**OLD ALLIES FACING NEW THREATS: THE TRANSATLANTIC
RELATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATO**

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ABSTRACT

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The September 11 terrorist attacks brought a discourse on the transatlantic rift to the agenda of international community. In fact, at the end of the CW, the emergence of the US as the leading hegemonic power gave way to transatlantic divergences concerning security perceptions and strategies of the post-CW era. Also, NATO has been challenged with these drastic changes in the international system. Yet, owing to the initiatives taken for the transformation of the Atlantic alliance during the 1990s, NATO maintained its relevance for the new world order. However, the divergences of the US and Europeans on their strategies to deal with the post-September 11 security threats led to another discussions about the future of NATO. Indeed, as the US' post-September 11 unilateral policies deepened the transatlantic rift already underway since the end of the CW, on the way to Iraq war, NATO turned out to be the place where the divisions between the allies were reflected the most. Hence, the US' preferences for ad hoc coalitions of the willing understanding damaged the long-during multilateral alliance by leading to a secondary role for NATO during the US' Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. That is why, time is needed to see whether the old allies facing new threats can reconcile their differences in the name of a renewed transatlantic security cooperation through the initiatives taken within NATO?

Keywords: NATO, transatlantic relations, post-Cold War, post-September 11, security.

iv

ÖZ

YENİ TEHDİTLERLE YÜZYÜZE ESKİ MÜTTEFİKLER:
NATO ÇERÇEVESİNDE TRANSATLANTİK İLİŞKİLERİ

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11 Eylül terörist saldırıları, transatlantik anlaşmazlığa ilişkin söylemi uluslararası toplumun gündemine getirse de gerçekte Soğuk Savaş'ın bitiminde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin (ABD) öncü hegemon bir güç olması, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin güvenlik algılamaları ve stratejileri için politik bir transatlantik uzlaşmazlığına yol açtı. NATO da uluslararası sistemde meydana gelen bu değişiklikler ile başa çıkmak durumunda kaldı. Ancak 1990'lar süresince Atlantic ittifağının transformasyonu için alınan inisiyatiflerle NATO yeni dünya düzenine uyum sağladı. Fakat, ABD ve Avrupa'nın 11 Eylül sonrası güvenlik tehditleri için gerekli stratejiler konusundaki uzlaşmazlıkları, NATO'nun geleceği hakkındaki tartışmalara bir kere daha öncülük etti. Aslında, ABD'nin 11 Eylül sonrası tek yanlı politikaları Soğuk Savaş itibariyle zaten varolan transatlantik anlaşmazlığı derinleştirirken, Iraq savaşına kadar olan süreçte NATO, müttefiklerin arasındaki bölünmenin en cok yansıtıldığı yer haline geldi. Bundan dolayı, ABD'nin özel ve geçici olarak kurulmus olan koalisyonlar anlayışı, NATO'nun ABD'nin Afganistan ve Irak kampanyalarında ikincil bir rol oynamasına yol açarak uzun vadede çok yanlı ittifaka zarar verdi. Bu nedenledir ki yeni tehditlerle yüzyüze olan eski müttefiklerin, yenilenmiş bir transatlantik güvenlik işbirliği adına, NATO içinde alınacak inisiyatifler sayesinde farklılıklarını uzlaştırıp uzlaştıramayacaklarını görmek için zamana ihtiyaç vardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: NATO, transatlantik ilişkiler, Soğuk Savaş sonrası, 11 Eylül sonrası, güvenlik.

To my mother...

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ABBREVIATIONS

AWACS	Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CW	Cold War
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
IFOR	Implementation Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSS	National Security Strategy
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PRT	Provisional Reconstruction Teams
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SU	Soviet Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

No one who woke up in the morning of September 11, 2001 predicted that they would witness such an important event emerging as a sign of vulnerability even for the world's most powerful country. That is why in less than 24 hours, the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington brought a multilateral cooperation to the forefront of international community through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council's decision on 12 September in which the Alliance's Article 5 commitment, considered "attack on one" as an "attack on all", was invoked for the first time in the Alliance's history.

In this respect, it was believed that the sense of vulnerability caused by September 11 would convince the Bush administration and the American public for the need of wide-ranging, multilateral engagement through a more centrist foreign policy, depending on alliances, instead of an isolationist one.[1] Yet, on the contrary to the expectations "war on terror", depending on an offensive response, has been prioritized in the US' foreign policy following the September 11 attacks and gave way to a deteriorated transatlantic relationship between the United States (US) and its European allies.[2]

In fact, this new form of offensive course in combating terrorism by the US can be seen in all of President Bush's major speeches since September 11 in which the President labeled the attacks as "an act of war" and told the American people that

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[1] Charles A. Kupchan, "The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy", *Political Science Quarterly*, 2003, Vol. 118(2), p. 208.

[2] Throughout the thesis the words "Europe", "European states", and "European allies" have been used interchangeably to mean certain European states acting together either through their national laws and institutions or through the laws adopted commonly within the European Union (EU) since there is not a united European Community in the adoption of a common strategy considering the issues discussed in the thesis.

"the nation is at war."[3] In 2002 the National Security Strategy (NSS) Paper of the US[4] introduced how the US would pursue its global interests in the post-September 11 era through "preventive" use of force to prevent threats such as terrorism and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons from emerging.[5]

However, on the other hand, the revelation of the European Security Strategy Paper[6] in 2003 underlined the transatlantic discrepancy since more clearly. Indeed, Europeans shared the US' concerns for the post-September 11 security environment by defining terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime as the key threats. Yet, Europeans did not feel themselves to be at war.[7] That is why Europeans emphasized a "comprehensive security approach" operating through an effective multilateralism in contrast to the assertive unilateralism adopted by the USA.

Moreover, while Europe tended to see terrorism as first and foremost a crime that might require special measures by law enforcement and the judiciary, many in the US governments saw military force in eradicating terrorism as an effective and proportionate tool.[8] Hence, it can be argued that the revelation of "pre-emptive doctrine" underlined the discrepancy between the US and Europe in their assumed strategies as the most appropriate response to deal with the post-September 11

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[3] Richard H. Schultz and Andreas Vogt, "It's War! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism Through a Doctrine of Preemption", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Spring 2003, Vol. 15(1), pp. 23-26.

[4] White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, accessed on 16.02.2006.

[5] James Steinberg, "Preventive Force in US National Security Strategy", *Survival,* Winter 2005-06, Vol. 47(4), p. 55.

[6] *A Secure Europe in a Beter World: European Security Strategy*, December 2003, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, accessed on 25.04.2007.

[7] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 122.

[8] ---, "The Post 9/11 Partnership: Transatlantic Cooperation against Terrorism", the Atlantic Council of the United States*, Policy Paper, December 2004, available at http://www.acus.org/docs/0412-Post_9-11_Partnership_Transatlantic_Cooperation_Against_Terrorism, accessed on 26.05.2007.

threats on the agenda, namely authoritarian states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and global terrorism.

In time, it became clear that the changing, but importantly diverging, policies of the allies reversed the course of relations subsequently from cooperation toward collision within the Alliance. Importantly, the state of affairs changed when Europeans have denounced "pre-emptive doctrine" of the Bush administration as another instance of American dangerous unilateralism while President Bush has occasionally mentioned the strategy as a rationale for intervening against Saddam.[9] The political relations have been influenced precipitating the questions on the future of NATO. Yet, it should be kept in mind that throughout its more than a half of century history, NATO had witnessed a number of crisis resulting from the diverging pattern of relations between the Atlantic allies.

In that respect, the end of the Cold War (CW) have emerged as an important factor which led to a serious change in the transatlantic relationship by decreasing the importance of NATO within the Atlantic politics as opposed to the CW years. In fact, while the disappearance of the main adversary of the Western alliance put an end to the commonly adopted strategies for the prevention of the spread of communism and the Soviet Union (SU) on the one hand, it also necessitated new strategies to deal with the newly emerging post-CW security challenges due to the irrelevance of the old CW concepts of containment and deterrence.[10]

Commonly adopted policies for the Alliance's transformation during 1990s can be considered as a part of the allies' initiatives for saving the existence of transatlantic cooperation under the framework of NATO for post-CW. However, the absence of transatlantic consensus on the character and seriousness of potential new threats of the post-CW era gave way to divergent assumptions about the purpose and priorities

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[9] Osvalso Croci, "A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2003, Vol. 8, p. 483.

[10] Adrian Hyde-Price, "European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force", *European Security,* 2004, Vol. 13 (4), p. 338.

of NATO.[11] Especially, this was exactly what has experienced in the 1990s following the territorial disintegration of Yugoslavia due to the Allies' diverging policies in dealing with such a major international crisis.

In this respect, in a similar way to the post-CW disagreements which had profound implications for NATO, the post-September 11 transatlantic politics also revealed a transatlantic rift resulted from a more unilateralist US' foreign policy. It should be noted that the US did not want to take into account the European allies' concerns for its offensive "war on terror" policy any more following September 11. In this context, NATO's assistance, provided by the collective security provision of the NATO's charter on September 12, was rejected by the US in its campaign against the Afghan Taleban regime.

Moreover, NATO became involved in the issue only in August 2003 when the ISAF became a NATO issue during the postwar stabilization. That is why Sten Rynning defines the NATO's missions in the fight against terrorism as a secondary role which began only in the postwar phase when "major nations felt that security affairs could safely be handed to the amorpehaus setting of Alliance diplomacy". However, even NATO's postwar stabilization mission beyond the capital of Kabul came true only following a prolonged debate between the US and the allies for combating remaining Taleban and al-Qaeda forces because the US initially opted for rallying, instead, on coalition forces under US command.[12]

While NATO has involved into the issue only during the stabilization efforts following the war, this postwar role of NATO in the Afghan campaign gave early signs of a more serious Atlantic crisis during the US' campaign for a regime change in Iraq. Especially, in the run-up to the Iraq war, both the campaign itself and its aftermath have had a profound impact for international relations in general and for

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[11] Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "What is NATO for?", *Survival,* Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 108.

[12] Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 128-129.

NATO in particular.[13] Importantly, the divergence between the Atlantic allies came into sight with a European bloc, consisted by France and Germany backed by Russia, who insisted on an explicit United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorization in the case of a possible US-initiated war against Iraq. The US had based its claims on the linkage between the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and the al-Qeade network responsible for the September 11 attacks and rejected the need for gaining a UNSC authorization. By the way, the transatlantic crisis was deepened by another division among the European states who supported and did not support the US' war against Iraq.

On another front, a US proposal for the authorisation for planning by NATO regarding the defence of Turkey in the event of an inevitable war against Iraq came to the agenda. When the French-German cooperation, supported by Belgium, blocked this US proposal the issue turned out to be another test case for NATO. However, as this Atlantic crisis for the protection of Turkey was solved lately, the tense relations did not let a cooperation in the US' Iraq policy due to the US' failure to take an explicit authorization from the UNSC. In the end, this lack of authorization prevented NATO from taking an important part in the Iraq war.

In line with the above analysis, the thesis argues that as the US' post-September 11 unilateral policies deepened the transatlantic rift already underway since the end of the CW, on the way to Iraq war NATO turned out to be the place where the divisions between the allies were reflected the most. Considering this argument, the main focus of the thesis will be on the evolution of the post-CW transatlantic relationship and its repercussions for NATO with a special emphasis on the post-September 11 policy divergences of the Western allies.

Having realized the fact that analyzing the allies' divergences in their approaches to the post-CW security agenda and their repercussions for NATO necessitates to

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[13] Christopher Bennett, "Foreword", *Nato Review*, Summer 2003, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/foreword.html, accessed on 23.05.2007.

review the politics of the CW years, the second chapter starts with an analysis of the Western allies' shared security priorities against the common communist threat following the World War II (WWII). During the CW era, NATO played an important role in the CW American military strategy as an organization where the strenght and cohesion of "the West" is mainly represented. Hence the chapter will examine the importance given by the US to the alliance management within NATO during the CW.

However, the CW ended with the dissolution of the SU and led to new obstacles for the Western allies to redefine common objectives for the post-CW era. Also, for NATO it became clear that to prolong its existence and ensure its persisting relevance in international politics, the Alliance had to recast itself and come up with new ideas, projects and roles.[14] In that sense, the implications of the end of the CW for the transatlantic relationship with a specific reference to NATO are dealt within the third chapter.

With the understanding that the new security agenda of the post-CW period can not be evaluated precisely without the effects of globalization in restructuring security concept, the third chapter discusses the new and expanded security concepts of the post-CW era as opposed to the traditional state-centric and military-focused approaches of the CW years. Since more diffuse, hidden and ill-defined threats were faced in the post-CW era there is more disagreements about the new threats and the best way to deal with them.[15] Balkan wars during the 1990s importantly underlines this fact, and they showed to the Western allies that as apart from the CW security environment of Europe, the challenges in a variety of forms can come from any direction, even from beyond Alliance borders.[16] Therefore, the NATO's missions of

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[14] Zoltan Barany, "NATO's Post-Cold War Metamorphosis: From Sixteen to Twenty-Six and Counting", *International Studies Review*, March 2006, Vol. 8(1), p. 165.

[15] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 12.

[16] Javier Solana, "The Washington Summit: NATO Steps Boldly into the 21th Century", *NATO Review,* Spring 1999, Vol. 47(1), p. 6, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9901-01.htm , accessed on 06.03.2007.

peacekeeping in Bosnia and crisis management in Kosovo will also be scrutinized in the third chapter as they have revealed the allies' early differences in their assumptions of the most appropriate responses for the serious international crises of the post-CW.

Indeed, to have a common response in dealing with the new threats is deemed very important for the Alliance since the allied countries can be said to be the most globalized countries in the world and they are the ones most at risk from the threats that globalization generates. That is why it is argued that NATO is no longer a security community but a "risk community" that secures the interests of its members against the new global insecurity they face, as opposed to the state-centric challenges of the past.[17] In this context, the transformation and enlargement processes within NATO will also be examined in the third chapter with special references to NATO's Rome and Washington Summits of the 1990s. In the event, the Washington Summit, apart from constituting the special occasion for the 50th anniversary of the Alliance, has emerged as a turning point for the transatlantic relationship. In this respect, the Alliance has set a clear course for its future political and military activities to promote both peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region at large with the newly adopted Strategy Concept in the 1999 Summit.[18]

Nevertheless, this is what was assumed on the eve of the 21th century until September 11 came and changed all the political dynamics over the Atlantic. In a sense, September 11 has emerged as another test case for the allies since it necessitates to overcome the differences in their approaches to deal with the post-September 11 threats and challenges such as terror and proliferation of WMD. Yet, the "war on terror" policy issued by the US with a more unilateralist rhetoric gave way to a deteriorated transatlantic relationship. Moreover, the differences of allies not only in

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[17] See Christopher Coker, *Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risks,* New York: Oxford University Press [International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 345], June 2002, pp. 64-88.

[18] Anthony Cragg, "A New Strategic Concept for a New Era", *NATO Review,* Summer 1999, Vol. 47(2), p. 22, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/rev-pdf/eng/9902-en.pdf, accessed on 06.03.2007.

their security perceptions but also in their approaches to deal with the commonly accepted security threats and challenges for the post-September 11 era have reinforced this transatlantic rift by giving harm to NATO. As a result, before analyzing the concrete repercussions of the post-September 11 politics to NATO, the allies' differences in their approaches to international security issues and crisis will be elaborated in the fourth chapter with specific references to the reasons behind their distinct security cultures evolving since the end of the CW around a discussion on being a "soft power" and a "hard power".

In line with the main argument of this thesis, it is worth to mention once more that the invocation of the collective security provision of the NATO's charter on 12 September failed to settle the question, of whether the allies would devise compatible strategies for dealing with terrorism, in NATO's favor.[19] Instead, the post-September 11 transatlantic diplomatic mechanisms over Iraq war turned out to be a bruising factor for NATO, even though the Alliance was not directly involved in the campaign.[20] However, it is worth to note that even before the Iraq campaign began the US' initial war, as a part of its "war on terror" policy, against the Afghan Taleban regime in 2001 had revealed important clues for the coming Atlantic crisis. Hence, in the fifth chapter the post-September 11 transatlantic politics and its repercussions for NATO have been examined under three sections.

The first section is devoted to NATO's invocation of Article 5 and the Afghan war. The reason behind is the US' choice to sideline NATO during the war by refraining "to craft a military coalition through the NATO alliance" despite the Alliance's decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that concerns collective defense.[21] However, although NATO did not take an important role in the Afghan

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[19] Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 120.

[20] Timothy Garden, "Rebuilding Relationships", *NATO Review,* Summer 2003, p. 3, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/pdf/i2_en_review2003.pdf, accessed on 06.03.2007.

[21] Jeffrey Lantis, "American Perspectives on the Transatlantic Security Agenda", *European Security,* 2004, Vol. 13(4), p. 373.

war it is a matter of fact that the Afghan war against al-Qaeda was supported generally by the European states. Yet, this was not the case for the Iraq war of the US which began in March 2003. While the initial European oppositions, beginning from January 2003, put forward by a common German-French front in which they insisted for an explicit UNSC authorization for the Iraq war, the position taken by George W. Bush was "much as it had been over Afghanistan: 'if we have to go it alone, we'll go it alone; but I'd rather not.'"[22] As a result, this lack of a convergence led to a further division between the European states by precipitating an "old Europe vs new Europe" debate, as discussed in the second section of the chapter where the political disagreements of the Atlantic allies have been examined in detail. And lastly, the Atlantic crisis of February 2003, resulting from the US' proposal to NATO for the protection of Turkey in the case of a possible war against Iraq under the Alliance commitment of Article 4 is discussed in the third section. In this context, negative response of the European allies within the community led to the US' ad hoc coalitions understanding for the post-September 11 era owing to the lack of a common front by the Atlantic Alliance as opposed to the CW years.

Finally, in the conclusion part, the evolution and transformation of the transatlantic relations since the end of the CW will be summarized once again by underlining the repercussions of the post-CW security considerations of the allies for the post-September 11 policy divergences over the Atlantic precipitated by the unilateralist policies of the US. And, the future of transatlantic relationship will be discussed briefly by mentioning the policy changes during the second term of the Bush administration and the role of NATO given importance for a healthy alliance.

Taking into account the mentioned points, the key research questions that are raised in the thesis are: -What are the profound implications of the end of the CW on the Atlantic community? -Did NATO prove its durability even in the post-CW world despite of the disappearance of communist threat as the guiding reason behind its

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[22] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 123.

foundation in the early CW years? -What are the main reasons behind the divergent security policies, strategies and interests of the Western allies which became appearant mostly in the recent Atlantic crisis of post-September 11? -And what are the implications of these post-September 11 transatlantic relations for NATO?

In trying to answer the above-noted questions, the thesis employs a descriptive methodology particularly in the second chapter while describing the historical evolution of the transatlantic relationship after the WWII through the early policy initiatives of the US for European security such as the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan and the foundation of NATO. In the third chapter, along with a theoretical discussion over the effects of globalization on the post-CW security framework, the emergence of Balkan crisis and their implications for NATO are dealt with specific references to the summit decisions taken in post-CW. Moreover, in the fourth chapter the thesis utilizes a "realist" explanation based on the logic of power politics for the reasons behind the allies' post-CW divergence in their threat perceptions and security strategies. However, these norms of real politics used for the explanation of the US aggressive primacy in the post-CW are dealt with through a short comparative discussion part including the political, cultural and structural explanations, as well.

Throughout the thesis, descriptive and analytical discussions have been carried out through a literature including books, articles and policy papers (secondary sources) on the transatlantic issues. Primary sources include the NATO Summit decisions and the NSS papers. Also, declarations given by the top official leaders of the states and international organizations, particularly of NATO, regarding the issue in question are also been extensively utilized.

CHAPTER 2

THE COLD WAR STRATEGY OF THE ALLIES:
NATO AS A COMMON GROUND

Despite of more than nine million soldiers death in addition to millions of civilians the World War I (WWI), also known as "the war to end all wars", could not put an end to coming of another war in less than thirty years. During the interwar period, as Europe struggled to recover from the devastation of the WWI the faith in the League of Nations in which the doctrine of collective security was embodied could not prevent people from experiencing another devastating war. Indeed, one of the League's main weaknesses can be attributed to the US' not joining the organization due to its unwillingness to relinquish some sovereignty in exchange for collective security. The League was, in fact, an American liberal plan to reorder world politics, but the American Senate did not approve the Covenant owing to the suspicion that the US might be drawn into distant wars in the name of collective security without the Senate's decision or the will of the American people.[23]

In the end, the WWII occured by leading to a world in which the US and the SU emerged as the world's two leading superpowers. A bipolar world created following the war left not only the dominance of Europe behind but also much of Europe in ruins. The devastated Germany was particularly the major consequence of war since the destruction of all military capability and economic infrastructure of Germany was deemed as necessary to preclude any future German war-making capability. This is due to the fact that the WWII came into effect following the ineffective appeasement policy of the British and French governments against Nazi Germany despite its nationalist policies giving way to the Holocaust in the end.

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[23] Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History,* Longman Classics Series, 2003, p. 87.

Although this European strategy stemmed from their desire to avoid a new European war during the 1930s, this strategy failed and left the historical responsibility of the war on Germany because the main reason behind the war was accepted as the German rejection of many post-WWI changes. Germany constituted one of the problems that contributed not only to eventual change of American strategy but also to the onset of the CW as a consequence of the divisions between the Americans and the Soviets about how to reconstruct Germany.[24] This change in American strategy was also reflected in the foundation of NATO since the Atlantic Treaty was served to reassure France, Britain and the other small countries about the economic and political reconstruction of West Germany from the outset by giving Western Europe the confidence to pursue economic integration.[25] Therefore, Germany was split into four zones of occupation, three of which under the Western allies, namely the Americans along with the British and French. They were reconstituted as a constitutional democracy within a process of West German integration while the eastern zone of Germany was under the SU's control.

By the time, most of Eastern Europe remained under the SU's influence by heightening existing tensions between the two camps in such a way which led to the CW. Being a period of conflict, tension and competition between the US and the SU for the developments achieved in the field of military, industry and technology from the mid-1940s until the early 1990s, the CW began to show itself with political rivalry for the support of allied states to reconstruct the postwar world.

At that historical juncture, it seems that there was no another choice for the US apart from involving in Europe. Hence, in the light of the lessons of the interwar years American strategists believed that unless the expansion of the Soviet influence and control over Western Europe and Japan was prevented the balance of forces would

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[24] Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History,* Longman Classics Series, 2003, p. 119.

[25] Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "What is NATO for?", *Survival,* Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 111.

tilt sharply against the US due to the assumption on the possible emergence of these two states as the centers of wealth and industry despite their devastation by the war.[26]

Consequently, as the CW began to spread even outside Europe the US sought the containment of communism by forging alliances all around the world from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, including the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); ANZUS, the partnership with Australia and New Zealand; and bilateral treaties with Japan and South Korea. It is clear that the American strategy of the CW, namely 'containment' rested on this network of anticommunist alliances planted around the SU's periphery. Considering the issue, Rajan Menon states that the ubiquity of alliances prompted observers to describe this phase of American foreign policy as "pactomania."[27]

However, Western European states turned out to be the main bulwark against the Soviet communism for a strong, cohesive and unified West. Timothy Garton Ash states that during the CW there was no doubt for the existence of "the West," at the core of which there were the free countries on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, in Western Europe and North America. Moreover, Ash argues that although its boundaries were in question the political community of the West was both real and imagined. While the community was real with its military front line it was also imagined with a mental army of West in which people are ready to die together in a battle for the assumptions about what united them.[28]

Indeed, initially there was some hope for postwar Europe to reestablish itself as another power at least to defend itself by its own means for providing the US a space to take a breath. Nonetheless, the British declaration for not being able to support Greece and Turkey economically and militarily any more faded all these hopes away

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[26] Rajan Menon, "The End of Alliances", *World Policy Journal,* Summer 2003, Vol. 20(2), p. 1.

[27] Ibid., p. 2.

[28] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, pp. 3-5.

by revealing the fact that the US should carry the burden of defending Europe. Joseph S. Nye states that in such a condition the US had to decide whether to let a vacuum develop or to replace British power by providing assistance to Greece and Turkey.

Yet, because this involved a considerable break from traditional American foreign policy based on isolationism of 1930s, Truman had to explain the policy change with the need to protect free people everywhere rather than the need to maintain a balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean.[29] In the end, the Truman Doctrine was released in March 12, 1947, as the first initiative of the US for the containment of Soviet expansion. Then, the Doctrine was followed by economic restoration of Western Europe through the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, effective from 1948 to 1952.

Hence, the next fifty years following the end of WWII, Europe experienced "a state of strategic dependence" on the US, according to which Europe's only strategic mission was standing firm and defending its own territory against any Soviet offensive until the US involved in the issue to defend European territories against the communist threat by the name of Europeans.[30] Since the US and the Western European allies concluded that communist expansion could not be contained without the reconstruction and recovery of Europe, this policy was shaped through the economic policies depending on aids and assistance to keep communist groups out of governments in Western Europe.

On the other side, the military containment was provided by the creation of NATO in 1949. However, it is important to note that before the signing of Washington Agreement, the Treaty of Brussels was signed on 17 March 1948 by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) as a precursor to

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[29] Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History,* Longman Classics Series, 2003, p. 121.

[30] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order,* London: Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 18.

NATO. The Brussels Treaty, later to become the Western European Union (WEU), also established a military alliance. Nevertheless, due to the importance given to the American participation in countering the military power of the SU, talks for a new military alliance began almost immediately.

Therefore, with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington DC on 4 April 1949 by 12 members of Atlantic alliance, namely the US, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and the five Treaty of Brussels states, NATO came into existence with the very purpose of "keeping the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in"[31] as characterized by the words of Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO.

Although the Washington Treaty was a brief and broadly drafted document in setting out its overall objectives the treaty provided few details for the organization of members to achieve these objectives. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in which the strategic mission of "collective security", whereby its member states agree to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party, was one of them. Anthony Forster and William Wallace argue that Article 5 constituted the subject of much debate in the US during both the negotiations and the ratification process owing to the concern of senators for the question on whether Article 5 committed the US irrevocably. However, as stated by Forster and Wallace, it only created a formal obligation of solidarity by "preserving the autonomy of each state's decision on the use of military forces".[32]

Moreover, the foundation of NATO reflected the US' commitments to wartime and postwar multilateralism. Multilateralism in NATO was revealed by the US concerns for ensuring that Europeans were given equal status to the US despite of the US' nuclear capability. Hence, Steve Weber defines the US political leadership at that

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[31] Quoted in Rajan Menon, "The End of Alliances", *World Policy Journal,* Summer 2003, Vol. 20(2), p. 2.

[32] Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "What is NATO for?", *Survival,* Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 108.

time as the concerns for creating an alliance based on a sense of shared purpose among peers in which the US should not treat "its trusted allies as junior members". Behind all these initiatives, according to Weber, what existed was the US concerns for ideological extremism on both sides as a result of a bipolar confrontation between the SU and US.[33] Accordingly, Robert Jervis also points out not only the US awareness for the importance of allied, especially European, support to resist Soviet encroachments but also great efforts made by Europeans to draw the US in with a fear for a return to American isolationism.[34]

In the end, these 12 states came together to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area in the name of an important mission "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" as stated in the Treaty.[35] In that respect, Forster and Wallace define the treaty as "a part of the wider process of reconstructing a Western Community based upon shared political and economic values", as being parallel with the other instruments of "enlightened American national interest intended to rebuild Western Europe as a partner for the US" such as the Marshall Plan and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).[36]

In analyzing the historical foundation of the NATO, Manfred Wörner, the NATO Secretary-General during the early 1990s, acknowledges that NATO was more than a classic military alliance by which disparate nations held together only by the assumption that "The enemy of my enemy is my friend". Instead, the Alliance

[33] Quoted in Helene Sjursen, "On the Identity of NATO", *International Affairs*, 2004, Vol. 80(4), p. 699. For more on the issue, see Steve Weber, *Multilateralism in NATO: Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power, 1945–1961,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

[34] Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine", *Political Science Quarterly,* Fall 2003, Vol. 118(3), p. 377.

[35] The North Atlantic Treaty ("Treaty of Washington"), Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm, accessed on 05.02.2007.

[36] Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "What is NATO for?", *Survival,* Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), pp. 111-112.

evolved over the years into "apolitical commonwealth of like-minded and equal nations sharing common values and, common interests." Moreover, Wörner also underlines the fact that rather than mentioning the SU, the Washington Treaty of 1949 stresses "the need for a permanent community of Western democracies to make each other stronger through cooperation, and to work for more peaceful international relations."[37]

Regarding the early years of NATO, Helene Sjursen also underlines the ambitions of representatives of member states for an Atlantic "community", apart from a military alliance. Sjursen argues that this dimension to NATO was strongly emphasized in the 1956 "Report of the Committee of Three on non-military cooperation in NATO". By mentioning the interdependence of politics and security, the report argued that the success of the military alliance depended on the political cohesion of an Atlantic community since the challenge to NATO was not exclusively military.[38]

However, the unexpected North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 transformed not only NATO's organization but also its threat perception due to the rising fear of a Soviet attempt to occupy West Germany. This fear precipitated an integrated military structure and establishment of a West European rearmament programme while US troops in large numbers stationed in the West Europe.[39]

In line with the above mentioned considerations, three years later Greece and Turkey also included in the Alliance after declaring their position in favor of Western unity against the Eastern block by adopting the treaty on 18 February 1952. Nonetheless, the main strategic role of NATO for the CW became more appearent with the inclusion of West Germany to the Alliance on 9 May 1955 since the creation of the Warsaw Pact as an organization of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was declared

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[37] Manfred Wörner, "The Atlantic Alliance in the New Era", *NATO Review,* February 1991, Vol. 39(1), p. 5, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9101-01.htm, accessed on 06.03.2007.

[38] Helene Sjursen, "On the Identity of NATO", *International Affairs*, 2004, Vol. 80(4), pp. 690-691.

[39] Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "What is NATO for?", *Survival,* Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p.111.

to counter the alleged threat from the NATO alliance due to the integration of a "re-militarized" West Germany into NATO via ratification of the Paris Peace Treaties.

Throughout the CW years, until the withdrawings of certain member nations from the Warsaw Pact in 1989 due to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and political changes in the SU, NATO stood firm against the Warshaw Pact. However, it does not mean that the Atlantic alliance was free from the cracks during those years. On the contrary, the American CW strategy for preserving the West united and strong against the Eastern block necessitated many concessions on both sides of the Atlantic due to the controversies resulted from politicies of de Gaulle for determined independence during 1960s, arguments over Germany's *Ostpolitik* during 1970s and strategic debates over arms agreements and arms buildups during the Reagan administration of 1980s.

However, although disagreements were inevitable, the cracks were always healed because fissures would have been dangerous not only strategically and ideologically, but also psychologically. While the very definition of victory in the CW was described with the continued unity and success of the liberal Western order, there was a fear that divides in the alliance would have eventually leaded to a fall in the "West" which represented the liberal, democratic norms against the alternative choice of the other side of the Berlin Wall.[40] Hence, the main principles of US strategic culture during the CW can be summarized as: the American leadership of the Western alliance, with a preference for multilateral action; nuclear deterrence and a shared belief in the utility of military force to achieve security objectives.[41]

On the eve of the dissolution of the SU, the Atlantic alliance, as being aware of the accelerating political change in CEE, continued to emphasize their commitments to provide an indispensable foundation of stability, security and cooperation for Europe

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[40] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003, pp. 77-80.

[41] Jeffrey S. Lantis, "American Perspectives on the Transatlantic Security Agenda", *European Security,* 2004, Vol. 13(4), p. 363.

as an evidence of "solidarity among the democracies of North America and Western Europe within the framework of the Alliance" with a desire to seize new opportunities for an undivided Europe.[42]

Following the fall of communism, however, all these commitments did not save NATO from discussions on its future with the understanding that the raison d'etat of the Atlantic alliance was cancelled owing to the collapse of the SU. It is because of the widely belief that the main reason behind the transatlantic cooperation within NATO was being a bulkward against the communist threat in Western Europe and North America. Manfred Wörner expresses the widespread concerns about the Alliance's future with a question: "What is there left for a politico-military alliance such as NATO to do now that the threat that dominated our daily lives and our planning assumptions for nearly half a century has all but disappeared?"[43] Therefore, by July 1990, despite concrete steps taken for the progress towards German unification and a scheduled summit meeting in London within days there was uncertainty about the course to take in NATO.[44] Accordingly, "the lack of a 'clear and present danger' around which the allies on both sides of the Atlantic can unite"[45] led to an European initiative to develop its own military capability autonomously from the US. Europeans with an aim to play a bigger part in world politics, began to consider decreasing their dependence on the US especially "as far as preventive diplomacy, crisis-management and peace-enforcement in the Euro-Atlantic area are concerned."[46]

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[42] Brussels Summit Communique of the North Atlantic Council, 14-15 December 1989, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c891215a.htm, accessed on 01.03.2007.

[43] Manfred Wörner, "The Atlantic Alliance in the New Era", *NATO Review,* February 1991, Vol. 39(1), p. 4, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9101-01.htm, accessed on 06.03.2007.

[44] Quoted in "Summary 1990", *NATO Update,* available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/1990/summary.htm, accessed on 16.05.2007.

[45] Adrian Hyde-Price, "Continantal Drift? Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty-First Century", *Defence Studies,* Summer 2002, p. 7.

[46] Jean Klein, "Interface Between NATO/WEU and UN/OSCE" edited by Michael Brenner, *NATO and Collective Security,* London: MacMillan Press and New York: St.Martin's Press, 1998, p. 249.

That is why the central issues of the post-CW world can be considered as the place and function of NATO in the restructuring of the Western security system and the will of the Europeans to assert themselves as autonomous actors on the world scene.[47]

[47] Jean Klein, "Interface Between NATO/WEU and UN/OSCE" edited by Michael Brenner, *NATO and Collective Security,* London: MacMillan Press and New York: St.Martin's Press, 1998, p. 252.

CHAPTER 3

THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AGENDA:
POST-COLD WAR NATO

With the dissolution of the SU all attention turned to the alliance over the Atlantic and NATO, the only institution where the common security understanding of the West was represented during the CW. Adrian Hyde-Price states that post-CW international society is characterized by much greater political uncertainty and moral ambiguity than the bipolar East-West conflict when international relations were perceived in much more black and white terms.[48] In the absence of a threat from the SU it was predicted that the incoming years witnessed a new structure of relations.

Since the West did not have to stand firm against the SU any more, the allies left their strategic partnership of the CW years within NATO. Hence, the disappearance of the communist threat of the CW security doctrines led to the questions asked about the future of NATO. In this regard, the widely held view was that NATO was brought about and sustained by "the rationale of a clearly identified and equally perceived" threat. Since this threat was no longer existed in the post-CW era NATO would be considered as obsolete. However, the US took the lead in "reasserting the post-CW relevance of NATO." In this respect, the speech of Secretary of State, James Baker, given in Berlin in December 1989 gave a clear message for the continuation of centrality of NATO with a proposal for "a significantly strengthened set of institutional and consultative links" built by the US in line with the pan-European CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and a more politically integrated European Community.

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[48] Adrian Hyde-Price, "European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force", *European Security,* 2004, Vol. 13(4), p. 334.

This initiative was also reflected in the title of the speech, "A New Europe, a New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era."[49]

3.1. A New Era: Globalization, Insecurity and NATO's Transformation

Following the disappearance of the SU the Atlantic Alliance faced with another challenge to its existence: globalization. Globalization, as a process in which many different complex patterns of interconnectiveness and interdependence have arisen in the late 20th century, creates wealth for some people, nations and societies. However, due to its unequal character it also creates inequalities for others by leaving them increasingly marginalised. Thus, it maximizes not only opportunities but also risks.[50]

Indeed, the new security agenda of the post-CW world is increasingly composed of more intangible and diffuse risks and challenges such as unfocused fears, perceptions of insecurity, and feelings of unease since they lack the physicality and directness of the East-West conflict, with its clear and present dangers.[51] Thus, the traditional approaches to security based on the realist assumptions about the anarchic nature of international relations and the intractability of the security dilemma are less and less relevant when it comes to understanding the more complex and diffuse nature of security risks and challenges in the modern world.[52] Hence, the CW concept of security dominated by the idea of national security defined in militarized terms has been undermined in the post-CW era. Instead, an expanded conception of security

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[49] Quoted in Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "What is NATO for?", *Survival,* Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 114.

[50] Christopher Coker, *Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risks,* New York: Oxford University Press [International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 345], June 2002, pp. 19-21.

[51] Adrian Hyde-Price, "'Beware the Jabberwock!' Security Studies in the Twenty-First Century" edited by Heinz Gartner, Adrian Hyde-Price and Erich Reiter, *Europe's New Security Challenges*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, pp. 27-28.

[52] Ibid., p. 41.

defined in broader international terms to include political, economic, societal, environmental as well as military aspects has been argued.[53]

In this respect, Seyom Brown states that the fundamental human interests that deserve to be accomodated and secured include not only physical safety and minimum public order, but also economic subsistence, a sustainable ecological environment, individual civic and property rights and opportunities for cultural and religious communities to develop their own ways of life.[54] However, despite of the arguments about broadening security concept beyond its traditional preoccupation with national security and military threats, according to Hyde-Price, issues such as poverty, immigration, and environmental degradation become a concern for security only when they threaten to provoke conflict and insecurity.[55]

In this respect, Manfred Wörner underlines the inevitable consequences of the collapse of communism during 1990s since the Alliance had to deal with the burdens of a rapid, profound social and economic transformation on the former Eastern block countries under the influence of communism by nearly half a century. Yet, the end of the CW transformed the European landscape of security in which the risks arise less from planned, ideologically-motivated aggression.[56] Accordingly, the Gulf crisis, dominated the world politics from August 1990 to March 1991 following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, also showed to NATO allies the possibility of unexpected new threats emerged from even outside the boundaries of the Allies.

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[53] John Baylis, "International and Global Security in the post-Cold War Era" edited by Steve Smith and John Baylis, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 254.

[54] Seyom Brown, "World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security' edited by Michael T. Klare and Yogesh Chandrani, *World Security: The Challenges for a New Century State*, New York: St. Martin's Press , 1998, p. 16.

[55] Adrian Hyde-Price,"'Beware the Jabberwock!' Security Studies in the Twenty-First Century" edited by Heinz Gartner, Adrian Hyde-Price and Erich Reiter, *Europe's New Security Challenges*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, pp. 27-28.

[56] Manfred Wörner, "The Atlantic Alliance in the New Era", *NATO Review*, February 1991, Vol. 39(1), p. 4, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9101-01.htm, accessed on 06.03.2007.

Hence, for the European and North American governments there was no other choice rather than to begin initiatives to transform NATO to deal with the new security problems of the post-CW era. In fact, the transformation of NATO's strategy and policy began with an action program released by the Alliance in 1990, known as the London Declaration. It emphasized the establishment of new relationship with CEE states and the determination to strengthen the CSCE with a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the construction of a European pillar within the Alliance. Furthermore, a commitment to pursue the arms control process beyond the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to limit the offensive potential of armed forces in order make a surprise attack or major aggression impossible constitutes another key element contained in the London Declaration.[57] Regarding this issue, General Galvin also acknowledges the importance of arms control process at those years by stating that the very existence of nuclear and other WMD possessed by nations outside NATO underlines NATO's resolve and its ability to protect itself against aggression.[58]

For these key issues, NATO showed its commitments with the Alliance's New Strategic Concept approved in the Rome Summit of 1991.[59] Rome Summit invited CEE countries, including the three newly independent Baltic states, to join the Allies in an institutionalized framework of consultations. Also, a new impetus to arms control was given in Rome in addition to a smaller but capable collective military organization in order to protect the peace, to manage crises, and to provide for defence.

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[57] Manfred Wörner, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit", *NATO Review*, December 1991, Vol. 39(6), p. 3, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9106-1.htm, accessed on 06.03.2007.

[58] John R. Galvin, "From Immediate Defense Towards Long-Term Stability", *NATO Review*, December 1991, Vol. 39(6), p. 18, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9106-3.htm, accessed on 06.03.2007.

[59] The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm, accessed on 17.01.2007.

Galvin asserts that from London to Rome, NATO was transformed from an Alliance dedicated to immediate collective defence against the possibility of a massive attack to a new political military configuration, watching over peace and prosperity in a time of transition and instability.[60] In a supporting manner, Wörner also mentions that necessary decisions to make the Alliance a community of values and destiny and a forum of political consultation on vital issues of foreign policy and security was taken in the Rome Summit. That is the way, according to Wörner, through which the Alliance would become "the core security organization of a future Euro-Atlantic architecture in which all states, irrespective of their size or geographical location, must enjoy the same freedom, cooperation and security."[61]

3.2. A New Security Agenda for NATO

Without doubt, the last decade of the 20th century witnessed unprecendented changes which came after the Gorbachev's announcement for political pluralism as a mark for the end of the Soviet Communist Party. That was followed by the three Baltic states', namely Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, embarking on the road to independence on the one hand and the voting of East German citizens massively for "Alliance for Germany", on the other. By the Spring of 1990, while the Warsaw Pact, the mechanism which bound Eastern Europe to the will of the Soviet military leadership, began to dismantle itself, Alliance Foreign Ministers seize the moment with a little known declaration: "Message from Turnberry" of NATO extending to the SU and all European countries the hand of cooperation and friendship to put past animosities aside for the sake of future cooperation.[62]

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[60] John R. Galvin, "From Immediate Defense Towards Long-Term Stability", *NATO Review,* December 1991, Vol. 39(6), p. 15, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9106-3.htm, accessed on 06.03.2007.

[61] Manfred Wörner, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit", *NATO Review*, December 1991, Vol. 39(6), p. 8, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9106-1.htm, accessed on 06.03.2007.

[62] Quoted in "Summary 1990", *NATO Update,* available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/1990/summary.htm, accessed on 16.05.2007.

On October 3, 1990, through the reunification of Germany, the former East Germany became part of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Alliance. Regarding the German unification, Manfred Wörner emphasizes that "the new Germany, as a full member of the Alliance, not only symbolizes the overcoming of Europe's division but is also contributing to stability and security in Europe in a way that a divided nation never could."[63]

Nevertheless, by May 1991, the signs of the break up of Yugoslavia became evident and turned out to be a test case for NATO' durability to meet allies' demands in countering the new emerging threats and challenges. Indeed, although it was believed that any major military threat from Central and Eastern Europe states could be precluded, the main concern in the early 1990s was possible crises resulted from their political, economic and social problems and the resurfacing of old historical disputes that would threaten European stability and affect Alliance security.[64]

Therefore, when the violence resulted from the break-up of Yugoslavia came to an undeniable scale Europeans began to assume that they would lead here under UN auspices while the US would provide air and naval support to the peacekeepers. However, as the time passed it became clear that "the EU–UN forces, handicapped by exceptionally obtuse rules of engagement and without practical political objectives, were unable to cope" with the situation. Hence, by mid-1994 there emerged a need for larger forces, ground action and a more determined policy which "would have to come from NATO and include a large US component."[65]

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[63] Manfred Wörner, "The Atlantic Alliance in the New Era", *NATO Review,* February 1991, Vol. 39(1), p. 3, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9101-01.htm, accessed on 06.03.2007.

[64] John R. Galvin, "From Immediate Defense Towards Long-Term Stability", *NATO Review,* December 1991, Vol. 39(6), p. 14, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9106-3.htm, accessed on 06.03.2007.

[65] Charles Kovacs, "US-European Relations from the Twentieth to the Twenty-first Century", *European Foreign Affairs,* 2003, Vol. 8, p. 447.

In 1992, as the conflict in the former Yugoslavia continued, a significant development in NATO policy was announced for NATO's providing assistance for peacekeeping activities and for monitoring compliance with UNSC Resolutions and decisions to limit the conflict in cooperation with the WEU. Towards the end of 1992 NATO enforced a no-fly zone and provided protection from the air which was followed by air strikes in August 1993 to prevent further human suffering in Bosnia.[66] However, although developing a common NATO position for intervening Bosnia-Herzegovina took a year of discussions and only realized after the massacre at Srbrenica, this was not an end for even greater disagreements during the preparations for, and in the execution of the air war that led to the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo.

In the end, in Kovacs words, "All of these have left a bad taste on both sides of the Atlantic and damaged the prospects for future joint actions."[67] At this point it is worth to remind that in 1991, George H. W. Bush administration revealed the decision to leave the Bosnian issue to "the Europeans"[68] by giving way to the first post-CW crisis of the West. On the other hand, some European leaders were also willing to take up this challenge by their own without an American involvement. In blocking American policy over Bosnia, in stark contrast to the Iraq crisis, the British were definitely among 'the Europeans'. Importantly, by Autumn 1994 until the decision was taken to launch air strikes to end the Bosnian war, as the NATO's first military action, sober observers suggested that "relations between Washington and London were as bad as they had been during the Suez Crisis of 1956- when Britain had also stood with France." [69]

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[66] Quoted in "Summary 1991-1992", *NATO Update,* available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update, accessed on 17.05.2007.

[67] Charles Kovacs, "US-European Relations from the Twentieth to the Twenty-first Century", *European Foreign Affairs,* 2003, Vol. 8, p. 447.

[68] Timothy Garton Ash uses this wording in quotation to underline the fact that "the Europeans" is the way by which the European allies of the US are habitually known in Washington. Cited in, Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 107.

[69] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, pp. 107-108.

However, Timothy Garden Ash defines the Clinton Administration's position since coming to power in January 1993 as agonized and vacillated as regards to the Bosnian issue. Hence, Ash argues that the decision of the Clinton's administration to stop the Bosnian Serbs and Slobodan Milosevic multilaterally through its long-established transatlantic alliance was the most instructive outcome of this crisis. In the end, "mending the rifts in the transatlantic alliance took priority over air strikes to drive back the Serbs around Bihac." This was explained best by one official: "Americans 'agreed that NATO is more important than Bosnia'."[70]

In the end, with the air strikes of NATO to aim to end the Bosnian war was achieved by the Dayton Agreement of 1995. After that, NATO took over the command of military operations in Bosnia from the UN through the Implementation Force (IFOR) replaced by the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in 1996. Its role was to continue to implement the agreements which ended the conflict and to assist in reestablishing stability and a basis for future peaceful development.

Unfortunately, all these initiatives could not prevent an internatinal intervention due to the conflict between the Serbian government and the Kosovar Albanians. In March 1999 the Alliance concluded that there is no alternative to military action in order to bring the conflict to an end, not only for the sake of the people of Kosovo, but in the interests of peace and stability in the Balkans as a whole and in the wider world. Therefore, an air campaign began on 23 March and continued until 10 June. Besides its being the first time to use armed force against a sovereign state with a claim to stop widespread atrocities committed by the attacked government in the 50-year existence of NATO the important point is that destructive force has been used with the stated purpose of implementing UNSC resolutions but without the UNSC authorization. Furthermore, following the withdrawal of Serb forces an agreement was reached on the deployment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) as an international

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[70] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 109.

military presence led by NATO to create conditions allowing the return of thousands of refugees.[71]

By this way, the answers to the questions on the future of NATO came again with the American involvement in Kosovo and Bosnia, that is why they, according to Kagan, should be seen as "a means of preserving the alliance and repairing the frayed bonds of the transatlantic relationship."[72] Accordingly, Charles A. Kupchan evaluates the war as a "resounding confirmation of U.S. internationalism" since during the air campaign the US led NATO into battle and Clinton held course until Slobodan Milosevic capitulated and withdrew his forces from Kosovo. However, on the other hand Kupchan describes America's effort in Balkans as half-hearted with only razor-thin political support and argues that "American behaviour after the end of the conflict over Kosovo gave further indication of Washington's clear intent to limit the scope of US commitments in the Balkans." That is why, according to Kupchan, the EU's redoubled efforts to forge a collective defense policy and a military force capable of operating independently of the US can not be considered as a coincidence. The main reason behind was the European awareness that they would be lonely, lacking the US support, in the case of a possible military crisis emerged on the continent in the future.[73]

It was under these circumstances the French-German initiative to develop a credible, autonomous European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), launched at St.Malo in December 1998, came into scene and has been the top priority for many NATO European members. It is argued that the failure of the European states in playing a

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[71] See for "Summary 1991-1992-1995-1997-1998", *NATO Update,* available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update, accessed on 17.05.2007.

[72] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003, pp. 49-50.

[73] Charles A.Kupchan, "The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy", *Political Science Quarterly*, 2003, Vol. 118(2), pp. 219-220.

significant role in the long Balkan crisis clearly demonstrated the limited effectiveness of a common security policy initiated by the Europeans.[74]

Indeed, the European initiatives for common security and defense policy began with the WEU. Especially, with the Maatrich treaty, it is confirmed that the WEU is competent "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications." In this sense, WEU is considered as a means of linking the EU and NATO since it is thought as "the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance". However, an unofficial European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was launched in January, 1994 at the NAC meeting in Brussels where the US accepted the prospect of putting military assets at the disposal of their European allies on a case-by-case basis to peacekeeping and peacemaking operations to which they did not wish to take part: the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept.[75] Considering all these initiatives, it is stated that "the Saint-Malo declaration went directly to the heart of the European security conundrum" by positioning the need for "appropriate structures" to be established within the EU, for the EU itself to acquire "the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces," and for an EU contribution to "the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance."[76]

The following year, the allies welcomed two important meetings: the Cologne European Council of June 1999 where the ESDP project had been launched and the Washington Summit of NATO by which the enlargement process came to the agenda.

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[74] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 108.

[75] See for Jean Klein, "Interface Between NATO/WEU and UN/OSCE" edited by Michael Brenner, *NATO and Collective Security,* London: MacMillan Press and New York: St.Martin's Press, 1998, pp. 250-252.

[76] Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler "The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy" edited by Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler, *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy",* New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p. 10.

3.3. The Enlargement of NATO and the Washington Summit

Indeed, the enlargement issue, in the end, turned out to be another proof of the US' support for the continuation of the Alliance with the inclusion of former members of the Soviet block. That is because of the belief that not to enlarge NATO would be an encouragement to divide Europe into two between a self-confident, secure West and an unstable and insecure East.[77] Within this context, Kagan regards NATO's enlargement with the intention of creating a Europe "whole and free" as another grand project showing the aim of the West to keep Europe in the forefront of American political and strategic thinking.[78]

Therefore, the enlargement process begun with the invitation of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union to establish regular diplomatic relations at the London Summit of 1990. This was followed by the foundation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991. In this respect, Forster and Wallace also evaluates the German-American initiative for the creation of the NACC as reflecting the determination of the US for a broader role for NATO in European security through this Council in which 16 NATO member states' foreign and defence ministers came together with their colleagues from nine CEE countries.[79] By 1997 the NACC has been transformed into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to bring together 19 allies and 27 partners for a wide-ranging issues from arms control to civil emergency planning besides the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) of 1994 for interaction and cooperation of NATO with the former communist bloc.

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[77] Zoltan Barany, "NATO's Post-Cold War Metamorphosis: From Sixteen to Twenty-Six and Counting", *International Studies Review*, March 2006, Vol. 8(1), p. 167.

[78] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 20.

[79] Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "What is NATO for?", *Survival,* Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 115.

On the other side of Europe, by the way, NATO membership was also thought to be important as a safeguard and promotion of democracy and free markets.[80] Kagan explains the willingness of former Warsaw Pact nations to become a part of NATO by their consideration of the Atlantic Alliance as the one and only institution in which the West was represented, apart from its being primarily a security organization.[81] In regard to be a part of "the West" through a membership of the two great Brussels-based institutions of the Cold War West, Ash states that "Poles, Czechs and Hungarians felt that the American-led NATO had embraced them sooner and more warmly than European Union." This is because of their thought that Europe was their family but found it behaved towards them like a rich man's club while "NATO was an exclusive Western Club, but received a family welcome."[82] However, despite their invitations to join the alliance in 1997 Madrid Summit, the integration of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO could be achieved in 1999 when they were able to conform to some principles which needed for the candidate states, such as civilian control issues, ethnic-and-gender-based discrimination within the armed forces and treatment of conscripts.

Importantly, as apart from representing the 50th anniversary of the Alliance, NATO's Washington Summit of 1999 has been emerged as a turning point due to the participations of the three new allies: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In their first Alliance Summit meeting, as stated in the Summit Communique, "their accession to the North Atlantic Treaty opens a new chapter in the history of the Atlantic Alliance."[83] Javier Solana makes it clear that the door to NATO membership remained "open to countries ready and willing to contribute to allied security, taking

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[80] Zoltan Barany, "NATO's Post-Cold War Metamorphosis: From Sixteen to Twenty-Six and Counting", *International Studies Review*, March 2006, Vol. 8(1), p. 167.

[81] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 20.

[82] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, pp. 109-110.

[83] Washington Summit Communique of the North Atlantic Council, 24 April 1999, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm, accessed on 17.01.2007.

into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe."[84] In fact, all these encouragement to bring partner countries closer to the Alliance was rooted from the fear that isolating the Balkans and the Baltics from Europe might have triggered a bigger threat to European security than separating Russia from European issues.[85]

Moreover, peacekeeping in Bosnia and crisis management in Kosovo following the Balkan wars underlines the complexity and range of NATO's new missions and led to a realization that there is no longer a requirement for heavy, static NATO forces and headquarters. That is why, as stated by Solana, the Alliance has implemented a reformed command structure which is streamlined and more flexible to be able to carry out peace support and crisis management mission. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Alliance neglects to address the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery since it is still believed that the WMD pose a risk both to national territories and to the troops involved in peacekeeping missions.[86]

As a result, in the Washington Summit the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons have been emphasized as a matter of serious concern. In that respect, it is stated that an initiative to improve the Alliance's political and military efforts has been launched in order to respond to the risks to the Alliance's security posed by the spread of WMD and their delivery means. Moreover, the Alliance's long-standing commitment for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation has reaffirmed within the Summit.[87]

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[84] Javier Solana, "The Washington Summit: NATO Steps Boldly into the 21th Century", *NATO Review,* Spring 1999, Vol. 47(1), p. 3, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9901-01.htm, accessed on 06.03.2007.

[85] Zoltan Barany, "NATO's Post-Cold War Metamorphosis: From Sixteen to Twenty-Six and Counting", *International Studies Review*, March 2006, Vol. 8(1), pp. 167-170.

[86] Javier Solana, "The Washington Summit: NATO Steps Boldly into the 21th Century", *NATO Review,* Spring 1999, Vol. 47(1), p. 6, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9901-01.htm, accessed on 06.03.2007.

[87] Washington Summit Communique of the North Atlantic Council, 24 April 1999, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm, accessed on 17.01.2007.

In the event, to strengthen the Alliance's adaptation to the new security challanges, the Summit also approved the Alliance's New Strategic Concept based on cooperation and partnership rather than political confrontation and military competition.[88] Indeed, after reaffirming the Alliance's fundamental commitment to shared values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and collective defense, this document sets out NATO's political and military strategy building on a comprehensive approach to security and crisis management. Moreover, the Washington Summit confirms the indivisibility of European and North American security and the importance of a strong and dynamic partnership in support of the values and interests shared.[89]

Javier Solana, as NATO Secretary General and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council in those years, asserts that the Washington Summit represents the culmination of a process for a new NATO which is "committed and designed to enhancing stability and security for the entire Euro-Atlantic area through new mechanisms, new partnerships and new missions, well into the 21st century."[90]

Hence, it can be stated that despite many European initiatives for ending the US dominance on European security through revitalization of the CSCE or prioritizing the WEU, NATO did not confirm the speculations on the demise of it thanks to its post-CW transformation process. Hence, through dozens of strategy documents, outlining the need for enhanced capabilities to combat post-CW challenges, NATO transformed itself from a CW military alliance into an organization focusing on a broader range of security issues such as failed or failing states, regional conflicts and

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[88] The Alliance's Strategic Concept, the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23-24 April 1999, *Press Release NAC-S(99)65*, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm, accessed on 05.02.2007.

[89] Anthony Cragg, "A New Strategic Concept for a New Era", *NATO Review,* Summer 1999, Vol. 47(2), pp. 19-21, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/rev-pdf/eng/9902-en.pdf, accessed on 06.03.2007.

[90] Javier Solana, "The Washington Summit: NATO Steps Boldly into the 21th Century", *NATO Review,* Spring 1999, Vol. 47(1), p. 6, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9901-01.htm, accessed on 06.03.2007.

humanitarian crises.[91] Furthermore, spreading stability to the CEE countries via the enlargement process and managing relations between the NATO members and the Russian Federation gave the Alliance a new dimension in dealing with the post-CW security needs.

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[91] Julianne Smith, "NATO Battles the Taliban and Tests Its Future in Afghanistan", *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 2006, Vol. 4(4), p. 26.

CHAPTER 4

SEPTEMBER 11 AND ITS IMPACT ON THE SECURITY CULTURES OF TRANSATLANTIC ALLIES

With the end of the CW, the root causes of the cooperation among the Western allies was begun to be questioned because the Western community faced "new challenges or old challenges redefined by global events."[92] Ethnic wars, human rights violations, illegal migration, economic instabilities and most importantly the despotic, authoritarian regimes, WMD and terrorism represented the main threats and challenges in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, new initiatives were taken within NATO during the 1990s for the transformation of the Alliance to deal with both the new security challenges and the new pattern of relations freed from bipolarity.

Yet, despite all these post-CW initiatives the Atlantic Alliance became less central both to the concerns of the publics and to those of their leaders. The reason behind was the emergence of the US as the predominant political, economic and military power owing to the structural changes in the international system following the loss of unifying threat of the SU. While the uniquely powerful US is less in need of support from others than before, "Europe which is rapidly evolving into a political actor of import, is less willing to defer Washington than it has in the past."[93]

However, this is not the end of the story. In fact, during the post-CW era the US and Europe have parted ways when the issue "comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges and fashioning and implementing foreign

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[92] Christopher Coker, *Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risks,* New York: Oxford University Press [International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 345], June 2002, p. 9.

[93] Ivo H. Daalder, "Are the US and Europe Heading for Divorce?", *International Affairs,* 2001, Vol. 77(3), p. 544.

and defense policies".[94] And, this transatlantic rift, rooted from the allies' differences in their reevaluations of security interests and strategies for the post-CW era, deepened more by the September 11 events. Since September 11 the US and Europe have been increasingly diverging on how to deal with the key security problems of terrorism, WMD and authoritarian states by putting the Atlantic Alliance into danger. As the concerns of its European allies for the US' war against terrorism were not taken into account by the Bush administration, within a year this crisis *for* the West had become a crisis *of* the West."[95]

4.1. The New Security Strategies of the Allies for Post-9/11: Terror As a Contested Phenomenon

On 11 September 2001 when there occured terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon by the hijackers a global challenge, namely terrorism, came to the forefront of the international community. Indeed, at NATO's Washington Summit of April 1999 the "strategic perspectives" focusing on terrorism and other threats such as organized crime had been discussed. Unfortunately, following the summit, they were overshadowed by Kosovo and out-of-area crisis management which had been labeled as a "fundamental security task" at that time. However, according to Sten Rynning, the September 11 terrorist attacks made it apparent that terrorism would be a more fundamental concern although "[s]till the question remained whether *all* allies would consider terrorism a grave threat and devise compatible strategies for dealing with it". That is why Rynning argues that "the question therefore touched upon the nature of the transatlantic partnership."[96]

Initially, it seemed as the terror challenge brought about the international cooperative initiatives reflected with the NATO's September 12 decision for the invocation of

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[94] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 4.

[95] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 8.

[96] Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 119.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, namely the collective defense clause. At that point, Christopher Hill underlines the straightforward declaration of Javier Solana in which he stated that "the European Union stands firmly and fully behind the United States", which means to the US that the Alliance was a two-way street and that there would be no safe haven for terrorists in Europe.[97]

Yet, when the coming days witnessed a more unilateral foreign policy approach on the US side based on on military force, the US and Europe began to increasingly diverge over the means to deal with the post-September 11 security problems. And, they were these political disagreements which constituted one of the main reasons behind the crisis which put the existence of the Atlantic Alliance into danger following September 11.

Timothy Garton Ash argues that "Faced with the problem of how to fight an abstract noun -'Terror'- the nations of the West did not pull together as they had in the late 1940s against Stalin's Red Army; they fell apart in bitter disagreements."[98] Considering the issue, Jeffrey Lantis mentions that as apart from the CW years when American leadership implied a coordination of foreign and security policies with key allies, the post-September 11 American dominance "represents a statement of separation of these interests in many context". According to Lantis, the reason behind is the fact that "The United States no longer seeks to be the 'first among equals' in the modern security environment but rather a somewhat isolated step ahead of all other countries."[99]

On 20 September 2001, in his "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People", President Bush gave early signals for his global and offensive policy. The President stated in his speech that:

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[97] Christopher Hill, "Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 2004, Vol. 42(1), pp. 145-146.

[98] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 8.

[99] Jeffrey S. Lantis, "American Perspectives on the Transatlantic Security Agenda", *European Security,* 2004, Vol. 13(4), p. 369.

> Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. … Every nation, in every region, now had a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be registered by the United States as a hostile regime.[100]

Indeed, within the US' complex and multidimensional plan to fight against terrorism, going after the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was the first and most visible aspect of the US plan owing to its symbiotic relationship with the terrorists responsible for September 11. However, according to Europeans addressing the root causes of terrorism rather than dealing with its symptoms was more important so that Europeans accepted only reluctantly the fact that military would have to be a part of the US' strategy.[101] That is why the US' decision to wage a war in Afghanistan against the Taliban regime and the al-Qaeda terrorist network, by sidelining NATO's commitment for collective defense, made it apparent that there were growing differences in the allies' opinions over the means to deal with global issues.

Moreover, in early 2002, the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, declared a new policy of international, allied cooperation by arguing that either the "mission will shape the coalition" or "the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator."[102] Yet, this new understanding based on a shifting coalitions of the willing rather than the permanent allies threatened the existence of the stable, long-term multilateral partnership represented within NATO.

In that respect, Adrian Hyde-Price underlines the effect of the September 11 terrorist attacks as a critical juncture for the US strategic culture. As a result of which, a wide-

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[100] Office of Press Secretary September 20, 2001 Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, acessed on 09.06.2007.

[101] Osvalso Croci, "A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2003, Vol. 8, p. 469.

[102] Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 120.

ranging debate on foreign and security policy has been underway by challenging many long-cherished strategic concepts of the CW, such as deterrence and containment.[103] In his remarks to the 2002 graduating class at West Point, Bush stated that "we started a transformation of America's national security paradigm" by declaring the unsufficiency, despite their necessity, of the defensive constructs for the new form of warfare confronting the US.[104] Since the "new war" necessitates new means to fight against it, President Bush reinterprets the meaning of self-defense by rejecting armed attack as the basis or requirement for using force. This reinterpretation reveals the fact that "Out of necessity, force must be used to preempt terrorists and those states that harbor and provide them with the means of war and terror."[105]

The dramatic change came into sight more with the NSS of the US[106] in September 2002 because in the document it was declared that "The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed."[107] By revealing the NSS, the Bush administration offered "its blueprint for how the United States would pursue its global interests in the post-September world", according to which the need for an expansive doctrine of preventive force was justified by underlining the risks of inaction in "a world full of increasing and shadowy dangers". Since then, all attention turned to the discussions on the right to use force to "prevent" latent threats,

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[103] Adrian Hyde-Price, "European Security, Strategic Culture, and The Use of Force", *European Security,* 2004 , Vol. 13(4), p. 328.

[104] Office of the Press Secretary June 1, 2002 President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point United States Military Academy West Point, New York, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html, accessed on 09.06.2007.

[105] Richard H. Schultz and Andreas Vogt, "It's War! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism Through a Doctrine of Preemption", *Terrorism and Political Violence,* Vol. 15(1), Spring 2003, pp. 24-26.

[106] White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, accessed on 16.02.2006.

[107] Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 120.

especially associated with terrorism and nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, from emerging.[108]

At that point, it is worth to note that in opposition to the widely held belief on the novelty of an American doctrine emphasizing acting pre-emptively to counter an imminent threat, in Croci's words, "[i]t has often been used in history and Bush has not been the first to accept it as part of American national security strategy: Clinton did it before him."[109] It is stated that in August 1998, due to an intelligence suggesting that the al-Shifa chemical plant in Sudan was being used to manufacture chemical weapons, in addition to its ties to Osama bin Laden, implicated in the attacks on US embassies in Africa earlier that month, the Clinton administration attacked the plant. Later, preventive force was again used to deprive Iraq of its nuclear, biological and chemical-related targets. Yet, despite considerable debate about the wisdom, legality and effectiveness of each of these preventive uses of force at that time, no one triggered the same degree of debate over its basic premise as the one issued by the Bush administration.[110] ,

One of the main source of debate in the post-September 11 era was the Bush administration's greatest emphasis on rogue states, in other words on the "axis of evil", as President Bush called them in his State of the Union Address in January 2002.[111] In his speech Bush identified an 'axis of evil' which includes Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Yet, Ash argues that "Europeans were unsettled by the religious moralism of the world 'evil', but even more by the word 'axis'" because according to Europeans Iraq, Iran and North Korea were not allied in a way which was

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[108] James Steinberg, "Preventive Force in US National Security Strategy", *Survival,* Winter 2005-06, Vol. 47(4), p. 55.

[109] Osvalso Croci, "A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2003, Vol. 8, p. 483.

[110] James Steinberg, "Preventive Force in US National Security Strategy", *Survival,* Winter 2005-06, Vol. 47(4), pp. 57-58.

[111] Office of Press Secretary January 28, 2002 President Bush Delivers "State of the Union", available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020128-19.html, acessed on 02.08.2007.

experienced during the WWII by "Axis" of Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and imperial Japan.[112]

Moreover, Europeans have adopted a calmer view in relation to the risks posed by these regimes owing to some cultural reasons. According to Robert Kagan, the Americans and Europeans view the same threat differently due to an unreasonable demand for "perfect" security by Americans living for centuries shielded behind two oceans while Europeans claim they know what it is like to live with danger and to exist side by side with evil, as they've done it for centuries.[113] Indeed, due to their long experience in dealing with the politically motivated terrorism of 1970s and 1980s Europeans widely believe that terrorism can be managed by negotiations instead of force. In addition to the European experience with managing these threats, this belief has also been shaped by the large Muslim minority populations living in many European countries. Hence, Clarke argues that "Some European politicians fear that any actions taken against extremist elements of those societies could result in a backlash and further radicalization."[114]

Despite the common concerns of the allies considering the international threats, the difference between the US and Europeans on the use of force was also revealed at the Brussels Summit of December 2003 with the European Security Strategy, titled as "A Secure Europe in a Better World".[115] Also known as the Solana document, it is a well-written, clear document in dealing with the compelling threats of the 21st century. Indeed, it should be noted that the document accorded with the NSS of the US concerning the key security threats by emhasizing the same concerns of the

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[112] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, pp. 119-120.

[113] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003, pp. 30-31.

[114] Jack Clarke, "The United States, Europe, and Homeland Security: Seeing Soft Security Concerns Through A Counterterrorist Lens", *European Security,* 2004, Vol. 13, pp. 129-130.

[115] *A Secure Europe in a Beter World: European Security Strategy*, December 2003, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, accessed on 25.04.2007.

European shared with the US in case of global security, namely terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime.

However, the strategy was mainly conceived to be developed as a response to American pre-emptive war understanding against which Europe failed to project coherence during the Iraq crisis. The reason behind was that while the document emphasizes the need to develop "a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention", this emphasis is far from "an endorsement of pre-emption", as argued by Dana H. Allin.[116] Rather, the security strategy of Europe underlined the need to develop effective international institutions, processes, and rule-based international order for an "effective multilateral system" on which European security and prosperity depended as apart from the need for "effective multilateral actions" highlightened by President Bush. That is why it is argued that despite the common assessment of the key threats, the ESS offered markedly different prescriptions in dealing with terrorism and nonproliferation.[117]

Indeed, in the post-September era, three reasons for a more expansive use of preventive force are mentioned by President Bush and his national security team: the changing nature of the actors who threaten the US, the characteristic of the threat, and the inadequacy of relying on collective action through the UNSC.[118] The US determination for distruct and destroy terrorist organization, even in the case of not being able to rely on collective action, have been declared in the NSS by the words that: "While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise

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[116] Dana H.Allin, "The Atlantic Crisis of Confidence", *International Affairs,* 2004, Vol. 80(4), p. 658.

[117] Stephen J. Flanagan, "Sustaining U.S.-European Global Security Cooperation", *Strategic Forum,* September 2005, p. 4, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0QZY/is_217/ai_n15950663, accessed on 19.09.2007.

[118] James Steinberg, "Preventive Force in US National Security Strategy", *Survival,* Winter 2005-06, Vol. 47(4), pp. 58-59.

our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them doing harm against our people and our country…"[119]

Yet, Gordon underlines the European view which stress the need for legitimacy coming from as broad an international coalition as possible and the approval and involvement of the UN. What Gordon argues that "This is not a surprising position for Europeans, who had already, during the 1999 debates over the Kosovo War and NATO's new Strategic Concept, stressed the overwhelming importance of the United Nations in legitimising military action." That is why Gordon defines the UNSC from the view point of many Europeans as "the most legitimate body for defining the world's general counter-terrorism policy".[120]

This reality came into sight with the US' unilateral war on Iraq in March 2003 by depending on the allegations for Iraq's efforts to attain weapons of mass destruction and a possible transfer of these weapons to Islamic terrorist organizations. This US' war on Iraq without an UNSC authorization not only undermined the reliability of the international law but also led to deep divisions between the Atlantic allies by intensifying the debate over being a "hard power" and a "soft power".

4.2. Being a Soft Power or a Hard Power and the Reasons Behind

Power can be described as the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants. There are two different types of power, the soft and the hard power, as defined by Joseph Nye. The soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade while the hard power refers to ability to coerce. Whereas soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, policies and political ideals, hard power grows out of a country's political and military might. In this context, the soft power understanding is more compatible with the European attitutes which depend on preferences for the methods of

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[119] White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, p.6, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, accessed on 16.02.2006.

[120] Philip H. Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", *Survival*, Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 95.

persuasion, mediation, compromise, dialogue and mutual understanding, instead of coercion. For Europeans the use of force should be applied as a last resort and it is needed to pay attention to others' views.[121]

Regarding the European strategic culture emphasizing on "international law over the use of force, on seduction over cohercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism", Kagan evaluates them as a conscious rejection of the European power politics, *Machtpolitik,* which brought them such a misery over the past century and more.[122] However, the US does not share the view of its European allies on the role of power in world politics. Actually, following WWII, the US emerged as not only a "world power" but also the world's "strongest power", as well due to its economy and its newly-gained monopoly in nuclear weapons.[123] More importantly, in the post-CW the US ceased to be one of two competing superpowers and became "Hyperpower", "superduper-power, "American empire", "new Rome", "unipolar world", as defined by Ash "to capture the new reality of a global predominance that arguably has no precedent in the history of the world."[124] Hence, as the structure of international system changed and the US took its place as the most powerful state the US did not hesitate to pursue its interests in its own way, without taking consent of the international community in general and its European allies in particular.

In that respect, Osvaldo Croci points out the differences resulting from threat perceptions of the allies for the post-CW era. According to which, while the proliferation of WMD, rogue states and terrorism consititute the main security threats for Americans; Europeans mainly deal with ethnic conflict and political economic instability in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the southern shores of the

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[121] See for further Joseph S. Nye, "U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq", *Foreign Affairs,* July/August 2003, Vol. 82(4).

[122] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order,* London: Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 55.

[123] Charles Kovacs, "US-European Relations from the Twentieth to the Twenty-first Century", *European Foreign Affairs,* 2003, Vol. 8, p. 441.

[124] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 95.

Mediterranean in addition to non-geographical issues such as underdevelopment and poverty that resulted occasionally in large and difficult-to-control migratory flows.[125]

Moreover, Croci also underlines the allies' different views on the concept of security. Given its hegomonic position, as the US think of security in global terms Europeans tended to define the security in regional terms by being limited to Europe itself and its neighbouring areas. As a result of which, Croci argues that in countering threats and promoting security while political and ecomonic means are usually overshadowed by the importance given to military force of US Europeans reliance on projecting liberal-democratic values to assure political and economic stability in the region through the progressive integration of CEE countries into the EU prevailed.[126] This means that "Washington is relying on its sheer power to get its way and Europe is putting its faith in international institutions, regimes and norms to tackle problems of common concern."[127]

That is why, it can be argued that even before the September 11 terrorist attacks an increasing divergence between the US and Europeans, stemmed from their differences in their capabilities, force structures, strategic assumptions and threat perceptions, was identified. And, it was this change that "could make the alliance less significant to US policy-makers and less acceptable to their European counterparts".[128]

In other words, the post-CW American stance based on power was precipitated, "if not caused by the interaction between the terrorist attacks and the election of George W. Bush, who brought to the office a more unilateralist outlook than his predecessors

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[125] Osvalso Croci, "A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2003, Vol. 8, p. 473.

[126] Ibid.

[127] Ivo H. Daalder, "Are the US and Europe heading for divorce?", *International Affairs,* 2001, Vol. 77(3), p. 553.

[128] Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "What is NATO for?", *Survival,* Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 109.

and his domestic opponents."[129] Indeed, until the Bush administration came to office with its stance based on highly unilateral fashion to assert its primacy, during Clinton and Bush before him, the US "used a mixture of carrots and sticks" to cultivate allies and maintain large coalitions. That is why Richard K. Betts states that Bush policy is the reverse of Clinton's which has been said as "multilaterally if we can, unilaterally if we must".[130] However, Charles Kupchan underlines the fact that despite the Clinton administration's rhetoric for committing to liberal internationalism based on leading through multilateral institutions and consensus, the US opted out of multilateral efforts on a regular basis during his administration.[131] The issue came into sight in December 1998 when the Clinton administration turned to the use of military force to bomb Iraq without a UNSC authorization after France, Russia and China blocked the American proposals for increasing pressure on Baghdad to cooperate with UN arms inspectors.[132]

Hence, it can be argued that "September 11 did not fundamentally alter" but "shifted and accelerated" a course that the US was already on by reinforcing American attitudes toward power.[133] In that respect, Allin H. Dana and Simon Steven mentions the fact that "The invasion of Iraq was also conceived, therefore, as a show of strength –a show that would be effective regardless of quibbles about who exactly attacked America on 11 September."[134]

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[129] Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine", *Political Science Quarterly,* Fall 2003, Vol. 118(3), pp. 378-379.

[130] Richard K. Betts, "The Political Support System for American Primacy", *International Affairs,* 2005, Vol. 81, p. 2.

[131] Charles A. Kupchan, "The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy", *Political Science Quarterly*, 2003, Vol. 118(2), pp. 220-221.

[132] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* London: Atlantic Books, 2003, pp. 43-44.

[133] Ibid., p. 91.

[134] Dana H. Allin and Steven Simon, "America's Predicament", *Survival*, Winter 2004–05, Vol. 46(4), pp. 7–30.

Indeed, considering a regime change in Iraq, it should be noted that Europeans were appeared more willing to tolerate the Iraqi dictator because other than the UK, European governments did not consider Saddam threat as great for European security.[135] Yet, Kagan argues that more tolerance to Saddam Hussein threat by the vast majority of Europeans can be explained with their incapability to respond which gives ways not only to European tolerance but also denial of the threat due to the risk of removing him,as opposed to the Americans who has a perpective of a powerful.[136]

Moreover, Rajan Menon points out the deep distrust of America's immense power and motives in Europe which led mistrust in much of Western Europe for the Washington claims on the danger posed by Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program and the links between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi dictator. Instead, inspite of Bush administration's dire warnings about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and alleged support of terrorism, regime change in Iraq was believed as the real goal of the US. That is why Menon rejects the main cause of problem as being a matter of differing perceptions or poor communication. Rather since NATO's dissidents understood the Bush administration's position perfectly, they simply rejected it.[137]

Hence, since the beginning of the US' campaign on Iraq, European insistence on gaining an international legitimacy through a UNSC decision is considered by Robert Jervis as a show of "less their abstract attachment to law and world governance than their appreciation of power." [138] In this respect, Kagan also argues that, although seen as a commitment to world order ideals, the main reason behind European hostility to American unilateralism is lack of European capacity to undertake unilateral military

[135] Osvalso Croci, "A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2003, Vol. 8, p. 474.

[136] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order,* London: Atlantic Books, 2003, pp. 29-32.

[137] Rajan Menon, "The End of Alliances", *World Policy Journal,* Summer 2003, Vol. 20(2), p. 4.

[138] Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine", *Political Science Quarterly,* Fall 2003, Vol. 118(3), p. 385.

actions, either individually or collectively so that self-interestedly "it is natural that they should oppose allowing others to do what they cannot do themselves."[139]

Yet, this Atlantic dispute over the use of force is not a new item on the transatlantic agenda. It was the Balkan wars in the 1990s which created early divergence over the two sides of the Atlantic since the intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 consitituted a precedent for the use of military force without a UNSC Resolution. However, at that point it is worth to underline the fact that when appeals to unity and diplomacy did not stop the civil war in Bosnia and Kosovo, Europeans did not hesitate to turn to military means to put an end to violence and to the flow of refugees that the conflict created through the means provided by the US. Hence, in Croci's words "if the EU can afford to be a 'civilian power' and spend less on defence, it is precisely because the USA spends more on its forces and does not shrink from using force also on behalf of its allies".[140]

That is why Kagan argues that since the US and Europe have different capabilities, they perform different international roles, according to which the US, being aware of its own power, is more inclined to attack global problems by using its military might while Europeans, being aware of their weakness, are more inclined to try and solve international problems steady cooperative diplomacy, resort to international law and transnational negotiation. So, this is why "Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus", according to Kagan.[141]

Yet, Ash points out the fact that "from the end of the Vietnam war to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, France and Britain were generally more willing to

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[139] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 38.

[140] Osvalso Croci, "A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2003, Vol. 8, p. 478.

[141] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, London: Atlantic Books , 2003, p. 3.

send their soldiers into dangerous action than the United States. It was Tony Blair who urged the American President to deploy ground troops in Kosovo, while French troops repeatedly intervened in Africa". "On this record," Ash argues "the two most important military powers in Europe, the British and the French, are at least as much 'from Mars' as the Americans."[142]

Yet, in the end, it was again the allied military campaign of Kosovo war that revealed not only the transatlantic military imbalance but also an American dominance both over the way the war was fought and over international diplomacy, before, during, and after the war. [143] Regarding the issue, Gordon argues that "Whereas many in Europe saw the Kosovo air campaign as excessively dominated by the United States and American generals, most Americans –particularly within the military– saw just the opposite: excessive European meddling, with French politicians and European lawyers interfering with efficient targeting and bombing runs, and compromising operational security." [144] Hence, the "lesson" of Kosovo that reinforced "a longstanding mindset in the Pentagon and much of the Republican Party that saw US leadership as essential and European allied support as politically useful but not particularly significant militarily."[145] And, it was this understanding that gave way to diplomatic divisions within the Atlantic Alliance by giving harm to Atlantic cohesion represented by NATO in political and military terms.

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[142] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 77.

[143] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order,* London: Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 47.

[144] Philip H. Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", *Survival*, Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 92.

[145] Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

SEPTEMBER 11 AND ITS IMPACT ON NATO

Atlanticism, which is a philosophy of cooperation among European and North American nations regarding political, economic and defense issues, has undergone significant changes following September 11 by giving way to a new course of relations between certain Western European states and the US. The allies' diverging strategies to fight with the new form of terror challenge gave way to not only fissures between the allies but also new questions on the future of the Atlantic Alliance.

5.1. Invocation of Article 5 and the Afghan War

First of all, it is worth to note that the myth that the alliance between Europe and America was no longer necessary or possible was demolished due to the transatlantic solidarity provoked by the terrorist attacks. It is believed that the attacks reminded Europeans of their common values and interests with the US on the one hand, and Americans of their enduring need for allies on the other.[146]

In that respect, the September 12 evening turned out to be an important date to remember for the sake of future of transatlantic relations in the Atlantic Alliance's history. On that day, NATO invoked the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 5, for the first time in its history, in which the purpose of NATO, the collective security system, was established. According to Article 5:

> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. Consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in

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[146] Philip H. Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", *Survival,* Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 90.

concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.[147]

By invoking Article 5, NATO allies not only showed their support and feeling of solidarity for the US but also showed their determination for their faith in multilateral engagement within the international arena whenever the Western values are under attack. This time the threat to Western values have found an existence with the attacks on the world trade centers. Indeed, Christopher Hill points out the fact that "The combination of commitment and discretion in Article V had originally been designed to allow states (not least the United States, ironically) some freedom of manoeuvre, and in any case it was rusty from non-use. It was therefore all the more remarkable that Nato members, 11 of them also in the Europe, were willing to make such an immediate and bold commitment."[148]

Considering the invocation of the treaty's mutual defence guarantee for the first time in the Alliance's 52 years, Gordon states that "When Article 5 was drafted…not a single signatory could have imagined that its first invocation would involve Europeans coming to the aid of the United States rather than the other way around. Yet that is precisely what happened, and NATO will never be the same again."[149]

Anthony Forster and William Wallace also describe the symbolism of the NATO Council on 12 September as striking as "it was attended by the Europe 'High Representative' for common foreign and security policy, Javier Solana, the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten and the President of the EU Commission, Romano Prodi, sitting alongside ministers from the member states as

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[147] "The North Atlantic Treaty" ("Treaty of Washington"), Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm, accessed on 05.02.2007.

[148] Christopher Hill, "Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 2004, Vol. 42(1), p. 146.

[149] Philip H. Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", *Survival,* Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 89.

they expressed their solidarity with the United States in the wake of terrorist attack organised from outside the NATO area."[150]

In fact, there were hopes, initially, for the multilateral engagement which would be expected to become real under the framework of NATO, where the common goods and interests of the allies have been confirmed against any threat as in the case of CW years. In that context, Charles A. Kupchan underlines the widely interpretation of the terror attacks "as an antidote" to the American unilateralist and isolationist trends, at least in the short run due to the Bush administration's efforts to build a broad coalition against terrorism by enlisting not only the support of NATO allies but also Russia, China and moderate Arab regimes.[151]

In that sense, it should be noted that NATO's formal engagement, stemmed from the Article 5 commitments of September 12, began on 4 October through a series of concrete measures. These were:

- Enhanced intelligence sharing, both bilaterally and within NATO;
- blanket overflight clearances for the US and other NATO aircrafts;
- assistance to allies and other states that might be subject to terrorrist threats as a result of their coopretaion with the US,
- measures to provide increased security for the US facilities in Europe;
- backfilling certain allied assets in the NATO area that might be required elsewhere for the campaign against terrorism;
- access for the US and other allies to ports and airfields on NATO territory;
- the deployment of standing NATO naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean; and

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[150] Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "What is NATO for?", *Survival,* Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 119.

[151] Charles A. Kupchan, "The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy", *Political Science Quarterly*, 2003, Vol. 118(2), p. 222.

- the deployment of NATO airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS) to US airspace so that American AWACS could be used abroad.[152]

Apart from these measures adopted by NATO allies to assist the US, NATO engagement in the fight against terrorism began with the deployment of AWACS to the US on 9 October. Namely, the Operation Eagle Assist ended on 16 May 2002. The other NATO mission, the Operation Active Endeavor for the positioning of a naval force in the Eastern Mediterrenean for surveillance and monitoring missions, began on 26 October and continued until 2005.[153]

Yet, in time it became clear that the invokation of Article 5 could not put an end to the questions on the future of the Alliance due to the US decision to use military force in its engagement in the fight against terrorism. This more unilateralist approach started to dominate the foreign policy agenda of the US and have become apparent on 2 October with the identification of the Taleban Afghan regime by the Bush administration as the principle target.

When the time came to implement the NATO guarantee under Article 5 in the form of the military campaign in Afghanistan, namely Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO was not used by the US. Philip Gordon explains this decision by stating that the US "decided not to ask for a NATO operation for military, political, and strategic reasons: only the United States had the right sort of equipment to projected military force half way around the world, and Washington did not want political interference from 18 allies in the campaign."[154]

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[152] Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 124.

[153] Ibid., pp. 124-125.

[154] Philip Gordon, "Reforging the Atlantic alliance", *National Interest,* Fall 2002, p.1, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2002_Fall/ai_92042424, accessed on 26.04.2007.

To put it in different terms, all hopes for a new course of transatlantic relations which would be renewed under a new unknown challenge faded away with the Afghan campaign in a short time. Despite the appreciation of the US for the allies' declaration of solidarity following the attacks, "Washington had no intention of asking NATO to lead or even be closely involved in the eventual military response". This case was made clear by US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, at the first high-level briefing provided by Washington to NATO defence ministers in which it was declared that the US was not interested in either using NATO structures or planning to rely heavily on European forces.[155] Hence, the Afghan campaign began on 7 October 2001 as an American one. The US bombers and cruise missiles struck at Taleban forces already under observation by special forces operating on the ground. The operation concluded on 22 December 2001 following the establishment of a new interim government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai.

Indeed, it should be noted that despite the fierce criticism of European anti-war criticism for the bombing of civilians in Afghanistan, it can be stated that the Afghan war against al-Qaeda generally carried mainstream European support.[156] Sten Ryanning argues that:

> In practical terms the United States acted as the lead-nation in a large of coalition of willing countries, with the military operation being run from the U.S. Central Command's headquarters at MacDill Air Force base in Tampa, Florida, to which about 40 out of 70 contributing countries sent military delegations. The impressive number of contributing countries signals political support and legitimacy on the one hand but also a visible need for leadership, which the U.S. forces were happy to provide-so much so that the United States appeared as self-sufficient and, in the view of some observers, disregardful of the contributions of its allies and partners.[157]

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[155] Quoted in Philip H. Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", *Survival,* Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 92.

[156] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 120.

[157] Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 123-124.

Therefore, although there were the statements of logistical and intelligence support offered by a host of other countries Americans did almost all the fighting with the only exception that the US forces were accompanied only by the Britain in the launch of the attack. In fact, "[o]nly after the main battles were over did forces from Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand arrive in significant numbers to serve as peacekeepers and help eliminate remaining pockets of resistance in the mountains."[158]

Hence, the contribution of NATO in the Afghan campaign came recently. As the new interim government was created as part of the Bonn agreement of 5 December 2001, the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was authorized by a subsequent UNSC Resolution to secure Kabul and the new government. Through the resolution NATO's engagement in the Afghan campaign begun although ISAF is not a NATO operation until August 2003.

In fact, since early 2002 NATO's modest role was to have facilliated the interoperationability that nations relied on to initiate ISAF. When the command of ISAF was about to be taken by Germany and Netherland in October 2002 due to a German-Dutch request for allied assistance NATO begun to assist contributing nations with the generation of forces, the sharing of intelligence and information, as well as with communication. In the end, on April 16 a unanimous decision was taken by NATO allies to take command of ISAF in Afghanistan by marking the first time in NATO's history that it took charge of an out-of-area operation going beyond the Euro-Atlantic confinements specified in the Strategic Concept of April 1999.

In fall of 2003, NATO's missions expanded geographically to bring stability to other regions of Afghanistan through Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT). These were small teams of civilian and military personnel working to provide aid and reconstruction in particular regions of Afghanistan. As this decision for expanding

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[158] Charles A. Kupchan, "The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy", *Political Science Quarterly*, 2003, Vol. 118(2), p. 222.

NATO's engagement in Afghanistan was announced by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the NATO's top decision-making body, in December 2003, this initiative was followed by NATO's first PRT command under the leadership of Germany began in January 2004. In the end, in June 2004 Istanbul summit NATO backed its decision to take a role in Afghanistan by a declaration that "Contributing to peace and stability in Afghanistan is NATO's key priority."[159]

Yet, apart from these recent initiatives taken by NATO allies for multilateral engagement under the US leadership during the postwar phase, the early decision of the US to sideline NATO during the Afghan war did not prevent speculations on the future role of NATO in the transatlantic relationship during Winter of 2003. The diplomatic crisis in the way to Iraq war turned out to be the important evidence of the further cracks in the Atlantic Alliance.

5.2. The Political Disagreements Over the Iraq War

Following the successful US campaign to topple Afghan Taleban regime, a regime change in Iraq under the dictator regime of Saddam Hussein came in the second phase in the US' fight against terrorism. Having emerged as more powerful and self-confident, the Bush administration did not hesitate to wage a war against Iraq even without a UNSC Resolution by depending on claims of the danger posed by Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program and the links between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi dictator.

Therefore, in March 2003 when the US-led coalition forces invaded Iraq and ousted Saddam Hussein for a democratic Iraq without full support of its European allies, this brough about not only the UN but also NATO's existence into question. In that respect, the diplomatic crisis between the old allies over the Iraq war gave early signs of this transatlantic rift.

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[159] Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 125-128.

Indeed, Ash argues that from the view point of the US, it was apparent that the war on terror did not end with Afghanistan, especially, "as the Unites States had been denied the crowning symbolic victory of capturing Osama Bin Laden, dead or alive". [160] On the other hand, for Europeans military action should be limited to Afghanistan as a "preventive" action, as opposed to an "punitive" one, based on an aim only at terrorist targets, with an authorization of the UNSC for the greatest degree of legitimacy in any case of intervention.[161]

However, Croci points out the fact that, given the precedent of Kosovo case where Europeans were willing to intervene without UNSC authorization although they stressed that the UNSC would have to play a central role in the future apart from this exceptional case, "the European leaders who opposed military intervention in Iraq could hardly argue that an intervention by the USA and a coalition of the willing would be unilateral and as such detract from UN authority more than the intervention by NATO in Kosovo." Moreover, according to Croci, in the case of Iraq, there were plenty of UNSC resolutions that could be reasonably interpreted as authorizing military action.[162]

The UNSC Resolution 1441 adopted on 8 November 2002 was one of them in which Iraq was warned of serious consequences if it did not cooperate fully with the inspection regime that was resumed in December 2002. However, when it became clear that the Iraqi regime did not comply with the resolution, a common front by France and Germany put forth an alternative plan, providing an increase in the number of the UN inspectors in Iraq and the deployment of one thousand blue helmets in their support. Regarding the issue, Croci point out the fact "They made, in other words, a case for 'enhanced containment' even if the latest UN resolution which they had approved, seemed to indicate that the game of containment was over

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[160] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 123.

[161] Osvalso Croci, "A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2003, Vol. 8, p. 469.

[162] Ibid., p. 478.

and the choice for Iraq was to disarm immediately or to face military intervention."[163]

Indeed, it is worth to mention that initially, most European countries, but especially France and Germany backed also by Russia, opted for a UNSC resolution for an explicit authorization of the use of force. However, when the US and the UK agreed to draft a second UN resolution to build international support for making war against Saddam, the same countries changed their tune by making their opposition clear. Yet, Menon argues that "Some seasoned observers were nonetheless convinced that the French would have to pull back from the brink, realizing the damage that would be done to NATO. But they were proven wrong."[164]

As opposed to the anti-interventionist line of Germany and France, the UK, however, supported the American position. Regarding the issue, Jervis mentions that although Blair's personal views may be part of the explanation this has been the British stance ever since WWII. Importantly, this stance is about to maintain a major role in the world through not only resisting to become too much a part of Europe but also through supporting rather than opposing the US.[165]

Hence, in a short of time it became clear that the intention of President Bush to confront Saddam's regime militarily led to not only a divergence in the Atlantic alliance but also another division with the European states, by giving damage to Atlantic Alliance within which Germany and France opted for an anti-interventionist policies.

On the US side, however, on the occasion of the meetings of the entire parliaments of France and Germany in Versailles to reaffirm their countries' special relationship on

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[163]Osvalso Croci, "A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2003, Vol. 8, p. 470.

[164] Rajan Menon, "The End of Alliances", *World Policy Journal,* Summer 2003, Vol. 20(2), p. 4.

[165] Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine", *Political Science Quarterly,* Fall 2003, Vol. 118(3), p. 385.

January 22, 2003, Donald Rumsfeld was asked at a press conference about Europeans reluctance to join the war against Iraq, as the American Defense Secretary. And, he replied the question by leading to an "old Europe vs. new Europe" debate emerged with the following disclosure: "You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe." What he said was that the center of gravity of "Nato Europe" was shifting to the east and there were lots of other countries in Europe who were with the US, not with France and Germany.[166]

Therefore, it can be argued that despite of the expectations for transatlantic solidarity for the US' fight against terrorism what made clear was that the effort "would be made up of many different coalitions in different parts of the world."[167] That means that: "The mission determines the coalition; the coalition must not determine the mission", as in the Donald Rumsfelf's view that had been articulated soon after 9/11, as a response to NATO's offer for support.[168]

According to Robert Jervis, the strong opposition of allies to overthrow Saddam can be considered as an advantage to Bush, besides its disadvantage for exacting domestic costs and complicating the efforts to rebuild Iraq because "it gave the United States the opportunity to demonstrate that it would override strenuous objections from allies if this was necessary to reach its goals. While this horrified multilateralists, it showed that Bush was serious about his doctrine."[169]

Indeed, the determination on the US side for going it alone, if necessitated in the case of any resistance from international community, showed itself in the speech of Bush in his 28 January 2003 State of the Union Adress where he declared that "this nation

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[166] Quoted in Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, pp. 82-83.

[167] Philip H. Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", *Survival,* Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 92.

[168] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 126.

[169] Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine", *Political Science Quarterly,* Fall 2003, Vol. 118(3), p. 374.

does not depend on the decisions of others." [170] This means that the US would act to launch an attack against Iraq without the approval of the UNSC despite strong opposition of France, Germany, Russia, China and much of the world's population.[171]

On 30 January 2003 a statement, later known as the "Letter of Eight", by state and government of five NATO/EU member countries namely, Spain, Portugal, Italy, the UK, Denmark and three NATO members and EU accession countries namely, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was issued to indicate their support to the US' military intervention to Iraq. Ash defines this statement as "a general reaffirmation of a Western community of values and transatlantic solidarity in the war against terrorism," and states that "Shortly thereafter, following some behind-the-scenes drafting by a forceful American advocate of Nato enlargement, the leaders of ten central and east European countries that were applying to join Nato…signed an open letter with even more explicit support for the Unites States."[172] These countries known as the "Vilnius Ten" are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

With regards to security of the "anti-communist" East European and Baltic members, Charles Kovacs argues that eight of the new members would continue to place a high priority on security issues by viewing the US as the de facto guarantor of their sovereignty and peace in Europe, rather than the EU because because most of them have been "the victims the USSR and Russian imperialism historically". That is why, according to Kovacs, "their leaders believe that without the USA, their countries would be still members of the Warsaw Pact and not of NATO."[173]

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[170] Office of Press Secretary January 28, 2003 President Bush Delivers "State of the Union", available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html, acessed on 02.08.2007.

[171] Quoted from Charles A. Kupchan, "The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy", *Political Science Quarterly*, 2003, Vol. 118(2), p. 222.

[172] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 83.

[173] Charles Kovacs, "US-European Relations from the Twentieth to the Twenty-first Century", *European Foreign Affairs,* 2003, Vol. 8, p. 454.

In response, French President Jacques Chirac criticized the statements of CEE countries as childish and irresponsible and threatened them with losing their chance to join the EU.[174] As Croci defines this criticism as "an imperious and rather undiplomatic reprimand"[175], Menon defines the France's warning to NATO's CEE members for their acting like delinquent children for backing the US as the most dramatic example of alliance altercations.

Considering the presence of pro-American governments in Britain, Spain and Italy which was tended to see as a solidly pro-American bloc in the CEE by the Bush administration, Ash asks that "why not call upon this 'new Europe' to redress the balance of the old?" and underlines the logical conclusion spelled out by the *Wall Street Journal Europe* in summer 2003: "If French hostility to the US persisted, the US will have no choice but to treat the atlantic alliance itself as a coalition of the willing".[176]

Indeed, the transatlantic disagreement emerged as a "vituperative match" in January 2003[177] and reached its peak point in February 2003 owing to the common front formed by France and Germany to block a NATO decision for the protection of Turkey in a possible case of war against Iraq by leading to another diplomatic crisis within NATO.

5.3 The Atlantic Crisis for the Protection of Turkey

According to Sten Rynning, on the way to the Iraq war, NATO's most significant contribution was the 19 February 2003 decision under the Washington Treaty's

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[174] Jeffrey Lantis, "American Perspectives on the Transatlantic Security Agenda", *European Security,* 2004, Vol. 13(4), p. 378.

[175] Osvalso Croci, "A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2003, Vol. 8, pp. 470.

[176] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World*, London: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 125.

[177] Osvalso Croci, "A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2003, Vol. 8, p. 471.

Article 4 commitment to consult whenever the "territorial integrity, political independence or security" of an ally is threatened.[178] Through the decision, the Alliance decided to dispatch AWACS radar planes, Patriot anti-missile batteries, as well as chemical and biological response units to Turkey, as part of an operation entitled Display Deterrence.[179] Yet, the diplomatic crisis resulted from French-German opposition backed by Belgium in reaching this decision gave important harm to NATO by calling its main raison d'etre into question.

Indeed, following the US' request on 1 5 January 2003, on 6 February the NAC, the top decision-making body of NATO, met to consider the US' proposal to task the Alliance's military authorities for planning deterrent and defensive measures in relation to a possible threat to Turkey. However, as the Council did not reach a conclusion in that morning, a set of decisions were placed under "silence procedure" until Monday, 10 February. Silence procedure is a regular feature of NATO's decision-making, according to which if no member country voices its opposition by the date and time specified, the decision is automatically adopted. Yet, on the morning of February 10, three NATO member countries, namely France, Germany and Belgium broke the silence procedure and led to the continuation of consultations.

Meanwhile, as expressed in its letter of 10 February 2003, following Turkey's request for consultations within the framework of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty stating that: "NATO's members will consult whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any NATO country is threatened", the allies have begun consultations.

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[178] Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.129.

[179] See for "Operation Diplay Deterrence", available at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/ NATOTurkey/DisplayDeterrence.htm, accessed on 21.06.2007.

However, they did not reach a conclusion through February 11 and 12 due to the French and German opposition backed by Belgium.[180] Sten Rynning argues that although Germany, France and Belgium blocked the political guidance that would have allowed NATO military authorities to plan for the asisstance by citing the danger of preempting the UN discussions on Iraq, their questioning "of the worth of Article 4 naturally raised questions about the value of Article 5, the commitment to mutual defense, while the request for assistance in the first place de facto involve NATO in a conflict that touched on the most sensitive issues in NATO's strategic raison d'etre, whether to fight preventive wars and whether to operate outside the Euro-Atlantic region."[181]

Accordingly, upon the reluctance of some NATO members to approve Turkey's request, in addition to the reaction of the US officials "with extreme impatience" for the lack of cooperation on Turkey's request, Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the Alliance is breaking itself up because it will not meet its responsibilites.[182]

Yet, in the end, with a technical solution to let NATO move on with the planning of indirect military assistance the crisis came to over. A new proposal focusing specifically on the defensive needs of Turkey which was put forward by the Secretary General Lord Robertson and NATO's Defense Planning Committee authorises Alliance military authorized "to implement, as a matter of urgency, defensive measures to assist Turkey" in the morning of 19 February.

That decision followed the Defence Planning Committee's decision of 16 February, with which the NATO Allies' commitment at the Prague Summit "to take effective action to assist and support the efforts of the United Nations to ensure full and

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[180] See for "Consultations on Measures to Protect Turkey", available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/02-february/e0210a.html, accessed on 21.06.2007.

[181] Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 141.

[182] Ted G. Carpenter, "The Bush Administration's Security Strategy: Implications for Transatlantic Relations", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs,* October 2003, Vol. 16(3), p. 518.

immediate compliance by Iraq, without conditions or restrictions, with UN Security Council Resolution 1441" is confirmed. Then, the allies have begun consultations to task NATO military authorities to undertake planning for the three possible defensive missions to protect Turkey: deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft; NATO support for the deployment of theatre missile defences for Turkey; NATO support for possible deployment of Allied chemical and biological defences.[183]

Indeed, since the aim of NATO's presence was to contribute to the defence of one of its members in accordance with the founding basis of the Alliance, in the end, NATO was saved from a further crisis with a decision of NATO for protecting Turkey in the event of an attack on its territory or population. "I am happy to announce that we have been able – collectively – to overcome the impasse we have faced for the past few days," said NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson at a press conference on 16 February. "These measures are intended to provide Turkey solely with defensive assistance."[184]

Therefore the deployment of surveillance aircraft and missile began with the authorization of NATO's Defence and Planning Committee on 19 February. The deployment began on 20 February and the operation was conducted under the overall command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General James L. Jones who approved on 13 March 2003 the plan for Operation "Display Deterrence", and it was concluded on 16 April 2003. The operation was run by NATO's regional headquarters Southern Europe and formally terminated by the Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, Adm. Gregory G. Johnson, on 30 April 2003.[185]

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[183] A Press Release of 16 Feb. 2003 on "Decision Sheet of the Defence Planning Committee", available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p030216e.htm, accessed on 21.06.2007.

[184] Quoted in "NATO to Deploy Defensive Assistance to Turkey", available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/02-february/e0219a.htm, accessed on 21.06.2007.

[185] See for "Operation Diplay Deterrence", available at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/NATOTurkey/DisplayDeterrence.htm and "NATO defensive assistance to Turkey", available at , http://www.nato.int/issues/turkey/index.html, accessed on 21.06.2007.

Following the deployment of surveillance aircraft and missile defences, NATO has been also assisting Turkey in preparing for possible humanitarian emergencies, such as a mass influx of refugees or chemical and biological attacks against civilians. On 3 March, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre received a request for assistance from Turkey for capabilities that might be needed by medical teams, civil protection teams and airport personnels to deal with the consequences of possible chemical or biological attacks against the civilian population. It also included items that might be needed to deal with the consequences of population movements towards Turkey. So the EADRCC has forwarded this request to its points of contact in the EAPC countries that, therefore, nations are invited to provide such assistance to Turkey.[186]

Following the decision that Operation Display Deterrence, had met its objectives in the context of Alliance containment under Article 4 the Secretary General not only expressed gratitude to all those troops whom participated in the operation but also welcomed the comments of Turkey's Permanent Representative to NATO, Ambassador Üzümcü. Considering the Operation Display Deterrence and Article 4 consultation, Üzümcü states that:"I convey once again the most sincere gratitude of the Turkish people and Government for the Alliance solidarity shown in reinforcing the defence of my country in response to the latest crisis in Iraq. We are convinced that, through such an active and collective display of deterrence, NATO has not only extended a much-appreciated helping hand to one of its members in her hour of need, but also proven, once again, its credibility and relevance as the cornerstone of collective security in the Euro-Atlantic area".[187]

Nevertheless, Kovacs defines the initial resistance of France and Germany for NATO assistance to Turkey and their veto to Article 4 consultations as an "unprecedented

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[186] See for "Possible Emergency Situation in Turkey", available at http://www.nato.int/eadrcc/2003/turkey/index.htm and "NATO Supporting Turkey in Civil Emergency Planning", available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/03-march/e0303b.htm, accessed on 21.06.2007.

[187] Quoted in "Conclusion of Operation Display Deterrence and Article 4 Security Consultations", available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-040e.htm, accessed on 21.06.2007.

move" since this move brought the credibility of NATO in question. Importantly, Kovacs argues that "The veto was later overcome through a procedural device, but the damage to NATO was not thereby lessened.[188]

Under these circumstances, on 20 March 2003 the Iraq war started and NATO did not take an initial role for the war due to the new understanding of the US for replacement of the permanent allies with the shifting coalitions of the willing by threatening the existence of the stable, long-term multilateral partnership represented by NATO. In that context, Rynning states that "As in Afghanistan, NATO reentered the arena of operation only when a NATO ally, Poland, responded to the US call for assistance in the phase of postwar stabilization and asked NATO for help in doing so. NATO, once again, functioned as a support for the willing-but-not-so-able."

Actually, it was not until Istanbul Summit of June 2004 the allies did reach a compromise agreement that NATO should set up a so-called Trainning Implementation Mission -subsequently became the Training Mission- that will help Iraqi authorities establish its Ministry of Defense, military headquarters, and a military academy. In the end, the successful Iraqi election of January 30, 2005 led to NATO's February 22, 2005 declaration that "we are united in our commitment to support" Iraq and, moreover, "all 26 Allies are contributing to the NATO mission to assist in training Iraqi forces."[189]

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[188] Charles Kovacs, "US-European Relations from the Twentieth to the Twenty-first Century", *European Foreign Affairs,* 2003, Vol. 8, p. 449.

[189] Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 129-131.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

With the end of the CW after the dissolution of the SU, the emergence of the US as the only predominant power with its huge military and economic capacities led to a unipolar world in which the role of European states within the US' post-CW security strategy began to be questioned. As the pattern of relations over the Atlantic changed, many speculated about the demise of NATO due to the widely held belief that the Alliance lost its raison d'etat after the dissolution of the SU. Nevertheless, apart from the protection of Western European and North American states against the Soviet communist threat the other main reason behind the foundation of NATO during the CW was the political consideration to sustain an international order in which the Western allies would pursue their interests. Hence, NATO proved its persistance and relevance for the post-CW era thanks to the initiatives taken by the allies for NATO's transformation during the 1990s.

Moreover, owing to the US' determination to pursue a hegemonic position within the Western world politically and militarily NATO played an important role during the Balkan crisis. However, on the other hand, the Balkan crisis made apparent the extraordinary capabilities gap between the allies by leading to a transatlatic divergence on the allies' security perceptions, strategies and interests for the post-CW era.

As the US and Europeans experienced such a tough times in their long-during alliance, the September 11 terrorist attacks emerged as another factor underlining the transatlantic rift continued since the end of the CW. The main cause of the rift was the increasingly divergence of the US and Europe on how to deal with the key security problems of the post-September 11 era, namely terrorism, WMD and rogue states. Moreover, besides the allies' differences about their security perceptions and strategies the political considerations of the post-September 11 era on both sides of

the Atlantic should be taken into account in examining the reasons behind the transatlantic rift. Importantly, as Europeans were concerned much about the US' more unilateral policies the US continued to try to legitimize its assertive foreign policy in the name of national security and not to hesitate to declare by the NSS that the US would act alone pre-emptively if it becomes necessary.

In the end, as the divergence over the Atlantic led to the realization of the US' initial war against Afghan Taleban regime within the framework of NATO, the tense relations came to an undeniable point following the US' declaration on the need for a regime change in Iraq. Then, on the way to Iraq war while NATO turned out to be the place where the divisions within the Atlantic community were reflected the most, the discussions on the value and continuity of the Atlantic Alliance came to the forefront of international community once more.

Nevertheless, though the transatlantic policy divergences prevented NATO to take a primary role within the US' post-September 11 strategy all the speculations on the "death" of NATO came to nothing. Especially with the inclusion of new seven members to NATO in 2004 through the Istanbul Summit initiatives of 2004 which followed by the Riga Summit of 2006 constituted important proofs for the allies' commitments to sustain transatlantic security cooperation under the framework of NATO.

Meanwhile, following the 2004 elections the first foreign visits to Europe made by the US Secretary of State Condolezza Rice and President Bush in February 2005 gave early signs of a return to the normalcy in the transatlantic relations by highlighting the efforts to bridge the differences over the Atlantic on the security policy priorities of the allies. Indeed, on the US' side it was deemed as the dare situation of the US in Iraq indicated the Bush administration the necessity of its allies' support especially in the postwar periods. On the other hand, it seemed that the Europeans began to be aware of their weakness militarily and politically to prevent the US' aggressive strategy without the cooperative initiatives within the

framework of NATO through which the interests of the Western community are sustained.

However, this does not mean that the transatlantic alliance is now free from further tensions experienced due to the policy divergences on some issues such as   the conflicts over the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court besides the US-European differences on how to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iran case. Therefore, time is needed to see whether the old allies facing new threats which needs to be deal with internationally find a way to reconcile their differences in the post-September 11 era.

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