

FROM GLOBALIZATION TO EMPIRE:
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF DOMINANT META-NARRATIVES

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ABSTRACT

FROM GLOBALIZATION TO EMPIRE: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF DOMINANT META-NARRATIVES

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“Globalization” and “empire” are the dominant meta-narratives of 1990s and 2000s successively. The liberal perception/presentation of the former finds its expression in the claims of trans-(supra)-nationalization. In addition, the theoretical and pejorative usages of the latter, which has flourished since 9/11 attacks to the World Trade Center in New York are also based on similar claims of trans-(supra)-nationalization. However, these claims seem not convincing in a world in which nation-states secure their central role in the organization of capitalist social relations. In this thesis, those meta-narratives will be critically evaluated by also taking into account the role of the US in world capitalist system. Such a critical outlook is essential for highlighting the persistence of capital relation with its contradictory nature and for developing some tentative ideas about the ways in which the organization/management of contemporary world capitalism as a multiple state system should be analyzed.

Keywords: Globalization, empire, nation-state, capital relation, trans-(supra)-nationalization

ÖZ

KÜRESELLEŞMEDEN İMPARATORLUĞA: BASKIN META-ANLATILARIN ELEŞTİREL BİR DEĞERLENDİRMESİ

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“Küreselleşme” ve “imparatorluk”, sırayla 1990lar’ın ve 2000’lerin baskın meta-anlatılarıdır. Öncekinin, liberal algılanışı/sunumu ulus ötesileşme (aşırılaşma) iddialarında somut halini bulur. 9/11 saldırılarından sonra yaygınlaşan, sonrakinin teorik ve pejoratif kullanımları da benzer ulus ötesileşme (aşırılaşma) iddiaları üzerine kuruludur. Hâlbuki kapitalist toplumsal ilişkilerin örgütlenmesinde merkezi rolünü koruyan ulus-devletlerin olduğu bir dünyada ulus ötesileşme (aşırılaşma) hakkındaki iddialar inandırıcı görünmemektedir. Bu tezde; yukarıdaki meta-anlatılar Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin dünya kapitalist sistemi içindeki rolü de dikkate alınarak eleştirel bir şekilde değerlendirilecektir. Böyle bir eleştirel bakış; sermaye ilişkisinin ve çelişkili doğasının devamlılığının altını çizmek ve bir çoklu devletler sistemi olarak günümüz dünya kapitalizminin örgütlenmesinin/yönetilmesinin nasıl analiz edilme yöntemlerine dair bazı öneri niteliğinde fikirler geliştirmek için gereklidir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Küreselleşme, imparatorluk, ulus-devlet, sermaye ilişkisi, ulus ötesileşme (aşırılaşma).

To my Mom,
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	v
DEDICATION	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Literature Review.....	11
1.2. Plan of Study.....	14
2. A CRITIC OF THE CONCEPT OF “GLOBALIZATION”	18
2.1. Introduction.....	18
2.2 Making Sense of the Meaning of ‘Globalization’?.....	23
2.2.1 A Critic of Liberal (Globalist) Understanding of Globalization.....	31
2.2.2 Technology and ‘Globalization’	32
2.2.3 Capital Relation and Globalization	37
2.2.4 A Reading of ‘Globalization’ as Form of Crisis of Capital Relation	46
2.2.5 Nation-State and ‘Globalization’	53
2.3 Conclusion.....	60
3. THE CONCEPT OF “EMPIRE” AND ITS CRITICS	66
3.1. Introduction.....	66
3.2. From Global Village to Revival of Geopolitics.....	67
3.3 An Effort to Read the Concepts of Empire and Globalization through the Persistence of Capital Relation.....	71
3.4 Globalization, Empire and US.....	73

3.4.1 Empire and US Hegemony (or Pax Americana)	76
3.4.1.1. What is US Hegemony?	76
3.4.1.2 Empire and US Hegemony	82
3.4.2 Globalization and <i>Empire</i>	87
3.4.2.1 <i>Empire</i> of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri	89
3.5 Empire and Inter-Imperialist Rivalry	101
3.6 Concluding Remarks on Empire Debates	105
 4. EVALUATIONS DEVELOPED THROUGH SOME CRITICS ON GLOBALIZATION AND EMPIRE ABOUT THE MANAGEMENT OF WORLD CAPITALISM	109
4.1. Introduction	109
4.2. Globalization as Inter-nationalization of Capital through Neo-liberal Integration	112
4.3. Empire?	118
4.4. What is New in Capitalism or What are the New Forms of Capitalist Imperialism	129
4.5. Conclusion	136
 5. CONCLUSION	139
5.1 What Conclusions can be drawn from the Critical Engagement of This Work on the Concept of ‘Globalization’?	141
5.2. What Conclusions can be drawn from the Critical Engagement of This Work on the Concept of ‘Empire’?	146
5.3 Significant Points for an Analysis of Contemporary World Capitalism	149
 REFERENCES	153

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

One must consequently continue to ask the same old questions even as one tries to understand what is distinctively new about the current period (Tsoukalas, 1999).

Reality can be understood through an historical analysis via a relational perspective in which the analytical concepts must be operationalized by focusing on the ‘continuities’ in human history and the ‘changes’ those continuities consist of. Since the concepts and the generalizations that have been designed for understanding the reality have not signified the whole contradictions of that specific reality, today most of the concepts in different disciplines of social science constructed to understand the changes and transformations in world capitalism have failed to grasp the persistence of the immanent contradictions of a world shaped through capital relation. Moreover, most of the concepts, due to their failure to grasp the contradictory nature of capital relation, have come into agenda with a claim to declare that humanity entered into a new historical era. In other words, those concepts have been operationalized as narrative of great transformation due to their failure to grasp the persistence of contradictory nature of capital relation.

‘Globalization’, ‘global village’, ‘end of history’, ‘new world order’ ‘informational society’, ‘post-industrial society’, ‘post-fordism’, ‘rising empire’ are the most famous narratives of great transformations. Those narratives are powerful intellectual tools to shape the peoples’ perceptions of the reality. The efforts aiming to understand the reality through those concepts need further and detailed investigations.

Among those narratives, ‘globalization’ and ‘empire’ have been two significant concepts (indeed, Zeitgeist of the 1990s and 2000s successively) operating as ‘narratives of great transformation’ in the ‘nature’ of capitalist social relations and its principal way of organization, that is through nation-state.

In Turkish, two works attracted my attention and determined my way of approaching those discussions around the concepts of “globalization” and “empire” and the relations between them. One is the article of Taner Timur (2002) “Küreselleşme”den “İmparatorluk”a 11 Eylül: Dönüm Noktası mı?” and the other is the book of Ergin Yıldızoğlu (2002), “Hegemonyadan İmparatorluğa”.

Through the insights derived from those writings, some questions have arisen in my mind. Those questions can be summarized as such:

- 1- Did any ‘change’ happen in the nature of capital relation?
- 2- May the contradiction between global character of capital and national character of the state be overcome?
- 3- Did the *modus operandi* of world capitalism changed?
- 4- What roles do nation-states take in the management of capitalist social relations?
- 5- Is there an instance or level called as trans-(supra)-national? Instead of supranational level/instance, may the phrase “imperialist intervention” be used in order to analyze the relations between developed countries and the others in rest of the world in the internationalization process of capital?
- 6- Do we need new categories (such as Empire) to understand the ongoing changes in contemporary world capitalism?
- 7- What do we mean by using the concepts of ‘hegemony’, ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’? Without a ‘global state’, how does the concept of

‘hegemony’ be constructed in order to apply it to analyze contemporary form of capitalism and its management?

- 8- Is inter-imperialist rivalry valid today? Or do we live in an ultra-imperialist phase of capitalism?

It seems meaningful to maintain that the answer to the first question about the nature of capital relation (capitalism) shaped other answers accordingly and gave its flavour to them.

“Globalization” and “empire” emerges as the concepts full of claims of total change (great transformation) in the nature of the (re)constitution and/or (re) organization process of everyday life.

According to Robinson (1996),

Globalization is a new phase of capitalism that involves a transition to a qualitatively new stage in the world system.

In addition, Hardt and Negri (2000:309) claim that,

Once we recognize the decline of the traditional national constitutional system, we have to explore how power is constitutionalized on a supranational level— in other words, how the constitution of Empire begins to form.¹

Such an understanding of epochal shift in human history is actually based on declining of nation-states in the trans-(supra)-nationalization² process that will be analyzed later in the second chapter.

¹ Similarly, Robinson (2001, 2005) declares the existence of a global /transnational state.

² Throughout this work, I will interpret both term (supra-) and (trans-) as concepts referring same thing. Both concepts have a meaning ‘beyond’ (Compact Oxford English Dictionary, www.askoxford.com) and most of the claims about supranationalization and transnationalization are shaped through the claims aiming to stress a condition ‘beyond’ nation-states. Hence, I will only refer those claims aiming to emphasize a level beyond the reach of nation-states.

Such assumptions narrating a ‘great transformation’ (historical rupture and/or epochal shift) in human history are in need of further analyses established over an understanding which aims to seek change through ‘change within continuity’ in which ‘continuity’ is defined as the persistence of contradictory nature of capital relation, that creates ‘tension between tendency of capital relation to create world market (“global character of capital”, Clarke, 2001) and the territorial –spatial- dimension (“national character of the state”, Clarke, 2001) of capital accumulation (surplus-value production).

In this thesis, these two narratives of great transformation (globalization and empire) and their assumptions about the contemporary world capitalism will be questioned through an effort for a critical reading on ‘liberal perception/presentation’ of globalization which finds its form in the main assumption of trans-(supra)-nationalization against nation-state. In other words, this thesis analyzes today’s two fashionable narratives of change, i.e. ‘empire’ and ‘globalization’, with a critical account on ‘trans-(supra)-nationalization’ processes. The reason to do so is to highlight the significance of focusing on the ‘change in continuity’ rather than solely focusing on the change itself that has been done by the narratives of great transformations (historical ruptures or epochal shifts) in human history.

In brief, throughout this thesis, a theoretical discussion around the concepts of ‘globalization’ and ‘empire’ will be pursued. Since those concepts are related with the transformations in world capitalism and its management, the main objective of the thesis is to indicate some basic points in order to construct an alternative outlook for the transformations in world capitalism and its management around the critics of those two concepts.

At the beginning of the 1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, it had been commonly declared that no nuclear and military challenge to ‘free world’

existed anymore, the ‘history’ ended (Fukuyama, 1989) and ‘ideology’ became obsolete while nation-states were losing their sovereignty (Cooper, 2003)³. As Gill (2002) identifies, “this new era was called as a phrase that is the end of history which is a key motto for the global hegemonic politics of the early 1990s”.

At the same time, it had been stated that mobility of capital, labour and commodities increased and also condensed with the increasing linkages among the world markets. Not surprisingly, the so-called increasing mobility and intensity of social relations across the globe (Giddens, 2002) has been provided through the so-called neo-liberal policies - (post) Washington Consensus⁴- which incarnated in structural adjustment policies in developing countries, and which are oriented to regulate and/or deregulate the world markets in accordance with the interests of capital, that were told to be ‘transnationalized’.

Kagan (2003) argues, for this so-called ‘new’ condition of the world, globalization provides a condition to live in ‘perpetual peace’- a Kantian cosmopolitan world order⁵.

Through such attributed features of ‘globalization’, it is commonly argued that Westphalian State System started to dissolve or the roles of nation-states have been declining (Cooper, 2003). In addition, it has been presented that the growing intensity of ‘social relations’ all over the world makes national territories meaningless. Such a process is presented by many scholars and

³ I will follow the insights derived from the critics and further analyses of Rosenberg (2005) and Yıldızoğlu (1996, 2003, and 2006) on so-called ‘globalization’ process.

⁴ I will interpret post-Washington consensus as ‘institutionally revised form of Washington consensus’ (Oguz, 2006) while conceiving both as efforts to overcome the crisis condition of capitalism that I will discuss in the second chapter.

⁵ Moreover, Kagan “proposes such idea as the ‘the fundamental truth of international system’ after 1990” (Buckel and Wissel, 2003).

politicians as irresistible and/or a process without a 'subject' (Hay, 2001)⁶. Moreover, it has been also presented that the only logical way for nation-states and the people is to integrate into such process and get their 'appropriate' places -shaped by their capacity to increase the competitiveness in their territories- in it. Thus, it has been stated that nation-states had to obey the rules of this 'new era'.

In this new era, "globalists" (Held and McGrew, 2003:2) argued that there emerged "an epochal shift in the character of human society" (Rosenberg, 2005:59). It was declared that a global village, stated to correspond to cosmopolitan world order reflecting a post-Westphalian world order, was established through 'globalization' in which a trans-(supra)-national space divorced from geopolitical clashes of nation-states was constituted.

In addition, in this new era 'market' and/or 'civil society', through neo-liberal discourse and applications, has been presented as if they are external from the state. This naturally caused to treat "... the state as a political force and globalization as an economic process with the corollary that their relationship is zero-sum in nature" (Jessop, 2001).

On the other hand, the contradictory and external perception of nation-state and economy finds its expression in such efforts to prove the so-called irresistible character of globalization. Such exteriority is established through the assumption of trans-(supra)-nationalization that is irresistible and inevitable, which has been declared to undermine the sovereignty of nation-states. In other words, nation-states are seen as the "victim of globalization" as Burnham

⁶ On the other hand throughout a line of thinking developed through conceptual framework of Harvey (2001), it will be argued that what has been happening since the 1980s and accelerated with 1990s in world capitalism have been the more visible form of the chronic instability of the capital relation that find its concrete form in neo-liberal policies to create a more integrated world market. I will discuss this issue through the crisis-ridden nature of capital relation in the Second Chapter that I will be discussing the 'liberal perception/presentation of globalization' which is indeed the contemporary form of internationalization of capital.

(1994:230) claims. However, rather than illustrating globalization and nation-state as thesis and anti-thesis (Buckel and Wissel, 2003), it seems more meaningful to perceive that "... globalization is a process organized inside and through the nation-state" (Panitch, 1994:63).

'Globalization' phenomenon, its liberal perception and presentation through such a vision based on declining of nation-states, has been full of various promises in world capitalism such as promises of increasing wealth and prosperity for all, establishing permanent peace, decreasing inequality e.g. However, those presented promises of 'globalization' (which was claimed to create peace and prosperity to the world in which labour, commodity and capital moves freely without any restrictions of nation-states) might be evaluated as failed due to the plenty of crises in Mexico (1994-95), Asia (1997-1998), Russia (1998), Brazil (1998-99), Argentina and Turkey (2001)⁷, the stock-exchange crisis (especially in the shares of the firms of the 'New Economy' that have been named as 'dotcoms') in New York (2001), and the various bloody wars most of which began in the early 1990s and some of which are still ongoing⁸. Furthermore, ultimately the 9/11 attacks and the military interventions of the US in Afghanistan and Iraq, the so-called promised condition of globalization that has increased density of social relations with an aim of increasing wealth, prosperity for all, and establishing permanent peace, was started to be interrogated severely⁹. Hence, the condition in which the crisis of capital

⁷ Savran (2002).

⁸ Those bloody wars are "War in Slovenia (1991), Croatian War of Independence (1991-1995), Bosnian War (1992-1995), Kosovo War (1997-1999), Southern Serbia conflict (2000-2001), Macedonia conflict (2001), and other wars like Algerian Civil War (1991-2002), Burundi Civil War (1993-2006), Second Congo War (1998-2002), Ivorian Civil War (2002-2007), Darfur Conflict (2003- ...), Kashmir Conflict (1999), First (1989-1996) and Second (1999-2003) Liberian Civil War, Rwandan Civil War (1990-1993), Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002), Somali Conflict (1988- ...), (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars).

⁹ Sicherman (2002) argues that 'globalization had begun to falter even before September 11, when the destruction of the World Trade Center ended the era. Today, geopolitics has returned with a vengeance'.

relation that might be argued to have been finding its expressions into geopolitical clashes among nation-states, and searching for ways to manage the crisis¹⁰ might be evaluated to force ‘globalization’ and its myths (declining power of nation-states and emerging global village that would create cosmopolitan world order free from geopolitical clashes) become less convincing. Moreover, it is now clearly declared that globalization is over (Rosenberg, 2005; Yıldızoğlu, 2006).

In the aftermath of 9/11 attacks and the ongoing military responses of the US (through *Operating Enduring Freedom*¹¹), it can easily be argued that,

Talk of ‘free markets’ gave way to theories of ‘terrorism’. Instead of ‘multiculturalism’, there was now ‘clash of civilizations’. In lieu of ‘competition came new ‘crusades’ and ‘infinite wars’, McJihads against McDonalds’. Analysts of the ‘new economy’ having lost their rating with the melting stock market, were overtaken by the old pundits of ‘realpolitik’ and ‘national security’ (Nitzan and Bichler, 2004:2).

Indeed,

As was once the case with the literature on ‘globalization’ ... it is the literature on empire and imperialism that is swelling (Pozo-Martin, 2006:231).

Like the emergence of globalization narrative after the collapse of the USSR, the emergence of the theoretical usages of empire as an *explanan*, emerged in such a turning point in contemporary capitalism (9/11 Attacks).

Suffice to say for the time being, we are still living in capitalist social relations which are based on surplus-value extraction shaped by class struggles. Neither ‘New World Order’ nor the ‘End of Cold War’ (nor does ‘War on Terrorism’)

¹⁰ According to Gowan (2006:150), “The great problem for capitalism is how to manage the contradiction between its necessary fragmentation into separate geopolitical units and its necessary tendency to construct deep transnational social linkages- political and economic and cultural- between these units. This is capitalism’s world order problem.”

¹¹ Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is the official name used by the U.S. government for its military response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Enduring_Freedom)

seems to have changed/transformed the existing capitalist social relations that might provide us to live in ‘perpetual peace’ and necessitates to have ‘new paradigm’ to analyze the existing societies. Let alone the ‘perpetual peace’, capitalist social relations (hence ‘international system’) cannot be divorced from the contradictions and crisis of capital relation (and internationalization of capital as a response to those crises) which find their violent forms in geopolitical clashes and inter-imperialist rivalry among nation-states¹².

As it was mentioned, after 9/11 Attacks, debates around the concept of empire have flourished. Although *Empire* of Hardt and Negri was written before such a turning point, their analyses have important effects on the discussions done by liberal, neo-conservative and Marxist scholars. In brief, the concept of “empire” was fashioned and started to be used as another *explanan* of the new world order in academic and political debates, but the usage of this term as the narrative of a great transformation has some intrinsic limitations. In this work, I will try to discuss those two narratives (empire and globalization) have some overlapping assumptions. Moreover, those assumptions are the product of challengeable liberal perception/presentation of globalization that focuses on the trans-(supra)-nationalization.

In those debates around the relations between globalization and empire, Mabee (2004:1365) argues that;

... we can see overlaps between globalization and empire in three important areas: in terms of the ideology of openness within the international system; the blurring of the discrete international–national boundaries of the Westphalia international system; and the development of hierarchy within anarchy.

According to Hardt and Negri (2003:116-19), “Empire is the political subject that effectively regulates” global market created by globalization through which “sovereignty of nation-states ... has progressively declined” (Hardt and Negri

¹² In that sense, *Nihil novi sub sole!* (Nothing new under the sun).

(2000: xi). Such exteriority established between nation-state and trans-(supra)-nationalization is resolved¹³ by another exteriority between ‘global market (economy) and Empire (politics).

These two narratives (globalization and empire) have also another common point that they have been used to understand the ‘change’ in capitalism with the ‘changes’ occurring in the role of the US for the world capitalism. For instance, globalization might also be named as Americanization of the world. Moreover, in those debates around those narratives of great transformations, Empire’s relation with the US is much clearer than globalization, since in one way or another, “Empire” is perceived and presented as the US itself or some connections are emphasized¹⁴. Why is this so?

First of all, it must be highlighted that those two narratives emerged in the historical period beginning in the 1970s with the structural crisis of capital relation. Same period is also the emergence of the discussion around the declining hegemony of the US (Wallerstein, 1984, 2003; Arrighi, 1984, 2005; Frank, 1984; Amin, 1984)¹⁵. Following the argument that world capitalism has been in crisis since 1970s, the ongoing discussions have been highly related with ‘internationalization of capital’- through neoliberal structural adjustment policies- as a response to the capitalism’s structural crisis and the channels that how such process are managed. Therefore, in this work, I will also try to stress the relations of those narratives with changing role of the US which has central

¹³ Hardt and Negri (2000)’s another argument about empire contradicts their claims. They claim that economic and politics are no longer separated in the world totally governed by Empire which is the form of such convergence. In this work, such intra-contradictions of the text of Hardt and Negri will not be analyzed. Only the overlapping assumptions with liberal perception/presentation of globalization will be tried to be asserted.

¹⁴ Even Hardt and Negri(2000), while claiming that Empire is everywhere and nowhere, they stress that US has a privileged position in Empire. I will also claim in the third chapter that Empire in the account of Hardt and Negri(2000) has organic relation with US.

¹⁵ Gill (2002) and Panitch (2005) do not accept such decline.

role in the contemporary form of world capitalism since the 1970s. For the time being, this central role can easily be recognized within the historical period since 1980s in which neo-liberal integration of world markets has been considered as a process occurring through the imperatives of (post) Washington Consensus with the execution of IMF and the World Bank, largely controlled by the US.

To summarize, through critical engagement with these two terms (operating as narrative of great transformation/historical rupture/total change) about the changes and transformations in world capitalism and its management, I will offer to use ‘internationalization of capital’ instead of ‘globalization’ accepting the possibility of the existence of inter-imperialist rivalry in different economic, political and cultural forms instead of using the concept of empire as the political subject governing the global market.

1.1 Literature Review

At first glance, in the literature on the first narrative of great transformation (globalization), one can find a huge volume of study most of which perceive the so-called globalization process in a way, what I call as shaped by liberal perception/presentation of the historical period beginning with the end of the Cold War. Such view is based on an understanding which accepts rapid integration of markets across the world through neo-liberal policies as trans-(supra)-nationalization process in which nation-states are declining and the geopolitics ended. Such an approach and its different forms can be viewed in various works of scholars from different school of thinking (Cooper, 2003; Kagan, 2005; Friedman, 1999, 2006; Fukuyama, 1989; Scholte, 2003; Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2003; Sklair, 1999, 2000; Giddens, 2002, 2003; Rothkopf, 1997). On the other hand, from different perspectives, so-called globalization process and its management have been criticized by various scholars actually on the

basis of how the process must be ‘managed’ (Rodrik, 2001; Stiglitz, 2002, Galbraith, 1999, Held and McGrew, 2003, Weiss, 1997, Weisbrot, et al 2001). Moreover, from a radical perspective, the concept itself and the historical period referred by this concept (post 1989) has been tried to be understood through the developments and changes through capitalist social relations (Albo, 2003, Amin, 2001; Brenner, 1999; Bromley, 1999; Burnham, 2001; Cammack, 2003; Clarke, 2001b; Rosenberg, 2005, 2000; Gowan, et al 2001; Hirst and Thompson, 1998; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Jameson, 2000; Jessop, 1999, 2000, 2002; Kızılcelik, 2003; Marcuse, 2000; Oğuz, 2006; Panitch, 1994; Radice, 1999, 2000; Savran, 1996, 2002a, 2002b, 2006; Sweezy, 1997; Tabb, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2003; Yıldızoğlu, 1996, 2002, 2003, 2006).

Generally, I followed the ideas of those above scholars having radical perspectives about the so-called ‘globalization’ phenomenon. However, among those scholars Hardt and Negri (2000) perceive globalization through the main assumptions of what I call liberal perception/presentation of globalization based on trans-(supra)-nationalization while they are forming their analysis on capitalist social relations. Instead of their approaches accepting trans-(supra)-nationalization which is similar to the liberal perception/presentation I followed the conceptual framework developed through the ideas and views of Marxist scholars from different traditions (Arrighi, 2004, 2005; Bonefeld, 2001, Neil Brenner, 1998, 1999; R. Brenner, 2001, 2006; Clarke, 2001a, 2001b; Gowan, 2002, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006; Harvey, 2001; Oğuz, 2006; Wood, 1999, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2006a, 2000b) Through their views about capitalist social relations and the ‘change’ in those relations, contemporary capitalism must be analyzed by following arguments:

- Nation-state secures its role in the organization of capitalist social relations
- The very nature, which is contradictory, of capitalist social relations did not change.

- The so-called globalization phenomenon must be perceived as internationalization of capital.

Following such a path, I tried to construct my way of looking at the ongoing changes in world capitalism.

For the literature on the concept of empire, another narrative of great transformation, I identified three different approaches in the views of different scholars using the concept of empire. The first path is shaped by neo-conservative approach taking empire (actually the US Empire) as something good for all nations (Ignatieff, 2003; Ikenberry, 2004; Kagan, 1998). The second path is full of pejorative usages of the concept in order to criticize the violent and unilateral orientation of the US foreign policy (Howe, 2003; Todd, 2004; Cox, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; Johnson, 2000; Callinicos, 2002; Petras, 2006; Foster, 2005, 2006). In this second path scholars from different traditions (Marxism, liberalism) have been used interchangeably with the US dominance. And finally the third path is consisting of much more theoretical usages of the concept (Agnew, 2003; Colás and Saull, 2006; Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2003; Panitch, 2003, 2000; Panitch and Gindin, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006; Hosseini, 2006; Saull, 2004; Mann, 2003, Wood, 2003). From these perspectives, I will not engage with all those scholars' views. I will only introduce the claims of Hardt and Negri (2000) on the concept of "empire", which carries a similar argument with the liberal perception/presentation of globalization that is trans-(supra)-nationalization.

On the other hand, in the literature, through which the concept of empire has been used, there is one common argument among most of the usages that empire (with its violent practices through bloody wars) comes after globalization (which signifies the global village characterized by wealth and prosperity provided by globalization). Such a view is tried to be criticized due to

its incapacity to grasp the continuous contradictions and tensions of capital relation that are immanent to the definition of capital.

Following a critical view developed through above arguments, I will also claim that the condition of co-operation between imperialist blocs do not imply an ‘ultra-imperialist phase’ of capitalism, as it is argued in *Empire* by Hardt and Negri (2000), since the immanent contradiction of capitals relation always creates contention and rivalry due to different specificities (Savran, 2002) of national spaces. Therefore, it is not wrong to argue that inter-imperialist cooperation is conjunctural but not structural (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris, 2006).

1.2. Plan of Study

My thesis consists of five chapters including the introduction and the conclusion chapters. In the second chapter, I will critically analyze the claims and views about globalization, mainly the liberal (globalist) ones. Since the liberal perception/presentation of globalization based on trans-(supra)-nationalization affects most of the radicals’ views, the liberal understanding of globalization must be examined critically for constructing my conceptual framework to understand the contradictory nature of capital relation.

My main aim in the second chapter is to demonstrate that humanity did not enter a new historical era. With such an aim I will try to make sense of globalization and offer an alternative view (perceiving reality through the process of internationalization of capital founded its post-1970s form as financial enlargement) for the period that has been tried to be explained with the concept of ‘globalization’. To do that, I will try to criticize liberal perception and show the relation between technology, globalization, nation-state and capital relation. Through showing their relations, I will present the conceptual

basis of alternative look to the globalization phenomenon, based on the outlook constructed by David Harvey (following Karl Marx). While introducing the conceptual framework of Harvey, I will offer to construct a critical view based on internationalization of capital, as an understanding focusing the change within continuity, in order to grasp the contradictory nature of capital relation that has been constituting the reality since 200 years, instead of globalization that is narrative of epochal shift in human history.

In the third chapter, following the conceptual framework developed in the first chapter, another narrative of epochal shift that is the empire will be tried to be engaged critically. To do that, I will try to show the relations among the debates about the changing conditions of world capitalism through the concepts of empire and hegemony while demonstrating important position of the US in those conditions.

My main aim in the third chapter that is similar to the one in second chapter that is to show that humanity did not enter a new historical period. As in the end of Cold War, after 9/11 attacks, the scholars and politicians declared humanity entered a new historical period. Similar to the claims of “globalization” concept based on the premises of epochal shift, the concept of “empire” has been popular in both academic writings and journals with an argument that nothing will be the same in the world after those violent attacks on the towers of World Trade Center. By opposing such narrative of epochal shift I will try to express the relations among the debates for the ‘new’ reality of human beings made through the concepts of “empire” and “hegemony”, while mainly focusing on the concept of empire. To do that, I will try to show the relations between those two concepts and their relations with the changing role of the US in world capitalism that has been also restructuring since the 1970s.

Through the third chapter, I will also engage with the claims of Hardt and Negri (2000), whose book became very popular in those debates around the concept of empire. Moving from such an aim, I will finally claim that empire is a concept theoretically denying the persistence of inter-imperialists rivalry in capitalism, which stems from the fact that each national space carrying historically different characteristics due to still-national specific class struggles that inevitably creates a hierarchy among nation-states.

In the fourth chapter, based on critical evaluations that I tried to develop within previous chapters, I will try to highlight some concluding remarks. My main objective in this chapter is to show that role of nation-state¹⁶ has not diminished as a result of ‘financial enlargement’ process (like liberal perception/presentation of globalization), instead it can be argued that ‘the form of state intervention in the economy and society has changed’ (Barrow, 2005:129). Such change in the form of state intervention through neo-liberal integration of different capitalism(s) as a response to overaccumulation crisis of capital must be evaluated in the changing conditions of world capitalism that has been (re) shaped through inter-imperialist rivalry.

In this chapter I will also claim that the concept of empire theoretically based on ‘ultra-imperialist’ assumptions (‘complete absence of inter-imperialist contradictions’, Poulantzas 1979:86) denies the fact that forms of inter-imperialist rivalry has changed. Therefore, it will be claimed at the end of the chapter that instead of an understanding based on ultra-imperialist assumptions

¹⁶ “The task of the state is to maintain the unity and cohesion of a social formation divided into classes, and it focuses and epitomizes the class contradictions of the whole social formation in such a way as to sanction and legitimize the interests of the dominant classes and fractions as against the other classes of the formation, in a context of world class contradictions” (Poulantzas, 1979:78). Moreover, “The class character of the capitalist state is most fundamentally determined by the separation of the state from civil society, and the corresponding subordination of state and civil society to the rule of money and the law (Clarke, 2001:79), which can only be provided by nation-states. Such necessity creates the ‘specificities’(Savran, 2002) of national space that hinders emergence of ‘smooth space’ created by an de-centred empire due to unknown nature of national class struggles.

(which ironically have some overlapping points with the liberal perceptions of globalization¹⁷ claims), the analysis of and what actually new in capitalism today must be constituted through perceiving the immanent tension of capital relation which inescapably creates contention and rivalry between different capitalism(s) located in different nation-states.

In the final chapter, following an aim to highlight the basic points of an outlook to explain what is really new in world capitalism I will ask some important questions which would offer tentative ideas about such an outlook.

17 Liberal perception/presentation of globalization as supra(tans) nationalization based on declining of nation-states and end of geopolitics can be read as the end of inter-imperialist rivalry arguments based on the assumption of ultra-imperialist (similar to the Kagan's claims for globalization, Kantian cosmopolitan order)

CHAPTER 2

A CRITIC OF THE CONCEPT OF “GLOBALIZATION”

2.1. Introduction

Globalization is not a stage of capitalism; it is capitalism *per se*
Wood (2003)

... plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose...¹⁸

There are lots of concepts that have been used to identify the so-called ‘great transformations’ of the era (started with the 1990s) which have along been tried to be explained by the concept of globalization (Savran, 1996). Some of those popular concepts are, ‘post-Fordism’, ‘postmodernism’, ‘information society,’ ‘post-industrial society’, ‘third wave’, ‘post-capitalist society’, ‘the end of organized capitalism’¹⁹. ‘Globalization’ as the ‘grand narrative of great transformation’ can be evaluated as the term providing the appropriate intellectual space for other terms, since the term has been operationalized for all the economic, political, cultural and technological changes that have been occurring after the end of the Cold War.

In this chapter, liberal perception/presentation of globalization will be used as the popular narrative of great transformation of the 1990s signifying an “epochal shift” (Robinson 2002, cf. Rosenberg, 2005) in human history through which a ‘global village’²⁰ is supposed to be established while the nation-states

¹⁸ “The more things change, the more they stay the same.”

¹⁹ Savran (1996).

²⁰ “Global village is a term coined by Wyndham Lewis in his book *America and Cosmic Man* (1948). However, Herbert Marshall McLuhan also wrote about this term in his book *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man* (1962). His book describes how electronic mass media collapse space and time barriers in human communication, enabling

are declining in the so-called trans-(supra)-nationalization process. In other words, by critically approaching the concept of ‘globalization’, first of all, I will highlight the narrative of great transformation, that is globalization presented as ‘epochal shift/historical rupture’ in human history distorts the perception of the reality by claiming that after the 1990s human history totally transformed (that finds its conventional form in the debates of transformation of Westphalian State system²¹ to post-Westphalian order or “post international system”²²). Therefore in order to make sense of ‘globalization’, I will point out the necessity to focus on the relation between so-called ‘globalization’ and the main social relation that (re)constitutes the social reality, that is capital relation.

As opposed to the “globalist’ account”²³ or the liberal perception/presentation of globalization phenomenon, claiming on the opening of a new era for humanity which divorced from clashes of nation-states and left the ground to the free markets as the ‘areas of freedom’ of neo-liberal ideology, this chapter critically examines the promises of this new paradigm (globalization) by searching for such continuities as the capitalist mode of production, the ongoing role of nation-states in the capital accumulation processes, and the system’s crisis-

people to interact and live on a global scale. In this sense, the globe has been turned into a village by the electronic mass media. Today, the global village is mostly used as a metaphor to describe the Internet and World Wide Web. The Internet globalizes communication by allowing users from around the world to connect with each other. Similarly, web-connected computers enable people to link their web sites together. This new reality has implications for forming new sociological structures within the context of culture.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_village_%28Internet%29).

²¹ Such conceptualization of international system (“in terms of geopolitical norms of interaction between states” Rosenberg, 2003:95), “has always stood in the way of a richer understanding of the international derived from analysis of the wider historical process of capitalist world development” (Rosenberg, 2003).

²² James Rosenau, cited by Rosenberg (2003).

²³ Held and McGrew (2003). Liberal perception/presentation of ‘globalization’ might be summarized as to be based on the claims that, by the help of technological revolutions, an ‘epochal shift’ in human history occurred through which a trans (supra) national level is constituted while nation-states lose their primary position in the regulation process of everyday life (which has been presented as irresistible process without subject (Hay, 2001).

ridden nature. To do that, I question the ‘trans-(supra)-nationalization’ arguments stating the decline of nation-states role in the world order as a consequence of imminent expansionary character of capital relation, within the light of the fact that nation-states are still securing their ‘regulative’ positions in capital accumulation processes. Therefore, in this chapter, it will be claimed that ‘globalization’ must be examined through the immanent tension between the tendency of capital relation to create a world market and the spatial dimension of the capital accumulation. Concomitant to this claim, it will be argued that nation-states are still securing their ‘regulative’ positions in capital accumulation process and the so-called ‘trans-(supra)-nationalization’ process must be critically analyzed in such a condition of world capitalism that is still shaped and reshaped by the regulations of nation-states. Since, behind the so-called ‘globalization’ process, there is the dynamic of the crisis-ridden nature of capital relation, which I will explain in this chapter. In addition, it will have been defended at the end of the thesis that social science does not need ‘new paradigm’ to analyze the post-Soviet (or even post-9/11 events) period and instead the concept of ‘globalization’; the historical process covering the last 35 years of world capitalism which exists for 200 years, must be conceived through the crisis-ridden nature of capital relation which inevitably causes ‘internationalization of capital’²⁴.

Scholarly, there are many advocating the need for new paradigm in so-called globalization process for understanding the new dynamics of social reality (since there emerged an epochal shift in human history with globalization); however, there are also critics about these ideas on the great transformation in the nature of social reality. *Inter alia*, according to Hardt and Negri (2000:251), “a paradigm shift in the world economic and political order was taking place” whereas, Rosenberg (2005:65) claims that there is no need for a new paradigm for the reality that has been told to be shaped by globalization; since “...

²⁴ I will discuss this issue in the following sections.

‘globalization’ was the magic word which simultaneously naturalized and dramatized ... tiger-leap of capitalist expansion, representing it as the unstoppable, uncontrollable climax of a universal human destiny.”

De-mystification of those liberal (globalist) assumptions based on the idea that humanity with globalization started to be experienced in a ‘global village’ through condition of “increasing interdependence” (Nye, 2003) divorced from geopolitical clashes and/or inter-imperialist rivalry among nation-states can be achieved through criticizing the liberal perception/presentation of globalization by the help of insights derived from the claims of *inter alia* Rosenberg (2005), assuming there is no need for a new paradigm. Through critically engaging with those assumptions, I will insist on the centrality of nation-state through not solely perceiving the international system “in terms of geopolitical norms of interaction between states” (Rosenberg, 2003:95). However, while discussing the centrality of nation-state in the historical process of internationalization of capital, I will not offer ideas/views or policy proposals like ‘globalization sceptics’ (Radice, 2000:5) who seeks to “promote conventional progressive agenda within fundamentally national political arena”. Since they also accept the liberal perception/presentation of globalization, that is trans-(supra)-nationalization; those sceptics’ critics of ‘globalization’ paves way to, what Radice (2000) claims as, ‘progressive nationalism’ which does provide ground for the “real subsumption of the labour” in the national level by establishing national/international dichotomy and then offering that national development is possible if national actors oppose the ongoing claims of the ‘forces of globalization’.

It must be highlighted that in this thesis, I will not follow such an intellectual path of ‘progressive nationalists’ (say the ones thinking that ‘social-democratic’ compromise between capital and labour is possible in contemporary form of world capitalism). Instead, in this part of my thesis, I will only try to criticize

the liberal perception/presentation of globalization (which has been presented as irresistible process without subject in human history that has created an ‘epochal shift’ with tremendous technological developments in the 1990s)²⁵ while offering to conceive the historical period that so-called ‘globalization’ has been referring with ‘internationalization of capital’.

In brief, the main argument for the period beginning with 1990 has been that social sciences had to have a ‘new paradigm’ to analyze the post-Cold War era (or like the period post-9/11 Attacks)²⁶, since then it was perceived that ‘globalization’ created an ‘epochal shift’ (Robinson 2002, cf. Rosenberg, 2005) in the human history. In other words, globalization as an irresistible and inevitable process has commonly argued to have transformed the social relations and that condition created an ‘epochal shift’ in human history. Therefore, most of scholars and thinkers²⁷ started to identify the different characteristics of this ‘new era’ created by ‘globalization’. Before examining those claims about the so-called new characteristics of the new era, it will be meaningful to try to make sense of ‘globalization’. However, it must be asserted that in this work a detailed analysis of ‘globalization’ will not be made; only a critical reading of some common points (that are perceiving globalization as trans-(supra)-nationalization and conceiving it as epochal shift/historical rupture

²⁵ It is not wrong to argue that such understanding has been a common perception of the process so-called ‘globalization’.

²⁶ Timur (2002) argues that there emerged an impression that empire even imperialism which have been disappeared from the agenda since 1990s, replaced the term globalization after 9/11 events. Therefore, any effort to highlight those historical events must sceptically approach those arguments about the paradigmatic shift, since as it will be claimed throughout in this thesis, a Marxist outlook still has capacity to explain those transformations in human history, based on the argument that capital relation with its crisis-ridden nature that finds its expression, what I will call an ‘immanent tension between its the tendency to create world market and the spatial dimension of capital accumulation’ in the following sections (2.2.1.2 Capital Relation and Globalization) of this chapter.

²⁷ The contributions in the book of Held, D. and McGrew A. (2003), provides a wide spectrum about the ideas and claims, about globalization, of distinguished scholars and thinkers like G. Modelski, A. Giddens, R. O. Keohane, J. S. Nye Jr., J. A. Scholte J. Rosenberg, P. Hirst and G. Thompson, M. Hardt and A. Negri, D. Held, M. Mann, M. Castells, R. Gilpin, D. Rodrik, J. Stiglitz.

in human history) in different definitions of the concept will be highlighted in order to help me search whether ‘globalization’ (or trans-(supra)-nationalization, as it is perceived form) must be evaluated as an ‘epochal shift’ in human history or not in the world that capital relation persists through the immanent tension of it between its expansionary character and the spatial character of surplus-value production which I will discuss later. For the time being, it is meaningful to try to make sense of the meaning of globalization through such line of thinking.

2.2 Making Sense of the Meaning of ‘Globalization’?

Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social relations? There can be no doubt that they follow (Gramsci, 1971:176)²⁸.

Globalization might be considered as the most popular concept of the 1990s (Radice, 1999) even might be perceived as the *Zeitgeist* of the 1990s²⁹. In both ordinary life and academic literature, it has been used to explain the so-called ‘great transformation’ of the period beginning with the collapse of USSR (hence with the end of Cold War). In other words, the concept of ‘globalization’ has been operationalized to understand/explain a ‘change’ in human history. This change has been presented distinctively by various scholars and thinkers. Therefore the attributed meanings to the concept differ extensively.

First of all, ‘globalization’ pointing out a change in human history as a ‘narrative of great transformation’, has been argued as an irresistible and inevitable process that no actor could escape from it (Bauman, 2006:7). Most of the discussions have been pursued as if such a process does not have a subject putting it into motion. In other words, ‘globalization’ as a concept has been used

²⁸ Quoted by Rosenberg (1994:54).

²⁹ *Zeitgeist* is originally a German expression that means "the spirit of the age", literally translated as "time (Zeit) ghost (Geist)". It denotes the intellectual and cultural climate of an era (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeitgeist>). The original claim belongs to Rosenberg, (2005).

to signify an irresistible and inevitable process³⁰ (in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR) without a subject (Hay, 2001). Therefore, the usage of the concept of ‘globalization’ (as a narrative of great transformation) for understanding/explaining the characteristics of the ‘new era’ emerged after the collapse of the USSR, became very common even it had not have a clear cut definition, since it has been started to be perceived commonly as a ‘natural’ process.

Without having clear cut definition, the concept of ‘globalization’ has been operationalized for explaining different economic, political, ideological/cultural and technological transformations since the 1990s. At the same time, those transformations have been presented as the products of the ‘globalization’ process. This paved the way for ‘careless’ operationalizing of the concept which makes the issue (understanding the changes in human history) hard to deal with. Indeed, as Marcuse (2000) argues,

The issue is more than one of careless use of words: intellectually, such muddy use of the term fogs any effort to separate cause from effect, to analyze what is being done, by whom, to whom, for what, and with what effect. Politically, leaving the term vague and ghostly permits its conversion to something with a life of its own, making it a force, fetishizing it as something that has an existence independent of the will of human beings, inevitable and irresistible.

Such muddy use of ‘globalization’ makes it having lots of meanings. As it may be seen below, it is possible to categorize the different meanings of ‘globalization’ referring analytically different realms of life.

- 1- In economic realm: Ever linked economy with increasing density and speed of capital flows. New Economy³¹ (claimed to be based on new industrial

³⁰ Even radical thinkers believe that (for example, Hardt and Negri, 2000:xii, pp:116-119), globalization, as an ‘irresistible and irreversible process’ causes ‘declining sovereignty of nation states and their increasing inability to regulate economic and cultural exchanges’ which are the primary symptoms of the coming of Empire’.

³¹ See Yıldızoğlu (2002:35). In addition, according to Frank (2001:2) “What is new is this idea’s (new economy) triumph over all its rivals, determination of American leaders to extend it to all the world, the belief among opinion-makers that there is something natural, something divine, something inherently democratic about markets.” Moreover, according to Tabb (2001),

revolution that is the emergence of Informational Technologies which can be summarized as Internet)(Editors of Monthly Review, 2001)

- 2- In political realm: Diminishing role of nation-states, emergence of supranational space, emergence of corporations without carrying national characteristics and origin.
- 3- In cultural/ideological realm: End of Ideology and History (Fukuyama, 1989).
- 4- In technological realm: Tremendous technological innovations: WWW, so forth.

The above claims about the period roughly started with the collapse of the USSR have been stated as both the causes and the effects of globalization in mainstream literature shaped through liberal (globalist) views meaning that a perception of “globalization as the developing outcome of some historical process” has been transformed and globalization as a concept has started to be used for ‘the changing character of the modern world’ (Rosenberg, 2003:93). Then, it is commonly accepted that ‘globalization’ has been the ‘prime mover’ of almost every change since the 1990s. This is because, the concept of ‘globalization’ turns out to be an “empty signifier” (Rosamond, 2002), meaning that globalization as an empty signifier which needs to be defined, is used to signify changing character of social phenomena (actually the social transformations in world capitalism).

“There has been talk of a “New Economy” toward the end of every long boom, when it is said that the business cycle is passé and that there are new rules.” In addition, New Economy can also be interpreted as the term referred to the claim that we are living in a society that is based on information/knowledge rather than industry. According to Editors of Monthly Review (2001), “It is of course widely believed that the rapid expansion of the Internet has been the device that has allowed the productivity effects of the New Economy to diffuse throughout the economy. But the facts, as Gordon’s analysis of productivity has shown, do not warrant such a conclusion at present. Computers are widely available in offices, but rather than increasing the productivity of business, the opposite effect often seems to apply, as employees use their corporate Internet access to look up stock quotes related to their personal investments, to do online shopping, or to carry on e-mail correspondence. Studies show that consumer oriented web sites get their highest usage not in the evenings or on weekends, but in the daytime, Monday to Friday, when people are at work.” Furthermore, Editors of Monthly Review (2001) argue that “... New Economy is seen, first and foremost, as consisting of those firms and economic sectors most closely associated with the revolution in digital technology and the growth of the Internet.” On the other hand, according to The Economic Report of the President (2001), “Over the last 8 years the American economy has transformed itself so radically that many believe we have witnessed the creation of a New Economy.”

Every attempt to explain and/or define the concept of ‘globalization’, which has no clear cut definition, has been shaped by different reasons. That is to say ‘globalization’ is a concept having lots of meanings attributed by different social actors and therefore by different scholars. Is it internationalization, liberalization, universalization or westernization, or all of them? For instance, according to Giddens (2003:60) it means ‘intensification of worldwide social relations’, similarly for Nye and Keohane (2003; pp: 75–83), globalization means ‘increasing of complex interdependence’. In addition, according to Scholte (2003), it is de-territorialization (actually supra territorialization)³² similar to the arguments of Hardt and Negri (2000). From a radical perspective, Dumenil and Levy (2006) claim that both first globalization eras (period between the end of 19th century-1930s) and current globalization (1980s- ...) can be called as ‘financial hegemony’ due to increasing financialization in world capitalism in those specific time periods. Similar to above understanding, current globalization period has been evaluated as the form of crisis of capital relation which has found its concrete form in the financialization process since 1970s³³. In addition, according to Callaghan (2002) (economic) globalization means “integration of financial markets and other markets, internationalization of production, increasing competitiveness.”

Apart from above definitions of the concept of globalization, there have been made different conclusions/arguments about the consequences of globalization. For instance, for many analyses *inter alia* Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Wolf (2003), inequality has been diminishing with ‘globalization’ and the wealth has been spreading better for last two decades. In contrast, for many analyses *inter*

³² Trans (supra) nationalization can be evaluated as the main assumption of the concept globalization though its muddy use. Indeed ‘trans(supra)nationalization’ is the prime argument behind the idea that ‘globalization’ created an epochal shift in human history, since previous era of human society had been shaped by ‘national’ forces however, with ‘globalization’ trans (supra) national forces are in the agenda according to various scholars (Cox,1993; Gill, 1990, Gill and Law, 1993; Robinson, 2001, 2005; Robinson and Harris, 2000; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Stokes, 2005, Sklair, 1999, Scholte, 2003).

³³ Arrighi (2004), Harvey (2004b), Bonefeld (2001).

alia Wade (2001), Weisbrot (2001) and Tabb (1997)³⁴ claim the opposite. Apart from those scholars, according to UNDP Report 1999;

- Globalization offers great opportunities for human advance- but only with stronger governance.
- The opportunities and benefits of globalization need to be shared much more widely.
- Globalization is creating new threats to human security in rich countries and poor.
- New information and communications technologies are driving globalization- but polarizing the world into the connected and the isolated (UNDP Report 2003).

As it may be realized in above determinations of UNDP, ‘globalization’ is seen as a process ‘offering great opportunities to every parts of the world’ if it is managed through stronger governance among regional, national and international actors. This management problem of ‘globalization’, although there is no clear cut definition of it, has also been issued by various scholars critically (Rosenau, 2007; Stiglitz, 2002), while some has argued that ‘globalization’ has provided inconvenient structure for the development strategies of poor nations (Rodrik, 2001). In addition, some scholars started to talk about ‘de-globalization’ which means re-empowerment of the local and national against supra-national powers (Bello, 2001).

According to Soros (2003), “globalization”, that is being used more than necessary, has lots of meanings. This again shows us the muddy use of the concept of ‘globalization’ as an *explanan* which must be examined as an *explanandum* first (Rosenberg, 2000).

Within such complicated issue, to make sense of the process ‘globalization’, there is also another dimension of the discussion: its relation with the leading capitalist country in world capitalism that is the USA. Generally, it has been thought that the US ‘plays a central role in all dimensions of contemporary

³⁴ According to Tabb (1997), “Growing inequality is a result of the marginalization of most of the world's population. Between 70 and 100 countries are worse off now than they were in 1980, according to UN figures”.

globalization’ (Nye, 2003a, 2003b). According to H. Kissinger and F. Fukuyama ‘globalization (of today)’ is another name of the US power (quoted by Yıldızoğlu, 2002:86).

Accepting such a link, globalization was asserted as a new label of American foreign policy (Kurth, 2001) and also as an American project (Agnew, 2003). Furthermore, it has been claimed that, those developments under the title of ‘globalization’ seem to be a process to Americanize the world (Kakinç, 2004:35). In addition, Friedman (2000) thinks that “globalization means the spread of free-market capitalism to virtually every country in the world which means also the spread of Americanization—from Big Macs to Imacs to Mickey Mouse—on a global scale” that is also the spreading of perfectness while Galbraith claims that “globalization . . . is not a serious idea. We, the Americans, invented it as a means for concealing our policy of economic penetration into other nations”³⁵. Moreover, according to Smith (2005:124), “globalization is the shorthand by which we describe a dense range of economic, social, political and cultural shifts begun in the 1970s, shifts upon which a third moment of the US global ambition has been built.” On the other hand, for Nairn (2003), it is possible to claim that “the US global policy and globalization are no longer two aspects of the same thing” and he asserts that “America is the enemy of the ‘globalization’”. In addition, the claims about the close relation between globalization and New World Order³⁶ claims/projects of the USA can be evaluated as finding its concrete forms on the discussions about the standardization of world culture, politics and economy.

³⁵ J. K. Galbraith, interview, Folha de Seo Paulo, October 2, 1997, quoted by Vilas (2002).

³⁶ The ex-president of USA, Ronald Reagan, used this phrase, for the first time, after the collapse of USSR which actually overlaps the same period that the concept globalization has been operationalized to analyze the economic, political, ideological and technological transformations in the aftermath of the end of Cold War.

This standardization has been presented as something good by some writers (Friedman, 2000; Rothkopf, 1997). Those writers have claimed that ‘globalization’ as the US-led project process has been dispersing all perfectness of US society over the world. Moreover, Ferguson clearly argues that condition of a ‘globalized’ world without the US is ‘apolarity’ (Ferguson, 2004). In fact, “apolar future is anti-thesis of globalization” for him. Therefore, single polarity in globalization process leaded by the US is inevitable if world does not want to witness a dark age, according to Ferguson.

Ferguson (2004) claims that;

For more than two decades, globalization-integration of world markets for commodities, labour and capital- has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny of civil war. The reversal of globalization – which a new Dark Age would produce- would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression.

No existence of the US (Leviathan) in ‘globalization’ process means Dark Age (State of nature) for Ferguson. I think Ferguson’s Hobbesian evaluation of the world after the collapse of the USSR cannot be evaluated as value-free, since the definitions and explanations about a social relation cannot be thought free from the outlook of observer and his/her interests. Thus, his definitions can be evaluated as highly influenced by the typical American nationalist perspective, which has been based on the assumption that “... United States enjoys universal significance because it is an archetype of virtue and the locomotive of human progress”³⁷.

It may be realized that various scholars understand ‘globalization’ in distinct ways and attribute different meanings to it. However, it is possible to identify the mainstream assumptions for the process called as ‘globalization’.

³⁷ For McCartney (2004), “according to American nationalist doctrine, in short, the United States can justifiably increase its power and prestige on the world stage, consistently with its mission, because, unlike any other nation-state, it embodies and promulgates values that all people share, even if they do not know it yet.”

First of all, the main assumptions of the mainstream analysis (which I call liberal-globalist-) of ‘globalization’ is the claim of the “end of geopolitics or geography” (Agnew, 2003), following the assumption that nation-states are declining and ‘transnational (supranational) bodies’ are emerging that will automatically end all the geopolitical clashes between nation-states due to the continuous decline of the scope of jurisprudence of nation-states (cf. Weiss, 1997; Hirst and Thompson: 1998; and Wood: 1999, 2003a 2003b, 2006). Such perception has actually been furthered by the claim of ‘end of history’ by F. Fukuyama (1989)³⁸. In brief,

it was argued that the post-cold War era represented the culmination of the liberal economic regime of free trade (and its corollary of liberal democracy) in an end of history in which the state-system and its divisions were replaced by supra-territorial governance and transnational networking (Coward, 2006).

The claims about the diminishing scope of nation-states and the increasing power of a so-called ‘supra-national’ level are at the core of the idea that ‘globalization’ creates an ‘epochal shift’ in human history. In addition;

The idea of globalization ... implies that accumulation of capital, trade, and investment are no longer confined to the nation-state and thus enhances the idea that capital flows have created a new world order with its own institutions and network of power relationships (Chilcote, 2002).

On the other hand, in this work, liberal perception of globalization undermining the internal relation between nation-states and capitalist economy will be criticized and the concept of ‘globalization’ will be taken as a narrative of great transformation (signifying an epochal shift in human history) that perceives ‘trans-(supra)-nationalization’ as a process diminishing the primacy of nation-

³⁸ According to McCarney (2006), Fukuyama’s claims are based on one of the original interpretation of W. Hegel’s ideas, which were actually the interpretation of Alexandre Kojève on Hegel.

state³⁹. Through this line of thinking, in the next section, critical evaluation of such narrative will be examined.

2.2.1 A Critic of Liberal (Globalist) Understanding of Globalization.

It was mentioned that without having a clear cut definition, ‘globalization’ has been used as a narrative of great transformation which created an epochal shift in human history. I think, following Rosenberg’s differentiation (Rosenberg, 2000), the word ‘globalization’ must be well-defined (must be evaluated firstly as an *explanandum*) first, in order to use it as an *explanan* for further analysis. Without ‘definition’ of globalization, using globalization *as an explanan* seems to be problematic as it is seen in previous section that there are distinct explanations about ‘globalization’. Otherwise, ‘globalization’ as a concept is transformed to be an “empty signifier” (Rosamond, 2002), meaning that globalization which needs to be defined, is used to signify other social phenomena (actually the social transformations). Hence, while its meaning is not known, it is used to explain social phenomena. This is actually one of the misleading parts of mainstream (liberal) and also some radical explanations about globalization (Hardt and Negri, 2000). Therefore, we need to explain the meaning of ‘globalization’.

As Savran (2002) argues; “... the indispensable task of any theoretical effort to understand the present world is to separate the reality of change within continuity from the myth of total transformation”. Thus, searching for well-defined conception of globalization must be supported by a historical analysis (focusing on the change within continuity), since “... understanding its meaning and prospects requires a temporal horizon that encompasses centuries rather

³⁹ Such an understanding finds its ultimate form in the phrase of Friedman (2006): ‘World is flat’.

than decades” (Arrighi, 2000) and viewing globalization as a new phenomena (or a ‘great transformation’) hinders the possibility of historical analysis. In brief it must be realized that ‘to separate the reality of change within continuity from the myth of total transformation’ (Savran 2002) is compulsory for any analysis about ‘globalization’. Otherwise, the concept (that has been presented as a process, signifying an epochal shift that created the end of history, without a subject) continues to be perceived as a narrative of great transformation in human history. Indeed, while history is periodized (retrospectively), there is always a danger of thinking present form of human society as the product of a unique generation of human history (Giddens, 2002). Thus, to avoid falling into the “fetishism of present” in the discussions of ‘globalization’, a historical analysis of the period that has been tried to be explained by the term globalization must be identified. To do that, technological transformations, which are the important material base of liberal perception of ‘globalization’, must be analyzed through their relations with capitalist social relations.

2.2.2 Technology and ‘Globalization’

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarians, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians’ intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image (Marx and Engels, 1969).

It has been commonly perceived that people all over the world is interconnected in a way not preceded in the past, as a consequence of those technological revolutions e.g. www. In other words, it has been claimed that technological developments connected people today and gave a new characteristics to the societies; via linking them cross-nationally (such an idea can be evaluated as the structural component of the process of trans-(supra)-nationalization presented

before). However, as Hirst and Thompson (1998) argue, world history also witnessed “a globalization era” through the period between 1870 and 1914 and “the present highly internationalized economy is not unprecedented” (Hirst and Thompson, 2003:98). They also argue that in some respects the current international economy is “less open” and “less integrated” than the period between 1870 and 1914. In addition, it is not the 1990s but the 1870s in which world economy shared the “real time” in human history by the help of submarine telegraph lines for Hirst and Thompson (1998)⁴⁰. Thus, it can easily be argued that the “marginal contribution”⁴¹ of the sub-marine telegraph lines to ‘world economy’ (in which a message was taken to USA from Europe in fifteen days), in terms of integrating of the national markets by connecting two sides of Atlantic, seems more than that of internet today.

Furthermore, the continuous claims about the technological changes (which have been used as the empirical base of the process globalization) might be claimed as technologically determinist or fetishist ideas, since technological innovations throughout history have not been realized for the sake of themselves (cf. Friedman, 2006). Technology (in the history of capitalism) must be thought through the endless (re)configuration of capitalist social relations since it is more meaningful to perceive technology as a ‘dependent’ variable of capitalist societies that has been constituted through capital relation.⁴²

One more thing about the claims for technological developments that have been accelerated since 1990s must be asserted. Today, technology (through internet) connects the people from different nations and markets in the world in one second but ‘forgets’ a whole continent (Africa) and by-passes it through cables,

⁴⁰ And also for Tabb (1997).

⁴¹ I owe this concept to Yıldızoğlu (2002).

⁴² As Marx and Engels (1969) in Communist Manifesto, claimed that “The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production and without them the whole relations of society”.

and mostly with satellite signals. Such condition of being by-passed (or say not connected to the world) means that ‘linking world’- current globalization of the world- is a selective process and the selection has been done according to the conditions for profitable configuration of time and space for capital relation (Harvey, 2001, 2004a, 2004b).

Therefore, with a historical perspective, one must distinguish the period started in the 1990s with the previous periods in order to ‘de-naturalize’ mainstream (shaped through liberal –globalist- views) perception and presentation of ‘globalization’ as a process, in motion since the beginning of human history, without subject. Thus, I find the differentiation made by Yıldızoğlu (2003) meaningful, for the time being, which is based on the differences between ‘globalization’ of the 1990s and ‘long evolutionary-historical globalization’. I find such differentiation meaningful and necessary, since the historically and theoretically undifferentiated use of the concept of globalization conceals its conflictual and unnatural condition designed by the interests of capital for the period started with 1990.

Yıldızoğlu (2003:305-306) claims that human history with the beginning of ‘time’ has continuously been witnessing an evolutionary globalization. Throughout history, villages, cities and regions have continuously been linked each other through various social reasons such as survival. Within such a historical ongoing process (while people have been continuously linked to each other due to social character of human beings), we must differentiate such ‘globalization’ process with ‘other’ globalizations - one of which we experienced since 1980s that were accelerated with the 1990s. The former globalization concept is defined as “long historical-evolutionary globalization” by Yıldızoğlu (2003:305-306). And the latter is the form of crisis of capital relation. Following Yıldızoğlu, I believe that the so-called ‘globalization process’ covering the period began in the 1980s must be considered within this

long dureé covering whole history of humanity. At that time it can easily be understood that ‘globalization’ is not new and we are not the ‘first generation of a global society’ (Giddens 2002). Rather than assuming ourselves as the ‘first generation of global society’, I find the offer assuming globalization (of the 1980s which has accelerated in the 1990s) as a form of crisis of capital relation as more viable in terms of understanding the ongoing changes in the contemporary world. I believe that trying to explain the globalization as form of crisis (crisis of capital relation) within the evolutionary-historical globalization of humanity helps us to differentiate the globalization process began in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s and de-mystify its perception as if it is a natural process without subject. Hence the conceptualization of Yıldızoğlu (2003) seems to make such a differentiation between two different historical processes (One covering the whole history of human being, the other covering a limited time period that has been shaped by the interests of capital to overcome its condition of crisis). Therefore, we need to differentiate “globalization of capital” -that is actually internationalization of capital- from the long historical period that has been continuing since the beginning of history. That is to claim that, last 25 years were not signifying an “intensified phase of globalization” (World Bank, 2007) which has been continuing since the beginning of history as natural and subjectless process. Rather, this historical process has been shaped through the interest of capital relation in order to overcome its never-ended overaccumulation crisis which began in the 1970s.⁴³

Having said that it is important to distinguish the transformations of the post-1980s from whole human history in order to make sense of so-called “globalization”, it seems necessary to explain the so-called globalization process. It has, as the form of crisis of capital relation, been the response of capital to overcome its structural crisis that has found its form in the conditions

⁴³ I will turn back to that issue in following sections.

of overproduction and overcapacity of the capital since the 1970s (Brenner, 2001).

For Yıldızoğlu (2002), “globalization” of the 1980s and 1990s has been the form of crisis of capital relation and all those economic, political, cultural transformations that have been occurring since the 1970s were the responses of capital to overcome its structural crisis that has found its form in the conditions of overproduction and overcapacity of the capital. In those conditions of overaccumulation and overcapacity, Dumenil and Levy (2006), claims that both first globalization era (internationalization of capital⁴⁴ in the period between the end of 19th century-1930s) and current globalization (began in the 1980s- ...) can be called as ‘financial hegemony’ in which the ‘financial capital’ take a leading position among other fractions of capital. Consequently, due to the such configuration among the fractions of capital (condition of financial capital as leading capital fraction), it is not wrong to argue that those economic and political transformations have been occurring to response the interests of capital in crisis which find its concrete form in neo-liberal policies⁴⁵ e.g. structural adjustment policies.

Having emphasized the relation between capital relation and ‘globalization’ while differentiating it from ‘long evolutionary-historical globalization’ of human being, it is meaningful to analyze such relation in detail.

⁴⁴ I will discuss globalization as a form of crisis of capital relation which finds its expressions in endless expansion through internationalization.

⁴⁵ According to Navarro (2006), globalization is “internationalization of economic activity according to neo-liberal tenets and those tenets that we have been facing with since 1980s, and more intense since 1990s, are the deregulation of labour markets, deregulation of financial markets, reduction of social public expenditures, privatization of services, promotion of individualism and consumerism, development of a theoretical narrative and discourse that pays rhetorical homage to the markets, promotion of anti-interventionist discourse about state” which have been prepared for overcoming the crisis condition of capital.

2.2.3 Capital Relation and Globalization

(...) the globe never has been a level playing-field upon which capital accumulation could play out its destiny. It was, and continues to be, an intensely variegated surface, ecologically, politically, socially and culturally differentiated (Harvey, 2001:377).

Globalization as a concept today cannot be thought without an analysis of capitalism (Kızılcelik, 2003), since, "...globalization is not itself a driving force" (Sweezy, 1997). Hence, 'what is relevant and important is to understand that capitalism in its innermost essence is an expanding system both internally and externally' (Sweezy, 1997). From such an outlook, Dumenil and Levy (2006) argue that, the period in question (post-1970 which actually covers the period since 1990 when the liberal perception/presentation of globalization has started to flourish) has been considered as a new era of capitalism shaped by neo-liberalism or neo-liberal globalization. The characteristics of this new era include:

a new discipline of labour and management to the benefit of lenders and shareholders; the diminished intervention of the state concerning development and welfare; the dramatic growth of financial institutions; the implementation of new relationships between financial and nonfinancial sectors to the benefit of the former, a new legal stand in favour of mergers and acquisitions, the strengthening of central banks and the targeting of their activity toward price stability and the new determination to drain the resources of the periphery toward center (Dumenil and Levy, 2006).

In brief, 'globalization of the 1990s' is not any kind of integration of people, national markets and institutions or "increasing of interdependence" (Nye, 2003) or "intensification of worldwide social relations" (Giddens, 2003:60) but neo-liberal integration of world markets (Savran, 2002).

I think the relation between globalization phenomena and neo-liberalism might be easily seen through an analysis of so-called 'integration of world markets' while the 'sovereignty of nation-states are declining'. This is actually

corresponding to what was mentioned before as the claims of ‘trans-(supra)-nationalization’ (by the globalists) in this work. Through this connection, I interpret both (neo-liberalism and globalization) as the part of same process to find new solutions to the crisis of capital relation.

Before evaluating the process ‘trans-(supra)-nationalization’ in which nation-state is claimed to be declining and a supranational level (that is actually the world market) is constituted, it is meaningful to identify the relation between capital relation and globalization phenomena.

Capitalist social relations reflect a historically specific mode of production in which bourgeoisie ‘creates a world after its own image’ through restless (re) configuration of time and space in order constitute a world market and neo-liberalism can be argued as (the contemporary form of such configuration) “a strategy responding the needs of capital, which has been in crisis since the 1970s” (Savran, 1996). In other words, neo liberalism is the contemporary form of the response of capital towards its crisis-ridden nature through the implementations of the principles of (post) Washington Consensus⁴⁶.

“Crises are endemic to the capitalist accumulation process” (Harvey, 2001:239). This makes capital relation a restless social relation which needs to configure and reconfigure the societies through transforming (actually subordinating) the other social relations. Therefore, it is important to understand the restless nature of capital relation which has actually been the main motive behind ‘globalization’ phenomena.

⁴⁶ I will explain its relation with neoliberalism and the internationalization of capital while I am discussing the relation between nation-state and globalization phenomena after the following section.

Capital as a social relation (Holloway, 1995) is a historically specific form of mode of production in human history. Basically, its specificity has lied on 'surplus-value extraction'.

The surplus-value is unpaid working times of free labour force. The surplus-value, which is created during the production process of commodities, is the source of the capitalist accumulation. Through circulation process, those surplus-values gained by individual capitalists are transformed into money (money form of capital) and with the transformation of that money form of capital into the productive form capital (i.e. means of production), cycle of capital accumulation process is completed. Such process, due to unpaid working times of labour force (surplus-value), always provides more money (money form of capital) than the amount of money expended initially, to individual capitalist for re-investing (transform) it into productive capital (means of production). Thus, capitalist accumulation gains its expansionary character through such an endless metamorphosis of different forms of capital (Marx, 1887).

The conditions for reproduction of the capital and the social system that it creates, that is capitalism, (has) is produced and reproduced through endless cycle of the self-expansion process of capital that is mentioned above. However, in such an apparently smooth process, capital relation (the main social relation, providing the historical specificity of capitalism, between the capitalists and the working classes) is constituted through the competition between individual capitalists and struggle between capitalists and working classes. These two historical processes (competition⁴⁷ and struggle) generate the 'dynamic' character of capitalism.

⁴⁷ Indeed, as Clarke(1991:453) stresses "capitalist competition is no more the everyday manifestation of the tendency to the overproduction of commodities".

Capitalists contending each other for grasping much more share of the market have been struggling with each other to shorten, what Harvey (2001) calls as “socially necessary turnover time” through adapting new technologies within a given “structured coherence” (Harvey, 2001). One of the Harvey’s concepts referring the conditions for the capitalist accumulation is ‘socially necessary turn over time’ that is organically related with the competition among individual capitalists and their drive for technological changes. For Harvey,

The circulation of capital has to be completed within a certain time span. This I call the ‘socially necessary turnover time’, the average time taken to turn over a given quantity of capital at the average rate of profit under normal conditions of production and circulation. Individual capitalist who turn over their capital faster than the social average earn excess profits. Those who fail to make the average suffer relative devaluation of their capitals. Competition then generates pressures to accelerate turnover times through technological and organizational change Harvey (2001:319).

Thus, the organic relation between competition, capitalist accumulation and technological change is evident as Harvey clearly underlines. Therefore technological changes must be thought as dependent to the crisis conditions of capital relation.

Harvey also introduces the concept “structured coherence”⁴⁸. For him;

... structured coherence, as Aydalot notes, embraces the forms and technologies of production (patterns of resource use inter industry linkages, forms of organization, size of firm), the technologies quantities and qualities of consumption (the standard and style of living of both labour and the bourgeoisie) patterns of labour demand and supply (hierarchies of labour skills and social reproduction process to ensure the supply same) and of physical and social infrastructures (Harvey, 2001:328-9)

In brief, structured coherence can be read as a profitable and secure configuration of time and space created by spatial/temporal fixes. Within a structured coherence, it is expected that capital accumulation can carry on eternally. However, as Harvey points out, due to “over-accumulation crisis, technological changes and class struggles”; given structured coherence, cannot

⁴⁸ For detail analyses see Jessop (1999, 2001).

absorb surpluses of capital and labour (repeatedly in history of capitalism). This corresponds to crisis⁴⁹. Mainly, the remedy of the capitalists for such inherent crisis of capitalist system is to externalize the surpluses of the capital and labour in order not to let them be devalued in their (core) countries. What has actually been occurring since the 1970s and what has been tried to be understood with the concept of ‘globalization’ since the 1990s can be evaluated to correspond such process above.

Through this conceptual framework, Harvey (2001:237-266) claims that; ‘the spatial dimension to Marx’s theory of accumulation under capitalist mode of production has for too long been ignored.’ Since, focusing on this spatial dimension of capital accumulation (territoriality of capital accumulation or “inherent spatiality of capitalist accumulation”; Jessop, 2001) helps my analysis of globalization of the 1990s, I introduced the contribution of Harvey (2001).

The organic connection of competition, technological changes and crisis conditions of capital relation provide me to de-mystify the liberal perception of globalization that perceives technology as an independent variable in capitalist society. Following Harvey’s conceptual framework underlining that organic connection between, it seems meaningful to conceive the motive behind those technological changes in capitalist society since the 1970s, as the necessary improvements for overcoming the crisis of capital relation.

Having underlined the organic connection between competition among individual capitalists, technological changes and crisis conditions of capital relation through highlighting the importance of neglected spatial dimension of

⁴⁹ Capitalists have several options to deal with such crises. They can accept redistribution in favour of workers to help absorb the excessive surplus; they can let their capital devalue; or they can go for a ‘spacio-temporal fix- a term that Harvey invented to describe geographical expansion into previously non-capitalist areas and forms of reproduction on the one hand, and long term, mainly infrastructural investments on the other’ (Nitzan and Bichler, 2004:8). As Nitzan and Bichler also state, “the most acceptable to capitalists is Harvey’s fix”.

capitalist accumulation, it must be emphasized that “over accumulation crisis” is endemic to the capital relation. As Clarke (2001a) stress that,

In his *Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy* (1843) he (F. Engels) had identified the source of the capitalist tendency to over-production in the incessant competition of capitalists with one another, which drove capitalists to increase production without regard to the limits of the market. Overproduction leads to the elimination of petty producers and the weaker capitalists, and so to the centralisation of capital, the coexistence of superabundance and want, of overwork and unemployment and to the alternation of boom and crisis’.

Clarke (2001a) also adds that,

In the capitalist mode of production every producer seeks to reduce the labour time necessary for production by developing the forces of production, and correspondingly increasing the scale of production. This leads to an increase in the quantity of commodities produced, and a fall in their price, which is the means by which the more advanced producers displace those who have been less successful.

This is called as ‘centralization’ process of capital in the hands of few that has been the result of overaccumulation crisis in which destructions of those individual capitalists who are less productive, through increasing conditions of competition. Consequently, this brings me the already mentioned organic relation among competition between individual capitalists, technological changes and crisis of capitals relation. As I mentioned before, competition between individual capitalists is one of the (other one is the class struggle) source generating dynamic charter of capital relation. Through the periodic crises (over-accumulation and/or overcapacity) that are inherent to capital relation due to its mode of existence (“accumulation for accumulation’s sake”; Harvey, 2001: 238), capitalism has been constituted via restless reformation of landscapes of world through deepening of capital relation within a given social formation and expanding of it geographically in order to subordinate other social relations e.g. modes of production (Luxemburg, 1986)⁵⁰.

In addition, according to Harvey (2001:241), those crises “... must in general have the effect of expanding the productive capacity and renewing the

⁵⁰ In following paragraphs, the issue will be clarified.

conditions of further accumulation”. He adds that “we can conceive of each crisis as shifting the accumulation process onto a new and higher plane”.

According to Harvey, new plane, for further accumulation of capital that is in crisis, has following characteristics,

This ‘new plane’ will likely exhibit certain combined characteristics of the following sorts:

1. The productivity of labour will be much enhanced by the employment of more sophisticated machinery and equipment while older fixed capital equipment will, during the course of the crisis; have become much cheaper through a forced devaluation.
2. The cost of labor will be much reduced because of the widespread unemployment during the crisis and consequently, larger surplus can be gained for further accumulation.
3. The surplus capital which lacked opportunities for investment in the crisis will be drawn into new and high profit lines of production.
4. An expanding effective demand for product –at first in the capital goods industry but subsequently in final consumption- will easily clear the market of all goods produced (Harvey, 2001:241).

The combination of “enhanced productivity of labour”, “reduced cost of labour”, “new and high profit lines of production for surplus capital” and “expanding effective demand for product” is seen as the solution of overaccumulation crisis of capital relation. In addition Harvey insists on the usefulness to “...pick up on the last element (the fourth element above) and consider how a new plane of effective demand, which can increase the capacity to absorb products, can be constructed”. According to him, such new plane of effective demand can be “...constructed out of a complex mix of four overlapping elements”:

- 1-The penetration of capital into new spheres of activity by (1) organizing pre-existing forms of activity along capitalist lines (e.g., that transformation of peasant subsistence agriculture into corporate farming), or by (2) expanding the points of interchange within the system of production and diversifying the division of labour (new specialist businesses emerge to take care of some aspect of production which was once all carried on within the same factory or firm)
- 2-Creating new social wants and needs, developing entirely new product-lines (automobiles and electronic goods are excellent twentieth-century examples) and organizing consumption so that it becomes ‘rational’ with respect to the accumulation process (working-class demands for good housing may, for example, be co-opted into a public-housing program which serves to stabilize the economy and expand the demand for construction products of a certain sort)
- 3-Facilitating and encouraging the expansion of population at a rate consistent with long-run accumulation ... that ‘an increasing population appears as the basis of accumulation as a continuous process’ from the standpoint of expanding the labour supply and the market for products.

4-Expanding geographically into new regions, increasing foreign trade, exporting capital and in general expanding towards the creation of what Marx called 'the world market' (Harvey, 2001:241-2)

“The penetration of capital into new spheres of activity”, “creating new social wants and needs” and “facilitating and encouraging the expansion of population at a rate consistent with long-run accumulation” are what I previously mentioned as ‘deepening of capital relation’ within a given social formation. In other words the first three elements are “a matter of intensification of social activity, of markets, of people within a particular spatial structure” (Harvey, 2001:242). With the last element Harvey starts trying to analyze capitalism’s nature of being bound to expand (other form of restlessness of capital⁵¹) geographically. For Harvey (2001:242), different from the first three elements of new plane, “last item brings us ... to the question of spatial organization and geographical expansion as a necessary product of the accumulation process”. And this is in relation with what Poulantzas (1979:42) means by ‘two-fold tendency’ of capitalist mode of production. According to Poulantzas, the two aspects of this tendency are “to reproduce itself within the social formation in which it takes root and establishes its dominance and to expand outside of this formation”.

The process of expansion of capital outside the given formation (actually the internationalization of capital) brings me to discuss again those ‘technological revolutions’ that are seen as the bearer of the globalization [trans-(supra)-nationalization].

Improvements in the means of transportation and communication (which have been providing spatial organization and geographical expansion possible) are necessary to shorten turnover time which is ‘equal to the production time plus

⁵¹ Restlessness of capital finds its form in deepening of capital relation in a given social formation and expansion of capital relation geographically.

circulation time' of a given capital, as Harvey quotes from Marx. In addition, "the longer the turnover time of a given capital, the smaller is its annual yield of surplus value" (Harvey, 2001:244). Thus reduction in circulation time (of capital in which surplus value is realized) is vital for capital in order to carry on accumulating. Hence, in a world connected through capital relation, it would be more accurate to perceive those 'technological revolutions'⁵² - in liberal perception of globalization as "inevitable and necessary improvements in the means of transportation and communication providing the reduction of the costs of circulation of capital" (Harvey, 2001:243). That is to say that "the imperative to accumulate consequently implies the imperative to overcome spatial barriers" (Harvey, 2001:244).

In brief, as quoting from Harvey (2001), it was tried to be emphasized that the capital relation has a nature of being bound to expand and to improve the technology. At the same time, it has a territory-bounded nature which is not contradictory to its '...tendency to create the world market' (Marx, 1973, 1999:308).

After explaining the Harvey's outlook (following Marx) to the crisis of capitalism and the characteristics of the nature of capital relation, I want to introduce the developed form of Harvey's outlook with his new conceptual framework constructed over the concept of 'spatial-temporal fix' to further my argument about the organic link between capital relation and 'globalization'.

⁵² "Annihilation of space by time" as Marx (1973) argues.

2.2.4 A Reading of ‘Globalization’ as Form of Crisis of Capital Relation (Through Searching New Spatial-Temporal Fixes⁵³)

The inner contradictions of capitalism are expressed through the restless formation and re-formation of geographical landscapes. This is the tune which the historical geography of capitalism must dance without cease (Harvey, 2001:333).

In above paragraph, Harvey tried to highlight that capital has always in search of further accumulation condition through (re) configuration of landscape of the world. He has been using a concept (spatial-temporal fix) to identify such searching process for new configuration of time and space of capital.

Harvey starts to explain the concept of ‘spatial-fix’ with his analysis on Hegel’s ideas about “how poverty is to be abolished” (Harvey, 2001:287). To clarify, it is meaningful to continue with Harvey’s quotations from Hegel.

According to Hegel, the way to abolish the poverty is to create new jobs (inner solution- within civil society) but this is not enough and ‘second set of solutions’ is necessary.

Civil society ... is driven by its ‘inner dialectic’⁵⁴ to ‘push beyond its own limits and seek markets, and so its necessary means of subsistence, in other lands that are either deficient in the goods it has overproduced, or else generally backward in industry’. It must also found colonies and thereby permit a part of its population ‘a return to life on the family basis in a new land’ at the same time as it also ‘supplies itself with a new demand and field for its industry’ (Harvey, 2001:287).

⁵³ Unlike the opposition of Jessop (2001) in his article that spatial fix and temporal fix are two different concepts and must be evaluated as so; within the scope of this thesis, I find to use spatial-temporal fix in accordance with Harvey’s explanations about through double meaning of ‘fix’: First meaning of fix is ‘a more literal fix in the sense of the durable fixation of capital in place in physical form’ and the other is ‘a more metaphorical ‘fix’ in the sense of an improvised, temporary solution, based on spatial reorganization and/or spatial strategies, to specific crisis-tendencies in capitalism’ in Harvey(2004). Harvey’s concept would be clearer with his saying about the necessity of spatial-temporal fix that “Aircraft are mobile but the airports to which they fly are not (Harvey, 2004).

⁵⁴ Such inner dialectic of civil society can be seen as the unrest nature of capital relation that provides the historical specificity of capitalism.

This paragraph can be considered as an immediate definition of the imperialism/colonialism of Hegel and it can be evaluated that Hegel perceives them (imperialism/colonialism) as “the necessary resolutions to internal contradictions that bound to beset any ‘mature’ civil society” (Harvey, 2001:287). Harvey’s interpretation of Hegel’s above quotation paves the way to create his conceptual framework. According to Harvey (2001:287-8), for Hegel,

Civil society is forced to seek an *outer* transformation through geographical expansion because its ‘inner dialectic’ creates contradictions that admit no internal resolution.

However, the potential of spatial expansion to resolve the crisis of the capital relation within a specific civil society is arguable. Due to existence of ‘inner dialectic’, “a spatial resolution to capitalism’s contradictions (Harvey, 2001:299)” can potentially create new crisis in new regions. Since, capital relation is bound to transform other modes of production, newly created spatial fixes also have same ‘tendency’ for crisis. By the way, such tendency cannot be evaluated as free from the struggle between working classes and capitalist, and competition among individual capitalists.

What I try to highlight that “when a particular civil society creates fresh productive powers elsewhere to absorb its over-accumulated capital (that may be named as imperialism), it thereby establishes a rival center of accumulation which, at some point in the future, must also look to its own spatial fix to resolve its problems”(Harvey, 2001:303). This can be claimed for what happened after Second World War in West Germany and Japan according to Harvey (through Marshall Plan⁵⁵). The two countries (new spatial and temporal fixes for over-accumulated the US capital) absorbed the over-accumulated capital of the US and now they have been perceived as the main threat to the US in world capitalism. Similarly, after the crisis in the 1970s (which “was a classic overaccumulation crisis”, Clarke, 2001:86),

⁵⁵ Harvey (2001:341).

... surplus capital found new outlets for productive investment, particularly in East Asia, where 'modernizing states' played a key role in providing the institutional infrastructure for accumulation and in preparing an educated, motivated and disciplined working class. (Clarke, 2001:86)

Harvey also interprets the crisis of capital as 'over accumulation crises'⁵⁶. In addition, for him "... spatial and temporal displacements⁵⁷ offer ample opportunities to absorb the surpluses (of capital and labour, Harvey, 2001:318)", as it was also mentioned in above paragraphs. However, such process, to find 'new outlets' (or 'new plane' in Harvey's term) cannot occur smoothly.

Over accumulation defines a state in which the smooth conversion of capital from one form to another and into money in particular, has become impossible. (Harvey, 2001:320)

Thus, the way for such 'conversion' brings me to the definition of spatio-temporal fixes. In line of Harvey's thinking on the crisis of capital, it can be summarized that over accumulated capital (capital in crisis) seeks to find new way to expand, to be realized, ultimately to resolve its crisis. The endless searching for 'new plane', as Harvey (2001:241) indicates the base of the argument that "creating world market is inherent to the very concept of capital" as Marx (1999) highlights.

⁵⁶ Harvey (2001:315) explains this as such: The crisis is typically manifest as a condition in which the surpluses of both capital and labour which capitalism needs to survive can no longer be absorbed. I call this a state of over accumulation. Moreover, 'the fact that capitalist accumulation always and everywhere takes the form of the overaccumulation and uneven development of capital implies that capitalist accumulation will always be interrupted by crisis marked by the devaluation of capital and the destruction of productive capital' Clarke (2001:90).

⁵⁷ Spatial and Temporal Displacement is clearly identified by Harvey (2003) in his article in Socialist Register. For him, 'The basic idea of the spatio-temporal fix is simple enough. Overaccumulation within a given territorial system means a condition of surpluses of labor (rising unemployment) and surpluses of capital (registered as a glut of commodities on the market that cannot be disposed of without a loss, as idle productive capacity, and/or as surpluses of money capital lacking outlets for productive and profitable investment). Such surpluses may be absorbed by (a) temporal displacement through investment in long-term capital projects or social expenditures (such as education and research) that defer the re-entry of current excess capital values into circulation well into the future, (b) spatial displacements through opening up new markets, new production capacities and new resource, social and labor possibilities elsewhere, or (c) some combination of (a) and (b).

While quoting from Harvey, I tried to highlight the centrality of the circulation of capital in capitalist system. Circulation⁵⁸ of capital is necessary for the reproduction of capitalist mode of production, which is the present mode of production that is producing and reproducing the everyday life.

Capital tends to 'circulate' without circulation time (Marx, 1973) and circulation of capital necessitates "social and physical infrastructures" (Harvey, 2001:313) which means that those infrastructures are necessary for capital to circulate without circulation time meaning that diminishing the barriers in front of the valorisation process.

In other words, regarding capital, "space appears as a barrier to be overcome" (Harvey, 2001:327). However, as Harvey argues, in order to annihilate space with time, "production of fixed and immobile spatial configurations (transport systems, and so on)" (Harvey, 2001:327) is compulsory. In other words, "spatial organization is necessary to overcome space" (Harvey, 2001:328) for capital relation. This is also what I argue by stating that capital has to expand at the same time it has also territory-bounded nature (Poulantzas, 1979:42).

"Capital and labour power must be brought together at a particular point in space for production to proceed" (Harvey, 2001:328), which is factory. Behind all this spatial configurations, there is tendency to create a 'structured coherence' in which capital can reproduce itself through smooth process of "production and consumption within a given space" (Harvey, 2001:328). Hence

... production and consumption, supply and demand (for commodities and labour), productions and realization, class struggle and accumulation, culture and lifestyle, hang

⁵⁸ "Circulation is an inescapable condition for capital, a condition posited by its own nature, since circulation is the passing of capital through the various conceptually determined moments of its necessary metamorphosis - its life processes" (Marx, 1857).

together as some kind of structured coherence within a totality of productive forces and social relations (Harvey, 2001:329).

In other words, for smooth process of capital accumulation, ‘creation of fixed, secure and largely immobile social and physical infrastructures’ is compulsory. Since,

This provides the necessary physical infrastructures for production and consumption to proceed over space and time (everything from industrial parks, ports and airports, transport and communications systems, sewage and water provision, housing, hospitals, schools (Harvey, 2004).

Harvey adds that the created structured coherence through spatial-temporal fixes, “... tends to be undermined by powerful forces of accumulation and over accumulation, technological change and class struggle” (Harvey, 2001:332). In other words, “accumulation and over-accumulation, class struggle and technological changes disrupt and transform’ class alliances as same as ‘they affect all fixed spatial configurations” (Harvey, 2001:335). And this creates a tension between spatial boundness of capital and its tendency to overcome the barriers in front of smooth capital accumulation process.

According to Harvey, such tension, between fixity and motion⁵⁹, in the period of crisis, incarnates into search for new ‘spatial fix’ with temporal displacements (Harvey, 2001:336) “...which threatens the coherence in a given territory and enable the instable character of capital relation more visible by causing formation and re-formation of new class alliances”. Consequently, as the incarnated form of such chronic instability, there emerge,

... trade wars, dumping, tariffs and quotas, restrictions on capital flow and foreign exchange, interest-rate wars, immigration policies, colonial conquest, subjugation and domination of tributary economies, the forced reorganization of territorial division of

⁵⁹ As Brenner (1998) points out the tension between fixity and motion is the tension ‘between capital's necessary dependence on territory or place and its space-annihilating tendencies,’

labour ...and finally, the physical destruction and forced devaluation achieved through military confrontation and war (Harvey, 2001:339).

It is argued before that, capital tends to 'circulate' without circulation time, as Marx (1999) argues and circulation of capital necessitates "social and physical infrastructures" (Harvey, 2001:313) which means that fixed infrastructures are necessary for capital to circulate without circulation time. This means diminishing the barriers in front of the valorisation process which is the core of the 'chronic instability' of capital relation. In such a chronic instability, state is indispensable element in the constitution of new 'structured coherence', since nation-state is a key-element in the process of spatial and temporal configuration of geography for smooth conditions for capital accumulation. Thus, claiming of the disappearing of nation-state (and being replaced by a trans-(supra)-national level) seems to be a baseless argument in a world constituted through capital relation (Wood, 1999, 2003, 2006).

As Savran (2002) argues, "capital roams the world freely as if it were a 'smooth' space of valorisation, but national spaces have their specificities ..." and those 'specificities' are constituted through different configurations of space and time by different regulations of nation-states even they have been tried to be informed by so-called 'transnational' regulations (by IMF, WB e.g.) and agreements (GATT, MAI e.g.)

In above paragraphs, the concept of spatio-temporal fix might be seen as a concept mostly related with 'economic' sphere or can be evaluated as a derived concept from economic determinist outlook as Jessop (2001) argues. On the contrary, according to Arrighi (2005:10), "spatial-fixes have an inescapable social aspect". For him, the concept means;

The literal fixing of capital in the form of ports, roads, airports, factories, schools etc. in and on the land, creates something more than a geographical landscape facilitating the accumulation of capital. It also brings into being a particular human habitat of social interaction and reproduction. And conversely, the metaphorical spatial fix for over-

accumulation crises involves much more than a devaluation of the capital fixed in land that is made obsolete by the creation of a new geographical landscape. It also involves a devastation of the human habitat embedded in the obsolescent landscape of capital accumulation (Arrighi, 2005:10).

Based on an analysis through Harvey's conceptual framework, it might be claimed that in order to provide a secure and profitable condition for valorisation of capital, new conditions for spatial/temporal fixes is brought into agenda (with neo-liberal transformation) by capitalists, namely new configuration of time and space since the 1980s.

Throughout this continuous search -restlessness of capital- for new configuration of space and time, we can interpret post-1970 (which is presented as the creation of Dollar-Wall Street regime which has been providing financial capital lead the world economy, by Gowan 2005, 2006) financial enlargements (through neo-liberal policies) as the product of searching new spatio-temporal fixes to avoid over accumulated capital in core countries being devalued. In other words, those financial enlargements in the history of capitalism can be seen as the response of capital to the crisis of capital relation in both the periods after the 1870s and the 1970s (Arrighi, 2000b). That is to say, that the financial enlargements occur when the 'smooth process' of accumulation (surplus value extraction or exploitation of the labor force) cannot be carried on sometimes (that is condition of crisis) and for capital (totally or partially) withdrawal from production sphere and entering into 'fictitious' form seems more profitable⁶⁰.

In line of this thinking, I argue that what has been happening since the 1980s and accelerated with the 1990s have been the "more visible form of the chronic instability of the capital relation" (Harvey, 2001) that find its concrete form in neo-liberal policies to create a more integrated world market through financialization.

⁶⁰ This is "dissociation of money from exploitation" in the account of Bonefeld (1995).

Financial enlargements mean actually the withdrawal of capital from production sphere and entrance into financial markets as credits, loans debts etc. Without buying and/or selling commodity in the markets, capitalists earn profits (M-M') from exchanging those papers (financial assets) in financial markets. However, as Bonefeld (2004) highlights, "... the guarantee of M-M' depends on M-P-M', that is exploitation of labour". In other words, "for the conversion of his money into capital ... the owner of money must meet in the market with the free labourer" (Bonefeld, 2004). This is what Marx means by explaining the general formula of capital. Therefore, reproduction of capital necessitates the 'expanding of value'⁶¹ and this cannot be achieved through exchanging of those papers without entering into production sphere that is place for surplus value production which is still regulated by the nation-states. In order to support this argument, it is significant to highlight the relation between nation-state and globalization.

2.2.5 Nation-State and 'Globalization'

... I would like to report that the rumours of the death of the state have been greatly exaggerated (Gilpin, 2003:350).

It was argued that liberal (globalist) perception of globalization based on the idea of trans-(supra)-nationalization undermines the role of nation-states. As opposed to those "globalists" who "have ... overstated the degree of state powerlessness" (Weiss, 1997:16); nation-states keep their key positions in capitalist system that has been witnessing a crisis since the 1970s. As highlighted by Rees (2001) "the role of the state has certainly been significantly

⁶¹ Expanding of value refers an activity of 'infinitely' putting the money into production process that is exploitation of labour which is source of reproduction of capitalist social relations. Therefore, the claims about 'trans (supra) nationalization' seem less convincing. Since, capitalist social relations cannot be reproduced through earning money from money; it is hardly true to claim that globalization means trans(supra)nationalization. Thus, internationalization of capital cannot mean 'trans-nationalization' or 'de-territorialization' since world is still linked through capital relation.

altered by globalization, but it has not been weakened”. Moreover, as Weiss (1997:13) argues, it is possible to argue that “... while national economies may in some ways be highly integrated with one another, the result—with the partial exception of money markets—is not so much a globalized world (where national differences virtually disappear), but rather a more internationalized world (where national and regional differences remain substantial and national institutions remain significant).”

Suffice to say for the time being, the changing character of capitalist states can be interpreted as changing forms of intervention of state (as if it’s a distinct entity from society- or externally related to) to society. In other words, as Petras (2001) argues, nation-state secures its central position in world capitalism that “is a global system organized nationally” (Wood, 1999).

The other side of the globalist argument of so-called ‘trans-(supra)-nationalization’ is the rising number of ‘transnational’ corporations which are considered as the sign of declining of nation-states. However, apart from the globalist account, (from a radical point of views, i.e. Marxists) analysis of ‘trans-national corporations, “transnational capital or classes or power bloc” (Wissel, 2004)’ or “transformations of international historic bloc to transnational historic bloc” (Gill, 1991) have proliferated since the 1980s. Those analyses based on the rising number of ‘transnational bodies’ (like Trilateral Commission) corporations without national roots (Sklair, 1999) seem to be exaggerated, since for many scholars those corporations still keep their national characteristics (Savran, 2006, Petras, 2001, Pozo-Martin, 2006) and those international bodies (like IMF, World Bank, WTO) are seen as the “international mediators of US hegemony” (Barrow: 2005:136).

In addition, talking about a ‘transnational class or capital’ (Robinson, 2000; Sklair, 2000; Gill and Law, 1989; Morton and Bieler, 2004) seems to be a strong claim (if not unrealistic, Wood, 1999, 2003) but needs further analysis.

In line of thinking that I was trying to develop since the beginning of this work, I propose that claiming of transnationalization of capital, with last financial enlargement era⁶² of capitalism since the 1970s, does deny the ‘imperialist’ and thus *inter*-national character (thus the spatial dimension) of capital relation since the formation of capitalist mode of production (Luxemburg, 2004). The claims about the ‘new form’ of capital (that is transnational form) also undermine what Sweezy (1997) tries to mention by stating that “globalization is not a condition or a phenomenon: it is a process that has been going on for a long time, in fact ever since capitalism came into the world as a viable form of society ...”

As it is mentioned above, the main assumption of liberal perception/presentation of globalization is the ‘assault’ of trans-(supra)-national forces on the scope of jurisprudence of nation-states. In other words, ‘globalists’ perceives globalization in accordance with such ‘dichotomy’- Trans-(supra)-national Forces Vs Nation-States.

In the categorization of Weiss (1997) there are four kind of understanding about this issue:

- i) Strong globalization; state power erosion.
- ii) Strong globalization; state power unchanged.
- iii) Weak globalization (strong internationalization); state power reduced in scope
- iv) Weak globalization (strong internationalization); state power adaptability and differentiation emphasized.

Similarly, for Sklair (1999) there are three different conceptions of ‘globalizations’:

⁶² Arrighi (2000) explains those financial enlargement periods as ‘systemic accumulation circles’ and claims that those eras have been repeated in the history of capitalism. It is suffice to say for my outlook that following Harvey, in a specific territory, lack of profitable configuration in space for capital, force capital gain its money form as credit, debt or other government papers.

a) *International* or *state-centrist* conception of globalization where internationalization and globalization are used interchangeably b) *transnational* conception of globalization, where the basic units of analysis are transnational practices forces and institutions c) *globalist* conception of globalization in which state is actually said to be in the process of disappearing.

As it might be realized, Weiss' category (i) resembles to the Sklair's category of (c). In both categorizations, state is claimed to be eroded due to the conditions created by 'globalization'. This was actually what I called the liberal perception/presentation of 'globalization'.

Indeed, this created 'dichotomy' between trans-(supra)-nationalization and the nation-state finds its concrete forms in the neo-liberal discourse which finds its form in Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2000).

According to Öniş and Şenses (2005), the idea behind Washington Consensus is the neo-liberal political economy. For them,

The organizing principle of neoliberal political economy was the notion of a minimal state, whose primary functions were to secure law and order, ensure macroeconomic stability and provide the necessary physical infrastructure.

In sum, "the state itself was conceived as the problem rather than the solution", in Washington Consensus, hence neo-liberalism, the contemporary form of the response of capital to its crisis conditions through internationalization, mostly financialization. Thus, this constitutes the main hold of the liberal (globalists) arguments about the 'globalization' process.

In writings of Öniş and Şenses (2005), Washington Consensus is evaluated as;

The universal policy proposal was to pursue a systematic programme of decreasing state involvement in the economy through trade liberalization, privatization and reduced public spending, freeing key relative prices such as interest rates and exchange rates and lifting exchange controls.

Such a 'universal policy proposal' is based on an understanding that "imperfect markets are always superior to imperfect states" (Öniş and Şenses, 2005).

However, due to various reasons (and conjunctural crisis through 1990s), it has been argued that it is necessary to revise that policy proposal immediately after the Asian Crisis at the end of 1990s. Hence, the so-called Post-Washington Consensus has been stated to emerge (Öniş and Şenses, 2005:274). Such new consensus can be argued as the ‘revised form’ of the former consensus that could not achieve ‘promises of globalization’ (Stiglitz, 2002) to create ‘the world’ in wealth and security dispersed equally and extensively. Most important proposition of this new consensus is actually its “... recognition that states have an important role to play in the development process” (Öniş and Şenses, 2005:275).

Such revision in the ‘governance’ of world capitalism through the change in Washington Consensus, seems contradictory to the claims/assumptions of liberal perception/presentation of globalization in which also nation-states are also considered as barriers in front of the historical progress of humanity through ‘globalization’, since ‘globalization’ has been perceived as an epochal shift signifying the end of history (hence end of nation-state) which would create a ‘Kantian cosmopolitan world order’ based on peace (Kagan, 2005).

“Recognition of the states” in (post) Washington Consensus is the recognition of the ‘chronic instability’ created by the tension between ‘fixity’ and ‘motion’ that is actually the tension between the tendency of capital to create world market and the necessity for spatial configuration for smooth process of capital accumulation. Since capitalism is organized nationally, nation-states cannot be withered away in such a world.

Washington Consensus⁶³ has same assumptions with the liberal perception/presentation of ‘globalization’. In addition, their very relation are so significant because;

According ... to many left critics of globalization, it is not seen as a crisis-ridden development of capitalist reproduction but rather as a regulative crisis i.e. a crisis of the political regulation of capital. The instability of the world economy since the early 1970s is seen to have led to the emergence of a qualitative different phase of accumulation, transforming the fordist Keynesian welfare-state into post-fordist neoliberal competition state. (Bonefeld, 2001).

Thus, focusing on the change of the role of nation-state in the policy proposals between Washington and (post) Washington Consensus that is “institutionalized revision of neoliberalism” (Oguz, 2006:152) seems to locate the argument about the change occurring since 1970s as a management problem of the world economy rather than focusing on the crisis-ridden nature of capital relation. In other words, the revitalization of the role of state in neoliberal discourse (from Washington to post-Washington Consensus) must be perceived in such a way that “recognition of the states” in (post) Washington Consensus is the recognition of the ‘chronic instability’ created by the tension between ‘fixity’ and ‘motion’ that is actually the tension between the tendency of capital to create world market and the necessity for spatial configuration for smooth process of capital accumulation. Since capitalism is organized nationally, nation-states cannot be withered away in such world through internationalization of capital. Then, the question is what happens to the forms of nation-state in the internationalization process of capital.

As Radice (1999) argues, the ability of nation-states has been undermined in such a process. However, this does not seem to challenge with the idea of ongoing centrality of nation-states today. For instance, neo-liberal idea of minimal state (motto of globalization period) cannot be grasped as ‘diminishing power of the state’ in the period of the 1980s’ and 1990s’ globalization; rather,

⁶³ Washington Consensus is argued as Apostle’s Creed of globalization according to Galbraith (1999).

it means that forms of intervention (forms of engagement, Jessop, 2001; and/or nature of state intervention, Navarro, 2006) of nation-state have been changed in order to provide secure spatial organizations with spatial and temporal displacements for over-accumulated capital. Moreover, instead of minimal state the newly invented concept of ‘market-friendly state’ (and also the definition of the state protecting and correcting the markets in the 1997 World Bank Report, namely the efficient capitalist state according to Panitch⁶⁴) can easily be evaluated as proving the idea that nation-states still secure their significant role in capitalist system (Wood 2003, 2006).

Hence, the revised forms of intervention of the capitalist state can be summarized as,

... to enable national capitalist development by the provision of appropriate physical and human infrastructure, by enabling the rise of an entrepreneurial class, by managing the internal and external macroeconomic balances, by opening their land and peoples to international trade and investment, and by cleansing the political elites and systems of corruption and violence in favour of democratic (i.e. electoral) legitimacy, transparency and stability (Radice, 2001).

Capitalism, therefore must be evaluated as a ‘multiple state system’ (2003b), since as Savran (2002) claims, “... each nation-state is still the locus of class-power” and “the ruling class of each nation has to consolidate its rule at the national level”.

What I have tried to assert up to now is clearly summarized by Albo (2003). He underlines that,

Capitalist economies are defined by a continual process of transformation of commodities and social relations in time and space in the pursuit of surplus value in the form of profits. The appropriation and production of value and commodities through the exploitation of labour takes place in spatially specific places of production; but the circulation of commodities and the distribution of value in exchange flows is potentially not bounded to any particular place. These two simple propositions have important conceptual implications. They imply that capitalism is inherently expansionary in a double-sense: competitive rivalries continuously compel the increase in the productivity of labour by

⁶⁴ Oguz (2006)

adding capital goods and reorganizing work, and there is a constant need to seek out new markets and new sectors for the production and realisation of new value added. And they suggest that particular places of production are always implicated in a wider set of social relations and exchange flows that form a 'hierarchy of space' in a more encompassing market.

Similarly, capitalist social relations and nation-states, as a form of those social relations, still secure their places (and/or powers) to constitute whole landscape (even space) of the world. Therefore the link between capital accumulation process and nation-states must not be allowed to be ignored by globalist assumptions which have been declaring that nation-state is declining and new 'global or transnational state' (Robinson, 2001) is arising.

In line of this thinking, (as opposed to the globalist claims that humanity enter in a new era divorced from constraints and clashes of nation-states based on the neo-liberal assumption that markets as the 'arena of freedom' provides a compatible ground for new era) it was insisted that 'globalization' is actually the response of capital to its crisis-ridden nature. To summarize,, it seems more meaningful to perceive that 'globalization' is the internationalization process of capital' (Oguz, 2006) due to capital relation's chronic instability created by the tension between fixity and motion.

2.3 CONCLUSION

"Globalization" is a polyvalent, promiscuous, controversial word that often obscures more than it reveals about recent economic, political, social, and cultural changes (Jessop, 2002).

What 'globalization' actually 'obscures' can be claimed as the crisis-ridden nature of capital relation created by the tension between fixity and motion. As a 'grand narrative of great transformation', the liberal perception/presentation of globalization is based on the emergence of new era characterized by a trans-(supra)-nationalization process through which world has turned out to be a

‘global village’ divorced from the geopolitical clashes between nation-states due to diminishing power of nation-states against trans-(supra)-national forces.

As opposed to such globalists view, to read globalization discourse (that is liberal) as “... a gigantic misreading of current reality- a deception imposed upon us by powerful groups, and even worse one that we have imposed upon ourselves, often despairingly” (Wallerstein, 1999, 2004) seems more viable. Moreover, it can be argued that ‘globalization’ as an explanatory concept has been consciously used instead of the concept of ‘imperialism’ (Boratav, 2004).

Globalization may be seen as primarily an economic, a political or a cultural process, or as involving changing combinations of these elements. Globalization may also be studied primarily as a process with specific societal origins which then expands on an increasingly worldwide basis, or as a feature of systemic interaction from the outset (Bromley, 1999:289-90).

However, “... globalization is not itself a driving force. It remains what it has been throughout the period we think of as modern history: always expansive and often explosive capital accumulation processes” (Sweezy, 1997). Thus, “What is relevant and important is to understand that capitalism is in its innermost essence an expanding system both internally and externally” (Sweezy, 1997) which finds its expression today, in so-called globalization process that actually correspond to the internationalization of capital.

By stating that globalization of the 1980s and (mostly) the 1990s might be considered as a form of crisis of capital relation, I do not claim that every transformations/changes that have occurred in social reality since the 1980s have been nothing but the necessary consequences of the restlessness of the capital relation. What I really want to emphasize is that the concept of globalization in its commonly presented form, has been considered as indispensable and irresistible and such presentation of globalization by various social actors neutralizes the conflictual nature of the globalization as a form of crisis.

Thus, I insisted on to make sense of ‘globalization’ as internationalization process of capital’ by presenting the Harvey’s conceptual framework based on the conceptual framework of him designed through the tension between tendency of capital relation to create world market and its need of being spatially fixed in the landscapes of the world shaped by ‘nation-states’. This is what Harvey tries to emphasize by stating that

The inner contradictions of capitalism are expressed through the restless formation and re-formation of geographical landscapes. This is the tune which the historical geography of capitalism must dance without cease (Harvey, 2001:333).

Following this line of thinking, I argue that capitalism as multiple state system (Wood, 1999, 2003) is still in need of nation-state for secure and smooth accumulation process, since there seems no other capable institution or formation to replace it as Wood (2003) argues. Thus, liberal presentation of globalization as trans-(supra)-nationalization which has been associated with ‘crisis of the territorial nation-state’ (Held, 2003) is not a viable (and also historical⁶⁵) argument as it denies the fact mentioned above about crisis-ridden, hence expansionist nature of capital relation which has to be (re) constituted/formed through ‘structured coherences’ established by spatial-temporal fixes due to space boundedness of surplus-value production- that is to say “... the guarantee of M-M’ depends on M-P-M’, that is exploitation of labour” (Bonefeld, 2004).

On the other hand,

The purpose of capitalist expansion remains the same-increasing the profitability of investments-but the methods, means, and instruments need to be adapted to changing historical circumstances (Vilas, 2002).

Those methods, means and instruments can be adapted through class struggles which originally have been giving different configurations of social classes in

⁶⁵ Since, “... the contradiction between the global character of capitalist accumulation and the national form of state is not a phenomenon but rather a characteristic of capitalism since its inception” Bonefeld (2001).

each ‘national’ space. Thus, even through some international regulations, agreements or policy proposals (such as Washington Consensus and its institutionally revised form⁶⁶ that is post-Washington Consensus) by the ‘directives’ of some ‘international’ institutions and /or forums (such as G7, IMF, Trilateral Commission or Davos) those ‘national’ spaces have tried to be uniformed in order to response the interests of international capital, every distinct national space⁶⁷ has its own economic, political and cultural configurations due to the different social struggles that have been made by different social classes. That is to say, “capital roams the world freely as if it was a ‘smooth’ space of valorisation, but national spaces have their specificities ...” (Savran, 2002). Moreover, those specificities are (re) constituted through class struggles within each ‘national’ space; hence they are not totally transformed in accordance with the regulations, agreements policy proposals easily.⁶⁸

In this chapter, by critically approaching the concept of ‘globalization’, first of all I highlighted that ‘grand narrative of great transformation’ that is globalization presented as ‘epochal shift’ in human history distorts the perception of the reality by claiming that after the 1990s human history was totally transformed. Therefore in order to make sense of ‘globalization’, I pointed out the necessity to focus on the relation between ‘globalization’-that is

⁶⁶ Oguz (2006).

⁶⁷ Moreover, as Hobsbawmn (1998:4) argue, “... the world economy continues to operate within the constraints of the state system in two ways. First, most of its transactions still take place within the borders of states, that is to say as internal trade and not as international trade (imports or exports). Second, it still remains subject to varying extents to the laws, institutions and policies of state governments.”

⁶⁸ The individual capitalist classes in a given national space have same interests with the interests of international capitalist classes. However, even their interests are same; those individual capitalist classes have different power within that specific national space due to continuous class struggles which creates different configuration of power relations between social classes. In here, for my argument it is enough to highlight the different individual capitalist classes in different national space face with distinct power configuration due to ‘national’ class struggles. For a brief not on the relations between national space and the capitalists, see Yıldızoğlu (2007a).

actually the internationalization of capital- and the main social relation that (re) constitutes the social reality, that is capital relation.

Then, I argued that the main argument behind the common perception and presentation of ‘globalization’ is so-called ‘trans-(supra)-nationalization’, which signifies the end of history by claiming the declining of nation-state that would create a cosmopolitan world order divorced from geopolitical clashes-that is a ‘global village’. In addition, it was pointed out that since surplus-value production that gave the historically distinctive characteristics to capitalist mode of production can occur in a ‘structured coherence’ established by spatial-temporal fixes, capitalism is still multiple state systems which are in need of nation-state for smooth accumulation process.

Then, based on categorization of two ‘globalization’ (of Yıldızoğlu, 2003), I insisted on to perceive ongoing transformations since the 1990s as a response of capital relation to its structural crisis through ‘internationalization’ in order to create new ‘structured coherences’ through new spatial-temporal fixes.

As I mentioned before, I insisted on ‘globalization’ as a concept cannot be operationalized as an *explanan* in order to analyze changes in world capitalism since the 1990s. Thus, after making differentiation between ‘globalization’-that is internationalization of capital- and ‘long-historical evolutionary globalization’ (Yıldızoğlu, 2002), I offered to perceive the changes in world capitalism through the process of ‘internationalization of capital’ which have theoretical capacity to perceive the tension that is immanent in capital relation.

To summarize, by focusing on the tension between fixity and motion, I insist on the ongoing primacy of nation-state for capital accumulation process through internationalization of capital which has been presented as ‘globalization’.

Such a conceptual framework, focusing on the tension of capital between fixity and motion (Brenner, 1998; Harvey, 2001) will provide me necessary outlook to critically engage with another 'narrative of great transformation' which has been presented as to have been signifying the emergence of another new era- that is Empire; with which I will try to deal critically in the next chapter by following this line of thinking.

CHAPTER 3

THE CONCEPT OF “EMPIRE” AND ITS CRITICS

3.1. Introduction

If we have to use force, it is because we are America.
We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We
see further into the future.
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
(In Bill Clinton's second term in US Presidency)⁶⁹

Today, according to Quadrennial Defence Review Report of USA, 2006; different from any army of nation-states, “... nearly 350,000 men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces are deployed or stationed in approximately 130 countries”. In addition, the currency of the US is still the world currency though the challenge of Euro. Consequently, this makes the US different from any other nation-state and identifying such power of a nation-state significant.

About the role of the US in world capitalism, in Turkish, two works of Timur (2002) and Yıldızoğlu (2002) took my attention and determined my way of viewing those discussions.

Through the insights derived from those writings in this chapter, an ‘another’ narrative of great transformation since 9/11 Attacks, that is “empire”⁷⁰ (neologism in the aftermath of 9/11 or *Zeitgeist* of the 2000s.), through examining its relations with the liberal perception of so-called globalization and

⁶⁹ Cox (2004).

⁷⁰ Before 9/11 attacks, the concept ‘empire’ has also been operationalized for the role of US in world capitalism. For instance, American Empire was demonstrated as ‘a benevolent empire’ (Kagan, 1998) seeking international security and prosperity which are the long term and universal interest of whole nations in the world. However, as Yıldızoğlu (2002, 2003, 2006) and Colás and Saull (2006) argues, usage of the concept has been flourished in the aftermath of 9/11 events. In order to base my argument, I will accept such periodization.

role of the US in world capitalism will be critically engaged.⁷¹ While doing that, in this chapter, it will be claimed that the contributions of some scholars and thinkers, analyzing the contemporary role of the US in world capitalism through the concept of “Empire”, have similar theoretical assumptions with liberal perception of globalization, while the concept of Empire has been viewed as a ‘rupture’ (Yıldızoğlu, 2006) or ‘sub-period’ (Pieterse, 2004) in so-called globalization process.

The main objective of this chapter then, like the first chapter, is to highlight the significance of focusing on the ‘change in continuity’ rather than solely focusing the change itself as it has been done by the narratives of great transformations (historical ruptures) in human history. In the first chapter, I tried to de-mystify and de-naturalize the so-called globalization which has been perceived and presented as irreversible and irresistible process that is ‘created’ by the end of history. In this second chapter, I will try to de-mystify the concept of “empire” while focusing its usage by radical scholars.

3.2. From Global Village to Revival of Geopolitics⁷²

Generally, these two narratives of great transformation (globalization that is *Zeitgeist* of the 1990s and “empire” that is *Zeitgeist* of the 2000s) have similar and contradictory assumptions, which will be expressed in following sections. Indeed those two narratives are the terms in order to analyze and present the changing conditions that have been occurring in contemporary capitalism since the 1970s. In other words, they might be evaluated also as the literal forms of efforts, which seek analyzing the unresolved crisis condition of the capital

⁷¹ Since, it has been operationalized as an *explanan* as if it is new *Zeitgeist* of the 2000s, it seems necessary to define what the concept of “empire” really is.

⁷² As Nitzan and Bichler (2004:4) emphasizes that “whereas during the period of the global village the focus was on the costs and benefits of ‘globalization’, now that the slogans changed, the dispute centres on the pros and cons of ‘American Imperialism’.”

relation since 1970s. Therefore, they are related with the conditions in and forms of management of contemporary world capitalism. For example, according to Hardt and Negri (2003:116-19), “Empire is the political subject that effectively regulates” global market; moreover it is the “sovereign power that governs the world”. In addition, for them it is in globalization that “sovereignty of nation-states ... has progressively declined” (Hardt and Negri (2000: xi) which led the ‘global market’ to emerge.

Both liberal perception/presentation of globalization as trans-(supra)-nationalization and the theoretical usages of the concept of “empire” have been used to demonstrate that there occurred a ‘qualitative’ change in world economy/world capitalism and I tried to criticize the liberal (globalist) claims about globalization in the previous chapter. Now, following conceptual framework that has been presented in the previous chapter, I will try to make a critical reading of the usages of the concept of “empire” by some radical scholars in order to analyze the transformations in world capitalism.

The concept itself, in one way or another, is attached to the governmental and economic acts of the US, since,

... particularly since the terrorist attacks on the United States(US) in September 2001, scholars and commentators across the ideological spectrum have revived the idea of empire to understand the nature of contemporary American global power-and in some instances promote it (Col  s and Saull, 2006).

As Col  s and Saull (2006) argue that in order to analyze the contemporary role of the US, the concept of “Empire”, flourished after the 9/11 events.

If the previous period had been read through liberal perception of globalization, humanity would have been living in a ‘global village’ constituted through supranational forces (Multinational corporations, international organizations, and NGOs) divorced from geo-political clashes of nation-states. Therefore, it

became possible to read 9/11 Attacks as another ‘rupture’ or ‘great transformation’ in human history, since national and/or geopolitical interests of individual countries have been brought into agenda. Indeed, after 9/11 Attacks, the vision of world through ‘liberal perception of globalization’⁷³ could be stated to have collapsed and then suddenly geopolitical clashes have been asserted to come into agenda again (Sicherman, 2002). Some began to claim that ‘globalization is over’ (Yıldızoğlu, 2006) or talked about ‘sinking globalization’ (Ferguson, 2005).

After the attacks on the towers of World Trade Center, the US declared that it could make ‘pre-emptive strikes’ against those threatening its ‘national interests’. While it has been stated that people on earth have been living in a ‘global village’ in which Kantian cosmopolitan world order was achieved (Kagan, 2005)⁷⁴, that was free from geo-political clashes, ‘new national security strategy’ of the US (National Security Strategy, 2002) brought us to the “desert of Real” (Žižek, 2001). Moreover, it became possible to talk about a transformation of global village turned into an arena of ‘new’ *geopolitics* (Klare, 2003) or about “revival of geopolitics” (Sicherman, 2002). In addition, in this era some nation-states have been categorized as ‘rogue states’ or ‘failed states’ or states in ‘gap’⁷⁵ by the elites and ruling classes of other ‘nation-state(s)’ and tried to be integrated into a new ‘free world’ (finds its material

⁷³ According to Liberal perception, due to the collapse of the USSR, ‘global village’ had been presented as the space where human kind with ‘globalization’ reached its final destination namely cosmopolitan world order that is free from geopolitical clashes of nation-states. That was actually presented as the contemporary form of ‘New World Order’.

⁷⁴ Before 9/11, it has been stated that world is a global village, thanks to collapse of the USSR (cause of nuclear threat) and globalization.

⁷⁵ According to Barnett (2003), gap refers to the states which are not connected through globalization and the core refers to the states connected through globalization. For a detailed analysis on thesis of Barnett (2003), see Roberts, Secor, and Sparke (2003). Robert et al (2003: 886-89), interprets Barnett’s theorization as “neo-liberal geopolitics” in which some states are integrated into the international system through neoliberal principles and the other states, states in gap, are excluded.

condition in Bush's sayings of "You either with 'us' or 'them'-terrorists) that is called as "core" by Barnett (2003).

In other words, the expressions, claims and also declarations of politicians and scholars of different nations (of especially G. W. Bush⁷⁶) about this new condition seem to create a contradiction with the previous discourse of 1990s about emerging cosmopolitan world. Now, it was started to be asserted that we have entered a [new] 'new world order' formed by nation-states differentiated as the ones in 'core' and the ones in 'gap'. In brief, instead of explaining the ongoing changes in world capitalism through the new conditions created by the trans-(supra)-national actors of 'global village' since 1990s, new efforts (War on Terrorism), and new concepts (new geopolitics or "empire") were launched to be used both in academic and non-academic circles.

That is to say, as Coward (2006:54) argues,

...the attacks upon New York and Washington and the responses this violence elicited from America and its allies problematised many of the assumptions of accounts of globalization. While the terror attacks appeared at first sight to bear the hallmark of transnational, networked phenomena, the response-the 'war on terror'- has been seen as a return to the state-centric security agenda that characterized the Cold War. While the Soviet Union may have disappeared, then it has been replaced by al-Qa'eda. Similarly, supposed diminishing of importance of the state-centric agenda that had dominated Cold War IR thinking has been refuted by the return to the agenda of organized force in pursuance of national interests.

The "supposed diminishing the importance of the state-centric agenda" was actually the product of 'liberal perception/presentation of globalization', that I discussed in previous chapter. However, the concept of "empire" emerges as a new narrative of historical rupture in human history after 9/11 Attacks with new debates around 'national interests'.

⁷⁶ 'We are planning a broad and sustained campaign to secure our country and eradicate the evil of terrorism. . . Great tragedy has come to us, and we are meeting it with the best that is in our country, with courage and concern for others. Because this is America. This is who we are. This is what our enemies hate and have attacked. And this is why we will prevail.' from Remarks by the President to Employees at the Pentagon," 17 September 2001, quoted by McCartney (2004).

As it was highlighted in the previous chapter, examining the ‘change within continuity’ (Savran, 2002) is much more meaningful to analyze the reality rather than focusing on the ‘change’ solely. Therefore, it is meaningful to discuss this new condition created by 9/11 Attacks through such outlook.

3.3 An Effort to Read the Concepts of Empire and Globalization through the Persistence of Capital Relation

It can be claimed that there emerged ‘tremendous’ changes (searching of capital for new structured coherences through configuration of time and space due to overaccumulation crisis of capital since the 1970s) in world capitalism and such transformations (and responses of various actors) must be managed and pursued through different theoretical approaches, paradigms, discourses or policies. However, while focusing on the ‘change’, most of the policy producers, thinkers and scholars forget the relations that are ‘continuously’ valid and effective. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, these continuous relations are ‘capitalist social relations’ whose crisis-ridden nature constituted through tension between the tendency of capital to create world market through annihilation of spatial barriers and its being bounded to ‘spatial-temporal fixes’ in order to (re) produce (expansion of value through endless surplus value production) itself.

Assuming the existence of such tension will help anyone to examine the relation among globalization (different from liberal perception) that is the response of capital to its crisis-ridden nature through internationalization-searching for new spatial-temporal fixes and the ‘new’ or changed form of rule of contemporary capitalist relations.

Liberal perception/presentation of globalization⁷⁷, through technological determinist outlook, and most of the analysis through the concept of “empire” focuses on only the ‘change’ while undermining the above feature of existing societies. Since, the period before 9/11 events was understood through liberal perception of globalization, it became easy (and seems necessary) to find new paradigms⁷⁸ for understanding the contemporary capitalism. If the ‘changes’ that have been occurring since the 1990s are understood as transformation of the world to a ‘global village’, the aftermath of 9/11 Events seem to necessitate a new paradigm, since in that period humanity can be claimed to have entered into another new phase in which each state must act through its national interest in order to protect its people from any “terrorist” attacks. However, interrogating the “new” agenda that has been shaped through “security” needs of each nation-state lies out of the scope of this thesis.

In this chapter, I am opposing such argument of change (necessitating paradigmatic shift in social relations) and emphasize the necessity to perceive the continuity of capitalist social relations in a world constituted through nation-states and geopolitical clashes as the form of inter-imperialist rivalry. In addition, by stressing the centrality of nation-state in current phase of capitalism as opposed to the “globalist” (liberal) claims about globalization process, I will critically engage with some usages of the concept of “empire”, by some radical thinkers, which has been operationalized for the role of the US, as a nation-state that has been played and is now trying to play a leading role in world capitalism. To do that, due to its similar assumptions with the liberal

⁷⁷ Market fetishistic liberal assumptions that have been giving shape to mainstream (liberal) analysis of globalization are based on an understanding of the relations between nation-state and economy (or society) as an external relations. In such a point of view, state is seen to have monopoly use of physical violence on the other hand; market (or civil society) is seen as the arena of freedom. Therefore, for liberals, ‘globalization’ process which has been providing the ground for supranational economic forces (corporations) to flourish would eventually constitute a ‘global village’ free from the constraints and wars created by nation-states.

⁷⁸ According to Hardt and Negri (2000:251), ‘a paradigm shift in the world economic and political order was taking place’ since 1990s.

perception of globalization, as a narrative of epochal shift in human history, Hardt and Negri's 'theoretical usage' of the concept of "empire" will be analyzed first and then the other usages (other theoretical efforts of Panitch and Gindin, 2003; Gowan, 2004b) of the concept will be presented in the following sections while discussing the relations among globalization, "empire" and the US.

Before going further to present the ideas of some important scholars using the concept of "empire", the relation between two concepts, globalization and "empire", and their relations with the US must be clarified.

3.4 Globalization, Empire and the US

It was discussed in the previous chapter that, after the collapse of the USSR (End of Cold War), a narrative of historical rupture (or great transformation) in human history emerged: that is globalization which has been seen as an 'epochal shift' in human history signifying the end of history that has been created through the geo-political and the economical clashes of nation-states. Such process has been stated as it was created by the so-called globalization (which is actually based on liberal assumptions of declining of nations-states against rising supranational powers). In contrast, it was proposed in previous chapter that contemporary globalization (internationalization) of capital might be read as neo-liberal integration⁷⁹ of world markets through trade and

⁷⁹ Neo-liberal integration of markets across the world might be seen to have been put into motion through neo-liberal policies reflected in (post) Washington Consensus. Washington Consensus and its "institutionalized" form (Oğuz, 2006) post-Washington Consensus were discussed in previous chapter in order to demonstrate false assumptions of the liberal perception of globalization while focusing on the differences between former and latter form of Consensus. The difference is mainly about the role of state in developmental process. While first Consensus was proposing the necessity of a 'minimal state', the latter one changed the argument and proposed the necessity of an effective state which must act in market-friendly manner. I propose that challengeable argument as the sign of the false assumption of declining nation-state of liberal perception of globalization. Moreover, I also highlighted that both form of Consensus might be evaluated as an effort to create new 'structured coherences' around the world through new configuration of space (capital and trade liberalization, offered by IMF through structural adjustment policies may be conceived as the most appropriate examples for

financial liberalizations those of which found their form in the policy proposals made by international institutions, that have been managing the world capitalism since 1945 (say the establishment of Bretton Woods Institutions), in which the control of executive positions are controlled by the US. Furthermore, it was stated that globalization must not be perceived as a neutral (conflict-free and also agent-free) process; since,

... globalization was the magic word which simultaneously naturalized and dramatized ... tiger-leap of capitalist expansion, representing it as the unstoppable, uncontrollable climax of a universal human destiny (Rosenberg, 2005:65).

In the previous chapter, following Rosenberg's arguments above, a separation was made between globalization as a response of capital to its crisis through internationalization and "long evolutionary-historical globalization" that refers to a long historical period in which human beings continuously link to each other which have been occurring since the beginning of history (Yıldızoğlu, 2003:305). I claimed that, by following such a classification⁸⁰, for conceiving the era started with 1980 as a period of searching for solution (to the crisis of capital relation) which reflected itself in financial enlargement of the capital across world markets by the help of technological innovations as 'dependent variables', would make us capable to understand the period started with 1980s and continued up to date.

On the other hand, the liberal perception of globalization, which has been presented as irresistible and inevitable process without a subject, has been carrying similar (if not same) arguments with the other narrative of the era used by US President Ronald Reagan: New World Order (NWO). It seems true to read NWO of the US as a project created for containing its rivals- containment

new plane of effective demand or new structured coherences in which the capital in crisis can find new space to accumulate).

⁸⁰ One the one hand long evolutionary-historical globalization and in the other globalization as the response of capital to its overaccumulation crisis

of the newly independent former Soviet Republics, China and e.g.- into the world capitalism, or subordinating them to the imperatives of the world capitalism. (Rather than viewing NWO as totally liberal perception of globalization, one must perceive the similarities between them).

Consequently, the NWO (whose promises –peace and prosperity- were not different from the promises of liberal presentation of globalization), might be read as project of capital located in the US and the US state for containing the countries that have been in, what Barnett (2003) states, the “gap”. This “neoliberal geopolitics⁸¹” of Barnett (2003), while categorizing the “core” as the landscape on the world connected through so-called “globalization”, categorizes nation-states as ‘rogue states’ or ‘failed states’ referring to the rest of the world, which has not been linked through so-called “globalization”. For Barnett (2003) the US is responsible of bringing all those states in the gap to the core. Therefore, from such an outlook it will be clear that the US had to take initiatives to contain those countries and bring those to the core which signifies actually the global village connected through globalization. Meaning that, those countries in the gap (that have not been integrated into world capitalism through neoliberal principles) must be ‘contained’ into world capitalism by the US according to Barnett, since Friedman (1999) argues that ‘for globalization to work, America can’t be afraid to act like the almighty superpower that it is’. Friedman (1999) also adds that,

...the hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist.... The hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

This actually brings the issues to the ‘violent’ foreign and ‘strict’ domestic and foreign policies of the US since 9/11 events in order to make ‘globalization’-

⁸¹ Roberts, Secor and Sparke (2003) define the categorization of Barnett as neo-liberal geopolitics, which is ‘the extreme form of American unilateralism’ having a ‘geopolitical world vision’... that ‘is closely connected to neoliberal idealism about the virtues of free markets, openness and global economic integration.’

that is internationalization of capital- to work, which has been providing the material for the discussions about the concept of “empire”. This link also underlines that instead of a rupture between previous periods, aftermath of 9/11 has been carrying same characteristics with previous era⁸². Since, the discussions around those concepts of globalization and “empire” has been made in a context in which the US hegemony (which I will discuss in following section) was mentioned as it has declined, it is meaningful to discuss another significant conceptualization and its relations with “empire” and globalization: Hegemony.

3.4.1 Empire and the US Hegemony (or Pax Americana)

3.4.1.1. What is the US Hegemony?

According to Robinson (2005);

There are at least four interwoven conceptions in the literature on the international order and the world capitalist system:

- a) Hegemony as international domination
- b) Hegemony as state hegemony
- c) Hegemony as consensual domination or ideological hegemony
- d) Hegemony as the exercise of leadership within historical blocs within a particular world order.

Crudely, it can be argued that (a) and (b), that have been and are common among various (neo) realist scholars in international relations, are the state-centric use of the concept of hegemony. The (c) is actually the usage of Antonio Gramsci and the (d) can be claimed to be the outlook of Neo-Gramscian scholars.⁸³

⁸² I will return to this continuity in the Third chapter while discussing the whole period since 1980s.

⁸³ “Neo-Gramscian perspectives ... have focused on the reciprocal relationship between production and power; on how distinct modes of social relations of production may give rise to certain social forces, how these forces may become the bases of power within and across states, and how these configurations may shape world order.” (Robinson, 2005:6).

An example of the categories (a) and (b) can be stated to be (neo) realist school of the discipline of international relations. The leading realist scholar, Mearsheimer (2004:184-5) claims that “a hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system”, since “... states constantly look for opportunities to take the offensive and dominate other states”. Such a Hobbesian understanding of international state system perceives nation-states as ‘thing in itself’ that is ‘divorced from society’ thus ‘have its own interest’ to seek power in order to survive in the so-called “anarchy” of international system. Those analyses (even the contributions of those (neo) realist scholars differs, both can be claimed as state-centric⁸⁴) perceive the international system solely “in terms of geopolitical norms of interaction between states” (Rosenberg, 2003:95). For instance, according to Nye (2003:110), “soft power” (say, consent) and ‘hard power’ (say, coercion) together provides the capacity of being hegemony in international system. However, because those characteristic (soft and hard power) are attached to the ‘capacity’ of a nation-state, his understanding is also state-centric.

In addition, those state-centric usages of hegemony locate a-historical idea of ‘fear’⁸⁵ at the center of inter relations between nation-states in world capitalism. However, rather than an idea of abstract ‘fear’, it is more realistic to claim that capital relation (re) constitutes the relations between nation-states in capitalism, that is a “multiple state system” (Wood, 2003b).

⁸⁴ ‘... conventional IR theory, ... reduces hegemony to a single dimension of dominance based on the economic and military capabilities of states’ as Bieler and Morton (2044:87) argues.

⁸⁵ Given this fear (which can never be wholly eliminated) states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances are for survival. Indeed, the best guarantees of survival is to be a hegemon, because no other state can seriously threaten such a might power.’ Mearsheimer,(2004).

The category (c) corresponds to the usage of A. Gramsci. According to Gramsci (1997)⁸⁶, hegemony is constituted through ethico-political leadership of a social class which can demonstrate its interests as ‘universal’ interests through creating a harmony of its and other (subordinate) classes’ interests. In this process, two significant characteristics of hegemonic social class are ‘creating and sustaining a capacity to use coercion over other classes’ and ‘creating and sustaining a capacity to take consent of other classes’, according to Gramsci. The capacity of taking consent of other classes is tested through collective will formation process in which three phases of consciousness are composed (Gramsci, 1971). Roughly, such process can be classified as such;

- Economic-corporate phase (Being aware of specific class interests)
- Phase of class consciousness (Extending specific class interests to more general interests of a social class)
- Phases of hegemony or ethico-political leadership (Bringing the interests of leading class into harmony with those of subordinate classes).

As Scherrer (2001:4) clearly summarizes,

In the economic-corporative phase, the members of a class discover their sets of interests based on their status in production and begin to organize themselves accordingly. In this stage, their demands are short-sighted and fixated on their own economic interests. Only once when they are in a position to develop strategies for ‘universalizing’ their interests – which presupposes abandoning short-term interests – do they reach the next, ethico-political phase. The final, hegemonic or state phase is attained if the members of a class can give their political agenda the nature of a state and thus ‘armour’ their hegemony in civil society with state coercion.

Moreover, two significant things in ‘collective will formation’ and its continuous reformation must be mentioned. One is that, “hegemony is achieved primarily by ‘non-coercive’ means (e.g., by offering a framework for the

⁸⁶ I am aware of the oscillations in the efforts of A. Gramsci to define the concept hegemony- that was originally a Russian concept- which was clearly demonstrated by P. Anderson (1976) in his critical essay. Moreover, for the time being in order to operationalize the concept in international relations in a different way from liberal-Institutionalist and neo-realist usage of hegemony in IR (Eralp, 2005), I will try to follow the argument of Gramsci about the compatibility of the concept of hegemony for international level(Gramsci,1997:325).

solution of other groups' problems) though not without coercion as a backdrop" (Scherrer, 2001:17), since "hegemony refers to an entrenched form of rule that resorts to coercion only in exceptional cases" (Scherrer, 2001:3). The other one is the existence of an 'integral state'⁸⁷ that was originally defined as nation-state by Gramsci. Thus, in Gramscian sense, in collective will formation process (consent building process), dominant class in historical bloc is in need of an integral state that helps to provide the capacity to dominant class to demonstrate its interests as the universal interest of whole society which, as a result, shall create ethico-political leadership of that dominant class-that is *hegemony*.

Today, in a condition of 'non-existence' of 'global state' (cf. Robinson, 2005), an analysis of international state system through the concept of hegemony (with a definition of Gramsci), especially its operationalization for the US (in the aftermath of WWII and also today) seems to have various form of eclecticism, since, most of the usages of the concept of hegemony for the management of world capitalism seem to become state-centric, due to non-existence of a 'global state'. However, following Anderson (2002)⁸⁸, for the time being it seems enough for our argument to perceive the concept of hegemony in international relations as the combination of coercive and consensual means. In other words, capacity of gaining the others' consent through non-coercive mechanisms in order to constitute legitimate order through political, cultural, economic namely ethico-political leadership can be

⁸⁷ "... the state in the strict sense and the state in the broad or 'integral' sense. In the strict sense the state is identical with the government, the apparatus of class dictatorship with its coercive and economic functions. Class domination is exercised through the state apparatus in the classical sense (army, police, administration, bureaucracy). But this coercive function is inseparable from a certain adaptive and educational role of the state, one that seeks to achieve an adequate fit between the productive apparatus and the morality of the popular masses, such function can be realized by a state in broad sense-integral sense." quoted by Bucu-Glucksmann (1980:92)

⁸⁸ "The 'normal' exercise of hegemony ... is characterized by the combination of force and consent, in variable equilibrium, without force predominating too much over consent". Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, Turin 1975, vol. III, p. 1638, quoted by Anderson(2002).

perceived as the central meaning of the concept of hegemony. Thus, the achievement of the US to constitute a legitimate world order through gaining the consents of the other nation-states through various mechanisms with a legitimate jargon of ‘common enemy’⁸⁹, that is the USSR, can be named as the condition of her being hegemony.

Having accepted such definition of the concept of hegemony the following point can be expressed about the US hegemony. In post-World War II, “the broad contours of the international order were created by the US, for her benefits, but other states also found value in it (Mabee, 2004:1362-3). In other words, for the period covering 1945-1970 (which has also been called as *Pax Americana*) it can be claimed that, “... for 20-odd years, what seemed good for the United States seemed good for most of the ‘free world’ as well” (Cox, 2005). Not to deviate my purpose in this study, the questions of how the US managed this period through which economic, social and political channels and initiatives are put aside. For the time being, suffice it to say that,

The post-war world order, designed and maintained by the United States, was capable of imposing discipline on the capitalist system as a whole in the name of “common interest” for all parties. Such “imposition” of hegemonic stability, however, cannot simply be regarded as a by-product of manipulation or coercion. It must also comply with a genuine ability of the leadership to transform economic dominance under a general unification of the camp of capital into political and ideological hegemony (Xing and Hersh, 2006)

In that period of the US hegemony (through its “economic capability”⁹⁰, military strength and cultural effectiveness”, Wallerstein 2003), capitals located in the US and in the other nation-states could be claimed to have found a relatively

⁸⁹ It can be claimed that, “During the Cold War, the threat of Communism served to legitimate U.S. hegemony over other capitalist states” (Gibbs, 2001).

⁹⁰ In post-war period till the end of 1960s, “The country [US] ran a balanced budget and enjoyed a current account surplus; its commodities flooded the world and it owned one half of the world’s foreign assets; the dollar was unchallenged ...” (Nitzan and Bichler, 2004:6).

secure condition for further accumulation⁹¹ and the US, as the leading capitalist state in world economy, could be argued to have given shape to world economy through Bretton Woods institutions from 1945 to 1970. Those international political regulations that had been held by International Monetary Fund and World Bank were not only suitable for the interests of capital located in the US but also suitable for the interests of other capitals located in different nation-states in the world economy. Indeed, that can be seen as the condition of being a hegemon in world capitalism. In other words, as Harvey (2004a) argues, the effect of “U.S. military and economic leadership as the sole capitalist superpower” in post-war era was the construction of “... a hegemonic U.S. (‘super imperialism’)” in world capitalism. However,⁹²

This system broke down around 1970 as the U.S.'s hegemonic economic position became untenable. Capital controls became hard to enforce as surplus U.S. dollars flooded the world market. The US then sought to construct a different kind of system that rested upon a mix of new international and financial institutional arrangements to counter economic threats from Germany and Japan and to re-center economic power as finance capital operating out of Wall Street (Harvey, 2004a).

Such financialization⁹³ (searching for new space to accumulate smoothly) actually has been seen as the “sign of autumn” signifying the end of the US hegemony (Arrighi, 2000). Furthermore, it is commonly accepted that hegemonic world order founded by the US (Cox 1993:60) started to decline (Wallerstein, 2003) with the crisis of capital relation in early 1970s⁹⁴ and since

⁹¹ “The enormous post-war growth of the credit system made it possible to overcome periodic crises and to sustain accumulation, at the cost of rising inflation” (Clarke, 2001a:84).

⁹² For the US, from the late 1960s, “... the trade surplus inverted into growing deficit; the budget balance ballooned into a massive deficit; the ownership of foreign assets by US residents was halved to one quarter of the world total; and government debt rose to over \$ 7.5 trillion-the world largest. These developments were accompanied by the collapse of Bretton Woods” according to Nitzan and Bichler (2004:6).

⁹³ I will try to discuss the new characteristics of this new in the next chapter.

⁹⁴ “The growing overaccumulation and uneven development of capital through 1970s led not only to an economic crisis but also to a deepening political one” (Clarke, 2001:85). However, I will not directly deal with this specifically political crisis (for instance discussions around ‘legitimation’ crisis).

that time, all the administrations (beginning with President Nixon), have pursued a same ‘multilateralist way’ to “handle the loss of hegemony” until the ‘unilateral’ orientation of the administration of G.W. Bush (Wallerstein, 2003).

Having said that Bush (George Walker) Administration in the US and its violent/unilateral foreign policy differs from the ones in previous periods; its meaningful to search the relation between the concepts of “empire” and the US hegemony; since those ‘violent’ and ‘unilateral’ foreign and ‘strict’ domestic policies of the US after 9/11 Attacks, which has been providing the material base for the discussions about the concept of “empire”, can be conceived as the efforts of the US to demonstrate its hegemony (Wood, 2003b:167)⁹⁵ or to make ‘globalization’- that is internationalization of capital- to work. Since, as Friedman (1999) argues, it seems that,

...the hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist.... The hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

3.4.1.2 Empire and the US Hegemony

What is this thing called hegemony? Is it a euphemism for "empire," or does it describe the role of a *primus inter pares*, a country that leads its allies but does not rule subject peoples? And what are the motives of a hegemon? Does it exert power beyond its borders for its own self-interested purposes? Or it is engaged altruistically in the provision of international public goods? (Ferguson, 2003)

It can be claimed that as Ferguson argue above, all those administrations of the US before G. W. Bush tried to engage “altruistically in the provision of international public goods” rather than to “exert power beyond its borders for its own self-interested purposes”. In other words, those administrations before G. W. Bush can be told to have been characterized as the ‘variants of velvet glove hiding the mailed fist’ (Wallerstein, 2003) in which the metaphor of

⁹⁵ For a contrary view to Wood (2003b:167) which claims the assaults and invasions of US as the decline of US, Nitzan and Bichler (2006:8).

‘velvet glove’ actually signifies the demonstration of particular interest as universally good.

“Mailed fist” can be argued to have been released with the unilateralism of G.W. Bush. Meaning that, with the violent foreign policy orientation of Bush administration since 2001, debates on the ‘consensual’ or ‘hegemonic’ order created by the US are started to increase. Such transformation may also be argued as an orientation from ‘multilateralism to unilateralism’ (Soros, 2003, 2005) or ‘from being a soft power to hard power’ (Nye, 2003). Moreover, more open claims declare that the US has been transforming from hegemony into an “empire” (Yıldızoğlu, 2003).⁹⁶

Like Agnew (2003), Mann (2003) and Aktükün (2004:260), Yıldızoğlu (2003, 2007c) operationalize the concept of “empire” as the last step of the US to recover/reconstitute its hegemony. According to him, such violent and strict orientation of the US foreign and domestic policies (through Operation Enduring Freedom and also national regulations through Patriot Act) must be interpreted as the last efforts of a hegemon, since it has no capacity (especially after denying to sign Kyoto Agreement, and to sign the establishment of International Court of Justice and also its invasion of Iraq without a UN resolution) anymore to constitute active consent or collective will of the actors and states across the world. The only orientation left to the US as the sole capitalist state having ever huge military capacity, is to act like an “empire”.

⁹⁶ His analysis is similar to the arguments of Perry Anderson. According to Anderson (2002:13), “These two changes of circumstance—the inflaming of popular nationalism in the wake of September 11 at home, and the new latitude afforded by the RMA abroad—has been accompanied by an ideological shift. This is the main element of discontinuity in current US global strategy. Where the rhetoric of the Clinton regime spoke of the cause of international justice and the construction of a democratic peace, the Bush administration has hoist the banner of the war on terrorism. These are not incompatible motifs, but the order of emphasis assigned to each has altered. The result is a sharp contrast of atmospherics (RMA: Revolution in Military Affairs denoting ‘a fundamental change in the nature of warfare, by comprehensive application of electronic advances to weapons and communications systems).”

Similarly, unilateralism of the US is seen as ‘domination without hegemony’ (and/or *hegemony*)⁹⁷ by Arrighi (2005) while he (Arrighi, 2003) conceives the possibility of world-empire as ‘a collective Western construction’ rather than a US project through her unilateral acts which is also evaluated as the only way to reconstruct its hegemony since,

The aggressive application of ‘hard power’ in the last few years has dissipated the gains US ‘soft power’ made in the post-Second World War era ... US unilateralism and its use of ‘coalitions of the willing’ in impatience with opposition by the majority of states and peoples has divorced the exercise of US power from the legitimacy of universal consent (Cox, 2004:312)

It is clearly declared that the US economy needs over 2 billion dollars (as capital in-flow) a day to sustain its capital account deficit that has been claimed as unsustainable (Arrighi, 2005:12-3). Under such a vulnerable condition, to finance its deficit (and to control her rivals economically and politically such as China, Russia and the other European countries) today the US has to take much more ‘initiatives’⁹⁸ than supporting ‘multilateralism’ through international organizations (which have been established by the US initiatives after 1945 to create the sustainability and expansion of capitalist social relations in international level) and being responsive to the other states’ interests (that can be thought as the necessity for being a hegemon at international level).

In such condition (domination without hegemony, Arrighi, 2005; or transformation from hegemony to “empire”, Yıldızoğlu, 2002), the US is told to create “a new design of international relations” (Ökten, 2004:169)⁹⁹. The US

⁹⁷ Arrighi (2005:21) uses such term (*hegemony*), in order to refer the “US current-account deficit reflecting deterioration in the competitive position of American Business at home and abroad”.

⁹⁸ Those ambitious initiatives including military assaults and invasions have been interpreted as the destructions caused by the tail of a fluttering dinosaur that is near to death by Yıldızoğlu (2002)

⁹⁹ Such ‘new’ design is told to be constructed through “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002 (NSS, 2002). In this governmental document of US (NSS,

foreign policy orientation, in accordance with this strategy (NSS, 2002), has started to be interpreted as a condition of rising “empire”¹⁰⁰. Consequently, “the notion of an American “empire” has become a central figure in contemporary, global political discourse - and employed from a far wider range of viewpoints.”(Howe, 2003:2). As Pieterse (2004:31) claims, “until recently imperialism was a left-wing term, but now empire has become a mainstream theme and makes a comeback in everyday language.”¹⁰¹

Michael Mann (2003) clearly shows the reason of such proliferation of the use of concept of “empire” which stems from the unilateral acts of the US. According to him (2003:2), “US policy toward Kyoto, land-mines, Star Wars, Iraq, Iran or the Southern Philippines’ are ‘all the parts of the grand strategy for a global American Empire, first envisioned as theory, then after 9-11 becoming reality”. In addition, as Howe (2003) argues;

As the US administration advocates pre-emption in doctrine and practice, and the state extends its influence worldwide, the notion of America as an empire is becoming central to contemporary political debate.

This seems so since, according to Ikenberry (2004)¹⁰², “for the first time in the modern era, the world's most powerful state can operate on the global stage without the constraints of other great powers.”

2002), it was stated, which then put into motion through invasions by the US Army, that ‘new paradigm’ shaped by the ‘security needs of nation-states’ has to be applied and the so-called old paradigm, that can be seen as the what Nye (2003) and Soros (2003) called as “multilateralist” paradigm or a paradigm designed by the condition of being *primus inter pares* (Aktükün, 2004:270), must be renounced.

¹⁰⁰For example, according to a realist scholar Ikenberry (2004), “today, the ‘American empire’ is a term of approval and optimism for some and disparagement and danger for others.” For him, “Neoconservatives celebrate the imperial exercise of U.S. power, which, in a modern version of Rudyard Kipling’s ‘white man’s burden,’ is a liberal force that promotes democracy and undercuts tyranny, terrorism, military aggression, and weapons proliferation.”

¹⁰¹For its variant use see, Ignatieff (2003), Cox(2007) Cox(2005).

¹⁰²According to Ikenberry (2004), “We have entered the American unipolar age.” And “the current debate over empire is an attempt to make sense of the new unipolar reality”.

In brief, it has been commonly claimed that the unilateral and violent orientation of the US is the ‘assertion of an American Empire’ (Tabb, 2002; Callinicos, 2002). The so-called theory behind unilateral and violent orientation of the US is argued to be “The Project for a New American Century (PNAC)¹⁰³” which is perceived as the “sign of imperial drive” (Yıldızoğlu, 2002). In accordance with PNAC, the pre-emptive strike, through *Operation Enduring Freedom* based on a unilateralist understanding of defence and/or offence, is seen as the only choice that remain to the US elites and ruling class to re-gain its hegemony¹⁰⁴.

Apart from those conjunctural usage of the concept of “empire” after 9/11, some scholars perceive the primacy of the US in world capitalism in the post-1945 era as the emergence of American empire (Panitch and Gindin, 2003; Cox, 2004, Gowan, 2004)¹⁰⁵, while most of the scholars have been operationalizing the concept interchangeably with imperialism and/or hegemony or even with globalization (Hardt and Negri, 2003)¹⁰⁶.

At first glance, the usages of the concepts imperialism, “empire” and hegemony interchangeably stems from not making clear distinctions between the terms and due to pejorative use of the terms “empire” and “imperialism”. Indeed, most scholars and thinkers conceive and use the concept of “empire” in a pejorative manner (Petras, 2006; Foster, 2005, 2006) or while attributing

¹⁰³ A document prepared by Richard Perle, John Bolton, Paul Wolfowitz, William Kristol, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, has been stated to be “a powerful force in shaping the US’s theory and practice since 9/11 events”(Cox, 2004).

¹⁰⁴ Huge military power of the US that is the most powerful arm of the US among all nation-states makes this possible (Mann, 2003).

¹⁰⁵ I will discuss the contributions of Panitch and Gindin and Gowan in the next chapter.

¹⁰⁶ Some scholars using the concept empire interchangeably with imperialism and/or hegemony are as follows: Colás and Saull (2006), Panitch and Gindin (2006), Bromley (2006), Cox (2006), Soederberg (2004), Pieterse (2006), Foster (2005, 2006a, 2006b), Petras (2006) Wade (2003).

some positive meaning to it (Kagan, 1998; Ignatieff, 2003) without supporting their arguments with any theoretical or material base. However, there are different lines of thinking defining “empire” and hegemony (Yıldızoğlu, 2002) as oppositely and also put the concepts of “empire” and imperialism in opposite directions (Hardt and Negri, 2000)¹⁰⁷. On the other hand, scholars such as Panitch and Gindin (2000, 2003, 2004, 2005), Wood (2003b), Gowan (2004) and Hardt and Negri (2000) make use of the term while avoiding its widespread pejorative meaning.

Among those contributions, the most distinguished one has had an effect in a wide spectrum. The book *Empire* (Hardt and Negri, 2000) became a leading theoretical source for “empire” debates from a radical-Marxist outlook. Since Hardt and Negri (even they try to develop a radical perspective against capitalism) also claim that there is need to construct a “new paradigm” to understand the world capitalism, in a way somehow similar to the assumptions of liberal perception of globalization (due to proposing the existence of trans-(supra)-national level in world capitalism), I will discuss their claims in the light of the conceptual framework that I tried to develop in the previous chapter while focusing on the persistence of capital relation.

3.4.2 Globalization and *Empire*¹⁰⁸

Timur (2002) argues that there emerged an impression that “empire” even imperialism (Cox, 2004) replaced the term globalization after 9/11 events. Similarly Coward (2006), claims that,

¹⁰⁷ I will not deal with all the conceptualization. Instead I will try to demonstrate similar fault in the analysis assuming that we need new paradigms to search for the changes in world capitalism similar to the arguments of liberal perception of globalization.

¹⁰⁸ Hardt, M. Negri, A. (2000).

...the attacks upon New York and Washington and the responses this violence elicited from America and its allies problematised many of the assumptions of accounts of globalization.

Those assumptions of globalization are previously summarized as the emergence of a global village (and/or international community) signifying the end of geopolitical clashes between nation-states in which so-called more universal interests of supranational actors will constitute the relations between people. This condition has been stated to be challenged in the aftermath of 9/11 events, since American unilateralism (American Empire) started to diminish the 'role of international community' (for instance the US invasion of Iraq without taking multilateral decision of the UN).

On the one hand, globalization was stated to diminish the role of nation-state, and on the other hand, in the aftermath of 9/11 events, American "empire", with its national interests while undermining the 'international community' (or global village), brought the old time politics (*Realpolitik*) into the agenda in which the interests of so-called disappeared nation-states become the constitutive force.

As it was mentioned before, capitalism is a 'multiple state system' (Wood, 1999, 2003) and nation-state secures its central position in world economy (Petras, 2006) since "... capitalism is a global system organized nationally" (Wood, 1999). Therefore, the main assumptions of liberal perception of globalization and the most of the usages of the concept of "empire" became problematic for me. Furthermore, it is also possible to assert that some usages of the concept of "empire" assume the significant role of nation-states in management of world capitalism (Petras, 2006; Panitch and Gindin 2003; Gowan 2006; Bromley 2006; Foster 2001), while Hardt and Negri's *Empire* has somehow similar assumptions with liberal perception/presentation of globalization that was summarized as the claims of trans-(supra)-nationalization.

The similarity of the claims of Hardt and Negri find its expression in the arguments of a realist IR scholar Ikenberry (2004). According to Ikenberry,

In the classic Westphalian world order, states hold a monopoly on the use of force in their own territory while order at the international level is maintained through the diffusion of power among states. Today's unipolar world turns the Westphalian image on its head.

The above claims of Ikenberry are so clear in his sentence declaring that “...unipolar world turns the Westphalian image on its head”. Such a view is actually same with the main argument of the liberal perception of globalization, which is based on the understanding that trans-(supra)-nationalization has been diminishing the power of nations-states. Similarly, Hardt and Negri (2000) claim an emergence of trans-(supra)-national level which undermines the sovereignty of nation-states¹⁰⁹. Hence, it is meaningful to discuss the claims of Hardt and Negri (2000) in order to show how such an understanding of reality based on epochal shift is so common among scholars, even from radical-Marxist tradition.

3.4.2.1 *Empire* of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri

The text of Hardt’s and Negri’s *Empire* seems to be a cryptic, esoteric and extravagant, indeed an indecipherable text (Panitch and Gindin, 2002). In the text, one finds lots of references from different disciplines in the name of applying interdisciplinary method. Through such an interdisciplinary method, writers declare that they try to construct a broad conceptual framework providing the theoretical base of their concept of “empire”. Indeed, they claim that empire is constituted today and constitutional process of empire will be identified in their work.

¹⁰⁹ “Once we recognize the decline of the traditional national constitutional system, we have to explore how power is constitutionalized on a supranational level— in other words, how the constitution of Empire begins to form” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 309).

It can be argued that,

Antonio Negri's and Michael Hardt's *Empire* poses a challenge to thinking about the changing nature of political power in the international capitalist system, the role of sovereign statehood in that order and, particularly, the character of American power (Bromley, 2003:17).

In addition to the claims of the “change” in the nature of political power, they also claim that a ‘global market’ is constituted today through “globalization”, indeed through “informatization” (through WWW).

Thus, the book itself becomes a book full claim of ‘historical ruptures/epochal shifts’ and the concept of Empire turns out to be another narrative of great transformations (similar to the grand narrative of 1990s, which is globalization) which have been shaping political, cultural and economic realms. As it was mentioned before, those narratives (globalization, ‘End of History’, ‘new world order’, ‘informational society’, ‘post-fordism’ ...) are powerful intellectual tools to shape the perceptions of the reality by the people. Thus the book of *Empire* and critics of the concept itself became significant to clarify our way of looking to contemporary capitalism. However, although *Empire* (the book) deserves to be criticized since it is ‘an encyclopaedia of total renovations (say ‘great transformation’¹¹⁰), in this work only the concept of empire in the book, its theoretical assumptions and their similarities with liberal perception of globalization as trans-(supra)-nationalization will be highlighted.

The main theoretical argument of the book, similar to the narrative (*Zeitgeist* or neologism) of the 1990s, that was globalization, is that humanity enters into ‘new’ era; indeed enters into a “transition period” (“qualitative passage in modern history” Hardt and Negri, 2000: 237) from “modernity” (or “industrialization”) to “post-modernity” (“informatization”) ¹¹¹ , from

¹¹⁰ Savran (2002) interprets all those narratives of great transformations as ‘total renovation’ theories.

¹¹¹ Hardt and Negri (2000: 280).

‘disciplinary society to the society of control’¹¹² and from “imperialism to Empire” and “from the nation-state to the political regulation of the global market” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 237).

According Hardt and Negri (2000:8-9), this ‘global market’ is the product of an unprecedented “rupture or shift in the contemporary capitalist production and global relations of power” (Similar to the technological determinist liberal perception of globalization) that was realized by “development of communication networks” (Hardt and Negri, 2000:32).

In addition they claim, which seems highly influenced from what was categorized as liberal perception of globalization in the first chapter, that

Once we recognize the decline of the traditional national constitutional system, we have to explore how power is constitutionalized on a supranational level— in other words, how the constitution of Empire begins to form (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 309).

Therefore, constitutionalization of supranational level signifies the constitution of Empire for them. In previous chapter, by following a specific line of thinking constituted through assuming the immanent tension of capital relation which finds its form through (re) configuration of landscapes of the world, I critically approached to the so-called ‘trans-(supra)-nationalization’ argument of the liberal perception and presentation of the globalization. Such argument of trans-(supra)-nationalization is nothing but bending the rod too near to one side of the issue: Tendency of capital to create world market. However, as Clarke (2001a) argues,

¹¹² According to Hardt and Negri (2000: 329), “... the disciplinary tools of modern society (jail, school, church, hospital) are in crisis. For them ‘Today the social institutions that constitute disciplinary society (the school, the family, the hospital, the factory), which are in large part the same as or closely related to those understood as civil society, are everywhere in crisis. As the walls of these institutions break down, the logics of subjectification that previously operated within their limited spaces now spread out, generalized across the social field. The breakdown of the institutions, the withering of civil society and the decline of disciplinary society all involve a smoothing of the striation of modern social space. Here arise the networks of the society of control’”.

In periods of sustained accumulation on a world scale this contradiction¹¹³ is suspended, as the internationalization of capital opens up opportunities for capital and for the state. In periods of crisis, the contradiction re-emerges.

Therefore, claiming that a trans-(supra)-national level emerged after the tremendous technological changes (technological revolutions what Hardt and Negri actually refers by 'informatization') since 1980s is problematic. However, in their account it is so clear that,

As the world market today is realized ever more completely, it tends to deconstruct the boundaries of the nation-state. In a previous period, nation-states were the primary actors in the modern imperialist organization of global production and exchange, but to the world market they appear increasingly as mere obstacles (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 150).

Such an argument is an exaggeration of the current transformations (if not fetishism of present influenced through liberal perception of globalization) in world capitalism and its management. Moreover, as Hoy (2005) argues that thesis of Hardt and Negri about integrated world market due to unprecedented globalization fails to make the important distinction between trade, capital flows and foreign direct investments in contemporary world capitalism. Hoy (2005) demonstrates that "of the four variables most commonly used by trade economists to monitor globalization (trade in goods and services, immigration, investment flows and portfolio flows), only portfolio capital flows are at all percentage highs". Thus, declaring that a 'global market' emerged through globalization seems to be a distortion of reality.

The more their (Hardt's and Negri's) arguments are based upon historical ruptures (with 'lack of empirical detail in a 400-page text', Panitch and Gindin, 2002:18) in human history the more it is possible to believe that 'liberal perception of globalization' influence the arguments of Hardt and Negri, since as I discussed in the previous chapter, so-called globalization phenomenon (its

¹¹³ The contradiction between "global character of capital accumulation and the national form of the state" (Clarke, 2001a:76).

liberal presentation) is not ‘unprecedented’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1998; Arrighi, 2000) and all those technological changes do not seem to create a historical rupture in human history similar to that sub-marine telegraph cables under Atlantic Ocean.

On the other hand, since Hardt’s and Negri’s *Empire* emerges as another narrative of ‘great transformation’ based on historical rupture, criticism of them through the concept of political economy becomes so hard. Through the ‘passage from modernity to post-modernity’, they propose another ‘great transformation’ in the nature of labour¹¹⁴ (from material to immaterial¹¹⁵). By referring this transformation, they claim that ‘the central categories of political economy tend to blur’ since,

Production becomes indistinguishable from reproduction; productive forces merge with relations of production; constant capital tends to be constituted and represented within variable capital, in the brains, bodies, and cooperation of productive subjects. Social subjects are at the same time producers and products of this unitary machine. In this new historical formation it is thus no longer possible to identify a sign, a subject, a value, or a practice that is “outside.”¹¹⁶

Actually, in political economy, those categories¹¹⁷ (based on epistemological differentiations not ontological) are signifying the same reality¹¹⁸, all of them have been in ‘inside’ indeed, in the Hardt’s and Negri’s terms. In other words, for them, in the ‘modern’ reality, in the previous period before *Empire*, those

¹¹⁴ “The passage toward an informational economy necessarily involves a change in the quality and nature of labor” Hardt and Negri (2000: 289).

¹¹⁵ They define immaterial labour as the “labour involved in production of services in which ‘immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge, or communication,’ are produced” Hardt and Negri (2000:290).

¹¹⁶ Hardt and Negri (2000:385).

¹¹⁷ In this limited space, I will not analyze those categories and their real definitions in political economy. Rather I wanted to show how they develop a sophisticated narrative of great transformation which finds their concrete form in the constitution process of *Empire*.

¹¹⁸ Sayer (1987) and Wood (2003a).

concepts, production/reproduction and productive forces/relations of production had signified two distinct realities. Thus, in post modernization/informatization process, those two different realities, including public and private realms and also economic and politics, converge and constitute in the totality of empire.

It is significant to highlight another important claim of those scholars which contradicts the historical specificity of capitalist social relations, that is the differentiation of economic and politics. According to Wood (2003), the differentiation of economic and politics, as independent realms, has been providing the historical specificity of capitalism. Indeed, one can argue that such a differentiation has supplied to the dominant class an ideological shield. Since, landlord, in pre-capitalist modes of production, had both political and economical power, the objective of resistance was so clear. However, thanks to such differentiation of economy and politics in capitalism, system is relatively resistance-proof. On the other hand, while Wood (2003a) repeatedly stresses the importance of such differentiation in the (re) formation / (re) constitution of capitalism, Hardt and Negri (2000) claim that “in Empire and its regime of biopower, economic production and political constitution tend increasingly to coincide.” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 41). Therefore, we face with another claim of great transformation in the nature of capitalist social relations (cf. Wood, 2003a)¹¹⁹.

Up to now, I tried to express how Hardt’s and Negri’s theoretical arguments are established through the narratives of great transformations (epochal shifts). In this limited space, it is not possible to deal with all claims of them, which I believe, necessitate further attention; especially the ones about transformation of disciplinary society to society of control. On the other hand, what I tried to

¹¹⁹ Within their theoretical framework, Hardt’s and Negri’s arguments seem coherent however I find the ideas of Wood (2003a) based on the necessity of separation of economic and politics for the reproduction of the capitalist social relations more meaningful.

stress is that those claims about epochal shift in the human society must be sceptically engaged through an understanding focusing on ‘change within continuity’. Since as it was mentioned before, those total transformation (or total renovation) theses are indeed exaggerations derived from fetishism of present (if not distortion) focusing on solely to the so-called ‘change’ in capitalist social relations while forgetting unchanged (immanent) character of the capital relation that has been (re) constituting the world capitalism, that is tension stemmed from the “contradiction between global character of capital relation and national character of state”(Clarke, 2001:76).

In other words, since for Hardt and Negri, globalization, is an “irresistible and irreversible process” generating “declining sovereignty of nation-states and their increasing inability to regulate economic and cultural exchanges” which are “the primary symptoms of the coming of Empire” (Hardt and Negri, 2003:116-9), it is meaningful to come back to the constitution process of Empire, which is closely related with the role of the US in world capitalism.

According to Hardt’s and Negri’s outlook based on total transformation of human societies; post-modern understanding of sovereignty¹²⁰, that is “network of power relations lying regional, national and supranational level”, must be operationalized to understand the ongoing changes in contemporary world, since Empire emerges in accordance with this understanding of new imperial sovereignty:

Empire can only be conceived as a universal republic, a network of powers and counter powers structured in a boundless and inclusive architecture. This imperial expansion has nothing to do with imperialism, nor with those state organisms designed for conquest, pillage, genocide, colonization, and slavery. Against such imperialisms, Empire extends and consolidates the model of network power. (Hardt and Negri, 2000:166-167)

Then, the main characteristics of Empire emerge as such;

¹²⁰ “The end of colonialism and the declining powers of the nation are indicative of a general passage from the paradigm of modern sovereignty toward the paradigm of imperial sovereignty”(Hardt and Negri, 2000: 137).

1-The concept of Empire is characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries. Empire's rule has no limits (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xiv).

2- Empire presents its rule not as a transitory moment in the movement of history, but as a regime with no temporal boundaries and in this sense outside of history or at the end of history (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xv).

3- Empire not only manages a territory and a population but also creates very world it inhabits. It not only regulates human interactions but also seeks directly to rule over human nature. The object of its rule is social life in its entirety, and thus Empire presents the paradigmatic form of biopower (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xv).

With an outlook of total transformation of human societies (human history), it can be assumed that, as Wissel (2004) argues, for Hardt and Negri 'empire' is "transnational decentralized empire"¹²¹, as it is so clear in the above propositions. In addition,

The United States does not, and indeed no nation-state can today, form the center of an imperialist project. Imperialism is over. No nation will be world leader in the way modern European nations were (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xiv)

The above argument is actually what I emphasized before that there is contradiction between the analyses of the concept of "empire" and also in the thesis of Hardt and Negri. While some argues, empire diminishes the power of nation-states, due to its unilateralism (or acting through supranational right), the others points out that empire (or imperial drive or unilateral acts of the US based on its 'hard power', Nye, 2003) brings the geopolitics and the national interests of nation-states which started to strengthen them and brings the *realpolitik* into agenda of contemporary world. There is an unresolved contradiction here which also exists in Hardt's and Negri's analysis. While empire is "transnational decentralized empire" (Wissel, 2004), Hardt and Negri contradictorily links the constitution process of empire with the US. For them,

¹²¹ "In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers," (xii) therefore "... it is both everywhere and nowhere. Empire is an ou-topia, or really a non-place." (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 190).

The contemporary idea of Empire is born through the global expansion of the internal U.S. constitutional project (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 182).¹²²

In other words, this presentation of the constitution process of Empire is also a “celebration of U.S. constitutionalism which is a model for ‘democratizing’ the Empire” (Petras, 2001). Thus, evaluation of the concept of empire is established through the perceptions of the evolution of the US state.

On the other hand, according to Hardt and Negri, final form of post-modern understanding of sovereignty based on supranational right emerged after Cold-War. They claim that,

With the end of the cold war, the United States was called to serve the role of guaranteeing and adding juridical efficacy to ... complex process of the formation of a new supranational right. (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 181)

After creating an immediate link between constitution process of empire and the US, they further their analysis by pointing out the following features of new rule in contemporary capitalism. They argue that,

The importance of the Gulf War derives rather from the fact that it presented the United States as the only power able to manage international justice, *not as a function of its own national motives but in the name of global right* (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 179).

It can be claimed that in the account of Hardt and Negri (2000), the evolution of the US State is the evaluation of the empire (similar to the arguments of Panitch and Gindin, 2003). Thus, in their account the condition of being empire

¹²² Hardt and Negri (2000: 167-8) also propose that “The realization of the imperial notion of sovereignty was along process that developed through the different phases of U.S. constitutional history’. This development process is summarized as follows: ‘A first phase extends from the Declaration of Independence to the Civil War and Reconstruction ; a second, extremely contradictory, phase corresponds to the Progressive era, straddling the turn of the century, from the imperialist doctrine of Theodore Roosevelt to Woodrow Wilson’s international reformism; a third phase moves from the New Deal and the Second World War through the height of the cold war; and finally, a fourth phase is inaugurated with the social movements of the 1960s and continues through the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European bloc. Each of these phases of U.S. constitutional history marks a step toward the realization of imperial sovereignty” .

traced back to the historical period before 9/11 Attacks. Similar to them, Gowan (2004b) operationalize the concept of empire for the US in the post-World War II era; however, for him

The social substance of this empire was ... that of the advanced capitalist world. The empire provided the USA with a framework through which American capitalism was able to expand outwards geographically, especially into Western Europe during the Cold War (Gowan, 2004b:259).

First of all, such condition is also explained by the term ‘the US hegemony’. Gowan uses the term while Panitch and Gindin (2003) refused to do so. On the other hand, Gowan rightly questions that, “... more needs to be said about this empire. What was its ontological status? Did it replace the interstate system across the capitalist core?” Gowan (2004b:259).

Like Gowan (2004b), it is not acceptable that such a hegemony of the US ‘replaced the inter state system’. Today, discussions around the concept of empire must ask whether the US is an Empire acting through a ‘supranational right’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000) or it is a typical nation-state (Zizek, 2004:24), acting through its particular interests. For instance according to Hardt and Negri;

The U.S. world police acts not in imperialist interest but in imperial interest. In this sense the Gulf War did indeed, as George Bush claimed, announce the birth of a new world order (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 180).

Such a differentiation between ‘imperialist’ and ‘imperial’ is the core idea behind this new form of supranational right. On the other hand, according to Hardt and Negri, Just War (*bellum justum*), (today it is ‘War on Terrorism’ actually) is “one of the suggestive and powerful symptoms” of the “rebirth of the concept of empire” (Hardt and Negri, 2000:12)¹²³. Due to those clear and

¹²³ Indeed, in Hardt and Negri’s mind such understanding of just war corresponds to those military interventions to East Europe in the name of humanitarian intervention to guard global

immediate links between the US and “empire” those questions come to one’s mind immediately:

How is Empire at once an unreal “ou-topia/non-place” and a very real “universal republic” that “rules” through the “interventions of the imperial armies?” How does a “network of powers and counterpowers” reconcile its internal differences to produce “national and supranational organisms” which seamlessly become one “unitary power?” (Hoy, 2005)

Consequently, this is clear that empire has organic relation with the US (if not same) in Hardt and Negri’s account, and since the US is not a ‘supranational actor’ acting through the notion of “supranational right”, it seems to be an exaggeration to claim that a total transformation is occurring from ‘age of nation-states to age of empire through the constitution process of empire in accordance with the evolutionary process of the US Constitution.

Finally, if we come back to the whole thesis of Hardt and Negri, those following paragraphs can provide a comprehensive summary of what *empire* really is. Apart from the pejorative uses of empire; in Hardt’s and Negri’s account;

Empire’s primary analytical goal, like that of so many recent books on globalisation, is to explain the genesis and nature of a new type of capitalist order that ‘rules over the entire “civilized” world.’ What sets Empire apart is not only the wild ride Hardt and Negri take us on as they try to marry what they consider to be the best of Marxist and postmodernist thought to this end, but the way they employ this theoretical hybrid to identify globalization with a new type of capitalist political régime, drawing a distinction between the imperialisms of the past (territorial sovereignty being extended through colonies) and what they call the new ‘empire’ (the supranational ‘penetration of boundaries’) (Panitch and Gindin, 2002:18).

In such an empire, there emerges a

... shift in the capitalist mode of production from the industrialization stage to that of ‘informationalisation’ and communication, and a corresponding shift from material to ‘immaterial’ production. Related economic, cultural and political transformations eventually led to the ‘smooth’ global order of the world market and a new kind of disciplinary sovereignty, a central power with no state centre (Panitch and Gindin, 2002:20).

justice and peace. However, today the discourse behind War on Terrorism can easily be interpreted as a claim of just war.

Moreover, as Panitch and Gindin (2002:18-9) clearly summarizes that in Hardt's and Negri's account or "In this new global capitalist empire, nation-states (including the former imperialist powers themselves) and the internal power relations within them are 'penetrated' by a 'new sovereign, supranational world power', so that 'the conflict and competition among several imperial powers has in important respects been replaced by the idea of a single power that over-determines them all, structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under one common notion of right that is decidedly postcolonial and postimperialist.'"

As Panitch and Gindin (2002) highlight, the main argument of Hardt and Negri, that is trans-(supra)-nationalization in which nation-states have been declining, contradicts the account of Panitch and Gindin (2003), the arguments of whom about an "informal empire" refers "a single power rule through nation-states not at the expense of their sovereignty",¹²⁴

To summarize, it can be stated that like liberal (globalist) perception of globalization, Hardt and Negri (2000) believe that there emerged a great transformation with so-called globalization process. It has changed the nature of existing social relations (hence capitalism) totally and an empire, as a political subject, is constituted to govern the 'global market' that has been the product of such total transformation. Moreover, due to its 'privileged position',¹²⁵ the US seems to be the *Empire* itself.

¹²⁴ It is interesting that Panitch and Gindin has sympathy for the arguments of Hardt and Negri while they recognize the central importance of nation-state in organization of world capitalism, indeed while Panitch (1994) argues that globalization is managed through nation-states not by a supra national power above them, Hardt nad Negri (2000) insists on trans (supra) nationalization.

¹²⁵ 'The United States does indeed occupy a privileged position in Empire' (Hardt and Negri, 2003:117). What give such 'privileged position' is her 'constitution' established over Jeffersonian federalist ideals, according to Hardt and Negri.

Such an assumption brings us to another but the central point in the empire debates: Inter-imperialist rivalry. This point is significant since; it seems to be the Gordian Knot in the debates around the concepts “empire” and Imperialism. In one way or another, “empire” is seen as a ‘supranational rule’ in world in which there is no possibility of inter-imperialist rivalry due to unprecedented integration of world markets (cf. Panitch and Gindin 2003). Even Panitch and Gindin (2003), while denying such ‘supranational’ rule by stating “... the conception of a transnational capitalist class loosened from any state moorings or about to spawn a supranational global state, is clearly exceedingly extravagant...”, they follow the arguments of impossibility of inter-imperialist rivalry¹²⁶ Indeed, if capitalism is organized nationally and centrality of nation-states are still valid, possible existence of inter-imperialist rivalry cannot be put aside, due to the existence of different national social formations through the class struggles between individual capitalists and working classes.

3.5 Empire and Inter-Imperialist Rivalry

As it is seen in the age of empire (Hardt and Negri, 2000), there is no possible threat of imperialist rivalry between ‘imperialist powers’, since ‘imperialism is over’ under the rule of a ‘post-modern sovereign’ acting through ‘supranational right’ whose center is unknown due to its dispersed power in supranational, national, regional and local scales in world landscapes. Indeed there seems to be a mere assumption that world capitalism is no longer constituted through the

¹²⁶ Since, they think that problems and crises that have been occurring since 1970s, “... reflect not the continuation of the crisis of the 1970s, but rather contradictions that the dynamic global capitalism ushered in by neoliberalism has itself generated, including the synchronization of recessions, the threat of deflation, the dependence of the world on American markets and the dependence of the United States on capital inflows to cover its trade deficit. There is indeed a systemic complexity in today’s global capitalism that includes, even at its core, instabilities and even crises. Yet this needs to be seen not so much in terms of the old structural crisis tendencies and their outcomes, but as everyday, normal dimensions of the system’s functioning...”

rivalries among imperialist blocs. The interests of 'global (or transnational) capital' which was created by the 'great transformation' created by globalization are leading the capitalism through structural adjustment policies shaped with neoliberal principles and there is no threat of imperialist war orienting to share world landscapes due to lack of clashing interests among the "transnational historic bloc" (Gill,1993) in world capitalism. Such an impossibility of imperialist rivalry due to existence of one and unified transnational capitalist class or actor seems to be the new form the idea of 'ultra-imperialism' of Kautsky (2004).

This old debate between Lenin and Kautsky over the form of imperialism seems still valid today. The questions which have arisen from that debate do not seem to be resolved. According to Panitch and Gindin (2002),

The distinction Hardt and Negri want to draw between today's new Empire (and its 'imperial interest') and the old imperialism ('imperialist interest') is indeed very important.

This separation is also recognized by Panitch and Gindin (2002, 2003, and 2005) and Panitch (2000) and they operationalize the concept of empire, even in a different manner somehow, in order to explain the role of American State in management of world capitalism while claiming impossibility of inter-imperialist rivalry. However, Panitch and Gindin (2003) do not give up the concept of 'imperialism'. Rather, they operationalize the concept of empire in order to highlight that,

Capitalist imperialism needs to be understood through an extension of the theory of the capitalist state, rather than derived directly from the theory of economic stages or crises. And such a theory needs to be open to the possibility not only of inter-imperial rivalry, and not only the conjunctural predominance of one imperial state, but also the structural penetration by one imperial state of former rivals (Panitch and Gindin, 2003).

The concept of American Empire (New Imperial State, which was concealed after 9/11 for them) of these scholars (Panitch and Gindin, 2003) indicate that

the US imperialism managed to “contain all its rivals” under the rule of itself after the end of Cold War.

On the other hand, unlike Arrighi (1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2005) who argues the current condition of the US as a process of “unravelling of the neoconservative imperial project” (Arrighi, 2005) which “... has transformed the US hegemony into ... domination without hegemony” (Arrighi, 2005), Panitch and Gindin (2005) evaluate the financialization process, since at the end of the 1970s in order to find new configurations for smooth accumulation process, as the way in which American Imperial state achieve to subordinate both undeveloped countries and other imperialist rivalries. Therefore today,

In contrast to the old paradigm of inter-imperial rivalry, the nature of current integration into the American empire means that a crisis of the dollar is not an ‘American’ crisis that might be ‘good’ for Europe or Asia, but a crisis of the system as a whole, involving severe dangers for all. To suggest, as Arrighi does, that because the holders of American Treasury bills are now primarily in Asia we are therefore witnessing a shift in the regional balance of power, is to confuse the distribution of assets with the distribution of power (Panitch and Gindin, 2005:73).

Analyses of Panitch and Gindin (2002, 2003, and 2005) and Panitch (2000) seem to have significant effort to answer the question on the role of the US in world capitalism. However, I believe there is no need to operationalize a new concept in order to develop a new understanding of imperialism, since it seems more meaningful to problematize -not the nature- the form of imperialism today, instead of using a new vocabulary which is originally foreign to the language of capitalism, that is empire.

In addition, as I claimed before, accepting the persistence of inter-imperialist rivalry or not seems to be the Gordian Knot in the debates around the concepts of “empire” and imperialism. For the discussion of the inter-imperialist rivalry, following arguments of Sakellariopoulos and Sotiris (2006) must be considered. For them,

Uneven development is the necessary outcome of the complex history of the emergence and domination of capitalism in different parts of the world, resulting to the creation of antagonistic total social capitals. Competition between capitals in the international plane is necessarily state-mediated, the state's role being to guarantee the interests of the capitalists as a whole- and this leads to inter-imperialist rivalry and war', since it seems meaningful to argue that forms of inter-imperialist cooperation are mainly contingent outcomes of particular conjunctures.

Moreover, as Harvey indicates,

...historically specific, spatial agglomerations of capital necessarily give rise to uneven development and 'regionality' so that 'inter-regional competition and specialization in and among these regional economies consequently becomes a fundamental feature of how capitalism works' (Bromley, 2006)

Therefore 'uneven character of capitalist accumulation is bounded to territories defined by different struggles between capitalist and working classes (that creates 'concrete specificity of each social formation', Poulantzas, 1979:78). That is what David Harvey tries to mean by "uneven spatio-temporal development of capitalism" (quoted by Sparke, 2003) which help us to recognize the "hierarchy in the international system" (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris, 2006) in which inter-imperialist rivalry is inevitable.

Furthermore,

...the competition between rival imperial powers, economic enterprises and MNC's has been essentially spearheaded by rival imperial states. For example, the U.S. imperial state is leading the fight to open European markets to U.S. beef, and U.S. exports of bananas from South and Central America, while the Japanese and the European states negotiate with the U.S. to increase the 'quota' on a series of exports, including steel, textiles, etc.(Petras, 2001)

Following this line of thinking on capital relation, inter-imperialist rivalry¹²⁷ is inevitable by nature of capital relation, thus an idea of "empire" based on 'ultra-imperialism' cannot be a 'structural' feature of capitalist imperialism that has been organized through multiple state system in which individual 'capitalisms' have been historically, culturally, politically and economically (re) formed by distinctive class struggles.

¹²⁷ "An obvious example is provided by the endemic and serious tensions between the US and the EU over trade: the current dispute over state subsidies to, respectively, Boeing and Airbus seems especially bitter and hard to resolve" (Callinicos, 2005).

3.6 Concluding Remarks on Empire Debates

As Pieterse claims,

Until recently imperialism was a left-wing term, but now empire has become a mainstream theme and makes a comeback in everyday language (Pieterse, 2004:31).

Roughly, the reason is claimed to be what Howe (2003) argues below. For him,

As the US administration advocates pre-emption in doctrine and practice, and the state extends its influence worldwide, the notion of America as an empire is becoming central to contemporary political debate.

As it was mentioned throughout the chapter there are various usages of the concept of “empire”. Not only pejorative but also optimistic views about American empire exist. For instance, according to Ikenberry (2004),

Today, the “American empire” is a term of approval and optimism for some and disparagement and danger for others. Neoconservatives celebrate the imperial exercise of U.S. power, which, in a modern version of Rudyard Kipling’s “white man’s burden,” is a liberal force that promotes democracy and undercuts tyranny, terrorism, military aggression, and weapons proliferation.

Such proliferation of the usage of the concept of “empire”, as it was mentioned before, happened in the aftermath of 9/11 Attacks. Before those dramatic events it has been argued that humanity has been witnessing a ‘great transformation’ created by so-called globalization which has been supposed to be the Kantian Cosmopolitan World Order (Kagan, 2005). However, after the events there emerged a ‘total change’ in the perception and/or presentation of the new form of the NWO in which the US started invasions and assaults in the name of its geopolitical interests through *Operation Enduring Freedom* while propagating as if it is the ‘the protector of the Free World against global terrorists’ like it did in the Cold War era in a similar way (constructing common enemy). It was also declared by officials of the US that protecting and advancing of the US interests and values have been necessary for ‘global peace and justice’.

Such transformation of world from being ‘a global village’ to a world shaped by ‘new geopolitics’ (Klare, 2003) has been interpreted by most of the scholars with an assumption of rising ‘empire’. The 9/11 events, as it was mentioned, played a constitutive role on such perception.

Today, different from any army of nation-states, “... nearly 350,000 men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces are deployed or stationed in approximately 130 countries” (Quadrennial Defence Review Report of USA, QDR 2006:9). This is actually most significant proof that the US has a different role among other nation-states in world capitalism. With such a huge military and also technological capacity, the violent orientation of the US foreign policy was interpreted as not being understood by the existing conceptual frameworks, paradigms or theories of social sciences.

Like liberal (globalist) arguments, those proponents of the concept of “empire” have been claiming that we needed different concepts since humanity were witnessing another epochal shift after the epochal shift created by globalization. Hence, such condition created a common understanding that we supposed to enter ‘a new phase’ that was different from the period before 9/11 Attacks. Such differentiation had also been made after the collapse of the USSR. This can be interpreted as another form of, that I mentioned in previous chapter, fetishism of present. I believe such fetishism creates actually the origin of the misperception of the reality after 9/11 Attacks while solely focusing on the change itself. Rather, as it was mentioned before, the unchanged character of world capitalism and its new form must be taken into count in order to analyze the transformations that had been occurring since the 1990s. On the other hand, one of theoretical usages of the concept of “empire” that was critically engaged in this chapter must be analyzed differently due to its endless propositions about the changing nature of human society.

I tried to highlight that although Antonio Negri himself is a radical-Marxist scholar, and M. Hardt is a radical scholar, their thesis in their book, by accepting the declining of nation-state against emergence of empire acting through supranational right in a world divorced from imperialism does not provide necessary analytical tools to analyze the contemporary form of capitalism and the role of the US in world capitalism. As Petras argues;

Hardt and Negri base their argument about a state-less, class-less empire without imperialism on the notion of a world market dominated by multi-national corporations (MNC) which, they argue, 'must eventually overcome imperialism and destroy the barriers between inside and outside (Petras, 2001).

They locate their empire thesis over the following assumptions that were critically presented before in this chapter. According to Hardt and Negri (2000),

... what used to be conflict or competition among several imperialist powers has in important respects been replaced by the idea of single power that overdetermines them all, structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under one common notion of right that is decidedly postcolonial and postimperialist (Hardt and Negri, 2000:9).

To summarize, while analyzing ongoing changes in world capitalism including its organization, a core idea assuming that "... capitalism is a global system organized nationally" (Wood, 1999) is so significant. While asserting the contradictory nature of capitalism in previous chapter, I tried to show how the immanent tension of capital relation, between tendency of capital relation to create world market and the territorial (spatial) dimension of capital accumulation, (re) constitute the conditions of reproduction of capitalist social relations. Thus, as it was also mentioned before, capitalism is still organized through nation-states and empire (or any supranational body or super-state institutions), as a concept to analyze the contemporary form of world capitalism and its management, does not seem to be appropriate analytical tool to understand changes that have been occurring in contemporary capitalism.

I will try to elaborate this issue in next chapter while I am discussing the forms of organization of contemporary world capitalism.

CHAPTER 4

EVALUATIONS DEVELOPED THROUGH SOME CRITICS ON GLOBALIZATION AND EMPIRE ABOUT THE MANAGEMENT OF WORLD CAPITALISM

In this chapter, based on the critics that I tried to develop in the previous two chapters on the concepts of ‘globalization’ and ‘empire’, some evaluation remarks will be highlighted.

4.1. Introduction

I argued that capital could be claimed to have found a relatively secure condition for further accumulation in the landscape of world, after Second World War through the hegemony of the US. USA, as the leading capitalist state in the world, could be argued to have given shape to world economy through Bretton Woods institutions between 1945 and 1970. In that period, those international political regulations that had held by IMF and WB were suitable for not only the interests of the capital located in U.S. but also the interests of other capitals in the world economy. In other words, capital located in the US could be stated to have achieved to demonstrate its interest as the universal interest of the whole capitalist system. That was the condition evaluated as the condition of being a hegemon in world capitalism.

According to Arrighi (2000b, pp.110-116), similar to the ‘hegemony’ of British Empire, American hegemony has provided a ground for Westphalian State System to be reconstructed and developed. For him, this made the US to gain the capacity to construct the new international system after the WW2. In addition, for Harvey, the effect of ‘U.S. military and economic leadership as the sole capitalist superpower’ in post-war era was the construction of “... a

hegemonic U.S. ('super imperialism')” in world capitalism. However, as Harvey (2004) adds,

This system broke down around 1970 as the U.S.'s hegemonic economic position became untenable. Capital controls became hard to enforce as surplus U.S. dollars flooded the world market. The U.S. then sought to construct a different kind of system that rested upon a mix of new international and financial institutional arrangements to counter economic threats from Germany and Japan and to re-center economic power as finance capital operating out of Wall Street.

In other words, in the aftermath of 1970s crisis, world capitalism entered into its new crisis era and it seems never ended yet. Today, such crisis finds its expressions in huge financial enlargement.

Not surprisingly, the so-called 'globalization' period overlapped with same period. While capital has been searching for 'new planes' (Harvey, 2001) (or 'structured coherences'), liberal perception/presentation of 'globalization' that I critically engaged in the previous chapter started to flourish (early 1990s). Moreover, the close relation with the liberal (globalist) view of 'globalization' and the term 'New World Order' (Henceforth, NWO)¹²⁸ by George Bush started to be emphasized by various scholars.

The NWO, that has been used for the era since the end of Cold War, has actually presented as the condition of world being shaped by the so-called 'globalization' process which would have create a cosmopolitan world order in where all the nations would gain wealth and live in peace. Moreover, Kurth (2001) asserts that 'globalization' is the new label of American foreign policy. In addition to such claim of Kurth, for Agnew (2003) globalization is an American project. And for Kakinç (2004), those developments under the title of 'globalization' seem to turn out to be a process to Americanize the world.

¹²⁸ “The term New World Order has become a catch-phrase employed to be described developments of post-1989” (Bonefeld, 2004).

The close relation between globalization and the claims/projects in the discourse of 'the NWO' of the USA finds its concrete form in the discussions about the standardization of world culture, politics and economy through globalization. This standardization has been presented as something good by some writers (Friedman, 2000; Rothkopf, 1997). Those writers have claimed that globalization as US-led project process dispersed all perfectness of US society over the world. Moreover, Ferguson (2004) clearly argues that condition of a 'globalized' world without the US is "apolarity". In fact, "apolar future is anti-thesis of globalization" for him. Therefore, single polarity in globalization process led by the US is inevitable if world does not want to witness a Dark Age, according to Ferguson (2004). For him;

For more than two decades, globalization-integration of world markets for commodities, labour and capital- has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny of civil war. The reversal of globalization – which a new Dark Age would produce- would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression.

No existence of the US (Leviathan) means Dark Age (State of nature) for Ferguson. I think Friedman's Hobbesian evaluation of the world after the collapse of the USSR cannot be evaluated as value-free. As I mentioned before, the definitions and explanations about a social relation cannot be thought free from the outlook of observer and his/her interests. However, there is a close relation between so-called 'globalization' and the US. Such a relation must be identified through perceiving such 'globalization' process as internationalization of capital in world capitalism in which nation-state plays a central role and the US as the leading country among others.

In the next section I will try to emphasize such link between the US and so-called globalization in accordance with the mentioned view above.

4.2. Globalization as Inter-nationalization of Capital through Neo-liberal Integration

It was claimed previously that liberal perception/presentation of globalization as trans-(supra)-nationalization undermines various facts about changes in world capitalism. Therefore, in order to analyze the changes that have been analyzed with the concept of ‘globalization’, I followed the distinction of Yıldızoğlu (2003) between “long evolutionary-historical globalization” and “globalization” that is internationalization of capital which has been presented as if subjectless trans-(supra)-nationalization by liberals (globalists). Such an analytic separation helps me to de-mystify the liberal claims about globalization based on the assumptions that trans-(supra)-nationalization undermines the sovereignty of nation-state. On the other hand, I find more accurate to follow a line of thinking which Sweezy (1997) identifies as such;

Globalization is not a condition or a phenomenon: it is a process that has been going on for a long time, in fact ever since capitalism came into the world as a viable form of society ...

Moreover, with such an analytical separation of Yıldızoğlu (2002), I believed to locate my analysis of globalization in a more historical perspective emphasizing the importance to put the issue in human history covering a *long duree*.

In such a line of thinking, I critically approached liberal claims based on ‘historical rupture’ in human history declaring the emergence of global village divorced from geopolitical clashes of nation-states and inter-imperialist rivalry, due to rising power of trans-(supra)-national forces – transnational corporations, institutions, NGOs e.g. In addition, since liberal perception/presentation of globalization signifies that the process itself is a natural, irresistible and indispensable, such perception/presentation of globalization by various social actors neutralizes the conflictual nature of the

globalization which is indeed a selective process that has been designed for the search of overaccumulated capital to find new structured coherence established through new spatial-temporal fixes.

In line with above outlook, I discussed ‘structured coherences’ (profitable configuration of time and space, as I discussed previously) necessitates active intervention of nation-states (the market friendly state or effective state in post Washington Consensus that is the new universal policy proposal of neo-liberal globalization¹²⁹ to form appropriate conditions for capital in crisis). Therefore, I rejected the idea of ‘declining of nation-state’. Instead, I tried to base my analysis on an idea that clearly identified by Wood (2003c).

Capitalism is, by nature, an anarchic system, in which the ‘laws’ of market constantly threaten to disrupt the social order. Yet capitalism needs stability and predictability in its social arrangements probably more than any other social form. The nation state has from the beginning provided that stability and that predictability by supplying an elaborate legal and institutional framework backed up by coercive force, to sustain the property relations of capitalism, its complex contractual apparatus and its intricate financial transactions (Wood, 2003c, 133-4).

Then, the main question is “... whether ‘global’ capitalism has found other and better means than the nation-state to perform all, or indeed any, of these basic functions” (Wood, 2003c:133-4) that were highlighted above. Hence, today’s “... global economy not only presupposes the nation-state, but relies on the state as its principal instrument” (Wood, 2002, 25)¹³⁰. Moreover, it can be claimed that “... today's globalization both is authored by states and is primarily about reorganizing, rather than by passing states” (Panitch, 1994:63).

¹²⁹ “...the dominant discursive formation of our time is the neo-liberal concept of ‘globalization’. It suggests that privatization and transnationalization of capital are either inevitable or desirable from a broad social viewpoint” (Gill, 1997).

¹³⁰ Quoted by Pozo-Martin (2006:231). For more detailed analysis about the persistence of capitalist interstate system, see Gowan (2005).

That is to say that,

... in a period of globalization ... the forms in which the state is involved have been changing. The state is involved in modifying the spatiotemporal matrices of capitalism and the nation, and it has a key role in managing the uneven spatiotemporal development by the capital relation (Jessop, 2002:113).¹³¹

To support this line of this thinking, one more argument may be asserted that class struggles have still ‘national forms’, ‘however international they are in essence’ (Poulantzas, 1979:78); since,

The nation, in the full complexity of its determination- a unity that is at the same time economic, territorial, linguistic, and one of ideology and symbolism tied to ‘tradition’- retains its specific identity as far as the ‘national forms’ of class struggle are concerned, and in this way the relation of state and nation is maintained. The changes in progress today only affect certain of the elements of this determination (Poulantzas, 1979:79).

Furthermore as I discussed in second chapter, contemporary form of internationalization of capital since 1970s, that has been named as globalization, has been shaped through neo-liberal principles.¹³² In addition, as Albo (2003)¹³³, emphasizes “neoliberalism as a social form of power and class relations is deeply embedded in the social reproduction of national capitalisms and thus in the hierarchy of world market.” Thus, such new configuration of “social form of power and class relations” in accordance with the principles of (post) Washington Consensus (“U.S. policy model to developing and transition

¹³¹ In other words, “... although the nature of state intervention has changed, the role of nation-state has not necessarily been diminished” Panitch (1994:63).

¹³² Characteristics of the era is “... a new discipline of labour and management to the benefit of lenders and shareholders; the diminished intervention of the state concerning development and welfare; the dramatic growth of financial institutions; the implementation of new relationships between financial and nonfinancial sectors to the benefit of the former, a new legal stand in favor of mergers and acquisitions, the strengthening of central banks and the targeting of their activity toward price stability and the new determination to drain the resources of the periphery toward center” (Dumenil and Levy, 2006).

¹³³ For Albo (2003), “The export of the U.S. policy model to developing and transition economies through the neo-liberal ‘Washington consensus’ became the standard for international economic support wherever the country, from Mexico to Mozambique to Russia, or whatever the issue, from capital flight to lack of industrial capacity to government debt, at hand.”

economies”) “became the standard for international economic support wherever the country, from Mexico to Mozambique to Russia, or whatever the issue, from capital flight to lack of industrial capacity to government debt, at hand”. Such condition has inevitably given a privileged position to the US in the hierarchy of world market among other “national capitalisms”.

On the other hand, apart from the liberal perception/presentation of globalization, among radical scholars capitalism is not conceived as I tried to highlight above. There emerged analyses of ‘transnational corporations, “transnational capital or classes or power bloc” (Wissel, 2004) or arguments around the “transformations of international historic bloc to transnational historic bloc” (Gill, 1995:97), since 1980s. Those analyses have been based on the rising number of transnational bodies (like Trilateral Commission), corporations without national roots (Sklair, 1999) although for many scholars insist on those corporations still keep their national characteristics (Savran, 2006, Petras, 2001). Indeed,

The first and most elementary point is that so-called ‘transnational’ corporations generally have a base, together with dominant shareholders and boards, in single nation states and depend on them in many fundamental ways (Wood, 2003c:135).

Moreover, rather than those of liberal (globalist) ones, claims of Marxists about a “transnational class or capital” (Robinson, 2000; Sklair, 2000; Gill and Law, 1989; Morton and Bieler, 2004) seem strong claims (if not “unrealistic”, cf. Wood, 1999, 2003c; or “extravagant”, Panitch, 2003) but need further analyses. For the time being, I can only state that I find all those claims about trans-(supra)-nationalization as somehow different forms of liberal perception/presentation of globalization. Therefore, in previous chapters, I offered to operationalize the IoC instead of globalization which recognizes the centrality of nation-state in world capitalism, since,

It is a fallacy ... to suppose that the importance of the nation state in the world order has diminished with the rapid internationalization of capital. The starting point for a productive analysis of the international order is thus the recognition of the durability of the nation state (Burnham, 1991:86).

An outlook that is conceiving those changes through process of the IoC will also have capacity to de-mystify the ongoing claims about the rising Empire which has also been constructed theoretically on the liberal (globalist) claims. Conceiving the historical process of the post-1970s as conflictual and contradictory process of IoC theoretically has capacity to perceive the tension between the tendency of capital relation to create world market and spatial (territorial) dimension of capital accumulation. And in such process, ongoing national character of class struggle (Poulantzas, 1979:78-79) leads each social formation within world capitalism to have its specific character.

Today, contemporary form of the IoC (started to be designed after the crisis in 1970s) has been managed through neo-liberal structural adjustment policies [(post) Washington Consensus, which a discussed in previous chapters]. After the crisis in 1970s, the US (under Nixon administration) took the decision to ‘scrap’ the international monetary system controlled by Bretton Woods, an international monetary system based on “a gold-linked dollar standard, using the dollar - the currency of one State - as the international money’ (Gowan, 2005:414).

According to Gowan (2005:414), after the decision of Nixon’s administration, as international money, the dollar, “was ... subordinated to shifting U.S. macroeconomic policy goals”. He adds that after the crisis “without a stable international monetary unit, sustained, long-term international economic relationships become gambles.” However, In the 1970s, such gambles¹³⁴ that

¹³⁴ Similarly, its same period the concept ‘Casino Capitalism’ that has been operationalized in order to highlight the increasing of financial capital flows across the world markets which have been being regulated through the liberations established in accordance with (post) Washington Consensus designed according to neo-liberal principals of structural adjustment.

has been occurring in the stock-exchange markets and other markets of financial assets across the world, did not cause similar crisis like in 1930s,

... because of the successful U.S. drive to liberalize international private financial flows, initially through engineering the recycling of petro-dollars through the private Anglo-American banks. This then enabled what I called, for short, “Wall Street”— in reality the U.S. financial market and its London (offshore) satellite financial market—to become the great clearinghouse of financial inflows and outflows on a global scale, mainly denominated in dollars. This, along with the denomination of international oil sales in dollars, ensured that the dollar remained the dominant international currency (Gowan, 2005:414-415).

Consequently, such financialization (increasing volume of gambles in Gowan’s account) through neo-liberal structural adjustments (by capital and trade liberalizations in national economies through Washington Consensus and its ‘post’ form) provided Wall-Street in the US became “a clearinghouse of financial inflows and outflow”¹³⁵ in a “world remains structurally fragmented economically into a mass of politicized monetary zones” (Gowan, 2005:422), controlled by the nation-states.

In such a condition that has been leaded by the US in the process of the IoC, ‘political form’ seems far from being “a global state but a global system of multiple states” (Wood, 2005:6). However, due to contradictory nature of capital relation which inevitably creates uneven development hence rivalries, the IoC has been a conflictual process in which the US State has had a privileged position among other developed (imperialist) countries. In addition, as a result of the IoC through financialization today the US economy is in need of 2 billion \$ in order to sustain its capital account deficit which has been claimed as unsustainable for its economy (Arrighi, 2005). That has been created as a result of the process of the IoC since 1970s through financialization due to decreasing competitiveness of the US economy and rising new competitive economies (Brenner, 2001).

¹³⁵ Such a global system is called in Gowan’s conceptual framework as Dollar-Wall-Street Regime (DWSR).

Finally, different from the claims of Ferguson (2004) about the relations between (liberally perceived) globalization and the US, I tried to emphasize that there is a relation between the US and internationalization of capital since the US had to be evaluated as a nation-state having privileged position in world capitalism in which the idea of ‘a global state’ governing world market is not convincing, due to existence of rivalries endeavouring to get that ‘privileged position’ in world capitalism.

4.3. Empire?

The concept of empire¹³⁶ itself has been used for centuries to designate a kind of rule over a specific territory (large or small) based on an economical and political structure (strict or loose). Scholars generally define “an empire as a state that extends dominion over populations distinct culturally and ethnically from the culture/ethnicity at the center of power”.¹³⁷ Indeed, it means, “an extensive group of states ruled over by a single monarch or ruling authority”.¹³⁸ In most of its usage it defines a single authority ruling over a territory. Therefore, even the original meaning of the concept empire has also a ‘territorial’ dimension. Consequently, the theoretical pillars of the claims about rising empire seem to be transcending the original meaning of the concept itself by undermining the territorial dimension of it.

On the other hand, the concept of empire, which “existed before capitalism” (Pozo-Martin, 2006:232) seems not capable to grasp the contradictory nature of capital relation, historically. Therefore, the claims about the concept empire

¹³⁶ The concept originally comes “from the Latin “imperium”, denoting military command within the ancient Roman government” (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empire>).

¹³⁷ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empire>.

¹³⁸ http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/empire?view=uk

must be thought through the claims of trans-(supra)-nationalization and the process of IoC.

Similar with the perspective outlined previous section, Poulantzas (1979) argues for the process of IoC beginning 1970s that,

The current internationalization of capital neither suppresses not by passes the nation-states either in the direction of a peaceful integration of capitals 'above' the state level (since every process of internationalization is effected under the dominance of the capital of definite country), or in the direction of their extinction by the American super-state, as if American capital purely and simply directed the other imperialist bourgeoisies (Poulantzas, 1979:73).

Moreover, he rightly highlights that,

If the state in the imperialist metropolises, though at present undergoing certain modifications, still maintains its character as a national state, this is due among other things to the fact that the state is not a mere tool or instrument of the dominant classes, to be manipulated at will, so that every step that capital took towards internationalization would automatically induce a parallel 'supranationalization' of states (Poulantzas, 1979:78).

However, according to Panitch and Gindin (2005), American imperial state is the "political carapace" of today's global financial order which has been created through what has been called as globalization and in such an order "finance and empire reinforce each other" (Panitch and Gindin, 2005:46-7). In other words, unlike Arrighi (2005), (the US domination without *hegemony*), for Panitch and Gindin (2005:47), "it is an American empire strengthened rather than weakened by ...financialization" after the crisis in 1970s.

According to Panitch and Gindin (2005:46-7) capitalist social relations in crisis have always been recovered through various mechanism up to now and today American Imperial State, in a world divorced from inter-imperialist rivalry, has been managing whole system which has been characterized by various crisis and recoveries, since capitalist social relations reconstituted through the containment of crisis through new imperial order leaded by American Imperial

State, which has achieved to subordinate other capitalist countries (say potential imperialist rivals) and integrate them into this new imperial order. Thus, earlier fragmentation of world into rival empires or states does not take place in the agenda now.

Panitch and Gindin choose to use the concept of empire not “polemically but rather descriptively” in order to “capture the fundamental difference of the role of American state plays in the world from that of any other state” (Panitch, 2003:235). On the other hand, unlike Hardt and Negri (2000), for Panitch and Gindin (2003) ¹³⁹ capitalism is still organized through nation-states ¹⁴⁰. Furthermore, by referencing the Jeffersonian principals of the US Constitution based on sovereignty enforced through pluralist ‘network power’, they (2006:26) indicate that,

The American empire... has certainly been hegemonic vis-à-vis these states and their capitalist classes, but it has never entailed, for all of the American economic and cultural penetration to their societies, a transfer of direct popular loyalty-call it a sense of ‘patriotism’- to the American state itself. Indeed American form of rule-founded on the constitutional principle of extended empire and self-government- has never demanded this.

As opposed to the claims of Panitch and Gindin (2006) about the ongoing centrality of nation-state in Empire, according to Hardt and Negri (2000:9),

... it is important to note that what used to be conflict or competition among several imperialist powers has in important respects been replaced by the idea of single power that overdetermines them all, structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under one common notion of right that is decidedly postcolonial and postimperialist (Hardt and Negri, 2000:9).

Actually, behind both perception of Panitch and Gindin and Hardt and Negri, there is the main assumption of the existence of a global market that has been

¹³⁹ For whom, American empire, which was established after Second World War, is unconcealed now.

¹⁴⁰ According to Panitch and Gindin (2003) the differentia specifica of US Empire is indirect rule, meaning that rather than colonial invasion, it prefers rule through nation-states.

controlled by trans-(supra)-national forces. Such perception fails to perceive the IoC through the tension immanent to capital relation which inescapably conceives the contradiction between global character of capital and national character of state (Clarke, 2001b) that inevitably created regional and national conflicts that can lead to different forms of inter-imperialist rivalry. Both perception of world capitalism - Hardt and Negri (2000), Panitch and Gindin (2003) - share similar ideas about the discussions on 'imperialism', indeed debates around 'inter-imperialist rivalry'. When Hardt and Negri (2000) declare the disappearance of imperialism, Panitch and Gindin propose the disappearance of inter-imperialist rivalry under an 'ultra-imperialist' rule of informal American Empire (Panitch and Gindin, 2003). For Panitch and Gindin (2005:73),

In contrast to the old paradigm of inter-imperial rivalry, the nature of current integration into the American empire means that a crisis of the dollar is not an 'American' crisis that might be 'good' for Europe or Asia, but a crisis of the system as a whole, involving severe dangers for all.

However, as Nitzan and Bichler (2004:7) argue "... such understanding is the assertion that ... global integration puts everyone in the same boat and therefore limits the incentive for rivals to trigger a crisis", which makes "the American empire truly unbeatable". Such view also undermines the "chronic instability" of capital relation, that I discussed in second chapter, that generates,

... trade wars, dumping, tariffs and quotas, restrictions on capital flow and foreign exchange, interest-rate wars, immigration policies, colonial conquest, subjugation and domination of tributary economies, the forced reorganization of territorial division of labour ...and finally, the physical destruction and forced devaluation achieved through military confrontation and war (Harvey, 2001:339).

The insistence of Panitch and Gindin (2003) to operationalize the concept of empire stems from their idea about 'lack of inter-imperialist rivalry' since, for

them, all the rivals of American capitalism have been ‘contained’ under the rule of single imperial order which is unconcealed since 9/11 Attacks¹⁴¹.

In addition, apart from previously presented usages of the concept of Empire, similar to the analyses of Panitch (2005) for the post-war period, Gowan (2004:491) claims that,

the United States’ business and political elites have sought to rally support as the champions not just of American business interests but of business interests and the strengthening of capitalism as a social system on a world-wide scale. United States’ business and political elites have sought to rally support as the champions not just of American business interests but of business interests and the strengthening of capitalism as a social system on a world-wide scale. This ... is a necessary condition for any capitalist world-empire project.

Moreover, according to Gowan (2006:139),

As the war ended, the US dominated the entire capitalist core, occupying the two big industrial centres- Germany and Japan-holding Britain in a financial and monetary vice, and facing a prostrate France and Italy.

For him, the “leaders of American capitalism’ generated ‘different ideas of how to turn this dominance into a coherent political form of world order.” The answer was ‘primacy’ meaning “... direct the US leadership of the entire capitalist core in a global political cleavage with the Soviet bloc and communism”, which created bipolar structure that “underpinned American primacy over the core” according to Gowan (2006:140). After the collapse of USSR, the question of “how to build a new primacy *structure*” (Gowan, 2006:143), “has been the central political problem facing the leaders of American state”. In addition, different from the previous primacy structure,

¹⁴¹ Since, it has been argued that “The reality of Empire suddenly appears both in the brutal exercise of military force on the margins against Afghanistan and in the way a unilateralist US régime was immediately obliged to construct a coalition for the ‘war against terrorism’ that included (to varying degrees) Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran, all of which had at one time or another also been on the ‘margins’” (Green, 2002:53).

The first big problem for rebuilding primacy after the Soviet collapse has been the fact that it has to be built as a *global order* and not just an order for the capitalist core (Gowan, 2006:144).

For Gowan, as another scholar using the concept of empire, “the Bush strategy¹⁴²,”

... centrally concerned with pulling the state elites of the main international powers, especially the West Europeans but also the East Asian, Russians and Chinese, into a new *structure of dependence* on the services of the American state. Its programmatic target is thus other core capitalist powers as well as China and Russia –quite different from its tactical and military targets. But in the line with the American strategic tradition, the Bush strategy seeks to achieve this *indirectly*. It has not attempted to bully any great power into accepting US primacy or else face in such a way that they will, as Joseph Nye put it, want what American wants (Gowan, 2006:146).

Gowan develops his analysis of ‘primacy’ (actually not different from the concept of ‘hegemony’,¹⁴³) over the assumptions to be mentioned which might be considered as considering the immanent tension that I emphasized throughout this work. According to him,

The great problem for capitalism is how to manage the contradiction between its necessary fragmentation into separate geopolitical units and its necessary tendency to construct deep transnational social linkages- political and economic and cultural- between these units. This is capitalism’s world order problem (Gowan, 2006:150).

Moreover, Gowan (2006:151-2) highlights that,

... if the transnational socio-economic linkage (neoliberalism, Gowan, 2006:152) system does consolidate in the core, it seems likely to generate something almost entirely absent in the internal life of the core for a very long time: the prospect of political disorders and deep crises of political representation within the core state themselves.

¹⁴² According to Gowan (2006:131), “the agency which constructed and carried the Bush strategy was not just the Bush team, but rather a much broader coalition of social forces which can best be understood as the leaders of the American business class and state”. Gowan (2003:137) also highlights that “The Bush team’s external tactics and methods are of course, also designed to strengthen its specific political base domestically and to feed the interests of Bush’s backers in specific business sectors. This is the normal way that American politics works”.

¹⁴³ Gowan (2006:132) also identifies that “American primacy and thus American hegemony has not been secured since the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Instead, the world has been in a transitional period.”

This brings the issue to the “task of the state ...to maintain the unity and cohesion of a social formation divided into classes” (Poulantzas, 1979:78) which denotes, “... fact that the state is not a mere tool or instrument of the dominant classes, to be manipulated at will, so that every step that capital took towards internationalization would automatically induce a parallel ‘supranationalization’ of states” (Poulantzas, 1979:78).

However, management of internationalization of capital must be considered and the concepts to explain it must be clarified well. The first question must be as follows: Do international organizations and managements of the world capitalism that is a ‘multiple state system’ (Wood, 2003), need a single super-power or hegemon which provides the coordination between dominant capitalist powers? If so, how does the position of the US in world capitalism must be read; as Empire, Hegemon or something else? If not, how must dominant position of the US, as nation-state, must be read today?

According to Gowan (2006:132),

The strategic problems facing the American state since the end of the Cold-War have been the problems of rebuilding American primacy.

And he adds that, “... 9/11 offered an opportunity for American class and state leaders to tackle some of the main strategic problems which have faced the United States since the collapse of the Soviet bloc” (Gowan, 2006:132). Such an opportunity for reorganizing its ‘primacy’ (or say hegemony),

... has been provided as ‘a global programme designed to enhance the power of capital over labour everywhere and to provide capital everywhere with an overall development project, in economics, social and political life. In the eyes of the American proponents of primacy, it is a positive-sum game for the capitalisms of the world (Gowan, 2006:139).

This, according to Gowan (2006:139), explains what “... the neocons mean with their insistence that their projected American empire is a benevolent empire”.

However, such a ‘global programme’ cannot be considered as ‘the natural consequences of a globalization process having no subject’. Rather it is the IoC through “gigantic swings in exchange rates” steered by “financial markets and foreign exchange markets” which are “situated ... in New York and its satellite London”, as Gowan (2003) claim.

The biggest players in these markets take their cue in exchange rate issues from every word and gesture of the Treasury Department's authorities and every move by the authorities of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. And since the two sides share fundamentally common interests, the U.S. Treasury Department can use the main financial market operators precisely as instruments and multipliers of public policy (Gowan, 2003).

Consequently, as Gowan argues globalization as the form of capital response to its immanent tension through internationalization is closely related with the reconstruction of the US ‘primacy’ or ‘hegemony’ in world capitalism while Hardt and Negri (2003) insist on that ‘globalization as empire that is being nowhere and everywhere’ while proposing the disappearance of inter-imperialist rivalry.

Indeed, these above claims and ideas (Panitch and Gindin, 2003; Gowan, 2006, Hardt and Negri, 2000) about the change in the management of capitalism that are declared as distinct, have one significant differentiation point which was traced back to a debate between Lenin and Kautsky. This significant issue has been developed around a basic question whether it is possible for capitalists from different national ties to co-operate or not.

While Lenin’s imperialism theory (1998) does not accept such a condition of cooperation, Kautsky (2004) insisted on the co-operation among the capitalists that could create an ‘ultra-imperialist’ condition for world capitalism.

According to Bromley (2006:30),

The outbreak of the First World War and the rivalries between the leading capitalist states in the interwar depression and the Second World War seemed to support Lenin over Kautsky. But, after the Second World War, relations among the leading capitalist states stabilised and, under American leadership, deep and extensive forms of co-operation were fashioned. Theories of US superimperialism in effect argued that Kautsky's world had been achieved by Leninist means. One imperialism – that is, US imperialism – had established such overwhelming dominance, by virtue of the defeat and exhaustion of its rivals during the War, that it was able to monopolise the stabilisation of capitalism in the periphery as well as the defence of world capitalism against the challenges now posed by the Soviet Union and the rest of the Communist world.

Similarly, Green (2002:63) argues that,

Capitalist competition persists, in some respects, in a more intensified form across the terrain of the world market. The Bukharin/Lenin analysis of imperialism is a deep but empirically grounded explanation of the conditions that led to the First World War, and has itself become a straitjacket constricting the imagination of Marxists today.

Therefore all the ideas and claims about the concept used by radical thinkers developed around this two option (ultra-imperialist management of world capitalism through cooperation and management of world capitalism in the existence of inter-imperialist rivalry due to uneven development of capitalism) for capital, have been shaping the views about the ideas of new forms of management of world capitalism. For example, according to Bromley, (2003:41), for Anderson (2002) and for also Peter Gowan,

As the consensual basis of US leadership declines – either because of the end of the Cold War or because of a reduced ability to operate as a pole of attraction – its hegemony can be expected to take an increasingly unilateral and predatory form, thereby prompting reactions in other power centers (Bromley, 2003:41).

Kautsky(2004) by the help of the concept of 'ultra-imperialism', Bromley (2003) with the concept of 'co-ordinated liberal order', Panitch and Gindin (2000, 2003, 2005, 2006) by the concept of 'informal empire', point out the same significant view assuming that there can not be an 'inter-imperialist rivalry'. On the other hand, Bromley (2003:48-9) argues that,

Economically speaking, the US has no option but to follow the logic of Kautsky rather than Lenin. Interimperialist rivalry is becoming a negative-sum game, a default option of last resort in the economics of the capitalist world. Militarily speaking, however, the unipolar moment offers a temptation to attempt to freeze the current position of US superiority for the foreseeable future, to maintain its distributive military edge over all other powers. This is what the Revolution in Military Affairs and the National Missile Defence programme are all about. At present, US military strategy aims to prevent the emergence of any regional power capable of matching its military might.

Therefore, it has been argued that two different logics emerged for the future management of world capitalism.

Bromley (2003) furthers his analysis by explaining that the US has to find a way to mix these two logics¹⁴⁴. Those logics are similar to the two different logics of power developed by David Harvey (following Giovanni Arrighi). According to Harvey (2004a, 2004b), there are ‘two logics of power’: Territorial logic of power and capitalist logic of power which must be thought as distinct to each other and imperialism is nothing but their contradictory fusion.¹⁴⁵ However, such a conceptualization based on the contradictory (thus, exterior) existence of each logic fails why this so and also hinders that such contradiction is stemmed from the very nature of capital¹⁴⁶. Contrary to Harvey, Brenner (2006:84) argues that;

¹⁴⁴ Bromley (2003:62) thinks that “The modern international system has witnessed two routes to international order. In the first, the dominant military and economic powers use their oligopoly of distributive power to compete and balance against one another and to manage the rest of the system, either on the basis of conceding spheres of more or less imperial influence to one another or through more concerted forms of global diplomacy. Understood in these terms, the United States is now in a unique position because of the unparalleled asymmetry of its military power ... The second route to international order is more co-operative and involves the generation of forms of positive-sum power by means of collective action in a partly co-ordinated liberal-capitalist world, the ultra-imperialist order anticipated by Kautsky.”

¹⁴⁵ Harvey’s founding conception of imperialism as a ‘contradictory fusion’ of “‘the politics of state and empire’ (imperialism as a distinctively political project) . . . and ‘the molecular processes of capital accumulation’ (imperialism as a diffuse political-economic process)’ remains unexplained, the ostensibly conflicting interests or processes that make for contradiction still requiring elucidation” (Brenner, 2006:81-2).

¹⁴⁶ Wood (2006:11) argues that “When he [Harvey] writes that ‘[t]he fundamental point is to see the territorial and capitalist logics of power as distinct from each other’ and to understand that they ‘frequently tug against each other, sometimes to the point of outright antagonism’, it is not clear precisely which distinction and which contradiction he really has in mind.”

... the way to confront this issue is not by reference to a dubious conflict between the interests of capital and that of states, but, more simply and straightforwardly, by reference to the problematic character of the form of state that historically emerged to carry out the political functions required for the reproduction of capital: the system of multiple states. The nature of capital itself – the social relationships among capitals and between capital and labour which constitute capital – cannot account for this form of state. Abstractly speaking, a single state governing global capital is perfectly conceivable and probably most appropriate from the standpoint of capital ... That capitalism is governed by multiple states is the result of the historical fact that it emerged against the background of a system of multiple feudal states, and, in the course of its development, transformed the component states of that system into capitalist states but failed to alter the multi-state character of the resulting international system.

In accordance with the critical outlook that I have tried to develop in the previous chapters, the source of that contradiction is in very nature of the capital relation itself. However, this nature of capital cannot be thought a-historically. Such a nature of capital is the product of historical struggles. Above, Brenner (2006:84) claims that “abstractly speaking, a single state governing global capital is perfectly conceivable and probably most appropriate from the standpoint of capital”. This may be true in the abstract world of theory but human history has been moving in a different path.

As Brenner (2006:84) also argues; “... capitalism ... failed to alter the multi-state character of the resulting international system”. Such ‘multi-state character’ (multiple-state system, Wood, 2003) of the international system has not been providing a condition of ‘ultra-imperialist’ world order, like the Empire of Hardt and Negri (2000) and the American Empire of Panitch and Gindin (2003). This claim of mine does not deny the fact that ‘imperialist blocs’ can co-operate for a more ‘smooth space’ for capital accumulation. Bromley (2003:34) argues that,

We can think of American power as a form of empire that leaves ‘its mark on the international relations of its era’ by providing a model for others to emulate, the replication of Americanism outside America as Gramsci put it; we can see the world as a series of rival imperialisms, potentially configured in postures of interimperialist rivalry, pacified by the overwhelming military power of US super imperialism; and we can see relations among the leading capitalist states as altogether more co-operative, as a

form of ultra-imperialist co-ordination based on the mutual interests of internationally organised capitalist firms and markets.

Those three views which are not mutually exclusive must be evaluated while keeping in mind what Sakellariopoulos and Sotiris (2006) argue by mentioning that,

... competition between capitals in the international plane is necessarily state-mediated, the state's role being to guarantee the interests of the capitalists as a whole- and this leads to inter-imperialist rivalry and war', since it seems meaningful to argue that 'forms of inter-imperialist cooperation are mainly contingent outcomes of particular conjunctures.

To summarize, in such a world constituted through capital relation having an immanent tension (that I discussed previous chapters), 'ultra -imperialism', more accurately inter-imperialist co-operation, (which found its different expressions in Hardt and Negri's Empire and Panitch and Gindin's American Empire or American Imperial State) can be interpreted as 'contingent outcomes of particular conjunctures' not as a structural feature of today's capitalism which has been argued to have totally transformed (through liberal perception and presentation of globalization process). Therefore, it seems that the question of "What is new in capitalism" must be answered through a path not denying the possible inter-imperialist rivalry.

4.4. What is new in Capitalism or What are the new forms of Capitalist Imperialism

... the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy for enlargement- enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies.

A. Lake (Bill Clinton's National Security Adviser)¹⁴⁷

It can be argued that,

Present stage of capitalism can be characterized as *neoliberal* as a result of the new course targeted to the restoration of the income and wealth of capitalist classes, *imperial* due to continued (or increased) pressure on the rest of the world, and *under U.S.*

¹⁴⁷ Gowan (2006:135)

hegemony because of the dominating position of the United States among imperialist countries (Dumenil and Levy, 2004:661).

In addition, it may also be added that,

Neoliberalism augmented tremendously the flows of financial income from abroad: a central feature of imperialism at the age of neoliberalism (Dumenil and Levy, 2004:663; cf. Arrighi, 2005¹⁴⁸).

However, such an understanding seems not explaining the ongoing unilateral and militarily violent orientation of the US in world capitalism where US State has a privileged (but not omnipotent) position due to what Gowan (2005) called Dollar-Wall Street-Regime. Thus, to claim the ongoing persistence of US hegemony¹⁴⁹ seems unconvincing to me. In order to emphasize ‘change within continuity’ I will insist on declining hegemony of the US (change) in a world constituted through capital relation.

Following analysis of Harvey (2001, 2004a, 2004b) and with the contributions of Yıldızoğlu (1996, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) on structural crisis of capital relation due to increasing tendencies towards overproduction/under consumption, in the critics of globalization I implied that it (globalization) corresponded to the financial enlargement as response to the structural crisis of capital relation since 1970s, which also corresponded to the period in which the decline of the US hegemony has been discussed. Such condition denotes the collapse of the post-war character of capitalism under the US leadership, established over an international monetary system (Bretton Woods).

According to Arrighi (2000b:110-116), similar to the ‘hegemony’ of British Empire, American hegemony has provided a ground for Westphalian State

¹⁴⁸ Arrighi argues such condition as the sign of having no hegemony

¹⁴⁹ “... hegemony is not just about power, but the deployment of power for perceived legitimate reasons which serve not only America’s interests but others’ too; and if the United States employs its vast power in the future such a way as to cause others to resent rather than welcome its use, then it could easily end up being a far less acceptable hegemon than it has been in the past” (Cox, 2002:67).

System to be reconstructed and developed after the Second World War. For him, this made the US to gain the capacity to construct the new international system after the WW2¹⁵⁰. Hence, in the post-war period, it is not wrong to argue that,

With its vast military machine, enormous material resources and ideological self-confidence, the United States, it was obvious, was like no other power on earth. (Cox, 2006:114)

In addition, for Harvey (2004), the effect of “U.S. military and economic leadership as the sole capitalist superpower” in post-war era was the construction of “... a hegemonic U.S. (‘super imperialism’)” in world capitalism. In such a hegemonic system, “the result was thus a unipolar capitalist world in which the United States had the right to take unilateral decisions on the great global cleavage with the Communist Bloc” (Gowan, 2003). However, as Gowan (2003) asserts that the US established its primacy through hub-and stokes model which can be argued to correspond to somehow Kautskyite “ultra-imperialism”¹⁵¹. However, after the collapse of Bretton

¹⁵⁰ According to Anderson (2002), the capacity of US ‘for spectacular economic growth, military power and cultural penetration’ comes from its ‘... continental scale of territory, resources and market, protected by two oceans, that no other nation-state comes near to possessing; and a settler-immigrant population forming a society with virtually no pre-capitalist past, apart from its local inhabitants, slaves and religious creeds, and bound only by the abstractions of a democratic ideology.’

¹⁵¹ According to Gowan (2003), “There was ... a partnership of core capitalist states during the Cold War in the fight against Communism and to keep the South under control. Institutions like the international financial institutions, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the security alliances as well as Western cooperation in the UN indicated this. But there was not only partnership. There was also American political dominance over the other core states. The partnership and its institutional expressions could be thought of as a superstructure. But underpinning that superstructure was a deeper structure of American political dominance. This deep structure derived from the ability of the United States to create a particular kind of hub-and-spokes structure of relations which ensured that for each of the main core capitalist states its political relationship with the U.S. hub was more crucial to its vital interests than any other possible relationship with any other power.” In addition, Xing and Hersh (2006) claims that “After 1945, US capitalism, acting in the interests of world capitalism as a whole, did establish a variant ‘ultra-imperialist’ economic order under its hegemony through a reorganization of the capitalist world economy by creating new conditions for the continuation of capital accumulation.”

Woods system, world capitalism entered into its new period of crisis and it seems never ended yet.

Today, such crisis finds its expressions into vast amount of financial enlargement (globalization)¹⁵² that began in early 1980s. After the crisis, similar to the claims of Gowan (2006) clearly shows while discussing the emergence of the Dollar-Wall-Street-Regime, Harvey (2004) highlights that,

Capital controls became hard to enforce as surplus U.S. dollars flooded the world market. The U.S. then sought to construct a different kind of system that rested upon a mix of new international and financial institutional arrangements to counter economic threats from Germany and Japan and to re-center economic power as finance capital operating out of Wall Street).

After the collapse of Bretton Woods and entrance to the period of permanent crisis of capital relation which have not been resolved yet,

U.S. banks gained the privilege of re-cycling the petro-dollars into the world economy. Threatened in the realm of production, the U.S. countered by asserting its hegemony through finance. But for this system to work effectively, markets in general and capital markets in particular had to be forced open to international trade (a slow process that required fierce U.S. pressure backed by use of international levers such as the IMF and an equally fierce commitment to neoliberalism as the new economic orthodoxy). It also entailed shifting the balance of power and interests within the bourgeoisie from production activities to institutions of finance capital (Harvey, 2004).

This process has been understood as ‘globalization’ due to liberal (globalist) perception/presentation which is different from what Yıldızoğlu (2002) claims with ‘long evolutionary-historical globalization’. Moreover, through liberal perception of ‘globalization’, it has been argued that a ‘global market’ was emerged, beyond the reach of national interests, which would serve the interests of all nations, people, and the state who/which play(s) the ‘gambles’ (Gowan, 2006) according to the rules [(post) Washington Consensus]. However, today it is clear that,

¹⁵² Such financialization can be viewed as “dissociation of money and exploitation” (Bonefeld, 1995:45) which inevitably and increasingly provides the ongoing condition of crisis of capital relation.

... global market is still far from integrated: the fact that wages, prices and conditions of labour are still so widely diverse throughout the world (Wood, 2003c:135).

Therefore, in this specific time period, it seems meaningful to perceive that,

The US used its control of financial and commercial networks to postpone the day of reckoning for its own domestic capital, enabling it to shift the burden elsewhere, easing the movements of excess capital to seek profits wherever they were to be found, in an orgy of financial speculation (Wood, 2003b:133).

In line with the conceptual framework provided by Harvey (2001), “movements of excess capital to seek profits ... in an orgy of financial speculation” have taken place through the search for structured coherences established through the rules of the ‘gambles’ designed by (post) Washington consensus in accordance with the neoliberal structural adjustment projects by the imposition of IMF, World Bank, WTO, which have been “the international mediators of the US hegemony” (Barrow: 2005:136).

In this new period, the efforts to resolve the structural crisis of capital through financial enlargement of capital established through liberalizations faced with conjunctural crises [in Mexico (1994-95), Asia (1997-1998), Russia (1998), Brazil (1998-99), Argentina and Turkey (2001), and the stock-exchange crisis in New York (2001)] which were perceived as the ‘failures’ in ‘globalization’ process (Stiglitz, 2002). Moreover, 9/11 Attacks and the military responses of the US through *Operation Enduring Freedom*, have made the ultimate impact to the process perceived/presented as the creation of ‘global village’ in which no geopolitical clashes exist and ‘global market’ in which interdependence between economic actors is established through ‘globalization’.

Above period, in which liberal perception/presentation of globalization was dominant, corresponded to the early times in post-Cold War era, at the same time and as Gowan describes,

After the end of the Cold War, ... Washington's pursuit of the liberalizing agenda [is] ... a 'global gamble' for world dominance, a Faustian bid to utilize the unipolar moment following the end of the Cold War to restructure the international political economy in ways that serve the particular interests of the United States, and especially those of the Wall-Street-Treasury axis (Bromley, 2003:20).

Such pursuit stems from the fact that "... the US economy [requires] manipulation of global monetary and financial, as well as political, relationships to suck in capital to sustain its domestic consumer booms and speculative bubbles" (Gowan, 2002:66-7). Therefore,

The problem is to build a world community of capitalisms that the United States leads. This is a problem of reconfiguring the relations between states and capitalisms in a way that enables the United States to govern the whole system in a sustained, long-term fashion that will enable U.S. capitalism to flourish (Gowan, 2005:418).

However,

An American military statecraft and geopolitics geared increasingly to sustaining international socio-economic relationships that serve too exclusively US domestic interests could eventually generate acute tensions at the heart of the new global order. A hegemon which up to now has always dominated the rest of the capitalist core indirectly, by shaping the external environment of its subordinate allies, might feel pressed to turn its arsenal of powers more directly in their direction (Gowan, (2002:66-7).

Gowan's analysis is similar to the analysis of Arrighi (2005), however, his approach, as he emphasizes,

... starts methodologically not from U.S. weaknesses, say in financial imbalances or whatever, but from U.S. strengths: in the field of statecraft, its military-political capacities, and its dollar dominance and the DWSR; in the field of social programs, the huge attractions for business classes of the neoliberal social model: a rentier capitalism with money capital in the driver's seat and a "market state" with a democratic form, drained of democratic substance (Gowan, 2005:420).

However, I think, this two scholars analysis constitutes the two sides of same coin. Weakness of the US is at the same time demonstrates its level of strength. the US might still be the model to other core countries in order to re-constitute its declining hegemony however, such a condition of being in need of 2 billion \$ capital in-flow to the US domestic market everyday and the violent and unilateral foreign policy of the US since 2001 cause problematic issues in world order problem of capitalism which has inescapably been (re)shaped by

inter-imperialist contention (that has been taking different conjunctural forms in the history of capitalism).

Contrary to my stress that world capitalism is constituted through antagonistic and rival power blocs, Albo (2003)¹⁵³ argues that,

The tensions and contradictions that have emerged with the U.S. 'new economy' illustrate the complexity of both rivalry and interdependence between the hierarchy of states within the world market. It is wrong to see the world market as only a chaotic complex of rival units on the verge of breaking down into warfare or overtly antagonistic blocs. At this political moment, the interdependence of interests of national ruling classes (even those in peripheral zones) in the existing international system far outweighs their rivalry. But it is equally wrong to speak only of the uneven interdependence produced by U.S. hegemony. This can return us to a conceptual abstraction of 'empire' that, on the one hand, gives a one-sided emphasis on the politico-military dimensions of territorial expansion reminiscent of pre-capitalist and colonial societies, and, on the other, elides the particular concentrations of power and authority in concrete places mediating the relations with other places. Japan, Germany, Canada, and even Brazil, Mexico and South Africa all constitute, in the particular modalities of their relations with others, dominant states in the hierarchy of the world market. And the contradictions of the economic relations of the U.S. to the world economy means that both alternate agendas and efforts at greater co-ordination from rival imperial centers are likely to increase in the near future.

However, Albo (2003) also states that, "interdependence between the imperial centers has not yet provided the co-ordination between them," that has been actually thought as the main idea behind the formation of Empire or Ultra-imperialism debates¹⁵⁴. If coordination between imperial centers/international power blocs has not been provided, the possibility of inter-imperialist rivalry and necessity to construct an alternative outlook through such awareness would be central to the discussions to the debate around contemporary forms competition and contention (and/or rivalry) between capitalists in a world of nation-states.

¹⁵³ According to Albo(2003), "The export of the U.S. policy model to developing and transition economies through the neo-liberal 'Washington consensus' became the standard for international economic support wherever the country, from Mexico to Mozambique to Russia, or whatever the issue, from capital flight to lack of industrial capacity to government debt, at hand."

¹⁵⁴ "How could American investment in China and Chinese investment in the United States both be evidence of American power?" (Nitzan and Bichler, 2004:7).

4.5. Conclusion

... the new form of imperialism we call globalization is more than ever an imperialism that depends on a system of multiple states (Wood, 2003:138).

Arrighi (2000b) and Harvey (2004) by stating “capitalist logic of power/territorial logic of power”, Holloway (1995) by stressing contradiction between the mobility of capital and immobility of state, and Oğuz (2006:211), by constructing a new conceptual framework consisting of categorization of space of production and liquid space; or Clarke (2001a) by emphasizing the contradiction between global character of capital and national character of state, and Gowan(2006) by asserting “capitalism’s world order problem”¹⁵⁵, all try to analyze the contradictory character (immanent tension of capital relation discussed in second chapter) embedded in capital relation. Following those scholars highlighted tension through a Marxists outlook, what I wanted to emphasize is that without being aware of such ‘tension’, any analysis of world capitalism would be misleading. As Tsoukalas (1999:58) argues;

... irrespective of the processes and mechanisms employed by capitalists in their search for profit, the main question to ask must concern the various forms of social activity of the bourgeoisie, or fractions thereof within the given domestic socioeconomic environments. If the constitution of domestic power blocks and their internal antinomies and political antagonisms can only be properly understood in conjunction with their trans-territorial entrepreneurial capacities, they must nonetheless also always operate within definite borders, however loose their dependence on internal markets may be. Even if capital may be controlled in the ether, it must be accumulated on earth.

“A single state governing global capital”¹⁵⁶ seems to be ‘appropriate’ for the smooth capital accumulation process, however capitalism “failed to alter the

¹⁵⁵ “The great problem for capitalism is how to manage the contradiction between its necessary fragmentation into separate geopolitical units and its necessary tendency to construct deep transnational social linkages- political and economic and cultural- between these units. This is capitalisms world order problem” (Gowan, 2006:150).

¹⁵⁶ “... formation of a truly international, transnational or world state would mark not a rational adaptation of the capitalist state to the global character of capital accumulation, but a

multi-state character of the resulting international system” (Brenner, 2006:84).

Therefore,

... the contradictions between transnational integration and political fragmentation remain structural and those who see only transnational integration (globalization theories) and those who see only political fragmentation and conflict (realists) cannot grasp the current dynamics (Gowan, 2005:422).

In addition, to say that capitalists have no nation does not contradict the above arguments of mine. Since, “the need to maximize profit has always involved certain requirements of organization and enforcement (among other things, to keep the working class in place) which up to now have been, and in the foreseeable future still promise to be, fulfilled above all by nation-states” (Wood, 1999). Such role of nation-state¹⁵⁷ cannot be argued as diminished as a result of ‘financial enlargement’ process, instead it can be argued that “the form of state intervention the economy and society has changed” (Barrow, 2005:129). Moreover, today (globalization)

The general progress of neoliberalization has ... been increasingly impelled *through* mechanisms of uneven developments. Successful states or regions put pressure on everyone else to follow their lead (Harvey, 2005:87).

Hence, through neo-liberal integration of different capitalism as a response of overaccumulation crisis of capital must be evaluated in the changing conditions

fundamental transformation of the state from, which could only be based on an inversion of the relationship between capital and the state, between politics and economics, an inversion which would hardly be consistent with the continued existence of the capitalist mode of production.” (Clarke, 2001:80).

¹⁵⁷ “The task of the state is to maintain the unity and cohesion of a social formation divided into classes, and it focuses and epitomizes the class contradictions of the whole social formation in such a way as to sanction and legitimize the interests of the dominant classes and fractions as against the other classes of the formation, in a context of world class contradictions” (Poulantzas, 1979:78). Moreover, “The class character of the capitalist state is most fundamentally determined by the separation of the state from civil society, and the corresponding subordination of state and civil society to the rule of money and the law” (Clarke, 2001:79), which can only be provided by nation-states. Such necessity creates the ‘specificities’ (Savran, 2002) of national space that hinders emergence of ‘smooth space’ created by a de-centred empire due to unknown nature of national class struggles.

of world capitalism that has been (re) shaped through in a world in which “successful” nation-states have gained certain primacy among others.

Consequently it is possible to argue that today, USA has been making propaganda as if it is the ‘the protector of the Free World’ (through its *Operation Enduring Freedom*) and protecting and advancing of the US interests and values (in aftermath of 9/11 attacks) have been tried to be demonstrated as necessary for ‘global peace and justice’ in order to make ‘US capitalism’ to protect her interests in world capitalism through reconstituting of its hegemony while making other nation-states and capitalist believe those interests are universal.

To summarize, based on the critics of theoretical usages of the concept of empire, I tried to show those usages were based on ‘ultra-imperialist’ assumptions (“complete absence of inter-imperialist contradictions”; Poulantzas, 1979:86) denying the possibility inter-imperialist rivalry. The analysis of and what actually new in capitalism must be constituted through perceiving the immanent tension of capital relation which inescapably creates contention and rivalry between different capitalism(s) located in different nation-states.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

History when it was declared to be dead appears full of surprises: is this the irony of history or the making of history? (Bonefeld, 2004)

After making an evaluation of the critical readings on the two concepts in the previous chapters, in this chapter a brief summary and some concluding remarks will be emphasized. Then, for further theoretical efforts to analyze the change in world capitalism some forward-looking questions will be asked.

At the beginning of this work my claims on ‘globalization’ and ‘empire’ were constructed over an assumption that our analysis of capitalism (or the reality constituted through capital relation) had to focus on the analyses of the ‘continuities’ in order to define the ‘changes’, without falling into fetishism of present taking the ideas of ‘epochal shift’ in human history as central to our arguments about the changes.

The concepts and the generalizations that have been designed for understanding the reality have not signified the whole contradictions of that specific reality. Today most of the concepts that have been constituted to understand the changes and transformations in world capitalism failed to grasp the immanent contradictions of a world constituted through capital relation. Moreover, most of the concepts, due to their failure to grasp the contradictory nature of capital relation, have come into agenda with a claim to declare that humanity entered into new historical era. In other words, those concepts have been operationalized as narrative of great transformation due to their failure to grasp the persistence of contradictory nature of capital relation.

Throughout this work it was claimed that the concepts of, ‘globalization’ and ‘empire’ (indeed, *Zeitgeist* of 1990s and 2000s successively) are most popular ‘narratives of great transformation’ declaring ‘change’ in the nature of capitalist social relations and its principal way of organization, that is through nation-state. These two assumptions that the most popular narrative of great transformation (historical rupture and/or epochal shift) in human history based on, are the products of the efforts to analyze the ongoing period of crisis of capitalism since the 1970s.

It was previously mentioned that those narratives are in need of further analyses established over an understanding which aims to seek changes/transformations through an outlook perceiving ‘change within continuity’ in which ‘continuity’ is defined as the persistence of contradictory nature of capital relation, that creates ‘tension between tendency of capital relation to create world market (“global character of capital”, Clarke, 2001) and the territorial (spatial) dimension (“national character of the state”, Clarke, 2001) of capital accumulation (surplus-value production).

As it was discussed elsewhere in this work, capital relation as a restless social relation between capital and labour constitutes the reality through its immanent tension between fixity and motion (Brenner, 1998). Globalization (liberal perception/presentation of it claiming the decline of nation-state through trans-(supra)-nationalization process) and empire (theoretical usage of Hardt and Negri and Panitch and Gindin based on disappearance of inter-imperialist rivalry) are the concepts that could not grasp this specific character, that is contradictory (Clarke, 2001a)¹⁵⁸, of capital relation. Therefore, I find meaningful to operationalize *inter*-nationalization of capital instead of the concept of globalization and to keep going on to operationalize the concept of

¹⁵⁸ According to Harvey (2001:332), ‘...there is a ‘chronic instability’, ‘... a tension within the geography of capitalism between fixity and motion, between the rising power to overcome space and the immobile spatial structures required for such a purpose’.

‘imperialism’ based on new forms of rivalry between imperialist blocs instead of the concept of empire.

Both concepts (globalization and empire), by claiming that human history entered into new era, have been constructed on overestimated analyses of the ‘changes/transformations’ in world capitalism. In line with this thinking, I critically engaged with those concepts (Globalization and Empire) through this work in order to develop tentative ideas for understanding the nature of changes/transformations in world capitalism. In this part of thesis, some concluding remarks based on such tentative ideas will be tried to be emphasized.

5.1 What Conclusions Can Be Drawn From The Critical Engagement Of This Work On The Concept of ‘Globalization’?

I developed my critics about so-called globalization phenomenon over two important determinations, one belongs Weisbrot *et al* (2001) and the other Bonefeld (2004). I believe those two determinations are enough to refute all those promises about peace and prosperity of liberal (globalist) perception of globalization.

While comparing the two eras (1960-1980 / 1980-2000), Weisbrot *et al* (2001), demonstrates that;

... for economic growth and almost all of the other indicators¹⁵⁹, the last 20 years have shown a very clear decline in progress as compared with the previous two decades.

In addition to these facts, Bonefeld (2004) highlights that;

¹⁵⁹ These indicators are the growth of income per person, life expectancy, mortality among infants, children and adults, literacy and education.

Over the last decade there has been an increase in the trafficking of women and children, prostitution and slavery. New markets have emerged in human organs and babies, reducing the proprietors of labour power not only to an exploitable resource but, also, to a resource to be operated on and sold, with babies being produced for export.

Having in those facts and determinations in my mind, I approached all the claims of globalist account of globalization sceptically, mostly its claims of trans-(supra)-nationalization which has been supposed to create an epochal shift in human history. However, by claiming that globalization of the 1980s and (mostly) 1990s might be considered as a form of crisis of capital relation, I do not claim that every transformation/change that have occurred in social reality since 1980s have been nothing but the necessary consequences of the restlessness of the capital relation. What I really want to emphasize is that the concept of globalization in its commonly presented form, has been considered as indispensable and irresistible and such presentation of globalization by various social actors and scholars has been neutralizing the conflictual nature of the globalization as a form of crisis of capital relation. For example, according to UNDP Report 1999;

- Globalization offers great opportunities for human advance- but only with stronger governance.
- The opportunities and benefits of globalization need to be shared much more widely.
- Globalization is creating new threats to human security in rich countries and poor.
- New information and communications technologies are driving globalization- but polarizing the world into the connected and the isolated. (Held, 2003: 421-429)

In order to analyze the reasons behind such perception and presentation of globalization, the ideas and views of various scholars were critically engaged in this work. Rosenberg (2005) clearly introduces the commonly accepted views and ideas about, what I have called as the liberal perception/presentation, globalization.

What were the 1990s about? The answer given by Globalization Theory was broadly as follows. Social changes in the West combined with the end of the Cold War to remove the fetters on transnational forces of all kinds; and those forces, newly armed with the latest communications technologies, and finally had a free hand to integrate the globe.

As the transnational interconnections proliferated, state sovereignty would become increasingly unworkable. In its place was emerging a new 'post-Westphalian' system of multi-lateral world governance, which would increasingly consign traditional international relations to the past. This is what they meant when they said that the future was 'global'. (And in fact they had to mean something like this; for nothing less than transformation on this scale could have justified the idea that 'globalization' necessitated a new paradigm for social science.) (Rosenberg, 2005:6).

Like brilliant analysis of Rosenberg (2005) on globalization shows us, the concept itself has been flourished with a claim that social science needed new paradigm. Such claim for necessity of a new paradigm was supported by theoretical arguments of some scholars (especially of Jan Aart Scholte). According to Scholte (quoted by Rosenberg, 2005:5),

... the traditional social sciences had been shaped by a 'methodological territorialism' which prevented them from seeing the reality of globalization, and that it was therefore necessary to produce nothing less than 'a paradigm shift in social analysis'.

Thus, trans-(supra)-nationalization process (liberal perception/presentation of globalization) is argued to be able to be understood through giving up 'methodological territorialism'. In brief, those scholars, defending above view about globalization, who are globalist (Held and McGrew, 2003:2),

... argued, 'globalization' — variously manifested in the collapse of military and ideological divisions, the transnational integration of the world to form a single social space, and the rise of new patterns of 'deterritorialized' social relations enabled by new means of communication — was producing a fundamental shift in the spatio-temporal constitution of human societies. (Rosenberg, 2005:4)

First of all, by opposing to such claim of paradigmatic shift, it was tried to be states in this work that changes in world capitalism do not necessitate new paradigm since we already have a paradigm, which constructed over the assumption of persistence of capital relation that is Marxist outlook. Through such outlook, it was proposed in this work that globalization (today, neoliberal integration of markets across the world) must be understood through the process of internationalization of capital whose explanations do not need a new paradigm.

On the other hand, apart from liberal (globalist) thinkers, radical thinkers within Marxist outlook also started to defend similar way of thinking (Hardt and Negri, 2000). Most of those radical thinkers thought that, today,

...a genuinely global capitalist system generates contradictions that cannot be addressed at national level alone, even by the most powerful states. Globalization has brought about some fundamental conversions in the “modus operandi” of the capitalist world system in which the system’s constitutive rules and regulative capacities are in the process of restructuring and generating new social constellations of actors and agencies. (Xing and Hersh, 2006)

While being aware of the fact that capitalism has been ‘changing’ since the 1970s, I tried to emphasize it was so since the emergence of capitalism. Hence, in this work it has been proposed that ‘modus operandi’ of the system did not change and those transformations in world capitalism can be grasped within the framework of Marxist analysis of capital relation and Marxist analysis of crises of capital relation¹⁶⁰. Therefore, claiming that ‘modus operandi’ of capitalist system changed seems not convincing.

Furthermore, within the liberal perception/presentation of globalization phenomenon it has been claimed that,

... global extension of free-market reforms will ultimately bring worldwide peace and prosperity. Like Modernity and Development before it, Globalization is thus narrated as the force that will lift the whole world out of poverty as more and more communities are integrated into the capitalist global economy (Sparke, *et al* 2003:887).

As opposed to such claim of ‘global village’ divorced from geopolitical clashes and characterized with peace and prosperity, it was claimed in this work that,

¹⁶⁰“Marx’s concept of sovereignty is consistent with the historical nature of international relations in both the 19th and the 21st centuries — indeed, it becomes progressively more consistent over this period, as capitalist society establishes and extends its sway in the world; meanwhile, the Westphalian’ concept is consistent with this nature in neither period” (Rosenberg, 2005:19).

...‘globalization’ was the magic word which simultaneously naturalized and dramatized ... tiger-leap of capitalist expansion, representing it as the unstoppable, uncontrollable climax of a universal human destiny (Rosenberg, 2005:51).

As an alternative way to such a-historical assumptions of liberal perception/presentation of globalization¹⁶¹, I believe that following an idea based on an analytical differentiation between ‘long evolutionary-historical globalization’ (historical process through which human beings have been connecting each other inevitably due to their social character) and current wave of globalization that is the form of crisis of capital (through which capital searches for new spatio-temporal fixes for the maintenance of its self-expansion¹⁶²) provides more meaningful ground to identify the changes in the continuity of capitalist social relations which has been shaped through conflictual relations among social actors and nation-states. Through following such differentiation, it must be accepted that, as Jessop (2002:113) argues,

The national state has long played a key role in establishing and regulating the relationship between the spatial and temporal matrices of social life (Poulantzas 1978, 114). This remains true in a period of globalization, but the forms in which the state is involved have been changing. The state is involved in modifying the spatiotemporal matrices of capitalism and the nation, and it has a key role in managing the uneven spatiotemporal development by the capital relation.

Finally, through looking such analytical differentiation, it might be stated that ‘globalization’ must be understood as internationalization of capital as a response to its contradictory nature constituted through the tension between its tendency to create world market by overcoming the spatial barriers and its

¹⁶¹ “Proclaiming that globalization implies an ‘epochal transformation’ or that it is a ‘historical break’ with the previous two centuries of the imperialist expansion of capitalism is at best a naive foolishness produced by a lack of historical information and analytical ability” (Carlos, 2002).

¹⁶² “The tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself” Marx (1999:308). However, as Harvey (2001:332-3) emphasizes, there is a ‘chronic instability’, ‘... a tension within the geography of capitalism between fixity and motion, between the rising power to overcome space and the immobile spatial structures required for such a purpose’. In addition, Capitalist development must negotiate a knife-edge between preserving the values of past commitments made at a particular place and time, or devaluing them to open up fresh room for accumulation.

being tied to the spatially and temporally organized structured coherences that has been designed by national territories.

5.2. What Conclusions Can Be Drawn from the Critical Engagement of This Work on the Concept of ‘Empire’?

Open-ended war against an invisible enemy is just what this new form of empire needs. The borderless empire of globalization needs infinite war, war without boundaries, war that is endless in both purpose and time.
(Wood, 2003:140)

It seems true that, as Gowan (2004b:491) argues,

One of the most striking areas of weakness in Western social science analysis in the last quarter of a century has been its inability to reach anything like a stable, minimal agreement on the role and capacity of the United States in international relations.

For instance, the scholars do not agree;

Which term “hegemony” or “empire” best describes the relationship the United States- more specifically, the US governmental apparatus-and the rest of the world today?
(Agnew, 2003)

In such a complicated issue, having accepted the 9/11 as a turning point, those discussions around the role of the US in world capitalism started to be designed through the concept of empire. Similarly, to the arguments of liberal perception of globalization, using the concept of empire for the role of the US started to refer another epochal shift in human history.

First of all,

... the change from the use of ‘hegemony’ or ‘superpower’ to empire, by even its advocates, is quite striking. It is recognition of both the level of American power and the pivotal role of the US in the international system (Mabee, 2004).

Hence, today, in order to recognize and identify the “level of American power” and its “pivotal role” in world capitalism; apart from pejorative use of the term,

the concept of 'empire' has been theoretically operationalized for the role of the US in world capitalism and/or in inter-state system by various radical scholars (Agnew, 2003; Bromley, 2003; Col  s and Saull, 2006; Cox, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Panitch, 2000, 2003; Panitch and Gindin, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006; Stokes, 2005; Todd, 2004). In most of the usages the 'unique' US constitution with its Jeffersonian ideals around federalist understanding of power (mostly in Hardt and Negri's account, and also in the outlook of Panitch and Gindin, 2003) plays a central role. Indeed, in those analyses being empire becomes a 'unique' characteristic of the US.

Such a change in discourse occurred after 9/11 Attacks, as I discussed before. A similar change happened also after the collapse of the USSR, a period in which the liberal perception of globalization (global village signifying the NWO in which peace and prosperity was supposed to exist for all the nations in world capitalism) emerged.

It was tried in this work that in both era we have been faced with narratives of great transformations declaring that we had entered a new era such as; new world order, global village, end of history, Kantian cosmopolitan world order or war on terrorism, 'rogue' states, clashes of civilizations and finally empire. I claimed that they did not let us to analyze the reality as a whole. Instead of operationalizing those concepts to understand the current phase of world capitalism, I stressed the necessity to focus on the perception of reality that has been constituted through capital relation in world territory defined and regulated through nation-states.

Contrary to my argument, Hardt and Negri (2000) declared the rising of empire which emerged as "a political subject governing the "global market". Such an empire is actually 'a transnational decentralized empire' (Wissel, 2004).

Since I discussed those discussions around the concept of empire in detail, for now, it is important to emphasize following issues about the ongoing importance about nation-state which still have significant role in the organization of capitalism and make the possibility of inter-imperialist rivalry apparent.

As Clarke (2001:90) clearly identifies that,

... the fact that capitalist accumulation always and everywhere takes the form of the overaccumulation and uneven development of capital implies that capitalist accumulation will always be interrupted by crisis marked by the devaluation of capital and the destruction of productive capital.

Therefore, in such a world designed through the movement of capital, any claim about emergence of a “smooth space”¹⁶³ must be opposed, since “rivalry still prevails among imperialist countries” (Dumenil and Levy, 2004:661). It cannot be in a form of wars but through different forms¹⁶⁴.

The concept of empire, which “existed before capitalism” (Pozo-Martin, 2006:232) is not capable to grasp the contradictory nature of capital relation while focusing on the emergence of ‘ultra-imperialism’¹⁶⁵. Therefore, imperialism, which “is rooted in capitalism and is therefore historically specific to it”, must be operationalized without claiming the disappearance of ‘inter-imperialist rivalry’. Following such outlook, I tried to stress that as far as the

¹⁶³ “The idea of Empire as a ‘smooth space’ is a central theme of the book” (Arrighi, 2002:4) of M. Hardt and A. Negri.

¹⁶⁴ For a new form of rivalry “endemic and serious tensions between the US and the EU over trade” and ongoing disputes over “state subsidies to, respectively, Boeing and Airbus” which “seems especially bitter and hard to resolve” (Callinicos, 2005) can be shown.

¹⁶⁵ I put aside a different contribution of Gowan (2004b) which seems to grasp that tension and existence of inter-imperialist rivalry.

tension¹⁶⁶ between the tendency of capital relation to create a world market and the spatial dimension of the capital accumulation exists (that is to say, as far as capitalist social relations exist), inter-imperialist rivalries can not disappear, since “forms of inter-imperialist cooperation are mainly contingent outcomes of particular conjunctures” (Sakellariopoulos and Sotiris, 2006), similar in Cold War somehow. Such contingent outcomes of particular conjunctures are the results of class struggles within each nation-states, since, “class struggle within the borders of each social formation determines its [nation-state’s] position in the hierarchy of the imperialist chain” (Sakellariopoulos and Sotiris, 2006). Therefore, it seems exaggeration that one imperial state structurally penetrates to its rivals and contains them into its informal empire (Panitch and Gindin, 2003).

5.3 Significant Points for an Analysis of Contemporary World Capitalism

My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced by them in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists.¹⁶⁷

Cecil Rhodes

... we are experiencing at the moment a particularly aggressive and egregious form of imperialism, which is now even ready to claim that it is imperialist (Wallerstein, 2003).

It is not convincing that we are living in the ‘age of globalization’. Rather, we live in a world constituted through capital relation which does not undermine the central position of nation-states in world capitalism. In addition, as

¹⁶⁶ “... capital as such, as a “blind” tendency towards unfettered accumulation, knows no borders. On the contrary, capitalist social relations require borders and can be reproduced only within the social, political and ideological conditions of specific capitalist social formations, in the form of territorial sovereign nation-states” (Sakellariopoulos and Sotiris, 2006).

¹⁶⁷ Quoted by Hardt and Negri (2000:232).

discussed before there is no ‘supranational actor’ acting through the notion of supranational right called as Empire of Hardt and Negri or an American Empire ‘structurally penetrated’ into its rivals as Panitch and Gindin (2003) argue. Hence, in such a world, “while evaluating the ‘almighty’ power of US” (Agnew, 2003:871) we must take into account following conditions of the US (Agnew, 2003:880-1):

- a. Military Superiority¹⁶⁸
- b. Being in need of foreign capital to finance its government spending and mass consumption¹⁶⁹
- c. Being in need of oil¹⁷⁰
- d. Lack of common danger that provides control over allies¹⁷¹.

Considering above challenges of the US necessitates a radical outlook of capitalism that was tried to be developed in this thesis. Such an outlook must be oriented to contribute to the theories of imperialism which recognize the ongoing possibility of inter-imperialist rivalry as one of structural characteristics of world capitalism due to uneven character of capitalist development derived from its immanent tension. In addition, this outlook has to take inter-imperialist cooperation into account sceptically, since such cooperation might be a conjunctural and/or contingent outcome in world capitalism rather than its new structural characteristic.

It must be stated that rather than mentioning a final word in such a limited space of a master thesis, it would be better to conclude by highlighting some

¹⁶⁸ See Mann (2003) for further analysis.

¹⁶⁹ See Arrighi (2005) for further analysis on that issue.

¹⁷⁰ See Harvey (2004) for detailed analysis.

¹⁷¹ Today, the discourse around the idea of “Islamic Terrorism” might play the role of the discourse “Communist Threat” as common enemy in Cold War era in order to create a ‘carapace’ for a new hegemony.

points for such an outlook which would provide an intellectual path (and/or line of thinking) to construct a much more comprehensible theory for the *modus operandi* of contemporary capitalism without distorting the reality with liberal perception of globalization and the ultra-imperialist claims of the discourse of empire.

After all those critical engagements with the dominant narratives declaring the emergence of epochal shift in human history, it must be asserted that to analyze the ongoing changes/transformations in world capitalism and its organization we are in need of considering some points.

First of all, the *modus operandi* of world capitalism did not change, since there has not occurred any change in the nature of capital relation. Secondly, because the contradiction between global character of capital and national character of the state is not overcome, nation-states are securing their central role in the management of capitalist social relations while their forms of engagement/intervention have been changing. Hence, the new narrative of empire that is signifying a trans-(supra)-national level beyond the jurisprudence of the nation-states is incapable of understanding the contradictory nature of capital relation that has been mentioned above.

Thirdly, since “ultra-imperialism thesis” seems not convincing due to the uneven character of capitalist accumulation process geographically which inevitably creates hierarchy among nation-states, the possibility of inter-imperialist rivalry in very different forms (from trade wars to military confrontation) always exist. Fourthly, the relations and/or contradictions between the policies and practices of international regular bodies (IMF, WB so forth) which aim to regulate national spaces in an uniform manner and the hierarchy of power among nation-states. In that sense, it might be meaningful “to give a Marxist meaning to geopolitics, distinguishing it from realist

geopolitics” or to formulate “a historical materialist geopolitics” (Pozo-Martin, 2006). Fifthly, it seems necessary to have a broad outlook in order to seek what have been really being changed between the ‘developed countries’ and the other countries in the rest of world. Then, it would be more meaningful and possible to understand whether the unilateral and violent foreign policy implementations of the US are the sign of the US hegemony or the evidences of American decline (Nitzan and Bichler, 2004:6, Mann, 2003).

In the light of above and taking into account the ongoing strategy of the US (War on Terrorism through Operation Enduring Freedom) as an “opportunistic and misguided adventure which undermines the structural reproduction of post-war US global –power” (Bromley, 2006; Panitch and Gindin, 2006)¹⁷², it is imperative to consider the possibility of the challenges/confrontations (geopolitical clashes, inter-imperialist rivalry, so forth) of nation-states which might take a variety of forms (such as economic, political and cultural). They gain critical importance in not only developing a critical evaluation of the dominant narratives which this thesis attempted to undertake but also to contribute to the development of theories of imperialism which recognize the tension between the tendency of capital relation to create world market and the territorial -spatial- dimension of capital accumulation process (necessity for spatial configuration for smooth process of capital accumulation through surplus-value production).

¹⁷² Colas (2006:9).

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