SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF MEGA-EVENT HOSTING:
OLYMPIC HOST AND OLYMPIC BID CITIES

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submitted by **SERTAÇ ERTEN** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy in City and Regional Planning Department, Middle East Technical University** by

Prof. Dr. Canan Özgen _____
Dean, Graduate School of **Natural Applies Sciences**

Prof. Dr. Melih Ersoy _____
Head of Department, **City and Regional Planning**

Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli _____
Supervisor, **Department of City and Regional Planning, METU**

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Ayda Eraydın _____
Department of City and Regional Planning, METU

Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli _____
Department of City and Regional Planning, METU

Prof. Dr. Gencay Şaylan _____
Department of Public Affairs, European University of Lefke

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özcan Altaban _____
Department of City and Regional Planning, METU

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ela Babalık Sutcliffe _____
Department of City and Regional Planning, METU

Date: January 08, 2008

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Sertaç Erten

Signature:

ABSTRACT

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Erten, Sertaç
Ph.D., Department of City and Regional Planning
Supervisor, Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli

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The aim of this dissertation is to provide a new perspective to the analysis of mega-event / host city relationship. The significance of the research subject depends on the interest in hosting mega-events such as the Olympic Games and the World Fairs, which generate a competition among cities. Turkish cities are recently being involved in this competition. In addition to that, mega-events have large-scale and long-term impacts on the built environment, which has not been thoroughly discussed in urban studies. The methodology which is based on a qualitative analysis comprises three steps: a historical analysis made on the Olympic host cities, and two case studies. The first case is Athens as the 2004 Olympic city, the second case is Istanbul as an Olympic bid city since 1990. This study recognizes but qualifies the concept of mega-event hosting. It is shown that mega-event hosting is a capacity-building process, whilst it has a potential to generate overdose investments problem in the built environment. The most significant conclusion of the study is that the ability of coping with this problem is correlated with the ability of absorbing the investments made.

Key words: mega-event, mega-sports event, mega-event hosting, physical capacity-building, over-capacity problem, absorption capacity, Olympic Games, Olympic host city, bidding, Olympic candidacy.

ÖZ

DEV ETKİNLİKLERE EV SAHİPLİĞİ YAPMANIN MEKANSAL ANALİZİ: OLİMPİYAT KENTLERİ VE OLİMPİYATLARA ADAY KENTLER

Erten, Sertaç
Doktora, Şehir ve Bölge Planlama Bölümü
Tez yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. İlhan Tekeli

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Bu tez çalışmasının amacı, dev etkinlikler ve onlara ev sahipliği yapan kentler arasındaki ilişkiye yeni bir bakış açısı getirmektir. Araştırmanın önemi, giderek daha çok kentin Olimpiyat Oyunları, Dünya Fuarları gibi dev organizasyonlara ev sahipliği yapmak istemeleri, bunun için yarışmaları ve bu yarışta Türk kentlerinin de yer almaya başlamasıdır. Ayrıca, dev etkinlikler kapsamında kentlere büyük çaplı yatırımlar yapılması, kentsel araştırma konusudur. Yöntem olarak, Olimpiyat ev sahibi kentlerinin tarihsel analizi ile iki alan araştırmasını içeren nitel bir çalışma geliştirilmiştir. Alan araştırmaları, biri 2004'te Olimpiyatlara ev sahipliği yapmış Atina, diğeri 1990 başından itibaren Olimpiyatlara dört kez üst üste aday olmuş İstanbul üzerinde yapılmıştır. Araştırmanın sonucunda, dev etkinliklere ev sahipliği yapmanın bir kapasite inşa süreci olduğu ve bu sürecin kapasite fazlası altyapı yatırımları problemi doğurma gücü olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Araştırmanın en önemli bulgusu, bu problemle baş etme becerisi, kentlerin bu yatırımları hazmetme becerileri ile ilişkili olmasıdır.

Anahtar sözcükler: dev etkinlik, dev spor etkinliği, dev-etkinlik ev sahipliği, fiziksel kapasite inşası, kapasite fazlası altyapı problemi, hazmetme kapasitesi, Olimpiyat Oyunları, Olimpiyat kenti, yarışma, Olimpiyat adaylığı.

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Dedicated to Cüneyt Koryürek

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AC : Absorption Capacity

ATHOC : Athens'2004 Organising Committee

DPT : State Planning Organisation (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı)

GSGM : General Directory of Youth and Sports (Gençlik ve Spor Genel Müdürlüğü)

HDK : Olympic Preparation Committee (Hazırlık ve Düzenleme Komitesi)

HOC : Hellenic Olympic Committee

IAAF : International Athletics Federation

IF's : International Federations

IOC : International Ollympic Committee

İSKİ : İstanbul Water and Sewage System Unit (İstanbul Su ve Kanalizasyon İdaresi)

NOC's : National Olympic Committees

NTUA : National Technical University of Athens

OAKA : Athens Olympic Sports Centre

OCP : Over-capacity problem

ORSA : Organisation for the Master Plan and Protection of the Environment of Athens, Ministry of the Environment, Planning and Public Works

PCB : Physical capacity-building

TMOK : Turkish National Olympic Committee (Türkiye Milli Olimpiyat Komitesi)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF MEGA-EVENT HOSTING

1.1. INTRODUCTION

Cities have been eager to host large-scale organisations and events beginning from the first half of the 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s. At present, mega-events are idealised as great opportunities to undertake urban development operations, which are becoming more and more difficult to operate with everyday resources of cities. Mega-events can be distinguished from smaller events -such as routine conferences, or celebrations- by the remarkable amount of resources that go into their implementation and the physical legacies for host cities. Frequently, in the years prior to a mega-event, the host city will witness exceptional rates of construction activity.

In case of mega-sports events, sports venues have a great potential to rehabilitate the area they are built. Cities that have inadequate sports facilities could use mega-sports events to strengthen their capacities, as well. However, there are many cases that the facilities and venues built specific to one mega-event might come up with the problem of maintenance and utilisation in the post-event period, which stands as an important urban planning and design problem.

A certain level of infrastructure is required for mega-sports events. The city is to possess a well-established transportation and communication network, a certain level of accommodation capacity, adequate sports venues …etc. In the case of the Olympic Games, there is an international non-governmental body called the International Olympic Committee (IOC), which owns the rights of conducting, promoting and regulating the modern Olympic Games. This institution selects Olympic host cities in

accordance with its selection criteria. These criteria describe the level of *capability to host* the Olympic Games.

The IOC asks for cities to have a certain level of this capability when applying for hosting. And it assumes that the cities fitting to the selection criteria will be able to be candidates, and theoretically the best one will be selected as the host city of those Games. When the committee selects the host city, the city has almost 7-year period to complete its weak points in order to fulfil the criteria.

In brief, a city is to build a physical, organisational and institutional capacity in order to host an international sports event. In case of the Olympic Games, physical capacity-building is very important since huge structures are constructed specifically for the organisation. On the other hand, these structures might remain idle in the post-event period or might be a financial burden for the municipality or the government. Therefore, mega-event might leave negative legacies for host cities. Nevertheless, the level of this spatial problem depends on the city's demographic characteristics such as city size, rate of population growth, demographic structure…etc. These characteristics are different in developed and developing regions. In this context, the study will try to draw a conceptual framework to the given issues.

1.2. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

The study will seek to bring forth a new perspective to the analysis of mega-event / host city relationship. It will try to answer the question of what kind of urban processes that mega-events generate once they are hosted. It will also analyse spatial requirements of mega-events, and their positive and negative legacies to host cities. The study will question the process of meeting these spatial requirements, urban problems that might be faced either after mega-event hosting or in a mega-event bidding, and the role of the city characteristics in coping with these problems that mega-events create.

Today many Turkish cities have been in such a competition that they try to host different kinds of large-scale and mostly international events. The scale varies: from an international NGO meeting to a global sports event. Istanbul, the largest city of the

country, has long been eager to host mega-events. This study's starting point is the questioning of Istanbul's interest to host the Olympic Games, which was substantiated by four-time Olympic candidacy of the city.

This study finds its legitimacy on the processes given below:

- At present, more and more cities are eager to host mega-events.
- Mega-events are important because they have a great impact on the built environment once they are hosted. Not only hosting but also bidding to host for a mega-event affects the built environment.
- The majority of the existing mega-event literature has concentrated on positive impacts of mega-events on host localities, while few has studied negative spatial impacts and has developed a theoretical framework on mega-event hosting.
- Therefore, any research on mega-events will have a considerable practical value as well as theoretical value in the field in case a coherent conceptualisation is made.

The study has a claim of developing a conceptualisation for mega-event hosting. In order to achieve it, the Olympic Games and the Olympic host cities will specifically be analysed. The in-depth analysis of Athens as the 2004 Olympic host city will give clues about the correlation between pre-event processes and post-event urban problems. The analysis of the Olympic bids of Istanbul on the other hand will provide a framework for evaluating lessons learned from Athens case and Istanbul's potentials to overcome urban problems that might be generated in case of mega-event hosting.

1.3. LITERATURE REVIEW ON MEGA-EVENTS

The review of the literature includes various studies made on and around the concepts of mega-event and mega-sports event. The studies made on the field could be grouped under three main sets (see fig. 1.1). First, there are contextual studies that evaluate the mega-event phenomenon from a larger perspective. Second, there are studies that make definitions on the mega-event phenomenon. Third, there are

studies concentrating directly on mega-sporting events and their relation with host cities/countries.



Figure 1.1: Sub-sets of the literature on mega-events.

1.3.1. Contextual Evaluation of Mega-Events

These studies concentrate on relations between mega-events and dynamics of global economy and its relation with localities. Research within this field can be classified into three groups. The first group of studies interprets mega-events as processes that are engendered by global capitalist system's requirements. There are studies that concentrate on transnational corporations (TNC's) that have significant impacts on decision-making processes of major sports events (Silk & Andrews 2001). Silk and Andrews (2001) claimed that World Cup has become a battle for brand supremacy between certain brands dominating soccer market. They underlined the institution of sponsorship and its domination over sports events, which are gradually turning into be an arena for transnational growth strategies.

Along the same line, Bourdiaeu (1996) evaluated the Olympic Games as a product, which is subject to the capitalist logic and its powerful international institutions such as sponsorship and TV rights. Ley and Olds (1988) pointed out that mega-events can best be understood as instruments of hegemonic power. Some other studies evaluate the process from a class-based view. Harvey (1989) and Debord (1983) specified the mega-events as urban spectacles, which are powerful instruments of social control and unification for the class-divided society. It deconstructs the formation of common

consciousness of working class in order to struggle with capitalism. According to Harvey (1989), they can also be used as a tool for urban regeneration, as they give the host city the opportunity to product a new and exciting image of itself.

The second group has a concern of positioning cities in a hierarchical framework and the event of Olympic Games is seen as a tool for stepping forward in this ranking. According to this group of studies, cities can be studied as part of a global, rather than national or regional urban hierarchy (Short *et al.* 1996). The studies of World City Study Group can be given as an example of this approach. Short *et al.* (1996) suggested a number of criteria that can be used to identify the position of cities in the global ranking. Beside some certain indicators like being major financial centres, telecommunication nodes, transportation nodes, and having corporation headquarters, they added the condition of being sites of global spectacles to these criteria. Their explanation depended upon the argument that global spectacles like the Olympic Games are important arenas for corporate sponsorship and advertising and an important way for cities to gain global recognition. Thus they represent cultural aspects of globalisation and hosting or bidding for the Olympic Games would be an indicator in global positioning.

The third group of study derives from the concepts of local entrepreneurship and local economic development. Key words are inter-urban competition, place-marketing and new consumption patterns. Urry (1995) evaluated mega-events as globalised forms of cultural flows, which produce cultural homogenisation. Culture is visualised and local identities and cultures are packaged for global visitors (ibid.: 152).

Hahn and Lee's (2001) study reviews Seoul Metropolitan Government's responses to two mega-events (1988 Seoul Olympics and 2002 World Cup). They stated that mega-event hosting cities are required to make several strategic decisions. The Olympic Games had a significant effect on spatial organisation and sport infrastructure of the city in the 1980s, the 2002 World Cup aims at using the existing physical capacity with a further strategy of improving city's global position and turning it into an entrepreneurial city.

The concept of *"entrepreneurial city"* stemmed from the dissolution of nation-based territorial economy and the emergence of competitive localities in the new global economy, and this generated an increase in interest for hosting mega-events (Harvey

1989: 260). Robins (1993) drew a general framework that localities seek for being involved in inter-urban competitiveness, and this covers strategies of attracting mobile investors (TNC's), consumers (tourists) and spectacles (sports and media events). Particular strategies are selected and developed in order to be competitive. Cochrane (1995) stated that place-based competitive entrepreneurial initiatives are important because every city wishes to become a global player.

In order to enhance city's image in worldwide scale, local authorities tried to promote local values for place-marketing. Sport has itself become a strategy for economic development via place-marketing for many cities. Especially in the UK, localities are encouraged to develop their own leisure policy. Cochrane *et al.* (1996) examined Manchester's Olympic bidding process as an example of new urban politics, which points to the shift from welfare politics to entrepreneurial business leadership. They pointed out the coalition of interest in the case of a mega-event hosting, which is expected to bring several revenues to those of local power structure. They tried to exemplify what such a bidding process comes to mean for a local government. With the help of elite networking, in a form of public-private partnership, the city of Manchester had aimed to shunt up the urban hierarchy, which is currently dominated by a small group of cities.

In relation to leisure-based tourism development, Bramham (2001: 286) gave the examples of Leeds, Manchester and Sheffield, which are yesterday's industrialised and today's post-Fordist cities. Beginning from the 1990s, local government of Leeds, encouraged by the New Right central government, has worked on leisure policies, concentrated mainly on sport, art and historical heritage. The growing interest in sport led sport strategies in Leeds to exceed other policies.

Loftman and Nevin (1996) studied three British cities as well, Birmingham, Sheffield and Manchester, which have tried to adopt new local economic development policies in response to global economic restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s. They wrote in their article that these cities have used meso-scale and large-scale events as pro-growth strategies of local regeneration and restructuring. With the collaboration of public and private sector, the cities have gained new global images and new economic opportunities.

Shoval (2002) questioned the importance of hosting mega-events in terms of creating a positive image for attracting investment to the city. His questions focus on the bids of New York and London for the 2012 Olympic Games, since these cities are two significant cultural centres, leading urban tourism destinations, and global cities as command and control centres. So, he added, they lack the usual justifications for wanting to host the Games. They already have global recognition, image and infrastructure. At the end of his analysis, he concluded that these cities are bidding for such events because despite their important economic position, they are fearful of competition from other European and American cities and they want to keep and improve their position in the hierarchy of the world's cities. As sports are increasingly becoming an important part of the urban economy, these cities try to develop their sports industry.

In Turkey too, three cities, Istanbul, Izmir and Antalya, made an informal bid for hosting Formula Grand Prix in the year 2005, which would bring a new image for the city on an international platform. Local powers together with private sector initiatives and other local actors wish to create conditions that are favourable for growth. It is what Logan and Molotch (1987) call as *"Growth Machine Theory"*, which is a conceptualisation of place in relation to different interest groups and their profit-seeking behaviours.

In brief, the literature proposes the term *mega-event strategy*, which refers to the cities' efforts to obtain a better economic base in consumption-based development via constructing either convention centres or sports facilities (Andranovich *et al.* 2001). On the other hand, mega-event strategy might entail greater risk than a typical consumption-based development project because *"it requires a city to obtain the external event, and stage it in such a way as to achieve the city's goals of attracting sponsors, tourists and positive publicity"* (ibid. 116).

1.3.2. Definition and Classification of Mega-Events

Early studies on mega-events dating back to the 1970s focused on the field of tourism event and their classification based on duration (i.e. short-term or long-term events…etc.) and status (i.e. prestige, hallmark…etc.). Later studies of the 1980s extended to include events, within which the distinguishing character was size or scale (Roche 1992). In the 37th Congress of the Association Internationale d'Experts Scientifiques du Tourisme (AIEST) on the theme of mega-events and mega-attractions, the definition of mega-event was made with *"the degree of presence or absence of touristic developments and/or the tradition of hosting visitors"* (Jeong 1992). Travis and Croize (1992) indicated in the conference that mega-events should be defined in terms of the scale of visitor numbers and 500,000 visitors/participants is the lower limit or minimal requirement (ibid.: 9).

Ritchie (1984 cited in Roche 1992), one of the first researchers on mega-events, offered a definition and classification of mega-events (he called them *hallmark events*), types of impact, and types of variables that might be measured as indicators for each type of impact (See Table 1.1). Hallmark events, wrote Ritchie, can be defined as *"major one-time or recurring events of limited duration, developed mainly to enhance the awareness, appeal and profitability of a tourism destination in a short and/or long term"* (ibid: 577). Such events rely for their success on uniqueness, status, or timely significance to create interest and attention.

Built upon Ritchie's definition, Getz characterised mega-events as being *"those that yield extraordinarily high levels of tourism, media coverage, prestige, or economic impact for the host community or destination"* (Wong 2000). Their volume should exceed one million visits, their capital costs should be at least $500 million and their reputation should be of a *"must see"* event. His method of evaluation was based on *overnight stays*, which was the indicator of the proportion of visits made by interstate or international travellers (Jeong 1992). His classification depends on six major categories of planned public events (see Table 1.2). He called them as hallmark event,

> "…a recurring event that possesses such significance, in terms of tradition, attractiveness, image, or publicity, that the event provides the host venue, community, or destination with a competitive advantage" (ibid: 7).

Table 1.1: Ritchie's classification of mega-events, source: Jeong (1992: 14).

Classification	Examples and Location
World fairs/expositions	Knoxville'82, New Orleans'84 Expo'67/ Montreal, Vancouver'80
Unique carnivals and festivals	Quebec Winter Carnival/Quebec City Stampede/Calgary
Major sports events	Summer Olympics/Los Angeles 1984 Winter Olympics/Calgary 1988 World Cup Soccer/Spain 1982 Marathons/Boston Grand Prix Racing/Monza
Significant cultural and religious events	Oberammergau/Germany Papal coronation/Rome Royal Wedding/London
Historical milestones	Anniversaries, Centennials, Bicentennials, Royal weddings
Classical commercial and agricultural events	Royal Winter Fair/Toronto, Wine Purchasing/France, Floriade'82/Amsterdam
Major political personage events	Presidential inaugurations, Funerals of head of state, Papal visits, Major political leadership conventions

Table 1.2: Getz's classification of mega-events, source: Judith 2000.

Classification	Examples
Business / trade	- Fairs, markets, sales - consumer and trade shows - expositions - meetings and conferences - fund-raiser events
Cultural celebrations	- festivals - carnivals - religious events - parades - heritage commemorations
Art / entertainment	- concerts - other performances - exhibits - award ceremonies
Recreational	- sport competitions (professional / amateur) - recreation (games and sports for fun / amusement events)
Educational / scientific	- seminars, workshops, clinics - congresses - interpretive events
Political state	- inaugurations - investitures - VIP visits

These two classifications might be partially misleading; because today, the attributes according to which classification was made are intermingled. It is very hard to categorise mega-events within this perspective, since they are planned and activated in a mixed way most of the time. Cultural and artistic events are specifically used as sub-components of major sports events and expos. Contemporary mega-events display a mix of exhibition and performance at the same time.

Jago and Shaw's classification of events demonstrates a tree-shape model, within which each concept stays within an upper-level concept (see fig. 1.2). There is a *"set of things"* and within this set, concepts take place with their only one feature. The problem of this classification is that it declines the possibility of a minor event becoming a hallmark event under contingent conditions.



Figure 1.2: Jago and Shaw's event framework, source: Fredline 2000.

Maurice Roche (1992, 2000) considered mega-events as a sub-class under public events, and he described three events that can be defined as "mega": The Olympic Games, the World Fairs (Expos) and the World Football Cup (See Table 1.3). He described mega-events as;

> "…large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance" (Roche 2000: 1).

As his study focuses on the contribution of mega-events to the construction of public culture in modernity, the attributes leading to classification are related with this cultural context, such as target attendance, type of media interest…etc. He analysed the mega-event phenomenon as dense social eco-systems and social calendars. His

grouping of mega-events depends on levelling the events in accordance with their scale of significance. The Olympics, the Football World Cup, specialist trade fairs and expos, some cultural events, such as Cannes Film Festival, being the most visible and spectacular examples, take place in world-level international events (Roche 2000: 3). There are also the "world-regional"-level versions of these events, which might be regional sports games, or continent-based cultural/ commercial events.

Roche (2000) also pointed out a personal level, within which people periodise of their biographies in relation to identifiable and memorable great events. He argued that mega-events provide inter-generational cultural reference points and *"thus relate to the identity problems facing people in contemporary society"* (ibid: 235).

Table 1.3: Roche's classification of public events, source: Roche (2000: 4).

Type of event	Example of event	Target attendance/market	Type of media interest
Mega-event	Expos Olympics World Cup (Soccer)	Global	Global TV
Special Event	Grand Prix (F1) World Regional Sport (e.g. Pan-Am Games)	World Regional/ National	International/ National TV
Hallmark Event	National sport event (e.g. Australian Games) Big City Sport/Festival	National Regional	National TV Local TV
Community Event	Rural Town Event Local Community Event	Regional/Local Local	Local TV/Press Local Press

Roche (2000) in this way expressed the features of mega-events as *temporal* and *cultural* markers. He suggested that mega-events could be seen as important cultural networks and movements, as well as being temporal and spatial hubs. Inspired from the studies of Castells, he suggested the term *"event-as-hub"* in order to emphasise the contemporary role of mega-events within the world of flows.

In the conclusion report of the conference called Transport and Exceptional Events, held by European Conference of Ministers of Transport-ECMT (2002), mega-events were described as exceptional public events, emphasising the increase in mobility requirements. According to this report, exceptional public events can be broadly classified by:

- Spectator capacity: an open or restricted capacity event (in a stadium), or a single- or multi-site event; alternatively, they can be classified by size, i.e. the number of spectators per day.

- Duration: one day (horse show), two to three weeks (Olympic Games), or several months (such as Universal Exhibitions).

- Location: a single or multi-site event, in a town centre or the outskirts, in a specific location or all along a selected itinerary.

In this classification, mega-events are seen as extra agglomerations to the existing physical patterns. Emery (2001: 92) argues that a sports event can be called major sports event when a sporting championship organised by the appropriate governing body of the sport and attracting a minimum of 1 000 spectators.

Up to this point, researchers suggest different definitions and classifications for the concept of mega-event. In these approaches, mega-events are conceptualised as external phenomena to host cities, of which particular characteristics are not taken into account. Kammeier's (2002) approach provides a more extensive approach in this respect, since his suggestion is to combine the characteristics of the mega-event with the properties of the place that hosts (or is eager to host) such a large-scale event. These characteristics are city's population size, resource base, previous experience with mega-events, adaptive institutional structure. He claimed that this kind of an analysis will provide us to outline strategies to cope with the *pulsar effects* that are generated by mega-events in host cities.

According to Kammeier (2002), mega-events are an issue of urban management, and in order that planners are able to cope with pulsar effects of mega-events, they should take into consideration the whole phases of mega-event hosting, pre-event, event and post-event period. Kammeier underlines four-phases that have to be handled by good management:

- Phase 1: The time before and around the city's application for being a host of the mega-event and its commitment to create the required facilities in time. This phase (and the time long before the application) must include a serious capacity analysis and pre-investment studies centred around the expected

demand and supply functions. Without such 'dry runs', the preparation for the event in the short Phase 2 would hardly be sufficient.

- Phase 2: The preparations for the additional infrastructure and services required to host the event itself (sports arenas, e.g.) and to cope with the additional demand (hotels, housing, transport, communications, e.g.); this includes planning, financing and implementation of all measures.

- Phase 3: The management of the event itself; and

- Phase 4: The long-term management after the 'hand-over', including post-event adjustments (such as dismantling temporary buildings and winding up ad-hoc services).

Kammeier (2002) gives a particular interest on demand and supply aspects of infrastructure and services. He states that both temporary and permanent supply measures must be employed to cope with the peak demand during the event. In order not to end with over-supply at hand once the event ends, the infrastructure that is beyond the long-term demand of the city must be built in temporary structures (see fig 1.3). He adds that the phases 1 and 2 are at least as important as phases 3 and 4.



Figure 1.3: Supply and demand aspects of a large-scale event and its pulsar effect, source: Kammeier (2002)

Hiller (2000b) on the other hand, makes a distinction between the terms special event and mega-event *"from the perspective of an urban analyst"*. According to him, any large-scale special event can be considered as a mega-event if it has a significant and/or permanent urban effect:

> "…that is if it is considered so significant that it reprioritizes the urban agenda in some way and leads to some modification or alteration of urban space which becomes its urban legacy…A special event becomes a mega-event for a city when it intervenes in the normal functioning of the city to mobilize resources for event preparation and event hosting." (ibid: 183)

The key factor in mega-event definition according to Hiller (2006) is significant alterations in the built environment. Along with this definition, Rio Carnival is not a mega-event since the structures are constructed temporarily in the city. There is no structural change in the morphology of the city in that case.

1.3.3. Research on Mega-Sports Events

With the rising interest in sporting organisations and decreasing significance of expos and fairs, mega-sports events have attracted more attention in terms of academic studies made on (Gratton *et al.* 2001). There can be defined three particular sub-sets in accordance with different focusing fields. These groups are not strictly divided, as they might obviously collide with each other in some cases.

1.3.3.1. <u>Tourism / Leisure Studies</u>

Considerable research exist on the relationship between mega-sports events and tourism. Early studies discussing the mega-event phenomenon in a general perspective have come out from this subject area. The studies of Getz (1991), Ritchie (1984), Hall (1992, 1997) and Roche (1992) shaped the theoretical discussions on the concept of mega-event.

Tourism / leisure studies can also be evaluated as intermingled with the economic impact studies which had initially provided a justification for the tourism studies. In other words, studies on economic impacts or legacies of ephemeral events have been used to support tourism / leisure oriented research. Economic and tourism studies have later on turned into separate fields of study.

The study of spectacles became an important area of the tourism and leisure literature in the 1980s (Gratton *et al.* 2001). Event tourism is a term that was invented in the same decade, and it was mainly fed by Getz's studies (Wong 2000). Being the fastest growing element of the leisure travel market, event tourism receives a significant interest from researchers (Chalip *et al.* 2002). The major key words of the literature are place marketing (Roche 2000; Holcomb 1999; Ritchie & Hall 2000), image creation or re-imaging (Smith 2001; Holcomb 1999; Turner & Rosentraub 2002). They are sustained with the notion of new urban tourism, which superimposes onto the place marketing via new attractive and exciting land-uses in cities and/or urban renewal projects for historic sites that create sign value in addition to exchange and use values (Fainstein & Judd 1999; Fainstein & Gladstone 1999).

This new form of urban tourism is centred on the urban scene rather than historic monuments or other values (Sassen & Roost 1999). Holcomb (1999) stated that several strategies exist in the work of selling cities, and one important strategy for putting a city on the map is the staging of events. Landing the Olympic Games or a World's fair is a key to global recognition and consequently tourist attraction.

> "Tourism is intimately connected to the place marketing process because of the way in which it is often used as a focus by government for regional redevelopment, revitalisation and promotion strategies." (Hall 2001: 168)

Smith (2001) argued that the strategy of using mega-sports events as a means of image reorientation and tourism attraction has primarily been implemented by industrial cities. Their industrial character was a barrier for the evolution of their tourism industry, and this stimulated cities to find out more positive concepts and themes in order to attract capital and people. Hosting sporting facilities seemed to be the best way in promoting an industrial city, which was in the road of loosing its industrial power due to the changing economic structures. The British cities Sheffield, Leeds and Manchester are significant examples of sports-oriented local development strategy.

American cities have a longer history of using mega-sports events to attract visitors, residents and investors (Andranovich *et al.* 2001). Sports development has been playing an important role in the image of the city in the U.S. case. The absence of a sports team and sports identity is perceived to have a negative effect on a city's economic chances, primarily from tourism sector (ibid.: 116). Thus the activity of stadium construction has an entrepreneurial base in the U.S. cities. The increase in the share of sports stadiums, festival malls, convention and art centres in cities' budgets directed the study of Judd *et al.* (2003), which is based on a national survey over the U.S. The aim of the study is to find out how much American cities invest to build a local economies with tourism and entertainment component. The results of their study show that cities are following two strategies in this respect: developing and marketing local culture through events and festivals, and constructing a tourism/entertainment infrastructure composed of a mixture of facilities such as sports stadiums, convention centres, renovated waterfronts…etc.

Burton (2003) accepted that mega-sporting events such as the Olympic Games are catalysts for economic change especially in tourism, in case there are spatial strategies developed in order to have a good handling. The Sydney's success in tourism after the Olympics depends largely on a developed strategic plan for marketing, advertising and publicity.

Some studies have focused on the calculation of possible tourism impacts of mega-sports events to the host locality. One year before the Athens 2004 Olympics, Kartakoullis *et al.* (2003) made a study on the tourism impacts of this mega-event, and they projected an increase in international visitors which would last from 1998 to 2011. For this described period, the writers estimated an additional increase in tourism around 440 000 visitors annually, and an increasing employment by 32 000 annually. Some other studies have questioned the consistency of these calculations. Hall (2001) evaluated the quantitative analyses of the impact of mega-events mostly overestimated. Major indicators used in tourism impact studies are guest night accounts, foreign and domestic air traffic, accommodation development, occupancy rates of hotels…etc.

1.3.3.2. Economic Impact Studies

It is the largest sub-set of studies that focuses on economic impacts and broader economic studies of large-scale sports events. It used to be a part of leisure/tourism-oriented studies in the beginning, but it started to be discussed in a separate and broader base after the 1990s. The growing use of sports events as an economic development tool displays parallels with growing studies in this field.

As mega-sporting events are growing with larger media coverage and sponsorship, an increasing number of cities have started to be eager to host such events. Occasionally, today a number of studies are conducted on various economic effects of these events on host and eager-to-host cities. These studies function as justification of hosting mega-events since a great majority of them underlines post-event positive economic impacts of these organisations. It is interesting in this sense that no economic impact studies were found for the Olympic Games hosting, before the year 1984, the year that Los Angeles had a great economic surplus in Olympic hosting (Kasimati 2003). Beside these positive impact studies, few studies exist on critical evaluation of economic aspects of mega-event hosting.

There are studies that have expressions on economic boost of mega sports events on the host nation's or city's economy. Brunet (1995) studied on the economic effects of 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, experienced before and immediately after the event held up. The methods he used contained both comparative analyses of certain economic indicators (such as construction & building facilities, employment rates, urban transformation studies…etc.) and analyses of citizen/visitor/investor opinions. The study was in a search of total impact analysis of the Games.

Gratton *et al.* (2001) also mentioned about the role of major sports events in the economic regeneration of cities as well. They made an evaluation of six major events staged in various cities of Britain between the years of 1996 and 1999. The method they used was multiplier analysis, which covers the total amount of additional expenditure in the host city to a net amount of income retained within the city after allowing leakages from the local economy. They made a comparison across the six events' results. The result they obtained is that there is a wide variation across sports events in terms of their ability to generate economic impact in the host city. A

greater-in-scale event does not guarantee a greater revenue or positive economic impact.

Burton's Olympic Sydney study (2003) depends on bid cost, games cost, revenues obtained, and the term "success" is evaluated within this framework. Crompton (2001) argued that the most research effort was put on economic impact argument in studying benefits of hosting major sports events. But he argued that there are four more benefits, which may in the long run be greater than the immediate economic impact. There are increased community visibility, enhanced community image, stimulation of other development and psychic income.

Barton (2004) underlined a distinction between financial impact, which is a kind of budgetary issue of the organising committee, and the wider economic impact, which covers the effects of the mega-sports event on general economy, i.e. tourism, physical infrastructure…etc. He stated that full-economic impact of hosting the Olympic Games is spread over time, through pre-Games, Games and post-Games phases. According to Barton, the opportunity cost rather than direct cost should be considered, since the opportunity cost would be higher if the Olympic Games will not generate white elephants (misallocated and misused Olympic facilities in the post-Games period) with little lasting value to economy.

Major economic measurement tools used in these analyses are cost-benefit, input-output analysis, econometric models or multiplier calculations. Several other writers stated that the estimation of an economic impact was an inexact science, being very vulnerable to several methodological shortcomings (Chalip & Leyns 2002). Ingerson (2001) questioned the consistency of these estimation mechanisms of economic impacts, in which positive benefits are generally exaggerated (such as tourism, exposure, employment) and negative impacts are mostly ignored (such as vandalism, environmental costs, service fees, displacements). Matheson & Baade (2003) also agreed that the exaggeration of benefits tempted by a sports event might cause misinterpretations. The use of gross as opposed to net measuring, for instance, may fail in these terms.

Roche (1992a) stated that there is an optimistic tendency in measuring economic impacts, within which gross benefits are measured while broader socio-economic dynamics are not illustrated. According to him, economic impact studies generate a

de-contextualisation of mega-events, since in that studies little is said about the urban community context. Hiller (1998), as well, underlined the need to make a more comprehensive analysis of mega-event impacts by broadening the analysis by including a wide range of impact from a longitudinal perspective.

Mules and Faulkner (1996) stated that it is not always a guaranteed benefit to the cities that host the event. Staging major sports events often results in the city authorities losing money even though the city itself benefits greatly in terms of additional spending in the city. Horne and Manzenreiter (2004) questioned the large-scale sporting events regarding the gap between the forecast and actual economic impacts which indicate the power struggle for determining the meaning of mega-events between different actors. According to their study, pro-hosting advocates tend to project optimistic estimates, while anti-hosting groups articulate various concerns.

Few studies exist on economic risks and costs of such events in terms of the local and national budget. Wilkinson (1994 cited in Hall 2001) stated that mega-events may have a considerable impact on housing and real estate values, particularly with respect to their tendency to displace groups of citizens located in the poorer sections of cities. Cox *et al.* (1994) said that mega-events often had a detrimental effect on low-income people who are disadvantaged by a localised boom in rent and real estate prices. Ritchie and Hall (1999) agreed on the same concern by criticising the dominancy of economic impact studies that might hide such social costs of hosting mega sporting events.

Matheson and Baade (2003) pointed out the increasing voice of developing countries and their major cities in getting the right to host and consequently share the economic benefits of international sports organisations. But such regions face particular difficulties while hosting such events. They claimed that in most cases mega-sporting events are an even worse investment for developing countries than for industrialised countries. First, expenditure for infrastructure is much higher in developing nations. Second, the opportunity cost is higher. Third, post-event use of facilities is questionable due to the affordability level for sports and entertainment facilities. Last, attraction of spectators and fans is more difficult regarding affordability.

1.3.3.3. Spatial Analysis Studies

The interest towards mega-event in urban studies has started after the 1990s. The city of Barcelona -especially after the Olympic year of 1992- has taken specific significance in this set of studies, since it consists of considerable amount of urban intervention.

The majority of the literature under this sub-set is interested in post-event urban developments, while some studies exist in post-event use of sports venues, and some other in pre-event urban planning related with mega-sports event. Thus the majority of them holds the subject as a one-direction relationship. That is to say, there is a common understanding in these studies that mega-sports events affect host cities, which recalls a casual relationship. There are three subsets of the spatial analysis studies.

a. Studies on the pre-event phase of mega-sports event hosting: Few studies are made on the pre-event period of mega-sporting events and their host cities. They include mainly the bidding and preparing period for mega-events in order to host them, which generates urban planning and design projects, and construction facilities.

Hiller (2000a) studied Cape Town's bid for the 2004 Olympic Games and he asked two questions in this research: 1) What is the urban impact of the mega-events and in what way do they contribute to urban transformation? 2) How are mega-events legitimated in order to justify urban support? Cape Town's Olympic bid would contribute to the transformation of the city though its emphasis was on human development, aiming to contribute to the process of restructuring the apartheid city. In the beginning of the bid, there was a coordinated working with the planning departments, trying to use the Olympics as a driving tool of projected plans for the built environment and community. However in time, it turned into a form of place-marketing process in order to restore the private sector, Hiller stated.

Park's (2004) study aims at identifying factors contributing to mega-event city selection. The quantitative assessment phase of the screening process was tested using the 1994 World Cup as a case study. The assessment was conducted in two parts. First, variables identified as key criterion for assessing the potential of a city as a host site for a mega-event based on central place theory were analysed using multiple logistic regression analysis. Second, the selection of host cities based on the

proposed quantitative analysis was compared with the host cities actually selected for the 1994 World Cup. No significant differences were found between the theoretical city selection and the actual host city selection in 1994.

b. Studies on the post-event phase of mega-sports event hosting: The literature generally uses the term "legacy" in order to refer to what the mega-event leaves in the host city. There can be defined three major fields concerning legacy, as Cashman (2002) states. *Economic legacy* refers to the greater national and city-wide benefits such as increase in tourism or other economic activities, increase in employment...etc. Or, it may refer to negative lastings like offset cost and financial burdens. *Physical legacy* refers to the changes in the city's built environment as well as the post-event use of venues and infrastructures. *Public culture and sports legacy* point to improvements in sports culture and opportunities of establishments of new partnerships and new organisational bodies in the host location.

Research on the post-event period and urban planning/regeneration processes can be analysed under two sub-parts. First, there are studies that focus on general improvements in host cities' infrastructures and economic activities. Essex and Chalkley (2001) studied the modern Summer Olympic Games in terms of infrastructural implications in the host cities, and they defined four phases concerning the effect of the Olympics on changing and modernising the built environment. According to their study, the most successful Games, from an infrastructural perspective, have been those that have followed a long-term development plan for the major programme of investment and renewal. Olympics can be best used *"as a mechanism for "fast-tracking" and financing the development of associated infrastructure"*.

Essex and Chalkley (1998; 2001) evaluated the Olympics as catalysts of urban change. The Olympic Games, they wrote, gives out major new developments and enables plans to be fast-tracked through the planning and development stages. Hiller (2000b: 198), on the other hand, stated that mega-events can play a significant role in urban change in the long-term, but only in the context of other changes of redevelopment and revitalisation. Specific to the Olympic Games, Hiller (2000a: 445) added that they are catalysts for change, but it is merely among many catalysts for change. He stated that Olympic proposals are not independent but closely linked to existing programs, agencies and plans that direct urban change. According to Hiller,

the Olympics could only be developmental to the extent that there is a deliberate will to make them so.

Second, there are studies concentrating on post-event use of the purpose-built mega-event infrastructure once the event is over. Post-event use research has recently become very important, due to the increasing importance of sustainability and efficient use of urban space. Hiller (2004) studied Salt Lake 2002 and Calgary 1998 Winter Olympic Games in order to analyse which sports venue is used for which activity in the post-event period. His concern was how to relate the post-event usage of Olympic infrastructure to the urban process in the long-term.

Next to the legacy of sports venues, the host locality is stated to gain long-term legacies of wider transport and infrastructure improvements. City's technical capacity –possibly for further uses- does improve. On the other hand, overdose of venues might turn into a problem. The well-known example is the last Football World Cup, and its host nations of Japan and South Korea. Being away from a football culture, but also being very close to desires of hosting a mega-sports event and earning money, these two countries have had more than 20 gigantic stadiums, of which future use is problematic.

c. Studies on the whole process of mega-sports event hosting: There are few studies that evaluate the mega-sporting event hosting as an entity of three phases, i.e. the pre-event period, the event period and the post-event period. Hiller (2000b) made the most extensive analyses in this respect. He proposed a methodology of evaluating mega-events with urban sociological dimensions.

Hiller suggested a linkage model in order to disaggregate dependent and independent variables in the analysis of mega-events and their capacity to alter urban processes. First, he proposed a *forward linkage* which points out how the event itself is the cause of effects. The main concern here is to answer what the mega-event may create, such as infrastructure, employment, tourism…etc. Second, he put forth *backward linkages*, which refer to the background of objectives and interests should be analysed. Third, he suggested *parallel linkages* that refer to the urban processes that come along with mega-event hosting. They cannot be controlled and they are residual to the event itself. Such processes are linked to the mega-event but are related to many other

factors as well. City traffic or gentrification for instance may begin parallel to the Olympic project, without any consideration in urban planning.

According to Hiller (2000b), the focus in the mega-event analysis should be on the city, since the main concern is how the mega-event contributes to the process of urban change. This three-set analysis ensures that *"the mega-event is placed in its full urban context as an urban event rather than something that is parachuted in and then disappears"* (ibid. 192). To do so, he offered a longitudinal analysis which covers both pre-event and post-event phases of the mega-event host city.

Kammeier (2002) brought about a planners point of view to the subject, and he described such special events as generating *pulsar effect*[1] in urban development. His emphasis is on the issue of coping with special events regarding urban planning. He underlined in his article that planners must consider the preparatory phases as much as the "hand-over" or "aftercare" aspects of these events.

1.3.4. Evaluation of the Literature

Reviewing the literature, it was displayed that there are many valuable studies in the area of research. When analysing historical development of the research, it is seen that in the beginning the literature focused on positive impacts of mega-events on host locations, while in the following periods the interest shifted toward the concerns on mega-event hosting (see Table 1.4). In the 1970s, tourism and leisure studies became dominant and the interest concentrated on mega-events that have a power to attract masses like festivals, fairs, expos. Studies focused on tourism and economic impacts of mega-events in the 1980s. By that period, many cities had lost their industrial character due to the post-industrial structuration, which generated economic crisis in many cities. In order to cope with the problem, cities started to find out new economic sectors like tourism, culture and leisure. Cities used sports and cultural events as a tool for generating urban tourism.

Up to the 1980s, the meaning of hosting an event was shaped mainly by nationalist politics. Countries wanted to display their economic development and modernisation

[1] Pulsars are celestial radio sources producing intense short bursts of radio emission. Instead of being constant over time scales of years or longer, they consist of periodic sequences of brief pulses.

processes via hosting mega-events such as Olympics, or World Football Cup, or World Expo, as a declaration to the world. In time, economic burdens of these events have increased. However, in the early 1980s, the Los Angeles 1984 Olympic Games changed this situation due to the large revenues obtained from TV rights. It was realised that mega-events would be used not for showing development, but for making development. Due to the changes in the spatial organisation of production and consumption processes, metropolitan centres have become the new generators of economy. Thus the meaning of the mega-events has shifted from nation-level to global level. Mega-event literature has started to get shape by focusing on economic impacts of events on host cities.

The ultimate physical change of the city of Barcelona after hosting the 1992 Olympics played an important role in changing the direction of research towards *physical impacts of mega-events on host cities*. The main question of mega-event researchers have shifted towards this track: *To what extent a city might change via hosting a mega-event?*

The success of the Barcelona 1992 Games, which came up with the strategy of placing the Olympic project within the city's further strategic plans and ended up with the overcoming of the economic crisis and obtaining of a new economic position in the European geography, generated an enormous interest towards hosting the Olympics. Cities have prepared mega-projects in order to host large-scale events, and they have started building large-scale facilities specifically built for that of mega-event. Almost all cities being in competition to host mega-events –and a major part of the existing literature studying mega-events- have the same discourse that has generated from the Barcelona experience: *"Mega-events are catalysts of planned urban development and they have certainly positive physical legacies on host cities"*.

In the 1990s, issues of *global-local*, *entrepreneur city* and *inter-urban competition* attracted researchers, who conceptualised mega-events as local development strategies. The literature focused on positive economic impacts of these organisations to the host locations. With the data obtained by cost-benefit and input-output analyses, economic dimension of mega-event hosting was underlined.

Beginning from the second half of the 1990s, the research concentrated on urban regeneration / urban renewal fields. The most important factor in this new opening

was the effect of the Olympic Games on Barcelona which hosted the event in 1992 and experienced a great urban change. Urban studies became dominant while tourism, leisure and economic impact studies remained weak.

In the 2000s, urban studies became more popular, while a critical standing emerged against mega-event hosting due to the concept of *sustainability*. The research started to question mega-event oriented built infrastructure and they focused on key themes like *"legacy"* and *"post-event use"*.

Despite the evolution of the mega-event research in this respect, tourism and economic impact studies still have dominancy in the literature. Their research questions are formulated around the role of mega-events as potential repositioning factors of tourist destinations and the impact of mega-event hosting on tourism development. Table 1.5 displays the pattern of concentration of the mega-event literature. There are valuable studies on mega-sports events and the concept of being mega-event host city, the majority of which analyse post-event period of mega-event host cities. Many of them focus on Olympic cities and their spatial, economic and social evaluation after the organisation. In most studies, the issue is not evaluated as mega-event hosting, but as an event being held in a city.

Studies evaluating mega-sports event hosting as a whole urban process are few. The most important study in this respect is Kammeier's article on pulsar effects and Hiller's (2000b) article on forward, backward and parallel linkages, which correspond to the general concerns and research questions of this dissertation. Kammeier did not evaluate mega-event hosting as an external situation for cities. He stated that mega-event hosting is a reflexive process, which is shaped by host or bidding city's socio-economic, cultural, demographic and spatial characteristics. He also claimed that mega-event hosting should be analysed as a whole with its pre-event and post-event periods. Hiller, too, claimed that mega-events are not parachuted in urban spaces, then they should be analysed with an urban context with a longitudinal analysis that will cover the whole phases of mega-event hosting.

Table 1.4: Analysis of the mega-event literature in periods.

PERIOD	DOMINANT FIELDS OF STUDY	DOMINANT ISSUES	MAIN CONCERN	MODELS & METHODS	DEFINITION	THE MOST SIGNIFICANT MEGA-EVENT
1970s	Tourism / leisure studies	Tourism attraction	event tourism	Tourist destination data analysis, number of visitors	Hallmark event	World fairs/ EXPOs, festivals, carnivals, concerts
1980s	Tourism impact studies	Post-industrial city	Urban tourism	Quantitative analysis	Prestige event Tourist event	Meso-scale sports events
First half of 1990s	Economic impact studies	inter-urban competition, global-local,	Inter-national significance, local economic develop-ment	Multiplier calculations, input-output analysis, cost-benefit analysis, economic models	Urban spectacle	
Second half of 1990s	Urban politics Urban regeneration	Entrepreneurial city, pro-growth strategies, place marketing			Global spectacle Mega-event	Large-scale sports events Olympic Games
2000-…	Urban regeneration studies Architecture studies	Sustainability, safety, environmental quality, technology	White elephants Pulsar effect Olympic Legacy	Longitudinal analysis, case study	Mega-event	Olympic Games, World Cup

Table 1.5: Evaluation of the mega-event literature. Dotted cells indicate the areas of concentration of this study.

Categories of mega-events / Fields and Dimensions	Non-sports mega-events	mega-sports events
FIELDS		
CONTEXTUAL STUDIES (urban politics)		
CONCEPTUAL STUDIES (DEFINITION)		
tourism / leisure studies		
Economic impact studies		
Spatial analysis studies (urban and architectural studies)		
DIMENSIONS		
BIDDING + PREPARING (pre-event phase)		
LEGACY (post-event phase)		
LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF MEGA-EVENT HOSTING (whole process)		

Looking at the issues discussed in the field, many researchers have studied the post-Olympic period in terms of how mega-events have affected the host cities. A few researchers have focused on the bidding periods and spatial problems that host cities face with. Moreover, the existing literature is largely limited to the developed cities, while mega-events have been playing an increasingly outstanding role in the developing world, where many developing cities are pursuing bids to host especially international sporting events, like the Olympic Games.

The existing literature has been dealing with the questions of why cities want to host these events, what are the impacts of mega-events on host cities, and how cities develop strategies to obtain the chance of hosting these events. The main question of the existing literature can be summarised by *"what cities expect from mega-events?"*. This study will try to reconceptualise the problem, and it will try to make a spatial analysis of mega-event hosting by asking *"what mega-events expect from cities?"*.

1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the literature review, the research questions of the study vary from the previous work. The main differences can be counted as follows:

Table 1.6: Principal research questions of the existing literature and the proposed study.

Research questions of the existing literature	Research questions of the proposed thesis
- What is mega-event?	- What is mega-event hosting?
- What cities expect from mega-events?	- What mega-events expect from host cities?
- What are the responses of host cities to mega-event hosting?	- What can be the responses and strategies of bidding cities of developing countries in case of a mega-event hosting?

According to this framework, the study will ask derivative questions of these principal questions as well as re-answering the questions of the existing literature:

1. What is mega-event?

2. What is mega-event hosting? What kind of components does mega-event hosting have?

3. What are the spatial requirements of mega-event hosting? How do cities response to mega-event hosting? What kind of problems that cities come across in mega-event hosting?

4. What kind of potentials and strengths can be defined for mega-event bidding cities in order to cope with these problems?

5. Which kind of strategies can be recommended for bidding cities which are from developing regions, and especially for Istanbul for its further Olympic bids?

This thesis will seek to find new paths to the process of mega-event hosting of a city. The first question has been discussed in the existing literature, but it is required to re-evaluate the definition. The second problem rises from the definition of mega-event hosting, which has not been broadly discussed previously. The process of mega-event hosting comprises of different dimensions, like organising a complicated and large-scale event, constructing mega-event-purpose-built infrastructure and facilities, making promotion of the city …etc. This study will aim to propose a definition for mega-event hosting.

The third question will seek for the spatial analysis of mega-event hosting, which this study will specifically concentrate on. There will be an emphasis on the problems of mega-event hosting on cities. Generally these problems are economic burdens and post-event legacies of built facilities. Under-utilisation of mega-event purpose built infrastructure has recently been analysed in the existing literature, while the studies did not suggest a comprehensive framework for the problem. This thesis will find answers to the problems of use of mega-event investments. It will also look for the critical success and failure factors that affect the emergence of the problem of under-utilisation and misallocation of mega-event facilities.

The fourth and the fifth questions will aim to establish a new perspective for mega-event bidding cities that are from developing regions (and specifically for Istanbul), which will have different responses to mega-events and will have potentials to handle the spatial problems of mega-events.

1.5. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

This study is structured in eight chapters. The aim of this **Chapter 1** is to explain the purpose and the scope of the study as well as to make a literature review on the concepts of mega-event and mega-sports event hosting. The chapter aims to find out the gap in the literature and describe the research questions of the study.

Chapter 2 will draw a conceptual framework for the process of hosting mega-events. Underlining the conflicting nature of mega-events in terms of their physical requirements, this part is a questioning of large-scale installations, which are built specifically for a mega-event to be used for a short period of time, and their post-event integration into the everyday life of inhabitants of the host city. In the theoretical discussion, venue and facility construction for a mega-event is named as *physical capacity building*. This brings about the *over-capacity problem* in the post-event period. However, host city might absorb the created capacity, which will be called *absorption capacity*. The theoretical basis of the dissertation will be based on these three concepts.

Chapter 3 will propose a methodological framework in order to explain how the study will be conducted. In **Chapter 4**, the thesis will focus on the historical analysis of the Olympic host cities, in relation to what kind of spatial capacities were built in time, i.e., how the concepts of physical capacity building, over-capacity problem and absorption capacity have interrelated with each other and how their relationships had changed throughout the history of the Modern Olympic Games.

In **Chapter 5**, the Olympic experience of Athens will be analysed from the perspective of *physical capacity-building* and *over-capacity problem*. The analysis of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games in detail, the bidding and preparation processes and the construction of the Olympic-purpose built infrastructure, will demonstrate that the Olympic installations (sports venues and other facilities) might generate several question marks in the post-Olympic period and the chapter will question the reasons behind these problems.

Chapter 6 will focus on Istanbul's consecutive Olympic bids. The city has had 4 consecutive bids since the beginning of the 1990s, for the Games of 2000, 2004, 2008

and 2012. The chapter will go deeply through the Olympic story of Istanbul, the process of physical capacity-building in this manner, i.e., the construction of the Olympic Park and the Olympic Stadium, their relation with the whole city. After analysing the Olympic bid history of Istanbul, the chapter will discuss the relationship between *physical capacity building* and *absorption capacity*.

Finally, **Chapter 7** will discuss the three key concepts of the dissertation, by interpreting the results of the historical analysis and two case studies, Athens and Istanbul. The chapter will discuss the main findings of the research, its potential contributions to the field, the limitations of the study and recommendations for future work.

CHAPTER 2

A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR MEGA-EVENT HOSTING

2.1. INTRODUCTION: THE MEGA-EVENT PHENOMENON

This chapter will try to make a spatial analysis of mega-events regarding their potential of improving host cities' physical capacities in terms of transport, sports and large-scale venue infrastructure. They are built to meet the over-demand during the event, while they can also bring about a problem of over-supply in these facilities after the mega-event hosting. On the other hand, the degree of over-supply and the level of coping with the problem differ in parallel to the characteristics of the host city. Some cities might absorb the built infrastructure and facilities in the short-run, while others might not. Three key concepts will be proposed in order to understand the process of mega-event hosting: **Physical capacity-building, over-capacity problem** and **absorption capacity.**

2.1.1. Observations on Mega-Events

It is needed to set features in order to call an urban event a mega-event. Stating observations on mega-events will provide a basis in this respect. These observations will cover the mega-events' last two decades and the experiences of host cities. The observed features of mega events can be enumerated as follows:

- Mega-events are large-scale organisations.
- They have global significance and they attract interest of masses.

- They provide signature architectural structures for the urban landscape concerning the global image.

These three are related with the international characteristics of mega-events. Having a global significance means that these events attract and accommodate international visitors. Since there is a global significance, the quality of physical environment is important for the city image in the world. When this significance increases, then the number of cities that wish to host that of event will increase. Zukin (1995 in Hiller 2000: 182) states that:

> "The larger the event as measured by the number of participants, the extent of media exposure, the potential revenue generation, and the international nature of the event, the more likely that cities will pursue the event as desirable."

Opening and closing ceremonies of mega-events are getting more popular regarding the global attention on TV, thus the urban image is getting more important in this sense. This brings about an architectural dimension in the discussions made on mega-events. Mega-events are opportunities for developments in form and technology of architecture. They represent examples of spectacular architecture (see fig. 2.1).

Figure 2.1: Examples of new forms and technologies practiced in Olympic stadiums.

- Mega-events are extra-ordinary conditions that go beyond everyday life.
- They display uniqueness in time and space.
- They are discontinuous in character; they are not hosted in the same location with repeating sequences.

Mega-events have a temporal significance. Being short-term and having a fixed-time schedule, they represent the conditions out of the routine everyday life. Accordingly, they indicate a certain temporality in social systems with their extra-ordinary character. Mega-events in fact create dissolution of compressed time and space since they stretch time and within this extended time they spread over the space.

- Mega-events need a city to host them. Thus they need special spatial requirements, which can change urban environment of the host city.

- The increased size of them means greater risks for host cities as well as greater potentials and opportunities.

- They generate short-time agglomerations in the host city. They create an extraordinary high concentration of "new" traffic superimposed on "usual" urban traffic for relatively short periods of time.

Mega-events carry their own spatial and temporal organisation patterns to the host city. It is not a case where only the people (athletes, press, spectacle, tourists, businessmen…etc.) move from one location to another. There should be a spatial structure that is specific to the mega-event, a complex of venues for the events to take place, a certain infrastructure for transportation and communication in favour of the event, and basically a certain stock of building for accommodation and gastronomic facilitation of visitors. They all transform the urban environment of the host city.

These bring about questioning the flexibility in spatial organisation, in other words, physical capability of a city in handling short-time agglomerations in urban space. It will be the flexibility of responding any expansion of demand within the urban system. That is one of the reasons that small cities are not generally suitable for mega-events. They do not have the *capability of absorbing* short-time agglomerations in space and time.

The recent illustration of the significance of this point is Leipzig, an ex-Eastern German city. The German government, out of many other industrialised and large cities such as Hamburg, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt and Stuttgart, chose and promoted this small city, with a population of 500 000, in order to bid for the Olympics of 2012. The aim was to regenerate the economy and re-shape the image of the city. The city was

eliminated in the Phase I due to the scale of the city. Germany was shocked after this decision of the IOC, because they believed in the experience in sports organisations and sports culture of Germany (Aksoy 2004). In spite of their motto of *"small is beautiful"*, in its report about applicant cities the IOC has indicated that Leipzig is so small that it could not store such a large-scale event, thinking only accommodation problem.

Therefore, mega-events create sudden swells in host cities. In an International Expo, the host city might attract 200 000 people per day. During the Sydney Olympic Games, more than 4.5 million people travelled to the Olympic Park over the 19-day period. For London 2012 Games, approximately 7.9 million spectators are expected to attend the various events. Mega-events require cities that are capable of carrying these sudden swells. This capability is proportional to the *current size of the city*, since the size defines the potentials of the city to absorb these swells.

- The awarding of a mega-event to a city is often contingent on the city which meets external obligations with a fixed date of accomplishing these obligations (Hiller 2000b).

- They generally state a deadline for host cities in order that they will meet these obligations.

This certainly creates a sense of urgency in urban planning schemes, which might disrupt long-term planning goals. In addition to that, it may cause irreversible planning mistakes (Solberg & Preuss 2004). On the other hand, mega-events have a potential to draw an outline for long-term planning schemes rather than interrupting. Mega-event strategy provides a clear timeline for development projects since it forces quick decisions (Andranovich *et al.* 2001: 127). Moreover, the urgency of projects might have a positive turn-over for cities which had long been lacking large-scale infrastructural projects.

- Mega-events require mobilisation of great amounts of capital in order to build new physical infrastructure for agglomerations and venues for occasions.

- They might require public and private corporation in capital investment, which would not occur under normal conditions.

A large sum of expenditure is required for the necessary upgrade of infrastructure or the construction of new facilities specifically to be used by the event. Since these operations are held within a fast-track time period, the host city or the country should have a financial support or should have a capacity to find a support. In the comparative analysis of Olympic host cities, Essex and Chalkley (1999 in Furrer 2002: 17) underlined that not all cities are capable of hosting the Games, which depends mainly on the amount of investment needed to bring the city infrastructure up to the standards that the IOC has defined.

- Mega-events require a complicated organisation and institutionalisation in local / national / international levels, and high division of labour.
- They have a significant economic dimension.
- They are closely related with technological development.

Given the institutional and organisational aspects of mega-events, they are quite complicated and thus display a high degree of division of labour. They require *capability of cooperation* in case of bidding and hosting stages. Together with the organisational complexity, resource complexity concerning the volume of money, human and social capital is noticeable. Since there is no real synchronization between the economic cycles peculiar to the mega-event, and that of investment in infrastructure and buildings, the role played by institutions becomes more important, in order to schedule and share the debts and profits in the long-term.

- There are different scales of mega-events; therefore the characteristics of host and bidding cities differ.

Different scales of mega-events can be analyzed in detail by focusing on categories of mega-events.

2.1.2. Categories of Mega-Events

There are two fundamental categories of mega-events. The first category is non-sports mega-events, which include world fairs and festivals as well as meetings of

specific groups like conferences and congresses. The second category is mega-sports events.

2.1.2.1. Non-Sports Mega-Events

World Fairs: They are organised for presenting new ideas, new technologies and new solutions for human life. They stay in the host city for a long period of time (from 3 weeks to 6 months) and open to public visits (Akyol Altun 2003). Approval to hold World Expo's (fairs) is given by the Bureau Internationale des Expositions (BIE)[1] which is based in Paris and represents 88 countries (METREX 2001). The objective of the organisation is to demonstrate progress and to show the prospects for the future. In general it is recommended the host city to acquire and develop an undeveloped peripheral and non-urban site for the exposition. In bidding for hosting a World Expo, it is more important to have a globally significant or original expo theme and concept, than to assure the certainty of infrastructure and expo venues. And displaying the integration of the Expo development into its metropolitan context together with the writing a scenario on the possible benefits of this event for the city is also a very important factor in bidding. The bidding city of the Expo is also to have the support of other countries who will have pavilions in the expo site for their exhibitions and who will then ask for the enduring attraction of the site during 6-month period.

BIE divides the world fairs into two categories: *"registered"* and *"recognised"* expositions (See Table 3.1). Registered exhibitions **(Universal Expositions)** are the biggest category events. Participants generally build their own pavilions. They are therefore the most extravagant and most expensive expos. Their duration may be between six weeks and six months. Since 1995, the interval between two registered expositions has been at least five years. Universal expositions are usually held less frequently than specialized or international expositions because they are more expensive.

Recognized expositions **(International or Specialized Expositions)** are smaller in scope and investments and generally shorter in duration; between three weeks and three months. Their total surface area must not exceed 25 ha and organisers must

[1] For further information see the website http://www.bie-paris.org.

build pavilions for the participating states, free of rent, charges, taxes and expenses. The largest country pavilions may not exceed 1.000 m².

World Fairs have regained their significance in the mid 1980s, with Vancouver 1986, Brisbane 1988, Seville 1992, Lisbon 1998 and Hannover 2000 (Shoval 2002: 590). It was realised that they would offer a potential for urban regeneration and development tool in the host city. Since there is no obligation to build specific buildings with specific standards as in the Olympic Games, the problem of over-capacity might be less severe. The expo site might easily be turned into a new housing or recreation area. These events generally speak to the local people, who can visit the event once or more than once during the long period of the event (3 to 6 months).

Table 2.1: List of registered and recognized expos, source: http://www.bie-paris.org

Year	*City-Nation*	*Type*	*Duration (month)*	*Participating nations*	Area (Ha.)	*Attendance* (Million)
1933	**Chicago, USA**	**Registered**	**4**	-	**170**	**22**
1935	**Brussels, Belgium**	**Registered**	**6**	**30**	**152**	**20**
1936	*Stockholm, Sweden*	*Recognized*	*1/2*	**-**	*0,5*	-
1937	**Paris, France**	**Registered**	**6**	**44**	**105**	**31**
1938	*Helsinki, Finland*	*Recognized*	*1/2*	*25*	*15,2*	*15*
1939	*Liege, Belgium*	*Recognized*	*2*	-	*50*	-
1939	**New York, USA**	**Registered**	**11,5**	-	**500**	**45**
1949	**Port-Au-Prince, Haiti**	**Registered**	**6**	-	**30**	**-**
1951	*Lille-Paris, France*	*Recognized*	*1*	*22*	*15*	*1,5*
1953	*Jerusalem, Israel*	*Recognized*	*1*	*13*	*15*	*1,5*
1958	**Brussels, Belgium**	**Registered**	**6**	**42**	**200**	**41,4**
1962	*Seattle, USA*	*Recognized*	*6*	*24*	*30*	*9,6*
1967	**Montreal, Canada**	**Registered**	**6**	**62**	**-**	**50,3**
1968	*San Antonio,USA*	*Recognized*	*6*	*23*	*37*	*6,4*
1970	**Osaka, Japan**	**Registered**	**6**	**75**	**330**	**64**
1974	*Spokane*	*Recognized*	*6*	*10*	*40*	4,8
1975	*Okinawa, Japan*	*Recognized*	*6*	*37*	*100*	3,5
1982	*Knoxville, USA*	*Recognized*	*6*	*16*	*30*	11,1
1984	*New Orleans, USA*	*Recognized*	*6*	*26*	*34*	7,3
1985	*Tsukuba, Japan*	*Recognized*	*6*	*48*	*100*	20,3
1986	*Vancouver, Canada*	*Recognized*	*5*	*54*	*70*	22,1
1988	*Brisbane, Australia*	*Recognized*	*6*	*36*	*40*	18,5
1992	*Genoa, Italy*	*Recognized*	*3*	*54*	*25*	1,7
1992	**Seville, Spain**	**Registered**	**6**	**111**	**215**	**41,8**
1993	*Taejon, S.Korea*	*Recognized*	*3*	*141*	*90*	*14*
1998	*Lisbon, Portugal*	*Recognized*	*4*	*143*	*50*	*10*
2000	**Hanover, Germany**	**Registered**	**5**	**155**	**160**	**18**
2005	**Nagoya, Japan**	**Registered**	**6**	**121**	**173**	**22**

There are five actors and five types of built environment in expos (Zelef 2007: 21):

- Main exhibition halls: Built by the host countries as permanent structures in general. Used for other activities in the post-event period (like congress halls, museums, sports venues…etc.)

- National pavilions: Exhibition halls of countries. Designed and built in general in their home country and moved to the expo.

- Beyond-national (IOC, United National and European Union) pavilions and under-national pavilions (colonies and autonomous regions like Catalonia)

- Social-cultural pavilions: Religious and social groups' structures

- Firm pavilions: exhibition halls of trans-national corporations

World Expos, in spite of their name, have so far been North American and European oriented events and hosted by these parts of the world (there are exceptions like Japan and South Korea). The main motivation behind hosting the expos is to generate economic vitality and develop relations between international markets (Bilsel 2007: 40). They have been increasingly serving for urban planning frameworks like urban revitalization in deprived lands (in general ex-industrial areas), urban rehabilitation in problematic areas like marshlands or ex-flood areas, and urban development in underdeveloped areas (Zelef 2007: 12). They have also been platforms for architectural experiments for new technologies and new materials.

Festivals are popular and attract lots of people. They have a significant tourism impact. However, host cities do not experience structural changes in their spatial organisation. Mega-event infrastructure is generally temporary structures, like wooden seats located in the streets for watching festival march. The most important urban element in festivals is accommodation capacity. Festivals can be called as special or hallmark events but not mega-event.

Events exclusive for a specific group: Cities host many international or national facilities, which generate a large number of movement patterns. Congresses, conferences, international meetings are in this group. This kind of mega-events in general prefers compactness in venues. The start and the end of the meetings might create an additional agglomeration in the host city. In the remaining time, during the event, they represent an inward-looking spatial organisation. They require high

accommodation capacity, but they prefer them to be close to the event venue. Tourism destinations can host these events (due to their existing accommodation provisions), if they have an adequate capacity of congress halls.

2.1.2.2. Mega-Sports Events

In this group, sports is the central activity. Cultural and social events might function as contributory activities. Mega-sports events can be grouped as multi-sports and one-sports events. Physical requirements of these two groups are different. Multi-sports events can be grouped as 1) *regional-or-specific group events* and 2) *international events*. Mediterranean Games, Asian Games, Asian Winter Games, Pacific Games …etc. are regional; while Universiade (World University Games), Winter Universiade, Commonwealth Games (inviting British-related nations), Paralympics (Olympics for disabled) …etc. are specific-group events. In regional mega-events, host cities are selected within that region. They include many sports branches, but they might not include all branches that the Olympic Games have. They are smaller scales of the Olympic Games.

There are two organisations that every member country and many sports branches (multi-sports event) and every group of athletes participate: Summer and Winter Olympic Games. They are international organisations. The Summer Olympic Games stand in the top of the mega-event hierarchy, regarding the attendance of both visitors and athletes, the interest of media and the physical requirements that the host location should offer.

Physical requirements of one-sports events are less complex comparing to multi-sports events. However, they require strong carrying capacities in terms of accommodation and transport. World Track and Field Championships and World Cup are the most significant mega-sports events in one-sports group. Table 2.2 summarises the categorisation for mega-events.

In brief, there is a hierarchy among mega-events when considering the scales spatial requirements of the organisations. Cities might prefer to bid for large-scale events after hosting meso-scale organisations, which provide them to have an existing physical infrastructure for larger events. Lisbon, for instance, started an urban

regeneration agenda in the beginning of the 1990s and realised a part of projects with the awarding of European Capital in 1994 (Bilsel 2007: 43). Planning visions drawn by the greater municipality for the extension of the city towards the east were realised by the hosting of 1998 Expo, which supplied a 340 ha. new development area for mixed-use urban life. Lisbon wanted to re-use the facilities built in the area for a larger event and it put the candidacy to the 2008 Olympics. After loosing, the city is currently preparing to bid for the 2016 Games.

Along the same line, Seville hosted the 1992 Expo and bidded for the 2008 Olympics as well. Manchester, on the other hand, bidded for the 2000 Olympics in order to regenerate the economic life and urban areas in the city, which deprived after the retreat of industry. The city lost the bid, but continued to develop a sports-event strategy for urban regeneration. Backing to a smaller scale event, Manchester hosted the Commonwealth Games in 2002, which changed the face of the city in positive manners.

2.1.2.3. Proposed Model of Categorisation for Mega-Events

Therefore, the categorisation made in Table 2.2 should be re-considered and re-formulated regarding the mega-event / host-city relation. According to this approach illustrated in Figure 2.2, mega-events should be grouped in accordance with their scale. Two criteria will be important:

1. amount of sudden and extra agglomerations generated by the mega-event in the host city,

2. amount of physical infrastructure to be built specific to that mega-event.

According to this new and more refined grouping, there are two basic groups of events. The first group consists of **meso-scale events** that include international festivals (music, culture, art…etc.), certain national festivals (Rio Carnival…etc.) and world championships of relatively wide-spread sports. Repeating and continuous sports events and festivals which are staged in the same location are included in this group. They can be called *hallmark* or *special events*. The second group of mega-events are **large-scale** in character and they create huge agglomerations in urban

space. They are discontinuous, rarely held in the same location. Therefore, Rio Carnival and Grand Prix are hallmark events, while the World Expo is a mega-event. On the other hand, an international conference might be a mega-event for a city, while it might be a hallmark event for another city. The host city or the bidding city is then not a container of the mega-event but an actor which draws the volume of the event.

The volume that is composed of sudden agglomerations in urban space due to the mega-event and physical infrastructure built specific to the mega-event produces a hierarchy among mega-events. The three principal mega-events being at the top of the hierarchy are the Olympic Games, the FIFA World Cup, and the World Fairs (Expos). The Summer Olympic Games stands as the most specific and special event in accordance to the criteria suggested in the model of classification. In addition to these two major criteria, there are two more components which shape the pulsar effect of the mega-event on the host city:

1. Duration

2. Global popularity



Figure 2.2: A proposed model for categorisation of mega-events.

Table 2.2: Types of mega-events, data collected from http://www.bie-paris.org, http://www.fifaworldcup.yahoo.com, http://www.olympic.org, http://en.wikipedia.org, Roche (2000), Pound (2004).

Types of mega-events			Example of the mega-event	Population of the host city in the host year	Total area used for the mega-event (hectares)	Attendance per day / Attendance in total (depending on tickets sold)	Number of active participators (athletes / players / academics)	TV rights income (in $ millions)
NON-SPORTS MEGA-EVENTS	Popular (people participate or visit)	World Fairs (Expos)	Seville 1992 (universal expo)	900.000	215 ha.	232.000 per day 44.000.000 in 6 months	-	-
			Lisbon 1998 (international expo)	560.000 (city pop.) 2.800.000 (greater area)	50 ha.	80.000 per day 10.000.000 in 6 months	-	-
		Festivals	Rio de Janeiro Rio Carnival	5.600.000 (city pop.) 12.000.000 (greater area)	N.A.	750.000 per day 300.000 in 4 days		-
	Exclusive for a specific group	Conferences /congresses	Istanbul Habitat 1996 (UN conf. on housing)	9.400.000	18 ha.	- 17.000 in 16 days		-
MEGA-SPORTS EVENTS	One-sports events		USA 1994 World Cup	*More than one city host the event*	50-100 ha. (one stadium)	120.000 per day 3.587.538 in a month	32 teams	N.A.
	Multi-sports events	Regional/ specific group events	Athens 1991 Mediterranean Games	750.000 (city pop.) 4.000.000 (greater area)	240 ha. Olympic Park (OAKA)	N.A.	2.762	N.A.
			Sheffield 1991 World University Games (Universiade)	197.000 (city pop.) 500.000 (greater area)	Don Valley Stadium Ponds Forge Swimming Complex Sheffield Arena	N.A.	3.346	Local press Regional news programmes Insignificant media interest
		International events	Barcelona 1992 Olympic Games	1.600.000 (city pop.) 3.100.000 (greater area)	130 ha. (Olympic Village)	3.000.000 in total	9.356	$ 416 (NBC) $ 90 (EBU)
			Atlanta 1996 Olympic Games	480.000 (city pop.) 5.000.000 (greater area)	133 ha. (Olympic Village)	8.300.000 in total	10.318	$456 (NBC) $247 (EBU)
			Sydney 2000 Olympic Games	150.000 (city pop.) 4.200.000 (greater area)	450 ha. (Millennium Olympic Park)	6.700.000 in total	10.651	$ 715 (NBC) $ 333 (EBU)
			Athens 2004 Olympic Games	3.761.000	240 ha. Olympic Park (OAKA) 210 ha. Hellinikon Old airport area 77 ha. Faliron Coastal Zone 45 ha. Goudi Sports Complex	3.800.000 in total	10.625	$ 793 (NBC)
			Calgary 1988 Winter Olympic Games	650.000	242 ha. (Oly. Park)	1.600.000 in total	1.634	$ 309 (ABC)

2.1.2.4. Proposed Definition for Mega-Events

Given the observations and analyses made on mega-events, the following statements can be suggested for the definition of mega-events:

- What defines certain events as "mega" can be answered by a spatio-temporal base. Spatially, mega-events require on-purpose built infrastructure, and they generate crowds which agglomerate in the city and create swells. Temporally, mega-events are short in duration, and discontinuous (not hosted periodically in the same location).

- Mega-events can therefore be defined as large-scale organisations with limited duration and changing location, which generate sudden and extra agglomerations of people and services that cause spatio-temporal swells in urban space. Coping with these swells during and after the event is related with the definition of mega-event hosting.

2.1.3. Olympic Games as a Mega-Event

Comparing to the world's largest three mega–events, The Olympic Games, the World Football Cup and the World Expos, there are certain differences between them. First of all, the first two are sports events, implying the difference in *spatial requirements* of them. The Olympic Games covers almost all fields of sports, so the use of sports venues in different scales and different locations stands as the main separating feature from the World Cup. In the Olympic Games, the flows among the parts and the *agglomerations* in the venues are significantly more than the other two mega-events.

By parts, it is *first* referred to the event venues (stadium in the case of World Cup and the exhibition site in Expos, the Olympic Complexes / Parks and single sports venues in Olympic Games), and *second* to the other requirements of the event. Accommodation of visitors / spectators, accommodation of athletes / football players, media workers…etc constitute the primary part following the event venues. Apparently, the number of parts (thus the number of relations between parts) displays variations in these three mega-events.

Second, the spatial and temporal arrangements are different in three mega-events. The expos extend to a half-year period, while the World Cups take place in one month. The Olympics is rather short, 16 days. So does the use of space: The stadiums -the venues of the World Cup are in general spread over the host country (ies), not only one city as in the case of other events. This affects the movement patterns (frequency, route and mode of movement), which eventually affects the way of using urban space during the mega-event.

Third, World Cup is hosted not by a city but by a country (or two accompanying countries). The World Cup hosting spreads over the country, which underlines the improvement of inter-city relations in spatial terms. The World Cup hosting may be used both for strengthening the transport infrastructure among cities of that country, and for lessening regional inequalities by making investments on different regions of the country rather than on a single city.

Fourth, organisation committees of these events have different priorities in city-selection. BIE, the institution of the World Expos, is interested in urban regeneration and development, so it tries to select cities that have potentials but have not had chance to develop. The IOC, organisation of the Olympic Games, is interested in standards of sports venues, athletes' and guests' comfortable transport between venues, and characteristics of the host city in terms of tourism destination, accommodation capacity…etc. FIFA, organising body of the World Football Cup, is interested in standards of stadiums, level of interest (or potential) in football in the host country, and the accessibility among stadium-cities of the host country.

Figure 2.3 is a graphical representation of the use of urban space in three mega-events. It displays that the Olympic Games has more components than the other two organisations. Providing the spatial relationship among these components is one of the most important responsibilities of the host locality. In the World Cup, there are two basic relationships: stadium-city and city-city relationship. Therefore, the spatial organisation of the mega-event spreads over the country in this mega-event.

In the Olympics, city-venue and venue-venue relations are important. Moreover, Olympic villages and media complexes are also important components of the organisation. These relations will be provided with the existing infrastructure of the city, or with newly infrastructure investments.



Figure 2.3: Graphical representation of three mega-events.

These kinds of problems are agreed by cities that want to host the Olympics and the number of the cities that wish to host it has been increasing (See Table 2.3). The reasons behind this aspiration will be explained in the following part.

2.1.3.1. Motivations behind Hosting the Olympic Games

Beginning from the 1990s, many cities has got enthusiastic on hosting large-scale events, specifically sports-organisations. The most significant dynamic is the technological development experienced after the 1980s. Two areas can be discussed in this manner. The first one is the development of *information technologies* and more specifically tele-communications/broadcasting, computing and microelectronics. The Olympic Games has become global show business by the advanced technologies of communication that create spectacle-advertising circle. TV revenues have increased in time (See fig. 2.4). Today, a large sum of the money coming from the media rights is transferred to the host city by the IOC. This has become one of the main generators of the interest in hosting (Hiller 2000).

Table 2.3: List of cities that displayed intention to host the Olympic Games.

year	Initial bids		Officially bidding cities		Host city
	Declared bids	Cancelled bids	Applicant cities	Candidate cities	
2008	Buenos Aires (Argentina), Monterrey (Mexico), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Cape Town (South Africa), Lisbon (Portugal), Krasnaya-Polyana (Russia)		Bangkok(Thailand), Cairo (Egypt), Havana (Cuba), Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), Seville (Spain)	Beijing (China) Istanbul(Turkey) Paris (France) Toronto(Canada) Osaka (Japan)	Beijing
2012	Abuja (Nigeria), Cairo (Egypt), New Delhi (India), Budapest (Hungary), Toronto (Canada)		Havana (Cuba), Istanbul (Turkey), Leipzig (Germany), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)	London (UK), Madrid (Spain), Moscow (Russia), New York (USA), Paris (France)	London
2016	Baku (Azerbaijan), Argentina, Doha (Qatar), Dubai (Un. Arab E.), Kenya, Hamburg or Berlin (Germany), Monterrey (Mexico), Netherlands, Portugal, Prague(Czech Rep.), Rio de Jan. (Brazil), Thailand	Baltimore (USA), Brussels or Flanders (Belgium), Fukuoka (Japan), India, Los Angeles (USA), Moscow (Russia), Sapporo (Japan), San Francisco(USA), San Diego (USA) / Tijuana (Mexico), Houston and Philadelphia (USA)	Chicago (USA), Madrid (Spain), Tokyo (Japan), Doha (Qatar), Prague (Czech Rep.), Rio de Jan. (Brazil), Baku (Azerbaijan)	-	-
2020	Budapest (Hungary), Busan (S. Korea), Cape Town (South Africa), Delhi (India), Copenhagen (Denmark), Mexico, Milan (Italy), Rome (Italy), Taiwan, St.Petersburg (Russia), St.Paul/Minneapolis (USA)		-	-	-



Figure 2.4: Earnings from Olympic television rights, in $ US millions (1960-2008), adapted from Brunet (1993), Pound (2004).

The second development took place in *transportation technologies*. Spatial dispersion of economic activity has reduced the transportation costs. In order to reduce the time spent in production and circulation, transportation networks were developed. Leisure patterns have also changed and mass-consumption of the 1960s was replaced by individualised/specialised holidays. Urban tourism has emerged. *The activity of visiting* gave way people to participate in sports events in an embodied way. Depending on the technological developments, trans-national corporations (TNCs) have become very powerful actors in the global patterning of sport and leisure practices. Expand of the global culture through the *activity of watching* has increased the power of TNCs specialised on such industries and on media.

It is claimed that there are 4 main motivations behind the aspiration of cities in Olympic hosting:

a. Building an international image: Cities that have a consideration of image-building via hosting the Olympic Games can be grouped under three subtitles. First, there are cities of opening and/or developing economies, and they wish to use the Olympic Games as a national project rather than a city project. Seoul 1988 Games is a typical example of this attitude. Second, there are cities that used to be ex-industrial centres, and they concentrate on sports industry in general. Their motto is *"from grey to green fields"* (Loftman & Nevin1996; Gratton *et al.* 2001; Smith 2001). Manchester's 2000 Olympic Bid can be evaluated within this manner. Sports has

become one of the leisure / consumption oriented development strategies used by such cities, which have a mark on the shift from industrial toward a post-industrial, service-dominated economy.

Third, there are global centres that already have a global image, recognition and infrastructure, yet they wish to host the Olympics as well. London, New York and Paris' 2012 Olympic bid (and London's nomination for those Games) are proper examples. According to Shoval (2002), these cities want to keep their superiority in the global economic system, and they want to emphasise their physical and organisational capacity to organise such a big event. They have also an emphasis on multi-culturality in their Olympic bid, which is expected to function as a buffer against terrorism that is ever-growing in such cities.

b. Increasing / restructuring economic activity: The shift towards post-Fordist economy in the developed regions generated policies on the regeneration of a post-industrial city economy. Mega-events have become a developing strategy, which constitute the basis of the new urban politics. According to this approach, local governments are less dependent on central government's financial aids, so they try to mobilise key actors other than the state.

The Olympic Games offer an opportunity for host cities to build their physical capacity not only in sports but also in city's general infrastructure, which might attract foreign capital in the long run. Brunet (1995) states that the main reason behind the economic boom experienced in Barcelona after the 1992 Olympic Games is that the Olympic project provided not only sports venues and transport networks among these venues, but also the investments made on communication, office blocks, new housing units, shopping areas. Due to the well-structured urban planning schemes including non-sports facilities as well as Olympic purpose-built sports venues, Barcelona experienced an economic boom in the pre-event period, in 1990-1991 (ibid: 25). Matheson and Baade (2004) state that sports infrastructure itself does little to promote economic growth, while mega-events often generate economic development due to the non-sports infrastructure development.

The restructuring and increasing of economic activity via hosting the Olympic Games might take place through two processes. First, the sports and transport infrastructure constructed *directly* for the mega-event might be the spatial backcloth for future

large-scale sports organisations, which might generate economic benefit from sports and cultural activities. Second, the constructions and projects that are *indirectly* related with the mega-event might generate a more general economic vitality. The historic centre revitalisation projects, waterfront rehabilitation projects, or downtown public transport development projects are for instance indirectly related with the mega-event but they carry the potential of being more permanent and having more turn-over for inhabitants.

c. Generating urban regeneration / revitalisation projects: Mega-events can transform a city. Barcelona 1992 Games in this sense stand as a turning point in the history of the Olympics, after which competing-to-host cities have focused more on the power of the organisation on the urban built environment. Cities have adopted this motivation for partial regeneration projects. Poor neighbourhoods, old industrial areas, deprived waterfronts and such large urban lands that have lost their real estate values and environmental aspects in time but having advantageous locations have become the main focal points of Olympic projects. On the other hand, Hughes (1993) states that, for the purpose of urban regeneration, smaller-scale mega-events are likely to be more effective and beneficial in cost-benefit terms than a one-off mega-event like the Olympic Games.

d. Building sports and general infrastructure: This motivation is generally observed in developing regions that have a poor physical infrastructure and an unstable political system that prevents long-term spatial planning and structural investments. Urban planning practices in those regions generally fail in terms of meeting the needs of fast-growing urban centres. In that case, governments evaluate the Olympic Games as a great chance to accomplish never-ended infrastructural projects.

2.1.3.2. Phases of the Olympic Hosting

Three phases can be identified in the hosting of the Olympic Games, and other mega-events as well. These phases are analysed below in terms of their urban meaning, with reference to Hiller's (2000b) and Kammeier's (2002) articles.

a. Pre-event phase: The pre-event phase is a *planning phase*, within which there are two sub-components as *bidding* and *preparation* phases. The bidding phase is very important since the decisions on site-selections and the site development plans are made in this period. As the Olympic Games are awarded only to one city, many other cities stay in the bidding phase and cannot pass into preparation phase.

There is an enormous amount of planning that must be represented in the bid plan. Achieving a serious consideration in the bid selection decision of the IOC is dependent on having a clear plan for the sites of sports facilities and other activities as well as having financial sufficiency. The city-selection process is a political process, since it depends on personal votes of the IOC members, and there are many in-correspondences among members. Therefore it is not the case that city-selection is rationally based on the criteria that the city has a proper Olympic project in the bidding phase. Nevertheless, presenting a strategic plan for the Olympic hosting in the bidding phase, in which both the event and post-event phase scenarios are properly written for the Olympic purpose built infrastructure will certainly affect the possibility of that city to be selected.

Once a city wins the bid, it goes by the preparation phase. *Fast-track planning* and implementation goes into effect due to the fixed timelines of preparation phase. This generally covers 7 to 9 years of the city's development and infrastructural plans before the Olympic Games.

The tight schedule of the Olympic Games has two side effects (Hiller 2000b): On the one hand, it ensures the realisation of projects, most of which have long been far from completion or even discussion. On the other hand, this tight timeline may produce autocracy against oppositions that may take place. Therefore, there is a *top-down planning* during this period. Normal planning procedures are subverted. There is an *external obligation* that forces the city to install many venues and facilities to be used principally for the 16-day event.

b. Event phase: The 16-day event period provides an urban festival atmosphere. Ease of movement in the city, security, accompanying urban amenities will positively support this mood. The participation of urban residents to the event is very crucial for the adoption of the facilities built for the organisation in the post-event period. During the event, the facilities work with a full capacity. Besides sports venues that will seat

thousands of spectators, accommodation and public transportation function with a high demand.

c. Post-event phase: Once the Olympics terminate, post-event phase starts with many opportunities and potentials as well as spatial problems. The organisation generates permanent improvements in the built environment, which will become a basis for further socio-economic development of the city. This phase is associated with the term *"mega-event legacy"*, which in general emphasises positive aspects of the sports organisation.

The major issue in the post-event phase is *after-use*. The *clarity* or *ambiguity* in the post-Olympic use of sports and other infrastructure as well as in the *ownership* of these constructions gets importance. It might turn into a real-estate management problem.

The preparation phase is related only with host cities. Therefore, while many cities experience bidding period and try to meet the spatial requirements of the Olympics in order to get the chance of hosting, only one city passes into the second step of the pre-event phase. It means that bidding period is very crucial since it affects many cities. Since the IOC chooses one city to host the Olympic Games, the bidding cities should be aware of the share of their direct and indirect investments. It is claimed that the more the share of the indirect investments made, the less often these kind of problems the bidding city might come across.

The preparing phase has strict time limits, in general 7 years. So does the event phase, which lasts 16 days (represented in the figure by double lines). Post-event phase, on the other hand, has an open-endedness, which might be either a problem-generating or potential-generating situation.

Figure 2.5 displays the idealised phases of the Olympic hosting in relation to the ratios of direct and indirect investments, expenditures and turnovers in the host city. According to the graph suggested, the bidding period which is the first part of the pre-event phase is a stage of competing with other cities which also wish to host the event. There is an official date for the submission of candidature files, although cities make preparations long before. Extending the bidding throughout a longer period might prevent the squeeze of investments and infrastructure-building within a short period of time (represented in the figure by a white arrow). Bidding cities in general

follow the strategy of building a significant part of the Olympic-purpose built (direct) infrastructure (like sports venues) after getting nominated (i.e. in the preparation period) in order not to cause an over-supply in sports infrastructure. On the other hand, stadiums are important and they are in general built or renovated in the pre-event period.



Figure 2.5: Phases of the Olympic hosting in relation to the ratios of direct and indirect investments, expenditures and turnovers in the host city.

2.2. PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Up to this part, the study tried to describe the mega-event phenomenon. In order to do so, first the observations that are made on the phenomenon were itemised. The outcome statement of this analysis was that mega-events point to the short-time intervals within which an urban space is densely used and agglomerations take place spatially as well as socially. And they put forward a pulse which is out of daily routines and daily tempo of the city life. Moreover, they have long-term consequences for the urban structure and dynamics of the cities that stage them.

However, these organisations are different from each other in many aspects. Therefore, in order to understand these differences as well as similarities, a second

step was taken in the analysis and answers to these questions were searched: What kind of categories exist among mega-events? Is there any hierarchy among mega-events regarding the hosting process? In this part, two main groups of mega-events were identified: *Non-sports mega-events* and *mega-sports events*. Two reasons lied behind using the concept of sports in the categorisation: 1) Sports has spatial fixes and purpose-built facilities, and 2) sports attracts interest of masses, and they have a global popularity.

Given in the Table 2.2, the amount of sudden agglomerations in the host city and the amount of physical infrastructure built specific to the mega-event will define the scale of the mega-event, which eventually generates a hierarchy among mega-events in terms of capability of hosting. The study showed that the Olympic Games stands at the top of the hierarchy. Based on it, third, the Olympic Games was analysed and described as a mega-event by comparing it with the other two mega-events (the World Cup and the World Expos). Then the motivations behind the aspiration of cities toward hosting the Olympic Games were outlined in sub-titles.

Based on the analysis of mega-event hosting which was summarised above, it is possible to make three statements as follows:

Statement 1: Today most of the mega-events are subject to a process of bidding. Cities or countries apply to the mega-event committees, and declare their ambition to host it. In accordance with certain criteria that the committee sets forth, they prepare a bidding book that would display the capability of the location to carry out a successful organisation.

Therefore, cities try to compose **a capacity** that is specific to that mega-event. In this respect, mega-events can be pictured as a kind of capacity-building processes or a process of re-arranging and using an existing capacity to host the event. Capacity is an entity of abilities and potentials to do something. Capacity-building then is the improvement of the conditions of this entity. So being eager to host a mega-event implies the setting up of organisational, constructional and institutional structures and procedures.

Looking at the literature on the term *"capacity building"* (CB), the main focus is on the organisational and institutional strengthening and development (Kaplan 1999). There

are several non-governmental organisations as well as private companies that study on CB of local governments, public sectors…etc. CB has three dimensions:

- *Institutions*—to provide the framework of goals and incentives for public sector performance and accountability,
- *Organizations*—defined as groups of individuals bound by some common purpose, with clear objectives and the internal structures, processes, systems, staffing and other resources to achieve them,
- *Individuals with skills*—to analyze development needs, design and implement strategies, policies, and programs to meet those needs, and deliver services.

The CB literature does not focus on **urban capability**. In general, CB is described as an internal process which could be developed by empowering of the existing potentials and strengthening of individuals and institutions in problem-solving and co-operation. The process of strengthening of cities' potentials is not discussed. However, cities try to fortify their abilities in order to involve in urban competition, which would be realised via developing infrastructure systems, cultural and social facilities.

On the other hand, these developments take their routes in time, so we do not name them. Strengthening of urban facilities is a continuous process. However, mega-events generate large swells in the city and do their spatial requirements differ. Moreover, the city must develop many projects for mega-event-specific facilities and build them in a short period of time. Therefore, the first statement is built on this condition:

Mega-events enforce host cities to build a noteworthy amount of infrastructure, including both **directly related** (stadiums, sports venues, multi-functional congress and convention halls…etc.) and **indirectly related** (transport and communication networks, ports, accommodation capacity…etc.) with the mega-event. Moreover, mega-events provide a basis for the establishment of new organisations, corporations, partnerships, which can increase the organisational capacity of host cities for further large-scale events. Nevertheless, the potentials of mega-events regarding the urban built environment are more significant. Therefore, it can be stated that mega-events are physical capacity-building processes.

Thus, a mega-event host city (or a bidding city) should build a physical capacity or should have an existing capacity in order to manage such an organisation that requires specific spatial needs. This means that the city will experience several large-scale projects within a limited time period.

Statement 2: Therefore, while constructing mega-projects for mega-events, there is a risk of constructing non-feasible projects. There is a problem of overcapacity, which cities might come across with once the mega-event terminates. It is very important to embed such large-scale projects into the everyday urban life in order not to undergo urban problems. Having no projections about their future use might generate serious debate areas. If not used and stay out of utilisation after constructed, first, such projects are a burden for both the central and the local government, since their annual maintenance costs are in million dollars. Second, they occupy a considerable size of urban land, and they might become barriers for other potential land-uses.

Statement 3: Mega-event hosting is interrelated with a city's both existing and potential capabilities. Some cities might have an existing physical capacity, since they might have hosted mega-events and had physical legacies from these organisations. Or, they might have strong potentials to absorb the built capacity in a short period of time. Therefore, over-capacity problem can be described within a context, and this context is the absorption capacity of the city.

In this respect, three key aspects are proposed in order to draw a conceptual framework for mega-event hosting:

1. Physical capacity-building in the city
2. Over-capacity problem in the city
3. Absorption capacity of the city

In the following parts, three aspects will be discussed with reference to the Olympic Games and the Olympic hosting in order to specify the problem definitions and statements.

2.2.1. Physical Capacity-Building In The City

In the Olympic Games, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is the authority in the organisation of the Games and the host city-selection process. It draws the outline for physical capacity-building.

IOC and Its Description for Physical Capacity

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) is an international non-governmental organisation that conducts, promotes and regulates the modern Olympic Games. One major role of the IOC is to select Olympic host cities. To assist it in its decision, it requires each candidate city to go through a series of steps and procedures. The IOC tries to evaluate the applicant cities' capacity for hosting the Olympic Games.

The current process of the Olympic city-selection starts with the National Olympic Committees (NOC) within each country. The NOCs are responsible for advancing a city's expression of interest to the IOC in hosting the Games.[3] The interested city must submit a candidacy file to the IOC, which is then evaluated by the IOC's Commission of Inquiry. The Commission will then critique each city using a standard form of evaluation, which includes technical merit, environmental considerations, transport, media facilities, security, health, public support…etc. The next step is the visit of potential host cities by the members from the Commission of Inquiry. In order that the IOC could make the appropriate decision, cities prepare a candidature file and the IOC representatives make a series of visits to these cities. The candidature file presents the opportunity for an applying city to describe its context, and how the city intends to perform the event with its present or projected capacities.

In time, the IOC has faced with an enormous interest to candidacy. In 1995, the committee decided to use a pre-selection approach to select the host city by aiming at reducing bid cities' costs and creating a more objective way of judging the bidding cities.[4]

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[3] There might be more than one candidate cities in a country. In this case, the national candidate cities must follow the NOCs' criteria which mirror IOC criteria.

[4] Beside the increasing interest to candidacy, there occurred a bribery scandal within the IOC members on the city-selection process. The corruption scandal associated with Salt Lake City nomination for the 2002 Winter Games has resulted in revised selection procedures to "minimise the risk of corrupt decision-making in future Olympic bids" (Essex & Chalkley 2001).

On February 18, 2000, the IOC Executive Board created and adopted a new *"Candidate Acceptance Procedure"* (CAP) applicable to all candidate cities. The IOC started to use this procedure for the first time for the selection of the 2008 Olympic city (Roche 2000: 211). The implementation of the CAP consists of two phases: **Phase I** involves the evaluation of all applicant cities in order to select candidate cities, and **Phase II** entails the submission of the candidate cities' candidature files and the IOC's ultimate selection of the Olympic city.

Phase I: In this stage, under the authority of the IOC Executive Board, cities make their application to the IOC via their National Olympic Committees (NOCs), and their status is accepted as *"Applicant Cities"*. The first phase does not involve a visit by the IOC Evaluation Commission, but rather depends upon a manuscript developed by the IOC Candidature Acceptance Working Group for the purpose of objectively judging the applicant cities' capability to host the Games with present and projected capacities. The Working Group limited itself to the examination of technical and factual data, and decided that the assessment of Applicant Cities in Phase I should be backed up by a software decision making programme, known as *Decision Matrix*. The 22 Questionnaire questions were ordered under several themes (See fig. 2.6).

The Decision Matrix is a software development that has developed the *OlympLogic* specific for the IOC. This programme enables a comparison of Applicant Cities on the basis of a number of IOC-specific criteria. Mathematical background of this programme depends on the *fuzzy logic*, which is used to describe uncertain conditions in a decision-making process. In case of dealing with inexact numerical estimates, like that future plans and financial conditions of Olympic-enthusiastic cities are inherently unclear, a fuzzy number is given to the level of that city in terms of a certain criteria (IOC 2004). This fuzzy number is actually an interval comprising a minimum and maximum grade. The more uncertain a criterion grade, the wider the span between the minimum and maximum grade.

When combining grades given to different criteria to an average, there is a risk that some weak grades might be masked by strong grades. The result could be misleading since the combined average of a city may be acceptable while there exists a hidden unacceptable weakness in a criterion grade. OlympLogic overcomes this problem by using the *entropy principle*, which simultaneously involves computing the respective performance of Applicant Cities for all criteria in relation to one another. The result is

that the entropy considers the turbulence, or unevenness of the grades, thus preventing the masking of weak grades and leading to more accurate results.

Therefore, the entropy principle is employed to measure the turbulence of the scores an evaluator gives to the criteria for assessing Applicant Cities. For example, if there are a number of criteria, which evaluates an Applicant City, and if the grades fluctuate widely between 1 and 10, the turbulence is high and thus there is a high degree of uncertainty in this Applicant. In other words, the entropy is a measure of trust in the capability of an Applicant City to host the Olympic Games.



Figure 2.6: Phases of the Olympic city-selection.



Criterion 2: General infrastructure (weighting=5)



Criterion 3: Sports venues (weighting=4)



Criterion 7: Transport concept (weighting=3)



Final results

Figure 2.7: Evaluation of the 2012 Olympic Games Applicant Cities by the software OlympLogic.

Figure 2.7 displays an example to the Phase I. The first three charts show the evaluation of applicant cities according to criteria of general infrastructure, sports venues and transport concept. The last chart shows the final evaluation made by OlympLogic software programme. The benchmark is 6, and cities that remain under this value will be eliminated and the rest of the applicant cities will continue bidding as Olympic candidate cities.

Phase II: In the Phase II, candidate cities are subjected to prepare a bid book (candidature file), which outlines several themes regarding the Olympic project (see Figure 2.6). The preparation of the file takes 6 months, and then the IOC evaluates the reports for another 6 months. The Evaluation Committee visits the candidate cities. Once the Olympic host city is selected, the city will have 7 years for preparations to complete physical infrastructure and to make organisations for the event.

Spheres of Physical Capacity: Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Infrastructure

The IOC in fact leaves almost all the responsibility of being an Olympic city to the applicant and candidate cities. There can be described three spheres for the physical requirements of the Olympic Games (Solberg & Preuss 2004) (See Table 2.4). The first one is the **primary infrastructure** that refers to the sports venues required for athletic competitions. This is *directly* related with the organisation. The main structure within this set is the Olympic stadium. It is the focal point of the whole organisation, since the main athletic events as well as the opening and closing ceremonies are held in there.

Stadiums are different from other land-uses in the city. A stadium generates flows of people and a variety of spatial interactions over a large area much greater than the stadium itself. It occupies a large urban land and it requires well-done transport connections to the city in order to avoid sudden congestions of people and vehicles.

There are differences between a mega-event stadium which is purposely built for hosting a large-scale sports organization and a league stadium. The first difference is the *frequency of use*. A league stadium is used at least 20-25 times in a year for

league matches, and it can also be used for other possible organisations, like concerts. Since the league stadiums are owned mostly by football clubs or municipalities, their exploitation is depended on these autonomous actors. So the issue of multi-functionality is easier in this sense. In a mega-event sports stadium, the owner is mostly the state, which prefers the venue to be reserved for international and regional competitions, mostly athletic events.

Therefore these stadiums are more fragile in terms of their frequency of use. This generates the risk of being worn out in time, which brings about high maintenance costs for the locality. Stade de France was built for the World Cup'1998 with high-technology. Its seating capacity can be converted from a athletics into a football match by moving athletics field out. Its design is so flexible that its capacity can change from 50,000 to 100,000. It has generated urban renewal in the surrounding area, which used to be an old industrial site called Saint Denis. Nevertheless, this multi-purpose and flexible stadium has stood as a problem for the state, since no sports clubs wanted to move their matches to there due to the large amount of high expenses (Hürriyet 1998, 14 Temmuz).

Table 2.5 displays that the Olympic stadiums which were built to seat many people were either adapted into post-event conditions and their seating capacities were reduced to reasonable amounts or demolished due to their unmanageable scale. Looking at the Olympic cities in history, half of the Olympic stadiums were built specific to the mega-event while the other half had already been in the city.

The second important difference is the *amount of urban resources* they use. Mega-event stadiums occupy more land. Since their seating capacity is larger than league stadiums, they need more car parking space, and they need additional exercise spaces for athletes of the mega-event. The Olympic Stadium might be combined with an Olympic Park, in which other sports infrastructure is installed concerning the efficiency of people and vehicles' movement during the Games (Erten & Özfiliz 2006).

The **secondary infrastructure** required for hosting the Olympic Games covers mainly the *housing needs* of athletes and media workers and their training facilities. In addition to that, there are environmental arrangements around the Olympic venues, such as parks, leisure areas, squares, and parking lots. Moreover, international broadcast centre which will provide facilities for the media.

Table 2.4: Physical requirements of the Olympic Games, source: Solberg & Preuss (2004).

Direct investments	**Primary Infrastructure** • stadium • indoor arena(s)special facilities (swimming pools, shooting range, equestrian facilities, rowing course…etc.)
	Secondary Infrastructure • Athlete Village & Media Village • Media and Press Centre Training Facilities • Parklands
Indirect investments	**Tertiary Infrastructure** • Transport (rail systems and roads, stations, airport facilities…etc.) • Tourism (accommodation, attraction places…etc.) • Principal infrastructure (sewege system, tele-communication, fiberoptic cabelling…etc.) • City centre renovations and rehabilitation

Table 2.5: List of the Olympic stadiums that are built for the Olympic Games, sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olympic_Stadium#Specially_Built

	Olympic Stadium	original seat. capacity	Present capacity (year of renovation)
Specially built for the Games	Francis Field **(St.Louis'1904)**	19 000	4 000 (1984)
	White City Stadium **(London'1908)**	80 000	demolished (1985)
	Olympisch Stadion **(Antwerp'1920)**	N.A.	N.A.
	Stade Olympic de Colombes **(Paris'1924)**	45 000	15 000 (planned)
	Olympisch Stadion **(Amsterdam'1928)**	34 000	64 000 (N.A)
	Olympiastadion **(Berlin'1916, 1936)**	110 000	76 000 (2004)
	Olympiastadion **(Helsinki'1952)**	70 000	40 000 (N.A)
	Olympic Stadium **(Rome' 1960)**	90 000	N.A.
	Olympiastadion **(Munich'1972)**	80 000	69 250 (N.A)
	Olympic Stadium **(Montreal'1976)**	58 000	46 000 (1991)
	Centennial Olympic Stadium **(Atlanta'1996)**	85 000	45 000 (1996)
	Stadium Australia **(Sydney'2000)**	110 000	81 500 (2003)
	Beijing National Stadium **(Beijing'2008)**	100 000	80 000 (planned)
	Olympic Stadium **(London'2012)**	80 000	25 000 (planned)
Already constructed	Panathinaiko Stadio **(Athens'1896)**	50 000	no change
	Velodrome de Vincennes **(Paris'1900)**	N.A.	N.A.
	Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum **(L.A.'1932, 1984)**	101 500	65 000 (1993)
	Wembley Stadium **(London'1948, 2012)**	82 000	demolished (2002)
	Melbourne Cricket Ground **(Melbourne'1956)**	107 000	100 000 (2002)
	National Olympic Stadium **(Tokyo'1964)**	52 000	57 300
	Estadio Olimpico Universitario **(Mexico City'1968)**	70 000	63 000
	Lenin Stadium **(Moscow'1980)**	103 000	85 000
	Jamsil Olympic Stadium **(Seoul'1988)**	100 000	69 000
	Estadi Olimpic de Montjuic **(Barcelona'1992)**	56 000	no change
	Olympiako Staido Athinas **(Athens'2004)**	72 000	no change
Specially built but not hosted the Games	Atatürk Olympic Stadium **(Istanbul-2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 candidacies)**	81 000	-

The **tertiary infrastructure** constitutes the *indirect* investments. It refers to the transport networks that provide access among sports facilities and also to the city centre and city gates (airports, harbours, train stations…etc.) as well as the accommodation facilities and primary infrastructure of the city such as sewage system, telecommunication …etc.

In brief, the IOC describes the physical capacity building process as the construction of required sports venues, accommodation complexes especially for athletes and audiences, and transportation network between venues, accommodation areas, city centre and airport. The general infrastructure of the city gains importance, the IOC gives the value 5 for this criterion, which refers to the availability of an existing capacity of the city, like well-established transportation and communication networks.

The primary infrastructure sphere of the existing capacity might be obtained from previous experiences of mega-event hosting. Mexico City for instance, has used the 1952 World Cup stadium for the 1968 Olympic Games. Montréal hosted the 1967 Expo, and the city wanted to reuse the infrastructural investments by 1976 Olympic Games. Barcelona, too, built one of the Olympic complexes on the 1929 Expo site (Montjuic Hill) which was planned as an urban park in Cerda's plans (Bilsel 2007: 33). In fact, cities have occasionally bid for the Olympic Games on the basis of adapting expo sites (Roche 2000: 91).

Physical capacity-building might be sustained in a flexible framework. For example, in Tokyo 1964, Barcelona 1992 and Athens 2004 Games, the accommodation capacity requirements were met by ship rented as hotels for visitors. Therefore, sudden swells in the urban space can be managed by developing temporary capacities designed only for the event phase.

2.2.2. Over-Capacity Problem in the City

When the physical capacity generated by the Olympic Games starts to induce a *utilisation* problem in the post-event phase, then the over-capacity problem takes place. The capacity required for a mega-event can exceed post-event needs. Almost

all Olympic and Olympic bidding cities face this problem in their Olympic adventure. However, there might be different reasons behind the formation of over-capacity problem. In the Seville experience above, the problem may arise from the size of the city, or in the Sydney 2000 Olympic experience the size of the Olympic Park, or in the Athens 2004 Games, the ambiguity in the ownership of venues in the post-event phase. For describing over-capacity problem in structural scale, the literature uses the *"white elephant"* phenomenon.

White Elephant Phenomenon

Warrack (1993) is one of the first researchers who proposed this phenomenon to be used for grand projects that become a misuse of public resources. According to Warrack, there are two kinds of mega-project failures. The first one is the unbuilt projects that never came to realisation for reasons other than objective analysis and timely decision-making; the second one is the built mega-projects that were not viable over time. He calls the second group as *"white elephants"*, and he associates the success of the mega project to the degree of this condition.

Another important study on the white elephant phenomenon is made by Robinson and Torvik (2005), who proposed a theory of white elephants. They stated that it is not the problem of underinvestment but extreme resource misallocation that lead to negative social surplus. They argued that white elephants might be preferred to socially efficient projects, if the political benefits are larger compared to the surplus generated by efficient projects.

Some other scholars too, describe the situation as the misuse of public resources, which is the result of the showcase projects of the local governments that wish to demonstrate projects having visibility, instead of utility (Zhu 2004; Vigor *et al.* 2004). According to the report of the South African Sport Commission (2003), white elephants are *"inappropriate over-scale structures"*. Horne and Manzenreiter (2004), related with this phenomenon, reviewed the World Cup 2002 and Japan/South Korea corporate partnership, which resulted in many under-utilised football stadia in these countries in which football spectatorship is very low.

Furrer (2002) made a definition specific to the Olympics. According to him, this expression refers to oversized venues and facilities that were planned with Olympic-size crowds in mind. He adds that;

> "…white elephants are designed in order to showcase the local economy and engineering prowess instead of fitting them into a long-term planning policy and responding to the local population's needs relative to leisure and cultural facilities" (Furrer 2002: 6).

Garcia (2004: 322-323) stated that it is possible to benefit from investing in event-led infrastructure, if the process is embedded within a consistent wider policy. However, she added, at the opposite end, investing in hallmark infrastructures may lead to the creation of expensive, underused facilities. Along the same line, Burton (2003: 38) claimed that creation of stadiums and sports venues is attractive during the period when the Games are approaching, but the Olympic venues can turn into ghost towns after the Olympics leave the city.

In brief, the white elephant phenomenon refers to the under-utilisation of single outstanding mega-event venues which belong to the group of primary infrastructure. These are in general stadiums, sports halls, media centres and these kind of outstanding buildings.

Factors of Over-Capacity Problem

In the Olympic history, the only city that has not experienced the over-capacity problem is Los Angeles which hosted the 1984 Games (Burton 2003). The existing facilities were used, most of them were rented from private sector, and few new projects were constructed. Los Angeles is agreed to be successful due to the revenues obtained from the organisation. Barcelona, on the other hand, was accepted as the second successful Olympic city since it managed to use the Olympic project as a tool of long-term urban planning, and make a positive turnover of the sports and other venues to the daily life. Yet Barcelona has experienced over-capacity problem in a certain degree, as well. The diving and baseball facilities had to be torn down after the Olympics due to under-utilisation (Solberg&Preuss 2004).

Each city has its own dynamics, and the occurrence of the over-capacity problem and its degree depends on many factors. A group of factors will be proposed in the following part, listed below in Table 2.6.

Table 2.6: Factors of the over-capacity problem.

Socio-Economic Characteristics of the City • Sport culture • Level of architectural facilities • Share of construction sector in city's economic facilities
Organisational Structure of Olympic Hosting • Public-private partnership in infrastructure construction • Actors participating in the Olympic project
Spatial Organisation of Sports Venues • Concentration or dispersion of venues • Accessibility of venues • Flexibility of venues (multi-functionality) • Degree of temporary venue construction • Construction of auxiliary facilities nearby sport venues
Conceptualisation of the Olympic Project • Share of direct and indirect expenditures • Primary motivations and spatial strategies for Olympic hosting

a. Socio-Economic Characteristics of the City

Sport culture: If the existing population is familiar with sports facilities, i.e. they use this infrastructure frequently, and then the built capacity will be less of under utilisation. Sport culture can be assessed by evaluating the following statistical data:

- the number of sports venues / m2 per person *(this data should belong to the pre-event period, in order to evaluate the normal level of sports culture)*
- the number of licensed sportsmen in the city
- the number of sports clubs in the city *(this should be evaluated in relation to the city size, in order to be able to compare with other cities)*

Level of architectural facilities: Sustainability and flexibility in architectural design will provide a chance to adapt sports venues to other uses or to change the seating capacity afterwards. This refers to innovative thinking and skills in architecture. Innovation in architecture has two opposite dimensions. On one hand, innovative and

outstanding buildings generate urban regeneration. On the other, they bring about the risk of under-utilisation due to their expensive and outstanding character which make them to be used only for special activities in the post-event period.

Share of construction sector in city's economic facilities: If the construction sector is very powerful in the Olympic host city, there will be a tendency of building new structures instead of using the existing building stock in the city (like deprived industrial buildings…etc.).

b. Organisational Structure of Olympic Hosting

In the evaluation of over-capacity problem, the financial and managerial organisation of the project should also be considered. The future use of sports infrastructure is drawn by which actor –and to what extent- is participating in the Olympic investments. The more clear definition of the role of each actor will be the more clear future use and program of sports infrastructure in middle and long-term period. The more the state holds the expenditures, the more ambiguous is the future use of the sports infrastructure, which refers to over-capacity problem. Figure 2.8 shows private and public share rates of seven Olympic cities.



Figure 2.8: Shares of public and private sectors' investments to the Olympic Games, source: Preuss (2000).

Sports venues, hotels and convention centres are in fact different from other structures like roads, schools, hospitals, since the target user is an outsider, i.e. a visitor (Perry 2003). Therefore, public investment in such structures is a question mark, especially in developing countries. On the other hand, a strongly private financing is possible only in cities, within which an urban infrastructure already exists before the Games (Preuss 2000).

c. Spatial Organisation of Sports Venues

Concentration or dispersion of venues: In the beginning of the Olympic history, all of the venues were gathered in one sports complex or a park, which made effective use of venues and high accessibility. In time, the size and the scale of the Games increased, which made much more difficult to construct one complex. On the other hand, the intra-city transportation facilities developed, and the dispersion became inevitable and more than one sports complex were built (see fig. 2.9).

- *Concentration of venues* in one or more sports complexes will provide an opportunity to have city-scale urban parks, theme parks, recreation areas, or future expo sites, or university campus areas. Nevertheless, it is impossible to concentrate them all on the same site, it needs to regroup the facilities according to their suitability for future needs and to act as support for the development of the districts.

- *Dispersion of venues* will provide the opportunity to sustain equal distribution of venues to the city, which means that the sports infrastructure can be modelled as district-based public investments which might be generators of sports in the city.

Cape Town 2004 Candidacy was based on dispersion strategy. While the competition venues were located in semi-dispersed pattern, training venues were dispersed to disadvantaged communities. 7 out of 42 sports facilities were located in poor districts of the city, while 66 of 77 training areas were in poor locations (Hiller 2000b). Barcelona followed the same strategy as well. The sports organisation was decentralised in the region of Catalonia, within which only 38.5% of investments were made in Barcelona while the rest of it made to other sub-regions of Catalonia (Brunet

1995). This brought about even development among regions. In addition to that, facilities distributed over the whole city bring the opportunity to build links between different areas. In contrast to these two examples, London claimed for its 2012 Olympic hosting to build the most compact Games in the history, which depends on the strategy to locate core sports events at an Olympic park (Kelso 2004). The IOC in fact imposes cities to gather the facilities together and provide large Olympic Parks for security and accessibility reasons.

Locational characteristics of sports venues: According to the Commission's report in Metropolis (2002), there are two possibilities for a city in site-selection. *First*, suitable land available will be used in its built-up area which is deserted or unused. This brings about the problem of divided ownership of land, and complex process of expropriation and demolition. *Second*, a new site on periphery will be developed, which requires great investments on transport infrastructure. Transport investments made on new peripheral areas might probably be a over-capacity problem at first moment. If planned strategically, these investments will be generators of new development areas, which means that *over-capacity problem* has a potential to turn into an *opportunity*.

There are three different tendencies in site-selections of sports venues:

- *Central city locations* are chosen, in order to regenerate the deteriorated areas. Atlanta 1996 Games is the best example. Advantages of this planning decision are less investments made on trans-networks that will not have immediate turnover to the city, and more livable city centre with lessening traffic congestion, increasing urban space quality…etc.

- *Periphery areas* are chosen, so as to have the opportunity of planning non-residential and unoccupied land. Moscow 1980 is the best example. This might be a policy of restricting downtown growth and decentralising the central business / culture activities. The most critical disadvantage of this approach is the threat of squattering around the newly developed sports complexes, which might lessen the prestige of the venues.

- *Old industrial areas* are chosen for sports development, especially the ones that are close to the city centre or have good transport connections. These are generally deprived areas that remain stuck in the city and have an existing building stock which generally represent industrial heritage characteristics.

There is an opportunity to transform them into sports complexes and turn the surrounding deprived area into a sports park, which is a good way of preventing over-capacity. Using old building and land stock may generate the problem of high expropriation costs, which on the other hand could be overcome by future value of the area. London 2012 is based on this approach, in which deprived but central industrial areas are turned into a positive value in the city.

Accessibility of venues: In site-selection decisions, two variables gain importance:

- The relationship of the sites with the city,
- The relationship of sites with each other.

If a sports infrastructure is built in high standards in itself but not connected to the city, then the investments made on such venues might turn into an over-capacity for the location. Especially Olympic Parks, which cover large urban lands and most of the time in the peripheries of cities, must be well connected to the city in order not only to be used only for sports events but also for recreational and commercial facilities. This kind of large areas should be attractive for people.

Flexibility of venues: If a sports venue can be used for facilities other than sports, then the structure proposes flexibility in its use. An indoor hall might be turned into a concert hall. Schwarthoff (2005) states that one of the stadiums they designed for the World Cup 2006 in GMP Architecture, the Frankfurt Waldstadion, will host 29 sports competitions in a year, while it will host 250 non-sports organisations, which will hold the structure very lively. Similarly, Ajax's Amsterdam Arena built in 1996 was calculated to get its revenues from both football and other activities like concerts…etc. (See Table 2.7).

Table 2.7: Shares of sports and non-sports facilities in total annual revenues of Amsterdam Arena.

	Amount (million $)	Percentage
Football	8	55.7 %
Concerts, catering, advertisements…etc.	6.35	44.3 %
TOTAL	14.35	100 %



Figure 2.9: Models for the spatial organisation of the Olympic Games.

Figure 2.10 displays the role of temporary constructions in lessening the over-capacity problem. If a certain part of the physical infrastructure is built as temporarily (light shaded area in the graph), then the supply line (which represents the normal route of the amount of facilities to be supplied by the city) will be caught in a shorter period of time and under-utilisation problem can be overcome. Similarly, accommodation requirements of mega-events can be managed by using ships as hotels, which will prevent the over-supply in the sector.



Figure 2.10: Relationship of temporary constructions and over-capacity problem.

Construction of auxiliary facilities nearby sports venues: Schwarthoff (2005) underlines that sports venues -especially stadiums- are social spaces and if the sports complex is supported with auxiliary facilities, like hotels, shopping areas, gastronomic facilities, and even residential uses, then they will be integrated into the urban life. Otherwise, they will remain as land-uses which host 25-30 sports competitions in a year. In contrast, he states, a stadium can be a much more dynamic and utilised land-use and the trend in urban planning and architecture is in this line. Wembley Stadium

was demolished and redesigned with the same philosophy. The stadium will offer a range of business opportunities, with a hotel and other facilities.

Briefly, spatial organisation of the sports facilities can strongly affect the over-capacity problem that would be faced in the post-event period. Seen in the Table 2.8, central locations for Olympic complexes have a potential to improve the ex-industrial sites or deprived areas that remain in the city, and to improve transport networks among parts. If the Olympic project is a dispersed one, dispersed through neighbouring cities, this would be used in city-region type urban developments to improve intra-city transport and communication networks. Nucleuses of sports venues dispersed in the districts will provide the opportunity of strengthening sports infrastructure in everyday life uses.

d. Conceptualisation of the Olympic Project

Share of direct and indirect investments: Physical requirements of the Olympic project can be grouped under three principal expenditure areas, that is primary, secondary and tertiary infrastructures (See Table 2.4). Barcelona, for instance, made only 9.1% of its Olympic investments for building Olympic-sports infrastructure (Brunet 1995). In Beijing, along the same line, only a fraction of the city's planned 22 billion in infrastructure improvements will be spent on sports facilities (Matheson&Baade 2004). Table 2.9 displays Olympic cities like Montreal, which is accepted as a loser of the Olympics due to its great financial debts, and high expenditures made on Olympic-sports infrastructure, and Barcelona, which minimised its direct investments to the Olympic sports venues and maximise indirect investments to the general infrastructure of the city. Figure 2.12 displays the relationship between direct/indirect investment ratio and over-capacity problem.

Table 2.8: Evaluation of the spatial organisation of the Olympic Games.

Spatial organisation of the Olympic Games		Advantages	Disadvantages
Venue design	*Multi-purpose buildings*	Maintenance cost can be more easily calculated.	Post-Games use of each venue is difficult to plan.
	Temporary constructions	It reduces costs and construction time.	Risk of turning into permanent structures in developing countries
Olympic stadium design	*adaptable seating-capacity*	Use of stadium more effectively and frequently	-
	Flexible roof design	Use of stadium more effectively and frequently	High cost
	Designing auxiliary facilities nearby	Opportunity to develop a mixed-use urban life	risk of triggering uncontrolled urban development nearby
Distribution of venues	*Concentration (Olympic Parks)*	Potential to turn the park into large-scale uses (university, urban park)	Difficult to sustain Olympic sports infrastructure, high costs of maintenance, long time required for reducing over-capacity problem
	Dispersion	Potential to use nucleuses of sports infrastructure to place sports in everyday life	Security concerns during the Games.
	Decentralisation through neighbouring cities	Opportunity to improve inter-city transport networks	Difficulties in inter-city transport
Location of venues in the city	*Inner city-deprived lands*	Venues will be the triggers of urban regeneration.	Unwanted inner-city congestion
	Periphery areas	Venues will be the triggers of urban regeneration	Unwanted urban sprawl
	Old industrial areas	Use of existing building stock	Difficult to create an architectural image
Venues-city relations	*Venues distant to city, close to each other*	Security provided, no inner city traffic congestion	Lack of city atmosphere, lack of locality sense
	Venues close to city, relatively far to each other	Potentials to construct new lines of transportation	Security concerns during the Games

Table 2.9: Comparison of direct and indirect expenditures of five Olympic cities, source: Brunet (1995).

	Tokyo'64		**Montreal'76**		**Los Angeles'84**		**Seoul'88**		**Barcelona'92**	
In millions of $US	*m of $*	*%*	*m of $*	*%*	*m of $*	*%*	*m of $*	*%*	*m of $*	*%*
Direct expenditures	452.116	2.7	2.824.863	89.0	522.436	100	1.467.853	46.5	2.460.855	26.2
Operational expenditures	169.510	1.0	411.857	13.0	450.394	86.2	478.204	15.2	1.361.156	14.5
Direct investments	282.605	1.7	2.413.006	76.0	72.042	13.8	989.649	31.4	1.099.699	11.7
Indirect expenditures	6.373.372	97.3	350.012	11.1	-	-	1.687.423	53.5	6.915.274	73.8
Total Olympic investments	6.825.488	100	3.174.875	100	522.486	100	3.155.276	100	9.376.129	100



Figure 2.11: Direct and indirect expenditures in relation to spatial requirements of the Olympic hosting.



Figure 2.12: Over-capacity problem and the share of investments in the Olympic project.

Primary motivations and spatial strategies for Olympic hosting: In Figure 2.13 below, field **A** indicates the development of the urban infrastructure that is planned regardless of the sports event. **B** is the infrastructure required for the sports event, which is anyhow planned for the development of the city. This primarily covers the transport infrastructure. **C** is the necessary structure that is needed only for the sports event and is not included in the city's long-term development plans. If **C** is too large, economic burdens of the event will be high and the problem of white elephants might occur. The scheme shows three fields where investments might be necessary. According to these researchers, a mega-sports event bid can only be justified if the event will provide urban development in a desired direction. They also quoted Huntoon and Wilson's (1994) statement that the benefits of large-scale events are greatest when the development associated with them is carefully integrated with the existing plans for a city.



Figure 2.13: Solberg and Preuss' (2004) scheme on city development and development through large-scale sports events.

Therefore, over-capacity problem can be analysed in relation to the investments made or planned to be made on the infrastructure. A city is going to organise a large-scale organisation, so it is needed to build a certain level of new infrastructure. Within this infrastructure, there are three packages which are primary, secondary and tertiary infrastructure (see Table 3.5). Indirect investments are in fact what Solberg and Preuss (2004) call as tertiary infrastructure in their analysis.

2.2.3. Absorption Capacity of the City

As it is underlined in the beginning of the chapter, mega-events basically refer to sudden agglomerations, which generate sudden swells in spatio-temporal terms. To cope with these changes, cities construct urban infrastructure like roads, underground lines, and develop their existing capacities of airports, hotels and other facilities. The study will suggest using the concept of *absorption capacity* to describe the context.

The term absorption capacity (AC) is derived from development economics, where it denotes the objective and measurable limits on a country's ability to make effective use of capital from abroad. In current EU discussion, it measures the ability of the EU member state to *'digest and consume'* the funds it obtained in order to foster its development and thus improve the economic and social situation in the country.

This study suggests the term to be used for indicating the city's ability of both **absorbing** the built physical capacity within a reasonable period of time and **squeezing** itself during the sudden agglomerations with its existing capacity. Absorbing refers to a longitudinal process, which indicates the potentials of a city. Population, population growth ratio and economic growth ratio are indicators of the power of absorbing. Squeezing, on the other hand, is related with a defined time interval. The framework for the absorption capacity can be drawn as follows:



Figure 2.14: Factors of total absorption capacity.

2.2.3.1. Squeezing (Absorbing Sudden Agglomerations during the Mega-Event)

During the mega-event, the host locality gets squeezed. The mass transit systems, the accommodation facilities and such infrastructure are used to the full or exceed the peak demands. It is possible to calculate the squeezing capacity by the following formula, which can be adapted in different variables of the existing capacity:



Figure 2.15: Proposed formula for calculating squeezing capacity.

The squeezing is related mainly with existing accommodation and transportation capacities. Meeting the accommodation requirements during the mega-event can either be accomplished by providing temporary solutions, like using large cruises as 4 and 5-star hotels, or by the existing facilities.

2.2.3.2. Absorbing (Absorbing the Built Capacity Over Time)

Population plays an essential role in the possibilities of later-use of the mega-event-purpose-built physical capacity. It is much easer to install big organisation into a big city which already has a demand. It is for instance easier to fill a stadium with a capacity of 65 000 in Seoul (9.9 million population) than of 60 000 in Seville (1.2 million population) (Metropolis 2002). Lillehammer, on the other hand, has a 23 500 population, while a 12 000 seat capacity ice-hockey hall was built in the city for the 1994 Winter Olympics. In addition to the population of the city, the dynamism in **population growth** is also significant. If the city grows fast, this means that the city will suffer from over-capacity problem for a much less period.

Economic dynamism is another factor of absorption capacity. Looking at Montreal, the city used to be the primary city of Canada in the 1960s. Most of the headquarters of companies were in the city. However, starting from late-1970s, the majority of economic activities moved to Toronto. Thus the city could not absorb the facilities built for the 1976 Olympic hosting, which also depended on the steady population growth and small size of the city.[5]



Figure 2.16: Relationship between population and the degree of problem of over-capacity.

In candidate or bidding cities, especially the developing cities, the investments spread over a longer period of time. So the absorbing abilities are high, since the city is growing and requirements are increasing, like transportation facilities.

2.3. CONCLUSION

This chapter was a theoretical discussion of mega-event hosting, which tried to develop a conceptual framework by evaluating Olympic Games and Olympic host, candidate and applicant cities. Within this framework, first, physical capacity building was reviewed. Second, mega-events were evaluated regarding their potential to generate over-capacity problem, which indicates over-supply in infrastructure built specifically for a mega-event. Third, the process of absorbing the created capacity was discussed with reference to Olympic host and candidate cities' characteristics.

[5] See 4.3.4.5 for details.

Physical capacity building (PCB) contains two cases. The first one is the Olympic city's preparations, which has a clear timetable and has to be finished before the event is held. The Olympic infrastructure should sustain IOC standards and should all be completed for the event. It is an intensified capacity building process.

The second case is the Olympic bidding cities' preparations. The physical capacity is not totally built. The developments are not squeezed into 7-year preparation period. There is an opportunity to use the mega-event as an urban development and regeneration strategy. If the bidding of a city lasts for more than one Olympics, then physical capacity-building will advance in a wider time interval.

PCB has three spheres of infrastructure that are described by Solberg and Preuss (2004). The *primary* and *secondary* spheres are described by the IOC standards. The host city is obliged to maintain sports venues, accommodation facilities (Olympic Village) and training facilities for athletes within the framework of these standards. Spatial organisation of these facilities (dispersed/concentric venues, core/periphery locations) and their architectural styles and technologies are defined by the host city. The *tertiary* sphere covers both auxiliary improvements like city centre rehabilitation and renovation projects, and essential requirements like accommodation facilities and transport/communication networks. They are called as indirect investments since they do not cover any construction of Olympic sports venues.

The other two concepts of the study are over-capacity problem (OCP) and absorption capacity (AC). There is a cause-effect relationship between PCB and OC, while AC proposes a contextual framework for OCP (See fig. 2.17).

The emergence of OCP takes place either by Olympic hosting or by Olympic bidding. In general, OCP emerging from the direct investments (primary and secondary infrastructure) is the problem of under-utilisation of single venues which remained idle in the post-event period. The literature names the situation with the phenomenon of *white elephant*. However, OCP has a wider meaning. The white elephant that is the concept used to describe the situation is an appearance of OCP.

In fact, the context of the Olympic Games makes the over-capacity problem inevitable. This context is drawn by the IOC, which is the owner of all the rights of the organisation and it directs the degree of capacity-building process. The institution decides which sports are included in the mega-event, how much seating capacity is

required for each venue, which city is to host the forthcoming event…etc. The responsibility of building physical capacity belongs to the host city. And the IOC does not construct a scenario for the economic sustainability of these infrastructures for that city. The IOC runs the city-selection evaluation process on the criteria it has defined. It turns the event into a competition and the costs that will be faced after the event are left to the host locality. Therefore, it is stated that the over-capacity problem can only be controlled but not removed. The degree of over-capacity can be predicted before, and spatial strategies in accordance to the threats can be developed.



Solberg & Preuss (2004)

Figure 2.17: Relationship between three concepts of the study.

Table 2.10: Relationship between mega-events and populations of (greater metropolitan areas of) the host cities.

Year	Olyimpic Games - (S):summer, (W): winter	Expos (*: registered universal expos)	World Athletic Championships	Universiade (World Student Games)	Mediterranean Games
1981				Bucharest, Romania	
1982		Knoxville (USA)			
1983			Helsinki (Finland)	Edmonton (Canada)	Casablanca (Morocco)
1984	Los Angeles (USA)S Sarajevo (Yugoslavia)W	New Orleans (USA)			
1985				Kobe (Japan)	
1986		Vancouver (Canada)			
1987			Rome (Italy)	Zagreb (Yugoslavia)	Latakia (Syria)
1988	Seoul (Rep. of Korea)S Calgary (Canada)W	Brisbane (Australia)			
1989				Duisburg (Germany)	
1990					
1991			Tokyo (Japan)	Sheffield (UK)	Athens (Greece)
1992	Barcelona (Spain)S Albertville (France)W	Seville* (Spain)			
1993		Taejon (S. Korea)	Stuttgart (Germany)	Buffalo (USA)	Languedoc- Raussillon (France)
1994	Lillehammer (Norway)W				
1995			Gothenburg (Sweden)	Fukuoka (Japan)	
1996	Atlanta (USA)S				
1997			Athens (Greece)	Sicily (Italy)	Bari (Italy)
1998	Nagano (Japan)W	Lisbon (Portugal)			
1999			Seville (Spain)	Palma de Mallorca (Spain)	
2000	Sydney (Australia)S	Hanover* (Germany)			
2001			Edmonton (Canada)	Beijing (China)	Tunis (Tunisia)
2002	Salt Lake City (USA)W				
2003			Saint-Denis-Paris (France)	Taejon (S. Korea)	
2004	Athens (Greece)S				
2005		Nagoya* (Japan)	Helsinki (Finland)	İzmir (Turkey)	Almeria (Spain)
2006	Torino (Italy)W				
2007			Osaka (Japan)	Bangkok, Thailand	
2008	Beijing (China)S	Zaragoza (Spain)			
2009			Berlin (Germany)	Belgrade, Serbia	Pescara (Italy)
2010	Vancouver (Canada)W	Shanghai* (China)			
2011			Taejon (S. Korea)	Shenzhen, China	
2012	London (UK)S				

Under 500.000 | 500.000 – 1 million | 1 million – 3 million | 3 million – 5 million | Over 5 million

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter has dealt with the question of *what* the research is trying to find out. This chapter will try to answer *how* the research will be conducted and what data are necessary to answer the research questions that are expressed in 3.2.4.

3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN

Research methods can be classified in various ways; however the most common distinction is the qualitative and quantitative methods. In quantitative research, the study has pre-determined hypotheses that will be measured and tested. The data is subject to numerical examination. The researcher is considered external to the research. The results of the data analysis can be generalizable to a larger unit of analysis. Examples of quantitative research in social sciences include survey methods, mathematical modellings, and statistical means. The research is carried out for *theory-testing* in general.

Qualitative research concentrates more on *theory construction* (Layder 1993) and it is more appropriate to analyse processes. The context of the study can be well established. The researcher is a part of the research, by observations or interviews with other people. Hypotheses are generated during data collection and analysis.

Concerning the research questions which focus on the spatial analysis of the process of mega-event hosting, the research design of this study will be structured on a qualitative analysis. The proposed methodological framework and the research design is given in Figure 3.1.

3.2.1. Research Strategy

The research strategy of the qualitative analysis is based on two *case studies* –Athens and Istanbul, and a *historical analysis* of Olympic cities. Case studies provide a deep understanding of phenomenon, events, people, or organisations (Berg 2006: 292). They are preferred when examining a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context. Case studies can be studied in many ways. Table 3.1 summarises different approaches to case study designs. In this research, there are two case studies. The case of Athens will be a *pre-post case study*, within which the whole process of Olympic hosting is analysed. The Olympic Games is the critical event that separates the process, and pre-post analysis helps to explore the theoretical framework and proposed concept in a better way. The second case that focuses on Istanbul's Olympic bids will be a *longitudinal case study*. The whole case study design of the research will be a *patchwork case study* (See fig. 3.2).

Table 3.1: Approaches in case study design, source: Berg (2006).

	Case Study Design Types
Yin (1994) Winston (1997)	Exploratory case studies Explanatory case studies Descriptive case studies
Jensen & Rodgers (2001)	Snapshot case studies Longitudinal case studies Pre-post case studies Patchwork case studies



Figure 3.2: Proposed case study design.



Figure 3.1: Methodological framework of the study.

3.2.1.1. Historical Analysis: Olympic Host Cities

Historical analysis will add empirical and theoretical depth to the analysis of the study, which has a contemporary focus. It will also have a crucial role in refining the theoretical concepts that are presented in Chapter 2. The historical analysis will also give the answer of why Athens will be chosen as a case study.

In the analysis, the Olympic cities history will be investigated under five phases, within which the fourth and fifth phases will be analysed in detail (1960-1996 and 2000-present periods). The phasing will be made depending on the concepts proposed in the theoretical discussions (Chapter 2).

3.2.1.2. Case Study 1: Athens - 2004 Olympic Host City

Athens 2004 Olympic Games stands as a breaking point in the history of mega-event hosting, regarding the IOC's emphasis on post-Olympic use of sports infrastructure and future bid cities' spatial strategies to use these infrastructure in the post-event phase. The conceptual framework that was proposed in Chapter 2 is a new basis for a new model for the spatial analysis of mega-event hosting. This model will be tested with the case study of Athens. With a pre-post case study, the link between the two principal concepts of the study (capacity-building and over-capacity problem) will be constructed and the argument that mega-event hosting is a whole process with its pre and post periods will be tested.

3.2.1.3. Case Study 2: Istanbul - Olympic Bidding City

Istanbul is a city that had four consecutive Olympic bids, including 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 Olympic Games. In fact, Istanbul's bids for this mega-event have been the starting point of the whole study. The city has not hosted the Olympics or other mega-sports event, but many investments have been made and a capacity has been built in time. Many of these investments have remained idle for a period of time as well. The case study of Istanbul's Olympic bids will aim to answer the question: What

are the potentials of the city in order not to face over-capacity problem and is it possible to make a correlation between city size and dynamism in urban growth with absorption capacity of the city?

3.2.2. Data Collection Instruments and Procedures

There are three data collection instruments in qualitative analysis: Reading (**documents**), asking (**interviews**), and watching (**observations**). In this study, data-gathering methods will include documents analysis, semi-structured interviews and observation in field trips. Data collection procedures are conducted in relation to the pre-event and post-event phases of the Olympic hosting.

3.2.2.1. Documents

There will be three major sources of data in terms of documents. First, the official documents published by the IOC and candidate / applicant cities will be analysed. They include the candidacy files of candidate cities, official reports of the Olympic host cities, and the reports of the IOC sessions. These data are available in the library of the Turkish National Olympic Committee (TMOK), the library of the Hellenic Olympic Committee (HOC), the official website of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (http://www.olympic.org) and the private website of Juergen Wagner (http://www.olympic-museum.de). Historical analysis will mainly be based on these data.

Second, press releases will be studied. The first group of these releases will cover the Athens 2004 Olympic preparation phase and the post-Olympic period. Given that the post-event period debates in Athens are very contemporary and still maintaining their appeal in written and visual media, the press releases are used first as a source that gives information on the issue, which have not been officially published yet, so cannot be reached through other channels of information. These resources will also be used for obtaining information on the content and actors of debates, which will give clues about the problems, emerged in the post-event period. The survey of press releases in Athens will cover the time period of September 1997-June 2005, from the day that

Athens was declared as the 2004 Olympic city, to the day the field trip is over in Athens.

The second group of press releases will be on the Olympic bidding story of Istanbul, which will provide information on different expectations of different actors from the Olympic Games, physical capacity building processes regarding the construction of sports venues, and the construction of the Olympic Stadium. The data will be collected from library of the TMOK, where all published news on the Olympic Games and the Olympic bidding of Istanbul have been archived starting from April 1996. The analysis of press releases will cover the time period of April 1996-May 2004. The start date of the analysis is relied on the library sources in TMOK. The end date indicates the announcement of Istanbul's elimination in the 2012 Olympic bid. Third, the secondary literature will be used.

3.2.2.2. Interviews

All interviews are in semi-structured format. The questions are scheduled and asked in a systematic way but in a conversation atmosphere, and the answers are allowed to be unscheduled probe. The interviews are conducted face-to-face and within the working hours of the interviewees and in their office environment. They are not tape recorded but recorded by taking notes. The study has nine interviews in total, four conducted in Athens and five in Istanbul. Interviews are made with persons who either involved in or were excluded from significant stages of the Olympic story in Athens and also in Istanbul. The themes of the interviews and the names of the interviewees are displayed in Table 3.2.

3.2.2.3. Observations

A 4-month field trip was conducted in Athens, in the period February 2005- June 2005, which provided the researcher the opportunity to make direct observation in the Olympic city. This experience has shaped the theoretical discussions that are presented in the previous chapter.

Table 3.2: List of interviewees and their positions, and the themes of the interview questions.

	Athens	**Istanbul**
Names and positions of interviewees	*Eleni Iliopoulou (urban planner in the ORSA)* *Viron Ioannou (instructor in the NTUA)* *Yiannis Polyzos (professor in the NTUA)* *Pavlos-Marinos Delladetsima (professor in the HU)*	*Yalçın Aksoy (General Director of HDK)* *Cem Atabeyoğlu (journalist, TMOK)* *Cüneyt Koryürek (journalist on sports)* *Üner Kırdar (son of Lütfi Kırdar)* *Aron Angel (urban planner-assistant of Henry Prost)*
Themes of interviews	*- Involvement in / exclusion from Olympic hosting process* *- Site-selection for the Olympic venues* *- Expectations from Olympic-sports infrastructure* *- Evaluation of Olympic project in relation to urban development dynamics of Athens*	*- Rationales behind the eagerness of Istanbul to host the Olympics* *- Site-selection process for the Olympic Park and stadium* *- Organisational successes and deficits in bidding processes*

3.2.3. Data Analysis

Data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the collected data. All data from documents (including press releases and official reports) and interviews are recorded in data cards and they are organised in accordance with the sub-titles of chapters. It is an evolutionary process, the outline and the sub-titles change in time when more data are collected. Athens and Istanbul cases are constructed as narratives.

3.3. CONCLUSION

The following three chapters will compose the research strategy of the whole study. First, historical analysis will be made on Olympic host cities. Second, the city of Athens and its 2004 Olympic hosting will be reviewed. Third, Istanbul will be analysed as an Olympic bid city.

CHAPTER 4

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF OLYMPIC HOST CITIES

4.1. INTRODUCTION

The chapter will be about the historical analysis of mega-events, more specifically the Olympic Games, with an emphasis on the *physical capacity-building processes* of the Olympic cities in history. The aim is to figure out the breaking points and changing tendencies in terms of capacity-building. Depending on the Olympic hosting history, the study will discuss *over-capacity problem* and *absorption capacity* of cities.

4.2. EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN OLYMPIC GAMES

Mega-events can be accepted as the reflections of the Modernity project, which has brought about the foundation of *universal values* and the matter of *progress*. The Industrial Revolution had tightened these objectives. Progress brought about a forcing of the existing abilities and building of new abilities/capacities in every fields of life. Standardisation of rules in national and international arenas came about, and spatially defined boundaries for each branch of sports-measures of sports venues appeared. In addition to that, international mega-sports events started to be formed.

Mega-sports events in the industrialisation era differed from the pre-industrial period in many aspects. First, religious meanings and dedications for divine world were replaced by secularism. Second, there appeared a division between athletes and

spectators. Third, bureaucratic and complicated organising bodies took the issue of organisation under specific institutionalisations. Fourth, spatial organisation of sports venues has changed and on-purpose venues were constructed.

The Industrial Revolution itself was not sufficient for the emergence and revival of mega-events. Three conditions supported the revival and development mega-events. First, there was a condition of capital discharging as an outcome of 1847-1848 crisis of capitalist over-accumulation, within which both surpluses of labour and capital lay idle and in exceeding quantities (Harvey 1989). Beginning from the 1850s, the capitalist system underwent a structural re-organisation in order to seize the control of production-consumption. There occurred a mega-growth in foreign trade and investments, which led the large capitalist powers to open the way of globalisation. The figures 5.1 and 5.2 display the boom in the sector of construction within the interval of 1850-1870. The period corresponds to the two cities' host of major mega events: London hosted 1851 and 1862 world fairs and Paris hosted 1855 and 1867 fairs and 1900 Olympics.

Second, developments in transportation and communication technologies transformed the circulation patterns of goods and people. The development of the steam engine provided an important territorial expansion for maritime and railway transport systems. From the 1880s, the railway networks expanded tremendously and became the dominant land transport mode both for passengers and freight. And the first public urban transport systems emerged. Underground metro systems began to be constructed, London being the first in 1863. Technological developments of the 19th century brought about new concepts of mass travel and mass tourism.

The era also marked the first significant developments in telecommunications. So the expansion of the railway network, the advent of the telegraph, the growth of steam shipping, and later the start of radio communication, the expansion of bicycle and automobile travel, all brought about new modes of experiencing time and space. The period of 1850-1870 covered the foundation of a new world market through the transportation and communications system (Harvey 1985a: 70).

They later triggered the third field, the field of consumption with newly invented social practices. Emergence of mass markets, sector of advertising, fashion for masses came out as the new conditions. They generated the emergence of international platforms,

which were to generate and display progress in three fields. World Expos and the Modern Olympic Games were the two major mega-events of this period.



Figure 4.1: Investment in built environment in Britain, 1835-1914 (million £ at current prices), source: Harvey (1985b).



Figure 4.2: Construction activity in Paris, 1800-1910 (entries of construction materials into the city, millions of cubic meters), source: Harvey (1985b).

4.2.1. World Expos (Fairs)

There is a direct relation between World Expos and capitalism and industrialisation (Bilsel 2007: 31). The first exposition was held in the Crystal Palace, built within the Hyde Park, 1851, London. Since the country experienced high degree of industrialisation, there was enough capital available for the organisation of the event and construction of the exhibition building. But a single building gradually remained insufficient for such a large-scale event. Beginning from the 1876 Philadelphia Expo, host cities began to provide other nations a piece of land to construct their own distinctive pavilions. This brought about the problems of site-selection and planning. Furthermore, beginning from the late 19th century, the nature of expos had gradually

changed in a way that they began to cover not only product-exhibition but also touristic entertainment sections which involved various shops, cafés…etc., and this increased the number of visitors to expositions. Consequently, spatial and institutional planning of the organisation became an important issue.

Contents of exhibitions were also spectacular, consisting of raw materials from around the world, new productive and communicative technologies, new products and commodities, art objects and scientific information. They were imposing the idea of progress and popularising the items of this progress (Roche 2000: 44-45). Sports events followed expos and they gradually substituted them in terms of significance and the role played within social life. Regarding the themes, the Expo history can be divided into two periods. In the beginning, the themes of the events focused on industrial development, inventions and discoveries. Up to 1970s, the themes concentrated on progress and technological development, whereas with the concerns about natural environment the themes shifted towards limits of progress with the consideration of sustainable development (Zelef 2007: 16). Beginning from the mid-1990s, sustainability and natural values were put into the centre in terms of expo themes (Akyol Altun 2003).

Regarding the organisational structure, the World Expos history can be grouped under two periods. In the first period, during 1851-1931, the expos continued in an unregulated basis and a non-standard frequency (see Table 4.1). The increasing interest to host the event and the ambiguity in the selection of the host location generated a need to establish regulations to improve relations between organisers, participants and inviting governments and to control the frequency. An International Convention was made in 1928 and the expositions were classified according to frequency, scale and the land required. In this second period, two groups of events were defined: *Registered* (universal) and *recognized* (international or special) expositions (see 2.2.2.a. in Chapter 2 for details). Thereafter, universal expositions were held less frequently and on a larger land with a longer duration (See Table 4.2).

Turkey's involvement in the events started in the 19th century. The Ottomans founded a pavilion in the 1873 Vienna Exposition (Tümer 2007). Turkish Republic participated in World Fairs first in 1930, in Budapest (Durhan 2006). This fair was not a world expo but an architecture-specific exposition. The fair was used as a platform for the representation of the young republic. In the 1939 New York Expo, the pavilion of

Turkey was criticised in the country since the characteristic elements of the Ottoman architecture was revived with nostalgia despite the theme of the expo *"building the future"* (ibid.) In 1958 Brussels Expo, the new republic and the modernity project was once more represented by underlining the culture of previous civilisations in Anatolia. Turkey became an official member of BIE in 2004, and in 2005 Izmir was proposed to host the 2015 World Expo. With the studies of Izmir Commerce Union, expo-hosting was added to strategic plans of the city (Gökçe 2007).

Table 4.1: List of universal expos and the area used for these events in 1851-1929, source: BIE official website http://www.bie-paris.org.

Year	City-Nation	Theme	Area (ha.)	Attendance (million)
1851	London, England	Industry for all Nations	10,4	6
1855	Paris, France	Agriculture, Industry and Arts	15,2	5,1
1862	London, England	Agriculture, Industry and Arts	15,2	6
1867	Paris, France	Agriculture, Industry and Arts	68,7	15
1873	Vienna, Australia	Culture and Education	233	7,2
1876	Philadelphia, USA	Celeb. of Centennial of US Independence	115	10
1878	Paris, France	Agriculture, Arts and Industry	75	16,1
1880	Melbourne, Australia	Arts, manufactures, agricultural and industrial products of all nations	25	1,3
1888	Barcelona, Spain	-	46,5	2,3
1889	Paris, France	Celeb. of centennial of French Revolution	96	32,2
1893	Chicago, USA	Fourth Centennial of discovery of America	290	27,5
1897	Brussels, Belgium	-	137	7,8
1900	Paris, France	Evaluation of a century	120	50
1904	St. Louis, USA	Celeb. Of Centennial of Louisiana	500	19,7
1905	Liege, Belgium	Commemoration of 75th anniversary of Belgium Independence	70	7
1906	Milan, Italy	Transport	100	10
1910	Brussels, Belgium	-	90	13
1913	Ghent, Belgium	-	130	9,5
1915	San Francisco, USA	Inauguration of Panama Canal	254	19
1929	Barcelona, Spain	-	118	-

Table 4.2: List of registered (universal) expos and the area used for these events in 1933-2005, source: BIE official website http://www.bie-paris.org.

Year	City-Nation	Theme	Area (Ha.)	Attendance (Million)
1933	Chicago, USA	A century of progress	170	22
1935	Brussels, Belgium	Transports, Colonisation	152	20
1937	Paris, France	Arts and technology in modern life	105	31
1939	New York, USA	The world of tomorrow	500	45
1949	Port-Au-Prince, Haiti	Foundation of Port-au-Prince	30	-
1958	Brussels, Belgium	A more human world	200	41,4
1967	Montréal, Canada	Man and his world land	-	50,3
1970	Osaka, Japan	Progress and harmony for mankind	330	64
1992	Seville, Spain	Space age	215	41,8
2000	Hanover, Germany	Human, nature, technology	160	18
2005	Aichi, Japan	Nature's wisdom	173	22
2010	Shanghai, China	Better Cities, Better Life	-	-

Table 4.3: Periods in World Expo history.



4.2.2. Pierre de Coubertin and the Modern Olympic Games

The Ancient Olympic Games was revived by Baron Pierre de Coubertin, a nobleman born into the French aristocracy. He had become interested both in physical education and also in ancient Hellenic civilisation in the 1880s. De Coubertin decided to reveal the Olympic Games in 1889. His idea of the Olympic movement was constructed on the bases of modernity, humanity, rationality and progress (Segrave, 2000: 271). The 18th century was the period of establishment of universal values. A renewed interest was born on this foundation in the field of studying and discovering the Hellenic world. Recovery of classical ideals and spatial organisation of the Antique world was associated with the European thought. Coubertin presented his ideas about the revival of these ancient Games in an international sports conference held in Paris in 1894 (Tzachrista 2002a: 30). His idea was to host these Games concurrently with the Universal Exposition of Paris in 1900. Concerned that a six-year waiting period might lessen the interest in the Olympics, the congress decided to hold the first Olympics in 1896. Several congress members suggested London as the location of the first Games, but later Athens was accepted as the first Olympic host city since Greece was the homeland of the Ancient Games.

Turkey has participated in the Olympic Games from the very beginning of the organisation. The Ottoman Empire established the National Olympic Committee immediately after the declaration of Meşrutiyet II in 1908 by the leading person Selim Sırrı Tarcan. The National Olympic Committee became the official member of the IOC in 1911. Due to the World War I, Turkey was excluded from 1920 Antwerp Games and its membership was cancelled till 1921. The economic crisis prevented the country to send athletes to 1932 Los Angeles Games.

4.3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES

Essex and Chalkley (2001, 2002) divided the history of the Summer Olympic Games into four phases regarding the degree of changes the Olympic cities have experienced in their spatial organisation (See Table 4.4). The first phase as they call the early Games (1896-1904) were small-scale, poorly organised and had minimal urban impact. In the second phase (1908-1932) the event became larger in scale, better organised and usually involved the construction of new purpose-built sports facilities. During the third phase (1936-1956), the sports facilities emerged as national symbols of the host country and consequently began to attract more attention, although their wider urban impacts remained rather modest. Since 1960, which represents the fourth phase, the Games have often been used to stimulate urban projects and consequently had a much more substantial impact on the urban environment of their host cities.

Table 4.4: Essex and Chalkley's (2002) study for the phasing of the Olympic cities in history.

PHASES	OLYMPIC CITIES	FEATURES OF PHYSICAL CAPACITY-BUILDING
Phase one (1896-1904)	Athens1896, Paris1900, St.Louis1904	*-Small-scale* *-Poorly organised* *-Not necessarily involving any new development*
Phase two (1908-1932)	London1908, Stockholm1912, Antwerp1920, Paris1924, Amsterdam1928, Los Angeles1932	*-Small-scale* *-Better organised* *-Involving construction of purpose built sports facilities*
Phase three (1936-1956)	Berlin1936, London1948, Helsinki1952, Melbourne1956	*-Large-scale* *-Well organised* *- Involving construction of purpose built sports facilities with <u>some</u> impact on urban infrastructure*
Phase four (1960-…..)	Rome1960, Tokyo1964, Mexico City1968, Munich1972, Montréal1976, Moscow1980, Los Angeles1984, Seoul1988, Barcelona1992, Atlanta1996, Sydney2000, Athens2004	*-Large-scale* *- Well organised* *- Involving construction of purpose built sports facilities with <u>significant</u> impact on urban infrastructure*

Essex and Chalkley's study is a grouping of the Olympic Games concerning the influence of the mega-event on the host cities' facilities, environment and infrastructure, which can be called physical capacity-building process. This grouping could be improved by dividing the fourth phase into two other sections in order to emphasise the emergence of the concern of over-capacity problem in host cities while constructing their sports infrastructure (See Table 4.5).

Table 4.5: Proposed phasing of Olympic hosting history.

PHASES		FEATURES
grouping of Essex & Chalkley)	Phase one (1896-1904)	*No physical capacity-building*
	Phase two (1908-1932)	*Small-scale capacity-building*
	Phase three (1936-1956)	*Physical capacity-building in sports facilities*
phases proposed for period 1960-…	Phase four (1960-1996)	*Physical capacity-building in urban scale*
	Phase five (2000-....)	*Emerging concerns about over-capacity problem*

4.3.1. Phase One (1896-1904): No Physical Capacity-Building

The first modern games was organised in Athens in 1896, concerning the symbolic meaning of the revival. The Greek government at that time wished to make a modernisation of the country and give Greece a character similar to western powers (Tzachrista 2002a: 30). However, in December 1, 1893, the government announced that the country was bankrupt, therefore the initial enthusiasm about hosting the Olympic Games turned into an intense concern. Athens resisted to the hosting due to its economic situation, but the IOC insisted on this city-selection, underlining that the costs will not exceed a defined amount. Nevertheless, the construction of new sports venues and the restoration of the old Panathenean Stadium by far exceeded the initial calculations of de Coubertin (ibid.: 32).

Athens hosted 311 athletes from 13 different countries, with an audience of 80 000. Prior to the Games, many officials felt that Athens did not have the required resources to build any new infrastructure or facilities (Hutton 2001). But the Games were held with the financial aids of wealthy citizens. The Panathenean Stadium, which was originally built in the 2nd century A.D., was reconstructed by the aids of Averoff, a wealthy Greek businessman, for the first Olympic Games.

The Athens 1896 Games were held in few sports installations, within which the antique Panathenean Stadium held the most of the competitions (See fig. 4.3). A new velodrome was built for cycling and lawn tennis events in the southern coast of the city, near Faliron region. The third sports installation was constructed in Kallithea to be used for rifle events.

The construction of the cycling velodrome caused many discussions since de Coubertin claimed that it was too costly to build such a facility, *"which will be of almost no use afterwards"* (Tzachrista 2002b: 80). After the Olympic Games of 1896, cycling as a sport began to decline. The velodrome was turned into a football ground (ibid.: 82). In 1936, the field was renamed as Karaiskakis Stadium, which contained both football and athletic fields. Nevertheless, the physical capacity of Athens in terms of general city infrastructure enormously increased between 1896-1906 (Koulouri 2004: 46-48).

The following host cities, Paris (1900), St. Louis (1904) and London (1908) had displayed a remarkable degree of fast industrialisation, urbanisation and economic development in their era. The games were each held within an international expo event due to the lack of opportunities to construct purpose-built facilities for a sports event.

Figure 4.3: Panathenean Stadium in Athens, source: http://www.worldstadiums.com.

4.3.2. Phase Two (1908-1932): Small-Scale Physical Capacity-Building

The first attempts in physical capacity development started with London Expo 1908. For the first time a stadium was built specially for the Games (COOB'92 1992: 121). A swimming pool and a diving tower were built nearby. A World Exhibition was held concurrently with the Games. The fair grounds, and Olympic stadium, remained and served as the site for future exhibitions and events. The *"White City"*, which was built for exhibition structures, became a pleasure/amusement park, and the stadium has turned into a site for the training of Olympic athletes.

In between the world wars, there was an unexpected growth in spectator sports. However, the Olympic Games could not exceed the World's Fairs' popularity in any way. The **1924 Paris Games** were the first to have a discrete *Olympic Village* for the athletes. In order to solve the accommodation problem of athletes, a set of barracks were built near the newly built Colombes stadium and the Olympic pool (COOB'92 1992). Beginning from the 1936 Berlin Games, several other facilities such as training grounds, rest, recovery, and leisure areas began to serve for the athletes (Munoz 1997).

Construction of venues had become more significant by time concerning the whole organisation of the event. And the consideration of post-Olympic use of sports venues started to take shape. In the official report published after the **1928 Amsterdam Games**, it is underlined that the establishment of the new stadium in the Olympic Town should not be Olympics-oriented:

> "It was no easy matter to estimate how many spectators would have to be provided for. As a matter of fact this number alone could not serve as a criterion for determining the number of seats, seeing the Stadium was not to be built exclusively for the Olympic Games, but was intended to form the basis for a sound business proposition afterwards. After conferring with the Stadium Company it was decided that provision would have to be made for an average of about 40.000 people, as a greater number was an exception." (The Netherlands Olympic Committee 1928: 181)

Although the stadium was built as permanent, they tried to figure out other solutions for this permanence. They constructed semi-permanent seating capacities as a strategy to stay away from the over-capacity problem after the Olympic Games finished (See fig. 4.5). Due to the war years, there was a concern about holding as

much an economical organisation as possible. To cope with the limited resources, the organisers tried to build very few permanent buildings, many sports facilities (even swimming pools) were built with temporary structures.

The Organizing Committee of the **1932 Los Angeles Games** decided to use the existing buildings rather than constructing new facilities. The existing stadium (called Coliseum Stadium) with 105 000 seating capacity was renovated. The Olympic Park was also called the Exposition Park, since competitions in the arts were included alongside of the sports, as associated in the Ancient Olympic Games. An art museum was built in the park next to the stadium, as well as a swimming and a fencing stadium (X^{th} Olympiade Committee 1933).

Figure 4.4: Amsterdam 1928 Games Olympic Town,
source: The Netherlands Olympic Committee (1928).



Figure 4.5: Comparison of seating capacities of various stadiums, source: The Netherlands Olympic Committee (1928).

4.3.3. Phase Three (1936-1956): Physical Capacity Building in Sports Facilities

By the end of the World War II, cities often had to be courted by the IOC rather than dropping into a bidding process (Shoval 2002: 589). A new era started with the **1936 Berlin Games**,[1] witnessing a large political propaganda of sport, which Shoval (2002) called *"supernationalism"*. The selection of Berlin signalled Germany's return to the world community after the defeat in World War I. People realised that the Olympic Games had a potential for the transfer of ideas and messages through sport, which was the alternative of World's Expos that were showcases of technological development and political power.[2] This ideology in Berlin Olympics can easily be seen in a text written on the expectations of the organizers. The text was underlining the wish to show the German sports to the world:

[1] The initial host city of the 1936 Games was Barcelona, which at the moment went into deep political uncertainty. The IOC made a second election via postal vote, in which Berlin won the competition (COOB'92 1992: 211).

[2] Hitler used the games as a display of his political strength, which was later called "Nazification of sport" (Shoval 2002). In order to display heroic strength of pure German youth, the teams were constituted of Aryan race. Many Jewish communities, in various countries, asked for a boycott of these Games.

> "In order that the success of the Olympic Games may be assured, they must not be regarded as the exclusive affair of the German sporting and gymnastic circles nor of the City of Berlin, but must command the interest and support of the entire German nation. If they can be organized on this basis, the Games of 1936 will be the most outstanding Festival of modern times, for German interest in sport is not less than that of the United States and is probably greater than that of any country in Europe [...] the Olympic Games of 1936 will be the most imposing of all international festivals and at the same time a German celebration of unparalleled proportions." (The XIth Olympiad Berlin-Official Report 1936: 44-46)

In the Berlin Games, the organization did not build an Olympic-purpose stadium. The 32 000 seating-capacity of the existing stadium was increased to 80 000. The stadium had been built for the hosting of the 1916 Games, which could not be held due to the World War I. However, its capacity was found *"not large enough for an Olympic Festival"*, moreover, *"not even large enough for the daily demands placed upon it or for the activities of the German Institute for Physical Education, founded in 1920"* (Organisationskomitee für Die XI. Olimpiade Berlin 1936: 130). Consequently, it was decided in 1925 to enlarge the stadium by the addition of a sport forum, which was declared as an architectural competition. The Olympic Park of Berlin Games, called the Reich Sport Field, was obtained by this way. The construction of the field had to stop in 1928 due to the lack of funds.

Even the organising bodies planned to raise the stadium capacity to 80 000, it was again found not enough, and studies began in 1928 for the most extensive enlargements possible for the stadium. However, the last decision belonged to the Reich Chancellor, who visited the Stadium on October 1933 and said that the stadium capacity had to be enlarged at least to 100 000:

> "Upon being informed that the Stadium and arena could accommodate from 120,000 to 130,000 persons, the Chancellor declared this to be entirely inadequate, and he indicated on a topographical map provided by Herr March a large plot to the west of the Stadium which seemed to him extensive enough for assemblies, festivals and processions. Herr March calculated that this would provide the possibility for assemblies numbering as many as one half million persons and pointed out that he himself had considered the possibility of leaving a section of the west curve of the Olympic Stadium open so that the view would extend unobstructed to the landscape beyond." (Organisationskomitee für Die XI. Olimpiade Berlin 1936: 55)

Thus, before the hosting of the Olympic Games, the post-Olympic use of Berlin's Olympic Complex called Reich Sport Field was roughly drawn. It would be the node of mass demonstrations as well as daily sports facilities of the society. The old stadium was demolished in November 1933, and the new stadium was built. Berlin Olympic Stadium was renovated in 1998 in order to be used in the World Cup'2006 held by Germany.



Figure 4.6: The Olympic Stadium in Berlin 1936 Games,
source: The XIth Olympiad Berlin-Official Report (1936).

Figure 4.7: The Olympic Park in Melbourne 1956 Games,
source: The XVIth Olympiad Melbourne-Official Report (1956).

The **Helsinki 1952 Olympic Games** too, had an emphasis on the propaganda of the national development by hosting a mega-sports event. Helsinki had formerly put its candidacy for the 1940 Games, which was cancelled due to the World War II. The 1952 Games were seen as a good opportunity to demonstrate the nation-state of Finland to the outer world. Many sports venues had already been constructed in the city of Helsinki for the 1940 Games, but their seating capacities were found limited for this new candidacy. The capacity of the Olympic Stadium was raised from 50 000 to 70 000 seats by adding wooden stands. These stands were demolished immediately after the Games, in 1953 (The XVth Olympiad Helsinki-Official Report 1952: 44).

In the **Melbourne 1956 Games**, the Olympic Park was located in a state-owned land, approximately 9.11 ha. large and 1 mile away from the city centre. The park is adjoint to Yarra River close to the city: Swimming (S), football (F), hockey (H), cycling (C), and parking area (T) (See fig. 4.7). According to the official report, many venues existed before the city was honoured to host the Games.

4.3.4. Phase Four (1960-1996): Physical Capacity Building in Urban Scale

The importance of expositions and fairs declined in this period while the Olympic Games took the leadership of mega-events, with a steady growth in the number of countries and athletes competing in the Olympic Games. This was due to the advances in photography, radio and TV, which provided a new platform for the presentation of national ideology without handling huge costs of fairs and expos (Rydell, 1993 in Shoval, 2002). On the other hand, the World Football Cup started in 1933, and the power of sport concerning its impacts on people was understood. Therefore, construction of stadiums and their urban impacts have increased.

Cities of defeated countries of the World War II (Tokyo, Munich, Rome…etc) desired to re-establish the nation's position and to remove the negative image associated with these countries. Mussolini intended to show to the world the results of his politics, and the plan of the Olympic Games Rome'1960 was prepared well in advance from 1951. Japanese wanted to show the Western world the progress they had made since their defeat in the war (COOB'92 1992). Tokyo underwent a complete transformation to host the 1964 Games. Tokyo provided a village for the journalists for the first time. Munich used the old airport in the 1972 Games to build the Olympic facilities. The city

poured resources to the event. They built a subway and extended the airport. This time there was a press centre for 4000 journalists.

Munoz (1997) associates the Rome'60, Tokyo'64 and Mexico'68 Games with metropolitan growth while he relates the next two games (Munich'72 and Montréal'76) with urban land-use modification, since the latter cases' Olympic venues reinforced the very centre of the city. Investments to the city centre in Munich were very high, covering pedestrianisation projects, new underground line and station buildings…etc.

4.3.4.1. Rome 1960 Games

The 1960 Rome Olympics represented a break from an Olympic urbanism point of view (Munoz 1997). A new area started called the *"era of gigantism"* (Hutton 2001) where host cities spent large amounts of money on the design and construction of the Games. For the first time ever, there emerged a regional conception behind the location and installation of Olympic facilities. The company Rome Olympic Constructions was established in 1954 for the construction of venues. Future uses of venues were considered and two areas were selected as Olympic complexes in the light of the urban development plans of Rome. A 9 ha. state-owned land was declared as the Olympic Park, which was located in the north of Rome and called *Foro Italico* (See fig. 4.8), and within which the Olympic Stadium with 90 000 seating capacity was located. The second complex -called *E.U.R.*- was located in the southern part of the city, on the land which was previously drawn up for the 1942 World Expo. The *Acqua Acetosa* was a sports zone for training facilities, and also for future needs of Rome. It was 22 ha. large and 2 km. away from Foro Italico, and 4 km. from the city centre (The XVIIth Olympiad Rome-Official Report 1960: 53-67).

Table 4.6 displays the population and population growth before, during and after the Olympic hosting, which points to the rapid urbanisation in Rome in the post-war period. The demand composed by the increasing population eased the integration of Olympic investments into the city life in a short period of time.

Figure 4.8: The North Olympic Centre (Foro Italico) in Rome 1960 Games, source: The XVIIth Olympiad Rome-Official Report (1960).

Table 4.6: Population growth in Rome before, during and after decades of Olympic hosting, source: http://www.demographia.com

	year	Population (in thousands)	Population growth (%)
	1951	1 658	
			30 (1951-1961)
Olympic hosting (1960) →	1961	2 161	
			23 (1961-1971)
	1971	2 656	
			6.5 (1971-1981)
	1981	2 831	

4.3.4.2. Tokyo 1964 Games

The Olympic Games gave an impetus to Tokyo's already proposed 10 year development plan; therefore the city underwent a serious construction process including not only sports facilities but also city infrastructure such as harbours, highways and waterworks (The Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad 1964). To meet the traffic congestion at the time of the Olympic Games, and in view of the continued rate of population increase in Tokyo, a comprehensive plan for highway and road construction was projected. The completion date for the twenty-two main highways designated as Olympic roads was set as August 1964. A long term plan for the construction of five extension subway lines extending a distance of 108.6 kilometres was approved by the city authorities in 1946. In 1962 this plan was enlarged to provide for eight lines over 177.5 km. Two lines of 12.5 km.

and 9.4 km. were specifically completed in time for the Tokyo Olympics and were connected to the existing subway network (ibid.: 48).

The event was held in three main Olympic complexes, for which it was also decided to in principle "prevent the facilities from being scattered over too wide an area, but rather to have them as close together as possible in a number of districts in groups" (ibid: 47): The Meiji Olympic Park, the Yoyogi Sports Centre and the Komazawa Sports Park. Komazawa, being the largest complex with 41 ha., was originally planned for the 1940 Games, which was given to Tokyo but later cancelled due to the World War. It hosted the 1958 3rd Asian Games.

Table 4.7 displays the ratio of direct and indirect investments made in Tokyo for the 1964 Games. Taking into consideration the population growth ratios given in Table 4.8, it is seen that the city achieved to meet infrastructural needs as well as sports installations, which used to be as deficient capacities before the Games.

Table 4.7: Shares of direct and indirect expenditures made for the 1964 Olympic Games, source: The Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad (1964).

	Amount (millions US $)	Percentage
Direct expenditures	102.28	3.7 %
- Construction of sports facilities	46.07	1.7
- const. of Olympic Village	28.61	1
- Direct expenditures of Organizing Committee	27.6	1
Indirect expenditures	2 640.25	96.3 %
- Highway improvement	486.94	17.76
- park improvement	9.17	0.3
- sewage improvement	95.55	3.48
- water work improvement	105.83	3.86
- Sumida River cleaning	2.77	0.1
- improvement of incinerating plants	26.67	0.98
- improvement of Yokohama Harbour	1.67	0.06
- cons. of Tokaido trunk line	1055.55	38.5
- cons. of a grade separation	23.89	0.87
- improvement of underground railways	526.39	19.2
- extension of commuter trains into Central Tokyo	79.16	2.9
- improvement to the Tokyo International Airport	23.89	0.88
- subsidies for increasing hotel accommodation	87.22	3.18
- impr. of broadcasting and communication facilities	86.39	3.15
- others	29.16	1.06
TOTAL	2 742.53	100 %

Table 4.8: Population growth in Tokyo before and after decades of Olympic hosting, source: http://www.demographia.com

	year	Population (in thousands) Greater area / city	Population growth (%)
	1955	15 424 / 6 969	
			36 / 27 (1955-1965)
Olympic hosting (1964) →	1965	21 017 / 8 893	
			28 / -2 (1965-1975)
	1975	27 042 / 8 647	
			12 / -3 (1975-1985)
	1985	30 273 / 8 354	



Figure 4.9: National Stadium designed by Kenzo Tange, source: The Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad (1964)

4.3.4.3. Mexico City 1968 Games

The spatial strategy of the Mexico City Games developed on the distribution of venues. They were placed all over the city in order to benefit the spatial impacts of facilities in a much broader area. Therefore, spatial concentration of venues in a large Olympic Park was avoided. The city was selected for the Olympics in 1964, and got prepared in four years for 1968 Games. Before starting constructions, the organisers made trips to the previous Olympic sites; Tokyo, London and Helsinki, in order to have lessons from previous experiences. A new transportation infrastructure was planned for the connection of dispersed venues, which later turned into the city infrastructure.

The city already had a stadium that was built in 1952 for the World Cup. It was refurbished in order to comply with the standards of different associations of sports (Castillo 2002).

Table 4.9 displays the shares of Olympic expenditures in total budget. Although the new sports installations and the Olympic Villages seemed to be direct expenditures made specifically for the Games, they were projected as constructions of permanent utility for Mexico City as the Olympic legacy for the city. With respect to the two Villages, both have been converted into residential complexes (See fig. 4.10). Therefore, 56.2 % of total expenditures were evaluated as indirect expenditures (MEXICO 68 1969).

Table 4.9: Shares of direct and indirect expenditures made for the 1968 Olympic Games, source: MEXICO 68 (1969).

	Amount (millions U.S. $)	Percentage	Post-Olympic legacy
Direct expenditures	159.28	90.6 %	
- Sports installations	53.6	30.5 %	•
- Olympic Village for sports delegations	16.08	9.2 %	•
- Olympic Village for cultural delegations	12.72	7.2 %	•
- Direct expenditures of Organizing Committee	76.88	43.7 %	
Indirect expenditures			
- City works	16.56	9.4 %	•
TOTAL	175.84	100 %	

Table 4.10: Population growth in Mexico City before and after decades of Olympic hosting, source: http://www.demographia.com

	year	Population (in thousands)	Population growth (%)
	1960	6 290	
			55 (1960-1970)
Olympic hosting (1968) →	1970	9 800	
			42,7 (1970-1980)
	1980	13 990	
			12,3 (1980-1990)
	1990	15 710	

Figure 4.10: Miguel Hidalgo Olympic Village built for sports delegations in Mexico City 1968 Olympics, source: MEXICO 68 (1969).

4.3.4.4. Munich 1972 Games

The Olympic Park of the Munich Games was originally planned in 1963 as a sports complex, with a projection of 15-20 years (Essex & Chalkley 2001). The area called *Oberwiesenfeld* had been used as an airfield; however the recently-opened Munich-Reim airport left the area largely idle. The Olympic Games made a fast-track effect on this planning decision, and the abandoned land turned into a sports venue, with its glamorous suspension structure and landscape elements (see fig. 4.11).

Figures 4.12 and 4.13 display the locations of sports venues, the first of which is a map of existing sports infrastructure of the city that is ready for the mega-event, while the second shows the realised siting of the Olympic venues. It displays that the Olympic Games bring about new spatial organizations rather than using the existing infrastructure. According to the official report, total costs of the event amounted to 1,972 million DM. About 75% of these expenses were investments which met deeply felt public needs and will retain their value for decades.

With the Munich Games, the Olympics came across with the security problem since a terrorist attack took place against Israeli athletes. Munich is one of the few Olympic sites that has made further use of its facilities. Since 1972 over 7500 cultural and

commercial events have taken place in this area. The Olympic Park, 4 km. east of the city centre, has regenerated what used to be the neglected part of the city.

Figure 4.11: 1972 Munich Olympic Complex, designed by Frei Otto.

Figure 4.12: Potential sites for contests and training in Munich in 1966, source: Pro Sport München (1973).

Figure 4.13: The final location of the Olympic competition sites in Munich, source: Pro Sport München (1973).

Table 4.11: Population growth in Munich before and after decades of Olympic hosting, source: http://en.wikipedia.org

	year	Population (in thousands)	Population growth (%)
	1960	1 055	
			-29.3 (1960-1970)
Olympic hosting (1972) →	1970	1 311	
			-1.6 (1970-1980)
	1980	1 298	
			-4.7 (1980-1990)
	1990	1 229	

4.3.4.5. Montréal 1976 Games

Montréal had held a universal expo in 1967, and the same year they won the Olympic bid for 1976. Staging of the Expo forced the city to invest on transport and other infrastructure, which encouraged the city to bid for the Olympics (Roche 2000: 91). The person behind both of the organisations was the mayor of the city, Monsieur Drapeau, who wanted to carry out extensive redevelopment with no support from central government (COOB'92 1992). The City Council built a subway, a new airport, opened new accesses to the motorways made a new city underground with warm and comfortable shops. It also built the Olympic Village, stadium, and several sports halls in the Viau Park, which was located in the periphery of the city.

The history of the Olympic Park goes back to 1912, when the city of Maisonneuve, then a suburb of Montréal, decided to set aside a 204 ha. land for development of a sports and recreation area. In the late 1930s, a botanical garden was built in the park and some 46 ha. land was left for future development as a major sports complex (COJO'76 1978). During the mid-1950, the park had suffered from the reduction of its green due to the construction of parking lots, development, and highway construction (Hutton 2001). This caused much concern among citizens. Another concern raised on the construction of the Olympic Village for the accommodation of athletes. Architecture departments of universities developed many schemes for the village suggesting economic solutions. Nevertheless, the mayor Drapeau insisted on building four semi-pyramidal buildings being 19 storeys and containing 980 units in each mass (see fig. 4.14).

The 1976 Montréal Games was certainly a disappointment in terms of financial structure; hence the city remained with a $2 billion debt. Other cities were deterred from bidding for awhile due to this financial risk. Besides this financial extravagance, the projected benefit of constructed sports venues for the citizens of Montréal failed. It was said that these world-class sports complexes were to be used for athletic competitions at provincial and national levels (Hutton 2001: 35). Due to the fact that venues required high service costs, it became unaffordable for most Montréal citizens to use. Montreal used to be the economic centre of Canada by the mid-1970s. When all headquarters moved to Toronto, city started to lose population (see Table 4.12).

Concerning the lessons learned from the Montréal experience, the attitude towards the Olympic Games has inclusively changed and the phrase of *"less of a financial burden-more long-term benefits"* has become the leading strategy. Hosting the games in this period brought enormous costs, which prevented many cities to bid for the organisation. The success of Los Angeles depended upon this strategy of using as much as possible the existing infrastructure and constructing little.

Table 4.12: Population growth in Montréal before and after decades of Olympic hosting, source: http://www.demographia.com

	year	Population (in thousands)	Population growth (%)
	1966	1191	
			1.67 (1966-1976)
Olympic hosting (1976) →	1976	1 211	
			-25 (1976-1986)
	1986	980	
			12.9 (1986-1996)
	1996	1 018	

Table 4.13: Shares of direct and indirect expenditures made for the 1976 Montréal Games, source: COJO' 76 (1978).

	Amount (millions US $)	Percentage
Direct expenditures	1 596	100 %
- Construction of Olympic Park	987	61.8
- const. of Olympic Village	85	5.4
- other sports facilities	141	8.8
- operating costs (direct exp. of Org. Committee)	207	12.9
- other	176	11.1
Indirect expenditures	N.A.	N.A.

Figure 4.14: Montréal Olympic Park and Olympic Village,
source: Games of the XXI th Olympiad Montréal-Official Report (1976).

4.3.4.6. Moscow 1980 Games

The 1980 Moscow Games was subjected to the U.S. boycott, while the following games held in Los Angeles were boycotted by the Soviet Union in return. The Moscow'80 Games was the first sports event within which the mega-event was thought within the context of 5-year Economic and Social Development Plan. The Moscow Development Master Plan envisaged the installation of a sports infrastructure and divided the city into 8 planning zones, each one equipped with a recreational and social centre (Munoz 1997). After winning the bidding, sports centres were built in 6 different zones. The Olympic Village was built in an urban extension area in the direction of the city's programmed growth and it turned into social housing afterwards. A new metro line was constructed.

Table 4.14: Population growth in Moscow before and after decades of Olympic hosting,
source: http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org.

	year	Population (in thousands)	Population growth (%)
	1970	7 106	
			14,5 (1970-1980)
Olympic hosting (1980) →	1980	8 136	
			11,2 (1980-1990)
	1990	9 052	
			14,7 (1990-2002)
	2002	10 382	

4.3.4.7. Los Angeles 1984 Games

The 1984 Los Angeles Games marked a turning point in the history of the games. With its financial success, the meaning of the Olympic Games has dramatically shifted from *nation-level* to *global-level*. Due to the Montréal Games, being the host city for the Olympic Games was evaluated as undergoing a complicated and a loaded job in terms of expenditures and organisations to be made for the event. This situation has dramatically changed after the financial success of Los Angeles Games 1984. The core of the Los Angeles proposals was to use existing sports facilities in order to minimize capital construction costs. After regarding the Los Angeles' economic success in 1984, the number of bid cities for the 1992 reached to 6 (See fig. 4.15).



Figure 4.15: Number of cities bidding for the Olympic Games, source: Barton (2004).

Table 4.15: Population growth in Los Angeles before and after decades of Olympic hosting, source: http://www.demographia.com

	year	Population (in thousands)	Population growth (%)
	1975		
Olympic hosting (1984) →	1985	11 819	
	1996	12 500	13.44
	2006	12 950	3.6

Los Angeles was the only candidate city for the 1984 Games due to the fear of cities and the IOC after Montréal's debtful organisation. So the city had no competition with other cities at the international level (Andranovich *et al.* 2001: 119). The citizens of Los Angeles voted against public support and thus the era of privately financed Games started. The organisation was left completely in the hands of private enterprise, and neither the city nor the federal government paid anything from their budgets (COOB'92 1992: 185). This marked the beginning of the commercialisation of the games and the development of global Olympic sponsorship deals (Barton 2004). Beginning from the 1984 Los Angeles Games, the significance of this urban mega-event in terms of socio-spatial and economic impacts on cities became more apparent.

The Olympic Stadium already existed, built before the 1932 Games. Very modest investment was made in new facilities. The Games had little impact on the infrastructure of the city, but *"they were a substantial commercial success benefiting from increased TV income and business sponsorship"* (Essex & Chalkley 2001). In fact, Los Angeles had been the candidate city of the USA between 1947-1972 (LAOOC 1985).

Los Angeles made $2.4 billion investment for the preparation of the games, and there remained a net profit of approximately $ 250 million (COOB'92 1992; Essex & Chalkley 2001). An additional employment of 25.000 persons was created by the mega-event. This generated interest of cities toward staging this organisation. And the number of bids for staging the Games dramatically increased in the following Games. Cities started involving in this competition. And the focus has shifted from *"a competition between nations towards competition between cities and their metropolitan areas on resources"* (Shoval 2002:592), such as tourists and international companies.

The Games were spread out over a large geographical area, 250 miles long by 50 miles, in order to use existing facilities and so to avoid great expenditure (Hill 1992: 160). The organizing committee realized a surplus of $225 million following the Games.

4.3.4.8. Seoul 1988 Games

After winning the Olympic bid in 1981, a comprehensive urban plan was prepared for Seoul in 1982 (Pyu 1999). The major proportion of Olympic developmental moneys was assigned to Chamsil, the southern district of Seoul, designed as the main Olympic development area by the Korean government (Jeong 1992). The Games made the maximum use of the existing facilities by renovating and upgrading them into international standards (ibid.: 38).

The risk of the Olympic facilities to remain idle was taken into consideration in the comprehensive plan. Thus the facilities' use after the Olympics was the major concern when constructing new venues. Out of a total 112 competition sites, 13 were newly built. Of these 13, 9 were Olympic purpose venues and 4 were university gymnasiums. 72 of 112 were training sites, which were existing sites such as school gymnasiums and public physical education facilities (Pyu 1999). Although the share of the Olympic sports infrastructure was controlled and major part of expenditures was not done in this field, 15 new hotels were constructed to strengthen accommodation capacity of the city (Joung 1992: 52). The capacity of the existing airport was also extended from 4.5 million in 1985 to 8 million passengers in 1988 (ibid.: 52). It coincided with the strategy of Seoul to display itself to the outer world and to turn into an important tourism/congress destination.

As seen from Table 4.16, direct and indirect investments made in the Seoul Games were almost equal to each other. $1.45 billion was invested for indirect Olympic-associated projects of the 5th Social and Economic Development Plan, such as improvements in sanitation facilities, traffic flow and communications, and conservation and beautification of the environment (ibid.: 44). Han River was purified, and recreational areas were provided along the river. Improvements made on urban transportation network remained the most important Olympic legacy in Seoul. Apartments to house athletes, journalists and other game-operating personnel during the Olympics were constructed by private constructors and became residential units after the Games, thus alleviating housing problems.

Table 4.16: Shares of direct and indirect expenditures made for the 1988 Seoul Games, source: Brunet (1995).

	Amount (millions US $)	Percentage
Direct expenditures	1 467	46.5 %
- direct investments	989	31.4
- operational expenditures	478	15.2
Indirect expenditures	1 687	53.5 %
TOTAL	3 154	100 %

Table 4.17: Population growth in Seoul before and after decades of Olympic hosting, source: http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org.

	year	Population (in thousands)	Population growth (%)
	1970	5 311	
			55.5 (1970-1980)
	1980	8 257	
			27.7 (1980-1990)
Olympic hosting (1988) →	1990	10 543	
			-5.9 (1990-2000)
	2000	9 917	

The Olympic operations of Seoul'88 and Barcelona'92 were characterised by the existence of major urban renovation plans with two important focuses. Munoz (1997: 19) states them as follows:

> "…on the one hand, the city's urban and economic development clearly focused to encourage degrees of urban internationalisation and globalisation, and on the other, the recovery of urban elements on the edge of local economic circulation."

In both cities, in spite of their socio-economic and cultural differences, the Olympic interventions fall within very similar planning contexts. They had problematic areas that suffered from either environmental pollution or leftover warehouses…etc. In both cases, the *physical capacities* were improved with significant amounts of investments. The investments were mainly in terms of handling agglomerations in urban space: In Seoul, the international airport was connected to the Olympic Complex, and in Barcelona, the airport was improved and city-centre bypasses and metropolitan access routes to the road network were constructed (ibid.: 19).

4.3.4.9. Barcelona 1992 Games

The end of the 40-year Franco regime and the introduction of democracy into local councils in 1979 made it necessary to provide an answer to the problems created by the lack of an urban planning policy: massification and the shortage of land for infrastructure and leisure activities in the city (COOB'92 1992:75). During the 1960s, this deficiency was accompanied by a serious housing shortage. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the traditional industrial sectors of the city declined. The city wanted to get out of the economic recession and bolster development. The situation created a deteriorated urban core with unused factories in the waterfront and poor peripheral residential areas (Hutton 2001: 37). The declaration of Barcelona as the dirtiest city of Europe in 1980 enforced the city to cease the situation.

Therefore, in 1980 the city of Barcelona needed to set out a programme of constructing public spaces of great importance and strategic location. In line with this policy, it was decided to implement a programme of projects on a larger scale. These would cover old industrial and warehousing sites, which had stood as problematic areas for some years. The programme took the form of converting these sites into sports and leisure areas.

The discussions on the idea of Olympic candidacy started in 1980. In the mid-1982, the officials prepared a report that included intentions, objectives and goals in the route of the Olympics, and made lobbying to the visitors that came to the city for the 1982 Spain World Cup (COOB'92 1992: 219). And the operational framework for the candidature was formally established in January 1983. Before the planning process, the Barcelona City Council and Generalitat of Catalonia signed an agreement to constitute a Managing Council, which would function as the decision-making body. This council would bring together the institutions, set out guidelines for the Olympic project and coordinate the measures. Beside the Managing Council, an Olympic Office was established in order to implement the decisions taken by the council (ibid.: 225). These organisational establishments were completed by 1984, the year of the Los Angeles Games which would be a good chance to represent and discuss the Olympic preliminary project (ibid.: 231). Infrastructural works in the preliminary project included the enlargement of the airport, extension of the port to the west, extension of the existing railway line, construction of a new metro system in coastal line and two new ring roads (see fig. 4.17).

Being accepted in 1986 to host the 1992 Games, Barcelona started to use the Olympic project as the catalyst for improvements in the general infrastructure of the metropolitan area and for large scale planning projects, which would change the shape of the growth of the city. 12 pilot project areas were chosen as *"areas of new centrality"* and the private sector was guided in commercial and residential development, which would eventually lead to the revitalisation of the surrounding neighbourhoods. As a result of the strategy of integrating the Olympic project with the urban planning project, 5 areas were selected for the Olympic development. These were Montjuic Hill (Olympic Stadium and Swimming Pool), Diagonal, Vall d'Hebron, Poble Nou, and the Olympic Village (Hutton 2001) (see fig. 4.18).

The critical decision given on the location of the main Olympic venues has provided the opportunity of urban regeneration in the central Barcelona. Locating the main venues of the Games in Montjuic Hill (Olympic Stadium and the swimming pool) and a part of the Olympic Village in the waterfront area called Pablo Nou generated urban change in declining areas. The idea of building a single monumental sports complex was discarded, as in the long-run it would be an excessively burdensome operation for the city (COOB'92 1992: 237). So the spatial strategy was drawn as the decentralisation of Olympic siting through the sub-sites in the region of Catalonia. Only 38.5 % of the Olympic investments were made in central Barcelona (Brunet 1995).

The Olympic Games were not only seen as the construction of venues and public transportation networks between venues and city centre. Instead, the Games were used as a strategy of realising large-scale urban projects which would have not occurred under normal conditions. While building transportation network, ring-road systems of various cities were studied and assessment of various types of road constructions were made (COOB'92 1992: 83).

Before constructions started, a distinction was made between the *organisational expenditures*, which refer to the investments non-usable in the post-event period, and the *project expenditures* which point to those usable after the event. The first one was taken as true costs, while the second was not identified as cost but a long-run urban investment (Brunet 1995). Project expenditures were counted as direct investments which will have a direct turnover to the city after the event.

The reason for the success of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games may lie in the organisational model that was applied (Brunet 1993). Because of inter-institutional agreement between administrators, successful combination of public and private enterprise took place (guidance from the public sector, private development techniques).

The other key factor was that a well-organised financial planning was applied. As soon as the IOC declared Barcelona being the host city of 1992 Games, a municipal firm (called *Vila Olimpica Societat Anonima*) was established in order to start operations. Its responsibility was to organise the planning, financing and implementation of the Games. The City of Barcelona made an agreement with the central government over the financing of the Olympic projects and then established a holding company called HOLSA, which integrated public and private agencies in financing the operations. Consequently, private developers made most of the financial investment, while the design and management of the Games was largely public (Hutton 2001: 43).



Figure 4.17: Works of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games,
source: Brunet (1995), Spanish peseta was converted to US dollar.



Figure 4.18: Olympic sites used in Barcelona 1992 Games, source: Roberts (1998).

Barcelona stands as a good example among Olympic host cities, since the city placed its Olympic concept within the Barcelona 2000 Strategic Plan, aiming to obtain the position of the *"gateway to Southern Europe"* and using the event as a lever to raise its level of facilities and environment to world standards (Metropolis 2002). The success of the Barcelona 1992 Olympic Games can be summarised in the following quote from the CEO of the organizing committee,

> "The material legacy of staging the Games a decade ago was a godsend to Barcelona. The city was able to tackle the very hard economic crisis that followed in 1993 far better than other regions of Spain precisely because the Olympic investments had been planned with the permanent needs of the city in mind and with the temporary demands of the Olympic Movements" (Jose-Miguel Abad, The Daily Telegraph, 5 Nov. 2002).

4.3.4.10. Atlanta 1996 Games

When Atlanta was awarded as the Olympic city in 1990, there were two distinct visions associated with the organisation. The first vision belonged to the previous mayor who was also the chairman of the amateur athletic federation. He wished to put on a successful athletic event. On the other hand, the present mayor was describing two dimensions of the Olympic Games: He underlined that the aim should cover both staging a spectacular sports event and using the event to revitalise the inner-city (Andranovich *et al.* 2001: 120). In fact, Atlanta wished to remote the Los Angeles model in organisation and financing. Nevertheless, the city did not have sufficient amount of existing sports facilities to apply the L.A. model. Therefore, this insufficiency led the city to promote an extensive urban development agenda (ibid.: 122).

Table 4.18: Direct and indirect expenditures of 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, source: ACOG (1997).

	Amount (millions US $)	Percentage
Direct expenditures	1 410.4	82 %
- Construction of sports facilities	494.2	28.8
- Construction of Olympic Village	109.8	6.4
- Host Broadcast	141.3	8.2
- Direct expenditures of Organizing Committee	665.1	38.6
Indirect expenditures	310.4	18 %
- Transport	91.5	5
- technological infrastructure	218.9	13
TOTAL	1 721	100 %

Table 4.19: Population growth in Atlanta before and after decades of Olympic hosting, source: http://www.citypopulation.de.

	year	Population (in thousands)	Population growth (%)
	1980	2 550	
			20.3 (1980-1990)
	1990	3 068	
Olympic hosting (1996) →			38.4 (1990-2000)
	2000	4 247	
			20.9 (2000-2006)
	2006	5 138	

The most important legacy of the organisation to the city is the telecommunication infrastructure, which was built in order to attract technology-based companies of the U.S. The 8.5 ha. Centennial Olympic Park was created in the downtown Atlanta in order to provide a celebratory gathering place for all during the event. It did not include the main stadium. It was planned that the 85 000-seat Olympic stadium will be converted into the home field for a baseball team, and for this reason the half of the seating capacity was constructed as demonté, that can be separated from the main stadium (Sabbah 1994).

4.3.5. Phase Five (2000-….): Emerging Concerns about Over-Capacity Problem

After the Sydney Olympic Games, the IOC started using *"sustainability"* more often. However, fundamental changes occurred in the philosophy of the Games with the 115th IOC session held in Prague in 2003, within which Athens' Olympic preparations had a significant impact on the decisions taken on the IOC's politics against the increasing scale of the Games (Pound 2003).

4.3.5.1. Sydney 2000 Games

The most significant characteristics of the Sydney Games was its emphasis on the sustainable development. The organisation claimed that it was going to be not only a city beautification but also biodiversity protection including conservation of water and

energy resources. In 1992, the IOC published a report on sustainability, and declared 90 principles to be followed in design, layout, construction and operation of the Olympic facilities (Essex & Chalkley 2001). Sydney tried to fulfil these principles and the first action was taken in the remediation of the Homebush Bay that is going to be used as the Olympic Park.

Sydney's vision for the Olympic Games indeed dates back to the early 1970s, when the New South Wales Government identified Homebush Bay as a possible Olympic site (SOCOG 2001: 11). Homebush Bay was first suggested as the site of a future Olympic Park for the 1988 Games. However, the AOC (Australian Olympic Committee) selected Melbourne to bid for the 1988 Games, whereas the federal government declined to provide this candidacy at that time.

Homebush Bay, approximately 14 km. west of the Sydney's city centre, had been the site of the city's abattoirs, brickworks and depots over 200 years. Its waterways had become landfill sites for chemical and industrial waste as well as household rubbish (ibid.: 12). On February 1973, an environmental report was published and it raised the possibility that the area could be rehabilitated as a future Olympic site. And in the same year the area was assigned in plans as a *"potential Olympic site"*. Therefore, the spatial strategy for the area's redevelopment was put through an Olympic hosting.

The area was remediated and in 1988, Homebush Bay was opened to public as a metropolitan park. In November 1990, the AOC chose Sydney as the bidding city of Australia, while Brisbane and Melbourne had been nominated as bidding cities, as well. Sydney prepared a bidbook in which environmental considerations were placed in the centre of their bidding strategy. Sydney's bidbook made a turning point in the IOC's criteria, which started to give much more credit to environmental issues and sustainable Olympics (Vigor *et al.* 2004). The main spatial features of Sydney's bid were counted in the bidbook as follows (ibid.: 19):

- Concentration of Olympic venues in one central location [Homebush Bay area]
- All athletes located in one Olympic village adjacent to the Olympic Park
- All venues within 30 minutes of Olympic Park

Sydney was selected as the Olympic city of the 2000 Games in 1993. A new government came to power in 1995 and a full-time minister was appointed for the Olympics and he was given the responsibility for all of the Olympic-related activities except police matters. Under the minister, two important bodies were established. First, OCA (Olympic Co-ordination Authority) was founded to undertake Olympic works including construction of venues, urban development of Homebush Bay. Second, ORTA (Olympic Roads and Transport Authority) was established for transport planning and operations of metropolitan Sydney (ibid.: 26-30).

The OCA developed a master plan for Homebush Bay in 1995 (see fig. 4.19). In February 1996, the master plan concept was approved. Principles of development were drawn with this plan, which basically defined four project sites (SOCOG 2001):

- An urban core of sporting, entertainment, exhibition and commercial sites (Sydney Olympic Park will be in this development zone)
- A new urban district (site of the Olympic village-residential suburb for 5000 people)
- A major metropolitan park
- A waterfront development having a public access to the shores of Homebush Bay

The total Olympic construction budget was A$3.3 billion, with A$2.1 billion contributed by government and another A$1.2 billion contributed by the private sector (ibid.: 62). A post-Olympic Master Plan was made in 2002 in order to redefine the role, the function and objectives of the Olympic Park in Homebush. The plan covers the next 10-20 years of the area. There are two key strategies in the plan. The first one is called *"Shaping our Cities"*, which is a planning strategy for the Greater Metropolitan Region. It involves protection and improvement of natural and cultural environment and enhancement of public uses in the area. The second one is called *"Shaping Western Sydney"*, a planning strategy for the western region of Sydney and it directly addresses the issues of employment, economic growth, housing, accessibility, and environment (Sydney Olympic Park Authority 2002).

Figure 4.19: The 1995 Master Plan prepared for Homebush Bay, site of Sydney Olympic Park, source: Sydney Olympic Park Authority (2002).

Figure 4.20: Sydney Olympic Park at Homebush Bay, source: Sydney Olympic Park Authority (2002).

Haynes (2001) states that there is a concern that the sporting venues at Homebush may become a bit of a white elephants. According to him, the challenge is now to encourage event organisers to use the Homebush facilities for their events. This means that the facilities built in the Homebush Bay are in general non-affordable; therefore they remain unused and may turn into white elephants. The main stadium at Homebush Bay struggles to find a use for more than once or twice a year and it remains estranged from the rest of the city (Vigor *et al.* 2004).

4.3.5.2. Athens 2004 Games

Athens has opened a new era in the concept of *"Olympic hosting"*, within which the consideration of post-Olympic use of constructed sports infrastructure has become quite important regarding the Olympic legacy of this built physical capacity. The Athens case will be reviewed in detail in the next chapter.

Table 4.20: Population growth in Athens before and after decades of Olympic hosting, source: http://www.citypopulation.de.

	year	Population (in thousands)	Population growth (%)
	1991	3 523	
			6.5 (1991-2001)
Olympic hosting (2004) →	2001	3 761	
	2011 (projected)		

Table 4.21: Shares of direct and indirect expenditures made for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, source: Kathimerini (2004, 13 November), http://www.europa.eu.int.

	Amount (million €)	Percentage
Direct expenditures	**7 200**	**67 %**
Sports venues	2 150	20 %
Olympic infrastructure	2 860	26.6 %
Security	1 080	10 %
Other	1 110	10.4 %
Indirect expenditures	**3544**	**33 %**
Attiki highway	950	8.8 %
Two new metro lines	1 600	14.9 %
A new tram line	350	3.2 %
A new suburban railway	640	5.9 %
Unification of archaeological sites	4	0.2 %
TOTAL	**10 744**	**100**

4.3.5.3. Changes in IOC's Policies regarding Over-Capacity Problem

The substitution of Samaranch by Jacques Rogge in 2001 had significant effects on the politics of the IOC. Rogge started to express reducing gigantism of the Olympics. Before his election as IOC president, Rogge chaired coordinating committee for the 2000 Sydney Games and he got considerations about increasing costs and logistic challenges (Furrer 2002). In his first session in the IOC as the president of the body, he suggested to cancel a group of branches like baseball and softball, in order to limit the rise of the organisation (Clarey 2005, 06 May). He set up a commission in 2002 in order to analyse the current scale and scope of the Olympic Games. The charter of the IOC changed in 2002 with this commission's decisions, which were published as a report in the 115th IOC session held in Prague in 2003. While sustainability was previously limited to environmental considerations only, this report made a reference to the idea of Olympic legacy (see Table 4.22). A new definition was added to the role of the IOC that was drawn in the Olympic Charter, which is the idea of **Olympic legacy**:

> "(The IOC) takes measures to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host city and the host country, including a reasonable control of the size and cost of the Olympic Games." (ibid.: 5)

Table 4.22: Sub-titles of the first set of IOC requirements: Concept and Legacy, source: derived from 2012 candidature files.

CONCEPT AND LEGACY
- PROPOSED DATES TO HOST THE GAMES
- VISION OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES
- **LONG-TERM PLANNING STRATEGY**
- OLYMPIC LEGACY
- INFRASTRUCTURE LEGACY
- IMAGE AND REPUTATION
- PROMOTING THE OLYMPIC IDEAL

After witnessing Sydney 2000 hosting and Athens 2004 preparations, the main concern of the IOC has become the critical size of the Games, which was exceeding the capacity of most cities (Furrer 2002). The IOC wanted to take measures to counteract gigantism and over-spending. While there were 237 events and 159 NOCs in the 1988 Seoul Games, these increased to 300 events and 200 NOCs in the Sydney 2000 Games. The number of accredited persons has also doubled from 100 000 to 200 000 between 1984 Los Angeles and 2000 Sydney Games (Pound 2003).

The IOC wished to manage growth of the Olympics, while at the same time to keep the attractiveness of hosting the Games. The problem definition of the IOC focused on the financial burdens it took, and its definition of gigantism emerged from this concern. The decisions taken in this session were shaped by individual interests of the IOC rather than the concern of urban problems that Olympic candidate cities might face in their bidding processes. Looking at the decisions given on the games format (see Table 4.23), it is seen that the IOC wants to keep the compactness of the organisation, spreading venues over the city is not preferred, which in contrast would be a better strategy for a host city since it challenges the city to distribute social facilities more equally in the city or to support poorer neighbourhoods by settling nucleuses of sports facilities. All of the 2012 candidate cities underlined in their candidature files that they offered the concentration of sports venues in large Olympic parks (London, Madrid, Moscow, New York, Paris 2012 Candidature Files).

The bidding round for the right to host the 2012 Games was the first bid since the Charter change in 2002 that indicated the fundamental change of philosophy of the IOC. In July 2005, London was awarded as the host city of the 2012 Games. London set up its bids on the claim of *"transformation of run-down urban areas from eyesores devoid of investment into oases of green parks and sporting arenas"* (Howden 2005, 15 February). The bid company of London'2012 tried to persuade the IOC by underlining that its plans will act as an engine for physical and social change (Muir 2004, 20 November). One of the slogans of the bid was to create the *"Hyde Park for the East"*, which will be 127 ha. large.

Within this framework, the Games was decided to regenerate Lower Lea Valley and its surrounding area. The area was identified as an "opportunity area" in the 2004 London Plan especially for accommodating the growing population of the city (Vigor *et al.* 2004). The area has been deprived for years due to industrial uses, and inhabited by poor communities. Its closeness to the central London and the extensive waterways give the advantages to the area:

> "The Olympic Park will be created in the Lower Lea Valley, 13 km east from the centre of London. This area is ripe for redevelopment. […] The Olympic Park will become a hub for east London, bringing communities together and acting as a catalyst for profound social and economic change. […] The new facilities in the Olympic Park will be open to the whole community, not just elite athletes. This will lead to more opportunities for everyone to participate in sport and physical activity. This will create a more inclusive,

more active community, leading to a fitter society and reducing health inequalities." (London 2012 Candidature File)

The legacy plans in the London 2012 bid is to have the stadium converted into a 25,000 seat athletics stadium with a sports training, science and medicine centre following the Games. However, several football teams have expressed a desire to move into the Olympic stadium after the games.

Table 4.23: Decisions taken by the IOC in 2003 against gigantism, source: adapted from Pound (2003).

VENUES AND FACILITIES choice of location, capacity, construction, overlay and operations of venues	Maximise temporary installations over permanent construction, especially where legacy requirements are less than Games requirements. - Following the principles: Maximizes use of existing venues. Supports new permanent construction only if there is a legacy need, thereby avoiding *"white elephants"*. Promotes and accepts temporary solutions for Games needs. Supports the concept of sustainable development. - Temporary construction is significantly cheaper than permanent. - Ongoing maintenance costs for permanent venues would be reduced. - Temporary structures can be re-used for other purposes in other locations over a long period of time.
	Combine use of venues, provide multi-functionality.
	Develop venues in clusters. Several stand-alone venues are much more expensive than clusters.
	Develop venue design standards to prevent over-building, overservicing and over-spending.
GAMES FORMAT duration and location of the Games	Minimize travel times and distances between venues. The Games must be compact, not spread over the city
	Share venues wherever possible. Using venues for more than one sports event will prevent building extra venues.
	Duration of the Games will be 16 days, host city of the Games will be one city. The Games will not be hosted by two cities.

According to Shoval (2002), bids of London, New York and Paris make the beginning of a new phase in the history of mega-events. These cities have already hosted many mega-events in the past, which left an important physical capacity what Shoval calls *"construction legacy"*. The IOC favoured these cities due to this existing built infrastructure. After the fails of Birmingham'1992 and Manchaster'1996 and '2000 Olympic candidacies, The IOC unofficially informed the BOA (British Olympic

Committee) that *"in order for a British bid to be taken seriously, London needs to be the site"* (ibid.: 592).

4.4. CONCLUSION

This chapter studied the capacity-building processes in the previous Olympic host cities. It focused on the shares of direct-indirect investments in Olympic projects and populations/population growth ratios of Olympic host cities in order to figure out the interrelations between three concepts of the study, physical capacity-building (PCB), over-capacity problem (OCP) and absorption capacity (AC).

The historical analysis showed that beginning from the Athens 1896 Olympics, the Games generated concerns about post-Olympic use of venues. Cities tried to find out solutions to prevent idle installations, such as in Amsterdam 1928 Games, in which the stadium was designed with a high flexibility in terms of seating capacity. Cities which had previous Olympic candidacies, such as Helsinki, Los Angeles and Tokyo, had already have primary infrastructure and they did not require building many venues for the Games. They empowered their city infrastructure by making indirect investments.

With the Rome 1960 Olympics, it was realised that the mega-event was not only an issue of sports venue installation but also a locomotive and a form of urban development. Olympic host cities evaluated the event within this framework and developed different spatial scenarios (See Table 4.24).

Table 4.25 is a general evaluation of Olympic host cities regarding the three concepts of the study. Looking at the chart, Tokyo and Mexico City display similar demographic data, considering the population growth rate and size of cities. However, the shares of direct and indirect investments are contrasting to each other. In addition to that, spatial organisation of the mega-event was concentric in Tokyo while dispersed in Mexico City. However, these two cities lacked any kind of physical capacity, therefore the share of investments did not make effect on the emergence of OCP. Both cities absorbed the created capacity for two reasons:

- Both cities had a large population and population growth ratio,

- Both cities lacked any kind of physical capacity (sports infrastructure and city infrastructure) before the Games,

Therefore, they divert from Los Angeles, which is a large city but has a lower growth in population. Nevertheless, the city did not experience OCP due to that a very low degree of installations were made specific to the Games in the city. The city's AC is high, since the city squeezed during the mega-event with its existing physical capacity.

Looking at the two small-size cities, Munich and Montréal, spatial organisation of the Games and population dynamism is similar in both cities. Population growth is steady in the post-event period, and the main Olympic Park is a central and concentric one. It can be said that these cities, especially, Montréal, had a low AC. When reviewed the literature, it was underlined that Montréal is the city which experienced the greatest lost in the Olympics in terms of both financial and spatial results. The Olympic Park stayed idle for a long period of time. Since the direct investments covered a great share in total Olympic investments, the city suffered from OC for years.

Figures 4.13 and 4.14 display that Munich did not require to make PCB, since the city used to have enough sports venues to host the Games. But when hosting the Games, new installations took place, and the city faced with OCP. However, since the city had a strong sports culture, the venues were integrated to the urban life easily in the post-event phase.

The only difference between Munich and Montreal Games is the post-Olympic vision for the main Olympic Parks. In Munich, the area was used as recreational park, while in Montréal, it was reserved for future world-class mega-sports events. As a result, Montréal remained with deprived and non-used expensive sports venues, which can be evaluated as a high degree of OCP.

The chart in Figure 4.23 is a comparison of population growth ratio of Olympic cities, of which populations in the Olympic year were accepted as 10 million in order to see the growth patterns. According to this chart, Montreal and Munich are the cities with a slow (even negative) growth, while Tokyo, Mexico City, Atlanta, Rome and Moscow have a rapid growth in the post-decade of the Games. Looking at the pre-event decade, Munich displays a greater growth comparing to Montreal. Therefore, the following statements can be made:

- Population and pop. growth have a direct relationship with the AC of the city.

- In spatial organisation of mega-events, central or peripheral locational settings for the main Olympic Park do not directly make effect on the degree of OCP. It is rather the post-Olympic vision that defines the degree of the problem. In addition to that, connections of the site with the city have impact on it.

- Similarly, dispersed or concentric design of the Games does not have direct impact on the emergence of OCP. In case of lack of physical capacity, dispersed design will meet the districts sports and cultural area requirements, which means that they will be absorbed in a short period of time.

Looking at the Seoul 1988 hosting, the city initially did not have a required squeezing capacity, then the investments were made on the increase of accommodation, airport and transportation capacities, which would not only meet the requirements for the moment but also serve for future absorptions of extra agglomerations, like tourism and congress facilities.

Barcelona, a middle-range size city, is an example where the private sector introduced the organisation very seriously. Almost half of the investments were made by private initiatives. In Sydney, too, one third of the investments were held by private sector. However, since a concentric and large-scale Olympic complex was designed in Sydney, its turn-over to the city life does not resemble to the Barcelona case. Barcelona's success partially depends on the use of Olympic nodes as attraction points, which further generated their surrounding environment.

In general, the share of indirect investments which cover transportation, communication, infrastructure networks as well as accommodation and airport capacities is important in the degree of over-capacity problem. Because the investments made to these fields will remain to the city in the post-event period as physical legacies. Direct investments, on the other hand, are related with the Olympic venues and facilities, of which spatial distribution and relation with the city gains importance. However, it is the level of absorption capacity of the city that defines the ability of the city to manage with OCP. If absorption capacity is low, then the city will suffer from OCP for a longer period of time whatever the spatial organisation of venues is.

The historical analysis of Olympic cities showed that the statements and the conceptual framework put in the theoretical discussion chapter are consistent. This chapter provided to clarify the most important factors of OCP and AC:

- Direct/indirect investments
- Spatial organisation of venues
- Population and population growth
- Public and private share in Olympic investments
- Primary motivations and spatial strategies for Olympic hosting

The following part will be the in-depth analysis of the Athens Olympic hosting, within which the links between PCB in the pre-event phase and OCP faced in the post-event phase will be constructed.



Figure 4.21: Comparison of populations of Olympic host cities in history, Olympic year population is accepted as 10 in every city.

Table 4.24: Olympic cities after 1960 and their motivations and spatial strategies in hosting, source: partially derived from Munoz (1997), Vigor *et al.* (2004) and Hutton (2001).

Olympic Cities	*Primary motivations of hosting Olympics*	*Spatial strategies for Olympic sports venues*
Rome 1960	To generate urban development in a post-war atmosphere	Incorporating sports venues into everyday urban life after hosting the Games
Tokyo 1964	To generate urban development in a post-war atmosphere	Using the Games as a tool for realising 10-year development plan
Mexico City 1968		Distributing venues, connecting them with new transport infrastructure, which later turned into city infrastructure.
Munich 1972		Locating the Olympic complex and village in the city centre and reinforcing the centre with avant-garde urbanism
Montréal 1976	To promote the city's international image and demonstrate Quebec's independence from the rest of Canada	Locating the Olympic complex and village in the city centre and reinforcing the centre with avant-garde urbanism
Moscow 1980	To represent the Soviet power	Installation of Olympic sports infr. to 8 planning zones of the city, each equipped with a social and recreational centre, building Olympic village in a new urban extension of city
Los Angeles 1984		Maximising the use of existing facilities, minimising the spending on infrastructure, using university dormitories for athletes' accommodation
Seoul 1988	To provide national prestige, to open up the country to the world	Increasing the airport capacity, building transport infrastructure, easing the housing shortage by constructing Olympic village and journalist village
Barcelona 1992	To generate regional economic development, to draw an urban planning scheme	Locating venues with the concept of "creating areas of new centrality"
Atlanta 1996	To have prestige and economic development; to enhance the immediate area surrounding the Olympic Park	Using the existing facilities already built, using university dormitories for athletes' accommodation
Sydney 2000	International positioning; to promote tourism and convention industries; environmental improvements	Transforming Homebush Bay into an Olympic complex and village for athletes and later a new suburb
Athens 2004	To promote tourism and convention industry, to reinvent Athens on international stage, to solve environmental and traffic problems	Using 5 major Olympic poles (3 Olympic Complexes, the Olympic Village and the city centre)

Table 4.25: General evaluation of Olympic host cities regarding physical capacity-building, over-capacity problem and absorption capacity.

	Physical capacity building (PCB)			Direct investments	Spatial organisation of Olympic venues	Total area of main Olympic complexes	Population in Olympic year (greater area)	Population growth (10 years before / 10 years after the Olympics)	public / private share in investments	**GENERAL EVALUATION**
	Direct investments		Indirect inv.							
	Primary infrastructure	Secondary infrastructure	Tertiary infrastructure							
1960 Rome						22 ha. Foro Italico 9 ha. E.U.R.	2 161 000	30% / 23%	N.A.	Post-war economic and urban growth Balanced direct-indirect investments Dispersed Olympic venues High degree of absorption capacity Olympic venues as locomotives of urban development routes
1964 Tokyo	1.7 %	1 %	58 % roads 22 % railroads 17.3 % other	**2.7 %**		41 ha. Komazawa Olym. Park	15 424 000	36% / 28%	100 % Public	Post-war economic and urban growth Majority of investments made on urban infrast. (indirect) Using Olympics as a tool to realise 10-year development plan High degree of absorption capacity
1968 Mexico City	30.5 % sports venues 43.7 % organisation	16.4 %	9.4 %	**46.9%**		No Olympic Park	9 800 000	55% / 42%	N.A.	High degree of population growth Majority of investments made on sports infrastructure (direct) High degree of absorption capacity
1972 Munich						208 ha. Oly. Park	1 339 000	-29.3% / -1.6%	100 % Public	Low degree of population growth Concentric Olympic Park High degree of absorption capacity due to the vision drawn for the main Olympic Park (recreation-leisure centre)
1976 Montreal	66.8 % Oly.Park 8.8 % other venues 12.9 org.	5.4 % Oly. Village	N.A.	**81%**		55 ha. Olympic Park	1 211 000	1.67% / -25%	100 % Public	Low degree of population growth Concentric Olympic Park Low degree of absorption capacity due to the vision drawn for the main Olympic Park (it should be reserved for forthcoming international sports events) High degree of over-capacity problem
1980 Moscow						No Olympic Park Venues dispersed in 6 medium-scale zones	8 142 000	NA. / 8.1 %	100 % Public	Medium degree of population growth Dispersed Olympic venues Using existing facilities as much as possible Low degree of over-capacity problem
1984 Los Angeles						54 ha. Expo Park	11 819 000	N.A. / 13.4 %	100 % Private	Using existing facilities as much as possible Minimum construction activities, mostly temporary buildings Completely covered by private sector No over-capacity problem
1988 Seoul	25 %	25 %	50 % Airport improvement, highways,	**50 %**			10 612 000	27.7% / -5.9%	46 % public 54 % private	Empowerment of general city infrastructure High degree of population growth before the Games High absorption capacity
1992 Barcelona	12 %	11 % Oly. village	42 % transport 13 % commun. 12 % hotel improvement	**12 %**		Montjuic Hill Diagonal Vall d'Hebron Poble Nou	6 059 000	N.A.	38 % public 62 % private	Using Olympics as a tool of long-term urban development Benefited from event-led development. High share of indirect investments, middle–scale and dispersed sports venues to be used as urban regeneration nucleuses.
1996 Atlanta	29 % sports venues 38.6 % organisation	6.4 % Oly. village 8.2 % media village	18 % telecommunication	**43.6 %**		8.5 ha. Cent. Park 12 ha. Olympic stadium	3 600 000	38.4 % / 20.9 %	15 % public 85 % private	Medium-size city population, high degree of pop. Growth Balanced direct / indirect investment share Dispersed Olympic venues Small-scale Olympic Park in city-centre Renewal of telecommunication infrastructure
2000 Sydney						450 ha. Homebush Olympic Complex	3 502 000	N.A.	30 % public 70 % private	Medium-size city population, low degree of population growth Large-scale and concentric Olympic Park High degree of over-capacity problem due to the scale of venues
2004 Athens	30 %	20 %	50 % Attiki highway, two new metro lines, railway, archaeological inv.	**50 %**		240 ha. Oly. Park 210 ha. Hellinikon 77 ha. Faliron 45 ha. Goudi	3 761 000	6.5 % / N.A.	73 % public 27 % private	Medium-size city population, low degree of population growth Low degree of absorption capacity Indirect investments made for renewing general infrastructure High degree of over-capacity problem due to the scale of venues

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDY 1: ATHENS - 2004 OLYMPIC HOST CITY

5.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will focus on the Athens case in detail, the bidding and preparation processes, the construction of the Olympic-purpose sports venues and the first year of the post-Olympic period.

5.2. THE CITY OF ATHENS IN A WIDER CONTEXT

Athens, capital of Greece, is situated on the southern coast of mainland Greece, extending over the central plain of Attica, a flat area surrounded by mountains on three sides and lined by the sea on the south. Approximately one third of the population of Greece concentrates in the Attica basin (about 4 million people), at an average density of 7000 persons per sq. km. (OECD 2004: 54-55). The greater Athens area (Attica region) includes 69 municipalities and is divided administratively into 4 prefectures (See fig. 5.1) (Christofakis 2004).

The city was stated as the capital city in 1833, while its population was only 12 000. The exchange of population between Turkey and Greece brought about an extra 1 million, almost half of which were settled in the Attica basin. This resulted in a severe housing problem, which was solved through the distribution of small parcels of land by the government to people. The expansion with the refugees magnified after the

World War II (Houvardas 2002: 50). Thus for many years, the physical development of Athens was characterised by small-scale construction activities. This trend of *"uncontrolled urbanisation"* (Vistonitis 2001) continued up to the end of the 1970s. With the nomination of the city as the 2004 Olympic Games in 1997, large-scale urban projects were launched with the expectations of solving urban problems that had accumulated in years.

5.2.1. The Olympic Games as a part of a Broader Modernisation Project

Besides these urban problems accrued, there was another issue to be tackled; the historic centre of Athens, which had been left aside for many years. In the second half of the 1980s, urban conservation projects were launched in Europe, and the idea of choosing a *"cultural capital of Europe"* every year started to take place. Athens was chosen as the first cultural capital in 1987, which motivated the city towards getting a new face for its historic centre.

5.2.1.1. Large-Scale Urban Projects in Athens

Large-scale changes in Athens took place in the very beginning of the 1990s. The launch of the EU aids, specifically structural funds, prepared the basis for large-scale projects, which in fact required large-scale money capital. The 1st Community Support Framework (CSF) covered the period of 1990-1993, which was given to upgrade infrastructure throughout Greece, while a limited number of projects were realised in the Attica prefecture and the city of Athens (OECD 2004, University of Thessaly 2002). The 2nd CSF, covering the period of 1994-1999, had a budget of €18.5 billion to be spent on improving the general infrastructure of Athens. The most important project of this period concerning Athens and the Attica region is the **new airport** at Sparta (ibid.: 64).

The 3rd CSF has been supporting the 2000-2006 Development Plan, which mainly covers the infrastructure works related with the Olympic Games 2004. Particular importance is given to the *"urban and aesthetic upgrade of Athens"* in view of the Olympic project (Angelidis 2002: 8). Together with the 3rd CSF, The Athens

Metropolitan Region (AMR) Development Program was conducted, which aimed at *"the exploitation of the possibilities of Athens as a powerful administrative and economic centre of the country, with growing European role"* (ibid.: 7).

Therefore, the EU funding has provided the financial basis for the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects in Athens, which had to remain in blueprint form over 20 years (Karkayiannis 2003, 4 October). The major projects financed were the **Attiki highway** -60 km. long external ring of Athens toll highway (€ 475 million EU funding of total cost of 950 million), the construction of **two new metro lines** and extension and modernisation of the existing line (€ 900 million funding of total € 1.6 billion), a **new tram line** running from the central Syntagma Square to the waterfront, which was later connected to another tram line -built to serve specifically for the waterfront Olympic venues (€ 175 million funding of total € 350 million), a **new suburban railway** as an upgrading and extension of the existing railway system (€ 320 million funding of total € 640 million), and the most important, the **unification of the archaeological sites** which aimed to create a pedestrian network throughout the principal archaeological sites and green areas (http://www.europa.eu.int).

Being the largest and the most important urban design and conservation/ rehabilitation study, the project of the Unification of the Archaeological Sites started in 1997 with the leadership of a joint stock company which was established by the cooperation of the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Environment, Planning and Public Works (Kalantidis 2002: 31). The project covered the ancient sites of Athens like the Acropolis, Ancient Greek and Roman Agora, as well as the historic town called Plaka and the contemporary city centre called commercial triangle. The project was completed in 2002. Three fourth of the project was budgeted by the EU structural funds. The project site covers about 3000 ha. The orange line in Figure 6.2 indicates the major pedestrian route called *"the Grand Promenade"*, and it provides a 2.5 km. walking track. The archaeological sites shown by dark green were integrated with the help of this line.

The EU funds thus helped the capital city to achieve the aim of modernisation by financing the major infrastructure and urban rehabilitation projects. In addition to the EU structural funds, the Maastricht Treatment of 1991 took Greece into a period of change in economic and public administration terms (Ioannou 2005, 01 April).



Figure 5.1: Administrative division of the Greater Athens Area, source: Christofakis (2004).

Figure 5.2: Area of the archaeological sites unification project in Athens, source: Unification of Athens' Archaeological Sites Booklet.

5.2.1.2. The Olympic Project

Briefly, beginning from the end of the 1980s, Athens introduced a modernisation process with several large-scale urban projects, within which the Olympic Games stood as an important milestone. Apart from these backings, there was an important motive for Athens to host the Olympic Games. The year 1996 would be the centennial anniversary of the Games, which were first held in 1896 in Athens, as a revival of an ancient tradition that originally took place in Olympia, Greece. The Olympic Games would support the city's and also the whole country's modernisation project besides this symbolic meaning.

The Olympic Games was thus idealised as *"the greatest challenge for the country in the visible future"* (Kotrotsos 2002). The importance of the Olympic project *"as a part of a greater modernisation movement"* has been repeatedly stated in the talks of the government and the official papers of the Athens Organising Committee (ATHOC) presented to the IOC. The common goal was underlined as *"to show the effectiveness of a modern European country with a very important place in a wider area of south eastern Europe"* (The Japan Times 2003, 22 February), and *"to publicise modern Greece on the international level and promote the potential of its administration and economy [while] the Games will serve as a bridge between tradition and the potential of modern Greece"* (Athens 2004 Candidature File). According to the mayor of Athens Dora Bakoyanni, the success of the Olympic Games would be a success for Greece, since *"it will prove to the entire world […] that the Games can be re-baptized in the freshness of the ancient Olympic spirit in the country"* (Athens News Agency 2003, 13 August). She added that Athens was placing the foundations for its future, *"both for the Games and for its further development as a historic urban centre and a modern large city"* (Athens News Agency 2003, 13 August).

Briefly, the Olympic Games was portrayed as a unique chance to overcome current functional, environmental and traffic problems of Athens by implementing large-scale infrastructure facilities and public works (Delladetsima 2003).

5.3. BIDDING AND PREPARING PHASE: PHYSICAL CAPACITY-BUILDING

In the second half of the 1980s, the government started to discuss the instance of candidacy. In June 1988, the Prime Minister Costas Simitis officially declared the Olympic candidacy of Athens to the IOC (Athens 1996 Candidature File). The main concept behind Athens' proposal for the 1996 Olympic Games was the provision of *"necessary conditions for upgrading the historical appearance of the city of Athens"*, and, in addition, of:

- a definite structure (a skeleton, a backbone) for the organisation of its urban planning network,
- a definitive structure for its transport system,
- new outlets for future growth which will lead to the decongestion of densely populated areas,
- new centres of supra-local importance for organised leisure activities, sports facilities, parks…etc.
- a better system of organisation for the city's historical sites,
- new areas which will upgrade the quality of life on a local, neighbourhood level, especially in the undeveloped western districts of the city (Athens 1996 Candidature File).

Four major poles were created, and intended to design a special Olympic Ring Road that would link these poles *(see fig. 5.3)*. The first one was the Olympic Village (V)- not built yet at that time, which would host the athletes of the Games, and be turned into a model of residential development following the Games. The second pole was the Athens Olympic Sports Centre (OAKA) (O) that would be the major Olympic venue including the International Broadcasting Centre (IBC), the media centre and the media village. The complex was built in 1981, having a stadium with a 80 000 seating capacity. Other venues such as velodrome, sports hall, swimming complex and indoor hall was to be built to host the 1991 Mediterranean Games. The third attraction pole was the historic city centre (C), to be the node of cultural activities and festivals, and the fourth was the Faliron Coastal Zone (F), the second primary pole for sports facilities (Athens 1996 Candidature File).



Figure 5.3: Four poles of the Olympic project proposal in the 1996 candidacy: Olympic Village (V), OAKA (O), City centre (C), Faliron Coastal Zone (F), source: Athens 1996 Candidature File

5.3.1. Bidding for the 2004 Olympic Games

The first candidacy, despite the great enthusiasm of the whole country motivated by the celebration of their 100th year anniversary –more widely called the Golden Olympics- has failed for several reasons. The Bid Committee put the second bid for the 2004 Games, and submitted the candidature file to the IOC in April 1996. Private consulting firms on behalf of the Bid Committee prepared a total of twenty-one studies, while no official planning agencies have considerably participated in the preparation of the bid or in the site selection process (Zifou *et al.* 2004). The city was nominated as the 2004 Olympic City in September 1997.

The basic concept in the candidacy of Athens was the creation of four poles that would be linked by the Olympic Ring Road, which was the same strategy as in the previous candidacy (Athens 2004 Candidature File). The IOC Evaluation Commission has prepared a text report on each applicant city of the 2004 Games. The report was highlighting the main strengths and challenges faced by each candidature. In this study, the approach of the IOC was based on the evaluation of Olympic projects one by one, assessing each of them regarding the state of completion, the seating capacity, the availability of access to other Olympic venues and transport networks…etc. Within this context, Athens was evaluated as having a proper proposal, in which 29 competition sites out of planned 39 sites **already existed** and there was an ongoing programme of extensive infrastructure construction, which would be positively supported by the Olympic project (IOC 1997) (See Table 5.1).

5.3.2. Preparations for the 2004 Olympic Games

After the 2004 Games were awarded to Athens in 1997, several debates took place regarding the characteristics of the Olympic venue sites. The debates –continued about two years until the statement of the Olympic Law 2730/1999 (Zifou *et al.* 2004) - concentrated on the post-Olympic impacts of these venues and their impact on urban development of Athens (see fig. 5.8). The criticisms concentrated on the **dispersed siting of facilities**, which might promote further **urban sprawl** (Doxiadis 2003, Marmaras 2003), the point-based interventions and the **lack of a consideration of the Olympic project as a whole** regarding the urban development trends of the city (Schizas 2003, Pipinis 2003), the danger of **environmental degradation** (Sarigiannis 2003, Pipinis 2003), the **absence of collective opinion** and public participation in decision-making processes concerning the site-selections (Doxiadis 2003, Pipinis 2003). Besides these general contradictions, each Olympic venue site was separately questioned, regarding the character of the site selected and the suitability of the venue to be built.

The critics were based on the candidacy file of the 2004 bidding. The Olympic project of Athens was not structured around a main sports venue –an Olympic Park like in Munich'1972 or in Sydney'2000, but around multiple activity nodes, the same strategy as of the previous 1996 bid, a 4-pole project connected by an Olympic Ring Road.[1] Apart from this circle of poles, there were several venues proposed in different areas of Attica. Yet, the main sites of the Olympic project were the OAKA in the north – district of Maroussi, and the Faliron Coastal Zone in the southern waterfront (See fig. 5.10). There was no proposal of venues in the site of the old airport, the Hellinikon area, which later turned into the third major pole of the Olympic project after the revision of the project.

[1] See Chapter 2 for the broad discussion of spatial concentration versus dispersion of Olympic sports installations.

Table 5.1: List of existing and to be built sports facilities indicated in the 2004 Olympic Candidacy Book of Athens

name and capacity of the site	num. of events to be held	num. of sports disciplines	state
A. ATHENS OLYMPIC SPORTS COMPLEX (OAKA)			
OLYMPIC STADIUM 80 000 seats (athletics)	42	1	Existing
OLYMPIC TENNIS CENTRE 12 000 seats: main court 5 500 x 2 seats: 2 semi-final courts	4	1	(main court) to be built
OLYMPIC INDOOR HALL 15 000 seats (artistic gymnastics) 18 000 seats (basketball)	 14 2	2	existing
OLYMPIC SWIMMING CENTRE 10 000 seats open 4 500 seats indoor	38	1	existing
OLYMPIC CYCLING CENTRE 5 000 seats	8	1	existing
B. FALIRON COASTAL ZONE			
FALIRON MULTI-PURPOSE COMPLEX 10 000 seats (taek./volley.) 8 000 seats (handball/judo) 8 000 seats (wrestling) 8 000 seats (fencing) 10 000 seats (boxing) 15 000 seats (volleyball)	68	8	to be built
PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP STADIUM 15 000 seats (handball / basketball)	2	2	existing
BASEBALL OC 12 000 seats main court 8 000 seats second court	1	1	to be built
KARAISKAKI STADIUM 22 000 seats (hockey) 5 000 seats	2	1	existing
SOFTBALL OC 10 000 seats	1	1	to be built
BEACH VOLLEYBALL CENTRE 10 000 seats + 7 500	2	1	to be built
C. OTHER COMPETITION SITES			
GALATSI INDOOR HALL 6 000 seats (table tennis / gymnastics)	6	2	to be built
PERISTERI INDOOR HALL 7 000 seats (badminton)	5	1	existing
NIKAIA INDOOR HALL 5 000 seats (weightlifting)	10	1	to be built
AGIOS KOSMAS YACHTING OC 3 000 seats + 50 000 spectators	10	1	alterations required
TATOI EQUESTRIAN AND ARCHERY OC 30 000 seats (equestrian) 5 500 seats (archery)	10	2	to be built
MARKOPOULO SHOOTING OC 10 000 seats	15	1	alterations required
SCHINIAS ROWING/CANOEING OC 10 000 seats	30	2	to be built
AEK STADIUM	2	1	existing

5.3.2.1. Review of the Original Olympic Project

The central government undertook the task of re-evaluating the bid and locating new sites for some of the original Olympic sites (Zifou *et al.* 2004). This time, an organisational structure was created, by the Law 2598 / 1998, which provided for the establishment of a Supervisory and Advisory Committee for organising and conducting the Games. This committee was comprised of two new institutional bodies that could operate in parallel with or autonomously of existing public authorities at all administrative and spatial levels: 1) *The National Olympic Committee* (NOC) and 2) the Organising Committee for the Olympic Games *"Athens 2004"* (ATHOC). The NOC was responsible for the overall planning, design and organisation of the Games and its duties and responsibilities were carried out by inter-ministerial commissions (Delladetsima 2003). ATHOC was a corporate body, which operated as a private company and bear the responsibility for the timely and quality completion of all Olympic and other supporting projects (Zifou *et al.* 2004).

The inter-ministerial committee responsible for the planning and design of the Olympic projects was directly appointed by the Prime Minister and was comprised by the Ministers of Planning, the Environment and Public Works, of Transportation and of Culture. The all-powerful General Secretariat for the Olympic Games was the head agency responsible for undertaking all planning and co-ordinating activities. No local governmental units participated in this organisational structure. The ORSA (Organisation for Planning and Environmental Protection of Athens), the designated planning agency for the Athens metropolitan region was only given a secondary, advisory role and was basically used for legitimating the locational choices made by the inter-ministerial committee. Thus, the central government retained its control powers over the selection of Olympic sites keeping at a minimum level the participation of local governmental units and the ORSA in the decision making process (Zifou *et al.* 2004).

5.3.2.2. Alternative Proposals of Other Actors

During the re-evaluation process that took around one year, a considerable public reaction came about, generated particularly by NGO's, planning and engineering professionals, academic institutions and other related groups (Zifou *et al.* 2004).

The most detailed critic of the Olympic candidacy file of Athens was made by the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA). In October 1997, almost one month after the nomination of Athens, a group of academics from the university's laboratory of urban environment elaborated a research proposing an alternative localisation of the Olympic venues (NTUA Research Group Laboratory of Urban Environment 1998). They published their proposal within 1998. The NTUA's research project aimed *"to make an objective analysis of the Application Form in relation to the main development axis suggested and set up for the city, and the formulation of propositions for a better urban insertion of the sport equipment in Athens' urban fabric"* (http://147.102.12.19:8086/NODE/ L1/3428.html). They underlined the use of the Olympic facilities after the event as the most important point of the study.

The main critics of the study group concentrated on the relationship of Athens urban pattern and current dynamics of development with the forthcoming Olympic project. Their critics can be summarised as follows (Iliopoulou 2004):

- The proposals were not corresponding to the anxieties for a sustainable development;
- The venues were occupying vacant areas that were reserved for open space (recreation and green) uses;
- The venues were not equally distributed in the Athens Basin (a great majority was planned in the privileged areas while few of them in the low-quality western part of the city);
- The Faliron Bay was excessively burdened with 10 venues;
- The Olympic Village might create conditions for urban sprawl due to its location in the outskirts of the city;
- Some venues (such as Schinias Rowing and Canoeing Centre) were located on naturally sensitive areas.

Beside these points, the research group claimed that the proposals of the candidacy dossier are in a large extent out of the axes of the existing urban plans, while they should be inserted into them (NTUA Research Group Laboratory of Urban Environment 1998). First of all, the Application Form, they stated, did not answer substantially the

urban issues suggested by Athens Directing Scheme (1985). Second, the majority of the suggested sport equipment implementations were on non-built areas (http://147.102.12.19:8086/NODE/L1/3428.html). Another crucial point according to the research group was the non-transparency of the project. They stated that:

> "Without a systematic argumentation of these choices [of sports venue sites], the end of scientific dialogue and the convergence of views, the research group considered that the result, the day after, could not be convertible and that the city would have lost an important occasion." (NTUA Research Group Laboratory of Urban Environment 1998)

On these bases, the researchers stated that the following axes should be realised in order Athens *"to benefit from this occasion of investments and works"*:

- The dispersion of Olympic installations and facilities as much as possible outside the Attica prefecture;
- Augmentation of the spread of the installations in the Athens basin with the priority given to the disadvantaged and poorer districts that lack such facilities and infrastructure, thus supporting the rehabilitation of such areas;
- The re-use of existing facilities and infrastructure, avoiding placements that would enforce tendencies of urban sprawl. The absolute priority should be given to the avoiding of occupation of ecological valuable places and of general importance for the city's environment;
- Construction of an integrated and cohesive network of mass transit system, which will form the structure of the services, network for the transportations not also during the Games, but also for the day after;
- Systematic addressing in the principal of re-use, re-utilisation with valorising or replacing the existent building and sports installations capacity;
- Revision of the idea of temporary installations and minimisation of their application to absolutely necessary cases. It should be underlined that these structures contain not only the danger of quality and infrastructure, but also the possibility of staying as permanent;
- Planning the installations and their environment with an environment-friendly perspective with the maximum use of re-utilisation and multi-function,

ecological material, systems of economic energy-use, and private car-using limitation.

The most significant attribute of the proposal was its emphasis on the strategy of re-use of the existing building stock (e.g. old industrial buildings, existing sports venues of municipalities…etc.) instead of constructing new buildings specifically for this mega-event. And one of their main concern was the integration of the newly built infrastructure into the urban life especially for the day after the Olympic Games. Yiannis Polyzos (2005, 08 June), the chief of the research project, states in a personal interview that what they proposed as an alternative was conceiving the Olympic project as an urban planning project for the future of Athens (see fig. 5.15).

In addition to the study of the NTUA, there were also other controversial voices regarding the characteristics of some of the Olympic venue sites, which seemed to confront the legitimacy of the Games. Although state authorities claimed that this study was taken into account while preparing the final plan of the Olympic project (Iliopoulou 2004), according both to the document of the Greek Parliament Bulletin (1999, cited in Zifou *et al.* 2004), and to Polyzos (2005, 08 June), none of the suggested alternative locations were adopted. This was despite the fact that there was considerable agreement among various groups of the debate.

5.3.2.3. The Final Olympic Project

The official re-evaluation process of the Olympic programme was concluded with the adoption of Law 2730/25-06-1999, entitled *"Planning, integrated development and implementation of Olympic projects and other provisions"*, which specified all the Olympic sites together with the indicated procedures for the integrated design of the distinct venues and facilities (Zifou *et al.* 2004). The purpose of the proposal was drawn as to finalise the locations of six Olympic venues in order to secure the convenient carry out of the Olympic Games. The sports venues were evaluated one by one –not within a context of an overall strategic plan.

The old Hellinikon airport area was added to the Olympic poles, and some of the sports facilities located in the coastal Faliron Olympic complex (basketball, fencing, baseball, softball, hockey) were moved to this new pole (see fig. 5.16).

The Olympic Games Redevelopment Programme was structured around 10 major nodal developments of sports and other service installations. The planning depended on a *"conventional physical land-use policy plan"* and had *"no strategic development component"* (Delladetsima 2003: 72). While the bid of Athens developed its legitimacy on a strategic vision for the future of the city, by time this objective remained underestimated. Delladetsima (2003) states that;

> "…the general Olympic redevelopment programme has not given any consideration to identifying common local goals and complementary areas of action with existing local development strategies. For example, no systematic consideration has been given to the implementation of locally defined goals that are linked to Olympic infrastructures, to potential post-Olympic uses, or to developing joint financial programmes."

The Law was provided for the preparation of specific plans for integrating the development of the host areas into the structure of the city as well. This was done through the formulation of *"Special Plans"* which contained necessary planning and building considerations for the host areas. In order to accelerate the decision-making and implementation processes, the role of the local authorities and other actors was curtailed by giving them a kind of advisory role (Delladetsima 2003).

On the other hand, the law has put more emphasis on the potential economic and political benefits of the to-be-built sports venues. These benefits were related to the *"progression of the competitive position of the country at the international and European level"*; *"placing Athens among the hierarchy of world and European metropolitan centres"* and *"promoting Athens as a centre of high-level service provision, entrepreneurship and innovation"* (Law 2730/1999, Article 1, in Zifou *et al.* 2004). According to the new planning concept, the spatial strategy has turned into the strengthening of Athens' international role and the redefining of its position amongst other metropolitan centres. The emphasis was concentrated on the growth potential of the Olympic nodes in terms of the employment and activity effects they can generate (Zifou *et al.* 2004), rather than their turnover for the day after the mega-event.

Another point related with the new plan was its conflict with the goals of the existing Athens Master Plan, which was prepared in 1985. One of the most important objectives of this plan was to prevent urban sprawl of the city, which was torn by the construction of new Olympic installations in the outskirts of the city, instead of using

the existing building stock –especially the old industrial buildings. The amendment of the Athens Master Plan in accordance with the Olympic project put a stop to the discussions on the locational choices of the sports and supplementary facilities.

Therefore, the discussions on the specification of the Olympic venue sites ceased with the adoption of the "Olympic Law" in 1999, which provided an integrated framework for the planning and design of the Olympic projects. Delladetsima (2003) calls the law as *"extraordinary"*, since it introduced special planning provisions for the host areas of the Olympic infrastructure, extraordinary acquisition procedures for private and public land in order to speed up the preparation period. And the Olympic project was simply installed into the existing Athens Master Plan/1985 in 1999.

Briefly, the objectives of the initial Olympic project have changed in time. The Olympic Games were at first conceived as *"the catalyst for positive intervention in the Athens agglomeration"* by supporting the upgrading of the urban environment, the development of an integrated transportation system and the development of a functional infrastructure network (Zifou *et al.* 2004). At the end, the organisation became the triggering mechanism for the improvement of the image of the city of Athens.

5.3.2.4. Actors of Preparations and Project Implementations

Official actors of the Games: As stated before, the Law 2598/1998 clearly defined the two official bodies (the NOC and the "Athens 2004" SA) who would be responsible for the organisation / conduction of the Games and the construction of the sports and other necessary venues. The hosting of the Olympic Games was seen by the organising bodies as a **country-event** rather than a **city-event** in the Athens case:

> "2004 is not merely the year of the hosting of the Olympic Games in Athens. It is a sole opportunity for the affirmation of our national progress, it is the unquestionable proof that 'we can achieve, at least, what others can'" (Kotrotsos[2] 2002: 22)

Therefore, the focus of the organising bodies was on making a successful hosting of the athletes, spectators, media and press workers and other visitors during the

[2] General director of the Press and Mass Media for the Organising Committee of the Olympic Games ATHENS 2004.

Olympic Games. The concern has become the showing of the *capability* of organising an event satisfactory for all.

Concerns of the construction sector: The Olympic project was conceptualised as an opportunity to enliven their sector with its volume of construction. More than that, the construction industry was expected to be the *"big winner"* of the Olympic preparation (Lamprou 2000). The major projects were announced as *"orphan projects"*:

> "The plan on the transportation infrastructure includes the construction of the Olympic Ring, which has a total length of 38 km […] The budget for the Olympic road construction is 273 billion drachmas […] The budget for the orphans is approximately 120 billion drachmas […] The Olympic Village, which has a budget of approximately 110 billion drachmas […] is a project that a lot of Greek construction companies and joint ventures are looking for, as the construction of the innovative settlement and the creation and exploitation of the International Zone, are going to be the major earnings and expectations for big surpluses in the stock market for the construction companies." (ibid.: 21-22)

The Olympic Games would have positive effects on the Greek economy according to expectations. The construction sector is one of the most important sectors of the Greek economy (University of Thessaly 2002). Horne and Manzenreiter (2004) state that for the 2002 World Cup, Japan has experienced quite a similar process concerning the effects of the construction industry on the organisation of the mega-event. The powerful parliamentary lobby of the construction sector in Japan led to huge public investments put in sports facilities, mainly in stadium construction. As a result, Japan government spent $4.6 billion only for the construction of ten stadia while hosting the half World Cup (Horne and Manzenreiter 2004: 190).[3]

Critical views of the disregarded actors: After the nomination of Athens as the Olympic city in 1997, several objections came out in varying segments of the society. The common point of the concerns was that they were generated by different groups of agents, such as academic institutions, NGOs, planning and engineering professionals, who stayed out of the decision-making and implementation processes. In fact, the notion of *"hosting the mega-sports event"* remained in an unquestioned manner within a limited number of actors, whose major concerns concentrated on

[3] Japan shared the hosting of the 2002 World Cup with South Korea.

short-term impacts of the Olympics. However, the excluded groups of agents were interested more in the post-Olympic period and the turnover of the Olympic investments to the everyday life.

The first group of debates came principally from the professionals such as academics on urban planning and architecture, regarding the Olympic installations, their site-selections, their possible impacts on urban development in general and their future uses in particular. Pipinis (2003: 50-52) criticised the conceptualisation of the Olympic Games as the only chance for the future of a city, in which the question of to what extent the Olympic infrastructure to be used by the citizens after the event was disregarded. He added that the post-Olympic use of the Olympic-oriented investments would judge the success of the preparations. Pagonis (2004: 105-111), too, objected the perception of the Olympics as a unique opportunity for enhancing the city and its image. According to Pagonis, this has produced an *illusion* which could be described as the *gap* between the aspiration of making Athens developed in terms of physical built environment and the position of the physical planning practice within the Olympic project of Athens.

Schizas (2003: 77-78) objected to the site-selections of the Olympic works since they were setting aside the 1985 Master Plan of Athens. He claimed that the empiricist approach has limited the planning activity and land-ownership interests have become a confrontation in front of the long-term physical planning projections. He evaluated the site-selection process of the Olympic works from the *equality* perspective, and he underlined that the point-based glamorous sports-venue projects have created *Olympic shop-fronts* within the well-being housing areas, while the poorer districts could not benefit from having better social infrastructure via holding apart of the Olympic sites in their living environment. Schizas criticised the Olympic experience of Athens that it has turned into a *"cementification"* project, which has decreased open areas. Pipinis (2003: 50-52) added that the city was going to be used as a background for the Olympic Games due to these point-based interventions.

The second group discussed the process in terms of democracy. They focused on the absence of architectural competitions that represented the openness to different ideas in project production (Pipinis 2003, Howden 2003), the disregard of the local government units and the local community interests (Zifou *et.al.* 2004), and the absence of public voice that left the discussion platform to the politicians and private

enterprises (Pipinis 2003). In fact, there was a public voice, which basically reacted to the increasing real-estate values (Delladetsima 2003: 65), the violation of the existing building rules for the Olympic-specific construction sites and their surrounding areas (WWF 2004), and the selection of environmentally fragile areas for the Olympic installations.

The third group of opposite voice focused on environmental concerns. Although the ATHOC Environmental Policy Principles underlined the effort to be made to make best use of the existing infrastructure so as not to occupy existing open spaces, the environmental assessment bulletin of the WWF (2004) stated that the siting of Olympic venues in unbuilt sites degraded the lack of green in Athens.

5.3.2.5. Construction of the Olympic Infrastructure and Main Concerns

When the IOC nominated Athens as the 2004 Olympic City in September 1997, the city seemed to have the three-fourth of the required sports venues. Coming to the midst of 2000, for 3 years of inertia, there had been in fact no serious construction activity in the city. This was first due to the agenda of the government, which was dealing with the joining the European Monetary Union for the stabilisation of the national economy (Nellas 2003, 7 November). Second, the legal complaints and petitions of the local community that opposed the projects that effected their living environment brought about a kind of tardiness in the process (Furrer 2002; Nellas 2001, 22 November). Third, the existing sports venues which seemed to be ready-to-use for the Games underwent a serious construction activity, which took more time than projected.

Of the most significant venue was the Olympic Stadium, for which the famous Spanish architect/engineer Santiago Calatrava was called to design a new roof structure in order to generate a new image for the stadium and the whole Olympic complex. He also designed structures for the entrance of the complex (See fig. 5.4 & 5.5). The construction work has repeatedly been listed on the IOC's informal list of *"dangerously delayed"* projects (ANA&ATHOC 2003, 5 December).

These conditions generated the problem of **delays** in the Olympic constructions. The IOC started speaking out the anxieties on these delays, stressing on that the city

risked losing the mega-event. This turned into a pressure of the anxiety of constructing on time over the anxiety of constructing by keeping in mind the post-Olympic use of the constructions.

Figure 5.4: Athens Olympic Stadium and its roof structure designed by Santiago Calatrava, source: personal archive.

Figure 5.5: Athens Olympic Complex and Calatrava's structure for the main pedestrian route, source: personal archive.

Anxiety 1: How to construct the Olympic infrastructure on time? In May 2000, the IOC president Juan Samaranch declared his disappointment on the delays and he jolted the Costas Simitis government (Nellas 2003, 7 November). He said that *"the 2004 Summer Games will be in danger unless the Greek organizers make 'drastic' changes in their preparations"* (Borowiec 2000, 13 May).

This warning was quite serious that talks started about the possibility of stripping the Games from Athens and returning them to a previous host city *"such as Seoul or Sydney"* (Moore 2000, 25 November). Upon this first warning of the IOC and the explicit request of Samaranch, the organising bodies of the Athens'2004 Games changed the president of the ATHOC 2004, in which Gianna Angelopoulos-Daskalaki returned to the presidency of the organising committee as the new chief (Howden 2004, 13 May). She had previously run the Athens bid, and then left this position for 3 years.

In addition to that change, in August 2000, the Ministry of Environment, Town Planning and Public Works presented a schedule for the construction of five major

projects for the Athens Olympics in 2004, which it said *"would make up for the time lost so far"* (Athens News Agency 2000, 22 August).[4] The ministry has taken over construction of these Olympic facilities after the General Secretariat for Sports and private enterprise failed to come across (ibid.).

The second warning of the IOC came in September 2001. After the visit to the Olympic sites, the IOC Coordinating Committee President Denis Oswald stated that measures must be taken up immediately to make up for lost time (Nellas 2001, 29 September). The third warning was made in June 2002. In the midst of 2002, the Greek government had announced a series of venue cuts, due to the increasing costs of Olympic installations:

> "With deadline pressures as strong as ever and the government anxious to keep a lid on the costs, several projects related to the 2004 Athens Olympics will have to be trimmed down or modified." (Nellas 2002, 28 June)

The most important ones were the cancellation of one of the two planned seaside beach volleyball courts, a hockey stadium and a baseball venue (Kathimerini English Edition 2002, 9 July). The government had also examined the cancellation of the boxing venue planned for a multi-sports complex in the Faliron area. At the end of 2002, the Ministry of Culture announced that four important projects that were supervised by the ministry fell behind the schedule. These were the refurbishment of the Olympic Stadium and its surroundings, including the construction of two arcs by noted Spanish architect Santiago Calatrava; the construction of sports venues at the site of the former Athens airport at Hellinikon; the boxing arena; and the weightlifting and tae kwon do arena at Ano Liossia (Kollias 2002, 6 December).

Some of the delays had occurred due to the legal challenges of losing bidders of the constructions, some other due to the last-minute change of the project site and even the architecture of the project. As the concentration was on the completion of the sports venues, the location of the venues in the city and their post-event future could not be questioned. All of the attention was given to the deadline, the organisation of the Olympic Games itself.

[4] These included a centre for rowing, canoeing and kayaking in Schinias and the Marathon region, a canoeing and slalom centre in Rizari, Marathon, a sailing centre in Agios Kosmas, beach volley courts in Faliron and baseball, softball, hockey and archery facilities on the grounds of the former Hellinikon airport.

Briefly, the initial excitement flashed by the rhetoric of *"solving urban problems of Athens via this mega-event"* has been replaced by a widespread anxiety to meet the deadlines of the Olympic project (Delladetsima 2003: 65). According to Pipinis (2003), the slogan of the Games has become *"whatever happens, we will be ready"*, which forced the host city to sacrifice a big part of the post-event benefits of the mega-event. Nevertheless, the delays experienced in Athens were not unusual; it happened almost all of the previous Olympic cities.

Anxiety 2: What to do with the constructed Olympic infrastructure? Concerning the use of Olympic venues in the post-Olympic era, the general secretary of the Olympic Games Costas Cartalis underlined some of the projects. He said that these Olympic venues and projects would serve the needs of local communities by creating increased local development and that, these in turn, are maintained by advanced infrastructure networks. He stated in 2002 that an extended planning programme has been designed and put into implementation, which included the adaptation of the old Hellinikon airport and the coastal Faliron area into an Olympic pole for the Games and thereafter into a metropolitan park a family park respectively (Cartalis 2002:41). The report of the University of Thessaly (2002) presented to the ORSA[5] stated a similar prospect for the venues:

> "In the future, the broader coastal area of Faliron could be transformed into a unique recreational park while several other activities, in accordance with the provisions of the Master Plan for Athens could be developed. The Athletic Centre of Aghios Kosmas is expected to become a park and an area "dedicated" to marine sports and tourism development."

The private sector, on the other hand, had an expectation that the government would transfer the public property to the private domain via a self-financing model, in which private sector operators finance the public project and then operate it for an extended number of years. There would be private consortiums for the post-Olympic use of the venues, *"which, the State fears, could become white elephants if left to the sports federations"* (Kotofolos 2004, 03 July).

[5] Organisation for the Master Plan and Protection of the Environment of Athens, Ministry of the Environment, Planning and Public Works.



Figure 5.6: Timetable of the Athens Olympic preparations, showing the time problem regarding the construction of Olympic purpose-built infrastructure.

The private sector's expectations from the post-Olympic utilization of the sports venues and areas took shape around international events that Athens would host in the near future, which would generate capital and tourists. Post-Olympic development of tourism to Greece is expected to move in the direction of *"making the optimal use of the sports venues by holding sports events which will attract worldwide interest, as well as by developing the facilities to use them for many other forms of activity (cultural and commercial activities, conferences etc.)"* (Eliopoulos 2004).

5.4. POST-OLYMPIC PHASE: OVER-CAPACITY PROBLEM

According to the report of the General Accounting Office of Greece, the overall cost of the 16-day Games was 8.95 billion euros, which is five times the budget of the Athens 2004 Organising Committee (Kathimerini 2004, 13 November; Kathimerini 2005, 13 May). It was *"the greatest sum ever spent on a single undertaking since the foundation of the modern Greek state"* (ibid.). 7.2 billion euros of this amount was covered by the state budget. Moreover, the annual cost of maintaining and operating the Olympic venues was estimated between 50 and 75 million euros. The cost of maintaining the Athens Olympic Sports Complex (OAKA) has been calculated at 20 million euros, the Stadium of Peace and Friendship at 6 million euros and the other venues at 25 to 50 million euros (Voutsadakis 2004).

5.4.1. Government's steps for the post-Olympic use

The future use of non-competitive venues such as the Olympic Village and the media centre were clear, while the sports competition facilities remained as a question mark. The government via a spokesman admitted that *"Unfortunately, there isn't any plan"* (Kathimerini 2004, 31 August).

5.4.1.1. Establishment of Hellenic Olympic Properties SA

Since the post-Olympic use of the venues had not been clearly defined in the pre-event period, the problems of utilization of the purpose-built venues and facilities

came out immediately once the Games is over. The Prime Minister Karamanlis had asked his ministers during the Games to come up with ideas on what to do with the facilities (ibid.). The government has put together a commission of 33 members who should announce a schedule for the post-Olympic use of the venues just after the Games.

Meanwhile, a special institution, Hellenic Olympic Properties SA was established in August 2004 for programming the post-event use of the Olympic infrastructure. The venues in the Hellinikon complex were handed over to the Ministry of Public Works, Physical Planning and Environment, although the Ministry did not want to take the responsibility for the sites at all, preferring to pass it on to Olympic Properties (Kathimerini 2004, 07 October).

The president of the Olympic Properties SA, Christos Hadziemmanouil, said that many of the projects used in the Olympics had not been officially turned over to the state and additional work might be needed in some cases to complete them (Athens News Agency 2004, 28 August). On the use of the facilities, he said this needed a systematic approach, in order to avoid flooding the market with services that were in direct competition with each other and said the focus would be on *"tourism, culture, sports and high-level recreation"* (ibid.). He said the management of the facilities should be achieved through cooperation between the state and private-sector, with strict observance of fiscal discipline.

On the other hand, the chairman of the Federation of Greek Industry Odysseas Kyriakopoulos suggested a strategy to pass the Olympic infrastructure to the private sector and not burden the state budget with the cost of maintenance (ibid.). For the moment, the municipalities joined the discussion of the post-Olympic use, and the mayors of municipalities that host Olympic venues called for the establishment of a state-control central management body to develop a unified post-Olympic policy for related facilities and infrastructure. Speaking during a conference held specifically to focus on post-Olympics use, the mayors also called for local administrations to have a say in managing the venues (Athens News Agency 2004, 04 September).

Due to the ambiguity of the post-Olympic utilization of many sports venues, a debate started among various domains, three of which driving the discussions: *the government*, *the private sector* (mainly construction companies) and *the local*

governments (municipalities that have Olympic venues within their border). And the problems were focusing on the issues of **ownership**, **administration** and **utilisation**.

> "Government officials have repeated that the stadiums and other installations, such as the media facilities, will not be sold to private companies, but have not indicated who is to operate them or how. The engineers hope that the facilities do not become the subject of bargaining between local government officials and the government, and that a comprehensive study with a view to finding the optimum model for their use will be begin as soon as possible" (Kollias 2004, 09 September).

The government in the beginning was underlining that it did not intend to sell the Olympic installations to the private enterprise, while the Greek construction companies were hoping to be in a new emerging market –that of the *"maintenance of the facilities"* (Kollias 2004, 09 September). Due to the unfavourable climate in the Greek construction industry, the possible maintenance work of large sports installations seemed to work in their favour. Since the probability of private run of these installations came to the agenda, local governments (municipalities) and inhabitants started to get involved in the discussions. The municipalities had two arguments in this respect. The first one concentrated on the environmental problems generated by the Olympic constructions. The second one focused on the opening of these areas to the public use, but in case that the state should cover the annual maintenance costs.

Throughout these discussions, the state tried to negotiate with the domains. Alternate Culture Minister Fani Palli-Petralia told that the government wanted a joint public sector-private sector format for exploiting the facilities. Moreover, she said local governments will also be involved in the future and management schemes for the facilities, which will be used for multi-purpose functions. She underlined one difficult issue, land use for certain facilities - in absence of zoning or even a land registry in some areas, which will also be harmonized via pending legislation (Athens News Agency 2004, 12 October). She stated that the locations were chosen without any consideration for the venues' post-Olympics use. She criticised the previous Simitis government, in power of which the sports venues had been built, and said that *"from the point of view of location, town planning, financial viability, even legislation, they were exclusively built to be used for 15 days during the Olympics"* (Kathimerini 2004, 02 December).

The president of the institution, Christos Hadziemmanouil, shared this view and suggested that *"it might have been wiser to have built fewer installations, as the city has different needs before and after the Games"*, noting that in the construction phase there was little planning for their post-Olympic use (Kathimerini 2005, 01 July).

The debates had two significant dimensions in spatial terms. The first one was the re-utilization of sports venues as single buildings; the second was the utilization of the Olympic complexes as a whole, within which the dominant subject was the **public/private space**. That is to say, whether these complexes (especially the Faliron coastal zone, the OAKA Olympic Complex, and the old airport Hellinikon) are going to be open to public or run by private enterprise has become the major problem.

In the issue of re-utilization of sports facilities, particular venues attracted private interest regarding their location in the city and the possibility of adapting them into other cultural/commercial uses. These profitable facilities were namely the venues in coastal Faliron area, the sailing marina in Agios Kosmas, Markopoulo shooting area, Schinias rowing and canoeing venue (Kathimerini 2004, 24 September) (See fig. 5.7). One venue which has failed to attract the attention of either developers or people in the arts is the Weightlifting Hall at Nikaia, which is not easy to access (Nellas 2004, 08 December). Properties offering the greatest opportunities, according to the president of Olympic Properties SA, included Faliron, Galatsi, Goudi and Hellinikon, since they are large venues in the centre of a city which needs large public facilities (Mandouvalou 2004). Therefore the ones that have been designed with the concern of **flexibility** and **accessibility** attracted more interest.

Table 5.2: Total cost of the Athens Olympic Games spent from the state budget, source: Kathimerini (2004, 13 November).

	Cost (billion euro)	Percentage %
Sports venues	2.15	29.9
Olympic infrastructure	2.86	39.7
security	1.08	15
other	1.11	15.4
TOTAL	7.2	100

Table 5.3: Owners of the Olympic sports venues in the post-Olympic period. The ones that are signed by * are newly built sports venues.

	Hellenic Olympic Prop. SA	Hellenic Olympic Committee	Ministry of Culture
ATHENS OLYMPIC SPORTS COMPLEX (OAKA)			
Olympic Stadium			√
Tennis Centre			√
Indoor Hall			√
Swimming Centre			√
Cycling Centre (velodrome)			√
FALIRON COASTAL ZONE			
Multi-Purpose Complex* (taek-won-do&handball& boxing)	√		
Peace And Friendship Stadium			√
Karaiskaki Stadium		√	
Beach-volley venue*	√		
HELLINIKON OLYMPIC COMPLEX			
Baseball venues(x2)*	√		
Hockey venues(x2)*	√		
Softball venues(x3)*	√		
Fencing venues(x3)*	√		
OTHER COMPETITION SITES			
Galatsi Indoor Hall*	√		
Ana Liossia Indoor Hall*	√		
Goudi Badminton & pentathlon complex*	√		
Nikaia Indoor Hall* (weightlifting)	√		
Agios Kosmas Yachting venue (sailing)	√		
Markopoulo Equestrian/Archery venue*	√		
Markopoulo Shooting venue	√		
Schinias Rowing/Canoeing venue*	√		
Ancient Panathenaic Stadium		√	



Figure 5.7: Locations of the sports venues owned by the Hellenic Olympic Properties SA.

5.4.1.2. Declaration of a draft law on Olympic venues (March 2005)

The government declared a plan in February 16, 2005, unveiling the measures about the exploitation of the Olympic venues, saying that only a small fraction of each former Olympic site (maximum 10% of the buildings within each complex) can be used for commercial purposes. This caused a public protest of local inhabitants led by 4 municipalities' mayors, who were against the refusal of the government to discuss the future plans for the 550 ha. Hellinikon site (Kathimerini 2005, 17 February). Local residents wanted whole area to be a metropolitan park, while the government wanted to sustain such a big land financially with the help of private investments. Eleni Iliopoulou, a city planner in ORSA, states in a personal interview that Hellinikon has a regional, even national character, and it is not possible for municipalities to sustain the area (Iliopoulou 2005, 02 June).

Local municipalities around Faliron Bay objected to the possible plan as well, since the plan indicated that there would be more construction and grants to commercial interests in the complexes than had been provided for in previous ministry plans (Kathimerini 2005, 25 February). The mayor of Kallithea, a neighbouring municipality of Faliron Bay, indicated that an attempt is being made to change both the content and the philosophy of the presidential decree that gave priority to athletic and cultural activities in this area. The mayor of Moschato, another neighbouring municipality, underlined the environmental problems emerged due to the flood problem of the Kifissos River, which has become more severe after the construction of the sports complex project at Faliron.

Briefly, following the explanation of the government in February 16, harsh critics started on the post-Olympic (mis)use of the sports and other venues. It was underlined that almost none of the spectacular 36 purpose-built stadiums have been used again, since *"the ministries and local authorities squabble over ownership and the government ponders their post-Olympic use"* (Grohmann 2005, 07 March). Critics were keen to stress the lack of planning (Iordanidis 2005, 18 February). Many thinkers underlined the problem of time, which caused a building activity at top speed and correspondingly shoddy workmanship (Hadzioannidou 2005, 03 March; Borowiec 2005, 07 March) that have generated the problem of keeping the venues proper:

> "Built at excessive cost in a race for international prestige last summer, many Olympic sites around the Greek capital already are decaying. The big question today is whether

> Greece can afford to prop up the most essential structures, thus increasing their cost, but preventing them from becoming a $5 billion wasteland. The nation's newspapers are blaming "shoddy workmanship and shortsighted planning" the extent of which is being exposed six months after the euphoria of the successful Olympic Games" (Borowiec 2005, 07 March).

Some other writers claimed that the organisational capacity of Greece did not meet the complexity of such a big organization:

> "The government's helplessness in determining the use of Olympic venues, which is now clear to all, betrays the fact that Greece's decision to host the Games was frivolous — not just because organizing such a huge event exceeded the potential of a small country but also because the Greek State simply does not have the capacity to manage such an undertaking" (Kastriotis 2005, 24 February).

Under the pressure of these critics, the government had to publish a draft law in March 30 2005, about the exploitation of the Olympic venues, within which certain venues' future utilization were clearly drawn, while other venues remained unclear. Under consideration were a theme park at Hellenikon, a museum at the International Broadcasting Centre, a golf course at Markopoulo, a marina at Agios Cosmas, and an urban park on the site of the old racecourse at Faliron (Kollias 2005, 01 April). Furthermore, the marina built next to the Peace and Friendship Stadium would become the National Sea Sports Centre, and the indoor arena at Faliron to be converted to a conference centre, while the beach volleyball court would be used for cultural events (Kathimerini 2005, 01 April). Agios Cosmas marina would require extensive construction works, which include 5-star hotels, yacht services, storage facilities…etc. The Alternate Culture Minister Palli-Petralia said that the draft bill would clearly establish *"the role of the state, the role of private investors and the role of local communities in this plan"* (Kollias 2005, 01 April.).

5.4.1.3. Call for tenders for 3 Olympic venues (July 2005)

The utilisation problem was still on agenda, and almost every other day an article on a newspaper or news on TV started to appear.[6]

[6] In a street interview appeared in TV broadcast, the Faliron Bay was announced as ownerless and idle, even 9 months have passed after the Olympics (Alpha TV 2005, 15 May).

At the end, the Hellenic Olympic Properties SA intended to assign long-term right of use of venues, and thus invited offers for three facilities, which included the canoe-kayak course in the old airport Hellinikon, International Broadcasting Centre in OAKA, and Goudi badminton hall. Figure 5.8 shows their presentation in the *"Call for Tenders"* paper (Hellenic Olympic Properties SA 2005a). The private companies interested in these venues would gain the right of lease, manage, maintain and commercially operate, while they would be able to construct additional structure within the permitted uses and lands.

Canoe-Kayak Slalom venue: Use of the venue will be assigned for a period of no less than 12 years. The venue comprises a large, state-of-the-art white-water facility, within a plot of 287,093 sqm, which also includes buildings with a total surface of approx. 9,000 sqm. On the day of this Invitation, this unique facility hosts the IFC Slalom Racing World Cup. The permitted uses of the venue include a water-park, theme park, commercial and leisure activities, food-and-beverage services.

Badminton arena: Use of the venue will be assigned for a period of 12 to 20 years. The arena has a total surface of approx. 8,200 sqm and is situated on a piece of land of approx. 25,000 sqm, being part of the broader Goudi Olympic venue. After the Olympics, the arena has been successfully used as a cultural venue, hosting important international productions (musical, ice-skating show). The permitted uses include sport and cultural events, food-and-beverage services and outdoor public functions.

International Broadcasting Centre (IBC): The building is adjacent to the main Athens Olympic Stadium. Use of the main part of the building will be assigned for a period of no less than 15 years. The total surface of the relevant part rises to 53,835 sqm above ground, with additional basements ready to be converted to approx. 1,700 parking lots. The existing above-ground floor heights permit the construction of additional horizontal levels. The part of the IBC which is not included in the Tender will house the Hellenic Olympic Games Museum and the World Museum of Classical Athletics. The permitted uses include commercial/shopping, mass-media studios, offices and food-and-beverage services.

Figure 5.8: First call for tenders for Olympic facilities.

5.4.1.4. Call for tenders for 2 Olympic venues (August 2005)

The company announced the second call for two other Olympic venues in the following month (Hellenic Olympic Properties SA 2005b).

	*Agios Kosmas Olympic Sailing Centre:* The right of use of the venue, which constitutes one of the most ambitious projects completed along the coastal zone of Athens, will be assigned for a period of no less than 25 years. It has a total surface of approximately 425.000 sqm, which also includes buildings of 8.945 sqm. The total buildable area amounts to 63.730 sqm. It is one of the most attractive sites for leisure and tourism development. The permitted uses include a marina for approximately 1.000 boats with boat support and handling premises, commercial shops, food and beverage facilities, deluxe guest rooms, cultural, leisure, sports and outdoor activities, heliport.
	*Galatsi Olympic Indoor Hall:* The right of use of the venue will be assigned for a period of no less than 12 years. The existing construction is impressive and highlighted by steel and glass elements. It is situated on a plot of land of approx. 90.000 sqm. Presently the built area amounts to 36.068 sqm and there is the possibility of further constructions of about 8.000 sqm. The permitted uses include commercial shops, food and beverage facilities, cultural venues, sports activities and/or a themed entertainment complex, with substantial parking facilities.

Figure 5.9: Second call for tenders for Olympic facilities

In the meantime, the state announced future uses of facilities in the Faliron complex. According to this declaration, the multi-purpose complex is to become a conference center, which requires some renovation, to be paid for out of the state budget. The rest of the Faliron complex is to include an ecology park, a track for field events and a stadium for team sports as well as auxiliary structures. The Faliron complex will be divided into three or four separate competitions (Kollias 2005, 13 August).

5.5. CONCLUSION

The detailed analysis of the Athens Olympic Games has provided to figure out the relation between the **physical capacity-building process** during the pre-event period and the **overcapacity problem** in the post-event phase. Between the dates 13-29 August 2004, Athens hosted a well-organised event. Success of events was evaluated as hosting the event with no delay, no significant problem, no terrorist attack, no traffic during the Games…etc. (Kollias 2004, 17 September). The day after the closing ceremony of the Olympic Games, the city started to tackle with the troubles generated by the facilities that are purpose-built for the Games. It was realised that these large-scale investments might turn into white elephants, hunchback on the shoulders of the state and the local governments, in case that they are not used with a proper frequency. And it was also understood that these problems have rooted in the preparation period.

When evaluated the problems in the post-Olympic Athens, Stathakis and Hadjimichalis (2004) stated that the nomination and the organisation of the Olympic Games were not integrated into a broader strategic plan of development. We are informed from the interviews that the Olympic facilities were added to the existing plans, without a study of their possible impacts to the neighbouring environment, or possible future scenarios for their utilisation. On the other hand, the pressure of the anxiety of *"constructing on time"* over the anxiety of *"constructing by keeping in mind the post-Olympic use of the constructions"* has affected the process in a negative manner. The limited discussions on the venue locations, their temporary or permanent construction possibilities…etc. generated a non-participatory decision-making process regarding the Olympic organisation.

The most important positive impact of the Games was the rehabilitation of the city centre and the unification of the archaeological sites. However, these kinds of urban regeneration projects had little shares in total expenditures. Moreover, within the 3rd CSF program, a large amount of structural funds were used to realise infrastructure improvements. Given the volume of these investments, the ratio of direct-indirect investments is not unbalanced (see Table 4.20), although the majority of investments made on Olympic-related facilities. It was heavily criticised since at the beginning of Athens' declaration as the Olympic city it was declared that the city had an already existing sports infrastructure to meet 70% of Olympic requirements.

Looking at the spatial organisation of major Olympic complexes, they are dispersed to the city, displaying a similar pattern with Tokyo'64 Olympics. Faliron, planned to be a waterfront development for the city, is suffering from accessibility problem due to the motorways separating the area from the city. The main sports complex OAKA is reserved for further high-standard and international sports venues. However, being surrounded by housing and lacking any auxiliary facilities (like hotels, commercial and recreation areas…etc), it stays under-utilised.

The discussions made on the use of existing building stock for the events are important. The academics from the NTUA had advocated this approach. However, mega-events are capacity-building processes and it is in their nature to construct a large amount of facilities. They have strong relations with construction sectors, which have large shares in countries' economies. In the previous chapter, Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show that although Munich had already have a ready stock of high-standard sports venues, a plenty of facilities were built other than this infrastructure.

It is stated that a total of 20,600 airplanes were due to land at the Eleftherios Venizelos airport in August, compared with the current monthly average of 17,000 (Athens News Agency 2004, 06 August) It shows that the city's accommodation and airport capacity could absorb the agglomerations. On the other hand, over-capacity emerged in terms of unique sports venues, which is called white elephants in the literature.

Over-capacity problem is framed by the abilities of the host city to absorb the constructed facilities and investments in a reasonable time period. Looking at the demographic structure of Athens, it is not a big city and there is little dynamism in growth.

Istanbul, which had 4 consecutive bids in the way of Olympic hosting, is of great importance in this regard, since the city has been building a physical capacity for hosting international sports events for a decade although these mega-sports event oriented sports infrastructure has a potential to produce overcapacity problem if not used properly. Therefore, there are many lessons to be learned from the Athens Olympic experience. The following chapter will be on Istanbul's Olympic bids, which will review the failure of bids and potentials to propose spatial strategies for the city.

Figure 5.10: The image of the Faliron Bay drawn for the 2004 Candidacy Book, source: Athens 2004 Candidature File.

Figure 5.11: Faliron Bay during the Olympic constructions (1), source: ORSA archive.

Figure 5.12: Faliron Bay during the Olympic constructions (2), source: http://www.mediainfo.org.

Figure 5.13: Faliron Bay during the Olympic constructions (3), source: http://www.mediainfo.org.

Figure 5.14: Faliron Bay after the Olympic Games, source: personal archive.



Figure 5.15: Alternative scheme of the NTUA Research Group for the Olympic project, adapted from the NTUA Urban Laboratory website (http://147.102.12.19:8086/NODE/L1/3428.html).



Figure 5.16: Final project for the Athens Olympic Games.



Figure 5.17: Master plan of Athens in relation to the Olympic Games, July 2000, source: http:// www.apada.com /2004/2004_Generalmap.html

CHAPTER 6

CASE STUDY 2: ISTANBUL - OLYMPIC BID CITY

6.1. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, a spatial analysis of mega-event hosting was made by the case study of Athens Olympic experiences. The study showed that PCB in the pre-event phase might turn into OCP in the post-event phase. Olympic-purpose built infrastructure and in some cases non-Olympic infrastructure might remain under utilisation.

This chapter will focus on Istanbul, which is a city that had four Olympic bids (2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 Games) and that started physical capacity-building in order to strengthen its candidature. Concerning the size and the dynamics of the city, Istanbul is claimed to have a higher absorption capacity comparing to Athens, and the tension between physical capacity-building and over-capacity problem will be evaluated in this respect.

6.2. OLYMPIC HISTORY OF ISTANBUL

Istanbul has bidded for the Olympic Games for four times. Before and during these bids, many other Turkish cities have also got interested in hosting different organisations. Some cities have accomplished mega-event hosting and some cities have remained with unsuccessful bids.

6.2.1. The Relationship between Turkish Cities and Mega-Events

Turkey has been participated in mega-events beginning from the foundation years of these organisations. However, it has wished to host such organisations as well. Following the great success that wrestlers obtained in 1948 London Olympic Games, it was decided that the *1949 European Wrestling Championship* would be held in Istanbul. (Kırdar 2004, 27 July). The Sports & Exhibition Palace was constructed within 14 months for this organisation, which was the first international mega-sports event held in Turkey.

The second mega-event held in Turkey was *the Mediterranean Games*, which also emerged as an idea in the London Olympics. In the London Games, representatives from Egypt offered to organise this kind of a regional sports event that would be open to countries that had a line in Mediterranean Sea. Turkey participated as a member country of these Games with other nine countries. The Games started first in 1951 and held in Izmir in 1971. Izmir gained a significant sports infrastructure with this organisation. In the mid-1980s, Turkey got interested in the Olympic Games in terms of hosting the organisation. Istanbul hereafter has become an important part of the Olympic Games.

Beginning from the mid-1990s, other cities got interested in mega-event hosting. Izmir was awarded in 2001 as the host city of 2005 World University Students Games (Universiade). The same year, the minister of Youth and Sports Fikret Ünlü stated that Izmir should be candidate to 2012 Olympic Games since the city will have an adequate physical capacity (Milliyet 2001, 26 Ağustos). He said that *"Why Istanbul? Izmir has more chance since the city has proper infrastructure, transport network and urban regeneration projects"* (Türkmen 2001, 27 Ağustos). In an interview with Yalçin Aksoy made before the Universiade, he underlined that Izmir is improving its sports infrastructure through the coming hosting of the Universiade 2005. Izmir might probably apply for TMOK for the candidacy of the Olympic Games by trusting its organisational capacity building and sufficient sports infrastructure. And the city might draw a vision for itself as "sports city" (Aksoy 2004, 22 Temmuz).

Erzurum, being the most important ski resort of Turkey, was awarded in 2007 as the host city of *2011 Winter Universiade*. The idea of hosting a winter event dates back to

2001 (Ülker 2001, 15 Ekim). It coincides with Izmir's awarding of Universiade and Istanbul's fail of 2008 Olympic bidding.

Currently, Mersin is candidate for the *2013 Mediterranean Games*. The mayor of the city had declared in 2002 that they were eager to construct an Olympic stadium to the city (Cumhuriyet 2002, 07 Ağustos). Other bidding cities are Volos (Greece) and Rijeka (Crotia). Izmir is bidding for 2015 World Expo as well. The other bidding city is Milano.

6.2.2. Evolution of the Idea of Olympic Hosting in Istanbul

There are two important periods in the Olympic history of Istanbul. The first one is the period of Lütfi Kırdar power, when he was both the mayor and the governor of Istanbul between 1938 and 1949. The second period starts with Bedrettin Dalan power, being the mayor of the city in 1984-1989 period. The Olympic project started to be realised with candidacies in the second period.

6.2.2.1. First Ideas towards Olympic Hosting: Prost and Kırdar

Henry Prost, a French urban planner / architect, had made significant plans in Paris, like the regional development plan of Paris. He was invited to Istanbul in the 1930s and in 1936 he started his planning studies. His studies made important contributions to the spatial organisation of Istanbul, especially in terms of sports infrastructure. He carried on his planning studies till the 1950s. The other important person in this respect was Lütfi Kırdar, who carried out the implications of Prost plan while he was both the mayor and the governor in the period 1938-1949.

Paris had hosted the 1924 Olympics and this mega-event had very significant impacts on the spatial organisation of the city. Before hosting the Olympics, Paris hosted the International Sports Congress in 1920, which made provisions for the creation of 24 stadiums. In the period between the two world wars, the government launched a program that tended to intensify sports activities in the ring zone creating a network of stadiums and schools related centres for physical education (OUI Paris 2008, 2001).

Prost was coming out of such a socio-spatial context and his urban planning ideas for Istanbul were shaped out of this perspective.

Prost in his master plan proposed two urban parks for Istanbul. The one is today known as Maçka Park or Congress Valley, which he called as the **Park No.2** (Angel 1987) Kırdar realised this park that was larger than 20 ha., located between Harbiye, Maçka, Taksim and Dolmabahçe. The Sports & Exhibition Palace[1] and İnonü Stadium are inherited from that period of sport facilities.

Nevertheless, more significantly, Prost proposed another urban park called **Park No.1**, which was located near the Historic Peninsula (see fig. 6.1).[2] This was going to be used for an Olympic Complex according to Prost. He keenly believed that Istanbul was going to host this mega-event:

> "As it is very possible for Istanbul to host the Olympic Games very soon, …with a tiny changes in urban land (like expropriation processes) an Olympic Stadium could be constructed in Historic Peninsula, the area of vegetable gardens close to the city-walls… And a tracking field could be built to the area just the outside of the walls… The highway parallel to the walls could function as the main channel going through the city centre from Edirnekapı and Topkapı gates and such a route would serve both for the tracking field and other sports venues within the walls" (Prost 1937b)

This park No.1 was on the agenda of Kırdar as a planned facility. He mentioned the ease of renovation of this area due not only to the vegetable garden use, but also the experience of fire in the previous times. Kırdar thought that the plan of Prost could be used as a base for the festivity of 500th anniversary of Istanbul's conquest (Kırdar 2004, 24 July). Nevertheless, the period of 1939-1950 was very difficult in economic manners for Istanbul, since the city was under the pressure of the possibility of introducing the World War II. Thus the project remained in plans and has never been realised.

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[1] It is today called as Lütfi Kırdar Congress Hall.

[2] Prost's spatial notions about sports and recreation were not limited with this project. He also suggested a Youth Park for the district of Florya, which used to have a pleasant nature and climate at that time. This park would have recreation and gymnastics fields for children and young, a tracking field, shortly a centre of physical education (ibid.). He planned a cycling route between this park and the gate of Topkapı, at least 2 m. width, which would construct a network of sports fields.

6.2.2.2. Materialisation of Olympic Bidding: Dalan Period

The first steps toward the idea of bidding for the Olympics date back to the year 1982. According to TMOK (1997), Vecdi Gönül, the Minister of Sports of that period, had called Turgut Atakol (the president of TMOK) and asked for information about the procedures of organising an Olympics. TMOK analysed the approaching 1988 Seoul Olympics and they prepared a report and sent it to the Ministry. In the same year, the IOC asked all the national committees whether any city wished to host the General Meeting in 1987. TMOK declared its candidacy for this meeting. In 1984, the IOC decided Istanbul to be the host city of 1987 General Meeting. Samaranch, the president of the IOC, visited the city in January 1987 and Dalan, the mayor of Istanbul, gave a reception for him.

The greater Municipality of Istanbul prepared a report on the Seoul Olympics in 1988 and a master plan and an action program for the Istanbul Olympics just after the Seoul Games. With the leadership of Dalan, the municipality decided to make an Olympic Village Master Plan, and this study was held by a consortium.[3] They developed two alternative villages for the Games in the site of Küçükçekmece Lake (Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi 1988b) (see fig. 6.3 and 6.4).

After the mayor elections in Istanbul in 1984, the city indeed introduced a new era in urban politics. The number of international events, organisations and relations increased. The concern of redefining the position of Istanbul within the global economic system had emerged. Dalan put the objective of his municipality as to re-make Istanbul as an international activity centre:

> ...our aim is to contribute to the development of our city as a modern metropolis and a universally acclaimed focal point for international attractions...In short, Istanbul is getting ready for the 21st century...We believe that national traditions and cultural heritage as well as personal skills and contemporary achievements should be esteemed on an international level and considered as integrants of common achievement, well being and happiness of all mankind. The only means for the realization of this goal is international celebrations and fetes of art, culture, sports and other spheres." (Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi 1988a)

[3] Yapılar Architecture, Dyckerhoff & Widmann (Munich) and Behnisch & Partners (Stuttgart).



Figure 6.1: Prost's Istanbul Master Plan prepared for the decade of 1943-1953, source: personal archive of Aron Angel.



Figure 6.2: Proposed site (near Küçükçekmece Lake) of the Olympic Village in Dalan's period, source: Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi (1988b).



Figure 6.3 and 6.4: Two alternatives of Olympic Complex developed by the consortium, source: Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi (1988b).

6.2.3. The First Bid: 2000 Olympic Games

Dalan's project remained as an intention, while Nurettin Sözen, the following mayor elected in 1989, made the first official steps toward the candidacy for the Games. In December 1989, he proposed the first official letter concerning the candidacy to the president. In January 1990, it was publicly announced that Istanbul put its candidacy for the 2000 Olympics. The municipality, the government and TMOK came together and TMOK recognised the candidacy of Istanbul for the Olympics organisation in the years of 2000.

The mayor Sözen made a speech in this gathering about the motives behind this candidacy (Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi 1990). The first motive he put forward was that the Olympics was the greatest event of the world and was worthy of bringing to Istanbul. Moreover, he said that such an organisation did highlight not only sports in that country but also all of the national assets like culture, arts, industry…etc. He added that the Olympics was a big opportunity for recognition of a country. And he underlined the legacy of monetary investments as social and technical infrastructure to the host city. [4]

After the recognition of the Olympic Law No. 3769 in April 1992, the lobby facilities started. Sinan Erdem, the new president of TMOK, took part in many gatherings and meetings of the private sector, and made speeches on the Olympic candidacy of Istanbul and its advantages for the city.

At the same time, international contacts accelerated. TMOK got in touch with 61 IOC members in the Barcelona 1992 Olympics and they were invited to Istanbul afterwards. Journalists from popular European magazines were invited and challenged to write about Istanbul. The first candidacy's strategy was to break down the common belief that Istanbul could be a risky choice and to advertise the geographical, historical and cultural potentials of the city (TC Başbakanlık Devlet Bakanlığı 1993).

According to the representatives of TMOK, Olympic candidacy had two aims. The first was to solve the city's infrastructure problems within seven years, instead of the thirty years that would otherwise be needed. The second, and more important, was to

[4] In the reunion of the Rotary Club and the Businessmen Association, he stated that the Olympics would be a salvation for Istanbul since it would bring solutions to many problems of the city (TMOK Haberleri 1992). Another time, in the meeting of Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and TMOK in September 1992, he emphasised that the Olympics was not an economic burden for the local and national government.

create opportunities for the people of the city to take part in sports activities providing them with modern sports facilities and grounds (Gündoğan, 2001; Atabeyoğlu, 2002).

6.2.3.1. Physical Capacity Building in the 2000 Candidacy

The national Olympic campaign started toward the end of 1992. The main themes were cultural diversity and *"let's meet where the continents meet"* (TMOK 1993). TMOK wanted to display the materialisation of the candidacy by enriching the sports-venues capacity. It was stated that an Olympic Stadium with capacity of 100,000 would be constructed and its construction would start in 1993 (TC Başbakanlık Devlet Bakanlığı 1993).



Figure 6.5: Organisational structure of the Olympic Preparation Committee (HDK).



Figure 6.6: Site plan of the Olympic Park proposed in the bid book of 2000 Games, source: Istanbul 2000 Candidature File.

Table 6.1: Istanbul's four Olympic bids and other bidding cities.

Year	CANDIDATE CITIES		HOST CITY SELECTED
	PHASE I: Applicant cities	PHASE II: Candidate cities	
2000	Beijing, Berlin, Brasilia, **Istanbul**, Manchester, Sydney		SYDNEY
2004	Athens, Buenos Aires, Cape Town, **Istanbul**, Lille, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, San Juan, Seville, Stockholm, St. Petersburg	Athens, Buenos Aires, Cape Town, Rome, Stockholm	ATHENS
2008	Bangkok, Beijing, Havana, Istanbul, Kuala Lumpur, Cairo, Osaka, Paris, Seville, Toronto	Beijing, **Istanbul**, Osaka, Paris, Toronto	BEIJING
2012	Paris, Leipzig, New York, Moscow, **Istanbul**, Havana, London, Madrid, Rio de Janeiro	Paris, New York, Moscow, London, Madrid	LONDON

Another strategy of TMOK was to host certain championships in the year 1993 in order to develop organisational capacity. Organising and hosting other large-scale events would eventually generate an experience of managing complex schedules and working in corporation. The European Youth Aquatics, Archery and World Stars Volleyball-World Stars Championships were organised in order to improve organisational abilities (TC Başbakanlık Devlet Bakanlığı 1993). On the other hand, The International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF) declared its sports schedule and left behind Istanbul as a host city of important athletics organisations.

The president of Turkish Athletics Federation, Aşkın Tuna claimed two reasons for it: 1) the lack of contact with international bodies and 2) the weakening of athletics in Turkey, which is the main sports field of the Olympics (Tezcan 1996, 23 Ekim). He added that the number of tracking fields suitable for international competitions was only one in Istanbul, which engenders doubts in sports infrastructure.

6.2.3.2. Failure in Bidding for the 2000 Games

The IOC made the city-selection for the 2000 Games in September 1993. Istanbul was eliminated in the first round by taking 7 votes out of 89. The first bid of Istanbul was evaluated as *a good intention* that was supported with a *law*, which was –unique in the world- one of the strongest factors of the bid (IOC, 1993). Although there was great support from the government and the public, the problems concerning the sports venues, required transportation networks and certain environmental problems affected the bid negatively. TMOK tried to contact with those who had voted against Istanbul to ask them where it had done wrong. They came across with a variety of responses. However, many of them replied that they thought the committee was not serious, that TMOK seemed to be only in it for the publicity attracted by an Olympic bid (Aksoy 2004, 22 July). In fact, the IOC thought that Istanbul did not have a capacity of realising a mega-event (Dorsey 1997, 06 Ocak). Briefly, the Olympic project remained on paper in the first candidacy, which later produced a common belief that Istanbul was seeking to improve its image and advertisement via bidding.

Aksoy (2004, 22 July) stated that Istanbul could not use the 4-year preparation period for the candidacy, since only 16 months remained for the city after the declaration of the Olympic Law in April 1992. Sinan Erdem said that within this 16-month period, minister of Youth and Sports had changed for four times (Sezer 1997, 15 Ocak). Moreover, during that period, institutional capacity of TMOK was very poor. The committee was using the 2 storeys of a building in Cağaloğlu. One of the IOC members, a close friend of Erdem, visited this place and told him not to invite the IOC Evaluation Commission to this place. Then the visitors were accepted in Çırağan Palace, which soon seemed inappropriate to the IOC members because they began to say that *"you had no place, and an organised group"* (ibid.).

Thus the 2000 candidacy involved a set of *illusions* considering the process of capacity building for the mega-event. Illusions continued in 2004 candidacy speeches of authority bodies, like Sinan Erdem claiming Istanbul to be the most suitable city out of 11 applicant cities of the 2004 Games (Tokgöz 1996, 24 Ekim). He stated that Istanbul would increase its chance due to the accommodation capacity, climate, geographical suitability, sports tradition, organisational capacity and having the youngest population of Europe (ibid.).

6.2.4. The Second Bid: 2004 Olympic Games

In November 1997, Istanbul declared its candidacy for the 2004 Games. Erdem, the president of TMOK, said they had to get down improving the sports infrastructure for this candidacy (TMOK Haberleri Kasım 1993). The first step was set as the start of the Olympic Stadium together with the Olympic Park. TMOK spent two years for the search of an appropriate land for the **Olympic Park**. First, the area required for the park was studied, and it was understood that at least 300 ha. was needed. Then the committee asked the Ministry of Finance and Treasury for the area required. The criteria were proposed as:

> "In a developing part of Istanbul, out of the main settlement area but close to the main transport corridors, having opportunity to link the city with railway system, preferably in the European side of the city, so being close to airport" (Aksoy 2004, 22 July).

The Ministry appropriated the 584 ha. land which was between the İkitelli Mass Housing Area and Altınşehir settlement (see fig. 6.7). The area was supposed to involve 14 *multi-use sports complexes* and *several outdoor venues*, which would meet the needs of the public regarding sports, cultural and social facilities (Erdem 2004: 211). It was stated that the selected area that used to be the property of the Ministry of Finance and Treasury was in fact under the risk of uncontrolled urban sprawl (ibid.: 215). With the construction of the Olympic Park, it assumed to be protected against such threats.

TMOK intensified the contacts with the municipality, since the greater municipality had to revise the master plans regarding the Olympic Park. This was important because it was the prerequisite for the start of construction of venues in the land appropriated.

In November 1995, the Department of Planning and Development of the Greater Istanbul Municipality prepared the Istanbul Metropolitan Area Sub-Regional Master Plan in 1/50 000 scale. The Olympic Park was put to plan under the title of "Urban Social Activities", but the plan was not Olympic-oriented. Instead, it was a guideline for the development of a great urban entity. The objective set for the year 2010 was stated as

> "…to establish equilibrium between conservation and development in Istanbul as a city integrated to the economic structures of both the world and the region" (Istanbul 2004 Candidature File).

One of the policies of the master plan was setting for the entire Metropolitan Area Sub-Region rules of land-use for international activities in sports, culture, commerce and services. The other one was devising projects for the construction of congress halls, culture and art centres, entertainment and exhibition facilities structures *capable to host international events*, creating museums ad archives, all with a view to ensuring Istanbul's status as a world-class city. The other target was defined as increasing the number of areas assigned for national and international sports events, artistic celebrations and leisure activities, and upgrading the standards of social facilities while encouraging such organisations. Nevertheless, no specific policies were defined with regard to this target.

6.2.4.1. Image-Making Studies

A very powerful study of image and advertising began in the second bid. A private company was charged with finding out slogans and keywords for Istanbul's bid. The company worked on the values of Istanbul and it suggested several keywords, such as capital for 3000 years, capital of three empires, city of tolerance, cultural diversity, co-existence of 26 ethnicities, mosaic of different religions…etc. The company made a SWOT analysis and out of this study, the main emphasis appeared as the *geographical advantages* of Istanbul, instead of its sports infrastructure (advantage of Moscow, for instance) or sports culture (of Germany) or the experience of sports-event organisations (of France). They stated that the city was located on an appropriate time zone for the Olympic Games, which referred to the increasing profits

obtained from TV rights. The advertising company pointed its approach as *"underlining the selling prosperities of Istanbul"* (Lowe Adam 1996).



Figure 6.7: A plan sketch of the land (close to the İkitelli Industrial District) appropriated for the Olympic Park, source: personal archive of Sinan Erdem.



Figure 6.8: Olympic Park site plan proposed in the bid book of 2004 Games, source: Istanbul 2004 Candidature File.

According to the world press, the advantage of Istanbul in its candidacy was the low costs that city would offer in an organisation. Cheap transportation of athletes and visitors and budget-friendly management would be the plusses of the city. On the other hand, the conservative Islamic party in power, terror in the southeast and high levels of inflation were generating question marks (Dorsey 1997, 06 Ocak).

Between the dates 3-14 June 1996, Istanbul hosted the Habitat II Conference, which was the largest mega-event that the city has ever hosted up to that moment. When was declared Istanbul to be the host city, several doubts emerged about the possibility of a successful organisation in such a city that had traffic problems, unhealthy urban development…etc. There was a common belief that we did not have a requisite level of *"know-how"* to handle such an event (Pirinççioğlu 1996, 17 Ekim).

Yiğit Gülöksüz, the president of the Habitat II National Committee, stated that Istanbul would experience a significant increase in capacity regarding the large-scale organisations to be held in the future (Güngör 1996, 22 Nisan). According to him, a successful organisation of the Habitat II conference would set forth the capacity of Istanbul in organising other mega-events and it would ease the candidacy of Istanbul for the Olympic Games (Küçükkaya 1996, 27 Nisan). Gülöksüz stated that this organisation would be an important reference for Istanbul which was candidate for the 2004 Games (Sabah 1996, 27 Nisan).

6.2.4.2. Failure in Bidding for the 2004 Games

It was declared in March 1997 that Istanbul was eliminated in the first phase of the city-selection process. Athens was selected, which was a surprise according to Erdem (2004: 265) since the city was at the beginning of the bid seen very deficient regarding the candidature file prepared. But Erdem later admitted that Athens was selected since out of the candidate and applicant cities Athens owned the largest number of sports complexes and venues. At that time, the only venue in Istanbul appropriate for Olympic competitions was the Abdi İpekçi Sports Complex (ibid: 210), which was dramatic for a city of its size, when thinking of the eagerness of hosting the world's largest sports event. Neşe Gündoğan, director of Sports in TMOK stated that there were only 180 sports facilities in Istanbul in hands of both public and

private sector, which was very low comparing to Olympic host cities like Barcelona, Seoul and Atlanta, which had over 3,000 facility areas (Gündoğan 2001, 24 Ocak).

Table 6.2 shows that there was a great deficiency in the existing sports venues in Istanbul. According to Yalçın Aksoy, director of HDK, Istanbul had a total of 369 ha. sports venues, while the total requirement was 2400 ha. (Erdemli 1998, 14 Mayıs). Sinan Erdem was stating that it could be overcome by building 14 additional venues, which would meet the requirements of a mega-sports event. This means that the concept of mega-sports event hosting was generally associated with the numeric data on capacities of sports venues.

There are three authority mechanisms in the activity of bidding for the Olympic Games in Istanbul. The first one is the **Turkish National Olympic Committee** (TMOK). The second is the **government**, which enacted the Olympic Law in 1992, as a response to this request. By this law, the financing and management of the bids were clearly drawn by the central government. The last one is the **Greater Municipality of Istanbul**, which is in the same official document defined as one of the key actors of the bidding processes and the possible staging of the games. These three bodies are subjected to work in partnership in order to start a capacity building process for a desired mega-event. In his autobiographical book, Erdem (2004: 286) mentioned about the lack of trust between the members of HDK. He described the situation occurred out of this context as follows:

> "The committee has been broken into three parts: the representatives of the greater municipality avoiding to pay their debts, the sports organisation which was always in agreement with the decisions of the minister of Youth and Sports, and the representatives of our [National Olympic] committee."



Figure 6.9: Comparison of 2000 and 2004 candidacies regarding participation of official actors to the HDK meetings, source: personal archive of Sinan Erdem.

Table 6.2: Sports venues and seating capacities in Istanbul in 1997,
source: GSGM İstanbul İl Müdürlüğü cited in Hacıbayramoğlu (1997, 16 Temmuz).

Venues that belong to GSGM				Venues that belong to Greater Municipality	
Name of the sports venue	Capacity	Name of the sports venue	Capacity	Name of the sports venue	Capacity
STADIUMS		SWIMMING POOLS		INDOOR VENUES	
İnönü	34,000	Burhan Felek	500	Bayrampaşa	1,500
Ali Sami Yen	32,000	Ataköy	1,500	Gaziosmanpaşa	1,500
Fenerbahçe	28,500	Kurtköy	2,500	Zeytinburnu	1,500
Yusuf Ziya Öniş	10,000	Burhan Felek (açık)	1,000	Beykoz	1,500
Bayrampaşa	10,000	EQUESTRIAN VENUES		Tarabya	2,000
Eyüp	10,000	Maslak	500	Okmeydanı	1,000
Vefa	12,500	ATHLETICS FIELD		Akatlar	1,200
Silivri	5,000	Burhan Felek	10,000	Florya	-
Şile	1,000	SHOOTING FIELD		Çırpıcı	-
Güngören	1,000	İstinye	500	Ümraniye	-
Avcılar	3,000				
Spor Akademisi	3,000				

INDOOR SPORTS VENUES	
Abdi İpekçi	12,500
Ataköy	1,500
Burhan Felek	1,500
Sarıyer	750
Eyüp	750
Bağlarbaşı	500
Silivri	250
Güngören	250
Çatalca	250
Altınay	250
Tozkoparan	250
Kartal	1,500
Bayrampaşa	500
Caferağa	2,000

Venues that belong to sports clubs
Zeytinburnu, Gaziosmanpaşa, Şenlikköy, Küçükköy, Küçükçekmece, Kasımpaşa, Tepecik, Beykoz, Kartal, Maltepe, Pendik, Selimiye, Avcılar, Sefaköy Kartal, Hürbarbaros, İFA, Kocasinan, Zeytinburnu Amatör Saha, Merter, Yıldız Tabya, Albayrak, Deniz Köşkler, Taşoluk, Yahya Kemal, Kulaksız Okspor, Okmeydanı Fetih, Kağıthane Arif Calban, Ayazağa, Büyükçekmece, Özmimarsinan, Terkoz, Paşabahçe, Kavacık, Kanlıca, Çakmak, İmes, Dudullu, Libadiye, Esatpaşa, Gülsuyu, Kartal Bulvar, Kaynarca, Sultanbeyli, Yenisahra

Aksoy (2004, 22 July) stated that out of these three authority mechanisms, the government and the municipality refused dressing the Olympic idea; they rather stood with their institutional identity. Therefore, he underlined, each actor hold up its own interests. The municipality, for instance, tried not to give the subsidy that it has to reserve for the Olympic Games in accordance with the Olympic Law. Onuk (1996, 14 Ocak) underlined that the mayor of Istanbul was not participating in the meetings of the OPC (see fig. 6.9). Gökçe (1996, 28 Şubat) stressed on the same problem by stating that *"the illness of not being able to work in cooperation is threatening the Olympic candidacy of Istanbul… HDK members could not get together regularly…the minister [of Youth and Sports] is not participating, mayor is not interested in, and the governor has not ever participated…".* Moreover, the municipality's attitude towards not paying its share in the Olympic Project[5] was paralysing the Olympic project (Özel 1998, 11 Nisan).

6.2.5. The Third Bid: 2008 Olympic Games

In order to define the right strategies for the sake of the Olympic project, HDK again made a research on the reasons of the fail of Istanbul's bidding (DPT 2000). Reasons were grouped under two main titles: One is the insufficiency of the sports infrastructure of Istanbul, and the other one is the lack of enough experience in hosting large-scale sports organisations (Erdem 2004; Aksoy 2004). They coincide the reasons of the 2000 fail. Therefore it was decided to build sports facilities to empower the further bids. The first step was the construction of the Olympic Stadium, the second was the construction of 10 new sports venues in the city, and the decision was taken by the Ministry of Youth and Sports (Sabah 1998, 21 Ağustos). After awhile, the ministry could not manage the maintenance costs of these facilities and made a protocol with local governments and transferred them to these bodies (Ersen 2000, 05 Ocak).

[5] According to the Olympic Law No.3796, HDK budget is composed of several institutions' shares, within which the Greater Municipality is subject to transfer %1 of its total budget to HDK.

6.2.5.1. Declaration of 2008 Candidacy

After the elimination of Istanbul in the first phase of the Olympic city-selection process in March 1997, Yücel Seçkiner (the Minister responsible from Sports) declared that the city was going to bid for 2008 as well (Güley 1997, 19 Ağustos). TMOK did not want to make further candidacy. Despite the reluctance of TMOK, the minister of Sports Fikret Ünlü insisted on the 2008 candidacy (Radikal 2000, 24 Mart). He stated that all of the Olympic investments would finish by 2005. In January 2000, the third candidacy was officially declared.

A crisis occurred in March 2000, and TMOK decided to withdraw the candidacy for two reasons. First, the debts of the Greater Municipality to HDK have become an important problem. The municipality sent an official letter to HDK, indicating that it decided to erase the previous debts to HDK and it would not pay any share to the committee. Second, the Greater and Bakırköy Municipalities did not give building permissions to the newly built sports venues.

At the end, the ministry insisted and TMOK sent the official candidature file to the IOC in the last application day, 25 March. This time Istanbul succeeded the Phase I of city-selection process in August 2000. The selection of the host city was one year later, in July 2001.

6.2.5.2. Construction of the Olympic Stadium

In the very beginning of the year 1997, concrete steps were taken for the construction of the Olympic stadium. Its contract was announced in January 1997, the construction was given to TEKFEN Construction Company in October 1997, after the failure of 2004 Olympic Games (Eser 1997, 10 Ocak). The company gave a guarantee to finish the structure in three years, by 2000 (Ercan 1997, 22 Ekim). The construction started in the end of 1997 and finished in November 2001.

The Olympic Stadium generated discussions after the start of its construction. The stadium was covered in its one-side, which was criticised by being non-functional and non-contemporary (Bartu 1997, 01 Aralık). It was stated that the world was building dynamic roof structures for stadiums that can be used both open and closed styles,

which increased the frequency of use[6] of these huge structures (Uluç 1997, 04 Aralık). The argument of this statement was that it is such a possibility of using Olympic stadium for the Olympics that it might happen once in a century. Therefore, the stadium should be designed to be used for other activities such as concerts…etc (Uluç 1998, 30 Ocak). Authorities in TMOK on the other hand underlined that open air stadium was to sustain the conditions of the IAAF, which has special rules for sports venues in the Olympics (Milliyet 1997, 05 Aralık). They also mentioned about the economic limitations to build a more flexible stadium (Cömert 1997, 05 Aralık). TMOK claimed that this stadium was not going to be built for football but for the Olympics (Tokgöz 1997, 02 Aralık). However, the stadium turned into a football arena after 2001. The discussions were stopped by the declarations of TMOK that stadium would not be covered, which would multiply the expenditures by 5 times (Fanatik 1998, 06 Nisan).

In January 1999, TMOK stated that the construction facilities in the stadium were going to stop since DPT did not include the project to the priority list which caused the cut of credits for the project (Hürriyet 1999, 14 Ocak). After a set of dialogue between TMOK and DPT, the decision was taken back and the project continued. DPT decided to take the Olympic project in the 8th 5-year development plan which was prepared for 2001-2005 period (Yeşin 1999, 17 Aralık). According to this plan, Olympic Games and construction of sports infrastructure were deeply evaluated under a sub-title, and funds were allocated to the venues which were approved by DPT.

The Olympic Stadium has always been the main part of the Olympic Park and Istanbul's Olympic project. It is because the scale of the stadium has made it the symbol of the intention to host the Games. Nevertheless, there are two important issues failed to accomplish: 1) accessibility of the stadium, 2) setting of the stadium.

The deficiencies in physical relationships of the stadium with the rest of the city appeared very dramatically in a championship match that was considered as the opening event of the stadium. People suffered in semi-constructed highways going from city-centre to the stadium. A similar occasion took place in Paris, a friendly football match was organised in November 1997 on the Stade de France building site. It was a kind of experiment for transportation facilities planned to be constructed. The

[6] See 3.4.1.c in Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of "frequency of use" and "over-capacity problem" relation.

result was that with only 4 000 to 5 000 spectators, the accesses to the stadium were saturated for several hours. Then the authorities decided to give priority to access by metro and by the suburban express.

Not only being isolated and far from the city but also being constructed near a low-quality but very settled housing area has produced serious problems in terms of drawing a general framework for the city's future development in relation to sports (see fig. 6.10). Today more developed cities bid for the Olympics in order to benefit from its urban effects in positive manner. Regenerating a decaying part of the city or using mega-structures of the Olympic project as a locomotive of further development within a vision are of few examples within this respect. The IOC report shares the same concerns about the site-selection of the Olympic Complex and its relationship with other parts of the city:

> "The many existing transportation problems in the city pose a major challenge to the organisation of the Games….detailed planning will be necessary to meet the challenges of an Olympic transportation system… The venues are located away from the most congested areas but are not convenient for many of the hotel accommodations for spectators and media. " (IOC 1997).

The committee concluded its remarks by the difficulty of the solution of the transportation problems due to the site-selection of the Olympic complex. On the other hand, Togay Bayatlı, the general secretariat of TMOK at that period, made a speech on this concern:

> "3 aspects of the Games have become increasingly more important in time: Accreditation. Media. Transportation…Half the 10 million population of Istanbul commute to work and school today. There is a sophisticated and punctual bus and shuttle service network for half of the 2.5 million school children. 30 % of Istanbul's population moves to holiday resorts, and schools will be on summer vacation during the Games. Therefore, a) Istanbul will be free of school traffic; b) we will have this network fully at our disposal for the Games" (TMOK 1997c).

The site also made a conflict between TMOK and İSKİ, since İSKİ did not find adequate the land that was separated for its facilities in the Olympic Park site (Tuncay 1998, 16 Ocak).



Figure 6.10: Olympic Stadium, surrounded by low-quality housing, source: personal archive of Baykan Günay.

6.2.5.3. Construction of Olympic Sports Venues

Conflicts between the Greater Municipality and HDK accelerated on the increasing debts of the municipality to HDK. The Municipality suggested building an indoor sports complex in Bağcılar district as an equivalent of its debts accumulated starting from 1993 (Yeni Yüzyıl 1998, 16 Nisan). After a protocol between two institutions, the construction of the venue started in 1998. In February 2000, the minister of Sports Fikret Ünlü visited the construction and stated in a speech that the venue will be the first sports venue of Turkey which will meet the Olympic standards (Demirbilek 2000, 24 Şubat). Sinan Erdem, on the other hand, declared the day after that the Bağcılar sports venue could not even put into the 2008 candidacy book of Istanbul. He stated that the seating capacity of the stadium (2,650) did not meet the Olympic standard of minimum 15,000 (Radikal 2000, 25 Şubat).

The second venue that generated conflicts was the Ataköy Multi-Purpose Hall.[7]The constructions were launched in 1992, but it remained unfinished up to 2001 due to the lack of money of the construction company (Erdem 2004: 283). By 1997, 40% of the construction facilities had finished (Erşan&Köyük 1997, 12 Eylül). The construction was still continuing in March 2007. During the construction, Bakırköy Municipality sent

[7] The venues was later re-named as "Sinan Erdem Multi-Purpose Hall" after the death of Sinan Erdem.

the venue to the court in order to demolish it since it did not have the building license (Sabah 2000, 04 Mart). The municipality stated that one of the two plots that the venue was built on belonged to them and did not give the building permission. It was also stated that the venue was built on a river bank which could not be acceptable concerning the earthquake risks.

The area of sports complex in Ataköy that was appropriated to the Ministry of Youth and Sports by the Emlakbank, was subjected to the construction of the Ataköy Multi-Purpose. In August 2004, the roof of the complex was still in progress. When the president of TMOK, Sinan Erdem, complained about the city-selection decision of the IOC to the president of the IOC, Samaranch, his response was that:

> "If you cannot achieve to finish an ordinary sports complex during a 7-year period, how will you organise the Olympics?" (ibid.: 284)

The site selected for the Olympic Park and stadium was criticised by the local governments of the Anatolian part of Istanbul (Pamuk 2001, 26 Ekim). They complained that the majority of investments in sports infrastructure were made in the European continent, which would produce inequality concerning the entire population of Istanbul. They stated that if the slogan of Istanbul's bid was *"the city where the continents meet"*, then the investments should be distributed evenly. The mayor of Kadıköy Municipality claimed that the Olympic project should refer to evenly distributed investments, especially in transportation networks (Harani 2001, 22 Ocak). The mayor of Pendik Municiaplity underlined that $ 10 million investments would be made to the Anatolian part while the European part would have $ 448 million, which generated uneven distribution of investments (Pamuk 2001, 26 Ekim). Sinan Erdem, on the other hand, answered the mayors that it was not possible to divide the Olympic project into parts in the city, since the IOC would not accept such a spatial organisation (Yeni Şafak 2001, 14 Mart).

6.2.5.4. Failure in Bidding for the 2008 Games

Istanbul succeeded the Phase I of city-selection process in August 2000. The decision of the IOC was interpreted as the approval of the capability of Istanbul to organise the mega-event (Koryürek 2001, 10 Mart). The city-selection committee visited

Istanbul in 20-25 March 2001. When the evaluation ended, the commission unofficially stated that there were question marks on the traffic congestion, transportation networks and environmental quality (Kanbur 2001, 25 Mart). TMOK members claimed that traffic would not be a severe problem during a probable organisation, since the primary and secondary schools are closed in summer times which would decrease traffic by 50% (Bayatlı 2001, 27 Mart).

Authorities were claiming that 45% of Olympic sports venues were ready since they were completed in four years (Yuva 2001, 08 Mart). Moreover, being the only city which would have an Olympic Stadium before being awarded as the Olympic city would bring many advantages to Istanbul. Having a compact Olympic project would be another advantage for the city, in which sports venues would be concentrated in two large Olympic complexes; the Olympic Park and Ataköy Olympic Complex (ibid.). Another advantage was the existence of the Olympic Law, which would guarantee the construction of sports venues and other non-Olympic investments (like transportation networks) without any problem in the process. Depending on them, Istanbul was seen as one of the most powerful candidates of 2008 Games.

Given in Table 6.3, except for Istanbul, candidate cities of the 2008 Games have planned to use the Olympic Games as a tool in urban regeneration, specifically restoring the declining areas or creating foci of new urban development corridors. In Istanbul, the decision in the selection of the main Olympic site (that is the Olympic Park) was taken in accordance with the availability of a large state property close to the main highways. And this decision was found risky because of carrying potential problems with uncontrolled urban growth. In May 2001, the IOC Evaluation Commission published a mid-report on candidate cities and underlined that Istanbul had a little chance comparing to other candidates due to the lack of transportation networks and the risk of economic crisis (Cumhuriyet 2001, 16 Mayıs). In July 2001, the IOC declared that Beijing was selected as the 2008 host city. Nevertheless, the authorities in TMOK stated that Istanbul's bidding experience will last until it gets the opportunity of hosting.

Table 6.3: Comparison of the 2008 Olympic candidate cities.

	Beijing	Istanbul	Osaka	Paris	Toronto
Population (in million)	13.8	9.4	8.8 (regional) 2.6 (city)	11.3 (regional) 2.1 (city)	4.8 (regional) 2 (city)
GDP (per capita US$)	2.700	6.720	71.870	22.857	20.580
Office stock-m^2	2.500.000	80.000	9.200.000	15.450.000	3.412.000
Hotel stock (4-5 star)	23.232 rooms	4.650 rooms	8.500 rooms	13.666 rooms	34.520 rooms
Potential impact on urban regeneration	A new urban park of 760 ha., creation of a new focal point in northern axis	A new Olympic park of 584 ha. on the west of city, potential problems with uncontrolled urban sprawl to the west	Creation of 3 man-made islands in Osaka Bay	Improving urban relationship between city and its north-eastern suburbs, urban renewal project involving re-use of former industrial area as Olympic village	Development of 6 km. Olympic waterfront, remediation of former industrial area

6.2.6. The Fourth Bid: 2012 Olympic Games

After 2008 failure, the construction of the Olympic stadium was accomplished in November 2001, but could not be opened to use due to the financial and technical inadequencies. The management of the stadium remained unclear, since the sports clubs did not want to use the stadium due to the lack of required transport and water-electricity infrastructure (Ağca 2001, 18 Ekim). Galatasaray Football Club was keen on using the venue because their original venue Ali Sami Yen had problems. After the site investigation, authorities did not want to use it because of the harsh winds that would negatively affect the matches (Kızılyalın 2001, 26 Aralık).

The stadium was first used in July 2002, for an unofficial football match played between Galatasaray and Olympiakos, and the problem of transportation was underlined since many people could not reach the venue (Kızılyalın 2002, 02 Ağustos). In the following month, Ministry of Youth and Sports, TMOK and Genral Directorate of Highways made meetings on the accessibility problem. The solution was proposed as to widen the existing highways, to make a connection from TEM motorway, to run a bus shuttle between the venue and Halkalı train station and to construct a ring road around the venue (Milliyet 2002, 24 Ağustos). Authorities explained that these solutions could help discharge of 8.000 vehicles, which is about 30-35.000 persons. The existing transportation network would carry this amount but the stadium was

80.000 seat-capacity (Hasol 2002, 26 Eylül). The stadium was lent to Galatasaray Football Club in May 2003 for 2-year utilization.

Another problem occurred between HDK and the Greater Municipality on the debts of the municipality to the committee, which was forced to go to the court due to this problem (See Table 6.4). The court resulted in January 2004, and the municipality was punished for paying all of its debts for the 1992-2001 period (Türkiye 2004, 13 Ocak). The municipality subjected to pay it by constructing transportation connections of the stadium.

The deadline of the 2012 Olympic city applications was in July 2003 and Istanbul declared its candidacy unofficially in May 2003. For this reason, there wasn't time for preparing a compound candidature file. The file of the previous candidacy (2008) was sent to the IOC with tiny changes. In May 2004, the IOC performed the first phase of the city-selection process. Jaques Rogge, the president of the IOC stated the committee could not see any improvement in Istanbul's candidacy, and 2012 candidature file was almost the same as 2004 and 2008 files (Sabah 2004, 24 Mayıs).

The press release-documentation showed that the enthusiasm in candidacy declined in years. The death of TMOK president Sinan Erdem in July 24, 2003 affected Istanbul's enthusiasm negatively. Togay Bayatlı became the new president of TMOK (Radikal 2003, 14 Ağustos).

Table 6.4: Budget and expenditures of HDK between 1992-2001, source: Harani (2001, 29 Temmuz).

	Amount (Turkish million lira in 2001 values)	percentage
Income	**114.773**	**100 %**
Legal domestic income	60.027	52.3 %
Foreign credits	54.746	47.7 %
Expenditures	**102.346**	**100 %**
Indirect expenditures		7.5 %
Administrative	1.598	
Publicity-lobbying	2.922	
International sports events	3.068	
Direct investments		
Sports venues	94.757	92.5 %
Income-expenditures difference	**12.427**	
Debts	5.227	
Receivable	17.654	

6.3. CONCLUSION

In the historical analysis of the Olympic cities, four components were underlined. The Istanbul case can be evaluated in the light of these components:

Direct/indirect investments: As shown in Table 6.4, a significant amount of money was invested in sports venues in order to meet the requirements of the IOC. On the other hand, due to the problems between the actors of the Olympic project, the required indirect investments were not constructed. Therefore, accessibility has not been realised and OCP emerged in a capacity-required city. The city has so far spent 90 % percent to direct investments which are Olympic-related facilities. On the other hand, comparing to the size of the city, the current sports infrastructure is weak.

Table 6.5 is a comparison of Athens and Istanbul in terms of accommodation capacity. Comparing to Athens ad Istanbul, Athens could be squeezed by extra agglomerations during the event, since it is a tourism destination and its accommodation and airport capacity have met the requirements of the Olympics. However, the investments made for the organisation may remain idle for a long period of time, since the city has a durable economics and population growth comparing to Istanbul. Therefore, Istanbul should strengthen its tertiary infrastructure, which will be the strengths of the city in any extraordinary case in the city (like congresses, festivals, sports events…)

Table 6.5: Comparison of Athens and Istanbul in accommodation capacity, source: UEFA (2004).

		5-star		4-star		3-star		2-star	
		No. of hotels	No. of rooms	No. of hotels	No. of rooms	No. of hotels	No. of rooms	No. of hotels	No. of rooms
Within 10 km. radius of stadium	Athens	16	4.073	44	4.688	78	5.008	181	6.732
	Istanbul	7	2.753	3	236	5	314	3	121
Within 75 km. radius of stadium	Athens	25	5.895	66	7.067	101	6.544	236	8548
	Istanbul	29	9.643	56	6.126	77	5.177	75	3.166

Spatial organisation of venues: Given that the Olympic Park is located outskirts and covers a 584 ha. area, Istanbul's Olympic project is similar to Sydney's spatial organisation. Instead of distributing the venues throughout the city, a concentrated

and peripheral area was chosen. The conditions of site-selection were shaped by the available and accessible state land. As seen from the Sydney experience notified in the sub-title 4.3.5.1, the sports venues and the green area created in Homebush Bay have suffered from under-utilisation due to the scale and distance of the complex. In Istanbul, the total area that is used for sports facilities 369 ha, while the Olympic Park itself is 584 ha.

Although the area of the Olympic Park has been chosen with the criteria of accessibility, it has stayed non-accessible for a long period of time. Low-quality in accessibility has prevented the venue to be used for the league games of football.

Population and population growth ratio: Istanbul is a large city, having the similar characteristics with Tokyo and Mexico City that were reviewed in Chapter 4. Having a large population and a high rate of population growth, the city demands urban infrastructure and this can be overcome by a tight program of capacity-building, in which a mega-event like the Olympic Games would be a chance to built the required general infrastructure. In addition to that, the young population gives the chance of using the purpose-built sports infrastructure effectively.

Public and private share in Olympic investments: Throughout 4 consecutive bids, the investments were made by public resources. The support of the private sector should be asked for the Olympic project, by underlining the post-event economic impacts of the event.

Primary motivations and spatial strategies for Olympic hosting: During the Olympic bids, Istanbul's strategy has been to try to meet the spatial requirements of the IOC. Given the facts that are derived from the Olympic bid history of Istanbul, the city requires a strategy for sports infrastructure, which can be absorbed socially since there is a lack of facilities and also the city is economically and demographically dynamic, comparing to Athens.



Figure 6.11: Istanbul's proposal of spatial organisation for the 2000 Olympic Games, adaptet from Istanbul 2000 Candidature File.



Figure 6.12: Istanbul's proposal of spatial organisation for the 2008 Olympic Games, adaptet from Istanbul 2008 Candidature File.



Figure 6.13: Istanbul's proposal of spatial organisation for the 2012 Olympic Games, adaptet from Istanbul 2012 Candidature File.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Mega-events are short-time but long-term-impact organisations. Today mega-events are considered to be a valuable instrument to promote a region as a tourism destination, business location, and an attractive place to live and work. These events generally have an impact on the built environment. Cities wish to host these events in order to develop their urban structure as well as to create a new urban image.

This study has aimed to draw a conceptual framework for mega-event hosting. The problem definition and the research questions of the study have been shaped by the interest of Turkish cities towards hosting mega-events. Olympic candidacies of Istanbul[1], Izmir's hosting of Universiade[2] in 2005 and its enthusiasm of hosting the 2015 World Expo, Erzurum's upcoming hosting of Universiade Winter Games in 2011 show that Turkish cities seek for being a part of the global competition in hosting large-scale organisations.

The literature review shows that there are valuable studies on mega-events and the concept of being a mega-event host city. However, it is obvious that there are gaps in the literature. First, since the host cities have mostly been geographically located in either Europe or North America, the literature has got shaped on the experiences and contexts of more developed regions. Moreover, it has focused on the power of local and its entrepreneurial capacity in generating its own financial resources, within which mega-events are conceptualised as instruments of entrepreneurialism and place-

[1] Istanbul has officially put its candidacy to 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 Olympic Games.
[2] Universiade is the World University Student Games, which is a multi-sports mega-event.

marketing. However, the increasing interest of developing countries for staging mega-events has been changing the geography and the components of mega-events.

Second, the majority of the research has analysed the post-event periods of mega-event hosting. Many of those researchers focus on Olympic cities and their spatial, economic and social evaluation after the organisation. In their studies, positive impacts of mega-events have been underlined, in which incomes obtained from the event and additional employment created have been emphasised. As the internal characteristics of host cities have not been included in the analyses, positive economic impacts have been generalised for every city.

Third, the subject has not been assessed as a mega-event hosting, but as an event being held in a city. The previous research has focused on the global popularity of the event, its impact to the host region in terms of economic, urban and tourism dimensions. The categorisation of mega-events has also been structured on this approach. Kammeier's (2002) and Hiller's (2000b) studies do not follow this path in this manner, since they evaluated mega-event hosting as an internal situation for cities. They agree that mega-event hosting is a reflexive process, which is shaped by the host city's socio-economic, cultural, demographic and spatial characteristics. They also stated that mega-events should be analysed within an urban context with a longitudinal analysis that will cover all phases of mega-event hosting.

Depending on the literature review, the research has come across the following gaps in the field:

- Descriptive research is made for the question of *"what is mega-event?",* while there is no comprehensive work focusing on *"what is mega-event hosting?"* These descriptive studies are problematic, since they suggest a static categorisation for mega-events, which are dynamic and require new descriptions.

- The existing research made on mega-event hosting is concentrated on the experiences of more developed cities. There is also a tendency to overstate the potential economic and social benefits of mega-events. The responses of developing cities are not thoroughly analysed. Thus the experiences of developed cities in mega-event hosting are generalised.

- Mega-event hosting is generally analysed with reference to post-event impacts. However, mega-event hosting should be analysed as a whole process with pre-event and post-event periods. Kammeier (2002) and Hiller (2000b) have suggested future work on the issue and this has not been fulfilled yet.

Based on the findings of the literature review above, this thesis has focused on the mega-event hosting and its criticism based on the spatial problems of investments made directly or indirectly for the mega-event, and the responses of host and bidding cities as well as potentials in coping with these problems. In detail, it has focused on *mega-sports events*, and it has critically evaluated the purpose-built sports and related infrastructure, and cities' responses to the concentrated infrastructure investments.

7.1. MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

In this study, a new field for conceptual discussion on mega-event hosting has been suggested. The discussion has been formulated on the basis of 1) initial observations on mega-events, 2) categories of mega-events and 3) statements on mega-event hosting. The following statements have been proposed:

1) A mega-event host city (or a bidding city) should build a physical capacity or should have an existing capacity in order to manage such an organisation that requires specific spatial needs. The main responsibility of the host city is to meet the requirements of the event as well as to meet the **over-demand** that takes place in the host region during the event. Over-demand refers to the condition of exceeding the full occupation of the existing urban infrastructure, which is generally observed in transportation and accommodation facilities during the mega-event.

2) In order to manage with the over-demand, 1) the city should have an existing and well-developed urban infrastructure, 2) temporary solutions should be developed for the mega-event, 3) new projects and new investments should be made, which will meet both the requirements of mega-event and future infrastructural requisites of the host region. In general, the third way is chosen in order to benefit from the potentials of mega-events in urban regeneration

and development. It means that the city will experience several large-scale projects within a limited time period. While constructing mega-projects for mega-events, there is a risk of constructing non-feasible projects. When meeting the over-demand, **over-supply** may emerge.

3) Mega-event hosting is interrelated with a city's both existing and potential capabilities. Responses of cities to mega-event hosting as well as mega-event candidacy are different. Some cities might have an existing physical capacity, since they might have hosted mega-events before and had physical legacies from these organisations. Then they might absorb the crowd in the city. Or, they might have strong potentials to absorb the over-supply in a short period of time.

A conceptual framework to verify these statements has been drawn in Chapter 2. Based on the analysis of the concept of mega-event, three concepts have been proposed for mega-event hosting: 1) **physical capacity-building** (PCB), 2) **over-capacity problem** (OCP), and 3) **absorption capacity** (AC). These concepts have been clarified by analysing specifically the Olympic Games.

In order to investigate the conceptual framework thoroughly, a patchwork case-study design has been formulated as a research strategy of the qualitative analysis. 1) The historical analysis of the Olympic host cities, 2) the case of Athens 2004 Olympics and 3) the case of Istanbul and its Olympic bids have been analysed, respectively.

In the historical analysis, five phases have been proposed for the Olympic host cities in relation to the three concepts of the study (PCB, OCP, AC). The periods 4 and 5 have been analysed in detail, since they indicate the remarkable scales in physical capacity-building and emerging concerns in over-capacity problem, respectively. The fourth phase starts with the 1960 Rome Olympics, which indicates the beginning of large-scale installations specific to Olympic Games and their wide urban impacts.

In the case study of Athens, the increasing concerns towards over-capacity problem have been clarified. Moreover, pre-event and post-event relationships of Olympic hosting have been explained. A field trip has been made to Athens for four-month period. The surveys in Athens covered the time period of September 1997-June 2005, from the day that Athens was declared as the 2004 Olympic city, to the day the field trip is over. Press releases have been the leading sources of the research.

In Istanbul case study, Olympic candidacies of the city have been analysed, which have started in the 1980s and ended officially in May 2004 with the failure of 2012 Olympic bid. Istanbul has not hosted the Olympics or any other mega-sports event, but many investments have been made and a capacity has been built over time.

At the end of the case studies, the following findings have been figured out.

7.1.1. Definition of Mega-Event

The study has investigated the definition of mega-event in the previous work, and it has found that mega-events are conceptualised as external to host localities, and the categories of mega-events are strictly drawn. For example, Maurice Roche (2000), the well-known scholar that studied mega-events, has defined three events as mega: Expos, the Olympics and the World Cup (See Table 1.4). The approach declines the possibility of a meso-scale event to turn into a mega-event. Other scholars (such as Ritchie (1984), Getz (1991) and Jago&Shaw) have also proposed definitions in which cities are containers for mega-events, and the size and scale of mega-events are given to the host cities. Moreover, the scale is commonly referring to the scale of significance in national or international level.

The proposed model of categorisation (See Section 2.1.2.3) has shaped the proposed definition of the concept. In the model, two criteria have been set: 1) Amount of sudden and extra agglomerations generated by the event in the host city, 2) Amount of physical infrastructure to be built purposely for the event.

According to the proposed approach, a dynamic definition has been given to the mega-event. Size and scale of mega-events can be redrawn by host cities. A sports organisation or a congress can be an ordinary event for a city while it can be turned into a mega-event by another city. It depends on the vision developed for the mega-event. Therefore, there is a mutual relationship between mega-event and host city.

In brief, mega-events can be defined as large-scale organisations with limited duration and changing location, which generate sudden and extra agglomerations of people and services that cause spatio-temporal swells in urban space, and which require

purpose-built infrastructures and structures. Coping with these swells during and after the event is related with the definition of mega-event hosting.

7.1.2. Definition of Mega-Event Hosting

Capacity is the key element in mega-event hosting. Mega-events expect a set of capabilities from cities in order to cope with sudden and extra agglomerations. Three components identify the mega-event hosting. **Physical capacity-building** (PCB) implies the construction activities made for coping with agglomerations as well as mega-event requirements. **Over-capacity problem** (OCP) refers to the problem of under-utilisation of facilities built directly or indirectly for the mega-event. **Absorption capacity** (AC) suggests a contextual backcloth for the degree of over-capacity problem.

PCB has three spheres: *Primary*, *secondary* and *tertiary infrastructure*. Primary sphere indicates the investments that are directly related with the mega-event. They include sports facilities in case of sports-event, convention centres and congress halls in case of meetings, or exhibition halls in case of fairs and expos. Secondary sphere refers to the supplementary facilities like accommodation of athletes and training areas in sports events. These two are described by the institution that is the organising body of the mega-event. It is the IOC in the Olympic Games, FIFA in World Cups, BIE in World Fairs. Tertiary sphere refers to the indirect investments that are related with the general infrastructure of the city. They are in general transportation and accommodation facilities, as well as city centre rehabilitations. New metro lines are opened, new highways are built, airports are expanded for more flights, and new hotels are constructed. In a very abstract definition, PCB is a process of meeting the requirements of over-demand which emerges from extra-agglomerations in the city, while it can also be a problem-solver for urban problems of the host or bidding city.

OCP indicates the over-supply in construction facilities. Many large-scale projects are held before the mega-event. They include primary as well as secondary and tertiary infrastructure. In the detailed analysis of the Olympic Games, it has been clarified that there are various spatial fixes. Several sports venues and training facilities should be built, and they should be connected to each other as well as to the city centre and city gates (airport, train station, port …etc) by well-working transportation networks.

Moreover, since the event will attract many visitors from other regions, they should be accommodated in the city or in neighbouring localities.

Construction of large-scale projects takes place not only in host cities but also in bidding cities. Therefore, OCP is not only the problem of mega-event host cities but also many others that are trying to stage this event or other large-scale and hallmark events. There are many factors that define the degree of the OCP. Table 2.6 shows the list of these factors. The most important factors are 1) spatial organisation of sports venues, 2) conceptualisation of the Olympic Project, and 3) organisational structure of the Olympic project.

In the spatial organisation, venues could be *concentric* in one location (like Olympic parks) or *dispersed* in the city, *centrally* located or *peripheral*, they could have *strong or weak access* to each other and to the city centre(s), and *flexible* or *non-flexible* in their use and in their seating capacity. In the conceptualisation of the Olympic project, the most important indicator is *the share of direct and indirect expenditures* made. Direct expenditures are the investments made on primary and secondary infrastructure and operational expenses. Indirect expenditures cover the investments made on the tertiary infrastructure, which is related more with the general infrastructure of the city.

AC is the potentials and strengths of the city to handle with over-demand and over-supply. Absorption capacity is described by two components: 1) absorbing agglomerations during the event, 2) absorbing the built infrastructure in time. The first one can be called squeezing capacity, in which the city will absorb the over-demand by squeezing itself. The second one is absorbing capacity, in which the city will absorb the over-supply by growing. They compose the total absorption capacity (See fig. 2.13).

Based on the case studies that have been analysed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively, the following results have been found regarding the correlations between PCB, OCP and AC:

- In the spatial organisation of the mega-event venues, accessibility and flexibility are more important than the concentration/dispersion pattern and central/peripheral location of main venues, regarding the degree of OCP.

- Accessibility is an issue of tertiary infrastructure which is covered by tertiary investments. Therefore, the more the indirect investments have a share in PCB, the less OCP in the investments will be experienced.

- The ratio between direct and indirect investments made for the mega-event plays an important role in fitting a mega-event into a city's ongoing urban development. Indirect investments will improve the city's general infrastructure, which will also support the squeezing capacity of the city. Direct investments will improve future event hostings of the city. In case of sports-events, they will improve the sport infrastructure.

- The more the private sector involves in the mega-event project during PCB, the less severe the OCP occurs.

- Developing cities have large absorbing capacities while their squeezing capacities remain low. Therefore, they should exist in the sphere of tertiary infrastructure while they built their physical capacity.

- The population and the dynamism in population growth have a lessening effect on OCP, since the size of the city and dynamism in growth point to the absorption of the built infrastructure in a shorter time period, comparing to slowly developing cities. Medium-size cities with steady population growths might come across the OCP more severely.

- Given the high population rates and the inadequacies of built infrastructure, developing cities present a challenge against the confrontation of OCP. Mexico City'1968 and Tokyo'1964 experiences has shown that both cities have absorbed the created capacity due to their large population and population growth ratio, and also their need to infrastructural investments.

- Having a high degree of AC does not remove OCP. The low-quality in accessibility may cause to under-utilisation, like in Olympic Stadium in Istanbul.

- PCB is a practice of not only mega-event host cities but also mega-event bidding cities, which construct many projects for an unknown time period. Therefore, bidding cities have a greater chance to use mega-events as urban development and regeneration tools.

- AC by itself is not adequate for the coping with the spatial problems. Drawing a post-event vision regarding the host city's future urban development will be a positive response against mega-event hosting. Barcelona's success depends on both matching the large-scale event with the city's future development and providing the share of investments among public and private sector. The in-depth case study made on Athens has confirmed that the lack of the urban planning strategies in the pre-event period has clearly drawn the framework of over-capacity problem in the post-event phase.

7.1.3. IOC and Its Criticism regarding the Olympic Games

At present, the Olympic bid corresponds to an important thought exercise for the city. However, the specifications of the IOC have been tiring out the bidding cities in the Olympic race. The institution forces bidding cities to build expensive and hallmark sports venues. Today, in London, the host city of the forthcoming 2012 Olympic Games, many voices raise against the mega-event due to its financial burden and extra constructions in the city. The IOC is not deeply interested in the repercussions of the Games for the host city, since their priority is the fulfilment of the PCB, which curtains the OCP.

Therefore, the modern Olympics need a radical rethink. This might take place in two ways: The first reform should be made on the spatial organisation of the Games. Currently, the Games are awarded to a single city, which will absorb all of the investments and human crowd and attraction. Decentralisation is not desired due to security problems and comfort of the participants (mostly the athletes). If the venues and facilities are spread around the neighbouring regions, then inter-city connections will improve and investments will be made on a more equal basis. The second reform should be made on the spatial fixes of the event.

7.1.4. List of Approaches for Developing Countries in Mega-Event Bidding

It is important to answer the question of what kind of strategies that developing countries like Turkey should follow in the mega-event competition. Within the

framework that is drawn by the theoretical discussions and the results of the case studies, developing regions have strong potentials to absorb large-scale and heavy investments. It is because that they currently suffer from infrastructural inadequacies and they have young and growing population.

Therefore, the following approaches should be considered in mega-events bids:

- Their motivation for hosting mega-events should be based not on international image-building or tourist attraction but on urban infrastructural empowerment. It covers not only the improvements in transportation networks but also other social and cultural facilities. In case of mega-sports events, sports facilities should be built by keeping their post-event use in mind, which will strength the social capital in the region.

- Since they have a dynamic urban development in which urban infrastructure remains insufficient, they should be aware of the structural requirements of any mega-event and the structural development of the city (see fig. 2.13).

- Developing regions' cities should build their physical capacity under the following approach: 1) making indirect investments during the candidacy, 2) making direct investments after the nomination of hosting the event. By doing so, overcapacity problem will be lessened and absorption capacity potentials of these cities will be taken into consideration.

- They should try to build accessible and flexible mega-event venues, in order to make a turnover from them in the post-event period.

- They should be aware of the hierarchy that exists among mega-events, and they should develop a strategy for their willness to be a part of the mega-event competition upon this hierarchy (see fig.2.2). It means that they should not start to bid for the top-level mega-events, like the Olympic Games.

- Finally, they should deeply question these events, their spatial requirements, their post-event legacies as well as burdens, regarding their own capacities and requirements.

7.1.5. Evaluation of Istanbul's Olympic Bids

Istanbul's Olympic bids for the 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 Games have been analysed in the previous chapter. The city authorities and the central government have declared to put the city's candidacy for 2016 and 2020 Games.

7.1.5.1. Questioning the Olympic Bidding

Up to this part, the study has made evaluations and recommendations on mega-event hosting. However, it should also question the conditions and justifications of bids. In case of Istanbul, it is observed that Olympic biddings have developed on a non-arguable base.[3] The candidacies of the city have been automatically put, as a dictation of the Olympic Law No. 3769, which has generated a condition of consecuvtive bidding without any kind of strategic planning. The law has created an illusion which prevented any discussion on Olympic bidding.

Olympic bids of Istanbul have been structured upon the infrastructural requirements of the city and the potentials and social requirements of the young population. The city has been suffering from the inadequencies especially in transportation, and the 7-year Olympic preparations were believed to be a treatment for the problem.

However, not only spatial organisation of the Olympic venues but also the shares of direct and indirect investments made for the Olympic candidacy have represented a set of inconsistencies with this ultimate goal of the Olympic bid.

Istanbul does not want to be excluded from the mega-event competition, since the Olympic Games is a very powerful tool of showing the "being a part of". However, the city has so far not created the conditions that will justify its bids. On the other hand, there is another Turkish city, Izmir, which is developing its infrastructural base, by hosting meso-scale sports and non-sports events, and which might be a rival of Istanbul in the near future regarding the competition of mega-event hosting.

[3] Although it has been known that the Olympics is changing its host location's continent in every 4 year, Istanbul has put its candidacy to 2008 Games while the 2004 Olympic Games have already been nominated to Athens, Greece, which is a neighbouring city of Istanbul.

Considering the whole country, concentration of every kind of event in Istanbul will bring about the problem of uneven development in regional basis. Events like congresses and festivals could be organised in Istanbul due to the urban tourism attractions and adequate accommodation capacity of the city.

7.1.5.2. Recommendations for Further Bids

If Istanbul will continue bidding, it should review its Olympic candidacies, and a new strategy should be drawn for the city regarding the potentials and weaknesses of the city. There are two main routes for Istanbul. The first way is to continue to follow the specification list of the IOC and try to build Olympic-standard sports venues in order to accomplish the requirements. So far, the Olympic Park has been acquired and the Olympic Stadium has been built and few sports venues have been completed. On the other hand, the accessibility problem of the main Olympic complex has not been solved and the use of the venue has not been clearly defined. Therefore, while following this route, Istanbul should also try to make indirect investments in order to strengthen the infrastructural networks.

The second route is to be in motion with other bidding cities which have similar characteristics with Istanbul, and question the criteria of the IOC which cause burden of investments made not only in the Olympic city but also in the Olympic bidding cities. But in general terms, Istanbul's Olympic bids should be conceptualised as a part of the urban development and social improvements. A national strategic sports plan is needed to co-ordinate the bidding which will not only function to maximize the participation of the community in sports and but also increase the share of the global sports and events industry. The ability to carry a successful bid depends on the careful analysis of capacities, within which the three concepts of this study (PCB, OCP, and AC) will certainly draw a framework for Istanbul.

7.1.6. Contributions of the Study to the Existing Research

The following points indicate the contributions of the study to the existing research:

- The concept of "capacity" has been introduced to the mega-event literature. The term has been studied with a triangular conceptual framework, **physical capacity-building**, **over-capacity problem** and **absorption capacity,** which have suggested a new and original perspective to the issue.

- Experiences of developing cities have been underlined by emphasising that they have potentials to overcome spatial problems that mega-event hosting might cause. The population growth and the economic dynamics being the most important potential have not been analysed before as a factor of over-capacity problem.

- A dynamic definition has been developed for the concept of mega-event, which was previously categorised in strict definitions. It has been stated that in accordance with the expectations and scenarios provided by host or candidate cities a meso-scale event can be turned into a mega-event. This has changed the categorisation and definitions of previous researchers.

7.2. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS

Theoretical and practical implications of the study will be as follows:

- The theoretical discussions of the study can be tested in other mega-events to see the relevancy of the proposed conceptual framework and to observe the responses of different types of mega-events.

- This thesis strongly emphasises the need to prepare the bidding books of cities by taking into consideration the risk of over-supply in mega-event investments and their potentials to absorb these investments after the event.

- Istanbul's Olympic bidding should be reviewed in future biddings regarding this research, since it has defined the spatial context of mega-event hosting and showed that Istanbul has potentials to absorb these types of mega-events.

7.3. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The research faced the most important limitations during the study of the Athens Olympic hosting. The first restraint is about the resources used. Although the newspapers and similar documents have been thoroughly analysed, the intended enquiries with inhabitants living near Olympic sports facilities have not been realised due to timing and budget constraints. In-depth interviews have remained limited as well. It has been difficult to arrange appointments with people who were in the Olympic project, due to their status.

The second limitation has aroused from the resources used in the historical analysis of Olympic host cities. The official reports of cities represented to the IOC have been used as major resources, which might prevent a more critical evaluation to the Olympic hostings.

7.4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK

Based on the encouraging findings mentioned above, the following recommendations and question marks are put forward for future investigations:

In accordance with the objectives of this study, the evaluation of Olympic host cities in terms of the three concepts of the research was presented. In the analysis, the over-capacity problem has only been studied by the variables of direct-indirect investment ratios and spatial organisation of the Olympic venues. Although these data have provided a substantial support to the hypotheses suggested in the theoretical discussions, the addition of other factors of over-capacity problem (like the share of construction sector in the country's economy) would certainly give some interesting results.

This study has provided an illustration of happening of shot-term organisations in different cities in different time periods, which is described by the concept of "hosting". On the other hand, such an interesting route has been emerging that it might entirely change the current discussions on mega-events. So far this study has discussed the mega-event purpose-built infrastructure and their problems for the host

city and host cities' responses in accordance with their absorption capabilities. Dubai Sports City, developed as a concept project and started to function as a living environment since 2007, is a manifestation of mega-event purpose-built cities. This new settlement offers high-standard sports venues as well as housing and commercial uses around (See fig. 7.1). The city will host 2014 Asian Games and is currently bidding for the 2020 Olympic hosting. Developments in Dubai stand as an interesting process, which might provide potentials for further work.

Figure 7.1: Dubai Sports City.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Sertaç Erten was born in İzmir, 1977. Following the undergraduate education in the department of City and Regional Planning at METU, between 1993-1998, she received the Urban Design Master's degree in the same university in 2000. She worked in the same department as a research assistant between 1999-2005. She is currently living in Istanbul, running an urban design and architecture bureau.