GENDERING THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE POPULATION: PATRIARCHAL PRODUCTION OF GENDERED SUBJECTIVITIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT IN EARLY REPUBLICAN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

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The main aim in this study is to understand how gendered subjectivities are constructed in political thought in early republican Turkey. In this respect, problematizations on gender, the main themes utilized in these problematizations and the operation of patriarchy in these intellectual activities are analyzed in the study. In doing so, the texts published in eight journals between 1929-1946 are examined employing a post-structuralist feminist theoretical framework, to which clarifications are proposed drawing on the works of Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt to make it befit the particular aims of the study. It is argued in the study that the political discourses prevalent in early republican era utilized gender in producing utility and docility from individuals and in advancing the population quantitatively and qualitatively. At the heart of the problematizations and discourses on gender differences was the aim of structuring the public and private lives of the individual men and women in such a way that they become politically, socially, economically, culturally and, most importantly, biologically productive. This led to a transformation in the models governing the

forms of patriarchal production of and control on gendered individuals and patriarchal power relations began to be modeled after disciplinary power, instead of sovereign power, that is (re)public(an) patriarchy began to become the dominant form, instead of private patriarchy. As a result, new forms of social control and new frameworks for organizing the roles of individual women and men in public, social and private realms emerged.

Keywords: Political Thought, Gender, Patriarchy, Public and Private Realms, Bio-Power

ÖZ

BİREYİ VE NÜFUSU CİNSİYETLENDİRMEK:
TÜRKİYE'DE ERKEN CUMHURİYET DÖNEMİ SİYASAL DÜŞÜNCESİNDE CİNSİYETLENDİRİLMİŞ ÖZNELLİKLERİN ATAERKİL ÜRETİMİ

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Bu çalışmadaki ana amaç Türkiye'de erken cumhuriyet dönemi siyasal düşüncesinde cinsiyetlendirilmiş öznelliklerin nasıl kurulmuş olduğunu anlamaktır. Bu bağlamda çalışmada toplumsal cinsiyet üzerine sorunsallaştırmalar, bu sorunsallaştırmalarda kullanılan ana temalar ve bu entelektüel faaliyetlerde ataerkinin işleyişi analiz edilmiştir. Bu yapılırken, 1929-1946 yılları arasında yayınlanmış dergilerde basılmış olan metinler, çalışmanın amaçlarına uygun hale getirmek için Michel Foucault ve Hannah Arendt'in çalışmaları temelinde açıklanan ve geliştirilen bir post-yapısalcı feminist kuramsal çerçeve kullanılarak incelenmiştir. Çalışmada erken cumhuriyet döneminde yaygın olan siyasal söylemlerin toplumsal cinsiyeti bireyleri yararlı ve uysal kılmak ve nüfusu nicel ve nitel olarak geliştirmek amacıyla kullandığı iddia edilmiştir. Toplumsal cinsiyet farklılıkları üzerine sorunsallaştırmalar ve söylemlerin temelinde erkek ve kadın bireylerin kamusal ve özel yaşamlarını, onları siyasal, toplumsal, ekonomik, kültürel ve, en önemlisi, biyolojik bakımdan üretici kılacak şekilde yapılandırma amacı vardır. Bu,

cinsiyetlendirilmiş bireylerin ataerkil üretimi ve kontrolünü yöneten modellerde bir değişime yol açmış ve hükümranlık yerine disiplinci iktidar modeli ataerkil iktidar ilişkilerini yönetmeye başlamıştır, kısacası, özel ataerki yerine kamusal/cumhuriyetçi ataerki hakim biçim olmaya başlamıştır. Bunun sonucunda, yeni toplumsal kontrol biçimleri ve kadın ve erkek bireylerin kamusal, toplumsal ve özel alanlardaki rollerini düzenleyecek yeni çerçeveler ortaya çıkmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasal Düşünce, Toplumsal Cinsiyet, Ataerki, Kamusal ve Özel Alan, Bio-İktidar

To Vera
and
To the loving memory of
Rabia Yeğenoğlu
and
Selen Güler

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The 1980 military *coup d'état*, wreaking havoc all the political movements and activism of the previous decades, gave rise to an *unintended consequence*, that of creating the appropriate milieu for the *emergence* of *feminism* in Turkey as a relatively *autonomous* political movement (Tekeli, 1986). Of course, the *coup d'etat* was not the only factor behind the *emergence* – the developments within western feminism on a larger scale, especially after the 1960s, had born their marks as well; nor it was the first time in Turkish history that *feminist* concerns and demands were voiced – there were debates around the issue of the position of women in society as early as the *Tanzimat* era (1839-1876) (Sirman, 1989). Following the *Tanzimat,* the First (1876-1878) and especially the Second Constitutional (1908-1918) periods brought about an intellectual climate conducive to the formation of women's organizations, launching of new women's journals and the emergence of Ottoman feminism. After the founding of the Turkish Republic (1923), women continued to publicize their demands, criticize the gender ordering prevalent in the society and challenge subordination to men. Although this was the case and some women, first in the Ottoman and, later, the Turkish contexts, were willing to challenge patriarchy, they were forced to, (when they did not self-consciously preferred to) subordinate their concerns to some “greater cause” – i.e. nationalism or socialism/Marxism, until post-1980 period. When the military regime banned all political activism, feminism, considered not-so-much-political a movement by the leading cadres of the regime,

could find its distinctive voice. Emerging as an autonomous movement, feminism found supporters within academic circles and women's and/or gender studies programs began to be established in Turkey in 1990s. From that time on flourished the studies on the mechanisms, structures and conditions leading to the subordination of women, within the context of which the position, situation and material conditions of women in Turkey are problematized and *immediate* problems facing women in familial, social, political, economic and cultural life have been analyzed in terms of their causes, effects and solutions. There is now a large and growing, albeit still wanting feminist literature on Turkey, the most demanding part being the studies on the history of political thought, since except for the feminist re-readings of Kemalist texts – founding and official ideology of the Turkish state – patriarchy and gender in the history of political thought have only occasionally been the subject of feminist analysis in Turkey. There are recent attempts at feminist (re)considerations of the works of political thinkers with different ideological affiliations, who have been prominent in the Turkish context, but the quantity of such studies is less than sufficient in providing a general understanding of the construction of gender and the operation of patriarchy in political thought – or the operation of political thought within the contours of patriarchy. It is particularly the reduction of this gap in the feminist literature on Turkey that I attempt to contribute to in this study.

In the study, my main aim is to historicize the discourses about and in relation to gender, with a particular focus on women, as they were (re)presented in political thought in Early Republican Turkey (1923-1946). In doing so, I examine the texts in eight journals – *Çınaraltı, Kültür*, *Resimli Ay*, *Türk Yurdu*, *Ülkü*, *Yeni Adam*, *Yurt ve Dünya*, *Yücel* – with different ideological leanings, published in the early-

republican era after the adoption of the Latin alphabet (1929), and analyze the gendering effects of the individualizing and totalizing discourses prevalent in these texts, through which human beings are made into sexed/gendered citizens. I focus on the early-republican era since the era was marked with great efforts at transforming the political, social, cultural and economic life in Turkey. Within the era, new forms of public and private relations were encouraged and new individualities/subjectivities were constructed and entertained through a process of citizenization. Although the beginnings of such efforts can be traced back to the Tanzimat period and even before, it was not until the founding of the Turkish Republic, and especially the adoption of Latin alphabet that these efforts affected the bulk of the individuals living in Turkey. The general form of problematization and the discourses that emerged – or at least became prevalent – as a result of these efforts continue to affect the lives of the people living in Turkey at the present in substantial ways. In this respect and on the assumptions that individualities/subjectivities and collectivities/ groups are constructed, and the limits within which we continually furnish ourselves with gendered subjectivities are imposed upon us *via* processes and discourses that are political, I argue that revealing the ways that the following questions were answered in early-republican political thought allows us to more accurately comprehend the contemporary patriarchy and the patriarchal limitations imposed on the actions of individuals and collectivities in Turkey, and to provide the grounds and devise the strategies for more effective feminist resistance to and struggle against them: *how gender categories – man and woman – and differences and relations between and within them were problematized in political thought in Early Republican Turkey, which basic themes were utilized in these problematizations* and *how did patriarchy operate in these intellectual activities* or *these intellectual activities operated within the*

contours of patriarchy?

Searching for answers to these questions I examined all the issues of four of the above-mentioned journals (*Türk Yurdu*, *Ülkü*, *Yeni Adam*, *Yurt ve Dünya*) and particular volumes of the remaining four (*Çınaraltı*: 1941-1942; *Kültür*: 1935-1938; *Resimli Ay*: 1930; *Yücel*: 1939). In deciding the journals to be analyzed, the criteria I attended to was choosing a set of journals with different ideological leanings, reasoning, it might be of help in showing that it is the same discourse and the same form of problematization that underlie the solutions proposed by different lines of thought to the perceived problems. Two main reasons forced and/or led me to include in my analysis only the journals that were published after the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1929. What *forced* me so was that I have no knowledge of Ottoman, which makes it impossible for me to read the journals published before 1929. What *led* me so was the fact that the adoption of the Latin alphabet was one of the cornerstones of the citizenization project put into effect in the era. Especially the latter reason allows me to argue that the effects of excluding the journals published before 1929 on the analytic coherence of the study is minimal.

When examining the texts in the journals, I did not take as the *unit of analysis* the *oeuvre* of the *finest minds/greatest thinkers* in Turkey – although many of the editors and authors of the journals can be named as such, but rather the political *discourses* circulating in these journals that construct and naturalize sex/gender differences and subject human beings to an unending process of sexual normalization. In other words, within the scope of this study, not the thoughts of specific individual political thinkers but the discourses that (re)produce the field of political thought/that are (re)produced

within the field of political thought in Early Republican Turkey are analyzed. Taking as unit of analysis the political discourses rather than the thoughts of individual thinkers, I draw on the Foucauldian understanding of history of thought, which he distinguishes from the history of ideas and history of mentalities. In the words of Foucault (2006):

> For a long time, I have been trying to see if it would be possible to describe the history of thought as distinct both from the history of ideas (by which I mean the analysis of systems of representation) and from the history of mentalities (by which I mean the analysis of attitudes and types of action ...). It seemed to me there was one element that was capable of describing the history of thought – this was what one could call the problems or, more exactly, problematizations. What distinguishes thought is that it is something quite different from the set of representations that underlies a certain behavior; it is also quite different from the domain of attitudes that can determine this behavior. Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and to question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals.

This approach allows considering as political the thoughts of the individuals who are not regarded as political thinkers – that is, who does not belong to the canon of political thought. Additionally, it is helpful in exposing the descents of the discourses on gender that continue to shape and limit the field of possibilities of human beings at the present, rather than providing accounts of the ways that people thought about sex/gender in the past. Within this framework, I decided to examine the texts in *the* journals instead of the *oeuvre* of a specific author or a circle of authors, because it is easier to keep track of the daily developments of problems, solutions and their problematizations through an examination of journals. However, although this Foucauldian approach broadens the scope of the political thought, it nevertheless renders what is meant by political

thought in this study far from self-evident and, thus, requiring clarification. Yet, it is not only political thought that requires clarification but, as may be expected of any social science study, virtually all of the concepts utilized in this study – the most important ones being *gender* and *patriarchy* – are heavily loaded. These concepts require clarification and their clarification, in turn, require the utilization of other loaded concepts, and so on, which makes one cannot help but feel trapped in an infinite regress. I do not profess to resolve this regress in this study, but hope to have clarified by the end of the next two chapters, the sense that these concepts are utilized in this study.

In the next (second) chapter, drawing heavily upon the work of two theorists, that of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault, I clarify the concept(s) of political (and) thought. In the third chapter, employing the Foucauldian strand of post-structuralist feminist theorizing, I elucidate the sense that the concepts of gender and patriarchy are utilized in this study. Although I employ the Foucauldian strand of post-structuralist feminist theoretical framework in the study, I employ it as a "toolbox," which contain certain tools, but to which, also other tools can be added and the tools it contains, which are designed for specific purposes can also used for other purposes. Therefore, also included in that chapter is a discussion of the theoretical framework of the study. In the fourth chapter, I provide a brief review of the gender-based analysis of early-republican era and political thought in Turkey. Since, feminist literature on Turkey has generally been focused on critical examinations of Kemalism in regards to the era in question, I especially deal with the feminist revaluations of Kemalism in that chapter. In the fifth chapter, I analyze the political discourses that had been circulating in Early Republican Era, through the problematizations of gender categories and relations between and

within them, in relation to the public/private distinction and on the basis of the concept of bio-power, since it is within the context of bio-power that the modern notion of sex, which is “a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species” (Foucault, 1979: 146) becomes a political concept, and renders it a necessity for governments to analyze (1979: 25-26):

> birthrate, the age of marriage, the legitimate and illegitimate births, the precocity and frequency of sexual relations, the ways of making them fertile or sterile, the effects of unmarried life or of the prohibitions, the impact of contraceptive practices.

In this respect, included in my analysis are the texts with a concern for the manner “each individual made use of his [and her] sex” (26), that is, texts with a concern for the individual and the population, in addition to the texts with a focus on the differences and relations between and within men and women. In examining these texts I employed discourse analysis with a genealogical approach and analyzed the texts in the manner suggested by Barthes (1971: 10):

> If until now we have regarded the text as a species of fruit with a kernel (an apricot, for example) the flesh being the form and the stone the content, it would be better to see it as an onion, a construction of layers (or levels, or systems) whose body finally contains no heart, no kernel, no secret, no irreducible principle, nothing except the infinity of its envelopes which envelop nothing other than the unity of its own surfaces.

Thus, I did not search for the evil or good secretly hidden behind the meanings the authors intended, and analyze the coherences and contradictions in the things said, but rather, I aimed to reveal what is constructed, through problematization, as an object of knowledge/truth, and what relations exist between this particular object and power. The details of this method is provided in the fifth chapter. In the sixth, and the final chapter, after providing a brief

summary of the study, I discuss its relevance in understanding the gendering effects of contemporary political discourses and in challenging their patriarchal leanings.

In writing this thesis I *risk* being subjective. My personal tone and the occasional references I make to my personal experiences, are inappropriate by conventional standards. This is a deliberate attempt at challenging the detached tone of academic writing, since, as many feminist scholars showed, it is a hindrance to politicizing and publicizing the concerns with which one enters the enterprise of knowledge production. Moreover, it treats the production of knowledge as the uncovering of the "truth out there," when, in fact, the truths are produced in relations of power. Although this is so, I am totally aware that the subjective position from which I write, is a position that I occupy, and not a position unique to me.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND: POLITICAL (AND) THOUGHT

Political thought is frequently defined as the study of conceptualizations of institutional power – i.e. state and government, and the basic political concepts – i.e. politics, sovereignty, legitimacy, rights and duties, liberty/freedom, equality, justice, representation, citizenship. Such a definition renders political the synonym for government or state-related and reduces political thought to governmental thought. Although, this approach does not conclude that political thinkers consider nothing but the institutional power – since the term “government” does not only refer to the institutional sphere of politics or to the management of states, but it also entails the ways that the lives and actions of individuals are structured – it nevertheless depicts as non-political many human actions/activities that take place in the private sphere, that is, social and intimate relations are left out of the boundaries of the political.

The most influential challenge to main/male-stream formulations of political-thought-as-governmental thought has been presented by feminist theorists, summarized in the motto “the personal is political.” Feminists problematized the exclusion of women from politics and searched for explanations and remedies for this situation. However, since there is no unitary feminist position that all feminists assume, there are widespread disagreements between and within different strands of feminism as to what is wrong with the main/male-stream

forms of political thinking and more importantly, as to what is *the political*. Should it be conceptualized following either or both of the theoretical routes Agnes Heller suggested towards grounding the concept: as a "*thing* (a *quality*, a *factor*)" that may or not be shared by other 'things,' or as a *sphere* or *system* upon entrance things or persons become political and upon exit non-political (Heller, 1991: 330; *emphasis added*). Should it be conceived of as a potentiality: is the *political* what emerges when human beings politicize matters that are not by their nature political? Is it a process or the result of the process of acting together? Is it something that values human life on earth or should it be transcended?

Searching answers to such questions about what constitutes the distinctiveness of the *political*, one may adopt a narrow or a broad approach to politics. On the one end of the spectrum, the political is conceptualized as that is exclusively and strictly related to the institutional power: management of the state, mechanisms of government. On the other end are the broad conceptions of the political, in which anything and everything that implies any form of practicing power, institutional or otherwise is conceived of as political. There are also many moderate positions in between. The narrow conception of the political excludes many issues from the domain of politics and leads to a depoliticization of many aspects of the human condition. The broad conception is problematic in that when everything is political then it becomes a meaningless concept, just a sensitizing term, that distinguishes nothing analytically. However, since, as Leftwich and Held argue, "there is, in fact, nothing more political than the constant attempts to exclude certain types of issues from politics" (Leftwich and Held, 1984: 144), and because it is the more responsive one to the concerns of the line of feminist theorizing

that I take part with, I adopt a broad conception of politics in this study, despite the problems inherent in it.

When a broad conception of the political is adopted, power becomes a core concept. In fact, independent of the approach one adopts, conceptions of the political almost invariably revolve around the concept of power, institutional or otherwise. As Freeden argues (2005: 116):

> There is no escaping that politics is about power and there is consequently no escaping that good political theory needs to give plausible accounts of what is entailed, in the broadest sense, by political thinking relevant to power.

Similarly Frazer and Lacey argue that "the main substantive component of an adequate political theory ... is a theory of power" (1993: 193). As a result, a consideration of "what power is" and/or "how power operates" is essential in conceptualizing the political. A second key component of the political is the public/private distinction, since conceptualizations of the political almost invariably contain discussions of the public/private distinction, although there are disagreements about whether or not the distinction is necessary; and when it is held to be so, how to theorize the relations between them, and what is the relevance of each to the political. A third component, which is related to the first, that I consider as integral to the concept of political is knowledge. More often than not, an antagonism is anticipated between the political and knowledge and/or truth. The political and its substantive component, power, is conceptualized as "something" that defies knowledge/truth and knowledge/truth is set in opposition to power. Foucault opposing such an antagonism, claimed that knowledge (and truth, a specific form of knowledge) is embedded in power relations and (modern) power operates *via*

knowledge, thus the relation between the power and knowledge is not one of antagonism but one of mutuality (Foucault, 1991: 27):

> We should admit ... that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.

It is important not to derive the quite simple conclusion that “power is knowledge” or “knowledge is power”: neither one is reducible to, subordinate to, dependent on or deductible from the other. They are like the two sides of a cursed coin, which does not allow one to tell the heads from the tails, although the sides are not identical. In Foucault's terminology, the sides of this cursed coin are joined in “discourse” (1979: 100), to which I turn later on in this chapter. Drawing on Foucault's framework, I argue that it is not power *per se*, but the “power-knowledge relations,” which produce and are produced within discourse, that lie at the heart of the political. In order are brief discussions of these elements, which I consider as constitutive of the political.

2.1. POWER

Power is frequently defined as making someone do something s/he otherwise would not do. These are called power-over conceptions, one of the most famous and basic definitions of which is proposed by Robert Dahl. Dahl's still much prevalent formulation, the “intuitive idea of power” suggests that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (1957: 202-03). Otherwise power is defined as the human capacity or ability to act. This sort of definitions are called power-to conceptions.

Hannah Arendt's definition in *On Violence*: that “power corresponds to the human *ability* not just to act but to act in concert” (Arendt, 1970: 44; *emphasis added*), exemplifies this conception. The adoption of either (or both) of these conceptions or the sense that power is conceived of in general, is to a large extent determined by the specific aims with which one engages in the enterprise of conceptualizing power. Steven Lukes rightfully argues that (2005: 63):

> How we think about power may serve to reproduce and reinforce power structures and relations, or alternatively it may challenge and subvert them. It may contribute to their continued functioning, or it may unmask their principles of operation, whose effectiveness is increased by their being hidden from view. To the extent that this is so, conceptual and methodological questions are inescapably political.

Feminist utilizations of different conceptions of power as strategic tools to understand and to challenge patriarchal relations and structures attest to the inescapably political nature of conceptual and methodological questions about power. Yeatman contends that, feminism is an “emancipatory movement which seeks to end a particular kind of power relationship” and thus “... is deeply concerned with issues of how power should be conceived and understood” (1997: 144). In other words, since feminism is an *analytico-political* project of changing the “human condition”; for the feminists, embracing a particular conception of power with or without providing an explicit definition of it, is a political act. Feminists from different theoretical backgrounds adopted different conceptions of power as strategic tools to challenge patriarchy and neither power-to nor power-over conceptions can be specified as feminist. Since there is no ready-made feminist conception of power and one cannot move on simply saying that a feminist conception of power is adopted, the sense that power is taken to mean in a(ny) feminist study has to be

clarified. In providing the sense that power is taken to mean within the context of the present study, I draw on the works of two theorists, Arendt and Foucault, who have adopted different conceptions of power and aim to make feminist use of their work on power, although their works are, in one way or the other, gender-blind.

Arendt, rejecting power-as-imposing-will-conceptions and basing on ability, presented a relational conception of power, which is "empowering" for those entering into the relation. In *On Violence* she proposes that (1970: 44):

> Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to the group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated to begin with (potestas in populo, without a people or group there is no power), disappears, "his power" also vanishes.

Emphasizing the relational character of power, Arendt refuses to understand power as means or resources that particular individuals possess, on the contrary, for Arendt power "is to an astonishing degree independent of material factors, either of numbers or means" (1998: 200). Instead of numbers or means, it is the togetherness in action that makes power possible: "power springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse" (200). Then, acting together people come to have power, which, in turn they may or may not use to empower a particular person to act in their name. However, this acting in their name does not point to a Hobbessian model of sovereignty. According to Hobbes (1641/1904: 120):

> the Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or Civill, that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will.

For Arendt, since power, the ability to act in concert, is the precondition of human freedom, a person empowered by a collectivity to act in their name does not attain the position of a sovereign. In other words, acting in the others name, does not mean acting over them, but rather it means acting with them, to substantiate human freedom. As such Arendt opposes sovereignty and claims that "If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce" (1969: 165). In addition to renouncing sovereignty and excluding from the definition of power the material factors, Arendt also distinguishes among *power*, *strength*, *force*, *authority* and *violence*. According to the distinctions drawn by Arendt, *strength* is a quality that is inherent in or characteristic to a person. *Force* indicates "the energy released by physical or social movements." *Authority* is "unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither coercion nor persuasion is needed." It is something that "can be vested in persons ... or it can be vested in offices." Distinctiveness of *violence* lies in its "instrumental character." Since it aims at "multiplying natural strength" it is "phenomenologically... close to strength" (1970: 45-46).

As power is independent of material factors and distinct from strength, force, authority and violence "power is always a power potential and not an unchangeable, measurable, and reliable entity like force or strength," it "exists only in its actualization" and cannot "be stored up and kept in reserve for emergencies, like the instruments of violence." (Arendt, 1998: 200). It is a "potentiality in being together" that has no limits (201):

> no physical limitation in human nature, in the bodily existence of man... Its only limitation is the existence of other people, but this limitation is not accidental, because human power corresponds to the condition of plurality to begin with.

As such the alternative of power is not strength, but force. Acquiring the means of violence one can exert force on others. However, although violence can destroy power, it is not a substitute for it, because, power springs from plurality, from acting and speaking together. Then while exerting force and violence – *tyranny* in the Arendtian terminology – may destroy the power of the collectivities, it can never substitute it and as such condemns "the rulers as well as the ruled" to "impotence and futility" (Arendt, 1998: 202).

With similar propositions to that of Arendt, but from a very different theoretical background and approach, Foucault offered a conception of power, that is relational, productive and critical of sovereignty, like that of Arendt's. Foucault challenged what he called "juridico-political discourse" (1979) or "theory of sovereignty" (2003), a view, he claimed, that underpins both the liberal theories of sovereignty and Marxist theories of class domination and that regards power as something that is possessional; that is centralized – originating from a single source; and that is repressive: as something that excludes, represses, cencors, abstracts, masks, conceals. Aiming to "[c]ut off the head of the king in political thought and analysis" (Foucault, 1979: 88-89), he argued, with the rise of modern forms of organizing society, there emerged a new economy of power, that cannot be modeled after sovereignty. This new economy of power, what Foucault called "disciplinary power," is primarily productive. In the words of Foucault (1991: 194):

> ... power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.

Disciplinary power found its model in the Panopticon, an architectural design by Jeremy Bentham. Bentham searched for ways to most economically secure the obedience of people without having to resort to coercion. For him, the best way for this was creating a space that would lead the inmates to internalize the gaze of their guardians. It was Panopticon that would erect a space in which many rooms are built around a central tower. The rooms are built in such a way that the inmates of the rooms can be monitored by guardians, without being seen by the inmates. The guardians are also monitored by a manager or an administrator, who is not visible to the eyes of the guardians. As a result, the inmates in the rooms –and the guardians as well, can never be sure whether or when they are being watched. In Panopticon things are arranged in such a way that (Foucault, 1991: 206):

> the exercise of power is not added on from the outside, like a rigid, heavy constraint, to the functions it invests, but is so subtly present in them as to increase their efficiency by itself increasing its own points of contact.

In this model, not those who *have* power or who exercise power are visible but those on whom power is exercised is exposed to the gaze. This shift in the economy of visibility is of import, since, with the inspecting gaze, there is no more any "need for arms, physical violence, material constraints." Individuals, under the weight of the gaze, interiorize it to the point that one becomes one's own overseer and exercising this surveillance over, and against, oneself (Foucault, 1980a: 155). As such, with "just a gaze," disciplinary power achieves its utmost purpose: producing *docility* and *utility* from the bodies.

It should immediately be noted here that sovereign power did not simply cease to exist when disciplinary power is introduced. According to Foucault modern power is exercised between these two limits: “a public right of sovereignty and a polymorphous mechanics of discipline” (2003: 37). It can be argued, then, that the king survived the decapitation. So the question to answer is “how is it possible that this headless body often behaves *as if* it indeed had a head?” (Dean, 1994: 156; emphasis in original).

According to Foucault, in the eighteenth century *masses* are turned into *populations*, when the governments began to focus their energies on the control of the life of the body and the life of the species rather than the sovereign's right to kill. Through this focus on life, what Foucault called the “threshold of modernity,” (the entrance of human life to the political arena), is reached (1979: 143) and emerged what Foucault called *bio-power*, a means of controlling the machine-body and the species-body. It has two forms: an *anatomo-politics of the human body* and a *bio-politics of the population*. Anatomo-politics of the body refers to disciplines, the individualizing technologies of power, which centers (1979: 139):

> on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls.

Bio-politics of the population, on the other hand refers to the *regulatory controls* (139):

> focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary.

These technologies of power, although leading to a decapitation of the king, nevertheless allowed *his* headless body to wave hands and his decapitated head to blink eyes. *He* was no longer the embodiment of power, *he* was not ruling the masses anymore; there was now a specific political rationality, to which the sovereign, too, submitted to. From that time on, "the relationship proper to power" is not "violence or struggle" or consensus, which are "[a]t best, only the instruments of power," but rather is the "singular mode of action, neither warlike, nor juridical, which is government" (1982a: 786).

According to Foucault "government" stands in between two other forms of relationships of power: "strategic games between the liberties" and "the states of domination" (1987: 130). In all three forms of power, Foucault defines power as the actions/conduct upon the actions/conduct of others (1982a: 789):

> [A relationship of power] is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action.

As such power is not "[a]n institution, ... a structure; or a certain strength that we are endowed with," but it is the name given to a "complex strategical situation in a particular society" (1979: 93). In this complex situation, people enter into relationships of power with other people, as in the strategic games between the liberties, or with a specific political rationality, as in the case of governmentality, which are not zero-sum games, but "an ensemble of actions which induce others and follow from one another" (1982a: 786). These relations of power, are not a hindrance to the freedom of individuals, although they may happen to become so, but on the contrary, power relations

are the condition of human freedom, because for a relationship of power to be different something than domination it needs to incorporate two “indispensable” elements (789):

> that “the other” (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up.

Foucault argued “power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (1982a: 790). Here freedom corresponds to the availability of a “*field of possibilities* in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments, may be realized” (790; emphasis added). When this field of possibilities is not available, “where the determining factor saturate the whole,” we cannot speak of power relations, but only of domination. However, what distinguishes “domination” is not that it is from the beginning a unilateral imposition of force, but it is a particular type of power relationship that is hierarchically fixed, in which the field of possibilities are extremely limited. At this point, the presence of freedom is what distinguishes power from “physical determination.” Hence his statement that “where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1979: 95).

Another integral component in the functioning of power is knowledge. Foucault argues that it is impossible to “speak truth to power,” since systems of production of knowledge and truth in a society are embedded in power relations and the relations between power and knowledge should be analyzed (1991: 27- 28):

> not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of

> knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge.

Knowledge is produced, through the human sciences/disciplines, which are grounded on discourse and produce discourses on human beings, impose limits on what is knowable and determine who can know and has the right to speak about them. There is no knowledge outside of discourses, there is no pre-discursive field that one can discover the “truth out there,” but the knowledge is invented within discourses that conceal the fact that knowledge is invented (Foucault, 1972).

Discourses, according to Foucault, are not “groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations)” and are not “reducible to the language (langue) and to speech.” Although “discourses are composed of signs... what they do is more than use these signs to designate things;” they “are practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972: 49). Discourse regulates the rules of *exclusion*, of what can be said and thought. However, what is said is not the same thing as what is spoken of: “[t]o speak is to do something other than express what one thinks; to translate what one knows” (209). In a speech situation, speaking subject is embedded in power relations and in a regime of truth, a "general politics" of truth, that is (Foucault, 1980b: 131):

> the types of discourse which [a society] accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures

> accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

However, this does not mean that there are accepted/dominant discourses on the one hand and excluded/dominated discourses on the other. Rather, there are various strategies in which multiple discursive elements come into play (Foucault, 1979: 100) and thus, (101):

> discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it ... there can exist different and contradictory discourses within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy.

Although discourses are not determinative, voice of the speaking subject still echoes something other than the *intentions* of the subject, s/he does not speak in the name of *the* or *a* truth, rather truth, produced on the basis of discourse, in relation to a particular society's "general politics" of truth, speaks through her/him. In fact, subject is produced within power-knowledge relations as a speaking and knowing subject and moreover as an acting subject. Hence Foucault's conception of subjectivity (Foucault, 1982a: 781):

> there are two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.

Such an understanding of subjectivity and Foucault's theory of power has received criticism from feminists who reasoned that feminism as an emancipatory project is doomed to failure without the agency of autonomous individuals. In the words of Linda Alcoff (1990):

> given the enormous productive efficacy Foucault accords to power/knowledge or the dominant discourse, there could be agency only if human beings were given the causal ability to create, affect and transform power/knowledge or discourses, but Foucault does not concede to us this capacity ... if Foucault's analysis of subjectivity is correct, a feminist emancipatory project is in trouble.

I think this criticism is misplaced since Foucault presents an account of power that both “constrains individuals and constitutes the condition of possibility of their freedom” (McNay, 1994: 4). Although the subject is constituted within power-knowledge relationships, it does not automatically follow that, the subject or groups of subjects are unable to construct different modes of power-knowledge relations.

Another sort of criticism leveled against Foucault is related to the lack of a normative framework in Foucault's writings, which led Nancy Fraser to argue that, Foucault's work is “normatively confused,” even if it offers an interesting account of modern power (Fraser, 1989: 31). Taking issue with Foucault's argument that resistance always accompanies power, Fraser contended that, this does not explain why domination ought to be resisted; “Only with the introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it” (1989: 29). Another misplaced criticism, I believe, since Foucault does not claim that power and/or domination should be resisted or these are bad things, rather he argues “my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous… If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do” (Foucault, 1983: 231-232).

Although I argue that these and other criticisms such as Nancy Hartsock's (1990 and 1996) are misplaced, I agree with Caroline

Ramazanoğlu that Foucault's works are gender-blind (1993). This is also true for Arendt, although Nancy Hartsock, pointing to the Arendtian conception of power, argues that women conceptualize power, different than men: they emphasize capacity and empowerment, rather than securing obedience. According to Nancy Hartsock, conceiving power as “energy and competence rather than dominance” provides a distinctively “feminist theory of power,” which is rooted in women's experiences (Hartsock, 1983: 224). This line of reasoning, is not Arendtian in nature, in fact, it is more in line with Ruddick's maternal thinking. However, the fact that these theorists were gender-blind does not preclude the possibilities of making use of their works in feminist analysis, and, indeed, feminist work inspired by Foucault is extensive (see, among others, Allen, 1996; Bartky, 1990; Bordo, 1993; Butler, 1993, 1997, 1999; McWhorter, 1999; Sawicki, 1991; Young, 1990), although, I believe, Arendt did not receive the interest, from the feminists, that she deserves.

2.2. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

As Kymlicka notes, in liberalism there are two different conceptions of public-private distinction (1990: 250):

> the first, which originated in Locke, is the distinction between the political and the social; the second, which arose with Romantic-influenced liberals, is the distinction between the social and the personal.

Arendt provided one of the most influential and at the same time controversial accounts of this tripartite distinction, between the public, social and the private. For Arendt each human activity has a proper sphere to take place in. In this respect, the proper sphere of political action – the activities that are related to erecting a common world, for her, is the public realm, and the proper sphere of activities related to

the maintenance of life is the private realm, which is “born of necessities.” What Arendt calls the “rise of the social,” from the interior of the household into the public sphere, blurs the boundaries between the private and the public: the activities of the household enter the public sphere – the realm that human beings come to realize the freedom inhering in them, and private sphere assumes the meaning of the sphere of intimacy. That is, with the “rise of the social,” conformity and uniformity penetrates the public and freedom becomes a matter of the private sphere.

In Arendt's work, public realm refers to two interconnected themes: the “space of appearance” and the “world we hold in common.” The space of appearance is the sphere of action and speech, which for Arendt are “coeval and coequal of the same rank and kind” (1998: 26). Through acting and speaking is constituted the reality of the world since “our feeling of reality depends utterly upon appearance and therefore upon the existence of a public realm into which things can appear out of darkness of sheltered existence,” (51) and since “it is the presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear” that assures the reality of the world. The “space of appearance” then, is what the phrase suggests, a space, in which everything can be made visible to the eyes of the others. It emerges when individuals gather in the “manner of speech and action” and as such “predates and precedes all formal constitution of the public realm and the various forms of government, that is, the various forms in which the public realm can be organized” (119). This is a space that “arises out of action and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be” (198) and it is not a fixed but a potential space, it is only a “... potentiality ..., but only potentiality, not necessarily and not forever” (200). The political action taking place in this sphere, generates

power in the sense explained above, which in turn “keeps people together after the fleeting moment of action has passed and what they keep alive through remaining together” (201).

Second dimension of the public, “the world we hold in common,” is the “[hu]man-made world of things” (173) such as the organization of the Greek *polis*, which was “physically secured by the wall around the city and physiognomically guaranteed by its law” (198). It provides a physical context that we share with others in political action. However, a space of appearance is necessary before “[hu]man-made world of things” can be erected. In other words, political action taking place in the space of appearance is the condition of a “world we leave in common,” in which people feel at home in the world, and which is an institutionalization of the space of appearance. But, institutionalization does not mean that the space of appearance becomes a fixed unity, it is still a potentiality in action, through which new relations can be established, and new realities are created, which, in turn, reshape the world we hold in common. This is a world “common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned places in it” and it “relates and separates men at the same time” (52). At this point, notion of plurality has an important place in Arendt's account (175-176):

> Human plurality, the basic condition of both action and speech, has the twofold character of equality and distinction. If men were not equal, they could neither understand each other and those who came before them nor plan for the future and foresee those who will come after them. If men were not distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is, was, or will ever be, they would need neither speech nor action to make themselves understood. Signs and sounds to communicate immediate, identical needs and wants would be enough.

For Arendt, since the individual traits are the ones that all human beings share, the “who-ness” of an individual cannot be captured by

her/his qualities, interests or the categories s/he belongs. In this respect, for Arendt, “who” somebody is refers to the “public identity” of an individual manifested through acting and speaking together in the public realm and is distinct from “what” somebody is. Who-ness of somebody entails his/her distinctiveness and uniqueness, while what-ness of somebody means his/her equality and sameness. According to Arendt, with the rise of the social, distinctiveness was rendered a private matter and the public sphere has been identified on the basis of equality, which, for Arendt, does not arise from human nature nor is inherent in birth. It is an association between people who are different and unequal, and established through human togetherness. Thus, equality in the public sphere is the “equality of unequals who stand in need of being 'equalized' in certain respects and for specific purposes” (215).

Arendt's thoughts on the rise of the social are criticized by a number of feminists, on the grounds that, in addition to being gender-blind, it committed a crime against the feminist claim that “personal is political.” In other words, most feminist authors see Arendt's accounts of the public, social and the private as problematic since, it is contended, it does not allow personal and private matters enter into the public realm of politics (see for example Benhabib, 1996; Dietz, 1995; Pitkin, 1995). For many feminists, not only Arendt's account was problematic, but the distinction itself was. Thus, some rejected the distinction altogether, while others shifted the focus from the public/private to public/domestic, that is, to the family (see for example Okin, 1991). I believe – well aware of the fact that such a position is not so much compatible with a post-structuralist perspective at the outset – retaining a sense of public/private distinction in the Arendtian sense in specifying the distinctiveness of the political (taking into consideration the dangers of understanding

the political with a view to a duality), is of much help. To this point, I turn later on in this chapter.

2.3. "THINKING"

Arendt argues, drawing on Kant, "intellect (Verstand) desires to grasp what is given to the senses, but reason (Vernunft) wishes to understand its meaning" (Arendt, 1978: 57). For Arendt, thinking refers to the activity of giving meaning to the world and questioning the given knowledges rather than the search for universals. Arendt's engagement with thinking resulted from her search for an explanation for the horrible crimes committed by people, especially by the Nazis. Arendt, in *On Totalitarianism* claimed that the evil was radical, capturing the comprehension of the people. However, after the trial of *Eichmann*, a former Nazi officer, she changed her mind about evil and emphasized the "banality of evil" (Arendt, 2006). Observing the Eichmann trial Arendt concluded "the deeds were monstrous, but the doer ... was quite ordinary, commonplace and neither demonic nor monstrous" (1978: 4). Eichmann was not innately wicked or insane but was unable "to think from the standpoint of somebody else" (2006: 49). At the root of the evil, then, there was *thoughtlessness*. Arendt asked (1978: 5):

> Could the activity of thinking ... the habit of examining whatever happens to come to pass or attract attention, regardless of results and contents, could this activity be among the conditions that make men abstain from evil-doing or even actually 'condition' them against it?

As such, for Arendt *thoughtlessness*, a problem potentially for everyone, was associated with evil and she proposed thinking as one of the conditions that prevents it. However, interestingly, Arendt claimed that in Eichmann's trial, for the successful functioning of the

trial, a certain amount of thoughtlessness was also necessary. This was because the trial was not in a position of "examining whatever happens to come to pass or attract attention," but had to function based on some foundationalist beliefs, without criticizing them. I believe, at this point Arendt turns to the distinction Kant made, between the public and private uses of reason, which are related to his thoughts on Enlightenment. According to Kant (Kant, 1996: 58):

> Enlightenment is mankind's exit from its self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without the guidance of another. Have courage to use your *own* understanding! is thus the motto of Enlightenment.

Using her/his understanding/reason, one has to attend to the differences between its public and private uses. The public use of reason, for Kant, is the use one makes of it "*as a scholar* [*Gelehrter*] before the entire public of the *reading world,*" its private use refers to the use "one makes of his reason in a certain *civil post* or office which is entrusted to him" (60; emphasis in original). In the public use of reason, one freely uses her/his reason and discusses matters freely. In the private use of reason, one obeys her/his superiors and follow their orders and do not argue with them. Private use of reason refers to the use one makes when fulfilling her/his duties. Then, it can be argued that the functionality of the trial was dependent on a private use of reason on the part of the judges, while Arendt could make a public use of reason to criticize whatever happens to come to pass in the trial.

For Arendt, thinking requires a "stop and think" attitude, a withdrawal from direct involvement with the world. Withdrawal does not refer to a retreat from the world on the one hand, and on the other hand, it does not mean thinking is a lonely or isolated activity, but it means

that it is a solitary activity, in which one keeps oneself as her/his company (1978: 185). Withdrawal from the world is a theme that Foucault also emphasized. For Foucault, thought allows one to (2006):

> step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and to question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem.

At the heart of reflecting on what one does as a problem is Foucault's concept of *problematization* (2000: 86):

> problematization does not mean the representation of a preexistent object nor the creation through discourse of an object that did not exist. It is the ensemble of discursive and nondiscursive practices that make something enter into the play of true and false and constitute it as an object of thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc).

Foucault, like Arendt, turns to Kant, and places his project within the second of two critical traditions that Kant laid the foundations of: the *analytics of truth*, which poses questions about the conditions that make the true knowledge possible and an *ontology of the present*, which questions the meaning of the present. However, where Kant and, also, Arendt, distinguished meaning and truth, thinking and knowing from each other, Foucault focused on the relations between them. In fact, as Foucault's concept of power-knowledge indicates, for Foucault, no knowledge is possible without the problematizations and hence, thought. So instead of acting within the limits of the Intellect, of what can be known, Foucault charges thought with the task of transgressing the limits (1984: 45):

> Criticism indeed consists of analysing and reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has to be turned into a positive one: in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief is to transform the critique conducted in the form necessary limitation in to a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.

As Arendt's “examining whatever happens to come to pass or attract attention,” thought for Foucault “is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest.” In this respect, the task of thinking in a critical way is to show that “what we accept as going without saying no longer goes without saying” (1982b: 34). And when the moment comes that (34):

> one begins to be unable, any longer, to think things as one usually thinks them, transformation becomes simultaneously very urgent, very difficult, and altogether possible.

At that point, different solutions are proposed to a perceived problem. Foucault aims to “rediscover at the root of these diverse solutions the general form of problematization that has made them possible—even in their very opposition” (2006). This, for Foucault, is the specific work of history of thought and the point of problematization, which develops domains of acts, practices and thoughts that render problematic the 'solutions' proposed to political problems.

2.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In understanding what political thought refers to, one needs to provide, at the least, accounts on power, knowledge, public/private, and thought. I tried to answer the question of what they entail

drawing on the works of Arendt and Foucault. As it is used in this study, the concept of power refers to those relations, in which people have a *field of possible actions* (*and reactions*) and a *capacity* to realize these possibilities, to act upon the actions of others and upon the actions of oneself, as well, *to* control, regulate, discipline or empower these actions or to act *against* being controlled, regulated, disciplined or empowered by these actions. Having capacity and a field of possible actions and responses, in short, freedom, is essential for a power relationship and is what distinguishes power from domination. Particularly, the notion of *capacity* is crucial here, since domination can materialize even when a field of possibilities is present, if actualization of the possibilities causes grave consequences. Then one has to be capable of realizing the possibilities without having to face grave consequences.

Acting upon the actions of others and oneself, one gathers *a* knowledge of the other and of oneself and on the basis of this knowledge defines particular subjectivities for the other and for the self. In other words, in a power relationship, one is continually subjected both by others and by oneself to a particular, but not necessarily the same, subjectivity. There is no subjective position, no essence of subjectivity prior to entering into power relations with the others and/or the self, in fact subjectivity is an effect of these power relations. But simply arguing that power produces subjectivities will not do, because power is not an institution, a position, a “something” that stands apart and produces subjectivity from where it stands. It is more apt to argue that subjectivities are not produced by power, but through, on the basis of, and in relation to power relations. It is as long as that we enter into power relations with the others or with *ourselves* (entering power relations with oneself takes place in solitude, as Arendt understands the term, when one keeps oneself a

company and acts upon her/his own actions, based on the models s/he finds in the culture, society or social group), that we come to *occupy* subject *positions*. As the wording suggests, through power relations, we do not become subjects of our actions; we do not become ourselves, our subjectivities, but come to *occupy* positions, which can as well be occupied by others, and also, we can occupy other subject positions.

In brief, power is not “a kind of stuff that can be possessed by individuals in greater or lesser amounts” (Young, 1990: 31); neither is it a static force vested in the institutions nor can it be conceptualized in relation to and on the basis of an opposition between a *power-to* conception on the one hand, and a *power-over* on the other - that is neither capacity/ability or nor imposing one's will over others alone can explain what power refers to. Power emerges only in the processes of individual and/or collective (inter)action, these processes are dynamic that the positions of individuals or collectivities in a power relationship are not fixed and stable – albeit these positions are not always equal to each other – and there is always the possibility that one or the other side gains an advantaged position – although reversing the positions is not as easy as it seems. Within these dynamic processes are produced the subjectivities that the sides and parts of a power relationship occupy, also are produced knowledges and truths on these subjectivities as well as new relations between human beings and new meanings of the “human condition.”

The knowledge, truth and subjectivities produced and human relations established within power relations are disclosed in a public realm, that is not always already there, but is a potentiality, that actualizes when human beings act and speak together. However,

public is not a predefined sphere, pre-existing the deeds and words of human beings; neither it belongs to a pre-defined gender category (public cannot be conceptualized as belonging to the men and private to women), it actualizes with individual and collective action. It should be noted that collectivities are formed through these actions, “we” does not precede the action. As Foucault argues (2006):

> ... the problem is, precisely, to decide if it is actually suitable to place oneself within a “we” in order to assert the principles one recognizes and the values one accepts; or if it is not, rather, necessary to make the future formation of a “we” possible by elaborating the question. … “we” must not be previous to the question; it can only be the result—and the necessary temporary result—of the question as it is posed in the new terms in which one formulates it.

Individuals/subjects reveal their uniqueness and distinctiveness and pose questions in new terms continually to form temporary and simultaneously emerging collectivities in the public realm. Thus, public provides a forum, in which individuals realize their interests and/or concern the welfare of others, and, on the basis of their actions, form collectivities.

Thoughts of individuals, which require the withdrawal from immediate activities and question the given, the automatic processes, are shared with others in this forum. Thus, thinking, in this study, does not refer to philosophical engagement. The political character of thinking, that is evident in both Arendt and Foucault is what concerns this study. It is not taken as an activity to reach the universals, but as an activity, through which effects of universality are added to specific and particular propositions, and what goes without saying is problematized. In such an understanding, thought by and in itself is political since through thought meaning and truth are created, and

these meanings and truths, in turn, shape the realms in which we live.

Drawing these together, the *political* simultaneously refers to the processes, the thoughts accompanying these processes, and the realm in which these processes take place to specify the meaning made out of the human world. In this respect, everything and nothing is political. Everything is political, since everything can be made into a matter of individual and collective action, which problematizes and challenges “what goes without saying.” Nothing is political unless one engages into this action. Thus political is a potentiality that may render everything and anything a political matter. In this respect, unless problematized in individual and/or collective political action, not only “private” matters are not political, but, also, “public” matters are not political, even if they involve power relations and are, invariably, the results of political processes. In other words, a distinction cannot be made between the private and the public as: the issues of the private realm are apolitical or non-political, but of the public realm are political, nor public realm is the sphere of institutional power (this we can call institutional sphere). *A depoliticization of the political* may occur in all realms – meaning, the political nature of the construction of the realms of human activities may be rendered invisible. When an issue of either the private or the public (or the institutional) realms is made an object of political action, the appropriate sphere in which that action takes place is the public realm, which emerges when human beings speak and act together – but not in uniformity.

In conclusion, political thought, as utilized in this study, refers not only to the engagements of *great philosophers* whose names are listed in the canon, but also to what everyone does when they begin

to contemplate on “what happens to come to pass.” However, this contemplation acquires its political character when the thoughts are *public-ized* in the manner of speech or writing. I guess the phrase that best captures my understanding of political thought is “the thoughts that are political.” So, political thought is the actions/ activities that attempt to give meaning to the “human condition,” problematize the meanings made of it, propose solution(s) to the perceived problems – immediate or likely to emerge, and offer visions of a “good” society, and/or legitimizations and naturalizations of the existing one.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: ENCOUNTERING POST-STRUCTURALIST FEMINISM

“Why Women's Studies?” asked one of the “women”, who was there waiting, like me, to be interviewed by the committee that would decide whether or not our intellectual and academic capacities were adequate to be admitted to *Gender and Women's Studies Program* in *Middle East Technical University*. I had been encountering the question since when I first decided to apply for the program and variants of such “questioning” since the first time I had shown interest in and support for feminist concerns. Obviously, there is nothing interesting in asking someone why s/he applies one program instead of another or why s/he positions her/himself with *this* political movement instead of *that* one. Fascinating for me were the assumptions lying behind these questions, who asks the questions to whom and under what circumstances. Being born a “male” makes me, in the eyes of the many – with or without feminist leanings – a usual suspect, behind the appearance of whose appeal to *feminist* ideals, whose resistance and challenge to *patriarchy* must there be a hidden truth and/or a secret program, which is at best, indirectly related to the apparent goal of furthering feminist concerns and at worst, employs this apparent goal as a mask to furthering some personal (and most probably) patriarchal interests. Since it is not “normally” expected of “normal” “men” to endorse feminist causes or to attend to gender/women's studies programs (for, in this line of reasoning, one is her/his *sex* and one's sex conditions her/his

gender and my gender precluded the possibility of being a feminist for me, the pride (an anti-feminist would say shame) of being which is reserved for the opposite gender than I am – i.e. “women,” to be(come) which I should have been born the opposite sex than I am – i.e. “female”), my *presence* required an explanation, a reason why. The explanations for this reason why, accounts on what constituted this hidden truth and/or on my secret program(s) are varied, ranging from the (pre)conception that it resulted from my avoidance or postponement of compulsory military service, to the belief that it served my secret “Casanova” plan of appealing to women, gathering their trust and using it to seduce more women than I could otherwise do. Moreover there are those who believe that my appeal to feminist ideals must have been related to a “defect” in my manhood, I must have been a homosexual or at least, a “light man” – meaning, a male who is not “man” enough to be a “man” – to declare support for feminism. Therefore, my act was considered an act of transgression of sex/gender boundaries, although there was no evident transgression in my actions.

When it is *non-feminist* and/or *anti-feminist* “men” and “women” who request the answers to such questions, I cite Henry David Thoreau's reply to Ralph Waldo Emerson's question. In 1840's America raged a war on Mexico and a tax is levied to finance the war. Refusing to pay the taxes in protest against the Fugitive Slave Act and the Mexican-American War, Thoreau was jailed for a night and was released when one of his friends paid the tax without his request or consent. According to some accounts, Emerson visits Thoreau in jail that night, and asks, “Henry, what are you doing in there?” in reply Thoreau says, “Waldo, the question is what are you doing out there?” Telling this anecdote, I move on to explain that there are struggles against *domination* and the basic question is whether one is “for,” or

“against” that domination – although I am fully aware that the parts and the sides of the struggle are never that clear as the question suggests. However, responding to the same question is much more difficult when a feminist, who believes that men and feminism are contradicting terms, directs it to me, since each word coming from my mouth reminds *her* of the *oppressive* history. In both cases, my sex/gender enter the conservation before me, make the opening statement for and in spite of me and I can never undo or take back that statement during or after the conversation. As such, reasons beyond my reach – that I am born a “male” – limits my field of possibilities: it limits the kinds of actions and speech I can engage in, it conditions my social activities, my political affinities/associations, the kind of my knowledge of the world. Then, in action and speech, my body and the meanings attached to it – i.e. my sex – become me, my sex/gender become my subjectivity. My sex/gender creates simulations of me, a hyper-reality, in which I become more real than me and myself. As a result, there is no *me*, there is no *myself*, there is only this specific body that simulates me, (re)presents me and, even, undoes me. However, I am not left undone, rather, I am continually undone and redone, I am in a continual process of patriarchal production, of meaning, of knowledges, of truths, of discourses about me. Not only my gender is this continual process of production, but also my sexed body is; and its effects are not only felt on my uses of my body, but, even more, on its shape, health, strength, in brief, on its very materiality.

Generally speaking, one's body and its “corresponding gender” are produced in a patriarchal process of subjectivity production, which conceal the fact that bodies, its sex and the consequent gender are not “natural” but are produced within a patriarchal web of power relations. Each and every human being, not only upon entering into

relationships with other human beings, but also in their relations with themselves (in their thinking in solitude, in their actions upon their own actions) is implicated in this web of power relations. Within this web are produced the subjectivities through, on the basis of and in relation to one's body and its gender. There are three overlapping processes in effect here, the process in which bodies are continually produced as sexed and gendered, the process in which the marks of this production is cleared from the bodies and they are marked as natural – in other words, the concealment of the production process is produced; and the process in which gendered subjectivities are produced on the basis of the seemingly natural bodies. As a result of these processes emerge the two grand categories of human beings; men and women, and also a third accompanying category of "deviants," those that transgress the "natural" limits of gender differentiation.

A number of questions arise at this point. On a general level, if the subject is constituted within (patriarchal) power relations, more accurately, through, on the basis of and in relation to these power relations (if there is not an *essence* to the subject, if they are not independent of power), does that preclude the possibilities of individual agency? If human beings are embedded in patriarchal relations in such a way that their subjectivities are constructed in a patriarchal process, is it possible for them to challenge patriarchy, to transgress its boundaries, and if so, how? On the other hand, if the subject is constituted in power relations and predetermined by the social context around her/him, what accounts for the variations between different subject positions? If patriarchy has such a determinate role in the production of gendered subjectivities, of which there are only two grand categories, how is it that there are various subject positions assumed by both members of two grand

categories? How do human beings happen to become unique and distinctive: why “signs and sounds” are not enough for human beings “to communicate immediate, identical needs and wants” and they need “speech [and] action to make themselves understood” (Arendt, 1998: 175-176)? But, at the same time, if human beings are unique and distinctive, if there are differences among each of the two categories of gendered bodies, how is it that not only common sense arguments but also (social) scientific research conclude that there are evidential differences between men and women, in their actions, behaviors, thinking, talking, sitting, eating, walking and so on? Are these differences “real” or “produced”? Do they result from the biological differences between the males and females or arise out of their different experiences in patriarchal settings? If it is true that there are essential or experiential differences between men and women, should it be taken to mean that these categories are so valid that no one can rid of or should we struggle to eradicate or espouse these differences and in either option, how?

There are various strands of feminist theorizing that one can adopt in attempting to answer these and similar questions. Since feminist theory is “extremely self-conscious,” a part of feminist literature deals with naming, categorizing, reviewing, pointing to the differences and similarities between these different strands of feminism (Dietz, 2003: 403), and there are various strands of feminist theorizing on how to categorize feminist theorizing. A review of the reviews of the reviews of the different feminisms and the responses of each to the above posed questions is outside the scope of the present study. Only a brief and no doubt an incomplete review of just one of the categories in those reviews of feminisms, that of post-structuralist feminist theorizing is provided here.

Keeping in mind the fact that there are more differences than similarities among feminists who are labeled or label themselves as post-structuralist feminist, post-structuralist feminism can be divided into two categories. On the one hand, there is the work of the so-called “French feminists,” which draws primarily on psychoanalytic theory of Lacan and linguistic deconstruction of Derrida (see for example Irigaray, 1985; Kristeva, 1982). On the other hand, there is the work of those feminists which draw on Foucault's theory of power, discourse and subjectivity (e.g. Bartky, 1988; Butler, 1999; Bordo, 1993; De Lauretis, 1987**;** Terry, 1989). It is this latter strand of post-structuralist feminist theorizing that I make use of in this study, in providing clarifications of the concepts of sex, gender and patriarchy.

Michel Foucault's influence on contemporary feminist theorizing has been vast and varied. Encountering with and responding to Foucault's works, especially his theories of power and subjectivity, feminist scholars, even those who dispute his claims, had to acknowledge his contributions. It is for a long time now that the question is not whether or not his contribution should be appropriated, but how it should be utilized in contemporary feminist theory. However, utilization does not mean word by word repetition of Foucault’s framework, but rather it points to making use of it as a toolbox, which contain certain tools to which others may also be added and the tools in it can be utilized for the purposes other than they were designed for. Thus, although I employ the Foucauldian strand of post-structuralist feminist theorizing in this study, I do not utilize it at face value, and propose, at the least, clarifications of that theoretical framework in relation to the purposes of the present study. In what follows, I first provide clarifications of the concepts of sex and gender, drawing primarily upon the work of Judith Butler and the

other post-structuralist feminists. In this respect I discuss the relations between the concepts of sex and gender, how they are constructed and the political nature of their construction. Second, I move onto elaborate on the concept of patriarchy. Drawing upon the work of the post-structuralist feminist who utilize Foucault's concept of disciplinary power and Slyvia Walby's distinction between the private and public patriarchy from a very different theoretical background I provide the sense that the concept of patriarchy is utilized in this study. In both parts, the clarifications provided in the previous chapter is utilized, that is the work of Hannah Arendt is included in the clarification of the theoretical framework of the present study as much as the works of Michel Foucault and post-structuralist feminists. (In)Concluding, drawing these together, I discuss the relations between the concepts of sex, gender and patriarchy.

3.1. POST-STRUCTURALIST FEMINISM ON SEX AND (TECHNOLOGIES OF) GENDER (PERFORMATIVITY)

In the 1970s the concept of *gender* began to be widely used as an analytical tool distinct from the concept of *sex*. The distinction aligns sex with the realm of nature, which is fixed and prior to culture, so non-negotiable and gender with the realm of the culture, which is mutable and negotiable. So, gender refers to the social/political and cultural meanings inscribed on the sexed body and sex, to the innate characteristics the body assumes. Since it is presumed that there are only two types of biologically different bodies, that is there are two “normal/natural” sexes – that of males and females, there are two “normal” genders within this understanding, corresponding to the sexes: one is either a man or a woman. There is also another

category of “deviants” or “transgressors” who are somewhere in-between.

The basic biological explanations for the differences between the sexes are based on chromosomal, hormonal and other kinds of anatomical differences. Anne Fausto-Sterling argues, that, even when the differences between the sexes are explained in terms of chromosomes, hormones or other anatomical differences, it is the apparent “acceptable” physical genitalia, that the argument is based on. That is, bodies are first categorized on the basis of apparent physical genitalia, and then differences between these two categories are defined in terms of chromosomes, hormones, brain size and so on. In other words, it is not that research aims to reveal if there are essential differences between the male and female bodies, rather it takes for granted that male and female bodies are different from each other and attempts to account for these presupposed differences. As Fausto-Sterling Argues, what acceptable physical genitalia is subject to considerable medical and biological bias, as the efforts of the medical community to control and “fix” the genitalia of the “problematic” inter-sexual individuals in a variety of ways attest. She argues, dueling the dualism of sex, there are more sexes than two (Fausto-Sterling, 2000).

Discussions of the biological-scientific explanations of “sexual differences” between males and females are beyond the scope of the present study. I believe that bodies are important in the construction of subjectivity, but also believe that drawing on biological-scientific explanations of sex in understanding the political (or social, or cultural) construction of embodied subjectivities, renders social sciences the sub-disciplines of biology. In the political realm, the objects of study are not chromosomes or hormones or brain size or

the like since what inhabit the political realm are not the *anatomical* bodies, but are the *lived* bodies. However, this must not taken to mean that I believe there is on the one hand the biological/anatomical/sexed body, the knowledge of which is uncovered by biology and is free from political, social and/or cultural systems of thought and on the other the lived/gendered body, the truth about which is produced in power relations. These are not two domains of knowledge that are distinct from and, thus, should not interfere with the sphere of, each other. Both biological/anatomical explanations of sex, and cultural explanations of gender are political constructs, utilized in making meaning of the human condition. In fact, as Moira Gatens argue, "anatomical body is itself a theoretical object for the discourse of anatomy which is produced by human beings in culture (Gatens, 1992: 131). Therefore (132):

> the sexed body can no longer be conceived as the unproblematic biological and factual base upon which gender is inscribed, but must itself be recognised as constructed by discourses and practices that take the body both as their target and as their vehicle of expression.

Hence, the concepts from biology are not only useless in understanding the political realm, they are also dangerous, since they describe dynamic process as fixed and static unities. As Foucault argues (1979: 154):

> the notion of "sex" made it possible to group together, in an artificial unity, anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a secret to be discovered everywhere: sex was thus able to function as a unique signifier and a universal signified.

Foucault, in an attempt to reveal the descents of the discourses that created the concept of sex as we have it today, analyzed the

proliferation of the discourses about sex and sexuality in nineteenth-century. Where these discourses were, seemingly, repressive, Foucault argued that these discourses served not to repress sex(uality) but to publicize and propagate it (1979: 34, 35, emphasis in original):

> What distinguishes these last three centuries is the variety, the wide dispersion of devices that were invented for speaking about sexuality, for having it be spoken about, for inducing it to speak of itself, for listening, recording, transcribing, and redistributing what is said about it … what is peculiar to modern societies, in fact, is not that they consigned sex to a shadow existence, but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of it *ad infinitum*, while exploiting it as *the* secret.

For Foucault, seemingly-repressive discourses on sex(uality) created the technologies used to control the human body and endowed it with a kind of sex(uality) that was unknown for the people living before then. A construction of human beings as sexed and sexual beings took place and began to be the prominent approach in accounting for the differences between human beings. In other words, sexing of the body is just as "socially constructed" as the gendering of the individuals, that is, just as cultural explanations of gender differences are "socially constructed," biological explanations of the sex differences are also "socially constructed" (I believe this is an unfortunate designation, most scholars stick to. I think, the better term would be "politically constructed," since what happens to come to pass in the social, are the results of political processes). If this is so, if sex itself is a cultural interpretation of bodily differences, then (Butler, 1999: 11; emphasis in original):

> [I]t makes no sense … to define gender as the cultural interpretation of sex… Gender ought not be conceived merely as the cultural inscription of meaning on a pregiven sex (a juridical conception); gender must also designate the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are

> established. As a result, gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural means by which "sexed nature" or "a natural sex" is produced and established as "prediscursive," prior to culture, a politically neutral surface *on which* culture acts.

In other words, sex must not be thought of as a given and gender, as a kind of power relation that tries control the meanings made out of this given. Sex, as well as gender, is socially/politically constructed. If "sex" is as socially/politically constructed as gender and if there is not a direct relationship between the two, we need not only talk about two sexes and, two genders, corresponding to the anatomical bodies. As Butler argues (1999: 10):

> Can we refer to a "given" sex or a "given" gender without first inquiring into how sex and/or gender is given, through what means? … If gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes, then a gender cannot be said to follow from a sex in any one way…Assuming for the moment the stability of binary sex, it does not follow that the construction of "men" will accrue exclusively to the bodies of males or that "women" will interpret only female bodies. Further…there is no reason to assume that genders ought also to remain as two.

As Fausto-Sterling show that there are not only two sexes, a number of anthropological or ethnographic studies, give strong evidence that the genders are not only two in all societies, and moreover, even when there are only two genders in a particular society, their positions do not follow the models familiar to people living in societies such as ours. In many Native American cultures there is a third gender, "berdache," which is attributed to spiritual individuals, who are believed to have both male and female souls. Berdache is commonly a biological male, who dress, work and behave as women. In direct contrast to the treatment of people with an ambiguous gender in our societies, berdaches are portrayed as having special powers and enjoy high social and economic status. According to Walter Williams, in these cultures, "biological sex is less important in

gender classification than a person's desire" (Williams, 1986: 22). Then, a dual system of gender is not universal. But even when the stability of the duality of genders is assumed, there are many variations in the positions of men and women vis-à-vis each other. In her classical study, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, Margaret Mead explored three very different cultures in New Guinea. She showed that in two of these cultures, masculinity or femininity were not the lines along which individual differences were organized. Social expectations from men and women did not differ in these cultures, although the form and content of the expectations did. Where *Arapesh* culture was a pacifist one that demanded gentleness from its members, *Mundugamor* was, a warrior culture, which demanded from its men and women members to be aggressive and violent. In these two cultures, society was not organized around gender differences. In the third culture that Mead examined, gender differences were emphasized. Members of the *Tchambuli* tribe were divided along the lines of gender; there was on the one hand the "charming, graceful, coquettish" nurturing gender, which is composed of men, and on the other hand there were the women, "who have the real positions of power in the society" (Mead, 1935: 197, 190). Thus in *Tchambuli* culture social life and individual differences were organized along gender differences, but in a model unfamiliar to us. Mead concludes from that "men and women are capable of being molded to a single pattern as easily as a diverse one" (Mead, 1935: 228).

Therefore, it can be concluded that there are not only two sexes and there are not two genders corresponding to the bodily differences of human beings. If genders are not two, represented in man and woman, one cannot assume a universal category of man and a universal category of woman. However, feminists, for the most part,

took for granted a notion of woman and utilized it as the subject of feminism. Butler in *Gender Trouble* undertakes the task of destabilizing the category, through a "*feminist genealogy* of the category of women." (Butler, 1999: 9; emphasis in original). Butler questions whether there is such a category that may be captured by the concept of women, who are the *only* potential actors of feminism and for whom political representation is pursued. Drawing on Foucault's theory of subjectivity Butler argues (1999, 4):

> Foucault points out that juridical systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent. Juridical notions of power appear to regulate political life in purely negative terms – that is, through the limitation, prohibition, regulation, control and even "protection" of individuals related to that political structure … But the subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of those structures.

Thus, for Butler (1999, 4):

> Feminist critique ought ... to understand how the category of 'women', the subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which emancipation is sought.

Butler argues that, taking as granted a category of woman may result in the opposite of the aims of feminists (1999: 7):

> the premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood as a seamless category of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the category. These domains of exclusion reveal the coercive and regulatory consequences of that construction, even when the construction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposes.

One such refusal to accept the category is bell hooks' statement that (1984: 8-9, 3):

> All too frequently in the women's movement it was assumed one could be free of sexist thinking by simply adopting the appropriate feminist rhetoric; it was further assumed that identifying oneself as oppressed freed one from being an oppressor. To a grave extent such thinking prevented white feminists from understanding and overcoming their own sexist-racist attitudes toward black women. They could pay lip service to the idea of sisterhood and solidarity between women but at the same time dismiss black women. … white women who dominate feminist discourse today rarely question whether or not their perspective on women's reality is true to the lived experiences of women as a collective group.

What constitutes a perspective on women's reality that is true to the lived experiences of women as a collective group? If there are differences between women from different backgrounds, is it possible to speak of women as a collective group and is it possible to speak about the lived experiences of women as a collective group? The criticisms of the black feminists such as bell hooks and feminists from different ethnic, national, cultural, social backgrounds have become useful in challenging the notion of universal category of woman and global sisterhood and in acknowledging differences within the category of women. However, the efforts at challenging the essentialist views of women, making visible the differences within the category of woman, continued to depend on the essentialist views of women. In other words, the essentialist category of *woman* was replaced with an essentialist category of *women*. That is, these feminist critiques of universal category of woman, although were a well-intentioned effort to account for the differences between women, replaced the category with specific cultural, racial, national, regional, socio-economic categories of women, such categories as western women, third world women, African women, Indian women, Muslim women, post-communist women, Turkish women, working women, rural women, or the like. As such, a universal essentialist category of women was replaced with cultural essentialist categories of women,

and differences within women, positioned in different categories of women, was overlooked (Narayan, 1998).

The problem of essentialism is an important one for feminism since even the efforts to challenge it, stays within the limits drawn by it. Assuming the idea that gender is historically, socially/politically and/or culturally constructed does not free one from essentialism. As Butler argues if one's gender is determined by cultural forces, gender is created by the social context around the subject, then, "gender is as determined and fixed as it was under the biology-is-destiny formulation" (Butler, 1999: 12):

> On some accounts, the notion that gender is constructed suggests a certain determinism of gender meanings inscribed on anatomically differentiated bodies, where those bodies are understood as passive recipients of an inexorable cultural law … in such a case, not biology, but culture, becomes destiny.

Similarly, Moi argues, holding that "there is a historically or socially given female essence" is not less essentialist than claiming that there is a biologically given female essence (Moi, 1997: 247). Does that make it an impossibility, as Diana Fuss argues, "to bracket of and to contain essentialist manoeuvres in anti-essentialist arguments" (Fuss, 1989: 4)?

The problem of essentialism becomes acute especially in deciding the "we" of feminist activism and theorizing (or, more accurately feminist theoretico-activism): when the idea of a universal or culturally, historically, socially/politically constructed essence of women is adopted, feminist activism finds a solid base for action, albeit overlooking the many differences among women; on the other hand, when the idea that there is not an essence to womanhood is adopted, it is believed that feminism as a representational politics

loses the grounds for political action and the subject for representation. Naomi Scheman, summarizing the situation facing the feminists in their search for the feminist "we," argues that: "the epistemological and political need to say we remains" even though "the case against saying we seems overwhelming: politically as a piece of imperialist presumption, and epistemologically as a fiction that equates autonomy with universality" (Scheman, 1993: 190). In the face of these problems, some feminists proposed a form of "strategic essentialism" (Spivak, 1987). For example Denise Riley claims that "both a concentration on and a refusal of the identity of women are essential to feminism" (Riley, 1988: 1). Snitow similarly argues (Snitow, 1990: 9):

> Feminism is inevitably a mixed form, requiring in its very nature such inconsistencies. … a common divide keeps forming in both feminist thought and action between the need to build the identity "women" and give it solid political meaning and the need to tear down the category "woman" and dismantle its all-too-solid history.

Judith Butler, refusing this pragmatic use of essentialism, contends (Butler, 1999: 8):

> The suggestion that feminism can seek wider representation for a subject that it itself constructs has the ironic consequence that feminist goals risk failure by refusing to take account of the constitutive powers of their own representational claims. This problem is not ameliorated through an appeal to the category of women for merely "strategic" purposes, for strategies always have meanings that exceed the purposes for which they are intended.

In its stead, Butler proposes (1999: 21-22; emphasis added):

> The antifoundationalist approach to coalitional politics assumes neither that "identity" is a premise nor that the shape or meaning of a coalitional assemblage can be known prior to its achievement. … when agreed-upon identities and agreed-upon

> diologic structures, through which already established identities are communicated, no longer constitute the theme or subject of politics, the identities can come into being and dissolve depending on the concrete practices that constitute them. Certain political practices institutes identities on a contingent basis in order to accomplish *whatever aims are in view*.

Arguing that the usage of passive voice is a move, on the part of Butler, to avoid saying "what we have in view," Ferguson contends that even Butler implicitly adopts some form of essentialism and that, that one cannot free oneself from essentialism completely. She sketches out three different positions in relation to essentialism: "essentialism per se," "universalization," and "coherent categorization." The first "attributes women's psychological and social experiences to fixed and unchanging traits resident in women's physiology or in some larger order of things" (Ferguson, 1993: 81). The second "takes the patterns visible in one's own time and place to be accurate for all" and the third refers to "any constitution of a unified set of categories around the terms of woman and man" (82). Ferguson believes, even if one escapes from the first two forms of essentialism, there is no escape from the third.

I think, Ferguson's claim that there is no escape from essentialism results from confusing identity-based politics with issue-based politics on the one hand and confusing identity with essence on the other. Her objection to Butler is exemplary of the first confusion: she takes the difference between "what we have in view" and "whatever aims are in view" as just a difference in the choice of the words. However, difference between them is not just a difference in wording. Butler's argument points to an issue-based political action, where Ferguson's argument points to an identity based one. Where for Butler, there are issues/aims on the basis of which identities can be formed, for Ferguson there are identities on the basis of which issues/aims are

formed. Although these two forms of human action continually refer to, and cannot simply be separated from, each other, there is still a difference between them. Does this mean that identity-based political action is inherently essentialist where issue-based political action is not. Things are a little bit more complicated than that.

Consider these two definitions of feminism: *feminism is a movement to end – at least to challenge – patriarchy*, and *feminism is a movement for the emancipation of women*. At the outset, first seems to refer to an issue-based politics and the second to an identity politics. However, how patriarchy is defined is crucial here. If patriarchy is defined as a universal system that dominates, subordinates and oppresses women, without first inquiring what the category of women refers to and how it is constructed, then, it can be said essentialism is a problem for issue-based political action, too. Assume for the moment that there is indeed a universal patriarchy, defined as the male domination over women. Can we conclude, from that that every “men” and “women” have the same conception of it, that every “men” and “women” have the same experiences in and through it and that every “men” and “women” make the same use of it. Feminists from different backgrounds, or better still, feminists attending to the differences between women from different backgrounds have shown that patriarchy is not a universal system of domination that operates in the same way in all times, places and contexts and “women” from different backgrounds do not experience the patriarchy in the same way. So, there are different forms of patriarchy as there are different collectivities of women and struggling against patriarchy is not a simple matter of challenging the patriarchal domination of a category of human beings by another category of human beings. On the other hand, in relation to the second definition of feminism the questions to be asked are: Can we

emancipate or empower a category? Even if we can, does that emancipation extend to the people who are believed to belong to that category? I doubt it. But the better question to ask is; What is it that makes us think that political action is impossible when people come to act in their uniqueness and distinctiveness rather than sameness and commonalities? Why do we believe that political action is united action of the essentially same people; that it requires a unity and an emphasis on the sameness of individuals taking part in it, rather than conceiving it as actions that distinctive and unique people engage in together? Why the emphasis is on unity rather than togetherness? And unite against what? Is there an all-encompassing solution to the problems faced by individuals as a result of patriarchal domination? I think that feminist political action should refer to people's acting together around an issue. What defines their togetherness is not their commonalities or essential sameness, but rather the kind of problematizations they engage in and the kind of solutions they propose. I believe categorization and construction of particular people with particular bodies, as men and women is one of such issues. Things are still complicated though.

In the patriarchal societies that we live in, people categorized as women are subordinated, dominated and oppressed because of their being categorized as women. Thus, emancipation of *women* from patriarchal domination is needed. However, patriarchy does not dominate a pre-existing subject, it first constructs the subject, which it comes to dominate. In other words, when we are talking about the patriarchal domination of women, we are talking about two interrelated themes; first, the construction and categorization of particular people as women, second the domination of people who are constructed as belonging to this category. So, the struggle against patriarchy is not a struggle that only challenges the

domination of women, it is simultaneously a struggle to challenge the construction and categorization of people with particular bodies as women or emancipation of women entails not only the emancipation of women from the domination but also the emancipation of women from being categorized as women. This is to say that a political action, in which individuals come together with and on the basis of their unique and distinctive identities to challenge being categorized is a viable one. The struggle should be, on the one hand, against being treated as a category and, on the other hand, against being dominated on the basis of belonging to that category. Therefore engaging in political action does not require identitional commonality of those who engage in it, and engaging in an identity politics, does not entail that there be an essence to the identities in question. Thus, it is not apt to argue that we are always already trapped in essentialism.

Thus far I have tried to show that; (a) we cannot take sex as natural and gender as cultural, (b) a binary sex/gender system is not the only human possibility (c) we should not continue to speak of women as a category (whether as a universally or culturally essential category), since it is a category constructed in patriarchal power relations. In brief, I aimed to show that gender identity is fluid and unstable. However, a question arises at this point that how gender identity can be fluid and unstable if subjects are constructed within patriarchal relations, as belonging to one of the two grand categories, that of male men and female women? In other words, is the social context around the individual determinative or does the individual have a say in this process? Moreover, what is this “thing” that is constructed: what is gender and how it is constructed?

At this point Teresa de Lauretis's "Technologies of Gender" is a useful guide. De Lauretis condensed her arguments into four central propositions (1987: 3, 9, 18):

> (1) Gender is (a) representation – which is not to say that it does not have concrete or real implications, both social and subjective, for the material life of individuals.
>
> (2) The representation of gender is its construction ... The construction of gender is both the product and the process of both representation and self-representation.
>
> (3) The construction of gender goes on as busily today as it did in earlier times ... through the various technologies of gender… and institutional discourses…with power to control the field of social meaning and thus produce, promote, and "implant" representations of gender. And it goes on not only where one might expect it to – in the media, the private and public schools, the courts, the family, nuclear or extended or single-parented ... The construction of gender also goes on, if less obviously, in the academy, in the intellectual community ... even, and indeed especially, in feminism.
>
> (4) the construction of gender is also effected by its deconstruction; that is to say, by any discourse, feminist or otherwise, that would discard it as ideological misrepresentation

De Lauretis uses Foucault as a guide, to trace the production of gender in the "technologies" of culture. For her, gender, as representation and self-representation, is the product of various social technologies (Lauretis, 1987: 2). According to de Lauretis, gender, sets up class distinctions, as in the way that when one belongs to a class, it is the class that defines one's identity, and relationships with other classes of people. This means that "gender assigns to one entity, say an individual, a position within a class, and therefore also a position vis-à-vis other pre-constituted classes" (4). For De Lauretis then gender is a kind of a social class in which one is positioned, and by being in that particular class, one takes up a definitive location in relation to other classes. However, the question

is; can one choose the class s/he belongs or is s/he positioned in it by the outside forces?

For de Lauretis production of gender is a social process. Gender is "'the set of effects produced in bodies, behaviors, and social relations,' in Foucault's words, by the deployment of 'a complex political technology'" (Lauretis, 1987: 3). For de Lauretis, then, individual does not have much say in the construction of gender, since she believes that gender creates class distinctions and one becomes a member of a class by either being identified or by identifying oneself as such. But if this is the case, then, one is doomed to the gender identity that is defined for her/him by the society. If this is so; if the individual has no choice but either be identified or self-identify with a pre-defined gender identity, then, how feminist action becomes a possibility?

At this point it is important to recognize that for de Lauretis gender representations, which assign meanings to individuals are semiotic constructions. If meaning is imposed upon a woman, if she is represented from the outside, she becomes passive in the process of gender production. However, when she *self-represents* as a woman, she takes on the production of meaning, instead of identifying with a forced identity. But still, since de Lauretis believes that a woman does not create or choose the social context, this process of self-representation is also limited by the technologies of gender. Thus, gender becomes a concept, in Lauretis's account, which is first defined by society, then interpreted and interpellated by the individual, as part of her creation of subjectivity.

Judith Butler, in her groundbreaking work, Gender Trouble provides an account of gendered subjectivity that concedes the individuals the

capacities to fashion their gendered subjectivities, more than de Lauretis does. For Butler, gender is a process, in which a person can and, indeed, does participate. In this respect, Butler rejects the humanist conceptions of the subject and its effects on thinking about gender. For Butler (Butler, 1999: 14-15):

> humanist conceptions of the subject tend to assume a substantive person who is the bearer of various essential and nonessential attributes. A humanist feminist position might understand gender as an *attribute* of a person who is characterized essentially as a pregendered substance or "core," called the person, denoting the universal capacity for reason, moral deliberation, or language.

Thus, Butler rejects the notion of gender as a substance, or an attribute possessed by the subject; gender is not a characteristic that a person can have. She claims that, gender is not a noun, neither is it a set of free-floating attributes. According to Butler, gender is a doing. But there is not a doer behind this doing that preexists the deed. Not because s/he is the doer behind the deed that she becomes the subject of doing, but her/his position as a doer, as the subject of doing, is constructed through, in relation and on the basis of the deed. In other words, the subject of doing, is constructed as the doer, not before the deed, but as the doing takes place – the doer behind the deed is constructed by the deed as the doer. Then, gendered subjectivity is an effect and this effect of gender is "*performatively* produced and compelled by the regulatory practices of gender coherence" (Butler, 1999: 33) Hence gender is a performance, it is performative and it constitutes the identity that it purports to be. In Butler's words (1999: 33):

> The challenge for rethinking gender categories … will have to reconsider the Nietzsche's claim in *On the Genealogy of Morals* that "there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed – the

> deed is everything." In an application Nietzsche himself would not have anticipated or condoned, we might say as a corollary: There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very "expressions" that are said to be its results.

Gender as a performance is able to subvert the traditional binary system of gender attribute, in which "men" are positioned in opposition to "women." At this point, Butler questions the "'coherence' and 'continuity' of the 'person'" as "logical or analytic features of personhood." According to Butler, "coherence" and "continuity" are "socially instituted and maintained norms of *intelligibility*" (Butler, 1999: 23; emphasis added). Intelligible genders are, "those which in some sense institute and maintain relations of coherence and continuity among sex, gender, sexual practice and desire" (Butler, 1999: 23) and norms of intelligibility, tie gender to a binary system through "compulsory heterosexuality." It is on the basis of "compulsory heterosexuality" one can view gender as a substance, a substance that requires a solidified coherence of sex, gender, and desire (Butler, 1999: 23-24, 173-174):

> Heterosexualization of desire requires and institutes the production of discrete and asymmetrical oppositions between "feminine" and "masculine," where these are understood as expressive attributes of "male" and "female." The cultural matrix through which gender identity has become intelligible requires that certain kinds of "identities" cannot "exist" – that is, those in which gender does not follow from sex and those in which the practices of desire do not "follow" from either sex or gender … In other words, acts and gestures, articulated and enacted desires create the illusion of an interior and organizing gender core, an illusion discursively maintained for the purposes of the regulation of sexuality within the obligatory frame of reproductive heterosexuality. If the "cause" of desire, gesture, and act can be localized within the "self" of the actor, then the political regulations and disciplinary practices which produce that ostensibly coherent gender are effectively displaced from view.

If gender can be freed from these norms of intelligibility, from the binary system that essentializes the distinctions between men and women, is the coherence of sex, gender, sexual practice and desire disturbed? For Butler, this leads to the questioning of the validity of conceiving gender as a substance, as a noun or as the attributes possessed by a person. Butler writes (1999: 32; emphasis in original):

> If it is possible to speak of a "man" with a masculine attribute and to understand that attribute as a happy but accidental feature of that man, then it is also possible to speak of a "man" with a feminine attribute, whatever that is, but still to maintain the integrity of the gender. If the notion of an abiding substance is a fictive construction produced through the compulsory ordering of attributes into coherent gender sequences, then it seems that gender as substance, the viability of *man* and *woman* as nouns, is called into question by the dissonant play of attributes that fail to conform to sequential or causal models of intelligibility.

Therefore, separated from the identity of an individual, who is believed to have a substance of gender, what a feminine or masculine attribute refers to becomes ambiguous. However, Butler asserts "gender can be rendered ambiguous without disturbing or reorienting normative sexuality at all" (1999: xiv). What this means is that, the doing of gender is not indicative of sexual practices that one engages. Butler uses the case of drag as an example, in which gender is being performed without its correlative assumptions for sexual activity. The act of a man of dressing and behaving as a woman need not entail the transgression of the boundaries of normative sexuality. Although he disturbs the norms of intelligibility, he does not necessarily disturb the norms of compulsory heterosexuality. Butler argues, although it makes sense to refuse a causal or structural link between gender and sexuality, "if what is meant … is that heterosexual normativity ought *not* to order gender,"

it is still important to realize that gender is regulated by sexuality, since it is possible that gender ambiguity operates "to contain or deflect non-normative sexual practice and work to keep normative sexuality intact" (1999: xiv; emphasis in original).

Then, cultural norms of gender intellibility, constructed on the basis of compulsory heterosexuality, constitutes the limits of gender performativity. As a result, performing gender is not an easy process, especially for the ones who assume a gender that is asymmetric to one's sex; that does not fit to the norms of cultural intelligibility and compulsory heterosexuality. Neither, the outcome of gender performance is a given. A time does not come that one suddenly finds one "is" a particular gender. S/he continually performs that gender. In other words, one does not wake up one morning to find herself/himself a wo/man, but one continually performs wo/manhood to be able to find her/himself a wo/man. For Butler the locus of this performance is the body, although gender is performed in any number of ways and in any number of domains. According to Butler (1999: 173; emphasis in original):

> …acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this *on the surface* of the body, through the play of signifying absences that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of the identity as a cause. Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are *performative* in the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are *fabrications* manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means.

What is the significance of Butler's theory for answering the above posed question of how gender is constructed and by whom, is her notion of gender as performance, as something enacted by an individual – who does not pre-exist the deed, but constituted by the deed as its doer – over time, through a series of actions, signs and

discursive practices. The primary locus of this performance is the body of the subject, which has “no ontological status apart from the various acts, which constitute its reality” (Butler, 1999: 173). The performance of gender, is able to subvert the traditional boundaries of binary gender, through parody. Butler cites the examples of drag, cross-dressing, and the sexual stylization of butch/femme identities in this respect. For Butler, parodying of the “normal” gender identities has the force of subverting the traditional gender identities and Butler argues, gendered subjectivities are constructed by the individuals themselves, within the limits of the cultural norms of intelligibility, which are formed on the basis of compulsory heterosexuality. Therefore, although Butler acknowledges that the social context surrounding the individual has an impact on the individual’s performance of gender, her focus is still on the individual. Furthermore, Butler concedes individuals the capacities to challenge and subvert the norms of intelligibility and compulsory heterosexuality.

As a conclusion three points should be emphasized, which are important for the sense that the concept of gender is used in this study. First of all, sex and gender cannot be distinguished from each other as: sex is natural and gender is cultural. Gender is not the meanings made out of a natural body, free from political meanings. Rather, both sex and gender are the meanings produced in relation to the human bodies. As a result, the binary sex/gender system, along the lines of which our societies are modeled, is neither “natural” and nor the only human possibility. Thus we should not continue speaking of wo/men as universally or culturally essential categories. Both the intelligible and the non-intelligible genders are constructed within the framework of patriarchal power relations. That genders are constructed, thus, does not necessarily mean that

people are helpless victims of their own gendered subjectivities, since although gendered subjectivities are to a large extent conditioned by the technologies of gender, that gender is performative enables human beings to interfere in the production of meanings on what it means to be a gendered subject.

3.2. POST-STRUCTURALIST FEMINISM ON DISCIPLINARY POWER AND PATRIARCHY

With the rise of the concept of “gender,” analytico-political energies and labors of feminist theorizing have been transferred from the analysis of *patriarchy* to the politics of *gender* and starting from the 1980s, feminist analysis on the basis of the concept of patriarchy began to disappear gradually. Although it is continued to be used, it has lost its previously privileged place of being the core concept of feminist theorizing. The rise of the concept took place in a context in which systemic analysis of large-scale systems and structures was utilized in explanations of inequality in different spheres of life. Feminists borrowing concepts and frameworks from these systemic analysis (especially from Marxist theory), analyzed gender relations and came to a conclusion that these frameworks are insufficient in explaining the specific forms of inequality, oppression, subordination, domination and exploitation that women face. Patriarchy would gain currency as a conceptual tool to explain these specific forms of macro-structural problems. Unsurprisingly, in the political atmosphere of post-1980s, in which micro-mechanisms were beginning to be emphasized instead of macro-mechanisms (as a result of both neo-liberalism and the forms of post-modernism that were modeled after neoliberalism), the concept was abandoned. As Maria Mies argues, patriarchy became a prominent concept when “the movement needed a term by which the totality of oppressive and exploitative

relations which affect women could be expressed as well as their systemic character" (1986:37), and declined in a context, in which micro gained prevalence on the macro and, as appropriate, gender became the core concept of feminist analysis.

The major reason behind the decline was the suggestion that the concept pointed to a universal and ahistorical form of male domination over women, based on the essentialist definitions of those categories. The argument was (and is) that employing the concept of patriarchy, one cannot attend to the differences within women and the different problems people labeled as women encounter in different times, places and contexts. Although these criticisms are valid, and such a conception of patriarchy had and has to be abandoned, I believe that retaining the concept, although with major reconceptualizations, is necessary for feminist theorizing, since it helps thinking in a systematic way the relations between gender categories, the technologies that effect the construction of these categories and the limits within which gender is performed. We need to retain it as we retain the concept of power: to name a particular kind and form of relation between human beings, in which human beings are divided into two "sexes" – i.e. male and female, categorized into two intelligible genders corresponding to these sexes – i.e. men and women, and differentially treated on the basis of their genders. In other words, we need to retain the concept of patriarchy not because male domination over females is universal, or not because this domination has the same form across time, place and context but we need to retain it to refer to the specific form that power relations takes in matters related to sex/gender. In this section I provide the sense that I employ the concept of patriarchy within the context of the present study. However, since it would require volumes to provide accounts of different definitions of patriarchy and

the criticisms leveled against them, I only provide brief accounts of post-structuralist feminist efforts at utilizing Foucault's concept of disciplinary power in conceptualizing patriarchy.

In *Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power,* Bartky embraces Foucault's concept of disciplinary power and utilizes it as a tool to understand women's acquiescence to patriarchal norms of femininity. Protesting Foucault's blindness to gender in his conceptualization of disciplinary power, through which human bodies are made docile, Bartky argues that Foucault treated human bodies “as if bodily experiences of men and women did not differ and as if men and women bore the same relationship to the characteristic institutions of modern life” (1988: 63). Extending Foucault's conceptualization of disciplinary power and his analysis of Panopticon, Bartky analyzes the construction of feminine docility through disciplinary practices. According to Bartky, the disciplinary practices that produce the docile feminine subjects are the symptoms of the "modernization of patriarchal domination." Modern disciplinary practices of patriarchal domination produce “a body which in gesture and appearance is recognizably feminine” and introduce “disciplinary project of bodily perfection,” through three categories of practices (64):

> those that aim to produce a body of certain size and general configuration; those that bring forth from this body a specific repertoire of gestures, postures, and movements; and those that are directed toward the display of this body as an ornamented surface.

Bartky argues that there are significant differences between men and women, “in gesture, posture, movement, and general bodily comportment: women are far more restricted than men in their manner of movement and in their spatiality” (1988: 66). On the

question that who is responsible for the restricted movement and spatiality of women, Bartky, answers “it is women themselves who practice this discipline on and against their own bodies” (81):

> The woman who checks her makeup half a dozen times a day to see if her foundation has caked or her mascara has run, who worries that the wind or the rain may spoil her hairdo, who looks frequently to see if her stockings have bagged at the ankle or who, feeling fat, monitors everything she eats, has become, just as surely as the inmate of the Panopticon, a self-policing subject, a self committed to a relentless self-surveillance. This self-surveillance is a form of obedience to patriarchy.

As such women's bodies become their self-Panopticons (1988: 72):

> In contemporary patriarchal culture, a panoptical male connoisseur resides within the consciousness of most women: they stand perpetually before his gaze and under his judgement. Woman lives her body as seen by another, by an anonymous patriarchal Other.

Living their bodies as seen by an “anonymous patriarchal other,” women internalize the feminine ideal in such a way that they are no longer in a position to challenge it, since they do not have the critical distance to do so. As a result, feminine ideals become a blackmailing force on women that to challenge these ideals and the accompanying disciplinary practices, women have to challenge their own identities.

Although, Bartky's framework has explanatory force “when it comes to the politics of appearance” her discussions of disciplinary power and self-surveillance, as Susan Bordo argues, overlook many situations, in which women are subordinated to men through the use of coercion (Bordo, 1993: 27). Bordo takes issue with anorexia nervosa and bulimia and argue that they emerge out of the conventional feminine practices such as dieting and make-up and out of a woman's efforts to come to terms with (and also to resist) social expectations from her. In Bordo's utilization of Foucault's concept of disciplinary power, women's understandings of their own experiences

in patriarchal society and the unstable character of disciplinary power are acknowledged (28):

> the woman who goes into a rigorous weight-training program in order to achieve the currently stylish look may discover that her new muscles give her the self-confidence that enables her to assert herself more forcefully at work.

However, this is a problematic and incomplete utilization of Foucault's disciplinary power since it misses the whole point and the important elements of power relations as they are characterized by Foucault. In both Bartky's and Bordo's utilization of disciplinary power, women are portrayed as helpless victims of disciplinary practices and, in a related fashion, women's subjectivity is consistently overlooked. Jennifer Terry's analysis (1989) on population control techniques, based on Foucault's concept of bio-power, provides a way out of the pitfalls of the accounts of Bartky and Bordo.

Taking issue with the concept of bio-power, Terry focuses on the disciplinary and regulatory practices aiming at controlling the bodies, and especially reproductive functions of women, through the discourses of mother's and fetus's health. Terry utilizes Foucault's framework to explain the background of state's intervention in women's use of their own bodies. Through the discourses on the health of the fetus, women are subjected to medical surveillance and state intervention. What is important in Terry's account is that she describes various resistances against the control of the state and the medical institutions, that is she acknowledges that women, instead of being helpless victims of disciplinary patriarchal mechanisms, can and in fact do challenge these mechanisms. Nevertheless, in Terry's account too, as in the accounts of Bartky and Bordo, feminist appropriation of Foucault's concept of disciplinary power have given

rise to accounts of patriarchy, in which certain aspects of women's subordination is explained, but women's responses to that subordination, the construction of her subjectivity simultaneously by the forces outside of her reach and by her own engagements is to a large extent left untouched. In other words, although they provide accounts of how women are implicated in the process, they nevertheless portray women as disciplined. Yet, the conception of patriarchy as a disciplinary form of power is important for the purposes of the present study, provided that the unstable character of the disciplines and the many resistances accompanying them are taken into view.

As much important for the present study is Sylvia Walby's distinction between private and public patriarchy from a very different background. Walby, in her influential study proposed six domains of analyzing patriarchy and two historical forms of patriarchy to differentiate between different forms and levels of it. The six domains Walby offers are “patriarchal mode of production; patriarchal relations in paid work; patriarchal relations in the state; male violence; patriarchal relations in sexuality; and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions” (Walby, 1990: 177). As for the two historical forms, Walby differentiates between private and public patriarchy. Although Walby's definition of patriarchy and her proposals concerning the six domains is not utilized in this study, her distinction between private and public patriarchy is. According to Walby, in private patriarchy “it is a man in his position as husband or father who is the direct oppressor and beneficiary, individually and directly, of the subordination of women” (1990: 178). In this form of patriarchy women are barred from public spheres. Public patriarchy, on the other hand, (178):

> is a form in which women have access to both public and private arenas, bu are nonetheless subordinated within them. The expropriation of women is performed more collectively than by individual patriarchs. The household may remain a site of patriarchal oppression, but it is no longer the main place where women are present.

Amending and adapting Walby's concepts of private and public patriarchy to the purposes of the present study, it can be argued that private patriarchy refers to a sovereign form of power, which operates mainly on the basis of mechanisms of domination and suppression. In this form of patriarchy, it is primarily the individual man that is “responsible” (more accurately *accountable*) for the domination, subordination and exploitation of women. In this form, coercion is the primary means of patriarchal control on women. Coercion is also the means of patriarchal control on men by other men. Modern, public forms of patriarchy are based on the disciplinary model of power. In it, all sides and parts of a patriarchal power relationship are subjected to patriarchal disciplinary mechanisms. That is, public patriarchy disciplines both men and women, although allocation of the advantages and disadvantages and the field of possibilities granted to each category of individuals differ much: adopting different strategies than widely acknowledged ones, women face much grave consequences than men do although public patriarchy operate as a mechanism of domination on both of these categories by defining strict boundaries for their fields of possibilities. An important feature of public patriarchy is that it utilizes gender differences to produce the optimal docility and utility from the bodies that are marked as male and female. In other words, with the modernization of patriarchy, provocation and making best use of life energies of individuals is aimed. However, to prevent the possible dangers of the provocation of the life energies of individuals, they are also subjected to disciplinary mechanisms, which render the

individual the agent of her/his own disciplining, who exercises disciplines over and against her/himself.

It is important to note that private forms of patriarchy did not cease to exist when public forms of patriarchy began to take hold. This means, the domination of women by individual patriarchs, as fathers, husbands, sons or brothers within the household still continues. With women's increasing visibility in social life, state and the society became the public father, husband, son or brother of women. This can be seen as an extension and expansion of the boundaries of private forms of patriarchy. Also, new disciplinary mechanisms are added to this extension and expansion, to prevent women from overstepping dangerous boundaries. These are not coercive mechanisms, as mechanisms of private forms of patriarchy. They operate on the basis of making women docile, while also providing them with a field of possibilities. In other words, these mechanisms provide women with a field of possibilities, the possibilities of freedom while at the same time, drawing the boundaries of that field. However, they also provide both women and men with the tools to overstep the boundaries drawn by patriarchy. So, the tools and mechanisms of private forms of patriarchy are kept in reserve to be utilized when these boundaries are exceeded. In brief, modern public patriarchy operates by utilizing both coercive and disciplinary tools, for, on the one hand, the provocation of the life energies of gendered individuals and producing utility from their gendered bodies and, on the other, to render them docile and make them the agent of their own docility.

3.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this chapter, from a Foucauldian strand of post-structuralist feminism, I have tried to clarify the sense that the concepts of sex,

gender and patriarchy are utilized in this study. In this respect, I argued that a distinction between sex and gender cannot be drawn as: sex is the innate characteristics that the human body assumes and gender is the cultural meanings made of these characteristics. Sex is not the natural, non-political surface on which cultural meanings – gender – are inscribed. Both are interpretations of the human body and both are utilized in the patriarchal production of gendered subjectivities. However, they differ in the level of their utilization: while sex is the first level of meanings inscribed on human bodies, that produces a *natural* sex for those bodies, gender is the second level of meaning inscription, on the already interpreted bodies of human beings. Thus, both sex and gender refers to the cultural/political inscription of meaning on the human bodies and digging gender, one cannot reach the universals of sexual differences. This means that both sex and gender are the interpretations of the human body, not (re)presentations of the universal truths about it. So, it is not the bodies *per se*, but it is the sexualization of the bodies that create differences between different categories of bodies, and through, on the basis of and in relation to these differences, create inequalities and hierarchies between men and women. Gender is the name given to a process of meaning production through, on the basis of, and in relation to which human beings are continually subjected to an unending process of sexual normalization. Human beings are continually examined, classified, and monitored by themselves as well as by others, to keep them the gender they *are*. Then, one is not born a wo/man, one does not become a wo/man, but one is in a process of becoming a wo/man, via the tools (strategies and technologies) s/he finds in her/his society. S/he is continually furnished with a gendered subjectivity, within the limits imposed upon her/him. So, s/he is not a wo/man, but s/he is a process of “wo/manizing” of the particular body that s/he

incarnates.

The construction of gender is a social/political process, even when individuals self-consciously and on the basis of self-knowledge construct themselves as gendered subjects. Although individuals have a share in this process, the "technologies of gender," the rules governing the process are not defined by the subject. Rather these technologies are to a large extent conditioned by patriarchal power relations. However, this does not preclude the possibility that the individual develops new forms of interacting with these rules. In other words, although the "rules of the game" are predetermined, the subject is not predetermined by these rules, there is always a possibility that one develops different forms of performing gender, and resisting it. It should be noted that although gender may be performed differently and uniquely by different individuals, it is not what is unique and distinctive about individuals, but refers to what is equal and same in them. In other words, gender does not refer to the whoness of individuals, but it is related to the whatness of individuals.

Patriarchy can be defined as the relations of power on the issues relating to gender. These power relations have different forms and levels. They may turn into domination, but may also end or subvert it. As the conception of power in the previous chapter suggests, there are situations in a power relationship when available field of possibilities are severely limited, or their actualization leads to grave consequences. In such situations, it may be concluded that there is patriarchal domination there. However, it should be noted, although primarily, it is not exclusively women, who are subjected to that domination. In a patriarchal setting both men and women, although with different levels and in different forms, may become subject to patriarchal domination. Nevertheless, it is women, who are granted a more limited field of possibilities. Thus, when I say patriarchy, I refer

to a form of power, that categorizes individuals into two on the basis of their apparent genitalia, as men and women, and attributes them differing roles and subjectivities. There are two interrelated themes in these power relations, first the construction of human beings as gendered on the one hand, and their domination on the basis of their gender category, on the other. In this respect, when I say something like wo/men are subjected to patriarchal domination, it is a short-hand usage for “people, who are divided into gender categories, and are dominated on the basis of this division.”

Drawing on Sylvia Walby's framework, I have differentiated between private and public forms of patriarchy. I argued that while sovereignty is the model for private forms, for public forms of patriarchy, which are more important for the purposes of the present study, disciplinary power is the model. Public patriarchy employs gender as a tool to make the individuals productive and docile at the same time, in other words, as a tool to make the optimal use of men and women. As such, it is one of the most important political/social control mechanisms on individuals. However, it should be noted here that since the rise of the public patriarchy does not point to the fall of private patriarchy (although it altered the kind of domination over gendered individuals), traditional forms of domination of women continues to exist and it is between the private and public forms that modern patriarchal production of gendered subjectivities takes place.

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: GENDER AND POLITICAL THOUGHT IN EARLY-REPUBLICAN ERA

Kemalism, named after the leader of the National Liberation War (1919-1922) and the founder of the Turkish Republic (1923-), Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, constituted the “general politics of truth,” that controlled the production of Republican discourses on gender in modern Turkey. Kemalism as a nation-building and modernizing ideology set the tone of patriarchy in terms of power-opposition nexus that would run through economic, political, social and intellectual spheres throughout the republican history. To put it more briefly, while Kemalist model of social and political reorganization was met with multi-dimensional opposition from various political strands it also represented the hegemonic patriarchal discourse. Both the reforms that were carried out under the state party of early-Republican era, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party, CHP) and the opposition to them were embedded in a patriarchal framework. Within the era, different solutions were proposed to the perceived problems but the problematizations and the discourses underlying these solutions were the same. This was most manifest in the construction of “ideal citizen” in general, and “ideal woman” of the republic in particular. It can be argued, then, that the importance of Kemalism, the hegemonic place it has occupied, did not result from its success in producing these discourses and problematizations, or its success in proposing the most viable alternatives and solutions. It is more accurate to say that Kemalism managed to become a

hegemonic discourse, through successfully colonizing the problematizations and discourses prevalent in the society.

The ruling cadres of early-republican era proclaimed a total break with the Ottoman past. The reform process that was carried out under CHP rule was built on the discourse that identified Ottoman period as the dark ages of the Turkish nation. Thus, alongside with the attempts to carve out a genuine national history and national identity, the reforms that directly regulated gender structure were offered as the symbols of the solemn commitment to the task of modernization. In this respect, such path breaking measures as the change in the structure of political regime from sultanate to republic, the abolition of the caliphate (1924), the change in the dress code (1925), the adoption of the Latin alphabet (1928) not only institutionalized a new political regime, but also signaled a new life style.

For the women the institutional background of this new life style was evinced in the abolition of *shariah laws* and in the adoption of Swiss Civil Code (1926). The new civil code improved women's status in marriage, family and inheritance. Besides, by the unification of education in 1924, the gender segregation in the educational sphere was formally lifted. The women subsequently acquired the right to participate in local elections in 1930, and in general elections 1934. Thus, the era was marked with great transformations on the one hand and great efforts for further transformation on the other. These transformations made what goes without saying, no longer going without saying and all aspects of human life in Turkey have been problematized in this era. In this chapter, in an attempt to explicate the historical context in which the texts analyzed in this study is produced, first, I give a brief account of the dominant political

structure in the era with a view to the *pros and cons* of the transformation that was aimed for women at large and for women's movement. Second, I provide a brief review of the gender-based analysis of early-republican era and political thought in Turkey. Since, feminist literature on Turkey has generally been focused on critical examinations of Kemalism in regards to the era in question, I especially deal with the feminist revaluations of Kemalism.

4.1. CITIZENIZATION AND THE CREATION OF REPUBLICAN WOMAN

Nation-state construction involves a “citizenization” project (Nisbet, 1986: 132). Citizenization offers the political connection between the individual and the state in the transformation of the “pre-modern” socio-cultural framework to a modern one. Thus, the status of citizenship, which signifies that the individual is classified as a “member of the state” - rather than a subject of the ruler - marks the formation of the modern state (Brubaker, 1991: 21, 49). As Moris Janowitz notes following the nationalist revolutions, the category and politics of citizenship serve as tools for the nation-states to pursue the envisaged transformation (Janowitz, 1983:8). Turkish experience was not an exception in this respect. The underlying political thought that drew the framework for Republican reconstruction was provided by the Turkist-Westernist nexus, the two intellectual strands of the last decades of Ottoman Empire that provided, at times opposing, recipes for saving the Empire from decline. Briefly, at the turn of the twentieth century there were three competing “schools of thought” that took issue with modernization-as-Westernization: Islamism, Westernism and Turkism (Berkes, 1964: 337-411). After the rather brief and inconclusive attempts by the Young Ottomans to forge a synthesis between modernization and Islamic way of life, the

Islamists categorically opposed to the infiltration of Western morals and mentality with recourse to the proper practice of Islam. The Westernists, resolved the tension between the Ottoman and the Western by strictly adhering to a comprehensive Westernization project, which embraced not only institutional reforms but also the transformation of people on the basis of what was deemed to be the Western model. Lastly, the Turkist school of thought proposed a synthesis between Western civilization and Turkish national identity. For the Turkists, Western superiority was based first and foremost on national consciousness. In early-Republican era, the crucial task turned out to be one of defining the national identity, and drawing the contours of national history.

Thus, although the dominant discourse was built on the claim to break with the Ottoman past, political thought in early-Republican era was fertilized by the developments in Ottoman political thought. The same was also true at the level of practice. Starting with the *Tanzimat* era (1839-1876) that has widely been taken as the symbolic start date of Ottoman-Turkish modernization process gradual steps were taken to introduce new conceptions and practices in legal, economic, political and social spheres. The republican era was different in the sense that while the dominating Ottoman style of reform had been one of searching for a synthesis between the traditional and the modern, in the new phase a two-dimensional construction took hold: the construction of the (*genuine*) national tradition and the construction of a new society and polity along modern lines. Zafer Toprak notes that while Turkist wing was in the reign during the rule of the İttihat ve Terakki (Party of Union and Progress) in the last decade of Empire, the nationalization attempts were more towards founding a common Ottoman national identity, rather than a homogeneous nation (Toprak, 2006: 14-22). In this

respect, the homogenization of the people around Turkish identity turned out to be the *nouveaux* and all encompassing Republican task. In this process gender relations certainly played a crucial role, especially in the definition of Turkish citizen, and in substantiating that Turkish Republic represented a brand new phase in the history of Turkish nation cleared of any attachments to the Ottoman Empire.

Building their political stance and practice upon Turkist lines with a zeal for modernization the ruling cadres of the Republic paid overwhelming attention to the creation of a new individual-as-citizen in denouncing the subject of the Ottoman Empire. For them the Ottoman subject represented the opposite pole of the Turkish citizen who was idealized as a "...rationalist, anti-traditionalist, anti-clerical person approaching all problems intellectually and objectively..." (Karpat, 1959:53-54). Along with the "modernizing" and "enlightening" tune in this qualification, the ideal citizen would and should also be conscious of and loyal to the genuine Turkish roots. Thus, the citizenization project of the Republic can be described as transforming the "ignorant" subject to the conscious, knowledgeable national citizen. While the reforms that directly concerned state-individual/citizen relations were devised on the assumption of the citizen of the Republic, the measures in the socio-cultural sphere were aimed at its creation. In such a setting language and history occupied central space in the reform process. In the first two decades of the Republic extensive discussions on both the content and methodology of social science education in general and history teaching in particular were carried out (Çapa, 2004: 80-87). The transformation that was started in the educational sphere was justified in terms of both contemporary civilizational criteria and nationalist political agenda. In line with the task of reviving the genuine tradition of Turkish nation, Turkish Language Institution

(1932) and Turkish History Institution (1934) were established so as to provide a scientific basis in the delineation of Turkish identity.

Kemal Karpat's definition of the ideal Turkish citizen misses a significant feature: the citizen of the Republic was also characterized with his, and also her, warrior identity – of course his and her warrior identity assumed different characteristics. This characterization shall not be read as a Turkish exception, but rather as a regular accompaniment to nation-state construction. Nation-states are built on and cultivate militarism (Poggi, 2001; Townshead, 1993; Tilly, 1985; Yeğenoğlu and Coşar, 2004). Thus unsurprisingly, in "reviving" the Turkish national identity and history the "ghazi/warrior tradition," inherited from the Ottoman Empire, occupied a central place. In this respect, the "myth of the military nation" (Altınay, 2004) served to carve out a desirable, honorable, duty-based identity out of the rather "unpopular military service" in Ottoman Empire (Zürcher, 1998: 443). Creating the rational, anti-traditional - in the sense of loyalty to Ottoman past - but at the same time traditional - in the sense of living through and by national consciousness – enlightened and "equal" citizens who are physically and psychologically fit for defending the nation-state – i.e. warriors – required an all-encompassing de-traditionalization and a re-traditionalization process.

The de-traditionalization and re-traditionalization process was framed around a gendered hierarchy, which involved a "degendering" and "regendering" project (Durakbaşa, 2002:24). In this respect, while the reforms in the legal sphere relatively leveled gender inequality compared to the past decades, the patriarchal texture can be read between the lines of the definition of the nation, the ideal citizen, and the respective locations of men and women within the Republican setting. As Göle notes, the woman issue and women at large formed

the benchmark in the course of Turkish nation-state building and modernization: "…in [Muslim] societies "the question of women" is not defined only in relation to the social conditions in which women live but is also related to the issues of culture and civilization" (Göle, 1996:29). In terms of patriarchy the foundation and consolidation of the Republican regime did not signal an era of essential transformation. Rather the process hinted at a change in the mode. In other words, modernizing reforms that were initiated in the early-republican era led to a transformation in patriarchy from sultanic mode to the republican one (Coşar, forthcoming). In the words of Fatmagül Berktay, "the absolute domination of father," was handed over "to the republic of brothers" (Berktay 2003: 105).

In Turkish modernization – read as secularization, nation-state construction, and capitalist reorganization of the economy – status and public visibility of women occupied a crucial place. While the attempt for secularization offered the channels for the lifting up and/or easing of Islamic restrictions on women's familial and public identities, delineation of the contours of national identity involved a new model of woman imbued with patriotism. Capitalist reorganization, on the other hand, necessitated active and sacrificing participation of women in economic life. In all the cases, the category of woman and the role of women were conceptualized in a way that takes men as the norm. Again, this was not a peculiarity of the Turkish experience with modernity. As Berktay cites from Carole Pateman, nation-state constructions are based on the unification of all members of the nation, which ignore women as "concrete/factual female [subjects]" (Berktay, 2001: 357). However, this does not result in the asexualization and/or de-sexualization of women. On the contrary, there was covert gender segregation in the constitution of the new society and polity, whose roots lay in the course of the

Ottoman modernization process. The most manifest examples of this segregation can be observed in the delineation of the characteristics of the ideal women of the republic, which was based on motherhood and compatriotship. Deniz Kandiyoti notes that the ideal woman was to be an “enlightened” mother and a “masculinized” social actor (Kandiyoti, 1995). Underlying this ideal portrait of woman was a deep anxiety over the morals, which according to Kadıoğlu, points the oscillation that the women of the Republic have been experiencing between being “... a la turca and unchaste” (Kadıoğlu, 1993). Since, via the modernizing reforms the women were “emancipated” from the Islamic restrictions of segregation, veiling, and they got the right to participate in political and economic life on formally equal footing with men, the modernizing (male) elite needed new moral means that would preempt the women from overstepping the boundaries. This was deemed all the more necessary considering that in the last decade of the Empire, the women had been considerably mobilized especially as an inevitable outcome of wartime conditions. The formula was found in the Republican virtue, which envisaged differentiated roles for the ideal man and ideal woman of the Republic.

Republican virtue necessitated a moral cultivation that required modernization of male and female identities without falling into the excesses of modernity – i.e. moral degeneration, a dominant theme of the political discourses of the era. Decisive in this re-configuration were middle-class values (Sancar, 2004). In her analysis of early-republican textbooks prepared for primary schools Tuba Kancı reveals that the role model for Republican boys were drawn on the basis of having a decent job to work, being industrious and working, and thus keeping the family, as fulfilling citizenship duty (Kancı, forthcoming):

> The middle-class man is portrayed as the wise, educated, and enlightened man. He is not only a civilized man, always dressed in a suit, but he also carries on a civilizing mission with respect to the people around. In the private space of home, he is presented as reading newspapers, or shown at the dinner table, making an educating talk to the children. In these representations, this man glitters as the embodiment of rationality and positivism. He also has strong will-power and patience.

As for the women of the Republic the safeguarding of virtue was provided via two channels that are functional in private and public spheres. In this respect, the women of the Republic were first and foremost defined in terms of their motherhood and housewifehood roles in the private sphere. However, motherhood role is not restricted to the private sphere. For, in Kemalist discourse, as well as in those political discourses, which somewhat diverged and/or challenged Kemalism, motherhood of the nation as a metaphor has been used as a dignifying characteristic of Turkish women and as a justification ground for their active participation in the public sphere.

Thus, the “new woman”s place was defined in terms of the “new family” of the Republic, which was basically perceived as a national unit. However, this does not connote the seclusion of women to the private sphere. Since in nationalist thought nation has been organically conceptualized in terms of familial relations, women’s place in the family also marked their primary roles in the public sphere. In her analysis of the utilization of “familial imagery” and the “imagery of the family” in the construction of Turkish nation-state, Carol Delaney notes that “one becomes a member of a family (or kinship unit), a nation, and a religion in remarkably similar ways: either by being born into it or in some cases by being naturalized” (Delaney, 1995:177). Apart from the gendered nature of these ‘units’ of attachment the construction of the organic connection between family and nation in nationalist thought reinforces the subjugation of

women. Thus, in the Turkish case, "… aile… has different meanings for women and men. Aile refers to wife and children; thus only men really have families; women are part of one" (Delaney, 1995:178). This difference has its parallelisms in the placement of men and women in the nationalist imagery and national political body.

Similarly in her in-depth case analysis of "…the imagination of modern nations…" and thus nation-state construction "through familial metaphors" (Najmabadi, 1997: 442), in early-republican Turkey, Selda Şerifsoy (2000:155-188) gives an account of the connection between primary and secondary schools, the military and Halkevleri, the organs of the CHP, which were founded for the "… political socialization of the citizens in accordance with Kemalist principles" (Şerifsoy, 2000:181) over the discourse on family. In her analysis Şerifsoy, substantiates the organic nexus between militarism, emphasis on the membership to the family and to the nation as arising from the human nature; and thus the argument that belonging to a nation is in the essence of a human being that underlay dominant political discourse of the era (Yurt Bilgisi, 1937: 4-6, quoted in Şerifsoy, 2000:169):

> Men have bitter and sweet feelings. Some of these feelings are temporary; some, like mother love never diminish; it always burns in the hearts. So does national sentiment… Turkish nation has given rise to many heroes for ages. A nation, which has given rise to such heroes who have come to the fore throughout the world is certainly beloved. Fathers belong to the nation; mothers belong to the nation; brothers/sisters belong to the nation, all beloved belong to the nation… Loving the nation and working to the degree of supreme sacrifice stems from this love.

Certainly, this was a gendered nexus; that is, in the delineation of ideal family, of ideal nation women were portrayed in subordinate roles to men and in both cultural and political terms the loci of loyalty

that was deemed to be indispensable was figured as the father, the patriarch (Hilmi, 1938:8, quoted in Şerifsoy, 2000:166):

> Family resembles a government in small scale. Father is its head, mother is the minister, children are the subjects. If father and mother combine their efforts in the family government, and if children give their acquiescence, things will be fine. Housewife, as a minister who takes the responsibility of her deeds, has some rights and duties and succeeds in her acts within the frame of these rights and duties.

Thus, the new national identity was twofold in essence (men/women) and was reflected in the gendered role division in the "new family" of the new Republic. However, again, the ideal underlying the new family was not a Republican invention, rather its roots date back to the rule of İttihat ve Terakki. In this respect too, Ziya Gökalp's thought, and his emphasis on the construction of "national family" was decisive (Durakbaşa, 2002: 103). But in wartime conditions the creation of national family was not an easy task to handle. Early-republican era provided the appropriate milieu in integrating the ideal to the construction of nation-state as part and parcel of the modernization process.

In the public sphere, alongside with motherhood, an image of "modern[ized] but modest" woman was constructed (Durakbaşa, 1998; Kadıoğlu, 1993) so as to define the contours of women's emancipation under Republican reforms. The modern Turkish woman was conceptualized as enlightened, intelligible, capable of making up a suitable partner for the modern Turkish man, and capable of having a profession. While women's enlightenment was perceived to be essential especially for raising healthy generations that would serve the nation (Durakbaşa, 1998: 36; Arat, 1998), their public visibility served to symbolize the modern nature of the republican regime. The decency, chastity of women, on the other

hand, was envisioned in terms of certain temperance, interpreted basically through their physical appearance and through the suppression of women's sexuality (Durakbaşa, 2002; Arat, 1998; İlyasoğlu, 2000; Kadıoğlu, 1999). As in the words of Atatürk (Quoted in İlyasoğlu, 2000: 71):

> … especially in our big cities our clothing does not reflect our identity. In our cities our women appear in two [types] of extreme clothing. They either veil themselves into darkness, or wear such indecent dresses, which you cannot see even in the most liberal balls of Europe.... The path to be followed is to incorporate the great Turkish woman to our work life, to share our lives with her, to make her the partner, friend, assistant of man in science, moral, social and economic life…. Even the most conservative nation of the world admires the woman who participates in scientific and artistic movements, social movements and who is not veiled, but who dresses in a virtuous way.

In such a leveling, the myth of the "Anatolian woman" was used as a counterforce against the risk of a loss of (masculinist) control over the "modern[izing] woman" – read as urbanized woman (Atatürk, quoted in Göle, 1996: 64):

> It is always they, the noble, self-sacrificing, godly Anatolian women who plough, cultivate the land, fell firewood in the front, barter in the marketplace and run the family and above all, it is still they who carry the ammunition to the front on their shoulders, with their ox-carts, with their children regardless of rain, winter, and hot days.

Within the framework of the discourse on family, which provided one of the bulwarks of nation-state construction, the cross- cutting role for women, deemed to be appropriate for these two typologies was found in housewifehood (Hilmi, 1937:8-13; Quoted in Şerifsoy, 2000: 166-167):

> The only concern of the housewife is to see to it that her man and her children live in a clean, comfortable and auspicious

> way; in order to do so she has to have certain qualities. With these qualities the housewife might create affluence out of poverty and wealth out of affluence: 1) tolerance toward the minor faults of youngsters… 2) discretion and frugality: using domestic commodities; women and girls should work outside home to earn money if the family suffers from low income 3) friendliness: as a matter of physiology, friendliness is a result of physical health. Thus one of the duties of a girl is to reinforce her physical strength by exercise; 4) fortitude: holding to her stance in the face of maid and children; 5) to be informed…; 6) Enjoying serving … to her man and children; 7) Providence and courage.

Thus, it is apt to argue that in the ruling political discourse the ideal woman of the Republic was not conceptualized in a monolithic mode. On the contrary, in a corporatist framework, the existing class differentiation was left untouched, and the peasant (Anatolian) woman, and the urban woman were classified in a differentiated way, while housewifehood offered a meeting point between these diverging identities. The common framework that connected them was the nation as the body of patriarch, and thus the family. In other words, regardless of the differences in appearance, literacy and economic status, they all shared the same requisite of loyalty to the nation and to the patriarch, i.e. the father, the husband.

Zehra Arat argues that the mentality underlying “Kemalist reforms approached women as the symbols and tools of modernization and Westernization rather than as equals and full partners of men...” (Arat, 1998:68). Similarly, Kadıoğlu observes that (Kadıoğlu, 1998: 89):

> ...debates over the direction of economic, political, and cultural development have often made references to the image of women. While on the one hand, status of women began to be viewed as a popular barometer of civilization, women were increasingly burdened with the difficult task of protecting national virtues and authenticity, on the other.

In other words, the construction of republican gender model constituted the hidden, but one of the most significant agendas – that of “gender regime” (Sancar, 2004: 200) - in the clash among different discourses for and/or against the dominant nation-state building and modernizing project. The voices of the women for the “woman issue” that ran counter to Kemalist policies and/or that implied autonomous political stances was hardly heard in these debates. This was not because the women were not interested in these discussions but because the ruling modernizing cadres were excessively intolerant to any possibility of opposition to the particular type of modernization task that reigned (Özbudun, 1988:12-13).

However, this state of affairs shall not be read as an all-out silencing of Republican women. On the contrary, so long as the women activists were loyal to the modernizing male elite they had the leverage to voice their demands and to engage in political activity. For example, in her memoirs, A. Âfetinan, historian who was in the close circle of Atatürk and who conducted research on history by his orientation, gives an account of her conversation with him on women's right to vote (Âfetinan, 1970:60-61):

> I was entrusted with teaching History and Civics courses in the Conservatory... In March 1930, I arranged a municipal elections practice in all my classes... The practice was carried out without gender differentiation. After the election one of my male students opposed this practice and said that women did not have the right to vote. I felt sorry. But I replied saying that they all have equal rights in the class. After the class, I went to [Atatürk's residence]... Şükrü Kaya, then the Minister of Internal Affairs [was also there]... I told the incidence ... [and] said that I would not feel myself equal with the same students when I was lecturing... The Minister of Internal Affairs immediately said that the government has submitted a draft law on municipal elections in previous month, and if [Atatürk] gives his consent ... women's right to vote could also be added [to the draft law]. I hardly believed what I heard.

Likewise, Zülal Kılıç notes that, Nakiye Elgün, who justified the forced retreat of the *Türk Kadınlar Birliği* (Turkish Women's Association) from nominating candidates in 1927 by declaring that "[t]he time is not yet ripe for us to participate. Our government has so far given every right that our womanhood merits; even more than that" had the opportunity to become one of the first woman members of parliament in 1935 general election (Kılıç, 1998:349). In this respect, these "Kemalist feminists" were content that (Abadan-Unat, 1986:29; Quoted in Durakbaşa, 2002:123)

> by means of 'liberating' the Turkish woman Atatürk aimed at laying the foundations of a more egalitarian and harmonious family life on the one hand, and laying the foundation stone of a nation, which would enable its female members as well as male members to use their energies and capacities efficiently and productively.

4.2. WOMEN'S VOICES

Among the potential loci of opposition to this state of affair was the women's movement. In so far as the women have been perceived as the "barometer of civilization" in Ottoman-Turkish modernization process, the reforms initiated in due course provided the grounds for the increasing public visibility of women. Serpil Çakır documents that by the end of the nineteenth century, and the beginning of twentieth century women had become active in various organizations as well as in intellectual spheres, which had largely been dominated by men (Çakır, 1996; see also Toska, 1998). Serpil Çakır classifies the women's associations that were formed in late nineteenth and early twentieth century under eight headings: Pious associations; associations focusing on educating women and aiming at resolving economic hardships faced by women; associations aiming at women's cultural enrichment; associations aiming at finding solutions

to the problems of the Ottoman Empire; women's branches of political parties; feminist women's associations; women's associations aiming at the defense of the country; and women's associations with political aims (Çakır, 1996:43-78).

Apart from philanthropic organizations that formed the bulk of women's organizations of the period one could also hear – though rare – calls for feminist consciousness (Nimet Cemil, 1921: 2, Quoted in Çakır, 1996: 119):

> We prefer to use the term feminism as it is. Let another foreign word enter into our language; what kind of harm would it make? But the existence and necessity of feminism cannot be denied.

Similarly as early as 1883 Arife Hanım, who was the editor of the journal *Şükufezar*, the first journal published by women, was voicing up liberal feminist ideals (Quoted in Yaraman 2001: 39-40):

> we, as a group who have been subjected to men's derisive views as long hair short brain [beings], will try to display the opposite of such a view. We will take our steps in the way of working and functioning without subordinating manhood to womanhood and vice versa.

Both the women who were active in philanthropic organizations and those who could make their “feminist” voices heard were mainly from the upper strata of Ottoman women. Zehra Toska notes that the reforms of *Tanzimat*, and subsequently, of the following First (1986-1878) and Second Constitutional (1908-1918) periods were not satisfying for the cause of women's liberation. For, the “new type of woman, which was shaped by the attitude of Ottoman women [in *Tanzimat*] toward the West and the tradition ... [was configured as] “a good mother, loyal wife and Muslim woman” in the following decades (Toska, 1998:75). Nevertheless, for Toska, the women activists of

the Second Constitutional period were more uncompromising with the ruling male elite, though they were struggling for the same cause – construction of the nationalist spirit, initially in terms of Ottoman nationalism, then in terms of Turkish nationalism – which also involved women as active participants.

The fact that the beginning of twentieth century was marked with subsequent wars on Ottoman lands, starting with Balkan Wars (1912-1913), continuing with the First World War and ending in the National Liberation War interrupted the evolution of Ottoman-Turkish women's movement. Ayşe Durakbaşa points that many women's organizations of the period demanded an independent status *vis-à-vis* the government. However, both the domestic and international contingencies of the era led to an almost inevitable cooperation among the ruling İttihat ve Terakki and women's movement (Durakbaşa, 2002: 109). In a similar vein, Kandiyoti notes that during the wartime the women's movement was integrated into the rising tide of Turkish nationalism (Kandiyoti, 1991; see also Durakbaşa, 2002: 102-112). This integration is symbolized in the profile that Halide Edib (Adıvar), one of the most prominent women authors of nationalist literature, drew for the ideal Turkish woman in her novel, *Yeni Turan* (1911), published on the eve of Balkan Wars (Quoted in Göle, 1996: 71):

> ...dignified, beneficial, hardworking members of society, companions, mothers of the whole nation such as the teachers and nurses of Yeni Turan in contrast to those who were the decorative elements of their houses and sources of love to their husbands.

Likewise, one of the declarations (1911) of *Teali-i Nisvan Cemiyeti*, (Society for the Elevation of Women) founded by Halide Edib and her circle in 1908, both voiced up the demand for equality with men,

while also confirming the adoption of nationalism by women's movement (Quoted in Durakbaşa, 2002:108):

> There is an Ottoman class, which is mostly ignored by men: Ottoman women. May courage, hope and strength be with you, brothers. We, your sisters, friends, mothers, who [are repressed] behind the fences, we are with you, we are courageous and even-tempered. ... We will either save our patrie, or die with you.

As in the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, in the early-Republican era, too, the woman issue was circumscribed by different political discourses on modernization. As noted above, a relatively autonomous movement that would institute itself with a distance to the modernizing cadres was preempted. The most significant example in this respect was the case of *Kadınlar Halk Fırkası* (Women's People's Party, KHF) (1923) (Toprak, 1988). In the beginning of the constitutive period women started to discuss political equality. KHF can be read as an outcome of these discussions. However, the party could only materialize as an initiative due to two reasons. First, by 1923 when women attempted to form a party of their own, women had not yet gained qualification to vote. Second, as noted above, the state-party, CHP, was intolerant to any attempt for competition and/or opposition. Thus, the party was immediately dissolved and the women involved in due process were channeled to form an association (Toprak, 1998). The course of the life of *Türk Kadınlar Birliği* (Turkish Women's Association, TKB), which was founded in 1924 also substantiates both the intolerance of the CHP to any kind of opposition and the patriarchal nature of the regime. In the 1927 Congress of the Association women demanded the right to vote in local elections. However, this demand was found untimely by the ruling elite (Kılıç, 1998:348). Besides, the head of the TKB, Nezihe Muhiddin, a well-known feminist whose relatively independent

stance annoyed the CHP, was unseated and a new (loyal) cadre was placed in the executive organs of the Association (Zihnioğlu, 2003: 150-219). The loyalty of the new cadre was displayed in the words of the successor of Nezihe Muhiddin, Latife Bekir (Quoted in Zihnioğlu, 2003: 250):

> Unlike Nezihe Hanım we will not run after shadow [engage in politics]. Maybe a time will come for that, too. But there are other things that we have to do now. For example, we will focus on the Association's economic condition. We will work for the marketing of domestic goods and for the employment of women and children who are in need of protection. We will work ... for transforming the Association to a club.

Unsurprisingly, the Association dissolved itself in 1935 after women got the vote in general elections. In the statement of the then head of the Association Latife Bekir, the allegiance to the CHP was all the more clear: “We delightfully dissolve the Association … We are all members of the party (CHP), of charity organizations…. We will be active in these organizations” (Zihnioğlu, 2003: 258).

It can be argued that the CHP’s hostile stance was not so much toward the demands voiced by women, but by the potential of women’s activism to evolve on its own. For example, Nezihe Muhiddin’s comments on polygamy during the studies on the amendment of existing Family Law in 1923 were in line with the Kemalist mentality: “A woman who is forced into such a worthless position cannot be a noble mother, eminent wife, and a heartfelt housewife” (Quoted in Zihnioğlu, 2003: 143). However, as Yaprak Zihnioğlu argues Nezihe Muhiddin’s insistence on an independent feminist organization led to a decisive conflict between feminists and the government. For the ruling cadres of the late 1920s such statements were almost impermissible (Nezihe Muhiddin, quoted in Zihnioğlu, 2003: 235):

> Women's Association is so determined that its solidarity is not hampered even if the Association is dissolved. The Association can be dissolved formally. But this is all a matter of formality. Those who have gathered around this ideal are committed to each other… We will hold on to our ideal when the Association is dissolved.

Şirin Tekeli frames Kemalist approach to the woman issue with recourse to the term "state feminism" (Tekeli, 1986: 193). This characterization is functional when the focus of attention is women's rights. Briefly, Kemalist reforms gradually introduced civil, economic and political rights that leveled gender inequality to a certain extent. However, considering that the cadre that devised and carried out these reforms were hostile toward the voice of women for women that was beyond their control, one tempts to agree with Zehra Arat's argument that Kemalism cannot be associated with feminism since "[it] ignored the notion of gender domination in the same way it denied class conflicts" (Arat, 1994:58). In this respect, rather than alleviating gender hierarchy, republican reforms reproduced the domination of men over women by "… reconstructing traditional society within a new, national context" (59). Thus, Kemalist reforms that in one way or another alleviated women's economic, political and social status shall be read in terms of the task of modernization, in which women – mentally, spiritually, and physically - were perceived as fresh evidences of the level of civilization of the country (Kadıoğlu, 1998) rather than as signs of the "feminist" intentions of the ruling cadres. This state of affairs certainly affected the development of women's movement throughout the republican era.

Throughout republican history the woman issue has been circumscribed by varying and at times contesting political discourses: Kemalism, Islamism, Leftism and Conservatism mainly voiced and represented by men have circumscribed the task of the liberation of

women (Tekeli, 1986: 192-195; Coşar, forthcoming. See also Kadıoğlu, 1998; Sirman, 1989). Among these discourses the first three have managed to integrate women activists into their ranks, which in turn strengthened their claims to be working for the improvement of women's conditions. In early-republican era these political discourses were constructed in terms of the problematique of modernization and all provided their own frameworks as to the best means of and style for the modernization of Turkish nation and/or to opposing modernization entirely. Though distinct, their modernization and/or "traditionalization" agendas shared a common patriarchal framework, which in the final analysis reproduced the gendered socio-political hierarchy in various modes.

Here it is apt to note two different approaches to the periodization of the course of women's movement in Turkey. The first approach classifies the stages of the movement on the basis of the development of an independent feminist consciousness, and argues that currently the movement is at its third stage; i.e. the feminist stage. The preceding two stages are periodized as follows: the period between nineteenth century and the foundation of the Turkish Republic; and the period between 1923-1980 (Erol, 1992). However, Ayşegül Yaraman (2001: 173ff), approaching the topic on the basis of women's rights and demands, notes that the first phase of women's movement – demanding equality with men - that started in the nineteenth century and continued until the 1980s has just ended. According to Yaraman, currently the women's movement is in its second phase – demanding "equality despite differences."

Be it at *a* second or *a* third phase it is also apt to argue that there has not been much room for dwelling onto the foundational connection between political thought and political structure with a feminist gaze.

In this respect, in line with Tekeli's argument, it is possible to offer a third alternative for periodization of the development of women's movement in Turkey into four stages on the axis of this connection. The first period can be located in terms of the rise and integration of the women's voices into the nationalist agenda between late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This period can also be taken as the birth stage of Turkish women's movement. The second period starts with the foundation of the Republic and extended to the 1960s. This period can be characterized as the assimilation of women's movement into Kemalist modernization paradigm. The third period, between 1960s and the latter half of the 1980s can be taken as the period of diversification in women's movement along different ideological frameworks. The fourth, and the last, period starts with the latter half of the 1980s and extends today. This period is important both for the rise of an autonomous feminist movement and certainly for the glimmerings of interest in the implications of the patriarchal nature of thought and structure for the interrogation of every day patriarchal practices.

4.3. PATRIARCHY IN TURKISH POLITICAL THOUGHT

Serpil Sancar, forcefully argues that Turkish social scientists have been in a state of “modernist blindness” in reading Ottoman-Turkish modernization process. She specifically criticizes Marxist and liberal approaches on the basis of their exclusion of family structure from the analysis (Sancar, 2004: 199). However, as also delineated above, starting with the İttihat and Terakki rule, family has been a major focus of consideration in the political discourses that took issue with first, modernization and subsequently nation-state building. Considering that women have first and foremost been identified with the private sphere, which in the course of modernization has been

defined as the sphere of family, it can be argued that the same neglect also runs for the problematique of patriarchy in the studies on Turkish political thought. Currently, there are rather few studies on Turkish political thought, which focus (in)directly on the construction of gender typologies and the relation between the mechanisms of government that run through the socio-political structure and gendered hierarchies (For example see Berktay, 1999; 2003; Bora, 2005; Kadıoğlu, 1998; Kandiyoti 1991; Sancar, 2004).

The mainstream studies that have been conducted in the field of Turkish political thought either bypass and/or marginalize the woman issue, the relation between nation-state building and the construction of the image of women, and/or the relation between established patterns of power and established gender regime. As R.W. Connell argues "each state has a definable "gender regime" that is the precipitate of social struggles and is linked to – though not a simple reflection of – the wider gender order of the society" (Connell, 1990: 523). Connell proposes "gender division of labor", "structure of power", and "the structure of *cathexis,* the gender patterning of emotional attachments" as the main components of a gender regime. A reading of economic, social and cultural reforms of early-republican era on the axis of these components gives an account of the reconstruction of patriarchy in the context of nation-state building on the nexus of capitalism, nationalism and militarism. In this respect, a reading of early-republican political thought on the same axis reveals the hegemonic (patriarchal) discourse that has permeated different strands of thought, while hinting at the hegemonization of patriarchy.

The increase in the literature on early-republican Turkish political thought especially in post-1990 period has not accommodated an increase in the interest between gendered practices and gendered

thought. Although by the rise of women's movement in the late 1980s, and the subsequent flourishing of women's/gender studies in a number of universities, analysis of how the woman issue was considered in literary texts of early-republican era and the following periods has gained grounds this refreshment has not yet found parallel grounds in the field of political thought in general. The analyses in the field of women's/gender studies have specifically focused on the works of prominent novelists and short story writers in terms of how the women were represented in the narrations, but not on the construction of gender categories, and roles in political thought, or the gendering effects of the prevalent dominant discourses, the general politics of truth in Turkey, in relation to gender.

In this respect, the growing academic interest in political thought in Turkey in the post-1990 period further substantiates the gendered hierarchy in political thought and practice. Briefly, except for the works on Kemalism that start from a women's perspective most of the studies in the field that have been produced in the decade have totally ignored the woman issue, let alone integrating the analysis of gender and patriarchy in political thought (For example see, İrem, 1996; Coşar, 1997). One exception is Süleyman Seyfi Öğün's integration of familial dimension into his analysis of Peyami Safa's political thought. However, Öğün analyzes Safa's "conservative error" on the basis of his model of ideal family, rather than focusing on the implications of his political thought for gendered hierarchies (Öğün, 1997). Likewise, the studies on early-republican journals have also bypassed the patriarchal context in which the texts were produced and which was reproduced through the texts. In other words, while the pattern of thought that dominated the early-republican era – Kemalism - and thus the Republican construction has repeatedly

been put under critical scrutiny, in-depth analysis of the patriarchal context of the republican political thought has not been carried out.

One appropriate case study might be the Political Thought series that are being published by İletişim Yayınları, in an encyclopedic format in the current decade. Worthwhile in the compilation of the course of Turkish political thought throughout the Republican era, the series, until now, have comprised insufficient contributions on political thought with a feminist gaze. To put it more briefly, in the different volumes on political thought the question of patriarchy has hardly found a place. Among the exceptions are contributions by Fatmagül Berktay (2001: 348-361; 2004: 275-285), Nicole A.N.M. Van Os (2001: 333-347), Ayşe Gül Altınay and Tanıl Bora (2002: 140-154), Ayça Alemdaroğlu (2002: 414-421), Nükhet Sirman (2002: 226-244), and Ayşe Saktanber (2002: 322-333).

In her article on the evolution of “feminism from Ottoman Empire to the [Turkish] Republic” Berktay (2001) locates the (dis)continuities between the Empire and the Republic with a view to the gender regime in both eras. She traces the historical roots of republican reforms – concerning women's economic, political and social status - in Ottoman Empire. While acknowledging that republican reforms, which provided for the public visibility of women “...and gradually transformed them into citizens..” hint at “...the most significant break with the Ottoman society” (2001:353), Berktay succinctly offers an outline of the patriarchal continuities. In doing so, she analyzes the parallelisms between the *Tanzimat* reforms and Republican reforms regarding Criminal Code and Family Law (2001: 352-359). Berktay emphasizes that “the difference in the degree of men's privileges among the two Criminal Codes” (2001:354). However, she also points at the patriarchal continuity enmeshed in the rise and

consolidation of nationalism that circumscribed the women's movement both in late Ottoman period and during the Republican era (2001: 354-356). Thus, despite all discontinuities, the gender regime of Ottoman Empire – i.e. “absolute sovereignty of the father” - was transliterated into the Republican era in the form of “the republic of brothers” (Berktay, 2001: 356).

In her article on “Feminism among Ottoman Muslims,” Os (2001) analyzes the attempts of “Muslim feminists in Ottoman Empire, majority of whom were from the middle and upper classes” (2001: 339) to change the established gender order. While acknowledging that the debates concerning women's right to education were mainly articulated from within *a* patriarchal discourse, Os emphasizes the effects of the rise of nationalism on the existing gender order (2001:342):

> The idea that women can contribute to national economy ... meant difference at two levels. ... The first difference was that women were featured not as passive, but as active, even though they were portrayed as consumers. The second difference was ... that the women were perceived to be productive.

Os also notes that the right to education also provided the women with the tools that made it possible to step out of the traditional gender order. For her apart from state education, which was quite limited in terms of both state resources and women's access, the women's circles, which formed alternative grounds for education also helped women in challenging the gender order (2001:341-344). However, she is cautious not to conclude with a substantial break with patriarchal structure. Instead, Os emphasizes the importance of women's activism – though limited with a certain class – in effecting certain changes – though not overall transformations – in a traditional patriarchal society and polity.

In Altınay's and Bora's article, which problematizes the nationalism-militarism nexus on the axis of the construction of masculinity sheds light on the gender regime that was aimed and accomplished in Turkish nation-state construction. Altınay and Bora underlines the function of military and military service in the demarcation of the boundaries between manhood and womanhood. Briefly, confining compulsory military service only to men, in other words, ensuring that both the “patrie... [and thus the women] are protected” generally exclusively by men, granted “first-class citizenship to men through military service as the holiest mission” (Altınay and Bora, 2002: 144-145). Women were integrated into this scheme as mothers - and warriors but “under exceptional conditions” (2002: 145). Altınay and Bora point at the daily reflections of this configuration and argue that “this culturalized construction of military service” (2002:144) also shapes the hierarchical gender relations. In this respect, the relation between men and women, and particularly between the husband and the wife is (re)produced in terms of miltaristic notions, nurtured in a context of nation-state construction. In this (re)production, not surprisingly, the connection between men and women are formed

with reference to the chain of command in the military. Certainly, education is the bulwark of such a construction (Altınay and Bora, 2002: 146-153).

Ayça Alemdaroğlu (2002: 414-421) offers a brief account of the discourse of eugenics with special emphasis on the control over women's bodies. In this respect, in the construction of nation-state, the “special” mission that marked the early-republican era, women were identified with the quite “holy” task of marriage and giving birth to the next generations. However, as Alemdaroğlu underlines, not all the women of *the* nation were perceived to be fit to carry this task. Those women who were from the lower classes were discouraged to give birth by means of population policies, while those from upper levels and “who were eligible for motherhood” but who did not prefer marriage or to bear child were deemed to be “detrimental losses for the state (Alemdaroğlu, 2002: 418). The eligibility for motherhood is defined in terms of both class status and the disciplinary capacity of the mother over her child(ren). In her article Alemdaroğlu notes the connection between nationalism, discourse of eugenics and the disciplinary practices of nation-state over women's bodies in early-republican context. In this respect, she explicates the function of the discourse of eugenics in the “production of a detailed national identity in the 1930s” (2002:420), which certainly involved the (re)production of women's body and bodily functions that would fit to the nation-state setting.

In her article on “The Nationality of Women,” Nükhet Sirman (2002: 224-244) explores the connection between the construction of “national family,” which inevitably reconstitutes the image of women, both public and private, and gender regime. In so doing, she focuses on the production and reproduction of women's roles, objects of

loyalties, and identities through the criticisms that were raised against *Tanzimat* bureaucratic-intellectuals in the literary works produced in post-*Tanzimat* era and reveals the parallelisms between the “ideal” images in those criticisms and the “ideal women” in early-Republican era. In this respect, Sirman argues that (2002: 238):

> the love for the patrie makes it possible to question the existing hierarchies, lays the foundations for new hierarchies, and explicates that this new hierarchy is built on the power of men who are [by now] equalized within the context of the love for the patrie over women. With an historical insight it can be observed that family comes forth as the new structure that enables [the construction] of all the powers.

Sirman reveals the extent of the intervention in women's lives in such a setting by emphasizing the proposed regulations in the literary works she analyzes from the portrait of love to marriage, from the recipes for women whom to choose to marry, how to chose to “knowing one's [woman's] place” - i.e. “womanhood” - in both the public and the private sphere (2001: 239-243).

Ayşe Saktanber (2002: 323-333) analyzes the “Kemalist women's rights discourse” with a view to the alternative gender regime that Kemalism has brought forth in order to replace the Ottoman-Muslim political and social structure. In line with the works that have been cited above she argues that (2001:327-328):

> Kemalism... while coming out against gender segregation as one of the most evident features of Muslim societies, and opting for active participation of women in all fields of social life, also provided the grounds for women to institute new moralistic control mechanisms over themselves, which are in essence extremely conservative and elitist, and fed by monolithic corporatist nationalist understanding.

In this respect, the adoption and internalization of Kemalist discourse, which signifies a new form of patriarchy, by publican

women who proclaim to be women's rights advocates further attests to the rather complex dynamics of the republican gender regimes, which in the final analysis leads to the prioritization of masculinist values.

In her analysis of the East-West dialectic in the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process through literary works, Berktay emphasizes (2004: 275):

> the ...reproduction of the old patriarchal ideology by the [male] Turkish intellectuals in order to come into terms with their anxiety in an ever changing environment and thus to prove that there are certain continuities even under new conditions.

According to Berktay, the Ottoman-Turkish male intellectuals shared the same grounds by objectifying women in their discourse through the "creation of [a] new woman under their control" (2004: 275). In the early-Republican era this anxiety also involved a distaste towards the Ottoman past (2004:279). Thus, the women are turned into points of reference for men's salvation from a two-layered anxiety that was rooted in a zeal for transformation – read as civilization – on the one hand, and steering the transformation so as to keep control over the society and polity. Certainly, coming to terms with this deep-rooted anxiety has necessitated a discursive practice that would portray the womanhood as unreliable and the ideal woman as "submissive" to men, and thus the state. And the most appropriate role for the "submissive" woman would be motherhood, a point which for Berktay reflects "gentlemen's alliance ... between the native Easternist [*Doğucu*] and native Westernist" (Berktay, 2001: 284).

There are also valuable contributions by Cihan Aktaş (2004), Sibel Eraslan (2004), Yıldız Ramazanoğlu (2004), and Ayşe Saktanber (2004) to the volume on Islamism, which except for Ramazanoğlu's

concise analysis of the construction of “Islamist women” in modernist imagination mainly focus on the increasing political visibility of “Islamist” women, rather than taking issue with the patriarchal axis of political thought. Aktaş's brief account of the consideration of the “veiling issue” throughout the Republican era offers clues for studying the patriarchal dynamics of the contradiction between Islamist and Kemalist modernization paradigms. Saktanber's article in this volume offers a gender based scheme for the sociological analysis on the relation between religion and women, but not an analysis of the gendered roots of political thought. Unsurprisingly, the volumes on liberal thought and conservative political thought do not contain any contribution, which directly and/or indirectly involves a gender based analysis, let alone the problematization and/or interrogation of the patriarchal nexus of political thought and structure.

4.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

As evident in the works introduced above, In Turkey, especially in the early-Republican Era, the regime of truth governing the Turkish society and polity was structured around the premises of Kemalism. In the era that begins with the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and comes to an end with the transition to multi-party rule in 1946, Kemalist discourse conditioned what could be said and thought of, how to think of and act upon the individuals and the proposals about the best way of governing the conduct of the citizens. The individual-citizen as a “...rationalist, anti-traditionalist, anti-clerical person approaching all problems intellectually and objectively...”, who is also loyal to her/his roots (Karpat, 1959:53-54) were prevalent themes in all lines of thought that offered different visions of a good Turkish society. In this respect, it can be argued that Kemalism provided the foundation of the political thought and action in Turkey,

rendering other visions of society in a position that simply deals with the matters of technicality, with the question of the best way of en*gendering* this particular individual-citizen. In other words, although it had different meanings for different groups of people with different ideologies, Kemalism provided the limits of thinking; it was the same form of problematization that was at the root of the solutions the thinkers with different ideological affiliations proposed to the perceived problems, that is, it was the same problems that they searched solutions for. This makes Kemalism distinctively important for understanding early-Republican political thought.

However, it should be kept in mind that Kemalism has this distinctive place not as an ideology but when (and) if it is considered as the name given to the general politics of truth in Turkey. Kemalists were not the founders of the general form of problematization or the creators of the discourses on society and the individuals-as-citizen. Kemalism was a discourse among other discourses which succeeded in colonizing other discourses, appropriating and challenging them for the specific aims of the Kemalist cadres. So, early republican political thought in Turkey cannot be labeled as Kemalist when Kemalism is understood as an ideology. Not everyone was a proponent of Kemalism, although virtually all political thinkers in early republican Turkey shared the same concerns. Only (and if) Kemalism is defined as the name given to the general politics of truth in Turkey, it can be argued that each and every political thinker was Kemalist and the political thinking in early republican Turkey ran along the lines of Kemalism. What is important here is analyzing Kemalism not as an ideology that structured the Turkish society and polity and with a view to explicit or implicit intentions and statements of its "authors." We can criticize and even try Kemalism as an ideology as much as we want, with a view to the statements and

actions of the leading cadres or the ideologues of Kemalist regime, we can search for and find, with evidence, aspects of Kemalism that is conducive to or a hindrance on the concerns of feminism – whatever way it is defined; that embraces patriarchy or that challenges it. The same is also true for the "opponents" of Kemalist ideology. Engaging in such a task, would be futile, unless one incorporates an analysis of the production of knowledges and truths on the construction of gender and discourses that accompany this production. In other words, in understanding the contours of political thought in early republican Turkey, what needs to be analyzed is the "regime of truth" that structures the production of knowledges and truths on and about the society, individuals-as-citizen, and relating to these in a circular fashion, on the gender categories and roles, that is, the general form of problematization and the ensuing discourses rather than the intentions and statements of the authors of a specific ideology. This helps us get a clearer picture of political thought in early republican Turkey and the operation of patriarchy in it – or its operation within the contours of patriarchy. It is only in this way that we can understand how we are made into the gendered individuals we are, through what means and towards what ends, which enable us, in turn, to find solid ground to challenge patriarchy in Turkey. In the next chapter, I undertake this task and analyze the texts of various "authors," published in eight journals, including the texts of those both "for" and "against" Kemalist ideology, with a view to the way that the truths about gender are produced and gender relations are naturalized, that is, I analyze the way that patriarchy operates in the production of gendered subjectivities in political thought in early republican Turkey.

CHAPTER FIVE

PATRIARCHAL PRODUCTION OF GENDERED SUBJECTIVITIES IN TURKEY

There had been times in the history of political thought in Turkey, when “what [is] accept[ed] as going without saying no longer [went] without saying,” making it almost impossible “to think things as one usually [thought] them” (Foucault, 1982b: 34). In those times “whatever happen[ed] to come to pass” (Arendt, 1978: 5) began to be examined critically, and as a result of these examinations “transformation [became] simultaneously very urgent, very difficult, and altogether possible” (Foucault, 1982b: 34). One such period in the history of political thought in Turkey was, for sure, Early-republican era, when great many efforts were made at building a war-torn country anew from the “ruins” of the Ottoman Empire and at the modernization of the country. In the era, virtually all aspects of human life were problematized within the framework of modernization, not only by the ruling cadres of the newly-found Republic, but also by thinkers from different ideological circles, in favor of or in opposition to the ideology of the ruling cadres – Kemalism. These problematizations led to a transformation in the way that gender, relations between and within different gender categories and the roles attributed to gendered individuals in public, social and private realms are conceptualized.

It is well known that the history of the attempts at modernization and/or westernization in Turkey can be traced back at least to the

Tanzimat period and even before. However, with the founding of the Republic a change took place in the tone and the focus of these attempts. Throughout the centuries following *Tanzimat,* modernization was conceived of as only entailing the modernization of the state, that is the primary focus of the conceptualizations of modernization/westernization was the state and its institutions and the life of the individual was not so much a concern in political thought. In other words, until the founding of the Republic, the concern was primarily with how sovereign power should best (re)structure itself so as to become *modern*. It was assumed, when it was considered as of importance, that the modernization of the state would entail the modernization of the society and/or the life of the individual, in brief, all other aspects of the human condition. What distinguished the political thoughts on modernization and/or westernization in early republican era from those of the earlier times is that, where the previous efforts were made almost exclusively to modernize the state, now, the attempted modernization was targeting the citizenry, too. The life of the individual, her/his life energies, the employment of these energies in the processes of political, social, economic, cultural, economic and biological production became to be the primary concerns for political thought. This trend can be observed as growing within the Ottoman political thought after the First and especially Second Constitutional periods, however, it was not until the founding of the Republic that the efforts at a wholesale modernization of all realms of human life in Turkey crystallized.

That the individual(-as-citizen) became a target for modernization signaled a change in the model governing the polity and the society. Where the Ottoman Empire was modeled after sovereignty, with the founding of the Republic disciplinary power began to take hold as a model for political/social structures, although sovereign power did not

simply ceased to exist. As a result, the issue for political thought was no longer primarily how to rule a subject, or a people, but rather it was how to govern the conduct of the individuals on the micro level and how to govern the populations on the macro level and in that, the concern was not only with the best way of structuring the interactions between the individual and the state/government and between the individual and the society, equally important was the biological life of the individuals: the flesh/body and the blood, the health of the body, its strengths, its abilities and most importantly its reproductive energies became matters for political thought. Thus, it can be argued that in the early republican era, "the threshold of modernity" (Foucault, 1979: 143) was reached, rendering life a political matter.

The most significant issue for political thought was now the best ways of provoking life energies of individuals and making use of these energies in all forms of production while at the same time precluding the possibilities that the individual, with her/his life energies provoked, breaks the rules of social life and making her/him, without resorting to coercion, conform to the schemes of social normality. In other words, the most significant issue for political thought was simultaneously producing utility and docility from (the bodies of) individuals. Thinkers from different ideological circles searched for the best ways of making use of "life" *via* the regulation of the population and the disciplining of the individuals. However, it should be noted that here docility did not refer to outright submissiveness. It was continually emphasized that people should obey the rules/commands not unconsciously and not because they had to, but consciously, with the recognition of what makes it necessary to obey these rules/commands, that is, the docility of the individuals were defined in such a way that it does not harm the energies and the creativity of gendered individuals. In other words,

the aim was to define subjectivities in such a way that to make the subject the agent of her/his own docility and make docility the guarantee of the increase in the productive energies of individuals.

Aiming to provoke the life energies of the individuals while simultaneously making them docile, political thinkers attempted to find the best ways of making use of people "without harming them, without eating up their life and psychological energies" (Cemgil, 1942: 368). The issue was not simply making use of the energies of the individuals, but it was making the *best use* of it by employing human beings in areas that fits their abilities the best (Fikret, 1934: 422):

> "using human beings in the jobs that best fits their abilities" is the most salient feature of life in contemporary culture and civilization. Nobody within the state machinery and the family of the nation wants individuals to spend their energies uselessly. With their activities that corresponds to their abilities, everybody is of best use to the society in which s/he lives and in this way s/he can become the perfect citizen.

Ability was an important theme in the thoughts of the political thinkers of the era, especially in matters related to education. Discovering the special ability of the child and training and educating them in accordance with this ability was proposed as the foremost duty of the education system. For example, Kip argued (1935: 9):

> Every child is a possessor of a special ability, which can only be discover through investigation, which sometimes remains concealed and which definitely exists. It is understood that not only normal children, even the imbeciles that are mentally deficient are the possessors of a special ability that can be exploited for the society. There are people in the social order, among the consumers who live as a storage commodity and tramps who feed on the compassion of the society, who will certainly prove useful and who can perform tasks that maybe a normal person cannot fulfill.

As the quotations suggest, in political thought in early republican Turkey, it was not enough that the individuals be “intelligent, sensitive and, even, energetic” (Baltacıoğlu, 1941a: 2). It was not enough that the individuals conform to the social norms. It was considered necessary, at the same time, that the individuals be “of use,” be productive.

It can be argued that, *productivity* was one of the core concepts, one of the most important key words of political thought in early republican Turkey. However, it should be noted that productivity did not only refer to industrial and/or agricultural, in short, economic production, neither the “obsession” with productivity limited to the cultural and social/political production; one of the most important aspects of productivity was the biological production of human beings, that is, procreativity. The emphasis on procreativity was related to the developments that turned peoples into populations. The collectivities of human beings were not simply *peoples* anymore, or more accurately, they had become a population more than a people. As a result, giving birth to children to increase the population have been presented as the most important “national” duty of the citizens and has been turned into a concerted economic and political action. However, increasing the population was not enough by itself, it was also necessary to advance it qualitatively. At the intersection of the need for advancing the population quantitatively and qualitatively the modern *family* gained importance. Family was problematized in political thought with a concern for the best way of structuring it so as to warrant that families are formed on the basis of the aim of giving birth to children, and raising them in line with the republican ideals – although these ideals were defined differently by different people. Thus, family served as a link between the regulations relating to the population and the disciplining of the individuals and was at the core

of the (patriarchal) social control mechanisms. It also served as a tool to link different realms of the human condition: the public, social, private and the intimate.

In such a setting, gender served as a tool in political thought, which enabled one to differentiate between individuals, and, playing on gender differences, to substantiate social/political productivity and social/political control of individuals. In the processes of patriarchal production of gendered subjectivities in political thought in Early Republican Turkey, gender was utilized to make the best use of individuals by making the best use of their “sexual” differences. In this chapter, I analyze the discourses through which gendered subjectivities are produced, how and on the basis of what the differences between and within genders are constructed and what form of patriarchy structured these processes of production and construction in political thought in Early Republican Turkey. In doing so, I examined the texts in a selection of eight journals, with different ideological leanings, published between 1929 and 1946, that is from the adoption of the Latin alphabet to the end of the early part of the republican era with the first democratic (read as multi-party) elections.

What is the significance of these dates, that makes it possible to consider the period in-between as a distinctive one? In a sense there is nothing significant in these dates and nothing distinctive about the period in-between. The era features many similarities with its past as well as its future. Moreover, these dates can be seen as insignificant when the more or less arbitrary nature of all attempts at periodization of history is taken into view. There are primarily two reasons for my *arbitrary* designation of the time span between 1929 and 1946 as a distinctive period. The periodization begins with 1929 since, first, I

have no knowledge of Ottoman, which makes it an impossibility for me to analyze the texts published before then and second, the alphabet reform, that had taken place at the end of the 1928, was one of the cornerstones of citizenization project put into effect by the Kemalist regime and supported by thinkers from different corners of political thought. The impact of that project can still be felt on the present day conceptualizations of citizenship and subjectivity/ individuality. The reason for "picking" 1946 as an end-date for the period, is the proliferation of the solutions proposed to the perceived problems, with the first multi-party elections. However, the general form of problematization underlying these solutions stayed, for the most part, the same. So, 1946 is the more arbitrary part of the periodization. It may have as well specified as 1950 – the date that the party (CHP) that initiated and effected the modernization processes since the founding of the Republic was replaced by another party (Democrat Party) – or as 1938 – the date that the most prominent figure of the founding and the modernization of the Republic (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) had passed away. However, the date is not completely arbitrary. Although the general form of problematization and the discourses governing the production of knowledge on gender stayed for the most part the same, the proliferation of the solutions proposed to the perceived problems effected a change, however minuscule, on the general form of problematization.

There is another issue, as to whether the selection of journals constitute a representative sample? The answer depends on what is expected of them to represent. If it is expected that the sample represent the hegemonic ideology of the early republican era, it is in a way representative since it includes an official publication of the Kemalist regime – *Ülkü*, but mostly not representative of it. The same

is also true for other ideologies and journals, that is they are in one way or the other representative of the thoughts of the ideological circles they belong to, although they are not *the* representative ones. However, what is sought in the present study is not a representativeness in terms of ideological coherences and differences, but representativeness in terms of general form of problematization that underlies the different solutions proposed to the perceived problems by different ideologies. In other words, it is the general form of problematization, or the general politics of truth that sets the rules of the production of discourses on gender, rather than the different solutions proposed by different ideologies that this study analyzes. In this respect, the selection constitutes a representative sample (as long as representation is a possibility) of the prevalent discourses and the general form of problematization in the early republican era.

In terms of method, I employed discourse analysis with a genealogical approach. I aimed to reveal what is constructed through problematization as an object of knowledge/truth on gender. I analyzed the relations between this object of knowledge/truth – in other words, object of thought – and power, that is relations between the objects of thought and the mechanisms that discipline the individual and the collectivities of individuals. In this respect, I did not try to uncover the intentions of the authors of the texts. Likewise, I did not aim to reveal the evil or good hidden behind the surface of what was apparently said. In other words, my aim was not to reveal what is *really* said behind what is *apparently* said. Instead, I stayed at the surface of the texts and analyzed the general form of problematization and the discourses prevalent in the texts. Thus, my concern was with what was said and how, why and in relation to what it was said. Analyzing the texts, I approached different texts by

different authors as constituting a unified whole, that is I did not analyze the texts separated from each other but analyzed them in their relations with each other. In doing so, I first analyzed the individual texts by individual authors as a whole in themselves then compared and contrasted them with each other, considering them as parts of a bigger whole and searching for the general form of problematization underlying them. So, what will be found in the following is not what specific authors, not even what specific ideological circles thought about gender in the past. Rather, I analyzed the general politics of truth on gender, the rules governing the production of discourses on gender differences and the significant themes in the patriarchal production of gendered subjectivities in political thought in Early Republican Turkey.

In what follows, I first provide general information on the journals that the analysis is based on. After that, I analyze the problematizations on and the constructions of gender in these journals, with a view to the discourses on population and the discourses on the differences between men and women, the relations between and within them and the roles attributed to them within the private, social and the public realms. The analysis proceeds not on a journal-by-journal and text-by-text basis, instead, I conducted a thematic analysis, the main themes being the regulation of the population and the disciplining of the gendered subjectivities in relation to the private, social and the public spheres. I conclude the chapter with a discussion on whether the changes in the general form of problematization in relation to gender in the early republican era point to the birth of the (re)public(an) patriarchy.

5.1. THE JOURNALS ANALYZED

In this study I analyzed eight journals that were published between 1929 and 1946. I used all the issues of four of the journals, published in the era in question (*Türk Yurdu*, *Ülkü*, *Yeni Adam* and *Yurt ve Dünya*) and particular volumes of the remaining four (*Çınaraltı*: 1941-1942; *Kültür*: 1935-1938; *Resimli Ay*: 1930; *Yücel*: 1939). In deciding the journals to be analyzed, the criteria I attended to was choosing a set of journals with different ideological leanings, reasoning, it might be of help in showing that it is the same discourse and the same form of problematization that underlie the different solutions proposed by different lines of thought to the perceived problems. In the selection of the four of the journals – *Türk Yurdu*, *Ülkü*, *Yeni Adam* and *Yurt ve Dünya* – I applied this criteria. I applied the same criteria in the selection of the rest of the journals, however, they were chosen randomly, not intentionally and were included to strengthen the representativeness of the sample in the way explained above and to ascertain the validity of the arguments of the thesis. Before moving onto the analysis, I provide, in this section, brief profiles of the journals in question. Profiles of the journals are provided not in order of importance or of the frequency of the citations from that journal, but in alphabetical order.

i. Çınaraltı

The journal was published weekly between 1941-1944 by Orhan Seyfi Orhon and Yusuf Ziya Ortaç. The major contributors to the journal were well-known figures from the right wing, extending from "republican conservatives" (for the term, see İrem, 2004) to racists. Among the most prominent authors who contributed to the journal

were (in alphabetical order) Nihal Atsız, Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, H. E. Erkilet, Al Temur Kılıç, Orhan Seyfi Orhon, Yusuf Ziya Ortaç, Peyami Safa and R. Oğuz Türkkan. The phrase under the headline of each issue is sufficiently telling of the position of the journal: “Unity in Language, Idea, Work.” Thus, *Çınaraltı* represents one among the brand of fierce advocates of Turkism in early-republican era (Öztürkmen, 2005: 192), with a concentration on Anatolian lands (Özdalga, 2006: 4), rather than opting for expansionism, which might be recalled in seeing Nihal Atsız's, Oğuz Türkkan's names.

It is possible to make a classification among the works published in the journal on the axis of the “issues of the day” and “arts”. In the first section, the overwhelming topic was unsurprisingly related with the “national.” In the second section poems, short stories were published. The majority of the poems were in line with the general topic of the journal – i.e. they were voicing the nationalistic sentiments, either in terms of heroism or in the calls for national unity.

ii. Kültür

It was started to be published by Asım İsmet Kültür in İzmir on a bi-weekly basis in 1933. Majority of the articles and essays in the journal were authored by Asım İsmet Kültür and Necati Kip. Rahmi Balaban, Ali Rıza Gürel, Ali Kemal, İsmet Aytekin Kültür and Naşit Sarıca occasionally contributed to the journal. *Kültür* was overwhelmingly a journal of teaching. It was claimed to be a “literary, teaching and social” journal publishing “essays on positive sciences, new principles of teaching and education, literary and cultural works.” In line with this statement, the majority of the essays, published in the

journal, focused on the education of children, on the cultivation of national culture (Kültür, 1936 : 5):

> We owe substantial duties to this motherland on which we live and to which we are connected ... with our minds and hearts, as human beings and as offspring.
>
> Our most essential duty is to enlighten Atatürk's revolution, which is founded on positive knowledge and its light that will shine through generations, ages, until eternity by our enthusiasm, faith and mind.

iii. Resimli Ay

The journal was published by Sabiha Sertel and M. Zekeriya Sertel between 1924-1930 on a monthly basis. The last issue of the journal was published on 1 January 1931. Sertels also acted as editorial writers. In their memoirs Sertels note that in the beginning they wrote the majority of the articles in the journal. In the first issue of the journal, published on 1 February 1924 the major task in the minds of Sertels is stated as follows (S. Sertel, 1987: 79-80):

> Up to now in our country two types of journals have been published. The first type of journals are literary journals, which address a small number of readers. There is also a second type of journals, which are published by booksellers and amateurs who wish to earn money and fame. “Resimli Ay” belongs to neither the first nor the second group. Our goal is to satisfy the needs of the readers for reading and to found a realist people's journal in our country. For us the worth of an article is based more on the multitude of the readers rather than the signature below it. Especially, the articles, short stories, general essays that will be published in “Resimli Ay” will not address the literary taste of a narrow group, but they will satisfy the sentimental, intellectual, aesthetic needs of the readers.

The life of the journal can be divided into two periods. In the words of Sabiha Sertel (1987: 81):

> ... The period between 1924 and 1928 is the period of struggling for the establishment of actual democracy and of analyzing social problems. Mostly I and Zekeriya were in charge of the intellectual front [of the journal]. Literary works were produced by the cadre [mainly composed of Mehmet Rauf, İbnül Refik Ahmet Nuri, Reşat Nuri, Yusuf Ziya, Hakkı Suha, Ercüment Ekrem, Hıfzı Tevfik, Sadri Ertem, Selim Sırrı, Mahmut Yesari and Yakup Kadri]. Besides these, we also spared place for the essays, which would improve people's general knowledge.
>
> The second period that started in 1928 and continued until 1930 indicated the birth of a new literature. [In this period] progressive, socialist ideas came forth in the essays and short stories. The cadre of authors was also changed. Nazım Hikmet, Sabahaddin Ali, Suat Derviş, Vâlâ Nureddin, Sadri Ertem and other authors appeared as the representatives of a leftist literature. Unlike the previous period, short stories, poems were written not for the sake of satisfying the taste of the authors but for revealing the facts about society. We can claim that these years turned out to be the generative period of a socialist literature. It was impossible to explicitly argue for socialist thought. These ideas were discussed in short stories, in the articles within certain limits.

However, the limits did not help Sertels and *Resimli Ay*, just as the other publications to which they contributed afterwards, to escape from the wrath of the government. Throughout their lives in Turkey Sertels were attacked by (extreme) nationalist groups, were tried, penalized, and at times imprisoned due to their “leftist” standing (S. Sertel, 1987; Z. Sertel, 2000; Y. Sertel, 2002). However, the publication of *Resimli Ay* was stopped not as a direct result of these developments but as a result of the demands of the partners of the journal who were mainly interested in profits (Z. Sertel, 2000: 152):

> *Resimli Ay* was established as [limited] company. Our partners did not approve our efforts. But as the job paid itself they did not complain. When the sales were dropped, and thus profits decreased after 1928 alphabet reform they reacted. They held us responsible for the drop in the sales. We could not reach an agreement. We liquidated the company and we had to pull out of the journal.

iv. Ülkü

Ülkü was the official monthly publication of People's Houses (*Halkevleri*). It was published between March 1933 and August 1950. Hakkı Uyar (1997) notes that *Ülkü* was launched as a reaction by Recep Peker, then General Secretary of the ruling CHP, to the publication of *Kadro*, which he considered to be communist-leaning. In more general terms the publication of the journal should be read as a reaction to the potential of plurality of the representations of Kemalism in early-republican era (Aydın, 2004: 15). The aim of the journal was, naturally, to form the "ideology of the revolution" (Uyar, 1997: 183), and thus propagating the ideology of the CHP. In this respect, the topics that were considered in the journal extended from peasantism to sports, philosophy, public health, history and literature (Karadeniz, 2002: 4). However, the common topic that dominated the journal was nationalization of the subjects. In the article by Recep Peker that was published in the first issue of the journal the *raison d'etre* behind the journal's publication was stated as follows (1933):

> "ÜLKÜ" is published in order to nourish the excitement of the new generation, leaving the dark ages behind and heading towards an honorable and enlightened future, to warm up the [essence] of revolution in the heart of Turkish nation, to speed up the progressive steps... to ensure unity in mind, heart and movement among those who take this path ... to serve national language, national history, national arts and culture... to disseminate the passion in the spirit of People's Houses, which work for reaching all these goals, *via* letters.
>
> In the declarations, foundation and analyses of "ÜLKÜ", the ideas of Republic, nationalism and revolution will be essential. The views of the political body that founded the People's Houses about the main concepts have been explicitly written and told many times. We will make use of any opportunity to continue these statements. Multi-dimensional, disorienting, vague opinions will not find a place in "ÜLKÜ". Essays will be under close scrutiny in this respect.

The articles published in the journal were classified into fifteen sections: Literature and language (poems, short stories, novels, illustration, analysis); Fine Arts (music, painting, sculpture, architecture); History; Sociology and Philosophy; Economy and Agriculture; Public Teaching; Protection of the Patrie; Womanhood; Science; News; Proposals; Public Health and Population; Sports, Games and Entertainment; Peasantism; Bibliography; People's Houses (Ülkü'nün yazı bölümleri, 1933: 90-93). The explication of sections in the first issue of the journal details the “first statement”. In this respect, under the section literature and language the aim was to publish (Ülkü'nün yazı bölümleri, 1933: 91):

> ...works, which would reinforce love for the nation and patrie, the excitement for revolution; which revive the great moments of Turkish history, which tell the heroisms in national struggle, which introduce and endear the big cities, towns, villages, each and every piece of the land, which reveal the ugliness and stupidity of bigotry ... which breathe love of populisms and lead the souls towards the great path.

Almost the same spirit ran through the introductory statements of all the sections, except for the sections of economy and agriculture, and womanhood. The section of womanhood was devised so as to include essays on women's movements in Turkey and in other countries, equality between men and women, the teaching role of woman in society and housewifehood. However, apart from arbitrary pieces on such issues as women's right to vote, and their position in the civil law, the section on womanhood was almost inactive.

The prominent authors of the journal were Mehmet Fuad Köprülü, Recep Peker, Tahsin Banguoğlu, Suut Kemal Yetkin, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Ahmet Kutsi Tecer, Nusret Köymen, Aydoslu Sait, Necib Ali Küçüka, Mehmet Saffet, Behçet Kemal Çağlar, Kazım Nami Duru, Ahmet Nesimi and Ferit Celal Güven, who were also members of the

CHP. In ideological terms the journal cadre represented a “solidarist, radical secularist and anti-liberal” stance (Aydın, 2004: 55).

v. Türk Yurdu

Descending from the journal of the Turkist circle – organized first in *Turkish Homeland Society*, which was replaced by Turkish Hearth in 1912 - in the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, *Türk Yurdu* has been the official organ of Turkish Hearths, a Turkist circle of intellectuals, politicians and youth. The publication of bi-weekly *Türk Yurdu* of the early-republican era was started with the foundation of the Republic (1923) and continued until the abolition of the Turkish Hearths in 1931. It was published again between 1942 and 1943. Today it is still in publication, going through its seventh phase. Among the authors contributed to the journal, from its first inception in 1911 to its closing in 1931, Ömer Seyfettin, Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Fuat Köprülü, Abdülhak Hamid, Yusuf Ziya, Faruk Nafiz, Orhan Seyfi, Necip Fazıl, Halide Nusret, Halide Edip, Yakup Kadri, Refik Halit, Hamdullah Suphi, Falih Rıfkı, Müfide Ferit, Selim Sırrı, Kâzım Nami, Nafı Atuf, Hilmi Ziya, Cemil Sena, Nurullah Ataç can be cited. In the present study, the issues of the journal published between 1929-1931 and 1942-1943 are analyzed.

In the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, the journal provided a milieu for those intellectuals who opted for an alternative way *vis-à-vis* Ottomanists, Islamists, and Westernists to save the Ottoman lands (Berkes, 1964). By the foundation of the Republic the ideology that was represented in the Turkish Hearths and disseminated by the journal laid the dominant nationalist discourse of early-republican era, as most conspicuously represented in the Sun-Language Theory and Turkish History Thesis. In this respect, Yusuf Akçura (1879-

1935), a prominent contributor to the journal both in the Ottoman and Republican eras stated that (Akçuraoğlu, 1990: 194):

> Half a century ago, the idea of Turkism was a thought that gave rise to ideas, feelings and aspirations in a couple of people, which was vaguely and hesitantly expressed now and then. This thought was so contradictory with the then existing circumstances that its supporters abstained from expressing it openly. However the idea of Turkism is realized today.

The journal embraced the inculcation of nationalist spirit into Turkish citizens. However, compared to Ağaoğlu's, Akçura's, Seyfeddin's Turkism *the* Turkism that steadily increased in tension turned out to be more conservative, positioning on extreme right and fiercely anti-communist (see Johnson, 2004: 105). Although there was no systematic division of sections within *Türk Yurdu* the journal contained regular sections on *the* "national," which revolved around the topics of national history, including ancient Turkish history, national language, national unity and consistent attacks on any public figure – especially intellectuals – who happens not to abide with the nationalistic standards of the journal.

vi. Yeni Adam

Yeni Adam is one of the most long-lasting periodicals in its genre. It was an opinion gazette and was published by İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu between 1934 until his death in 1978, with short intervals. Among the authors who contributed to the journal were Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar, Nurullah Ataç, Peyami Safa, Şükûfe Nihal (also contributed with her poems to *Çınaraltı*), Adnan Cemgil, Hüseyin Avni, Bedri Rahmi, Cemil Sait, Nurettin Şazi Kösemihal, Nazım Hikmet, Sait Faik, Kerim Sadi, Asaf Halet, Sabahattin Ali and Sadri

Ertem. Baltacıoğlu explains this plurality of political positions of the authors contributing to the journal as (Baltacıoğlu, 1937: 2):

> Despite the plurality of political positions as represented by its contributors, the standard theme that dominated the journal in almost all of its issues as well as its diverse sections was the question of a “new teaching” that would fit to the new age and thus to the “new man” ... Old thinking had conceived man as a stable, static being; it always lagged behind rapidity, alacrity, innovation, change. Above all, believing in abstract opinions, to hold breakthroughs in bounds evinced the teaching of this old man. ... The new man is being born as the counter opposite of all these [features].

In different sections of the journal the issues varied, ranging from Turkishness, to pedagogical information, womanhood and children, hygiene, physical health, literary criticism, in all of which the main concern was the new citizen of the Republic and the best means for cultivating people in accordance with the principles of the regime. This concern is also to do with instituting an accurate understanding of and hence solid relation with the “modern”. In fact, it can be argued that the journal represents the rather ambiguous search in early republican era to root the “new” society in *a* tradition and in Kemalist ideology, which can be observed in almost all the publications analyzed in this study. However, what made *Yeni Adam* different is the successful and appealing – in the sense of its readable style and content as well as the overly convincing style of Baltacıoğlu himself – synthesis between the “new” and the selections from the “imagined old” *via* the "social school" into a form of the ruling ideology – Kemalism.

vii. Yurt ve Dünya

The journal was published between 1941 and 1944 by Behice Boran, Pertev Naili Boratav and Adnan Cemgil on a monthly basis (after the

thirty-eighth issue the journal was published bi-weekly). It was directed first by Behice Boran and after November 1942 by Pertev Naili Boratav. Besides the three founders, Mediha Berkes, Niyazi Berkes, Muzaffer Şerif, Saffet Dengi (Korkut), Hüseyin Avni, Sabahaddin Ali, Muzaffer Ş. Başoğlu and Burhan Arpad were the most prominent authors who contributed to the journal. Melih Cevdet Anday, Kemal Bilbaşar, Ahmet Naim, Orhan Kemal, Bekir Sıtkı Kunt, Fethi Giray, Mehmet Kemal, Rıfat Ilgaz and Enver Gökçe also wrote for the journal.

Because of the leftist affiliations of the founders and the authors that frequently contributed to the journal, *Yurt ve Dünya* was subjected to continuous attack both from the government and from nationalist circles. The bulk of the contributions to the journal were almost unreservedly classified as "communist." In his memoirs Niyazi Berkes explains this state of affairs in relation to the spirit of the times (1997: 271-272):

> Those who do not know the level of thinking during the era of National Chief cannot easily comprehend why this poor journal had led so many people to get into a towering rage. Considering contemporary level of thought I can say that the journal was one of the highest journals of the period. That is why this poor journal turned out to be a "phenomenon" to attack...

On the contrary, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, among the well-known "republican conservatives," had no trouble to call the circle as "Marxist and militant" (Ülken, 1992: 387). On the other hand, in the first issue of the journal it was declared that rather than engaging in political issues, the contributions would mainly be related to "... the world affairs, the developments in the world of arts and science" (quoted in Karadeniz, 2002: 12). The main sections of the journal can be classified as follows: Economy, sociology, history, psychology, arts

and literature, poems, short stories, literary criticisms. Apart from that the journal circle assumed a classical understanding of “intellectual responsibility,” which was totally in line with the spirit of early-republican era (quoted in Karadeniz, 2002: 13): “

> ... *YURT VE DÜNYA* tried to the best of [our] ability to satisfy the wishes of the enlightened reader. In our essays ... we first and foremost tried to be bald and sincere. In this [way] we tried to the best of our ability to consider many social and intellectual issues, to think on these issues, to argue and criticize; in other words to create an actual and solid atmosphere of thought. We believe that the intellectuals can fulfill the service to our people and our land ... only by creating such an atmosphere [of thought].

viii. Yücel

Yücel was published between 1935 and 1956 on a monthly basis by Muhtar F. Enata in İstanbul. The journal was closed a couple of times temporarily due to the interpretation of some of the essays as contradicting to the principles of the republican regime. In the journal mainly the university students were addressed. Authors from a wide range of ideological and political affiliations contributed to the journal. Among the most prominent names Şinasi Özdenoğlu, Bedri Aydoğan, Orhan Şaik Gökyay, Bülent Ecevit, Şahap Sıtkı, Pertev Naili Boratav, Cahit Sıtkı Tarancı, Ceyhun Atıf Kansu, Ziya Osman Saba, Ahmet Muhip Dıranas, Ferit Celal Güven, Necati Cumalı, Fazıl Hüsnü Dağlarca, Talip Apaydın, Sabahattin Kudret Haksal, İlhan Tarus, Cevdet Kudret, Cemil Meriç, Samet Ağaoğlu, Türker Acaroğlu, Haldun Taner, Celal Sılay, Oğuz Kazım, İbrahim Zeki Burdurlu, Vedat Günyol, Müştak Erenus and Orhan Burian can be cited. This plurality, or in Vedat Günyol's words, “ragtag” (Günyol, 1993), can be read in relation to Cemal Süreya's depiction of the evolution of the

dominant identities in the journal throughout its life span (quoted in Karadeniz, 2002: 5):

> It is possible to name the period ... [that started with] the participation of Vedat Günyol and Orhan Burian to the journal circle ... as the second phase of the journal ... In this period the spirit of humanism, the spirit of focusing on one's own cultural values gains weight ... [Thus *Yücel*] represented [an] idealist [stance] within the frame of a general understanding of humanism until 1946; between 1946-1950 [the journal] took a critical stance against the compromises from Atatürkism; and after 1950 a pessimist stance.

Thus, according to this classification the first phase of the journal, which this study focuses on, is marked with the dominant spirit of the 1930s. While the bulk of the essays published in the journal were on arts in general, and literature in particular and on the philosophical issues, which, first and foremost, aimed at introducing the reader to western arts and philosophy, the common theme of the early republican era was also embedded into the journal (Nabi O., 1939: 299):

> In ending every year of new Turkey we see with delight that we are faced with new horizons of much more enormous duties, of greater works that would lead the patrie to happiness and light are opening up.
>
> [The crucial questions are] what are the needs of the patrie? What is the role of Turkishness in the frame of humanity? Has the revolution been fulfilled? Which duties are left to us? What sort of other enemies do we have that should be eliminated together with the red and the green? Have the people been rose to the level that we opted for? Has the whole country entered into the life that was longed for? What kind of victories would we have in the field of culture? How should we enlighten the village?

Likewise, the headlines on the first pages of each and every issue of journal were filled with statements, which repetitively acknowledge commitment to the principles of Atatürk.

5.2. GENDERING THE POPULATION

In the eighteenth century, it was realized that governments were not dealing with subjects, with masses or simply with a people, but specifically with a population, which has its specific variables: “birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation” (Foucault, 1979: 25) and accordingly population emerged as an economic and political problem. Although the importance of population was known long before then – that the strength and wealth of a country depended on the population – the new political economy of population formed a “whole grid of observations regarding sex” (Foucault, 1979: 26):

> There emerged the analysis of the modes of sexual conduct, their determinations and their effects, at the boundary line of the biological and economic domains. There also appeared those systematic campaigns which, going beyond the traditional means – moral and religious exhortations, fiscal measures – tried to transform the sexual conduct of couples into a concerted economic and political behavior.

The concepts of family, fatherhood (thus manhood) and motherhood (thus womanhood) acquired their modern meanings within the framework of this modern construction that is called population. Especially after the founding of the Republic, when the “threshold of modernity” was reached, population its quantity and quality had become a matter of concern both for the ruling cadres of the Kemalist regime and the political thinkers “for” or “against” the Kemalist ideology. It can be argued that, giving birth to children and raising them in line with the republican ideals could no longer be seen as *reproduction*, but it was seen as one of the most important production, the production of human beings, their *pro-creation*. It is needless to say that a major and the primary role was attributed to women in this biological and/or “sexual” production of human beings.

Their role was not only to give birth to children, but also, they were required to keep the mental as well as the bodily health of the children sound. In the extreme, it was expected of them to secure the purity of the Turkish blood, and advance its quality and in more moderate accounts, they were thought of as the sun of the children, that gives them life and raises them healthily and in accordance with the republican ideals. Although men, too, were required to do their best to contribute to the quantity and the quality of the population, women had a bigger share and it was considered as her first and foremost duty.

Three kinds of solutions prevailed in the problematizations of the quantity of the population in political thought in early republican Turkey: increasing the births, decreasing the deaths, and exporting citizens through migration, or in other words, increasing the population through "blood transfer" (Nabi Y., 1939a: 37). The role of the gendered individuals and especially women was focused on the first two, so my analysis is, while the third was relegated to the state. Although it had been argued frequently that all the three were important (the third one not so frequently as the first and second and only when the individuals to migrate is of the "Turkish blood") for increasing the population, the most important one for the intellectuals of the early republican era was the increase in the births and it was frequently propagated. The thinkers for the most part acknowledged that the capacity and willingness of the "Turkish" women exceeded that of the women of other nations, yet, it was considered not enough and was proposed that each women bear more and more children (see, among others Baltacıoğlu, 1940a, 1941a, 1941b, 1941c, 1943a, 1944a; Barker, 1935; Irmak, 1943, 1944, 1945; Kazım, 1941; Kip, 1936; Nabi, 1939; Ülkü, 1935a; Ş., 1935; Yüceuluğ, 1942). For example, one of the most trenchant supporters of the increase in

population, Baltacıoğlu, addressing “young men” advised (Baltacıoğlu, 1941a: 16; also see 1941b: 2; 1940a:2):

> Multiply! Get married! Build a home no matter it is made of mud! Your first duty should be to raise children! Have 1,2,3,4,? ..., 10, 12 .. children. Think that with each child you have, one more is added to the 20 million of Turks and be glad! Millions are made of one-hundred thousands, one hundred thousand are made of thousands, thousands are made of hundreds and hundreds are made of miraculous and fertile ones. Man Turk! Be proud of fatherhood. Woman Turk! Be proud of motherhood! Turk, multiply!

Baltacıoğlu argues that the willingness of women to give birth is a sign of the health of a nation in terms of its culture (Baltacıoğlu, 1944a: 2):

> What is the most clear and certain evidence that shows the health of a clan, a tribe, a nation in terms of culture? The fertility of its women! If that society is lively, sound, its women give birth to children continually. The willingness to give birth comes only from adherence to the life of the community. This fertility is a sign of social optimism. In societies, where the culture is corrupted, women do not give birth, they become pessimist, child enemy; they become against marriage ... giving birth, becoming a wife and mother ... and they build an ideology that fits their situation.

Similarly it is argued in *Ülkü* that (Ülkü, 1935a: 211):

> The meaning of the increase in population in a country is that there is a government that makes all the activities relating to work and amplitude possible and that brings the people peace and tranquility. Crowded Turkey, is a work of the Republic as the prosperous Turkey.

However, thinkers were not so optimistic about the willingness of “Turkish” women to give birth when it came to urban women. Although Turkish women were considered as fertile and willing to bear children, it was continually emphasized that it is rural women who gave birth to many children. Urban women was seen as not so

willing and it may be argued that the concern for the thinkers was to increase the pregnancy levels of urban women. In other words, the propagations of increasing the births targeted specifically urban women (Baltacıoğlu, 1941c: 2):

> Urban women, especially snobbish ones, consider child bearing a heavy, burdensome task. No doubt this is a sign of moral decadence or Turkish women that goes unpunished. There are also snobbish men who thinks in this way and even cooperates with her wife. Moreover there are men who avoid women as a result of homosexuality and family-phobia and there are women who hate men.

Similarly, it is the urban women that the problematizations on abortion focus on. For example, Adalan cites seven reasons for the increase in the number of abortions. However, one theme, which is the increasing freedom of urban women, dominates these reasons. In all the reasons Adalan cites, freedom is the main motivating force that lead urban women to abortion (Adalan, 1936). It is needless to say that accounts on abortion did not consider it as a matter related to a woman's use of her own body, instead it was seen as a crime against the society. In the words of Necip Ali Küçüka (1936: 26):

> A mother's life is important. When necessary a child can be sacrificed to save her life. However, aborting a child, killing a child who is a produce of life when the are no reasons a crime is committed, above all, against the society. For the nations and the countries that needs to multiply in a short period of time, acting in this way is utterly a betrayal.

In abortion, like in conception, it was urban who were seen as creating a problem. Thus, advancing the population quantitatively by increasing the births, discourses targeted specifically the urban women. The concern with increasing the birth rates among urban women, in these discourses, not only served to advance the

population quantitatively, but also functional in advancing its quality, as will be shown in this section later on.

The other way of increasing the population was decreasing the deaths. In the words of Baltacıoğlu (1944a: 2):

> What is the most clear and certain evidence that shows the health of a clan, a tribe, a nation in terms of civilization? Preventing the death of the born children and the ability to sustenance. Regrettably, our nation, which has such a high level of culture and fertility, is backwards in terms of the techniques that we call civilization. As a result we cannot sustain the born children.

So, decreasing the deaths is a prominent theme in relation to the problem of population, especially when the deaths to be decreased is the deaths of the babies. But it should be noted that decreasing the deaths is thought to be useful in increasing the population only when it goes hand in hand with the increase in the births. Otherwise it is thought to be useless since it leads to a population consisting only of old people. Decreasing the death of the new-born, thinkers proposed continually, the founding of institutions that monitor the health of the children and the pregnant women. In this respect, decreasing the death of the mothers was thought to be as important as decreasing the death of the babies. For example Barker argues (1935: 206):

> think of the contribution that a mother that has died before or during giving birth to her first child could make to the country. She would give many more children to the country until the age of forty five. Raise them and make them have a wife (*sic*.) and children [*çoluk, çocuk*]... the wealth and population would increase.

Some thinkers felt the urge to “warn” about the dangers of this state of affairs. It was argued that with rural women giving birth at high rates and urban women, especially intellectual women, at low rates,

the quality of the population would deteriorate in time, leading to the decadence of Turkish civilization. For example Kansu argues (1939: 113):

> In matters related to the population the issue of quality is as much as important as the quantity. This issue was brought forward many times in the history of humanity. Because, in the decadence of the many civilizations that does not exist today, the decrease in number of the organically and intellectually aristogenic class in relation to the cacogenic class has been an important factor. It should not be forgotten that nations rise with their noble children. The decadence of the nations begin when the birth rates in the elite families lag behind the average.

Two interrelated points should be made here; that the unwillingness on the part of the urban women to give birth was seen as the sign of the decadence of the Turkish civilization and that the numbers alone meant nothing, it was important that *people of quality* bear and raise *children of quality*.

The quality of the population was an important concern in political thought in early republican era in terms of the education level, the health of the individuals, the skills of the workforce. Two themes have been prominent in matters related to the quality of the population, education and eugenics. The focus was more on the first than on the latter, although rehabilitation of the generations, and the quality of the people bearing children, as shown above, was in one way or the other a concern for the most of the thinkers. Family has been considered as the most important domain to secure the quality of the population. In fact, it has been considered the first condition of the matters related to the population. Also, it is through the family that the unity of the nation is established. In the words of Cansever (1942a: 68):

> For a human being to incarnate, a family, composed of a mother and a father is needed. It is required that the mother feed and nourish the child in her own body for some time. After the birth, the child needs to be fed by a nutritious liquid from her mother's blood and to be grown with love, to be protected. All these, naturally, are necessary and vital reasons that attach the child to the mother and father rather than the concept of humanity. By this way the child gets in touch with her/his ancestors ... her/his psychological improvement, too, attaches her/him to the mother, the father, relatives, ancestor, and finally, to the tribe and nation, which are nothing more than the extended version of the same descent. Common language, shared sacred things, common conventions, tastes, mentalities and interests reinforce national existence and they also attach the child to this existence tightly.

Cansever argues that the motherhood has so much an important role in the construction of nation (1942b: 15):

> ... the idea and feeling of nationalism make up an eternal, essential and holy law for human beings. For the lack of this feeling the child has to be deprived of the compassion of mother, of breastmilk and of her protection and love. In Turkish we have sayings noting the importance of breastmilk. We name an immoral person as "someone who comes of bad stock" [*sütü bozuk*]. This saying has a major meaning. The purity, nobility of breastmilk is the most important and most essential factor that guarantees the nobility, moral being of a human being all through her/his life. Apart from that it is also necessary to maintain that all the human beings in the world actually agree to speak the same language. Considering that it is impossible to create a human community, which is deprived of the compassion of mother and national language it is also impossible to eliminate the idea and feeling of nationalism.

In Cansever's argument, first a family, second a good mother, with a pure Turkish blood and with a noble and moral character is the most important factors that provides the children with a sound and national character and strengthens the national culture. Although in most of the texts there are disagreements with Cansever's general arguments, when it comes to the quality of the population and the role of the mother and family in it, all seems to agree. In other words, such a hard-line nationalism as Cansever's is not advocated by many

thinkers, the role of the family and the mother in a family in securing the quality of the population is continually emphasized and moreover, the relations of blood between the child, the mother, the family and the well-being of nation is overtly or covertly recognized. However, in more moderate accounts, the emphasis is on the role of the mother in nurturing the child and making her/him healthy, both bodily and intellectually. In other words, it is expected of women to educate the child, and furnish her/him with and socialize her/him into the requirements of the modern republican life (Ferit Celal, 1929: 1):

> We shall learn by heart that just one child is a nation, a patrie in her/his own. Imagine the contributions of just one child to the history, future of a nation. Because of negligence incomprehensibly great intelligence, characters, talents were turned into vermins for humanity. What is there, but the neglect of the society, the mother and the father that led those people of whose wickedness we fear, who lead a miserable existence in prisons to become such wretched, decadent?

To prevent such a situation, some thinkers argued that couples should be free to break up with each other easily to form new and more healthy families, that is it was argued that divorcing should be made into an easy process, since it is contended a disharmonious family does harm to children more than it does good. For example Baltacıoğlu argued (1945: 11):

> What is to be done, as we argued for a long time, is to simplify marriage and divorce. Thinking that Turkish family shall weaken, dissolve when this is done is nothing but a delusion that does not correspond to the facts. What can be expected from keeping husbands and wives as couples, between whom there are no longer any spiritual bonds via the force of the law except for harm and danger. Even the differences in psychological states must be a sufficient reason for divorce. Families experiencing matrimonial troubles can be broken down to form harmonious families.

It is needless to say that the general rule was preserving the family and solving its problems. However, since family was not considered to be an asset on its own right, and was esteemed for the function it fulfills that of supplying the biological base of the republic, its breakdown when unsolvable matrimonial troubles occur was not considered a big disaster for the society, except for the situation that divorce rates get high.

As can be seen, two main themes prevailed in the problematization of population; the importance of family and the importance of the fatherhood and motherhood duties of men and women. In matters related to population gender served as a tool to control the use that men and women makes of their own bodies and own lives. However, it is important to note that women were subjected to patriarchal control at higher levels. As will be seen more clearly in the next chapter, the (un)happiness of the family was considered to be resulting from the actions of women. Women's increasing visibility in social life did not trouble much, but as long as they fulfilled their motherhood duties and even wifehood duties were not considered as much important. One may reach the conclusion that through the politics of population women's traditional roles were reinforced, but I think matters are a little bit more complicated than than. I think what was reinforced was not the traditional images of womanhood, since neither motherhood nor womanhood was no longer being defined in traditional ways. Giving birth to child is no longer seen as reproduction, now it was a kind of social production with its new rules and methods. Also, a new element was inserted to the process, that is, fatherhood became an important aspect of the life of the children. What continued to be traditional in this picture was that women are thought to be the primary one to take care of the children. However, this was not the only proposal, many thinkers argued that raising the

children is not the duty only of women, and it can be done by men as well – although it is not as much preferable – and it is better still if child raising is done by the institutions of the state. In brief, through discourses on the importance of the quantity and the quality of the population, gendered individuals were subjected to a patriarchal control mechanism, that made them politically, socially, economically, culturally and biologically productive while at the same time rendered them docile to prevent them from claiming for themselves the goods produced. In fact, docility of gendered individuals was one of the "social goods" produced in the process. The discourses on population made sexual contact between individuals a concerted economic and political action, turned their bodies into the raw materials to be used in the production of the biological base of this action and utilized gender as a mechanism to control the use they made of their bodies and its energies.

5.3. GENDER-IN(G) THE INDIVIDUAL

After the founding of the Turkish Republic, women became to be more visible in social life. Although women's political action were not considered as legitimate by the ruling cadres of the Republic and also by the political thinkers, there were widespread agreement that a women's place was no longer the confines of the domestic sphere. With women becoming more visible in social life, traditional forms of patriarchy could no longer function as an effective social control mechanism. For the new wo/men of the Republic, a new form of patriarchy, new conceptualizations of gender and new role models in the public, social and private lives of gendered individuals became to be a necessity. Accordingly, traditional forms of patriarchy are denounced by most of the political thinkers. Lip service were paid to oppose the inequalities between men and women, but it can be

argued that what was opposed was not the domination, oppression, suppression, subordination or exploitation of women, but opposition was specifically towards the coercive mechanisms that created inequalities, on the grounds that these mechanisms harmed the life energies of both men and women. A patriarchal social control mechanism that would effectively render the individuals docile without harming their life energies was now a necessity. As a result, in early republican political thought emerged a new form of patriarchy that can be called (re)public(an) patriarchy, which at times challenged and at times operated in harmony with the existing one. What was distinctive in this new form of patriarchy was that it did not operate on clear cut divisions between the spheres of men and women, but individuals from both sexes/genders may be placed in a position as long as it is thought that this position is appropriate to make the best use of the individual in question. So a woman could become a pilot, as in the example of Sabiha Gökçen, as long as it is believed to be for the best of the society. In this respect, it was not necessary that Sabiha Gökçen be the best pilot or one of the best, the image that a woman pilot creates was also a form of making use of individuals. However, there were domains of work and labor that is thought to belong to prominently to one of the sexes/genders. Yet, the domains of life were not strictly divided between a public and a social sphere for men and a private sphere for women. Women were allowed to enter the social sphere, with public sphere being limited to the entrance of both men and women. The principle around which gendered subject were divided was the principle of productivity – not only in terms of economic activities, but also in terms of social, political, cultural and biological activities.

Within this framework, women were thought to be most productive as mothers, that is women's most important contribution to the social

production was thought to be the biological production: the production of human beings. In the journals I analyzed, there were accounts that went as far as to suggest that only women who does not have the ability and the capacity to give birth should be participating in the processes of economic production and women with a capacity to bearing child should "produce" babies (Yılmaz, 1939: 59-60):

> today we have women who are doctors [of medicine], judges, lawyers, engineers and authors, in a way that, it seems there are no jobs, in which women cannot succeed as competent as men, there are no fields of activity that women cannot make effort equal to that of men... However, just as there is a separate duty for each creature of the nature and organism, it should not be forgotten that there is an important principle in social life that should never be overlooked, and that is called division of labor. ... we need personnel and population. It is on this basis that we do not forget the division of labor and we find it sufficient for women to attend to high-school education in the fields that men can more easily and, probably, better succeed. Today we need, more than women doctors [of medicine], we want mothers who can take the precautions when necessary and raise her child in line with the requirements of the society. What we need is not women judges and lawyers, but we need judicious women who knows to raise her child scientifically, who knows the Turkish civil rights, especially, who can use the rights of family, who can serve for the happiness of her home.... Only women who cannot and who are not capable of building a family as a result of the exceptional circumstances and unnatural reasons and factors, can become experts and have jobs.

Similarly Ortaç argued (1942: 3):

> Turkish girl became members of parliament, doctors [of medicine], judges, motorman. But her most honorable quality is being a mother... Education should not make women forget her womanhood while teaching her many new things. With every [working] women Turkish nation loses a mother.

Leaving aside the solutions the authors proposed, that only women incapable of giving birth should be allowed to have a job, these

accounts on the duty of women is illustrative in many respects of the general form of problematization of gender differences in political thought in early republican era. Women's contribution to the social, or more accurately, national production was seen primarily in terms of biological production that is by giving birth to human beings. Although there were widespread agreement that women's primary duty was to give birth, that this should be their only duty is not so much agreed on. In other words, many authors proposed that women become mothers, while at the same time contributing to the other areas of production. In this respect, many authors have claimed that women should become “even” soldiers and make themselves visible in every field of activity. (see for example Baltacıoğlu, 1936; Tökin, 1936) Some suggested that women, especially rural women, indeed, continue to the biological production of human beings, while participating in the agricultural production (Tonguç, 1938: 442-443):

> Mother is the spirit of the family. She takes care of the children, raises them, prepare the food and clothes of the members of the family. She cleans the house, arranges and organizes it. She takes care of the animals, and she does the agricultural work. She bears children as much as she can. Her whole life is made of work, love and altruism. Her duty is much harder and multi-dimension than that of her man ... in rural family everything is related to the “mother.”

Therefore, it was required of women first to bear children and second to have a decent job. Some thinkers suggested that child raising should be left to the institutions of the state, designed specifically for that purpose and women's relation to children should be limited to giving birth to them (Kip, 1936a: 5-6):

> Most of the time, the love of the mother who earns her life working outside is becoming fatherized. One day, the issue of child shall become an event consisting of giving birth. That who gives birth shall not interfere with the rest and shall not even think of it.

What is significant here is the term *fatherization*. Where most of the time love of the mother to her child is seen as the most intimate love of all, that women establish close relationship with their children, it is argued that with working outside the domestic sphere women's love to her child becomes fatherized, meaning there emerges a particular distance between the mother and the child. However, that the relationship of father to the child is portrayed as distant does not mean that there is no relationship between the father and the child. It is continually emphasized, although not frequently as in the case of women, that father should contribute to the raising of the children, and that without the distant relationship that fathers have with their child, children's education becomes incomplete. So, although rearing the children is not seen as the men's primary duty, it is nevertheless seen as their one of the most important duties, they owe to the nation.

Another significant theme in the texts analyzed in this study is that motherhood is proposed as a primary duty of women not because they are not capable of fulfilling the duties accorded to men, but because they are made better use of in their duties as mothers. This is to say, most of the authors, willingly or unwillingly acknowledge that women can do the jobs that men do, can succeed in all the activities as much as men. For Example, in Resimli Ay it is argued that there are no significant difference between the mental capacities of men and women (Resimli Ay, 1930: 5):

> In the last years the issue [of mental and moral differences between men and women] has been scientifically studied. Various analysis from various perspectives were conducted. And finally [it was understood that] apart from sexual difference there is no difference between men and women... Sexual difference is related to the formation of the body. Apart from those differences, which are supposed to exist are either imaginary or exaggerations. Today, differences that are

> observed in some fields are caused by education and society... However, we shall note that there are differences between man and woman in mental and emotional terms. But this difference is not that big as it is supposed.

The reason that motherhood is proposed as the prime duty for women, although there are no significant differences between men and women is that the country needs population, it is only women that can give birth to children and thus, women, instead of working outside, should fulfill the need of the country by giving birth to children. In other words, motherhood is praised not as a mask to bar women entering the social life, or to confine them to the domestic sphere, but it is praised specifically for productive aims, for the increase in the population and advancement of its quality. This is one of the most important differences between the traditional forms of patriarchy and the modern, (re)public(an) form of patriarchy. Where in the first, private/domestic sphere is designated as the appropriate sphere for women, in (re)public(an) patriarchy, private realm is not the sphere that belongs to women or that women belongs to. Moreover, the affairs of the private sphere is not ruled anymore by an individual, sovereign patriarch, who organizes the household in line with his own interests and who makes use of it as he wants. Both the women's and men's place within the household is organized through the disciplinary (re)public(an) patriarchy, women's and men's labor within the private sphere becomes a concern for mechanisms of social control. Nevertheless, the patriarchal social control is not exerted on women and men in the same way and/or in the same level. Although both men and women are subjected to patriarchal gendered subjectivities, the field of possibilities defined for each of the genders differed significantly. Moreover, although, women's duties and the contributions women make to the production of the society are praised, they are not allowed to enjoy its benefits in the same degree as men and above all, they are not considered as

legitimate political actors of the public realm. In spite of all the talk about the equality of men and women, women's contribution to the building of the “world we live in” is overlooked, more specifically, they are barred from the process (R.S., 1930: 55):

> After the building is constructed in good health womanhood provides the means for residing in that building. After the society is formed the role of maintaining that society, embellishing life is left to women. ... for womanhood, nineteenth century is not an age of progress, it is rather an age of decline. Because as in the world of arts, there were new, great experiences in the world of ideas. Women cannot resist big storms. Their work can be productive only when civilization is in tranquility.

There are no widespread agreement on the second part of this argument that women's intellectual capacities can function only in times of tranquility. However, the argument that women should enter and act – more precisely, work – in the man-made world of things, after men made them, is the one that most of the authors acknowledge. In this respect, the “world we live in” is pictured as constructed by men, and after that construction women comes to participate in that sphere. Thus, the “sphere of appearance,” through the action taking place in which the “world we live in” is constructed, is closed for women. As such, women's place in society is a semi-public place, more accurately it is a social place. They can participate in the public sphere, after that sphere is structured by men, which makes their participation in the public, not public at all. Still, the recognition of the participation of women in social life had far reaching consequences for political thought in Turkey.

5.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the political thought in early republican era in Turkey, there had been many transformations, and a great many efforts made for

further transformation, that made it impossible to think things as one usually thought them previously. As a result, new problem(atization)s entered the domain of political thought and within this domain are formulated new solutions to the problems facing the society and the individuals. On this basis, the form of patriarchy and the construction of gendered subjectivities differed from the Ottoman period. Where the previous form of patriarchy drawn strict boundaries for the gender and ruled gender differences on the basis of a model of sovereignty, the (re)public(an) patriarchy played on gender differences to make the best possible use of them. In this respect, (re)public(an) patriarchy was dynamic and adjusted itself successfully to changing conditions. It was a disciplinary mechanism, instead of a sovereign one. It aimed structuring gendered subjectivities in such a way that men as well as women would become docile at the same time as they become productive. So, gender became a tool for social control, but a control that does not require submissiveness from those who are subjected to this control, but requires productivity in their docility. Thus, what is at issue was structuring the self-management of gendered individuals in a way that the “sexual” differences, more accurately differences between the male and female bodies are made use of in production in all its meanings, social, political, cultural, economic and most importantly biological, sexual production of human beings.

What I call (re)public(an) patriarchy effected a change in the discourses on gendered subjectivities and the roles attributed to different genders in public, social and private realms as well as changes in the conceptualizations of these realms. Women were no longer confined strictly to the boundaries of the domestic sphere, their activities were not simply labor anymore, that only serves the continuation of human life on earth. They were allowed to work in the

social sphere, that is to have a job and participate in social activities. However, they were not allowed to engage in political action, that is they were barred from the processes that created the world we leave in. This means, they were granted a kind of visibility in social life, but they were not allowed to participate in the “sphere of appearance” or act in the “world we live in.” In (re)public(an) patriarchy, neither the separation of these spheres of life, nor the patriarchal control in them was based on coercive mechanisms. Disciplinary mechanisms began to be the primary ones. In this respect, it can be argued that discourses in political thought in early republican era aimed to create docile individuals which were of use to the society, more accurately to the nation. However, this docility, since it depended on the disciplinary mechanisms, at the same time created the possibilities of individual freedom. In brief, although (re)public(an) patriarchy structured the life of the individuals living in Turkey, structured the way that they experience their gendered subjectivities and the production of these subjectivities, its disciplinary mechanisms did not determine the field of possibilities of individuals. As such, it exerted a more effective social control on individual life, since without coercion, patriarchy became more difficult to be recognized.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

In this study, I have attempted to historicize the political discourses about and in relation to gender – with a particular focus on women – as they are presented in Turkish political thought. The rationale behind the study was not to understand the way people thought in the past, which ideas have prevailed, and how we are different than that. Moreover, my aim was not to reveal the evil or good secretly hidden behind the meanings people thinking in the past intended in their writings and, analyze the coherences and contradictions in the things said. Rather than that, I aimed to show the descents of the discourses on gender, that is how we are made into who we are (gendered subjects/individuals), how we are differentiated and divided from others in a historical process. In this respect, from a Foucauldian strand of post-structuralist feminist theoretical framework and on the basis of Foucault's concept of bio-power and Arendt's conceptualization of public and private realms, I analyzed what is constructed, through problematization, as an object of knowledge/truth, and what relations existed between this particular object and patriarchal power relations.

To understand our embeddedness in the past, which, ironically, produce us as a difference from the past, I focused on the early-republican era, since the era was marked with great transformations and in this era was put into action an all-embracing process of citizenization, which affected the lives of the bulk of the people and transformed the society into a rather homogeneous one. The

transformations that took place in the era were grave and quick, so the subsequent problems that surfaced. To keep track of the daily developments of problems and the solutions proposed I examined a selection of journals and analyzed the discourses prevalent in them. Intellectuals who wrote in these journals, attempting to find solutions to the problems posed by these transformations, problematized gender categories, roles attributed to them and relations between and among them. The ensuing solutions from these problematizations were different from each other as a result of the different ideological commitments of the journals and the intellectuals, but the underlying discourses were the same, which still bear their marks on our "who-ness." These are the descents of the discourses that are still prevalent today, which produce (the meanings of) gendered subjectivities in Turkey. Moreover, it is in this period that modern patriarchy – which impose limits on the fashion that the individuals furnish themselves and are furnished with gendered subjectivities, the roles they attribute to themselves and that are attributed to them, the way that relations between and among them are constructed – visibly emerged. This does not mean that the Turkish society were non-patriarchal before the early republican era. What this means is that, with the transformations that began to emerge in the eighteenth century in the Ottoman era, and crystallized in the early republican era, which destabilized and denaturalized the "traditional" discourses on gender, the tone of patriarchy in Turkey changed to a large extent and rather than the private patriarchy, (re)public(an) patriarchy began to take hold. The discourses and problematizations underlying this (re)public(an) patriarchy, which shaped the process of citizenization and the individualities/subjectivities constructed and entertained within the process, still have – in one way or the other – currency today and continue to affect our lives in substantial ways.

Before beginning the analysis of the texts in the journals, I first provided clarifications of the core concepts of the study. In this respect, I argued, drawing on Arendt and Foucault, that political refers to the processes, the thoughts accompanying these processes, and the realm in which these processes take place to give meaning to the human world. I argued that nothing and everything is by nature political. Everything is political, in the sense that all aspects of "human condition" are the results of political processes, on the one hand, and on the other, all issues relating to the human life on earth can be made into a matter of action, thought and speech. Nothing is political, although all aspects of human condition are the results of political processes, unless problematized and acted upon either to alter or to conserve. Thus, what is named as social is the result of the political processes, however, when political processes lead to a result, more accurately, end in a resultant product, it loses its actuality and becomes a potentiality of action. Drawing on such an understanding of the political, and emphasizing the political character of thought – since it is through thought that meaning is made out of the human condition, and on the basis of these meanings that the activities of human beings are structured, I defined political thought as the actions/activities that attempt to give meaning to the "human condition," problematize the meanings made of it, propose solution(s) to the perceived problems – immediate or likely to emerge, and offer visions of a "good" society, and/or legitimizations and naturalizations of the existing one.

Discourses on sex/gender are (re)produced within political thought, as political thought is (re)produced within patriarchal discourses. Conceptualizing the concepts of sex, gender and patriarchy, I drew upon the Foucauldian strand of post-structuralist feminist theorizing, offering clarifications to it. I argued that sex is as socially/politically

constructed as gender. But they refer to two different levels of the patriarchal production of gendered subjectivities. Sex refers to the processes where human bodies are divided into two; differences between the two are produced, and telltale signs of this production are made invisible. In other words, through discourses on sex, bodies are constructed as different and their differences are constructed as natural. Gender refers to the processes, in which meaning is made of the produced-as-natural sexed bodies, that is through gender a second layer of meaning is inscribed on the human body, on the first layer inscribed by sex. In other words, sex and gender refer to similar processes and discourses on sex and gender have similar effects. Both are ongoing processes throughout the life of the individual. As Beauvoir argues, one is not born a wo/man, but also one is not born as a fe/male, fe/maleness refer to the meanings made out of the apparent differences of the human body and especially differences in reproductive organs. These meanings are changeable, and in fact change in time and place. This is not to suggest that there are no differences between the so-called male and female bodies, this is to suggest that at the point that these differences are defined, they cease to be “natural,” and become produced-as-natural. Then, sexing and gendering of the individuals are simultaneous processes, to which discourses of their naturalness and normality accompany. These processes are controlled on the one hand by the individual, on the other by the society the individual is embedded in and still on the other hand, by the individual’s perception of the society s/he is embedded in. Thus, in the gendering process the subject fashion her/himself with the tools s/he finds in his/her society, attending to his/her perception of the society and is fashioned by the society with a particular gendered subjectivity. It is patriarchy that creates the rules of this gendering process and the rules of the production of discourse on sex and gender.

I do not take patriarchy as the intentional male domination of females, which is ahistorical and universal. Rather patriarchy is a continually changing system of power-relations, which are not fixed, pre-determined and static. In these power relations, control is exerted, although primarily, but not exclusively, on women. Patriarchy is not only a system of domination of women by men, or men by men. Patriarchy is the effects of the gendering discourses on men and women, which dominate both, which controls both, regulates the behaviors of both, imposes limits on the way they are furnished with subjectivities. However, this should not be taken to mean that men and women are equally dominated in patriarchy. This would not be nothing different than the patriarchal, masculist cries that claim men are in a worse position than women – a childish cry for sure, that cannot bear even a little loss in the great number of privileges that *he* historically held. What I mean is rather that, patriarchy erects a system of domination that affects both men and women, yet, it affects women to a larger extent than men, since although manhood is also a pre-determined category that people born with a penis have to confine themselves to, women, people born with a vagina, in addition to the requirement of confining themselves to the category of womanhood, are faced with subordination and inequality. Then, the difference is the additional subordination and inequality that women face – and it is certainly a great difference. Through these differences between men and women, privileges and differential positions, desires and its objects are created, which makes it difficult, let alone to challenge, even to recognize the presence of patriarchy in our lives. Patriarchy is a system that limits the fields of possibilities that the individuals have, that limits their capacities of using these field of possibilities and transgressing these limits causes women, more than men, to face grave consequences. Thus, I employed the term patriarchy to refer to a structure, to a

system of controlling, regulating and shaping all the realms of human life – public, private and as well intimate – through dividing practices, through a process of normalization, that categorizes the behaviors of individuals with a view to a scheme of normality, that distinguishes the normal from the deviant, that erects a dual system of sex differences, that fixes individuals to one of the two sexes (defines them in relation to the apparent genitalia they have in birth); that defines distinct types of living in the human world for the two sexes, in brief, that separates men from the women, define distinct characteristics and, thus, distinct roles for them, and in the process, render women to a subordinate status.

In the texts I analyzed, constant attempts were made at challenging the traditional forms of patriarchy that confined women to a subordinate position. However, this efforts did not target ending patriarchy in all its forms. The (re)public(an) patriarchy that emerged in the early-republican era, created a discourse that lead intellectuals to concern the best ways of making use of the individuals in modernizing the Turkish society and in strengthening the Turkish state. This means, the concern was how to produce simultaneously docility and utility from individuals with different sexes. The different roles attributed to men and women are to a large extent related to this obsession with utility. Trying maximizing utility different as well as intersecting roles are attributed to men and women.

In political discourses of the era, the country was pictured as in need of more population, which is portrayed as a precondition of building a strong state. Women were depicted first and foremost as mothers, because of this necessity of increasing the population. It was reasoned that women could be utilized best by giving birth to children. Giving birth was only the one aspect of this reasoning.

Giving birth was not enough, it was also necessary to keep the children alive. Keeping them alive was the mother's duty, a duty that requires the accumulation of knowledge on the best practices of mothering. In addition to this, the relationship between the mother and the child is portrayed as the most intimate relationship on earth. Since this was so, educating the children, socializing her/him to the republican life was also her duty. Thus, women's motherhood roles were important in two respects. On the one hand, giving birth to children and keeping him/her alive, women could increase the quantity of the population, on the other hand, socializing the children to the republican way of life she could advance the quality of the population. Realizing this duty necessitated on the side of the women, the knowledge on the best practices of mothering, on the republican regime and on the meaning of modern life. Hence the necessity of educating women. However, women's only role was not that of motherhood, she was also the wife and had to perform wifehood roles. Yet, the emphasis on the wifehood roles of women was not as strong as the motherhood roles, since different solutions are proposed to the issue of the best utilization of the forces of men and women. While some held the view that entrusting the domestic tasks to women was the best way of making use of the life forces of individuals, the others suggested that domestic tasks could, although not so frequently would, be fulfilled by men. Third, there was the utilization of women's life forces in the social realm. Women should also be working outside of the home, should have a job and share the expenses of the home. The modern women image was precisely this working women image.

Notice that I used "social" instead of "public" in explaining the roles of women outside of the private sphere. This is a deliberate usage, since, and it was one of the prominent feature of the (re)public(an)

patriarchy, women's confinement to the private sphere did not end with her entrance into the public sphere, but with her entrance into the social sphere. At this point, I draw on the Arendt's distinctions between public, private and social and on her differentiation between the elements of *vita activa*, namely; labor, work and action. For Arendt, *labor* referred to the activity that corresponds to the biological processes of the human body, which serves the continuation of life of the species. It is an activity primarily of existence and is repetitive. *Work* “is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence,” through which human beings change the “world we live in,” build durable and permanent structures. *Action*, the highest element of all activities, refers to the relationship between human beings and corresponds to the human condition of plurality. Action is the main condition of political existence, although all three activities are in one way or the other related to the political life. In short, labor is the activity that serves the continuation of the life of the species, work creates durable structures which are permanent and action creates history and remembrance, which allows us to remember the great deeds of people lived who before us; is what keeps us together in the public realm in spite our different interests and what allows us to do great deeds that will be remembered by the people that will live after we leave the world. I believe, of all the three activities, women are confined in the early republican era, to labor and work. Their activities in terms of action was neither allowed nor considered as legitimate in the texts I have analyzed. Hence they were freed from the confines of the private/domestic sphere, were considered as legitimate actors in the social sphere, but they were not considered as the actors of the public realm, they were not included in the togetherness in action. Men and women did not act together in the public sphere; rather men acted together, and women acted in unity with the men. This means that an active role was not

allowed women in shaping the public realm. Thus, (re)public(an) patriarchy freed them from the confines of the home and confined them to the social sphere, although there were many statements declaring the equality *of* women *with* men in terms of citizenship, that is statements of women's equality in the public realm. In brief, the texts I have analyzed in particular and the (re)public(an) patriarchy in general granted women a semi-freedom: a *freedom from* the confines of the home and doing primarily labor; a *freedom to* enter the social life and work; but not a *freedom of* action in the public realm.

One more point should be made here. The analysis of the texts did not suggest that the entrance of women to the social realm necessitated their masculinization or asexualization as Kandiyoti argues. Kandiyoti claimed that entering into the public realm women had to peel themselves of their womanhood, since the dark costumes and short hair, which the elite women had worn signified for her the masculinization of women (Kandiyoti, 1997). However, an analysis of the texts in the journals suggests the contrary. Journals, continually published articles on how to appear as beautiful. In this respect, traditional views of beauty, which praised plump bodies are challenged, in favor of more slim bodies and more importantly more healthy bodies. This focus on health was also in line with the concern with utility of the bodies. The healthy body was also a symbol of beauty for men. Then, leaving the private sphere did not mean the masculinization or asexualization of women but rather their de- and re-sexualization; de- and re-feminization. It was a process men as well as women was subjected in that, men were also, re-sexualized and re-masculinized. However, it is true that man continued to be the norm. Even in the most “benevolent” accounts on women’s roles, the aim was to equalize women with men. Yet it should also be noted

that it was not the individual man who was the norm, but it was the ideal republican man. So, not only women were subordinated to the norm, but men, too, were subordinated to it.

(Re)Public(an) patriarchy freed men from patriarchal domination of the sovereignty. However, although the head was cut, and the sovereign's headless body was more cautious not to mess with men, they were also dominated by the discourses underlying the (re)public(an) patriarchy. The utility of men, similar to women, were not seen in their action in the public realm, but their work in the social realm, but they were in a position more allowing to their entrance into the public realm. However, while women's utility were defined primarily in terms of labor, men's utility were defined more in terms of work. Their first and foremost duty was strengthening the state by entering the processes of production and, strengthening the family by earning money, which in turn would still the contribution to the strengthening of the state. After their duty as work, their duties as labor began, since just as women are defined as mothers, men are also defined as fathers. Although, as explained above, there were disagreements on men's duties in the domestic life, they certainly had duties in educating the child, in repairing the household commodities, and in keeping the family together and protecting it. However, they were in a more advantageous position being the heads of the households they live in. Still, it should be kept in mind that they were not the rulers of the households, rather they were the representatives, and, more accurately, agents of general discourses on the family.

When, the writings in the journals considered, it can be seen that it was the obsession with utility that laid the foundations of (re)public(an) patriarchy. It was an attempt to make more and better

use of the individuals and utilizing their differences. It addressed the men's needs of getting rid of the sovereign's patriarchy, which was private in nature, since he ruled the masses as he managed the affairs of his house. It also addressed the needs of women in getting rid of the private patriarchy, which was imposed on them by the agents authorized by the sovereign. In other words, it eradicated the boundaries drawn by the private patriarchy, replacing them with the limits imposed by (re)public(an) patriarchy. This was a radical change in itself and opened great many possibilities for men and women. Building on my analysis, I disagree with Kandiyoti who claims (1991: 42):

> the authoritarian nature of the single-party state and its attempt to harness the “new woman” to the creation and reproduction of a uniform citizenry aborted the possibility for autonomous women's movements.

I believe possibilities were not aborted, although they were limited. In this respect I believe that we should give up attributing the Kemalist project an all-encompassing and determining authority. Within the early-republican era, the era that Kemalist project was most strongly enforced, different solutions are proposed to the problems facing the society. Yet, these solutions are underlined by a particular discourse that continues to limit the possibilities for autonomous movements. I believe, trying Kemalism is not more than a futile task, it is the discourses underlying Kemalism, which does not originate in Kemalism, although they are manifested in it that should be targeted. Thus, the task of feminism, I believe, is not only challenging particular ideas that are bottlenecks for feminism, but rather it is to problematize the discourses, general systems of thought that underlie these ideas. Feminist analysis should not concern itself only with the evil or good in the hidden meanings behind the speeches delivered by the leading cadres or the writings of the intellectuals.

Rather, it should focus on what limits are imposed on the production of these meanings; from what general plane that particular solutions are proposed to the social problems; on what general assumptions about the individuals do these meanings and solutions rest. Thus, the task is not trying, but searching for the possible openings in any system; not opting for a particular solution instead of the another, but producing new solutions through feminist problematizations; not designating a particular realm of human condition as the realm of freedom and struggling towards entering it, but creating new realms of political action. In a word, we should stop working in a public realm, the shape of which is predetermined, but begin acting in it, producing new problematizations, new solutions, new kinds of relationships and new kinds of reality and truth.

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