

FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, AND AN EPISTEMICO-ONTOLOGICAL
GROUND FOR RESISTANCE

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ABSTRACT

FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, AND AN EPISTEMICO-ONTOLOGICAL GROUND FOR RESISTANCE

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Michel Foucault characterizes power as ubiquitous and productive in the sense that there is no power-free truth, subject, and knowledge. Moreover, he studies the historical conditions of truth and subject to have an existence in a way that he historicizes them rather than delineating truth as corresponding to reality and subject as a self-subsistent and ahistorical substance. In this respect, his anti-essentialist account of power, truth, and subject is criticized on the account that he excludes the possibility of resistance against power through deconstructing any firm ground which is absolutely free from history and power and thus a promising substratum on which resistance can be substantiated. In this study, I will argue that these criticisms are ill-founded because they are either based on the misunderstandings of Foucauldian account of power or functioning with an assumption that resistance entails essentialist metaphysics as a ground, the assumption which is itself devoid of justification. Moreover, I will claim that it is an anti-essentialist ground—an epistemico-ontological ground—that supplies Foucault with a basis for substantiating the account of resistance.

Keywords: Foucault, Power, Resistance, Sexuality, Self-Transformation.

ÖZ

FOUCAULT, CİNSELLİK VE DİRENİŞ İÇİN EPİSTEMİK-ONTOLOJİK TEMEL

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Michel Foucault, iktidarı her yerde var olan ve üretken olarak betimleyip iktidardan bağımsız bir gerçekliğin, öznenin ve bilginin var olamayacağını savunur. Dahası Foucault, gerçekliği realiteye gönderme yapan ve özneyi de nevi şahsına münhasır ve tarihten bağımsız tanımlamaları ile resmetmek yerine gerçekliği ve özneyi tarihselleştirip bunların var olabilmelerini mümkün kılan tarihsel koşulları inceler. Bu bağlamda, herhangi bir öze gönderme yapmayan iktidar, gerçeklik ve özne betimlemeleri direniş olanağının temellendirilebileceği, tarihten ve iktidardan bağımsız bir çıkış noktasını terk edip iktidara karşı direniş dışladığı gerekçesiyle çokça eleştirilir. Bu yazının amacı bahsi geçen eleştirilerin ya Foucaultcu iktidar çözümlemesini yanlış yorumladıklarından ya da direnişin özlere gönderme yapan metafizik bir temele muhtaç olduğu yanlışlamasına kapıldıklarından temelsiz olduklarını göstermektir. Ayrıca bu yazıda, bu tür bir metafiziğin reddine dayanan Foucaultcu çıkış noktasının—epistemik-ontolojik temel—Foucault felsefesi için direnişin temellendirilmesindeki asıl dayanak olduğu savunulacak.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Foucault, İktidar, Direniş, Cinsellik, Benin-Dönüşümü.

To her

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Michel Foucault's radical account of power is based on the omnipresence of power and power's productivity. For Foucault, power is not only located in the hands of a particular class or a Hobbesian sovereign against whom there is just an innocent resistant whose appeal to unalterable truth or invincible justice will somehow and someday eradicate the pervert monarch or the colonialist classes. In his account, power is ubiquitous, i.e. there is no place, ideology, or truth which is absolutely free from power. Moreover, power is productive, since either by means of which or among omnipresent power relations, subjects and bodies are created, truth is constructed, and knowledge is obtained.

Such an account of power is much disputed and severely criticized due to Foucault's rejection of any power-free truth and ahistorical subject by means of which, for critics, it is possible to find a ground for resistance, justification for any normative claim against power, and legitimacy of political movements. In addition, it is suggested that even if Foucault had accepted some basic truth on which the possibility and desirability of resistance could be substantiated, the omnipresence of power would fool any critical or resistant movement and discourse. In other words, Foucault is criticized on account of his way of characterizing power by means of productivity and ubiquity; that is, critics presuppose that invincible truth or power-free subject is required if there is to be a resistance against power. Therefore, such critics do not want to relinquish their metaphysical assumption that resistance entails essentialism in a way that we can

justify our theories and political movements by means of an essence such as ahistorical truth or a self-subsistent subject.

The objective of this study is to present that Foucault's account of power does not exclude the possibility of resistance; therefore, there is no inseparable connection between truth in the sense that it corresponds to reality and resistance, or between ahistorical subject and the possibility of resisting discourses, i.e. essentialist metaphysics is not the *sole* way of grounding resistance.

To arrive at my aim, I will follow the traces of ontological and epistemological presuppositions of Foucault so as to determine his epistemico-ontological ground for resistance, which is neither essentialist nor discards the possibility of resistance. The field in which I will follow these traces will be mostly *Foucault on sexuality* rather than generalized theoretical speculations of him since Foucault always avoids giving clear-cut definitions once and for all as if he revealed what was universal or Platonic, but excavates separate definitions and functions of, say, power, subject, and truth in different discourses with different characteristics. In this sense, sexuality will be the most general subject for me in determining Foucauldian epistemology, ontology, and resistance.

In the first section of this study, I will describe Foucault's account of power in a tentative way. For this aim, I will characterize his anti-Hobbesian and anti-Marxist account, which refers mostly to the disciplinary, normalizing, and individualizing faces of power. Moreover, I will briefly mention the relationship of power with knowledge, subject, and truth. Before closing the first section, I will summarize Foucault's characterization of power in a sexual domain.

In the second section, I will present criticisms directed against him. However, I will limit the range of criticisms to those which are based on the assumption that ahistorical essences are *sine qua non* for resistance to have an existence, because, as I said, one of the aims of this study is to show that there is no necessary

connection between essentialism and resistance in general, and between anti-essentialism of Foucault and pessimism in particular. However, I will not respond to these criticisms in the end of this essay; but *throughout the essay* I will endeavor to dissolve the supposedly necessary link between essentialism and resistance.

In the third section, I will elaborate the characterization of Foucault's account of power in a way that it is possible to destroy some misunderstandings of Foucault's account and some criticisms which are ill-founded and based on these misunderstandings. Additionally, this section will clarify that ubiquity of power does not exclude resistance, and point out how Foucauldian resistance might be in sexual domain or against sexual-discrimination.

Then, under the heading of *Genealogy*, one of the methods of Foucault in his historical studies will be described. As we will see, genealogical method is a tool of Foucault in his counter-discourses against power, which will open the way for us to uncover the epistemico-ontological ground of him for resistance.

In the *Ontological Implication* section, as the subtitle implies, I will determine the ontological ground of Foucauldian discourses. This ground will be revealed by means of the Greek sexuality and Foucault's review of it with clarifying the suitability of this anti-essentialist ground to resistance.

The following two sections are reserved for the description of Foucault's epistemological presuppositions. These presuppositions will be inquired by means of reviewing his power/knowledge thesis, of his account of truth, and of the method of archaeology Foucault has used in his historical researches until early seventies. I will also characterize the similarities and dissimilarities between archaeological and genealogical methods with a clarification that Foucault's anti-essentialist epistemological ground is not preventive for resistance. And the last

section is formed for the purpose of dealing with some “methodological problems” possible to emerge due to my review of Foucault’s philosophy.

CHAPTER 2

POWER

Foucault characterizes power in a way that runs contrary to traditional views. For him, the intrinsic qualities of power are not repression or exploitation. To wit, power cannot be understood using Hobbesian or Marxist concepts. Power is not a right, like a “commodity” which is “transferred” or “alienated,” and in the name of which the sovereign has “the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it” (Foucault 1990, p. 136). For power’s applications are not merely based on “law” and “seizure.” Moreover, power is not an entity, perhaps of a metaphysical kind, which can be possessed or transferred.¹ In addition, its functioning does not have to be followed in production-relations in which one group dominates the other exploited one. That is to say, neither “economy” nor “class domination” is an essential notion for studying power (Foucault 1980, pp. 89, 90).

Therefore, power should not be viewed as an entity, like the state, disregarding subjects or individuals and their needs, and functioning to fulfill the needs of a totality or of any particular caste. On the contrary, power operates through

¹ In fact, Foucault is opposed to what he calls “juridical theory” which analyzes power in terms of “the model of a legal transaction involving a contractual type of exchange,” due to which the account of power can be given along the axis of legitimacy/illegitimacy of power or by means of the dichotomy between the legal and justified rights of sovereign and the oppression of him due to the transgression of contract, constitution, or law (Foucault 1980, pp. 88, 91). As opposed to juridical theorists whose concern is either to justify the legitimacy of a sovereign power or to set limits to the exercise of power and to observe if the actions of a sovereign or ruling class are in conformity with laws, Foucault is reluctant to limit the study of power to such a law/transgression axis and, as we will see below, he is rather concerned with the diverse relationships between power and knowledge, and with the disciplinary forms of power whose discourse is “that of law but that of normalisation” in contrast to “the juridical rule” determining what is legitimate (Ibid, p.106).

“individualizing,” on the condition that “this individuality would be shaped into a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns,” i.e. individuals must be normalized (Foucault 2002a, p. 334).

For the sake of clarity and for understanding how power functions as normalizing mechanism, it is useful to borrow an analogy presented by Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1982) between Kuhn’s paradigm and Foucault’s power mechanisms. For Kuhn, normal science requires paradigm or exemplar. However, the task of science, then, is not to transform its way of reasoning into new paradigms, but to find anomalies and explain them using the traditional system by appealing to accepted norms. Analogically, normalizing power mechanisms determine the normal way of behaving, living or having sexual intercourse, which are destined to define what is deviant or abnormal in order to normalize it in regard to norms, truth, or normality.

For Foucault, repression, exploitation, and forbidding laws—all such negative concepts—are insufficient to understand power, because either they are limited concepts in accounting for innumerable power relations or mechanisms, or they can reveal only one aspect of them, i.e. for Foucault, power is multifaceted and its account cannot be limited to repression, class domination, legal rights, and seizure or punishment; but, as we will see, power has normalizing, individualizing, and productive faces. From the eighteenth century onward, the Occident has been inventing more sophisticated and more effective power strategies which primarily do not suppress but control, do not disregard but function through permanent surveillance, do not take life by means of the right of laws but care for the strength of body, longevity of life, and prosperity of race. Therefore, power mechanisms do not primarily operate as monarchs but as governors. Moreover, Foucault does not study power as an exterior domain put into practice to control innocuous subjects. In Foucault’s view, subjects are not *per se* entities but constructions of power mechanisms or arising among power relations. Therefore, again, power cannot be studied through Hobbesian terms, i.e. Leviathan is not

constituted by subjects who are then subject to it, but they are shaped as subjects. Hence, “One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself... to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework” (Foucault 1980, p. 117). Thus, the study of power should not appeal to the individual as an “elementary nucleus” or a “primitive atom,” because “it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals” (Ibid, p. 98). To wit, power mechanisms or relations are “productive” in the literal sense of the word. Such a view is, I think, totally harmonious with the idea of “the omnipresence of power.” In Foucault’s view, although power is not a unitary being—one and the same power as an essence in all relations—it is available in every place, every moment, and every relation, since “it comes from everywhere” (Foucault 1990, p. 93). Two conclusions follow this omnipresence and productivity of power. First, “there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary” (Ibid, pp. 95, 96). Second, there is no discourse, knowledge, truth, or subject which is absolutely free from power.

However, we should keep in mind that Foucault is not a theoretician, whose theory of power reveals the essence of power, and whose theoretical principles are applicable to power relations once and for all. In one respect, Foucault’s avoidance of giving a definitive power theory is understandable. For Foucault would have rejected plurality and given *essential* characteristics of *the Power*, if he had given a theory defining power once and for all, which would be contrary to Foucault’s pluralistic and anti-essentialist project. On the contrary, Foucault studies the relationships between power and knowledge, and localizations of power in different places and epochs by means of genealogy as it reveals the different forms power relations take. Therefore, I believe, understanding Foucault’s account of power and its relations to knowledge, or making the criticisms of his account intelligible or labeling them as ill-defined, we should appeal to his genealogies. In light of this caution, I will explore his genealogies of

sexuality, and his method. But before going into sexuality, I will present one of his examples about the distinction between the “exclusion of lepers” and the “inclusion of plague victims” to reveal power’s functioning.

Foucault states that there was a strong separation of, a borderline between the lepers and the rest of the society at the end of the middle ages. It was forbidden to breach the boundary, and to have contact between the separated groups. Lepers were exiled “into a vague, external world beyond the town’s walls” (Foucault 2004, p. 43). That is to say, the healthy part of the town was purified through the “rejection,” “exclusion,” or “deprivation” of the lepers. Considering such a town and exclusion, Foucault believes that we usually depict power mechanisms with such negative concepts in addition to “disqualification,” “exile,” “incomprehension,” to wit, “an entire arsenal of negative concepts or mechanisms of exclusion” (Ibid, p. 44). In addition, for Foucault, it is believed that the ignorance of the monarch, the manipulation of truth, and the total exclusion of one class are the intrinsic qualities of power in which monarchy and suppression, exclusion and repression sustain its reign. However, in Foucault’s view, such a model of power is old-fashioned, which seems applicable only in a “slave society” or in a “feudal society” (Ibid, p. 51).

Nevertheless, for Foucault, in opposition to the leprosy case, at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, the West witnessed a different form of power whose primary tactic was to observe and control. Analogically, in the “plague-infested towns,” subjects were the objects of permanent “surveillance” and “detailed analysis” in order to be governed in an effective way (Ibid, pp. 44, 45). Every bit of information or knowledge about subjects had to be collected, classified, and analyzed. Therefore, it was not the case that the mission of power was to purify one part through excluding the other. On the contrary, everyone was put under permanent surveillance for the control of health, of the longevity of life, by means of the knowledge collected and information grasped so as to understand whether any particular subject deviated

from the norms of health; in other words, whether s/he was normal or abnormal. In this respect, Foucault's "panopticon" analogy, taken from Jeremy Bentham, is in order. Panopticon is a kind of ring-shaped building, mostly a kind of prison building in Bentham's mind. In other words, it is an idealized apparatus for punitive power, in the middle of which there is a watchtower. The ring-shaped building is full of cells having two windows, one of which is designed to be seen by the watchtower, and the other one is the source of sunbeams lightening the cells such that the process of surveillance can be continuous, and the cells totally transparent. Each cell is separated so as to individualize every inmate such that inmates' every behavior, gesture and mode of being in smallest detail, can be observed and recorded individually; such that any possible collective revolt and disorder can be eliminated; such that every particular constituent of the dangerous mass can be divided into determinate parts with assigned places. Moreover, although inmates are visible in every moment, observers have to be invisible by means of the Venetian blind such that no one among the inmates is able to discern whether the observation process is functioning, i.e. power must be faceless and without individuality (Foucault 1991, pp. 200, 201). Hence, for power to be exercised, no person or group is needed, since it is sufficient for every inmate to *suppose* that they are *probably* watched. Then, power, in panopticon, is not in the violence of wards, but in "an inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself" (Foucault 1980, p.155).

Given that panopticon is an idealized form of imprisonment, it is useful to compare it with the mode of functioning of power, and especially of punitive power in its *old form*, operating before the eighteenth century in the Occident, so as to delineate the functioning of a *new form*. In the archaic system, imprisonment had no effective role in the punitive power. Prison was a place in which the suspects were detained in order both to be kept until the genuine punishment was exercised, and to be saved from the attacks of injured party; it was a place for

punishment only if the crime was not so severe and the criminal was not fit to be sent to the galley (Foucault 1991, p. 118). Punishments were mostly based on tortures such as burning the criminal alive, or dragging him by means of horses, or exposing him to the amputating operations. Those operations had two functions. On the one hand, that torturing had to be observed by the inhabitants such that they would both be struck with the terror of power and encountered with the nonconformist who was marked by the red-hot iron, and the placard he carried that indicated the crime he committed, and the shame he had before the angry mass of people. On the other hand, since the laws were emanated from only one source, since the will of a sovereign was a law, and finally, since the breach of any law meant the injury against the very person of a sovereign, against his will, and against his omnipotence, the invincible character of sovereign's power must be repaired, i.e. sovereign had to win the war, take his vengeance, manifest his incomparable power before the spectators, latent criminals, and anyone having doubt of sovereign's omnipotence. However, that monarchical power, or what amounts to the same thing, punitive power, was full of "loopholes," because "It was discontinuous, rambling, global system with little hold on detail, either exercised over consolidated social groups or else imposing itself only by means of exemplary interventions" in such a way that if those exemplary interventions were too violent, which had to be so in order to function as exemplary, then there was a risk of inciting revolts (Foucault 1980, pp. 151, 152). It was possible that either by means of blasphemies and the like uttered by the victim who had nothing to lose, sovereign or the authority of him would be ashamed; or the spectators would attack prosecutors in order to help the victim escape when they thought that the victim had no genuine crime, or that the punishment was so severe that no one, but the sovereign was exposed to shame and the victim was respected and heroized.

If we turn back to the panopticon analogy which is a representation of an ideal form of confinement having its most suitable place in the gradual transformation of the way of punishing beginning with the late eighteenth and the nineteenth

centuries, for Foucault, what is punished is not the body, or at least the end of punishing process is not to eliminate body by means of cruel tortures. Moreover, spectator-obsession of power is also eliminated. For both the objects of punishment and an attitude toward body are changed in the eighteenth century.² On the one hand, not only the crime, but the criminal is punished. As Foucault puts it, “judgement is also passed on the passions, instincts, anomalies, infirmities, maladjustments, effects of environment,” etc. (Foucault 1991, p. 17). Of course, “They are judged indirectly” as “attenuating circumstances” based not only on the situation that the criminal found himself at the time he committed crime, but also on his past, his former crimes, i.e. his propensity for crime, his criminal character or delinquency, his obstinacy in assaulting social and legal conventions; and his supposed need for rehabilitation or normalization, his innate delinquency, or damaged psychology, or inability of suppressing natural instincts, sexuality or savagery by means of education or religion; or finally, his urgent cry for objectification before psychology, pedagogy, psychiatry, and criminology (Ibid, pp. 17, 18). Henceforth, of course gradually, experts are not only responsible for answering “Has the act been established and is it punishable?” but also “What would be the most appropriate measures to take? How do we see the future development of the offender? What would be the best way of rehabilitating him?” (Ibid, p. 19). For the criminal is not the one who opposes sovereign’s will or the society as a whole, but the one who possibly deviates from the norm, that is a *self-evident* and *innocent* indicator of the need of a mesh of social and natural norms, or of judicial and psychological norms.

On the other hand, as opposed to the tortured body, for Foucault, what we witness is “submissive” and “utilized” body. For him, when judges, philosophers and experts were proposing prison as a new form of punishment apparatus, their objective was such a body. For example, they suggested work-habit which must be imposed upon criminals, which would not only serve the acquisition of “love of duty” and awareness of “the difference between mine and thine”; but also such

² I will clarify this point further in the *Epistemological Implications* section.

occupations together with the strict determinations of meal-time, prayer-time, bed and wake-time, would transform the criminals' irregular lifestyle and body-usage (Ibid, pp. 234, 243).

Consequently, panopticon with its utility in observation, separation, and strict regularities, or the prison form dreamt by the nineteenth century experts with its gradual meshing with rehabilitating-mechanisms was, "an apparatus for transforming individuals" aiming at "the amendment of the guilty man" (Ibid, p. 233, 234).

However, for Foucault, from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries on, panopticon-like mechanisms were available, or at least beginning to be established gradually, throughout the Occident. Those mechanisms or institutions have turned towards "a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy"; in other words, the observing, correcting, normalizing, and also individualizing techniques have been mostly effective in the functioning of power (Ibid, p. 200). Individualizing power has operated throughout schools for example, by means of isolating every student, assigning a place to them, permanently controlling their performance and character; or throughout factories, etc. Therefore, panopticon was not only welcomed in the prison, but also in schools, armies or factories. Actually, for Foucault, Bentham's panopticon project was welcomed immediately, since the *neurosis* of the second half of the eighteenth century was based on "the fear of darkened spaces" in which there might have been "arbitrary political acts, monarchical caprice, religious superstitions, tyrannical and priestly plots, epidemics and the illusions of ignorance," which were waiting to be demolished, or observed and controlled, or illuminated (Foucault 1980, p. 153).

Moreover, for Foucault, it is a mistake to identify panopticon with any specific institution or even with institutional forms. "The Panopticon... must be understood as a generalizable model of functioning," when the objective is

correction, normalization, individualization, and observation; it is a discipline or a bundle of disciplinary techniques, “flexible methods of control, which may be transferred and adapted” (Foucault 1991, pp. 205, 211). It is the soul of “de-institutionalized” power as “a type of power” with its various techniques and interiorising effect.

Consequently, Foucault presents two forms of power. On the one hand, the monarchical form of power conducted upon the bodies by means of tortures and spectator-obsession, established on the absolute right, or what amounts to the same thing, on the invincible will, of a sovereign; however, old-fashioned, “post-feudal,” “pre-industrial,” and finally, juridical. On the other hand, there is a disciplinary form of power which is “de-institutionalized” with its adaptability and interiorising effect, conducted upon the individual with its very character, form of being, and way of life. That is, Bentham’s panopticon is an idealized and institutionalized form of what is de-institutionalized, of disciplinary society.

As for sexuality, in Foucault’s view, accounts of power always depict power mechanisms as repressive, dictating law-makers, as if the only instrument of power mechanisms was “law” or “taboo” or “censorship” determining what was “licit” and “illicit,” or what was “permitted” and “forbidden” in sexual intercourse; as if power functioned only through “the threat of a punishment” (Foucault 1990, p. 84). In other words, in such critiques of power, the “repressive hypothesis” reigns. For Foucault, the repressive hypothesis follows the “juridico-discursive” model of power by which the account of power is limited to the place where the actors are the legislator and the discourse of a law both of which are the sources of prohibitions regardless of whether power is exercised on sex or whether it is exercised by “the prince who formulates rights, of the father who forbids, of the censor who enforces silence, or of the master who states the law” (Ibid, p.85).

In the repressive hypothesis, it is believed that, from the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards, but most aggressively in the nineteenth century Victorianism, sexuality was reduced to silence with only the productive and legal sex remaining available. Only the *relata* of the family had the right, not only to have sexual intercourse, but also to talk about, and confirm sex and its very existence. There was no talk of sexuality outside the conjugal relationship; no discourse on what was illicit. It was accepted that, for example, there was nothing to say about the sexuality of children, since it was believed that it did not exist. Therefore, the characteristics of such critiques are their way of depicting power which makes sexuality “disappear,” functions with “an injunction to silence, an affirmation of nonexistence” (Ibid, p. 4). Hence, given this myth of repression, for the defenders of the repressive hypothesis, we began to liberate ourselves gradually, for example, thanks to Freud. However, if sexuality has been repressed for centuries, scientific discourses with their “scientific guarantee of innocuousness” are not sufficient (Ibid, p. 5). For them, we should modify the laws and abrogate prohibitions, these being the *sole* sources of our misery, to regain the right to speak on the truth of our desires, pleasures, feelings, in or outside science, without punishment. Thus, the increase of sexual discourses in or outside science is depicted as an indication of the right way, the last destination of which is the salvation from, or the condemnation of power, and the reign of truth *contra* ignorance, negligence, and repression.

However, Foucault is not content with the repressive hypothesis as in the case of his rejection of Marxist and Hobbesian critiques of power as inadequate. He is skeptical about both the tenability of the repressive hypothesis and the unwarranted distinction between power mechanisms and the critiques of it. Initially, as we saw, power has not operated primarily by laws or repressions, but by control and surveillance; not by the law of the state to punish, but by the rule of the truth or norm to normalize. Secondly, for Foucault, in contrast to repression and injunction to silence, the real explosion in the number of discourses on sex has been available for the last three centuries before which Christian authority had

desired to hear everything, not only and essentially about acts of sodomy, adultery, or fornication, but about all “thoughts, desires, voluptuous imaginings, delectations, combined movements of the body and the soul” (Ibid, p. 19). The aim was to control the community’s purity, to govern sexual life and behaviors, and to normalize in the name of God.

Such a desire to hear, and the strategies to incite for confession, always operate by means of “truth,” both in Christianity and, after the eighteenth century, in “demography, biology, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, ethics, pedagogy, and political criticism” (Ibid, p. 33). For instance, since the middle ages, the Occident has elaborated techniques for confession, “for producing truth,” associated with incitements, laws, or tortures (Ibid, p. 59). Such a truth-hunt through sexuality is the western strategy of “the hermeneutics of the self.” Every Christian, in this hermeneutic occupation, should have deciphered his thoughts, involuntary images, or movements in the body, temptations or behaviors, to see whether they were illusive, hiding anything about sexual aberration in the depths of the self with all its dangers and impurities. In other words, everyone should have understood who he was by means of his sexuality and sexual identity, or by means of his *true* feelings behind the illusions, feelings to be confessed in every detail, both to the penitent himself and to the more experienced confessor, to see if there was any abnormality or sin to be normalized or governed, regardless of its termination in an illegal act (Foucault 2000b).

Moreover, after the eighteenth century, “new technologies of sex” have not been confined to Christianity and religion. Sex was a matter of “the social body” (Foucault 1990, p. 116). Everyone had to be the object of permanent surveillance and control. Power relations and control battles were not only limited to the relation between the penitent and the confessor, but “children and parents, students and educators, patients and psychiatrists, delinquents and experts” were the new protagonists of the field (Ibid, p. 63). In this secularized field, control mechanisms did not relinquish confession techniques, but elaborated them in a

different taxonomy: the Christian view of condemnation and purification was replaced by “the rule of the normal and pathological” (Ibid, p. 67). This was the place of reason and scientific truth. Henceforth, sex was to be confessed in order to be administered by means of scientific norms; “it was necessary to analyze the birthrate, the age of marriage, the legitimate and illegitimate births, the precocity and frequency of sexual relations, the ways of making them fertile or sterile” (Ibid, p. 25). Mostly, what was at issue was not sex but aberrations, or perversions; medicine or psychiatry aimed to rescue the hygiene of the society, to normalize or confine perverts or “degenerate and bastardized populations” by means of the scientific truth of sexuality (Ibid, p. 54). Moreover, *the truth* about heredity revealed that any “sexual pervert,” like a homosexual, would possibly have “a hemiplegic ancestor, a phthisic parent, or an uncle afflicted with senile dementia,” and that any sexual aberration would cause devastating results for the race in the future (Ibid, p. 118). Therefore, every bit of life needed to be controlled, governed, and explored through confession.

Hence, the myth of repression with all its so-called tools such as injunction to *silence* or *nonexistence* is defective. For Foucault, in the West, man is transformed into the “confessing animal”—rather than being oppressed in silence—whose liberation concept is based on confession of the truth (Ibid, p. 59). However, as opposed to the repressive hypothesis, power is productive in the sense that, through power mechanisms or among power relations, not only discourses, but also subjects are constructed. For power, for example, cannot suppress or make aberrant invisible, punish whenever s/he arises, but must accept s/he as a nature, history, an entity whose nature must be understood through detailed analysis, since power requires knowledge to control. In other words, power does not repress any nonconformist, but produces perverts with their original nature and different sexuality. Given this requirement, for instance, before the nineteenth century, “sodomy” was an illicit occupation the occupant of which is nothing but the one who did not conform to the rules due to his nonconformist actions. However, “The nineteenth century homosexual” was a nature, a deviant to be normalized, “a

personage,” “a past,” “a case history,” “a childhood,” or the one who had a different “morphology,” “a mysterious physiology,” and “a species” with “a hermaphroditism of the soul” (Ibid, p. 43). Therefore, the sodomite and the homosexual are not one and the same. Their identities are defined by power mechanisms or among power relations.

As opposed to the repressive hypothesis depicting sexuality as a naturally given but repressed constant, in Foucault’s view, from the eighteenth century onward, the “deployment of sexuality” was a control-apparatus whose primary tactic was to control and govern by means of confession, incitements for confession, constructions of subjects, and both scientific and hermeneutic truths which are not concerned primarily with illegal acts, but with different forms of sexuality, with pleasures or desires hiding the truth of man, with abnormal sensations or movements of the body. However, this body is not an ahistorical essence waiting to be discovered. Foucault states, “I do not envisage a ‘history of mentalities’ that would take account of bodies only through the manner in which they have been perceived and given meaning and value; but a ‘history of bodies’ and the manner in which what is most material and most vital in them has been invested” (Foucault 1990, p. 152). In this respect, for example, one of the body-constructions was the “flesh” or the convulsed body of the eighteenth century Christianity, which was constituted due to the transformations of the way power functioned.³ As Foucault states,

³ For Foucault, the Christian power had functioned between the twelfth and seventeenth centuries by means of punishments given to the breaches of the commands in sexuality. In this respect, what were to be sought and punished were sinful acts such as “fornication,” “adultery,” “debauchery,” “abduction,” “sodomy,” or “bestiality” (Foucault 2004, p. 185). However, beginning with the eighteenth century, power has functioned so as to control not primarily acts, but the “movements,” “senses,” “pleasures,” “thoughts,” and “desires” of body (Ibid, p. 186). Henceforth, every desire or image with the voluntary and involuntary movements of the body had to be confessed, analyzed, and controlled. To wit, every movement of the body, every sensual pleasure of any sense organ needed to be under permanent control since the body with its movements and pleasures was defined as a locus of all sins due to some intrinsic mechanisms of it. That body was a lustful flesh with the soul having perverse desires.

The body is now a body in which there exists a series of mechanisms called “ticklings,” “titillations,” and so on, a body that is the seat of multiple intensities of pleasure and delight, and a body that is driven, sustained, and possibly held back by a will that does or does not consent, that takes pleasure or refuses to take pleasure (Foucault 2004, pp. 201, 202).

Additionally, for Foucault, when medicine became a foundation for “hygienic control of sexuality” in the eighteenth century, its domain was not the construction of another body, but the Christian flesh which was re-codified by means of “instinctual disorders,” “nervous system,” voluntary and involuntary movements of the body, and the “notion of hystero-epilepsy,” instead of ticklings or titillations (Ibid, pp. 223, 224).

Moreover, we should keep in mind that, for Foucault, sexuality is not “a kind of natural given,” but “a historical construct,” a “network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power” (Ibid, pp.105, 106). Moreover, what concerns Foucault in his historical studies of western sexuality is not the history of sexual acts or of libidinal manifestations but of sexuality as an “apparatus” or “*dispositif*” whose elements are “discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions” (Foucault 1980, p.194). Hence, an apparatus is a “system of relations” formed between such elements, it is a particular combination of both discursive and non-discursive elements coming into existence for strategic purposes, for the “manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilizing them, utilizing them (Foucault 1980, p.196). For example, a scientific discourse can be used as a regulatory guide of human actions, or an architectural form can have a strategic usage such that by means of it, it might be possible to observe every behavior of inmates in order to regulate them in accordance with particular laws and moral imperatives

or to collect knowledge by means of observation so as to decide which measures should be taken in order to govern human behavior, or a discourse “can function as a means of justifying or masking a practice” (Ibid.).

In this sense, the myth of repression with its juridico-discursive account of power was merely one of the tactics in omnipresent power relations to make control universal, to make it warranted, to incite for confession; it was to say, since sexuality carries a danger of degeneration, and since one of the reasons for its danger is its repression, we should confess the truth of all our desires and pleasures in order to govern them with the help of experts. Therefore, there is no liberation or rupture between power mechanisms and the critiques of them. Liberation lies not in the scientific or hermeneutic truth of sexuality desiring to arise to the surface from the depths of selves.

CHAPTER 3

CRITICISMS

Owing to such an account of power with its rejection of repressive hypothesis, Foucault has been criticized severely. For example, it is argued that if power is omnipresent, it is not plausible to believe in liberation which should be one of the basic elements of power-studies. Even if there is a possibility of “moving from one set of practices to another,” i.e. even if there is a possibility of leaving any specific power relation with all its mechanisms and strategies, it is hard to see how such a movement might be defined as liberation since Foucault excludes the plausibility of any prediscursive and power-free “common measure” to appraise the “impositions” of separate fields (Taylor 1984, p. 174). I will call this criticism “the Liberation Argument.”

The omnipresence of power and the impossibility of a prediscursive subject pose another problem for Foucault: the feasibility of resistance. He is criticized for precluding any basis for the “explanation” of resistance. For instance, if the explanatory concept of resistance is a “resisting other” or the modification of the self into the new self, as opposed to, and in order to resist power, it is hard to elaborate it, since every “other” is also a strategic construction among ubiquitous power relations (Philp 1983, p. 44). In addition, the lack of explanation for resistance and the famous belief in omnipresence make it difficult to justify why we should resist (Ibid, p. 44). I will call this criticism “the Explanation/Justification Argument.”

Moreover, it is argued that Foucault's "antiessentialism," "his extreme reluctance to admit the fundamental character of any notion other than Power/Resistance" produces, yet again, a problem of resistance, since there is no basis for him to substantiate his philosophy against power (Horowitz 1987, p. 65). For every place, discourse, or relation is "colonized by power" (Ibid, p. 64). However, Foucault requires some basic notions such as truth to be intelligible. As it is stated, Foucault believes that truth is constructed by power mechanisms or among power relations for the control of subjects as in the hermeneutics of truth and in the so-called human sciences. It is argued that, Foucault, hence, depicts power as hiding itself behind the construction of truth, and functions by means of "disguises," "masks," and "falsehood" (Taylor 1984, p. 174). Therefore, he requires prediscursive and power-free truth to oppose to power, to reveal disguises, and to uncover the veil of Maya. At least, he requires some true statements so that his philosophy might be separable from a fairy-tale, when he depicts the falsehood of power. Hence, Foucault has to accept truth for the sake of the possibility of resistance and liberation which might be grasped by means of negating what is false, that which is constructed and illusion. I will call this criticism "the No Ground Argument."

Accordingly, it is emphasized that since there is no essence to appeal to among power relations, but only power and resistance, there is no hope of changing the situation radically, since every modification or introduction of "a new reality principle" with "a new self" is nothing but the birth of original perverts or "others," since, as we saw, power mechanisms construct the true way of living, normal behavior, or sanitized sexual intercourse which defines the scope of normality, and determines abnormal (Horowitz 1987, p. 66)—the view which I will call "the Radical Change Argument."

Similarly, anti-essentialism of Foucault faces essentialist attacks in feminist context, depending upon the supposition that Foucault's assault on essential self, truth, or the innocence of discourses about justice or human rights, eliminates any

attempt to break oppression in emancipatory movements (McLaren 2004, p. 214). In one respect, such criticisms presuppose that the only possible way for resistance and liberation of women is postulating woman as a free agent resisting against patriarchal power through appealing to the norms of social or human rights, or to the truth of womanhood which has been represented in a false way, but its real and true representation might somehow eliminate the oppression. I will call this argument “the Feminist Argument.” Surely, there are different criticisms of Foucault in feminist context which I consciously omit, because my exposition of criticisms and their solutions are mostly based on the debate over essentialism/anti-essentialism and normativity in regard to truth or reality/relativity in regard to power or paradigm.

Obviously, such arguments—especially the arguments about truth—might be incorporated into accounts of sexuality. For the belief in constructed truth and the condemnation of western confessions for the production of truth prevent the so-called perverts or, say, homosexuals from keeping their faith in scientific truth which precluded or will preclude religious-moral discrimination against them; or from depicting their desires, passions, ways of life, to wit, their truth in or outside science to be understood, in order to resist normalizing power mechanisms or, as Foucault would say, “the racisms of the state” (Foucault 1990, p. 54). I will call such an imaginary criticism “the Sexual Discrimination Argument.”

Lastly, Foucault’s unwillingness for accepting any normative support both in epistemological and political level is exposed to severe criticisms such that he is blamed for occluding the possibility of resistance. As Nancy Fraser (1981) suggests, Foucault “suspends” or “brackets” the question of “truth/falsity” and “truth/ideology” in the sense that he obviates or just disregards “the problematic of epistemic justification” when he alloys power with knowledge once and for all without postulating any *criterion* for separating power’s distortions from genuine knowledge—although, for Fraser, such a bracketing can be motivated by “heuristic” or theoretical needs, Foucault is much closer to “epistemological

cultural relativism” (p. 275). Furthermore, Foucault disregards not only epistemological but also “normative justification” such that he totally suspends the question of legitimacy/illegitimacy of power or of particular power mechanisms having strong correlations with the production of knowledge, with the construction of subjects, and with the imposition or direct formation of particular lifestyles. However, Foucault’s vicious suspensions, Fraser continues, do not free him from falling into “normative ambiguities” in the sense that he does not refrain from seeing his discourses as counter-discourses or counter-power and from critiquing current power practices as “undesirable and in need of dismantling and transformation,” which are currently ubiquitous such that it is impossible to dismiss any movement or theory as adulterated by power or as inadequate for purifying its “power-laden” characteristics (Ibid, pp. 280, 285). Against this background, Fraser types her mostly quoted words about the impasse of Foucauldian account of power:

Foucault calls in no uncertain terms for resistance to domination. But why? Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions of some kind could Foucault begin to answer such questions. Only with the introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us *what’s wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it* (Ibid, p. 283), [Emphasis mine].

As an additional support, Jürgen Habermas (1992) champions Fraser’s beg for normativity by means of defaming Foucault’s position as falling into vicious circle due to power’s omnipresence, its impunity in regard to purified normative refuges, and therefore the limited place of every counter-power which is destined to move “within the horizon of the power that it fights,” as long as Foucault does not detach himself from relativism and does not appeal to any power-free *criterion* to warrant resistance or any counter-power (p. 281). Obviously, if we put the cart before the horse, both Fraser’s and Habermas’ beg for normativity as to discover some *criteria* in blaming modern power, leaving vicious circle, and pointing out “what’s wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime” in quest

of resistance, is to beg for acquiring an answer for what will be marvelous about tomorrow, i.e. what is the path for salvation in which we will be enlightened about the comparative decadence of the present in the face of redemption; and what will be the rubrics of the Promised land which can be unveiled beforehand if we leave relativism and beg for normativity and truth? Accordingly, I will call such a search and disappointment about normativity in Foucault's philosophizing as "the Salvation Argument."

However, I believe that all these criticisms are ill-founded because they are based on some misunderstandings of Foucault's characterization of power, and the method—genealogy—he uses with his epistemological and ontological implications. Therefore, in the next two sections, I will present Foucault's account of power with further details and characteristics of genealogy to respond to criticisms directed against him. Then, I will turn to some of his genealogies about sexuality to follow the traces of epistemological and ontological implications of him in order to both continue to encounter criticisms and to reveal Foucault's heritage so as to determine Foucauldian resistance and its possibility among power relations and against the power mechanisms he describes.

CHAPTER 4

POWER RELATIONS

In order to understand Foucault's standpoint fully and to face criticisms, it is important to understand his account of power in further details. For Foucault, power must be viewed "as the multiplicity of force relations" (Foucault 1990, p. 92). To wit, power has a relational character; hence, different *relata*, strategies, institutions, or mechanisms occupy the battle field, in which, due to diverse encounters, collisions, or juxtapositions, mechanisms or *relata* support each other, confront their adversaries, modify their strategies, or change their roles. Hence, it is important to note that Foucault does not talk about "Power with a capital P," in which we have the omnipotent power and suppressed resistant (Foucault 1996, p. 260). Then, the term power is used in reference to the relations in which, as we saw, panopticon-like strategies have been available from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries on. Therefore, henceforth, I will call power both as a relation with a particular form and as a particular form or strategy between various relations.

Laws, mechanisms, institutions, sovereigns, or dominating classes, are not intrinsic occupants of power, but they are organized in force relations as strategic tools to control, govern, or even to dominate; therefore, they are "the terminal forms power takes" (Ibid, p. 92). As for sexuality, what Foucault studies is not the reason why power—as if it were an entity—constructs any specific truth as its tool, but the determination of particular "power relations" in the field of sex, and of some modifications in these relationships due to counterinvestments or counter-attacks (Ibid, p. 97).

Moreover, although violence might be available in power relations, it is not an essential strategy in them. Power is operated primarily not through the manipulation of bodies but it is exercised on actions, i.e. in these relations: “Power exists only as exercised by some on others,” and especially on the actions of others (Foucault 2002, p. 340). To wit, it is a process of governing actions, but also thoughts and desires; it is “governmentality” (Foucault 2007, p. 134). That is, any occupant of a specific power relation endeavors to govern the actions of an opponent occupant by means of the determination of “the field of possibilities in which the behavior of active subjects is able to inscribe itself” (Ibid, p. 341) as in the case of *voluntary* confessions of sexual desires to priests or psychoanalysts. Therefore, modern power relations do not primarily present slavery or chains, but the governance of actions and possible behaviors. Hence, power can be practiced only over *free* subjects, and “slavery is not a power relationship when a man is in chains” (Ibid, p. 342).

Moreover, “Power relations are... nonsubjective” (Foucault 1990, p. 94). One of the reasons of power’s nonsubjectivity is the inconceivability of putting any specific individual or group on panopticon.⁴ For holding panopticon’s privilege is to be outside of it, which is to transform power studies into one of the old-fashioned monarchical power theories. In this sense, as opposed to the Hobbesian account of power, panopticon allows, analogically, everyone to observe the one who observes; that is, panopticon permits the observation-process last *ad infinitum*. In other words, the genuine holder of panopticon might only be the famous Leviathan which is left out in Foucault’s philosophy; therefore, for Foucault “there is no absolute point.” Yet, in Foucault’s analyses, panopticon is like a “machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised” (Foucault 1980, p. 156). That is, for example, the monarch himself is observed by psychiatry, medical statistics, or by himself. For Foucault’s description of power opposes traditional accounts of

⁴ See *Power* section.

power such that panopticons are not always material beings, and that their effects do not always come from outside. As an example, take the Christian hermeneutic occupation in which not only believers, but also priests had to observe themselves, e.g. their bodily movements or their nocturnal images which might be the source of some impure desires;⁵ or both bodily and spiritual dietary obsessions; or the eighteenth and the nineteenth century bourgeoisie techniques⁶ to observe, control, and normalize *itself*, that caused the emergence of a strange situation in which the observer and the observed were identical.

Additionally, the second reason for the nonsubjectivity of power is its relational character in the sense that it is impossible to determine the state, Christianity, or psychiatry as dominating and subjects as dominated once and for all. Therefore, every *relatum* of the relationship can have a different role with its separate strategy. For example, Foucault states that beginning with the nineteenth century, a lot of discourses both in medicine and in legal science about “the species and subspecies of homosexuality, inversion, pederasty, and ‘psychic hermaphroditism’ made possible a strong advance of social controls” in the field of the dichotomy between normality and abnormality (Foucault 1990, p. 101). However, another *relatum* of the relationship counterinvested its discourses about the “normality” of homosexuality. Hence, it is not the case that *the Power* functions through discourses on dominated class, but “Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations” (Ibid, pp. 101, 102). Moreover, for

⁵ See *Power* section.

⁶ For Foucault, beginning with the eighteenth century, four different strategies have emerged, in the West, over sex and body. These were “A hysterization of women’s bodies,” “A pedagogization of children’s sex,” “A socialization of procreative behavior,” and “A psychiatrization of perverse pleasure,” which more or less correspond to the emergence of “feminine body” as “thoroughly saturated with sexuality,” of onanism believed to be the cause of moral and physical degeneration of the masses, of hygiene or birth-control techniques, and of pathologized sexualities (Foucault 1990, pp. 104, 105). These technologies were control strategies of bourgeoisie who did not first use them over the masses due to the politico-economical requirements, but over itself and its body. In other words, “it provided itself with a body to be cared for, protected, cultivated, and preserved from the many dangers and contacts, to be isolated from others so that it would retain its differential value; and this, by equipping itself with—among other resources—a technology of sex” (Ibid, p. 123).

Foucault, when homosexuals are in asymmetrical power relation with the state, the prolongation of such a struggle “can influence the behavior or non behavior of the other” (Foucault 2000b, p. 167). Therefore, the possibility of modification in the relation and the possibility of resistance, both by counter-attacks and by counterinvestments, to act on actions are always available, since such a possibility makes any specific power relation what it is, but not a form of “physical determination” (Foucault 2002a, p. 342). Hence,

Where there is power, there is resistance, and... this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.... Their existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network (Foucault 1990, p. 95).

As a result, considering the relational and nonsubjective character of power, we can deal with the Liberation Argument. Initially, we should define the concept of liberation correctly. When Foucault states that there is no “great Refusal,” it was meant that there is no place which is absolutely free from every power relation. However, no available relation with its *relata* having defined roles is necessary. Therefore, liberation must be defined, accordingly, as the liberation from any power relation in which *we* are on the dominated side. However, there is no permanent dominated side, but a particular place in the power relation, regardless of whether the relation is symmetrical or asymmetrical. There is always the possibility of changing asymmetry in favor of *ourselves*, since what is omnipresent is not *the Power* as a dominating class but the relationship. Therefore, as in the Liberation Argument, it is not the case that *we* are leaving one relation for the sake of other, in which there are some *impositions* on *us* more or less similar to former *impositions*, and in which *we* are *dominated* as in the case of the former relation, and even where this is the case, we have no *common measure* to evaluate separate *impositions*, or the degree of *domination* exerted on *us*. I believe that such a criticism based on a misunderstanding of Foucault’s belief in the nonsubjectivity of power relations, since there is no permanent *we*, *imposition*,

or *domination* in all power relations. Therefore, the possibility of liberation is available in Foucault's description of power in the sense that *we* have the possibility to liberate *ourselves* from *our* current role in the particular power relation through changing the role *we* undertake by counter-attacks and counterinvestments since power functions as "an action upon an action," without any intrinsic side of the acted and the acting (Foucault 2002a, p. 340).

As for sexuality, and for the Sexual Discrimination Argument, it is obvious that appealing to both scientific and hermeneutic truth is not the sole way of resisting power mechanisms, since separate discourses and strategies are always possible among power relations in which scientific and hermeneutic truth are not the liberator, but they are constructed to act on our actions. Now the question is what the Foucauldian recipe is for struggling against control mechanisms. If Foucault has any tactic for this, to wit, if there is any strategy for resisting power mechanisms, then the Sexual Discrimination Argument will lose its importance.

For Foucault, our strategy should not be to understand who we are or what our intrinsic truth is as in the case of hermeneutic occupation of Christianity or in psychoanalysis, but we should reject who we are, and struggle to be what we might have been. That is to say, in the struggle against power mechanisms or, say, against the state, we should create "new forms of subjectivity" by means of deconstructing the determining factors of the self or the accepted forms of individuality constructed by normalizing power mechanisms. Therefore, the sole task of the resistant is not to "liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization linked to the state" (Foucault 2002a, p. 336). Resisting power requires resisting the power mechanisms which determine the normal way of life, sexual intercourse or individuality, by means of creating an *other* permanently—permanently, since power has no single source, but it is everywhere—with different modes of relationships, say, in sexual intercourses or of creating new forms of life not based on "existing cultural forms" (Foucault 2000b, p. 160).

Obviously, to have the possibility of creating other forms of lifestyle, liberation or political struggle, in the literal sense of the word, is needed, but what Foucault emphasizes is that it is not sufficient for freedom without the complementary lifestyles are created. Therefore, “the question of gay culture” interests Foucault (Foucault 2000b, p. 159). For him, what homosexuals need is not to realize that they are homosexuals, but they should “become” through creating different forms of values, “types of existence,” or “ways of relating” (Ibid, p. 159). In other words, what is to be dismissed is the question “Who am I” or “What is the secret of my desire” (Foucault 1996, p. 308). Nevertheless, through homosexuality, for Foucault, not only different forms of relating which are supposed to serve to *sexual pluralism*, but also “homosexual ascesis,” must be produced; that is, what is needed is a kind of the original art of living which means to oppose to the assimilation by existing cultural forms through creating others (Ibid, p. 310). Hence the answer to the question of resistance, as I implied in the Sexual Discrimination Argument, lies neither in the truth nor just in so-called natural rights to satisfy sexual hunger, but in creating lifestyles. To wit, it is crucial to eliminate the old-fashioned supposition of more or less psychoanalytic or Christian view of *arcana conscientia*—hidden consciousness—hiding the truth of who we are, what we essentially desire or be inclined to, by means of deciphering all of the pleasures we have; that is, the operation of decoding which is usually followed by normalization in the name of rehabilitation of what is deciphered is not liberatory at all. In Foucault’s view, it is important not to appeal to such a sexual truth, but conversely, to reject such a truth; i.e. “we should be striving, rather, toward a desexualization, to a general economy of pleasure that would not be sexually normed” (Ibid, p. 212).

What does desexualization consist of? Desexualization means the rejection of tyranny or of the process of tyrannization of sexual norms which are based on the ascription of sexually hidden truth to the individual to be corrected—which potentially refers to everyone or refers to the one who is supposedly in the need of psychiatrization or of being pathologized because of one’s sexuality—and the

rejection of tyranny or of the process of tyrannization of sexual norms which are solely based on vaginal penetration. That is why Foucault is not only concerned with homosexuality or sadomasochism, but also happy with seeing any movement “of fabricating other forms of pleasure, of relationships, coexistences, attachments, loves, intensities” (Ibid, p. 218). As Arnold Davidson suggests (2006), what concerns Foucault in the first place is not sexuality at all, but morality, i.e. “style of life,” and especially new styles of life which are neither normalized nor substantiated on the hegemonic cultural or medical norms (p. 134).

What can sadomasochism mean for Foucault? It obviously serves to “the desexualization of pleasure,” in which the source of pleasure is not confined to vaginal penetration, but the body or the eccentric parts of body or new forms of relating are used (Ibid, p. 384). It is a kind of original creation due to not only pleasure/pain axis, but its being an original strategic game in the sense that, for Foucault, in heterosexual relationships, such games or courtships are performed before sex, but in such a “subculture,” these games—games of flight/pursuit or subordination/domination—are available in the very process of sex (Ibid, p. 388).

How does sadomasochism represent a new mode of sexual relation, and does Foucault propose sadomasochism or homosexuality as a tool for resistance against normalization processes? If Foucault is proposing them, what is special in them which make them promising but not the others; and if he does not give any agenda which favors some forms of relating at the expense of others, why does he talk about sadomasochism and gay culture as new forms of constituting pleasure with their original ethics or rules of courtship?

First, how does sadomasochism represent a new mode of sexual relation? To answer the question, I will present only some general features of masochism by means of its desexualizing properties, and original relating and pleasure-taking

strategies, described by Gilles Deleuze (2006) who analyzes masochism through the novels of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, in his book *Coldness and Cruelty*.

How does a masochist behave? For Deleuze, it is inevitable for a masochist to “suspend” the world or “the validity of existing reality” so as to produce a new one, an ideal one; that is, the masochist lives in an imaginary world with his various roles in various sexual relationships constituted by mostly mythical stories and fantasies (Ibid, p. 33). In his view, such a suspension is the source of pleasure of the masochist who does not only suspend the real world, but also suspends or delays the arrival of pleasure by means of pleasure/pain axis; to wit, when pain is made a necessary precondition for pleasure, fear of pain suspends the wish of searching for pleasure, but also suspends or delays the arrival of pleasure by means of pleasure/pain axis. Moreover, as it can be inferred, Deleuze’s description of masochism is not related to the view of masochism based on the idea of having pleasure in pain, since, for him, masochism is “a state of waiting” which is the cause of the intensification of pleasure (Ibid, p. 71). Therefore, at least the one constituent of pleasure is the suspension of the world and, paradoxically, of the very pleasure itself.

Who are the participants in masochistic relationship and what are their roles? In masochism, we have a “torturer” and a “victim.” However, their relation is very different from what the terms suggest. Initially, the torturer and her victim should base their relationship on a contract which describes the rules and determines the behaviors of participant parties. Moreover, the so-called victim should not search for a sadistic woman in order to be, say, whipped, but for someone who is supposed to be trained and shaped so as to play her assigned role (Ibid, p. 22). In other words, she must be made a torturer in such a way that by means of punishing her victim, the victim will be located in the process of pleasure. To wit, the victim will find pleasure in punishment indirectly—the punishment which was supposed to prohibit pleasure. Therefore, fooling prohibition or punishment

which, in turn, allows what is prohibited to arise, is another source of pleasure in addition to suspension (Ibid, p. 88).

Lastly, who is the punished one? For Deleuze, he is the one who represents “the father” or “his likeness in the son” who is the sadistic one or, more accurately, is the image of “genital sexuality” (Ibid, pp. 99, 100). Therefore, the aim of punishment is to kill father and with him, his genital sexuality. Moreover, by getting rid of genital sexuality, the victim will have the opportunity “to be reborn from the woman alone, to undergo a second birth,” that is, a kind of “parthenogenetic rebirth” which represents the substitution of desexualized pleasure for genital sexuality (Ibid, p. 100). Therefore, masochism is a kind of relating mode with different rules and sources for pleasure, which in turn, is in the service of desexualization.

Given that what Foucault means by sadomasochism’s desexualizing quality and originality is described, also clarified by Deleuze in masochism, it is time to answer the second part of our primary question posed above: does Foucault propose sadomasochism and homosexuality as tools, but more accurately, as special and excluding tools for resisting normalization? In other words, does Foucault favor homosexuality and sadomasochism at the expense of heterosexual relationships? Does he not only search for *the other* and *quasi-abnormal*, but also substitute them for the *quasi-normal*? Is his *motto long live sadomasochism*? For Foucault, the other or quasi-normal is not a “good side” *per se*, but as he states, “One must pass to the other side—the ‘good side’—but in order to extract oneself from these mechanisms which make two sides appear, in order to dissolve the false unity, the illusory ‘nature’ of this other side with which we have taken sides” (Foucault 1996, p. 222). As a result, he focuses on *the other* with its possibilities and the originalities so as to use them in the service of pluralism, which is supposed to be supported in order to break the monotony of normalization which

is the instigator of the distinction and discrimination between the normal and abnormal. *The other* is not the good one *per se*, but *the strategical*.⁷

However, we saw that, in the Explanation/Justification Argument, creating an “other” seemed unnecessary to explain resistance, since it is also created among power relations or by power mechanisms. Yet we might solve the problem by appealing to the nonsubjectivity of power relations. For it is not the case that the only *relatum* of power relations is the state defining normality and an “other” as an abnormal. Since there is no permanent side of any power relation in which acted and acting roles are defined once and for all, it is possible for resisters to create their other, analogically as normal, for strategic requirements, for resisting normalizing mechanisms. Therefore, the impossibility of prediscursive and power-free *subjects* is not a hindrance for Foucault; on the contrary, since there is no truth in constructing *selves*, we have the opportunity to appeal to either Foucauldian discourses or others in self-creation for political purposes. As for justification, since one can explain resistance in Foucault’s philosophy, there is no question of justifying the reason why we should resist. Moreover, I believe that there is no need to elaborate the problem of justification and its failure, since, for me, the reason for resistance in omnipresent power relations is an ethical and subjective question which depends on the responder, regardless of the feasibility of resistance.

In addition, I believe that one more question must be asked both to understand Foucault’s philosophy better and to continue to respond to remaining criticisms: what is the Foucauldian apparatus, or how should it be, to allow for the creation of new selves for resisting control mechanisms? Initially, it is obvious that we need a strategy or an apparatus which is not absolutely free from power in the sense that it is supposed to have political importance to sustain struggle and for resisting control mechanisms. Moreover, it should be congenial with the mission of permanent creation of selves without any crystallization. Lastly, it should not be

⁷ I will say much on the strategical nature of Foucault’s philosophy in the *Genealogy* section.

grounded on objective truth, in order to be cotenable with Foucault's belief in truth as a construction. In the metaphorical sense of the words, it should have a "groundless ground." I believe that such a strategic and political apparatus with all the requirements is "genealogy." Therefore, I will study the nature of genealogy in the next section.

CHAPTER 5

GENEALOGY

For understanding the functioning of genealogy, we must look at various writings of Foucault, in which he describes the characteristics of genealogy both by depicting his method and by offering a Nietzschean perspective. Initially, as opposed to traditional history, genealogy is not concerned with revealing an “unbroken continuity” by means of discovering ideas, characteristics, beliefs, or ideologies in their original foundations so as to follow their traces to the present, or to determine their degenerations, as if one and the same concepts proceeded continuously toward approaching maturity or deterioration; as if the mission of historians were to uncover the reality of the past which determines the present. Therefore, genealogy’s field of investigation is not the knowledge of “origins” or continuity, but of “descents” and unique events. Its task is not to reveal the truth or essences behind concepts, characteristics of nations, or some sentiments believed to be naturally given. Yet,

to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations... the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things which continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being lies not at the root of what we know and what we are but the exteriority of accidents (Foucault 2000a, p. 374).

To wit, genealogy is not an apparatus to construct a continuity, say, in order to confirm some assumptions of scientific or political ideologies in the name of truth, but endeavors to dissolve what is believed as consistent with itself, and as having no history, by means of uncovering “an unstable assemblage of faults,

fissures, and heterogeneous layers” in order to historicize values, morality, subjectivities, scientific truth of normality and abnormality, etc (Ibid, p. 380). As for the “emergence” of concepts, of ideologies, of rights, or of instincts, genealogy does not promise to find essences, but determines force relations, will to power, by which knowledge is formed to subjugate, control, govern, resist, change the situation in the relation, or to debilitate the ruler, enthrone the slave.

Therefore, genealogy fulfills one of the requirements of being an apparatus in force relations since it does not appeal to truth or essence. Moreover, it never claims “objectivity” in the investigations of the past because of “its affirmation of a perspectival knowledge” (Ibid, p. 382). Hence, the master of genealogy, as opposed to the traditional historian, does not need to eliminate himself and his precedence from his works, he is perspectivist. And since he rejects to search for origins as if he endeavored to reveal the immutable identities, self-subsistent essences and pure forms preceding what is actual, contingent and different, he has “anti-Platonic purposes” (Ibid, p. 385).

In addition, genealogical method carries out another requirement of our task. It is not absolutely free from power relations; on the contrary, it is a strategic tool to “diagnose” the present in the sense that it does not reveal who we are, but endeavors to present the contingency of, or the formation—due to “chances” and “encounters”—of what current “forms of rationality” claim as “necessary,” “by following lines of fragility in the present—in managing to grasp why and how that-which-is might no longer be that-which-is” (Foucault 1988, pp. 36, 37). To understand the nature of genealogy, it is helpful to look at Foucault’s bizarre concept: “eventualization.” By eventualization, Foucault refers to singularities or singular events such as “the singularity of madness in the modern Western world” as opposed to madness as an essence and historical viewpoints about this essence (Foucault 2007, p. 63). Therefore, Foucault’s genealogies do not work by means of referring to the origin and its “products” emerged due to the necessary connections or strict and linear causal chain between the origin and its product;

but they are carried through investigating various relations, different connections and separate encounters, which, in turn, cause the emergence of a singular event as an “effect” of such heterogeneous and “multiple determining elements” (Ibid, p. 64). Moreover, for Foucault, in these relations what is eventualized is not the universal or its exemplification, but obviously the product of historical encounters. Hence, genealogy does not refer to anything as an ultimate truth, and also it aims to show that there is no such truth or essence to construct any system upon it, in such a way that it will clarify that, say, there is no necessary form of punishment or the asylum is not a necessary form of therapy or cure, in order to make the actors of, say, asylum or prison, “no longer know what to do’, so that the acts, gestures, discourses up until then had seemed to go without saying problematic, difficult, dangerous” (Ibid, pp. 277, 284).

Then, two conclusions follow immediately. First, genealogy is a political and strategic occupation; second, it is Socratic. However, to reveal the history of the so-called constants is not to exhibit them as irrational or untrue. It only reminds us that “these forms of rationality.... reside on a base of human practice and human history”; therefore, “they can be unmade” (Foucault 1988, p. 37). Hence, such an investigation is based on the mission “to think differently” (Foucault 1992, p. 9), to attack the current politics of truth in order to construct “a new politics of truth” (Foucault 1980, p. 133). In other words, the philosophy of Foucault is not concerned with what is genuinely true or false, and justified or unjustified. Then, what kind of philosophy does he perform? To which philosophical viewpoint or school does he belong? I believe that it is impossible to appreciate the philosophy of Foucault, without delimiting the mode of his philosophy.

Foucault’s way of philosophizing can be characterized as *an art of self or a way of life* supported by the so-called spiritual exercises based on historical investigations so as to make a critique of the present. To clarify this point, I will present Foucault’s and Pierre Hadot’s perspective of the ancient philosophy, mostly based on these themes, i.e. philosophy as *a way of life* and *an art of self*. Then, I will

show that it is possible to produce a *strong* analogy between ancient philosophy and Foucault's philosophy that will be helpful in reviewing the latter and its appreciation.

For Foucault, in antiquity, but especially in the post-Socratic philosophy, "philosophy increasingly sought its definition, its center of gravity, and fixed its objective around something called... the art, the reflected method for conducting one's life, the technique of life" (Foucault 2005, p. 177, 178). That is, philosophy was not based on theoretical discourses in order to grasp abstract truth as an end in itself, but to preach some particular ways of life, which means that philosophy was a kind of spiritual guidance advising some ways of conducting self so as to free the self from its present situation. In other words, as Hadot puts, philosophy was characterized as "a way of life," as a "therapeutic" occupation, the aim of which was to transform the inauthentic self (Hadot 1995, p. 265). For him, anyone who has not been transformed by philosophical life yet was characterized, nearly by all philosophy schools, as anxious and unhappy due to his uneducated *animus* which desired what was not necessarily desirable and easily graspable such that he was transformed by such external forces or representations into a slave (Ibid, p. 102).

For Foucault, the *motto* for participating in the process of self-transformation was *cura sui*—take care of yourself. Such a care was performed by means of some exercises such as meditation, "examination of conscience," "memorization of the past," or abstinence (Foucault 2005, p. 11). Moreover, *cura sui*—or its possible modifications such as "paying attention to the self," "withdrawing into the self," "experiencing delight with oneself,"⁸ "exercising perfect control over oneself"—

⁸ We should note that Hadot does not totally agree with Foucault on this point. For him, although it is true that the culture of philosophical life in that period preached detachment from external impulses and return to the inner self for independence, the aim was not to turn into and conduct an *individual* self in order to create an aesthetics of existence, but to overstep it in order, especially in Stoicism, to be united with what is universal, with "the best portion of oneself," with "a transcendent self" (Hadot 1995, p. 207). As in Hadot's words, "Seneca does not find his joy in

was sometimes associated with the techniques of freeing the self from ignorance and sometimes from bad habits; with the *motto* “know yourself”; sometimes it was taken as an end in itself and sometimes as a precondition for genuine care given to the city; but mostly, it was characterized with an aim of eliminating the domination of external impulses. As a result, without living a philosophical life and performing some exercises, it was impossible to be transformed in the style of life and the mode of perceiving the world or external representations; and such a correlation was also true *vice versa*.

In Hadot’s view, such a need of transformation in the mode of perceiving the world or external representations can be seen clearly in the Stoic philosophy. In it, philosophers or anyone having desire for living a philosophical life had to distinguish “what depends on us” from “what does not” (Hadot 1995, p. 84). That distinction was supposed to free any performer of unphilosophical life from desiring what was actually beyond control or product of causal chain, which, in turn, gave anxiety and unhappiness when the desire of it was not satisfied. Therefore, Stoic philosophy taught “Indifference to indifferent things” (Ibid, p. 86). In light of indifference, it was needed to view external world not by subjective tastes, but objective viewpoint.

How can such an objective viewpoint be grasped? In other words, what were the exercises for reaching it which will be helpful in the transformation of self? I will present only two themes in this context, which, as we will see, constitute, together with self-transformation and philosophy as a way of life, the most part of Foucault’s philosophy.

Initially, one of the exercises to perform genuine transformation of self was based on the attention given to *the present*. For, in the ancient philosophy, but mostly in the Stoic philosophy, only the present depends on us because the past and future

‘Seneca’, but by transcending ‘Seneca’; by discovering that there is within him—within all human beings, that is, and within the cosmos itself—a reason which is a part of universal reason” (Ibid.).

has no existence and beyond control; moreover, they are the sources of futile discomfort and anxiety (Ibid, pp. 227, 228). In addition, by means of giving attention to the present, to what one thinks now, to what one does and desires now, by means of this never-ending vigilance toward actuality, it is possible to distinguish, in every external impulse or representation, what depends on us from what does not. Obviously, this process of vigilance is supposed to serve to eliminate the domination of external forces which are desirable when subjective viewpoint is taken, but one will be indifferent when it is understood that they do not depend on us.

As another spiritual exercise, initially we should distinguish—as Hadot does—“*philosophy itself*” from “*discourse about philosophy*” (Hadot 1995, p. 266). Discourse about philosophy is concerned with more or less theoretical occupations the objective of which is to grasp, say, physical truth as an end in itself. However, they are not genuinely philosophical if they have no usage as spiritual exercises. Therefore, in the borders of genuine philosophy or philosophy itself, “Theory is never considered an end in itself; it is clearly and decidedly put in the service of practice” (Ibid, p. 60). Then, in addition to the attention given to the present, we have a practical philosophy. For example, as a subclass or one face of philosophy, physics is used as a spiritual exercise in the pursuit for self-transformation in such a way that it clarifies the unimportance of human occupations in the vast universe, futility of some desires for, or sorrows due to, an object or an event which is the product of nature and of causal chain, which means that that does not depend upon us; and lastly, it is a promising tool in being united with the “universal reason” or “all-embracing Logos” such that quasi-desirable objects can be neutralized by means of eliminating subjective viewpoints and of having the ability of seeing things as how nature sees them indifferently (Ibid, p. 242). Then, we have practical knowledge as a unique genuine knowledge in ancient philosophy.

Consequently, in Foucault's and Hadot's views, there are some important themes which are *sine qua non* for understanding ancient philosophy. These are its practical character, practical knowledge, vigilance toward the present, and its transformative nature.

As for the philosophy of Foucault, in similar to the ancient philosophy characterized with a way of life and an art of self, Foucault gives some hints about his affinity with such a mode of philosophy by pointing out the possibility of reading nineteenth century philosophy as an attempt to recreate ancient tradition. For him, especially, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Baudelaire can be read as philosophers of "an ethics and an aesthetics of the self" (Foucault 2005, p. 251). Moreover, Foucault believes that such attempts were not fully successful in the strong sense of the term, although to create such an ethics and aesthetics is "an urgent, fundamental, and politically indispensable task, if it is true after all that there is no first or final point of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one has to oneself" (Ibid, p. 252). Now it is time to read the philosophy of Foucault so as to appreciate its real value, in terms of its affinity with the ancient philosophical themes, modified due to the urgency of philosophy's political usage as it is indicated above.

Initially, Foucault performs a kind of critical philosophy in order to be governed "not like that, not for that, not by them," which means that Foucault's critical attitude is not similar to Rousseau's, since Foucault rejects the possibility of "an originary freedom" through postulating, as we saw, the omnipresence of power and power's ubiquitous relation to knowledge, truth, and the construction of selves (Foucault 2007, pp. 44, 75). Moreover, since governmentality or normalizing power mechanisms are defined with their permanent surveillance and, say, affinity with truth-producers such as psychology, psychiatry, pedagogy, and criminology, to form anti-governmentality discourses means to present and make a critique of power's true discourses and power effects of truth; and to study the irrational roots of what seems to be rational (Ibid, pp. 47, 54).

How does Foucault fulfill the requirements of this task? In similar to ancient tradition of self-transformation, Foucault is obsessed with the present. For him, what is urgently needed is a “philosophical ethos consisting in a critique of what we are saying, thinking, and doing” (Ibid, p. 113). Moreover, by means of historical investigations or history of the present, he aims to show the contingency of what is presupposed as obligatory or universal and to present the possibility of change or transformation in what we do, think, and are (Ibid, p. 113, 114). As a result, as opposed to normalizing power mechanisms, what Foucault does by philosophizing is to clarify that, say, there is no evident, universal, and necessary form of normality, but what we have at hand is only historical contingency which has taken universal status among power relations, but not due to the correspondence to self-sufficient reality or, what amounts to the same thing, to Platonic ideas. And this is the reason why Foucault says, “I dream of the intellectual destroyer of evidence and universalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of power” (Foucault 1996, p. 225).

In critique of the present, again in similarity with ancient tradition, his second obsession is revealed: self-transformation. If we take again normality-example given above and normalizing power or self-constructing power mechanisms, by means of history of the present and contingency Foucault tries to show the possibility of eliminating or rejecting the *criteria* of normal way of life, having sexual intercourse or viewing the world; and he endeavors to point out the possibility of self-transformation in lifestyles, thought habits, ways of taking pleasure or forms of relating. Hence, such a “philosophical ethos,” with the “historico-political test of the limits that we may go beyond” through researching where the contingencies are located, aims at self-transformation⁹ (Foucault 2007,

⁹ Obviously, such a call for self-transformation or “stylization” as James Bernauer and Michael Mahon suggests, does not aim at “aestheticism” *per se*, but has political purposes, i.e. what Foucault aims at is not “narcissistic self-absorption,” but “transgression” (pp. 161, 162).

p. 115). Moreover, historical knowledge of the present or of contingencies is philosophical as the ancients gave it its special meaning, i.e. Foucault's discourses are *philosophical*, but not *discourses about philosophy*, since their sole aim is transformation; hence, it is practical. Foucault states, "I know that knowledge can transform us" or "if I know the truth I will be changed"; for him, truth/transformation relationship is the cause of what he calls "aesthetic experience," that is, creating one's life and self as a work of art (Foucault 1996, p. 379). However, we should note that, in Foucault's philosophy, the direction of transformation is *intentionally* not given, since, for him, such a preaching of direction would be a kind of prophecy which can limit the possibility of transformation and self-creation (Ibid, p. 312).

As a result, in Foucault's view, theory is "practice" and books are "little tool boxes" in the opposition to power and in the service of self-transformation (Ibid, pp. 75, 149). Therefore, what Foucault posits cannot be taken as a part of theory or doctrine full of genuine arguments, but a part of spiritual exercise, "an ethos" or "a philosophical life" (Foucault 2007, p. 118). Then, in appreciating the value of his philosophy, we cannot neglect his affinity with the ancient themes such as self-transformation, obsession with the present, practical knowledge, and practical discourses. However, we have to be cautious not to make an analogy between two different eras an identity. Foucault's philosophy does not propose a dogma to which every self-transformation must be directed; hence, it is not pragmatic,¹⁰ but has to be situated in the political context; hence, his philosophy in general, and his genealogies in particular, must be characterized as *strategical*.

In light of the perspectivist character of genealogy, and its strategic nature, we can respond to the No Ground Argument. Initially, we saw that genealogy does not appeal to truth. As William Connolly (1985) states, when Foucault depicts power mechanisms, his statements are not true in the literal sense of the word, but they

¹⁰ I use the notion of pragmatism as a practical philosophy performed in the "way of life" tradition of philosophy in antiquity, rather than to refer to *American Pragmatism*.

are genealogical or perspectival knowledge which is designed to present subjects or identities, not as power-free or prediscursive givens, but as constructions *in order to* provide the possibility of transformation. Hence, his writings are not motivated by a promise of Platonic truth, but they are tactical occupations. Foucault states,

I have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean to say, however, that truth is therefore absent. It seems to me that the possibility exists for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to induce effect of truth, and for bringing it about that a true discourse engenders or ‘manufactures’ something that does not as yet exist, that is, ‘fictions’ it. One ‘fictions’ history on the basis of a political reality that makes it true, one ‘fictions’ a politics not yet in existence on the basis of a historical truth (Foucault 1980, p. 193).

Yet, performing this task, Foucault does not present a fairy-tale, but approaches history empirically from his perspective, and from his political requirements. His aim is to transform the current ideologies of truth or rationality for resisting power in the sense that we can have the chance to reject the norms of the true way of living or being. Therefore, even if he has no ground free from power such as absolute truth, he attacks control mechanisms by his perspectival knowledge. Moreover, such a perspectival knowledge provides the opportunity of transformation, since it does not appeal to truth in order to crystallize a form of living or being, that would certainly be a blockage for transformation. Actually, he substantiates his counterinvestments, by means of perspectivist or constructivist truth so as to reveal the “falsehood” and “disguises” of power. And I believe, in this sense, that the defenders of the No Ground Argument can only attack his perspectivism. Yet such an attack will put the burden of proof about the preference between a correspondence theory of truth and perspectivism back on critics. In addition, there is a fatal misunderstanding in the No Ground Argument, which we should not neglect. Foucault never believes that what power mechanisms construct is “falsehood.” As we saw, their rationality is not irrational, and their truths are not false. Yet they are constructions as in the case of

Foucault's discourses. And the aim of Foucault is to eliminate the constructions of adversaries by means of his constructions in order to create new rationalities which will be useful for expanding the area of the thinkable, and for enriching the relationships with different modes and subjectivations.

Consequently, genealogy is a promising method for resisting power mechanisms due to its rejection of truth or essences, and due to its basis as a strategic apparatus in providing the possibility of transformation. Hence, I will continue to work in genealogy to grasp Foucauldian resistance better and to deal with the remaining criticisms I exposed. Yet, henceforth, I leave theoretical debates, and enter into genealogies at work. Therefore, as I stated at the beginning of this essay, I will discuss the genealogies of sexuality in order to find the epistemological and ontological implications of Foucault's work as his groundless ground which is, as I stated before, one of the principles to which our resistance-tool should appeal.

CHAPTER 6

ONTOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

In the second and the third volume of *the History of Sexuality*, Foucault investigates how and why western people have begun to see themselves as “desiring subjects.” He endeavors to reveal the forms of subjectivation in sexuality, and the reason why sexuality has become an ethical or a medical problem. In other words, Foucault’s domain of study, his genealogy of sexuality, by which I will trace the implications of ontological presuppositions, is based on the question: “What were the games of truth by which human beings came to see themselves as desiring individuals?” (Foucault 1992, p. 7).

In this genealogy, I will focus only on the so-called Greek homosexuality to uncover Foucault’s ontological implications. In light of this aim, I will also benefit from some sources other than Foucault. Initially, for Foucault, in Ancient Greece, it was plausible for a man to have “women, boys, slaves” to satiate his sexual hunger. To wit, he was free to select any of them as “the objects of possible pleasure” (Ibid, p. 47). There was no universal rule for a man to prevent him from having sexual intercourse with these possible objects. However, this freedom was not the elimination of all ethical rules in the sexual domain. For Greeks, the ethical value of sexual life did not depend on the object chosen, but on the “intensity” of intercourse—moderation. Therefore, *initially*, the interaction between sexuality and morality came to existence in the axis of “quantity” rather than “quality” which is an important variable for moderns in their moral judgments.

Understanding the scope of the words “intensity” and “quantity,” we should appeal to Greek morality as presented by Foucault. Foucault’s target in reviewing Greek morality is the notion of “self-mastery.” Self-mastery means the control of pleasures or appetites, the superiority of the self over them in order to free itself from the slavery of desires, in other words, it is “the perfect supremacy of oneself over oneself” (Ibid, p. 31). To wit, the reasonable part of the self should dominate the inferior part. However, we should keep in mind that pleasures were not inferior *per se*, but due to their natural intensity, and liability to excessiveness, they were latent chains to enslave the self and to eliminate self-mastery. Such an ethics in regard to pleasures and self-mastery was based on a war for “ascendancy and dominion,” “slavery” and “mastery” (Ibid, p. 66). That is to say, the freedom, domination, and superiority of self was required to reign its kingdom over the self by controlling desires and pleasures, by governing them, and by disallowing their rebellion in order not to be prevailed by bodily pleasures and desires. In light of this war, self-mastery was the motivating factor, for instance, for Socrates, when he did not touch Alcibiades lying next to him. Self-mastery of Socrates deprived Alcibiades of hearing some lovely compliments, suggestive touches in the Gymnasium, and copulation. In other words, self-mastery of Socrates was the cause of Alcibiades’ failure in seducing Socrates, and his admiration for Socrates’ “manliness and self-control,” or his “strength of mind” (Plato 2002, 219d).

However, such a quantity-oriented morality does not necessarily exclude the moral problematization of the some forms of sexual intercourse between male partners. Initially, one of the most important variables in that problematization was the so-called distinction between activity and passivity with the condemnation of the latter, which was the second interaction point of sexuality and morality in addition to moderation, since passivity meant the acceptance of “being the object of the other’s pleasure,” or of assuming subordinated or dominated role which was available for women and slaves, but not for the free countrymen of Greece (Foucault 1992, p. 46). For example, it was contemptible for two *adults* to have sexual intercourse in which one of them would be passive.

In fact, the real problem of activity and passivity was about boys. For they were not adults not to be passive partners, but they would be adults whose histories would be marked by the shame of passivity and by their existence as an object of pleasure, as “an obliging partner in the sensual pleasures of the other” (Ibid, p. 211). Such a problem arose for Greeks, since they found an

isomorphism between sexual relations and social relations. What this means is that sexual relations—always conceived in terms of the model act of penetration, assuming a polarity that opposed activity and passivity—were seen as being of the same type as the relationship between a superior and a subordinate, an individual who dominates and one who is dominated, one who commands and one who complies, one who vanquishes and one who is vanquished (Ibid, p. 215).

Therefore, to play the dominated and vanquished role in sexual intercourse for a boy was a problem for his future when he decided to play an active and dominating or commanding role in society, since passivity was for women and slaves both in the governance or domination of flesh and of social body. However, the situation was more complex than it seems. For accepting the dominated role was not in itself contemptible for a boy, but it depended on the *status* of him and his active partner. There was no shame for a slave,¹¹ for example, to be a passive partner in sexual intercourse. To wit, in addition to *quantity* and *self-mastery*, *social status* was also a characteristic quality of Greek morality about sex, which constituted a paradigm or a kind of *weltanschauung* in turn with other characteristic qualities.

Moreover, passivity was not *per se* contemptible even for a boy. But what was the *criteria* determining the ethical value of passivity? To explain the situation, we must understand the social rules—especially the rules in the classical period of Athens—in the ancient world. Therefore, I will present the Greek-style courtship in the so-called homosexual relations, which implies that sexuality does not have

¹¹ Moreover, the laws in the classical period of Athens—between the second half of the fifth and the second half of the fourth centuries—forbade slaves from having sexual intercourse actively with boys who were Athenian citizens (Cantarella 2002).

to be codified according to the sexual object people choose as in the codification of moderns; rather, it is possible to codify it differently as in the case of the dichotomy between activity and passivity. Such a codification with its original ethics can also clarify Foucault's preaching of creating different lifestyles, valuations, and ways of relating, which are not based on the traditional culture. As for homosexuality, such a codification means the *other* system of values which is not superimposed upon heterosexual culture.

As I stated before, the Greek-style same-sex valuation necessitated the condemnation of passive adults. However, passivity of boys was neither contemptible nor praiseworthy *per se*.¹² There was no shame for a passive boy, if he followed social conventions. In addition, the social rules were diverse for different occupants of a sexual relation, which makes the Greek-style so complicated that we must grasp it in detail before presenting the rules of courtship. This complexity can be made simpler by means of an appeal to Pausanias who describes the complicated way of Athenian relating style in Plato's *Symposium*. For him, the complexity of the situation is caused by the different attitudes toward boys and men in a particular relation. For Athenians praise the lover who follows his beloved in a resolute way when he succeeds in seducing his beloved. In such a case, the insistent lover is not exposed to any allusion that he is doing something shameful. Yet, boys are controlled by means of prohibitions such that they are not allowed to being seduced by their lovers. Their fathers and even society encourage them to flee from their followers. Nevertheless, such prohibitions are not designed to preclude same-sex relations, but they are a kind of

¹² However, the value of a passive boy is under debate. As opposed to Cantarella, Foucault talks as if passivity for a boy were an invincible obstacle, since, for him, Greeks did not believe that a passive boy could have any pleasure. Foucault states, "they couldn't even imagine reciprocity of pleasure between a boy and a man"; and therefore, "they couldn't accept that a young boy who was supposed to become a free citizen could be dominated and used as an object for someone's pleasure" (Foucault 2000, p. 257). However, I believe, that was not the case, at least completely, since as we will see below, for example, pseudo-Aristotle did not reject the pleasure felt by a passive boy. Moreover, I will omit Foucault's rejection of reciprocity and the total denigration of passivity in order to clarify an ethics or a possible ethics which is not superimposed upon an existing culture. In addition, such negligence will have no effect on the ontological implications of Foucault I am tracing, which is the justification of my negligence.

incentives for inspiring the partners to unite in true love which is based on the attraction of moral beauty and the charm of character, but not on the body itself. In contrast, the followers of “vulgar” love seek only orgasm, regardless of whether their partners are worthy. Yet, as Cantarella (2002) states, this incentive does not mean the elimination of bodily contact. For the flight of a boy is a means for testing the lover to see whether he really loves him. Moreover, this test is performed in order to understand whether any particular lover is worth to yield to. In this respect, what was the true love which united the lover and the beloved without any sign of opprobrium, besides its appeal to the beauty of the character? What were the social rules which made any love the true one? And what kind of valuation system or a culture was constructed by those rules such that we have the opportunity to call that culture original, but not superimposed upon the heterosexual one?

True love, for Greeks, required enslavement on the lover’s side. He had not to follow any small boy whose moral or intellectual capacity was not formed fully, and who was so charming that attracted his lover only due to the bodily attraction he had. For, true love was abandoned when the lover sought only physical beauties, and loved one boy until the more beautiful one met his gaze. Rather, true love asked for companionship between partners such that even if the charm of the boy disappeared, the lover did not abandon, but became the everlasting friend of, him. In addition, as for the beloved one, he had to resist the lover’s endeavors to seduce him, flee from his follower, and present himself as an obstinate celibate in order to test his lover’s intention; otherwise, he was exposed to opprobrium, since he was *caught easily* like an inferior object of other’s pleasure. That love, therefore, required the lover’s exhibition of his qualities and purpose, and the obstinacy of the beloved. Moreover, although the relationship between them was erotic in addition to the friendship, the true love inspired by both the lover and the beloved had “spiritual, intellectual and educational” character (Cantarella 2002, p. 28). In other words, as Cantarella states, same-sex relations had a kind of initiative value such that by means of his lover, the beloved could improve himself both in

intellectual capacity and in character as a morally upright citizen of Athens. In this respect, boys needed to test their lovers also according to their intellectual gift and wisdom. And this was the reason why Alcibiades chose no one, but Socrates:

[Y]ou're the only lover I've ever had who's been really worthy of me.... I think it'd be just as absurd to refuse you *this* as anything else you wanted that belonged to me.... If there's one thing I'm keen on it's to make the best of myself, and I think you're more likely to help me there than anybody else (Plato 2000, 218c).

Considering the social rules of courtship based on the pursuit/flight games, and the dichotomy between worthy and unworthy lovers, what does such a long exhibition of Greek-style mean? Initially, the social rules of a sexual relationship between men and boys make the Athenian complicated view about male-love easier to understand, since the Greeks' sermon about pursuit and flight along the axis of worth is very similar to the modern heterosexual relations in which, as Dover reminds, not the boy, but the girl is the one who should flee from his lover as soon as he ensures her that he is not a transitory follower of bodily beauty, in order not to be caught easily. Secondly, Greek-style in "homosexuality" implies an original culture which does not depend upon the "heterosexual" one, without any opprobrium for its quasi-abnormality. But why is it original, if we could make an analogy between the Greek-style and the modern heterosexual-style? For such a true love and also the romance between the lovers were partly—if not completely—confined to same-sex relationships, since it was nearly impossible for the Greeks to accept women's intellectual sufficiency which was obviously required for the true love, one of the most important characteristics of which was, as we saw, an education. Moreover, since women were seen as inferior to their male counterparts, and confined to the walls of family space, they were not worth of being everlasting companions.¹³ Lastly, the true love and the worthy lover as to

¹³ I think, this is a good opportunity to reject the modern view which attributes some constant characteristics to "homosexuals" as the followers of purely physical relationships in contrast to the "normal" "heterosexual" love, since in the ancient world, "heterosexual" love was mostly based on the copulation—and procreation—as opposed to "homosexual" love. Therefore, I think, such characteristics can be anything, but constants without any history.

yield to for a boy, with other ingredients of the Greek paradigm, echo even in the classical period Athenian laws about male prostitution. Initially, as Cantarella states, male prostitution was not a breach of laws *per se*, since the performers were taxed. However, any male prostitute would lose not only his *status*, but also his rights to work as a priest, as an advocate for the state, as an officer regardless of whether he had been elected, and as a speaker in assembly. For he “made a woman of himself,” who had not such rights (Cantarella 2002, p. 46). In other words, he was deprived of his *social status* as a male Athenian citizen. Nevertheless, the real punishment—death—was performed, *only* as soon as a prostitute continued to use his invalid rights. Accordingly, in Dover’s view, since foreigners had no *status* of citizenship, they were free to prostitute themselves. Moreover, the purchaser who did not made a woman of himself, i.e. who was not seeking *unworthy love passively*, was scorned neither in ethical nor in legal grounds as long as he was not the guardian of the prostitute. As a result, the Greeks disdained only the *passive* one and such contempt cause nothing, but the loss of *status*.

In addition, the correlation of the social status-ingredient of such a moral system with the reference of it is illuminating. For Foucault, this morality was for men, in fact, for free men. To have lesbian relations were not ethical, but judicial issues. Moreover, such ethical rules were not important principles for slaves, since they were under the domination of an authority whose prescriptions for them would define their modes of behavior. Therefore, not the principles of moderation or the rules of courtship, but the commands of an owner were the rules to be followed. Since the issue was ethical for an elegant class, moderation and self-mastery, social rules and the pursuit of true love, were not universal rules applicable to everyone as in the case of Christian morality, or in the case of the medieval laws prohibiting sodomy, or in the case of nineteenth century psychiatry’s revealing of perversity or abnormality in everyone performing such nonconformist acts.

In respect of all it has been said so far, the crucial point, I believe, is that it is hard for us to use our common categories—homosexuality and heterosexuality—in order to determine ancient way of having sexual intercourse. As Foucault states, regardless of whether we are permissive or not, in the case of homosexuality, we tend to believe that any performer of male-love has different “drives” or “desires” as opposed to heterosexual lover (Foucault 1992 p. 188). We have separate labels based on the objects chosen in sexual relationship. However, for Greeks, this was not the case. They did not see the one who enjoyed boys as having a different nature from the one who enjoyed girls.¹⁴ For “they believed that the same desire attached to anything that was desirable—boy or girl” (Ibid, p. 192). Hence, as Foucault states, male love did not refer to different forms of life, “experience,” or “valuation” (Ibid, p. 187). Therefore, there was no homosexual with his different personage, unhappy childhood, or unnatural physiology in the ancient world,¹⁵ since Greek way of reasoning did not construct sexuality by means of dividing it into different kinds with ascribing them some kinds of particular nature according to the sexes of partners, but sexuality was codified mostly along the axis of the distinction between activity and passivity. And there was no bisexual, if we mean by bisexuality “two kinds of ‘desire’, two different or competitive ‘drives’, each claiming a share of men’s hearts or appetites” (Ibid, p. 188). For such a notion is plausible as a synthesis, when there is a distinction between thesis and antithesis,

¹⁴For it was inconceivable and nearly impossible for them to separate lovers as a homosexual and as a heterosexual, indicating two different species. In this respect, the separation of the love for boys and the love for girls most probably indicates a matter of taste as in the case of taste differences between blond-lovers and brunette-lovers. As Dover (1989) states, “The Greeks were aware... that individuals differ in their sexual preferences, but their language has no nouns corresponding to the English nouns ‘a homosexual’ and ‘a heterosexual’, since they assumed... that (a) virtually everyone responds at different times both to homosexual and to heterosexual stimuli, and (b) virtually no male both penetrates other males and submits to penetration by other males at the same stage of his life” (p. 1).

¹⁵ Cantarella points out that there is a risk of neglecting the existence of some Greeks who were mostly inclined only to men or only to women, if we accept Foucault’s view of homosexuality as a social construction. For her, although the Greeks did not “recognize ‘homosexual’ as a category,” homosexuality was available “in the modern sense of the word” for them (p. ix). However, the modern sense requires a categorization of homosexuality by means of the attribution of different nature, physiology, and a way of life, i.e. an inclination mostly to males or to females is not the issue. Therefore, in this respect, there was no homosexual in the ancient world as a member of the different *species* in the modern sense of the word.

and the Greeks did not create bisexuality by means of combining the so-called exclusive drives.

However, femininity was, for Greeks, a shameful form of existence but we should keep in mind that the notion of femininity in the ancient world does not refer to our notion of it. For anyone who was not the master of himself, incapable of establishing dominion over pleasures, in other words, who was submissive and subjugated or dominated by his desires could be called feminine, since, for Greeks, he was not capable of performing the requirements of virility and self-mastery. Moreover, for Foucault, any adult man who accepted the passive role; in other words, who was subjugated or dominated by the other, was certainly feminine as opposed to the one whose self-mastery allowed him to have a sexual relationship actively, no matter whether he chose boys or girls to slake his need. Therefore, I believe that we can infer, without difficulty, that homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality, were not available in ancient Greek culture—the view which is perfectly cotenable with the distinction between the sodomite and the nineteenth century homosexual I presented in the *Power* section of this study, and with Foucault’s belief in the construction of subjects and the rejection of naturally given, prediscursive constants.

Moreover, Foucault never believes that there are any prediscursive “biological given” in the depths of homosexuality and in homosexual lifestyles causing “promiscuity, anonymity between sexual partners, purely physical relationships” (Foucault 2000b, p. 146). For him, such characteristics do not depend upon the so-called perversion or abnormality caused by hermaphroditism of the soul, but upon the “Christian culture of the West,” which prevents homosexuals from having elaborated lifestyles or “a system of courtship,” but allows the emergence of only few possibilities for performing the act itself (Ibid, pp. 149, 150). For Foucault, in the West, it is believed that the sexuality of men is more violent than women’s,¹⁶

¹⁶ For Example, according to Krafft-Ebing, one of the biggest names in the discourse of the nineteenth century psychiatry, who is the first psychiatrist in the Western tradition using the

and the result of such a belief is a relative tolerance for illegal sexual acts as in the permission to establish brothels and houses of prostitution; “Thus, even homosexuality benefited from a certain tolerance toward sexual practices, as long as it was limited to a simple physical encounter” (Ibid, p. 146).

Therefore, relatively modern codification of sexuality, mostly based on the sexual object people choose, and on the psychiatrization of desires or drives, and on the attributions of different structures for the so-called different natures such as man, woman, or abnormal, is a kind of possible sex/sexuality codification among many¹⁷ with the construction of homosexuality and heterosexuality, another one

concepts of homosexuality and heterosexuality in similar to modern usage and creating the concepts of masochism and sadism, “woman has less sexual need than man” such that overstimulated sexual desire in woman is a sign of her pathological character (Krafft-Ebing 1924, p. 73). That is because, for him, the love of a man is sensual which is to be satisfied, but the love of a woman is “more spiritual than sensual,” i.e. her love is based on the love of a mother in regard to her offspring and on the need of her husband’s affection; thus, Krafft-Ebing concludes: “the wife accepts marital intercourse not so much as a sensual gratification than as a proof of her husband’s affection” (Ibid, p. 14). In this sense, the loss of sexual desire in woman is not a cause of destruction for her if “loving children gladden the maternal heart,” although diminution of “virile powers” is detrimental for a man (Ibid, p. 13). In other words, males are those creatures who *naturally* seek pleasure and self-gratification, but females are *naturally* contradicting the idea of self-care in sexuality, but their love is stimulated by the happiness of caring and gratifying *others*, e.g. her offspring or husband. Thus, woman’s happiness is dependant, i.e. not actively pleasure-seeking, but passively pleasure-giving or care-giving. In Krafft-Ebing’s view, “the feeling of dependence... exists in a stronger measure in woman, on account of her social position, and the passive part which she takes in the act of procreation” (Ibid, p. 9). Moreover, due to woman’s passive role “endowed by Nature,” the feeling of subjection and submission is naturally associated with the feeling of pleasure in her heart. That is “the tone-quality of feminine feeling” and she has “an instinctive inclination to voluntary subordination to man” (Ibid, pp. 195, 196). This is the reason why, for Krafft-Ebing, masochism, which delineates that kind of sexual pleasure which is gained by the idea of being subjected to other completely and humiliated by him, is the disease of a woman since it is “an abnormal intensification of certain features of the psycho-sexual character of woman” (Ibid, p. 196).

¹⁷ Another possible codification which is not based on the different species with their diverse sexualities would be the codification of “the New England colonies in the years 1607 to 1740” (Katz 1995, p. 37). New Englanders codified sexuality according to “the productive ideal” which has lasted until the second half of the nineteenth century in the West (Ibid, pp. 17, 37). This codification equated normal sexuality with productivity in contrast to modern codification. Moreover, religious and legal mechanisms were on the alert for eliminating any perverse intercourse not ended in procreation, such as fornication, sodomy, or masturbation (Ibid, p. 37). Desire-seekers were not only a kind of nonconformists in regard to laws, but also perverts and sinners not because of their perversion from natural/sexual tendencies, but from natural/procreative order. Therefore, heterosexuals and homosexuals were not constructed as belonging to diverse species, or a kind of species, since their pervert-discoverer tools were based

of which is activity/passivity oriented one which has its original categories, moral rules, and, as I will give an instantiation of it in the *Methodological Problems* section, scientific discourses in which it seems impossible to construct homosexual and heterosexual as subjective constructions.

Furthermore, for Foucault, not only subject is constructed, but also subjective experience cannot be taken for granted. In this sense, Foucault's research area is rooted in "an analysis of the 'games of truth'" which delimits subjective experiences, i.e. he inquires into the modes of the relationship man establishes with himself and into the possibility of establishing these particular modes of the relationship "through which being is historically constituted as experience; that is, as something that can and must be thought" (Foucault 1992, pp. 6, 7). Thus, Foucault asks,

What are the games of truth by which man proposes to think his own nature when he perceives himself to be mad; when he considers himself to be ill; when he conceives of himself as a living, speaking, laboring being; when he judges and punishes himself as a criminal? What were the games of truth by which human beings came to see themselves as desiring individuals? (Ibid, p. 7).

For instance, as I indicated above, Foucault's quest in sexuality is to clarify the history of desiring subject in the Occident such that he would, if he were alive, approach modern psychoanalytical or hermeneutic deciphering of the truth of man by means of an appeal to its historical forerunners, to the possibility and conditions of existence which, in turn, would allow him to delimit the possibility of "an experience that caused individuals to recognize themselves as subjects of a 'sexuality'" (Ibid, p. 4).

To illustrate this point in an indirect way, I will present the first signs of his constructivism about subjective experience which was proposed in his almost

on an archaic model: procreation. However, we should not forget that procreative ideal was abolished in the 1880s, even though it seems archaic (Ibid, p. 19).

totally rejected (by Foucault himself) book's second edition published in 1962, eight years later than the original one, and which will be a model for me to approach sexuality in general and sexual or homosexual subjective experience with its conditions of emergence in particular.

In this strange archaic book—*Mental Illness and Psychology*—which is full of Freudian, phenomenological, and even existential psychoanalytical themes and reminiscences, Foucault's target is the myth of regression which is based on the postulation of a mythical and anatomical substance such as "psychic force" or "libido" which associates the progress of individual development, and its evolutionary nature can be subject to retrogradations and inhibitions or fixations in a certain level in the case of a pathological development of mentally ill person who is, thus, identified with the child or the primitive. That is the reason why "psychoanalysis believes that it can write a psychology of the child by carrying out a pathology of the adult" (Foucault 1987, p. 19). However, although Foucault does not totally dismiss regression and regressive behavior of mad as explanatory concepts, he rejects their mythical and so-called anatomical correlates so as to keep the experience of mad in its originality without subsuming it under another's such as child's or primitive's. In this respect, he substitutes psychological concepts such as defense mechanism for anatomical ones in giving account of regression such that in pathological conduct, the deranged de-realizes the present and produces the substitutive or simulated past as an escape from the present in order to protect himself from it. Foucault exemplifies the situation by means of a case study in which the delusional adopts infantile attitudes so as to flee from the responsibility of caring for his ill father; therefore, what we see in such cases, for Foucault, is a "recourse rather than a return" to the past (Ibid, p. 33).

Moreover, anxiety, apart from fear caused by what is external as Heidegger would say, lies under the process of defense in regard to present, which is produced by "internal contradiction" as "the experience of a simultaneous wish for life and death, love and hate," as in the case of a man having homosexual love for another

and due to which, as an effect of protection mechanisms, blames and abhors his secret beloved as being entrapped into the hands of devious desire for himself (Ibid, p. 40). However, what is the cause of pathological behavior as stimulated by anxiety which is not extraterrestrial but quotidian and not always in pathological form? For Foucault, the answer lies in the circular nature of pathological anxiety under the influence of which the mad guards himself against the present anxiety coming into existence due to the past and to the history of him, who de-realizes the present by means of appealing to the past, “by appealing to protections that were set up in earlier, similar situations” (Ibid, p. 41).

In this sense, Foucault endeavors to give an account of madness and its novel experience—apart from the attempts of anatomical explanations—by means of an appeal to phenomenology. For him, to understand madman’s experience, we need to describe anxiety the delusional is exposed to through “noetic analysis” and to delineate the world produced by anxious consciousness through “noematic analysis.” That is, a “phenomenology of mental illness” is needed (Ibid, p. 46). One of the interesting parts of Foucault’s analyses for the subject matter of my study is Foucault’s noematic analysis through which he tries to familiarize the world of the delusional. This is the world of anxiety, alienation, fragmentation, and contradiction as opposed to tranquility and stability. This is the world in which objects can be expanded *ad infinitum*, shatter the imposition of space and time, disobey the categorically causal determination at the expense of violating the inveterate natural laws and what everyday experience has thought us to expect: representation and what is represented, sound and its usual source, do not fit the world in which we feel ourselves at home; people and their language or occupations lose their significance and drive mad into loneliness and into his private world or abandon him into the unfamiliar, fragmented story in which no relation—causal or social—is familiar anymore; everything can be exposed to contradictory and convoluted exhibitions. Therefore, in such a world, to what consciousness is exposed is the “contradictory unity of a private world and an abandonment to the inauthenticity of the world” (Ibid, p. 56). At this point, the

most important question comes to the mind of Foucault: what is “its [illness’] conditions of appearance” (Ibid, p. 60); to wit, why does nothing but such a world uncovers itself to the delusional consciousness and what are, if we use one of his favorable expressions after 70’s, the games of truth which make possible the emergence of such a world? This question and its answer point out the first sign of Foucault’s constructivism in regard to subjective experience and in regard to the study of historical possibilities.

For Foucault, for example, in order to find relief in the past in direct opposition to the present, the delusional must be located in a culture in which the past and the present are irreversibly situated at the opposite sides of the life-span; a culture in which education and educational institutions must protect the child in isolation in regard to the world of adults; a culture in which the environment of a child is factitious and mythical, devoid of the wildness of social practices, and full of mollifying, justifying, and aggrandizing what is adult and socially wild. Similarly, for instance, “religious delusions” have their possibility of existence not in religion or delusion, but “in the present content of experience” which does not allow “the assimilation of religious or mystical beliefs” with the secularized world of everyday experience (Ibid, p. 81). Moreover, what noematic analysis reveals as the world of delusional finds its possibility or condition of emergence in the world of sane in which rivalry and exploitation are widespread; in which social and economic relations preclude the emergence of a natural state as contractarians would say, cause the emergence of necessary relations in a given society which is also the cause of the emergence of economic and legal dependencies; in which social norms or economic links both enable man to live in together and feel at home, and make them exposed to discrimination, hostility, alienation, and dependencies. Therefore, only in this world of separation, alienation and contradiction, say, schizophrenia is possible since it easily finds its “structural model for the paradoxes” and alienation, when the world of sane is defamiliarized by social and economic constraints and exclusions (Ibid, p. 84). Thus, Foucault concludes,

In opening itself up to a delusional world, it is not by means of an imaginary constraint that the morbid consciousness is attached; but in submitting to real constraint, it escapes into a morbid world in which it rediscovers, without recognizing it, the same real constraint: for it is not by wishing to escape it that one goes beyond reality (Ibid, pp. 83, 84).

Nevertheless, it is obvious that nearly none of the elements of this analysis is available in Foucault's later works except the idea of subjective experience's constructed nature and its need for historical conditions or games of truth which constitute the relationship man establishes with himself in particular times. Therefore, it is legitimate to incorporate the constructivist idea behind the constitution and conditions of existence of delusional experience into sexuality in order to appropriate it for the purpose of this study, that is, in order to grasp Foucault's ontological implications by means of appealing to sexuality. In this respect, it is possible to speculate that for the experience of homosexual self-abhorrence or homophobia to have an existence, modern pathological and relatively modern religious beliefs and practices are needed as opposed to Greek life as it is explored above in sexual domain, i.e. same-gender love and different-gender love must be delimited exclusively; the practitioners of them have to find their place in the taxonomy of sexual behaviors with strictly identified morphological, physiological, anatomical, and physiognomic characteristics; they are required to be classified under the rubric of exclusive styles of life and habits with either pathological or normal ways of seeking pleasure; behavioral patterns and sexual choices must be problematized and pathologized in need of correction; the abandonment of, say, Greek codification of sexuality based on the dichotomy of activity and passivity is needed and that codification has to be superseded by modern psychiatric analyses and codification which also dismissed the match of sexual instinct with procreation after the late nineteenth century; the assimilation of the so-called homosexual pleasure, lifestyle, and behavior with the religious, moral, and even secularized environment must appear nearly impossible; masculinity and femininity must be identified with psychiatric notions, with

particular characteristics which are exclusively valued and imposed on others from the range of verbal expressions to dressing. Of course, such a list is ludicrously short, but it can provide the understanding of what it means for subjective experience to require some historical conditions so as to come into existence.

As a result, considering that the genealogy of the desiring subject and the belief in the construction of subjective experience indicate a rejection of the ahistorical homosexual having homosexual experience as given without history and a rejection of prediscursive, power-free and primordial subject, I believe, Foucault's works point to a groundless ground as ontological basis. I will call such a basis or an ontological implication as "nominalism" to define the ideology in which subjects are constructions relative to religious beliefs, moral or legal rules, or psychiatric reasoning, etc; and there is no ahistorical species such as homosexual, delinquent, or mad.

However, what might ontology and nominalism mean in the context of the twentieth century continental philosophy? To understand the meaning of nominalism and ontology in the Foucauldian context, we should appeal to Foucault's own usage of the term "historical ontology." For Foucault, after accepting the view that subjects are not given entities but creations, one consequence immediately follows: "we have to create ourselves as a work of art" (Foucault 2000, p. 262). However, it is obvious that this *motto* has a presupposition: *we have created ourselves so far*. Then his genealogies are tracing the history of, methods for, strategies and power relations in, these creations. For Foucault,

Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting

on others; third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics¹⁸ through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents (Ibid, p. 262).

As Ian Hacking states, this occupation refers to ontology, since it is about “what there is,” i.e. it is directed to the some types of objects, not only “material” objects, but also “classes” and “kinds of people” such as homosexuality and homosexuals (Hacking 2002a, pp. 1, 2). Moreover, this ontology is historical, since it locates classes and their members in history. In other words, it makes universals historical and particulars are those beings emerging at the same time with historical universals (Ibid, p. 26). Therefore, this ontology is “historicized nominalism,” since it implies that there is no prediscursive being—in Foucault’s philosophy, that being is mostly subject—until the categorization process or naming process begins (Hacking 2002b, p. 49).

Then, what are the characteristics of nominalist ontology? Initially, it does not appeal to truth in the sense that it does not need to refer to a prediscursive, ahistorical child desiring to be loved with some complexes such as the Oedipal. Moreover, I believe, the nominalist ontology is a promising tool for resisting power by means of rejecting the truth and the objectified subject of control mechanisms. The construction of nominalist ontology might be used strategically and politically to deconstruct the so-called “perverts” of the human sciences, those termed as “abnormal,” or as individuals to be corrected, since it does not appeal to ahistorical constant to measure the abnormality of a given subject so as to discriminate people. In addition, nominalist ontology might defamiliarize any blockage in the possibility of transformation, since it is opposed to any attempt at crystallization. Lastly, no matter which name we ascribe to such a constructivist belief about subjects, Foucault’s ontological implication responds to the Radical Change Argument in which it was stated that it was impossible to find any reality principle with its new self which was not inimical to “others.” Obviously,

¹⁸ However, this does not mean that we, as free agents, always constitute ourselves consciously. As Foucault states, “if we take educational institutions, we realize that one is managing others and teaching them to manage themselves” (Foucault 2000, p. 277). Moreover, we can add psychiatric and medical discourses or spiritual directives to educational institutions as subject-producers.

nominalist ontology has no truth or norm to define the true way of subjectivation, but it has equal distance from every constructed self which is neither normal nor abnormal, and it creates no undeconstructable status distinction between them due to psychiatric or biological norms. Metaphorically, such ontology posits *nebula* as its basic notion, different densities of which cause separate forms of subjectivation and subjects, all of which appears in order to vanish without crystallization. Since there is no norm, truth and the principle of normality in nominalism, it cannot allow the *normal* and an inimically separated *other* to arise. And against such a background, as Thomas Flynn (2005) suggests, “the nominalist historian’s task” is to study the history of those practices which are responsible for the creation of subjects, and to “lay bare these practices in their plurality and their contingency in order to reveal the *fields* that make an otherwise heterogeneous collection of objects and events intelligible” (p. 34).

Yet, even though nominalist ontology discards Radical Change Argument, is it really applicable in political context in addition to its explained utility in opposing discrimination? In order to clarify its applicability, I will present three different applications of it in feminist context, both in micro-political and macro-political levels, that is also to face the Feminist Argument. My aim is to show the illegitimacy of constructing strong parallels between essentialism and resistance as opposed to anti-essentialism and pessimism, regardless of whether nominalist ontology as a possible resistance tool is devoid of any imperfection, or whether it is the sole source for political movement.

The first application of nominalist ontology in feminist context is in micro-political level, i.e. the level in which liberation is not confined to the abolition of laws, public demonstrations, or collective movements, but is mostly based on liberatory practices of individuals. In this respect, Helen O’Grady shows, in Foucauldian spirit, that woman-identity with its supposedly natural characteristics is both a means of social control eliminating authenticity and the cause of inadequacy feelings for women.

After reminding the Foucauldian power thesis and power's self-monitoring effect, she states that identity-constructions with their accepted norms demand obedience on the part of women. Therefore, most of women are under the hegemony of "self-policing" techniques in order to keep the requirements of their supposedly natural qualities, which cause them to subject themselves to permanent control (O'Grady 2004, p. 91). For her, "Self-policing tends to be experienced as an automatic part of thinking and thus as reality" (Ibid, p. 93), and failing to fulfill the requirements of the self causes "a sense of personal deficit or inadequacy" (Ibid, p. 113)—the requirements of, for example, motherhood and child caring as opposed to sapphism and *Electra complex*.

In order to eliminate such negative effects of ascribed identities, O'Grady points out the usefulness of deconstructing identities. For rejecting permanent characteristics of the so-called natural identity or gender might help transforming problematic identity constructions, eliminating inadequacy feelings, escaping the power of self-policing strategies, and allowing self-transformation and authenticity.¹⁹

Similar in nature, however more radical than the first, the second political application of nominalist ontology is available in radical feminism. Starting with 1970s, radical feminism has strongly opposed "sex roles" and "sexual categories" which, they believe, were the sources of women's confinement to heterosexual marriages, housewifery, motherhood, subordinate roles in society, which were supported by some Western myths equating woman-sexuality with "vaginal intercourse" or "penile penetration" ascribed to womanhood, woman body, or

¹⁹ At this point, her "Narrative therapy" analogy is on target. In this therapy, it is presupposed that identity is a historically constructed narrative demanding obedience, and that deconstruction of once constructed and problematic identity causes the emergence of the possibility of reconstructing diverse selves in order to "develop" (perhaps a weird term in Foucauldian context) life-quality (O'Grady 2004, p. 111). Obviously, such a technique can have a usage in eliminating homosexual self-abhorrence I discussed above in the context of constituted subjective experience and in "correcting" the experience of homophobia.

feminine pleasures as natural characteristics (Katz 1995, p. 147). Therefore, they tried to reveal that sexual categories are not innocent correspondences to reality, but constructions causing women's degradation in social space, and obligatory heterosexuality in family space in which procreativity is described as essential for society and natural for femininity. Radical feminism scorned sexual/political/discriminatory categories such as woman, man, or lesbian, by means of arguing that these categories are constructions in contrast to their so-called biological givenness which, they believe, "makes the difference... inevitable... and helps to maintain the unequal social power of men over women," and eliminates authenticity in creating original selves, in exploring diverse pleasure-sources, or in transforming current body-usages (Ibid, p. 143). In other words, radical feminists used a kind of nominalist ontology as well in terms of rejecting ahistorical woman and lesbian.

Obviously, O'Grady and radical feminists' constructivism is mostly based on the need for self-transformation at micro-political level, although radical feminism desires social change. But is it possible to move from micro-political level to the macro-political one without appealing to the old-fashioned essentialism? Is it conceivable to change women's social position without any recourse to essential feminine experience? Donna Haraway (2004) reveals that such a possibility exists.

After confessing the influence of Foucault in her constructivist and poststructuralist thesis, she postulates "cyborg" and "cyborg politics" (Haraway 2004, p. 8). Initially, cyborg is not a kind of "essential unity" providing a place for the so-called genders or races with inevitable characteristics (Ibid, p. 14). Moreover, it does not recourse to nature; and neither promise salvation nor accepts innocence of any political movement or group. Additionally, it has no location in the creation-scale; therefore, its myths are "non-oedipal" (Ibid, p. 9). Cyborg politics does not confine itself to women's victimhood, motherhood, or femininity, since it avoids sexist, political, old-fashioned dualisms. Lastly, it is not

based on “universal, totalizing theory” which is destined to miss “reality,” i.e. lived experience (Ibid, p. 39). Then what is a cyborg, or how does cyborg politics work?

For Haraway, cyborg is both a fictional collective entity and a part of social reality. It is a fiction, since its particular constituents, i.e. women, are social constructions. However, it is a part of social reality, since these social constructions are located in a lived experience, i.e. woman-experiences. It is constructed in order to deviate from the norms, transform the relationships and constructions; in order to construct, deconstruct, and reconstruct identities and demolish “phallogocentric origin stories” (Ibid, pp. 8, 33, 34). It is a constructed standpoint covering different lived experiences of diverse social constructions, allowing collective movement, and avoiding identity politics, by means of its sanctification of difference and diversity, and by means of its “affinity” politics welcoming different identities (Ibid, p. 14). Therefore, it is a sign of the possibility of collective/political movement without violating the borders of nominalist ontology.

Consequently, in light of these political applications of nominalist ontology, it is obvious that for liberatory movements, both in micro-political and in macro-political levels, essentialism is not a kind of necessary condition in contrast to the presuppositions of the Feminist Argument I presented above. Now it will be helpful to clarify the borders of Foucauldian nominalist ontology further before closing this chapter, with the confidence of nominalist ontology’s explained applications and defended utilities.

Foucauldian nominalist ontology, through rejecting identities and supposedly natural distinctions between masculinity and femininity, or between homosexuality and heterosexuality, does not accept assimilation, since it is designed to oppose normalizing, in other words, assimilating power mechanisms. Its strategy is pretty appropriate for exhausting self-creation possibilities which

are inexhaustible in identity politics, since it allows permanent transformation and affinity coalitions. Moreover, although it might be useful in changing our current viewpoints for sexism or racism, it is future-oriented, because it demands never-ending plurality. Lastly, it is hostile to any crystallization—possible to emerge after the destruction of current crystals.

CHAPTER 7

EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Given that Foucault's ontological implications are presented, it is time to inquire into his epistemological implications. Initially, all the requirements I determine before, such as the avoidance of absolute truth and of isolation of power relations must be fulfilled. But also, for the sake of establishing a coherent system, we need an epistemological belief which has to be cotenable with Foucault's nominalist ontology. Therefore, after delineating Foucault's epistemology in this and the next section without violating the borders of a field delimited by the mentioned requirements, I will pose the question if it is possible to match his ontology and epistemology in a coherent way.

I will follow the traces of Foucault's epistemological implications in three fields. Firstly, I will inquire into the implications of his power/knowledge thesis; therefore, I will turn back to panopticon-analogy and disciplinary society. Secondly, I will present Foucault's account of truth with its epistemological implication. And lastly, I will work on his early writings—archeological period—in the following section.

In the *Power* section, we saw that for Foucault, power operates by means of disciplinary techniques in order to observe, normalize and control since the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. Moreover, such a power has a de-individualized and de-institutionalized form which has been adaptable in different institutions or fields. It is important to note two reminders before going further. On the one hand, in disciplinary societies, power tends to individualize the one

who is supposed to be disciplined, and to de-individualize itself as the panopticon—analogy clearly shows. On the other hand, disciplinary power and its correlates—disciplinary techniques which have been available in schools, hospitals or asylums—did not emerge *ex nihilo*. They were used in “religious institutions” and in the “colonization and confinement of vagrants, beggars, nomads, delinquents, prostitutes,” directed by, again, religious institutions *in a limited way* (Foucault 2006, p. 70).

What is the target that must be corrected, normalized or standardized in the disciplinary society? And which techniques are used? We saw that the target of disciplinary society is not the tortured body. But, on the one hand, it is the soul; in other words, the character, psychological attitude, aggressive tendencies, laziness, immorality, delinquency, must be *trained* and *corrected*. That is why we need psychology, psychiatry and criminology. For Foucault, this soul—soul of the criminal in criminology, soul of the stubborn student in pedagogy—is not the product of criminology and pedagogy, which is *discovered* by *free spirits* and then *naturally* used in disciplinary institutions. On the contrary, the new form of power, through its appeal to the more refined power-modality—normalization—produces, or produces the possibility of, new categories such as “psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.; on it have been built scientific techniques and discourses” (Foucault 1991, p. 29, 30). Thanks to the paradigm change in the form of power, we have a scientific soul surrounded by scientific discourses. Thanks to which we grasp pedagogical, psychological, criminological, and psychiatric knowledge of the soul. That is, the effect of power in this particular area is an emergence of an entity, neither fully scientific nor religious, with its genuine knowledge. On the other hand, another target of the disciplinary society is submissive and trained body—the body with its determined postures, gestures, strength, ability to respond the requirements of the task and the norm, the norm of being a student in the school, of being a worker in the factory, even of being a mad in the asylum, and lastly of being an inmate in the prison. Then,

which techniques are used so as to achieve to reach such a “docile body?” And what kind of relationship they have with knowledge?

Initially, *partitioning* as a discipline-technique: it is inevitable for disciplinary society to divide the masses into assigned places in order to control and observe. For the partitioning operation makes possible to valuate and judge the characters, postures and gestures, abilities, normalities and abnormalities of *every particular individual* (Ibid, p. 143). For instance, thanks to the new form of punishment, we have prisons such that every individual has his/her assigned place according to his/her age, sex, danger and “the technique of correction to be used” (Ibid, p. 269).

Then, *hierarchization*: every individual has to have his/her place not only according to his/her age and sex, but also his/her progress in normalization, rank, normality and adaptation to the norm. In other words, “Discipline is an art of rank,” that is, art of determining “the place one occupies in a classification”; yet such an art does not work by means of immutable positions (Ibid, p. 145, 146). For instance, it is possible for inmates in the prison to have rewards such as the reduction in penalty, or revision of the punishment such as the cell-punishment, according to the progress of the inmate in the process of correction, according to whether s/he presents a *good conduct*. Consequently, these two processes, partitioning and hierarchization, are the obsession or *a priori* requirements of discipline, and were the distressing problems of the eighteenth century-experts. For example, in this period, one of the most important questions was “how one was to distribute patients, separate them from one another, divide up the hospital space and make a systematic classification of diseases” (Ibid, p. 148). But, of course, every hierarchized place has not only its particular assignments, but periodization. That is, every task has to have a time limit which corresponds to the measure determining who belongs to that place and who is abnormal. Progressive education assigned for hierarchical classes in schools or time-tables in factories are some indicators of it.

Third, *docility*: not only every task has time limit, and needs strictly determined periodization, but also every posture, gesture, and usage of body must be determined due to the requirements of the task. For instance, military camps have to be supported by innumerable discourses delineating the way soldiers must move, greet and run, with the determination of periodization to which every movement, greeting and running must conform (Ibid, p. 151). Moreover, every part of the body must be in harmony with other parts, i.e. relationship between the parts of body and body as a whole must be delimited. For instance, every soldier must run in such a way that their steps and the way how they grasp their weapons have to be harmonized (Ibid, p. 152). Naturally, these determinations must be supplemented by exercises such that every hierarchized place would have its characterized assignments according to which every exercise would be described, but also these exercises would be designed in such a way that not only they would allow the requirements of progress toward terminal point or of class be fulfilled, but also would make possible to compare every individual with the other members of a particular class, with one's former performances, and with the requirements of this class which determine the measure of belonging to that class (Ibid, p. 161).

Then, *observation*: it is inevitable for disciplinary society to observe every posture, gesture, characteristic qualities, progress, and normality of every isolated and hierarchized individual in order to see if corrective techniques are useful, if normalization progress is successful, if any individual rightly responds to the requirements of the norm. Observation is *sine qua non* of knowing not only the behaviors of individuals, but also his progress toward the desired end of correction, and of fulfilling the required transformation of individual (Ibid, p. 172). Moreover, pure observation is not sufficient for discipline: "Documentation" is also required. Every *datum* coming from observation must be documented or recorded so as to see the progress of individual, suitability for his assigned class, his distance to the normality; "in order to maintain him in his individual features, in his particular evolution, in his own aptitudes or abilities,

under the gaze of a permanent corpus of knowledge,” which, in turn, makes possible to perform classifications, transformations, comparisons and determinations of “what treatment to apply to each” (Ibid, pp. 190, 250). Of course, the other face of the observation—examination—has to be at work as well. For examination allows the mesh of observation and “normalizing judgement” to come into existence (Ibid, p. 184). Thanks to the new form of power, no individual is a neglected part of a suppressed mass, but an individual, a case, a history with his evolution and progress.

Before determining the relations of disciplinary mode of power with knowledge, it is important to give more attention to two points or infer some conclusions from what has been said so far. On the one hand, as it is implied, disciplinary power individualizes. To wit, it cannot be satisfied with monarch’s negligence, with unregulated masses. It assigns places for every particular individual, hierarchizes, differentiates from other elements, observes individually to determine the best way of rehabilitating, and historicizes in such a way that any progress, inclination, evolution, and progressive digression from the norm would be unfolded. However, contradictorily, it also makes individuals *object* as if they were the sources of knowledge; knowable entities with an essence, transformable, having an ability of being adopted toward what is useful, normal or sacred, or of being diverted from them; lastly, latent or hidden sources from which psychological, pedagogical, criminological and psychiatric knowledge can be grasped. Hence, it is the process of “the objectification of those who are subjected” (Ibid, pp. 184, 185).

What are the power/knowledge relations? And is it possible to infer any epistemological implication from them? Initially, three basic relations between power and knowledge can be inferred immediately from what we have said so far. First, power seeks knowledge, power works with knowledge through observation, documentation, taxonomy, and historiography. Knowledge is *sine qua non* for power to function. If there is no knowledge, then there is no power. Second,

power wildly requires knowledge. It needs psychological and pedagogical knowledge so as to function, to determine the best way of treatment; physiological and anatomical knowledge to produce docile, submissive and utilized bodies; pharmacological and medical knowledge to correct the wild animal spirit. Third, it produces knowledge. In fact, it had produced, for Foucault, psychological, pedagogical, and criminological knowledge in a crude way in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries even before psychology, pedagogy, and criminology were institutionalized. Thanks to power, “accumulation of new forms of knowledge” comes forth before institutionalization (Ibid, p. 224).

However, it is obvious that these basic forms of power/knowledge relations do not give any idea about what would be the epistemology of Foucault. However, other power/knowledge relations will give an idea about his epistemology. In his account, human sciences find their very possibility in the new form of power, in the objectification and individualization processes of power. That is, thanks to *non-scientific* processes, thanks to power relations, *scientific* knowledge arises. For Foucault:

if they [human sciences] have been able to be formed and to produce so many profound changes in the episteme,²⁰ it is because they have been conveyed by a specific and new modality of power: a certain policy of the body, a certain way of rendering the group of men docile and useful. This policy... called for a technique of overlapping subjection and objectification; it brought with it new procedures of individualization.... that has made the human sciences historically possible (Ibid, p. 305).

Moreover, the so-called sciences of man do not only find their possibility due to the paradigm change in power, but also they used and still use techniques of power. That is, psychology, pedagogy, criminology and psychiatry, in the name of the sacredness of truth, are established or institutionalized upon normalization, classification, division of normality and abnormality, progress or development-processes with their psychological tests, documentation, objectification,

²⁰ I will clarify the meaning of the notion of “episteme” in the *Archaeology* section below.

individualization, and finally, comparison of individuals with the norm, class, society and the other inhabitants of the class. Additionally, they used the more or less similar techniques of correction in the name of humane rehabilitation. For instance, the nineteenth century-psychiatry has used the interiorising effect of panopticon in order to cure; that is, it has isolated madmen with an imposition of the idea of being observed as a madman such that they would behave as if they were cured and renounced their recalcitrance (Foucault 2006, p. 102). Or the nineteenth century-experts, as we saw above, proposing prison as a punishment form, were imitated by the nineteenth century asylum-experts, in the usage of strict regulations as a therapy technique for giving inmates an acquisition of work-habit, body-usage, and lifestyle (Ibid, p.142).

Therefore, at least in the relationship between the new form of power and human sciences, in other words, between power and knowledge, there is a strict relationship, and even dependence such that it is possible to infer an epistemological implication: knowledge, with its possibility of formation in a particular form and with the particular techniques for acquiring it, is relative to power. At least, in this historical and specific situation, epistemologically, there is no knowledge if there is no power, and the form of knowledge is directly related to the form of power. Moreover, Foucault does not limit himself to just *this* historical relativity, but generalizes the relationship between power and knowledge.²¹

that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.... In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge (Foucault 1991, pp. 27, 28).

²¹ I will say much on this generalization later in the *Methodological Problems* section.

Given that some of the power/knowledge relations were shown in such a way that it is possible to have an idea about Foucauldian epistemology, it is useful to look at Foucault's account of truth as it is promised at the beginning of this section before giving our last decision about his epistemology. For Foucault, truth is "the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated" (Foucault 1980, p. 132). Moreover,

Each society has its régime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Ibid, p. 131).

It is obvious that we are encountered here with a kind of proposed paradigmatic truth or the view of *weltanschauung*.²² To clarify this point, I will give an example, taken from Arnold Davidson (2001), which is Foucauldian in spirit, to illustrate briefly how *weltanschauung* determines what is true or false, and meaningful or meaningless; in Davidson's words, how different styles of reasoning determine genuine diseases and meaningful scientific questions about these diseases. Moreover, I believe that Davidson's view will give an idea about the relationship, to which I will turn later, between Foucault's ontological implications and his epistemology which has not been determined yet.

Davidson claims that diverse "style of reasoning," "systems of knowledge" determine diverse sexual identities (Ibid, p. 32). For example, before the second half of the nineteenth century, sexual identity was defined by means of "anatomical style of reasoning." Femininity was defined by the existence of "vulva," "vagina," "menstruation," as opposed to virility which is defined by "ovoid bodies" or "spermatic cords" (Ibid, pp. 33, 34). To wit, sexual identity was constructed through "the structure and function of the reproductive organs," and "physiological differences" (Ibid, p. 38). However, after that time, the style of

²² As we will see later, the notion of *weltanschauung* needs further clarification.

reasoning, which determined the rules separating the true from the false or defining the area in which true and false could be separable, was modified. Henceforth, what characterizes the feminine and the masculine is a mode of “impulses, tastes, aptitudes, satisfactions, and psychic traits,” or tendencies to behave like a woman or man, to enjoy dressing like a woman or man as if such characteristics were naturally given (Ibid, p. 35). Obviously, this style of reasoning—“psychiatric style of reasoning”—is different from the ancient one both in concepts and in the factors determining sexual identities.

Moreover, diverse styles of reasoning with their diverse sexual identity-constructions determine diverse “diseases” and “disorders” (Ibid, p. 35). For example, in the anatomical style of reasoning, the protagonist of the perverts was “hermaphrodite” due to his/her anatomical disorders as opposed to “homosexual” whose deviations were based on his appetites, pleasures, impulses, or way of life. To wit, hermaphrodite and homosexual are separate entities due to separate styles of reasoning. Moreover, it seems impossible to pose the problem of physiological/psychological reasons of homosexuality in the anatomic style of reasoning, since homosexuality refers to the mode of life, tendencies, and appetites. For when the sexual identity of a man, for example, is defined by means of his “spermatozoon,” it is hard and also meaningless to answer some questions about homosexual-like “perversions:” “Can a spermatozoon be heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual? Can it suffer from deviant sexuality, or abnormally increased or decreased sexuality? Can it have masochistic, sadistic, or fetishistic desires?” (Ibid, p. 38). These are unanswerable questions since, in the anatomical style of reasoning, perversion is not based on psychiatric terms.

Is this difference between two paradigms²³ just a tiny difference between two viewpoints, or are they the products of much more extensive differences in two diverse coherent systems? In other words, is it possible to give an account of this

²³ As it will be clarified in the *Archaeology* section below, the notion of paradigm—in Kuhnian sense—is a promising tool in reviewing the philosophy of Foucault.

difference in two viewpoints through appealing to more general, but equally diverse, *weltanschauungen*? I believe that it is possible to give an account of this *prima facie* tiny difference in terms of psychiatry's own bifurcation into two diverse styles of reasoning which is presented by Foucault. For him, before the second half of the nineteenth century, psychiatry was based on the "system of belief"; in other words, "to say that someone was mad, to ascribe madness to him, was always to say that he was mistaken, and to say in what respect, on what point, in what way, and within what limits he was mistaken" (Foucault 2006, p. 7). Naturally, this psychiatry—psychiatry of delirium—has its nosographical and etiological bases which were grounded on anatomical and pathological correlates; but, for Foucault, at the time of cure or therapy, they were excluded, and experts has focused only on "Hallucinations, acute deliria, mania, fixed ideas, and maniacal desire" (Foucault 2004, p. 158). For instance, psychiatry of delirium has been mostly encountered either with the "delusion of grandeur" in the mad who believed that he was a king or only man in the asylum space surrounded with women; or with the "assertion of omnipotence" which did not correspond to psychiatrist's view of reality.

Moreover, this archaic psychiatry with its anatomico-pathological basis and delirium obsession has cured the supposed kings in the best way its paradigm allowed. Since the mad supposes himself to be a king or to have power, what would be the best way in the therapy, if not humiliating, torturing, or isolating him so as to "prove" that he has no power; or if not employing him as a worker to present the "real value" of money, of poverty, and of need; or if not regulating inmate's working, eating and sleeping time strictly in such a way that he recognizes that he is under the will of another without having power and even will (Foucault 2006, pp. 151, 152, 175). Then we have a perfectly close and coherent system with its anatomico-pathological and delirious presuppositions and its perfect correlates as therapy techniques. Moreover, in light of delirium and this coherency, it was nearly impossible to pose questions about homosexuality, if there was no sign of hallucination. Yet, it seems very hard to match

homosexuality and its possible *causes* or *cures* with hallucinations or delirium if the *male-pervert* has no belief in his *femaleness* such that he acts as if he was a *female*. Yet, what is the natural behavior of females? For femininity was not defined, as Davidson shows, by means of behavior, appetite, mode of being, or way of life; but by means of vulva and vagina, i.e. by means of anatomical concepts. Then, the impossibility of homosexuality, of true and false statements about it, to arise; and the reason why we have some unanswerable or meaningless questions in the archaic form of psychiatry, which are meaningful for us, is not due to tiny differences in different paradigms which can be easily eliminated, but due to much more fundamental reasons.

What happened in the late nineteenth century that allowed homosexuality to come into existence with true and false statements and with the genuine scientific field of study about it? In Foucault's view, we witnessed for some reasons which I will omit, a paradigm change—the transformation of the psychiatry of delirium into the psychiatry of instinct which is based on instincts, their curability or abnormality, their naturalness or rectification with the demarcation of “voluntary” and “involuntary” movements of the body (Foucault 2004, p. 158). Moreover, “instinct is precisely that element whose existence is natural, but which is abnormal in its anarchical functioning, which is abnormal whenever it is not mastered or repressed” (Foucault 2006, p. 222); and the sexual instinct in particular is the one which is too vital to confine itself to normal and heterosexual relationship, and therefore deviates from the norm as in the case of “onanism,” “pederasty,” “lesbian love,” “the violation of corpses,” or “bestiality” (Foucault 2004, p. 279). Consequently, by means of this paradigm, psychiatry is capable of pathologizing every deviation from the social norms of behavior, which was nearly impossible in the old taxonomy. Thanks to the paradigm change, “Any kind of disorder, indiscipline, agitation, disobedience, recalcitrance, lack of affection, and so forth can now be psychiatrized” without any sign of hallucination or delirium (Ibid, p. 161).

As a result, such kind of fundamental paradigm changes and, as we will see below, paradigmatic incommensurability Foucault has in mind when he defines truth as a bundle of rules determining what is true and false, supported by diverse techniques, justifications, presuppositions and identity-constructions.

Is it possible to see these paradigm changes as progresses toward truth, or should we conclude that Foucault *really* refers to incommensurability? Is it not possible to refer to some *criteria* such as the *criterion* of predictive power or explanatory power in order to distinguish the archaic model of, say, psychiatry from the genuine one?²⁴ To answer these questions, and finally to reach, again vaguely, epistemological implications of Foucault, it is inevitable to separate two truth modalities distinguished by him. On the one hand, for him, there is what he calls “a technology of demonstrative truth” or “a philosophico-scientific standpoint of truth” which describes truth as if it is available in every moment and every place, waiting to be discovered, mostly hidden, sometimes vaguely unfolding itself due to our scientific methods’ and techniques’ insufficiency, and lastly, can be grasped by anyone having the right scientific instruments to search for it, appropriate concepts to think about it, and sophisticated language to articulate it (Foucault 2006, pp. 235, 236). On the other hand, there is also, as opposed to this discovered truth, an event truth in the history of Occident, which had been eventually dominated and eliminated by the former. (Ibid, p. 238, 239): this modality of truth—event truth—is

dispersed, discontinuous, interrupted truth which will only speak or appear from time to time, where it wishes to, in certain places; a truth which does not appear everywhere, at all times, or for everyone; a truth which is not waiting for us, because it is a truth which has its favorable moments, its propitious places, its privileged agents and bearers (Ibid, p. 236).

For example, take the ancient “Greek, Latin and medieval medicine of crises” (Ibid, p. 237). For Foucault, as an event truth, truth of the disease could be

²⁴ Both the notion of incommensurability and the *criteria* for evaluation will be elaborated in the *Archaeology* section.

understood only if the crisis occurred. That is, the intrinsic truth of an illness, its essence, cannot unfold itself, if the crisis as a particular event is not available; “Before the crisis the disease is one thing or another; it is nothing in truth,” since truth does not wait to be discovered, it unfolds itself and vanishes; it is discontinuous (Ibid, p. 243).

For another example, take “Alchemical truth:” it is not graspable to everyone. It is not sufficient to have appropriate instruments or concepts, but some kinds of ritual must be performed with the required “moral or ascetic qualifications of individual”; moreover, that truth, is not waiting to be grasped, but unfolds in the “ritual staging,” “burst[s] forth or pass[es] by as an opportunity to be grasped in a ritually determined moment that is always enigmatic” (Ibid, p. 241). That is, it excludes the possibility of accretion of scientific knowledge, and any hope for taking predictive or explanatory power as a *criterion* determining the right method for the acquisition of truth.

In another context, Foucault calls the disciplines working with more or less similar truth acquisition techniques as spirituality as opposed to philosophy. He attributes spirituality to the ancient philosophy excepting Aristotle. Spirituality is based on a bundle of exercises, purifications, transformations in the way of life and mode of being, or changes in the perceiving of the world, ascetic rituals performed in order to acquire truth, which, in turn, will fulfill the partial transformation and purification (Foucault 2005, pp. 15, 16). Hence, the master of spirituality would ask “what fashioning of myself must I undertake, what modification of being must I carry out to be able to have access to the truth” (Ibid, p. 189). For instance, as Pierre Hadot (1995) states, in Neo-Platonism, in order to reach the truth or the One or Intellect—that means to be identical with it—that is, transformed and purified completely, it is necessary to purify the individual soul. But what is the soul? What are its intrinsic qualities? Or what is its essence? In order to grasp its truth or essence, it is inevitable to extract what is alien to it. That is, it is *sine qua non* to purify it for acquiring the truth of it. Therefore, as Foucault

would say, we have a kind of spiritual process which necessitates purification and transformation for the sake of acquiring truth which completes the genuine transformation.

As a result, we saw that there is a truth modality which is based on spirituality, personal transformation, discontinuity, and eventualization that directly excludes the possibility of taking predictive and explanatory power as *criteria* determining the borders of genuine form of knowledge; and it eliminates at least some *criteria* to compare different paradigms. Therefore, we cannot ascribe Foucault, if we turn to incommensurability-question, any kind of belief leading to the view of progress toward truth between different paradigms or between diverse bundles of rules determining what is true, false, or meaningless. Naturally, what follows is that, as an indicator of his epistemological implication, Foucault *relativizes* the truth of true statements to *incommensurable paradigms*.

Until now, we have seen some of the epistemological implications of Foucault in regard to power/knowledge thesis and in regard to his account of truth. However, as I promised above, his early writings must also be investigated so as to reveal his epistemology, since both the famous power/knowledge thesis and the account of truth with different modalities belong to his late writings in which Foucault uses his genealogical method as opposed to archaeological one which is partly superseded by the former from the 70s on. Yet, delineating Foucault's archeological method with its epistemological implications and finally pointing out *the epistemological implication* of him, I reserve the next section, since the method of archaeology deserves comprehensive description.

CHAPTER 8

ARCHAEOLOGY

Before describing the nature of archaeology, one question immediately comes to mind: is it tenable to appeal to archaeology in grasping Foucault's epistemological presuppositions, although the subject matter of this study is mostly based on power, resistance, and sexuality, which are obviously not problematized, at least thoroughly, by Foucault until 70's—as if his views were continuous without any interruption or transformation throughout three decades? Of course this inescapable question must be answered without trickery if this section of the study is substantiated on a firm ground, and if the epistemological implications of Foucault's works will be derived in a justified way. However, I will suspend this problem for now, but I will turn to it later in several times during the description of archaeological method is given. To wit, both the description of archaeology and the justification of such a description will be given together. To describe archaeology, I will mostly appeal to *The Archaeology of Knowledge* published in 1969, in which Foucault gives the details of the method he had used in his preceding books with further theoretical elaborations.

In this period, Foucault's way of historicizing, as in the case of genealogical historicizing, is not based on the presupposition of continuity as if a kind of transcendental consciousness or a teleological process were at work; as if beneath every historical transformation of scientific, political, or social practices there were a “single mind” or a “collective mentality” which had caused every process, regardless of whether it was speciously discontinuous, to come into completion from the beginning; as if historical flow strived to reach its completion; as if the

task of an historian were to grasp the perfect unity beyond interruptions through eliminating them gradually (Foucault 2002b, p. 4). Rather, in historicizing, every discourse must be taken in its singularity and repetition in different contexts through different functions as opposed to assimilating them into the hidden source which can be searched *ad infinitum*, and to which scientific or political progress can be attributed *ad nauseam*. Rather than appealing to the concepts of tradition or genre, teleology or progress, origin or evolution, Foucault believes, every statement—as an ingredient of a discourse—must be taken in its historical dispersion and uniqueness; that is,

we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements... and show what other forms of statement it excludes.... why it could not be other than it was... how it assumes, in the midst of others and in relation to them, a place that no other could occupy (Ibid, p. 30).

Therefore, as in the case of genealogical eventualization, Foucault's area of study is what is singular, dispersed, and unable to be assimilated into the vast unities. But Foucault searches for another unity which is not opposed to dispersion and transformation; to wit, he is interested in historical conditions for objects, statements, theories, and concepts to emerge in their dispersion—these conditions are called the “*rules of formation*”; and every regularity Foucault finds in words and objects as permeating into them, as delimiting them, as dispersing them from one another, in other words any unity which is based on such a “system of dispersion” is called a “*discursive formation*” (Ibid, pp. 41, 42).

However, to allow dispersion to have a place in history is not to presuppose that there is no unity, tradition or origin, and that what these unities permit us to call an oeuvre, science or philosophy is unwarranted from the beginning, and that their formulation or reformulation are illegitimate once and for all. Rather, Foucault aims to defamiliarize them, corrupt their self-givenness and universality, deconstruct their natural immediacy so as to open the path for new

generalizations, unities, and the extended area of thinkable by means of problematizing the definitions and restrictions, the laws and form, tenability and un-tenability, subclasses and nature, of what is taken as uniform. To wit, as in the case of genealogy, Foucault's obsession with defamiliarization of what is familiar in order to expand the area of thinkable is also available in his archaeological analyses.

How does Foucault reach his goal; how does he defamiliarize unities and permit others to come to the fore? Initially, he takes commonly accepted unities as his research area such as psychopathology or nineteenth century psychiatry, not in order to reveal their illegitimacy by means of unveiling incoherencies between them, but in order to study their specific nature, their *criteria* for postulating—for themselves—unity and progress, their laws of formation for their very existence, so as to make them seem secondary in regard to the conditions of existence which are the preconditions for any unity or *criterion* of postulating progress to have an existence.

However, what I have said so far is mostly about what archaeological method is not, and what its peripheral characteristics are. But before going further in order to apprehend archaeological method fully, it is enough from those peripheral characteristics to see some correlations between archaeological and genealogical methods. Both of them are opposed to the axiomatic status of accepted unities, continuities, phenomenological subject, teleological narratives, and hidden origins. And lastly, both of them are eventualized by Foucault for the sake of deconstruction and defamiliarization in the search for expanding the area of thinkable.

If we turn back, in order to understand archaeological method's search for discursive formation and epistemological implications of it, to the area in which Foucault looks for regularity, our initial subject matter must be the "object" and its formation. In this respect, discursive formation can be formed around the very

object it is about; and as long as that object continues to attract, say, scientists' curiosity, we have a unified place for statements ranging from archaic to complicated formations. For instance, it can be said that the uniform place for psychopathological discourses and statements, and psychopathological discourse as a unity, is to be found around its object, that is, madness. However, for Foucault, such an attempt would be futile, since

It would certainly be a mistake to try to discover what could have been said of madness at a particular time by interrogating the being madness itself, its secret content, its silent, self-enclosed truth; mental illness was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its developments, indicated its various correlations (Ibid, p. 35).

Thus, from the range of different psychiatric formations to legal and political discourses, we have no self-subsistent madness or madman as identical with himself throughout centuries regardless of whether it is "discovered" appropriately or not. Therefore, to form a unity around an object, initially it is needed to interrogate discursive mental illnesses in regard to their formation due to social, political, and religious discrimination; due to pathological taxonomies, medical practices, and way of cure; that is, due to the procedures for functioning of a discourse, when and where mental illness is constructed in a particular form. For example, if our subject matter is an object-delinquency, what archaeological method is supposed to describe is the rules and relations required for this object to have an existence, i.e. the relation between legal concepts, "degrees of diminished responsibility" and psychological concepts of development or arrested development, voluntary and involuntary movements, habitual and instinctual stimuli, the relation between social or legal "norms of the behavior of individuals" and psychiatric rules or norms for description, therapy, classification and cure must be revealed (Ibid, p. 48). As a result, archaeology, in regard to object formation, searches for the rules of formation for particular mental illnesses to appear, to differ from one another, to be dispersed, and to be uniquely situated in history. In this sense, Foucault suggests, "one cannot speak of anything at any

time... it is not enough for us to open our eyes, to pay attention, or to be aware, for new objects suddenly to light up and emerge out of the ground,” if the conditions of emergence are not available (Ibid, p. 49). Therefore, as in genealogy in which the concept of power was postulated as a condition for emergence as we saw, which was the reason why truth was not waiting to be grasped by free spirits, for early Foucault too, objects are not waiting to be matched by statements in the minds of free spirits who shatter all dogmas so as to grasp reality. Therefore, as for epistemological level, Foucault rejects the old-fashioned myth of correspondence in which an object is ready to be matched by the word in order to give its truth; or conversely, it is not the case that the word waits for confirmation until it refers and correctly corresponds to a prediscursive object. However, for him, objects and words cannot be separated since there is no object “anterior to discourse” as in the case of late Foucault’s rejection of prediscursive subject, truth, and object (Ibid, p. 52). Thus, as for the cotenability of archaeology with genealogy, they both have similar epistemological presuppositions about truth and object so far.

Moreover, as in the case of genealogical analyses, early Foucault does not accept subject as a given entity, but he interrogates the possibilities of subjective positions in discourses determined by historical conditions. To find these conditions, archaeologist studies the right and status of particular subjects who are allowed to utter discourses or find available positions in discursive field, with particular historical transformations and discontinuities of these rights and status. For example, medical discourses do not give anyone possibilities for pronouncing medical and genuine statements having truth-value. Additionally, “institutional *sites*” from which discourses are distributed must be described, since they have an effect on the particular form of discursive formations and their available possibilities for subjects to hold. For instance, only it is after “the nineteenth century that daily medical practice integrated the laboratory as the site of a discourse that has the same experimental norms as physics, chemistry, or biology” (Ibid, p. 57). That is, it opened up the possibility and particular form of discourse-

formation with its *criteria* for genuine discourse both for the particular combination of statements and for the enunciative modalities subjects can use. Lastly, the possible positions for subject to take in the discourse are also relative to another kind of historical condition: “according to a certain grid of explicit or implicit interrogations, he is the questioning subject and, according to a certain programme of information, he is the listening subject; according to a table of characteristic features, he is the seeing subject” (Ibid, p. 58). Obviously, these situations are also historical; that is, by means of different medical techniques or autopsy-methods, of different forms of medical education, classification, notation, and modified theoretical relations to other domains, the possibilities of seeing, listening, and questioning subject will be changed and their role and importance in medical discourse will be modified.

Similarly, archaeologist does not take concepts as given and follow their particular evolutions or identify them throughout separate discursive formations, but endeavors to find the rules of formation for concepts as for statements by means of which concepts are formed, distributed, reformulated, and reappear by different functions. For the sake of grasping such an underlying field, particular combinations of statements, the way how one articulates what he observes, the way how classification, characterization and articulation takes place in a particular field and time must be described. Moreover, archaeologist determines, for the same purpose, how statements, formulated in another field, are incorporated to the one archaeologist gives his attention, which *criteria* are used for such an incorporation, what function these statements have in this new field. In addition, such an analysis is supposed to explain in which form “quantitative statements” are translated into “qualitative formulations” (Ibid, p. 65). As a result, this analysis is concerned about the laws according to which concepts are formulated, derived from one another, exclude or confirm one another, or intersect with each other.

And lastly, it is inevitable for archaeologist to determine particular “formations of strategies,” that is, strategical/theoretical choices as “certain organizations of concepts, certain regroupings of objects, certain types of enunciation, which form... themes or theories,” in order to give an account of discursive formations (Ibid, p.71).

As for summary, Foucault’s archaeological method is designed to reveal the place with its particular rules of formation, in which subjective positions, concepts, their dispersion and relation with each other, objects, and strategies as possible organizations of these elements, come to existence as actualized possibilities formed by historical conditions. To wit, it is not always possible to form all kinds of objects and concepts, to find all subjective possibilities available, and to combine statements in every mode of connection. However, this does not mean that every possible object or concept and mode of combination of statements must be or is actualized in history. Every discourse such as psychiatry or criminology form separate connections of statements, diverse bundles of objects, or different possible places for subjects to hold, which altogether give rise to theories as possible groupings of possible elements. In this respect, an archaeologist must give an answer to the inevitable question: why are some possibilities actualized whereas others could not transcend their status of possibility? To answer this question, archaeologist must inquire into the relations between the discourses toward which archaeologist gives his attention and other discourses which can be models for the former in direct analogy or opposition. Moreover, “*non-discursive practices*” and their impositions and functions within discursive field have to be examined in order to understand how and why some possibilities are actualized and also how these same possibilities become potential beings, since it is obvious that discourses are available and have function in non-discursive fields which have their own “*rules and processes of appropriation*” (Ibid, p. 75). If we turn back to our mental illness-example for the sake of clarifying this point, as Foucault suggests, it is needed to describe “hospitalization, internment, the conditions and procedures of social exclusion, the rules of jurisprudence, the

norms of industrial labour and bourgeois morality, in short a whole group of relations that characterized for this discursive practice the formation of its statements” (Ibid, p. 197).

However, obviously, this does not mean that non-discursive practices directly form medical objects, but they give rise to, with other causes of course, the conditions of emergence for objects. For instance, they open up the space in which mental illness can have an existence, by means of behavioral norms of society, of legal and political discrimination, of determining the rights and status or education of those who can speculate about it, of establishing hospital assistance with a particular kind of social and political norms of health and a particular form of registration and supervision.

At this point, one of the most important similarity or cotenability and also discontinuity of archaeology with genealogy is revealed: the role of power. Foucault confesses that, although he mentioned briefly the relationship between discursive and non-discursive fields in archaeological period, he did not give thorough attention to power and its correlation with knowledge as he does after 70’s; as in his own words: “what was lacking here was this problem... of the effects of power peculiar to the play of statements” (Foucault 1980, p. 113). Nevertheless, regardless of whether power or non-discursive practices have similar importance in both periods, genealogical and archaeological periods of Foucault are marked by his contempt for prediscursive object, phenomenological subject, self-subsistent truth, and by his search for expanding the area of thinkable; moreover, for both periods, truth is dependant upon underlying rules such that, as we saw above, it is described, in genealogical period, as a set of rules and to each society is ascribed particular regime of truth, and power is delineated as *conditio sine qua non* for the emergence of it in similar to the account of truth in archaeological period in which rules of formation determine the possibilities for objects and statements to emerge such that only in these possibilities we can talk about their correspondence and the truth-value of the latter. Additionally,

archaeological method's similarity with genealogy is so strong that in one of his late articles, Foucault combines them without hesitation. For instance, in "What is Revolution?", "the *archeological level*" of an historical analysis is characterized as a search for the rules and conditions for "historical acceptability"; and genealogy is characterized for the rules and "conditions for the appearance of a singularity born out of multiple determining elements" (Foucault 2007, pp. 61, 67). Moreover, at this point, archaeology and genealogy do not belong to diverse styles of analyses, but they are necessary and simultaneous ingredients of the same analysis so as to give an account of what there is in its historical conditions of existence. As Garry Gutting (1989) indicates, archaeology is not wholly eliminated by genealogy after 70's, but it preserves its existence so as to enlighten the historically transformable rules of formation; however, genealogy, as an additional and complementary tool, allows Foucault to describe the causes of these rules and transformations of them by means of power relations. Gutting's suggestion can be justified by an appeal to the introduction of the second volume of *The History of Sexuality*. There Foucault states that he is always concerned with the history of particular "problematizations," e.g. he studies the reason why and how some forms of behavior were characterized as a problem to be solved, which social and medical practices problematized them, which subjective experiences were created by such problematizations, how and in what forms they were delineated as the signs of mental illness; or why sexuality was made an ethical and a medical problem, which social, political, and religious practices or institutions problematized it, how and in what forms the desiring subject or the abnormal was constructed. In this sense, he indicates that he always uses his archaeological and genealogical tools for problematizing particular problematizations:

It was a matter of analyzing, not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their "ideologies," but the *problematizations*... and the *practices* on the basis of which these problematizations are formed. The archaeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to examine the forms themselves; its genealogical dimension enabled me to analyze their formation out of the

practices and the modifications undergone by the latter (Foucault 1992, pp. 11, 12).

Moreover, in his 1968 interview—“History, Discourse and Discontinuity”—Foucault dwells on the relationship between power and knowledge, or more correctly, between discursive and non-discursive fields more thoroughly than he does in his methodological book—*The Archaeology of Knowledge*—such that, he suggests, “my archeology owes more to the Nietzschean genealogy” (Foucault 1996, p. 31). For instance, in “History, Discourse and Discontinuity,” he states that the most influential motivator of choosing clinical discourse with its discontinuity and modifications in regard to its rules of formation as one of his research area is the comparative easiness of grasping “the relationship between this scientific mutation and a number of precise political events” such that he can easily study the conditions and transformations of the medical discursive field (Ibid, p. 45).

In addition, archaeology and genealogy are also designed for the same purposes in regard to the obsession with the present and with the political relevance they both have. As in the case of genealogical method, the early Foucault is also eager for studying what is still effective; that is, archaeological method is about “determining the system of discourse within which we are still living, at the moment we are obliged to put into question the words that still resonate in our ears and which are indistinguishable from those we are trying to speak” (Ibid, p. 30). As for political relevance, Foucault states that his theoretical studies are not a refuge for safe, but they are directly related to *praxis*. It is true that he studies the rules of formation of political, scientific, or philosophical discourses and their relations to non-discursive practices as opposed to usual social critiques which are mostly based on, for Foucault from the nineteenth century on, “the epiphany of a triumphant reason” and “the historic-transcendental destination of the West” with their acceptance of scientific practices or discourses as “universal rules” for others and with their eulogizing these discourses’ so-called progress toward

enlightenment (Ibid, p. 48). In Foucault's account, beyond the myths of enlightenment and transcendental dialectic, "A progressive politics is one which recognizes the historical conditions and specific rules of a practice," and it defines "the possibilities of transformations" (Ibid, p. 48). Therefore, as Foucault endeavors by his genealogical method, archaeology is available for transformation through defaming what is taken as uniform with itself, without history, and pure from any non-discursive relation in the path of progress toward incorruptible truth. As a result, in regard to their similarities and dissimilarities, archaeological method is cotenable with the genealogical one; and it is perfectly warranted to appeal to the former in order to derive Foucault's epistemology in the context of power, resistance, and sexuality, although they are not the subject matter of early Foucault in a thorough way.

Given that an appeal to the archaeological method in quest of epistemological implications of Foucault in the context of this study is warranted, we can continue to delineate archaeology without hesitation. As I stated above, early Foucault's interest in his archaeological studies lies in understanding discursive formations in regard to the rules of formation. But what is a discourse? For Foucault, a discourse is a bundle of statements. Then what is a statement? Is it the same thing, say, with a proposition and is it the case that if a proposition has no referent, then any corresponding statement refers to nothing? For Foucault, this is not the case; but conversely, it is the statement and its correlate that determine whether the corresponding proposition has a referent. The correlate of a statement is "a group of domains in which such objects may appear" for propositions to refer to such as the domain of tangible things, or the domain of imaginary objects which obviously excludes physical observation as a *criterion* for verification. Moreover, a statement does not need objects to have a referent since it is connected to its "referential" whose constituents are not objects but the "laws of possibility" or the "rules of existence" only by means of which an object can have an existence; that is the second reason why a proposition requires statement as a precondition if it is to refer to anything at all (Foucault 2002b, p. 103). A statement's correlate also

provides possibilities for subjects to hold. For example, it is obvious that a statement appeared in a physics book before the construction of Riemannian geometry and a statement in a novel have different possible places for subjects to hold. Then a statement can have a propositional form, if a sentence, in which a statement is located, has a propositional structure; however, a statement cannot be identified with a proposition and it is not dependant upon it. It is, rather, a bundle of signs which can be about objects or pronounced by different subjects or can have an existence or coexistence with other signs, due to the rules of existence. To wit, in Foucault's words, a statement is "the modality of existence proper to that group of signs... [and] allows it to be in relation with a domain of objects, to prescribe a definite position to any possible subject, to be situated among other verbal performances" (Ibid, p. 120). In addition, every statement is and must be formulated among other statements, since every statement can have an existence through referring to, transforming, repeating, being contrary to, describing, being confirmed or disproved by, and being valued or preserved by other statements. And lastly, every statement is a unique entity, since any two statements cannot be identical when they are pronounced in different times due to the dichotomy of diverse referentials and correlates, even if their grammatical structures or ingredients are the same.

In this context, archaeology analyzes statements; it inquires their referentials and correlates, that is, their modes of existence due to which objects can be referred, diverse forms of articulation can be available, subjects can make pronouncements in particular forms; it analyzes that form due to which statements can not only come to existence, but also coexist, be repeated, and have different truth-values and importance in particular institutions with diverse functions. In other words, archaeology focuses on the "archive," i.e. it focuses on the "systems of statements" which are the sources of not only statements but also objects in regard to their historical conditions and possibilities of existence (Ibid, p. 145). Foucault sometimes calls these historical conditions of existence as "historical *a priori*"; that is,

not a condition of validity for judgements, but a condition of a reality for statements. It is not a question of rediscovering what might legitimize an assertion, but of freeing the conditions of emergence of statements, the law of their coexistence with others, the specific form of their mode of being, the principles according to which they survive, become transformed, and disappear (Ibid, p. 143).

Furthermore, these rules are *a priori* since they have constitutive functions. To wit, they are not only preconditions, as Kant's space/time forms or *a priori* categories are, for genuine statements and objects to appear, but also only on the basis of them "propositions are built up, more or less exact descriptions developed, verifications carried out, theories deployed" and a belief can correspond to truth, error, or just an illusion (Ibid, p. 200). However, these preconditions are not transcendental, but historical. In this sense, we can elaborate the question of incommensurability as promised above. Since the Foucauldian *a priori* rules of formation are historical as opposed to the Kantian transcendental and universal categories, it is impossible for him to make a critique of reason, but he can analyze different forms of reason or diverse reasons in fact with their diverse formation, verification, meaning, and comparison *criteria*. In this sense, there is no zero-point to evaluate and compare different formations by means of invoking to objectivity; that is the reason why every statement is unique, dispersed, and cannot be superseded by others in the sense that free spirits, supposedly free from all dogmas and all the restraints of historical conditions, cannot make a progress toward un-constructed and genuine and objective truth corresponding to reality. Accordingly, archaeologist, then, must study the forms of exchanges in diverse systems by questioning the transformable *a priori* rules which allow for particular discourses to incorporate the statements of other systems, to make them function in particular ways, to evaluate them, to accept them as true or true in some restricted domain as in the relationship between, say, Newtonian and Einsteinian discourses, or to condemn them as illusory and belong to human fancy or superstition. However, this does not mean that transformation of, or exchanges between, diverse historical *a priori* preconditions are identical

throughout history. Transformations are also historical such that they are also discontinuous; therefore, their particular forms must be studied. And an appeal to transformation does not necessitate positing two completely different worlds such that they both have peculiar objects, subjective positions, or enunciative modalities; but some of them can be elaborated, disappeared or transformed, and some of them can keep their existence throughout diverse systems, yet in different rules of formation, in not only altered meanings but also in separate formation-styles of meaning.

Lastly, after the elaboration of incommensurability, we need one more elaboration—an elaboration of what is stated above without caution: the idea of *weltanschauung*. If we take *weltanschauung* in the sense of *zeitgeist* in Hegelian form or in a structuralist form making itself felt in every discourse and statement throughout a particular epoch, Foucault is obviously an opponent of it, since, as I stated at the beginning of this section, he is not concerned with “collective mentality,” but he takes every statement and discourse in its isolation and dispersion. In this sense, for example, nineteenth century psychiatry can have different set of constructive rules than the rules of the nineteenth century criminology. To wit, in Foucault’s words, in regard to his analysis, “It is the friends of the *Weltanschauung* who will be disappointed” (Ibid, p. 176).

If we turn back to our initial question—epistemological implications of Foucault—archaeologist’s view of science can be illuminative. In Foucault’s view, the set of rules or historical *a priori* conditions are “indispensable to the constitution of a science” (Ibid, p. 201). For “the sciences... appear in the element of a discursive formation and against the background of knowledge”²⁵—that

²⁵ However, this does not mean that whenever the discourses or discursive practices in question are nominated as firmly established sciences, knowledge (*savoir*) is condemned as prescientific and the product of human fancy, or rejected by totally enlightened scientific practices. On the contrary, for Foucault, scientific discourses elaborate possible—due to historical *a priori* rules—objects or forms of articulation or possible forms of verification, rather than substituting what precedes themselves.

knowledge (*savoir*) as the field of possible objects to be referred and analyzed, of possible subjective positions to speak of the objects, of possible modes of combination of statements in which themes, theories, and concepts can be constructed (Ibid, pp. 201, 203). As a result, at the epistemological level, scientific objects, statements, or modes of functioning, are not opposed to what is historical and therefore unable to claim universality. But objects, so-called discourses, statements, and *criteria* for grasping or attributing truth-value to statements, of a science, are preconditioned by what is historically changeable, incommensurable, and therefore relative.

Moreover, for Foucault, it is the “*episteme*” that “makes possible the existence of epistemological figures and sciences,” and that forms “constraints and limitations which, at a given moment, are imposed on discourse”²⁶ (Ibid, p. 211). What Foucault means by *episteme* is:

The total set of relations²⁷ that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that gave rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems; the way in which, in each of these discursive formations, the transitions to epistemologization,²⁸ scientificity,²⁹ and

²⁶ In addition, in an interview conducted after the publication of the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault redefines the notion of *episteme* in accordance both with his early writings and with his late notions such as *apparatus*: “the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within... a field of scientificity.... [and] makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific (Foucault 1980, p. 197).

²⁷ It is a set of relations between diverse sciences, epistemological figures, historical *a priori* rules, different stages or developmental episodes of discursive practices, and non-discursive practices which together form a web making possible the emergence and functioning of particular scientific discourses, the separation of what is scientific from what is not, the relationship between diverse scientific discourses with diverse stages of development, and redefinition of objects or reconceptualization of themes.

²⁸ A stage of epistemologization of a discursive practice is that stage in which a bundle of statements is uttered in an articulate way with the determination of the rules of “verification” and “coherence” in a more or less strict way, and in which it functions as a model for other practices (Foucault 2002b, 206).

²⁹ When a discursive practice operates in accordance not only with the rules of formation, but also with “a number of formal criteria” or a particular set of rules for constructing propositions, it surpasses a “*threshold of scientificity*” (Ibid.).

formalization³⁰ are situated and operate; the distribution of these thresholds, which may coincide, be subordinated to one another, or be separated by shifts in time; the lateral relations that may exist between epistemological figures or sciences in so far as they belong to neighbouring, but distinct, discursive practices (Ibid.).

What are the epistemological implications of Foucault's early writings and what are the presuppositions of archaeological method? To answer this question, I will turn to one of the philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn, as I appealed to Ian Hacking when I named the ontological implication of Foucault, so as to alleviate the confusion of different contexts. The philosophy of Thomas Kuhn the relativist³¹ will be a model for me in determining Foucauldian epistemological presuppositions. Therefore, it is the time to digress from the usual flow of this study, and to describe Kuhnian account of truth, progress, and scientific practice.

Initially, Kuhnian account of "paradigm" has some similarities with Foucauldian philosophizing. For him, paradigms are particular and historical models for scientific practices to formulate laws in particular forms, to use particular instruments, to appeal to particular verification *criteria*, and to apply theories in particular ways. Preparadigmatic period is also prescientific period where diverse schools function on the basis of competing fundamentals and operating styles such that only with the advent of a paradigm these conflicts can be suppressed in the sense that "normal science"³² reaches "maturity" and operates without

³⁰ When a scientific discourse is mature enough to determine its axioms, structure and tools, that is, "when it is thus able, taking itself as a starting-point, to deploy the formal edifice that it constitutes," it is a formalized discourse (Ibid.).

³¹ It must be noted that in his 1969 postscript to his major work—*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*—although Kuhn rejects the label relativism for his work in the sense that he does not reject the possibility of comparing different scientific paradigms due to their ability to solve scientific puzzles "presented by nature" and to the "accuracy of prediction" (pp. 205, 206)—although he accepts the label if it refers to the rejection of an ontological commitment by which it is believed that our theories are approaching the truth located beyond time-dependant scientific paradigms—as we will see, neither any *criterion* for evaluating different paradigms nor the phrase "presented by nature" is acceptable in his major work.

³² As Ian Hacking (2002c) suggests, Kuhnian mature sciences are basically natural sciences, whereas Foucault shows that such paradigmatic regularities are also available in the sciences of

questioning its fundamentals and rejects what is not assimilated into these fundamentals as non-scientific (Kuhn 1996, p. 10). Moreover, as in the case of Foucault's belief in the construction of objects, for Kuhn, theory—or paradigm—and facts are not two separate entities; and paradigm determines “what sorts of entities the universe did and did not contain,” what is the *real* definitions of, say, space and time (Ibid, p. 41).

Furthermore, as in the case of Foucault's speculation that everything cannot be said or formulated in a genuine way at every time, for Kuhn, on the basis of a paradigm can anything be described scientifically only if it is meaningful due to the *criteria* of the paradigm, and can anything be problematized only if it is solvable in the paradigm; otherwise any statement, problem or question is reduced to what is metaphysical or just a gibberish. For when a paradigm determines the area of genuine scientific practices, it specifies the scientific questions or puzzles such that sound questions must be about the collection of empirical *data* so as to delineate paradigmatic facts' nature, physical or chemical reactions of them, characteristics or articulation in a simpler mathematics; so as to make predictions with strong precision in order to match theory and constructed fact; and so as to generalize the paradigm by applying it into other domains. Therefore, genuine problems are genuinely problematized, for Kuhn, not because of their “intrinsic value,” but because of the paradigm itself (Ibid, p. 37). In addition, as Foucault ascribes the emergence and validity of the *criterion* of verification to historical *a priori*, Kuhn suggests that it is the paradigm that leads scientists to use and validate particular puzzle-solution tactics and instrumentation.

In Kuhn's view, paradigms change when a crisis occurs in them. That is, when a particular paradigm is unable to solve its genuine puzzles, when anomalies

man such as psychiatry, criminology, or pedagogy. See also “Progress through Revolutions” section of Kuhn's *magnum opus*, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, in which Kuhn strongly separates natural sciences from the social ones, philosophy, and art. There it is assumed that these disciplines are less inclined to fit into all-encompassing paradigms since their fundamentals are always *at stake* between competing theories and worldviews.

stubbornly reject to be assimilated into the abstract theory, when the way how one solves puzzles or see the world in a metaphysical sense or use particular instruments or verification techniques does not handle with the anomaly such that any genuinely scientific practice cannot even operate anymore, only then the status of paradigm's fundamentals are transformed from common-sense into questionable. That is the precondition for scientifically non-sense—non-sense in regard to the standards of a particular paradigm—theories to acquire the right to speak at least plausibly—although not yet scientifically—and for the paradigm change. In this sense, we can infer two consequences: first, Kuhn uses the concept of crisis in accounting for the changes of paradigms in a similar way with Foucault who uses the concept, initially, of non-discursive practice in a vague way, and then, of power in a more sophisticated form, to account for the changes in the rules of formation; secondly, as Foucault, Kuhn occludes the way for free-spirits to open their eyes and grasp the truth without any need of historical preconditions. As he suggests,

It is often said that if Greek science had been less deductive and less ridden by dogma, heliocentric astronomy might have begun its development eighteenth centuries earlier than it did. But that is to ignore all historical context. When Aristarchus' suggestion was made, the vastly more reasonable geocentric system had no needs that a heliocentric system might even conceivably have fulfilled.... Besides, there were no obvious reasons for taking Aristarchus seriously (Ibid, p. 75).

Lastly, as Foucault, Kuhn does not endeavor to oppress discontinuity and paradigm changes, but posits incommensurability between paradigms or historical *a priori* as Foucault would say. That is, paradigm changes refer to “non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one” (Ibid, p. 92). That is because diverse paradigms have “substantive differences,” i.e. they do not refer to, say, the same space and time since they completely modify their definitions; have diverse “methods, problem-field, and standards of solution accepted”; have diverse conceptions of science according to which some problems, questions or puzzles,

and solutions are polarized into scientific and metaphysical (Ibid, p. 103). Therefore, it is, in this sense, legitimate to modify Kuhn's words so as to make them resemble to Foucault's: every scientific statement is unique and cannot be evaluated by means of a common, pre-discursive *criterion*, but their dispersion and evaluation are carried out thanks to their discontinuously historical and thus changeable rules of existence. Therefore, both in the Foucauldian and Kuhnian accounts, there is no belief in the myth of enlightenment narrating the idea of progress toward objective truth.

As a result, both Foucault the archaeologist and Kuhn the relativist respect discontinuity and transformation of what is constitutive in particular disciplines; disregards cumulative progress toward objective truth; describes object, truth, methodology, verification *criteria* as rule-dependant and relative to history; and rejects an objective *criterion* obviating the talk of incommensurability. As for epistemological level, truth and its family, i.e. what is true, false, or unable to have a truth-value, are relative to the constructive paradigm in Kuhnian sense and to the historical *a priori* in Foucauldian sense. These rules and paradigms are more or less similar to the rules called "relativized *a priori*" by Michael Friedman (2001). They are *a priori* since they are "constitutive principles" for the existence of empirical laws not only in regard to whether the statements depicting them are true, but also in regard to their having truth-value or meaning at all (p. 74). In the context of natural sciences, Friedman also calls them mediating rules since they are the sources of mediation between "abstract mathematical representations" and "the concrete empirical phenomena" by means of, say, presuppositions about the nature of light, postulation of theoretical entities which cannot be *directly* tested in principle such as the principle of inertia, and determination of the philosophical status of geometry, etc. (Ibid, p. 77). In this sense, these preconditions are Kantian such that genuinely true statements or empirical laws and lastly the truth, meaning, scientificity, are constituted in them. However, they are not transcendental but historically changeable such that by means of the dichotomy between diverse bundles of *a priori* rules, not only true statements are modified,

but also their possibility to have a truth-value, meaning, and even genuine scientificity is re-constructed.

As a consequence for the last two sections, given that Foucault's historical rules are relativized since they are transformable in the sense that they are the signs of discontinuity and dispersion, and the signs of the rejection of objective truth, scientific progress toward grasping reality located beyond all paradigms, and prediscursive object; but also given that, as we saw in the preceding section, there is a strong and constructive relationship between power and knowledge—the missing part in archaeology—and the incommensurable and exclusive paradigms are postulated due to the impossibility of accepting prediscursive *criteria* in giving conciliatory judgments between them; I will call Foucault's epistemology or *the epistemological implication* of his works as relativism. That is, both for the archaeological method and for the genealogical one, I suggest, relativistic presuppositions are always assuming their founding roles for Foucault. To him, as a historian of truth, truth always describes what is rule-dependant, power-dependant, and constructed throughout history through changeably necessary conditions, therefore through what is relative as opposed to objective and correspondent of reality.

As for the appropriateness of relativism as a groundless ground, relativism fulfills the requirements of our *criteria* described above: the avoidance of absolute truth and of isolation of power relations. Initially, it is obvious that relativist account of truth is *in principle* opposed to absolute or objective truth. Therefore, it is appropriate for Foucault's two of the biggest obsessions: expanding the area of thinkable and making transformation possible or allowing permanent creation. For relativism is directly opposed to crystallization and what is unchangeable and inevitable. Rather, relativistic presuppositions themselves have their existence in Foucault's philosophy so as to show that what seems as necessary is contingent, historical, and therefore changeable; so as to vitiate the status of what is depicted as inevitable the contrary of which would obviously be devious or, at least,

unscientific. Moreover, relativism is also appropriate for Foucault's counter-discourses to function among ubiquitous power relations. For, as we saw, in his view, progressive politics lies in the struggle for showing the possibility of transformation. Therefore, it is warranted to say that Foucault's account of power—which depends on a ubiquitous relations of force having strong correlations with knowledge, and on a modality of power based on the process of controlling, determining, and constructing subjects, lifestyles, actions, and even the mode of sexual intercourse—is perfectly cotenable with relativism in the sense that relativism is a possible tool for iconoclasm in its rejection of inevitability, objectivity, and *stasis* or crystallization. Hence, it is a groundless ground of Foucault in epistemological level, as nominalism in ontological level, so as to hammer the sovereignty of truth or, say, of psychiatric, pedagogical or criminological truth of human nature in order to create different natures and relationships or at least to make their creation possible and thinkable.

In this respect, let's evaluate the strength of the Salvation Argument as the last criticism I exposed in which it was stated that Foucault falls into normative ambiguities since his discourses are not only counter-discourses or counter-power, but also lacking in any normative claim due to his epistemic cultural relativism which eliminates any possibility to evaluate what is wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime, with what will be marvelous about tomorrow, with what is the path for salvation, and with what will be the rubrics of the Promised land. Hence, it was suggested that Foucault would not answer why we should resist, if he did not permit any prediscursively true, normative, and power-free presupposition to enter into his discourses. In other words, as Joseph Rouse (2006) suggests, such kind of criticisms function with a *motto* “either a critique of power in the name of a legitimacy, or an acceptance that power makes right” (p. 108).

Initially, we should note that, for Foucault, it is impossible to postulate any prediscursive *criterion* to see what is wrong with the current modality of truth.

Therefore, there is nothing wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime or there is no intrinsic evil in any power modality *in a prediscursive sense*. However, every power mechanism is dangerous since they always have the possibility of being crystallized and seem as natural and inevitable. As it can be seen, Foucault presupposes transformation as desirable as opposed to *stasis*, as in the case of his ontological and epistemological presuppositions. Moreover, since every power modality or power mechanism is historical and cannot, therefore, be exhaustive in its impositions about lifestyles or habits, it is always restrictive and limited. Therefore, there is no path which is justifiable and free from being dangerous, and which leads to salvation in which power will be unproblematic and lead to the Promised Land whose borders are justifiable in an objective sense. Therefore, for Foucault, there is no resistance for salvation, but resistance lies in infinity. It demands permanent attack and creation and transformation. If we still believe in salvation, then Foucault has nothing to say to us. But in regard to his account of omnipresent and also constructive power, there is no promised land to go. Thus, there is no correspondingly inevitable and justifiable norm or program to follow. But in infinity, what remains possible is guerilla attack which will not discriminate some due to its established norms and will not intensify the possibility of creating new others because of these same norms. In this sense, obviously, relativism or contempt for normativity is not an impediment for resistance, but a *possible* tool for it regardless of whether it is flawless.

Consequently, there is no necessary connection between truth and resistance, as there is no necessary connection between essence and resistance. However, this does not mean that relativism and nominalism are *exclusively necessary* tools for resistance, but they are *possible* tools the presupposition of which provides Foucault's account of power with its counter-power, that is, resistance; and thus obviates the criticisms based on the presupposition of a strong and inevitable correlation between truth, essence and resistance. Therefore, all I have said so far about relativism and nominalism is schematic and meant to show their *possible*

utility, but must be sophisticated by particular case studies for evaluating their *particular applications*.

CHAPTER 9

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

Until now, we saw that the Foucauldian account of power is based on omnipresent power relations, which are productive in the sense that there is no prediscursive and power-free truth or subject. Mostly because of this point and of the belief in rule-dependant truth, we called Foucault's epistemological and ontological presuppositions as relativism for the former and nominalism for the latter. Moreover, it is revealed that at least in the context of Foucauldian account of power, neither absolute, power-free, and prediscursive truth nor essential, transcendental, or prediscursively given subject is necessary for resistance to have a possibility of existence. This last point is meant to answer the criticisms I exposed which are in quest of truth or essence so as to find the possibility of resistance. These criticisms are criticizing Foucault as much as relativist conception of truth and nominalist conception of subject. However, as we saw, it is obviously not the case that every critique of power must have essentialist ontological presuppositions in order to find a place for resistance. However, it is possible that relativist conception of truth and nominalist conception of subject can be devastating according to some other accounts of power. Yet, in Foucault's account, since resistance is mostly based on defamiliarization, deconstruction, permanent transformation and creation due to power's productivity and omnipresence, relativism and nominalism can be promising tools.

However, describing Foucault's presuppositions under the rubric of nominalism and especially relativism can produce some methodological problems. Initially, we must decide whether it is warranted to *generalize* the epistemological

implications of his works and power/knowledge relations described in them so as to call Foucault's epistemology as relativism, since his historical researches are mostly based on the historical studies about the sciences of man such as psychiatry and criminology. Secondly, we must briefly touch the two-millennium old question—by modifying it for the sake of this study—if we take relativism as our tool: is Foucault's philosophy self-refuting? And lastly, for the sake of coherence, we must investigate whether nominalist conception of subject and relativist conception of truth are cotenable or mutually exclusive.

Initially, let's analyze the possibility or justification of generalizing relativist conception of truth in the philosophy of Foucault. What I have presented so far, I believe, indicates that, for Foucault, the interaction between power and knowledge is undeniable. However, we should be cautious about the range of these interactions. I mean, we should explain whether, for Foucault, power and knowledge cannot be absolutely separated only in the case of psychiatric or medical knowledge, or his genealogies of the sciences of man with his archaeological account of truth as rule-dependant is merely one of the different domains in which some of power/knowledge relations are instantiated in the sense that some rule-dependant true statements are constructed, and such or diverse relations and historical *a priori* rules are always available in other domains too. I believe that the latter interpretation is the right one to describe Foucault's thoughts. In other words, truth is always described as rule-dependant and power-dependant regardless of the domain. For Foucault never limits the interaction of power and knowledge to any specific domain, but he talks about the relationship of power and knowledge or truth in general. For example, he claims, "truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits... nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves" (Foucault 1980b, p. 131).

Moreover, he chooses, say, psychiatry as his target not because in other fields there is no power/knowledge or truth/control mechanism relations with different forms of interaction, and not because truth or knowledge are prediscursive or power-free in some other fields, but because of a strategic maneuver to reveal *easily* the one instantiation of what he thinks is the case. Therefore, he asks,

if, concerning a science like theoretical physics or organic chemistry, one poses the problem of its relations with the political and economic structures of society, isn't one posing an excessively complicated question? Doesn't this set the threshold of possible explanations impossibly high? But on the other hand, if one takes a form of knowledge... like psychiatry, won't the question be *much easier* to resolve, since the epistemological profile of psychiatry is low one and psychiatric practice is linked with a whole range of institutions, economic requirements and political issues of social regulation? Couldn't the interweaving of effects of power and knowledge be grasped with *greater certainty* in the case of a science as 'dubious' as psychiatry? (Foucault 1980b, p. 109), [Emphases mine].

However, such an interpretation of the range of power/knowledge relations is not unproblematic. For example, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) state that, inseparability of power and knowledge, for Foucault, is available only in some sciences. Moreover, for example, natural sciences "free themselves from their involvement with power," even though they are originated "in the practices of specific social institutions" (p. 116). In Foucault's view, they claim, these sciences "tell us something like the truth about how things really are, even though they are produced and used in a social context" (Ibid, p. 116). Such an obviously contradictory claim with what I have said so far is supported by means of Foucault's belief in the once constructed but then dissolved relationship between a particular form of power and knowledge of natural sciences in the middle ages. For Foucault,

the sciences of nature, in any case, were born, to some extent, at the end of the Middle Ages, from the practices of investigation. The great empirical knowledge that covered the things of the world and transcribed them into the ordering of an indefinite discourse that observes, describes and establishes the 'facts'... had its operating model no doubt in the Inquisition.... But what

this politico-juridical... investigation was to the sciences of nature, disciplinary analysis has been to the sciences of man (Foucault 1991, p. 226).

However, in his account, although the sciences of nature *have freed themselves* from the juridical model, the sciences of man could not reach such a detachment in their relationship with the model of disciplinary analysis. Beyond this point, in the foreword of Foucault's archaic book—*Mental Illness and Psychology* whose, as we saw, nearly all of the postulations and presuppositions are rejected by Foucault the archaeologist and the genealogist—Dreyfus suggests that “Foucault remained throughout his life a scientific realist” in regard to the natural sciences (Foucault 1987, p. x). This suggestion is supported by means of Foucault's account of mental and organic pathology. That is, in *Mental Illness and Psychology*, Foucault attacks “metapathology” described by him to refer to the inclination in mental pathology to define the origins of mental diseases, symptoms, psychological maladies and health in more or less similar fashion to organic pathology as if a kind of metapathology could be instantiated both in psychological and organic level. In this respect, for him, as organic pathology takes person as a single organism and studies the relationship between particular functional disorders and their damage given to the organism as a whole, mental pathology too takes person as a “psychological totality” which is, as a coherent psychological nature of man, available in every gesture, behavior or dream, and by means of which “illness was seen as an intrinsic alteration of the personality, an internal disorganization of its structures, a gradual deviation of its development” as a whole (Ibid, p. 7). However, what deserves attention in this study for my purpose and for Dreyfus' suggestion is that Foucault speaks as if, as opposed to mental pathology which only imitates organic pathology but must be studied by means of different models so as to understand illness, organic pathology captured what was real and prediscursively the case:

anatomy and physiology offer medicine an analysis that authorizes *valid* abstractions against the background of organic totality.... The importance

given in organic pathology to the notion of totality excludes neither the abstraction of isolated elements nor causal analysis; on the contrary, *it makes possible a more valid abstraction and the determination of a more real causality* (Ibid, p. 10), [Emphasis mine].

In this background, Dreyfus attributes Foucault realism, and states that although *Mental Illness and Psychology* cannot be a genuine model for understanding his thoughts, there is no reason to believe that Foucault has modified his once held belief in prediscursive and power-free causal powers corresponding to reality as described in organic pathology. Hence, for Dreyfus, in his later works, Foucault analyzes “the nonautonomous human sciences” as opposed to “the autonomous natural ones,” and that is the reason why we have never seen again such allusions to prediscursive reality in his later works (Ibid, p. xi). As a result, in Dreyfus’ and also Rabinow’s view neither relativist conception of truth nor power/knowledge relationship is generalizable in Foucault’s philosophy.

Yet, I believe that such an objection to the generalization of Foucault’s belief in power/knowledge relations and relativism is ill-founded. For it is important to understand that power and knowledge have different forms of relation; that is to say, the interaction of power with knowledge does not have to be confined to “social context,” or to any “specific social institution.” For, according to Foucault, even science or the way of performing it has a hegemony, since it defines the *criteria* separating true from the false, and label “others,” which do not fit to these *criteria*, as non-sense. Moreover, these *criteria* determine some institutions, groups, or discourses as truth-tellers, and define the status of them. In this case, the hegemony of these *criteria* enthrones some kind of discourses, and discriminate others. Therefore, the question of Foucault, for example, for Marxism claiming to be a science, is “What types of knowledge do you want to disqualify in the very instant of your demand: ‘Is it a science?’” (Foucault 1980a, p. 85). Moreover, Foucault believes that these *criteria* and “some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects” reject the scientific value of some kind of knowledge or discourse as “disqualified” or “illegitimate” because of the fact

that they are not unitary, and they are “beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity,” or they are discontinuous (Ibid, pp. 82, 83). Therefore, it is possible to have “the tyranny of globalising discourses” (Ibid, p. 83) without the minute relationship with society, and to be freed from one power relation does not necessitate being purified from all power relations once and for all. Secondly, although Foucault analyzes only the sciences of man, I suggest, it is *impossible* to find in his mature works any allusion of the dichotomy between two different accounts of truth one of which is historically-changeable or rule-dependant and the other one is corresponding to the prediscursive reality. Moreover, from the fact that Foucault studies diverse power/knowledge relations in some particular fields—it is possible that every field has its original and unique relations which cannot be seen in any other field—it cannot be deduced that other fields are immune to other forms of power/knowledge relations. For instance, although Foucault does not study the history of mathematics, he states,

mathematics, for example, is linked, albeit in a completely different manner than psychiatry, to power structures, if only in the way it is taught, the way in which consensus among mathematicians is organized, functions in a closed circuit, has its values, determines what is good (true) or bad (false) in mathematics (Foucault 1996, p. 445).

In regard to generalizing Foucault’s relativism, another objection comes from Martin Kusch (1991). He claims that Foucault’s philosophy is similar to “relativist sociology of science” in regard to epistemology, and similar to “irrealist constructivism” in regard to ontology (p. 196). Yet his relativism or constructivism is merely a methodological one, i.e. Foucault studies “practices and scientific discourses *as if* in their constituting activity these were not constrained by nature,” and he never believes that there is no reality but construction, and there is no truth in the literal sense of the word but control apparatus, since Foucault distinguishes “the object of the history of science” from “the object of science” (Ibid, p. 199). However, I believe, this objection is both more radical in the sense that it is very far from being the right way of describing

Foucault's philosophy and more ill-founded than the objection of Dreyfus and Rabinow. For if the aim of Foucault were to study the object of the history of science without rejecting the truth of scientific discourses and the reality of scientific entities as homosexuals or criminals having monstrous nature, then he would be confined to his university-room, and his philosophy would have no political purpose which is, as we saw, the crucial motivating factor for him to philosophize. For he believes, "a system of constraint becomes truly intolerable when the individuals... don't have the means of modifying it. This can happen when such a system becomes intangible as a result of its being considered a moral or religious imperative, or a necessary consequence of medical science" (Foucault 2000b, p. 148). Therefore, he aims to reveal that there is no prediscursive or power-free and hence inevitable truth or knowledge or entity in the literal sense of the word—not for the object of the history of science—since if, say, homosexuals with their characteristics were naturally given entities, and if what nineteenth century-psychiatry claimed in the case of the perversion of homosexuality corresponded to reality, then there would be no opportunity for Foucault to call homosexuals creating a personage, or a life-style without rejecting what is *really* true.

Given that our generalization of power/knowledge relations and relativist conception of truth is warranted such that Foucault's own discourses are "entrapped" into supposedly self-destructive relativism, we must turn to our second methodological problem: is Foucault's philosophy self-refuting? For instance, Habermas suggests that if power is omnipresent and truth is a rule-dependant and constructed entity, then Foucault's own discourses fall into "self-referentiality"—that is, Foucault's statements are relatively, but not absolutely, true—and therefore undermine their foundations, i.e. they are "illusory" (Habermas 1992, p. 279).

To dismiss such a problem in the philosophy of Foucault, the most common maneuver is to contrast, as Gutting does, local relativism with the view of

“universal skeptic or total relativist” (Gutting 1989, p. 272). By appealing to Foucault’s speculation about the dissolution of once constructed relationship between a particular kind of knowledge and a particular form of power, as we saw above, Gutting supposedly solves the problem. Moreover, his account is supported by Dreyfus and Rabinow such that, for them, if total relativist approach were acknowledged by Foucault and therefore if his own discourses’ truth-value were determined by historically-changeable *a priori* rules, then it would be futile for him even to waste his time to write his books. However, as we saw, Foucault’s relativist conception of truth and power/knowledge relations described in his works are generalizable, and relativism does not necessarily excludes resistance, i.e. it is not futile to endeavor for at least resistance if we accept relativism as our founding concept. Moreover, Foucault believes that, as we saw, his genealogical discourses are not free from power. Additionally, his archaeological discourses are not free from historical *a priori* either:

My book is a pure and simple “fiction”: it’s a novel, but it’s not I who invented it: it is the relationship between our period and its epistemological configuration and this mass of statements. This subject is indeed present in the totality of the book, but he is the anonymous “one” who speaks today in all that is said (Foucault 1996, p. 24).

Therefore, neither Gutting’s nor Dreyfus’ and Rabinow’s suggestions are defensible. However, I suggest, we must analyze the criticism rather than taking its structure as self-evident and trying to answer it. Now we know that Foucault posits relativist conception of truth. Then its being illusory or genuineness cannot be evaluated according to the other theories of truth such as the theory of correspondence. If the only modality of truth is the relative one or the power-dependant one, then it is not legitimate to ask the power-independence of any statement so as to evaluate its genuineness; otherwise, we would fall into the question-begging activity. To wit, if the only modality of truth for the true statements lies in their relation with power and historical *a priori*, then the *criterion* for being illusory cannot be based on having some relations with power

and historical *a priori*. Then, what would be illusory in this conception of truth would be the existence of supposedly power-independent or rule-independent statements, since they would produce the vicious contradiction with the negation of power-independence and rule-independence of true statements in the relativist conception of truth. Then, how can we evaluate Foucault's discourses in regard to their being illusory or not? Since he claims that all discourses are rule-governed and power-dependant, find their very possibility of not only existence, but also justification and verification, and since Foucault's discourses are designed to function as counter-discourses and counter-power, we must evaluate his discourses' being illusory or not by means of referring to these claims, suggestions, and presuppositions in order to see whether it is possible to find any contradiction. As a result, since his discourses, as Foucault himself claims, are neither power-free nor beyond the rules of historical *a priori*, and also since his presuppositions never, as we saw, preclude the possibility of resistance and therefore of becoming counter-discourses, his philosophy is not illusory and self-refuting.

As for the last methodological problem, nominalist ontology and Foucault's rejection of prediscursive truth or knowledge are cotenable in the sense that since there is no naturally given, prediscursive, or power-free subject, then there is no prediscursive and objective knowledge or truth about a subject. To clarify this harmony, I will give an example about the physiology of the effeminate as described by Aristotle as opposed to the nineteenth century homosexual with "antipathic sexual instinct" described by Krafft-Ebing.

We saw that Christian tradition approaches sexuality by means of the hermeneutics of the self in which desires, movements, pleasures, images and thoughts are deciphered. Moreover, it is believed that thoughts or images may have different meanings waiting to be analyzed and confessed to the confessor who is an expert in deciphering and normalizing them. In addition, we should keep in mind that, at first sight, it seems that there is a correlation between

scientific discourses about the psychological/physiological reasons for homosexuality and the western power mechanisms which, as we saw, were modified in the eighteenth century so that the reign of discourses about perversion began to function by means of attributing to pederasts a personage, a childhood, a morphology and physiology, a nature or character, or even a lifestyle. Nevertheless, we saw that, in the ancient world, there was no homosexual with a different kind of personage or nature, with a diverse physiology or morphology, with hidden and perverse desires to be confessed, deciphered, and controlled in the sense that Greeks did not see two different natures when they perceived the one who enjoyed boys and the one who enjoyed girls, since Greek morality about sexuality focused on quantity rather than quality in the sense that it did not discriminate people by means of the sexual object they chose, yet scorned passivity and effeminacy. Therefore, it is obvious that in such a tradition, it is nearly impossible to elaborate a science which defines physiological sources of so-called homosexuality on a pathological basis, because it lacks the concept of homosexuality. However, it is plausible to expect a kind of discourse which defines the pathological sources of effeminacy with the concepts of *activity*, *passivity*, and the contempt for *effeminacy*. Therefore, I will appeal to Aristotle's *Problems*, which is probably not an original but attributed work, in order to clarify the plausible form of a discourse in the ancient world.

Aristotle asks, "Why do some men enjoy sexual intercourse when they play an active part and some when they do not?" (Aristotle 2000, 26). The reason is that every "waste product" has a destination, and normally these products follow their usual paths. For example, "semen passes into the testicles and privates," "tears into the eyes," "mucus into the nostrils," "blood into the veins" (Ibid.). When there is a distortion in a "natural condition" due to the blockage of some passages in the path of testicles, "such moisture flows into the fundament" (Ibid.), and therefore, "the naturally effeminate" wishes "friction" in that part of his body (Ibid.). These people are either "unnaturally constituted," or because of the "recollection" of the "pleasure" they felt in, or the "habit" of, passivity—the first

experience of which corresponds to puberty—and because of the transformation of habit into the “second nature,” they act *unnaturally* (Ibid.). As it seems, for Aristotle, having an unnatural condition or pathological character is not about the object chosen or about the hermaphroditism of the soul with a deviant personage or traumatic childhood, or about the perversity of desires, but about the Greek morality and sexual concepts in that time.

However, if we take the nature of man-to-man sexual relationship as it is delineated by the nineteenth century psychiatry, we encounter with a totally different sexual identity construction and the knowledge of that construction. In the period when man-to-man sexuality was nominated as homosexuality in the first time—the second half of the nineteenth century—sexuality and homosexuality were defined or codified by means of feelings, pleasures, taxonomic places, different natures *sui generis*, and desires as opposed to the distinction between activity and passivity, and quantity, as used as parameters of Greek sexuality. Nevertheless, this is not to say that the nineteenth century psychiatry grasps what is there in the nature of homosexuals by means of its freedom from *dogma* and of elaborated modern science with its never-erring tools. For the historical conditions both in the functioning of power and of psychiatry have changed such that the new paradigm of sexuality was born which has allowed the creation of homosexuality and the scientific knowledge about it. For example, as we saw, from the eighteenth century on, power mechanisms gave up that strategy which had been based on exclusion, punishment, and destruction of who was non-conformist in action, and have transformed themselves into nature-attributers or creators of taxonomies in order to observe, classify, become informed, and control. Moreover, in the nineteenth century, as we saw, the psychiatry of delirium has been transformed into the psychiatry of instinct such that every non-conformist action could be pathologized by means of instincts regardless of whether the so-called patient had any sign of delirium. The instinct in sexual domain has also escaped the inevitable match with procreation and begun to be associated with pleasure such that it was absolutely possible to create and

distinguish homosexuals from other non-procreative desire-seekers regardless of whether they had normal or pathological sexualities. That is, homosexuals have gained a separate taxonomic place from that of masturbator, sodomite, or heterosexual. Lastly, sexuality has been defined by means of the psychiatric terms, as we saw, rather than the anatomical ones in the sense that it was possible to pathologize pleasures and desires, and to create new creatures diagnosed as having no correlation between their anatomical and psychological sexualities, i.e. the third sex was born in the second half of the nineteenth century.

As a result, these were the historical *a priori* conditions to make homosexuality have an existence as a concept of defining the third sex or a nature *sui generis* with different kind of instincts and pleasures, with pathological feelings and behaviors, and with alien anatomical and psychological characteristics. This was the paradigm which has created the modern notion of homosexuality which had the implacable need for those conditions, which had not been available before the process of *homosexualization* has begun, in order to be classified as normal or pathological. *That homosexual* who was the product of those conditions was diagnosed, treated, or punished. All the questions concerning man-to-man sexuality, such as if it was pathological or not, if punishable or not, if neurological or psychological, were referring to *that concept* of man-to-man relationship, homosexuality, which was based on contrary instincts, diverse feelings, inexplicable pleasures, perverse inclinations and tendencies; therefore, what Aristotle explained about the nature of passive pederast was to be neglected regardless of whether what he said was empirical or archaic, since to what Aristotle referred was not the homosexual of the nineteenth century psychiatry with unconventional *feelings* and *desires*, but the passive pederast with unconventional *acts*.

If we turn to Krafft-Ebing as a source of knowledge about homosexuality, we see the paradigmatic correspondence with the functioning of the nineteenth century psychiatry both in the creation of homosexuality and in constructing the

knowledge about that creation in similar to the paradigmatic correspondence between the system of Aristotle and the codification of sexuality in Ancient Greece.

Initially, for Krafft-Ebing, in his *Psychopathia Sexualis*, the motivating factor of sexual act is sexual instinct, or what he sometimes calls, *vita sexualis*. As a psychiatrist of currently developing paradigm of his time, he is not sure whether he is to delineate that instinct with pleasure or procreation. For instance, he sometimes asserts, “The primary element of *sexual preference* is love, i.e., the expectation of unsurpassed pleasure”; but he sometimes declares, “In sexual love the real object of the instinct” is “propagation of the species” (Krafft-Ebing 1923, p. 9).

Secondly, Krafft-Ebing defines sexuality by means of psychiatric or psychological qualities as if they were natural, that makes him ready to diagnose homosexuality as a result of the lack of correspondence between the anatomical and psychical sexualities in accordance with the paradigm he belongs to. For him, the sexuality of every normal person is determined, *prima facie*, by his/her “primary characteristics” such as sexual organs and “secondary characteristics” which have subdivisions as “bodily” and “psychical” characteristics.” The psychical characteristics are “sexual consciousness,” “psychical dispositions, inclinations, etc” (Ibid, p. 42). However, in his account, it is hard to find “the pure type of the man or the woman” since some women, in some degree, have “male characteristics” such as the preference for “manly sports (without the influencing elements of early education),” and vice versa, such as the man with “an inclination for female occupations (embroidery, toilet, etc)” (Ibid, p. 43). Then what is the determining factor which constitutes sexuality? Krafft-Ebing is aware of the fact that people has been inclined to think that that factor was “the development of genital glands,” as it is harmonious with the older paradigm; however, that paradigm was disproved due to the fact that psycho-sexual characteristics, and masculine or feminine type might be visible in people whose sexual organs are

just beginning to develop, or in hermaphrodites, or in the one with congenital defects, although it is hard to eliminate anatomical terms completely in determining the very sexuality itself.

Thus concludes Krafft-Ebing: “The form of the sexual glands is therefore not the qualifying element of sex-determination, [as it can be seen, he has no separation between sex and gender] but we must look rather to sexual sensations and the sexual instinct” (Ibid, p. 45), e.g. sexual desires or feelings, the feeling of femininity or masculinity, inclination toward opposite sex, psychical predilections, etc. Then he takes the last step which is *sine qua non* for the birth of the third sex: he specifies the correlation between “the inception of anatomical and functional development of the generative organs” and the development of “a definite character, corresponding with the sex” as normal and congenital (Ibid, p. 283).

Krafft-Ebing describes homosexuality under the rubric of the “Perversion of the Sexual Instinct” which also includes masochism, sadism, and fetishism. These so-called diseases are usually caused by hereditary degeneration. Such degenerated persons are congenitally degenerated; they have neuro-pathological problems rarely associated with anatomical degeneration; although it is possible to encounter with acquired perversion, psychological effects cannot initiate the perversion of the sexual instinct in a person if he is not tainted “*ab origine*.” In other words, they belong to different species congenitally with a contrary sexual instinct.

Homosexuality, in particular, is that disease by which a person is not attracted by the opposite sex and usually does not present the secondary psychical characteristics of the anatomical sex he belongs to, but excited by his own sex and, for men, has “the instinct of the female” with the opposite sex’s psycho-sexual characteristics (Ibid, p. 54). Since it is a disease of instinct and manifests “psychical anomaly” with that kind of desire and personal qualities the person is

not supposed to have, for diagnosis of homosexuality, *“The determining factor here is the demonstration of perverse feeling for the same sex; not the proof of sexual acts with the same sex”*; in other words, homosexual is the one who has different feelings and desires which altogether constitute a new species with “Homosexual feeling” (Ibid, p. 286). That is, no man, for example, who has sexual intercourse with other men is homosexual if the stimulus of his very act is his over-stimulated sexual hunger, immorality, or the lack of sexual satisfaction as in the case of being imprisoned or having, for women, an exaggerated fear of infection or of pregnancy. Therefore, yet again, Aristotle remains archaic because the paradigm he belongs to does not operate by means of feelings, desires, and psycho-sexual qualities, but by means of the act itself, the act which is not potent to be the basis on which a different species is formed with an alien nature.

In such a codification, homosexuality has different forms due to the intensity of “antipathic sexual instinct.” It is possible that some homosexuals also have weak inclinations toward opposite sex and their psycho-sexual characteristics are not converted with a clear-cut modifications; this is the case of “Psychical Hermaphroditism” (Ibid, p. 352). However, in most cases, although not always in a complete form, “effemination” or “eviration” process begins with the modifications in “psychical personality,” “manner of feeling,” and “inclinations” (Ibid, p. 382). For the latter form, two case-studies of Krafft-Ebing are illuminating for understanding how psychiatric terms are proliferated such that the codification of Ancient Greece seems archaic in modern paradigm. In case 129, the patient is diagnosed as a male-homosexual because when he was a child, he was playing with girl’s toys and liking toilettes; he is now jealous of women’s “quiet manner” and chic; he feels himself as if he was a woman; when he wears a military uniform, his only wish is to wear a costume of a woman; in sexual intercourse with his wife, he feels himself passive and in the position of a female; he has “woman’s dispositions” since he is “tenacious,” “mild,” and “forgiving”; his stomach is feminine too, he cannot bear irritating foods and has no toleration for alcohol; he feels as if he had a clitoris rather than penis. This person has no

sexual relation with any other man and has wife and kids, but displays women's psycho-sexual characteristics and desires to be a passive one in sexual relationship, which is sufficient for Krafft-Ebing to call him homosexual (Ibid, pp. 304-324).

Moreover, in case 130, we can see the perfect separation of the paradigm of the nineteenth century from the ancient form of sexual codification. In this case, a woman has a predilection for manly sports, for "intellectual conversation" rather than dancing or participating in a talk of dress, love, or perfume; she is audacious with "the character of a man"; she feels that she has a penis. But what is extraordinarily peculiar to the system of Krafft-Ebing is that she has no sexual inclination either for men or women; but due to her masculine feelings and converted psycho-sexual characteristics, she is diagnosed as a female-homosexual (Ibid, pp. 324-328), the diagnosis which was impossible to have a place in the discourse of Greek sexuality based on the very *act* itself.

As a result, the construction of homosexuality in the system of Krafft-Ebing is made possible by means of the preserved harmony he has with his paradigm—historical *a priori*—and the knowledge and diagnosis of homosexuality always refer to that entity which was impossible to have an existence in the discourse of Aristotle regardless of whether the Greek medicine is dogmatic. Moreover, the system of Krafft-Ebing, which is more sophisticated in relation to Aristotle's and highly archaic for the twentieth century sex/gender distinction, is perfectly reasonable in supplying the knowledge of homosexuality due to its parameters. For example, take the statement, "masochism is... only a rudimentary form of antipathic sexual instinct" or "the masochistic element is so frequently found in homosexual men" (Ibid, pp. 211, 212). These statements are nearly analytically true no matter what empirical *data* are available. For, as we saw, Krafft-Ebing defines the sexualities of men and women with secondary psychological qualities, and locates the desire for voluntary submission, dependence, and passivity in the

center of women's psycho-sexual personality.³³ Then he defines masochism, a disease of woman, as the pathological intensification of this personality and as a perversion of the sexual instinct as in the case of homosexuality. That is, masochism and homosexuality are the different forms of the same disease. Lastly, for him, to be a male-homosexual is to be a person with a man's anatomical characteristics and woman's psychical characteristics the pathological form of which leads to masochism. In this sense, it is obvious that Krafft-Ebing, without an inevitable need of experiment and empirical research, can associate homosexual the pathological and the effeminate with masochist the pathological and the dependence-seeker as opposed to Aristotle who could not have any word for converted *feelings* and *active pederasts*.

Consequently, the knowledge of homosexual must be, in principle, in accordance with the homosexual. And if that homosexual is a historically constructed entity and if its construction is relative to the, say, particular psychiatric reasoning or medical codification, in other words if nominalism is presupposed as ontological position in regard to sexuality, then we have separate forms of knowledge, which can be mutually exclusive, as they are true, false, meaningless, or common sense, relative to that historically constructed entity rather than to the reality. For, it is the same bundle of formation rules that allows homosexuality and the knowledge about it to arise as the products of historically changeable rules. Therefore, nominalist ontology and relativist epistemology are cotenable in such an extent that nominalist ontology entails relativist epistemology.

³³ See footnote 16.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

We saw that Foucault's way of characterizing power is not based on the "Power with a capital P," but for him, power is relational and non-subjective, which is why resistance is not excluded from his account of power although power is delineated as ubiquitous. However, the crucial point of the critics, as it is described above, was not only power's ubiquity but also its productivity. For if power is omnipresent and productive, in other words if power has an inseparable relationship with knowledge, truth, and subject, then there is no point of resistance which supposedly require a kind of firm ground such as prediscursive truth and self-subsistent subject. Obviously, Foucault's description of subject as being constructed among power relations and truth as being relativized to the historically changeable rules fool such a firm—justified and unalterable once and for all—ground, that is very provocative for the critics.

Throughout this essay, the only point that I exactly agreed with those critics was that Foucault had anti-essentialist assumptions when he has been philosophizing. In this respect, I called his ontological implications as nominalistic in the sense that there is no prediscursive and power-free subject, but just social constructions. The nominalistic implications that I have followed throughout this essay by means of the Foucauldian history of sexuality revealed that his nominalistic ground does not exclude the possibility of resistance, but rather it can be a promising ground for resisting against sexual discrimination and for constructing an anti-discrimination-oriented morality.

Moreover, Foucault's epistemological ground which is uncovered by means of delineating the function and purpose of both genealogical and archeological method pointed that relativistic ground was not a preventive and self-refuting charlatany in respect to resistance and counter-discourses. In addition, as we saw, Foucauldian epistemological and ontological presuppositions were perfectly cotenable and have formed harmoniously an epistemico-ontological ground of Foucauldian discourses for resisting against the power mechanisms he has described. This ground was the proof of the fact that there is no necessary and inseparable connection between the discourses of essentialist metaphysics and counter-discourses. As it is implied, the voice of those critics—of those whose earnest desire is to find an unalterable ground for resistance, whose force can reduce every conflict to silence in determining the way, tool, objective, and constituents of resistance at the expense of disregarding *other* ways, tools, objectives, and constituents—is inharmonious with that voice who narrates the omnipresent, disciplining, and normalizing power relations which are inviting permanent, self-creatory, and ab-normalizing counter-discourses.

Then the aim of this study was to show that relativism and nominalism were promising grounds in regard to the invitation by means of their *groundlessness* which allows *permanency* of attacks, deconstruction of selves and of normalities with their discriminated other.

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