TRANSFORMING RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES INTO *ETHNIE*S:
THE PROCESS OF LEBANESE NATION-BUILDING
1920-1958

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ABSTRACT

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1920-1958

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This thesis analyzes the process of nation-building in Lebanon in an historical context, covering the period staring from the declaration of the French Mandate in 1920 until the first civil war of 1958. The thesis defines nation-building as a process of transformation of the pre-modern form of religious identity into the modern ethnic and/or ethno-national identity, which develops along with state-making. In contrast to the claims in the literature that label all non-Western nation-building and state-making as deficient processes emerged as a result of the direct effects of Western colonialism, this study aims to establish an alternative approach in understanding the process of Lebanese nation-building. In this context the thesis evaluates the validity of the premises of the modern nationalism approaches in the literature on questions such as how far colonialism can be labeled as the primary source of Third World nationalism(s), and to what extent the nation-building processes were successful. The thesis claims that the Lebanese case presents a complex case, since nation-building was emerged not only emerged as a result of Western colonialism and power struggles but also did materialize because of the power struggles between and within domestic (Lebanon), regional (Arab states) and international (Europe and Ottoman Empire) actors.

ÖZ

DİNİ TOPLULUKLARI ETHNİK TOPLULUKLARA DÖNÜŞTÜRME:
LÜBNANDA ULUSLAŞMA SÜRECİ
1920-1958

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Bu çalışma, Lübnanda uluslaşma sürecini tarihsel bir çerçeve içinde 1920'de Fransız Mandasının ilanından, 1958'deki ilk sivil savaşa kadar olan dönemi kapsayacak şekilde incelemiştir. Bu tez uluslaşma sürecini modern öncesi dini kimliğin modern etnik ve/veya etno-milli kimliğe dönüştüğü devletleşme ile birlikte gelişen bir süreç olarak tanımlamaktadır. Litaratürde Batılı olmayan uluslaşma ve devletleşme süreçlerini birebir Batı sömürgeciliğin etkisiyle ortaya çıkan çarpık süreçler olarak tanımlanmasına rağmen, bu çalışma Lübnan'da uluslaşma sürecini alternatif bir yaklaşımla açıklamayı amaçlamıştır. Bu bağlamda bu tez, literatürdeki modern milliyetçilik yaklaşımlarının önermelerinin geçerliliğini, sömürgeciliğin ne dereceye kadar üçüncü dünya milliyetçiliklerinin kökeni olarak kabul edilebileceği; ve uluslaşma süreçlerinin ne kadar başarılı olduğu gibi sorular üzerinden değerlendirmiştir. Tez, Lübnan örnekleminin karmaşık bir örnek olduğunu; uluslaşmanın sadece batı sömürgeciliğinin bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmadığını, yerel (Lübnan), bölgesel (Arap Devletleri) ve uluslararası (Avrupa ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu) aktörler arasındaki ve içerisindeki iktidar mücadelelerinin sonucunda da ortaya çıktığını savunmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Lübnan, millet, uluslaşma, devletleşme, sömürgecilik, Fransız emperyalizmi, etnik topluluk ve iktidar

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> To study the conditions of existence of a
> given social identity, then is to study the
> power mechanisms making it possible.
> (Laclau, 1990: 32)

The concept of nation and the idea of nationalism has always been a popular subject in understanding the transformation of cultures since the French Revolution. Even though there are various definitions of the term nation, in its simplest form one may define it as a type of intense group identification, 'us', that generates its own domain of sovereignty resulted from a real historical process. What is more, an overview of the literature on the subject would indicate there is a tendency to define this particular 'us' as a political community developed along with the state (Gellner, 1983: 6-7; Anderson, 1991: 5-7; Breuilly, 2005: 66). Accordingly, nation is considered as a product of Western experience which constructed itself as a result of political, economic and social transformations within the Western European states (namely France, Britain and Germany). Yet, this process of transformation took the form of a shift from the traditional and/or primeval group identification based on traits such as religion, tongue, dynasty or region, to a more modern and secular understanding of 'us', where vassal subjects of the medieval period turned into citizens, whose rights and duties were defined and secured by law (Huizinga, 1959: 107, 130-32; Anderson, 1991: 7).

However, though both the state and nation were considered as interrelated concepts, and state-making and nation-building were treated as two overlapping processes following the historicity of Europe, the level of compatibility in-between is dubious in relation to the region and the time period in question. Historically, in the western experience making of the state and the formation of the nation overlapped, whereas

in the other parts of the world this relationship between the two was problematic (Linz, 1993: 359-360). While until the 19th century nation-building and state-making were processes developed *pari passu* in Western Europe as early as the 12th century in the form of national consciousness, and transformed itself starting with shift from barter to monetary economy, beginning of centralization of the power of the kings, the appearance of new social classes and towards the end the Renaissance and Reformation movements (Huizinga, 1959: 107; Smith, 1986: 241). As Kohn put it through these changes "the purely vegetative group feeling developed for the first time into a national consciousness, which received its inspiration from the ancient classics and from the Old Testament, both now read in a new light and with a new understanding" (Kohn, 1958: 120).

As a further point, as these newly emerging national consciousness materialized itself to a nation following the French Revolution, the structures and ideologies that made it possible were exported to the other parts of the world. On the other hand, the late nationalism and nationalist movements in the Third World countries emerged as a result of colonization and/or decolonization following the Second World War, (Smith, 1986: 241-242). Additionally, since these Third World countries, in addition to being late comers, were multi-communal, multi-ethnic in nature rather than creating a nation, they made keeping various *ethnie*[1] together a priority (1986: 232). Hence, they were regarded as deficiencies.

Moreover, current discourse of nation and nationalism in the academic literature, formulated around the works of scholars such as Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and Anthony Smith, claims that the idea of nation was defined over the experience of Europe, and parameters for nationalism were set on the basis of the particularities of the European/Western experience. This paradigm is marked with a tendency to view nationalism through the perspective of modernization, which enforces its turn, the habits of exploring and analyzing the non-Western modes of nationalism through western conceptualizations. Hence, though concepts such as

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[1] I will use the French term *ethnie* following Anthony Smith in order to define ethnic communities that share a common history and tradition, have a common culture, share a common origin myth, symbols, and have a degree of solidarity (See Smith, 2005a: 25)

state (dawla), country (*watan*) and nation (*umma, qawmiyya* and *milla*) were used in the non-Western world throughout history, they were regarded as mere religious designations that lacked the necessary "political and emotional content" of the European conceptualization (Lewis, 1998: 57).

Indeed, contrary to the European experience, the boundaries between the primordial (religious) identity and modern (ethnic/ethno-national) identity in the non-European regions were/are more fluid; hence, more unstable. As a result, an analysis of the non-Western modes of nation-building and state-making over modern nationalism approaches presents a challenge. Therefore, rather than a single approach, an eclectic approach is needed to study the nature and organization of these processes of nation-building and state-making.

Additionally, the idea of modern state and nation in regions like Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and Far East were also regarded as developments emerged due to the exportation of western models. Accordingly, the primordial attachments that define the social identity of the region, prevented/prevents the formation of a "territorial state with individual citizenship, secular law and principles of sovereignty"; hence the emergence of 'modern' states materialized as a result of rupture in the political, economic and social evolution of these societies (Zubeida, 1989: 130, 139, 162). In other words, the nation-building along with state-making in these territories were either the products of colonialism, or the tools of the colonized to resist and out-power the forces of the colonizer.

However, one may criticize this view for treating the colonized as the object of history, since it neglects the internal dynamics and the idiosyncratic characteristics of the colonized nations. If one defines nation following the European historicity as a "named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all" (Smith, 2005a: 24), in eastern nations, whose 'us' identification was restrained between authenticity and foreign penetration, two domains of sovereignty would emerge. While on the one hand the foreign power would define the legal,

economic, territorial, and political boundaries of the conquered nation, on the other hand the indigenous population would create its autonomy and authenticity over its culture and origin myths that constituted the core of solidarity among its members. Yet, it is possible to argue through differentiation between these domains; not only the hierarchy between the colonizer and the colonized was defined, but also was the idiosyncratic character of the nation-building process in the colonized world (Chatterjee, 1993: 6-10).

Thus, in order to understand the nation-building as well as state-making processes in the regions like the Middle East, it is necessary to examine the effects of colonialism in deconstructing and reconstructing essentially religious categories into modern concepts. Hence the primary concern of this thesis is to examine the transformation of pre-modern form of religious identity into modern ethnic and/or ethno-national identity. The thesis will focus on the case of multi-communal, multi-sectarian Lebanon in order to offer a satisfying understanding in relation to the question how modern ethnic identity was articulated to the pre-existing, pre-modern (religious) identification. The choice of Lebanese case is motivated by the fact that it constitutes a rather representative example for the other Third World countries in addition to her failure to base herself on a solid national basis as if heralding the 'eventual' failures of the other countries in the foreseeable future.

An overview of Lebanese history indicates that the territory of Lebanon did not transform itself into a historico-political unit until late 18th century. While in the antiquity the Lebanese entity was shaped along with the relationship between the indigenous *ethnie*s and Greco-Roman culture, starting from 7th century the region became part of Islamdom[2] and Arab-Islamic civilization (Phares, 1995: 31). By the time the 16th century, Lebanon had been populated with a number of ethnic communities, religious sects and tribes such as the Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Druzes, Sunni Muslims, Jews, Armenians and Shiis. Yet, when the region became a

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[2] I will use Islamdom as term to indicate Islamic world following Marshall Hoghon (See Hoghon, 1977).

part of the Ottoman Empire with the 1516 conquest, due to its complex ethic and religious structures, the Lebanese were permitted to be ruled by local authorities.

Furthermore, the sectarian and ethnic heterogeneity and the power relations between the local communities dominated the course of politics in Lebanon. Yet, the political entity in the region can be summarized as a combination of pseudo polity, a collection of supra-identities formulated on the basis of sect, kin and village as well as prevailing pre-modern forms of loyalties, namely the patriarchal and tribal bonds (Hudson, 1969: 247-248[3]). Yet, this complex socio-political structure gave birth to four lines of nationalist ideologies based on four different *ethnies* with different historic territories and origin myths: (1) Muslim Arabism, (2) Christian Arabism, (3) Christian/Phoenician Lebanism, and finally (4) Mediterraneanism or Revised Lebanism.

Among those while the first one was supported mainly by the Muslim population and a number of the Christian intellectuals that were affected by the spreading Pan-Arabism, the remaining three were Christian in essence (Firro, 2003: 30-38). Accordingly, the Muslim Arabists argued that the Lebanese political entity was essentially Arab in character that Lebanese state-making should keep its loyalty to the Islamo-Arab heritage. On the other hand, intellectuals affiliated with the missionaries were among the first to propose narration of the nation over antiquity and Christianity in contrast to the rising threat of Arabism and/or Islamism in the region.

While Christian Arabists claimed that the culture, history and ethnography of the nation were essentially Syrian (Orthodox) and its homeland (*watan*) was covering

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[3] Yet an overview of Lebanese historico-political structure would state that Lebanon was a combination of "(1) a particularistic "mosaic" society; (2) an authoritarian and hierarchical family structure; (3) religious institutions that are politically influential; (4) power dispersed in religious sects, regional groupings, economic pressure groups, and ideologically oriented political movements; (5) foreign influence in politics; (6) a distinct entrepreneurial habit that has produced both a small class of "merchant princess" and a large, stable petty bourgeoisie; (7) a cult of leadership, historically the result of feudalism, which has produced the factions of notables, each with a local clientele; (8) a territory…with five geographically well-defined regions" (Hudson, 1969: 248)

Bilād al-Shām[4] (بلاد الشام), Lebanists dated their origin myths back to Phoenicians, and declared the nation of Mt. Lebanon[5] as essentially non-Arab in character (Firro, 2004: 1-2). In their view, the proposed nation should solely be Christian, and the areas where Muslim population is dominant should be excluded from the new territories. Lastly, an alternative to all these ideologies was presented by Michel Chiha, a Maronite intellectual and politician, which can be labeled as a revised Lebanism or Mediterraneanism. Instead of a nation narration based on the idea that Phoenician civilization was inherited by the Christians of Mt. Lebanon, he proposed a "syncretistic" Lebanism, in which the sectarian differences were united with the ethno-historical origin, i.e. both the Muslim and the Christian communities were sharing the same Phoenician history. Thus, what Chiha proposed was the establishment of a pluralistic state in which different sects, originally from the same historically determined ethnic source lived in harmony, building a bridge between East and West; between Christians and Muslims (Zamir, 1988: 125).

These four ideologies continuously competed among themselves in order to dominate the nation-building ideology in Lebanon. Yet, at the end of the First World War as mandates began to be established in the former Ottoman territories by the leading European powers, the conflict between Christian and Muslim nationalisms led to establishment of a strictly differentiated sectarian state and nation starting from 1920. Starting with establishment of the mandate in 1920 until first civil war of 1958 the competition between those four ideologies determined the course of state-making in Lebanon, which in turn determined the path for nation-building.

Hence, in this thesis I will cover the period between 1920 and 1957 as the epoch of development of the modern nation-building. I will formulate my arguments on the basis of three assumptions. First, historical continuity is central in understanding the state-making and nation-building processes and observing the change within them. One may argue the analysis of Lebanon's governmental system can be dated back to

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[4] Synonym used for to define Geographical Syria bordered by Mediterranean in the west, Syrian Desert in the east, Sinai in the south and Taurus range in the north.

[5] Mt. Lebanon as a term indicates the semi-autonomous political administrative unit established in Christian dominated parts of Vilayet of Syria in 1861by the Ottomans.

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Ottoman period. Therefore, a study on nation-formation within the territories of the Ottoman Empire requires a study of the pre-modern religious identification over the *millet* system[6], since the modern ethnic nation-building in these regions derived from the socio-cultural characteristics of religious-communal experience of the *millets* (Karpat, 2002: 611).

Secondly, colonialism, along with imperialism, is a remarkable factor that needs to be taken into consideration in order to understand the nation-building process in the Third World. Nevertheless, it should not be dealt as an ahistorical and homogenous process. Not only there were differences between policies adopted by the European colonial powers, but also the nature of colonialism and imperialism did change within time. The number of dominating actors was also bound to change, while until the Second World War Britain and France were considered as the two major players, with the start of the Cold War period US and USSR became the new dominant actors in the region.

Finally, Lebanon is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious state not suitable to be readily 'converted' into a national unity. Therefore, within the process of nation-building the inner domain constituted more than one *us* vs. *them* category. Hence, the nation-building ideal was created more than one 'us' identification where various myths of origin, historical memories, and shared loyalties competed to dominate the nation-building and state-making processes. Therefore, due to failure of creation of a single *ethnie* that will further produce a single nation, Lebanese social and political entity failed to establish a nation and a state in the modern European sense.

In line with these views, I will try to analyze how far modern ethnic identity was articulated into this fragmented social identification as it is found in Lebanon determined the course of nation construction in the period between 1920 and 1957. In the following chapter I will first present a discussion on transformation of the

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[6] The *millet* system – that dominated the administrative structure of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire from the 15th to the 20th century – was a socio-cultural framework based first on religion rather than on ethnicity, which habitually reflected linguistic difference, and later laid the ground for the late 19th and 20th century nationalism movements in the Balkans and the Middle East (Karpat, 2002: 612).

traditional *millet* system into a modern base as a result of ideological, social and political interaction with the European powers between 1840 and 1920. The shift of emphasis from religion to ethnicity and the relationship between ethnicity and modernity is covered over the causes and effects of three significant events: first violent encounter between the Christians (Maronite) and the Muslims (Druze) and establishment of *Double Qaimaqamate* in 1842, second civil strife and the establishment of the *mutasarrifiyya* in 1860, and finally the end of the First World War and the establishment of the French mandate in 1920. While the first two events are significant in terms of emergence of consociationalism[7], the last one can be considered as the beginning of a strictly sectarian state and nation idea.

The third chapter covers the period starting from the beginning of the mandate in 1920 to the abolishment of the parliament in 1936 due to changing international and domestic political conditions. The chapter presents a discussion on colonialism in the region, and the nature of the colonial state-making and nation-building under the French mandate. The level of success of colonialism in transforming the traditional structures into modern ones is the primary concern of this section. On the basis of a review of the relationship between the mandate's civilizing mission and increasing power of the Christian Phoenician Lebanists, the chapter questions the approaches in the literature on nationalism.

Forth chapter provides an historical overview of the events that lead to independence from 1936 till 1943. The period until the announcement of the *National Pact (1943)*, which affirmed Christians' recognition of Lebanon's place in the Arab world, as well as, Muslims' approval of its independent statehood, is the primary concern of the section. The chapter claims that not only changes in power balance between the colonizer and the colonized occurred, but also did between and within the rival communities and their ideologies.

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[7] Consociationalism is a political system that requires governmental stability, avoidance of violence, survival of both democracy and power sharing institutions for the survival of the political structure, where rival subcultures constantly compete for institutional and political power (Lijphart, 1969: 207).

The fifth and the final chapter will cover the two presidential periods, the reign of Bishara al-Khuri and Camille Chamoun. In the first part, a discussion on the construction of Arab-Christian identity is covered over an analysis of the period from the announcement of National Pact in 1943 until 1952 elections. Throughout the chapter the effects of Arab emphasis in the Lebanese politics and claimed Christian-Muslim harmony in the National Pact on the post-colonial state is discussed. The main focus of this section lies on the sectarian relations in Lebanon. The chapter claims that rather than the abolition of the sectarianism and/or consociationalism, the new state focuses on reconstruction of the boundaries between the communities; thus, made keeping various *ethnie*s together her priority.

The second section of the chapter stresses on the era after the 1952 elections and beginning of the reign of Camille Chamoun until the start of the first civil war in 1958. The effects of domestic, regional and international actors and ideologies in the 1950s on Lebanon are the primary concern of the chapter in order to understand the revival of the nation-building model of the French High Commissionaire and Maronite Patriarch.

Finally, in the conclusion the nature of nation-building and state-making in the particularity of the Lebanese historico-political structure is revised. The thesis argues that contrary to dominant paradigm in nationalism approaches in the literature, Lebanon presents a unique case where colonialism is effective as a (general) system – which constantly reconstructs and reconceptualizes itself as a result of changing, historical, political, social and economic conditions – rather than a European (particular) monopoly. What is more, unlike any other modes of nation-formation Lebanese nation-building was an act of power struggle and power balance between domestic, regional and international actors.

CHAPTER 2

TRANSFORMATION OF A SOCIETY
FROM RELIGIOUS TO ETHNIC BASE:
A FAILED ATTEMPT
1840-1920

The overall goal of this chapter is to analyze the effect of Lebanese political structure in formation of a national community in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. How the construction and reconstruction of community and identity did occur in different historical situations is the primary concern of this chapter. Hence, after briefly reviewing the nature of the Ottoman *millet* system and the classification it generates over religious identity, I principally focus on three events that gradually forced a shift towards identification over *ethnie* within the history of Lebanon.

First, I analyze the causes and effects of the first civil war in Lebanese political entity in 1842 as the beginning of strict differentiation between religious communities. Second, I focus on the 1860 civil strife and the start of transformation of religious identity into ethnic identity over the four nation models emerged in the Lebanese social and political structure. Lastly, I cover the period after the First World War until the announcement of French Mandate in 1920, and emergence of Christian ethnic nationalism as the dominant ideology in the new state-making process. The chapter claims that the transformation emerged as a result of increasing European/French intervention in the Ottoman territories, which triggered changes in demographic dynamics, forms of production and land ownership, and political alliances between the Muslim and Christian populations.

2.1 Ottoman Rule in Lebanon and Rise of Religious Community (1516-1840)

As a term rooted in the Western scholarship community has always been central in understanding both micro and macro dynamics of the social. Yet, similar to many other concepts, the literature does not hold a general unified agreement over its definition. Though earlier conceptualizations implied that communities were pre-modern, homogenous groups sharing a 'unity of will'/solidarity (Tönnies, 2001: 18-22), later studies focus on the contracted nature of these groups (Gusfield, 1975: 30-33). Among those Cohen treated communities as social constructs that use symbolic boundaries to differentiate the category of 'us' from 'them' (Cohen, 1985: 12-13). Accordingly, it is argued that myths, rituals and other symbols were used in addition to visible boundaries, such as geography, race, law, language, and/or religion, in defining *emic* and *etic* identity of a community.

What is more, such a definition is valuable in understanding the construction, maintenance and destruction of a social group. However, it is not possible to claim every group is permeated by solidarity. Hence, a working definition of the term should be based on the assumptions that community is a dynamic group that needs to be continuously constructed and reconstructed, and is not necessarily homogenous in its attitudes. Besides, even though the relationship between its members is not antagonistic in nature, it is also not free from conflict (Burke, 1992: 58). Yet, following *emic* and *etic* use of communality and exclusion, in this section I cover formation and transformation of communal identity in Lebanon during the reign of Ottoman Empire.

In the early 16th century as Ottomans took over the political administration in the Levant[8], multi-communal, multi-religious Lebanese social entity began to be ruled by local authorities along with the *millet* system. In contrast to modern conceptualization of nation as a political community imagined as sovereign and territorially limited (Anderson, 1991: 7), the Ottoman *millet* (nation) was a non-

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[8] Term used to indicate countries bordering the region covering eastern Mediterranean including the modern states of Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, as well as, the Palestinian Arabs of the Western Bank and the Gaza Strip and the southern Turkey (See Harris, 2003: xi)

political, non-territorial, self-sovereign entity. *Millets*, which were initially defined as categories to differentiate Muslims and non-Muslims, were constructed by the Ottoman administration as tools to incorporate various religious/ethnic groups into Ottoman economic, political and administrative structures. Moreover, the uniqueness of the system derived from its ability to preserve the religious, cultural, and ethnic continuity within the conquered communities (Karpat, 2002: 611). The communal boundaries were defined first on the basis of shared universal elements of faith, then on ethnic and linguistic differences. Although Ottomans placed religion at the top of *etic* communal identification through this system, they also secure the prevailing traditional forms of identification such as patriarchy and parochialism. Yet, the basic organizational unit of the *millet* matrix was the family-based communities (Karpat, 2002: 612-618, 621). Therefore, it is possible to claim due to its complex organization *millet* system presents a semi-modern category of communal identity. In comparison to the traditional, primordial attachments based on traits such as family, lineage, and tribe (see Shils, 1957: 130, 142), *millet* generated a broader and more fluid identification. However, it still lacked the premises of the modern 'civic' European conceptualization of the nation, in which historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, common civic culture and ideology were central (Smith, 2005b: 179).

Nevertheless, this semi-modern conceptualization resulted in recognition of four *millets* – Druze, Maronite, Greek, Matâwila (Shiis) – within the Lebanese socio-political entity starting from the late 16th and early 17th centuries (Farah, 2000: 4). In addition to religious and ethnic boundaries, each community also had their own territorial dominance. While Druzes (Muslim) were powerful in the region known as Jabal al-Druze, the Greeks (Orthodox) were dominating the urban (trade) centers of Koura district, southeast Tripoli, as well as some villages of the Metn. On the other hand, the Catholic Maronite community was dominant in the northern parts of Lebanon, whereas Shiites remained in the rural hinterland of Biqa Valley and south Lebanon (Bannerman, 1995: 177-179).

Moreover, the social relationships between these groups, stimulated by the administrative structure of the Empire, generated politico-economic boundaries. While economically rich and politically powerful Druze dynasties became the rulers of the *îmara* of Lebanon (Phares, 1995: 49), Matâwila (Shiis), who lacked political and the economic power, were subordinated by the Ottoman and the Druze rule, and became the layman (Bannerman, 1995: 178). On the other hand, Christian community of Maronites emerged as one of the leading social, economic and political powers in the region. This Arabic speaking community strengthened its position by establishing alliances with the Catholic Church starting with the Crusaders (1097-1291) (1995: 174). As a result, Maronites, who had better relations with the European powers and diplomacy, became advisors for the local rulers. Additionally, Greeks due to dominating the commercial centers acted as traders (Bannerman, 1995: 177-179). Since this community was essentially the organizers of trade within the Ottoman realm they managed to develop more close relationship with the Muslim population in contrast to Maronites (1995: 178). Thus, they were more successfully incorporated to Ottoman political, social and economic system.

However, it is possible to argue this (*etic*) socio-political classification not necessarily created a peaceful incorporation to Ottoman political structure. One of the immediate outcomes of *millet* system on Lebanese socio-political entity was emergence of clashes with the prevailing Muslim communities, who did not define their identity over Orthodox (Sunni) Islam (Abu-Husayn, 1992: 666). Indeed the period starting from the 16th century was a period of continuous clashes between the Ottomans and Druze dynasties. Even though Ottomans labeled them as Sunnis, and appointed the heads of the powerful Druze dynasties, the Maans (1516-1697) and the Shihabs (1697-1842), to rule Lebanon, they faced with continuous resistance, for ignoring the local dynamics of the region. Since Druze identity, as a deviant Sunni community, was an *etic* construct, the Druzes built alliances to break down the Ottoman rule. As a result, in the late 16th century the resistances began to be supported by the European countries who wanted to reduce the Ottoman military power and slow down her expansion in Europe. Yet, the European intervention in the early 16th and 17th centuries was limited to sell of arms to the rebels (1992: 668-669).

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Nevertheless, all of these events resulted also in the emergence of a symbiotic relationship between the Christian and Muslim communities. Since the political entity was ruled by a Druze emir counseled by a Maronite advisor, each community needed the other in order to secure its sovereignty in the region. While Christians were needed as the intermediaries for trade, as soldiers for battles, and intellectuals for diplomacy by the Druze rule, Christians needed the Druze as a guarantor of their political autonomy (Phares, 1995: 49). As a further point, it can be said that this friendly Druze-Maronite relationship established in the 1600s led to emergence of a form of 'local patriotism' (Malik, 1992: 17). The Ottoman imagining of *millet* resulted in unification of two ethnically, religiously and tribally different but linguistically similar communities, which lead to a form of patriotism based on discrimination of the 'Ottoman (Colonizing) Other'. Even though these communities did not establish a narrative for a political community both sovereign and territorially limited in Lebanon, the alliances made against the 'Ottoman other' laid the ground for establishment of a national consciousness. In other words, though nation as a community that share "a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all" (Smith, 2005a: 24) did not exist, the roots for establishment of these premises were set.

However, due to the continuous struggle between the Ottomans and the Druzes a power vacuum was created. Yet, during the late reign of Shihabs, this vacuum resulted in emergence of Maronite Church as a strong political power. In this period Maronite Patriarchy turned itself into a political entity by utilizing its close ties with the Christian Europe and the Catholic Church (Farah, 2000: 11). The more Druze lost political and military power, and became a marginal category, the more Christians gained power enough to shake and reverse the equilibrium between the Christian and Muslim communities, which in the later periods gave them the opportunity to determine the course of modern state-making and nation-building.

2.2 Foreign Intervention and the First Clash between the *Millets* of Lebanon (1842)

Foreign influence and intervention started in the 16th century turned out to be a more visible and powerful force in the later periods. Beginning from the early 19th century international power struggles, imperialist and colonialist[9] policies of the European powers, became the most significant factor in transforming the Lebanese social, economic and political structure. What is more, in this period Europe turned herself from an arms supplier to an ideology exporter and economic investor, who (re)shapes the power balance not only between the ruling Ottomans and the Lebanese social entity, but also between the *millets*. Yet, this change of role was triggered by the change in power perception and economic interests of the European states. While in the 1600s the colonial/imperial policy had been shaped on the basis of mercantilism, in the 1800s race for the domination over natural resources became the central issue (Braunstein, 1983: 8). What determines a strong state was no longer being a great power in Europe, but being a great (imperial) power in non-Europe. Thus, all European powers tried to gain dominance by invading the non-Western territories or signing treaties with the local chiefs and founding the early "protectorates" (Adams, 1991: 207).

Along with these developments, the Eastern Question became a key issue both in the politics of the two leading European powers, Britain and France. For Britain, the projection of the Indian Trade routs and prevention of any other European power to gain control of the Middle East was the primary concern. Hence France and the rising Germany were seen as threats against continuity of British political and economic expansion (Adams, 1991: 204). On the other hand, French were also trying to gain power in the region starting with Napoleon's Egyptian campaign. Their aims were to establish France as a Mediterranean power, reinforce French authority in North Africa through domination in the Levant, mainly in Damascus, the historical

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[9] Throughout this work I will adopt Edward Said's conceptualization of imperialism and colonialism. While the former would indicate 'the practices, theories and attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory', the latter would refer to a product of imperialism, and imply 'the implementing of settlement on distant territory' (Said, 1993: 9).

citadel of Islam and Arabism, as well as, providing protection for the Christians in the region (El-Solh, 2004: 2).

However, among those two powers France can be labeled as the most influential over Lebanese social, economic and political transformation in the 19th century. In this period the core of French colonial discourse was a modernizing and/or civilizing mission (*mission civilisatrice*), whose goal was to use/manipulate local culture, religion and language (mainly the Christians, Maronites) in order to legitimize the French colonial/imperial rule. Combined with the rising Maronite political power in the 1800s, *mission civilisatrice* shook the harmony between the Christian and Muslim populations, and laid the ground for the emergence of different (local) patriotisms. Despite this destructive effect, modernizing/civilizing mission of France can be considered as productive for paving the way for the development of the conditions needed to constitute national consciousness(es) in Lebanon, if one accepts spread of market relations and establishment of a national elite as prerequisites for nation-building. Yet, *mission civilisatrice* began in the economic and cultural domains, laid the ground for transformation of the religious communities into *ethnies* in the late 19th century.

It is possible to claim the modernization mission of France started first in the domain of economics. By supporting Mehmet Ali Pasha, the *Khidiv* of Egypt, and his fight for independence from 1820 to 1840, French successfully established a control mechanism on Syria and the trade routes of Levant. Moreover, the domination of these trade roots begot the domination of production in the region. Following the encouragement of the Egyptian administration in Syria, in 15 years governmental control was intensified, land tenure was reorganized, and a drastic integration into world market took place. As a result, "incidence of taxation and of government encroachment upon traditional liberties" increased radically (Burke III, 1992: 22).

By 1860s Levant had turned into a major silk producer to meet the high European demand for silk. There were around 200 silk-reeling factories in the 19th century; however, due to limits of the local market, they were more concerned with export

production (Owen, 1988: 27). Consequently, the economy of the Levant became highly dependent on the French market since France was importing 40-50 per cent of the raw silk from the world market (Firro, 1990: 154). One direct outcome of this increased economic activity was the establishment of consulates in the big cities and the transformation of Beirut into a mercantile and diplomatic centre. Increasing economic opportunities, better infrastructure facilities laid the ground for the immigration of the local Christians from periphery to centre, from Mt. Lebanon to Beirut; thus, paving the way for the transformation of the Muslim character of the city (Johnson, 1986: 11-12). The other result of this increased economic activity was emergence of a new Christian middle-class that challenged the hegemony of the Druze notables by establishing direct relations with the peasantry (Hourani, 1966: 258)

However, as the geographic and economic boundaries between communities became more fluid through these changes, cultural boundaries began to be underlined. Yet, the modernizing mission of France in the cultural domain was probably the most significant factor in deconstruction and reconstruction of the communal boundaries in the Lebanese context. The alliance between the Catholic missionary enterprise and the French administration constituted the core of this transformation. French used missionaries to spread her imperial power in the non-European world (Braunstein, 1983: 411). Not only the silk production helped to strengthen the economic ties with the local merchants and the French, but also missionaries did support France in laying the ground for French cultural domination with the establishment of schools and clinics (Burrows, 1986: 111-112). Especially the increasing missionary activities in next two decades "indirectly helped to lay foundations of the colonial welfare state" in the mandate era (Thompson, 2000a).

In the early 19th century, the missionary movements started in 1626 turned into the tools of the French to spread their ideology. The initial practices of conversion of the Orthodox Greek to Catholicism, and reorganization of the Maronite Church were reconstituted by the French political culture at home and overseas territories. Following the secular July monarchy the position of the Catholic Church within

France was questioned and restrained; hence leading a shift in clerical activities from centre (France) to periphery (overseas territories) in the form of missionary movements. This exclusion from home politics in the 19th century resulted in formation of friendly alliances with the ruling colonial administrators, and spread of pro-French sentiments in addition to their pro-Christian mission (Thompson, 2000a). What is more, in order to make themselves "accepted by the largest possible portion of the population" they (mainly the Jesuits) also used the vernacular Arabic and appearance and clothing of the Maronite monks (Herzstein, 2007: 755).

One direct outcome of this alliance between the Catholic Church and France was foundation of a bilingual elite class within the Lebanese local communities, whose first language (Arabic) was replaced with French. By the time 1914, the French had 500 schools and over 100,000 students in the Levant and the administration allocated 1.27 million francs for French education in the region (Thompson, 2000a; Zamir, 1988, 38-39; Burrows, 1986: 110). Yet, these schools turned out to be very crucial in providing local political elite during and after the French Mandate. Influenced also by the changes that were triggered by increased urbanization and economic change, this new bilingual class paved the way for the establishment of national bourgeois in the later decades. While the French favored the graduates of Jesuit's St. Joseph University[10] in appointing important governmental posts, the two prominent figures of Lebanist nationalism of late 1930s and 1940s, Emile Eddé and Bishara al-Khuri, attended to these schools as well (al-Solh, 2004: 14-17; Thompson, 2000a).

However, in an attempt to (re)secure their political position Druze community began to establish alliances with the British and the Protestant missionaries, in contrast to the prevailing alliance between the French, the Catholic missionaries and the Maronite Church. Nevertheless, this power struggle began in the economic and continued in the cultural domains resulted in strengthening of local patriotisms. The first clashes between the communities began over tax collection and appointment of new administrative staff that each sect refused to pay levies until they were ruled by

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[10] University of St. Joseph was founded in 1875 as a result of the joint collaboration between the Maronites, Jesuits, France and Vatican in an attempt to counter the practices of the Protestant Beirut American University, and was the first Catholic university in the region (Herzstein, 2007: 749, 752).

a leader of their own *millet* (Farah, 2000: 64-65). Even though started as anti-Ottoman, these patriotisms quickly label the opposite sect as an 'other' equally threatening as the Ottomans. Yet, the clashes turned into a civil war in 1842 as Anglo-French rivalry took its pace.

Following the war of 1842, as a result of the tensions and the violence had taken place within the region the Istanbul government adopted a new political system as suggested by the European powers. Accordingly, two districts were created on the basis of religious affiliation: a northern district under a Maronite deputy governor; and a southern district under a Druze deputy governor. This new arrangement came to be known as the *Double Qaimaqamate*. Nonetheless, since in each territory a significant number of the opposite group remained, leading to a failure in creating the homogeneity in both of the populations; an Ottoman governor was appointed as the administrator of the Christians in Druze territories and Druzes in the Christian region to secure the rights of each minority group (Winslow, 1996: 32).

As a final point, one may argue even before colonization began, through imperialism elements of European ideal of modern nation and state were started to be constructed much to the foresight of the modernization theorists. Not only state apparatuses were assembled, but also was a class loyal to this new state apparatus created. On the other hand, contrary to Gellner's praise of *imperialism* that define the European imperialists "like the emperor who found Rome brick and left it marble, these conquerors…found the world agrarian and left it industrial or poised to become such" (Gellner, 1996: 159), the civilizing mission of France was an exploitative system parallel to Sartré's claims (Sartré, 2001: 31). Through the missionary movements and expansion of trade, the primary goal of France was exploitation of the Lebanese material and human resources. Additionally, this exploitation not only resulted in boost of a war but also deepening of the communal boundaries between the Christian Maronites and Muslim Druzes. Besides, all the factors that lead to the civil war also laid the ground for the transformation of religious identity of the Lebanese communities. However, transformation of these boundaries needed two more centuries.

2.3 The 1860 Civil War and Transformation of Religious Identity to Ethnic Identity (1860-1914)

In the 1850s the conditions that lead to 1842 civil war continued to shape Lebanese political, economic and social structure. Migration was still an issue, and continuous immigration was changing the population balance between the Christian and Muslim population. In addition to the internal migration of the Christians to the Muslim territories, a vast number of Muslim immigrants from the Balkans, Crimea, Caucasus, Algeria, and Tunisia, were moving to the Ottoman domain as a result of the Ottoman-Russian wars (1806) and the end of Abdel Kader's resistance to French occupation in the North Africa (1830) (Karpat, 1985: 175-177).

Despite these changes in demographic dynamics, the decrees on the change of the forms of land ownership were threatening the alliance between the Muslims and the Christians (Firro, 1990: 156-157). Following the new Ottoman land reform that favored private ownership, unequal distribution of land between the migrants and the local population created new tensions. While the newcomers were getting land in cultivable areas, the indigenous population was restraint with state-owned land, which became infertile due to continuous mulberry tree cultivation for the silk industry. Hence, demographic and economic change once again led to a civil strife in 1860.

When the old system failed as it prevented cooperation between the two communities and a new civil war broke out in Lebanon, France put her military support on the side of the Maronites. As a result of her increasing power in the region in 1860, she became the protector of the Christian (Catholic) minorities within the Ottoman realm and used her rights to continuously shape the political structure of Mt. Lebanon and Syria (Burrows, 1986: 111). As a result of the clashes within the local population, the Ottoman administration introduced another system, that based on the revised articles of the *Réglement et protocole relatifs à la réorganisation du Mont Liban* (1864), as a solution (Akarlı, 1992: 79).

According to this regulation, an autonomous *mutasarrifiyya* of *Mt. Lebanon* would be established under the administration of a Christian governor (*Article 2*) and an administrative council would be created (*Article 3*). What is more, the council would be composed of twelve members (four Maronites, three Druzes, two Greek Orthodoxs, one Greek Catholic, one Shi'i and one Sunni) where the allocation of the seats to local groups was based on the estimated distribution of population and land ownership (Akarlı, 1992: 80; Winslow, 1996: 41). On the other hand, the *Réglement* not only established a special political regime, but also did build an economic regime that was marked by low taxes and *laissez-faire* (Owen, 1988: 28). These principles and the rule of *mutasarrif* remained until the proclamation of the martial law in 1914. Another outcome of this new administrative structure was radicalization of the communal boundaries between the Christians and the Muslims. The *millets* of Lebanon*,* which initially indicated a non-political and non-territorial entity, were both politically and territorially limited on the basis of numerical dominance, and their sovereignty was secured by law.

In addition to these changes, as Ottoman administration tried to modernize its institutions and mimic modern civic institutions of Europe, the boundaries of millets were further deconstructed. Parallel to Smith's claims, borrowing from the civic conceptualization of the nation, which stressed on legal-political equality, common economy, and shared civic culture and ideology, Ottomans tried to create an ethnic model that aimed to replace primary religious identities with 'Ottomanism' (Smith, 2005b: 180). Yet, following Anderson one may argue the nation-building in the 19th century Ottoman Empire was a form of 'official nationalism', which emerged as a reaction to the popular nationalist movements in Western Europe and acted as a means for "combining naturalization with retention of dynastic power" (Anderson, 1991: 86-87). However, the contradictory nature of *Tanzimat* and *Islahat* edicts of the 19th century turned religiously defined communities into a problem. While the Muslim population was stripped of self-identification and treated as homogenous and Ottoman in nature, the non-Muslims, who were put under the protection of a European power of the same sect, was left to choose between two different states to

secure and define their rights and duties, along with their identity (Karpat, 2002: 339-342).

Further, even though this 'Ottomanism' in theory envisaged equal cultural liberty to all Ottoman subjects, *de facto* application resulted in discontinuity in prevailing ethnic and linguistic cultures of the communities. Especially, in the 20th century as Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) came to power the emphasis on ethnic aspect of nation was strengthened (Haddad, 1994: 201). Increasing emphasis on Turkish language and necessity of Ottoman/Turkish education in order to obtain positions in administrative structure slowly develop a resistance by the non-Turkish elite of the existing communities. Yet, the bilingual elite class, who had been in Europe and/or were educated in the missionary schools, was the main actor in the formation of an anti-Ottoman, anti-Turkish national consciousness in the region.

As Smith stated, ethnicity and language, along with religion were the building blocks of nation-building process in the non-European regions such as Ottoman Empire and Lebanon (Smith, 2005: 179-181; 2003: 9-10). Additionally, rise of print culture, also acted as a medium in transformation of the religiously defined identities into ethnically defined ones as Anderson envisaged in his *Imagined Communities (*Anderson, 1991: 37-38). Parallel to the spread of missionary schools and increase in bilingual elite, the number of printed media was also increased drastically in Lebanon between 1904 and 1914. By 1914 there were 117 active newspapers and 51 magazines (Ireland, 1970: 226).

However, since the literacy levels were low in the region and the scope of the print media was limited, it is not possible to attribute spread of nationalist sentiments in the region merely to the development of a print culture. Yet, it is also not possible to deny the fact that periodicals and newspapers played a crucial role in spreading the nationalist ideals in the 20th century. While the works of Ismail Gasparalı, Yusuf Akçura and others helped to establish and spread Turkish nationalism in the Turkish populated Ottoman territories (Berkes, 1964: 322), writers such as Kahlil Gibran

were influential in formation and spread of ethnically limited Christian nationalism in Christian (Maronite) Lebanon (Salem, 2003: 19, 22).

Along with these developments, migration and acts of missionaries can be labeled as the other two factors that helped constitution of nationalist consciousness in the Lebanese context. As a significant native population emigrated from Wilayat of Syria, due to both drastic transformation of the economic, social and political structure of their homeland and the changes in immigration policies of the West, diaspora communities were founded in Europe and the Americas, which by means of media and missionary stories spread Christian sympathy and anti-Ottomanism in the host countries (Karpat, 1985: 175-179). Among those the Lebanese elite living abroad had a considerable effect in formation of the myths of the new nation, and pressured the allied administrations for the independence of Lebanon from the Ottoman rule before and during the First World War (Firro, 2003: 19-20). Additionally, the bilingual elite were also effective in the formation of nationalist ideologies of Lebanon.

Yet, one may talk about four different schools of thought that effected the nation-building discussions in early the 20th century. Not only these four approaches established tightly intertwined bond between religion and national consciousness, but also did articulate ethnic traits in construction of ethnic identities. What is more, in accordance to the premises of the nation presented by Anthony Smith, all four of them define a different ethnic national model whose origin myth could be traced back to a particular real and/or fictive ancestor (see Smith, 2005b: 180).

Among those the earliest narration was a Muslim Arab one. The weakening power of the Ottoman state and the increasing reforms, along with the emerging threat from European empires and the spread of the ideals of Enlightenment and French Revolution, helped to reconstruct the ideological structure of the Arab Islamdom. Arabism began as a reaction to the increasing threat of Ottomanism and/or Turkism, and put its immediate loyalty to Arab heritage and culture (Haddad, 1994: 202). The Sunni, Shii and Druze intellectuals, as well as, a number of Christian intellectuals,

who were influenced by Pan-Arabist movement, were the main supporters of this ideology (Firro, 2003: 30). The pioneer of this school in Lebanon was the Sunni intellectual Muhammad Bayhum who claimed the Arab heritage laid the ground for overcoming the sectarian institutionalization (2003: 39). Arabists wanted total independence and did not want to replace an old colonizing power with a new one. Even though Arab nationalists supported unification with the greater Arab world, Arab nationalism did not turn itself into a mass movement even in Syria where it was strongest at the end of the 19th century.

On the other hand, in contrast to Muslim Arab nationalism, Christian Arab nationalism was introduced, and spread through missionaries and print culture. In the late 19th century a number of Arabic journals and newspapers began to be published by Christian secularist school of writers in Cairo and Beirut (Hourani, 1983: 245). Intellectuals affiliated with the Protestant missionaries (such as Butrus al-Bustani, George Samné and Shukri Ghanem) were among the first to propose a narration of a nation over religion and ethnicity. Accordingly, the ethnic model defined by these scholars claimed Geographical Syria, *Bilād al-Shām* as their historic homeland and traced their ancestry to Syrian Orthodoxs.

What is more, they also argued that the culture, history and ethnography of the nation were essentially religious in nature, and the original language of the nation was lost due to Islamo-Arab conquest (Firro, 2004: 1). Hence, they sought a *Grand Syrie*, which united the historic territories of the Christian of Geographical Syria. Associations established by the émigrés, especially the *Comité Central Syrien* and the *Comité Libanais de Paris,* were enthusiastic supporters of this ideology during and at the end of First World War. Along with the premises of this ideology these organizations tried to shape polices of the France on state-making and nation-building after the establishment of the mandate (Firro, 2003: 19).

Yet, another ethnic model, that was formed following the historical, ethnographic and linguistic research on the past nations, was introduced by the intellectuals of the (Catholic) University of Saint-Joseph in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Following the works of the two scholars, Father Pierre Martin and Henri Lammens, history of the population of Mt. Lebanon was traced back to Phoenicians (Firro, 2004: 2). As a result, Lebanists supported the establishment of a *Petit Liban* (Smaller Lebanon), according to which the proposed nation should solely be Christian in character, and the areas where Muslim population was dominant should be excluded from the new territories.

This idea of Lebanism depicted in the origin myth of Phoenicianism based its claims in the results of the archeological excavations and Ernest Renan's *Mission de Phénicie (1864-1874)*. This Phoenician heritage myth, which later adopted by the French Mandate, was fed with both the archeological discoveries and literary genres among which works of Kahlil Gibran, a Christian Maronite émigré who romanticized the Phoenician past and Christian heritage, were the most prominent. Even though Muslim and Christian Arabists used symbolic construction, it was the Christian imagery depicted by Gibran that ultimately dominated the nation-building in Lebanon.

Parallel to Chattarjee's claims on reconstruction of Indian history and romanticizing of the Indian Civilization and the Hindu culture by the British imperialism (Chatterjee, 1993: 102), the national history of Lebanon was also revised and de-scribed in line with the colonial orientalism. Similar to the Indian nationalists that based their claims on British colonial historiography, and labeled Muslim occupation as the beginning of the decline of the Indian civilization, Lebanists followed French colonial historiography and also created a Muslim (colonizing) 'other'. They claimed the Lebanese were descendents of Phoenician civilization*,* and the Arab/Turkish/Islamic conquest marked the decline of their civilization. In line with these observations, it is possible to claim that Gibran's early writings – which were in vernacular Arabic – were influential in the further construction of the Lebanese consciousness. What is more, a detailed analysis of his works would indicate romanticism and mystification of a beautiful homeland (almost always Mount Lebanon), and repeatedly handled link between the pagan and Christian face of Lebanon (Salem, 2003: 19, 22).

As a further point, following Anthony Smith's conceptualization it is possible to claim this 'myth of decline' gave way to a 'myth of regeneration', in which the guidelines for restoration of the Golden Age was defined (Smith, 1986: 104). Lebanists argued European protection should be considered as the major guarantee for Christian freedom that would enable to the revival of the older civilization. In other words, just as the Indian nationalists' legitimization of British hegemonic rule through presentation of colonial protection as a guarantee for the threat of Islam, majority of the Lebanists considered Europe as a guarantor. Following the narrative of Maronite Chuch, who claimed 'myth of ancestry' was not only limited to Phoenicians, but also did include the Francs, Lebanism also traced a fictive consanguneal kinship to the modern French Republic. Thus, they legitimized the use of French as a vernacular in contrast to the oppressor's language (Arabic and/or Ottoman) (Firro, 2003: 23-26; Kaufman, 2004: 174).

As a result, it is possible to say that both the *Greater Syria* and the *Smaller Lebanon* were 'myths of regeneration' that were produced following French orientalism and French imperial historiography. From the writings of Renan, Nerval, Lamartine, Chateaubriand, Saulcy to the missionary report and Anglo-French joint declaration of 1918, Lebanon was depicted as a 'Christian' country exploited under 'the violent' rule of the Muslims and the Turks. While Renan in the late 19th century was first to support the idea that the roots of Lebanese could be traced back to Phoenicians in his *Mission de Phénicie (1864-1874)*, Nerval in his *Le Voyage en Orient* seeks the traces of the heritage of Rome, Athens and Jerusalem in the city of Beirut (Said, 1979: 82). Additionally, the missionary reports on Levant stress on the necessity and the urgency of the emancipation of the Christians and the solution of the Syrian Question (Thomspon, 2000a).

Furthermore, throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries these myths of regeneration were supported by the European powers hoping to turn Lebanon and Syria into loyal allies. The status of Lebanon was perceived as a damsel-in-stress situation from the French point of view, where the valiant knight (Catholic France) would come to rescue the enslaved princess (Catholic Maronites) from the treacherous barbarians

(Muslims/Arabs) and the vicious dragon (Ottoman Empire) and ask her hand (Mandate), along with her dowry (silk and tobacco production and ports). Yet, in the joint declaration in 1918 the emphasis was put on the freedom of Syria and Mesopotamian states by the two major powers, Britain and France. It is stated that:

> The aim of France and Great Britain in carrying on in the Near East the war let loose by Germany's ambitions is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and the free choice of the native populations.[11]

In addition to that, since the Christian Levant also accepted such victimization, the collective historic memory formulated over orientalization of the Christian orient. In their view the Christian orient was left behind, whereas the (Christian) occident achieved modern standards of life. What is more, the success of the West based on essential characteristics of the occidental communities, whereas their failure was due to the backwardness primordially engraved to eastern culture. Hence, development and modernization could only be achieved through outside intervention. In his memoir Edward Atiyah[12] describes this collective consciousness of the Christian Levantine as:

> They liked to wallow in the luxury of the feeling that though a Moslem power ruled over them, the great nations of the world, so vastly superior in every way to their decrepit, were Christians like them. Gradually a romantic attachment grew out of this feeling. The Syrian Christians came to adopt, psychologically, the nationality of their respective European co-religionists. They adopted it jealously, fervently. They became *plus royaliste que le roi*, idealistic lovers and hero-worshippers of the West.
>
> The Syrian Christians hated Turkish domination, and looked forward to being freed from it – not to freeing

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[11] *Franco-German Armistice: June 25, 1940*, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1940/400625a.html [last accessed in 29 September 1996].

[12] A Syrian Christian intellectual born in Lebanon in 1903

themselves from it, and setting up an independent Syrian state, since in such an event the Moslems would be in a crushing majority, and the Christians would, as they thought, be still oppressed and persecuted. They looked forwards then to being freed from Mohammedan suzerainty by one of the European powers (Atiyah, 1946: 2-4).

However, the final ethnic model presented by Michel Chiha introduced a different orient that can be labeled as engraved in a *revised Lebanism* or *Mediterraneanism*. Instead of a nation narration based on the idea that Phoenician civilization was inherited by the Christians of Mt. Lebanon, he proposed a 'syncretistic' Lebanism, in which the sectarian differences were united with the ethno-historical origin. In other words, the religious content of 'myth of ancestry' that limited to Christians was omitted in this model.

Therefore, in the new myth of origin both the Muslim and the Christian communities were considered as sharing the same Phoenician history. Consequently, what Chiha proposed was establishment of a *Grand Liban*, in which Christians, namely the Maronites kept the cultural and political dominance at hand. Yet, in this unity the Muslim population was also included. In other words, Chiha's narration of 'myth of regeneration' based on the idea of formation of a pluralistic state in which different sects, originally from the same historically determined ethnic source lived in harmony, building a bridge between East and West; Christians and Muslims (Zamir, 1988: 125).

As a final point, the position of the old Muslim and Christian millets in Lebanese nation-building constituted the core of the struggle between those four models in dominating the nation-building process in Lebanon. Since, each group perceived the other ideological claim as a threat to the sovereignty of the new nation, each model spread within a certain territory. While Lebanism was dominant in the Maronite areas of the Month Lebanon, Arabism was widespread in Muslim dominated Beirut, Aleppo and Wilayat of Syria (El-Solh, 2004: 1, 7). Nonetheless, at the end despite the Muslim and Druze demands, the will of the colonizer determined the communal identity in the region following the First World War.

2.4 End of the First World War and the Rise of Christian Nationalism (1919-1920)

The new communal identity of the Lebanese socio-political entity was determined in an age of warfare, when the power balance between and within the domestic, regional and international communities were defined and redefined. At the end of the 19th century, the decentralization of the Ottoman Empire was presented as a solution to the Eastern Question. It was no longer possible, as well as, favorable to try to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, there was too much hostility in administrative strata of the European powers. Yet, Lord Clarendon stated (1865) "the only way to improve them [Ottoman Empire] is to improve them off the face of the earth" (Kedourie, 1987: 15). On April 8, 1904 two great powers; Britain and France signed *Entente Cordiale* in an attempt to resolve diplomatic disputes and secure the status of their colonies in the Middle East in case of warfare.

When the First World War began Britain tried to manipulate the Arab (Muslim) model of nationalism in her favor, and established alliances between the British governmental bodies and the dynastic/tribal leaders of the Arab Middle East. The Arab ethnic model searched its own state to build a nation through the alliance between Sir Henry McMahon, the High Commissioner for Egypt and Hussein bin Ali from Hashemite line, the *Sheriff* of Mekke. After the start of war the Turkish administration tried to silence the possible Arab resistance trough violent means. The members of prominent families as well as the heads and members of Arab associations and clubs that did not recognize the sovereignty of the Turkish body were arrested and/or sentenced. Even though there were antagonism between the Turkish administration and its Arab subjects, the break occurred in June 1916 with *Sheriff* Hussein's declaration of autonomous rule in Hijaz (Fisher, 1963: 366).

What is more, the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence worked as a tacit guarantee to the Arabs that seek independence. Especially two statements in the letter dated 24 October 1915 were crucial in establishment of the perception of this tacit guarantee. First one claimed the British political administration "is prepared to recognize and

support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca"; and the other stated that "when the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government those various territories"[13].

On the other hand, other than the Hussein-McMahon alliance, another secret alliance was made between the two leading European power concerning the division of the rule of the region. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 can be considered as the recognition of France and French interests in the region as a decisive power by the British contrary to the premises of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence.

Source: *Map of the Sykes-Picot Agreement,*
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/graphics/sykespicot.jpg
[last accessed in 12 May 2002]

FIGURE 1. MAP OF THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT (1916)

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[13] *The Hussein-McMahon Letters (excerpt)* (October 24, 1915), http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1916/mcmahon.html [last accessed in 14 June, 1998].

According to this treaty, the territories recognized as the historical homeland of Arabs and offered to Hussein, were given to French and through the separation of the Blue Zone from 'Zone A' (See Figure 1) the special status of the Lebanon was recognized by both of the European powers. In addition, the map of *Sykes-Picot* laid the ground for territorial imagining of Syrian and Lebanese nation according to the European civic national model (Zamir, 1988: 41-42). Nonetheless, the conflicting clauses in the Sykes-Picot Agreement and Hussein-McMahon Correspondence later in 1920 led to clashes between Syrian nationalists and the French military, after the Syrian parliament elected Hussein's son Faisal as King of Syria.

Therefore, one may argue at the end of the war Lebanese political entity was got caught in the power struggle between the French and the Anglo-Arab government in Damascus. On the other hand, the US government, which began to be effective in world politics during the First World War, acted as an intermediary between the allied and central powers. In an attempt to solve the problem of territorial claims, a commission was formed by the US government and was sent to the 'Occupied Enemy Territory Administrations' (O.E.T.A.). On August 28, 1919 the famous *King-Crane Commission* presented a report on the native opinion[14]. Yet, on the basis of the petitions received the commission summarized the local tendencies as pro-French despite the resistance of Druze to French rule. The report stated that:

> [B]ut outside the Lebanon proper, in the areas which it is proposed to include in the "Greater Lebanon," such as Tyre, Sidon, "Hollow Syria," and Tripoli, a distinct majority of the people is probably averse to French rule. This includes practically all the Sunnite Moslems, most of the Shiites, a part of the Greek Orthodox Christians, and the small group of Protestants. Most of these ask earnestly for America,

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[14] Yet, the report also mentions the insufficiencies and difficulties of the petition collecting process such as the unbalanced petition received from different regions (more from O.E.T.A. East than the South) and from different religious communities (more of Christians than the Moslems); or observation of repetitive signatures in the petitions; or the third party efforts to affect the content of the petitions that the reports states "[s]imilar activities on the part of French sympathizers were observed in Beirut" see *The King-Crane Commission Report* (August 28, 1919), http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1918p/kncr.html [last accessed on May, 2004].

> with Britain as second choice; the balance for Britain
> with America as second choice[15]

On the other hand, one may argue as mentioned in the previous section religious, economic and cultural factors embedded in nation models constituted in the late 19th century were determinant in the choice or rejection of the mandate. Yet, the commission perceived these preferences as the direct result of the French colonial/imperial policies that they stated:

> The French policy of "colonization" shows its fruits in many inhabitants of this area, as well as of Beirut and other parts of Syria, who feel that they know French better than Arabic, and who are apt to hold themselves as of a distinctly higher order of civilization than the people of the interior.
>
> The appeal of lighter taxes and military service, greater security and opportunities for office-holding has an effect upon Christians in neighboring areas, so that many of them incline toward a Greater Lebanon under a permanent French mandate[16]

However, one may claim even though religious, economic and cultural factors were significant; it was the Christian communities (Maronite Patriarchy) who shaped the scope of the new Lebanese political entity and the nationalist movement (Phares, 1995: 68). Since the institutions and organizations that were familiar with the western diplomacy, and had close relations with the European powers, were Maronite Christians, the most prominent actors in constitution of the new state were the Lebanists. What they wanted was *Greater Lebanon* – a country separate than Syria, which includes the territories of Mt. Lebanon and the portions of Muslim dominated regions (the port cities) – under the French Mandate.

Moreover, in order to achieve this goal Patriarchy sent a delegate to 1919 Paris Peace Conference, where they presented a report on the memorandum on the 'local'

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[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

(Christian) population. Accordingly, Lebanese as a national community was defined as a self-sovereign political community (since 1860), sharing the occidental culture of Europe and being the rightful owners of the historical territories of the Phoenician civilization (Zamir, 1988: 270-271). As a further point, one may argue the state the Maronite patriarchy was demanding was similar to the state during *mutasarrifiyya*, where the power of the foreign controllers, inspectors, and agents were defined and limited in order to prevent direct control of the Lebanese political structure, and secure the credibility and the dignity of the government (1988: 281-282).

On the other hand, while the French governmental body favored a united *Greater Syria* from 1915 to 1919, as a result of the pressures from the French-educated elite a shift towards "divide and rule" policy took place; and the ideal of *Grand Liban* began to be supported. Finally, on 24-26 April 1920 in San Remo Conference issues concerning mandates/protectorates, oil and pipelines and "united action with respect to the Turks and Arabs" were decided based on the classification proposed on the Article 22 of the Covenant of League of Nations, Accordingly, while Syria and Lebanon was placed under a French mandate, Iraq and Palestine was given to British (Tauber, 1995: 29; Fisher, 1963: 380).

To conclude, despite emergence of a number of nation models, it is not possible to say former pre-modern and semi-modern forms of identification were fully developed into a modern European understanding of an *ethnie* right away in the early 20th century. Yet, one may argue colonialism and foreign intervention provided the necessary path for the development of these identities as in the emergence of four nation models. Nevertheless, the relationship between colonial and imperial circumstances and nation-building is still problematic and it will be further discussed in the next section. However, as the chapter indicates it is possible to label colonialism/imperialism as a system, a powerful factor continuously affecting the social, political and economic structure of the country. Hence, following these observations one may claim similar to the modernists' claims nation in the non-Western world was a product of colonialism. Yet, this colonial relationship can be

defined as power relationship operating on four levels of power balance between the colonized and colonizing communities.

To begin with, in the most traditional sense the practice of power follows top to bottom direction, in which the colonizer extracts what it wants which the colonized is obliged to supply. Yet, until the 20th century in the Lebanese case this took the form of collection of levies during the Ottoman colonialism and transformation of economic and political structure for the benefit of France in the French imperial period. However, since one cannot simply label the colonized as a passive, victimized agent, a second type of relation is from bottom to top, in which the colonized restricts, regulates and manipulates the practice of the colonizers power. This means that the colonized can lobby to influence the colonizing government through associations and organizations founded in the mother country by the colonized elite (i.e. reports of the *Comité Libanais de Paris* and the Maronite Church which was influential in the formation of the *Grand Liban* ideal) or can use violent means to change the policies of the colonizer (i.e. 1860 civil war).

Nonetheless, the third level took the form of power struggles within the colonized. Since the Lebanese entity was multi-communal, the third level of exercise of power took mainly the form of Muslim-Christian and Druze-Maronite clashes. Finally, one may talk about a fourth level on which a delicate balance of power between several rival colonizing actors took place. Yet, the Anglo-French clash for the domination of Levant and the conflict between Europe and Ottomans can be considered as the primary examples of exercise of power this third level. Following these four levels of power relationships, I will further discuss the national boundary construction in Lebanon in the mandate era from 1920 till 1936 in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

ATTEMPT TO BUILD A UNITY OF STATE AND NATION:
COLONIAL NATION BUILDING IN LEBANON
1920-1936

In the previous chapter I discussed the evolution of community and identity construction over religion to ethnic identity during the 19th and early 20th centuries. In order to provide a more analytical picture of the emergence of *ethnies* and ethnic nationalism(s) in the particularity of Lebanese socio-political context, in this chapter I cover the period starting from the announcement of the mandate in 1920 until the abolition of the colonial constitution in 1936. The chapter starts with a discussion of construction of the Lebanese community as a nation not unified but differentiated over three symbols, map, census and museum, by the French Mandate, and continues to analyze the reaction of different social groups to this identity formation. Lastly, the chapter covers the effects of this differentiated 'us' identity, and questions the link between colonialism and modern state-making and nation-building. The primary concern of this chapter is the nature of the relationship between state-making and nation-building during the colonial period and its effects on ethnic classification. In line with that, the chapter aims to question how far colonial structures and conditions were successful in formation of modern categories.

3.1 Symbolic Production of Boundaries of the New Lebanese Nation: Map Census and Museum (1920-1925)

Historically, the defeat of Faisal (the son of Sherif Hussein) and his Arab government in Syria in July 1920 by the French military, not only paved the way for partition of Middle East between France of Britain, but also did lay the ground for the foundation of a Christian state in Lebanon. When the French High

Commissioner, General Gouraud announced the establishment of *Grand Liban*, Lebanon became the first 'independent' Christian state in the Arab/Muslim realm (Zamir, 1988: 1). However, the sectarian differentiation that gained diplomatic status with the establishment of *mutasarrifiyya* turned into the face of the new state as the primary problem for constitution of a modern communal identity. This complex socio-political structure tried to be overcome through state-making and nation-building processes.

One may argue nation-building in French Lebanon took the form of an act of imagining that kept old ethno-religious identities central to the narration of the nation. Parallel to Anderson, this narration was a reconstruction of the old social attachments to form an exclusive community, which was or should be autonomous within a particular territory, and to which people should give their ultimate loyalty (see Anderson, 1991: 7). In line with that, the boundaries of the new 'colonial Lebanese nation' were reinforced with symbolic equipments such as map, censuses and museums during the period between 1920 and 1925.

While the censuses helped the colonizer to create fixed identity categories for the colonized, maps provided a totalizing classification equipment both to demonstrate the antiquity of the territorial limits and to create recognizable and visible logos (1991: 166, 173). On the other hand, museums acted as tools for the colonizing power to act as the guardian of tradition by showing his level of control on objects, people and history (1991: 184). These symbols not only helped to establish fictive communal identities on the multi-communal, multi-sectarian Lebanese society, but also reinforced the discriminatory classification of various sects and *ethnies* dominating Lebanese culture.

Following these observations, one may claim symbolic boundary construction started first through language as a means of classification during the colonial period. The newly established French High Commissionaire brought the paternal colonial discourse to the Lebanese political structure. Accordingly, France was depicted as the new caring mother of the newly adopted children of Syria and Lebanon. Yet, this

fictive family also included a multi-ethnic, multi-communal occupying army constituted by the other adopted children. What is more, the part given to the High Commissioner was the role of a stern father who would rule his new household with discipline and control; and give every chance to obey before punishment (Thompson, 2000b: 40).

Through discipline and control, this new adoptive parents tried to conduct nation-building and state-making simultaneously. French tried to construct a Lebanese 'nation' first over territorial imagining of the frontiers of the new state. However, through the lobbying of the Maronite Church (1919 and 1920 delegations) and other missionaries the scope of this territorial imagining was limited to Lebanist ideology. Yet, the proclaimed Phoenician heritage that begot the claim on Phoenician frontiers for Lebanon, determined the territorial differentiation of the new state. The territorial boundary construction started with the division of the Wilayat of Syria and Mount Lebanon into five 'states', Damas, Aleppo, Druze, Alawi, and Great Lebanon. Nonetheless, the imagining of these frontiers resulted in formation of two historically related but geographically distinct countries. By 1924 Damas and Aleppo units were united to form the Syrian state, which with the states of Jabal al-Druze, Alawis and *Grand Liban* constituted the Syria/Lebanon Mandate (Winslow, 1996: 60).

On the other hand, the new Lebanon's territorial limits were composed of portions of the mostly-Muslim Ottoman provinces of Tripoli, Damascus, Sidon, and the traditional Christian territories of Mount Lebanon (Phares, 1995: 66). The final frontiers of the new state could only be determined at the end of Laussanne Conference in 1923 and due to American complaints, the project was revised a year later (Winslow, 1996: 62; Zisser, 2000: 1). Finally, the new state, with Beirut as its capital, was to cover the region from Nahr al-Kabir in the north to Ra's al-Naqura in the south, from Mediterranean in the west to Anti-Lebanon Mountains in the East (see Figure 2).

In addition to this, constructed boundaries of the nation were also reinforced with making of the new map of the nation. Maps, which can be defined as a European-

style classification of a spatial reality (Anderson, 1991: 173), were used as the markers to remind the limits of the sovereignty of each sect within the colonial state. However, the most notable outcome of this territorial and symbolic imagining was the boycott started by the Muslim population, who followed the (Muslim) Arabist model. From 1920 until the 1930s the Muslims refused to recognize the new map of the new nation and continuously repeated their demands for unification of Syria.

Source: *Syria and Lebanon 1923 Map*,
http://unimaps.com/syria-leb1923/index.html [last accessed in 2005]

FIGURE 2. MAP OF COLONIAL SYRIA AND LEBANON (1923)

Despite the power struggles within and between the local communities, France continued to enforce her *civilizing mission* in Levant. Along with the territorial imagining, which based on the demands of the Lebanists and the Maronite Church, the French began to model the political apparatus along with the colonial policies of the republic and the French nation-building experience. While Gouraud turned to rural and conservative notables for strengthening the loyalty to the French rule in Syria, he established close bonds with the Maronite Church in Lebanon. Committed to their project, French encouraged establishment of local governments with councils, *bureaux*, courts, and staff that would be initiated and supervised by the High Commissioner in Beirut, and his French staff (Winslow, 1996: 62). Nonetheless, these French specialists rather than being mentors to the local elite, acted as the decision makers and sole possessors of the administrative and governmental posts.

In addition to symbolic imagining over maps, French colonial power also conducted censuses to quantify the sectarian and tribal differences between the communities. However, since Muslims boycotted the 1921 census, Christians emerged the sole power to determine the course nation-building. Combined with the privileged position of the Church the new state structure was determined as sectarian in nature (Thompson, 2000b: 44). In this sense the Colonial Lebanon was a revised version of Ottoman *mutasarrifiyya* where political equality was eroded and social mobility was restricted. Yet, in an attempt to modernize the Syrian and Lebanese political entities Gouraud appointed Robert De Caix as the Secretary General, who encouraged employment of the graduates of protestant and catholic missionary schools (Winslow, 1996: 63).

In addition to that, the Representative Council established in 1922 also was given a Christian face, that majority of its members were Maronite Christians. Even though the election of the members of the council based on proportional representation of the communities constituting the Lebanese society, the boycott of the Muslim communities of the 1921 census resulted in quantitative recognition of Christians as the dominating minority. Parallel to Anderson, the census not only acted as a

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classification medium to fix the identity of the communities as Christian, but also was used as a marker of political dominance of one another.

Nevertheless, the paternalism of Gouraud replaced with colonial republicanism during the reign of and his two successors General Maxime Weygand and General Maurice Sarrail. It is possible to claim, nation-building in this new period can be labeled as a process of secularization. Along with the premises of the modernist nation conceptualization, the new nation was tried to be stripped of its religious content. Hence, both Commissioners reduced the power of the Maronite Church in political decision-making. While the changes were welcomed by the Muslim and the Druze population, the Catholic Church and the missionaries were highly critical of the new regimes' practices.

If the Gouraud period indicated an ethnic nation-building along with the premises of Christian Pheonicianism, the later periods adopted a more modernist nation-building model. Yet, one may claim the state-making and nation-building during the reign of Weygand and Sarrail was a process of constructing "political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cross political ones, and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state…should not separate the power-holders from the rest" (Gellner, 1983: 1). Hence the priority was on state-making, which would transform the traditional, agrarian (static) Lebanon to a modern (civilized), industrialized society, and dissolve the pre-existing principles of social organization based on status (i.e. Maronite patriarchy).

In line with that view, the Commissioners developed Lebanese civil service, established a new currency and a new electoral law, regulated land tenure, and reorganized the law-enforcement offices. In addition to that, the laicist High Commissioner Sarrail, discouraged delegations of religious patriarchs, dismissed General Vandenberg, the French governor of Lebanon, who has close connections with the clerical parties, withdrawn the children of French soldiers and officials from the missionary schools, reopened local Arab nationalist schools. However, it was no more than an act of colonizing power imposing her political and economic model to

her colonized subjects (Thompson, 2000b: 44). It was a civilizing mission based on top to bottom exercise of power. However, as Sarrail's term came to an end, Maronite Patriarchy regained political power.

As a final point, one other medium used by the imperial/colonial French to limit communal identity was museum. Starting with the spread of archeological excavations in the regions, first exhibits for artifacts were established in 1861 in Sidon. Nonetheless, these can be labeled as storage rooms for the French until the valuable artifacts were taken to homeland (Tahan, 2005: 87-89). Nevertheless, as the idea of museum construction became a part of nation-building process in Levant, French High Commissionaire further limit historical tradition of Lebanon by controlling her *objet d'art*. When national museums began to be constructed in 1922, already territorially differentiated Lebanon and Syria were also archeologically separated. Accordingly, while the Lebanese national museum would include Phoenician artifacts, the Syrian museum would only be composed of Arab/Islamic relics (Kaufman, 2004: 123).

To conclude, one may summarize French state-making as deviant form of modern state and nation formation. Contrary to Gellner's praise of colonialism as an actor of modernism (see Gellner, 1996: 159), the French colonial rule merely revised the old traditional forms of social, economic and political structures. What is more, the 'equality for all' and 'one nation and one state' premises of the modern nation-state were turned into making of a state favoring foreign educated Christians and a fractioned nation. Yet, these policies were rejected and criticized only by the subaltern Muslim communities but also by the Christian intellectuals, who claimed an ethnic unity for all the members of the nation.

3.2 Reactions to the French Rule and Revision of Historic Memory (1925)

The foundation of the French mandate and increasing alliance between the clerics and the French High Commissionaire not only faced with resistance of the Muslim

and Druze communities, but also with disapproval of (some) Christian nationalist elite. Among those the Muslims and Druze were particularly against the colonial rule since they wanted unification with Syria and continuity of old social and economic systems. Hence, while in Lebanon Muslims boycotted every step of the French bureaucracy (including the 1921 census), and isolated themselves from her practices, in Syria a number of military confrontations began to take place due to the economic and political policies of the High Commissary which threatened the tribal structure of the Jabal al-Duruz (Phares, 1995: 77; Hanf, 1993: 65).

Even though there were uprisings since the 1919 against the French rule, the major mutiny began in 1925 by al-Atrash in *Jabal al-Druze* as a result of the arrest of the Druze leaders complaining from the practices of the High Commissionaire. The primary reason behind al-Atrash's resistance was dissatisfaction with French political and economic modernization policies. Druzes, who had enjoyed considerable amount of autonomy during the Ottoman reign, were agitated with the interventionist policies of the French. Although it began as a local rebellion, Druze revolt turned into a macro level resistance with an anti-French, anti-outsider face (Winslow, 1996: 60-63).

Nonetheless, one may argue following the Sarrail's policies that reinforced the sectarian differentiation and isolation, the Druze revolt in Syria became another cornerstone in Muslim-Christian affairs in Lebanon, which along with the memories and the myths of the 1860 civil war reinforced the raise of Christian Lebanism, and sharpening of the fear of Muslims. Even though the leaders of the revolt emphasized a secular patriotism over the slogan 'Religion belongs to God, the Motherland to all', Christians were still mistrusting the Druzes (Atiyah, 1946: 129). Yet, the 'us' vs. 'them' differentiation and the fear of the 'Muslim Other' were so powerful that any Christian death was considered as a hate crime of a Muslim. Atiyah depicted this victimization on behalf of the Christians as:

> I knew…that our neighbour's son, far from being a religious martyr, had been murdered by a fellow-Christian in a quarrel over a woman. And yet the

effects of those insidious influences was to re-create around me the hateful atmosphere of the Beyrouth I had known in my childhood….I was back there myself, and it was more like 1910 than 1925; for the Christians feared the Moslems, and the Moslems hated the Christians because the Christians wanted the French while the Moslems wanted independence; and like others I began, in spite of myself, to hate and fear and wish to get away from this hell which I had known before (Atiyah, 1946: 132).

While the Muslim reactions both took violent and non-violent forms, the Christian response was peaceful in essence that reactions mainly dominated the print culture of Lebanon. Yet, among the intellectuals with anti-French sentiments Kahlil Gibran emerged as the symbol of anti-colonial (Christian) nationalism. In his famous essay *Your Lebanon and Mine* (1920) Gibran defines the French/Colonial [Your] Lebanon as an artificial imagining and labels it as a "political knot…an international problem yet to be solved" with the conducted censuses, clashes between the bishops and generals, territorial conflicts, financial exploitation, the rivalry between representatives, committees, as well as, between parties and sects (Gibran, 1978: 95-98).

On the other hand, Gibran's own Lebanon depicted a natural, historical continuity devoid of conflict, hence another myth. In another essay, he conceptualized nation as a collection of individuals with different dispositions, [ideological] tendencies, opinions united with a stronger, deeper and general inner bond (Gibran, 1999: 87). Nevertheless, this bond did not need to base on religion, language, consanguinity and/or economic interests. In his view there were different types of nations where each of these factors may placed a role in establishing the bond between its members. Yet, national bond was considered as something more primordial, essential in character. In other words nations had 'personalities' which were products of both natural givens and effects of external factors (such as language, religion or ethnicity)

Moreover, the subjects of *Your Lebanon* imagining were labeled suffering from inferiority. They are obliged to domination and get caught in a false consciousness. Yet, Gibran defines the community of this Lebanon in the poem as:

[T]hose who croak like frogs boasting that they have rid themselves of their ancient, tyrannical enemy, but the truth of the matter is that this tyrannical enemy still hides within their own souls

They are the slaves for whom time had exchanged rusty chains for shiny ones so that they thought themselves free

How great they are in your eyes, and how little in mine!
(Gibran, 1978: 99-100)

In contrast the children of the Lebanon depicted by Gibran were romanticized in the Lebanese nationalist discourse. The true people of Lebanon, in Gibran's eyes, were composed of noble and hardworking peasants, honorable and brave man, and patriotic mothers. Through this imagining, Gibran and his ideals became synonymous with the Christian nationalism. Nonetheless, one cannot label him as a nationalist writer. Yet, despite there were other artists (Christian and Muslim) none of them were that successful in construction of a Lebanese identity. Hence, one has to point out the possibility that Gibran's success lies on the fact that he wrote in the vernacular rather than in the language of a 'civilized other' (Salem, 2003: 27, 43).

On the other hand, the Druze revolt had its impact on the diaspora and the Lebanese lobbies in France as well. One outcome of the revolt was the questioning of the practice of the French mandate that on September 23, 1926, *Comité Libanais de Paris* presented a report to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the High Commissioner over the fulfillment of the requirements of the Article 22 of the Covenant of League of Nations and the organization of the French authority in *Grand Liban*. The committee claimed that though the mandate rule was defined as a temporary rule aiming modernization of the country in the covenant, the French policy since the occupation was consistently generating conflict that the sectarian clashes emerging (especially following the Druze revolt) were French products (Jung, 1927: 97).

Moreover, what were significant in the report were a new historical narration in-the-making, and the emergence of a new enemy (French *Haut Commissaire*). Thus, the myth of decline was transformed and the evil Turks of the 19th century were replaced with the French. In other words, this time France and her colonial policies were the reasons behind the decay of Lebanese civilization. The new enemy was no longer the egregious tyrant Abdulhamid who hated and persecuted the Christians for his own pleasure, and/or the treacherous Druzes as the childhood memories of Maronites depicted. It was rather a greedy, indifferent, prejudiced High Commissioner that called for conflict and war, failed to protect the people of Lebanon, and exploited her people economically. As a further point, the Committee, unlike their previous arguments in during and at the end of First World War, romanticized the Ottoman reign for establishing an autonomous Lebanon. Yet, the report stated that:

> [Our] country held the reputation of the "perfect security" of its territory, in the Christian district, as well as in Druze and Muslim districts
>
> By provoking these dissentions, France was the cause of massacres, lootings, fires of which our citizens were the victims. They found themselves in complete poverty, they dispersed all over the Lebanon, and they only live with public charity and with the help of fellow countrymen living abroad
>
> The Lebanese Committee is obliged to remark that before 1860 and after this memorable day Lebanon has been always considered as being able to govern herself. For 50 years her citizens has already made considerable progress in all branches of human activity (Jung, 1927: 97, 100)[17].

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[17] *"...Notre pays était réputé par la parfaite sécurité de son territorie, soit dans les districts chrétiens, soit dans les districts druses et musulmans....En provoquant ces dissensions, la France a été cause des massacres, des pillages, des incendices dont ont été victimes nos concitoyens. Ceux-ci se trouvent dans un état de dénuement complet, ils sont dispersés dans tout le Liban et ne vivent que de la charité publique et des secours qui leur sont adressés par leurs compatriotres habitant l'étranger....Le Comité Libanais se doit de faire remarquer que déjà avant 1860 et après cette date mémorable, le Liban a toujours été considéré comme pouvant se governer lui-même. Despuis cinquante ans, ses concittoyens ont encore fait des progrès considérables dans toutes les branches de l'activité humaine..."*

Hence, following both Gibran's and diaspora's response to the new colonial state, it is possible to claim lack of unity between different sects led to revision of origin myths in Christian, Lebanese nationalism models. While the 'myth of ancestry' once again emerge as the symbol of the golden age of the community in the Phoenician times (as in Gibran's writings), 'myth of decline' was revised to turn French into the new enemy (as in diaspora's claims). Nonetheless, in order to reduce the tension between communities, and create a more homogenous and harmonious society French introduced constitutional rule in 1926.

3.3 Constitutional Republic and Emergence of a Multi-nation State (1926-1936)

In spite of the sectarian and ethnic discrimination it generated, the Druze rebellion of 1925 turned into a beneficial opportunity to modernize the Lebanese state structure. However, unlike the foresights of the modernists, who label Western colonialism and imperialism as a positive factor in (re)construction of the agrarian societies permeated with the rule of local authorities, dominance of primordial attachments into modern civilized (industrial) entities that operated over states providing complex division of labor and social mobility for her members (Gellner, 1983: 3-4; 1996: 159-160), the French colonial government reinforced the old sectarian social and political structure. The mandate treated colonial state-making as a tool to possess monopoly of legitimate violence on its colonial citizens. Hence, rather than establishing a secular unified civil society, they created a strictly differentiated sectarian society. Yet, this sectarianism led the new Lebanese state to turn into an entity continuously pressured by various ethno-religious communities.

What is more, the announcement of the constitutional period in Lebanon marked the beginning of this new confessional, consociational era. Following replacement of Sarrail with Henri de Jouvenal in 1926, the French colonial rule asked the Representative Council to prepare a blueprint for a constitution. Early in 1926 Representative Council prepared 210 questionnaires in order to determine the preferences of the public. While 135 of those were sent to notables and civil leaders,

75 of them to religious patriarchs due to pressures from Paris and the Maronite Church contrary to criticism of both Christian and Muslim delegates. Nonetheless, since many Muslim and Druze leaders boycotted the poll, the population that supported non-sectarianism was eventually underrepresented in the formation of Lebanese constitution (Thompson, 2000b: 50-51).

Based on the results of the poll on May 26, 1926 Lebanon was proclaimed as a constitutional republic by the French and Charles Dabbas, a Greek Orthodox, was appointed as the first president of Lebanon (Winslow, 1996: 65). The new constitution was modeled after the constitution of the French Third Republic as "an independent and indivisible state" whose frontiers were defined as the "ones which are officially recognized by the Mandatory French Government and by the League of Nations" (Article 1) and whose official languages were Arabic and French (Article 11) (The Lebanese Constitution, 1997: 225-226). Moreover, the Articles 16, and 17 indicated that the new political system would emerge around an elected Chamber of Deputies, an appointed president, and an appointed senate, akin to the organization of the authorities in the Law of February 25, 1875 of French Third Republic (Article 1).

However, the sectarian language of the 1926 Constitution was reconsidered in 1927 and later in 1929 due to a multitude of criticisms directed. In addition the appointed Senate was abolished and presidential term limit was extended. Yet, the confessional (multi-sectarian) and/or consociationalist (multi-communal) discourse was not erased from the text. Among those articles promoting confessionalism, the Article 24 states that "[T]he Members of the chamber of Deputies shall be elected in accordance with Order No. 1307 dated 8 March 1922 [which decrees the seats of the Senate would be elected on the basis of the sectarianism] (emphasis added)" (1997: 230-231). Even when the article amended on October 17, 1927 the emphasis on confessionalism highlighted rather than diminished that the new article not only announced that the seats of the elected members would be distributed according to sectarian representation, but also the seats of the appointed deputies would be determined according to the sectarian nature of the district they represent.

Yet, the logic behind the sectarianism is announced in the Article 95 as follows:

> As a provisional measure and according to Article one of the Charter of the Mandate and for the sake of justice and amity, the sects shall be equally represented in public employment and in the composition of the Ministry, provided such measures will not harm the general welfare of the state (1997: 259-260).

In line with that the Article 96 defines the allocation of seats as "5 Maronites; 3 Sunnis; 3 Shi'ia; 3 Orthodox; 1 Catholic; 1 Druze; 1 minorities" (1997: 260).

Even though emphasis on personal liberties, secular, non-monarchical definition of power marked the newly established constitution, it was controversial in its republican claims. While the Lebanese were granted with equality before law (Article 7), individual liberty (Article 8), freedom of consciousness (Article 9), free (public) education (Article 10), and freedom of speech (Article 13), in each article their limits were emphasized within the [Mandatory] law. Additionally, French was assigning sovereignty to people whereas, giving the High Commissioner the power to control every step taken by the parliament and the authority to suspend the constitution itself (Thompson, 2000b: 53).

Although the first four parts of the constitution imply the sovereignty of the Lebanese Republic, articles in Part Five (Provisions Relating to the Mandatory Power and the League of Nations) shows the dependency of the republic. According to the Articles 91, 92 and 93, the French were decreed as the ultimate post that the parliament and the senate need to verify its international policies. Further through Article 98 the High Commissioner were granted with the power to appoint the first Senate – which will stay in power for 2 years "in order to facilitate the immediate implementation guarantee of the full implementation full execution" of the constitution (The Lebanese Constitution, 1997: 260).

In addition to all, the High Commissary exercised censorship over the press in order to suppress the criticisms against the establishment of a constitution based on French colonial/imperial discourse. Yet, the letter sent to two leading journals (*Al-Maarad*

and *Al-Barak*), which were highly critical of 1926 Constitution and French attempts for revision, and seek for full autonomy for Lebanon, by Colonel Catroux (the High Commissioner behind the scene) is significant for indicating how little the paternalistic discourse of colonial rule was changed. The High Commissary was still depicted as the stern adoptive father who needs to educate his adopted children; and gives every chance to obey before punishment. In his letter Catroux stated that:

> As I have already declared to your parliamentarians, I am now declaring you that the will of the mandatory authority tends to approve the modification as it is. If we see that you and the members of your Parliament continue to oppose to the modification in question then we will be led to conclude that your attitude deserves to face the consequences [18] (Jung, 1927: 161).

On the other hand, this new constitution continued to generate resistance from below. Yet, the majority of the reactions to the French rule were coming from the Muslim population who no longer did constitute political majority despite their significant numbers. While in *mutasarrifiyya* Muslims constituted both a numerical and political minority, they continued to be a political minority, despite their increased numbers with the inclusion of the Muslim populated territories from *Wilayat* of Syria in 1920s. Yet, with the 1932 census (Figures 3 and 4) Muslim got the needed opportunity to manipulate the classification of the colonizing power to their benefit. The new census was a useful medium in showing the numerical balance between the Muslim and Christians.

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[18] *Je vous déclare maintenant, ainsi ue je l'ai déjà déclaré à vos parlementaires, que la volonté de l'autorité mandataire tend à l'approbation de la modification telle qu'elle est. Si nous voyons que vous et les membres de votre Parlement continuez à la modification en question, nous serons amenés alors à conclure que votre attitude mérite d'en subir les conséquences.*

Community	*Mutasarrifiyya* (1911)	%	*Grand Liban* (1932)	%
Maronites	242,308	58.3	227,800	29.0
Greek Catholic	31,936	7.7	46,709	5.9
Greek Orthodox	52,356	12.6	77,312	9.8
Other Christian Communities	3,026	0.8	45,125	5.7
All Christians	329,626	79.4	396,946	50.4
Sunnis	14,529	3.5	177,100	22.5
Shi'is	23,413	5.6	155,035	19.8
Druze	47,290	11.4	53,334	6.8
All Muslims	85,232	20.5	385,489	49.1
Jews	86	-	3,518	0.5
Total	414,944	100	785,933	100

Source: Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, p. 7

FIGURE 3. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN LEBANON (1911-1932)[19]

	Total	Christians		Muslims		Miscellaneous	
		N	%	N	%		%
Official Gazette	793.396	391.946	49.4	386.369	48.7	-	1.90
Official Gazette (excluding émigrés)	652.012	264.892	40.62	372.032	57.06	-	-
MAE, Beyrouth, 567, no. 1	785.729	392.730	49.99	383.200	48.78	-	1.25
MAE, Beyrouth, 567, no. 12	834.429	420.414	50.38	405.237	48.56	-	1.06

Source: Firro, *Inventing Lebanon*, pp. 119-121

FIGURE 4. CENSUS RESULTS ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT SOURCES (OFFICIAL GAZETTE & MINISTERE DES AFFAIRS ETRANGES)

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[19] These statistics based on calculations without subtraction of the number of the *émigré*s.

Moreover, the 1932 census was also useful in transforming the political conditions set with the 1921 census (which was boycotted by the Muslims), which led Christians to gain the control of nation-building and state-making processes. The 1932 census provided the cement of the construction and formation of the Lebanese citizenry (Maktabi, 1999: 221). As the Muslims pressed to exclude the number of the *émigrés* from the census results, the Chistian's political authority was put in danger. The issue of *émigrés* in interpretation of the census results became a problem throughout 1930s, since without the émigrés the Maronites suddenly became a minority within a sectarian state to Maronite Church's horror.

To conclude, however calculated, this new demographic structure led to the formation of a new political structure in which representation of all communities became central for to guarantee the co-existence of various communities in the post-colonial period. Parallel to Anderson's premises the census continued to act as a tool for the colonizer to control the colonized through quantitative classification. However, by manipulating the results the colonized (Muslim) began to challenge the control of the colonizer. Hence, one may define the position of the colonized as a continuous cycle of relationships where they were placed "simultaneously in a position of subordination in one relation and a position of dominance in another" (Chaterjee, 1993: 36).

As a further point, since the national consciousness was established along with religious consciousness, it is possible to argue national-building was a failure in Lebanon. Parallel to Hobsbawm, it is possible to claim the prevailing religious identities challenge "nation's monopoly claim to its members' loyalty" (Hobswam, 1990: 68). Not only they prevented initiation of nation as a civic community, but also did disallow creation of ethnic identity and establishment of *ethnies,* that would transform Lebanese communities into a nation, in the colonial period. Following the effects of these developments, the next chapter will focus on the transformation of the relationship between France and Lebanon, along with the changes of power balance between different sects.

CHAPTER 4

A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION:
PATH TO REVIVE CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM ALLIANCE
1936-1943

Following the conditions that were discussed in the previous chapter, in this chapter I look at the transformation of the communal (national) identity with decolonization starting with 1936 and abolition of the constitution until the announcement of the 1943 National Pact. Basically, the primary goal of this chapter is to understand the factors that effected the formation of an anti-colonial national consciousness that revive the old Christian-Muslim alliance in the political arena. The chapter starts with a discussion on the relationship between colonialism and new national elite. Then, it covers the changes in the domestic social, economic and political structure, and their effects on national identity construction in the 1930s. Finally, following a discussion on the link between the changing international dynamics with the Second World War and domestic politics, the chapter focuses on the announcement of the National Pact in 1943 and establishment of the (anti-colonial) nation-state in the post-colonial period.

4.1 Colonial Elite and Nationalist Sentiments: System Creating Leaders vs. Leader Creating Systems

In order to have a better understanding of the transformation of the idea of the nation and/or the national consciousness in Lebanon, it is crucial to examine the effects of the colonial state which served as the 'model' for the ensuing process of nation-building, since what one refers as post-colonialism, does not simply indicate a time period following the end of colonialism, but also refer to transformation of the old political, social and economic structures. If one is to define colonialism in Sartré's

terms and label it as a system that represented a deliberate and systematic form of exploitation (Sartré, 2001: 31), then what is called as post-colonialism would refer to a new system that needs understanding of economic, political, social and cultural implications of change, questioning of historical certainties, problematizing the relationship of literary traditions and anterior texts, and finally de-centering and historicizing of the subject. In other words, if the relationship between the West and her overseas territories is a product of a colonial and/or imperial dialogue, then any change within the nature and the scope of this relationship would require formation of a new dialogue, which would eventually reshape/transform the economic, political, social and cultural domain that the colonial/imperial discourse formulated.

What is more, for some scholars such as Fanon, this process of decolonization primarily indicated replacement of the social roles by different actors, "the replacing of a certain "species" of men by another "species" of men" (Fanon, 1968: 35); hence, presumed creation of a 'new' class, native bourgeois. A further conceptualization of decolonization in the literature presupposed a direct link between colonialism and rise of nationalism in the non-European territories. Accordingly, Third World nationalisms were considered as recent phenomena that were anti-colonial nationalisms in nature; thus made disposition of Western/European political, social and/or economic domination and hegemony (Smith, 1986: 232, 241-242; Norbu, 1992: 5-8). However, one may argue the level of compatibility between the decay of Western colonialism and the rise of local nationalist sentiments indicates a vague case in the Lebanese context.

As the previous chapters showed historically two forms of colonialism and imperialism, Ottoman and French, shaped the communal identities in Lebanon. While the former generated the religious identification, the latter led to transformation of these communal identities. Nonetheless, following the arguments of Huizinga and Gellner, if one presupposes patriotism preceded nationalism at the ideological level and nationalism created her nation in return (see Huizinga, 1959: 99, 102-109; Gellner, 1983: 6, 57), it is possible to claim what one describe as Lebanese nation-building was indeed a process of transformation of local

patriotisms. In that case, one may present the civil war of 1860 as *terminus a quo* for construction of nationalism in Lebanon. Moreover, as the following two chapters will confirm the nation-building and state-making in the post-colonial Lebanon was a continuation of the ideologies of the 20th century.

Hence, rather than Western colonialism and imperialism preceding the nation ideal in Lebanon, one may argue both factors emerged *pari passu*. As a further point, even though starting from the mid-19th century European imperialism and colonialism shaped the cultural domain and introduced European concepts such as constitution, national frontiers, censuses, elections and museums during the processes of nation-building and state-making, in every step of recreation of the cultural domain and institutionalization of these concepts domestic actors emerged as a decisive power. Hence, one cannot claim colonized were merely passive actors. Additionally, the 'other' that defined the 'us' identity of the local patriotism transformed in time. While the 'other' was Ottoman Empire and the Turks during the 19th century, it became French colonialism and High Commissionaire in the early 20th century.

On the other hand, the relationship between the leaders of Lebanese 'national' entity and the colonial/imperial system followed the dominant paradigm. It is possible to claim by transforming the state, the economic structure and cultural domain starting from the 19th century, colonialism paved the way to create a new colonial *intelligentsia* that would eventually constitute the core of the prospective post-colonial nation-state. In the early 1920s while on the one hand the old social classes, namely the clergy and the Maronite Patriarch, became the main actors in construction, maintenance and reconstruction of the sectarian nature of the state, the French mandate also created 'secular' educated leaders (*zu'ama*[20]) who were loyal to the new colonial state and colonial identity.

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[20] *zu'ama* (singular *za'im*) literarily means leaders and refers to "the recognized leader of a community who has the power to speak for his clients as a group or as individuals" (Firro, 2003: 93). Yet, as I shall use the term, it would refer to the generation of leaders of the colonial/imperial *intelligentsia*

While the roots of the colonial bilingual elite can be traced back to the missionary movements in the Levant, one may argue the *zuʻama* of the early 20th century was purely a colonial construction created out of the rural and urban merchant and *ʻulama* families, in order to counter the power vacuum emerged with the boycott of the leading Sunni families of Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli in 1920s (Firro, 2003: 94-95, 101). The colonial *zuʻama* of Lebanon was composed of Christians (Emile Eddé and Bishara al-Khuri) and Muslims (Riyad al-Sulh), both the newly emerged Western educated merchant families and the descendents of traditional 'feudal' dynasties who received education in the missionary schools. Yet, following Chatterjee this new bourgeois was "created in a relation of subordination" within the hegemonic project of colonial state-making and nation-building (Chatterjee, 1993: 36).

In the decolonial period the two dynamic leaders, Emile Eddé and Bishara al-Khuri, emerged from the Christian elite in the 1930s, and constantly competed for power. Although both of them were born into Maronite Christian families and educated in the French missionary schools, they represented different lines of nation ideals. While former supported the strictly exclusionist Christian nation model that based its myth of origin to the Phoenician civilization and Franc settlers, the latter embodied the revised Lebanism of Michel Chiha.

Among those, Eddé was one of most influential political figures that collaborated with the French High Commissioner before and during the mandate period. He joined Lebanese representatives who claimed establishment of *Grand Liban* within its historic territories in 1919 and 1920; and served as a Prime Minister from 1929 until 1930 (Zamir, 1978: 232). Nonetheless, despite his views on nation-building, he remained as one of the most enthusiastic supporter Christian Lebanism. Eddé defined the historic homeland of the Lebanese as Mt. Lebanon; identified the *ethnie* – that would transform the Lebanese community into a nation – not only as Christian, but also as Catholic; and finally, aimed making French the official language of the nation following the ancestry myths that connect Francs and Maronites historically (El-Solh, 2004: 15). What is more, following the results of the 1932, he was the first to support differentiation of the Muslim dominated

territories from *Grand Liban* in order to prevent submission of Christians to Muslims in the later decades (Zamir, 1978: 232-233). However, he abandoned (at least publically) these views during presidential campaign against al-Khuri in 1932 in order to appeal the votes of the Muslims and the Maronite Church (1978: 234-235).

On the other hand, his opponent Bishara al-Khuri sought an independent, unified Lebanon, whose identity was a combination of Christian and Arab Islamic culture, as the model for independent nation-state. Hence, since he was neither a keen enthusiast of French colonialism as Eddé nor a supporter of Syrian unionists, and married to the sister of Michel Chiha, al-Khuri was considered as a moderate, he found support from different social groups including the Jesuits and the Sunnis (2004: 16-17). Consequently, turning him into a powerful *zuʿama,* unlike the other merchant Christian elites of the colonial Lebanon, and the president in the post-colonial era (Firro, 2003: 101-102). Nonetheless, one may argue the success of al-Khuri in integration of a revisionist Lebanism into nation-building and state-making processes laid on maintenance of balance of power between different segments of Lebanese society. Even though created and/or transformed by the colonial system, the state-making and nation-building as forms of communal identity construction in Lebanon, were simply products of continuous power struggle between various social actors.

As a final point, since national identity emerged in the form of local patriotisms embedded in antagonism towards an 'other', it is possible to claim al-Khuri took over the power through further otherization of the French. Besides, the domestic struggles reinforced this otherization. The antagonism between mandate and the Lebanese institutions were at its peak in the 1930s. On the other hand, not only there were ideological clashes between the French, Muslims and Christians, but also were within Christian (Maronite) factions (Yapp, 1996: 107). Hence, the following sections will focus on the conditions of transformation of power relations between and within Lebanese communities, in order to have a better understanding of the

emergence of al-Khuri and his Arab Lebanism as the new model for state-making and nation-building a decade later.

4.2 Transformation of Old Institutions and Social Classes: (Re)birth of Christian-Muslim Alliance (1936)

Constitutional period did not last long that it was abolished a decade later as a result of the rivalry between Eddé and al-Khuri. At the end of Dabbas' term, the vote for presidency resulted in a crisis dividing the Chamber of Deputies. The rivalry resulted in a deadlock where the Chamber of Deputies was divided into two. In order to solve the issue, some deputies suggested a Muslim, Shaykh Muhammad al-Jisr, as a compromise candidate. However, the French High Commissioner Henri Ponsot suspended the constitutional rule on May 9, 1932 in order to secure the sectarian political hierarchy (El-Solh, 2004: 15; Winslow, 1996: 67).

However, the acts of Ponsot dissatisfied the French authorities and Paris administration replaced him with Comte Damien de Martel on October 12 1933 (Firro, 2003, p. 122). As soon as he arrived, de Martel promised the revival of Constitutional rule and having new elections. Yet, the issue of interpretation of the results of the 1932 census, which directly affected the allocation of the seats among the sects, became an issue of controversy between Maronite Patriarch Antoine Arida and High Commissionaire till late 1930s. The Maronite Patriarchy, who controlled the policies of the state throughout the 1920s, continuously sought revision in the results of the 1932 census (2003: 123).

Yet, the crisis erupted in 1934 as de Martel established monopoly decrees over the manufacture and trade of tobacco. With the introduction of the decrees *No. 275/LR* (1934) and *No. 16/N.R* (1935) the French companies established a cartel on tobacco production. The Maronite Church, that owned a great deal of land for tobacco production, was the first to criticize the French for the improper use of mandatory principles (El-Solh, 2004: 17). The most notable result of these decrees was the joint

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resistance of both Christian and Muslim tobacco producers under the leadership of Patriarch Arida. The resistance to monopoly was a turning point in the policies of the church, whose previous policies was based on an ethicized religious national identity that placed protection of the Christian's (mainly Maronite) rights and privileges at the centre. Whatever the initial intentions had been, for the first time the Maronite patriarchy had the support of the Sunni notables (Firro, 2003: 135-136). What is more, what had started as an economic power struggle turned into local patriotism as Arida began to base his claims on economic independence.

Moreover, the patriarch was also supported by the Syrian nationalists, who consider his approach as anti-mandatory, and anti-French. Besides, the Arab nationalists' attitudes towards *Grand Liban* were also changing in the 1930s. The new generation of Arab nationalists was adopting a more cross-sectarian outlook, while emphasizing ethnicity in their nationalism narrations (Solh, 1992: 155-156). Hence, Arida started to support the Syrian-Lebanese relations in return. On September 1935, in a meeting with the leaders of Syrian National Bloc[21], Arida declared that both Syria and Lebanon were historically unified entities. He stated that "Lebanon and Syria, indeed, [are] communities bound by language, manners, traditions, [and] economic interests. This is why it is difficult to establish an absolute separation in between"[22] (Firro, 2003: 128). However, his concern with the Syrian question was far from unification with Syria, instead he adopted an approach similar to that of Michel Chiha, which requires alliance between the Christian and Muslim populations. Yet, he placed the Church at the top of this alliance as the leading institution.

On the basis of this new approach Arida began to support al-Khuri and his unionist policies (Firro, 2003: 39). Hence, it is possible to claim while the years of Ponsot was marked with the rivalry between Eddé and al-Khuri, de Martel's reign turned out to be a struggle for power between the French High Commissionaire and the

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[21] The organization was created in 1928 in order to lead the struggle against the French Mandate

[22] « Liban et Syrie nt, en effet, liés par la communauté de langue, de moeurs, de traditions, d'intérêts économiques. C'est pourquoi il est difficile d'établir entre eux une séparation absolue ».

Maronite Patriarch, in which once again the Church emerged as the deceive factor in the Lebanese political organization and the national identity building. As a result of this struggle in 1936 elections while Arida supported al-Khuri and his anti-mandate policies, de Martel supported Emile Eddé, and helped him to be elected as president on January 30, 1936 (El-Solh, 2004: 18). Nevertheless, even though Eddé came to power, this new anti-colonial, unionist approach of al-Khuri determined the course of the Lebanese decolonization and state-making by manipulating the conditions emerged during the Second World War.

4.3 Change of International Power Balance: The Path to the National Pact (1940-1943)

In addition to the domestic changes, the late 1930s and the early 1940s were marked with changes in international arena. Hence, in order to strengthen the loyalties to the mandatory regime French and British began to propose treaties of alliance to their Levantine and Mesopotamian mandates, due to the rising threat of Germany. While British signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty with the Iraqi administration (1930), French endorsed Franco-Syrian (1936) and Franco-Lebanese (1936) treaties with her two Levantine mandates. These treaties were significant from the Syrian and Lebanese nationalists' point of view since directly (as in the Franco-Syrian Treaty of Independence) or tacitly (Franco-Lebanese Treaty of Friendship and Alliance) they guarantee the independence of the two countries in near future. However, with the start of the Second World War, these agreements lost their connotation for the French that the High Commissionaire abolished the constitutional rule for the second time in 1939 by declaring state of emergency (El-Solh, 2004: 42-46; Firro, 2003: 146-147; Winslow, 1996: 70-71)

The changing dynamics and power relations during the Second World War affected the course of politics in the Levant, as well as, in the rest of the colonized world. While as the First World War symbolized the peak of colonialism and reconstruction of the political map of the non-European world , the Second World War indicated the

loosening of colonial bonds and change in the administrative map. In other words, not only the war resulted in a revolution in industrialized countries of the West with the substantial changes in economics, international relations and technology, but also led to a political revolution in their colonies (Lee, 1991: 7).

By 1939 the fate of the French Empire and her colonies was questionable. The France was under German attack and it was no longer an institutional reality (Thobie, et al., 1990: 311). On June 25, 1940 France and Germany signed an armistice, which opened the way for the occupation of three fifths of France's territory, leaving the rest in the south east to a new government established under the leadership of Philippe Pétain – aging First World War hero – (*Article II*[23]). Following these developments in the early 1940s the France was divided between the Vishy's constitutional legitimacy and the image of Pétain and the struggle for Free French (FF) and Général de Gaulle's – a nationalist general became the symbol of freedom during WWII – BBC broadcast of 18 June 1940. While the Vishy regime acted as a puppet government of the Nazi Germany, de Gaulle and his Free French Forces aimed to restore the dignity of the *L'État Français*. Yet, the struggle of FF started in the colonies (Gaunson, 1987: 1-2). Consequently, similar to the First World War, the Second World War marked another milestone in the history of colonial politics in France and the fate of Lebanese political structure.

The *Levant Question* and *Syrian Occupation* in the Second World War emerged as an extension to rising German sympathy in the Near East. The Levant crisis began with the pro-Nazi coup d'état in Iraq in April 8, 1941. As a result, in order to stop increasing German influence in the Levant; and prevent enemy penetration to the East, during the summer of 1941 the FF forced under Charles de Gaulle and British troops invaded Syria following a bloody battle that resulted in 4600 casualties on Allied side (Churchill, 1951: 327-331). After the siege of Syria and Lebanon, in order to secure the loyalties of the Levantines to FF, Général Catroux announced in June 8, 1941 that (Thobie, et al., 1990: 338):

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[23] *Anglo-French Joint Statement of Aims in Syria and Mesopotamia* (November, 8 1918), http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1918/syria.html [last accessed in 5 February 1996].

> From now on you will be sovereign and independent
> people. Your status of independence and soverignity
> shall be guaranteed with the treaty [treaties of 1936] that
> defines our reciprocal relations…Our mutual situation
> shall be the one of closely united allies in the pursuit of
> idea and common goals[24]

However, contrary to the promises made to Syria and Lebanon, later in 1941 the FF decided to continue French domination in Levant. Yet, de Gaulle's demands for the administration of these territories unconditionally, led to a predicament for the British. Similar to the crisis emerged from the difference in promises and expectations in the treaties and agreements made (Hussein-McMahon Correspondence vs. Sykes-Picot Agreement), a new crisis occurred due to conflict in Britain's independence promises to the Levantine states and the requirements of the Anglo-French alliance (Viorst, 1965: 65).

While the British accused French of being antipathetic to Arabs, and giving the Maronite Christians disportionate privileges at the expense of Muslims, the French claimed the British were making appeals to the Arab governments to reduce the French influence in the region, if not to replace it with their own (Gauson, 1987: 5-6). The accusations continued between the forces, yet, due to the state of urgency the British repeated stated that they had no secret agendas to threaten the position of France in her colonies. Consequently an agreement was signed between de Gaulle and British representative Lyttleton on July 24, 1941. Through this treaty the British recognized FF's diplomatic status in Levant. The agreement stated that (Thobie, et al., 1990: 338):

> We, the British, do not have any intention of infringing
> in any way the position of France…Free France and
> Great Britain have promised to each other independence
> to Syria and Lebanon. We gladly admit, once this stage
> was crossed […] the France shall have the dominant and

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[24] *« Vous serez donc désormais des peuples souverains et indépendants…votre status d'indépendance et de souveraineté sera garanti par un traité où seront en outre définis nos rapports réciproques. En attendant sa conclusion, notre situation mutuelle sera donc celle d'alliés étroitment unis dans la poursuite d'un idéal et de buts communs. »*

priviledged position among all other nations of Europe[25].

The relations with the FF and de Gaulle were deteriorated during the summer of 1943, due to reactions of the French administration to the results of the 1943 elections in Lebanon (November Crisis). The elections of 1943 turned into a power struggle between the Lebanese nationalists, France and Britain. Since as the earlier elections president were to be elected by the Chamber of Deputies (not by the general public), in order to secure the presidential seat and their position in Levant both British and the French held their own campaigns and tried to put pressure on the Lebanese deputies. Yet, it is possible to claim they both "cancelled each other out" (Zisser, 2000: 42-43). At the end, the French were defeated as none of their candidates were elected. However, the outcome cannot be labeled as a British victory either. Instead what happened was France's incapability of providing support from its traditional Lebanese allies; thus, allowing emergence of a local independent local power. As a result, it is possible to claim anti-colonialism was the triggering factor in the formation of the new nation and/or nationalism narration.

4.4 The National Pact and De-Scribing the Unified Lebanon (1943)

Despite the external power struggle, the 1943 elections were highly significant in terms of internal struggles within Lebanon. The elections were considered as the trademark for the establishment of a Lebanon of all communities. What's more, primary outcome of the elections was the establishment of the National Pact. The pact rather than a written agreement was an oral one indicating a consensus between two major communities, the Christians and the Muslims. It initially stressed on Christians' recognition of Lebanon's place in the Arab world, and Muslims' abjuring of unification with Syria ideals.

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[25] *« Nous, Britanniques, n'avons nullement l'intention d'empiéter d'aucune façon sur la position de la France [...] La France libre et la Grande-Bretagne ont l'une et l'autre promis l'indépendance à la Syrie et au Liban. Nous admettons volontiers qu'une fois cette étape franchie, et sans la remettre en cause, la France devra avoir une position dominate et privilédgiée parmi toutes les nations d'Europe. »*

Accordingly, both parties agreed that power allocation would be done on the basis of communal divisions; in which Maronite community considered to have seniority (according to 1932 census). In line with that the government would be structured on proportional basis that it would have six Christian and five Muslim members (Zisser, 2002: 233-234). Yet, another aspect stressed in the pact was the Arab character of the state (*wajh 'arabi*). In Riyad al-Sulh's words, the pact aimed to Arabize the Christians and Lebanize the Muslims (Attie, 2004: 9). However, this revision in identities was a product of both the encouragement of external actors, namely the Britain – who wanted to contain and diminish French political power in the Levant – and domestic political parties who were in search of alliances to destroy the colonial rule in the region.

According to these understandings the 1926 Constitution was revised. While Part Five (Provisions Relating to the Mandatory Power and the League of Nations) was abridged totally, the nature of the symbol of the new republic was redefined. The Article 1, which described Lebanon as "an independent and indivisible state" whose frontiers were defined as the "ones which are officially recognized by the Mandatory French Government and by the League of Nations", was replaced with the Article stating Lebanon as an "independent, indivisible, sovereign state" (The Lebanese Constitution, 1997: 225-226). Moreover, the new colors of the flag were determined as "three horizontal stripes, a white stripe between two red ones" where a cedar three occupies the centre of the flag (Article 5) (1997: 226).

Following these changes on November 9, 1943 the Article 95, which explained the *raison d'être* of the Mandate administration, was restated as a guideline for the abolitions of the (old) sectarianism. In the new article it is stated that:

> The Chamber of deputies that is elected on the basis of equality between Muslims and Christians shall take the appropriate measures to bring about the abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional plan. A National Committee shall be formed and shall be headed by the President of the chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister, leading political, intellectual, and social figures.

During the transitional phase:
(1) The sectarian groups shall be represented in a just and equitable manner in the formation of Cabinet.
(2) The principle of confessional representation in public service jobs, in the judiciary, in the military and security institutions, and in public and mixed agencies shall be cancelled in accordance with the requirements of national conciliation; they shall be replaced by the principle of expertise and competence. However, Grand One posts and their equivalents shall be excepted from this rule, and the posts shall be distributed equally between Christians and Muslims without reserving any particular job for any sectarian group but rather applying the principles of expertise and competence (1997: 259-260).

However, it is possible to claim, the National Pact rather than creating a totally new political structure, settled with reconstruction of the old structures. While the *de jure* sectarian discrimination of the common people before the law was abolished, the equality on the political domain continued to be defined over numerical ascendancy. In other words, while the pact granted social mobility to the citizens of the new nation-state in the social and economic domains, in the political domain sectarian classification and discrimination continued.

Additionally, despite the changes in the constitution aiming for granting rights to the Muslim subaltern, the pact and the government did fairly nothing for gendering the language of the constitution. Laur Mogheizel – one of the pioneers of women's rights in Lebanon – claims that the Lebanese laws and constitution had a gender-neutral language and does not specify the equality of economic, cultural, and/or social rights of men and women (Joseph, 2000: 126). Instead, it is possible to claim women not only utterly excluded in the formation of the citizenship myths through the establishment of a national jurisdiction; they were also ripped of their rights granted by the French and the Ottoman laws. While through introduction of Election Law of 1950 deprived of women from the right to vote (which were granted with 1934 decree), the prevailing citizenship laws of 1925 denied women from passing citizenship to their children and/or holding their citizenship (rights) once they married to a foreigner (contrary to 1925 Ottoman laws) (2000: 126-128).

In addition to, its all shortcomings as a civic nation-building symbol, the National Pact also cannot be considered as a modern phenomenon for being an oral agreement between the elite (*zu'ama*) of the society. In other words, one may label the pact as a top to bottom communal identity constitution emerged as a result of the power struggles generated between the two dominant European powers, and within the domestic elite. Nonetheless, through National Pact continuity with both Islamo-Arabic past and Christian-Phoenician heritage was provided. Hence, what Smith labeled as ethnic nationalism was revised and reinforced and a new origin myth heralding the unity of various sects was created. Yet, in the next chapter I will focus on the effects of this new imagining during the early years of the independent Lebanon over an analysis of the reign of al-Khuri and Chamoun.

CHAPTER 5

BIRTH OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE AND A SECTERIAN NATION:
THE REIGN OF BISHARA AL-KHURI & CAMILLE CHAMOUN
1943-1957

In the previous chapter I discussed the conditions generated with political, social and economic changes in the domestic and international arenas, and al-Khuri's emergence of the leader of the new Lebanon, along with the establishment of National Pact as the cement of the post-colonial identity. In this chapter I focus on al-Khuri and Chamoun periods in detail, in order to understand the (re)construction of the structure and the organization of the independent Lebanon as both state-making and nation-building processes. The chapter starts with a discussion on Lebanese imagining term of al-Khuri rule starting from the announcement of the National Pact in 1943 until the elections of 1947. Then, it discusses the resistance this imagining generated within the power balance among different social actors and focuses on the period started with the 1947 elections until the assassination of Riyad al-Sulh in 1951 and 1952 elections. Lastly, the section focuses on the effects of both the national pact and al-Khuri regime in national identity constitution.

The second part of the chapter focuses on Camille Chamoun period and aims to provide a discussion on how the absence of the nation-building project in the independent Lebanon resulted in (re)construction of colonial identities. Following a discussion on the changes in the Chamoun period in the social, political and economic domains, the chapter analyzes the revival of Christian nationalism starting from 1952. Then it covers the relationship between international, regional and domestic actors that resulted in an antagonistic power struggle by 1957. The chapter claims that even though colonialism of the 19th and the early 20th centuries were ceased to effect the policies and projects of the non-European world, a new form of colonialism emerged that controlled the political, social and economic practices of these regions.

5.1 Emergence of an Arab-Christian Nation: The Reign of Al-Khuri (1943-1952)

5.1.1 Reimagining Lebanon and Integration into the Arab World (1943-1947)

The famous dictum of Renan: "getting its history wrong is part of being a nation"[26] can be presented as the gist of Lebanese nation-building during and after the French mandate (Renan, 1882). Yet, following Ernest Renan and Benedict Anderson, one may label nation-building as a process of continuous self-actualization and forgetting (Renan, 1882; Anderson 1991: 204-205). Accordingly, nations remember and deliberately forget certain parts of its history while constituting of their social identity. What is more, the use of this cyclical memory took its pace in the construction of the myths of the nation in the Lebanese context. While the myth of origin and/or the cult of ancestor of the nation were imagined as essentially Christian and Phoenician during the mandate period, this imagining was corrected by the invented traditions of the new post-colonial state as a synthesis of the history of Arabness and Christianity, ethnicity and religion, in the early years of the new independent state.

What is more, within this cycle of remembering and forgetting, the state-making and nation-building in the early 1940s focused on securing of the loyalty to the already established state apparatus, rather than redefining the limits of national frontiers and content of ethno-religious categories. In other words, the aim of the new state was to provide continuity with the past, while creating a new social identity. In line with Hobsbawm's presuppositions Lebanese state sought loyalty of its members over the use of imaginary. As Hobsbawm claimed through this process,

> [b]oth "traditions" actually invented, constructed and formally instituted and those emerging in a less easily traceable manner with a brief and dateable period - a matter of a few years perhaps - and establishing themselves with great rapidity….seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1).

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[26] « l'erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la création d'une nation »

Yet, establishment of continuity with the past in the 1940s Lebanon began constitution of a new flag. The old flag of the mandate period with a cedar three on the French tricolor not only used as a tool for legitimization of the colonial rule, but also as a medium emphasizing the Phoenician- Christian cult of ancestors. Accordingly, while the cedar tree, which grew in that particular geography of the Mt. Lebanon, claimed as the symbol (witness of the past and the future) for its durability, the colors red, white and blue symbolized the Phoenician heritage. Among those while the red stood for the blood spilled for the *patrie*, white signified the snowy mountains of Mt. Lebanon; hence the historical homeland. On the other hand, blue represented the merchant character of the Phoenicians and their will to explore (Kaufman, 2004: 21). Nonetheless, this Phoenician trio invented by the colonial rule was replaced with a new trio, "three horizontal stripes, a white stripe between a red ones" where a cedar three occupies the centre of the flag (Article 5) (The Lebanese Constitution, 1997: 226), that excluded the Phoenician symbolism.

Moreover, the national flag as a symbol was simply a transformed old tradition, which was used to establish or legitimize institutions and social hierarchies of the French colonial rule, rather than being a purely 'new' tradition invented to provide social cohesion and collective identity. Even though the new flag eliminated the Phoenician blue, and the Lebanist cult of ancestors, it continued to emphasize the *patrie* and the historical homeland that were introduced by the French. What is more, the nation continued to use the same national anthem and as the previous chapter showed (almost) the same constitution.

Yet, following the National Pact there were not many institutional revisions in the state-making and nation-building processes. Hence, one may argue the primary goal of the new state was keeping the various (hostile) sects and communities together as in most of the newly independent states Third World states. However, the rationale of the new state can be attributed to emergence of a very hostile environment. With the weakening of French power, Lebanon was begun to be perceived as a prey – which needs to be absorbed within a greater Arab unity by many Syrian intellectuals and Hashemite dynasty. Therefore, the Lebanese diplomacy under al-Khuri became a

checks and balances system aiming integration to international and regional systems while keeping National Pact as an initiative (Zisser, 2000: 85-86).

Another task that the government stressed upon was the evacuation of all foreign forces while establishing friendly ties with France for to secure the future of Franco-Lebanese relations. Even though France proposed to sign various treaties with the al-Khuri after the November crisis in order to strengthen its position in the region, Khuri rejected all the offers for claiming to have pre-set conditions. In spite of that, French tried to pressure the government throughout 1944 by supporting Emile Eddé. Nonetheless, despite Maronite Church's cooperation, at the end of 1944 the relations between the two countries were in a deadlock and in 1945 violent demonstrations took place as French brought new troops to Beirut. Yet, in 1945 the evacuation of the French forces began and ended with departure of the last troops a year later (Zisser, 2000: 90-92).

As the state rescued herself from the last visible traces of colonial violence, starting from 1944 al-Khuri began to put more emphasis on Lebanese integration to the Arab world. Even though political unification with the Arab world was bound to a series of violent discussions, all ideological camps agreed on the necessity of the continuation of the economic relations with the Arab world (Owen, 1988: 28). In addition to the economic benefits, the integration was a necessity due to the ambiguous political position of Lebanon in the international arena. Since Lebanon's independence was not fully accepted in the international arena and the state was restrained between the hostile French colonialists and Syrian unionists, collaboration with the Arab Muslim neighbours considered as a must for the nation-in-making to be successful.

In order to secure the continuity of the state on October, 7 1944 al-Khuri signed Alexandria Protocol with six other major Arab states, agreeing to the establishment of a joint Arab organization. The immediate benefit of the protocol was recognition of the political status of the country. Accordingly, Lebanon was defined as an independent and sovereign state that the Article 4 stated that:

> The Arab States represented on the Preliminary
> Committee emphasize their respect of the independence
> and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present frontiers,
> which the governments of the above States have already
> recognized in consequence of Lebanon's adoption of an
> independent policy, which the Government of that
> country announced in its program of October 7, 1943,
> unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of
> Deputies[27]

Further, since the protocol required cooperation between the parties (Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt) on economic, cultural, social matters, along with the political issues, the new government aimed to please different segments of the society. However, while the French was suspicious of the protocol and considered it as a British scheme to expel French totally from the Levant and Middle East, three groups, Maronite Patriarchy, Eddéists and the Mediterraneanists, conducted the course of the domestic opposition (El-Solh, 2004: 251-253). As a result, the government was faced with harsh criticisms and resistance by the nationalist elite due to the articles related to the premises of organization of the union between the six states. The section (Article 1) that describes the goal of the union was the most problematic. Accordingly the aim of the protocol was defined as controlling:

> [T]he execution of the agreements which the above
> states will conclude; to hold periodic meetings which
> will strengthen the relations between those states; to
> coordinate their political plans so as to insure their
> cooperation, and protect their independence and
> sovereignty against every aggression by suitable means;
> and to supervise in a general way the affairs and
> interests of the Arab countries[28].

However, the ambiguity of the scope and limits of cooperation in the text led to the revival colonial dependency arguments. Maronite Patriarch Arida claimed that the protocol was a text (potentially) denying the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon since, rather than a Western/French rule, Lebanon was now put under the

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[27] *The Alexandria Protocol; October 7, 1944* http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/alex.htm [last accessed in 30 July 2007].

[28] Ibid.

restrictions of a different power (Arab union) (2004: 253-254). Following Arida's concerns, Eddéists and the Mediterraneanists, the two remaining two prominent groups that supported Christian nationalism also criticized the nature of the conference and the protocol. The membership discussions led to revival of the old Arabism vs. Christianism/Lebanism debates in Lebanon. In their view the union with Arab (Muslim) states reflected the will of the Sunni Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh and his scheme to replace the Christian face of the Republic (El-Solh, 2004: 255).

These debates sharpened a year later, as Lebanon joined to the League of Arab States [جامعة الدول العربية], founded by the other six states, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, on March, 22 1945. Similar to the protocol the league aimed coordination in economic, cultural, social affairs, and health affairs; and forbids member states from resorting to force against each other[29]. However, in order to prevent further agitation on half of the Christian nationalists, the Lebanese committee adopted a con-unionist, and anti-Islamist language during the discussions over the text of the league (El-Solh, 2004: 273-275).

The Lebanese draft for the pact based on preservation of the independence and sovereignty of the member states, idea of cooperation in the non-political fields; whereas, were utterly against the compulsory arbitration except in case of the disputes over the frontiers and the sovereignty of member states, domestic jurisdiction of a member state and issues related to the interests of foreign powers (2004: 269). Yet, despite the attitude of the Lebanese Commission, the nationalists continued their anti-unionist claims. One may argue, the failure of the government to suppress the anti-Arabism of the Christian nationalists lies on al-Khuri regime's too much reliance on the National Pact and a few national symbols to provide social cohesion and to legitimize their moderate rule. Rather than creation of new symbols and a new class to legitimize their power, they merely tried to replace seats of French bureaucrats in the institutions and organizations founded through colonial imagining.

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[29] *Pact of the League of Arab States, March 22, 1945* http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/arableag.htm [last accessed in 30 July 2007]

As a further point, the government also did not attempt to establish a national education system through which it could transmute the [new] ideology of the independent state. Majority of the schools remained under the missionaries. Even though the language of the state was defined as Arabic by the constitution (Article 11), due to lack of state schools the missionary schools continued to produce a bilingual elite educated in European/Western orientalist discourse, which further reinforce the heterogeneity within the Lebanese culture (Salem, 2003: 46). The other result of the lack of unified national education was the increasing vulnerability of the new State to the ideological movements dominated the rest of the Arab world in the 1940s and 1950s (i.e. Nasserism) (2003: 45). Therefore, it is possible to claim though there was a state-making process, there was no nation-building project in Lebanon during the reign of al-Khuri.

While international and regional affairs were made priority than domestic ones during the Khuri regime, internal issues and power struggles marked the course of domestic politics. To begin with, shortly after the November crisis of 1943, Khuri tried to discharge Emile Eddé the from the Chamber of Deputies only to be opposed (and prevented) by the French, as well as, the majority of Maronite leadership and the supporters of Lebanese independence including al-Khuri's Prime Minister Riyad al-Sulh (Zisser, 2000: 90-92). However, for to secure the survival of the government, in 1944 Eddé was discharged from the chamber.

Further, on April 1944 elections were held to fill the empty seats in the chamber. However, the elections brought a subtle power struggle between the government and local notables (especially in North Lebanon). While the government supported Wahib Taraya Ja'ja (supported by Sulh) and Nadra 'Isa al-Khuri (supported by the president), the other candidate Yusuf Karam was considered as an ally of Eddé. The elections turned into a battle of prestige for the government, as Karam increased his chances to be elected. Furthermore, the elections also became the battle ground for Anglo-French rivalry in the Levant.

Despite government's pressures for support, Karam was the victorious party – and his success considered as a symbol of anti-government movement. The day Karam

came to Beirut for to take his oath (April 27, 1944), a clash between Karam's supporters, the French soldiers and the Lebanese police resulted in death of a number of Lebanese. Yet, later the April 27 incident became an excuse for the arrest of Eddé supporters (Zisser, 2000: 110-113). Thus, one may conclude just like the French High Commissioners ruled Lebanon through discipline and control from 1920 until 1941, al-Khuri government continued to play the part of stern father in state-making.

5.1.2 New Power Struggles, Nationalism Narrations and Khuri's Second Term (1947-1951)

Following the expulsion of Eddé from the cabinet, the first elections of the independent Lebanon were held on May 25, 1947. One may argue the initiative behind the elections were to increase the government supporters in the Chamber of Deputies to guarantee reelection of Khuri to the seat of presidency (Goria, 1985: 29). The 1947 legislative elections were also interesting in their own accord. The rivalry between Camille Chamoun – a Maronite Christian member of al-Khuri's Constitutional Bloc – and al-Khuri along with Antun Sa'adah – leader of Syrian National Party known for his anti-Arabist and pro-Syrian policies –, Emile Eddé and finally Fawzi Qawuqji – former leader of Arab revolt in Palestine – marked the course of elections. Nevertheless, rather than foreign interference, government interference managed to bring out the results of elections; and al-Khuri was elected for the second time.

However, one may argue al-Khuri ruled Lebanon similar to the way the French did. Each cabinet seek its own political survival and depending of the circumstances were replaced with weaker ones. Yet, in his first six-years term Khuri achieved major success (especially in the international affairs area) and made most of the Sunni notables dependent on himself that he was able to be elected for a second term (Winslow, 1996: 93-97). Nevertheless, events in his second term and the charges of political and financial corruption laid the ground for decline in his power. Similar to Fanon's claims on absence of a national bourgeois in the underdeveloped world, the *zu'ama* slowed down the harmonious development of the nation (Fanon, 1968: 174-

176). Even though most of them were educated in European schools, and familiar with the modern European conceptualization of state and nation, the *zu'ama* kept their primeval religious, patriarchal, parochial attachments ,and rather than becoming a replica of European dynamic, educated, secular bourgeois, they turned into a greedy cast and the caricature of western (national) bourgeois.

Yet, as the case of election of Karam indicates, one may label the political structure in Lebanon during the reign of al-Khuri as an 'electoral patriarchy' or 'electoral feudalism' (Winslow, 1996: 87). Rather than an emphasis on democracy and equality of all, the elections became the playground for the traditional elements that the traditional *zu'ama* controlled every step of the political participation. Especially during the period between 1947 and 1952 corruption and nepotism became a major problem in political affairs. As a further point, the political corruption went hand-in-hand with economic corruption that the *zu'ama* tried to continue the privileges the primeval attachments would provided them.

On the other hand, since the new state did not aimed to establish a class loyal to its policies, some *zu'ama* revived pre-mandate nationalisms in the form of political parties. Among those, Kamal Jumblat and his National Socialist Front (NSF) emerged as a powerful opponent. Jumblat – a Druze leader who had close ties with French; and educated in French missionary schools – acted as the Lebanese Gandhi aiming to attach anti-sectarian character to the political structure of Lebanon through non-violent revolutionary politics (Goria, 1985: 31). In addition to NSF, Syrian Social National Party (SSNP) of Antun Saadeh came out as another powerful threat to al-Khuri's reign. Founded in 1932, the ideology of SSNP was organized around the ideal of *Grand Syrie* and supported unification of Syria and Lebanon (1985: 33). In order to change the government's Arabist tendencies in 1949 the party declared a revolution in Lebanon. However, with the help of the Syrian government Sa'ada was captured and executed shortly afterwards. Yet, following this incident the Khuri rule became more authoritarian that journalists and newspapers were under constant control and police were on alert for possible emergence of reformist ideas (Winslow, 1996: 97).

Another significant event that worsened the conditions created by the National Pact and *zuʿama*, was the war with Israel (1948). Lebanon – as a member of the Arab League – declared war on Israel a day after its declaration of independence in 1948. Even though due to its weak military power, Lebanon did not play a major role during the battle, the war resulted in further deepening the communal boundaries. Not only the loss shook the legitimacy of the government's international policies, but also did introduce a new ethnic category, Palestinian refugees, to the already complex Lebanese social structure. The only positive side the 1948 war brought was skilled and unskilled labor, the capital and companies that led economic prosperity in 1950s.

However, the aftermath of war was more problematic for the Lebanese political and social composition in the long-run as the increasing number of refugees threatened the balance between the Christian and the Muslim population. Yet, even though the number of refugees was very high, initially there were no open criticisms, except the protest of Maronite Archbishop Ignatus Mubarak. Nevertheless, in order to secure the sectarian power balance in the society, the Lebanese state dealt with refugees according to the premises of the Maronite-Sunni alliance of 1943. In order to secure the horizontally differentiated communal hierarchies, the state developed two interrelated policies. The refugees, almost all of whom were peasants, mainly prevented to settle in Lebanon and denied their integration to the economic domain. The refugee camps were the primary mediums of the containment of the refugee issue. The Muslims faced with strict discrimination. Especially the refugee camps established in southern Lebanon, occupied mainly by the Muslim poor, were in poor condition and Palestinians in the camps suffered severely (Sayigh, 1994: 23; Hudson, 1997: 248-249). As the Maronite hostility towards Palestinians increased al-Khuri reign failed to legitimize its actions.

As a final point, by the end of 1940s the governmental legitimacy was constantly threatened by the rival nationalist models, developed in the late 19th century. Since the National Pact itself was a pre-modern entity for being a contract between leaders rather than communities, the premises of the pact were valid as long as the two leaders established and maintained their hegemonic rule. Yet, when in 1951 Riyad

al-Sulh was assassinated by the SSNP in order to avenge the death of Saadeh, the pact and the ideology it represented quickly dissolved. Following Gellner, since there were no national bourgeois and/or a national high culture, the revised Lebanism of al-Khuri failed to construct a nation, and was replaced with a new Christian nationalism model, that rejected Muslim and Arab character of the Lebanon.

5.1.3 Phoenicia Revisited: The Effects of the National Pact and the al-Khuri rule (1943-1952)

Even though al-Khuri and al-Sulh aimed to make the boundaries between the Muslim and Christian communities more fluid by Arabizing the Christians and Lebanizing the Muslims, at the end of their 8 years of reign, the relationship between the two communities hardly changed (if not for the worse). For one thing the pact and its aftermath represented not only a domestic consensus on allocation of power, but also an agreement with Western and regional actors on the exercise of power. As the above discussions show, the checks and balances policy introduced by al-Khuri resulted in development in state-making rather than nation-building. As Attie claimed the pact presupposed an alliance between confessional elites; hence, did neither seek integration of communities together nor establishment of a common national identity (Attie, 2004: 27).

Nonetheless, following the consociationalism discussions of the scholars such as Lijphart and Hudson one may argue the practice of pact was successful in terms of modern state-making. Lebanon, whose political, economic and social structures were organized by a cartel of elites not only mimic a western structure, but also established its own unique model through acting on the basis of the principles of consociational system[30]. Al-Khuri (and the later Chamoun) rule made maintenance of stability, avoidance of violence, and survival of power sharing institutions the primary goal within a system where rival religious subcultures competed for

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[30] In Lijphart's conceptualization the stability of the system depends on six factors in which the leaders and/or the elite is the key figure: (1) distinct lines of cleavage, (2) a multiple balance of power, (3) an external threat, (4) moderate level of nationalism, (5) popular attitude seeking a grand coalition, (6) relatively few load on the decision making apparatus (Lipjhart, 1968: 25-30).

institutional and political power. Hence, the Lebanese political organization starting from 1943 until the civil war of 1975 can be labeled "a system capable of structural modernization" (Hudson, 1966: 174) modeled after the political systems of Scandinavian and Low Countries (such as Switzerland, Austria and Belgium) (Lijphart, 1969: 207).

On the other hand, it is also possible to claim the lack of a common identification ground, the idea of being a nation, generated challenges in establishment of stability and consensus in the society. Even though failed to (re)construct a high culture, following Geller and Hobsbawm one may claim, the state in Lebanon did indeed determine the conditions for emergence of nationalism since the late 19th century (Gellner, 1983: 55; Hobsbawm, 1990: 10, 44-45). However, rather than nationalism engendering a nation, the nationalism led to re-production of the state, leading to a continuous antagonistic power struggle for social identity.

Nonetheless, in order to legitimize the pact and the confessional system, starting from the mid-1940s, Phoenicia and Phoenicianism began to be (re)emphasized in the high culture of the new state. It is possible to claim, the textual and/or ideological reproduction of the ideology during this period mainly conducted over the works of Michael Chiha. Through his speeches and essays Chiha laid the ground for maintaining and legitimizing the ideological cohesion "formed by the financial-mercantile oligarchy and old landed interests" (Hartman & Olseretti, 2003: 42)

Accordingly, nation was depicted as product of a unity of will rather than a result of shared language and religion (2003: 48). Lebanon was presented as a carbon-copy of Phoenicia[31]; hence, a haven for minorities and an economic dream for its citizens. While the organization of the constitution along with the premises of consociational representation labeled as a necessity to provide cohesion within the multi-sectarian community, the *laissez-affair* system and low taxation presented as the natural result of being essentially a merchant republic (2003: 49-52). Additionally, all these actions

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[31] In his essay, On Freedom, Chiha described Lebanon as "[A] maritime republic is always a merchant republic—the laws of geography and history want it this way. *In such a republic, it is just that the merchants, inspired by the highest kind of public-spiritedness, know their rights and duties better. They also should be more closely tied to public life and the making of laws, and feature in the Council of State in a more respectable and effective way*." (Hartman & Olseretti, 2003: 45)

were legitimized over the discourse of destiny. In addition to the « *la diversite´est notre destin* » ideal, the cult of ancestors was further helped to maintain and legitimize the acts of government through the myths of historical and geographical continuity with the golden age of the Phoenician (Lebanese) civilization (Firro, 2004: 22). In his speeches right after the declaration of independence Chiha defined the independent Lebanon as:

> In relation to the extent of our territory, *the Lebanon of today* is practically the same as the original Lebanon-Phoenicia. . . . The range of the Lebanese mountains is our backbone, both literally and figuratively, it runs parallel to the sea and the chain of cities by the sea (2003: 44).

As a result of the increasing emphasis on the myth of origin and perceived threat of the 'Muslim Other' by the Maronites a new cartel of elites took over the power following 1952 elections. Yet, in the following chapter I will discuss the nature of change in national identity constitution of the state from 1952 till 1957, and provide the factors behind emergence of a reverse nation-building during the reign of Camille Chamoun.

5.2 Reclaiming Colonial Identity: Reimagining Christian Lebanon (1952-1957)

5.2.1 Revival of Christian Nationalism (1952)

Even though Camille Chamoun began to turn into the symbol of opposition starting from 1949, it was only after the assassination of al-Sulh (1951) and al-Khuri's loss of power, he could assume presidency. In 1952 as a result of the support of the British and the majority of Muslim deputies, he was elected as the second president of the independent Lebanon; and served as president until 1958 (Attie, 2004: 46). Hence, the political rule of the country was legitimized with the alliance between the external and domestic actors, as in the decade earlier. As a Maronite Christian *zu'ama*, he was also educated in the missionary schools and worked in the colonial institutions. Yet, even though he was a member of al-Khury's Constitutional Bloc

and worked as a minister in a number of his governments, Chamoun broke with al-Khuri following the 1947 elections, to protest the illegal modifications of the constitution to reelect al-Khuri for a second term (Wilson, 1997: 97).

Despite the criticisms, the presidency of Chamoun can be labeled as a continuity of the economic and political projects of the al-Khuri regime and turned Lebanon into the 'Switzerland of the Middle East'. Yet, the 12 years (1946-1958) of the two presidencies was characterized with two paradoxical developments. While on the one hand a cartel of elites, with a rural and urban commercial background, held the political power in their hands and continuously clashed in between at the expense of the collapse of the public order, on the other hands the public presented support for the sectarian differentiation revised with the 1943 National Pact and supported the consociational democracy. Every step of the new bureaucracy was elitist and venal; yet, welcomed with the alliance between the sects (Harris, 1996: 137).

What is more, one may argue Chamoun began to rule the country in an authoritarian way, similar to al-Khuri. As he faced with hostility of the upper-class, who wanted to maintain the privileges of the old social order, he asserted radical the institutional and the symbolic revisions to secure his political power. The first changes during the Chamoun presidency started in the parliament. During the previous decade the electoral map was dominated by the al-Khuri supporters as a result of the vote-buying tactics emerged during the colonial rule. The established alliances with the rural *zu'ama,* and making of the 'gand lists' for candidates resulted in establishment of a presidential patronage (1996: 138). Hence, in order to break the pre-modern attachments of the parliament, Chamoun made revisions in the electoral system and increased the seats of the deputies.

Nonetheless, it is possible to claim what Chamoun did indeed was again replacement of the old actors with new ones at the expense of the balance brought by National Pact (1996: 141). The aim was to prevent influential leaders of the sects, such as Kamal Jumblat (Druze), Ahmad al-Asa'ad and Sa'ib Salam (Muslim), to determine the seats of the parliament in favor of a certain community, in order to maintain the bureaucratic stability. However, Muslim Community especially the Sunnis felt

alienated by his effort to undermine the authority of the premiership. Hence, the rule of Chamoun can also be labeled as the violation of the National Pact of 1943.

The dissatisfaction on behalf of the Muslim community became visible as a pamphlet was published by the Mu'tamar al-Hay'at al-Islamiyya al-Da'im by the Sunni community in 1953. Accordingly, 13 main articles were defined, out of which two of them dealt with economic dissatisfaction of the community, to show the unequal distribution of rights between Muslims and Christians and biased (symbolic) construction of Lebanon as a Christian nation. The dissatisfaction with the nationality law, incomplete census results and resistance to conduct new census, lack of revision in the textbooks, representation of country as a Christian state by the Tourism Office, and lack of Islamic representation in the National Museum were the main arguments presented in the pamphlet (Attie, 2004: 55-56). Even though the pamphlet did not gain much support from the leaders of the Muslim community, the criticisms increased gradually. The gap between the two communities broadened in the trial of the writer Georges Ibrahim Shaker, who allegedly insulted Islam in his works. Yet, the events in the celebration of Prophet's Birthday in 1954 were the peak of Sunni frustration with the regime and Chamoun was accused of deliberately weakening the Muslim political power (2004: 57).

Despite the political and social dissatisfaction with the rule, the presidency of Chamoun was not criticized on the basis of the economic policies. Although Khuri was the one that established the ties with Arab countries, it was Chamoun whose reign was benefited from those, and turned the country into the 'merchant republic' ideal. He signed trade agreements with Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Egypt in 1953; and put special emphasis on tourism as a source of revenue (2004: 53). As a result of increasing economic prosperity with the liberal economic policies, "[T]he state began to reap the benefits of its public services, including water, electricity, railroads, tramways, and others" (Salem, 2003: 60). Not only the dominant position of the Christians in the economic domain was reinforced, and power of the merchants and the Christian bankers were increased in shaping the economic policies, but also the country as the cradle of Phoenician civilization, became an economic narration as well.

On the other hand, despite these discriminatory changes in the institutional structure of the country, the literary narratives of the nation remained non-problematic and hopeful. The Lebanon continued to be imagined through the writings of Gibran and Chiha in the 1950s (Salem, 2003: 57). Similar to Gibran's and Chiha's invention of Lebanon a Phoenician/Merchant republic, Chamoun invented the state as Phoenician-Christian. In addition to political and social construction of Lebanon, as a Christian state whose roots could be found in the antiquity, the new state (along with her nation) was economically imagined as a Phoenician entity. However, all this imagining led only the criticism of construction of myth of origin over Phoenicia, but also criticism of economy. Chamoun criticized for putting priority on physical infrastructure projects and visible construction of the Lebanese identity rather than providing expenditure on public development projects, such as education and job creation, even though there were huge amount of revenues (Attie, 2004: 53).

Yet, the hostilities towards the Chamoun rule was stimulated as the Baghdad Pact of February 1955 signed. Even though Lebanon was not one of the parties of the pact, it generated a number of criticisms and discussions related to the identity of the Lebanese nation and state. While in the 1940s it was the Christian Maronites were threatened with implications of the protocols of the Arab League, in the 1950s Sunni and Shiite population felt defenseless as a result of the increasing foreign intervention (namely US) and rising emphasis on Christianity at the expense of the balance created with the National Pact (1943).

Additionally, spreading ideology of Nasserism in the region further reinforced the will for Arab nationalism among the Muslim members of the state to secure their survival. In addition to the domestic disputes, a further problem Chamoun faced with between 1955 and 1957 was the increasing polarization of the Western and regional powers. While on the one hand Cold War politics of US and USSR was threatening the regional alliances, the emerging Arab nationalism of Nasser of Egypt was challenging the legitimacy of the power of Chamoun.

5.2.2 Emergence of Neocolonial Circumstances and a Society on the Verge of Civil War (1955-1957)

One may argue, even though in 1943 the Lebanese political entity claimed independence and disattachment from the colonial system, colonialism as a system managed to control Lebanese political, economic, and social policies by transforming itself with the changing historico-political and economic conditions of the world politics. This new system of colonialism (neocolonialism), which can be labeled as "the worst form of imperialism" in Kwame Nkrumah[32]'s words not only challenged the already fragile structure of Lebanon but the whole Third World.

The threat the neocolonialism set was driving from the fact that unlike the (old-fashioned) colonialism, the imperial actors could exercise power without justifying the actions it was taking abroad. What is more, since there is no visible opponent in this new system, there is no visible opposition (at home) that could act as a shelter for the oppressed (Nkrumah, 1965: xi). In line with that view, the previous forces, France and Britain was replaced with new powers in the Middle East region. While before the First World War neither US nor USSR was a factor in Middle East, following the end of Second World War both countries emerged as the new exploiters in the world politics, especially on issues of oil, integrity of Middle East and competition for global power.

Yet, following the Suez war of 1956, the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was introduced by the US to protect the Middle East from Soviet encroachment, Lebanese nation-building as a project ceased to operate as the survival of the state became the priority. Moreover, since the state was operating on sectarian basis, keeping the Muslim community within the already established hierarchy and containment of the radical Arab nationalism of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser were the another objectives. Hence, it is possible to argue the Lebanon of 1950s verifies Smith's thesis that label Third World nation-building as deficiencies. Due to the complex multi-communal, multi-sectarian nature, Lebanese political entity prioritized keeping various *ethnies* together (Smith, 1986: 232). With that aim

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[32] The first post-independence president of Ghana

in mind when the polarization began, Chamoun did not take sides and stayed neutral. Yet, he was generally criticized as pro-Westernist by the Sunnies in the period after 1956, and accused of failing to diminish effects of Nasserism/Arab nationalism by the Western powers (namely the USA) (Wilson, 1997: 105).

As mentioned above the polarization began in 1955 with the Bagdad Pact. The US government, in an effort to surround the ideological expansion of USSR with military alliances, created the pact, which was sighed with Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Britain. Nonetheless, as a reaction to increasing US hegemony in the region, a new forum for radical Arab nationalism occurred, and led by Abdel Nasser, who had come to power in Egypt in 1952. As Nasser refused to join any Western alliance, and established a counter 'positive' alliance with Saudi Arabia and Syria (Arab Tripartite Pact), his achievements in dealing with the West aroused great enthusiasm both in Egypt and throughout the region (Attie, 2004: 70).

In 1955 Nasser further challenged the hegemony of the Western powers by an arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia, leaving an open door for USSR to intervene Middle Eastern politics (2004: 87). Yet, the crisis emerged in 1956 as Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company as a response to Anglo-British rejection to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam. Following the fears for losing the control of the canal England and France, allying with Israel, started military action against Egypt. However, at the end of 1957 Nasser emerged as a victorious side and began to symbolize earlier hopes and aspirations of creating an Arab nation devoid of Western control.

Within this complex power struggle between regional and international actors, Chamoun's policy related to these developments were continuum of the checks and balances system created in the al-Khuri period. Despite all the privileges the Christians were gaining throughout the presidency of Chamoun can be labeled as an Arabist, at least in the foreign policy. Especially early in the 1950s, he earned the support of the Arab (Muslim) population for his efforts on recognition of Arab states, such as Kuwait, in the international arena. He saw himself as a mediator between the international superpowers and the Arabs (2004: 77-78).

However, the public opinion within the country was also divided. While the majority of the Christian population was in favor of continuum of relations with the West, the Muslims wanted the government to support the Egyptian campaign of Nasser. The intermediary role of Chamoun failed as the Prime Minister Abdullah al-Yafi and Minister Saeb Salam boycotted the foreign policy of Lebanon, which was rejected by the Muslim population, and reined from their government posts. These resignations became the symbols for the spread of Nasserism in Lebanon. While the two figures led the anti-Chamoun campaigns in 1957, following the Suez crisis Nasser himself called the (Muslim) Arab population to replace Chamoun. A further factor that reinforced the division between the communities was making of a pro-American, anti-Arabist, anti-communist Christian Charles Malik the minister of foreign affairs. As a result of these developments and increasing antagonism between the Muslims and the Christians, Chamoun shifted his alliances to US, which in the end resulted in outbreak of a civil war and US intervention in 1958 (2004: 104-106).

Nevertheless, the failure of Chamoun's presidency can be attributed to the factors that resulted in decay of al-Khuri regime. To begin with, there were no common consensus between different the communities, and all decisions were taken by a cartel of elites. What is more, these elites were the products of the old colonial system, hence lacked the necessary economic, social and symbolic capital to legitimize the power of the state and create a unified nationalism ideology that would eventually establish its own nation. Not only had the elites of different sects clashed but also elites of the same communities. Hence, following Fanon it is possible to claim these elites constituted the great danger to the unity of state; hence, the unity of nation.

Further, even though Chamoun tried to broke the power of the old *zu'ama*, the process was simply replacement of these men with new ones sharing the same high culture of the old colonial classes. The only difference between the parliament in al-Khuri period and the parliament in Chamoun era was the weakening of the Muslim and Druze power. While the position of figures such as Kamal Jumblat (Druze), Ahmad al-Asa'ad and Sa'ib Salam (Muslim) systematically were weakened, Charles Malik, a Maronite Christian known for his anti-Arabism and anti-communism

supported by the Western powers – was made the prime minister (Attie, 2004: 106-108). It is possible to argue the colonial system that made Dabbas and Eddé president made Malik minister in order to secure the position of Lebanon as an allied country. After a decade of independence, the Lebanese political structure failed to generate its own *intelligentsia* once again.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Following these observations, this thesis emerged out of the dissatisfaction with the existing literature on nation-building, along with state-making in the Third World, which relates the emergence of nation-states in these regions to Europe and its expansion. Even though European states, namely France and Britain, provided the primary models for formation of the modern states and nations in regions like Middle East, Far East and Latin America, one cannot treat these developments as mere consumption of western models and concepts. Instead this work claims that both the grand systems such as colonialism, imperialism and modernism, and idiosyncrasy of the domestic communities helped to materialize the nature, organization and scope of nation-building and state-making in the non-Western territories.

This study focuses on the particular case of the Middle East instead of conceptualizing Middle Eastern nationalism over European concepts and historicity, this thesis claims that Third World nations and states cannot be considered as essentially deficient categories. Unlike the literature that challenged the two processes of nation-building and state-making with cultural essentialism (religion, particularly Islam), historical discontinuity (the effects of the First World War and/or the Second World War) and patrimonialism (tribalism, oriental despotism), this study aimed to explore the effects of these idiosyncratic characteristics on nation-building and state-making. Throughout the chapters, it is emphasized that the state-making and nation-building were joint products of indigenous characteristics and external systems, rather than the direct products of Western encounter. Hence, as opposed to being a vertical (top to bottom) process, where the western political structure defined the eastern state and nation, it was a construction that took place at a horizontal level.

In order to discuss how this horizontal construction took place, this study focuses on the particularity of Lebanon and covers the articulation of modern identity categories

(ethnicity) into the traditional, pre-modern communal identities defined over religion over a historical analysis starting from the Ottoman era till the break of the first civilwar in 1958, with a particular emphasis on the transformations that took place between 1920 and 1957. The study discussed the transformation of the *millet* system that was established by the Ottoman Empire into a nation system in the modern sense. Among many historical breaking points that were discussed in the previous chapters, one may argue four of them (1860 civil war, 1926 beginning of the constitutional period, 1943 National Pact, 1952 beginning of the reign of Chamoun) had more effects on this transformation than the others. While the 1860 civil war helped to establish nationalist ideologies in the region, through the beginning of the constitutional period (1926) the Lebanese community became a more rigidly differentiated sectarian society. Even though with 1943 National Pact a consensus tried to be achieved, following the election of Camille Chamoun the Lebanon returned to rigid sectarianism of the constitutional period; hence, failed to establish a modern, unified nation.

Moreover, the overview of the Lebanese political history shows us that Lebanese basic political characteristics were a combination of territorially differentiated pluralistic society merged with patriarchalism, parochialism, tribalism and sectarian differentialism, which were directly influenced by international and regional power struggles. Yet, even though those characteristics of Lebanon prevented her from establishing a nation-state and forming a nation in the modern European sense, as chapter 2 reveals these basic characteristics were not essential categories, but were the result of colonialism as a system, rather than a particular type of colonialism (French colonialism).

The *millet* (nation) system, which was integrated to the region by the Ottoman colonialism, established the core of the religious communal identities in the region. However, as the Ottoman administration threatened the survival of the primordial attachments and the already established communal identities; and European imperialism made its way to the economic, political and social domain of the region in the late 19th century, four nation-building models and four lines of nationalism came to light, three of which were placing the Christian identity at the centre of the

prospective nation. Unlike the millets, these nation models equated religious identification and *ethnie* either by ethnicizing religious identification (Phoenicianism and Mediterrainianism) or attaching religious connotations to the already defined ethnic categories (Muslim Arabism and Christian Arabism).

On the other hand, even though all those four categories of nationalism were created as a joint result of domestic, regional and international actors and systems, colonialism, namely French colonialism, was the one that determined the victorious within the struggle for domination over the state-making and nation-building processes. Hence, it is possible to claim the case of Lebanon verifies the assumptions of the literature related to the link between historical (dis)continuity and nation-building. Rather than a evolutionary pattern, the nation-building and state-making processes followed an artificial route, in which the requirements and the boundaries were (pre)determined by the guardians (Europe and Ottoman Empire). While the Ottomans invented the traditions to determine the communal boundaries that were later claimed and defended by the local communities, the Europeans (namely the French) determined the nature and scope of the relationships between these invented communities.

As the chapter 3 indicates the French colonial rule was the factor behind the formation of modern institutions and imagining of the new 'modern' state according the premises of the French state-making and nation-building after the revolution of 1789. Nonetheless, it is not possible to label Western colonialism as a productive, positive feature as the literature claims. Even though the French started her imperial polices along with her desire to transform into a great power and spread her civilization into the non-European world, this *mission civilisatrice*, merged with divide and rule colonial policy, created a state of many nations as opposed to the discourse of nationalism that claim a single state with a single nation.

The discussions covered in the chapters 4 and 5, points out that although a modern 'nation' state, which borrowed the institutions and symbols of the Western culture, was created in comparison to the administration based on the *millets* of the Ottoman reign, it remained a caricature of her European equivalents. Both nepotism and

patriarchalism remained to determine course of politics and economics not only in the Mandate, but also in the post-colonial Lebanon. However, the thesis suggests that this failed nation-state making was the result of the destructive policies of the colonial rule rather than the outcomes of essential categories in the region. That is to say, unlike the cultural essentialism of the literature that doomed Middle East to failure, the case of Lebanon indicated that France and the organization she brought and imagining she made were the primary reasons behind the failed modernization of Lebanon.

Nevertheless, despite the failed nation-state building, the Lebanese political structure managed to create a form of modern state structure as a result of nationalism. In other words, nationalism rather than creating a nation in the European sense materialized a multi-communal consociationalist state as an unintended consequence of colonialism. The thesis proves that the French colonial state-making and nation construction were based on the *divide et impera* policy; and aimed to contain the threatening groups and ideologies through nations. Therefore, even though by 1958 Lebanon was started to be labeled as the 'Switzerland of the Middle East', one cannot claim the confessional state emerged as a result of the institutional structure and the classes that were created by the colonial rule to legitimize Lebanese nation and state. On the other hand, it is still possible to conclude, the idiosyncratic character of Lebanon, similar to many other Middle Eastern states, could lead to establishment of modern socio-political structures. Even though the modernity of these structures is different than the modernity of their European counterparts, they still indicate a modern structure. Hence, one cannot claim there is one path for modernity (European way) and all the remaining are deviant cases.

In relation to these the thesis also claims that the failure to establish a nation was due to the lack of the social class to transform religious identities articulated with ethnicity into a nation. The *intelligentsia* of Lebanon followed the characteristics of the native bourgeois of the colonized nations, and sought to secure their own interests. As a further point, these 12 years confirms Smith's presuppositions that due to its multi-communal, multi-ethnic character, the state apparatus aimed to contain these various hostile groups together. Yet, neither during the presidency of al-Khuri

nor of Chamoun had the state aimed to create its own nation. However, this struggle for keeping *ethnies* together was a result of incapacity of the state to create a unified class loyal to her cause.

As a final point, this thesis claims that the nation-building in Lebanon as a social identity construction was a power relationship between different domestic, regional and international actors, and systems. Hence, the state cannot be placed at the centre of the discussions. Consequently, borrowing from Laclau, it is possible to define nation-building in Lebanon as "an act of power and that identity [it generates] as such [is] power" (Laclau, 1990: 31). The study shows us that both the nation-building and state-making processes were produced due to the struggles between and within religious sects (Maronite vs. Sunni/Druze, Lebanist vs. Arabist, Eddists vs. supporters of al-Khuri), between institutions (Maronite Church vs. French High Commissionaire, and/or Maronite Church vs. Lebanese diaspora communities, and/or French High Commissionaire vs. Lebanese parliament) and countries (Ottoman Empire vs. France and France vs. Britain).

As a further point, although these power struggles resulted in establishment of Lebanon as the 'Switzerland of the Middle East' in the first half of the 20th century, they were the products of contingent social relations and identities. To begin with, the establishment of the consociational and/or confessional state was an 'accident', since it was not the aim of the state-making and nation-building projects in the first place, but also part of the 'essence' of the Lebanese social structure, which rooted in the *millet* system. Similarly, it is not possible to fix relations and/or identities of neither Christians nor Muslims of Lebanon with any precision. As mentioned in the introduction, both the boundaries between religious and ethnic identity are fluid. Therefore, identities of both the Lebanists and (Muslim) Arabists were/are a combination of 'essence' and 'accident'. It is not possible to predict how far the Maronite Church or Khalil Gibran would label themselves as a Phoenician without Renan's *Mission de Phénicie (1864-1874)*, or what would happen to identity construction if there were no historical discontinuity in the Lebanese historico-political structure.

Lastly, as the communal identities in Lebanon were constructed/produced as a result of power struggles, formation of a unified, homogenous nation presents a dilemma. Borrowing from Laclau if one accepts that "power is a prerequisite of any identity" then it is possible to conclude "the radical disappearance of power would amount to the disintegration of social fabric" (Laclau, 1990: 33). In other words establishment of a unified, harmonious society without power struggle, in the Lebanese context a homogenous nation, is an impasse, since the very essence of the Lebanese socio-political structure based on hierarchies of the relational identities.

The contingency of social relations and the ineradicability of power relations in Lebanese historico-political and economic domains resulted in radical transformation of the Lebanese society. Even though that the transformation until the civil war of 1958 was not that radical, by 1975 the struggle for power and dominance for national identity resulted in drastic changes in the identity debates of the 'nation'. As a result, the discussions on whether or not Lebanon was successful in the construction of nation, is irrelevant since the very process of nation-building was organized as such to make maintaining nation impossible. Finally, this impossibility was also a result of external intervention; in the sense that, it was the Western colonial rule that put together different social groups whose identity was hostile to each other.

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