

HUME'S MORAL THEORY AS EXPRESSED IN HIS A TREATISE OF  
HUMAN NATURE AND ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN  
UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF  
MORALS

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## ABSTRACT

HUME'S MORAL THEORY AS EXPRESSED IN HIS A  
*TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE AND ENQUIRIES CONCERNING*  
*HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES*  
*OF MORALS*

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The aim of this study is to examine Hume's moral theory as expressed in his two main books, *Treatise* and *Enquiry* and to show the defects of this theory. Without explaining some basic doctrines such as moral motivation, moral judgment, sympathy, passions, virtues, justice e.t.c., it is not possible to understand Hume's moral theory. To this aim, first, Hume's moral theory is explained in detail. Next, in order to provide a deeper understanding of the theory, its relation with his epistemology and his aesthetics are explained. Afterwards, few philosophers who influenced Hume's thought such as Hobbes, Mandeville, Hutcheson have been briefly discussed. Consequently, it is claimed that Hume's moral theory has a heterogeneous structure so it is difficult to understand his moral theory. Hume's moral theory contains an ambiguity due to his conception of sympathy, which has led to some misinterpretations.

Keywords: Hume, Moral Theory, Sympathy, Virtues.

## ÖZ

### HUME'UN İNSAN DOĞASI ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME VE İNSAN ANLIĞI VE AHLAK İLKELERİ ÜZERİNE ARAŞTIRMALAR'DA İFADE EDİLDİĞİ ŞEKLİYLE AHLAK TEORİSİ

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Bu çalışmanın amacı Hume'un iki temel kitabı, *İnceleme ve Araştırmalar'da*, ifade edildiği şekliyle ahlak teorisini incelemek ve bu teorinin eksiklerini göstermektir. Ahlak motivasyonu, ahlak yargısı, duygudaşlık, tutkular, erdemler, adalet gibi bazı temel öğretilerini açıklamadan Hume'un ahlak teorisini anlamak mümkün değildir. Bu amaçla, ilk olarak, Hume'un ahlak teorisini ayrıntılı olarak açıklanmıştır. Devamında, teorinin daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağlamak için, Hume'un bilgi felsefesi ve estetiği ile olan ilişkisi açıklanmıştır. Daha sonra, Hume'un düşüncesine etki eden Hobbes, Mandeville, Hutcheson gibi bazı filozofların düşünceleri kısaca tartışılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, Hume'un ahlak teorisinin heterojen bir yapıya sahip olduğu bu nedenle de anlaşılmasının güç olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Hume'un teorisini duygudaşlık kavramından ötürü bir belirsizlik taşımaktadır, bu da yanlış yorumlara neden olmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Hume, Ahlak Teorisi, Duygudaşlık, Erdemler.

To My Parents



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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- Treatise*** : *A Treatise of Human Nature*
- Enquiry*** : *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning The Principles of Morals*
- Standard of Taste***: *A Standard of Taste and Other Essays*
- Four Dissertations***: *Four Dissertations and Essays on Suicide& The Immortality of The Soul,*

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Ethical theories arise in different contexts, so they address different problems. There were few great thinkers who had immense influence on modern philosophy in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. One of these philosophers is David Hume.

David Hume lived between 1711 and 1776. In moral philosophy, Hume is a member of moral sense school. Shaftesbury was a founder of moral sense school and he was the first person who used the expression 'moral sense'. This expression was formulated by Hutcheson and adopted by Hume, both of whom are supporters of moral sense theories. Hume is the most important philosopher in this sense.

The subject of ethics is related to our action and our experience in everyday life. We can never deny the importance of ethics in our life. That is why I have chosen the study of ethics. Although there are many ethical theories, I will mention only moral sense theory. It is known that there are two main theories about the source of morality. One of these is rationalist ethics, the other is sentimentalist ethics. I have tried in this dissertation to give an exposition of Hume's moral theory, with the addition of some basic concepts that shaped his philosophy.

Hume tried to explain and establish the experimental method in philosophy. In this dissertation I will try to sum up Hume's theory of morals. I have chosen to examine Hume's moral theory, because I believe that we can find an implicit explanation of the moral sense theory in Hume's moral philosophy. Moreover, Hume is a good example of moral sense theorists because he has left a lasting impact on moral philosophy and psychology.

What is the moral sense theory? According to moral sense theory, sentiments play an important role in morality. "A moral sense

theory gives a central role to the affections and sentiments in moral perception, in the appraisal of conduct and characters, and in deliberation and motivation.”<sup>1</sup> In the moral sense tradition, sympathy plays the fundamental role in morality. Moral sense theory contrasts with rationalist theories of ethics. In other words, moral sense theory can be understood as standing in opposition to the rationalist theories. According to moral sense theories, morality is based on sentiments. Hume believes that moral behavior is due to a ‘moral sense’, as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson thought before him. Hence, we can say that he came under Hutcheson’s influence and his ethical views should be placed in moral sense theories. For both Hutcheson and Hume, sentiment is the dominant element in morality. Therefore, in the fifth chapter of this dissertation I will examine briefly some of Hume’s predecessors such as Bernard Mandeville, Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Hobbes, in whose thought sentiments played an important role.

In this dissertation, first I will examine David Hume’s moral theory in a general framework. In doing this, I will mention some important concepts –moral judgments, moral motivation, passions, sympathy, artificial virtues such as justice, reason- that are used by Hume. In my effort to explain Hume’s moral theory, I will mainly follow Hume himself as closely as possible by making use of his works, *Treatise* and *Enquiry*.

We can find Hume’s views on ethics in his two principal books. His first work is *A Treatise of Human Nature* and the later work is *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*. Although there are some different points between these two books, they are not so wide apart. *A Treatise of Human Nature* includes topics about our understanding, our passions and our morality. We can say that in this book Hume outlines his theory of human morality. He devoted the second book of the *Treatise* to an

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<sup>1</sup> C. Taylor, “Moral Sense Theories,” in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, CD-ROM Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge, 1998.

account of the human passions. In the third book of the *Treatise* we find his views about morality. He describes how moral distinctions may arise from differences and the importance of sympathy. He tries to found a moral system.

On the other hand, *Enquiry* consists of two parts, *Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding* and *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. It may be said that there is also a relation between the second and third book of the *Treatise* and the second part of the *Enquiry*. In a way *Enquiry* is a summary of the *Treatise*.

Hume is merely describing a moral system. To understand morality, it is necessary to understand both what moral action involves and the role morality plays in society. Hume's moral theory involves the agent's action, the receiver, and the spectator. Moral agent performs an action; the receiver is affected by moral agent's action while spectator approves or disapproves of the agent's action. For example, if I as a moral agent give some money to a poor person, he-she will have pleasure because of my act. In this example, the poor person is the receiver and he is affected by my action. A virtuous character is important, because virtue motivates moral action. According to Hume, the moral worth of an action is derived from the virtue and our moral judgments concern both persons and actions.

Hume uses words in different senses; this is the important factor that makes everything about him more complex. Because of this factor, many Hume scholars have misunderstood or misinterpreted what Hume tried to say. To this difficult style can also be added.

This complex situation of the Hume studies concerning his thoughts on the issues of human understanding is important. However, I thought that it is very interesting to see that the main features and defects of his moral theory based on his experimental method. Hence, I hope that by this dissertation that I might contribute to the clarification of Hume's ambiguities in his moral theory. Especially, I have tried to show the defects of Hume's system. Therefore, I offer this dissertation about



Hume's thoughts concerning human passions, moral sentiments and virtues. However, this is a very difficult task and I am aware of this.

I believe that the concept of sympathy is the key concept in understanding Hume's thoughts concerning his moral theory. The concept of sympathy is presented in the *Treatise*. My purpose is to give an interpretation of Hume's moral theory. In my discussion I will draw on both the *Treatise* and *Enquiry*.

My dissertation may have suffered from over-quotation, particularly from Hume himself, but I thought that these quotations are necessary to understand Hume. I have, however, attempted to paraphrase his texts on many occasions.

Hume's moral theory has remained under the shadow of his epistemological thoughts. Therefore, for a long time, many scholars have neglected Hume's thoughts about moral theory. However, Hume's moral theory has also very important place in ethics. In general, it can be claimed that Hume's actual philosophy lies in his *Treatise*, so I have chosen *Treatise* as the main reference.

In many studies about Hume, we can find three main problems: The identity of self, the problem of causation, and the problem of is-ought. However, I think, these problems are related to Hume's thoughts on epistemology, so I will not discuss these problems. In this dissertation, rather than going into details of the discussions concerning these problems, I preferred to only present Hume's thoughts about causation and those on is-ought relationship.

I have tried to give an analysis of Hume's moral theory as expressed in his two main books, *Treatise* and *Enquiry*. I believe that Hume's philosophy has a unitary character and it cannot disintegrate. In order to understand his moral theory, it is necessary to know his epistemology and aesthetics since there is a clear parallelism among them. That is why I have chosen to discuss his epistemology and his aesthetics in addition to his moral theory.

I have divided my dissertation into six chapters. I have devoted the second chapter of this dissertation to the account of Hume's moral theory including passions, sympathy, reason, moral judgments, virtues etc. In this chapter, I will try to sum up Hume's moral theory and discuss some ambiguities in his system. I believe that this chapter will be one of the most important parts of my dissertation. In Hume's philosophy, there is no God. Therefore, for him, morality is not dependent on religion. Hume's account of moral motivation is grounded in moral psychology. Morality is not based on reason; it is based on sentiments. Morality is a consequence of our passions. We can say that morality is a matter of passions rather than reason in his system. Passions are caused by virtues and vices that produce moral pleasures and pains respectively. In his theory of the passions, motives determine the quality of action. Actions cannot be virtuous unless their motives are virtuous. Hume claims that our approval and disapproval determine moral distinctions.

In Hume's moral system, moral distinctions depend on certain sentiment of pain and pleasure, so it can be said that Hume's ethics is hedonistic. Although he maintained the existence of moral sense in some way as other moral sense theorists, we can find some different points in his approach. In some points, the distinction between Hume's views and rationalists' views disappears. This bears some important criticisms toward his theory. In general, we can say that since Hume's moral philosophy has a heterogeneous structure, it is difficult to understand some points in his theory. Thus, it becomes necessary to explain some main concepts such as morality, sentiment, virtue and sympathy to understand Hume's moral theory. I believe that Hume's classification of the passions and the concept of sympathy are the most important difficulties of his moral system.

Next, I will examine Hume's account of virtues. Hume discusses virtues in the Book Three of the *Treatise*. According to Hume, virtues are mental qualities and they are either useful or agreeable to possessors or to others. Hume divides virtues into natural and artificial

virtues. Justice is very important concept in his thought, Hume discusses justice as an artificial virtue. However, the distinction between artificial and natural virtues is criticized. In this chapter of my dissertation, I argue this distinction. We cannot find such a distinction between natural and artificial virtues in the *Enquiry*. While in the *Treatise*, Hume says that justice is an artificial virtue; in the *Enquiry*, he does not use the term “artificial virtue”.

In the third chapter, I deal with Hume’s epistemological thoughts. Hume’s epistemology is very important, because it can be claimed that his moral theory is also affected by some of his epistemological thoughts. Therefore, in order to understand Hume’s moral theory, it is necessary to know the fundamental characteristics of Hume’s epistemology. It is natural that there are some relations between Hume’s ethical theory and his epistemology, so, we can say that his theory of knowledge implies his ethical theory in some respects such as the experimental method which is the key component of both his epistemology and his ethics. We can find Hume’s account of human understanding and also his epistemological thoughts in the Book One of the *Treatise* and his book which is titled *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.

Next, I try to present a brief explanation of Hume’s thoughts concerning the issues of space and time. In this section Hume discusses the infinite divisibility of space and time. After this subject, I discuss the problem of causation. Hume claims that the cause-effect relationship and necessary connexion cannot be known; this is called the problem of causation. The problem of causation has a lasting effect on many philosophers especially Kant. In this part of my dissertation, I briefly mention Hume’s understanding of causality and Kant’s responses to his account of the causation. However, this is a very complex issue which is not the main problem of the present study.

After presenting Hume’s thoughts concerning the issues of knowledge and human understanding, in the fourth chapter of my

dissertation I will try to explain Hume's conception of aesthetics because I think there is a close relation between his aesthetical and ethical views. Although we cannot find Hume's view about aesthetics in his two main books, his theory of aesthetics is very important, since there is a close relationship between his aesthetical and ethical theories. We can find Hume's aesthetical theory in his essay "The Standard of Taste". Taste is a very important concept both for his moral theory and his aesthetic theory. Hume's moral and aesthetic theories are based on taste and sentiments.

In the fifth chapter, I try to present some of Hume's predecessors such as Thomas Hobbes, Bernard Mandeville and Francis Hutcheson. I give a brief presentation of the thoughts of these philosophers. The philosophy of Hume shows his refusal of the Hobbesian self-interest doctrine, but he also directly criticizes Hutcheson's moral intuitionism. Hobbes believes that people act on morality's commands rather than on their feelings. Mandeville, on the other hand, claims that all human actions are alike because they all are motivated by self-interest. Hume rejects that all our motives are self-interested. Hobbes and Mandeville adhere to what Hume called "the selfish system". Mandeville's views have some influence on Hume's thought especially on his theory of artificial virtues. Hutcheson was also a member of moral sense school, like Hume. Hutcheson's views had a visible impact on Hume thoughts concerning morality. We can find his effects on Hume's thoughts concerning the issue of reason.

Finally, I conclude that particular pleasures and pains are the source of moral behavior in Hume's moral system. Therefore, human beings always try to avoid particular pains and seek particular pleasures in their moral behavior. Since Hume's moral philosophy has a heterogeneous structure, it is really difficult to understand some points in his theory. Hume is merely describing a moral system. To understand morality, it is necessary to understand both what moral action involves and the role morality plays in society. His moral theory contains an

ambiguity due to the concept of sympathy. Therefore, his theory is capable of a double meaning and inevitably brings him to close relation with the rationalist ethics in some ways. This aspect has caused some serious criticisms made by later philosophers.

## CHAPTER II

### A GENERAL OUTLOOK OF HUME'S MORAL THEORY

#### 2. 1. Moral Judgments and Moral Motivation

In Book three of the *Treatise*, Hume explains his moral theory. He presents a descriptive account of morality. He rejects the primary role of reason to determine the moral worth of actions. He claims that moral distinctions are not derived from reason; they are derived from moral sense. Hume is concerned with virtuous character, because virtue motivates moral action. It may be claimed that Hume's ethics is a kind of virtue ethics. Moral worth of an action is derived from virtue in this type of ethics. According to Hume, virtuous character arises in two ways; either on natural ground, or encouraged by experience and education. Therefore, experience and education are important factors for development of morality. Moreover, we know that Hume is an empiricist, so, he tries to apply his empirical method to explain his ethics.<sup>2</sup>

In Hume's system, morality stems from human nature. He believes that moral distinctions arise from interest and education.<sup>3</sup> Price presents a summary statement of Hume's ethical theory in following quotation:

It consists of three main points: the first, a theory of generic value; the second, a theory of specifically ethical

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<sup>2</sup> "Hume's ethical theory is based upon an all-devouring egoism...for nothing could be more obvious to even the most superficial reading than the fact that Hume places the source of the moral judgment and of the conduct which it approves in what he calls "the benevolent principles of our frame". (Frank C. Sharp, "Hume's Ethical Theory and Its Critics", *Mind*, vol. 30, 1921, p. 43). Glossop claims that Hume's ethical theory has two parts: "First, there is the analytic part, the definition of what "virtue" means. Then comes the synthetic part of what qualities of character are virtues and what they have in common" (R.J. Glossop, "The Nature of Hume's Ethics", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 27, 1967, p. 528).

<sup>3</sup> "He puts it that morality itself has no foundation in nature, but is founded merely on the pain or pleasures that arises from considerations of self-interest". (Norton, *Cambridge Companion to Hume*, p. 148).

value; and the third, a classification and description of those things which possess ethical value as well as an account of the psychological reasons for their possessing it. The theory of generic value is the proposition that goodness consists in the immediate productiveness of pleasure. The genus of values, then include all those things which immediately cause that feeling.<sup>4</sup>

It is claimed that Hume divides moral judgments into judgments of virtue and judgments of obligation. The judgments of virtue is the following form; “X is virtuous”. Human action is the subject of a moral judgment<sup>5</sup>. He claims that when a person’s moral character and the moral character of his/her actions are determined; person’s motives play an important role. “The source of the moral judgment may be described provisionally, as satisfaction or ‘delight’ in another’s good and dissatisfaction or ‘uneasiness’ in his evil.”<sup>6</sup> Moral judgments do not depend on our personal interest.

Hume’s view is against moral rationalism. Hume’s ethical theory can be called sentimental ethics, since moral distinctions are based on sentiments. He claims that moral distinctions are derived from moral sense. He opposes rationalist ethics. What is the moral sense? Hume believes that morality is linked to the calm passions. We can find Reid’s criticism of Hume’ moral sense in the following quotation:

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<sup>4</sup> K.B. Price, “Does Hume’s Theory of Knowledge Determine his Ethical Theory?” *The Journal of Philosophy*, 47, 1950, p. 428.

<sup>5</sup> Hume goes on to say in his *Treatise*; “This evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produces them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs. But these actions are still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive, that product’s them”( *Treatise*, p. 477).

<sup>6</sup> Sharp, “Hume’s Ethical Theory and Its Critics”, p. 52.  
According to Sharp, the moral judgment is the judgment of the impartial spectator. “The moral judgment claims to represent a judgment based upon equal concern for equal interests...The distinction accordingly between the valid and invalid moral judgment is inseparably bound up with the fundamental features of Hume’s ethical system.” (Sharp, “Hume’s Ethical Theory and Its Critics”, pp. 54- 55).

Thomas Reid's criticism of Hume, when he writes: "When Mr. Hume derives moral distinctions from a Moral Sense, I agree with him in words, but we differ about the meaning of the word *Sense*. Every power to which the name of a sense has been given, is a power of judging of the objects of that sense, and has been accounted such in all ages; the moral sense is therefore the power of judging in morals. But Mr. Hume will have the Moral Sense only a power of feeling without judging- this I take to be the abuse of a word."<sup>7</sup>

In Hume's system, moral judgments express our approval and disapproval. In other words, approbation and condemnation are the important ideas of moral judgments. The pleasures and pains are related to moral judgments. In moral judgment, we express our emotional reactions to events. He says, "reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will". It can be claimed that there is a difference between the sentiments of approbation or disapprobation, and the judgments of approbation or disapprobation.<sup>8</sup>

M. L. Homiak (2000) claims that moral judgments are not the result of actual passions, because "the moral judgments of the agent are actually a result of applying what must be a complex principle for measuring pleasure and pain"<sup>9</sup>. I do not agree with him, if moral judgments are not result of passions what is the source of moral judgments? And where is the difference between Hume and moral rationalists? Moral judgments are the result of our feelings. Therefore

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<sup>7</sup> R. I. Markus, "Hume: Reason and Moral Sense", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 13, (1953): 139-158, pp. 152-153.

<sup>8</sup> "The *sentiments* of approbation and disapprobation depend on *actual* sympathy which may vary from person to person and situation to situation, while the *judgments* of approbation and disapprobation depend on an *ideal* equal sympathy toward all persons regardless of time and place" (Glossop, "The Nature of Hume's Ethics", p. 530). We can infer from this quotation, for Glossop there two kinds of sympathy, actual and ideal. If this is true, we can say that ideal sympathy has an important place in morality, not actual sympathy. However, this is arguable, but I do not want to argue this issue in this section.

<sup>9</sup> M.L. Homiak, "Hume's Ethics: Ancient or Modern?", *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 81, (2000): 215-236, p. 217.



unlike rationalist moralists for Hume, moral distinctions are not based on reason. Hume says in 3/3/1, “the approbation of moral qualities is not derived from reason”. He goes on to say in the Enquiry;

The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be *whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation*; and vice the contrary. We then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, what actions have this influence. We consider all the circumstances in which these actions agree, and thence endeavor to extract some general observations with regard to these sentiments.<sup>10</sup>

Hume believes that there must be an agreement in morality; therefore there must also be agreement in moral judgments over time and place. There is a relation between morality and motivation. Our passions motivate our actions. Therefore, reason cannot motivate morality. “Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of reason.”<sup>11</sup>

Hume departs from his rationalist contemporaries in that he tries to explain the moral judgments by means of his moral psychology. Hume believes that “a sense of morals is a principle inherent in the soul.”<sup>12</sup> In the following quotation, he criticizes his rationalist contemporaries;

Those who resolve the sense of morals into original instincts of the human mind, may defend the cause of virtue with sufficient authority; but want the advantage, which those possess, who account for that sense by an extensive sympathy with mankind. According to the latter system, not only virtue must be approv'd of, but also the sense of virtue: And not only that sense, but also the

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<sup>10</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 289.

<sup>11</sup> *Treatise*, p. 457.

<sup>12</sup> *Treatise*, p. 619.

principles, from whence it is derived. So that nothing is presented on any side, but is laudable and good.<sup>13</sup>

Hume believes that there is a possibility of moral education; this shows that human nature is continuous with the moral sentiment. Hume's account of the origin of morality is a causal one. It can be claimed that his account of causality and of moral judgment are similar to each other.

The very first response to Hume's moral theory was probably a letter written to Hume by Francis Hutcheson. There are three objections raised to Hume's. The first is that Hume's analysis was too technical. Secondly, Hutcheson challenged Hume's position that justice is artificial. Thirdly, he criticized Hume for classifying many qualities of an agent as virtues which, instead, should be classified as natural abilities, such as wit.<sup>14</sup>

Moral judgments are based on experience, it can be claimed that they are expressions of human emotions or feelings. The foundation of moral judgment can be seen as satisfaction and dissatisfaction of person's feelings. Hume claims that moral judgments are objective judgments. We can predict character traits by the way of moral judgments. Therefore, moral evaluations are not matter of reason, they are matter of sentiment.

Capaldi (1966) explains Hume's theory of moral judgment in the following quotation:

A moral judgment is of the form "X is virtuous," where X may be replaced by the name of a human action and "virtuous" refers to a moral sentiment. The relation of a moral sentiment to a moral judgment is thus confirmatory.<sup>15</sup>

Hume envisages three stages by which our judgments are extended:

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<sup>13</sup> *Treatise*, p. 619.

<sup>14</sup> [www.iep.utm.edu/h/humemora.htm](http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/humemora.htm)

<sup>15</sup> N. Capaldi. "Some Misconceptions About Hume's Moral Theory" *Ethics*, 76, 1966, p.209.

- Stage 1: Sympathy induces us to take account of the happiness and suffering of others as well as our own.
- Stage 2: General standards correct the operation of sympathy so that we attach the same moral importance to the happiness or suffering of anyone, ourselves or others, close to us or remote from us.
- Stage 3: In some cases we need to take into account not merely the utility of particular acts, but the usefulness to society of a whole system of general rules and conventions.<sup>16</sup>

What is the difference between moral sentiment and moral judgment? Moral judgments depend on our evaluation. They are related to our feelings of sympathy; this is the distinctive feature of moral judgments. We can say that moral judgments arise from sympathy. Moral sentiments also depend on sympathy. Moral sentiments are moral and they are expressions of feeling. Moral judgments are reports about the existence of a moral sentiment. Our moral judgments are about actions in the past. We can make moral evaluation by sympathy. Moral judgments are universal, while moral sentiments may change from person to person.

His positive thesis will be that moral distinctions are rooted in the presence of *secondary* impressions, that is, the *passions*. While these affective responses of pleasure or pain, like or dislike, are the ultimate *basis* of moral judgments, Hume does not adhere to any subjectivism that would seek to *identify* or *reduce* moral judgments to these feelings.<sup>17</sup>

Moral judgments are expressions of passions that we feel. "Moral judgments are independent of personal interests or sentiments arising from personal interests."<sup>18</sup> There is no objective wrong or right. Moral positions are expressions of passions.

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<sup>16</sup> J. B. Schneewind, *Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 57. .

<sup>17</sup> J. Baillie, *Hume on Morality*, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 106.

<sup>18</sup> Glossop, "The Nature of Hume's Ethics", p. 531.

Hume's account of moral judgment is psychological. We can say that his account of moral judgment depends on his psychological account of passions. Moral evaluations are feelings. There is a relationship between motive and action. There is also a relation between character and action, this is causal. Our mental states such as passions, desires give rise to our actions.

We can claim that there is a causal relation between action and character. There is no quality in the agent which causes any action for Hume. We cannot observe the relation between action and character, like cause and effect. This is a feeling of expectation in the observer. According to him, actions are only indicators of character traits. Therefore, it can be claimed that our approval and disapproval rests on character traits.

I want to close this section by summarizing Hume's account of morality: In Hume's moral system, moral distinctions depend on certain sentiment of pain and pleasure, so it can be said that Hume's ethics is hedonistic. According to Hume, morals imply that moral sentiment is common to all people. Moral system includes blame or praise. In other words, our approval or disapproval defines moral distinctions. For him, moral distinctions are based on the moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation. He regards morals as based on a universal sentiment. This sentiment is sympathy or humanity. He claims that people approve or disapprove of manners of each other by sympathy. It can be said that particular pleasures and pains are the source of moral behavior in Hume's moral system. Therefore, human beings always try to avoid particular pains and seek particular pleasures in their moral behavior.

### **2.1.1. Sympathy**

In Hume's moral theory, the general principle of morals is sympathy. The concept of sympathy is important to understand Hume's psychological theory of moral sentiment. Moral sentiment arises through

sympathy. We can find the mechanism of sympathy in Book two and three of the *Treatise*. However, Hume presents his theory of sympathy in 3/1/11. The concept of sympathy has a very important place in Hume's moral theory. It can be said that this concept is one of the keystone concepts in Hume's moral system. Since we can only comprehend Hume's system by understanding his conception of sympathy. In the following long quotation, Hume argues the process of sympathy mechanism.

We may begin with considering a-new the nature ad force of *sympathy*. The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations, nor can any one be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree susceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature. When I see the *effects* of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself...We are only sensible of its causes or effects. From *these* we infer the passion: And consequently *these* give rise to our sympathy.<sup>19</sup>

Sympathy may be seen as a psychological process. Hume suggests that morality comes from sympathy. Hume's sympathy is the means of communication through which we come to understand the sentiments (pleasure, pain) of others and from which we can determine vice and virtue. Sympathy is a communication of feelings, so we can observe our own behavior by sympathy. In the *Enquiry*, sympathy is mentioned in a different name, *humanity* and which is the social feeling. In the *Enquiry* Hume makes a close relationship between sympathy or humanity and social theory. It can be claimed that sympathy is the

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<sup>19</sup> *Treatise*, pp. 575-576.

feeling with the passions of others. We can also say that sympathy leads people to strive maintaining good relations with their fellows.<sup>20</sup>

Hume believes that people can feel others' pains and pleasure, so they are capable of sympathy for others. Others influence us. Hume explains the sympathy by the conversion of an idea into an impression. Therefore its function is to explain how one can go from an idea of the feeling to an impression. The closeness is important to convert the idea into an impression. He believes that sympathy is a principle of human nature, and source of moral virtues. We can aware of the feelings of others through sympathy. "Our affections depend more upon ourselves, and the internal operations of the mind; for which reason they arise more naturally from the imagination, and from every lively idea we form of them."<sup>21</sup> According to Hume, this is the nature and cause of sympathy. We can infer from this that sympathy is a kind of imaginative act.

The relation of objects to us produces sympathy. "Sympathy depends on the relation of objects to ourselves. Relations are requisite to sympathy."<sup>22</sup> Relations produce sympathy by means of the association between the idea of another's person and that of our own. We can say that the source of moral distinctions is the sympathy. Human beings are similar to each other. We sympathize with other persons by means of similarity, so similarity is also important in sympathy. This relation of similarity makes us conceive what concern others. It can be said that the primary characteristic of human being is sympathy.

Sympathy is the communication of sentiments from one person to another person. It is the ground of moral experience. It is a kind of

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<sup>20</sup> "The play of sympathy is affected, as Hume has shown in various places, by our relationships to the persons concerned, our distance from them in time and space, the nature and limitations of our own past experience, the efficiency of the working of the imagination, familiarity, and the preoccupations or humours of the honor". (Sharp, "Hume's Ethical Theory and Its Critics", p. 54).

<sup>21</sup> *Treatise*, p. 319.

<sup>22</sup> *Treatise*, p. 322.

communication. Kempt Smith explains the process of communication in two stages. He goes on to say,

The affections of others are at first known to us only by their effects, i.e. by their external bodily signs. These signs through association recall in idea the passions which have accompanied them in ourselves in the past. This is the first stage in the process of communication. The second stage consists in the conversion of the passions thus ideal entertained into the actual passions themselves.<sup>23</sup>

Our sympathy with others gives us the sentiment of pain or pleasure, when any object is presented related to us. "The stronger relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition."<sup>24</sup> If there is a similarity in our manners, country and language, our sympathy is stronger.

We may say that custom and relationship cause sympathy. According to Hume, it is sympathy "which takes us so far out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of other."<sup>25</sup> We understand the feelings of others by sympathy. How can I know the sentiments of others? According to Hume, we know the sentiments of others by sympathy. I know this by my experiences. For example, if we see a person in pain, we can feel pain. I recognize all my affections firstly in myself. After this I can enter into the sentiment of others. For Hume, this mechanism is the foundation of morality or communication. He calls this mechanism sympathy. "The ideas of happiness, joy, triumph, prosperity, are connected with every circumstance of his character, and diffuse over our minds a pleasing sentiment of sympathy and humanity."<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> K. Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume*, London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1964, p. 170.

<sup>24</sup> *Treatise*, p. 318.

<sup>25</sup> *Treatise*, p. 579.

<sup>26</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 234.

Sympathy does not mean the love of mankind. "There is no proof of such a universal affection to mankind. There is not a universal love among all human creatures."<sup>27</sup> Sympathy also concerns beyond our own species. Hume believes that there is sympathy among animals. "The howlings and lamentations of a dog produce a sensible concern in his fellows."<sup>28</sup>

People react to the same object in different ways. "I have a pleasing sympathy in the prospect of so much joy, and can never consider the source of it, without the most agreeable emotions."<sup>29</sup> People may have different moral motivation and have different moral reasons. Therefore, they may not agree what is virtue or what is vice. In other words, they differ in their judgments because they differ in what they feel. However, according to Jensen (1977), Hume rejects moral disagreement and he does not discuss the moral disagreement. Moreover, feeling is individual, so it is a problem how it can give rise to objectivity. Hume explains this by sympathy. Sympathy is the communication of sentiments among people. This communication makes possible the objectivity claim.<sup>30</sup>

Hume mentions social sympathy in the *Enquiry*. "Popular sedition, party zeal, a devoted obedience to factious leaders; these are some of the most visible, though less laudable effects of this social sympathy in human nature."<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 481.

<sup>28</sup> *Treatise*, p. 398.

<sup>29</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 221.

<sup>30</sup> "The role of sympathy as the general principle of morals was both to make the self socially oriented and to account for the production of moral sentiments. Where there is no conflict between self-interest, limited benevolence, and social interests where the members of the community are not family members and friends, sympathy is an acceptable explanation. Where such a conflict does exist, sympathy apparently cannot begin to operate". (N. Capaldi, *Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy*, New York: Peter Lang, 1992, p.228).

<sup>31</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 224.



Hume makes mention of that weak and strong sympathies. He asserts, “when a sympathy with uneasiness is weak, it produces hatred, when strong it produces love.”<sup>32</sup> According to him, while weak sympathy is limited to the present moment, strong sympathy has a broader perspective.

According to Hume, sympathy makes possible an objective moral judgment. “A moral distinction immediately arises; a general sentiment of blame and approbation”<sup>33</sup>. He believes that an action is virtuous, if we approve it. What one finds an action agreeable or disagreeable; this way he determines approval and disapproval. “Our actions have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances”<sup>34</sup>. If we find something is agreeable, we approve of it and it is good. In general, people approve beneficial actions and disapprove of harmful actions. Thus people tend to say the same thing about what is virtue and what is vicious. Our approval and disapproval are operated by sympathy. He claims “morality is more properly felt than judged of.”<sup>35</sup> People always blame harmful actions even when victims are strangers. However, if the person who is benefited or harmed is the member of our family, sympathy operates more strongly.

According to Hume, all our sentiments consist of principles of sympathy or humanity. This sympathy or humanity is founded on uniform experience. However, this does not mean that it is not innate, but learned. We know that the source of sympathy is not definite in Hume’s moral system. All men have the sense of sympathy, so it can be said that sympathy is innate. It can be derived from the following passage from the *Enquiry*; Hume claims that moral distinctions are innate.

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<sup>32</sup> *Treatise*, p. 385.

<sup>33</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 271.

<sup>34</sup> *Treatise*, p. 401.

<sup>35</sup> *Treatise*, p. 470.

Hume infers that “sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature, it has a great influence on our taste of beauty, and it produces our sentiment of morals in all the artificial virtues”<sup>36</sup>. Sympathy is the general principle of morals in the *Treatise*. It is the basis of moral sentiment and moral motivation. It is a link between what is moral and what is social. “The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind.”<sup>37</sup> The sentiments derived from sympathy are the same for all humans and produce the same assessment. Morrow (1923) understands the social unity as an external union of individualities. The mutual influence of people bears the social unity. He also claims that sympathy is a more general factor than the motives to activity in Hume’s theory. Our shared moral sensibility enables us to see our character and our conduct mirrored in one another’s sentiments. In the following quotation, we can find the process of sympathy;

- 1- I see someone exhibiting behavior that is a natural and reliable indicator of distress.
- 2- I form the idea of this state of mind.
- 3- At this point, the associative principle of resemblance enters the picture. All persons are highly similar to each other, purely by virtue of being of the same species. Since “our self is always intimately present to us”, seeing someone upset lead to the idea of *me* feeling this distress. That is, I am moved only because I am seeing *someone like me* in pain.
- 4- The additional pain caused by this thought “enlivens” the original idea into an impression, so I come to feel a distress similar to what I originally perceived in the other person.<sup>38</sup>

I think we can schematize the process of sympathy. In the following figure, I try to schematize this process by using the process of empathy. I think there is a close relation between sympathy and


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<sup>36</sup> *Treatise*, p. 577.

<sup>37</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 272.

<sup>38</sup> Baillie, *Hume on Morality*, pp. 57-58.

empathy. Therefore, we can explain the sympathy process as in the following schema;



**Figure 1:** Sympathy process

In the first step, I perceive the person who is in front of me. In the second step, his/her feelings are transferred to me. And in the last step, if I react to his/her feelings, the process of sympathy is completed.

In the *Enquiry* sympathy and general benevolent tendency have the same meanings. Albee (1897) criticizes Hume’s view of sympathy. He thinks that Hume cannot explain the relation between “our derived sympathy and our self-regarding tendency”. Albee claims that in the *Treatise*, Hume’s treatment of sympathy was a bad one and Hume recognizes this. Therefore, he gives a good explanation on the same

subject in the *Enquiry*. However, I do not agree with Albee. Since, I think there is no important change about the concept of sympathy between the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry*. We cannot find a better explanation of sympathy in the *Enquiry*. The concept of sympathy is ambiguous in both works. In fact, in the *Enquiry* we can find some passages which Hume rejects so called sympathy mechanism.

It is but a weak subterfuge, when pressed by these facts and arguments, to say, that we transport ourselves, by the force of imagination, into distant ages and countries, and consider the advantage we should have reaped from these characters, had any commerce with the persons.<sup>39</sup>

A person's qualities have a tendency to be pleasing or displeasing to others. Recall that there are three fundamental relations in Hume's system, relations of ideas, relations of impressions, and double association of ideas and impressions. We can say that sympathy is an example of the double association of ideas and impressions. On the other hand, it is clear that there are some difficulties in sympathy mechanism.<sup>40</sup>

In sum, the moral sentiments are produced by sympathy. Therefore, sympathy is the basic element in Hume's moral system. However, sympathy mechanism is a very complex network and nowhere in the *Treatise* Hume gives a simple description of sympathy process. The approval of virtues is explained by sympathy. Sympathy is the bridge between the social and the psychological; it is the faculty by

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<sup>39</sup> *Enquiry*, pp. 217-218.

<sup>40</sup> "There are three sources which lead to the difficulties in Hume's sympathy mechanism. The first source of difficulty lies in Hume's ideas as regards the relations, associations and correspondences that lead up to the sympathy mechanism...the second problem concerns the relation of the sympathy mechanism to Hume's prior divisions of the subject of passions and the idea of association. This problem centers primarily on his notion of the general function of a passion...the third issue which clouds the notion of sympathy in Hume's philosophy is whether or not the sympathy mechanism of Book II of the *Treatise* is forsaken, if not abrogated, in his later, popular writings-principally in *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*". (D. Tweyman, *Hume: Critical Assessments*, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 461-462).

which inner mental states are shared among individuals. In Hume's moral system, the concept of sympathy seems to be problematic in some respects. This faculty is common in all people. On the other hand, Hume claims that we have no innate moral motives. What is the source of this faculty is not clear. Hume does not say anything about its origin. Is it innate? If it is I think there is a problem. To my interpretation, sympathy is innate, as it is indicated in the following passage from section V of the *Enquiry*;

From the apparent usefulness of the social virtues, it has readily been inferred by sceptics, both ancient and modern, that all moral distinctions arise from education, and were, at first, invented, , and afterwards encouraged, by the art of politicians, in order to render men tractable, and subdue their natural ferocity and selfishness, which incapacitated them for society. This principle, indeed, of precept and education, must so far be owned to have a powerful influence ...But that *all* moral affection or dislike arises from this origin, will never surely be allowed by any judicious enquirer. Had nature made no such distinction, founded on the original constitution of the mind, the words, *honorable* and *shameful*, *lovely* and *odious*, *noble* and *despicable*, had never place in any language; nor could politicians, had they invented these terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any idea to the audience.<sup>41</sup>

Can we say that this is a challenge to his empiricism? It is arguable, but I believe that the concept of sympathy does not fit in Hume's empiricism. We know that he tries to explain morality by his experimental method, but how the concept, "sympathy" is explained by experience is ambiguous.

### **2. 1. 2. Reason**

Hume believes that morality is based on sentiment, not reason. For Hume, reason is instrumental and it provides hypothetical imperatives. We act by emotions, not reason. Reason is inert faculty. He believes

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<sup>41</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 214.

that reason alone cannot produce action; there is something that motivates the will to moral action. It is passions. Moral sentiments are expressions of feelings. Our actions are not governed by reason; they are governed by passions. What is the role of reason in moral thinking? Reason must be understood relative to action.

According to Hume, reason is a faculty that compares ideas with each other. "Reason, which is able to oppose our passion: and which we have found to be nothing but a general calm determination of the passions."<sup>42</sup> While sentiment selects ends, reason only shows means. Reason helps us to discern the means to our ends, but it cannot select ends. According to Hume, "reason exerts itself without any sensible emotion."<sup>43</sup> However, he accepts that there are certain calm desires; these desires produce emotion. He claims that these calm desires or passions are confused with reason.

When any of these passions are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason, and are suppos'd to proceed from the same faculty, with that, which judges of truth and falsehood.<sup>44</sup>

Human passions and actions are influenced by morality, so morality cannot be derived from reason. "Since morals have an influence on the actions and affections, they cannot be derived from reason."<sup>45</sup> Hence, reason cannot be expressed moral judgment, because unlike moral judgment, it cannot move to action.

Hume claims that, "it is our feelings or sentiments that exert practical influence over human volition and action. Our feelings have the power to result in actions. Morals excite passions, and produce or

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<sup>42</sup> *Treatise*, p. 583.

<sup>43</sup> *Treatise*, p. 417.

<sup>44</sup> *Treatise*, p. 417.

<sup>45</sup> *Treatise*, p. 457.

prevent actions.”<sup>46</sup> Hume believes that “reason is only the slave of the passions”.

Hume believes that reason does not primarily determine the moral worth of actions. Reason cannot produce morals, because of their influence on the actions. Besides, the conclusions of our reason are not the rules of morality.

Moral good and evil are certainly distinguished by our sentiments, not by reason: But these sentiments may arise either from the mere species or appearance of characters and passions, or from reflexions on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and particular persons.<sup>47</sup>

However, Hume claims in the *Enquiry* that we can recognize the several tendencies of actions by reason and can make a decision, which are useful for humanity. Hence, we cannot say that there is no place to reason in Hume’s system. In the *Enquiry*, he accepts the role of reason in morality. He says; “*reason* instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and *humanity* makes a distinction in favor of those which are useful and beneficial.”<sup>48</sup>

The immediate effect of pain and pleasure is the will. According to Hume, will is the internal impression. “By the will, I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of our mind.”<sup>49</sup> We can say our actions are related to our will. Reason neither produces the will nor prevents it. Reason alone can never be opposed the passion. Hume believes that reason does not prevent volition or dispute with any passion, because any action can never be produced by reason. Reason does not produce the impulse, although impulse is directed by it. Consequently, the judgment can be

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<sup>46</sup> *Treatise*, p. 457.

<sup>47</sup> *Treatise*, p. 589.

<sup>48</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 286.

<sup>49</sup> *Treatise*, p. 399.

unreasonable, but passion cannot be unreasonable. Reason and passion can never oppose each other. According to him, understanding can justify or condemn passion, only when a passion is founded on false supposition. Capaldi (1989) claims that Hume argued that reason did not operate solely in terms of the rationalist model, so Capaldi insists that we need a much broader conception of reason. People are not guided solely by reason but by passion. Therefore, reason can be understood relative to action.

Philosophy has two parts: speculative philosophy and practical philosophy. According to Hume, while morality is active, reason is inactive. "Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood."<sup>50</sup> Errors cannot be source of immorality. "The operations of human understanding divide themselves into two kinds, the comparing of ideas, and the inferring of matter of fact."<sup>51</sup> In the *Enquiry* he repeats this view, "reason judges either of matter of fact or of relations."<sup>52</sup> Reason gives the knowledge of truth or falsehood and it is not a motive to action. In the *Treatise*, we can find the definition of reason and its role in morality. His main claim that morality is not based on reason is implied in the following paragraph. I directly quote the whole paragraph;

Reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the *real* relations of ideas, or to *real* existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason...

This argument is of double advantage to our present purpose. For it proves *directly*, that actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety to it; and it proves the same truth more *indirectly*, by shewing us, that as reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it, it cannot be the source of

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<sup>50</sup> *Treatise*, p. 458.

<sup>51</sup> *Treatise*, p. 463.

<sup>52</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 287.



the distinction betwixt moral good and evil, which are found to have that influence. Actions may be laudable or blameable; but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable...The merit and demerit of actions frequently contradict, and sometimes control our natural propensities. But reason has no such influence. Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason. Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals.<sup>53</sup>

In the *Treatise* reason alone cannot distinguish virtue and vice, so “it must be by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to mark the difference betwixt them.”<sup>54</sup> However, Hume does not deny the importance of reason. When the source of moral praise is found the usefulness, “it is evident that reason must enter for a considerable share in all decisions of this kind; since nothing but that faculty can instruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions.”<sup>55</sup> In the *Treatise*, he claims that reason can influence on our conduct by two ways “either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects.”<sup>56</sup>

Moral distinctions depend on human perception, so they are either ideas or impressions. They are impressions and not perceived by reason. Hume believes that morality has not any relation of with science. Therefore, morality cannot be an object of science and reason. Hume rejects the demonstrability of morality.

There has been an opinion very industriously propagated by certain philosophers, that morality is susceptible of demonstration; and thou’ no one has ever been able to advance a single step in those demonstrations.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> *Treatise*, p. 458.

<sup>54</sup> *Treatise*, p. 470.

<sup>55</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 285.

<sup>56</sup> *Treatise*, p. 459.

<sup>57</sup> *Treatise*, p. 463.

In this statement, Hume criticizes rationalist views. Resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality and proportions in quantity and number are the relations of objects. These four relations belong to external objects and only these four relations can be demonstrable. "Reason or science is nothing but the comparing of ideas, and the discovery of their relations."<sup>58</sup> However, moral relations cannot be applied to external objects and cannot be demonstrable. Hume believes that if it were true, moral properties would also be applied to inanimate objects. "No relation can alone produce any action."<sup>59</sup> In *Enquiry* he mentions this subject. He claims that if morality consisted only in relations, inanimate objects would be moral agents.

Inanimate objects may bear to each other all the same relations which we observe in moral agents; though the former can never be the object of love or hatred, nor are consequently susceptible of merit or iniquity.<sup>60</sup>

If Hume accepts the moral relations, these relations are different from the relations of science and we cannot perceive these relations. Moral statements are not about the world, so there is no objective right or wrong about moral statements.

Gary Watson examines the source of moral action in his work, titled "Free Agency". He rejects Hume's view about reason. Unlike Hume, He believes that reason is an original spring of action. Watson tries to explain why reason is not the source of moral action in Hume's system by the way of the analogy of Plato's distinction of the soul. It is known that Plato divided the soul into two parts; rational and irrational. The rational part of the soul is the source of motivation, according to Plato. However, Watson claims that in Hume's system, reason does not

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<sup>58</sup> *Treatise*, p. 466.

<sup>59</sup> *Treatise*, p. 465.

<sup>60</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 293.

refer to Plato's rational part of the soul and so reason is not the source of moral action.

In the *Treatise* Hume mentions the distinction between "is" and "ought" in order to criticize the rationalist ethics. I did not mention this distinction in my literature review, because the problem of 'is' and 'ought' has important place in the history of philosophy. I will not examine this problem in details in my dissertation, I only briefly present it.

Hume believes that reason only has a theoretical function, and thus is a purely informative faculty. It is related to relations of ideas and causal connections. Hume rejects the idea that reason is dominant over the passions. There is no any combat between passion and reason for Hume. Some philosophers claim that reason has pre-eminence over passion, but Hume rejects this. According to him, this is a mistake, and he tries to show "reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will and it can never oppose to passion in the direction of the will". In order to prove the fallacy of the opposite view, he presents his main phrase about reason; "reason is the slave of the passions". We can claim that Hume's psychology of action is summed up in this phrase. Hume's psychology of reason and passions may be shown in the following figure;

REASON	PASSIONS
Means	Ends
Matters of fact	Feelings
Descriptive judgment	Normative judgment

**Figure 2:** Hume's psychology of reason and passions.

Hume cannot explain how it is impossible to act contrary to reason. The fear of ghosts is contrary to reason, since there is no ghost. To try to cut down a tree with a knife is also contrary to reason. However, why this is contrary to reason is not explained by Hume. Hume limits the operation of reason. According to him, reason can make demonstrative and causal inferences. There are two functions of reason in his system:

- a) Reason may establish *demonstrative truths* founded on the abstract relations among our ideas. These we may think of as the truths of logic and mathematics and the like.
- b) Reason may also establish, on the basis of experience, the *relations of cause and effect* between objects and events.<sup>61</sup>

### 2. 1. 2. 1. Is and Ought

Although is-ought is an important problem, I will not discuss it in detail, because the aim of this dissertation is partly explain to some difficulties of Hume's moral system. I do not think it is an easy job to solve this problem and we have no sufficient time to give any satisfactory conclusion. In this section, I give only a brief presentation of the problem.

I quote the is- ought paragraph, because this paragraph is important for contemporary moral theory.

I cannot forbear adding to these reasoning an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have always hitherto met with, I have always remark'd that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the begin of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs, when of a sudden I am surpris'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I met with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.

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<sup>61</sup> J. Rawls, *Lectures On The History of Moral Philosophy*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 28.

For as this ought, or ought not, express some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observed and explain, and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how tis new relation can be deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar system of morality, and let us see, that the objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.<sup>62</sup>

In this quotation, Hume says that since moral assertions are not statements of fact, they cannot be derived by reason. He sees ought as a surprising new relation. Hume also argues that the previous moral system in this paragraph. However Hume does not explain is-ought problem in the Treatise. "Ought" implies a specific moral category, but sometimes "ought" also implies obligation. Hume does not accept any moral category; he may accept that "ought" implies a kind of moral obligation.

I want to mention Capaldi's<sup>63</sup> schema relating to "is" and "ought" paragraph. According to him, there are three major elements in this paragraph, these are as follows:

- A- The examination of previous moral systems reveals that they reason in the "ordinary way".
- B –Previous moral systems also contain propositions connected by "ought" and "ought not".
- C- Paying attention to this change from (A) to (B) does three things:
  - 1) It subverts all the 'vulgar' systems of morality,
  - 2) It shows that moral distinctions, specifically vice and virtue, are not relations.

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<sup>62</sup> *Treatise*, p. 469-470.

<sup>63</sup>Capaldi claims that Hume says four things about "ought". "First, he says it is a relation,; second, he specifically calls it a new relation; third, he asks that this relation be observed and explained; finally, he requests an explanation for the deduction of this new relation from "others," which presumably stands for other relations". (N, Capaldi, "Hume's Rejection of 'Ought' as a Moral Category," in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 63, 1966, p. 127). Capaldi, does not accept the general interpretation of is-ought paragraph. According to this accepted interpretation, the is-ought paragraph is concerned with the derivation of "ought" from "is". He believes that this is mistaken.

3) It shows that moral distinctions are not “perceived by reason.”<sup>64</sup>

According to Capaldi, “the rejection of ‘ought’ in the *Treatise* is only another example of Hume’s critique of the view that moral distinctions are perceived or discovered as relation of ideas.”<sup>65</sup>

Recall that our approval and disapproval depend on our sentiments, not reason. Reason means our capacity of knowledge in Hume’s system. It is related to knowledge. On the other hand, sentiment is related to feelings and emotions. Hume makes a distinction between reason and sentiment.

There is, of course, a trivial way to validly derive a moral ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, by means of the natural deduction rule of Disjunction-Introduction. Thus, from *Snow is white*, I can infer *either snow is white or one ought to always tell the truth*. Of course, one might reply that this conclusion is not *itself* an ought-statement, but a complex statement which *includes* an ethical statement. Second, one could point out that from these two premises above, one cannot infer the genuinely ethical claim that one ought to always tell the truth.<sup>66</sup>

We can conclude that if “ought” implies the existence of a specific moral category, Hume rejects this kind of moral category. However, it implies moral obligation but only as a factual state of affairs. The is-ought problem shows the difference between descriptive statements and prescriptive statements. Hume claims that such derivation is not possible; moral judgments cannot be inferred from factual judgments. On the other hand, it can be claimed that Hume’s system in the *Treatise* depends on such a derivation.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Capaldi, *Hume’s Place in Moral Philosophy*, pp. 58-59.

<sup>65</sup> Capaldi, “Hume’s Rejection of ‘Ought’ as a Moral Category”, p. 129.

<sup>66</sup> Baillie, *Hume on Morality*, p. 138.

<sup>67</sup> “The rejection of “ought” has been contextually supported in three ways.(1) Hume clearly identifies “ought” as a *new relation*, and e rejects moral relations in general and

I think Hume does not discuss the relationship between “is” and “ought”. We cannot find a paragraph relating to “is” and “ought” in the *Enquiry*. This paragraph is about moral sentiment. We can say that the is-ought paragraph shows the confusion between moral judgment and moral sentiment. Hume rejects any normative conception of morals by this paragraph. Therefore, it can be seen that the rejection of “ought” challenges the normative ethics.

## 2.2. Theory of Passions

Passions has been traditionally examined by some philosophers such as Aristotle, Stoics, etc. For Aristotle, passions were related to pleasure and pain. According to Stoics, passions were related to good and evil. However, in this section of my dissertation I only discuss Hume’s theory of passions, because I think it is important in order to understand his moral theory. It can be claimed that much of Hume’s account of passions is traditional. He adopts the Stoics’ view that passions are related to good and evil. He believes that there are eight fundamental passions: the four of them are direct passions (grief, joy, desire, and aversion) like Stoics, and other four passions are indirect passions (pride, humility, love, hate). Hume devoted the second book of the *Treatise* to an account of the human passions, but he cannot mention passions in his *Enquiry*. Therefore, I will examine the second book of the *Treatise* in this chapter.

Hume claims that ideas and impressions consist of all the perceptions of the mind. “It has been observed, that nothing is ever present to the mind but its perceptions; and that all actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, and thinking, fall under this denomination.”<sup>68</sup> The only difference between ideas and impressions

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new relations in particular. (2) There are *no contexts in which he uses “ought” as a moral category*. (3) The rejection of “ought” is consistent with Hume’s epistemology, psychology, and moral theory”. (Capaldi, “Hume’s Rejection of “ought” as a Moral Category”, p. 134).

arise from their degree of vivacity and degree of force. The difference between ideas and impressions is that ideas are weaker perception, while impressions are stronger perception. Hume comprehends all our sensations, passions and emotions under the impressions. He believes that impressions and ideas consist of all perceptions of the mind. Impressions are stronger than ideas. We can find more detailed explanations about ideas and impressions in book I of the *Treatise*. He claims that there is a resemblance between simple ideas and impressions. There are three kinds of connections, which may occur between ideas: resemblance, contiguity and causation. There is a relation among both ideas and impressions. While ideas are related by resemblance, contiguity and causation, impressions are only related by resemblance.

The impressions are also divided into original (*sensation*) and secondary (*reflective*) impressions. “Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs.”<sup>69</sup> Original or impressions of sensation are all the impressions of the senses, pleasures and pains. Hume believes that the causes of impressions of sensation are not known. “Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea.”<sup>70</sup> Hume explains the arising of the reflective impressions in book I of the *Treatise* section II, as follows (adding my own emphasis):

An impressions first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst and hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the

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<sup>68</sup> *Treatise*, p. 456.


<sup>69</sup> *Treatise*, p. 275.

<sup>70</sup> *Treatise*, p. 275.



impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be *called impressions of reflexion*, because derived from it.<sup>71</sup>

A passion is a kind of impression, which is caused by the object. This impression is called reflective impression. These reflective impressions are passions and they admit of another division into calm and violent. Calm passions are “the sense of beauty and deformity in action”. Pride, humility, grief, joy, desire, aversion, hope, fear, love and hatred are the violent passions. Hume’s this classification, which is based on the first three paragraph of book II of the *Treatise*, is shown in figure 3;



**Figure 3:** Classifications of passions.

<sup>71</sup> *Treatise*, pp. 7-8.

The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the *calm* and the *violent*. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly call'd passions, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible. But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, these impressions have been commonly distinguish'd each other.

When we take a survey of the passions, there occurs a division of them into *direct* and *indirect*.<sup>72</sup>

This quotation is problematic. In this quotation, Hume introduces that impressions of reflection are emotions. Therefore, it can be said that emotions are divided into calm and violent. The expression "those other impressions" refers to the violent reflective impressions, so these violent reflective impressions are passions and they are divided into direct and indirect passions. However, it is seen that none of the distinctions cut across each other. Hume only draws the direct/indirect distinction within the class of violent reflective impression. According to him, calm reflective impressions are neither direct nor indirect. Why do not this direct/indirect and calm/violent distinctions cut across each other? Since "passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity", we can infer from this expression that violent emotions are passions and calm emotions are not. Moreover, Hume understands "by passion is a violent and sensible emotion of mind"<sup>73</sup>. We can infer from all of this all passions are violent and no passion can be calm, because of this he only makes direct/indirect distinction under the violent passions. Therefore, the direct/indirect distinction and violent/calm distinction do not cut across each other. However, it is


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<sup>72</sup> *Treatise*, p. 276.

<sup>73</sup> *Treatise*, p. 437.

expected to the direct/indirect distinction must lay under the all the reflective impressions. Since he claims that passions are reflective impressions, all reflective impressions can be divided into indirect and direct. It is difficult to understand this position of Hume. It may lead to misunderstandings.


The following two figures are presented by Tweyman. The first figure shows the description of ideas and impressions of reflection; the second figure shows the double relation.



**Source:** S.D. Tweyman, *Hume: Critical Assessments*, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 466.

**Figure 4:** A general model passion:

(1) as a rubric for a complex, a temporal mechanism or (2) as a particular element of a general mental function.



**Source:** Tweyman, *Hume: Critical Assessments*, p. 466.

**Figure 5:** The double relation

Hume claims that calm passions are confounded with reason, because their sensations are not evidently different. It can be claimed that for Hume, calm passions are related to both moral and aesthetic judgments. “When any of these passions are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason, and are supposed to proceed from the same faculty.”<sup>74</sup> Hume calls them calm desires, although he claims that these are real passions. This is important, because it can be seen that Hume mentions calm passions as a kind of desire and he claims that these desires are of two kinds; “either certain instincts originally implanted in our nature, such as benevolence and resentment; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, considered merely as such.”<sup>75</sup> Hume also makes a distinction between calm and weak passion; between a violent and a strong passion. Calm and violent passions can

<sup>74</sup> *Treatise*, p. 417.

<sup>75</sup> *Treatise*, p. 417.

be changed into each other. Calm passion can be changed into a violent passion either by a change of temper or of the nature of object. Hume states that the difference between calm and violent passions is that “the same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one.”<sup>76</sup>

According to Hume, passions arise from pleasures and pains either directly or indirectly. This leads Hume to make a distinction between direct and indirect passions. He believes that there are two kinds of passions, direct passions and indirect passions. Of the first kind are desire, aversion, joy, grief, hope and fear. These direct passions arise immediately from pleasure and pain, good and evil. In other words, the direct passions “arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable.”<sup>77</sup> Indirect passions arise indirectly from feelings of pleasure and pain. Pride, humility, malice, generosity, envy, pity, ambition, love and hatred are indirect passions. Indirect passions “proceed from same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities.”<sup>78</sup> Indirect passions distinguish moral sentiments from other sentiments. Baier claims that direct passions are caused by their objects while indirect passions involve both the thought of something that pleases, and the recognition of that good thing as belonging to a particular person, bringing a consequent pleasure in that person.<sup>79</sup>

Hume believes that there are three causes of passions: The first is the association of ideas. “Tis impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily upon one idea...the rule, by which they proceed, is to pass from one object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produced by it.”<sup>80</sup> The second is that the association of impressions. “All resembling

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<sup>76</sup> *Treatise*, p. 419.

<sup>77</sup> *Treatise*, p. 439.

<sup>78</sup> *Treatise*, p. 276.

<sup>79</sup> A. C. Baier, “David Hume,” in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, CD-ROM Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge, 1998.

<sup>80</sup> *Treatise*, p. 283.

impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow.”<sup>81</sup> Hume also claims that when these two kinds of association concur in the same object, transition is made more easily. In other words, there is a transition between these two kinds of association. The third is that double association of ideas and impressions. These are also properties of human mind. It can be inferred that passions result from associations. Neither a relation of ideas nor a relation of impressions is alone sufficient to give rise to any passion. Therefore, he states that there must be a double relation of ideas and impression in order to give rise to passion.

According to Hume, object of passions and sensation of them consist of their properties. On the other hand, properties of the causes are their relation to object of passion and their relation to produce sensation of passion. Hume compares the two properties of passions to two properties of the causes and concludes that “cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion.”<sup>82</sup> The cause exciting the passion is related to this object. The sensation is also related to the sensation of the passion. He claims that passions are derived from this double relation of ideas and impressions. This double relation consists of the association of ideas and the association of impressions. Hume states “‘Tis observable of these two kinds of association, that they very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object.”<sup>83</sup> It can be claimed that Hume uses this double relation to explain the origin of the indirect passions. Why indirect passions? Because, he mentions this relation in case of pride and humility, love and hatred, and these are indirect passions. Moreover he says, “indirect passions arise from a double

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<sup>81</sup> *Treatise*, p. 283.

<sup>82</sup> *Treatise*, p. 286.

<sup>83</sup> *Treatise*, pp. 283-284.

relation of impressions and ideas.” Therefore it can be claimed that Hume does not give a wider account to direct passions and it cannot be said that he explains clearly the origin of the direct passions. Hume devoted only a single part to these passions; the rest of book II of the *Treatise* is devoted to explain indirect passions such as pride and humility, love and hatred.

Hume believes that we cannot give any definition of the passions, it is impossible. There is a difference between the cause of passion and the subject of passion. Pleasure in which related to self is the cause of passion. For example, a man who has a beautiful house may be vain. In this situation, the cause of passion is house and the subject of passion is man.

We can say that all passions arise from pleasures and pain, and thoughts about their causes. Passions are founded on our thoughts, because they are impressions. Since all impressions are founded on our thoughts and passions are a kind of impressions, it is reasonable to say that passions are also founded on our thoughts. Hume believes that all morality is founded on pleasure and pain. Each of the passion has a particular feeling; this feeling is either agreeable or disagreeable. Hume tries to make some limitations, which are derived from the nature of the subject, to his ethical system. He explains five limitations in section VI of book II. He asserts:

The first limitation is that every thing related to us, which produces pleasure or pain, produces likewise pride or humility. The second limitation is that the agreeable or disagreeable object be not only closely related, but also peculiar to ourselves. The third limitation is, that the pleasant or painful object be very discernible and obvious, and that not only to ourselves, but to others also. The fourth limitation is deriv'd from the inconstancy of the cause of these passions. The fifth limitation is that general rules have a great influence upon pride and humility, as well as on all the other passions.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> *Treatise*, pp. 290-293.

Pleasure and pain are foundation of all passions in Hume's theory. It is necessary to present good or evil to produce any kind of passion. Passion produces an idea. We think of our own qualities by the passion. The character of any passions is determined by present sensation. "The passions may express themselves in a hundred ways, and may subsist a considerable time, without our reflecting on the happiness or misery of their objects."<sup>85</sup> The causes and effects of all passions are variable.

Imaginations and passions are faculties of the mind. There is a close relation between imagination and passions, so imagination has an effect on the passions. Opposition, uncertainty, custom, facility, distance and repetition have an effect both to increase and diminish our passions. According to Hume, opposition supports the passions, while facility weakens them like distance. Therefore, the first is agreeable to us and we desire it, the second is uneasy and we avoid it. Hume also mentions the necessity of belief to the exciting all our passions. He states "belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression."<sup>86</sup>

Hume claims that there is a connected chain between passions. If the objects of passions are different, these passions have no influence on each other. Passions can pass from one link to another. According to Hume, passions descend with greater facility than they ascend. "Impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union; and like colors, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself."<sup>87</sup> Hume believes that passions resemble a string-instrument, and they are slow and restive. The animating principle of all passions is *sympathy*.

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<sup>85</sup> *Treatise*, p. 368.

<sup>86</sup> *Treatise*, p. 427.

<sup>87</sup> *Treatise*, p. 366.



### 2.2.1 Indirect Passions

Hume claims that indirect passions are “the secondary effects of a previous feeling of pleasure and pain”. There are four fundamental indirect passions: pride, humility, love, and hatred. These four indirect passions are shown in figure 6.

		Object	
		Self	Others
Impressions	Pleasant	PRIDE	LOVE
	Painful	HUMILITY	HATRED

**Figure 6:** Indirect passions

Hume believes that all morality is founded on pleasure and pain. “By the intention we judge of the actions, and according is that is good or bad, they become causes of love or hatred.”<sup>88</sup> In this quotation, it can be claimed that Hume speaks like Kant, since in Kant’s ethics, intention is important for the judgment of our actions. For Hume, intention is necessary to produce love or hatred, pleasure or pain.

Each of the passions has a particular feeling. This feeling is either agreeable or disagreeable. “All agreeable objects, related to ourselves, by an association of ideas and of impressions, produce pride, and disagreeable ones, humility.”<sup>89</sup> Hence, we can say that objects producing pleasure and pain produce pride and humility, as long as these objects are related to us. Pride and humility are “only pure sensations, without any direction or tendency to action.”<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> *Treatise*, p.348.

<sup>89</sup> *Treatise*, p. 290.

<sup>90</sup> *Treatise*, p. 382.

The object of love and hatred is other person. The object of pride and humility is myself. But object is not the source of these passions. Pride and humility have the same object, "self". "Pride and humility, those that connected succession of perceptions, which we call self, be object of these two passions."<sup>91</sup> Although pride and humility have the same object, their affects and sensations are contrary to each other.

The original cause of pride and humility is pain and pleasure. Pride is produced by virtue and it is an agreeable impression in the mind. The mind has secondary qualities in the same way that external objects do. Original qualities define the subject of pride and humility. The chief spring of the mind is pleasure or pain. Every quality giving us pleasure causes pride or love.

This plain, that, according as the impression is either pleasant or uneasy, the passion of love or hatred must arise towards the person, who is thus connected to the cause of the impression by these double relations, which I have all along requir'd. The person has a relation of ideas to myself, according to the supposition; the passion, of which he is the object, by being either agreeable or uneasy, has a relation to the impressions to pride or humility. 'Tis evident, then, that one of these passions must arise from the love or hatred.<sup>92</sup>


The characteristics of any person, bodily accomplishments and external advantages produce love and esteem. The opposite of these qualities produce hatred. There is a difference between the quality and the subject of a passion. For example; a person who possesses a luxury car and people show esteem for him/her because of the beauty of the car and the relation of property. Therefore, it can be concluded that the source of esteem is based both on the beauty of car and the relation of property, and if one of these is removed this passion cannot arise.

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<sup>91</sup> *Treatise*, p. 277.

<sup>92</sup> *Treatise*, p. 338.

Hume believes that “the same qualities that produces pride and humility, cause love or hatred”<sup>93</sup>. The natural object of pride and humility is myself, of love and hatred is other person. Hume claims that there is a similarity between sense of pride and sense of love, as well as humility and hatred. It is known that a square has four sides such as *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*. There is a line between *a* and *b*, between *c* and *d*; these two lines form two opposite sides of the square. There is also a line between *a* and *c*, *b* and *d*; these two lines form the other two opposite sides of the square. Hume places the four passions- pride, humility, love, and hatred- in each of the sides of the square. Therefore, he claims that there is a relation between pride and humility, love and hatred, pride and love, and finally humility and hatred. He explains this situation as follows; “Pride is connected with humility, love with hatred, by their objects or ideas: Pride with love, humility with hatred, by their sensations or impressions.”<sup>94</sup> Love and pride are agreeable passions, while humility and hatred are disagreeable or uneasy passions. This can be illustrated in figure 7, as follows:



**Figure 7:** The relation of four indirect passions

However, in the following quotation Baillie claims a different situation. I do not agree with Baillie, because Hume says that there is a relation in each of these four indirect passions.

Hume now confronts an asymmetry, in that while love can lead to pride, and hatred to humility, such transitions tend

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<sup>93</sup> *Treatise*, p. 332.

<sup>94</sup> *Treatise*, p. 333.

not to occur in the reverse direction. For example, my pride in a virtue does not thereby yield an increase in the love I feel for my friends or family, yet my recognition of their virtues causes my self-esteem to rise.<sup>95</sup>

Desire and aversion always follow love and hatred. "Love is the desire of happiness to another person, and hatred that of misery."<sup>96</sup> This is contrary to experience.

"The production of an indirect passion requires (a) that the cause must be in some close relation to the person concerned, and (b) that it be intrinsically pleasing or displeasing, regardless of any such relation."<sup>97</sup> According to Hume, indirect passions arise from a double relation between ideas and impressions. For example, I have an idea of some subject, such as having a beautiful house and this idea gives me pleasure. I associate this feeling of pleasure with a feeling of pride by the principle of resemblance. This association is the first relation in the double relation. Then the feeling of pride causes me to have an idea of myself, this is the object of pride. Finally, I associate the idea of myself with the idea of my house by causality. This association constitutes the second relation in the double relation. In this example, how the passion of pride arises is explained. The three other fundamental indirect passions arise in parallel ways. For example, if my house is ugly and causes me pain, then I will experience the passion of humility. By contrast, if someone else has a beautiful house, then this will lead to a feeling of love for that person. If that person has an ugly house, then this will lead to a feeling of hatred towards that person.<sup>98</sup>

The indirect passions are closely related to character traits. If the trait is supposed to be a virtue; it generates the following result:

(a) If it is mine, I will feel pride;

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<sup>95</sup> Baillie, *Hume on Morality*, p. 63.

<sup>96</sup> *Treatise*, p. 367.

<sup>97</sup> Baillie, *Hume on Morality*, p. 61.

<sup>98</sup> The similar example can be found in ([www. iep. utm. edu/h/humemora.htm](http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/humemora.htm))

(b) If it is of my companion, it will feel love towards her.

If the trait is supposed to be a vice; it generates the following result:

(c) If its mine, I will feel humility;

(d) If it is of my companion, it will cause me to hate her.<sup>99</sup>

We can conclude that for Hume, pride, humility, love, and hatred are the four fundamental indirect passions. The objects of the indirect passions (self, others) are different from their causes (good character, nice clothes, etc.). Pride and love are positive feelings, but humility and hate are negative. The object of pride-humility and love-hatred are different. The object of a passion and the cause of a passion are different. The object of love and hatred is other person, while the object of pride and humility is myself. In other words, when pleasure or pain is specially related to a particular person it produces indirect passions. If the particular person is someone else, it produces love and hatred; if the particular person is oneself, it produces pride or humility.

### **2.2.2. Direct Passions**

Hume makes a distinction between direct and indirect passions, but he does not correspond perfectly with what he said. Since, he claims that all passions are derived from original impressions of pain and pleasure. The indirect passions involve principles of association, but the direct passions do not. Hume does not give a detailed explanation of the direct passions; he devotes to it only one part of book 2 of the *Treatise*. Therefore, it is difficult to understand clearly these kinds of passions.

Direct passions arise from good and evil naturally. Whenever we see something good or bad, direct passions arise immediately without any complexity. Direct passions arise from a natural impulse which is unknown. Thus, direct passions arise from good and evil, pleasure and pain, impulse.

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<sup>99</sup> Baillie, *Hume on Morality*, p. 62.

Direct passions take their additional force from indirect passions. “The impressions, which arise from good and evil most naturally, and with the least preparation are the *direct* passions of desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear, along with volition.”<sup>100</sup> The key direct passions are desire, aversion, joy, grief, hope, and fear. Fear and hope, joy and sorrow arise from the uncertainty or certainty of good or evil. “When good is certain or probable, it produces JOY. When evil is the same situation there arises GRIEF or SORROW. When either good or evil is uncertain or probable, it gives rise to FEAR or HOPE”<sup>101</sup>. What Hume says in this quotation is shown in figure 8.

	Good	Evil
Certain	JOY	SORROW
Uncertain	HOPE	FEAR

**Figure 8:** Direct passions

When good or evil objects are considered abstractly, we have a desire towards good objects and aversion towards evil ones. When good or evil objects are actually present, I have a joy towards good objects and grief or sorrow towards evil objects. When these objects are only anticipated, I have a hope towards good objects and a fear towards evil ones. The logic of these six direct passions can be illustrated as follows:

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<sup>100</sup> *Treatise*, p. 438. For example, if I consider a pleasant thing, such as being a rich, then I will feel the passion of desire; on the other hand if I consider a painful thing, such as being a poor, then I will feel the passion of aversion.

<sup>101</sup> *Treatise*, p. 439.

	Good objects	Evil objects
Abstractly	DESIRE	AVERSION
Present	JOY	GRIEF
Anticipated	HOPE	FEAR

**Figure 9:** The logic of direct passions

It can be given an example based on figure 6. For example, I compare the passions of winning lottery and having burglarized. I can think that if I win the lottery, my money will be stolen. In this situation, I compare two opposite passions. I desire to win the lottery and I have an aversion towards being mugged. Suppose, both situations are present, I will experience joy over winning the lottery, but on the other hand I will experience grief over being mugged. Finally, I know that I will win the lottery and all of my money will be stolen at some times in the future. In this situation, I will experience hope regarding the winning lottery and fear of being mugged.<sup>102</sup>

Some direct passions arise from an unknown natural impulse such as “desire of punishment to our enemies, hunger, and a few bodily appetites. These kinds of passions produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections.”<sup>103</sup> In this quotation, we can infer that there are two kinds of direct passions, according to Hume. Of the first kind arise good and evil, and of the other kinds arise natural impulse. The second kinds are only natural instincts; they include the impulses that make us feel the pain of hunger and the pleasure of eating. I think there is no place for these kinds of passions in morality. Moreover, Hume said that all passions arise from good and evil. He makes a mistake in regarding of natural instincts as passions. On the

<sup>102</sup> This example can be found in ([www. bluejoh. com](http://www.bluejoh.com)).

<sup>103</sup> *Treatise*, p. 439.

other hand, these second kind of direct passions may be called “*producer*”, because they produce good and evil. If all passions arise from good and evil, we know that producer passions produce good and evil, then it can be claimed that all passions arise from these producer passions. Then, the producer passions have an important place in morality, because if they do not exist, there is no good and evil. However, I think we do not achieve such a conclusion this is a mistake.

The distinction between the direct and indirect passions can be explained in such a way that the objects of the direct passions are their causes, while the objects and causes of indirect passions are different. The following passage illustrates this point:

A suit of fine cloaths produces pleasure from their beauty; and this pleasure produces the direct passions, or the impressions of volition and desire. Again, when these cloaths are considered as belonging to our self, the double relation conveys to us the sentiment of pride, which is an indirect passion; and the pleasure which attends that passion returns back to the direct affections, and gives new force to our desire or volition, joy or hope.<sup>104</sup>

According to this passage, a fine suit produces the direct passion of desire. The suit is both the cause of my desire and its object. Because I want the suit and my desire is directed towards it.

Let me summarize the turns of the argument, Hume defines the passions in that “a passion is an original existence, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification.”<sup>105</sup> Hume claims that there is a relation among passions and the transition is possible among them. Passions are similar to a sequence. Calm passions influence our conduct. Hume also makes a distinction between direct and indirect passions under the violent passions. The direct passions do not involve any association, but indirect passions do.

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<sup>104</sup> *Treatise*, p. 439.

<sup>105</sup> *Treatise*, p. 415.



He claims that there are four principal indirect passions (pride, humility, love, hatred) and six principal direct passions (desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear). This kind of classification may be found in ancient tradition such as Stoics. Stoics also divide passions “first, into *Love* and *Hatred*, according as the Object is good or evil; and then subdivides each, according as the Object is *present* or *expected*. About Good we have these two, *Desire* and *Joy*: About Evil we have likewise two, *Fear* and *Sorrow*.”<sup>106</sup>

Hume is influenced by F. Hutcheson, one of the most important thinkers in the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment. Hutcheson tries to explain the nature of human actions, so he mentions passions. He defines passions as follows; “when more violent *confused Sensations* arise with the *Affection*, and are attended with, or prolonged by bodily Motions, we call the whole by the Name of *Passion*, especially when accompanied with some *natural Propensities*.”<sup>107</sup>

There is some inconsistency in Hume’s theory of passions, so it is difficult to analyze his theory. I think the most important difficulty in his theory of passions is the classification of the passions. Recall that he divides passions into direct and indirect, but this division does not lay under the calm passions. There is no any satisfied answer why this is so. Calm passions have important role to determine our morality. However, in some places in the *Treatise*, these calm passions are presented as mixed reason. I think, this leads to some misunderstandings. The causes of all passions are pleasure and pain.

Kempton Smith argues that passions have disinterested character in Hume’s account. “They have pleasure and pain as their *Efficient Cause*, but not as their *Object*.”<sup>108</sup> Hume’s theory of passions is

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<sup>106</sup> F. Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002, p.49.

<sup>107</sup> Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, p. 50.

<sup>108</sup> Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume*, p. 139.

deterministic. This deterministic theory of passion implies that internal nature of people is identical; this leads to say that there is a common passion in all human beings, which is called *sympathy* by Hume.

### 2.3 Virtues

Hume discusses virtues in Book three of the *Treatise* under the title of *Morals*. Book three of the *Treatise* includes three parts. In the first part, he discusses the outline of his moral theory. The second part is about artificial virtues such as justice and injustice. And in the last part of Book three of the *Treatise*, he discusses natural virtues. Why does Hume firstly mention artificial virtues and then natural virtues? I think this shows that in Hume's system artificial virtues are more important than natural ones.

People approve or disapprove something, this leads them to act. Our moral sentiments distinguish between virtues and vices. Vices and virtues are the causes of pride and humility. Virtues play an important role to moral judgment in Hume's system. "Morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation."<sup>109</sup> Virtue and vice are constituted by the good and bad qualities of our actions. Virtuous character arises naturally; it is encouraged by experience. Virtue and vice are determined by pleasure and pain. In 3/1/2, concludes that "virtue is distinguished by pleasure, and vice by the pain". In this section of the book, he also discusses the question whether virtue is natural or artificial. He believes that some virtues are natural, while some are artificial.

The original cause of virtue and vice is pleasure and pain, as well as pride and humility. "An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious why? Since its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a

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<sup>109</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 289. "The meaning of 'approbation' seems to be one of the more difficult and controversial aspects of Hume's definition" (Glossop, "The Nature of Hume's Ethics, p. 529). Glossop claims that Hume does not make a distinction between a sentiment of approval and a judgment of approval. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret this.

particular kind.”<sup>110</sup> Virtue produces pride. Pride is an agreeable impression in the mind. Pleasure is the cause of passion.

Pride and humility, love and hatred, are excited by any advantages or disadvantages of the mind, body, or fortune; that these advantages or disadvantages have that effect, by producing a separate impression of pain or pleasure.<sup>111</sup>

An excessive pride is esteemed vicious, and a just sense of humility is esteemed virtue. Virtue is always accompanied by a feeling of pleasure and vice by a feeling of pain.<sup>112</sup> He defines virtue as the quality of the mind that produces pleasure; every quality that gives pain is dominated vicious. “These sentiments may arise either from the mere species or appearance of characters and passions, or from reflexions on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and of particular persons.”<sup>113</sup>

According to Hume there are four different sources from which this pleasure and pain arise: 1) the utility of a quality to person himself; industry, good sense, frugality. 2) the utility of a quality to others; benevolence, justice. 3) the immediate agreeableness and disagreeableness of a quality to others; politeness, modesty. 4) the immediate agreeableness and disagreeableness of a quality to person himself; courage, cheerfulness. In fact these are the four sources of moral distinctions. “Personal merit consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person himself or to

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
<sup>110</sup> *Treatise*, p. 471.

<sup>111</sup> *Treatise*, p. 614.

<sup>112</sup> “Hume tells us that the only way to discover virtue and vice is to look inside ourselves and to find there is a sentiment of approbation or disapprobation toward the person (or action) under consideration...The discovery of the virtue and vice is grounded in the passional nature of the observer” (Homiak, M. L., “Hume’s Ethics: Ancient or Modern” in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 81, pp. 215-236, (2000); p. 216-217.

<sup>113</sup> *Treatise*, p. 589.

others.”<sup>114</sup> According to Hume, immediate pleasure gives rise to the sense of vice and virtue.



**Figure 10:** Virtues

### 2.3. 1. Justice and Artificial Virtues

Hume believes that there are two kinds of virtues: social (natural) virtues and artificial virtues. The most important artificial virtue is justice in his system. He considers chastity and modesty as female virtues, these are also artificial virtues.<sup>115</sup> However, to understand Hume’s account of artificial virtues, it is necessary to understand his argument about justice.

In order to understand his distinction between natural and artificial virtues, it is necessary to know what he means by the “artificial”. He uses the concept of artificial as opposed to natural. He claims that the word “natural” has three senses. The first sense of natural is opposed to miracles, the second is used to oppose to unusual. And finally it is opposed to artificial. He considers justice as an artificial virtue and public benevolence is the motive to justice. In the first and second senses of “natural”, it must be accepted that all virtues

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<sup>114</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 268.

<sup>115</sup> According to Hume’s theory of artificial virtues, “honesty with respect to property, fidelity to promises, allegiance to government, and female chastity and modesty are analyzed as virtues whose existence depends upon the social invention of rules for the common good, and the approval of which comes from sympathy with the public interest” (Cohon, “The Common Point of View in Hume’s Ethics, p. 830).

are natural. Therefore, the distinction between natural and artificial virtues arises from the third sense of “natural”.

In the part two of the Book three of the *Treatise*, Hume begins to discuss the question is that whether justice as an artificial or natural virtue. He says, “there are some virtues, that produce pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and necessities of mankind. Of this kind I assert *justice* to be...”<sup>116</sup> However, it is ambiguous why he considers justice as a virtue. He explains this in the following quotation, “justice is a moral virtue, merely because it has that tendency to the good of mankind; and, indeed, is nothing but an artificial invention to that purpose.”<sup>117</sup>

In the *Treatise* Hume asks two questions about justice; the first question is “concerning the reasons, which determine us to attribute to the observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity?”<sup>118</sup> He tries to answer this question to explain the source of justice and property. His second question is that “why we annex the idea of virtue to justice, and of vice to injustice?”<sup>119</sup> He tries to answer this question to explain why we approve of justice and disapprove of injustice. It can be said that these two questions are alike. In answering these questions, Hume analyzes justice as a virtue. In the 3/2/6, Hume examines some farther reflexions concerning justice and injustice. He claims that there are three fundamental laws of nature; “that the stability of possession, of its transference by consent and of the performance of promises”. Society is necessary for well-being of men and justice arises from after the formation of society. There is no any original principle in men’s mind, so it can be claimed that justice is an artificial virtue. Hume rejects the common description of justice. “Justice is commonly defin’d

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<sup>116</sup> *Treatise*, p. 477.

<sup>117</sup> *Treatise*, p. 577.

<sup>118</sup> *Treatise*, p. 484.

<sup>119</sup> *Treatise*, p. 498.

to be a *constant and perpetual will of giving every one his due.*<sup>120</sup> He claims that this opinion is false.

Charles E. Cottle (1979) claims that Hume considers justice as an artificial, not natural, virtue because of the five characteristics of justice. According to Cottle, these five characteristics of justice show the differences between artificial and natural virtue, these are as follows:

The first is that artificial virtue (or at least justice) requires the invention of rules intended as guides to conduct...the rules of natural virtue, by contrast, are first most appropriately thought of as observable regularities of behavior and only then, as guides to conduct...Artificial moral judgment, unlike natural moral judgment, proceeds deductively on the basis of established rules in an attempt to achieve certainty and admits no degrees of gradation<sup>121</sup>

In other words, the rules of natural virtue are not the inventions. The second and third markers, which show the distinction between natural and artificial virtue, appear in moral judgment. In the Treatise 3/2/6 Hume claims that “the general maxims of philosophy and law establish this position, *that property, and right, and obligation admit not of degrees.*”<sup>122</sup> The fourth is that unlike natural moral judgments, artificial moral judgments “proceeds by inflexible general rules. And finally, the impartiality found in decisions of justice is not the same kind of impartiality found in natural moral judgment.”<sup>123</sup> These five characteristics of justice are explained more fully by Hume in the Treatise 3/2/6.

Hume believes that there is a difference between the motives to acts of justice and honesty, he explains this distinction as follows; “for shou’d we say, that a concern for our private interest or reputation is the

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<sup>120</sup> *Treatise*, p. 526.

<sup>121</sup> C. E. Cottle, “Justice as Artificial Virtue in Hume’s Treatise,” in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 40, 1979, p. 458.

<sup>122</sup> *Treatise*, p. 530.

<sup>123</sup> Cottle, “Justice as Artificial Virtue in Hume’s Treatise”, p. 458.

legitimate motive to all honest actions; it would follow, that wherever that concern ceases, honesty can no longer have place.”<sup>124</sup> Why people restore their loan? What motive has people to restore their loan? Hume believes that a virtuous action arises from virtuous motive. He says, “no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of morality.”<sup>125</sup> Mackie tries to interpret Hume’s theory of justice and claims that according to Hume, justice is a sort of honesty. Mackie gives an outline of Hume’s argument about justice as an artificial virtue; this argument has the following structure: virtuous action has a virtuous motive, but this leads circularity. Therefore, there must be another motive for virtuous actions. He discusses what is this motive in the case of honesty? Honest actions cannot be motivated by self-love, public interest, general benevolence, and private benevolence. So it is concluded that the motive for honest actions can only be honesty itself. This is a paradox, and the solution of this paradox is to admit the artificiality of the sense of justice and injustice.

Hume cannot show any natural attempt to approve of justice. “Hume is interested in the ‘origins’ of virtues and vices, and so far he has not shown that justice inevitably and quite generally leads to any of the things we are motivated towards.”<sup>126</sup> It is claimed that this is a problem in his system and his solution is that justice is an artificial virtue. However, it can be arguable whether this is really a solution or not.

Artificial virtues arise naturally in society; they arise from some necessities of mankind. They include design and invention. These virtuous are social conventions and they “produce pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, which arises from

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<sup>124</sup> *Treatise*, p. 480.

<sup>125</sup> *Treatise*, p. 479.

<sup>126</sup> B. Stroud, *Hume*, Routledge: London and New York, 1997, p. 200.

the circumstances and necessities of mankind.”<sup>127</sup> These kinds of virtues have evolved. Baillie claims “any attempt to explain the origin of our approval of justice that is restricted to natural motives will be either circular or blatantly false.”<sup>128</sup> Hume also knows this circularity, so he claims that justice is an artificial virtue. “We have naturally no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity...there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle.”<sup>129</sup> However, he claims that unless we accept the sense of justice is artificial, there is circularity.

The source of justice is utility. Therefore, the concept of utility is also important. The approval of justice depends on both human nature and the approval of benevolence. The approval of benevolence depends only on the moral sense. He bounds justice to utility. “Justice is useful to society, public utility is the sole origin of justice.”<sup>130</sup> There is a mutual benevolence among the people, it may be said that this is the source of society. “The natural sentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the interests of mankind and society.”<sup>131</sup>

Utility is also the source of praise and approbation. Hume tries to justify utility by its beauty. If something is useful, we tend to say this is beautiful. It can be said that there is a relationship between beauty and useful. “The natural sentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the interests of mankind and society.”<sup>132</sup> The aim of benevolence is that it gives happiness. Our desires contribute to our happiness. Beauty is based on pleasure and pain. “In judging of the beauty of animal bodies, we always carry in our eye the economy of a certain species; and

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<sup>127</sup> *Treatise*, p. 477.

<sup>128</sup> Baillie, *Hume on Morality*, p. 158.

<sup>129</sup> *Treatise*, p. 483.

<sup>130</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 183.

<sup>131</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 230.

<sup>132</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 230.



where the limbs and features observe that proportion, we pronounce them handsome and beautiful.”<sup>133</sup>

In the *Enquiry* Hume uses the benevolence as a first passion. Utility pleases us, because we are to some degree other persons, and it contributes to the good of others. “No views of utility or of future beneficial consequences enter into his sentiment of approbation; yet is it of a kind similar to that other sentiment, which arises from views of a public or private utility.”<sup>134</sup> The source of approbation or disapprobation is the idea of utility. The utility of virtue is the source of its merit. “The merit of benevolence, arising from its utility, and its tendency to promote the good of mankind.”<sup>135</sup> Artificial virtues conform to beneficial convention. Hume believes that private benevolence arises from public benevolence.

Self-preservation plays an important role to motivate justice. Justice is necessary for the benefit of society. Equity and justice are alike, according to Hume.

The rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state and condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to that utility, which results to the public from their strict and regular observance.<sup>136</sup>

Therefore, although people are equal with regard their possessions, they cannot be equal as to their qualities.

In the *Treatise* Hume said that there was a relation between justice and property. It can be claimed that the object of justice is property and justice means respect for property. “Who make use of the word *property, or right, or obligation*, before they have explained the origin of justice,....,are guilty of a very gross fallacy.”<sup>137</sup> Some writers

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<sup>133</sup> *Treatise*, p. 483.

<sup>134</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 260.

<sup>135</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 257.

<sup>136</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 188.

claim that Hume's justice is a set of rules which regulate property. Hume repeats this relation between justice and property in the *Enquiry*. There is property in all society. "Hence justice derives its usefulness to the public: And hence alone arises its merit and moral obligation."<sup>138</sup> According to Hume, property must consist in some relation of the object and this relation must be internal. "Property is perfectly unintelligible without first supposing justice an injustice."<sup>139</sup> There was no property in the state of nature, because property arises from society. Property is not natural.

Man needs many things to continue and protect his life. In order to require his needs and protect his life, man enters into society. Therefore, we can say that self-preservation is the source of society. "Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects, and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures."<sup>140</sup> Hume believes that society is not natural, because it is not an original feature of the human condition; but its development is natural.

We said that justice is related to property. According to Hume, justice includes a set of rules about property. Property arises from the distinction between "mine" and "yours". Which rules do determine property? In section three of part two of the third book of the *Treatise*, Hume discusses the rules which determine property. He claims that "possession must be stable", this is the general rule. The effect of custom is very important to reconcile people to any thing they have long enjoyed. This leads to the rule of "the assignment of property to the present possessor be natural". However, Hume believes that this rule is not sufficient to determine the rules of the property in the society. Therefore, he tries to find other rules to do this. He suggests four conditions which determine the property after society is established.

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<sup>137</sup> *Treatise*, p. 491.

<sup>138</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 188.

<sup>139</sup> *Treatise*, p. 533.

<sup>140</sup> *Treatise*, p. 485.

These four conditions are; Occupation, Prescription, Accession and Succession.

Occupation means the first possession. If someone claims something, which has never been possessed, it becomes the property of his/her. Prescription means long possession. The first possession or occupation of something is proved by prescription. These two conditions are more important than other conditions. The relation of possession is a kind of cause and effect, because property arises from these two kinds of possession, first and long possession. Hume also mentions the importance of the prescription or long possession to determine property in the *Enquiry*.

Sometimes both *utility* and *analogy* fail, and leave the laws of justice in total uncertainty. Thus, it is highly requisite, that prescription or long possession should convey property; but what number of days or months or years should be sufficient for that purpose, it is impossible for reason alone to determine.<sup>141</sup>

The third way of the acquisition of the property of objects is accession. Accession is related to objects that are our own property. For example, if we have a garden which includes some trees, the fruits of our trees are our own property. And we own the milk laid by our cow. The last way to acquire property is succession. Succession means inheritance. After the parent's death, parent's possessions pass to their near relation. Therefore, succession is assumed as a natural right.

In the state of nature, there was no property so justice also was unknown. There was no law of justice before society. Justice arises from property, property arises from society. So there is a close relation between justice and society. In society, people have to obey some rules; these rules are not natural, they are invented by people. The rules of justice are also invented so they are artificial. Why do these rules arise? These rules are necessary to protect people's rights,

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<sup>141</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 196.

especially property right. According to Hume people have some defects; one of the most important defects of man is his selfishness. Because of people's defects, some inconveniences arise. Hume believes that since society provides additional force, ability, and security, it is society alone that provides a remedy to these inconveniences. Hume says "justice takes its rise from human conventions; and that these are intended as a remedy to some inconveniences, which proceed from the concurrence of certain *qualities* of the human mind with the *situation* of external objects."<sup>142</sup> According to Hume, these qualities of human mind are selfishness and limited generosity. Therefore, it can be said that selfishness and limited generosity are basic inconveniences, they requires a remedy which is provided by society. In 3/2/2, Hume claims that the remedy is derived from artifice, not from nature. "All questions of property are subordinate to the authority of civil laws, and alter the rules of natural justice, according to particular convenience of each community."<sup>143</sup> Justice supports the public utility and civil society. It can be said that Hume's account of justice is similar to Hobbes's account of justice. For both, property and justice arise together within society.

Hume believes that artificial virtues are social conventions. Therefore the concept of convention has an important place in Hume's argument about justice as an artificial virtue. Although Hume does not accept the natural law tradition and contract theories, he believes that there must be a convention among people who live in a society. He believes that the possession can be done by a convention. However, how does this convention arise? In this convention, people do not depart from their own interest. They must abstain from the possession of others. In other words, this abstinence provides the rise of this convention. According to Hume, after this convention the ideas of justice and injustice, the concepts of property, right and obligation arise. Therefore, it can be concluded that justice depends on this convention.

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<sup>142</sup> *Treatise*, p. 494.

<sup>143</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 196.

Convention arises in a society, so the rise of justice also depends on the foundation of a society. Without justice, society dissolves; so there is a mutual relation between justice and society. He mentions some features of this convention. The first feature of it is that convention is not a promise since promises stem from conventions. Hume gives an analogy about this feature of convention.

Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by n agreement or convention, tho' they have never given promises to each other. Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less derived from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it. On the contrary, this experience assures us still more, that the sense of interest has become common to all our fellows, and gives us a confidence of the future regularity of their conduct: And 'tis only on the expectation of this, that our moderation and abstinence are founded.<sup>144</sup>

Since promises play an important role to determine the rule of morality, promise-keeping is another important thing in examining artificial virtues. Hume believes that promises are also conventions. In the following quotation, we can find Hume's view about promise;

The rule of morality, which enjoins the performance of promises, is not *natural*, will sufficiently appear from these two propositions, which I proceed to prove, viz. *that a promise wou'd not be intelligible, before human conventions had establish'd it; and that even if it were intelligible, it wou'd not be attended with any moral obligation.*<sup>145</sup>

According to Hume, the feature of the promise is that although it has an influence on present action, it regards the future actions. Hume believes that there is no any act of the mind which belongs to promise

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<sup>144</sup> *Treatise*, p. 490.

<sup>145</sup> *Treatise*, p. 516.

and the act of the mind producing the obligation of promise is the willing of that obligation. This obligation arises from the promise. We can conclude that promises, like justice, arise from convention and so they are artificial. And it can also be claimed that Hume regards promise as a part of justice.

Rawls interprets Hume's concept of convention and tries to show the features of convention. Rawls claims that a convention involves a rule and it is the shared awareness of a common interest. It expresses an idea of reciprocity. Three conditions are necessary for existence of a convention. "First, this shared sense of a common interest is mutually expressed, and so the existence of this common interest is public knowledge; the relevant rule is available and also publicly known."<sup>146</sup> As far as I understand from these conditions, a convention requires a rule, common interest and public knowledge. Rawls explains the third and the last condition as "the rule must be actually followed in society for a convention to exist."<sup>147</sup> Hume claims that without a convention, it cannot be the idea of justice as a virtue. Hume summarizes his account of justice and convention as follows;

Justice establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest, suppos'd to be common to all, and where every single act is perform'd in expectation that others are to perform the like.<sup>148</sup>

In the *Treatise* Hume does not deny the existence of benevolence. Benevolence is a calm desire or passion, an irreducible instinct. Although he accepts the existence of private benevolence, he mentions especially public benevolence. In the *Enquiry*, he devotes many pages to explain the concept of benevolence and he also mentions private benevolence.

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<sup>146</sup> Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*, p. 60.

<sup>147</sup> Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*, p. 61.

<sup>148</sup> *Treatise*, p. 498.

Public utility requires that property should be regulated by general inflexible rules; and though such rules are adopted as best serve the same end of public utility, it is impossible for them to prevent all individual hardships, or make beneficial consequences result from every individual case. It is sufficient, if the whole plan or scheme be necessary to the support of civil society, and if the balance of good, in the main, do thereby preponderate much above that of evil.<sup>149</sup>

People think of their interests. According to Hume, public benevolence is the original motive to justice, not private benevolence. However, he also claims “a single act of justice is frequently contrary to public interest.”<sup>150</sup> Private benevolence can be on different levels from one to one. “Private benevolence towards the proprietor is, and ought to be, weaker in some persons, than in others.”<sup>151</sup> Justice depends on the fact of our sense of common self-interest. The sense of justice and injustice are derived from society, not nature. However, Hume said that he used of the word natural as opposed to artificial. In other words, he explains “as no principle of the human mind is more natural than a sense of virtue; so no virtue is more natural than justice.”<sup>152</sup> For Hume, justice is artificial but the sense of its morality is natural.

We said that in his analysis of justice Hume asks two questions: The first question was that “concerning the reasons, which determine us to attribute to the observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity?” Hume tries to answer this question to explain the source of justice and property. We can find his answer to the first question, in the following quotation; “’tis only from the selfishness and confin’d generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin.”<sup>153</sup> The second

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<sup>149</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 305.

<sup>150</sup> *Treatise*, p. 497.

<sup>151</sup> *Treatise*, p. 483.

<sup>152</sup> *Treatise*, p. 484.

question was that “why we annex the idea of virtue to justice, and of vice to injustice?” Hume says that there is sympathy among people. People can feel others’ pain and pleasure by sympathy. In human actions, every unpleasant things are called vice and pleasant things are called virtue; “this is the reason why the sense of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice.”<sup>154</sup>

The rules of justice are similar to the rules of games, because they are both regulative and constitutive.

Since laws of justice do not exist before men ‘agree’ to form themselves into a society, there is no such thing as property outside of society. Without the laws of justice there are no rights, duties or obligations at all.<sup>155</sup>

There are two sources for establishing rules of justice; self-interest being the first original motivation for establishing rules of justice. The second motivation is the interest of our family and our friends. Thus the rules of justice are not natural; they depend on understanding and judgment. The laws of justice are not mean laws which govern property. Hume says;

Mankind is an inventive species; and where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary, it may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds immediately from original principles, without the intervention of thought or reflex. Tho’ the rules of justice be *artificial*, they are not *arbitrary*. Nor is the expression improper to call them *Laws of Nature*; if by natural we understand what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> *Treatise*, p. 495.

<sup>154</sup> *Treatise*, p. 499.

<sup>155</sup> Stroud, *Hume*, p. 203.

<sup>156</sup> *Treatise*, p. 484.



Self-love is the source of injustice. So, justice contradicts self-interest. Public interest is connected with justice. However, Hume says “*self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue.*”<sup>157</sup> I think it may be said that Hume contradicts himself in this quotation, because he said that the original source of justice was public benevolence. “Public utility is the general object of all courts of judicature; and this utility too requires a stable rule in all controversies.”<sup>158</sup> We can say that self-interest and benevolence are important factors to the origin of justice. It may be said that justice and self-love are contrary to each other. Artificial virtues impede some of our desires. For example, we prevent ourselves from stealing the property of others, because reason shows us this is wrong. It can be said that our short-term desires are prevented in favor of long-term goals.

For Hume, there are two different foundations to show the distinction between justice and injustice, self-interest and morality. It is because of self-interest that people recognize the impossibility of living in society without some rules. “The oppositions of interest and self-love have constrained mankind to establish the laws of justice.”<sup>159</sup> Therefore, the rules of justice are established by people. Hume says, “the laws of justice, being universal and perfectly inflexible, can never be deriv’d from nature, nor be the immediate offspring of any natural motive or inclination.”<sup>160</sup> The laws of justice are the laws of society. Like all other laws, the laws of justice also rise from the good of mankind.

Hume believes that justice is more important than other virtues. He says “no virtue is more esteem’d than justice, and no vice more

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<sup>157</sup> *Treatise*, pp. 499-500.

<sup>158</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 309.

<sup>159</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 261.

<sup>160</sup> *Treatise*, p. 532.

detested than injustice.”<sup>161</sup> Since allegiance, modesty, chastity and good manners are human inventions, they are also classified as artificial virtues in Hume’s system. Hume claims that artificial virtues are esteemed by sympathy.

Hume tries to give both political and psychological examination of artificial virtues. It is political, because in discussing justice he discusses the foundation of society, government and property. We can say that the examination of justice is sociological. It is psychological, because the source of esteem of artificial virtues is sympathy. Hume believes that justice is approved because of understanding and judgment. In other words, our approval depends on judgment and understanding in the case of justice, because justice is an artificial invention. In morality, our judgments are founded on the approval of justice.

Although Hume does not discuss the difference between artificial and natural virtues in the *Enquiry*, he examines justice in the part one of the section three of the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. In this section, He claims that justice is useful to society. There is no important difference between *Treatise* and *Enquiry* in his views about justice. In both, the origin of justice is public utility. He claims that justice is necessary to procure happiness and security in society. However, I think the most important difference between *Treatise* and *Enquiry* is that while in the *Treatise*, Hume says that justice is an artificial virtue; in the *Enquiry*, he does not use the term “artificial virtue”.

### **2.3. 2. Natural Virtues:**

Hume discusses the natural virtues in 3/3/1 of the *Treatise*, after discussing artificial virtues. In fact, we can find in this part of the book, Hume’s moral system. In morality, we approve some actions and disapprove some. The source of our approving and disapproving depends on our pleasure and our pain. Therefore, people try to seek pleasure, and avoid pain. If any quality of mind gives pleasure it is

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<sup>161</sup> *Treatise*, p. 577.

called virtuous, if it gives pain it is called vicious. Virtue and vice are closely related to action, so it can be claimed that they are signs of some quality or a character in the action. "Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility; and consequently are never considered in morality."<sup>162</sup> It is said that pride or humility, and love or hatred are basic elements of morality. Vice and virtue are also determined according to these four passions. Virtue is associated with pride or love; and any action which causes love or pride is called virtuous. In addition, vice is associated with humility or hatred; any action which causes humility or hatred is called vicious.

Hume makes a distinction between virtues and natural abilities. Intelligence, judgment, wit, good sense are natural abilities for Hume. However, it is not clear why he makes such a distinction between virtues and natural abilities. He claims that natural abilities are involuntary and this distinguishes them from virtues. But this is not sufficient to explain the difference between virtues and natural abilities, Natural virtues, unlike artificial virtues are not dependent on any contrivance. What is the origin of these virtues? Hume deals in 3/3/1 the origin of the natural virtues and vices. Natural virtue can be defined as the qualities which is given person by nature. We said that there is a close relationship between actions and morality. Actions are only character traits for Hume. Therefore, it can be claimed that virtues can be defined as character traits which are morally approved. In natural virtues, approving of character traits do not depend on any thing, they are naturally approved. Sympathy is the natural source of natural virtues. In the following quotation, Hume divides natural virtues; the one kind of natural virtues is what Hume calls "heroic virtues".

In general we may observe, that whatever we call *heroic virtue*, and admire under the character of greatness and elevation of mind, is either nothing but a steady and well-

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<sup>162</sup> *Treatise*, p. 575.

established pride and self-esteem, or partakes largely of that passion. Courage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory, magnanimity, and all the other shining virtue of that kind, have plainly a strong mixture of self-esteem in them, and derive a great part of their merit from that origin.<sup>163</sup>

These heroic virtues are related to pride or self-esteem. We can say that self-esteem is associated with these virtues. If people have these virtues, they are esteemed by other people. I think these virtues are beneficial to society, so it can be seen as a kind of social virtues. Hume's classification of natural virtues is not clear. He tells us heroic virtues, but what are the other kinds of natural virtues? We cannot find any satisfied answer to this question in his *Treatise*.

Prudence, temperance, frugality, industry, assiduity, enterprise, dexterity can be classified as natural virtues. Hume tries to give a psychological examination of the natural virtues. Hume claims that the source of esteem is sympathy in the artificial virtues, and he says "sympathy has a great influence on our taste and beauty, and *that* it produces our sentiment of morals in all the artificial virtues."<sup>164</sup> What is the source of esteem in natural virtues? The source of esteem of natural virtues is also sympathy, since sympathy is the fundamental principle in morality in Hume's system. He also claims that natural virtues and other virtues are produced by sympathy. Natural virtues are naturally approved, vices are naturally disapproved. In the case of artificial virtues, the cause of approbation depends on whether the action is good for society or not. Many natural virtues also have a tendency to be beneficial to society. We may say that these kinds of virtues relate to utility. Hume believes that meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency, moderation, equity are called social virtues and also they can be called natural virtues. Hume believed that social virtues are good for society; these virtues have a tendency to the good

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<sup>163</sup> *Treatise*, pp. 599-600.

<sup>164</sup> *Treatise*, pp. 577-578.

of society. However, he does not accept the view that every kind of virtue is related to the tendency to the good of society.

Some virtues have a tendency to the good of one person's advantage, natural virtues are this kind. "Natural virtues obviously and directly benefit the persons towards whom they are exercised."<sup>165</sup> Goodness and benevolence are examples of natural virtues. Therefore, it can be concluded that morals are deducted from self-love. Is self-love the original source of our approval of the natural virtues? If it is, can we say Hume is egoist? I do not think so, because he claims that the source of our approval of social-natural virtues depends on public benevolence.

According to K.B. Price (1950), Hume makes a distinction between instinctive and approval values. Instinctive values produce pleasure without experience. Approval values are related to approval for the object. These approval values are also divided into aesthetic values and ethical values. Ethical values are virtues. These two kinds of values depend on our approval, but they differ as to their pleasure which the object produce. However, I do not agree with Price. Hume does not claim such a distinction; there is no place for him in his *Treatise*. I accept the name of approval values, because it is reasonable. Price says that ethical and aesthetic values are approval values, it is true. However, the argument of instinctive value is arguable; it is not clear what kinds of values are instinctive.

We can conclude that in Hume's system some virtues are artificial such as justice, because their approval depends on our observation and experiments. We live in a society, so we must obey some rules. Some actions are approved by society; if you act honestly you are praised. If you act justly, your action is approved by people who live in a society. However, it is not clear in Hume's system, the rules of society change from society to society and from time to time. The rules

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<sup>165</sup> Mackie, *Hume's Moral Theory*, p. 121.

of justice are also human conventions, so these rules change from time to time and from country to country.

He claims that the distinction between artificial and natural virtues is that in the natural virtues, unlike the artificial, good “arises from every single act, and is the object of some natural passion.”<sup>166</sup> In the *Enquiry* Hume does not mention the difference between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ virtues. The distinction between artificial and natural virtues is one of the problems in Hume’s system. Why he mentions justice as an artificial virtue is not clear, but it is claimed that justice is an artificial virtue because of the way it arises. Many philosophers have criticized Hume’s view of justice. B. Stroud (1977) claims that justice is said to be an artificial virtue; but this does not mean there is no such a source in human nature. I do not agree with Stroud; according to Hume justice is an artificial virtue, because there is no such passion in human mind. It can be claimed that Hume’s natural virtues are innate. This is an ambiguity in Hume’s moral system, because he tries to apply his experimental method to identify his moral theory.

Hume’s explanation of natural virtues is not clear, he mentions these virtues shortly. He tries to give a psychological explanation of natural virtues. It can be claimed that natural virtues are secondary virtues for Hume. Both artificial and natural virtues are esteemed by sympathy, because sympathy is the central concept in Hume’s moral system. Mackie claims that Hume’s natural virtues are a further set of artificial virtues. Hume’s argument about justice is political rather than moral. Therefore, another distinction between natural and artificial virtues is that while artificial virtues are about society, natural virtues are about person. We can also say that before the formation of society, there are natural virtues. What is the origin of these natural virtues? Are they innate? Do they dictate reason? The answers of these questions cannot be found in Hume’s system. If it is said that natural virtues are innate, where is the Hume’s empiricist system? We know that in

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<sup>166</sup> *Treatise*, p. 579.

Hume's moral system, there is no God. We can conclude that Hume's moral system, especially his discussion of virtues, has many defects. Many issues are ambiguous.

## CHAPTER III

### HUME'S EPISTEMOLOGY AND ITS RELATION TO HIS MORAL THEORY

In the Book one of the *Treatise* and his book which is titled *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, we can find Hume's account of human understanding and also his epistemological thoughts. The Book one of the *Treatise* consists of four parts. Part one is related to the origin of ideas. In part two, he discusses the ideas of space and time. In part three, he discusses the knowledge and probability; he goes on discussing the cause- effect relation in this part. And finally, in part four he argues skepticism; in this part he discusses personal identity and self. The analysis of the concept of cause and belief, and some assumptions about our ideas make up Hume's theory of knowledge. In this chapter of my dissertation, I will try to find how Hume's theory of knowledge influenced his ethical theory. I believe that there is a relation between Hume's epistemological thought and his ethical theory. Therefore, I try to explain his epistemology.<sup>167</sup>

#### 3. 1. Human Understanding

According to Hume, the perception of mind is divided into impressions and ideas. Impressions include sensations, passions and emotions. Ideas include thinking and reasoning. Therefore, we can say that while impressions are related to human passions such as Hume's moral system, ideas are related to human understanding such as his epistemological theory. He claims that in some particular situations such as in sleep, our ideas can approach to our impressions and sometimes our impressions cannot be distinguished from our ideas.

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<sup>167</sup> "Hume's theory of knowledge is constituted by a certain set of assumptions and a derivative analysis of the concepts of cause, substance, and belief, and of the view that nature is governed by law or is uniform". (Price, "Does Hume's Theory of Knowledge Determine his Ethical Theory?" p. 426).



However, despite these situations, there is a difference between impressions and ideas.

Hume believes that the difference between our impressions and ideas arise from their degree of vivacity and force. Ideas are weaker perceptions than impressions. He claims that ideas and impressions resemble each other except for their degree of vivacity and force. After finding this resemblance, he concludes that perceptions of the mind appear both impressions and ideas. In relation to this, he gives an example; he says that when we shut our eyes and think something, our ideas are representations of our impressions.

Hume makes another division of perceptions: simple and complex. This distinction can be extended to both impressions and ideas. He claims that while complex perceptions are distinguished into parts, simple ones are not distinguished into some parts. He rejects that our complex impressions and ideas are copies of each other. He claims that this is not universally true, because it can be shown that a complex impression has not a correspondent idea. However, it cannot be shown a simple impression that has not a correspondence idea, so there is a great resemblance between simple ideas and impressions. On the other hand, according to Hume, “complex ideas are formed from simple ones, so simple and complex ideas are correspondent to each other”<sup>168</sup>. He believes that “all ideas are deriv’d from impressions, and nothing but copies and representation of them.”<sup>169</sup> Hume concludes that “all our ideas are copies of our impressions”. This is known copy thesis.

Hume claims that the subject of his *Treatise* is the question “how they stand with regard to their existence and which of the impressions and ideas are causes and which effects.”<sup>170</sup> In relating to this, he tries to prove this general proposition: “*That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are*

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<sup>168</sup> *Treatise*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>169</sup> *Treatise*, p. 19.

<sup>170</sup> *Treatise*, p. 4.

*correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.*"<sup>171</sup> To prove this proposition he suggests two phenomena: the first is that "there is a great connexion betwixt our correspondent impressions and ideas, and that the existence of the one has a considerable influence upon that of the other."<sup>172</sup> He believes that the causes of our ideas are our impressions. The second phenomenon is that when the faculties, which give rise to impressions, are obstructed; both impressions and their correspondent ideas are lost.

Hume also discusses a contradictory phenomenon that impressions are prior to their correspondent ideas. He gives an example about colors to explain this. He says that suppose there is a person who has never met a special shade of blue, but he knows all other colors and all other shades of blue. All the shades of blue except one, is placed before him. When he looks at them, he perceives that there is a blank place, but only few people may supply this deficiency from his imagination. Hume uses this situation to prove that "the simple ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions". However, this is an exception, so it cannot be this. Hume claims that the first principle in the science of human nature is that "all our simple ideas are derived from their correspondent impressions". Since our simple ideas also depend on experiment and they are conveyed by our senses, there is no any innate idea in human nature.

If impressions are prior to ideas, it is necessary to discuss our impressions before discussing ideas. According to Hume, there are two kinds of impressions: impressions of sensation and impressions of reflexion. Impressions of sensation arise from unknown cause in the soul. On the other hand, the impressions of reflexion arise from our ideas. Hume explains the order of arising of these impressions in the following quotation (emphasis is mine);

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<sup>171</sup> *Treatise*, p. 4.

<sup>172</sup> *Treatise*, p. 4.

An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be *called impressions of reflexion*, because derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the *impression of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and deriv'd from them.*<sup>173</sup>

In 1/1/3 Hume also argues the ideas of the memory and imagination. He claims that impressions can appear as an idea in the mind, this can be done by the way of the memory and imagination. He goes on to say, this is done by two ways; "either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea."<sup>174</sup> We repeat our impressions by our faculty of memory in this first way and in the second way by our faculty of imagination. Hume believes that the ideas of the memory are stronger than the ideas of imagination. "The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position."<sup>175</sup> This is the first principle. The second principle is that "*the liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its ideas*". Regarding the second principle, Hume gives winged horses, Golden Mountain in the fables as an example. However, in these it only unites two simple ideas which were acquainted. For example, we experience wing and horse, so we have an idea of wing and of horse. If we unite these two ideas, we have a complex idea such as winged horse but we never experience a winged horse, this is only an idea which is produced by

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<sup>173</sup> *Treatise*, p. 8.

<sup>174</sup> *Treatise*, p. 8.

<sup>175</sup> *Treatise*, p. 9.

our imagination. If there is no any distinction between simple and complex ideas, these kinds of products of imagination seem to us very strange. In other words, thanks to the distinction between simple and complex ideas we can unite our ideas in any form we want. "All the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: the mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will."<sup>176</sup>

There are three qualities, which produce an association among ideas. These three qualities are resemblance, contiguity in time and space, and cause and effect. The strongest quality which produces relations among ideas is the relation of cause and effect. Our ideas pass easily from one idea to the other by way of resemblance. "Tis likewise evident, that as the senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie *contiguous* to each other."<sup>177</sup> The relation of cause and effect is the most extensive relation. When one object produces a motion on the other object and it has a power to produce the other object, these two objects are connected by the cause- effect relation. The common subject of our thoughts and reasoning is complex ideas. Relations, modes and substance are the parts of these complex ideas. These three qualities which produce an association among ideas are in the mind. Therefore, it is questionable whether this is a kind of rationalism.

Hume claims that there are two different senses of the word relation; "either for that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination,..., or for that particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy."<sup>178</sup> According to Hume, there are seven kinds of the source of philosophical relations. These relations are also related to our conduct. These are as follows:

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<sup>176</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 19.

<sup>177</sup> *Treatise*, p. 11.

<sup>178</sup> *Treatise*, p. 13.

- 1-Resemblance
- 2-Identity
- 3-Situation in time and space
- 4-Proportions in quantity or number
- 5-Degrees in quality
- 6-Contrariety
- 7-Causation

Hume does not accept the existence of any substance. He believes that “the idea of substance is a collection of simple ideas”. The united simple ideas by imagination give rise to the idea of substance. He goes on to say,

Thus our ideas of gold may at first be a yellow color, weight, malleableness, fusibility; but upon the discovery of its dissolubility in *aqua regia*, we join that to other qualities, and suppose it to belong to the substance as much as if its idea had from the beginning made a part of the compound one.<sup>179</sup>

In discussing abstract ideas, Hume claims that “*that the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of the degrees of each.*”<sup>180</sup> He suggests three arguments to prove this proposition. The first argument is that all different objects are distinguishable and all distinguishable objects are different. The second argument is that “no impression can become present to the mind”. The third is that if anything is absurd in fact and reality, it must also be absurd in an idea. However, if something is clear and distinct, it is possible. General terms present the idea of individuals. “*Some ideas are particular in their nature, but general in their representation.*”<sup>181</sup> Hume concludes that abstract ideas are individual.

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<sup>179</sup> *Treatise*, p. 16.

<sup>180</sup> *Treatise*, p. 18.

<sup>181</sup> *Treatise*, p. 22.

Hume suggests four reflexions to prove his thoughts about abstract ideas. These four reflexions are as follows;

The first observation is that when it is mentioned by any great number, there is no adequate idea of it in the mind. The mind has a power to produce such an idea thanks to the adequate idea of the decimals.

The second observation is that for example there is a person who remembers all of his paper. However, while he is making a presentation, he forgets what he will say. If a single word is presented to him, he can recollect the whole paper.

Thirdly, Hume goes on to say;

I believe everyone, who examines the situation of his mind in reasoning, will agree with me, that we do not annex distinct and complex ideas to every term we make use of, and that in talking of *government, church, negotiation, conquest*, we seldom spread out in our minds all the simple ideas, of which these complex ones are compos'd.<sup>182</sup>

And fourthly; to facilitate their entrance into imagination, individuals can be collected together under a general term.

Hume infers a conclusion from these four observations. "If ideas be particular in their nature, and at the same time finite in number, 'tis only by custom they can become general in their representation, and contain an infinite number of other ideas under them."<sup>183</sup>

After discussing the origins of ideas and its relations, Hume argues the operations of understanding in his *Enquiry*. He claims that knowable properties are two kinds; relations of ideas and matters of fact. In the section four of *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, he goes on to say;

All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *Relation of Ideas*, and

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<sup>182</sup> *Treatise*, p. 23.

<sup>183</sup> *Treatise*, p. 24.

*Matters of Fact.* Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain...Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe...

Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner;...The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. *That the sun will not rise to-morrow* is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, *that it will rise.*<sup>184</sup>

In the foregoing quotation, he says that relation of ideas and matters of fact are the objects of human reason. This division is known as "Hume's Fork". "What Hume's Fork denies, then, is nothing less than the possibility of using reason to demonstrate the existence of anything either natural or divine."<sup>185</sup>

Relations of ideas are certain. One of the examples of this kind is mathematical propositions such as triangle has three sides. Matters of fact is not certain, the contrary of it is also possible. In other words, their denials do not imply contradiction and so they are not demonstrable. Although relations of ideas are certain, they do not exist in the universe. In contrast the relations of ideas, matters of fact imply existence. While the relations of ideas resemble analytic a priori propositions, matters of fact resemble synthetic a posteriori propositions.

### **3.1. 1. The Ideas of Space and Time**

In the book one of the *Treatise*, Hume discusses the notions of space and time. "The capacity of the mind limited, and on never attain a full and adequate conception of infinity."<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> *Enquiry*, pp. 25-26.

<sup>185</sup> G. Dicker, *Hume's Epistemology & Metaphysics*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 40.

<sup>186</sup> *Treatise*, p. 26.

The foundation of human knowledge is the agreements of the relation between ideas and its objects. In this section Hume discusses the infinite divisibility of space and time. He claims that if anything can be infinitely divided, it has infinite parts. If we accept that any finite extension does not contain infinite numbers of part, we must also accept that any finite extension cannot be infinitely divided into infinite parts. And vice versa of this is also true. Hume concludes that

The idea of an infinite number of parts is individually the same idea with that of an infinite extension; that no finite extension is capable of containing an infinite number of parts; and consequently that no finite extension is infinitely divisible.<sup>187</sup>

Hume accepts that we have an idea of extension, because we can talk concerning it. In the following quotation, Hume explains how we get the idea of extension.

Upon opening my eyes, and turning them to the surrounding objects, I perceive many visible bodies; and upon shutting them again, and considering the distance betwixt these bodies, I acquire the idea of extension.<sup>188</sup>

The idea of extension is derived from either our internal impressions which include passions, emotions, desires and aversions, or our senses. Hume believes that the idea of space cannot be derived from internal impressions; therefore the idea of space is derived from our external senses. However, he does not explain why the idea of space cannot be derived from internal impressions. He claims that any object is alone sufficient to give the idea of extension. In other words, we first receive the idea of extension from the extended objects. "the idea of space is convey'd to the mind by two senses, the sight and touch; nor does any thing ever appear extended, that is not either

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<sup>187</sup> *Treatise*, p. 30.

<sup>188</sup> *Treatise*, p. 33.



visible or tangible.”<sup>189</sup> He believes that we are conscious that the idea of extension can really exist. Unless we can regard the idea of space or extension as a tangible or visible object, there is no any idea of space or extension.

Hume does not make any difference between these perceptions, he believes that the succession of impressions give us the idea of time. According to Hume, “time or duration composed of parts that are not co-existent”.

The ideas of space and time consist of parts, which are simple and not divisible. Hume’s system about the idea of space and time has two parts. The first part of his system is that because of the capacity of mind is finite, “no idea of extension or duration consists of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas, but of a finite number, and these simple and indivisible.”<sup>190</sup> The second part is that the ideas of space and time are the manner or order of objects. These two ideas are not separate or distinct ideas. “’tis impossible to conceive either a vacuum and extension without matter, or a time, when there was no succession or change in any real existence.”<sup>191</sup>

Hume discusses the objections against the idea of space and time. The first objection is against the finite divisibility of extension. In general it is believed that extension can be infinitely divided into parts, because of the absurdity of the system of mathematical points. Hume’s answer to this objection is that since there is a medium between the “infinite divisibility of matter and the non-entity of mathematical points, this objection fails”<sup>192</sup>. Hume goes on to say, “the second objection is deriv’d from the necessity there wou’d be of *penetration*, if extension consisted of mathematical points.”<sup>193</sup> Hume tries to give an answer to

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<sup>189</sup> *Treatise*, p. 38.

<sup>190</sup> *Treatise*, p. 39.

<sup>191</sup> *Treatise*, p. 40.

<sup>192</sup> See [www.iep.utm.edu/h/humeepis.htm](http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/humeepis.htm)

this objection in discussing the meaning of penetration. He claims that penetration is impossible, but he examines penetration in other sense, “the annihilation of one body upon its approach to another”. He claims that because of the weakness of both our imagination and senses, it is difficult to answer such kinds of objections. The objections against the indivisibility of the parts of extension are derived from mathematics.

The ideas which are most essential to geometry, viz. those of equality and inequality, of a right line and a plain surface, are far from being exact and determinate, according to our common method of conceiving them.<sup>194</sup>

However, it is not clear Hume’s answers for these objections, especially the objections derived from mathematics. He tries to refute the demonstrations, but defend definitions about mathematical objects.

The third part of the book one of the *Treatise*, he discusses the knowledge and probability. There are three fundamental relations; these are resemblance, contiguity and causation. According to Hume, the relation of resemblance is the source of error. Kemp Smith argues that the relation of resemblance enters in a twofold manner, these are:”1-as concerning the human species in general, 2-when reinforced by additional similarities of manner, or character ... more powerfully.”<sup>195</sup>

I already mentioned that there were seven philosophical relations; resemblance, identity, relation of time and place, proportion in quantity or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety and causation. Hume divides these relations into two classes; “into such as depend entirely on the ideas, which we compare together, and such as may be changed without any change in the ideas.”<sup>196</sup> Resemblance, proportion in quantity or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety; these four

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<sup>193</sup> *Treatise*, p. 40.

<sup>194</sup> *Treatise*, pp.50-51.

<sup>195</sup> Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume*, p. 72.

<sup>196</sup> *Treatise*, p. 69.

relations entirely depend on ideas. Hume believes that these four relations are the foundation of science. Hume explains the other three relations more particularly. These three relations are identity, the situations in time and place, and causation<sup>197</sup>. In the following part, I will discuss the idea of self.

### 3.1.2 The Idea of Self

Hume believes that self consists of body and mind. In the second Book of the *Treatise* he says, "But tho' pride and humility have the qualities of our mind and body, that is *self*."<sup>198</sup> It can be claimed that for Hume, there is a distinction between the idea of self which is discussed in the first Book of the *Treatise* and the self discussed in the second Book of the *Treatise*.<sup>199</sup> He says "we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves."<sup>200</sup>

The idea of self is related to our perceptions of the mind. I think Hume believes that self exists, but we cannot get the idea of self from any one impression. He rejects the existence of a simple idea of self. In the first Book of the *Treatise*, Hume claims that we have no any impression that give rise to the idea of self. "But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference."<sup>201</sup>

Capaldi claims that our past experiences produce indirect passions, these indirect passions discover the idea of the self. This is shown in the following figure:

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
<sup>197</sup> See [www. iep. utm. edu/h/humeepis.htm](http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/humeepis.htm)

<sup>198</sup> *Treatise*, p. 303.

<sup>199</sup> Capaldi also supports this distinction. He says, "It is the mind, therefore, which is a set of perceptions, not the self. It is not the self which is a set of perceptions but the idea of self is a set of perceptions" (Capaldi, *Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy*, p. 169).

<sup>200</sup> *Treatise*, p. 253.


<sup>201</sup> *Treatise*, p. 251.



**Source:** Capaldi, *Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy*, p. 173.

**Figure 11:** The relation of idea of the self and indirect passions.

Capaldi claims that simple idea of memory produces the idea of the self, while the complex idea of the memory discovers the idea of the self. He schematizes the idea of the self in the following figure.



**Source:** Capaldi, *Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy*, p. 175.

**Figure 12:** The idea of self.

\*This is the memory that produces the idea of the self.

\*\* This is the memory that discovers the idea of the self.

Hume's account of the self is misunderstood by many scholars and it is seen as an important problem in the history of philosophy. We can summarize Hume's thought about the self as follows: Hume believes that there is no simple idea of self. He argues self in two different ways: he rejects the simple idea of self on the one hand and he accepts the existence of self on the other hand. He claims that the idea of self is a bundle of perceptions. On the other hand he believes that self consists of mind and body. Therefore, like Capaldi, it can be claimed that Hume makes a distinction between the idea of self and the self itself. Moreover if there is no any simple idea of self, it can be claimed that the idea of self is a complex idea. It can be claimed that the problem is not related to the idea of self, but to the identity of self.

### **3. 2. The Relation of Cause and Effect**

Causation is an important topic for philosophy of science. In this chapter I will examine the treatment of causation by David Hume. It is known that Hume is famous for formalizing the problem of causation. He claims that "humans do not know the necessary connexion between objects and thus do not know the relationship between cause and effect. This is the problem of causation."<sup>202</sup>

The principle of causation has an important place in Hume's thought. It has a lasting effect on many philosophers especially Kant. Kant tried to answer Hume's view about causation.

Causality is the relationship between cause and effect, or the principle that everything has a cause. The problem of what a cause really is remains a mystery. Cause and effect appear to always be easiest to explain in terms of ball games. Let us take a very simple example. When I play billiards I strike a white ball, the ball rolls forward and strikes a red ball. Then this red ball moves across the table and drops into a pocket. Why did the red ball move? Since, it was struck by the white. In this example, when I am playing billiards, I cause one ball

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<sup>202</sup> See [www. spaceandmotion. com](http://www.spaceandmotion.com)

to hit another and the latter ball is moved because of my action of hitting the first ball into it. In this case, we saw one ball strike another, but we did not see anything else. Then how do we know that a cause exists? We know that there was a cause; otherwise the second ball would not have moved. However, this situation can be explained by one of the laws of science. Hume claims that there is a difference between motion in the second ball and motion in the first ball. These are distinct events from each other. We can claim that every event is a distinct event from its cause, there is no relation between cause and effect.<sup>203</sup>

When I see, for instance, a Billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause? ... All our reasoning *a priori* will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference.<sup>204</sup>

Although Hume accepts the ideas of cause and effect are derived from both impressions of sensation and impressions of reflexion, he regards the impressions of sensation as the origin of these ideas. "Tis only *causation* which produces such a connexion, as to give us assurance from the existence or action of one object, that 'twas follow'd or proceeded by any other existence or action."<sup>205</sup> Hume believes that the relation of causation informs us existences which we do not see or feel. How is this done? The relation of causation includes two parts; cause and effect. There is no any impression of cause and effect, because there is no such a quality in the objects. In other words, there is no one quality which is called causation. Hume accepts that there is an idea of causation in our mind, but this idea is derived from some relation among objects. There are two essential relations to cause

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<sup>203</sup> This example comes from [www. bluejoh. com](http://www.bluejoh.com)

<sup>204</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 30.

<sup>205</sup> *Treatise*, pp.73-74.

and effect, the relation of contiguity and priority of time. Priority of time gives rise to relation of succession. However, the relations of contiguity and succession are not sufficient to afford the idea of causation. The third relation is called necessary connexion, and this is more important than the other two relations.

In order to understand Hume's ideas of causation, we must discuss what is meant by causation and his views are on the matter. In both his *Treatise* and his *Enquiry*, Hume argues that causes and effects are not knowable, but are habits of our mind to make sense of the observation that *A* often occurs together with *B*. In the *Treatise* Hume tries to find an answer to the following two questions:

*First*, for what reason we pronounce it *necessary*, that every thing, whose existence has a beginning, should also have a cause?

*Secondly*, why we conclude, that such particular causes must *necessarily* have such particular effects; and what is the nature of that *inference* we draw from the one to the other, and of the *belief* we repose in it?<sup>206</sup>

It can be claimed that Hume did not find any satisfactory answer to these questions. He claims that there is no way to prove either that every event must have a cause or that like causes must have like effects.

In general, it is accepted that any existence has a cause but Hume does not accept this. According to him, it is not necessary to have a cause. There is a distinction between the idea of beginning of existence and the idea of a cause. It is not necessary "whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence". Hume rejects all demonstrations which are produced to prove the necessity of a cause and he discusses four arguments about this.

The first argument is presented by Hobbes. According to Hobbes, if any object begins to exist in any points of time and place, these points of time and place are equal. If there is no any cause to determine the

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<sup>206</sup> *Treatise*, p. 78.

beginning of an object, the object can never exist. On the other hand, according to Hume, this is absurd, it is not necessary to have a cause. The second argument is presented by Clarke. He claims that “everything must have a cause”. If there is no any cause, the object itself is the cause of the existence. Hume believes that this argument is not conclusive. Since when we deny a cause, we also accept there must be a cause; this is a contradiction. We know that Hume said when we talk on any thing; we accept the existence of the idea of it. The third argument is presented by Locke; he claims that “whatever is produced without any cause is produced by *nothing*”. However, this is also absurd since nothing is nothing, nothing cannot be a cause as well. The fourth argument is “every effect must have a cause, because ‘tis imply’d in the very idea of effect.”<sup>207</sup>

According to Hume, the idea of causation arises from observation and experience. He asks, “Why we conclude, that such a particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects, and why we form an inference from one to another?”<sup>208</sup>

All our arguments concerning causes and effects consist both of an impression of the memory or senses, and of the idea of that existence, which produces the object of the impression, or is produc’d by it. Here therefore we have three things to explain, viz. *First*, The original impression. *Secondly*, The transition to the idea of the connected cause or effect. *Thirdly*, The nature and qualities of that idea.<sup>209</sup>

Hume believes that “objects have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another.”<sup>210</sup> Experience can produce a belief of

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<sup>207</sup> *Treatise*, p. 82.

<sup>208</sup> *Treatise*, p. 82.

<sup>209</sup> *Treatise*, p. 84.



cause and effect. In *Enquiry*, he repeats this by saying, “*causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason but by experience*”. For example, according to Hume, the principle of “*like objects, placed in like circumstances, will always produce like effects*” is established by custom.

Philosophers believe that human reason has two parts; knowledge and probability. Knowledge is the evidence. Probability includes arguments which arise from causes and effects. Many arguments from causes and effects are only probability. If someone says that it is probable that the sun will rise-tomorrow, people laugh at him/her. Hume divides human reason into three kinds; knowledge, proofs, and probabilities. In the following quotation, Hume explains what he means by these.

By knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas. By proofs, those arguments, which are deriv'd from the relation from cause and effect, and which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty. By probability, that evidence, which is still attended with uncertainty.<sup>211</sup>

There are many similarities between Hume's doctrine on causality and his epistemology. Therefore, Hume's theory of association of ideas is good place to begin the subject of causation. All our ideas are derived from impressions. Resemblance, contiguity and causation are the general principles, which associate ideas. Therefore, causation can be seen only a sort of problem of association. “The idea of cause and effect is derived from experience, which informs us, that such particular objects, in all past instances, have been constantly conjoined with each other.”<sup>212</sup> We can infer from this quotation that constant conjunction is a relation between cause and effect. According to Hume, causation is a

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<sup>210</sup> *Treatise*, p. 103.

<sup>211</sup> *Treatise*, p. 124.

<sup>212</sup> *Treatise*, pp. 89-90.

philosophical relation and it implies contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction. The probabilities of causes are all derived from the association of ideas to a present impression. "An opinion or belief may be most accurately defined, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION."<sup>213</sup> When any impression becomes present to us, it only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity."<sup>214</sup> The resemblance has a very important place to live the idea. There is also an effect of contiguity, since "distance diminishes the force of every idea". The cause of the idea of a belief is the present impression. Belief is a kind of custom and it derives from past repetition. Belief arises from only experience and it is an act of the mind. Hume believes that "all belief arises from the association of ideas, according to my hypothesis."<sup>215</sup>

The simple ideas of both memory and imagination arise from impressions. Belief and assent attend the memory and senses. Belief can be defined as the vivacity of impressions. The existence of an object can be derived from other objects, this is done by experience. Hume explains the nature of experience as follows: we remember an object which we saw in the past. There is a contiguity and succession in our perceptions and thus we remember like objects in all like relations in a constant conjunction. We infer from one to the other, and thus one is called cause and another is called effect. There is a constant conjunction between cause and effect. Hume believes that the mere repetition of any past impression is not sufficient to infer the idea of necessary connexion. According to him, it can be claimed that the necessary connexion depends on the inference. "The transition from an impression present to the memory or senses to the idea of an object, which we call cause or effect, is founded on past *experience*, and on

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<sup>213</sup> *Treatise*, p. 96.

<sup>214</sup> *Treatise*, p. 98.

<sup>215</sup> *Treatise*, p. 112.

our remembrance of their *constant conjunction*...”<sup>216</sup> From this Hume asks “whether experience produces the idea by means of the understanding or of the imagination”. We can say that according to Hume the idea of causation is produced by imagination, it is not produced by reason. All conceivable things are possible.

Hume claims that since probability discovers the relations of objects, in some respects it is founded on our ideas.

The only relation beyond the impressions is the relation of causation. The idea of causation is derived from experience, and this experience “informs us that such particular objects, in all past instances, have been constantly conjoined with each other.”<sup>217</sup> Reason cannot discover the ultimate connection between cause and effect; in other words we cannot see the connection one object to the other by means of the reason. “Wherever the mind constantly and uniformly makes a transition without any reason, it is influenc’d by these relations.”<sup>218</sup> The inference does not depend on reason; it only depends on the union of ideas. We know that Hume presented three principles which associate the ideas; resemblance, contiguity and causation. Hume goes on to say, “we have no other notion of cause and effect, but that of certain objects, which have been *always conjoin’d* together, and which in all past instances have been found inseparable.”<sup>219</sup> Causation is a philosophical relation which implies contiguity, succession and constant conjunction. This constant conjunction is also the basis of general causal beliefs.

At this stage, then, the hypothesis under consideration is that we judge that X caused Y just in case (1) X occurs prior to Y, (2) X and Y are contiguous both spatially and temporally, and (3) past observations have revealed an

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<sup>216</sup> *Treatise*, p. 88.

<sup>217</sup> *Treatise*, p. 90.

<sup>218</sup> *Treatise*, p. 92.

<sup>219</sup> *Treatise*, p. 93.

impression similar to X to be always succeeded by one similar to Y.<sup>220</sup>

According to Hume, the idea of cause and effect is derived from experience. He supposes this view both in the *Treatise* and in the *Enquiry*. He says, "all reasoning concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of *Cause* and *Effect*. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses"<sup>221</sup>. We arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect from experience, it is not *a priori*. "That causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason but by experience."<sup>222</sup> In other words, causation is based on our custom and custom operates on the imagination. We can infer from the one object the existence of the other by custom. Hume believes that we can only observe one event following another; we cannot discover any thing. "Similar objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have experience. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this also we have experience."<sup>223</sup> If we see one event precedes another, we call the one is the cause, the other is the effect. The conjunction of cause and effect is arbitrary. The consequence of this experience is determined by custom or habit. He says:

Now as we call every thing CUSTOM, which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion, we may establish it as a certain truth, that all the belief, which follows upon any present impression, is derived solely from that origin. When we are accustomed to see two impressions conjoined together, the appearance or idea of the one immediately carries us to the idea of the other.<sup>224</sup>

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<sup>220</sup> Baillie, *Hume on Morality*, p. 27.

<sup>221</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 26.

<sup>222</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 28.

<sup>223</sup> *Enquiry*, pp. 76-77.

<sup>224</sup> *Treatise*, pp. 102-103.

Hume is of the opinion that the human mind cannot form a connexion between two objects such as cause and effect. Therefore, we cannot perceive any tie between cause and effect. Since all our ideas are derived from impressions, the idea of necessity is also derived from impression. Necessity exists in the mind, not in objects. We cannot observe the necessary connexion between objects.

When one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other...We then call the one object, *Cause*; the other, *Effect*. We suppose that there is some connexion between them.<sup>225</sup>

Hume goes on to say about his views of necessary connexion in his Enquiry:

This idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events...But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion.<sup>226</sup>

Hume believes that power, force, and necessary connexion occur in metaphysics. We cannot get the idea of necessary connexion from the external objects. We can only learn from experience how one event constantly follows another. "One event follows another; but we

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<sup>225</sup> *Enquiry*, pp. 74-75.

<sup>226</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 75.

never can observe any tie between them. They seem *conjoined*, but never *connected*.”<sup>227</sup>

Hume claims that we have no any idea of power, because “all ideas are deriv’d from, and represent impressions. We never have any impressions that contain any power or efficacy. We never therefore have any idea of power.”<sup>228</sup> He says, the terms of efficacy, power, necessity, connexion and force are synonymous. Therefore, we have also not any idea of these. We cannot arrive at these kinds of ideas such as necessary connexion, cause and effect from one instance. However, the idea of necessary connexion arises from the multiplicity of resembling instances. The idea of necessity arises from an impression, but we cannot perceive this impression by our senses. Therefore, this impression is internal; Hume says “the idea of necessity is an internal impression of the mind”. From this, we can conclude that Hume makes a division between internal and external impressions. We can claim that external impressions arise from our senses. Internal impressions arise from our passions. Hume goes on to say, “the necessary connexion betwixt causes and effects is the foundation of our inference from one to the other. The foundation of our inference is the transition arising from the accustom’d union.”<sup>229</sup> However, we cannot perceive the necessary connexion between causes and effects. We can say that necessary connexion depends on our beliefs, because our idea of it derives from our habits.

Hume gives us two kinds of definition of the cause; the first is that cause is “an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all objects resembling the former are plac’d in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble latter.”<sup>230</sup> The second definition is that;

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<sup>227</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 74.

<sup>228</sup> *Treatise*, p.161.

<sup>229</sup> *Treatise*, p.165.

A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.<sup>231</sup>

Hume suggests eight rules which are related to causation. These are mentioned in *Treatise* pages 173 and 174.

1- There must be a contiguity between cause and effect in space and time.

2- Cause must precede effect.

3- There must be a constant union between cause and effect.

4- The same cause should produce the same effect.

5- Causation is ascribed to the circumstance, wherein we discover the resemblance.

6- The following principle is founded on the same reason.

7- When any object increases or diminishes with the increase or diminution of its cause, 'tis to be regarded as a compounded effect.

8- If any object exists without any effect, it is not the sole cause of that effect.

Hume believes that there is nothing that produces any impression of necessary connexion, so there is no such thing as a necessary connexion in nature. This idea arises from a number of similar instances. He believes that we consider cause and effect to be contiguous by the force of custom and our ideas of a necessary connexion come through repetition<sup>232</sup>. Hume does not deny the existence of causal connexions. He says:

When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able to discover any power or necessary connexion; We only find, that the one does actually follow the other...The mind feels no sentiment or *inward* impression from this succession of

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<sup>230</sup> *Treatise*, p.170.

<sup>231</sup> *Treatise*, p. 170.

<sup>232</sup> [www. bluejoh. com](http://www.bluejoh.com)

objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion.<sup>233</sup>

If there is no such thing as a necessary connexion, how this affects our view of the world. This leads us to scientific induction. We see the same occurrence under many different conditions and we begin to feel that it is a law of nature. However, there is a problem with presuming that one thing will always go with another, just because it always has done in the past. This is most clearly illustrated by an analogy given by Bertrand Russell.<sup>234</sup>

“Domestic animals expect food when they see the person who usually feeds them. The man who has fed the chicken every day throughout its life at last wrings its neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken.”<sup>235</sup>

In this example, the chicken will have experienced being fed first thing under many different circumstances, over many years. The chicken “had always known things to be this way, so it would expect them to go on being the same way”. However, in this example, we saw only that if we saw anything is regularly happened in the past, we would expect the same thing would happen in the future.

People believe that events always have happened in some way in the past, and so it is likely to continue that way also. However this ends up as a circular argument, because the justification is also inductive. We cannot say that all predictions based on empirical evidence are most reliable, as Russell’s chicken demonstrates, because there is a possibility of other predictions, which will satisfy the observations. The principle of induction is based on two justifications;

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<sup>233</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 63.

<sup>234</sup> This can be found in [www. bluejoh.com](http://www.bluejoh.com)

<sup>235</sup> B. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p.35.



the future must resemble the past and it is always worked before, so it will probably continue to work. Hume rejected these two justifications. He does not accept that we have learned the nature of bodies from our past experience. He claims that all inferences from experience are effects of custom.<sup>236</sup> Therefore, it can be claimed that Hume does not accept the principle of induction.

Kant's reply to Hume's problem of causation is also important. Hume's views about causation awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber. Kant says "I openly confess my recollection of David Hume was the very thing which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction."<sup>237</sup> Kant's answer to Hume is a refutation of Hume's skepticism concerning the causal principle in question.

Kant claims that Hume was misunderstood by some metaphysicians. Hume never doubted whether the concept of cause was right, he doubted "whether that concept could be thought by reason *a priori*, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth, independent of all experience...This was Hume's problem. It was solely a question concerning the origin, not concerning the indispensable need of using the concept."<sup>238</sup>

We can find Kant's answer to Hume's skepticism concerning the causal principle in his second analogy. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant states four analogies of experience, the second and the third analogies come under the heading of causality in the usual sense of the term. Kant states in the second analogy, "all alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect."<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>236</sup> These opinions can be found in [www. bluejoh. com](http://www.bluejoh.com).

<sup>237</sup> I. Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. Lewis White Beck, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1997, p. 8.

<sup>238</sup> Kant, *Prolegomena*, p. 7.

According to Kant, space and time are necessary to perception. The understanding applies certain categories on perceived data. Kant claims that Hume felt that cause and effect were not objectively real, because he did not use these categories. The principle of causality applies to things only as phenomena.

The principle of causation is the *a priori* law that all changes of phenomena occur according to the rule of necessary connection of cause and effect. We do not know *a priori* what is the cause of any phenomenon; this must be discovered by experience. But we do know *a priori* that every event we experience does have a cause.<sup>240</sup>

Kant explains necessity as a causal necessity. According to him, necessity is not the existence of things.

Kant suggests that there are certain sequences of representations which are irreversible and others which we can take in whatever order we like. Now irreversibility implies necessity, and a necessary sequence is a sequence, which is determined by the category of causality. Therefore this is for Kant a proof of causality.<sup>241</sup>

There are two kinds of propositions, analytic *a priori* and synthetic *a posteriori*. However, Kant claims that there are also synthetic *a priori* propositions such as mathematical, natural science, and metaphysics contain such judgments. Kant believes that causation is a kind of metaphysical knowledge and these kinds of knowledge lies beyond experience. He defines metaphysical knowledge, as "it is therefore *a priori* knowledge, coming from pure understanding and pure reason."<sup>242</sup> Kant suggests synthetic *a priori* claim for causality,

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<sup>239</sup> I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp Smith, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965, p. 218.

<sup>240</sup> Kant, *Prolegomena*, p. xvii.

<sup>241</sup> A. C. Ewing, *A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 160.

especially for necessary connexion. He claims that the concept of cause “must either be grounded completely *a priori* in the understanding, or must be entirely given up as a mere phantom of the brain.”<sup>243</sup> The inference is neither demonstrative nor intuitive, but it is experimental. “From causes which appear *similar* we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions.”<sup>244</sup> Kant assumes that “experience tells us, indeed what is, but not that it must necessarily be so, and not otherwise. It therefore gives us no true universality.”<sup>245</sup> Kant’s metaphysical system can be described as an attempt to answer Hume.

Hume believes that cause and effect are unsupportable. We see sequences of events, but can never see the necessity that determinism requires. He claims that we have a belief that the future will resemble the past. However, we cannot eliminate this belief and also we cannot prove it by any kind of argument. Hume defines belief as “*a strong and lively idea derived from a present impression related to it.*”<sup>246</sup> This derivation is made by causal inference, and the relation is causation.

It can be claimed that both Hume and Kant address the same issues; cause and effect is a metaphysical phenomenon and the causal principle cannot be proven by experience. However, their approaches are different.

In short, our only experience of causation is the experience of our own willed actions in response to some motivation. When we observe the motion of billiard balls we can imagine the first ball motivates the second. This is an illusion. Hume insists that there is no evidence of causation in nature. Can we say he is right? He claims that we can find an evidence of causation only in human actions. We have

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<sup>242</sup> Kant, *Prolegomena*, p. 13.

<sup>243</sup> Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 125.

<sup>244</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 36.

<sup>245</sup> Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 42.

<sup>246</sup> *Treatise*, p. 105.

seen cause and effect conjoined so frequently that we expect the one to follow from the other and so accustom ourselves to belief in the operation of something wholly unreal. Causation is thus reduced to a form of self-delusion, for Hume<sup>247</sup>. In Hume's own words:

There are no objects, which by the mere survey, without consulting experience; we can determine to be the causes of any other; and no objects which we can certainly determine in the same manner not to be causes. Anything may produce anything.<sup>248</sup>

However, we do not want to accept that "anything may produce anything". Our understanding of the world is based on our beliefs such as the sun always sets in the west. Hume does not distinguish regular connexion from causation. However, we distinguish regular connexion from causation. For example, Monday regularly follows Sunday, but we do not think that Sunday causes Monday. This shows us that there is a difference between to be a cause and to be followed by an event. It may be claimed that if Hume had distinguished causation from regular connexion, he would not have had the problem of causation.

Although we can see that "Tis therefore by EXPERIENCE only, that we can infer the existence of one object from that of another."<sup>249</sup> it could be considered that we cannot know the existence of causation or the non-existence of a necessary connexion. Since what semantically we mean by causation is an observable regular succession of events. Therefore, it can be claimed that causation is nothing more than regular succession. Although causation is a regular occurrence for all people, they would find it difficult to act in the world<sup>250</sup>.

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<sup>247</sup> See [www.spaceandmotion.com/Phil-David-Hume-Philosopher](http://www.spaceandmotion.com/Phil-David-Hume-Philosopher)

<sup>248</sup> *Treatise*, p. 173.

<sup>249</sup> *Treatise*, p. 87.

<sup>250</sup> See [www.bluejoh.com](http://www.bluejoh.com)

Hume's rejects the basic idea of causation as a necessary connexion between events in nature has an important place in the history of philosophy. People think that we perceive a connexion between cause and effect; but as a matter of fact, we cannot perceive such a connexion between objects. However, when one event follows another constantly, people naturally think that there is a connexion between these events. Hume challenges this belief. According to him, although we perceive the one event following the other, we do not perceive any necessary connexion between them. Hume believes that our idea of causation includes an expectation for some events follow other events; we expect that the first event will be followed by the second. It can be said that Hume was right, because we cannot observe directly the relation of cause and effect in the nature. We can neither prove nor disprove this relation.

Hume maintains that custom or habit is the great guide of life and the foundation of all natural science. Therefore, his rejection of causation also implies a rejection of scientific laws; because scientific laws are based on the general premise that one event necessarily causes another. However, if it were claimed that Hume denies the possible existence of a necessary connexion between cause and effect, this would raise problems for everyday life. If we did not believe that the sun would rise tomorrow, we would never get anywhere. Therefore, we must believe that there is a regular succession between events. My past experiences produce in me an expectation that the sun will rise again tomorrow. I cannot prove that it will, but I feel that it must.<sup>251</sup>

We can conclude that the inference of the idea of necessity is deductive. The constant union and the inference of the mind compose the idea of necessity. Necessity is explained by uniformity. Cause and effect are different from each other and we cannot infer the existence of the one from the other. The existence of cause and effect can only be

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<sup>251</sup> [www.bluejoh.com](http://www.bluejoh.com)

inferred from experience. The causation can be found in all places in the nature.

Hume doubts the possibility of demonstrating causal principle. It can be claimed that Hume does not doubt the principle itself, but he doubts the inference we draw from cause to effect is grounded in reason. There is no accepted solution for this problem.

To sum up, it can be claimed that there is a relation between Hume's epistemology and ethics. Can we say that Hume's theory of knowledge imply his ethical theory? According to Price (1950), Hume's theory of knowledge does not imply his ethical theory.<sup>252</sup> However, I disagree with him. Unlike Price, I believe that we can find some relations between Hume's ethical theory and his epistemology, so we may say that his theory of knowledge implies his ethical theory in some respects. Since in his theory of knowledge Hume makes a classification of our impressions, this classification is also used to explain his theory of passions. Moreover, the experimental method is the key component of both his epistemology and his ethics. On the other hand, we cannot deny the differences between his two theories. "While Hume's theory of knowledge does not imply his ethical theory, it does enable a critique of moral philosophies...and preparing the way for others."<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> "If Hume's ethical theory is implied by his theory of knowledge, all of the propositions included in it mean nothing different from at least some of those contained in his epistemology" (Price, "Does Hume's Theory of Knowledge Determine his Ethical Theory?" , p. 429). I do not agree with Price, this explanation is unsatisfactory. The second objection of Price is that he says, "if Hume's theory of knowledge did imply his ethical theory, the former could not be true if the latter were false"(Price, p. 430). Price also accepts some relations between Hume's epistemology and ethics. For example, he says in page 432, "there may well be a relation *like* that of implication between the two. The relation to which I refer is one such that any two theories are related by it only if some propositions from one in conjunction with some propositions not found in that one are used to derive the other". I think, the problem arises the concept of imply. I do not say Hume's epistemology implies his ethical theory, I only claim that Hume's epistemological thoughts influence on his ethics.

<sup>253</sup> Price, "Does Hume's Theory of Knowledge Determine his Ethical Theory?" , p. 434.

## CHAPTER IV

### HUME'S POSITION ON AESTHETICS AND ITS RELATION TO HIS MORAL THEORY

#### 4.1. Hume's Essays Related to His Aesthetics

Aesthetic can be defined a theory of beauty or philosophy of art. The objects of aesthetic are the works of art. Although Hume does not mention his aesthetic views in his two main books, *Treatise* and *Enquiry*, his views about aesthetics can be found in his numerous essays. One of the most important essays, in which he explains his aesthetic theory, is "The Standard of Taste". Before examining this essay I will briefly mention his other essays, since I believe that we can learn Hume's aesthetics or his view of art from them. Let us begin to briefly examine Hume's other essays:

*Of the Standard of Taste:* In this essay, Hume tries to find a standard of taste in order to evaluate aesthetical judgments.

*Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion:* In this essay, he claims that delicacy of taste and delicacy of passion are two kinds of delicacy. Delicacy of taste is related to aesthetic taste or taste of art. Delicacy of passion includes both delicacy of taste and delicacy of passion. Beauty and deformity is important for delicacy of passion. According to him, the effects of delicacy of taste and delicacy of passions are the same; both "produce the same sensibility to beauty and deformity of every kind."<sup>254</sup>

*Of Tragedy:* In this essay, Hume tries to explain why we feel pleasure when observing tragic events in the theatre. "All the passions, excited by eloquence, are agreeable in the highest degree, as well as those which are moved by painting and the theatre."<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>254</sup> D. Hume, *Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays*, USA: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965, p. 25.

<sup>255</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 31.

*Of Essay Writing:* In this essay, Hume claims that intellectual people are divided into learned and conversable. "The learned are such as have chosen for their portion the higher and more difficult operations of the mind. The conversable world joins to a sociable disposition, and a taste for pleasure"<sup>256</sup>. He thinks that this distinction between people can be removed by the help of his essay.

*Of Simplicity and Refinement in Writing:* Hume believes that simplicity and refinement are necessary for works of art especially writing, but these are neither too much nor too little. "Productions which are merely surprising, without being natural, can never give any lasting entertainment to the mind."<sup>257</sup> If the work of art is too natural or too ornament, it does not give pleasure. There must be medium between the excess of simplicity and refinement.

*Of Refinement in the Arts:* In this essay, Hume argues luxury. According to him, luxury "means great refinement in the gratification of the senses; and any degree of it may be innocent or blamable, according to the age, or country, or condition of the person."<sup>258</sup> Therefore, luxury is also necessary to progress in the arts, but this luxury should not be excessive. Action, pleasure and indolence are elements of human happiness. When people are lazy, luxury is harmful to society. Refinement affects both on private and on public life. "Luxury, when excessive, is the source of many ills, but is in general preferable to sloth and idleness, which would commonly succeed in its place, and are more hurtful both to private persons and to the public."<sup>259</sup> Industry, knowledge and humanity are advantageous both in private and public life. Private happiness and public happiness increase with the growth of refinement in the arts.

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<sup>256</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p.38.

<sup>257</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p.44.

<sup>258</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 48.

<sup>259</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 59.



*Of Eloquence:* In this essay, Hume argues that ancient societies are superior to modern societies in some works of art especially oratorical eloquence.

*Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences:* In this essay, Hume tries to explain the influence of chance and cause on the rise of science and art. He believes that chance and cause have a great influence on the arts and sciences. He describes chance and cause as follows; "what depends upon a few persons is, in a great measure, to be ascribed to chance, or secret and unknown causes; what arises from a great number, may often be accounted for by determinate and known cause"<sup>260</sup>. He believes that the rise of art and science is a matter of some causes, not chance.

*Of the Study of History:* In this essay, Hume argues that the study of history has some advantages and he encourages women to the study of history. He claims that there are three advantages of the study of history, these are; "it amuses the fancy, it improves the understanding, and it strengthens virtue."<sup>261</sup> According to him, we can see the relation of the cause and effect throughout history. History is an important part of our knowledge and our experience.

In this essay, Hume also claims that there are three extreme people: a man of passion, a man of business, and philosopher. According to him, "history keeps in a just medium between these extremes, and places the objects in their true point of view."<sup>262</sup>

*The Epicurean:* In this essay Hume claims that happiness is found in pleasure like Epicureans. He claims that ease, contentment, repose, and pleasure constitute happiness.

*The Stoic:* In this essay, Hume uses Stoic view of natural order. Nature gives mankind some features to supply their necessities, for example intelligence. Therefore, nature does not let indolence. Industry

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<sup>260</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 72.

<sup>261</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 96.

<sup>262</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 99.

and intelligence are important for people to achieve happiness. Hume believes that happiness is the great end of human industry, and so arts were invented, sciences were cultivated, laws were ordained, and societies were modeled.<sup>263</sup> Security is necessary to existence of happiness. Laws provide security and liberty. Therefore, Hume believes that laws and liberty are the source of human happiness.

*The Platonist:* In this essay, Hume presents some views about art, which is similar to the Platonist view. He claims “the most perfect happiness surely must arise from the contemplation of the most perfect object.”<sup>264</sup>

*The Sceptic:* In this essay Hume argues sceptical view that no objects are desirable in themselves. Desirability of objects depends on the human mind. “Though the value of every object can be determined only by the sentiment or passion of every individual, we may observe, that the passion, in pronouncing its verdict, considers not the objects simply, as it in itself, but surveys it with all the circumstances which attend it.”<sup>265</sup> In this essay, Hume also presents some situations to be happy with regard to passion. According to him, passion must be medium, it must be social, and it must be cheerful.<sup>266</sup>

*Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature:* In this essay, Hume does not accept that all human conducts are selfish. He thinks that the comparison of human nature with animals or God is mistaken. We can make a comparison between one man’s conduct and another man’s conduct, but not another species.

*Of Superstition and Enthusiasm:* In this essay, Hume argues superstition and enthusiasm are species of false religion and these are the source of all corruption. He explains the “weakness, fear, melancholy, together with ignorance, are, therefore, the true sources of

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<sup>263</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 108.

<sup>264</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 117.

<sup>265</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 131.

<sup>266</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 126.

Superstition.”<sup>267</sup> On the other hand, “hope, pride, presumption, a warm imagination, together with ignorance are therefore the true sources of enthusiasm.”<sup>268</sup> He presents three reflection with regard to superstition and enthusiasm, these are as follows: First, “superstition is favorable to priestly power, and enthusiasm not”. Second, religions, which are enthusiastic, are more violent than other religions, which are superstitious. Third, “superstition is an enemy to civil liberty, and enthusiasm a friend to it.”<sup>269</sup>

*On Suicide:* In this essay, Hume rejects that the suicide is immoral. He claims that suicide is not a transgression of our duty of god, society, and ourselves. Therefore, suicide is not a crime and it is not blamed, the task of philosophy is to show this.

*On the Immortality of the Soul:* In this essay, Hume argues that the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated by metaphysical, moral or physical arguments. Immortality can only be justified by revelation. The last paragraph says, “Nothing could set in a fuller light the infinite obligations which mankind have to Divine revelation, since we find that no other medium could ascertain this great and important truth”<sup>270</sup>.

#### **4.2. The Standard of Taste**

Hume was one of the important philosophers in the eighteenth century. In general it is claimed that Hume has influenced by Jean-Baptiste Du Bos in his aesthetic views. *Critical Reflections on Poetry and Painting* is the most important book of Du Bos. Du Bos believes that art satisfies pleasures in humans. I will not examine Du Bos’ views in this dissertation, I will only mention briefly his views referring to J. L. Townsend’s book, titled *Hume’s Aesthetic Theory*. Townsend mentions

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<sup>267</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 146.

<sup>268</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 147.

<sup>269</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 149.

<sup>270</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 167.

the similarities and differences between Hume and Du Bos in this book. “There are striking similarities between Du Bos’s defense of sentiment and the priority he gives to sentiment and experience over reason and inference in judgments of taste and the positions of Hume.”<sup>271</sup> Although it is clear that there are some similarities between Hume and Du Bos, both accept the priority of sentiment over reason in aesthetic judgments; Townsend also claims that there are differences between them. “I will argue that Hume’s approbation, if it is that, is substantially different in its final outcome from what one finds in Du Bos, however.”<sup>272</sup>

It can be said that Hume’s views on aesthetics can be derived from thinkers of eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment. The notion of taste and “beauty” were very important concepts in the eighteenth-century. Hume was also influenced by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson’s views of aesthetics. Hutcheson’s aesthetic theory moves from beauty to the experience of spectator. Hutcheson believes that beauty is not a complex idea; it gives rise to a pleasure and so it is pleasure. The sense of beauty is not an innate idea for Hutcheson, so it can be concluded that people have no innate aesthetic distinctions. Hutcheson also claims that there are two kinds of beauty; relative beauty and absolute beauty. Natural objects provide examples of absolute beauty, while the works of art provide examples of relative beauty.

Hutcheson also claims that there are two senses: external sense and internal sense. Beauty is perceived by this internal sense. Therefore, beauty is not a property of an object; it depends on the spectator’s feeling.

Hume’s aesthetic theory and his moral theory are parallel to each other. His aesthetic judgment parallels his moral judgment. Hume claims that moral and aesthetic evaluations are expressions of sentiment. “The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all

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<sup>271</sup> D. Townsend, *Hume’s Aesthetic Theory*, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 76.

<sup>272</sup> Townsend, *Hume’s Aesthetic Theory*, p. 77.

mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it.”<sup>273</sup> According to him, in morality people have a universal sentiment, called *sympathy* in the *Treatise* and called *humanity* in the *Enquiry*. He also uses the term “*universal principle*” in “the Standard of Taste”. All moral and aesthetical judgments depend on some universal principle, and general approbation. This general sentiment is the source of morals; I think it is also the source of his aesthetic theory. Both moral and aesthetic systems include blame or praise, approbation or disapprobation. “The humanity of one man is the humanity of every one, and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures.”<sup>274</sup> Hume believes that if sentiments arise from universal principle of human creature, these sentiments are the same in all people. He says “*general rules* create a species of probability, which sometimes influences the judgment, and always the imagination.”<sup>275</sup> Both moral and aesthetic judgments are the matters of approving or disapproving. However, in moral judgments we approve or disapprove of one’s character while in aesthetic judgments we approve or disapprove of one’s taste. It may be claimed that moral judgments are more important than aesthetic judgments in society. “In neither aesthetic nor moral judgments is action the *object* of moral or aesthetic approval in the strict sense of ‘object’-the content of an impression or idea- that Hume requires”.<sup>276</sup> In aesthetic, taste is more important than moral character. According to Townsend, there is difference between moral and aesthetic perceptions. He says, “who one is, not what one does, determines one’s moral perception... Aesthetic perception is also a characteristic of the one who perceives.”<sup>277</sup> This explains the

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<sup>273</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 212.

<sup>274</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 273.

<sup>275</sup> *Treatise*, p. 585.

<sup>276</sup> Townsend, *Hume’s Aesthetic Theory*, p. 140.

difference between moral perceptions and aesthetic perceptions. Although Townsend accepts that it is difficult for Hume, he says “Hume might be able to allow that someone could have good taste without being a good person.”<sup>278</sup> I do not agree with Townsend, because I think we cannot separate Hume’s aesthetic theory from his moral theory. We know that Hume’s moral theory and aesthetic theory are based on sentiment and taste. Education and experiment have very important place in both aesthetic and morality. Therefore, we can say that while our taste is improving, our character is also improving. It is not plausible to make a strict difference between taste and character, at least for Hume.

The only thing which separates aesthetic sentiments from moral sentiments is these sentiments themselves. Both aesthetic and moral judgments are immediate. Pleasure and pain provide a direct link between aesthetic and moral. “Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar’d to sounds, colors, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind.”<sup>279</sup> We can conclude from this quotation; in morality, vice and virtue are perceptions of the mind like beauty and deformity in aesthetics. Therefore, ethics and aesthetic have the same foundation.

We said that Hume’s aesthetic theory can be found in his essay, titled “the Standard of Taste”. In this essay, Hume tries to solve the question of the differences among the aesthetic judgments, where he tries to find a general rule for making a true aesthetic judgment. “The essay wrestles with the perennial question of the objectivity of judgments of taste. Hume’s final proposal in this matter is to identify the standard of taste with the judgments of the best critics.”<sup>280</sup> Hume believes that this is possible and he tries to show how this is possible.

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<sup>277</sup> Townsend, *Hume’s Aesthetic Theory*, p. 141.

<sup>278</sup> Townsend, *Hume’s Aesthetic Theory*, p. 141.

<sup>279</sup> *Treatise*, p. 469.

Though the beauties of writing had never been methodized, or reduced to general principles; though no excellent models had ever been acknowledged, the different degrees of taste would still have subsisted, and the judgment of one man been preferable to that of another, but it would not have been so easy to silence the bad critic,...But when we show him an avowed principle of art,; when we illustrate this principle by examples, ..., from his own particular taste, he acknowledges to be conformable to the principle; when we prove that the same principle may be applied to the present case, where he did not perceive or feel its influence: he must conclude, upon the whole, that the fault lies in himself, and that he wants the delicacy which is requisite to make him sensible of every beauty and every blemish in any composition or discourse.<sup>281</sup>

Sverdlik claims that “here Hume is considering the nature of an aesthetic disagreement, and showing how it is to be resolved.”<sup>282</sup>

In general, it is claimed that the solution of Hume is to find an ideal spectator or critic. Under the ideal conditions, a judgment given by an ideal critic is a true judgment. Beauty and deformity are responses of taste. “It is certain a musical voice is nothing but one that naturally gives a particular kind of pleasure; yet it is difficult for a man to be sensible, that the voice of an enemy is agreeable, or to allow it to be musical. But a person of a fine ear, who has the command of himself, can separate these feelings, and give praise to what deserves it”.<sup>283</sup> We can say that Hume defends objectivity of aesthetic judgments; he believes that an ideal critic gives a true judgment without any prejudice. According to him, people have different tastes so their views about aesthetics are different. However, he thinks that there must be some general rules,

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<sup>280</sup> N. Carroll, “Hume’s Standard of Taste”, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 43, 1984, p. 181.

<sup>281</sup> *Standard of Taste*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>282</sup> S. Sverdlik, “Hume’s Key and Aesthetic Rationality”, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 45, 1986, p. 72.

<sup>283</sup> *Treatise*, p. 472.

which all people agree on them. The notion of taste has an important place in Hume's aesthetic theory. It can be said that taste is the central notion in his aesthetic. What does the taste mean? Although Hume does not give a clear definition of taste, it means a sense or faculty that judges aesthetic objects. However, this sense is external or internal is not clear in Hume's system. We can give such an example; suppose there are two people *A* and *B*, these people criticize a picture. *A* is a painter, but *B* does not have any knowledge about the art of picture. *A*'s judgments are true and *B* must agree with *A*. Hume gives an example from Don Quixote; there is a hogshead. There are two men who taste wine and give their opinions. One of them tastes wine and he approves the taste of wine, but he says that there is a small taste of leather in wine. The other tastes the wine and he also approves the taste of wine, but he says that there is a taste of iron in wine. People laughed at them because of their judgments; but when the hogshead is emptied, it is seen that there are a key and leather at the bottom. This story presents an example of differences among aesthetics judgments.<sup>284</sup>

The story is meant also as an analogy to an aesthetic dispute and its resolution, for he goes on to say that there is a 'resemblance' between 'mental and bodily taste,' thereby implying that the story is only an example of the latter.<sup>285</sup>

Hume tries to seek a standard of taste. According to him, a standard of taste is "a rule by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least a decision afforded confirming one sentiment, and condemning another."<sup>286</sup> However, people have different sentiments of beauty and deformity, so their sentiments of aesthetics are also different. In morality, the difference among people lies in particulars, but there must be a harmony in morals. Therefore there

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<sup>284</sup> This story comes from Hume's *Standard of Taste*, p. 10.

<sup>285</sup> Sverdlik, "Hume's Key and Aesthetic Rationality", pp. 70-71.

<sup>286</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 5.



must also be a harmony in our aesthetic judgments. Hume believes that the difference is not derived from languages. He thinks that the differences among languages are only in a degree of blame or approbation. "The word virtue, with its equivalent in every tongue, implies praise, as that of vice does blame."<sup>287</sup>

In his article, titled *Hume's Standard of Taste: The Real Problem*, J. Levinson claims that there is an ambiguity in the notion of taste. According to Levinson, the real problem is the problem of taste. He asks "does the standard of taste function as a definition of the beautiful, or does it function rather as a principle for resolving disputes regarding the beautiful?"<sup>288</sup> It is clear that the standard of taste does not function as a definition of beautiful in Hume's aesthetic view. Therefore, the second is more reasonable, but I think according to Hume, the standard of taste does not function to solve problems of beauty. The problem is not concerning only the beautiful; the problem is also related to aesthetic judgments. Therefore, in Hume's opinion, the standard of taste means a standard of true aesthetic judgment. "Hume analogizes aesthetic feeling and taste to gustatory feeling and taste, and says that there is no disputing either because beauty as a sentiment, like my love of Burger King, is a matter of having an individual subjective feeling rather than of observing an intersubjectively available property of objects."<sup>289</sup>

Morality is based on sentiments, not reason. Aesthetic is also based on sentiments. We can explain all the qualities of an object by reason, but since beauty is not a quality in an object we cannot determine the worth of object by reason. The worth of an object depends on our approbation or disapprobation; this is possible by sentiments, not reason. For Hume, reason is instrumental and it

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<sup>287</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 4.

<sup>288</sup> J. Levinson, "Hume's Standard of Taste: The Real Problem", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 60, 2002, p. 228.

<sup>289</sup> Caroll, "Hume's Standard of Taste", p. 182.

provides hypothetical imperatives. We act by emotions, not reason. Moral sentiments are expressions of feelings. While sentiment selects ends, reason only shows means. Reason helps us to discern the means to our ends, but it cannot select ends. "Understanding and reasoning are necessary preconditions for the proper operation of good taste but they are not part of the faculty itself, nor part of its exercise."<sup>290</sup>

There is a diversity of sentiments. The mind feels a sentiment of delight or uneasiness from the qualities of objects. "This sentiment must depend upon the particular fabric or structure of the mind...and produces a sympathy or conformity between the mind and its objects."<sup>291</sup> We can conclude that objects have no desirable things in themselves; the desirability of objects depends on the structure of human passion. "Objects have no worth or value in themselves. They derive their worth merely from the passion."<sup>292</sup> According to Hume, beautiful is a relative quality. The sense of beauty does not exist in the objects; it exists in the mind. It is impossible to find a real beauty or deformity, since "beauty is no quality in things themselves; and each mind perceives a different beauty."<sup>293</sup> However, if it can be found a considerable uniformity of sentiments among people, it can be derived an idea of real or perfect beauty. Hume claims that judgments are based upon approbation.

In moral decisions, all the circumstances and relations must be previously known; and the mind, from the contemplation of the whole, feels some new impression of affection or disgust, esteem or contempt, approbation or blame.<sup>294</sup>

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<sup>290</sup> *Carroll*, "Hume's Standard of Taste", pp. 185-186.

<sup>291</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 124.

<sup>292</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 126.

<sup>293</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 6.

<sup>294</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 290.

No views of utility or of future beneficial consequences enter into this sentiment of approbation; yet is it of a kind similar to that other sentiment, which arises from views of a public or private utility. The same social sympathy gives rise to both.<sup>295</sup>

We approve of someone, because of his acquaintance. Someone's acquaintance affects us, and this leads us to the sentiment of approbation. "This principle enters into all the judgments which we form concerning manners and characters."<sup>296</sup> I think this principle also enters into aesthetic judgments; we approve a work of art, because of its features.

Wherever an object has a tendency to produce pleasure in the possessor, or in other words, is the proper *cause* of pleasure, it is sure to please the spectator, by a delicate sympathy with the possessor. Most of the works of art are esteemed beautiful, in proportion to their fitness for the use of man, and even many of the productions of nature derive their beauty from that source.<sup>297</sup>

Different men have different inclinations. There is a difference between one man's conduct and another. According to Hume, "there is nothing, in itself, valuable or despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed; but that these attributes arise from the particular constitution and fabric of human sentiment and affection."<sup>298</sup> The same object produces the feeling of delight in one person, while it may produce uneasiness in another, because people have different bodily senses.

Even when the mind operates alone, and feeling the sentiment of blame or approbation, pronounces one object

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<sup>295</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 260

<sup>296</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 267.

<sup>297</sup> *Treatise*, p. 577.

<sup>298</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 121.

deformed and odious, another beautiful and amiable; I say that, even in this case, those qualities are not really in the objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment of that mind which blames or praises.<sup>299</sup>

Hume also mentions the distinction of primary and secondary qualities of objects. "That tastes and colors, and all other sensible qualities, lie not in the bodies, but merely in the senses". Hume believes that "the case is the same with beauty and deformity, virtue and vice. There is a sufficient uniformity in the senses and feelings of mankind, to make all these qualities the objects of art and reasoning, and to have the greatest influence on life and manners."<sup>300</sup>

According to Hume, the rules of composition can be found on experience. This is possible by general observations and this leads us to "*universal experience*". Thus, it can be claimed that the different sentiments of people can be reconciled by this universal experience. However, what is the universal experience? There is no clear definition of universal experience in Hume's essay of the Standard of Taste. But I think this universal principle has the same meaning with what he calls *sympathy* or *humanity*.

According to Hume, the general rules of tastes are uniform in human nature.

Wherever you can ascertain a delicacy of taste, it is sure to meet with approbation; and the best way of ascertaining it is, to appeal to those models and principles which have been established by the uniform consent and experience of nations and ages.<sup>301</sup>

Hume claims "all the general rules of art are founded only on experience and on the observation of the common sentiments of human

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<sup>299</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 122.

<sup>300</sup> *Standard of Taste*, footnote p. 125.

<sup>301</sup> *Standard of Taste*, pp. 12- 13.

nature.”<sup>302</sup> According to him, three circumstances are necessary to gain a right experiment. These are as follows: a “perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, and a due attention to the object”.

“Delicacy” is another important notion in Hume’s aesthetic. He believes that the difference between one person and another is originated from the delicacy. “One obvious cause why many feel not the proper sentiment of beauty is the want of that delicacy of imagination which is requisite to convey a sensibility of those finer emotions.”<sup>303</sup> The two species of delicacy is delicacy of taste and delicacy of passion. Hume defines delicacy of taste as follows: “where the organs are so fine as to allow nothing to escape them, and at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition, this we call delicacy of taste.”<sup>304</sup> In other words, delicacy of taste means a refinement of taste. We can refine our aesthetic sense of taste through experience. He believes that mental and bodily taste resemble to each other, there is a great resemblance between them. According to Hume the beauty of body and that of mind are similar to each other. The source of beauty is found in advantage. But I think this is not true for works of art. Moreover, Hume believes that delicacy of taste and delicacy of passion have the same effect. However, he also claims “notwithstanding this resemblance, delicacy of taste is as much to be desired and cultivated, as delicacy of passion is to be lamented, and to be remedied, if possible.”<sup>305</sup>

“The perfection of the man and the perfection of the sense of feeling are united” in the delicacy of taste. Practice, education, experience, and delicacy of taste are important to give a true judgment. However, a man with a delicacy of taste is a rare case. “Delicacy of taste enlarges the sphere both of our happiness and misery, and makes

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<sup>302</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 8.

<sup>303</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 10.

<sup>304</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 11.

<sup>305</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 26.

us sensible to pains as well as pleasures which escape the rest of mankind.”<sup>306</sup>

Hume compares the works of art with the works of nature. “Art is only the under workman, and is employed to give a few strokes of embellishment to those pieces which come from the hand of master...Art may make a suit of clothes, but Nature must produce a man.”<sup>307</sup> There is a difference between the conduct of nature and the conduct of man. The works of art are imitation of the nature. “Art copies only the outside of nature, leaving the inward and more admirable springs and principles as exceeding her imitation, as beyond her comprehension. Art copies only the minute productions of nature.”<sup>308</sup> In other words, according to Hume, works of art is an imitation of reality. We know that Plato also claims that art is an imitation, but art is an imitation of imitation because this world is also imitation of the world of ideas. Therefore, it can be found a similarity between Hume and Plato in this situation. Hume claims that imagination plays an important role in the art. “The force of imagination, the energy of expression, the power of numbers, the charms of imitation are naturally delightful to the mind.”<sup>309</sup> In other words, these help to convey the sense of pleasure.

According to Hume, there is a relation between arts and society. Art progresses in the free governments. Education, custom and example are also important to progress in the arts. He believes that the progress of arts and sciences depends upon causes. He observes four causes: First, arts and sciences arise in free governments. Second, politeness and learning increase on commerce. Third, sciences develop in a republic, while in a civilized monarchy polite arts are developed. Fourth, if the arts and sciences decline in any state, it is difficult to revive them in the same state.

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<sup>306</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 26.

<sup>307</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 100.

<sup>308</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 117.

<sup>309</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 35.

Hume claims that “every work of art has a certain end or purpose for which it is calculated. The object of eloquence is to persuade, of history to instruct, of poetry to please, by means of the passions and the imagination.”<sup>310</sup> Art softens some passions; painful passion can be converted into pleasurable passion by the works of art.

The passion, though perhaps naturally, and when excited by the simple appearance of a real object, it may be painful; yet is so smoothed and softened, and mollified, when raised by the finer arts, that it affords the highest entertainment.<sup>311</sup>

Arts, sciences, philosophy and habit refine temper; soften our passions. In the *Treatise*, Hume claims that “the immediate agreeableness and disagreeableness of a quality to others is one of the sources of moral distinctions”. To prove this, he presents two principles: the first is sympathy and the second is comparison. In ‘the Standard of Taste’, Hume also mentions universal principle and comparison. He claims that these are necessary to make a true judgment of aesthetical object. Therefore, it can be said that works of art can be concerned as agreeable qualities to others, but they are abstracted from any consideration of utility. According to Hume the concept of *wit* is important for people. Although he does not give a definite description of wit, he explains it as “a quality immediately *agreeable* to others, and communication.”<sup>312</sup> He claims that wit has an effect on taste and sentiment, and it is the source of approbation and affection. “It is only by taste we can decide concerning it (wit). What is this taste? It is plainly nothing but a sensation of pleasure from true wit, and of uneasiness from false, without our being able to tell the reasons of that pleasure or uneasiness.”<sup>313</sup>

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<sup>310</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 16.

<sup>311</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 35.

<sup>312</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 262.

There are some differences in the sentiments of beauty and worth among people. "All the difference between one man and another, with regard to life, consists either in the *passion*, or in the *enjoyment*: and these differences are sufficient to produce the wide extremes of happiness and misery."<sup>314</sup> Hume believes that education, custom, prejudice, caprice, and humor vary our taste of this kind.

People react to the same object in different ways. "I have a pleasing sympathy in the prospect of so much joy, and can never consider the source of it, without the most agreeable emotions."<sup>315</sup> People may have different moral motivation and have different moral reasons. Therefore, they may not agree what is virtue or what is vice. In other words, they differ in their judgments because they differ in what they feel. Feeling is individual, so it is a problem that how it can give rise to objectivity. Hume explains this by sympathy. Sympathy is the communication of sentiments among people. This communication makes possible the objectivity. In aesthetic, because people have different tastes, their aesthetic judgments may be different. Hume explains the objectivity of aesthetic judgments by universal principle, or standard of taste.

According to Hume, sympathy makes possible an objective moral judgment. What one finds agreeable or disagreeable determines approval and disapproval. If we find something is agreeable, we approve this and it is good. In general, people approve beneficial actions and disapprove harmful actions. Thus people tend to say the same thing about what is virtuous and what is vicious. Our approval and disapproval are operated by sympathy. Hume infers that "sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature; it has a great influence on our

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<sup>313</sup> *Treatise*, p. 297.

<sup>314</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 126.

<sup>315</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 221.



taste of beauty.”<sup>316</sup> The sentiment derive from sympathy are the same for all humans and produce the same assessment.

In ‘the Standard of Taste’, although Hume tries to find a standard of taste and he claims that there must be a general rule to make a true aesthetic judgment, he also accepts the difficulty of this. He says,

The general principles of taste are uniform in human nature: where men vary in their judgments, some defect or perversion in the faculties may commonly be remarked; proceeding either from prejudice, from want of practice, or want of delicacy: and there is just reason for approving one taste, and condemning another.<sup>317</sup>

It is difficult to find a standard of taste, but it is not impossible. According to Hume, humans have different humors and some manners can change from age to age and from one country to another. These are the sources of the variations of sentiments of men. While some people praise one work of art, other people may blame same work. The lack of strong sense, lack of experiment, prejudice and also religious principles play an obstructive role to establish a standard of taste. Because of prejudice, practice and delicacy, men approve one taste and condemn another. Hume claims that the true standard of taste is based on five criteria, these are as follows: “strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice.”<sup>318</sup>

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<sup>316</sup> *Treatise*, p. 577.

<sup>317</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 19.

<sup>318</sup> *Standard of Taste*, p. 17. Hume’s rules for art appreciation and criticism can be listed as follows:

- 1- Start with the right equipment. To discern “the sentiment of beauty” reliably requires “a delicate imagination”.
- 2- Practice makes perfect. The more experience you get in looking at works of art, the more discerning your judgment becomes.
- 3- Take several looks. What you miss on the first examination may become clear on the third or fourth.
- 4- Compare the work with others like it. This will help you see what you might otherwise miss.

Hume's aesthetic theory and moral theory are alike. Aesthetic evaluation is based on sentiment and taste, for Hume. Aesthetic judgments are matter of taste, not matter of fact. However, it can be claimed that taste includes both reason and bodily senses. In the *Enquiry*, Hume explains the distinction between reason and taste as follows:

The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood: the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. Reason being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery: Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition.<sup>319</sup>

Taste is very important notion for both Hume's aesthetic and moral theory. Taste is subjective, so tastes may be different. On the other hand, judgments are objective and there must be some general principles to make a true judgment. Hume tries to find a standard of taste. It can be said that the problem is how the objective judgments can be derived from subjective tastes? I think Hume's theory can find an answer to this question. Hume's both moral and aesthetic theory is based on sentiment and taste, not reason. Because Hume believes that reason only judges matter of fact and of relations. Moral issues and works of art are not a matter of fact; they include spectator's feeling. Spectator's feeling is important in works of art, but the experience of others is also very important to decide whether an object is beautiful or not. I think pleasure in works of art is a matter of taste. Therefore, the

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5- Free the mind from prejudice. As much as possible, forget about any special personal interest you might have in the work (e.g. , that it was made by a relative of yours, or that you paid a large amount of money for it, or that you agree or do not agree with the point the work is making). Try to be a disinterested observer. (P. B. Lloyd, *Hume's Passions and Kant's Imperatives: Sources of Morality*, University of Oxford).

<sup>319</sup> *Enquiry*, p. 294.

difference among people depends upon their pleasure, which is taken from any works of art. There must be an agreement among people with regard to worth of an aesthetical object. For example, no one denies the worth of Mozart or Beethoven's compositions. Some people may not take pleasure from these, but the worth of these work are not changeable from one person to another.

In sum, Hume's aesthetic views can be found in his several essays. Aesthetics is a kind of approval value, like ethics. When an aesthetic object gives rise to pleasure, it is value. Therefore, aesthetic value depends on our approval or disapproval.

Hume's aesthetic theory rests upon the idea that there are rules or principles of taste, and that aesthetic rationality consists in discovering and applying these rules, especially in cases where people dispute about the aesthetic value of an object.<sup>320</sup>

Hume discusses issues such as taste, delicacy, refinement, eloquence, essay writing, luxury, historical views, happiness, and aesthetic sentiments in the above mentioned essays. However, it can be claimed that he develops his fundamental aesthetic theory in his essay, 'the Standard of Taste'. In this essay, he seeks a standard of taste. Although he accepts the differences of tastes, he also claims that there must be a harmony in aesthetic evaluation. This harmony is provided by a "universal principle", which all people agree on it. He also claims that strong sense, delicate sentiment, practice, comparison, and unprejudiced mind are the criteria, whereupon the standard of taste is based. We can refine our taste through experience; and to have a delicacy of taste is possible by education. "With apologies to Hume one might assert that to understand the role of rules in aesthetic rationality would be like discovering the key with the leathern thong at the bottom of the philosophy of art."<sup>321</sup>

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<sup>320</sup> Sverdlik, "Hume's Key and Aesthetic Rationality", p. 69.

<sup>321</sup> Sverdlik, "Hume's Key and Aesthetic Rationality", p. 75.

There is a parallelism between Hume's aesthetic judgment and his account of moral judgment. He believes that aesthetical and moral judgments are matters of taste. Hence, there is a close relationship between his theories of morality and aesthetics.

## CHAPTER V

### FEW PHILOSOPHERS WHO INFLUENCED HUME'S THOUGHT

There are some philosophers who influenced Hume's thought. In this chapter of my dissertation, I will briefly mention Thomas Hobbes, Bernard Mandeville and Francis Hutcheson's thoughts. These three philosophers, in one way or another left an impact on Hume's philosophy. There are similarities between Hobbes and Mandeville's thoughts. Both supported selfishness as ground of morality. Hobbes is generally regarded as a political philosopher. He claims that the source of natural law is not reason, it is passion. His view is that reason is subordinate to passion. Therefore, we can say that Hume's famous phrase "reason is the slave of the passions" is colored by Hobbes' thought. Mandeville's claim that virtues are not natural, but they are acquainted has an effect on Hume's artificial virtues. Hutcheson is one of the important moral sense theorists and he also influenced Hume. We can find his effects on Hume's thoughts concerning the issue of reason. This has also been cited by Capaldi;

To argue that moral motives are reducible to non-moral motives of self-interest would in effect eliminate the distinction between Hutcheson and Hume on the one hand and Hobbes and Mandeville on the other.<sup>322</sup>

#### 5. 1 Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes is one of the greatest philosophers in political philosophy. In this section I will briefly mention Hobbes' views about the commonwealth and the duties of citizens and sovereign. Hobbes' has two famous books, titled *Leviathan* and *On the Citizen (De Cive)*. I preferred to use *On the Citizen* rather than *Leviathan*. According to Hobbes, all social and political obligations are derived from the natural

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<sup>322</sup> Capaldi, *Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy*, p. 6.

rights. Laws of nature, as opposed to rights of nature, are the conclusions of reason. People avoid the obstacles to self-preservation by means of this reason. According to Hobbes the natural laws of human nature do not arise from reason, but from the powerful forces of the passions.

It is claimed that the ethics of Hobbes is a kind of philosophical ethics. Hobbes believes that moral law and natural law are the same. "Ethics, he told us, is the science that theorizes consequences from the passions of men."<sup>323</sup>

The conclusion of Hobbes's argument is a claim of political theory- namely, that political obligation rests on individual consent. But implicit in his argument is a conception of morality and its normativity that has powerfully influenced moral philosophers ever since.<sup>324</sup>

According to Hobbes, love and desire are the same psychological state. When the object is absent, this state is called desire. On the other hand, when the object is presented to us, it is called love. There is a similar relation between aversion and hate.<sup>325</sup> For Hobbes, desires and aversions move us to actions.

Like the bodily motions that give rise to color appearances, so also do the motions of desire/love and aversion/hate give rise to their distinctive experiential states. And for ethics, Hobbes believed, it is these appearances that make all the difference. Hobbes called them "delight" and "trouble of mind," respectively.<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>323</sup> S. Darwall, *Philosophical Ethics*, USA: Westview Press, 1998, p. 90.

<sup>324</sup> Darwall, *Philosophical Ethics*, p. 87.

<sup>325</sup> "Desire and aversion for Hobbes, are what get us thinking about ethics in the first place. To desire something is to see it as good, and to be averse to it is to see it as bad" (Darwall, *Philosophical Ethics*, p.92). "The key to understanding value judgment, Hobbes believed, was to see its role in deliberation, desire, and action."(Darwall, *Philosophical Ethics*, p.90). "Hobbes's theory of action is as follows. All actions result from desires or aversions. A desire is (literally) a motion in the body of the person who has it toward the desire's object. An aversion is the same motion "fromward" (Darwall, *Philosophical Ethics*, p.91).

Hobbes believes that there is no property in the objects themselves, as Hume will. We see objects as good or bad, because of our desires and aversions. Hobbes claims that morality is a set of rules based on collective interest.

The state of nature in Hobbes was the condition of men without a civil society. Hobbes believes that there was a war in which every man was against every man in the state of nature. The state of nature was a state of war. In the state of nature men were entitled to perform any act which they thought would further their preservation. According to him, every man is equal by nature, so in the state of nature “each man has a to right all things.” People want to defend themselves and they want to unnecessary power, these demands of them are the sources of mutual aggression. He believes that there was a war in the state of nature. However, we cannot infer from this that Hobbes believes that men are evil by nature. In the state of nature there was no sovereign, so there was no security.<sup>327</sup>

According to Hobbes, people are not sociable by nature, but they can be motivated to enter civil society. “Man is not born fit for society. Man is made fit for society not by nature, but by training.”<sup>328</sup>

Hobbes’ theory is based on the principle of self-preservation. In the state of nature people had a fear of their lives, so it can be said that fear is an important element to set up civil society or government. In other words, the beginning of civil society is the mutual fear. “The first foundation of Natural Right is that each man protects his life and limbs

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<sup>326</sup> Darwall, *Philosophical Ethics*, p. 92.

<sup>327</sup> “Hobbes rejected classical natural law’s contention that the goods of all are harmoniously ordered and that a coincidence between natural law and self-interest is metaphysically guaranteed. On the contrary, Hobbes thought, what gives morality and political society its point is that people’s interests frequently conflict and, consequently, that if each simply pursues his self-interest, the collective result would be a war of “all against all.” (Darwall, *Philosophical Ethics*, p. 89).

<sup>328</sup> T. Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 24-25.

as much as he can"<sup>329</sup>. However, this does not mean that whatever men do in the state of nature is legitimate. Unless people transfer their Natural Rights, peace is not attainable. According to Hobbes, the fundamental law of nature coincides in the right reason. People set up society by an agreement for their interests.

According to Hobbes, reason set down certain rules; these rules are the laws of nature. The laws of nature are conclusions of reason that inform us what should be done or how to avoid obstacles to self-preservation. We can say that the laws of nature are primarily rules for self-preservation.

The fundamental law of nature is to preserve people's life. The other laws of nature are derived from this law. Men must abandon their rights. This can be by two ways; he renounces and he transfers it to someone else. It is necessary both the will of the recipient and the will of the transferor in order to transfer a right.

The laws of nature are the same divine laws for Hobbes. Hence, he sees the laws of nature as moral imperatives. The laws of nature are derived from the principle of self-preservation. Hobbes believes that the laws of nature are immutable and eternal. People obligate the laws of nature in the internal court. The laws of nature are understood by reason. It can be said that reason is the law of nature itself. The pursuit of peace is the fundamental law of nature. Men left the state of nature and erect a commonwealth by following the laws of nature. Natural law prescribes absolute obedience to sovereign except when he commands us to perform self-destructive acts. On the other hand, Hobbes believes that all human law is civil law and civil laws cannot be contrary to natural law.

People transferred their rights and set up a commonwealth to keep peace, because the natural laws are not enough to do this. People may transfer their rights to one man or an assembly. According to

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<sup>329</sup> Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, p. 27.



Hobbes, a commonwealth is a union. There is one will in the commonwealth, because everyone transferred their wills to one man.

Sovereign power requires ministers and subordinate officials in order to preserve peace. There must be one sovereign power. There cannot be two sovereign powers in a commonwealth. Hobbes calls this sovereign power absolute power. There is a mutual relationship between absolute power and sovereignty. There is no sovereignty without absolute power, and there is no absolute power without sovereignty.

We can conclude that Hobbes' theory is based on obligation. All obligations are derived from the right of nature. The individual's right is self-preservation. We can say that the principle of self-preservation is very important in Hobbes' theory.

Hobbes's general metaphysical theory is materialist: everything in the world, including human beings and their minds, is to be explained ultimately in terms of matter in motion. Men have desires and aversions, but their motives are entirely selfish. "Good" and "evil" are words which express only the relation of things to the speaker's desires.<sup>330</sup>

Man's nature is anti-social. However, he transferred his rights in order to preserve his security. In other words, man is compelled into society for the advantages of life. Hobbes believes that no state can maintain security unless an absolute sovereign governs it. Sovereign power is very crucial to keep peace.

Mutual fear is the source of the society. In a commonwealth there are civil laws. These laws are also derived from natural laws. Although man's duty is to obey the laws, the duty of sovereign power is for the sake of peace. Sovereign power is not obligated by civil laws, but he has to obey the laws of nature.

In sum, we can say that Hobbes' theory belongs essentially to the natural law tradition. All other laws are derived from the natural law.

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<sup>330</sup> J.L. Mackie, *Hume's Moral Theory*, New York: Routledge, 2003, p.7.

Human nature is the mother of the natural law. It can be said that commonwealths and sovereigns can arise from transferring rights. This transferring is made by a contract. Hobbes claims that this contract was established in the past and it cannot be broken. For him, the kind of commonwealth is not important. The function of government is important. We can conclude that the aim of the state for the sake of security and happiness. There was a war in the state of nature. In this situation, people's lives were in a danger, so they set up society by an agreement. It can be inferred that society is necessary to prevent people's lives and rights. According to Hobbes, there are two main kinds of law: natural law and civil law. Civil laws are made by people who live in society, so civil laws are the laws of commonwealth. Natural laws are immutable, rational and understandable by human reason. We can say that state is governed both natural laws and civil laws, for Hobbes. Therefore, civil laws cannot be contrary to natural laws.

Hobbes accepts the selfish system in morality. He rejects a moral domain. In other words, he does not discuss whether the source of morality is reason or sentiment. Hume also rejects Hobbes' selfish system of morals and distances himself from Hobbes. Hume rejects the Hobbes' claim that men are selfish. On the other hand, some of Hobbes' thoughts influence on Hume. Recall that Hobbes claims that natural laws are not based on reason; they are the forces of passions. "Subordination of reason to passion had already been asserted by Hobbes."<sup>331</sup> Therefore, we can say that Hume's famous phrase "reason is the slave of the passions" can be referred back to Hobbes' thoughts.

## **5.2 Bernard Mandeville**

In this section of my dissertation, I will briefly mention Mandeville's thoughts. Bernard Mandeville (1670- 1733) is one of the most important predecessors of Hume. He was born in the Netherlands. *The Grumbling Hive, or Naves Turn'd Honest*, a poem, was published by him in 1705.

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<sup>331</sup> Capaldi, *Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy*, p. 9.

His famous book is titled *The Fable of the Bees*. In this book, Mandeville tries to give an explanation of socialized man. Although his work is considered as political, it is considered as a moral philosophy. Mandeville claims that there is no difference between animals and man. His theory is mainly concerned with politics. He takes political theory from ethical theory. According to him, human sociability and virtue stem from self-love and self-liking.

It is claimed that there are similarities between Mandeville and Hobbes, especially Hobbes' works affect Mandeville's book which is titled *The Fable of the Bees*. "Mandeville was read as cynical reincarnation of Hobbes. He was understood as praising vice and condemning virtue."<sup>332</sup> Although it is difficult to find a certain relations between Mandeville and Hobbes, there are some similarities. "Hobbes, of course, maintains that the most effective government is an absolute monarchy, not the government which Mandeville praises."<sup>333</sup> Hobbes and Mandeville argue that all human acts are motivated by self-interest. They adhere to what Hume called "the selfish system". We can say that both Mandeville and Hobbes believe that moral rules are artificial.

Mandeville does not accept moral motivation. "What is original, interesting, and important about Mandeville, especially in relation to Hume, is that Mandeville makes the case that the desire for luxury is a spur to the growth of civilization"<sup>334</sup>

We said that Mandeville's most important book is *The Fable of the Bees*. In this book, he tries to explain the process of human socialization. He discusses that public benefits and private vices. We can find the relation between politic and morals in this book. Why does he call his book *The Fable of the Bees*? "*The Fable of the Bees* offered a psychologically compelling account of the positive social function of

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<sup>332</sup> J.B. Schneewind, *Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant*, New York:Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.389

<sup>333</sup> J. D. Young, "Mandeville: A Popularizer of Hobbes," in *Modern Languages Notes*, 74 (1959), p. 12.

<sup>334</sup> Capaldi, *Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy*, p. 13.

greed... The bee had long been a symbol of the orderliness of absolute monarchies.”<sup>335</sup> His main theory can be found in his subtitle, *Private Vices, Public Benefits*, volume I of *The Fable of the Bees*. The book begins with a poem, *the Grumbling Hive or Knaves Turn'd Honest*. Mandeville claims that the life of the bees similar to humans and they live like men. We can relate a small part of his poem in the following quotation;

The Root of Evil, Avarice,  
That damn'd ill-natur'd baneful Vice,  
Was Salve to Prodigality,  
(K.)That noble Sin; (L.) whilst Luxury  
Employ'd a Million of the Poor,  
(M.)And odious Pride a Million more:  
(N.) Envy it self, and Vanity,  
Were Ministers of Industry;<sup>336</sup>

Mandeville claims that “the vilest and hateful qualities of man are the most necessary accomplishments to fit him for the society”<sup>337</sup>. He says, “to show that these qualifications, which we all pretend to be ashamed of, are the great support of a flourishing society has been he subject of the foregoing poem.”<sup>338</sup>

Mandeville considers man as a thoughtful animal, “the most perfect of animals”. There are many objections to his view that man is animal. It is claimed that Mandeville’s analysis of morals depends on naturalistic anthropology. “Mandeville called his project an “anatomy” of “the invisible part of man.”<sup>339</sup> He tries to derive an explanation of moral motivation from human nature.

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<sup>335</sup> B. Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees and Other Writings*, ed. E. J. Hundert, Indianapolis/ Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997, pp. xxi-xxii.

<sup>336</sup> Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, p. 28.

<sup>337</sup> Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, p. 34.

<sup>338</sup> Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, p. 36.

Mandeville distinguished three decisive causes in the long, slow progression to civility: the banding together of savages for their mutual defense against animals; the stimulation of man's innate pride and courage through threats and attacks of other men; and the invention of language and letters.<sup>340</sup>

Mandeville believes that all men have identical psychological structures in all times and places. Mandeville believes that people have a tendency to pride and this tendency is innate.

"Mandeville is usually credited, or discredited, with the belief that man is no more than a theater of the passions, and that virtue consists accordingly in actions."<sup>341</sup> Hume has similar thoughts with Mandeville, since Hume also believes passions determine our actions.

The word 'morality' is either synonymous with 'virtue' or signifies that part of philosophy which treats of it and teaches the regulation of manners; and by the words 'moral virtue' I mean the same thing which I believe everybody else does.<sup>342</sup>

According to Mandeville, virtue consists in action. He claims that virtue is every action of men contrary to natural impulse; vice is self-regarding action of men. Virtue is more beneficial than vice and it is eternal. He does not accept the division between the lower action and higher action. Mandeville claims that virtue is not natural but acquired. Therefore, we can claim that in Mandeville's thought, there is no any natural virtue; all virtues are artificial.

Mandeville believes that virtues debar people from the enjoyment. "Virtuous acts are really due not to reason, or social feeling. He defines the moral virtues as the political offspring which flattery

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<sup>339</sup> Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, p. xxv.

<sup>340</sup> Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, pp. xxviii- xxix.

<sup>341</sup> Rogers, "The Ethics of Mandeville," p.3.

<sup>342</sup> Schneewind, *Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant*, p. 397.

begot upon pride.”<sup>343</sup> The remoteness and the nearness have an effect on the degrees of some passions such as envy in Mandeville’s thought. According to him, envy is a compound of grief and anger. The source of malice is also envy. Malice is the reverse of pity; it is difficult to find the origin of malice. Mandeville claims that the most amiable passion is pity. Self- denial is the condition of virtue.

Honor means the good opinion of others and the reverse of it is dishonor, according to Mandeville. The fountain of honor is sovereign. He says, “the invention of honor has been far more beneficial to the civil society than that of virtue.”<sup>344</sup> He believes that love and honor refine mankind. While love accomplishes the women, honor polishes the man. Why he makes such a distinction is not clear.

He believes that all passions center in self-love. “No creature, he tells us, is naturally less capable of living with his fellows than man, since he is an extraordinarily selfish.”<sup>345</sup> He considers the love of mothers to their children as a kind of passion. However, this passion is not a natural. Mandeville believes that there is no natural passion or virtue. Women love their children, but this is not natural. This arises from the result of reason, education, and thoughts of duty. He defines love as an adulterated appetite.

In Mandeville’s system, education and custom have very important place. Like Hume, he makes a distinction between good qualities and virtues. Luxury is harmful to society. He says, “if once we depart from calling everything luxury that is not absolutely necessary to keep a man alive, that then there is no luxury at all.”<sup>346</sup>

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<sup>343</sup> Rogers, “The Ethics of Mandeville,” p. 2.

<sup>344</sup> Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, p. 211.

<sup>345</sup> W. C. Swabey, *Ethical Theory from Hobbes to Kant*, USA: Vision Press Limited, 1961, p. 80.

<sup>346</sup> Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, p. 66.

Although he believes that human nature cannot change; it is the same in everywhere, Mandeville tries to explain the difference between man in the state of nature and the same creature in the society.

He believes that knowledge, temperance, fortitude, humility, and other embellishments of the mind are the most valuable acquisitions. He goes on to say,

I expect to be asked why in the fable I have called those pleasures real that are directly opposite to those which I own the wise men of all ages have extolled as the most valuable. My answer is, because I don't call things pleasures which men say are best, but such as they seem to be most pleased with.<sup>347</sup>

In Mandeville's thought, there are two types of men; abject, low-minded people and lofty people. Abject people are "always hunting after immediate enjoyment, incapable of self-denial, with no regard to the good of others."<sup>348</sup> Lofty people are considered as high-spirited creatures. They are "free from sordid selfishness, valuing above all the improvements of the mind-in short, truly human, and quite different from the lower animals."<sup>349</sup> This contrast between two types of people is derived from praise and flattery.

Mandeville insists on the innateness of morality. It can be claimed that his ethics is a sort of social ethics, and social virtues are in the center of this ethics.

By society he means body politics. The political bodies of society are laws and government. "The economic claim that private vices are public benefits is, to be sure, not as paradoxical as it sounds. By vice, he means to cover everything that men think of as an evil."<sup>350</sup>

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<sup>347</sup> Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, p. 89.

<sup>348</sup> Mackie, *Hume's Moral Theory*, 2003, p. 23.

<sup>349</sup> Mackie, *Hume's Moral Theory*, p. 23

<sup>350</sup> Rogers, "The Ethics of Mandeville," p. 8.

Mandeville does not accept the innateness of man to society; in other words, man is not born fit for society. Because of his needs and his imperfections, people enter the society. "The sociableness of man arises only from these two things..., the multiplicity of his desires, and the continual opposition he meets with in his endeavors to gratify them."<sup>351</sup> Society depends on the multiplicity of desires. Vice is the source of prosperity and progress.

Mandeville also accepts that there are some rules in every society and every members of society must obey these laws. Avarice and prodigality are necessary to society. In the following quotation, Mandeville discusses some circumstances about avarice and prodigality;

More money than land, heavy taxes and scarcity of provisions, industry, laboriousness, an active and stirring spirit, ill-nature...; old age, wisdom, trade, riches...and liberty and property well secured, are all things that dispose to avarice. On the contrary, indolence, content, good- nature...and the uncertainty of possessions, are circumstances that render men prone to prodigality.<sup>352</sup>

In sum, Mandeville tries to find a basis for morals. He believes that the spring of action is private and it depends on self-interest. The private interest of individual derives from the public good of society. Mandeville argues that self-interest is the basic motivation of all human acts. There is no any perfect good and no so entirely evil in both nature and morality. His views are more similar to those of Hobbes than Hume. In some respects, however, there are great differences between them. Mandeville accepts the only self-love is natural; there is no natural virtue in human nature. Unlike Mandeville, Hume tries to show that benevolence and sympathy are natural as well as self-love. I believe that unlike Mandeville, in Hume's theory man is not selfish. On the other hand, Mandeville's claim that virtues are not natural, but they are

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<sup>351</sup> Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, p. 135.

<sup>352</sup> Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, p. 109.



acquired has an effect on Hume's artificial virtues. Moreover, the phrase "the slave of the passions" had been used by Mandeville, before Hume. "Mandeville's theory of flattery as the basis of morality stresses the role of fiction in the control of men and may be regarded as a forerunner of Hume's theory that justice is an artificial virtue."<sup>353</sup> We can conclude that Mandeville's views have an impact on Hume's theory especially his theory of artificial virtues.

### 5.3. Francis Hutcheson

Francis Hutcheson was one of the most important philosophers who influenced Hume. He is a member of moral sense school. In ethics, the problem of Scottish enlightenment is the foundation of morals. It is claimed that Hutcheson also was the first among the Scottish philosophers to approach the problem of foundation of morals. According to Hutcheson, the moral sense is a feeling of approbation for actions. He believes that ethical properties are natural properties.

Three propositions are central in Hutcheson's theory, (i) We have a motive of genuine benevolence; we desire the happiness of others as an end, not merely as a means (in any way) to our own happiness. (ii) We have a moral sense, a tendency immediately to approve of actions of certain kinds and to disapprove of others. (iii) The object of this moral sense is benevolence; we approve of actions because and in so far as we take these to express the motive of benevolence.<sup>354</sup>

In the foregoing quotation, it is said that Hutcheson's theory includes three main propositions. The first proposition claims that we have a genuine benevolence. However, it is not clear whether this benevolence is innate or derived from our experiences. The second proposition says that all people have a moral sense. And the object of this moral sense is benevolence. We approve or disapprove of actions

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<sup>353</sup> Swabey, *Ethical Theory from Hobbes to Kant*, p. 82.

<sup>354</sup> Mackie, *Hume's Moral Theory*, New York: Routledge, 2003, p. 25.

by means of this benevolence. Some thinkers criticize Hutcheson's idea that the object of moral sense, a tendency to approve and disapprove of actions, is benevolence. Mackie is one of them, he says, "If the object of moral approval is benevolence, what is the object of moral disapproval."<sup>355</sup> This seems to be problematic.

Hutcheson tries to explain the nature of human actions, so he mentions passions. Hutcheson divides pleasures and pains into simple and complex, although he does not use complex pleasures. Rather he calls these kinds of perceptions "perceptions of an internal sense". According to him, these pleasures "arise only upon some *previous Idea, or Assemblage, or Comparison of Ideas*."<sup>356</sup> According to him, "sense is a 'power of receiving' a class of 'perceptions' from objects independently of our will."<sup>357</sup> Hutcheson also makes a classification of senses; he claims that there are five classes of our senses. These are; external senses, internal sense, public sense, moral sense and sense of honor.<sup>358</sup>

He also makes a similar classification of desires and aversions. Therefore, our desires and aversions are also divided into five classes by him. "Desires arise in our Mind...upon Apprehension of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events."<sup>359</sup> As far as I understand, Hutcheson divides desires into the primary and the secondary. He says "secondary Desires of everything imagined useful to gratify any of the primary Desires."<sup>360</sup> Desires of wealth and power are examples of these

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<sup>355</sup> Mackie, *Hume's Moral Theory*, p.27.

<sup>356</sup> Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, p.16.

<sup>357</sup> W. C. Swabey, *Ethical Theory from Hobbes to Kant*, USA: Vision Press Limited,1961, p. 82.

<sup>358</sup> This classification comes from Hutcheson's book, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, pp. 17-18.

<sup>359</sup> Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, p. 18.

secondary desires. He does not give a clear example of primary desires.

Hutcheson believes that our affections and passions depend upon our opinions. He claims that there are degrees of our desires. Our fantastic desires arise from our negligence and ignorance. He says “every object of Desire is uncertain except Virtue.”<sup>361</sup>

*Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*  
Hutcheson distinguishes three kinds of good connected with three different kinds of pleasure. Hutcheson also claims that there are three kinds of good and evil. Those are universal, particular and private. According to him, natural good is pleasure and natural evil is pain.

Hutcheson considered the *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense* to be an integral part of his moral system. He believes that desire and aversion are the proper affections and they are distinct from other sensations. He distinguishes affections from passions.<sup>362</sup> He calls desire, aversion, joy and sorrow affections, they are not passions for him. Hutcheson defines passions as follows; “when more violent *confused Sensations* arise with the *Affection*, and are attended with, or prolonged by bodily Motions, we call the whole by the Name of *Passion*, especially when accompanied with some *natural Propensities*.”<sup>363</sup>

Hutcheson makes a classification of passions; he divides passions into five classes. The first class passion is about our own actions; these are moral joy, self-approbation, and remorse. The

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<sup>360</sup> Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, p.19

<sup>361</sup> Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, p. 82.

<sup>362</sup> Hutcheson mentions both Malebranche and Zeno's views about passions. There are six passions for Malebranche and four passions for Zeno. However, I will mention neither Malebranche nor Zeno's view about passion in detail. In this chapter I will only briefly discuss Hutcheson's general philosophy. Hutcheson says, “the passions about our own Actions occasioned by the *Moral Sense*” ( p. 55).

<sup>363</sup> Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, p. 50.

second is public passions about state of others; these passions are goodwill, compassion, pity and congratulation. The third is public passions with moral perceptions such as regret. The fourth class is public passions and relations of agents. The fifth is public passions joined with the selfish. Can we claim that these public passions are called selfish passions? I cannot give any answer to this question, because I am not sure. He claims that ambition, covetousness, hunger, lust, revenge, anger are selfish passions.<sup>364</sup>

Interest or self-love 'is the natural inclination to pursue the pleasures provided by external objects, or the means that is used to satisfy it. Fundamental to Hutcheson's moral philosophy is the doctrine that benevolence underpins every virtue. The cardinal virtues of temperance, courage, prudence and justice, which were supreme in the classical and Christian traditions, constituting the sum of all virtues, are approved by our moral sense only if practiced in order to promote public good.<sup>365</sup>

Moral sense is also a kind of sense such as external senses, but it is common to all mankind. There are four cardinal virtues, temperance, courage, prudence and justice, which are necessary to public benevolence. Since all these virtues are related to society, I think these four virtues can also be called social virtues.

However the analogy between the pleasures afforded by external objects and those afforded by moral sense has produced many problems of interpretation both in Hutcheson's time and in our own. The reference to pleasure seems to lay his doctrine open to the accusation that he is a hedonist. Perhaps the best interpretation is given by Hume when he says: "We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: but in feeling that it

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<sup>364</sup> This classification comes from Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, pp. 55-64. He also claims, "every Passion or Affection in its moderate Degree is innocent, many are directly amiable, and morally good: we have Senses and Affections leading us to publick Good, as well as to private; to Virtue, as well as to external Pleasure." (Hutcheson, *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, p. 65).

<sup>365</sup> A. Brodie, *The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 138.

pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that is virtuous.<sup>366</sup>

In Hutcheson's thought, benevolence is the key concept. He believes that benevolence underpins all virtues. He tries to make a distinction between natural goodness and moral goodness. Natural goodness produces pleasure. Moral goodness is a kind of idea.

When he says that moral goodness is 'our idea of some quality...' he surely does not mean that moral goodness is literally an idea; he must mean rather that our idea of goodness is the idea of some quality that provokes approval in us. Yet, as we shall see, there is an important ambiguity hidden in this phrase.<sup>367</sup>

Hutcheson's distinction between natural good and moral good is important. He says of natural good; "the pleasure in our sensible perceptions of any kind, gives us our first idea of natural good"<sup>368</sup>. He define moral good as follows; "moral goodness in this treatise, denotes our idea of some quality apprehended in actions."<sup>369</sup>

Hutcheson's *Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* is directed to establishing two theses:<sup>370</sup>

- (1) That some actions have an immediate goodness perceived by a moral sense, and
- (2) That the motive of virtue is not an intention to gain the pleasure which accompanies virtuous actions, neither is it an intention to gain the reward, which may be given to the virtuous person by society or by God.

There are terminological similarities in Hutcheson and Hume. The Hutchesonian internal *senses* become internal *sentiments* or feelings in Hume's treatment. Hume's

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<sup>366</sup> Brodie, *The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment*, p. 138.

<sup>367</sup> Mackie, *Hume's Moral Theory*, p. 24.

<sup>368</sup> E. Sprague, "Francis Hutcheson and the Moral Sense," in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 51 (1954), p. 794.

<sup>369</sup> Sprague, "Francis Hutcheson and the Moral Sense," p.795.

<sup>370</sup> Swabey, *Ethical Theory*, p. 82.

internal sentiment is a perception, specifically a calm passion.<sup>371</sup>

Hutcheson's views of ethics and aesthetics are related to "internal sense". He believes that moral and aesthetic judgments are perceptual; he does not accept the rationality of these kinds of judgments. He says,

The pleasures of internal Senses, or of the imagination, are allowed by all, who have any tolerable Taste of them, as a much superior Happiness to those of the external Senses, tho they were enjoyed to the full.<sup>372</sup>

Hutcheson claims that there are two kinds of pleasure; sensible and rational. Sensible pleasures are felt by external sense, such as the taste of chocolate. According to Hutcheson, sense perception has a nonvolitional character, it is innateness.

Hutcheson makes some aesthetic categories. In the *Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, he mentions eight aesthetic categories. These categories are as follows;

The external senses of Sight and Hearing we have in common with the Brutes: but there's superadded to the Human Eye and Ear a wonderful and ingenious Relish or Sense, by which we receive subtler pleasures; in material forms *gracefulness, beauty and proportion*; in sounds *concord and harmony*; and are highly delighted with observing exact *imitation* in the works of the more ingenious arts, Painting, Statuary and Sculpture, and in motion and Action; all which afford us far more many pleasures than the external senses...And the very *grandeur and novelty* of objects excite some grateful perceptions not unlike the former, which are naturally connected with and subservient to our desires of knowledge.<sup>373</sup>

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<sup>371</sup> W. Halberstadt, "A Problem in Hume's Aesthetics," in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 30, 1971, p. 211.

<sup>372</sup> Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, p. 104.

The sense of beauty is not an innate idea for Hutcheson, so it can be concluded that people have no innate aesthetic distinctions. "Hutcheson considered 'pleasure of the imagination' as equivalent to 'sense'."<sup>374</sup>

Hutcheson conceives of sense perception as: (i) Independent of the will, (ii) innate, (iii) independent of knowledge, and (iv) immediate. These four marks distinguish it from reason."<sup>375</sup> The sense of beauty gives rise to pleasure, so pleasure is the object of the sense of beauty. Kivy (2003) claims that at least there are six internal senses in the philosophy of Hutcheson such as the senses of beauty, grandeur, imitation, novelty, fitness and humor. These six internal senses are also called aesthetic senses.<sup>376</sup>

Hutcheson claims that there are two kinds of pleasure; sensible and rational. Sensible pleasures are felt by external sense, such as the taste of chocolate. According to Hutcheson, sense perception has a nonvolitional character. He also claims that there are two kinds of beauty: relative beauty and absolute beauty. Natural objects provide examples of absolute beauty, while the works of art provide examples of relative beauty. "We therefore by Absolute Beauty understand only that Beauty, which we perceive in Objects without comparison to any thing external, of which the Object is supposed an Imitation, or Picture; such as that Beauty perceived from the Works of Nature, artificial Forms, Figures, Theorems."<sup>377</sup> He claims that we perceive comparative or relative beauty in objects and this kind of beauty is commonly considered as imitations of something else. "All beauty is relative to the sense of some mind perceiving it; but what we call relative is that which

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<sup>373</sup> P. Kivy, *The Seventh Sense*, Oxford: Clarendon Pres, 2003, p. 35.

<sup>374</sup> Kivy, *The Seventh Sense*, p. 34.

<sup>375</sup> Kivy, *The Seventh Sense*, p. 38.

<sup>376</sup> These come from Kivy, *The Seventh Sense*, p. 44.

<sup>377</sup> F. Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Original Ideas of Beauty and Virtue: in Two Treatises*, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004, p. 27.

is apprehended in any object, commonly considered as an imitation of some original: and this beauty is founded on a Conformity, or a kind of unity between the original and the copy.”<sup>378</sup> All beauty of nature falls under the comparative or relative beauty.

Hutcheson claims that there are two principles of action; reason and affection or passion. Like Hume, according to Hutcheson reason is the knowledge of the relations of things. According to him, reason has an important place in morality. He says, “Morality of Actions consists in *Conformity to Reason, or Difformity* from it.”<sup>379</sup>

In sum, Hume and Hutcheson agree with public desires and the nature of sympathy. Laird (1967) explains the similarities between Hutcheson and Hume in the following quotation:

- a) Hutcheson had a general Newtonian conception of psychological method; and he was not averse to the principle of association.
- b) Hume’s account of “impressions of reflection” was borrowed directly from Hutcheson.
- c) Hume’s greatest debt to Hutcheson, however, was derived from Hutcheson’s account of the office of reason.<sup>380</sup>

Hutcheson is one of the important moral sense theorists and he influenced Hume. We can find his effects on Hume’s thoughts concerning the issue of reason. “Hutcheson argued that reason was neither the source of moral insight nor the spring of moral action.”<sup>381</sup> In the following quotation, this effect is clearly presented.

Hutcheson’s claim that practical reasoning (reasoning that leads to action) must operate with the ideas of good and

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<sup>378</sup>Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Original Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, p. 42.

<sup>379</sup>Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, p. 136.

<sup>380</sup>J. Laird, *Hume’s Philosophy of Human Nature*, USA: Archon Books, 1967, pp.209-210.

<sup>381</sup>Capaldi, *Hume’s Place in Moral Philosophy*, p. 16.



evil antecedently provided by our instincts, affections and moral sense is transmuted by Hume in the *Treatise* into the curious claim that reasoning, even about the probable outcome of action, cannot give rise to any action at all.<sup>382</sup>

According to Hutcheson, there are two kinds of pleasures; sensible and rational pleasure. On the other hand, internal and external senses are two main senses. While internal senses receive pleasure from ideas, external senses receive pleasure from external objects. He also believes that moral sense has a universal character and it is a matter of feeling. Therefore, moral sense cannot tell us what is good and what is bad. Hume follows Hutcheson, he claims that moral judgments are not subjective, they are intersubjective since they depend on our feelings.

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<sup>382</sup> S. Brown, *British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment*, London and New York: Routledge History of Philosophy, vol.5, 1966, p. 180.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

What I have tried to do is to show that there are some ambiguities in Hume's moral theory. Many scholars of Hume's philosophy are only concerned with his thoughts on the issue of human understanding. However, I tried to give a clear and distinct explanation of Hume's system. I hope I have succeeded.

Hume's moral philosophy includes moral psychology or the theory of passions. Hume's theory can be represented as the outcome of his thoughts which was influenced by Hobbes, Mandeville, Hutcheson, etc. It is claimed that Hume's account of justice is similar to that of Hobbes, and that his account of pride was borrowed from Mandeville. However, Hume rejects both Hobbes and Mandeville's selfish system. Hume used Hutcheson's term "moral sense". Hume's account of moral motivation is grounded in moral psychology. Hume's account of reason on the other hand, was borrowed from Hutcheson. Hutcheson and Hume describe people as interrelated, they involve in society out of necessity. Hutcheson and Hume's claim are observational. They observe experiences, and make an inference to make a moral evaluation.

It is clear that Hume's theory opposes to the rationalist ethics. Hume rejects views of ethical theories of rationalists. The fundamental difference between rationalist ethics and sentimentalist ethics is the source of morality. Rationalists claim that morality is based on reason. However, sentimentalists do not accept this view, according to them the foundation of morality is sentiments, not reason.

Hume outlined his own moral philosophy in his two principal books, *Treatise* and *Enquiry*. Hume's first treatment of ethics is *Treatise*. He tries to explain the source of moral apprehension in the *Treatise*. It can be said that *Enquiry* is a summary of *Treatise*.

We can find some different points between the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry*, but these differences are not very important. The subject matter is the general principle of morals in both. We can say that the fundamental difference between the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry* is what concerns the foundation of morals. While in the *Treatise* the main source of morals is sympathy, in the *Enquiry* humanity is the foundation of morals. However, there is not an important difference between sympathy and humanity. Both are the same, but their names are different. Other differences are as follows.

In the *Enquiry* we cannot find an explanation of passions as much as in the *Treatise*. Hume devotes many spaces in the *Enquiry* to explain the justice. He devotes many spaces in the *Treatise* to approving what the source of the moral distinctions is than in the *Enquiry*.

Hume's moral theory involves the agent's action, the receiver, and the spectator. Agent's action has an effect on receiver's feelings. A virtuous character is important, because virtue motivates moral action. According to Hume, the moral worth of an action is derived from virtue. According him, our moral judgments are concerned with both persons and actions.

In Hume's philosophy, there is no God, but this order is set up by nature. Therefore, for him, morality is not dependent on religion. Hume's account of moral motivation is grounded in moral psychology. We can claim that Hume's theory is an example of modern ethical theories which do not refer to God.

Hume's moral theory is that moral judgments are based on approbation and disapprobation, so they are empirical beliefs. However, this contradicts his fundamental doctrine that morality is based on sentiments, not reason. Morality is not based on reason; it is based on sentiments. Morality is a consequence of our passions in Hume's system. We can say that morality is a matter of passions rather than a matter of reason. However, I think, his view that morality is solely based

on sentiment is problematic. Hume said that our approval and disapproval determine moral distinctions. However, for example, even if someone lacks the appropriate sentiments we still expect from him/her to recognize that killing, stealing are wrong. He cannot explain how it is possible to act contrary to reason.

Hume's classification of passion is the other difficulty of Hume's system. He makes a division between calm-violent and direct-indirect passions. However, in this classification, as we have seen, there is inconsistency. Passions are caused by virtues and vices that produce moral pleasures and pains respectively. In his theory of the passions, motives determine the quality of action. Actions cannot be virtuous unless their motives are virtuous. This theory can be rejected. Recall that according to Hume, virtue causes pleasure and vice causes pain. He claims that pride is vice, and humility is virtue. However, humility causes pain. If vice causes pain, then humility must be vice. How is it to be virtue? Why Hume consider humility as a virtue is not clear. Hume does not mention such issues.

According to Hume morals imply common sentiments in all people. Moral system includes blame or praise. In other words, our approval or disapproval defines moral distinctions. For him, moral distinctions are based on the moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation. He considers morality to be a universal sentiment. This sentiment is sympathy or humanity. However, I think the concept of sympathy is the most difficult concept in Hume's moral system. Hume claims that people approve or disapprove of manners of each other through sympathy. He also claims that particular pleasures and pains are the source of moral behavior in Hume's moral system. Therefore, human beings always try to avoid particular pains and seek particular pleasures in their moral behavior. In Hume's theory, "sympathy" is a problem. It includes many ambiguities. Hume argues that people always seek pleasures and avoid pains. How can reconcile pleasure with virtues? Some moral norms may be an obstacle to gain pleasure. For

example, heroin gives pleasure, but taking heroin is bad and it is not a virtuous action. There are similar cases where there is a conflict between people's desires and morality.

In Hume's moral system, moral distinctions depend on a certain sentiment of pain and pleasure, so there is justification for the claim that Hume's ethics is hedonistic. Although he maintained the existence of moral sense like other moral sense theorists, there are differences in his. Moreover, we can say that in some points the distinction between Hume's views and the rationalists' views disappears. This situation exposes Hume's moral philosophy to sharp criticism.

Throughout my dissertation, I have shown some unclear points in Hume's moral philosophy. First, he does not explain clearly what the relation between moral sentiment and moral motivation is. The second is his use of the concept of utility which makes his position as a utilitarian or not uncertain. Capaldi claims that Hume is not a utilitarian. "It is because moral predicates refer to moral sentiments and because moral sentiments are caused by non-useful qualities that Hume may not be considered a utilitarian."<sup>383</sup>

The third, why justice is artificial is unclear. The fourth, his classification of passions is problematic. And finally, why he tries to find a general principle that is the same for all human mankind such as semi-innate principle like humanity or sympathy is also obscure.

In general, we can say that since Hume's moral philosophy has a heterogeneous structure, it is difficult to understand some points in his theory. His moral theory also contains an ambiguity due to the concept of sympathy. Therefore, his theory is capable of a double meaning and inevitably brings him to close relation with the rationalist ethics in some ways.

Throughout my dissertation, I conclude that there is one fundamental feature in all Hume's works. This feature is the experimental method. His thoughts depend on experimental method

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<sup>383</sup> Capaldi, "Hume's Rejection of 'Ought' as a Moral Category," p. 211.

and observation, so it can be claimed that he uses a form of empiricism in both his epistemology and his moral system. Moreover, we can claim that in order to understand Hume's ethics, it is necessary to know his thoughts on other philosophic issues. It is my final observation that despite the existence of inconsistencies and ambiguities in his thought in general, Hume's philosophy presents a unitary character.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A

#### TURKISH SUMMARY

#### **HUME'UN İNSAN DOĞASI ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME VE İNSAN ANLIĞI VE AHLAK İLKELERİ ÜZERİNE ARAŞTIRMALAR'DA İFADE EDİLDİĞİ ŞEKLİYLE AHLAK TEORİSİ**

Ahlak teorileri farklı bağlamlarda ortaya çıktıkları için farklı problemlere işaret etmektedirler. Modern felsefeye büyük etkide bulunan filozoflardan biri de David Hume'dur. Hume ahlak felsefesinde "ahlak duygusu" (*moral sense*) okulunun bir üyesidir. Bu okulun kurucusu ve "ahlak duygusu" ifadesini ilk kullanan kişi ise Shaftesbury'dir. Bu ifade daha sonra F. Hutcheson tarafından formüle edilmiş ve Hume tarafından da benimsenmiştir. Bu bağlamda modern felsefeye en büyük etkide bulunan filozofun Hume olduğunu düşündüğüm için, bu çalışmada onun görüşlerini analiz etmeye çalıştım.

Bilindiği üzere Hume'un felsefe tarihine bıraktığı en temel problemler: kişisel özdeşlik problemi, nedensellik problemi ve olgu-değer (*is-ought*) problemi olarak adlandırılan olandan olması gerekenin çıkarılamayacağıdır. Her ne kadar çalışmam içerisinde bu problemlere de yer verdiysem de, bu sorunlar üzerinde yeterince görüş belirtildiği için çalışmamda bu problemlerin detayına girmedim. Çalışmamın ana temasını, bu problemlerden dolayı da geri planda bırakılmış olan Hume'un ahlak felsefesine ilişkin görüşleri oluşturmaktadır. Hume'un ahlak felsefesinin analizini yapmanın bu alandaki literatüre bir katkı sağlayacağına inanıyorum.

Bu çalışmada David Hume'un *İnsan Doğası Üzerine Bir İnceleme* (*A Treatise of Human Nature*) ve *İnsan Anlığı ve Ahlak İlkeleri Üzerine*

*Arařtırmalar (Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals)* adlı iki temel yapıtında ele almıř olduđu ahlak felsefesine iliřkin grřlerinin analizini yapmaya alıřtım. Bunu yaparken de bu iki temel eseri ana referanslarım olarak kullandım. Bir ka nokta dıřında Hume'un her iki yapıtındaki grřlerinin aynı olduđunu syleyebiliriz. Hume'un felsefesinin genel olarak bir btn olarak ele alınacađını dřndđm iin her ne kadar ahlak felsefesine iliřkin grřlerinin analizini sunmaya alıřsam da, Hume'un bilgi felsefesi ve estetik grřlerini de bu alıřmada aıklamaya alıřtım. Gerek bilgi felsefesinin gerek estetiđinin ahlak felsefesi ile yakından iliřkisi olduđu dřncesindeyim. Bu nedenle bu alıřmada Hume'un felsefesi bir btnlk iinde ele alınmıřtır. Ayrıca Hume'un ahlak felsefesine iliřkin grřlerinin belirlenmesinde etkisi olduđunu dřndđm, kendisinden nce gelen T. Hobbes, B. Mandeville ve F. Hutcheson'ın grřlerine de alıřmam ierisinde yer verdim.

David Hume 17. yzyıl batı felsefesinin nemli dřnrlerinden biridir. Her ne kadar felsefede onun diđer felsefi grřleri zellikle de bilgi felsefesi bađlamındaki grřleri, ahlak teorisini glgede bırakmıř olsa da Hume'un ahlak anlayıřı modern batı felsefesinde olduka nemli bir yer teřkil etmektedir. Hume'un ahlak teorisini ele almamın nedenlerinden biri de budur. Hume'un ahlak teorisine iliřkin grřlerini *İnceleme* adlı eserinin nc kitabında ve *Ahlak İlkeleri zerine Arařtırmalar* adlı yapıtlarında bulabiliriz. Ahlak felsefesi onun bilgi teorisinden ayrı tutulamaz. Deneyim ahlak alanında da olduka nemli bir yere sahiptir ve Hume deneyimle ahlakın đrenilebileceđini savunur. Eylemlerin ahlaksal deđerini belirlemede aklın baskın bir rol oynadıđı grřne karřı ıkar. Hume'a gre ahlaksal farklılıklar akıdan deđil, ahlak duygularından trerler. Hume erdemli karakter ile ilgilenir, nk ona gre erdem ahlaksal davranıřı motive eden şeydir. Bu tr bir etik anlayıřında bir eylemin ahlaki deđerı erdemden trer. Hume'a gre erdemli karakter iki yolla ortaya ıkar; ya dođal olarak ya da deneyim ve

eđitim yoluyla. Deneyim ve eđitim ahlakın geliřmesi iin gerekli olan iki nemli faktrdr.

alıřmamda ilk olarak, Hume'un ahlak felsefesinin bir analizini yapmaya alıřtım. Bunu yaparken de *İnceleme* ve *Arařtırmalar* adlı iki temel yapıtımdan faydalandım. Hume'un ahlak felsefesi genel olarak řu Őekilde zetlenebilir: Hume'a gre ahlakın temeli duygulanımlardır. Akıl (*reason*) kendi bařına ahlakta hibir belirleyici rol oynamaz ve tutkularla akıl arasında da bir atıřma yoktur. "Akıl tutkuların klesidir" Őeklindeki nl sz ahlakın akla deđil duygulara bađlı olduđu ynndeki fikrinin temelidir. Hume'a gre, akıl tek bařına ne davranıřlarımızı ynlendirebilir, ne de ahlak bakımından iyi olanla kt olanı birbirinden ayırabilir. Ahlak alanının konusunu dřnceler deđil duygular oluřturur. Ahlakın temelini de akıl deđil duygular ve tutkular oluřturmaktadır. Hume'un ahlak đretisinde tutkular nemli bir yer teřkil eder. Tutkuları da dolaylı ve dođrudan tutkular olmak zere ikiye ayırır. Acı ve haz dođrudan tutkular olan isteme, kaınma, sevin, znt, korku ve umut tutkularının nedenidir. Eđer acı ve haz belirli bir tek kiři ile alakalı ise ve bu kiři herhangi bir insan ise dolaylı tutkular olan sevgi ve nefreti, kiřinin kendisi ise gurur ve ařađılanma tutkularını ortaya ıkarır. Ahlaksal davranıřın temeli duygulanımlardır, kiři belirli acı ve hazları birbirinden ayırabilmelidir. Dolayısıyla acı ve haz etiđin temel đelerindedir. İnsanlar da bu nedenle her zaman belirli hazları arayıp belirli acılardan da kaınmıřlardır. Bu bakımdan Hume'un ahlak teorisinin hazcılık ile de uyuruđu iddia edilebilir. Ancak Hume'da ahlaki deđerlendirmenin temeli zel bir haz ve zel bir acıdır. Ahlak zmlemesinde de deneyci bir yntem sunar.

Hume'un sisteminde en nemli kavramlardan biri "*sympathy*" yani duygudařlık kavramıdır. Duygudařlık kavramı Hume'un ahlak teorisini anlamak iin nemlidir. Bu duygudařlık mekanizmasını *İnceleme* adlı eserin ikinci ve nc kitaplarında bulabiliriz. Duygudařlık en nemli ahlak ilkesidir diyebiliriz. Duygudařlık, birbirine benzeyen Őeyler arasındaki iletiřim olarak da tanımlanabilir. Bu nedenle



duygudaşlıkta benzerlik önemlidir, benzerlik ne kadar fazla olursa hissedilen duygudaşlık da o derece artar. İnsan önce kendisiyle, sonra toplumla ve en sonunda da tüm insanlıkla duygudaşlık ilişkisi kurar. Bu “duygudaşlık mekanizması” Hume’un etiğinin temelini oluşturur. Hume, duygudaşlığı bir izlenimin bir düşünceye dönüşmesi olarak da tanımlar. Hume duygudaşlığın doğası ve nedenini *İnceleme* adlı yapıtında şu sözlerle açıklar;

Duygularımız başka tüm izlenimlerden çok kendimize ve anlığın içsel işlemlerine bağımlıdır; bu nedenle bunlar daha doğal olarak imgelemden ve onlara ilişkin olarak oluşturduğumuz her diri düşünceden doğarlar. Duygudaşlığın doğası ve nedeni budur, ve başkalarının görüş ve duygularını saptadığımız her yerde onlara öyle derinlemesine giriş yolumuz budur.<sup>384</sup>

İnsanların güzellik ve değer duyguları arasında bazı farklar vardır. Hume beğenilerimizin eğitim, alışkanlık, önyargı ve huy tarafından farklılaştığını iddia eder. İnsanlar aynı nesneye farklı şekillerde tepki verirler; farklı ahlaksal eylem ve akıllara sahip olabilirler. Bu yüzden erdemlin ve erdemsizliğin ne olduğu konusunda aynı fikirde olmayabilirler. Bir insan herhangi bir davranışı erdemli olarak nitelendirirken başka birisi bunu erdemsiz bir davranış olarak nitelendirebilir. Diğer bir deyişle, insanlar farklı şeyler hissettiklerinden dolayı farklı yargılarda bulunurlar. Hissetme öznel bir şeydir, bu nedenle nesnelliğin nasıl sağlanacağı bir sorundur. Hume bu sorununun duygudaşlıkla çözülebileceği inancındadır. Duygudaşlık duyguların iletimi olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Nesnelliği mümkün kılan da duygular arasındaki bu iletişimdir. Olumlu veya olumsuz bulunan şeyler onaylama veya onaylamamayı belirler. Eğer biz bir şeyi olumlu buluyorsak, o şeyi onaylarız ve o bize göre iyidir. Genel olarak insanlar yararlı eylemleri onaylar ve zararlı eylemleri kınarlar. Böylece neyin erdemli neyin erdemsiz olduğu konusunda aynı şeyi söyleme

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<sup>384</sup> D. Hume, *İnsan Doğası Üzerine Bir İnceleme*, çev. Aziz Yardımlı, İstanbul: İdea Yayıncılık, (1997), s. 291.

eğilimindedirler. Bu onaylama ve onaylamama da duygudaşlık tarafından yönetilir. Hume, “duygudaşlık insan doğasında çok güçlü bir ilkedir, güzellik beğenimiz üzerinde büyük bir etki gösterir, ve tüm yapay erdemlerde ahlak hislerimizi üretir”<sup>385</sup> der. Duygudaşıktan türeyen bu duygu bütün insanlarda aynıdır ve aynı değerlendirmeyi üretir. İnsanların belirli bir eylemi ahlaksal açıdan onaylamasını ya da onaylamamasını sağlayan da bu duygudaşlık mekanizmasıdır. Böylece duygudaşlık, ahlak yargılarının da temelini oluşturur. İnsanlar duygudaşlık sayesinde birbirlerinin haz ve acılarını anlayabilmekte, aynı zamanda ahlaksal yargılarda bulunabilmektedirler. Bu nedenle Hume’un etiğini duygudaşlık etiği olarak adlandırabiliriz. Bu etiğe göre bir eylemi iyi ya da kötü olarak değil, onaylıyorum ya da onaylamıyorum şeklinde değerlendirebiliriz. Bunu yaparken de deneyimlerimiz ön plana çıkar, eğer çoğunluk tarafından geçmiş deneyimlerimize bakarak bu tür bir eylemin onaylanmadığını görmüşsek biz de bu eylemi onaylamayız. Hume’un sisteminde ahlaklılık insan doğasında yer alır. Ahlak yargıları bizim onaylamamız ve onaylamamamızı ifade eder. Yani onaylama ve onaylamamaya ilişkin duygularımız ahlak yargılarıyla ilgilidirler. Acı ve haz da ahlak yargılarıyla ilgilidir.

Hume’a göre duygudaşlık, insanlar arasında olduğu kadar hayvanlar arasında da var olan bir ilişkidir. Başkalarının hislerini duygudaşlık yolu ile anlayabilirim. *Sympathy* yani duygudaşlık, tüm insanlarda ortak olan bir tutkudur. Diğer taraftan Hume, duygudaşlığın insan sevgisi anlamına gelmediğini de söyler. “İnsanlığa karşı böyle evrensel bir sevginin olduğuna dair bir kanıt yoktur. Bütün insanlar arasında evrensel bir sevgi yoktur”<sup>386</sup> der. Bu açıdan bakarsak Hume’un felsefesinde bir tutarsızlık olduğunu görürüz. Ahlakın temel ilkesi olarak nitelendirdiği duygudaşlık kavramı, çalışmam içerisinde Hume’u eleştirdiğim en temel noktalardan biridir. Böyle bütün insanlarda ortak bir ilkenin kaynağının ne olduğuna ilişkin belirsizlikler ve bazı yerlerde

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<sup>385</sup> *İnceleme*, s. 493.

<sup>386</sup> *Enquiry*, s. 481.

bu ilkenin doğuştan olabileceği fikrini çağrıştıran düşünceleri Hume'un denevciliğine gölge düşürmektedir. Bu nedenle Hume'un ahlak alanında ortaya atmış olduğu duygudaşlık ilkesinin bir hata olduğunu düşünmekteyim.

Bu çalışmada ortaya koymaya çalıştığım bir diğer unsur da, duygudaşlık mekanizmasını sanat alanında yer alan estetik özne ve estetik nesne arasındaki etkileşim mekanizmasını gösteren özdeşleşim olayının basamakları ile açıklamaya çalışmamdır. Özdeşleşim ve duygudaşlık arasında yakın bir ilişki olduğunu düşündüğüm için böyle bir çaba içerisine girdim. Duygudaşlığın daha geniş kapsamlı olması onu özdeşleşimden ayırmaktadır.

Daha sonra Hume'un erdemler (*virtues*) ile ilgili görüşlerini analiz etmeye çalıştım. Hume *İnceleme'nin* üçüncü kitabında erdemler konusunu tartışır. *İnceleme'nin* üçüncü kitabı da üç bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölümde Hume, ahlak teorisinin ana hatlarını tartışmaktadır. İkinci bölümde ise yapay erdemleri ve adaleti tartışır. Üçüncü bölümde de doğal erdemleri tartışır. Hume'un öncelikle yapay erdemleri açıklaması, felsefesinde yapay erdemlerin doğal erdemlerden daha önemli bir yere sahip olduğu düşüncesini çağrıştırmaktadır. Erdemler ahlak yargılarımızda önemli bir rol oynarlar. Ahlak duygularımız erdemlilik ve erdemsizliği birbirinden ayırır. Erdem ve erdemsizliğin asıl kaynağı acı ve haz duygularımızdır. Erdemleri yapay erdemler ve doğal erdemler olarak ikiye ayırır. Doğal erdemler herhangi bir gereksinime dayanmadan doğal olarak insanda bulunan erdemlerdir. Başka bir deyişle, kişiye verilmiş olan niteliklere doğal erdem diyoruz. Çeviklik, zeka, merhamet v.b. erdemler doğal erdemlere örnektirler. Yapay erdemler insanlığın gereksinimleri sonucu toplumda ortaya çıkan erdemlerdir. Erdemler arasında böyle bir ayırım yapması ve adaleti yapay erdem olarak ele alması, Hume'un felsefesindeki tartışma konularından bir diğeridir. *Araştırmalar* adlı eserinde böyle bir ayırımla karşılaşmamaktayız. Hume, *Araştırmalar'da* yapay erdemden söz etmemektedir ama adalet konusunu ele almıştır. Çalışmam içerisinde

doğal ve yapay erdem ayrımını, özellikle de adaletin yapay erdem olarak ele alınmasını tartışmaya çalıştım. Ayrıca doğal erdemleri yeterince açıklamamış olmasını eleştirerek, bu erdemlerin kaynağının akıldan mı, doğuştan mı kaynaklandığı konuları üzerine tartıştım. Sonuç olarak Hume'un erdemlerle ilgili görüşlerinin de bazı eksik ve hatalı noktalarını göstermeye çalıştım.

*İnceleme* adlı eserin ilk kitabında Hume'un insan anlayışına ve bilgi felsefesine ilişkin düşüncelerini bulabiliriz. Bu kitap dört bölümden oluşmaktadır: Hume, birinci bölümde düşüncelerimizin kökenini tartışır. İkinci bölümde, uzay ve zaman düşüncelerini; üçüncü bölümde bilgi-olasılık ve nedensellik düşüncelerini; son bölümde ise kişisel özdeşlik konularını tartışır. Ben de çalışmamın üçüncü bölümünde Hume'un bilgi felsefesine ilişkin görüşlerine yer verdim. Bunu yaparken de Hume'un uzay ve zaman, kişisel özdeşlik ve nedensellik ile ilgili düşüncelerini de tartışmaya çalıştım. Bu bölümde onun bilgi felsefesi ve ahlak felsefesi arasındaki ilişkiyi ortaya koymaya çalıştım. Her ne kadar K. Price gibi bazı düşünürler Hume'un bilgi felsefesinin onun ahlak felsefesini belirlemediğini iddia etmiş olsalar da ben buna katılmıyorum. Bilgi felsefesi alanındaki görüşlerinin ahlak alanındaki görüşlerini belirlediği ve bunların birbirinden ayrı tutulamayacağı inancındayım. Bilgi felsefesinin temelini oluşturan deneyci yöntemin ahlak felsefesinin de temelini oluşturduğunu söyleyebiliriz.

Hume'a göre zihnin bütün algıları düşünceler ve izlenimlerden oluşmaktadır. İzlenimlerimiz duyum, tutku ve duygularımızı; düşüncelerimiz de düşünme ve uslamamalarımızı içermektedir. Dolayısıyla, izlenimlerimizin Hume'un ahlak sisteminde olduğu gibi tutkularımızla; düşüncelerimizin de bilgi felsefesinde olduğu gibi insan anlayışı ile ilgili olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. İzlenimleri de kökensel ya da duyum (*original impressions or impressions of sensation*) izlenimleri ve ikincil ya da düşünsel izlenimler (*secondary or reflective impressions*) olmak üzere ikiye ayırır. İkincil izlenimler tutkulardır ve bunlar da kendi içlerinde sakin (*calm*) ve şiddetli (*violent*) tutkular olmak üzere ikiye

ayrılırlar. İzlenimler ve düşünceler genel olarak birbirlerine benzerler, sadece algılarının güçlü veya zayıf olması ile birbirinden ayrılırlar. Düşüncelerimiz izlenimlerden daha zayıf algılardır. Hume'a göre düşüncelerimizin nedeni izlenimlerimizdir. Andırım, zaman ve mekanda bitişiklik, neden ve etki ilişkisi düşünceler arasındaki çağrışımı saylayan üç niteliktir. Bunlardan en güçlüsü, neden ve etki ilişkisidir.

Hume insan aklının objelerini de düşüncelerin ilişkileri (*relations of ideas*) ve olgu durumları (*matters of fact*) olmak üzere ikiye ayırır. Bu ayırım "Hume'un Çatalı" olarak adlandırılır. Düşüncelerin ilişkileri kesindir, matematiksel önermeler bunlara örnektirler. Olgu durumları ise kesinlik taşımaz, bunların tersinin olması da her zaman mümkündür.

Çalışmam içerisinde Hume'un felsefe tarihinde büyük yankılar uyandıran nedensellik ile ilgili görüşlerini de analiz etmeye çalıştım. Biliyoruz ki Hume'un nedensellik ile ilgili görüşleri oldukça tartışma konusu olmuştur. Hume nedensellik ilişkisinin doğada olmayacağını iddia etmektedir. Çünkü, doğada zorunlu bağlantı yoktur, biz böyle bir ilişkiyi gözlemleyemeyeceğimiz için nedensellik düşüncesi de yoktur. Bu fikir bize alışkanlıklarımız sonucunda yerleşmiştir. Örneğin "a" olayından sonra sürekli "b" olayını gözlemlememiz, biz de "b" olayının nedeninin "a" olayı olduğu gibi bir izlenim yaratmıştır. Burada bizim gözlemlediğimiz şey, iki olayın arka arkaya meydana gelmesinden başka bir şey değildir. Yani biz burada nedensellik ilişkisini gözlemlememekteyiz, dolayısıyla Hume'a göre doğada böyle bir ilişki yoktur.

Çalışmamın dördüncü bölümünde Hume'un estetik teorisinin temel özelliklerini ve estetik teorisi ile ahlak teorisi arasında nasıl bir paralellik olduğunu ortaya koymaya çalıştım. Hume'un estetik ile ilgili düşünceleri onun çeşitli makalelerinde yer alır. Bu makalelerinde beğeni, incelik, zarafet, hitabet, makale yazımı, lüks, tarihsel görüşler, mutluluk ve estetik duygular gibi çeşitli konuları tartışır. Ancak estetik teorisini geliştirdiği en temel yapıtı "Beğenin Ölçütü" (*The Standard of Taste*) adlı makalesidir. Bu makalede Hume, doğru bir estetik yargıda

bulunmak için genel kurallar bulmaya çalışır. Ona göre insanlar farklı beğenilere sahip olduklarından dolayı estetik ile ilgili görüşleri de farklıdır. Ancak Hume bütün insanların üzerinde uzlaşabileceği bazı genel kurallar olması gerektiğine inanır. Her ne kadar beğeni için geçerli olabilecek bir ölçüt bulmaya çalışsa da ve doğru bir estetik yargıda bulunmak için genel bir kural olması gerektiğini iddia etse de, böyle bir şeyin zor olduğunu kabul etmektedir. Beğeni için bir ölçüt bulmak zordur ama imkansız değildir. Beğenin genel ilkelerinin insan doğasında tek olduğuna inanır. Hume'a göre insanlar buldukları yere ve zamana göre değişebilen farklı davranış ve huylara sahiptirler. Bu da insanların duygularının farklı olmasına neden olmaktadır. Bazı insanlar bir sanat çalışmasını överken, başka insanlar aynı çalışmayı yerebilirler. Güçlü bir duygu eksikliği, deneyim eksikliği, önyargı ve dinsel ilkeler beğeni için bir ölçüt geliştirmede engelleyici rol oynarlar. Önyargı, deneyim ve incelikten dolayı insanlar bir beğeniye onaylar ve diğerini onaylamazlar. Hume doğru bir beğeni ölçütü geliştirmek için beş kriter sunar, bunlar: kuvvetli bir duygusal yatkınlık, hassas bir duygulanım, deneyim, karşılaştırma ve önyargılardan arınmış bir zihin.

Hume açısından beğenin ölçütü, doğru bir estetik yargıda bulunmak için gerekli olan ölçünün bulunması anlamındadır. Beğeni kavramı Hume'un hem ahlak teorisinde hem de estetik teorisinde önemli bir kavramdır. Beğeni öznel, dolayısıyla beğeniler çeşitlilik gösterebilmektedir. Diğer taraftan yargılar nesnelir ve doğru bir yargıda bulunmak için bazı geçerli genel ilkeler olmalıdır. Bu nedenle Hume beğeni için bir ölçüt bulmaya çalışır. Ancak öznel beğenilerden nasıl nesnel yargılara varabileceğimiz bir sorun olarak görünmektedir. Hume'un estetik teorisinin de bu soruna bir yanıt bulma niteliğinde olduğunu iddia edebiliriz.

Hume'un sisteminde sakin tutkular ahlak ve estetik yargılarla bağlantılı olarak acı ve haz hislerinin duygularıdır. Örneğin, güzel bir sanat çalışmasını gördüğümüzde, haz duygusunu deneyimleriz. Ahlaksal iyi ile estetik güzelliğin aynı temele dayandıklarını

söyleyebiliriz. Bu açıdan bakılırsa Hume'da etik ve estetik arasında bir fark yoktur. Ancak estetik duygular ve ahlaksal duygular arasında önemli bir fark olduğu da iddia edilebilir. Bu fark da, ahlaksal duyguların kişiyi eyleme sevk etmesi, ama estetik duyguların böyle bir işlevinin olmamasıdır. Ahlaksal ve estetik duygular arasındaki bu farkın da Hume'un tutkular arasında yapmış olduğu ayırmadan kaynaklandığını ileri sürebiliriz. Ahlaksal duygular ve beğeni sakin tutkular içerisinde yer alır. Estetik ve ahlaksal duyguları birbirinden ayıran tek şey yine bu duyguların kendisidir. Hem estetik hem de ahlaksal yargılarımız dolaysızdırlar; ve her ikisinde de davranışlar ve araçlar aynıdırlar. Estetik ve ahlaksal duygular arasındaki doğrudan ilişkiyi sağlayan şeyin de haz ve acı olduğu söylenebilir. Buradan da şunu söyleyebiliriz, ahlak alanındaki erdem ve erdemsizlik, tıpkı estetik alanındaki güzellik ve çirkinlik gibi anlaktaki algılardan ibarettir, dolayısıyla estetik ve ahlak aynı temel üzerine kuruludur, her iki alandaki duygular içseldirler.

Farklı kişiler farklı eğilimlere sahiptirler. Bir insanın davranışı ile başka bir insanın davranışı arasında mutlaka bir fark vardır. Aynı nesne bir insanda hoşnutluk yaratırken başka bir kişide hoşnutsuzluk yaratabilir, çünkü insanlar farklı bedensel hislere sahiptirler. Bu nedenle duygularda da farklılıklar söz konusudur. Şunu diyebiliriz ki, nesnelere kendi içlerinde arzulanabilir şeyler değildirler, nesnelere arzulanabilirliği insan tutkusunun yapısına dayalıdır. Güzellik duygusu nesnelere değil, zihinde bulunan bir duygudur. Bu nedenle gerçek güzellik veya çirkinliği bulmak imkandır. Ancak Hume'a göre, eğer insanlar arasında duyguların bir birliği bulunabilirse, gerçek veya mükemmel güzellik fikri türetilebilir.

Hem ahlaksal hem de estetik yargıların onaylama ve onaylamamadan ibaret olduğunu söylemiştik. Ancak ahlaksal yargılarda onaylanan ya da onaylanmayan kişinin karakteri iken, estetik yargılarda onaylanan ya da onaylanmayan kişinin beğenisidir. Ahlaksal yargıların estetik yargılara göre toplum içerisinde daha önemli bir yere sahip

oldukları da iddia edilebilir. Estetikte ahlaksal karakter yerine kişinin beğenisi ön plandadır.

*İnceleme*'de Hume, başkalarına doğrudan haz ve rahatsızlık veren bir niteliğin ahlaksal ayrımların kaynaklarından biri olduğunu söyler. Bunu kanıtlamak için duygudaşlık ve karşılaştırma ilkelerini ortaya koyar. "Beğenin Ölçütü" adlı makalesinde de, evrensel ilke ve karşılaştırmaya değinir. Bu iki ilkenin estetik bir nesne ile ilgili doğru bir yargı vermek için gerekli olduğunu iddia eder. Bu nedenle denebilir ki, sanat yapıtları başkalarına haz veren niteliklerle ilgilidir, ama her türlü yarar duygusundan soyutlanmıştır. Hume'un sisteminde etik ve estetik yargılar birbirlerine paraleldirler, her iki alandaki değerlendirmeler duyguların ifadelerinden ibarettirler. Hume'a göre ahlak alanında insanlar evrensel bir duyguya sahiptirler, bu duygunun adı *İnceleme*'de duygudaşlık (*sympathy*) *Araştırma*'da ise insanlık (*humanity*) olarak adlandırılmıştır. "Beğenin Ölçütü" adlı makalesinde ise evrensel ilke (*universal principle*) kavramını kullanır. Bütün ahlaksal ve estetiksel yargılar evrensel ilkeye ve genel bir onaylamaya dayanır. Bu genel duygulanım ahlakın kaynağıdır, bu aynı zamanda Hume'un estetik teorisinin de kaynağını oluşturur. Hume'a göre eğer ahlaksal duygular insan yaradılışının evrensel ilkesinden türüyorsa, bu duygular bütün insanlarda aynı olmalıdır. Genel bir uyuşum için geçerli olabilecek kurallar deneyim ile bulunabilir. Bu da genel gözlemlerle mümkündür ve bizi "evrensel deneyime" götürür. Böylece iddia edilebilir ki, insanların farklı duyguları bu evrensel deneyim sayesinde uzlaştırılabilir. Ancak evrensel deneyim nedir? Hume'da bu kavramın bir açıklamasını bulamayız. Ama bana göre bu evrensel deneyim, Hume'un duygudaşlık olarak adlandırdığı duygu ile aynı anlamdadır.

Hume'da estetik yargılar olgu konusu değil, beğenin konusudurlar. Ancak beğenin hem akli hem de bedensel duyuları içerdiği iddia edilebilir. Burada Hume'a şöyle bir eleştiride bulunulabileceğini düşünüyorum, eğer estetik yargılar olgu değil



yalnızca beğeni konusu iseler bunların doğru mu yoksa yanlış mı olduklarını sormak da anlamsız olmaz mı?

Çalışmamın beşinci bölümünde Hume'un ahlak felsefesinin şekillenmesinde etkili olan Hobbes, Mandeville ve Hutcheson'ın görüşlerini açıklamaya ve hangi açılardan Hume'a etkide bulduklarını göstermeye çalıştım. Hume, Hobbes ve Mandeville'in insanların eylemlerinin kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda şekillendiği görüşlerini, yani ahlakın temelini bencillik olduğunu eleştirir. Hume'un "akıl tutkuların kölesidir" şeklindeki ünlü sözünün kaynağının Hobbes'a dayandırılabilceğini, bu açıdan Hobbes'un Hume'un felsefesinde önemli bir etkisi olduğunu iddia edebiliriz. Diğer taraftan Mandeville'in erdemlerin doğal olmadığı yönündeki görüşleri de Hume'un yapay erdemler teorisi üzerinde oldukça etkili olmuştur. Mandeville'in düşüncesinde de Hume'da olduğu gibi eğitim ve deneyim önemli bir yere sahiptir. Hume da Mandeville gibi iyi nitelikler ve erdemler arasında ayırım yapar. Ayrıca "tutkuların kölesi" ifadesi Hume'dan önce Mandeville tarafından kullanılmıştır. Hutcheson da Hume gibi "ahlak duygusu" okulunun temsilcilerindendir. Dolayısıyla Hutcheson'ın düşüncelerinin Hume üzerindeki etkisi oldukça fazladır. Hutcheson da Hume gibi ahlakın temelini duygular olduğunu iddia eder ve insan tutkularını temel inceleme konusu yapar. Hume'un "düşünsel izlenimler" ile ilgili fikirlerinin doğrudan Hutcheson'dan alındığı iddia edilmektedir. Gerek Hume gerekse Hutcheson ahlak duygusunun bütün insanlarda ortak olarak bulunduğu konusunda da aynı fikirdedirler. Ayrıca Hume'un duygudaşlığın doğası, ahlakın kaynağı, ve akılla ilgili düşüncelerinde Hutcheson'ın fikirlerinin önemli bir yere sahip olduğu açıktır.

Hume'un ahlak felsefesi ahlak psikolojisinin (*moral psychology*) yer aldığı tutkular teorisini içerir. Onun etiği rasyonalistlerin etiğine karşıdır, çünkü ahlakın temelini akıl değil duygular oluşturmaktadır. Daha önce de belirttiğimiz gibi *İnceleme* ve *Araştırmalar* Hume'un düşüncelerini bulabileceğimiz iki temel yapıtıdır. Her ne kadar bu iki eser arasında bazı farklar olsa da, genel hatlarıyla önemli bir farklılık

yoktur. Hume'un ahlak felsefesinde tutkular arasında yapmış olduđu ayırım, duygudaşlık mekanizması, yapay erdem ayırımı felsefesindeki yeterince açık olmayan ve çeşitli tartışmalara yol açan başlıca konulardır. Ben de çalışmam içerisinde özellikle bu konularda Hume'un felsefesini eleştirdim ve bu konulara açıklık kazandırmaya çalıştım. Her ne kadar Hume'un ahlak felsefesi bazı açılardan sorunlu olsa da, Hume'un felsefesinde tek bir özelliğın hakim olduğunu söyleyebilirim: "Deneysel yöntem" Hume'un bütün felsefesine egemen olan bir yöntemdir. Bütün eksikliklerine rağmen Hume'un felsefesi bir bütünlük taşımaktadır ve bu nedenle birbirinden ayrılamaz. Çalışmam içerisinde Hume'un diğer felsefi görüşlerine de yer vermemin sebebi de budur, temelleri bakımından Hume'un bütün felsefi düşüncesinin deneyim üzerine kurulu olduğu sonucuna varabiliriz.

Son olarak şunu söyleyebilirim ki, bu çalışmada Hume'un ahlak felsefesinin sorunlu yanlarını ortaya koymaya çalıştım. Böylelikle Hume ile ilgili çalışmalara yeni bir katkı sağlanacağı inancındayım. Farklı bir bakış açısıyla Hume'un ahlak felsefesinin analizini yapmaya ve ortaya çıkan sorunların açıklığa kavuşturulmasını sağlamaya çalıştım. Bunu gerçekleştirmek için de Hume'un felsefesinin bir bütün olarak analizini yapmaya çalıştım, umuyorum bu konuda başarılı olmuşumdur.

**APPENDIX B**  
**CURRICULUM VITAE**

**PERSONAL INFORMATION**

Surname, Name: Gülcan, Nur Yeliz  
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**EDUCATION**

<b>Degree</b>	<b>Institution</b>	<b>Year of Graduation</b>
MS	Mersin University, Philosophy	2002
BS	Hacettepe University, Philosophy	1999
High School	İskenderun Barbaros Lisesi, Hatay	1993

**WORK EXPERIENCE**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Enrollment</b>
2007- Present	Dicle University, Department of Philosophy	Lecturer

**FOREIGN LANGUAGES**

Advanced English, Ancient Greek

**PUBLICATIONS**

1. Gülcan, N. Y. "Dil Felsefesinde Gönderge Sorunu", Felsefe Dünyası, 44, 168-182 (2006).
2. Gülcan, N.Y. "Rawls'ın Doğruluk Olarak Adalet Teorisi", Kaygı Dergisi, 8, 84-90 (2007).

## **PRESENTATIONS**

1. 18-20 Ekim 2006 tarihleri arasında düzenlenen II. Ulusal Uygulamalı Etik Kongresi'nde "Uygulamalı Etik ve Hume'un Ahlak Teorisi" başlıklı bildiri sunumu.
2. 22- 24 Kasım 2006 tarihleri arasında düzenlenen Türkiye Estetik Kongresi'nde "Hume'un Estetik Teorisinde Etik ve Estetik Yargılar Arasındaki İlişki" konu başlıklı bildiri sunumu.
3. 9- 13 Temmuz 2007 tarihleri arasında düzenlenen, XVII. International Aesthetics Congress "The Concept of Beauty in Aesthetics" konu başlıklı bildiri sunumu ve Oturum başkanlığı.
4. 10-15 Eylül 2007 tarihleri arasında düzenlenen 38. ICANAS (Uluslararası Asya ve Kuzey Afrika Çalışmaları Kongresi) Kongresi'nde "Tarihsel Süreçte Dinin Bilimsel Alandaki Etkileri Açısından Din-Bilim İlişkisi" konu başlıklı bildiri sunumu ve Oturum başkanlığı.

## **HOBBIES**

Swimming, car sports, volleyball