

THE CONCEPT OF SELF IN THE CONTEXT OF THE “DESPISERS OF
THE BODY” ALLUDED IN NIETZSCHE’S
THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA

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ABSTRACT

THE CONCEPT OF SELF
WITH RESPECT TO THE “DESPISERS OF THE BODY” ALLUDED IN
NIETZSCHE’S *THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA*

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This thesis analyses the concept of self with respect to Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) implications on the “despisers of the body” in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Nietzsche’s exposition of the self as a varying multiplicity neither within nor out of the body is the basic assumption of this dissertation. In this sense, the place of Nietzschean self considering the evolution of the concept of self through history will be analyzed. The concept of ego (subject) will be discussed as Nietzsche’s critique of the so-called manifestation of self; the concept of body will be discussed as the embodiment of Nietzschean understanding of the self.

Keywords: Self, body, subject, Nietzsche

ÖZ

NIETZSCHE’NİN *BÖYLE SÖYLEĐİ ZERDÜŞT*’ÜNDE BELİRTİLEN
“BEDENİ AŞAĞILAYANLAR” BAĞLAMINDA
KENDİLİK KAVRAMI

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Bu çalışma, kendilik kavramını Nietzsche’nin (1844-1900) *Böyle Söyledi Zerdüş*’ünde belirtilen “bedeni aşağılayanlar” a yüklediği anlamlar kapsamında incelemektedir. Bu tezin temel varsayımı, Nietzsche’nin kendiliği ne bedeninin içinde, ne de bedeninin dışında varolan değişken bir çoğulluk olarak ifade etmesidir. Bu amaçla, kendilik kavramının tarihteki gelişimi göz önünde bulundurularak, Nietzsche’nin kendilik kavramı incelenecektir. Nietzsche’nin kendiliğin sözde tezahürü olarak eleştirdiği ego (özne) kavramı ve kendiliğin tecessümü olarak değerlendirdiği beden kavramı tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kendilik, beden, özne, Nietzsche

To My Family

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I want to express my heartfelt gratitude for my mother Nihal Yazıcı and for my father Coşkun Yazıcı who have always stood by me and supported every decision I made during my entire life [and I know they always will], who have tolerated my pre-thesis depression, and who have always encouraged me for not only completing this dissertation but also for anything in this life. I also want to acknowledge the rest of my family: R. Selma, Hakkı, and Ege Görgülü for the sparkles they have introduced into my life during I was coping with my research; and my beloved M. Emre Görgülü without whom not only completing this dissertation but living the rest of my life would not be possible.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis analyses the concept of self with respect to Wilhelm Friedrich Nietzsche's (1844-1900) implications on the "despisers of the body" in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Nietzsche's exposition of the self as a varying multiplicity, neither totally within nor out of the body is the basic assumption of this dissertation. To this end, the dissertation will discuss "what constitutes one's true self"¹ in connection with Nietzsche's rejection of the claim that "the 'true self' is something purely 'inward' and private"² and with his assertion that it is not something independently existent out of the body as he mentions from the mouth of *Zarathustra*:

Behind thoughts and feelings, there is the mighty Lord, the unknown sage which is the self, and it dwells in your body; it is your body.³

¹ Nietzsche, F. *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, ed. Daniel Breazeale (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. xvi.

² *Ibid.*

³ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. and eds. Adrian Del Caro and R. B. Pippin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 23.

In the light of this expression which focuses on the self through its meaning considering the body and the bodily, Nietzsche's consideration of the conception of the self which has evolved through philosophical traditions in history will be analysed and his own stance in the matter of the self will be tried to be outlined. For this purpose, the questions of 'how Nietzsche criticizes his predecessors,' 'how he criticizes the notions that have been used to mention self,' and 'what he brings about instead for the consideration of the self' will be tried to be answered.

The conception of self from Nietzsche's point of view is decided to be discussed through this dissertation because Nietzsche's implications are obviously the incentive factors in the development of the thoughts of his successors, and he has been influential not only in the area of philosophy but also in psychology and literature. The most important people for whose work Nietzsche's thoughts have lighted the way are George Santayana (1863-1952), Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) who were significant figures of the philosophical movement in twentieth century.⁴

"Nietzsche speaks negatively of a certain subject, of the ego, but not of a certain being – the self."⁵ In this sense, there occurs an inevitable

⁴ See Wicks, R. (1998), "Friedrich Nietzsche", *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta [Internet]. Available from <<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/>> [Accessed March 28, 2008]. For further reading also see Deleuze, G. *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, c2006); Derrida, J. *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, c1978); Foucault, M. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, trans. and ed. D. F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 139-164; Heidegger, M. *Nietzsche*, trans. and ed. David F. Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991); Jung, C. G. *Nietzsche's Zarathustra: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1934-1939*, ed. James L. Jarrett. (Princeton; New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988); Santayana, G. *The German Mind: A Philosophical Diagnosis* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968).

⁵ Corngold, S. "The Fate of Self: German Writers and French Theory", *The German Quarterly*, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Spring, 1989), p.56.

distinction between what is called subject⁶ and what is called self according to Nietzsche. Although to what the two terms refer used to invoke the same thing throughout the classical Western thought until the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they do not. As Nietzsche writes,

the subject is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is.⁷

Therefore, the “what there is”, from Nietzsche’s point of view, refers to the “genuine self” which is “profound, creative, and authentic”⁸, whereas subject is an attribution of man to define a doer for all the actions man himself performs. This inevitably causes the self to be grasped as a split structure, keeping in mind not to disregard that it has appeared in disguise throughout the history of philosophy and it was not always called the “self” but also “subject”, “being”, or “I”, ignoring the fact that there is also the body, which enables man to “embody” life, to embody what there is, with all its liveliness.

Nietzsche’s consideration of man’s complex relationship with history has basically developed his conception of self.⁹ Nietzsche “undermines rather than to refute philosophical claims since to refute means to accept another,”¹⁰ because he believes that “the utterances of the philosophers are neither true nor false but ‘nonsense’ and the perennial problems which

⁶ The concepts of ‘subject’ and ‘ego’ are used synonymously in the dissertation and will be discussed in Chapter 3.

⁷ Nietzsche, F. *The Will To Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 267.

⁸ Corngold, S. “The Fate of Self: German Writers and French Theory”, p.56.

⁹ Nietzsche, F. *Untimely Meditations*, p. xvi

¹⁰ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, c1965), pp. 82-83.

have exercised them are only 'pseudo problems'."¹¹ This can be explained by the great share of language in the development of culture, thus in the development of the former philosophies, since language is the only medium to conduct thoughts to the followers. Nietzsche explains the importance of language for the development of culture as follows:

The significance of language for the evolution of culture lies in this, that mankind set up in language a separate world beside the other world, a place it took to be so firmly set that, standing upon it, it could lift the rest of the world off its hinges and make itself master of it.¹²

And he adds that:

Indeed, humans gave themselves all of their good and evil. Indeed, they did not take it, they did not find it. It did not fall to them as a voice from heaven. Humans first placed values into things, in order to preserve themselves – they first created meaning for things, a human meaning!¹³

Man's desire to rule the world seems to have risen out of his belief that "in language we had knowledge of the world" according to Nietzsche.¹⁴ Because, being able to name everything makes everything accessible to man's knowledge, and man thinks this way he has the knowledge of 'all.' In his own words:

The sculptor of language was not so modest as to believe that he was only giving things designations, he conceived rather that with words he was expressing supreme knowledge of

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Nietzsche, F. *Human All Too Human*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, intro. Richard Schacht (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 16.

¹³ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 43.

¹⁴ Nietzsche, F. *Human All Too Human*, p. 16.

things; language is, in fact, the first stage of occupation with science.¹⁵

Nietzsche strongly seems to criticize this tendency of man to construct names and structures for the metaphysical or non-corporeal existences which are believed to be present within man himself while he speaks of the “despisers of the body.”¹⁶ In *Daybreak*, Nietzsche explains this as man’s eagerness to make discoveries on his own existence in order to solve the problem of the duality of his thinking and corporeal being and in order to explain the meaning of this duality. Yet, as stated in the passage below, Nietzsche thinks that man only raises a more problematic understanding of himself by those discoveries:

Wherever primitive mankind set up a word, they believed they had made a discovery. How different the truth is! – they had touched on a problem, and by supposing they had *solved* it they had created a hindrance to its solution.¹⁷

Danto states that Nietzsche aimed at cracking “the habitual grip on thought in which language holds us,” in order to make us realize how our minds are dominated by the concepts we cannot escape from, regarding the rules our language follows.¹⁸ However, Nietzsche’s essential problem was not the constructive structure of language. His main criticism to the classical philosophy was its ivory tower, which is constructed out of imagination rather than the actuality of life, such as the names assigned to the so-called

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ See Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 22.

¹⁷ Nietzsche, F. *Daybreak*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, eds. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 32.

¹⁸ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, p. 12.

parts of the self: subject, soul, spirit, and consciousness.¹⁹ In Nietzsche's own words:

The peculiarly withdrawn attitude of the philosophers, denying the world, hating life, doubting the senses, desensualized, which has been maintained until quite recently to the point where it almost counted for the *philosophical attitude as such*, - this is primarily a result of the desperate conditions under which philosophy evolved and exists at all: that is philosophy would have been *absolutely impossible* for most of the time on earth without an ascetic mask and suit of clothes, without an ascetic misconception of itself. To put it vividly and clearly: the *ascetic priest* has until the most recent times displayed the vile and dismal form of a caterpillar, which was the only one philosophers were allowed to adopt and creep around in. . . .²⁰

In this context, it can be said that "Nietzsche tried to construct a philosophy consistent with the extraordinary openness which was available to man, or at least a philosophy that would entail this openness as one of its consequences."²¹

Hales and Welshon explain Nietzsche's arguments against the philosophical conceptions of the subject, such as "the Cartesian ego, the Kantian transcendental subject, and the Schopenhauerian subject," because in each situation it is asserted that there is an autonomous, probably conscious entity discovered which is separate from its actions, and which is a subject whose identity is not composed of the "actions it performs and the abilities and dispositions – Nietzschean instincts and drives – that are the

¹⁹ Those so-called parts will be explained in Chapter 3.

²⁰ Nietzsche, F. *On The Genealogy of Morality*, trans. Carol Diethe, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 89.

²¹ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, pp. 12-13.

sources of those actions.”²² Because, they state that according to Nietzsche, the self is neither a thing, thus it is nor a conscious thing, and the views embracing the opposite idea are false.²³ Danto, in a likely manner, points out the problem of the conscious self, analysing man’s conception of consciousness due to its relationship with Nietzsche’s theories of language and considering his words in *The Gay Science*:²⁴

Consciousness is really just a net connecting one person with another – only in this capacity did it have to develop; the solitary and predatory person would not have needed it.²⁵

This is because for Nietzsche, consciousness is necessary in order for man to be able to determine what he is lacking and what he needs to survive, and he should give utterance to those needs by the mediation of language. As Nietzsche has mentioned:

[T]he development of language and the development of consciousness (*not* of reason but strictly of the way in which we become conscious of reason) go hand in hand.²⁶

And

[o]nly as a social animal did man learn to become conscious of himself -²⁷

²² Hales, S. D. & Welshon, R. *Nietzsche’s Perspectivism* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, c2000), pp. 130-131.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, p. 120.

²⁵ Nietzsche, F. *The Gay Science*, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff and Adrian Del Caro (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 212.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

Danto then questions the contradictory situation of consciousness, considering that on one hand “only what is conscious comes into language” which means that “the origins of consciousness reveal themselves in communication-signs;” as Nietzsche himself states as follows:

[M]an, like every living creature, is constantly thinking but does not know it; the thinking which becomes *conscious* is only the smallest part of it, let’s say the shallowest, worst part – for only that conscious thinking *takes place in words, that is, in communication symbols*; and this fact discloses the origin of consciousness.²⁸

On the other hand, Danto states that “paradoxically it will follow that allegedly private words – words which have reference to our inner states – form the basis and the original part of our common and public language.”²⁹ In Nietzsche’s words:

Concepts, possible only when there are words – the collecting together of many images in something nonvisible but audible (word). The tiny amount of emotion to which the “word” gives rise, as we contemplate similar images for which *one* word exists – this weak emotion is the common element, the basis of the concept.³⁰

Thus, it can be inferred from this state [which seems to be a contradiction] that the existence of consciousness and that of the words or concepts which signify the alluded inner states of men are interdependent, none of the two having priority or superiority upon the other.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, p. 120.

³⁰ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 275.

Hales and Welshon argue that when Nietzsche rejects that there exists an ego or an “I,” this does not necessarily follow that he is also rejecting that a bundle of drives and experiences do exist.³¹ They agree with Thomas Reid’s identification of Nietzschean understanding of self which holds that: “My personal identity implies the continued existence of that invisible thing which I call myself; and whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not thought I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, acts, and suffers.”³² In this context, the existence or the conceiving of the I as the self cannot said to be possible if those thoughts, actions, and feelings are only considered to be the I itself. Instead, they should be noted as the activities of the self. Still, from Nietzschean point of view, those activities should not be thought of separately from the self as pure activities; otherwise, the *distinction of the doer and the deed* would not be able to be got rid of, which Nietzsche aims at doing so.³³

Moreover, the rejection of the subject, of the “I,” or of the other concepts which were used to refer to the self, and Nietzsche’s continuous indication of those concepts aimed at showing that those concepts did not have “univocal instantiation.”³⁴ To this end, Nietzsche re-used those concepts in the bounds of his own philosophical stance in order to expose the multivocity of the concepts.³⁵ Regarding this, Hales and Welshon suggest that Nietzsche’s Bundle Theory of the self grants an account of individuals which are totally constructed by experiences, actions, impulses, and drives

³¹ Hales, S. D. & Welshon, R. *Nietzsche’s Perspectivism*, p. 166.

³² *Ibid.* Also see Reid, T. “Of Identity” in *Personal Identity*, ed. J. Perry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

³³ For further discussion, see Chapter 3.1; also see section 4.1.2.

³⁴ Hales, S. D. & Welshon, R. *Nietzsche’s Perspectivism*, pp. 58-59.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

besides what is thought, wanted, and done.³⁶ In this context, they mention that, for Nietzsche, there does not exist a “diachronically identical subject;” and instead, as having reference to Nietzschean consideration of the self, they point out Amelie Rorty’s definition of the self as “a loose configuration of habits, habits of thought and perception and motivation and action [i.e., character traits], acquired at different stages, in the service of different ends.”³⁷ Nietzsche himself explains his emphasize on physiology and on the role of body, and criticizes man’s being conditioned to ascribe a further meaning beyond the physical as follows:

The body and physiology the starting point: why? . . . We understand that the ruler and his subjects are of the same kind, all feeling, willing, thinking – and that, wherever we see or divine movement in body, we learn to conclude that there is a subjective, invisible life appertaining to it.³⁸

An interpretation of this passage asserts that, as Hales and Welshon have pointed out, the terms “mental” and “physical” refer to the same division of entity rather than referring to “distinct ontological realms,” and those same entities are namely “forces of willing, feeling, and thinking;” and since there is no distinction to be made between mental and the physical, there is no need to specify a relationship between them.³⁹ Thus, for Nietzsche, the terms mental and physical are referring to the same entity in terms of self; and there is no need to specify names separately for the so-called divisions of the self - such as consciousness – like the diachronic explanation of self [or of subject as the two were considered to be the same] did so, as obvious in Nietzsche’s criticism below:

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

³⁷ *Ibid.* Also see Amelie O. Rorty: “Self-deception, *akrasia* and irrationality” in *The Multiple Self*, ed. John Elster, p. 130.

³⁸ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 271.

³⁹ Hales, S. D. & Welshon, R. *Nietzsche’s Perspectivism*, p. 172.

Philosophers (1) have had from the first a wonderful capacity for the *contradictio in adjecto*; (2) they have trusted in concepts as completely as they have mistrusted the senses: they have not stopped to consider that concepts and words are our inheritance from ages in which thinking was very modest and unclear.⁴⁰

Moreover, those terms, for Nietzsche, imply multivocality stemming from their obscurity which hardly enables one to define a coherent role or function to each term or concept, without appealing to the illusory explanation transcendentalism ensures.

Likely, Fink explains that Nietzsche considers man's unfaithfulness to earth as being the core reason of man's being split "into a duality of sense and spirit, into an opposition of body and soul."⁴¹ And man's despising of his body has emerged out of this distinction according to him since his soul appears to be chained to his body and always in a state of trying to escape.⁴² This discontent was brought about by man's feeling of his soul's imprisonment, breaks the bonds between man and the world he lives in, thus he seeks for another world where his soul would be freed of its chains. Nietzsche mentions this in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, referring to the followers of Christian tradition as they banish man from the actual world due to the denaturing act of their moral commands as follows:

I beseech you my brothers, remain faithful to the earth and do not believe those who speak about transcendental hopes. They mix poison whether they realize this or not.⁴³

⁴⁰ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 220.

⁴¹ Fink, E. *Nietzsche's Philosophy*, trans. Goetz Richter (London; New York: Continuum, c2003), p. 60.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 6.

In this manner, Nietzsche attempted to regenerate a new understanding of the concepts which have been misrepresented by the Christian/Western tradition. One of those concepts is the soul, which was identified as “eternal and indivisible;”⁴⁴ and instead of getting rid of the conception of soul, since it is “one of the oldest and most venerable of hypothesis,” he considered it regarding the expression of multiplicity, since “the human being, the body, the soul, the subject, the individual was proposed as a multiplicity” in his understanding of the self.⁴⁵

As Nietzsche does not ignore the conception of soul, he considers the Western conception of soul and criticizes it as follows:

All instincts, which are not discharged outwardly *turn inwards* – this is what I call the *internalization* of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his “soul.”⁴⁶

For Danto, this has much to do with the prohibitions within the society which are developed through consciousness, and since those prohibitions are in conflict with the drives, man becomes an agent against himself. He writes that “if we assume that a drive is simply discharge, as Nietzsche’s theory of instinctual drives holds, and not something which is the subject of the verb *discharge*, then there will be discharging during the time prohibition holds; if the prohibition is obeyed, this discharge will not be against an external object,” which puts forth an *internal* object that is the man himself “who turns his aggressive discharges inward.”⁴⁷ Consequently, it is because of the Western or Christian conception of soul,

⁴⁴ Thiele, L. P. *Friedrich Nietzsche and The Politics of The Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism* (Princeton, L. J.: Princeton University Press, c1999), p. 52.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

⁴⁶ Nietzsche, F. *On The Genealogy of Morality*, p. 61.

⁴⁷ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, p. 179.

developed together with the moral and thus religious regulations within those Western or Christian societies, that man is made to find himself in a state of expectation of a world beyond, where - he is convinced that - he would be rewarded for turning away from himself, from his physicality and from his drives. Nietzsche defines those men as follows:

To *them*⁴⁸, *it*⁴⁹ is a sickly thing, and gladly would they jump out of their skin. Hence they listen to the preachers of death and they preach of hinterworlds themselves.⁵⁰

And he adds:

More honestly and more purely speaks the healthy body, the perfect and perpendicular body, and it speaks of the meaning of earth.⁵¹

To sum up, in the dissertation, the problem of the self and Nietzsche's discussion of the issue considering the role of the body will be analysed in three main chapters other than the Introduction and Conclusion sections. After the introduction part, in Chapter 2, the evolution of the conception of self during the time of Nietzsche's predecessors will be analysed. In Chapter 3, the so-called manifestations of the self, namely the subject (ego), soul, spirit, and consciousness will be discussed. In Chapter 4, the embodiment of Nietzsche's conception of self will be analysed considering the body, drives, and language factor.

⁴⁸ Referring to the "hinterworldly."

⁴⁹ Referring to their own body.

⁵⁰ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 22.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 2

THE PLACE OF NIETZSCHEAN SELF IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF THROUGH HISTORY

Nietzsche's philosophy in general, invokes a kind of sense that it has evolved upon his disagreements with the philosophical movements and understandings of his predecessors through history because of its rebellious character and style. In this context, it would be a crucial attempt to analyse the basic streams of thought in order to have a picture of what Nietzsche would have had in his mind while expressing his ideas on what the self *cannot*⁵² be.

In this context, history of philosophy will be analysed under two main sub-eras, namely classical Western philosophy and modern philosophy. The distinction focuses on the degree of importance of understanding man, as

⁵² It would be more explicative to define what Nietzsche mainly disagrees with in the first place, since it has already been mentioned, his philosophy in general and thus his thoughts on the self evolve under those negative implications of him out of the previous philosophical tendencies of his predecessors.

he took a back seat considering the importance of understanding the universe for the former, and as understanding man becomes more crucial than that of the universe for the latter.

With the shift in the area of interest in philosophical activity from finding out the features of universe to the analysing of that of man, two main concepts emerged as pertaining man: mind and body; mental and physical. The distinction of the two is in the center of Nietzsche's problem about the conception of self and its *sub-concepts*⁵³, since this distinction extends to the distinction of subject and self, which cannot be described definitely. Moreover, considering "On the Despisers of the Body,"⁵⁴ this distinction also extends to the problem of bodily existence, questioning if it is embodying the so-called mental forms or falling outside of them for Nietzsche. Because, it becomes impossible to distinguish those forms or concepts from each other; and as they are telescoped in each other, they inevitably become being interpreted in a wide range of meanings and reciprocations.

In summary, the two different eras in the history of philosophy will be discussed below, considering the most possible parts of thoughts in those eras which can said dominantly to have had crucial effects in the development of Nietzsche's philosophical stance.

2.1 Classical Western Philosophy

Classical Western philosophy focuses on three main issues in general; an appeal to a world beyond the one of which we actually have experience of, the power of a universal set of moral rules, and a kind of thought process

⁵³ These sub-concepts of the self are are subject (ego), soul, spirit and consciousness which are going to be discussed in Chapter 3.

⁵⁴ See Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, pp. 22-24.

prior to the secular world and having control of it, so can both inspire and change it.⁵⁵ Thus, classical philosophy does not consider man in the first place but tries to theorize over what has been posed earlier and proceeds by the same philosophical questions on the mechanism of the universe, searching for a transcendent order or meaning beyond the physically experienced, including man himself. Man's being perceived as a distinct element in nature which is only meaningful by the attributions that are believed to be primordial in the universe, inevitably transcends man's position in front of man himself, and he ascribes too much meaning on what is only human invention; on the supernal universe. Following this oversolicitude of man for the universe, the so-called primordial order – the moral determinations which are thought to be necessarily obeyed for succeeding in the “other life”⁵⁶ - plays upon man as a ruler, diminishing his place in his own eyes by it's the so-called universal, moral regulations.

From pre-Socratics to the Renaissance, philosophy was fundamentally an endeavour to understand the universe by observing it in the search for mathematical, teleological, or theological explanations regarding the insights of the predecessors and following the path they have set out. The Eleatics thought that certain truths were only revealed by reason opposed to what is indicated by the senses.⁵⁷ Likely, Plato (427-347 BC) believed that senses “revealed a secondary order of reality” as Socrates (469-399 BC) did. The basic thought was that senses gave us beliefs, but not the truth itself.⁵⁸ Such precedence, attributed to reason, had trivialized the body as the provider of the senses, and man had been thought to be reason in his

⁵⁵ Solomon, R. C. *Living with Nietzsche: What the Great “Immoralist” Has to Teach Us* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 70-78.

⁵⁶ Used for indicating another dimension which is believed to be beyond all the seen in classical Western thought.

⁵⁷ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, p.81.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*

essence without giving priority to analysing that essence but rather the priority is to use it as an instrument in passing judgements on the world. In this manner, man was not considered as the primary issue for the classical Western thought until the Renaissance.

With Renaissance, humanism emerged which had a strong effect on the deflection of philosophy by the interest in the condition of human being, considering “the distinction between macrocosm and microcosm and the ability to shape one’s own nature.”⁵⁹ In this sense, man becomes subject to the evaluation of man himself as a part of the cosmos, which opens the way to the consideration of man not for the sake of exploring and acquiring the knowledge of the universe but for the eagerness to analyse and understand himself in the first place.

After the interest in the order of universe had slid to the human being with the Renaissance, the origin of man’s faculty of thinking was started to be questioned regarding man’s existence in the universe, which is considered to be the beginning of the modern philosophy, subsuming two basic thoughts; rationalism which asserted that all knowledge was obtained by the faculty of reason, and empiricism which asserted that all knowledge comes through senses, as will be discussed in the following section.

2.2 Modern Philosophy

In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, “the expressivist notion of nature was seen as a moral source”⁶⁰ and Nietzsche’s *conception*⁶¹ of self

⁵⁹ Ashworth, E. J. “Renaissance Philosophy”, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0 (London: Routledge, 1998).

⁶⁰ Taylor, C. *Sources of The Self* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p.7.

⁶¹ The term conception (of something) is used for referring to Nietzsche’s comprehension of that term, since conceptualization would not be a proper terminology for analysing Nietzsche’s approach.

was shaped in a parallel way to the developing views during this period. In this sense, Nietzsche rejects the general view of classical Western philosophy which has induced man to create a transcendental understanding of morality for the sake of the so-called other life and contends that the surface is only deception, because this understanding lies on the basis of an “epiphenomenal self”⁶² which renders the self as a phenomenon caused by another phenomenon. Consequently, the self is split into an ego (subject) and the body - what is not beyond or within what is seen but what is “there” according to Nietzsche as he claims that

. . . the awakened, the knowing say: body am I through and through, and nothing besides; (...).⁶³

This will be Nietzsche’s basic discussion on the manifestation of self - which was never directly called self by Nietzsche, but which existed as the endeavour to be able to say something about man’s existence - with respect to the despising of the body by Western tradition, and Nietzsche’s argument will in the first place focus on cleaning of the self from that crowd of *untouchable*⁶⁴ conceptions [of the self] that despise the touchable; namely, the body.

Marshall states that Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was “the first writer to bring a clearly defined notion of self, an ordinary self, that of a largely atomistic and autonomous self above the threshold of visibility in Western thinking.”⁶⁵ Though, the series of thoughts until Rousseau have had a great influence on the philosophy of late nineteenth and twentieth

⁶² Corngold, S. “The Fate of Self: German Writers and French Theory”, p.57.

⁶³ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p.23.

⁶⁴ This term is used in order to indicate abstract conceptions in an emphatic way.

⁶⁵ Marshall, J. D. “A Critical Theory of The Self: Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Foucault”, *Studies In Philosophy And Education*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (January 2001), p. 79.

centuries, including Nietzsche's philosophical stance which was more likely to have evolved as a reaction to those previous philosophical understandings.

Undertaking the issue from the beginning, the basic idea of the rationalist thought, the Cartesian assumption "cogito, ergo sum", asserts that the verification of man's existence depends on the fact that man is a thinking substance or being. René Descartes (1596-1650) suggested that "I may doubt whether any of the ideas I entertain correspond to anything whatever outside myself; and I may doubt whether there is anything outside myself to which they may correspond. Yet I can hardly doubt that I have these ideas; and the more such doubts as I find myself able to raise, the more I discover about myself; and propositions about myself, Descartes felt, cannot be queried or seriously denied."⁶⁶

What disturbed Nietzsche about Descartes was not mainly the inference of his being [the I] out of his thinking but rather it was Descartes' expectation of that thought to have an *in-itself* reality, meaning that the [activity of] thinking is assumed to be an unquestionable inborn activity as a faculty of inborn reason. In Nietzsche's words:

"There is thinking: therefore there is something that thinks": this is the upshot of all Descartes' argumentation. . . . Along the lines followed by Descartes one does not come upon something absolutely certain but only upon the fact of a very strong belief. . . . what Descartes desired was that thought should have, not an *apparent* reality, but a reality in *itself*.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, p.102.

⁶⁷ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 268.

In other words, Descartes' belief in an in-itself conception of thought is emanating out of his belief in a creator and that is how he explains the springing of thought. Nietzsche points this out as follows:

Even Descartes had a notion of the fact that in a fundamentally Christian moral mode of thought, which believes in a *good* God as the creator of things, only God's veracity *guarantees* to us the judgements of our senses.⁶⁸

The philosophers, who have embraced reason oriented life, have generally seen the body as a cage for the higher faculties within man, which “seeks for release”, and the passions as “distraction from a higher vocation.”⁶⁹ Bodily existence is not considered as a part of man's precise essence, but only as a mediation to emphasize rational activity as the core of man's existence by exhibiting the body as a jail that masks the ‘intellectual essence’⁷⁰ of man. “Depreciation of the body motivates depreciation of the senses, and the opposition between sense and reason has its origin in this distrust. Such *theories* of reason, not reason as such, are the targets for Nietzsche's antirational attacks.”⁷¹

Therefore, thought, being the determining cause on the verification of man's existence, presupposes the distinction of mind and body. This dual understanding of man's existence opens the way to the human invention terms, or concepts, which Nietzsche uses to indicate how those terms conjoin for the ultimate and the same end – for the representation of man. In this context, Descartes can said to have created individualism which means that the individual designs the line of thought in order for himself to

⁶⁸ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 240.

⁶⁹ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, p. 81.

⁷⁰ Used for indicating ‘reason’.

⁷¹ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, p. 81.

be described “through universal criteria”, meaning soul, reason, will, etc.⁷² Nietzsche would disagree with both the universality of those terms and with their representation as criteria that are said to describe thought, since individualism in this context seems to embody a contradiction of on one hand man himself as designing the line of thought and on the other hand his being determined by some in-itself factors through that line as mentioned above.

The self which Descartes claims he has discovered in the name of “essence” was an outcome of the moral attitudes such as the atom was “a posit set down by grammatical coercion.”⁷³ These two concepts seem to be the reflections of each other. Nietzsche unifies these two concepts under the name of “psychic atomism” which suggests the belief in the self as something permanent and indestructible.⁷⁴ In Nietzsche’s words:

For the single person – the ‘individual’, as the people and the philosophers have understood him thus far – is an error: he is nothing by himself, no atom, ‘no ring in the chain’, nothing which has simply been inherited from the past – he is the whole single line of humanity up to and including himself. .
⁷⁵

So, Nietzsche criticizes the conception of self - or that of the individual in the same manner as the personified mode of the self - to be designated as something definite, having a singular meaning and being attributed to every

⁷² See Taylor, C. *Sources of The Self*, pp. 143-158.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Nietzsche, F. *Twilight of The Idols*, trans. and intro. Duncan Large (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 59.

man as a template, and instead he proposes a multiplicity of the notion of the self, *having many aspects and manifestations*⁷⁶.

Psychic atomism, on the other hand, meaning the positing of such kind of irreducible conceptions, enables to define the abstractness of man's inwardness, which is invisible and untouchable. Without such conceptions, man can hardly utter his so-called inwardness, and including the Cartesian understanding, the conception of self in classical Western philosophy has acquired its shape out of the creation of such conceptions which drew the condition of man to the well-known duality of the corporeal and abstract – of the body and soul.

Although Nietzsche is generally considered to be an antirationalist, he was in fact against the comprehension of reason as opposed to life, or “whatever makes life possible.”⁷⁷ Such [so-called] universal, human invention concepts are the primary cause for the obstruction of life according to Nietzsche, since they are also the source of artificial moral obligations. So, Nietzsche's main opposition is not to the centralization of reason but to the designation of it as against life, which also means against man himself.

Danto writes that “whatever reservations philosophers since may have had with points in Cartesian philosophy,” they generally shared the Cartesian view that “skeptical quiescence is at least achieved in our knowledge of ourselves and of the immediate contents of our own consciousness.”⁷⁸ However, Nietzsche did not agree with this. He insists that “there is nothing we are more and more frequently wrong than we are about

⁷⁶ Those manifestations will be discussed in Chapter 3.

⁷⁷ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, p. 81.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.103

ourselves.”⁷⁹ The logical inference of Descartes, getting off from the assumption that one cannot doubt that he is doubting at that moment, does not simply explain the assertion “I think” for Nietzsche⁸⁰, because

[t]he philosopher has to say: “ When I dissect the process expressed in the proposition ‘I think,’ I get a whole set of bold claims that are difficult, perhaps impossible, to establish, - for instance, that *I am* the one who is thinking, that there must be something that is thinking in the first place, that thinking is an activity and the effect of a being who is considered the cause, that there is an ‘I,’ and finally, that it has already been determined what is meant by thinking, - that *I know* what thinking is. Because if I had not already made up my mind what thinking is, how could I tell whether what had just happened was not perhaps ‘willing’ or ‘feeling’? (...)”⁸¹

Here Nietzsche questions how the philosopher himself would ever be convinced that this deduction of ego or “I” out of not doubting of thinking at that moment would mean the verification of the existence of an I, since it might be willing or feeling of not being able to doubt thinking at that moment. Thus it is never able to arrive at an absolute conviction on the existence of I by the assurance of being’s state of thinking; moreover, it is not able to arrive at such a conviction because while thinking is the activity performed by the being itself, which is said to be the ego or I, it is also the effect of the existence of that being that enables conceiving of the existence of that being. Therefore, Nietzsche’s understanding reveals that thinking and the concept of I are reflectively dependent on each other and the existence of one cannot said to explain the other’s existence in the way Descartes did.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

⁸¹ Nietzsche, F. *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Judith Norman, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 16-17.

Through the rise of modern philosophy which arose during when concentration on man's faculty of thinking was being considered, another point of view emerged in opposition to the rationalist one, which is empiricism.

Empiricism came into the picture as a theory of meaning or thought which states that our concepts are derived from experience.⁸² Experience here, although it is hard to give a clear or certain definition of it, includes "any mode of consciousness, including a variety of modes such as "sensory, aesthetic, moral, religious, etc."⁸³ In this sense, empiricism in its general context is not acceptable for Nietzsche since the conception of either moral or religious experience cannot be conceived actually, since the concepts 'morality' and 'religion' are themselves human invention and thus the experience of them would be nothing more than illusion. Nietzsche's opposition to those concepts are closely related to his understanding of self, since that understanding stems mainly from arguing against the belief of Western tradition within the frame of the so-called pre-established moral values which have reference to the so-called other world and which gave birth to the so-called manifestations that the self is said to embody; such as *soul*, *spirit*, or *consciousness*.

Moreover, empiricism maintains one of the basic characteristics of Western philosophy which is the understanding of mind and body distinctively and that is obvious in John Locke's (1632-1704) statement that our ideas are either gained through experience or they are the complex forms of our unified simple ideas, and there is another kind of knowledge which can

⁸² Alston, William P. "History of Philosophy of Religion", *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0 (London: Routledge, 1998).

⁸³ *Ibid.*

only be explained as *a priori*, such as geometry.⁸⁴ In this sense, universal knowledge was believed to be gained via a relation between abstract ideas and that there existed an “immediate knowledge” that “particular external things are causing ideas in us.”⁸⁵ Nietzsche is against the idea of causality, especially when Locke extends his argument to individuation and indicates that “a person is individuated not by an immaterialist soul” but by “unifying and continuous consciousness,” which means, in a sense, that “real essences are unknown to us.”⁸⁶ This is because the unifying consciousness is meant to unify those real essences which are unknown to us and which cannot be analysed individually, but they could only be gathered by the faculty of consciousness with an unexplained operation to us. Nietzsche would strongly disagree with such a term as ‘real essence,’ which also paves the way for the invention of aforementioned abstract concepts about self or about man’s existence.⁸⁷

Locke’s expression of an unknown essence is in the basis of his belief in God as creator and legislator, with public opinion and government, and “natural or moral law is God’s benevolent will for us.”⁸⁸ Thus, although Locke is an empiricist, he cannot get rid of *a priori existences*⁸⁹ by means of which – God, public opinion, and government – man’s being is organized as he perceives the existence of those three by the faculty of his

⁸⁴ Ayers, M. “John Locke”, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0 (London: Routledge, 1998).

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Nietzsche is also against the consideration of the conception of consciousness as it is said to perform activities which man cannot perform on his own, such as unifying those unknown essences, which will be discussed in Chapter 3 in detail.

⁸⁸ Ayers, M. “John Locke”, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0.

⁸⁹ This term is introduced in order to express Locke’s belief in those three regulative factors unconditionally, meaning that the existence of those is unquestionable.

consciousness. In this context, Locke can be said to have a notion of self which functions in realizing and experiencing the unquestionably existent modes of legislation of world acting upon man.

David Hume (1711-1776), on the other hand, although he shares the basic assumptions of empiricist thought with Locke, challenges his religious point of view and states that “our ‘reason’ is not some God-given privileged access to truth, but simply our language-affected variant of ‘reason in animals.’”⁹⁰ So, man can be said to be more *reasonable* than animals are, thus a hierarchy can be spoken of. Such kind of ranking would pave the way for the same concepts characterizing the notion of self, in the same way Locke’s alluded “unknown real essences” did, since by that assertion Hume wants to show “how many of our beliefs are owing to our ‘imagination,’ rather than to our ‘reason.’”⁹¹ Thus, the faculty of imagination is the factor that differentiates men from animals according to Hume, so that it is the defining factor of the self, likely as the faculty of reason was that factor for rationalism.

Though, Hume can be said to have approached to Nietzschean understanding only in one sense - it is through the “thoroughness of his naturalistic process.”⁹² He makes a point of passions, like Nietzsche does – though from another point of view -, which enables action and through “psychological association in passions,” our “belief formation” and the “workings of our imagination” are enabled, too.⁹³ Still, Hume’s naturalistic empiricism cannot be said to come much closer to the point Nietzsche aims at

⁹⁰ Baier, A. “David Hume”, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0 (London: Routledge, 1998).

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ *Ibid.*

making in the case of self, since it maintains the cause and effect, since passions trigger actions and actions can be said to be the formation of beliefs or the activity of imagination which cause the understanding of man distinctly from his imagination or beliefs, thus primacy still lies in something else than man himself - which is one of Nietzsche's main criticisms on the endeavour to understand man and define him by means of a self -; namely in his experiences and the reflections of these experiences in abstract foundations such as imagination or where aforementioned belief formation takes place.

Consequently, both rationalism and empiricism had a notion of primacy of man, in contrast to the classical Western tradition's concentration on the universe and its features, though they still could not find a way out of their arguments on either man's mind or on his senses which are the endeavours in order to understand man himself. Thus, man is still in the second place from Nietzschean point of view; and in the first place there are the mediums – mind and senses – which give rise to interpretation on the effectivenesses of those mediums and therefore the understanding of man is open to any kind of misunderstanding through the concepts arising out of varying interpretation.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), “the paradigmatic philosopher of the European Enlightenment”, unified the basic ideas of earlier rationalism and empiricism, and through that unification he created a strong model for inferring the basic principles of science and morality in a subjective way.⁹⁴ In this context, he “was the philosopher of human autonomy, holding the view that by the use of our own reason in its broadest sense human beings can discover and live up to the basic principles of knowledge and action without outside assistance, above all without divine support or

⁹⁴ Guyer, P. “Immanuel Kant”, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0 (London: Routledge, 1998).

intervention.”⁹⁵ Thus, although he asserts that man’s autonomy is not dependent on the divinity of an agent, it follows from his argument that, for Kant, man should limit himself by the laws designed via his use of reason with reference to an unknown agent’s determination of how man should live, since any form of law-based action has to have some reference to a higher agent. For Nietzsche, this is, in other words, the

[p]hilosophy defined by Kant as “the science of limitations of reason!”⁹⁶

Kant’s understanding of subjectivity was far different than Nietzsche’s understanding of man, in the way that Kant supposed the faculties of man – meaning his reason in general – as prototypes, whereas Nietzsche was strongly opposed to this. Kant suggested that the laws of nature and morality were both grounded in human reason, and the world was the organization of our experience by categories and laws which were created by men themselves.⁹⁷ Nietzsche does not affirm that such certain categories and laws can be invariant as Kant suggests, because Nietzsche thinks that conceptual schemes vary from society to society, and assuming that one could survive out of the society, those schemes even vary from person to person.⁹⁸

Those conceptual schemes, which refer to the synthetic a priori judgements [and which were thought to be inherent in the structure of human mind and the human mind cannot operate without them]⁹⁹ in Kantian understanding,

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 247.

⁹⁷ Guyer, P. “Immanuel Kant”, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0.

⁹⁸ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, p. 40.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

are not acceptable for Nietzsche, as he states the reason of positing such judgements in his own words in *Beyond Good and Evil*:

It is time to replace the question of “How are synthetic apriori judgements possible?” with “Why is the belief in such judgements necessary?”. We must understand that such judgements must be believed true, however false they are in nature, just in order that beings of our sort may be preserved.¹⁰⁰

Such apriori judgements, when applied on the self, are the conceptions of ego, soul, and spirit which work for the preservation of the beings of our sort the same way. Man needs to hold on to such definitions in order to feel contented and unique in nature, because what is unknown or undefined makes man feel uncomfortable with themselves and such conceptions are the key terms for man to discern themselves from the ordinary nature of the “apparent world”¹⁰¹ in order to attribute themselves a transcendental value due to their faculty of reason which is a feature that overcomes nature. This apparent world is an inevitable outcome of Kant’s description of such apriori features as *things-in-themselves*¹⁰², “which we think are inherently existent in the world, are instead only our ways of thinking about the world, having no objective residency;”¹⁰³ and the body, which is being despised by the primacy and the oneness of reason, inevitably becomes a part of that so-called apparent world, to which Nietzsche is against.

German Idealism, which began as “the attempt to complete Kant’s revolutionary project: the derivation of knowledge and ethics from the spontaneity and autonomy of mind or spirit,” aimed at clarifying the

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

problem of the duality of Kantian distinction between knowable objects contributed by mind and matter of sensation contributed by mind-independent things-in-themselves.¹⁰⁴ This tradition kept emphasizing the primacy of mental activity with an extra effort to overcome the dualisms of Kantian thought by producing “developmental monisms.”¹⁰⁵

Developmental monisms emphasized the sociality and historicity of reason which opened a road for the development of individual self-consciousness that required consciousness of another mind.¹⁰⁶ This view of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854) was followed by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s (1770-1831) view of “human history as a series of conflicts and resolutions which enable the reciprocal recognition of individuals” and both Schelling and Hegel shared the thought that “a systematic philosophy must portray nature as the mind’s preconscious development.”¹⁰⁷ Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) criticized them by arguing that “their philosophy of nature was a betrayal of idealism that explained the mind in nonmental terms and deprived the mind of its autonomy.”¹⁰⁸

In this context, analysing thought and existence and trying to establish a philosophical connection between them seems to be a problematic issue for modern philosophy, especially for German Idealism. For Nietzsche, as have been mentioned, this duality is a basic problem since any other distinction comes out of such distinct discriminations. Although modern

¹⁰⁴ Franks, P. “German Idealism”, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0 (London: Routledge, 1998).

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

philosophy, and especially German Idealism, has come closer to man in each step, the main problem is sustained: Drawing exact distinctions between reason and existence. More specifically, the main problem is, as Nietzsche points out, the bodily existence.

This problem of duality can be said to have been carried to a different dimension by Arthur Schopenhauer's (1788-1860) conception of world as a continuous mutual influence of images and desires. In this context, Schopenhauer cultivated his notion of self on his assumptions that man is essentially embodied and active, and the world is man's representation, so that it is exhausted in its perceptibility. And since there is a world of appearance or of objects, of which we have knowledge, there must also be subjects.¹⁰⁹ In relation to this, Schopenhauer clearly makes a distinction of subject (which Schopenhauer calls the self) and object, where the self is certainly not an object and it does not have an appearance, therefore it is not in space and time. The self is "like an eye"¹¹⁰ which cannot see itself; yet which mirrors the world."¹¹¹ So, Nietzsche would strongly disagree with such conception of self which, as Schopenhauer states, does not have an appearance and thus puts forth the distinction of subject and object.

Although it appears like Schopenhauer's conception of self underestimates the body and has no common points with Nietzsche's, Schopenhauer takes up body from another point of view by suggesting that the self is not merely a representative of the world because there is will, which is action and which is embodied, attacking the "rational and transparent self of

¹⁰⁹ Janaway, C. "Arthur Schopenhauer", *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0 (London: Routledge, 1998).

¹¹⁰ Here Schopenhauer uses the term "eye" homonymously with the term "I".

¹¹¹ Marshall, J. D. "A Critical Theory of The Self: Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Foucault", p. 79.

Descartes.”¹¹² At least, both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer are opposed to an imaginary self – a purely rational and transparent self, in other words. Moreover, for Nietzsche, as for Schopenhauer, we have tendency to associate “will” with the “ordinary mentalistic connotations” in its metaphysical employment.¹¹³ But this tendency must be overcome when one is to speak of Nietzsche, because reference to a mental formation – such as the aforementioned soul, spirit, or consciousness - would be self-contradictory considering his philosophical stance that is opposed to binary opposition of mind and body.

Thus, Nietzsche’s understanding of self can be said to have been strongly influenced by Schopenhauer’s consideration of will - as the will in man is the will to life for Schopenhauer which is a strong instinctual desire to live and to continue living¹¹⁴-, in the sense that, for Nietzsche, the self cannot be conceived distinctly from the desire to live in its purest natural form, like that of an animal and it should not limit itself with any kind of sanction that is against the very nature of the animal, so against that of the man.

2.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, all those philosophical movements, especially the ones which have evolved through the era of modern philosophy, have a crucial role as Nietzsche’s targets of attack in the evolution of his conception of self as a multiplicity and as something indistinctive from either man’s mind or body or, more generally, from his life, like many of other understandings of Nietzsche have evolved in the same manner. His thoughts have been

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹¹³ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, p. 109.

¹¹⁴ Marshall, J. D. “A Critical Theory of The Self: Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Foucault”, p.80.

formed through his criticisms against classical views of his predecessors stemming from Western moral and religious structure of that time in general. That is why main historical philosophical stances about the universe and about man have been analysed briefly in this chapter, since that historical line gives an almost clear picture of Nietzsche's reasons for generally stating his arguments on self and on man against his predecessors'.

CHAPTER 3

THE SO-CALLED MANIFESTATION OF SELF

Although the term “ego” [or “I”] has been used to stand for the conception of self through history, as it was discussed in the previous chapter, for Nietzsche the concept of ego is not unquestionably an equivalent of the concept of the self he conceives of. Because, the “ego” is not something unstudied; it grows in company with man’s other metaphysical attributions - namely soul, spirit, and consciousness - which have erroneously been thought to be primordially existent with man and have been appealed in order to define self by the predecessors of Nietzsche. In Nietzsche’s own words:

There exists neither “spirit,” nor reason, nor thinking, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth: all are fictions (...).¹¹⁵

So, in the light of this passage, the concepts of ego, soul, spirit, and consciousness which evolve together with the consideration of the conception of ego will be discussed in this chapter, and how Nietzsche

¹¹⁵ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 266.

criticizes the customary illusory assignment of those concepts as the manifestation of self will be analysed.

3.1 Ego (Subject)

A great number of people live their lives under the shadow of an imaginary ego which encloses impersonal opinions and arbitrary, fictitious evaluations and it is not dependent on the people it enfolds, because it stipulates universal judgements about man.¹¹⁶ Such universal judgements are the characteristic consequences of humanism in Western culture, where “men regard themselves as gods in miniature, lording over earth and all forms of life, flattering themselves that they are the measure of all things.”¹¹⁷ This arrogance in man overrates the ego as something which dissimulates man as he is superior to nature.

Humans are in the form of coping with the conflicting drives and instincts within themselves in contrary to animals, and culture - which is the basis of man’s arrogance - has arisen on this ground aiming at making a “tame and civilized animal, a *domestic* animal”¹¹⁸ through the illusory rules and environment of a human society. In this context, Nietzsche defines men as follows:

They have something of which they are proud of. And what do they call that which makes them proud? *Education*¹¹⁹ they

¹¹⁶ See Jaspers, K. *Nietzsche: An Introduction to The Understanding of His Philosophical Activity* (Baltimore: Hopkins University Press, 1997).

¹¹⁷ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth* (Berlin: New York: De Gruyter, 2004), p. 417.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 407.

¹¹⁹ Here this word can be considered as a reference to the conception of *culture* regarding Nietzsche’s point of view on culture. See Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*.

call it, it distinguishes them from goatherds. For that reason they hate to hear the word 'contempt' applied to them.¹²⁰

So, the world in its natural form is condemned by men, feeling that their existence is the core of the world due to their superiority above nature. This is the error in man as Del Caro states, "who thinks he is free in the world of unfreedom, the amazing exception, the super animal, the almost-god, the meaning of creation whose existence cannot be thought away, who calls his history world history."¹²¹ Thus, man's invention of a concept of ego, or I, is an outcome of his belief in himself as a core cause of everything in the world, and man thinks he is the ultimate dweller in the world who has the right to shape the world the way it would please himself, which is a teaching of the culture.

This falsification and humanization of the world by man is ridiculous according to Nietzsche, which is a consequence of man's casting of values onto the "actual world"¹²² that prevails the values of nature.¹²³ Man has a tendency to overcome nature by those attributes. He states that:

It is in the nature of thinking that it thinks of and invents the unconditioned as an adjunct to the conditioned; just as it thought of and invented the "ego" as an adjunct to the multiplicity of its processes; it measures the world according to magnitudes posited by itself – (...).¹²⁴

So, the conception of ego is only a mental or psychological source for man to place his belief beyond the accessible, beyond the physically observed -

¹²⁰ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 9.

¹²¹ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 417.

¹²² This term indicates the world, of which we have direct experience; the world we dwell in.

¹²³ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 417.

¹²⁴ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 309.

beyond nature in general according to Nietzsche. In a reflexive manner, the conception of ego comes into being for the sake of being in a continuous state of endeavoring to explain what there is beyond the seen. Nietzsche points this out when he explains the conception of subject (ego) as

[t]he term for our belief in a unity underlying all the different impulses of the highest feeling of reality: (...).¹²⁵

Concerning that belief in a subject or ego, which - as Nietzsche states - is man's need to hold on to a feeling of reality, Stack explains referring to Lange that Nietzsche had in mind the idea that categories such as unity, substance, being, object, cause, etc. were basically convenient hypothetical notions that have practical value but no ontological reference.¹²⁶ He adds, quoting Nietzsche, that "we have need of unities in order to be able to reckon; this does not mean that we must assume that such unities exist. We have borrowed the concept of unity from our 'ego'-concept; our oldest article of faith. At present, (...) we are firmly convinced that our I-concept does not guarantee any real unity."¹²⁷ In other words:

"The subject" is the fiction that many similar states in us are the effect of one substratum: but it is we who first created the "similarity" of these states; our adjusting them and making them similar is the fact, not their similarity (- which ought rather to be denied -).¹²⁸

Moreover, Nietzsche adds that:

¹²⁵ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 268.

¹²⁶ Stack, G. "Kant, Lange, and Nietzsche" in *Nietzsche and Modern German Thought*, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (London; New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 38

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 269.

Even “the subject” is such a created entity, a “thing” like all others: a simplification with the object of defining the force which posits, invents, thinks, as distinct from all individual positing, inventing, thinking as such. Thus a capacity as distinct from all that is individual – fundamentally, action collectively considered with respect to all anticipated actions (action and the probability of similar actions).¹²⁹

In this sense, the concept of ‘subject’ is introduced by man himself in order to ascribe a special name and meaning for the ‘thing’ which he thinks is in charge of all of his actions; however, by this attribution he creates another being than himself which, he believes, performs actions distinctly from his action of attribution of such a thing, without realizing this paradoxical situation since he does not think that this thing is his creation; he thinks it has already been existent.

Consequently, the concept of “I,”¹³⁰ or ego, is the “transposition of I onto things”.¹³¹ Because, for man, the I is conceived as already there from the beginning, which is nothing but a “fictional attribute”¹³² indeed, and Nietzsche criticizes this tendency of man to “use human as the overall standard”¹³³ for defining the rest of the world. Thus, the I was conceived as something pre-existent, meaning that it was believed to be present before all other phenomena in order to be able to advert the conception of “thing.” In Nietzsche’s words:

¹²⁹ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 301.

¹³⁰ See editor’s note, Nietzsche, F. *Twilight of The Idols*, p. 90.: ‘I’: it should be noted that in this context that Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) also uses the term ‘das Ich’ (‘the I’) for what has generally been translated into English as ‘the ego’. Both Nietzsche’s critique here of the ‘I’ as construct and the notion of ‘projection’ would subsequently be developed by Freud.

¹³¹ Fink, E. “Nietzsche’s New Experience of World” in *Nietzsche’s New Seas*, ed. Michael Allen Gillespie and Tracy B. Strong, trans. Michael Allen Gillespie (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 212.

¹³² See Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, pp. 417-431.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

Man's three 'inner facts', the things he believed in most firmly – the will, the mind, the I – were projected out of himself: he derived the concept of Being from the concept of the I, and posited the existence of 'things' after his own image, after his concept of the I as cause. No wonder if, later on, he only ever rediscovered in things *what he had put in them*. – The thing in itself, to say it again, the concept of thing: just a reflection of the belief in the I as cause . . .¹³⁴

Considering the matter from another perspective, the conception of self, with the introduction of a conception of I or the ego - and likely the introduction of the conceptions of soul, spirit, and consciousness - turns into a problem because "our notions of the self" become "embedded in complex conceptual and grammatical structures."¹³⁵ Thus, ego is a grammatical function which masks man and inevitably there fades in the obscure subject, the self, as a rhetorical construction. So,

[I]anguage is assigned by its emergence to the time of the most rudimentary form of psychology: we become involved in a crude fetishism when we make ourselves conscious of the basic premisses of the metaphysics of language, in plain words: of *reason*. *This* is what sees doer and deed everywhere: it believes in the will as cause in general; it believes in the 'I', in the I as Being, in the I as substance, and *projects* the belief in the I-substance onto all things – only then does it create the concept of 'thing' . . .¹³⁶

With respect to the paragraph above, Rosen states that, for Nietzsche, the ego is the projections or deeds belonging to the bodily activity.¹³⁷ So, the ego is only a name given to the world constituting activity performed by

¹³⁴ Nietzsche, F. *Twilight of The Idols*, p. 28.

¹³⁵ Emden, C. J. *Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness and The Body* (Urbana: University Of Illinois Press, 2005), p. 122.

¹³⁶ Nietzsche, F. *Twilight of The Idols*, p. 18.

¹³⁷ See Rosen, S. *The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche's Zarathustra* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995).

thinking and perceiving, and the aforementioned world is, then, an artistic form produced by the transcendental ego.¹³⁸ The word “transcendental” represents the rational activity of man, which constructs the world in the way he can easily adopt it to himself, but this is only an artificial world according to Nietzsche. So, he changes the structure of the world constituting activity of the transcendental ego into the world constituting activity of earth, body, or self and this way aims at making man come down to earth, to the actual world.¹³⁹

In this context, Nietzsche rejects the hegemony of the ego upon man as the self, because the self is, unlikely the so-called ego, much more than a cause, much more than a doer, and much more than a grammatical function invented for the sake of grounding a confirmation of the world. Moreover, the ego is not even something ‘really there’ as have already been mentioned; it is constructed and illusory, although for the self, one can say that it is ‘there,’ at least, considering the *body*¹⁴⁰. Nietzsche explains the distinction of the self from the conception of ego in his own words below:

Always the self listens and seeks: it compares, compels, conquers, destroys. It rules and is also the ruler of the ego. . . . Your self laughs at your ego and its proud leaps. “What are these leaps and flights of thought to me?” it says to itself. “A detour to my purpose. I am the leading strings of the ego and the prompter of its concepts.” . . . The self says to the ego: “Feel pain here!” And then it suffers and reflects on how it might suffer no more – and just for that purpose *it is supposed to think!*¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ The conception of body will be discussed in Chapter 4.

¹⁴¹ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 23.

At this point, Nietzsche seems to be approaching at the issue in an almost ironic way, since he defines a ruler kind of self for the sake of despising the so-called ego; though, as it will be analysed through the following sections, Nietzsche, indeed, does not have an ideal of that kind of self. His [understanding of] self is, in brief, more likely to be both a ruler and a myrmidon, where neither the former heads upon the latter and nor the ruled becomes oppressed by the ruler, and that kind of self sounds like to be basically a multiplicity of countless humanly conditions either in conflict with each other or getting on well.

Another reason for Nietzsche to speak ironically about the self with reference to the conception of ego is that because he criticizes man for overrating his own creation as have been discussed at the beginning of this section. Ego, or I, eventually, is not something which can be indicated clearly to be existent here or there; moreover, such an indefinite concept totally seizes man, without any clear explanation, with the laws it has made upon itself with reference to an – again – indefinite agent which speaks of morality or social order as a clairvoyant. Nietzsche definitely rejects such surrender to a nonexistent being and decrees from the mouth of *Zarathustra*:

“My ego is something that shall be overcome: my ego is to me the great contempt for the mankind,” so speak these eyes.¹⁴²

That great contempt, arising out of the inability to meet the claims of the so-called ego, leads to a continuous dissatisfaction of man with himself as a single being, hence he enters under cover of the crowd, of the herd, where he finds or - in a more realistic sense – creates for himself the reasons for the existence and for the regulations of his ego. Nevertheless, Nietzsche claims that:

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

Truly, the sly ego, loveless, wanting its benefit in the benefit of the many: that is not the origin of the herd, but instead it is going under.¹⁴³

To sum up, Nietzsche criticizes the conception of an ego, or that of the “I,” because of its being an inventory conception in order for man to find himself a place in the society – or in the *herd* in Nietzschean terminology -, which is necessary for the satisfaction of man’s desire for ratification; however, the society is no self-existent context, and it is formed out of man’s belief in an ego which is thought to be responsible for man’s actions and it is supposed to bridle the inappropriate ones.

In this case, the conception of an ego, from Nietzsche’s point of view, seems to be a created, organized context in which man thinks he can explain his existence, and he also can explain the world, or - in general – anything either physical or mental. Considering this, the sub-contexts, to which ego gives birth and with respect to which it would better be discussed will be analysed in the following sections, namely *Soul and Spirit*, and *Consciousness*. In the former section, the concepts of soul and spirit; in the latter section, the concept of consciousness will be discussed as human invention concepts which arise out of man’s belief in an ego or in a subject, and Nietzsche’s criticism on this issue will be exposed.

3.1.1 Soul and Spirit

Nietzsche’s understanding of soul and spirit can be better examined by conceiving them in the same context, rather than approaching the two distinctly. This is because Nietzsche’s thoughts on the two evolve reciprocally for the sake of reaching an ultimate end, namely the creation of the superman. To this aim, first, Nietzsche’s thoughts on the conception

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

of spirit will be given in brief, and then his understanding of the conception of soul will be analysed in relation to his consideration of the collaborative existence of the two.

Nietzsche's apprehension of spirit is the very opposite form of the Platonic or Christian conception of spirit for which

“spirit” is only a means and tool in the service of higher life, of the enhancement of life,¹⁴⁴

and for Nietzsche, this understanding of spirit is

actually a life-endangering, life-calumniating, life-denying principle.¹⁴⁵

Instead, Nietzsche aims at precluding this understanding of spirit serving “purposiveness, system, or co-operation.”¹⁴⁶ In Nietzsche's words:

Where a certain unity obtains in the grouping of things, one has always posited *spirit* as the cause of this coordination: for which notion there is no ground whatever. Why should the idea of a complex fact be one of the conditions of this fact? . . . We shall be our own guard against explaining purposiveness in terms of spirit: there is no ground whatever for ascribing to spirit the properties of organization and systematization.¹⁴⁷

This is how Nietzsche defines what he has been denying as the conception of spirit in the first place, and his own understanding - with which he aims at replacing the previous - would be explained and comprehended in a better way after his approach to the conception of soul is analysed.

¹⁴⁴ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 342.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 286.

¹⁴⁷ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 285.

Nietzsche's approach to soul might strongly seem to reflect the characteristic of his philosophy which is generally said to enclose contradictories, because while he denies that something called soul exists, he also mentions it as a participant to man's bodily existence. This contradictory approach of Nietzsche to soul and his appraisal of the diacritic points between the concepts of soul and spirit will be analysed in detail below.

Nietzsche speaks from the mouth of *Zarathustra* as:

“Body am I and soul” – so speaks a child. And why one should not speak like children? But the awakened, the knowing one says: body am I through and through, and nothing besides; and soul is just a word for something on the body.¹⁴⁸

White suggests that “thus speaks only the awakened one,” as quoted above, and “although he may speak thus all times, *Zarathustra* quotes him only when speaking to the one tempted to despise his body.”¹⁴⁹ This is because the audience, to whom Nietzsche speaks, should be considered while the significance of “*Zarathustra's* utterances” is to be determined or interpreted. Because, while on one hand Nietzsche denies the existence of something called ‘soul’ which represents any ‘part’ of the so-called self, on the other hand he seems to refer to something he calls soul in some of his writings one of which is quoted below:

But his [*Zarathustra's*] *soul* grew full of impatience and desire for those whom he loved, because he still had much to give them.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 22.

¹⁴⁹ White, A. *Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth* (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 72.

¹⁵⁰ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 63.

White explains this dual utterance of Nietzsche on the soul regarding the audience which, Nietzsche thinks, has become a crowd of “despisers of the body,” by pointing out *Zarathustra*’s concern about his “brother”¹⁵¹, one of *Zarathustra*’s companions,” for whom there might still be time not to become a part of that crowd who despises the body and “*Zarathustra* attempts to use this time. But, what he tells this companion about the soul, at this time, is not his last word on the subject.”¹⁵² In this context, soul, for Nietzsche, represents something; and certainly, it is neither something “permanent and unchanging,” nor “once and for all” as it was believed to be so in the Christian-moral tradition.¹⁵³ Regarding this, Nietzsche can said to be stating what the soul cannot be, in the passage quoted below:

Christianity has accustomed us to the superstitious concept of the “soul,” the “immortal soul,” soul-monads that really are at home somewhere else and have only by chance fallen, as it were into this or that condition, into the “earthly” and become “flesh”; but their essence is not held to be affected, to say nothing of being conditioned, by all this. It was Christianity that first invited the individual to play the judge of everything and everyone; (...) and one has to enforce *eternal* rights against everything temporal and conditioned! . . . What speaks here is something beyond becoming, something unchanging throughout history, something immortal, something divine: a *soul!*¹⁵⁴

So, Christianity’s clear distinction of body and soul and its attribution of supernatural features on the soul - as it is mentioned in the passage above – which is believed to be prior to all what is physical are Nietzsche’s main

¹⁵¹ This “brother” is likely to indicate *Zarathustra*’s hope for the *Übermensch*, who is a “successor to the images of ‘higher humanity’ offered by traditional religions.” For further information, see Clark, M. “*Friedrich Nietzsche*,” *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0 (London: Routledge, 1998).

¹⁵² White, A. *Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth*, p. 73.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹⁵⁴ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 401.

objections about the historical conception of soul. Apparently, Nietzsche seems to claim what has been wrong about the conception of the soul in the first place, and then, only from this criticism of his, can it be inferred what the soul could probably mean for him since he never states a certain, coherent, clear, or unique definition of soul.

Thiele defines Nietzschean soul as plurality, likely to the multiplicity of the subject, “as social structure of the drives¹⁵⁵ and emotions.”¹⁵⁶ The incorporation of drives and emotions to the definition of the Nietzschean understanding of soul can be said to indicate how a concept of soul has come into being by the inevitable influence of Christian moral values which “call the passions evil – or good, or bad, or whatever -”¹⁵⁷ since Nietzsche takes “the voice of the body as speaking in the passions,” and he takes the “interpretation of what the body says as the work of the soul.”¹⁵⁸ In other words, Nietzsche speaks of a soul which is not detached from the drives or passions and which co-exists with the body; because, for him, the soul should not express or bound up what is contrary to the natural context of the body or that of the drives.

The core of Christian-moral conception of soul’s close relationship with the drives is “inhibition” for Nietzsche, as Jaspers states, because all the “deceptions, degenerations, illnesses and infections” of the soul stems from the “transformations caused by the inhibition of drives” which is also the source of the development of human soul.¹⁵⁹ This is how “the desires

¹⁵⁵ Drives will be discussed in Chapter 4 in detail.

¹⁵⁶ Thiele, L. P. *Friedrich Nietzsche and The Politics of The Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism*, p. 52.

¹⁵⁷ White, A. *Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth*, p. 77.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Also see Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, pp. 26-27.

¹⁵⁹ Jaspers, K. *Nietzsche: An Introduction to The Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, p. 135.

become wild animals when they are interpreted as evil.”¹⁶⁰ As in the case of the “pale criminal,”¹⁶¹ since “his soul damns his bodily desires as evil, and represses them for as long as it can,” the pale criminal becomes “the victim of his soul.”¹⁶² This means that, “even if the soul is merely something ‘in the body’, it is something that can undermine the body; it can be the source of the body’s destruction.”¹⁶³ Here, Nietzsche emphasizes that even if the soul could be acceded to exist in the body, as it had been believed to do through the history of Western philosophy, it is obvious that the same soul is always working against man’s nature. Thus, what is called drive was understood in a negative maner in Western tradition, as it was something harmful for man and the other man in society. In fact, Nietzsche argues that the harmful state of the drives is achieved by the suppression of them, in which the soul has a considerable role.

As Huskinson mentions, for Nietzsche, individuals are determined by their physical drives rather than by a metaphysical identity within or beyond them.¹⁶⁴ Here, the metaphysical identity seems to refer to what Nietzsche alludes by soul, or reason, since he writes that

the body is a great reason, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, one herd and one shepherd.¹⁶⁵

With respect to this, Nietzsche’s utterance of body’s multiplicity can be thought as, at the same time, embracing the conception of soul “as the

¹⁶⁰ White, A. *Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth*, p. 78.

¹⁶¹ See Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, pp. 26-27.

¹⁶² White, A. *Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth*, p. 78.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ See Huskinson, L. *Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in The Union of Opposites* (New York: Bruner-Routledge, 2004), pp. 11-19.

¹⁶⁵ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 22.

highest kind of being,” but “not because it is more powerful or richer than the other beings.”¹⁶⁶ Because that would – as it has already happened with the Christian conception of soul – prepare the basis of the belief in a second world, which is also the highest kind of world, which is supposed to welcome those who have been “good” men [and Nietzsche would then ask: “Good according to what or whom?”]. But instead, for Nietzsche, the soul could be “the most embracing being” because it is “open to the existence of the world,”¹⁶⁷ meaning that “only the soul can invest the body’s passions with a ‘highest goal’, and only the soul can then ‘hold holy its highest hope’,”¹⁶⁸ thus it embraces an end the body also shares and it “must view that end as so share.”¹⁶⁹ So, Nietzsche wants to see the body and the soul as cohabitants, endeavoring for the same end - which is the creation of man himself anew - and reaching the extent of *Übermensch* by *overcoming himself*¹⁷⁰. Thus, the soul would come out of its shell, covering it for being something untouchable and distinct from the bodily and the worldly, and by being “exposed to all-embracing play of the world” this way, “the soul itself would become cosmic and becomes similar to the world.”¹⁷¹ In the end, the soul Nietzsche speaks of “is not the soul sought by the *hinterworldly*¹⁷², not something apart from the body, not something that would survive body’s death, not something that would attain its satisfaction

¹⁶⁶ Fink, E. *Nietzsche’s Philosophy*, p. 86.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ White, A. *Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth*, p. 80.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹⁷⁰ Self-overcoming is one of the cornerstones of Nietzsche’s philosophy. For further reading see Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, pp. 88-90.

¹⁷¹ Fink, E. *Nietzsche’s Philosophy*, p. 95.

¹⁷² Refers to the followers of the Christian tradition. See Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, pp. 20-22.

only through the body's frustration, or not its salvation would be only through the body's destruction."¹⁷³

In this manner, Nietzsche's critique of the soul is, indeed, of a soul which is thought as something detached from the body, of a soul which is understood to be the treacherous opponent of the body, always criticizing its natural moves and labelling them as sins since that kind of soul is believed to be subject to the punishment which will be the compensation of the body's instinctive tendencies in an other world¹⁷⁴. Conversely, the soul Nietzsche refers to is an embodied soul which is not separately existent out of the body, which does not have superiority over the body and which will not be punished for the drives of the body neither in this nor in an other world. All these properties which cannot said to be belonging to Nietzschean understanding of soul are, as Nietzsche explains, the artificial formation of the soul out of classical Western and Christian tradition. In his own words:

The church – and in this it has done nothing but succeed and inherit from the philosophy of antiquity – proceeding from a different standard and desiring to save a “soul,” the “eternal destiny” of a soul, first believes in the expiatory power of punishment and then in the obliterating power of forgiveness (...).¹⁷⁵

Besides, he defines the Christian/Western “hatred for the privileged body and *soul*^{176,177} as the

¹⁷³ White, A. *Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth*, p. 80.

¹⁷⁴ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, pp. 20-22.

¹⁷⁵ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 212.

¹⁷⁶ By the “privileged soul” here, referring to something not approved by Christian or Western tradition, Nietzsche seems to allude his own conception of soul as something embodied; something in the same context with the body.

¹⁷⁷ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 160.

revolt of the ugly, ill-constituted souls against the beautiful,
proud, joyous,¹⁷⁸

where he points at the denial and despising of the passions or drives by referring to the ugly and ill-constituted souls that have been culminated by the teachings of Christianity in contrast to his conception of an embodied soul in co-operation with the body to arrive at the *Übermensch*.

In this sense, Del Caro puts forth the opposition of morality and cultivation in Nietzsche's thought for consideration, in order to indicate what Nietzsche means when he mentions the soul as being embodied and co-operating with the body. He states that morality is the factor which spoils the soul, because it causes an exhaustion out of the pain and arrogance morality brings about, and instead, Nietzsche appreciates cultivation, which paves the way for constructing a new body which is able to create a new soul.¹⁷⁹ In order to create that new soul, one should let his soul dissolve into the world he lives, without trying to protect it from being labelled a moral criminal; since, as long as man tries to draw moral boundaries, to restrict his natural motives, and as long as those natural motives are "morally conceptualized"¹⁸⁰ into other forms, man's perception of soul becomes of something arbitrary, nonexistent. Instead, Nietzsche writes:

I love the one whose soul squanders itself, who wants no thanks and gives none back: for he always gives and does not want to preserve himself.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ See Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, pp. 417-431.

¹⁸⁰ See Nietzsche, F. *On The Genealogy of Morality*, pp. 67-68.

¹⁸¹ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 8. Also see editors' note: "See Luke 17:33. This is the first of approximately 135 direct allusions to the Bible, in which Nietzsche typically applies Christ's words to Zarathustra's task, or inverts Christ's word in order to achieve a life- and earth-affirming effect."

In the passage above, Nietzsche opposes to the fragmentation of body and soul in a sense, since he is loud in his admiration to the one who lets his soul dissolve in the cause of embodiment courageously, and this opposition emanates from the personification of each fragment¹⁸² - two of which is the soul and the spirit - as something else than man himself which is in action independently according to the moral values. This means, Nietzsche points at something else than the soul/spirit and body distinction when he points at the soul, as *Zarathustra* says to the rope dancer:

Your soul will be dead even sooner than your body – fear no more!¹⁸³

The passage above would be understood more clearly in reference to the passage below:

Once the soul gazed contemptuously at the body, and then such contempt was the highest thing: it wanted the body gaunt, ghastly, starved. Thus it intended to escape the body and the earth. Oh this soul was gaunt, ghastly and starved, and cruelty was the lust of his soul! But you, too, my brothers, tell me: what does your body proclaim about your soul? Is your soul not poverty and filth and a pitiful contentment?¹⁸⁴

The soul mentioned above is the Christian soul, which is believed to be distinct from the body, believed to be the highest form of being and it wanted to take control of the body and its desires, labelling them evil. Thus, man can neither consider himself as totally beast, nor can he be *totally human* in the way Western values have taught him to be [meaning the inhibition of his passions and drives]. So, man is in the midst of a concealed depression rising out of this situation. In a similar manner,

¹⁸² The referred fragments are soul, spirit, and consciousness.

¹⁸³ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 11.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Rosen explains that the death of the rope dancer, his fall down of the rope while trying to cross over, symbolizes man's historical condition today according to Nietzsche, which is the fluctuation of man between "the beast" and "the superman."¹⁸⁵ The case of the rope dancer is crucial for understanding Nietzsche's conception of soul, together with his conception of spirit, where the soul can said to be representing the "subjective or personal side of the individual human being" and the spirit being the symbol of the mankind as a whole," aiming at reaching its "highest aspiration."¹⁸⁶ In this sense, the rope-dancer is the "spirit of late-modern European man"¹⁸⁷ which desires to overcome itself and go beyond the rope and which had been corrupted by the coercion of tradition. So, the spirit imagines emancipating the soul from its chains for the aforementioned [highest] aspiration.¹⁸⁸

Although Nietzsche denies the fractionation of man's existence, he might seem to comprise contradictory expressions by distinctively referring to the soul, spirit, and body, but this is only a misleading interpretation of what Nietzsche tries to indicate. Because, by speaking in reference to a distinctive explanation of the soul and the spirit, Nietzsche tries to abolish the previously declared meanings which had been attributed on them through history, and instead, he aims at using those conceptions [of soul and spirit] to serve the self-creation of man, thus to serve his reaching of the superman.

¹⁸⁵ Rosen, S. *The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche's Zarathustra*, p. 50.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-67.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-53.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-67.

3.1.2 Consciousness

Consciousness, for Nietzsche, is a “reflective and dependent phenomenon, reflective and dependent upon some other kind or kinds of phenomena”¹⁸⁹, thus it is an arbitrary constitution and

everything of which we become conscious is arranged, simplified, schematized, interpreted through and through.¹⁹⁰

In this sense, for Nietzsche, consciousness alone cannot be said to be a part of the self without being conceived together with other phenomena such as language and instincts, or body in general. In this context, Deleuze explains that consciousness is an expression of the "relation of certain reactive forces with the active forces that dominate them."¹⁹¹ So, the existence of consciousness is only an inventory bond between those forces - *or conflicting instincts in other words* - either dominating or being dominated by each other, which is supposed to enable man to explain his taking cognizance of the multiplicity within himself. In Nietzsche's own words:

The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general? My *hypotheses*: The subject as multiplicity.¹⁹²

As consciousness is considered to be a dependent phenomenon upon man's physical attributions such as language and drives for Nietzsche, which are also the elements of the alluded multiplicity within man, without those

¹⁸⁹ Hales, S. D. & Welshon, R. *Nietzsche's Perspectivism*, p. 135.

¹⁹⁰ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, pp. 263-264.

¹⁹¹ Deleuze, G. "Active and Reactive" in *The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation*, ed. David B. Allison (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985, c1977), p. 82.

¹⁹² Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 270.

attributions it could not have achieved its meaning in the sense Western tradition ascribes to it. However, that meaning is construed in a wrong way in Western tradition according to Nietzsche since it is not uttered that consciousness is an arbitrary constitution. Moreover, it is believed that either *bodily or mental functions*¹⁹³ eventuate independently of consciousness in the first place, and then enter our consciousness which has already been existent before those functions took place. With respect to this, in an opposing manner Nietzsche states that:

It is essential that one should not make a mistake over the role of “consciousness”: it is our relation with the “outer world” that evolved it. On the other hand, the direction or protection and care in respect of the co-ordination of the bodily functions does *not* enter our consciousness; (...).¹⁹⁴

Thus,

[t]hat which becomes conscious is involved in causal relations which are entirely withheld from us – the sequence of thoughts, feelings, ideas in consciousness does not signify that this sequence is a causal sequence; but apparently it is so, to the highest degree.¹⁹⁵

Nietzsche obviously states that “conscious things are illusory,” that “our identity is not determined by consciousness,” and that “consciousness is epiphenomenal.”¹⁹⁶ In Nietzsche’s own words:

¹⁹³ Those two terms are brought out separately since Western tradition is founded on this duality.

¹⁹⁴ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 284.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ Hales & Welshon, *Nietzsche’s Perspectivism*, p. 132.

“Consciousness” – to what extent the idea of an idea, the idea of will, the idea of a feeling (known to ourselves alone) are totally superficial!¹⁹⁷

Moreover, since consciousness is epiphenomenal, it is always consciousness “of” something, and Nietzsche objects to one’s conceiving of consciousness for the “unity of the organism,”¹⁹⁸ together with the fact that as he mentions that:

Everything that enters consciousness as “unity” is already tremendously complex: we always have only a semblance of unity.¹⁹⁹

So, there is no unity of consciousness, neither as subject nor as a psychological state since it is epiphenomenal, a secondary phenomenon arising out of another. Because, Nietzsche thinks that

*consciousness in general has developed only under the pressure of the need to communicate.*²⁰⁰

In this respect, the conception of consciousness is only meaningful in a social environment, where interaction and communication take place. In society [as aforementioned social environment], concepts and physical accordance [between members] are necessary in order to establish interaction and communication between the members to prevent chaos, and concerning this, Nietzsche’s understanding of consciousness, as Emden has also signified, revolves around “conceptual and bodily aspects” meaning “rhetoric and physiology”²⁰¹ considering the general historical conception

¹⁹⁷ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 263.

¹⁹⁸ Hales & Welshon, *Nietzsche’s Perspectivism*, p. 131.

¹⁹⁹ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 270.

²⁰⁰ Nietzsche, F. *The Gay Science*, p. 212.

²⁰¹ Emden, C. J. *Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness and The Body*, p. 110.

of the term “society.” So, Thiele’s assertions that for Nietzsche, “consciousness is an anti-individualistic development” and it is “the effect of herd existence” seem to be agreeable, and thus consciousness is a feature of man’s “herd nature,” not of his “individual existence.”²⁰² As Nietzsche makes it clear:

Usually, one takes consciousness itself as the general sensorium and supreme court; nonetheless, it is only a means of communication: it is evolved through social intercourse and with a view to the interests of social intercourse – “Intercourse” here understood to include the influences of the outer world and the reactions they compel on our side.²⁰³

Concerning this social intercourse, Nietzsche remarks that “consciousness is a kind of ‘language’, a mediated and symbolic simplification and interpretative construction on the psychological event that it models, itself already an interpretation.”²⁰⁴ Emden puts a wide interpretation on this by noting that language, as a means of communication and thus as a medium of the herd, goes “hand in hand” with consciousness; and consequently, the so-called self, one of the so-called manifestations or aspects of which is consciousness, is an “inevitable or necessary rhetorical construction,” a “regulative fiction allowing ourselves relate to external reality and other people’s actions, thoughts, languages.”²⁰⁵ So, consciousness has been necessary in order for man to stay tied to his surrounding, although this has no reality further than the feeling of man being a part of the so-called external world and to stay in touch with it.

²⁰² Thiele, L. P. *Friedrich Nietzsche and The Politics of The Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism*, p. 36.

²⁰³ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 284.

²⁰⁴ Hales & Welshon, *Nietzsche’s Perspectivism*, p. 142.

²⁰⁵ Emden, C. J., *Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness and The Body*, p. 110.

Along with the aforementioned intercourse which is the basic factor in the “emergence of consciousness”, so-called necessity of consciousness is what causes the “internalization of drives” as Nietzsche calls it, which is “a term that describes the sequence of events in which we discovered that reliance on ‘regulating, unconscious, and infallible drives’ would have to be replaced with ‘thinking, inferring, reckoning, co-ordinating cause and effect’.”²⁰⁶ So, while on one hand “communication necessitates consciousness,” on the other hand Nietzsche repeatedly states that “ultimately growing consciousness is a danger; and whoever lives among the most conscious Europeans,” who “obliterate individual and repress animal, even knows that this is a disease.”²⁰⁷ The problem of consciousness, here, refers to the suppression of animal by the deflected realization of a necessity of establishing a cause-effect relationship between events through the faculties of mind – through thinking, inferring, reckoning, and co-ordinating as alluded above - instead of paying attention to the drives. This necessity of causal thinking which has developed consciousness in the sense it is thought to regulate those faculties of mind in relation to the subsisting order in the community or society which holds man in bounds for the sake of maintaining the so-called order in the society.

Thus, it can be inferred that, in one sense, in means of maintaining the order in society, consciousness was a consequence of man’s need [as an animal] “to calibrate” himself “against those with whom” he “comes in contact.”²⁰⁸ This way man guarantees his preservation against others. In Nietzsche’s words:

²⁰⁶ Hales & Welshon, *Nietzsche’s Perspectivism*, p. 167.

²⁰⁷ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 428.

²⁰⁸ Hales & Welshon, *Nietzsche’s Perspectivism*, p. 167.

As soon as one animal sees another, it measures itself against it in its mind, and man in barbarous ages did likewise. From this it follows that every man comes to know himself almost solely in regard to his powers of defense and attack.²⁰⁹

Thus, consciousness, as a manifestation of self, indicates the extent that man can know himself to, which is through his realization of environmental factors and since he needs to name this realization in order to define himself; partially, he calls it consciousness. In this context, Nietzsche states that:

Our perceptions, as we understand them: i.e., the sum of all those perceptions the becoming-conscious of which was useful and essential to us and to the entire organic process – therefore not all perception in general (...); this means: We have senses for only a selection of perceptions – those which we have to concern ourselves in order to preserve ourselves. *Consciousness is present only to the extent that consciousness is useful.*²¹⁰

So, while society is the primal factor in the development of consciousness due to language and communication, it is also the basis of suppression of man's drives in Western tradition, such as soul and spirit have been mentioned to be so.

3.2 Conclusion

To sum up, Nietzsche criticizes the way soul, spirit, and consciousness have been used to have reference to the consideration of self as something abstract in general, and he tries to indicate how this abstractness is man's own creation on the basis of language and society – which is bound up with culture and morality -. In this sense, the criticism's target is the common

²⁰⁹ Nietzsche, F. *Daybreak*, p. 134.

²¹⁰ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, pp. 274-275.

property of those concepts, which is the esteeming of the unseen and thus ignoring the physical. Moreover, those concepts in their Christian-moral meanings are working against man's nature, because they are considered to be responsible from man's reward-worthy existence in the actual world in order to deserve an existence in the world beyond.

CHAPTER 4

THE EMBODIMENT OF NIETZSCHEAN SELF

In this chapter, the idea that body is the ground to be human will be discussed as the core issue and the plurality of body will be tried to be manifested in terms of drives and language.

4.1 Body

Zarathustra has claimed that

[t]he awakened, the knowing says: body am I through and through, and nothing besides; . . .²¹¹

and he has claimed that the body is

[a] great reason, a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, one herd and one shepherd.²¹²

²¹¹ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 23.

²¹² *Ibid.*

In this context, Nietzsche's understanding of body can be said to be shaped around a manner of multiplicity, since while he claims that man is entirely body - referring to his previously explained criticism of abstract concepts of ego, soul, spirit, and consciousness -, at the same time he claims that the body is also a kind of plurality, embodying man's reason and all its contradictories - or drives in other words - without bringing out a hierarchy between itself and reason.

In other words, for Nietzsche, the traditional mind-body distinction cannot be said to be a considerable problem since he conceives the mind not as ontologically distinct from the body.²¹³ Instead, as Hales and Welshon have already stated and as have been indicated in Chapter 1, Nietzsche's stress on the importance of the body might be closely related to the *Bundle Theory*²¹⁴ of the self which paves the way for the explanation of the body in terms of a unity of forces or entities which are not merely biological. Thus, Nietzsche thinks that "persons are more than mere bodies."²¹⁵ This should not be understood as in contradiction with what has been denoted from the mouth of *Zarathustra* that the man is entirely body, since man's bodily existence should be contemplated together with his act of reasoning and with his conflicting drives, and in that case so-called contradiction would disappear. Solomon's explanation of the mind from Nietzschean stance as a "convergence of forces, 'a mass of passions flowing off in different directions'" has quite a manner with the Bundle Theory, and he clarifies that there is no hierarchy between reason and body by inclining that the mind is not a "peculiar place; it is not inside of anything."²¹⁶

²¹³ Hales & Welshon, *Nietzsche's Perspectivism*, p. 149.

²¹⁴ Was explained in detail in Chapter 1.

²¹⁵ Hales & Welshon, *Nietzsche's Perspectivism*, p. 170.

²¹⁶ Solomon, R. C. *Living with Nietzsche: What the Great "Immoralist" Has to Teach Us*, p. 73.

Deleuze explains Nietzsche's consideration of the body in a similar way. He states that the body is defined by the relation between existing quantities of forces which are "in a relation of tension between one another" rather than as "a field of forces or a nutritive medium in which a plurality of forces quarrel" since there is no "medium" or no "field of forces."²¹⁷ Likely, for Janaway, Nietzsche conceives the body "as a collectivity, a multiplicity of cells and organic functions, bound together by a fluctuating set of quasi-social power relations."²¹⁸ Lingis approached the matter with a similar attitude, considering Nietzschean understanding of body as a multitude of forces rather than of atoms.²¹⁹ So, from Nietzschean stance, the body itself should be considered as the tension or relation itself between those forces; not as a place which shelters those conflicting forces. Nietzsche's main intention here is to explain the body as a multiplicity without causing it to be apprehended as something merely related to physicality, but instead indicating how it is primarily related to man's existence in general.

Del Caro defines the body as the "container or carrier of the mind," but this should not be understood as the body is enclosing the mind. Here, Del Caro seems to mean "body's senses, instincts and its unique physicality in relation to environment" - that can be counted as the alluded forces in relation to each other - which come together and form a "new empowerment or authority,"²²⁰ considering his implication that Nietzsche has a view that human beings should be brought back to a state at which

²¹⁷ Deleuze, G. "Active and Reactive" in *The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation*, p. 80.

²¹⁸ Janaway, C. "Nietzsche, The Self, and Schopenhauer" in *Nietzsche and Modern German Thought*, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (London; New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 131.

²¹⁹ See Lingis, "The Will to Power" in *The New Nietzsche*, ed. David. B. Allison (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985, c1977), pp. 37-61.

²²⁰ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 430.

they achieve a “grounded, embodied, self-affirming existence” which corresponds to “the expansion of humanity’s capacity to feel greater respect for all life forms and earth.”²²¹ In other words, such existence Nietzsche has in mind is possible by man’s *realization of his body’s nature as it is* - explained as its senses, instincts, and its physical uniqueness as an interactive multiplicity within nature or environment -, without trying to modify it through suppressing moral sanctions evolved through history.

Nietzsche mainly accuses Christianity for man’s alienation from himself, for ascribing erroneous or perverted meanings to their instincts and thus to their body, since Christianity has taught to “mortify and repress the flesh” through its *inhuman*²²² teaching of morality, so that man was “divided and alienated from his very humanity,” meaning to be abhorrent from his body and thus from his instincts in the first place.²²³ For this reason, humans are more susceptible to error than animals are for Nietzsche, since humans are wedged between their “physical pleasure and displeasure” because of the moral regulations enfolding their life.²²⁴ Their physical pleasure is supplied by their instincts, very same as the animals; their displeasure is caused by their suppression of instincts for the sake of so-called moral or social order. This is closely related to the problem of consciousness, as already been discussed in section 3.1.2, that the “repression of the animal by the most conscious Europeans”²²⁵ makes way for the development of consciousness, thus the nature of man [as an animal] is ignored by such formulated herd

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² Here, this term is used to indicate Nietzsche’s harsh criticism on Christianity in an efficient way, emphasizing his despair for mankind’s wretchedness born of Christianity and mankind’s becoming of another breed - by the modifications brought up by Christianity - which is sick and harmful to the entire world, even to himself.

²²³ Huskinson, L. *Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in The Union of Opposites*, pp. 28-34.

²²⁴ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 429.

²²⁵ Also see section 3.2.1.

instinct under the name of consciousness, inherited from those *conscious Europeans*. In Nietzsche's words:

They despised the body: they left it out of the account: more, they treated it as an enemy. It was their delusion to believe that one could carry a "beautiful soul" about in a cadaverous abortion – To make this conceivable to others they needed to present the concept "beautiful soul" in a different way, to revalue the natural value, until at last a pale, sickly, idiotically fanatical creature was thought to be perfection, "angelic," transfiguration, higher man.²²⁶

Here Nietzsche means the Christian societies by "they," and points out the Christian moral values which do not reckon the body and treat it as a corpse, ignoring the instincts and senses and asserting that this way a higher being in terms of [beautiful] soul is arisen. In the following passage, Nietzsche explains this despising of the body as the ignorance of the Christians on physicality, and their wrong conception of soul or spirit which are thought to be in its purest and highest form when deprived of the body and the bodily. As they have evaluated instincts and everything physical with respect to the restrictions brought about by the moral regulations within their societies, the lowest degree of instinctiveness received the highest respect in the ladder of morality whereas it was the sign of sickness for Nietzsche as he mentions below:

Ignorance in *psychologics* – the Christian has no nervous system - ; contempt for, and a deliberate desire to disregard the demands of the body, the discovery of the body; the presupposition that this is in accordance with the higher nature of man, that it must necessarily be good for the soul; the systematic reduction all bodily feelings to moral values; illness itself conceived as morally conditioned, (...).²²⁷

²²⁶ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 131.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*

Del Caro explains that, from Nietzschean stance, the development of spirit also seems to be a matter of the body, like that of consciousness, “since it is the history and it is becoming sensible of the fact that a higher body is forming.”²²⁸ This is observable in man’s eagerness to know much about nature, considering Nietzsche’s implication that it is body’s ultimate desire to perfect itself. Nietzsche’s reference to perfection goes hand in hand with his consideration of spirit as representative of the *soul of the humanity*²²⁹, which is simply man’s endeavour to perfect himself through creating his own world and values anew within his nature. And the changes to be made on this aim of perfection are reflected through consciousness and its evaluations – in terms of the linguistic and the instinctive -, also through all kinds of pleasure and displeasure.²³⁰ Here, pleasure and displeasure seems to be referring to man’s realization of the depravation of the established Western values and feeling of displeasure against this situation on one hand, and on the other hand, his feeling of pleasure due to his realization of his power to be able to change this situation in favour of himself within his nature. Because, as Lampert notes, all values are rooted in the body, even when they are transcending the body or diminishing its worth and all values are human creation controlling human affairs.²³¹ Thus, this is more than a matter of the human being; it is a matter of overcoming of man himself in order to break free from sickly moral order of Western tradition and achieve the healthy state of man as he mentions that:

²²⁸ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 429.

²²⁹ For further discussion of Nietzsche’s understanding of the soul and the spirit, see section 3.1.1.

²³⁰ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 429.

²³¹ Lampert, L. *Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (New Haven: Yale University Press, c1986), pp. 31-32.

More honestly and more purely speaks the healthy body, the perfect and perpendicular one; and it speaks of the meaning of the earth.²³²

This meaning of earth, as Solomon suggests, can only be achieved through the creation of ourselves and through the invention of new values but he emphasizes that, for Nietzsche, the activity of creation always takes place “in accordance with our inborn abilities and limitations.”²³³ He adds that through this self-creation, there is “no need of any problematic commitment to one or another kind of subject; neither any mysterious acts of will,” and man’s character would be manifested by his self-creation; in other words, by his cultivation and development.²³⁴

The reason Nietzsche explains this self-creation in terms of body and physicality because there lies the idea of the multiplicity of the self in the center of his claims. To achieve this multiplicity, first he needed to subvert the established meanings of the concepts which have been used to refer to self ambiguously. Moreover, as Abel states in *Die Dynamik*, the body acts as the actual basis of interpretation together with the mutual support of man’s efforts to interpret the world, self, and the others.²³⁵ Due to this mutual relationship, body seems to be the interpreting act; thus, it can be inferred that it is the ground to be human.²³⁶ In this sense, as Müller Lauter suggests, physiology serves the basic change in human being, where the basic change is what Nietzsche calls “cultivation,” in opposition to

²³² Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 22.

²³³ See Solomon, R. C. *Living with Nietzsche: What the Great “Immoralist” Has to Teach Us*, pp. 74-79.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 430. Also see Abel, G. *Die Dynamik Der Willen Zur Macht und Die Ewige Wiederkehr* (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984).

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

morality, which is necessary for “constructing a new body capable of creating a new soul.”²³⁷

Creating that new body capable of creating a new soul, which is the soul *Zarathustra* aims at developing in opposition to the perverted Christian soul, necessitates becoming “fully conscious of his body” like *Zarathustra* has done, and it also necessitates making “good use of it.”²³⁸ Making good use of the body should not be understood as a “bodily hedonism” or a “surrender to passions,” since *Zarathustra* rather admonishes a kind of discipline which encloses the “transcendence of body” in his own way of understanding through the “mastery of its inclinations for the good of mankind.”²³⁹ In this sense, regarding Huskinson’s interpretative comment on Nietzsche that “we are no more than the natural ‘inner occurrence’ of primitive and sublimated bodily desires,”²⁴⁰ *Zarathustra* seems to be aiming at teaching and preaching of the transformation of “private passions into service for mankind.”²⁴¹

In this context, those private passions [drives in other words] and language will be discussed in the following sections as the two basic forces in relation from Nietzschean point of view, via which the body is considered as the “self” in terms of multiplicity.

²³⁷ Lampert, L. *Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, pp. 31-32. Also see Müller-Lauter, W. *Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions and The Contradictions of His Philosophy*, forw. Richard Schacht, trans. David J. Parent (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, c1999).

²³⁸ Huskinson, L. *Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in The Union of Opposites*, pp. 28-34.

²³⁹ Lampert, L. *Nietzsche's Teaching : An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, pp. 31-32

²⁴⁰ Huskinson, L. *Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in The Union of Opposites*, pp. 20-28.

²⁴¹ Lampert, L. *Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, pp. 31-32.

4.1.1 Drives

Man is a “multifarious, mendacious, artificial and opaque animal; uncanny to other animals, less by strength than by cunning and cleverness”; and man is “the only species intelligent enough to alter the conditions of life on earth” thus “the only species dangerous enough to destroy ourselves and the earth” through his “inventiveness in the area of morals” which is the distinctive factor between man and animal rather than “strength or physicality”.²⁴² As a consequence of mankind’s suffering of its own thoughts, “a state of completion, wholeness and regeneration” is lacking in humans who have been averted and “physically obstructed” by their “cognitive apparatus” - by which the source of moral regulations are meant – and their suppressed, “inwardly turned instincts.”²⁴³ Jaspers expresses that ‘the suppression of drives alters the condition and essence of human beings’ as “all instincts turn inward when deprived of outward discharge.”²⁴⁴

The suppression of “instincts or drives or emotions or desires”²⁴⁵ was a consequence of philosophical tradition which has always conceived philosophy to be the business of reason, since “emotions have been considered alien if not enemies to reason” and “Nietzsche saw the history of humanity consisting of the war on the passions and a passionate life.”²⁴⁶

²⁴² Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 402.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 401-410.

²⁴⁴ Jaspers, K. *Nietzsche: An Introduction to The Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, p. 130.

²⁴⁵ “Nietzsche’s use of “drive, passion, emotion, and desire” interchangeably embodies “a rich theory of the multiplicity and complexity of the motives of human behaviour.” See Solomon, R. C. *Living with Nietzsche: What the Great “Immoralist” Has to Teach Us*, pp. 74-79.

²⁴⁶ Solomon, R. C. *Living with Nietzsche: What the Great “Immoralist” Has to Teach Us*, pp. 70-73.

Rather, he thought that the “evil passions” should be consented to breed naturally since, otherwise virtue would not be possible²⁴⁷; and the “extirpation of evil impulses” would not only make the evil perish, also the good would perish, too.²⁴⁸ In Nietzsche’s words:

Once you had passions and named them evil. But now you have only your virtues: they grew out of your passions . . . Out of your poison you brewed your balsam; . . .²⁴⁹

Here Nietzsche seems to approach the subject ironically, referring to the man’s spoiling of his animal instincts by means of what he calls “culture,” which means “making a tame and civilized animal, a domestic animal of the human” today.²⁵⁰ In this sense, the consideration of the conception of soul from Christian-moral point of view and culture is directly related to the negative role attributed to drives. Thus, the emergence of the conception of soul as a consequence of suppression of instincts alluded above, is also a consequence of man’s co-existence with culture, since making of a tame and civilized animal as culture aims at necessitates the repression of his drives. This way, the soul is being attributed a sublimated role, a discrimination from the bodily. It is treated as the core of man’s being, whereas bodily desires and passions are said to dim its transcendence. Likewise, as Hales and Welshon states, the “redirection of *drives*,” which were born of the impact of moral sanctions of the society, and “whose objects were originally external,” brings a new “intentional

²⁴⁷ Hollingdale, R. J. *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, c1999), p. 160.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

²⁴⁹ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 25.

²⁵⁰ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 407.

object” into being - *the self or I* ²⁵¹ - and against that being a feeling of struggle against it dwells in. ²⁵² This struggle is mainly a consequence of the privilege attributed to the soul, because for the sake of achieving the purest transcendence, man is opposed to himself, to his own nature, in the endeavour to ignore his drives which are taught him in the name of culture as they are improper regarding the order of society.

Thus, Nietzsche considers culture as being “established by a separation (meta-phor) between the instincts (the ‘body’) and thought or expression. And such separation is a consequence of man’s consideration of himself as he is at a higher level in his “false ordering of rank regarding animals and nature.”²⁵³ Such false hierarchy arranged by man is a sign of his endeavour to cover himself up under morality “like a disguise,” and this has resulted with man’s becoming of a “sick, crippled animal.”²⁵⁴ That is why priests are to be considered as “essentially dangerous forms of existence of the human being” according to Nietzsche, since they are the primal clan who hold great hostility toward the senses and instincts and thus toward the body.²⁵⁵ This is closely related to the conception of soul in Christian tradition, since it is believed to be the basis of the difference between man and animal emanating from its transcendental identity which will open the doors of an afterlife for men according to the degree of their suppression of drives under cover of morality.

²⁵¹ Here it should be noted that the use of self does not seem to correspond to Nietzsche’s understanding of the self. It is more likely to be in the meaning of “subject,” which is used synonymously with “I” or “ego” in this dissertation. For further discussion, see Chapter 3.

²⁵² Hales & Welshon, *Nietzsche’s Perspective*, p. 167.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

According to Nietzsche, instead of masking man's predatory character as an animal, which has "no moral disguise," instincts must be "reinstated" and they must be "externalized rather than being internalized;" senses should be used "to affirm the external (real) world" rather than to be "denied and mortified," and "instead of positing humans in opposition to nature and world, they should be attuned to being in nature."²⁵⁶ With respect to this, as Jaspers points out, Nietzsche sees the humanity in need of following the insecure and naturally dangerous new path guided by *Zarathustra* and he speaks of that kind of man as the man "who is not yet sustained within a stratified society and who must find the source of his ties within himself."²⁵⁷ Because, only this way man could escape the "sick nature of bad instincts" which have been "accumulated from generation to generation" and only this way can they become "domineering, unreasonable, and interactable."²⁵⁸ Otherwise, when a drive is transformed into a more intellectual form, a new name for it is required with "a new stimulus and a new value," and the latter form of the drive is often in contradiction with the former state,²⁵⁹ and consequently, this contradiction causes the sick nature alluded above. Thus, for Zarathustra, healing that sick nature of humanity is healing its instincts in the highest priority.²⁶⁰

In this context, Del Caro explains Nietzschean understanding of the condition of *healthy* man as preserving the animal in himself and by this

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁷ Jaspers, K. *Nietzsche: An Introduction to The Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, p. 157.

²⁵⁸ Lackey, M. "Killing God, Liberating 'The Subject': Nietzsche and Post-God Freedom", *Journal of The History of Ideas*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (October, 1999), p. 746. Also see Nietzsche, F. *The Gay Science*, pp. 225-226.

²⁵⁹ Huskinson, L. *Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in The Union of Opposites*, pp. 11-19.

²⁶⁰ Lackey, M. "Killing God, Liberating 'The Subject': Nietzsche and Post-God Freedom", p. 746.

preservation, Nietzsche means the endeavour to “embody the contrast between human and animal” and only this way man could “create the ‘great soul’²⁶¹ who is truly creator and creation.”²⁶² Huskinson undertakes Nietzsche’s embodiment of the contrast between human and animal as “a moderated collaboration of Apollonian and Dionysian instincts,” stating that this is his seeking of the “whole individual,”²⁶³ which contains both bestiality and rationality.²⁶⁴ So, for Nietzsche, irrationality is not prior to the rational when Nietzschean understanding of the self is spoken of, but he is trying to unify the two.²⁶⁵

In conclusion, Nietzsche criticizes the conventional approach to the drives or instincts, which has led to the necessity of the suppression of them in relation to the despising of the physical. Because, regarding this situation, the conception of self seems to have arisen as another being than the morally acceptable one, and man perceives this self as something he should be on guard against by the faculty of his reason and by the impact of soul, spirit, and consciousness factors [which have been created by man - although man believes that they have been already existent - in order to regulate or bridle the drives-oriented side of man] as alluded in previous sections. Though, Nietzsche tries to indicate how those drives are inseparable from man’s being, or self, and how this self is the only being

²⁶¹ Here Nietzsche’s understanding of the multiplicity of self is indicated in contrast to the Western/Christian consideration of the conception of soul as something immanent; neither created nor creating.

²⁶² Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 402.

²⁶³ Huskinson, L. *Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in The Union of Opposites*, pp. 11-19.

²⁶⁴ See Fink, E. “Nietzsche’s New Experience of World” in *Nietzsche’s New Seas*, pp. 203-219.

²⁶⁵ Huskinson, L. *Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in The Union of Opposites*, pp. 11-19.

man can achieve - there is no other transcendental being designed for the so-called another world.

4.1.2 Language

In this section, language will be discussed as an embodiment of Nietzschean self although it will be stated as a human creation which have arisen out of man's need to communicate. What makes it crucial at the point of embodiment of the self is its practical role in explaining the artificial *moral* world and its concepts developed by grammar. So, language has both a negative and a positive role; negative in the sense that it is the basis of the criticized concepts, positive in the sense that without language it would not be possible to speak of body or physicality in reference to self.

The impact of language cannot be disregarded in man's despising of the body - despising of nature in a more extensive saying -, since, as have been discussed in previous sections, Nietzsche assigns man's herd instinct and his forming of societies due to that instinct - which was injected into him by Western value judgements - as the primal reason of his accusation of his body and his nature. Thus, establishing communication through those societies could only be fulfilled by language. Del Caro explains this as one's necessity to use the same words for the "same species of inner experiences" which can only be based on common experiences.²⁶⁶ By those common experiences, Nietzsche means culture in general, so language alone cannot said to be a factor of communication. It is a meaningful factor only in the same culture and in the same society. Del Caro carries on pointing at Nietzsche's explanation in *Beyond Good and Evil*:

²⁶⁶ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 114.

This is why a people in a community will understand each other better than they understand people belonging to other groups, even when they all use the same language. Or rather, when individuals have lived together for a long time under similar conditions (of climate, soil, danger, necessities, work), there *arises* something that “understands itself”- a people.²⁶⁷

And this understanding of each other is crucial in a society since language “is a process of abbreviation” enabling the “fastest possible communication” at the moment of danger.²⁶⁸ Thus, language is a need in the society due to man’s instinct of self-preservation. In a likely manner, Lackey claims that humans were compelled to turn to language in order to survive, for being the most endangered animal being in need of constructing a system of communication through which they were “empowered to outsmart the other, more threatening beasts.”²⁶⁹ Thus, as a “utilitarian device for survival,” language functioned as “a bridge between human beings” while it also paved the way for the invention of the concepts such as consciousness, soul, spirit.²⁷⁰

So, besides being a need of society to survive, language is an artificial product which is not limited by only the aim of survival. This is obvious in men’s use of language differently when referring to the things on earth and when referring to the beyond, as Del Caro has stated, and he denotes that man uses a “more positive semantics when speaking of the beyond.”²⁷¹ In this context, he points at Nietzsche’s claim that man shows a disdain against *all closest things*, whereas he esteems the further and the “most

²⁶⁷ Nietzsche, F. *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 163.

²⁶⁸ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 114.

²⁶⁹ Lackey, M. “Killing God, Liberating ‘The Subject’: Nietzsche and Post-God Freedom”, pp. 750-751.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁷¹ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 77.

important things” which are not even genuine.²⁷² This seems to be stemming from what Nietzsche is said to be criticizing from the beginning of the dissertation, from Western tradition which has taught that body and bodily are vicious, so that men are directed to the abstract by the judgement that corporeal is perverting. Nietzsche accuses priests and metaphysicians for making men tag along their “hypocritical and exaggerated language”²⁷³ which is the origin of the emergence of man’s depreciation of the earth and considering it as a place of humiliation.

In this manner, “men are seduced by the grammar of the language they speak,” Danto suggested.²⁷⁴ In other words, men considered their own creation of the abstract concepts - which were discussed in Chapter 3 as the so-called manifestation of the self - as immanent entities; and they believed that the world was being described properly by their attributions; although the world, as they consider it, was in fact only “a reflection of the structure of their tongue.”²⁷⁵ This is bound up with man’s strong inclination to dominate nature; because, where man cannot dominate nature, he destroys it with his “drive to create metaphors” and this inevitably “results in the construction of a ‘second world’ that is controllable and lasting in comparison to the fleeting world of images which are not processed into concepts by *animals*.”²⁷⁶ Animals are referring to *men* here, since without the creation of metaphors and thus without the construction of that second world, men are in the state of animal because Del Caro states that “the basis of our humanism is language.”²⁷⁷

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 107.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁴ Danto, A. *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, p. 84.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁶ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 424.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

The aforementioned process, through which the images are transformed into concepts, is the “forming of metaphors” which is the “fundamental drive of human beings,” since otherwise it would not be possible to form a second world which can be manipulated by men themselves, a world which is “the much maligned world of appearance” as Nietzsche characterizes it; in other words, it is the “world that *concerns*” men.²⁷⁸ Del Caro seems to refer the second world as man’s concern instead of the actual world he lives in, since the creating of metaphors aims at holding onto the belief of such world.

Haar approaches to the matter of grammar considering “proper names,”²⁷⁹ the identity of which and that of the self are reduced, by the Nietzschean approach, to an “interchangeable mask” inseparably connected with the “universal Game” that is defined by Haar as the “indefinite shifting of masks.”²⁸⁰ This is obvious in Nietzsche’s use of the words soul, spirit, and consciousness interchangeably with the words ego or subject as have already been discussed in Chapter 3. Though, such shifting is ambiguous in method since there are no pre-defined rules designating the mode of shifting in Nietzsche’s use of those words. Instead of defining such shift in terms of rules, Nietzsche explains the origin of language as follows [which

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

²⁷⁹ See Reimer, M. (2003), “Reference”, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta [Internet]. Available from <<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reference/>> [Accessed March 27, 2008]: “Proper names are paradigmatic referring expressions. Expressions like ‘George W. Bush’, ‘Barcelona’, and ‘Mount Everest’ are thus to be counted as proper names. What do these expressions have in common? In virtue of what do they constitute a *genuine class* of linguistic expressions? They are *syntactically simple* expressions that refer, or at least purport to refer, to *particular* objects/individuals. Thus, ‘George W. Bush’ refers to a particular man, ‘Barcelona’ refers to a particular city, and ‘Mount Everest’ refers to a particular mountain. And even though it is questionable whether expressions such as ‘Santa Claus’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes’ *actually refer* to anything at all — there can be no doubt that they at least *purport* to refer: to Santa Claus and Sherlock Holmes, respectively. They thus count as proper names for present purposes.”

²⁸⁰ Haar, M. “Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language” in *The New Nietzsche*, ed. David B. Allison (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985, c1977), p. 35.

has also been quoted in the previous chapter, discussing the conception of ego]:

Language is assigned by its emergence to the time of the most rudimentary form of psychology: we become involved in a crude fetishism when we make ourselves conscious of the basic premises of the metaphysics of language, in plain words: of *reason*. *This* is what sees doer and deed everywhere: it believes in the will as cause in general; it believes in the 'I', in the I as being, in the I as substance, and *projects* the belief in the I-substance onto all things – only then does it create the concept of 'thing' . . .²⁸¹

Thus, Nietzsche's use of proper names interchangeably does not occur within a method because it is a psychological situation; it is related to the belief in the doer and the deed. As he explains further:

We set up a word at the point at which our ignorance begins, at which we can see no further, e.g., the word "I," (...): - these are perhaps the horizon of our knowledge, but not "truths."²⁸²

So, the considered doer and deed distinction is just satisfying the need of man to hold onto a belief of order of the world, and as Nietzsche implies,

. . . [w]e read disharmonies and problems into things because we think only in the form of *language* – and thus believe in the "eternal truth" of "reason" (e.g., subject, attribute, etc.). *We cease to think when we refuse to do so under the constraint of language*; we barely reach the doubt that sees this limitation as a limitation.²⁸³

In this context, we believe in the "eternal truth of reason" because we see in everything a subject and an attribute; and, if we attempt to deny this, we

²⁸¹ Nietzsche, F. *Twilight of The Idols*, p. 18.

²⁸² Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 267.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

would have denied that we are thinking – in terms of language. Here Nietzsche seems to make an allusion to Descartes' claims on the relationship between the realization of man's existence and the activity of thinking;²⁸⁴ and men think that the eternal truth would set them free in the other world, without even recognizing that this is a limitation already.

Thus, considering Nietzsche's understanding of the self within multiplicity and instability, language would not be sufficient in the explanation of continuous change of the self and the use of concepts with an ambiguous interchangeability would cause discontent in the man of today, the man of the society, of the herd. In Nietzsche's own words:

Linguistic means of expression are useless for expressing "becoming"; it accords with our inevitable need to preserve ourselves to posit a crude world of stability, of "things," etc.²⁸⁵

This means that man does not feel safe where he cannot find stability, therefore language is insufficient in explaining "becoming"²⁸⁶ of the Nietzschean self. For example, the use of concepts such as soul, spirit, etc. and attributing distinct properties to those concepts in the name of the self limit the meaning of self and this way create stability. Thus, it is obvious that what would bring us to the becoming of the self Nietzsche points out is the understanding of multiplicity and it is not possible to place this understanding neither in a linguistic nor in a grammatical form.

²⁸⁴ For further discussion, see Chapter 2.

²⁸⁵ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 380.

²⁸⁶ This term is used to indicate the never-ending process that Nietzsche states the self should be in, meaning "self-overcoming." For further reading, see Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, pp. 88-90.

4.2 Conclusion

In this chapter it has been discussed that Nietzsche's approach to body is mainly consistent of his criticism of the distinction of mental and physical since the latter is being humiliated due to that distinction. Because, for Nietzsche, the body is related to man's existence in its totality; it is neither mere physicality nor an isolated physical sphere where only physical activities take place. The alluded humiliation also mainly stems from the distinction of mind and body, which results in the opposition of moral regulations of Western culture and the demands of drives or instincts, although the former is not a natural occurrence but man's own designation. Consequently, the conception of self in Western tradition excludes man's bodily existence and in this chapter it has been tried to indicate how Nietzsche sets his face against this exclusion and how he reintroduces body in the account of self considering the factors of drives and language.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The basic aim of this dissertation was bringing up Nietzsche's consideration of the conception of self as a multiplicity, which cannot either said to be purely physical or mental regarding Nietzsche's criticism of the *despisers of the body*²⁸⁷. In this sense, the dissertation focused on analysing what can said to be constituting one's true self from Nietzschean stance, with respect to his opposition to an inwardly self whose existence is not dependent on the body. In order to do that analysis, a historical picture of the development of the conception of self was given in the first place. Later, the concepts which have arisen during that historical period and which have been used to refer the modes of self were discussed due to Nietzsche's criticism of those concepts. Lastly, Nietzsche's approach to the conception of self was analysed considering his thoughts on body and physicality and their primary inclusion in the conception of self without placing it into a different place than where man's so-called soul, spirit, consciousness, or thoughts in general, take place.

Nietzsche criticizes the epistemological activity from Socrates to Kant, which is for him an attempt to "secure certain foundations of knowledge,"

²⁸⁷ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, pp. 22-24.

because he thinks that it has “enslaved man to the world” in terms of its moral and grammatical order, for the sake of “discovering fixity and stability of meaning.”²⁸⁸ This eagerness for such discovery stems from man’s existence in society and thus from his herd instinct which fashions his language and consequently his so-called consciousness as he feels dependent on communication within the herd, in other words, within society. Regarding this, Nietzsche rejects that psychological events such as the herd instinct are epiphenomenal, meaning that they are not dependent on consciousness [as they were conventionally believed to be], and thus he rejects the “primacy and causal efficacy of consciousness.”²⁸⁹ By rejecting this, Nietzsche aims at emphasizing the role of body in the constitution of thought and emotion and emphasizing his denial of the “diachronic identity of the self,” so that the “multiplicity of the body and its states” would not be threatened by the “unity [thus hegemony] of consciousness.”²⁹⁰ Because, that unity and the belief in a conscious self are illusions stemming from man’s “grammatical habit of using ‘I’.”²⁹¹ In this manner, he also criticizes the act of thinking to be designated as something proving the existence of I, handling the issue from the opposite perspective as follows:

People used to believe in “the soul” as they believed in grammar and the grammatical subject: people said that “I” was a condition and “think” was a predicate and conditioned – thinking is an activity, and a subject *must* be thought of as its cause. Now, with admirable tenacity and cunning, people are wondering whether the reverse might be true: that “think” is the condition and “I” is conditioned, in which case “I” would

²⁸⁸ Ansell-Pearson, K. J. “The Exoteric Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche”, *Political Theory*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (August, 1986), p. 499.

²⁸⁹ Hales & Welshon, *Nietzsche’s Perspective*, p. 149.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

be a synthesis that only gets *produced* through thought itself.²⁹²

Thiele explains that grammatical habit in relation to the belief in the doer and the deed in terms of the successive role of language: “Without grammar, language is impossible. Without language, culture is impossible.”²⁹³ So, grammar underlies man’s belief in causality and thus his belief in “ultimate purposes,” due to the relationships between subjects and predicates; and consequently, “the unconsciously accepted and employed rules of grammar serve as the preparatory exercise for man’s belief in a lawlike universe subject to divine, metaphysical, or natural principles.”²⁹⁴ On the other hand, for Nietzsche, as men form their own *earthly* values of creation, earth becomes an associate in that creating activity so it is no more considered to be a mere product.²⁹⁵ This appears to be closely related to Nietzsche’s consideration of the self, as he is criticizing the concepts which used to indicate the varying parts of the self separately for his predecessors of Western tradition in the sense that those concepts were supposed to be existent independently of the self, as have been discussed in Chapter 3, and instead, he claims that those concepts should be considered as practical entities introduced by the use of language and as a multiplicity in terms of self which is preserving its authenticity for every man *sui generis*²⁹⁶. Thus, Nietzsche denies the understanding of self as something dependent on pre-existent concepts – such as soul, spirit, or

²⁹² Nietzsche, F. *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 49.

²⁹³ Thiele, L. P. *Friedrich Nietzsche and The Politics of The Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism*, p. 109.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁵ Del Caro, A. *Grounding The Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth*, p. 151.

²⁹⁶ This phrase in Latin means “of its own kind.” See Merriam-Webster Online. Available from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sui%20generis>.

consciousness – which have been already there unquestionably before every man’s existence. In Nietzsche’s own words:

You creators, you higher man! One is pregnant only with one’s own child. Do not let yourselves be misled and spoon-fed! Who after all is *your* neighbour? And even if you act “for your neighbour” – still you do not create for him!²⁹⁷

So, Nietzsche denies the self to be considered as an ontological fact or an originary cause.²⁹⁸ He considers such understanding of the self as “a fiction, or rather as a linguistic phenomenon;” instead, he perceives the self as dispersed among the “multitudinous languages that constitute it, and that it constitutes.”²⁹⁹ In other words, Nietzsche suggests that we must consider the self together with the sum of its acts and with their contents and that “the deed is a fiction and the doer is ‘a second derivative;’” because “each subject is constituted not simply by the fact *that* it thinks, wants and acts but also by *what* it thinks, wants and does.”³⁰⁰ In a likely manner, Dewey underlines a theory of self from Nietzsche’s point of view which does not consider the self as something always “there and then,” and which does not fashion a firmly set self, as he remarks that he wants to emphasize “*the notion of a working or practical self* against that of a fixed or presupposed self.”³⁰¹ Thus, it can be said that Nietzsche reduces the self to the “totality of its actions”³⁰² without perceiving them distinctly from the self itself.

²⁹⁷ Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, pp. 236.

²⁹⁸ Hassan, I. “Quest for The Subject: The Self in Literature”, *Contemporary Literature and Contemporary Theory*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Autumn, 1998), p. 425.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 426.

³⁰⁰ Nehamas, A. “How One Becomes What One Is”, *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 92, No. 3 (July 1983), p. 398.

³⁰¹ Dewey, J. “Self-Realization as The Moral Ideal”, *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 2, No. 6 (November 1893), pp. 653-654.

³⁰² Nehamas, A. “How One Becomes What One Is”, p. 389.

In this manner, Nietzsche emphasizes the role of drives and every bodily sensation in the constitution of self in opposition to the previously stated theories of the self which claimed that the self was constituted of abstract concepts. Here, it should be noted that Nietzsche's denotation of self as a constituent of drives and bodily sensations is not leaving the act of thinking or thought itself out of this constitution. But the point is that, he is considering thought, or any other abstract conception such as soul and spirit, as embodied in man's physicality. Regarding the passage below, it is obvious that Nietzsche is not denying such concepts totally, and that he is aware of the complication in the situation.

A single individual contains within him a vast confusion of contradictory valuations and consequently of contradictory drives. This is the diseased condition in man, in contrast to the animals in which all existing instincts answer to quite definite tasks.³⁰³

The reason of the complication, according to Nietzsche, arises due to the consideration of the self within Western moral society that is corrupted and perverted by the ascetic ideals of the Judeo-Christian tradition which turned man into a "torture chamber," a "pinning and desperate prisoner," sick of himself.³⁰⁴ Thus, man comes to hate his body and his bodily demands because of what that tradition has taught him; and, as a result of this hatred, man places the abstract above all other corporeal things.

So, Nietzsche's understanding of the embodiment of abstract concepts such as soul, spirit, and consciousness – without attributing them identities separately over the body - can thought to carry the apprehension of the substrata of the self as ambiguous and undefined with it, thus the "atoms of the community-of-the-self" [referring to the multiplicity of it] seem to

³⁰³ Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, p. 94.

³⁰⁴ Hassan, I. "Quest for The Subject: The Self in Literature", p. 426.

remain essentially unknowable.³⁰⁵ Here, it should be noted that the “atoms” of the self refer to the basis of the self, which cannot be determined or designated, and for Nietzsche it cannot even be said that there are such atoms forming the self. Thiele expresses the various names given to the forms of self as the “molecules”³⁰⁶ formed by those atoms, which are used inconsistently. Thus, the transcendental subject alone, without taking the body into account forming such a multiple understanding of the self, for Nietzsche, cannot be an overall account of the self.³⁰⁷

Apparently, Nietzsche’s consideration of the self is mainly founded on his criticism of his predecessors and the Western moral tradition which has shaped the philosophical approach to the concepts which were thought to define the self. To this aim, the concepts were treated individually, as independent existences from each other and from the self, without even considering the physical attributes of man, and they were ascribed transcendental values due to the prospected conferment awaiting man in a world beyond, due to his actions whether they are morally coherent or not. Regarding this, Nietzsche’s attacks on the despisers of the body can be said to be indicating his main criticism on the issue that man should not be apprehended as a fragmented being; he should not be imprisoned to those transcendental values set forth by his own kind; thus, in one sense, also by himself due to his obedience. Because, by such imprisonment, man comes to deny his own drives as an animal, and he is stuck between the states of being an animal and being a human being, where being human is made to be understood in a perverted way by the Western tradition.

³⁰⁵ Thiele, L. P. *Friedrich Nietzsche and The Politics of The Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism*, p. 54.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁷ Janaway, C. “Nietzsche, The Self, and Schopenhauer” in *Nietzsche and Modern German Thought*, p. 122.

To sum up, Nietzsche appears to draw an account of self which cannot be said to be dependent on a single concept or several concepts where each have different roles. Instead, he draws an account of self which can only be understood in terms of multiplicity, considering man as both an abstract and a corporeal existence none of which have priority over the other and which can be better apprehended by the practical use of each without ascribing exact definitions to them in terms of defining the self.

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