

THE EFFECTS OF INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS AND INGROUP  
IDENTIFICATIONS  
ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
OF THE SECOND-GENERATION TURKISH MIGRANTS IN THE  
NETHERLANDS

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Approval of the Graduate School of Middle East Technical University

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE EFFECTS OF INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS AND INGROUP IDENTIFICATIONS ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF THE SECOND-GENERATION TURKISH MIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS**

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Through the lenses of Social Identity Theory, this thesis endeavours to understand how perceptions of intergroup relations and in-group identifications affect the choice for different mobility strategies and forms of political participation among the second-generation Turkish migrants in the Netherlands. To this end, two political participation paths are specified: ethnic and mainstream. The former is defined as promoting ethnic group interests in the political arena while the latter is defined as participation in national Dutch politics. Perceptions of illegitimate and unstable status differences, of impermeable group boundaries, and of discriminatory intergroup relations are expected to contribute to the choice for collective mobility strategy and ethnic political participation mediated by Turkish identification. Conversely, legitimate, stable and permeable intergroup conditions are hypothesized to lead to the choice for individual mobility strategy and mainstream political participation through affecting Dutch identification. Three path models

including perceptions of legitimacy, stability, permeability and discrimination as predictors, Dutch and Turkish identification as mediators, mobility strategies as both outcomes and mediators, and ethnic and mainstream political participation as outcomes were tested in a sample of 161 participants. Results generally confirmed the expectations except for the stability hypothesis. The theoretical implications of the findings are discussed.

Keywords: Social identity theory, Social identity, Migration, Netherlands, Turkish migrants, Mobility strategies, Political participation

## ÖZ

### GRUPLARARASI VE GRUPİÇİ DEĞİŞKENLERİN HOLLANDA'DAKİ İKİNCİ KUŞAK TÜRK GÖÇMENLERİN SİYASAL KATILIMI ÜZERİNE ETKİLERİ

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Bu tez, Sosyal Kimlik Kuramına göre, Hollandadaki ikinci kuşak Türk göçmenlerde, gruplarası ve grup içi algıların farklı hareketlilik stratejilerini ve siyasal katılım yollarını nasıl etkilediğini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu nedenle, iki siyasal katılım yolu tanımlanmıştır: etnik ve ana görüş. Etnik siyasal katılım politik alanda grubun kendi çıkarlarını savunması olarak tanımlanırken, ana görüş, Hollanda ulusal politikasına katılım olarak tanımlanmıştır. Gayrimeşru ve istikrarsız statü farklılıklarının, geçirgen olmayan grup sınırlarının ve ayrımcı gruplararası ilişkilerin Türk kimliğinin önemini artıracığı ve dolayısıyla kolektif stratejilerin tercih edilmesine ve etnik siyasal katılıma yol açacağı öngörülmektedir. Diğer taraftan, meşru, istikrarlı ve geçirgen algılanan gruplararası ilişkilerin, Hollandalı kimliğinin önemini artıracığı ve onun aracılığıyla bireysel stratejilerin tercih edilmesine ve ana görüş çerçevesinde bir siyasal katılıma yol açacağı farzedilmektedir. Gruplarası statü farklılıklarında meşruiyet, istikrar ve geçirgenlik algılarının bağımsız değişken; Türk ve Hollanda kimliğinin aracı değişken; bireysel ve kolektif stratejilerin hem sonuç hem de aracı değişken; iki siyasal katılım

yolunun da bağımlı deęişken olduęu 3 model tanımlanarak, 161 katılımcıdan oluşan bir örnekleme test edilmiştir. Sonuçlar genel olarak, istikrar deęişkeni hariç öngörülerini doğrulamaktadır. Tezin son bölümünde, sonuçların kuramsal doğurguları tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Sosyal Kimlik Kuramı, Sosyal kimlik, Göç, Hollanda, Türk göçmenler, Hareketlilik stratejileri, Siyasal katılım

*Allochtone* of the Netherlands,  
*Ausländer* of Germany,  
*Almanca* of Turkey,  
To the children of Turkish migrants in Europe



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

People want to feel positive about themselves and their groups. Then how do members of disadvantaged groups react to their unfavourable conditions? This has been an issue of inquiry for long not only in social psychology literature (Hirschman, 1970; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; Tajfel, 1978; Taylor & McKirnan, 1984; Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble, & Zellerer, 1987) but also in political participation literature (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Habermas, 1994; Kymlicka & Norman, 2000). Yet, little attention has been paid to distinct political participation behaviours of disadvantaged groups and few studies linked these political behaviours/preferences to their perceptions of social structure, their mobility strategies and to their multiple collective identities. Few existing studies mainly focused on the path towards ethnic politics (e.g. Sears, Fu, Henri, & Bui, 2003) and disregarded the possibility that members of disadvantaged groups may also take the mainstream way to politics. Taking on this task, this thesis aims to contribute to an understanding of the intergroup conditions under which some members of a low-status group start mobilizing around their own group's political interests and some do not (i.e. when they do participate in national politics as such). Such information is essential in multicultural societies of our time in which authorities and policy makers have to bridge competing political interests. Moreover, by focusing on political behaviours and preferences instead of merely attitudinal outcomes in light of the fact that attitudes and behaviours are at most moderately correlated, results of this thesis bears even more practical and theoretical importance.

In an attempt to answer the question of how members of disadvantaged groups react to their unfavourable conditions, in psychology, it was once assumed

that they internalize society's biases against them and adopt certain preferences for advantaged groups (Allport, 1954). For example, Cartwright (1950) argued

The groups to which a person belongs serve as primary determinants of his self-esteem. To a considerable extent, personal feelings of worth depend on the social evaluation of the group with which a person is identified. Self-hatred and feelings of worthlessness tend to arise from membership in underprivileged or outcast groups (p.440)

Likewise, Erik Erikson (1968) referred to 'inferiority' feelings and self-hate in minority groups. Allport (1954, p.152) added that "group oppression may destroy the integrity of the ego entirely, and reverse its normal pride, and create a groveling self-image". "Self-hatred" phenomenon was used to describe a minority's low social status by many social scientists (Jost & Burgess, 2000). However, the notion that members of disadvantaged groups internalize the cultural values and stereotypes resulting in lowered self-esteem and diminished self-concept has not received much support (Crocker & Major, 1989; Lemaine, Kastersztein, & Personnaz, 1978; Tajfel 1978).

To the contrary of what was assumed once by Cartwright (1950) and Erikson (1968), Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1987) claims that members of disadvantaged groups have the motive to achieve a positive social identity despite the negativity attached to their social identity by the mainstream society. Therefore, in order to overcome the negative effects of this low status on their identity, they would strive to achieve a positive social identity. To do so, they can adopt a variety of strategies that can range from active strategies of individual mobility to collective strategies of social change. While individual mobility or pass refers to attempts of individuals (and families) to join high-status groups, collective mobility or voice refers to attempts at improving group status collectively (Hirschman, 1970; Tajfel, 1978). Instead of (or together with) pursuing an active strategy, they may also cognitively alter or reevaluate their position relative to the high status group to achieve a positive social identity, which is the so-called social creativity strategy. Social Identity Theory also specifies the intergroup conditions affecting the decisions that low status group members make about such strategies. Specifically, group members' beliefs about the stability and the legitimacy of the



status structure and the nature of the group boundaries determine how they choose between individual mobility, collective mobility, or social creativity strategies (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Apart from socio-structural group properties, the strength of ingroup identification (Ellemers & Barreto, 2001; Mummendey & Otten, 2001) is mentioned as one of the basic determinants of mobility strategies (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999).

This study applies SIT to the case of the second-generation Turkish migrants in the Netherlands, i.e. the children of first-generation Turkish migrants. They are perceived to be a culturally and economically low-status group by the mainstream society as much as their parents (Arends-Toth & Van de Vijver, 2002). The study of today's children of immigrants not only reveals new information about this increasingly important segment of a country's youths, but bears on theoretical issues of broader importance concerning their attitudes towards mobility and their behaviours towards and preferences for political participation. A strong case can be made that the decisive factor in this regard is not so much the fate of first-generation immigrants as that of their descendants. It is the children of immigrants who, as Dutch citizens and full members of the society, will define the direction and outlook of their respective ethnic communities.

Therefore, how the second-generation Turkish migrants, react to their inferior status position resembles a rather suitable and interesting field context for testing SIT. In addition, this thesis furthers SIT literature in several ways. First, together with mobility strategies, which are well-studied in function of intergroup perceptions and identifications, two political participation paths are identified: one is ethnic political participation, which is indicated by pursuing one's own group interests in politics and by forming an ethnic civic community (Turkish media use and participation in Turkish organizations), and the other is mainstream political participation, which is specified as participation in national Dutch politics as such and in mainstream civic community (Dutch media use and participation in cross-ethnic/Dutch organizations). Secondly, the thesis takes into account possible multiple identifications. Among the second-generation Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands who lived all their lives in the Netherlands, it is very important how the ingroup is defined. Therefore Turkish identification as well as Dutch identification

are defined as mediators between intergroup perceptions and political mobilization, and between intergroup perceptions and mobility strategies. Last but not least, perception of discrimination is included as a determinant together with stability, legitimacy and permeability; as Dion (2001) argues in her review article, it is a pivotal dimension for predicting reactions of disadvantaged individuals and groups especially with regards to group identification and collective-oriented responses.

The thesis aims to figure out the internal dynamics and the impact of intergroup perceptions, mobility strategies and ingroup identifications on political participation orientations and behaviors of second-generation Turkish immigrants. Stemming from a theoretical model displaying their internal dynamics, three conceptual models are specified. In the first model, it is posited that the way in which the second-generation Turks perceive the intergroup status differences (whether they think that they can actually pass into high status majority group, whether they find the intergroup status differences legitimate and whether they think that status differences can be changed in the near future) determine their levels of identifications with Turkish identity and Dutch identity, through which they endorse the individual mobility or the collective competition strategy. In the second model, it is proposed that the way in which the second-generation Turks perceive intergroup status differentiations including perceived group discrimination shapes their levels of identifications, which in turn determines their choices for mainstream political participation and ethnic political participation. In the third model, it is questioned whether the way in which the second-generation Turks perceive the intergroup status differences determine their choices for mainstream political participation and ethnic political participation via affecting their choices for the mobility strategies, particularly the choice between individual mobility and the collective competition strategy.

The present dissertation consists of 5 chapters. In the following chapter, first, a theoretical framework is presented incorporating two lines of literature, that is, social psychology, pointedly Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1987) and Relative Deprivation Theory (Crosby, 1976; Gurr, 1970; Runciman, 1966), and political science, pointedly, minority rights and political participation (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Taylor, 1992). Secondly, a theoretical model is

introduced, followed by a literature review concerning the relations between the theoretical constructs defined in the model. Stemming from this theoretical model, the following three models are specified: concerning the impact of intergroup perceptions and ingroup identifications on the mobility strategies, concerning the impact of intergroup perceptions and ingroup identifications on political participation orientations, and thirdly regarding the effect of intergroup perceptions and mobility strategies on political participation outcomes. Lastly, pertaining to these three models, the basic research questions and the hypotheses are addressed.

In the third Method chapter, the characteristics of the sample of the study are specified. Then, the features of the scales for the variables in question are described in details with reference to their reliability and validity. Finally, a brief overview of the general features of the statistical analysis employed, namely, structural equation modeling, is presented.

In the fourth Result chapter, first, the descriptives of the variables in question are reported. Then, the results of the measurement models, namely, confirmatory factor analyses, and of the structural models with reference to each of the three models are presented respectively.

In the final chapter, results are discussed in relation to the hypotheses specified in the second chapter and the literature. The chapter and the dissertation are concluded by addressing the limitations and strengths of the study, as well as the implications of the study for future research.

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Growing portions of immigrants, along with ethnic revitalization movements, have caused widespread concern with issues of ethnic identity and ethnic political participation. The aim of this thesis is to understand political participation behaviors of second generation Turkish immigrants, one of the largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands, through a social psychological perspective. That is, the thesis endeavors to understand and predict their political participation behaviors based on their perceptions of intergroup relations (i.e. relations between the Turkish minority and the Dutch majority in terms of status differentiations in the Netherlands), their identifications with Turkish and/or Dutch identity, and their preferred mode of upward mobility strategies, particularly the choice for the individual mobility and collective competition.

Intergroup relations are pointedly defined in terms of whether second-generation Turkish immigrants think that they can or cannot pass into high status majority group (permeability), whether they perceive the situation legitimate or illegitimate, and stable or unstable, and to what extent they identify with Turkish or Dutch identity. It is vital to understand the way in which the-second-generation in the Netherlands perceive intergroup relations and to what extent they identify with Turkish or Dutch identity, not only because it will help to explain their choices for different migrant strategies but also will shed light on the processes towards the choice for ethnic political participation with a potential of action, which is of utmost importance to any immigrant receiving country and particularly Europe. Alas, although political participation has been an issue of inquiry before, the question of to what extent these perceptions of second generation Turkish immigrants will play

a leading role in civic participation and political participation of Turkish youth directly and via the preferences for individual and/or collective mobility strategies has never been asked in the literature.

Addressing the gap in the literature, the aim of this study is (1) to differentiate the ways in which immigrants are politically mobilized within the host society in terms of ethnic and general political participation and to understand the underlying migrant perceptions, and mobility strategies behind ethnic and mainstream political participation (2) to understand the ways in which the second-generation in the Netherlands perceive the relations between Turks and Dutch in terms of status differentiations and to what extent they identify with Turkish or Dutch identity, (3) to see how their views and identifications affect their preferred mode of upward mobility strategy, particularly the choice for individual upward mobility and collective competition (4) to explore how their views and identifications affect their preferences for different forms of political participation particularly the choice for ethnic and mainstream political participation.

In the quest for these aims, three exploratory models are tested, which are parts of a larger conceptual model concerning the impact of intergroup perceptions, ingroup identifications and mobility strategies on political participation behaviors. In the following sections, first, the case of Turkish immigrants in Europe and particularly in the Netherlands is presented as a representative case of ‘negative social identity’. Then, a brief overview of the literature is given regarding low-status minority groups through the lenses of social psychology and political science. Thirdly, the theoretical model is explained, followed by a literature review based on which the links between theoretical constructs are hypothesized. Finally, three models are specified together with the research questions and the hypotheses pertaining to the respective models.

## **2.1 Turkish Immigrants in the Netherlands**

Many people from different cultural backgrounds migrated to the Netherlands after the Second World War. A large number of immigrants came from the former Dutch colonies. Then ‘guest workers’ were recruited from southern Europe, Turkey and Morocco in the 1960s. Asylum seekers and refugees followed

in large numbers in the period 1995-2000. In 2003, the number of non-western immigrants and their offspring in the Netherlands reached a record level of 1.692.000, making up 10% of the total population. People of Turkish origin are one of the largest groups (358.000) (Garssen & Zorlu, 2005). Like in most other European countries, the increasing ethnic diversity in the Netherlands did not lead to a broad intermixing of different cultures and ethnicities. On the contrary, many immigrants have remained relatively isolated and of low status (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004); and native Dutch have remained intolerant and prejudiced towards immigrants (Gijberts, 2005<sup>1</sup>; Vermuelen & Penninx, 2000).

Turks in the Netherlands are generally perceived by Dutch as a typical low-status immigrant group (Arends-Toth & Van de Vijver, 2003). The Turkish immigrants' low status in Dutch society is related to their lack of economic qualifications, their tendency to maintain native language and lack of mastery of the host country's language, all in turn related to the recent character of their migration and their rural origin (Veenman, 2001)<sup>2</sup>. Unemployment rates among Turks are relatively high in the Netherlands, 21 % compared to 9% among the host population (Dagevos, 2006). Both first generation and second generation immigrants have low levels of education, although that of the second-generation is improving. Second-generation Turks have less chances of entering the university system than the host population (Van Amersfoort & Doornik, 2003; Andriessen & Phaet, 2002). Turkish immigrants reside in underprivileged neighborhoods that are largely ethnically homogenous (Manço, 2000). All these factors contribute to a "negative social identity" of Turkish youth in the Netherlands.

Another important point is that Islam plays a significant role in creating belongingness and a shared identity in the Turkish immigrant community (Manço, 2000). Yet, their frame of reference in terms of identity construction as well as of community organizations is still mainly their country of origin, not Islam or Muslim

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<sup>1</sup> For example, half of the native population of Netherlands thinks that there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands and that immigrants must not hold on to their own culture and customs too much. Moreover, while these attitudes towards migrants are relatively stable since the 1990s, attitudes towards Muslims grew more negative from 1998 to 2004 (Gijberts, 2005, p. 197).

<sup>2</sup> This view is particularly evident in the assimilation hypothesis. However, we also agree to the discrimination view, saying that the low status of immigrants is due to the discrimination they face in the host society.

communities in general, pointing to the prominence of Turkish Islam (Kroissenbrunner, 2003). In this regard, Turkish Muslim organizations are important both in the formation of identities and opinions, and in preventing isolation and marginalization (Manço, 2000; Kroissenbrunner, 2003).

In sum, the case of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, typical of those in Western Europe, seems to be a representative case for studying negative social identity and upward mobility strategies.

## **2.2 Negative Social Identity: Perspectives from Social Identity Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory**

Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1987) has become one of the most predominant theories in the study of intergroup behaviors as well as the interplay between intergroup behaviors and the social structure including status relations between groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The key concept of the theory, social identity, is defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p.63).

Social comparisons among ingroup and outgroup members is a major theme in both Social Identity Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT) (Crosby, 1976; Gurr, 1970; Runciman, 1966), as they both suggest that people compare themselves with others to evaluate their position in the social world (Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). Both theories provide insight into how people may respond to their socially disadvantaged positions and how they may try to change their position (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Schmitt & Maes, 2002). In SIT, positive comparisons provide satisfactory social identity and negative comparisons (differences between ingroup and outgroup perceived to favor outgroup) result in negative social identities. Thus, negative social identity is defined as “unsatisfactory contributions that the membership of a group makes to an individual’s concept of himself” (Tajfel, 1978, p.9), defining dimension of which is group’s status vis-à-vis other groups. In RDT, a perception of discrepancy between one’s group and other group in terms of positive outcomes results in fraternal deprivation with negative

emotional consequences being anger and resentment (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Schmitt & Maes, 2002; Tropp & Wright, 1999), which evokes negative identity (Schmitt & Maes, 2002). Then, what do individuals with negative social identity do?

One of the main assumptions of SIT is that people strive to achieve or maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel, 1978). Social comparison process due to an underlying motive to favor self increases the relative superiority or favorableness of the ingroup over the outgroup (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Then, when an individual has negative social identity due to his/her group membership, rather than self-devaluation or self-hate, it is proposed that the individual would attempt to improve his/her social position in order to achieve a positive social identity. Such responses to negative social identity have been conceptualized as “identity management strategies” (Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke, & Klink, 1998) or “mobility strategies” (Moghaddam & Perroult, 1992).

These mobility strategies are first differentiated by Hirschman (1970) as Exit and Voice, while the former refers to attempts at leaving the group, the latter refers to attempts at improving a group’s status such as through protest. Based on these distinctions, Tajfel (1978) defines individual mobility and collective competition strategies, respectively. The former is a strategy to “pass” into high status majority group. The latter is a strategy to maintain group loyalty and pool efforts to improve their situation collectively.

Apart from these upward mobility strategies, he also adds three cognitive strategies to which he refers as social creativity strategies: comparing the ingroup to the outgroup on some new dimension (e.g. “we may be not well off as much as they are but we are more hospitable and social people”), changing one’s values to previously negative comparisons (e.g. “black is beautiful”), and changing the outgroup with which the ingroup is compared (e.g. “we are better off than the Moroccans here”).

According to both SIT and RDT, the choice for mobility strategies is affected by the socio-structural characteristics of intergroup relations such as stability, legitimacy and permeability. Permeability means perception of a possibility of leaving the inferior group and joining the higher status group.



Stability deals with the perceived variability of the status differences between groups. It points to the impossibility of changing status relations between the low status and the high status group. Legitimacy means the degree of acceptance and justifiability of the status differences between both groups (Tajfel, 1978). These socio-structural group properties are proposed to affect preferred mobility strategies to the extent that group members identify with their ingroup (Mummendey & Otten, 2001; Ellemers & Barreto, 2001).

Tajfel (1978) originally refers to mobility strategies as public and political behaviors. For example, he mentions protest as a collective mobility/competition strategy, and thus includes political behavior. However, the latter scholars in the field define these strategies less as political behaviors and more as cognitive processes and detach the theory from its links to politics. Although Relative Deprivation Theory has been more tied to political causes and consequences, it has been more of a link between identifications, feelings of injustice and of illegitimacy and the attitudes towards collective action rather than bona fide political behaviors or interests such as voting, talking about politics or political preferences. In the next section, the issue of identification and political participation is addressed through lenses of political science theories.

### **2.3 Identity Politics: Perspectives from Political Science**

Charles Taylor (1992) argues that in modern times, identity is serious politics -identity politics – and it is played out for interests and with serious consequences, not only about who ends up with what but also about how the basic social settlement is framed. He goes on to argue that minorities have the right to demand for recognition of their difference and the authenticity of their identities, which have repercussions in the political arena as well. He criticizes liberalism, which is the guard of individual rights and liberties, for being blind to collective rights and liberties such as the demands of minorities. In psychological terms, he differentiates individual identities from collective (social) identities and argues that liberalism stands for the former but not for the latter. The rights and liberties that minorities ask for are the claims for recognition of collective identities in the public domain such as the claims for language rights.

Habermas (1994), although a strong critique of the communitarian view that Taylor espouses<sup>3</sup>, also supports the view that a well-formulated theory of rights requires a politics of recognition that protects the integrity of the individual in the context in which his or her identity is formed. Moreover, Habermas (1994) differentiates two levels of assimilation: (1) into the way of life, the practices and the customs of the majority culture, (2) into the way the democracy is institutionalized and “the public use of reason” is practiced in the host society. While the latter is a necessary condition, the former, which is referred to as ethical-cultural integration, is voluntary in his formulation of deliberative democracy. Hence, minorities are expected to agree on the procedures of deliberation of the modern democracy, yet they are not expected to give up their social-cultural practices and values in which their ethnic and/or religious social identity is formed.

Stemming from a different view from Habermas, Kymlicka (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000), one of the most prominent advocates of multiculturalism, makes a strong case for the rights of minorities to cultural membership, which is inextricably related to the debate about democratic citizenship and civic virtue. This link is evidenced by Putnam’s influential study of the performance of regional governments in Italy, which shows that the virtues and identities of the citizens are important factors for the health and stability of a modern democracy. Putnam (1993, 2000) points out that higher levels of associational activity lead to more political participation, because this directly or indirectly stimulates the development of the necessary attitudes and the skills for political participation, such as trust and norms for public behavior and responsibility. Although the link between associational activity and political participation is supported by other studies (Pollock, 1982; Putnam, 1993, 2000), there is no evidence for the role Putnam attributes to trust as a crucial mediator between civic participation and political participation (Togeby, 2004; Van Londen, Phalet, & Hagendoorn, under review).

Kymlicka (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000) also mentions that when it comes to the role of ethnic/religious associational activity, political theorists disagree about

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<sup>3</sup> The difference between Taylor and Habermas lies in their conception of individual versus collective rights. While Habermas claims that the system of individual rights is not blind to cultural differences, Taylor finds individual and collective rights incompatible.

the role of ethnic and religious groups in promoting citizenship. Do minority rights for ethnocultural groups such migrants and ethnic minorities and their “primordial” organizations, inhibit or enhance citizenship virtues such as political participation?

Fennema and Tillie (1999) were among the first to apply these considerations to ethnic minorities. They expected that the structural aspects (density of the ethnic organizations) and the organizational activity of individuals, as well as the ethnic media contribute to the formation of ethnic civic community life and thereby to political participation of immigrants (Fennema, 2004; Till, 2004). However, other studies have only provided inconclusive evidence for the positive impact of ethnic civic community on general political participation. For example, Jacobs, Phalet and Swyngedouw (2004) report that, while Turks score high on some indicators of ethnic civic community, it is Moroccans who have a higher level of political involvement in Belgium. Berger, Galonska and Koopmans (2004) find out that migrants active in ethnic organizations are more politically active but not more interested in German politics than migrants who are not active. They account for the inconsistency by suggesting that political participation in itself also has two orientations: it may be focused on general German issues or on the ethnic group interests, while only the former is selectively captured by these studies.

Garcia (1987) finds out that political participation of Mexican immigrants in the US includes ethnic group interests, such as the claims for the use of Spanish language in public and for access to public education for undocumented immigrant children. Kymlicka and Norman (2000) also note that a number of disadvantaged groups are in favor of the group representation strategy in politics. These findings support the idea that the interests and participation of immigrants in politics may focus on different goals than is common among natives and suggest that ethnic and general (mainstream) political participation needs to be differentiated. While the former implies that immigrants are interested in the issues in the interests of their own group in the political arena, the latter entails a due concern in the common interests of the citizens.

In the next section, I link the views from social psychology and political science by proposing an integrated theoretical model which questions the impact of intergroup perceptions, identifications and mobility strategies on political

participation behaviors, here differentiated as ethnic and mainstream political participation.

## **2.4 The Integrated Theoretical Model**

Based on views from SIT and RDT as well as political science theories, a new theoretical model is proposed so as to define various intergroup factors in affecting a variety of mobility strategies and to shed light on mediating social psychological processes. In this regard, not only the socio-structural properties of the ingroup but also the perception of the outgroup's attitudes in terms of discrimination, which is considered important particularly in relation to immigrants (Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997; Zagefka & Brown, 2002), are suggested to have direct and indirect effects through group identification on the mobility strategies. In addition, by taking the issue one step further, the model questions whether these social psychological perceptions have an effect on the way in which the immigrants are politically mobilized (see Figure 2.1).

It needs to be made clear that this model is a conceptual model, guiding three models to be tested which are specified in the last section.

### **2.4.1 Political participation: General, or focused on ethnic interests?**

Political participation refers to the adoption by large numbers of individuals of patterns of orientation towards political objects. A broad range of measures refers to political participation, namely, voting, participation in political activities (e.g. campaigning, demonstrating), participation in neighborhood policies, and political interest and knowledge.

Some scholars emphasize that, for example the size, density and heterogeneity of a community or neighborhood contribute to political action and participation because they offer stimulating resources (Hunter & Staggenborg, 1986). Some other scholars (Pollock, 1982; Putnam, 1993, 2000) focus on one kind of resource in particular, namely, participation in civic organizations or in ethnic organizations (Odmalm, 2004). Participation in ethnic organizations has been found to be positively related to voter turn-out of Turks in Denmark (Togeby, 2004) and to informal political participation of Turks in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands (Jacob & Tillie, 2004). On the other hand, participation in cross-ethnic

organizations yields inconsistent results with regards to political participation (Jacob & Tillie, 2004). In addition, gender and socio economic status (SES) are other important factors studied in relation to political participation. Women are reported to be less politically active (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002) as well as the low-educated ones (Pollock, 1982). For example, in the Turkish migrant community in Denmark, education is found to have a positive impact on political participation (Togeby, 2004).




Figure 2.1. Conceptual Model showing all possible paths based on the literature. Dashed lines indicate direct effects when the respective variables are indirectly related as well.

As I mentioned before, while in the literature, it is generally assumed that immigrants are either politically mobilized within the host society or they have a homeland orientation, namely an interest in the politics of their home country, it is also possible that within the host society politics, the interests and the participation of immigrants in politics may focus on different goals than is common among the natives. As it was stated, few existing studies focus mainly on ethnic political mobilization and link it to (politicized) ethnic identity and/or perceptions of social structure (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Sears,

Fu, Henri, & Bui, 2003). Yet, not all members of disadvantaged groups think their own group's interests in politics. As far as the second-generation of Turkish migrants who practically lived all their life in the Netherlands are concerned, it is very probable that some of them will feel more Dutch and participate in political arena with a mainstream focus, that is, without any intentions to advance ethnic interests. In support of this view, Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans (2004) suggest that political participation in itself also has two orientations: it may be focused on general issues or on ethnic group interests. They conclude that when two immigrants are politically interested at the same degree, the one who is a member of an ethnic organization will be more interested in the political issues concerning their own ethnic group's interests. They also report that only participation in cross-ethnic organizations has a positive impact on political participation with regards to the political activities pertaining specifically to the mainstream society. Likewise, according to Fennema (2004), members of an ethnic community possibly will have trust in ethnic leaders more than in the leaders of the dominant group.

In this respect, I expect that there are two paths for migrant political participation, namely ethnic political participation and mainstream political participation; and I try to describe the social psychological processes that determine when members of low status groups prefer a group representation strategy. I adopt an extensive range of measures to differentiate between ethnic and mainstream political participation in terms of political aims/issues and actors. Firstly, while some immigrants will actively participate in Dutch politics, for example, focusing on predominantly mainstream issues such as health and/or environmental concerns, some other immigrants will participate in politics, mainly focused on ethnic/religious issues (e.g. claims for Islamic schools, use of mother tongue in public, anti-discrimination policies, immigration issues). Secondly, I differentiate between ethnic and mainstream political participation in terms of preferences for different political actors and whom they represent (e.g. distinguishing preferences or ethnic and non-ethnic candidates and distinguishing politicians who represent the common interests of the citizens from those who represent the special interests of their ethnic community).

However, such a differentiation based on only preferences for political actors and issues would be reflecting a vote-centric approach, while immigrants like any other minority groups are to have their real influence, it will be through participating in formation of public opinion. That is, they will have their real influence on the processes of deliberation and opinion formation that precede voting (“voice rather than vote”) (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000, p.9) such as participation in ethnic and cross-ethnic organizations. Therefore, I also include measures to differentiate between participation in Turkish organizations and participation in Dutch/mainstream organizations. Moreover, other scholars (Fennema and Tillie 1999, Fennema, 2004; Karpathakis, 1999; Silverstone & Georgiou, 2005) note the importance of the use of mass communication, such as watching ethnic television and reading ethnic newspapers as one of the elements of ethnic civic community in relation to political participation. Ethnic media offers windows of opportunities for politicians to spread their discourses. Hence, I also include measures of ethnic media use (reading Turkish newspapers and watching Turkish TV)<sup>4</sup> and Dutch media use (reading Dutch newspapers and watching Dutch TV) to differentiate between ethnic and mainstream political participation.

Phalet and Swyngedouw (2002) show that the Turkish second-generation in Belgium participate in both ethnic and cross-ethnic organizations. To put it differently, participation in ethnic and cross-ethnic organizations are positively correlated. This suggests for the Netherlands that although there might emerge two discernible factors according to the ethnic/cross-ethnic dimension, there might be a common factor lying behind these items denoting the participant’s general tendencies of participating, and of following media (watching TV and reading newspapers). Hence, these two paths are not necessarily opposing ways of political participation.

Studies in the literature generally do not maintain a distinction between mainstream and ethnic political participation, aiming at predicting when migrants

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<sup>4</sup> For inclusion of Turkish media usage, it can be argued that it reflects a homeland orientation rather than ethnic collective agency in the Netherlands. However, an analysis of the Turkish TV channels available in the Netherlands suggests that they are oriented towards Turkish immigrants in Europe and not to Turkey (e.g. Channel D is a popular TV channel in Turkey while Channel EuroD is its satellite-version oriented towards Turkish immigrants in Europe)

prefer one over the other. However, some scholars who research the internal dynamics of ethnic political participation postulate that education and SES are important predictors of ethnic political participation. The migrants with low status as indicated by class, income or education are likely to pursue a group representation strategy or to have a collective mobility orientation in their political interests and activities (Garcia, 1987; Leifer, 1981) such as preference for an ethnic leader (Dubey, 1971). Moreover, ethnic identification in conjunction with economic disadvantages is found to be positively related to ethnic political participation (Leifer, 1981).

I expect that those second-generation Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, who identify more with Dutch identity and who prefer an individual mobility strategy, will participate more in non-ethnic/Dutch organizations, read Dutch newspapers and watch Dutch TV, talk more about Dutch politics, have less interest in ethnic political issues, and prefer Dutch political leaders.

On the other hand, those who identify with Turkish identity and those who prefer a collective competition strategy will participate more in Turkish organizations, read Turkish newspapers, watch Turkish satellite TV, have interest more in ethnic/religious political issues such as special religious facilities like Islamic schools and the claims for recognition of Turkish language and will prefer talking about politics targeted towards Turkish people. Besides, although I do not have any predetermined expectations, I also anticipate that individual perceptions of immigrants, that is, whether they think that they can or cannot pass into high status group (permeability), whether they perceive the situation legitimate or illegitimate, and stable or unstable, may directly affect whether or not they are politically mobilized on ethnic grounds. Besides, I presuppose that perception of group discrimination will have a direct effect on ethnic political participation.

#### **2.4.2 Mobility strategies**

Individual and collective mobility strategies are a great deal studied in the social identity literature, although the terms have different meanings and are measured in different ways by various scholars (Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke, & Klink, 1998; Moghaddam & Perroult, 1992; Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2004; Tajfel,



1978; Turner & Brown, 1978). Tajfel (1978) originally defines individual mobility and collective mobility strategies on the basis of Hirschman's (1970) distinction between exit (pass) and voice. While individual mobility refers to attempts of individuals (and families) to leave low-status groups in order to join high-status groups, collective mobility refers to attempts at improving own group's status collectively.

Collective mobility has been interchangeably named as social change, collective behavior (Tajfel, 1978) and collective/social competition (Turner & Brown, 1978). Tajfel (1978) also mentions protest as a collective mobility/competition strategy, and thus includes political behavior, while other scholars working in the tradition of Social Identity Theory refer to non-political and general attitudinal measures of collective competition. For example, Turner and Brown (1978) measure social competition as an ingroup bias in post-task ratings of ingroup and out-group performance. While ingroup bias has received much more attention than other strategies in the literature (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002, for review), it is yet only one of the various social competition strategies (Turner, 1999; Turner & Reynolds, 2001).

Moreover, Phalet and Swyngedouw (2004) differentiate between the types of collectivities that are the agents of the mobility strategy, namely, the individual, familial and ethnic strategies<sup>5</sup>. They refer to Taylor and McKirnan's study (1984) that shows that individuals can rely on individual, familial or collective/ethnic resources when faced with a social dilemma. In their framework, strategies follow from individual, familial and ethnic social capital. In addition, they find that culture maintenance is related to the choice for collective mobility and adaptation/ integration is related to the choice for individual mobility strategies.

Blanz et al (1998), elaborating on the subject of 'identity management strategies,' define collective mobility strategies along the line of Tajfel's definition, namely that "members of low status groups try to improve their relative status position by a reversal or at least an equalization of the status relation between the in- and out-group." In other words, rather than ingroup bias, their definition refers

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<sup>5</sup> Tajfel (1978), based on Hirschman (1970), considers family-level mobility as individual mobility.

to an effort in the pursuit of collective change and improvement. Moreover, in their factor analytic study, they conclude that social competition which involves competition for a higher socio-cultural status and realistic competition entailing competition for a higher economic status load on the same factor. That is, collective competition is a unidimensional construct referring to collective change and improvement in terms of both economic and social-cultural capital. Besides, in their view, individual mobility implies strong behavioral consequences with regards to new group membership. Thus, they actually refer to integration or acculturation.

Moghaddam and Perreault (1992) describe not only individual mobility but also collective mobility as two different ways towards integration. While individual mobility strategies include attempts to participate in the mainstream culture, collective mobility involves primarily participation in the valued activities of the ethnic ingroup<sup>6</sup>.

Similarly, individual and collective mobility strategies are delineated as participation in the mainstream culture and the culture of origin respectively. Moreover, Tajfel's emphasis on defining mobility strategies as public and political behaviors is maintained. Therefore collective mobility is defined as a strategy to cling to one's own group and to pool efforts to improve the ingroup's situation collectively, and individual mobility as a strategy to pass into the high status majority group. Then, the strategies are studied in relation to political behaviors.

In the literature, there are a number of factors associated with individual and collective mobility strategies among minority group members. It is often stated that preferences for collective mobility over individual mobility will depend on both the permeability of group boundaries and people's level of ingroup identification. When passing to a high-status majority group is unlikely, people tend to have a preference for collective mobility. On the other hand, even a small possibility of passing exists, they will prefer to respond individually and show little endorsement of a collective mobility strategy (Blair & Jost, 2003; Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). This view is criticized

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<sup>6</sup>They further argue that while the former leads to assimilation kind of integration, the latter leads to endorsement of multiculturalism

by some scholars based on their real-life studies in which the general inclination was reported to be the collective action strategy (Boen & Vanbeselaere, 1998; Moghaddam & Perrault, 1992; Moghaddam, Taylor, & Lalonde, 1987).

As for identification, members of low-status groups who have strong in-group identifications are more likely to choose collective mobility strategies irrespective of permeability of the group boundaries (Blair & Jost, 2003). Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel and Blanz (1999) state that ingroup identification actually mediates the relationship between permeability and mobility strategies. That is, those who perceive the group boundaries permeable are more likely distance themselves from their ingroup and hence to prefer an individual mobility strategy.

Perception of legitimacy is also associated with a preference for individual mobility while perceived group discrimination is correlated with a preference for collective mobility (Moghaddam & Perreault, 1992). Correspondingly, when people perceive inequality in terms of distributive and procedural injustice, they are more likely to endorse the option of collective mobility (Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble, & Zellerer, 1987). Another intergroup perception that is linked to mobility strategies is stability. Members of low status groups who think that status differentiations can be changed in the near future, referred to as instability, opt for collective mobility strategies (Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999).

Phalet and Swyngedouw (2004), based on their cross-cultural study comparing Turks, Moroccans and Belgians in Belgium, state that Turks prefer ethnic mobility most and individual mobility least. They also report that second-generation immigrants opt more often for individual mobility than older generations, and women value more collective strategies than individual ones.

The five-stage model of collective action (Taylor & Mckirnan, 1984) assumes that among low-status group members, group openness interacts with individual ability. Under the condition of group permeability, talented members of a low-status group will adopt an individual mobility strategy, whereas low-ability individuals will prefer collective action. If education is considered as an indicator of talent/ability of low-status group members, then those who are highly educated are

more likely to prefer an individual mobility strategy (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2004; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990; Verkuyten & Reijerse, in press).

Based on the findings of the literature, I expect that perceptions of impermeable, unstable and illegitimate intergroup situations will increase identification with ethnic Turkish identity, which in turn will lead to adoption of collective mobility strategy (the mediation hypothesis). These perceptions may also have direct effects on mobility strategies. That is, perceptions of legitimate, permeable and stable intergroup situations will make the adoption of collective mobility strategy more likely and that of the individual mobility strategy less likely. Moreover, I propose that mobility strategies will differentiate among different kinds of political participation. While the individual mobility strategy will be associated with mainstream political participation, the collective mobility strategy will be associated with ethnic political participation. In addition, I am going to explore whether these mobility strategies mediate the relation between intergroup perceptions and political participation outcomes.

### **2.4.3 Mediating Role of Ingroup Identification**

According to SIT and RDT, in-group identification plays a pivotal bridging role between socio-structural group properties on the one hand and mobility strategies and/or collective action on the other. That is, identification is not only a product of intergroup relations but also a determinant of evaluation and behaviour (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1999; Doosje, Spears & Ellemers, 2002; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Reynolds, 2001).

First, studies of identification often emphasize that identification is a strategy itself, changing in function of the socio-structural group properties (Doosje et al., 1999; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993; Ellemers et al., 1998; Verkuyten & Reijerse, in press) or of perception of group discrimination (Branscombe et al., 1999; Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998) in such a way that perceptions of impermeable, unstable and illegitimate intergroup relations and discriminatory attitudes elevate in-group identification.

Second, in-group identification is treated as an individual variable that determines the preferred choices of mobility strategies. High in-group identification

leads to collective strategies, while weak identification leads to individual-level strategies (Mummendey et al., 1999). Indeed, in-group identification is well studied as the most robust predictor of collective action (Gurin & Townsend, 1986; Kawakami & Dion, 1993; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Lalonde & Cameron, 1993; Tougas & Veilleux, 1987; Tropp & Wright, 1999; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000; Wright & Tropp, 2002). For example, gender identification is reported to predict discontent and motivation to engage in collective action (Gurin & Townsend, 1986) and support for affirmative actions (Tougas & Veilleux, 1987). In studies of Gray Panther members and gay men, Simon et al. (1998) showed that under conditions of illegitimacy and instability, the strength of in-group identification was the best predictor of participation in collective action. De Weerd and Klandermans (1999) in their longitudinal study of the protest of Dutch farmers in the Netherlands reported that in-group identification indeed stimulated political protest.

As evident from the examples, while many studies in the literature take into account in-group identification, only a few scholars point to the mediating role of in-group identification, e.g. between the socio-structural group properties and the mobility strategies (Mummendey et al., 1999), between ideology and collective action (Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006), between common fate/threat and collective action (Simon et al., 1998), between cultural beliefs, particularly legitimacy of the intergroup situation, and crowd behaviour (Reicher, 1996). In accordance with this line of research, this thesis hypothesizes that in group identification(s) mediate the relation between intergroup perceptions and political mobilization outcomes.

Furthermore, going beyond the conventional ingroup/outgroup distinction of SIT framework, this study raises the issue of multiple identities. It is of paramount importance how the in-group(s) is (are) defined. For many young Turks living in the Netherlands, it is often not a question of being Turkish or Dutch but a question of the extent to which they feel Turkish as well as the degree to which they feel Dutch. Theoretically, dual identity hypothesis (Gonzalez & Brown, 2003; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000) is most relevant to understand how national and ethnic identity can be maintained as different levels of identifications: ethnic identity is maintained as the subgroup identity but within the context of a superordinate category, namely,

national identity. Yet, that presupposes a positive relation between two identities and ignores the possibility that national identity may not be inclusive when it is defined by blood line as in the case of Netherlands. In the public discourse in the Netherlands, being Dutch, referred to as “autochtone”, is perceived to be conditional upon having Dutch parents<sup>7</sup>. In support of this argument, Berry, Phinney, Sam, and Vedder (2006) report that ethnic and national identity in the Netherlands are negatively correlated among Turkish-Dutch youngsters while among youngsters of Turkish origin in many other European countries, they are not significantly correlated. Methodologically, this also points to the necessity of measuring ethnic and national identities separately as it allows to capture “multiple, partly overlapping, or crosscutting and even conflicting collective identities” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 321).

In line with a multiple identity approach, Verkuyten and Reijerse (in press) in their study regarding Turkish youth in the Netherlands report that perceptions of legitimacy and permeability are negatively related to Turkish identification and positively related to Dutch identification. Yet, to the contrary of the predictions of SIT, stability is found to have a positive impact on Turkish identification and a negative effect on Dutch identification.

This thesis not only takes into account multiple identities but also the question of how and under what conditions these identities become politicized. In another words, under what conditions ethnic identity becomes politicized to the extent that the social group becomes “a group of and for itself in the political arena” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 323). Wong and Cho (2005) questioned the conditions under which racial identity became politicized and maintained that that Black identification was related to support for government policies for the interests of African Americans. Similarly, Huo, Smith, Tyler, and Lind (1996) in their study of different ethnic groups in the US found out that when identification with the subgroup became the primary self-categorization, instrumental concerns dominated other concerns in terms of the expectations from the authorities. Another study in

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<sup>7</sup>The public discourse is very much influenced by the distinction between “allochtone” and “autochtone”. Even the native born children of migrant families are still regarded as “allochtone”. During the interviews, many respondents reacted to the identity question by saying “I can not be Dutch, my parents are Turkish!”

the US came to the same conclusion that ethnic identity was politicized: it was significantly correlated with support for public policies that promoted minority-group interests and with political attitudes in ethnically relevant domains (Sears, Fu, Henri, & Bui, 2003). While all these studies link ethnic/racial identity of disadvantaged groups to their political attitudes and preferences, this thesis also elaborates on the link between their national identity and mainstream politics, which is generally disregarded.

Based on the findings of the literature, it is posited that the perception of stability, permeability and legitimacy will have a positive effect on Turkish identification and a negative effect on Dutch identification. Moreover, it is proposed that Turkish identification will lead to adoption of the collective competition strategy and ethnic political participation, while Dutch identification will lead to endorsement of the individual mobility strategy and mainstream political participation. Besides, it is expected that identifications will mediate the relation not only between intergroup perceptions and the mobility strategies, which is confirmed in the literature (Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999), but also between intergroup perceptions and political participation.

#### **2.4.4 Intergroup perceptions: Permeability, legitimacy, stability and discrimination**

Permeability refers to the perception of the possibility of leaving inferior groups and joining higher status groups. Hence, whether low-status group members are likely to use the individual mobility strategy largely depends on whether or not group boundaries are perceived as permeable and thus allow individual social mobility (Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, De Vries, & Wilke, 1998; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Mummendey, Mielke, Wenzel, & Kanning, 1996). Permeability is proposed to predict individual mobility strategies directly and indirectly (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). For the former, Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam (1990) indicate that when members of low-status groups think that even if few deprived ingroup members can join the dominant group, namely under conditions of group permeability, chances for collective action are significantly reduced. For the indirect hypothesis, Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, De Vries, and Wilke (1998) show that mere possibility of group permeability reduces ingroup identification among low-status group members.

Likewise, Mummendey, Mielke, Wenzel, and Kanning (1996) find that impermeability leads to strong ingroup identification which in turn leads to reduced tendencies to leave the inferior group. Verkuyten and Reijerse (in press) report that although the Turkish-Dutch perceive the group boundaries more impermeable than their Dutch counterparts, those who find the group boundaries permeable are more likely to associate themselves with the Dutch.

Legitimacy suggests that to the extent that members of inferior groups feel that their groups are deprived and entitled to more, they will perceive the status differentiation as illegitimate (Wright, 2001). If there are no doubts about the legitimacy of the status differentiations between groups, members of low status groups may resign themselves to the present state of affairs rather than improve their group's standing (Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble, & Zellerer, 1987); or attempt individual mobility strategies rather than collective change strategies (Mummendey, Mielke, Wenzel, & Kanning, 1996). Ellemers, Wilke and van Knippenberg (1993) show that illegitimacy of low status groups cause feelings of anger, strong identification with the ingroup and depending on stability, competitive intergroup behavior.

Stability, nonexistence of the possibility of change of the status hierarchy between groups, is likely to impede the choice of collective strategies, but facilitate the choice of individual strategies. If a group has a good chance of improving its status, people are more likely to identify with that group (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1999; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993). However, Verkuyten and Reijerse (in press) show that the opposite is true for the Turkish-Dutch; that is, the more they perceive the situation as being stable, the more they identify with being Turk. Other scholars also report that stability is on the whole a poor predictor of identity management strategies (Mummendey, Mielke, Wenzel, & Kanning, 1996; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel & Blanz, 1999; Turner & Brown, 1978). This may well be explained by the fact that coupling of illegitimacy and instability of a status system provides the most powerful impetus for the rejection of status hierarchy, rather than each would do per se (Tajfel, 1981; Turner & Brown, 1978). This would point to an interaction effect between stability and legitimacy or permeability. Yet, this may also be explained by the ambivalence of the attitudes of



subjects in a study towards guessing the future stability or instability of status differences. In support of this view, in experimental studies where stability is manipulated rather than guessed, a more reliable effect is observed (Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002). In real life, on the other hand, people can be unsure of future stability or instability of intergroup relations, which may lessen the effect of stability as a predictor.

Only very few attempts are made to include all three socio-structural factors, namely, stability, legitimacy and permeability, and identification in a study. One example is experimental findings of Ellemers, Wilke, and van Knippenberg (1993). They report that (1) in low status groups, group permeability reduces ingroup identification and increases chances for individual upward mobility, (2) irrespective of permeability, if members of low status groups perceive their inferiority as unstable, they have high group identification and prefer collective strategies, (3) illegitimacy has weaker effects compared to stability and permeability, though it increases group identification and chances for social competition.

A real-life analogue of this study is the one by Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, and Blanz (1999) in which they investigate the impact of the socio-structural group properties on East Germans' identity management strategies. They indicate that (1) stability and permeability best distinguish among collective strategies and individual strategies while not predicting social creativity, (2) perceptions of stability and permeability have a negative effect on collective strategies and a positive effect on individual strategies, (3) although legitimacy has weaker effects, it is in line with the SIT premises, namely, it has a positive effect on individual mobility and a negative effect on social competition strategies, (4) identification has a negative effect on individual strategies and a positive effect on collective strategies.

Apart from these socio-structural group properties, perceived threat to social identity is one of the most important factors to consider regarding intergroup relations in the SIT framework (Bizman & Yinon, 2001; Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Verkuyten & Nekuee, 1999), though the literature considers either the socio-structural group properties or the threat but not both at the same time. The nature of the threat largely depends on the

social context. In this study, drawing from previous studies, perceived group discrimination is regarded as a social identity threat, namely a threat to the value of social identity (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002). Dion (2001) in her review article points to the importance of taking discrimination into account. She states that it is a pivotal dimension for predicting reactions of disadvantaged individuals and groups especially with regards to group identification and collective-oriented responses.

In the case of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, who are stereotypically considered traditional (Hagendoorn & Kleinpenning, 1991), it is highly likely that Turkish immigrants will perceive high group discrimination (Zagefka & Brown, 2002; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002). Perception of discrimination based on one's group membership encourages derogation of the rejecting outgroup members (Crocker, Voekl, Testa, & Major, 1991) and increases ingroup identification (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Dion, 2001 for a review). Ellemers, Wilke, and Van Knippenberg (1993) in a series of experimental studies show that when members of low-status groups receive unjust treatment, their ingroup identification increases. Gurr and Harff (1994) support this view that discrimination leads to increased ethnic identification in a case study of Turkish immigrants in Germany. In a similar fashion, Duckitt and Mphuthing (1998) find support for the link from perception of threat to identification in their longitudinal study. That is, the more people feel threatened and discriminated, the more they stick to their group membership. Moreover, perception of discrimination increases the likelihood of choices for collective action (Gurr & Harff, 1994; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994).

The literature presents clear tendencies in the ways these socio-structural group variables affect identifications or mobility strategies. In line with the literature, it is posited that perceptions of illegitimate, impermeable and unstable intergroup situations will have a direct and indirect effect via identifications on mobility strategies. To put it differently, those second-generation who perceive the group boundaries impermeable, and the status differences unstable and illegitimate will endorse the collective mobility strategy directly or via increased Turkish identification. On the other hand, those who perceive the intergroup situations

permeable, legitimate and stable will adopt the individual mobility strategy directly or via increased Dutch identification. Moreover, the question is raised as to whether these agreed-upon effects of the socio-structural group properties on the strategies will be valid in relation to political participation behaviors. The thesis will explore the impact of perceptions of illegitimate, impermeable, unstable, and discriminatory intergroup situations on ethnic and mainstream political participation directly and indirectly via enhanced identifications.

## **2.5 The Models and the Hypotheses**

The basic research questions and the hypotheses regarding the models to be tested based on the literature review are summarized below. The larger theoretical model in Figure 2.1. has become a guide to define these three models that are more moderate in scope and hence testable. They can be considered as successive models to explain the bigger picture that represents the perceived reality.

### **2.5.1 Hypotheses based on Model 1**

Model 1 concerns the impact of intergroup perceptions (permeability, legitimacy, and stability) on the mobility strategies via identifications. The following research questions are addressed: (1) how do the second-generation in the Netherlands perceive the relations between Turks and Dutch in terms of status differentiations and to what extent do they identify with Turkish or Dutch identity? (2) How do their views affect their preference for mobility strategies, i.e. individual mobility vs. collective competition?

Model 1 is a full mediation model. That is, it is assumed that both Dutch identification and Turkish identification mediate the relation between intergroup perceptions and mobility strategies. The conceptual diagram of model 1 is presented in Figure 2.2. A full mediation model requires that the direct effect of predictor variables on dependent variable is reduced and/or no longer significant after the mediator variable is taken into account (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Since the reduced direct effects can still show up in the presence of mediator variables, they are represented in the model by dashed lines. No hypotheses regarding control variables

(age, education and gender) are put forward. The following direct and indirect relationships are hypothesized based on this model:




Figure 2.2. Conceptual Diagram of Model 1

1. The direct effect of stability on individual mobility  
Those second-generation who perceive the status differences between Turks and Dutch stable in the near future would adopt the individual mobility strategy
2. The direct effect of stability on collective competition  
Those second-generation who perceive the status differences between Turks and Dutch unstable in the near future would adopt the collective competition strategy
3. The direct effect of legitimacy on individual mobility  
Those second-generation who find the status differences between Turks and Dutch legitimate are more likely to adopt the individual mobility strategy
4. The direct effect of legitimacy on collective competition  
Those second-generation who find the status differences between Turks and Dutch illegitimate are more likely to adopt the collective competition strategy
5. The direct effect of permeability on individual mobility  
Those second-generation who think that they can actually pass into Dutch society are more likely to opt for the individual mobility strategy

6. The direct effect of permeability on collective competition  
Those second-generation who think that they are blocked from passing into Dutch society are more likely to opt for the collective competition strategy
7. The indirect effect of stability on individual mobility  
Those second-generation who find the intergroup situation stable would have higher levels of Dutch identification, through which they would adopt the individual mobility strategy
8. The indirect effect of stability on collective competition  
Those second-generation who find the intergroup situation unstable would have higher levels of Turkish identification through which they would adopt the collective competition strategy
9. The indirect effect of legitimacy on individual mobility  
Those second-generation who find the intergroup situation legitimate would have higher levels of Dutch identification, which is going to lead to their endorsement of the individual mobility strategy
10. The indirect effect of legitimacy on collective competition  
Those second-generation who find the intergroup situation illegitimate would have higher levels of Turkish identification, which is going to lead to their endorsement of the collective competition strategy
11. The indirect effect of permeability on individual mobility  
Those second-generation who find the intergroup boundaries permeable would have higher levels of Dutch identification, which is going to lead to their endorsement of the individual mobility strategy
12. The indirect effect of permeability on collective competition  
Those second-generation who find the intergroup boundaries impermeable would have higher levels of Turkish identification, which is going to lead to their endorsement of the collective competition strategy

### **2.5.2 Hypotheses based on Model 2**

The second model concerns the impact of intergroup perceptions (stability, legitimacy, permeability and discrimination) and identifications (Turkish and Dutch identification) on political participation behaviors (ethnic and mainstream political participation). In model 2, the following research questions are addressed: How do

the perceptions of the second-generation of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands pertaining to intergroup relations and their identifications with Turkish or Dutch identity affect their political participation behaviors, i.e. mainstream political participation and ethnic political participation? To put it differently, what are the underlying migrant perceptions and identifications behind ethnic and mainstream political participation?

Model 2 is also a full mediational model. That is, it is assumed that both Dutch identification and Turkish identification mediate the relation between intergroup perceptions and political participation outcomes. The conceptual diagram of model 2 is presented in Figure 2.3. A full mediation model requires that the direct effect of predictor variables on dependent variable is reduced and/or no longer significant after the mediator variable is taken into account (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Since the reduced direct effects can still show up in the presence of mediator variables, they are represented in the model by dashed lines. These direct effects are hypothesized based on the few studies regarding the effect of intergroup perceptions on ethnic political participation. In the model, only direct and indirect effects are tested, interactions are tested separately. The following direct and indirect relationships are hypothesized based on this model:




Figure 2.3. Conceptual Diagram of Model 2

1. The direct effect of legitimacy on ethnic political participation  
The participants who find the intergroup status differences illegitimate are more likely to be politically mobilized on ethnic grounds. To put it differently, they would participate in Turkish organizations, would use Turkish media, would talk about political issues targeted towards Turkish people, and would be interested in making political claims regarding their own group's collective rights.
2. The direct effect of discrimination on ethnic political participation  
The participants who think that their group is discriminated are more likely to be politically mobilized on ethnic grounds
3. The indirect effect of legitimacy on mainstream political participation  
The second generation Turks who find the intergroup status differences legitimate would report higher levels of Dutch identification through which they would opt for mainstream political participation. To put it differently, they would participate in Dutch organizations, would use Dutch media, and would prefer a Dutch political leader.
4. The indirect effect of legitimacy on ethnic political participation  
The second generation Turks who find the intergroup status differences illegitimate would report higher levels of Turkish identification, which would lead them to be politically mobilized on ethnic grounds
5. The indirect effect of permeability on mainstream political participation  
The second-generation Turks who find the intergroup boundaries permeable would have higher levels of Dutch identification, which would lead them to be mobilized with a focus on mainstream politics
6. The indirect effect of permeability on ethnic political participation  
The second generation Turks who find the intergroup boundaries impermeable would report higher levels of Turkish identification which would lead them to be politically mobilized on ethnic grounds
7. The indirect effect of stability on mainstream political participation

The second-generation Turks who think that the intergroup situation cannot be changed would have higher levels of Dutch identification, which would lead them to endorse mainstream political participation.

8. The indirect effect of stability on ethnic political participation

The second-generation Turks who think that the intergroup situation can be changed would have higher levels of Turkish identification, which would lead them to endorse ethnic political participation

9. The indirect effect of discrimination on ethnic political participation

The second-generation Turks who think that their group is discriminated would have higher levels of Turkish identification, which would lead them to endorse ethnic political participation.

Apart from these hypotheses, despite acknowledging that no hypotheses can be proposed regarding control variables; existing findings suggest that women would be less politically mobilized in either way. The educated would associate themselves more with Dutch identity and less with Turkish identity. Moreover, the educated would choose the mainstream path to political participation and correspondingly they would be less likely to pursue group interests in the politics. The older second-generation participants would have less Turkish identification since the longer the duration of stay in a country, the more the integration to mainstream society is expected, which would result in the weakened the ethnic identity.

### **2.5.3 Hypotheses based on Model 3**

This model has to do with the impact of intergroup perceptions (legitimacy, stability, permeability, and discrimination) and the mobility strategies (individual mobility and collective competition) on the political participations (ethnic and mainstream political participation). The following research questions are asked: (1) How do the perceptions of intergroup relations and preferences for the mobility strategies affect the political participation orientations of the second-generation of Turkish immigrants? (2) Do the mobility strategies mediate the relations between the perceptions of intergroup relations and political participation?



In this model, identifications, which also mediate the relation between intergroup perceptions and political consequences as shown in the previous model, are left out of the analyses on purpose. As assumed in the theoretical model in Figure 2.1., a two-step mediation is originally assumed, first by identifications and then by mobility strategies, which is too ambitious to prove statistically and theoretically in this study. Besides, the study by Mummendey et al. (1999) as well as our first model suggests that these intergroup perceptions have direct effects on mobility strategies even in the presence of identifications. That's to say that the model is not based on spurious relations. Model 3 is also a full mediational model. Both individual mobility and collective competition strategy are proposed to mediate the relation between the intergroup perceptions and the political participation outcomes. The conceptual diagram of model 3 is presented in Figure 2.4. A full mediation model requires that the direct effect of predictor variables on dependent variable is reduced and/or no longer significant after the mediator variable is taken into account (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Since the reduced direct effects can still show up in the presence of mediator variables, they are represented in the model by dashed lines. In the model, direct and indirect effects are tested, interactions are tested separately. The following direct and indirect relationships are hypothesized based on this model:




Figure 2.4 Conceptual Diagram of Model 3

1. The direct effect of discrimination on ethnic political participation  
The second-generation Turks who think that their group is discriminated would be politically mobilized on ethnic grounds. That is, they would participate in Turkish organizations, would use Turkish media, would talk about political issues targeted towards Turkish people, and would be interested in making political claims regarding their own group's collective rights.
2. The direct effect of discrimination on mainstream political participation  
The second-generation Turks who do not perceive group discrimination would endorse mainstream political participation. That is, they would participate in Dutch organizations, would use Dutch media, and would prefer a Dutch political leader
3. The indirect effect of legitimacy on ethnic political participation  
The second generation Turks who find the intergroup status differences illegitimate would be more likely to adopt the collective competition strategy, through which they would be politically mobilized on ethnic grounds.
4. The indirect effect of legitimacy on mainstream political participation  
The second generation Turks who find the intergroup status differences legitimate would opt for the individual mobility strategy, through which they would endorse mainstream political participation
5. The indirect effect of permeability on ethnic political participation  
The second generation Turks who find the intergroup boundaries impermeable would be more likely to adopt the collective competition strategy, through which they would be politically mobilized on ethnic grounds.
6. The indirect effect of permeability on mainstream political participation  
The second generation Turks who find the intergroup boundaries permeable would opt for the individual mobility strategy, through which they would endorse mainstream political participation
7. The indirect effect of stability on ethnic political participation

The second generation Turks who think that the intergroup status differences can be changed would be more likely to adopt the collective competition strategy, which would lead them to be politically mobilized on ethnic grounds.

8. The indirect effect of stability on mainstream political participation

The second generation Turks who think that the intergroup status differences cannot be changed would opt for the individual mobility strategy, which would lead them to endorse mainstream political participation.

Apart from these hypotheses, based on the literature review, it is expected that women would be less politically mobilized in either ways. Women are also less likely to pursue individual mobility strategy. The educated and the older ones would prefer the mainstream political participation path and would be less likely to pursue group interests in the politics.

## CHAPTER 3

### METHOD

#### 3.1 Participants

One hundred sixty one Turkish-Dutch participants participated in this study. They were second-generation Turkish immigrants, meaning that they were either born in the Netherlands ( $n = 117$ ) or migrated to the Netherlands before the age of 8 and grew up in the Netherlands ( $n = 44$ ). By including only the second-generation immigrants, the possible confounding effect of duration of stay was avoided. The sample consisted of 85 men and 76 women so as to take into account and balance any possible gender differences. In order to prevent potential confounding effects of ethnic origin and religious sect, only Turkish people belonging to a Sunni sect participated in the study. That is to say, Kurdish people and Alevis were not included in the study. Respondents were either living or studying in one of the three big cities of the Netherlands, namely in Amsterdam ( $n = 55$ ), Rotterdam ( $n = 47$ ), and Utrecht ( $n = 59$ ).

The age of respondents ranged from 18 to 41 (only 19 of them were 30 years old and over) and their mean age was 23.35 year ( $SD = 5.18$ ). The mode of educational level ranging from 1 (primary school) to 8 (university degree) was 6, which indicated a higher level vocational education, called MBO. The mode of educational level recoded as low (-1), medium (0), high (1), was medium. There were no significant differences between men and women in terms of educational level,  $t(159) = -1.427$ ,  $p = 0.155$ . Eighty seven of the participants were students. Among the remaining 74 participants, 45 participants were employed, while only 13 participants were self-employed. Among the remaining 16 participants who were neither student nor employed, 10 participants were either looking for a job and 6 participants were looking after home.

As for family types and marital status, 130 participants were not married (only 3 of them were divorced) and 31 participants were married. While only 16 of the participants lived alone or with their friends, 137 of them were living with their families and only 8 of them were living with their extended families. The mode of the number of people in the same household was 4 people.

In terms of parental education and background, educational levels in Turkey and in the Netherlands were coded in a different way. As for those parents who completed their education in Turkey, the mode of educational level ranging from 0 (illiterate) to 4 (university degree) was 2, indicating primary/secondary school level education. Only 26 parents also continued their education in the Netherlands and it was with the vocational track. Among those participants who were married, all were married to people from Turkish origin, and only 7 of the spouses were born in the Netherlands, while 20 of them were from Turkey. The mode of the educational level of the partners from Turkey was high school, while that of those from the Netherlands was MBO, vocational track.

As for the status of the jobs of the participants, parents and/or spouses, I was not able to do a reliable statistical coding. Moreover, I think that the education of the participant is the only valid measure of social status in this study. Yet, I also think that it is important to mention the kind of jobs they were doing to support the argument held in the theoretical part of the thesis that Turkish immigrants are low status. While 56 % of the mothers were housewives, 3% were kindergarten teachers and the rest were doing low status jobs, such as being a worker in a factory or a cleaning lady. For fathers, although job variability was higher than that of women, there were three big categories, the worker, the retired/unemployed, and the self-employed (e.g. restaurant owners, hairdressers, repairmen, owners of computer shops and internet cafes). Yet, only few had professional jobs (like one project manager in the municipality). Compared to the mothers and the fathers, the participants themselves and their spouses had generally higher level jobs including professional jobs (see Appendix A for the complete list of the jobs for the participants).

The participants were approached in various ways, such as by using networking, including different organizations (university/school organizations,

mosques, youth centers), by visiting places such as cafes, kebab places, Turkish markets, shopping malls, restaurants, and by scanning internet sites including friendship sites and forums. Questionnaires were conducted in the language respondent preferred (Dutch or Turkish), one-to-one but in privacy.

This study applies snowball sampling with multiple entries, followed by a comparison of basic background characteristics (education, gender) with the Turkish migrant population in general to detect selection bias (Arendts-Toth & Van de Vijver, 2003). This procedure showed that our sample was quite similar to the Turkish population in the Netherlands except for the educational level. When the educational level of the respondents in this sample was compared with those in the results of SPVA 2002<sup>8</sup> for the second-generation Turkish migrants (Dagevos, Euwals, Gijssberts, & Roodenburg, 2006), our sample was somewhat higher educated,  $t(153) = 20.03, p < .001$ .

### **3.2 Measures**

The questionnaire administered consisted of demographic questions and the scales to be checked. All the scales were translated from English to Turkish and to Dutch and checked through back translations. For the Dutch translations, native speakers and a Dutch teacher checked for wording, accuracy and clarity of the items. A Turkish-Dutch checked for the correspondence and accuracy of the translation between the Turkish and Dutch questionnaire. The Turkish version of the questionnaire is in the Appendix B.

#### **3.2.1 Stability**

The perception of stability was measured in two ways, as a continuous variable and a dichotomous variable. The Likert-type scale consisting of 4 items was adapted from Mummendey et al. (1996), and a 7-point response format was used so that higher scores indicated perception of stability. For example, stability was covered by items like, “I think that status differences between Dutch and Turks

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<sup>8</sup> The SPVA (Sociale Positie en Voorzieningsgebruik van Allochtonen/Social Position and Facilities Use of Ethnic Minorities) is a repeated cross-sectional survey, organized by the Institute for Sociological and Economic Research (ISEO) in Rotterdam, and Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands (SCP). The SPVA consists of random samples of the population in 13 cities in the Netherlands.

will remain the same in the near future'. Moreover, the scale had been used in a previous Dutch study with Turkish immigrants (Verkuyten & Reijerse, in press). For the dichotomous variable (stab2cat), again a 5-point-scale was used, yet it ranged from (1) worse to (5) better so that while the midpoint of the scale indicated stability, particularly with reference to socio-economic conditions; all other responses indicated perception of instability, thus creating a dichotomous variable.

In terms of reliability of and validity of the scale, the reverse item (stab3), which lowered the reliability of the scale as well as the explained variance, was dropped from further analyses. Without the reverse item, reliability analysis pointed to the reliability of items, with  $\alpha = .75$ . According to principal axis factoring with varimax rotation, the scale produced a single factor.

### **3.2.2 Legitimacy**

The scale for perception of legitimacy consisting of 3 items was also adapted from Mummendey et al. (1996) and was used in a previous Dutch study regarding Turkish immigrants (Verkuyten & Reijerse, in press). The scale was measured on a 7-point-Likert-format with higher scores indicating perception of legitimate intergroup relations. For example, an item for legitimacy would be "Dutch deserve to be better off than Turks in the Netherlands". Reliability analysis pointed to the reliability of items, with  $\alpha = .68$ . Since reliability measure is sensitive to the number of items, this value is acceptable for scales with only 3 items (Blanz et al., 1998) and higher than .54 which was reported by a previous study (Niens, Cairns, Finchilescu, Foster, & Tredoux, 2003). Principal axis factoring with varimax rotation was performed for exploratory factor analysis and the scale was found valid.

### **3.2.3 Permeability**

The scale for perception of permeability of intergroup boundaries consisting of 3 items was also adapted from Mummendey et al. (1996) and also used with Turkish immigrants by a previous Dutch study (Verkuyten & Reijerse, in press). It was measured on a 7-point-scale with higher scores indicating perception of permeable group boundaries. For example, an item for permeability would be "It is not difficult for a Turk (born and grown up) in the Netherlands to be considered as

Dutch”. Reliability analysis pointed to the reliability of items, with  $\alpha = .72$ . According to principal axis factoring with varimax rotation, the scale was valid.

### **3.2.4 Perceived Group Discrimination**

The scale consisting of 4 items was adapted from Ruggiero and Taylor (1995) and used in other Dutch studies (Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002; Verkuyten & Nekuee, 1999). An example is “Are people from your ethnic group ever discriminated against, when looking for a job?”. The answers were given on a 5-point-Likert scale, ranging from never to always. Another scale of discrimination consisting of 4 items, which measured affective and individual discrimination, was also developed in order to reveal more subtle ways of discrimination as well as to provide the base for convergent validity of group discrimination with individual discrimination.

In terms of reliability and validity of the perceived group discrimination scale, one item (discr3) measuring the discrimination on streets and shops was dropped from further analyses. Without this item, reliability analysis of the remaining three items pointed to the reliability of items, with  $\alpha = .73$ . For individual discrimination, reliability analysis pointed to the reliability of items, with  $\alpha = .85$ . Separate principal axis factoring with varimax rotation for exploratory factor analyses yielded one factor for each scale.

When principal axis factoring with oblimin rotation, where factors can be correlated, was performed with all the 7 items, two factors were produced, with a correlation of .58. All the items loaded on the respective factor. That is, the four items for individual discrimination loaded on one factor, while the remaining three items for group discrimination loaded on the other factor. Two factors explained 56% of the total variance. In the analyses reported in the result section, only the measure of group discrimination was used.

### **3.2.5 Ingroup Identifications:**

#### **3.2.5.1 Turkish identification**

Turkish identification was measured based on two indicators, one measuring cognitive component and the other measuring affective/evaluative component of identification. The cognitive component was measured with 5 items adapted from



Luhtanen and Crocker's importance of identity scale (1992). It was used in other Dutch studies and with Turks as well (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002). One sample item would be "I see myself as a typical Turkish person." For affective/evaluative component of Turkish identity, the 8 items were adapted from the collective self esteem (CSE) scale developed by Crocker and Luhtanen (1990). It is originally based on the combinations from four subscales, two of which were used in this study: private collective self-esteem (how they evaluate their group), and public collective self-esteem (how other people evaluate their group, similar to inter-group status). Answers were given on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), higher scores indicating stronger identification.

The reliability of the three subscales of Turkish identification, namely, importance of identity, public collective self-esteem and private collective self-esteem pointed to the reliability of the scales, with  $\alpha = .74$ ,  $\alpha = .73$ ,  $\alpha = .82$ , respectively. Principal axis factoring with varimax rotation was performed for exploratory factor analysis, which yielded problematic results with reference to the construct validity of the collective self esteem scale. When all the 13 items were entered, 3-factor solution did not confirm the trilogy of the public, private and importance subscales. Reverse items loaded together, and subscales could not be differentiated meaningfully.

When only the subscales for measuring the importance of identity and the public self esteem were analyzed together, 3 factors were produced, with the reverse items loading together on the third factor. Since these reverse items were correlated with the items of the other factors, the third factor was found unreliable and dropped from further analyses. The investigation of the two-factor solution yielded theoretically interpretable results, in which the items loaded on the respective factor, confirming the theoretical distinction between importance of identity and public collective self esteem subscales. The two factors explained 47% of the total variance. The two factors were correlated,  $r = .51$ . Because of the problems regarding the construct validity of the subscales, I decided to use only the importance of identity scale consisting of 5 items for further analyses.

### **3.2.5.2 Dutch identification**

Dutch identification was measured with 5 items adapted from Luhtanen and Crocker's importance of identity scale (1992). It was used in other Dutch studies (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002). An example item would be "I am proud to be a Dutch citizen". The reverse item ("If someone says something bad about the Netherlands, it is just as if they say something bad about me") lowered the reliability of the scale and had very low correlations with the other four items. After dropping the reverse item, the reliability enhanced, with  $\alpha = .81$ . According to principal axis factoring with varimax rotation for exploratory factor analyses, the one factor produced explained 52% of the total variance.

### **3.2.6 Individual Mobility**

This individual strategy of upward social mobility was measured with 4 items adapted from Blanz et al. (1998). It was measured on a 7-point-scale with higher scores indicating the adoption of this strategy of passing into the high status majority group. An example item would be "I make any effort to be considered as a Dutch". Reliability analysis pointed to the reliability of items, with  $\alpha = .79$ . Principal axis factoring with varimax rotation was performed for exploratory factor analysis and produced one factor, which explained 50% of the total variance.

### **3.2.7 Collective Competition**

This collective strategy of upward social mobility was measured with 6 items adapted from Blanz et al. (1998). It was measured on a 7-point-scale with higher scores indicating the adoption of this strategy of pooling efforts to the ingroup to enhance the group's status collectively. While the first two items were similar to what Blanz et al. (1998) called realistic competition (such as "we, Turks, have to work for having more say about the quality of schooling/education in the Netherlands"), the remaining 4 items were similar to what they called social competition (such as "we, Turks in the Netherlands, will make it clear to the Dutch that we are more competent"). Reliability analysis pointed to the reliability of the items, with  $\alpha = .86$ . Principal axis factoring with varimax rotation was performed for exploratory factor analysis. Only one factor was produced with eigenvalues over 1, which explained 44% of the total variance. This was also in line with the factor

analytic results of the study by Blanz et al. (1998) where they reported that the items of scales of realistic and social competition loaded on the same factor.

### **3.2.8 Mainstream political participation**

This was a latent construct, measured by the following indicators: preference for a Dutch political leader, participation in Dutch civic organizations, following Dutch media

**Preference for a Dutch political leader (malead1):** It originally consisted of ranking of 4 alternative political candidates, two Turkish and two Dutch candidates, either representing group interests of Turkish people or common interests of the citizens. So the participant was asked to rank the 4 alternatives from 1 to 4. Then I calculated a score for each individual by the following method. First, each item was given a weight while the preference for the Dutch political candidate who represented the common interests got the highest weight. Secondly, the choices were given weights in terms of being 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> choice. Thirdly, by multiplying the weight of each item by the weight of each rank (choice) and summing them up, every participant got a score, ranging from 2.70 to 5.70, higher numbers indicating the preference for a Dutch political leader.

**Civic participation in Dutch organizations (dutchciv):** The scale consisting of 3 items, namely participation in 3 types of organizations (youth, sports, woman) were tested using CFA was adapted from other studies with Turks such as Rotterdam Minorities Survey (Phalet, Lotringen, & Entzinger, 2000) as well as Brussels Minorities Survey (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002). Answers were given on a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (regularly), higher scores indicating the higher frequency of participating in Dutch organizations. Reliability of internal consistency of the items was calculated separately for men (with 3 items) and women (with 4 items including women organizations). Moreover, the internal consistency score should be taken into consideration with caution since participating in one organization regularly practically lowers the possibility of participating in another organization. Reliability of internal consistency of the items was low, with  $\alpha = .50$  for men and  $\alpha = .47$  for women. According to principal axis factoring with varimax rotation for exploratory factor analyses, the one factor

produced explained only 23% of the total variance (see also the results section for confirmatory factor analyses of civic participation using SEM).

**Dutch Media:** It is a composite score consisting of two questions: one measuring how often people read Dutch newspapers, ranging from 1 (rarely/never) to 5 (everyday/always), with a midpoint (3) indicating once a week/sometimes, the other measuring how many hours a week people watch Dutch TV, ranging from 1 (0-3 hrs) to 5 (more than 20 hrs).

### 3.2.9 Ethnic political participation

It was a latent construct computed from the following indicators: preference for ethnic political issues, preference for talking about politics targeted towards Turkish people, participation in Turkish organizations, following Turkish media. I should note that access to Turkish TV and newspapers are relatively easy and common in the Netherlands.

**Preference for ethnic political issues (eth\_iss):** It originally consisted of ranking of the 4 political claims/issues preferred out of 7 political issues, developed based on the literature. Each political issue also had a weight with regards to the extent to which it proposed ethnic/group interests. The weighing of the political issues was checked by four independent experts on the immigration issue. Each rank (from 1<sup>st</sup> to 4<sup>th</sup>) also had a weight. By multiplying the weight of each rank by the weight of the chosen issue and summing up the 4 choices, each participant got a score, ranging from 2.40 to 5.90; higher numbers indicating a preference for ethnic political issues.

However, one can still question the validity of this measure because a political claim can propose an ethnic interest as well as a common interest depending on the intents of the people making the claims. For example, socio-economic conditions can be a political issue of ethnic interest to the extent that a participant claims it only for his/her own group. To resolve this problem, the participants were also asked to rate their choices (4 political issues that they were most interested) to indicate to whom/which groups the issue was most relevant/important in the Netherlands. The answers were given on a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (the issue is most relevant for predominantly Turks because Turks live problems regarding the issue) to 4 (the issue is most relevant for everybody

living in the Netherlands because all people live problems regarding the issue), 2 referring to predominantly Muslims and 3 referring to all immigrants. The lower the score the participant gets from this latter scale, the more he/she is interested in the ethnic political issues/ethnic claim making. So a high negative correlation between two scores would support the use of the former scale as an indicator of preference for ethnic political issues, which was confirmed, Pearson  $r = -.53, p < .001$ .

**Preference for talking about politics targeted towards Turkish people (prefpol3):** It originally consisted of one question asking whether the individual talked more about general Dutch politics in the Netherlands or issues targeted towards Turkish people, ranging from 1 (only general issues) to 5 (only issues targeted towards Turkish people), while the midpoint referred to a balanced interest in both issues. Then the variable was recoded into 3 levels by effect coding, ranging from -1 (only general issues) to 1 (only issues targeted towards Turkish people).

**Participation in Turkish organizations (turkciv):** The scale consisting of 4 items, namely participation in 4 types of organizations, was adapted from other studies with Turks such as Rotterdam Minorities Survey (Phalet, Lotringen, & Entzinger, 2000) as well as Brussels Minorities Survey (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002). Answers were given on a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (regularly), higher scores indicating the higher frequency of participating in Turkish organizations. Reliability of internal consistency of the items was calculated separately for men (with 3 items) and women (with 4 items including women organizations). Reliability analysis pointed to the reliability of the items, with  $\alpha = 0.76$  for men, and with  $\alpha = 0.65$  for women. By principal axis factoring with varimax rotation for exploratory factor analysis, the one factor produced explained only 33% of the total variance (see also the results section for confirmatory factor analyses of civic participation using SEM).

**Following Turkish Media:** It is a composite score consisting of two questions: one measuring how often people read Turkish newspapers, ranging from 1 (rarely/never) to 5 (everyday/always), with a midpoint (3) indicating once a week/sometimes, and the other measuring how many hours a week people watch Turkish TV, ranging from 1 (0-3 hrs) to 5 (more than 20 hrs).

### 3.2.10 Control measures

**Education:** It ranged from 1 (primary school) to 8 (university). Differences between Dutch education system and Turkish education system should be noted for clarification of the coding. Students enter a general examination when they graduate the primary school and depending on the score they get from this examination, they are advised by their teachers to go on with one of the 4 levels of high school, VBO/IVBO (lower/preparatory vocational education) coded as 2, MAVO (junior general secondary education) coded as 3, HAVO (senior general secondary education) coded as 4 and VWO (university preparatory education), coded as 5. Similarly, there are different levels of higher education: MBO (senior secondary vocational education) coded as 6, HBO (higher professional education) coded as 7 and WO (University education). Only those students who graduate from VWO can directly go to the university level. If they are graduated from MAVO or HAVO, they have to continue with HBO, which lasts 3-4 years, in order to get a university education which lasts another 4 years. The education was recoded into three by effect coding, and used in further analyses (1-4 is coded as -1, 5-6 is coded 0, 7-8 is coded as 1).

**Gender:** It was a dichotomous variable (1, women, 0, men)

**Age:** It was a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 41 years.

### 3.3 Statistical analysis: Structural Equation Modeling

In this study, structural equation modeling technique was used to analyze the data using AMOS, version 5 (Arbuckle, 2003). It provides analytic strategies for testing of complex models that analyze causal relationships among theoretical constructs referred to as unobserved or latent variables. Kline (2005) defines seven essential characteristics of SEM: (1) SEM requires researchers to think in terms of models that needs to be a priori theoretically based, and in this sense it is confirmatory; yet when the defined model does not fit the data, it can be modified, and in this regards, SEM can also be exploratory; (2) There are two kinds of variables, the observed and the latent, while the presence of latter is not a must for all kinds of SEM analyses; (3) The basic statistics used in SEM is covariance matrix; (4) It can be used for both experimental and nonexperimental data; (5) It is related to many multivariate techniques such as multiple regression, factor analysis,

canonical correlation, and the analysis of variance; (6) SEM is a large sample technique (minimum 150 cases or 5:1 cases/parameter ratio); (7) There are various kinds of statistical tests, the role of which might be less important in the overall analysis than the ones in traditional analyses.

There are different techniques to do SEM analyses in the literature. (1) Path analysis, which is the original SEM technique, concerns effects among observed variables. In this technique, the mean scores computed from the items of scales can be defined as observed variables. (2) The technique of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) or measurement models tests whether the items of a factor really load on that factor, which is defined as a latent variable. (3) The technique of hybrid models or structural models (SR) has features of both path analyses and factor analyses. In this technique, relationships between latent constructs are generally the focus of analysis.

This study used a combination of all the three techniques. First, I did confirmatory factor analyses of all the scales so as to confirm that the scales were uniconstructs. Secondly, I did path analysis to test Model 1. Thirdly, to test Model 2 and Model 3, I defined a model in which predictor variables were defined as observed variables (cause indicators) and outcome variables were defined as latent constructs with effect indicators each. Namely, ethnic and mainstream political participation were defined as latent constructs as each of their indicators had different rating scales. Hence, in the end the models defined were a combination of a path and SR model. This kind of modeling is also called multiple indicators and multiple causes model (MIMIC). A MIMIC model is a measurement model with both cause and effect indicators (Kline, 2005)

In order to overcome the restrictions of the sample size and the problem of robustness of the results, bootstrapping method was used. Bootstrapping is a statistical resampling method. When repeated many times with a computer (e.g. 1000 times), it simulates the drawing of numerous samples from a population. If a solution is not found for a particular bootstrap sample or AMOS is unable to fit the model in a given bootstrap sample due to a singular covariance matrix, and the number of nonfitting solutions is high, it may suggest that the model is not robust. The Bootstrap section of the output also contains the mean of the parameter

estimates from the multiple bootstrap samples. The difference between the maximum likelihood-based estimate and the bootstrap-based estimate is shown in the Bias column. Large bias values suggest a substantial discrepancy between the results of the bootstrap analysis and the original normal theory-based analysis. Moreover, bias corrected percentile method for 95% confidence interval shows p-values for unstandardized regression coefficients of the variables in the model. When results of this method are consistent with results of regular model testing, it confirms the effects of the variables in question. Finally, when Bollen-Stine bootstrap technique is employed, AMOS displays the p-value for the hypothesis test of the overall model fit. Small bias values, consistent significance values for effects of variables in a model, non significant p-value for the overall model fit, and small number of nonfitting bootstrap solutions suggest that the model is robust ('AMOS FAQ #7', n.d.; Kline, 2005)

Structural equation modeling provides a number of fit statistics in order to evaluate how well the proposed model fits the data. An implied covariance matrix is calculated and compared to the actual covariance matrix of the observed variables. A number of goodness of fit statistics is based on the discrepancy between the actual and implied covariance matrix. The most basic fit statistics is model chi-square,  $\chi^2$ . As the value of  $\chi^2$  increases, the fit of the model becomes increasingly worse. That is, the discrepancy increases. Thus, it is indeed a "badness of fit" index because the higher the value it has, the worse the model fits the data. The p-value for  $\chi^2$  has to be nonsignificant, namely, larger than .05 in order to decide that a model fits the data. However,  $\chi^2$  is sensitive to the size of correlations: bigger correlations generally lead to higher values of  $\chi^2$ . It is also very sensitive to the sample size and may lead to rejections of the models, particularly when the sample size is very large. To reduce this sensitivity, normed chi-square (NC) can also be used, calculated by dividing the chi-square value by its degrees of freedom ( $\chi^2/df$ ). NC has to be lower than 3.0 (Kline, 2005). Another fit statistics is root mean square of error approximation (RMSEA). RMSEA smaller than .05 indicates close approximate fit; values between .05 and .08 suggest reasonable fit, and RMSEA bigger than .10 suggests poor fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). A 90% confidence interval is also reported with RMSEA showing the degree of uncertainty associated with it.



The lower bound of the confidence interval has to be lower than .05 while the upper part should not exceed .10. There are some other fit indices, such as goodness-of-fit-index (GFI), adjusted goodness-of-fit-index (AGFI) and comparative-fit-index (CFI), both of which range between 0 and 1.0, and indicate good fit when larger than .90 (Kline, 2005). AGFI tends to be larger as sample size increases; correspondingly, AGFI may underestimate fit for small sample sizes (Bollen, 1990) and for more complex models (Kline, 2005). The AGFI has not performed well in some computer simulation studies and thus it is less often seen in the literature (Kline, 2005).

Apart from these rules of thumbs, one should still be cautious in interpreting the fit statistics. A good fit does not mean that the model is proved nor does it mean that the causality is proved. It only implies a good fit between the model and the data. So, researchers must justify their models and suggested causality theoretically rather than only statistically. However, statistical superiority of the model is important as well. Testing the theoretically-based model with alternative statistical models, which might also provide good fit, is a common method used so as to prove the statistical superiority of the main model. Hence, I adopted this technique in this study in an attempt to provide further support for the model.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **RESULTS**

The data have been analyzed in accordance with the three main questions and subsequently three models defined in an attempt to answer the questions in the theoretical framework. These models were tested using structural equation modeling with AMOS version 5 (Arbuckle, 2003).

Before proceeding with the results of the analyses, first, descriptive statistics of the variables will be presented. Details of data cleaning and central tendency measures of the variables in question will be explained. Secondly, intercorrelations among observed variables and correlations between observed and latent variables will be discussed. This will both provide the base for three models defined in the theoretical framework and give a general opinion for possible statistical models against which the defined three models will be compared. Besides, it will be a further ally to support the robustness of the results of structural equation modeling. Thirdly, gender differences will be discussed in relation to dependent variables, namely, measures of ethnic and mainstream political participation and of Dutch and Turkish identification. Finally, results of confirmatory factor analyses will be presented to confirm construct validity of the observed variables and the latent constructs.

#### **4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the Model**

Prior to analysis, age, gender, education, stability, legitimacy, permeability, group discrimination, Turkish identification, Dutch identification, individual mobility, collective competition, preference for a Dutch political leader, participation in Dutch organizations, Dutch media (Dutch newspapers, Dutch TV), preference for ethnic political issues, preference for talking about politics targeted

towards Turkish people, participation in Turkish organizations, and Turkish media (Turkish newspapers, Turkish TV) were examined through various SPSS programs for accuracy of data entry, missing values and fit their distributions and the assumptions of structural equation modeling. Missing values in quantitative variables were replaced by the mean value of the distributions (2 missing values in preference for a Dutch political leader, 2 missing values in watching Turkish TV and Dutch TV, 1 missing value in the individual mobility). Before and after missing value replacement, correlations were checked.

For univariate normality, Curran, West, and Finch (1996) recommend concern if skewness is greater than 2 and kurtosis greater than 7. Kurtosis is usually a greater concern than skewness. In practice, many structural equation models with continuous variables will not have severe problems with nonnormality. The effect of violating the assumption of nonnormality is that chi-square is too large (so too many models are rejected) and standard errors are too small (so significance tests have too much power). All the variables in the models met the assumptions of normality ('Practical Approaches', 2005).

As for outlier analyses, two cases were univariate outliers because of their extreme  $z$  scores. With the use of a  $p < .001$  criterion for Mahalanobis distance, the same two cases, 41 and 64, were identified as multivariate outliers. Further inspection of the cases showed that they had extremely low values with regards to the variable collective competition. I did the analyses (model testing) with and without these two cases. The only difference was the increased effect size of collective competition which did not result in any differences in significance levels of the variables in the models. Hence, I decided to keep these two cases in the further analyses.

Descriptive information about the characteristics of the variables with regards to the present study has been summarized in Table 4.1.

#### **4.2 Intercorrelations among the Observed Variables**

To explore how intergroup perceptions and ingroup identifications were associated with mainstream and ethnic political participation, intercorrelations were calculated as shown in Table 4.2. This will further support the results of the models

defined as well as the exploration of potential statistical models other than the ones defined in theoretical chapter.

Table 4.1. Descriptive information

Variables	Scale range	Observed		
		range	Mean	SD
Stability	0 - 1	0 - 1	0.40	0.49
Stability	1 - 7	1 - 7	3.90	1.39
Legitimacy	1 - 7	1 - 6.67	2.71	1.29
Permeability	1 - 7	1 - 7	3.59	1.45
Discrimination	1 - 5	1 - 5	3.11	0.74
Turkish identification	1 - 7	1.60 - 7	5.82	1.06
Dutch identification	1 - 7	1 - 7	2.99	1.30
Individual mobility	1 - 7	1 - 7	2.88	1.68
Competition	1 - 7	1 - 7	5.52	1.08
<b>Composite mainstream political participation</b>		1.14 - 3.86	2.35	0.53
Preference for Dutch political leader	2.70 - 5.70	2.70 - 5.70	3.73	0.86
Dutch organizations	1 - 4	1 - 4	1.95	0.60
Dutch media	1 - 5	1 - 5	2.87	0.96
<b>Composite ethnic political participation</b>		0.88 - 3.87	2.43	0.59
Preference for ethnic political issues	2 - 6	2.40 - 5.90	4.18	0.89
Preference for politics towards Turkish people	-1 - 1	-1 - 1	-0.08	0.70
Turkish organizations	1 - 4	1 - 4	2.56	0.80
Turkish media	1 - 5	1 - 5	2.74	1.00

First of all, in order to define a latent construct, all indicators have to correlate to each other consistently. All indicators of the latent variable mainstream political participation (variables 10-12) are all positively correlated so as to support the presence of the latent construct. The strength of the correlations range between .15 (Dutch organizations and Dutch political leader) and .25 (Dutch organizations and Dutch media). Likewise, the indicators of the latent variable ethnic political participation (variables 13-16) are all positively correlated, correlations ranging from .12 (ethnic political issues and Turkish media) to .31 (Turkish organizations and Turkish media) suggesting the presence of a common latent construct.

As predicted, while Turkish identification (variable 6) correlate to all indicators of ethnic political participation positively (ranging from .25 to .37),

Dutch identification (variable 7) correlate to all indicators of mainstream political participation positively (ranging from .19 to .34).

Table 4.2. Correlation Matrix of the Observed Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Stabcat															
2. Stab	.19														
3. Legit	.06	.10													
4. Perme	.20	.15	.26												
5. Discrim	-.15	-.12	-.25	-.30											
6. Turkid	-.14	-.03	-.32	-.29	.18										
7. Dutchid	.03	-.02	.11	.28	-.04	-.34									
8. Indmob	.09	.14	.33	.24	-.08	-.39	.58								
9. Compet	-.15	-.04	-.37	-.21	.20	.53	-.14	-.17							
10. Malead	.09	.02	.29	.14	-.13	-.44	.34	.33	-.30						
11. Dutciv	-.01	-.01	.11	.10	-.07	-.12	.19	.21	-.08	.15					
12. Media_d	-.01	-.05	.22	.17	-.12	-.18	.23	.21	-.16	.18	.25				
13. Et_iss	-.11	-.15	-.01	-.22	.09	.25	-.14	-.21	.17	-.17	-.08	-.02			
14. Prefpol3	-.07	-.02	-.21	-.22	.21	.37	-.17	-.24	.22	-.20	-.09	-.19	.16		
15. Turkciv	-.20	-.13	-.01	-.21	.19	.37	-.08	-.13	.15	-.18	.29	.03	.20	.23	
16. Media_t	-.23	-.01	.04	-.06	.15	.30	-.12	-.09	.15	-.12	.02	.20	.12	.28	.31

Note: Correlation coefficients above .16 are significant at  $p < .05$ , above .20 are significant at  $p < .01$ , above .26 are significant at  $p < .001$ . Vars: Variables.

1: stability (cat), 2: stability, 3: legitimacy, 4: Permeability, 5: Discrimination, 6: Turkish identification, 7: Dutch identification, 8: Individual mobility, 9: Competition, 10: Preference for a Dutch political leader, 11: Participation in Dutch organizations, 12: Following Dutch media, 13: Preference for ethnic political issues 14: Preference for political issues targeted towards Turkish people (-1,0,1), 15: Participation in Turkish organizations, 16: Following Turkish media

As for the intergroup perceptions, while stability as a continuous variable shows poor correlations with all variables, stability as a categorical variable is negatively correlated with all indicators of ethnic political participation (ranging from -.07 to -.23) in line with the predictions of SIT. Legitimacy is significantly negatively correlated with Turkish identification ( $r = -.32, p < .001$ ) and competition ( $r = -.37, p < .001$ ) and positively correlated with individual mobility ( $r = .33, p < .001$ ). Permeability is significantly negatively correlated with Turkish identification ( $r = -.29, p < .001$ ) and competition ( $r = -.21, p < .01$ ) and positively

correlated with Dutch identification ( $r = .28, p < .001$ ). Discrimination significantly correlates to Turkish identification ( $r = .18, p < .05$ ) and to competition ( $r = .20, p < .05$ ).

Moreover, among the predictors, while permeability is negatively correlated with stability ( $r = .15, p = .05$ ) and legitimacy ( $r = .26, p < .01$ ), the latter two are not significantly correlated. Discrimination is negatively correlated with permeability ( $r = -.30, p < .001$ ) and legitimacy ( $r = -.25, p < .01$ ). This suggests that intergroup conditions that are perceived impermeable and illegitimate are also perceived as discriminatory.

### 4.3 Intercorrelations between the observed and the latent variables

To further confirm the construction of the latent variables, namely ethnic political participation and mainstream political participation, and the hypothesized links between the observed variables and the latent variables, two composite scores were calculated using SPSS: one for ethnic and the other for mainstream political participation based on the indicators defined in the method section. The correlations between composite variables and the observed variables are shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3. Intercorrelations between the observed and the latent variables

Vars	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Main	.03	-.02	.31	.20	-.16	-.37	.38	.37	-.27	.65	.65	.74	-.13	-.23	.06	.06
Ethnic	-.25	-.12	-.06	-.26	.24	.50	-.20	-.25	.27	-.26	.06	.04	.59	.60	.66	.71

Note: Correlation coefficients above .16 are significant at  $p < .05$ , above .20 are significant at  $p < .01$ . Composite variables: Main: mainstream political participation, Ethnic: Ethnic political participation. Observed variables: 1: stability (cat), 2: stability, 3: legitimacy, 4: Permeability, 5: Discrimination, 6: Turkish identification, 7: Dutch identification, 8: Individual mobility, 9: Competition, 10: Preference for a Dutch political leader, 11: Participation in Dutch organizations, 12: Dutch media, 13: Preference for ethnic political issues 14: Preference for political issues targeted towards Turkish people (-1, 0, 1), 15: Participation in Turkish organizations, 16: Turkish media

The variables from 10 to 12 are all indicators of the composite variable mainstream political participation, and those from 13 to 16 are all indicators of the composite variable ethnic political participation as shown by their high correlations with the respective composite measure.

In accordance with the predictions, mainstream political participation is significantly correlated with legitimacy ( $r = .31, p < .001$ ), permeability ( $r = .20, p < .05$ ), Turkish identification ( $r = -.37, p < .001$ ) and Dutch identification ( $r = .38, p < .001$ ). Ethnic political participation is significantly correlated with stability ( $r = -.25, p < .01$ ), permeability ( $r = -.26, p < .01$ ), discrimination ( $r = .24, p < .01$ ), Turkish identification ( $r = .50, p < .001$ ) and Dutch identification ( $r = -.20, p < .05$ ).

#### **4.4 Gender Differences**

Many studies in psychology mainly include only men and then generalize their results to all humans in order to escape from potential biases or complications. Else, they include both sexes in an attempt to compare and contrast the attitudes and/or behaviors of men and women (Matlin, 1996). In this study, I do not aim at comparing and contrasting women and men but questioning if men and women have really different tendencies that differentiate between ethnic and mainstream political participation as well as between Turkish and Dutch identification.

A one-way MANOVA was conducted to see whether gender had a significant effect on the extent to which the respondents identify with Turkish and Dutch identity. With the use of Wilks' criterion, the combined dependent variable was not significantly affected by gender  $F(2, 158) = 1.16, p = .315$ , neither were separate dependent variables, for Turkish identification,  $F(1) = 3.55, p = .55$ ; for Dutch identification,  $F(1) = 2.33, p = .13$ .

To explore gender differences in mainstream political participation, separate analyses were conducted for each indicator. For preference for a Dutch political candidate, results of a one-way ANOVA yielded that the gender difference was not significant,  $F(1) = 3.69, p = .057$  (for men,  $M = 3.85$ , for women,  $M = 3.60$ ). Gender differences in participation in Dutch organizations was significant,  $F(1) = 26.89, p < .001$ , with a moderate effect size  $\eta^2 = .15$ . Men participated in Dutch organizations more often ( $M = 2.29$ ) than women did ( $M = 1.68$ ). Gender

differences in following Dutch media was also significant,  $F(1) = 6.76, p < .05$ , which showed that men followed Dutch Media more often ( $M = 3.07$ ) than women did ( $M = 2.67$ ), with a small effect size,  $\eta^2 = .04$ .

When it comes to ethnic political participation, first, Chi-square test using SPSS was conducted to observe whether there was a relationship between gender and the preference for talking about political issues targeted towards Turkish people (-1, 0, 1), which yielded significant results, Pearson  $\chi^2(2) = 7.79, p < .05$ . More women (62% of women) compared to men (41% of men) had a balanced interest in talking about both general issues and issues targeting Turkish people (category coded as 0), while more men (27% of men) compared to women (13% of women) showed interest in talking about political issues specifically targeted towards Turkish people. Then, with regards to remaining three indicators, separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted. As for preference for ethnic political issues, gender did not have a significant effect,  $F(1) = .89, p = .345$ . On the other hand, gender had a significant effect on participation in Turkish organizations,  $F(1) = 19.30, p < .001$ , with a moderate effect size,  $\eta^2 = .11$ . Men participated in Turkish organizations more often ( $M = 2.81$ ) than women did ( $M = 2.28$ ). Gender differences in organizational participation may partly be due to different calculations for men and women. For men, participation in women organizations was excluded from calculations. Gender had a significant effect on following Turkish media as well,  $F(1) = 5.04, p < .05, \eta^2 = .03$ . Men followed Turkish media more often ( $M = 2.91$ ) than women did ( $M = 2.55$ ).

Finally, a one-way MANOVA was conducted using gender as the independent variable and 2 composite measures (mainstream political participation and ethnic political participation) as the dependent variables. With the use of Wilks' criterion, the combined dependent variable was significantly affected by gender  $F(2, 151) = 19.77, p < .001$ , with partial  $\eta^2 = .21$ . Univariate F tests showed that gender had a significant effect both on mainstream political participation,  $F(1) = 23.17, p < .001$ , with partial  $\eta^2 = .13$ , and on ethnic political participation,  $F(1) = 9.75, p < .01$ , with partial  $\eta^2 = .06$ . Men compared to women scored higher on both ethnic political participation measure (for men  $M = 3.08$ , for women,  $M = 2.65$ ) and mainstream political participation measure (for men  $M = 2.49$ , for women,  $M =$



2.21). This result suggests that although men participate in politics more than women, this difference does not differentiate between ethnic and mainstream political participation.

#### **4.5 Confirmatory Factor Analyses**

Confirmatory factor analyses of individual variables or groups of related variables in question will be presented. While confirmatory factor analyses of individual variables provide support for unidimensionality of constructs, testing confirmatory factor analyses of groups of related variables provide support for not only convergent construct validity but also for discriminant validity. When an observed variable has a high correlation with a similar variable such as the one between Dutch and Turkish organizational participation, it has convergent validity. When an observed variable has no correlation or a negative correlation with another variable such as the one between competition and individual mobility, it has discriminant validity.

##### **4.5.1 CFA of Intergroup Variables**

Stability with 3 items, legitimacy with 3 items, and permeability with 3 items was tested using the confirmatory factor analysis<sup>9</sup>. According to the model  $\chi^2(24) = 42.07, p = .01$ , the null hypothesis that the model was correct was rejected. In other words, the model did not fit the data. Based on the exploratory factor analysis of the variables, problems with reverse items had been defined. Since letting the error terms correlate across variables is not a proper way (Kline, 2005), I decided to let the error terms of legitimacy item 2 and 3 correlate, both of which were reverse items (between error terms,  $r = .80$ ). Analysis of the standardized regression weights of individual items showed that stability item 3 did not load on the respective factor,  $\beta = -.09, B = -.12, p = .28$  and hence stab3 (“The status of Turks will progress in the following years vis-à-vis Dutch”) was dropped from further

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<sup>9</sup> Originally stability was measured with 4 items, from stab0 to stab3, which was the reverse item. However, there were many missing values on stab0 due to a printing error on the questionnaire. In Amos 5, the data with missing values are analyzed in a different way, including mean structures as well and some of the fit statistics are not reported when the data has missing values. Due to the difficulties of analyzing data with missing values, stab0 was not involved in the CFA of the variable stability

analyses. After these modifications, the model fit the data,  $\chi^2 (16) = 22.73, p = .12$ ;  $\chi^2/df = 1.42$ ; RMSEA = .05 (.00-.09); GFI = .97, AGFI = .93, CFI = .98. (Table 4.4).

Table 4.4. Standardized regression weights

Items		Factors	Estimates
stab1	<---	STABILITY	.85
stab2	<---	STABILITY	.84
legit1	<---	LEGITIMACY	.82
legit2_	<---	LEGITIMACY	.26
legit3_	<---	LEGITIMACY	.32
perme1	<---	PERMEABILITY	.70
perme2	<---	PERMEABILITY	.94
perme3_	<---	PERMEABILITY	.41

Correlations between the latent variables proved discriminant validity. That is, they were not significantly related and they were separate constructs: between legitimacy and permeability  $r = .38$ , between legitimacy and stability  $r = .14$  and between stability and permeability  $r = .18^{10}$ .

#### 4.5.2 CFA of Identifications

Turkish identification with 5 items and Dutch identification with 4 items from importance of identity scale was tested using CFA. The fit statistics suggested an acceptable fit to the data:  $\chi^2 (26) = 32.73, p = .17$ ;  $\chi^2/df = 1.26$ ; RMSEA = .04 (.00-.08); GFI = .96, AGFI = .92, CFI = .99. Analysis of the standardized regression weights of individual items showed high loadings on the respective factors. Two factors correlated negatively,  $r = -.42$ . (Table 4.5)

#### 4.5.3 CFA of the Mobility Strategies

Collective competition with 6 items and individual mobility with 4 items was tested using CFA. According to the model  $\chi^2 (34) = 78.72, p < .001$ , the null hypothesis that the model was correct was rejected. Based on Lagrange Multiplier

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<sup>10</sup>AMOS 5 does not give significance values for the correlations, but significance values for the covariances among these three latent variables showed that they were not significantly related.

(LM) test and standardized residual covariances, I decided to correlate the error terms of the following items within their respective factors: competition items 1 and 2 ( $r = .38$ ), items 2 and 6 ( $r = .22$ ), individual mobility items 1 and 4 ( $r = .27$ ), items 1 and 2 ( $r = .22$ ).

Table 4.5. Standardized regression weights

Items		Factors	Estimate
turkid1	<---	TURKISH ID	0.56
turkid2	<---	TURKISH ID	0.82
turkid3	<---	TURKISH ID	0.82
turkid4	<---	TURKISH ID	0.61
turkid9_	<---	TURKISH ID	0.42
dutch1	<---	DUTCH ID	0.68
dutch2	<---	DUTCH ID	0.87
dutch3	<---	DUTCH ID	0.70
dutch4	<---	DUTCH ID	0.63

After correlating the error terms, model fit the data,  $\chi^2 (30) = 35.93, p = .21$ ;  $\chi^2/df = 1.20$ ; RMSEA = .04 (.00-.07); GFI = .96, AGFI = .92, CFI = .99. The results of the analysis showed that all parameters were significant (Table 4.6.). Two factors correlated negatively,  $r = -.21$ .

Table 4.6. Standardized regression weights

Items		Factors	Estimate
compet1	<---	COMPETITION	0.52
compet2	<---	COMPETITION	0.58
compet3	<---	COMPETITION	0.88
compet4	<---	COMPETITION	0.86
compet5	<---	COMPETITION	0.77
compet6	<---	COMPETITION	0.71
Ind_mob1	<---	INDIVIDUAL MOBILITY	0.44
ind_mob2	<---	INDIVIDUAL MOBILITY	0.65
ind_mob3	<---	INDIVIDUAL MOBILITY	0.97
Ind_mob4	<---	INDIVIDUAL MOBILITY	0.60

#### 4.5.4 CFA of Participation in Dutch and Turkish Organizations

Participation in ethnic organizations with 4 items (youth, mosque, sports and women) and participation in cross-ethnic (Dutch) organizations with 3 items (youth, sports, women) were tested using CFA. Although all the paths were significant, the model did not fit the data,  $\chi^2 (13) = 83.97, p < .001$ . Based on Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and standardized residual covariances, I let the following error terms to correlate: women organizations of Turks and Dutch ( $r = .56$ ), Turkish woman and sports organizations ( $r = -.20$ ), Dutch youth and sports organizations ( $r = .34$ ). Then, the model fit the data,  $\chi^2 (10) = 17.69, p = .06, \chi^2/df = 1.77$ ; RMSEA = .07 (.00-.12); GFI = .97, AGFI = .92, CFI = .96. Besides, the results of the analysis showed that all the items significantly loaded on the respective factor except for Dutch sports organizations (Table 4.7)

Although it mattered whether an organization was an ethnic or cross-ethnic one, since there were apparently two distinct factors, there seemed to be a common factor behind this distinction, referred to as participation tendency, which was evident in the high correlation between these two factors,  $r = .60$ . This point will be further deliberated in the discussion part. It should also be noted that this analysis was conducted with a sample size of 154 since 7 cases who did not have any political interest were excluded from the analysis.

Table.4.7 Standardized regression weights

Items		Factors	Estimate
Turk_youth	<---	TURK_ORG	.73
Turk_mosque	<---	TURK_ORG	.54
Turk_sport	<---	TURK_ORG	.66
Turk_woman	<---	TURK_ORG	.30
Dutch_youth	<---	DUTCH_ORG	.74
Dutch_sport	<---	DUTCH_ORG	.07
Dutch_women	<---	DUTCH_ORG	.39

#### 4.5.5. CFA of Ethnic and Mainstream Political Participation

CFA involved ethnic political participation with 4 items (preference for ethnic political issues, preference for talking about politics targeted towards Turkish

people, participation in Turkish organizations, following Turkish media, named as eth\_iss, prefpol3, turkciv, media\_t, respectively) and mainstream political participation with 3 items (preference for a Dutch political leader, participation in Dutch civic organizations, following Dutch media, named as malead1, dutchciv, media\_d, respectively).

With all 7 indicators included, the model did not fit the data,  $\chi^2(13) = 51.54$ ,  $p < .001$ . Based on the statistical criteria (LM index and inspection of standardized residual covariances) and on the literature (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002), I let the following error terms to correlate: the one between participation in Turkish and Dutch organizations ( $r = .44$ ), and the one between following Turkish and Dutch media ( $r = .37$ ). Although correlating the error terms across factors was not recommended in general (personal communication, J. Weesie, 2006, May) doing so adds up in this context. Kline (2005) refers to it as an appropriate way of representing multidimensional measurement. In other words, in addition to the ethnic/cross-ethnic dimension, correlated error terms represented tendencies for organizational participation and media use. To put it differently, those who followed media, followed both Turkish as well as Dutch media more often than those who did not follow media. After letting their error terms correlate, model fit the data,  $\chi^2(11) = 11.12$ ,  $p = .43$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 1.01$ ; RMSEA = .01 (.00-.08); GFI = .98, AGFI = .95, CFI = .99. (Table 4.8). It should also be noted that this analysis was conducted with a sample size of 154 since 7 cases who did not have political interest at all were excluded from the analysis.

Table 4.8. Standardized regression weights

Items		Factors	Estimate
Ethnic issues	<---	ETHNIC POLITICS	.33
Politics concerning Turkish people	<---	ETHNIC POLITICS	.56
Turkish organizations	<---	ETHNIC POLITICS	.46
Turkish Media	<---	ETHNIC POLITICS	.48
Dutch leader	<---	MAINSTREAM POLITICS	.52
Dutch organizations	<---	MAINSTREAM POLITICS	.32
Dutch Media	<---	MAINSTREAM POLITICS	.37

## 4.6 Model 1

In this part, I aim at understanding the way in which the second-generation in the Netherlands perceive the relations between Turks and Dutch in terms of status differentiations and to what extent they identify with Turkish or Dutch identity and moreover at exploring how their views affect their preference for mobility strategies, i.e. individual mobility vs. collective competition.

### 4.6.1 Main Model

In this model, it was presumed that identifications mediated the relationships between intergroup perceptions (legitimacy, stability, permeability) and mobility strategies (individual mobility and collective competition). In other words, how the second-generation perceived the intergroup status differentiations in terms of legitimacy, permeability and stability determined their level of identifications with Dutch or Turkish identity which in turn led to differential taking up of the two mobility strategies.

All variables were defined as observed variables and hence it was a path model. In examining the model, first all the possible direct and indirect paths between independent variables including critical demographic characteristics (legitimacy, stability, permeability, age, education and gender), mediators (Turkish and Dutch identification) and outcome variables (individual mobility and competition) were estimated. . The full model did not fit the data,  $\chi^2 (2) = 13.29, p = .001, \chi^2/df = 6.64, AGFI: 0.56, RMSEA = .19 (.10-.29)$  in spite of high GFI (.98) and CFI (.95).

Following the examination of the path coefficients in the full model, I repeated the analyses by eliminating the pathways that were not significant. The inspection of modification indices in the first step also suggested that the error terms between Dutch and Turkish identification was highly correlated so the correlated error between these two variables was added to the model ( $r = -.26$ ).

The simpler model included one less variable as stability was dropped due to its nonsignificant effect. Consequently, the comparison of the full model with the simpler model was done through a comparison of Akaike's information criteria of two models (the full model AIC = 119.29, the simple model AIC = 73.59), which

showed that the simpler model was a better model. Hence, we preferred the simpler model with fewer paths and with added correlated error. The simpler model fit the data,  $\chi^2(13) = 9.59, p = .73, \chi^2/df = .74, GFI = .99, AGFI: .96, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 (.00-.06)$  (see Figure 4.1)




Figure 4.1. Coefficients in Standardized values for the Model 1 after modifications

As hypothesized in the theoretical part, identifications mediated the relationships between intergroup perceptions and mobility strategies. The second-generation Turkish immigrants who found the intergroup boundaries permeable distanced themselves from low status Turkish identity ( $\beta = -.21, B = -.15, p < .01$ ), and increased their level of Dutch identification ( $\beta = .28, B = .25, p < .001$ ). Similarly, those who found the intergroup situations legitimate decreased their level of Turkish identification ( $\beta = -.27, B = -.22, p < .001$ ). Although one can argue that the opposite may also be true, that is, the more they identify with Turkish identity, the more they find the intergroup situations impermeable and illegitimate, experimental studies of SIT support the former argument that is also held in this study (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1999; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993; Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, De Vries, & Wilke, 1998; Ellemers & Van Rijswijk, 1997; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990; Taylor, Moghaddam,

Gamble, & Zellerer, 1987). Moreover, while those who identified more with Turkish identity preferred collective competition strategy ( $\beta = .45, B = .46, p < .001$ ), those who identified more with Dutch identity preferred individual mobility strategy ( $\beta = .48, B = .47, p < .001$ ). Turkish identification also had a negative effect on the preference for individual mobility strategy ( $\beta = -.15, B = -.18, p < .05$ ). Apart from mediational effect of legitimacy via Turkish identification on collective competition strategy, legitimacy had also direct effects on both individual mobility strategy ( $\beta = .22, B = .22, p < .001$ ) and collective competition strategy ( $\beta = -.21, B = -.18, p < .01$ ). Adoption of one strategy was negatively correlated with the adoption of the other strategy ( $r = -.15$ ).

Stability did not have any significant effects on any of the variables, hence dropped from further analyses of the model. This might be explained with the inadequate properties of the scale for stability as well as the ambiguous attitudes of the relatively young participants of this study towards the stability of future status differences between Turks and Dutch in the Netherlands. This issue will be further taken up in the discussion part.

As for control variables, gender had a negative effect on Dutch identification ( $\beta = -.16, B = -.41, p < .05$ ), suggesting that women reported slightly lower levels of Dutch identification. Education had a positive impact on Dutch identification ( $\beta = .15, B = .29, p < .05$ ) and a negative impact on Turkish identification ( $\beta = -.16, B = -.25, p < .05$ ). That is, the more educated they are, the more they identify with Dutch identity and relatedly the less they identify with Turkish identity. Finally, age had a negative impact on Turkish identification ( $\beta = -.16, B = -.03, p < .05$ ). The older generation identified less with Turkish identity.

For testing the robustness of the model, another technique, referred to as bootstrapping was used. Out of the 2000 samples drawn from the main sample, none of the bootstrap samples were unused because of singular covariance matrix or a nonfitting solution. Bias values were very small (from .01 to .00) which further supported the robustness of the proposed model. Moreover, bias corrected percentile method for 95% confidence interval gave consistently similar p-values for unstandardized regression coefficients of the variables across different methods.



According to overall model fit of Bollen-Stine bootstrapping technique, model fit the data,  $p = .75$ .

#### **4.6.2 Mediation by Identifications**

The mediation by mobility strategies were proved based on the following two criteria. First, based on the criterion by Kline (2005, p.146), to test the impact of predictor (X) on the dependent (Y2) mediated by Y1, I first included the direct effect of X on Y2 to the model, then deleted the path from the model, and compared the two models with the difference chi-square. If the difference chi-square was nonsignificant, mediation was confirmed. Secondly, based on the criterion by Baron and Kenny (1986), the initial correlation between X and Y2 should be reduced or become nonsignificant after the addition of Y1 to the model.

As explained before, model trimming was based on deletion of nonsignificant paths. The direct paths from permeability to mobility strategies were nonsignificant and hence deleted. However, to verify further the mediation of Turkish identification (Y1) of the effect of permeability (X) on collective competition (Y2), we compared the model with the direct path included between X and Y2,  $\chi^2(12) = 9.44$ , with the model in which the path was deleted  $\chi^2(13) = 9.59$ . The difference between the models was not significant,  $\chi^2(1) = .16$ ,  $p = .69$ . Based on the parsimony rule of SEM (that is, the simpler the better), we preferred the model with one less path. This further supported the mediational role of Turkish identification between permeability and collective competition (Kline, 2005). Moreover, according to the criteria suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986), the correlation between permeability and collective competition ( $r = -.21$ ,  $p < .01$ ) was no longer significant after the addition of Turkish identification to the model, suggesting a full mediated association. In a similar fashion, we tested the mediational role of Dutch identification (Y1) of the effect of permeability (X) on individual mobility (Y2), we compared the model with direct path between X and Y2 included and the one without this path, which resulted in difference chi-square,  $\chi^2(1) = .064$ ,  $p = .80$ . Moreover, the correlation between permeability and individual mobility ( $r = .24$ ,  $p < .01$ ) was no longer significant after the addition of Dutch identification to the model, suggesting a full mediated association.

### 4.6.3 The Alternative Model

As the statistical fit itself does not prove that the model is correct, a general inclination for SEM analyses is to test robustness of the theoretically based model by comparing it with alternative statistical models in order to prove its statistical superiority.

Although mediation by identifications of the effect of intergroup variables on mobility strategies is theoretically sound, I also tested an alternative model in which identifications were entered as outcomes as in the same level with mobility strategies.

First, I compared the full models with all possible direct and indirect effects included. As it was stated above, the main full model yielded the following fit statistics,  $\chi^2(2) = 13.29$ ,  $p = .001$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 6.64$ , GFI = .98, AGFI: 0.56, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .19 (.10-.29). On the other hand, the full model of the alternative in which identifications were outcomes, not mediators, yielded very poor fit statistics,  $\chi^2(6) = 103.65$ ,  $p = .000$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 17.28$ , GFI = .89, AGFI: .01, CFI = .57, RMSEA = .32 (.27-.37). When the value of Akaike's information criterion (AIC) of the main model was compared with that of the alternative model, this fit index was found to be considerably lower for the hypothesized model (AIC = 119.29) than for the alternative model (AIC = 201.65). As lower AIC suggests better fit, these results show superiority of the main model above the alternative model.

Secondly, I compared the main model and the alternative model after deletion of all nonsignificant paths and correlating the error terms. When all nonsignificant paths deleted from the main model and after adding the error covariance between Turkish and Dutch identification, the main model fit the data very well, as explained above,  $\chi^2(13) = 9.59$ ,  $p = .73$ ,  $\chi^2/df = .74$ , GFI = .99, AGFI: .96, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 (.00-.06), AIC = 73.59. On the other hand, when all nonsignificant paths deleted from the alternative model and after adding the error covariance between Turkish and Dutch identification ( $r = -.24$ ), the alternative model still did not fit the data,  $\chi^2(14) = 99.910$ ,  $p = .000$ . Inspection of LM indexes suggested correlating the error terms between Dutch identification and individual mobility ( $r = .52$ ), between Turkish identification and competition ( $r = .43$ ), and between Turkish identification and individual mobility ( $r = -.28$ ). After adding these

correlated errors, alternative model fit the data,  $\chi^2 (11) = 9.29, p = .60, \chi^2/df = .84, GFI = .89, AGFI: .95, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 (.00-.07), AIC = 77.29.$

A comparison of the main model with the alternative model via Akaike's information criterion showed that the main model had lower AIC values (73.59) and thus was a better model than the alternative model (77.29). Since both models had exactly the same variables, it was also plausible to compare them via chi-square difference test,  $\chi^2 (2) = 0.31, p = .86,$  which showed that the difference was nonsignificant. Based on the parsimony rule of SEM (the simpler the better), as the main model was simpler than the alternative, the main model was preferred over the alternative. Moreover, modification indices suggested additional links from Turkish identification to competition and from Dutch identification to individual mobility. Correlating the error terms between identifications and mobility strategies were statistically similar to adding paths between these variables. This further confirmed that the main model was theoretically and statistically superior to the alternative model.

#### **4.7 Model 2**

I endeavor to understand the impact of how the second-generation perceive intergroup relations in terms of stability, legitimacy, permeability and discrimination and of to what extent they identify with Dutch or Turkish identity on their choices of mainstream political participation and ethnic political participation.

Since the question presupposed that the participants did have political orientations and behaviors, those cases who did not vote, did not think of voting in the future and had barely political interest were deleted and the following analyses were carried out with a sample size of 154.

##### **4.7.1 The Main Model**

In this model, it was presumed that those participants who found the status differentiations between Turks and Dutch illegitimate, impermeable, unstable and discriminatory would be more attached to Turkish identity and hence would pursue group interests in the political arena, that is, would be politically mobilized on ethnic grounds. Based on the previous model, it was also assumed that identification

would mediate the effects of intergroup perceptions on political participation outcomes.

In defining the model, ethnic and mainstream political participations were defined as latent variables since each of their effect indicators represented different components of political participation and hence had different rating scales. Three effect indicators were defined for mainstream political participation: preference for a Dutch political leader, participation in Dutch organizations, and following Dutch media. Four effect indicators were defined for ethnic political participation: interest in ethnic political issues, talking about political issues concerning Turkish people, participation in Turkish organizations and following Turkish media. Following Turkish media for ethnic political participation and preference for a Dutch political leader for mainstream political participation were selected as reference variables and were imposed ULI constraints. That is, their unstandardized loadings were fixed to 1. All other variables were defined as observed variables, namely as cause indicators. Hence, this model had both cause and effect indicators, it is a combined structural-path model. This is also called a MIMIC model.

In examining the model, I first estimated all the possible direct and indirect paths between independent variables including critical demographic characteristics (legitimacy, stability, permeability, discrimination, age, education and gender), mediators (Turkish and Dutch identification) and outcome variables (ethnic and mainstream political participation) without any correlated error terms added. The full model did not fit the data,  $\chi^2(60) = 112.41$   $p = .000$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 1.87$ , GFI = .92, AGFI: .82, CFI = .84, RMSEA = .08 (.05-.09), AIC = 264.41.

Following the examination of the path coefficients in the full model, I repeated the analyses by eliminating the pathways that were not significant. The previous confirmatory factor analyses of political participations suggested that the error terms between participation in Turkish and Dutch organizations ( $r = .35$ ), between Turkish and Dutch media ( $r = .33$ ) and between Turkish and Dutch identification ( $r = -.26$ ) were highly correlated, and thus the correlated errors were added to the model. Correlating the error terms between ethnic and cross-ethnic organizational participation was an appropriate way of presenting multidimensional measurement (organizational tendency) as suggested in the theoretical part.

The simpler model included fewer variables as stability and age were dropped due to their nonsignificant effects. Consequently, the comparison of the full model with the simpler model was done through a comparison of Akaike's information criteria of two models (the full model AIC = 264.41, the simple model AIC = 169.62), which showed that the simpler model was a better model. Hence, we preferred the simpler model with fewer paths and with added three correlated errors. The simpler model fit the data,  $\chi^2(57) = 73.62, p = .068, \chi^2/df = 1.29, GFI = .94, AGFI: .88, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .04 (.00-.07)$  (see Figure 4.2).




Figure 4.2. Coefficients in Standardized values for the Model 2 after modifications

Similar to first model, perception of permeability had a negative affect on Turkish identification ( $\beta = -.22, B = -.17, p < .01$ ) and a positive effect on Dutch identification ( $\beta = .29, B = .26, p < .001$ ) while legitimacy only had a negative effect on Turkish identification ( $\beta = -.26, B = -.21, p < .001$ ). Likewise, Dutch identification had a positive effect on mainstream political participation ( $\beta = .38, B = .12, p < .01$ ) while Turkish identification had a negative effect on mainstream

political participation ( $\beta = -.43, B = -.17, p < .001$ ) and a positive effect on ethnic political participation ( $\beta = .58, B = .27, p < .001$ ). Discrimination had a significant direct effect on ethnic political participation ( $\beta = .30, B = .20, p < .05$ ).

As for control variables, women identified less with Dutch identity ( $\beta = -.16, B = -.41, p < .05$ ), and were less politically mobilized both on mainstream issues ( $\beta = -.49, B = -.42, p < .001$ ) and on ethnic grounds ( $\beta = -.35, B = -.35, p < .001$ ). The higher educated identified less with Turkish identity ( $\beta = -.17, B = -.28, p < .05$ ) and more with Dutch identity ( $\beta = .17, B = .34, p < .05$ ) and consequently they participated in politics more with a focus on mainstream issues ( $\beta = .23, B = .15, p = .05$ ) and less with a focus on ethnic interests ( $\beta = -.18, B = -.13, p = .05$ ). The overall model explained 81% of the variance of mainstream political participation and 65% of ethnic political participation

As it was with the former model, to further test the robustness of the model, Bollen-Stine bootstrapping technique was used. Out of the 2000 samples drawn from the main sample, none of the bootstrap samples were unused because of a singular covariance matrix or a nonfitting solution. AMOS found that the model fit better than expected in 1664 of the 2000 samples,  $p = .168$ . Moreover, bias corrected percentile method for 95% confidence interval gave consistently similar p-values for unstandardized regression coefficients across different methods. Similarly, a regular bootstrapping technique provided small bias values (.00-.13), further supporting the robustness of the model.

#### **4.7.2 Mediation by Identifications**

Based on the criteria by Kline (2005, p .146), to test the impact of predictor (X) on the dependent (Y2) mediated by Y1, first the direct effect of X on Y2 was included to the model, and then deleted from the model, and the two models were compared with the difference chi-square. If the difference chi-square was nonsignificant, mediation was confirmed. Based on the criteria by Baron and Kenny (1986), the initial correlation between X and Y2 should be reduced or become nonsignificant after the addition of Y1 to the model.

As explained before, model trimming was based on deletion of non-significant paths. The direct paths from permeability to political participations were

non-significant and hence deleted. However, to verify further the mediation of Turkish identification (Y1) of the effect of permeability (X) on ethnic political participation (Y2), the model with the direct path included between X and Y2,  $\chi^2 (56) = 72.83$  was compared with the model in which the path was deleted  $\chi^2 (57) = 73.62$ . The difference between the models was not significant,  $\chi^2 (1) = .80, p = .38$ . Based on the parsimony rule of SEM (that is, the simpler the better), the model with one less path was preferred. This further supported the mediational role of Turkish identification between permeability and ethnic political participation (Kline, 2005). Moreover, according to the criteria suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986), the correlation between permeability and ethnic political participation ( $r = -.26, p < .01$ ) was no longer significant after the addition of Turkish identification to the model, suggesting a full mediated association. Similarly, mediational role of Dutch identification (Y1) between permeability (X) and mainstream political participation (Y2) was tested by first including and then deleting the direct path between X and Y2, which resulted in difference  $\chi^2 (1) = 1.424$ , which was not significant,  $p = .23$ . The correlation between permeability and mainstream political participation ( $r = .20, p < .05$ ) was no longer significant after the addition of Dutch identification to the model, suggesting a full mediated association.

Furthermore, mediation effect of legitimacy (X) on mainstream political participation (Y2) via Turkish identification (Y1) was tested by first including and then deleting the direct path between X and Y2, which resulted in difference  $\chi^2 (1) = 2.24$ , which was not significant,  $p = .13$ . The correlation between legitimacy and mainstream political participation ( $r = .31, p < .01$ ) was no longer significant after addition of Turkish identification to the model. Both of these results suggested a full mediated association.

Finally, it was questioned whether the impact of legitimacy (X) on ethnic political participation (Y2) was mediated by Turkish identification (Y1). According to the criteria by Baron and Kelly (1986), since legitimacy did not initially have a significant correlation with ethnic political participation ( $r = -.05, p = .50$ ), the mediation hypothesis was not supported.

### 4.7.3 Alternative Model

In order to confirm that the model was correct, it was compared with a statistical alternative model in which the identifications were entered as outcome variables as in the same level with the two latent factors.

First, I compared the full models with all possible direct and indirect effects included. As it was stated above, the main full model yielded the following fit statistics,  $\chi^2(60) = 112.41$ ,  $p = .000$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 1.87$ , GFI = .92, AGFI: .82, CFI = .84, RMSEA = .08 (.05-.09), AIC = 264.41. On the other hand, the full model of the alternative in which identifications were outcomes, not mediators, yielded very poor fit statistics,  $\chi^2(64) = 166.67$ ,  $p = .000$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 2.60$ , GFI = .88, AGFI: .74, CFI = .69, RMSEA = .10 (.08-.12). The two models were compared via the values of Akaike's information criterion (AIC), which revealed that this fit index was considerably lower for the hypothesized model (AIC = 264.41) than for the alternative model (AIC = 310.67). As lower AIC suggests better fit, these results showed superiority of the main model above the alternative model. Moreover, a comparison of the difference chi-square was also plausible here since two models included exactly the same variables except for the paths from identifications to political participations. The result showed that deletion of these paths significantly decreased the model fit,  $\chi^2(4) = 54.26$ ,  $p = .000$ .

Secondly, the main model was compared with the alternative model after deletion of all nonsignificant paths and correlating the error terms. When all nonsignificant paths deleted from the main model and after adding the error covariances between Turkish and Dutch identification, between participation in Turkish and Dutch organizations, and between Turkish and Dutch media, the main model fit the data very well, as explained above,  $\chi^2(57) = 73.62$ ,  $p = .068$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 1.29$ , GFI = .94, AGFI: .88, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .04 (.00-.07), AIC = 169.62.

On the other hand, when all non-significant paths deleted from the alternative model and after adding the error covariances between Turkish and Dutch identification, between participation in Turkish and Dutch organizations, and between Turkish and Dutch media, the alternative model still did not fit the data,  $\chi^2(58) = 130.39$ ,  $p = .000$ . Inspection of LM indexes showed that it was required to correlate the error terms between Turkish identification and ethnic political



participation ( $r = .28$ ) and between Dutch identification and mainstream political participation ( $r = .13$ ). Even after adding these correlated error terms, the model had only poor fit,  $\chi^2(56) = 83.41$ ,  $p = .01$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 1.49$ , GFI = .93, AGFI: .87, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .06 (.03-.08), AIC = 181.41. The main model had lower AIC values (169.62) than the alternative model (181.41), which proved its statistical superiority. Moreover, correlating the error terms between identifications and political participations were statistically similar to adding paths between these four variables. This further confirmed that the main model was theoretically and statistically superior to the alternative model.

### **4.8 Model 3**

In this model, I aim at understanding the impact of intergroup perceptions and upward mobility strategies on political participation outcomes. Identifications were left out of the analyses on purpose.

Since the question presupposed that the participants did have political orientations and behaviors, those cases who did not vote, didn't think of voting in the future and had barely political interest were deleted and the following analyses were carried out with a sample size of 154.

#### **4.8.1 The Main Model**

In the third model it was assumed that the second-generation Turkish immigrants who found the status differences between Turks and Dutch in the Netherlands unstable, illegitimate, impermeable, and discriminatory would be more likely to cling to their own group and choose collective competition strategy, and hence, they would be more likely to pursue their own group's interests in the political arena as well. It was also scrutinized whether mobility strategies mediated the relationship between intergroup perceptions and political outcomes.

In defining the model, ethnic and mainstream political participations were defined as latent variables since each of their effect indicators represented different components of political participation and hence had different rating scales. Three effect indicators were defined for mainstream political participation: preference for a Dutch political leader, participation in Dutch organizations, and following Dutch

media. Four effect indicators were defined for ethnic political participation: interest in ethnic political issues, talking about political issues concerning Turkish people, participation in Turkish organizations and following Turkish media. Following Turkish media and following Dutch media were selected as reference variables for their respective factors and were imposed ULI constraints. That is, their unstandardized loadings were fixed to 1. All other variables were defined as observed variables, namely as cause indicators. Hence, this model had both cause and effect indicators, it is a combined structural-path model. This is also called a MIMIC model.

In examining the model, I first estimated all the possible direct and indirect paths between independent variables including critical demographic characteristics (legitimacy, stability, permeability, discrimination, age, education and gender), mediators (Turkish and Dutch identification) and outcome variables (individual mobility, competition, ethnic and mainstream political participation) without any correlated error terms added. The full model did not fit the data,  $\chi^2(70) = 118.95$   $p = .000$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 1.64$ , GFI = .93, AGFI: .84, CFI = .87, RMSEA = .07 (.04-.09), AIC = 250.57.

Following the examination of the path coefficients in the full model, I repeated the analyses by eliminating the pathways that were not significant. The inspection of modification indices in the first step and the previous confirmatory factor analyses of political participations suggested that the error term between participation in Turkish and Dutch organizations ( $r = .34$ ), the one between Turkish and Dutch media ( $r = .34$ ) were highly correlated, and thus the correlated errors were added to the model.

The simpler model included fewer variables as age was dropped due to its nonsignificant effect. Consequently, the comparison of the full model with the simpler model was done through a comparison of Akaike's information criteria of two models (the full model AIC = 250.57, the simple model AIC = 189.27), which showed that the simpler model was a better model. The simpler model fit the data,  $\chi^2(66) = 81.27$ ,  $p = .098$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 1.23$ , GFI = .94, AGFI: .88, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .04 (.00-.07) (see Figure 4.3)




Figure 4.3. Coefficients in Standardized values for the Model 3 after modifications

As hypothesized in the theoretical part, the second-generation who found the situation legitimate tended to adopt the individual mobility strategy more ( $\beta = .23$ ,  $B = .22$ ,  $p < .01$ ) and to adopt the collective competition strategy less ( $\beta = -.37$ ,  $B = -.31$ ,  $p < .001$ ) than those who found it illegitimate. Those who thought they could actually pass into high status Dutch society, that is, who found the group boundaries permeable, were more likely to adopt the individual mobility strategy ( $\beta = .20$ ,  $B = .17$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Stability as a categorical variable had a nonsignificant but meaningful negative effect on the collective competition strategy ( $\beta = -.13$ ,  $B = -.29$ ,  $p = .08$ ). In other words, those who perceived that things could change were more likely to adopt collective competition strategy. In addition, those who approved the individual mobility strategy were likely to participate in politics more with a focus on mainstream issues ( $\beta = .35$ ,  $B = .12$ ,  $p < .01$ ) and less with a focus on ethnic interests ( $\beta = -.34$ ,  $B = -.14$ ,  $p < .01$ ), while those approving collective competition strategy were likely to be politically mobilized more with a focus on their own

group's issues ( $\beta = .23, B = .10, p < .05$ ) and less with a focus on mainstream issues ( $\beta = -.22, B = -.09, p = .05$ ).

Perception of group discrimination had a direct positive effect on ethnic political participation ( $\beta = .31, B = .21, p < .01$ ) and a nonsignificant yet telling negative effect on mainstream political participation ( $\beta = -.19, B = -.12, p = .08$ ). The model explained 66% of the variance in mainstream political participation and 49% of the variance in ethnic political participation.

As for control variables, women espoused the individual mobility strategy less ( $\beta = -.21, B = -.52, p < .01$ ) and they were politically mobilized less both on ethnic ( $\beta = -.46, B = -.43, p < .001$ ) and mainstream grounds ( $\beta = -.47, B = -.42, p < .001$ ) than men. The impact of education was similar to the second model. The more educated pursued less ethnic interests ( $\beta = -.22, B = -.17, p < .05$ ) and more mainstream interests ( $\beta = .37, B = .25, p < .01$ ) in the political arena than the less educated.

As it was with the former models, to further test the robustness of the model, the Bollen Stine bootstrapping technique was employed. Out of the 2000 samples drawn from the main sample, none of the bootstrap samples were unused because of singular covariance matrix or a nonfitting solution. AMOS found that the model fit better than expected in 1558 of the 2000 samples,  $p = .221$ . Moreover, bias corrected percentile method for 95% confidence interval gave consistently similar p-values for unstandardized regression coefficients across different methods. Similarly, a regular bootstrapping technique provided very small bias values (.00-.07) further supporting the robustness of the proposed model.

#### **4.8.2 Mediation by Mobility Strategies**

Based on the criteria by Kline (2005), to test the impact of predictor (X) on the dependent (Y2) mediated by Y1, the direct effect of X on Y2 is first added to the model, then deleted from the model, and the two models are compared with the difference chi-square. If the difference chi-square is nonsignificant, mediation is confirmed. Based on the criteria by Baron and Kenny (1986), the initial correlation between X and Y2 should be reduced or become nonsignificant after the addition of Y1 to the model.

First, it was questioned whether the impact of legitimacy (X) on ethnic political participation (Y2) was mediated by collective competition (Y1). According to the criteria by Baron and Kelly (1986), since legitimacy did not initially have a significant correlation with ethnic political participation ( $r = -.05, p = .50$ ), the mediation hypothesis was not supported. Unlike the mediation via collective competition strategy, the mediation of legitimacy (X) on mainstream political participation (Y2) via individual mobility (Y1) proved to be a full mediation. The correlation between X and Y2 ( $r = .31, p < .001$ ) was no longer significant after the addition of Y1 to the model. The difference model chi-square was nonsignificant,  $\chi^2(1) = .205, p = .65$ , further supporting the mediation.

Secondly, it was tested whether the impact of permeability (X) on mainstream political participation (Y2) was mediated by individual mobility (Y1). The initial correlation between X and Y2 ( $r = .20, p < .05$ ) was no longer significant after the addition of Y1 to the model. The difference chi-square was not significant,  $\chi^2(1) = 2.53, p = .11$ , both of which substantiated the mediational hypothesis. Finally, it was questioned whether the impact of permeability (X) on ethnic political participation (Y2) was mediated by individual mobility (Y1). The correlation between X and Y2 ( $r = -.26, p < .01$ ) was no longer significant after the addition of Y1 to the model. The difference model chi-square was nonsignificant,  $\chi^2(1) = .21, p = .22$ , further supporting the mediation.

#### **4.8.3 Alternative Model**

In order to confirm that the model was correct, it was compared with a statistically alternative model in which mobility strategies were entered as outcome variables as in the same level with the two latent factors.

First, I compared the full models with all possible direct and indirect effects included. As it was stated above, the main full model yielded the following fit statistics,  $\chi^2(60) = 98.57, p = .001, \chi^2/df = 1.64, GFI = .93, AGFI: .84, CFI = .87, RMSEA = .07 (.04-.09), AIC = 250.57$ . On the other hand, the full model of the alternative in which mobility strategies were outcomes, not mediators, yielded very poor fit statistics,  $\chi^2(64) = 123.57, p = .000, \chi^2/df = 1.93, GFI = .91, AGFI: .81, CFI = .80, RMSEA = .08 (.06-.10)$ . The two models were compared via the values

of Akaike's information criterion (AIC), which revealed that this fit index was lower for the hypothesized model (AIC = 250.57) than for the alternative model (AIC = 267.57). As lower AIC suggests better fit, these results showed superiority of the main model above the alternative model. Moreover, a comparison of the difference chi-square was also plausible here since two models included exactly the same variables except for the paths from mobility strategies to political participations. The result showed that deletion of these paths significantly decreased the model fit,  $\chi^2(4) = 25.01, p < .05$ .

Secondly, the main model was compared with the alternative model after deletion of all nonsignificant paths and correlating the error terms. When all nonsignificant paths deleted from the main model and after adding the error covariances between participation in Turkish and Dutch organizations, and between Turkish and Dutch media, the main model fit the data very well, as explained above,  $\chi^2(66) = 81.27, p = .098, \chi^2/df = 1.23, GFI = .94, AGFI: .88, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .04 (.00-.07), AIC = 189.27$ . On the other hand, when all non-significant paths deleted from the alternative model and after adding the error covariances between participation in Turkish and Dutch organizations, and between Turkish and Dutch media, the alternative model still did not fit the data,  $\chi^2(69) = 107.43, p = .002$ . Inspection of LM indexes showed that it was required to correlate the error terms between individual mobility and ethnic political participation ( $r = -.37$ ), between individual mobility and mainstream political participation ( $r = .28$ ), between competition and ethnic political participation ( $r = .30$ ). After adding these correlated error terms, the model had acceptable fit,  $\chi^2(66) = 84.47, p = .06, \chi^2/df = 1.28, GFI = .93, AGFI: .88, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .04 (.00-.07), AIC = 192.47$ . Although the two models had exactly the same number of degrees of freedom for the same variables included, the main model had lower chi-square values. The main model had also lower AIC values (189.27) than the alternative model (192.47), which proved its statistical superiority. Moreover, correlating the error terms between mobility strategies and political participations were statistically similar to adding paths between these four variables. This further confirmed that the main model was theoretically and statistically superior to the alternative model.

#### 4.9 Interactions

Finally, to test for possible interaction effects of the socio-structural variables on the dependent variables, which were undetected in the path analysis, additional regression analyses were conducted and simple slopes were tested with the aid of a computational tool (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, in press)<sup>11</sup>. To this end, structural variables were centered (Aiken & West, 1991). For ethnic political mobilization, a significant interaction between stability and permeability ( $\beta = -.176$ ,  $B = -.042$ ,  $p < .05$ ) reveals that the negative effect of stability holds only under high-permeability conditions,  $M_{\text{unstab}} = 1.38$  versus  $M_{\text{stab}} = 0.78$ ,  $t(141) = -2.70$ ,  $p < .01$ , but vanishes under low- and average- permeability conditions (see Figure 4.4.). This suggests that only when intergroup boundaries are perceived as highly permeable (i.e. thinking that one can be perceived as Dutch), perceived stability of status differences (i.e. thinking that it will not change) will diminish ethnic political mobilization.




Figure 4.4. Interaction of permeability and stability on ethnic political participation  
X2: permeability

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<sup>11</sup> In addition to regression analyses, ANOVAs were conducted using socio-structural variables dummy coded via median split so as to testify the interaction effects.

Similarly, for mainstream political mobilization, a significant interaction effect between legitimacy and permeability ( $\beta = .267, B = .071, p < .01$ ) renders that positive effect of legitimacy is significant only under conditions of high permeability ( $M_{\text{illeg}} = 3.19$  versus  $M_{\text{legit}} = 4.02, t(141) = 2.92, p < .01$ . (Figure 4.5). Namely, only when the group boundaries are perceived highly permeable, perceived legitimacy will accentuate mainstream political mobilization.




Figure 4.5 Interaction of permeability and legitimacy on mainstream political participation  
X2: Permeability



## **CHAPTER 5**

### **DISCUSSION**

The main objective of the thesis was to describe and specify the political strategies that disadvantaged groups could adopt. In addition to this central goal, it had two more aims: to understand the social psychological antecedents of their choices between different political strategies and to test the SIT model (Mummendey et al., 1999), which was revised in line with the specific field setting. The field setting was the case of the Turkish second-generation in the Netherlands who have inherited the low-status of their Turkish migrant parents. How they perceive the intergroup relations not only influences their identifications with Turkish and Dutch identity, but also shapes their political responses in the Netherlands.

#### **5.1. The case of second-generation Turkish immigrants**

Although the study of children of Turkish immigrants reveals important information as to the future of Turkish community in Europe, it has been understudied in the literature compared to the first generation. This study investigates their attitudes toward mobility, their multiple identifications, and links their attitudes and perceptions of intergroup relations to their political participation strategies in the Netherlands. It is important, therefore, to understand the special characteristics of this case study. The two paths of political participation and the multiple identifications defined and discussed in this study bear more importance as well as become more relevant for the second-generation than for the first-generation immigrants. The orientation of the first generation of immigrants could still be their “home” country. That is to say, they might engage in self-enhancement through

mobility strategies pertaining to their home country and not within the host society. This would then cause “parallel societies” or closed ethnic communities, members of which would be interested neither in the host society politics nor in the upward mobility within the host society. However, for the children of Turkish immigrants, who have practically lived all their lives in the host country and who have never migrated themselves, there is no “home” country to return. Although emotionally they might still be attached to their parents’ home country, they do not have any intentions of returning to this so-called home country. Indeed, Diehl and Schnell (2006)’s analysis of a longitudinal study of first and second-generation Turkish immigrants in Germany supports this argument. They show that in 2001, more than 80% of the second-generation Turkish immigrants plan to stay in Germany forever and only 20% of them feel totally a member of country of origin. These results suggest that for the children of Turkish migrants in Europe, the “home” is the society of settlement. Therefore, for the second-generation, defining their mobility strategies and political participation within the host society is more appropriate than arguing for a homeland orientation referring to the country of their parents’ origin.

## **5.2. Intercorrelations among intergroup perceptions**

It is important to understand how and why intergroup perceptions are correlated. Bettencourt et al. (2001) in their meta-analytic study conclude that stability and legitimacy are positively correlated. In sharp contrast, Verkuyten and Reijerse (in press) find a significant negative correlation between these two variables for the Turkish-Dutch. In the present case, stability and legitimacy are seen as independent from each other in accordance with Mummendey et al. (1999). Moreover, different from these studies but consistent with SIT (Tajfel, 1978), the more the respondents in this thesis perceive the boundaries permeable, the more stable and the more legitimate status inferiority is perceived. That is, perception of permeability is positively correlated with perceived stability and legitimacy in this thesis. Varied correlations reported in different studies can be explained by the nature of the study (e.g. experimental versus real life, Ellemers, 1993; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992) and also among the real life studies by varying contextual

and demographic factors (e.g. student sample in Verkuyten & Reijerse, in press, versus mixed sample in this thesis).

As for the perception of discrimination, stable, legitimate and permeable conditions are perceived as less discriminatory in this study. When the Turkish second-generation perceive that they are blocked from passing into Dutch society, namely impermeability of group boundaries, they find it discriminatory. This implies that they want to be considered as Dutch. In support of this view, during the interviews, they generally state their dismay to the impermeability of group boundaries.

### **5.3. Model 1**

The results of the thesis generally point to the confirmation of the hypotheses and the SIT model, except for the stability hypothesis. Concerning Model 1, hypotheses 1, 2, 7, 8 were about stability effects and were not confirmed. Namely, those second-generation who perceived the status differences between Turks and Dutch stable in the near future adopted neither the individual mobility strategy (Hypothesis 1), nor the collective competition strategy (Hypothesis 2). Moreover, their perception of stability did not have any effects on either their level of Dutch identification (Hypothesis 7), or on their level of Turkish identification (Hypothesis 8). Absence of any significant direct or indirect effects in the model is not surprising in light of the equivocal evidence presented in the theoretical part regarding stability. Two possible explanations are put forward. The `ambiguity` explanation is based on personal observations during the field study that the respondents, due to their relatively young age, were undecided about the stability versus instability of the future relations between Turks and Dutch in the Netherlands. They did not have a past reference to reflect upon the future of the intergroup relations. The `scale properties` argument states that stability indeed might tap two aspects of intergroup relations, stability of socio-economic structure or of relations per se. In this regard, the scale might have low construct validity leading to nonsignificant effects.

Perception of permeability of group boundaries had an effect on the extent to which respondents identified with both Turkish and Dutch identity; while

identifications predicted the choice for collective competition and individual mobility respectively. Hence, Hypotheses 11 and 12 regarding the indirect effects of permeability on mobility strategies through enhanced identifications were confirmed. Perception of permeability did not have any added direct effects on mobility strategies (Hypotheses 5 and 6 were not confirmed). Although perception of permeability of group boundaries had an effect on the extent to which respondents identified with both Turkish and Dutch identity, in light of the low-level of Dutch identification among the respondents, one has to be cautious in concluding that permeability as such leads to higher Dutch identification. Their level of Dutch identification is still quite low. This is consistent with the critical findings showing that in real life studies, members of low-status groups are more reluctant to give up on their identity and to choose individual mobility (Moghaddam et al., 1987; Moghaddam & Perreault, 1992). Moreover, this provides further support for the argument that is held in the theoretical part that how Dutch identity is framed in the public discourse in the Netherlands very much affects how people experience these identities. Similarly, Diehl and Schnell (2006) report for Germany that only 35% of the second-generation Turkish immigrants feel totally German. This is also low considering that they have lived all their lives in Germany. However, in Germany, similar to the Netherlands, being German is perceived to be conditional upon having German parents. Hence, the Turkish second-generation become *allochtone* of the Netherlands and *ausländer* of Germany. Worse yet, they are perceived to be foreigners also in Turkey and are regarded by the mainstream society as *alamancı* in Turkey.

Perception of legitimacy had direct effects on both mobility strategies (hypotheses 3 and 4 were confirmed) but was mediated by only Turkish identification (Hypothesis 10 was supported and 9 was partially supported). Perceived illegitimacy of intergroup status differences enhanced their level of Turkish identification. This might suggest that high levels of Turkish identification among the children of Turkish immigrants are also to some extent reactive to the perceived illegitimacy of the conditions. However, the direction of causality between intergroup perceptions and identifications cannot be proved in a correlational study. That is to say, it might also be true that those who identify more

with Turkish identity perceive more illegitimacy. However, experimental studies of SIT make a strong case for the hypothesis that the level of identification changes depending on the socio-structural variables (Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993; Ellemers et al., 1998). In sum, the results of the model 1 are quite in line with the hypotheses drawn from SIT and with the results of the study by Mummendey et al. (1999).

#### **5.4. Model 2**

Similar to the model 1, the results of the study generally point to the confirmation of the hypotheses and the SIT model, except for the stability hypothesis. Perception of permeability of group boundaries had an effect on the extent to which respondents identified with both Turkish and Dutch identity. Mediated by Turkish and Dutch identity, it had indirect effects on ethnic political participation and on mainstream political participation respectively. Therefore, hypothesis 5 regarding the indirect effect of permeability on mainstream political participation via enhanced Dutch identification and hypothesis 6 regarding the indirect effect of permeability on ethnic political participation via enhanced Turkish identification were confirmed. Similar to the first model, one has to be cautious in concluding that permeability as such leads to higher Dutch identification, considering the low level of Dutch identification among the Turkish second-generation. The mean level of Dutch identification is 3, which indicates “somewhat disagree”. Moreover, everything being equal, permeability would at most increase the level of Dutch identification 1.5 point on a 7-point Likert-type scale. The mean level of Turkish identification, on the other hand, is 5.82, which indicates “agree”.

Although it has been suggested that in societies in which ethnic group boundaries are quite impermeable and in which ethnic minorities have to cope with social derogation and exclusion, a minority position leads to stronger in-group identification (Ellemers, 1993), Hutnik (1991), additionally, has pointed out that ethnic minority groups are endowed with their own culture, traditions and structure providing their group members with a sense of ethnic dignity. Hence, a stronger identification and positive in-group evaluation should not be considered only as a reaction to an inferior minority position.

The perception of legitimacy only had an effect on Turkish identification. Mediated by Turkish identification, it had an indirect effect on ethnic political participation and hence hypothesis 4 was confirmed. Hypothesis 3, which predicted that perceived illegitimacy would have an indirect effect on mainstream political participation through enhanced Dutch identification, was only partially confirmed. Perceived illegitimacy had an indirect effect on mainstream political participation but was mediated by Turkish identification. It did not have any added direct effects (Hypothesis 1 was not confirmed). When the Turkish second-generation think that intergroup status differences between Turks and Dutch in the Netherlands are illegitimate, they have higher levels of Turkish identification and thus are more likely to advance their group's interests in the political arena. On the other hand, if they find the status differences legitimate, they are less likely to identify with Turkish identity and more likely to be interested in politics as a regular Dutch citizen would do.

This raises the following two questions: Do they really find these status differences legitimate? If so, why do not they adopt the Dutch identity? In more statistical terms, why does not Dutch identity mediate the impact of perceived legitimacy on mainstream political participation? Pertaining to the first question, during the interviews, some of the second-generation Turks explicitly stated that the status differences were legitimate. In explaining the reasons, some were more critical of the first-generation Turks, referring to their increased use of unemployment money ("They do not work, they just want to get unemployment money", "They are lazy") or to their lack of Dutch language efficiency ("They do not know Dutch well, although they have been living in this country for such a long time"). Some others explained the reasons why they find the status differences legitimate by referring to the recency of immigration ("It is very normal to have status differences as the Dutch have been living in this country for long and we came to this country later on"). Concerning the second-question, Dutch identity is framed in this country in such a way that even if they want to be Dutch, they are not regarded as Dutch ("As long as I have a darker skin, I am not accepted as Dutch"). That might be the reason why perceived legitimacy of status differences does not necessarily enhance their level of Dutch identification. Hence, through attenuated

Turkish identification, but not through accentuated Dutch identification, they adopt mainstream political participation.

Finally discrimination directly instigated ethnic political mobilization (Hypothesis 2 was confirmed) in line with studies postulating that perceptions of discrimination lead to collective action (Lalonde & Silverman, 1994). Yet, contrary to the expectations and the literature (Branscombe et al., 1999; Dion, 2001; Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998), discrimination did not have any added effects on identifications (Hypothesis 9 was not supported). As impermeable and illegitimate situations were also perceived as discriminatory, part of the effect of discrimination on Turkish identification might be captured by these variables. As long as they perceive discrimination on the basis of their group membership, it is very reasonable that they are going to advance their group's interests in the political arena. Many of them stated that just because they had a Turkish surname or name, they were not selected for jobs. Indeed, the existence of discrimination against migrant groups has been demonstrated in many studies in the literature (Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000; Zegers de Beijl, 2000).

Similar to the first model, stability did not have any effects in the model. As it did not have any significant effects on identifications, hypothesis 7 regarding the indirect effect of stability on mainstream political participation through enhanced Dutch identification and hypothesis 8 regarding the indirect effect of stability on ethnic political participation through enhanced Turkish identification were not confirmed. Absence of any stability effects in the model can be explained by "ambiguity" of the attitudes of the respondents in this study toward future intergroup relations between Turks and Dutch in the Netherlands as well as by the poor "scale properties" of the stability variable. Apart from these two arguments which are explained in details while discussing the results of the first model, a third explanation could be the "hidden interactions" argument. The "hidden interactions" argument stems from the hypothesis that the coupling of illegitimacy and instability of a status system provides the most powerful impetus for the rejection of status hierarchy, rather than each would do per se (Tajfel, 1981; Turner & Brown, 1978). In other words, these socio-structural group properties (legitimacy, stability and permeability) interactively would influence people's responses to status

differentiations (Turner & Brown, 1978; Verkuyten & Reijerse, in press). This is partially supported by the results indicating that the proposed negative effect of stability on ethnic political participation only holds true under conditions of high permeability. That is, under permeable and stable intergroup conditions, ethnic political participation is the least preferred strategy.

### **5.5. Model 3**

Perceived legitimacy of intergroup status differences affected their choices for mobility strategies, which shaped their political participation behaviors. Hence, hypothesis 3 regarding the indirect effect of legitimacy on ethnic political participation via adoption of collective mobility strategy and hypothesis 4 regarding the indirect effect of legitimacy on mainstream political participation via adoption of the individual mobility strategy were confirmed. When the second-generation Turks find the status differences legitimate, which suggests that they also become critical of the first generation Turkish immigrants as explained above, they opt for the individual mobility strategy. That is to say, they attempt to pass into Dutch society behaviorally (trying to be a Dutch citizen in terms of living as a Dutch) and emotionally (in terms of feeling and belonging in the Netherlands). This pattern is very commonsensical considering that most of them would never return to their so-called home country. Having positive attitudes towards individual mobility, they would also participate in politics as a regular Dutch citizen would do. To put it differently, they will not necessarily advance their Turkishness in the political arena. On the other hand, when they find the status differences illegitimate, they are more likely to maintain loyalty to their Turkish in-group and pool their efforts to improve the group's situation collectively. Having positive attitudes towards collective competition, they would advance their group's interests in the political arena as well.

While permeability had an effect on the choice for individual mobility strategy, through which it had an indirect effect on mainstream political participation (Hypothesis 6 was confirmed), it did not have any effects on the collective competition strategy (Hypotheses 5 was not confirmed). So, thinking that they could actually be perceived as Dutch by the mainstream society, they also had



more positive attitudes towards adopting the “passing” strategy, which in turn paved the way for mainstream political participation. This implies that when they think that they can actually be perceived as Dutch by the mainstream society, they have more positive attitudes towards feeling and behaving as a Dutch citizen (individual mobility) and thus they are more likely to participate in Dutch organizations, to prefer a Dutch political candidate and to follow Dutch media. However, feeling blocked from passing into Dutch society (impermeability of group boundaries) did not lead to adoption of collective competition strategy. This surprising lack of effect might be due to the strong impact of legitimacy on the choice for collective competition strategy. So, as to the choice for collective competition, perceived illegitimacy of status differences might be more relevant than perceived impermeability of group boundaries. Yet, one also has to bear in mind that these two predictors are significantly correlated. That is, impermeable group boundaries are also perceived as illegitimate.

Discrimination had direct effects on both kinds of political participation. The second-generation Turks who thought that their group was discriminated were politically mobilized on ethnic grounds (Hypothesis 1 was confirmed). The second-generation Turks who did not perceive group discrimination, on the other hand, endorsed mainstream political participation (Hypothesis 2 was also confirmed). The results support the inclusion of discrimination as a predictor together with legitimacy, although perceived illegitimacy and discrimination are theoretically linked and statistically correlated. Perceived discrimination is a more powerful predictor particularly with regards to the political responses of disadvantaged groups. This might be because discrimination refers to a more concrete form of exclusionary behaviour which limits access to important life domains, which in turn motivates the targets of discrimination towards political action.

Finally, stability as a categorical variable had a non-significant yet telling negative effect on the collective competition strategy. Hence, hypothesis 7 regarding the indirect effect of stability on ethnic political participation through the collective competition strategy was confirmed, while hypothesis 8 concerning the indirect effect of stability on mainstream political participation via the individual mobility strategy was not confirmed. Those second-generation who thought that the

future intergroup relations would be stable, namely that could not be changed, were less likely to choose collective competition strategy. This indeed suggests that only if they perceive a chance of change, they are more likely to attempt at collective change strategies. If they perceive unchangeability, they are more likely attempt at individual mobility strategies. This is similar to the ‘structural approach’ in social mobility research in sociology which analyses the effects of both organizational opportunity structure and hierarchical levels on upward mobility (e.g. Brüderl, Preisendörfer & Ziegler, 1993).

### **5.6. The impact of control variables: Age, gender and education**

Age had a negative impact on Turkish identification in the first model. This might be explained in two ways. First, it could be a “duration of stay” effect. Namely, the longer the Turkish second-generation live in the Netherlands, the more integrated they become to the Dutch society and hence the less they identify with Turkish identity. However, such a conclusion could only be drawn based on a longitudinal study. Another explanation would be a “cohort” effect. This suggests that the older cohort of Turkish second-generation identify less with Turkish identity because they grew up in a more tolerant and multiculturalist environment than the younger generation. In the last decade, there has been a dramatic change in the Netherlands both in migration policies and in majority attitudes from a more multiculturalist stance towards a more integrationist (and even assimilationist) stance (Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). For example, half of the native population of Netherlands thinks that there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands and that immigrants must not hold on to their own culture and customs too much. Moreover, while these attitudes towards migrants are relatively stable since 1990s, attitudes towards Muslims grew more negative from 1998 to 2004 (Gijberts, 2005, p. 197). These studies suggest that the younger generation of Turkish second-generation has grown up in a more hostile and discriminatory environment, which might explain their higher level of Turkish identification.

Education had a positive impact on Dutch identification and on mainstream political participation, and a negative impact on Turkish identification and on ethnic political participation. The strong impact of education in the model is well

explained within Taylor and McKirnan's five stage model (1984). They emphasize that individual mobility "will not be attempted by all or even the majority of disadvantaged group members. Rather, it will be initiated by relatively high status, highly skilled or educated individuals within the disadvantaged group" (p. 294) (Boen & Vanbeselaere, 1998; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). In support of this view, Phalet and Swyngedouw (2002), in their study of Turkish and Moroccan migrants in Belgium, demonstrate that collective strategies as well as ethnic identity become less attractive with higher levels of education. Moreover, education stimulates a critical attitude towards in-group norms, traditions and conservation values (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2004). As for its impact on politics, while lack of education leads to collective-oriented political activities (Garcia, 1987), education as an indicator of socio-economic status is reported to advance political participation in general (Pollock, 1982; Togeby, 2004). This seemingly contradictory finding supports the results of this study that education stimulates mainstream political participation on the one hand and stands in the way of ethnic political participation on the other.

Finally, concerning gender differences, women identified less with Dutch identity and they were less politically mobilized. In support of the former argument, Yalçın-Heckmann and van Gelder (2000) explain how women could play a significant role in the cultural, ideological and biological reproduction of ethnic and national differences, based on an analysis of the Kurdish women in Turkey. Similarly, Turkish second-generation women in the Netherlands may play a significant role in reproducing the Turkish culture in the Netherlands, which might explain their lower level of Dutch identification.

In support of the latter finding, Jacobs and Tillie (2004) in their comparison of Turkish communities across European countries show that in Belgium and in the Netherlands, Turkish women participate less in politics. A deeper look into the gender differences in political participation in this study and in the literature suggests that the difference is mainly due to the differences in organizational participation. Feminist political scientists argue that women's lack of presence in the public sphere is very much related to the inequalities arising from the traditional gender division in the households. The problem is not only the separation of private

from the public sphere but also the lower status of women in gender hierarchy due to the patriarchy (Wedel, 2001). Wedel (2001) in her analysis of squatter households in İstanbul argues that as politics is perceived to be pertaining to the public sphere, from which migrant women living in the squatter households were mainly excluded, their political participation levels were not indeed reflecting their level of knowledge and interest in politics. This could as well be the case for the migrant women in the Netherlands. Organizational participation would mean that they expressly participate in the public sphere which belongs to “men”. Hence, gender differences in organizational participation may not reflect women’s lack of political interests but only reflect their exclusion from the public sphere. That’s why one should be cautious in interpreting these results as suggesting Turkish second-generation women’s lack of political interest in the Netherlands.

### **5.7. Contributions and implications of the study**

The results of this thesis give further credibility to the SIT model (Mummendey et al., 1999; de Weerd & Klandermans, 1999) and contribute to this line of research in a number of ways. First, it indicates that SIT can be a useful tool to understand not only social movement participation, attitudes towards mobility and collective action, but also the political responses of disadvantaged groups. This study shows that perception of intergroup relations, what Tajfel (1978) refers to as socio-structural group properties, are important in understanding and predicting different political participation behaviors. When people think that intergroup status differences are illegitimate, group boundaries are impermeable and majority attitudes are discriminatory, they fall back on collective strategies and try to advance their groups’ interests in the political arena. This information is also essential for policy makers and authorities in the Netherlands, who try to bridge competing political interests of different groups. As long as the intergroup relations are not taken into consideration, this study suggests that politics would be an arena of competing ethnic interests of different groups in the Netherlands.

Secondly, this study also highlights the importance of multiple identifications in SIT. While studies of SIT generally focus on the in-group/ out-group division, this simplistic view is limited in capturing the multiple

identifications existent in multicultural societies of our time. Multiple identifications may imply tensions and conflicts between different understandings and loyalties. Is being simultaneously Turkish and Dutch possible? This study draws attention to this conflict and the importance of considering multiple identifications in SIT. Moreover, it shows that in-group identification is not only dependent on the individual himself/herself (and on the in-group) but also on the perceiver (and on the out-group). That is to say, the extent to which the Turkish second-generation identify with Dutch identity is as much dependent on the mainstream society as it is on their own preferences. This study also draws attention to the political implications of multiple identifications. The results show that Dutch identification paves the way for mainstream political participation, namely, participation in politics with a more universalistic approach and not by advancing ethnic group interests in politics. Thirdly, this thesis throws new light on political participation literature by introducing an intergroup perspective.

These issues also relate to the criticisms held against SIT: (1) the inconclusive and fragmentary evidence it provides with regards to how and when subordinate groups react to their unfavourable condition, (2) its lack of differentiation between different forms of groups (ethnicity, religion, students of a class, members of a team, vegetarians etc. ) (3) lack of an integrated approach on how to manage multiple identities in multicultural contexts (dual, hybrid or common identities) (Brown, 2000). Making a distinction between social categories and social groups, Rabbie, Schot and Visser (1989) argue that the latter is defined by perceived interdependence or common fate. In their view, the reason why members of a group show in-group bias is not because they strive to achieve a positive social identity but because they perceive a common fate with other members. However, irrespective of the motives behind whether they perceive a common fate or they would like to achieve a positive social identity, the thesis aimed to contribute to SIT by testing its predictions in a real life study.

Moreover, this thesis contributes to the SIT literature in Turkey. Hortaçsu (2000) in her study of majority-minority relations in the case of veiled and unveiled university students in Turkey shows that tolerance (including perceived outgroup homogeneity, in-group bias and individuation), identification (including

identification and in-group homogeneity) and contact are three factors important in understanding the intergroup relations between these two groups. She further suggests that self-categorization and reactions to outgroups are two sides of the same coin. In line with her study, this thesis argues for a close link between perceptions of the out-group attitudes and self-categorization as the in-group member in the case of Turkish second-generation. Another study by Dalmış (2003) focuses on the intergroup relations in the case of the nationalist movement in Turkey and examines the effects of the target group, the comparative context and level of in-group identification on the perceptions of homogeneity. Taking the study of SIT one step further, the current thesis not only looks at the psychological outcomes but also deals with how these intergroup perceptions are reflected in the political arena.

### **5.8. Theoretical Concerns and Limitations**

There are a few theoretical concerns and methodological limitations that need further clarification. First of all, although relative deprivation theory is part of the theoretical framework, only perceived discrimination measures were adopted and used in the thesis. Although there is a strong relationship between perception of deprivation and discrimination theoretically (Sakallı, 1995), Dion (2001) in her review article compares discrimination theories and relative deprivation and concludes that perceived discrimination measures are more powerful and consistent predictors of criteria of interest such as militancy and related attitudes. She also states that of the different types of relative deprivation, affective group deprivation is the best predictor. Future studies should take up especially the affective relative deprivation and incorporate it into the theory.

One can also be critical of the use of the term “ethnic” to refer to the activities of Turkish migrants. Ethnicity is generally defined with reference to a descent and common origin because of similarities of physical type or of custom or because of memories of colonization and migration (Weber, 1968, p.389). Verkuyten (2005, pp.74-89) elaborates on the concept of ethnic identity and suggests that ethnicity involves elements such as media, music, clothing, nonverbal behavior and speech styles. Although he claims that ethnicity also applies to the

identity of majority, it is generally the minority group and their activities that are called “ethnic”. Majority’s ethnicity is claimed to be the national identity as a superordinate category encompassing all subordinate ethnic/religious minorities. Hence, Dutch identity becomes the national identity and Turkish identity becomes the ethnic identity in the Netherlands where the Dutch is the majority. Having said that, such a discussion about the role and definition of ethnicity is beyond the scope of this thesis. In line with the literature, I adopted the term ethnic to refer to the (activities of) Turkish migrants in the Netherlands throughout the thesis although I caution about its implications.

There are also some limitations regarding the definition and specification of political participation strategies, which should be taken up in future studies. First of all, one can be critical of whether following Turkish and Dutch media is a behavioral component or rather a political outcome of the respective identity (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004). Preference for Turkish or Dutch media is more than of a preference of language and therefore it is more than a behavioral component of identity. In support of this view, Klandermans (1997) speaks of media as a method of creating consensus mobilization. Many scholars advocate that media plays a leading role in the spread of discourses of political leaders and in the formation of political attitudes (Fennema, 2004; Fennema & Tillie 1999; Karpathakis, 1999; Silverstone & Georgiou, 2005). There is also accumulating evidence in psychology that exposure to media coverage of political events changes one’s political attitudes (e.g. the effects of priming on candidate selection, Krosnick & Kinder, 2004; for an experimental study, Iyengar, Peters, & Kinder, 2004). A limitation of the questionnaire is that it is not asked whether participants are following the political events in the media. However, as the analyses are carried out with those participants who are interested in politics, one can assume that they also follow the news in the media.

Secondly, the use of the term “political participation” might be confusing seeing that the thesis does not refer to the social movement participation or political protest nor to mobility strategies studied in SIT literature (Blanz et al., 1998; Mummendey et al., 1999; Tajfel, 1978) but it refers to a political participation path/strategy. Hence it involves not only the political behaviors per se but also the

preferences that lead the way to specific political behaviors, what Klandermans (1997) calls consensus and potential of mobilization<sup>12</sup>.

Moreover, these two political paths are not exhaustive of the strategies that are available to the disadvantaged groups. There might be other responses such as political apathy or adopting non-normative ways of making politics (Hirshman, 1970; Taylor & McKirnan, 1984). This thesis could not model political apathy as few respondents showed no political interests at all, which might be an indication of the higher educational level of the respondents in this thesis compared to other studies. Moreover, as the subjects were more educated the discussion of parallel societies or of a closed ethnic community was not relevant either.

Relatedly, three methodological limitations of the thesis become manifest. Because of the absence of random sampling, the thesis ended up with a sample of relatively more educated respondents. As they were more educated, participation in Turkish and Dutch organizations became inseparable, which suggested the existence of a common participation tendency. Correlating the error terms between participation in Turkish and Dutch organizations and between following Turkish and Dutch media in order to represent this general tendency is a statistical limitation of the study, which should be taken up in future studies. Besides, although the sample size was deemed acceptable, a larger sample would have allowed to run more powerful analyses. Moreover, the sample does not involve Alevi and Kurds. Hence, the generalizability of the results should be handled with caution.

## **5.9. Conclusions**

Before concluding, in terms of its policy implications, this thesis raises the question as to how these political strategies are linked to the much debated issue of integration. Although these two strategies are negatively correlated, a deeper look into the results show that there is a high positive correlation between participation in ethnic and Dutch organizations and between following Dutch and Turkish media. That is, the Turkish second-generation in the Netherlands participate in both

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<sup>12</sup>Consensus mobilization is a term referring to generation of a pool of potential supporters who are not necessarily prepared to participate in any collective action. It is a struggle for the mind of people (Klandermans, 1997, p.7).



organizations (see Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002 for Belgium) and follow both media. This provides the conviction that ethnic and mainstream political participation are two distinct but not opposing ways to political integration. To put it differently, the former is not a separatist option as well as the latter is not necessarily assimilation. They both represent alternative ways of political integration. Political integration is defined by Habermas (1994) as integration into the way the democracy is institutionalized and “the public use of reason” is practiced in the society. To the extent that the Turkish second-generation use democratic political mechanisms of the Netherlands, they are politically integrated irrespective of whether or not they are motivated by their own group's interests.

In spite of the limitations, this thesis takes this line of research one step further by connecting political behaviors and choices to their intergroup causes. Intergroup relations and identity are inherently political issues, as well as political issues are inherently social-psychological. A combined approach offers the possibility to understand the myriad ways in which intergroup relations are formed in a multi-cultural society.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A

#### THE LIST OF JOBS FOR THE EMPLOYED PARTICIPANTS

The following categorization is based on the details of occupation that the subject provided, the education level and the employment categories of those who are not students and working. Unless they have a education level coded as 7 or higher, the subject is not considered professional. Education level 5-6 generally indicates skilled work depending on the post the subject holds.

The job

Bakery owner	self-employed
Lawyer	professional
Cashier in a supermarket	unskilled worker
Technician in a coputer firm	skilled worker
Football player	professional
Cleaner	unskilled worker
Restaurant owner-doner-kebab	self-employed
Security guard in a private company	skilled worker
Manager in the consulting department of a computer firm	professional
Bakery owner	self-employed
Worker in a harbour	unskilled worker
Security guard	skilled worker
A firm providing construction workers	self-employed

Kindergarten teacher	skilled worker
Taxi driver	self-employed
Insurance agent in a bank	skilled worker
Trip organizations-sell of package trips	skilled worker
Worker in a supermarket	unskilled worker
Cleaner in a private company	unskilled worker
Terminal worker	unskilled worker
Carpenter	skilled worker
Kindergarten teacher	skilled worker
Commercial manager	professional
Human resource manager	professional
Working in an association	skilled worker
Accountant	skilled worker
Bicycle repairing selling	self-employed
Waiter in a restaurant	unskilled worker
Accountant	skilled worker
Railway repairman	unskilled worker
Administrative worker	skilled worker
Supermarket owner	self-employed
Repairman-cars	unskilled worker
Engineer in a computer firm	professional
Consultant in Human Resource Management	professional
Pedagogue, planning to open a kindergarten	professional
Kindergarten teacher	skilled worker
Child protection center, educationalist	professional
Worker in a factory	unskilled worker
Cleaner in a school	unskilled worker
Weddesigner/cafe owner	self-employed
Carpenter	skilled worker
Car repairman	self-employed
Providing personnel to firms	self-employed
Working manager cinema	professional

Driver in a post office	skilled worker
Hairdresser	self-employed
Working in a fair/exposition center	skilled worker
Working in a supermarket	unskilled worker
Computer business	skilled worker
Cashier in a supermarket	unskilled worker
Security guard	unskilled worker
Giving private driving lessons	self-employed
Project manager in municipality	professional
Tour operating	skilled worker
Assistant manager	professional
Assistant in a notary public	skilled worker
Model	skilled worker
Construction technician	skilled worker
Orthoptist in a hospital	professional
Orthoptist in a hospital	professional
Restaurant owner	self-employed
Psychologist	professional
Controller in trains	skilled worker

Unskilled workers: 14

Skilled workers: 23

Self-employed: 14

Professional: 14

## APPENDIX B

### THE SURVEY

#### SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Bu çalışma Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, Psikoloji Bölümü, Sosyal Psikoloji doktora programına bağlı olarak Doç. Dr. Bengi Öner-Özkan'ın ve Utrecht Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Bölümüne bağlı olarak Doç. Dr. Karen Phalet'in danışmanlıkları altında yürütülen, Uzman Psikolog Gülseli Baysu'nun doktora tez çalışmasıdır. Soruların doğru ya da yanlış cevapları yoktur. Sizin içten ve gerçek cevaplar vermeniz araştırmada geçerli ve güvenilir sonuçlar elde edilmesini sağlayacaktır.

Çalışmada sizden kimlik belirleyici bilgiler istenmemektedir. Bu yüzden kimliğinizle ilgili hiçbir bilgi vermenize gerek yoktur. Cevaplarınız saklı tutulacak, bütün cevaplar grup olarak araştırma amacıyla değerlendirilecektir.

Her bölümün başındaki yönergeleri lütfen dikkatlice okuyunuz ve hiçbir soruyu boş bırakmayınız. Anketi tamamladıktan sonra son bir defa gözden geçirerek boş kalan sorular varsa lütfen cevaplayınız. Bu anket formu kapak dahil 18 sayfadan oluşmaktadır. Gösterdiğiniz ilgi, yardım ve işbirliği için şimdiden teşekkür ederim.

Gülseli Baysu

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**Hane Tablosu (Kendiniz, anneniz ve babanız için doldurun)**  
**(Evlü iseniz eşiniz ve çocuđunuz için doldurun)**

Kim?	Dođum Yılı	Dođum yeri (ülke/il/ilce veya köy)	Kaç yıldır Hollanda'da	cinsiyet	Öđrenci ise Şuan devam ettiđi okulu/sınıfı	Öđrenci deđilse son okuduđu sınıf	Meslek Nerede çalıştığını ve ne iş yaptığını detayıyla yazar misiniz?
Kendi							
Annesi Evliyse eşi							
Babası Evliyse çocuđu							

Eđitim için ařađıdaki okul seviyelerini kullanın

- 1 İlkokul
- 2 Meslek okulu (IVBO/VBO)
- 3 Lise (MAVO)
- 4 Lise (HAVO)
- 5 Lise (VWO: atheneum and gymnasium)
- 6 Meslek okulu (MBO)
- 7 Meslek okulu (HBO)
- 8 Üniversite

Evinizin: İl:..... Semt: .....

İş durumunuz nedir? Lütfen sizin için dođru olan seçeneđi halka içine alın

1. Ücretli bir işte çalışıyor
2. Kendi işi
3. Daha önce hiç çalışmamış ve iş arıyor
4. İşini kaybetmiş ve iş arıyor
5. İş aramıyor

Eđer iş aramıyorsanız, nedeni nedir? Lütfen sizin için dođru olan seçeneđi halka içine alın

- a. Tam zamanlı öğrenci
- b. Evi çekip çeviriyor
- c. Sağlık nedenleri
- d. Uygun iş yok

Düzenli maaş aldığımız bir işte çalışmıyorsanız, bazen part-time/yarı zamanlı işlerde çalışıyor musunuz? Yada aile işinde çalışıyor musunuz? Lütfen nerde ve ne zamanlar çalıştığınızı açıkla mısınız?

Ailenizin/sizin net toplam aylık geliri yaklaşık olarak nedir? (tüm kaynaklardan, maaşlardan, kiralardan, burslardan). Aşağıdaki seçeneklerden uygun olanı işaretleyin

- 500 eurodan daha az
- 500-1000 euro
- 1000-2000
- 2000-3000
- 3000-4000
- 4000-5000
- 5000 üstü

Evinizde kaç kişi yaşıyor? Onların sizinle yakınlık dereceleri nedir? (Örnek: Annem, babam, 2 kız kardeşim, 1 erkek kardeşim, babaannem)

Yasal olarak Hollanda vatandaşı mısınız? (evet/hayır)

Başka bir ülke vatandaşlığımız var mı? Evetse hangi ülke?

Ana diliniz (ana dilleriniz) nedir?

Aşağıdaki ölçeğin yardımıyla ne derece Hollandaca ve Türkçe konuşup, okuyup yazabildiğinizi söyler misiniz?

1	2	3	4	5
Hiç iyi değil	Pek iyi değil	Oldukça iyi	Çok İyi	Mükemmel

	Konuşma					Okuma					Yazma				
Türkçe	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Hollandaca	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5

## INTERGOU P PERCEPTIONS

Aşağıdaki fikirlere ne derece katıldığınızı yada katılmadığınızı ölçek yardımıyla belirtiniz. Her cümlenin karşısındaki uygun sayıyı daire içine alınız.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Kısmen katılmıyorum	Kararsızım	Kısmen katılıyorum	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum

## STABILITY

Türklerin statüsü/durumu önümüzdeki yıllarda kolay kolay değişmeyecek (Hollandalılara kıyasla)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Önümüzdeki 5 yıl içinde Türkler ve Hollandalılar arasındaki ilişkinin aynı kalacağını düşünüyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Yakın gelecekte Türkler ve Hollandalılar arasındaki statü farklılıkları aynı kalacak	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Türklerin statüsü/durumunun yakın gelecekte (Hollandalılara kıyasla) değişeceğini düşünüyorum	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## LEGITIMACY

Hollandalılar Türklerden daha iyi durumda olmayı hak ediyorlar.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Türklerin Hollanda'da (Hollandalılara kıyasla) daha kötü durumda olması haksızlıktır	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hollandalılar Türklerden daha iyi durumda olmayı hak etmiyorlar.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## PERMEABILITY

Hollanda'da doğmuş büyümüş bir Türkün Hollandalı olarak kabul görmesi zor değildir	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hollanda'da yaşayan bir Türk Hollandalı olarak kabul görür.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hollanda'da yaşayan bir Türk için Hollandalı olarak kabul görmek neredeyse imkansız.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## IDENTIFICATIONS

Şimdi de sırasıyla Türk olmak ve Hollanda vatandaşı olmak hakkındaki hislerinizi ve görüşlerinizi öğrenmek istiyoruz. Aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katıldığınızı yada katılmadığınızı belirtir misiniz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Kısmen katılmıyorum	Kararsızım	Kısmen katılıyorum	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum

## COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM SCALE

Importance of Identity Scale: Items Turkid1, 2, 3, 4, 9 (9 is a reverse item)

Private collective self-esteem: Items Turkid5, 6, 10, 11 (10 and 11 are reverse items)

Public collective self-esteem: Items Turkid7, 8, 12, 13 (12 and 13 are reverse items)

Kendimi tipik bir Türk olarak görüyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Türk olmaktan gurur duyuyorum	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Türk olmak kim olduğumun önemli bir parçası	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Eğer biri Türkler hakkında kötü söz söylese benim hakkımda kötü söz söylemiş demektir	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Genelde Türk olmaktan memnunum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Türk olmak hakkında kendimi iyi hissediyorum	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Genelde Türkler diğer insanlar tarafından iyi görülür.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Genelde diğerleri Türklere saygı gösterir	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Bazen Türk olmaktan hoşlanmıyorum	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Bazen Türk olmaktan rahatsız oluyorum	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Bazen Türk olmanın iyi/faydalı olmadığını hissediyorum	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Diğerleri Türklerin kötü olduğunu düşünüyorlar	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Çoğu insan Türklerin genelde diğer gruplardan daha az etkin/başarılı olduğunu düşünüyor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7



Kendimi tipik bir Hollanda vatandaşı olarak görüyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hollanda vatandaşı olmaktan gurur duyuyorum	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hollanda vatandaşı olmak kim olduğumun önemli bir parçası	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Eğer biri Hollanda hakkında kötü söz söylese benim hakkımda kötü söz söylemiş demektir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Bazen Hollanda vatandaşı olmaktan hoşlanmıyorum	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

### DISCRIMINATION

Lütfen her cümle için karşısındaki en uygun sayıyı daire içine alarak belirtiniz

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Asla	Arasıra/nadiren	Zaman zaman	Sık Sık	Daima

### PERCEIVED GROUP DISCRIMINATION

Ne sıklıkta Hollanda'daki Türkler iş ararken ayrımcılık yaşıyorlar?	1	2	3	4	5
Ne sıklıkta Hollanda'daki Türkler ev ararken ayrımcılık yaşıyorlar?	1	2	3	4	5
Ne sıklıkta Hollanda'daki Türkler sokakta yada alışveriş yaparken ayrımcılık yaşıyorlar?	1	2	3	4	5
Ne sıklıkta Hollanda'daki Türkler okulda yada işyerinde ayrımcılık yaşıyorlar?	1	2	3	4	5

### INDIVIDUAL AFFECTIVE DISCRIMINATION

Hollandalılar tarafından kabul görmediğimi hissediyorum.	1	2	3	4	5
Hollandalıların bana karşı olduklarını hissediyorum.	1	2	3	4	5
Türk olduğum için dalga geçildim ve hakarete uğradım.	1	2	3	4	5
Türk olduğum için insanlar benden uzaklaştı yada aralarına almadılar	1	2	3	4	5

## MOBILITY STRATEGIES

Aşağıdaki fikirlere ne derece katıldığınızı yada katılmadığınızı ölçek yardımıyla belirtiniz. Her cümlenin karşısındaki uygun sayıyı daire içine alınız.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Kısmen katılmıyorum	Kararsızım	Kısmen katılıyorum	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum

## INDIVIDUAL MOBILITY

Hollandalı olarak kabul görmek için elimden geleni yaparım	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Türk olarak değil Hollandalı olarak yaşamaya çalışıyorum	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Gelecekte kendimi Hollandalı olarak görmek istiyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kendimi Hollanda'ya ait hissetmek istiyorum	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## COLLECTIVE COMPETITION

Hollanda hükümetinin bize iş vermesini beklemek yerine biz Türkler kendi işlerimizi yaratmalıyız	1	2	3	4	5	6
Biz Türkler Hollandada okulların/egitimin kalitesi hakkında daha çok söz sahibi olmak için çalışmalıyız.	1	2	3	4	5	6
Biz Türkler ne kadar etkin/başarılı olduğumuzu Hollandalılara kanıtlayacağız	1	2	3	4	5	6
Hollandalılara kim olduğumuzu (daha iyi) göstereceğiz/öğreteceğiz	1	2	3	4	5	6
Çok kısa zamanda Hollandalılardan daha çok inisiyatif/girişimcilik ve mücadele göstereceğiz	1	2	3	4	5	6
Biz Türkler daha iyi bir nama (naam/reputatie) kavuşmak için çalışmalıyız.	1	2	3	4	5	6

## MAINSTREAM POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

### TALKING ABOUT DUTCH POLITICS

Ne sıklıkta Hollanda politikası hakkında konuşursunuz? Aşağıdaki uygun sayıyı daire içine alınız.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Yılda bir kez veya daha az	Yılda birkaç kez	Ayda bir	Ayda birkaç kez	Haftada bir	Haftada bir kaç kez	Her gün

Ne sıklıkta Türkiye'deki politika hakkında konuşursunuz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Yılda bir kez veya daha az	Yılda birkaç kez	Ayda bir	Ayda birkaç kez	Haftada bir	Haftada bir kaç kez	Her gün

### PREFERENCE FOR A DUTCH POLITICAL LEADER

Türkler aşağıdaki adaylardan kime oy vermelidir? Lütfen önce 4 adayı da okuyun. 1den 4 e kadar tercih sıralaması yapın. En çok hangi adaya oy vermek gerektiğini düşünüyorsanız onun yanındaki boşluğa 1 yazın. İkinci tercih edeceğiniz adayın yanına 2, üçüncü adaya 3 ve son tercihiniz olan adaya 4 yazınız.

- Hollanda'da dürüstçe çalışacak Hollandalı bir aday
- Türklerin yararına olumlu politikaları olan Hollandalı bir aday
- Hollanda'da dürüstçe çalışacak Türk bir aday
- Türklerin yararına olumlu politikaları olan Türk bir aday

### CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN DUTCH ORGANIZATIONS

Şimdi de boş zamanınızı nasıl değerlendirdiğinizle ve herhangi bir organizasyona katılıp katılmadığınızla ilgili birkaç sorumuz olacak. Bir organizasyon %50nin üstünde Türk üyeye sahipse Türk, %50nin üstünde Hollandalı üyeye sahipse Hollanda organizasyonu kabul edilmiştir. Ne sıklıkta aşağıdaki organizasyonların aktivitelerine katıldığınızı aşağıdaki ölçek yardımıyla cevaplayınız.

1	2	3	4
Asla	Bir kere	Birden fazla	Düzenli olarak

Hollanda gençlik organizasyonu	1	2	3	4
Hollanda spor kulüpleri	1	2	3	4
Hollanda kadın hareketi organizasyonları	1	2	3	4

### READING DUTCH NEWSPAPERS

Ne sıklıkta Hollanda gazeteleri okuyorsunuz?

1	2	3	4	5
Asla/nadiren	Ayda bir kaç/ Ara sıra	Haftada bir/ bazen	Haftada birkaç kere/sık sık	Her gün/daima

### WATCHING DUTCH TV

Haftada kaç saat Hollanda kanalı seyrediyorsunuz?

1	2	3	4	5
0-3 saat	4-7 saat	8-12 saat	13-20 saat	20 saatten fazla

### ETHNIC POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

#### PREFERENCE FOR ETHNIC POLITICAL ISSUES

Aşağıdaki politik mevzulardan hangileriyle en çok ilgileniyorsunuz? Hepsini oku, 4 tanesini seç! Sectiklerini 1den 4 e kadar sırala! En çok hangi konu ile ilgileniyorsanız o cümlelerin yanındaki boşluğa 1 yazın, ikinci olarak ilgilendiğiniz konunun yanına 2, üçüncü olarak ilgilendiğiniz konunun yanına 3, dördüncü olarak ilgilendiğiniz konunun yanına 4 yazınız

- Göçmenlikle ilgili konular \_\_\_\_\_  
(örnek: kontroller, vize alımı, vatandaşlık hakkı verilmesi, oturma izni harçları vs.)
- Ayrımcılıktan korunmaya ve entegrasyona yönelik politikalar \_\_\_\_\_
- İslami okul açma gibi dini olanaklar, cami yapımına izin verilmesi, Türk dilinin resmi kabul edilmesi \_\_\_\_\_
- Güvenlik ve suç konuları \_\_\_\_\_
- Sosyo ekonomik olanaklar (yüksek kalite okullar ve işler) \_\_\_\_\_
- Sağlık/ sosyal güvenlik/ sigorta sorunları \_\_\_\_\_
- Çevre sorunları \_\_\_\_\_

### Control variable

Yukarıda seçtiğiniz ve sizi en çok ilgilendiren 4 konu için sırasıyla Hollanda’da en çok kimi ilgilendiriyor işaretler misiniz? Her konunun karşısındaki uygun sayıyı daire içine alın.

1.konu	1	2	3	4
2. konu	1	2	3	4
3. konu	1	2	3	4
4. konu	1	2	3	4

1	2	3	4
Özellikle Türkleri çünkü en çok Türkler bu konuda sorun yaşıyor	Özellikle Müslümanları çünkü en çok Müslümanlar bu konuda sorun yaşıyor	Hollanda’da yaşayan göçmenleri çünkü en çok göçmenler bu konuda sorun yaşıyor	Hollanda’da yaşayan herkesi çünkü herkes bu konuda sorun yaşıyor

### PREFERENCE FOR TALKING ABOUT POLITICS TARGETED TOWARDS TURKISH PEOPLE

Daha çok genel Hollanda politikası üzerine mi yoksa Türklere yönelik hususlarda mı konuşursunuz? Uygun sayıyı daire içine alınız.

1	2	3	4	5
Sadece genel konular	Çoğunlukla genel konular	Hem genel hem Türkleri ilgilendiren konular	Çoğunlukla Türkleri ilgilendiren konular	Sadece Türkleri ilgilendiren konular

### PARTICIPATION IN TURKISH ORGANIZATIONS (turkçiv)

Şimdi de boş zamanınızı nasıl değerlendirdiğinizle ve herhangi bir organizasyona katılıp katılmadığınızla ilgili birkaç sorumuz olacak. Bir organizasyon %50nin üstünde Türk üyeye sahipse Türk, %50nin üstünde Hollandalı üyeye sahipse Hollanda organizasyonu kabul edilmiştir. Ne sıklıkta aşağıdaki organizasyonların aktivitelerine katıldığınızı aşağıdaki ölçek yardımıyla cevaplayınız.

1	2	3	4
Asla	Bir kere	Birden fazla	Düzenli olarak

Türk gençlik organizasyonu	1	2	3	4
Cami yada dini organizasyonlar	1	2	3	4
Türk spor organizasyonları	1	2	3	4
Türk kadın hareketi organizasyonları	1	2	3	4

### READING TURKISH NEWSPAPERS

Ne sıklıkta Türk gazeteleri okuyorsunuz? Lütfen aşağıdaki uygun sayıyı daire içine al

1	2	3	4	5
Asla/nadiren	Ayda bir kaç kere/ Ara sıra	Haftada bir/ bazen	Haftada birkaç kere/sık sık	Her gün/daima

### WATCHING TURKISH TV

Haftada kaç saat Türk kanallarını seyrediyorsunuz?

1	2	3	4	5
0-3 saat	4-7 saat	8-12 saat	13-20 saat	20 saatten fazla

### CONTROL FOR GENERAL POLITICAL INTEREST

Ne sıklıkta politika/politik meseleler hakkında konuşursunuz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Yılda bir kez veya daha az	Yılda birkaç kez	Ayda bir	Ayda birkaç kez	Haftada bir	Haftada bir kaç kez	Her gün

Hollanda'daki son yerel seçimlerde oy kullandınız mı? (evetse hangi parti)

Hollanda vatandaşıysanız, Hollanda'daki son genel seçimlerde oy kullandınız mı? (evetse hangi parti)

Hollanda'daki gelecek yerel seçimlerde oy kullanmayı düşünüyor musunuz? (evetse hangi parti)

Hollanda'daki gelecek genel seçimlerde oy kullanmayı düşünüyor musunuz? (evetse hangi parti)

## APPENDIX C

### TURKISH SUMMARY

#### GİRİŞ

Psikolojinin temel varsayımlarından biri, insanların kendileri ve ait oldukları gruplar hakkında olumlu düşünmeye ve iyi hissetmeye ihtiyacı olduğu yolundadır. Toplumda farklı konumda gruplar bulunduğuna göre, düşük statülü bir grubun üyesi olan insanlar bu duruma nasıl tepki vermektedirler? Bu konu uzun zamandır sadece sosyal psikoloji yazınında değil (Hirschman, 1970; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; Tajfel, 1978; Taylor & McKirnan, 1984; Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble, & Zellerer, 1987) siyasal katılım yazınında da araştırılmaktadır (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Habermas, 1994; Kymlicka & Norman, 2000). Ancak, çok az çalışma düşük statülü grupların üyelerinin politik katılım davranışlarını ve tercihlerini incelemiş, ve bunları kişilerin sosyal yapıyı nasıl algıladıklarıyla, hareketlilik stratejileriyle ve farklı kimlik edinme süreçleriyle ilişkilendirmiştir. Bu nedenle bu tez, Hollandadaki ikinci kuşak Türklerde iki farklı politik katılım yolu tanımlamakta ve bu yolları onların çoklu kimlik edinme süreçleriyle ilişkilendirmektedir. Ayrıca, sadece tutumları değil politik davranışları incelediği için, bu tezin sonuçları kuramsal alanda olduğu kadar, uygulamaya yönelik de önem taşımaktadır.

Alt grup üyelerinin, gruplarının toplumsal konumlarına nasıl tepki verdiği sorusuna cevap ararken, geçmişteki çalışmalar, alt grup üyelerinin toplumun kendilerine karşı olan ön yargılarını kabul ettiklerini ve hatta içselleştirdiklerini ileri sürmüştür. Örneğin Eric Erikson (1968) azınlık grup üyelerindeki “aşğılanma” duygusundan söz etmiştir. Benzer şekilde, “Kendinden nefret etme” ifadesi pek çok sosyal bilimci tarafından alt grup üyelerinin toplumsal konumunu tarif etmek için kullanılmıştır. Ancak, alt grup üyelerinin kendilerine karşı olan ön yargıları

içselleştirdikleri ve dolayısıyla kendilik değerlerini kaybettikleri yolundaki görüşün bilimsel çalışmalar tarafından desteklenmediği görülmüştür (Crocker & Major, 1989; Lemaine, Kastersztejn, & Personnaz, 1978; Tajfel 1978).

Cartwright (1950) ve Erikson (1968)'ın savunduklarının aksine, Sosyal Kimlik Kuramı (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1987), alt grup üyelerinin toplum tarafından olumsuz algılanmalarına rağmen, olumlu bir sosyal kimlik edinmeye çalışma güdüsüne sahip olduklarını savunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, düşük statünün kimlikleri ve kendilik değerleri (öz saygı) üstündeki olumsuz etkisinden kurtularak, olumlu bir kimlik edinmeye çalışacakları var sayılmaktadır. Bunu yapabilmek için alt grup üyeleri bireysel yada kolektif stratejiler kullanabilirler. Kurama göre, bireysel hareketlilik stratejileri bireylerin ya da ailelerin daha yüksek statülü gruba geçebilme çabaları olarak tanımlanırken, kolektif stratejiler grubun statüsünü bir bütün olarak yükseltmeye yönelik stratejilerdir (Tajfel, 1978). Bu aktif stratejilerin yanında, bireyler grubun toplumsal konumunu bilişsel olarak değiştirmeye yada yeniden değerlendirmeye yönelebilirler. Bu tarz bilişsel stratejilere sosyal yaratıcılık stratejileri adı verilir. Örneğin, “biz onlar kadar başarılı olamayabiliriz ama biz daha sosyal ve misafirperveriz” diyerek bireyler grubun ekonomik statüsünü önemsizleştirerek sosyal becerilerini ön plana çıkarabilirler. Sosyal Kimlik Kuramı alt grup üyelerinin ne zaman hangi stratejileri tercih edeceklerini belirleyen gruplar arası koşulları da tanımlamaktadır. Buna göre, üç önemli boyut vardır: gruplar arası konum farklılıklarının kalıcılığı yada değişmezliği, meşruiyeti ve gruplar arası sınırların geçirgenliği (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Alt grup üyelerinin gruplar arası statü farklılıklarının kalıcı, yani değişmez, ve meşru olduğunu, ve gruplar arası sınırların geçirgen olduğunu düşündüklerinde bireysel hareketlilik stratejilerini tercih edecekleri, gruplar arası statü farklılıklarının değişebilir ve gayrimeşru olduğunu, ve gruplar arası sınırların geçirgen olmadığını düşündüklerinde ise kolektif stratejileri tercih edecekleri öngörülmektedir. Bu üç boyut yanında, alt grup üyelerinin gruplarıyla ne kadar özdeşleştikleri, toplumsal hareketlilik stratejilerinden hangisini tercih edeceklerini belirleyen en önemli değişkenlerden biridir (Ellemers & Barreto, 2001, Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Mummendey & Otten, 2001).



Bu tez Sosyal Kimlik Kuramını Hollanda'daki ikinci kuşak Türklerde, yani birinci kuşak Türk göçmenlerin çocuklarında, test etmektedir. Onlar Hollanda'da, toplum tarafından sadece ekonomik olarak değil, sosyal ve kültürel açıdan da düşük statülü olarak algılanmaktadırlar (Arends-Toth & Van de Vijver, 2002). İkinci kuşak göçmenleri çalışmak hem bir ülkenin giderek önemi artan genç kuşakları hakkında yeni bilgiler sağlamak hem de onların toplumsal hareketliliğe yönelik tutum ve politikaya yönelik tercih ve davranışları hakkında bilgi edinmek bakımından önemlidir. Ayrıca, Türklerin Avrupa'da yaşadıkları ülkedeki geleceğini ve konumunu belirleyecek olan, birinci kuşak göçmenlerden çok, tam vatandaşlık haklarına sahip olan ikinci kuşak Türklerdir.

Dolayısıyla, ikinci kuşak Türk göçmenlerin düşük sosyal konumlarına nasıl tepki verecekleri son derece önemlidir ve Sosyal Kimlik Kuramını test etmek için uygun bir bağlamdır. Ayrıca bu tez bu alandaki çalışmalarını pek çok açıdan bir adım ileriye taşımaktadır. Öncelikle, bu çalışmada sosyal psikoloji yazınında sıklıkla çalışılan toplumsal hareketlilik stratejilerine ek olarak, iki politik katılım yolu tanımlanmıştır. Bunlardan biri grup üyelerinin kendi grubunun çıkarları doğrultusunda politikaya katılması ve etnik bir cemiyet oluşturması (Türkçe televizyon ve gazeteleri takip ederek ve Türk organizasyonlarına katılarak) anlamına gelen etnik siyasal katılımdır. Diğer ana görüş çerçevesinde bir politik katılımdır ve Hollanda politikasıyla kendi etnik grubunun çıkarlarını göz etmeksizin genel olarak ilgilenmeleri ve genel bir cemiyet oluşturmaları (Hollanda televizyon ve gazetelerini takip ederek ve Hollanda organizasyonlarına katılarak) anlamına gelir. Bu tezin literatüre ikinci katkısı ise, çoklu kimlik süreçlerini ele almasıdır. Tüm hayatlarını Hollanda'da geçirmiş olan ikinci kuşak Türkler söz konusu olduğunda Türk kimliğiyle ne kadar özdeşleştikleri kadar Hollanda kimliğiyle ne kadar özdeşim kurdukları da önem kazanmaktadır. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmada sadece Türk kimliği değil, Hollanda kimliği de ele alınmaktadır. Son olarak, kalıcılık, meşruiyet ve geçirgenlik değişkenleri ile beraber, ayrımcılık algısı da bağımsız değişken olarak modellere eklenmiştir. Alt grup üyelerinin politik ve kolektif tepkilerini anlamak açısından bir toplumda ne kadar ayrımcılık gördüklerini anlamak son derece önemlidir (Dion, 2001).

Özet olarak bu tez, gruplar arası ilişkilerin nasıl algılandığı, bu algıların kimlik edinme süreçlerini nasıl etkilediği ve son olarak bu algıların ve çoklu kimliklerin farklı politik katılım ve hareketlilik stratejilerini nasıl etkilediğini incelemektedir. Bu amaçla üç farklı model tanımlanmış ve bu modeller yapısal eşitlik modelleme yöntemiyle test edilmiştir. Birinci modelde, Türklerin gruplar arası ilişkileri nasıl algıladıklarının (Hollandalı olarak kabul görüp görmedikleri, gruplar arası statü farklılıklarını meşru bulup bulmadıkları, ve statü farklılıklarının gelecekte değişeceğini düşünüp düşünmedikleri) Türk yada Hollanda kimliğiyle ne derece özdeşleşeceklerini belirleyeceği ve bu algıların ve kimliklerin bireysel yada kolektif stratejileri tercih etmelerini etkileyeceği var sayılmaktadır. İkinci modelde, katılımcıların gruplar arası ilişkileri nasıl algıladığının (kalıcılık, meşruiyet, geçirgenlik ve ayrımcılık) kimlik edinme süreçlerini etkilediği (Hollandalı ve Türk kimliği) ve dolayısıyla politik katılım tercihlerini (etnik ve ana görüş çerçevesinde politik katılım) belirlediği var sayılmaktadır. Son modelde ise, bu algıların (kalıcılık, meşruiyet, geçirgenlik ve ayrımcılık), hareketlilik stratejileri (bireysel yada kolektif hareketlilik stratejileri) üzerindeki etkileri aracılığıyla politik katılım tercihlerini belirleyip belirlemeyeceği sorgulanmaktadır.

Bu tez 5 bölümden oluşmaktadır: Giriş, kuramsal çerçeve, yöntem, sonuçlar ve tartışma. Aynı şekilde Türkçe özet de, giriş, kuramsal çerçeve, sonuç ve tartışma bölümlerinden oluşmaktadır. Ancak, sonuçlar ve kullanılan ölçekler hakkında daha ayrıntılı bilgi için tezin İngilizce bölümüne bakılmalıdır.

## **KURAMSAL ÇERÇEVE**

Günümüz dünyasında giderek artan göç ve göçmenler, etnik kimlik ve etnik politik katılım gibi konuların önemini artırmıştır. Bu tezin amacı, Hollanda'daki en büyük göçmen gruplarından biri olan Türk göçmenlerin çocuklarının, yani ikinci kuşak Türk göçmenlerin politik katılım davranışlarını ve tercihlerini sosyal psikolojik bir yaklaşımla anlamaya çalışmaktır. Diğer bir deyişle bu tez, (1) katılımcıların Hollandalılar ve Türkler arasındaki gruplar arası ilişkileri nasıl algıladıklarını dört boyutta (kalıcılık, meşruiyet, geçirgenlik, ayrımcılık) incelemekte; (2) bu algıların kimlik edinme süreçlerini (Hollanda ve Türk kimliği)

nasıl etkilediğine bakmakta; (3) bu algıların ve kimliklerin toplumsal hareketlilik stratejileri (bireysel ve kolektif) üzerindeki etkisini incelemekte; ve son olarak (4) bu algıların, kimliklerin ve hareketlilik stratejilerinin katılımcıların siyasal katılım, davranış ve tercihlerini (etnik ve ana görüş çerçevesinde politik katılım) nasıl etkilediğine bakmaktadır.

Sosyal Kimlik Kuramı (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1987), Görelî Yoksunluk Kuramı (Crosby, 1976; Gurr, 1970; Runciman, 1966) ve siyaset bilimi yazını (özellikle azınlık hakları ve politik katılım hakkında) (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Taylor, 1992) temel alan bu tez, kuramsal bir model çizmiş (Fiüre 2.1, s. 15) ve bu kuramsal model temel alınarak üç ayrı model tanımlanmış ve test edilmiştir. Bu kuramsal modelin öğeleri sırasıyla açıklanmaktadır.

### **Genel bir siyasal katılım mı yoksa etnik çıkarlar doğrultusunda bir politik katılım mı?**

Göçmenlerin politik katılımı hakkında, genelde ya yaşadıkları ülkedeki politikaya katılacakları yada kendi ülkelerinin politikasına ilgi duyacakları var sayılmaktadır. Oysa ki, göçmenler yaşadıkları ülke politikasına katılırken, yerli halkın politikaya katılımından daha farklı amaçlar güdebilirler. Başka bir deyişle, göçmenlerin yaşadıkları ülke politikasına katılımları da kendi içinde farklılaşabilir. Var olan çok az sayıdaki çalışma etnik politik katılım konusunu incelemiş ve bunu (siyasallaşmış) etnik kimlikle ilişkilendirmiştir (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Sears, Fu, Henri, & Bui, 2003). Oysa ki, göçmenlerin hepsinin politikaya kendi etnik gruplarının çıkarlarını savunmak için katılacağı varsayımı yanlış olabilir. Yani, etnik kimlik üzerinden politika yapmaya da bilirler. Özellikle, bütün hayatlarını Hollanda'da geçirmiş olan ikinci kuşak Türkler söz konusu olduğunda, bir kısmının kendini daha çok Hollandalı hissetmesi ve dolayısıyla politikaya ana görüş çerçevesinde, yani etnik grup çıkarlarını savunmaksızın, katılması da mümkündür. Bu görüş, Berger, Galonska ve Koopmans (2004) tarafından da desteklenmektedir. Onlar göçmenler için iki politik katılım yolu tanımlamıştır: etnik politik katılım ve genel politik katılım.

Bu görüşe uygun olarak, bu tez de bu ayrımı kullanmakta ve göçmenlerin hangi sosyal psikolojik koşullar altında hangi etnik yada genel siyasal katılım

yolunu tercih edeceğini arařtırmaktadır. Etnik ve genel politik katılımı tanımlamak ve ayırt etmek için bir çok ölçüm kullanılmıştır. Öncelikle, bazı göçmenler Hollanda politikasına dair genel konulara (örneğin sağlık ve çevre sorunları) ilgi duyarken, bazıları daha çok etnik ve dinsel politikalara (örneğin, Müslüman okullarına ve Türkçe'nin kamusal alanda kullanımına yönelik politikalar, ayrımcılığı önlemeye yönelik politikalar) ilgi duyabilir. İkinci olarak, bazıları, yerli Hollandalı politikacıları tercih ederken diğersleri özellikle Hollanda'daki Türk politikacıları tercih edebilir. Ancak etnik ve genel politik katılımı sadece politik aktörlere ve konulara dayanarak tanımlamak konuya sınırlı bir bakış açısı getirecektir. Çünkü, göçmenlerin politikaya asıl katılımı ve etkileri örgütlenme ve medya aracılığıyla kamu görüşünü etkileyerek olmaktadır. Bu amaçla, Türk örgütlerine katılım ve Hollanda'daki Türk medyasını takip etme etnik politik katılım ölçümleri olarak, Hollanda örgütlerine katılım ve Hollanda medyasını takip etmek ise ana görüş çerçevesinde (yani genel) politik katılım ölçümleri olarak tanımlanmıştır.

### **Hareketlilik stratejileri**

Bireysel ve kolektif hareketlilik stratejileri Sosyal Kimlik Kuramı yazınında sıklıkla çalışılmakla birlikte, bu stratejiler çeşitli çalışmalarda farklı şekillerde tanımlanmış ve ölçülmüştür (Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke, & Klink, 1998; Moghaddam & Perroult, 1992; Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2004; Tajfel, 1978; Turner & Brown, 1978). Tajfel (1978) başlangıçta bireysel ve kolektif hareketlilik stratejilerini Hirschman'a dayanarak (1970) geçiş/çıkış (*pass/exit*) ve seslendirme (*voice*) stratejileri olarak tanımlamıştır. Diğers bir deyişle, bireysel hareketlilik stratejileri bireylerin ya da ailelerin daha yüksek statülü gruba girebilme çabaları olarak tanımlanırken, kolektif stratejiler grubun statüsünü bir bütün olarak yükseltmeye yönelik stratejilerdir.

Kolektif hareketlilik stratejileri, sosyal değışim, kolektif davranış (Tajfel, 1978) ve kolektif/sosyal çekişme (Turner & Brown, 1978) gibi farklı isimlerle anılmaktadır. Tajfel (1978) protestodan da kolektif hareketlilik/çekişme stratejisi olarak bahseder, ve aslında politik davranışı da kolektif hareketlilik stratejisi

kapsamında değerlendirir. Ancak Sosyal Kimlik Kuramı yazınındaki diğer çalışmalar politikaya olan bu vurguyu göz ardı etmiş ve genellikle politik olmayan tutumları incelemiştir. Örneğin, grup yanlılığı (*ingroup bias*) diğer stratejilere kıyasla çok daha fazla çalışmıştır (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Halbuki grup yanlılığı sosyal çekişme stratejilerinden sadece biridir (Turner, 1999; Turner & Reynolds, 2001).

Phalet ve Swyngedouw (2004) stratejileri bireysel, ailevi ve etnik olmak üzere üçe ayırmıştır. Bu kuramsal çerçevede, farklı stratejiler, bireylerin bir sorunla karşı karşıya kaldıklarında dayandığı farklı kaynaklar olarak tanımlanmıştır. Ayrıca, bu araştırmacılar kişilerin kendi kültürlerini koruma isteğinin kolektif hareketlilik stratejileriyle, yeni kültüre uyumun ise bireysel hareketlilik stratejileri ile ilişkili olduğunu bulmuşlardır.

Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke ve Klink (1998) ise bu stratejileri detaylandırarak toplamda 12 strateji tanımlamış ve bunlara “kimlik yönetim stratejileri” adını vermişlerdir. Onların tanımında, Tajfel’e (1978) uygun olarak, kolektif hareketlilik, alt grup üyelerinin kendi grupları ve dış grup arasındaki konum farklılıklarını eşitlemek yada tersine çevirmek için çabalamalarıdır. Diğer bir deyişle, grup yanlılığı yerine, alt grup üyelerinin değişim ve gelişim yönündeki çabaları çalışılmaktadır. Ayrıca, bireysel hareketlilik stratejisini yeni grup üyeliğine ilişkin davranışlar geliştirme olarak tanımlamış ve aslında uyum ve kültürselleşmeden bahsetmişlerdir.

Bu tezde bireysel ve kolektif stratejiler Blanz ve arkadaşlarının çalışması temel alınarak tanımlanmıştır. Ayrıca Tajfel’in başlangıçtaki politik davranışlara vurgusu göz önünde bulundurularak, bireysel ve kolektif hareketlilik stratejilerinin politik davranışlarla ilişkisi incelenmiştir. Sosyal Kimlik Kuramı yazınında alt grup üyelerinin gruplar arası ilişkileri algılayışlarının ne tür stratejileri tercih edeceklerini belirleyeceği öngörülmektedir. Özellikle, gruplar arası sınırların geçirgenliği, gruplar arası konum farklılıklarının kalıcılığı ve meşruiyeti ve kişilerin gruplarıyla ne derece özdeşim kurdukları hangi stratejileri tercih edeceklerini belirleyen etmenler olarak sıklıkla çalışılmıştır (Blair & Jost, 2003; Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).

### **Aracı Değişken Olarak Grup Kimliği**

Grup kimliği, Sosyal Kimlik Kuramı ve Görelî Yoksunluk Kuramı yazınlarında, hem sosyo-yapısal grup özelliklerinden etkilenen bağımlı değişken, hem de bu algıları ve davranışları belirleyen bir bağımsız değişken olarak; yani hem sonuç hem de sebep olarak çalışılmaktadır (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1999; Doosje, Spears & Ellemers, 2002; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Reynolds, 2001).

Öncelikle, var olan çalışmalar grupla özdeşleşmenin grup algılarının bir sonucu olarak değiştiğini göstermektedir. Eğer alt grup üyeleri ayrımcılık görüyorsa, gruplar arası sınırların geçirgen olmadığını yani toplum tarafından kabul görmediklerini düşünüyorlarsa, gruplar arası konum farklılıklarını meşru görmüyorlarsa ve bunun gelecekte değişebileceğini düşünüyorlarsa kendi gruplarına daha çok bağlanmakta ve özdeşleşmektedirler (Branscombe ve ark., 1999; Doosje ve ark., 1999; Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993; Ellemers ve ark., 1998; Verkuyten & Reijerse, yayında)

İkinci olarak, gruplarıyla ne derece özdeşleştikleri seçecekleri stratejiyi de belirlemektedir. Güçlü bir grup kimliği kolektif stratejilerin tercih edilmesine, zayıf bir grup kimliği ise bireysel stratejilerin tercih edilmesine yol açmaktadır. Ayrıca grup kimliği kolektif eylemin de en önemli belirleyicisi olarak sıkça çalışılmıştır (Gurin & Townsend, 1986; Kawakami & Dion, 1993; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Lalonde & Cameron, 1993; Tougas & Veilleux, 1987; Tropp & Wright, 1999; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000; Wright & Tropp, 2002). Örneğin, De Weerd ve Klandermans (1999) Hollandalı tarım işçilerinin protestosunu inceleyen çalışmalarında grup kimliğiyle özdeşleşmenin siyasal protestoyu teşvik ettiğini göstermişlerdir.

Örneklerden de anlaşıldığı gibi, yazında pek çok çalışma grup kimliği ve özdeşleşmeyi çalışmakla birlikte, çok daha az çalışma aracı değişken olarak grup kimliğini incelemiştir. Mummendey ve arkadaşları (1999) sosyo-yapısal grup özellikleri (yani kalıcılık, meşruiyet ve geçirgenlik) ve hareketlilik stratejileri arasında; Deaux, Reid, Martin, ve Bikmen (2006) ideoloji ve kolektif eylem arasında; Simon ve arkadaşları (1998) ortak tehdit algısı ve kolektif eylem arasında;

Reicher (1996) ise kültürel kanılar (özellikle gruplar arası durumun meşruiyeti) ve kalabalık davranışı arasında grup kimliğini aracı değişken olarak tanımlamış ve incelemiştir. Bu tezde bu çalışmalara paralel olarak grup kimliği ile özdeşleşmeyi aracı değişken olarak tanımlamaktadır.

Ayrıca bu tez, bu tarz çalışmaları bir adım öteye taşıyarak, çoklu kimlikler konusunu ele almaktadır. Hollanda'da yaşayan ikinci kuşak Türkler için Türk kimliğiyle ne kadar özdeşleştiklerini anlamak kadar Hollanda kimliğiyle ne kadar özdeşleştiklerini anlamak da önemlidir. Kuramsal olarak, ikili kimlik önermesi (*dual identity*) (Gonzalez & Brown, 2003; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000), milli ve etnik kimliklerin farklı seviyelerde ama bir arada nasıl sürdürülebileceğini ifade etmesi açısından bu konuyu anlamak için en uygun yaklaşımdır. Etnik kimlik (bu bağlamda Hollanda'daki Türk kimliği) alt grup kimliği olarak ve milli kimlik (bu bağlamda Hollanda kimliği) üst kategorisi içinde yer almaktadır. Ancak, bu önerme, etnik ve milli kimliğin olumlu yönde bir ilişki içinde olduğunu var saymaktadır. Oysa ki Hollanda'daki gibi milli kimliğin kan bağı üzerinden tanımlandığı ülkelerde, milli kimliğin kapsayıcı bir üst kimlik olamayabileceği göz ardı edilmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, Hollandalı olmak (*autochtone*) Hollandalı anne-babaya sahip olmak şeklinde anlaşılmakta ve orada doğmuş büyümüş olmalarına rağmen ikinci kuşak Türkler, Türk anne-babaya sahip olduklarından hala yabancı (*alloctone*) olarak görülmektedir. Berry, Phinney, Sam, ve Vedder (2006) Avrupa'daki pek çok ülkedeki ikinci kuşak Türk'leri inceleyen çalışmalarında, başka pek çok ülkedeki durumun aksine, Hollanda'da Hollandalı kimliği ve Türk kimliği ile özdeşleşmenin ters yönde ilişkili olduğunu göstermişlerdir. Bu yöntemsel olarak da, bu iki kimlikle özdeşleşmeyi tek bir değişken değil de (Hollandalı Türk) farklı iki değişken olarak ölçmenin (Hollandalı ve Türk), etnik ve milli kimlikler arasındaki olası çelişki, çatışma ve kesişmeyi anlamak açısından daha uygun bir yöntem olacağı savını desteklemektedir.

Bu tez, sadece çoklu kimlik süreçlerini ele almakla kalmamakta, bu kimliklerin politik doğurgularını da ele almaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, hangi sosyal psikolojik koşullar altında bu kimliklerin siyasallaştığı sorusuna cevap aramaktadır. (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 321). Örneğin, Huo, Smith, Tyler, ve Lind (1996) Amerika'daki farklı etnik grupları inceleyen çalışmalarında, alt kimlikle yani etnik

kimlikle özdeşleşmenin, etnik grup çıkarları doğrultusunda politikaya katılımı öngördüğünü bildirmişlerdir. Alt grupların politik katılımını inceleyen yazında var olan sınırlı sayıda çalışma, etnik kimlik ve etnik politik katılım arasında ilişkiye bakarken (Sears, Fu, Henri, & Bui, 2003), bu tez aynı zamanda milli kimlik ve genel politik katılım arasındaki ilişkiyi de incelemektedir.

### **Modeller ve Varsayımlar**

Bu tezde üç farklı model test edilmektedir. Birinci modelde gruplar arası duruma yönelik algıların Türk ve Hollandalı kimliğiyle özdeşleşmeyi etkileyeceği ve bu kimlikler aracılığıyla seçilen hareketlilik stratejilerini belirleyeceği var sayılmaktadır. Daha detaylı olarak, (1) Geçirgen olmayan grup sınırlarının, meşru ve kalıcı olmayan konum farklılıklarının Türk kimliğinin önemini artırması, geçirgen grup sınırlarının, meşru ve kalıcı olarak görülen konum farklılıklarının Hollanda kimliğinin önemini artırması beklenmektedir; (2) Hollanda kimliğinin bireysel stratejilerin tercih edilmesine, Türk kimliği ile özdeşleşmenin kolektif stratejilerin tercih edilmesine yol açacağı beklenmektedir; (3) Bu kimliklerin aracı değişken, gruplar arası algıların bağımsız değişken, ve hareketlilik stratejilerinin bağımlı değişken olarak tanımlandığı bir model test edilecektir (Figür 2.2, s.30).

İkinci modelde gruplar arası duruma yönelik algıların Türk ve Hollandalı kimliğiyle özdeşleşmeyi etkileyeceği ve bu kimlikler aracılığıyla politik katılım yollarını belirleyeceği var sayılmaktadır. İkinci modele yönelik varsayımlar şunlardır: (1) Geçirgen olmayan grup sınırları, meşru ve kalıcı olmayan konum farklılıkları Türk kimliğinin önemini artırırken, geçirgen grup sınırları, meşru ve kalıcı olarak görülen konum farklılıkları Hollanda kimliğinin önemini artıracaktır; (2) Hollanda kimliği ile özdeşleşme ana görüş çerçevesinde bir politik katılımı, Türk kimliği ile özdeşleşme etnik politik katılımı teşvik edecektir; (3) Bu kimliklerin aracı değişken, gruplar arası algıların bağımsız değişken, ve iki politik katılımın bağımlı değişken olarak tanımlandığı bir model test edilecektir (Figür 2.3, s.32)

Son olarak, üçüncü modelde, gruplar arası duruma yönelik algıların seçilen hareketlilik stratejilerini belirleyeceği ve bu hareketlilik stratejileri aracılığıyla politik katılım yollarını belirleyeceği var sayılmaktadır. Üçüncü modele yönelik



varsayımlar şunlardır: (1) Geçirgen olmayan grup sınırları, meşru ve kalıcı olmayan konum farklılıkları kolektif stratejilere yönelimi artırırken, geçirgen grup sınırları, meşru ve kalıcı olarak görülen konum farklılıkları bireysel hareketlilik stratejisine yönelimi artıracaktır; (2) Bireysel hareketlilik stratejileri ana görüş çerçevesinde bir politik katılımı, kolektif hareketlilik stratejileri ise etnik politik katılımı teşvik edecektir; (3) Bu hareketlilik stratejilerinin aracı değişken, gruplar arası algıların bağımsız değişken, ve iki politik katılımın bağımlı değişken olarak tanımlandığı bir model test edilecektir (Figür 2.4, s.35).

## YÖNTEM

Yüz altmış bir kişiyle yapılandırılmış görüşme yapılmıştır. Bütün katılımcılar ikinci kuşak Türklerdir, yani ya Hollanda'da doğup büyümüş ( $n = 117$ ) yada Hollanda'ya 8 yaşından önce göç ederek eğitimlerine orada başlamışlardır ( $n = 44$ ). Örneklem 85 erkek ve 76 kadından oluşmaktadır. Bütün katılımcılar, Hollanda'nın üç büyük şehriden birinde yaşamakta ya da çalışmaktadır, yani Amsterdam'da ( $n = 55$ ), Rotterdam'da ( $n = 47$ ), yada Utrecht'te ( $n = 59$ ). Etnik köken ve dini mezheplerin olası etkisini engellemek amacıyla çalışmaya Aleviler ve Kürtler dahil edilmemiştir. Katılımcıların yaşları 18 ve 41 arasında değişmektedir (sadece 19 katılımcı 30 yaş üzerindedir) ve ortalama yaş 23.35 yıldır. Ortalama eğitim seviyeleri 1 (ilkokul)-8 (üniversite) ölçeğinde 6'dır ve bu mesleki eğitime (MBO) denk düşmektedir. Bu çalışma da kartopu örnekleme yöntemini kullanmaktadır. Hollanda'da seçkisiz örneklem kullanan çalışmalarla kıyaslandığında, buradaki katılımcıların daha eğitilmiş olduğu saptanmıştır (Dagevos, Euwals, Gijssberts, & Roodenburg, 2006)

Çalışmada kullanılan ölçekler yapı geçerliği ve güvenirlik açısından kontrol edilmiştir. İstatistiksel yöntem olarak bu çalışma, yapısal eşitlik modelleme yöntemini (AMOS 5) kullanmaktadır.

## SONUÇLAR VE TARTIŞMA

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı alt grup üyelerinin politik tepkilerini anlamaktır. Bu temel amacın yanı sıra, iki amacı daha vardır: farklı politik tercihlerin altında yatan sosyal psikolojik nedenleri anlamak ve Sosyal Kimlik Kuramının varsayımlarını test etmek. Bunun için, Hollanda'daki ikinci kuşak Türkler çalışılmıştır. Hollanda'daki Türk göçmen çocuklarının gruplar arası ilişkileri nasıl gördükleri ve oradaki Türklerin düşük sosyo-ekonomik konumuna nasıl tepki verdikleri, politik tercihleri, davranışları ve tutumları incelenmiştir.

Çalışmanın sonuçları genel olarak Sosyal Kimlik Kuramının varsayımlarını doğrulamaktadır. Sırayla ele alınacak olursa, birinci model yapısal eşitlik modelleme yoluyla test edilmiş ve gerekli düzeltmelerden sonra modelin veriye uyduğu tespit edilmiştir (Bakınız Figür 4.1., s. 65). Diğer bir deyişle Türk ve Hollanda kimliğinin aracı değişken olarak tanımlandığı model istatistiksel olarak doğrulanmıştır (Varsayım 3, Model 1). Ancak gruplar arası algılardan, kalıcılık algısı ne kimlik edinme süreçlerini ne de hareketlilik stratejilerini doğrudan yada dolaylı olarak etkilememektedir. Yani, gruplar arası konum farklılıklarını kalıcı olarak görmek onların ne Hollanda kimliğiyle ne de Türk kimliğiyle özdeşleşmelerini, ne bireysel ne de kolektif stratejileri tercihlerini etkilememiştir. Aslında kalıcılık varsayımı, yazındaki çalışmalarda da kimi zaman doğrulanmış kimi zamansa beklenin tersi yönde bir etki elde edilmiştir (Verkuyten & Reijerse, yayında). Bunun nedeni, bu çalışmadaki Türk göçmen çocuklarının, Türkler ve Hollandalılar arasındaki konum farklılıklarının gelecekte değişip değişmeyeceği hakkındaki kararsızlıkları olabilir. Sonuç olarak bu çalışmadaki katılımcılar genelde genç olduğundan gelecekte ne olacağına dair net bir fikirleri olamayabilir. İkinci bir sebep ise kullanılan ölçeğin yapı geçerliğinin olmaması olabilir. Aslında kalıcılık hem ilişkilerin kalıcılığı hemde konum farklılıklarının kalıcılığı olarak algılanabileceğinden ve bu çalışmada kullanılan ölçek bu etmenleri kapsamadığından kalıcılık varsayımı doğrulanmamış olabilir.

Grup sınırlarının geçirgen olarak algılanması katılımcıların hem Türk hem de Hollandalı kimliğini etkilemiş, bu kimlikler de seçilen stratejileri belirlemiştir. Diğer bir deyişle, grup sınırları geçirgen olarak algılandığında, yani Türk göçmen

çocukları Hollandalı olarak kabul gördüklerini düşündüklerinde, Hollandalı kimliğiyle daha çok özdeşleşmiş ve Türk kimliğiyle daha az özdeşleşmişlerdir. Ancak, Hollanda kimliğiyle ortalama özdeşleşme seviyesi oldukça düşük, Türk kimliğiyle özdeşleşme seviyesi ise oldukça yüksektir. Dolayısıyla, “grup sınırlarını geçirgen algılamak Hollanda kimliğiyle özdeşleşmeyi sağlar” gibi bir sonuca varmak yanıltıcı olabilir. Aslında, yazında da bu tarz bir görüş eleştirilmiş, deneysel çalışmalarda oluşturulan yapay gruplara kıyasla gerçek hayatta insanların kendi gruplarından ve kimliklerinden kolay kolay vazgeçmeyeceği belirtilmiştir (Moghaddam ve ark., 1987; Moghaddam & Perreault, 1992). Ayrıca bu bulgu, Hollanda kimliğinin, kapsayıcı bir üst kimlik değil, aileye, fiziksel özelliklere ve kan bağına bağlı bir kimlik olarak sunulduğu savını da desteklemektedir. Görüşmeler sırasında bir çok katılımcı Hollandalı olamayacaklarını çünkü Hollandalı anne-babaları olmadığını dile getirmiştir. Benzer bir şekilde, Almanya’da yapılan bir çalışma oradaki ikinci kuşak Türklerin %85inin sonsuza kadar Almanya’da kalmayı düşünmesi rağmen, sadece %35inin kendisini tamamen Alman gibi hissettiğini göstermiştir. Türk göçmen çocukları, Hollanda’da *allochtone*, Almanya’da *ausländer* ve Türkiye’de *alamancı* yani hep yabancı olarak görülmektedirler.

Meşruiyet algısı hareketlilik stratejilerinin tercihini hem direk olarak etkilemiş hem de Türk kimliği aracılığıyla dolaylı yoldan etkilemiştir. Gayrimeşru bulunan konum farklılıkları Türk kimliğinin önemini artırmıştır. Bu bulgu aslında Türk kimliğinin bu derece önemli olmasının tepkisel yönüne dikkat çekmektedir. Ancak, ilişkisel bir araştırmada sebep-sonuç ilişkisinin yönünü kesin olarak tespit etmek mümkün değildir. Yani, Türk kimliğiyle daha çok özdeşleşenler konum farklılıklarını daha gayrimeşru algılıyor da olabilirler. Fakat, Sosyal Kimlik Kuramı yazınında yapılan deneysel çalışmalar özdeşleşme seviyesinin grup algılarına bağlı olarak değiştiği yönündeki savı desteklemektedir.

İkinci model de yapısal eşitlik modelleme yoluyla test edilmiş ve gerekli düzeltmelerden sonra sonra modelin veriye uyduğu tespit edilmiştir (Bakınız Figür 4.2., s. 71). Diğer bir deyişle Türk ve Hollanda kimliğinin aracı değişken olarak tanımlandığı model istatistiksel olarak doğrulanmıştır (Varsayım 3, Model 2). Birinci modele benzer şekilde, geçirgenlik algısının hem Türk kimliğini hem de Hollandalı kimliğini etkilediği görülmüştür. Ayrıca, bu kimlikler üzerindeki etkisi

aracılığıyla, etnik ve genel politik katılımı da dolaylı olarak etkilediği görülmüştür. Ancak daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, Hollandalı kimliğiyle ortalama özdeşleşme seviyesi oldukça düşüktür (1-7 Likert tipi ölçekte 3, ki bu “kısmen katılmıyorum”a denk düşmektedir), ve Türk kimliğiyle özdeşleşme seviyesi oldukça yüksektir (1-7 Likert tipi ölçekte 5.82, ki bu “katılıyorum”a denk düşmektedir). Dolayısıyla, geçirgenlik algısının etkisi yorumlanırken bu değerler göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır.

Her ne kadar yazında, etnik grup sınırlarının geçirgen olmadığı ve etnik azınlıkların dışlanma ve ayrımcılığa maruz kaldığı toplumlarda azınlıkların etnik kimliklerinin güçlendiği dile getirilse de (Ellemers, 1993); Hutnik (1991), ek olarak, etnik azınlık grupların kendi kültürleri, gelenekleri ve yapıları olduğuna, ve bunların onlara bir saygınlık duygusu sağladığına dikkat çekmektedir. Dolayısıyla, güçlü bir etnik kimlik sadece alt grupta olmaya yada azınlık olmaya bir tepki gibi düşünülmemelidir.

Meşruiyet algısı sadece Türk kimliğiyle özdeşleşmeyi etkilemiştir. Türk kimliğine etkisi aracılığıyla, etnik politik katılım ve genel politik katılımı dolaylı olarak etkilemiştir. Diğer bir deyişle, Türk göçmen çocukları konum farklılıklarını gayrimeşru bulduklarında, Türk kimliğiyle daha çok özdeşim kurmuş, dolayısıyla politik alanda da kendi gruplarının haklarını ve çıkarlarını gözetmişlerdir. Öte yandan, Türkler ve Hollandalılar arasındaki konum farklılıklarını meşru bulduklarında da Türk kimliğiyle daha az özdeşim kurmuş ve politikayla da normal bir Hollanda vatandaşı olarak, yani etnik çıkarları gözetmeksizin, ilgilenmişlerdir. Bu bulgu beraberinde iki soruyu akla getirmektedir. Öncelikle, gerçekten statü farklılığını meşru buluyorlar mı? Eğer öyleyse, bu neden katılımcıların Hollanda kimliğiyle özdeşleşme seviyelerini etkilemiyor? Birinci soruya cevaben, görüşmeler sırasında bazı Türkler bu statü farklılıklarını normal bulduklarını dile getirdi. Sebep olarak, kimisi birinci kuşak göçmenleri çalışmamakla ve işsizlik parasıyla geçinmekle (“Onlar çok tembel, çalışmak istemiyorlar, işsizlik parası alıp evde yatıyorlar”) yada dil bilmemekle suçlarken (“o kadar uzun zamandır burada olmalarına rağmen hala Hollandaca bilmiyorlar”); kimisi, zamana ve göçün yakın zamanda gerçekleşmiş olmasına (“Hollandalılar çok uzun zamandır bu topraklarda yaşıyor, biz daha yeni geldik”) değindi. İkinci soruya cevaben ise, çoğu katılımcı Hollandalı olarak kabul

göremediklerinden yakındı (“Koyu bir tenim olduğu müddetçe Hollandalı olarak görmüyorlar beni”). Bu, statü farklılıklarını meşru görseler dahi neden daha çok Hollandalı kimliğiyle özdeşleşmediklerini açıklamaktadır. Sonuç olarak da, meşruiyet algısı Türk kimliğiyle özdeşleşmeyi azaltarak ama Hollandalı kimliğiyle özdeşleşmeyi artırmadan politik katılım tercihlerini etkilemektedir.

Son olarak ayrımcılık algısı, etnik politik katılımı direk olarak etkilemektedir. Bu bilgi yazındaki, ayrımcılık algısının kolektif eyleme yol açtığı bulgularıyla örtüşmektedir (Lalonde & Silverman, 1994). Ancak, yazından farklı olarak (Branscombe ve ark., 1999; Dion, 2001; Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998), ayrımcılık algısı kimlik edinme süreçlerine etki etmemiştir. Geçirgen olmayan grup sınırları ve gayrimeşru statü farklılıkları aynı zamanda ayrımcı olarak algılandığından (olumlu yönde ilişki), ayrımcılığın özdeşleşme üzerindeki olası etkisinin bir kısmı bu değişkenler tarafından açıklanmış olabilir.

Türk göçmenlerinin çocukları, etnik kimlikleri yüzünden ayrımcılığa uğradıklarını düşündükleri müddetçe, politik alanda kendi gruplarının çıkarlarını savunmaları kaçınılmazdır. Görüşmeler sırasında bir çok katılımcı, sırf soyadları yada isimleri Türk olduğu için işe alınmadıklarını dile getirdi. Yazındaki çalışmalarda Avrupa’da pek çok ülkede göçmenlere yönelik ayrımcılığı görgül olarak göstermektedir (Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000; Zegers de Beijl, 2000).

Birinci modele benzer bir şekilde, bu modelde de kalıcılık varsayımı desteklenmemiştir. Bunu açıklamak için ortaya atılan iki varsayımın yanı sıra üçüncü bir açıklama daha mümkündür. “Gizli etkileşim etkisi” savı, meşruiyet, kalıcılık ve geçirgenlik değişkenlerinin birbiri ile etkileşim halinde olduğu, ve bu etkileşimlerin insanların tepkilerini belirlemede önemli bir rol oynayacağı varsayımlarına dayanmaktadır (Tajfel, 1981; Turner & Brown, 1978). Bu sav, çalışmanın sonuçları tarafından da desteklenmiştir. Kalıcılık değişkeninin etnik politik katılım üzerinde beklenen negatif etkisi sadece yüksek geçirgenlik durumunda ortaya çıkmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, ancak gruplar arası sınırlar geçirgen algılandığında (yani Hollandalı olarak kabul görececeklerini düşündüklerinde), konum farklılıklarının kalıcılığı (yani değişmeyeceğini düşünmeleri) etnik politik katılımı azaltmaktadır (Figüre 4.4., s. 81)

Üçüncü model de yapısal eşitlik modelleme yoluyla test edilmiş ve gerekli düzeltmelerden sonra sonra modelin veriye uyduğu tespit edilmiştir (Bakınız Figür 4.3., s. 77). Diğer bir deyişle, bireysel ve kolektif hareketlilik stratejilerinin aracı değişken olarak tanımlandığı model istatistiksel olarak doğrulanmıştır (Varsayım 3, Model 3). Gruplar arası konum farklılıklarının meşru görülmesi hareketlilik stratejilerinin tercihlerini, seçilen stratejiler de politik katılım tercih ve davranışlarını etkilemiştir. Gruplar arası statü farklılıklarını meşru bulduklarında, bireysel hareketlilik stratejilerini tercih etmişlerdir. Yani, Hollanda toplumuna geçmeye olumlu bakmışlar, ve geçiş stratejisini benimsedikleri için politik alanda da etnik çıkarlarını savunmaksızın ana görüş çerçevesinde bir yol izlemişlerdir. Öte yandan, statü farklılıklarını gayrimeşru bulduklarında, gruplarına bağlılıkları artmış, gruplarının statüsünü yükseltmeye yönelik bir strateji benimsemişler (kolektif hareketlilik), ve dolayısıyla politik alanda da grup çıkarlarını ön plana çıkarmışlardır.

Grup sınırlarının geçirgenliği bireysel hareketlilik stratejilerinin tercihini etkilemiştir. Yani Hollandalı olarak kabul görececeklerini düşündüklerinde tutum olarak da Hollandalı olmaya çalışmışlardır. Öte yandan ayrımcılık algısı direk olarak etnik politik katılımı teşvik ederken, ayrımcılık algılamamak genel politik katılımı teşvik etmiştir.

Bu sonuçlar, Hollanda’da ve genel olarak günümüz çok kültürlü toplumlarında geliştirilecek politikalara ışık tutmaktadır. Politikacıların ve yetkililerin toplumdaki farklı grupların birbirleriyle olan ilişkilerini, yani gruplar arası ilişkileri, ve çoklu kimlik edinme süreçlerini göz önünde bulundurmaları gerektiğinin altını çizmektedir. Son olarak, bu tez, politik doğurguları açısından, tanımlanan iki politik katılım yolunun “uyum (entegrasyon)” süreciyle nasıl ilişkilendiği sorusunu akla getirmektedir. Bu çalışmada tanımlanan iki politik katılım yolu (etnik ve genel) ters yönde ilişkili olmakla beraber, Türk ve Hollanda örgütlerine katılım ve Türk ve Hollanda medyasını takip etmek olumlu yönde ilişkilidir. Diğer bir deyişle, Hollanda’daki ikinci kuşak Türkler, Türk teşkilatlarına katılıyor ise Hollanda teşkilatlarına da katılmakta, Türk medyasını takip ediyor ise Hollanda medyasını da takip etmektedir. Bu bulgu da, tanımlanan iki siyasal katılım

yolunun farklı ama karşıt olmayan yollar olduğu, ve ikisinin de politik uyuma katkıda bulunacağı savını güçlendirmektedir. Ana görüş çerçevesinde tanımlanan (genel) politik katılım özümseme (asimilasyon) anlamına gelmediği gibi, etnik siyasal katılımı ayrılıkçılık anlamına gelmemektedir. Bu iki yol da siyasal uyumun iki seçeneğidir. Siyasal uyum Habermas (1994) tarafından bir ülkedeki demokrasiye ve demokratik yapılara katılım olarak tanımlanmıştır. Dolayısıyla, ikinci kuşak Türkler, kendi etnik çıkarları doğrultusunda yada değil, Hollanda'nın politik mekanizmalarına katıldıkları müddetçe, siyasal olarak uyum sağlamaktadırlar (entegre olmaktadır).

Bu tez, bu alanda yapılan çalışmaları bir adım öteye taşıyarak, siyasal davranış ve tercihlerin gruplar arası ilişkilerde yatan nedenlerini incelemiştir. Gruplar arası ilişkiler ve kimlik süreçleri politik konular olduğu kadar, politik konular da aslında sosyal psikolojiktir. İkisini birleştiren bir yaklaşım, günümüz çok kültürlü toplumlarında gruplar arası ilişkileri biçimlendiren sayısız yolları daha iyi anlamamıza fırsat sağlayacaktır.

## APPENDIX D

### CURRICULUM VITAE

#### PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Baysu, Gülseli  
Nationality: Turkish (TC)  
Date and place of birth: 25 August 1978, Ankara  
Phone: 00 32 16 32 56 32  
Email: Gulseli.Baysu@psy.kuleuven.be; gulseli\_baysu@yahoo.com

#### EDUCATION

2007 to present	Marie Curie research assistant, University of Leuven, Belgium
2005 - 2006	visiting scholar, European Research Center for Migration (ERCOMER), Utrecht University, Netherlands
2002 to present	preparing PhD in Social Psychology, Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara, Turkey
2001 – 2002	MA in Political Science and Public Administration (High Honor), Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
1996- 2001	BSc in Psychology (High Honor), Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara, Turkey

#### AWARDS

2005- 2006	Nuffic/ Huygns scholarship (11 000 euro)
2006	award by Marie Curie Chair programme of the European Commission (DIPLOMIG project) (350 euro) for participation in a training program
2001 June	award for ranking first in CGPA among the psychology graduates



## **ACADEMIC ACTIVITIES**

- 2007, 9-13 July participation and presentation in IAIR conference in Groningen, Netherlands
- 2007, 15-19 June participation and presentation in 10<sup>th</sup> Jena workshop on intergroup processes, Jena, Germany
- 2007, 9 March participation and presentation in Dutch cross-cultural psychology meeting, Tilburg University, Netherlands
- 2006, 1-10 July participation in the training program called 'The Sociology and Politics of Immigration in Europe' in the European University Institute, Florence, Italy
- 2001 June the VII. National Convention of Psychology Students, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey

## **LANGUAGES**

Advanced English (TOEFL 267), Basic Dutch

## **TECHNICAL SKILLS**

MS Office Applications (word, excel, powerpoint), internet applications  
SPSS (multivariate analyses): advanced level  
Stata (multivariate analyses): basic level  
Mlwin (Multilevel analyses): intermediate level  
AMOS (Structural equation modeling): advanced level;  
LISREL (Structural equation modeling): basic level