

CAUGHT BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND SOCIALISM:
THE KAZAK *ALASH ORDA* MOVEMENT
IN CONTINUITY

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ABSTRACT

CAUGHT BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND SOCIALISM: THE KAZAK *ALASH ORDA* MOVEMENT IN CONTINUITY

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This dissertation aims to discuss the incorporation of the “nationalist” Kazak intellectuals of *Alash Orda* to the Soviet Socialist Republics and their role in the establishment of the Kazak ASSR. In the course of events they acted first together with Russian liberal democrats, then they sought to establish a national government and fought against the Bolsheviks, but after 1920 they chose to stay in the USSR and join the modernization process of their homeland alongside the Bolsheviks.

In the mainstream academic discourse the local leaders in the republics of the USSR are generally considered as passive victims of the Soviet policies. The members of the Kazak national movement of *Alash Orda* are also neglected as

weak political figures after they had accepted the Soviet rule. But they continued their struggle for enlightening the Kazak people in 1920s. Their collaboration with the Bolsheviks was concomitant to their motives of modernizing the Kazaks. Their role in the Soviet Kazakhstan did not come to an end after their acceptance of the Soviet sovereignty but it continued.

My argument is that the struggle of the members of *Alash Orda* was in continuity with their program before the revolution, and their cooperation with the Bolsheviks was a way to realize their objectives, and it opened a sphere for them to have a role in the formation of the Kazak ASSR.

Keywords: Kazak, Kazakh, Kazakstan, Kazakhstan, Alash Orda, Intelligentsia, USSR, Soviets, Nationalism, Modernization, Land Question.

ÖZ

MİLLİYETÇİLİK VE SOSYALİZM ARASINDA: KAZAK *ALAŞ ORDA* HAREKETİNDE SÜREKLİLİK

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Bu tez “milliyetçi” Kazak aydınlarından oluşan *Alaş Orda*’nın Sovyetler Birliğine katılımının nedenlerini ve Kazak ÖSSC’nin kuruluşundaki rollerini tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. *Alaş Ordacılar* süreç içinde önce liberal demokrat Ruslarla birlikte hareket etmiş, sonra bir ulusal hükümet kurup Bolşeviklere karşı savaşmış, ancak 1920’den sonra SSCB’de kalıp Bolşeviklerle birlikte memleketlerinin modernleşmesine katılmayı seçmişlerdir.

Akademik alanda SSCB cumhuriyetlerindeki yerel önderler genelde Sovyet siyasetinin edilgen unsurları olarak görüldüklerinden yok sayılırlar. Kazak ulusal hareketi *Alaş Ordacılar* da 1920’de Sovyet egemenliğini kabul ettikten sonraki dönemde zayıf siyasi figürler olarak görüldüklerinden ihmal edilmişlerdir. Ancak *Alaşçılar* Kazak halkını modernleştirme mücadelelerine 1920’lerde de devam

etmiştir. Bolşeviklerle işbirliği yapmaları Kazakları modernleştirme hedefleriyle uyumluydu. Sovyet egemenliğini kabul ettikten sonra rolleri Sovyet Kazakistanında sona ermemiş devam etmiştir.

Alaş Orda üyelerinin mücadelesi devrimden önce açıkladıkları programlarıyla uyum içindeydi ve Bolşeviklerle işbirlikleri de amaçladıklarını gerçekleştirebilmenin bir yoluydu ve bu işbirliği onlara Kazak ÖSSC'nin kuruluşunda bir rol sahibi olmalarını sağlayacak bir alan açtı.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Kazak, Kazakistan, Alaş Orda, aydınlar, SSCB, sovyetler, milliyetçilik, modernleşme, toprak sorunu.

To My Grandfather,

Dr. Kemal Ataç

(1917-2006)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.O.	Autonomous Oblast
ASSO	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Oblast
ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
C.C.	Central Committee of the party
<i>Kadets</i>	Constitutional Democrats
Kazkraikom	Commissariat of Kazak Krai
Komuch	Committee of the Members of the Constituent Assembly
Narkomnat	Commissariat for Nationality Affairs
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the turmoil of transformations in Russia between 1917 and 1920, the Kazak intellectuals made sharp political decisions in their alliances to reach their goals. In the course of events they acted first together with Russian liberal democrats, then they tried to find a national government and fought against the Bolsheviks, after 1920 they continued their struggle in the USSR and joined the modernization process of their homeland alongside the Bolsheviks.

Because of the radical shifts in their political position they have been evaluated by different writers and at different times very controversially during the Soviet period. After the dissolution of the USSR, the same figures are glorified or condemned by different writers as “nationalists.”

This dissertation aims to discuss the incorporation of the “nationalist” Kazak¹ intellectuals of Alash Orda to the Soviet Socialist Republics. They made up the first generation of the Kazak politicians. This dissertation will also study their evolution to become members of a socialist Kazakhstan and the possible reasons of that transition.

¹ Here in this dissertation, “Kazak” and Kazakhstan” are used instead of the widely accepted Russian transliteration “Kazakh” and “Kazakhstan” in English. This is the official denomination preferred by the Republic of Kazakhstan.

In order to understand, what they had at hand, why they made certain decisions, and why they ended up at the side of the Bolsheviks, it is necessary to study the period they were going through, and their aims in shifting their alliances, and what happened in the Soviet period.

The reforms after the 1905 Revolution paved the way for the establishment of a new generation of Kazak intellectuals. After 1905, they joined the Russian political establishment as members of the Constitutional Democrat's party (*Kadet*), and published influential periodicals; after February Revolution in 1917, they formed an independent political party, *Alash* and a Kazak government, *Alash Orda*; during the civil war from 1918 to 1920, they allied with the Whites against the Bolsheviks and sought to consolidate the sovereignty of the state of *Alash Orda*.

The period between the February Revolution in 1917 and the Bolshevik sovereignty in the Kazak Steppes in 1920 has a very important place in recent Kazak historiography. This is the period, when the Kazak intellectuals formed the Kazak *Alash Orda* government. Since the formation of the first Duma in 1905, Kazak intellectuals were developing tools of modern policy making. In the process of reshaping political structure following the February Revolution, they seized the importance of the times they were going through and formed an independent government to deal with their own problems on equal terms with Russia.

Although they had fought against the Bolsheviks during the civil war, they joined them in the beginning of 1920, and took part in the modernization project of their homeland. Most studies on the Kazaks at the first period of the 20th

century are based on the period until the establishment of the Soviet rule. The study of that period until the cooperation stresses only the nationalist struggle of the Kazak intellectuals, and it is open to instill excessive ideas about the nationalist tendencies of the Kazak intellectuals. When the Kazaks realized that they could not defeat the Bolsheviks, they decided to resume their role as modernist Kazak intellectuals under the Soviet rule. Their influence was weakened in time, but they continued to work until they were murdered by the purges at the end of 1930s.

It is argued here that their nationalism is evaluated by later historians in current aspects distorting their understanding of nationalism. They were for the survival of their people, for which becoming a nation was deemed as indispensable. Their main aim was modernization and becoming culturally equal with the Russians; forming the Kazak nation was part of their modernization project, and it was sought to be implemented under different rules in continuity.

The study of their deeds and choices reflects that they had a certain agenda together with nationalism, modernization of the Kazak people. This was to be achieved by becoming a nation; thus, nationalism can be considered as part of their modernization project. It is probably more realistic to evaluate them as modernist intellectuals trying to save their people by a modernization effort. The radical changes of their allies under changing conditions were not an outcome of paradigmatic shifts but they were indeed carrying on their objective of modernization. Thus, they can probably be considered as pragmatic or realistic politicians trying to make history under given conditions. Posthumously, they acquired different roles in different historiographies.

In my study I will attempt to show the continuity in the motives of the members of the *Alash Orda* government, the sovietization process of the Kazak Steppes, what they had on their agenda, what was common with the Bolshevik agenda, which might have facilitated their participation on the Bolshevik side, what kind of policies were implemented by the Bolsheviks, and how and why the members of *Alash Orda* were removed from the political stage. They were liquidated nearly two decades later. The focus of this dissertation will be the period until the end of 1920s, when they had an active role in the modernization.

They were neither deluded nor did they join the Bolsheviks by force, but there were some common points shared with the Bolsheviks, which might have created some optimism; and participation was a way of implementing their project of modernizing the Kazak society. The creation of a nation out of Kazak tribes was also understood as part of this modernization process, i.e. as a stage in the historical evolution of social groups.

The independence of Kazakhstan in 1991 opened a new field for social inquiry. Before the independence, Kazakhstan was generally an isolated field of study. Not only during the Soviet period but it was also cut off from the Western world long before that period.

There are only few sources on Kazak history published in English. The major source is Martha Brill Olcott's book, called "The Kazakhs" from 1987.² Recently, the quantity of studies on Kazakhstan is increasing with the help of some

² Martha Brill Olcott, (1987) *The Kazakhs*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California.

Ph.D. dissertations.³ Most studies and documents on the Kazaks are in Russian, and until recently most academic studies were relying basically on Russian sources, where the Kazak intellectuals were condemned as bourgeois-nationalist intellectuals. The exaggeration of nationalist tendencies supports a one-dimensional study of the members of Alash Orda as nationalist leaders.

The independence of Kazakhstan in 1991 brought radical changes to the historiography in Kazakhstan. After the independence, re-writing the Kazak history became one of the most important issues of social studies – if not the most important one. There are many books being published on Kazak history, a field neglected during the Soviet period.⁴ The Soviet historiography underlined the role of the Russians as the protector of the weak Kazak people (“big brother”) and pioneer of the human civilization, whereas the Kazaks were described as savage, nomadic peoples.⁵

In addition to this tendency of Soviet historiography, the history of Alash Orda was considered as a politically dangerous field of study. The first studies on Alash Orda were written in 1920s, when most members of Alash Orda were alive. The first book, *Alash Orda*, was a small pamphlet consisting documents prepared by A. K. Borochokov published in 1927. It was followed by another collection of

³ See for example, Steven Sabol (1998) “*Awake Kazak!*” *Russian Colonization of Kazak Central Asia and the Genesis of Kazak National Consciousness: 1868-1920*, a dissertation submitted to Georgia State University, published as Steven Sabol (2003) *Russian Colonization of Central Asia and the Genesis of Kazak National Consciousness*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY; Deniz Balgamiş (2000) *The Origin and the Development of Kazak Intellectual Elites in the Pre-Revolutionary Period*, a dissertation submitted to University of Wisconsin-Madison.

⁴ See for the recent official history texts, Mambet K. Kozybaev, et. al. (1998), *History of Kazakhstan Essays*, (ed.) Ministry of Science-Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan-Institute of History and Ethnology Named by Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, Gylym, Almaty.

⁵ T. Turlugulov (1991) *Rasskazy po Istorii Kazakhskoi SSR, Posobie dlia V Klassa*, Rauan, Alma-Ata.

documents by N. Martynenko in 1929. In 1935 S. Braynin and Sh. Shafiro published *Alashorda Tarihinin Ocherkteri* (Essays on the History of Alash Orda). They were all representing the official party line, which was condemning Alash Orda as a bourgeois-nationalist movement. After 1935 even this kind of books were not permitted to be published⁶ and a selected amnesia was applied by the state to bury the movement of Alash Orda.

Recently, it acquired a very privileged position in the general discourse to stress the depth of the Kazak civilization, nation and state-formation. The Kazaks are trying to strengthen the political basis of their state formation, and the short lasting emergence of an independent Kazak government (*Alash Orda*) in 1917-1920 happens to be a valuable source for the legitimacy of the Kazak nation-state. The Kazaks aim to show that their independent state of today has deep roots and that they have a history of struggle for independence and founding a state. It is necessary to show that the independent Kazakhstan was neither a new, unfounded establishment nor an “accidental” byproduct of the unexpected fall of the USSR but an interrupted development. Today in Kazakhstan, consequently, the period is being thoroughly studied, and recently collected works of significant intellectual leaders and the documents of that period are being published.⁷

⁶ Kengesh Nurpeisov (1998b) “Alashtanu” *Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia 1*, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaksiyasy, Almaty: 252-253.

⁷ See for example, M. K. Koigeldiev et. al. (2004) *Alash Kozgalysy, Kuzhattar men Materialdar Dzinaghy, seyir 1901 j – jeltoksan 1917 j., Dvizhenia Alash*, Ata Murasy, Almaty; Kenges, Nurpeisov (1995) *Alash hem Alash Orda*, Almaty; Omarbekov, Talas (2003) *Kazakstan Tarihynyng XX Ghasyrdaghy Ozekti Maseleleri*, Oner, Almaty; U. Subkhanberdina (1999) *Kazak Khalkynyng Atamuralary*, Ortalyk Ghylymi Kitapkhana, Almaty; Mustafa Chokai (1998) *Tangdamaly Birinshi Tom*, (transcr.) Nusipkhan, Aitan, Kainar, Almaty; Mustafa Chokai (1999) *Tangdamaly Ekinshi Tom*, (transcr.) Nusipkhan, Aitan, Kainar, Almaty; Akhmet Baitursunov (2003) *Adebiet Tanytkysh*, Atamura, Almaty. Alikhan Bokeikhanov (1994) *Shygharmalary*, Almaty. Mirzhakyp Dulatuly (2003) *Bes Tomdyk Shygharmalar Zhynaghy*, Almaty, Mektep.

Recent Kazak books are inclined to exaggerate the deeds of the members of Alash Orda during the civil war. They are praised, especially by distinguished Kazak specialists of that period, such as Nurpeisov and Koigeldi as independence fighters. The weakness of Alash Orda is overseen, which leads to misinterpretations of the period such as the ambiguity of their shifts from one side to the other.

Additionally, Alash Orda was not the only political movement of the period. They were not a unique organization but Kazak examples of a general process. Similar movements were seen in Central Asia in National Union of Turkestan or in Caucasia, Ukraine as well. Most of their members joined the Bolsheviks and cooperated in the establishment of national Soviet republics.

Although it is not a determinant factor in their writings, Alash Orda is also evaluated by recent Kazak scholars as a movement seeking for alliances with other Turkic peoples of Central Asia. Despite the fact that they had close relations with Zeki Velidi (Togan, 1890-1970) from the north, Bashkortostan, and Mustafa Chokai (1890-1941) from the south, Turkistan, they were not for an alliance with them but they were seeking to form their own nation.⁸ Their relationship with other Turkic leaders was part of the Russian political structure, which was pushing them as a matter of fact to act together as “Russian Muslims.”

In addition to Kazak sources, some sources written in Turkish, which due to language issue are not widely used in the West, are also worth to mention. Turkey was one of the countries accepting *émigrés* from the Turkic peoples of the

⁸ This will be exemplified in the second chapter on their relationships with Chokai and Zeki Velidi, and in the fourth chapter “Kazak Intellectuals as Modernizers”.

USSR. There is some valuable first-hand information to be found in books and memoirs of non-Kazak Turkic *émigrés*, like Zeki Velidi Togan's,⁹ and in some recent studies of the second generation Kazak *émigrés*,¹⁰ some of which are only accessible to Turkish readers. Their work consists of indispensable information and alternative perspectives of Turkic intellectuals, who were not persecuted during the purges or raised in the USSR.

The books written in Turkey during the Cold War, i.e. before the dissolution of the USSR, are based on the information presented by the *émigrés*. In their assessment, their immigration seems to be the most rational choice under the threat of the Russian oppression.¹¹ Also the books written in the West are generally based on the information of the *émigrés* and some Russian sources. Their subject matter is not related to explain the intentions of political and intellectual leaders, who have chosen to stay. They rather tend to underline the nationalist tendencies, struggle for independence and anti-communist resistance.¹²

9, Zeki Velidi Togan (1981) *Bugünkü Türkili Türkistan ve Yakın Tarihi*, Enderun Kitabevi, İstanbul; Zeki Velidi Togan (1999) *Hâtıralar*, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, Ankara (first published 1968).

¹⁰ Hasan Oraltay (1973) *Alaş: Türkistan Türkleri'nin Milli İstiklal Parolası*, Büyük Türkeli Yayınları, İstanbul; Abdulvahap Kara (2002) *Türkistan Ateşi: Mustafa Çokay'ın Hayatı ve Mücadelesi*, Da Yayıncılık, İstanbul; also in Kazak: Abdvakap Kara (2004) *Mustafa Chokai: Omiri, Kuresi, Shygharmashylyghy*, Arys Baspasy, Almaty; Hüseyin Adıgüzel (2005) *Milli Komünizmin Öncüleri: Rıskulov*, İleri Yayınları, İstanbul; Kayyum Kesici, (2003); *Dün, Bugün ve Hedefteki Kazakistan*, İstanbul, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık; Zeyneş İsmail (2002) *Kazak Türkleri*, Ankara, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları.

¹¹ Mehmet Saray (1994) *Rus İşgali Devrinde Osmanlı Devleti ile Türkistan Hanlıkları Arasındaki Siyasi Münasebetler (1775-1985)*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu; Baymirza Hayit (1995), *Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadele Tarihi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara; Nadir Devlet (1999), *Rusya Türklerinin Milli Mücadele Tarihi (1905-1917)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara; Alaeddin Yalçınkaya (1997), *Sömürgecilik & Panislamizm Işığında Türkistan, 1856'dan Günümüze*, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul.

¹² See for example, Serge Zenkovsky (1967), *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts.

For most studies it is out of question, what was persuasive for the other political leaders, who had chosen to stay and continued to work within the Bolshevik state apparatus.

Their “nationalism” should not be understood in terms of the later nationalism between 1920s and 1945 under the strong influence of racism. As E. J. Hobsbawm notes in his book *Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Program, Myth and Reality*, nationalisms (and nations), are not given, definite facts, but they are “invention”s, and their meaning changed in time due to objective historical factors. It was sometimes a political *leitmotif* for the left for popular right (after the French Revolution), independence and solidarity against imperialism (after the Second World War); sometimes it activated large rightist masses for unity, assimilation and expansion (interwar period). He states that the radical attempts to homogenize nations through ethnic cleansing, forced deportation and genocide are the result of the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination proposed during the First World War, which required to coincide the state frontiers with the frontiers of nationality and language.¹³

This periodisation and contextualization can also help to explain the case of the Kazak intellectuals. The evaluation of their deeds with later nationalist ideas would be a retrospective, misleading assessment. The nationalism of the Kazak intellectuals is a product of the period before the increase of xenophobic motives in nationalism that is prior to the Second World War. Most of the Kazak intellectuals had well-established personal and political relations with the

¹³ Eric John Hobsbawm (1992) *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Russians. Similar to other nations of the period, thus, their nationalism was not close to racism, but directed to obtain cultural and political rights for the survival of their people.¹⁴ They considered becoming a modern nation as the only way for the survival of their people in the age of nations.

For most of the members of Alash Orda, it can be argued that there was some continuity in their political motives, whether they were acting with the *Kadets*, or working for the national government or with the Bolsheviks. While some other Kazaks had migrated to China and Iran, and some leading members of Central Asian, Caucasian or Volga-Ural peoples, such as Mustafa Chokai (Kazak), Mehmet Emin Resulzade (Azerbaijani), Zeki Velidi (Bashkort), Sadri Maksudi (Tatar), Ayaz Iskhaki (Tatar) chose to become political refugees in other countries, The Kazaks preferred to join the Bolsheviks and to stay in their country. They can be considered as examples of another path, who preferred to and continue with their work.

However, the books written during the Cold War - and also recent studies - concentrate on one of the periods, being either the period until the establishment of the Soviet sovereignty (1920) or the period of Stalin's purges in 1930s. This periodisation disregards the role of the Kazak intellectuals under the Soviet administration and the possible reasons of their cooperation in its first years. Hence, the establishment of the Soviet authority did not bring a complete end to the activities of the Kazak leaders, but it opened some channels for them, which might have facilitated their acceptance of the Soviet power. What attracted the Kazak intellectuals to the Soviet rule remains to be a less studied question.

¹⁴ See the quotation on page 59-60.

In the Soviet historiography, the Kazak history was written on a territorial basis, like in all Soviet republics, in order to strengthen the attachment of the citizens to the republics within the borders drawn in Moscow. The end of the USSR did not end this tendency of territorial historiography but changed the context. While in the Soviet historiography it was “nationalist in form, socialist in context,” after the independence it turned into being “socialist in form, nationalist in context.”¹⁵ Despite the fact that the socialist ideology was abandoned, the methods used in the Soviet period proved to be persistent. Moreover, the territoriality was strengthened to prove the depth of the Kazak civilization.

Although this attitude has its positive aspects, like suspension of irredentism, the time of the Kazak intellectuals should be more thoroughly studied within a broader geographical context, such as the changes in the USSR and Central Asia. The distinctive features in Kazakhstan should not be overseen, but it is also true that they can be more fully understood as part of a broader context.

In order to facilitate seeing the contrasts, in the next chapter the life of an alternative figure, a Kazak intellectual from the southern Kazakhstan *Alash Orda* will also be briefly mentioned. Mustafa Chokai, who was the president of the Kokand government in Turkistan, had close relations with members of *Alash Orda*, and especially with the leader of *Alash Orda*, Bokeikhanov, who was much older, more experienced and better known in Russian politics. Their close relation continued during the chaotic years as well. Chokai - in addition to his position of presidency in the Kokand government in Turkistan - as a Kazak from Syrderya

¹⁵ Büşra Ersanlı (1995), “Siyasal Aidiyet Hakkı: Osmanlı Sonrası ve Sovyet Sonrasında Tarih Eğitimi” 2. *Uluslararası Tarih Kongresi, Tarih Eğitimi ve Tarihte ‘Öteki’ Sorunu*, Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı.

Oblast, was also the Kazak representative of Syrderya Kazaks and minister in the *Alash Orda* government. Apart from those facts, the weakness of their governments forced them to act together. But they followed their own agendas and the final decision of Chokai turned to be joining the resistance against the Bolsheviks and then leaving the country, whereas Bokeikhanov and other members of *Alash Orda* remained in the USSR. The association and differentiation makes him worth to mention.

Even so, they were acting within the bigger context of Russia. The individuals' personal goals are shaped within a given context. It is not stable and predetermined but open to changes with changing alternatives and possibilities. The individuals do not act as heroes making the history, but they act as agents within structures trying to figure out what to do in a certain time interval and to find the best fitting tactics to reach their final goal. The will of a certain organization, like *Alash Orda*, is not the only determining factor in changing the course of the history. They needed to be flexible in changing their tactics embedded to the political structure of Russia in order to reach their goal of modernization and survival of the Kazaks. The changes in Kazak leaders' alliances can be understood within the context of their interaction with the changing conditions surrounding them. Their policies were path-dependent, i.e. constructed by historical, political arrangements.

The Kazaks not only had to deal with the changing political structure of Russia but they - together with the Bolsheviks - were affected by the world-system as well, which was eradicating some options for the Kazak independence, such as the support of the USA under the Wilsonian Principles of self-

determination, or the defeat of the attempt of German revolution, which caused to put an end to the hopes of a world revolution and create an isolated USSR trying to keep the Soviet nations under tight control instead of creating desirable examples of freedom and equality for the East.

When the agents try to project the future and make plans accordingly, they evaluate only the factors revealed to them. It is never possible to be able to evaluate all the factors. Moreover, any time new factors may arise transforming the conjuncture totally.

Despite the fact that agents act within structures, in the case of the Kazak leaders, they had the possibility to leave the country and struggle in exile, like another prominent personality from Turkistan, Mustafa Chokai did. The agents are not totally bound by the structure; they have the capacity to choose. There are many others, who had chosen to stay in their homeland. The reason for that may vary, but here, it is argued that the choice made by the leaders of Alash Orda is parallel to what they aimed in their political struggle. Although they sacrificed most of their organizational and personal initiative by accepting the Soviet sovereignty, it was not conflicting with their aim of modernizing the Kazak society.

Insofar as it is not possible to foresee and plan every aspect, the projects of every “winner” or “loser” can fall victim to unintended consequences. There are plenty of potential historical figures forgotten in the past, who were not lacking the subjective features but objective conditions, which prevented the fulfillment of their dreams. This is true for the Kazak intellectuals as well, who are still among the lesser known historical figures. They acted in accordance with their program,

which will be sought to be exemplified in this dissertation, but the future developments determined by a wider structure weakened their position and led to their purges.

It is not only the future, which cannot be predicted precisely in the way as it will be, but also the past cannot be constructed “as it really was.”¹⁶ We comprehend the past through a recollection of all events accumulated within the past process.¹⁷ The past is evaluated on top of all the previous layers of events and interpretations, which complicates to seize an original, historical event free from mystifications. A certain event in history cannot be evaluated independent of the knowledge of the following events, and they unintentionally affect our judgment. History should be studied based on historical documents but with the use of new tools and methods in order to construct the past free from present day categories as much as possible.

In the case of the Kazak intellectuals, it should be kept in mind that they had to make decisions in a total turmoil, when the whole Russia with its colonies was being reshaped, and none of the policy-makers had definite plans for the future but only thoughts and flexible tactics to achieve their dreams. The Kazaks were also in search of tactics appropriate to their final goal.

What the Kazak intellectuals had in mind in making decisions can only be understood by reconstructing what was available to them. However it should also

¹⁶ This is definitely in contradiction with the distinguished historian and founder of positivist historiography Leopold von Ranke’s (1795-1886) aim that history should be told “as it really was” (*wie es eigentlich geschehen ist*).

¹⁷ This is studied by Edmund Husserl in his analysis of “time consciousness,” according to what the consciousness of past contains only the reproduction of that particular past point but at the same time a continuous iterative reproductions of all earlier time points up to now.

be kept in mind that it is not possible for anybody to imagine the whole picture. It is worth to remind that it was not possible for any Kazak intellectual of that time under the fragmented flow of information to know what was going on in the Russian capital or in any other part of Russia. Consequently, it is not possible for any modern historian to construct the past - and not even the general background of individual decision makers - as it really was. We might be in a more advantageous position to construct the total picture by studying documents on a wider area with the knowledge of the course of events, but still we would not be constructing what the individual leaders had in their mind, and here the constructed total picture might even be misleading.

The past is generally evaluated with imposed ideas of time according to changing needs, and different versions of history are being produced as the “real” picture of the past. In order to give a definite assessment of the past, different segments are selected due to changing needs. The changing assessment of the Kazak intellectuals did not come to an end, when they passed away, but it continued with sharper differentiations. They were first condemned as “bourgeois-nationalist enemies of the people”; then they were celebrated and acquired the status of national heroes. They were neither heroes nor “enemies of the people,” but it is rather the next generations, who create the “heroes” or “traitors” in writing the history. Here they will be treated neither as heroes nor as traitors or victims but as individuals trying to cope with the means of modernization for the Kazak people.

CHAPTER 2

2. The Kazak Intellectuals as Liberal, Nationalist Politicians

The Kazak intellectuals joined the political arena after the introduction of constitutional monarchy and foundation of Russian Duma in St. Petersburg, in 1905. The political liberalization in Russia opened a new sphere for the Kazak intellectuals to pronounce and discuss the problems of the Kazak society. Moreover, they learned through meeting other peoples' representatives the use of new methods in politics, need for organization, tools of political agitation etc. They also realized that they were not the only people in the Russian Empire with expectations from the tsar.

In the first Duma of 1905, Kazaks had four representatives from the Steppe region (*Dala Ualaiaty*¹⁸) led by Alikhan Bokeikhanov¹⁹ (186?²⁰-1937). They joined the Constitutional Democrats (*Kadets*), which was a liberal democratic Russian party. Their democratic principles were attractive for non-

¹⁸ *Dala Ualaiaty* (Steppe Province, i.e. the Kazak Steppes) consisted of four oblasts, what make up today roughly the central and northern territories of Kazakhstan. It included the city of Orenburg, which is a Russian city today, but southern Kazakistani regions of Semirechie and Syrdarya were part of Turkistan. Some sources add the – Kazak - representatives of these two southern regions and declare the number of Kazak representatives in the first Duma as six. See for a map of the oblasts to appendix A, map 1 and for a map of administrative divisions of the Kazak Steppes and Turkistan to appendix A, map 5.

¹⁹ See for a picture of him appendix C, picture 1.

²⁰ There are different years of birth for Bokeikhanov; the most common dates cited by scholars are 1866, 1869 and 1870 (Sabol 2003: 73-74).

Russian nationalities, and in their program in article 11, it was declared that “the fundamental law of the Russian Empire must guarantee to all nationalities living in the empire, aside from full civil and political equality, the right to free cultural self determination.”²¹

Until the February Revolution they remained together with Russian liberals, in the Constitutional Democratic Party, and Bokeikhanov acquired a distinguished position as a member of the party council.

During that period the Kazaks published an influential newspaper, *Kazak*²² (1913-1918), under Bokeikhanov together with Akhmet Baitursynov²³ (1873-1937) and Mirzhakyp Dulatov²⁴ (1885-1935).²⁵ The newspaper became the breeding ground of a new generation of Kazak intellectuals and a political ground to discuss the problems of the Kazak people. The newspaper was instrumental in creating the Kazakness and grounding their political demands.

The main issues of Kazak intellectuals in that period were: land question, national rights – including creating the Kazak literary language - and social changes (modernization), which were all interconnected in a political agenda of saving the Kazak people. All Kazak intellectuals indifferent of their political orientation or political differentiations were interested in those problems.

²¹ Sabol 2003: 109.

²² See for a picture of the first issue appendix C, picture 2.

²³ See for a picture appendix C, picture 2.

²⁴ See for a picture appendix C, picture 3.

²⁵ See for a picture of all three publishers together appendix C, picture 5.

2.1. The February Revolution and the Foundation of an Independent Kazak Political Party, *Alash*

The February Revolution changed the course of events radically. The incidents started on 23rd of February²⁶ following a strike on the International Women's Day. The strikes and demonstrations continued until the soldiers joined the demonstrators on 27th of February and the Petrograd Soviet was established. The soldiers and workers organized themselves in the soviets,²⁷ and parallel to that the Provisional Government²⁸ was built which would depose the tsar and end the monarchy.²⁹ It all happened very rapid and unexpectedly.³⁰

Zeki Velidi (Togan) tells in his published memoirs, *Hâtıralar* (1999), that the uprising started on 17th of February. He was living next to the barracks, where the incidents first started. His notes on the reaction of the Muslim Fraction in Petrograd³¹ illustrate how the revolution was perceived by Muslim intellectuals in the heart of the events.

²⁶ That was the date on the old Russian, Jullian calendar, what was 13 days behind the Western, Gregorian – and later Soviet – calendar. According to the Western calendar the date was 8th of March. The new calendar was adopted on 1/14 February 1918.

²⁷ The word “soviet” is written in miniscule, if it is used for the councils. Otherwise, if it is used for the USSR or for a certain soviet, such as Petrograd Soviet, it is written with capital letter.

²⁸ This divided authority between the soviets and the Provisional Government became one of the weaknesses of the republic, which was later exploited by the Bolsheviks, when they called for “all power to the soviets,” what came to their control.

²⁹ However, that meant neither the end of the monarchists' hopes nor the end of the conflict between the monarchists and liberal democrats (republicans). After the Bolshevik Revolution, the monarchists allied with the liberal democrats, but then during the civil war they turned against them.

³⁰ James White (1994), *The Russian Revolution: 1917-1921*, Edward Arnold, London: 67-73.

³¹ The name of the city of St. Petersburg (Sankt Peterburg in Russian) was changed by Nicolas II to Petrograd because of its German connotation, in August 1914, after the outbreak of the First World War, and in 1924 following Lenin's death, the name of the city was changed to Leningrad to be renamed St. Petersburg (Sankt Peterburg in Russian) after the failed military coup of August

On the day the revolution started, I left home and went early in the morning to the head quarter of Muslim Fraction. The door was closed. After ringing insistently [for a while], they finally opened the door. What was I supposed to see! All night long our Muslim deputies had played cards. All rooms were filled with a thick smoke. When I mirrored their scandalous situation by telling them, that it was like hell outside, and they were playing cards there, Ibniyemin Akhtiamov replied to me: “What kind of a revolution can happen here, the situation is just a putsch of the soldiers...”³²

This is a fine example of misperception. Even though the incidents were in the same city, not all of them were aware of the consequences. The February Revolution and then the October Revolution found even less resonance among the Muslim intelligentsia, who were considering those events as military putsches between different fractions of Russians.

The events hastened and a week later political leaders from Kazan, Crimea, Caucasia and Kazakstan flowed to Petrograd.³³ At the time of the February Revolution in 1917, the Kazak leader Bokeikhanov was working as a Kadet member behind the front in Minsk and assisting the soldiers and workers.³⁴ But another Kazak leader from Turkistan, Chokai, was in Petrograd. He was living in the same building with the office of the Muslim Fraction and took a leading role in the discussions of Muslim Fraction during the course of events.³⁵

1991 (ann E. Robertson & Blari A. Ruble (2004), “St. Petersburg,” James R. Millar ed., *Encyclopedia of Russian History*, Gale Group Inc. MacMillan Reference, New York, NY: 1484-1485).

³² Togan 1999: 122.

³³ Togan 1999: 123.

³⁴ Kara 2002: 79.

³⁵ Togan 1999: 123.

The members of the Muslim Fraction were then aware of the fact that these events could bring them more liberty, if they would be capable of organizing their fellow nationals as quickly as possible. They all wanted to organize a congress for all Muslims of Russia. The main issues they were discussing were about practical problems of organizing a congress, but they were also discussing whether they should propose a unitary, democratic Russian Republic – like Chokai, as a member of *Kadets*- or call for more national rights under a federal democratic Russian Republic – like Zeki Velidi (Togan).³⁶

When Bokeikhanov heard about the revolution, he sent a telegram to 25 centers in Kazak Steppes and Turkistan³⁷ signed by 15 other members of the *Kazak* newspaper. They called for supporting the revolution and the Provisional Government, which was expected to bring them liberty, equality and fraternity. They also declared that they were for a democratic Russian Republic, and the Kazaks should immediately start for the preparation of the elections for the Constituent Assembly.³⁸ They were convinced that the Provisional Government would acknowledge some rights on autonomy in the future Russian Republic.

On the 20th of March in 1917, a call for the unification of the three *jüzes*³⁹ to form the Kazak nation, the consolidation of the new government and preparations for the forthcoming parliamentary elections was published in the

³⁶ Togan 1999: 123.

³⁷ See for a map of administrative division Kazak Steppes and Turkistan appendix A, map 5.

³⁸ Kara 2002: 79; *Kazak* 24 March 1917, no: 223.

³⁹ The Kazaks are members of a tribal confederation, which was based on three tribal groupings: *Ulu Jüz* (Senior Horde), *Orta Jüz* (Middle Horde) and *Kichi Jüz* (Junior Horde). In the Kazak folklore, they are considered to be founded by three sons of their ancestor, *Alash*.

Kazak newspaper signed by Bokeikhanov, Chokai and Dulatov.⁴⁰ They were assuming that the elections would be held in three months, and they had to be very quick in organizing on the local level.⁴¹

The February Revolution was celebrated in the Steppes and in Turkistan, because it was perceived, especially by the older generation, as a result of the fierce uprisings of 1916⁴² against the tsar's decree on the conscription of Muslims in Central Asia. According to Bokeikhanov, it was celebrated by the Kazaks, because it saved the Kazaks from the tsarist yoke, and secondly the time had come for the Kazaks to rule their own state.⁴³

They expected that the *Kadets* would help them in their effort to create an autonomous Kazak state. Some Kadet members supported a model similar to the United State of America, in which all states could enjoy some liberty but would be united under the same constitution.⁴⁴

On the 7th of March 1917, the newly established Provisional Government declared an amnesty for the uprising of 1916, strengthening the optimism of the Kazaks. Three days later, the government announced another decree to pardon the Russians, who had mistreated the Kazaks during the incidents.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Kara 2002: 82

⁴¹ Kara 2002: 84-85. The elections for the Constituent Assembly would be held on 15-19 November 1917 (White 1994: 174).

⁴² Kara 2002: 78, Chokai, Mustafa, *Yaş Türkistan* 1936: 10.

⁴³ R. K. Nurmagambetova (2003), *Dvijenie Alash i Alash-Orda: Istoriographia Problemy 1920-1990-e Gody XX Veka*, Ministerstvo Obrazovania i Nauki Respubliki Kazakhstan Institut Istorii i Etnologii Im. Ch. Ch. Valikhanova, Almaty: 16.

⁴⁴ Nurmagambetova 2003: 14.

⁴⁵ Nurmagambetova 2003: 17.

On 7th of April 1917, the Provisional Government sent a telegram to Kazaks offering them to join the formation of the Committee of Turkistan and join the Provisional Government. N. P. Shepkin became the chairman and two Kazaks became committee members, Bokeikhanov the second, Tynyshbaev the third member of the committee. Additionally, Bokeikhanov was appointed as the commissar of Turgai Oblast⁴⁶ and another author of *Kazak* newspaper, Khalel Ghabbasov⁴⁷ became the chairman of Semipalatinsk Zemstvo.⁴⁸ Tynyshbaev became the commissar of Semipalatinsk Oblast.⁴⁹

They had to be very resolute and act very fast, and Bokeikhanov was aware that those were the very days, which “the future generations would either recall them with blessings or condemn them.”⁵⁰ On 24th of June, it was announced in the *Kazak* newspaper that “Kazaks should form their own party, because there is no party to solve the problems of the Kazaks.”⁵¹ Chokai wrote about the Russian democrats that “although they were very attractive and inviting in the

⁴⁶ Oblast: An administrative division, which is smaller than a country and bigger than a raion.

Zemstvo: Local, electoral self-governing bodies of Russia between 1864 and 1918 (Oleg Budnitskii (2004), “Zemstvo,” Millar, James R. ed., *Encyclopedia of Russian History*, Gale Group Inc. MacMillan Reference, New York, NY, v. 4: 1721-1722).

⁴⁷ See for a picture appendix C, picture 3.

⁴⁸ According to Rustamov, Khalel Ghabbasov was not chairman but vice-chairman of Semei Oblast (S. Rustamov (2001) “Ghabbasov Khalel,” *Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia 3*, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 93.

⁴⁹ Nurmagambetova 2003: 17.

⁵⁰ Kara 2002: 80, Koigeldiev 1995: 363. Nevertheless, it both happened. They were both condemned as traitors and celebrated as independence fighters at different periods, by different people due to changing contexts.

⁵¹ Nurmagambetova 2003: 21.

period of tsardom, they became very repulsive and repellent in power.”⁵²

Bokeikhanov, who was the Kazak representative of the *Kadets* since 1905, left the party to form an independent Kazak movement. In the article “Why did I leave the Party?,” he published in the newspaper *Kazak*, he explained the reasons as follows:

The Constitutional Democrats party stands for transferring the land to private possession. In our situation the transferring of the land to private hands will lead to the fact, that in some time, as it was in Bashkiria [Bashkortostan], the plots of the land will pass to the neighbouring muzhik, and the Kazaks will become poor. The Constitutional Democrats party comes out against national autonomy. We, having raised the Alash banner, are aiming to form a national autonomy... The Constitutional Democrats party comes out against the separation [of] the church from state, but I support the separation of church from state. The disagreements on these three positions... have distinctly brought to light. That is why I decided to go out from the Constitutional Democrats party and to organize the Alash party.⁵³

Bokeikhanov summarizes his differences with the *Kadets* in three points: privatization of land, national autonomy and separation of religion and the state. Those three points are important in understanding their goals, which would later lead them to form a national government and then maybe even to join the Bolsheviks. This pattern implies some continuity in *Alash Orda*’s struggle from the establishment of independent *Alash Orda* movement to the acceptance of the Soviet rule.

⁵² Kara 2002: 79, Chokai 1936: 13.

⁵³ Nurpeisov, Kenges, (1998a), “The Alash Party’s Role and its Place in the Social and Political Life of Kazakhstan,” *History of Kazakhstan Essays*, (ed.) Kozybaev, M. K., Ministry of Science-Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan-Institute of History and Ethnology Named by Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, Gylym, Almaty: 128-129; Bokeikhanov 1994: 268-269.

The land problem of the rising peasant population was an important problem in the agenda of Russian political parties. In order to meet the peasantry's demand of land, the liberal *Kadets* wanted to privatize the land, but the Kazaks were afraid that that would transfer the land to Russian peasants, while the widely nomadic Kazak population would lose their pasture lands, impoverish and turn into landless peasants.

Moreover, Russian nationalism was strengthening among the liberals, and the potential economic differentiation between the Russian peasants and the Kazak nomads was not a matter of concern for the *Kadets*. A sharper example of increasing pro-Russian nationalist tendencies was seen in their rejection of the demands for national autonomy, although it was mentioned in their party program.

The demand about the division of religion and state can be understood as part of a general attitude of modernist enlighteners, but here the issue of division of religion and state is evaluated within the context of autonomy of religious affairs, which can be understood as a factor to strengthen Kazak autonomy. Bokeikhanov wrote down the following argument in the same article:

If we consider the history of French, Russian and other peoples, we see that, when an imam is paid by the state, he will definitely be sold to the state, and he will work for her. Religious affairs will be degraded; state affairs and religious affairs should therefore be separated. The Russians call that 'separation of state and church affairs'. Kadets do not agree with me. That has come into light, this year.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Nurmagambetova 2003: 21.

It is hard to know the real aim of Bokeikhanov, whether he really wanted to form a separate, honorable position for religion, or was he intending to put an end to the state sponsored status of religion. The Kazak intellectuals were indeed in a similar position to socialists in terms of religion. They were in confrontation with religious institutions and especially in education system the confrontation of the new method schools (*usul-u cedit*) and old method schools (*usul-u kadim*) was acute, and the competition was reproduced between members of these two different schools to lead the society.

On the other hand, the Russian liberals had close ties with the upper strata of the society. Russia was a newly industrializing country, where the bourgeoisie was not strong enough to challenge the authority of the traditional elites. *Kadets* had not only strong ties with the bourgeoisie but also with some reform-minded aristocrats. They did not want to destroy the old regime totally but to reform it, where the religion would keep its position. It was the socialists of different political organizations, who considered religion as an obstacle in modernizing the society and wanted to weaken or totally destroy traditional structures, including religious authority.

2.2. The First All-Kazak Congress

While separating from the *Kadets*, the authors of the *Kazak* newspaper decided to organize the Kazaks separately around their crystallizing modernist and nationalist ideals and to represent their people for the coming elections.

Accordingly, they organized in Orenburg⁵⁵ the First All-Kazak Congress, on 21-26 July 1917.⁵⁶ They discussed 14 issues on their agenda: the type of government, autonomy of Kazak oblasts, land question, organization of the national militia, *zemstvos*, education, court of law, the ecclesiastical and religious bodies, women's rights, call for Constituent Assembly and the preparation for the elections, Congress of All-Russian Muslims (*Shura-i Islamiye*), foundation of a Kazak political party, the situation of Semirechie (Zhedisu) Oblast, election of delegates for All Russian Federal Congress and Petrograd Committee of Education.⁵⁷

The resolutions of the congress are important, because they were the first written documents of Kazak intelligentsia's political objectives. They are published in *Kazak* newspaper on 31 July 1917, just five days after the congress, which shows the importance they gave to act as quickly as possible to deal with the pace of time. The resolutions were like articles of a full-fledged program for the development of the Kazak society. They reflect the problems and solutions offered by the Kazak intelligentsia. The resolutions give an idea about the path they would try to follow under changing conjunctures.

The congress was held under the great influence of the authors of the *Kazak* newspaper, and the subjects of discussion in the *Kazak* newspaper

⁵⁵ Orenburg, which is today a Russian city between northwestern Kazakhstan and southeastern Bashkortastan, was the center of Kazak intelligentsia, who were publishing the *Kazak* newspaper. Additionally, it was on the railroad; at the same distance to other two important Kazak cities, Semei and Tashkent; and Bokeikhanov was appointed by the Provisional government to Orenburg as governor of Turgai Oblast (Kara 2002: 84), on 20th of March (Kara 2002: 82). These facts made Orenburg the most significant city for the Kazaks and the center of the Kazak political movement.

⁵⁶ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; N. Martynenko ed. (1992) "Postanovlenie Vcekirgizskogo C'ezda v Orenburge 21-28 Iulia 1917 Goda," *Alash Orda: Sbornik Dokumentov*, Maloe Izdotelsvo "Aikap," Alma-Ata: 46 (first published in 1929). The Bashkort Congress was also held in the same city on 21-26 July. (Togan 1999: 142; Togan 1981: 360-361).

⁵⁷ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 46; Nurpeisov 1998a: 129-130.

determined the main points of arguments during the sessions, such as the autonomy, land question and modernization issues. It seems that the authors of *Kazak* newspaper were better equipped to discuss political-economical problems, which became the main issue in preparations for the hastening political ground.

Below the resolutions of the congress will be summarized in order to give some about the most significant issues for the Kazaks, and how they were discussed by them. They built the basis of their party program and their struggle in Alash Orda in the coming period; thus some of them, such as the issues related to nationalism, modernization and land question, will be further discussed in the next chapters.

Without much discussion they decided for the government type of Russia to be a “federal, democratic, parliamentary republic.”⁵⁸

The issue about the autonomy of Kazakhstan or the relations between the Kazak government and a federal, democratic, parliamentary Russian Republic was more problematic. There were two different ideas about autonomy, which were both advocated by three most influential writers of the *Kazak* newspaper. Bokeikhanov, the editor of the newspaper, was for Kazak territorial-national autonomy as part of a democratic, federal and parliamentary Russian Republic. The other prominent figures of the newspaper, Baitursynov and Dulatov, were for more national rights and they supported an independent Kazak state. The majority of the members of the congress decided for the territorial-national autonomy,⁵⁹

⁵⁸ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 46.

⁵⁹ Nurpeisov 1998a: 129.

which was probably considered as a more realistic proposal. They came to the decision that “Kyrgyz [Kazak] oblasts should obtain their territorial autonomy due to their national differences and [differences in] their life styles.”⁶⁰

The Kazaks’ were clearly different than the Slavic peoples. Their life style was based on nomadism, while the migrating Slavic peoples were generally peasants, and the Kazak nomadism was under the threat of agriculture. The Kazak pasture lands, mainly their winter pastures, were settled by the Slavic peasants, when they were away in their summer pastures. The Kazak intelligentsia was for sedentarization of the Kazaks, because they considered it as the necessary step in the linear “evolution of the humanity.” Otherwise the Kazak people would be perished. Kazak culture and Kazakness was in need of protection within the autonomous oblasts considering the needs of the Kazak people.

Another important issue was the confiscation of Kazak lands by the Russian state to be distributed to the Russian peasantry.⁶¹ The emancipation of the slaves in 1861 created a big population of peasants, who were in need of agricultural land to settle and farm. Additionally, the Russian population was increasing. Russia tried to solve the appetite of the Russian peasantry for land by opening the non-cultivated land to agriculture. The waste pasture lands of nomadic Kazaks were being taken by the state in favor of the Russian peasantry, which built a serious problem for the Kazaks. The Kazak politicians wanted to

⁶⁰ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 47.

⁶¹ The land question and the migration of the Russian peasantry was one of the most critical problems in Turkistan as well. Most confrontations between the Russians and natives or between the central government and the natives were centered on the issue of returning the confiscated land back to the original users of land and the prevention of further Russian immigration (Kara 2002: 107-108).

stop the immigration of the Russian peasants and return the confiscated but undistributed plots of land back to the Kazaks.⁶²

They prepared a detailed list of their demands on land question summarized in 14 articles, which reflects the importance of the problem for the Kazaks. The articles reveal that the fertile plots of land were given to the Russian peasantry. The Kazaks were not demanding the return of land already owned and cultivated by the Russian peasantry but the land which was kept or governed by the state, like undistributed land and forests. There were some plots of land given to the Kazaks, but they were less fertile than Russian peasantry's land, and thus they demanded that the distribution of land should not be according to size but the production capacity. They also called for the establishment of agricultural unions out of clans, who would own and cultivate the land all-together.⁶³

An autonomous government needs a militia, and they decided to form a national militia.⁶⁴ They were, however, in a weak position to train and equip a national militia. When the civil war broke, they had to move faster than ever to find the necessary support in building their militia and becoming a real power on the battlefield for protecting the Kazak people.

The democratization of Russian political arena had strengthened local groups and different local initiatives, such as soviets and *zemstvos*, had gained impetus. As the industrialization was not developed in the Kazak society, the Kazak people could only organize and join the political arena through *zemstvos*.

⁶² Nurpeisov 1998a: 129.

⁶³ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 47.

⁶⁴ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 47.

But *zemstvos* were popular unions based on land, and the Kazak life style based on nomadism was contradictory to the organization of *zemstvos*. Since the nomads were not settled on a certain territory for long periods, they could not be registered for the *zemstvo* of a certain territory. As the most appropriate tool for organizing and politicizing the Kazak people, the congress decided that new *zemstvos* should be organized to include nomads. Additionally, it was decided that units smaller than villages should also be united in *zemstvos*,⁶⁵ which was another problem for the settled Kazaks, because they were generally scattered to small settlements on wide steppes. This issue was evaluated as part of the preparations for the elections. They wanted to mobilize the Kazaks as many as possible and to represent the Kazak people in the parliament with more and better educated Kazaks; they proposed in an article to elect and send educators.⁶⁶

Not only in the election of representatives of the Kazak society but in general education formed a very significant quality for the Kazak leaders. It was seen as an irreplaceable tool in creating a strong Kazak society. They decided that “a popular and compulsory education” is necessary. “The first two years, the education should be in the native language; educative books and other supplementary material should be written according to Kazak grammar rules.”⁶⁷ They were not just for creating an educated generation from their fellow Kazaks, but education was also considered as a tool in creating some consciousness of Kazakness. The Kazak students were to be educated at least for the first two years

⁶⁵ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 47.

⁶⁶ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 47-48.

⁶⁷ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 48.

in Kazak, so that they would develop some command of their native language. Enlightenment, modernization, creating a national identity were all going hand in hand, regarded as indispensable from one another, and education was on their intersection, if the future generations were to be considered.

The issue about the courts of law was also discussed as part of the Kazak autonomy and creation of local courts closer to Kazak life style. In order to create new Kazak courts in every oblast commissions were aimed to be held determining their resolutions as their proposals for the upper court of All-Kazak Courts of Law Commission. Local representatives would join the All-Kazak Courts of Law Commission. They would make decisions about the new law, until 1 February 1918, when they will hand it over to the legislative body.⁶⁸

Kazaks were incorporated into the Russian law after a long process of gradual development.⁶⁹ They, however, wanted to step back ahead from to evolutionary adoption of Russian laws by creating a new body of law autonomous of binding Russian laws, which would be closer to Kazak customs and traditions. This can be understood within the context of strengthening the autonomy of Kazak nationhood, but this can also be seen as part of modernizing the Kazak society, since it prescribes the evolution from traditional to rational, i.e. from Kazak customs and traditions to a written body of law. The work on laws would influence the Kazak society in two ways: It would form an autonomous body for

⁶⁸ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 48.

⁶⁹ The incorporation of Kazak society to Russian laws will be summarized in the section 4.3.2. See for an analysis of incorporation Martin, Virginia (1997), "Barimta: Nomadic Custom, Imperial Crime," *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and People: 1700-1917*, in (eds.) Brower, D. R. and Lazzerini, E. J., Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 249-269.

the Kazaks, and it would also fit to the evolution of the Kazak society from traditional customs and laws to a rational body of law. As this would be implemented through laws closer to Kazak customs and in Kazak language, this would present a “more appropriate,” “more natural” model for the evolution from traditional to rational society. National struggle and the goal of modernization were also inseparable in the context of law.

Issues related to religion were planned to be dealt by the All-Kazak Courts of Law as well. Until the establishment of the All-Kazak Courts of Law the religious affairs of the Kazak people would be carried by the *muftiat* of Orenburg but only temporarily, until they would be part of the Kazak legal executive body. They appointed two religious judges (*kazy*) for two oblasts and commissioned three oblasts to elect their own *kazys*.⁷⁰ The articles about these two issues meant that religious affairs would be incorporated into the executive power of the state. The religious body would be organized also to strengthen the Kazakness through the use of Kazak language in all-Kazak communities and dual-use of it in mixed Kazak-Tatar communities.⁷¹

Similar to the process of forming a law system, the religion was also treated both to strengthen the Kazak autonomy by confirming the status of the Kazak language and to modernize the Kazak society by incorporating religion into the sphere of state affairs. The Kazak identity was not only sought to be separated from Russian influences as it was seen in the example of law but it was also sought to be separated from the Tatar influences, which were felt especially in the

⁷⁰ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 49.

⁷¹ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 49.

field of religion and education.⁷² By “separation of religion and state” they actually meant separation of religion from Russian and Tatar influences, and they intended to build some form of laicism by integrating religion into the field of command of a modern Kazak state. In a Kazak state the religious affairs would also be run by the Kazak state under the authority of the Kazak muftis. Religion as a fundamental source of culture was to be taken from the control of the Tatar muftis and reorganized under the authority of the muftis speaking Kazak language and open to the Kazak government’s guidance.

Although the Kazak leaders were all men, women’s rights was a vital issue for them, which is another common issue with modernizers from other parts of the world. In order to modernize the Kazak society, they felt the necessity to deal with patriarchy as well and thus, seek to struggle for the equality of man and woman on behalf of women. According to the resolutions “the women should enjoy equal political rights; the decision to marry should be a woman’s own decision; *kalym*⁷³ had to be abolished; the marriage of girls below the age of 16 is prohibited; *imam* is not allowed to marry a girl below the age of 16 and a boy below 18; *imam* should marry the partners with mutual consent; a widowed woman should marry on her own will, marriage between relatives is absolutely forbidden; a man can only marry a second woman with the approval of the first wife, if she does not accept, she has the right to leave, but man has to take care of

⁷² For further information see the chapter of “Sovietization as a Modernization Project”.

⁷³ *Kalym*: The money paid by the bridegroom to the bride's family, which is still practiced in some Central Asian towns.

her until she marries [another man]; Kazaks are banned to marry their patrilineal relatives seven-generations-back.”⁷⁴

The traditional patriarchal position of women was/is considered by many modernists as one of the most acute sources of a society’s backwardness. It has been/is comprehended as one of the key issues for most modernizers with a significant symbolical value in reflecting and fighting the traditional social structure. It seems that Kazak intellectuals shared that understanding as well, and they recognized the position of women in Kazak society by putting it on the list of their priorities. In order to change the status of women, they wanted to start with formal, legal inequalities related to women’s disadvantageous position in the Kazak society.

The congress elected 89 representatives and candidates from Akmolinsk (11), Semipalatinsk (8), Turgai (7), Uralsk (7), Semirechie (11), Syrderya (14), Ferghana (15), Semerkand oblasts (3) and Bokei Orda (3).⁷⁵ Among the elected Kazaks, there were also Alikhan Bokeikhanov and Khalel Ghabbasov from Semipalatinsk, Akhmed Baitursynov and Mirzhakyp Dulatov from Turgai, Khalel Dosmukhamedov⁷⁶ and Zhansha Dosmukhamedov⁷⁷ from Uralsk, Mukhamedzhan Tynyshbaiev from Semirechie, Mustafa Chokai and Sanshar Asfandiarov from Syrderya, and again Mustafa Chokai from Semerkand. Although the congress was an All-Kazak Congress, the elected persons were not

⁷⁴ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 49-50.

⁷⁵ See for a map of oblasts appendix A, map 1.

⁷⁶ See for a picture of Khalel Dosmukhamedov appendix C, picture 8.

⁷⁷ See for a picture of Zhansha Dosmukhamedov appendix C, picture 9.

just Kazaks, there were also – at least - two Russians among them, Grigoriy Nikolaevich Potanin from Semipalatinsk and Vadim Chabkin from Ferghana oblasts.⁷⁸

They accepted the Kazak representatives – including Zhansha Dosmukhamedov and Mustafa Chokai - chosen by the *Shura-i Islamiye*, and commissioned their transportation to the congress to be held in Petrograd. Until the arrival of eight Kazak delegates from eight oblasts Zhansha Dosmukhamedov and Validkhan Tanyshov were appointed as responsible of *Shura-i Islamiye*.⁷⁹

They also gave the authority to the representatives of *Shura-i Islamiye* to form their own party/fraction based on principles of democratic, parliamentary republic, if necessary. The program of the party was to be ratified by the committee of Kazak territory.⁸⁰

The severity of the problems in Semirechie made that oblast one of the issues discussed in the congress. The Kazaks in Semirechie had to struggle with Russian soldiers returning from the front and armed peasants in protecting their belongings and their lives. They also had to deal with famine. The congress called for disarmament of Russians and aid for the Kazaks suffering from starvation.⁸¹ Actually Semirechie was not one of the four oblasts of the Russian administrative region of the Kazak Steppes, which consisted of only four Kazak oblasts of the steppes and left the southern Semirechie and Syrderya oblasts to the

⁷⁸ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 50-51.

⁷⁹ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 51-52.

⁸⁰ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 52-53.

⁸¹ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 53.

administration of Turkestan, but the congress was held to represent all Kazaks and find solutions for all of them. Indifferent of administrative divisions all regions with some Kazak population were represented in the congress. Semirechie together with Syrderya Oblast was a region within the administrative division of Turkistan but with a majority of Kazak population.⁸²

The final decision was about the selection of Kazak representatives. Alikhan Bokeikhanov, Zhansha Dosmukhamedov and Validkhan Tanyshov were authorized to represent the Kazaks in the congress of federations to be held in Kiev, in August 1917. If they would not have the possibility to attend the congress, they were to be replaced by members from the other elected body of representatives, *Shura-i Islamiye*. For the commission of education in Petrograd, Kenzhan Aspendiar was elected.⁸³

The resolutions they issued were true signs of the foundation of a modern state and Kazak society. Their decisions, such as the replacement of clerical courts with legal courts, equal rights to women and abolishment of *kalym* (bride price), popular, compulsory and state controlled education, were all parts of a project they designated to create a modern Kazak society.⁸⁴ All these issues were concomitant to their objectives of modernization and nationalism. Their future path would reveal that they were open to change their tactics and allies to reach their objectives. Their collaboration and work with the Bolsheviks was in

⁸² See for a map administrative divisions appendix A, map 5.

⁸³ *Kazak*, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 53.

⁸⁴ Nurpeisov 1998a: 129-130.

continuity with implementing their modernization project reflected in these resolutions.

One of the main results of the congress was the decision about “recognition of the necessity of the formation of a Kazak party.” The First All-Kazak congress laid the foundations of the first Kazak national party under the slogan of “Kazak people’s liberation from the colonial yoke.” The party program was to be published in the *Kazak* newspaper, some months later, on 21 November 1917.⁸⁵

2.3. The Bolshevik Revolution and the Formation of the *Alash Orda* Government

While the Kazaks concentrated on the preparations for the elections of the Constituent Assembly and organization of their political party, in Russian cities the Bolsheviks were actively working in the soviets to gain power and lead the country to revolution. The revolution started during the Second All-Russian Congress of the Soviets on 25-26 October (7-8 November) 1917.

Until the Bolshevik Revolution there were two governments in Russia, the Provisional Government and the soviets. The Bolsheviks were supporting the soviets against the Provisional Government, and in the night of 25th of October (7 November), the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government through Military Revolutionary Committees, and the following day the occupation of the Winter Palace happened to be the final blow with detention of members and

⁸⁵ Nurpeisov 1998a: 130.

ministers of the Provisional Government. The same day, that is on the second day of the Second All-Russian Congress of the Soviets, during the Congress the Bolsheviks declared the end of the Provisional Government,⁸⁶ and the two-headed administrative authority of the soviets and the Provisional Government was cancelled.

Lenin's call for "all power to the soviets of the workers, soldiers and peasants" was enacted, and it brought the Bolsheviks, who had turned the soviets to their stronghold following Lenin's *April Thesis*,⁸⁷ to power. On the 13/26th of October, they announced their program based on the promise of peace to the army, land to the peasantry. It was based on an alliance of the toilers of the land and workers because of the large number of peasants in Russia.⁸⁸

Another step of the Bolsheviks was their declaration on the national question and the right of self-determination. On the 21th of November (2 December) 1917, the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia was issued, but it did not create hopes and support for the Bolshevik regime on the Kazak side.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ White 1994: 165-166.

⁸⁷ Immediately after his arrival on 3/16 April 1917, Lenin started to propagate against the cooperation with the Provisional Government and for turning the soviets to the basis of a new, revolutionary government. His theses was published in *Pravda*, on 7/20 April, and became known as "April Theses". The theses was first found too radical by the party elites, but in summer and fall the disillusionment from the Provisional Government radicalized workers and soldiers in the soviets, and they moved to the side of the Bolsheviks, who had then also focused to work in the soviets, consequently turning the soviets into the stronghold of the Bolsheviks. See for further information, Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1964) "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," *Lenin Collected Works*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, v. 24, 19-26.

⁸⁸ See appendix B, picture 3, 4 for propaganda posters of the alliance of workers and peasants.

⁸⁹ See page 40 for Bokeikhanov's assessment of the Bolsheviks.

The Kazaks far away in their quarter in Orenburg had no connection to those activities, and they were busy with their preparations for the elections of the Constituent Assembly. Not only in Central Russian centers but also in Turkistan the Bolsheviks were actively working to gain power. On the 23rd of October (5 November) members of the Workers and Soldiers Soviet in Tashkent had decided to overthrow the local government, which was initiated on the 26th of October (8 November) and resulted in the seizure of power on the 1st/ 14th of November.⁹⁰

On the 21st of November (4 December), some weeks after the October Revolution of the Bolsheviks, the Kazaks published the program of their independent party, *Alash*.⁹¹ It seems that they were not aware of the decisiveness of the Bolshevik Revolution, and they might have seen it as just another governmental change in the Russian capital.⁹² Probably, even the Bolsheviks were not aware of the persistency of their power.⁹³

The program of the Kazak party written by a commission under Bokeikhanov and Baitursynov⁹⁴ was generally based on the resolutions of the first All-Kazak Congress. The program was not very different than most modernist, reformist parties of the period inspired by the tenets of the French Revolution and

⁹⁰ Kara 2002: 115-116. See for the situation appendix A, map 2.

⁹¹ *Kazak* 21 November 1917, no: 251.

⁹² Kara relying on Chokai's writings, states that in Turkistan region they did not take sides in the armed struggle between the revolutionaries and the supporters of the Provisional Government, because they considered it as an internal struggle of the Russians (Kara 2002: 116, Mustafa Çokay (1988), *1917 Yılı Hatıra Parçaları*, Yaş Türkistan Neşriyatı 28, Ankara: 67).

⁹³ White 1994: 165-167. The Bolsheviks celebrated the persistency of their revolution, because they were able to surpass the legendary Paris Commune, probably not hoping that there would be years to celebrate with parades on squares.

⁹⁴ Kara 2002: 144.

leftist movements. It consisted of ten articles, which can be summarized as follows:⁹⁵

- 1- Russia should be a federal, democratic republic composed of autonomous republics. In elections everyone is equal indifferent of language, religion and gender.
- 2- Autonomous Kazak oblasts will enjoy the same status with others. The party aims to help the society and increase the cultural level. The party considers the poor as its comrades and the property-owners as its enemy.
- 3- Political equality and immunity is acknowledged in the Russian Federation.
- 4- Religion and state should be divided. Everyone is free and equal. Kazaks will have their own muftis.
- 5- Courts should be adapted to the traditions of each society and they should be in native languages of the majority of people [i.e. in Kazak or in Russian].
- 6- For protection of the society military might is necessary.
- 7- Taxation should be according to the property owned.
- 8- Labor rights should be in favor of workers. Because the number of workers is not big in Kazakstan, Alash supports the Mensheviks in matters of labor rights [i.e. a leftist, pro-labor tendency including the

⁹⁵ *Kazak*, 21 November 1917; Martynenko 1992: 88-90.

support of economic rights, like better wages, and political rights, like labor unions and workers' soviets].

9- Everyone should benefit equally from education. Education should be free, in the native language [i.e. Kazak] in first years. Kazaks should have their own educational bodies till the level of higher education. They should be autonomous, where all teachers and professors will be elected.

10- In distribution of land natives should have the priority towards immigrated peasants. Fertile lands should be presented to the Kazaks. Relatives should use the land together without dividing it to families.

The party program was both modernist⁹⁶ and nationalist. The members of Alash Orda aimed to protect the Kazaks by fighting for their autonomy, escalation of the status of Kazak language, but they also wanted to create a modern Kazak society through equality for all, freedom of speech, justice for the poor, protection of the poor in taxation, recognition of workers' right, separation of religion and state, free and popular education. The solution of the land question and putting an end to the Russian migration was also mentioned here.⁹⁷

With this party program the publishers of the newspaper *Kazak* became the representatives of the Kazak people.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ The modernist aspects of the program are further discussed in section "*Alash Orda* and Modernization: The Possible Reasons of their Collaboration with the Bolsheviks and its Results".

⁹⁷ Nurpeisov 1998a: 131-132. The program will be further evaluated in the fourth chapter by discussing the modernist aspects of the Kazak intellectuals.

⁹⁸ Nurmagambetova 2003: 21.

They calculated the changing conditions very quickly and transformed themselves in a very brief period of time to the most influential spokespersons of the Kazak society. The elections held in some Kazak regions illustrated the growing power of Alash Orda. The only other political party was *Ush Jüz* (three jüzes), which was a party formed after the October Revolution with the Bolsheviks' support. There was, however, a big difference between *Alash Orda*'s and *Ush Jüz*'s support. In Semipalatinsk, *Alash Orda* got 3.304 votes and *Ush Jüz* only one vote; in the industrial and mining region Ekibastuz *Alash* got 708 votes, *Ush Jüz* none; in the city of Omsk *Alash Orda* got 80 votes, *Ush Jüz* 60 votes; in the districts of Omsk *Alash Orda* got 16.600 votes, *Ush Jüz* 300.⁹⁹ The results of elections show that *Alash Orda* was matchless in representing the Kazak society and leading them in the struggle of national liberation. *Ush Jüz* was a new party, and they had very weak links with the Kazak people. The weakness of the proletariat in the Kazak Steppes can also be a reason of their powerlessness, but they were not stronger in industrial and mining regions, such as Ekibastuz, as well.

Alash Orda on the other hand, despite its strength in popular support, was weak in building the necessary state apparatuses to solidify its position as the leader of the Kazak society. The members of *Alash Orda* needed to start forming governmental bodies in order to realize their aim of creating an autonomous Kazak state. *Alash Orda* had to evolve from a political movement to the

⁹⁹ Nurmagambetova 2003: 22.

administrative, executive organ of the Kazak society, which came into being during the Second All-Kazak Congress.¹⁰⁰

The Second All-Kazak Congress on 5-12 December united more people in the party organization.¹⁰¹ There were representatives from all regions, where Kazaks were living; in addition to previous Kazak regions, there were also representatives from Altay Gubernia, Samarkand and Kara-Kyrgyz region.¹⁰² They decided to form a “Provisional People’s Soviet,” called *Alash Orda*,¹⁰³ thus an autonomous Kazak government. The government would consist of Bokei Orda, Uralsk, Turgai, Semipalatinsk, Akmolinsk, Semirechie, Syrderya, Zakaspiy, Altay gubernias and oblasts.¹⁰⁴ The government was headed by Bokeikhanov.¹⁰⁵ However, they did not intend to build an all-Kazak government and left 10 positions - out of 25 members - to Russians and other non-Kazaks.¹⁰⁶ Every

¹⁰⁰ Nurmagambetova 2003: 23.

¹⁰¹ One of the participants of the congress was Mustafa Chokai, who was elected for the newly formed autonomous Khokand government in Turkistan. The autonomy was declared two weeks ago, but the Kazaks in Orenburg learned it through Chokai (Kara 2002: 146), which shows the poor conditions of the flow of information in the turmoil of the revolution.

¹⁰² Nurmagambetova 2003: 23.

¹⁰³ Kara 2002: 145, Nurpeisov 1998a: 133.

¹⁰⁴ Nurmagambetova 2003: 23. See for a map appendix A, map 1.

¹⁰⁵ The president was Bokeikhanov, Halil Abbasov Vice-President, Mustafa Chokai Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Birimjanov Minister of Justice, Muhammadjan Tynyshbaev Minister of Interior Affairs, Alimjan Ermekov Minister of War, Ahmed Baitursynov Minister of Culture, Jihanshah and Khalil Dosmuhammadov and Ahmed Bey Sarsan were ministers of central-west (Togan 1981: 369). Tynyshbaev and Chokai were both members of the government in Turkistan as well. They were from the southern Kazak tribes, which were part of Turkistan. Tynyshbaev was the first president and Chokai was the minister of Foreign Affairs, later Chokai replaced Tynyshbaev as the new president (Nurpeisov 1998a: 133).

¹⁰⁶ Kara 2002: 145, Nurpeisov 1998a: 133.

nationality, including the migrated Russians, was to be represented in the government.¹⁰⁷

The Congress also underlined the need for the establishment of an army,¹⁰⁸ which is an indispensable quality of having a state. But the Kazaks lacked both the military training and necessary equipment to build an army. The first step in building an army was the establishment of the militia.¹⁰⁹ They called the people for conscription through the *Kazak* newspaper, but this time - contrary to 1916 – the Russians refused to join the militia.¹¹⁰ The problem was, however, worse than that; even if the number of militia would increase the number of arms and munitions would not suffice to equip them.

That was the time of the civil war in Russia, and the Kazaks chose the side of the White Army. The reasons of that might be numerous: from the point of the Kazaks, the provisional government and its supporters, i.e. the Whites, were still the legitimate government; their liberal Russian friends were within the ranks of the Whites; the Whites with the generals of the Russian army might have seemed stronger than the Reds, especially in the region of the Kazaks; and the bourgeois-democratic ideals of the liberals at the side of the Whites must have been still more credible for the Kazak intellectuals. Furthermore, the assistance they needed

¹⁰⁷ Nurmagambetova 2003: 24.

¹⁰⁸ Nurpeisov 1998a: 133.

¹⁰⁹ Nurmagambetova 2003: 25.

¹¹⁰ Nurmagambetova 2003: 25. This is another example of the fact that the state Kazak leaders wanted to form was never an all-Kazak state. In every sphere of political life, in all kinds of duties and obligations citizens were equal, indifferent of nationality, religion and gender. Their nationalism was not xenophobic or racist but close to French type of nationalism.

to form their armies was promised by the Whites, and they would send guns, munitions, uniforms and military trainers to form the Kazak militia.

It was not only practical reasons, which led the Kazaks to join the Whites. There was also enmity among the Kazak leaders against the Bolsheviks as it was mentioned by Dulatov. He wrote about the Bolsheviks that “they destroy and change everything wherever they go. They try to seize everything, and when they seize the power, they do whatever they want to. Of course, there should not be rich and poor on the earth and there should be no difference between them; it is nice that everyone could live in peace, but that requires a couple of centuries [to be achieved].”¹¹¹

Not only the intellectuals but the Kazak people did not embrace the revolution as well. Baitursynov commented on the question why the Kazaks did not accept the revolution and claimed that it was related to the main features of the Kazak people, i.e. the Kazak proletariat was not well-established, and the Bolshevik propaganda was more appealing to the proletariat.¹¹²

Bokeikhanov criticized the Bolsheviks severely as follows:

Peasants, workers, and soldiers, keep in mind that the Bolsheviks consider: 1) the responsibility of rulers to their people; 2) freedom of speech, the press, and meetings; 3) universal, direct, and ballot voting; 4) the inviolability of citizens and deputies; 5) the people’s power—a bourgeois prejudice.... The red mask of revolution has fallen down from the face of the Bolshevik and revealed his nature.¹¹³

¹¹¹ D. A. Amanzholova (1994), *Kazakski Avtonomizm i Rossia: Istoria Dvijenja Alash*, Izdatelski Tsenter Rossiya Molodaya, Moskva: 30.

¹¹² Amanzholova 1994: 30.

¹¹³ Amanzholova 1994: 30, translated in Sabol 1998: 162.

The class differences were secondary for Alash Orda, and they had close relations with the well-off of the Kazaks. Despite the fact that they were not “more proletarian” than the Bolsheviks in terms of their family background or occupation, they were not critical to the position of the Kazak elite and propertied middle or petty bourgeoisie, different than the Bolsheviks. Therefore, Bokeikhanov saw it necessary to criticize the Bolsheviks from a perspective demanding democracy on behalf of the whole society indifferent of their class positions. Bokeikhanov went further and condemned Lenin by being hypocritical on democracy, because of the fact that his understanding of democracy did not include the rights of the bourgeoisie.¹¹⁴

The Bolshevik Revolution was made initially for the proletariat, and the absence of the proletariat was a setback for the acceptance of the revolution by the Kazak people, who were mostly nomadic. In order to obtain the support of the Kazaks, Bolsheviks needed other tools to persuade the leaders and the mass of the Kazak people, which would come first with military superiority, then with promises on national rights and some optimism on modernization.

In November 1917, the Cossack forces (the Whites) under ataman “Dutov overthrew the soviet power and arrested the revolutionary committee” in Orenburg, which was the political and intellectual centre of the Kazaks. Also in

¹¹⁴ Amanzholova 1994: 30. Actually, this criticism on Lenin is not well-founded. Lenin was not hypocritical in that sense, because he had never spoken about democratic rights of bourgeoisie but applied a different definition of democracy valid for the “oppressed masses of people,” basically the proletariat. They foresee a democracy for the proletariat but dictatorship for the bourgeoisie with their thesis of “dictatorship of the proletariat”..

the eastern center of the Kazaks, Semipalatinsk,¹¹⁵ the Cossacks built a military government. In both centers of the Kazak intellectuals the Whites were superior to than the Reds.¹¹⁶

The White Army was commanded by experienced officers of the Russian Empire, loyal to the tsar, and consisted of the *kulaks*, Russian migrants, *Kadets*, some Socialist Revolutionaries (SR), Mensheviks and members of the *Shura-i Islamiye*. Thus, it was a broad alliance of all groups against the Bolsheviks.¹¹⁷ Under those circumstances, it was very expectable for the leaders of the *Alash* movement to join the Whites.

When on 18th of January 1918 the Reds took Orenburg, the leaders of *Alash Orda* acted with the Whites, and they left the town with the Cossacks of Ataman Dutov. This attack divided the Kazak government geographically just some months after its foundation. *Alash Orda* had three centers by that time: Zhana Semei in Semipalatinsk Oblast in the east, Zhypity in Uralskaya Oblast in the west, and Semirechie Oblast in the south.¹¹⁸ Bokeikhanov, who was the governor of the oblast moved to Semipalatinsk.¹¹⁹ Uralskaya Oblast was called “Western Alash Orda” and ruled by Zhansha and Khalel Dosmukhamedov brothers.¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ See appendix A, map 2 for a map of the civil war.

¹¹⁶ Nurpeisov 1998a: 134.

¹¹⁷ Nurpeisov 1998a: 135.

¹¹⁸ Nurpeisov 1998a: 133.

¹¹⁹ Togan 1999: 160.

¹²⁰ Togan 1999: 188.

From October 1917 till April 1918, the Bolsheviks took the control of all Turkic territories including the Kazak Steppes and Turkistan.¹²¹ In order to consolidate their power among different nationalities, in January 1918, the Commissariat of Nationalities headed by Stalin confirmed the right of self-determination and defined the new state as a “Federation of Soviet Republics.”¹²²

Stalin invited national leaders from all regions to Petrograd for the preparation of the new constitution. On 18th of February, he called Alibi Zhangeldin¹²³ (1884-1953) from Turgai Oblast to represent the Kazaks. After the seizure of Orenburg by the Bolsheviks, Zhangeldin had become the new governor of Turgai Oblast replacing Bokeikhanov. Zhangeldin could not visit Stalin, because he was “busy with counter-revolutionary activities” in the region, and asked him to wait until his arrival.¹²⁴

In March, Stalin, Tatar Bolshevik Vahidov and other members of Narkomnats¹²⁵ sent a telegram demanding the establishment of “Tataro-Bashkirskoiy Sovetskoiy Respublika” (Tatar-Bashkort Soviet Republic). They also asked that “revolutionary committees of Azerbaijanis, Tatars, Georgians,

¹²¹ See for the situation appendix A, map 4.

¹²² Donald J. Raleigh (2004), “Civil War of 1917-1922,” Millar, James R. ed., *Encyclopedia of Russian History*, Gale Group Inc. MacMillan Reference, New York, NY: 269.

¹²³ See for a picture of Zhangeldin appendix C, picture 15.

¹²⁴ Amanzholova 1994: 33.

¹²⁵ Narkomnats: Commissariat for Nationality Affairs was established following the Bolshevik Revolution by Stalin in order to deal with the affairs of non-Russian nationalities in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

Armenians, Kyrgyz people [Kazaks], Sarts, Turcomans and others should send their own concrete plans of federation (...) to Narkomnats.”¹²⁶

On 28th of March, a telegram was sent to Alash Orda headquarter in Semipalatinsk. Narkomnats asked them to build the Kyrgyz [Kazak] Nationalities’ Commissariat, but also to exclude and fight the Muslim Democrats, i.e. liberal, national-democratic leadership of Alash Orda. The autonomous Kazak state would be built on the example of Tatar-Bashkort Soviet Republic. The Kazaks replied to this proposal by simply telling them “if you want to build a Kazak republic, [just] do it.”¹²⁷ The negative response of Alash Orda was predictable, because the acceptance of the proposal would require removal of all leaders of Alash Orda, which was basically a national-democratic movement.

But still Bokeikhanov sought to establish relations with the Bolsheviks as well and sent Khalel and Zhansha Dosmukhamedov (leaders of the western section) to Moscow to meet Lenin and the People’s Commissar Stalin. Additionally, Bokeikhanov commissioned Khalel Ghabbasov to negotiate with Stalin by telegraph. Moscow promised them material assistance on cultural needs and autonomy.¹²⁸ Until the intensification of the civil war, the *Alash Orda* government made good use of the weakness of the two opposing sides, and they initiated to establish some administrative local bodies and military troops.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Amanzholova 1994: 34.

¹²⁷ Amanzholova 1994: 34.

¹²⁸ Nurpeisov 1998a: 134.

¹²⁹ Nurpeisov 1998a: 134.

Bokeikhanov was in a shaky position. He wanted to use every alternative for the salvation of the Kazak society including a negotiation process with the Bolsheviks. Bokeikhanov was a long time member of the *Kadets*. As the leader of the liberal, national-democratic Kazak movement and a renowned former member of Bolsheviks' rival, *Kadets*, he should have become an open target for the Bolsheviks.

The telegram sent to Moscow¹³⁰ on 3rd of April, is signed by Ghabbasov as president, despite the fact that the president was indeed Bokeikhanov. Amazholova argues that Bokeikhanov was probably hiding around Semipalatinsk in those days, because on 25th of January the Bolshevik Kazak leader Zhangeldin had sent a telegram to Petrograd asking to arrest Bokeikhanov, Baitursynov and Eldes Omarov, who were suspected to be around Orenburg. The soviets in Semipalatinsk had also ratified Bokeikhanov's detention. It was probably Bokeikhanov, who led the negotiation process, but he was underground and did not want to reveal his place.¹³¹

The telegram sent on 3rd of April accepts the proposed government type of a federal soviet republic, but Alash Orda demanded the right to determine the borders of Kazakhstan, and asked how the relationship with the Soviets would be. Alash Orda accepted that regional rule would be under the Soviets' jurisdiction, but it had to rule nationalities democratically.¹³²

¹³⁰ In March 1918, the capital was moved from Petrograd to Moscow as was under the threat of the German assault.

¹³¹ Amanzholova 1994: 35.

¹³² Amanzholova 1994: 35.

The Bolsheviks and Alash Orda had different aspects on democracy. For the Kazaks it should include all people in the country – nations - indifferent of their social class, but the Bolsheviks had made the revolution in the name of the proletariat, and the “dictatorship of the proletariat” was unquestionable. The bourgeoisie was considered as exploiters of the toiling masses, and the workers had to be emancipated from the yoke of the bourgeoisie. In order to change the social structure and create a more egalitarian society it was necessary to differentiate the two main classes of the society, discriminate the beneficiaries of the exploitation and bring an end to the reproduction of class differences.

Also on the question of federation, the Bolsheviks and Alash Orda had different ideas. Alash Orda was for more sovereignty, whereas the Bolsheviks did not trust a group of national-democratic politicians with a liberal background and an agenda still in effect. The differentiation between Alash Orda and the Bolsheviks on the issues of nation and class will be further investigated in the following chapters.

Despite the fact that there was an antagonistic relationship between these two movements, the relations were not all negative. On answering a telegram sent by Dosmukhamedov on 3rd of April, Stalin ordered amnesty for all arrested members of Alash Orda, which was published by Kazak Bolsheviks’ newspaper, *Ush Jüz*.¹³³

On 5th of April All-Kazak Soviet Congress was organized under M. Tungachin with a budget of 12 million rubles sent by Lenin to Dosmukhamedov.

¹³³ Amanzholova 1994: 35.

They sent a telegram on 16th of April telling that the relations between the Bolsheviks and Alash Orda were very positive¹³⁴ and they gave the following information to be published:

We are discussing autonomy with Sovnarkomnats. Sovnarkom accepts our autonomy, under the condition if we accept the Soviet rule. We gave them officially what Orda wants. Sovnarkom told us by a telegram that Sovnarkom demands amnesty for arrested Kyrgyz [Kazak] organizers and wants to form a Kyrgyz [Kazak] commissariat from them, called Alash Orda. Alash autonomy is declared. Inform the people.¹³⁵

Both the Bolsheviks and Alash Orda needed to cooperate. The Bolsheviks wanted to consolidate their authority in the USSR and to spread the revolution to other countries. Kazakhstan and Turkistan was the gateway to the East. Alash Orda was weak in founding a state and govern it, beside the fact that they were too weak to resist the - Red and White – Russian parties of the civil war.

On 17th of April, Dosmukhamedov told in a speech in Saratov Sovdep that all “Kazak oblasts should be restructured according to the Soviet example (...) consisting of eight soviets with the central soviet administration in Semipalatinsk.”¹³⁶ Dosmukhamedov, however, also speaks out about the problems and weakness of Alash Orda. There were only *zemstvos* as administrative units in Semipalatinsk but no soviets, and it was very hard to build up soviets in Semipalatinsk, where there were no workers and soldiers. He also

¹³⁴ Amanzholova 1994: 38.

¹³⁵ Amanzholova 1994: 38.

¹³⁶ Amanzholova 1994: 38.

states that it was only the Soviets, who treated them well, and no one except the Soviets considered them.¹³⁷

On 11th of May, the Kyrgyz [Kazak] department in Narkomnats was activated. The main objective was announced as the establishment of the autonomous Kyrgyz [Kazak] Soviet.

The front against the Reds was consolidated due to the new factors, and in spring the civil war took a new shape, which would also affect Alash Orda and push them to reevaluate their alliances.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on the 3rd of March 1918 created great disturbance among the masses. In addition to that, the forceful terms on food supply had alienated the peasantry from the Bolsheviks. The Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) decided to overthrow the Bolsheviks and in need of armed forces, they allied themselves with the monarchist generals outside the Bolsheviks' sphere of influence. Moreover, the Allies were shocked by the end of the war on the German eastern front, they were also afraid that the materials they had sent to Russia could now be seized by the Germans.¹³⁸

It should not be forgotten that no capitalist government had welcomed the socialist revolution, and they would prefer it to be destroyed, before the waves of the revolution were to be spread to their own country. The peasants were rising on the land, the strong leftist groups of the Mensheviks and SRs were ready to challenge the Bolshevik authority and the Allies were preparing a counter-attack.

¹³⁷ Amanzholova 1994: 38-39.

¹³⁸ White 1994: 193-194.

The popular support, political organizations and external powers were in a position to strengthen the front of the monarchist generals. The Bolsheviks were surrounded, thus, by all oppositional forces. The “democratic counter-revolutionaries” joined the armed forces of the monarchist generals and they were supported by the Allies with munitions, which totally changed the course of the civil war in Russia.

The initial event which changed the war around Urals and consequently the Kazak Steppes was the revolt of the Czechoslovak legion. Czechoslovakia was then under the control of Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the legion was formed by Russia to fight on the side of Allied Forces against Austro-Hungary for the independence of Czechoslovakia. After the agreement of Brest-Litovsk they were to be sent to France via Trans-Siberian Railway and the Pacific Ocean.¹³⁹ When, on 27th of May 1918¹⁴⁰, however, Trotsky as the head of Red Army ordered their disarming,¹⁴¹ they revolted and took the control of all railway stations between Chelyabinsk and Omsk¹⁴² cutting the Bolshevik lines between Moscow and the land beyond Urals. The Bolsheviks were afraid of that Czechoslovak legion, which was in collaboration with the Allies, could move to the side of the Whites, which was also supported by the Allies and was in need of arms and soldiers.¹⁴³

¹³⁹ Rex A. Wade (2001), *The Bolshevik Revolution and Russian Civil War*, Greenwood Press, Westport: 66.

¹⁴⁰ Togan 1999: 174.

¹⁴¹ Wade 2001: 66.

¹⁴² Togan 1999: 174.

¹⁴³ Wade 2001: 66.

The Czechoslovak legion was already hostile to the Bolsheviks because of their agreement with the Germans.¹⁴⁴ Trotsky's decision helped them to rise and fight.

On 8 June 1918, the brigades of SRs took the cities of Saratov and Samara, where they established the Committee of the Members of the Constituent Assembly (Komuch).¹⁴⁵ The Constituent Assembly had a second chance to reshape and join the Russian political arena through a call for not surrendering to the Germans. They had a socialist agenda and left the land confiscated from the land-owners in the hands of the peasants, but did not put the policy of nationalization into practice any further. They also abolished Bolsheviks' forced food supply measures and fixed grain prices, bringing some relief to the peasantry.¹⁴⁶

On 11th of June the Whites took Semipalatinsk and on 19th of June Alash Orda, including Bokeikhanov came to Semipalatinsk¹⁴⁷ to turn that city into their headquarter.¹⁴⁸ Bokeikhanov entered with 500 Kazak cavalries and the banner of Alash Orda, which was made of the emblem of *yurta*¹⁴⁹ on a white fabric, the same as *Kazak* newspapers emblem.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁴ Togan 1999: 174.

¹⁴⁵ At the elections of the Constituent Assembly on 19th of November 1917, the SRs gained 40 percent of the votes, the Bolsheviks 23.9 percent, the Kadets 4.7 percent and the Mensheviks 2.3 percent (White 1994: 175), but the Assembly was suspended by the Bolsheviks right after the first meeting on Lenin's justification that the election was made before the split in the SR party, and that the republic of the soviets was a higher form of democracy (White 1994: 176).

¹⁴⁶ White 1994: 195.

¹⁴⁷ Amanzholova 1994: 44.

¹⁴⁸ For the situation in 1918-1919 see appendix A, map 3.

¹⁴⁹ Yurta: traditional tent of the Kazak nomads.

¹⁵⁰ Nurmagambetova 2003: 29. See for a picture *Kazak* newspapers emblem appendix C, picture 7.

In June 1918, the *Alash Orda* government ratified some decrees, abolished all legal decrees of the soviets, which were under the Bolshevik control, and the communists were persecuted which can be considered as part of their negotiations with the Constituent Assembly in Samara under Komuch, and Dutov, who was the head of another anti-Bolshevik government, that is the – conservative – Provisional Siberian government in Omsk. The *Alash Orda* government was in need of technical assistance and military equipment to build up the militia, and the Whites promised to provide military training, arms, munitions and uniforms. The western section, Khalel and Zhansha Dosmukhamedov, received 600 rifles and machine guns from Komuch; the Turgai Oblast around Orenburg received rifles, munitions and uniforms from Dutov, and with Dutov's help they built two horse regiments, which immediately joined the struggle against the Reds.¹⁵¹

They had formed some administrative apparatuses, and they were taking necessary steps to form the militia. However, they were suffering significant material deficiencies as it was mentioned on 26 October 1918. The quotation written by a member of Alash Orda gives valuable information about the strength of the Kazak militia as well.

As to our participation in common struggle from the Bolshevik-German yoke,¹⁵² the Kirghiz [Kazak] mobilized parts [*sic.*] could not get arms in proper time on many reasons, which didn't depend on us. Now we understand, that these arms are enough not only for us [*sic.*]. At present time in Semirechie in the struggle against the Bolsheviks take part [*sic.*] the Kirghiz [Kazak] troops in number 300 men [*sic.*], there are about 8

¹⁵¹ Nurpeisov 1998a: 135.

¹⁵² The strange phrase of "Bolshevik-German yoke" reflects the negative effect of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the "surrender" of the Bolsheviks to the Germans, and the importance of reopening the front against Germany.

thousand volunteers in Semirechenskaya oblast, 2 thousand – in Semipalatinskaya, 2 thousand – in Ural'skaya, 450 men – in Kustanai.¹⁵³

The Kazaks had in total 12.750 armed men, which was not few, but that was not much for a population about six millions Kazaks (1915), and even if they had achieved to conscript more Kazaks, the equipment shortage would prevent them to build a stronger army. Not only the Kazaks but the Whites were also short of arms and munitions. Although some Kazaks were voluntarily joining the Kazak troops, they were lacking training, arms, munitions and uniforms to fight on the front. However, as the recent Kazak historian Kenges Nurpeisov, who is one of the leading specialist on the *Alash Orda* movement, admits “in Kazakhstan the great mass of the native population was deprived a stimulus – creation of their national state.”¹⁵⁴ Thus, apart from the fact that the *Alash Orda* government was short of military equipment to build an army, the number of voluntaries was not much and the support was not widespread to form strong and numerous regiments.

For the Kazak leaders, the military question was not the only problem they should deal with but they were in need of skilled cadres in all domains of state formation. While writing on the impossibility of the unification of the *Alash Orda* government and the Kokand government, Bokeikhanov mentions those problems as well.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Nurpeisov 1998a: 136.

¹⁵⁴ Nurpeisov 1998a: 137.

¹⁵⁵ Kara 2002: 147.

Autonomy means being a separate state. It is not an easy job to form and administer a state. We lack the cadres to work in political affairs, and we, the Kazaks, are suffering from the general ignorance of the Kazaks, but in Turkistan the ignorance and lack of skilled cadres is ten times worse than us.¹⁵⁶

They were badly in need of skilled cadres on every level of military and bureaucratic functions, which pushed them to look for allies, who could help them in forming a modern state with all its institutions. Although, they tried to form an alliance with the conservative monarchists, they proved to be worse than the Bolsheviks.¹⁵⁷

The Monarchist generals had an agenda of re-establishing the “one and undivided” Russian Empire¹⁵⁸ which alienated liberal democrat members of Komuch, with which they could indeed keep their alliance until defeating the Bolsheviks. Their desire for the reestablishment of the old regime prior to the February Revolution was turning them into undesirable allies for both the liberal democrats and for the non-Russian supporters, such as the Kazaks or the Russian Cossacks. The Cossacks were the main human source of the Whites’ military might, and when the Cossacks turned against the Whites because of their authoritarian methods, the Whites were deprived of their valuable cavalries. Furthermore, they terminated their support by the peasantry. Instead of maintaining the support of the peasantry, they gained their enmity within a year by giving the land back to the land-owners and punishing the resisting towns by

¹⁵⁶ Kara 2002: 147.

¹⁵⁷ Togan 1999: 208.

¹⁵⁸ White 1994: 207. See appendix B, picture 1 for an interesting propaganda poster of the Whites.

totally burning them down.¹⁵⁹ The re-establishment of the monarchy meant also the re-establishment of the old rights of property on land. The gains of the peasantry during the revolutions were taken back to support the traditional landed gentry of the monarchy.

Kolchak, who was elected as the Supreme Ruler of Russia by other generals fighting in the western, southern and eastern fronts against the Bolsheviks,¹⁶⁰ arrested the members of Komuch¹⁶¹ making himself dictator (*Verkhovniy Pravitel*) of White Russia,¹⁶² on 18 November 1918.¹⁶³

Chokai, who was also a member of Komuch, states that Kolchak saw liberal democrats as enemies of Russia. He ordered them to be arrested and sent by train from Yekaterinburg through Chelyabinsk further to the east to Shadrinsk, but Chokai was informed that all Komuch members were to be executed by shooting on the way to Shadrinsk, and in the city of Chelyabinsk he organized the Kazak troops, the Bashkort member Alkin the Bashkort troops and Chaikin the workers to initiate an uprising, so that the members of the Constituent Assembly could escape. The plan was carried out successfully.¹⁶⁴ This incident reflects how the relations between the allied liberal and monarchist Whites had deteriorated. The White generals wanted to get rid of any potential rival including the members

¹⁵⁹ White 1994: 204-205.

¹⁶⁰ White 1994: 204.

¹⁶¹ Kara 2002: 169.

¹⁶² "White Russia" shouldn't be confused with Byelorussia.

¹⁶³ Togan 1999: 200, Kara 2002: 169.

¹⁶⁴ Kara 2002: 170-172.

of the parliament. They dreamt of a monarchist Russia as it was before the February Revolution. Before the Bolsheviks had taken power, it was the democrats, who had overthrown the tsar and terminated the Russian monarchy. Thus, they were considered by the monarchist generals not very different than the Bolsheviks as being the enemies of monarchies.

Leading Komuch members run to west and met Zeki Velidi (Togan) in Sterlitamak (Isterlitamak) in Bashkortostan. The fall of the Constituent Assembly for the second time frustrated the democrats more than ever. In Orenburg they decided that it was clear that they could not keep working with the Whites. Some decided that they had nothing to do in Russia anymore. The civil war had created a last opportunity for them to participate in the Russian political arena, but after the defeat of that final chance they determined to seek asylum in Europe and organize a struggle from outside of Russia. They had no military might in order to join the armed struggle. However, some, like Chokai and Chaikin, preferred to continue their struggle in Russia for some more time and wait for possible changes in the course of the civil war.¹⁶⁵

Moreover, the rights of nationalities were also to be cut to return to the pre-revolutionary, monarchist period. On 21st of November, three days after abolishing Komuch, Kolchak abolished Alash Orda and Bashkort governments as well.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Kara 2002: 172-173.

¹⁶⁶ Togan 1999: 200.

The Whites were not only losing their popular support but they were also loosing on the battlefield effecting Alash Orda as well. The situation for Alash Orda was worse than ever. Their government was abolished by the Whites, and Kazak centers of Orenburg and Uralsk were seized by the Reds again, in January 1919.¹⁶⁷ The government of Alash Orda was divided again and they were under the threat of both the Whites and the Reds.¹⁶⁸ The Bolsheviks were now much stronger in the region due to their restoration of control on the Moscow-Tashkent railroad and unification with their forces in Central Asia.¹⁶⁹ They had to re-evaluate the situation and their alliances.

In the beginning of 1918, Alash Orda had initiated a negotiation process with the Bolsheviks, but they changed their orientation rapidly after the Agreement of Brest-Litovsk and the revolt of the Czechoslovak legion, and joined the Whites with members of Komuch. However, not a year had passed; before the tide turned again, and they had to investigate the possibility of a new negotiation process with the Bolsheviks.

Before passing to the side of the Bolsheviks, they consulted another leader of the resistance movement, Zeki Velidi (Togan), the president and commander of the army of Bashkortostan. In his memoirs he explains the event as follows:

At the beginning of the February 1919, (...) two representatives from Kazakhstan arrived to us... They brought the letter from Akhmed Baitursynov from Turgai and negotiated about what was the situation

¹⁶⁷ See for a propaganda poster about the Reds' attack against the Whites appendix B, picture 2.

¹⁶⁸ See appendix A, map 4.

¹⁶⁹ Nurpeisov 1998a: 137.

with passing to the side of the Soviets... I wrote a letter to Akhmed Baitursynov and Alikhan Bukeikhanov. I wrote there the following:¹⁷⁰ We are going to join the side of the Soviets in a few days. You must know that crossing over to their side is a forced step. Kolchak's extreme hostile relations to us leave us no other choice. We remain faithful to our national principles and to our agreements with the government Alash-Horde. You understand, that to conclude peace with the Soviets, you must not trust them, that believing their word is impossible.¹⁷¹

The Kazak and Bashkort leaders decided to surrender their troops to the Reds on the same day. However, that did not result in a sudden surrender of all *Alash Orda* regiments to the Bolsheviks. First, the Western Alash Orda would join the Bolsheviks. Eastern section could not challenge Kolchak's authority, because they were weak and too close to his general Belov's territory.¹⁷²

Furthermore, it was not clear whether they would be sentenced or not, and they were suspicious of Bolsheviks' honesty in their discourse on national rights. It took nearly a year till they decided to join the Bolsheviks, and only after a negotiation process through Baitursynov's collaboration with the Bolsheviks and the total deprivation of the Kazaks' military stance.

On 18th-20th February the pioneering group of the troops moved to the Bolshevik side and the Kazak leaders headed by Baitursynov and Karaldin met Zeki Velidi (Togan) and other Bashkort leaders to move together to Moscow by train.¹⁷³ The Bolshevik policy on nationalities was changing again. Bolsheviks

¹⁷⁰ Nurpeisov 1998a: 137.

¹⁷¹ Togan 1999: 208, translated in Sabol 2003: 148.

¹⁷² Togan 1999: 208.

¹⁷³ Togan 1999: 213.

superiority on the battlefield gave them self-confidence to include nationalist leaders to the Soviet apparatus.

On the 8th congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), in March 1919, the Bolsheviks took decisive decisions to win the nationalities and to consolidate their superiority against the Whites. They had gained the superiority on the field, and they wanted to win the nationalities to end the war by recognizing the right of national autonomy for existing Tatar, Bashkort and Kazak governments. The Bolsheviks established contacts through the department of Peoples' Commissariat (*Narkomnat*).¹⁷⁴

On the other hand, the Whites' attitude towards the non-Russian nationalities was changing for the worst. The confrontation with the Bolsheviks must have pushed the Whites to the other extreme and the alliance of the democratic forces during the civil war must have strengthened the conservative, monarchist, pan-Slavist and chauvinistic tendencies. During the course of war, in less than three years even the liberals or moderate socialists had to cooperate with the conservative, monarchist generals, who possessed the military might they needed. As it was mentioned above, however, even the liberal, democratic Russians were treated as a threat by the monarchists and their main stronghold, Komuch, was closed by Kolchak with a coup d'état and the arrest of the members.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ Nurpeisov 1998a: 137.

¹⁷⁵ White 1994: 196.

Due to changing conditions under the Kazak president Bokeikhanov's information the second man in charge, Baitursynov had gone to Moscow to act as a mediator between the Kazaks and the Bolsheviks, and to check their sincerity. On the 10th of July 1919, Lenin signed a decree on "the Provisional Regulations about the revolutionary Committee on Governing the Kyrgyz [Kazak]¹⁷⁶ Krai" in order to form an organ to improve necessary skills for national autonomy. It included an equal number of pro-Bolshevik members and members of *Alash Orda* movement, and was headed by Baitursynov as vice president.¹⁷⁷ Actually, the basic mission of Baitursynov was to build the ground for a negotiation between the Bolsheviks and the leaders of *Alash Orda*. He was working on both sides for a peaceful transition from the side of the Whites to the Reds.

During that period, he announced his ideas about the present situation, socialism and the Kazak people in the newspaper *Zhizn Natsionalnosti* (Life of the Nationalities) in an article called "Revolution and the Kyrgyz" as follows:

I am writing as a representative of the group of Kazak intellectuals ... who led the Kazak national policy under the tsarist government and struggled with the last one as well. What the Kazak endured under the tsar's government is better known to us than by anyone else. Owing to the existence of basic [primitive] socialism and communism among the Kazaks, and because of the living conditions, the absence of class distinctions, and strong divisions of property, the Kazak people did not feel a peculiar need for the socialist system...¹⁷⁸ Having arrived in the

¹⁷⁶ In the 18th and 19th century, the Russians and Westerners were using the term Kazak (Cossack in the west) for warlike Russian groups on the fringes of the Russian Empire, and the Turkic Kazak tribes on the Kazak steppes were called Kyrgyz, whereas the actual Kyrgyz tribes were called Karakyrghyz. In 1925 century, Soviet regime and Soviet writers accepted to use the term Kazak only for the Turkic Kazak people, but the application of the term Kyrgyz for the Kazaks continued in the 1920's. (Edward Hallet Carr (1989), *Sovyet Rusya Tarihi Bolşevik Devrimi 1, 1917-1923*, İmge Yayınları, İstanbul: 291).

¹⁷⁷ Nurpeisov 1998a: 138.

¹⁷⁸ Sabol 2003: 149.

Central Soviet Russia as a delegate from Turgaiskaya group of the Alash-Horde, which sent me for negotiations with the Central Power,¹⁷⁹ however seeing the state of order in everything and the attention to the Kazak national question, which corresponds to the points, proclaimed in the Declaration of Rights of Russia's Peoples, from the bottom of my heart I can say to calm my comrades, that we were not mistaken, when we favoured the Soviet power to the Kolchak one.¹⁸⁰

Baitursynov was positive about joining the new regime in Russia. The Soviet Russia was against their common enemy, tsarism, which was made the scapegoat of all evil in the Russian Empire. The installation of a new regime against tsarism was expected to bring a bright future for the Kazaks. Although the Kazak intellectuals had nationalist objectives, it was not expected to be in contradiction with the socialist system, because Kazak life based on nomadism was considered as a primitive form of socialism (or better to say, communism). The short paragraph carries messages and affirmations to both sides Baitursynov had to deal with. He was assuring the Bolsheviks that their commitment would be sincere and supported by the deeply rooted "primitive communism" Kazak way of life, and he was confirming the members of Alash Orda that this was the right side to join.

2.4. Joining the Bolsheviks

Since the midst of 1919, the leftist tendency was strengthening among the Kazaks and some were moving to the side of the Bolsheviks. By the end of 1919,

¹⁷⁹ Nurpeisov 1998a: 137-138.

¹⁸⁰ Sabol 2003: 149.

that took a mass character, and in the beginning of 1920 through the negotiations and political amnesty all leaders of *Alash* movement joined the Bolsheviks.¹⁸¹

However, they were not easily accepted. In January 1920, the president of *Alash Orda*, Bokeikhanov, and three other members were arrested. Detentions took in other places like Omsk and Akmolinks Oblast as well. Additionally, *Kyzrevkom* (Kyrgyz [Kazak] Revolutionary Committee) investigated the leaders of the western section, Khalel and Zhansha Dosmukhamedov, and decided that the “motive for transition of the western part of the Alash-Horde to the Soviet side was not its sympathy with the ideas of this power, but probably irreparable situation of its nearest allies – the Ural Cossacks and also impossibility of realization their worked out flight plan from the bounds of the Ural Oblast.”¹⁸² The decision made on 5th of March 1920 was their separation “from the Kirghiz [Kazak] working masses” and “send[ing] them to Moscow or other central provinces.”¹⁸³

Nevertheless, joining the Bolsheviks was not the only alternative. Another Kazak leader from Turkistan, Mustafa Chokai, who was mentioned above as the president of the independent Kokand government, went underground after the seizure of the state by the Bolsheviks. He first joined the Komuch, moved to Georgia after its destruction, and then he immigrated to France, where he published newspapers and became one of the leaders of the Turkic nationalist movement in exile.

¹⁸¹ Nurpeisov 1998a: 139.

¹⁸² Nurpeisov 1998a: 140.

¹⁸³ Nurpeisov 1998a: 140.

Zeki Velidi (Togan), the president of the Bashkort government, who was also mentioned above, worked until 1920 (29th of June)¹⁸⁴ in close relation with Lenin and Stalin in the nationality question and with Trotsky in the Red Army. Then, he joined the armed struggle against the Bolsheviks in Central Asia. After the defeat of the struggle, he moved to Austria, Turkey, Germany, and again to Turkey, where he worked as a professor of history.

The other alternative for the leaders of *Alash Orda* was also joining the armed struggle or to leave the country, like them.

Although the members of *Alash Orda* had to leave the political stage (or decision making process) to the Bolsheviks and new political figures,¹⁸⁵ most Kazak intellectuals continued to work as educators, editors or administrators to build a modern Kazak nation just as they did before their political struggle after the February Revolution.

Their struggle was about national rights, modernization and land question. Actually, they were not political revolutionaries but social revolutionaries. Their main priority was the survival of their people, which could only be achieved through creating a modern, educated, settled Kazak nation. Baitursynov's passage from the second issue of the *Kazak* newspaper reflects clearly what their intention since the very beginning was:

¹⁸⁴ Togan 1999: 281.

¹⁸⁵ Those new figures of the Kazak political arena had joined the Bolsheviks before the members of *Alash Orda*. Those are political figures, like Turar Ryskulov, Ali Zhangeldin and Mehmediar Tungachin, who joined the Bolsheviks actually not long ago but in 1918, obtained important posts in the soviet government (Togan 1981: 378). This new group of Kazak politicians will be studied in the fourth chapter.

The Kazakh nation for a long time has inhabited a definite territory, and lived a particular kind of life. Now we see the tremendous wave of colonizers in the Kazakh steppes. What will be the fate of our nation in the future? Judging from the historical course of events, it is not difficult to guess that the new elements arising here will prove themselves culturally the stronger compared with the local population. As time goes by, the latter will be devoured by the former. On the other hand, if both prove to have culture on the same level, then they will be able to develop independently, and they will exist in their own right, preserving their own national fate. Now, however, a rupture in the economic life of the Kazakhs is unavoidable. Peasants are settling in those regions which are suitable for agriculture; regions which are suitable for cattle breeding are taken away from us by the new colonizers.... In a word, by all kinds of roads foreign nationalities are entering our minds. Thus there arises a grave question for us, the question about the independence of the Kazakh nation. In order to save our independence, we must attempt, with all forces and means at our disposal, to rise to a state of enlightenment and general culture. For this purpose we must first of all occupy ourselves with the development of literature in the national language. We must never forget that nation has a right to demand an independent life, which speaks its own language and has its own literature. In this regard matters stand very badly with us. The modern Kazakh intelligentsia, having received their education in Russian schools and Tatar *medreses*, already begin to feel contempt for the Kazakh language, and begin to speak Russian or Tatar among themselves. That is a bad sign. If it should continue further, then we shall have once and for all said goodbye to the Kazakh language and, along with it, to the Kazakh people as an independent nation. If we do not want this happen, it is absolutely necessary to solve this question from its very root and to start right now with the perfection of the Kazakh language and literature.¹⁸⁶

This quotation shows that the main objective of the Kazaks was preventing the extinction of the Kazak society, which was triggered by the arrival of Russian colonizers. The problem for Baitursynov actually arose from the fact that the Russians were culturally more advanced than the Kazaks. Baitursynov was afraid that the Kazaks would be dominated if not assimilated by the Russians. The assessment of the problem also reflects that their nationalism was different than a rather new nationalist trend of the period, in which assimilation and ethnic

¹⁸⁶ Mirzhakyp Dulatov (1922) "Akhmed Baitursunovich Baitursunov (Biograficheskii Ocherk)," *Trudy Obchshstva Izycheniia Kirgizskogo Kraia* 3: 21-22, translated in Thomas Winner (1958) *The Oral Art and Literature of the Kazaks of Russian Central Asia*, Durham.

cleansing had a significant position. The publishers of the newspaper *Kazak*, on the other hand, aimed to live side by side with the Russians but without being assimilated to their “high culture”. The significance of “culture” in their comprehension is also seen in their use of the term “independence.” Although this term can be understood taken separately or within a retrospective reading, as if it was implying political independence, the quotation shows that the writer was indeed commenting on the creation of the independent being of the Kazak identity. Thus, his priority here was again advancing the Kazaks to the Russian cultural level. He considered the development of the Kazak language and literature as indispensable to reach that goal. Russian schools and *medreses* under Tatars domination were comprehended as significant obstacles for the autonomous development of Kazak language. This short section of an article refers to all issues Kazak intelligentsia believed to be crucial: land question, national survival, cultural and linguistic improvement. The challenge of the Russian colonizers awoke the need for modernizing the Kazak society.

The Kazak intelligentsia had to move very fast from being educators of Kazak society to political organizers. Miroslav Hroch in his work on nationalisms states that a nation comes into being in three stages.¹⁸⁷ On phase A, there are only a small group of intellectuals, researchers, who try to collect cultural objects and they dream of a nation. On phase B, the political cadres struggle as nationalists for

¹⁸⁷ Hroch is not the only person claiming that nations are constructed following the establishment of the (nation-)states. He is one of the members of the modernist approach on nationalism together with Ernest Gellner, Eric J. Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson, who consider nation as a modern phenomenon and a social body constructed after the state was seized and reshaped by a nationalist elite. Here I mentioned only Hroch’s formulation as it is the most appropriate model for the changing role of the Kazak intelligentsia.

independence; and on the last phase they gain autonomy and create a nation.¹⁸⁸ In the case of the Kazak leaders the shift from phase A to phase B had to be made very fast due to the changing conditions in Russia. And when it was clear that they could not achieve autonomy, they joined the Bolsheviks and turned back to phase A.¹⁸⁹

Alash Ordists were not the first generation of Kazak intellectuals. The vanguards of Kazak enlightenment are Chokan Valikhanov (1835-1865) and Ibrahim Altynsarin (1841-1889), but after 1905, when some Kazak intellectuals were publishing *Kazak* newspapers, there were not single figures anymore but members of a wider Kazak intelligentsia.¹⁹⁰ While they were struggling hard to create a national, cultural consciousness for their fellow Kazaks, they had to jump to the stage of political nationalism, for which the Kazak society and they were not ready yet. They lacked the organizational tools, bureaucratic apparatuses of a political movement to build a nation-state, and there was no time to create them. Moreover, the world-system was also discouraging since big powers were turning to isolationist policies in foreign affairs to repair their war-torn countries. There was no external support to come to realize the promise of self-determination of the Allies.

Under the pressure of their acute problems the Kazaks had to turn their faces to internal allies. They were not only lacking the necessary tools to fight for

¹⁸⁸ Miroslav Hroch (1985) *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among Smaller European Nations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 185.

¹⁸⁹ See page 135-136 for tables showing the changes between phase A and phase B.

¹⁹⁰ Sabol 1998: 126-127.

independence and build an autonomous state but also their power was not sufficient to transform the society. They needed allies in Russian politics to carry their reforms for the enlightenment of the Kazak society, and also the support of a more efficiently organized state apparatus was necessitated. The swift changes in Russian political arena forced them to form alliances on a large spectrum from liberals to Russian nationalists and finally to the Bolsheviks.

They should have thought that it would be more beneficial to the Kazak society, if they would stay and work together with the Bolsheviks in their modernization project. The above mentioned arguments of Baitursynov were not in contradiction with the Bolshevik ideology. It is true that the tenets of the Soviet modernization project had many common points with their principles mentioned in their petitions, articles or party program. Socialists or Kazak nationalists were products of their time, who wanted to carry their people to the next step in the human evolution, and modernization was understood as the main vehicle of ending the backwardness. They shared similar ideas in creating an educated population based on rational and scientific curriculum; the backwardness, traditional and conservative members of the ancient regime were their common enemies in that struggle.

The difference was about the method to reach that end. Bolsheviks through their access to Marxism and political debates in Europe had a more complex understanding about what to do, and they put great importance on changes in the economic structure. Economics had a privileged position in their plans of industrialization or electrification as the most essential requirements of

development.¹⁹¹ Though, not only on the technological level but also in understanding the society, economics played a critical role. The society was classified according to the individuals' position in the class structure, which gave the class position and the political acts in the face of class relations the precedence over the national rights.

On the other hand, the Kazaks gave priority to culture over economics. They aimed to deal with Kazaks' cultural level, and it was the whole Kazak society indifferent of class differences. The main difference between the Bolsheviks and the Kazaks was on economics versus culture but more notably proletariat versus Kazak nation, which would lead to further clashes in the coming period.¹⁹²

Nevertheless, it is also true that the Bolsheviks' program was so far the most open-minded Russian agenda in terms of national rights. The Bolsheviks were seemingly putting great value on the recognition of national rights and even the right of secession was acknowledged. The Kazaks were also optimistic about that the land question would be discussed and solved.

Basically, all three issues might have been seen as soluble or at least open to negotiation. In the end, modernization project was realized under the USSR. The national cultural rights were acknowledged by the Bolsheviks but political autonomy was only on paper and the newly created soviet socialist republics

¹⁹¹ See for a propaganda poster showing the importance of electrification for industrial infrastructure appendix B, picture 12.

¹⁹² This clash on culture versus economics will be further discussed in the third and fourth chapters.

became local executive organs of Moscow-based policies.¹⁹³ As a matter of fact, from Stalin's point of view this could only be achieved by removing all potential resistance to Moscow's policies, which meant liquidating the well-known leaders of the Kazak people. The third issue, land question between the Kazaks and the Russian settlers, seized to exist by eliminating the very foundation of the problem through confiscating the land and formation of *kolkhoz* and *sovkhozes*.

When the history is written from a distance, schemas and classifications are necessary in understanding certain events. However, the figures do not act – always- according to preset, definite projects, and they are not implemented step by step until reaching the final stage. More often, it is us, who tend to comprehend the past from a given “final” point in time and judge the temporal choices as segments of a fixed final project. Indeed they were just trying to save their people by modernizing them with the help of different allies under changing conditions. They were trying to make history but under given circumstances. The pushing factors related to the demise of their hopes with the Whites should have strengthened the weak hopes on the Bolsheviks, so that the cooperation should have appeared to them as the only solution under given conditions.

In the following chapters the fate of three important issues for the Kazak intellectuals will be discussed: the nationality policy, modernization and the land question under the Soviet sovereignty.

¹⁹³ When the USSR dissolved in 1991, and the Soviet Republics gained independence, the republics emerged as breeding grounds of new, would-be nation-states.

CHAPTER 3

3. The Formation of the Soviet Nationality Policies and the Kazaks

The Kazak intellectuals saw no other alternative rather than joining the Bolsheviks and cooperating with them in the formation of a modern Kazak nation. They were both modernizers and nationalists. Their aim of modernization was shared by the Bolsheviks, and the Bolsheviks seemed to be the most open-minded Russian political organization in terms of nationality policies.

In this chapter the evolution of the Bolsheviks' nationality policy, its influence on the Kazak intellectuals and their exclusion will be discussed; additionally the formation of the Kazak SSR will be summarized.

The Bolsheviks aimed to shape the political structure with more trusted local politicians, and the Alash Ordists as former political rivals had no significant position in determining the nationality policy. Throughout the 1920s the nationality policy evolved under changing conditions, continuous debates and differing sides of discussions, and it was alienated in time to the original draft on national rights in 1920.

The Alash Ordists aimed at the survival of the Kazak society by strengthening the Kazak language and literature, and autonomy. The autonomy was achieved on paper, and had no real meaning, but the borders were drawn, some administrative bodies of state were established, and after the dissolution of

the USSR, the autonomy became a reality. Unintended consequences brought about the changes Alash Ordists aimed some seventy years later.

Despite the fact that they were excluded from the political arena, they could continue to work in the field of education and join the struggle of constructing a modern “Soviet republic.” They were educators and enlighteners before the turmoil of the civil war, and following the end of the war they turned back to their original occupation to lend a hand in modernizing the Kazak society as educators, publishers or scientists. In this chapter, consequently, they will leave the stage to new political figures with more political influence in determining the policies. The deeds of Alash Ordists under the Soviet rule will be explained in the next chapter as part of the modernization process under the Soviet rule.

3.1. Nationality Policies of the USSR

The Bolsheviks had no clear-cut program at the time of the revolution; they had certain objectives, like materializing the egalitarian society of the communist utopia, but they had neither an example, nor a detailed program, nor any experience in state affairs. Their agenda was based on daily matters and decrees, illustrating the evolution of their political program.

The weakness of other alternatives and possibilities of cooperation in these two issues, i.e. nationalization and modernization, enabled the participation of the Kazak intellectuals in the new government. In the first phase of Moscow’s policies, the modernization aspect created an active role for the Kazak intellectuals in the formation of a new Kazak society. The nationality policy was first giving the impression of being relatively positive, at least open to discussion; but later the Moscow-oriented policies paralyzed the local leaders. Year by year

the centralization around one-party, one-ruler was consolidated alienating local figures. First, the cooperation with nationalist leaders in national affairs was abolished and Alash Ordists concentrated on cultural affairs, then the cultural functions of the national communist politicians was also abolished, and finally at the end of 1920s the purges put an end to any alternative other than Moscow's policies.

During the cold War the cooperation of the local leaders with the Bolsheviks and their later execution was evaluated by some authors in the West as the "betrayal of the national leaders by the Bolsheviks."¹⁹⁴ According to that, first some nationalist demands were accepted only to be abandoned later, when the Bolsheviks would consolidate their power. Adeeb Khalid argues that there are several problems with this argument; two points he mentions are related to that problem:

It imputes the ideological stability to both sides during a period of massive upheaval, when, indeed, actions of both sides were governed by emergency responses to unforeseen contingencies. It also implies the existence of internal homogeneity in the two camps that vanishes on closer inspection. (...) The various sides of the conflict were therefore neither united nor in possession of fully formed ideologies. As the various actors negotiated the uncertainties of revolution and war, their political agendas were transformed, often in unexpected ways.¹⁹⁵

According Khalid, we cannot speak about a betrayal here, because both the Bolsheviks and the Kazak intellectuals had no full-fledged program at the time of

¹⁹⁴ See for example Richard Pipes (1968), *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

¹⁹⁵ Adeeb Khalid (2001), "Nationalizing the Revolution in Central Asia," *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, (ed.) Ronald Grigory Suny & Terry Martin, Oxford University Press, New York: 145-146.

the revolution or the civil war. Both sides were acting according to changing conditions of the time. Besides the groups were not homogenous groups. There were different ideas, and the chaos created by the speed of changes complicated the establishment of stable groups and programs.

Another widely accepted argument is related to the problem of Moscow's nationality policies. It is generally accepted that the establishment of Central Asian republics was part of a divide-and-rule policy. Among the forerunners of this approach on national delimitation policy, which evaluates the process of creating national republics not as acknowledgment of a national right but as a hidden agenda to divide a greater nationalism are Richard Pipes, Alexandre Bennigsen, Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, Robert Conquest, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse.¹⁹⁶ This view has become the mainstream approach in the West, during the Cold War.

Especially, in the example of the Central Asian republics, it is generally accepted by above mentioned authors that Soviet nationality policies were implemented to eliminate the pan-Turkist and pan-Islamist threat. The national borders and the new national identities created within those borders are considered as Soviet fabrications to divide a Turkistani identity.

This argument is supported by the fact that in the Ferghana Valley, in the heart of Turkestan, there was a mixed population without crystallized identities as Kazak, Uzbek or Kyrgyz; and while the Soviet authorities were referring to

¹⁹⁶ See for example Alexandre Bennigsen Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay(1964) *The Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the USSR and their Linguistic Problems*, Central Asian Research Center, London; Robert Conquest (1962) *The Last Empire*, Ampersand, London; Hélène Carrère d'Encausse (1994) "The National Republics Loose Their Independence," ed. Edward Allworth, *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance*, Duke University Press, Durham.

language as the source of nationality, in the Ferghana Valley many people were bilingual, and language was just a tool of communication between different groups, so it was flexible and open to change.

Akbarzadeh makes the following statement about the absurdity of this situation:

To the peasants of this multilingual valley this policy seemed completely absurd. They could not comprehend the necessity of choosing their identity on the basis of language, when they speak Uzbek at home, Tajik in the mosque and Kyrgyz with their in-laws. Which one could be picked? All were equally important to the peasant of the Ferghana Valley.¹⁹⁷

It has been argued that their identity would be established due to their mother-tongue, but what their mother-tongue was, was chosen according to the country, they were living in.¹⁹⁸ Thus, in practice their identity became a result of created borders.

Arne Haugen argues, however, that the relationship between indigenous actors and Soviet politicians is more complex than a simple divide and rule policy.¹⁹⁹ He refers to John Schoeberlein, who argues that there is little evidence to prove an agenda of divide and rule policy. This representation based on “aggressor-victim dichotomy” was an outcome of the Cold War period. The end

¹⁹⁷ Shahram Akbarzadeh (1997), “A Note on Shifting Identities in the Ferghana Valley,” *Central Asian Survey*, No.16, pp. 65-68.

¹⁹⁸ Akbarzadeh 1997.

¹⁹⁹ Arne Haugen (2003), *The Establishment of National Republics in Soviet Central Asia*, Palgrave, Chippenham.

of the Cold War introduced the possibility to challenge this idea, which had acquired the status of common knowledge.²⁰⁰

Adeep Khalid also criticizes this aspect and states that “such an analysis is blind to the massive transformation in notions of identity that took place in these years in Central Asia.”²⁰¹ He makes the following statement:

Seeing the national delimitation simply as a divide-and-conquer strategy of the Soviets transforms Central Asians into passive victims of imperial intrigue. Equally, seeing creation of national boundaries as a transparent application of ethnographic knowledge blinds us to the fact that ethnographic knowledge that attached unequivocal labels to every individual in the new Soviet state itself was the product of a complex politics involving the drawing of boundaries both of inclusion and exclusion. The Soviet state was only one actor in this politics.²⁰²

The Kazaks were also not just passive victims of the Soviet policies. They had the options to cooperate, join the resistance movement or became political émigrés. The Bolsheviks would not be able to fight a widely supported resistance. The commitment of some intellectual leaders and the people enabled the Bolsheviks to control the Steppes and Central Asia. The creation of new boundaries and republics was also accepted by most, which produced new spheres of political influence for different local leaders, similar to creation of new republics and new national elites in other parts of the world out of the colonies of great powers of the time. The discussion and the role of different local actors will be exemplified on the last pages of this chapter in Chicherin’s letters.

²⁰⁰ Haugen 2003: 24.

²⁰¹ Khalid 2001: 145.

²⁰² Khalid 2001: 146.

The boundaries were not created to produce divisions among the people out of nothing. The role of the local elites would not suffice as well, if there were already some “divisions” in the Central Asian peoples. The differences between the Kazaks in the Steppes and other Turkistani peoples were clearer for the indigenous peoples of the region than we think today. The president of Kokand government, Mustafa Chokai, tells an interesting anecdote. When the Kokand government fell, he secretly left the city, and while he was crossing the Ferghana Valley, he was captured by twenty armed, young Uzbek townspeople. They were fanatic Muslims considering the Kazaks (and the Bolsheviks) infidels to be exterminated. He would nearly be hanged by about 80 Uzbeks, who were indeed represented by him as the president of the Kokand government or in the Russian parliament a short while ago. He was saved in the last instance, when a person recognized him and explained his deeds.²⁰³

This example shows that there were already some differences among different social groups – not nations - to start with in building modern nations. Moscow did not draw the national boundaries by itself to be implemented in Central Asia, but relied on tribal affiliations and the support of local cadres. The potential risks of drawing up new boundaries were a matter of discussion among the Bolsheviks as well, as it was exemplified Chicherin’s letters.

The nationality policies of the Soviets was not a one-dimensional process set from the beginning. It was the product of long discussions, based on ethno-territoriality, the right of self-determination, economic sustainability, and also divide and rule policy. Additionally, there were a variety of actors, such as the

²⁰³ Kara 2002: 157.

resistance movements to the Bolsheviks, i.e. *Basmachis* or National Union of Turkistan, moderate nationalists cooperating with the Bolsheviks, nationalist communists, such as Turar Ryskulov²⁰⁴ (1884-1938), Russian Bolsheviks against Stalin's nationality policy. The drafts of nationality policies of 1920s were outcomes of those factors and strikes of different actors. The following pages are about the shaping of Bolsheviks policy on nationalities, the Kazak intellectuals responses and creation of new republics.

3.1.1. The Foundations of Bolshevik Nationality Policies: Before the Revolution

The Bolsheviks based their ideology on Marxist writings, but in Marx and Engels' writings the national question had no special place. It was expected that the nations would wither away, once communism was achieved. According to Marxist thought, the history is based on class struggle, and national identity is an epiphenomena created by capitalism. Thus, in a communist world, national differences, which are phony antagonisms, would turn into irrelevant issues, nations would disappear and the humanity would be united with the eradication of class antagonisms.

However, the complex situation of empires, like the Austria-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire forced the Marxists in those countries to discuss the question of national rights. The Bolsheviks commissioned Stalin to work on the question of nationalities. After his study Stalin wrote his most important work,

²⁰⁴ See for a picture of Ryskulov appendix C, picture 14.

Marxism and the National Question (1913),²⁰⁵ which formulated Bolshevik's reply²⁰⁶ to Austrian Marxists' principle of "extraterritorial, national cultural autonomy."²⁰⁷ Austrian Marxists and the Bolsheviks formed two opposing sides of the discussion.

Otto Bauer from Austrian Marxists discussed in a major essay the concept of nation of some Italian sociologists, who defined nation as possessing a common territory, common descendants, a common language, common traditions, experiences, history, rules and religion.²⁰⁸ Bauer argues that spatial differentiating would break a nation into pieces, and their culture, which is one of the sources of being a nation, would also differentiate in authentic, unitary, new forms.²⁰⁹ According to Bauer and Karl Renner "the triumph of communism would result in an increasing differentiation of nations rather than merging of nations."²¹⁰ So, if the nations would survive, their rights should be protected, and not as territorial social groups, which would lead to cultural fragmentation, but as cultural extraterritorial social groups. Therefore, their principle of extraterritorial, national

205 Josef V. Stalin (1953a), "Marxism and the National Question," *Works, Volume 2, 1907-1913*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow.

206 John Glen (1999), *The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia*, Palgrave, Chippenham, Wiltshire: 73.

207 Ronald Grigor Suny (2001), "State-Building and Nation-Making: the Soviet Experience," *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, (ed.) Ronald Grigory Suny & Terry Martin, Oxford University Press, New York: 239.

208 Otto Bauer (1992), " 'Ulus' Konsepti," ed. Tom Bottomore & Patrick Goode, *Avusturya Marksizmi*, Kavram Yayınları, Istanbul: 91.

209 Bauer 1992: 93.

210 Glenn 1999: 73.

cultural autonomy defended each nationality to be represented in the parliament indifferent of their territory.²¹¹

The Bolsheviks were both against that aspect and the moderate variation supporting the principle of “territorial national cultural autonomy.” The Bolsheviks were supporting the “regional autonomy,” “in which political units would not have ethnic designations.”²¹²

Stalin’s definition of nation was that “[a] nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.” He underlined that none of them “taken separately is sufficient to define a nation.”²¹³

The counter-argument of Stalin stated in that essay was that the Austrian Marxists were confusing the concept of nation with the concept of ethnic group, and that they were treating each nation as a union of individuals but not as a territorial corporation. Stalin and Bauer’s models need to be contextualized, since the two empires, i.e. Austro-Hungarian and Russian, were at different stages of industrialization and nation-formation.

Gellner’s model about the birth of nations is the closest to the national process in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He argues that nationalism is the outcome of the industrialization process. When rural people with different dialects

²¹¹ Suny 2001: 239.

²¹² Ronald Grigor Suny (1998), *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States*, Oxford University Press, New York: 140.

²¹³ Stalin 1953a: 307.

and languages move to big cities, i.e. centers of industrialization, they realize that persons speaking similar dialects with them are sharing the same poor living conditions, whereas the better-off use a much different language.²¹⁴ The industrialization process in Austro-Hungarian was pushing the citizens with different cultural backgrounds to industrial centers, where they met people with the - same and - different cultures, while the industrialization in Russia was not that deep and wide-spread to construct a common ground for the interaction of different cultural groups. Except in some industrial cities or some social groups, like the Tatars, the mobility of different cultural groups was not common, which was making regional autonomy an option for the Russian case.

Bringing the territoriality back had long-lasting effects on the party's assessment of nationalities' question and that found the basis of the federal system²¹⁵ after the revolution.

In the version of nationality policies before the revolution, the right of self-determination was accepted, but the nationalities within the socialist state would neither possess the right of autonomous political territories nor federal rights.²¹⁶ As mentioned above the Bolsheviks had no full-fledged program at the time of the revolution, and the changing conditions, negotiations with different groups evolved to the program of nationality policies.

²¹⁴ Ernest Gellner (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.

²¹⁵ Glenn 1999: 73-74.

²¹⁶ Suny 2001: 239.

3.1.2. The Evolution of the Nationality Policies after the Revolution

The discussions evolved under the political necessities to a discourse of federation for the Soviet republics. This was the result of political necessities rather than an objective of the Bolsheviks²¹⁷ enjoying a long history in their program. In the conjuncture during the revolution the non-Russian nationalist movements were being formed to acquire more rights, and the Bolsheviks were claiming to be the antidote of Russian tsars. They disputed the “prison of peoples” in the Russian Empire.

On 21st of November 1917, the Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia was issued, which was one of the first decrees published one month after the Bolshevik Revolution²¹⁸ showing the importance of the issue for the Bolsheviks.

It brought four principles: “equality and sovereignty of the peoples of the Russian Empire; the right of nations to self-determination; abolition of all privileges based on nationality or religion; freedom and cultural development for national minorities.”²¹⁹

Because of the fact that the right of secession was acknowledged, the borders of the new state were not drawn immediately and left to the negotiation process. By the end of 1917, Poland, Finland had already chosen secession, and in

²¹⁷ Glenn 1999: 74.

²¹⁸Victoria Khiterer (2004) “Nationalism in the Soviet Union,” Millar, James R. ed., *Encyclopedia of Russian History*, Gale Group Inc. MacMillan Reference, New York, NY: 1000.

²¹⁹ Khiterer 2004: 1000.

Ukraine the Mensheviks established an independent state.²²⁰ But soon the Ukrainians gave their support to a White Russian, General Kaledin, who was organizing an army to fight the Bolsheviks. And in Georgia, the opponents of the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks were elected to the government. These events led to harsh debates.²²¹ Ronald G. Suny stresses that:

In contrast to his party comrades on the left, he [Lenin] refused to oppose the independence of Finland, Poland and Ukraine. Though he hoped that such separations could be avoided and reserved the option to oppose specific moves toward independence on principle, he abjured the use of force to keep the empire whole. He was unequivocal in his public commitment to “the full right of separation from Russia of all nations and nationalities, oppressed by tsarism, joined by force or held by force within the borders of the state, i.e. annexed.”²²²

Lenin’s aim was founding a socialist republic with different national republics, each possessing the right of secession. He argued that acknowledging the right of secession does not mean that every nation would leave, just like the fact “that recognition of the *freedom* to leave one's husband is not an *invitation* to all wives to do so” is.²²³

This right should be understood together with the principle of internationalism. Lenin expected that the revolution in Russia would be followed by revolutions in developed capitalist world centers. Russia was just the weakest

²²⁰ See for a map of national resistance to the Bolsheviks in 1917-1918 See appendix A, map 2.

²²¹ Michael McCauley (1993) *The Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Longman, London: 37-38.

²²² Suny 2001: 240.

²²³ Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1964b) “A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism,” *Lenin Collected Works*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, v. 23, 72.

link in the chain of imperialism; a revolution in Russia should be supported by a chain of revolutions in the capitalist world for the success of the Russian Revolution.²²⁴ Leon Trotsky had already formulated his notion “Permanent Revolution” in *Results and Prospects* in 1906 and stated that Russia would first go through a bourgeois revolution, which will be followed by the workers’ revolution, and finally the Russian proletariat’s revolution would spark a world revolution.²²⁵ The first two steppes were left behind, and the time had come for the final step.

As Suny puts it “Soviet Russia was conceived not as an ordinate national state but as the first stone in a future multinational socialist edifice.”²²⁶ The union was open both ways: to secede and to join the first soviet socialist union. All the working peoples of all countries were expected to be united in their socialist republics under a “World Socialist Soviet Republic.”²²⁷

In a speech in 1919, his ideas, expectations and enthusiasm were shared with the proletariat.

Today, the workers who have remained loyal to the cause of throwing off the yoke of capital call themselves Communists. All over the world the association of Communists is growing. In a number of countries Soviet power has already triumphed. Soon we shall see the victory of

²²⁴ Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1964a) “Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism,” *Lenin Collected Works*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, v. 22, 185-304.

²²⁵ Leon Trotsky (1969) *Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects*, Pathfinder Press, New York.

²²⁶ Suny 2001: 238.

²²⁷ Alexander Chubarov (2001), *Russia’s Bitter Path to Modernity*, Continuum International Publishing, New York, NY: 63.

Communism throughout the world; we shall see the foundation of the World Federative Republic of Soviets.²²⁸

In this speech Lenin was probably trying to increase the moral strength of the Bolshevik militants and sympathizers. It was not true that “[i]n a number of countries Soviet power [had] already triumphed,” but they were optimistic that their revolution would spread, the workers in other countries would join their struggle, overthrow bourgeois governments and join their federation, but they had to deepen their revolution in Russia as well.

The civil war was still on their agenda, and they were in need of alliances with the peasantry and non-Russian nationalities. Turning non-Russians to voluntary allies was the necessary condition of winning the proletariat and oppressed peoples of the world. Thus, according to Lenin, they had to compromise. Ultimately, all oppressed peoples and workers of the world would unite for the international socialist revolution and to found the World Socialist Soviet Republic, where the demand for land and statehood would cease to exist.²²⁹

Under the optimism of a world revolution and pragmatic plans of gaining the support of nationalities in Russia, in January 1918, a new declaration acknowledged to all nationalities the right to participate in the federal government; the basis of participation would be determined by the participating nationality itself.²³⁰ The federation was considered as a transitory period till the

²²⁸ Microsoft Encarta (1993-2003), “Lenin, Vladimir Ilich,” Microsoft Corporation, Hulton Deutsch/From V. I. Lenin: Speeches on Gramophone Records 1919-1921 (Cat. # Melodiya MCD 003) (p) 1987, Melodiya.

²²⁹ Suny 2001: 241.

²³⁰ McCauley 1993: 37-38, Suny 2001: 241, Raleigh 2004: 269.

total union of the proletariat of different nations.²³¹ The federation would on the one hand help to the flourishing of nations (*ratsvet*), and to unification of nations (coming together, *sblizhenie*), which was expected to result in merging of nations (*sliyanie*).²³² Thus, in the final phase, the federation of different nations would turn to be superfluous as there would be no nations anymore.

The promise of equality and sovereignty gave the non-Russian peoples confidence to act on the side of the Bolsheviks or to leave Russia,²³³ which would further change the development of the Bolsheviks' nationality policies. In 1918, there were nineteen commissariats with the authority of acting for a particular nation, which would also change in some years. At the top of the commissariats was People's Commissariat for Nationalities (Narkomnats), headed by Stalin,²³⁴ who would become the person undermining the power of individual commissariats with the help of changing circumstances.

There were different sides on matters of nationality policy. The evolution of the policies was shaped by the struggle between those different discussants and the course of events. The change of policies cannot be understood without mentioning those cases.

For all Bolsheviks class struggle had a clear priority over the matters of nationality. Acknowledgment of national rights was a compromise for their agenda based on class struggle. However, Lenin was optimistic in the eradication

²³¹ Vladimir İlyiç Lenin (1989) *Ulusların Kaderlerini Tayin Hakkı*, Sol Yayınları, Ankara: 226.

²³² Glenn 1999: 74.

²³³ Chubarov 2001: 61.

²³⁴ McCauley 1993: 37-38.

of nations and hence the disappearance of the national question under the solidarity of the proletariat. Additionally, he accepted the notion taken from Marx that “[a] nation which oppresses another cannot be free.”

Lenin as the head of the party and Stalin as he head of Narkomnats had opposing ideas on the right of self-determination. Since December 1917, Stalin was putting forward that the right of decision for secession should be given only to the proletariat in societies with a bourgeois class.

In the Eighth Party Congress on 18-23 March 1919, Bukharin supported Stalin’s formula of “self-determination for the laboring classes.” According to this formula the right of self-determination of the bourgeois-nationalists in Central Asia or in other parts of Russia would not be recognized. Bukharin argued that nationalism was both bourgeois and proletarian, but Russia was a worker’s state then, and the right of self-determination was a step backward. He stated that the right of self-determination should be applied to the “Hottentots, the Bushmen, and the Indians.” The peoples without a distinction of bourgeoisie and proletariat were to enjoy the right of self-determination.²³⁵ Lenin’s counter-argument was as follows:

(...) [H]ow is it that Comrade Bukharin has forgotten a small tribe, the Bashkirs [Bashkorts]? There are no Bushmen in Russia, nor have I heard that the Hottentots have laid claim to an autonomous republic, but we have Bashkirs [Bashkorts], Kirghiz [Kazak] and a number of other peoples, and to these we cannot deny recognition. We cannot deny it to a single one of the peoples living within the boundaries of the former Russian Empire. Let us even assume that the Bashkirs [Bashkorts] have overthrown the exploiters and we have helped them to do so. This is possible only when a

²³⁵ Suny 2001: 241-242; Togan 1999: 215.

revolution has fully matured, and it must be done cautiously, so as not to retard by one's interference that very process of the differentiation of the proletariat which we ought to expedite. What, then, can we do in relation to such peoples as the Kirghiz [Kazak], the Uzbeks, the Tajiks, the Turkmen, who to this day are under the influence of their mullahs? Here, in Russia, the population, having had a long experience of the priests, helped us to overthrow them. But you know how badly the decree on civil marriage is still being put into effect. Can we approach these peoples and tell them that we shall overthrow their exploiters? We cannot do this, because they are entirely subordinated to their mullahs. In such cases we have to wait until the given nation develops, until the differentiation of the proletariat from the bourgeois elements, which is inevitable, has taken place.²³⁶

Lenin's fundamental goal was overthrowing the bourgeoisie by the proletariat and modernization of the society, or - better to say – the “progress of the humanity.” The progress of the humanity goes through some stages, and in less developed societies Lenin gave the priority to the establishment of a developed, modern nation, where the proletariat would be separated from the bourgeoisie and secured from the influence of the traditional, conservative ideas represented by the *mullahs*. Only this proletariat of a developed nation could make the revolution. Lenin's position in terms of modernization was shared by the Kazak intelligentsia. This policy opened a sphere for the Kazak intellectuals to take part in the modernizing the Kazaks.

Lenin's position was also supported by his political pragmatism. He saw a critical potential in the antagonistic relation between the oppressed peoples and oppressors for spreading the revolution. He stated that 70 percent of the world people were living in colonial or semi-colonial countries as oppressed peoples.²³⁷

²³⁶ Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1965a) “Eighth Congress of the RCP(B),” Lenin Collected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow, vol. 29, 141-225, 171-172.

²³⁷ Lenin, 1989: 233.

He believed that the oppressed peoples of the world would revolt against the imperialist oppressors, and they would demand to join the USSR by themselves. For that reason, the USSR should be very careful in the treatment of its own oppressed peoples (by the Russian Empire).²³⁸ The possibility of using the Muslim peoples of the Soviet Republic in spreading the revolution to the Muslim colonies of Britain affected the policies of the Bolsheviks in relation to the Muslim peoples under their control.²³⁹ On 31st of December 1922, Lenin stressed in one of his last notes very clearly that they should be careful in their relation with their “own non-Russian nations.”

It must be borne in mind that the decentralisation of the People's Commissariats and the lack of co-ordination in their work as far as Moscow and other centres are concerned can be compensated sufficiently by Party authority, if it is exercised with sufficient prudence and impartiality; the harm that can result to our state from a lack of unification between the national apparatuses and the Russian apparatus is infinitely less than that which will be done not only to us, but to the whole International, and to the hundreds of millions of the peoples of Asia, which is destined to follow us on to the stage of history in the near future. It would be unpardonable opportunism if, on the eve of the debut of the East, just as it is awakening, we undermined our prestige with its peoples, even if only by the slightest crudity or injustice towards our own non-Russian nationalities.²⁴⁰

Because Lenin was optimistic for a world revolution to come, he was judging even a minor rudeness or injustice to non-Russian nations as an unforgivable failure. He was even ready to sacrifice the centralization, i.e.

²³⁸ Lenin, 1989: 222-246.

²³⁹ Khalid 2001: 154.

²⁴⁰ Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1966) “The Question of Nationalities or ‘Automization’,” *Lenin Collected Works*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, vol. 36: 610-611.

“unification,” if it was to harm the prestige of the socialist world revolution. The international gains of the world socialism had a clear precedence over the “national” rights of the “Russian motherland.”

3.1.3. Central Asian Leaders’ Reaction to Soviet Policies

On the other hand, the Muslim party members were trying to organize the Russian Muslims and increase their power. In the Fifth Regional Party Congress, held in Tashkent, on 17 January 1920, the following resolution was adapted:

In the interest of international unity of workers and oppressed people, be it resolved that we shall oppose by means of communist agitation the strivings of Turkic nationalities to divide themselves into various national groups such as Tatars, Bashkirs [Bashkorts], Uzbeks and others, and to establish small, separate republics. Instead, with a view to forge the solidarity of all Turkic peoples who so far have not been included within the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), it is proposed to unify them within a Turkic Soviet Republic, and whenever it is not possible to achieve this, it is proposed to unite different Turkic nationalities in accordance with their territorial proximity.²⁴¹

They were acting as Russian Muslims since the political ground was opened to democratic organizations after 1905, and they wanted to continue their joint political struggle in Central Asia under the same roof. It was planned to form a union of the Turkic peoples, but it was not pan-Turkic because it had no prospect of uniting all Turkic peoples of Eurasia including those far away from Central, Asia and excluding the non-Turkic peoples from the political ground of the Turkic

²⁴¹ Svat Soucek (2000) *A History of Inner Asia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 220.

Soviet Republic. It was modeled on the RSFSR, which cannot be condemned as a pan-Slavic union as well.

It is also reflected here that the division of Turkic peoples was a project discussed even in the first year of the Soviet sovereignty in Central Asia. These arguments and Turkic political leaders' resistance show that the theory about "divide and rule" is not unfounded. There were already some supporters of the "divide and rule" policy before it was finally enacted, but there were also other ideas, view points. It is possible to find evidences in support of controversial arguments. What matters is just related to which part of different documents is being used. The situation is more complex than a dualistic relationship between "aggressors versus victims," or whether there were already different nationalities, or were they produced through Moscow's "divide and rule" policies. All those factors had their part in the discussions and in the establishment of Soviet republics.²⁴²

While Moscow was working on creating new national republics, Turkic peoples were founding their own organizations. Well-known political figures of different Turkic peoples, who were cooperating with the Bolsheviks, Kazak Turar Ryskulov, Tatar Sultan Galiyev and Bashkort Zeki Velidi (Togan) were working for the formation of a unified Turkistan. Ryskulov and Galiyev wanted to form a communist party for the Turkic peoples independent of Moscow. They stated that the proletariat in the East was very weak, and the struggle should be against

²⁴² See for some examples to Chicherin's letters in the section "Establishment of the Kazak SSR".

imperialism.²⁴³ In the national level their agenda was built on fighting the problems arising from underdevelopment. But they were criticized as bourgeois-nationalist, and lost their position in the party.²⁴⁴

Nevertheless, their position was supported by Lenin's writings as well. Lenin had written on 26 July 1920 (and reaffirmed that on 30 December 1922), in his report to the Commission of Nations and Colonies that the main idea of their thesis was to define the nationalism of oppressed peoples and oppressing peoples differently.²⁴⁵ According to Lenin, the distinctive characteristic of imperialism was the division of the world into a small group of oppressing peoples (500 million persons) and a large group of oppressed peoples (1.250 million persons). And the whole world system would be determined by the struggle between the oppressed peoples, headed by the Soviet Russia, and the oppressing peoples.²⁴⁶ Here, the nationalism of the oppressed peoples was considered as positive, since it was for protection against the imperialism of the oppressors.

While Lenin was working on his report to the Commission of Nations and Colonies, Zeki Velidi (Togan) chose to join the *Basmachi*'s. He wrote in his book *Bugünkü Türkili Türkistan ve Yakın Tarihi*²⁴⁷ and *Hâtıralar*,²⁴⁸ how his

²⁴³ Michael Rywkin, (1990) *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia*, M. E. Sharpe Inc., Armonk: 29.

²⁴⁴ Ryskulov and Sultan Galiyev continued to work within the Communist Party as significant leaders, but were accused, called back to Moscow to work or arrested, until they became victims of Stalin's purges.

²⁴⁵ Lenin 1966: 607.

²⁴⁶ Lenin 1989: 233.

²⁴⁷ Togan 1981.

²⁴⁸ Togan 1999.

expectations from Bolsheviks came to an end. He was an influential leader in close relationship with the Kazak intellectuals. But while the Kazaks had chosen to stay, he chose to leave and join the guerilla warfare in Central Asia. His preference for the “other option” makes him a beneficial example for comparison.

Until 29th of June 1920,²⁴⁹ Zeki Velidi (Togan) had a close relationship with Bolsheviks, such as Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev with whom he was exchanging ideas about the nationality question. In 1920, Lenin and Stalin offered Zeki Velidi (Togan) to work on a wider level, on the whole Russian Federation, instead of just for the Bashkorts.²⁵⁰ Zeki Velidi (Togan) was in a position to accept that task for a certain period, although he was not trusting Stalin, who rather wanted to utilize everybody for his personal interests –in Zeki Velidi’s words- and he was thinking that nothing could be expected from the Communist Party of Russia, which was even at that time under Stalin’s control.

However, a project by Lenin on the colonial problem, changed Zeki Velidi’s plans and he decided to move underground. Lenin had prepared 12 theses, which was to become his report to the Commission of Nations and Colonies, and sent them to some persons to be discussed including Zeki Velidi (Togan). Here, according to Zeki Velidi (Togan), Lenin showed clearly that he trusted only the members of the Russian proletariat in colonies; and even after the triumph over capitalism, the Russian proletariat would be the guide in the

²⁴⁹ Togan 1999: 281. Here, he compares his act of “leaving Lenin” in 1920 with his act of “leaving his father” to study on the same day of 1908.

²⁵⁰ If we consider other examples of calling to Moscow, which will be mentioned in the following pages, this can probably be seen as an act to break the local links of a national leader and to pacify him/her in the center.

colonies. Persons like Zeki Velidi (Togan) would also be evaluated according to their acceptance of the proletariat's guidance.²⁵¹

Although Zeki Velidi (Togan) puts the nationality on the foreground of Bolsheviks' evaluation, it is probably more realistic to remind the Bolshevik thesis of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and to argue that the Bolsheviks preferred the proletariat to the bourgeoisie but not the Russians to non-Russians. Most of the "Russian" Bolsheviks, including Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky, were indeed children of non-Russian ancestors, and they were keen on emphasizing the international solidarity of the proletariat, but in Central Asia most of the proletariat was of Russian origin, and relying on the proletariat could lead to the de facto leadership of the Russians. In practice, the dictatorship of the proletariat was replaced by the command of the party, since the proletariat was not seen matured yet in its size and class consciousness, which meant that they were not ready to realize the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus, their role was taken by the party, and the result of it was an increase in the number of native party members but at the expense of their determinacy.²⁵²

Bolsheviks' distrust in persons outside of their ranks was most probably a habit of long years of secret organization. Persons like Zeki Velidi (Togan) or Alash Ordists would always be considered as suspicious parallel to the general perception in the party. It could have been changed, but that required a change in the general course of the party and reorienting the cadres including the members of the higher echelons of the party. Following the discussions on nationality

²⁵¹ Togan 1981: 401.

²⁵² See page 96.

policy exemplified in the Polish, Georgian cases and the formation of the federal administrative structure Lenin seized the significance on emphasizing the rights of the non-Russians against the “Great Russian chauvinists,” which was also one of the main themes in his last notes.²⁵³ The general perception in the party could not be altered and, on the contrary, it was consolidated due to the centralization process and weakening of the soviets with the disappearance of the dissidents in the party.

The role of the Russian socialists as the vanguard of the world revolution, which was asked to be accepted in the Second Communist International and Congress of the Peoples of the East by their “allies” in the world revolution can also be seen as a sign of this comprehension. Both congresses were held during the Polish war. There was a debate going on whether they should attack Poland. This demand is of the many examples of this pro-Russian tendency, which was one of the groups in the party. This discussion continued after Lenin’s death and other examples of it were also seen in the clash between the local cadres in Kazakhstan and cadres directly appointed by Moscow. However, as the party’s authority over the soviets strengthened and Soviet government became more authoritarian, the local cadres were also replaced by men sent from Moscow.²⁵⁴

²⁵³ Lenin’s stance against “Great Russian chauvinism” is addressed on pages 90, 98.

²⁵⁴ The replacements of Kazak politicians by persons sent from Moscow are discussed in section 3.2. and 4.2.

3.1.4 The War with Poland and its Effect on Nationality Policies

The situation in Poland in 1918-1920 was one of the main factors which affected Bolsheviks' debates about the rights of nations. In 1920, Lenin accepted an attack to Poland. In a speech on May 5, 1920, delivered to the members of the Red Army leaving for the Polish Front, he stated that they were going "to them, not as aggressors but as liberators," and concluded his speech with slogans "Long live the peasants and workers of a free independent Polish Republic! Down with the Polish magnates, landowners and capitalists...",²⁵⁵ which reflects that he assumed that their attack would liberate the workers of Poland from the yoke of the Polish bourgeoisie and feudal landlords.

The Bolsheviks considered the attack to Poland as part of the struggle for the world revolution, and the war with Poland was discussed during the Second World Congress of the (Third) Communist International, and all 37 represented countries declared that they consider the war of the Russian Soviet Republic against White Poland as "their" war, "the war of the Communist International against the bourgeoisie, against the imperialists of the whole world."²⁵⁶

On 31 August 1920, at the opening speech of the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, the war in Poland was again mentioned by Zinoviev as follows:

²⁵⁵ Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1965b) "Speech to the Men of the Red Army Leaving for the Polish Front," *Lenin Collected Works*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, v. 31, 127-128.

²⁵⁶ Brian Pearce translated in (1977) *Congress of the Peoples of the East*, New Park Publications, London; Baku, September 1920, Stenographic Report.; <http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/baku/index.htm>.

Comrades, the war against White Poland is being waged, formally speaking, by the Russian Soviet Federal Republic, but in reality it is not merely a war between the Russian Socialist Republic and the White Polish Republic, but a war of labour against capital. (...) I, comrades, am profoundly convinced that our congress of the working masses of the Eastern peoples will support this call and say: Yes, the war of the Russian Soviet Republic against White Poland is not only the war of the proletarians of the West but also the war of the working masses of the peoples of the East against our common oppressors!²⁵⁷

In two significant organizations of the time initiated by the Bolsheviks, namely the Communist International and Congress of the Peoples of the East, the war in Poland was put on the agenda. The Bolsheviks and the Russian Socialist Republic was considered as the vanguard of the world socialist revolution, and socialists or oppressed Eastern peoples of the world were seen as natural allies in socialist Russia's war.

It was accepted as a war of the socialists and oppressed peoples against the bourgeoisie, in which Polish workers were expected to join the Russian forces. Although Bolsheviks, including Lenin, were expecting that the Polish workers would eventually put self-determination into action in favor of joining the Soviets,

²⁵⁷ Pearce 1977.

but the workers considered it as an invasion. Later, Lenin stated that his idea of non-intervention and self-determination was right, but it was too late.²⁵⁸

The rejection of Polish workers to aid the Russian socialists terminated Bolsheviks' plans to spread the revolution with other socialists of Europe, and especially to join the German socialists. The failure and isolation helped to pave the way for Stalin's formula of "socialism in one country."

3.1.5. The Georgian Case and the Establishment of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics

In the summer and spring of 1922, another significant event affected the Soviet's policy of nationalities: the case of Georgia. Until 1922, the relation between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republics (RSFSR) and other five republics, i.e. Ukraine, Belorussia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia were not well defined. The Soviet Russia's entrance to the field of international relations pushed Moscow to formalize the relations between the center and national Soviet republics.²⁵⁹

On 10 August 1922, Politburo demanded proposals for the resolution of obscure relations between the republics. Stalin prepared his proposal at the end of August and sent it, "Project of a Resolution Concerning the Relations between the RSFSR and the Independent Republics," to Central Committees of each republic. His project was incorporating them into the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative

²⁵⁸ McCauley 1993: 37-38.

²⁵⁹ Pipes 1968: 269-270.

Socialist Republic) as autonomous republics. Azerbaijan and Armenia accepted this proposal, Belorussia and Ukraine were for the existing system, but Georgia was strictly against it. They considered it as the unilateral abrogation of the treaty of 1921.²⁶⁰

When Lenin was informed about the commission's work, he got angry and criticized that the project would create dependent republics to Russia and undermine the possibility to win nationalist movements in the future. He called Stalin and proposed to create a new federation, Union of the Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia, to which the RSFSR should also be subjected just as the other Soviet republics. Stalin agreed to change "autonomy" with a federation of Soviet republics.²⁶¹

On the Plenum of 6 October 1922, Lenin was absent, but he sent a telegram declaring "war on Great Russian chauvinism" and insisting on changes on the proposals. The new draft of constitutional principles was prepared accepting his suggestions. The republics could enter the Union as formally independent states.²⁶²

These changes did not satisfy the Georgian opposition, because Stalin insisted that they should join the Union through the Transcaucasian Federation and not directly as an independent Soviet republic. Moscow's stance alienated even communists, like Makharadze, who was a very prestigious leader as the oldest Georgian communist and he was known for his strict anti-nationalist

²⁶⁰ Pipes 1968: 270-272.

²⁶¹ Pipes 1968: 272-273.

²⁶² Pipes 1968: 273.

position and his opposition to Lenin's call for national self-determination. On October 22, the Central Committee of Georgian Communist Party resigned to protest Moscow.²⁶³

The protests in Georgia overshadowed the debates in Moscow and postponed the completion of the Union agreement. Finally, on 29 December, Stalin read the articles of the Union to the attended representatives of the republics, and the next day in spite of the protests of Georgian representatives the resolutions were accepted in the joint session, which was named "the First Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."²⁶⁴

The situation in Georgia was commissioned and suppressed by a committee including Ordzhonikidze and Dzerzhinsky. In spite of the fact that they were non-Russian, they were true centralists and acted like Russian nationalists. In his notes, on 31 December 1922, Lenin in a paragraph on Dzerzhinsky mentions that "it is known that assimilated non-Russians always overdo in the matter of hundred per cent Russian attitudes."²⁶⁵ He wrote that "exemplary punishment must be inflicted on Comrade Orjonikidze [Ordzhonikidze]. (...) The political responsibility for all this truly Great-Russian nationalist campaign must, of course, be laid on Stalin and Dzerzhinsky."²⁶⁶

In March, Lenin received another report on the Georgian case, which angered him more, and he turned completely to the side of the Georgian

²⁶³ Pipes 1968: 273-275.

²⁶⁴ Pipes 1968: 275.

²⁶⁵ Lenin 1966 : 606.

²⁶⁶ Lenin 1966 : 610.

opposition.²⁶⁷ He decided to form a new commission, and on the 5th of March sent a letter to Stalin's rival Trotsky requesting him to "undertake the defense of the Georgian case in the Party C.C."²⁶⁸

The next day Lenin commissioned Kamenev and Kuibyshev as the new investigation committee, and he also sent a message to Mdivani and opposition leader Makharadze declaring his full support for them: "I am following your case with all my heart. I am indignant over Orjonikidze's rudeness and the connivance of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I am preparing for you notes and a speech."²⁶⁹

In the coming days Lenin would probably try to diminish Stalin's role in the nationality policy and maybe even in the party in general. However, Lenin suffered a (third) heart attack on the same day he sent the message, which paralyzed him, and made his further involvement in politics impossible.²⁷⁰ Consequently, it was Stalin's position that affected the further development of the nationality policy and the developments in the USSR.

The constitution of the USSR was finalized on 6 July 1923²⁷¹ and it was ratified on 31 January 1924,²⁷² which carried Lenin's formula of federation and

²⁶⁷ Pipes 1968: 288.

²⁶⁸ Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1970) *Lenin Collected Works*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, vol. 45: 607.

²⁶⁹ Lenin 1970: 608.

²⁷⁰ Pipes 1968: 289.

²⁷¹ Pipes 1968: 276.

²⁷² McCauley 1993: 52-54.

the “freedom to secede from the union,” but which became “a mere scrap of paper” in terms of those national rights parallel to Lenin’s warnings.²⁷³

Pipes states that it was Lenin’s high prestige, which paved the way for the acceptance of his formula of federation and right of self determination, but most of the Bolsheviks were not comfortable with those compromises to nations. Pipes also adds that the majority of the party members (97.3 per cent) had joined the party after the revolution, and they were not ready to understand the reasoning behind Lenin’s national policy. Moreover, because the industrialized regions had basically a Russian population, the proletariat and the new party members were also generally Russian (72 per cent in 1922), which made the implementation of Lenin’s national proposals to other nations even less probable.²⁷⁴

This policy on nationalities should have been supported by another policy in order to increase the participation of native cadres. Lenin aimed to support it with a policy called “nativization” (*korenizatsia*²⁷⁵). How the policies turned into “scraps of paper”, will be discussed in the following section.

²⁷³ Lenin 1966: 606.

²⁷⁴ Pipes 1968: 277.

²⁷⁵ *Korenizatsia* is a word derived from the word “root”, and it actually means “rooting”. The different nationalities were considered as the various roots of the gigantic tree of the emerging, big Soviet nation. “Nativization”, which is not only the act but also the English translation of *korenizatsia*, would help the “Soviet tree” to be supported by “native” roots. Different native peoples were not understood as threats to the USSR but as the underlying basis of the new Soviet society. Thus, native peoples were to be supported by affirmative action, despite the fact that their proletariat and the socialist consciousness was still very weak.

3.1.6. Nationality Policies under Stalin

The debate between Lenin and Stalin continued until the former's death. After Lenin's death Stalin sanctified him,²⁷⁶ made himself guardian of Lenin's "frozen" ideas as a kind of "unchallengeable supporter of Leninism," which found its manifestation in his "Foundations of Leninism,"²⁷⁷ but he continued to carry on his own policies with quotations from Lenin.

One of the determining debates on nationality question was on the identity of the carriers of the right for self-determination: the proletariat or the nation as a whole including the bourgeoisie.²⁷⁸ The principle of self-determination remained as a right but its application was made impossible. Also the authority of the republics was weakened, and the administrative rights of the republics were made deficient. While in 1920, Narkomnats were changed into a kind of parliament with elected national representatives, they gradually lost their significance, and they were abolished in 1924.²⁷⁹

Stalin was anxious of that not intervention in nations' political affairs would only help the counter-revolutionaries. For him the USSR was the only socialist state, and it had to be preserved, whatever it would take.

²⁷⁶ See for some of the first examples of Stalin's praise on Lenin and formation of "Leninism", Josef V. Stalin (1953c) "On the Death of Lenin: A Speech Delivered at the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets, January 26, 1924," *Works, Volume 6*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow: 47-53; Josef V. Stalin (1953d) "A Speech Delivered at a Memorial Meeting of the Kremlin Military School, January 28, 1924," *Works, Volume 6*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow: 54-66.

²⁷⁷ Josef V. Stalin (1953e) "Foundations of Leninism: Lectures Delivered at the Sverdlov University," *Works, Volume 6*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow: 71-196.

²⁷⁸ Suny 2001: 242.

²⁷⁹ McCauley 1993: 37-38.

The establishment of national republics, however, was not set aside. The nations were considered like roots of the great Soviet tree.²⁸⁰ This policy was called “nativization”; it was encouraged by Lenin and applied by Stalin until the early 1930s. The aim was consolidation of nationalities based on three ways: “by supporting the native language, by creating a national intelligentsia and political elite, and by formally institutionalizing ethnicity in the state apparatus.”²⁸¹ As a result of these “nativization” policies, the percentage of Kazak members in the Kazak Communist Party grew from 8 percent in 1924 to 53 percent in 1933.²⁸² Although the quantity was growing, the well-established intellectuals of the Kazak people were removed from higher positions and replaced by inexperienced, less skilled cadres promoted due to their loyalty and relations in the party network due to the centralization in the party. Nevertheless, it is also true that “nativization” opened a wide sphere for the former members of Alash Orda to enjoy a fruitful period until 1928.

It was expected from the “nativization” policy that in the long run the nations would mold into one Soviet nation with the help of the party policies and the industrialization.²⁸³ The society was carried into a new period, in which the old, together with national identities, was expected to lose its significance and the new would rule. A new individual was aimed to be formed, *homo sovieticus* (*sovetsky chelovek*), and norms and values were defined for this idealized figure of

²⁸⁰ McCauley 1993: 111.

²⁸¹ Suny 2001: 252.

²⁸² Suny 2001: 253.

²⁸³ McCauley 1993: 111.

the USSR. However, this was implemented together with the policy of centralization, which meant that cadres from the Russian Bolsheviks were preferred to the non-Russians for higher positions, and thus the native administrators were controlled by the persons appointed from Moscow.²⁸⁴

From the viewpoint of the Politburo they were more trusted, because it was feared that others from regions with less developed relations of production could possess nationalist, petty bourgeois or even feudal tendencies, which would help the “enemies of the Soviet regime.” Trusted persons were often from the close circle of higher party members which paralyzed the rise of native cadres. Zeki Velidi’s (Togan) reasoning for separation on 29 June 1920²⁸⁵ was validated, but only after the discussions ended with negative results for the natives with the suppression of the opposition and dissidents within the party ranks towards the end of 1920s.²⁸⁶

Stalin’s priority for sustaining socialism in one country, might have suppressed the tactical ideas on presenting more rights to the Soviet Republics – and more freedom to everybody- parallel the decrease in the hopes of spreading the revolution. When Lenin was optimistic for a revolution from the East in the second half of 1920, the civil war had come to an end, Denikin was defeated, Kolchak was dead, Red Army was marching to beat the nationalist Polish general and to help the Polish proletariat. There was an enormous enthusiasm for the

²⁸⁴ See for replacements to Togan 1981: 393, 397, 402.

²⁸⁵ Togan 1981: 402-403.

²⁸⁶ The discussions and liquidations in Moscow are addressed in sections 4.4., 5.5. liquidations of Kazaks in 3.2., 4.2, 4.4. 5.5.

world revolution.²⁸⁷ Russia would join via Poland German revolutionaries, and the revolution in the East, i.e. in British and French colonies would cut the veins of world imperialism and clear the road for the world revolution. The desperate days under siege were over, and it was time to win the world.

But all that was in vain. Neither the proletariat of the European countries nor the oppressed peoples of the colonies replied to the call of the Bolsheviks for revolution. The USSR was left alone in the world as a poor, underdeveloped and war-torn country.

Stalin and his supporters had only one issue in their mind: instead of spreading the revolution, saving the only socialist country in the world.

Lenin on the other hand had different priorities. He underlined the importance of the world revolution and mentioned even the Russian Revolution could be sacrificed. In terms of nationality policy he was for declaring much more power to national republics and aimed to “retain the union of Soviet socialist republics only for military and diplomatic affairs, and in all other respects restore full independence to the individual People's Commissariats.”²⁸⁸ He was not restrained that this would lead to the dissolution of the Soviet Union:

As it was mentioned above in the quotation from 31 December 1922, the possibility of a revolution in the East was for him worth to give up the Soviet Union, because a revolution in the East would weaken the imperialist states of the West, and lead to a world revolution embracing Russia as well. Different than

²⁸⁷ Suny 2001: 244.

²⁸⁸ Lenin 1966: 610-611.

some other Bolsheviks, like Stalin and new members of the party, Lenin was closer to an internationalist understanding rather than protecting the Soviet – or Russian – interests.

However, the apparatus in charge was the party with its members, who had obtained their political experience during the years of tsarist suppression. The party apparatus, whose foundational principles were laid in Lenin's pamphlet *What is to be Done*²⁸⁹ (1901), was a product of the struggle against the secret police of the tsar. The objective of the seizure of the state, which was a thoroughly oppressive organization, pushed the party also to become an authoritarian, military-like, secret organization functioning from top to bottom, which was controversial to the emancipatory aims of the revolution. A relatively more democratic party guided by organizational principles different than the Leninist cells based on control from top to bottom were proved to be weaker and less resistant to tsarist secret police.

The devotion to party discipline and anxiety of police infiltration created close knit cadres suspicious of persons outside of the party ranks. The soviets or the national leaders in bordering republics were not old members of the party. Neither had they had the will to act strictly according to policies sent from Moscow's nor the party apparatus had the will to listen to the demands of the councils be it the soviets or the national councils.

Lenin was aware of the dangers of the party structure he created, and that it was threatening the emancipatory potential of the revolution. Moreover, not only

²⁸⁹ Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1961) "What is to be Done? Burning Questions of our Movement," *Lenin Collected Works*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, v. 5, 347-530.

the party apparatus but the tsarist state apparatus against which the party was formed was also very authoritarian and in contradiction with socialist ends. However, it was seized and operated by the Bolsheviks then. He reminded the Bolsheviks that the tsarist apparatus was only to be used for a certain, temporary period of time, and it was brought into play under conditions of war and famine, in his notes on 31 December 1922:

It is said that a united apparatus was needed. Where did that assurance come from? Did it not come from that same Russian apparatus which (...) we took over from tsarism and slightly anointed with Soviet oil? (...) There is no doubt that that measure should have been delayed somewhat until we could say that we vouched for our apparatus as our own. But now, we must, in all conscience, admit the contrary; the apparatus we call ours is, in fact, still quite alien to us; it is a bourgeois and tsarist hotch-potch and there has been no possibility of getting rid of it in the course of the past five years without the help of other countries and because we have been "busy" most of the time with military engagements and the fight against famine.²⁹⁰

The authoritarian tsarist apparatus, which was only to be applied for a temporary period was then internalized by members of the party. As mentioned above the party apparatus and the political education of party members was not against the use of the tsarist state apparatus, but only for a transitory period, and both authoritarian apparatuses were to be transformed with the help of institutions from bottom up, such as the soviets or giving freedom to national councils.

The state was shaped from top to bottom parallel to their administrative experience in the party. They were for the "dictatorship of the proletariat", who - in theory - should make up the majority of the society, and under the "dictatorship

²⁹⁰ Lenin 1966: 605-606.

of the proletariat” the representative democracy of the oppressive minority of the society, the bourgeoisie, would be replaced by the direct democracy of the proletariat. However, the very proletariat in Russia was a small social group with insufficient class consciousness, and their role was undertaken by the party cadres. Together with their Leninist party experience, the party members paved the road for the rise of Stalin and establishment of one-party system in which the state was fused with the party ruled from top to bottom.

In his notes Lenin warned the Bolsheviks that the use of the authoritarian Russian apparatus would deeply damage their nationality policy:

It is quite natural that in such circumstances the "freedom to secede from the union" by which we justify ourselves will be a mere scrap of paper, unable to defend the non-Russians from the onslaught of that really Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvinist, in substance a rascal and a tyrant, such as the typical Russian bureaucrat is. There is no doubt that the infinitesimal percentage of Soviet and sovietised workers will drown in that tide of chauvinistic Great-Russian ruffraff like a fly in milk.²⁹¹

The future developments confirmed Lenin's anxiety and the "freedom to secede from the union" turned to be "a mere scrap of paper,"²⁹² and the non-Russians were left unprotected towards the great-nation, who were - in Lenin's words - "great only in their violence, only great as bullies."²⁹³

The fusion of the party with the state or reshaping the state apparatus on the model of the party carried the authoritarian characteristics of the party to the

²⁹¹ Lenin 1966: 606.

²⁹² Lenin 1966: 606.

²⁹³ Lenin 1966: 608.

state apparatus, and it also carried gradually a simply bureaucratic functionary of the party, the General Secretary Stalin, to the top position of the state.

This process was facilitated by the frantic need of industrialization and catching up with the capitalist countries. They had lived through a world war and had witnessed the power of the total war. Countries, like Germany, had employed all sources they had for a single cause. Although they were not successful, the efficiency of the militarist German state organizing a whole society as a war machine must have been astonishing for them and should have influenced them in preparing the five-year-plans.

In 1931, Stalin stated in a speech that they were surrounded by enemies, and they had to cover the distance of 50 years vis-à-vis their position to developed countries in just ten years. For that reason, everything should be done. He did not want to deal with any problem or dissidence, which could slow down the great leap forward. Opposition was considered as a potential danger and an obstacle on the road of rapid industrialization and the jump off of the only socialist state in the world. The ground was to be cleared from every possible “confusing” idea.

Stalin declared in an interview his principle aim as follows:

The task to which I have devoted my life is the elevation of a different class - the working class. That task is not the consolidation of some “national” state, but of a socialist state, and it means an international state; and everything that strengthens that state helps to strengthen the entire international working class. If every step I take in my endeavour to elevate the working class and strengthen the socialist state of this class were not

directed towards strengthening and improving the position of the working class, I should consider my life purposeless.²⁹⁴

In Stalin's mind everything was combined with a single aim. All humanity would benefit from a state of the working class; all workers of the world would foster by the achievements of the "only socialist state"; all workers of the USSR, which was a newly industrializing country with a newly developing, conscious working class, were to be led by the party; and the party apparatus was under the authority of Stalin, who had devoted his life of the working class of the world. The danger arose, when Stalin considered himself as the only person, who knew where to lead the pupil.

The size of the party was growing with new members, but they were not familiar with theoretical issues and less interested in theoretical debates than the older party members. Lenin's speeches and writings were valued as strict rules to follow, and his legacy was the main source of legitimacy for the party members which created a frozen rhetoric under the term of "Leninism." The authoritarian party model of 1902 was sanctified as the basic model for the state apparatus.

Lenin's words were products of different times devoted to the work of a secret organization. Lenin was a pragmatic person, who could change the tactics due to analyzes of changing conditions, and as the charismatic leader of the party, founder of the main principles, he had the advantage to be flexible to change the course. In some cases, he had to act "against the current" in the party, such as the situation just before the revolution. While his successors had to act testifying their

²⁹⁴ Josef V. Stalin (1954b) "Talk with German Author Emil Ludwig," *Works, Volume 13, 1930-1934*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow: :107.

loyalty to Lenin, only he could change the general course of the party in times of need, like in the implementation of NEP. It is open to speculation, whether he would change the authoritarian characteristics of the party and create a state withering away, like he had proposed in his book *The State and Revolution*,²⁹⁵ but in a party, where the base of legitimacy were his words and the rules he set for a secret organization, there was no other possibility than a cautious, authoritarian party-state turning also the national rights to a “scrap of paper.” The structure was already formed, tested and confirmed by the success; furthermore, the members of the party had acquired their membership and their political education according to the authoritarian principles. Transforming the existing structure was very hard without democratizing it with new institutions, such as the soviets or national councils, and new party members. It is debatable, whether “Lenin’s high prestige” would suffice - as it was the case in the discussions on federation²⁹⁶ - to transform the created structure. Yet it seems certain that he was the only person, who could challenge the principles founded during the struggle against the tsarist state apparatus. His death facilitated the sanctification of the “Leninist” principles of the years of struggle and strengthening the role of the party against the soviets and national councils.

²⁹⁵ Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1964d) “The State and Revolution,” *Lenin Collected Works*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, v. 25, 381-492.

²⁹⁶ For the expression used by Pipes for Lenin’s influence in discussions of federalism see page 92, Pipes 1968: 277.

3.2. The Consequences of Changing Soviet Policies to the Kazak Political Sphere

On 26 August of 1920, the Kyrgyz²⁹⁷ Autonomous Soviet Socialist Oblast (ASSO) was founded with its capital in Orenburg. It consisted of four oblasts of the former Steppe General Governorate of the Russian Empire: Ural, Turgai, Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk.²⁹⁸

The Kyrgyz [Kazak] ASSO was ruled by six First Secretaries of the *krai* party organization, of which only a single person was Kazak,²⁹⁹ M. Muzagaliyev, who led the organization in 1921.³⁰⁰ One of the Alash Ordists, Baitursynov, was also a member of the government as the People's Commissar of Education, in 1920-1921. They both lost their positions in 1921, but the real challenge to Kazak intellectuals came in 1925.

On 29 May 1925, Stalin wrote a letter to Kazkraikom (Commissariat of Kazak Krai) Bureau announcing that he was “against non-party intelligentsia educating Kirgiz [Kazak] youth in politics and ideology,” and continued that they

²⁹⁷ As mentioned above the Turkic Kazak tribes on the Kazak steppes were called Kyrgyz by the Russians, whereas the actual Kyrgyz tribes were called Karakyrgyz. Hence, the administrative boundaries covering the Kazakh Steppes were also called Kyrgyzstan ASSR. See for a map of Kyrgyz ASSO appendix A, map 1.

²⁹⁸ W. P. Zelds, K. Coates (1969), *Soviets in Central Asia*, Greenwood Press, New York: 120. see for a map of oblasts appendix A, map 1 and a map of administrative divisions of Steppe regions and Turkistan appendix A, map 5.

²⁹⁹ See for a picture of the first meeting of the Kyrgyz [Kazak] Autonomous Soviet Socialist Oblast appendix C, picture 30.

³⁰⁰ Mambet Koigeldi (2007) “The Alash Movement and the Soviet Government: A Difference of Positions,” Tomohiko Uyama ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia*, Slavic Research Center of Hokkaido University, Japan: 161.

“did not seize power to let the political and ideological education of [their] youth to be handed over to the bourgeois, non-party intelligentsia.”³⁰¹

Alash Ordists, who were already excluded from the political arena, were continuing to work in enlightening the Kazaks, but Stalin’s letter was a sign that their sphere of work would be further restricted. A new person, F. I. Goloshchekin, was appointed from Moscow with more authority than his predecessors to implement Stalin’s policies in Kazakhstan.

On 23 October 1925, Goloshchekin presented a report called “On the Kazak Press,” where he underlined the “stranglehold” of Alash Orda on the Kazak-language Press, and he ordered the Kazkraikom to establish a Press Department under the Kazkraikom and employ “as many trained workers as necessary.”³⁰²

In two meetings Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) discussed the situation of the Kazak Press, and on 23 October 1925, they declared that all Kazak-language publications of Tsentroizdat (the Central Publishing House for Peoples of the Soviet Union) should be politically edited and Bokeikhanov should be released of his position as editor.³⁰³ The influence of Alash Ordists was sought to be reduced by defining them as bourgeois, *bai*, and reactionary.³⁰⁴

³⁰¹ Koigeldi 2007: 162.

³⁰² Koigeldi 2007: 163.

³⁰³ Koigeldi 2007: 163.

³⁰⁴ Koigeldi 2007: 164.

Bokeikhanov, who could continue to work in enlightening the Kazak society, although he was the leader of the former Alash Orda, had to leave his position. He had a long political background as the leader of Kazak members of Kadet, editor of Kazak periodical *Kazak*, leader of the Alash Orda in their fight for autonomy; and all his deeds were irrelevant to Bolshevik causes if not antagonistic. His hostility with the Bolsheviks did not keep the Bolsheviks to employ him in their struggle to modernize the Kazak society. The iron grip, however, was being tightened. Stalin and his supporters were increasing the party authority with trusted, loyal cadres. The outcome of it in Kazakhstan was first the shrinking sphere of influence of Alash Ordists, and then of some other Kazak politicians, who could act on their own initiative.

The removal of Alash Ordists was signifying a shift in political orientation in Kazakhstan, and they were replaced by Kazaks willing to act according to Moscow's expectations. They were not expressing national demands but implementing policies prepared in the political center in Moscow.³⁰⁵ This can be considered as a result of the general changes in the USSR, which was providing superiority to the party structure over the power of the soviets, or a move to centralization around a strictly organized party apparatus.

Goloshchekin approved that simply by asserting that "the political line is the line of the party's Central Committee. We do not have our own political line."³⁰⁶ The state apparatus of Kazakhstan was turned into a segment of the

³⁰⁵ Koigeldi 2007: 164.

³⁰⁶ Koigeldi 2007: 166.

Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik),³⁰⁷ despite the fact that one of the basic aims of socialism was turning the state to the executive organ of the councils (soviets), to decentralize it and create the necessary stages for the withering away of the state.

The nationality policies were also affected by this centralization process, and put a distance to the idea of self-determination. As mentioned above the timing of the right to self-determination and the identity of decision-makers was a matter of discussion between Lenin and Stalin. After 1925, it is reflected in many phrases in party documents, that “national problems can be solved only in the course of building socialism, the building of socialism is possible on the basis of close economic and political ties with the entire Union, the latter being a possibility only together with solution of the main problems in building socialism throughout the USSR.”³⁰⁸

Every figure, which could get in the way of Moscow’s intervention to local politics, was seen as “regionalist” or “Kazak nationalist”. If they had some influence on the Kazak society, they were considered more dangerous. Kazak Bolsheviks, such as T. Ryskulov, A. Dosov, S. Aspandiyarov,³⁰⁹ S. Sadvakasov,³¹⁰ N. Nurmakov³¹¹ were removed from major positions and called to

³⁰⁷ Koigeldi 2007: 166.

³⁰⁸ *Partiinoye stroitel'stvo v Kazakstane: Sbornik recheni i statei (1925-1930gg.)*, (1930) Moscow, Alma-Ata: 150; translated in Koigeldi 2007: 165.

³⁰⁹ The Kazak name “Aspandiyarov” is written as “Asfendiyarov” in Russian sources.

³¹⁰ The Kazak name “Sadvakasov” is written as “Sadvokasov” in Russian sources. See for a picture of Sadvakasov appendix C, picture 27.

³¹¹ See for a picture of Nurmakov appendix C, picture 28.

Moscow³¹² to diminish their political effect in the regional politics and to work under close supervision. They were replaced by European officials sent from Moscow.³¹³

This wave of assignment to Moscow started right after Goloshchekin's arrival to Alma-Ata. Second secretary of Communist Party Krai Committee Sultanbek Khodzhanov,³¹⁴ who was a popular leader among masses since the water and land reforms of 1921-1922, was sent to Moscow after being accused to be head of an anti-Goloshchekin plot, called August alliance, which Goloshchekin produced to remove his potential rivals in Kazak politics. August alliance consisted of Khodzhanov, Peoples Commissar of Education Smagul Sadvakasov and the Chairman of the Kazak Central Execution Committee Zhalau Mynbaev.³¹⁵

Goloshchekin stated that there should be a "little October" in Kazakstan, which would be carried out against the Kazak *aul*.³¹⁶ He was not only clearing the ground to strengthen his authority or for centralization around the Russian Communist Party but he was also destroying potential Kazaks, who could oppose the coming storm of collectivization.

After the removal of Khodzhanov, Sadvakasov continued his criticism to the party on agricultural policy and industrialization. In 1927, he underlined that the poor situation of the Kazak *aul* is not the outcome of *bais* or *kulaks* exploiting

³¹² See for a picture of Sadvakasov and Nurmakov with Stalin in Moscow, 1925 appendix C, picture 31.

³¹³ Koigeldi 2007: 169.

³¹⁴ See for a picture of Khodzhanov appendix C, picture 29.

³¹⁵ Koigeldi 2007: 168.

³¹⁶ Koigeldi 2007: 169.

them but lack of “work opportunities, shortage of land, work tools and equipment.” His solution was supplying the Kazaks with “horse, hay and scythe.” Additionally, he was advocating that instead of confiscating the property of the *bais*, they should be taxed to use their money in cooperatives and social welfare programs. This was a dangerous proposal for the period and he was condemned as “upholding the interests of the propertied classes,” and he was nicknamed as the “*bais*’ ideologue.”³¹⁷

In terms of industrialization he was stating that some party members wanted to turn Kazakhstan and Central Asia into suppliers of raw materials. He was supporting that unlike the Russian Tsardom, which used Central Asia as a source of raw materials, “socialist industry should develop according to the principle of economic expediency.”³¹⁸

Supporters of these ideas was criticized by Chairman of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) Zelenskii in an article called “The General Line” in *Pravda Vostoka*. They were acting in opposition to the “general line” of the party, and they were condemned as being “nationalists” and “backers of the idea of a closed economy.”³¹⁹

Sadvakasov’s reply to Zelenskii is an early example of the later criticism of the Soviet economy, which was regarded as inefficient because of vast distances between the raw materials and production bases. His argument was as follows:

³¹⁷ Koigeldi 2007: 170.

³¹⁸ S. Sadvokasov (1994) *Izbrannoe*, Almaty: 74; translated in Koigeldi 2007: 170.

³¹⁹ Koigeldi 2007: 170.

(...) [F]rom the standpoint of economic expediency, industry should be situated as close as possible to the sources of raw materials. (...) setting up industry in a region requires not only raw materials, but working hands and fuel. The answer to that is the millions of poor in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and the billions in reserves of coal and oil in Kazakhstan.³²⁰

Instead of using Central Asia only as a source of raw materials, he wanted to turn Central Asia into an industrial center. This would change the poor situation of the Kazaks by converting them into industrial workers, and this would increase the independency of Kazakstan, but Moscow aimed to create an interdependent economy; especially on the fringes of the USSR self-sufficient republics might be considered as a threat.

The final assault on supporters of Kazaks' right, such as Khodzhanov, Sadvakasov, Mynbaev, i.e. "August Alliance" of 1925, was enacted following the Third Plenary Session of the Kazkraikom, organized by Goloshchekin in 1927. They were convicted as "nationalist" and with "having ideological ties with Alash Orda."³²¹ They were also accused by Goloshchekin in 1925 during his first assault on the Kazak intelligentsia, but then he could only remove former members of Alash Orda. It took another two years to Goloshchekin to destroy the political position of them.

His closing speech was of great importance in the attack against the Kazak intelligentsia:

³²⁰ Sadvakasov 1994: 74-75; translated in Koigeldi 2007: 171.

³²¹ *Vnutripartiinye voprosy na 3-m Plenumе Kazakhskogo Kraikoma VKP (b)* (1927), Kyzyl-Orda: 162; translated in Koigeldi 2007: 171.

There are two types of Alash Orda members: old leaders and a new generation of Alash Orda. There is a major difference between them. I believe that if we take the old Alash Orda members, they have something that lies in the past. In the past they were, in Kazakh terms, Kazakh revolutionaries in the making – [*sic.*] bourgeois revolutionaries. The younger don't have that. They are more malevolence. They grew up fighting the Soviet authority.³²²

It seems that they had transformed the term “Alash Orda” into an evil word, like a contagious disease infecting other Kazaks. The accusation of being a member of Alash Orda was adequate for Goloshchekin to undermine their reputation. He even labeled them “more malevolence” because members of Alash Orda were “done,” they had an alternative plan to Bolshevik socialism, but it could not be achieved, and they were not dangerous anymore.

This situation, however, did not prevent Goloshchekin to attack once again the Alash Ordists. In October 1928, secret police, OGPU, led another operation against Alash Orda, in which 44 members were arrested. Eight years after the dissolution of Alash Orda and cooperation with the Bolsheviks in modernizing the Kazak society, they faced a harsh period of investigation based on the suspect that they had formed an underground counter-revolutionary organization in 1921.³²³

The struggle in Kazakhstan continued to exclude more Kazaks from the political arena. The conflict in this period was classified by Mambet Koigeldi, who is one of the most prominent Kazak historians of the recent Kazak history, as follows:

³²² *Vnutripartiinye voprosy na 3-m Plenum Kazakhskogo Kraikoma VKP (b)* (1927); translated in Koigeldi 2007: 171.

³²³ Koigeldi 2007: 176. The activities of former Alash Ordists and measures against them will be discussed in the next chapter with their effort in modernizing the Kazak society.

Firstly, striving to consolidate power, Communist party structures at the republic, province and district levels began to force the Soviet authorities into a lesser role, which naturally led to retaliation by the latter. Secondly, all across Kazakhstan, Russians or of other European lineage were appointed to the posts of first secretaries of the Communist party's provincial committees, while the chairman of the executive committees of provincial Soviets were mostly Kazakh.³²⁴

The political disputes of the period were evaluated in two levels: clash between the party and the soviets, and the conflict between Russian or European party members and Kazakh members of the soviets. As I have mentioned above this was a general trend, part of the centralization around the party structure. As a result of the party's consolidation of power, soviets were losing their role in politics. As the soviets were local councils, they were mainly filled by local cadres, but the party has always been weak in Central Asia, and in a process of transition, where the party was gaining the superiority, it was very predictable that the Central Asians would lose their position in politics. The decline of the Kazaks' role in politics was not only a result of national discrimination but it should be comprehended together with the centralization process sanctifying the party.

The power struggle between Goloshchekin as the First Secretary of the Communist Party Krai Committee and Mynbaev as the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Kazakh ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) was an example of the conflict between these two apparatuses.³²⁵ Goloshchekin was Russian loyal party member appointed by Moscow only to implement Moscow's policies in Kazakhstan. On the other hand, Mynbaev was a

³²⁴ Koigeldi 2007: 172.

³²⁵ Koigeldi 2007: 172-173.

local Kazak leader in the position of executing the soviets' decisions and express their expectations. The policy of centralization meant suppression of the local voices and consequently confrontation on every administrative level.

Khodzhanov, Sadvakasov and Mynbaev were removed from their position because of their resistance to the "party line." After them, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the republic, i.e. head of the government, Nygmet Nurmakov was also eliminated because of his resistance to the reduction of the role of the soviet structure. He told in the Krai Committee Bureau that their "soviet structures [were] completely being supplanted by the party structures."³²⁶ In 1929, after the campaign of collectivization had started, he was removed from the office and sent to Moscow to work in the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.³²⁷

3.3. An Outcome of the Nationality Policies Debate: the Establishment of the Kazak SSR

In October 1924, the Central Committee declared the birth of two socialist republics, Uzbek SSR and Turkmen SSR; two autonomous republics, Tajik ASSR³²⁸ and Kyrgyz [Kazak] ASSR, and two autonomous oblasts, Kara-Kyrgyz A. O.³²⁹ and Karakalpak A. O.³³⁰ The Karakalpak A. O. was part of the Kazak

³²⁶ Koigeldi 2007: 174.

³²⁷ Koigeldi 2007: 174-175.

³²⁸ Tajikistan was part of Uzbek SSR until 5 December 1929, when the Tajik SSR was founded (Helene Carrère d'Encausse (1994), "The National Republics Loose Their Independence," ed. Edward Allworth, *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance*, Duke University Press, Durham: 257.

³²⁹ It became the Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast as part of Kazak ASSR on 25 August 1925, and Kyrgyz SSR on 5 December 1936 (d'Encausse 1994: 257).

ASSR until 1932, when it became directly a part of the Russian SFSR as Karakalpak ASSR. In 1936, Karakalpak ASSR was joined to the Uzbek SSR.³³¹

The creation of new republics in 1924 changed the borders of Kazakhstan as well. The Kazak capital Orenburg was annexed to Russian SFSR. This can be understood as a result of dividing the Turkic peoples of the Bashkorts and Kazaks, because Orenburg was between these two Turkic Soviet Republics, and it was an important political and intellectual center for both of them. Thus, the Kazak capital in Orenburg – capital since 1920 - was first moved to Kyzylorda in 1925, and then to Alma-Ata in 1929.

The Bolsheviks were drawing the boundaries of the republics not just according to ethno-territorial principles, but they put a great value on the economic sustainability and development of the republics as well. While the Kazak center Orenburg was taken from the Kazaks, the fertile southern regions of Semirechie and Syrderya oblasts were added to the Kazak ASSR. Additionally, economically significant northern mines in Pavlodar district, which were part of the Russian SFSR in Siberia, were also added to Kazak ASSR after long discussions with the Siberian delegates.³³²

It was expected that those relatively more developed regions would help to break the “backward” mode of production of the Kazaks based on nomadism and cattle-breeding. According to Jeremy Smith the main aim of the Bolsheviks was to create, as far as practicable, predominantly mono-ethnic territories in which the

³³⁰ d’Encausse 1994: 256-257.

³³¹ See for a map of Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics after 1936 appendix A, map 6.

³³² Jeremy Smith (1999), *The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917-23*, Macmillan, London, 78-84.

titular nationality would be able to flourish within established borders fair to all parties (ethno-logical principle) and viable economies.³³³

As it was mentioned above the Bolsheviks founded their ideas on Stalin's pamphlet of *Marxism and National Question* (1913).³³⁴ Despite the fact that they were for "regional autonomy," but against "political units" having "ethnic designations."³³⁵ It seems that their ideas moved closer to "ethnic designations". The formula of nativization had to be supported by more positive policies towards ethnic groups, which required encouragements for the development of nations. Parallel to Stalin's definition of nation they had to build "a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture,"³³⁶ which necessitated the establishment of republics with predominantly mono-ethnic territories and viable economies, so that the nations could flourish.

Although it might seem conflicting with their emphasis on class, nation was considered just as a temporary process for them in the transition to the "higher stages of human evolution." They were ready to make compromises, like national rights, on the way to communism, and they saw no danger in compromising for phony phenomena, like nation. It should also be mentioned that this was not a complete shift from "regional autonomy" to "political units" with

³³³ Smith 1999: 66-84.

³³⁴ See the section 3.1.1. for the formation of Bolshevik nationality policy.

³³⁵ Ronald Grigor Suny (1998), *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States*, Oxford University Press, New York: 140.

³³⁶ Stalin 1953a: 307.

“ethnic designations.” In the Soviet republics the ethnic groups would not be proportionally represented, but every citizen would enjoy the same rights as members of a certain republic, so ethnic principle was completed by territoriality.

The discussions on nationality were not only based on economic concerns or ethnic groups. The different sides of discussion had various counter-arguments as they were declared by Chicherin in his seven letters dating from 5 April to 30 October 1924. His letters reflect both the heterogeneity of the Bolsheviks and voluntary cooperation of local cadres in “national-territorial delimitation of borders.”³³⁷

In his first letter from 5 April 1924 sent to Stalin, Chicherin pronounced his concerns about the elimination of the Khivan and Bukharan khanates, and argued that this liquidation “would create negative reactions towards them in the Muslim world and in the West.” Additionally, he argued that the Kirghiz, i.e. the Kazaks, were comfortable with the status quo, and “they don’t want to leave to the Uzbeks quite delicious lands, nor do they want to merge with Orenburg and leave the Kirghiz part of Middle Asia under Orenburg’s authority.” Chicherin consequently considers this act “without any doubt (...) not the path [they] should follow.” For him, it is at least “to the highest degree untimely.”³³⁸

In his letter from 16 May sent to the Politburo, we acquire that the resolution on redrawing borders was postponed until the next party meeting,

³³⁷ Hasan Ali Karasar (2002) “Chicherin on the Delimitation of Turkestan: Native Bolsheviks versus Soviet Foreign Policy. Seven Letters from the Russian Archives on *Razmezhevanie*,” *Central Asian Survey*, 21 (2), 199-209.

³³⁸ Karasar 2002: 204.

which was another sign of continuing debates. Other states were also informed, and Turkey, Afghanistan and Persia were concerned about its implementation.³³⁹

On 22 May, Chicherin wrote to Stalin, complaining that the “economic dimension of the issue is not been taken sufficiently into consideration.” He underlined again that “from the point of view of international politics it should definitely be postponed,” as the liquidation of two Muslim states, Bukhara and Khiva, would be considered as a violation by the Muslim peoples. He also informs us about the controversies among Central Asian populations, such as Teke Turkmens against Bukharan or Khivan Turkmens or Bukharans against Samarkandis. He compared the situation to opening Pandora’s Box.³⁴⁰

On 28 May, in his letter to the Politburo, he reminded again that “everybody in the Muslim world would interpret the liquidation of the ancient Muslim states of Bukhara and Khiva as a blow to Islam and to Eastern peoples.” Here, he also revealed that there were local supporters of delimitation. He defined them as “the Uzbek commercial bourgeoisie,” who wanted “to get rid of poor areas and create a large cotton-producing region, which would provide them with commercial opportunities.” Turkmen politicians were also supporting the plan of delimitation, “because it would give them an opportunity to become heads of the new state.” He added that Kirghiz [Kazak] people were against delimitation.³⁴¹

His letters were influential neither in changing nor in postponing the plans for delimitation. Moreover, his pessimism about an upheaval in Central Asia or

³³⁹ Karasar 2002: 205.

³⁴⁰ Karasar 2002: 206.

³⁴¹ Karasar 2002: 207.

on devastating impacts in international politics was not confirmed. His letters, on the other hand, shed light to the hot debates and to differences of opinion among different Bolshevik figures. It also shows that the plan of delimitation had supporters among the local elite as well. In his three letters, he mentions well-known Uzbek political figure Faizulla Khojaev as one of the main supporters of the project.³⁴² He combines the support of – other – Uzbeks with their commercial and Turkmens' with their political ambitions.

On 5 December 1936, Kazak ASSR became the last republic – together with Kyrgyz ASSR -, which acquired the status of “Soviet Socialist Republic” becoming the Kazak SSR. According to article 28 of the Soviet constitution: “The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Akmolinsk, Aktyubinsk, Alma-Ata, East Kazakhstan, Guriev, Jambul, West Kazakhstan, Karaganda, Kyzyl-Orda, Kutanai, Pavlodar, North Kazakhstan, Semipalatinsk and South Kazakhstan Regions.”³⁴³

Although the foundation of a republic was a call of the Kazak intellectuals, the Kazak SSR was established after having weakened the influential Kazak leaders. The sovereignty of the republic was limited, and all the control was kept in Moscow. The Kazak capital was reduced just to an execute organ of the plans prepared in Moscow.

In this chapter it was aimed to exemplify that the nationality policies, consolidation of power, exclusion of Alash Orda, drawing the republican borders were not well-defined policies at the beginning, and consequently they were not

³⁴² Karasar 2002: 206-208.

³⁴³ Josef V. Stalin (1978) “Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” *Collected Works, Volume 14, 1934-1940*, Red Star Press Ltd, London: 206.

implemented step-by step according to a certain plan to victimize the local – Kazak – leaders. The construction of the Soviet system and the policies were shaped in discussions of different political leaders with opposing aspects. It was Stalin, who finally rose as the sole leader of the party and the state apparatus, and it was his ideas, that were reflected in the final composition of the Soviet structure.

The members of Alash Orda saw no threat in joining the Bolsheviks in 1920, and although they were excluded from the political arena, they found a substantial sphere for their activities in investigating and developing Kazak society's culture and language.

Parallel to the changes in the formation of the USSR, the prominent members of Alash Orda were first removed from significant political positions in 1921, but a certain sphere of influence was left to them until they were released also from their educational or editorial positions, and arrested in 1928 (except Bokeikhanov). Finally they were executed in 1937-1939. Also Bolshevik Kazaks were affected from the changing policies and between 1925 and 1929 even the most reliable and effective Kazak politicians were removed from their position to leave their place to a new generation, which would just follow the orders of the Central Committee in Moscow.³⁴⁴

The next chapter will deal with the modernization process, which was realized through projects prepared in the center, in Moscow and implemented via Alma-Ata in the Kazak ASSR.

³⁴⁴ The removal of the influential Kazak politicians will be discussed in sections 3.2., 4.2. and 5.5.

CHAPTER 4

4. Sovietization as a Modernization Project and its Implications in the Kazak ASSR

Here in this chapter, the modernist aspects of the Kazak intellectuals, the modernization project of the Bolsheviks (social policies, industrialization and collectivization) and finally the purges will be discussed.

As it was mentioned in the previous chapters that the Kazak intellectuals were enthusiastic in implementing a modernization project, but they were too weak to form an efficient state and transform the society. Although the Soviet apparatus of the war-torn country was also in a weak state, it was relatively better prepared to rebuild a state and reshape the society, which might have enabled the participation of the Kazak intellectuals in the new government and opened them new channels to realize – some - of their dreams.

4.1. *Alash Orda* and Modernization: The Possible Reasons of their Collaboration with the Bolsheviks and its Results

The Kazak intellectuals around Bokeikhanov were not just nationalists, but they were also true modernizers. Their party program of 1917, around which many Kazak intellectuals were united and formed the core of the *Alash* movement, is a clear example of the scope of their modernist aspirations. It is

worth to mention again in order to understand what they stood for as a party or as modernizers, which is the aim of this section.

On the first period of the Bolshevik rule, the cooperation seemed to be a reasonable option for the Kazak intellectuals, since they were modernizers, like the Bolsheviks, and – as mentioned by Baitursynov – communism was not in contradiction to Kazak way of life with its communist core.

Their party program published in the *Kazak* periodical on 21 November 1917 – when they had no constructive relations with the Bolsheviks - reflects what they understood as the way of building a modern Kazak society. They thought that the only solution for the salvation of the Kazaks was creating a nation in the modern world, i.e. age of nations. The program summarizes the basis of the foundation of a modern Kazak society united as a nation and led by a state implementing the requirements of founding a modern society.

Most issues mentioned in the program, which was a genuine example of their modernist aspect, were not controversial to the Bolsheviks' revolutionary program or at least they seemed to be open to discussion. As mentioned above, the Kazaks were for founding a democratic, federal parliamentary Russian Republic with cultural freedom and autonomy for the Kazaks.³⁴⁵ The Bolsheviks were also for a federation, where the different nationalities would enjoy their territorial autonomies. That was far beyond the situation during the tsars. On the other hand, the level of democracy was never satisfying; moreover, in time it deteriorated more and more under Stalin paving the way for the liquidation of the Kazak intellectuals.

³⁴⁵ Nurpeisov 1998a: 131-132; Mambet K. Koigeldiev (2004), *Alash Kozghalysy: Dvizhenia Alash*, Alash, Almaty.

Below you will find an assessment of the ideas of the members of Alash Orda in terms of their modernist aspects as they were reflected in their program.³⁴⁶

The members of Alash Orda demanded equal rights for all citizens without any difference of sex, religion and ethnic origin.³⁴⁷ That reminds the principles of the declaration of human rights of the French Revolution. The Bolshevik ideology was based on Marxism that accepted the main idea of the French Revolution, but claimed that the poor people were betrayed by the bourgeoisie. So, they were arguing to be the real executors of the principles of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, and they even aimed to surpass them by destroying the class differences all together with their sources.

Alash Orda called for the separation of state and religious affairs.³⁴⁸ Intellectuals, like Bokeikhanov, were very negative towards religious tendencies, which Bokeikhanov considered as the main barrier of the development. Bokeikhanov's caution, as the leader of Kazak intellectuals, is also witnessed in his attitude against an alliance with the nationalist, reformist Turkistanis, when he avoided close relations with them in order to abstain from the influence of religious movements in Turkistan.³⁴⁹ The Bolsheviks as atheists had a stronger opposition to religious institutions. Also in the case of religion, the Kazak intellectuals were closer to the French model of laicism in which the religion continued to keep its institutions but its interference to state affairs was

³⁴⁶ The articles of the party program are summarized on page 37-38.

³⁴⁷ Nurpeisov 1998a: 132.

³⁴⁸ Nurpeisov 1998a: 132.

³⁴⁹ Kara 2002: 147-148.

prohibited, whereas the Bolsheviks were again more radical and for damaging the power of religion through confiscating the property of religious institutions and encouraging a more active struggle against religious practices.

Alash Orda was for the reorganization of the court and administration according to local and national characteristics,³⁵⁰ but the centralization process of the USSR according to decrees of Moscow was in contradiction with the demand of localization. Also the article of the program about the establishment of the army and conscription of the Kazaks³⁵¹ was against centralization.

However, it seems to be necessary to distinguish the differences in Bolsheviks' tactics. The party was based on strict centralist principles, since 1902, which was considered as essential to fight the authoritarian tsarist state apparatus, but Marxism's final goal is the destruction of the state. According to Marxists – different than Anarchists, who are for a sudden break down of the state –, the state should wither away in time, and this would be achieved once the power of the state apparatus was distributed and shared by the society. The soviets in Russia were ideal councils to share the power concentrated on the state, minimize its authority and pave the way for the withering away of the state apparatus. Despite the fact that the party's centralist structure and the communist decentralist ideals were antagonistic, it was aimed – at least by Lenin – that once the tsarist repressive state apparatus, i.e. the reason of Bolsheviks' centralist party structure, was defeated, the party should restructure itself and open channels for more

³⁵⁰ Nurpeisov 1998a: 132.

³⁵¹ Nurpeisov 1998a: 132.

democracy. They were aware of the significance of democracy as it was argued by Lenin against P. Kievsky in 1916 as follows:

It fails to appreciate the significance of democracy. For socialism is impossible without democracy because: (1) the proletariat cannot perform the socialist revolution unless it prepares for it by the struggle for democracy; (2) victorious socialism cannot consolidate its victory and bring humanity to the withering away of the state without implementing full democracy.³⁵²

The Kazaks' call for more autonomy found a reply in Lenin's formula for "freedom to secede from the union" and stress on federation, which was mentioned in the previous chapter, but Stalin did not trust the non-Russians and he created an authoritarian party structure turning the promised national rights to only a piece of paper.

The demands of the Kazak intellectuals for the reorganization of tax collection (more from the rich), and presenting legal rights to workers in accordance to the Mensheviks' program³⁵³ were less than the aims of the Bolsheviks.

The article on the development of science and public education with free and popular education in Kazak language³⁵⁴ was in total consistency with the Bolsheviks' aims. The Bolsheviks were also strong supporters of free, popular education, and they were not against education in national languages. The nativization policy and Lenin's formula of "socialist in form, nationalist in

³⁵² Lenin 1964b: 74.

³⁵³ Nurpeisov 1998a: 132.

³⁵⁴ Nurpeisov 1998a: 132.

contend” helped the education of native languages. It was not only “politically correct” but it also aimed to transmit the socialist ideas to young generations in their native language.³⁵⁵

A common language was, however, also necessary, as it was the case in every modernizing country, which was to become Russian language. The Bolsheviks were projecting to build a modern industry as part of their general modernization attempt and in order to create a strong proletariat and Soviet economy. Education could produce a mobile and interchangeable workforce equipped with complex new skills and social formation. Such skills were beyond the capacity of traditional forms, such as family and kinship ties or *medrese* education, and they could only be provided by a public education system supported by a common language and integrated into a centralized political, economic, and educational system as it was the case in other modernizing, industrializing Western countries. This necessity made the most common language, Russian, the shared, common language of the USSR, but different than most other modernizing, industrializing countries, the nativization policy encouraged the development of native languages as well.

This process required vast resources to be employed and standardization, which could only be achieved by a well-organized state apparatus. The Bolsheviks possessed the necessary apparatuses of the state to build an education system, which was missing among the Kazaks. Hence, the cooperation with the Bolsheviks would be very effective in the accomplishment of an educated,

³⁵⁵ See for more information on possible reasons of their education in native language section 4.3.1.

modern Kazak nation, and this sphere of the new great leap forward was to become the most efficient field of cooperation for the Bolsheviks and Alash Orda.

It is also worth to mention that the need to produce a mobile and interchangeable workforce required a wider education of the Russian language, which was not directly related to the goals of Alash Orda, but unless Kazak language would be taught to the new generation and studied by Kazak linguists, Russian language would possess no threat for the Kazak language. They were all fluent in Russian, and it played a leading role for them in contacting the culture and ideas of the modern world.

A last but very significant issue for the Kazaks was preventing the migration of the Russian peasants to Kazak pasture lands and returning the unused land to the Kazaks,³⁵⁶ which was but not easy to achieve. The Bolsheviks on the borders of Russia were a strange mixture of big landlords, well-off tradesmen, entrepreneurs with many employees and some workers – mainly railroad workers; most of them were Russians, and they had joined only the party after the revolution. The Bolsheviks were in favor of supporting the empowered Kazaks, but the main source of power for the Bolsheviks in Central Asia were the Russians, who had settled in Central Asia in the last decades. For the Russian settlers Moscow was a natural ally as being the center of the Russians, additionally the small proletariat was also set up from those Russian settlers, and they did not have a peaceful relationship with the Kazaks. The bloody turmoil of 1916 was very recent. Thus, the Bolsheviks had to act very careful in that matter.

³⁵⁶ Nurpeisov 1998a: 132.

They had to start with changing the structure of the party, so that it would represent the poor people, which generally consisted of the Kazaks.

The demands of the Kazak intellectuals were politically liberal in general. They seem to be close to the egalitarian, secular, modernist, humanist principles of the declaration of human rights. Their nationalism was also closer to the French model, free of racism or essentialism of the German form of nationalism,³⁵⁷ which would strengthen after the war.

Their position corresponds to Hobsbawm's periodisation of nationalism, which was not racist until the end of the First World War. He argues that the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination proposed during the First World War, which required building independent nation-states, forced the nationalist leaders to act according to "race" and homogenize nations through ethnic cleansing, forced deportation and genocide.³⁵⁸ The Alash Ordists were not touched by that idea, which was reflected during the uprising of 1916 as well. It would be expected from a nationalist movement influenced by the Wilsonian principle to support the Kazaks fighting against the Russian settlers, but instead they sought to calm down the rebel Kazaks.

In terms of social transformation, they had a different agenda than the Bolsheviks. The Kazak intellectuals were for an evolutionary model of transition through bourgeois-democratic reforms and establishment of capitalism in a pre-capitalist society. While they wanted to carry reforms for the whole society (nation) indifferent of the classes, the Bolsheviks aimed to make changes to

³⁵⁷ See the quotation from Bokeikhanov on page 59.

³⁵⁸ Hobsbawm 1992.

strengthen the proletariat, which was expected to become the foundation of the revolution. Both the Bolsheviks and the Kazak intellectuals aimed to modernize the society, but their priorities were different: either carrying reforms for the whole nation, or putting the proletariat to the first place as the vanguard in transforming the society.

Both were optimistic about that all society would benefit from their social engineering projects, but supporting the proletariat meant supporting initially Russian workers, and supporting all society required the application of positive discrimination in favor of the weakest social group in the region of present Kazakhstan, the Kazaks, and to start by improving their culture and economic conditions. The priority of the proletariat together with the policy of *korenizatsia* meant creation of a Kazak proletariat to benefit from the revolution.³⁵⁹ What could not come into being in centuries had to be proceeded in shortest time as possible. The question was about the speed of the transformation brought the Kazak intellectuals and the central authorities to opposing sides. The introduction of the First Five-Year-Plan and the collectivization reduced the time interval necessary for that transition. As mentioned in the previous chapter this was a direct and unlimited interference of the center to regional politics, and it was carried after the liquidation of all generations of the Kazak leadership.

The establishment of nations, which had a significant place in the Kazak intellectuals' program, was regarded not only by the Kazaks but also by the Bolsheviks as a necessary stage in the social development. They both believed in

³⁵⁹ The call for the creating the Kazak proletariat was not welcomed by the Kazak masses, because they preferred to keep their traditional, nomadic way of life. See for an example of it on the last page of this chapter on their reply to the call for working in the construction of Turksib.

the linear development, “progress” of the society, in which recently the nations had come into being. For the Bolsheviks this was a transitory process in the evolution, but for Alash Orda it was a final stage in the development of modern societies and a requirement of modernization. However, the Bolsheviks were positive in recognizing the national rights, since it was considered just as a transitory process.

Arne Haugen states that “[i]n some Soviet accounts, the [national] delimitation is seen as a strategy for overcoming Central Asia’s backwardness, such as clan-based and tribal organizations.”³⁶⁰ Also E. H. Carr³⁶¹ and many recent researchers consider the Soviet nationalities policy as part of a modernist understanding. Nations are “necessary,” “natural” or “historically inevitable”³⁶² stages of modernization. According to Yuri Slezkine, the nationalism of the backward peoples on the borders of the USSR was supported in order to facilitate their “economical, social and cultural” “catching-up with Russia,”³⁶³ which led Terry Martin to call the USSR an “affirmative action empire.”³⁶⁴ Francine Hirsch states that it should be understood as a strategy for modernization, and that it was indeed a “state sponsored evolutionism.”³⁶⁵ Jeremy Smith examines it as a tool for

³⁶⁰ Haugen 2003: 20.

³⁶¹ Haugen 2003: 16; Carr 1989.

³⁶² Terry Martin (2001), *The Affirmative Action Empire, Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca; Haugen 2003: 16-17.

³⁶³ Yuri Slezkine (1994), “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” *Slavic review*, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 414-452; Haugen 2003: 16.

³⁶⁴ Martin 2001.

³⁶⁵ Francine Hirsch (1997), “Towards an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of ‘Soviet’ National Identities,” *The Russian Review*, vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 201-226; Haugen 2003: 17.

stability, which would lead to the development of material conditions and create ultimately the basis of socialism.³⁶⁶

For both the Kazaks and the Bolsheviks creating a Kazak nation was part of a bigger project, that is modernization, and both the Bolsheviks and the Kazak intellectuals were in need of the other. The Kazak intellectuals were in need of a strong base of support to implement their modernization project, and the Bolsheviks were in need of local cadres for legitimacy and execution of their policies.

The Soviet modernization project was successful in terms of transforming Kazakhstan and Central Asia, and creating a modern society. Three decades later, in 1950s, this was acknowledged even by anti-communist scholars of the West, who considered the Central Asian Soviet Republics as threat, because they were used by the Soviets as an effective tool to prove the capacity of their socialist project to underdeveloped countries.³⁶⁷ As “colonel” Geoffrey Wheeler puts it:

There is another innovation in the methods which the Soviet government is using to implement its policy towards Asian countries. This is the greatly increased use of the eastern, and largely Muslim, republics of the USSR as a shop window with which to impress the outside world with Soviet achievements in areas which have many affinities with under-developed countries in the Middle East and South Asia. (...) in their standard of living, in general and technical education, and in industry and agriculture they are far ahead of many independent eastern countries. (...) hardly a day goes by but some delegation from the Arab countries, from Pakistan and from Indonesia, is present in Central Asia. (...) and it would be foolish to suppose that the delegations are not impressed, if only because they

³⁶⁶ Smith 1999; Haugen 2003.

³⁶⁷ Will Myer (2002) *Islam and Colonialization: Western Perspectives on Soviet Asia*, Routledge Curzon. Place of Publication, London.

have been told by the western propaganda that conditions in Soviet Asia are deplorable.³⁶⁸

The dream of the Russian and Turkestani Bolsheviks to turn Central Asia into an example and a breeding ground to spread the revolution to the East was finally put into practice under Stalin, who was against the spread of revolution in the previous period of 1920s. In the past three decades, the USSR had gone through a process of sharp industrialization and modernization. The potential threat of local intellectuals, who could act separately, was eliminated, and Soviet Central Asia – and Kazakstan – was modernized from above. After the war, it was time for the victorious USSR to strike again to spread their zone of influence by using the Soviet Central Asia as an example for the underdeveloped countries of the world.

Michael Rywkin argues that “as since been demonstrated, both Sultan Galiev and Ryskulov were about thirty five years in advance and geographically misplaced.”³⁶⁹ The endeavor to spread the revolution to the East was again put into practice by Stalin as it was envisaged as the only way out for spreading the socialism to the world, but only after the initiative of the national organs and the soviets were suppressed and they were replaced by a clumsy state apparatus, and the charismatic leaders with the rank and file of the Soviet state.

Marx did probably never imagine that some people would turn socialism in the name of Marxism into a model to be imported by authoritarian, underdeveloped states. Marx had in mind to find out the possible sources of a

³⁶⁸ Geoffrey Wheeler (1954) “Cultural Developments in Soviet Central Asia,” *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 41, III, 179; transferred from Myer 2002: 18.

³⁶⁹ Rywkin, Michael (1963) *Russia in Central Asia*, Collier, New York: 47.

strong dissident movement to destroy the current system and create a new society from top down, whereas the state officials of the Third World Countries visiting the Central Asian show case were only seeing a model to transform the society from bottom up.

The next pages will be about the establishment of the pacification of the non-party initiatives and industrialization process.

4.2. Kazak Intellectuals in Socialist Kazakstan

In November 1919, all members of Alash Orda were promised political amnesty, as a result of Baitursynov's political bargaining. Moreover, Baitursynov - and Zeki Velidi (Togan) – were offered by Stalin to join the party:

Although both of you are nationalists, we know you as people who will be able to accept the idea of world-wide revolution. (...) In your lands today begins the life of the party. We want to see you inside this work. Those who chose to be outside the organization, life leaves behind. You are not communists, but I want to see you as members of the party and to work with us.³⁷⁰

They accepted this invitation and also other members of Alash Orda joined the Bolsheviks.³⁷¹ They used the channels not closed to them to work in the modernization project of their people.

However, by 1923, all nonparty members of the government, who had been also active members of the *Alash Orda* government, were removed from

³⁷⁰ Sabol 2003: 149.

³⁷¹ As mentioned above, Zeki Velidi first accepted the invitation, but then left the party the next year in summer and joined the armed struggle.

their positions.³⁷² In 1925, a Russian – of Jewish origin - Feodor Goloshchekin³⁷³ was appointed by Moscow as the first secretary of *krai* party of Kazakhstan.³⁷⁴ That was the time, when Stalin was strengthening his position in the party, he was assigning loyal party members to key positions and Goloshchekin was an old, ambitious party member³⁷⁵ and one of his trusted men. The change of cadres and the liquidation of a new generation of Kazak leadership following the Alash Ordists were explained in detail in the previous chapter. Under Goloshchekin the ruling elites in Kazakhstan were changed again, and the influential Kazak intellectuals left their place to a new generation of Kazaks and Russians more trusted in Moscow.

The new policies of Moscow were to be executed by the new cadres sent from Moscow. Goloshchekin implemented the centre's social policies, collectivization and industrialization in Kazakhstan. The Alash Ordists were first pushed to cultural, scientific activities, and they continued their work of enlightening the Kazaks until 1928. The paragraphs below are on their activities between 1920 and 1928.

In 1920, shortly after joining the Bolsheviks, some members of *Alash Orda*, like Bokeikhanov, who used to be the president of the *Alash Orda* government, were arrested for a brief period as “bourgeois nationalists.”

³⁷² Olcott 1987: 212.

³⁷³ Goloshchekin was one of the perpetrators of the execution of the tsar and his family.

³⁷⁴ Nerikbaev 2004: 5; J. Matthew Payne (2001), *Stalin's Railroad, Turksib and the Building of Socialism*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh: 308.

³⁷⁵ Goloshchekin was accepted to the Central Committee in 1912, right after him Stalin also became a member of the Central Committee.

Bokeikhanov gave up his political activity, and participated in scientific expeditions in the steppe.

Despite the fact that most members of Alash Orda were considered as dangerous and removed from the Kazak political sphere, some others were free to work in the political sphere in the early 1920s. Among these former members of Alash Orda are to be mentioned: Baitursynov,³⁷⁶ Zh. Aimaulytov,³⁷⁷ D. Adilev,³⁷⁸ A. Alibekov,³⁷⁹ Gh. Alibekov,³⁸⁰ Sh. M. Bekmukhammedov,³⁸¹ A. A. Yermekov,³⁸² T. B. Zhamanmurynov,³⁸³ A. K. Kenzhin,³⁸⁴ Kh. N. Nurmukhamedov,³⁸⁵ M. S. Samatov.³⁸⁶ All of those eleven members of Alash Orda worked as people's commissars in the Soviet government.³⁸⁷

Baitursynov, who was one of the leading members of *Alash Orda* (vice-president) together with Bokeikhanov, had joined the Bolsheviks before other leaders of Alash Orda, and he enjoyed to be a more influential person in socialist

³⁷⁶ M. S. Nerikbaev, et al. (2004), *Kazakstanyng Halyk Kommisarlary 1920-1946 jj.*, Kazakstan Respublikasy Prezidentining Muraghaty, Almaty: 96-97.

³⁷⁷ Nerikbaev 2004: 50.

³⁷⁸ Nerikbaev 2004: 82.

³⁷⁹ Nerikbaev 2004: 88-89.

³⁸⁰ Nerikbaev 2004: 89-90.

³⁸¹ Nerikbaev 2004: 108-109.

³⁸² Nerikbaev 2004: 181-182.

³⁸³ Nerikbaev 2004: 191-192.

³⁸⁴ Nerikbaev 2004: 237-238.

³⁸⁵ Nerikbaev 2004: 329-330.

³⁸⁶ Nerikbaev 2004: 382-83.

³⁸⁷ See for a picture of the People's Commissars of 1921 appendix C, picture 16.

Kazakstan than Bokeikhanov and other members of Alash Orda. He was more optimistic than Bokeikhanov and was hoping a brighter future with the Bolsheviks; he continued his political life for some time, and then concentrated on educating the Kazaks, elevating literacy and developing the Kazak culture.

From September 1920 to September 1921, he was the People's Commissar of Education³⁸⁸ of the Kazak ASSR; and thence to June 1922, he became Vice Commissar of Education and Head of Academic Center. In 1922-1925 he was the head of Academic Research Center.³⁸⁹

In the early 1920s, when the party was still accepting them, he advised other Kazaks to join the party,³⁹⁰ because as Stalin had told them "Those who chose to be outside the organization, life leaves behind."³⁹¹ But he remained to be a nationalist, i.e. a person trying to improve the life of his nation. In 1922, Baitursynov wrote about nationalism and their comprehension of nationalism in *Ak Zhol* periodical the following:

[O]ur journalists are nationalists; this means they take an active part in life of their nation, partaking in its sorrows and joys. It is impossible not to be a nationalist. It would be contrary to the laws of nature. A non-nationalist is not a man, he is a pig. The October Revolution did not transform our nationalist journalists into internationalists.³⁹²

³⁸⁸ People's Commissar of Education: a position similar to a Minister of Education.

³⁸⁹ Nerikbaev 2004: 96-97.

³⁹⁰ Sabol 2003: 115.

³⁹¹ Sabol 2003: 149.

³⁹² Sabol 2003: 115.

Joining the party was just a way enabling them to work for their aims. Baitursynov wrote that “by becoming communists, we, the nationalists, can use the legal channels for the best interests of the Kazakh people.”³⁹³

But these channels were soon to be closed to him as well, and he was expelled from the party with some other party members in 1924.³⁹⁴ Although he was expelled from the political arena, he continued his work of enlightening the Kazak people. His influence on the Kazak people persisted as a poet, linguist and the editor of the periodical *Ak Zhol*.³⁹⁵ He also worked as educator of the Kazak language and literature until 1928, and became a professor of Pedagogy, in 1928. He became also the writer of the first textbook on geography.³⁹⁶

In 1929, shortly after his ascension as a professor, he was arrested and exiled to Archangelsk in 1929, but he was released with Maxim Gorki’s support. In 1937, he was arrested for the last time and executed on 8 December 1937.³⁹⁷

He wrote many books to enlighten the Kazak people: *Kyryk Mysal* (Forty Parables, 1909), *Masa* (Table, 1911), *Oku Kuraly* (Rules of Reading, 1912), *Til Kural, 1. Zhyldyk* (Rules of Language, First Year, 1914), *Til Kural, 2. Zhyldyk* (Rules of Language, Second Year, 1915), *Baianshy* (Transmitter, 1920), *Til - Kural, 1-Til Tanytkysh Kitap* (Rules of Language, First Book of Introduction, 1925), *Til - Kural, 3-Til Tanytkysh Kitap* (Rules of Language, Third Book of

³⁹³ Sabol 2003: 115.

³⁹⁴ Nerikbaev 2004: 96-97.

³⁹⁵ Sabol 2003: 115.

³⁹⁶ Nerikbaev 2004: 96-97.

³⁹⁷ Sabol 2003: 115.

Introduction, 1925), *Til Zhumsar* (Language Becomes Softer, 1926), *Adebiyet Tanytkysh* (Introduction to Literature, 1926), *Elip-bi Zhana Kural* (Alphabet and Rules, 1928).³⁹⁸

He put a great value on the Kazak language. He argued that the survival of the Kazak people depended on the survival of its language. Kazak intellectuals were trying to develop a literary Kazak language, but there was also a need for linguistic studies. Just as intellectuals of other nations on the first phase of nationalism, they worked like linguists and folklorists.³⁹⁹ They entered the second phase through their struggle for independence as well, but when it was clear that they could not achieve autonomy, they joined the Bolsheviks. For a while they undertook an active role in the establishment of the Kazak ASSR, but once the doors were closed to them they turned back to phase A, and continued to perform the work of a linguistic researcher.⁴⁰⁰ Baitursynov was not the only example of it, but he was the most productive member of Alash Orda during the Soviet years.

The other ten People's Commissars were less significant figures in the *Alash Orda* movement. The biographies of those ten members of Alash Orda will be briefly summarized below in order to exemplify some common points and

³⁹⁸ C. Kirabaev, R. Syzdykova, Mambet Koigeldiev (1999) "Baitursynov Akhmet," *Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia 2*, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 76. His a selection of his articles was published in the last years of the USSR (Akhmet Baitursynov (1989) *Shygharmalar*, Alma-ata).

³⁹⁹ Hroch 1985: 185.

⁴⁰⁰ The fact that they were all writers or educators prior to their political carrier enabled them to find another way to help their people. If the consider with the help of the Kazak intellectuals, the life of two other significant figures, Zeki Velidi (Togan) and Mustafa Chokai would probably differ. Chokai has lways been an active politician, whereas Zeki Velidi (Togan) was also a researcher. If his early alliance with the Bolsheviks was to be followed, he could also turn back to phase A, but for others like Chokai, who were only political figures, it would not be easy to continue their work in the USSR.

dates in their life story. Their life story also reveals that although there were some shared periodical changes in their carrier not all of them did suffer from the same policies. The central policies demanding the removal of members of Alash Orda did not function in totality to all of them.

D. Adilev⁴⁰¹ (1900-1930) was a member of Alash Orda in 1917-1918, and a People's Commissar in 1920-1921. Until 1925, he was one of the less significant members of the executive organs of education and an educator. In 1925, he became one of the founders and director of the National Theatre. He was arrested in 1928 and executed by shooting in 1930.⁴⁰²

According to Koigeldi, the purges of 1928-1929 were based on the contradictory evidence given by D. Adilev. Adilev told them that some members of Alash Orda had come together to build a counter-revolutionary organization in 1921. Accordingly, 43 other members of former Alash movement were imprisoned.⁴⁰³

Zh. Aimauytov⁴⁰⁴ (1889-1931) was a member of Alash Orda in 1917-1919, in 1919 he joined the Revolutionary Committee of Semei, and joined the Communist Party in 1920. In 1920-1921 he held the position of the vice-chairman in the People's Commissariat of Education (with Baitursynov). After 1921, he

⁴⁰¹ See for a picture of Adilev appendix C, picture 18.

⁴⁰² Nerikbaev 2004: 82.

⁴⁰³ Koigeldi 2007: 176.

⁴⁰⁴ See for a picture of Aimauytov appendix C, picture 19.

worked as editor, teacher, author, school director, but in 1929, he was arrested executed by shooting.⁴⁰⁵

A. Alibekov⁴⁰⁶ (1893-1937) was a member of Alash Orda in 1917-1918; in 1919, he joined the Communist Party. In 1920-1921, he was a member of the Kyrgyz Revolutionary Committee (KyrRevKom) in the Narkomnats. From 1921 to 1924 a People's Commissar of the Inspection of the Work and Workers, and a People's Commissar of Work until 1926. He was a as a deputy member in 1925 and 1927.⁴⁰⁷ He is a rare example of Alash Ordists, who was not arrested in 1928, but he was not a member of the political apparatus after 1928; and continued to work in the government as a director (1933-1937). He committed suicide in 1937.⁴⁰⁸

Gh. Alibekov⁴⁰⁹ (1870-1923) was a member of Alash Orda in 1917-1918; in 1919, he joined the Communist Party. In 1920, he was a member of the revolutionary committee and then head of the Special Committee of the Kyrgyz Revolutionary Committee. In 1920-1921, he became the People's Commissar Justice of Kazak ASSR. In 1922, he obtained a less significant position as head of the executive committee of a district, until his death a year later.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁵ Nerikbaev 2004: 50.

⁴⁰⁶ See for a picture of A. Alibekov appendix C, picture 20.

⁴⁰⁷ See for a picture of A. Alibekov with soviet delegation in 1927 appendix C, picture 17.

⁴⁰⁸ Nerikbaev 2004: 88-89.

⁴⁰⁹ See for a picture of Gh. Alibekov appendix C, picture 21.

⁴¹⁰ Nerikbaev 2004: 89-90.

Sh. M. Bekmukhammedov⁴¹¹ (1892-1958) joined the Communist Party in 1919, removed from the party in 1923, taken back to the party a year later, but again liquidated in 1925. He was a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee in 1919 and member of Inspection of the Work and Workers. In 1921-1922, he became the People's Commissar Justice of Kazak ASSR (following Gh. Alibekov), public prosecutor in 1922. He was not arrested, neither in 1928 nor in 1938,⁴¹² and continued to work on different levels of the government until his death in 1958.⁴¹³

A. K. Kenzhin (1887-1938) was one of the long time members of Alash Orda, where he worked from 1917 to 1919. In 1920, he joined the Communist Party, became the vice-chairman in the People's Commissariat of Education in 1921, and then People's Commissar of Education till 1922. He held many significant positions in the government, like People's Commissar of Work and Workers in 1924 and People's Commissar of Commerce in 1924-1928. After 1929, he worked in less significant positions. In 1932, he was sentenced but

⁴¹¹ See for a picture of Bekmukhammedov appendix C, picture 22.

⁴¹² It is not easy to understand, how he was saved from the executions. Although he was mentioned as a member of Alash Orda in Nerikbayev's book, his role in this movement was probably very minimal, and Nerikbayev doesn't mention the date of his membership. The National Encyclopedia of Kazakhstan (*Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia*) gives a more detailed description of his earlier years, and according to it in 1917 he was expelled from the Faculty of Law of Kazan University, where Lenin had also studied tow decades ago, because of his participation in the student movement. Later in that year, he had already a leading position in the Soviet of the Red Army (M. Abdesh (1999) "Bekmukhamedov Shavkat Mukhammedkhanuly," *Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia*, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 258). Most probably, Nerikbayev's information is misleading; he had only a temporary role in Alash Orda if he had any.

⁴¹³ Nerikbaev 2004: 108-109.

released in 1934 and worked again in a political position in a commission for the preparations of the Kazak SSR. However, he was also executed in 1938.⁴¹⁴

Kh. N. Nurmukhamedov⁴¹⁵ (1900-1938) worked as a members of Alash Orda from 1917 to 1919, and in 1920, he joined the Communist Party. He completed his education until 1932, while he was working in the local committees of the party and in periodicals. After 1932, he worked as a lecturer in university and as director. In 1933-1934, he worked in the planning committee and in 1936-1937 he was the People's Commissar of Health and Commerce. At the height of his carrier he was arrested and killed in 1938.⁴¹⁶

M. S. Samatov⁴¹⁷ (1894-1938) was a member of Alash Orda from 1917 to 1918, and he joined the Communist Party in 1920. In 1921-1924 he was the People's Commissar of Food. He enjoyed working in many offices as a chairman or vice-chairman. While he was continuing to work in the planning committee in a significant – and trusted - position as the vice-chairman (since 1932), he was arrested and killed in 1938.⁴¹⁸

A. A. Yermekov⁴¹⁹ (1891-1970) was one of the founders of Alash Orda and member of the government. In 1920, he became a member of the Revolutionary Committee and KyrRevKom. He was a school director in 1921-

⁴¹⁴ Nerikbaev 2004: 237-238.

⁴¹⁵ See for a picture of Nurmukhamedov appendix C, picture 23.

⁴¹⁶ Nerikbaev 2004: 329-330.

⁴¹⁷ See for a picture of Samatov appendix C, picture 24.

⁴¹⁸ Nerikbaev 2004: 382-83.

⁴¹⁹ See for a picture of A. Yermekov appendix C, picture 25.

1925, a member of the planning committee, in 1925-1926. In 1926, he worked in an agricultural office for a while and then he worked as a teacher until being arrested in 1930. In 1938, he was arrested again. He was not killed during the repression, but he was arrested once more in 1948. He spent most of time in prison camps until 1955.⁴²⁰

T. B. Zhamanmurynov⁴²¹ (1888-1938) was a member of Alash Orda in 1917. He joined the Communist Party in 1920, and he held the position of the vice-chairman in the People's Commissariat of Work in 1921. He continued to work in the People's Commissariat of Work until 1929. He was not affected from the liquidations of 1929, and kept working in different branches of the state as director or chairman until 1937, when he was arrested, a year later he was also killed.⁴²²

⁴²⁰ Nerikbaev 2004: 181-182.

⁴²¹ See for a picture of Zhamanmurynov appendix C, picture 26.

⁴²² Nerikbaev 2004: 191-192.

Table 1: Changing Position of People's Commissars in Years.

	A.B.	Zh.A.	D.A.	A.A.	Gh.A.	Sh.B.
Alash Orda	1917-1919	1917-1919	1917-1918	1917-1918	1917-1918	?
Communist Party	1920-1924	1920-?	?	?	1919-?	1919-1925
People's Commissar	1920-1921	1920-1921	1920-1921	1921-1924	1920-1921	1921-1922
Removal from the Government	1922	1921	1925	1928	1922 reduction	NA
Detention	1929	1929	1928	NA	NA	NA
Execution	1937	1929	1930	1937 (Suicide)	1923,died naturally	NA
Occupation after Removal	Educator ⁴²³	Educator	Educator	Educator	NA	NA

Source: Nerikbaev 2004.

Table 2: Changing Position of People's Commissars in Years.

	A.Ye.	T.Zh.	A.K.	Kh.N.	M.S.
Alash Orda	1917-1920	1917	1917-1919	1917-1919	1917-1918
Communist Party	1920-?	1920-?	1920-1936	1920-?	1920-?
People's Commissar	1925-1926 Plan. com.	1921	1921,1922, 1924-1928	1936-1937	1921-1924
Removal from the Government	1927?	1937	1936	1937	1937
Detention	1930, 1938	1937	1936	1937	1937?
Execution	1970 (died naturally)	1938	1938	1938	1938
Occupation after Removal	Educator	NA	NA	NA	NA

Source: Nerikbaev 2004.

All of those People's Commissars were members of *Alash Orda* except one, who was probably never a member of it. They left the movement in different

⁴²³ Here, the term "educator" is used in its broadest meaning as "educator of the people" working as a teacher, author, publisher, editor, scientist, director in educational organizations.

years, but most of them, eight out of ten⁴²⁴ left it in 1918 and 1919, and only one was still a member in 1920, when the movement was liquidated after the amnesty. It seems that most members of *Alash Orda* did not wait for the amnesty in 1920, and left the movement beforehand due to *Alash Orda*'s decline or disillusionment.

All of the members except one, whose date of acceptance to the party we know, joined the party in 1920. This must be a clear sign of the changes brought by the amnesty and the party's policy of opening up the ranks to local political figures. The party was in need of educated, able cadres to recruit in order to establish necessary state institutions. Consequently, they started to help the formation of the new administrative bodies as People's Commissars the same year. Four of them were People's Commissars in 1920 and four others in 1921. In 1921, all People's Commissars of 1920 with a background in *Alash Orda* were removed, and some of them were replaced with other members of *Alash Orda*. The removal of the first group, including Baitursynov, did not mean a total removal of *Alash Ordists* from the decision-making positions. From the second group of People's Commissars of 1921 only one lost his position the next year. Half of all People's Commissars from the movement of *Alash Orda* continued to work as People's Commissars in different decision-making positions in the formation of the Kazak ASSR.

All members of *Alash Orda*, who were removed from the political arena or not even accepted to work in the decision-making positions, found a way to assist

⁴²⁴ Sh. M. Bekmukhammedov is not excluded, because he was either not a member of *Alash Orda* or his activity covered a very limited period. His relationship with the *Alash Orda* is not mentioned in his biography in the *Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopediasy* (M. Abdeshev (1999) "Bekmukhammedov Shavkat Mukhammedzhanuly," *Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia 2*, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 258).

the Kazaks in their enlightenment. All of them were active in that process as teachers, professors, authors, editors, scientists or directors in various means of enlightenment, like educational institutes, publishing houses or theatres.

Some of them were persecuted in 1928, but some others continued to work in the government and they even enjoyed to work as People's Commissars. It is also interesting that the only long term member of Alash Orda – among the People's Commissars -, A. Yermekov who was also one of the founders of Alash Orda and member of the government, was the only person, who was not executed but exiled and died naturally in 1970.

When the history is written from a distance, we are inclined to evaluate the events from the point of later developments. In case of the history of Alash Orda, it is known to us that around 1938 some executions took place in Kazakhstan, and the executed persons were generally associated with the movement of Alash Orda. This fact leads to conclusions as if all members of Alash Orda were persecuted at the end of 1920s⁴²⁵ and executed at the end of 1930s. As the biographies above exemplifies, there were also some exceptions, such as Yermekov, who was not executed, because he was not interested in active politics but in natural sciences. However, he was not saved from the persecutions and spent many years in prison camps.

The conclusion, that members of Alash Orda were killed based on the identity of the victims, should be reevaluated from another point by checking the life story of other members of *Alash Orda*, in other words, the argument based on

⁴²⁵ For Example, Nurpeisov states that “all participants of the Alash movement were arrested and persecuted” during the trial in 1928-1929 (K. Nurpeisov (1998c) “Alash Isi,” *Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia 1*, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 253).

the identity of the victims of 1938 should be tested from the starting point via the story of the Alash Ordists in 1917. Although it is true that the members of *Alash Orda* were the first victims of the executions, and there was a ruthless case against them, it is also true that some members were able to work within the state apparatus.

This is also true for the fact that some members of Alash Orda were removed from politics in 1921. The closure of the political arena to some members of Alash Orda, like Baitursynov, is also understood, as if all of them were pushed to the field of cultural struggle. It is quite probable that those, who were permitted to work, were considered as insignificant, “unthreatening” figures.

It is worth to summarize the biographies of other members of Alash Orda as well, such as Alikhan Bokeikhanov, Mirzhakyp Dulatov, Khalel Ghabbasov, Khalel Dosmukhamedov, Zhansha Dosmukhamedov and Maghzhan Zhumabaev.

Bokeikhanov (1866-1937) was the oldest and leading figure of the Kazak political movement in first quarter of the 20th century, and he was one of the founders of Alash Orda. He joined the Bolsheviks in 1920 following Baitursynov’s political bargaining on an amnesty for the members of Alash Orda. He was held in custody, but he was released after a short while, and became a member of the Kazak ASSR, Committee of People’s Commissariat of Agriculture. In 1922, he was called to Moscow to work as a scientist in the People’s Commissariat of National Affairs. In 1926-1927, he became a member of the prestigious Russian Academy of Sciences, and in 1927 he became a professor of agriculture.⁴²⁶

⁴²⁶ Mambet Koigeldiev (1999) “Bokeikhanov Alikhan Nurmukhameduly,” *Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia 2*, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 403.

Although the Bolsheviks' opinion seems to be positive for Bokeikhanov considering his assignments, he was always under the supervision of the center. When he left Moscow without permission in 1926, he was arrested for fifteen days by the secret police, OGPU, in the Kazak city of Aktobe.⁴²⁷ He was kept away from Kazak ASSR in order to diminish his influence among the Kazaks.

In 1928, he was arrested again as part of the trial in the Kazak ASSR against the former members of Alash Orda. The OGPU, indeed, sought to open the case through intensive interrogations of another former Alash member, Eldes Omarov, in torture chambers in October 1927. The reason was "the fact that he had invited the movements leader, Alikhan Bokeikhanov to a retreat" in a farm in Chelyabinsk in Russia with 30 Kazak families. Omarov did not accept the allegations, and the case was dismissed,⁴²⁸ but the OGPU's reaction to this invitation shows the gravity of the situation for OGPU.

Bokeikhanov was the only outstanding member of Alash Orda, who was not taken into custody during the trial of 1928-1930,⁴²⁹ but he could not escape Stalin's purges in 1937, and he was executed on 27 November 1937.⁴³⁰

Another well-known leader of Alash Orda is Mirzhakyp Dulatov (1885-1935), who was a poet, writer, journalist and educator. He started to help improving the life of the Kazaks as a teacher in a village school in 1902,⁴³¹ but he

⁴²⁷ Koigeldiev 1999: 403.

⁴²⁸ Koigeldi 2007: 175-176.

⁴²⁹ Koigeldi 2007: 181.

⁴³⁰ Koigeldiev 1999: 403. Bokeikhanov's collected works were published after the independence of Kazakhstan (Bokeikhanov, Alikhan (1994), *Shygharmalary*, Almaty).

⁴³¹ Z. Bisenghali, S. Imanbaeva (2001) "Dulatov Mirzhakyp," *Kazakstan Ul'tyik Entsiklopedia* 3, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 295.

should have realized that there was more to do, and he got acquainted with Baitursynov and Bokeikhanov, with whom he developed a close relationship.

In some years he also became one of the leaders of Kazak struggle for enlightenment, when in 1909 he published his first poetry, *Oyan Kazak* (Awake Kazak!), in which he appealed to the Kazaks to end up their eternal sleep in the darkness of ignorance and indifference to their deprived status, and become an educated, self-confident people. In 1910, he published the first Kazak novel, *Bakysyz Zhamal* (Unlucky Zhamal), where he criticized the poor status of women in the Kazak society. He became one of the most active writers of the periodical *Aikap* and *Kazak*,⁴³² which became the breeding ground of the later Alash movement.

In 1917-1920 he was one of the leading members of Alash Orda with a militia under his command, but in 1920 he also dissolved the troops under his command and joined the Bolsheviks. In 1920, he worked in Tashkent in the periodical *Ak Zhol*, but went back to Kazak ASSR the next year and worked as judge in the court. He was taken into custody for a short time because of his participation in the Alash movement in 1922. From 1922 to 1926, he worked as a teacher, vice-editor of the periodical *Enbekshi Kazak* (Proletarian Kazak), and in the National Publishing House. He was arrested in 1928, and he was sentenced to be shot in 1930, but later the judgment was changed to ten years in concentration camp. In October 1935 he died in the infamous concentration camp in Karelia,

⁴³² See for a list of his articles, Subkhanberdina 1999.

Belomor-Baltic Canal, where tens of thousands died during the construction of the canal connecting White Sea and Arkhangelsk to Leningrad.⁴³³

Except his poems, novels, articles,⁴³⁴ he wrote school books as well, such as *Esep Kuraly, Bastauysh Mektep Okushylaryna* (Rules of Calculation, for Primary School Students), *Esep Kuraly, Bastauysh Mektepte Ekinshi Zhyl Okytylatyn* (Rules of Calculation, for Primary School Second Class Students), *Kyraghat Kitaby* (Reading Book).⁴³⁵ He was always an active member of the struggle for the survival of the Kazak people. He knew that the Kazaks had to take their place among the modernized, developed societies, and this could be achieved by education.

Khalel Ghabbasov (1888-1931) was another leading member of Alash Orda. He also started his carrier as a teacher, and then graduated with Gold Medallion from the Moscow Faculty of Physics and Mathematics. During the civil war, he was the vice-chairman of the Semipalatinsk Zemstvo⁴³⁶ and then Semei Oblast Zemstvo in the Alash government and redactor of the periodical, *Sary Arka*.⁴³⁷ In 1918 he negotiated with Stalin by telegraph as the president of Alash

⁴³³ Bisenghali., Imanbaeva 2001: 296-297.

⁴³⁴ Today, he is one of the popular writers of Kazak literature. Collections of his poems, novels, articles are being published in Kazakhstan (see for example, Dulatuly 2003.)

⁴³⁵ Bisenghali., Imanbaeva 2001: 297.

⁴³⁶ According to Nurmagambetova, he was the chairman of Semipalatinsk Zemstvo (Nurmagambetova 2003: 17).

⁴³⁷ Rustemov 2001: 93.

Orda⁴³⁸ - probably on behalf of Bokeikhanov, the actual president of Alash Orda, when he was hiding around Semipalatinsk.⁴³⁹

After 1920, he participated in the government. In 1920, he was a member of the National Department of the Revolutionary Committee, in 1921-1923 a commission member in Kazak ASSR, in 1924-1925 he sought to find solutions to socio-cultural problems, in 1926 he was called to Kazak ASSR Planning Committee. However, similar to others from his generation he was condemned as “people’s enemy” in 1930, and executed by shooting in Moscow Prison in 1931.⁴⁴⁰

Khalel Dosmukhamedov (1883-1939) graduated from the Military School in 1903. When he was a student, he wrote in local periodicals to enlighten the people on political issues. In 1905 he joined the *Kadets*. Three years later he graduated from the Faculty of Medicine, became a military doctor, and worked in different military camps until 1913. After 1913 he worked as a doctor in Ural Oblast. He published in the periodical *Kazak* generally articles on public health and diseases. He also published a book on a disease.⁴⁴¹

After the February Revolution of 1917, he was the representative Uralsk together with his brother Zhansha Dosmukhamedov in the First All-Kazak

⁴³⁸ Nurpeisov 1998a: 134.

⁴³⁹ Amanzholova 1994: 35.

⁴⁴⁰ Rustemov 2001: 93.

⁴⁴¹ Sh. Tileubaev (2001a) “Dosmukhamedov Khalel,” *Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia 3*, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 276-277.

Congress.⁴⁴² In the government he sought to organize the Alash militia and collect taxes to build a budget.⁴⁴³ In 1918, when the Alash government was divided, he and his brother ruled the Uralskaya Oblast, also called “Western Alash Orda.”⁴⁴⁴ Again in 1918, when Bokeikhanov was seeking a way to establish peaceful relations with the Bolsheviks, they were sent to Moscow to negotiate with Lenin and the People’s Commissar Stalin.⁴⁴⁵ Stalin arranged an amnesty for all arrested members of Alash Orda,⁴⁴⁶ and Lenin sent 12 million rubles to him.⁴⁴⁷ When the negotiations failed and the civil war started again, Dosmukhamedov brother continued to rule the Western Region of Alash Orda and fight against the Bolsheviks. In 1919, they stopped fighting and joined the Bolsheviks.

On March 5, 1920 he was considered as dangerous to the Kazak people and removed from the Kazak Steppes. He was first sent to Moscow, and then he operated in Tashkent, Turkestan in various departments of administration. He was a member and then chairman of the Scientific Committee established to enlighten the peoples of Turkistan and find solutions to scientific and cultural problems; doctor in the Institute of Physical Inspection, in the Institute of Pedagogy and in the University of Turkistan, Faculty of Medicine; member of the People’s Commissariat of Protection of Health; member of the Committee of National Public House of Turkestan and after 1925 chairman of the Eastern Section of

⁴⁴² Kazak, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 50-51.

⁴⁴³ Tileubaev 2001a: 276.

⁴⁴⁴ Togan 1999: 188.

⁴⁴⁵ Nurpeisov 1998a: 134.

⁴⁴⁶ Amanzholova 1994: 35.

⁴⁴⁷ Amanzholova 1994: 38.

National Public House of Kazak ASSR, and in 1926 vice-chairman of the National Public House.⁴⁴⁸

He published many books to continue his struggle to enlighten the people, such as *Tabighattanu* (Learn the Nature, 1922), *Zhanuarlar* (the Animals, 1922), *Adamyng Ten Tirligi* (Body Health of Man, 1925), *Okushylardyng Saulyghyn Saktau* (Protection of the Students' Health, 1925), *Dene Bitimi Zhane Onyng Zhumysy Turaly Engimeler* (Conversations on the Body Development and its Function). Although he was a doctor and generally interested in biological issues, he was also interested in linguistics, just like other members of Alash Orda. He worked on vowel harmony and published books like *Kazak-Kyrgyz Tilderindegi Singarmonizm Zahgy* (The Rules of Vowel Harmony n Kazak-Kyrgyz Languages, 1924), *Sherniaz Sheshen* (1925), *Alash Ne Soz* (Alash, What Kind of a Word?, 1927), *Bukaradaghy Koriltash Medresesin Calu Turaly Epsana* (Legend on the Construction of Koriltash Medrese in Bukhara, 1927), *Tille-Kary men Shirdar Medreselerin Calghyzghan Zhalantos Batyr Shezhiresi* (The Genealogy of Zhalantos Batyr, who Founded Tille-Kary and Shirdar Medreses, 1928).⁴⁴⁹

In 1927 he became the chairman of the committee to found the National University; in 1928 he was appointed as professor and prorector of the Institute of Pedagogy. At the height of his carrier, he was arrested in 1930, and he was exiled. In exile he turned back to his profession and worked as a doctor. In 1938, he was arrested again and sentenced to death, but died on tuberculosis the next year.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁸ Tileubaev 2001a: 276.

⁴⁴⁹ Tileubaev 2001a: 276.

⁴⁵⁰ Tileubaev 2001a: 276-277.

Zhansha Dosmukhamedov (1886-1932) graduated from the University of Sankt Petersburg, Faculty of Law in 1912, and worked in the court of Tomsk until the February Revolution of 1917. After the February Revolution he participated in the Alash movement and worked together with his brother Khalel. In 1920 he was also sent to Moscow, and he worked there as economist in the department of Animal Husbandry. In 1922-1925, he was a member of the *Talap* movement, which was established by the intellectuals of Central Asia for the development of civilization. He was commissioned to translate the Law of Citizenship and Homicide to Kazak. In 1932 he was executed.⁴⁵¹ His life, struggle, exile had some parallelisms with his older brother Khalel Dosmukhamedov, who seems to be a more active person than him. Nevertheless, Zhansha Dosmukhamedov was one of the victims of the first wave of executions, whereas Khalel Dosmukhamedov survived it but was executed in the second wave in 1939.

Maghzhan Zhumabaev⁴⁵² (1893-1938) was a distinguished poet. He was the only significant member of Alash Orda with a long education in *medreses* with famed Tatar teachers. In 1912, he published his first poetry, which turned him into a celebrated poet among the young Kazak and Tatar generation. He published many articles in the *Aikap* and *Kazak* periodicals, where he got acquainted with the leaders of the later Alash movement. During the time of Alash

⁴⁵¹ Sh. Tileubaev (2001b) "Dosmukhamedov Khalel," *Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia* 3, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 277.

⁴⁵² See for a picture of Zhumabaev appendix C, picture 13.

Orda he was a delegate in both All-Kazak Congresses and in the administration of Petropavl Zemstvo.⁴⁵³

In 1919 he joined the Bolsheviks. He was not a member of the administrative apparatus of the Soviet state. Actually, he was not much interested in politics; he did not take an active political role in Alash Orda as well.

He wrote in many newspapers publications, such as *Bostandyk Tuy*, *Sholpan*, *Sana* and *Ak Zhol* in 1919-1923. In 1923 he went to Moscow to study at the Institute of Higher Education for Literature and Art. He continued to write articles and publish poems in different magazines in Tashkent and Kazak ASSR. After graduating in 1927 he worked as a teacher. In 1929 he was also taken to the court. He was sentenced to ten years exile, but he was released with Gorki's assistance in 1936. When he was arrested once again in 1938, he was working on translations. He was executed in 1938.⁴⁵⁴

It is mentioned above that some insignificant members of Alash Orda took active roles in the establishment of the Kazak ASSR. Yet not only insignificant members of the movement but influential members, such as Baitursynov and Ghabbasov were also permitted to take part in the policy-making top positions of the state. On the other hand, some of the influential leaders of Alash Orda were called to Moscow, such as Bokeikhanov, Khalel and Zhansha Dosmukhamedov. Because of Bokeikhanov's high esteem among the Kazaks he was kept in

⁴⁵³ Sh. Eleukenov, S. Rustemov (2002) "Zhumabaev Maghzhn," *Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia* 4, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 66-68.

⁴⁵⁴ Eleukenov, Rustemov 2002: 66.

Moscow for a longer period, although he was employed in higher academic positions.

When another influential Kazak politician, Khodzhanov, was called to Moscow, to work in a prestigious position as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, he knew what it meant and replied: “I was not summoned to Moscow to get things done, of course, but to not get things done.”⁴⁵⁵

But still they were free to act in the field of cultural and educational affairs and continue their struggle to enlighten the Kazak people just as in the years before the civil war. This time they had a stronger support and a more efficient state apparatus, which enabled them to help the Kazak people more than before, until they lost these opportunities in 1928.

The party first removed the members of Alash Orda from political arena but rewarded them with strong positions in the educational aspect of their modernization project. The shared motives of creating a modern, well-educated society and also the consent and support of the Bolsheviks for the development of native languages opened a wide sphere for the Alash Ordists to work. Moreover, a relatively more efficient, more devoted state apparatus than the tsarist one was put into their use.

However, the Soviet system closed in itself again and excluded influential members of Alash Orda from their enlightening positions as well. The arrests of 1928 seem to have come out of a sudden, when the members of Alash Orda were

⁴⁵⁵ Koigeldi 2007: 168.

on another height of their carrier in top positions. The center was planning a great leap forward, and it was approaching the First Five Year Plan and collectivization, which was planned to be executed with very harsh measures. The discussions on the collectivization were completed; Stalin wanted to implement a rapid, determined program for collectivization, which required the eradication of all potential sources of opposition, who could turn into leaders of the rural population, which would endure the devastating effects of the new attack.

The Kazak intelligentsia was influenced once more by the outcome of the discussions in the center, and this time most of them were left only with the right to live – and just for another decade. Definitely if the course of events would run differently, the members of Alash Orda could continue to pave the way of the Kazak peoples' modernization. Despite the fact that history is not written based on speculations, it is useful here in order to seize the situation of the members of Alash Orda. At the time, when they joined the Bolsheviks the picture was generally encouraging for them, and they found time and different alternatives to help to modernize and educate the Kazak people, and it was even possible to perform them in the Kazak language also by setting the foundations of the linguistic studies on the Kazak language.

That was what they were intended to do before the revolution. The revolution had invited them to the political arena, as they were the most able cadres of the Kazak society to act as political leaders of their society. When their political role was taken into the command of the Bolsheviks, they turned back to their activities before the revolution. Unfortunately, the discussions among the Bolsheviks resulted with the worst possible outcomes for the Kazak intelligentsia.

4.3. Modernization of the Culture and Education in the Kazak ASSR

The life of the traditional Kazak society was based on cattle breeding and nomadism, which had to be transformed in order to create the foundations of a socialist society. The domination of the traditional power elites, such as the religious leaders and tribal leaders must be terminated, and the new Kazak elite was to be raised through mass education and attack on customary practices.⁴⁵⁶ The social policies and especially education was oriented towards the termination of the old - traditional - system and creation of a new - socialist - system.

Although Moscow's objects were not always shared by the local cadres, the policies on social policies and industrialization, and their priority was shared by them as well. The Bolsheviks aimed indeed the creation of nations by "affirmative action,"⁴⁵⁷ but Stalin considered the use of local initiatives on decision-making as a threat to central policies. He aimed to run the country by a determined state apparatus, which was maintained by the disciplined party cadres. He aimed to create a country working like a machine, more exactly, German war machine of the World War. Stalin considered that the USSR was obliged to cover the distance with other world powers in shortest time possible, which required policies similar to times of total mobilization. Despite the fact that social policies and industrialization was in accordance with what the Kazaks had in mind, the implementation of these policies parallel to Moscow's orientation to centralization involved pacification of local cadres.

⁴⁵⁶ Olcott 1987: 193-194.

⁴⁵⁷ Martin 2001.

Kazak society was aimed to be a new nation, with nationals different than the ones aspired by the previous generation of the Kazak nationalists but with a supranational identity of the new, socialist, modernized Soviet man (*sovietsky chelovek*). While the new generations created through education, the intelligentsias of the former generations were eliminated. The Attacks on the traditional power bases and forms of subsistence together with plans to produce the new Soviet man would radically change the Kazak society within a generation.

4.3.1. Education and Literacy Campaigns for Modernization

Especially, mass education and the campaign against illiteracy had an indispensable place in the restructuring the society.⁴⁵⁸ Stalin presented at the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee in June 1923, what they had to do in order to “raise the cultural level of the local population” as follows:

It is necessary, for example:

- a) to organize clubs (non-Party) and other educational institutions to be conducted in the local languages;
- b) to enlarge a network of educational institutions of all grades to be conducted in the local languages;
- c) to draw into school work the more or less loyal school-teachers of local origin;
- d) to create a network of societies for the dissemination of literacy in the local languages;
- e) to organize publishing activities.⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁸ See for propaganda posters on illiteracy appendix B, picture 5, 6, 10.

⁴⁵⁹ Josef V. Stalin (1953b) “Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) with Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions, June 9-12, 1923,” *Works, Volume 5*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow: 304.

In order to carry those activities they necessitated educated, local collaborators. The members of Alash Orda were not building the only well-educated group of Kazak intellectuals, there were also others, who had never joined the Alash Orda but acted with the Bolsheviks, such as Ryskulov, Seifullin, Asfendiarov, S. Ghabbasov, Zhangeldin etc. Nevertheless, the attempt to educate the masses was in need of every single person, who was able to fulfill the requirements of the task. And on the side of the members of Alash Orda Bolsheviks' object to educate the masses was in utmost harmony with their zeal of educating the masses and the use of the Kazak language. Stalin's emphasis on the use of local languages cannot be left unnoticed.

Geoffrey Wheeler, in a distinguished book of its time, makes the following argument on the necessity of education and its link to indoctrination:

(...) the institution of a widespread system of education and propaganda designated to condition the people of the new regime and insulate them from all outside influences. ... it was incomparably the most important of the three dealing with the Muslim masses of Central Asia, where it was not a question of re-education, as it was in western Russia, but of the introduction where virtually none had existed before. There can be no doubt that the effect of education on a previously illiterate population was profound: it occupied their brains in a way that they had never been occupied before.⁴⁶⁰

Education was (and still is) a tool of indoctrination, which could change the traditional inward looking society and open the young generation to the influence of the state. The education had long-term advantages for the Bolsheviks,

⁴⁶⁰ Geoffrey Wheeler (1964), *The Modern History on Soviet Central Asia*, Greenwood Press, Westport: 139.

in so far as the educated new generation would become more open to agitation through newspapers and pamphlets, and the party cadres could establish a direct contact with them. This would, in turn, reduce the role of the intermediaries. Furthermore, schooling children at an early age would break their parents' control on them and diminish the power of the transferred traditional, cultural codes.⁴⁶¹

However, this is true for every modern state, which applies popular education as a vehicle to shape the society and create citizens sharing the same norms and values in accordance with the presence of the state. It is also true that the pace of development necessitated a more skilled labor force, as it was the case in other modernization projects.

The Bolsheviks were not the only example attempting to use the education to change the society on the international level, but also on the "national" level. This great leap to modernization was also supported by the nationalist Kazak intellectuals, who considered the end of illiteracy as one of the main tenets in bringing the Kazak backwardness to an end. In order to implement the campaign against illiteracy, the Soviet authorities necessitated educated Kazak cadres, which opened a new channel for the Kazak intellectuals to help their fellow countrymen, while the political channels were becoming less accessible.

Despite the fact that Stalin's stress on local languages is inseparable from the need of indoctrinating the masses with the most appropriate tools, such as the local languages, it is also true that it opened the members of Alash Orda unprecedented opportunities for studying and educating in Kazak.

⁴⁶¹ Olcott 1987: 193-194.

In July 1922, the Kazak government initiated a mobilization against the illiteracy. All literate Kazaks were invited to join the campaign to eradicate the illiteracy. New schools were opened and *medreses* were reopened, but when the Soviet authorities saw that some *medreses* were used for anti-Bolshevik propaganda, they were closed again.⁴⁶²

Because most of the Kazak population was nomadic, Kazak government established *Red Caravans* in 1922. Each district was supposed to send its *Red Caravan* to educate the Kazaks in the *auls* and give lectures on communism. Right after *Red Caravans*, *Red Yurts* were introduced to *auls* to fight against the female illiteracy and help the emancipation of women.⁴⁶³ *Red Yurts* were sometimes migrating together with the *auls*, and they were giving assistance to all *aul* members with specialists, distributing medicine for Kazaks and their animals, and educating them on agricultural issues, but their number was not sufficient to give the adequate assistance to wide and dispersed population of the Kazaks.⁴⁶⁴

By the end of 1920s, despite the ambitious campaigns against illiteracy, only less than 10 percent of *aul* schools had adequate buildings and materials,⁴⁶⁵ and as a result of insufficient sources, in 1929, the adult literacy was estimated between 9 to 37 percent,⁴⁶⁶ and only less than one third of all school children were

⁴⁶² Olcott 1987: 171.

⁴⁶³ See for propaganda posters to eradicate women illiteracy appendix B, 6, 7, 8 and emancipation of women with socialism appendix B, 9.

⁴⁶⁴ Olcott 1987: 171.

⁴⁶⁵ Olcott 1987: 171.

⁴⁶⁶ Olcott states on another page that “less than 10 percent of the Kazakh population was literate by the end of the decade [1920s] (Olcott 1987: 171).

enrolled to state schools. That was the picture of the literacy before the collectivization.

In July 1929, the collectivization policy was accompanied by a literacy campaign. However, because of the horrible situation created by the collectivization, only 80 percent of the budget set for the campaign could be used.

The illiteracy campaign was also affected by the purges very negatively. Olcott makes the following statement:

How many of those arrested in the 1930s were teachers, is impossible to know, but it was admitted at the time that the educational system of Kazakhstan was in complete disarray by early 1934. Few teachers were left in the countryside, most rural school buildings had been torn down to use as fuel.⁴⁶⁷

The campaigns, however, were carried on, and in 1934 over 13.000 new teachers were enrolled for the campaign. In 1934, the Kazak State University was opened, and in 1938, the Academy of Sciences. In 1936, another 12.000 new teachers and literacy volunteers were sent to eradicate the illiteracy. By that time, nearly 75 percent of all Kazak women were illiterate, and they were the main target of this campaign. As a result of this campaign, in 1940-1941, 98 percent of all children between 8-11 years were attending the state schools, and by the end of 1939, 76,3 percent of all men and 66,3 percent of all women were literate.⁴⁶⁸ After the Second World War, the percentage of schooling and literacy continued to increase reaching to 100 percent.

⁴⁶⁷ Olcott 1987: 194.

⁴⁶⁸ Olcott 1987: 195-196.

4.3.2. Attack against the Customary Practices

After the incorporation of the Alash Orda government, the Bolsheviks sought to consolidate the state authority by abolishing customs outside the state's control. In December 1920, Kazak ASSR accepted a resolution to punish blood revenge (*kun*). In Kazak customs it was accepted to take the revenge of a relative from the family of the offender, which was not acceptable by the state, and this problem was obliged to be resolved under the authority of laws.⁴⁶⁹

The payment for brides by the groom to the family of the bride (*kalym*) was also banned in the Kazak ASSR.⁴⁷⁰ That was one of the goals of Alash Orda as well.⁴⁷¹ The members of Alash Orda put great value on the emancipation of women as part of their modernization project, and bride price was a significant sign of inequality between men-women reducing women to properties, which were to be purchased for a marriage.

The imposition of the Russian rules to the Kazak Steppes had indeed a longer past parallel to the incorporation of the Kazak land to the Russian Tsardom. The attack against the custom of *barïmta* is a useful example of the past and gradual incorporation of Kazak life to the Russian authority, which was fully achieved only at the time of the USSR.

Barïmta was defined as robbery and plunder since the Russian Tsardom's Regulations of 1822. But the Russian authority was not strong enough to put an

⁴⁶⁹ Olcott 1987: 171.

⁴⁷⁰ Olcott 1987: 171.

⁴⁷¹ Nurpeisov 1998a: 129-130.

end to it and solve it within the structure of the courts of the state. For the Kazaks it remained to be an integral part of the Kazak way of life and justice system.

According to the nomads, *Barimta* was a legitimate right of taking a nomad's livestock by another nomad; it was sometimes realized with force and generally with the participation of the members of a whole community. The livestock was kept till the offended community would come with a fair proposal. It occurred in cases, when the attacked had a debt to the offender, or in cases of blood feud, and *barimta* was even considered as a heroic act. Nevertheless, the murder in blood feuds and in raids was not acceptable for the Russian authorities, and it had to be abolished to install the state authority as the only legitimate means of justice.⁴⁷²

In 1865, a commission was sent to the steppes to report the situation. The report concluded the following:

While it was not yet feasible to impose imperial judicial reforms on the nomads because they were not sufficiently developed to comprehend Russian law, eventually Russian law would supplant customary law there. If only the nomads could see the benefits of Russian justice, they would learn to live by it.⁴⁷³

According to the law of 1868, the rights of the Kazaks were defined more precisely, and their structures were sought to be incorporated into the Russian system. Most civil and criminal cases, except murder, treason and *barimta* could

⁴⁷² Virginia Martin (1997), "Barimta: Nomadic Custom, Imperial Crime," *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and People: 1700-1917*, in (eds.) Brower, D. R. and Lazzerini, E. J. , Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 249-269.

⁴⁷³ Martin 1997: 255.

be handled by a people's court (*narodny sud*) according to customary law. It was headed by a *biy* elected by the committee member for a three-year term.⁴⁷⁴

In 1891, a new statute improved the rights of the Russian authorities in favor of peasants and against the nomads. A newly established institution, peasant land captain (*zemsii nachal'nik*), gained more rights of control, and also the state was favoring the new coming colonizers of the steppes. The police control over nomads increased, and their migration was put under pressure.⁴⁷⁵

With this new statute, the Kazaks acquired a special status as *inorodtsy*⁴⁷⁶ and obtained the right of local self-administration. Russia's aim was to "civilize" the nomadic Kazaks by making them a part of their administration and driving them to sedentarization. For that reason, they were using the Kazan Tatars, since the end of the 18th century. The Tatar merchants were building commercial relations with the Kazaks, Tatar mullahs were executing missionary activities among the Kazaks, who were under the strong influence of animistic beliefs, to strengthen Islam, and Tatar educators were transmitting western influences, the ideas about modernization and nationalism.⁴⁷⁷

The incorporation of the Kazak Steppes to the Soviets accelerated the process in the Steppes. The Soviet apparatus declared various resolutions in order

⁴⁷⁴ Martin 1997: 256.

⁴⁷⁵ Martin 1997: 256-257.

⁴⁷⁶ *Inorodtsy*: means "of foreign origin. In 1822, Russia created a special status for non-sedentary ethnic groups in Siberia and gave them the permission them to take part in a local self-administration. That was not a full citizenship (*prirodnye*), and later it was used to differentiate other ethnic groups in Asiatic part of Russia and Jews. In the second half of the 19th century, it became a pejorative term for non-Russians (Andreas Kappeler (2001) *The Russian Empire: A Multi-Ethnic History*, Longman, Harlow: 409-410).

⁴⁷⁷ Kappeler 2001: 188-189.

to discredit the traditional forms of justice and customs and integrate the traditional Kazak society to their project of creating a modern Kazak society.

By the end of 1923, marriage of minors, levirate and sorority, marriage contract of any type without state approval were banned. Those bans, however, were expected to be enacted by the local authorities, who were generally in favor of the local of the customs, which made the regulations inapplicable.⁴⁷⁸

As long as the authority of the traditional power groups in the Kazak *auls* would keep its position, it was impossible for the Soviet authorities to enact the regulations. It would take some more time until the educated, new generation would challenge the authority of the old. There was another alternative to this evolutionary model that the authority of the traditional power-holders could be torn down by a kind of revolution in the *aul*, similar to the grim attack of collectivization.

4.4. Industrialization under NEP and the Response of Kazak Politicians to Centralized Soviet Industrialization

During the civil war the Bolsheviks applied harsh methods in order to use every source in their disposal for the mobilization and to increase their strength against the Whites, Allies and the Germans. They started in mid-1918, the use of extreme measures in rural areas for the confiscation of crops and livestock to meet

⁴⁷⁸ Olcott 1987: 171.

the needs of the growing Red Army, and in November 1920 all factories and private businesses were nationalized to deal with the shortages.⁴⁷⁹

The war communism, however, resulted in acute shortages in 1920 and a devastating famine in 1921.⁴⁸⁰ During the war communism most of the harvested grain was taken by the state in rural areas. The peasants saw no reason to grow more than they need, which led them to reduce the food they grew. This reduction caused first shortages, then a terrible famine in 1921.⁴⁸¹

After the civil war and war communism in March 1921, a New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced, when Lenin had realized that it was time for a more liberal economic model with some place for the market in order to ease the pressure on the peasants. The shortages caused by the pathetic motivations for the peasants and the famine could not be solved without encouraging them to grow more and to sell the excess product in the market. NEP also legalized the establishment of small and medium size firms and factories, from which some entrepreneurs benefited, but in general the success in industry was limited. It was the agricultural production and some intermediately tradesmen (*Nepmen*), how had profited from NEP. The limited success in industry and the growth in agriculture caused to a crisis termed as “scissors crisis” by Trotsky in 1923.⁴⁸²

⁴⁷⁹ Evans, David & Jenkins, Jane (2001), *Years of Russia and the USSR, 1851-1991*, Hodder & Stoughton, London: 237-238.

⁴⁸⁰ See for a map of areas affected by the famine appendix A, map 7; and for a propaganda poster calling for the allied work of the peasants and workers to beat the hunger and to repair the war-torn country appendix B, picture 3.

⁴⁸¹ Evans & Jenkins 2001: 239.

⁴⁸² Evans & Jenkins 2001: 245-247.

The term “scissor” was taken from the graph; the line of the rise of industrial prices and line of the decline of agricultural prices was crosscutting each other resembling a scissor. Because of the disproportionate change in their prices, the “blades” of the “scissor” were widening. The peasants, who had to sell more in order to buy the industrial products with increasing prices could give up producing more than their immediate needs. Thus, industry should keep pace with the agriculture, which was claimed to be solved by leaving the NEP and forming a planned economy as it was argued by a group called “Platform of 46” including Trotsky. Later, in 1928, NEP was replaced by Planned Economy under Trotsky’s rival, Stalin,⁴⁸³ after defeating Trotsky and becoming the unchallenged leader of the party.⁴⁸⁴ The discussions on economy and on the industrialization affected the modernization process and the debate on the dependency on Moscow’s policies as well. The introduction of Planned Economy was implemented parallel to centralization and also collectivization.⁴⁸⁵

Here, in this section, the debate on the industrialization of the USSR and its reflection in the Kazak ASSR will be summarized underlining the centralization attempt and the road to collectivization.

Kazakhstan was a poor country in terms of industrialization, but it was a rich country in mines, which was strengthened during the creation of borders; the borders of Kazakhstan were expanded to include mines in order to create some

⁴⁸³ See for a propaganda poster for the shift from NEP to Planned Economy appendix B, picture 15, 16.

⁴⁸⁴ Evans & Jenkins 2001: 247.

⁴⁸⁵ NEP is also addressed in section 5.4. in explaining the turn to collectivization.

basis for its sustainability. A lead plant was established in Chimkent; there were copper mines in Balkash and Zhezkazgou, zinc and titanium mines in Ust-Kamenogorsk, coal mines in Karaganda, chemical industry in Chimkent and Aktyubinsk, oil production in the northern Caspian Sea, and sugar plant in Taldykurgan and Taraz.⁴⁸⁶

However, during the period of NEP, its achievements remained less than satisfactory to create the basis of industrialization and pave the way for communism. The USSR was in need of an accelerated program to depart from the backwardness taken from tsarism and catch up with the developed world. That was not only an indispensable element of the communist utopia by strengthening the proletariat, but it was also essential for the survival of the USSR. In 1927, Britain suspended the diplomatic relations with the USSR, and their diplomatic relations with their neighbors, like Poland and China, were not promising,⁴⁸⁷ which supported the discourse on “socialism in one country”; and a great leap forward was required for the “survival of the only socialist country in the world,” who had to build a sustainable economy by relying only on its own sources to stand against the increasing “hostility of the imperialist world.”

Between 1925 and 1928, in the last years of NEP, two rival groups were confronted on the issue of industrialization. The right-wing was led by Bukharin and the left-wing by Trotsky. Stalin allied first with Bukharin against his stronger rival Trotsky to liquidate him; then he liquidated Bukharin. By using the

⁴⁸⁶ Michael Fergus & Janar Jandasova (2003) *Kazakhstan: Coming of Age*, Stacey International, London: 135.

⁴⁸⁷ Chubarov 2001: 95.

discussion between two rival groups, he eliminated them both and consolidated his power in the party.⁴⁸⁸

Industrialization was an inevitable attempt accepted by the two factions in the party. They differed only in the methods and means of financing the industrialization process. The left was for a rapid industrialization “by increasing the tax burden on the peasantry and channeling the bulk of resources into state-owned industries,”⁴⁸⁹ which was expected to create the necessary capital for the investment for industrialization, and the tax pressure on the peasants would force them to move to the factories for better life standards creating the necessary manpower for the industry. According to them, the problem of “initial capital accumulation” for the investments of the state should be solved to the disadvantage of the peasantry.⁴⁹⁰

The right wing, on the other hand, supported a slow and evolutionary model following the basic features of NEP. Bukharin supported a kind of mixed economy with state sector on the “commanding heights” and the private sector with small-scale industry, handicraft and peasants.⁴⁹¹ He was for the continuation of the worker-peasant alliance put forward by Lenin in his pamphlet of *April Thesis*, in 1917, to make the revolution in a society, in which the wide majority of the population was the peasantry. That was still the case in the USSR, and

⁴⁸⁸ Chubarov 2001: 95.

⁴⁸⁹ Chubarov 2001: 96.

⁴⁹⁰ See for more information, Evgenii Alekseevich Preobrazhenskii (1965) *The New Economics*, Clarendon Press Oxford.

⁴⁹¹ Chubarov 2001: 95.

Bukharin's proposal was for the continuation of the alliance for stability and peaceful transition.⁴⁹²

In 1925-26, Stalin was an enthusiastic supporter of Bukharin's thesis against other powerful party members, Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, but as soon as they were defeated, he changed his position, turned against Bukharin by supporting the adoption of a radical transition to industrialization.⁴⁹³

In 1928, NEP left its place to the 'great turn'; it was now the time of rapid industrialization⁴⁹⁴ and collectivization in agriculture⁴⁹⁵ under central planning directed by Moscow, and thus the First Five-Year Plan was introduced.⁴⁹⁶ According to official records the gross output of industry in Kazakhstan increased from 51 million rubles in 1913 to 982 million rubles in 1937.⁴⁹⁷

One of the main projects of the industrialization and modernization for Kazakhstan in that period was the construction of a railroad connecting Siberia and Russian proper to Central Asia crossing through - and therefore also connecting -

⁴⁹² See for more information, Nikolai Bukharin (1979) *The Politics and Economics of the Transition Period*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

⁴⁹³ Chubarov 2001: 96.

⁴⁹⁴ See for a poster showing the golden age in the future by building socialism through industrialization, appendix B, picture 13.

⁴⁹⁵ See for a propaganda poster of peasants marching like an army of production appendix B, picture 14 in order to increase the agricultural production before the collectivization.

⁴⁹⁶ Christopher Read (2001), *The Making and Breaking of the Soviet System*, Palgrave, Hampshire: 67.

⁴⁹⁷ Coates 1951: 109.

Kazakstan to the rest of the USSR. The plan was announced in January 1927.⁴⁹⁸

Matthew J. Payne states that:

To firm believers in the party's modernization program for 'backward' regions of the old Empire, Turksib promised a destruction of the old way of life. These men already thought in terms of cultural revolutions and great leaps forward, of the railroad not as a conveyance of wheat or cotton, but as a bearer of modernity. They moved quickly to shape Turksib's impact on regional development by attempting to influence its hiring policy, routing, and contracts.⁴⁹⁹

Like every project of industrialization, the project of Turksib, which was actually a plan for increasing the regional specialization and efficiency by deporting Siberian grain to Central Asia and Central Asian cotton to Russia, was understood by the local leaders as another opportunity to move the people to modernization. It was enthusiastically accepted as a tool of getting a big source of income from the centre for investment and turning the rural Kazak population to laborers. This was expected to create the "genesis of urban proletariat," a "stable industrial base," "quickening of cultural life" and "wider access to the outside world."⁵⁰⁰

In 1926, the total number of workers in large-scale industry was only 18.200, in transport 20.600, and 4.800 in construction within a population of 6.500.000. In 1927, there were 7.210 workers in the Union-wide industries, and only ca. 3.000 were Kazaks, who had a population of more than 3.500.000. It was

⁴⁹⁸ Payne 2001: 11.

⁴⁹⁹ Payne 2001: 12.

⁵⁰⁰ Payne 2001: 12.

impossible to continue on the way to communism with such a small population of proletariat, and “they did not even deserve” to become a Soviet nation.⁵⁰¹

The Kazak authorities were in need of every tool for industrialization and production of a proletariat out of the Kazak nomads. Payne underlines that local leaders were neither away from the administrative positions, like it was under tsarism, nor they were disinterested.⁵⁰² They were not just passive objects of the central plans, but they were also challenging it.

Sadvakasov, who was a significant member of the opposition as the member of the Kazkraikom Bureau of the party, People’s Commissar of Education and editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Engbekshi Kazak* (Proletarian Kazak), was also one of the outstanding critics of the party line.⁵⁰³ He criticized Moscow’s policies and claimed that the aim was keeping Kazakhstan and Central Asia just as suppliers of raw materials. That was in continuity with the tsarist policies, but Soviet policies had to rely on economic expediency.⁵⁰⁴ He assessed the party line as follows:

(...) industry should be situated as close as possible to the sources of raw materials... setting up industry in a region requires not only raw materials, but working hands and fuel. The answer to that is the millions of poor in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and the billions in reserves of coal and oil in Kazakhstan.⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰¹ Payne 2001: 10.

⁵⁰² Payne 2001: 12.

⁵⁰³ His ideas were mentioned above briefly in the third chapter in the section, “The Consequences of Changing Soviet Policies to Kazak Political Sphere”.

⁵⁰⁴ Koigeldi 2007: 170.

⁵⁰⁵ Koigeldi 2007: 171.

He was right in demanding to build factories in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, which would accelerate the industrialization in Kazakhstan, growth of the proletariat and that would also create a more dynamic and efficient economy. The Central Committee, on the other hand, was not just aiming the creation of an industrialized country; they also wanted to create a centralized country working like a machine. The oppositional figures, such as Sadvakasov, who were acting as the spokesmen of the society they were representing, were considered as threats to the system, which necessitated simple implementers of central policies. The elimination of the dissidents and their replacement with more trusted, less pushing cadres had become a significant part of the operations.

In addition to the fact that the industrialization process was limited only to some domains of labor, the number of the Kazak workers was still very low. The creation of the Kazak proletariat was in accordance with Moscow's policy of "nativization", but the centre proved to be uninterested in employing Kazak workers. In October 1928, the number of Kazak workers was 3.895, whereas the Russian workers numbered as 27.519.⁵⁰⁶ The lobbying efforts of the Kazak leaders, especially Ryskulov with his ambitious activity, were not successful in recruiting the Kazaks, despite the success of his arguments in obtaining a generous system for the preference of the natives based on "cost on transportation and insurance of the workers from the European part" and that "the natives were heartier and more acclimated to the endemic diseases, brutal climate, and poor housing in the region." Although he achieved to convince the centre to employ

⁵⁰⁶ Payne 2001: 28.

more Kazaks, it could not be accomplished, because of the fact that the rates of unemployment were very high, and the unemployed workers registered for jobs were predominantly Russian workers. Recruitment of local workers for the construction of Turksib meant employment of nearly 30.000 unemployed Russian trade union members, who had a priority for new jobs.⁵⁰⁷

Most Kazaks preferred still a nomadic way of life, and they were not in need of industrial jobs. There was a long time to see the effect of the “scissors,” which would decrease the benefits of the land and force the nomads and farmers to become industrial workers, or the traditional way of life had to be crashed swiftly and by force, as it was the case in the great leap forward to collectivization. In the next chapter the collectivization and the destruction of the traditional Kazak way of life will be discussed as the “final solution” to the land question.

⁵⁰⁷ Payne 2001: 28-30.

CHAPTER 5

5. Land Question in the Steppes and the Final Solution: Collectivization

Most issues mentioned in the sections above, such as the liquidation of the Alash Orda members from their strong positions, removal of other influential Kazak leaders from their positions, the authority of the traditional leaders with some traditional institutions resisting Soviet modernization implemented together with the centralization process, were finally brought to an end during the collectivization.

The members of Alash Orda were sharing the aim of sedentarization of the Kazak society. They were also supporting some kind of collective farms, which was also mentioned in their party program. The tenth article of their program, which was about the land question states that “relatives should use the land together without dividing it to families,”⁵⁰⁸ because of the fact that the Kazaks were living in bigger lineage groups than families. They were using the pasture lands as members of tribal groups, and they could continue to do so in farming the agricultural land as well. This would also facilitate to adjust to a new mode of subsistence. Nevertheless, the ruthless methods the Soviet state apparatus applied had nothing to do with Alash Ordists’ or most of other Kazaks’ ambitions.

⁵⁰⁸ *Kazak*, 21 November 1917; Martynenko 1992: 90.

The land question was one the main problems of many agrarian societies. The increase in population and relative decrease of land to be cultivated by each household was inevitable, which caused problems within the rural society. In the case of the Kazak Steppes, the nomads were in need of wide areas to use as winter and summer pastures. Because they were not stable on a certain territory for the whole year, the fertile soil of their winter pastures was exposed to be occupied by the Russian settlers. Moreover, the use of the land by the Russian settlers on agricultural purposes seemed to be a more effective way of using the land. The confiscation of the Kazak land by the Russian state to be distributed to the Russian peasantry, consequently, turned into a serious problem for the Kazak intelligentsia.⁵⁰⁹

5.1 The Arrival of the Russian Settlers and the Rise of the Land Question

The flow of Russian peasants to the Kazak Steppes en masse started in 1860s as an outcome of the emancipation of the slaves in 1861. The law of emancipation created a big population of peasants, who were in need of agricultural land to settle and farm. Additionally, the Russian population was also increasing, which was steadily increasing the peasants in need of land to be cultivated. Russia tried to solve the appetite of the Russian peasantry for land by opening the non-cultivated land to agriculture. The waste pasture lands of the nomadic Kazaks were being taken by the state in favor of the Russian peasantry.

⁵⁰⁹ The land question and the migration of the Russian peasantry was one of the most critical problems in Turkistan as well. Most confrontations between the Russians and natives or between the central government and the natives were centered on the issue of returning the confiscated land back to the original users of land and the prevention of further Russian immigration (see for example Kara 2002: 107-108).

The Russian state considered only permanently settled and cultivated plots of land as part of property,⁵¹⁰ but the nomads were not using constantly the same land to feed the animals, and in 1860s, when the land policies were introduced, only 10 percent of the Kazaks were engaged in agriculture.⁵¹¹

In 1891 a Steppe Statute was introduced which aimed to expand the land under Russian settlers' control. Article 120 of the statute demanded that all excess land was to be taken by Public Land Found to be distributed to the new settlers. It was projected that Kazaks needed only 15 *desiatins* (ca. 40 acres) land per man⁵¹² for the sedentary families and 15 *desiatins* per person for the nomadic families;⁵¹³ the land over 15 *desiatins* should be presented to the found.⁵¹⁴

Russian statistician, who set the norms for the plots of land, visited the Steppes and observed that the Kazak nomads were leaving the nomadic way of life as a result of the new measures.⁵¹⁵ He stated that:

(...) strips of plowland, corn fields, and large areas sown to grain already form inviolable borders on the Steppe before which the nomad stock-breeder must halt with his herds, a boundary not to be crossed, a historically necessary symbol of change from one form of economy to another....Replacing the nomad with his eternally wandering herds there has arisen here a half-settled form of life, and occupation with the land.

⁵¹⁰ Olcott 1987: 89.

⁵¹¹ Olcott 1987: 84.

⁵¹² Olcott refers to it as 15 *desiatins* per household and indifferent of sedentary or nomadic.

⁵¹³ Gulnar Kendirbaeva (1999) "We are the Children of Alash," *Central Asian Survey*, 18(1), 7; originally from Baitursynov, Alikhan. (1914) "Kazak khem zher meselesi," *Kazak*, No 54.

⁵¹⁴ Olcott 1987: 87.

⁵¹⁵ Peter Rottier (2003) "The Kazakness of Sedentarization: Promoting Progress as Tradition in Response to the Land Problem," *Central Asian Survey*, 22 (1), 70.

And where the plow has cut into the bosom of the earth pastoralism has already started to break up and an agricultural way of life has begun.⁵¹⁶

The difficulties created by the cultivation of land were limiting the Kazak pasture lands. The settlements and fields were both cutting the way of the nomads, and they were built near sources of water. So, the nomads were squeezed to smaller areas.⁵¹⁷ Indeed there is no excess land in a nomadic economy. They need wide pasture lands, because the animals do not eat all the grass they find on a certain territory, but move from one spot to the other. Large areas are the only way for the survival of the animals in years of jut and drought.⁵¹⁸ Moreover, excess use of the same land over the years, which was a new pattern for the nomads depleted the soil, and accelerated the nomads' deprivation.⁵¹⁹

A Russian surveyor, A. A. Kaufman, sent to the steppes for inspection stated that a nomadic economy required 145 *desiatins* per household for its maintenance.⁵²⁰ This led to the impoverishment of the Kazaks. The terrible situation of the Kazaks and the danger of it was also reported by Pahlen, who warned the Russian officials that "Their [resettlement officials] effect upon the local population was so disturbing that the friendly relations that had hitherto existed between the Russians and the natives were brought to an end," and he

⁵¹⁶ Rottier 2003: 70.

⁵¹⁷ Olcott 1987: 92.

⁵¹⁸ Olcott 1987: 90.

⁵¹⁹ Olcott 1987: 92.

⁵²⁰ Rottier 2003: 71.

argued that confiscation of more excess land would invite resistance from the Kazaks.⁵²¹

The Russian authorities, on the other hand, were not interested in the needs of the nomads. They considered the transition from nomadic to agricultural economy as a rational move for the benefit of all Russia and also for the benefit of the Kazaks in the long term.⁵²² Stolypin argued “that the needs of one group, such as the Kazakhs, could not become before the interests of the empire as a whole... The greatest good for the most people would be achieved if the steppe region were to become a net exporter of grain.”⁵²³

5.2. The Reaction of the Kazak Intelligentsia to the Land Question

Although the settlement of the Russians and the loss of the Kazaks of their pasture lands were not considered by the officials as an issue to be dealt with, it built a serious problem for the Kazaks. In the first decades of the 20th century, the new generation of the Kazak intellectuals added this issue to their agenda. They sought to stop the immigration of the Russian peasants and return the confiscated but undistributed plots of land back to the Kazaks.⁵²⁴

The writers of the both influential periodicals of the period, *Aikap* (1911-1916) and *Kazak* (1913-1918), gave the land question a special place in their

⁵²¹ Rottier 2003: 71.

⁵²² Olcott 1987: 91.

⁵²³ Olcott 1987: 89.

⁵²⁴ Nurpeisov 1998a: 129.

articles, and they all considered the sedentarization as the necessary step to be taken for the survival of the Kazaks.⁵²⁵

The periodical *Kazak* announced that “[t]hese days there are many problems facing the Kazaks, but the most important one is the land problem.”⁵²⁶

Bokeikhanov had earlier participated in Shcherbin’s expedition, and he knew the situation in detail. He wrote in an article with statistical data that the land of the Kazaks between 1893 and 1913 had decreased, while their population had further increased, because every year more land was taken from the Kazaks to be presented to Russian *muzhiks*.⁵²⁷

Baitursynov complained in another article on the policy of the resettlement officials as follows:

Last summer they appeared, surveyed the land, dug furrows, and completely prepared the land for resettlement. These 5000 desiatins included a thirteen home winter camp as well as Kazak summer pastures. Did this work benefit the Kazaks? Of course not! This land was stolen for the muzhiks. The Kazak land was stolen and we believe stolen improperly.⁵²⁸

Although the Russian politicians and officials were claiming that the confiscation of land was not harming the Kazaks, people, like Bokeikhanov and Baitursynov were aware of the dire situation and they were trying to make the voice of their people heard.

⁵²⁵ Rottier 2003: 71; Kendirbaeva 1999: 8.

⁵²⁶ Rottier 2003: 73.

⁵²⁷ Rottier 2003: 73.

⁵²⁸ Rottier 2003: 74.

Dulatov was also interested in this problem, and it became one of the main issues in his articles and poems. In 1907 an article he published in the newspaper *Serke* triggered the officials to close down the newspaper. His poem *Oyan Kazak* (Awake Kazak) also reminds the loss of land in the opening verses.

Open your eyes, awaken, the Kazak, hold up your head,
Do not spend your life in vain!
Land is lost; religion and life are deteriorating,
My Kazakh, now it does not become you to lie as before!⁵²⁹

In another poem in the collection of *Oyan Kazak* he dealt with this issue in more detail, as if he was summarizing the development of the situation for us:

...
In the year 1867 they took our land as well.
From year to year our pastures and water resources shrink,
The muzhiks come out to settle.
...
All the Kazaks are being chased out,
As the Farmers come to settle.
They set out to survey the land,
And with this purpose take our good land.
...
Since the arrival of the Russians all the good land is diminishing,
The only souls remaining are farmers.
To us all that remains is bitter water and the desert steppe,
Plant crops, do not abandon the good land.
Take a look from the mountains and stones,
The rich possess barns for their horses.
Now the muzhiks come like great clouds,
They fill the Kazak land.
The time now is too short to quarrel (among ourselves),
I beg you all to pay attention.
At 15 desiatins a household,
If we give this land away, how will we remain?⁵³⁰

⁵²⁹ Rottier 2003: 74.

⁵³⁰ Rottier 2003: 76.

After the arrival of the Russians in 1867 the Kazak plots of land were taken from them, and they were pushed away from their land by the farmers. The farmers take the fertile parts of the earth and living the poor places to the Kazaks. He calls the Kazaks to stop quarrelling and to act to stop the deprivation of the Kazak people. The life of the Kazaks was bound to the earth; if they would loose the land, they could cease to exist.

For most intellectuals, at least for the writers of the rival *Kazak* and *Aikap* newspapers, the solution was not the conservation of the nomadic way of life. They understood the history as a linear process of development, in which nomadism was the previous stage to be surpassed by the next step, sedentarization. The resistance to this natural development would be in vain, and to the disadvantage of the Kazak people, because it will lead them to a miserable position in confronting the sedentary Russians.⁵³¹

The authors of *Kazak* were asking “our people do not plant crops, we cannot even produce food, how can the Kazak continue to exist?”⁵³² And the editor of *Aikap*, Mukhamedzhan Seralin was stating that:

We are convinced that the building of settlements and cities, accompanied by a transition to agriculture based on the acceptance of land by Kazakhs according to the norms of Russian muzhiks, will be more useful than the opposite solution. The consolidation of the Kazakh people on a unified territory will help preserve them as a nation. Otherwise the nomadic auyls will be scattered and before long lose their fertile land.⁵³³

⁵³¹ Rottier 2003; Kendirbaeva 1999.

⁵³² Rottier 2003: 75.

⁵³³ As quoted and translated in in Kendirbaeva 1999: 8; Rottier 2003: 77; originally in S. Z. Zimanov and K. Z. Idrisov (1989) *Obshchestvenno-politicheskie vzgliady Mukhamedzhana Seralina*, Alma-Ata.

The disagreement of these two groups was on the method of sedentarization. The group around *Kazak* supported a sedentarization with intensive livestock breeding. They argued that the Steppes were not well suited for agriculture.⁵³⁴ The authors of *Aikap*, on the other hand, were insisting on giving up the livestock breeding and concentrate on agriculture in order to modernize in shortest time possible.⁵³⁵ The authors of *Kazak* were also arguing that livestock breeding requires twice as much land than agriculture, which would increase the land owned by the Kazaks - and territory of the fatherland protected from the Russian settlers.⁵³⁶ Both considered the modernization as the only solution and sedentarization was part of it, and the need for it had become a vital issue with the arrival of the Russian settlers.

Both modernization and nationalism were related to the land question. The problems created by the arrival of the Russians and the threat of extinction for the widely nomadic Kazak population forced the Kazak intelligentsia to look for a way out. Modernization of the Kazak society seemed to be the only solution to them, and they realized that in a modern world they had to exist as a nation. Nationalism was not only a requirement for participating in the modern world of peoples, that is nations, but it also meant dedication of an individual to his/her people. These facts required enlightenment of the people with every means available.

⁵³⁴ Rottier 2003: 78-79.

⁵³⁵ Rottier 2003: 78.

⁵³⁶ Rottier 2003: 79.

The passage from the second issue of the *Kazak* newspaper written by Bokeikhanov reflects, how the arrival of Russians triggered the need to become a strong, that is a modern and self-conscious, people.

Now we see the tremendous wave of colonizers in the Kazakh steppes. What will be the fate of our nation in the future? Judging from the historical course of events, it is not difficult to guess that the new elements arising here will prove themselves culturally the stronger compared with the local population. As time goes by, the latter will be devoured by the former. On the other hand, if both prove to have culture on the same level, then they will be able to develop independently, and they will exist in their own right, preserving their own national fate.⁵³⁷

This passage gives clues on their understanding of nationalism as well. For them it was a tool to protect their people from extinction. They neither wanted to be perished nor assimilate the foreigners, but thinking that they should be equal benefiting by the existence of the other. Their nationalism was neither xenophobic nor aiming to send Russian settlers away from Kazakhstan; they rather wanted to live peacefully side by side. They only yearned for the survival and the development of the Kazak people.

5.3. The Uprising of 1916

When the Kazak intelligentsia was publishing their articles in their newspapers and trying to spread their ideas to the wider population, in 1916, a violent uprising shook Central Asia. The viable problem for the Kazak and the Kyrgyz peoples, diminishing pasture lands had long created a critical situation in Central Asia. Despite the fact that the outbreak of the First World War (1914) had

⁵³⁷ Dulatov 1922,"; 21-22, translated in Winner.

diminished the number of European settlers, the number of already settled people was still beyond the limits that nomads could tolerate. Moreover, the burden of excessive taxes and forced labor, and the unfair price-fixing of the Russian merchants related to the hardening conditions of the war created grievances which could easily develop into a widespread revolt against the Russians in Central Asia.⁵³⁸

The initial case which triggered a revolt was the application of a government decree in June 25, 1916, which was aiming at the mobilization of all men between 19 and 43 as laborers (*merdikar*) in the war.⁵³⁹ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse adds that the decree consisted of various categories, but the lists were falsified and manipulated, as a result of which the tension arose.⁵⁴⁰ The intelligentsia around the newspaper *Kazakh* tried to calm down the tension, but they were not effective on the Kazak and Kyrgyz tribes away from the Russian administrative centers. The tension was already high because of land losses to the Resettlement Office. If they would leave their families, they knew that their families, their land and animals would be left unprotected against the officials and the Russian settlers.

It is worth to mention that while the authors of the periodical *Kazak* sought to calm down the Kazak insurgents, people like Ryskulov and Zhangeldin⁵⁴¹ had

⁵³⁸ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse (1994) "The Fall of the Czarist Empire," Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia, 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press: 209-210.

⁵³⁹ Togan 1981: 336-337.

⁵⁴⁰ d'Encausse 1990: 210.

⁵⁴¹ Nerikbaev 2004: 194.

an active role in the uprising of 1916. Those persons were among the first Kazak members of the Bolsheviks.

The revolt intensified with the involvement of tribes and introduction of their organizational methods. The Kypchak, Naiman and Argun tribes joined the uprising and chose their khans and *serdars* (military commandants). The tribal struggles between these groups were forgotten, and they allied against the common enemy colonizing their pasture lands. They acted like three nomadic khanates; the Kypchak and Naiman tribes established governmental organizations. The Kypchaks had an assembly (*shura*) with ten members headed by Abdulgaffar and they were performing governmental acts, like tax collecting and juristic procedures.

After bitter clashes, by the end of the year, the Arguns accepted the terms of the Russian Empire. After the October Revolution (1917), some of the Kypchaks (followers of the *serdar* Amangeldi) established relations with the Bolsheviks in Tashkent. Followers of Abdulgaffar joined the newly established, *Alash Orda* government in Semei, but then Abdulgaffar was killed by the Bolsheviks. After his death, Abdulgaffar became a folk hero,⁵⁴² and then one of the national heroes of the independent Kazakhstan. Amangeldi was killed by the soldiers of *Alash Orda*, while he was fighting under the red banner, and he became one of the heroes of the Kazak ASSR.

⁵⁴² Togan 1981: 337-338.

5.4. The Land Question under the Soviet Rule

In 1917, when Bokeikhanov left the *Kadets*, with whom he was working since 1905, one of the three reasons he declared was his rejection of the privatization of land. He argued that “the transferring of the land to private hands will lead to the fact, that in some time, as it was in Bashkiria [Bashkortostan], the plots of the land will pass to the neighboring *muzhik*, and the Kazaks will become poor.”⁵⁴³ The Kazaks were not in a position to work the land. They were not as experienced as the Russians, and in time they would sell the land to Russians and begin to work on their fields.

In the congresses and party program of Alash Orda the land question was one of the critical issues. Alash Orda movement supported the gradual sedentarization of the nomadic Kazaks, but the fertile plots of land were already presented to the migrated Europeans. Thus, they demanded that in the distribution of the land the Resettlement Office should distribute the land not according to its size but according to its production capacity. They also demanded the establishment of agricultural unions, where clans would own and work the land cooperatively, which was similar to the Soviets’ later model of *kolkhoz*.⁵⁴⁴

In 1920s, it was expected that under NEP the peasants would realize the benefit of collective farms⁵⁴⁵ by themselves and join them voluntarily. Christopher Read argues that:

⁵⁴³ Nurpeisov 1998a: 128; Bokeikhanov 1994: 268.

⁵⁴⁴ Kazak, 31 July 1917; Martynenko 1992: 47.

⁵⁴⁵ There were two types of farms: *kolkhoz* and *sovkhoz*. *Kolkhoz* was collective farm, in which the farmers and livestock breeders had a certain plot of land; they were selling the output at minimal prices to the state, paying taxes, and working for the state for some months. *Sovkhoz* was a state farm, which was owned and run directly by the state, and the people working in *sovkhoz* were regular state officials paid by the state.

Lenin had expected NEP to draw the peasants towards socialism through the advantages of cooperation and economies of scale, enabling modernization of the rural economy (modernization, greater chemical inputs, more efficient pooling of landholdings into larger units, end of strip cultivation and so on) and the release of surplus labour for industrial projects. Instead the village had almost turned its back on the outside world and withdrawn into independence based on its traditional institutions.⁵⁴⁶

NEP did not help to the replacement of the Petty Commodity Production, and it strengthened the power of the tribal leaders by turning the trend against the authority of the party. The towns turning into closed economic units were also becoming less exposed to external influences, i.e. Soviet intervention.

Additionally, the need for a swift development of industry necessitated cheap and sufficient agricultural products to be produced by the peasantry. The permission to ownership and market relations in the agriculture was not presenting the necessary amount of agricultural products to feed the urban population increase the proletariat and accelerate the industrialization. Furthermore, there was a need for accumulated capital for investment in order to improve machinery and built new factories, which could only be obtained through increasing the agricultural products and exportation⁵⁴⁷ in a land, where the main product were agricultural products.

The decision made in Moscow was to force the nomads into sedentary life whatever it takes, which was lead by Goloshchekin under Stalin's direction.⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴⁶ Read 2001: 69.

⁵⁴⁷ Evans & Jenkins 2001: 273.

⁵⁴⁸ Fergus & Jandasova 2003: 134.

Most Kazaks, but especially “right-wing”⁵⁴⁹ Kazak party members, such as Khozhanov and Sadvakasov, were for the survival of the project of Kazak *aul*. They supported the idea that the Kazaks were in fact close to communism, and Kazak nomadic way of life was a form of primitive communism,⁵⁵⁰ which was also argued by Baitursynov, in 1920.⁵⁵¹ Destroying the Kazak *aul* would be an act against the Kazak masses and turn them against the Soviet rule, but continuation of the Kazak *aul* would lead to the spontaneous and voluntary sovietization of the Kazak masses without a confrontation with the party.⁵⁵²

Despite the fact that the members of Alash Orda – and all other non-party members – were removed from the government, they were still enjoying some political influence by their published articles. Baitursynov also joined the discussion and supported the idea for the preservation of the Kazak *aul* in an article in 1926. Baitursynov underlined in this article the primitive communism of the Kazak society, which he had first highlighted in his above mentioned article in 1920, and which was also one of the main arguments of the right-wing Kazak Bolsheviks opposing the sovietization of the Kazak *aul*. His argument was that:

The Kazakh people accepted the idea of communism earlier than any others. In their daily routine even now lives the idea of communism, in particular, in the free hospitality offered everyone by the Kazakhs, free

⁵⁴⁹ There two main oppositional fractions in the party, the right wing and the left wing. The right wing was headed by Bukharin, who was for the continuation of the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry, which necessitated the continuation of the NEP and rejection of harsh projects against the peasantry. The left wing, on the other hand, was led by Trotsky, who demanded a rapid shift in the Soviet economy, which was basically a peasant economy, to an industrial economy.

⁵⁵⁰ Olcott 1987: 212.

⁵⁵¹ Nurpeisov 1998a: 137-138; Sabol 2003: 149.

⁵⁵² Olcott 1987: 212.

help offered by the *bais* for their poor fellow clansmen, in *saun aitmai*, *sagun* etc. The Kazakhs have a communal clan interest.⁵⁵³

The primitive communism and the suitability of the Kazak communal life to Bolsheviks' communism was underlined by Baitursynov as one of the factors, which facilitated his acceptance of the Soviet sovereignty. After six years of cooperation, he still had the same idea that a communist political agenda is not a threat for the Kazak way of life.

However, Moscow was determined to crash the clan leaders, and the fifth regional congress of the Kazak Communist Party under Goloshchekin, who was especially sent for the implementation of sovietization of the Kazak *aul*,⁵⁵⁴ decided that the power base of the tribal leaders (*bai*) were to be terminated by reducing their livestock.⁵⁵⁵ The land of the kulaks was distributed to poor peasants, and the cattle-breeders were dispossessed of their animals.⁵⁵⁶

When in 1926 the elections were held, it proved that the party was ineffective in restricting the power of the traditional elites, because more than 90 percent of the elected officials were nonparty candidates.⁵⁵⁷ The plan of sovietization of the Kazak *aul* in order to break the traditional, tribal sources of power and dekulakization was not successful. Not only on the political level, i.e. on the level of power struggles, but also on the economical level, since it was poorly organized. The poor, new owners of cattle had neither hay nor the right of

⁵⁵³ Olcott 1987: 218.

⁵⁵⁴ See for a propaganda poster of the sovietization of the agriculture appendix B, picture 14.

⁵⁵⁵ Olcott 1987: 212.

⁵⁵⁶ Fergus & Jandasova 2003: 134.

⁵⁵⁷ Olcott 1987: 166.

pasture to feed the animals, notwithstanding the very cold winter and frost which killed many animals.⁵⁵⁸

Robert Conquest points to another failure of this period of sovietization of the Kazak *aul*: “the campaign for the Sovietization of the Kazak aul (migrating clan based village) in 1925-1928 failed because the village Soviets which were formed fell without fuss into the hands of the traditional local elites,”⁵⁵⁹ which was in sharp contrast with the ideology, and it was not only witnessed in Kazakhstan but in the whole USSR. So, the New Economic Policy (NEP) had to leave its place to a new policy, under which collectivization was to be implemented.

There was a strong opposition in the party against the collectivization policy of the party.⁵⁶⁰ The renowned Kazak party member Sadvakasov pronounced his stance at the third *krai* conference as follows:

Give Kazakh a horse, hay and scythe, make it so that his farm is sustainable and it will be a hundred times more benefit [*sic.*] than simply distributing what there already is. The idea of distribution of what there already is [is] essentially an extremely dangerous idea, for distributing what there already is[,] has an inherently consumerist aspect. Give a poor man a cow today, tomorrow he slaughters and eats it, and another day he may ask for another one, and if there isn't another one then we're left with nothing... Today it's not some shock the country is waiting for, but constructive and peaceful work. And it is not new expropriations that will save it, but work and science.⁵⁶¹

⁵⁵⁸ Fergus & Jandasova 2003: 134.

⁵⁵⁹ Robert Conquest (1986), *The Harvest of Sorrow*, Oxford University Press, New York: 192.

⁵⁶⁰ Sadvakasov's criticism is shortly mentioned in the third chapter in the section 3.2.

⁵⁶¹ Koigeldi 2007: 169-170.

Sadvakasov was against a kind “shock therapy,” which would destroy all the existing system to replace it with a new one. Although his argument that “a poor man would kill and eat the cow given to him” is exaggerated, and it was not easy in the strictly controlled system of *sovkhoz*, his argument, that instead of destruction the exiting system should be strengthened by supporting the Kazaks, could not be ignored. He was for a gradual shift to collective farms. He supported the idea that the implementation of flexible tax policies in favor of collective farms would eventually pull the population into the collective farms.⁵⁶² The Central Committee, however, had other plans, related to the discussions on the “scissors crises” and breaking the power of the traditional elites.

5.5 Liquidation, Collectivization and Concentration of Power

Because of the harsh measures planned for the conversion of the Steppes through the collectivization program they first had to eradicate all potential opponents of the program and every person, who could become spokespersons of the suffering Kazak nomads, and then initiate the implementation of the program and destruction of the rural sources of Kazak authority.

When Goloshchekin was sent to carry the sovietization of the Kazak *aul*, collectivization had already become a political issue more an economic restructuring program. The Soviet authorities were convinced that the power of the potential opponents in the Steppes had to be broken down, whatever it takes.

The liquidations of the party cadres were initiated shortly after Goloshchekin’s arrival to Alma-Ata. In December 1925, during the party

⁵⁶² Koigeldi 2007: 170.

conference two prominent members of the right-wing, Khozhanov and D. A. Yermekov, who were against the rapid sovietization of the Kazak *aul*, were expelled from their top positions in the party.⁵⁶³

The attack continued the next year, and in April in the second party plenum more Kazaks and Russians, who were generally former Mensheviks or Socialist Revolutionaries, were expelled accused of their assumed pro-*bai* or pro-*kulak* deviations. Both the right-wing and left-wing were severely criticized, and no one could escape to be discredited.⁵⁶⁴ The division of the party in fractions helped Goloshchekin to use one group against the other, and then destroy them all, just like Stalin did with the left-wing and the right-wing in the center.

A letter written by Trotsky to a member of the Central Committee, G. Sokolnikov, is the only testament reflecting the situation in the party in that period. The letter was written after a visit of the right-wing Kazak party members. Trotsky had already lost much of his power, but the Kazaks were in desperate need to find someone to help them.⁵⁶⁵ His letter to Sokolnikov from 11 March 1927 is a clear description of the situation of the Kazak party and the only picture of the party from that period. Trotsky describes four factions within the party: the Russians, the Kazaks sympathetic to the Russians, right-wing and left-wing. He states that the biggest division is between the Kazaks and the Russians and that “[b]etween the European and Kazak communists there is a wall.” Trotsky claims

⁵⁶³ Olcott 1987: 212-213.

⁵⁶⁴ Olcott 1987: 213.

⁵⁶⁵ Later, during the purges this visit was used against them as a proof of their united struggle with Trotsky, who was Stalin’s archenemy and was condemned as a betrayer (Olcott 1987: 213). Every relation with him was considered as a proof of treason.

that Russians were encouraging divisions among the Kazaks; he also adds that while the left-wing was closer to Goloshchekin, they were not enjoying an inclusion to power, and both wings of the Kazaks were discriminated.⁵⁶⁶

This visit and the letter from a period, when Stalin was not able to consolidate his power in the party, is a clear testament that there were also different factions and opposition within the party ranks in the Kazak ASSR; they could visit other members of the party, ask for their assistance or even cooperate.

An article written by Sadvakasov and published in *Bolshevik* in January 1928 became the last criticism against the party. It criticized the application of Stalin's nationality policy in Kazakhstan and the First Five-Year-Plan, which would increase the state control in the Steppes. Both the right-wing and the left-wing Kazaks were against the command economy, because it was neglecting the special features of the Kazak society. The implementation of the plan would destroy the Kazak economic and social life, and the disinterested attitude of the centre was a clear sign that they did not care, what would happen to the nomadic Kazaks.⁵⁶⁷

Goloshchekin first attacked the right-wing. When the liquidation of the right-wing was accomplished, Goloshchekin was not in need of the left-wing any more, and they were also liquidated. The ranks of the party were filled with

⁵⁶⁶ M. K. Kozybaev & I. M. Kozybaev (2003), *Kazakstan Tarihy 10*, Mektep Baspasy, Almaty: 119-120; M. K. Kozybaev & I. M. Kozybaev (2003), *Kazakstan Tarihy, Khrestomatia 10*, Mektep Baspasy, Almaty: 161-163; Olcott 1987: 213-214.

⁵⁶⁷ Olcott 1987: 214.

opportunists joining the party for personal benefits, and they were ready to follow their superiors indifferent of their orders.⁵⁶⁸

After the removal of oppositional cadres in the government to Moscow and persecutions on the former members of Alash Orda, all administrative bodies were cleaned up. After the removal of the significant former members of Alash Orda, the Bolshevik Kazaks with some initiative were also removed from Kazak ASSR in 1928-1929, there was no one left to argue against the central policies. That was the end of the constructive role of the Kazaks within the party ranks. But that also meant that now Moscow could implement every policy without being criticized or rejected in Kazak ASSR starting with the collectivization.

On 7 November 1929, with Stalin's article "The Year of Great Turn"⁵⁶⁹ a radical attempt for the collectivization was officially put into action on a waste territory from Ukraine to Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, however, that was not only a process of collectivization or dekulakization,⁵⁷⁰ but it also meant ending the age old period of nomadism by settling semi-nomadic Kazaks in collective farms. It was a big step from nomadism to settled life. Goloshchekin expressed his comprehension about this "leap" as follows:

Settlement is collectivization. Settlement is the liquidation of the *bai* semi-feudals. Settlement is the destruction of tribal attitudes... Settlement is simultaneously the question of socialist construction and the approach of socialism, of the socialist reconstruction of the Kazak mass without

⁵⁶⁸ Olcott 1987: 214.

⁵⁶⁹ Olcott 1987: 180.

⁵⁷⁰ See for a propaganda poster of dekulakization appendix B, picture 17.

divisions by nationality under the leadership of the vanguard of the proletariat and the Communist party.⁵⁷¹

The party considered this project as another stage of the revolution. They were convinced that they were introducing the October Revolution finally to Central Asia. In their assessment they were the vanguards of the revolution carrying it to the last horizons within the USSR. This attack was expected to end feudal age of Central Asia and progress the Kazak people to the next stage in the human development.

As mentioned above the issue of settlement was a crucial issue for the Kazak intellectuals discussed long before the Bolshevik Revolution. All Kazak intellectuals were convinced of the necessity of a settled life to improve the Kazak culture and the life of the Kazaks. The discussion among the Kazak intellectuals was not on the necessity of the sedentarization but on the speed of the process. The writers of the journal *Aikap* were stating that the settlement of Kazak nomads should be realized immediately, whereas the writers of the *Kazak* periodical were advocating a slow, gradual shift to settled towns. The Soviet solution for sedentarization was their policy of collectivization, which was implemented by force and very rapidly in the most devastating way possible.

The collectivization was initiated in November 1929, and in a month 500 collective farms were built in Kazakhstan. By February 1930, 35,3 percent, by March 1930, 42,1 percent of the population was collectivized. The speed of collectivization was far beyond the limits the authorities expected.⁵⁷²

⁵⁷¹ Olcott 1987: 183.

⁵⁷² Olcott 1987: 180-181.

Stalin celebrated the unexpected success of the collectivization in Pravda in an article, “Dizzy with Success” on March 2, 1930 as follows:

The Soviet government’s successes in the sphere of the collective-farm movement are now being spoken of by everyone. Even our enemies are forced to admit that the successes are substantial. And they really are very great. It is a fact that by February 20 of this year 50 per cent of the peasant farms throughout the U.S.S.R. had been collectivised. That means that by February 20, 1930, we had *overfulfilled* the five-year plan of collectivisation by more than 100 per cent.⁵⁷³

The accelerated speed of the collectivization was beyond expectancies, and Stalin together with other party members saw this as a great success. He was warning the members of the party because this was achieved “with comparative ‘ease’ — ‘unexpectedly’; they should not “become dizzy with success” that they “can achieve anything.”⁵⁷⁴

For his the success of the project was “due ... to the fact that it rests on the *voluntary character* of the collective-farm movement ... with the active support of the main mass.” He underlined that “collective farms must not be established by force [which] would be foolish and reactionary.”⁵⁷⁵

However, the real situation was very different. “In practice all work had been reduced to a desire not to merely satisfy but to amaze the authorities with the

⁵⁷³ Josef V. Stalin (1954a) “Dizzy with Success: Concerning Questions of the Collective Farm Movement,” *Works, Volume 12*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow: 197.

⁵⁷⁴ Stalin 1954a: 198.

⁵⁷⁵ Stalin 1954a: 199.

quickness and successfulness of the work, without adding any special significance to its quality, expediency and sensibility.”⁵⁷⁶

This quotation is actually from an earlier document (1907), and it highlights the confiscation of land carried out by resettlement officials. After about two decades despite the fact most of the officials were replaced by a new generation of party cadres, it seems that nothing has changed in the behavior of the officials encouraged by the state, which was expecting remarkable success in the campaign. In order to achieve a quick and definite success 25.000 devoted industrial workers were sent to the rural areas to force the peasants and nomads to join the collective farms.

However, the organization was not in a position to allocate the necessary resources, such as money, construction materials, seed, drugs and farm implements, to the collectivized nomads.⁵⁷⁷ Animals concentrated in farms died because of malnutrition and epidemics.

That was followed by a retreat of the collectivized nomads with their animals left, in order to survive. From April to June 1930, the number of farms decreased from 7.019 to 5.701. The collectivization attack of Moscow created great resistance. Instead of giving their animals to the farms, the nomads simply killed them. Many people left Kazakstan and ran away to present Xinjiang Uighur Region in the Peoples Republic of China.

⁵⁷⁶ T. Sodel'nikov (1907) *Bor'ba za zemliu v kirgizskoi stepi (Kirgizskii vopros I konizatsionnaia politika pravitel'stva)*, SPb., 52; as quoted in Gulnar Kendirbai (2002) *Land and People: The Russian Colonization of the Kazak Steppe*, Klaus Schwartz Verlag, Halle/Berlin: 50.

⁵⁷⁷ Olcott 1987: 181.

The political goal was accomplished by breaking the power of the traditional power-holders, but it destroyed the whole form of subsistence of the Kazaks without creating an alternative for them to survive. In this turmoil many Kazaks died because of hunger, epidemics and struggles.⁵⁷⁸ The number of Kazak households declined from 1.232.000 in 1929 to 565.000 in 1936.⁵⁷⁹ Sarsembaev indicates that the population of Kazaks decreased from 6 million in 1915 to 4.120.000 in 1930, and then following the collectivization campaign another 1.750.000 died of starvation, epidemics and execution. Additionally about 653.000 people went to neighboring republics and countries. “Even in 1959, the population of the Kazaks was only 2.8 million.”⁵⁸⁰ Kendirbai states that the sedentarization was enacted with the loss of 42 percent of the Kazak population – together with the migrant to China, 80 percent of their livestock and “the complete destruction of their traditional economy and social structures.”⁵⁸¹

Although there are no exact numbers about the loss of the Kazak population, the figures below show the cost of collectivization to the livestock of Kazakhstan.

⁵⁷⁸ Zh. Abylkhozhin, K. Aldazhumanov, Yu. Romanov, (1998), “Kazakstan in the System of ‘Kazarmennyi Socialism’,” in *History of Kazakhstan Essays*, M. K. Kozybaev, ed., Ministry of Science-Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan-Institute of History and Ethnology Named by Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, Gylm, Almaty: 153-156

⁵⁷⁹ Olcott 1987: 185.

⁵⁸⁰ A. Sarsembaev (1999), “Imagined Communities: Kazak Nationalism and Kazakification in the 1990s,” *Central Asian Survey*, 18(3): 325.

⁵⁸¹ Kendirbai 2002: 69.

Table 3: Number of Livestock in Kazakstan.

	1916	1924	1929	1934	1941
Sheep and Goats	18.364.000	11.400.000	27.200.000	2.261.000	8.132.000
Cattle	5.062.000	4.750.000	7.400.000	1.591.000	3.356.000
Horses	4.340.000	2.500.000	7.200.000	441.000	897.000

Source: Allworth, Edward., ed. (1994), *Central Asia, 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC: 302.

The sharp decrease, especially on sheep and goats, which were the main source of food for the Kazaks together with cattle, shows, how badly the Kazaks were affected by the collectivization plan. Nomads could not survive after loosing their basic source of subsistence. The table also indicates that, if the collectivization were a plan for improving the economics by increasing the agricultural products, it was a huge defeat. Nevertheless it was successful in terms of breaking the power of the *bais* by destroying their source of power.

In 1932, Goloshchekin was found guilty for the mistakes of the collectivization. Yet the problems created by the speed and weak organization of the collectivization continued. The collectivization campaign together with the refusal of Kazak nomads to join the collective farms, slaughter of animals and the decline of the grain harvest led to a crisis in the summer of 1932 and he was dismissed in the autumn.⁵⁸² He was replaced by another man from Moscow, an Armenian, Mirzoian. Definitely, Goloshchekin's dismissal could not repair the mistakes already made; there was not enough food to feed the population and more Kazaks died of starvation in 1933.

⁵⁸² Olcott 1987: 216.

Despite the big human costs as the outcome of destruction of the traditional order in Kazakstan, Ukraine, North Caucasus, the Volga regions and South Ural region, Stalin was always proud of the collectivization plan he accomplished. He considered it as the “second revolution” after the October Revolution,⁵⁸³ which was assumed to have spread the revolution to the rural areas. Although the population of the peasantry and grain production fell down, many of the remaining peasants moved to cities presenting the necessary manpower for industrialization, and the grain product collected by the state had doubled, which created a cheap source of food to feed the growing proletariat and to export so that more capital could be collected for the long anticipated industrial investment.⁵⁸⁴

The collectivization was not only carried out for its economic benefits. It should be understood within a political framework. Stalin had a plan for centralization. The local elders (*aksakals*), religious persons, tribal leaders, old or new the local intelligentsia, in a way anyone, who could turn into spokespersons of the local communities, were considered as a threat. It was aimed to create a state apparatus functioning like a machine. There was no room for criticism or reluctance in following the directives of the center.

The creation of a system from top to bottom required rank and file, and especially the implementation of a hastened plan with all its mercilessness demanded cadres to be sent unsympathetic to the needs of the local population. Consequently, the local figures with more regional support and sympathy to the local population were removed, and they were replaced by men sent from

⁵⁸³ His article of “The Year of Great Turn” was published on the anniversary of the – original – October Revolution.

⁵⁸⁴ Chubarov 2001: 99-100.

Moscow, like Goloshchekin and Mirzoian. They were also weaker figures in terms of their local support and links with influential local groups. As a result, they had to rely on their appointers support. Thus, the purges of 1928-1929 and the collectivization initiated in 1929 can be understood as segments of an interrelated project. It is also true that they were part of Stalin's concentration of power restructuring of all the USSR and even the international communist movement.⁵⁸⁵

What is more striking in Stalin's period, are the final purges of 1937-39, which cost the life of - at least - 22.000 people. Until the end of 1930s a new generation was raised through the newly formed education system and institutes of political education. They were obedient cadres ready to follow the directives of the center. If they failed to follow the orders, there were always plenty of others to take their place. Although the old cadres were pacified and they were not building any threat to Stalin's solid system, they were still considered as dangerous elements to be destroyed.

The purges of 1937-1939 had deeper outcomes than the liquidations a decade ago. Most members of Alash Orda became victims of Stalin's purges. Not only "suspicious" former nationalists, such as the members of Alash Orda, but communist Kazaks were also taken into custody, and they were executed. The most prominent member of the Turkistani and Kazak communists, Ryskulov, the well-known communist poets Seifullin and Dzhansugurov, the members of the

⁵⁸⁵ In 1928 the head of Comintern (Communist International) was also replaced with Dimitrov. The policy was also changed from the defense of the USSR based on the thesis of "socialism in one country" to a more aggressive stance stating that a world crisis for capitalism had come and it would finally collapse. The role of all communist parties in the world was defined as unifying around the Communist Party of the Soviet Republic and fighting against all non-communist national parties. The communist parties of the world were also firmly connected to Moscow.

party of 1920, Dzandosov, Rozybakiev, Asybekov, were also among the victims of the purges together with “a whole generation of Kazak intellectuals, poets, and writers.”⁵⁸⁶ “In 1937, all members of the Politburo of the Kazakh Communist party, including the Chairman of the Kazakh Sovnarkom ... were arrested,” and most of them were executed.⁵⁸⁷ The case of Kazakhstan was not exceptional; by 1940, no one was left from the members of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolshevik), Central Committee, except Stalin.

⁵⁸⁶ Olcott 1987: 217-219.

⁵⁸⁷ Fergus & Jandasova 2003: 137.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Reading the history in one direction, from the viewpoint of what had happened, in order to understand, why it had happened in that very direction, leads one to put the pieces together in a certain way, so that the final point was validated through single events, and it turns into the logical outcome of the whole process starting from the beginning. This aim of logical construction of the process under the light of the final point, omits the uniqueness of the past instances, which leads the researcher to ignore the failed attempts or reconstruct unintended consequences, since they would distort the compactness of the pattern. We all need patterns to comprehend the process we are going through or we are studying, and we tend to omit pieces, which cannot be placed within a pattern.

Here, in the case of the Kazak intellectuals between 1920 and 1937, the long period under the Soviet rule, is neglected together with what they had done in all through those years. During the Cold War Central Asia was evaluated within the anti-communist policies, and it was comprehended as part of the last empire destined to fall apart with its “prison of peoples.” Most studies on Kazakhstan and Central Asia were written with a colonialist aspect considering the Kazaks and Central Asians as passive victims of central policies. It was generally neglected that they were also agents of the implementation of central policies.

Despite the fact that there were well-structured explanations of historical events in their gradual development, they were distorted because of the fact that they were considering the final point as the natural outcome of all that happened. For the sake of the argument, it can be claimed that if the aim is to explain the final purges; the development of events will be constructed in a way, so that the cooperation of the Kazaks would turn into their voluntary acceptance of their death penalty, which would seem to be very clear and expectable right from the beginning, i.e. 1920. The weakness of this assessment lies in its capacity to explain the cooperation of Alash Orda with the Soviet government.

My aim is to illustrate the historical continuity of their struggle in creating a modern Kazak society. Although most studies are occupied with the period before 1920, be it the deeds of the Kazak intelligentsia in the first two quarters of the 20th century or the “fight for independence” during the civil war, their struggle did not come to an end with their submission to the Soviet sovereignty.

The Kazak Alash Orda government, which was formed by the intellectuals around the *Kazak* newspaper, has a privileged status today as a proof of the permanency of the Kazak independence. The “independent” government of Alash Orda survived hardly three years, which was a significant but short period in the struggle of the members of Alash Orda. Despite the fact that it affected their position in the eyes of the Bolsheviks, and today it defines their status in their revised judgments of a nation, it should be emphasized that their life and their struggle was not limited only to these period.

The negligence of the historical continuity is caused first of all by the poverty of documents on Alash Ordists’ deeds in the Soviet period; secondly the

exaggeration of their work before 1920 overshadows their later accomplishments; thirdly the power of cruelty of the later developments, that is their liquidations and executions, is so blinding that it caused an “eclipse of reason” to comprehend the previous years under the Soviet authority.

After 1920 their action was left behind the closed doors of the USSR. In the West the main source of information was to find in the writings of the émigrés, who were not part of the events after the consolidation of Soviet power in 1920s – except Baymirza Hayit. They were, furthermore, the ones, who preferred to leave. They were anxious that Moscow would fasten its grip on nationalities, which came into being step by step until the execution of former nationalist leaders. Their assessment was influenced by their anxiety, and when the local intelligentsia was annihilated, their notion was confirmed cancelling the need to study the developments prior to the purges. The influences of the Cold War supported this negligence to study the 1920s and the role of the local intelligentsia.

The studies in Kazakhstan were also influenced by changing political mood. Until 1935, documents on Alash Orda were being published with negative interpretations criticizing the Alash Orda movement as a bourgeoisie nationalist movement. When they were condemned at the end of 1920s and executed at the end of 1930s, even the existing documents were either destroyed or suspended until the independence. Moreover, all that was studied was limited to the period of Alash Orda. The negative attitude in the Soviet period was replaced by a positive aspect after the independence, but the fixation on the three-years-period continued.

The study of this period led by the Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences is still going on, and the related volume of official history, *Kazakstan Tarihy* (History of Kazakhstan), is still waiting to be completed and published since 2004 – as of July 2007. The publication of the book can change the general attitude towards this period.

The role of the members of Alash Orda in the formation an autonomous government during the civil war is the only attempt to build modern governmental bodies in Kazakhstan. Its uniqueness in the history of the Kazaks outshined their later accomplishments. It is expectable for anyone, who is interested in the recent history of the Kazaks, to concentrate on this period. This concentration, however, produces an exaggeration of it and the power of Alash Orda. It will give a broader picture of the past, if history was comprehended in its chronological continuity with revealing occurrences step by step, and by placing the events and historical figures into relatively fair positions within the historical context.

The power of cruelty of Stalin's purges overshadowed the establishment of the Soviet system and the fact that there were other actors in the discussions and other possibilities in the formation of the Soviets. The extent of Stalin's purges was unknown to most both in the West and in the USSR until 1956. When they were revealed, the myth created around the personal cult of Stalin and his "tremendous achievements" were damaged and the view was refracted to the cruelties of his period in order to seize the period from the point of new evidences. These new evidences, however, produced new mystifications turning the Kazak intelligentsia into passive victims of a calculable punishment. The demystification of Stalinist myths caused an eclipse of reason on understanding the period before

his rise to power. It is misleading to evaluate the whole process of the establishment of the Soviet rule with what happened during the purges. The purges were not inevitable outcomes of the Soviet rule, but they were probably the worst possible final stage of the monolithic party structure built against an authoritarian state to destroy it but not to replace it.

The members of Alash Orda were among the executed persons during the purges, but it should be reminded that it took 17 years until the execution took place, and the members of Alash Orda lost their position in building a modern Kazak nation not right after their submission but after a long and gradual process shaped by discussions between different powerful political figures.

First, Alash Ordists, like Bokeikhanov and Dulatov were not allowed to join the political arena and only some Alash Ordists, like Baitursynov, who acknowledged his commitment to the communist cause, were accepted to governmental positions. All through the 1920s, the governmental positions were open to influential Kazak party members, like Ryskulov, Khozhanov, Sadvakasov and their opposition to central polices was still acceptable until 1928, while non-party Kazak intellectuals could take the benefit of doing their part in modernizing the Kazak society.

In 1930s some of the Kazaks, like Ryskulov, resumed their political influence but were deprived of their previous power, while the members of Alash Orda were detached of their influence on the Kazak society. With the rise of Stalin and his attack for the consolidation of power separated the members of Alash Orda first from their role on the enlightenment of the Kazak people, and they were kept in isolation, then they passed away on the hands of the secret police.

The long process had to go through many stages until the purges took place, and there had always been other options, before it came to the final destruction of the Alash Ordists; especially at a time, when they were already deprived of their political power, and representing no threat for the Soviets. In that sense, it seems that it was not the logical outcome but the illogical one. They were doing, what they believed that they had to do, when no one knew, what would happen next. It is not to be forgotten that even the close associates of Stalin could not escape from being killed as a result of an unreasonable terror.

In order to develop a deeper understanding of the events the Kazak intelligentsia went through we need to place them into the historical context within a broader spatial framework. However, most studies in Kazakhstan and in general are concentrated on the developments in Kazakhstan because of the deeply rooted Soviet tradition of territoriality in the Kazak historiography or because of the academic requirement of delimiting the scope of work. This tendency of negligence of the radical changes in the higher echelons of the party leads to ambiguities on some turning points in their life, such as their acceptance of the Soviet sovereignty, removal of some cadres from influential political positions, and their arrest in 1928-1929.

Their acceptance of the Soviet rule was not related just to their weakness. They had other alternatives like joining the émigrés or the *basmachi* movement. Nevertheless collaborating with the Bolsheviks seemed to be reasonable to them; not just because the Bolsheviks were the lesser of evils but also they seemed to be open to create a Kazak nation and carry it to modernization by utilizing the sources and administrative knowledge of the new socialist republic. They made

their decision under the given circumstances, and it was not possible to know, where it would lead, from the very beginning. They were just seeking to change the history of their people, which were under the threat of extinction vis-à-vis the newly emerging modern nations. The preference of the Soviet rule to leave the country was a conscious choice, since it was considered as the only way to help the formation of a modern Kazak nation, which was in consistency with their modernization project in Alash Orda. Until they were executed, they sought to help through open channels the modernization project of the Kazak nation as active agents in continuity with their life-long ambitions, for another 17 years.

Their removal from their top positions at the end of 1920s seems to be incomprehensible at a time, when they were enjoying helping the Kazak people at the top of educational, enlightening institutions. It seems to be out of a sudden, if the discussions and centralization process in Moscow is left aside. Additionally, the development of the three selected issues was also highly related to the course of the debates in Moscow. The negligence of the process in Moscow turns the conclusion of the process in Kazakhstan into an ambiguous case or more often to the expected result of a planned procedure.

In order to understand their lifelong struggle and their critical choices it would be probably more helpful to consider them as some intellectual vanguards fighting to modernize their people, the essentially tribal, nomadic Kazaks. The decline of the Kazak people was accelerated by the migration of the European settlers, and the members the Kazak intelligentsia, who had acquired a modern education, were aware that the only solution for the survival of the Kazak people was to become a modern society equal to the Russians. They knew that this could

only be achieved through a modern education similar to their modern curriculum but in the Kazak language.

Their nationalism can be understood in terms of protecting and motivating their compatriots to reach the level of the cultured Russians. Parallel to the general trend in the European sciences and as a result of their education in Russian universities, they had a linear understanding of history as it was common in that period. The Kazak society was maintaining a “backward” social system as nomads living in tribal organizations. In order to break the “backwardness” of the people, they had to be united as a nation free of the influences of religious leaders and archaic tribal authorities, if they were against their modernization attempt. The new social structure required for the modern age was becoming a nation. All modern, exemplar societies of the period were organized as nations, and they were ruled by a parliament founded on the “will of the people,” i.e. nation, which was also part of their struggle. They aimed to be an equal part of a federated, democratic, parliamentary Russia, which could only be achieved by creating this culturally equal, modern Kazak nation.

In this dissertation with the intention of following the continuity and exemplifying the gradual changes in the Soviet system three issues, which were considered as determinant for the members of Alash Orda, are sought to be studied. These issues were related to nationalism, modernization and land question. Their nationalism was based on obtaining some social, cultural and political rights for improving the life of the Kazaks. Modernization was also understood as an unavoidable tool of improving the Kazak way of life; therefore, modernization can also be understood as part of nationalism in terms of improving

the life of the Kazaks, and vice versa. Land question was one of most critical and concrete issues to deal with. It was a more vital, evident problem for the general Kazak masses, and other issues were in a way solutions to the land question.

In the second chapter it was aimed to demonstrate what the aims of the members of Alash Orda was, at a time, when they were acting like an autonomous administrative body and seeking for alliances. This chapter reveals that the reasons of their sharp decisions in changing alliance was their weakness during the war between the Reds and the Whites, but more important than that they were also weak for carrying the necessary reforms needed for their challenge of modernization.

They were just a few well-educated intellectuals with a variety of educational and professional backgrounds. The need for an educated group of vanguards brought them together, and they directed their effort to political and military affairs, which were indeed not concomitant with their educational background. They worked hard in founding an autonomous administrative body, but they lacked cadres to run both military and bureaucratic affairs. The equipment, buildings, sources, nothing was available to them except their will, and their will led them to look for building alliances on both sides.

Because of their liberal democratic inclinations they befriended with the democratic members of the Whites, but the course of events, that is the removal of their democratic associates from the ranks of the Whites and the growing power of the Reds, pushed them to join the Bolsheviks. The principles they had declared in their congresses and in the party program demonstrate what their fundamental intentions were. It is important here to underline that their move to the side of the

Bolsheviks does not necessarily connote their surrender but a continuity, because what the Bolsheviks were promising to follow was not antagonistic to *Alash Orda*'s objects.

They demanded in their congresses and in their party program an autonomous oblast with its own educational, legal, religious military bodies in a parliamentary, federal Russia; creation of a modern society through education, separation of the religion and the state, improvement of women's social status; protection of the poor and the workers; solution of the land question in favor of the Kazaks.

The categories of autonomy (or national rights) could be achieved in the Soviet rule. The Bolsheviks were not only more promising than the monarchist Whites or any other group they could ally with but they were also openly founding institutions for the development of nationalities. They were positive in using the native, titular language in schools and administrative bodies. The extent of the autonomy of the Kazak "Autonomous" SSR was not definite yet, it was still being discussed in 1920, but the right of self-determination was acknowledged at least on paper. Those were more encouraging than anything they could have expected to come from the Russian capital.

They shared a similar educational background with the Bolsheviks, and they had a similar vision in modernizing their country and their compatriots. The Bolsheviks were also obsessed with the need of transforming the backward society they were living in. Although education had a significant role in both of their methods of transforming the society, there was a sharp difference in priorities for them. For the Bolsheviks class struggle had precedence over national

issues or - more fundamentally - economics over cultural issues, whereas the Kazaks were stressing the need for giving the precedence to the Kazaks, who were already culturally and economically in a deprived, underprivileged position.

The Bolsheviks were positive on discussing the land question as well. However, it was not clear, how they would deal with property on land. According to their basic principles property was to be abolished on the whole territory of the USSR, and everyone should be able to take the advantage of the land equally, but it was to become a matter of long discussions due to the fact that the new Soviet Republic had borrowed an underdeveloped country with an overwhelmingly peasant population. The peasants had acquired some piece of land from former landlords, and their right of land possession was acknowledged by the Bolsheviks as part of Lenin's formula of "the alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry." The property rights were in contradiction with the Marxist principles, but that was considered as a practical solution for Russia, and it was probably expected to be solved after the world revolution, additionally in the course of time the peasants would realize the benefits of the collective farms and join them.

For the Kazaks the Bolsheviks seemed at least open to discussion since they were for a different model in terms of property. They were for a more just distribution of the land under the control of the Resettlement Office, sharing their priorities in sedentarizing and modernizing the Kazaks, and the solution of the problem through collective farms was not a strange idea for the Kazaks, which they were also proposing for sedentarizing the *auls*, only the method of implementation was to be discussed.

The Communist Party ranks in Central Asia were filled both with people, like Ryskulov and Zhangeldin, who had an active role in the uprising of 1916, and Russian settlers, who were expecting that the Bolsheviks would naturally support them, since they were also Russians. While it might have created hopes in the masses to see their spokesperson in the government, the Russian support for the Bolsheviks complicated the solution of the problem.

Soviet nationality policies were shaped by the discussions between different political figures. There was no precise, extensive program at the time of the revolution but only Lenin's proposal for self-determination and Stalin's preliminary reports on nationality policy. For the Bolsheviks the nations would anyhow wither away. Lenin was optimistic that if the national rights would be acknowledged to peoples, there would be no need for them to fight for national rights. Nation and nationalism was considered as a pseudo-phenomenon, which was determined to be replaced by class consciousness.

However, not everyone was as optimistic as Lenin, and people like Stalin were supporting more forceful methods to suppress nationalist tendencies. Their discussion was also influenced by some events of the period, such as the failure of the expected German Revolution, Polish War, and Ukrainian and Georgian cases.

Although the 1920s were understood within the context of the Great Purges of 1937-1939, it was not obvious even for the leading Bolsheviks which direction they had to follow. The foundation of the USSR based on Soviet republics with some autonomy was Lenin's plan, which was distorted during its application by Stalin. In the end Lenin's formula of a union of Soviet republics to which the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic would also be accepted on

equal terms was ratified, but shortly after Lenin had to leave the political ground and the founding principles of the Soviet Republics were reshaped again leaving the autonomy and the right of self-determination of nations only as matters on paper. Still the policy of *korenizatsia* was continued to be supported until 1930s, which gave freedom the peoples to be educated in their native language and to develop their national culture, but it was reshaped and modified by Moscow. In practice the Soviet republics turned into executive bodies of Moscow. In 1928 all republics had lost their initiative. They were indeed neither directed by Russia, nor by Moscow, nor by the seemingly all-powerful Politburo, the whole USSR, and even the Communist International was turning to be control by a centralized mechanism led by a single man.

The much debated policy of divide-and-rule also seems to be more complicated than it seems. The letters and discussions from that period reflect that there was no single plan in determining the borders of the Soviet Republics. Some recent scholars challenge the Cold War aspect on national delimitations in Central Asia, and argue that there was neither such a plan nor the Central Asians were passive victims of an imperial intrigue. Soviet politician Chicherin's letters prove that there were some people, who were against the national delimitations. Additionally, we know from recent documents, that there were long discussions about the borders, in which local politicians, Kazaks, Uzbeks, Russians had also participated. They were not just passive victims of the central policies but active parties of the discussions.

On the other hand, the existence of some reaction against the national delimitation is also the evidence of the presence that at least some of the

discussants were for a divide-and-rule policy. Nonetheless, it would be misleading to comprehend the whole process as an extension of the final point; but again something would be missing, if the past would be studied only as a negation of a dominant thesis, like the theory of divide-and rule policy. The intense process of the shaping of Soviet nationality policies presents all kinds of facts verifying most claimants' arguments but on the cost of the negligence of "inconsistent" facts.

If we try to construct the process from the beginning as it was revealed to the partakers, the members of Alash Orda experienced first some rights not enjoyed before. They were part of a system in which they had a certain role as policy-makers in their republic and also participating in the making of Soviet policies. Baitursynov was first in the Narkomnats, and then he acquired the highest rank in determining educational policies in the republic as the People's Commissar of Education. Bokeikhanov was called to Moscow, but he became a renowned academician in the highest academic institute of the whole state. Notwithstanding their limitations that was probably more than they could achieve in a liberal democratic Russian Republic they dreamt of.

However, it was to change for the worse in the years to follow, and they lost the prestigious and influential positions they hold. Most prominent members of Alash Orda were removed from policy-making positions, but they acquired significant positions in enlightening the Kazaks, as educators, editors or directors. Their fundamental aim was nothing more than creating a modern, educated Kazak society. They had entered the political arena in the turmoil of the revolutions out of necessity. When they were removed from the political arena, they took back

their role as educators of their society and sought to do their best in a variety of positions.

The Bolsheviks were not like the tsarist bureaucrats, and the weakness of their institutional bodies during the government of Alash Orda was over. They could continue their struggle for modernization in a better organized state with the same motives for modernization. Moreover, they were working in an autonomous republic carrying their name as the titular nation and they were able to educate the masses and publish many journals and books in Kazak.

Despite the fact that their sphere of influence was limited from political to cultural affairs, they were still free to follow their agenda from the tsarist period but this time as laborers in a state concomitant with their endeavor of modernization. Their arrest in 1928 seems to have come out of a sudden, when they were at highest positions in their struggle for the enlightenment outside of the political arena. The Great Purges destroyed all initiative of local actors, together with all channels of their participation in the development of their people and even their physical existence.

When the present situation of the Kazak nation is considered, it can be argued that the Soviet experience brought considerable changes to the Kazak people and maybe accelerated their march on the way to modernization, especially compared to other countries in their vicinity but outside the Soviet attempt for modernization.

The Kazak intellectuals at the beginning of the 20th century were aiming the modernization of the Kazak people and creating a place for them among the civilized nations of the world, and the Soviet experience created both a Kazak

nation and carried it into the modern age. The former was actually the unintended consequence of the Soviet experiment, and the later was a shared intention with the leaders of Alash Orda. As a twist of fate, both aims of them, modernization and creation of Kazak nation, were realized.

Kazakstan with its modern nation and state is today much closer to the dreams of the leaders of Alash Orda than other Asian countries to the south of the Soviet realm. The Kazak intellectuals were lacking the popular support to carry out the reforms, and they were also lacking administrative cadres for that. As a matter of fact, the involvement of the USSR created a strong base to implement the reforms for modernization.

After the dissolution of the USSR, when nationalism became the main source of political legitimacy, the leaders of Alash Orda became national heroes in the independent Kazakstan. Leaders of Alash Orda, such as Bokeikhanov, Baitursynov, Dulatov and others are again celebrated figures with pictures, museums, statues and publications of their collected works.

Despite the fact that Kazakstan is a modern country today, modernization is not just related to how a society looks from the outside, or whether they had distanced themselves from the pre-modern, “feudal” traditions. The strong state-apparatus, which became the main vehicle of implementing the modernization project, was also a product of modernization. Establishment of a modern, efficient state was considered as the only way for the survival of the USSR and for the transformation of the “backward” Soviet peoples from top, by force.

However, modernization is not only related to industrialization or creation of bureaucratic system of a modern state. The Soviet experience aimed to build the *sovietsky chelovek*. The soviets were councils, where the individuals would materialize through taking active part in decision-making processes. The socialist model aimed the creation of able, conscious individuals with some potent to determine his/her future. The rapid modernization project from top to bottom, however, paralyzed the individual initiative.

This process from top to bottom, in a way, contradicts both the socialist ideal of an emancipated human being and the rational, self-conscious individual of modernization. In a modern society, the individuals are inclined to use their initiative and reasoning in their choices; it is a society based on individual freedom and reason, requiring a social structure from bottom up. One of the main differences of the modern societies from the traditional societies is the open channels for individuals but not the replacement of traditional forms of oppression with the oppression of the modern state apparatus.

The Soviet experience created in Stalin's years an etatist, rapid modernization project based on a strong command economy, similar to nation-states organized during total wars as war machines. The military-like system and discipline accelerated the development of the USSR, but it terminated its dynamism and further development on the individuals' personal initiative. Modernization is not a process of absolute good; it can work both negatively and positively for different social groups and institutions. The Soviet modernization process was based first of all on the establishment of a modern state-apparatus, which in the long-term paralyzed the development of workers' initiative. Indeed

Marx expected in his early writings, *1844 Manuscripts* that the capacity and initiative of human beings would flourish in the stage of communism.

Stalin's plan of "socialism in one country" and monopolization of all power in the hands of one-party, one-man affected Kazakhstan as well. Because of the collectivization and purges all alternative power groups in the USSR were destroyed and the possibility of alternatives was also ruined. The existence of different proposals was necessary to overcome the setbacks of the planned economy. The top-to-bottom system turned the individuals to simple parts of a gigantic machine with no power to voice their needs and look for solutions. As part of the centralization the soviets, i.e. councils, were replaced by the party organs, and that meant that the elected local representatives of the Kazaks were replaced by the party officials appointed from Moscow. The indifference of appointed party cadres and destruction of the power of local organs paved the way for the worst possible results for the Kazak intelligentsia.

The Soviet experience under Stalin achieved to establish an industrialized country in the shortest period possible, but in the end it proved to be a catastrophe in terms of the long-term benefits. The possibility of constructing a socialist country from-bottom-up based on the soviets was sacrificed to the rapid industrialization and the anxiety of protecting socialism in one country.

The Kazak intellectuals, who had voluntarily chosen to cooperate, were among the leading figures of the Kazak modernization in 1920s. However, then they were sacrificed at a time, when they presented no threat but some potential for deepening the Soviet model. It is true that delimiting the oppressive features of a modern state and the need for democracy from bottom-up was also beyond the

scope of the Kazak leaders, but their confrontation with the center as the representatives of the Kazaks would – de facto - have an effect on the state to be more flexible. With their sacrifice, it seems that the possibility of a flexible, indigenous model of socialist transformation and a modern, Kazak society with more space for personal initiative and reason concomitant with a democracy from-bottom-up was also suspended.

Alash Orda joined the Soviets in continuity with their object of modernizing the Kazak society or in other words creating a modern Kazak nation. Collaboration with the Bolsheviks was the most appropriate solution for them to reach their goal. In the first years they found valuable channels open to them to transform the Kazak society. The modernization and the process of becoming a nation was accelerated with the Soviet state apparatus. However, the political struggle in the higher echelons of the party developed in another way excluding both the dissidents in the Politburo and influential figures in the Soviet republics. Their ambition of modernization, which was a genuine mission for the Bolsheviks, was carried out and realized by less influential men of order replacing the local cadres, and by the party taking the place of the soviets, which could become the local peoples' vehicle to form a different society and country.

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
Kazak, 31 July 1917

Kazak 21 November 1917

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
Appendix A: Maps of Central Asia and the Early Soviet Period



Map 1: Russian and Early Soviet Administrative Division of Oblasts in Central Asia (Brower & Lazzerini 1997: 137).



Map 2: National Resistance against the Bolsheviks (John Channon (1996) *The Penguin Historical Atlas of Russia*, Penguin Books, London: 107).



Map 3: Civil War 1918-1919 (Hermann Kinder & Werner Hilgemann (1978) *Atlas of World History Volume II: From the French Revolution to the American Bicentennial*, Anchor Books, New York: 142).



Map 4: War around Orenburg (Institut Marksizma-Leninizma Pri TsK KPSS (1983) *Istoria Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Souza: Atlas*, Moskva: 50-51).



Map 5: Soviet Administrative Division of Kyrgyz [Kazak] ASSR and Turkistan ASSR before 1924 (Allworth 1994: 240).



Map 6: Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics after 1936 (Allworth 1994: 258).



Map 6: The Famine of 1921 (Channon 1996: 105).

Appendix B: Soviet History in Propaganda Posters



Picture 1: A Propaganda Poster of the Whites: A Russian warrior (an image of St. George) attacks the red dragon to save Kremlin (tsar): “For the United Russia-Bolshevism Creep over the Heart of Russia with the Thick Snake Ring” 1919 (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 2: A Soviet Propaganda Poster during the Civil War, the Reds’ Attack at the Whites: “Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge” 1920 by Lisitski (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 3: The United Work of Workers and Peasant to Beat the Hunger and Repair the War-Torn Country: “Only Close Unity of Workers and Peasants Saves Russia from Ruin and Hungry” 1920 (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 4: The Union of Workers and Toilers of the Earth: “I Believe We'll Celebrate the 100th Anniversary” 1920 by Bondi (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 5: The Campaign against Illiteracy: “An illiterate Man is a Blind Man” 1920 by Radakov (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 6: The Campaign against Illiteracy: “Do You Help to do away with Illiteracy; Everyone Join the Society, Down with Illiteracy” 1925 (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 7: The Campaign against the Illiteracy of Women: “Woman! Learn writing and Reading” 1923 by Kruglikova (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 8: The Campaign against the Illiteracy of Women: “Work and Learn, to the Best our Life Will Turn” 1924 by Emelzhanov (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 9: Emancipation of Women under Socialism: “Liberated Woman, Build up Socialism” 1926 by Strakhov-Braslavski (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).




Picture 10: For the Protection and Education of Children: “Don’t Scold nor Beat Your Children, Don’t be Bad-You Better Buy a Book for Them Instead” 1928 by Pomenskii (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 11 For the Protection of Children: “Away with assault, battery and punishing children in the family” 1926 by Federov.



Picture 12: The Establishment of Industrial Infrastructure through the Cult of Lenin “Lenin and Electrification” 1925 by Shass-Kobelev (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 13: Building the Socialist Utopia through Widespread Industrialization: “The Building of Socialism” 1927 by Kotov (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 14: Attempts of Increasing Agricultural Output before the Collectivization: “Poor Peasant and Peasant of Average Means, Increase Crops” 1928 by Shulpin (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 15: The Shift from NEP to Planned Economy with the Help of Lenin's Cult: "It Will Be the Socialist Russia from the NEP Russia" 1930 by Klutsis (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 16: The Shift to Planned Economy: "Let's Fulfill Great Work's Plans" 1930 by Klutsis (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).



Picture 17: Collectivization: “Let's Annihilate the Kulak's Class” 1930 by Kukryniks (<http://eng.plakaty.ru/posters>; 1 Oct. 2007).

Appendix C: Pictures of Kazak Intellectuals and Politicians



Picture 1: Alikhan Bokeikhanov (1866-1937) (*Kazakstan Ul'tyik Entsiklopedia* 2, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 402).



Picture 2: Akhmet Baitursynov (1873-1937) (*Kazakstan Ul'tyik Entsiklopedia* 2, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 72).



Picture 3: Mirzhakyp Dulatov (1885-1935) (*Kazakstan Ul'tyik Entsiklopedia* 3, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 296).



Picture 4: Khalel Ghabbasov (1888-1931) (*Kazakstan Ul'tyik Entsiklopedia* 3, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 93).



Picture 5: Publishers of *Kazak* newspaper: Akhmet Baitursynov, Alikhan Bokeikhanov, Mirzhakyp Dulatov (from left to right) (*Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopediya* 2, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 72).



Picture 6: First issue of *Kazak newspaper* (on the center of the right column is an announcement of Baitursynov's book *Til Kuraly, Rules of Language*).



Picture 7: Fourth issue if *Kazak* newspaper with its emblem made of *Kazak yurt* (tent), which was later also used in the banner of Alash Orda.



Picture 8: Khalel Dosmukhamedov (1883-1939) (*Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia* 3, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 275).




Picture 9: Zhansha Dosmukhamedov (1886-1932) (*Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia* 3, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 277).



Picture 10: Zeki Velidi Togan (1890-1970) (Zeki Velidi Togan (2003) *Başkurtların Tarihi*, Türksoy Yayınları, Ankara).



Picture 11: Mustafa Chokai (1890-1941) (Chokai 1999).



Picture 12: A recent sculpture of Baitursynov and Dulatov (*Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia* 2, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 72).



Picture 13: Maghzhan Zhumabaev (1893-1938) (*Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia* 4, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 66).



Picture 14: Turar Ryskulov (1884-1938) (*Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia* 7, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 502)



Picture 15: Alibi Zhangel'din (1884-1953) (*Kazakstan Ultyk Entsiklopedia* 3, Kazak Entsiklopediasynyng Bas Redaktsiasy, Almaty: 531)



Picture 16: Members of the People's Commissars' Soviet (1921): (from left to right, sitting) A. Aitiev (1886-1936, Kazak), N. Kalashnikov (1884-1922, Russian), A. Zhangeldin (1884-1953, Kazak), M. Myrzaghaliev (1884-1937, Kazak), Sheftel (?), E. Raikhman (1893-?, Jewish), unknown, M. Shamov (1887-1938, Russian); (standing) unknown, A. Baitursynov (1873-1937, Kazak, Alash member), unknown, A. Alibekov (1893-1937, Kazak, Alash member) (Nerikbaev 2004).



Picture 17: Delegation of the Kazak Soviets' Fourth Meeting, 1927 (A. Alibekov is the fourth from left in the second row, with a moustache) (Nerikbaev 2004).



Picture 18: D. Adilev (1900-1930)
(Nerikbaev 2004: 82).



Picture 19: Zh. Aimauytov (1889-1931)
(Nerikbaev 2004: 50).




Picture 20: A. Alibekov (1893-1937)
(Nerikbaev 2004: 88).



Picture 21: Gh. Alibekov (1870-1923)
(Nerikbaev 2004: 89).



Picture 22: Sh. M. Bektukhamedov (1892-1958) (Nerikbaev 2004: 108).



Picture 23: Kh. N. Nurmukhamedov (1900-1938) (Nerikbaev 2004: 329).



Picture 24: M. S. Samatov (1894-1938) ((Nerikbaev 2004: 382).



Picture 25: A. A. Yermekov (1891-1970) (Nerikbaev 2004: 181).



Picture 26: T. B. Zhamanmurynov (1888-1938) (Nerikbaev 2004: 191).



Picture 27: Smagul Sadvakasov (1900-1933) (Nerikbaev 2004: 611).



Picture 28: Nyghmet Nurmakov (1895-1937) (Nerikbaev 2004: 91).



Picture 29: Sultanbek Khodzhanov (1893-1941) (Nerikbaev 2004: 269).



Picture 30: First meeting of the Kyrgyz [Kazak] Autonomous Soviet Socialist Oblast, 1920 (Nerikbaev 2004).



Picture 31: S. Sadvakasov (1900-1933) and N. Nurmakov (1895-1937) with Stalin in Moscow, 1925, when they were called to Moscow (Sadvakasov is the second, Stalin fourth, Nurmakov sixth in the second row from left to right) (Nerikbaev 2004).

Appendix D: Chronology of Events

1861	Emancipation of the slaves in Russia followed by migration of Russian settlers to the Kazak Steppes.
186?	Birth of Alikhan Bokeikhanov.
1867	The Kazak lands are taken by the state to be presented to Russian settlers.
1873	Birth of Akhmet Baitursynov.
1885	Birth of Mirzhakyp Dulatov.
1891	A Steppe Statute was ratified aiming to increase the land of the Russian settlers.
1905	Introduction of constitutional monarchy and foundation of Russian Duma in St. Petersburg. Some Kazaks, including Bokeikhanov join the <i>Kadets</i> and they are elected to Duma.
1911	Publication of the Kazak newspaper <i>Aikap</i> (until 1916).
1913	Publication of <i>Kazak</i> newspaper (until 1918). Publication of Stalin's pamphlet <i>Marxism and the National Question</i> .
1914	First World War.
1916	
25 June	The government decree aiming at the mobilization of all men between 19 and 43 as laborers (<i>merdikar</i>) in the war. Uprising in Central Asia.
1917	
23 February /	The strike on the International Women's Day, February
8 March	Revolution starts.
27 February	Petrograd Soviet was established, February Revolution.
7 March	Provisional Government declared an amnesty for the uprising of 1916.
10 March	Provisional Government pardoned the Russians, who had mistreated the Kazaks during the incidents of 1916.
20 March	A call for the unification of three <i>jüzes</i> signed by Bokeikhanov, Chokai and Dulatov is published in the <i>Kazak</i> newspaper.
3 April	Lenin arrived to Petrograd.
7 April	Lenin published <i>April Thesis</i> .
7 April	Provisional Government invited the Kazaks to join the formation of the Committee of Turkistan and join the Provisional Government.
24 June	<i>Kazak</i> newspaper announced that "Kazaks should form their own party, because there is no party to solve the problems of the Kazaks." Bokeikhanov left the <i>Kadets</i> .
21-26 July	The First All-Kazak congress.

31 July	Resolutions of the congress are published in <i>Kazak</i> newspaper.
13 October	The Bolsheviks announced their program based on the promise of peace to the army, land to the peasantry.
23 October	Members of the Workers and Soldiers Soviet in Tashkent had decided to overthrow the local government.
25-26 October	Second All-Russian Congress of the Soviets.
25 October	October Revolution starts.
25 October	Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government through Military Revolutionary Committees.
26 October	Occupation of the Winter Palace.
26 October	During the Second All-Russian Congress of the Soviets the Bolsheviks declared the end of the Provisional Government; two-headed administrative authority of the soviets and the Provisional Government was cancelled with Lenin's call for "all power to the soviets of the workers, soldiers and peasants."
26 October	Workers and Soldiers Soviet in Tashkent initiated an attack against the local government.
1 November	Workers and Soldiers Soviet in Tashkent seized the power.
November	The Cossack forces (the Whites) under ataman Dutov overthrew the soviet power and arrested the revolutionary committee in Orenburg.
21 November	The program of Alash is published in the <i>Kazak</i> newspaper.
21 November	Bolsheviks' Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia.
5-12 December	Second All-Kazak Congress.
1918	
January	The Commissariat of Nationalities headed by Stalin confirmed the right of self-determination and defined the new state as a "Federation of Soviet Republics."
18 January	The Reds took Orenburg, the leaders of <i>Alash Orda</i> acted with the Whites, and they left the town with the Cossacks of Ataman Dutov. This attack divided the Kazak government geographically.
25 January	The new, Bolshevik governor of Torgai Oblast, Zhangeldin, sent a telegram to Petrograd asking to arrest Bokeikhanov, Baitursynov and Omarov, who were suspected to be around Orenburg.
1/14 February	The change of old Russian, Jullian calendar with the Western, Georgian calendar; the dates below are according to the new calendar.
18 February	Stalin called Zhangeldin to Moscow, to represent the Kazaks.
March	Stalin, Tatar Bolshevik Vahidov and other members of Narkomnats sent a telegram demanding the establishment of "Tataro-Bashkirskoiy Sovetskoiy Respublika" (Tatar-Bashkort Soviet Republic). They also asked that "revolutionary committees of Azerbaijanis, Tatars, Georgians, Armenians, Kyrgyz people [Kazaks], Sarts, Turcomans and others should send their own concrete plans of federation (...) to Narkomnats."

3 March	The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk is signed.
28 March	A telegram was sent to Alash Orda headquarter in Semipalatinsk demanding the establishment of the autonomous Kazak state on the example of Tatar-Bashkort Soviet Republic but exclusion of liberal, national-democratic leadership of Alash Orda.
3 April	Ghabbasov sent a telegram to Petrograd as president of Alash Orda accepting Petrograd's proposed government type of a federal soviet republic.
3 April	Stalin ordered amnesty for all arrested members of Alash Orda.
5 April	All-Kazak Soviet Congress was organized.
16 April	A telegram was sent to Alash Orda telling that the relations between the Bolsheviks and Alash Orda were very positive, Alash autonomy was accepted and could be declared.
17 April	Dosmukhamedov told that "Kazak oblasts should be restructured according to the Soviet example." War communism in Russia.
11 May	Kyrgyz [Kazak] department in Narkomnats was activated. The main objective was announced as the establishment of the autonomous Kyrgyz [Kazak] Soviet.
27 May	Trotsky ordered the disarmament of the Czechoslovak legion, and they revolted.
8 June	The brigades of SRs took the cities of Saratov and Samara, where they established the Committee of the Members of the Constituent Assembly (Komuch).
11 June	The Whites took Semipalatinsk.
19 June	Some members of Alash Orda, including Bokeikhanov came to Semipalatinsk to turn that city into their headquarter.
June	<i>Alash Orda</i> government abolished all legal decrees of the soviets and arrested the Bolsheviks.
18 November	Kolchak, who was elected as the Supreme Ruler of Russia by other generals fighting in the western, southern and eastern fronts against the Bolsheviks, arrested the members of Komuch and became the dictator (<i>Verkhovniy Pravitel</i>) of White Russia.
21 November	Kolchak abolished Alash Orda and Bashkort governments.
1919	
January	The Kazak centers of Orenburg and Uralsk were seized by the Reds.
February	Two representatives of Alash Orda visited Zeki Velidi (Togan) with a letter from Akhmed Baitursynov, asking his ideas on passing to the side of the Soviets.
18-20 February	The pioneering group of the Alash troops moved to the Bolshevik side and the Kazak leaders headed by Baitursynov and Karaldin met Zeki Velidi (Togan) and other Bashkort leaders to move together to Moscow by train.
18-23 March	8 th congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) was held, where the Bolsheviks took decisive decisions to win the nationalities after long discussions on the right of self-

	determination.
10 July	Lenin signed a decree on “the Provisional Regulations about the revolutionary Committee on Governing the Kyrgyz [Kazak] Krai”.
November	All members of Alash Orda were promised political amnesty.
1920	
January	All remaining members of Alash Orda joined the Bolsheviks.
January	The president of <i>Alash Orda</i> , Bokeikhanov, and three other members were arrested for a short time.
17 January	Fifth Regional Party Congress in Tashkent and Muslim party members sought to organize the Russian Muslims for a Turkic Soviet Republic.
5 March	It was decided that the leaders of the western section, Khalel and Zhansha Dosmukhamedov, would be separated from the Kazak “working masses” and send to Moscow.
29 June	Zeki Velidi (Togan) left the Bolsheviks.
26 August	Kyrgyz [Kazak] Autonomous Soviet Socialist Oblast was founded with its capital in Orenburg.
31 August	Attack against “White” Poland.
November	All factories and private businesses were nationalized as part of the war communism.
December	A resolution to punish blood revenge (<i>kun</i>) was accepted.
1921	
	Shortages and the great famine.
March	New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced.
1922	
July	Kazak governments campaign against illiteracy Establishment of <i>Red Caravans</i> , <i>Red Yurts</i> .
10 August	Politburo demanded resolution of obscure relations between the republics followed by Stalin’s “Project of a Resolution Concerning the Relations between the RSFSR and the Independent Republics.”
6 October	Lenin declared “war on Great Russian chauvinism” and insisted on changes on the proposals.
22 October	The Central Committee of Georgian Communist Party resigned to protest Moscow.
30 December	The First Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The articles on the union were accepted with protests of the Georgians.
30-31	Lenin criticized some Bolsheviks on the Georgian case and underlined the danger of “Great Russian chauvinism.”
December	
1923	
5 March	Lenin moved completely to the side of the Georgian opposition and asked Trotsky to “undertake the defense of the Georgian case in the Party C.C.”
6 March	Lenin commissioned a new investigation committee for the Georgian case and sent a telegram to Georgian opposition for their encouragement.

6 March	Lenin suffered a (third) heart attack, which paralyzed him, and made his further involvement in politics impossible.
31 July	The constitution of the USSR was ratified. “Scissors crisis” because of the disproportional growth in agricultural and industrial sectors. Marriage of minors, levirate and sorority was banned.
1924	
5 April – 30 October	Chicherin’s letters on drawing national borders.
October	Party C.C. declared the birth of two socialist republics, Uzbek SSR and Turkmen SSR; two autonomous republics, Tajik ASSR and Kyrgyz [Kazak] ASSR, and two autonomous oblasts, Kara-Kyrgyz A. O. and Karakalpak A. O.
1925	
	Stalin allied with Bukharin against Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev. The campaign for the Sovietization of the Kazak <i>aul</i> . Kazak capital was moved from Orenburg to Kyzylorda. Feodor Goloshchekin was appointed by Stalin as the first secretary of <i>krai</i> party of Kazakhstan to realize the centralization attempt in the Kazak ASSR.
29 May	Stalin’s letter against “non-party intelligentsia educating Kirgiz [Kazak] youth in politics and ideology,” and for their removal.
23 October	Goloshchekin’s report “On the Kazak Press” aiming to diminish non-party intelligentsia’s role.
December	Two prominent members of the right-wing, Khozhanov and D. A. Yermekov, who were against the rapid sovietization of the Kazak <i>aul</i> , were expelled from their top positions in the party.
1927	
January	The plan for railroad project Turksib is announced. A. K. Borochokov published documents of Alash Orda. Britain suspended the diplomatic relations with the USSR, which increased the isolation of the USSR.
1928	
January	Sadvokasov in his article published in <i>Bolshevik</i> criticized the application of Stalin’s nationality policy in Kazakhstan and the First Five-Year-Plan. It became the last criticism against the party. The failure of “the campaign for the Sovietization of the Kazak <i>aul</i> .” Introduction of Planned Economy instead of NEP.
October	Secret police’s operation against Alash Orda.
1929	
	N. Martynenko published documents of Alash Orda Kazak capital was moved from Kyzylorda to Alma-Ata.
July	Literacy campaign
7 November	On the anniversary of the revolution with Stalin’s article “The Year of Great Turn” a radical attempt for the collectivization

	was officially put into action on a waste territory from Ukraine to Kazakstan.
1930	
February	35,3 percent of the Kazak population was collectivized.
March	42.1 percent of the Kazak population was collectivized.
1 March	Stalin's article "Dizzy with Success" was published celebrating the collectivization effort.
April to June	Resistance against rapid collectivization and collectivized farms declined from 7.019 to 5.701.
1932	Karakalpak A. O. was taken from the the Kazak ASSR and joined the Russian SFSR as Karakalpak ASSR.
1933	Famine caused by collectivization effort.
1934	
	The Kazak State University was opened.
	13.000 new teachers were enrolled for the literacy campaign.
1935	
	S. Braynin and Sh. Shafiro published <i>Alashorda Tarihining Ocherkteri</i> (Essays on the History of Alash Orda).
	Death of Mirzhakyp Dulatov.
1936	
	12.000 new teachers and volunteers were appointed for the literacy campaign.
	Karakalpak ASSR was joined to the Uzbek SSR.
	Kazak SSR was declared.
1937	Stalin's "Great Purges" and executions of most members of the Kazak intelligentsia, including Alash Orda.
1938	The Academy of Sciences is founded.
1939	The end of the "Great Purges".

Appendix E: Turkish Summary

1917-1920 yılları arasında Kazak aydınları birbirine zıt görünen iki ayrı grupta ittifak kurdu. 1917 Şubat Devriminden sonra Kazak halkının sözcüleri olarak öne çıkan *Kazak* gazetesi çevresindeki aydınlar, demokratik bir Rusya Federasyonu içinde Kazak halkının hak ettiği yeri alması için *Alaş Orda* hükümetini kurdular. Ekim Devriminden sonra bu çevre önce Bolşevik karşıtı Beyazların safına katıldı, ancak 1919'da Bolşeviklerin safına geçmeye başladı. 1920 başında Alaşçılar artık tamamen Bolşeviklere katılmıştı. Bu tezde Alaşçıların Kazak gazetesi çevresindeyken belli amaçları savunmaya başladıkları, bunların *Alaş Orda* hükümetini kurdukları dönemde bir siyasal program çerçevesinde netleştiği, 1920'den sonraki dönemde de Sovyet idaresi altında yine bu hedeflerini gerçekleştirmeye çalıştıkları gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bunun için Alaşçılar açısından önemli üç temel mesele ele alınmış ve konu bunların gelişimi örneğinde incelenmiştir.

Alaş Ordacılar üstüne yapılan çalışmalar Sovyet Birliği'nde 1927'de *Alaş Orda*'yla ilgili belgelerin yayınlanmasıyla başladı. 1929, 1935'te daha geniş derlemeler yayınlandı. Ancak 1935 yılında Alaşçılar milliyetçi aydınlar olarak değerlendirildiklerinden onlarla ilgili yayınlar engellenmeye, eleştirel bir önsözle basılmış olsa dahi derlemeler ortadan kaldırılmaya başlandı. SSCB'nin son dönemine kadar çalışmalar Batıda ve sınırlı kaynaklarla gerçekleştirildi. Bu

çalışmada Rusça ve pek çoğu yeni yayınlanmakta olan Kazakça kaynaklarla, Batıda yayınlanmış çeşitli yapıtlar ve kimisi sadece Türkçe yayınlanmış olan mültecilerin yazdıkları anı ve kitaplar kullanılmıştır.

1991’de Kazakistan bağımsızlığını kazandıktan sonra bir Kazak devleti kurma mücadelesinin yeni bir çaba olmadığı, bunun Sovyet döneminden önceki bir sürecin devamı olduğunu göstermek amacıyla *Alaş Orda* hükümetiyle ilgili bilgileri derlemek önem kazandı. Bugün Kazakistan’da *Alaş Orda* üstüne pek çok çalışma yapılmaktadır; yeni ortaya çıkarılan belgeler sayesinde Avrupa’da ve ABD’de de *Alaş Ordacıların* tamamının Bolşeviklere katıldığı 1920’ye kadarki dönemi kapsayan değerli çalışmalar yapılmaktadır. Ne var ki yapılan çalışmalar 1920’de her şey sona ermiş gibi sonlandırılmakta ya da başka bir döneme, 1937-1939 arasındaki Stalin’in büyük tasfiyelerine odaklanmaktadır.

Bu yaklaşım, Alaşçıların Kazakistan’da ya da SSCB’nin diğer merkezlerinde en azından 1928’e kadar devam eden katkılarını görmezden geliyor. Alaşçıların 1920’de saf değiştirmesi ne teslim olmaları ve mücadelelerini sona erdirmiş olmaları anlamını taşımaktadır ne de çok sonra gerçekleşecek ölümlerini kabullenmiş olmaları anlamına gelmektedir. Alaşçıların Sovyet saflarına geçmeleri mücadelelerinin sonu değildi; kanımca, Basmacılarla katılmak dışındaki seçeneklerin kapanmış olması bir yana, amaçladıklarını Sovyet hükümetinden alacakları destekle gerçekleştirebileceklerini düşündüklerinden bu yolu seçtiler. Bu çalışmanın bir amacı da önemli ama gölgede kalmış bir konu olan 1920’lerde Alaşçıların ne yaptıklarını ve 1928’deki kısmi tasfiyelerine kadarki süreçte modern bir Kazak ulusunun ortaya çıkarılmasındaki rollerini ortaya koymaktır.

Alaşçılar, SSCB döneminde “milliyetçi” ve “vatan haini” olarak görülmüştür, bugün ise “milli kahramanlar” Kazakistan’da çok saygın bir konumuna yükseltilmişlerdir. Birbirine zıt her iki yaklaşım da değerlendirmelerini Alaşçıların 1920 öncesindeki etkinliklerine, daha çok da 1917-1920 arasında yaptıklarına dayandırıyor. Oysa Alaşçıları anlamak için daha sonraki tercihlerine, katkılarına bakmak da önemlidir. Alaşçıların mücadelesi sadece “milliyetçi” olarak görüldükleri bu dönemle sınırlı kalmamış, kurmak istedikleri modern Kazak ulusunun oluşumuna katkıda bulunmak için kendilerine bazı olanaklar sunan ve kimi konularda hemfikir oldukları Bolşeviklerle yollarına devam etmişlerdir. Tasfiyeleriyle sonuçlanan süreç, sonu baştan belli, gelişmelerin doğal bir sonucu değildir. Bu süreç tamamlanmadan önce SSCB’de uzun tartışmalar yaşanmış, ancak bu tartışmaların sonunda muhtemelen yerel önderler açısından en olumsuz sonuçları doğuracak olan, merkezileşmeye en çok ağırlık veren kesim, *sovyetler* (kurultaylar) aleyhine parti ve devlet üstünde egemenliğini kurmuştur.

Yaşanan olayların, gelişmelerin içindeki kişiler tarafından kavranması çok kolay değildir. Ancak olaylar sona erdikten sonra, yaşananlara bakıp bunlar hakkında açık bir fikir sahibi olmak mümkün olur. Ne Bolşeviklerin ne de Alaşçıların tereddütsüz ve tavizsiz, önceden saptanmış, kesin hatlarıyla belli bir hedefe doğru yürüdükleri söylenemez. Gündelik olayların karmaşası içinde özneler, önlerindeki seçenekler arasından kendi planlarına uygun gördükleri yolları seçer ve o yönde ilerlemeye çalışırlar. Sonraki gelişmeler bu özneleri tarihçilerin “kahraman” ya da “hain” gibi uç tanımlamalarla değerlendirilmelerine neden olabilir, ancak bunlar öznel sınıflandırmalardır ve aslında süreç içinde

kendi yollarını bulmaya çalışan insanları nitelemekten uzaktır. Alaşçılar da dönemin hayati bir öneme sahip olduğunun bilinciyle, önlerinde varolan seçenekler arasında kendi hedeflerine en uygun gördüklerini seçmiş, 1920'den sonrasını da kapsayan bir süreklilik içinde, milli hükümet kurmaktan sosyalist bir ülkenin parçası olmaya kadar Kazakların modern bir ulus olması için çaba sarf etmişlerdir.

Birinci Bölüm: Liberal, Milliyetçi Siyasetçiler Olarak Kazak Aydınları

Kazak aydınlarının Rusya siyasal hayatında yerlerini almaları 1905'te açılan Duma sayesinde gerçekleşti. Birinci Duma'da dört Kazak bölgesinden, Alihan Bökeihanov'un (186?-1937) önderlik ettiği dört temsilci görev aldı. Bökeihanov meşrutiyetten yana, liberal demokrat Rus Kadet hareketi içinde önemli bir konuma sahip bir Kazak aydını ve siyasetçisiydi; ölümüne kadar da Kazak aydınlanması ve siyasi mücadelesinde saygın ve etkin bir yere sahip oldu.

Alaş Orda hükümetini kuracak olan çevre de Bökeihanov ve ondan daha genç olan Ahmet Baytursinov (1873-1937) ve Mirjakıp Dulatov (1885-1935) öncülüğünde çıkarılan *Kazak* (1913-1918) gazetesi çevresinde bir araya geldi. Bu çevre Kazak halkını ilgilendiren konuları, çözüm önerilerini, Kazak halkını aydınlatacak, onları modern bir ulus yapacak girişimlerini bu dergi aracılığıyla tartışmaya, geniş Kazak yığınlarına duyurmaya başladı. Bu dergide ağırlıklı olarak ele alınan konular arasında toprak sorunu, ulusal haklar, bir Kazak edebi dilinin oluşturulması, toplumsal dönüşüm (modernleşme) gibi tamamı Kazak halkının kurtuluşu çerçevesinde değerlendirilebilecek meseleler yer alıyordu.

1917 Şubat Devriminden sonra *Kazak* dergisi çevresindeki bu grup, temsilciler meclisine dayalı yeni bir düzene doğru ilerleyen Rusya’da çok hızlı hareket etmeleri ve kısa bir süre içinde yapılacağını düşündükleri seçimler için Kazak halkını örgütlemeleri, mecliste onların haklarını korumak amacıyla hazırlık yapmaları gerektiğini kavradı. Bunun için Rusya’nın diğer bölgelerinde diğer halklar için olduğu gibi Kazakistan’da da Tüm-Kazak kongreleri yapılmasını ve burada bir yandan Kazak halkını bir araya getirirken, bir yandan da Kazak halkının taleplerini ortaya koymayı üstlendiler. Bökeihanov *Kadet*lerden ayrıldı ve arkadaşlarıyla birlikte üç Kazak cüzünü birleştirip, Kazakları temsil edecek bir siyasi parti kurmaya girişti.

21-26 Temmuz 1917’de toplanan Birinci Tüm-Kazak Kongresinde katılımcılar on dört başlık altında hükümetin türü, Kazak *oblast*larının özerkliği, toprak sorunu, ulusal milislerin oluşturulması, *zemstvolar*, eğitim, mahkemeler, dini kurumlar, kadın hakları, temsilciler meclisi ve seçimlere hazırlık, *Şuray-i İslamiye*, bir Kazak siyasi partisinin kurulması, Jedisu bölgesinin durumu, Tüm-Rusya Federal Kongresi ve Petrograd Eğitim Komitesi için temsilcilerin seçimi ile ilgili konuları tartıştılar.

Bu kongre sonunda kaleme alınan ve 31 Temmuz 1917’de *Kazak* gazetesinde yayınlanan kararlar bize Kazak aydınlarının siyasi hedefleri hakkındaki ilk somut talepleri sunduklarından büyük öneme sahiptir. Kongreye *Kazak* gazetesi çevresi damgasını vurmuş ve alınan kararların özünü gazetede tartışılan öneriler oluşturmuştur.

Burada Rusya’nın federal, demokratik bir cumhuriyet olması, Kazak Steplerine göç eden Rus köylülerine verilmek üzere devlet tarafından el konan,

ama henüz dağıtılmamış toprakların ihtiyacı olan Kazaklara verilmesi, herkes için zorunlu ve parasız eğitim, ulusal milislerin, Kazak adetlerine uygun işleyen yerel mahkemelerin kurulması; dini işlerin önce bir Kazak müftülüğüne sonra da Kazak yönetiminin yetki alanına devredilmesi; kadın hakları gibi gerek modernleşme gerekse özerklik gibi, ancak hepsinin ortak paydası modern bir Kazak ulusu yaratmak olan kararlar alındı. Bu kararlar eşliğinde Kazak halkının temsilcisi olarak *Alaş* partisi kuruldu ve parti programı 21 Kasım 1917'de *Kazak* gazetesinde yayınlandı.

Bu arada 7-8 Kasım 1917'de Petrograd'da Bolşevikler Geçici Hükümeti yıkarak tüm iktidara *sovyetler* (konseyler) adına el koydular. Şubat Devriminden beri Rusya'da iki başlı bir yönetim vardı. İşçi ve askerler arasında Temmuzdan sonra hızla güç kazanmış olan Bolşevikler, Petrograd'daki İkinci Tüm-Rusya Sovyetleri Kongreleri sırasında Geçici Hükümet temsilcilerini tutuklayarak bu iki başlılığa son vermiş, iktidarda Rusya'nın gerçek temsilcileri olarak gördükleri *sovyetleri* iktidarda rakipsiz bırakmışlardı. Bu durumun önemi ve kalıcı değişikliklere yol açacağı başlangıçta Alaşçılar arasında görülemedi. Alaşçılar bunu merkezde, Ruslar arasındaki bir iktidar hesaplaşmasının parçası olarak gördüler ve kendi hazırlıklarına devam ettiler. Aslında Bolşeviklerin kendileri de bunun kalıcılığı hakkında kuşkulara sahipti.

Alaşçılar kendi örgütlenmelerine devam ettiler, siyasi parti programlarını yayınladılar ve bununla girdikleri seçimlerde ezici bir çoğunlukla Kazak halkının gerçek temsilcisi olduklarını onaylattılar.

On maddeden oluşan programlarında öne çıkan hedefleri şunlardı: Rusya federal, demokratik bir cumhuriyet olmalı; Kazak *oblastları* bunun özerk bir

parçası olmalı; parti yoksulun yoldaşı, mülk sahiplerinin düşmanı olmalı; din ve devlet işleri birbirinden ayrılmalı; Kazakların kendi müftüsü olmalı; mahkemeler Kazak geleneklerine uygun hale getirilmeli; askeri kuvvetler oluşturulmalı; vergi, sahip olunan mülke göre alınmalı; işçi hakları korunmalı; herkes eğitimden eşit yararlanmalı, eğitim parasız ve ilk yıllarda Kazakça olmalı; toprakların dağıtımında yerel halka öncelik ve ayrıcalık verilmeli.

Bolşeviklerin yayınladıkları ilk kararnamelerden biri ulusların hakları ve ulusların kendi kaderlerini tayin hakkıyla ilgiliydi. Bu, Alaşçılar tarafından coşkuyla karşılanabilecek olmasına karşın Alaşçılar Beyazların saflarına katılmayı tercih ettiler. Bunun nedenleri arasında şunlar sayılabilir: Alaşçılar dağıtılan geçici hükümete daha yakındı ve bunu Rusya'nın meşru hükümeti olarak görüyorlardı; aynı meclisin sıralarını paylaştıkları, demokratik bir Rusya kurma mücadelesinde birlikte saf tuttıkları meclis dışından diğer arkadaşları da Beyazların safındaydı; ayrıca Beyazlar Alaşçıların merkezi Orenburg dahil geniş bir bölgede Bolşeviklerden daha güçlü görünüyorlardı. Bunların yanında Alaşçıların kurmayı kararlaştırdıkları milisler için malzeme, eğitim ve teçhizata da gereksinimleri vardı ve Beyazlar bu beklentilerini karşılamayı vaat ediyorlardı.

1918'de Alaşçılar iç savaşta Beyazların yanında yerlerini aldılar. Savaş sırasında bir yandan devlet organlarını kurmaya çalışırken, bir yandan da süvari birlikleri oluşturmaya başladılar. Bu adımlarla Alaşçılar, kendi ayakları üstünde durabilecek, Kazak halkını milletler dünyasının bir parçası yapabilecek kurumları inşa etmeye çalıştılar. Ancak yazışmalardan görüldüğü üzere idari ya da askeri hiçbir devlet kurumu için yeterli elemanın olmaması onlar açısından ciddi bir sorun teşkil ediyordu.

Bunun yanında Kızıl Ordunun iç savaşta üstünlüğü ele geçirmesi ve Ocak 1918’de Alaşçıların merkezi Orenburg’u alması da *Alaş Orda*’ya önemli bir darbe vurmuş, *Alaş Orda* hükümeti coğrafi olarak birbirinden uzak üç merkez tarafından idare edilir duruma düşmüştü. Öte yandan Beyaz Ordu; sosyalistler, cumhuriyetçiler, monarşistler gibi pek çok grubu bir arada tutuyordu ve “tek ve bölünmemiş bir Rusya” sloganı etrafında birleşmiş monarşi yanlısı generallerden Kolçak, Kasım 1918’de kendi egemenlikleri altındaki Samara’da kurulmuş olan demokrasi ve cumhuriyet yanlısı hükümeti dağıtıp, üyelerini tutuklatarak bu birliğe darbe vurdu. Bu, Alaşçıların da umutsuzluğa düşmelerine Beyaz Ordu dışında arayışlara girmelerine neden olacaktı.

Alaş Orda Şubat 1919’da Başkurtların önderi Zeki Velidi’ye (Togan) iki temsilci yollayarak, görüş alışverişinde bulundu. Başkurtlar birkaç güne kadar Kızıl Ordunun safına geçeceklerdi; Zeki Velidi (Togan) Kazaklara bunu birlikte gerçekleştirmeyi önerdi. Gelişmelerden anlaşıldığına göre, *Alaş Ordacılar* hep birlikte saf değiştirmek yerine, birkaç kişiyi öncü olarak yollamayı ve onların hem Sovyet saflarındaki durumu gözden geçirmeleri hem de bir genel siyasi af anlaşması yapmalarını kararlaştırmıştı. Baytursınov ve Karaldin öncülüğündeki bu grup 18-20 Şubatta Zeki Velidi (Togan) ile birlikte Bolşeviklere katılıp, Moskova’ya hareket etti.

İç savaşın kazanımlarını pekiştirmek ve diğer halkları da kendi saflarına çekerek Beyazların tüm dayanaklarını ortadan kaldırmak isteyen Bolşevikler bir örnek teşkil etmesi için Mart 1919’da Tatar, Başkurt ve Kazak hükümetlerinin özerkliğini tanıdılar. Bu doğrultuda Halk Komiserlikleri (*Narkomnat*) kuruldu. Kazak özerkliğinin oluşturulması için çalışacak kurumun başına Temmuz 1919’da

Baytursinov getirildi. Baytursinov, bu tarihlerde *Jizn Natsionalnostei* (Milliyetlerin Hayatı) gazetesinde yayınlanan bir makalesinde Kazaklar arasında “ilkel komünizm”in yaygın olduğu, sınıf çelişkilerinin olmadığını yazarak, hem Bolşeviklere hem de diğer Kazaklara bir geçiş sorunu, uzlaşmaz çelişkilerden doğacak yıpratıcı mücadeleler olmayacağı mesajını verdi. Yine aynı yazısında Alaşçılara daha açık bir mesaj da verdi ve “tüm yüreğimle yoldaşlarımı teskin edebilirim ki, Sovyet iktidarını Kolçak’inkine tercih etmekle yanılmamışız” diye değerlendirmesini aktardı.

1919’un özellikle ikinci yarısında pek çok Alaşçı Bolşevik saflarına geçmeye başlamıştı; 1920 başında *Alaş Orda*’nın önderlik kadrosunda kalan hükümet başkanı Bökeihanov ile Dulatov gibi diğerleri de Bolşeviklere katıldılar. Bunlardan Bökeihanov kısa bir süreliğine tutuklanıp, serbest bırakıldı ve çalışmasına izin verildi.

Üçüncü Bölüm: Sovyet Milliyet Politikalarının Oluşumu ve Kazaklar

Bolşeviklerin milliyet politikaları süreç içinde ve farklı taraflar arasındaki mücadeleler tarafından biçimlendirilmiştir. Bu konudaki ilk çalışma Stalin tarafından 1913 yılında hazırlanmış olmakla birlikte, 1917’de devrim gerçekleştirildiğinde Lenin’in ısrarıyla milliyetler politikasının merkezine yerleştirilen “ulusların kendi kaderlerini tayin hakkı” gibi ilkeler dışında, aslında pratik işlerin nasıl yürütüleceğiyle ilgili izlenecek açık bir program yoktur. Kaldı ki, böyle bir program olsaydı dahi sürece yön verecek olan bu programdan çok yine Bolşeviklerin içinde ve dışında yer alan farklı taraflarla yapılacak tartışmalar ve gelişen olaylar olacaktı.

Soğuk savaş döneminde ortaya atılan kimi tezlerin aksine Bolşevikler süreci tek başlarına yönlendirebilecek konumda değillerdi. Yapılan çalışmalarda kaynak yetersizliğinden, yerel kaynaklara erişimin engellenmiş olmasından ya da araştırmacıların siyasi yönelimleri nedeniyle yerel önderlerin rolü ihmal edilmiştir. Gerek Batı merkezli çalışmalar gerekse Sovyetlerde yapılan çalışmalar birbirine zıt nedenlerle ağırlığı merkezi otoriteye vermiş ve sanki baştan alınmış kararlar doğrultusunda bir planın gerçekleştirildiği gibi bir izlenimin doğmasına neden olmuşlardır. Oysa ne kararlı tek bir siyasi grup vardı ne de süreç baştan beri onların yönlendirmesi altında gelişti. Bolşevikler içinde de, onların pazarlıklara giriştiği yerel önderler arasında da farklı görüşleri savunanlar vardı. Süreç bunların pazarlıkları ve karşılaşılan olaylarda alınan farklı tavırlar tarafından biçimlendirildi. Bu bağlamda 1924'te Orta Asya'da farklı cumhuriyetlerin oluşumu da baştan verilmiş bir karara göre değil, gerek Bolşevikler arasında gerekse Orta Asya'daki önderlerle yapılan tartışmalar sonucunda, "böl ve yönet" politikası dışında kültürel haklar, ekonomik sürdürülebilirlik ve yerel önderlerin desteği ya da itirazı gibi etkenler tarafından belirlenmiştir.

1917'de devrimden sonra amaçlanan, Lenin tarafından ortaya atılan görüş, Rusya dahil tüm cumhuriyetlerin özgür iradeleriyle katılacakları ya da ayrılacakları bir birlik kurmaktı. Finlandiya, Polonya gibi ülkelerin ayrılması, Ukrayna, Gürcistan gibi ülkelerin Bolşevik olmayan yönetimlerle Moskova ile pazarlığa oturması buna uygundu. Ancak özellikle Polonya, Ukrayna, Gürcistan'daki gelişmeler Moskova'daki tartışmaları derinden etkiledi. Öte yandan Bolşeviklerin devrimin Rusya'da kalmayacağı, asıl sosyalist olması gereken gelişmiş kapitalist Almanya aracılığıyla dünyaya yayılacağına olan

inancın Alman Devriminin başarısızlığa uğramasından sonra yıkılması da süreci etkiledi ve merkeziyetçi, korumacı anlayışların güç kazanmasını kolaylaştırdı.

Devrimin ülkeden ülkeye yayılmasıyla etki alanı genişleyecek olan, sınırları konmamış bir “Dünya Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti” ya da 1919’da Lenin’in tanımladığı şekliyle “Dünya Federe Sovyet Cumhuriyeti” ideali devrimin yayılma olanaklarının tıkanmasıyla, varolanla yetinme ve elde kalanlarla “tek ülkede sosyalizm”i koruma yönündeki görüşlere destek sağladı. Lenin 1923’te siyaset sahnesinden çekilene kadar yazı ve söylevleriyle Gürcüler, Başkurtlar, Kazaklar gibi halkların kendi kaderlerini tayin hakkını savundu, ancak gelişmeler karşısında karşı cephede yer alan Stalin, Buharin, Cerjinski, Orjonikidze’nin merkeziyetçi görüşleri ağırlık kazandı. Sonuçta, her ne kadar Lenin’in vurguladığı gibi şeklen Rusya’nın da dahil olduğu bir “Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği” kurulduysa da; özünde bu, merkezinde Rusya’nın yer aldığı, diğer cumhuriyetlerin kendi kaderlerini tayin hakkı bir yana, iç işlerinde özerkliklerinin dahi olmadığı bir yapıya dönüştü. Ulusların kendi kaderlerini tayin hakkı da, özerklikleri de yasada varlıklarını korumalarına karşın, bunlar kağıt üstünde kalmaya mahkum kılındılar.

Bununla birlikte ulusal değerlerin desteklenmesi ve ulusların gelişimine paralel olarak büyük Sovyet ağacının kök salmasını amaçlayan *korenizatsia* politikası Lenin’in aktif siyasetten çekildiği 1923’ten, hatta 1924’teki ölümünden sonra da devam etti.

Lenin’in ölümünden sonra Stalin, Leninizm adı altında ölümsüzleştirdiği ve dondurduğu ilkelerin izleyicisi olarak kendini Lenin’in meşru varisi olarak kabul ettirdi. Partinin genel sekreteri olarak aslında önemsiz, bürokratik bir

konuma sahip olan Stalin, bu konumu aracılığıyla yaptığı atamalarla parti içinde ve SSCB'nin tamamında etkinliğini arttırdı. Aslında *sovyet* olarak tanımlanan kurultaylara dayanması gereken, dolayısıyla yerel önderlikler üstünde aşağıdan yukarıya doğru işlemesi gereken sistem, partinin denetiminde yukarıdan aşağıya işleyen bir yapıya dönüştü. Parti, devlet mekanizmasıyla iç içe geçerek, 1928'e doğru aşamalı bir biçimde ülkenin, *sovyetlerin*, yerel önderliklerin üstündeki tek otoriteye dönüştü. Bununla birlikte parti içinde de tek bir kişi iktidarı kendinde topladı.

SSCB'nin “insanlığın sosyalizme doğru ilerleyişinde yalnız kalması”, “tek ülkede sosyalizm”i korumak, mümkün olduğunca hızlı, gelişmiş kapitalist ülkelerin düzeyine erişmek için planlama ile bir atılım yapmak gibi kaygılar bu merkeziyetçi yapının kurulmasını ve kabul görmesini kolaylaştırdı. O zamanki anlayışa göre, SSCB'ye de Birinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında Almanya örneğinde görüldüğü gibi, bütün kaynakların bir devlet planlamasıyla seferber edildiği kapsamlı bir kalkınma hamlesi gerekiyordu. Bunun da tek yolunun bir ordu gibi yukarıdan aşağı bir komuta anlayışı ve merkezi planlama olduğuna inanılıyordu. Koşulların bu yönde gelişmesi, 1917'de devrimden önceki özgürlükçü iddiaların bir kenara bırakılarak baskıcı yöntemlerin benimsenmesini meşrulaştırmış olmalı.

Öte yandan *korenizatsia* politikasına uygun olarak, Kazak dilinin gelişimi, modern bir Kazak toplumu yaratma yönünde de dikkate değer adımlar atılıyordu. Alaşçılar da kendilerine bu kültürel atılım içinde yer buldular ve kendilerini, onlara sunulan, daha önceden sahip olmadıkları olanaklarla halklarının gelişimine, eğitime, aydınlatılmasına adadılar.

Dördüncü Bölüm: Bir Modernleşme Projesi Olarak Sovyetleştirme ve Kazak ÖSSC'deki Sonuçları

1920'de Alaşçılar Bolşeviklerin saflarına katıldıklarında kendi hedeflediklerinden farklı bir yola sapmamış, sadece halklarını modernleştirmek için başka bir yol izlemeyi seçmişlerdi. Gerek yayınladıkları *Kazak* gazetesinde gerekse 1917'de hazırladıkları parti programında ağırlık verdikleri en önemli meseleler arasında Kazakların modern bir ulus olarak tarih sahnesine çıkmaları yer alıyordu. Gelişmeler sonucunda bunu demokratik federal bir Rusya Cumhuriyeti içinde gerçekleştirmeleri bir seçenek olmaktan çıkmıştı. Ancak Bolşevikler de onların modernleşme hedeflerini paylaşıyorlardı ve Bolşeviklerin de ülkenin modernleştirilmesi için kendileriyle bu hedefi paylaşan yerel aydınlara gereksinimleri olduğundan Kazakistan dahil Orta Asya ülkelerinde kendilerine yenilikçiler arasında pek çok yandaş bulabildiler.

Alaşçılar daha çok eğitim, kültürel etkinlikler gibi alanlarda kendilerine yer bulurken, siyaset sahnesinde de rol alanlar oldu. 1919'da Bolşeviklere katılan Baytursinov, 1921'e kadar bakanlıkla eşdeğer bir makamda, Halk Komiseri olarak görev yaptı. Bu tarihte siyaset sahnesinden çekilmek zorunda kaldıysa da onun gibi Alaşçılar arasında önder konumunda olmayan başka Alaşçılar Halk Komiseri olarak Kazakistan'ın yönetiminde etkin görevler aldılar.

Ancak hem Alaşçıların önder kadrosunun hem de daha geri planda kalan Alaşçıların asıl etkinlik alanları Kazakların eğitimiyle ilgili alanlarda oldu. En azından 1928'e kadar pek çok Alaşçının biyografisinde öğretmen, müdür, bilim adamı, profesör, dekan, rektör, dilbilimci, tiyatrocu, yazar, editör, doktor, başhekim olarak çalıştıklarını, üstelik kimilerinin en üst düzey devlet

kurumlarında bu görevlerini yerine getirdiklerini görüyoruz. Bunlardan siyasetteki rolleri tasfiye edilmiş olsa da bundan sonra asli işlevleri olan Kazak halkını aydınlatma görevlerine geri döndükleri anlaşılıyor. O dönem onların içinde bulundukları koşullar açısından bakacak olursak, ne Rus Çarlığı döneminde ne de *Alaş Orda* döneminde sahip olmadıkları pek çok olanağın ellerinin altında olduğunu ve belki de en sonunda *Kazak* gazetesini çıkardıkları yıllardan beri yapmak istedikleri işlere kendilerini adayabildiklerini düşünebiliriz. Bu dönem, yayınladıkları kitaplar açısından da çok verimli bir dönem olarak görünüyor. Alaşçılar, Kazak halkının gelişimi için okul kitapları, tiyatro oyunları, romanlar ile dilbilim, tarih, hayvancılık, sağlık, tarım gibi kendi meslekleriyle ilgili çeşitli konularda bilimsel araştırmalar yapıp sonuçlarını yayınlıyorlar.

Alaşçıların yanında devlet de çeşitli modernleşme atılımlarıyla Alaşçıların beklentilerine uygun adımlar atıyor. Eğitimin yaygınlaştırılması için çeşitli kampanyalarda on binlerce öğretmen görevlendiriliyor ve bunlar aracılığıyla yerleşim yerlerinde etkin kampanyalar düzenleniyor. Ancak nüfusun önemli bir kesiminin göçer olması nedeniyle bu kampanyalar *Kızıl Yurtlar* ve *Kızıl Karavanlar* gibi göçerlere eşlik edecek, onlara eğitim ve sağlık alanında destek verecek girişimlerle de destekleniyor. Bunlar, halkı sosyalist idealler doğrultusunda eğitmek gibi amaçlar taşısa da, Alaşçıların Kazak halkına sunmak istedikleri modernleşme ile ters düşen adımlar değil.

Bunun yanında Sovyetler bazı gelenekleri de kaldırmaya girişiyorlar. Her ne kadar Alaşçılar mahkemelerin geleneksel hukukla uyumlu hale getirilmesini savunmuş olsalar da, özellikle kadınla erkek arasındaki eşitsizlik onların da önemle üstünde durdukları konular arasında yer alıyor. Bunun bir yansıması olan

başlık parasının (*kalım*) yasaklanması Alaşçıların da uygulamaya koymayı hedefledikleri bir önlem. Yine Alaşçıların da hedefledikleri arasında yer alan reşit olmayan kişiler arasındaki evlilikler, berdel gibi geleneksel uygulamalar da yasaklanıyor. Ancak bunlar güçlerini geleneksel, patriarkal düzen ve bunu besleyen geleneksel ilişki ağlarından aldıklarından bunların halen egemen olduğu bir ortamda bu yasaklanan gelenekler varlıklarını korumanın yollarını buluyor.

Sovyetlerin giriştiği bir başka önemli atılım da sanayileşme alanında. Geniş kesimlerin köylülüğe dayandığı bir ülkede proletaryaya dayalı bir devrim yapmış olmanın zaafılarını taşıyan Sovyet hükümeti, en kısa zamanda proletaryayı olması gereken güce taşımak durumundaydı. Bununla birlikte Sovyetlerin bir an önce kendi ayakları üstünde durabildiği ve çevresindeki kapitalist ülkelerle arasındaki farkı kapattığı bir konuma erişmesi gerekiyordu. Bu gerekçelerle Sovyetler hızlı bir sanayileşme atılımına girişmeliydi. Kazakistan için de bu geçerliydi, ancak merkezin Kazak topraklarını daha çok bir hammadde bölgesi olarak görmesi, partinin önde gelen Kazak Bolşevikleri tarafından da sert biçimde eleştiriliyordu. Ne var ki, bu eleştiriler de yerel önderleri destekleyen *sovyet*lerin yerini partinin alması, böylelikle yerel önerlerin yerini de merkezden atanan, Goloşçekin gibi merkeze sadık kişilerin almasıyla bertaraf edilmiş oldu.

1928’de girişilecek planlı ekonomi hamlesi öncesinde merkezin kararlarına direnç gösterebilecek, yerel çıkarları savunabilecek ve gücünü bulunduğu yerden alan seçilmişler bulundukları konumlardan uzaklaştırıldılar. Böylelikle, 1928’de başlanan planlı ekonomi öncesinde merkezin direktifleri karşısında direnç, en azından tereddüt gösterebilecek, halk açısından ortaya

çıkabilecek yıkımlarda halka sözcülük edecek, böylelikle yine programın aksamasına neden olabilecek kişiler ortadan kaldırıldı.

Sanayileşme, SSCB çapında etkin planlama, etkin işbölümü, makine gibi uyumlu işleyen bir sistemin yaratılması, insan ve hayvanların *sovhoz* ve *kolhoz*larda toplanması, Sovyet gücünün ulaşamadığı *aullarda* geleneksel otoritenin kırılması olarak özetlenebilecek pek çok gereksinim birikerek, 1928-1929'da planlı ekonomiye geçiş ve onun öncesinde muhtemel muhalefet odaklarının konumlarından uzaklaştırılmaları şeklinde bir sonuç doğurdu.

Beşinci Bölüm: Steplerde Toprak Sorunu ve Nihai Çözüm: Kolektifleştirme

Bolşeviklerle Alaşçılar arasındaki meselenin düğümlendiği alanlardan biri toprak sorunuydu. Gerek ulusal haklar gerekse modernleşme açısından kimi Bolşevik Kazaklar da dahil daha geniş bir Kazak aydın grubuyla merkez arasındaki ayrım daha çok öncelikler konusundaydı. Kazaklar geri konumdaki bir halk olduklarından Kazak aydınlarına göre öncelik Kazak halkına verilmeliydi; diğer Bolşevikler ise, konuya sınıf penceresinden bakıyor ve Kazak ya da Rus ayrımına girmeksizin önceliğin ezilen sınıf olan proletaryaya verilmesi gerektiğini söylüyorlardı. Böyle bir kuramsal tartışmada, kişi ideolojik tercihlerine göre bir yer tutabilir, ancak işçi sınıfına dahil olanların çoğunluğunun Rus olması, Bolşevik de olsa Kazaklar açısından durumu güçleştiriyordu. Ama sorun bununla da sınırlı kalmıyordu. Pek çok Rus, kendi hükümetleri diye gördüklerinden Bolşevikleri desteklerken (ve bu sınıfsal konumları nedeniyle destek de bulabilecekken), aynı zamanda mülkiyet sahibi sınıfın da çoğunlukla çarlık

politikaları sayesinde oluşan zengin toprak sahibi Ruslardan oluşması, Bolşevikler açısından işi daha da zorlaştırıyordu.

Rus çarlığı döneminde nüfus artışı ve 1861’de toprak köleliğinin kaldırılışı Rus köylüsünün toprak talebini arttırmıştı. Kazak Steplerinde göçerlerin kullandığı, tarıma açılmamış, yerleşik düzene geçilmemiş toprakların bu köylüleri yerleştirmek için çarlığa gerekli araziye sunacağı düşünülmüştü. Bu amaçla, Kazaklar tarafından kullanılmadığı varsayılan topraklara, kurulan bir komisyon tarafından el konularak, bu toprak tarım yapmak amacıyla toprağı değerlendirmek isteyen köylülere dağıtılmıştır. Çıkarılan kararnamelere göre yalnızca sürekli yerleşimin olduğu ve işlenen topraklar mülk olarak kabul ediliyordu. Ayrıca tarım için gerekli toprak büyüklüğü tarımla uğraşan aileler için adam başına 15 *desyatin*, göçerler için kişi başına 15 *desyatin* olarak belirlenmişti. Bu statünün dışındaki topraklara Devlet Toprak Vakfının el koyma hakkı vardı.

Ancak bu uygulama Kazakların kışın sığındıkları daha sıcak yerlerdeki, korunaklı ve verimli topraklara el konulup bunların göçle gelen köylülere verilmesine neden oluyordu. Bu uygulamayla göçerler hayvanlar için gerekli sulak arazileri de kaybediyorlardı. Öte yandan her göç mevsiminde daha önceden geçiş yolu olarak kullandıkları toprakların çitlerle çevrilip tarıma ayrıldığını görmek, yeni göç yolları aramak zorunda kalmalarına, hatta belli bölgelerde sıkışmalarına yol açıyordu. Bu gelişmeler Kazakları yerleşik hayat geçmeye zorluyordu, ancak verimli toprakların önceden gelen köylülere verilmiş olması ve daha önemlisi, Kazakların tarım konusunda yeterli bilgisinin olmaması, Kazakları yerleşik hayat geçseler dahi çok kötü koşullarda yaşamaya mahkum ediyordu.

Kazak aydınları göçerlerin yerleşik hayata geçmelerinin gerekli olduğu konusunda hemfikirdi. Gerek *Kazak* gerekse *Aikap* gazeteleri etrafında bir araya gelmiş olan Kazak aydınları Kazak halkının ilerlemesi için yerleşik hayata geçmelerini gerekli bir aşama olarak görüyor, ancak bunun yöntemi ve hızı konusunda ayrışıyorlardı. *Aikap* çevresi çok hızlı bir biçimde yerleşik hayata geçilmesi ve hayvancılığın bırakılması gerektiğini savunurken, *Kazak* çevresi bunun aşamalı bir biçimde yapılmasından yanaydı ve hayvancılık Kazak Stepleri için en uygun geçim yolu olduğundan bunun tamamen terk edilmemesi gerektiğini savunuyorlardı. Ayrıca hayvancılığın sürdürülmesi devlet tarafından Kazaklara tahsis edilecek toprakların daha geniş olmasını da sağlayacaktı.

Kazak aydınları yalnızca dergi yazılarında değil, diğer eserlerinde de bu konunun önemine vurgu yapıyorlardı.

Sonradan *Kazak* gazetesinin kurucuları arasında yer alan Dulayov'u üne kavuşturan ve o dönem Kazak milli uyanışı açısından da büyük öneme sahip *Oyan Kazak* (Uyan Kazak) şiirinde de bu meseleye yer verilir. Kazakların uyanmasını gerektiren nedenler arasında ilk sırada "toprağın gitmesi" sayılır ve şiirin devamında da 1867'den beri Kazakların toprakları nasıl yitirdikleri ve bunun olumsuz sonuçları aktarılır.

Bökeihanov da *Kazak* gazetesindeki bir yazısında Kazak Steplerinin kolonileştirilmesinin vahim sonuçlarına dikkat çekerken, Kazakların kurtuluşu için çözüm önerileri de sunar. Kültürel olarak daha güçlü bir unsurla yan yana olmak daha zayıf olanın yutulmasına neden olacaktır. Bu nedenle Bökeihanov kültürel olarak güçlü bir duruma gelmenin, böylelikle iki toplumun birbirini yok etmeden bağımsız gelişimini sürdürmesinin önemine dikkat çeker. Dulatov ve

Bökeihanov'un yazdıklarından da görüldüğü gibi, Kazakların modern bir ulus olması Kazak aydınları için ivedilik taşımakla birlikte onları buna kritik bir önem vermeye iten toprak sorunudur.

Bökeihanov'un bu yazısında da diğer yazılarla tutarlı bir biçimde bölgeye sonradan gelenlerle bir arada yaşamının düşünüldüğünün görülmesi Kazak milliyetçiliği açısından ilginç bir duruma işaret eder. Bu milliyetçilik Kazak olmayanları dışlamaya yönelik değil, Kazakların varlıklarını korumaya, Kazakları geliştirmeye yönelik bir milliyetçilik.

1916'daki büyük isyanı hazırlayan da toprak sorununun yarattığı gerilimdir. Her ne kadar isyan Rusya'nın Müslümanları da askere alma kararına tepki olarak ortaya çıkmış olsa da bunun yarattığı patlama toprak sorununun en çok gerilime yol açtığı Orta Asya'da, Kazaklar ve Kırgızlar arasında yaşanmıştır.

Bu dönemde *Kazak* gazetesi çevresi isyan eden halkı sakinleştirmeye çalışırken, daha sonra Bolşeviklere katılacak olan Rıskulov, Cangeldin gibi Kazaklar isyancıların arasında yer alıyorlardı. Toprak sorunu, toprak paylaşımı milliyetçi hareketler için hassas bir konudur. Toprakların paylaşımı pek çok milliyetçi önderliğin halkı kendi yanına çekmesini kolaylaştırmıştır. Kazaklar arasında böyle bir söylemin ve dışlamacı eğilimlerin görülmemesi herhalde sadece merkezi hükümet karşısındaki zayıflıklarıyla açıklanamaz. 1916 isyanı gibi hassas dönemlerde ya da iç savaş sırasındaki gibi görece güçlü oldukları dönemlerde dahi Kazak aydınlarının bir arada yaşamayı dışlamaması, Kazak olmayanların elindeki topraklara el koymaya girişmemek bir yana *Alaş Orda* hükümetinde onlara da temsilcileri için yer ayırmaları dışlamacı değil bir arada yaşamaya önem veren bir milliyetçiliği benimsediklerinin önemli göstergeleri arasındadır.

Bolşeviklerin toprak sorunu karşısında farklı bir çözümü vardı. Toprak sorunu göçle gelenler ve Kazaklar arasında bir fark gözetmeksizin çözülecekti. Bolşevikler ilkesel olarak mülkiyete karşı olduklarından toprakların kimin mülkiyetinde olması gerektiği de onlar açısından aslında bir sorun teşkil etmiyordu. Bolşevikler açısından milliyeti ne olursa olsun göçerler ve köylülerin kolektif çiftliklerde bir araya gelmesi esastı. Mesele daha çok *Aykap* ve *Kazak* gazetelerinin tartışmasında olduğu gibi bunun yöntemi konusundaydı.

Sadvakasov, Hocanov gibi önde gelen Bolşevik Kazak siyasetçileri kolektifleştirmenin uzun bir sürece yayılarak gerçekleştirilmesi gerektiğini savunuyorlardı. Aslında bu tartışma sadece Kazaklar arasında yapılmıyordu; Moskova’da da bu konum Buharin çevresindeki bir grup tarafından savunuluyordu. Hızlı bir kolektifleştirme köylüleri felakete sürükleyecek ve işçi-köylü ittifakına zarar verecekti. Ancak 1925-1928 arasındaki “*aulların sovyetleştirilmesi*” atılımının başarısızlığı, kolektifleştirmede istenen sonuçların elde edilememesi, hatta seçimlerde Kazak *aullarında* geleneksel seçkinler kesiminin gücünü koruduğunun görülmesi, Stalin gibi daha sert önlemler alınmasını savunanların konumunu güçlendirdi.

Katı bir kolektifleştirmeye girişmeden önce, buna direnç gösterebilecek ya da bir felakete sürüklenen Kazakların sözcülüğünü üstlenebilecek kişiler 1928-1929’da ya Moskova’daki görevlendirmelerle bölgeden uzaklaştırıldılar ya da sürgüne yollandılar. Moskova’da ülkenin en saygın bilim kurumu Bilimler Akademisinde çalışmakta olan Bökeihanov dışındaki pek çok Alaşçı, bu tutuklama kampanyasının kurbanları arasında yer aldılar. Etkin Bolşevikler olarak mücadelelerini sürdüren Kazaklar ise Moskova’da sözde önemli görevlere tayin

edilerek kızağa çekildiler. Böylece 7 Kasım 1929'da devrimin yıldönümünde Stalin kolektifleştirme hamlesini başlattığında, buna karşı çıkabilecek kimse kalmamıştı.

“Küçük Ekim Devrimi” olarak adlandırılan, devrimin nüfuz edemediği kırsal bölgeye taşınması olarak görülen bu atılım köklü bir biçimde ekonomik, siyasal ve toplumsal alanları yeniden düzenlemeyi amaçlıyordu.

Kolektifleştirme amaçlandığı gibi çok hızlı başladı, Mart 1930'da nüfusun yüzde 42,1'i kolektifleştirilmişti. Bu, beklenenin de ötesindeydi. Yalnızca Kazak Stepplerinde değil, Ukrayna'ya kadar geniş bir alanda aynı amaçlarla başlatılan bu atılım, Stalin tarafından da Martta beş yıllık planın hedeflerine ulaşıldığı açıklanarak kutlanmıştır. Ne var ki, bunun beklentilerin ötesinde olması gerekli hazırlıkların yapılmamış olması anlamını da taşıyordu. Göçerler ve köylülerin zorla yerleştirildikleri çiftliklerde ne kendileri ne hayvanları için yeterli yiyecek vardı. Ayrıca hastalıklara karşı gerekli önlemler de alınmamıştı. Kalabalık grupların bir arada yaşaması hem hayvanlar hem de insanlar arasında salgın hastalıkların hızla yayılmasını kolaylaştırdı. Çiftlikler Marttan sonra hızla terk edilmeye başlandı ve çiftliklere geri dönmek için insanlar büyük direnç göstermeye başladılar. Elde insan nüfusu hakkında kesin rakamlar olmamakla birlikte bu dönemde Kazak hanelerinin sayısı yarı yarıya azaldı. Pek çok kişi açlıktan, salgınlardan ya da direniş sırasında öldü. Kimileri de ülke dışına kaçmak zorunda kaldı.

Bu atılım yalnızca Kazaklar ve onlar için hayati öneme sahip hayvanların kitlesel şekilde yok oluşuna neden olmadı; bu yıkım geleneksel Kazak toplumsal yapısına ve iktidar sahiplerine de ciddi bir darbe indirdi. Alaşçıların beklentilerine

uygun biçimde Kazak halkının modern dünyanın bir parçası olması için mücadelelerini sürdürürken, 1928’de birden bire kovuşturmalara uğramalarının nedeni herhalde kolektifleştirmekle ilgilidir. Muhtemelen Moskova harekete geçmeden önce bu atılımının yaratacağı tahribatı dile getirecek potansiyel önderleri etkisizleştirmek amacıyla, Alaşçıları tam da hızla yükseldikleri bir dönemde toplumsal hayattan soyutlamıştır.

Bökeihanov gibi bazıları dışında Alaşçıların çoğu etkilerini yitirseler de bir süre daha sistemin çizdiği dar sınırlar içinde varlıklarını korudular. Ancak 1937-1939’da girilen büyük tasfiyeler sırasında istisnai birkaç Alaşçı dışında hepsi milliyetçilik suçlamasıyla ortadan kaldırıldılar. Elbette ortadan kaldırılanlar sadece onlar değildi. İnancı birer Bolşevikler olarak mücadele etmiş diğer Kazaklar da bu kıyıda ortadan kaldırıldı. Hatta sadece Kazaklar da değil, üst düzey pek çok Bolşevik ölüme mahkum edilerek yok edildi. Bu tasfiyeler sonunda, 1940’ta devrimi yapan Rus Sosyal Demokrat İşçi Partisi’nden sadece Stalin hayatta kaldı.

Sonuç:

Tarihi sonraki gelişmelerin bilgisi ışığında bugünden okumak, kişiyi ister istemez tarihteki belli bir sonucun nasıl adım adım inşa edildiğini anlamak için tarihi olayları değerlendirmeye itiyor. Böyle bir bakış kişiyi farklı olasılıkları görmezden gelmeye ve sonuçta ortaya çıkanın doğal bir sonuç olduğunu düşünmeye itebiliyor. Oysa insan içinde yaşadığı dönem aynı açıklıkta göremiyor. İnsanların içinde yaşadıkları dönem yalnızca sonradan güç kazanacak olan etkenler tarafından değil, ortadan kaybolan etkenler tarafından da belirleniyor.

Dolayısıyla bir dönemi ve insanların tercihlerinin nedenlerini anlamak, başarısızlığa uğramış etkenleri de göz önüne almakla, tarihi yaşandığı dönemin koşullarıyla birlikte yeniden kurmakla mümkündür.

Öte yandan soğuk savaş sırasında oluşturulan paradigmlar çerçevesinde SSCB'ye "halkların hapishanesi" tanımıyla bakmak da sürecin gelişiminin anlaşılmasını engelliyor. Orta Asya'da uygulanan politikalar buradaki halkların katılımı, önde gelen kimi aydınların desteği olmadan kök salamazdı. Alaşçılar örneğine bakıldığında, onların da Bolşeviklere katılması elbette sebepsiz değildi. Önem verdikleri meselelerden ulusal haklar, modernleşme ve toprak sorunu konusunda 1920'de Bolşevikler onlara sadece o dönemki diğer siyasi gruplar arasında değil, daha önce Rus siyaset sahnesinde yer almış hareketler arasında da en olumlu vaatlerde bulunan hareketti.

Ulusların kaderlerini tayin hakkı, ulusal dilde eğitim, devlet kurumlarının oluşturulması, federe bir siyasal sistem gibi pek çok hak, sonradan kağıt üstünde kalanlar bir yana konsa bile, Alaşçılar için önemli bir gelişime işaret ediyordu. Modern bir toplum kurma konusunda Bolşeviklerle ayrı düştükleri çok az nokta vardı. Bolşevikler din ve gelenekler konusunda daha radikal olsalar da sonuçta çağdaş bir toplum yaratma konusunda Alaşçılarla aynı hedefi paylaşıyorlardı. Alaşçılar bunu gerçekleştirmek için iyi işleyen devlet kurumlarına gereksinim duyuyorlardı. Özellikle de halkın bu kadar geri, okur-yazarlık oranının bu kadar düşük olduğu bir toplumda cehalete ve toplumun geriliğinin sorumluları arasında gördükleri gelenekçilere karşı güçlü bir devlet desteğine gereksinim vardı. Bolşevikler bunu sunmaya açtı ve kısa sürede inşa edilen devlet aygıtıyla da Kazak ulusunun modern dünyanın bir parçası olmasının yolunu açtılar.

Kazakların önem verdiđi bir başka mesele olan toprak sorununun çözümüne de Bolşevikler olumlu bakıyorlardı. Eşitliğe önem vermeleri ve isyanda etkin rol almış kimi kişilerin şimdi Kazak Bolşeviklerinin önde gelenleri aralarında olmaları umutları arttırıyor olmalıydı.

Sonuçta modern bir Kazak ulusu inşa edildi. Toprak sorunu ise, kolektifleştirme ile tartışmaya konu olan toprağın mülkiyet hakkının herkesin elinden alınıp kullanım hakkının paylaşılmasıyla bir anlamda yok edilmiş oldu.

Bugüne kadar Alaşçılar üstüne yapılan çalışmalarda Alaşçılar yalnızca “milliyetçi” önderler olarak öne çıkarılmış ve ağırlıklı olarak 1920 öncesi mücadeleleri üstünde durulmuştur. “Milli mücadele” dönemi (1917-1920) anti-komünist kesim açısından SSCB baskısına karşı milliyetçi bir direnişin olduğunu göstermek için önemliydi; Sovyetler açısından bu dönem katledilen önderlerin milliyetçi olduklarını göstermek için önemliydi; bugün bağımsız Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti açısından ise bu dönem bağımsızlık mücadelelerinin ve devlet kurma çabalarının köklerini ortaya sermek için önemli.

Tüm bu yaklaşımlar modern bir Kazak ulusunun oluşumunda en az bu dönem kadar önemli 1920’leri görmezden geliyor. Bununla birlikte, milliyetçilikleri üstüne yapılan bu vurgu, onların modernleşmeci yanlarının görmezden gelinmesine yol açıyor.

Soğuk savaş döneminde Batı açısından Kazak aydınlarıyla ilgili bir başka önemli vaka ise 1937-1939 arasındaki “büyük tasfiye” ve aydınların acı sonudur. Aydınların sonunun vahametinin bir tür “akıl tutulması” yaratarak, bunun öncesinde olanlara da bu gözle bakılmasını yol açtığını söyleyebiliriz. Milli

mücadele ve aydınların yok edilmesi arasına sıkışan dönem, bu epik ve trajik açıdan güçlü iki olay arasında sıkışıp önemsizmiş gibi görünmüş olmalı.

Oysa bu çalışmada gösterilmeye çalışıldığı gibi, 1920-1928 arasındaki dönem de Kazakistan açısından öneme sahiptir. Bolşeviklere katılma kararlarıyla Alaşçılar Kazak halkının modern bir ulus olarak “milletler çağı”nda yerini almasına yardımcı olmuşlardır. Bu anlamda, Sovyetlere katıldıktan sonra Alaşçıların Kazak halkına katkıları kesintiye uğramamış, Alaşçılar pek çok alanda ve hatta muhtemelen eskisinden daha etkin bir biçimde Kazak halkını aydınlatmaya devam etmiştir.

Alaşçıların sonunu hazırlayan koşulların oluşması çoğu Alaşçı için 1928’e ya da 1937’ye kadar sürmüş ve bu olumsuz koşullar farklı tarafların arasında geçen uzun tartışmaların bir ürünü olmuştur. Döneme 1937-1939’daki olayların penceresinden bakmak yerine Alaşçıların içinden geçtikleri dönemin penceresinden bakıldığında, olasılıkların çeşitliliği daha açık görülmektedir. Alaşçılar Sovyet yönetimini kabul ederken gördükleri elbette önlerindeki bu görece olumlu koşullardı ve tasfiyelere kadar bundan yararlanmasını da bildiler.

1921’de Baytursınov gibi etkin Alaşçılar siyaset sahnesinin kenarına itilirken, hâlâ Alaşçıların önünde Kazaklara faydalı olmak için geniş bir alan vardı. 1928’deki ani tutuklamaların hemen öncesine kadar da bir tehdit olarak görülmek bir yana, sistem alanlarında üst mevkilere tırmanmalarına açıktı.

Ancak Alaşçıların ve hatta onlarla birlikte pek çok kişinin sonunu getiren olgu, Kazakistan’dan uzakta Moskova’da yapılan tartışmalar sonucunda geldi. Burada kurulan merkezi otorite, yerellerdeki inisiyatifi, bunların sözcüsü olan yerel önderleri ve bunların güç alabileceği *sovyetleri* (kurultay) tasfiye edecek

biçimde iktidarını kabul ettirdi. Başlangıçta amaçlanan taban inisiyatifine dayanan aşağıdan yukarıya işleyecek ve bu nedenle “Sovyetler Birliği” olarak adlandırılacak bir yapıydı. Bunun içinde Alaşçı olsun olmasın Kazakların sözcüleri de kendilerine yer bulacaktı. Nitekim merkezileşme devam etmesine karşın, tasfiyelere kadar kısmen bu hâlâ işliyordu. Ne var ki, sonuçta ortaya çıkan parti etrafında tek bir amaç, en kısa zamanda güçlü bir ülke yaratmak için birleşmiş neferlerden oluşan, yukarıdan aşağı, askeri bir disiplinle işleyen bir makine oldu. Kuruluşuna katkıda bulunacakları modern bir Kazakistan’ın ve kurultaylara dayalı modernleşmeci bir SSCB’nin parçası olmuş Alaşçılar da bu merkezileşme sonucunda, inisiyatif sahibi diğer insanlarla birlikte monolitik bir partiyi egemen kılmak için kurban edildiler.

Appendix F: Vita

Yunus Emre Gürbüz was born in Istanbul on August 24, 1969. He received his B.S. degree in sociology and M.S. degree in history from Middle East Technical University in June 1998 and January 2003, respectively. He worked in the software business in 1998-2001, as a research assistant at KORA, METU in 2001-2007 and as a lecturer at the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University, Bishkek in 2006-2007. He conducted his Ph.D. studies at the Leiden University, the Netherlands, as an Erasmus Exchange student in 2005-2006 and in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan in 2006-2007. His current research interests include the Eurasian history in the post-Chinggisid period in general with special emphasis on Kazak, Kyrgyz and Uzbek history, Soviet modernization process, Russian history.