism of the paternal philanthropic state.[184] Therefore, we should not forget that documentary photography is used in order to convey a certain truth and objectivity for certain purposes. This truth and objectivity, on the other hand, have always remained within a liberal sentimentalist ideology and, hence, eradicated any possibility of taking up action to destroy this liberal ideology.

4.3 Photography and Memory

As I have already mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, the past does not transform itself into memory, but rather it should be represented in a certain form to become memory. There are various tools for such a representation, but photography, perceived as embodying the memory of the past in itself, has been conceptualized as perhaps *the* best form for such an articulation. Photography, coming into existence in an era in which the past felt to be under the threat of

[184] John Tagg, 'The Burden of Representation', pp. 13-14, 173-174.

erasure because of the sense of accelaration of time, was immediatly coined with memory and was embraced as a saver. The relationship between memory and photography has always been thought as a direct and immediate one, to the extent that photographs have been seen as "non-verbal narratives of the past."[185] The photograph, who portrays the past reality, the *having-been-there* of things, has been held to bear testimony to the past and to carry this past to us in a visual form. The belief in the absence of agency and mediation in the production of photography also enhances its significance as a memory tool. Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing a couple of decades after the invention of photography, has called it the " mirror with a memory," the mirror as a metaphor implying the passive, unmediated nature of photographic representation.[186] Photography was handled as if there was a resemblance between the images appearing slowly on the photographic paper and things, previously forgotten, coming to mind.[187]

We encounter this coinage between memory and photography in various parts of life. It is because of this assumed relationship that such a thing as family albums exists. We keep the photographs of the loved ones, carry them with us in our wallets. Others collect photographs of unknown people to create for themselves an album of memory of a certain period in history. We encounter photographs in museums. Archives are full of them. Newspapers and magazines display them occasionally. And so on.

Some prominent scholars disclaimed that there existed a relationship between memory and photography and even suggested that they were in opposition to each other. Siegfried Kracauer, for example, claimed that photography,

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[185] Alison M. Moore, 'History, Memory and Trauma in Photography of the *Tondues*: Visuality of the Vichy Past through the Silent Image of Women', in Patricia Hayes (ed.), *Visual Genders, Visual Histories*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 141.

[186] Joan M. Schwartz, "*Un Beau Souvenir du Canada*: Object, image, symbolic space" in Elizabeth Edwards and Janice Heart (eds), *Photographs Objects Histories: On the materiality of images*. London and New York: Routledge, 2004, pp. 18. The reason why Holmes use the word 'mirror' is that he was talking about the photographic practice in terms of daguerretype, which has a highly reflective silvered surface.

[187] Kutz Koepnick, 'Photographs and Memories', *South Central Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 111.

corresponding to the historicist thinking which emerged at about the same time, contradicts memory. According to him, photography and historicism both refer to a continuum, the first to a spatial one whereas the second to a temporal one and, hence, oppose to memory which neither corresponds to the whole temporality of an event, nor to its entire spatiality. He asserts that photography and historicism encompasses everything in the past without discrimination whereas memory is full of gaps; one does not remember the past in a continuum, but instead holds single images whose selection might seem arbitrary, but whose presence are meaningful, relevant and significant to the person. He further states that as time passes and as we are temporally more and more distanced from the things that are portrayed in the photograph, the semiotic value of the photograph decreases as it is not possible anymore to draw reference to the original; those who have not encountered themselves the things depicted in the photograph will not be able to render the picture meaningful or to embrace the meaning presented to them fully.[188]

Another scholar who denies the relationship between photography and memory is Roland Barthes. It is true that it was Barthes who emphasized that photographs depicted a past reality, that they ensured us that a certain thing existed in the past and was placed in front of the lens. But it is this characteristic of the photography, according to Barthes, which is not in conformity with memory, to the extent of becoming tools of counter-memory. According to him, the photograph directs us to certainty, not to memory. To put it more rightly, by only providing us with dull certainties of the past, the photograph blocks the way leading to memory. As he himself states, "on each occasion *it fills the sight by force*, and . . . in it nothing can be refused or transformed."[189]

To start with the arguments of Kracauer, I think that throughout his article, he is able to find examples to support his very particular arguments and that the final destinations that he reaches is very much in conformity with from where starts.

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[188] Siegfried Kracauer, 'Photography', trans. by Thomas Y. Levin, *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Spring, 1993), pp. 425, 429. The spatial continuity that he refers to involves capturing an object as a spatial continuum from any one of a number of positions., pp. 428.

[189] Roland Barthes, 'Camera Lucida', pp. 91, original emphasis.

However, I think that his points of departures that are mistaken. According to historicism, we can reach the meaning of the past through following each temporal sequence that led to certain events. Photography, however, does not provide us such a sequential path to follow. Indeed, I think that photographs very much resemble the memory-images that Kracauer discusses in that they are the representations of the single moments that are chosen arbitrarily and that, as such, they are very much alike with memory in terms of the way they keep traces of the past. Moreover, although Kracauer associates historicism and photography with continuum and memory with gaps, I think that no matter how arbitrarily one is able to keep in his/her mind the images of the past, these images still have to refer to a continuum in order to be meaningful. This point is indeed what renders memory-images that Kracauer discusses more powerful than photographs in providing a meaning about the past; memory-images stand in our minds, not as snapshots floating in the dark on their own, but as a continuum of a before and after of the images and in a context. If that was not the case, that is, if they did not refer to a coninuum and a context, than they would have nothing to do with memory, becoming only flashbacks of the past about whose meaning we could not be sure. The photographs, on the other hand, being single snapshots do not possess such a continuity and context on their own. Nevertheless, the photograph and memory do not have a contradictory relationship in terms of what Kracauer asserts.

With regards to the argument of Barthes, on the other hand, we should pay attention to what kind of memory he is talking about when he is refuting its relationship with photography. In his discussion of memory, Barthes follows the distinction made by Marcel Proust in *Remembrance of Things Past* between voluntary and involuntary memory. It is this second type of memory that Barthes is refering to in his discussion; the kind of memory which is more sensual, coming suddenly out of nowhere and haunting us, being triggered by the encounters of everday experience in the form of smell, taste, sound, and so on. Therefore, limiting memory only to the sensory and instanteneous dimension and blaming the photograph for not being able to meet up the criteria of this kind of memory, Barthes disclaims any relationship between them. Nevertheless, it is again from his

writings on photography that we can find the traces of the existence of such a relationship. In *Camera Lucida*, Barthes introduces two terms for the discussion of the elements of the photograph: *studium* and *punctum*. To describe them briefly, the *studium* refers to that element in the photograph which refers to a cultural body of information; the viewer will be able to recognize it immediatly as a consequence of his/her membership to the culture. The *studium* is intelligible to every viewer of a photograph who is familiar with the culture. *Punctum*, on the other hand, is that element which punctuates the *studium*. It is that 'detail' which disturbs and bruises the viewer. The *studium*, according to Barthes, is always coded whereas the *punctum* is not. The *punctum* is that element which we cannot name, which is a good sign for Barthes, because if we could name it, than it would not prick us anymore. The *punctum* has the power of expansion in the sense that it is what we, as viewers, add to the photograph by means of 'thinking-eye', but which is already there. As the *punctum* is a detail, a partial object in the photograph, giving examples of *punctum* is, according to Barthes, giving oneself up.[190] This is the introduction of the term *punctum* which relates memory to photography. As I have already mentioned, Barthes claims that memory and photography were in opposition to each other because the photograph, providing us frozen images of the past, cannot direct us to memory. In discussing the relationship between memory and photography, he does not pay attention to photography's ability to expand, to stimulate our 'thinking-eye,' to evoke memories about things which are already in the photograph but which we add to them. Barthes's term, the *punctum*, I suggest, is that relationship between memory and photography. It seems that it is because he does not acknowledge initially that the photograph does lead us to imagination that he considers it as blocking memory. The photograph, however, does not remain limited only to that time that it was taken; it rather allows the viewer to wander around

[190] *ibid*., pp. 25-55. In the latter part of the book, the punctum starts to refer, for Barthes, to the 'that-has-been' character of the photograph. As he himself puts it,"the *punctum* is: *he is going to die*. I read at the same time: *This will be* and *this has been*.. Whether or not the subject is already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe." pp. 96.

anytime of the entire life-span of the thing photographed, be it a person, an object or an event.[191]

Although there are some people who remain suspicious about the link between memory and photography, what photography has indeed achieved was to transform what we understand from memory, as well as history and has done this in two ways. First of all, the photograph has become what we remember instead of being the medium through which we remember. Remembering a certain thing of the past has almost become not being able to call up a story but to recall a picture.[192] For example, there exist certain iconic photographs which themselves made history and which came to our mind immediatly when we try to remember those events, such as the photograph of migrant mother, surrounded by her children, of the execution of a Vietcong suspect by a soldier, or of the children fleeing a napalm attack.[193] Therefore, some photographs, more than becoming the iconic representations of certain events, have become what we remember first when we try to remember those events. Secondly, it altered our conception of memory and history by blurring the distinction between description and direct perception. The past is what is far from our perception and which has to be reconstructed in a certain form in order to be accessible. This reconstruction, whether in the form of analysis or explanation, whether official or popular, is, as Hayden White suggests, "an analysis or explanation of the events as previously *described*."[194] The photograph has been perceived as destroying this process of re-description and as providing instead direct perception. Moreover, this shift has also meant a shift from 'experts' to ordinary people in the telling of the past, not in the sense of rendering the former obsolete, but in the sense of making the latter also significant. As the photograph

[191] Thierry de Duve, 'Time Exposure and Snapshot: The Photograph as Paradox', *October*, Vol. 5, Photography, (Summer, 1978), pp. 123.

[192] Susan Sontag, 'Regarding the Pain of Others', pp. 80.

[193] Cornelia Brink, 'Secular Icons', pp. 137. The photographs mentioned here are as follows: Dorothea Lange, *Migrant Mother*, Nipoma, California, 1936. Eddie Adams, *General Loan Executing a Vietcong Suspect*, February 1, 1968. Huynh Cong (Nick) Ut, *Children fleeing a napalm strike*, June 8, 1972.

[194] Scott McQuire, 'Visions of Modernity', pp. 132-133.

provided direct perception, it was believed, we could tell the story of the past by looking at those photographs.

What we should problematize is not whether there really exists a relationship between memory and photography, but rather the nature of this relationship. Since its invention, the photograph has been taken as having an immediate, natural relationship to memory. What we should look at, I suggest, is not the ontological roots of this relationship. We should rather focus on how this relationship is built and how it is made to look natural.

What we should be aware of first and foremost is that no photograph has a memory of its own. Memory is not recorded by the photograph, but rather expressed through it.[195] Photographs are not direct translations of memory, but are rather constructed to refer to certain memories. It is by the backing-up by certain narratives and discourses that we perceive certain photographs to endow certain memories. However we tend to forget this as we believe in the photograph's fidelity in reflecting reality. We tend to see photographs to speak for themselves and easily forget that they rather "speak for whatever agenda mysteriously results from their unique unexplained reproduction."[196] Such a problematic approach is a continuation of the belief that photographs provide direct perception, overriding the act of re-description. However, we ignore that photographs are placed to conform the accounts previously described. As such, the photograph does not render re-description obsolete, but rather is placed in it.

Moreover, we encounter photographs in certain contexts. The context has the power of changing the meaning of a photograph. The encounter with the same photograph on a newspaper, on a gallery wall or in a history book does not end up with the yielding of the same reaction on the part of the viewer. The context is what affects the way we perceive the content of the photographs in the first place. Therefore, a photograph seen in a history book or a memoir might lead us to see it as refering to a certain memory, whereas the same photograph hanged on a gallery

[195] Martha Langford, *Scissors, Paper, Stone: Expressions of Memory in Contemporary Photographic Art*. Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007, pp. 3.

[196] Alison M. Moore, 'History, Memory and Trauma' pp. 144.

wall might be just another example of the possibility of photographic act. The same photograph might also be used to arouse different memories according to the context within which it is provided; a photograph of a past atrocity, for example, might mean for a certain group as an embodiment of their traumatic memories, whereas for another group it might refer to their glorious memories of victory. The meaning of a certain photograph is not ahistorical either. A old photograph of a person whom we do not know, for example, might cause us to remember things such as clothing, adorning specific to a certain age, whereas that same photograph was sured used by someone at some point of history to remember a specific person.

The belief in the 'natural' relationship between photography and memory leads us to forget that photographs are used to support only certain memories. The events of the past come to be associated with the circulation and repeated reproduction of only some photographs, misleading us to believe that the narrative that is told through these photographs is the only possible one. Those photographs which would threaten the meaning ascribed to certain events and, hence, the memories associated with them, are kept out of view. People are shown only those photographs which are in conformity with what they are taught to remember. Moreover, the photograph, by its very nature, is the representation of a one single moment. As this single moment is taken as if to represent the whole, we see the photograph as the incarnation of the totality of event, neglecting the complexities and differences that might have taken in that event. Therefore, while imagining a relationship between photography and memory, we forget the politics of memory inherent in the process and the use of photography in its service.

What is more, the direct relationship drawn between memory and photography has been built upon the assumption that looking at those pictures, the viewers will all remember the same thing about the past. The photographs are taken as if there is only one way of experiencing them. We should not forget that the official and popular narratives and the photographs in circulation are not the only way to remember the past. There also exist various written and oral narratives and also personal experiences which help people to keep track of the past. As such, although they might remain a minority, certain people's memory of the past might

be different than those provided to them by official and popular discourse. Henceforth, when these people will face those photographs which are aimed to result in a certain way to remember the past, they might experience it in a totally opposite way. That is why although photographs, seen to be tools in the service of social coherence as they will provide only one single narrative and one single way of experiencing them, they might also result in social division.[197]

Although there exists an agreement on the relationship between memory and photography in terms of the latter's support for the former, there exists some sort of controversy on the nature of this relationship. Despite the fact that the photograph is believed to connect the past and the present, that is, the events of the past and our experience of seeing the visual evidence of those events in the present, there is disagreement on the nature of this connection. On the one hand, photographs, freezing the past in the picture form, are believed to protect the present from the horrors of the past. On the other hand, however, there is the argument that, although they are things from the past and far from the present, their capacity to be seen, through reproduction and circulation, any time and anywhere, refers to 'a past that will not pass.' Therefore, there is this unresolved dualist approach in terms of whether photographs lead one to have a memory of the past which remains secure in not threatening today, or whether they cause one not to be able to leave things behind and to go through the past in the present and in the future, never remaining in a convenient distance from the horrors of a previous time.[198] The controversy, we can say, is therefore about whether the photographs help us to support our memories by ensuring us of the pastness of the past or whether by reminding us that the past is never past enough.

Finally, we should pay attention to the fact that the relationship between photography and memory has always been imagined in terms of the former's supporting the other. It has been neglected that photographs can also create memories that we did not have prior to seeing the images. This can be done in two

[197] Steve Edwards, *Photography: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 125.

[198] Alison M. Moore, 'History, Memory and Trauma', pp. 159.

days. Some new photographs can be taken from the archives and be brought to daylight. Encountering new photographs of an event which we have been familiar so far with the representation of only some pictures might lead us to remember those aspects that we have forgotten. Or else, photographs might help us to create memories of events that we did not experience ourselves, that, perhaps, we were not born yet at the time those events took place. This issue can be clarified with the help of a concept generated by Marianne Hirsch; that of 'post-memory,' which I have briefly mentioned in the previous chapter. Hirsch has introduced this concept in order to be able to discuss the memories of traumatic events that are held by people who did not experience these events themselves, but who hold strong memories about them anyway as they grew up dominated by the narratives about that event. Post-memory refers to those memories which are not experienced personally, but which are rather transferred from somewhere else. The term, which was initially coined for the familial context, was later used for discussions at a collective and cultural level. I think that this term can also be used to understand the relationship between photography and memory of things we had not gone through. Looking at those photographs which have become the iconic representations of certain events and being exposed to certain narratives about the meaning of those events might result for us in the creation of memories that we did not have previously. From another point of view, we can even claim that every relationship drawn between a specific photography and a memory that it carries fall under this logic. As I have already mentioned, photographs do not carry themselves memories but rather are deployed with them; therefore, our recognition of a photograph as the embodiment of a certain memory is a result of a process of transference in which we are taught the meanings and memories a photograph refers to. Other than supporting or creating memories, photographs can also contradict our memories when we face photographs who challenge a certain of the past. Finally, photographs can also erase memories that are not photographed.

4.4 *Face2Face* and Collective Memory

The photographs that are associated with memory and that I have discussed so far are those which are taken during the course of events, which refer, although in a constructed manner, to a certain 'reality.' They have a 'factual' basis. The photographic project *Face2Face*, on the other hand, does not aim to represent a visual evidence to what has happened. In that sense, the photographs which are the concerns of this thesis are those that are fictive, in the sense that their representation does not refer to a 'reality existing out there.' They are rather constructions which aim at presenting us that the world we are living in is not the only possible one. They are undertakings which rearrange things, objects, people, and so on, in such a manner as to offer us a perspective which is strange to us only because it is what we are not wanted to see. They are the photographs which do not remain within the truth regime of the culture in which they are produced. They rather work to subvert them.

That a photograph does not refer to a reality which once existed out there does not mean that it does not have a relationship to memory. There are various photographers who construct images in order to refer to the memories of the past events. At the end of the previous chapter, I have stated that experiencing an event and remembering it in representation are different things. I have claimed that the gap that exists between these two, instead of being ignored or condemned, can be taken as the potential place for cultural and artistic creativity. The photographers that I am talking about are those that are using this place creatively, to the extent of influencing the way we remember the past in the first place.

The photographic project *Face2Face*, on the other hand, does not take into account the concept of collective memory. It does not aim at altering the way the past is remembered. As I have already stated, it is rather interested in the present and in the future. It tries to intervene into the way the two communities identify each other by providing them with an unfamiliar image of the other side. As such, it hopes to be carving the way for the emergence of a peaceful dialogue in the future. Therefore, this photographic project is centered around the concepts of dialogue and

representation. As I have already discussed, by grounding itself upon these two concepts, it fails to pay attention to the various dimensions which shape the contemporary Israeli and Palestinian identities and to the fact that the present of both communities are very much shaped by their past. This is, I think, the tender point of the project. As it does not pay attention to the collective memories of the two communities and as it neglects issues such as diaspora, nostalgia and home which are significant dimensions of these communities' self-definition as well as of the reasons of the enmity between them, the project misses the history of the enmity between the two communities. It rather takes the enmity for granted, without questioning its reasons, and focuses upon altering the way the other side is constructed and represented so that a peaceful dialogue can emerge between them.

CHAPTER V

ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN COLLECTIVE MEMORIES

A victim is defined by *Oxford English Dictionary* as "one who is reduced or destined to suffer under some oppressive or destructive agency." The victim is indeed an individual identity-position. However, we also encounter this label being extended to certain communities to describe that they have been the sufferers of another community's actions. In some cases, on the other hand, a certain community grants itself the status of victim. Victimhood might seem as an odd preference to build one's community around, as it looks like a negative term at first sight, putting the emphasis on the powerlessness and helplesness of the community in question. Nevertheless, the concept holds positive connotations, as well, as the victim, because of the sufferings that have been gone through, is freed from responsibility and blame and is justified for wrongdoing.[199] Moreover, the victim is also a victor, as Martin Jaffee claims, by being destroyed but by being reborn again in a way that overcomes the victimizer.[200] Following from here, we can argue that, although it seems to refer to a condition of helplessness at first sight, victimhood as an identity-position does not indeed render the community more powerless but, on the contrary, confers upon it a morally higher position compared to the wrongdoings of the other community and, henceforth, renders it powerful again, morally if not physically.

Conferring upon two communities the labels of victim and victimizer is carried out from outside by looking at the asymmetry between the communities at

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[199] Ruchama Marton, 'The Psychological Impact of the Second Intifada on Israeli Society', *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, (2004), pp. 73.

[200] Martin S. Jaffe, 'The Victim-Community in Myth and History: Holocaust Ritual, the Question of Palestine and the Rhetoric of Christian Witness', *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, 28, Spring 1991, pp. 230-231, cited in Idith Zertal, *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*. trans. by Chaya Galai, Cambride and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 2. This overcoming of the victimizer is not necessarily in the form of changing the roles and victimizing the oppressor, but it can be also realized through the act of victimization itself, in which those who exercise power is dehumanized. See Gil Anidjar, *The Jew, The Arab: A History of the Enemy*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003, pp. 117.

hand or from the position of the victim itself. It is odd to expect the victimizer to confirm its position; what we witness instead is a justification by the victimizer for the misdeeds that it carries by putting the blame on its adversary. Henceforth, the so-called victimizer does not agree upon defining the other community as a victim, but rather as only one which gets what it deserves. Naming one community as victim and the other as victimizer from outside or agreeing upon the claims put forward by those who argue to be holding the position of victim is always a political act, no matter how obvious the disparity between the parties might be. The situation gets even more complex when both of the parties involved claim that they are the true victims and the other party is the victimizer. An example of this situation can be seen in the case of Israel and Palestine.

Both the Israelis and the Palestinians define themselves as the victims of the other party and put forward evidence that will prove their claim. Palestinians, to start with, perceive the Israelis as militarily and economically more powerful and show as evidence the sufferings that they have been going through since the establishment of the State of Israel. Israelis, on the other hand, perceive the Palestinians as an existential threat and feel threatened in general by the demographic superiority of the Arab world, recalling memories of being a minority in Afro-Asia and Europe for many years.[201] Both parties' memories are full of events which will prove that they are the true victims.

The conflict between Israel and Palestine is probably the one about which the political act of naming the victim is most vehemently carried on, both by ordinary individuals, by political actors such as nation-states, international and non-governmental organizations and by the scholars. There exist a multitude of books and articles on the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some of them simply provide a chronological explanation on the history of the conflict. Others focus specifically on a certain event, such as the 1948 war. And most of them try to prove which party is the true victim.

[201] Dan Bar-On and Saliba Sarsar, 'Bridging the Unbridgeable: The Holocaust and Al-Nakba', *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, (2004), pp. 65.

In this chapter, my aim is not to provide another argument to prove the true victim and the true oppressor. Neither is my aim is to chart a history of the conflict and to provide a chronology of what happened when and how. Rather, my intention is to discuss how Israelis and Palestinians exist in each other's and memories and representations, which are generally constructed around the belief of being victimized and how they relate themselves to the lands over which they are fighting through remembering. For this purpose, this chapter will initially start with a discussion of how the Christian Europe constructed the Arab and the Jew, at one point in history, as a singular group through the term Semite and how then splited up them again into two. Next, I will discuss how the collective memories of Israelis and Palestinians are constructed in two separate sections. The two sections devoted to this aim, however, follow a similar pattern in that I will initially look, in both cases, at how the present of the Israelis and the Palestinians are haunted by their memories of the past, influencing the way the two communities construct each other, by focusing specifically upon two incidents; namely, the Holocaust for the Israeli case and the *Nakba* for the Palestinian case. Then, I will focus upon the relationship these two communities hold toward their land and their past. The third subheadings of the both sections will be devoted to the way Israelis and Palestinians construct and represent each other. Finally, in the last section, there will be a discussion about the consturction of the Apartheid Wall, which is the culmination point of the Israelis' and the Palestinians' attempt to differentiate themselves from each other, although, in the case of the wall, this differentiation and separation is applied unilaterally by the former upon the latter. I should put it here as a disclaimer before going any further that this chapter will only be interested in the negative opinions of the Israelis and Palestinians about each other. There of course exist Israelis and Palestinians who are after a peaceful solution which will be to the advantage of both sides. There are various groups, both on the Israeli and Palestinian side alongside those which operate together, which work against the established understandings, which oppose with their governments' attitude and which do not have an hostile attitude toward the other side. However, their voice still remain marginal and it is the negative opinions from both sides for each other

that still prevail. Therefore, this chapter will include only the negative opinions which dominate the Israeli-Palestinian relationships.

5.1 From Semites into Arabs and Jews, Palestinians and Israelis

In all the discussions regarding the conflict taking place in the Midde East, the existence of two polarized and separate identities as the Arab and the Jew, or as the Palestinian and the Israeli is taken for granted from the very start. As Gil Anidjar points out, the existence of these two separate identities are not questioned nor problematized in terms of "[w]hat purposes are served by, what are the reasons for, the naturalization of this distance, the naturalization of the opposition, of the enmity between the Arab and the Jew."[202] Although we are all too familiar with the descriptions of the history of the conflict between the Arab and the Jew, or the Palestinian and the Israeli, the history of their becoming enemy, that is, the history of their construction as two distinct and antagonistic communities, to put it in another way, the history of the naturalization of the adversary between the Arab and the Jew, or the Palestinians and the Israelis have never been written, as Anidjar points out.[203] The situation becomes even more complex, and ironic indeed, when one takes into account the fact that at one point in history the Arab and the Jew were considered to be part of the same communal identity, that is, the Semite.

The word *Semite*, whose early usage was *Shemite*, is derived from the name of Shem, one of the three sons of Noah. *Oxford English Dictionary* defines the word as referring to "a person belonging to the race of mankind which includes most of the peoples mentioned in Gen.x. as descended from Shem, son of Noah, as the Hebrews, Arabs, Assyrians, and Aramæans." The word *Semitic*, on the other hand, was first used in linguistics to refer to a language family; it was first proposed by August Ludwig von Schlözer in 1781 to refer to the languages related to Hebrew and it then was fixed and started to be used as a technical term. In the nineteenth

[202] Gil Anidjar, 'The Jew, the Arab', pp. xiii.

[203] Gil Anidjar, *Semites: Race, Religion, Literature*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008, pp. 34.

century, the term Semitic was used to refer to people who had historically spoken the Semitic language, resulting in the consideration of these people forming altogether a distinct race. However, some other scholars of the same century also argued that considering these ethnic groups as forming one distinct race is a result of the blurring of races which had previously existed. Later on, the Nazi ideologues took up the issue and argued that believing that the Semitic refers to one distinct community was indeed a result of racial confusion.[204]

Gil Anidjar argues that the construction of the Jew and the Arab as the Semite and later on the splitting up of them into two distinct races actually refers to a history of what the Christian wants and needs.[205] According to him, the Western history has been very significant in the making of the modern world,[206] the construction of the Jew and the Arab being no exception. In his book, *The Jew, The Arab*, he analyzes the history of Europe which "managed to distinguish itself from both the Jew and Arab and to render its role in the distinction, the separation, and the enmity of the Jew *and* Arab invisible."[207] This positioning of Europe against the Jew and the Arab was first realized by subsuming them under the same category, namely, the Semite. As we see in the book of Edward Said, *Orientalism*, the concepts of Semite and Semitic were introduced as a result of the Orientalist philological study to denote a language family.[208] The usage of these concepts, however, did not remain limited to linguistic purposes and was applied to denote an ethnic and racial marker that would enable to make a differentiation between the Aryans and the Semites.[209] Conceptualizing these words as such markers, according to Anidjar, resulted in "the Semitic hypothesis," which corresponded to "the historically unique, and discursive moment whereby whatever was said about the

[204] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semitic

[205] Gil Anidjar, 'Semites', pp. 21.

[206] *ibid*., pp. 7.

[207] Gil Anidjar, 'The Jew, the Arab', pp. xviii.

[208] Edward Said, *Orientalism*. London: Penguin, 1977, pp. 139-40.

[209] Gil Anidjar, 'The Jew, the Arab', pp. 30.

Jews could equally be said about Arabs, and vice versa."[210] Such a conceptualization of the Jew and the Arab was well prevelant in the 8th century. Anidjar mentions in his book that from this century onwards, Christian writers started to characterize Muslims as being the 'new Jews' and to refer to Islamic belief and practices as Jewish. He gives another example from the Christian artists who started to display Muslims alongside Jews while depicting the scenes of Christ being tormended and, as such, recasted Muslims as Christian killers.[211] As the Jew and the Arab, that is, the Semites, were believed to be sharing ethnic, linguistic and religious characteristics, there existed on the part of the Christian that they held similar hostility toward Christendom.[212] It was because of this assumed association between them that the Western Christendom first subsumed them under the same category and then tried to emphasize the difference existing between them. Perceiving both of them as enemies, the Christian tried to separate them from each other by locating them under distinct discursive spheres.[213]

According to Anidjar, such a separation was carried out by constructing the Jew as the military and political enemy and the Arab as the theological one.[214] The construction of the Arab as a theological enemy corresponds to the historical period in which Europe started to construct itself as a secular entity. As such, while positing itself as secular, Europe associated the Orient, in our case the Arab, with religion. This differentiation formed the basis of the enemy status of the Arab as a religious one. The Jew, on the other hand, remained as an enemy within, living with the Europeans and started to be handled in political terms. This differentiation between the Jew and the Arab was later on consolidated by the Nazis as they racialized and detheologized the Jew and deracialized and theologized the Arab, to be able to keep them in conformity with their ideology. As a result, the Jews were

[210] Gil Anidjar, 'Semites', pp. 18.

[211] Gil Anidjar, 'The Jew, the Arab', pp. 34.

[212] *ibid*., pp. 35, taken from Jeremy Cohen, *Living Letters of the Law: Ideas of the Jew in Medieval Christianity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

[213] *ibid*., pp. 35.

[214] *ibid*., pp. 35

started to be seen as a racial, and not a religious, community, whereas the exact opposite was the case for the Arabs. This shift was also seen in the separation of Jewish studies from Orientalist studies by the Nazis and in the turning of the Jewish religion, history and culture into a separate branch of study.[215] Henceforth, the Arab and the Jew which once belonged to the same race was split up into two. This differentiation was later on adopted by the Zionist enterprise itself, as well, as they saw this split as an opportunity to disassociate themselves from the East and to integrate with the Europeans.

The construction of the Semite as to include the Jew and the Arab and then the splitting up of them again into two is very telling in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well. The long history of the Jew's and the Arab's being constructed as enemies of the Christian Europe had sure have an impact upon the relationship between these two groups. The way Israelis and Palestinians differentiate themselves from each other and represent the other party is not free from the history of what the Christian has wanted. However, I will not dwell upon the history of this construction any further as the concern of this chapter is to mainly discuss how Israelis and Palestinians represent and remember the other side by looking at the arguments put forward by themselves.

5.2 Israeli Collective Memory

A common memory of the past is one of the unifying elements for all the communities. The festivals, holidays, prayers, calendars and rituals of all the communities are, in one way or another, related with remembering and Israeli people are no exception. Nevertheless, Israeli people are believed to hold a specific relationship to memory, to the extent of being called as a "people of memory."[216] As I have already discussed in the third chapter, a sense of community, a communal identity is related with the sharing of a collective memory among the members of

[215] Gil Anidjar, 'Semites, pp. 19 and note 25.

[216] Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, 'Frames of Remembrance', pp. 57.

that community. Such a situation, therefore, is relevant for all the communities. However, Israeli people's relation to the past and their self-identification through memory is usually singled out as a peculiar case. The reason for this is that Jewish people, who were expelled from their lands by the Romans in 70 AD with the destruction of the Second Temple, lived for generations in many countries, in which they considered themselves as 'minorities,' waiting for the time to turn back to the Holy Lands that were promised to them in the Bible and to establish there an independent state of their own. Until that time came, Jewish people, dispersed all around the world, built a sense of community with reference to remembering the past. It was only in the 19th century, when Zionism was established and when the first Zionist pioneers arrived to Palestine, that "Jewish history" started to be considered as a legitimate subjected to be studied by the Jews themselves[217] and continued to be a serious undertaking since the establishment of the State of Israel. Interestingly enough, however, this history of the Jews did not cover the two thousand years that had passed in exile. What was done instead was to tell the history of the Jews starting from two thousand years ago and then passing immediately to the arrival of first Zionists to Palestine. Such a rupture of eighteen centuries serves to two ideological undertakings. First, by extracting the diasporic history of the Jews from the Jewish history and by bridging the first century to the nineteenth directly, the illusion that no one else but only Jews have inhabited the lands is enhanced. By creating a sense of physical continuity, the historical gap caused by the exile is compensated, even erased.[218] Second, neglecting the years that passed in exile also serves as a justification and legitimization for the establishment of the state of Israel. David Ben-Gurion, the founder and the first prime minister of Israel, claimed that no such a thing as Jewish history had existed,

> because the history of a nation is only the history which creates the nation as a single whole, as a national unit, and not that which happens to individuals and groups within the

[217] *ibid*., pp. 57.

[218] Yael Zerubavel, 'Transhistorical Encounters in the Land of Israel: On Symbolic Bridges, National Memory, and the Literary Imagination', *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Spring/Summer 2005), pp. 117.

> nation . . . For 1,800 years . . . we have been excluded from world history which is composed of the chronicles of peoples.[219]

Therefore, it was only the creation of the State of Israel which gave the Israelis their histories back.

The rest of this section will be divided into three. In the first part, I will discuss how the memories of the Holocaust were brought by Israel to the Middle East context. There exists a vast literature on the Holocaust, dealing with its various different aspects. For the concerns of this chapter, however, I will only deal with the Holocaust in terms of its relation to the establishment of the State of Israel and of its impact upon the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. The second section will provide a discussion on how Israel related itself to the lands it perceived as its own. Finally, the last section will be devoted to the way the Palestinians are constructed and represented in Israeli collective memory.

5.2.1 The Holocaust imported to the Middle East

The establishment of the State of Israel was based on the idea that it would be a home for those who survived the Holocaust and that it would breach the inability to talk about it by creating a space where the survivors would be given a voice for their lives and stories. The state was also seen as to provide the survivors with the legal and verbal frameworks for their claims and charges.[220] Nevertheless, this rationale upon which the state was grounded was not really pursued in the subsequent years of its creation. After the foundation of the state, there rather came a "quasi-official silence," as Idith Zertal claims, together "with an effort to extract the newborn state from history and endow it with a transcendental and meta-historical character."[221] The introduction of the Holocaust into the Israeli politics

[219] David Ben-Gurion, 'The Redemption', *Der Yiddisher Kempfer*, 30, 16 November 1917, cited in Idith Zertal, 'Israel's Holocaust', pp. 93.

[220] Idith Zertal, 'Israel's Holocaust', pp. 57.

[221] *ibid*., pp. 93.

was carried out only in certain circumstances, mainly in times of crisis and was never referred to according to the context in which it took place, but was rather re-contextualized and imported to the conflict taking place in the Middle East. Therefore, there existed an official approach on the part of the State of Israel to feel "the simultaneous need to remember and to forget" the Holocaust, as James Young argues in his book on the memory of the Holocaust. To quote from Young at length,

> On the one hand, early statists like David Ben-Gurion regarded the Holocaust as the ultimate fruit of Jewish life in exile; as such it represented a diaspora that deserved not only to be destroyed but also forgotten. On the other hand, the state also recognized its perverse debt to the Holocaust: it had, after all, seemed to prove the Zionist dictum that without a state and the power to defend themselves, Jews in exile would always be vulnerable to just this kind of destruction. As a result, the early leaders found little reason to recall the Holocaust beyond its direct link to the new state.[222]

Henceforth, when articulated, the memory of Holocaust only served for the justification of the state and has never been discussed in terms of the atrocities the Nazis exerted. After the end of World War II, the European-nations states involved in punishing the Nazis for the crimes they committed. On the part of Israel, on the other hand, who tried to disremember the past, there was only a symbolic act of passing of the The Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law in 1950, in order not to lag behind other nation-states. However, the law was not meant for the Nazis themselves, but rather for the Jewish collaborators and although there had been certain trials of some Israelis, no one was sent to prison. When it came to the Nazis, on the other hand, Israel made it clear that it would not involve in any kind of Nazi hunts, mainly because of the fact that it wanted to put all of its efforts "to become a nation among the nations" and to secure diplomatic relations with the international community.[223]

As a result, the memory of the Holocaust was mainly repressed once the state of Israel was established. Although 300,000 survivors of the Holocaust were

[222] James E. Young, 'The Texture of Memory', pp. 211.

[223] Idith Zertal, 'Israel's Holocaust', pp. 94-95.

now the citizens of the state and although they influenced the fabric of the society to a great extent, their existence in the country was in the form of "absent presentees."[224] There existed only few acts of commemoration of the Holocaust and these were organized mainly by the survivors themselves rather than the state. It was only the few ghetto uprisings in the concentration camps which were commemorated during the 'Holocaust and Ghetto Uprising Day' which was established officially only in 1951.[225] Therefore, the Holocaust was only commemorated with reference to a few cases of Jewish heroism. The school textbooks published after the foundation of the state provided very minimal information about the Holocaust. The most critical events of the Jewish history, according to Ben-Gurion, were Moses's leading the Jews out of Egypt and gathering them at the Mount Sinai, to any of which the Holocaust was not seen to be equal.[226]

It was on 23 May 1960 that the Holocaust gained a new meaning for Israel and was reintroduced to the collective memories of the Israeli people. This was the day when Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi war criminal who was sometimes referred as the architect of the Holocaust, was announced by Ben-Gurion to be captured in Argentina. Eichmann was brought to Jerusalem, was tried by an Israeli court and was sentenced to death. It was a huge event for Israel. After years of ignorance, the Holocaust could finally be faced. Israelis were no more in a situation of a total helplessness in front of it. They were rather in a position of power, sovereignty and control. The capture and the trial of Eichmann was seen as a valuable lesson for the Israeli youth as well, as in this way they would be connected with their past and

[224] *ibid*., pp. 94. "A reversed term, ''present absentees,'' was given to the Palestinian inhabitants who fled or were expelled from their homes and villages in the 1948 war and became ''displaced persons'' in their native country." Note 10.

[225] Avner Ben-Amos and Ilana Bet-el, 'Commemoration and National Identity: Memorial Ceremonies in Israeli Schools' in *Homelands and Diasporas*, pp. 174.

[226] Idith Zertal, 'Israel's Holocaust', pp. 93.

they would learn that "Jews are not sheep to be slaughtered but a people who can hit back," as Ben-Gurion put it.[227]

Therefore, it was the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem which brought the Holocaust back to the memories of Israeli people, this time turning themselves into the more powerful party. Furthermore, it was from this time on that the Holocaust was imported to the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict and was set as the stone in reference to which Israelis identified the world around themselves. The Holocaust now became not only a past event which was finally faced, but a constant threat. The State of Israel was seen as a lone country surrounded by an anti-Semitic world and the country's gates were seen to be full of Nazi-like enemies.

The import of the experience of the Holocaust to the relationship with the Arabs was realized in two ways. First of all, there was a constant articulation by Ben-Gurion that there were Nazis who were hiding in the Arab countries and that witnessing the declarations of the Arab countries about the State of Israel was like listening to a Nazi speaking. Second, the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin El-Husseini, was depicted as a major Nazi criminal and one of the major architects of the Final Solution. That there was a connection between the Mufti and the Nazis, especially with the office of Eichmann, was declared to become obvious with the trial of Eichmann and with the documents that were found after the Nazi defeat in the European archives.[228]

Henceforth, the trial of Eichmann and confrontating with the Holocaust anew resulted in the merging of one enemy with the other, or, to put it more rightly, in the disappearance of one enemy and its reincarnation in the body of another. After the trial, it was very commonplace to draw an equality between the Nazis and the Arabs. The trial provided Israel with enough evidence for its fear of annihilation, as the Arabs were seen as the new Eichmanns who aim at destroying the Israelis. Although introduced very late, the memory of the Holocaust served as a national unifier for the Israelis. This memory was not necessarily constructed

[227] *ibid*., pp. 95-108. The quotation is taken from David Ben-Gurion, 'The Eichmann Case as seen by Ben-Gurion', *New York Times Magazine*, 18 December 1960.

[228] *ibid*., pp. 97, 100-101.

according to what happened in the recent past. Rather, the feeling of victimization was imagined to be transferred from one experience to another, and it was only with the reference to the Israeli-Arab conflict that a memory of the Holocaust, as well as a rendering meaningful of the trial of Eichmann, was constructed. The State of Israel used this memory in order to posit itself as the 'eternal victim' surrounded by an anti-semitic world. Such a perception resulted in Israel's extracting itself from all kinds of responsibility and criticism and in the justification for the misdeeds it carried. Furthermore, this positioning itself as the 'eternal victim' resulted, as Hannah Arendt points out, in the dehistoricization and essentialization of Jewish victimhood[229] and, henceforth, provided the possibility to bring forward the feeling of victimhood in all circumstances possible.

5.2.2 Eretz Israel

'Eretz Israel', that is, the Land of Israel, is a concept settled in the collective memories of Israelis. It refers to the fact that Jewish people has a God-given right over the lands extending roughly from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean. Such a belief originated from the account of the lands promised by God to the Jews, told in the Bible.[230] During the eighteen centuries that the Jewish community lived as a diaspora, it was the dream of returning back to the lands that were promised to them which united them and which granted them a communal identity. The Zionist enterprise put this belief at its background and worked, starting from the 19th century onwards, to build an independent state in Palestine. This association between the Jews and the Promised Lands did not only exist in the mind of the Jews, but also of the Christians and as such they also saw the existence of an Israeli state in Palestine as of right.

Ghada Karmi tells an event at the very beginning of his book, one which portrays very clearly how Israeli discourse over Palestine has changed over the

[229] *ibid*., pp. 164.

[230] Ghada Karmi, *Married to Another Man: Israel's Dilemma in Palestine*. London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2007, pp. 62, 64

years. At the first Zionist Congress which took place in Basel in 1897, the idea of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine was first raised for discussion. In order to look for the suitability of the country for this aim, two representatives of the rabbis of Vienna were charged with traveling to Palestine. After the exploration, the representatives reported back that the land was already the homeland of Palestinian Arab population and told that "[t]he bride is beatiful, but she is married to another man."[231] Such an articulation acknowledges the existence of a Palestinian population as the inhabitants of the land and is in contradiction with the discourse of the subsequent years which asserted Palestine as the homeland of only the Jews. Israel Zangwill, for example, writing years later of the report of the rabbis, said about Palestine "a land without a people for a people without a land," a view which is widely embraced by the Zionists and which still continues to be a reference point for the State of Israel's existence in Palestine as of right. What was meant by "a land without a people" was not that there were nobody living in that soil at that time, but rather that those who inhabited the lands were uncivilized, traditional people, who lack any sort of national consciousness. The land was seen as a "virgin country," and was described by Ben-Gurion as "primitive, neglected and derelict." Another Israeli politician, Abba Eban, depicted Palestine, by quoting Mark Twain's impressions of the Holy Land in his book *The Innocents Abroad* in 1867, as a "squalid, unpromising, almost repellent land."[232] Such perceptions about the land have thus served as a justification for the creation of the State of Israel, as the lands were seen to be claimed as their own by no one. The claim that there existed no national consciousness among the inhabitants of the land which would give them a right to build a nation-state and the perception of the land as neglected and virgin provided enough evidence, according to the Jews, that the lands could be considered empty and that a state for the Jews thus could be established there.

The State of Israel was created as a result of the Resolution 181 passed by the UN General Assembly on 29 November 1947, deciding on the splitting of

[231] *ibid*., at the very beginning of the book, page numbers are not provided.

[232] Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 4.

Palestine into two independent state, one Palestinian and the other Jewish, connected with an economic unity and Jerusalem having a special status. The conventional Zionist account of the rest of the story is as follows: despite the many sacrifices that they had to make, Israelis accepted the plan, whereas the Palestinians and the Arab states rejected it completely. The day the expiry of the British Mandate, which ruled the country since 1920, was declared and the establishment of the State of Israel was proclaimed, seven Arab states sent their armies to Palestine to destroy Israel. The war of 1948, remembered by the Palestinians as the *Nakba* (catastrophe) and by the Israelis as the War of Independence, was waged between a Jewish David and an Arab Goliath.[233] Israel fought for its survival heroically and managed to beat the Arab armies. The Palestinians fled from Israel to neighbouring countries, following the orders they received from their leaders, despite Israel's claims for peaceful co-existence. After the war, the State of Israel sought peace for all their heart but there was no body on the other side to talk the issues with.[234]

Such was the story told by Israel. However, to display what is untold reveals a greater deal. First of all, we should note at the very beginning that the resolution was never translated into Hebrew in its entirety. It was only those parts which were in conformity with the expectations of the Israeli leaders that were retained. As such the Israeli society was only informed about the parts of the resolution which congruent with the Zionist project and was left uninformed about those part that did not suit the Zionist aims. Furthermore, Israel did not really comply with the resolution. For example, that there would be no permission of expropriation of lands ownded by an Arab in the Jewish state, or vice versa, written in the resolution, was not performed by Israel. On the contrary, Israel granted itself the lands of the Palestinian inhabitants who fled the country, covering an area of 60 percent of its own territory. After the war, Israel was holding over 20 percent of the lands that

[233] David and Goliath refer to the future king of Israel and a Philistine warrior, respectively. The story about their fight can be found at the Old Testament. To describe it briefly, David, a young boy at that time, faces Goliath, which is a gigantic enemy, and beats him in the war. Israel refers to this story very frequently by positioning themselves as David, the young and powerless enemy, who fought a heoric war against the gigantic enemy, Goliath, that is the Arab World, and defeated it.

[234] Avi Shlaim, "The Debate About 1948" in Ilan Pappe (ed.), *The Israel/Palestine Question*. London and New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 151.

belonged to Palestinians according to the UN Resolution.[235] Moreover, it was only years later, with the studies of the new historians[236], that it came out that Israel was not the weaker party in the war but was rather much more prepared for the war than the Arab armies and that the Palestinians did not flee the country, complying with the orders they received from Arab leaders, but rather that they were killed and massacred and expelled by the Israelis.

After the 1967 War, also known as Six-Day War, Israel has further expanded its territories by almost three times, as it annexed Egypt's Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula, Jordan's West Bank and East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights from Syria.[237] In order to render a Jewish character to the lands it annexed, the State of Israel involved in changing the fabric of its new territories, mainly by renaming the acquired lands, a process which already begun in 1920 when Jews were buying lands from the Palestinians. This policy of renaming was also applied after the 1948 and 1967 wars. For this purpose, a Naming Committee was built as a sub-division of Jewish National Fund, which consisted of archaeologists, biblical experts and other scholars. The mission of the committee was to regrant the newly acquired

[235] Sylvain Cypel, *Walled: Israel Society at an Impasse*. New York: Other Press, 2006, pp. 52.

[236] The 'new historians' is a name attributed to those Israeli scholars who started to publish their works in the 1980s. They initially analysed the 1948 war in order to show that the traditional Zionist account about the war did not reflected the truth and that Israel committed a lot of crimes against humanity before, during and after the war towards the Palestinians. The studies of the new historians later expanded to other important events in the history of the State of Israel, again to shatter the myths put forward by Israel. I should note here that what the new historians argued were never things uttered for the first time; they were arguments already put forward for many years by the Palestinian scholars. However, it was only with the studies of the new historians, that is, of scholars from within Israel, that these arguments started to be considered as true, instead of mere propaganda. Furthermore, although their works revealed facts which were concealed by Israel, their work did not say anything about the Palestinians themselves and were only limited to discussing the Israeli position. Finally, I should also note that this act of myth shattering by the new historians has also turned into a kind of myth making. The act of myth shattering was presented by some as an evidence to the high moral standars of Israelis who are mature enough to acknowledge their mistakes. Henceforth, Israelis are again posited as morally superior than the Palestinians, who do nothing else than blaming Israel and who does not face up its own myths and mistakes. See Ilan Pappe, "Introduction: New historiographical orientations in the research on the Palestine Question", in Ilan Pappe (ed.), *The Israel/Palestine Question*, and Joyce Dalsheim, 'Deconstruncting National Myths, Reconstituting Morality: Modernity, Hegemony and the Israeli National Past', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December), 2007, pp. 521-554.

[237] *Dictionary of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Culture, History and Politics*, Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2005, pp. 235.

lands their ancient Hebrew names and, as such, de-Arabise the territory. It was not always possible to locate the ancient Jewish sites, but this did not matter that much as the motive behind this naming activity was not scholarly, but ideological. Apart from that, the Palestinian villages which were distroyed during the wars and which now belonged to Israel were converted into Jewish settlements. The lands were not only used for housing purposes, but they were also converted into national parks, including picnic areas, children playgrounds, access to nature, and so on, an endeavour undertaken again by JNF. In these parks, the decision of what to plant belonged to JNF and the Fund chose to plant pine and cypress trees, instead of natural flora indigenous to Palestine, in order to make the country look European and in order to support the wood industry of the country, as overtly stated by the country. The trees were not only planted over destroyed houses but also over fields and olive groves, as well. Ironically enough, the pine trees planted by Israel failed to adopt to the local soil despite efforts on the contrary and the olive trees, which were planted there more than fifty years ago, popped up by literally splitting up the pine trees into two.[238]

Planting trees brought to JNF a lot of reputation for being concerned for the ecology. However, turning the lands which once belonged to Palestinians into entertainment and leisure spaces and hiding whatever remained behind the trees was indeed a way of erasing the traces of the Palestinian presence in these spaces.

5.2.3 How the Palestinians are Represented in Israeli Collective Memory

It is not possible to claim that the way the Palestinians were constructed and represented by the State of Israel and Israeli people was one and the same for all times. The representations are rather influenced by the collective memories of the past, which are constructed very selectively and in conformity with the ideological necessities of the time. It is true that the Palestinians and the Arabs in general are seen in very negative terms, in general. However, this negativity is defined differently, sometimes even in an incompatible ways, in different times, ranging

[238] Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*. Oxford: One World, 2006, pp. 225-229.

from unacknowledging the existence of a Palestinian people at all to equating them with the Nazis.

That there does not exist a Palestinian people is a view which is articulated constantly in different times. It was first put forward when claiming that the Palestine was "a land without a people." What was meant by this, as I have already said, was the absence of a civilized and modern community, having a national consciousness of its own. Rather, the Palestinians were seen as insignificant nomads, who had no cultural permanence and who could not have any lasting claims towards the land.[239] We witness the same renouncing of the existence of a Palestinian people when it comes to the issue of refugees, in which the Israeli state refuses to accept the refugees as Palestinians and rather calls them as "Arab refugees," and at times even refuses to grant them the status of refugee and simply describes them as "minorities."[240] This ignorance continued to persist in the succeeding years as well. For example, Golda Meir, the head of diplomacy for a longtime, said very openly when she became prime minister (1970-1974) that "[t]here is nothing that can be called a Palestinian people." The same rejection was also transferred to the situation in which Israel sought a partner to solve the problems and when "[t]here [was] no one to discuss things with."[241]

Like the Palestinian identity, the reality of a Palestinian national movement has also been rejected for a very long time, until the Oslo Accords in 1993 in which the State of Israel finally recognized Palestine Liberation Organization as a legitimate party to discuss the issues with. Until that moment, Israel prefered to describe the movement as "armed bands" or as "the terrorist organization known as the PLO."[242] Over many years, Israel refused to accept the particularity of the movement and perceived it as a reaction to Zionist enterprise; a national movement's existence prior to the Zionists' existence was denied. It was even

[239] Edward Said, 'Arabs and Jews', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter, 1974), pp. 4.

[240] Uri Ram, "The Colonization Perspective in Israeli Sociology" in Ilan Pappe, 'The Israel/Palestine Question', pp. 53 and Sylvain Cypel, 'The Walled', pp. 135.

[241] Sylvain Cypel, 'The Walled', pp. 132 ve 143.

[242] *ibid*., pp. 139, 141.

claimed by the Israeli historian Meir Pa'el that "the Zionist movement is one of the most successful national movements in history for it started with the aim of forming one national group, and it ended up with forming two."[243] Henceforth, the movement was believed to exist only because of the existence of a Zionist one. The reality of a Palestinian national movement was also rejected with reference to the fact that it was the Arabs, not the Palestinians, with whom Israel waged its wars. The main reference point for this claim is the 1948 war, in which Israel fought against the armies of seven Arab states. By putting this argument forward, Israel hides the fact that before the 1948 war, there was a continuous civil war waged with the local community, that is the Palestinians, who fought for their territories. Israel rather preferred to make the enemy look foreign by putting the emphasis on the armies of the Arab states. The state also chose to refuse its war against the Palestinians because if it recognized this fact, then it would have to face the sufferings it caused, the expulsion of the Palestinions, the refugee problem, and so on, that is, all those events which contradicted Israel's self-image as the true victim. There also existed times in which Israel acknowledged the existence of a Palestinian national movement, but this acknowledgment took place only by demonizing the movement, by turning the Palestinians into brutal enemies with whom neither dialogue nor compromise was possible.[244]

Israel's attitude towards the Palestinians, and the Arabs in general, is full of racist connotations. The claim "a land without a people" is an example of this. As I have already mentioned, this phrase implies the primitive, uncivilized nature of the Palestinian people and, as such, the racial superiority of Israel. The claim for racial, combined with moral, superiority of the Israelis and the consequent degradation of the Palestinians is repeted in many occassions. Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, for example, who later became the President of the State of Israel, mentioned Palestinians as 'looters,' 'robbers,' 'cheaters' and 'plunderers.' Furthermore, there were constant references

[243] Issam Nassar, 'Reflections on Writing the History of Palestinian Identity', *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture*, Vol. 8/9, Issue 4/1 (2002), pp. 26. These remarks are attributed to Israeli historian Meir Pa'el and belong to personal communication between the author and Ilan Pappe.

[244] Shlomo Ben-Ami, 'Scars of War', pp. 24.

to the animalistic nature of the Palestinians as well as the Arabs, like asserting "the Arabs [as] proliferating in Jerusalem like ants;" comparing them to snakes; describing the Palestinian leaders as crocodiles, telling "[t]he more you feed them, the hungrier they are;" arguing that "the Arabs are closer to animal than to the human," and so on.[245] Apart from that, the Palestinians and the Arabs were seen as primitive and tribal people. Such a perception was not peculiar to the Israelis, of course, and was very much influenced by the European Orientalist literature. The orientalist views about how the Arabs were backward were echoed in the declarations of state leaders, like when Ben Gurion asserted that "[w]e live in the twentieth century; they live in the fifteenth; we have created an exemplary society in the heart of the Middle Ages."[246] Such a perception led the Israeli state to assume a paternalistic discourse towards the Palestinian, one similar to the 'White Man's Burden.' We can witness such an attitude in Ben-Gurion's attributing to Zionism the role "to raise up the Arab masses from their degradation" or his claim that Jews had not come to Palestine "to expel the Arabs," but rather "to build."[247]

The Palestinians and the Arabs are seen as obstacles to the existence of the State of Israel. They were perceived as such when the state was first established and continued to be seen as the same. Here lies the source of the fear of Palestinians and Arabs. Although at other times they are seen as weaker than Israel, when it comes to the endurance of the state, they are thought as brutal enemies creating an existential threat. Such a situation causes, according to Israel, to take action against the enemy inevitably. The inevitability of the circumstance means that it is not Israel which is responsible for what will happen to the Palestinians and Arabs because they are the ones who determine what Israel should do. Such a conceptualization provides Israel with ethical superiority over its enemy. This view is culminated in the notion of "purity of arms." The notion implies that as the

[245] Shlomo Ben-Ami, 'Scars of War', pp. 4 and Sylvain Cypel, 'The Walled', pp. 102-103. The quotations are taken from *Le Monde*, August 8, 2002; *Agence Free Press*, August 29, 2000; *Maariv*, October 20, 2000.

[246] Shlomo Ben-Ami, 'Scars of War', pp. 4.

[247] *ibid*., pp. 13.

enemy is morally inferior and as the Israel's intentions are good, then fighting against an evil enemy renders Israeli's arms pure.[248] Henceforth, Israel extracts itself from all responsibility about the controversy with its enemy. It blames the other party for all the sufferings it is going through. It is from such a perspective that Ben-Gurion perceived the refugee problem created with the 1948 and 1967 wars, discharging Israel from all the blame and even claiming that it revealed "with overwhelming clarity which people is bound with strong bonds to this land."[249]

The Palestinians and the Arabs are also seen, as I have previously said, as Nazi-like enemies. They are perceived as the new Nazis who wants to complete the job the Nazis were not able to finish. Every event which took place was rendered meaningful with reference to fighting against a second Holocaust. For example, at the time of the trial of Eichmann, the situation was related with the Palestinians and was claimed that "150 meters from the courtroom there is a border, and behind that border *thousands of Eichmanns* lie in wait, proclaiming explicitly, 'what Eichmann has not completed, we will.'" The refugee problem was also understood with reference to Holocaust in that Abba Ebanat, Israel's Foreign Minister at that time, declared after Israel's victory of the 1948 war that "[t]here would have been no Jewish refugees had Israel lost the war. There would have been two million corpses added to the six million Holocaust victims."[250] Even a non-Zionist politician, Brit-Shalom Ihud, asserted that "[i]f I weigh the catastrophe of five million Jews against the transfer of one million Arabs, then with a clean and easy conscience I can state that even more drastic acts are permissible."[251]

Ruchama Marton claims that such a perception is a result of the projection of Israeli's self-hatred, because of its helplessness against Nazi atrocities, on to the Palestinians and the Arabs; the more the Palestinians became miserable and

[248] Sylvain Cypel, 'The Walled', pp. 67.

[249] Shlomo Ben-Ami, 'Scars of War', pp. 42.

[250] Yosef Almogi, 'There are Thousands of Eichmanns near the Borders of Israel,' Davar, 12 June 1961 quoted in Idith Zertal, 'Israel's Holocaust', pp. 110, and Abba Eban responding at the UN to King Hussein's complaints over Isarel's actions in the war, reproduced in Ma'ariv, 27 June 1967 cited in pp. 112.

[251] Shlomo Ben-Ami, 'Scars of War', pp. 31.

helpless, the more they turned into an object of hatred for the Israelis.[252] Interestingly enough, the culmination of this helplessness for the Jews in the concentration camps was to be named as a *Muselmann*. The word was used in the camps to refer to the relatively large group of people who were seen as having unconditional fatalism as they lost any real will to survive.[253] A *Muselmann* was a person who gave up the struggle and who was "reduced to staring, . . . no longer responding even to beatings, who for a few days or weeks existed, barely – and who then collapsed and were sent to the gas."[254] There is no agreement on the origin of the term. It is claimed that "[s]eeing from afar, one had the impression of looking at Arabs praying."[255] However, the similarity in appearance cannot be the sole source for the concept. Giorgio Agamben claims that the most likely explanation is the literal meaning of the word muslim, as "the one who submits unconditionally to the will of God", referring to the Islam's supposed fatalism.[256] It is probably because of this unconditionality that these people were called *Muselmann*. The memoirs of the survivors of Holocaust is full with descriptions of them.

> The so-called *Muselmann*, as the camp language termed the prisoner who was giving up and was given up by his comrades, no longer had woom in his consciousness for the contrasts good or bad, noble or base, intellectural or unintellectual. He was a staggering corpse, a bundle of physical functions in its last convulsions. As hard as it may be for us to do so, we must exclude him from our considerations.[257]

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[252] Ruchama Marton, 'The Psychological Impact', pp. 77.

[253] Giorgio Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and The Archive*. trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen, New York: Zone Books, 1999, pp. 45.

[254] Gil Anidjar, 'The Jew, the Arab', pp. 140, quoted from Inge Clendinnen, *Reading the Holocaust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 35.

[255] *ibid*., pp. 140, quoted from Zdzislaw Ryn and Stanislaw Klodzinski, 'An der Grenze Zwischen Leben und Tod. Eine Studie über die Erscheinung des 'Muselmanns' im Konzentrationslager', trans. (from Polish) by Olaf Kühl, *Auschwitz-Hefte* 1 (1987), pp. 94.

[256] Giorgio Agamben, 'Remnants of Auschwitz', pp. 45.

[257] *ibid*., pp. 41.

Therefore, the person who turned into a *Muselmann* was also given up by the fellow Jews in the camps. To quote from Agamben at lenght,

> No one felt compassion for the Muslim, and no one felt sympathy for him either. The other inmates, who continually feared for their lives, did not even judge him worthy of being looked at. For the prisoners who collaborated, the Muslims were a source of anger and worry; for the SS, they were merely useless garbage. Every group thought only about eliminating them, each in its own way.[258]

The *Muselmann* marked the threshold between life and death and between the human and the inhuman. It was the fear of all the prisoners of the camps to turn into one. If they gave up the struggle, they knew that "they would not die at Auschwitz as Jews."[259] Henceforth, it is for sure that the word muslim has settled into the consciousness of Israeli people. The hatred they felt for the helplessness of the *Muselmann* was projected on to the Muslisms. This hatred, however, did not result in the coining of the Palestinians with the victims of the Holocaust, but rather with the Nazis themselves.

5.3 Palestinian Collective Memory

The present condition of the Palestinian people very much resembles to Israeli people's being called as "people of memory." Driven out of their country and driven out of history, as the history is always that of the victor's, by Israel, a few of them remained in their own territories as 'minorities,' while others were turned into exiles taking refuge in neighbouring countries and many others dispersed to countries all around the world. The community tried to construct a sense of cohesion, which had been disrupted by Israel, through holding a collective memory of the years before the establishment of the State of Israel, seen as a lost paradise; through remembering the sufferings caused by Israel and, thus, the lamentation of

[258] *ibid*., pp. 43.

[259] *ibid*., pp. 55.

the present and through portraying an anticipated return back to their territories.[260] As a result, the Palestinian community in the present can also be referred as a "people of memory."

It is fair to expect that Palestinians, scattered to different places from each other, might choose to display the collective memory shared by all the members of the community, no matter where they are, through separate icons. However, it is beyond the scope of this work to examine the situation, for example, of the Palestinian refugees in the Lebanon camps and the Palestinians who are currently living in Israel, holding Israeli ID cards, under separate sections. My aim is rather to show what is common between them, that is, how they remember the past and how they perceive Israelis. For this reason, in this section I will initially discuss the *Nakba* and how it is established in the collective memories of the Palestinians; then I will discuss how the Palestinians remember the past and imagine themselves at the same time; finally, I will describe how Israel and the Israelis are perceived by the Palestinians.

5.3.1 The *Nakba*

The *Nakba*, meaning 'catastrophe' in Arabic, is the word given by the Palestinians to the 1948 war. This war is seen as a catastrophe because during the war Israel evacuated Palestinian villages, massacred those who remained behind, expelled the Palestinians from their own territories, expropriated their lands and prevented them, later on, from returning back to their home. Henceforth, at the end of the war, the social cohesion of Palestinians was destroyed by Israel and they were transformed from a settled and mostly agricultural society into a nation of refugees, second-class citizens, communities under military occupation and exiles. Today, between three and four million Palestinians live in refugee camps; approximately one million in Israel as Israeli citizens; another three and a half million in the West Bank and Gaza under the occupation of Israel; and the

[260] Nurith Gertz and George Khleifi, 'Bleeding Memories', *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture*, Vol. 10, Issue 4 (2003), pp. 106.

remaining two or three million live as exiles in various countries around the world.[261]

Henceforth, for the Palestinians the *Nakba* refers to their dispersal, rather than to the defeat of the Arab armies by Israel. The state of Israel insisted that the Palestinians left the country voluntarily, abiding by the orders they received from Arab countries, in order to embarrass the Jewish state, whereas Palestinians perceived their expulsion as a systematic campaign, pre-planned by Israel.[262] However, the claims of the Palestinians remained marginal to the writings of the history of 1948 war for many years, as their accounts were mainly seen as mere propaganda. It was, therefore, the Zionist account which was prevalent in the writing of the history of the 1948 war for years. The telling and writing of this history by the Zionists have three main characteristics. First of all, it was mainly the participants, soldiers, politicians, hagiographers, journalists, biographers and so on who wrote the history of the war. Therefore, the war, its reasons and consequences, were not analysed from a historical perspective. Secondly, and related with the first feature, the descriptions of the war did not contain much political analysis, but were rather composed of the chronicles of military operations and the heroic tasks undertaken by Israeli soldiers. Thirdly, that the Israelis held higher moral standards than its enemies was tried to be proved in these accounts. The argument of purity of arms was used very frequently to prove moral superiority, claiming that the weapons were pure as they were only employed in self-defense and as they were not used against defenseless civilian people.[263] These Zionists accounts prevailed the telling of the history of the 1948 war until 1980s, that is, until new historians re-studied the war. The accounts of these historians were not different from what the Palestinians had been arguing for years. However, these arguments considered to be real by the international community as well as by the Israelis only after people from

[261] Ghada Karmi, 'Married to Another Man', pp. 17.

[262] Benny Morris, 'The Causes and Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine: The Israeli defence forces intelligence service analysis of June 1948 ' in Ilan Pappe, 'The Israel/Palestine Question', pp. 168.

[263] Avi Shlaim, 'The Debate', pp. 151.

within the Israeli society started to put them forward. These historians revealed that Israel did not act as innocent as it used to claim during the war, that it killed Palestinians and that it expelled them from their own lands. However, the descriptions of the new historians did not include much material about the Palestinians and what they had gone through. They were rather accounts about the Israelis themselves. Although the studies of the new historians were critical, this criticism did not transcend the habit of being interested only with what the Israelis had done and had gone through. Henceforth, although the studies generated by new historians put forward the facts such as the expulsion and the massacre of the Palestinians, they remained interested with the position of the Israelis during and after the war, and not of the Palestinians.

As a result of the *Nakba,* the shared experience of displacement was what started to unite the Palestinians. Those who remained in Israel were uprooted from where they used to live and were pushed to live in the margins of the city. Those who started to live in the camps, started to build their identity around the concept of refugee. Homi K. Bhabha argues that the "the nation fills the void left in the uprooting of communities and kin." Henceforth, it was this feeling of uprooteness which started to consolidate and strengthen the Palestinian national identity in the subsequent years.[264]

Although Israel refered to the 1948 war as the War of Independence, the term *nakba* also found acceptance in years to come by the Israeli officials. The word, meaning 'catastrophe,' was used to counter the moral weight of the Holocaust. However, as Ilan Pappe claims, this word, being an elusive one, also left the perpetrator out and set Israel free from the responsibility of what it did. Therefore, Pappe rather uses the word 'ethnic cleansing' to discuss what happened in and after 1948, a perspective which was embraced neihter by Palestinians nor by Israeli new historians.[265] The term *nakba* was also challenged by those on the Palestinian side, for other reasons. Nazmi El-Jubeh, for example, asserts that a

[264] Issam Nassar, 'Reflections on Writing the History' pp. 34. The quotation is taken from Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 139.

[265] Ilan Pappe, 'The Ethnic Cleansing', pp. xvii.

nakba is used when a close friend or a relative disapperead abruptly or when a natural disaster happens; that is, it is used for situations over which one has no control of. However, he suggests that although what happened in and after 1948 was a catastrophe, defining the situation only with this term is misleading, because the 1948 war was also a defeat. The denial of the word defeat, he says, sets free the Palestinians, and the Arabs in general, from assessing their own errors and turns Israel into an "intangible natural element" against which the Palestinians are left with nothing to change the situation. He claimes that the self-victimization of the Palestinians by positing themselves as sufferers of a catastrophe is one of the main obstacles for the Palestinian self-identity and national movement.[266]

5.3.2 Remembering the Past and Imagining the Self

The Palestinian collective memory is deeply influenced by nostalgia. Going through an harsh experience of being uprooted from their home caused the Palestinians to mourn for whatever remained behind. This mourning, although mainly directed towards the lost home, was not only limited with this. For the Palestinians, everything was always better before, this 'before' referring to the wall, the Al-Aqsa intifada, the Oslo Accords, the intifada before that, the wars of 1973, 1967 and 1948, the establishment of the State of Israel and the migration of the first Zionist pioneers to Palestine, retrospectively.[267] As their conditions kept deteriorating, the Palestinians felt nostalgic about whatever slipped from their hands this time, although the main nostalgic object to which everything else was related remained as the home.

Following the distinction made by Svetlana Boym between restorative and reflective nostalgia, which I have discussed in the third chapter, I think that the Palestinians' mourning for their lost home fall under the former category. As I have already discussed, the emphasis in restorative nostalgia is on *nostos*, that is 'return

[266] Sylvain Cypel, 'Walled', pp. 190, 193.

[267] Isabel Kershner, *Barrier: The Seam of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. New York and Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 52.

to home' and what is attempted is to reconstruct the lost home transhistorically and to return back to the original condition. I think that what differentiates restorative nostalgia from reflective one is that in the former, being nostalgic about the past and dreaming to go back to that original condition is one and the same thing. One can be nostalgic about the past, but might not dream of going back to that original condition, by constantly postponing returning back, as we see in reflective nostalgia, which puts the emphasis on *algia*, rather than *nostos*. Thus, I think that mourning and dreaming to go back at the same time is what defines the restorative nostalgia and is what we witness exactly as far as the Palestinians are concerned. For the Palestinians, remembering their lost home and dreaming for the day when they would return back home are two processes which, I suggest, are like the two sides of a paper.

As I have discussed in the third chapter, the 'classical' diasporas were seen to be Jewish and Armenian communities. However, an increase in the global displacement of people and an increase in scholarly interest in the concept have resulted in attributing this term to various other communities as well, the Palestinians being one example. Indeed, the Palestinian people meet all the criteria specified by James Clifford for the definition of a community as a diaspora. Palestinian people have been dispersed from their homes against their own will and have been prevented to come back. Their dispersal started with the *Nakba* and continued in the subsequent years, as well. Palestinian people hold strong memories of their dispersal as well as of their homes they have left behind and they have a strong desire to return to their homes. Furthermore, the identity of the Palestinians as a community was very much influenced by this dispersal, as it has been argued that it was only after the dispersal that Palestinian-ness and Palestine acquired their contemporary meanings. As Helena Lindholm Schulz asserts, it was "by being expelled to homelessness that Palestinian-ness was ultimately formed."[268] This argument does not mean that Palestinian people did not have a national consciousness before the *Nakba* and, thus, before the creation of the State of Israel. It rather means that what lies at the basis of the contemporary identity of the

[268] Helena Lindholm Schulz, 'The Palestinian Diaspora', pp. 97.

Palestinians is the experience they had gone through during the *Nakba*. By meeting all these criteria, the Palestinian community can also be called a diaspora. Indeed, Palestinians have a specific term to describe their diaspora; namely, *ghurba*.[269] The Palestinian diaspora today resides in countries as diverse as Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, The Gulf states and various countries in Latin America and in Western Europe. However, there are also many Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza, which remain within the territory of Palestine and many others who live in Israel as minorities. Such a situation prevents us from telling that these people live *in* diaspora. However, we can still say that their lives are determined by diasporic condition, as Schulz does, as they were expelled from their home, hold strong memories about their dispersal and dream to go back there.[270]

Uprooted from their lands, Palestinians are nostalgic about the home they have left behind. This concept of home is used by Palestinians to refer both to their country, their village and their familial home. These homes which no longer exist are remembered by Palestinians through idealizing and romanticizing. A Palestinian refugee, for example, describes the past as "[w]e lived in paradise."[271] The land that was lost is remembered in terms of richness in the sense that one was able to live from the land and in terms of happiness. Another Palestinian who was born in diaspora examplifies this situation as the following: "The pre-1948 history that my grandfather gave me was not a history of tragedy. It was a history of how well we were doing in the land, how much we loved our land. He would talk about how he had horses that worked the land."[272] In addition to the land and property that was lost, there also exists a deep sense of longing towards the loss of society and community, the relations with the neighbours and the feeling of security that this

[269] *ibid*., pp. 92.

[270] *ibid*., pp. 21-22.

[271] *ibid*., pp. 109.

[272] *ibid*., pp. 109.

provided.[273] These accounts about the past and the land, however, did not always reflect the reality of class and economic tensions which were prevalent back then are kept out of stories.[274] The home left behind is always remembered in positive terms. Indeed, at some places, the Palestinians even built where they currently lived according to places where they used to live. A story told by Amos Elon about this point is very telling.

> Many Israeli soldiers were surprised and some were deeply disturbed to discover among the refugees a form of "Arab Zionism": the living memory of a lost homeland, to which they were passionately attached as the Jews had remained attached to Zion in the land of their dispersion. The education of these young soldiers – some were born after the establishment of the state – little prepared them for a discovery such as this. Upon entering a refugee camp one young soldier discovered that the inmates [*sic*] were still organized into and dwelled according to the village, town and even street they had lived in prior to the dispersion in 1948, villages and towns that were now thoroughly Israeli.[275]

When asked where they are from, most Palestinians answer by telling the name of a village or town, which they were born in or which, even if they never inhabited, their grandparents come from, and which now belonged to Israel. They even show the keys to their houses and some old documents to prove that they indeed own these places.[276] The Palestinians have various iconic objects that they use to commemorate the home. Olive trees, stone houses, oranges, keys and documents belonging to the houses they left behind, embroidered dresses and postcards, on which the photographs or drawings of these icons or the images of Palestinian villages and cities are put, are some examples. The semi-destroyed buldings of the 1948 to commemorate the violence of the war and the grave markers

[273]Ilana Feldman, 'Home as a Refrain: Remembering and Living Displacement in Gaza', *History & Memory*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 2006), pp. 18, 20

[274] Helena Lindholm Schulz, 'The Palestinian Diaspora', pp. 110.

[275] Elia T. Zureik, 'The Palestinians in the Consciousness of Israeli Youth', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Winter, 1975), pp. 58. The quotation is taken from Amos Elon, *The Israelis: Founders and Sons*. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1971, pp. 264.

[276] Dan Bar-On and Saliba Sarsar, 'Bridging the Unbridgeable', pp. 65.

in unexpected places to display the urgent burials under siege are left untouched to commemorate the violence that had been gone through both in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in the refugee camps. Other than these, both in the refugee camps and in the OPT, the walls of buildings and of the camps are full, especially in times of crisis, with posters of martyrs, murals of Jerusalem, of Dom Rock and of important moments of the refugee history of the Palestinians and with photographs of children throwing stones and of political prisoners. The posters of martyred family members are also put on the interior walls of houses. The Palestinians also named the schools, clinics, hospitals and shops after the Palestinian cities and villages.[277]

The Palestinians who personally experienced displacement were mainly an illiterate population, only few of the men having reached high school. Many members of the subsequent generations who were born in diaspora, on the other hand, have completed higher education. As such, there exists a wide educational divide between this first and the other generations and a shift from a predominantly oral society to a fully literate one.[278] This difference is reflected in the way different generations commemorate the past. Whereas the first generation commemorates the past more by depending upon the icons and by narrating stories about the past, the subsequent generations commemorate the past thorough reading as well as collecting testimonies and archival documents.[279] There also exist village memorial books who were prepared by generations born in diaspora through the memories and testimonies of their parents. These books contain information about the villages of the Palestinians and are published for a local readership.[280] Apart from that, another significant difference between the *Nakba* generation and the subsequent ones is that whereas the former one was mainly a rural agricultural society, the

[277] Laleh Khalili, *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration*. New York: Camridge University Press, 2007, pp. 6.

[278] Efrat Ben-Ze'ev, 'Transmission and Transformation', pp. 126.

[279] *ibid*., pp. 136.

[280] Rochelle Davis, "Mapping the Past, Re-creating the Homeland: Memories of Village Places in pre-1948 Palestine" in Ahmad H. Sa'di and Lila Abu-Lughod (eds), *Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 54.

latter one consisted of people who were mainly born and raised in urban environments. As a result, the latter group was much more able to learn, reach and use various media. Henceforth, for the subsequent generations, film- and documentary-making has turned into a significant commemorative genre. Amateur films which were made during visits back to villages as well as professional documentaries have become important commemoration tools produced as well as watched by the generations born in diaspora.[281]

The Palestinians, dispersed and fragmented from each other, uses various mediums which connect them to each other, which serve to the consolidation of collective memories and which endow them with the hope to return to home. One such medium is radio, which is used as a medium both to unite the Palestinians and to help them keep their memories alive. It is also used to educate the Palestinians about their own past, as their school education does not really provide them with that information. For example, a journalist who used to work in a radio station tells that he used his radio program to educate Palestinian people by making special programs on the important moment of the Palestinian history and also on old Palestinian villages, for which he invited guests to his program, who were ordinary Palestinians who used to live in that village, so that they could tell how the daily life in the village was like, what were the customs like, and so on. Another important medium is television. Using cheap satellite dishes, the Palestinians are able to access to various Arabic channels. It is also used as an important memory tool as, for example, Hizbullah's television channel al-Manar produced a docudrama series, called al-A'idun (The Returness), about the history of the various Palestinian camps, how they emerged and what their current political and social landscape was.[282] Internet is also another medium used for the construction of a unified sense of identity for the Palestinians who lived separate from each other. There exist various internet sites made by the Palestinians about Palestine in general as well as about specific villages. The websites enable people to establish ties across borders

[281] Efrat Ben-Ze'ev, 'Transmission and Transformation', 126, 136-7.

[282] Laleh Khalili, 'Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine', pp. 76, 77.

and post messages and photographs. They are also very informative for the generations who were not born there and who have never visited there.[283]

As their social cohesion was destroyed and as their national identity was denied by Israel, it has been a very important task for the Palestinians to assert their national identity and to unite people around it. As I have already mentioned, one of Israel's main claim was that there did not exist a Palestinian population having a national consciousness when the first Zionists came to Palestine and that a national awareness emerged only with the Zionist enterprise. It has been a significant task for the Palestinians to refute this claim. Many Palestinian scholars managed to bring "Palestinians back into the history of Palestine," by discussing the reality of a Palestinian self-consciousness before the arrival of the Zionists.[284] It is true that the Palestinians did not define themselves solely in terms of their peculiar nationality but also saw themselves as part of a broader Arab community. This fact should not make us perceive the Palestinian self-consciousness as a primitive or as a false one. When looking at the history of Palestinian self-identification, one should not search for a chronological development,[285] in which the Palestinians were initially the children of a greater Arabic community from which they cut themselves from in time as they grow. At times, putting forward a pan-Arabic identity was a political necessity for the Palestinians, mainly at times when there was a crisis with the State of Israel and when the Palestinians were in need of the support of Arab fellows. Such a strategic action should not divert us from the reality of a Palestinian national identity.

When the first Zionist pioneers came to Palestine, they initially built agricultural colonies. Therefore, the first clashes between the Israelis and the Palestinians took place in the villages. This situation determined how the Palestinians defined themselves against the Jews. The Palestinians adopted the figure of the *fellahin* (peasant) to define themselves. Still today, they wear peasant

[283] Efrat Ben-Ze'ev, 'Transmission and Transformation', pp. 136.

[284] Beshara B. Doumant, "Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine: Writing Palestinians into history" in Ilan Pappe (ed.) 'The Israel/Palestine Question', pp. 10.

[285] Issam Nassar, 'Reflections on Writing the History', pp. 31.

forms of dress, put on their head the *kaffiyah*, the traditional headdress used by men, perform *dabkeh*, the village dance and sing the songs remaining from those times.[286]

Education is one of the most important tools in portraying what parts of the past are significant and necessary for the constitution of the collective identity. UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in Near East), since its establishment in 1948 for providing services and aid to Palestinian refugees, and UNESCO have been responsible for the education of Palestinian children, especially those in the camps. The original educational program intended to help the refugees integrate into their host countries. In the 1960s, the educational program was changed into one which focuses upon enhancing individual capabilities through vocational, professional and technical training. After the war in 1967, UNRWA had to come to terms with the Israeli government in order to be able to continue educating Israeli children in OPT. As a result of the negotiations, UNRWA had to modify the textbooks in order to exclude every hostile references to Israel, as well as words such as Palestine, tahrir (liberation), feda'yi, to cancel Palestinian history courses and to replace the place names in Arabic on the maps with their counterparts in Hebrew. Such a situation meant that the instruction on Palestinian history had to be carried on during informal lessons, rather than through textbooks. The UNRWA teachers in the 1960s and 1970s, being themselves children from the camps, were very significant in the transmission of nationalist narratives to the children. The lessons carried on informally were important in the education of the children about the history of their own country. Not only children, but also adults were the recipients of the nationalist pedagogy. During the adult literacy classes, the Palestinians were thaught Palestinian geography and significant events and places of the Palestinian history. However, in the 1980s, the prominence of UNRWA in nationalist pedagogy decreased drastically. The autonomy of the school teachers and principles was shortened. So, they had to follow extensively the guidelines of UNRWA. This

[286] *ibid*., 31-32.

situation led the Palestinian NGOs to take on the pedagogical role and to teach the children Palestinan history and geography.[287]

Overall, it was difficult for the Palestinians to conserve a collective memory of the past, mainly of the years before 1948. This was mainly because the ordinary refugees leaving their homes in 1948 did not write any memoirs neither of their lives before expulsion nor of their exile. Even if they had written their experiences, the artefacts of their everday lives and the villages from where they were expelled were already destroyed. In the years following the explusion, the older memories were further silenced as there was a need for a "strategic choice of commemoration" against the sufferings that were happening continuously. What was more devastating for the Palestinian collective memory, however, was the silencing of the past by Israel through suppression of various Palestinian archives. In 2001, for example, Israel confiscated the Orient House and expropriated all the archive, which included land ownership documents which went back to the Ottoman Empire period. At the same year, all of the data on all aspects of Palestinian society, which was found in the Palestinian Office of Statistics, was confiscated by Israel. In 2002, during the re-occupation of the West Bank, Israel took the documents and computers' hard disks of the NGO offices, banks, hospitals, radio and television stations, schools and cultural centres, as well as the Land Registry Office, the Education ministry, the Health Ministry, and so on.[288] It was only very lately that oral history projects were initiated to record the memories of Palestinians.

Specific politicies conducted by the State of Israel also makes it difficult for the Palestinians to carry forward a national cohesive identity. It has been argued that at the very early years of the state, after the 1948 war, for example, Israel armed and favoured certain Palestinians groups against others. Furthermore, the state aimed at dividing the national cohesion between its Palestinian population by categorising all its non-Jewish citizens into Muslims, Christians and Druze. The state also favoured

[287] Laleh Khalili, 'Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine', pp. 73.

[288] *ibid*., pp. 60, 63.

the Druze over other groups, defining them as an "ethno-religious community," and granting them autonomy over various issues, such as endowments, religious education, and so on. Apart from that, Karmi claims that Israel adopted and labelled aspects of Palestinian culture, such as portraying Palestinian potteries as Israeli souvenirs; borrowing some features of *dabkeh* and putting them into *hora*, an Israeli folkloric dance; displaying Palestinian dishes as its own, and so on.[289]

5.3.3 How the Israelis are Represented in Palestinian Collective Memory

The Palestinians opposed to the right of existence of the State of Israel since its creation. Such a view is related with the perception of the Jews before the establishment of the state, even before the arrival of first Zionist settlers from Europe, because at that time the Jews were seen as a religious group and ethnically part of the indigenous community, as they very much look like the Palestinians, spoke Arabic and shared the culture of the Palestinians. The similarity between the two groups was also realized by the British, who set a commision the riots in Jerusalem in 1920, as it was declared that "[t]he Orthodox Jew of Palestine was a humble, inoffensive creature . . . hardly distinguishable from the rest of the peasant population."[290] Perceived only as a religious community, the Palestinians believed that the Jews did not have a right of self-determination to build up a nation-state.

The arrivals of the Zionists from Europe, on the other hand, confused the Palestinians as these new comers did not look like what they called as Jews. They looked foreign, behaved differently and did not speak Arabic. Their difference from the indigenous Jews, however, did not cause the Palestinians to give up on delimiting the Jews to a mere religious community. They further argued that being only a religious community, the Jews had no right of self-determination for the creation of a state for the Jews. More than that, the Palestinians saw these Jews as tresspassers who would corrupt and subvert the indigeneous culture, influencing the

[289] Ghada Karmi, 'Married to Another Man', pp. 19.

[290] *ibid*., pp. 70. The quotation is taken from Karl Sabbagh, *Palestine, A Personal History*. London: Atlantic Books, 2005, pp. 160.

values of traditional family and communal life badly. The existence of a Jewish state in Palestine, they believed, would destroy Arab purity, as the region was inhabited overridingly by an Arab population. Furthermore, being a settled community, they perceived the Jews as a tribal, parochial and selfish culture, which were inferior to the noble universalism of Islam.[291]

From 1920s onwards, the word "artifical" was used by the Palestinians to describe the nature of a Jewish state. As the Jewish community was an artifical one, as they were seen only as a religious group, their state was regarded to be artifical, as well. After the declaration of the State of Israel, for many years to follow, the Palestinians, countering their being ignored and rendered nameless and invisible by Israel, deprived the Jewish state from the same reality, by refusing to utter the word Israel and by using terms like 'the Zionist entity' or 'the artifical state' instead.[292] Another term that was frequently used to describe the state of Israel was 'colonial.' The term was initially adopted by the Palestinians and later on used by some Western scholars, as well. The name 'colonial' served a better political purpose than the 'artifical,' I think, as with the former term, the Palestinians were also able to challenge the self-image of Israel as morally superior and the argument of purity of arms. It also provided the basis for the arguments that Israel was an oppressor state, the Palestinians being the victims of its atrocities. Henceforth, the term 'colonial' provided the Palestinians with enough evidence to claim their victim status and to prove that they were the morally superior party.

The Palestinians considered themselves as the true victims. Being expelled from their homes, taken away the right to go back, turned into refugees or second-class citizens, pushed to live insecure and unhealthy lives with the bare minimums, imprisoned in the villages by the walls surrounding them, left to the arbitrary decisions of the Israeli officials and soldiers, cut from the international community, and so on, the Palestinians saw themselves as the victims of the sufferings caused by Israel. They could not comprehen why no action against a state who caused them

[291] Shlomo Ben-Ami, 'Scars of War', pp. 6.

[292] Sylvain Cypel, 'Walled', pp. 182.

so much sufferings was taken, either. What a Palestinian woman said, that is, "[w]e hit them with stones and they call us terrorists, and the Jews hit us with tanks and aeroplanes and missiles and guns and everybody watches and says nothing."[293] This is a view commonly shared among the Palestinians. Not all the Palestinians describe their actions against the State of Israel as only throwing stones, of course. Most of them articulate and, in fact, feel proud of the Palestinian suicide bombers. Indeed, the posters of the martyrs that I have mentioned also includes those suicide bombers who were perceived as to have sacrificed themselves for their community. However, armed attack towards Israel is not a terrorist act for the Palestinians, but rather a national movement aimed at defending oneself. It is the Israeli state which causes them to do such things, they assert, rather than because they are brutal enemies enjoying blood, as the Israelis prefer them to see.

One common tendency among the Palestinians is to consider the Israeli society as a monolithic society. The Palestinians perceived the Israeli society, since the establishment of the State of Israel, as a homogeneous one and neglected the fact that this society was indeed composed of different ethnic and immigrant groups having distinct cultural and linguistic characteristics. Such a view caused the Palestinians to imagine Israel's military, economic and political capability as greater than it really is.[294] Henceforth, their feeling of weakness and victimness *vis-à-vis* Israel increased proportionally.

One last word can be said about how the Palestinians perceived the Holocaust. For them, the Holocaust was mainly a European event. Therefore, Palestinians claimed that they were not responsible for what happened to the Jewish people in Europe, but believed that they were the ones who were paying the price of something in which they had no role, the price being defined as the existence of the State of Israel at the expense of themselves.[295] As a result, the common way to perceive the Holocaust for the Palestinians was to exteriorize it and to put the

[293] Laleh Khalili, 'Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine', pp. 105.

[294] Elia T. Zureik, 'The Palestinians', pp. 52.

[295] John Bunzl, ' Mirror Images: Perception and Interest in the Israel/Palestine Conflict', *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture*, Vol. 12, Issue 2/3, (2005), pp. 10, 11.

emphasis on the fact that they were not involved in it. They refrained from understanding how the Holocaust influenced the conditions in which they were living in. In the recent years, however, there started a tendency on the part of the Palestinian scholars to argue that the Palestinians should study and understand the Holocaust. Only after doing this, they believe, Palestinians can understand the existence of the State of Israel and find solutions to what they are going through accordingly.

5.4 The Wall

As we have seen so far, the perceptions of the Palestinians and Israelis towards each other, whose only negative sides is discussed here, revolves around the demonizing of the other side. Since the first contact between them with the arrival of the Zionist settlers in the 1880s, the solution of the problems has never been tangible. Instead, both sides have wished that the issue would be solved by hoping that one morning they would wake up and see that see the other side disappeared magically. Those Palestinians and Israelis who could not see the resolution in any other places, have tried to separate and differentiate themselves from the other side as much as possible. The culmination of this perspective was the construction of the Apartheid Wall, although it is the result of a decision-making process applied by one side unilaterally, without asking the opinions of the other side.

Writing in 1923, Vladimir (later, Zeev) Jabotinsky, one of the early Zionist leaders, claimed that it was not possible to persuade the Palestinians through peaceful terms about the Zionist project, as, he believed, the Palestinians, like every indigeneous people, "will resist alien settlers as long as they see any hope of ridding themselves of the danger of foreign settlement." He argued that waiting for a voluntary agreement on the Palestinian side would mean to abandon the Zionist project. What should be done, according to him, was to provide the development of Zionism "under the protection of a force independent of the local population – an iron wall which the native population cannot break through." What he meant by this

was not the establishment of a concrete barrier between the two communities, but was rather 'a wall of bayonets,' as Karmi argues, meaning, fighting with the Palestinians.[296]

The strategy of iron wall has been applied by Israel since the arrival of the first Zionists to Palestine. However, this strategy did only result in exacerbating the situation further, bringing the Israeli-Palestinian relations to an impasse. Israel, henceforth, started to look for other strategies which would prevent the Palestinians from entering to Israel. It was the end result of such a logic that in 1995, Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister at that time, charged Moshe Shahal, the then Energy Minister, to design a 'security fence' which would parallel the West Bank Green Line.[297] After the assasination of Rabin, Shimon Peres, who became the new prime minister, approved in 1996 the construction of a 'buffer zone' of 2-km wide along the Green Line, which would consist of fences, fields of electronic surveillance, helicopter patrols and permanent presence of soldiers, again to prevent Palestinians' entry. His successor, Benjamin Netanyahu, however, put this plan aside, as he believed that establishing a security border along the Green Line might be perceived mistakenly as a political one. The plan was taken again by Ehud Barak in 2000, after the failure of Camp David negotiations. Barak's plan comprised of withdrawal from lands which seemed expandable, such as Gaza Strip and of construction of a wall which would serve to annex the occupied territories which was kept by Israel in the West Bank. The plan aimed at imposing the final borders of Israel on Palestine. When the plan of building a fence was being developed by the Israeli politicians, the *al-Aqsa intifada*, the second national Palestinian revolt, broke out in September 2000. From that time on, there had been a dramatic increase in the number of Palestinian suicide bombers who crossed the Green Line and caused many causalities on the Israeli side. The situation provided the State of Israel with

[296] Ghada Karmi, 'Married to Another Man', pp. 3

[297] Green Line is the implicitly recognized border of Israel by the 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242. The border was decided in 3 April 1949 as the Israeli-Jordanian armistic line, separating Israel from West Bank. The Green Line delimits the territories under Israeli and Arab control and this is what the Palestinians claim to be demarcating the borders of the Palestinian state. This line, however, was breached by Israel during 1967 war. See, 'Dictionary of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict', pp. 145.

enough motivation to build the wall at last. As such, Ariel Sharon commissioned Uzi Dayan, the National Security Director, with finding a way that would prevent Palestinian penetration, ending up with Dayan's coming up with a proposal similar to the proposal of the previous prime minister. This is how the the plan of building a wall received Israeli cabinet endorsement and the construction started in 2002.[298]

The description of the history of deciding on the construction of a wall generally revolves around the eruption of the second *intifada* and the consequent necessity to prevent the growth of the number of Israeli causalities caused by Palestinian infiltrators. However, we should not tell this history by only starting from 2000. This history did not start with Yitzhak Rabin either. The decision to build up a wall was rather part of a longer history, in which Israel has sought to find a way to estrange the remaining Palestinian population as well as to expand its territories. Therefore, instead of being a strategic tactic, found necessary at a point in history, it was rather a culmination point of Israel's positioning and defining itself vis-à-vis the Palestinians. This situation was also obvious when one takes into account the fact that the construction of the wall, the discourse around which being a temporary security measure, proved in the years to come that it would rather be a permanent one, establishing a new border between Israel and Palestine.

The construction of the wall, which will be a barrier of 600 kilometers lenght once finished, has not been completed yet. The wall takes different forms according to the locality. It mostly consists of a fence of 45 meters wide, with a "smart" fence at the center with video cameras and electronic sensors. Alongside the fence runs a military patrol roads to reveal the likely direction of an infiltrator if one suceeds in getting through. A trench of four meters deep lies on the Palestinian side of the fence so that the vehicles cannot crash through. The fence is further bordered by mounds of coiled razor on each side. Although forming only a small percentage of the entire barrier, in some places the wall takes the form of concrete blocks of 8 meters high and 45 centimetres thick, with surveillance towers placed at

[298] Ray Dolphin, *The West Bank Wall: Unmaking Palestine*. London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006, pp. 12-14.

300 meters distance from each other.[299] The concrete wall is erected at places where the Palestinians settlements were close to Israeli ones and where there was the threat of attacks by snipers.

There is a disagreement over the terminology that should be used for this barrier. Israel refers to the barrier as a 'fence.' In his meeting with US President George W. Bush at the White House on 29 July 2003, Ariel Sharon presented to the President a copy of Robert Frost's poem, *Mending Wall,* and quoted the last line, that is, "[g]ood fences make good neighbours," in order to claim the necessity as well as the positive aspect of the barrier that was being erected.[300] The poem from which Sharon quoted is written from the position of a man who repairs with his neigbour the wall between them every spring. The line that was quoted by Sharon is uttered a couple of times throughout the poem by the neighbour. What was ironic about Sharon's bringing this poem forward is that the man, from whose position the poem is written, thinks that "[s]omething there is that doesn't love a wall, that wants it down" referring to the nature which damages the wall every year and, thus, to the unnaturalness of the wall itself. Furthermore, the man does not necessarily understand why they have erected a wall in the first place and why they keep building it again each and every year and does not know "[w]hat [he] was walling in or walling out, and to whom [he] was like to give offence." So, what is funny about Sharon's presenting this poem is that he chose a sentence from the whole poem which contradicts the spirit of the poem and posited as evidence for what his claims.

By insisting on the term 'fence,' Israel also wanted to put the emphasis, not only on good neighbourliness, but also on its security aspect, on its providing "defence." Since its erection, the Israeli discourse over the barrier has always revolved around the need to prevent the intruders from causing to harm to Israel, to protect the Israelis from terrorists acts, by even calling it an "anti-terror obstacle" at times. For the Palestinians, however, the barrier was a "racist separation" and they

[299] Isabel Kershner, 'Barrier', pp. 4 and Ghada Karmi, 'Married to Another Man', pp. 157.

[300] Ray Dolphin, 'The West Bank Wall', pp. 37. The poem can be read at http://writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/88/frost-mending.html

used the word "wall" (at times, "apartheid wall") to define the barrier. They assert that the barrier is being erected not for security purposes, as Israel claims, but to annex new Palestinian lands and to confine Palestinians inhumanely. That the barrier mainly consists of fence and that the concrete wall forms only a small percentage of the whole does not contradict with the term 'wall.' As the International Court of Justice declared, condemning the erection of the barrier, that the term "cannot be understoof in a limited physical sense" as it 'the wall' is the best way to understand Israel's attempt to annex new lands and to establish a new border.[301]

No matter how much persistent Israel is on the issue that the wall is not meant to annex Palestinian lands and to establish a permanent border, the facts point to the opposite. To begin with, the 80 per cent of the wall is constructed inside the Palestinian territory, resulting in the annexation of the 9.5 per cent of Palestinian lands. Furthermore, the entry and exit of the Palestinians through the wall is conducted through the gates and is left to the arbitrary decisions of the Israeli soldiers; the gate and permit regime applied by the soldiers very much resembles to a border regime. What is more, it is odd to believe that Israeli would spend that much money on the construction if it did not mean to keep the wall permanent. Furthermore, the rationale of the establishment of the wall, that is preventing Palestinians from entering into Israel and preventing Israeli citizens from terrorist acts, contradicts with the fact that an estimated 242,000 Palestinians are left on the Israeli side of the wall, add to this many Israeli citizens left on the wrong side.[302]

The establishment of the wall has caused many humanitarian problems on the part of the Palestinians. The wall separates the Palestinian farmers from their cultivated lands, the vintners from their vineyards, shepherds from their pastures and villages from their water reserves.[303] The Palestinians have to pass through the

[301] *ibid*., pp. 41. The quotation is taken from *International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 9 July 2004.

[302] Ghada Karmi, 'Married to Another Man', pp. 157.

[303] Gideon Levy, 'Apartheid Wall', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 4, (Summer, 2003), pp. 102.

gates in order to be able to go to their lands, schools, works and also to hospitals, and so on. The control of the gates, however, belong solely to the Israeli soldiers and the decision whether to open the gates or not is given arbitrarily. The wall, therefore, is an obstacle against the right of free movement of people as well as of seeking education and health. The wall prevents the connection of the Palestinians with an outside world and encircles them within.

With the establishment of the wall, any day-to-day contact between the Palestinians and Israelis is prevented to a large extent, as well. As Marton asserts, "[w]hen viable human contacts are prevented, the dehumanizing and even demonizing of the Palestinians can prevail."[304] It is as if the less the Israelis see the Palestinians, the more they know about them. The wall, which removes Palestinians from sight, also serves to the consolidation of the belief that the Israelis are the only inhabitants of the lands, which were empty once they got there. Therefore, I would like to finish this chapter of my thesis with an anecdote told by Morton, which, I think, illustrates the point I have just made.

> On one part of the separation barrier on the road to Jerusalem, a concrete divide blocks the view of Palestinian villages from Israelis traveling along the road. Uncomfortable with the grayness of the military concrete, some enterprising people have painted a pastoral view on the wall: painted trees and houses, a painted sky, a painted landscape empty of people. This act represents more than ever the process Israeli society has undergone: Rather than accepting the presence of another people on these lands, they forcibly block them out - and block them in – and wishfully paint a fake image of a land empty of people.[305]

[304] Ruchama Marton, 'The Psychological Impact', pp. 78.

[305] *ibid*., pp. 79.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this thesis, I have looked at an activist photographic undertaking, which, I suggested, fell short of its motivation to generate dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian communities. I initially problematized the idea of dialogue promoted by the artists of the project, which was believed to generate between these communities once they realized how similar they were to people from the other side. I have argued that the artists have failed to see that the conflict that has been going on between the two communities was also a kind of dialogue, in which they clearly told each other what they thought about each other. I have further stated that the 'peaceful' kind of dialogue which was supported by the artists was seen to be depending upon realizing how the other side was different from what is believed until that time. As such, I suggested, the artists did not deal with the issue of the interruption of the self and of the disruption of its self-identical nature, which should have been the basis of the kind of dialogue which is at the basis of peaceful co-existence. I further claimed that the artists grounded their project on a realization, in the present, of the unfamiliarity and the similarity of the other side and on a peaceful dialogue which would, consequently and hopefully, take place in the future. I argued that as such the artists did not take into account various dimensions that determined the way the Israeli and Palestinian identified, constructed and represented themselves and the other side. I suggested that they neglected the fact that the present of both communities were haunted by their present and that without rendering justice for the wrongdoings gone through in the past, without providing both communities with the opportunity to voice their sufferings and without interfering with the prevalent narratives and representations in both communities about the other side, then there could occur no dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian people. At the rest of the thesis, I have initially discussed the concept of collective memory. Then I have turn towards photography and its relation to collective memory, to be able to show how photography served

the function of remembering the past and how such a dimension was neglected by the photographic project under scrunity. Afterwards, I have turned towards a long discussion of Israeli and Palestinian collective memories and how both parties represented and constructed each other.

No matter how well-intended it is, I think that the project remains only a superficial one as it does not deal with various dimensions which determine the contemporary Israeli and Palestinian identities. By not paying attention to the heavy burden of the past on the present of these two communities, the project remains only a sympathetic approach to the Israeli-Palestinian question without any possibility of a real influence. However, we should not pass over the photographic project completely as it has certain parts which can be associated with the collective memories of both communities and which can be think of intervening with the way both communities identify themselves and each other.

First of all, the project can be thought of in terms of holding a relation to collective memory because of the fact that it provides each party with an image of the other different from what they are used to see. I have argued at lenght in the previous chapter how Israeli and Palestinian people construct each other as enemies, how the image they have in their mind about each other is a demonic one and how all these are related with what they choose to remember about each other. As we have seen, the differentiation they make between themselves and the others leads to a huge gap, to the extent of the dehumanization of the other. The photographs in this project, on the other hand, aims at displaying the similarity of both communities. In some pairs of photographs, it is really not possible to say which one is an Israeli and which one a Palestinian. We can speculate that the artists of the project have specifically chose for photographing people who would look very much alike. I have also already mentioned the artists' telling that Israeli and Palestinian people were not always able to find correctly which one of the photographs belonged to an Israeli or a Palestinian and that they were surprised to find out that they made mistakes. As such, the project has interfered with the way the self, the other and the relationship between the two are identified. This transformation was also realized with the deformation of the faces of the

photographed. As I have already said, the other projects carried out by the same photographer also involve people who were photographed from very close. However, this one is the only project in which the faces of the models are deformed. This should have meant something for the photographer for sure. I suggested that the deformation of the faces was related with the endeavour to render the other side unfamiliar, in the sense that the other was not what we had always thought of. Rendering unfamiliar was part of the process of showing how both communities looked similar to each other because it was only after seeing an unfamiliar photograph of people from other side that the viewers would be surprised, laugh, stop for a while and then would rework their ideas about the other side. It was after realizing how the other side was unfamiliar than its regular representations that its similarity would be recognized.

Secondly, and related with the first issue, this photographic project can be claimed to intervene with the construction of the other side in a variety of manners. To begin with, the project can be interpreted in terms of being an affirmation of the Palestinian and Israeli identities. We have seen in the fifth chapter that the Palestinians, but mostly the Israelis, tried to ignore that an other party, with whom to talk the matters, existed. While Palestinians have ignored the existence of Israelis by calling them Jews, the Israelis have tried to erase the Palestinian identity by calling them Arabs or Muslims. In this photographic project, on the other hand, we see the Palestinians and the Israelis, people who took part in this project *because* they identified themselves *as* Palestinians and *as* Israelis, and *not* as Arabs or Jews. As such, this project can be claimed to be a confirmation of the existence of the Palestinian and Israeli people once again. What is more, the people who were photographed did not have the face of a devilish enemy, either. On the contrary, they looked like agreeable people doing funny faces and making people laugh. One cannot see in these faces a Nazi-like enemy or a bloodthirsty Zionist. Other than that, the people from both sides are shown the same photographs. As I have already said, the two sides generally see each other through media. The images that they see about themselves and about the other side is different for each party. This project, on the other hand, shows both sides the same images. As such, these photographs

do not support the discourses built upon the images of peaceful self and of brutal other; the photographs are rather the same for each party. Furthermore, people from the two communities who were photographed did not look like monolithic unities isolated from each other. We can see that the Palestinians differed from each other a lot and so did the Israelis. Therefore, these portraits did not back up the narratives about the other which was perceived as a monolithic horde. Moreover, the portraits also displayed how much the Palestinians and Israelis looked like each other. In some pairs of portraits, it is not possible to tell which one is the Palestinian and which is the Israeli. Consequently, seeing these portraits also contradicted with the belief that the self was so much different from the other, having nothing in common.

Finally, we should pay attention to the fact that this photographic project uses a space which is already deeply endowed with memory. The photographs are put in various places in the cities, but they are mainly hung upon the Apartheid Wall. Putting the photographs of people facing each other on a wall which separates them from each other is, I think, more than just ironic. It rather refers to the transformation of an area already deeply embedded with memory. It does not ignore it, but rather reworks it. It uses what is already there to turn it into something new. The wall is generally thought by Israelis and Palestinians as beyond which the devilish enemy lives. The photographs hung up on the wall, however, portray people from the other side whose image contradicts with the demonic view. It is as if these people whose portraits are put on the wall are making fun of Israelis and Palestinians and of their attitude towards each other. In fact, this view is also articulated by one of the photographed, Reb Eliyahu, the rabbi. Talking about the project and about his participation in it, he argues that their aim with this project was to get rid of the wall, fear and hatred between Israeli and Palestinian people and, more importantly, to show the world that they could make fun of themselves and of the situation and that they could stop being too much serious about what was going on.[306]

[306] http://jr-art.net

Nevertheless, there are various other dimensions which are not taken into account by the project. First of all, although the photographic project tries to provide an image of the other side other than an already too familiar one and although the deformation of the faces of the photographed is a crucial dimension of rendering the other side unfamiliar, it is still not enough. As we have seen in the second chapter, the project tries only to alter the way the other side is constructed and represented and does not pay attention to the necessity to disrupt the construction of the self. As I have already discussed in that chapter, the emergence of the dialogue, which the artists of the project imagines, is seen to be depending upon seeing the other side from an altogether new perspective. The position of the self in this dialogue, however, is neither questioned nor problematized. The artists of the project are not interested in disrupting the construction of the self. However, the interruption of the self is what is needed for a realistic and permanent dialogue. Dialogue does not depend upon how the other side looks like at a certain period of time, but depends upon how the self constructs itself and learns to cope with itself. The project, on the other hand, does not intervene in the way the self positions itself in relation to the other, but rather simply on the way the other side is seen from the position of the self.

Secondly, the dialogue that the project upholds seems to be one which can be summarized as 'dialogue among religions,' as the project seems to be putting a lot of emphasis on the participation of the leaders of three religions in the project. Although a priest was also photographed and interviewed, the emphasis is especially put on the rabbi and the imam. The photographs of these two religious leaders are paired on the cover of the book of the project. Furthermore, they were invited to autograph the books of the project. They were also invited to Switzerland when the project was being exhibited there to symbolically help the creators of the project with the pasting of the photographs on buildings. Almost all of the videos about the project contain an interview with these two religious leaders. And so on. I suggest that such an emphasis put on these two religious leaders in terms of the project is a continuation of a perception which is very much fashionable for the last couple of years; namely, 'dialogue among cultures,' which almost always means

'dialogue among religions.' This dialogue is emphasized generally in the most problematic places of the world and in almost each and every case we see the religious leaders' deliverence of speeches in favour of the peaceful co-existence of communities. The reasons of controversy going on between communities is reduced to a clash between religious, the solution to which being searched again in religion. Such a perception is also prevalent in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian context. It is possible to come across with various speeches delivered in order to assert how the populations of the region, being the followers of three Abrahamic religions, were indeed cousins and how they knew deep inside that they wanted to live together in peace. It is of course favourable to witness such peaceful speeches instead of callings to war in the name of religion. However, the reduction of the conflict to a history of religions is also very misleading. Such an attitude results in the ignorance of the history of the conflict, of the political reasons of the controversy and of the prevailing discourses since the beginning of the problems. As we have already seen, both the Palestinians and the Israelis have tried to neglect the identity of the other party by calling the other as Jews and as Muslims, respectively. Putting the empasis on the history of religions again reproduces this discourse, although for peaceful reasons this time. The necessity to live together in peace is articulated through the Jewishness and Muslimness of these people, two religious identities which are also used by others to prove the barbaric nature of the other party. No matter how well intended the emphasis put on the religious leaders by the creators of the project and no matter how lovely the testimonies of these two leaders, I think that it still is an obstacle for peaceful co-existence of these two communities as I think that there could not be a lasting peace between them without acknowledging the Palestinianness and the Israeliness of the people and without paying attention to their peculiar histories and sufferings. A peaceful co-existence, respectful to the rights, histories and collective memories of both parties should not be grounded on Jewish and Muslim identities, but rather on Israeli and Palestinian identities.

Thirdly, the project seems to be handling the Israeli and Palestinian communities separate from each other, as if they refer to two distinct identities which an outsider should introduce to each other. However, the Israeli and

Palestinian identities are shaped in relation to each other, although their discourse seem to be ignoring the existence of an other side. Who is an Israeli cannot be thought independent of a Palestinian and who is a Palestinian cannot be thought independent of an Israeli. Although each side have tried to show for years how different they were from the other side and how they were the victims of the sufferings caused by the other side, their self-definitions have been shaped according to how they interpreted what had happened between them and to which incidents they put the emphasis while ignoring which other ones. Furthermore, as I have already discussed in the second chapter, the Israeli and Palestinian communities are already in a kind of dialogue with each other. The war that has been going on between them for years and the sufferings each party caused to the other are a way to tell how they think about each other. Consequently, Israelis and Palestinians are not two communities which are disconnected and isolated from each other and which should be brought together and introduced to each other. They are already in relation with each other and they know about each other already all too well. It is true that the kind of relation that the artists hope would emerge is of a different kind. However, to think of these two communities as if there exists no relation between them is misleading.

Forthly, the project can be criticized in terms of the absence of the supposedly existing common values between the artist and the audience. John Hallmark Neff argues in his article on public art that when there does not exist common interests and shared beliefs between the artist and the audience of his/her artwork, it is common to witness the failure of the artwork which was aimed to have an influence on the public. That is, according to Neff, when the artist's interests, beliefs and expectations do not correspond with that of the audience, then there is no possibility for the two to meet on a common ground.[307] In such a case, the artist's expectation from his/her artwork in terms of having an impact upon the audience remains only a romantic one. I assume that this situation is also the case in *Face2Face* to some extent and that it is most visible in putting the Apartheid Wall

[307] John Hallmark Neff, "Introduction: Daring to Dream," *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 16, No.4 (Summer 1990), pp. 857.

as the background of the project by the artists of the project. The aim of this thesis was not to discuss whether the project had any concrete effect on the Israeli and Palestinian people, as it was not possible to learn the opinions of these two communities about the project. However, I think that we should pay attention to one opinion about the project articulated by a Palestinian man, in order to be able to clarify the point I am trying to make. An Israeli daily newspaper, *Haaretz*, which published an article on *Face2Face* in 2007 while the project was still taking place, interviewed a Palestinian man, Khalil Khamis from Jerusalem, about what he thought about it. The man said "the pictures are beatiful. But I don't see them. I see all the problems the Palestinians are facing. There is no peace with this wall."[308] We can speculate that this might be a general attitude on the part of the Palestinians towards the project, in terms of being well aware of the good intentions of the creators of project but of thinking that they did not understand the core of the issue. The book of the project contains the comments of people from all over the world, who have come across with the project and who have shared their opinions with the creators. These people are mainly from other parts from the world, mostly from France, appreciating the optimism of the project. However, there are only two Israeli people who wrote down their opinions, supporting the project and there is only one person, not from Palestine, but who claims to have talked to her Palestanian friends about this project and to have been told that using the Apartheid Wall for such a purpose serves nothing more than to the normalization of the violence they are exposed to and that the wall has to be destroyed for a real peace instead of being used for such projects. Another commentor from France argued that taking the wall as a support for peaceful arguments resulted nothing more than in further institutionalizing the wall. The Apartheid Wall locks the Palestinians in, creating an huge open-air prison. The wall, for the Palestinians, is the materialization of their sufferings imposed on them by the State of Israel. Taking the wall as a background to articulate the necessity for peace might be seen as neglecting its dehumanizing factor. Although the project aims at bringing these people face-to-face in a manner which involves no hierarchy and which is exempt

[308] http://jr-art.net

from all the power relations prevalent in the real life, it can be criticized as reproducing these power relations as it sets as its background a wall which paralyzes the lives of the Palestinians. It is true that the portraits of the photographed were pasted in various places in the cities. Therefore, it might be seen as an unfair attitude to criticize the portraits put on the wall, as there were various photographs in various other places. However, it was the photographs hung on the Apartheid Wall which was promoted by the creators of the project. What I mean by this is that the creators of the project prepared a poster which invited the Palestinians and the Israelis to the putting of the portraits on the Apartheid Wall by informing about the date and hours of the pasting (see fig. 7). No such advertising or invite was carried out for other photographs put on other places. It is possible to argue from here that the creators of the project have granted a special importance and a symbolic meaning to the photographs put on the Apartheid Wall and to the participation of the Palestinians and the Israelis to this specific activity. I think that the creators of the project perceived the Apartheid Wall as simply a barrier which separates the Israelis and the Palestinians from each other and that they were oblivious to the fact that the wall was imposed unilateraly by Israel on the Palestinians. The wall carries with itself power relations which cannot be overcome by simply using it for another purpose, that is, for putting agreeable portraits and this is a major criticism point for *Face2Face*.[309] Therefore, no matter how good their intentions were, the artists failed to see the devastating influence of the wall on the lives of the Palestinians and the impossibility of a permanent peace as long as it remained there. They used the wall, which the Palestinians wanted to see destroyed, as a background to put their photographs on. In such a case, it is not possible to talk about a real confluence between the beliefs of the creators of the project and of the audience, the Palestinians in this case. It is true that various Palestinian and Israeli people agreed on to model for the project. However, as the

[309] In a way that echoes their assertion that they were neither pro-Palestinians nor pro-Israelis, the creators of the project did not use a single terminology for the Apartheid Wall and did rather prefer to refer to it as "security fence/separation wall" everytime they mentioned it.



Figure 7: The Announcement of the Pasting of the Portraits

Source: jr-art.met

creators of the project reported, this almost always necessitated long discussions to be able to convince them. It might be argued that these long conversations, which resulted in the persuasion of the photographed, brought them and the creators of the project on the same page, in the sense that they were convinced to perceive the project from a certain perspective. However, I am not sure whether such a common perspective can be said to be existing on the part of the audience which did not have the chance to listen to the arguments of the creators of the project for long hours. The only way the audience could be convinced was through visual means, that is, by showing them these portraits. The context in which these photographs are displayed, on the other hand, with the Apartheid Wall as the background, can be argued to have resulted in the interpretation of the project differently, not in terms of distrusting the good intentions of the creators of the project, but in terms of seeing the artwork in its final form as a useless one, which missed the crucial point of the dehumanizing factor of the wall on the Palestinian people.

Finally, and maybe most importantly for the concerns of this thesis, the project can be criticized in terms of neglecting various dimensions which determine the present Israeli and Palestinian identities. As I have already discussed, the project does not pay attention to how the past of both communities shape their present and how their contemporary situation is influenced by the heavy burden of the past. The project, for example, does not take into account the fact that both communities are influenced by diasporic condition and by nostalgia. Although Israeli community is not a diasporic one anymore, the eighteen centuries which have passed in diaspora have very much shaped their relation to Eretz Israel. The Palestinian community, on the other hand, is currently a diasporic one and its relation to their lands is very much influenced by nostalgia. Therefore, the project fails to pay attention to the insistence of both communities in having claims over the same land as well as to the reasons of this insistence. It does not take into account the history which determines the relation the both communities hold towards the same lands. Furthermore, the project does not pay attention to the collective memories of both communities, which determine the way the other side is constructed and represented as well as the position taken towards the other side. What I am trying to propose here is not, as I

have already said in the second chapter, that nothing can be done for peace to occur between the two communities as their memories are full of incidents of sufferings caused by the other side. Rather, what I propose is that for peace to come into existence, both communities should be provided with the opportunity to voice their sufferings. Moreover, both parties should be rendered justice for the sufferings they had gone through. The prevailing narratives which shape the current Israeli and Palestinian identities and the representations of the other side should also be intervened. Without realizing these three main points, there can occur no 'peaceful' dialogue between the two communities only because they realize how similar they are to each other. As I have already argued, the enmity between the two communities does not result from the fact that they have forgotten how much they looked alike, but rather from the fact that they remember the past all too well and only in a certain way. Therefore, that the project fails to pay attention to the fact that both communities are very much haunted by the memories of the past which cause them to construct and represent the other side only in a certain way, is a very significant point of criticism on its part.

Apart from what the project achieves and at what points it fails, there is one significant dynamic of the project peculiar to itself, which we should take into account in order to understand it better. Although the main target audience of *Face2Face* was the Israelis and the Palestinians, it can be argued that the project was aimed to reach to the Western audience as well. The project was actualized once and only for a very short period of time. We do not know exactly how long the photographs remained visible, but we know that there are a few photographs taken a couple of months later than the project, showing some portraits having been teared down (see fig. 8 and 9). However, although the project was realized in the Middle East context only once, it was not permitted to vanish altogether. A book of the project was released. Videos as well as photographs taken during the project were shared through the website of the project as well as through JR's own website. The photographs were exhibited in various European cities, both in the galleries as well as by dressing various buildings with the portraits. Articles and interviews about the project were published in various European and American journals and magazines.

Figure 8: Five Months After the Action, Palestinian Side of the Wall

Source: jr-art.net



Figure 9: Two Months After the Action, in Jerusalem

Source: jr-art.net

We can argue from here that although the project was initially aimed towards the Israelis and the Palestinians, once realized, another audience came into view, that is, the Western one. The exhibitons aimed at acquainting the Western audience with the project, supported by the website of the project and by the publishing of the book, which is not too much expensive but which still remains affordable for only a small portion of the world. The project does not only aim at changing the perceptions of the Palestinians and the Israelis towards each other, but also of the Western people towards them. The Palestinians and the Israelis are known by the rest of the world through media, especially in times of crisis. The Palestinians who are shouting for the death of the Israelis, for example, or the photographs of little Israeli girls writing messages on the bombs the Israeli army was going to throw on the Palestinians, or the pictures of people from both sides crying for their losses caused by the atrocities of the other side are the images we are used to see in terms of the Israeli-Palestinian context. The photographs of *Face2Face* not only shows another image of the other side to the Israelis and the Palestinians, but to the rest of the world, as well. Instead of images proving the barbaric nature of the Third World or evidences of the eternal misery of these people, the Israelis and the Palestinians are displayed in a truely different manner to the rest of the world, as well. We can argue, therefore, that the project can also be interpreted in terms of having an impact upon how the rest of the world perceives the Israelis and the Palestinians.

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