

**AN UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF MODERNIZATION IN TURKEY:
NATIONALIST REACTIONS FROM ITS PERIPHERY**

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ABSTRACT

AN UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF MODERNIZATION IN TURKEY: NATIONALIST REACTIONS FROM ITS PERIPHERY

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This dissertation studies the impact of a nation-state oriented modernization project on the socio-political and economic structure of the Kurdish speaking areas in Turkey with specific reference to center-periphery relations. The primary objective of this study is to document and analyze strategies and practices that have been introduced by the center to transform the Kurdish speaking periphery and integrate it with the Turkish nation-state. It also analyses the impacts of this process on the periphery alongside the latter's responses to them. The analysis focuses on the application of the modernization project in three different fields: namely the economic, political and educational spheres. For this purpose the history of modern Turkey is divided into three periods. The first period covers the years from the foundation of the Turkish Republic until transition to the multi-party political system, that is, from 1923 to 1950. The second period is between 1950 and 1980. The post 1980 period is the third period.

Key Words: Turkey, Modernization, Kurds, Center, Periphery.

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DE MODERNLEŞMENİN HEDEFLENMEMİŞ BİR SONUCU: TÜRKİYE’NİN ÇEVRESİNDEN MİLLİYETÇİ TEPKİLER

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Bu tez Türkiyede ulus-devlet yönelimli modernleşme projesinin nüfusunun çoğunluğunu Kürtçe konuşulan bölgelerin sosyo-politik ve ekonomik yapısı üzerindeki etkilerini merkez-çevre ilişkileri bağlamında tartışmaktadır. Çalışmanın esas amacı merkezin Kürtçe konuşan çevreyi dönüştürmek ve Türk ulus devletine entegre etmek amacıyla takip ettiği politika ve stratejileri belgelemek ve incelemektir. aynı zamanda bu durumun çevrenin sosyo-politik ve ekonomik yapısı üzerindeki etkileri ve çevrenin verdiği tepkiler ile de ilgilenmektedir. Bu çalışma modernleşme projesinin siyaset ekonomi ve eğitim alanlarındaki uygulamalara odaklanmaktadır. Bu amaçla modern Türkiye tarihi üç alt döneme ayrılmaktadır. İlk dönem cumhuriyetin ilan edildiği 1923 yılından çok partili siyasal sisteme geçildiği 1950 yılına kadar olan yılları kapsamaktadır. İkinci dönem 1950-1980 arasını, son dönem ise 1980 sonrasını kapsamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Modernleşme, Kürt, Merkez, Çevre,

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation studies the impact of a nation-state oriented modernization project on the socio-political and economic structure of the Kurdish populated areas in Turkey with specific reference to center-periphery relations. Its primary objective is to document and analyze strategies and practices that have been introduced by the center to transform the periphery and integrate it with the newly constituted Turkish society. In a broader context, this dissertation is concerned with the problem of national integration facing most of the contemporary new states. As argued by some scholars (Coleman and Rosberg, 1964; and Liddle, 1970), the problem of national integration has two major dimensions: (i) the political or horizontal dimension involves a meshing together of disparate social groups, which diverge in terms of kinship, ethnicity, linguistic, religious and racial backgrounds, within the framework of national loyalties and institutions; and (ii) the territorial or vertical dimension involves the closing of the cultural and political gap between an urban, western-educated, nationalist political elite on the one hand and the masses of the largely traditional and rural population on the other.

In the context of this dissertation, the principal questions that will be addressed with regard to the center can be summarized as follows: How has the center dealt with the integration and transformation of the Kurdish populated periphery? What kinds of strategies have been introduced in order to attain national integration? To what extent have the various strategies of

integration and transformation been successful? How did this process come to an end? Within this framework, this study also aims to elaborate on the responses given by the periphery, where the Kurdish population constitutes the majority. Questions taken up with regard to the periphery include: How has the periphery reacted? What kinds of strategies have been developed by the periphery against the modernization project of the center? The analyses will be focused on the application of the Turkish modernization project in three different fields: namely the economic, educational and political spheres. The global patterns will also be taken into consideration, thereby discussing the above-summarized questions in a broader political and historical context.

The main argument of this study is that, for a variety of reasons to be enumerated below, the Turkish modernization project evolved in a direction quite different than what the modernizing elites had intended with regard to the Kurdish populated parts of the periphery. The first reason for this unexpected result can be identified in the approaches and methods that have been followed by the Turkish state elites. The arrangements that have been carried out as a part of nation-state building relied heavily on imposing regulations. These arrangements, as Paul Stirling (1981: 15) pointed out, were not only enacted, they were also enforced in due time. The reformation agenda of modernizing elites was markedly elitist and authoritarian due to their desire to maintain the separation of society and the state. Indeed, as Edward Shils (1960: 281) has documented, this tendency to embrace such a separation is built into almost all newly established states:

In almost every aspect of their social structures, the societies on which the new states must be based are characterized by a 'gap'. It is the gap between the few, very rich and the mass of the poor, between the educated and uneducated, between the townsman

and the villager, between the cosmopolitan or national and the local, between the modern and the traditional, between the rulers and ruled. It is the “gap” between a small group of active, aspiring, relatively well-off, educated and influential persons in the big towns and an inert or indifferent impoverished, uneducated and relatively powerless peasantry.

The social origins of the Turkish modernizing elites, the majority of whom belonged to the military and civil bureaucracy, deepened this gap. Thus, they believed not only in the distinction between the state and society that attributed priority to the former, but also in the imposition of regulations from above in an attempt to force the transformation into a nation-state.

A second explanation for the divergent course of Turkish modernization was the attitudes accounted for in the implementation of the reforms. The modernizing elites did not consider the ethno-linguistic composition of the region when applying these regulations. Therefore, though the modernizing elites did not appear to reject the existence of the Kurds, they tended to believe that the Kurds are Turks who have forgotten their origin and therefore strived to assimilate them into Turkishness. As result of this perception, Turkification and assimilation strategies have been introduced extensively, particularly in the linguistic and cultural spheres. For example, the use of Kurdish was prohibited, geographical names were Turkified, and the giving of Kurdish names to children was banned. Similarly, political organizations, which insisted on the Kurdish identity and demanded the recognition of cultural rights, were forbidden. Furthermore, there were interventions, which aimed to rearrange demographic composition. Such prohibitive practices were actually inflicted upon all ethnic and religious groups, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, and thus

were not exclusively applied to the Kurds.¹ However, the Kurds have offered the strongest and most long-lasting resistance to these policies. To some extent, this study also aims to understand this unrelenting Kurdish resistance within its social and historical context.

Partly due to the above-mentioned reasons, the modernization process in Turkey resulted in developments that may be referred to as *unintended consequences* in that they were quite contrary to the aim of the modernizing elites. These unintended consequences include the perpetuation of the role of the traditional local notables at the social, economic and political levels; the maintenance of primordial group affiliations, the so-called tribal networks and kinship ties, as a significant aspect of social life; and, finally, the emergence of a new form of collective self-imagination that, while not necessarily making the old forms of imaginations redundant, reduced their significance at the local level. In short, pre-modern social formations have not only resisted the modernization project but also have reproduced themselves through modern instruments and developed counter-surviving strategies. Before discussing the implementation of the modernization project specifically in the Kurdish populated periphery and its unintended consequences, I will first summarize and discuss the arguments of the different approaches to the modernization of Turkey.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The literature that attempts to examine the modernization process in Turkey is quite substantial. Here I will focus solely on the three major approaches, each

¹The best example at hand is Jews who, in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne, officially have the status of a minority and legally are entitled to exercise their minority rights.

of which discusses the issue of Turkish modernization from a different perspective, namely the dependency school, the modernization approach, and the center-periphery model.

The *dependency school* (Keyder, 1981, 1987a, 1996) understands this process in light of economic and global dynamics, conceptualizing Turkey's modernization as the result of the expansion of the capitalist world market and Turkey's attempt to become part of this market. Although this approach provides valuable arguments and draws a broad, encompassing picture of the process, it overlooks the internal social dynamics.

The *modernization approach*, which posits continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, attributes a vital role to the impact of the West. According to Bernard Lewis (1968), the pioneer figure of this approach, the Turkish revolution began, in the formal sense, with the forcible overthrow of the old political order and the establishment of a new one in 1908. In another respect, however, it has been going on for nearly two centuries. This approach, which assumes a hierarchy between the West and the rest of the world, tends to attribute a primary role to the modernizing impact of the West. While beneficial in its consideration of external factors, this approach also invites significant criticism. First, the assumed philosophical premise regarding the progress of history is problematic. The modernization approach ascribes a linear development to the history of societies. Due partly to this perception, historical development has been conceptualized in an evolutionist framework. Second, this approach tends to exaggerate the role and the impact of the West on the historical development of non-western societies. Lastly, it ignores the role of conflict in societal development.

The final theoretical framework that one needs to consider with regard to the modernization process in Turkey has been provided by Şerif Mardin (1973, 1991, 2002). Mardin attempts to analyze the emergence of modern Turkey from the point of transformation of state-society relations. For this purpose, Mardin focuses on the relationship between the center and the periphery and the shifting nature of that interaction. He thereby attributes a prominent role to state elites in general and the civil and military bureaucratic elites in particular. In fact the modernization of the bureaucratic elites constitutes an outstanding aspect of the Mardin's analysis. Thus, he tends to demonstrate the continuity between the Ottoman and the Republican periods of modernization process.

Though Mardin's approach provides strong arguments and a detailed sociological analysis of the modernization of Ottoman-Turkish society, it has some shortcomings that need to be attended to. First, this approach is so center-centered that it pays little attention to the periphery. Accordingly, it tends to establish the relationship between the center and the periphery as one-dimensional and over-determined by the center. As a result, Mardin does not deal with the peripheral strategies of resistance toward the center. Moreover, the Mardinian analysis takes the periphery as a homogeneous entity, a monolithic actor, and disregards its internal dynamics. Finally, Mardin also reduces and oversimplifies the periphery, understanding them only in the context of a religious-traditional categorization.

At the theoretical level, this dissertation aims to contribute both to the discussions on the conceptualization of center-periphery relations and the arguments that aim to examine Turkish political history with specific reference to that conceptual framework. First of all, neither the center nor the periphery is

a fixed entity. Both are dynamic and have their own rules. The relation between them is not one-dimensional, that is, it is not determined solely by the center. On the contrary, they influence each other in complex ways. Though there is a tension between them, this does not mean that conflict or struggle always determines the interaction between the center and the periphery. Thus, the relationship might be better described as a pendulum swing.² In other words, a hegemonic struggle for the direction of the pendulum determines the confrontation between the center and the periphery.

This study has benefited from the arguments of the approaches outlined above in different respects. However, the analysis here will be mainly based on the view that the modernization process in Turkey was primarily a nation-state oriented project led by the civil and military bureaucratic elite. Accordingly, the central goal was to abolish the old social and political structure and to build a modern society. To achieve this aim, various reforms were carried out which were initiated by imposing regulations as part of the social engineering project. The modernizing elites devoted a significant part of their energies to the restructuring and integration of predominantly Kurdish populated areas to the society at large. This was due not only to the rising resistance that resulted in a series of rebellions during the early Republican period, but also because of the persistence of the traditional social structure in the region.

Thus, in addition to the nation-wide reforms, a series of specific arrangements aimed at reshaping the socio-political structure of the region and

² By emphasizing this point, I do not mean to overlook the power inequalities between the center and the periphery. In other words, my intention is not to imply a power struggle between equals. One must acknowledge that the center is always more powerful in terms of its institutional and instrumental capabilities with regards to the periphery. However, the periphery also develops resistance and survival strategies aiming to swing the pendulum to its advantage.

integrating it with the newly constituted society were also put into practice. Such arrangements were varied and closely connected with the center's perception of the region, including, for example, the deportation of local notables and powerful families to the western parts of Turkey and the establishment of an unusual regional form of administration, which was conducted by officials appointed by the center. In like manner, the majority of the region's parliamentarians were not originally from their respective constituent areas. Rather than aiming to dissolve the traditional-feudal socio-political structure and pave the way for a structural transformation, the primary objective behind these regulations was to provide further centralization and to strengthen the power of the state in the region. These policies and practices of the state towards the region suggest that in the eyes of modernizing elites major structural transformations could only be brought about by imposing regulations and revolution from above.

Time Period Categorization

As indicated above, this study aims to discuss the impact of nation-state oriented modernization process on the socio-political and economic structure of the Kurdish populated periphery in Turkey. Since the modernization process had disparate ramifications during different periods, I have divided the history of the Turkish Republic into three periods. It should be noted, however, that these period categorizations are neither arbitrary nor absolute. Moreover, the basic patterns of one period can also be observed in another one. Nonetheless, as discussed further below, there are some peculiarities of each period that justify the proposed divisions. The first period spans the years between 1923 and 1950 and will be discussed paying particular attention to the policies of the

single party ruling during this time, the Republican People's Party (RPP). The second period covers the years between 1950 and 1980. The last period deals with the developments that occurred after 1980.

Radical Modernization Period: 1923-1950

The first period can be described as the radical phase of modernization. The main priorities in this period were to establish a nation-state and construct a new collective-national identity and reforms were carried out accordingly. The instruments and institutions employed to achieve this aim were primarily authoritarian, centrist and elitist. The political and institutional tendencies characterizing this period derived from the social origins of the modernizing elites on the one hand, and the modernizing elites' conception of what was problematic on the other. As Mardin argues (1991 and 2002) the modernization of Ottoman Turkish society, above all, is the modernization of bureaucracy and the bureaucratic elites, which indicates the prominent role played by such civil and military elites in this process. As a result, the objective was usually either to save or to reinforce the strength of the state. The individual, or to put it in more general terms, the society was always considered to be of secondary importance when compared with the state. Since the tradition of saving the state was the dominant motive, the Turkish nation-builders inevitably sought to reconstruct the state through regulations and arrangements. Overall, the modernizing elites handled the problems associated with modernization primarily as matters of security, law and order, and thereby employed authoritarian instruments and institutions. This situation paved the way for the emergence of strong reactions from the periphery, which the literature on center-periphery relations in Turkey tends to define as a homogeneous entity.

Throughout this period, we observe that strong centrist-elitist policies determine the nation building as well as state building process with the centralization and consolidation of state power being the primary object. This bent toward the state emerges in a number of spheres. The economy, for example, was entirely dependent upon etatist policies. The administrative system both at the local and national level was likewise determined by the center and centrally appointed governors were endowed with unusually more power than those in other administrative institutions. The political sphere was also completely under the control of the center in that the methods of both political participation and representation at the regional level were decided by the central elites. As a result, a two-round electoral system that heavily relied on centrally controlled constituents was applied and even the nominees were appointed by the center.

New Solutions for an Old Question: 1950-1980

It is possible to argue that the post-World War II period witnessed a dramatic shift in the modern history of Turkey. The economic and political developments that took place soon after the World War II resulted in the emergence of a bipolar world, which played a prominent role in this process. Turkey adamantly avoided being a part of this political polarization of the pre-war period and pursued an equilibrium policy in the international arena. Later, however, Turkey leaned in favor of capitalist-western-democratic alliances and accordingly joined first the UN and NATO and later other Western international organizations. Although Turkey had not entered the war, she was included in the Marshall Plan and, in line with this plan, Turkey became de facto a part of the West, meaning that she could no longer make social and economic

decisions single-handedly. This development was not unforeseen but, on the contrary, was to be expected given the ideological and political preferences of the state elites, who had always equated modernization with westernization and aspired to integrate with the western world. Besides these global developments, domestic developments such as the emergence of regional popular social discontents stemming from the authoritarian policies of single party and the requirements of the economic structure also played a crucial role in this process.

These developments resulted in a dramatic transformation of both the political and economic structures. The political system that had depended on one-party rule was replaced by a multi-party political system, which characterizes a competitive participatory democracy. The strong centrist-elitist political culture, which brought about restrictions and prevented the *peripheries* from participation in political life, was now replaced by a more populist political atmosphere that allowed for the involvement of different interest groups in the political arena.

Due to the significance of this change in the political sphere and its important ramifications, this study will also consider the impact of the multi-party political system on the socio-political structure that was prevalent in the region, making specific reference to the key arguments in the literature about Turkey's political modernization. As pointed out by Leder (1979: 82), the literature on political modernization argues that the transition to a competitive multi-party political system paves the way for the emergence of two contradictory developments concerning the regional political structures. First, the competition between political parties at the local level strengthens the

authority of the traditional elite and supports the traditional order that sustains them (Huntington, 1968: 444). Moreover, according to some scholars, political parties may become the instruments of the local elites who are concerned with resisting the efforts of other groups to participate in the political process (La Palombara and Weiner, 1966: 435). The second prominent result of the transition to a multi-party political system is that it opens up channels of participation in political life and political mobilization. As Rudolf and Rudolf argue (1967), the competitive political system facilitates political participation and the mobilization of different social groups.

Analogous to the arguments put forth by the literature on political modernization above, the following political-institutional developments may be considered anticipated outcomes of the transition to multi-party system during the post-WWII period in Turkey. First, the constitution of 1961, when compared with the previous 1924 constitution, introduced social, political and civil rights which were more democratic and recognized the freedom of organization in the social, political and economic realms as a part of the political system.

A transformation in the economic structure can also be observed. The economic policies shifted from a state-promoted development model to an import substitution industrialization model. The primary goal was to integrate Turkey with the capitalist world system and the endorsed method at the time for achieving such an objective was planned development and particularly national developmentalism. As Atilla Eralp argues

The issue of development has always occupied a significant place in the Turkish political agenda. Ever since the establishment of the republic, development has been defined as the principle objective towards which the whole society would strive to work (Eralp, 1990: 219).

The changing paradigms of the center, then, influenced the application of the modernization program in the periphery. The most observable result of this situation was the return of the traditional local notables to the social and political life.

Unintended Consequences: 1980 and Its Aftermath

During this period, two contradictory developments took place at the global level, which influenced both the policies pursued by the center and the responses of the periphery. First of all, many nationalist movements appeared in different parts of the world, both those oriented toward the nation-state and those with other foci. The decline of Soviet style socialism accelerated this development. Second, transnational organizations also emerged in this period challenging the existence of these emerging nationalist movements and forcing the nation-states to redefine their functions. The most powerful and influential of these transnational organizations was the European Union (EU) and Turkey's attempt to enter it constituted one of the most important developments on the domestic front at this time.

The interventions of the US-led international powers in Iraq and the resulting developments should also be mentioned here. After the military intervention, Iraq became divided into three parts. The north of Iraq was left to the control of the Kurds, who constitute the majority in this area, and they proceeded to build a federative government there. This development is significant in two respects: First, this situation fostered the spread of nationalist sentiments among the Kurds of Turkey. Second, the Turkish state became more sensitive about its Kurdish population and the Kurdish question. This

sensitivity stemmed not only from the possible nationalist threats but also from various security concerns as separatist Kurdish nationalist movements found support in North Iraq.

Global developments aside, the distinctive characteristic of the period after 1980 is Turkey's attempt to attain full integration with the West. Indeed, similar attempts have always constituted a prominent component of the political agenda of the state elites in Turkey. However, the internal and external developments that occurred during this period further accelerated such attempts. The effort to enter the EU, as mentioned above, constitutes the most important of these attempts. Nevertheless, Turkey's efforts to enter the EU paved the way for the emergence of a paradigmatic contradiction as the process of integration and its demands for the implementation of political reforms highlighted a dilemma within the Turkish modernization project. As a nation-state oriented project, Turkish modernization was based on the one-state one-nation principle. However, westernization was also a goal and, indeed, paradoxically served as the basis for the modernization and state-building project. With the attempted integration with the EU, therefore, the tension between these two goals surfaced. The demands of the EU for the recognition of the minority rights and for establishing a multicultural democracy challenged the basic political foundation of the Turkish modernization project, that is, "one-nation one-state." Further aggravating this dilemma was the fear that the recognition of cultural rights would lead to the development of nationalist consciousness among different ethnic groups in Turkey, groups which the Turkish state aimed to assimilate into Turkishness.

After the 1980s, these developments began to evolve in a new direction due to outstanding changes in the social, economic and political spheres. Turkey's economic development was impressive and rapid industrialization resulted in major changes in the economic structure. To begin with, agriculture-based production was replaced with industry and, for the first time, industrial production exceeded agricultural production. The contribution of industrial production to the GNP has been remarkable. Moreover, the mechanization of agriculture has reached a very significant level. Demographic mobility, which resulted in urbanization, was another important development. An essential change also took place in mass education. Education facilities not only for primary and secondary levels but also for higher levels increased allowing larger numbers of people access to education, though opportunities to receive higher education remained limited. The literacy rate also increased considerably from 67 percent to 87 percent, between 1980 and 2000 (DIE, 2003).

The developments that occurred in the area of communication were particularly notable. After the privatization of TV and radio in the early 1990s, the conventional mass media not only diversified but also became more accessible. The availability of satellite-based broadcasts and Internet access provided diverse sources of information. The rise of the mass media was followed by a proliferation and a mass scale dissemination of Kurdish cultural products. Especially after 1991, when the restriction on the non-official languages was lifted, the number of books, magazines, journals, newspapers, music CDs and cassettes literally skyrocketed. Furthermore, the development of information technologies and mass media constituted a challenge to the

nation-state and its cultural and geographical borders on the one hand, and introduced new opportunities for the citizens on the other. The number and sorts of publications were not only increased but also varied. The improvement in the transportation technologies that accelerated geographical mobility should also be mentioned here.

Lastly, during this period and for the first time in Turkish political history, pro-Kurdish political parties also emerged. Although it is still prohibited by law to establish ethnic, religious or class-based political parties in Turkey, some Kurdish groups established a number of political parties without any open reference to their Kurdish identity. These parties played a prominent role in the politicization of the masses in general resulting in the spread of nationalist sentiments among the Kurdish community. The developments and circumstances outlined above determined both the policies pursued by the center and the responses of the periphery. A sharp rupture occurred in the strategies followed by the center as was signified by a statement made by the prime minister at that time, Süleyman Demirel: "We (the Republic of Turkey) recognize the Kurdish reality." This marked the beginning of a new era where the state elites began to deal with the region in a significantly different way. The most important result of this statement, in my view, was that the official elites distinguished the Kurdish problem from 'terrorism' as such by emphasizing its economic, cultural, social and political dimensions.

Despite this change in discourse, however, the traditional policies and strategies that aimed to transform and integrate the region into Turkishness remained active for a long time, along with the introduction of several new policies and strategies, which will be discussed below. Although the usual

instruments and institutions specific to the previous periods were employed throughout this period as well, several 'unusual' administrative institutions of the first period were also revived. Additionally, deportation and re-settlement strategies were put in practice. However, while during the first period the center aimed to utilize these strategies to assimilate the population, after the 1980s, the center strove through these policies to bring security and order to the region. Furthermore, these policies also endeavored to achieve economic integration between the region and other parts of Turkey.

The peculiarity of this period is that, not only were the long-lasting authoritarian strategies and the denial of the ethno-political dimension of the Kurdish issue abandoned, but the cultural rights of the Kurds were also recognized officially. In other words, the state began to promote the cultural and linguistic rights that had been restricted for a long time.

One needs, however, to emphasize that, during this period, neither has the semi-feudal-traditional social structure of the region been dissolved entirely, nor have the tribal-kinship ties lost their significance. It is even possible to claim that the old form of social structure, the so-called semi-feudal social system, has resisted and reproduced itself via modern instruments. Compared with 30 or 40 years earlier, the traditional elites in the region are more or less still playing their traditional roles in the social, economic and political spheres. The religious leaders, for example, still have followers (*mürîd*) and continue to exercise influence over the masses. Yet another example is the continuation of honor killings, which is an indicator of a patriarchal society.

In other words, there are several characteristics that still mark the region as traditional. These include the followings: the agricultural-rural economy

continues to shape the mode of production and production relations; social and economic inequalities are still very sharp; a fair wealth distribution has not been insured; religion has not been removed from the public sphere to the private one; traditional gender roles continue to exist as does discrimination against women; and, lastly, the communitarian social culture has not been replaced by an individualistic one.

Moreover, the region is still characterized by a high infant mortality rate, a high birth rate and with the lowest rate of literacy compared to the national figures (the tables will be provided in the relevant chapters). In short, based on the measurable indices of modernization, the region still qualifies as underdeveloped; in many respects it still is predominantly rural and far from the level of development of modern societies described by most social scientists. However, a gradual change resulting in dramatic consequences can also be observed in the region, as will be discussed in related chapters. Undoubtedly, this process cannot be compared with the one that Marx eloquently describes which occurred at the end of the eighteenth century in Europe. However, keeping the social history of the region in mind, I think that it may be compared to the structural transformation that appeared in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Particular attention should be given to the post-1980 developments since this period marks the beginning of some considerable changes in the social, economic and political life of the region. The most outstanding development of this period is the *transformation of the self-imagination* of the members of the Kurdish community and the consequent re-construction of the collective identity. Primordial group affiliations, tribal ties and kinship networks

are still the sources of the construction and definition of the collective identity. Similarly, the old social divisions and cleavages also continue to survive in the region in various ways and at various levels. Yet, despite the fact that both the primordial components of identity and the pre-modern forms of social divisions are still the key determinants of daily social interactions at the local level, the Kurds also articulate a more abstract form of collective imagination that surpass tribal differences and unite the Kurds under the umbrella of an ethnic identity, a significant modification.

Secondly, *the politicization of the masses* in the greatest number in the history of the region is another important development that characterizes the post-1980 period. By politicization of the masses, I mean the high level of participation in the local as well as national elections, expanding membership rosters for political parties and increasing participation in demonstrations. Regardless of the motivations behind these developments and regardless of what they required, a significant number of the local populations have become more politicized than they were ever before.

Thus, both the transformation of the self-imagination of the Kurds in the region and particularly the political mobilization of the masses indicate significant developments that characterized the post-1980 period. This period may be referred to as a time characterized by the “reemergence of Kurdish nationalism.” This contemporary Kurdish nationalism is based on a different dynamic than the Kurdish nationalism spanning the years 1880 to 1950. Traces of Kurdish nationalism go back to the late 19th century (Bruinnesen, 1992; Olson, 1992; Jwaideh, 1999). We also know that the nationalist ideas influenced many rebellions that took place in the early years of the Republic

(Bruinessen, 1992; McDowall, 2004). However, the Kurdish nationalism revived after the 1980s differs from the previous one both in respect to its leaders and its reach. While the earlier Kurdish nationalism was predominantly led by traditional local elites, this new nationalism has been led by elites educated at universities and located in urban centers. Moreover, this new nationalism is region-wide and goes far beyond the traditional social cleavages and primordial group attachments.

The above-mentioned developments bring us to the question of the role played by the Kurdish elites in the revival of Kurdish nationalism that took place after the 1980s. These contemporary developments must be elaborated in relation to the role of the Kurdish elites that began to emerge in the 1960s and the 1970s. The majority of these Kurdish elites belonged to the middle and upper classes or were members of influential families. What made them different from the elites of the previous eras was their political agenda. Influenced by Marxist ideologies, this new group of elites believed in the transformation of the old social structures. In this sense, they were like the Kemalists who believed that the traditional society could and should be transformed from above.

The Organization and General Argument of the Chapters

This dissertation is composed of five chapters including the present introductory one. The following second chapter will examine the main arguments of three different approaches on the modernization of Turkey.

Chapter Three will deal with the period from 1920 to 1950, but particularly with the period of the single party regime. This period is mainly characterized by the attempts to build a nation-state and to construct a national

identity. First, I will discuss the basic characteristics of the nation-state oriented modernization project. Then, I will examine the application of this project in the region. Lastly, I will elaborate on the responses and reactions given by the periphery to the politics and policies of the center.

The transition to a multi-party political life was a turning point in the history of modern Turkey in many respects. Chapter Four will discuss the following questions: How did the transition to a multi-party political system affect the state policies of integration and transformation toward the Kurdish populated periphery? What kinds of strategies were introduced? Were there any significant continuities and discontinuities between the first and second periods? To address these questions, first the global and domestic circumstances that determined the policies carried out during this period will be examined. Then, the political agenda of the central elites will be discussed. Last, this chapter will also analyze the peripheral strategies cultivated in the region in response to these developments.

Chapter Five focuses on the developments that occurred in the period from 1980 to today. This chapter also aims to discuss the impact of global circumstances-developments on the internal arrangements regarding the Kurdish question.

The Scope of Study

This study covers thirteen provinces, namely; Ağrı, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli, Urfa and Van.³ Several criteria were taken into consideration for the selection of these provinces. The

³ Although Şırnak and Batman became provinces in 1990, their populations were also predominantly Kurds by mother tongue.

first and by far the most important criterion was the mother tongue as stated by individuals themselves in the national censuses conducted between 1935 and 1965. In all national censuses, including the 1980 census, there was a question about the mother tongue. However, while the results of the first eight censuses were announced while the last three remain unpublished. According to the published results of the censuses, more than fifty percent of the population in the cities listed above is Kurdish as evidenced by their mother tongue. Urfa, among them, is an exception. Although the Kurdish-speaking population in Urfa is less than fifty percent, the Kurds constitute the largest group within the total population based on the linguistic classification.

Besides the linguistic criteria, two other criteria were also taken into consideration in the selection of the cities in the region. The first one concerns the administrative system. All these provinces, without exception, have been ruled at least once via a special form of government such as the Inspectorate General and the OHAL. The second criterion is the distribution of the votes in the national elections by the political parties. The pro-Kurdish political parties (such as DEP, HEP, HADEP, DEHAP) received the highest percentage of the votes in the last three general and local elections in all of the provinces listed above.

The Source of Data

The analysis developed in this study is based on various sources. The first one includes printed documents such as books and journal articles as well as unpublished studies. The data provided by the Statistics Institute of Turkey on education, population, urbanization, migration and agriculture constitutes the second group of sources. The evaluations and discussions concerning the

background of the deputies are drawn from the Turkish Grand National Assembly's records. These records are based on a biographical questionnaire, which was distributed by the General Secretariat when new members joined the Assembly. The government programs constitute another source of data of this study. I also benefited from the development plans prepared by the State Planning Institute. The results of the general elections that were held between 1950 and 2002 were also taken into consideration.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL APPROACHES ON THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY

2.1. Introduction

Modernization and westernization attempts in Turkey have persisted over the last two centuries, constituting the central axis around which the social and political history of the country has turned. This process of modernization, which started with the goal of saving the state or making it stronger, carries on until today, having experienced a number of both continuities and ruptures over the course of its long history. There is a huge body of literature devoted to a discussion of this process, a thorough assessment of which is neither possible nor within the scope of this study. Instead, in order to provide a theoretical perspective for the discussions in this study, I will evaluate the basic arguments of three different approaches to the modernization/westernization of Turkey: the modernization theory, the dependency school, and the center-periphery approach. I will furthermore take up the specific arguments of these three approaches regarding the relations between the center and the Kurdish-populated regions in Turkey. Finally, I will elaborate on how the discussions in this study can benefit from these three perspectives.

2.2. Modernization Theory: Revolution from Above

It is possible to argue that the modernization of Turkey began to receive special academic attention and interest in the late 1950s. The first studies that came out in this period were formed in the ideological and political environment of the cold war era. The approach which initially gained popularity, the “modernization theory”, classifies societies as traditional or modern, underdeveloped or developed and argues that societies are progressing in an irreversible linear line from the traditional towards the modern. Inspired by the Hegelian philosophy of teleological history, this approach supposes a categorical difference between the West/occident and the rest of the world. Presenting the West as an ideal prototype, this approach supposes that the societies outside of the West would modernize along the same Western-modeled trajectory of progress.

There are many studies that attempt to discuss the modernization of Turkey in the conceptual framework of the modernization theory (Lewis, 1968; Frey, 1965; Dodd, 1979; Özbudun, 1970 and 1976; Tachau, 1980), with two main versions of the theory emerging in such studies. First, there are studies which suggest discussing the Turkish Republic’s modernization/westernization as a continuity of the process that began with the Ottoman Empire, while others argue a complete rupture thesis. In this study, I will follow the arguments of the first view, though I acknowledge that it does have many problems. I believe that any social phenomenon or historical event can only be understood in a social-historical context. Therefore, from now on, whenever I refer to the “modernization approach,” I mean that theory which assumes an historical continuity. A brief survey of the ramifications of this theory when applied to

Turkey follows, considering first how it views the establishment of the Turkish nation-state, second its assumptions regarding the changes in the traditional societal structure, third its perceptions of the West and the impact of this perception on the modernization process, and finally, ending with a consideration of the way this theory conceptualizes the Kurdish-populated periphery.

The continuity version of the modernization theory posits the establishment of the Turkish nation-state both as a result and continuation of the historical process dating back to the 18th century⁴. Bernard Lewis, the most popular figure of this approach, expounds on this by stating that

The Turkish revolution began, in the formal sense, with the forcible overthrow of an old political order and the establishment of a new one in 1908. In another sense, however, it has been going on for nearly two centuries (Lewis, 1968: 480).

Thus, according to this approach we must view the Turkish nation-state as the final phase of the modernization/westernization process which has been going on for about 200 years. Thereby, the development of the Turkish state did not constitute a sudden change in direction, but rather was the result of long years of reform. "The basic change in Turkey -from an Islamic empire to a national Turkish state, from a medieval theocracy to a constitutional republic, from a bureaucratic feudalism to a modern capitalist economy- was accomplished over a long period, by a successive reformers and radicals" (Lewis, 1968: 481).

The modernization theory, assuming a top-down approach to modernity, also contends that there is a lack of essential transformation of the traditional

⁴ Bernard Lewis (1968: 486) states, with a little exaggeration, that the westernization of the Turks has a history of 1000 years. "The essential change attempted by Turks in their revolution was one of Westernization, another step in the westward march of the Turkish people began 1,000 years ago, when they renounced China and turned to Islam."

structure in Turkey despite the modernizing reforms. Rather, the change was simply based on the westernization of the society by the bureaucratic elites through a revolution-from-above, with no fundamental change in the power and property relations in society. Özbudun (1976: 43) puts it aptly “The Kemalist conception of modernization involved mainly the adoption of western political and cultural institutions, with no radical change in the existing social structure”. In this process, the modernizing elites needed the assistance of the representative notables of the feudal structure, and did not hesitate to collaborate with the tribal and feudal notables. According to Özbudun

Thus, an implicit tradeoff materialized between the two groups (military bureaucratic elite and local nobility). The local nobility supported the modernization program of the national military-bureaucratic elite, in return for which it was allowed to retain its land, status and local influence, as evidenced in the conspicuous absence of any real land reform under the republican governments” (Özbudun, 1970: 389).

This recognition of the continuing traditional structure and the way said structure was utilized by the elites will be especially important for the purposes of this study, as will be expounded on below.

Thirdly, according to this framework, the West has a dual connotation: first, as an ideal model, and second, as a rival. The aim of the first wave of modernization reforms, which emerged at end of the 18th century, was mainly to save and strengthen the state by taking the West as a model. Yet, in this effort, the West was ironically also perceived as a rival. For that reason, the first main reforms were largely in the military sphere (Lewis, 1968; Frey, 1964). These initial reforms were followed by the Tanzimat period, when more extensive reforms were initiated, the main goal of which was also to strengthen the state against the West in the military, economic, and political spheres. With

the waning of the Empire and the diffusion of the western ideas, the scope of the reforms was expanded: "Liberal, patriotic, and even revolutionary ideas infected the Turkish students and cadets, diplomats and military attaches, who came to explore the secrets of the mysterious Occident; in time these ideas find their way to Turkey, where they gave new impetus and a new direction to the young officers and officials, and led to the successive constitutional and popular movements of 1876, 1908, and 1920" (Lewis, 1968: 481). The *Tanzimat* reforms and then the transition to constitutional regime were prominent stages in the modernization/westernization of Ottoman-Turkish society. However, the primary goal was to find an answer to the question, "*Bu devlet nasil kurtarilabilir?*" (How can this state be saved?) (Lewis, 1968: 212).

Finally, the way in which this theory conceptualizes the Kurdish-populated periphery will prove both helpful and limited with regard to this study. One of the arguments of this approach which expands our understanding is that the modernization process in Turkey is essentially based on a top-down course of westernization of the society by bureaucratic elites. This assumption makes it easy for us to understand the relationship between the center and the periphery. On a related topic, this approach also provides a way to analyze both the tradeoff between the modernizing elites and the local notables, and the social and political consequences of that relationship. As it will be discussed in detail in the following pages, the main agents of the semi-feudal structure, which prevails in Kurdish-populated areas, survived for a long time thanks to the collaboration that they managed to establish with the center. The contributions of these arguments will be incorporated into the analysis in the coming pages whenever appropriate.

On the other hand, the shortcomings of the modernization theory when it comes to the relations between the center and the Kurdish-populated periphery, as well as regarding the confrontation emanating from this relationship, should also be noted here. The basic attitude of the modernization theory is shaped on the basis of a teleological explanation of history and an understanding of linear development. Thus, the Kurdish resistance was nothing but a resistance of traditional-feudal structure against development and progress. “Kurdish revolts after the proclamation of the republic often combined both elements of opposition, namely the religious reaction against secularism and the local hostility against the centralizing tendencies of the officialdom” (Özbudun, 1976: 43 and Lewis, 1968: 266-8). There is no need to underline that this explanation is of a reductionist-evolutionist character. Moreover, this kind of argument makes it difficult to understand the historical phenomena which arise through internal dynamics as well.

2.3. Dependency School: The Political Economy of Turkish Modernization

Another perspective of the modernization of Turkey is expressed by the dependency school, which, to some extent, emerged as a reaction to the premises and arguments of modernization theory outlined above. This approach deals with the modernization/westernization of Turkey in a political-economy-based theoretical framework. Finding its expression in the studies of many researchers such as Keyder (1981; 1987a), Kasaba (1988), Owen (1983), Pamuk (1987), Owen and Pamuk (2002) and Boratav (2006), this approach explains the modernization of Turkey by referring to the efforts that came into being as early as in the late Ottoman period to integrate into the

capitalist world system. In the present study, this approach will be utilized with particular attention to the works of Çağlar Keyder (1981 and 1987a), a prominent scholar of this school of thought. The main arguments of Keyder regarding Turkish modernization and the dependency school's contribution to the center-periphery relation debate will be reviewed below. However, as a necessary foundation, an explanation of the world-system theory must come first given that it provides a conceptual and theoretical framework for the dependency school.

The world-system theory, which was developed by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974 and 1976), focuses upon two main concerns: internal dynamics and the development of global capitalism. Like the modernization theory, this approach also divides all societies into two major groups, the West and the rest. However, unlike the modernization theory, this classification is based on political economy. According to this view, a series of developments occurred in the West in the 16th century which resulted in the emergence of capitalism. Moreover, this new system was based on a division between the countries which have already completed the process of transition to capitalism (the core countries) and those countries which are late in passing into the capitalist structure (the peripheral countries). This division having been made, the core countries, it is argued, determine the developmental process of the peripheral countries.

The theoretical framework provided by the world-system theory constitutes the departure point for Keyder's arguments about the modernization and westernization of Turkey. Keyder understands the modernization process, which started in the Ottoman Empire and went on through the foundation of the

modern Turkey, as the integration process of Ottoman-Turkey into the capitalist world system. In Keyder's words

The Ottoman Empire was transformed under capitalist incorporation and was dismantled through the success of various nationalist separatisms. [...] It was the bureaucracy, which in the course of dissolution of the Empire, constructed a new nation-state and attempted to effect its transition to modernity (Keyder, 1987a: 1).

Keyder discusses this process by focusing on the distinctive dynamics of the Ottoman Empire and the role of the economic and political relations the Empire established with the capitalist West. To Keyder (1987a: 7), the Ottoman Empire was not feudal. Moreover, the central role of the state in the economy on the one hand, and the fact that the basic mode of production was based on independent small peasantry, on the other, hindered the emergence of the bourgeoisie that could economically and politically challenge the center. This situation solidified the power of bureaucracy in the economic realm in addition to its hegemony in politics. The *ayan* resistance in the 18th century was the first significant effort to form a capitalist class which was independent from the state. However, this effort failed for various reasons. Although trade is mainly in the control of the center in a centralist agricultural economy, the trade activities were mainly held by the non-Muslim population.

According to Keyder (1981), the integration of the Ottoman Empire with the political-economic logic of European capitalism began to institutionalize in the early 19th century. The mechanisms of integration throughout this century were trade, debt and direct investment (1987a: 47). "When the level of trade with the West began to increase, Europeans attempted to secure the institutional conditions for orderly conduct in business matters" (1987a: 21). The intervention of the Great powers, whose main aim was to preserve their

economic interests, resulted in the 1839, 1856 and 1876 reformations. The chief outcome of these reforms was an increase in the economic power of the non-Muslim minorities. "The mechanisms through which economic integration (into the world economy) proceeded were carried mostly by the non-Muslim population of the Empire" (Keyder, 187a: 22). According to Keyder

The bureaucracy attempted at various points to bring the Levantines under the center's legislative authority, however, the Great powers were adamant in defending extraterritorial privileges. Despite failure on this count, there was, until the last quarter of the 19th century, no radical disillusionment with reformism following Western guidelines (Keyder, 1987a: 51).

In short, the mechanisms of integration for the Ottoman Empire with the capitalist world-system throughout the 19th century were debt, trade, and direct investment. The bureaucracy continued to play a dominant role in economy but the integrations with the capitalist world-system were achieved through the non-Muslim population. By the end of the 19th century, the dependence of the Empire on the west increased more and more. The Empire went bankrupt in 1881 and the Public Debt Administration was founded. Moreover, the scope of the capitulations that the Empire recognized for the western states and companies contributed further to the economic conditions. More importantly, throughout this period, there was an intense struggle over the Ottoman markets among the core capitalist countries (Britain, France and Germany).

The first significant attempt to change the above-painted picture was made after the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) came to power, a majority of whose members belonged to the military bureaucracy. The first priority of the CUP was to save the state (Keyder, 1981). For this purpose, they pursued relatively liberal policies in the early years of their power. These policies were oriented to ensure the geographical and political integrity of the

empire. However, the separatist nationalist movements among the non-Muslim populations on the one hand, the land losses of the Empire on the other, led the CUP to abandon policies of Ottomanism in favor of a Turkish nationalist program (1987a). The change in political preferences influenced the economic policies as well.

The main purpose of the economic policies was to establish a national economic system. For this aim, a series of regulations were put into effect. The capitulations were abrogated unilaterally, a new trade regime was introduced, protectionist duties were instituted, and the privileged status of foreign companies was abolished (Keyder, 1987a: 61). More importantly, there was the attempt to create a bourgeois class.

The CUP's aim of creating an independent capitalist nation-state was interrupted due to the World War I. This goal was instead achieved by the military bureaucratic elites, including some ex-CUP members, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. However, according to Keyder, Turkey's transition from a peripheral position to the integration with the capitalist world system as an independent state became possible only after the policies instituted after the Great Depression in 1929.

Having outlined the basics of Keyder's approach, and by extension that of the dependency school, with regard to Turkish modernization above, let us now turn to a consideration of the way in which this theory approaches center-periphery relations. Keyder's approach, and that of the dependency school in general, like the modernization approach, pays little attention to the internal dynamics and the local conflicts. It primarily deals with the relations and conflicts between the core capitalist countries and the peripheral countries.

Thus, the relations and confrontations between the center and its local periphery in Turkey occupy a secondary place in the agenda of this approach.

Although the dependency school does not concern itself primarily with the confrontation between the center and the periphery, it contributes a great deal to the discussions of the economic policies of the center from a historical perspective and of the development of these policies, as well as to the discussions about the center-periphery relations. As will be discussed in the relevant chapters, the most important ruptures in the policies of the center concerning the Kurdish-populated periphery emerged immediately after Turkey's attempts to integrate into the capitalist world system, attempts which had a clear impact upon the changes that took place in its political and economic structure following the World War II. These changes had significant consequences in the Kurdish populated periphery, with the most important being in the political sphere. In the single-party era, the integration of the Kurdish periphery into the center was being rendered through a small group of people who had the consent of the center. The transition to the multi-party system increased the capacity of the center to incorporate the periphery. In other words, multi-party political system provided new opportunities for the integration of the periphery with the center.

The ramifications of Turkey's attempts to integrate with the capitalist world system on the policies and strategies pursued in the domestic periphery are worth mentioning, particularly after the 1990s. This influence, which emerged in the process of Turkey's integration with the EU, is multi-dimensional. As I will discuss in more detail in the last chapter, suffice it to

state here that there were significant ruptures in the policies traditionally pursued since the establishment of the Republic.

The contribution of dependency school to the debates in this study is not limited to the points mentioned above, however. I believe that this approach also provides important contributions in the context of regional disparities. One of the most important dimensions of the confrontation between the center and the Kurdish-populated periphery is that the latter of the two is backward. This approach provides significant contributions in order to discuss the backwardness of Kurdish-populated regions in the context of the uneven development of capitalism in Turkey⁵. This point will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

Both the modernization theory and the dependency school examine the modernization of Turkey with specific reference to the global dynamics. Each of these theories provides important arguments about the modernization process of Turkey from a different perspective. However, these approaches did not concern themselves with the relationship between the state and the society in general, and the relationship between the center and periphery, in particular. Whenever these theories take up such issues, they usually consider them as secondary issues in their broader theoretical frameworks. The dimension that these theories fail to take into account is addressed by the center-periphery approach introduced by Şerif Mardin.

⁵ For a good study of this sort, see Aydın: 1989.

2.4. Center-Periphery Approach: The Transformation of Values

Şerif Mardin, who believes that the confrontation between the center and the periphery was the basic problem of Turkish politics even into the middle of the 20th century, argues that this situation emerged when the Ottoman reformers attempted to establish a western-style central state. The Mardinian approach to center-periphery relations focuses on the historical development of this basic question.

Mardin begins his analysis by underlining a basic difference between the Ottoman society and the western societies. For him, there was a multiple confrontation between the center and the periphery in the west “Because of its feudal antecedents, the process of centralization that created the modern state included a series of confrontations leading to compromises with what may be called the forces of the periphery: the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers, and later, industrial labor” (Mardin, 1973: 170). Such a multiple confrontation seems to be missing in the Ottoman Empire until the 19th century.

Another differential aspect of the west in the context of center-periphery relations is the success of the peripheral elements in integrating with the center. In other words, the center incorporated the periphery into the political system by granting privileges or giving autonomy to the peripheral elements. In the Ottoman Empire, however, “in the more general, ecological sense, the center and the periphery were two very loosely related worlds” (Mardin, 1973: 171). However, the distinction between the center and the periphery was apparent. On the one hand, there was the center, which was composed of the Sultan and the officials, and, on the other, a highly segmented periphery. In other words, there were two different worlds separated by a demarcation line

between the official elites and the rural masses. The center and the periphery were enjoying two different domains, which were isolated from each other economically, politically and culturally.

This distinct separation between the center and the periphery has its roots in two aspects of Ottoman society. First, it originated from the classical Ottoman political system, which tolerated localism to a great extent. According to Mardin

As the Empire expanded, the Ottomans dealt with the new social institutions they encountered by giving the seal of legitimacy to local usages and by enforcing a system of decentralized accommodation toward ethnic, religious, and regional particularisms. No attempt was made for a more complete integration when loose ties proved workable (Mardin, 1973: 171).

The second factor contributing to this separation was the social background of the official elites. The official elites, a great majority of whom was recruited from the non-Muslim groups, were different from the periphery in terms of their privileged status, and their social and cultural characteristics. Their primary objective was to serve to the sultan, as well as to fortify the authority of the center in the political and economic domains.

The above-described Ottoman political system based on center-periphery distinction continued until the 19th century. However, this structure gave rise to three basic problems at the beginning of the 19th century, when the Ottoman reformers attempted to build a central state on a western model. Two of these difficulties centered on the integration of two different populations into the nation-state: The integration of non-Muslim groups and, perhaps surprisingly, the integration of the Muslim groups. While the first problem disappeared to a great extent as a consequence of land losses and exchange of population, the second problem would continue. Mardin describes this

second issue as follows: “although it is usually overlooked, the national integration of Muslim components was just as much of a problem as that of the non-Muslim groups” (Mardin, 1973: 176). The first important attempt to solve this problem was Sultan Abdulhamid’s policy of Islamism. The CUP’s nationalism-based policies aiming to provide integration followed Abdulhamid II’s policies.

Finally, the third problem that Ottoman reformers encountered in their attempts to create a centralist nation-state was the difficulty in providing for the meaningful participation of discrete elements in the political system. According to Mardin, this problem still persisted until the mid-20th century. Indeed, both the second and the third problems mentioned above confronted the Republican elites as well who attempted to build a nation-state. In other words, the center-periphery duality was still in existence when the Turkish Republic was established.

During the War of Liberation, there was an alliance between bureaucratic elites and local notables and after the establishment of the Republic “a sizeable portion of the notable class was successfully co-opted into the ranks of the Republican People’s Party” (Mardin, 1973: 182). Nonetheless, neither the cooperation with local notables nor the policies in the single-party era prevented the confrontation between the center and periphery from continuing and thus the gap between the center and periphery continued during the single-party era for several reasons, including: Firstly, “the builders of the Turkish Republic placed the strengthening of the state first in their priorities”. Secondly, “the modernizing elites devoted their energies to the building of national identity, rather than to radically changing the place of the peasant in

the system.” Thirdly, the Kemalist elites perceived the social integration of the periphery as being achievable only through top-down regulations. In other words, “the Kemalists had a fine understanding of regulations, but they missed the revolutionary-mobilizational aspect that, in certain contemporary schemes of modernization, mobilized masses for a restructuring of society” (Mardin, 1973: 184).

With the end of the single-party period a change may be identified in the center-periphery gap in that the periphery was partially integrated with the center after the transition to multi-party politics and the DP’s rise to power. Although the founders of the DP had similar social origins with the members of the CHP, they were more sensitive to peripheral demands, which helped reduce the gap between the center and periphery. The intervention of the military (the traditional bureaucratic elites) was oriented to the integration of the periphery with the center. This intervention showed that the political positions that had been traditionally attributed to the center and the periphery up until that moment had changed. While the center had maintained a progressive, modern standpoint, it started to have a conservative, status quo position. The periphery, on the other hand, which has been known as backward and conservative, started to vocalize a more pluralist political attitude. Another landmark event for a change in the center-periphery positions is the military intervention of 1960. The old polarization of center against periphery acquired a new form: preservers of the Procrustean, early Republican order against those who wanted change (Mardin, 1973:186).

Having thus briefly reviewed this center-periphery approach in light of Turkey specifically, let us now turn to a consideration of its weaknesses as a

theoretical framework. Though the center-periphery model provides strong arguments and a detailed sociological analysis of the modernization of Turkey, nevertheless, it has some shortcomings that need to be attended to. First, this approach is so center-focused that it pays little attention to the periphery. Accordingly, it tends to establish the relationship between the center and the periphery as one-dimensional and over-determined by the center and thus does not deal with the peripheral strategies of resistance toward the center. Examples abound which support that, contrary to this model, a full understanding of center-periphery relations requires a consideration of both the center and the peripheral strategies. The most popular example of this sort may be seen in the actions of the religious periphery. After the transition to multi-party politics, the center was obligated to revise its radical secularist reforms. While Mardin tends to assess this situation as a strategy on behalf of the center to integrate the periphery, this development could be understood as a center response to peripheral resistance, thus demonstrating that the relations between the center and periphery were not one-dimensional. More importantly, it shows that the direction of the relations between the two can at times be determined by the periphery.

Another significant shortcoming of the center-periphery model is the way in which it treats the periphery as a homogeneous entity and a monolithic actor. In other words, this approach reduces and oversimplifies the periphery, understanding them only in the context of a religious-traditional categorization. Though the religious characteristic of the periphery in Turkey, including the Kurdish-populated regions, cannot be denied and though the radical secularist reforms initiated, particularly after the proclamation of the Republic, constituted

the main component of the confrontation between the center and periphery, it nonetheless seems problematic to view the periphery solely as a religious-based homogeneous entity. In this regard, the still-ongoing confrontation between the center and Kurdish-populated periphery since the inception of the Republic provides a compelling counterargument.

CHAPTER 3

FROM AN EMPIRE TO A NATION-STATE (1923-1950)

3.1. Introduction

This chapter concentrates on the period from the establishment of the Republic up until 1950, when the CHP (Republican People's Party) rule was replaced with the DP (Democrat Party) as a result of free elections. The primary focus will be on the single-party era (1923 and 1946) due to the fact that the fundamental political, ideological and economic paradigms of the Turkish nation-state were shaped throughout this period. Similarly, it was in this period that the codes of the relationships between the state and society in general and the center and peripheries in particular were redefined.

The assessment of this period will begin with the establishment of the Turkish nation-state, followed by an examination of the main characteristics of the reform program that were initiated for the consolidation of the Turkish nation-state. The application of a nation-state oriented modernization project in the Kurdish-populated periphery will then be discussed in detail. I will examine the strategies aiming to transform the socio-political structure of the Kurdish areas as well as the policies aiming to integrate these areas into the newly constituted society. To this end, I will pay attention to the following three fields: politics, economy and education. Finally, I will elaborate on the impacts and consequences of these regulations on the Kurdish-populated periphery.

3. 2. The Establishment of the Turkish Nation-State

When the World War I was over, it was not only the war that had ended. The completion of the war also marked the end of the age of empires and the victory of the nation-state that had emerged more than a century before. Two empires in particular, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire had disappeared from the scene of history. Many nation-states were established in the region once under the control of the Ottoman Empire, with the Republic of Turkey being one of them. However, its establishment came after a prolonged War of Independence and a power struggle between the national elite. What follows is a brief discussion of the process of independence and the foundation of the state. I will give special attention to the role of discourse, nationalist and otherwise, in recruiting supporters for the struggle, the internal as well as the external dimension of the struggle, and the method of state-building that followed. The modernization of the Republic and its distinguishing factors will also be outlined.

3. 2. 1. The War of Independence

Soon after the First World War was over, the Ottoman Empire was forced to sign the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918. Article Seven of this treaty stipulated that the Entente had the right to occupy any place in the Ottoman Empire if it considered its security to be under threat (Zürcher, 1994: 138), a right that they exercised a short time later as the Entente troops occupied several parts of Anatolia. Many movements of resistance to this intrusion appeared at this time under the name The Association for Defense of National Rights (*Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*), especially in the regions of Anatolia which

were under occupation. Though these movements had similar purposes, however, they were spontaneous and local in nature.

The unification of the resistance movements and their transformation into an organized struggle would be carried out, ironically, by an Ottoman officer, Mustafa Kemal, who had been given the task to disarm the Ottoman army. First in Erzurum,⁶ and then in Sivas, congresses were attended by the delegates of the resistance movements from different parts of the country. Of the decisions made in these congresses, two of them are especially noteworthy. The first one determined that the resistance movements would be gathered under the *Anadolu ve Rumeli Mudafa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*, ARMHC (Society for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, SDRA-R), and that an executive committee (*heyeti temsiliye*) would be established under the chairmanship of Atatürk which would have the authority to act like the government, thus outlining the organizational structure necessary for the War of Independence. The second decision, as stated in the SDRA-R's program, defined the aim and the political character of the War of Independence as being, "To activate the national forces and to make the national power dominant, in order to assure the integrity of the Ottoman country and the preservation of the supreme authorities of the Caliphate and the Sultanate and the national independence" (cited in Tunçay, 1981: 343). In other words, the goal was to struggle against the imperial powers on behalf of the Caliphate and

⁶ Held in Erzurum on July 10, 1919. The delegates from Trabzon and the *Vilayet-i Şarkiye* (Eastern provinces namely, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Erzurum, Sivas, Van) branches of the Association for the Defense of the Rights attended. The delegates focused on the need to resist the allied forces' attempts to establish Armenian and Greek states in Anatolia. A representative executive committee (*Heyet-i Temsiliye*) was formed to speak for and to co-ordinate the activities of the resistance movement and Mustafa Kemal was elected as the chairman.

Sultanate, to realize the full independence of the Islamic nation and the Islamic land.

Given the second decision above, it can be argued that the War of Independence was carried out through the political symbols and language inherited from the Empire. Though there was a nationalist discourse, it was based on an inclusive discourse referring to the 'millet' tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire, rather than an exclusive discourse of nationalism striving for a distinction centered in ethnicity and language. The rural majority who participated in the war were motivated by this call to Ottoman tradition. As Özbudun (1970) argues, they were motivated less by truly nationalistic feelings than the desire to defend the homeland and religion against infidel invaders and to save the Caliph from the hands of the enemy. The indivisibility of the country and the significance of Islamic solidarity were not only expressed in the resolutions declared after the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses. Similarly, the letters, which were sent by Atatürk to the local influential figures asking for their help and cooperation, reflected the same discourse.⁷ The focus on Islamic unity was so dominant that 'the program of the SDRA-R indicated that all the Muslim citizens are the natural members of the SDRA-R' (Tunçay, 1981: 343).

The attitude of SDRA-R which was inclusive of all Muslims did not extend only to participation in the War of Independence. The organization, at the same time, was also clear in its position of keeping the political sphere open only to the Muslims. Although the organization declared in its program that "we are totally respectful of the rights of all of the non-Muslim people with whom we have long been living together," the non-Muslim elements were not

⁷ For the letters and telegraphs that Atatürk sent to the local notables in various regions of Turkey, see, Atatürk: 1972 and 1991.

allowed⁸ to participate in the elections held after the closure of the Istanbul Assembly (Tunçay, 1981: 341). Likewise, in the first Grand National Assembly, this Islamic-centered discourse was dominant as “the deputies during their oath-taking ceremony swore loyalty to the Caliphate and Sultanate (Kirişci and Winrow, 1997: 79). Atatürk, during his opening speech in the First Assembly, was emphasizing the solidarity and unity based on religion: “Those who composed the assembly were not simply Turks, Circassian, Kurds or Laz but were rather elements of a *united Islamic community*” (Kirişci and Winrow, 1997: 79, emphasis added). The cohesion derived from Islam would also play an important role in determining who espoused the War of Independence and the establishment of the Republic.

In the eastern part of Turkey, where the Kurdish populations were mainly located, a significant degree of support was given to the War of Independence.⁹ While the Armenian struggle for an independent state, which would include the Kurdish-populated areas, played an important role in cementing the Kurdish assistance to the future Turkish Republic, the political-ideological nature of the War of Independence which asserted that the war was being fought by all Muslim people on behalf of the Caliphate against the infidel enemy, was also a compelling motive. Mustafa Kemal was very sensitive to underline these two

⁸ The non-Muslim minorities did not themselves attend the last Ottoman Assembly (Tunçay, 1981: 41).

⁹ According to Kirişci and Winrow (1997: 79) 22 of the 56 delegates who attended the Erzurum Congress were Kurds and some of them were representatives in the executive committee. For more information about the local Kurds’ attitudes during the Turkish War of Independence see; Perinçek, 1999. It seems that the Kurds’ support for the War of Independence was not limited with the east and southeast regions only. According to Goloğlu, cited in Perinçek, there was a significant help given by the Kurdish forces in the defense of İzmir (Perinçek, 1999: 123).

points in the letters and telegraphs that he sent to the local notables in the region to secure their help.¹⁰

On the other hand, it must be noted that the attitudes of the Kurds were not by any means monolithic. There were important disagreements among the Istanbul-based Kurdish organizations like *Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti*¹¹ and the Kurdish elite involved in these organizations. Some of them defended the unity between the Turks and Kurds, a solidarity based on Ottoman patriotism and the bond of Islam. Another group asserted that the Kurds had to struggle for their own national independence (Kutschera, 2001; Kutlay, 2002; McDowall, 2004).¹² Although a considerable portion of the local Kurds supported the war of independence, it seems that there also existed a difference of opinion by those who demanded autonomy and independence, and remained equally distant from both the Istanbul government and the independence movement led by Atatürk. Several uprisings organized by those holding this position took place but were far from involving all of the Kurds in the region. The *Koçgiri*

¹⁰ Atatürk, in a telegraph dated September 15, 1919, stated the following: "It is doubtless that the Turk and the Kurd will continue to live as two full brothers inseparable from one another and remain as a castle of iron against our enemies inside and outside in the form of an unshakeable body around the Caliphate, as long as religious and honorable men like you exist" (cited in Perinçek, 1999: 121).

¹¹ For a detailed and comprehensive study on this association, see Göldaş (1991).

¹² Kutschera (2001: 43-45) argues that the Kurdish elites outside the region were divided into two as supporters of autonomy and supporters of independence. Şerif Paşa (ex-Ottoman Ambassador), Celadet and the Kamuran brothers, and the leading members of the Bedirhan family were defending independence. (The Bedirhan family was the leader of the last Kurdish semi-autonomous emirate. The members of this emirate, which was abolished in the middle of the 1800's as a part of the centralization reforms, were exiled to Istanbul. For a detailed study on this family, see Malmisanij (2000)). Seyyid Abdulkadir (Abdulkadir, is the son of Sheikh Abdullah, who was the leader of the uprising which took place in 1881 and was defined as the first Kurdish nationalist rebellion by Olson. Abdulkadir, who settled in Istanbul in 1890's, headed the Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti for some time and participated in Sheikh Said Uprising and at the end was executed) was defending autonomy.

revolt¹³ and *Milli Aşireti* uprising were two such insurrections, which were fed by nationalist sentiments.

The War of Independence, which resulted in the establishment of a new Turkish State, was mainly executed against the occupant forces. Nevertheless, there was an internal dimension as well in that the resistance movement which fought against outside enemies also engaged in a power struggle with the Ottoman administration and the government in Istanbul. I must note right away that the struggle with Istanbul was not only political. At the same time an armed struggle with many counter-resistance movements supported by the Istanbul government was being carried on as well.¹⁴ In this period, elections were held for the Ottoman Parliament in October 1919. A considerable number of those elected were members or sympathizers of the resistance movement in Anatolia. Soon after the establishment of a new Assembly, the Istanbul government recognized the executive committee, followed by the acceptance of the *Misakı Milli* (National Pact) in the parliament. This document, which could be characterized as the program of the independence war, foresaw the country's definitive independence based on the decisions of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses.¹⁵

¹³ This uprising, which took place in March 5, 1921, was organized by Haydar Bey, the leader of Koçgiri tribe and a member of Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti, Nuri Dersimi and Haydar Bey's son, Alişer. Its purpose was to establish an independent Kurdistan. Alişer also played an active role in the Dersim uprising later in 1937 (Göldaş, 1991: 47-51 and Perinçek, 1999: 102-105).

¹⁴ In the period of the independence war, there were many counter struggle movements which were supported by the Istanbul government or acted with different purposes. For a study on the counter resistance movements of this type, see Tokluoğlu (1995) and Şeker (2002).

¹⁵ The National Pact was made up of six articles and these were briefly as follows: 1- The territory inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority (united in religion, race and aim) formed an indivisible whole, but the fate of territories inhabited by an Arab majority which were under foreign occupation should be determined by plebiscite. 2. A plebiscite could determine the fate of the "Three Vilayets" of Batum, Kars and Ardahan, which had been Russian from 1878 to 1918. 3. The same should hold true for the fate of western Thrace. 4. The security of the capital, Istanbul, and of the Sea of Marmara must be assured. The opening of straits to

Upon the approval of the National Pact in the Ottoman Parliament, the Entente powers occupied Istanbul (March 16, 1920), arrested many deputies and sent many of them into exile. Shortly after this, the Ottoman Parliament was closed down (April 2, 1920). Atatürk perceived this as an opportunity and upon his call an Assembly named Grand National Assembly was founded in Ankara.¹⁶ It was sort of an unusual Assembly, since it was not formed on the basis of a countrywide general election.¹⁷ Partially for this reason, it was a heterogeneous Assembly with a highly representative character in terms of class, social and geographical aspects.¹⁸

The Grand National Assembly on the one hand represented, the political will of the War of Independence, and on the other hand, initiated some regulations to construct the legal and institutional substructures of the newly emerging state. In other words, it was acting like a constitutive Assembly. In this respect, it was functioning largely in a state- building fashion, as seen by the following noteworthy actions: A regular army was established; courts were

commercial shipping would be a subject for discussion with other related countries. 5. The right of minorities would be established in conformity with the treaties concluded between the Entente and European states. 6. The economic, financial and judicial independence of the empire should be assured and free from restrictions (cited in Zurcher, 1994: 144).

¹⁶ For a comprehensive study on this Assembly, see Akin (2001).

¹⁷ Most of it (232 deputies) consisted of the ones elected in the elections held by the SDRAP after the closure of the Ottoman Parliament. Among the remainder, 92 deputies were transferred from the Istanbul Parliament, and 14 of them consisted of the deputies who had returned after they were arrested and sent into exile by the British forces after the occupation of Istanbul (Tokluoğlu: 1995: 79).

¹⁸ Kılıç Ali, one of Atatürk's close friends, defined this assembly like this: [It] was an utterly different world. There you could find people who had pulled on jackets over their loose robes, people ranging from a number of bigoted individuals who wore the fez to Kurds and Circassians wrapped up in their national customs, astrakhan-wearing nationalists, the doctor, pharmacist, commander, ulema, judge, dervish, sheikh, lawyer, telegraph official-pasha, bey, effendi, aga, hacı, hoca, of every sort, from every occupation, all types of a society" (cited in Frey, 1965: 306). According to Tunaya who classified the deputies according to their profession, the distribution of the first grand national assembly was as follows; 120 self-employed people, 125 government officials, 13 municipal employee, 53 members of the army, 53 scientists, 5 tribal chiefs (cited in Akin, 2001: 49).

founded to protect justice,¹⁹ international agreements were signed,²⁰ and most importantly, a new Constitution was constructed. Such enactments as those made by this assembly were not just regulations needed to build a state, but at the same time they indicated, if not determined, the political character of the newly formed society and state.

The first significant regulation which pointed to the state's new political nature was the Law on Fundamental Organization adopted in January 1921. The first article of this Law, which provided a legal structure for a new government, states that, "Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation. The method of administration is based on the principle of people actually and personally governing its fate" (Özbudun, 1992: 81). This reference to a "nation," though still a flexible concept at the time, was an important sign regarding the political character of the upcoming state. Moreover, it is possible to argue that it constituted a major departure from the form of government under the Ottoman Empire. The approval of the abolishment of Sultanate followed this in 1922, just after the military victory of the War of Independence, following prolonged and severe debates. These two developments were the historically momentous in the process of establishing the new secular nation-state. The war had been won, but the political struggle between the Turkish political elites in the

¹⁹ The most well-known of these were the Independence Courts. According to Aybars (2006), who prepared one of the most comprehensive studies on them, eight Independence Courts were established in this period (Ankara, Eskişehir, Konya, Isparta, Sivas, Kastamonu, Pozanti, and Diyarbakır). These worked mainly to punish the deserters and suppress the resistance movements against the government in Ankara. Yusuf Ziya Bey, who worked as a member in the Kastamonu branch of the Independence Court, was arrested and accused of preparing the uprising in 1924, before the Sheikh Said rebellion, and died in prison just before the uprising occurred.

²⁰ The first international agreement was signed with Bolshevik Russia on March 16, 1921. Another agreement was signed in the same year with France.

Assembly persisted.²¹ Two groups stood out in this struggle, those led by Atatürk, and on the other side those opposed to him,²² a struggle which would turn fatefully in one direction with the 1923 elections.

3.2.2. Radical Modernization

General elections were held in 1923, a time at which when the War of Independence was militarily completed but when the diplomatic negotiations continued. Elections concluded with the success of the group led by Atatürk. The leading staff of this group, which turned into a party²³ shortly after the elections, governed the country until 1950. During this period, especially in the first 15 years of their government, they executed a radical modernization program. Allow me to mention in the following the distinguishing features of this program, which constituted the legal, political, economical, cultural and institutional bases, i.e. the founding paradigms, of the new Turkish nation-state.

Firstly, the main purpose of this program was to abolish the old traditional structure and build a new society based on western-modern-secular values, a purpose which differentiated it from previous reforms. As Keyder argues

²¹ There were many groups in the parliament in this period including: the Solidarity, or Union Group (*Tenasüt Grubu*); the Independence Group (*İstiklal Grubu*); the Defense of Rights Faction (*Müdafaai Hukuk Zümresi*); the People's Faction (*Halk Zümresi*); the Reform Group (*Islahat Grubu*); the conservative Islamists (mostly clerics); the moderate conservatives; a small labor element; and an equally small band of those labelled 'more or less Communists'" (Frey, 1965: 307).

²² The second group, according to many researchers (Frey: 1965; Tunçay: 1981; Tokluoğlu: 1995) was made up of members whose main commonality was to oppose Atatürk. A considerable portion of these came from the unoccupied regions of the country. One scholar (Lewis, 1968) argues that this situation played an important role in their political attitude. They preferred a form of government similar to the European model. However, at the same time, they wanted to protect the Caliphate permanently.

²³ For a detailed and comprehensive study regarding the group's process of forming a party and then establishing single-party power, see Tunçay (1981).

What distinguished Kemalist reformism from its precedents was the concentrated effort to define a political system free of religious and dynastic legitimation. By abolishing both the sultanate and the caliphate, the republic constituted itself on a secular-nationalist base (Keyder, 1987a: 86).

Şerif Mardin (1991 and 2002), agrees with Keyder on the difference of Kemalist reformism from its precedents. Moreover, Mardin argues that the republican reforms indicated primarily a change of values. In this sense, these reforms aimed at an absolute rupture with the Ottoman-Islamic past.

By way of a brief digression, however, it should be noted at this time that there were also remarkable similarities between these reforms and the previous ones, the most important being the primacy that they attributed to the state. Insel & Aktar, who discuss the Republican modernization with respect to this continuity, present a quite assertive argument. According to Insel and Aktar

The main purpose in the Republican period was not to modernize but to make the government more dominant over the society. [....] The three basic, unassailable principles of the Turkish republic, republicanism, laicism and nationalism, are united by one fundamental component, statism. Statism is a totalitarian political world in which every dynamic in society comes about under the control and supervision of the state, every social improvement is evaluated according to the superior benefits of the state, and the autonomous legitimacy of social phenomenon is not recognized outside of the state (İnsel and Aktar, 1990: 12-13).

Thus, Insel and Aktar perceive not an absolute break with the past but rather a continuing attempt to acquire and solidify power.

Returning now to the distinguishing features of the modernization program and the accompanying foundational paradigms of the Turkish state, a second component of the program promoted by the modernizing elite, who consisted mostly of military-civilian bureaucrats was its endorsement of nationalism, secularism and etatism (Özbudun, 1976: 43). Among these,

secularism, according to many scholars (Berkes, 1964; Akural, 1984; Kadioğlu, 1999), was the leitmotiv of the modernization and westernization efforts. For instance, Akural (1984) argues that secularism is the foundation on which all the other Kemalist reforms were built. In a similar vein, Niyazi Berkes (1964), accepted as an authority in this field because of his extensive work on modern Turkey, believes that the essence of Turkish modernization is secularism. Moreover, this is not a secularism simply defined as the separation of the public or state affairs and the religious affairs. It is the rebuilding of all areas of social life based on secular values. Gellner, who is known for his anthropological and sociological studies on Islamic societies, along his other works, shares Berkes' perspective. Gellner (1981: 58) claims that there are two notable methods of modernization in Muslim countries, those which oppose religion and those which embrace it. For him, Turkey is a good example of the first category.

Kadioğlu (1999: 28-29), who discusses the Republican secularization policies in light of Locke and Comte, comes to this conclusion: Rather than endorsing a position in keeping with Locke's philosophy, which views laicism as the complete separation of religious and state affairs, and understands religion to be a private matter under the possession of the church, the Republican secularism comes closer to a positivist and evolutionist view in line with Comte. In short, secularism is not simply the separation of religious and governmental affairs, but a means for a more happy life in both public and private areas.

Secularism is a goal in this sense as well. The secularism of the Republican period, on the one hand separated religious and governmental affairs, and, on the other hand brought religion under the control of the state, thus bearing traces of both aspects of Comte's understanding of secularism.

Let us briefly consider each of these aspects and their implementation in more detail below.

In order to separate religious and public or state affairs, a series of legal and institutional arrangements were gradually carried out after the foundation of the Republic. The most important one was the abolishment of the Caliphate on March 3, 1924, which was undoubtedly a crucial step towards the establishment of a secular political structure and political modernization. Furthermore, it also marked an ideological-political rupture with the Ottoman-Islamic past, since ‘the Ottomans were the heirs of the Islamic Caliphate and the Ottoman sultans assumed the role of protector of the entire Muslim world’ (Mardin, 1973: 193). The abolishment of the Caliphate was followed by some other legal and institutional reforms. The Ministry of Şeriat and Evkaf (pious foundations) was eliminated. Then, the religious schools, *medreses*, were closed and the religious orders (*tarikât*) were abolished in 1924. Some other alterations to the Constitution followed these. The article “the religion of state is Islam,” for example, was removed from the constitution with amendment in 1928. Finally, the principle of secularism was added to the constitution.

It was not, however, simply a matter of separating religion and state, as mentioned above, but also of bringing religion under the control of the state and nationalizing it. Some of the reforms which established state hegemony in the religious sphere include: The Department of Religious Affairs was established in place of the Ministry of Şeriat and Evkaf, with the goal of standardizing religion based on a single interpretation (*sunni-hanefi* interpretation). Likewise, the religious schools, *medreses*, were closed and state-sponsored religious schools (İmam Hatip Schools and Theology Faculty), which depended on

Ministry of Education and were under the control of the government, were opened. Some non-institutional regulations were made as well aimed of nationalizing religion, such as changing the language of worship from Arabic to Turkish.

For the purposes of this study, there were two important results of the secularization reforms. The first one is that they increased the distance between the secular ruling elite and traditional-conservative masses. Additionally, these reforms paved the way for the emergence of new forms of confrontations between center and periphery. Second, these reforms put an end to the central role of religion in the affairs between state and society. However, the success of the alternative presuming to substitute for religion's role is controversial even today.

The third important feature of the Republican period modernization is the fact that it was implemented as a revolution from above.²⁴ In other words, it strove to rebuild society without making any fundamental change in the form of ownership, the relations of ownership and the social stratification. This was partially a result of the modernizing elite's perception of modernization and westernization. As Özbudun argues (1976: 43) "the Kemalist conception of modernization involved mainly the adoption of western political and cultural institutions, with no radical change in the existing social structure." It may also be attributed in part to their perception of society in general and social stratification in particular. Their conception of society was formed on a functionalist-communitarianism basis. There was no place for a class-based stratification in this conception, which Taha Parla (1989) described as

²⁴ For a comprehensive study on Turkey's modernization/westernization as a revolution from above, see Trimberger (1978).

corporatist-solidarism. The best example of this conception can be found in the CHP's program dated 1935:

It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of the division of labor for the individual and social life of the Turkish people. The farmers, craftsmen, laborers and workmen, self-employed, industrialists, merchants and public servants are the main groups of working population constituting the Turkish community (cited in Frey, 1965: 76).²⁵

Thus this understanding of society as divided based on labor needs, not on class, contributed to a top-down revolution format.

The fourth distinctive feature of the Republican modernization-westernization was its execution as a civilizing project. The reforms, whose primary goal was to build a new nation, also involved *civilizing* the daily lives, modes of behavior, and world of values of the members of this nation. This objective was achieved on one hand by making legal regulations (regarding clothing, the hat law), and on the other by educating the public by means of various social and cultural activities (balls, beauty contests). Institutions like people's houses and village houses were built with the goal of educating the public and allowing them to adopt the reforms as their own. From the perspective of bureaucratic elites, on the one side were the elites enlightened and aware of the knowledge of truth and on the other were the rural masses still immature in the Kantian sense.

The best example of this elitist attitude can be found in the CHP's program in 1931, in an article that regulates the election system. It is stated as

²⁵ For an interpretation that says the roots of this corporatist view may be found in the guild organization of Turkish craftsmen and relates it to the origins of Turkish nationalism, see Heyd (1950).

follows: The single-round elections were accepted as a principle. Yet it was decided “until the voters gained sufficient political, social and cultural knowledge enabling them to make an informed decision, it would be more appropriate and conformable with the idea of democracy to select the secondary voters, whom they knew closely and trusted. *Until the citizens were given the necessary education and reached the high standards desired*, the ruling party would continue to use the two-round election system” (cited in Koçak: 2005, emphasis added). Thus, the elites perceived part of the goal of these reforms to be the enlightening of the masses, bringing them up to the standard where they could participate appropriately in all aspects of society, including government.

Finally, the most important characteristic of the Republican Turkey’s modernization with regard to the topic at hand was that it introduced a new contract between the center and the periphery. This new contract was to replace the old, traditional one which Şerif Mardin (2002) called a tacit (*zimni*) contract based on the *millet* system. The new contract, defined on a basis of constitutional citizenship, required the acceptance of all elements of the society as citizens, without regarding racial or religious distinctions. Article 88 of 1924 Constitution states it in this way: “The Turkish people, regardless of religion and race, are called Turk as regards citizenship” (Kili and Gözübüyük, 1985: 138).

This definition, as many researchers argue (Kadioğlu, 1999; Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997), represented a conception of citizenship based on inclusivity as its dominant characteristic, rather than an exclusivist conception which defines citizenship on the basis of territory. In other words, when compared with the nation-state models of the West, it resembled the legally-defined French nation-

state tradition, rather than territorially-defined romantic German example (Kadioğlu, 1999). However, in practice, the ethnic and secular boundaries of the new identity suggested for citizenship was not as clear as its legal definition.²⁶ Its ambivalence often impaired its effective implementation. As a result, conflicts often arose with the secular boundaries of this contract²⁷ when concerning the non-Muslim citizens who were regarded formally as minority, and with the ethnic boundaries of it when concerning the Muslims from different linguistic and ethnic origins. Thus, its pure and inclusive character with regard to its legal definition could not prevent discriminatory and assimilationist practices from emerging at different times in different forms, especially in the economic and cultural spheres. With regard to the secular boundaries in the economic realm, non-Muslims were obliged to pay an additional tax called an “asset task.”²⁸ On the cultural side, non-Muslim citizens, whose mother tongue was not Turkish, were forced to speak Turkish with “Citizen, speak Turkish” campaigns.

The ethnic boundaries of this contract also proved problematic as elements of different ethnic origins were accepted inside the new collective identity but were subjected to cultural and linguistic assimilation. I should emphasize right away that the elements of different ethnic-linguistic origins were not subjected to discriminative practices.

²⁶ For an important study discussing the ethno-secular character of the Turkish national identity, its way of construction and the problems involved, see Yıldız (2001).

²⁷ The discussions around the religious boundaries of the contract generally argue that some discriminative practices were applied to the non-Muslim citizens. However, the new contract involved some problems concerning the Muslims as well. For instance, Alevis, who believe in a different interpretation of Islam, were treated differently than Sunni Muslim citizens.

²⁸ For a comprehensive study on the asset tax and its applications, see Aktar (2000). In fact, the discriminative practices that non-Muslims were subjected to in the economical sense was not limited to the asset tax. For two studies on Republican minority policies, see Oran (2004) and Okutan (2004).

3.3. Application of the Nation-State Oriented Project in the Kurdish-Populated Periphery

The reforms adopted as a part of the modernization project did not presuppose any differences between different regions and sectors of society. In theory, they embraced all social and geographical elements of the country on an equal basis. In practice, however, the modernization project in the Kurdish-populated regions was carried out by institutions and instruments specific to this region and with tighter measures than those we observe in the other regions. Indeed, the modernization project, throughout the country, and particularly in the region at hand, must be seen as having a three-pronged purpose: the consolidation of state power, the establishment of security and order, and the defense of nationalist policies. In each of these areas, in addition to measures that were employed in other parts of the country, a number of additional “special” measures and institutions were created in the Kurdish-populated regions.

3.3.1. Diagnoses from the Center: Reform Programs for the Kurdish Populated Areas

The essence of the practices during the single-party era found their expression in the plans that were prepared by various upper-level bureaucrats. The most comprehensive plan, though there were others,²⁹ was the one referred to as

²⁹ During the period starting right after the Sheikh Said Revolt up until the passage to multi-party politics in 1946, a number of official reports were prepared. All these reports were devoted to the question of “what should be done” in order to integrate the Kurdish-populated areas into the newly created society. The first of these reports was prepared by Abdulhalik Renda, the Speaker of the National Assembly and the deputy from Çankırı. Renda’s report was entitled “*Ayaklanma Din Perdesi Altında Tamamiyle Milli Bir Hareketir*” (The Rebellion is a National Movement under the Guise of Religion). In his report, Renda proposed various strategies, the primary one being assimilation. He also suggested other strategies that focused on reshaping the demographic makeup of the region. According to Renda, these strategies were to be put in effect under Martial Law. Shortly after Renda’s report, the Minister of Internal Affairs Cemil Ubaydin prepared a similar report namely, “*Kürdistan Umumi Valilikle ve Müstemleke Usulü İdare Edilmelidir*” (Kurdistan Should Be Ruled in a Colonial Manner under General Governorship). This report, too, was essentially putting forward suggestions regarding

the *Eastern Reform Plan*. Soon after the Sheikh Said Rebellion, a committee, the *Şark Islahat Encümeni* [Eastern Reform Committee], was formed by the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü on September 8, 1925 with the purpose of preparing a reform plan for the region.³⁰ This plan, which consisted of 28 articles, was quite detailed and can therefore be best understood by a categorization of the interrelated propositions it upheld.

The first category is that of *administrative arrangements*. As a part of these arrangements, the plan proposed that Turkey should be divided into five regions of *Inspectorate General*. The fifth one would include the following provinces: Bayezit, Bitlis, Dersim, Diyarbakır, Elaziz, Ergani, Genç, Hakkari, Malatya, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Siverek, Urfa, Van and the districts Hınıs, Kiğı, and Pülümür.³¹ The Inspectorate General would be responsible for carrying out the reform plan. As will be revealed in the following pages, this suggestion was carried out and as a result, the region was ruled by the Inspectorate General throughout the single-party period. Moreover, it was declared that the Eastern

the consolidation of state power and the establishment of security and order. In this regard, it is worth noting administrative regulations that strengthened the power of the central authority and the regulations aiming at the resettlement of the population to ensure Turkification of the region. For the complete texts of these two reports and for more detailed information on similar reports, see Bayrak (1993 and 1994). The Eastern Reform Plan, which was mentioned above was a comprehensive plan that incorporated the above-mentioned and other similar reports. Another report was written by the then-Minister of Economy Celal Bayar. Written in 1936, this report differed from its preceding examples in many ways. The most significant characteristic of this report was the importance it attached to economic development and integration. Including a partial critique of the policies that were carried out until then, which were mostly authoritarian in nature, this report aimed to explore possibilities of a new strategy without disregarding security and order. For the full text of the report and a lengthy explanation concerning the report by Bayar's daughter Nilüfer Gürsoy, see Bayar (2006).

³⁰ The members of this committee are as follows: Cemil Uybadın (the Minister of Interior Affairs), Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (the Minister of Justice), Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda (Çankırı deputy) and Kazım Orbay (the Second Chief of the Turkish General Staff) (Bayrak, 1994: 258).

³¹ The majority of the population in these provinces was Kurds by mother tongue. For more information about the distribution of population by mother tongue in these locations, see Dündar (1999).

provinces should be governed under martial law until the end of the application of the reform program.

Under the Eastern Reform Plan, a policy that can be defined as *demographic engineering* was recommended, aiming to reconstruct the demographic composition of the region by deportation and resettlement of the population. The plan proposed that the émigrés particularly from Caucasia and Balkan states would be settled in the east with the government paying their expenses. In return, the people that organized, supported and participated in the Sheikh Said Rebellion were to be deported to the western parts of Turkey. The deportation and resettlement of the population were applied in different times and at various levels, the most extensive one being in 1934 based on the Law of Settlement numbered 2510 and dated 10 June 1934.

The third category of the plan consists of the measures concerning *security and order*. To provide security and order, the plan introduces several suggestions, including the following: the collection of guns, the prohibition against carrying weapons and the prevention of smuggling. The power of the police and gendarmerie would be increased in addition to the construction of new outposts and police stations.

The fourth category of suggestions, which may be labeled *discriminative arrangements*, regulates the appointment of officials. According to these arrangements, officials of local origin would not be appointed as either civil or military judges, not even at levels of secondary importance. Moreover, appointed officials would not be in office for more than three years in the region, a suggestion put forward in 1930 by İbrahim Tali Öngören, the Inspector General between 1928 and 1932. In his report, which was sent to the Prime

Minister İsmet İnönü in 1930, Öngören defended this suggestion by explaining that the officials who remain in the region for a long time are assimilated (Koçak, 2003: 98).

The *assimilation* of the Kurdish population into the Turkish culture and identity constitutes an important part of the plan. As the fifth category, these suggestions include the following arrangements: Branches of Turkish Hearths and the Schools, schools specifically for girls,³² *kız mektepleri*, should be established in the places that are originally Turkish but are on the verge of assimilation into Kurdishness and in the places populated by Arabic speaking peoples. Furthermore under this category those who spoke a language other than Turkish in town centers, shopping districts and bazaars, in government and municipal offices and other institutions and organizations, would be punished for committing the crime of resisting against the orders of the government and municipalities.

The measures aiming to *abolish the tribal structure and diminish the role of local notables as mediators* between people and officials were also suggested in the plan. To this aim, it proposed an increase direct rule and the establishment of a powerful administrative system.

The seventh category deals with *transportation and construction* as the plan suggested constructing roads and railways. Such developments in infrastructure would serve to fortify the nation's boundaries, a ramification noted by İsmet İnönü in a speech he gave upon the opening of the Sivas Railway: "As an old soldier, with great ease, I can state to my citizens that with the entrance

³² The plan attributed special importance to education as a tool for the construction of a homogeneous society on the basis of language and culture. There was a special emphasis on the education of girls. For a comprehensive study on girls' schools perceived as a part of this aim, see Akşit (2005).

of the train to Sivas, the defense of the borders of the fatherland has been doubly strengthened” (cited in Sönmez: 1990).

Having considered the basic propositions of the *Eastern Reform Plan* above, let us now turn to a more thorough examination of two of the most utilized and significant aspects of that plan, the office of Inspectorate General and the strategy of resettlement and deportation.

3.3.2. The *Inspectorate General*

The most common and long-lived institution that was introduced by the state elites in order to affect transformation and integration of the region was the Inspectorate General.³³ The primary goal of this special form of administration was to secure law and order and to consolidate state power.³⁴ The justification of the project was as follows:

Today when one examines our current 63 provinces with a general regard, one can see that they are, from an economic, social and geographical point of view, divided into several regions that are interrelated with each other; and one can see that there are various public and common benefits among the provinces that make up these regions. In order to examine the common benefits and needs in their own localities with an all-inclusive eye, in order to regulate the provision of these and at the same time, by keeping the province *under a strict examination and supervision*,

³³ The idea of Inspectorate General first came into existence at the end of the 1870s. According to this idea that was put forward by the European countries and Russia especially in the regions where Armenians were living, the Armenians would participate more in the governance. However, essentially, this idea constituted a reduction in the Ottoman central power over these regions. This project, which was also included in the Berlin Treaty (article 61) aimed to lead to the rule, especially Armenian-populated regions, of a Governor General who had superior powers (Koca, 1998: 152). Although the Ottoman State accepted this proposition, it did not put it in practice. Nevertheless, it was carried out after the proclamation of the Second Meshrutiyet, when it was put in effect in order to control the separatist movements in the Balkans. After the foundation of the Republic, due to the increasing revolts in the Kurdish regions, the central government revitalized this old practice. For more detailed information about the Inspectorate General, see the works by Koca (1998) and Koçak (2003).

³⁴ According to Koca (1998: 219-229) when the First Inspectorate General was established there were more than 80 bands of rebels in the areas incorporated by the Inspectorate General.

and in order to carry out the issues required by the needs of administration, the execution of the constitution of the Inspectorate General has become necessary and indispensable (cited in Koçak, 2003: 55).

The aim that was stated in the proposal in a broader context became clearer and specified in the 3rd article of the law: “Inspector Generals are tied to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and oversee security within their regions; they continually pursue and oversee the application and execution of the laws and regulations and they make use of the powers that the ministries have by law and those that have been decided to be entrusted to them by the Committee of Executive Deputies (*İcra Vekilleri Heyeti*) ” (cited in Koçak, 2003: 71).

Thus, the First Inspectorate General was introduced by the Law entitled *Umumi Müfettişlik Teşkiline Dair Kanun*, No. 1164 and legislated on June 25, 1927 (Koçak, 2003: 54). The First Inspectorate General, which was in full effect until 1947, incorporated the following provinces: Elaziz, Urfa, Hakkari, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Siirt, Mardin, and Van.³⁵ These provinces were ruled under the martial law that was declared immediately after the Sheikh Said Revolt (Tunçay, 1981: 179). It is also interesting to note that these were the provinces where the CHP had no local branches (Uyar, 1998: 327).

The Inspectorate General was ruled by an official who was endowed with significant power and was appointed by the Minister of Internal Affairs. As the head of the administration, the Inspector General was primarily responsible for securing law and order, though the economic, social, administrative, legal and military issues were also under his responsibility. He had to report

³⁵ The number of the provinces may change over time. For instance, Elaziz was incorporated into the Fourth Inspectorate General, which was established in 1936 (Koçak, 2003: 231), while Muş and Ağrı were incorporated into the First Inspectorate General in 1929 and 1930 respectively (Koca, 1998: 174).

incidents to the Minister of Internal Affairs and he sometimes sent reports to the Prime Minister as well. When examining the reports prepared by the Inspector General, one may observe that these reports were mainly concerned with security and order.

3.3.3. Demographic Engineering: The Reconstruction of the Heterogeneous Population Inherited from the Empire

Apart from the state elites' concern with security and order, as reflected in the office of Inspectorate General, another driving anxiety was the ethnic, linguistic and religious composition and regional distribution of the population. They were concerned not only about population exchange and the emigrants that would be accepted to the country, but they were also quite concerned about the linguistic, religious and cultural features of the then-present population. When one considers the composition of the population at the time of the establishment of the Republic in light of the project of building a homogeneous population of the modernizing elites, this sensitivity towards the demographic composition of the country should come as no surprise.

As many scholars demonstrate (Keyder, 1987a; Tekeli, 1990), at the beginning of the 20th century the demographic composition of the population living in Anatolia was quite heterogeneous in many respects. "According to the census of 1906, the Ottoman population within the border of present-day Turkey was around 15 million. Approximately 10% of this population were Greeks, 7% Armenian and 1% Jewish. Muslims counted over 80% (Keyder, 1987a: 79). Although Muslims were grouped within the same category, they, too, were quite diverse in terms of ethnic, linguistic and denominational affiliation. While the majority of the Muslim population was Turkish, many were

identified as belonging to Kurdish, Arab, Caucasian, Albanian, Laz and other ethnic and linguistic groups.³⁶ The ethno-linguistic plurality of the population was also acknowledged by Mustafa Kemal soon after the opening of the Grand National Assembly, when he noted that those who constituted the assembly were not only Turks, Circassians, Kurds or Laz, but they were elements of a united Islamic community (Kirişci and Winrow, 1997: 79). Similarly, although the majority of Muslims belonged to the Sunni sect of Islam, there was also a significant *Alevi* population.

However, both the number and the distribution of the population dramatically changed due to the developments occurring in the first two decades of the 20th century. In particular, the proportion of Muslims and non-Muslims changed. The reasons for such a shift in favor of the Muslim population were as follows: the wars that had been going on for decades, the independence of the Balkan countries since the Second Meshrutiyet and, perhaps most important, the linguistic and religious homogenization of the Anatolian population by the Committee of Union and Progress.³⁷ Thus, as Tekeli points out:

The population of Anatolia decreased from 17.5 million to 12 million in the period between 1912 and 1922; that means 30 percent of the population was lost.” Indeed, not only did the population decrease, but also the ethno-religious and linguistic composition of the population changed. For instance, 1.350.000 out of 1.5 million Greeks were sent to Greece in line with the treaty signed with Greece. Similarly, 700.000 Armenians were deported under the pretext of having revolted against the Ottoman state (Tekeli, 1990: 61).

³⁶ For more on the demographic composition of Turkey in this period, see Karpas (1985)

³⁷ For more information about the CUP's population policy in general and resettlement of the Muslim elements in particular, see Dündar (2001).

In short, when the Republic of Turkey was established, the population of Anatolia was relatively homogeneous compared with the preceding two decades. However, the existing demographic composition was still a significant issue, precisely because this was an obstacle for the creation of a homogeneous society and nation. To overcome this obstacle and build a nation, different instruments were employed. If not the most common, resettlement of the population was one of the most significant policies employed to reach this goal. The resistance and reactions in the Kurdish regions contributed to the acceleration of the employment of this strategy.

Deportation and resettlement strategies were applied at many times and on different levels. The most extensive one, as mentioned previously, was applied in 1934 based on the Law of Settlement numbered 2510 and dated 10 June 1934. According to Yıldız (2001) this law is a law disclosing the racial dimension of Kemalist nationalism as it is expressed around the concepts of race, blood and descent. Its apparent aim is to secure unity in “language, culture and blood’. Having been prepared very carefully, the law consisted of 50 articles and introduced the basic principles of resettlement. The second article of the law divides Turkey into three regions of settlement. The first region of settlement is defined as places where a concentration of the population having Turkish culture is desired to be located. Region number two included the areas allocated to the population to be assimilated into Turkish culture. The places to be evacuated and prohibited from settlement and residence for reasons of geography, health, economics, culture, military and discipline, constitute the region number three. The other articles of the law outline the settlement process. Needless to say, to examine each article goes beyond the

limits of this study. I will instead address first the underlying objective of the law and then focus on its application and results.

The primary aim of the Law of Settlement was to secure linguistic and cultural homogenization. Thus, it attempts to re-arrange the demographic composition by resettlement of the population. The areas where the population with Turkish culture is desired to be concentrated would be settled by the population belonging to Turkish culture on the one hand, and the population to be assimilated into Turkish culture would be resettled in the areas where Turkish culture prevailed on the other. In this respect, “the law is basically a law of assimilation, taking ‘adherence to Turkish culture’ and speaking Turkish as a mother tongue as starting points, geared particularly towards non-Turkish Muslim ethnicities, namely Kurds and Arabs” (Yıldız: 2001).

The Law not only strove to reconstruct a homogeneous nation on the basis of a common Turkish language and culture, it also aimed to deconstruct traditional social stratification including such elements as aghas who derived their power from big landownership, tribalism based on kinship ties and sheikhs who gained their power from religion. Article 10 of the law in particular deals with the regulation of traditional social structure. Although it was not expressed openly, it seems the Law of Settlement had other aims, as well, the most important of which was to punish local notables, who resisted the central power, by exiling them to other parts of the country.³⁸

Moreover, this law also provided for the resettlement of non-Muslim minorities, particularly Armenians and Jews. The goal behind the resettlement of non-Muslims, just like in the resettlement of the non-Turkish population, was

³⁸ The transfer of those who were loyal to the government during the revolt and those who served the government for the suppression of the revolt were to be *postponed* (italics added).

to assimilate them into Turkish culture and identity. The method suggested for this project is expressed in Article 11 as follows: Those citizens whose mother tongues were not Turkish could not set up a communion, a village, a quarter, a group or an association of workers or artisans. As a result, the Jews in Thrace and the Armenians living in different parts of Anatolia were deported to Istanbul.

The law also regulated the conditions of the admission of emigrants.³⁹ The first sections of the six articles, which begin with Article Three and proceed to Article Eight, entitled “The Admission of Emigrants and Refugees,” are devoted to this issue. Similar to the resettlement of the domestic population, the determining criterion in the admission of emigrants was belonging to Turkish descent and the ability to speak the Turkish language, as regulated by Article Three. The reason underlying this policy of emigrant settlement was to increase the Turkish population of the country. This would be realized especially by their resettlement in the regions that were intended to be assimilated into Turkish culture.

Detailed information regarding both the resettled population and those that returned to their previous provinces, with the exception of that provided by Tekeli, is sorely lacking. According to Tekeli (1990: 64); based on this law, 5,074 households with 25,831 people were deported from the following provinces to western parts of Turkey: Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Çoruh, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Erzurum, Erzincan, Kars, Malatya, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli and Van. These populations were required to stay in the places where they were settled.

³⁹ Between 1923 and 1937 a total of 771.611 people were accepted to Turkey either as refugees or as a result of the population exchange with Greece. 8,017 of these were resettled in the Eastern provinces. However, a great majority of these people left their designated locations (Koca, 1998: 335) and moved to other regions of Turkey.

However, as indicated by Tekeli (1990: 64), after the passage to a multi-party political system, two laws were implemented in 1947 and 1948 which gave permission to those that had been previously deported to resettle in their native regions, which resulted in the return of 5,045 households with 27,323 people to their native lands.

3.4. The Political Sphere and the Representation of the Kurdish Populated Periphery

In considering the center-periphery relations with specific reference to the Kurdish-populated periphery, several questions emerge with regard to the political sphere: What was the nature of the relationship between the center and the Kurdish-populated periphery in terms of politics? In other words, what was the basic pattern of political participation and political representation in the region? What were the strategies pursued in order to provide political integration? The following section addresses such questions by focusing on the deputies that made it to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) as the representatives of the region throughout the period under consideration. Before going into this discussion, however, let us briefly look at the political structure and election system in this period.

3.4.1. Political Structure and Electoral Process During the Single-Party Period

Although some have offered different interpretations regarding the political structure of this period, it has conventionally been accepted that the strictly centrist single-party rule dominated the political sphere. For instance, the political scientist Sunar (2004: 70) depicts this period as one in which the political structure was characterized by a state-dominated, mono-party

authoritarianism. The authoritarian regime of the early Republic was marked not by its populist incorporation but by its exclusion of the masses (Sunar, 2004: 72). Özbudun's evaluations of the single-party period under the CHP rule are in agreement with Sunar's observations. According to Özbudun,

The CHP's rule neatly fits the exclusionary one-party type, where the party maintains its monopoly over political participation by limiting the scope of political participation, rather than by either liquidating or assimilating the subordinate social force (Özbudun, 1976: 45).

The election system and election laws are in conformity with the political system. The elections held during the single-party period were conducted according to the electoral law of 1877, namely *İntihab-ı Mebusan Kanunu* [The Law on the Election of Deputies] (Koçak, 2005; Uyar, 1999). This law, which underwent some changes throughout this period,⁴⁰ required two round elections. According to this system, the 'primary voters' (*müntehibi evvel*) elected the 'second round voters' (*müntehibi sani*) and then the 'second round voters' elected the MPs (parliamentarians). The 'second voters' and the MPs were both elected for a specified portion of the population. In order to vote, one had to be a Turkish citizen and over the legal age for voting. Similarly, as far as the right to be elected was concerned, one had to be a Turkish citizen and over 30 years of age.

These were the basic principles of the electoral system that were defined by the law. However, there were also some practical aspects, such as

⁴⁰ The most important changes were brought about by the electoral law accepted in 1935. First, women were given the right to vote and be elected as MPs. Second; the portion of the population for each MP and second voter was changed. Third, for the first time in the Republican history [including the period of the national resistance movement (*milli mücadele*)] members of minority groups were nominated as candidates, in order for the communities of the non-Muslim minority to be represented too, as had been the tradition of the Ottoman parliament. The fourth and final change was that the legal age for voting was raised from 18 to 22 (Koçak, 2005).

the determination of candidates and voting, which were not defined by the law and yet, were complementary factors of the representative political system. As mentioned above, a two-round electoral system was applied throughout this period. The CHP had absolute authority to decide both the second voters and the candidates. The Party's local headquarters determined the second voters and presented them to primary voters (Uyar, 1998: 269). The primary electors had no alternative to the list that was announced by the party and had to vote for the candidates nominated by the CHP (Koçak, 2005).

A similar procedure was employed for determining the parliamentary candidates. The party's top-level executive committee that was composed of the head of the party, the Secretary General and the Attorney General, determined the candidates.⁴¹ However, the party leader had a key role in this process. As Uyar (1999: 27) points out: "Throughout the Single-Party Era, candidates for parliament, were generally determined by Atatürk during his period, and later by İnönü in his own period." To become a candidate, in addition to the requirements that were introduced by the electoral law, the following condition was necessary: "the candidate's only duty was to gain the confidence of the party leader. This meant absolute loyalty to the leader, to the regime, to the party and to government" (Koçak, 2005).

Thus, once the party nominated a person, he would be elected as an MP, even with a single vote, because the second voters, who were themselves members of the CHP, had to vote for the candidates presented by the party

⁴¹As Frey (1965: 14) argues "*individuals sometimes found themselves nominated and then elected to a deputyship without ever having been personally consulted*. For example, Ali Rıza Türel, who later became the Minister of Justice, was asked by a reporter just how he became a deputy. He replied: 'I was Assistant Prosecutor in Izmir. I saw my name among the list of candidates which was published [in the newspaper], and I so learned'" [emphasis added].

(Koçak, 2005). Moreover, refusing to vote for the party's candidates would mean subjection to disciplinary measures, including expulsion from the party (Uyar, 1998). The electoral process was described by Fethi Okyar (who was the Prime Minister between 1924 and 1925) in this manner: "the Single-Party era had started to fully function with all of its specialty and the political life had become solely composed of counting the names that had been given to the second voters who put them into boxes, from one election to the next" (cited in Tunçay, 1981:149).

Indeed, the party program of the CHP of 1931 had accepted single-round elections as a principle. However, it was stated that until the voters gained sufficient political, social and cultural knowledge enabling them to take an informed decision, it would be more appropriate and in conformity with the idea of democracy to select the secondary voters, whom they knew closely and trusted. Until the citizens were given the necessary education and reached the high standards desired, the ruling party would continue to use the two-round election system (Koçak, 2005 and Uyar, 1998).

The electoral system and the method of the nomination of candidates, as has been depicted above, demonstrate that the characteristics of deputies did not reflect the political structure in the region; but rather the political perspective that dominated the center. Nevertheless, the data about the deputies from the region partly illuminates the representation of the region, its political preferences and the dynamics of the integration with the center.

3.4.2. Social Characteristics of Deputies of the Region

In order to better grasp the strategies and instruments employed by the center in its shaping of the political sphere of the period and in its attempts to include

the periphery, the educational and occupational backgrounds of regional deputies must be examined. There were a total of six consecutive periods in the functioning of the Assembly. A total of 2,362⁴² deputies took part in these Assemblies, 213 of these deputies entered the Parliament in order to represent the Kurdish regions.⁴³ The data concerning educational and occupational characteristics as well as places of birth of these parliamentarians provides enlightening information regarding the political system of the single-party era in general and center-periphery relations during this period in particular. Let me start with a very fundamental indicator, the distribution of parliamentarians by birthplace (see Table 3.1 below).

3.4.2.1. Birthplace: From Uncertain to Certain

Some researchers (Frey, 1965 and Tachau, 1980) evaluate the dominant political system in a society on the basis of the relationship between the birthplaces of the representatives and the constituencies that they represent. These researchers define the high proportion of deputies born in the province/region represented as a sign of localism and regionalism, and the low proportion as an indicator of strong centralism. The same researchers explain the low proportion of locally born deputies as the sign of the fact that the center lacks confidence in those regions. Based on this observation, one scholar concludes that “the political parties -in Turkey- have tended to grant a higher

⁴² In fact the total quota was 2,203 (DIE: 2004:11), however, following the re-appointments to the emptied posts due to deaths and resignations, the number reached 2,362 (Öztürk, 1995a and 1995b; Güneş, 1995; Çoker, 1995b) (Reappointments for the years of 1939 and 1943 were missing in above calculations)

⁴³ The debate about the deputies, throughout the following pages, is based on the data derived from the following sources: Çoker, 1995a and 1995b; Güneş, 1995; Öztürk, 1995a and 1995b; TBMM, 1994.

degree of local representation to the delegations from those areas of which they were unsure” (Frey, 1965: 191).

Table 3.1 The Number and Percentage of Deputies of the Region by Birthplace, 1923-1943

	ASSEMBLIES													
Birth Place	II [1923]		III [1927]		IV [1931]		V [1935]		VI [1939]		VII [1943]		Total	
Region Istanbul Izmir Other Provinces Abroad Total	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
	35	80	12	46	10	40	8	21	9	22	7	18	81	38
	2	5	3	12	4	16	8	21	10	24	13	34	40	19
			1	4	2	8	2	5	3	7	3	8	10	5
	4	9	5	19	4	16	8	21	8	20	9	24	39	18
	3	7	5	19	5	20	13	33	11	27	6	16	43	20

Source: Çoker, 1995a and 1995b; Güneş, 1995; Öztürk, 1995a and 1995b; TBMM, 1994.

The first and perhaps the most striking figure is the sharp decrease in the rate of the deputies born in the region of constituency represented. During the period between 1923 and 1946, the proportion of the deputies born in the region diminished from 80 percent in the Second Assembly (in 1923) to 18 percent in the Seventh Assembly (in 1943). The first reason that comes into mind is geographical mobility. However, it is difficult to explain this drastic change in relation to the degree of geographical mobility, which particularly before the end of the Second World War was less effective.⁴⁴ The proportion of the representatives born in the rest of Turkey also prevents us from explaining the sharp decline in the rate of deputies born in the region only with geographical mobility. If geographical mobility was the reason behind the disproportional distribution of deputies' birthplaces, we may expect similar fluctuations in the number of representatives born in the rest of Turkey.

⁴⁴ As aptly stated by Frey (1965:186), before the end of the Second World War, over 90 percent of the people residing in the region was born there. According to the data of the DIE (2002), amongst the provinces under consideration, the rate of the residents that were born in these provinces were more than 90 percent, except for Ağrı (77% in 1935) and Van (89% in 1935).

Therefore, the proportional distribution of deputies by birthplace needs to be considered in more detail.

Some possible assumptions can be raised here. One may assume that the CHP was unsure about the region and thus hesitated to depend on local nominees or could not find reliable delegates born in the region. Similarly, one may also argue that the CHP had been dissatisfied with the locally born representatives that were elected before. Or perhaps the nomination of a high degree of locally born delegates, as was the case with the Second Assembly, was a strategy that lasted until the consolidation of party power. After consolidating its power, the CHP did not need to collaborate with local representatives any more and appointed the ones that seemed to be more reliable from outside of the region.

However, in my opinion, the reason behind the decrease in the rate of the locally born deputies goes beyond the limits of these assumptions and should be examined in a broader framework. Taking into account both the electoral system and the strict process of nominating candidates, this situation stemmed from the CHP's political and ideological preferences that can be defined as elitist, centrist and conservative. The elitist attitude of the CHP may also be observed in the data concerning educational backgrounds of the representatives. As the figures of the parliamentarians' educational data will reveal, the CHP avoided candidates with a lower level of education, preferring instead to depend on well-educated representatives. The strict centrist attitude resulted not only in nominating the representatives that were born in different provinces, but also in the application of a two-stage electoral system. The high proportion of representatives who were reelected to the next Assembly lends

further support to my argument that the CHP was very conservative. As our case shows, the reelection rate was more than 65 percent overall and the proportion of reelected deputies was more than 85 percent in the Third (1927) and Fourth (1931) Assemblies.

The second significant figure is the high rate of the locally born representatives in the Second Assembly in 1923. In this Assembly, the rate is 80 percent, which is much higher than the average of the entire country (60 percent) (Frey, 1965: 188) and has also elevated above the rate of the representatives of the region (75 percent) in the First Assembly in 1920, an Assembly well known for being the most pluralistic in terms of ethnic, linguistic, religious, occupational, and geographical diversity of the entire Republican history. This discrepancy between the rates in the First and Second Assemblies can be explained in two ways. First, it can be argued that it emanated from the efforts of the CHP to integrate the region into the newly constructed society. Second, when one bears in mind the political atmosphere of the period and especially the power struggle in the First Assembly, one can interpret it as a political maneuver. When scrutinizing closely the composition of the future assemblies, the second interpretation, rather than the first, seems more tenable. It is quite difficult to account for this situation as a result of the CHP's regionalist tendencies or as a result of the project of political integration of the region. Instead, the reason must be the political polarization and opposition that appeared in the First Assembly. The opposition in the First Assembly and the political atmosphere of that time might have compelled Mustafa Kemal and his friends to nominate locally born delegates.

The third interesting finding from the table 3.1 is the fact that the proportion of deputies who were born in Istanbul and Izmir sharply increased over time. Although they constituted five percent of the representatives of the region in 1923, the proportion augmented gradually and they became the largest group, with 42 percent, in 1943. This group is the second largest group with 24 percent total. Indeed, the overrepresentation of deputies born particularly in Istanbul is not specific to the region.⁴⁵ As indicated by Frey (1965: 186-187) “the disproportionate inclusion of deputies born in the Marmara area –overwhelmingly from the city of Istanbul- seems to have been strongest in the single party period”.

Finally, the proportion of deputies who were born outside Turkey also deserves particular attention. The parliamentarians that were born outside Turkey constituted 18 percent in total. More interestingly, this group was the largest group with 33 percent in the Fifth Assembly. This situation would be reasonable due to the developments that took place in the late Ottoman Empire and the early years of the Republic, i.e. the loss of land and the exchange of population between Turkey and Greece. However, looking at the internal distribution of this group, it is easily discernable that the proportion of deputies born in the Aegean and the Balkans is almost 70 percent.

Kirişçi and Winrow (1997: 105) explain the low rate of the locally-born deputies on the basis of the opposition that emerged in the Kurdish regions.

According to Kirişçi and Winrow

⁴⁵ As pointed out by Frey (1965: 186-187) “In the First Assembly, before the assumption of firm control by Mustafa Kemal, the number of deputies born in the Marmara-Istanbul region corresponded quite closely to the population of that region. Then, in Second Assembly, the beginning of one-party period, the proportion of *Istanbullular* (those born in Istanbul) rose sharply. This proportion continued to rise essentially throughout the remainder of the People’s Party era. The peak was reached in the Seventh Assembly, when one deputy out of every three had been born in the Marmara-Istanbul region.”

The government became increasingly intolerant of any opposition to its policies. Mustafa Kemal and the leadership of the CHP, the single party in power, handpicked all parliamentary deputies. As a result, the constituencies mostly populated by Kurds had the lowest percentage of locally born deputies. A Kurd who refused to support the government policies on modernization and nation-building could not participate in the work of the assembly and government (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 105).

Although I agree with this assessment, I find it incomplete. As Frey shows, the rate of locally born deputies was consistent for the whole Assembly. According to Frey

A high degree of localism is apparent in the First Assembly (1920), with some 62 percent of all deputies for whom I have information being born in the province represented in the parliament. This percentage declined slightly in the Second Assembly, and then more rapidly in each of the following Assemblies of the Atatürk era until it reached a low of 34 percent in the Fifth and final Atatürk Assembly (1935) (Frey, 1965: 187-188).

This situation can be evaluated on the basis of Mardin's argument regarding the center's view of the periphery. As Mardin argues (1973: 182) "the fact is that between 1923 and 1946 the periphery -in the sense of provinces- was suspect, and because it was considered an area of potential disaffection, the political center kept it under close observation."

3.4.2.2. Education: The Erudite Representatives of the Uneducated Masses

The distribution of the educational background of the deputies that represented the region throughout the single party period is portrayed in Table 3.2 below. The following conclusions are immediately obvious: First, the university-educated representatives constitute the largest group with 40 percent total. Unlike other categories, this group increased gradually. If the military school category is regarded as university level, the number and proportion will elevate

even more sharply. Second, although there were some slight fluctuations over time, the rates of all other categories diminished. Third, primary school-educated representatives constitute the lowest group. There are only 1 out of 213 deputies whose highest level of completed education is primary school. The proportion of representatives educated at *medrese*, religious school, is lower than 1 percent in the aggregate; however, 12 deputies indicated that they also received *medrese* education besides the middle and high school level education. Finally, a note about the private category is necessary. It is a very ambiguous category with no available information, making it rather ineffectual.

Table 3.2 The Deputies of the Region by Educational Level, 1923-1943

	ASSEMBLIES													
Birth Place	II [1923]		III [1927]		IV [1931]		V [1935]		VI [1939]		VII [1943]		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
University	9	21	7	27	8	32	18	46	20	49	23	61	85	40
Military School	9	21	8	31	9	36	13	33	9	22	7	19	55	26
High School	8	18	5	19	3	12	4	10	6	15	5	13	31	15
Middle School	12	27	4	15	2	8	2	5	4	10	3	8	27	13
Primary School	1	2											1	
Medrese*					1	4	1	3					2	
Private**	5	11	2	8	2	8	1	3	1	2			11	5
Unknown									1	2			1	
Total	44	100	26	100	25	100	39	100	41	100	38	100	213	100

Source: Çoker, 1995a and 1995b; Güneş, 1995; Öztürk, 1995a and 1995b; TBMM, 1994

* 12 deputies declared that had received medrese education in addition to middle and high school.

** What is meant by the private category is not clear. Practically, there is no more information about it.

Before evaluating the significance and implications of these statistics, one other observation should be highlighted. The findings regarding the educational backgrounds of the representatives of the region are valid for the whole country in general. In other words, the same pattern can be discerned in the single party period Assemblies across the board. For instance, according to Frey

Over 60 percent of the 2,210 Turkish deputies serving between 1920 and 1957 had obtained some training at the *university* level. If the group for which I lack information is excluded, this proportion rises to almost three of every four deputies with some university training (Frey, 1965: 43).

One might expect, therefore, that the educational level of the various representatives would be reflective of their constituent regions. However, the educational level of representatives of both the Kurdish regions and the whole country is equally high. Moreover, there is a sharp contradiction between deputies' educational level and that of the whole population. In an attempt to explain this situation, I propose that such discrepancies between representatives and population stemmed from the elitist attitudes of the CHP. Politics, in its essence, is the work of the well educated and knowledgeable. However, such a sharp gap between the educational level of representatives and that of the rest of society can only be a result of political elitism.

3.4.2.3. Occupation: Former Officials, New Politicians

Before considering the occupational background of the deputies as outlined in Table 3.3 below, the system of occupational classification should be explained. The classification that I will use throughout this study is based to a great extent on Frey's classification (1965), though there are some differences. Following Frey's classification, the professional category includes lawyer, public notary, doctor, dentist, engineer, pharmacist, veterinary doctor, contractor and banker. The official category covers those vocations whose primary orientation was the performance of a state function and nearly all were state employees. Frey categorized a deputy that was a lawyer working for the government under the "professional"; whereas I classified the same person under the category

“official”. Similarly, I preferred to evaluate *journalism and writer* under the professional category, while Frey placed them in the independent category.

Table 3.3 Occupational Backgrounds of the Deputies of the Region, 1923-1943

OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS			ASSEMBLIES						
Major		Minor	2 [1923]	3 [1927]	4 [1931]	5 [1935]	6 [1939]	7 [1943]	General Total
Official	Military	count	8	7	8	14	10	8	55
		%	18.2	26.9	32	35.9	24.4	21.1	25.8
	Education	count	6	2	2	4	3	8	25
		%	13.6	7.7	8	10.3	7.3	21.1	11.7
	Government	count	3	5	6	4	4	3	25
		%	6.8	19.2	24	10.3	9.8	7.9	11.7
	Law	count	5	3	2	2	3	4	19
		%	11.4	11.5	8	5.1	7.3	10.5	8.9
Officers	count	10	3	3	7	8	8	39	
	%	22.7	11.5	12	17.9	19.5	21.1	18.3	
	Official Total	count	32	20	21	31	28	31	163
	%	72.7	76.9	84	79.5	68.3	81.6	76.5	
Professionals	Law	count	2	2	2	3	4	3	16
		%	4.5	7.7	8	7.7	9.8	7.9	7.5
	Medicine	count				1			1
		%				2.6			0.5
	Engineering	count					1	1	2
		%					2.4	2.6	0.9
	Economics	count					1		1
		%					2.4		0.5
Journalism-Writer	count	1	2	1	2	3		9	
	%	2.3	7.7	4	5.1	7.3		4.2	
	Professionals Total	count	3	4	3	6	9	4	29
	%	6.8	15.4	12	15.4	22	10.5	13.6	
Agriculture & Trade		count	8	1		1	3	2	15
		%	18.2	3.8		2.6	7.3	5.3	7
Religion		count	1	1	1	1	1		5
		%	2.3	3.8	4	2.6	2.4		2.3
Others		count						1	1
		%						2.6	0.5
General Total		count	44	26	25	39	41	38	213
		%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Çoker, 1995a and 1995b; Güneş, 1995; Öztürk, 1995a and 1995b; TBMM, 1994.

When we look at the occupational distribution of parliamentarians we observe that the “official” category constitutes the largest group with 77 percent. Indeed, this category is much more than 77 percent, since a

significant number of deputies belonging to other categories have also had an official background, making the official category even more dominant. The internal distribution of this category is as follows: The deputies who had military occupation constitute the largest group with 26 percent (for the whole Assembly II-III-IV and V the average of this group was 17 percent). The second largest group in this category is the local level bureaucrats with 18 percent. The governors and the 'official' lawyers constitute the last two groups with 10 and 9 percent, respectively.

The professionals constitute the second largest category with 14 percent in the aggregate. Compared to other professions, lawyers are quite dominant, constituting eight percent of the total, while journalists comprise four percent. The last three professions are engineering, medicine and banking that together constitute less than two percent in the aggregate.

The last two categories are agriculture-trade and religion. Seven percent of the representatives declared their occupation in the fields of agriculture and trade. The deputies who have religious occupational background constitute two percent of the aggregate. However, the proportion should not mislead the readers as there is actually only one deputy that had a religious occupation who was nominated five times.

The results that can be deduced from the table go beyond the limits of those numbers briefly stated above, however. First, the occupational background of deputies reflects neither the regional nor the national level occupational distribution of the population. In other words, there is a sharp difference between the occupational background of deputies and the population they represent. For instance, "while the dominant field of occupation for the

Turkish male population, fifteen years of age and over, in the selected years was agriculture, with higher than 65 percent” (Frey, 1965: 81), the rate of deputies engaged in agriculture is less than seven percent.

The second, and I think the most noteworthy finding, is related to the political sphere and the domination of the officials over politics. The borders between politics and the state have disappeared. Thus, the political sphere is overwhelmingly dictated by the official elites. The internal distribution of the deputies by occupational background is not merely a matter of over or under representation of one specific group. It also reflects the decision-makers’ perception of the political system in general and the role of the politicians in particular.

Third, as a result of this perception, the army officers and the administrative officials have constituted the first two largest groups, together with more than 50 percent in the aggregate.

Finally, the under representation of the religious category can also be evaluated in relation to this perception. As pointed out above, although the proportion of deputies with a religious occupational background was 2 percent, this proportion belongs to only one deputy, who was elected five times.

3.4.3. The Modernizing Elites and the Local Notables

As argued above, the majority of the representatives was born outside of the region and had no local connections with provinces they represented. However, there is a group of deputies who were born in the region and had strong local connections that were favored by the CHP for a long time. Some of these deputies were lifetime deputies. Here, I would like to pay particular attention to the deputies who were nominated by the CHP for four or more times, with

specific reference to the following questions: Why have they been favored for such a long time? What were their distinctive features? And did they share any common traits?

When considering the social and historical background of these parliamentarians, three trends surface. First, they either had connections with the CUP, organized and participated in the activities of the SDRA-R, or supported the War of Independence. Halil Hulki Apaydın, who was appointed as Siirt deputy throughout the single party period, was a *müftü* (doctor of Islamic Law) and he belonged to a family of sheikh. He was engaged in politics through the CUP, of which he had been the administrative secretary for some time. He also founded the Siirt branch of SDRA-R, which he himself directed. Şeref Uluğ and Feyzi Piriñççioğlu, who belonged to the same famous, land-owning family, were appointed as Diyarbakır deputies repeatedly. Both of them had been founding members of the eastern branch of the SDRA-R in Diyarbakır. Moreover, Piriñççioğlu was exiled to Malta due to the role he played in the Armenian massacres. He also had a *green-banded independence medal* and was a delegate in the Lausanne Conference. He was nominated for five terms as the Diyarbakır deputy. Indeed, I think involvement in the SDRA-R or support for the War of Independence must have been a necessary but not sufficient requirement for being favored and nominated by the CHP, simply because at that time it was not very unusual to come across someone with these qualifications.

This point may be illustrated best by the case of the two famous landlord families of Diyarbakır, namely the Cemilpaşazadeler and the Piriñççizadeler. The Cemilpaşazadeler had Kurdish nationalist sentiments and some members

of this family were active in the Kurdish nationalist movement.⁴⁶ However, they also had relations with Mustafa Kemal, when he was a military officer in Diyarbakır in 1916-1917 (Malmisanij, 2004: 138-140 and Silopi, 1991: 43). This relationship continued after Mustafa Kemal left Diyarbakır and, particularly during the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal remained in communication with them in order to secure their support. Thus, some members of this family, together with Piriñçizadeler and some other local influential figures, founded the Eastern branch of the SDRA-R in Diyarbakır (Malmisanij, 2004) and supported the War of Independence. However, after the establishment of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal not only avoided contacting them and nominating any of them to the Assembly, but he also exiled this family to Syria.

Unlike Cemilpaşazadeler, the Piriñçizadeler had never been active in the Kurdish nationalist movement. On the contrary, they always had good relations with the state and they gained important positions in local and central administrative units (Arslan, 1992 and Çoker, 1995a). As mentioned above, some members of this family had taken part in the foundation of the Eastern branch of the SDRA-R and supported the Independence War. The relationship between Mustafa Kemal and the Piriñçizadeler, which began in 1916, continued after the establishment of the Republic. As a result, three members of this family, Feyzi Piriñçioğlu, Şeref Uluğ and Ziya Gökalp, the first two of whom had also been in the First Assembly and were on the side of the First Group, were nominated to the National Assembly by the CHP several times. The discrepancy in the way these two different families were treated stemmed from their opposite conceptions of identity politics.

⁴⁶ For more information about this family and their role in the Kurdish national movement see; Malmisanij: 2004.

As can be deduced from this case, which can be enriched with various other examples, participation in the activities of the SDRA-R and supporting the War of Independence was not enough to be favored and nominated by the CHP. Such preference by the state over such a long period of time required the presence of additional qualifications, including: the acknowledgement of the modernization project, the acceptance of the collective identity proposed by the Kemalist elites and the passionate defense of the Turkification policies. Mehmet Refet Ülgen, who was a deputy of Urfa between 1923 and 1946, is a good example in this respect. He believed in the Kemalist modernization project and its application in the region as evidenced by his activities in the Assembly: “He suggested ten law proposals when he was in the Assembly. Three of them were: speaking Turkish in Turkey, to have primary school education in Turkish schools and to receive boarding students to middle and high schools” (Öztürk, 1995a: 775). İlyas Sami Muş, the deputy of Muş and Bitlis in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Assemblies and later of Çoruh in the 5th Assembly, and Mahmut Soydan, the deputy of Siirt 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Assemblies until his death in 1936, were the members of the Committee of Preparing the Constitution of 1924 and signed the final report, which stressed that:

Our state is a nation-state. [It is] Not a multi-national state. The State does not recognize any nation except for the Turkish nation. In the country, there are people who should have equal rights and who also come from another race. However, it is not permissible to grant them rights according to their racial characteristics and to voice words that are loaded with such a meaning (cited in Göldaş, 1997: 229).

Another very interesting example is İbrahim Arvas, who belonged to a famous sheikh family in Hakkari. He was in all the Assemblies between 1920 and 1950 as the deputy for Van and Hakkari. His elder brother, Abdullah, and

his uncle, Masum, joined the SDRA-R as a delegation of Van and supported the War of Independence. However, both Abdullah and Masum and their children were exiled after the Sheikh Said Revolt. Arvas believed that, in their essence, the Kurds are Turks who had forgotten their language, culture and identity. In his memoirs, *Tarihi Hakikatler* (Historical Truths), which he published in 1964, he explains these ideas in detail. “Therefore”, he says,

The great task of our administrative officers is to teach the Turkish language and to train this people with Turkish culture, the majority of whom are Turks. [...] Every headman and civil servant of villages in addition to the administrative officers of province, town, district and villages should initiate courses outside [regular] schools in order to teach Turkish. And with rewards, they should make it attractive and encourage it. If one works in such a sincere and serious manner, at most in a period of four or five years, the number of people not-speaking Turkish will diminish a lot (Arvas, 1964: 26).

The last apparent requirement to receive the favor of the CHP was loyalty to Mustafa Kemal and absolute obedience to his authority. The best example is Feridun Fikri Düşünsel who represented Dersim (Tunceli) in the Second Assembly. Düşünsel graduated from the Faculty of Law, got his PhD in France and became a lawyer (Öztürk, 1995a). He was nominated by Atatürk in the elections held in 1923 and was a member of the Committee for Preparing the Constitution of 1924 (Göldaş, 1997).

Despite his loyalty to modernization and Turkification projects, Düşünsel was not able to become a deputy during Atatürk’s lifetime: first, he voted against the Law of Maintenance and Order, becoming the only one among the deputies of the region present in the voting who rejected this law (Göldaş, 1997). His objection to this law was completely legal in nature. He believed that the current laws were sufficient and that there was no need for a new law. That

is to say, the reason underlying his opposition was not political, but legal.⁴⁷ The second explanation for his not being a deputy was the fact that he was a constitutive member⁴⁸ of Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (the Progressive Republican Party)⁴⁹.

Similarly, İhsan Hamit Tiğrel,⁵⁰ who had been in the Second Assembly as a Diyarbakır deputy, was not nominated again until 1946, when the first multi-party elections took place. Like Düşünsel, Tiğrel was also a member of constitutive committee of the TpCF. There was yet another reason that made these two deputies suspect regarding their loyalty to Atatürk and the regime. Düşünsel did not attend the meetings for the legal proceedings about the constitution of the First Inspectorate General. Tiğrel, on the other hand, participated in these meetings, but abstained from voting (Koçak, 2003: 63).

We may conclude that these three criteria, and most particularly the last two, determined the borders of the political sphere throughout the single party

⁴⁷ For the full text of the meetings on the Law of Maintenance of Order and for Düşünsel's ideas in these meetings, see Göldaş, 1997.

⁴⁸ In fact, this case was not specific to these two deputies. According to Tunçay (1981: 109), only two of the 29 deputies, namely, Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Refet Bele, were re-elected during Atatürk's lifetime.

⁴⁹ The Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, which was closed down due in part to its cooperation with the Sheikh Said Revolt, "wanted separation of powers, greater control over the government by the assembly and an end to the rather random judiciary as represented by the independence courts" (Keyder, 1987a: 85). For more information about TpCF see, Emrence, 2006 and Tunçay, 1981.

⁵⁰ Hamit Tiğrel belongs to Tiğreller family, which is a big land-owning family of Diyarbakır (Arslan, 1992: 62). After Atatürk's death, Tiğrel was once again nominated in 1946. In 1948, he made a speech at the Grand National Assembly regarding the people of the East and Southeast of Turkey, saying: "some have forgotten their native language and are using a foreign tongue. The reason behind this is 450 years of neglect. From now on, these people must not be left to perversion and ignorance. Education is imperative to the spread of national culture in that region" (cited in Goloğlu, 1982: 222). Two other members of this family, Zülfü Tiğrel and his son Hamit Zülfü, were also in the parliament at various times. Zülfü, who was an advisor-delegate in the Lausanne Treaty, was nominated for five terms as a Diyarbakır deputy (Çoker, 1995a).

period. The representatives who fulfilled these criteria were nominated again and again, regardless of their social origins. As aptly pointed out by Özbudun

The local nobility, being relatively well-educated and exposed to western civilization, was more likely to support such a program than the more traditionally oriented peasant masses, provided that the revolution did not touch the sources of their local power. Thus, an implicit tradeoff materialized between the two groups. The local nobility supported the modernization program of the national military-bureaucratic elite, in return for which it was allowed to retain its land, status, and local influence, as evidenced in the conspicuous absence of any real land reform under the Republican governments (Özbudun, 1970:389).

Beşikçi evaluates the long-term relationship between the CHP and the local notables from a different perspective. He defines those who were deputies for a lifetime as “objectively Kurdish” and he explains the reason for the CHP’s preference of them on the basis of the fact that they denied their Kurdishness and advocated Turkishness (Beşikçi, 1991a: 200-213).

3.5. Regional Economic Policies in the State Sponsored Development Model

3.5.1. The Economic Panorama of Turkey in 1920s

When the republic was founded, the economic structure of Turkey with respect to accumulated capital, qualified work force, industrial substructure, and the like, was in dire straits. Turkey’s efforts, as a peripheral country, to integrate into the capitalist world system for about a century, on the one hand, and the wars, which had persisted over the last decade, on the other, had significantly impacted this situation.

Agriculture was the main sector in the economy, not only in terms of employment⁵¹ but also with respect to national income⁵² and exports.⁵³ Despite its prominent position at the center of the economy, however, agriculture can be said to have been underdeveloped in many respects. First, the area cultivated for agricultural purposes, whose biggest part was allocated to cereal production,⁵⁴ composed only a small proportion of the total lands.⁵⁵ Second, the technology⁵⁶ used in agricultural production, which was mainly serving the domestic market,⁵⁷ was very primitive. Furthermore, the land tenure structure was very much shaped by the lingering Ottoman tradition, which meant that there were big landlords who held large amount of land, and the small peasants and landless families. In that period in which the petty production pattern⁵⁸ was dominant, such a land tenure structure was out of balance.⁵⁹ In short, in the early period of the republic, Turkey was an agricultural society where the pre-

⁵¹ 81.6 percent of the total employment in 1927 was in agriculture (Barkan, 1980: 449; Tekeli and İkin, 1983: 37).

⁵² Boratav (2006: 51) indicates that during the period between 1923 and 1929 the average share of agriculture in GNDP (with current prices) was 46 percent.

⁵³ Agriculture had a predominant position also in exports. For example, Boratav (2006: 50) indicates that in 1926 tobacco, raisin, cotton, fig, hazelnut, wool, opium and egg constituted 60 to 72 percent of the total exports.

⁵⁴ 90 percent of the cultivated areas/lands was devoted to the production of cereals (DİE, 1973: 86).

⁵⁵ Agricultural lands constituted 5.6 percent of the total land area.

⁵⁶ Although the state eagerly encouraged the mechanization in agriculture, the agricultural technology of the period was limited to mainly to ploughs. According to Tekeli and İkin (1983: 37), the total number of agricultural machines was 15.711. Moreover, there were significant differences regarding the regional distribution of these machines. The Ankara region had the greatest majority of them and it was followed by the Çukurova and Aegean regions.

⁵⁷ According to Keyder, in the years between 1923 and 1929, 20 percent of agricultural produce was being exported (cited in Boratav: 2006: 50).

⁵⁸ The extent of the land that agricultural holdings managed was 25 *dönüm* on average. Nevertheless, in the regions where transportation infrastructure was developed and where there was market-oriented production, this amount would reach about 100 *dönüm* (Tekeli and İkin, 1983: 38).

⁵⁹ For instance, according to Acar (2001:10), in 1913 10 thousand *derebey* and 40 thousand big landlords had 65 percent of the total land. There is not reliable data showing that this situation changed fundamentally in the early Republican period.

capitalist mode of production prevailed, as the following review of various additional aspects of the economy and economic regulations at the time will reveal.

In terms of the level of industrialization and industry's position in the general economic structure, the situation was not very much different in that industry, like agriculture, remained small and underdeveloped. In the 1920s, the proportion of industry in the gross national product was about 11 percent (Boratav, 2006: 51). In the 1927 industrial census, 46 percent of the industrial workers were employed in work places with less than four workers (Boratav, 2006: 52). The industrial production was mainly in food, leather and textile industries.⁶⁰

Development in the area of transportation, which was crucial for the economy and economic growth, was limited to a small number of railways. When the Republic was founded, the total extent of railways in the borders of the country was, according to the most optimistic calculations, 4,177 km⁶¹ (İnan, 1972). While the web of highways was longer in sum, the highways were considerably lower in quality. In short, there was not any sufficient infrastructure, which could hasten the transportation of raw materials to the industrial centers, and the commercial/agricultural products to the markets. That is to say that the country lacked the necessary infrastructure to accommodate the transport of labor and products between different regions.

Another important point about the economic situation of this period was that a class of national bourgeoisie who could lead the way in the process of

⁶⁰ According to Boratav (2006: 52), by 1927, the share of these three groups in industrial production [imalat sanayi] was 87 percent.

⁶¹ A great majority of these lines were managed by international companies. The more important point was the imbalance in the regional distribution of these lines. According to Sönmez (1990: 106), 40 percent of these lines were in the Aegean Region, primarily in İzmir.

national development and industrialization was lacking. To a certain extent, this was because up to this point the economic sector had been dominated by the non-Muslims, who thereby accumulated significantly higher amounts of capital than the Muslims. The regulations which had been initiated over the previous century had been largely in favor of non-Muslims, and had thereby contributed to this unbalanced capital distribution. At this time an important portion of this non-Muslim population had left the country for either population-exchange or for some other reasons, thereby drastically reducing the amount of available local capital (Keyder, 1987a).

Lastly, the Lousanne Treaty, which denoted that Turkish Republic's independence was being recognized on the international level, abolished the capitulations. However, it brought about a set of economic regulations, which were disadvantageous for Turkey. This treaty instituted that the debt⁶² of Ottoman Empire was to be paid to a significant degree by Turkey. It also introduced a set of troublesome regulations in the area of custom tariffs which worked against local-national industry.⁶³

3.5.2. The Economic Situation of the Kurdish-Populated Area in the Early Years of the Republic

The economic structure of the region at hand did not differ considerably from the situation of the national economy. In many areas, including industrialization, mode of production, production technologies, substructure, accumulation of

⁶² In accordance with Lousanne Treaty, the debts of the Ottoman State were distributed among the states that shared the Ottoman lands. Turkey's share was 2/3 of the whole debt and it was required to pay it back by 1929.

⁶³ The most important article was concerning the taxes to be applied to imported and domestic goods. It required that the same rate of consumption and sales tax would be applied to both imported and domestic goods, and yet only the goods under the state monopoly would be allowed to have high prices in order to increase public income (Boratav, 2006: 40).

capital, and the like, however, the region lagged behind the national average. The dominant mode of production was semi-feudal agricultural production that depended on primitive and labor-intensive technologies. More importantly, there was a significant irregularity in the structures of means of production and land ownership. This system, whose historical roots dated back to the land tenure structure known as *yurtluk-ocaklık*,⁶⁴ brought about a privileged

⁶⁴ Many researchers seek for the origins of the semi-feudal structure in the practices of the late Ottoman Empire. In order to be able to better understand the land tenure structure in the region, now let us look at the practices in the Ottoman Empire. The classical organization of land upheld that "all land belonged to the Sultan and the state." The lands were arranged in three categories: *mülk* (freehold land); *vakıf* (land granted for charitable purposes); and *miri* (agricultural land). *Miri* lands were the most important source of income for the state and therefore, were subject to a detailed land regime for the purpose of taxation. The *timar*, as the Ottoman land tenure system was called, was the responsibility of the *sipahis*, the military men, for their service to the state. The *sipahis* were not owners of the land but representatives of the state and responsible for collecting taxes from the *reaya* (peasants) and providing the army with its military needs. The *zeamet* and *has* were granted to the higher-ranking officers and *sancakbeyis* and *beylerbeyis* respectively. However, the *timar* system began to decline and was replaced by the *iltizam* (tax-farming) system after the second half of the sixteenth century. In the *iltizam* system, the agricultural lands were rented out to *mültezims* (tax-farmers) who would organize and undertake the tax collection. The period when the *timar* system began to disintegrate was also the period when the region under consideration started to be taken under Ottoman control. Partly as a result of this, the Ottoman rule applied a different administrative and financial system in the region. There were two types of administrative organization besides the ordinary Ottoman *sancak*, the Kurdish *hükûmets* or *hükûmet sancakları* and the *ekrad sancakları*. The last two had a privileged status comparing to the ordinary *sancaks*.

The *hükûmet sancakları* were donated to their owners for their help and devotion during the Ottomans conquest of the region (Göyünç, 1991). The holder had a ruling position that was determined by inheritance. "The state preferred not to interfere in their succession and internal affairs, and contented itself with recognizing the authority of the rulers" (Özoğlu, 2004: 57). All the revenues in the *hükûmets* belonged to the hereditary Kurdish *bey* who was the head of legal and administrative authority. Thus, the holders did not pay any revenue to the central treasury but provided military forces to the state upon request. In short, *hükûmets* had a great degree of autonomy compared to other forms of *sancaks* and administrative units. So the state did not interfere in either administrative or economic issues unless the *bey* died or betrayed the state, at which point the sultan appointed a new *bey* from the same family. Though the number and geographical borders of *hükûmet sancakları* might have changed over time, they continued to exist until the first half of the 19th century. As result of centralization reforms carried out in the 19th century, this administrative structure was abolished.

Like *hükûmet sancakları*, *ekrad sancakları* were also given to the local powerful Kurdish tribesmen as a grant due to their obedience and service during the Ottoman conquest of the region. The *ekrad sancakları* differed from the *hükûmets* in that they were registered in the tahrir defterleri containing *timar* and *zeamet* (Mutlu: 2002: 82). The holders had the same obligations as all *sipahis* of ordinary *sancaks* did. Thus, the *sancak beyi* had to contribute to the central treasury and supply regiments to the *beylerbeyis* army upon request. However, as pointed out by Bruinessen (1992: 157) "when central authority was strong and the sultan's troops nearby, these Kurdish *sancakbeyis* usually fulfilled their obligations. At other times they tended to go their own way and not to care about their military and financial obligations."

There was another form of organization called *mir-i aşiretlik* in the region. "[M]ir-i aşiretlik, which have *yurtluk-ocaklık* status, were outside of the *sancak* system and the status of

accumulation of land in the hands of a limited number of people. In spite of the land law of 1858 and further regulations of the following periods aimed at a more equal distribution, “this landownership pattern was maintained until and even during the republican period and the big land holders who were the owners of large land in reality became legal owners of their lands as well”⁶⁵ (Kazgan, 1966: 30).

The agricultural production in the Kurdish-populated regions was totally subsistence in nature and there was almost no market-oriented production. For example, according to a report prepared by the Erzincan Chamber of Agriculture presented in the Agricultural Congress of 1931, of the total agricultural production of the provinces of Bitlis, Erzincan and Muş, some 80 percent was allocated to the consumption of the villagers themselves. The

the holder of *mir-i aşiretlik* was nearby the status of *zeamet* holder and of *sancakbeyis*” (Mutlu, 2002: 84).

In short, the Ottomans preferred to apply an indirect rule in the region. The *sancak* holders were equipped with considerable power and privileges. The central government recognized the holders’ authority and did not intervene in the internal affairs of the *sancaks* provided that they fulfilled their obligations such as paying taxes and supporting military forces. The ottomans supported this structure due to the following different reasons: First, it was a system which served both economic and military needs in that this way the taxes were collected in time and it would be easy to get military forces whenever it was needed. Second, by this system the tribal cleavages were maintained and tribes were prevented from challenging the central authority by uniting together against the state. By way of a side note, it does not mean that this strategy of keeping the tribes divided always worked properly. On the contrary, there were many examples of the challenges posed by the Kurdish tribesmen to the central government, especially when the state was weak. In such situations, the state intervened militarily. Finally, this system also functioned as a precautionary institution against the danger from Iran, in that it contributed to the composition of a buffer region of loyal powers. Due partly to this administrative strategy some *sancak* holders increased their powers and semi-autonomous Kurdish emirates emerged.

The most important impact can be observed in the land ownership. As mentioned above, in the Ottoman land tenure system all land belonged to state and individual possession of the land was not permitted. However, the Ottoman administration system was applied to the region in such a way that private possession of the land was practically secured. As holders of *yurtluk-ocaklık*, *hükümet* and *mir-i aşiretlik* the tribal leaders, notables and ruling families “were able to gain almost total private ownership in land, mainly due to their initial differential status in contrast with ordinary *timar* holders” (Akçay: 1995: 16).

⁶⁵ For instance, although this law did not allow one person to own a village, many villages in the region continued to be in the possession of one person or one extended family. With respect to such instances of concentrated possession, the most unbalanced provinces were as follows: 123 of 664 villages in Urfa, 70 of 663 villages in Diyarbakır were the properties of one person, family or extended family. Similarly, 32 villages in Siirt and 11 villages in Van were private property of a person or family (Akçay: 1995).

same report cites that only 1 percent of the production entered the market (cited in Sönmez, 1990: 100-101; for a similar view, see Tekeli and İlkin, 1983: 38).

In terms of industrial establishments and the level of industrialization, the situation in the region was much worse than that in the country as a whole. According to the 1927 industrial census, the number of industrial holdings with more than four workers was about 912, while the total number of this sort of establishments in countrywide scale was 13,675 (cited in Sönmez, 1990: 103). Similarly, the number of industrial establishments that benefited from 'the law on industrial encouragement' numbered only six; while for all of Turkey it was 1.417 (cited in Sönmez, 1990: 102).

The transportation infrastructure was also quite poor in the region. The sole important web of transportation, which connected the region to the national and international markets, was the 'Eastern railways'. However, this line of railways was concentrated near the southern borders of the country and was far from fulfilling the needs of the region.

Having thus considered the economic situation of both the nation and the region during this period, it is now appropriate to take up the economy-politics of this period for the country as a whole, followed by an elaboration on the place of the region in these policies.

3.5.3. The Regional Economic Policies of the Etatist Development Model

Modernizing elites believed that economic development was indispensable for the creation of a new state. In their view, national independence could not be

maintained without economic sovereignty.⁶⁶ Thus, although they dedicated an important part of their energies to the restructuring of legal and political domains, economy occupied a significant position on their agendas as well. As many scholars (Boratav, 2006; Keyder, 1987a) argue, the economic policies of this period were, in many respects, the continuation of the national economy model pursued by the Committee of Union and Progress. The nationalization of the economy, the creation a national bourgeoisie and state-sponsored industrialization were the main characteristics of this model. As Owen and Pamuk state (2002: 23), “industrialization and the creation of a Turkish bourgeoisie was the basic aim of national economic development.”

Although the essential aim was industrialization and the creation of a national economy, the economic policies of this era were not monolithic. On the contrary, some scholars (Boratav, 2006; Owen and Pamuk, 2002) evaluate the policies and regulations of this period in three phases. The first period was relatively liberal;⁶⁷ it gave priority to agricultural domain,⁶⁸ viewed the foreign capital positively⁶⁹ and was open to the outside world. This first stage did not

⁶⁶ In his speech in the opening of the Economy Congress that was held in 1923 in Izmir, Atatürk stated that: “My friends, those who conquer by the sword are doomed to be overcome by those who conquer by the plough, and finally to give place to them. That is what happened to the Ottoman Empire.... The arm that wields the sword grows weary and in the end puts it back in the scabbard, where perhaps it is doomed to rust and molder; but the arm that holds the plough grows daily stronger, and in growing stronger becomes yet more the master and the owner of the soil” (cited in Lewis, 1968: 466).

⁶⁷ For example, the Economy Congress included the participation of the representatives from the areas of agriculture, trade, industry and labor. As is well-known, this Congress was held in Izmir in 1923 and it was at this congress that the basic framework for the economic policies of this period was determined.

⁶⁸ As a result of this priority, the tax called *Aşar*, which was a huge burden for the agricultural sphere, was lifted in 1925. With a legal regulation introduced in 1926, private ownership of land was accepted.

⁶⁹ According to Owen and Pamuk (2002: 25), the attitude of state elites toward foreign capital was to encourage them to cooperate with local investors, a situation which increased the power of the foreign capital in economy. There were foreign shareholders in a proportion of more than 30 percent in the more than 200 companies that were founded in the 1920s. As Keyder

last long, however. The decrease in the prices of raw materials on the one hand, the great depression on the other, ushered in radical change in the economic policies of Turkey, as it did in the other peripheral countries around the world. In this second stage, which Boratav (2006: 60) calls Import-Substitute-Industrialization (ISI), the goals of the policies that were adopted were two-fold: nationalization of the economy⁷⁰ and state-sponsored industrialization.

Turning now to the economic policies that were enacted in the region, it may be observed that non-economic factors, rather than an economic rationality, were determinative in shaping these policies. In other words, the priority of economic policies in the region was not the industrialization of the region, or its integration with the national markets, or its opening to the capitalist market; instead non-economic factors governed the day. This assertion may be confirmed by an examination of the industrial investments and public expenditures in the region and the attitudes and regulations of political decision-makers regarding the issue of deconstructing the semi-feudal structure that had been dominant in the region. What, then, were these prevailing non-economic concerns? They may be divided into the following two categories: First, the establishment of security and order so as to consolidate state power and, second, the creation of a homogeneous nation on the basis of language and culture rather than economic integration, development and

indicated, "Between two-thirds and three-quarters of all credits were extended by foreign banks that had been spurred on by competition with newly formed Turkish banks. Foreign capital was also prominent in new manufacturing firms. Of the sum invested in manufacturing corporations between 1923 and 1929, foreign capital accounted for exactly twice the contribution of Turkish capital" (Keyder, 1987a: 94).

⁷⁰ For this purpose, many investments belonging to foreigners have been nationalized by the state; primarily, industrial holdings and railroads.

industrialization. Economic issues have been viewed as supplementary and secondary to the achievement of this goal.

In order to be able to confirm this observation, a look at the industrial plans of the period between 1930 and 1940, which is characterized as etatist era, is sufficient. These plans were prepared to determine the policies of industrialization and development. The first industrial plan, prepared in 1933, called for the foundation of 19 industrial plants (İnan, 1972). The regional distribution of these plants, however, was uneven, with only two of them, both textile factories, to be placed in the Eastern and Southeastern Regions, one in Malatya and one in Iğdır. In other words, the region that is under consideration in this study did not find a place in the first industrial plan.⁷¹

The scenario did not improve with “The Second Industrial Plan of Turkish Republic” of 1936. This plan proposed the establishment of a total of 88 industrial facilities in various areas, but only two of these facilities would be located in the provinces, which this study examines. Both of these plants, one of them was a copper mine and the other a food factory,⁷² would be in Diyarbakır (İnan, 1989).

In sum, the development strategy of the 1930s, which was based on state-sponsored industrialization, planned the foundation of a total of 107 industrial plants. Of these, only two would be located in the region under question. Issues with the region, such as its geographical conditions, the backwardness of its infrastructure for transportation and its distance from the

⁷¹ In his study entitled *Doğu Anadolu'nun Hikayesi: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarih* (The Story of Eastern Anatolia: an Economic and Social History), Sönmez (1990: 112) argues that in the first industrial plan included the goal of the construction of a food facility/plant in Diyarbakır and the foundation of a cigarette factory in Bitlis. However, İnan (1972) does not provide such information in the list of planned investments in the first industrial plan.

⁷² In İnan's categorization this factory was to be one for vegetables and fruits. Koca (1998: 394) notes that as the first state investment in the region, this foundation was a factory of alcohol.

national markets, made it a disadvantageous location in economic terms. Furthermore, the dominant development-industrialization strategies of the era were not region-centered but rather nation-centered. In short, both the conditions that were to the disadvantage of the region and the dominant development strategies of the period played an important role in this process. However, the preferences of the political decision-makers were at least as influential as the above-mentioned factors. The speech of İsmet İnönü, the Prime Minister at that time, which he delivered during his visit to Bitlis in 1935 made such preferences very clear:

Bitlis is an artificial Turkish city, a Turkish center, between Hizan and Mutki which has been brought into being by the power and force of the state. As such, it can only stand as a Turkish center by the measures of the state. If it is left on its own, it is likely that in a short time it will become a Kurdish village and in this way, it is probable that the regions Mutki, Hizan, Şirvan, Garzan will form a collection of places where Turkish is not heard. [...] The result of these considerations is as follows: We must maintain Bitlis as a powerful center, a Turkish homeland and a stronghold. Bitlis people are used to penetrating into the Kurdish areas. Their ability is an invaluable help for the Turkish culture. [...] If we can make of it a small industrial center, a place for gathering raw materials and a marketplace, Bitlis will be very influential for Turkish culture. Given this situation, Bitlis remains an essential point of support against cultural and political expansion from the north and south. The history of Bitlis proves it trustworthy for this duty⁷³ (cited in Koca, 1998: 432).

I should note at this point that the argument that made previously that non-economic factors were determinative in the economic policies in the single-party era was not solely based on the evidence that industrial investments were weak. There are other indications as well. The investments made in transportation also verify the above-presented claim. As was noted earlier, in the beginnings of the 1920s, a transport infrastructure that would connect the

⁷³ About one year following İnönü's speech, a cigarette factory was built in Bitlis.

region to both national and international markets was almost non-existent. Between 1923 and 1948, approximately 400 kilometers of railroads were constructed in the region (Tekeli and Ilkin, 2004: 288-292). When one keeps in mind the fact that in the same period in the entire country a total of 4000 km of railroads was constructed (Tekeli and Ilkin: 2004 and İnan: 1972), this was an important investment. However, these railroads were far from serving the whole region. Moreover, these railways were, to a very large extent, concentrated in the central parts of the region, where mines were located.

Although in this period the policy of transportation was such that priority was given to railways (Tekeli and Ilkin: 2004), highways were also given attention. It even seems that in the region under question, highways received the greatest priority. The information provided by Koca (1998) and Koçak (2003), regarding the Inspectorate General's reports verify this observation. For instance, Koca (1998: 321-323) indicates that during his term as Inspectorate General, the First General Inspector İbrahim Tali Öngören (1928-1932), almost all of the roads that were built were those that connected Diyarbakır (where the center of the General Inspectorate was located) to the neighboring provinces. One cannot deny the importance of these roads for the market economy. Yet it seems difficult to claim that this was the primary goal behind the construction of these roads.⁷⁴ After his visit to the region, the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü returned to Ankara and he sent word to the Fourth Inspectorate General

⁷⁴ In his PhD dissertation about the First Inspectorate General, which included the region under question, Koca argues that the policy of road construction and transportation during the single-party era was determined by considerations of security and the mines: "Although young Turkish governments, in their policies of transportation, gave priority to the construction of railways, the network of transportation, which was attempted to be realized through plans oriented to the security of the region and the export of mines, remained insufficient in regards to the domestic market" (Koca, 1998: 320).

Hüseyin Abdullah Alpdoğan. This document clearly shows the priority in the construction of roads:

In order to successfully complete the job of the reformation of Dersim, we will not fail to provide any kind of help, whenever necessary. It is appropriate to conceive that it will be necessary to work on it for two or three years. Particularly, in order to maintain our military situation and to protect our sovereignty even in the winter, in contrast to the flood of military expeditions conducted thus far, it may be necessary to do an operation on a small scale in the winter. It is necessary that we complete and advance the road and construction works accordingly (cited in Koçak, 2003: 324).

Finally, the distribution of the expenditures by six ministries in the period between 1946 and 1950 sheds light on the regional economic policies. The relevant data is given in the Table 3.4.

Table 3.4 Percentages of Expenditures by Six Ministries in the Region Between 1946 and 1950⁷⁵

Total population in 1945	Total Expenditure	Security and Order	Public works	Justice	Education	Health	Agriculture
1 498 979	116 322 253 (TL)	34.1%	26.4%	10.1%	17.6%	8.3%	3.4%

Source: the table was rearranged from Aşgın (2000).

As can be seen from the Table 3.4, most of the expenditures were exhausted for the establishment of security and order.⁷⁶ The expenses that were made for security and order were about one third of the total expenditures in six areas. The expense made per person (26.46 TL) in the region was almost twice as much as the average of Turkey (13.86 TL). When one includes the expenses made for the judiciary, one can see that 45 percent of the public

⁷⁵ The expenditures listed here in relevant areas are the ones made by the respective ministries. They do not indicate the shares in national total expenditure but rather the shares in the total expenditure made by these relevant six ministries.

⁷⁶ The expenses made in the category of security and order were essentially made by the General Directorate of Security and General Force of Gendarmerie.

expenditures were made for the purpose of the establishment of security and the consolidation of state power. Doubtlessly, the revolts between 1925 and 1938 had an important impact on this financial prioritization.

The expenses on public works followed those on security and order with a percentage of 26.4. Considering the steepness of this rate of expenses, one might think that the center gave priority to infrastructure and to investing of public works in the region. However, the findings that Koca (1998) and Koçak (2003) provide on the basis of official correspondences between Inspector Generals and Ankara are illuminating in this regard. In his report submitted to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, on January 19, 1932, İbrahim Tali Öngören (the Inspectorate General) stated that they had had a water installment constructed in Diyarbakır for 200.000 TL (Koçak, 2003: 116). About four years later, Prime Minister İnönü sent a telegram (dated June 29, 1936) to Inspectorate General Abidin Özmen, letting him know that he reserved 280.000 TL for the building of Inspectorate General (Koçak, 2003: 123). Finally, in his report dated February 18, 1939, Özmen asked for extra allowance for the continuing construction of 200 flats for officers in various towns in the region (Koçak, 2003: 124). In short, as the above-presented examples show, and other similar examples could be given here, most of the expenditures on public works were devoted to the construction of official buildings.

One of the most striking results in Table 3.4 is the percentage of expenditures in the area of agriculture. Although more than 90 percent of the employment in the region was in the agricultural field and agriculture constituted the main economic activity, agricultural expenses were the smallest proportion at 3.4 percent. This figure becomes all the more staggering in that

this period was the beginning of the application of agriculture-based development model in Turkey's economic policies (Boratav, 2006: 94). Furthermore, during the period between 1946 and 1953, the rate of agricultural growth was 13.2 percent and the average agricultural share in the GNDP was 42 percent in 1946-1947 (Boratav, 2006: 101). In 1934, 10 percent of wheat production and 7.3 percent of barley production in Turkey came from the region (Sönmez, 1990: 101).

Although agriculture received the lowest share in public expenditures, state elites did not hesitate to intervene in the structure of ownership in agriculture that was the main sector in the region's economy. The first comprehensive and serious intervention was the land reform in 1934. In addition to other objectives, one aim of this reform was to provide the landless peasants with land and to break the power of big landowners. However, the reform was not successful for two reasons: First, the reform did not aim to distribute the lands owned by big landowners amongst the landless peasants; rather, it attempted to distribute public lands. Second the nature of the reform was such that, as Barkan (1980) indicates, the political characteristic of the reform preceded its economic characteristic. The law essentially aimed to punish the big landowners who resisted the central authority rather than make a fundamental change at the economic level. Consequently, landowners were resettled in the western parts of Turkey and their lands were redistributed to the migrant families that arrived in the region later on. However, two laws that were promulgated in 1946 and 1947 permitted the exiles to return to their previous residences and to get back their lands. The great majority of them returned to their homes and retrieved their properties.

The most important attempt that aimed to restructure the distribution of agricultural lands and to reduce social and economic power of big landowners was the “*Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*” (Law Number 4753), promulgated in 1945. This law, which remained in full effect until 1972, allowed for the distribution of public lands to the landless farmers rather than dividing and distributing the large properties of the landowners (Owen and Pamuk, 2002: 144). For instance: “in Turkey more than 450 thousand families in 6700 villages were given 22 million *dönüm*⁷⁷ of lands” (Korkut, 1984: 52-53 and Aktan, 1973: 650).

Not only did the reform of the central authority attempting to change the structure of landownership did not bring about fundamental change, but the reforms carried out in other areas reinforced this existent structure. The reform on civil law and the regulations regarding title deeds both played an important role in this process. The most provocative argument on this subject was raised by the Turkish sociologist İsmail Beşikçi (1969: 75). He argues that, “the real feudalism’s becoming rooted in the East has been by the [establishment of] Republic. (...)

The eastern ruling classes, feudal lords carrying out their judgments over the people until the proclamation of the Republic, assented to the civil code and private property laws, including land-related property ownership, and were thereby shrouded in a legal identity and legitimized with the republic. Whereas in the past the imperial edicts limited the portion of the owned lands usable by the landowner of a designated region, with the Republic the landowner was free to do what he wanted with the land.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ “Dönüm” is a land measure. One *dönüm* corresponds to 7444 square meters (about a quarter of a acre).

⁷⁸ Nur Yalman presents a very similar argument. Yet, unlike Beşikçi, Yalman believes that the origins of this situation go back to the late Ottoman period. According to Yalman “The legal developments of the nineteenth century, which were intended to increase the power of central authority and to dismantle the feudal land structure of the Europe, in fact, had unforeseen effects on the agrarian system. They seem to have accomplished exactly the opposite of what

In conclusion, at the end of this period, that is, by 1950, the economic structure in the region did not experience a significant change in regards to industrialization, the level of integration with the national economy, mode of ownership or relations of ownership, as well as many other respects. Agricultural production remained the main sector in the economy. Similarly, the region used to be characterized by the imbalance in the distribution of lands: on the one hand, there were big landowners, on the other hand peasants with small lands and landless peasants. For instance, according to the Agricultural Census Results in 1950, 35 percent of 245.000 agricultural holdings were held by the landless (DIE, 1956). Agricultural production was based on primitive technologies to a large extent and agricultural mechanization was extremely low. To illustrate, in the beginnings of the 1950s, when there was a rapid move towards agricultural mechanization in Turkey, in 1952, there were a total of 2.055 tractors in the region (DIE, 1955). The situation of the level of industrialization was similarly static. According to Sönmez (1990: 123-124), the number of companies that benefited from the law encouraging the development of industry was 17 in 1941. Finally, in terms of the level of economic progress, the gap between the region and other more-developed regions in Turkey only got wider. This was due in part to the geographical conditions of the region and in part to its social, historical heritage. Nevertheless, it is not an exaggeration to claim that the policies put in effect in the region further accelerated this process.

had been intended. The *ferman* of the Sultan, which in the past entitled the holder of an estate to draw only a certain share of the produce from the land allotted to him, now, probably under the influence of European land codes, turned him into a landlord with full freehold tenure” (Yalman, 1971: 186).

3. 6. Education as Means of Nation Building

Education has a specific place and a prominent role in the history of Ottoman-Turkish modernization and westernization. Education has often been the first item in the agenda of the modernizing elites and was expressively viewed as the key to modernization. As Frey argues

The history of westernization or modernization in Turkey is in large measure the history of secular education there- of a school system, which turned out more and more modern graduates until the balance was tipped in favor of European ways (Frey, 1964: 209).

The idea of reformation in the Ottoman Empire, as argued by many scholars, appeared first after the military defeats (Lewis, 1968; Berkes, 1964). The solution introduced by the reform movement of this period, which viewed the recession as a military matter, was the reorganization of the army on the basis of western-style educational programs. As a part of this solution, military schools were opened,⁷⁹ western military officials were invited to train the Ottoman army and military students were sent to Europe to study.⁸⁰ These arrangements, however, stopped neither the military defeats nor the economic and political recession. Nevertheless, they paved the way for the emergence of a comprehensive reform program.

The first attempts to establish a modern western-style educational system were initiated by the *Tanzimat*, the first comprehensive program of

⁷⁹ Excluding the short-lived school of geometry (*Hendeshane*) established in 1734, the opening of the naval school of mathematics (*Mühendishane-i Bahri Hümayun*) in 1873 is evaluated as the first attempt in the reformation of education (Sakaoğlu, 2003: 56 and Frey, 1964: 212).

⁸⁰ Later on, this tradition continued in various spheres. In other words, students were also sent to Europe in other branches (especially in positive sciences) and this wave constituted the intellectual basis of the Turkish modernization movement.

modernization-westernization. Before the early 19th century, there were three types of schools in the Ottoman Empire. These were the Palace School (*Enderun Mektebi*), the religious schools (*medrese*), and the private children's primary schools, the *sıbyan mektepleri*, supported by the *ewqaf*, religious institutions. The state's responsibility in education was limited to the training of the military and bureaucratic officials. The basic education of the Ottoman subjects was not conceived of as a public responsibility. Indeed, the most important result of the reform or modernization process in education was the acceptance of the state's responsibility for the basic education of the Ottoman subjects. A report prepared by *Meclis-i Umurı Nafia*, which was published in *Takvimi Vekayi* dated 6 February 1839, argued the significance of public education as follows: "This document emphasized the fact that education was the source of happiness for the people and that the salvation of the poor and ignorant people came through education. Furthermore, the same document stressed that industrialization would not progress by means of practical skills and that the main objective of the state should be the policy of the universal spread of literacy" (cited in Sakaoğlu, 2003: 65).

The developments occurring in this period can be listed as follows: First, the state, for the first time, accepted the responsibility for the education of its subjects. Second, western-type secular primary and secondary schools were opened. Third, the primary education was to become compulsory. Fourth, the girls would be sent to school, both primary and secondary. Lastly, the ministry of education was established.

The significance attributed to public education and the discussions around the educational system continued after the declaration of the first

constitution. Similarly, the modernization of the educational system and the strategy of using education as a tool in the service of social progress and social integration persisted. Such trends can be seen in the policies employed during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamit II (1876-1909) when education was utilized in order to attain social unity. In addition to his other policies in the educational sphere, the most significant novelty during this period was the establishment of schools targeting Muslim elements. Known as “*Aşiret Mektepleri*” (tribal schools), these schools aimed to integrate Muslim peoples such as Kurds, Arabs and Albanians into the political system within the framework of the principle of Islamic unity. The CUP era, on the other hand, was characterized by the secularization of educational system and the coming to the fore of the national reforms.

After the proclamation of the Republic, a comprehensive reform program was put into practice. The reformation of the educational system was an important part of this program. The primary aim was to abolish the old educational system and establish a national, secular educational system. Early on in this period, before the Law of the Unification of Educational System (*tevhidi tedrisat kanunu*) was accepted by the Grand National Assembly, Atatürk stressed the necessity of a new educational system, underlining the main feature of this system as follows: “It is necessary that Turkey’s educational policy be indicated fully and without any doubt regarding clarity and be put into practice. This policy must be national in content in every sense” (cited in Sakaoğlu, 2003: 169).

One year later, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü explicitly stated what the state elites wanted to do:

We want national education, what does this mean? We can understand this better by its opposite. Its opposite is religious training or international education. You teachers, will provide not religious or international but national education. In a sense, religious education is international education. Our education, however, will be that of ours and for ourselves (cited in Sakaoğlu, 2003: 172).

The aim of the new educational system was described in the book, *History IV*, prepared by the *Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti* (Society for the Research of Turkish History) as follows: “(1) To train nationalist, populist, revolutionary and secular republican citizens. (2) To universalize primary education, to teach all citizens, including shepherds living in the mountains, how to read and write” (cited in Sakaoğlu, 2003: 200).

To establish the educational system according to the above stipulations a series of arrangements were carried out, the first of which was the Law entitled the “unification of education” (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat*), accepted in 1924. As one may easily deduce from the title of the law, this law primarily aimed to accomplish unity in the educational system.⁸¹ Indeed, as mentioned before, a series of reforms with similar aims were initiated throughout the late Ottoman period. However, the educational system relied heavily on dual education. The state provided public education by secular schools but these schools were few in number and the educational facilities were insufficient. The *medrese* educational system continued to exist alongside the new secular school

⁸¹ The aim of the Law was as such: “For the success of a general educational policy of a state, one has to provide the unity of a nation in regards to thoughts and feelings and this can be realized by the unity of education. When the *Tanzimat* was proclaimed, although there was the desire to realize the unification of education, there was no success in this regard. This duality gave birth to many bad and undesirable consequences, as two types of people started to be trained as a result of this dual education. When our suggestion is accepted, the unique authority of all educational institutions within the Turkish Republic will be the Ministry of Education. Consequently, in all educational homes, the Republican policy of knowledge will be followed as the common path of education” (cited in Sakaoğlu, 2003: 169).

system. Moreover, the public education was provided by two opposite educational institutions. There were also minority schools, which furthered the fragmentation.

This situation was disadvantageous in many respects. First, it paved the way for the emergence of social, political and cultural fragmentation in society. Moreover, it promoted and deepened the gap between the ruling elites, the majority of whom graduated from secular schools and the ruled masses that were educated at the religious educational system. Secondly, the *medrese* education, which depended heavily on religious training, was viewed by the secular elites as an obstacle for not only the social, economic, cultural and scientific development and progress, but also for the establishment of a modern-secular society. In short, the duality in the public education was an important obstacle to progress as well as to national integration. To Atatürk “the unity of the educational system was necessary for the development of social life and progress” (cited in Sakaoğlu, 2003: 169). Ziya Gökalp, the ideologue of the Republic, depicts the fragmentation in the area of education and the need for a new educational system as such:

In this country, there are three layers of people differing from each other in civilization and education: the common people, the men educated in *medreses*, the men educated in (modern) secular schools. The first still are not freed from the effects of the Far East civilization; the second are still living in Eastern civilization; it is only the third group, which has had some benefits from Western civilization. That means that one portion of our nation is living in an ancient, another in a medieval, and a third in a modern age. How can the life of a nation be normal with such a threefold life? How can we be a real nation without unifying this threefold education? (Cited in Frey, 1965: 39).

To address this split in society identified by Gökalp, the *medreses* were abolished and all other schools, including the religious schools maintained by the religious organizations, the military schools at primary and secondary levels⁸², the minority schools⁸³ and the private schools were taken over by the Ministry of Education (Frey, 1964: 217 and Sakaoğlu, 2003: 169-172).

Another important innovation introduced by this law was its suggestions regarding religious education; the 4th Article of the law proposed the abolishment of *medreses*, the traditional religious schools, and the establishment of new religious schools. As argued by Frey (1964: 217), “to consolidate their initial victory Atatürk and his cohorts proceeded virtually to obliterate the system of religious education, which had fed traditionalism, and to expand and improve the existing structure of secular public schools”. Thus, *medreses* were abolished⁸⁴ and the prayer leader and preacher schools (*imam hatip okulu*), which were aimed to replace the *medreses* and provide the society with the religious officials in order to meet the society’s need for religious functionaries, were established. Similarly, a theological faculty was opened in 1924. However, both the *imam hatip* schools and the theological faculty were closed for lack of students, in 1929 and 1934 respectively. Arabic and Persian were removed from the curriculum of the schools in 1927, as were religious courses.⁸⁵

⁸² One year later, military schools were again tied to the Ministry of National Defense (Sakaoğlu, 2003: 170).

⁸³ This was not the sole regulation concerning minority schools. Due to this law, religious symbols and religious teachings oriented to an indoctrination of the feelings of nationhood were banned. Moreover, it was made obligatory to teach history, geography, and the Turkish language (Sakaoğlu, 2003: 172).

⁸⁴ To some estimates, 479 *medreses* were abolished after the Law was passed (Sakaoğlu, 2003: 172).

Another important reform was the replacement of Arabic letters with the Latin alphabet. This reform, which symbolizes the intention to break with the Ottoman-Islamic past, was introduced with two aims. First, it was seen as a means of becoming a part of modern societies since the Arabic alphabet symbolized a commitment to the Muslim community. Shortly before the alphabet reform, Atatürk said: “Our nation will show that she is on the side of the entire world of civilization with both her writing and her mind” (Sakaoğlu 2003 189). Second, the secular Republican elites thought that it was too difficult to learn the Arabic alphabet and that this caused illiteracy. Therefore, they thought that the problem of illiteracy would be solved more easily by adopting the Latin alphabet.

The state elites, who viewed education as an instrument to modernize and build a nation, paid particular attention to adult education.⁸⁶ Adult education was seen not only as an important component of the national educational system but also as a necessity for national integration. The significance of adult education was stressed by Atatürk as follows: “an educational system, which is not supported and completed by adult education, can never reach nationalist goals” (cited in Karaömerlioğlu, 2006: 59). To this end, adult education campaigns were organized and specific institutions were established.

⁸⁵ The regulations concerning religious education included the private and foreign schools, as well. However, one can see that the teaching of religion courses in primary schools in the villages for one hour per week continued (Kaplan, 2005: 159).

⁸⁶ According to Karaömerlioğlu, in the 1930s adult education was a popular subject in Europe and specific institutions were formed to this end in many European countries, as well. Several intellectuals and civil servants were sent to Europe in order to examine these kinds of educational institutions (Karaömerlioğlu, 2006: 58).

The *millet mektepleri* (national schools), which were established in 1928, constituted the first institutional arrangement. The objective of *millet mektepleri* was stated as follows:

Thanks to the fact that one can easily and quickly learn how to read and write by the new Turkish alphabet which has been accepted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, it is necessary to provide the Turkish nation with its use and to make big masses of people literate (Cited in Sakaoğlu, 2003: 191).

Every illiterate Turkish citizen between 15 and 45 years of age was regarded as potential students of these schools. According to some estimates, 2.520.779 people learned reading and writing in *millet mektepleri* between 1929 and 1937 (Sakaoğlu, 2003: 192). The success of this campaign is all the more impressive if one takes into account the fact that, according to the census in 1935, the total number of the people in this age group was 6.979.431 (DİE, 2003: 8).

As argued above, the modernizing elites viewed the educational institution as a key to modernization and as an instrument to build a secular national society. In this context, the educational policies pursued in the Kurdish-populated areas were determined by and reflected this perception. These policies, at first glance, strove to increase the literacy rates and improve the educational level of the population; however, they also aimed to assimilate the Kurdish population into the Turkish one. Thus, the educational institution was employed as an instrument to integrate the region by assimilating the Kurds into Turkishness, a view that was expressed by the officials at various times.

For instance a report, which was introduced to the Ministry of Interior by Abidin Özmen, the First General Inspector at that time, in 1937 suggested that: "In some of our provinces, it is necessary to collect children from the villages

through administrative means, and establish boarding schools⁸⁷ in order to train them under the direction of idealist and powerful teachers based on Turkish culture and foundational characteristics”⁸⁸ (cited in Koçak, 2003: 101). Indeed, this suggestion was not new. The *Eastern Reform Plan*, which is evaluated in this chapter in detail, included similar recommendations. Stating, for example, that “the branches of Turkish Hearths and the Schools should be established in the places that are originally Turkish but are on the eve of the assimilating into the Kurdishness and in the places populated by Arabic speaking peoples” (Bayrak, 1994).

Before going into the discussion of the impact of educational reform in general and the consequences of the use of education as a tool in the Kurdish-populated areas in particular, I would like to take a comprehensive look at the actions undertaken in the area of education. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 provide the data about the number of schools, teachers and the enrollment in primary, junior high and high schools for Turkey and for the region in the period between 1923-24 and 1950-51. Here, I will consider only the most important results rather than replicating the figures that can easily be observed from the Tables 3.5 and 3.6.

⁸⁷ He means Regional Boarding Schools. Although boarding schools were implemented in the single-party era, in this period there was a limited practice of training the students attending the boarding schools as “yatılı” students. The project of establishing independent boarding schools began after the 1960s. I will go into the examination of these schools, known as YİBO, in the next chapter.

⁸⁸ The report was also important because the reporter, Abidin Özmen, was appointed to the Ministry of Education by Atatürk for the period between 09.07.1934 and 09.06.1935.

Table 3.5 Number of Schools, Teachers and Enrollment in Primary, Junior High and High Schools for Turkey and for the Region in 1923-1924

	Primary School			Junior High School			High School		
	Schools	Teachers	Enrollment	Schools	Teachers	Enrollment	Schools	Teachers	Enrollment
Turkey	4 770	9 396	320 049	65	387	9 320	22	205	4 491
Region*	168	279	6 161	6	34	745	1	6	152

Source: Alkan, 2000 (Rearranged).

* The "region" here includes the following provinces: Beyazıt, Bitlis, Genç, Dersim, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Urfa and Van.

Table 3.6 Number of Schools, Teachers and Enrollment in Primary, Junior High and High Schools for Turkey and for the Region, 1950-1951

	Primary School			Junior High School			High School		
	Schools	Teachers	Enrollment	Schools	Teachers	Enrollment	Schools	Teachers	Enrollment
Turkey	17 428	35 871	1 616 626	406	4 528	68 187	88	1 954	22 169
Region*	953	1 259	61 967	28	181	2 645	3	54	432

Source: Milli Eğitim İstatistikleri İlk Öğretim, T. C. Başvekalet Umum Müdürlüğü, Yayın No: 346, Ankara and Milli Eğitim İstatistikleri İlk Öğretim T. C. Başvekalet Umum Müdürlüğü, Yayın No: 347, Ankara

* The "region" includes the following provinces: Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli, Urfa and Van.

The first significant observation is that in all categories one can see a tremendous increase. Among all of these categories, the one with the least growth is the high schools, which still boasts a 300 percent increase. The biggest growth, on the other hand, is in the number of primary school students, which grew tenfold. The fact that primary school education was compulsory had a very significant impact on this immense rise. But the essential reason was the perspective expectations of primary education on the part of the state elites. President İsmet İnönü expressed the following in this regard in 1935:

Up to this point, whether or not the Kurds should be educated has been considered from a political stance. [...] I am of the opinion that education at the primary level is of a greater advantage to us. Primary education and good, qualified teachers are very important means by which to educate in places that have become Kurdish and could easily return to Turkishness, and even to draw Kurds to Turkishness through the teaching of the Turkish language. [...] If there are Kurds among those who have applied

to attend the middle school, we also should not reject them (Cited in Koca, 1998: 438).

Consistent with the emphasis on primary education expressed by İnönü, a comparison of the figures regarding the number of schools between the primary, middle and high school categories reveals a clear preference for the first. The rise in primary schools was far beyond both the average increase in the entire country and the increase of the middle schools and high schools in the region. What I would like to stress is that there were not significant attempts to bolster the opportunities of post-primary school education. The educational policies in the region were, to a great extent, oriented to primary school education.

Secondly, the discrepancies between the region and the rest of Turkey in general demonstrate that the region continued to be at a distinct disadvantage. There were attempts to close this gap only at the level of primary school education, which turned out to be insufficient; on the other hand, the gap at the levels of middle and high schools persisted at an increasing rate.

Thirdly, the most important observation, that also confirms the previously raised claim, is that the modernizing elites attached great significance to education in that it was a tool employed to build a modern society and nation. Therefore, the investments in the educational sphere were much higher than those in many other areas. It should also be noted that there was not a discriminatory practice between educational investments in the region and the rest of Turkey in general.

Finally, one should note that although education was considered vital, the fundamental objective behind educational policies was not to materialize a

structural transformation in social stratification, but rather to facilitate assimilation into Turkishness. The fact that the main focus of the policies in the educational area was limited to primary school, and not to higher levels of education, lends support to this observation.

The educational investments were not confined to those in the realm of formal education. As I argued before, adult education was also an important part of the educational policy and thus encouraged the establishment of some additional institutions. *Millet Mektepleri* was the first of them. Established with the primary aim of increasing literacy, these schools existed in the Kurdish and Turkish areas alike. Indeed, the figures regarding adult education in the Kurdish region are notable. Between 1929 and 1935, 22.470 people learned how to read and write in the *Millet Mektepleri* in the provinces of Beyazıt, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Urfa and Van⁸⁹. When one looks at the literacy rates, one can see the significance of this number more clearly. In 1935 the literate population was 48.099, which means that 47 percent of the literate population had been educated in the *Millet Mektepleri*.

Another figure worthy of mention is the sharp decrease in the number of the people who received certificates from the *Millet Mektepleri*. Out of 22.479, 8.946 people attended these schools in the year of 1929-1930, when these schools first opened. In other words, 40% of those who attended did so during the first year of the schools' existence. Later on, the interest in these schools sharply decreased and by 1935, the number of attendants dropped to 1.273, even though the illiteracy rate was still higher than 90%. This abrupt decline in

⁸⁹ The total number of the population who got the certificate from the *Millet Mektepleri* in the same period for all Turkey was 1.254.252.

the interest in the *Millet Mektepleri* could be explained by the fact that the attendance in the first year was not voluntary.

Table 3.7 The Number and Percentage of the Literate Population for Turkey and for the Region in 1935 and 1950

Year		Total	Literate (%)	Illiterate (%)
1935	Turkey	12 366 833	20.4	79.6
	Region	791 854	6.1	93.9
1950	Turkey	17 776 961	32.5	67.5
	Region	1 438 971	12.4	87.6

Source: DIE, 2002 and 2003 (Rearranged).

Let us now turn to the question of how the reforms of the educational system affected the region. First of all, this process interrupted the development of the Kurdish language and prevented Kurdish from becoming a language of instruction. The education in *medreses* was in Kurdish, and, in fact, it was only in these religious schools where Kurdish was used as a teaching language. Indeed, Kurdish was predominantly a spoken language rather than a written language due to various social, historical and political reasons. However, this situation began to change in the late 19th century when a group of Kurdish intellectuals, the majority of whom were educated in secular schools, published journals and newspapers in Kurdish.⁹⁰ The prohibition of the use of non-Turkish languages in the public areas as well as in educational institutions thereby accelerated the demise of the use of Kurdish.

Another important ramification of these reforms was visible in the socio-political structure. As discussed in the third chapter, the centralization arrangements, carried out in the 19th century, resulted in dramatic changes in

⁹⁰ The first Kurdish publication was a newspaper, namely "Kurdistan." The paper "Kurdistan" started to be published by Mikdat Midhat Bedirhan in 1898 in Cairo. It was published in both Kurdish and Ottoman Turkish. For more information about Kurdish publication in this period see Malmisani & Lewendi (1992), Klein (1996), and Hassanpour (1992).

the socio-political structure of the region. The most important one was the decline of semi-autonomous local notables and the rise of a religious class. While the main role of this class was to meet the religious needs of their society, gradually this role diversified and they started to take on various social roles besides providing only religious services.⁹¹ The most important amongst these new roles was education. Public education in predominantly Kurdish regions, as in other regions in the Ottoman Empire, was given in *medreses*. Education in *medreses* was under the control of religious elites, however, particularly after the alphabet reform, it was no longer possible for them to fulfill this role and those who did so were only able to do it secretly and to a limited extent. Though educational reform and other reforms may not have changed their social status in a radical way; in the long-term, it took over their social roles. As I will discuss in the following chapters, these religious elites were replaced by modern-educated elites starting with the 1960s. I should add that this situation was not only in the Kurdish regions but prevailed throughout the whole of Turkish society.

3.7. The Responses of the Periphery

3.7.1. A General Overview of the Kurdish Populated Area in the Single-Party Period

When the Turkish Republic was founded in the 1920s, the regions under consideration in this study housed a dominant semi-feudal and traditional economic and political structure, which dated back to the Ottoman Empire. The most outstanding characteristic of this structure was the fact that social

⁹¹ For a detailed analysis of these roles, see Bruinessen (1992).

belonging was determined on the basis of primordial affiliations. In this social structure, where group affiliation and kinship ties were strong, the dominant form was tribalism and communalism. A great majority of the population was living in rural areas and considerable portion of these people were living as nomads and semi-nomads. Despite the centralization policies that started around the mid-19th century, continuing and expanding in the Committee of Union and Progress period, local notables still had an important role to play.

The economic structure was mainly based on self-sufficient agricultural production. Relations between the ownership and those who were involved with production were extremely uneven in this structure and a pre-capitalist mode of production was dominant. Although we do not have reliable records about that period, the present information shows that the mode of land-ownership was highly uneven. Similarly, the means of production were composed of primitive technologies and production was therefore labor-intensive. Economic activities were not market-oriented but were subsistence based. An exchange economy, in line of a monetary one, was dominant. In other words, there was almost no integration with the national market.

The situation in terms of educational level and educational opportunities was quite dire. In order to ascertain the level of education and its structure in the region, it is enough to look at the modern educational institutions and the numbers of enrollment in these institutions in the 1923-1924 academic year. According to the data provided by Alkan (2000), there were a total of 175 modern schools and 7,058 enrollments in the region. Moreover, a majority of these schools served those in urban areas, which constituted only a small portion of the population. A more detailed discussion regarding this issue can

be found in the preceding pages. More importantly for the topic at hand, public education, just as in the country on the whole, had a dual characteristic: on the one hand, there were religious schools, i.e. *medreses*; on the other hand, there were a very limited number of secular-modern educational institutions. *Medreses* that fulfilled the function of education were not only distant from the control of the center, but the language of instruction was Kurdish.

To what extent did this above-painted picture change with regard to the economic structure and the educational level when one comes to the 1950s? The economic structure in the region remained almost the same without any notable change, a stark comparison to the rest of Turkey. Undoubtedly, the historical, geographical and social conditions specific to the region had an important role to play in this stagnant situation; nevertheless, the priorities that the center attached to the policies focusing on security and order reinforced and contributed to this lack of change.

Unlike in the economy, in the educational sphere extraordinary progress was made both in terms of literacy rates and educational structure. For instance, while the literacy rate was 6 percent in 1935, it was above 12 percent in 1950.⁹² The structural development in formal education is no less striking. It is enough to refer to the figures about primary education, to which the state elites attached the utmost importance, to note the advancement. While in the academic year of 1923-1924 the number of primary schools was 168, it had increased to 953 at the end of 1950. For the same years, the number of

⁹² No reliable data for the period before 1935 exists. The figures for 1935 show that about 48,000 people, or 6.1 percent of the population, were literate (DIE, 2002). With the establishment of *millet mektepleri* (national schools) for adult literacy training, about 22,000 people, or at most 3 percent of the population, became functionally literate between 1929 and 1935. These percentages show an outstanding increase in literacy by 1950.

teachers went up from 279 to 1259 and student enrollment increased more than 10 fold, i.e. from 6,161 to 61,967. I have presented a detailed discussion of the developments in the levels of education and the educational composition of the population in the preceding pages.

3.7.2. Resistance

Having now laid the groundwork of the situation in the region with regard to economic and educational conditions, we may now turn to the response of the region to the center. Center-periphery relations in this period were characterized by resistance and suppression. There were a total of 17 revolts in the region starting shortly after the foundation of the Republic and continuing until 1938.⁹³ These revolts present a diverse picture regarding their social and political claims, class characteristics and the geographical localities of their occurrence.

Some of these revolts were reactions to the regulations that were initiated for the consolidation of state power. For example, the Raçkotan-Reman Revolt, which took place on August 7, 1925, constituted a resistance by the Raçkotan and Reman tribes of the disarmament of the region by the security forces (GKBKI, 1992b: 66-70 and Koca, 1998: 129-133). Similarly, the Koçuşağı Revolt of 1926, which took place in Tunceli, was the revolt of the local people who refused to pay taxes and do military service (GKBKI, 1992b: 74 and Koca, 1998: 140-142). Rather than having political characteristics, these revolts were a manifestation of reactions against the center's establishment of its economic and administrative authority in the countryside.

⁹³ Mete Tunçay (1981: 127-128), with reference to the book titled "Revolts in the Turkish Republic, 1924-1938" published by the Chief of Staff in 1972, indicates that there were a total of 18 revolts during the single-party era. 17 of these revolts were in the Kurdish regions.

Needless to say, these revolts neither found a strong social basis nor did they last long.⁹⁴ According to Tokluoğlu (1995: 193), who suggests interpreting these rebellions according to their symbolic meanings, these revolts can be read as a way of refusing the power of the state.

Unlike the above-mentioned revolts, there were a number of other revolts with strong political claims, aims and projects. These were reactions to the attempts of the center to redefine the social contract between the center and peripheries on the basis of Turkish nationalism and secularism. The first revolt in this category was the Sheikh Said Revolt, one that has attracted the most discussion regarding its political nature. Robert Olson (1992) and Martin van Bruinessen (1992), well-known for their studies on Kurds and Kurdish nationalism, believe that the rebellion had religious as well as nationalist motives. The Turkish scholar Mete Tunçay (1981), on the other hand, argues that the revolt was primarily a nationalist one. According to another interpretation (Mumcu, 1991), it was a religious uprising. It is beyond the scope of this study to exhaust the discussion about the political nature of this revolt. Here it is sufficient to extract from the debate two fundamental components of this first and largest Kurdish revolt in the Republican period: on the one hand, there were religious people who were discontented by the reforms imposed as a part of radical secularism; on the other hand, there were Kurds who were conscious of their distinct Kurdish ethnic identity and who had nationalist sentiments; both religious and nationalist motivations played a role in this rebellion.

⁹⁴ There were other revolts of this sort. Eruhlu Yakup Ağa ve Oğulları Revolt (1926), Pervari Revolt (1926), Mutki Revolt (1927). For more information about these rebellions, see Koca (1998: 133-143).

Like the Sheikh Said Revolt, the Mount Ararat Revolt⁹⁵ also had a heavily political character, though it was more secular in nature than the former. This revolt was led by İhsan Nuri⁹⁶ and it was organized⁹⁷ by the nationalist Kurdish organization, Hoybun,⁹⁸ and the purpose of the revolt was “to save the Kurds and Kurdistan from the yoke of Turkey and to found an independent state of Kurdistan within its natural and national borders” (Alakom, 1998: 26).

Following van Bruinessen (1992), it is important to note that: “All the rebellions had remained regional and in many cases it was Kurds themselves who had played an active role in suppressing these rebellions.”

3.7.3. Collaboration

It is difficult to claim that the attitude of the Kurdish-populated periphery towards the nation-state project was realized in one single form throughout this period. As can be seen from the above discussion, the dominant mode of reaction was armed uprising. In addition, however, there were also those who sought to cooperate with the new regime, to support its project and at times, to fight alongside the state against the anti-regime resistance of the rebels in the region. A great majority of those who cooperated had had close ties with the

⁹⁵ In the relevant literature about this topic, although it is called “Mount Ararat Revolt”, it was, in fact a series of three consecutive revolts. The first took place between May 16 and June 17, 1926; the second between September 13 and 20, 1927; the last between September 7 and 14, 1930 (Tunçay, 1981 and Koca, 1998).

⁹⁶ İhsan Nuri was from Bitlis. He was commanded to suppress the first revolt that took place in the Republican period, namely, the Nestorian Revolt (September 12 and 28, 1924). However, he fled to Iraq with 275 soldiers under his command. Then, during the Sheikh Said Revolt he came to Turkey to support the revolt and after the revolt, he fled to Iran. For more information about İhsan Nuri see; Alakom (1998) and Koca (1998).

⁹⁷ Contrary to the commonly held views, Koca (1998: 302-303) argues that the “Mount Ararat Revolt” was organized by three different organizations. According to Koca, alongside Hoybun, *Kürt Teali Cemiyeti* and *Halaskaran Cemiyeti* [organized in Iran and Turkey] also took part in this revolt.

⁹⁸ For more information about Hoybun, see Alakom (1998).

center since the late Ottoman period and especially during the War of Independence. Although there was a fundamental change in the political structure of the center, these segments remained compliant with the new regime.

Some of these instances of cooperation appear to be strategic alliances with the center in order to gain advantages against their local rivals. The Piriñçizadeler from Diyarbakır is a good example for this. As was indicated earlier, a big and famous landlord family from Diyarbakır, the Piriñçizadeler played an active role in the organization of the SDRA-R and they supported the War of Independence. Their rivals, the Cemilpaşazadeler also supported the War of Independence. However, the Cemilpaşazadeler had strong nationalist sentiments and thus hesitated to cooperate with the new regime in the post-war period. The Piriñçizadeler, in order to turn the distance of the Cemilpaşazadeler from the new regime to their own advantage, maintained their cooperation with the center. According to McDowall (2004: 399): “those families that supported the regime tended to do so not for any ideological reason, but to acquire material advantage or worst a local rival.”

Doubtlessly, it would remain incomplete to explain the support given to the new regime in the region solely on the basis of strategic alliances emanating from inter-tribal competition. One should also note that there were those who sided with the new regime due to political and ideological reasons. These were mainly the Alevites who, because of their religious identity, had had problems with the Sunni Ottoman central authorities and who were subjected to oppression, especially by the Kurdish tribes employed in Hamidiye Regiments. Alevites, who had also contributed to the War of Independence in

important ways, were eager after the War to support the new regime because of its initiation of secularizing reforms. For example, the support they gave to the state during the Sheikh Said Revolt should be noted here. The Alevites, like the Hormeks in the province of Muş, fought against the rebels on the side of the state, despite the fact that there were strong nationalist sentiments in the revolt. It should also be mentioned that the support that they gave to the state did not originate solely from religious motivations. They also thought that they were ethnically Turkish, rather than Kurdish.⁹⁹

In short, regardless of the considerations, expectations or advantages they had in mind, some parts of Kurdish society adopted the project of the center and did not hesitate to support it. However, “the alliance between national bureaucratic elite and the provincial notables was more a marriage of convenience than a manifestation of a genuine integration between center and periphery. Each maintained distinctive identities, outlooks, priorities, and ‘operational codes’ throughout the single party years” (Özbudun, 1976: 45).

3.8. Conclusion

In conclusion, one can assert that throughout this period, the strategies and policies that the center pursued in the Kurdish-populated areas were shaped on the basis of the following concerns: the consolidation of state power, the establishment of security and order and the assimilation of the Kurdish population. These concerns originated in part from the resistance that emerged in the region. However, the belief of the modernizing elites in social change and integration by means of top-down social engineering and reform also had its

⁹⁹ For more information about the Alevites attitudes toward the new regime and the Kurdish nationalism see; Firat: 1983

impact on these policies and strategies. In a parallel vein, their tendency to create a new society and nation from above and by “forced homogenization” (Gellner, 1983) played a significant role in this process.

It seems difficult to claim that the priority of the policies put into effect in the region was the dissolution of the present semi-feudal and tribal structure. The institutions and instruments that were employed, the regulations that were carried out and other similar preferences in practice confirm that said dissolution was not a focus. In fact, the modernizing elites did not hesitate to cooperate with the main agents of the semi-feudal structure and nourished the latter’s survival strategies. The conflict that they experienced with semi-feudal elements emerged only after the latter’s resistance. They did not touch semi-feudal structures so long as they did not resist.¹⁰⁰

The response of the Kurdish periphery to the policies and strategies of the center, on the other hand, revolved mostly around resistance and reaction. Some of these resistances were realized by the local notables who did not want to give up their long-standing privileges and advantages. However, it seems that the fundamental reason underlying these reactions was the attempt on the part of the center to redefine its relations with the periphery on the basis of secularism and nationalism. Although they were articulated by various other factors, it is possible to argue that nationalist sentiments played a significant role in the manifestation of this resistance and is thereby possible to define the

¹⁰⁰ There were various reasons for their hesitancy to conflict with the semi-feudal structures. First, these groups had supported the War of Independence. Like in other regions in Turkey, the notables in Kurdish-populated regions also took part in the organization of the War of Independence and they provided significant support in economic and military terms. Secondly, the priority of the modernizing elites was the reconstruction of the legal and political spheres along Western, secular lines. It seems that they believed that superstructural reforms in time would deconstruct the feudal structure. Finally, from an economic point of view, there was a big amount of cultivable public land that was not being cultivated. Instead of dividing large landholdings, it was more rational to distribute the unused lands to landless farmers and thus, to take advantage of these lands.

Kurdish nationalism of this period as an 'articulated nationalism.' This nationalism, however, suffered from geographical, religious and tribal differences and it was far from constituting a unity amongst the Kurds on an ethnic or linguistic basis.

CHAPTER 4

NEW SOLUTION FOR AN OLD QUESTION (1950-1980)

4.1. Introduction

This chapter primarily deals with the developments, which occurred during the period between 1950 and 1980 with a particular focus on the following questions: How did the transition to the multi party political system affect the state policies and strategies concerning the Kurdish-populated areas? How did the main changes in the political and economic structures of Turkey in the post-World War II era influence the socio-political and economic structure of the region? Did the nature of the relationship between the region and the center bring about any change in the characteristics of the confrontation that manifested and prevailed in the form of 'armed resistance' during the course of the single-party political era? If so, what were these changes? All these will be considered, as it has been done in the previous chapter, in light of three aspects, namely the economic, political and educational spheres.

For that purpose, the major changes that took place in the economic and political structure of Turkey after World War II will be discussed first. Then, the main features of the policies and strategies pursued in the Kurdish-populated periphery in this period will be introduced and the reflections of these policies in the three core domains mentioned above (economic, political and educational) will be elaborated on. Lastly, the chief alterations in the socio-economic and

political structures of the region in general, and the local attitudes vis-à-vis the central policies, in particular, will be discussed.

4.2. Post-World War II Transformations in Turkey's Economic and Political Structures

4.2.1. The Transition to Multi-Party Competitive Political System

Even though Turkey was not an active participant of WWII, the post-war period ushered in a new era in the history of modern Turkey. The single-party authoritarian rule, which had lasted nearly three decades, would be replaced by multi-party participatory democracy.¹⁰¹ These radical changes in the political structure, and the corresponding ones in the economic structure were the result of a series of domestic and international developments. By the second half of 1940s, as Owen & Pamuk (2002: 141) argue, a significant number of social groups had apparently declared discontent with the single-party regime. The most severe discontent was rising among the rural population, which comprised 80 percent of the total population. The residents of rural areas would be economically distressed by augments in the existing taxes as well as by the introduction of new taxes, which were instituted to overcome the heavy impacts of war (Owen & Pamuk, 2002). There was almost no improvement in their life quality, education, health and communication standards (Zurcher: 1994).

¹⁰¹ There were two attempts to shift to multi-party system during the single-party era. The first effort came with the establishment of the *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Progressive Republican Party, hereafter TpCF) in 1924. Headed by Kazım Karabekir, TpCF was composed of members who opposed the CHP. The TpCF was accused of being involved in the Sheikh Said rebellion and harboring counter-revolutionary attitudes and was thereby banned from politics in 1925. The second attempt to institute a multi-party system occurred in 1930. On Atatürk's demand, the Free Party was established under Fethi Okyar's leadership. However, this party also only lasted a short time, not more than three months. Thus, the political system in Turkey persisted as a single-party system. For more information about the FP, see Emrence (2006) and for the TpCF, see Tunçay (1981).

The radical secularist policies of the single-party rule, especially when they suppressed the expression of popular religious beliefs, generated further discontent among the people (Zurcher: 1994). As I discussed earlier, the institutional and legal secularization reforms on the one hand, and the suppression of the expression of popular religion, on the other, produced a gap between the society and the state.

Yet another development which contributed to the structural changes in the political realm was a shift in the relationship between the large landowners and the CHP. The cooperation between the big landlords, who were relatively wealthy, and the single-party power had been replaced by an uneasy relationship. In 1945, the single-party prepared a land reform plan. While there had been several attempts at land reform by the founder-elites of the republic in previous decades, the previous reform plans, as Barkan argues (1980), were rather limited in scope and the political motives behind those reforms were dominant over economic intentions. This time, however, the reform plan was much more far-reaching. According to Owen & Pamuk (2002), the main purpose of the reform was to restore the unsatisfactory relationship between the government and the poor people, who had little or no land, and consequently to reduce their displeasure with the state.¹⁰² Ironically, however, the reform served only to promote more discontent, and added yet another group of people, the big landowners, to those who were disgruntled with the single-party government's rule. Initially, the demands of this new group of challengers, who were led by the members of the parliament holding large

¹⁰² Because of the opposition of the owners of large lands, this reform was to a certain extent limited to distribution of some public lands to the farmers who lacked any land. However, throughout a period of nearly three decades, approximately 20 million *dönüms* of lands would be distributed (Korkut, 1984).

lands, centered on the declared reform. However, this group soon formed an organized opposition and extended their demands, calling for more democratization, the retreat of the state from economy, and the elimination of authoritarian modes of government. The pressure of this opposition on the one hand, and the increasing discontents in the different parts of society, on the other, compelled the single-party government to embrace a transition to a multi-party participatory system, a decision made in 1945.

Besides the above-stated alterations in domestic politics, developments on the global level were also operative in this process. World War II did not only result in the collapse of the totalitarian-fascist regimes, it also gave birth to the idea of establishing a new international system which would be constructed and managed by the US. Based on the Bretton Woods conference,¹⁰³ this new international order relied on a philosophy of development shaped by liberalism of the economy and of politics. This ideology endorsed economic development, and the supposed modernization, which would accompany it, as primary aim and expectation for societies (Keyder, 1996: 9). It was unavoidable that this situation would impact societies like Turkey who had Westernization as the most important component on their political agendas. Indeed, as I discussed earlier, most of the time the reform movements, which had been a part of Ottoman-Turkish history for more than a century, centered around this push toward westernization in that they involved the restructuring the society according to the western model.

¹⁰³ The conference, which was held in 1944 in Bretton Woods, was striving for a model of trade which was based on a liberal international economic order of a non-discriminatory and cooperative nature. There were three institutions which played crucial roles in putting in practice this model: The IMF; the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (which later became the World Bank); and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), whose primary aim was to decrease the custom tariffs and non-tariff obstacles so as to liberalize the international trade (Owen and Pamuk, 2002: 128-129).

This swing to the West, as many scholars underline (Zurcher: 1994; Owen and Pamuk: 2002; Keyder: 1987b), was enhanced by Russia's claims on the lands of northeastern Turkey, claims which accelerated the inclination in Turkish politics to partner with western countries. During the single-party era, Turkey preferred not to make a decisive choice between communist Russia and the capitalist West, and instead sought to balance their international relations between the two poles. Turkey persevered in its neutral position in spite of Russia's efforts to persuade Turkey to side with the Allies in World War II. In the post-war era, Russia specified the following stipulations regarding its future relationship with Turkey: "The re-adjustment of the Turkish-Russian borders with the return of lands in south-eastern part of Turkey, which used to belong to Russia between 1878-1918; and establishment of an allied Russian-Turkish defense force in the regions of Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits for the defense of the Black Sea' (Zurcher: 1994). The Russian position pushed Turkey into the West's willing arms and the US, who was trying to become a hegemonic power on the global level, exploited the tension between Russia and Turkey to its own ends. For example, in spite of the fact that Turkey had not participated in the war, she was included in the Marshall plan.¹⁰⁴

The process of developing a partnership with the West, which began with the introduction of the Marshall Plan, continued with a series of collaborations on military, economic and political grounds. First, Turkey became a member of the European Council on August 8, 1949, and a series of collaborations in military affairs followed. Turkey dispatched a military

¹⁰⁴ Similarly and for the same reasons, Greece was also added to this plan. Turkey gained some 155 million TL in this plan. According to Menderes' first government program, Turkey had a budget deficit of 174 million TL in that period, and the financial aid would be used to cover this deficit (T.C. Başbakanlık O ve M Daire Başkanlığı, 1978: 181).

contingent to fight in Korea, furnished the United States with a string of military bases and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Keyder, 1987b: 64). In 1963, the Ankara Treaty was signed between Turkey and the European Economic Community, constituting the first step for Turkey to obtain member status in an important transnational organization, which would evolve to be the European Union (EU) after 1990s. (Turkey's membership accession process for this organization and its effects on domestic affairs will be discussed in detail in the subsequent chapter). In a similar way, membership in the most essential organizations of the capitalist world, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), would follow.

The integration process of Turkey to the global capitalist system led by the western countries compelled Turkey to reshape its economic, political and legal system according to the principles imposed by those countries. Briefly stated, these principles required a political system based on multi-party competitive political system and a free market economic system based on private enterprise. As a result, the distinctive conditions of the domestic arena on the one hand, and the global dynamics on the other, brought about radical changes in political and economic structure.

4.2.2. Corresponding Changes in Regional Politics

The radical changes in the political and economic structure of Turkey provoked changes in the policies that were conducted in the region focused on in this study as well. The first and most important development was the elimination of the Resettlement Law introduced during the single-party period. With two laws introduced in 1947 and 1948 (law codes 5098 and 5227 respectively), the population who had been forced to reside in the western parts of the country

would be allowed to return to their homelands (Tekeli, 1990: 64). Similarly, with the introduction of the law code numbered 5826, the forbidden regions in the provinces of Tunceli, Van, Siirt, Bitlis, Ağrı and Kars would be reopened to residence (Tekeli, 1990: 64).

The process of change in the region continued at an increasing pace during the reign of the Democrat Party (DP), which came into power in the general elections of 1950. Before the elections, the DP severely criticized the authoritarian applications of the CHP, claiming that the CHP's economy-politics had served to intensify poverty. Based on these criticisms, the DP promised more democracy and freedom in the cultural, political, social and economic domains. The Kurdish-populated areas, in which the relationship between the state and the people was problematic, occupied a special place on the DP's agenda. In the second congress of the party, which was organized a year before the elections, Celal Bayar, one of the most important leading figures of the party, promised that the DP would work for significant changes in the politics of the region:

We see this country as the land of people with equal rights. Westerners and easterners, they all have the same rights. In short, we have the same common country. There will be no difference between the easterners and the westerners in legal or practical terms. This is one of the biggest missions of the DP. As soon as we will come into power, the separation between the east and the west in this country will be buried. We will make the future generations forget about this separation. This is why we approved the offering that one of our friends should accompany the President in his visit to the east (Cited in Goloğlu, 1982: 272-273).

When the DP came into power, most of the authoritarian policies and regulations were either loosened or abandoned, among which were the policies governing the administrative system. The Inspectorate General, which was

established in 1927 with the aim of consolidating state power and providing security and order in the periphery, was abolished (Koçak: 2003). Similarly, the demographic engineering instrument, namely the practice of forced residence, which had been utilized in different times in a variety of ways, was done away with. The most popular change, however, came in cultural domain with the eradication of the law that banned Kurdish from daily usage. As Kendal (1993: 75) argues, “the Kurdish language was now semi-clandestine; its use in private was tolerated, although it was still illegal to publish anything in it.”

The new policies regarding the religious domain, although not directly about the region, would also have significant consequences in the life of the region. The radical secularist reforms, the closure of the *‘tekkes* and the *zaviyes*’, and the prohibition of education in the *medreses* constituted some of the most important complaints of the opposition movements in the region. The DP did not do away with the restrictions on the *tekkes* and *zaviyes*, nor would it allow *medrese* education. It did, however, ease the legal pressure exerted over the illegal activities of these institutions.¹⁰⁵ This accelerated the revival of the classes whose privileges had been rooted in their functions in these institutions.

Similarly, the revival of education in *medreses*, in spite of restricting laws, not only contributed to the renewal of Kurdish language and culture but also accelerated the dissemination of nationalist ideology among the students of these institutions.¹⁰⁶ Most of the individuals who would take on important

¹⁰⁵ One of the most important reasons of the military coup of 1960 was the accusation that the DP has been compromising the principle of secularism. For example, the DP abolished the law which banned the Arabic call to prayers and “made religious classes compulsory in schools” (Kaplan, 2005: 223).

¹⁰⁶ The texts with clear nationalist sentiments penned by Jigerxwin, who himself had a *medrese* background and who later became a radical Marxist-nationalist, were studied by some *medrese* students. Jigerxwin, whose real name was Shexmus Hesen, was born in 1903 in Mardin. He migrated to Syria after the Sheikh Said revolt, and became one of the founders of the

roles in Kurdish nationalist movements in the later periods would have once been either students or teachers in the *medreses* at this time. Among these, the two most popular ones were Mehmet Emin Bozarslan and Abdurrahman Dürre. Bozarslan was born in Diyarbakir in 1935 and received a *medrese* education. Before he moved to Sweden as a political asylum seeker in 1978, he managed to publish 17 books, some in Turkish and some in Kurdish, which incorporated religious, linguistic, historical and literary themes, as well as sociological attempts to analyze the socio-political and economic structure of the Kurdish-populated area. He also transcribed some important Kurdish texts from Arabic letters into the Latin alphabet, including: The Kurdish newspaper *Kurdistan* which had been published in the late 19th century; the *Mem-u-Zin* of Ehmede Khani, a popular Kurdish man of letters in the 17th century.

Dürre, who like Bozarslan was educated in a *medrese*, was born in 1938. Yet, unlike Bozarslan, Dürre was not involved with writing and publication; he was instead concerned with the political domain. These two figures were active in the Kurdish nationalist movement which revived in the 1960s, went to trial with regard to the case of the *Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocaklari* (DDKO) (Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East) in 1971 and were sentenced to jail (Ballı, 1991: 74-75).

In the DP period, in addition to the lifting of prohibitions, as noted above, some unlawful events of the single-party era would be investigated as well, events which had had deep negative impacts on the collective memory and conscience in the region. Among these, the most commonly known was the

Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Syria. Jigerxwin, who died in Sweden in 1984, had many publications in the areas of language, history and literature. His poems in particular, which had nationalist themes, played a significant role in the emergence of the consciousness of Kurdish identity.

case of Muğlalı incident (*Muğlalı olayı*).¹⁰⁷ In 1943, in Özalp, a town in the province of Van, 32 people were tried for smuggling. These people were released in the court, but were later rearrested by the gendarme, taken to the border region and executed.¹⁰⁸ The perpetrators of these executions had already been tried by a military court in 1948 and sentenced to a variety of punishments. However, the case would be brought to the agenda of the parliament in 1956 one more time by the DP, who demanded the trial of the leaders of the CHP as well, including İsmet İnönü. In the end, the investigation was closed with prescription and none of the accused leaders were sentenced (Beşikçi, 1991c).

Another explanation for the DP's interest in the illegal treatment in the region perpetrated during the single-party period was the constitution of the party itself. The party members who were of Kurdish origin and who had significant support from the region were active in determining such efforts. For example, Celal Yardımcı,¹⁰⁹ the DP deputy of the province of Ağrı, heavily criticized the Inspectorate General in 1951 in the Grand National Assembly: "You see the cruel governors of the provinces only there. The homeland of the inspectorate General is there (in the East). This region has been ruled with the special severe laws which could hardly been found even in the Inquisition" (cited in Koçak, 2003: 281). The most serious criticism against the Inspectorate

¹⁰⁷ The poem of "33 bullets" of Ahmet Arif, a poet with a Kurdish origin, made the event known as "33 Bullets."

¹⁰⁸ For the depositions of the witnesses of this event, together with the records of the session held in 1956 by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey concerning this event, see Beşikçi (1991c).

¹⁰⁹ Celal Yardımcı was the only region deputy who was enrolled in the cabinets established between 1951 and 1960. He became the minister of justice, minister of education and minister of state respectively (T. C. Başbakanlık O ve M Daire Başkanlığı: 1978).

General was expressed by Mustafa Remzi Bucak, the deputy of Diyarbakır. In his resolution for the elimination of the Inspectorate General, he said that:

It is strange and sad to observe the truth about the Inspectorate General, that when one has a look at the period between its foundation and disappearance, one can hardly come across any productive effect that would be well-suited to its *raison d'être* in the provinces which regrettably have been subjected to be ruled by the mentioned administrative office. One will see, on the contrary, that in every corner there is a taste of 'Indian General Governorship.' In this respect, *the Inspectorate General has nothing but added filthy and horrible, bloody pages to our political and administrative history* (Cited in Koçak, 2003: 282, emphasis added).

Though the DP lifted some prohibitions and conducted some investigations, all of which were important, their rejection of the single-party period policies was by no means absolute. The basic constitutive paradigm of the republic, which justified the authoritarian applications of the single-party era, maintained their significance. By way of reminder, said paradigm consisted of the following principles: Turkey is a unified country with a unified people; everyone living in Turkey is a Turk as long as he/she is connected to the republic through the bond of citizenship; and the official language of Turkey is Turkish. These principles continued to make up the bases of the policies regarding the region during the DP's rule as well, as will be seen below.

On the one hand, the authoritarian treatments were given up to a certain degree and a relative democratization in the civil and cultural rights was realized. On the other hand, some of the routine political practices and strategies of the single-party period, such as assimilation and the prioritization security and order, were maintained. For instance, in the period between 1951 and 1960, the two largest parts of the public budget in the region were allocated respectively to education and security. As can be observed from the

Table 4.1, education constituted 35.2 percent and security and order 29.6 percent of the public budget. When the allocation for the justice is taken into account, the entire expenditure for establishing security and order corresponds to the 40 percent of the total amount allocated to all six items. In other words, like the CHP, the DP also paid particular attention to security and order, as well as to the indivisibility of the country.

Table 4.1 Percentages of Expenditures by Six Ministries in the Region Between 1951 and 1960 (%)

Population in 1955	Total Investment	Security & Order	Public Works	Justice	Education	Health	Agriculture
2 083 000	670 079 141 (TL)	29.6	8.5	10	35.2	10.7	5.9

Source: This table is reproduced from Aşgın (2000).

What differentiated the DP from the CHP, however, was what they defined and perceived as a threat to national unity. In the single-party reign of the CHP, the resistance in the region was perceived as a feudal opposition to the modernization and secularization reforms, and was suppressed accordingly. In the period of DP, however, the resistance in the region would be defined either as the provocation of the external powers that wanted to divide Turkey, or as the dangerous ideology of communism. In other words, the discourse of religious and tribal reactionary philosophies was replaced with the discourse of dangerous ideologies like communism and separatism. This change in the discourse would ossify in an incident which took place in 1959 where some 49 people, most of whom were either students or those with high occupational statuses like lawyers, journalists, and doctors were accused of treachery and separatism and were arrested accordingly.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ For more information about this event and the list of the suspects, see Ballı (1991: 69-79).

Thus, despite some principal similarities, the differences between the DP and the CHP would be such that they would eventually lead to military intervention and the overthrow of the DP rule in 1960.

4.2.3. Restoration at the Center: The Military Intervention

The events of 1960, which resulted in a new government in Turkey, should be considered under the light of the previous discussion. While some writers believe that 'serious economic problems and political instability in Turkey resulted in military intervention in 1960' (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 107), the primary reason behind the intervention, it may be argued, was the arrangements for liberalization introduced by the Democrat Party. Thus, by the mid-1950s, the social and political grounds for the military coup had already been established (Keyder, 1987b: 43-44). Both the DP regulations in the religious domain, which were perceived as counter-revolutionary by the Kemalist faction, and the gradual elimination of the aggressive assimilationist policies of the single-party era accelerated the military intervention. According to Kirişçi and Winrow (1997: 107) the armed forces believed that the liberalization which had taken place under the DP, especially in eastern parts of the country, had led to an increase in Kurdish national consciousness.

The military government which took over after the DP's removal should be considered in light of their policies at both the national and regional levels. At the national level, the military government achieved two important reforms. First was the institution of a new constitution and, second, the establishment of the State Planning Organization, which was to have central control in planning for the economy. Though these reforms were on a national level, both of them

had significant local impacts on the socio-political structure of the region and on the relationship of the region with the center.

The new constitution, as several scholars underline, introduced novelties in state-society relations, individual rights and liberties, freedom of speech, civil and organizational rights (concerning the establishment and membership of labor unions), and in many other spheres. According to Bülent Tanör (2000: 378), for example, the “historical mission [of 1961 constitution] was not to firm up the state authority, but to institutionalize democracy and freedom.” Another scholar, İsmail Kaplan, also makes a similar observation:

The 1961 constitution regulates the state-citizen relations with its political position located somewhere between liberal-socialist understanding of state and a moderate solidarist-corporatist approach (Kaplan, 2005: 263).

This constitution not only introduced a constitutional protection for classical rights and liberties but also brought in new definitions about who could use these rights and liberties.¹¹¹ As Tanör observes (2000: 381), “In [the] 1924 constitution, the statements about the rights and liberties were written to depict ‘every Turk’ or ‘Turks’ as the primary owners of these rights and liberties. In 1961, this understanding was to be given up and every statement about the regulations of rights and liberties pointed toward an anonymous agent expressed by the term ‘every one.’ Hence, the very agent of rights and freedom was individual human beings, without regarding whether he or she is of a Turkish or foreign origin.’ Such changes were more humanistic and liberal

¹¹¹ These rights, which have been known as classical or principal rights and freedoms, cover the social, cultural and economic rights and liberties of individuals. The codes numbered 12 through 40 of the constitution install these rights and liberties.

compared to the 1924 constitution whose primary principles had been determined by nationalist ideas.

However, compared to the 1924 constitution, the 1961 constitution introduced more nationalist regulations that determine to whom the political sovereignty belonged. While the 1924 constitution stated that the sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the *nation (Millet)*, the 1961 constitution changed this into sovereignty which unconditionally belongs to the *Turkish nation* (Yeğen, 1999: 122). The difference between the expressions '*the nation*' and the '*Turkish nation*' clearly indicates the nationalist sentiment in the latter.

Organizational rights, primarily those of labor unions and civil-occupational organizations, as well as student associations-organizations and universities, were brought under constitutional protection. Similarly, important changes were made in the law of political parties for the sake of democratization of political life. In short, freedom of speech, of association, and of press afforded by the new constitution, promised social and economic rights (McDowall, 2004: 407). The effects of the innovations inaugurated by the 1961 constitution on the socio-political structure of the region will be discussed in detail in the succeeding parts.

The newly installed military government, the National Unity Committee, also enacted measures on the regional level with specific reference to the region considered for this study. The National Unity Committee initiated a series of measures to deal with the Kurdish-populated areas which were very similar to those carried out during one-party period. As Kendal stated

One of the Committee's very first measures had been to intern 485 Kurdish intellectuals and notables in a military camp established at Sivas, where they were held for four months. Fifty-

five of them were exiled to western cities of Turkey for two years (Kendal, 1993: 65).

The stated reason for such a decision was the following:

This law has been introduced in order to achieve certain social reforms; to annihilate the order of the middle ages which prevails in Turkey; to bring an end to the institutions of aghas and sheiks, to make it known that there is no power over the state in the 20th century in Turkey; and to bring an end to abuses, exploitations and deprivations of citizens¹¹² (Arslan, 1992: 60).

Although this was reminiscent of the Resettlement Law of the single-party period, it differed in two respects. First, unlike the previous one, this law had a rather limited scope. Second, in line with the above statement outlining the reasons of the law, apparently most of the exiled people were aghas and sheiks with large land holdings. However, most of these people were also had a political background of opposition to the CHP. As Arslan stated (1992: 60), “Among the 55 exiled people, 54 were members of the DP, and one from the CKMP (Republican National Peasant Party).” Thus, it seemed that the main target was the DP and the main goal was to punish those who supported the DP, rather than the eradication of the feudal system.¹¹³

Other regulations implemented with regard to the Kurdish-populated regions during this military rule were those which required the names of places to be changed to Turkish. “By Law No. 1587 the National Unity Committee had already started to change Kurdish place names into Turkish ones, names which hurt public opinion and are not suitable for our national culture, moral values,

¹¹² This statement of reason is almost the same as the statement of reason for the Resettlement Law of 1934 (which is expressed in its 10th article). The first clause of the 10th article was thus: “The law cannot grant individual power to the *aşiret*. Even if there is a proof of written judgment, the given rights are abolished hereby. All of *aşiret chieftaincy*, ranks of *aşiret* rulers (*ağalık* and *beylik*) and the rank of *sheikh* have been abolished with all of their organizations and branches without regard to any official documents, experiences or traditions that bring forth proof in their favor” (quoted by Beşikçi, 1991d: 116).

¹¹³ Shortly after the CHP-YTP coalition was built (in September 1962), the exiled people were allowed to return to their original places, due to the pressure exercised by the YTP (New Turkey Party) (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 108).

traditions and customs” (McDowall, 2004: 406). A 1985 publication of the Ministry of Internal Affairs states that, of the provinces that fall in the scope of this study, a total of 5.332 residential areas exist, of which some 4.045 have been renamed, a proportion of 76 percent. There is no information about the exact date of these changes; however, it is strongly possible that these changes were initiated between 1960 and 1985.

One final point regarding the region-affiliated policies enacted by the military government should be made. The National Unity Committee (NUC) insistently stressed the realization of cultural homogeneity through language. In order to achieve this, some regulations in the educational system were proposed and executed. The NUC, which noticed an insufficiency in the institutions of education, enacted a Law providing a base for the establishment of regional boarding schools. Further discussion about the regional boarding schools the primary goal of which, McDowall (2004: 406) defines as the assimilation of the Kurdish population, will be provided later in this study.

4.2.4. Changing Paradigms: Development-Underdevelopment

As it might be inferred from the examples given above, there were interruptions as well as continuity in the policies regarding the region from the single-party to the multi-party periods. However, one aspect that distinguished the policies regarding the region in this period from those of the single-party period was the tendency to perceive the region in terms of the dichotomy of development and underdevelopment, a perception prevalent during the DP administration. While the single-party period principles of the consolidation of state power, the establishment of security and order, and the construction of homogenous national unity were maintained, a new dimension was also added to the policies

pursued in the region. This new dimension addressed the question of the gap in the socio-economic developmental level between the region and the developed parts of the country, and of the way this gap should be treated. This issue was taken very seriously both when the DP was in power and in its aftermath. So much so that, in the governmental programs of almost all parties after the 1960s, this dimension occupies a significant place in the economic-social development sections of their plans. For example, in the program of the Demirel government it was stated that,

Decreasing the gap among the regional developmental levels is the natural requirement of realization of the balanced developmental process with social justice. Another important issue we stress is that of the development of the Eastern region. The development of all the regions of our country, the territorial and national integrity of which is indivisible, is a constitutional necessity. [. . .] Our aim is to bring all regions of Turkey to contemporary levels of civilization. It is for this reason [. . .] we see the necessity of introducing special measures in the regions where backwardness is massive and acute. The aim of these special measures is not to create privileged regions, but to forge integration (<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hukumetler.htm>).

Especially in the Five Year Development Plans (FYDPs), regional disparities in general, and the question of low level of development of the Kurdish-populated regions in particular have been a prevailing issue.¹¹⁴ Indeed, a separate sub-category of development under the title of 'less developed regions'¹¹⁵ was added to the second Five Year Development Plan (DPT, 1985: 4). The

¹¹⁴ For detailed analysis of the works about the less developed regions in the government programs and FYDP, see Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği (1993: 73-137).

¹¹⁵ The law code no. 202 which was introduced in 28 February 1963, argued for the execution of a more comprehensive development plan, which would be prepared specially for the 22 provinces of the Eastern and Southeastern parts of the country, apart from the National Development Plan. These provinces were defined and referred to as the Less Developed Regions (DPT, 1985: 4).

investments allocated in the FYDPs to these provinces will be elaborated in detail in the subsequent chapters.

Interestingly, it seems that this new question was not only adopted as a significant item of the agenda of the center, but also composed the most fundamental theme of the agenda of the social opposition emerging in the region. In other words, this new paradigm spread to the demands and reactions of the periphery causing the economic, social and cultural underdevelopment of the region and its associated problems to comprise the main arguments of the social opposition of the region. Thus, the argument formulated by the center on the basis of economic and social structures was reproduced and utilized by the oppositional voices of periphery.

There were several reasons behind this paradigmatic shift. First, the resistance and reaction which surfaced during the single-party period had been suppressed through a variety of instruments and institutions. By the 1950s, the consolidation of state power had been achieved to a certain extent and a relatively satisfactory level of security and order was effective, thus the attention of the state elites regarding the region could be directed elsewhere.

Another reason, and the most important one in my opinion, was the fundamental change in the economic paradigm in general and the change in the definitions of development, progress and growth specifically. The economic paradigm, which prevailed until the 1960s, was relying upon an agriculture-based development model (Owen and Pamuk, 2002: 144-145). The definition of 'development' in this paradigm was based on the rate of increase in the income per capita thus the criteria of economic development was measured by an increase in the income level. It was, thereby, a largely insufficient

understanding of 'development,' as noted in the following passage: "Therefore, it was rather a small-scale parameter which failed to explain social development and which could only explain the extension of demand" (Dinçer, Özaslan and Kavasoğlu, 2003: 6).

A series of transformations on a global scale in the 1960s brought about significant changes in the developmental strategies as well as in the definitions of such terms as development, growth and progress. As Owen and Pamuk (2002: 129) argue, the increase in trade rates against the basic goods resulted in a transition in the strategies of development and growth in the periphery in the beginning of the 1960s. The developmental model, which was based on the exportation on raw materials, would be replaced by import substitution industrialization. This new model to a certain extent "required a domestic market expanding at a pace sufficient to accommodate the production potential" (Keyder, 1987b: 299). The peripheral countries, which tried to enhance their growth level by exporting raw materials to the world, would be compelled to give principal weight to their domestic market when they felt the disadvantages of the breaking down of export-import equilibrium, requiring an enlargement of the domestic national market.

Similarly, the definitions of the terms development, growth and progress would be subjected to a change. The widespread approach, which had been defining development and progress merely on the basis of economic progress, would give heed to a more extended model, which was based on social, cultural, and spatial criteria, in addition to the economic measure. Therefore, the difference between the regional developmental levels became one of the most important components of this new strategy of progress.

The competitive multi-party political system had an important role in the formation of the new policies of the region according to the dichotomy of development-underdevelopment. Those parties who wanted to be successful in the competitive conditions of multiparty system had to consider the poor developmental level of the region. The mainstream parties of the center-right and center-left differed in their approaches to this issue but all of them paid particular attention to it in their party programs and electoral declarations. The TIP (Workers' Party of Turkey), which radically differed from the mainstream parties in its approach to the backwardness of the region and the solutions it offered, had a unique role in the treatment of the region within this newly emerging framework.

Up to this point, I discussed the changes that came into existence in Turkey's economic and political structure and how these were reflected in the traditionally followed politics of the Kurdish-populated periphery. In another respect, I also tried to examine the basic patterns in the period from 1950 to 1980. Now, as in the previous chapter, let us look more closely at the center's application of these politics in the Kurdish-populated periphery in three areas, the political, economic and educational. Allow me to begin with the political sphere.

4.3. Political Sphere and the Rise of Localism

As was argued before, soon after World War II, prominent changes occurred in Turkey's political system. The single-party rule that lasted for more than two decades was replaced by multi-party political system. Furthermore, the two-round electoral system was replaced by a one-round system. There were a

several important consequences of this change. First, the political realm, which had previously been open only to the representatives approved by the center, became relatively more democratized and it has become open to all those meeting certain qualifications. Secondly, it opened up new channels for both political mobilization and the integration of the periphery with the center. Similarly, it provided new opportunities for the periphery to express its social and political demands by non-violent means. Finally, and related to the first two points, it led to the revitalization and return of the repressed local notables.

In the following section, I will take up the first of these two changes in the political system, the passage to multi-party political, with specific reference to the impacts it had upon the socio-political structure of the region, looking particularly at the results of the general elections and the educational and occupational characteristics of the MPs (parliamentarians) elected. The section about the characteristics of the MPs will focus on a total of 345 deputies selected from the period between 1950 and 1980. However, I have limited the section about the election results to the elections between 1960 and 1980. This is mainly because the results of the elections between 1950 and 1960 have been proven inaccurate on a number of accounts,¹¹⁶ despite the fact that I contacted the relevant institutions and I conducted research in the archives.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ The most important reason was that there was no valid ballots cast for the elections held between 1950 and 1957. Moreover, these results have significant errors both on a provincial and a regional basis. For instance, in the 1950 elections, while the number of registered voters was 104,553 in Mardin and the number of actual voter was 92,178; the aggregate of the votes obtained by the political parties and the independent candidates was 137,731. Similarly, 50 percent of the votes in several provinces have been counted as invalid. There are similar problems with independent votes, too. For instance, while the total national valid ballot casts for independents in the elections in 1950 was 44,537, the regional figure was 64,885. It is possible to give more examples of this sort of mistakes/errors. Thus, I decided to exclude the results of these elections from my examination.

¹¹⁷ These institutions are Higher Election Committee, Turkey Statistics Institute and Turkish Grand National Assembly.

4.3.1. National Elections Local Reflections

The results of the general elections provide significant data concerning the political structure in the region. First of all, the participation rate in the region is higher than the national average, except for the elections held in 1961.¹¹⁸ It is possible to interpret this elevated level of participation as an indication that the voters trust the political system and that they perceive the elections to be a legitimate instrument in order to express their social demands and political preferences. Another analysis of this high rate is given by the scholars (Özbudun, 1976; Abadan, 1967; Dodd, 1979; Güneş-Ayata, 1994) who adopt the perspective of the modernization school. They explain this rate a result of the level of socio-economic development, asserting that participation in elections is determined by the persistent influence of tribal leaders and local notables in underdeveloped regions, where patron-client relations are dominant. "It certainly seems to be generally accepted, at any rate, that the larger vote in the less developed areas is due to its being mobilized by local leaders relying on a traditional loyalty or fear of retribution, or is due, simply, to greater communal unity"¹¹⁹ (Dodd, 1979: 132). Beyond this high rate of participation and its various corresponding explanations, the way in which these votes were divided among candidates is also noteworthy. Thus, a more

¹¹⁸ In the 1961 elections, the AP (Justice Party) did not participate in elections in five of the 11 provinces in the region, which are as follows: Bingöl, Bitlis, Mardin, Siirt and Tunceli. When one takes into account the support that both its predecessor DP and the AP received in the region, it is possible to claim that the AP's non-participation in the elections has had an important impact on the low proportion of participation.

¹¹⁹ Although I agree with these scholars on their arguments concerning the trade-off between the center-parties and local notables, I believe that their argument regarding the relationship between local notables and voters is problematic. The problem is that they discuss the relations between tribal leaders and voters through the stereotypical orientalist and modernist framework. For a partial critique of this sort of arguments, see Yalçın-Heckmann (1990).

detailed consideration of the percentage of the votes received by various candidate categories follows, beginning with the votes garnered by independent candidates and then moving on to a review of the center parties, minor parties and, finally, the ultra nationalist parties and their respective support in the region.

The percentage of the vote received by the independent candidates in these elections is quite striking. The independent ballots cast in the region were not only higher than the national average but also witnessed a tremendous upsurge particularly in the elections held after 1961. It increased almost seven-fold from one election to the next, going from 2.4 per cent in 1961 to 15.7 percent in 1965. This pattern persisted to a large extent in the next three elections held in 1969, 1973 and 1977, and the independent candidates obtained 20.4, 16.3 and 24.6 percent of the votes in aggregate respectively.

Table 4.2 Number and Percentage of Votes Received by Political Parties and Independents in the 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973 and 1977 Elections

Year		Number of Registered Voters	Number of Actual Voters and Rate	Number of Valid Ballots Cast	POLITICAL PARTIES										YTP	IND.
					AP	CHP	GP/CGP	CKMP	DP	MP	MHP	MSP	TBP	TİP		
1961	Turkey	12 925 395	10 522 716 81.4%	10 138 035	3 527 435 34.8%	3 724 752 36.7%		1 415 390 14.0%							1 391 934 13.7%	81 732 0.8%
	Region	991 120	781 250 78.8%	757 384 96.9%	72 084 9.5%	283 539 37.4%		94 638 12.5%							288 758 38.1%	18 321 2.4%
1965	Turkey	13 679 753	9 748 678 71.3%	9 307 563	4 921 235 52.9%	2 675 785 28.7%		208 696 2.2%		582 704 6.3%				276 101 3.0%	346 514 3.7%	296 528 3.0%
	Region	1 085 618	780 210 71.9%	749 226	209 908 28.0%	210 068 28.0%		24 467 3.3%		104 08 1.4%				26 407 3.5%	150 559 20.1%	117 409 15.7%
1969	Turkey	14 788 552	9 516 035 64.3%	9 086 296	4 229 712 46.5%	2 487 006 27.4%	597 818 6.6%			292 961 3.2%	275 091 3%		254 695 2.8%	243 631 2.7%	197 929 2.2%	511 023 5.6%
	Region	1 216 441	877 816 72.2%	849 158	256 642 30.2%	145 457 17.1%	98 899 11.6%			15 110 1.8%	10 768 1.3%		2 969 0.3%	20 125 2.4%	125 964 14.8%	173 224 20.4%
1973	Turkey	16 798 164	11 223 843 66.8%	10 723 658	3 197 897 29.8%	3 570 583 33.3%	564 343 5.3%		275 502 11.9%	62 377 0.6%	362 208 3.4%	1 265 771 11.8%	121 759 1.1%			303 218 2.8%
	Region	1 338 900	967 314 72.2%	934 941	203 968 21.8%	218 500 23.4%	119 394 12.8%		101 232 10.8%		13 199 1.4%	125 279 13.4%	616 0.1%			152 753 16.3%
1977	Turkey	21 207 303	15 358 210 72.4%	14 827 172	5 468 202 36.9%	6 136 171 41.4%	277 713 1.9%		274 484 1.9%	951 544 6.4%	1 269 918 8.6%	58 540 0.4%	20 565 0.1%			370 035 2.5%
	Region	1 661 652	1 233 136 74.2%	1 195 387	278 640 23.3%	310 096 25.9%	43 269 3.6%		11 396 1.0%	27 622 2.3%	226 310 18.9%	359 0.0%	2 975 0.2%			294 653 24.6%

Source: DIE, 2004 (Rearranged).

Political Parties: AP (Justice Party), CHP (Republican People's Party), GP (Reliance Party), CGP (Republican Reliance Party), CKMP (Republican National Peasant Party), DP (Democratic Party), MP (Nation Party), MHP (Nationalist Action Party), NSP (National Salvation Party), TBP (Unity Party of Turkey), TİP (Worker's Party of Turkey), YTP (New Turkey Party).

Undoubtedly, the high proportion of independent votes emanated in part from the national political system. In other words, political instability, the electoral system, and the incapacity of the existing political parties played an important role in such a development. Nevertheless, this situation was mostly the result of local dynamics, a realization which calls for an analysis of the socio-political structure in the region. Said analysis highlights the strength of communitarian solidarity and the corresponding frailty of party affiliation in the region. As Özbudun (1980: 112) argues: "A high proportion of votes garnered by independents demonstrate the incapacity of the party system to articulate and/or aggregate interests." The relationship between the independent parliamentarians and the political parties in the period between 1960 and 1980 seems to support this argument. For instance, throughout this period 10 independent candidates were elected to the National Assembly. Seven of them were elected two or more times. All of these seven deputies made it to the Parliament at least once through the ranks of a political party. Along similar lines, Akarlı and Ben Dor (1975: 158) argue that "in Eastern Anatolia, where the notion of state is weak, political life is much less institutionalized than elsewhere, and patron-client networks subvert the infrastructure of political parties."

Thus it seems that the candidates themselves, rather than the political parties, are able to obtain the loyalty of the people in the region. Özbudun's analysis of the high degree of independent support continues in this vein by stating that, "high levels of support for independent candidates can be taken as an indicator of mobilized and deferential participation" (1980: 110). Unlike Özbudun, however, who tends to explain the high rate of independent votes

with specific reference to semi-feudal, tribal social structure and incapacity of the party system, Kirişçi and Winrow (1997: 108) account for this situation by the revival of a Kurdish consciousness: "Awareness of a Kurdish identity seems also to have manifested itself in increased votes for independent candidates."

Nonetheless, despite the weakness of party loyalty in the region compared to other regions of Turkey, both the center-right and the center-left parties enjoyed significant support in the region. For instance, the CHP, the center-left party, emerged as the strongest party in three of the five national elections, while the center-right AP was the largest party in two elections. However, the support given to the center parties witnessed sharp fluctuations over time. For instance, while the rate of support for the CHP was 37.4 percent in the elections held in 1961, it sharply decreased first to 28 and then to 17.1 percent in the next two elections, respectively. Then, the figures changed again in the elections held in 1973 and 1977 with the ballots cast for the CHP increasing to 23.4 and 25.9 percent, respectively. This rise in the CHP's votes in the 1970s could be attributed to the party's various projects, primarily land reform and its attempts at removing the region's socio-economic backwardness. The votes of the center-right party, AP, also oscillated as follows: It increased from 9.5 to 28 and then to 30.2 percent in the elections held in 1961, 1965 and 1969 respectively. Although the appeal of the center parties fluctuated, and the rate of their votes was below their national average, both the center-right and the center-left parties received important support in the region.

The support that some minor parties received is also worthy of mention, namely the MSP¹²⁰ [National Salvation Party, the pro-Islamic party], the TİP [Workers Party of Turkey, the left-wing party], and the YTP¹²¹ (New Turkey Party). These parties were quite different from each other in terms of their political demands, programs, and targets. However, all three parties garnered significant support from the region. For instance, the MSP received 13.4 and 18.9 percent of the regional votes in the elections held in 1973 and 1977, while its national average was 11.8 and 8.6 percent respectively.

Similarly, the YTP obtained 38.1, 20.1 and 14.8 percent of the regional ballots cast in the elections held in 1961, 1965 and 1969, respectively. This party became the leading party in the region in the election of 1961, which was the party's first election after its foundation. Furthermore, the rate of votes it obtained in the region in this election was about three-fold its average rate in Turkey. The most important reason behind the success of the YTP in the region

¹²⁰ MSP was founded by the members of the MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi/National Order Party), which had been closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1971 on account of its violation of the principle of secularism in the Constitution. It was the representative of an Islamic-oriented movement in the political arena. This movement was called National View by its founders. According to Mardin: "the MSP's official doctrine can be summarized under the following three headings: a religious worldview, an attempt to further accelerated Turkey's industrialization and a populist economic distribution, and social morality" (Mardin: 1991: 106).

¹²¹ YTP was one of the two parties (the other party was AP) that were founded after the 1960 coup, as heir of the DP. An important part of its founders were the members of the dissolved Freedom Party, some ex-members of the DP and some others from universities and the business world (Abadan, 1966: 198). Social justice, injustice of income and underdevelopment were the most significant issues on the party's agenda. For instance: "of the party's 80-page declaration in the 1965 elections, 50 pages were devoted to economic problems (Abadan, 1966: 205). The second article of the party program was as follows: "we are convinced that the differences of extreme wealth and income that bring about polarizations in the community and their effects that distort the balance and harmony in the community and [their effects] that damage the spiritual solidarity among citizens should be removed. For this purpose, without distorting the economic order and harmony, within a social body that is based on individual enterprise and ownership, without shaking trust and stability, we want social harmony and balance to be realized." Favoring a mixed economic system, the YTP put forward economic development as its fundamental project (cited in Topkaya, 1969: 584). According to Abadan (1966: 204), although in various issues the YTP adopted some opinions that can be classified as left of center; it claims to be a center party. A statement by one of the founders of the party, Raif Aybar, verifies this. Aybar stated the following: "The YTP is a party that defends social justice, without having a socialist label."

was the strong cooperation it established with local notables. For example in her study that focuses on an evaluation of the election results of 1965, Nermin Abadan indicates that:

The attraction of the YTP lies neither in the persuasive aspects of the program nor in the dynamism of the party cadre, rather it lies in the individual superiority of the individuals attempting political competition on behalf of the party (Abadan, 1966: 208).

Yusuf Azizoğlu from Diyarbakır is an example of such a local notable in that he assumed an important role in the foundation of the party and its organization in the southeast. I will present more detailed information about Azizoğlu in the following pages, but allow me to briefly note a few points here: Azizoğlu belonged to a powerful large landowning family that had been exiled during the single-party era. After the passage to a multi-party political system, he became involved in political life in the ranks of the DP and he was actively involved in the organization of the party in the region. After the closure of the DP, Azizoğlu took a vigorous part in the foundation of the YTP and he had an important role in the popularity of the party in the region. He also took a part in the '*Eastism*'¹²² movement, which emerged in the ends of the 1950s. This

¹²² Nezan Kendal, one of the founders of the Kurdish Institute in Paris, describes the Eastism movement as follows: "the Kurdish 'feudalists' were figuring less and less as Kurds and more and more as landlords with access to an electoral clientele and capitalist privilege. Many tribal chieftains-aghas, beys and sheikhs- moved to the towns where they became entrepreneurs, wholesalers, city landlords and shareholders. Their children, who were educated in Turkish schools and American colleges, were later to provide the first wave of campaigners for what to be known as 'Eastism' (*Doğuculuk*), support for economic change and progress in the East. [...] The first group of 'Eastists' (*Doğucu*) was based in Diyarbakır and published a daily broadsheet called *İleri Yurt* (The Advanced Country) from the fall of 1958 onwards. The paper was written in Turkish and merely stressed the East's underdevelopment, its lack of hospitals, roads, schools, etc" (Kendal: 1993: 64). *İleri Yurt* was not the only journal that this movement published. Another journal was a bi-monthly entitled *Dicle-Fırat*, which was published in 1962. It was a bilingual (Turkish and Kurdish) journal and published by Eastist intellectuals close to Dr. Azizoğlu. The magazine was particularly popular amongst the university students (Kendal, 1993: 64). After having published eight issues, it was closed in 1963 by the accusation that it aimed to separate the country and to found an independent Kurdistan. Among the contributors to the journal was Musa Anter, who was murdered in 1992 in Diyarbakır and Yaşar Kaya, who

movement put an emphasis on the problems of the East and Southeast from within a non-separatist political framework. Azizoğlu, who was “also the leader of the YTP for a term” (Topkaya, 1969: 579) was appointed as the Minister of Health in the coalition cabinet of the CHP and the YTP. When he was in the cabinet, Azizoğlu had more hospitals and dispensaries built in eastern provinces than all previous governments had put together (Kendal, 1993: 66 and McDowall, 2004: 408).

Beside Azizoğlu, Recai İskenderoğlu (Diyarbakır), Kasım Küfrevi (Ağrı), İhsan Bedirhanoğlu (Van), Kemal Badıllı (Urfa)¹²³ and Sait Mutlu (Muş) were all local notables who played a crucial role in the regional achievement of the YTP. I will present more information about these figures in the following pages. Suffice it to note the following now: a great majority of them belonged to big landowning tribes; they were traditional elites belonging to influential *tariqats*; and they had been subjected to forced migration during the single-party era.

Compared with the MSP and the YTP, the success of the TIP was limited. For instance, in 1965, the TIP picked up more than fifty percent of its regional votes from three provinces, namely Diyarbakır, Tunceli and Urfa. In fact, the significance of the TIP originates from its symbolic characteristic rather than the highness of the rate of its votes. This is mainly because this party criticized the state’s policy with regard to the Kurdish issue, defended the recognition of the Kurdish identity and asked that the Kurds be given their

was elected to the parliament in 1991 from the ranks of the pro-Kurdish party DEP, and who later was chair of the Kurdish Parliament in Exile. For more information about *Dicle-Fırat* see; Malmisanij and Lewendi, 1992: 135-150.

¹²³ Kemal Badıllı was elected as the YTP deputy from Urfa in 1961. Coming from a powerful tribal family, Badıllı graduated from Faculty of Law and was a lawyer. He is well-known for his work on the Kurdish language. In 1963, he published a work called Kurdish Grammar. His poetry was published in a Kurdish socialist journal called *Yeni Akış*, a bilingual journal published in Ankara in 1963 (Malmisanij and Lewendi, 1992: 171).

cultural-political rights. The position of the party on this issue was officially declared in its 4th Congress, held in November 1970 as follows

There is a Kurdish people in the east of Turkey.... the fascist authorities representing the ruling classes have subjected the Kurdish people to a policy of assimilation and intimidation which has often become a bloody repression"¹²⁴ (Cited in Entessar, 1992: 89-90 and Ballı, 1991: 75-76).

Entessar evaluates this official position, asserting that (1992: 90): "this was a revolutionary statement, marking the first time in modern Turkey that a Turkish political party had openly recognized the existence of Kurds as a persecuted minority."

Another factor drumming up support for the TIP in the region was its radical agenda regarding the semi-feudal structure that had been dominant in the region, a position of sharp contrast to the YTP and MSP stances. Ironically, the TIP got an important part of the votes from the region by exploiting the very tribal structure to which it expressed opposition. For instance, in the 1965 elections, a considerable portion of the total votes cast for the TIP were from Diyarbakır; that is, 8,867 of the total 26,407 votes were from Diyarbakır. Moreover, one of the two deputies elected from the TIP ranks in the region was Tarık Ziya Ekinçi, who belonged to a powerful tribe in Diyarbakır.

The above-outlined espousal of the minority parties in the region is explained by some scholars, particularly those adopting the modernization theory (Dodd: 1979), on the basis of the level of socio-economic development. For instance according to Dodd

¹²⁴According to McDowall (2004: 409) in so doing, the TIP sounded its own death knell. Following the military intervention of 1971, the TIP was declared an illegal organization and was forced to close down due mainly to its declaration concerning the Kurdish question.

When indices of economic and social development are considered alongside voting figures it is found that the more developed regions tend to vote for the larger parties...the small parties do well in less-developed regions. These parties (the small parties) tend also to be very local (Dodd, 1979: 128-9).

The political scientist Sayarı, on the other hand, attempts to explain the question according to changes that take place in the electoral system. Sayarı notes that

The switch from a plurality to a proportional system of elections in 1961 facilitated the rise of fragmentation in Turkey's party politics. The new electoral system made it easier for the minor parties to gain the representation in the parliament (Sayarı, 2002: 14).

Finally, the support, or lack thereof, received by the ultra nationalist parties merits brief mention. The political parties which stressed Turkish nationalism received lowest percentages of votes in all elections. As it can be easily observed from the Table 4.2, the vote cast for the MHP, which was the first and the most popular political party in this category, was below the national average.

In sum, regarding political patterns, the region is different from the whole of Turkey in many respects. The voters in the region see the political system as legitimate and they show a strong desire to participate in this system. Nevertheless, political preferences show that there is a collective tendency to be regionalism-centered. A regional affiliation, rather than a national one, is accorded higher importance. In terms of political participation, the multi-party political system provided noteworthy opportunities to integrate the region into the political system.

However, the process of political integration resulted not in a transformation based on the political mobilization of the masses, as one might

expect, but rather in the resurrection of the power of the traditional local elites. I will discuss this point in more detail in the subsequent pages but at this point let me very briefly point out that 196 of the total 346 seats from the region were occupied by 78 deputies that were elected twice or more. An important majority of these deputies were of the traditional local elite social status. This reassertion of influence by the traditional local elites via political means begs the question: How did the rise of localism and the passage to a multi-party system affect the social characteristics of these deputies and allow for this reclaiming of power? In order to find an answer to this question, an investigation of the social characteristics, both educational and occupational, of the representatives of the region chosen in these elections seems appropriate.

4.3.2. Representation and Representatives

4.3.2.1. Educational Characteristics of the Deputies of the Region

Let me begin with a general evaluation of the data concerning the educational characteristics of representatives presented in the Table 4.3 by considering each category and its general trends over the specified time period.

Table 4.3 The Deputies of the Region by Educational Level, 1950-1977

Assembly	University	Military School	High School	Secondary School	Primary School	Private	Medrese	Unknown	Total
09 [1950]	22 55.0%	4 10.0%	5 12.5%	3 7.5%	4 10.0%	1 2.5%	1 2.5%		40 100.0%
10 [1954]	25 53.2%	2 4.3%	11 23.4%	5 10.6%	2 4.3%	2 4.3%			47 100.0%
11 [1957]	34 61.8%	2 3.6%	5 9.1%	7 12.7%	4 7.3%	3 5.5%			55 100.0%
12 [1961]	24 61.5%	1 2.6%	4 10.3%	6 15.4%	3 7.7%			1 2.6%	39 100.0%
13 [1965]	28 68.3%	3 7.3%	3 7.3%	6 14.6%	1 2.4%				41 100.0%
14 [1969]	20 50.0%	2 5.0%	5 12.5%	9 22.5%	3 7.5%	1 2.5%			40 100.0%
15 [1973]	19 45.2%	1 2.4%	4 9.5%	9 21.4%	8 19.0%	1 2.4%			42 100.0%
16 [1977]	18 42.9%	1 2.4%	3 7.1%	9 21.4%	10 23.8%	1 2.4%			42 100.0%
Total	190 54.9%	16 4.6%	40 11.6%	54 15.6%	35 10.1%	9 2.6%	1 0.3%	1 0.3%	346 100.0%

Source: TBMM, 1994 (Rearranged).

The graduates of university are the largest group with a percentage of 54.9. However, although they were the largest group overall, one can see important fluctuations in time. Particularly after 1965 their proportion decreased sharply. For example, while their rate was at its peak in 1965 with 68.3 percent, in 1969 it went down to 50 percent. The decrease continued in the following two terms as well and in 1977 it was at its lowest level with 42.9 percent.

Secondary school graduates were the second most common group, comprising 15.6 percent of the general total. This category saw slight fluctuations until 1965. The lowest rate of their representation was 7.5 percent in 1950 and the highest was 15.4 in 1961. The percentage of this group was 14.6 percent in 1965 and it increased by half in 1969, rising to a rate of 22.5 percent. In the following two terms, it was represented by a percentage of over 20 percent. Among all categories, the most fluctuation was seen among the group of high school graduates. In aggregate, this group ranked third with a percentage of 11.6, with rates oscillating from 23.4 percent in 1954 to 7.1 percent in 1977.

Primary school graduates comprise the fourth most common group with 10.1 percent of the aggregate total. This category was generally below 10 percent until 1965. In 1965 there was only one primary school graduate and its percentage was 2.4 in aggregate. However, the change one can view following 1965 is quite striking and was in stark contrast to the category of university graduates. It rose first to 7.5 percent in 1969 and then to 19 percent in 1973. In 1977 it was up to 23.8 percent, which was the second largest category in aggregate and was its highest proportion throughout the entire Republican history.

Finally, the military school category, except for the 1965 Assembly, gradually decreased from 10 percent in 1950, to 2.4 percent in 1977.

Before going into the discussion of the political representation of the region through the educational characteristics of the MPs, I would like to present two relevant findings. The first one concerns the comparison of the representatives of the region with the whole assembly. The second one

pertains to the comparison of the educational composition of the MPs with that of the region.

As can be seen from Table 4.4 below, there are significant differences between the MPs of the region and the whole Assembly. The educational level of the representatives from the region is always below than that of the whole Assembly. To illustrate, let us look at the findings about university graduates: While in the region the highest and lowest percentages are 68.3 percent (1965) and 42.9 percent (1977), for the whole assembly the range spans from 75.1 percent (1973) to 67.1 percent (1950). The difference between the region and the whole assembly is the smallest in 1965. In this assembly, except for the secondary school level category, the figures for all other categories were similar. However, from this year on, with the exception of the percentages corresponding to military school education, the region proved to be higher in the high school, secondary school and primary school rates than those of the national average.

Thus, from 1965 onwards (when the discrepancy was the smallest), the difference between the two has grown to the disadvantage of the region. While the rate of university graduates increased in the whole assembly and other categories decreased, except for primary school graduates, the opposite occurred among the representatives of the region with the percentage of university graduates decreasing and other groups increasing.

Table 4.4 The Proportional Distribution of Deputies by Educational Level, 1950-1977

ASSEMBLY		University %	Military School %	High School %	Secondary School %	Primary School %	Private %	Medrese %	Unknown %	Total %
09 [1950]	Turkey	67.1	6.2	10.5	8.6	2.5	1.8	0.8	2.5	100.0
	Region	55.0	10.0	12.5	7.5	10.0	2.5	2.5		100.0
10 [1954]	Turkey	72.8	4.4	8.7	7.9	2.2	1.1	0.4	2.4	99.9
	Region	53.2	4.3	23.4	10.6	4.3	4.3			100.0
11 [1957]	Turkey	70.5	3.8	9.5	8.4	4.7	1.5		1.5	99.9
	Region	61.8	3.6	9.1	12.7	7.3	5.5			100.0
12 [1961]	Turkey	71.8	5.8	8.7	7.8	3.1	1.1		1.8	100.1
	Region	61.5	2.6	10.3	15.4	7.7			2.6	100.0
13 [1965]	Turkey	72.9	7.6	9.3	6.2	2.0	0.7		1.3	100.0
	Region	68.3	7.3	7.3	14.6	2.4				100.0
14 [1969]	Turkey	70.0	5.3	9.3	10.0	4.7	0.4			99.7
	Region	50.0	5.0	12.5	22.5	7.5	2.5			100.0
15 [1973]	Turkey	75.1	3.8	6.2	7.1	5.8	0.4		1.6	100.0
	Region	45.2	2.4	9.5	21.4	19.0	2.4			100.0
16 [1977]	Turkey	74	3	7	7.1	7.1	0.7		1.1	100.0
	Region	42.9	2.4	7.1	21.4	23.8	2.4			100.0
Total	Turkey	71.7	4.9	8.7	7.9	4.0	1.0	0.2	1.6	100.0
	Region	54.9	4.6	11.6	15.6	10.1	2.6	0.3	0.3	100.0

Source: TBMM, 1994 (Rearranged).

The second comparison I would like to pause upon before proceeding with the discussion at hand is that of the educational characteristics of representatives versus the population represented. There is actually very little data available to be able to make such a comparison. Thus, I will try to accomplish this by using educational data from 1975 for the population aged 25 and above, in conglomeration with data about literacy rates in the region.

Table 4.5 provides significant information in this regard. As it reveals, more than 70 percent of the population aged 25 and over was illiterate. Furthermore, a significant number of the literate population did not receive any formal education. Only four percent of the population received secondary, high school and university degrees, while the largest group was those who had a primary school education with 16.7 percent. In brief, there was a substantial

gulf between the representatives and the population represented. However, over time, the change that appeared in literacy rates shows that this gulf decreased. For instance, the literacy rate increased more than threefold, from 12 percent in 1950 to 38 percent in 1975. While in the same period, the number of university-educated representatives decreased and the proportion of the primary school-educated increased thus closing the gap between the representatives and the population considerably.

Table 4.5 Literacy and Educational Level of Population Aged of 25 and Above in the Region in 1975

Illiterate	Literate but no school completed	Primary School	Secondary School	High School	University	Unknown	Total
846 777	99 127	199 757	19 455	21 090	5 976	3 036	1 195 218
70.80%	8.30%	16.70%	1.60%	1.80%	0.50%	0.30%	100.00%

Source: DIE, 2002 (Rearranged).

Let us now turn back to the discussion of the social characteristics of the MPs and reflect upon what might have been responsible for the changes and fluctuations observed. One important transition, with the multi-party political system, can be said to have resulted in an outstanding change in the composition of representatives. The sharpest change occurred in two categories, namely primary school and military school educated parliamentarians. For instance, while the number of primary school graduates was only one in the single-party era, it rose to 35 in this period. Similarly, while the percentage of military school graduates was 26 percent between 1923 and 1946 (the second largest group), in the multi-party period it decreased sharply, falling to 5 percent.

It is also possible to explain this situation by the fact that the center had lost its strict control over the political sphere and thereby instigated a rise in

localism. One should interpret the large proportion of the well-educated parliamentarians in the two assemblies following the 1960 coup (in the Assemblies of 1961 and 1965) in light of this point of view. Secondly, the positive correlation between high education and political representation throughout the single-party era lost its significance in this period. Thirdly, with a rather optimistic interpretation, one can claim that the rise in the representation of those with a low-level of education is indicative of political mobilization at the level of the masses. The trend after 1965 is interesting. From that year on, while the rate of those with a high educational level (especially university educated) decreases quite sharply, the rate of primary school-educated representatives increases immensely. This may be attributed to the fragmentation and instability in the political structure,¹²⁵ caused by both the military interventions and the changes in electoral system. With a fragmented political system, in the regions where the political system is too weak to institutionalize and where local dynamics are determinative, the parties prefer local actors. For instance, the proportion of primary school graduates is the highest in 1973 and 1977 assemblies. In both elections, 18 of the representatives elected from the region were primary school graduates. When we look at the distribution of these 18 MPs to parties, there was almost no difference between center parties and small parties (MSP 6, CHP 5¹²⁶, AP 4, GP, CGP and DP 1). Thus, the alterations in the educational background of the region's Assembly parliamentarians over time can be said to have originated in the shifting political structure at both the national and the local

¹²⁵ For example, the number of parties that participated in elections in 1961 was four, whereas it increased to six in 1965 and to eight in the following three elections (DIE, 2004: 9).

¹²⁶ Of the 104 deputies that the CHP got from the region between 1950 and 1977, only eight were primary schools graduates. Five of these eight representatives were elected in 1973 and 1977 elections.

level. As might be expected, the educational characteristics were not the sole factors affected in this environment. The occupational compositions of the MPs also reveal significant variation due to the above-noted transitions. These occupational changes will be discussed in the following section.

4.3.2.2. Occupational Background of the Deputies of the Region

In considering the occupational background of the MPs of the region, allow me to begin once again with a general overview based on the Table 4.6 below. As this data reveals, the professionals constituted the largest category by 45.4 percent in aggregate. The parliamentarians who were engaged in agriculture and trade were the second largest occupational group by 35.5 percent in aggregate, while officials were the third occupational category represented by 19.1 percent.

Table 4.6 The Deputies of the Region by Occupation, 1950-1977

Occupational Groups		National Assembly								
Major	Minor	09 [1950]	10 [1954]	11 [1957]	12 [1961]	13 [1965]	14 [1969]	15 [1973]	16 [1977]	General Total
Official	Military	3	2	1	1	2	1	-	-	10
		7.5%	4.3%	1.8%	2.6%	4.9%	2.5%			2.9%
	Education	2	5	4	4	3	3	1	2	24
		5.0%	10.6%	7.3%	10.3%	7.3%	7.5%	2.4%	4.8%	6.9%
	Government	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	4
		2.5%	2.1%	1.8%	2.6%					1.2%
	Law (Official)	5	3	5	5	4	1	1	-	24
		12.5%	6.4%	9.1%	12.8%	9.8%	2.5%	2.4%		6.9%
	Officers	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	4
		2.5%	2.1%	1.8%				2.4%		1.2%
Total	12	12	12	11	9	5	3	2	66	
	30.0%	25.5%	21.8%	28.3%	22.0%	12.5%	7.2%	4.8%	19.1%	
Professional	Law	7	6	13	9	13	10	15	10	83
		17.5%	12.8%	23.6%	23.1%	31.7%	25.0%	35.7%	23.8%	24.0%
	Medicine	6	7	8	3	4	4	1	2	35
		15.0%	14.9%	14.5%	7.7%	9.8%	10.0%	2.4%	4.8%	10.1%
	Engineering	3	2	2	-	3	2	1	3	16
		7.5%	4.3%	3.6%		7.3%	5.0%	2.4%	7.1%	4.6%
	Economic	1	2	2	3	1	-	1	-	10
		2.5%	4.3%	3.6%	7.7%	2.4%		2.4%		2.9%
	Journalism	-	2	1	-	1	1	3	1	4
			4.3%	1.8%		2.4%	2.5%	7.1%	2.4%	1.2%
	Others	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	4	9
						2.4%	2.5%	7.1%	9.5%	2.6%
	Total	17	19	26	15	23	18	24	20	157
		42.5%	40.6%	47.1%	38.5%	56.0%	45.0%	57.1%	47.6%	45.4%
Agriculture & Trade		11	16	17	13	10	18	18	20	123
		27.5%	34.0%	30.9%	33.3%	24.4%	45.0%	42.9%	47.6%	35.5%
General Total		40	47	55	39	41	40	42	42	346
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: TBMM, 1994 (Rearranged).

Compared to the change in educational characteristics, the changes in vocational characteristics are much more striking. It can even be said that the pyramid turned upside down. While officials were the largest group during the single-party era by a representational rate of 80 percent, this percentage plunged to below 20 percent. On the other hand, the proportion of deputies engaged in agriculture and trade increased almost fivefold, from seven percent

in the single party period (1923-1946) to 35 percent in this period (1950-1980). The other group who reflected notable changes was the professionals, with their rate increasing threefold over the designated period.

The officials category, which registered some of the most drastic changes as noted above, deserves further attention here. While their proportion was 30 percent in 1950, it declined sharply, sinking to 4.8 percent in 1977. The only exception was the Assembly in 1961, an exception which is most likely explicable by the coup in 1960. It actually decreased numerically, yet since the regional quota was reduced from 55 to 39, it increased proportionally.

Actually, except in 1961, the regular decrease of the officials is not specific to the region but rather it is valid for the whole assembly. As Tachau (1980: 207) points out, after the transition to the multi-party period “the proportion of officials has never again risen above 30 percent.” This situation, as many scholars indicate (Frey, 1965; Tachau, 1980), was an outstanding development and it underlined the transformation of the political system: “The regime was shifting from an authoritarian bias to a more consensual, pluralist or participant one” (Tachau, 1980: 207). Indeed, this does not only point to a transformation in the political system, but it also shows that there was a rupture in how political representatives were perceived in that significance attributed to state experience tended to disappear.

The professional category is also noteworthy in that it constituted the largest group in all sessions; it was not, however, without its vacillations. The fluctuation that emerged before and after the 1960 coup is especially worth mentioning. While their proportion was 47.1 percent in the 1957 Assembly, it went down to 38.5 in the first assembly that gathered after the coup. In the

following assembly (1965), it increased to 56 percent. One may conclude that the professionals are more responsive to the military intervention in the political system than other major groups.

The parliamentarians that were engaged in agriculture and trade were the most stable as compared with the previous two groups. Until 1965, it fluctuated only slightly. Then, it increased hundred percent and rose to a proportion of 45 percent in 1969. They continued to maintain their high proportion in the period between 1969 and 1977.

The distribution regarding sub-groups also reveals some important findings. Among these groups, the most striking figure is the high proportion of lawyers. The lawyers constituted the largest single occupational group with 24 percent in aggregate; despite the conservative classificatory procedure.¹²⁷ When official lawyers are included, the rate of this group reaches over 30 percent. Tachau argues that the same trend is valid Turkey in general, not just in the region, and he adds that

The predominance of professionals, particularly lawyers, in the Turkish parliament since the advent of multi-party politics thus symbolizes the end of the tutelary hold over Turkish society and politics exercised by the previously dominant official elite (Tachau, 1980: 208).

Frey (1965), who is of the same opinion as Tachau, attempts to explain the high rate of lawyers with the lawyers' ability to slip in and out of a hazardous political career without serious professional damage.

¹²⁷ According to Frey (1965: 395) "though there are a few striking exceptions, such as Germany, and though most national legislatures are not so heavily populated by lawyers as those of the United States and the some of British Commonwealth nations, the fact is that lawyers tend to be the largest single occupational group in parliament after parliament all over the world."

The above-mentioned arguments reduce the high representation of the lawyers to the change in the political system and to vocational advantages. However, in my opinion one should also incorporate the voters' preferences into the analysis at this point. In this sense, one can observe that due to their superior language abilities as denoted in their eloquence in speech and writing along with their mastery of the codes of the center, the lawyers were seen as ideal intermediaries for voters.

Having considered the occupational data in detail, we may now draw several conclusions in light of the trends and changes which this data reveals. The transition to the multi-party system, and the period which followed, demonstrated first and foremost that the centrist-statist understanding had lost its significance in political representation. In other words, the center lost its hegemony over the political representation; hence the significant decrease in the official category discussed above. Secondly, local dynamics gained significance in political representation, as can be seen with the rise in the agriculture/trade category after 1969 because those involved in these occupations were more closely representative of the realities at the local level. In other words, localism¹²⁸ took the place of centralism: "The opening up of tutelary developmental system and the inauguration of a western, multi party parliamentary structure emphatically increased the representation of local forces, that is, of *local elites*" (Frey, 1965: 397). The political volatility and the competition between political parties also played an outstanding role in this process. Finally, it is possible to evaluate the rise of localism as a result of the suspicion towards the center and distrust of the center's intermediaries.

¹²⁸ My definition of localism here is the same as Frey's, which means simply that the MPs were born in the constituencies, which they represent.

Having thereby covered the impact which the changes in this period had upon the socio-political structure of the region by a thorough look at the political dynamics of the region, let us now take up a similar issue with regard to economics. In other words, how did the transitions of the period and the policies of the center affect the Kurdish-populated periphery in the economic sphere?

4.4. The Regional Economic Policy in the National Developmentalism Era

In 1950, when multi-party political life started, the economic structure in the region was predominantly agrarian and was characterized as semi-feudal. Despite the conservative classificatory procedure,¹²⁹ more than 80 percent of the population was located in rural areas (DIE, 2002). Agriculture was the basic source of employment and economic income. The land tenure structure, in spite of a number of legal regulations during the single-party era, was still uneven and bore traces of the Ottoman land system. For instance, according to the results of the Agricultural Census conducted in 1950, there were 245.000 agricultural holdings and 35 per cent of them were landless families¹³⁰ (DIE, 1956). The unbalance was seen not only in landownership, but also in the distribution of the amount of lands that agricultural holdings possessed. For example, according to the Village Inventory Surveys which were carried out by the Ministry of Village Affairs between 1962 and 1967, out of a total of 4.328 villages in the region, 3.767 belonged to the inhabitants of the villages, 170 belonged to individuals, 161 belonged to families, and 96 belonged to *sülales*

¹²⁹ This figure takes the following as its criterion: the regions with a population of 2000 or more are considered as urban. The total population is 1,762,938. During the same period, the total population of Turkey is approximately 20,950,000 and 75 percent of this population lived in the rural areas.

¹³⁰ This proportion was 26 percent for Turkey in general.

(landlord families).¹³¹ The mode of production and relations of production were pre-capitalist. Agricultural production depended heavily on primitive technologies and mechanization was almost non-existent. Let us take the year 1952, which corresponds to the beginning of Turkey's rapid mechanization of agricultural production as an example. In this year, there were a total of only 2.055 tractors in the region (DIE, 1955).¹³²

Similarly, there was almost no industrialization. The very few establishments that could be considered industrial facilities were devoted to the management of mines and a few small-scale enterprises similar to studios. According to Mustafa Sönmez (1990: 123-124), "in 1941, there were 1.052 companies that benefited from the Industrial Encouragement Law (*Teşviki Sanayi Kanunu*) and 17 of them were in the region."

If this was the economic situation in the region in the early 1950s, the question follows: to what extent did this state of affairs change over the period in question? As I discussed before, an outstanding change had taken place in the economic policies of Turkey in the late 1940s. The etatist economic policies of the single-party period were abandoned in favor of a development model that was open and that more fervently encouraged private enterprise. The Capitalist World System, which Turkey wanted to become a part of, not only endorsed but also imposed such a transition. Another imposition of the Capitalist World System was its requirement that Turkey, an agricultural society, executes an

¹³¹ For instance 123 of 664 villages in Urfa, and 70 of 663 villages in Diyarbakır were the private property of an individual, a family or a *sülale* (lineage) landlord family. Similarly, 32 villages in Siirt and 11 ones in Van were the property of an individual or a family.

¹³² Indeed, considering the total number of tractors in Turkey in the same year, one might think that even this number is high. Yet it seems that this was the dramatic result of the first wave of mechanization and at least during the first ten-year period, this rate of increase did not continue. On the contrary, there was a decline: in 1961, the number of tractors decreased to 1.377 in the region, while in Turkey in general it went up to 42.500, i.e. a three-fold increase.

agriculture-based development program in the context of the international division of labor and thus, take its place in the world markets as an agricultural producer.¹³³

Needless to say, it was inevitable that Turkey's participation in the international division of labor in the context of an agriculture-based development model would have vital effects on its own domestic periphery, which was mainly an agricultural region. The most important of these effects was the commercialization of agricultural production, including its mechanization. For instance, the number of tractors in use, which was 2.055 in 1952, increased to 14.000 in 1980. Technological changes resulted in the enlargement of the cultivated areas, and, by 1980, the amount of agricultural land in the region rose to 34.582.245 hectares. While agricultural lands increased, the population that was employed in agriculture decreased, falling from around 90 percent in 1950 to 77 percent in 1980. The population that abandoned agricultural employment either migrated to industrialized areas as labor power or they started to work in service sectors in urban areas; the service sector was the second largest sector with the proportion of 15.8 percent. Agricultural production was not only diversified but it also saw a significant increase in productivity, which caused it to be more capitalist market-oriented. Until this time, production was heavily subsistence-oriented; but it now started to occupy an important place in the market.

Agricultural modernization, which emerged mainly in the forms of mechanization and market-oriented production, did not significantly change the relations of production and especially the mode of landownership in the region,

¹³³ Thornburg (1968) clearly stated this point in the plan that he prepared for the World Bank.

however. As Aydın noted, “despite these changes, the household as an economic unit, a unit of reproduction of the peasant family, persisted in south-east Anatolia” (Aydın, 1989: 172). Thus, the land tenure structure, which could historically be traced back to the Ottoman system of *yurtluk/ocaklik*, continued to exist.

During this period, the proportion of landless families actually decreased from 35 percent in 1950 to 25 percent in 1980 (DIE, 1956 and 1984). The reason behind the decline of the rate of the landless peasants was not because the present agricultural land was re-distributed, but because the new lands that were opened for agriculture were distributed to landless families. It is also possible to assert that the rural-urban migration had an impact on this phenomenon. Between 1965 and 1980, 500.000 families that migrated to urban areas were landless peasant families. Despite the appearance of change in the proportion of landless families, therefore, the uneven distribution of agricultural lands did not actually alter significantly. The Table 4.6, which incorporates data provided by the Agricultural Census of 1980, shows the distribution of the agricultural land by holdings. According to this data, 56 percent of total agricultural holdings consisted of less than 50 decare, and the rate of the land they cultivated was 8.7 percent of the total land. On the other hand, 36.4 percent of the total cultivated land was controlled by 3.6 percent of total holdings that consisted of 500 and above decare,¹³⁴ thus confirming the

¹³⁴ The data of the Agricultural Census of 1980 is not provincial but regional. Region Six, as categorized in the census, includes the provinces, which this study focuses on, except Ağrı and Tunceli. Therefore, one should interpret these figures bearing in mind that these two provinces are not included. Nevertheless, I should note that it would hardly change the picture even if Ağrı and Tunceli were included in this category, because when one looks at the data from other periods (available in the next chapter), which is on a provincial basis, one can see that while the distribution of lands is unbalanced in Agri, it is more balanced in Tunceli. Thus, it is possible to assume that they would not create a significant change in the data were they included.

persistence of large landownership. Zülküf Aydın tends to explain this continuation on the basis of advantages that were guaranteed by the multi-party political system. According to Aydın

[After the introduction of the multi-party system] tribal Kurdish notables found themselves a part of the power bloc in Turkey in the 1950s. Their tribal affiliations and their control of land in the region gave them a tremendous peasant backing in the elections. Once they became influential figures in local and national politics, they were able to use their political influence to gain access to credit facilities, improved seeds, technological aids, fertilizers, insecticides etc¹³⁵ (Aydın, 1989: 172).

Table 4.7 The Number of Holdings and Cultivated Area by the Size of Holdings in Turkey and the Region in 1980

In decares	TURKEY				REGION			
	Number of Holdings	% of holdings in total	Agricultural area	% of arable land	Number of Holdings	% of holdings in total	Agricultural area	% of arable land
1...49	2 267 021	62.1	45 555 886	20.0	201 850	56.0	3 013 470	8.7
50-99	738 376	20.2	48 392 133	21.3	63 650	17.6	4 085 190	11.8
100-199	421 523	11.5	54 244 977	23.8	53 403	14.8	6 767 780	19.6
200-499	193 730	5.3	52 002 284	22.9	28 920	8.0	8 115 203	23.5
500-999	26 407	0.7	17 858 013	7.8	11 847	3.3	8 620 756	24.9
1000+	3 032	0.1	9 502 396	4.2	968	0.3	3 979 846	11.5
Total	3 650 089	100.0	227 555 689	100.0	360 690	100.0	34 582 245	100.0

Source: DIE, 1984 (Rearranged).

The issues of land-ownership and the unbalanced picture in the structures of land management were two of the mostly-debated issues throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Although the discussion was conducted essentially in the framework of economic development, it had a social

¹³⁵ The data of Five Year Development Plans also confirm this argument. For instance, in the first four Five Year Development Plans, in Tunceli (where there is much more just distribution of lands, compared to other provinces) the share that was allocated to agriculture among public investments was nine percent, six percent, two percent and one percent, respectively. On the other hand, in Diyarbakır, Mardin and Urfa (where the land distribution has been extremely unbalanced), the planned investments in agriculture sometimes reached 75 percent, despite the fact that they would sharply fluctuate. For instance, in the Second Five-Year Plan, 74 percent of planned public investments in Mardin were devoted to agriculture. For more information about the amount of public planned-expenditure by sectors, see Kutbay (1982).

dimension as well. The problem was national as much as it was regional and the most common solution that was proposed in order to change this was a land reform that would be carried out by a legal regulation. To this end, between 1960 and 1971, ten law proposals were prepared (Korkut, 1984: 56). However, none of these drafts was promulgated for various reasons, the most important being the resistance of big landlords who were successful in turning the economic power they derived from their lands into power in political sphere.¹³⁶ These big landlords generally preferred the center parties, but also tried to enter the Parliament as independent deputies, whenever they believed that they could not maintain their interests under the banner of a political party. As the results of the general elections held between 1965 and 1977 also demonstrate, the independent votes in the region were much higher than the national average, constituting between 15 to 25 percent of the total votes in the region.

Needless to say, the opposition of big landlords to land reform was not the only reason for its defeat. The influence of the attitudes of the central right governments regarding this issue must also be taken into account. Among these, the AP, which remained in power the longest between 1960 and 1980, was not categorically against land reform. However, the AP wanted land reform not in order to realize the principles of equality and social justice, but rather as a policy oriented to agricultural production (Demirel, 2004: 299).

¹³⁶ For example, a draft that was proposed in 1965, was rejected by 167 yes votes against 159 no votes, thanks to the fact that about 30 big landlords from the CHP did not participate in the voting (Korkut, 1984: 55). This was the case despite the fact that the proposal was made by the CHP, which advocated land reform not only on the basis of economic grounds, but also as a requirement of modernization project. Besides, the limit of the land that the proposed draft required a farmer family to have was 5000 *dönüms*, which was a flexible amount.

Eventually, in 1973, the promulgation of a general agricultural reform, which also included a land reform, occurred. The Law on the Reform of Land and Agriculture (Law 1757), had two main objectives: (a) to ensure that the land was cultivated efficiently by raising agricultural production, to guarantee that the increased production will be dealt with efficiently and to prepare the grounds for the development of industry, a necessity for development; and (b) to remove the imbalance in the distribution of land and income, to create possibilities of employment, and to ensure security of property in the agricultural sector (Korkut, 1984: 59).

Although the efforts at land redistribution were, in the end, fruitless, developments in the agrarian economy had significant impacts on social life in the region. The most important consequence was demographic mobilization. Agricultural mechanization and uneven land tenure structure on the one hand, and the pull factors, particularly the job facilities, in the Western parts of the country on the other, paved the way for population movement. Thus, in the period between 1965 and 1980, approximately 500.000 migrated out of the region. A rapid shift in the rural-urban distribution of the population accompanied this accelerated population movement. As one can see from the Table 4.7, particularly beginning with the 1960s, there was rapid urbanization and consequently the urban population rose from less than 20 percent in 1950 to 36.9 percent in 1980, almost a two-fold increase.

Table 4.8. The Distribution of Population (Rural or Urban) in the Period Between 1950 and 1980

Year	Total	Urban	%	Rural	%
1950	1 762 938	339 790	19.3	1 423 148	80.7
1960	2 451 411	563 576	23.0	1 887 835	77.0
1970	3 366 468	1 026 322	30.5	2 340 146	69.5
1980	4 330 444	1 597 890	36.9	2 732 554	63.1

Source: DIE: 2002 (Rearranged).

Thus, though some of the ultimate goals were not achieved in the agricultural sphere, particularly in terms of equal land distribution, significant changes can be said to have occurred nonetheless. By comparison, industrial developments remained at a much lower level. In terms of both the number of employed and the total regional income, the industrial share remained almost static at its 1950 level. According to the findings in 1980, the employment in industry was 2.6 percent in the region, while it was 11 percent in Turkey as a whole (DIE, 2002 and 2003), thus indicating that the gulf between the region and more developed western parts of Turkey was increasing.

The explanations for this widening gap are numerous, but the most compelling is the hesitancy of private capital to be active in the region. Private capital avoided making investments there due to such considerations as the geographical structure, climatic conditions, distance from domestic and foreign markets with high demands, and the shortage and dispersion of rural residences. Therefore, the region's poor access to the ports and national market on the one hand and its small domestic market on the other makes it hardly attractive to private capital (Kendal, 1992: 44).

The industrial investments of the public sector in the region were concentrated on three areas: mining, energy and industry of agricultural foods.

The State investments were determined by two basic approaches: 1. A balance should be maintained between investments made in this region and other regions. 2. State investments were changing according to the policies of the governments in power and they were open to populism and therefore lacked continuity, despite the fact that they were required to be executed in line with the projects in development plans. The Demirel government expressed the logic of the public industrial investments in the following way:

In the region, the food industry and consumption goods will be developed. The transportation of the products (that the people in the region consume) from far distances will be prevented, since the buying power of the people in the region is essentially very limited. In this way, there will be both openings for new jobs and the consumption goods will be provided in the region with reasonable prices (cited in Sönmez, 1992: 175).

In short, the region, in many respects, but especially in economic terms, was highly underdeveloped and there were huge differences in terms of development compared to other regions of Turkey.

4.4.1. Five-Year Development Plans and the Region

It was after the 1960s that the region started to have a place in national economic policies and that regional development programs started to be advanced. Until that time, the economic policies of the DP government understood economic growth to be the increase in GNDP and other like indicators and therefore did not deal with interregional disparities. However, after the 1960s, the regional disparities in general, and the underdevelopment of the region in particular became a subject to which many governments gave place in their programs, a problem that they promised to solve. For example, in

the program of the first Demirel Government (1965-1969) which was set up under the leadership of the center-right party, AP, in 1965, it was stated that:

There are big differences between many regions of the country, especially in the Eastern and Southeastern regions, in terms of life conditions. It is a natural requirement for the realization of our development in the most balanced way possible within [the frame of] social justice, to reduce the regional disparities (<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hukumetler.htm>).

And it went on as follows:

To make our people living in the poor regions more wealthy, to provide them with job opportunities will be possible by the acceleration of [the construction of] infrastructural establishments and [making] industrial investments. To this aim, investment reduction rates will be adjusted in a way that will encourage industrial investments and also the life and educational standards of the people of this region will be increased by such means as technical training and instruction (<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hukumetler.htm>).

Similarly, the CHP Government, which was set up under İnönü's leadership, also declared the removal of interregional, unjust differences of development to have the priority in their social policies and noted that:

For this purpose, we will try to remove the imbalance between regions by rapidly increasing national income and by primarily channeling the surplus national income to our low-income citizens, our underdeveloped regions and especially our eastern regions, by means of tax policy, public expenditures and the encouragement of investments (<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hukumetler.htm>).

The backwardness of the region did not only occupy a place in government agendas, but also became an important topic of discussion in academic-scientific circles at this time. Well-known for his academic studies on the social and economic structure of the region, sociologist İsmail Beşikçi

voiced rather radical arguments that were quite distinct from the mainstream understanding. According to Beşikçi (1969: 284), there were two fundamental and complementary dimensions to the question: first, was the coalition of exploitation constituted by the eastern and western dominant classes and second was the ethnic issue. The essential reason he cited for the region's underdevelopment was the feudal structure that was dominant in the region and the state's policies that exploited this feudal structure.

The advocates of the mainstream position, on the other hand, defined the region's lack of development as the result of unequal capitalist development. A third perspective is offered by the official elites, who viewed the main reason as rooted in the historical, geographical, social and other local circumstances. Thus, while different explanations were proposed by various groups and no one seemed at this time to be without an opinion, an interesting observation is that the question at hand was by no means a new one. On the contrary, it was a question that had a long history. So why had it become such a predominant issue in the minds of so many different groups? This can largely be explained by the impact of the developmentalist model based on national development ideology. As Keyder indicates (1987b: 299) "as an industrialization model, ISI required not only a steady flow of foreign exchange but also a domestic market expanding at a pace sufficient to accommodate the production potential." It was thus to meet the requirements of the industrialization model being employed at the national level that the underdevelopment of the region had become such a central issue. This industrialization model, and the necessity of expanding the domestic market which accompanied it, was embodied and pursued through a series of Five

Year Plans. It is to a closer look at these Five Year Plans, in Tables 4.9 and 4.10, and their impact upon the focus region that we now turn.

Table 4.9 The Proportional Distribution of Allocated Investment by Sectors in the First Four Five-Year Development Plans (%)¹³⁷

	Agriculture	Mining	Industry	Energy	Transportation	Tourism	Construction	Education	Health	Services	Total Share
1st Plan											
Region	13.3	15.7	6.8	8.9	17.8	0.3	1.7	20.7	6.7	8.1	8.8
LDRs (22 Provinces)	13.2	10.2	9.6	20.4	13.6	0.3	1.9	18.3	6.1	6.4	23.4
Others (45 provinces)	17.4	5.9	24.2	15.1	10.0	2.4	1.5	15.0	3.3	5.2	76.6
Turkey	16.4	6.9	20.8	16.3	10.9	1.9	1.6	15.8	4.0	5.5	
2nd Plan											
Region	26.1	6.4	7.1	13.0	16.0	1.1	2.5	15.2	3.2	9.5	6.7
LDRs (22-33 Provinces)	13.1	7.7	11.9	29.8	12.4	0.8	2.0	13.1	3.4	5.8	21.7
Others (45-34 provinces)	9.0	4.8	36.6	13.1	11.8	1.6	2.2	11.2	3.0	6.7	78.3
Turkey	9.9	5.5	31.2	16.8	11.9	1.4	2.1	11.6	3.0	6.5	
3th Plan											
Region	10.6	3.2	22.1	14.7	15.7	1.0	2.0	13.3	3.5	13.9	6.9
LDRs (40 Provinces)	7.7	11.5	26.1	18.9	11.0	0.7	0.9	10.5	2.9	9.7	33
Others (27 Provinces)	5.7	5.5	40.6	11.6	12.3	1.6	0.7	9.7	2.8	9.4	67
Turkey	6.4	7.5	35.8	14.0	11.9	1.3	0.8	10.0	2.9	9.5	
4th Plan											
Region	10.3	13.9	22.2	21.3	8.2	0.4	4.1	9.5	2.7	7.3	7.0
LDRs (40 Provinces)	9.9	17.1	19.8	29.6	6.0	0.3	1.8	7.5	2.2	5.7	33.2
Others (27 provinces)	7.2	7.6	35.0	22.9	7.6	0.9	1.3	6.7	3.4	7.4	66.8
Turkey	8.1	10.7	30.0	25.1	7.1	0.7	1.5	7.0	3.0	6.8	

Source: Kutbay & Sürmeli, 1976 and Kutbay, 1982 (Rearranged).

¹³⁷ Allow me to give some information about these tables. Firstly, the rates include the amounts that have been allocated in the program. There is no data which reveals to what extent these budgets were realized. Therefore, the proportions here concern only the planned investment budgets. Secondly, the budget allocated for the projects, which covers more than one province, is given in the "Others" category. These kinds of investments are not taken into consideration since they could not be divided between provinces. In other words, this data has been provided only from the planned investment budgets on a provincial basis. Thirdly, the provinces that have been under consideration in this study are located in the category of Less Developed Regions (LDRs). Thus, the category of LDRs also includes these provinces. Finally, the data in "total share" is its proportion to the budget in the aggregate total. The tables have been reorganized by collecting data from the following two studies: Kutbay and Sürmeli (1976) and Kutbay (1982).

Table 4.10 Sectoral Distribution of Investment in the Region in the First Four Five-Year Development Plan (%)

Plan (Year)	Agriculture	Mining	Industry	Energy	Transportation	Tourism	Construction	Education	Health	Services	Total Share
I (1963-1967)	13.3	15.7	6.8	8.9	17.8	0.3	1.7	20.7	6.7	8.1	8.8
II (1968-1972)	26.1	6.4	7.1	13.0	16.0	1.1	2.5	15.2	3.2	9.5	6.7
III (1973-1977)	10.6	3.2	22.1	14.7	15.7	1.0	2.0	13.3	3.5	13.9	6.9
IV (1978-1982)	10.3	13.9	22.2	21.3	8.2	0.4	4.1	9.5	2.7	7.3	7.0

Source: Kutbay & Sürmeli, 1976 and Kutbay, 1982 (Rearranged).

The purpose of these tables is neither to compare the public investments for regions nor to conclude an argument by comparing the state's income and expenses in the region¹³⁸. The main purpose is rather to elaborate upon the economic policies pursued in the region with specific reference to the public investments by sector. To do this, I will discuss in the following pages the ramifications witnessed in the region with specific reference to the Table 4.9 above that presents the distribution of projected investments according to regions on a sector-by-sector basis, in the context of the first four Five-Year Development Plans.

The first ramification of the plans in the region which must be taken up is actually a lack thereof. Although "the gradual elimination of regional disparities between developed Western and developing Eastern provinces of Turkey" (Dinçer, Özaslan, and Kavasoğlu, 2003: 12) was identified as one of primary objectives of regional development plans, the inter-regional differences deepened.¹³⁹ For example, according to the Eastern Anatolian Project that was

¹³⁸ Undoubtedly, such a study would also be very important. For such a study, see Mutlu (2000).

¹³⁹ The experts that prepared the development plans themselves note that the gap has not been closed. A study assessing regional development plans states that: "The interventions of the public sector, oriented at the distribution of the created income, that is, the distribution of the wealth, have not been able to reduce interregional unbalances to the desired extent (Dinçer, Özaslan, and Kavasoğlu, 2003: 12) The reasons for this are stated as the following:

prepared by the State Planning Organization (SPO), the region has been less developed for a long time, at least for the last 30-40 years. Moreover, according to a study undertaken in 1945, six out of the 16 least developed provinces were in Eastern Anatolia. This figure went up to nine in 1965 and 1985 and then to 12 in 1996 (DPT, 2000). Allow me begin to explain this ever-widening gulf with the lesser of the two main reasons: the distribution and amount of investments by region as indicated in the Table 4.9 above. The most developed regions received the greatest share. In the first two FYDPs, the share that was allocated to developed regions was three and four times more than the share that went to the areas that were defined as Less Developed Regions. In the last two plans, although the gap has been reduced, still there exists a two-fold discrepancy¹⁴⁰. It is possible to explain this situation by the high contribution of the developed regions to the general budget.

While the overall amount of investment in each region is certainly a significant contributor to the continuing underdevelopment in the East, the main reason is found in the sectoral distribution of those investments. In the developed regions the industrial sector, which has the potential to most rapidly close the regional disparities, has been strongly supported. In the underdeveloped regions, however, that was not the case; instead, the sectors

"Despite intensive attempts, amongst the reasons for continuation of development differences in this period are: geographical structure, climate features, distance from domestic and foreign markets with high demands, the multiplicity and dispersion of rural residential units". It is interesting to note that the persistence of a developmental gap continues to be explained on the basis of conditions specific to the LDRs. It does not touch upon the preferences in the planning and the strategic mistakes that originate from these preferences as possible sources of blame as well.

¹⁴⁰ According to Kutbay (1982: 4), between the years 1963 and 1981, 35.9 percent of the total budgets of the FYDP were allocated to the investments that included more than one province. A great majority of these investments were in provinces outside the LDRs. When one also takes this fact into account, it will be seen that there have been a lot more investments made in the provinces in the "developed category".

that were supported were transportation, mining, energy and service, all of which either did not produce a surplus or channeled their surplus to the national budget, not the local one.

This situation is even more drastic in the first two plans. In these plans, the investment share that was made in the highly industrially developed provinces in Turkey is four to five times more than that of the region. Although in the subsequent two plans, this situation changed and the industrial share allocated to the region rose up to more than 20 percent, this was still much below the average of the developed regions and Turkey in general. In these two plans, it can be argued that another reason for the increase in the industrial share for the region was the fact that the MSP [National Salvation Party], which had a high potential of votes in less-developed areas, took part in the government coalitions and thereby encouraged such allocation increases.

The underdevelopment of the region and the insufficiency of investments of manufacturing industries in bringing about interregional development differences has also been underlined in a report that was prepared by SPO. According to this report, there are three main factors that bring about the underdevelopment of the Eastern Anatolia. These are: the differences in labor productivity between agriculture and other sectors, insufficient industry (especially manufacturing industry) and lastly, differences in productivity between sub-sectors and regions in industry and other sectors (DPT, 2000: 10).

The distribution of investments by sector and by regions shows that the center aimed at the consolidation of state power and the establishment of its control by means of its economic policies in less-developed areas in general and in the region in particular. In defense of this argument, particular attention

must be paid to the budget that allocated for two sectors; namely, services and transportation. The fact that transportation and services were allocated more assistance than many other sectors, including health, verifies this assertion. Similarly, the share of these sectors has been above the average of Turkey. For example, except for the Third Plan, in all other plans, these two sectors have been allocated shares constituting more than 25 percent of the aggregate regional investment. It cannot be denied that transportation has significant functions including integration with the national market by means of the transfer of raw materials to industrial regions, the manufactured goods to the market and the circulation of labor. Transportation is thereby an indispensable infrastructural instrument in the growth and development of economy. Furthermore, the transportation infrastructure of the region was very backward and in need of improvement. However, the service budget, also occupying a prominent place in the sector allocations, is another matter. When one takes into consideration the fact that the service budget was basically used to employ agents whose primary objective was to perform the function of the center and to establish its power at the periphery, then it is possible to claim that economic policies have been oriented toward the establishment of the control over the periphery to a significant extent.

As I indicated before, in the development plans neither development nor regional disparities were evaluated solely by economic indicators, rather other indicators were also considered at least as strongly, one of which was education. I discuss the educational policies of this period and developments regarding education in more detail in the following section. Here, however, I will elaborate on the public expenditures for education in the context of economic

policies. It seems that more importance has been attributed to the increase in educational facilities and in the educational level in the region than to economic development. This assertion can be made on the basis of the proportion of educational investment in all of the four FYDPs. This proportion in the focus region, as can be seen in the Table 4.9, was higher than those both in Turkey in general and in the provinces that were defined as less-developed areas in particular. Especially in the first two plans, the allocation for education was 20.7 percent and 15.2 percent, respectively. Both on a provincial basis and on a sectoral basis, education received the most stable share. While the budget allocated for agriculture, energy, mining and transportation was concentrated in some provinces, such an observation is not valid for the educational budget. Having briefly identified the priority given to education in the region in the economic realm, let us now consider education in the region during this period in a broader context.

4. 5. Educational Institution After the Etatist Era

As the detailed discussion in the previous chapter demonstrates, education was one of the spheres to which the state elites attributed the utmost importance. This attitude emanated partly from their Enlightenment-oriented tendencies. However, the more important reason was that they viewed education and particularly mass education as the most effective instrument in the creation of a modern society and nation. In brief, education has been perceived by the Republican elites as both the tool and the goal in order to build a modern, secular society. To what extent did this perception change when the power moved out of the Republican elites' hands? In other words,

how was the passage to multi-party politics reflected in educational policies? What was the meaning and role of education amongst other policies that were put into practice in the Kurdish speaking periphery? To what extent did the educational composition of the region change? I would like to discuss the strategies and investments that have been pursued in the educational area in the context of these questions.

As many scholars argue, the transition to multi-party politics did not bring about significant changes in regards to the dominant educational ideology and policies.¹⁴¹ “On the contrary, Turkey entered multi-party political system by praising the single-party regime, by looking down on political pluralism, by aiming to inform its citizens about the ‘powerful’ six arrows, by adopting an understanding of educational training such that people that lack a pluralist political culture” (Ustel, 2004: 242, and for similar arguments, see Kaplan, 2005). In short, education continued to be perceived, as one can understand from the qualifier *national* (as in national education), to be the most vital instrument for the building of a nation.

¹⁴¹ The most important change in educational policies was in the field of religious education. In the CHP's congress that was held in 1947, the CHP had already taken some measures to reevaluate earlier secularization policies. As a part of these measures, the Schools for Prayer Leaders and Preachers (*Imam Hatip Kursları, IHK*) were opened, a Faculty of Theology (*İlahiyat Fakültesi*) was founded at the University of Ankara, and elective courses on religion were introduced in the primary school curriculum (Toprak, 1987: 226). The DP, after coming to power in 1950, continued these policies with great eagerness. In the academic year of 1959-1960, the number of IHKs increased to 19 and the second Faculty of Theology was founded in Istanbul, named the Higher Islamic Institute (Kaplan, 2005: 224). However, it seems difficult to call these novelties a true break with the past, a rupture, for several reasons. First of all, these sorts of examples were already present in the single-party era. As I discussed in the previous chapter, IHKs were founded in 1924 and a Faculty of Theology was founded at Istanbul University in the same year. Similarly, classes of religion were taught in primary and secondary schools in urban areas [provinces] until 1927 and the same classes were taught in primary schools in villages till 1940 (Kaplan, 2005: 159). Secondly, religious education was under the strict control of the center and its curriculum was, like in other schools, prepared by the Ministry of National Education and thus, it was being shaped within the frame of official educational policies. Thirdly, it is more accurate to define these changes as a relaxation in radical secular policies.

It is possible to observe this continuity in the regulations that were initiated after the passage to multi-party politics. For instance, in the Program of Primary Education that was issued in 1948 and remained in full effect till 1968, the general aim of primary education was defined as follows: “primary school gives the values and ideals that are necessary for the life and future of the nation. Primary schools *have to indoctrinate children with national culture*. The important duty of primary schools is to have all citizens efficiently acquire all of the information, habits, knowledge, the will to serve; which are *necessary so as to give them [all citizens] the same ideals, the same national goals* (Cited in Kaplan, 2005: 213, emphasis added).

Similar statements may be found in the Fundamental Law of National Education, which was promulgated in 1973. This law, as Kaplan observes, in spite of having undergone some changes in 1980, has continued to constitute the main axis of the ideology of Turkish national educational system. The second article of this law puts forward the aim of the Turkish national education as follows:

To train all members of the Turkish nation as citizens who are committed to Atatürk revolutions and Turkish nationalism that has found its expression in the beginning of the Constitution; [citizens] who adopt, preserve and develop the national, moral, humane, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish nation; [citizens] who love their family, fatherland, nation and always try to praise them; [citizens] who know their duties and responsibilities towards human rights and the national, democratic, secular, social state of the law of the Turkish Republic based on the fundamental principles [expressed] in the beginning of the Constitution and [citizens] who demonstrate these attributes in their deeds (Cited in Kaplan, 2005: 265-6).

4.5.1. Investing in Education

When it comes to the policies carried out in the focus region, one can see that the importance attached to education increases sharply. A good sign of this fact is that in many of the government programs and regional development plans, there was a continuous emphasis put on education. For instance, in the program of the 2nd Menderes Government which remained in power between the years of 1951 and 1954, it was stated that: “in the construction of village schools, the priority will be given to the needs of Eastern provinces and those that are equally backward.” The same program promised to start the construction of a university in the East¹⁴² (T.C. Başbakanlık O ve M Daire Başkanlığı, 1978: 203). Similarly, in the Program of 9th İnönü Government that was established on June 25, 1962, it was indicated that, in regards to educational policies, they would pay particular attention to measures aimed at the removal of differences between underdeveloped regions and other regions of the country.

The value accorded to education was by no means limited to government programs. Throughout the period known as the Planned Development Period, when one looks at the sectoral distribution of regional public investments, one can see that education occupied a privileged position amongst other areas. (For a comparative distribution with other sectors, see Table 4.10). In these plans, the projected amount of investment for education in the region has always been above the average of the country.

¹⁴² This promise fulfilled much later, in 1973, when Dicle University was founded in Diyarbakir.

Table 4.11 The Share of Educational Investments in the First Four Five Year Development Plan (%)

	Five Year Development Plans			
	I [1963-1967]	II [1968-1972]	III [1973-1977]	IV [1978-1982]
Turkey	15.8	11.6	10.0	7.0
Region	20.7	15.2	13.3	9.5

Source: Kutbay, 1982 (Rearranged).

4.5.2. Regional Boarding Schools

Before going into a discussion concerning the changes was brought about in the region's educational infrastructure and educational composition as a result of the Center's prioritization of education, I would like to touch upon a relatively new development, which had existed in theory for a long time but was only actualized in this period. In 1960, after the military constituted a government (the NUC) following the coup, education was once more one of the most important issues to be dealt with. In January 1961, the NUC enacted a Law providing for the establishment of regional boarding schools. McDowall (2004: 406) indicates that the essential aim of these schools was the assimilation of the Kurds. Indeed, this idea was not a novel one. For example, Abidin Özmen, the First Inspectorate General between 1935 and 1943, proposed the establishment of such schools in the report which laid out the policies to be pursued in the region¹⁴³. Özmen in his report stated that:

In order to assimilate those who we want to into the Turkish community, it is necessary to make them Turkish instead of Kurdish speakers. This is an indisputable matter. For this aim, it is necessary to set up boarding schools, take village children away from the villagers, from their parents whom they spent time with,

¹⁴³ Özmen has also made suggestions about where these schools should be established: "These institutions can be founded in the subdivisions of the provinces: first in Gevaş in the Van province, then in Beytüşşebab in Hakkari, Hizan in Bitlis, Malazgirt in Muş, Pervari in Siirt, Eğil in Diyarbakır, Derik in Mardin and Viranşehir in Urfa" (Koca, 1998: 480).

and have them bring their own simple wooden beds... In these schools, only Turkish will be spoken, and a program will be followed, which will promote Turkish propaganda and stir in them a love for exalted Turkish figures, and the period of education will be three years and the children will remain in school for 10 or 11 months each year. This situation should be instituted by law. *This is in the style representative of a missionary pursuit* (cited in Koca, 1998: 478-480, emphasis added).

The realization of this project in a comprehensive way became possible only after 1961. The aim of these schools, presented in the regulations regarding regional boarding schools, is summarize in the following fashion: “(1) to provide the regions with a scattered population and with a population under 250 with schools and teachers; (2) in certain villages to help the activities of the vitalization of the Turkish language and culture; (3) to help the region’s health, agriculture, public education and every kind of its development activities”. Since the year of 1973-1974, in the majority of the schools of this sort, a transition was made to an eight-year educational program (Sönmez, 1990: 173-74). In the Table 4.11, one can see the number of schools and students in the year 1965-1966, when these schools started to function.

Table 4.12 Number of Schools and Enrollments by Gender in Regional Boarding Schools in 1965 and 1966

	Number of Schools	Enrollment		
		Total	Male	Female
Turkey	29	9 065	6 275	2 790
Region	17	5 100	3 640	1 460

4.5.3. Educational Profile of the Kurdish Populated Areas

Having noted the important actualization of this boarding school plan, we may now look at the changes brought about in the educational infrastructure and the

educational composition of the population. In order to do this, I will focus on Table 4.13, which provides data about the number of schools, teachers and students in primary, secondary, high, and vocational schools in the academic years of 1949-1950 and 1980-1981.

Let us start with the change in the general number. The total number of schools was 937 in 1950. It went up to 5,526 in 1980, a six-fold increase. In the same period, the number of teachers raised from 1, 869 to 22,520, a twelve-fold increase, while the total enrollment increased from 63,700 to 586,549. Except for the number of secondary schools and the category of teachers in vocational schools, all other categories show an increase above the average of the country.

It is particularly striking to take note of the growth in the number of enrollments in the levels of secondary and high school education. While the number of enrollment in secondary education augmented 27 fold, it increased 69 fold in high schools. It is possible to claim that the changing perception regarding formal education had an impact on this process. In other words, the desire for post-primary school education reflects the aspiration for social mobilization and integration with society at large by means of education. This data also reveals a rupture with the single-party era in the context of educational policies, because, as has been established previously, the educational policies of the single-party era prioritized primary education, and here we see growth in the upper echelons of education, not simply in primary schools. The change in development strategies therefore could also be said to have contributed to the emergence of this rupture.

Table 4.13 Number of Schools, Teachers and Students in Primary, Secondary, High and Vocational Schools in the Region and Turkey, 1950-1980

Year	Primary			Secondary			High Education			Vocational Education		
	Schools	Enrollment	Teachers	Schools	Enrollment	Teachers	Schools	Enrollment	Teachers	Schools	Enrollment	Teachers
1949-1950												
Turkey	17 106	1 591 039	34 822	381	65 168	4 364	88	21 440	1 931	317	55 522	4 584
Region	891	58 814	1 473	26	2 348	167	3	489	41	17	2 049	188
1980-1981												
Turkey	45 637	5 691 066	215 073	4 240	114 751	35 913	1 099	518 692	40 172	1 272	355 007	33 690
Region	5 114	476 089	17 424	240	62 876	1 551	100	33 602	2 218	72	13 982	1 327

Source: DIE, 1983b, 1983c, 1983d (Rearranged).

Although primary education had also been highlighted in the single-party period, and thus we have already observed increases in that category before this time, it should be noted here that primary education also continued to expand. In the academic year of 1949-1950, while the number of primary schools was 891 in the region, in 1980 it went up to 5114, which was a six-fold increase. In the same period, the number of students in primary schools increased eight-fold. These upsurges are much steeper than the average increase in the country.

Table 4.13 points to another area where we see prominent changes in the educational composition of the population. There was an immense increase in the literacy rate of the people in the region. While it was around 12 percent in 1950, it went up 39.4 percent in 1980; i.e. approximately a three-fold increase in 30 years. The increase in literacy rates especially in the 1960s is quite intriguing. While it was 17.4 percent in 1960, in 1970 it went up to 30.9 percent; despite the fact that in this period the population increased 37 percent and, moreover, that those who were only literate in the old script were now considered illiterate, both of which should have restricted literacy rate growth.

Needless to say, the investments put into education and the developments in the opportunities for education were very influential in this immense increase. However, it seems that the change in the literacy composition of the population did not originate solely from formal educational facilities, as can be noted by the fact that nine percent of the regional population at or above the age of 25 were literate despite the fact that they did not graduate from any schools. Most probably, they learnt how to read and write while they were doing their military service. Despite all the positive developments with regard to the literacy rates, however, there remains a large discrepancy between the region and the general rates in the country. Moreover, if one looks at the other side of the coin, that is, when one looks at the illiteracy rates, the situation is highly problematic as in 1980 still more than 60 percent of the population in the region was illiterate.

Table 4.14 Literate Population in the Region and in Turkey, 1950-1980

		1950	1960	1970	1980
Turkey	Total Population	17 776 961	22 526 092	29 273 361	37 508 534
	Literate (%)	32.5	39.5	56.2	67.5
Region	Total Population	1 438 971	1 883 127	2 579 698	3 356 329
	Literate (%)	12.4	17.4	30.9	39.4

Source: DIE, 2002 and 2003 (Rearranged).

These figures are valid for the population 5 years of age and over in 1950; and 6 years of age and over for the other years.

4.5.4 Privileged Cities

As was shown before, the totality of educational investments and expenses in the region were above the average of Turkey. Nevertheless, it seems that there are important differences between provinces in terms of the shares reserved for education. Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Tunceli and Muş received payments considerably

above the averages of both the provinces in the region and Turkey in general. For instance, during the DP period between 1951 and 1960, the percentages of provincial public aggregate expenditures reserved for education are as follows: 44.4 percent in Ağrı, 42.8 percent in Bitlis, 42.4 percent in Bingöl, 39.9 percent in Muş and 39.5 percent in Tunceli (Aşgın, 2000: 162-164). This trend also continued in the period of planned development, particularly during the first two Five Year Development Plans. In the first development plan, the projected educational expenditures for Tunceli, Bingöl, Ağrı and Muş are 52, 51, 41 and 37 percent respectively. In this plan, the budget that was reserved for education for the entirety of Turkey was 16 percent and the average of the region was 21 percent (Kutbay, 1982).

It would have been possible to define this situation as positive discrimination, if the three big revolts in the early Republican period had not predominantly appeared in these provinces. The Sheikh Said Revolt in 1925 found the most important support from the provinces of Bingöl, Muş and Bitlis.¹⁴⁴ Ağrı was the home for a number of revolts between 1926 and 1930. Similarly, the last revolt in the interwar period appeared in Tunceli in 1937 and it was suppressed next year.¹⁴⁵ Compared to the other revolts that appeared in the early Republican years, these three rebellions come to the fore due to their political claims and the social support they found. These events can therefore be taken as an explanation for the greater concern for the education of the people located in these areas.

¹⁴⁴ The other provinces that supported the revolt were Elazığ, Diyarbakır and Erzurum. For the geographical borders of the Sheikh Said Revolt, see; Bruinessen, 1992.

¹⁴⁵ Similarly, the Kocgiri Revolt, which was seen during the War of Independence and which was heavily colored by nationalist claims, was also centered in Tunceli.

It is interesting to observe that Tunceli always received a privileged status amongst the provinces in the region in terms of educational investments. This seems to be partly due to the fact that the last revolt took place in Tunceli. For example, 77.4 percent of the aggregate public expenditures in Tunceli in 1964, 52.8 percent in 1966, and 63.4 percent in 1967 were devoted to the educational sphere (Kutbay and Sürmeli, 1976: 76). The question of what kind of results these investments produced regarding the political aims of the center is not the immediate concern of the present study, though it may be noted briefly that the results appear to be outstanding. In 2000, the literacy rate for Tunceli was 83 percent and it was the first in this respect among the provinces of the region. In terms of the rate of schooling in primary and secondary school level, Tunceli is not only above the average of the region but also that of the entire country (Dinçer, Özaslan and Kavasoğlu, 2003: 216).

Unlike the above-mentioned provinces, however, educational expenditures remained relatively low in the provinces of Mardin, Siirt and Urfa. Particularly in the last two Five Year Development Plan periods, that is, between 1973 and 1983, the situation was very critical. For instance, in the Third Five Year Development Plan, the share reserved for education from the aggregate public investments in the whole region, was 13.3 percent. The percentage for Urfa, Mardin and Siirt were 8.1, 8.2 and 9.6 percent, respectively. In the subsequent development plan, the situation is even more telling. While the share of educational investments for the region was 9.5 percent, this proportion was 4.2 percent in Siirt, 5.9 percent in Urfa and 9.1 percent in Mardin (Kutbay, 1982). It should be noted that these were linguistically heterogeneous provinces and like others in the region, the majority of the

population in these provinces declared that their mother tongue was Kurdish (Dündar, 1999: 188). In the census in 1950, the distribution of the population of these three provinces according to mother tongue can be seen from Table 4.15.

Table 4.15 The Distribution of Population by Mother Tongue in Three Provinces in 1950 (%)

Provinces	Turkish	Kurdish	Arabic
Mardin	7.5	66.3	23.1
Siirt	9.9	73.2	16.7
Urfa	41.4	45.2	13.1

Source: Dündar: 1999 (Rearranged).

Moreover, most of the people in Turkey who declared their mother tongue as Arabic were also concentrated in these provinces. For instance, according to a research conducted regarding native languages in the 1950 census in Turkey, there were 269,038 people who spoke Arabic. 88 percent of this number lived in the provinces of Hatay, Mardin, Urfa and Siirt (Dündar, 1999: 79). It is interesting to observe that although these provinces are linguistically heterogeneous and although the majority of their population spoke a language other than Turkish, education received less importance compared to other provinces in the region. A case could thus be made that priority was not given to these regions, despite their obvious need, because these three provinces saw the least armed resistance in the interwar period as compared with others in the region.

4.6. The Perspective in the Periphery

Up to now, my discussion has revolved around the policies of the center related to the Kurdish-populated areas in light of internal and global circumstances. Now, I want to discuss the effects of the modernization process in general, and the impacts of these policies in particular, on the region. In other words, I will analyze the change in the socio-economic and political structure of the region and the effects of these changes, followed by a look at the emerging power structures in the region including the return of the repressed notables, the formation of a new group of Kurdish political activists, the Kurdish-left.

The change in the Kurdish-populated area was less outstanding compared to the total structural transformation, which Turkey underwent after the 1950s. The economic structure of the region remained rooted in agricultural production. By 1980, approximately 80 percent of the population was employed in agriculture. More importantly, there was not any remarkable change in the uneven distribution of the land among the landowners. In other words, the structure of the ownership of the means of production was scarcely changing while there was a clear change in the mode of production through mechanization. For instance, as it was argued before, 25 percent of the families who were engaged in agriculture were people who had no land at all. There was a substantial inequality among the agricultural households in terms of the amount of the land they owned. The holdings that had less than 50 decares constituted 56 percent of the total agricultural holdings and the land that these holdings managed was 8.7 percent of the entirety of the arable lands. On the other hand, the holdings that had more than 500 decares constituted 3.6 percent of the total agricultural holdings and the land that these holdings

managed was 36.4 percent of the whole of the arable lands. Thus, the largest portion of the population continued to reside in rural areas. In 1980, some 63 percent of the total population of the region was rural (DIE, 2002). It is difficult to claim that there occurred a radical change in the source of collective identities. In other words, kinship ties and primordial attachments continued to be in many ways effective in the formation of collective identities. Despite these areas of inertia, however, there were significant developments in the relations between the center and the periphery as well as in the social structure of the region.

The most significant development was the emergence of new opportunities for social and political mobilization. Especially the innovations brought about by the 1961 constitution in the field of political and cultural organizations had important contributions to this development. The increase in the opportunities of mass education also promoted this process. The population migration and interactions resulting from it, though not necessarily the reasons lying behind it, would further accelerate this process.

4.6.1. The Return of the Repressed: Traditional Local Notables back in the Politics

As is discussed above, the changes and developments taking place in the economic and political structure of Turkey had significant impacts upon the policies regarding the region. In fact, it was not only the policies and strategies of the center which were subject to modification, but also the forms of resistance and the methods of survival employed by the periphery. In this sense, one of the most important consequences of the shift in political structure into multi-party system was that the peripheral demands could now be

expressed and defended through non-violent measures. What they once demanded via armed struggles would now be expressed through the available legal instruments, one of the most common being the political machine. Although the political sphere was under many restrictions, it would nonetheless become the most important means in the hands of the periphery.

The value of the political machine to the periphery, thus, makes the return of the traditional local notables to the political arena, one of the weightiest results of the transition to the multi-party system. They began functioning as the mediator between the center and the periphery, a role which had ceased during the single-party period. Yet, their renewed influence also had a fundamental difference from their previous power apparatus, as McDowall (2004: 402) argues: "Their primary goal was not to gain autonomy but to become more closely integrated members of the ruling Turkish establishment." Paradoxically, this tendency ushered in the revival of the class which had been the main target of the suppressive approach of the modernization project of the republic. What is more, this class would use the multi-party system to increase their social and economic power through the competition between the parties.¹⁴⁶

As Huntington argues: (1968: 444) "The competition between political parties at the local level strengthens the authority of the traditional elite and supports the traditional order, which sustains them." The competition between the political parties was not their sole instrument, however. They nominated independent candidates for general elections when they were not on very good terms with political parties, or when they found it unsatisfying to work in certain

¹⁴⁶ Needless to say, this is not a one-sided utilization. The political parties also exploited the existing semi-feudal social structure in a similar way to increase or preserve their local support.

parties, and they managed to increase their power in this way. This utilization of independent candidates is obvious when we have a look at the results of the general elections after 1965. In these elections, the number of independent MPs representing the region is far ahead of the average for the whole country. In some elections, we observe that up to 80 percent of the independent MPs are from the region.¹⁴⁷ In short, the change in the political structure, which resulted in the emergence of the competitive participatory political system, paved the way for the return of the repressed. There are many individual examples of this return and I want to discuss some of the more noteworthy ones in detail, namely, Selahaddin İnan, Kasım Küfrevi, Yusuf Azizoğlu, Mustafa Ekinci and İhsan Bedirhanoğlu.

Selahaddin İnan¹⁴⁸ was a member of a well-known sheikhly family, namely the “Gaws family” of Bitlis. “He fought for the National Forces (Kuva-i Milliye) in the national independence war and served as the *kaymakam* (local governor) of Hizan between 1920 and 1922” (Öztürk, 1998: 167-8). In the single-party period he was exiled to Bursa. Later, he would be pardoned with the amnesty law of 1947 and return to Bitlis (Anter, 1999: 85). İnan became a Democrat Party deputy for Bitlis in 1950 and maintained this position in the two subsequent electoral periods. After the 1961 military coup, he would be accused of violating the constitution and tried accordingly in *Yassıada* Military Court. He was sentenced to life in prison (Öztürk, 1998: 168). His eldest son,

¹⁴⁷ The proportions of the independent votes of the region in the total country-wide votes for independent candidates were correspondingly 22 percent in 1961; 40 percent in 1965; 34 percent in 1969; 50 percent in 1973 and 80 percent in 1977.

¹⁴⁸ His father, Seyyid Ali, participated in the Bitlis Revolt, which occurred in 1914 and was executed immediately after the revolt had been suppressed (Anter, 2000: 84-85 and Yüksel, 1993: 164).

Zeynel Abidin İnan, served as a deputy for the AP for three electoral periods between 1969 and 1977.¹⁴⁹

Another figure, who had a similar background with İnan, was Kasım Küfrevi. Kasım Küfrevi's father, Abdülbari Küfrevi, belonged to a famous Naksibendi order and attended the Sivas Congress as a representative (Anter, 1999: 92). The Küfrevi family was exiled to Istanbul for their support of the Ağrı rebellion, which lasted from 1926 to 1930. Kasım Küfrevi graduated from the faculty of law at Istanbul University when he was in exile in there. Then, he joined the DP soon after the transition to multi-party political system and was elected to the Grand National Assembly as an Ağrı deputy. He served as deputy for Ağrı between 1950 and 1960 through the DP. When the DP was banned from politics, he would be elected as deputy for two successive periods under two other parties, namely the YTP (New Turkey Party) and the GP (Reliance Party).

İnan and Küfrevi underline an interesting point about the return of the Sheikhs. Although they relied upon the power that they gained from their Sheikh origins, they returned not to perform their role as sheikhs but to acquire new roles. In this sense, as Mesut Yeğen (1999) puts aptly, there was a gulf between what had once been repressed and what was now returning. In other words, what returned was not that which had once been repressed. What was coming back was subject to transition.

¹⁴⁹ The family continued to play an active role in political life after 1980. Selahaddin İnan's youngest son, Kamuran İnan, was chosen in 1975 as a senator of the Republic and was the Energy Minister in Demirel's government. He was elected as a deputy in 1983 under the MDP banner and in 1987, 1991 and 1995 under the ANAP banner. A member of the family's second generation, Edip Safer Gaydali (Zeynel Abidin's son) from 1991 until now has been chosen as a Bitlis Deputy in all the parliamentary elections.

It was not only the sheikhs who were being restored to the political domain. The big landowners and the members of *aşiret* (tribe) were also returning to prominence, the most popular example of which is the Azizoğlu family. The Azizoğlus, who were located in Silvan and Diyarbakir, were a big landlord family¹⁵⁰ originally tracing back to an *aşiret* (Arslan, 1992: 67-68). This family, like many other influential families, was subjected to forced settlement and could only enter politics after the introduction of the multi-party system. The most popular figure of the family in the political domain was Yusuf Azizoğlu, who was a medical doctor.¹⁵¹ He was one of the founding members of the DP with a Diyarbakır origin. He first became the mayor for Dicle in 1946. Then, between 1950 and 1961, he was elected as a deputy under the DP banner three times in Diyarbakır. After the military coup, when the DP was banned from the politics, he participated in the foundation of the YTP¹⁵² with a group of ex-deputies of the DP. Working as a deputy for the YTP between 1961 and 1965, Azizoğlu would be appointed the Minister of Health in the coalition cabinet of the CHP-YTP in 1962. “During his brief term of office, he had more hospitals and dispensaries built in eastern provinces than all previous governments put together, which gained him considerable popularity” (Kendal, 1993: 66).

Another example similar to Yusuf Azizoğlu, was Diyarbakir deputy Mustafa Ekinci. Mustafa Ekinci was a member of “a family named ‘Yasinzadeler’, whose power originated from religion, though they were not

¹⁵⁰ According to Arslan (1992: 67) this family had 33,000 *dönüm* of arable land in late 1960s.

¹⁵¹ Another member of the Azizoğlu family, Iskan Azizoğlu, was elected as a CHP deputy for Diyarbakır.

¹⁵² For more information about YTP see; Topkaya (1969: 581-615) and Abadan (1967).

considered a part of the 'ulema' class of the Ottoman Empire, and who at the same time owned a large amount of land" (Arslan, 1992: 66). The family owned, as the records reveal, some 20.400 *dönüms* of land in 1968. His father, Yasinzade Şevki Bey, was one of the founders of 'İtilaf Fırkası' in Diyarbakır. He was tried in the Eastern Tribunal Court (*Şark İstiklal Mahkemesi*) together with his father and the two were sentenced to forced settlement in the western parts of Turkey" (Arslan, 1992: 66). "Living as an exile in Ordu and İstanbul between 1936 and 1947, Ekinci would become a DP deputy for Diyarbakır in 1950 elections" (Malmisanij, 2004: 483-484). In the next election too, he was selected as a deputy for Diyarbakır. "In 1955, he founded the Freedom Party with a group of deputies" (Malmisanij, 2004: 484). "He gave up active politics when he failed to be elected in the 1957 elections" (Arslan, 1992: 67). Another member of this family, Tarik Ziya Ekinci, would be elected as deputy for TIP in Diyarbakır in 1965 election.

There are many examples of the returning repressed which could be mentioned here.¹⁵³ Allow me to take up one last one, that of İhsan

¹⁵³ For instance Halis Öztürk, who was elected to National Assembly between 1950 and 1960 for Ağrı. His father, Sikanlı Abdülmecid Bey, was involved in the Ağrı Revolt in 1930 and deported to İstanbul (Anter, 2000: 135). When his family was in exile in İstanbul, Halis got a university degree from the Law Faculty. After the transition to the multi-party system he joined the DP and was elected as deputy. Even if we don't have definite information about whether they were caught in the forced resettlement, many agahs, sheikhs and tribal leaders who did not have a place in the political arena during the single-party period turned to the political sphere at this time. Said Mutlu belonged to a famous sheikh family around the Bitlis and Muş provinces. He was elected deputy for Bitlis in 1961 under the banner of the YTP. Muhyettin Mutlu, from the same family became a MSP deputy for Bitlis in 1973 and 1977. Another popular shaikh from Muş, Giyasettin Emre, was elected as a DP deputy in the 1954 and 1957 elections. His brother, Kasım Emre, was elected in the '69, '73 and '77 elections as a deputy from Muş as a candidate of the NTP, an independent and the AP respectively. Mehmet Emin Seydagil, who was elected deputy for Muş in 1977, was a member of an influential shaikhly family known as Mal-a Seyda located in Norşen, a small town between Muş and Bitlis. Mal-a Seyda was neutral during the Shaikh Said Revolt however they were still exiled (Yüksel, 1993). As with the sheikhs, the large land owning aghas with tribal membership took their place in the political arena in a similar manner. The most well-known example is Necmettin Cevheri who from 1965-1977 was chosen four times as a deputy of Urfa under the AP banner. He was a lawyer, graduated from the law faculty, who came from a strong tribe owning lots of land. One final

Bedirhanoğlu, if I may. Bedirhanoğlu's case is a good example to sum up the relationship of the local notables of the region with the center, as well as to illustrate the role of the notables in political life.¹⁵⁴ Ihsan Bedirhanoğlu belongs to the Bedirhaniler (the Bedirhan Family), which ruled the last semi-autonomous Kurdish principality that was abolished in the mid of 19th century. In 1840s, the principality was abolished in line with the policies of centralization and the family members were exiled to Istanbul. Some second generation members of the family actively participated in the Kurdish nationalist movement which was emerging at the end of the 19th century.¹⁵⁵ While these members continued to be in the Kurdish nationalist movement after the foundation of the republic, some other members preferred to integrate within the new regime, as was the case with Ihsan Bedirhanoğlu.

As we observe through the records of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Ihsan Bedirhanoğlu was only a primary school graduate and he was engaged in agriculture. As a first step in his political career, he became a

example is the Kartal family from Van. Hamit Kartal, elected in the 1954 elections under the Democrat Party, was the first representative in the political arena of this family, who came from a powerful tribe residing in Van, Fevzi Kartal, a lawyer who was known for being tried in the famous trial of the 49 which took place in 1959, was from the same family (Ballı, 1991: 70). This case was the first serious case of a Kurdish opposition. In 1959, 49 people accused of separatism and Communism, including writers, intellectuals and university students, were arrested and, after military intervention, at the court trial were hit with various penalties. To see a list of all those in this trial, see Ballı (1991). While some members of Kartal family were being tried for Kurdish separatism and Communism, other members continued to cooperate with the center-right parties. Kinyas Kartal, "who was a disciple of Said-i Nursi during years of exile" (McDowall, 2004: 400) was selected as an AP deputy from Van in 1973 and 1977. The family continued this contradictory manner of conduct into the 1990s. For example in the 1991 elections, Remzi Kartal represented the SHP-DEP while Nadir Kartal was chosen as a deputy of the center right DYP (True Path Party). Interestingly enough, during the registration in the parliament Nadir Kartal, chosen from the center right party, included Kurdish in the "known languages" section of his registration, while Remzi Kartal chosen from the obviously pro-Kurdish party, DEP, did not give any information in this section.

¹⁵⁴ For an exhaustive study on Bedirhaniler, see Malmisanij (2000). Also relevant are Sevgen (1982) and Celil (1992).

¹⁵⁵ The most well known are Celadet Ali and Kamuran Ali Bedirhan. These two brothers published the first newspaper published in Kurdish, the Kurdistan Newspaper. They took part in the founding of the *Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti* (the Exalted Kurdistan Association).

deputy for Van for the YTP in 1961. Later, in elections of 1973 and 1977, he became the deputy of the CGP and the CHP respectively for the Van province. In 1987, he returned to active politics and became the Van deputy of ANAP (Motherland Party).

Those who returned to active politics were not composed merely of those who had been suppressed by exile. The political activities of some of those sheikhly and agha families who were representatives for the region during the single-party reign, continued. Some of the illustrative examples of this tendency were Abdulhakim Arvas,¹⁵⁶ Hamid Zülfi Tiğrel, İhsan Hamit Tiğrel,¹⁵⁷ Vefik Piriñçcioğlu,¹⁵⁸ and Abdurrahman Odabaşı.¹⁵⁹ However, it seems that most of the local notables who had collaborated with the center

¹⁵⁶ Abdulhakim Arvas belonged to a famous sheikh family located in the Van and Hakkari provinces. The family's first generation representative in the political arena was Ibrahim Arvas, who from 1920-1950 served as deputy of the CHP for 30 uninterrupted years. Also from this family, Abdulhakim Arvas was chosen as the CHP deputy from Van in the 1957 elections. After 1980, this family was represented by M. Ejder Arvas and Aydın Arvasi in the political arena.

¹⁵⁷ Tiğreller was a family that had strong ties with the CHP throughout single-party period. From this family Zülfü Tiğrel was in parliament under the CHP banner in the following assemblies: 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6. Another member of the family, İhsan Hamit Tiğrel, was also nominated by Atatürk in 1923 for the Second Assembly. However, he was not nominated for another term as deputy because of his involvement in the founding of the TpCF (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası; Progressive Republican Party) and because of his abstention in the law meetings to establish the first inspectorate general. After passing through several parties, İhsan Hamit Tiğrel once again entered into politics and was chosen as an independent from Diyarbakır in the 1946 and 1954 elections. The last parliamentarian from this family was Hamid Zülfi Tiğrel. However, he did not take up the family tradition and align with the CHP, but rather with its competitor, the DP, from which he was chosen as a deputy from Diyarbakır in 1957.

¹⁵⁸ This family, like Tiğrel family, was an influential family who cooperated with the CHP during the single-party period. Three members of Piriñçcioğlu family, Fevzi Piriñçcioğlu, Şeref Uluğ and Ziya Gökalp, were appointed as deputies at various times during the single-party period. For more information about these members see the related sections of the previous chapter. The collaboration between the CHP and the Piriñçcioğlu family remained after transition to multi-party political life. Vefik Piriñçcioğlu was elected as Diyarbakır deputy under the banner of the CHP in the elections held in 1961. "This family's close relative, Ferit Alpiskender, was selected as a deputy from Diyarbakır in the 1950 elections under the DP banner" (Arslan, 1992: 58).

¹⁵⁹ Mahmut Odabaşı, a member of the family of Odabaşı, has been enrolled as CHP deputy for Urfa by Atatürk and served in this position between 1923 and 1932. Abdurrahman Odabaşı, a second-generation member of this family, would also maintain the political affiliation of his family and became a CHP deputy for Urfa in 1957.

throughout the single-party period either withdrew from politics or they were directed to other parties when the multi-party system was introduced.

4.6.2. The Emergence of New Kurdish National Elite

In the period when the traditional local notables were returning, there was also emerging a new intellectual group of political elites, who played an outstanding role in the long run in the social and political life of the region. It is with a survey of this group, including of its ideology, background, various factions, and utilization of the press through publications and perspectives on nationalism and the socio-political structure of the region, that we will close this chapter. These elites, many of whom were of middle and upper class origins, differed from the traditional elites in many aspects, perhaps the most significant being their secular and modern educational background. Their political agenda was to a great extent shaped by left-wing ideologies. Their political discourse

was very different from the one that prevailed among the Kurds of Turkey before the Second World War. The emphasis was clearly on a revolutionary and radical rhetoric. The denial of the Kurdish identity and the lack of economic development in eastern Anatolia were attributed to capitalism and imperialism. This argument provided a basis of solidarity for Turkish and Kurdish revolutionaries (Kirişçi, 1998: 240).

This newly emergent group was radically against the traditional, semi-feudal socio-political structure, which had been prevailing in the region. Although they differed in the solutions, which they offered to overcome the problems, a leftist framework centered on the idea of class struggle shaped their basic ideological position. Their impact was very limited in the rural areas compared to the traditional elites. Yet, these figures easily found support in the metropolitan centers. Most of the support came from Kurdish students who had come to the

big cities for the purpose of college education. Beside this, they gained support among the migrants who had moved to the cities from the rural areas as excess agricultural laborers due to the mechanization of agricultural production.

The most important part of the new political-national elites' political agenda was shaped by their emphasis upon the social, economic and, cultural underdevelopment of the region and by their insistence on attracting attention to the difference in the developmental levels of the eastern and the western parts of Turkey. They accepted that underdevelopment was a result of uneven development brought by capitalism; however, they claimed that the fundamental reason was the chauvinistic-nationalist economic-social policies of the ruling class.

As mentioned above, the 1961 Constitution introduced freedom of organization. The new nationalist Kurdish elites also benefited from this freedom and established many associations. Amongst them, the most popular one was the *Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları* (Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East), established in 1969. According to Kirişçi and Winrow

Originally the aim of these organizations seemed to be to persuade the government to recognize the Kurdish language and grant cultural rights to the Kurds. Instead of religious, tribal and traditional themes which Kurdish groups had made use of in the inter-war period, the leaders of these cultural and student organizations would in time turn more revolutionary and radical (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 108).

The founders and chairmen of these organizations were tried mostly for violating the penal codes no. 141 and no. 142. They were sentenced to different punishments, but were released with the 1974 amnesty law (Ballı, 1991: 74).

These new elites could also be classified as the Kurdish-left. As Entessar argues

The Kurdish-left which was first organized under the roof of the TIP and later under different organizational structures, started splitting into factions from the second half of the 1970s on. Differing objectives and tactics strained relations between the Kurdish and Turkish left. For the Kurds, the goals of socialist revolution and Kurdish nationalism were not incompatible; they had to be pursued simultaneously. The Turkish left, on the other hand, considered Kurdish insistence on the ethnic recognition as counterproductive, divisive, and ultimately detrimental to the survival of the political left. They contended that ethnic recognition would be achieved under the proletarian leadership of a socialist Turkey (Entessar, 1992: 92).

Let us look briefly at one such faction: "One group that emerged was *Özgürlük Yolu* (The Road to Freedom). Many of its members were activists in the banned Worker's Party of Turkey" (Entessar, 1992: 92). As indicated by Entessar (1992: 92) *Özgürlük Yolu* did not penetrate a large segment of the Kurdish population, but maintained some appeal among intellectual and trade union circles. At the end of the 1970s this group adopted a more formal structure and became the Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan (hereafter SPTK). This party, led by Kemal Burkay, defended the co-existence of the Turks and the Kurds on a democratic-socialist ground. For that purpose, SPTK proposed a socialist revolution based on two basic levels.

Kurdistan has not got its national independence yet and done away with feudalism, the character of the revolutionary stage facing the Kurdish people is the national democratic revolution. This revolution is going to take the colonial fetters off the people, wipe out the foreign domination, and liberate the Kurds... Our party knows very well that only socialism can put an end to exploitation and backwardness. Thus, the national democratic revolution should be brought to perfection by the socialist revolution (Gunter, 1990: 64).

The press was the most important instrument used by these new elites. The 1961 constitution relatively expanded the freedom of press and the new elites used this freedom to publish a series of journals, though most of them would be banned shortly after they were being published.¹⁶⁰ Most of these journals were published in Istanbul and Ankara and were in Turkish, while some of them were bilingual (in Kurdish and Turkish). These publications mostly concerned themselves with such questions as granting cultural and political rights to Kurds; the recognition of the Kurdish identity, and the economic and social problems of the Kurdish-populated areas. In other words, criticisms of the state policies concerning the region made up the most important volume of these works. Also, critical analytic approaches to the semi-feudal socio-economic structure of the region were prevailing in those journals. Some of the sample publications of this sort include: *Yeni Akış* (the New Current), *Özgürlük Yolu* (The Road to Freedom), *Deng* (Voice), *Rızgari* (Liberation), and *Roja Welat*.

Yeni Akış was a monthly bilingual (published in Turkish and the Kurmanji dialect of Kurdish) Kurdish socialist journal published in Ankara in 1966, under the editorship of Mehmet Ali Aslan.¹⁶¹ The first issue of this journal was titled “we discuss the question of east.” Under this framework, the journal “published theoretical articles on the Kurdish question and defended the idea of an alliance between the Kurdish and Turkish working classes against the ruling classes. It called for a socialist regime as the only means of bringing justice,

¹⁶⁰ For a more complete survey of the journals published in this period, see Malmisanij and Lewendi (1992).

¹⁶¹ Mehmet Ali Aslan, who was a lawyer from Ağrı, was later become president of the TİP (Workers' Party of Turkey) (Malmisanij and Lewendi, 1992: 172).

equality and well-being to the Turkish and Kurdish people” (Kendal, 1993: 67). The journal would be banned following its 4th volume, being accused of encouraging separatism and threatening national unity (Malmisanij and Lewendi, 1992: 169).

Journals which managed to survive the longest were bilingual ones like, *Özgürlük Yolu* and *Yeni Akış* (which were published in Turkish, Kurmanji and Dimili-Zaza dialects of Kurdish) (Malmisanij and Lewendi, 1992: 216-220). *Özgürlük Yolu*, which was a publication of Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan, launched in 1975 in Ankara and published its 44th volume when it was closed down in 1979. Its editor, Kemal Burkay, also served at the same time as the leader of the SPTK. “This political and cultural journal covered the various aspects of the Kurdish question in Turkey.... as well as general Turkish issues concerning the left as a whole” (Kendal, 1993:71).¹⁶²

Nationalism was an important subject for the political agenda of these elite. However, rather than an ethnic and separatist nationalism, the nationalist discourse of this group was articulated into a left-wing political perspective. Among the most immediate demands of this group was the recognition of the Kurdish identity, the political and cultural rights of Kurds, as well as the elimination of the regional disparities between the Kurdish-populated areas and the developed regions of Turkey. They believed that these demands would be realized only in a socialist system constructed by Kurds and Turks in collaboration.

¹⁶² The cover issues of the first volume were as follows: The emergent task is to shift to a democratic platform; the Iraqi Kurdish Nationalist War for Freedom; the Fascists create a fight between Alevi and Sunni people; Victory in Vietnam and Cambodia.

The nationalist ideas were effective not only among the educated secular elite, but also among the young generations of the traditional elite, thus inspiring a new group which falls neither into the traditional elite category, nor into the new political-national elites. “Inspired by the Kurdish movement in Iraq, where Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) were leading a successful guerilla struggle against the central government, young members of Kurdish traditional elite founded in 1965 the clandestine Kurdistan Democratic Party in Turkey” (Bruinessen, 1995).

The most important point where the KDP differed from the new elite was in their standpoint concerning the socio-political and economic structure of the region. These groups of elite were not intent to change the traditional structure of the region, that is, the Kurdish left were much more radical in terms of their political demands than the KDP: “While the pro-KDP wing called only for the establishment of Kurdish autonomy, the Kurdish left demanded not only cultural rights but also the socioeconomic restructuring of Kurdistan and the transformation of the hierarchical Kurdish society into a more equitable society”¹⁶³ (Entessar, 1992: 90).

State elites were aware of the fact that the KDP could revive nationalist sentiments among the Kurds of Turkey and that in this way the KDP might bring about a promotion of separatist movements. Therefore, on November 16, 1960, General Gursel, the leader of the Military coup, issued a warning to Kurds in Turkey who might be tempted to emulate their compatriots in neighboring countries. “If the mountain Turks do not keep quiet, the army will

¹⁶³ There are different arguments about the political demands of the traditional-conservative Kurds. For example, those like Kirişçi (1998: 241) and Entessar (1992) argue that their essential demands are for autonomy while Bruinessen (1995: 344) asserts that their demand is for independence.

not hesitate to bomb their towns and villages into the ground. There will be such a bloodbath that they and their country will be washed away” (Kendal, 1992: 65 and McDowall, 2004: 406). Yet, the KDP did not last long leaving the political arena in early 1970s (Bruinessen, 1995: 344).

4.7. Conclusion

The post-World War II period witnessed a dramatic shift in the modern history of Turkey. Both global and domestic developments significantly contributed to this land marking change. Firstly, Turkey joined to the world of capitalist-western-democratic alliances and accordingly joined first the UN and NATO and later other Western international organizations. This development was in line with the ideological and political preferences of the state elites, therefore was not unexpected but had significant economic and political implications for the country. Secondly, domestic developments such as the emergence of regional popular social discontents stemming from the authoritarian policies of single party and the requirements of the economic structure also played a crucial role in pressing for a socio-economic and political transformation.

Accordingly, dramatic transformations both in the political and socio-economic structures were observed in the post-World War II Turkey. A multi-party political system, which characterizes a competitive participatory democracy, was introduced. The strong centrist-elitist political culture, which restricted and prevented the *peripheries* from participation in political life, was now replaced by a more populist political atmosphere that allowed for the participation of different interest groups in the political arena. The economic policies also shifted from a state-promoted development model to an import

substitution industrialization model. The primary goal became the integration of national economy to the capitalist world economy under the banner of national developmentalism.

The changing paradigms of the center influenced the application of the modernization program in the periphery. I have considered in detail the implications of this paradigm change for the Kurdish populated periphery in economic, educational and political areas. We have seen that despite the new development paradigm and efforts to close the regional development gaps, the region under consideration remained underdeveloped, rural and traditional. Significant improvements were made in the realm of education. The reach of educational institutions were expanded and deepened in the region and the number of those reaching formal education increased considerably. Yet higher education remained an elite attainment and, coupled with the failure of initiating a substantive socio-economic transformation in the region, strengthened the power of local notables as well as created new group of highly educated national elite.

The transition to multi-party system and political liberalization at large also generated two significant developments among the Kurdish population. On the one hand, competitive politics strengthened the authority of the traditional elite who returned back to politics in larger numbers and with more power. The boomerang effect of this development was to further strengthen the power of local notables in local social and political life thus reinforcing the traditional socio-economic and political patterns. On other hand, multi-party political system coupled with the socio-economic changes in the region created a new group of highly educated upper and middle class Kurdish elite as a new political

actor. This new political actor, unlike the traditional local notables, played a significant role in the revitalization of cultural and intellectual currents within the Kurdish society, voiced more strongly the need for cultural recognition, and demanded a radical transformation in the existing socio-political structure of the Kurdish areas dominated by the interests and alliances of the local traditional elites.

CHAPTER 5

THE DILEMMA OF TURKISH MODERNIZATION (Post-1980)

5.1. Introduction

The post-1980 period has been characterized by intensive discussions and a partial reconstruction of the fundamental paradigms that draw the boundaries between the center and its peripheries. These debates have centered on the constitutive principles of the Republic, the principles that have guided regulations and practices since the establishment of the Republic. A number of developments both at the national and global level led to these debates. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss this process since the 1980s, paying particular attention to the Kurdish-populated periphery.

To accomplish this, I will first endeavor to assess the change that Turkish society has been undergoing since the 1980s in relation to domestic and global circumstances. I will also evaluate how this social change has been reflected in the policies that have been put into effect in the Kurdish-populated periphery with specific reference to political and economic developments. Finally, I will examine the consequences and impacts of both state policies and domestic and global developments on the Kurdish areas. In other words, I will discuss the developments and changes in socio-political and economic structures in Kurdish areas since the 1980s.

5.2. A General Overview of the Post-1980 Period

5.2.1. A Return to the 1930s? Military Intervention

In 1980, the military took over political power in Turkey and ruled the country with a totalitarian regime for three years¹⁶⁴. The goal of this intervention was similar to the one stated in the previous coup d'états: "to preserve the integrity of the country, to provide national unity and integrity, to prevent a probable civil war, to reestablish state authority, secure its existence and to remove the reasons preventing the democratic system from functioning" (<http://www.belgenet.com/12eylul/1209198001.html>). In short, "the Military saw the salvation of Turkey in the reintroduction of what it regarded as strict Atatürkist policies. The political discourse derived from these policies put clear emphases on the Turkishness of Turkey, the unity of the Turkish nation, and the territorial integrity of Turkey" (Kirişçi, 1998: 241).

Thus, the democratic system was terminated, all political parties were closed down, every kind of union and civil organization was banned, and freedom of thought and expression were limited to a significant degree. Additionally, the universities, which are supposed to protect and encourage the production of free and scientific knowledge, were left open to interference by the political authorities (an institution called the Higher Education Council was set up and a great number of oppositional academics, most of whom were leftists, were dismissed from universities). Moreover, the press and other

¹⁶⁴ "According to official statistics, during three years of the military rule over 60.000 people were arrested. However, the International League of Human Rights had a very different story. It claimed no fewer than 81,000 Kurds had been detained between September 1980 and September 1982" (McDowall, 2004: 416).

publications were subjected to powerful censure and numerous journalists were arrested.

The military, which had seized civilian rule in order to remove the threat directed at Turkey's indivisible integrity and to restore the social and political structure in accordance with Atatürkist principles, intervened most significantly in the drafting of a new constitution. It was prepared by a group of professors that were appointed by the military and was accepted by referendum in 1982.¹⁶⁵ The constitution was constructed on a strict centrist foundation, which gave primacy to the state over society and curbed individual rights and freedoms. In short, it both curtailed the relatively liberal regulations introduced by the 1961 Constitution¹⁶⁶ on the one hand, and eagerly endorsed the centrist, authoritarian laws of the 1961 Constitution on the other.¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, the 1982 Constitution strengthened the power of the executive, giving the president the right to dissolve the Assembly and to rule by decree (McDowall, 2004: 416).

One of the most important reasons behind the military intervention was the opposition that emerged in the second half of the 1960s in various leftist organizations. This opposition criticized the center's policies about the Kurds and its activities and thereby provoked a reaction.¹⁶⁸ The military perceived this opposition as one of the most vital threats to the indivisible integrity of the

¹⁶⁵ The participation in the referendum was meant to be compulsory. Thus, the participation rate was 91.3 percent and the Constitution was adopted by an overwhelming majority of 91.4 percent (DIE, 1983a: 1-3).

¹⁶⁶ The most important of all were those regarding political and union organizations.

¹⁶⁷ National Security Council.

¹⁶⁸ The other two reasons were as follows: the religious threat directed at the secular characteristic of the state and the leftist movements that aimed to reconstruct the established political and economic system of the country on a class-basis. In 1979, in a demonstration of the pro-Islamic party NSP in Konya, some demands to change the secular characteristic of the state were expressed/voiced and this march was shown as a justification for the military intervention.

country and thereby showed particular attention to the Kurdish-populated regions. Similar to other regions of the country an authoritarian administration was established in the region through military-administrative measures, and, as was the case in the 1930s, aggressive-assimilationist instruments and institutions were revitalized as well.

Two such institutions were the Turkish Language Society and the Turkish History Society, both of which were to be influential in downplaying a distinct Kurdish identity: As Kirişçi and Winrow argue

They were expected to reintroduce the political discourse of the 1930s, which had argued that Kurds were Turks. Articles and books claiming common ancestry for Turks and Kurds, as well as arguments that a separate Kurdish language did not exist suddenly proliferated. It was claimed that efforts to distinguish a Kurdish identity from a Turkish one were simply fabrications on the part of Western intelligence agencies and separatist groups which were seeking to divide up the country (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 112).

Two means were employed to further blur the line between Turkish and Kurdish identities. First, semi-academic studies were undertaken with the support of the military. These studies tried to prove the assertion that the Kurds are [actually] Turkish and that there is no such language as Kurdish.¹⁶⁹ Second, some prohibitions in the cultural-linguistic sphere were introduced. Indeed, it seems that the linguistic and cultural domain was the one to which the military

¹⁶⁹ It is worth noting here a published series of works produced by the Turkish Cultural Research Institute in Ankara in the first half of the 1980s. These works, some of which had been published previously, were dedicated to proving the thesis that Kurds are actually Turks in terms of ethnicity, linguistics history, culture, etc. Some of these works include the following: Nazmi Sevgen's (1982) *Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu'da Türk Beylikleri (Osmanlı Belgeleri ile Kürt Türkleri Tarihi)* (The Turkish Principalities in Eastern and South Eastern Anatolia), M. Şerif Fırat's (1983) *Doğu İlleri ve Varto Tarihi* (5th edition), Tuncer Gülensoy's (1983). *Kurmançî ve Zaza Türkçeleri Üzerine Bir Araştırma* (A Research on Kurmanci and Zaza Turkish), Edip Yavuz's (1983) *Doğu Anadolu'da Dil-Onomastik İlişkileri Üzerine Bir Deneme* (An Essay on the Relationship of Language and Onomastic in Eastern Anatolia), Şükrü Kaya Seferoğlu's (1982) *Anadolunun İlk Türk Sakinleri: Kürtler*, Şükrü Kaya Seferoğlu and H. Kemal Türköz (1982) *101 Soruda Türklerin Kürt Boyu*, İsmet Parmaksızoğlu (1982) *Tarih Boyunca Kürttürkleri ve Türkmenler*.

paid the most attention. For example, a new law regarding Turkish was instituted at this time: “[The] military regime introduced a new law, Law 2932, which declared that the mother tongue of all Turkish citizens was Turkish” (Barkey and Fuller, 1997: 73). In addition to this law, there were also constitutional prohibitions against the use of the non-Turkish languages. Articles 26, and 28 of the 1982 Constitution put forth this prohibition as follows:

(Article 26): No language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought. Any written or printed documents photograph records, magnetic or videotapes and other media instruments used in contravention of this provision shall be confiscated. (Article 28): Publications shall not be made in any language prohibited by law (Cited in Entessar, 1992: 96).

It was thus that the early years of 1980 following the coup d’etat were typified by an increase in authoritarianism both through military and constitutional means and by a decrease in tolerance for diversity and opposition, resulting in the suppression of the Kurdish language and identity. However, with the advent of 1983, the political scene would alter.

5.2.2. Economic and Political Liberalization

In 1983, civilian rule resumed with an election in which political parties and candidates participated with permission from the military junta. The most successful party in the elections was the *Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP (Motherland Party) under the leadership of Turgut Ozal, previously a bureaucrat in the State Planning Organization. The ANAP ruled the country until 1991. Throughout its rule, the primary priority of the ANAP was to reduce the role of the state in the economy, to encourage private enterprise and to foster integration with the capitalist world market. In short, its political program gave precedence to economic liberalism over political liberalism.

Nevertheless, during the second term of its rule, it provided a relative democratization by amending or removing some of the articles of the 1982 Constitution, particularly those that limited social and political life. Said changes included the following: articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Turkish Penal Code, which limited freedom of speech, were removed; the prohibitions on labor and civil organization were relaxed; some bans were lifted thanks to changes that were made in laws on political parties and electoral law; and the state monopoly over the press, publication and broadcast was ended and privatization began. I should note at this point that especially economic liberalism, but also the corresponding the reorganization of state-society relations on a relatively democratic-liberal ground, bore traces of the liberal trend achieving dominance in the developed-western democratic world. In other words, the socio-economic developments in Turkey coincided with the rise of liberalism that came to be called Reaganism & Thatcherism, which took the place of the welfare state in the West.

The wave of liberalization in political and economic domains created a relatively liberal environment with regard to state-society and center-periphery relations, as well as individual rights and freedoms. However, the reflection of this shift on the traditional state policies in Kurdish-populated areas was seen only after the 1990s. (I will discuss the developments in the 1990s in the following pages in detail.) The ANAP, until the end of the 1980s, despite its liberal structure, followed a strategy that was based on the concern of the consolidation of state power and the establishment of security and order. As a part of this strategy, the ANAP resurrected certain institutions and instruments similar to those established during the late Ottoman and single-party periods.

The two most long-lasting and well-known of these practices were the village-guard system and the *Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği*-OHAL (Emergency Rule Region-ERR).

5.2.3. Village-Guards

The village guard system, which is still legally in effect, was established in April 1985.¹⁷⁰ Some scholars compare village guards to the Hamidiye Regiments in the late Ottoman period.¹⁷¹ The fundamental purpose of this regulation in the

¹⁷⁰ For Article 9 of the Village Guards Regulation, see Official Gazette dated 7 January 2000, No. 24096. "The duties of the village guards are as follows: a) Determining those who violate the lives, chastity, property and security of their possessions, following that, to notify the village headman and the nearest gendarmerie unit as soon as possible, to prevent them from running and hiding, to apprehend them with the help of the villagers and the village's municipal police; b) Apprehend perpetrators during or after the crime, before they cover their tracks; c) In incidents involving judicial law enforcement, taking necessary measures for preventing loss or destruction of evidence; d) When informed about disasters such as fire, flood, earthquake, landslide or avalanche, notifying the village headman and the nearest gendarmerie unit; e) Investigating the business and relations of ex-convicts or suspects who are in the village, following up on draft evaders, handing over information obtained to the village headman or the gendarmerie; f) Taking necessary precautions for various violations against vineyards, gardens and their roads, drinking water complexes, transformer stations and common village property, water wells, retaining walls and canals and similar village structures, and helping the general or specific law enforcement in their protection" (Beşe, 2006: 139).

¹⁷¹ These irregular military units, which were known as the Hamidiye Cavalry, were first established in 1891 by Abdulhamid II. "The Hamidiya was raised from selected Sunni Kurdish tribes, preferably of proven loyalty, to form mounted regiments of approximately 600 men. In many cases these regiments were drawn from one tribe, and its commanding officer was the tribal chief" (McDowall, 2004: 59). According to Olson (1992: 31), "in 1910, the number of the Hamidiye Cavalry rose to 64 and its military power was more than 53 thousand." According to Duguid, there were two main goals of these units, which were created on the basis of the Sultan's pan-Islamism policies: "to increase the efficiency of the Kurdish tribes in the event of another war with Russia and to provide at the same time a mechanism for supervision and control" (Duguid: 1973: 145). According to another claim (Beşikçi, 1969: 175-177), which approaches the Hamidiye Regiments from the point of view of the Kurdish policies of the Ottomans, the basic purpose of this project was to control the Kurds on the basis of divide and rule policies. In order to make his point, Beşikçi demonstrates that all the Kurds that were recruited to the Hamidiye Regiments were Sunni Kurds and they established domination over Alevite Kurdish tribes. [For instance, "the powerful Sunni Jibrān tribe (located in Erzurum, Muş and Ağrı), which had fielded four regiments, soon started attacking the Alevi Khurmaks, confiscating their lands" (McDowall, 2004: 60). The origins of the conflict between the tribes called the Jibrāns and the Khurmaks were prepared during this period and this conflict went on after the foundation of the Republic. The Jibrāns in particular took an active part in the Sheikh Said Revolt. One of the leaders of the Jibrāns, Halid Jibrān was a high ranking army officer in Erzurum and he was the head of the Erzurum [provincial] branch of the Azadi, the organization that coordinated the revolt. Shortly before the revolt, he was killed in a Bitlis jail, where he had been imprisoned on the grounds that he had been making preparations for the revolt. The Khurmaks, on the other hand, took the side of the Republican forces. It seems that the

late 1980s: “was to enable villages to defend themselves against attack from the PKK” (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 129).

The village guards are armed and paid by the government to fight the PKK. Figures regarding their salaries are as follows: “by 1992 the monthly stipend of a village guard was approximately US \$230” (McDowall, 2004: 424). For guards that are fully employed, the average salary as of December 2005 was 390 YTL per month, including clothing, shoes and food allowances, which are provided by the state. In 2005, the yearly cost of the system to the state stood around 300 million YTL (Beşe, 2006: 140). Village guards are recruited individually but the employment policy depends more on the total employment of a tribe. “Among the more notable tribes involved were the Jirki, Pinyanish, Goyan and the Mamkhuran. The central government did not hesitate to recruit the tribes, which it normally viewed as criminal or delinquent. Of these the most notorious was the Jirki in Hakkari, whose chief, Tahir Adıyaman, was still wanted for the killing of six gendarmes in 1975 (McDowall, 2004: 424). Recruitment grew apace. “The number of village guards increased from just under 18,000 in 1990 to 63,000 by August 1994 when the interior minister

Khurmaks’ support for the Republic was not limited to military support. One of the leading figures of the tribe, M. Serif Firat wrote a book in 1954, the title of which was “Dogu Illeri ve Varto Tarihi”. This book was dedicated to the reproduction of the official discourse claiming that the Kurds are actually Turkish. Robert Olson (1992: 33), who is well-known for his studies on the late Ottoman and early Republican period Kurdish nationalism, believes that “the Hamidiye Regiments were an important stage in the rise of Kurdish nationalism”. [Thus,] it seems that the Hamidiye Regiments were not solely a military project. They also constituted an effort to maintain the unity of the disintegrating Empire on the basis of Islamic unity. It was also an economic, cultural and social project of integration with the cultural dimension of the project being comprised of tribal schools. After the overthrow of Abd al Hamid’s regime by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1908, the Hamidiya regiments were renamed the Tribal Light Cavalry Regiments but remained essentially the same (...) tribal regiments were sent to some trouble spots (Yemen, Albania etc) alongside regular troops” (McDowall, 2004: 63).

announced that there would be no further additions” (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 130).¹⁷²

The essential goal of the village guard system was to ensure that the population in the rural areas would be able to defend themselves against the attacks of the PKK and to help guarantee that they would aid the security forces. However, this system resulted in a number of legal, social and economic problems.¹⁷³ The village guards, which derived their legitimacy from the law and their power from the state, did not hesitate to engage in various illegal activities and to use violence against the villagers. More significantly, the village guard system kept tribal structure alive and ensured its continual reproduction both because the recruitment policy encourages the total employment of the tribe and because all the salaries for the village guards are paid in full to the tribal leader, to be distributed by him. For instance, “in autumn 1992 Sadun Seylan, chief of the Alan tribe in Van, who owned 26 villages, fielded 500 village guards, a force he could increase six-fold if necessary. For these 500 men, Seylan received \$115,000 monthly” (McDowall, 2004: 424).

The strategy pursued to provide security and to establish order was, to a very large extent, military in nature. The number of military forces deployed in the region and its change with the passage of time verifies this observation. According to Kirişçi and Winrow (1997: 130),

¹⁷² Human Rights Watch gives a different account of the number of village guards. According to HRW, as of August 2004, there were 58,416 village guards in Turkey (Human Rights Watch: 2005: 10). This number is that of the guards that are recruited by the state. In addition, there are voluntary village guards. According to Beşe (2006: 140), in addition to the temporary village guards currently under full employment, there are 25,000 voluntary village guards. And approximately, 22,000 temporary village guards have resigned since 1985.

¹⁷³ Minister of Internal Affairs Aksu, in his answer to the motion for question given by CHP İzmir Deputy Türkan Miçooğulları in September 2005, declared that since the inception of the Temporary Village Guard system on March 26, 1985, 4,972 guards had committed crimes and of these 853 were arrested (cited in Beşe, 2006: 140). For some examples concerning the illegal activities with which village guards were involved, see HRW (2005) and TBMM (1998).

The normal level of Turkish troop deployments in the area was around 90.000. This number had risen to 160.000 by June 1994. By the end of 1994, taking into account also the number of police, Special Forces and village guards, there were 300.000 security forces deployed in eastern and southeastern Turkey. [...] Apparently, one quarter of the total manpower of NATO's second largest army was deployed in the area (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 130).¹⁷⁴

Needless to say, the village guard system was only one amongst many other instruments introduced to address the insecure conditions arising from the PKK. While, as we have seen above, it was primarily a military method, other nonmilitary means were also employed to manage the situation, one of which was related administrative arrangements.

5.2.4 Revitalization of Inspectorate General: Emergency Rule Region (OHAL)

Since the central authority thought that the existent measures, primarily military in nature, remained insufficient to establish security and order, they also introduced a number of administrative regulations. For this purpose, on July 19, 1987, OHAL (Emergency Rule Region) was activated.¹⁷⁵ As with the village

¹⁷⁴ The most important reason for the security and order-oriented policies in the region was the number of the PKK fighters. According to government figures, at the end of 1994, it was only 4.000 to 5.000" (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 130). According to White, who relies on the US sources, this number is much higher: "In 1995 the US Department of State estimated that the PKK had a guerrilla force of about 15,000 supported by a part-time militant of 75,000" (White, 2000: 143). It seems that although 18.500 militants were killed in the conflict for almost two decades, their number remained the same. In a recent visit to the US, the Turkish Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt mentioned the same number as that of 1994. (<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=213302&tarih=18/02/2007>).

¹⁷⁵ In the foundation of the OHAL, the activities of the PKK played an important role. However, the OHAL had been planned before the PKK began armed uprising. On November 25, 1983, the government promulgated *Olağanüstü Hal Kanunu* by the law numbered 2935. Limiting itself with martial law, the government did not put the OHAL into practice. In 1987, the government did not find martial law to be enough and therefore, put the OHAL into practice (Koca: 1998: 188-189). When it was first founded the OHAL included the following eight provinces: Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli and Van. In 1990, five more provinces in the region, namely Adıyaman, Batman, Bitlis, Muş and Şırnak were also included in the OHAL and thus, the number of the provinces in the OHAL reached 13.

guard system, the historical origins of this regulation likewise go back to the late Ottoman period. However, even more than similar regulations from the Ottoman period, it resembles the Inspectorate General, an administrative office of the early Republic period that was founded in 1927 and abolished in 1952¹⁷⁶ (Koca, 1998: 189). Until 1990, the OHAL functioned as a means to establish the power of the center in the countryside and to provide coordination in administrative, military and political domains in the OHAL provinces. However, certain changes in the law regarding the rights of the Governor General, who administered the OHAL regions, were introduced as a result of two major factors: first, the increasing attacks of the PKK on the civilian and military targets, and second, the social dissatisfaction that was communicated by the participation of large masses from the region in sizeable demonstrations.

The Council of Ministers issued a bylaw on April 9, 1990. This bylaw, numbered 413, gave extraordinary powers to the Governor General, powers which even the President of the Republic did not have, including the following: "It allows the Governor General to censor the press by banning, confiscating, and heavily fining publications that wrongly represent incidents occurring in a region which is under a state of emergency, disturbing its readers with distorted news stories or commentaries, causing anxiety among people in the region and obstructing security forces in the performance their jobs. The Governor General is further allowed to shut down publishing houses that print such publications. He may also exile people who 'act against state' to other parts of Turkey with their relocation sites to be chosen by the Ministry of Interior" (Entessar, 1992: 107).

¹⁷⁶ According to Koca (1998: 189) the fourth article, which outlines the rights and powers of the regional governorate of the OHAL, is the same as that of the Inspectorate General.

He is further granted the right to control or prohibit all union activities, including strikes and lockouts; prevent boycotts, slow-downs, and the closing down of workplaces. Moreover he is allowed to require State Security Court Public Prosecutors to open cases against people who violate decree 413, evacuate villages 'for security reasons' without prior notice, and transfer 'harmful' state employees. "The Council of Ministers also gave the Governor General the power to dismiss any judge, prosecutor, or military officer working in the area under his jurisdiction" (Entessar, 1992: 108). Although the number of the provinces in the OHAL changed over time, the OHAL remained in full effect until 2002, when it was abolished in accordance with the laws paving the way for integration into the European Union.

5.2.5. Demographic Engineering

Both the village guard system and the OHAL were regulations initiated against the armed Kurdish resistance, which emerged in the 1980s and became substantial in the region. I will focus on this resistance in more detail in the following pages. Before proceeding with said discussion, however, I would like to focus on another development that emerged in relation to that resistance. Starting in the second half of the 1980s, a large number of villages and hamlets were evacuated and their residents migrated to substantial metropolises either in the region or in other parts of the country¹⁷⁷. The OHAL itself asserts that the data regarding such migrants are as follows: "as of 1997 3,165 villages and hamlets were evacuated and the people living in these areas, which numbers 378,335, migrated to towns in the region and in other parts of the country"

¹⁷⁷ For studies about forced migration and for a comprehensive discussion on this issue, see Demirler and Kayhan (2006).

(TBMM, 1998: 12 and HRW, 2005: 5-6). However, national and international NGOs and other more objective sources claim that these numbers are much higher.¹⁷⁸

Another study conducted by the Institute of Demographic Studies at Hacettepe University in 2006 entitled "Research on Migration and Displaced Populations in Turkey," cites an even higher number than those provided by the official sources. According to this research,¹⁷⁹ "between 1986 and 1995, from 950.000 to 1.200.000 people migrated from the rural and urban areas in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia for 'security reasons'." This number is approximately 20 percent of the total population of the region and it did not include migrations to places outside of Turkey.

Official authorities claimed for a long time that the PKK brought about the evacuation of villages and forced migration. For example, in 1994, Azimet Köylüoğlu, the Minister responsible for Human Rights, claimed that soldiers had burnt villages in Tunceli. Tansu Çiller, the Prime Minister at the time, responded by denying these allegations and claiming that the villages had instead been burned by the PKK (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 131).¹⁸⁰ The PKK was also said

¹⁷⁸ For example, the Diyarbakir Bar Association suggests that as many as two million have been displaced. The U.S. State Department reports for 1998 considered 560,000 a credible estimate (HRW, 2005: 14).

¹⁷⁹ This research is based on surveys completed by 7,316 people from 5,009 household circles, with the research focusing on those migrating from 14 specified provinces or those migrating to 10 specified provinces. For a comprehensive evaluation of the published report of these research results, see (Ayata and Yüksek, 2007).

¹⁸⁰ The OHAL Governor Ünal Erkan, during whose term (21.01.1992-01.11.1995) the evacuation of villages was experienced most intensively, expressed the same assertion. In 1996, Erkan responded to the Assembly Research Commission, which was charged with conducting research on claims concerning the evacuation of villages: "During the term of my governorate, I did not encounter the demand to evacuate villages and I did not use this power of mine. Erkan claimed that "evacuation of villages was entirely the result of terrorists". Moreover, he stated that when one asks a villager "who displaced you from here?," there might be ones saying "the state displaced us," but since they are afraid of terrorists they cannot say "terrorists displaced us". All the OHAL governors who were in charge until 1996 expressed

to be using certain villages and hamlets for food and shelter. Moreover, it did not hesitate to attack villages that did not support its struggle. Objective sources also verify that some villages were evacuated for these aforementioned reasons. Furthermore, some villagers voluntarily migrated, as they did not want to be a part of the conflict between the PKK and security forces. Despite these alternative explanations for migration, it nevertheless seems that most of the villages and hamlets were evacuated by the security forces.

In the mid-1990s, when village evacuations were most prevalent and intense, a new administration came to power as a result of the 1995 elections. After a short-lived coalition of the DYP-ANAP, the RP-DYP coalition was created. While the change in government neither brought about a radical change in official view, nor ended the village evacuations and forced migration, it did establish an Assembly Research Commission to address the issue. Composed of certain parliamentarians, this commission would investigate the question and submit its findings in a report to the General Assembly¹⁸¹. The most significant result of the report was as follows: it revised the official view, which stated that the PKK carried out village evacuation and forced migration. The revised official view, however, explained that the village evacuations had resulted from security concerns in that the villages, which the military was

similar claims. For the views of the OHAL governors on this issue, especially Ünal Erkan, see TBMM Arastirma Komisyonu Raporu (1998: 14-15).

¹⁸¹ In 1995, the RP won the general elections with a percentage of 21.4 and it was the second biggest party in the region with 24.1 percent, following the HADEP, which got 25.9 percent of the votes (DIE, 2004: 100-101). Out of 60 deputies elected from the region, 28 were elected from the RP. In short, as the bigger partner of the coalition, the RP received the important segment of the votes, which took it to power, from the region. Partly as a result of this, the new government accepted the foundation of an Assembly Research Commission entrusted with the investigation of village evacuations. Needless to say, during the same period, the research of various national and international NGOs and human rights organizations were also significant as they brought the issue to the agenda.

unable to protect, were vacated and at times burned to prevent them from being used by the PKK for logistical purposes (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 130).

In short, whatever their reasons and goals, approximately 20 percent of the population in the region had to migrate from their villages to different towns and regions in the country within a period of less than two decades. This situation caused a number of difficulties in the social, political and security realms,¹⁸² the most important of which was rapid urbanization and the problems related to this phenomenon. For example, while the urban population in five provinces, namely Batman, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Urfa and Van was 995.000 in 1990, it increased more than two-fold only in four years and it reached 2.260.000 in 1994 (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 134).

Due to the problems that forced migration brought about and also the atmosphere of relative security after the arrest of the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, in 1999, the Turkish government began providing means by which the return of the displaced people to their villages could be accomplished.¹⁸³ With the approval of Turkey's candidacy to the EU in 2002, the return of the displaced population issue acquired a new dimension. "In May 2003, the E.U.'s Accession Partnership with Turkey required [that] the return of internally displaced persons to their original settlements should be supported

¹⁸² One of the most important reasons for village evacuations was to dry the logistic resources of the PKK in rural areas. However, it seems that this strategy brought about an opposite result. "A report prepared by a group of Turkish parliamentary deputies concluded that the security operations and the practice of village burning was fuelling Kurdish nationalism and was forcing especially young people to join the ranks of the PKK" (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 131).

¹⁸³ In this regard, the first serious attempt was made in 1999. In March 1999, then prime minister Bülent Ecevit launched the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project with the following description: "Within the framework of the project, those families who wish to return to their villages will be identified; infrastructure facilities of the villages will be completed; housing developments will be increased with the labor of families; and social facilities will be completed to increase the standard of living of the local people, especially in [the areas of] health and education. Moreover, activities such as beekeeping, farming, animal husbandry, handicrafts and carpet weaving will be supported so that these families can earn a living" (HRW: 2005).

and speeded up” (HRW, 2005). The European Commission’s October 6, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey stated that the Turkish government had provided information that since January 2003, 124,218 internally displaced persons (approximately one third of the official total of 350,000) have returned to their villages (HRW, 2005: 14).

Having considered, therefore, some of the impacts of the Kurdish armed resistance, both in terms of the regulations and institutions employed to quell that resistance and the demographic effects it had on the people of the region, it is now appropriate to turn to a more thorough review of the resistance itself.

5.2.6. Armed Resistance of the Periphery

As was indicated in the previous discussion, one of the most significant justifications for the coup d’etat of 1980 was the separatist activity of illegal Kurdish nationalist organizations, which had accelerated in the 1970s. The military regime launched a number of measures and arrangements against these activities, primarily military and penal ones. Yet it seems that these measures were effective only temporarily, as around the mid-1980s an armed and organized resistance emerged in the region. Some commentators describe this revolt that emerged under the leadership of the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan: Kurdistan Workers’ Party) as the most recent Kurdish revolt in the Republican era. The PKK is still active despite the fact that its leader was caught and put in jail. This revolt had dire consequences in human, economic, social, legal, military and other areas, the most dramatic consequence being the loss of human life. According to Ümit Özdağ (2007), in the conflict between the security forces and the PKK between the years 1984

and 2007, 40.000 people were killed.¹⁸⁴ This approximately quarter-century long conflict between the state forces and the PKK also accrued immense economic expenses. According to some estimates, the damage to Turkey's economy as a result of this conflict equals approximately 100 billion dollars (Özdağ: 2007). Furthermore, and specifically in reference to the purposes of this study, the conflict also impacted the policies that the state has followed in the Kurdish-populated regions since the 1980s. It is in light of such impacts, therefore, that I will briefly review the rebellion to the extent that it relates to the present discussion.

The PKK emerged in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist organization in Ankara. The majority of the members of this organization, which was called the Ankara Democratic Patriotic Association of Higher Education (ADPHAE), were university students who were from the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian regions. The founders of this organization came from lower and middle-class families.¹⁸⁵ Like many other left-wing organizations at that time, its goal was to

¹⁸⁴ These numbers include only the deaths during direct-armed conflict. However, in addition to these, there were also indirect losses. These deaths, referred to as "mystery killings". Amongst these were journalists, businessmen, deputies and leaders of political parties. One of these figures was Musa Anter, a non-secessionist Kurdish nationalist, who advocated a non-violent, democratic solution for the Kurdish question. (For more information about Anter's biography and his role in Kurdish nationalist activities, see Anter, 2000). After his murder in 1992 in Diyarbakir, the then-prime minister Demirel made the following comment: "those killed were not real journalists. They were militants...they kill each other" (McDowall, 2004: 435).

¹⁸⁵ The leader of the organization, Abdullah Öcalan was born in 1947 in Ömerli, a village of Halfeti, in the Urfa province. His family was poor with 7 children. He completed his high school education in Ankara as a boarding student. He started his college education in Ankara in 1971 at the School of Political Science at Ankara University. Due to his participation in a protest march in 1972, he was arrested and sent to jail for seven months. After he was released, he left college and began political-organizational activities (Ballı, 191: 202-203). The other members of the ADPHAE included the following: Cemil Bayık, Kesire Yıldırım, Musa Erdoğan, İsmet Kılıç, Hasan Asgar Gürgöze, Kemal Pir, Kemal Özcan, Baki Karaer and Ali Haydar Kaytan (White: 2000: 158). Öcalan, in the interview with White, depicts the founders of the organization in this manner: "all of them were poor: peasants, not very educated people, students" (White, 2000: 158). McDowall (2004: 420) likewise identifies the class dimension of the organization: "the Apocular were unlike all previous Kurdish groups in Turkey (or elsewhere) in that they were drawn almost exclusively from Turkey's growing proletariat. They were filled with anger at the

bring about a class-based revolution. As Entessar (1992: 94) points out: “their original activities focused primarily on gaining official recognition for Kurdish language and cultural rights”. There were two fundamental components of the political agenda of the organization: Marxism-Leninism¹⁸⁶ and Kurdish nationalism. “Its program is a mixture of Marxism-Leninism and extreme nationalism, with the ultimate goal of establishing a greater independent Kurdistan consisting of the Kurdish areas in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria” (Gunter, 1988: 395).

After the 1980 coup, some of the founders and members of the organization were arrested and imprisoned.¹⁸⁷ The rest of them left Turkey for the countries such as Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. The PKK continued its military and political activities, especially in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, and later returned to Turkey in 1984 having determined to launch an armed struggle. The range of their targets expanded to include economic and military, as well as civilian, targets.¹⁸⁸ “The purpose was to weaken the presence of the state and disrupt its ability to provide basic public services” on the one hand, and to

exploitation of both rural and urban proletariat at the hands of aghas, merchants and the ruling establishment.”

¹⁸⁶ According to White (2000: 136), although the PKK claims to be a Marxist and Leninist, its ideology, strategy and tactics are a mixture of Stalinism and nationalism. The organization consciously fosters a Stalin-like personality cult around its leader, Abdullah Öcalan.”

¹⁸⁷ According to McDowall (2004: 422): “following the 1980 coup 1,790 suspected PKK members were captured, substantially more than from any other single Kurdish group. Several were members of the central committee”.

¹⁸⁸ Of the public targets, which constituted a smaller proportion than the military ones, one can see that schools and teachers were targeted the most. According to a report prepared by IHV, 128 teachers were killed between August 1984 and November 1994. According to the data provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, between 1992 and 1994, over a period of just two years, 5,210 schools were closed down because of general insecurity. 192 of these schools were burnt by the PKK. Schools were targeted because the PKK believed that Ankara was using its national education system to assimilate the Kurds. The PKK had pledged to disrupt all educational activities until the teaching of the Kurdish language was allowed (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 128).

“challenge the state’s ability to maintain security in south-eastern Turkey and thus impose itself as an alternative source of authority” (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 113) on the other.

The targets of the PKK did not only include state and public targets but also the semi-feudal structure in the region and its main proponents, that is, the large landowners. A document published by the organization entitled "The Path of the Kurdistan Revolution" explained its targeting of large landowners by defining the Kurdish-populated regions as a classic colonial entity, where Kurdish feudal landlords and comprador bourgeoisie collaborated with the ruling classes. The organization thus foresaw a two-stage revolution: national and democratic. The document expounds further on this two-stage plan by stating that, “the national phase of the Kurdish revolution would entail the establishment of an independent Kurdistan as a sine qua non for the attainment of Kurdish rights. The democratic phase of the revolution would clear away the contradictions in society left over from the middle ages, [such as] feudal and comprador exploitation, tribalism, religious sectarianism and the slave-like dependence of women” (Cited in Entessar, 1992: 94-95).

However, it seems that the primary purpose of the attack of the PKK on the semi-feudal tribal structure was not to clear it away, but rather to use it to its own advantage. To this end, the organization followed various strategies. The PKK tried to persuade the tribes to sanction its position and ideology by means of political propaganda. When this method proved fruitless, it did not hesitate to

use violence. Indeed, violence was an often-used strategy particularly until the early 1990s.¹⁸⁹

The 1990s brought important changes in the political strategies of the organization. The first change was the attitude of the organization toward dominant social values in the region in general and with regard to religion in particular. Its previous approach, which had viewed religion and religious institutions as an obstacle to its struggle, was gradually replaced with the strategy to instrumentally employ religious values in the political arena. This shift in strategy was also influenced by the government's use of religious feeling against it (the PKK) and the suggestion that the PKK intended to suppress Islam (McDowall, 2004: 435). Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the organization, published books and articles emphasizing the rational and liberal aspects of Islam. Groups faintly associated with the PKK came into being two of which were the Partiya Islami Kurdistan (PIK) and Islami Hareket (McDowall, 2004: 435). The satellite TV stations and other press outlets supported by the PKK broadcast programs and issued publications in line with this new strategy with the aim of increasing social support and in order to become a mass movement. In addition, the rise of a nationalist-Islamist and state-supported organization called Hizbullah also had an impact on the new strategy.¹⁹⁰

Another change occurred with reference to the political demands of the organization. While the organization never gave up its ultimate aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state, there were, nonetheless some conjectural fluctuations in terms of its political aspirations encompassing a

¹⁸⁹ Needless to say, tools of both propaganda and violence were used not only against tribes but also against rival Kurdish groups/organizations.

¹⁹⁰ For more information about Hizbullah, see; Çakır (2001).

broad range which included: an independent state, autonomy, federation, the recognition of Kurdish identity by the state and the guarantee of political, cultural and linguistic rights originating from such recognition. For example, in an interview with a Turkish journalist in 1991, Öcalan stated that although they aspired to establish an independent Kurdistan, under the circumstances of that time, the organization preferred not to separate from Turkey; he noted that: "[Even] if the Turks leave us, we will not [leave them]" (Ballı, 1991: 231-235).¹⁹¹ In November 1991, the journalist İsmet İmset asked Öcalan whether he might accept a federal solution to which the latter replied, 'unquestionably this is what we see' (quoted by McDowall, 2004: 432).

In 1998, Turkey made a very sudden and decisive move in order to put an end to the PKK. Up to that point, there had been a large number of military operations against the organization both within the country and in Northern Iraq, where the camps of the organization were located. However, these operations did not produce the desired result. One important reason for their breakdown was the support that the organization found from neighboring countries, particularly Syria and Iraq. Syria provided shelter especially for Öcalan and other leaders of the organization. In 1998, the Turkish President, Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff warned Syria to stop lending support to the organization. If they chose to continue their assistance, the highest Turkish authorities declared, they would not hesitate to get involved in a war with Syria. Thus, Syria could not bear the pressures from Turkey, which was backed also

¹⁹¹ When responding to the question of whether the obstacle before the establishment of an independent state by separating from Turkey was demographic or economic integration, Öcalan conceded that both were partial factors. And he added that the more important reason is the fact that Kurds are not intellectually and morally prepared for independence. "A people that has not attained independence in its intellectual and ethical respects, that is, in its ideological and moral respects, is a slave, dependent even if they had their own state" (Ballı, 1991: 232).

by US support, and Syria deported Öcalan. Öcalan first went to Russia, then to Greece and then to Italy. Finally he sought refuge in Kenya, where he was eventually caught with the help of the US.

After the arrest of its leader the PKK for a long time abandoned its strategy of armed conflict. The organization has changed its name as KONGRA-GEL. Recently, it has been putting emphasis on political lobbying activities particularly in the Europe-centered international public sphere. Nevertheless, the organization continues to make itself heard with minor attacks on military targets. According to Turkish authorities, its militants currently number around 5000 –1500 being in Turkey and 3500 in Northern Iraq (<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=213302&tarih=18/02/2007>)

The most important development with regard to the PKK in the recent past has been the reformulation of traditional state policies in the Kurdish regions. The state elites now distinguish between two issues: the Kurdish question and terror. Actually earlier, for instance in the 1970s, there was a distinction made between the regional question and the separatist terror question. However, in the '70s this distinction never included the acceptance of the cultural, linguistic and other rights of the Kurds. By contrast, in this new period these rights have been acknowledged and it has been emphasized that they should be taken into consideration independently of the terror question.

5.2.7. The Abandonment of Traditional Policies and the Recognition of Kurdish Ethnic Identity

Starting with the late 1980s, important alterations in the approach of the state to the Kurdish question came into view, this transformation emanating from a number of developments on a global scale on the one hand, and from domestic

social, political and economic changes, on the other. This transformation initially found its expression in the declaration by some state elites that there are different ethnic groups in Turkey and that Kurds are one of these groups. For instance, shortly after his victory in the presidential election of 1989, Turgut Özal stated that: “the people of Turkey come from many different origins as the remnants of an Empire. A theory of a nation is more correct than one of races” (Entessar, 1992: 100). The same year, he took one step further and announced that “one out of six Turks is a Kurd” (Entessar, 1992: 101) and that “he himself had Kurdish blood” (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 113).

The signs of a change in the state’s approach to the Kurdish question were not limited to the President’s statements. Similar views were expressed both in the Parliament and in the program of the coalition government of the CHP-DYP that was established in 1991. “The government programme promised major reforms for eastern Anatolia, which would also address the ‘Kurdish problem’. In December 1991, the deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü called for the recognition of the cultural identity of Turkey’s Kurdish citizens” (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 113). A final example can be cited from March of 1992 when Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel openly announced that he recognized the reality of a Kurdish ethnic presence in Turkey (Kirişçi, 1998: 244).¹⁹²

It is true that the above-mentioned examples simply constituted statements made by upper-level officials and the prohibitive laws remained in effect. The first actual legal change, introduced at the beginning of 1991, was a

¹⁹² Three years before this declaration, Demirel stated the following during the debates taking place regarding the removal of the law that bans the Kurdish language: “are they [the government and the ruling party] going to authorize Kurdish in schools, on the radio and television? Are they going to authorize the use of Kurdish in the administration? It would be misguided, if such is not the case, to exploit this issue in this way” (Entessar, 1992: 102).

partial lift on the ban of the use of the Kurdish language. "In February 1991 a draft bill was introduced into the Assembly to repeal Law 2932 and thereby allow the use of Kurdish except in broadcasts, publications and education" (McDowall, 2004: 431). Other significant regulations were also initiated in various spheres, primarily in terms of cultural rights. A great majority of these regulations would later on be put into effect thanks to the integration process with the EU. I will elaborate on these arrangements in detail in the following pages.

5.2.8. Global Developments and Its Local Reflections

The rupture in the state elites' approach to the Kurdish issue in the late 1980s was affected to a substantial degree by various developments at both the global and the domestic level. In other words, this break from traditional policies is closely tied to national and global conditions and thus should be examined in the light of center-periphery relations within a multidimensional framework which takes such factors into account.

Let me begin with the global developments. The first and most important of the developments in the global arena is, undoubtedly, the downfall of the Soviet Union and the corresponding blow to socialist ideology. This event was interpreted by many commentators as not only the end of the bi-polar world but also the victory of the western liberal capitalist system¹⁹³. While the bi-polar world declined on the one hand, transnational regional organizations started to

¹⁹³ The most provocative arguments in this line were expressed by the American-Japanese scholar Francis Fukuyama (1992), who comes from a conservative/neo-Hegelian tradition. In his article entitled "The End of History?" which he later turned into a book entitled "The End of History and the Last Human Being," Fukuyama interpreted the disintegration of the Soviet-type socialism as indicating the bankruptcy of communism and as the victory of western liberal democracy. According to Fukuyama, liberal democracy won a victory not only against communism but also against all political systems that claim to comprise an alternative.

gain significance, on the other. Some of the transnational organizations created on political, economic, military and other bases which began to acquire importance included NAFTA, the EU, NATO, to name a few. This emergence of transnational organizations was interpreted by some as the crisis or the end of nation-states¹⁹⁴. Paradoxically, however, at the same time many nationalist movements appeared in different parts of the world, some of which were nation-state oriented and some of which had different foci¹⁹⁵. Such a paradox begs for a theoretical debate regarding the relationship between transnational organizations and the nation-state; however that is beyond the scope of this study. A consideration of the specific case of Turkey as a nation-state and the impact of its interaction with the strongest transnational organization, namely the EU, on the broader social and political structure in Turkey in general and on the Kurdish-populated periphery in particular, on the other hand, is in keeping with the present discussion and will therefore be addressed forthwith.

It is possible to evaluate Turkey's attempts at full integration with the EU as a continuation of modernization and westernization efforts that can be traced back to the Tanzimat. Rather than retelling this long history here, I would like to focus on the post-1980 developments, after underlining one point: While the

¹⁹⁴ Actually the debate surrounding nationalism and nation-states is a part of a much wider debate. At the center of the debate are such issues as a clarification of the basic principles found in modernity. An evaluation of such debates here extends beyond the boundaries of this study. In light of this it is possible to say that the following are of relevance to our topic: especially the concept of a collective identity, on a philosophical level, before the debates are carried out for long when the political sphere is about to take the fore, differences in social life begin to have an impact.

¹⁹⁵ While some of these movements were nation-state oriented ethnic nationalism, others were in the form of cultural nationalism defending cultural rights, while still others advocated for the rights of minorities or different groups found within the traditional boundaries of the nation-states. As an extremely violent example for the first category, those in the Balkans can be mentioned, ironically located right next to the EU, which is the strongest transnational organization.

attempts at modernization and westernization preceding the Republic were oriented more toward the project of saving the state in addition to institutional adjustments, the efforts following the proclamation of the Republic were much more comprehensive and their aims were to reconstruct society in a far-reaching manner along western lines.

As I discussed in the previous chapter, in the immediate aftermath of the World War II, the balance of power in the world was reshaped. Throughout this period, significant changes appeared in Turkey's social and economic system as well as in the domain of its foreign policy. These developments also influenced westernization and modernization strategies. The earlier approach based on the principle of reconstructing state and society in line with western-modern values was replaced by a new strategy that emphasized a partial integration with the west, in the form of military and financial cooperation. As a part of this strategy, Turkey became a partner in some organizations and to others she applied for membership, one of which was the European Union. The groundwork for the EU had been laid in 1951. Later on, in 1957, it took a new name, the European Economic Community (EEC). Turkey applied to this community for the first time 1959. Four years after that, in 1963, the Ankara Treaty was signed between Turkey and the EEC. However, this treaty was, to a great extent, economic in nature, as it had a tariff union as its eventual objective, an aim, which was realized in 1996 when a tariff union between Turkey and the EU came into being.

In 1987, Turkey applied to the EU for full membership; however, this application was turned down for various reasons until 1999.¹⁹⁶ At the 1999

¹⁹⁶ For example, in the EU Summit which was held on December 12-13, 1997 in Luxemburg regarding the improvement of the EU-Turkey relations, the following topics were underlined in

Helsinki Summit, the EU granted Turkey the status of a 'candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states' (TESEV, 2006: 1). Full membership required a series of reforms, labeled the Copenhagen Criteria, with which every country willing to become a full member of the EU had to comply.¹⁹⁷ As a part of integration process a comprehensive reform program was carried out.¹⁹⁸ Some of those reforms, particularly those falling under the heading of political criteria, are relevant to the discussion at hand. The most important of these was that which stipulated that the state is required to recognize cultural identities of different ethnic and religious groups and to remove obstacles, which hinder the full realization of these rights.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, these arrangements not only required ensuring the cultural rights of these ethnic and religious groups under constitutional guarantee, but they also obliged the state to promote said rights. As a part of this arrangement, broadcasts in Kurdish, Arabic, Circassian and Bosnian started on the state TV channel, for half an hour a week. Similarly,

the resulting declaration: the prevention of human rights violations in Turkey, solving the Kurdish question by democratic means, the continuation of political and economic reforms, the establishment of good and stable relations with Greece, and the support of negotiations under the supervision of the UN in order to find a solution for the Cyprus question.

¹⁹⁷ These criteria were determined in the Copenhagen Summit in 1993; the main priority areas identified for each Candidate State relate to its ability to take on the obligations of meeting the Copenhagen criteria which state that membership requires. These criteria can be summarized here as follows: The first one is the political criteria that the candidate State has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. The existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union is the second group of criteria. The last category dealt with the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (Birden, 2002: 27).

¹⁹⁸ Nine adaptations of the law package were presented. These radical reforms included the areas of penal and civil codes, commerce, and law. The most important reforms were the following: the removal of capital punishment, the democratization and civilization of the political sphere, freedom of thought and expression, and the removal of barriers placed before labor unions and civil organizations.

¹⁹⁹ Actually, with a regulation in 1991, the use of and publication in languages other than Turkish was made possible. Yet, this regulation was only limited with the lift of the ban.

permission was given for broadcasts to be conducted in languages other than Turkish on private TV channels and radio stations,²⁰⁰ and also for the opening of private classes to teach these languages.²⁰¹ Broadcasting on state TV in a language other than Turkish, especially in Kurdish, was a momentous development in the modern history of Turkey²⁰², precisely because, until this moment, the official view was that there was no such language as Kurdish and that Kurdish was a local dialect that is a mixture of Persian, Arabic and Turkish.

The regulations regarding the exercise of cultural rights were not limited to the area of linguistics. The law regulating practices of naming children was also annulled. The relevant law, numbered 1587, read as follows: “the names which contradict the national culture, morality and traditions and insult the public cannot be legally registered on birth certificates” (McDowall, 2004: 427). As a result of these legal reforms, this ban was lifted and families were left free to name their children as they please.

This acceleration of Turkey’s integration with the capitalist world system in general and with the EU in particular also influenced the relations between the state and society and the center and periphery both in the newfound recognition of the cultural, political and social rights of peripheries and in the

²⁰⁰ Though permission was given to private radio and television for such broadcasts, the length of the broadcast and its contents were subject to limitations and were inspected by the High Committee on Radio and Television.

²⁰¹ Private Kurdish courses were opened in the Region and some western regions where the Kurdish population was large. The following are the provinces and the respective dates in which Kurdish courses were opened: Adana (18.05.2004), Batman (10.12.2004), Diyarbakır (29.07.2004), İstanbul (23.08.2004), Mardin Kızıltepe (15.10.2004) ve Şanlıurfa (04.12.2004). Of these, the courses in Adana and Batman were closed by the founders due to low enrollment in March and July of 2005 respectively.

²⁰² Actually, communication tools owned by the state were broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. But permission was given not for broadcasting in languages used by other ethnic or linguistic groups in Turkey but rather for the use of Western languages such as English, French and German.

removal of barriers to the realization of these rights. Peripheries tried to strengthen their positions by making use of the opportunities with which this whole process provided them. The most well-known channel for securing their rights was European Court of Human Rights. The issues that were once known as domestic problems of Turkey and that were subject only to the legal, political, and economic authority of the Turkish nation-state now went beyond national borders. Therefore, this process provided the periphery with new opportunities, as it challenged the legal, political and economic authority of the center.

The US-led international intervention in Iraq was another important external development that concerned Turkey directly.²⁰³ Although it was not amongst the declared purposes of the intervention, a de facto Kurdish state was established in Northern Iraq²⁰⁴. Turkey became very anxious about the existence of a federal Kurdish state close to her borders, especially given its proximity to the area where most of Turkey's Kurdish citizens were living, for two distinct reasons.²⁰⁵ First, Turkey feared that it might accelerate the rise of

²⁰³ To end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait was the aim of the first intervention, which occurred in 1991. The declared aim of the second one, which was carried out thirteen years later, was as follows: to destruct the chemical and biological weapons that were claimed that Iraq had and also to end the Saddam Hussein's rule.

²⁰⁴ The only element missing which would qualify the Kurdish region in Iraq as a state is independence. Other than the issue of independence, it possesses many instruments and institutions necessary for a state, such as a flag, security forces, educational institutions where the language of instruction is Kurdish, a parliament etc.

²⁰⁵ When coming to 2007, Turkey's attitude toward the establishment of a federation in Northern Iraq has tended to become tougher. Moreover, this hard attitude was reinforced when the central government in Iraq appeared to be willing to compromise. This situation crystallized at the beginning of 2007 due to a short polemic between the government directed by the liberal right wing AKP party and the military chief of staff and the president. A veiled warning was issued by the chief of staff with regard to the government's plan to establish democratic relations with the local Kurdish government authorities in Northern Iraq and President of Iraq, who has Kurdish roots, for the purpose of eliminating the presence of the PKK in Northern Iraq. The chief of staff accused the Kurdish authorities in Northern Iraq with supporting the PKK and announced that he would not meet with them. President Sezer who was clearly involved in the debate persistently avoided inviting the Iraqi President Talabani, who had Kurdish roots, to

separatist nationalist ideas among the Kurds of Turkey.²⁰⁶ Second, Turkey was concerned about the security threat that the PKK presented from Northern Iraq, despite the fact that its leader was caught and sent to jail in 1999, because most of the PKK militants have been taking refuge in Northern Iraq. Turkey has thus been trying to prevent a potential declaration of independence in Northern Iraq while simultaneously working to quell the nationalist-separatist influences that developments in Iraq might raise among her own Kurdish citizens. The developments in Iraq have been influential not only for state policies, but also for the Kurds in Turkey. Some Kurds from Turkey, though limited in number, have gone to Northern Iraq to receive a university education.

Thus the developments in the global arena during this period, particularly the downfall of the Soviet Union, the corresponding rise in importance of transnational organizations, most specifically the EU, and the US invasion of Iraq, all had important ramifications for the status of the periphery in Turkey. However, it was not global developments alone, but also changes within Turkey itself, which had a drastic impact on center-periphery relations.

5.2.9. Turkish Society in the post-1980 Period

On the domestic front, changes in the economic sphere, as well as those in different realms of social life as documented by various development indicators, would significantly impact center-periphery relations during this period. Of great importance in this regard was the alteration in the economic structure. In

Turkey. When this tendency toward toughness at the level of the chief of staff and the president became obvious it was justified by the support found by the PKK in Northern Iraq.

²⁰⁶ Turkey's concern stemmed from its historical experiences. In 1960s, the Kurdish nationalist movement, the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Mustafa Barzani in Iraq, influenced the Kurds of Turkey and received significant support, particularly among the Kurdish notables in Turkey.

spite of industrialization, which came about as a result of the ISI strategies after the 1960s, Turkey was still an agricultural country by 1980. 58 percent of the whole population was employed in agriculture (DIE, 2003: 18-19) and the share of agriculture in GNDP was 25 percent, while that of industry was 18 percent (Owen and Pamuk, 2002: 336). As I will discuss in detail in the following pages, after 1980, the Turkish economy experienced a rapid process of industrialization on the one hand and an increasing integration with the capitalist world system, on the other. By 2000, the share of industry in GNDP increased to 28.4 percent, while that of agriculture declined to 13.4 percent (DPT: 2003). The process of mechanization and commercialization in agriculture, which began with the 1950s, increasingly continued in the post-1980 era. An illustration of this may be seen in the dramatic increase in the number of tractors: while the number of tractors in 1980 was 436,000, it more than doubled in 2001, reaching 948,000 (DIE, 2003: 205). The shift in economy also changed the geographical distribution of the population. While 44 percent of the population lived in urban areas in 1980, this proportion went up to 65 percent by 2000 (DIE, 2003: 7).

There have also been notable developments in education, which is understood to be the indicator of social progress and development. The educational composition of the population and the progress observed in the establishment of educational facilities are noteworthy in many respects. In 2000, the literacy rates for 6 years of age and over reached 87 percent (DIE: 2003). In the academic year of 2005-2006, the ratio of those receiving schooling reached 57 percent and 90 percent, in secondary and primary education, respectively (http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab_id

=102). Compared to figures in 1980, there has been a noteworthy progress in college education in terms of the number of colleges, the number of students enrolled in colleges and the total number of university graduates. In 1980, there were 13 universities in Turkey, and a majority of these universities were in the big cities. The number of students enrolled in these universities totaled 237.369 (DIE, 2003: 66). In 2006, however, the number of universities went up to 93 (68 of these are public, 25 are private), and the number of students enrolled in these universities rose approximately ten-fold, that is, enrollment reached 2.342.898. (http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=104). In such an immense shift, one should note the fact that both the public and private sectors had started to make investments in education and therefore both played an important role in this transformation.

Despite the significance of the changes in education, however, it would not be an exaggeration to state that even more significant was the progress seen in the area of communication. Indeed, this development parallels what has been characterized as a revolution in communication on a global scale, which has been defined by some commentators as the age of communication. The channels and tools of communication not only increased but also acquired an immense speed and diversity. While conventional communication instruments such as TV and radio started to reach many more people due in particular to the investments of the private sector, new communication technologies such as satellite television, the Internet and mobile phones also abounded. Particularly, new technologies are noteworthy in that they have provided their users with the possibility of receiving information from various sources. Perhaps more importantly, they also contributed to the development of

citizenship consciousness and thus, encouraged people to exercise their rights. More important still was the challenge such communication technology posed to the geographical and cultural borders of the nation-state. In short, Turkish society has undergone an outstanding process of change since the 1980s.

All these developments brought about the redefinition of modern states in general, and the economic, social, legal and cultural roles and functions of nation-states in particular. The most significant impact of this process was the developments concerning the relations between state and society, state and the individual, and the center and the periphery. The legal regulations initiated as a part of the EU membership process on the one hand, changes in various aspects of social life on the other, led to a new stage in regards to the relations between state and society, this new stage favoring the latter. In this respect, different social segments, which had been repressed by the project of creating a homogeneous society on the basis of centralist, elitist, secularist, and nationalist principles and which had not had the opportunity to express themselves, came forward to the public sphere. Nurdan Gürbilek defines this process as the 'return of the repressed,' and describes this situation as follows:

The 1980s were, on the one hand, the period of strictest pressure that was lived in this society, it was a period in which the state violence made itself felt in the most apparent way, on the other hand, it was a period which brought along cultural pluralization and the release of cultural identities that have been imprisoned within totalizing ideologies. The cultural demands that were previously able to exist solely within the confines of political projects and that were subject to the language of these projects found the possibility of self-expression only in the 1980s. However different dynamics of development they have had, constituting their own discourses, existing with their own names in the public opinion, and seeking for their own popular language have been possible for Kurds, women and homosexuals only in this period. In short, it was the return of a kind of life that can be called "peripheral", the lives that have been existing up until today

in modern cultural identities only by being repressed and the lives that have subjected themselves to those identities" (Gürbilek, 2001: 102-103).

In short, the most important characteristic of the post-1980 conditions was the resistance that the peripheries demonstrated against the political and cultural codes of the center. In this regard, the strongest resistance came from the two groups that have remained outside the ethno-secular boundaries of the center, namely Kurds and Islamists. These two groups demanded more than mere recognition; they wanted the constitutive paradigms of the center to be redefined. In other words, they claimed a position in and right to the center. This was a new stage in the confrontation between the center and periphery.

5.3. The Limits of Political Sphere

The political sphere experienced the most radical intervention from the military in September 1980, when the military assumed political rule. The military not only closed down political parties and sent their ruling cadres to jail, but also introduced determining principles that would re-draw the boundaries of the political sphere in Turkey for the next 20 years. One of the most vital ways in which said boundaries were redefined was by the introduction of the Law on Political Parties,²⁰⁷ a law which also helped to make the party closures

²⁰⁷ Article 69 of the Constitution reads as follows: "The closing down of political parties is decided by the Constitutional Court upon the suit opened by the Chief Republican Prosecutor of the Supreme Court." On the basis of these regulations, the Constitutional Court closed down many political parties. The RP [Welfare Party] was one such party, which was closed in this fashion. RP was the first party in the 1995 elections in that it received the highest percentage of the total votes, (21.4 percent) and it was the big partner in the coalition government that ruled the country between 1996 and 1997. Founded as a continuation of this party, the Fazilet Partisi [Virtue Party], which ranked as the third party in the 1999 election by receiving 15.4 percent of the votes, was also closed down. A number of pro-Kurdish parties were also closed down, such as HEP, ÖZDEP, DEP, HADEP. "In February (1999) the pro-Kurdish Democratic Mass Party was closed. The KDP, led by Şerafettin Elçi, had called for political, civil and cultural

mentioned above much easier. The pre-existing law that banned the establishment of a political party based on ethnicity, class or religion was preserved in an even stricter form. The newly introduced law, which sees the foundation of parties or political activities with reference to religion, ethnicity and class as a threat to national unity, in a sense reflects the corporatist understanding of the single-party era.

Similarly, the perception of a homogeneous society based on language and culture propagated during the single-party period continued to determine the political sphere. For example, Article 89 of the Constitution reads as follows: "No political party may concern itself with the defense, development, or diffusion of any non-Turkish language or culture; nor may they seek to create minorities within our frontiers or to destroy our national unity" (Entessar, 1992: 96). In a similar vein, with the change in the Law (numbered 2839) on the election of deputies, double threshold system of proportional representation was introduced²⁰⁸ (DIE, 2004: 5).

In short, the boundary of the political sphere was redrawn; political representation was restricted by significant obstacles, and by means of similar instruments. The control of the center over the political sphere was increased by regulations in the electoral system as well as by the law on political parties. On the other hand, as will be seen below, this period was also a time in which political mobilization and participation in the political system increased. How did

rights *within* the Republic and had never suggested secession. Nevertheless it and its leader were accused of making 'separatist' propaganda" (McDowall, 2004: 442).

²⁰⁸ According to this electoral system, the number of the valid votes (from that specific electoral region) of the political parties and independent candidates that pass the national threshold, (including the votes that are received at the custom gates) are divided first into one, then two... until it reaches the number of the deputies that will represent that electoral region. According to the size, the [number of the] deputies in the electoral region will be divided among the political parties and independent candidates (DIE, 2004: IX). Although it underwent some changes in 1987 and 1995, this electoral law is still in effect.

this situation manifest itself in the political patterns in the region? How have political preferences, political participation and representation been affected? Within the context of these questions, I would like to discuss the dynamics of the participation in the national political system and the representation of the region in the post-1980 era.

5.3.1. Political Participation in the Kurdish Populated Areas

In 1983, the multi-party political system resumed with an election in which those candidates and political parties given permission by the military could participate. From 1983 until 2002, there were a total of six general elections. The rates of participation in these elections, the distribution of votes by political parties and the voting behavior provide important data regarding political tendencies and preferences in the region, as will be discussed below.

Table 5.1 Number and percentage of votes received by political parties and independents participating in the elections held between 1983 and 2002²⁰⁹

Table on Number and Percentage of Votes Received by Political Parties and Independents Participating in the Elections Held between 1983 and 2002																		
		Number of registered voters	Number of actual voters and rate	Number of valid ballots cast	Political Parties													
					RP/FP/SP	AKP	DYP	ANAP	DSP	CHP	HADEP/ DEHAP	MCP/ MHP	BBP	SHP	HP	MDP	IND.	Others
1983	Turkey	19 767 366	18 238 362	17 351 510	7 833 148										5 285 804	4 036 970	195 588	
			92.3%		45.1%										30.5%	23.3%	1.1%	
	Region	1 304 312	1 135 264	10 632 78	359 078										324 174	375 410	4 616	
			87.0%		33.8%										30.5%	35.3%	0.4%	
1987	Turkey	26 376 926	24 603 541	23 971 629	1 717 425		4 587 062	8 704 335	2 044 576			701 538		5 931 000			89 421	196 272
			93.3%		7.2%		19.1%	36.3%	8.5%			2.9%		24.8%			0.4%	0.8%
	Region	1837234	1695320	1 622 532	279 185		281 743	486 125	130 412			19 221		339 626			73 779	12 441
			92.3%		17.2%		17.4%	30%	8%			1.2%		20.9%			4.5%	0.8%
1991	Turkey	2 9979 123	25 157 089	24 416 666	4 121 355		6 600 726	5 862 623	2 624 301					5 066 571			32 721	108 369
			83.9%		16.9%		27.0%	24.0%	10.8%					20.8%			0.1%	0.4%
	Region	2 162 694	1 750 708	1 686 884	291 671		369 833	360 852	33 323					603 613			18 688	8 904
			81%		17.3%		21.9%	21.4%	2%					35.8%			1.1%	0.5%
1995	Turkey	34 155 981	29 101 469	28 126 993	6 012 450		5 396 009	5 527 288	4 118 025	3 011 076	1 171 623	2 301 343					133 895	455 284
			85.2%		21.4%		19.2%	19.6%	14.6%	10.7%	4.2%	8.2%					0.5%	1.6%
	Region	2 365 412	1 883 817	1 808 895	435 228		290 153	298 401	38 709	66 425	468 280	80 679					77 494	53 526
			80%		24.1%		16%	16.5%	2.1%	3.7%	25.9%	4.5%					4.3%	3.0%
1999	Turkey	37 495 217	32 656 070	31 184 496	4 805 381		3 745 417	4 122 929	6 919 670	2 716 094	1 482 196	5 606 583	456 353				270 265	1 059 608
			87.1%		15.4%		12.0%	13.2%	22.2%	8.7%	4.7%	18.0%	1.5%				0.9%	3.4%
	Region	2 746 445	2 280 321	2 142 236	340 146		336 645	266 840	108 578	100 747	642 186	122 650	31 292				109 355	83254
			83.0%		15.9%		15.7%	12.5%	5.1%	4.7%	30.0%	5.7%	1.5%				5.1%	3.9%
2002	Turkey	41 407 027	32 768 161	31 528 783	785 489	10 808 229	3 008 942	1 618 465	384 009	6 113 352	1 960 660	2 635 787	322 093				314 251	3 577 506
			79.1%		2.5%	34.3%	9.5%	5.1%	1.2%	19.4%	6.2%	8.4%	1%				1%	11.3%
	Region	3 105 580	2 341 200	2 260 508	78 421	430 384	209 208	155 751	20 195	180 201	858 157	100 614	16 513				133 533	77531
			75.4%		3.5%	19%	9.3%	6.9%	0.9%	8%	38%	4.5%	0.7%				5.9%	3.4%

²⁰⁹ RP (Welfare Party), FP (Virtue Party), SP (Felicity Party), AKP (Justice and Development Party), CHP (Republican People's Party), DSP (Democratic Left Party), DYP (True Path Party), ANAP (Motherland Party), HADEP (People's Democracy Party), DEHAP (Democratic People's Party), MCP (Nationalist Work Party), MHP (Nationalist Action Party), BBP (Great Union Party), SHP (Social Democrat Populist Party), HP (Populist Party), MDP (Nationalist Democracy Party). **Others: in 1987:** IDP (Reformist Democracy Party). **1991:** SP (Socialist Party). **1995:** İP (Labor Party), MP (Nation Party), YDH (New Democracy Movement), YDP (Rebirth Party), YP (New Party). **1999:** İP (Labor Party), MP (Nation Party), LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), ÖDP (Freedom and Solidarity Party), BP (Peace Party), DP (Democrat Party), DBP (Democracy and Peace Party), DTP (Democratic Turkey Party), DEPAR (Changing Turkey Party), EMEP (Labor Party), SİP (Socialist Rule Party), YDP (Rebirth Party). **2002:** MP (Nation Party), LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), BTP (Independent Turkey Party), ÖDP (Freedom and Solidarity Party), TKP (Turkey Communist Party), İP (Labor Party), YTP (New Turkey Party), YP (Country party), GP (Young Party). **Source: DİE, 2004.**

First of all, the participation rate in the national elections, compared to the previous period, saw an outstanding increase. While the rate of participation in the period between 1960 and 1980 was around 70 percent, in 1980s and after the rate of participation always remained above 80 percent, except for the elections held in 2002 see Table 5.1. This situation cannot be seen merely as the politicization of the masses; it also reveals a strong will to integrate into the national political life. As Kirişçi and Winrow (1997: 151) suggest: “the fact that the participation in elections in the Kurdish-populated areas have rarely fallen below the average for the rest of Turkey suggests that the Kurds largely remain integrated in the national political life”.

It is interesting to note that, while the rate of participation increased, the appeal of the center parties gradually diminished. In other words, the support for and confidence in mainstream political parties gradually disappeared. For instance, in the last elections held in 2002, the portion of the vote that went to four center-political parties, namely ANAP (Motherland Party), DYP (True Path Party), DSP (Democratic Left Party) and CHP (Republican People’s Party), which are supposed to represent the center-right and center-left, was less than 25 percent. This was partly a result of the political fragmentation and volatility of the party system that emerged especially after the 1990s.

Other trends which may be identified in the election results include the notable popularity of both the religious and nationalist parties. The high level of support received by the pro-Islamic parties emphasizes that religion continued to influence voting behavior in the region. More surprising, however, and more significant was the sizable increase in the votes for the ultra nationalist party (the MHP), a result which leads one to question if this constitutes a rise in

Turkish nationalism in the region²¹⁰. Although the votes that this party received were below the national average, it is almost twice as many votes as it received in the 1970s²¹¹. For instance, in the 1977 elections when this party had previously received its highest proportion of votes, it got 2.5 percent of the votes. By contrast, in the three elections that were held after 1995, it received 4.5 percent, 5.7 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively²¹². It is possible to explain this support given to ultra-nationalist parties in two ways: First, Kurdish nationalism, which was revived in this period, led to the rise of *counter or reactionary nationalism* among the Turkish population. Second, it could be explained by the preferences of the tribal elements that make use of Turkish nationalism as a survival strategy in order to maintain their social and economic privileges.

Another important transition seen in the election results of this period is the relatively lower portion of votes cast for independent candidates, an indication that the primordial ties' and tribal affiliations' power to mobilize the masses was slipping. In other words, group affiliation was replaced by political party affiliation. While the percentage of independent votes is still much above the average of Turkey, compared to independent votes received in the

²¹⁰ Indeed, a great majority of the political parties in Turkey have a nationalist agenda, broadly speaking. Moreover, the Law on Political Parties imposes this condition as a principle. Thus, here, I do not mean this kind of nationalism. The parties that I refer to are those that, more than having such a general nationalist discourse in their programs, have an ultra-nationalist agenda and political discourse. In this sense, the political party, which I draw a specific attention to, is the oldest and the most popular representative of ultra nationalism in modern Turkish political life, namely the MHP.

²¹¹ In fact, it is only after the 1990s that this party started to become stronger. For instance, the proportion of the votes that the MÇP (the predecessor of the MHP) got in the 1987 elections was 2.9 percent and 1.2 percent, in Turkey and in the region respectively. This proportion is much less than that in 1977. MÇP formed a coalition with the pro-Islamist RP and entered the 1991 elections. The party then changed its name to the MHP and entered the 1995 elections receiving 8.2 percent of the vote in Turkey in general and 4.5 percent in the region.

²¹² When one adds the votes that other ultra nationalist parties such as the BBP (Great Union Party), the İP (Labor Party) and the BTP (Independent Turkey Party) to these votes, this proportion increases even more.

elections held after 1965, it decreased sharply in this period. For example, in the previous period (1950-1980) the peak of independent votes was in the 1977 elections and it was 25 percent; however, in the post-1980 period, the highest proportion of independent votes was seen in the 2002 elections, which was six percent. This means more than a four-fold decline. The main reason behind the decrease of independent votes, it seems, is that parties emerged which gained the confidence that they would advocate the social and political demands of the region at the institutional political level.

As the above discussion indicates, the political sphere in the region grew in positive ways during this period in the sense that an increase in political participation signified a greater number were utilizing their opportunities and fulfilling their duties as citizens. However, the post-1980 period also revealed troubling limitations in political representation at both the national and regional levels with regard to the principle of the national threshold. To illustrate, although the DEHAP received 38 percent of the votes in the region in the 2002 election, the party was not represented in the Assembly as it did not reach the national threshold. However, the AKP, which received half of the number of votes (19 percent), received 45 of a total of 65 seats from the region²¹³.

5.3.2. Social Characteristics of the Deputies of the Region

In the six general elections from 1983 until 2002 a total of 330 deputies were elected for Grand National Assembly. A discussion of these deputies' educational characteristics follows based on Table 5.2 below.

²¹³ The CHP, which received only eight percent of the votes in the region, got 15 of the remaining 20 seats, while independent candidates received the remaining 5 seats.

Table 5.2 The Deputies of the Region by Educational Level, 1983-2002

Assembly		University	Military School	High School	Secondary School	Primary School	Total
17 [1983]	Count %	27 65.9	1 2.4	4 9.8	2 4.9	7 17.1	41 100.0
18 [1987]	Count %	33 67.3		5 10.2	4 8.2	7 14.3	49 100.0
19 [1991]	Count %	36 70.6		8 15.7	2 3.9	5 9.8	51 100.0
20 [1995]	Count %	40 65.6		14 23.0	4 6.6	3 4.9	61 100.0
21 [1999]	Count %	45 69.2		11 16.9	6 9.2	3 4.6	65 100.0
22 [2002]	Count %	48 73.0		11 17.5	5 7.9	1 1.6	63 100.0
Total	Count %	229 68.8	1 0.3	53 16.1	23 7.0	26 7.9	332 100.0

Allow me to begin the discussion of these educational characteristics with a first look at the general distribution and then at the changes, if there are any, which took place during this period. In aggregate, university graduates constitute the largest group with a percentage of 68.8. High school graduates follow with a percentage of 16.1. The following two categories are those of primary and secondary school graduates, with a proportion of 7.9 percent and 7 percent, respectively. With the passage of time, there have been important changes in the proportion of the representation of these groups. The number of university graduates increased consistently. Although their proportion decreased in 1995, numerically they continued to increase. On the other hand, the proportion of the deputies with a primary school education consistently declined: while it was 17.1 percent in 1983, in 2002, it was 1.6 percent. Unlike the previous two categories, the proportion of secondary and high school graduates followed an inconsistent pattern.

So, to reiterate, there has been a significant shift in the educational levels of deputies in the post-1980 period. In the period between the years 1950 and 1980, the percentages of university graduates, high, secondary and primary school graduates were as follows: 54.9, 11.6, 15.6 and 10.1 percent respectively. The percentages of these categories for the post-1980 period are as follows: 68.8, 16.1, 7 and 7.9, respectively. In order to view this change more clearly, let me compare the last assembly of the previous period and the first of the post-1980 period. While, in 1977, the proportion of university graduates was 42.9 percent and that of primary school graduates was 23.8 percent; they were 65.9 percent and 17.1 percent, respectively.

Undoubtedly, the progress in educational facilities and the change in the educational composition of the population in the region impacted this shift. For instance, as can be seen from the Table 5.3, the educational composition of the population at and above the age of 25 changed significantly in the period between 1980 and 2000, despite the fact that the population increased two-fold. While the proportion of the university graduates increased three-fold, that of high school graduates went up more than three-fold and that of primary school graduates increased approximately two-fold.

Table 5.3 Educational composition of population 25 years of age and over, 1980-2000 (%)

Year	Total population	Illiterate	No school completed	Primary School	Junior high school or vocational school at junior high school level	High school or vocational school at high school level	Higher Education
1980	1 295 315	70.0	7.6	15.9	2.4	2.7	1.4
1990	1 805 730	55.9	5.8	27.1	3.5	5.3	2.4
2000	2 444 077	42.8	7.8	30.0	5.5	9.6	4.2

Source; DIE, 2002.

Similarly, the educational background of deputies shows that there is a positive relationship between political representation and education level. A great majority (68.8 percent) of the deputies that were elected to represent the region are university graduates. If one includes those with a high school education, this proportion reaches 85 percent. On the other hand, the proportion of deputies with primary and secondary education is around 15 percent.

The educational composition of deputies of this period resembles those in the single-party era. As was discussed in the third chapter, the political sphere in the single-party period was characterized by centralist and elitist characteristics to a great extent thus promoting a strong correlation between political representation and being well-educated. However, in the single-party period, this was the result of the political attitudes of centralism and elitism dominant at the time and did not reflect the educational composition of the region. Contrary to this, the picture that emerges in the post-1980 period originates from local dynamics as is supported by the changes that appeared in the educational level of population 25 years of age and over discussed above.

5.4. Reemergence of Kurdish Nationalism

So far, I have discussed the policies that were employed in the region in the post-1980 period. I have also tried to examine both national and global developments and their corresponding ramifications for Turkish law and society. Now, I would like to elaborate on the consequences of the process of modernization in general, and those of the policies in particular. Let me begin by underlining two points. First of all, according to many of the criteria used in

development indices, the region is still underdeveloped in many regards and there is still a significant developmental gulf between the developed regions in Turkey and the region under consideration. For instance, according to a study entitled “A Research on the Ranking of Provinces and Regions according to their Socio-Economic Development”²¹⁴, which was published by the State Planning Organization in 2003, 11 of the 16 provinces in the category of the least developed provinces are the ones that are examined in this study (Dinçer, Özaslan and Kavasoğlu: 2003: 71).

Secondly, although it includes the least developed provinces of Turkey according to development indices, there have been important changes in the social, economic and political structure of the region after 1980. It is possible to compare these changes with the ones brought about by the reforms that were initiated in the 1850s in the context of centralization policies. The most outstanding difference was that while the previous reforms had been brought about by the intervention of the center, the recent ones were a result of internal and global dynamics. It may also be possible to compare these changes to those that the Turkish society underwent in the 1960s.

In the post-1980 period the developments in the region were so drastic as to require a brief discussion. Allow me to start a discussion of the transformations in the post-1980 period with a look at socio-economic indices, including the changes in population, literacy and educational composition, the economic structure, the distribution of land, the mechanization of agriculture and the penetration of capitalism. In 1980, the population of the region was approximately 4.330.000. In 2000, however, it went up to 7.417.000. Except for

²¹⁴ In this research, 58 figures included in the “social and economic categories” have been used (Dinçer, Özaslan and Kavasoğlu, 2003: 21).

the period between 1990 and 1995, when forced migration was intensive,²¹⁵ one can see that there was a population increase of approximately one hundred percent. The total fertility rate also confirms a high population rise. To illustrate, in 1980, while the TFR for Turkey was 3.4 percent, it was between the 4.2 and 6.0 percent for the region. In 2000, while the average TFR of Turkey decreased to 2.5 percent, it was between 3.6 and 7.1 percent for the provinces in the region, except for Tunceli, where it was 1.9 percent. Both the infant mortality rate (IMR) and the child mortality rate (CMR) saw outstanding changes further contributing to the growing population. In 1980, the IMR was between 103 and 160 per thousand; whereas in 2000 it went down to between 36 and 63 per thousand. The CMR decreased from 34-65 per thousand to 6-15 per thousand. Compared to the average of Turkey in general, the regional rates of the IMR and CMR are still extremely high. Nevertheless, the change that was seen in throughout the 20-year period is immense.

The change in literacy and educational composition of the population is noteworthy also in several respects. Let me start with the most fundamental indicator, namely literacy rate. While the literacy rate was 39.4 percent for the population 6 years of age and over in 1980, by 2000 it increased to 69.5 percent (DIE: 2002). School enrollment likewise climbed during this time. While the number of students enrolled at primary schools was 538.965 in 1980 (DIE: 1983b and 1983c), this number went up to 1.654.076 in 2005²¹⁶. During the same period, the number of students enrolled in high schools and vocational

²¹⁵ For instance, according to the research of the HUNEE, the amount of the migration was between 950.000 and 1.200.000 between 1990-1995. During the same period, the out migration from the region was 936.000,

²¹⁶ A change was introduced in the law on primary education in 1997 and primary and secondary education were united and the period of primary education was extended to 8 years. The numbers presented here include the number of students attending primary and secondary schools in 1980.

schools increased approximately four-fold, that is, from 47.584 (DIE: 1983c and DIE: 1983d) to 180.139 (DIE: 1983c and DIE: 1983d). In 2000, the rate of schooling for primary education was the lowest in Bitlis with the rate of 73.5 percent and the highest in Tunceli with the rate 110.1 percent. In secondary and vocational education, on the other hand, the proportion of schooling is around one sixth of the average of Turkey in some provinces of the region. In 2000, while the schooling ratio of secondary education in Turkey was 44 percent (http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=102), it ranged from 11.4 (Şırnak) to 44.3 (Tunceli) percent for the region. The ratio for vocational education is much more striking. While the average of Turkey is 20.5 percent, it is at its lowest in Diyarbakir and Batman by the rate of 3.3 percent, and at its highest in Tunceli by the proportion of 33.6 percent (Dinçer, Özaslan and Kavasoğlu: 2003).

One can view similar trends in higher education. The rate of university graduates in the region (population 25 years of age and over) is 1.4 percent in 1980. This rate increased threefold in 20 years and in the year of 2000, it went up to 4.2 percent (DIE: 2002). However, one can see that the development of universities remained quite insignificant. In this regard, in 2007, only 3 of the 93 universities in the entire country were located in the region (<http://www.yok.gov.tr/istatistikler/istatistikler.htm>).

From the above-presented information regarding the rates of literacy and education, some important points come to the fore. First and foremost, there are significant differences between primary and higher educational levels when compared to the average of the country. Although the schooling ratio in primary education is below the average of Turkey, the difference between the two is not

that big. It is possible even to see that the rates in four provinces are above the rate of Turkey in general. Yet the schooling ratio in the high schools is below the average of Turkey in all provinces of the region except for Tunceli.

This situation is, to a large extent, due to the fact that primary education is obligatory. Nevertheless, it is also possible to argue that in the educational policies pursued in the region, the priority has been given to primary education. This observation is confirmed by the changes that occurred in the number of teachers that were employed in primary, high and vocational schools. While the number of teachers employed in primary schools in the academic year of 1980-1981 was 18.975 (DIE: 1983b and DIE: 1983c), it increased more than two-fold and by the academic year of 2005-2006 it had risen to 41.310. On the other hand, the number of teachers in high schools decreased from 2.218 to 1.782 and in vocational schools it went down from 1.327 to 996 over the same period. At this point, one should underline the fact that the proportion of rise in the number of students in high and vocational schools was higher than that of primary schools. The number of students per teacher is even more remarkable. As of the academic year of 2005-2006, while there was one teacher for 40 students in primary schools; in high schools there was one teacher for 80 students. For the average of Turkey, these numbers are 27 and 25, respectively.

There were also important developments in the economic structure of the region, that is, in the mode of production, relations of production and means of production that were dominant in the region. Agriculture continued to be the main sector for employment and of the GRDP. For instance, as of 2000, 67.4 percent of the total employment and 37 percent of the GRDP were in

agriculture. For the country in general, these rates were 47.8 and 13.4 percent, respectively (DIE, 2003 and DPT, 2003). Nevertheless, both the number of agricultural holdings and total amount of arable land saw significant changes. For instance, while the amount of arable land was 53.593.633 decare in 1991, it went down to 31.843.559 decare in 2001. In the same period, the number of agricultural holdings decreased significantly, falling from 419.428 to 354.942 between 1991 and 2001 (DIE: 1991 and 2001, the results of agricultural census). The evacuation of villages for security reasons had an important role in the shrinkage of the agricultural lands and holdings. As I pointed out earlier, more than 3.000 villages and hamlets, where the overwhelming majority was engaged in agriculture, were evacuated and the people in the locations had to migrate to towns. The new agricultural policies that were initiated in the process of the integration with the EU also accelerated the shrinkage in agriculture²¹⁷. According to these new agricultural policies, the state would stop buying and supporting some of the agricultural products that were produced in the region, the most important of which was tobacco.

The change in the amount of lands that holdings managed and in the distribution of agricultural lands is also impressive. For instance, in 1980, the holdings that had less than 50 decares, constituted 56 percent of the total agricultural holdings and the land that these holdings managed was 8.7 percent of the entirety of arable lands. On the other hand, the holdings that had more than 1000 decares constituted 0.3 percent of the total agricultural holdings and the land that these holdings managed were 11.5 percent of the whole arable lands. This picture changed in 2001 in the following manner: while the rate of

²¹⁷ For the main outlines of the new agricultural policies that were put in effect in the EU integration process, see Bagater and Yıldırım (2002).

the holdings that had less than 50 decares of land decreased to 49.5 percent, the rate of the land that they ran increased to 10.4 percent. The change in the rate of holdings that had more than 1000 decares was also parallel to this. Thus, while the rate of these holdings amongst the total holdings increased two-fold, the proportional increase of the land that they control remained at the level of 35 per cent. It is particularly striking to observe the decrease in the number of holdings that had more than 5000 decares of land. According to the agricultural census in 1991, 405 of the 441 holdings in the whole country that had more than 5000 decares of land were located in the region. At this point, I should note that the distribution of these holdings in the region was not equal; on the contrary, it was limited to a few provinces. For instance, of the 405 holdings, 365 were in Diyarbakir, 24 in Mardin and 15 in Siirt²¹⁸. According to the agricultural census conducted 10 years later, this figure decreased to 57 in Turkey in general, and to 5 in the region in particular. In as brief a time as a decade, this change that was seen in the structure of land ownership, which was to the disadvantage of big holdings, is quite noteworthy. It is difficult to argue that this change originates from local dynamics. Most probably, the main reason was the agricultural policies that were initiated in the process of the EU integration. This is mainly because the new agricultural law introduced the upper limit of 500 decares for the agricultural subsidies and, thus, lifted the aid for the arable lands above the amount of 500 decares.

²¹⁸ It is quite another issue to discuss to what extent the records on the picture of the ownership of agricultural lands reflect the reality. For instance, Mustafa Bayram (who was the deputy from Van for one term), in his CV submitted to the Parliament, declares that he had more than 40 thousand donums of land. However, neither in the agricultural census of 1991 nor in that of 2001, there is any information stating that there are holdings that have more than 5000 decares of land in Van.

In short, the agricultural holding structure changed in favor of small and middle-sized holdings. There were two factors that had an impact on this process, one being local and the other global. One of these reasons was the rapid population rise and the resultant fragmentation of agricultural lands. The other reason was the law on the agricultural subsidies mentioned above, which was introduced in the process of the EU integration. The fact that agricultural subsidies would be provided for the holdings that had less than 500 decares of land led the bigger holdings to be divided into small and middle-scale holdings.

Another important development in agriculture was the mechanization and the penetration of capitalism. This process had already started in the 1960s, and through the 1980s, it continued ever increasingly. In 2000, there were a total of 62.143 tractors in the region (2001 Agricultural Census). The increasing mechanization in agriculture on the one hand, and the new agricultural policies and the agricultural shrinkage due to forced migration on the other, brought about rapid population movements. As some scholars point out: “more than an estimated 3 million people have left the region (eastern and south east Anatolia) in the last twenty years” (Romano and Sirkeci, 1999: 1001). It seems that the population that migrated from rural areas due to agricultural contraction, must have been employed in the service sector as evidenced by the increase in service sector employment from 15.8 percent in 1980 to 26.4 percent in 2000, a rise of more than 60 percent (DIE: 2003). Similarly, the spatial distribution of the population was affected by this development given that the rate of urbanization was approximately 37 percent in 1980 and it increased 55.5 percent in 2000, i.e. an increase of more than 50 percent. The evacuation of villages on account of security concerns had an

impact on the rise in the rate of urbanization to a great extent. As noted earlier, after 1987 more than 3000 villages and hamlets were evacuated and, according to some estimates, more than 1 million people were forced to migrate.

So far, I have elaborated on the changes in the region in the post-1980 period by focusing on some of the fundamental social and economic indicators. Needless to say, the developments characterizing the post-1980 period were not solely limited to such indices. The power structure of the region, the forms of social belonging, the codes of relations with the center, the forms of individual and collective belonging and social norms all underwent dramatic changes.

As was demonstrated in the previous chapters, the dominant socio-economic structure in the region was heavily semi-feudal. After the 1960s, the developments that brought about fundamental changes in the social, political and economic structure of Turkey as a whole also had an effect upon the region and helped to initiate the partial dissolution of the semi-feudal structure of the region. Although the basic elements of this structure, such as aghas and sheikhs, did not totally disappear, they lost their previous social, political and economic importance. This structure had able to survive by the use of numerous instruments and strategies, despite the fact that the Republican elites had been employing top-down methods in line with their social engineering programs in order to eliminate it. Thus, it is difficult to argue that social engineering attempts did not have their part in this process. Nevertheless, the main factor was the change in economic conditions that made this socio-economic structure possible. For instance, the institution of the

sheikh has been able to survive despite elitist-radical secular reforms and prohibitions. Moreover, after the 1960s, it was revitalized through various means and, although it has not been recognized legally, it has even increased its economic power. The most significant areas where this institution derived its social capital and prestige were their role in the *medreses* (religious schools) and as a mediator in social conflicts. Despite their perseverance in the face of social engineering reforms, however, the sheikhs were still negatively affected by changing economic conditions and thus witnessed the general, though by no means total, trend toward semi-feudal dissolution.

The change in modes of social belonging accompanied this disintegration in social stratification as can be seen in the developments in collective identity in general and self-perception in particular during this period. Kinship ties and primordial attachments that were constitutive of collective identity and individual belonging lost their previous importance, despite the fact that they continued at different levels. Instead of this sort of belonging, a collective imagination based on ethnicity and language came into existence as did a heightened political consciousness. A significant number of people tend to define their collective identity with reference to this new form of imagination or this new found political awareness

The rise of political consciousness and the politicization of the masses is one of the distinctive characteristics of this period. The participation in legal political life reached its highest degree since the passage to a multi-party political system. The rate of participation in general and local elections, with the exception of the elections in 2002, was above 80 percent. Similarly, political party affiliation took the place of primordial group attachments. Politicization is

not limited to the participation in institutional political organizations, as involvement was also witnessed in the participation of large masses in marches, rallies, and demonstrations in order to express their social, economic and cultural demands as well as their complaints and opinions. The celebration of Newroz, thus, is perhaps the biggest social and cultural event that is worth noting in this regard.

This new form of social belonging and collective imagination also generated the revival of ethnic nationalism. By this I do not mean to indicate the separatist Kurdish movement that emerged under the leadership of the PKK and the nationalism that has been embodied in this movement. It is true that the PKK is one of the most significant components and agents of this neo-nationalism. Moreover, the PKK played a prominent role both in the spread of nationalist sentiments among the Kurds and the rise of nationalism. Furthermore, it is also true that the PKK played an important role in the spread of nationalism to the large masses. However, what I want to point is a kind of nationalism that goes beyond the PKK, albeit including the PKK. This new nationalism appeared in a very wide spectrum as regards its social basis, political claims and the forms of its manifestation. It is different from earlier nationalist movements or nationalist sentiments in many respects. In order to discuss these differences in general and this new stream of nationalism in particular, I must enter briefly into a debate about certain points that have been raised in the previous chapters.

As a number of scholars have pointed out, the emergence of the influence of nationalist ideas amongst the Kurds dates back to the late 19th century (Jwaideh: 1999; Olson: 1992; Bruinessen: 1992). This first-wave of

nationalism, which may be referred to as proto-nationalism, consisted of movements of resistance to centralizing reforms under the leadership of local notables who wanted more autonomy. The foundation of the nation-state in Turkey and the reforms and regulations that were put into effect in its aftermath accelerated the spread of nationalist ideas amongst Kurds. From the establishment of the Republic up until 1938 there were many revolts originating from nationalist sentiments. Nonetheless, nationalism in this period, in terms of its religious, geographical and class characteristics, as well as political claims, was far from including all Kurds. For instance, although there are differing views about its nationalist characteristics, the biggest Kurdish revolt in the early Republican period, the Sheikh Said Revolt, did not find support from Alevi Kurds; it was carried out by Sunni Kurds. Although it had strong nationalist sentiments, it was a Sunni Kurdish revolt, with respect to its claims, demands and social support. Similarly, the last Kurdish revolt of the early Republican period, namely the Dersim Revolt, was local in terms of both its geographical and religious features. Unlike the former one (the Sheikh Said Revolt), this revolt included mostly Alevi Kurds and geographically it was limited to the then-designated Dersim (Tunceli) region. Therefore, it is difficult to claim that the nationalist movement in the early Republican period provided unity amongst the Kurds and that it mobilized the Kurds on the basis of a common national consciousness.

It is only after the 1960s that nationalist ideas reemerged amongst the Kurds. Yet this second-wave of nationalism was limited solely to the attempts of middle and upper-class, urbanite and secular-educated group of intellectuals. The majority of these new elites were inspired by left-wing ideologies and their

understanding of nationalism was mainly characterized by an eclectic composition of Marxism and nationalism. It is difficult to argue that this highly fragmented, eclectic nationalism was successful in providing the unity amongst the Kurds or that it was founded in considerable mass support. In this respect, the largest support that it received was in the “Eastern Rallies” that the Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East organized with the Workers Party of Turkey in the 1970s. In short, the nationalism that emerged between 1960 and 1980 was a movement that was carried by a new group of elites, whose dominant political agenda was Marxism, not by the Kurds as a whole.

The neo-nationalism that emerged after the 1980s, however, is different from the previous two phases in many respects. The most significant difference is the mass support that it has received. One can see that for the first time the unity was made possible on the basis of a collective identity that went beyond class, linguistic, religious and geographical differences. Secondly, this neo-nationalism has been shaped solely on the basis of linguistic and ethnic identity, without being articulated by a secondary ideological component, such as religion or Marxism.

The aggressive assimilationist policies of the state since the establishment of the Republic, that is, the attempt to shape society by means of centralist-authoritarian policies based on the nationalist-elitist-secularist project, have had a significant impact on the emergence of this neo-nationalism. In a parallel vein, regional underdevelopment and the fact that the state ignored the region in many spheres have also contributed to the emergence of Kurdish neo-nationalism. Yet, I believe that the most important reason was the change that society underwent after the 1980s. The developments in economy,

changes in demographics, increasing education levels and diversified and increasing means of communication all unraveled traditional forms of belonging on the one hand and imposed new forms of belonging on the other.

The exponential growth of the means of reproduction of cultural identity and its increased consumption also had an important impact on this process. The legal regulation in 1991 which lifted the ban on the use of the Kurdish language and, the subsequent regulations in the context of the integration process with the EU, accelerated this process. Likewise, the multiplication of and technological advances in the means of communication have also played a significant role. One of the most obvious developments in terms of communication was in the form of the newspaper press. Although the 1991 regulation mentioned above did not include the permission for publications in Kurdish, from then on, a number of dailies and periodicals started to be published. Some of these publications were Kurdish, and some others were in both Kurdish and Turkish. Other forms of communication also played a vital role in the shaping of a sense of Kurdishness. For example, everything from the musical productions of artists such as Şivan Perwer and Civan Haco and the literary products of writers such as Mehmed Uzun, to the satellite TV channels and new communication technologies, such as internet, and the widening in the print and visual press were all financed and spread directly by the Kurds as a way of reinforcing cultural identity.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

If a foreigner (any ordinary foreigner, not necessarily one with an Orientalist bias) who had traveled to Turkey in the middle of the 1920s were to return in the 2000s, two things would surprise him/her the most. First, the social, political, cultural and economic changes that Turkey has undergone. Needless to say, such a changed picture would warrant surprised attention, even, or perhaps especially, if one were to also look at said changes in other geographical locations. Of course the developments in scientific, technological and other spheres would not be seen as limited to Turkey, however, the dimension of such changes in Turkey would be considered unique.

The second surprise for our imaginary visitor, unlike the first one, belongs solely and specifically to Turkey. Furthermore, this surprise would not be the result of change as the first one was, but the result of continuity, namely the continuity in the nature of the relations between the center and the Kurdish-populated periphery over the past 80 years. Though the historical origins of this confrontation go back to the centralization reforms of the 19th century, the tension between the center and periphery acquired new characteristics in the Republican period, characteristics which persist to this day. In this study, I analyzed these new dimensions. On the basis of these discussions, there are several patterns that come to the fore in the evolution of the relations between the center and the Kurdish-populated periphery throughout the Republican history.

Firstly, the relations between the center and the Kurdish-populated regions have always been shaped around concerns about security, order, the danger of separation and so on. At this point, I do not solely mean military measures and the other complementary means but also the policies in administrative, economic, educational and other areas to a significant degree. This was true both for the periods when security and order were largely assured and thereby the priority was given to economic development and progress, as well as for the periods of insecurity when there were armed revolts (the period between 1924 and 1938 as well as the post-1984 period with the armed revolt led by the PKK).

Such an observation begs the question of why these concerns persistently dominated policies and measures regardless of the circumstances in the region. Several potential factors emerge as possible causes of this situation. First, it could simply be a pattern immanent to the nature and construction of nation-states and thus this persistence constitutes a mere manifestation of such a pattern. It could also be understood with reference to the historical heritage that left traumatic traces on the official collective memory in Turkey. By “traumatic traces” I am referring to the lasting impression made by the land losses experienced by the Ottoman Empire in its last two centuries. The Ottoman Empire, which had been the dominant power in three continents, was removed as a principal actor from the stage of history as a result of the wars and nationalist movements of the territory under its rule. Although they zealously denied the political, cultural, institutional, and social heritage of the Ottoman Empire, it was not that easy for the founding elites of modern Turkey

to deny this historical heritage. Thus, this heritage of loss affected the practices of the center at different levels.

A third possible explanation for this security and order-centered approach may be found in the armed opposition that emerged in the region in different periods. As I have discussed in the relevant chapters of this study, particularly throughout the 15-year period following the establishment of the Republic, there were a total of 17 revolts that had differing political demands and social bases. Moreover, again in the same period, there were quite frequent affairs of smuggling over the nation-state borders by people who were either unfamiliar with the political-geographical borders or were reluctant to obey the economic, legal, and administrative principles of the central authority.

One final factor contributing to the predominant place of security and order in the center-periphery relations is the socio-political composition of the center. A great majority of the agents of the center were coming from the military-bureaucratic class whose priority was to save the state and strengthen it. Furthermore, when it came to state-society, center-periphery relations, the dominant understanding in the center prioritized the former over the latter. This understanding not only constructed a hierarchical division between the center and the periphery in favor of the former, but, as Mardin highlights as well, it also perceived the periphery as a suspicious and dangerous entity that should always be kept under close scrutiny.

A second area where the continuity of the center-periphery relations may be observed is in their multi-dimensional nature. In other words, the relations between the two are not one-dimensional and thereby cannot be characterized as a subordinate, submissive periphery versus a determinant, all-powerful

center. The center is always more powerful in terms of its institutional and instrumental capabilities with regards to the periphery. Much more importantly, the center has the advantage of claiming the monopoly of legitimacy. Nevertheless, the relations between the two should not be understood as solely determined by these factors. The periphery influenced the center sometimes by resistance and sometimes by consensus. This influence at times produced unfavorable results for the periphery, such as the authoritarian measures instilled after the emergence of revolts in the region, and at other times advantageous ones, like the obliged lessening of such authoritarian practices by the center in response to periphery opposition.

One final continuity identified in this study is the role of global dynamics in shaping center-periphery relations. Just as the center-periphery relations were not monolithic and or one-dimensional; they were also not solely determined by local and national dynamics. Global trends and international dynamics influenced these relations both in terms of the policies of the center and in terms of the resistance and survival strategies of the periphery. The influence of global dynamics was seen, in the most straightforward manner, in the periods when Turkey was trying to integrate with the capitalist world-system, specifically in the following two historical stages.

The first stage resulted in significant changes in the political and economic structure of the center in the aftermath of World War II which not only brought an end to totalitarian regimes in Europe, but also led to paradigmatic shifts in the political and economic structures of peripheral countries such as Turkey. As a partial consequence of this change, the single-party authoritarian rule was replaced with a multi-party competitive political system. Similarly, the

etatist economic model that was based on state-sponsored industrialization was replaced with a free-market, liberal economic model.

These changes in the political and economic paradigms of the center were also reflected in the policies instituted in the Kurdish-populated periphery. Issues such as the backwardness of the region, regional disparities and the integration of the region with the national markets, all of which have not been vocalized until that point, started to gain significance in the agenda of the center. Additionally, the transition to a multi-party competitive political system opened up new venues for political mobilization on the one hand, and it brought about the democratization of the political representation which had previously been open only to those that had permission from the center. These developments, along with other consequences, had two significant results in the context of the relations between the center and periphery. First, the periphery started to vocalize its demands by means of non-violent instruments, such as political organizations, the press, publications and so on. The second result was the return of the local notables that had been repressed throughout the single-party era.

Thus the impacts of the above-mentioned global dynamics were significant, albeit indirect, in this first historical stage. With the advent of the second historical stage, beginning in the second half of the 1980s, this influence appeared in a more straightforward and open manner. Such influence emanated partly from the transformations seen in the strategies of Turkey oriented to integration with the capitalist world-system. While the strategy of integration had previously been in the form of limited military and economic alliances, it started to be replaced with the strategy of full integration. As a part

of this strategy, Turkey applied to the EU for full membership. In addition to many other developments, candidacy for full EU membership had significant impacts on the relations between the center and its peripheries. Such a development brought about the revision of the constitutive paradigms of the center and the redefinition of the center-periphery relations.

In short, Turkey's relationship with the capitalist world-system affected the essence and direction of its relations and confrontation with its peripheries. In this respect, it is possible to argue that the higher the level of integration with the capitalist world-system, the more the center acquired different abilities to incorporate its peripheries.

Having thus considered the continuities in the center-periphery relations over the past 80 years, allow me to conclude by returning to the main factor that shaped these relations to begin with, namely the modernization project in Turkey. As the primary argument of this study maintains, the modernization project in Turkey evolved in a direction different from what the modernizing elites had intended with regards to the Kurdish-populated parts of the periphery. In brief, the primary goal was to abolish the old-traditional social structure and establish a modern-secular-national society based on constitutional citizenship. A comprehensive reform program, which aimed at achieving that goal, introduced institutional regulations in legal and political spheres on the one hand, and aimed to transform the norms of everyday life on the other. However, in the Kurdish-populated areas, the modernization project had unintended consequences as well.

The most important of all was the evolution of Kurdish nationalism. As many scholars point out, nationalism for the first time, started to be effective

among the Kurds at the end of the 19th century. When the Turkish nation-state was established, nationalism was more the intellectual elit[ist] ideology of a small group of an educated upper-class people living in Istanbul. The first significant stage in the evolution of Kurdish nationalism follows the proclamation of the Republic. The new social contract that modernizing elites offered and the radical reforms not only resulted in powerful social discontent in Kurdish-populated areas, but also they paved the way for an alliance between nationalist elites in Istanbul and local-traditional elites and such an alliance accelerated the spread of nationalism at a local level. This particular type of nationalism, which can be called “articulated nationalism”, had several distinctive characteristics. The most significant was that it was fragmented in terms of class, geographical, social, religious, and even linguistic aspects. In other words, it was far from providing a strong unity amongst the Kurds on the basis of ethnicity and language. Secondly, Kurdish nationalism which found its expression in a series of revolts until the 1930s, was mostly under the leadership of traditional elites (sheikh, tribal leaders, agha). Lastly, it had a strong religious dimension.

The radical modernization project that was put into effect in the early Republican era on the one hand, and a series of developments in the social, political, and economic life of Turkey after the 1950s on the other, had important consequences in terms of the transformation of Kurdish nationalism. The most important one was as follows: a new nationalist elite emerged. These new elites that started to be effective from the 1960s on, were middle and upper-class and an important part of them had received secular education. The two constitutive elements of their political agenda were Marxism and

nationalism. They radically criticized not only the policies that the center followed in Kurdish-populated areas, but they were also opposed the semi-feudal, traditional socio-economic and political structure. The most popular solution that they presented in order to change these was a class-based revolution.

Just like the Kurdish nationalist movement of the early Republican period, this new nationalist movement was also an articulated kind of nationalism. However, while the previous one was articulated with religious, and tribal elements, the latter was articulated with left-wing ideologies. In short, the religious dimension that was dominant in the interwar period was replaced with a secular ideology.

The third stage in the evolution of Kurdish nationalism corresponds to the post-1980 era. The most distinctive characteristic of nationalism of this period is the fact that it was constructed solely on the basis of language and ethnicity without being articulated with a secondary element. In other words, the constitutive roles of religion in the interwar period, and that of left-wing ideologies between 1950 and 1980 lost their importance in this period. Partly as a result of this process, the fragmentation formerly created by religious, class, and geographical factors disappeared. In short, in the post-1980 era, the unity was achieved on the basis of ethnicity and language. There are some other differences of Kurdish nationalism in the post-1980 era compared to the previous two. While nationalism was mostly a kind of elite ideology, in this period it became more a mass movement. I do not argue that the evolution of Kurdish nationalism was solely a product of nation-state oriented modernization project; however, the reforms and regulations in different spheres had an

important role, although they did not intend that consequence. In this regard, secularism and educational reforms are worth mentioning.

The instruments and strategies that the center employed in order to integrate the periphery backfired: they served either as kindling for disintegration or as a tool of opposition and resistance against the center. In this sense, the best example that can be given at this point is education. Following Althusserian line of analysis, as an ideological state apparatus, education has been the instrument and institution that the center most trusted for the creation of a modern homogeneous society on the basis language and culture. However, the opposition and resistance against the center came from those people that had taken the most advantage of these institutions.

A few examples here will prove convincing. Abdullah Ocalan was the child of illiterate parents. He received a university education that only 2 per cent of the total population in Turkey could receive. The same man has been the leader of the most long-lasting resistance against the integration policies of the center throughout the Republican history. Similarly, as was discussed in the fourth chapter, almost all of the new nationalist elites that emerged from the late 1950s onward were either university students or university graduates. Finally, it was mainly urban dwelling Kurdish university students or graduates that attended the private Kurdish language courses, which were opened to fulfill a requirement of the EU criteria.

It is possible to view a similar picture in the political domain. Political modernization's objective was the direct participation of citizens in the political system. Moreover, it aimed to eradicate the structure in which local notables were traditional mediators between the individual and the state and instead

construct a direct relationship between the citizen and the state. While this project led to the exclusion of local notables from political sphere in the single-party era, it resulted in the traditional elites's use of politics as a survival strategy.

Finally, it should be noted that the venue of the relationship between the center and Kurdish-populated periphery will be determined by international conditions, to an important extent. In other words, while it has been a domestic issue so far, in the future its global dimension will start to gain importance. In this sense, one should refer to the process of Turkey's integration with the EU and the developments concerning Northern Iraq. Another projection is as follows: while the tension between the center and Kurdish-populated areas has been between the State and the Kurds, it seems that this tension will evolve towards one that is between an ethnic one between the Kurds and Turks.

I would like to end my dissertation with the following wish: I hope that our imaginary stranger will not be frustrated/astonished once again if he visited Turkey in the future.

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APPENDIX A

TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye’de ulus devlet yönelimli modernleşme projesinin nüfusunun çoğunluğunu Kürtçe konuşanların oluşturduğu illerin sosyo-ekonomik ve politik yapısı üzerindeki etkilerini merkez-çevre ilişkileri bağlamında tartışmaktır. Diğer bir deyişle bu çalışma, merkezin Kürtçe konuşan çevreyi yeni inşa edilen topluma entegre etmek amacıyla takip ettiği politikalar ve çevrenin bunlara gösterdiği tepkiler ile ilgilenmektedir. Bu bağlamda çalışmamız şu soruların cevabını aramaktadır. Kürtçe konuşan çevreyi yeni inşa edilen topluma entegre etmek amacıyla ne tür politika ve stratejiler takip edildi? Genel olarak modernleşme süreci daha özelde ise merkezin takip ettiği politika ve stratejiler Kürtçe konuşan çevrenin sosyo-ekonomik ve politik yapısını nasıl etkiledi? Kürt çevre merkez politikalara nasıl tepki verdi? Konuyu bu ve benzeri sorular temelinde, tarihsel toplumsal bir bağlam içerisinde tartışmaktadır.

Tezin temel iddiası şudur: Türkiye’de Kürtçe konuşan nüfusun oluşturduğu çevre söz konusu olduğunda modernleşme projesi hedeflenmeyen bir şekilde sonuçlandı. Modernleşme projesinin temel hedefi, tek-ulus tek-devlet ilkesi temelinde modern, seküler, batılı tarzda bir ulus devlet inşa etmektir. Diğer bir deyişle amaç, millet sistemine dayalı çok dilli, çok kültürlü, çok dinli imparatorluk mirasından vatandaşlık temelinde hukuksal olarak tanımlanmış yeni bir kolektif aidiyet temelinde yeni bir toplum inşa etmek idi. Bu amaçla, hukuktan ekonomiye, siyasal alandan gündelik yaşama bir çok alanı kapsayan kapsamlı bir reform programı hayata geçirildi.

Kürtçe konuşan çevre bağlamında ele alındığında modernleşme projesinin hedeflenmemiş önemli sonuçları oldu. En önemlisi Kürt milliyetçiliğinin evrimi olarak tanımlanabilecek gelişme idi. Bir çok araştırmacının da vurguladığı üzere milliyetçilik Kürtler arasında ilk defa ondokuzuncu yüzyılın sonlarında etkili olmaya başladı (Jwaideh: 1999, Olson: 1992, McDowall: 2004, Bruinessen: 1992). Türk ulus devleti kurulduğunda ise milliyetçilik daha ziyade İstanbul'da ikamet eden üst sınıflara mensup okumuş küçük bir grubun entellektüel seçkin ideolojisi olarak vardı. Kürt milliyetçiliğinin evrimindeki ilk önemli aşama cumhuriyetin ilanından sonradır. Modernleşmeci seçkinlerin sunduğu yeni toplumsal sözleşme ve hayata geçirilen radikal reformlar kürtçe konuşulan bölgede toplumsal huzursuzluğa yol açmakla kalmadı aynı zamanda İstanbul'daki milliyetçi elitler ile taşradaki kürt eşrafı birbirine yaklaştırdı ve milliyetçiliğin taşrada yayılmasını hızlandırdı. Eklektik milliyetçilik olarak tanımlanabilecek bu milliyetçiliğin ayırdedici bir kaç özelliği vardı. En önemlisi sınıfsal, coğrafi, sosyal, dinsel ve hatta dilsel nitelikleri itibarı ile parçalı idi. Diğer bir deyişle Kürtler arasında etnisite ve dil temelinde güçlü bir birlik sağlamaktan uzaktı. İkincisi, 1930ların sonlarına kadar bir dizi isyanda ifadesini bulan kürt milliyetçi hareketi büyük oranda geleneksel elitler (Şeyh, Aşiret lideri, Ağa) öncülüğünde idi. Son olarak, güçlü bir dinsel vurgusu ve boyutu vardı.

Bir yanda cumhuriyetin erken dönemlerinde hayata geçirilen radikal reformlar (özellikle sekülerizm alanında) bir yandan da 1950'lerden sonra Türkiye'nin ekonomik, siyasal ve toplumsal yapısında meydana gelen bir dizi gelişme kürt milliyetçiliğinin dönüşmesi anlamında önemli sonuçları oldu. Bunlardan en önemlisi yeni bir milliyetçi seçkinler grubunun ortaya çıkması

oldu. 1960'lardan itibaren etkili olmaya başlayan bu elitler orta ve üst sınıflara mensuptu ve önemli bir kısmı modern okullarda eğitim almıştı. Siyasal acendalarının iki kurucu elemanı vardı: marksizm ve milliyetçilik. Onlar, sadece merkezin Kürtçe konuşulan çevrede takip ettiği politikaları radikal bir şekilde eleştirmiyorlardı aynı zamanda çevrede egemen olan yarı-feodal, geleneksel sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasal yapıya da karşıydılar. Karşı oldukları bu iki durumu değiştirmek üzere sundukları en popüler çözüm sınıf temelinde bir devrim idi.

Cumhuriyetin erken dönemindeki kürt milliyetçi hareketi gibi bu yeni milliyetçi akım da eklektik bir milliyetçilikti. Ne var ki ilki, dinsel, feodal unsurlar ile eklemlenmişken 1960'lardan sonra etkili olmaya başlayan milliyetçilik sınıf temelli sol ideolojiler ile eklemlenmişti. Kısacası, iki savaş arası dönemde egemen olan dinsel boyut yerini seküler bir ideolojik boyuta bıraktı.

Kürt milliyetçiliğinin evrimindeki üçüncü aşama 1980 sonrası dönemdedir. Bu dönemdeki milliyetçiliğin en ayırdedici özelliği ikincil bir unsur ile eklemlenmeden salt etnisite ve dil temelinde kurulmasıdır. Diğer bir değişle, İki savaş arası dönemde dinin, 1950-1980 arasında ise sol ideolojilerin oynadığı kurucu rol önemini yitirdi. Kısmen bunun da etkisiyle, daha önceleri dinsel, sınıfsal, coğrafi, dilsel, vb gerekçelerin yol açtığı parçalanmışlık önemli oranda kayboldu. Kısacası, 1980 sonrası dönemde etnisite ve dil temelinde birlik sağlandı.

Kürt milliyetçiliğinin 1980'lerden sonraki evresi daha önceki iki evreden başka farkları da vardı. Önceki iki evrede milliyetçilik büyük oranda bir tür elit ideolojisi iken bu dönemde kitleselleşti. Toplumdaki farklı sınıfsal, sosyal, ekonomik katmanlarına mensup kesimleri kapsamaya başladı.

Çalışma üç alana odaklanmaktadır: Ekonomi, siyaset ve eğitim. Ekonomi ile ilgili değerlendirmeler, devletin-merkezin çevrede takip ettiği politikaları makro ekonomik göstergeler üzerinden yapılmaktadır. Daha sonra bölgenin ekonomik yapısında meydana gelen gelişmeler değerlendirilmektedir. Siyasal alanla ilgili tartışmalar merkezin çevreyi siyasal sisteme dahil etme stratejilerini; çevredeki siyasal tercihleri, eğilimleri ve bunların zaman içerisindeki seyrini anlamaya yöneliktir. Tartışma genel seçim sonuçları ve milletvekillerine ilişkin bazı göstergeler (doğum yeri, eğitim düzeyi, mesleği) üzerinden yürütülecektir. Son olarak, eğitim alanında takip edilen politikalar, modern bir toplum ve ulus inşa etme aracı olarak eğitime atfedilen önem bağlamında tartışılmaktadır. Kısacası, bu üç alan merkezin çevreyi ekonomik, siyasal ve kültürel olarak yeni inşa edilen topluma entegre etme strateji ve politikalarını ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. Bu durumun çevrenin sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasal yapısı üzerindeki etkileri ve zaman içerisinde meydana gelen değişimler de ayrıca değerlendirilmektedir.

Bütün bunlar yapılırken cumhuriyet dönemi üç alt döneme ayrılmaktadır. Dönemleştirme yapılırken merkezde meydana gelen gelişmeler aynı zamanda çevrenin siyasal toplumsal yapısında meydana gelen değişimler de gözönünde bulunduruldu. Birinci dönem, Türk ulus devletinin kurulduğu 1920'den serbest seçimler sonucunda iktidarın el değiştirdiği 1950 yılına kadar geçen süreyi kapsamaktadır. Bununla birlikte, tartışma esas olarak Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) liderliğindeki tek-parti iktidarının egemen olduğu döneme (1923-1946) odaklanmaktadır. Bunun temel nedeni, Türk ulus devletinin kurucu temel paradigmalarının bu dönemde şekillenmiş olmasıdır. 1950-1980 arasındaki

dönem bu çalışmanın ikinci dönemini oluşturmaktadır. Üçüncü dönem, 1980 sonrasını kapsamaktadır.

Çalışmamız Türkiye'nin Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu bölgelerindeki on üç ili kapsamaktadır. Bu iller şunlardır: Ağrı, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli, Urfa ve Van. Bu iller seçilirken bir kaç ölçüt kullanıldı. İlki ve en önemlisi, anadile ilişkin verilerdir. Bilindiği üzere 1980 yılına kadar yapılan nüfus sayımları nüfusun anadilini belirlemeye yönelik sorular barındırmakta idi. 1965 yılına kadar yapılan sayımların sonuçları yayınlandı. Bu veriler, açıklanması güç hatalar barındırsa da, Türkiye'deki nüfusun dilsel tasnifi için eldeki tek kaynaktır. Bu verilere göre, ana dillerinin Kürtçe olduğunu beyan edenler, Urfa hariç, diğer bütün illerde nüfusun yüzde elliden fazlasını oluşturmaktadır (Dündar: 1999). Urfa'da anadilinin Kürtçe olduğunu beyan edenlerin oranı yüzde ellinin altında olmakla birlikte, diğer dilsel gruplara (Türkçe, Arapça) göre en büyük grubu oluşturmaktadır.

Anadil verisinden başka iki ölçüt daha göz önünde bulunduruldu. İlki, idari yapıya ilişkindi. Bu illerin tümü farklı tarihlerde ve farklı süreler ile olağanüstü bir idari sistem ile yönetildi. Tek parti döneminde Umumi Müfettişlik, 1985-2002 arası dönemde ise Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği (OHAL) olarak bilinen bir idari sistem uygulandı. Son olarak, genel seçim sonuçlarının da gösterdiği üzere bu iller siyasal eğilimleri ve tercihleri itibari ile Türkiye genelinden büyük oranda farklılaşmaktadır. Bu durumu 1965-1980 arası dönem için bağımsız adayların 1991 sonrasında ise acendalarında kürtlüğe yaptıkları özel vurgu ile ön plana çıkan siyasi partilerin (HEP-DEP-HADEP) aldıkları yüksek oy oranlarında gözlemlemek mümkündür.

Yukarıda da belirtildiği üzere bu çalışma cumhuriyet tarihinin üç döneme ayırmayı ve her bir dönemi gerek merkezin takip ettiği politika ve stratejiler gerekse bu süreçte çevrede meydana gelen değişimler ve çevrenin tepkileri bağlamında tartışmayı önermekteydi.

Tek parti döneminde takip edilen politikaların iki temel önceliği vardı: devlet otoritesinin konsolidasyonu, diğer bir deyişle, düzen ve güvenliğin tesisi birinci öncelik idi. İkinci öncelik, dil-kültür temelinde homojen bir ulus inşa etmek idi. Hemen belirtmeliyim ki bu iki öncelik birbirini dışlamayıp aksine birbirini tamamlamaktadır. Kısacası, modern bir devlet ve dil-kültür temelinde yeni bir ulus inşa etmek bu dönemin esas önceliğini oluşturmaktaydı. Bu iki öncelik ekonomiden siyasete, eğitimden idari yapıya her alanda takip edilen politikaları belirledi.

Devlet otoritesinin konsolidasyonu olarak tanımlanabilecek önceliği en bariz şekilde siyasal alanda ve idari yapıdaki uygulamalarda gözlemlemek mümkündür. Bir çok araştırmacının da gösterdiği üzere bu dönemin siyasal sistemi otoriter-merkeziyetçi-seçkin bir nitelikteydi (Tunçay: 1981, Uyar: 1998, Sunar: 2004). Devlet ile özdeşleşmiş tek partinin egemen olduğu bu yapıda siyasal katılım ve temsil merkez tarafından sıkı bir şekilde belirlenmekte ve kontrol edilmekteydi. Uygulanan iki aşamalı seçim sistemi siyasal katılımı sınırlandırmakta, siyasal temsilciler merkez tarafından atama yapılrçasına belirlenmekte idi. Bu durum çevrenin siyasal sisteme entegrasyonunu sınırlı hale getirmekteydi.

Otoriter merkeziyetçi anlayış siyasal alanın yanısıra başka alanlarda da egemendi. Bu anlamdaki en popüler uygulama idari sistemde hayata geçirildi.

Kökenleri geç Osmanlıya kadar giden ve Umumi Müfettişlik olarak bilinen bir idari sistem uygulandı.

Bunların yanısıra başka yöntemler de uygulandı. Nüfusun zorunlu iskanı en fazla bilinendir. Devlet otoritesinin konsolidasyonunun yanısıra dil-kültür temelinde homojen bir toplum inşa etmek amacı da olan bu uygulama bölge nüfusunun bir kısmının Türkiye'nin batı bölgelerinde, Türkiye dışından gelen göçmen nüfusun ise bölgede zorunlu iskanı şeklinde hayata geçirildi (Tekeli, 1990).

Bu dönemin ikinci önemli önceliği, yukarıda da vurgulandığı üzere, asimilasyon yoluyla çevrenin merkez ile kültürel-dilsel entegrasyonu idi. Asimilasyondan kastedilen, dil-kültür temelinde homojen bir ulus inşa etmek amacıyla nüfusun Türkçe konuşmasını sağlamaktır. Bu amaçla Türkçe dışındaki dillerin kullanılması kısıtlandı, bu dillerde eğitim verilmesi ve kültürel üretimde bulunulması yasaklandı, bunlara uymayanlar cezalandırıldı.

Asimilasyon yoluyla kültürel-dilsel entegrasyona atfedilen önem en bariz şekilde eğitim politikalarında ifadesini buldu. Özellikle eğitim alanındaki yatırımların eğitim kademelerine göre dağılımı ve zaman içerisindeki değişim bu durumu açıkça ortaya koymaktadır. Örneğin 1923-1924 eğitim öğretim yılında bölgede toplam 168 ilkokul vardı, buralarda görevli öğretmen sayısı ise 279 idi. 1949-1950 eğitim-öğretim yılına gelindiğinde ilkokul sayısı 891'e, öğretmen sayısı ise 1473'e çıktı. Buna karşılık, 1923-1924 eğitim-öğretim döneminde 1 lise ve 6 öğretmen vardı. 1949-1950 eğitim-öğretim yılına gelindiğinde okul sayısı 3'e, öğretmen sayısı ise 54'e yükseldi. Bu verilerin de gösterdiği üzere tek parti dönemi eğitim yatırımları esas olarak ilk öğretim kademesi ile sınırlı idi.

Yukarıda anılan iki temel öncelik (devlet otoritesinin konsolidasyonu ve asimilasyon yoluyla çevrenin merkez ile entegrasyonu) ekonomi politikalarını da önemli oranda belirledi. Diğer bir deyişle, tek parti dönemi boyunca takip edilen ekonomi politikaları ekonomik mülâhazalardan ziyade ekonomi dışı mülâhazalar tarafından belirlendi. Bu nedenledir ki Kürtçe konuşan çevrede egemen olan yarı-feodal, kapitalizm öncesi üretim biçimi ve üretim ilişkilerinin dönüştürülmesi ve bu sayede ekonomik entegrasyonun sağlanması merkezi otoritenin acendasında pek az yer buldu. Yer bulduğunda ise başka alanlarda olduğu üzere yasal düzenlemeler ve yukarıdan aşağıya değişim yöntemi uygulandı (toprak reformu). Dahası, genellikle bir tür terbiye aracı olarak uygulandı. Merkeze direnen güçlerin sürgün edilmesi şeklinde hayata geçirildi.

Buna karşılık çevrenin tavrına-tepkilerine baktığımızda, bunların iki ana formda ortaya çıktığını görüyoruz. İlki, merkezin sunduğu yeni toplumsal sözleşmeyi koşulsuz olarak kabul eden ve merkez ile çeşitli düzeylerde işbirliği şeklinde ortaya çıkan uzlaşmacı tavır. Bu kesimler büyük oranda cumhuriyet öncesi toplumsal, siyasal ve ekonomik ayrıcalıklarını, yeni merkez ile yaptıkları işbirliği sayesinde sürdürmek isteyen yerel eşraf ve dinsel kimlikleri nedeniyle osmanlı döneminde dezavantajlı bir durumda olan alevilerden oluşmaktaydı.

Öte yandan, toplumun önemli bir kesiminin yeni sözleşmeye itiraz ettiğini görüyoruz. Siyasal talepleri ve toplumsal nitelikleri itibari ile farklılık arzeden bu kesimlerin itirazları milliyetçilik ve laiklik temelinde hayata geçirilen düzenlemelere yönelikti. Bu kesimler tepkilerini silahlı direniş yoluyla ortaya koydu. 1923 ile 1938 arasında toplam 17 isyan vuku buldu. Bu isyanların bir kısmı devletin taşradaki otoritesinin tesisi (vergilerin toplanması, askere alma, kaçakçılığın önlenmesi) sürecine yönelik itirazlardan oluşmaktaydı. Bununla

birlikte, siyasal talepleri, toplumsal destekleri vb itibariyle milliyetçi isyanlar da meydana geldi.

1940ların ikinci yarısından itibaren Türkiye'nin siyasal ve ekonomik yapısında radikal değişiklikler meydana geldi. Yirmi yılı aşkın bir süredir devam eden otoriter tek partili siyasal sistemden çok partili demokratik yapıya geçildi. Benzer şekilde, dışa kapalı, devletçi ekonomik kalkınma modeli yerini özel girişime dayalı kapitalist pazar ekonomisine bıraktı.

Türkiye'nin siyasal ve ekonomik yapısında meydana gelen gelişmeler, genel olarak devlet toplum özelde ise merkez ile kürtçe konuşan çevre arasındaki ilişkileri de etkiledi. Tek parti döneminde uygulanan bazı otoriter düzenlemeler yumuşatıldı veya terkedildi. Bu düzenlemelerden en önemlisi nüfusun zorunlu iskanına ilişkin olanı idi. 1947 ve 1948 yıllarında çıkarılan iki yasa ile daha önce zorunlu iskana tabi tutulan nüfusun eski yerleşim yerlerine dönmelerine izin verildi. 1950 yılında yapılan seçimlerden sonra iktidara gelen Demokrat Parti döneminde (1950-1960) bu süreç devam etti. Çıkarılan bir yasa ile Kürtçenin kamusal alanda konuşulması serbest bırakıldı, Umumi Müfettişlikler lağvedildi, tek parti döneminde meydana gelen hukuka aykırı, kollektif hafızada/vicdanda derin izler bırakmış olan bazı olaylar hakkında meclis soruşturması açıldı.

Kuşkusuz bu düzenlemeler önemli idi. Bununla birlikte bu durumu tek parti döneminden radikal bir kopuş olarak değerlendirmek zordur. 1950-1960 arası dönemde altı temel bakanlık (Adalet, Milli Eğitim, İçişleri, İmar ve İskan, Sağlık ve Tarım) tarafından yapılan kamu harcamalarının dağılımı, tek parti döneminin temel önceliklerinin (devlet otoritesinin konsolidasyonu, düzenin tesisi, güvenliğin sağlanması ve asimilasyon) önemlerini korumaya devam

ettiğini göstermektedir. Harcamaların bakanlıklara göre dağılımına bakıldığında yüzde 35 ile Milli Eğitim Bakanlığının ilk sırada olduğu görülecektir. Milli Eğitimi, yüzde 30 ile İçişleri ve yüzde 10 ile Adalet bakanlığı takip etmektedir. Buna karşılık, tarım bakanlığı yüzde 5 ile son sırada yer almaktadır. Sonuncu veri ile başlayalım. Bölge nüfusunun yüzde 90'dan fazlasının tarım ve hayvancılık alanında istihdam edilmesine rağmen tarım bakanlığı eliyle yapılan harcamalar son sırada yer almaktadır. Öte yandan, İçişleri ve Adalet bakanlıklarının harcamaları birlikte ele alındığında, toplam harcamaların yüzde 40'ının devlet otoritesinin konsolidasyonu, düzenin tesisi, asayiş ve güvenliğin teminine ayrıldığı görülecektir (Adı geçen bakanlıklar eliyle yapılan harcamalara ilişkin veriler için bkz. Aşgın 2000).

Altı bakanlık arasında en büyük harcamanın Milli Eğitim bakanlığı tarafından yapılmış olması, eğitimin asimilasyon aracı olarak kullanılması anlamında, tek parti dönemi ile sürekliliğin devam ettiğini göstermektedir. Bu durum 1980'lere kadar devam etti. Örneğin, ilk dört beş yıllık kalkınma planında eğitime ayrılan bütçenin illere göre dağılımına bakıldığında beş ilin (Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Muş ve Tunceli) hem Türkiye hem de bölge ortalamasının üstünde olduğu görülmektedir. Bu durumu pozitif ayrımcılık olarak değerlendirmek mümkün olabilirdi eğer 1923-1938 yılları arasında ortaya çıkan isyanlardan en büyük üç tanesi ağırlıklı olarak bu illerde vuku bulmamış olsaydı. Cumhuriyet döneminin ilk ve en önemli isyanı olarak bilinen Şeyh Said isyanı Bingöl, Bitlis ve Muş illerinde önemli destek bulmuştu. Ağrı, 1926-1930 arası dönemde bir dizi isyana ev sahipliği yapmıştı. Cumhuriyetin ilanından sonra meydana gelen isyanların sonuncusu Tunceli ilinde idi. Bu üç isyan, sadece buldukları toplumsal destek itibarıyla değil aynı zamanda içerdikleri

milliyetçi talepler itibari ile de Cumhuriyetin erken dönemindeki isyanlardan daha fazla dikkat çekmişti.

Eğitimin asimilasyon aracı olarak kullanılması anlamında tek parti dönemi ile süreklilik arzetsse de bu dönemin (1950-1980) eğitim politikaları tek parti dönemindekinden bir noktada farklılaşmaktadır. Tek parti dönemi eğitim politikalarının öncelikli hedefi Türkçe okuma yazmayı öğretmek ve temel vatandaşlık eğitimini sağlamaktı. Bu nedenledir ki eğitim yatırımları ilk öğretim kademesi ile sınırlı idi. Çok partili yaşama geçildikten sonra, özellikle de 1960'lerden itibaren, eğitim asimilasyon aracı olmanın yanısıra toplumsal mobilizasyon aracı olarak da ele alınmaya başlandı. Bu nedenledir ki, ilk öğretimin yanısıra orta öğretim kademelerine yapılan yatırımlar önemli artış gördü. Örneğin 1949-1950 öğretim yılında 26 olan ortaokul sayısı 1980-1981 yılına gelindiğinde 240'a, 3 olan lise sayısı ise 100'e çıktı. Artış okul sayıları ile sınırlı değildi. Bu okullarda görevli öğretmen sayıları da benzer şekilde artarak 2.837'den 96.478'e çıktı.

Demokrat Partinin özellikle dinin popüler temsiline ilişkin yaptığı bazı düzenlemeleri Kemalist modernleşme projesinden sapma ve karşı devrim çabası olarak değerlendiren askerler 1960 yılında bir darbe ile yönetime el koydu. Darbe sonrası kurulan Ulusal Birlik Komitesi hükümeti tek parti dönemindeki bazı otoriter uygulamaları yeniden canlandırdı. Bunların önemli bir kısmı kültürel alana ilişkindi. Kürtçenin kullanılması yasaklandı, bir çok yerleşim yerinin isimleri türkçeleştirildi ve ailelerin çocuklarına kürtçe isimler vermesi yasaklandı. Bu alandaki en önemli düzenleme yatılı bölge okullarının kurulmasını öngören yasanın kabul edilmesi idi. İlgili yasada da vurgulandığı üzere bu okulların kuruluş amaçlarından bir tanesi "belli köylerde Türk dilini ve

kültürünü canlandırmaya yardımcı olmak"tı. Bir yanda kültürel dilsel yasaklar canlandırılırken bir yandan da tek parti döneminde bir çok kez uygulanmış olan zorunlu iskan yöntemine başvuruldu. Bu çerçevede bölge ileri gelenlerinden 55 kişi Türkiye'nin batı bölgelerine sürgün edildi.

Kürtçe konuşan çevrede takip edilen politikalar bağlamında en önemli değişiklik 1960'lardan sonradır. Bu tarihe kadar çevre politikalarının esas önceliği devlet otoritesinin tesisi ve kültürel-dilsel asimilasyon yoluyla ulusal bütünleşmenin sağlanması idi. Bu tarihten itibaren öncelik, kürtçe konuşan çevrenin ulusal pazar ile ekonomik entegrasyonuna verilmeye başlandı. Diğer bir değişle ekonomik mülahazalar önem kazanmaya başladı.

Kürtçe konuşan çevre bağlamında bir kaç önemli değişiklik meydana geldi. İlki ve en önemlisi; çevre, taleplerini-tepkilerini şiddet içermeyen araçlar ile dile getirmeye başladı. Bunlardan en yaygın iki tanesi basın yayın faaliyetleri ve sivil örgütlenmeler idi. Bir yanda 1961 Anayasasının sivil haklar alanında getirdiği görece liberal özgürlükçü ortam bir yanda eğitim olanaklarındaki artış bu süreçte önemli rol oynadı. Özellikle 1960'lardan itibaren bir kısmı çift-dilli (Türkçe ve Kürtçe) süreli yayınlar yapıldı. Aynı şekilde, büyük çoğunluğu üniversite öğrencilerinin öncülüğündeki öğrenci derneklerinden oluşan çeşitli sivil-siyasi örgütlenmeler ortaya çıktı.

İkincisi, tek parti dönemi boyunca bastırılan, siyasal alanda temsil edilme imkanı bulamayan geleneksel seçkinler siyasal alana geri döndü. Bu durum bir yanda çevrenin ulusal siyasal sistem ile sınırlı-kısmi entegrasyonunu beraberinde getirirken bir yandan da bölgede egemen olan yarı-feodal geleneksel yapının kendini yeniden üretmesine önemli katkı sağladı.

Üçüncüsü ve son olarak yeni bir kürt milliyetçi elit sınıfı ortaya çıktı. Büyük kısmı orta ve üst sınıflara mensup olan bu yeni seçkinler iki savaş arası dönemdeki milliyetçi elitlerden bir çok açıdan farklıydı. Bu yeni seçkinlerin en ayırdedici özelliği siyasal ajandaları idi. Acendalarının iki kurucu unsuru marksizm ve milliyetçilik idi. Onlar sadece merkezin Kürtçe konuşan çevrede takip ettiği politikalara değil aynı zamanda Kürtçe konuşan çevrede egemen olan yarı-feodal, geleneksel sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasi yapıya da radikal bir şekilde karşı idi. Sınıf temelinde yapılacak bir devrim sundukları yegane çözümdü.

1980'lerden sonra gerek merkezin takip ettiği politika ve stratejiler gerekse çevrenin tepkileri bağlamında önemli değişiklikler meydana gelmeye başladı. Ulusal ve global ölçekte meydana gelen bir dizi gelişmenin bu süreçte önemli rolü vardı. Merkezin Kürtçe konuşan çevrede takip ettiği politikalar bağlamında bu döneme baktığımızda bir yanda cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan itibaren sürdürülegelen politikalardan radikal bir kopuş olarak tanımlanabilecek düzenleme ve uygulamaların hayata geçirildiğini öte yandan tek parti dönemindeki bir dizi kurum ve pratiğin yeniden canlandırıldığını görüyoruz. Birbiriyle çelişkili gibi görünen bu durum ekonomik, sosyal, kültürel geri kalmışlık sorunu ve güvenlik, asayiş ve terör sorunu şeklindeki ikili bir ayırımdan kaynaklanmaktadır: Diğer bir değişle merkezin kürtçe konuşulan çevre politikaları bir yanda ekonomik, sosyal, kültürel geri kalmışlık, ülkenin gelişmiş bölgeleri ile arasındaki gelişmişlik farkı ve bunların yol açtığı sorunlar bir yandan da 1980'lerin ortalarından itibaren PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi) öncülüğünde ortaya çıkan ayrılıkçı şiddetten kaynaklanan güvenlik sorunu şeklindeki ikili bir ayırım temelinde şekillendi.

Bu tarihe kadar tek-ulus tek-devlet ilkesinde ifadesini bulan resmi görüş yerini Türkiye’de farklı dilsel ve etnik grupların var olduğu görüşüne bıraktı. Resmi görüşteki bu kırılma en yüksek kademedeki görevlilerin beyanlarında ifadesini buldu. Söylemsel düzeydeki bu kırılmayı/açılımı yasal düzenlemeler takip etti. Düzenlemelerin önemli bir kısmı dilsel-kültürel alana ilişkindi. Türkçe dışındaki dillerin kullanılmasını yasaklayan yasa iptal edildi ve bu dillerde basın yayın faaliyetlerinin yapılmasına ve kültürel üretimde bulunulmasına izin verildi. Bu anlamda en radikal düzenleme AB uyum süreci çerçevesinde hayata geçirildi. Devlete ait televizyon kanalında haftada yarım saat 4 farklı dilde yayın yapılmaya başlandı. Aynı şekilde, özel radyo ve televizyonlarda Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu (RÜTÜK) tarafından belirlenen süre ve içerikte yayın yapılmasına izin verildi. Türkçe dışındaki dilleri öğretmek üzere özel kurslar açılmasına izin verildi.

Daha önce de vurgulandığı üzere bu dönem aynı zamanda tek parti dönemindeki bir dizi kurum ve pratiğin yeniden canlandırıldığı bir dönem oldu. Bu kurum ve pratikler devlet otoritesinin güçlendirilmesi, güvenliğin tesisi ve huzurun sağlanması amacına matuftu. Bunlardan en popüler olanı idari sisteme ilişkindi. Tek parti döneminde Umumi Müfettişlik olarak bilinen güçlü merkeziyetçi idari sistem yeniden canlandırıldı. Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği (OHAL) adıyla bilinen bu sistem 1985 yılından AB uyum yasaları çerçevesinde iptal edilinceye kadar hizmet verdi.

Bir diğer pratik nüfusun iskanına ilişkindi. Tek parti döneminde nüfusun etnik ve dilsel dağılımının yeniden düzenlenmesini öngören ve esas amacı dil-kültür temelinde homojen bir toplum inşa etmek olan zorunlu iskan uygulaması bu dönemde de başvuruldu. 1980’lerin ortalarından 1990’ların sonlarına kadar

geçen 15 yıllık süre zarfında 3000'den fazla yerleşim birimi boşaltılarak buralarda ikamet eden bir milyondan fazla kişi başka yerlerde ikamete zorlandı. Daha önceki uygulamalardan farkı, bu dönemdeki zorunlu iskanın güvenlik gerekçesiyle meşrulaştırılması idi.

Güvenlik gerekçesiyle hayata geçirilen bir başka düzenleme köy koruculuğu sistemidir. Kökenleri geç-Osmanlı dönemine kadar giden bu uygulama merkeze/devlete sadık aşiretlerin yardımcı güvenlik elemanı olarak istihdam edilmesine dayanmaktadır.

Çevre bağlamında ele alındığında 1980 sonrası dönemin ayırddedici bir kaç özelliği ön plana çıkmaktadır. İlki, yaklaşık elli yıl sonra şiddet tekrar araç olarak kullanılmaya başlandı. İkincisi, şiddet dışı enstrumanların kullanılması, ilgili yasalardaki değişikliklerin ve kitle iletişim teknolojilerindeki muazzam gelişmelerin de etkisiyle, çok daha fazla arttı. Üçüncüsü, kültürel kimlik siyasallaştı. Dördüncüsü, kollektif tahayyül yerel, dilsel, dinsel, coğrafi ve kabilevi temelden daha soyut olan etnisite temelinde kurulmaya başlandı.

Sonuç olarak, merkez ile Kürtçe konuşan çevre arasındaki ilişkinin gelecekteki seyrine ilişkin bir değerlendirme ile bitirmeme izin verin. Bu aşamada iki nokta ön plana çıkmaktadır. Birincisi, önümüzdeki dönemde merkez ile kürtçe konuşan çevre arasındaki ilişki büyük oranda uluslararası koşullar tarafından belirlenecektir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'nin AB'ye üyeliği ve Kuzey Irak'taki gelişmeler anılmaya değerdir. İkincisi, Merkez ile Kürtçe konuşan çevre arasındaki gerilim bugüne kadar devlet ile kürtler arasında vuku buluyordu ama öyle görünüyorki bu gerilim devam etmekle kalmayacak aynı zamanda Kürtler ile Türkler arasında etnik bir çatışmaya da dönüşecektir.

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU Sociology	1999
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1999-Present	METU, Sociology	Research Assistant
1997-1999	Gaziantep University, Department of Sociology	Research Assistant