

**TRADE UNIONISM IN TURKEY: THE SELF-UNDERSTANDING OF TÜRK-İŞ
AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY AND POLITICS (1950-1982)**

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ABSTRACT

TRADE UNIONISM IN TURKEY: THE SELF-UNDERSTANDING OF
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The arguments concerning the trade unionism and working class movement in Turkey as well as the largest confederation, Türk-İş, in relation to the involvement in the political arena is debated in this thesis by underlining the lack of class identity among the workers. The main argument is that Türk-İş was not established by the will and efforts of the workers. Another major discussion point of the thesis is the non-partisanship policy of Türk-İş. It has been found that Türk-İş participated quite actively in the political sphere until the 1980 military intervention. However, the limits of this participation were widely drawn by the major political parties of the country. The thesis defends that there are problems stemming from the lack of class consciousness among the Türk-İş workers, the hierarchal structure of Türk-İş and the profit oriented approaches of the political parties towards Türk-İş.

Keywords: Trade Unionism, Türk-İş, Working Class, Non-Partisanship Policy, Political Sphere

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DE SENDİKACILIK: TÜRK-İŞ’İN KENDİNİ TANIMLAMASI VE TOPLUMDA VE SİYASETTEKİ ROLÜ

(1950-1982)

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Bu tezde Türkiye’deki sendikacılık ve işçi hareketi ve en büyük konfederasyon olan Türk-İş ile ilgili yaklaşımlar-eleştiriler işçi sınıfındaki sınıf bilinci eksikliđinin altı çizilerek ve siyasal alan ile ilişkilendirilmeler incelenerek tartışılmaktadır. Önemli bir eleştiri Türk-İş’in işçilerin kendi irade ve çabaları sonunda kurulmamış olmasıdır. Tezdeki diđer bir önemli tartışma noktası Türk-İş’in partilerüstü politikasıdır. Türk-İş’in siyasal alana 1980 askeri müdahalesine kadar oldukça etkin bir biçimde katıldığı saptanmaktadır. Ancak, bu katılımın sınırları geniş ölçüde ülkedeki ana siyasal partiler tarafından çizilmiş olduğunu göstermek mümkündür. Tez, Türk işçi sınıfındaki sınıf bilinci eksikliđinin, Türk-İş’in hierarşik yapısının ve siyasal partilerin Türk-İş’e çıkar amacıyla yönlennmelerinin problemlere yol açtığını savunmaktadır.

Anahtar sözcükler: Sendikacılık, Türk-İş, İşçi Sınıfı, Partilerüstü Politika, Siyasal Alan

To my precious daughter Denise

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAFLI: Asian-American Free Labor Institute

AFL-CIO: American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations

AIFLD: American Institute for Free Labor Development

CRTUY: Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey

CTRТУ: Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions

CNWU: Confederation of Nationalist Workers' Unions

DP: Democrat Party

EGS: Electricity, Gas, Bus

ICFTU: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

ILO: International Labor Organization

JP: Justice Party

NC: National Committee

RPP: Republican People's Party

SEE: State Economic Enterprise

SPO: State Planning Organization

SSI: State Security Institution

SWA: State Water Affairs

TSR: Turkish State Railways

WPT: Workers' Party of Turkey

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Context

A study of the development of trade unionism in Turkey requires the research of the economic, social and political aspects of the issue. Moreover, the historical background, especially the root of the trade union movement in the Ottoman Empire, is necessary to be investigated. During the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, a number of differences took place despite a transformation of continuity in many areas. Therefore, in order to understand Turkey better, we need to evaluate this inheritance from the Ottoman Empire. In addition, to find out the labor relations in Turkey, the precondition is the exploration of labor relations in the Ottoman Empire (Makal 1997a: 128)

The emergence of the workers' movement in Turkey can be observed during the strike of the dock workers in 1872. Another development is the Second Constitution of 1908 which had an impact on the industrial relations as it had on other areas during the Ottoman rule while leading to some new formations different from the former periods. The legal regulations after 1908 in the realm of industrial relations, the law called "Tatil-i Eşgal" (1909), for instance, was in force until the 1936 Labor Law in the Republican period.

During the Second Constitution in 1908 there were more strikes by the minorities and the Balkans because of the destruction owing to the deteriorated economic structure. The Western capitalists became the sole employers and used their power against trade unionism by enforcing bans and sanctions with the help of the Western

states who had already captured the sovereignty of the country. Nonetheless, trade union movement did not stop in spite of such legal bans. On the other hand, those strikes against those Western capitalists had a positive impact on the public contributions to the Independence War as it was supported by them.

With the establishment of the Republic, there had been great transformations in all spheres which can be accepted as the starting points of the new era although there were not immediate basic changes in the realm of industrial relations. However, the implications of such transformations are possible to be observed in the further regulations regarding the relations between the worker and the employer. The first indication is the Labor Law of 1936 (Act No. 3008) which drew the main characteristics of the labor relations and emphasized the need for institutionalization. On the other hand, strikes and lock-outs were forbidden and there was not a regulation on trade unions but the institution of labor representation was organized.

It is possible to observe the traces of the authoritarian state during the first years of the Republic in the legal formulation of the single party period. In those years, the Turkish state appeared to be pervasive and powerful, extending into every corner of public and private life in the new country. In brief, the intervention of the state in Turkey increased in the economic realm (Timur 1997: 138-139). As a result, the Labor Law of 1936 carries the authoritarian characteristics of the single party era. Timur underlines the controlling attitude of the state by stressing that the minimum wage problem also was not solved in that law because it was delayed to the war years.

In the newly established Republic, the bourgeoisie, on the way to expand, was advancing in cooperation with the big land owners and fighting against state capitalism in addition to the dominance of the bureaucracy. On its way, the bourgeoisie was successful to receive the support of the poor peasants and labor by using some propaganda techniques. Similarly, in the 1950's, the party of the dominant classes, the DP, by stressing the right to strike and by obtaining the support of the working class as well as the majority of the society, was able to

acquire power from the RPP, who was in close contact with military and civil bureaucracy.

During the multi-party era which starts in 1946 there was great emphasis of politicians on the working class due to their election concerns. The next turning point in the new Republic is the Workers' and Employers' Trade Unions and Confederations Law enacted in 1947 (İşçi ve İşveren Sendikaları ve Sendika Birlikleri Hakkında Kanun) (Act No. 5018). This was the first legal step towards the regulation of the institutionalization of the industrial relations in Turkey. For the first time, the foundation and the activities of the trade unions were regulated by a law. Nevertheless, according to the law, the trade unions dealing with politics were banned. Although it was the first law organizing the labor relations in the country, it was not progressive enough. In addition, according to the law, unions were not able to use their income for any goal which was not written in this law. That meant that they were not allowed to spend their financial resources for political purposes.

During the multi-party period, the DP and the RPP were arguing for the representation of their own views by the trade unions. To illustrate, Celal Bayar was for the union of the workers under the patronage of the DP (Sülker 1955a: 53). Furthermore, it is argued that the RPP built a Worker's Bureau following the Trade Union Law in 1947 in order to set up a kind of social control and to have the support of the workers who had already become a large group of voters. However, when the documents about the RPP during that period are investigated, it can be clearly seen that there was no Worker's Bureau built by the RPP (Makal 2006: 21). Nonetheless, the worsening economic conditions of the late forties prevented the RPP from responding the needs and expectations of the workers. As a result, the workers had tendency towards the DP, who seemed the only way to gather their own growing opposition tendency.

Finally, with the influence of the external and internal factors, on 6 April, 1952, Türk-İş was born. First of all, there was the intensive impact of the U.S.A. on its establishment. In addition to the external factor, the internal factor playing a role in its emergence was the attempt of the trade unions. In that period, trade unions were

affected by the leftist class based organization, and there was a fearful attitude towards left at that time. Moreover, the reactions of the workers against poverty and the unfavorable working conditions accelerated the emergence of Türk-İş. According to Koç, the period between the formation of Türk-İş in April in Bursa and its first general assembly in September in İzmir is interesting and it is the period during which some leftist approaches were at stage. He also adds that such deviation or shift was immediately corrected and eliminated during the first assembly (Koç 1986a: 16-43). In the second assembly, although its participation in ICFTU was accepted, the government did not give the required permission and Türk-İş could not get in touch with ICFTU and left apart from the European trade unionism. Türk-İş finally became a member of ICFTU in 1960 after the coup of May 27 with the permission of the government. However, Türk-İş was always in close contact with the American officials and the American trade unions since it was born or even before its emergence.

The impact of the 1960 military coup on trade unions and the movement itself was undeniably remarkable. The basic issues as trade unions, collective bargaining and strikes were taken into consideration in the 1961 Constitution along with the economic and social rights. The 1961 Constitution, known as the most liberal one, guaranteed the right to strike for the workers and extended the civil servants' rights. For the first time, the concept of 'social state' was written on the Constitution. The acts concerning trade unions and collective labor agreements, strikes and lock-outs were promulgated after the constitution.

This was a completely different new era compared to the former periods. Act No. 274 concerning Trade Unions and Act No. 275, born in 1963, concerning Collective Labor Agreements Strikes and Lock-outs in 1963 were the important references of the labor relations until 1983. The 1961 Constitution and the laws enacted following it to arrange the labor relations were the first progressive judicial regulations in the history of the country to arrange collective agreements, strikes and lock-outs.

Initially, an unintentionally imitative model inspired from the American Model in the Turkish trade union movement was observed. One of the most important

historical determinants in this trend was the close relationship between the U.S.A. and the Turkish trade unionism as an extension of the American exterior policy after the World War II, known as the Truman doctrine. Formerly distributed American aid to the unions by means of the Ministry of Labor was directly sent to Türk-İş after 1962. The financial reports of Türk-İş between 1960 and 1970 show the grandeur of the American aid to Türk-İş. In fact, things coming along with these aids are more important than the aids themselves. By means of them a certain doctrine and trade union action expanded in the Turkish trade unionism. In the same period more and more Türk-İş unionists visited the U.S.A. and they were obviously influenced from such visits.

Another important impact on Türk-İş was the relations with AFL-CIO and AAFLI who organized training and research programs to educate Turkish unionists. In spite of intense American effort, it is not possible to declare that Turkish trade union movement developed solely by means of the relations with that country. The problems that Turkey faced in that period and Turkish opposition to the American international relations caused the emergence of some totally American hostile currents in the Turkish trade unionism. Moreover, the liberal atmosphere brought by the 27 May coup influenced the actions of the Workers' Party of Turkey and trade union movement and lead to an increase in the leftist publications and socialist movements.

On the other hand, the number of the unionists elected to the Parliament rose between 1960 and 1970. However, there were not important and effective policies adopted on the area of the interests of the working class and trade unions since most of those unionist deputies were form the Justice Party (JP). The disaffiliation from Türk-İş with the effect of the Workers' Party of Turkey (WPT-Türkiye İşçi Partisi) has led to the establishment of the Confederation of Progressive Workers' Unions (CRTUY- Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu known by its acronym DİSK), in 1967. Later, in 1970, the Confederation of Nationalist Workers' Unions (CNWU-Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu known by its acronym MİSK) was founded and it had close links with The Nationalist Movement Party. Some members of the CRTUY became deputies of the WPT, Workers' Party of Turkey,

and after the closure of the CRTUY, in the elections of 1973, the CRTUY supported the RPP but the unionists of the CRTUY were not elected to the Parliament. The last important one is the emergence of HAK-İŞ in 1976, which had close connections with The National Salvation Party. As a result, there was a rapid growth in trade union membership in that period in Turkey.

Another related area to be discussed, the political activity of trade unions, their role in politics and the influence of politics on trade unions, requires an investigation of the effects of global economic restructuring on trade unions after the 1970's while focusing on the Turkish case. During this transition period, the policies of the IMF and the World Bank caused less power for trade unions in the political arena and in legislation due to the dominance of globalization over labor.

The period of the 1970's marked the end of the golden age of capitalism, which had flourished in the 1960's with an economic growth and optimism of the working class for the future. However, the expectations of the two parties, the labor and the capital, about the economic growth and welfare state lost power by the late 1970's. The developments, particularly the crisis of 1970's had severe impact on Turkey, on Turkish working class and trade union movement.

The economic crisis of the 1970's was reflected in Turkey and the continuous economic growth of the 1960's ended in the beginning of the 1970's. However, attempts for solution were regularly delayed and the first measure to hit Turkey was the austerity program of 24 January 1980. From the 1970's onwards, while creating job opportunities by means of State Economic Organizations, the governments in Turkey often used public servants for political employment by hiring their supporters for the public enterprises.

The 1970's were a period of social and political upheavals in Turkey. In fact, trade union movement became stronger and more influential. Accordingly, trade union membership grew rapidly. Türk-İş, with its largest number of membership, played an important role in the link between the trade union movement and the politics. After the 1970's, the two main groups who organized the protests, gathered in the

meetings and marched in the squares of the big cities were the workers and the students. The actions of the workers were not generally organized by the trade unions. In this period, many demonstrations, strikes and clashes with the police took place. It appears that Türk-İş and the CRTUY supported the military coup of 12 March 1971, staged under these circumstances. However, there were no adverse legislative changes on trade unions after the coup.

Between the first years of the 1970's and the late 1970's there was relative improvement in the living conditions of the workers. Thanks to the economic growth, import substituting industrialization and the struggle of workers and trade unions, the situation was rather satisfying except for the few interruptions. After 1975 a kind of civil war developed between the radical right and left forces. Rival political groups' movements and parties tried to get the control of the trade unions and use them in order to reach the masses and to exploit their resources. There were frequent armed conflicts between various political groups in the work places. Trade unions lost the initiative. The employers started to respond by resisting to the demands of the trade unions, so the impact of the crisis on the workers was felt severely.

Actually, the crisis in the 1970's hurt all Western trade unions and the Turkish union movement was affected accordingly after 1980. For instance, when the British trade union movement is studied, a pervasive air of crisis was apparent. The long post-war period of rising union membership and increasing union density went into reverse during the 1980's. Part of the explanation for this fall, certainly in the early 1980's, was the sharp rise in unemployment. The fall of membership continued in England in the 1990's (Penn; Scattergood 1996: 245).

In the Turkish case, the 24 January 1980 austerity and stabilization program was a turning point in the history of class struggles in Turkey. The programs imposed by the IMF assigned a new role to Turkey, the provider of cheap labor-power. The only groups who resisted these austerity measures were mainly the working class and trade unions. As a result of strikes and protests, it became clear that the stabilization and re-structuring program could not be implemented in peace.

When the coup d'état of 12 September 1980 took place, the large majority of the population saw it as a relief from the fear of death and insecurity. That was the reason why it was welcomed by most. Moreover, the dismissal of workers was prohibited by The National Security Council. Some other similar factors have influenced the workers towards a docile attitude about the coup and the prevention of trade union activity.

The period after the 1980 military coup and the constitution of 1982 need to be studied as a totally different period since it brought new arrangements with the Trade Unions Law (Act No. 2821) and the Collective Labor Agreements, Strikes and Lock-outs Law (Act. 2822) in 1983. The major difference from the 1960 period was in the realm of rights. The group who was severely hit by both the 24 January austerity program and 12 September military coup was the working class. Furthermore, the trade union movement was badly wounded. This is the reason why this study examines the period until the 1980's because the trade union movement went into a period of deprivation. Most of the Türk-İş leaders were sent to prison and all the financial activities of the trade unions were taken under the control of the state. Therefore, a period of halt was the case in the political arena and thus in the trade unions. That's why the study ends with this period of halt and deprivation.

Türk-İş supported the intervention of the military and stated its desire to the parliamentary democracy as soon as possible. On the other hand, the majority of Türk-İş unionists hoped the destruction of the leftist approaches in the trade union movement. Some Türk-İş unions, Yol-İş for instance, also faced prosecution. The result of the coup was a period of defeat for the working class and trade unionism in Turkey. Many rights and benefits were curtailed by the new legislation or by the government-dominated Supreme Board of Arbitrators.

Compared with 1961, one of the main changes was that individual freedoms were extremely limited. For instance, the freedom of expression was restricted and the justification declared by the state officials was to protect youth from harmful currents of thought. Moreover, this restriction was applied to the press and other media. Any kind of news or information detrimental to the internal and external

security and encouraging crime, revolt or rebellion was forbidden. The right to assemble and demonstrate was also limited.

New restrictions were also introduced on the activities of trade unions and associations. The new constitution required unions to refrain from the political activity, prohibiting them from supporting or receiving any support from political parties. As a result, unions were also prevented from participating in the meetings. In addition, unions were required to deposit their funds in state-owned banks. As a result, the freedom of association was limited and both strikes and lock-outs were forbidden. These restrictions curbed the unions' power in industrial relations and in public life. Professional organizations were also prohibited from supporting political parties or receiving support from them. Furthermore, they were put under the supervision of ministries and were required to maintain their headquarters in the capital.

The 1982 Constitution and the two acts, Act No. 2821 concerning Trade Unions and Act No. 2822 concerning Collective Labor Agreements, Strikes and Lock-Outs, limited obviously the basic rights of the workers and trade unions. Due to the martial law ruling the country, it was impossible to exercise rights in the existing legislation. All the associations of the public servants that were politically active before the 1980 period were liquidated and the leaders faced prosecution and imprisoned for long periods.

The general secretary of Türk-İş, Sadık Şide served in the military government as the Minister of Social Security. Furthermore, three leaders from Türk-İş were chosen to the Parliament founded by the military after the 1980 coup. It was pointed out by many in the Marxian terminology the so-called worker representatives in the Parliament as 'the servants of capitalists' and as the ones guilty of obscuring the democratic process. However, those four Türk-İş leaders kept their position in the Parliament to struggle for the rights of the workers and tried to minimize the efforts of the military wanting to curtail the most important right of the workers. Otherwise, the wounds of the coup regarding workers' rights would have been more destructive. Furthermore, during the preparation of the new Constitution, Türk-İş

leadership started to respond by organizing a large meeting in Ankara on 8 September 1982. Meanwhile, the attitude of the president of Türk-İş, Şevket Yılmaz, on the other hand, was interpreted in favor of the constitution. He was widely criticized in the following years. Meetings and demonstrations organized by Türk-İş from 1984 onwards were not influential in changing the policies of the governments.

In the second half of the 1980's things changed and the attitude of the Motherland Party also changed. The government of Özal faced with two major issues after 1985: despite a yearly 7% economic growth, rates of inflation were climbing and causing loud criticism and the leaders of the period before 1980 were back on the public stage again despite the constitutional ban. As Ergüder declares, 'Özal and the MP leaders were giving up their conciliatory style, especially with respect to the press' (Ergüder 1991: 45).

This attitude of the MP leader in the eighties is very similar to the one of the DP leader in the fifties. The difference is the dissimilarity between the two periods and the two military interventions. The sixties started with a military coup which isolated the DP from the political arena and with the impact of the economic policies, basically import substitution policies, the Westerners needed a consumption society, a well-balanced market and cheap labor, so they promoted the widened liberty and rights given by the state to the workers which were provided in the 1961 Constitution and the Acts 274 and 275 in 1963.

The difference is that the MP was born after a military intervention while the DP was liquidated with a military intervention. Therefore, the MP was lucky to be the only political party collecting the votes of the hopeless people of the eighties. They were desperate because of the deteriorated economy and the shortened political liberty atmosphere. Even though the MP supported the curtailment of the workers' rights, it was able to gain the support of the workers because of two reasons: there was not an alternative powerful political party opposing against the MP and the workers' movement had already been lost somewhere behind the 1980 coup and there was no way to bring it back to the stage. When the conciliatory attitude of

Türk-İş first with the military and then the political power, the MP, became obvious in the perceptions of the workers, their desperate psychology in addition to their fear of terror pictures in the whole country drawn before the 1980 coup prevented them from uniting again and struggling for their captured rights. The unfortunate and sad result is today's picture: a scattered working class with no class consciousness at all, with no fervent leaders at all and thus, with no enthusiastic workers at all!

Since the goal of this study is to explore the major trade union confederation in Turkey, Türk-İş, the focus is on the external and internal dynamics having an influence in its establishment. The major external dynamic is the shift of Turkey in the international arena from Europe to the U.S.A. after the war. Naturally, as part of the internal dynamics, a historical map of the workers' movements and actions since the Ottoman Empire is required to find out the economic, social and legal inheritance. The two important political periods, the single party and the multi-party era have different economic, political and social implications on the workers and those are the main domains of research in the study regarding Türk-İş. The study ends with the period of 1980 coup, 1982 Constitution and the two important laws which curbed all the rights given to the workers after the 1961 Constitution: Act No. 2821 concerning Trade Unions and Act No. 2822 concerning Collective Labor Agreements, Strikes and Lock-Outs. Together with the frightened, conforming and thus indifferent attitude of Türk-İş, those legal structures regulating the worker's movement and trade unions have succeeded in preparing today's silence of the divided, motionless and emotionless working class.

Although the Turkish military assumed power for a limited period and left its reign as soon as the law and order were restored, the impact of the coup, especially its influence on the working class was permanent and its traces can not be forgotten. With the introduction of two new laws and the threats against the union representatives, the working class who had gained many rights before the 1980's went into a period of dominance and limitations.

Furthermore, the influence of the leader of the 1980 coup, Kenan Evren, played an important role in the curtailment of the worker's rights. He had a different image, a

cares attitude toward the public who already had great attachment and respect to the army. His image identified as a general who saved the country and maintained peace, law and order made most of his acts easily acceptable by the Turkish society because all the terrorist actions and the harsh fight between the left and the right stopped after his takeover. He had an image of a charismatic father, so he gained absolute approval by the majority of the society. That is the reason why anything he did was widely accepted by the different segments of the society.

Initially, as soon as he resumed power, he sent many politicians and trade union leaders to prison along with the Türk-İş executives. As he was broadly supported as a leader who stopped bloody fight which had been going on for years, his anti-democratic decisions against the trade union leaders or the working class did not raise public criticism. This constituted the irreparable damage to the workers' movement, which ended up with their complete exclusion from the political arena and led to their absolute silence and indifference which can be observed even today. As a conclusion, the current stillness and the fragmentation of the Turkish workers, the majority of which are the members of the largest union, Türk-İş, stems from the exploitation of the 1980 military coup.

1.2 Aim of the Study and Essential Questions

Türk-İş has never been an organization of class struggle since its birth in 1952. It has been rather a service organization serving especially for the financial needs of the workers. Many external and internal factors work for the perpetuation of the lack of class consciousness among Türk-İş workers while keeping in touch and receiving the support of many union leaders. Furthermore, Turkish intellectuals have been limited in their attempts to contribute to the improvement of the trade unions as independent powers. Finally, the attitudes of the political powers against the attempts of the workers to unite their political strength have influenced Türk-İş and caused the adoption of the "non-partisanship politics" principle. Actually, the legal procedure does not allow trade unions to provide political parties with financial and

organizational assistance. Even the activities permitted by the laws are not tolerated by the political parties.

The "non-partisanship politics" principle of Türk-İş, adopted in 1964, was registered to the rules and regulations of the Confederation. This principle was similar to the "non-partisan politics" doctrine of the American trade unionism except for some details stemming from the difference in the unionism of the two countries. According to Işıklı, the adoption of this principle by Türk-İş is the reflection of the public hatred against politics and the politicians, and this antipathy emerged as an excretion after the May 27 intervention. Therefore, the executives of Türk-İş were also affected from the same atmosphere (Işıklı 1990: 354-355).

The two important events reflecting Türk-İş executives' attitudes towards the tendency of the unionists to join the political life in the 1960's are the foundation of the WPT, the Workers' Party of Turkey, in 1961 and the emergence of the idea to build a "Workers' Party" (Çalışanlar Partisi). The WPT, Workers' Party of Turkey, was founded on February 12, 1961 by eleven trade union leaders, most of who were from Türk-İş. However, the dominant group in Türk-İş was never willing to join or support the WPT. The trade unions which wanted to support the WPT were forced by Türk-İş to leave the confederation. Surprisingly, the same Türk-İş executives agreed to build another class based party for the workers as an alternative to the WPT short after its emergence. The name would be the "Workers' Party". Nevertheless, due to the active life of the WPT and the support of the unions and intellectuals for the WPT, the idea of "Workers' Party" faded.

Another important development is the foundation of the CRTUY within the organization of Türk-İş, which can be interpreted as a reaction to its "non-partisanship politics" principle. This doctrine of Türk-İş, which is dealt intensely in this study, is not a neutral attitude; on the contrary, it is partial since it appears to be a kind of abstention.

It is claimed that the pre-1980 polarization was caused by mainly small extremist parties and groups. Their elimination from the parliament has provided a stabilizing

factor. However, the constitutional ban on the political activities of trade unions and on their connections with political parties is not desirable or legitimate. In fact, the Turkish labor movement has also been influenced from the decline in the worldwide loss of power of the trade unions. In recent years, in the West, the workers' political influence has weakened as it has come to be seen more as a special-interest group, looking out primarily for the self-interests of its members (Reynolds, Masters, Moser 1991: 371-372).

Türk-İş is not participating in the political arena on account of its "non-partisanship politics" principle and is arguing that the working class does not have an adequate experience of democracy. Such policy of Türk-İş has led the way to the dominance of the capitalist powers. Furthermore, the sphere which should have been occupied by Türk-İş, the largest labor organization of the country, is still vacant. This study aims at observing the external and internal dynamics leading to this vacancy. Unfortunately, the latest immediate actions of Türk-İş in the last couple of years are paradoxical, unstable and untrustworthy.

To conclude, workers' rights is an area in which the governments in Turkey have not been able to solve the problems. Türk-İş has not been successful in finding solutions to the social policy problems and influencing the governments to support the worker's rights in this area. The necessities of a social state have not been realized. The major problem, unemployment, has always been on the agenda. As a result of income distribution gaps social unrest persists in the country and thus, serious social disturbances become inevitable. In order to restore social peace, social policy is a must (Talas 1992a: 306).

In the study, first, I have tried try to investigate the weakened power of the trade unions in Turkey with the inheritance from the Ottoman Empire. The periods such as from the emergence of the Turkish Republic to the multi-party era and from the 1946 elections to the 1960 military coup have been investigated in detail. Meanwhile, the beginning of the 1950's until the 1961 Constitution has been discussed in many aspects since it includes the establishment of Türk-İş in 1952. The Labor Laws 274 and 275 concerning the collective labor agreements and strikes

has been touched upon intensely since they were the two greatly important laws providing the workers with broadened rights for the first time. Then the period of the 1970's is discussed while considering the process of globalization after the 1970's by focusing on the most powerful and largest union, Türk-İş. Trade unions, particularly Türk-İş, have not been successful against privatization and their role in the political arena is seen basically in collective bargaining. Furthermore, they have not succeeded in obtaining other economic and social rights and interests. They did not produce a policy to reduce the negative effects of globalization and did not play an active role in the Turkish politics.

Second, I question the role of trade unions in politics by discussing the 'non-partisanship politics' principle of Türk-İş. Despite this principle adopted in 1964, the leaders of Türk-İş have traditionally been involved in politics. Since the 1970's, the military coups, the transformation in the political arena, especially the coming to power of parties defending neo-liberal policies and replacing social democrat parties have played a major role in the weakening power of trade unionism. The civil and military governments have been successful in achieving their main policy, 'taming trade unionism'. The current result is a crisis and discontinuity in trade unionism.

Throughout the study, I have tried to answer the following questions: "what is the reason for the crisis in trade unionism in Turkey?", "what is the impact of globalization on the labor movement?", "what is the relationship between the trade unions and political parties?", "what is the role of Türk-İş in the political arena as the largest union of the country?", "what is the outcome of non-partisanship policy of Türk-İş?".

1.3 Methodology

The study depends on textual analysis of the annual reports of Türk-İş together with a literature review. These writings include the material in the archive of Türk-İş, published by the numerous trade unions under its administration. Particularly, all

kinds of material composed by Türk-İş have been examined since it is the focus point of the study.

As the aim of the study is to discuss the self-understanding of Türk-İş while investigating the trade union movement in Turkey, especially the period after the 1960's, the papers and the journals of the period have been scanned and the related information in the literature has been introduced in the study. Especially the processes of Türk-İş in order to affect the political realm so as to reach higher goals have been analyzed by examining the literature.

Moreover, the main framework material skeleton of the study, the interviews with the former and recent Türk-İş leaders and officials who have also played significant roles in the political arena have been incorporated into the study in order to supplement adequate facts and figures about the developments within Türk-İş. While investigating the role of Türk-İş in society and politics since its emergence, which is quite a long period, the interviews with the significant figures of Türk-İş contribute a great deal to the study.

1.4 Structure of the Study

In the study, firstly, I have planned to give an overall analysis of the advent of the trade union movement during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. As many researchers argue, the roots of the movement are in the period of the Ottomans. That is the reason why I have started with that period before the Turkish Republic. Next period that has been dealt with is the single-party period after the emergence of the Republic because the traces of the authoritarian regime can be clearly observed in the laws and regulations concerning working conditions.

In the following chapter, I have dealt with the multi-party era and the effects of the political changes on labor norms. Actually, the focus is on the emergence of Türk-İş with the change of its attitude towards political sphere. In addition, the

modifications in its self-understanding have been researched by means of interviews with its top management officials.

The next chapter is an analysis of the economic, social and political events of the period after the 1970's along with the hotly debated issues of Türk-İş. The discussions raised by Türk-İş and its power to make them perceived particularly by the political parties and the society as a whole has been the emphasis while finding out the role of Türk-İş in society and politics.

The succeeding chapter mainly concentrates on the period after the 1980 military coup and its effects on trade union movement, on labor organizations, mainly Türk-İş, and on laws related with the labor relations and social security. On the other hand, the influence of structural adjustment policies on the working class has been investigated. The attitude and the change of leadership in Türk-İş after the 1980's has been stressed in order to analyze its relations with the state and the political parties. In fact, the study ends with the investigation of the period covering only the first years of the 1980's when the popularity of the military reached a peak and the democratic rule was back on stage with the 1983 elections afterwards. Due to the silence and fragmentation of the working class after the 1980 coup which itself prepared the necessary ground to tame the workers who had gained quite a lot of rights before 12 September, the study aims at researching the period before 1980 particularly.

The number of the interviewed trade unionists is 17. This is the highest number that could be reached since the focus area of the study requires two characteristics: people who played a leadership role in Türk-İş and in political life in Turkey. The most difficult part of the interviews has been to reach those people who are in their seventies or eighties since the study starts investigating rather earlier periods like the 1950's and 1960's. The interviews provide us with the information that is necessary to understand the events happened within Türk-İş in addition to its impact on social policy.

The conclusion is allocated to the evaluations of Türk-İş in terms of its efficiency and its difficulties in reaching its objectives. I have tried to show the contributions and the weaknesses of the organization in its attempts to affect politics and legal norms.

CHAPTER TWO

TRADE UNION MOVEMENT DURING THE OTTOMAN ERA AND SINGLE PARTY ERA

2.1. The Factors Hindering the Proliferation of the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire

In this chapter, the focus is on the period during which the Ottoman Empire suffered from the integration with capitalism and ended up due to several factors that are examined in terms of the economic and social developments taking place in the late years of its collapse. Particularly, the emergence of the working class and the dynamics hindering the development of the working class consciousness has been researched. Firstly, the Ottoman Empire regressed during its integration phase with the capitalist world and together with the impact of a number of nationalist separation movements, it broke up. A distinctive characteristic of the Empire was that it was not the bourgeoisie who spent effort to construct a nation state or who tried to modernize this state, it was the leading class of the Empire, the bureaucracy, who kept its controlling role during that period.

In the Empire, the two classes, the peasants and the working class, did not have enough power and were not organized enough to affect the outcome of the political struggle. Because there was not the property of large lands and the Christian bourgeoisie left the country, the bureaucracy was still powerful against the newly emerging bourgeoisie. As a result, the bureaucracy was still able to control and stimulate the social and economic transformation which held a state centered policy and it was able to maintain its power over the state due to the fact that the Muslim bourgeoisie was exceedingly weak to challenge. In this context, whatever happened to the working class is the main area of my study. The sound answer is that it was

unable to grow and flourish. The main reason was the lack of a bourgeoisie class. Moreover, it did not go through a capitalist stage directly. In this chapter, the major area that I discuss is the roots of the emergence of the working class and the reasons why it was powerless to thrive.

Until the sixteenth century, the main trade of the Ottoman Empire was the goods of luxuries such as spices, drugs and textiles. In the following centuries the trade between the Empire and Europe rose and at a later point, the European world economy absorbed the Empire and at this point the Empire which used to be a world empire was transformed into a state surrounded by the capitalist world economy.

At this point, the issue of dependence needs to be debated. The development of European capitalism took advantage of enhancing its perseverance by obtaining concessions from the Ottomans at any stage; however, the Ottomans did not become a dominion of any another country. On the other hand, the relation between Europe and the Ottoman Empire involved giving rising concessions. This was the common picture. Moreover, the Empire demanded nothing in return from the Europeans. The Empire joined the economy of the West but the boundaries and the means were drawn by such countries. Furthermore, in every area, it went through a transformation period within the limits accepted by its own internal dynamics. However, the Ottomans were not able to pass to a further production phase by means of its own internal dynamics. Its ordeal to initiate innovation usually started by top-down policies, and it usually confronted reactions aiming at going back to the starting point and it did not have a chance to go forward.

The dependency of the Ottoman state started first with the loans given by the Galata bankers who were a group of people formed by the minorities living in İstanbul. The state, under strict control of such bankers, was regularly under French and British pressure forcing the Empire to borrow from abroad. The Ottoman state had no other choice since it did not have the strength to struggle. For instance, it borrowed from abroad sixteen times between 1854 and 1875 and a great proportion of the borrowed amount was going back to Europe as the interest rate of the previous loans was high. Meanwhile, although a small amount of the money was spent on the construction of

railroads and docks, it was mostly and unwisely spent on the construction of palaces or guns. Consequently, a heavy foreign trade debt was a major problem during the nineteenth century (Kazgan 1999: 23).

Another factor contributing to the dominance of the West was the foreign investment which was not welcomed enthusiastically by the bureaucracy but which had to be accepted due to various pressures. Many European tradesmen settled in the big cities worked in cooperation with the non-Muslim minorities and increased their income by exploitation. Moreover, they had tax exemptions and they did not construct industries employing a large number of workers, so their contribution to the public was rather limited. Furthermore, most of the state income was coming from the taxes gathered from the poor peasants. Finally, as a result of huge amounts of loans, increasing debts, domineering foreign capital and imbalances between exported and imported goods, there was a real financial dominance of the foreign money lenders and it was impossible to pay the loans back; the domination of the Western world, therefore, was inevitable.

The foreign capital of the period did not improve and it was limited with only trade related activities. Since the productive capital was limited, an industrial bourgeoisie was not able to develop. As Keyder asserts, since the productive capital was limited, the lack of diversity within the bourgeoisie did not lead to the improvement of a possible bourgeois class belonging to the industry to contradict the trade and finance capital. In other words, a protective domestic opposition did not emerge to resist the domination of the capitalism over the Empire (Keyder 1989a: 69). The political result was that a bourgeois division was not able to form and thus, was unable to carve a place for itself in the political power and change the conditions of the capitalist integration.

When the economic structure of the Ottoman Empire is researched, the two topics, agriculture and land owners and the change that they performed, are undeniably necessary to study and have significant priority. When compared to the countries which went through remarkable transformation during the Industrial Revolution, the agriculture in the Empire did not have proper features to pass into the stage of

capitalist agriculture. The transformation from small property dominated agriculture, in which peasants were obliged to pay the high taxes. The large-scale estates were not an apparent instance of the Ottoman incorporation into the capitalist markets. Such transformation heading to large landlord estates was rarely observed. The local notables, merchants and tax collectors, on the other hand, were doing their best to profit from the change. Thus, my interpretation is that despite the existence of increasing trade, a change in the relations of production did not occur.

In Europe, together with the emergence of property rights on land, methods of production experienced a revolution. Property was a defense against the intrusion of the state. This form of absolute and unbreakable property is associated with social change, which was something that is not valid in the Ottoman form of property. It took some time for agriculture to get the attention it deserved from the Ottoman government. Until 1893 a subordinate agriculture director within the Ministry of Trade and Public Works supervised agricultural policies. The director of the time, the Armenian Amasyan Efendi (1880-1888) sent agricultural inspectors to the provinces to advise the cultivators on the methods and crops. In 1893 agriculture was transferred to the new Ministry of Forests, Mines and Agriculture, in which it received primary importance. Furthermore, the creation of the Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankası) led to a reform in the entire system of agricultural credit (Shaw 1977: 230-231).

Anatolian agriculture was getting commercialized in the nineteenth century. The agricultural production was increasing and there was a major rise in crops to be exported. The production of such items as silk, tobacco and crops like figs, raisins, olives and cereals was improving. During the nineteenth century, the production for the market became increasingly dominant in Anatolia, through a mechanism whereby peasant agriculture underwent an adaptation rather than being replaced by forms of large landownership (Arıcalı 1991:131). These developments caused a significant change in agrarian society in Anatolia but my concern is whether a transformation in the land ownership took place or not. The income of the Ottoman state was based on land revenues. Therefore, we notice the effort of the state to subsidize for the expansion of agricultural production, introduction of new crops

and an increase in the cultivated areas; however, we do not notice a major transformation in property relations in spite of a major transformation in the expansion and diversification of agricultural production.

In the case of the peasants, since they owned the land necessary to support themselves, the owners of the big agricultural businesses had a tendency to work with people who wanted to work on their farm and share the half of the harvest, a traditional way of distributing the agricultural product, rather than with the waged workers. As a consequence, the proliferation of capitalist structures employing a working class did not occur. One exception may be the production of cotton. On the other hand, this system based on the small business in agriculture was a preference of both, the central authority and the financial realities as tax collection (Makal, 1997b: 135). Actually, this is the reason why it is possible to find waged labor in sectors other than agriculture.

Another extremely important point to be discussed is the issue of expropriation which had a direct impact on the emergence of the working class in the Ottoman Empire. When the military expansion came to a halt, the regular functioning of the Empire was disturbed and this led to the expropriation of the direct producers. Such people who were expropriated were not able to contribute to the improvement of the capitalism because their break off with the production means was not a result of it. Since the liquidation of the tradesman and artisans did not occur because of the developments related to the capitalist production relations of the country but because of the external dynamics, they did not play a role in the capitalist industrialization of the country.

With the increase in the military failures, new distribution relations were created among the dominant classes and the expropriation of the direct producers accelerated. Moreover, this acceleration was also due to the pressure from the economic pressure and intense exploitation of the usury. As Akdağ states, “the usurers took advantage of the situation in which the peasants were short of money, so they were in a massive debt” (Akdağ 1975: 490). The result was that people who wanted to invest on land bought huge areas and the expropriation of the direct

producers became faster. Consequently, two thirds of the peasant population moved to the big cities as İstanbul, Edirne and Bursa (Koç 1991: 49).

In the Empire, there was a group of waged workers apart from the industry workers. Although traditionally the attempts to write on a topic as the past of the working class in the Ottoman era has been limited, we encounter a range of workers in the field of agriculture, construction, services, and mining in the centralized feudal structure of the Ottoman Empire. Many writers, in the effort to survey the history of the Turkish working class, usually tend to search for an industrial setting apart from the private sector and the military in the Ottoman Empire. However, there was a working class in the Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century. In the centralized structure of the Empire, in the guilds, the covert organization of the apprentice against the master workman to save their rights did not become adequately apparent. Furthermore, struggle was not a traditional way to gain rights. The elimination of the artisans and tradesmen prevented the already existing limited tendencies from passing onto the working classes.

The Ottoman industry was based on tradesmen and artisans mainly. This structure started to change after the Ottoman industry initiated a close contact with the foreign countries. Finally, this led to the demolition of the Empire owing to the capitulations and foreign trade agreements. The first trade agreement to lead the way to the foreign trade was the 1838 trade agreement with the United Kingdom. Later, the number of such agreements increased, which resulted in the end of the Empire (Issawi 1996: 41-42). In that period, the amount of the products imported from European countries rose abruptly. As a result, the artisans of the country were not able to survive due to severe competition with the foreign countries and they were completely wiped out in some fields. To illustrate, the areas affected seriously from the foreign trade were essentially weaving and tanning. Concerning the area of research in this chapter, such a harmful impact on the working class of the Empire resulted in the decrease in the number of workers.

During the late years of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman working class was dominated by the state, which led to an unequal relationship and a limitation of the

workers in the need of the achievement of their ends. However, to a certain extent, the Ottoman working classes were rather successful in obtaining their demands. Especially during the eighteenth century, the uprisings of the guilds, workers and janissary corps were the clues of their attempt to coerce the weakening governments. Moreover, relentless and unsuccessful wars exhausted the central state during the following century. As a result, the negotiating power of the working class augmented as the state depended on the support of the guilds. The outcome was the emergence of the role of the guilds in organizing political life and social stability in accordance with the declining power of the central state. On the other hand, the abolition of the janissary corps in 1826 had an empowering impact on the state, thus a restraint in the actions of the workers.

After the second half of the nineteenth century, the world was entering a new phase, imperialism. The capitalists of the European countries were competing in order to find profitable investment lands. Meanwhile, some basic investments as telegram and railway started in the Ottoman Empire. It was the foreign capital which was building the railways. In fact, those railways constructed by the foreigners were the means for the integration of the railway areas with the foreign countries rather than for the internal unity of the Empire (Tekeli and İlkin 2003: 24). The process of passing to the capitalist production in the industry was slower compared to the changes in the trade and agriculture. The artisans producing in the guild system in the eighteenth century were able to maintain their existence. In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman market was open to everyone and thus the production within the guild decreased, which led to the passage from the trade capital without links with the guild to the industrial production.

According to Sülker, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the statesmen of the Empire worked in cooperation with the foreign capitalists while running after their own interests. Naturally, these ruling state workers followed a policy which was facilitating the business opportunities for the foreigners. The attempts of the local rich were prevented and the associations were perceived as dangerous elements to the state. That was the reason why joint companies and professional associations were difficult to emerge. Their foundation was shown as a sort of

alliance against the Ottoman Sultan. Meanwhile, the domination over the workers was much stronger than the one in Europe and the workers of the Empire were exploited in every area (Sülker, 1998:59).

While discussing the reasons for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it is worth to underline power politics which played a major role in the disintegration of the Empire with its own incompetent economic and financial administration dislocating the economy, exploiting the underdeveloped human resources and making it impossible to improve financially. The Empire had human, agricultural and mineral resources but owing to incompetent administrative and managerial skills, an inadequate strategy for investment and development, there was not sufficient growth. In spite of the heavy burden of taxes on the population, the income of the Empire was not satisfactory to meet the exceedingly rising needs of the public budget. The economy was incapable of coping with the relentlessly growing expenditure due to selfish and incompetent officials (Hershlag 1980: 304-305).

The subject of Ottoman debts during the last decades of the Empire is a well-known fact. State finances showed steadily a deficit and balances were met through borrowing from abroad. At first, the borrowings began as a short term solution to the revenue crisis. Then, the bureaucracy turned to foreign borrowing to preserve its relative economic status. The result was that those debts constituted the main reason for the financial deficit. Economic development, on the other hand, was in large part initiated by foreign investments. As Keyder remarks, the conditions for the development of capitalism through an integration into the world capitalist market were set up by foreign capital. Moreover, he claims that without the impact of foreign capital, the development of commodity production would certainly have been much slower (Keyder 1977: 326). The result was a sort of semi-colony state of the Ottoman Empire because it was importing industrial goods but exporting agricultural products. In addition, the Empire was more and more dependent on the European countries politically as well as economically. The evidence demonstrating its dependency was the emergence of the 'Düyun-u Umumiye'.

Erol Kahveci underlines the importance of the Ottoman debts and its impact on the emergence of the Ereğli Company in 1891. He claims that the Ottoman State was forced to permit its creditors to take charge of certain imperial revenues because it had failed to pay the interest on a foreign debt of £200 million. A European-controlled organization, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was set up to collect payments on the loans. The result was the penetration of the European companies, seeking investment opportunities in the Empire, and a concession which ultimately led to the formation of Ereğli Company whom a license to build a port, to load coal and to build junction railroads to serve the mines at Zonguldak was granted. This French company had the right to the construction, administration and exploitation for a 50-year period and it easily dominated coal production (Kahveci, in Kahveci, Sungur and Nichols 1996: 180).

When the Zonguldak mines were opened, the Ottoman Empire did not need huge amounts to consume due to its lack of industrialization. Nevertheless, because of the rise in the price of coal in the international market and the increasing use of steamships led to increased consumption, the Ereğli Company was encouraged to expand production. Moreover, the Government utilities and railroads increased the demand for coal. As a result, almost 10 000 people were employed in this area in the late nineteenth century. On the other hand, nearly three-quarters of the coal workers were rotational. They were mostly from the agriculture communities and they remained at the mines for two to three weeks at a time. They were the ones who did the underground work and the remaining one quarter included the more permanent ones who did not perform the similar work. On the other hand, most of the skilled workers were foreigners working in the mine repair shops. Consequently, workers did not develop a group identity to the advantage of the company and any sense of a working class consciousness nor a desire to organize emerged. The company profited from the feeling of the workforce as peasants as well as miners. In addition, a French quarter was built in Ereğli, the most beautiful area of the city, Zonguldak. There were fabulous houses, 2 churches and 2 religious schools to educate priests in the quarter. This was kind of a French colony. According to

Ahmet Naim, there were many missionaries who were also secret agents (Naim 1934: 82).

As it can be observed in the example of Ereğli Coal Company, with the ruining impact of the expanding industrial capitalism of Europe, the general decay of Ottoman industry dates from the early nineteenth century. A flood of cheap manufactured goods, mostly textiles, flowed into the market. The result was that already established Turkish cotton and silk manufacturers suffered exceedingly. Other imports were ironware, paper and other items that the Turkish local industries failed to compete.

This process which began in the first half of the nineteenth century went on in the second half. Apart from a few necessary local craftsmen like tailors and cobblers, the manufacturing arts disappeared completely. Consequently, the country became an exporter of raw materials and importer of manufactured goods. Although there are many reasons of the collapse as Capitulations or others, the main one was the significant inability of the weak, pre-modern economy to resist the competitive impact of modern capitalist industry.

During the rule of Abdülmecid, more than 150 factories were established. However, those state factories were ill conceived, inefficient and mostly irrelevant to the country's needs. Most of them were closed. Private industry, on the other hand, came into being for the most part by foreign control and operation. They were not also able to compete with the quick, cheap export materials. As a consequence, in the hands of a government too weak to enforce and to apply its policies, there was the failure and impoverishment.

The Independence War had a weakening effect on the workers' movement which had been intense in the previous decade. As Güzel declares, between 1919 and 1922, nineteen strikes were observed in İstanbul, which was under occupation, and its surroundings (Güzel 1985a: 824). Furthermore, almost all of those strikes took place in the transportation area, especially the railway companies managed by the foreign capital. The period after 1912 is totally different than the previous span in

that the livelihood in the leftist movements and workers' associations ended almost immediately due to the wars. First the War of Trablusgarp between 1911 and 1912 then The Balkan War between 1912 and 1913 and then the First World War started in 1914 and ended in 1918. Another factor leading to the end of the workers' movement that had recently thrived in the Ottomans was the increasing despotic rule of the Committee of Union and Progress.

The history of the Ottoman working class in urban centers is ambiguous during the period that I would like to investigate in this chapter. The population of the workers until 1914 is stated in diversity in the written materials. In a broad sense, this was a working class. Nevertheless, most of them, first of all, were urban workers who did not form a self-consciously organized group, so their sense of group consciousness is debatable. According to Donald Quataert (Quataert 1994: 12), the number of the urban workers was around 250 000 in manufacturing alone. In fact, the most accessible means to find out the events related to the actions of this class is the petitions that they presented to the government.

When such petitions are observed by researchers as Quataert, it is revealed that the workers covered in those documents range from proud and independent artisans to humble and demoralized suppliants. Many petitions by the guilds were pointing to existing regulations and requesting official enforcement of their rights to obtain their rights. Some of the examples are the petitions of the tanners' guild or the silk cloth makers and dyers guild in İstanbul in the second half of the nineteenth century. Another case is the petition of the non-guild workers from Nevşehir who worked in İstanbul. They collectively petitioned the state to be exempt from a new income tax by underlining their poor agriculture in their home.

During the period before 1908, unionism was almost non-existent. Only a couple of them existed as charity organizations rather than trade unions. They were actually built by the non-Muslim Ottomans and foreigners living in İstanbul in order to help the workers who were in the need of aid. For instance, an Italian organization called La Societa Operaia Italiana was built in 1866 (Sencer 1969a: 190).

The first political party stressing the working class was “the Association of Private Entrepreneurship and Centralization”, (Teşebbüsü Şahsi ve Ademi Merkeziyet Cemiyeti) built by Prens Sabahattin. Later, in 1894, the workers founded secretly “Ottoman Worker’s Association” (Osmanlı Amele Cemiyeti). Sencer states that more than 4000 workers were employed in the Tophane factories managed by the Military Minister and these workers selected a committee of eight people so as to build an association. The leaders of the Association got in touch with the Young Turks living abroad and thus were following the opinions growing in Europe, giving priority to liberty and were pointing out the difficulties that the workers were facing. On the other hand, they spent some effort in order to awaken the people against the oppressive actions of the Sultan. However, the members of this association were caught and sent to exile (Sencer, 1969b: 104-105).

An important incident to investigate the Ottoman labor history is the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. It is the major turning point in the history of the working class movement of the Empire (Dumont 1980: 383). Firstly, while surveying that period, the freedom of the press enables us to find details of a variety of marches and petitions by the workers. Secondly, a number of unions and syndicates appeared and subsequent strikes took place in the months following the July 1908 coup owing to the revolutionary slogan of the workers, which stressed that liberty included the right to organize and to strike. The 1908 Revolution provided the introduction of the workers’ organizations and political associations to the Ottoman public. The constructors of the Ottoman Workers Association built their union again but this time legal and it was called Ottoman Progress Industry Organization (Osmanlı Terakki-i Sanayi Cemiyeti). This union was abolished due to Law Tatil-i Eşgal but was built once more in 1910 and was named Ottoman Artisans Association (Osmanlı Sanatkarlar Cemiyeti) (Sencer 1969c: 157). The result was a great number of strikes, 104 of them in 1908. It is a notable figure, particularly when we consider the situation in the Middle East in the early twentieth century.

It is stated by many researchers that the reason behind those strikes coming after the 1908 revolution was mainly economical. Nearly all of the strikes were organized owing to demands of the workers for higher wages and better working conditions

(Sencer 1969d: 227). Boratav claims that the workers received a 15% increase in their daily wages when the years 1905 and 1908 are compared (Boratav, Ökçün, Pamuk 1985: 37). According to Karakışla, this can be interpreted as an indication of the workers' profit obtained due to the 1908 strike upsurge. He also adds an example of the dock workers of İzmir who went on a strike with a demand of 100% increase in their wages. Another one is the tobacco workers of the tobacco plant in İstanbul Cibali. They went on a strike because they refused the offer, 50% increase in the wages, since they found it inadequate. Moreover, the railway workers of the İzmir-Kasaba railroad demanded a 20% increase in the wages that are below five Ottoman Lira and 30% increase for the ones above it. The workers of the Paşabahçe Bottle Factory started a strike because of their demand of a 12.5% increase in the wages.

When the results of those subsequent strikes are examined, it is obvious that some groups of workers were rather successful in gaining relatively higher wages in that period. The strike of the Beirut-Damascus-Hama railway workers, for instance, ended with a 50% wage increase. Furthermore, the Anatolian Railway Company offered a 40% increase for the workers who had had a 10-year experience and 30% increase for the ones with less than 10 years experience. Not finding the rise adequate, the workers went on a strike. However, they ended up with a lower rate of increase. Another achievement was the one of the Selonica tobacco workers' strike which ended up with a pay rise.

As Karakışla adds, "the similarity among the strikes after 1908 is that both white collar and blue collar workers prepared the petitions together and went on a strike as a united group". Secondly, the pay increase offers were directly related to the experience and obtained accordingly. Thirdly, in most cases white collar workers received a higher rise compared to that of the blue collar ones. The reason may be that the trade union delegates and worker representatives were elected among the white collar workers. Finally, one interesting remark on the period is that there happened only one strike having political incentive. This was the strike of the waiters in Salonica who protested against the Bulgarians who came to visit the city after the independence declaration of Bulgaria (Sencer 1969e: 32-39).

Such strikes appearing right after the Revolution were also organized against the foreign capital. Furthermore, they demonstrate us that there was a real question of labor. Most of them were done to demand higher wages and they were sometimes rather violent. For instance, those who struck after the July revolution usually received a good part of the demanded wage raise. In addition, in May and June 1909, a group of Jews sephardites (Benaroya, Arditti, Recanati and Hazan) formed the Federation of Socialist Labor.

Charles Issawi argues that ‘the 1908 revolution and ensuing wave of strikes, the rise in prices, the Balkan and Italian wars, and increased mobilization, large-scale emigration and somewhat greater economic activity, combined to raise money wages sharply in the years immediately preceding the First World War’(Issawi 1980: 264-265). He also quotes from British consuls of different cities of the Empire. In İzmir, ‘wages of common laborers were estimated to have risen from 10-12 piastres in 1908 to at least 16 by 1910, matching the general rise in prices’. (United Kingdom, Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1911: vol. 97. Cited in Issawi, 1980). In Ayvalı,, ‘the labor question is becoming more serious every day. A few years ago the average daily wage of farmland was 1s. Now it is difficult to find men at 2s. 6d. This is due to the extension of military service to Christians, who are therefore leaving the country’. (United Kingdom, Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1912-13: vol. 100. Cited in Issawi, 1980).

In Salonica, ‘the strikes, with few exceptions, ended in the successful realization of the employees demands for shorter hours and higher pay; but the general result has been a rise in prices and in the cost of labor, to which is traceable in part a temporary stagnation in trade at the end of 1908, due also in part to the boycott of Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian commerce’. (United Kingdom, Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1909: vol. 98. Cited in Issawi, 1980). Two years later it was reported: ‘Owing to the rise in the cost and standard of living, to the increased influence of the Socialist organizations and labor syndicates, and especially to the alarming proportions assumed by emigration, unskilled labor is daily becoming more exacting in its demands. (United Kingdom, Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1912-13: vol. 100. Cited in Issawi, 1980).

Finally, Issawi quotes a report from İzmir: ‘there was a certain shortage of workers, (in 1912-13), but the women to an almost complete degree supplied the need for labor during winter’. (United Kingdom, Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1914: vol. 95. Cited in Issawi, 1980). The writer’s conclusion is that on the eve of the First World War, the bargaining position of labor improved, and it seems probable that the rise of wages exceeded that in prices, at least in the more developed parts of the country.

An interesting event which is worth to be mentioned is the role of the mediators who were well educated and from an upper class compared to the average worker. While confronting, the workers themselves asked for the mediation of the members of the revolutionary Committee of Union and Progress and some government officials. Interestingly, those mediators agreed with the workers on their claim of low wages. According to the interpretation by Quataert, the state and its agents are seen as seeking to impede workers’ mobilization with a series of timely concessions designed to placate the bulk of the workers and isolate those pushing for radical change (Quataert 1983: 125-126).

One example is the appointment of a chief administrative officer of a district, Mehmet Ali Ayni Bey, to the restoration of order in the important mines of the country in August 1908. The workers had threatened the foreign engineers and left work, demanding that the company director increase wages. He met with the mine officials and some workers, and spoke of freedom, justice and equality. Amazingly, the next day they agreed to return to work. The reason might be the cooperation of the state and the workers to maintain equity and harmony.

On the other hand, there were certainly some open clashes between the military and workers in railway and mine workers. To illustrate, in Aydın, a worker was killed and several wounded in a strike. In Ereğli, during the strikes in coal mines, workers destroyed several locomotives and later wounded a foreign strike breaker. In August 1908, the union of the Anatolian Railway workers and employees informed the government of its intent to organize the union not only in big cities of İstanbul, Bursa and Salonica, but everywhere in the Empire. This threat and the actions of the

railway workers irritated the state and the capital. The result was the first antistrike legislation right after the great Anatolian railway strike of 14-16 September 1908.

Another issue to be discussed in this context is the role of religion and ethnicity in the process of the establishment of the working class. Foreign merchants and foreign corporations affected ethnic and religious relations. They hired foreigners for the executive positions, Ottoman Christians for the middle ranked jobs and Muslims for the lower ranks. The working class faced with a rupture due to this reason. The workers acted according to their own ethnic capitalist classes while confronting against the multi-national Ottoman Empire. Surprisingly, most unions coming into existence after the Revolution of 1908 were multiethnic and multi-religious. The majority of the skilled workers consisted of the Armenians and Greeks in addition to the foreign workers who had already adopted their own nationalist programs. Naturally, the result was their negative impact on the class unity.

Although the state itself started to found rather large industrial business in order to meet its military needs, the adoption of an economic policy in respect with the industrialization process was mainly after the Revolution of 1908. A subsequent adoption was the priority of Turkish militarism while abandoning the liberal policies like gathering all the ethnicities in one nation, the Ottoman nation. The emphasis on a Turkish nationalism was the ideology of the 'İttihat ve Terakki' who would work for the establishment of a Turkish bourgeoisie during the later years. Their incentive was likely to stem from the domination of the ethnic groups in the economic sphere. One example of this domination can be the possession of the shareholders of the Zonguldak Area Mines and the distribution of ethnic groups. As it is shown in list below, most of the owners were Greeks and Armenians:

<u>Zonguldak Area Mine Owners</u>	<u>Number of Mine</u>
Papazođlu Marko	3
Fabrikacı Andon	2
Kurci (Gürcü) Kumpanyası	1
Çolak Konstanti Simon Ođlu Yorgi	2
Anderya ve Şurekası	1
Boyacıođlu Veresesi (heir) (Turkish origin)	1
Nikoli Marko	1
Artin Karamanyan ve Şurekası	2
Ziko	1
Latin Yanko	1
Kurci (Gürcü) Pano	1
Latin Yorgi	1
Istefan Marko ve Miloşahin	1
Pavlaki Zafir Yuvan, Vasil Vaspaso	7
Rombaki Veresesi (heir)	1
Milopro ve Partalcı Yuvan	1
Hacıođlu ve Şureaksı (Turkish origin)	1
Rado ve Petro	1
Cura ve İspiro	1
Halaçyan Parsih	1
Bodosaki	1
Muraj ve Şinork	2
Vasilaki Kalfa	2
Emin Ađa (Turkish origin)	3
Mustafa Çavuş (Turkish origin)	2

To be continued

Cafer Efendi Ahmet İsmail Veresesi (heir)	1
(Turkish origin)	
Hacı Ahmet Ali ve Süleyman Sırrı Bey	1
(Turkish origin)	
Hacı Ahmet Ali Ağa vereseleri (heir)	1
(Turkish origin)	

Source: Kadir Tuncer, 1998: pp. 34-35

Actually, the economic structure of the Empire played an important role in its collapse. Until the Second Revolution the Empire did not have a centralized economic formation. In other words, the income of the state was not collected by the Ministry of Finance. There was not the concept of a single budget. In the late years of the Empire, the state used to borrow money from the non-Muslim bankers, mostly the ones from İstanbul. When the state was not able to pay the loans back, it started to print banknotes increasingly. The result was the loss of value for its own currency against the foreign currencies. After 1908 İttihat ve Terakki suggested strongly the idea to form a national bank. Finally, in 1917, a national bank, 'Osmanlı İtibar- Milli Bankası' was established. However, it was too late to heal the economy. The result was the decrease in the number of the work places and so in the labor.

During the First World War labor shortage increased exceedingly in sectors other than agriculture. The industry statistics done for the years 1913-1915 give us the necessary data. The Statistics of 1913-1915 about the industry were done in İstanbul, İzmir, Bursa, Bandırma, Manisa, Uşak and İzmit. In some cities the drop

was really obvious. For instance, in İzmir the number for each workplace went down from 41.7 to 22.9 (Toprak 2003: 96).

Although the statistics of 1913-1915 are limited with a couple of cities and include a part of the industrial institutions in the Ottoman Empire, they are able to give us some idea about the industry of the period since nearly most of the important industry were located in those areas. For example, in 1915, of the 282 institutions, 155 were in İstanbul (55%) and 62 in İzmir (22%). Apart from those two big cities, the amount of the rest in other places was only 65 (23%) (Makal 1997b: 144). These statistics reflect that it is difficult to talk about an industrial progress during the last years of the Empire. During the years of war, although the salaries of the workers seemed to demonstrate a rise, their purchasing power dropped steadily. According to Toprak, the inflation rate rose 300% between the years 1914 and 1917, which was the highest increase which the world had ever seen. He states that the people of 'İttihat' introduced the inflation rate to the world literature (Toprak 2003: 96).

The result is that the mechanisms that could integrate Ottoman economy into the capitalist world were mainly trade, loans and direct investments. Those mechanisms were the reasons for the marginal structure of its economy. A rapidly improving group was basically the minorities. The ruling class, on the other hand, kept its major role in the social system. That gives us the idea that this class had the means and instruments to change things in the country. The effort spent by this class is studied in the next chapter.

2.2. The Roots of Legal Norms Regulating the Labor-Employer Relations

Before focusing on the events related to the emergence of laws regulating the labor relations and social policy in the Ottoman Empire, it is necessary to study the developments that were happening in Europe during the same period, the 1800's, in terms of building a legal structure for a profitable employment of the workers. The first law in the field of modern social policy associated with the state intervention is the 1802 British Children Protection Act. In 1818, Robert Owen, who himself was

an entrepreneur, asked some governments to examine the launch of protection and social help institution that he build for the workers in his own plant within a sense of humanity. In those years, even England, where a capitalist industry was establishing, did not have a precise collective law on the protection of labor. The initiative of Robert Owen was due to humanist reasons but it required economic burden since he wanted the other capitalists to take the same measures as he had already done. However, his proposal did not receive attention.

20 years after Owen, Adolphe Blanqui claimed his idea on a reduction of daily work from 15 hours to 13 hours a day. He also added that this could only be achievable when it is applied by all the industrial countries. After Blanqui, Friedrich List mentioned the need for an international labor organization and an international social policy. As a result, a Swiss entrepreneur, Daniel Legrand, proposed the British, French and German governments the use of a Prussian law which had been introduced in 1830 and aimed to protect the children working in industry. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the number of those struggling for the principle of social protection of the workers at an international level increased. On the other hand, today's perception of labor protection in order to reach an effective production and better economic results was not recognized in such period. Therefore, it was believed that the protection of labor at a national level was a load to each country who was acting in such a humanist motive. A country which was taking the risk to have the burden of expenses due to labor protection would be deprived of its chance to compete in the international arena with those which had not accepted such norms.

As a result of those discussions, the first congress on the issue met in Berlin by the government representatives in order to formulate uniform measures at an international level and eliminate the difficulties stemming from the inequalities in the economic competition. Only some recommendation was proposed to the governments of the countries attending the conference but no decision at an international level was taken. Moreover, no international agreement was signed. Next congress was held in Zürich. Unlike the congress in Berlin, Professors, labor and capital representatives and the agents of a variety of political parties

joined the congress of Zürich. The first meaningful meeting as a result of those congresses was held in Basle in 1901 and the International Labor Bureau, whose function was to form a Code from the work of the industrial countries and to organize international conferences, was established. In the following years, many countries joined the decisions taken at the international level and the most important steps were taken after the First World War on the way to establish social peace and a solution to the economic struggle problem which was a principal basis in the political relations among the countries. The result was the formation of 'International Labor Organization, ILO' in 1919 (Tuna and Yalçıntaş 1981: 250-264).

The situation in the Ottoman Empire in terms of legal formations do not show a different pattern when the historical developments are investigated. A topic like the legal regulations in the field of labor relations such as wages, social policy or right to strike demonstrate a rather primitive characteristic in the second half of the nineteenth century. The first and the major reason is the recent improvements on such a topic in Europe. Another reason is the similarity of the working conditions and regulations of the Ottoman Empire to the European counterparts. . To illustrate, the first legal regulation in the labor relations area of the Empire was the Police Regulation of the 1845. According to this first regulation, one of the duties assigned to the police was to demolish the associations or communities formed by the workers who quitted work and who were planning to go on a strike and thus, to prevent a possible revolution (Güzel, 1985b: 52-54).

In the late Ottoman history, the most important legal reform can be the promulgation of the new civil code, Mecelle, whose first section appeared in 1869 and which was completed in 1876. The code was very largely the work of Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (1822-95), a scholar, historian and jurist. He preferred to remain within the Islamic tradition and to prepare a code which was modern in form but firmly based on the Sheria. It remained in force in Turkey until 1926 (Lewis 1961a: 120). As Lewis remarks:

For the past millennium the Turkish peoples had formed a part -for long the dominant part- of the community of Islam, and their whole culture –religion and politics, law and art, society and government –was shaped in Islamic moulds and stamped with the imprint of the common Islamic past. For the past century they had been imitating the West to save the Empire from collapse and win the respect of Europe by conforming to European patterns of culture and organization (Lewis 1961b: 229).

The law of 1876, the first Turkish constitution called Kanun-u Esasi, did not fetch many improvements in terms of social rights. However, although it was not designed for social right, the 1876 Constitution drew the legal framework of the individualistic labor relations until 1926. On the other hand, Mecelle sustained its presence until the 1926 Civil Code. Mecelle which was in force for such a long period was undergone a variety of modifications bore labor relation regulations which were in accordance with the circumstances of the period

Although there was an emergence of the opinion to formulate a civil code influenced by the European laws, especially French Civil Code, the board preparing Mecelle was highly affected by the views underlining Islamic roots and consequently, Mecelle had greatly shaped by the impact of Sheria Law. However, it is a very important law in regards with the history of Law since it is a further step from the traditional law period to the written law order. We can observe the Islamic law based reason in the regulations of the work relations. According to Talas, these regulations were the products of a social politics concept (Talas 1992b: 39).

With the declaration of liberty on 24, 1908, a great number of strikes emerged all over the Empire. This increase is also related to a significant law concerning the legislation on strike, ‘Tatil-i Eşgal Law’ dated 1909. During the discussions of the Law in the Ottoman Parliament, more than 5000 workers from many nationalities representing a variety of production ranches organized a meeting in Salonica on 6th June 1909. Speeches in four different languages as Ottoman, Bulgaria, Greek and Hebrew were given and declarations in five different languages were distributed. This was the first of the several meetings organized by the Ottoman workers (Karakışla 1998: 37). When the Law was enacted, the number and the speed of the

strikes diminished. Between 1909 and 1912, only 33 strikes took place and the number of the strikes between 1913 and 1918 was only five.

The Law was highly affected by the French Laws. According to Mesut Gülmez, ‘freedom to strike’ was the accepted approach in this law. He claims that the Law of 1909 did not forbid strikes precisely although it had a limiting attitude as banning the right to form trade unions. The law provided an uncomplicated system of mediation and made it compulsory before the strikes. He also adds that the workers were banned from the strikes before trying this peaceful means and receiving its results. Moreover, it proposed some sanctions in the event of the objection. However, the law did not forbid strikes in the case of disagreement (Gülmez 1982:2). Therefore, he argues that the law did not forbid the right to strike directly and exactly for the workers that it includes. On the contrary, it initiated a ‘freedom to strike’ on a legal stand, which would go on until 1936, the Labor Law.

During the preparation of the law, two French laws were examined and were inspired from. The first one was “Law of Voluntary Arbitration for the Collective Disagreements between the Workers and the Employees” dated in 1882. This was such a liberal law that it gave the counterparts the right to struggle, especially right to strike for the workers, without the arbitration process. Although it was the basis of *Tatil-i Eşgal*, the steps to be followed before going on a strike were different. While the French law proposed the arbitration as a choice, the law of 1909 required this step as an obligatory procedure before a strike. Furthermore, the second French law, from which ‘*Tatil-i Eşgal*’ was influenced, was the Law of 1864 which initiated freedom to strike under no punishment at all (Gülmez 1982: 2).

On the other hand, the interpretation of Zafer Toprak on the Law of 1909 differs from that of Gülmez. He argues that the law did not bring the right to strike in the workplaces belonging to the state. Furthermore, it did not legalize strike after compulsory arbitration. The Law forbade the strikes in the workplaces providing public services by stressing the continuity of the job in such areas. Nevertheless, Gülmez is of the opinion that this law was the first to confer the workers the right to strike.

Besides the right to strike, another legal realm to be researched related to the prosperity of the workers during the Ottoman period is that of the social security norms, which should not be examined in terms of those adopted today. Actually, social security involves some risks which can be faced by a worker. For example, the worker may suffer from an illness due to the accidents of work or an illness. There is a wide range of risks which are covered by social security norms in order to provide a regular income for the worker and her/his family. Its purpose is to offer a regular income in the case of a pay cut and make them able to survive. What can be observed in the Ottoman period as the instances of social security are mainly social aid traditions and the individual savings. Some of the aids were the ones given according to the Islamic rules and some others can be the pious foundations. In fact all such instances can be conceived as primitive illustration of social security. As a result, it is possible to find only a limited number of modern social security practices in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.

The most frequent social aid example is the one done with religious incentives of the Islamic rules. Another case is the help supplied within the family in order to make the family members survive. A third type was the guilds which had saving coffer to collect a regular amount of money from their members according to their income. Members used to pay some amount of money during the regular periods of the year and each was calculated according to the salaries. In case of injuries, illnesses or death of the members, the chest was coming into effect and helping such people in order to compensate their financial losses. This can be interpreted as a primitive type of social security (Makal 1997c: 214). Furthermore, this archaic social security system covered people more seriously than the ones as religious or familial aids. However, the weakening power of the guilds and finally their disappearance led to the abolishment of such relief arrangements.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, it is possible to meet some organizations as retirement chests, organizations which were nearer to modern social security structures. One example is the Military Retirement Chest built in 1866 in order to provide only one branch of social security, retirement aid for a small

group of the wage workers, military. Later on, a retirement chest was founded in 1881 for the state officials apart from the military (Tuncay 1986: 215). The result that can be inferred is that such social security organizations, almost similar to today's structures, covered mainly a group of state officials.

The reason for the limited coverage excluding the other workers may be the strength of those two groups and the regularity in their wages. On the other hand, they received a relatively high pay compared to other groups. The military and state bureaucracy had a virtual superiority over the other classes in the Empire and they gained this power by means of their role in the westernization and modernization. As Zürcher asserts:

Ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ottoman politicians had tried to counter the growing supremacy of the European powers, of which they became increasingly aware, by a policy of westernization. This policy was actuated by two motives, both eventually aiming at the same goal, the restoration of Ottoman power. These two motives were: a genuine desire to make the administration of the Empire more efficient by the adoption of Western methods and institutions and a desire to please the European powers by effecting reforms on European lines and so to reduce the constant pressure exerted on the Empire by them (Zürcher 1984: 1).

Consequently, when those first steps taken in the Ottoman Empire are compared with the developments happening in the West, in Europe, it is difficult to observe a huge time gap since social security was a relatively new phenomena for that period. For instance, the first compulsory insurance systems similar to the modern ones were introduced in Germany in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Therefore, my conclusion is that, the Ottoman Empire, actually, was not way behind.

2.3. Labor Relations during the Single-Party Era

Having described the legal framework in the late years of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the major laws such as Mecelle, which is a new civil code sustaining its presence until 1926, and Tatil-i Eşgal Law of 1909 in addition to their

impact on labor in the subsequent years, the events and legal circumstances within the boundaries of labor relations during the single party period will be discussed in this chapter. The major economic, social and legal issues of the period leading to the multi-party period and the establishment of Türk-İş will be the focus.

After the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the economic tendencies were not initiated with a totally different stand point. On the contrary, the persistence of the old was apparently significant. The goal was to produce a national bourgeoisie this time and this would lead to the development and modernization. This was the decade of restructuring and the government encouraged the private capital and provided the capitalists with some privileges and prospects so as to increase it. In fact, İzmir Economic Congress, which took place in 1923, played the major role in shaping the basic structure of the policies about the industry. The basic contribution of the government was the protection of the national industry, introduction of the high customs taxes and tax exemptions for the investment goods. Despite the attempts of the government in that period, the development in agriculture was twice higher than that of the industry. Moreover, the growth in industry between 1923 and 1929 was much lower than that of the GNP.

When we examine the labor relations related to the legal structure before the establishment of the Republic, we realize that in spite of the oppressive law called “Tatil-i Eşgal” forbidding the workers to organize and to strike, the strikes and labor movements starting with the II Meşrutiyet continued in the big residential regions until the onset of the World War I. In this period, the apparent impact of the leftist currents was observed in the Balkans. In fact, Salonic became the ideological center for the labor movement. However, this movement came to a standstill during the years of the World War I. After losing the land in the Balkans, the working class movement was severely affected. Due to the defeat during the war and the cruel working conditions, the labor movements in the work places administered by the foreigners gained an incentive. Afterwards, when Mustafa Kemal initiated the Independence War, labor movement also gained a politic characteristic while joining this war. Workers quitted all kinds of activities as strikes and organizations

and they contributed to the army by producing weapons and instruments and they fought during the war as soldiers.

After the break up of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the World War I, the Turkish Republic was formed in 1923 following the victory of Turkish nationalists against the Allied forces that had occupied Anatolia. A transition period from a multi-religion Empire to a nation state took place. The first leaders of the Republic envisaged a harmony of all the citizens' interests regardless of class, ethnicity or religion. The political outcome was the single-party rule and suppression of all kinds of political conflict such as the opposition from the labor organizations. During the single-party era, the onset of the state-led industrialization motive was remarkable especially in agriculture.

When the War was over, the Turkish economy was in really bad shape. Especially when the notion of labor is considered, the picture is not flourishing one. There was 20% decrease in the agricultural labor. In fact, there was a real decrease in the labor because of the military obligations. Moreover, the industry inherited from the Ottoman Empire was very small. Although the long term policies adopted in the first years of the Republic were liberal economic principles, the state intervention on the economy was great. The single party structure made it easier to intervene in any area of the new Republic, especially the economy. The government and state officials expected an economic growth by means of the leading force of the private sector but they were disappointed. The private companies of the period were too small and were unable to start a motivation. However, with the establishment of the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) to manufacture basic goods in the 1930's, a demand for industrial labor emerged.

The emerging hopes of the newly developing bourgeoisie were wiped out owing to the 1929 economic crisis, the effect of which was permanent and severe. The price of the export goods fell sharply and the value of the Turkish Lira dropped abruptly. The result was a great amount of debt for the importers and serious bankruptcies in the trade area. The peasants, unable to receive bank loans, had to lower their prices and finally had to sell their properties and possessions. Actually, this crisis led to the

expropriation of all classes. However, it did not lead to the class movements since the workers did not have a tradition to struggle for their rights and did not have class based organizations. The silence of the working class was perpetuated by the suppressive policies in addition to the expropriation.

While implementing repressive actions, the government put into effect a new customs regime including specific taxes and thus it was able to carry out a protectionist foreign policy. The economic crisis and the subsequent difficulties led to the emergence of new economic policies. State entrepreneurship appeared to be compulsory after the 1929 crisis (Çıladır 1977a: 178). The measures taken by the government to resist the crisis turned out to be the shape of the state and the new balance between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie continued until the Second World War.

The measures taken against the economic difficulties were mainly bans and restrictions and more frontiers to get protected against the foreign world. The ruling party, the Republican Public Party, set its place by declaring in 1931 that the political rule was a single party regime and the party took the responsibility to govern in the name of the nation. The party would rely on the 'populist' principles while taking over this responsibility and would be wise enough to eliminate all the possible fractions attempting to divide the nation. Consequently, the party would aim at settling national law and order instead of class struggle. In fact, the government was frequently declaring that the reason for the state intervention on the people was due to the economic crisis shaking the whole world. In other words, it was supposed that the crisis was the result of the liberal market economy and new economic means were necessary. As a result, an anti-liberal approach defending the planned economy was emphasized. Besides, there was consensus on the strict control of the foreign economic activities and the requirement of the protection on the industry by the state by means of planned policies.

Another principle declared in the 1931 Congress of the RPP was 'etatism', which provided the bourgeoisie a profitable environment because they had been asking the help of the state. With the contribution of the USSR during the preparation together

with some financial aid, the 1st Industrial Plan was put into effect in 1934. The already existing state enterprises were revised and a rapid industrialization period started. Naturally, the bourgeoisie was for the protection of the etatist approach of the RPP.

In addition, the attitude of the RPP was misleading towards the workers. Before the 1931 elections, some important characters of the RPP went to different cities in order to find workers suitable for the Parliament as a deputy. While doing that they disguise their identity and aim. For instance, they found two high school graduates and made them deputies. In that period, those two people who were able to finish high school were unlikely to be the mine workers. That means that the government was producing fake workers to give some false impression to the public (Tuncer 1998: 66).

According to Koç, there was not any workers' action between 1929 and 1930. However, due to some particular actions between 1931 and 1932, a change was made in the Turkish Penal Code and in 1933, the penalty for workers' strike was increased. Moreover, the police were given the right to arrest anyone and for an unlimited period of time in 1934. Besides, with a change in the Penal Code, to support the domination of a class over another and to get organized within this perspective were given heavy punishment in 1936 (Koç 1979a: 44). All of the legislative actions taken against the working class had a major role in restricting their rights to organize and gain class consciousness.

Koç also argues that the RPP founded fake organizations during the economic crisis period, and the Party appointed people from its own organization or from the dominant classes. Another important event pulls our attention: according to the governor of İzmir in 1934, all the workers and artisans would be members of the worker-artisan unions after the 1st January 1935 and workers would not be allowed to work in any job unless they register until 1st March 1935. In addition, people employing such unregistered workers would be punished. Nevertheless, these attempts were not successful to employ, so they were given up (Koç 1979b: 58-59).

The only organization which appeared in this period within the state officials was the teachers. They started new organizations after 1931. Nonetheless, the RPP was against their organization and tried to keep them within a single organization in order to limit their independence. This was the organization called 'public home' (halkevi) working mainly on cultural sphere. In the second half of the 1930's they faded because they were not interested in the economic or democratic rights of the teachers. The RPP, perpetuating the suppression, had a main concern while founding those public homes all over the country in 1932: to prevent the development of class consciousness.

On the other hand, when we examine the classes other than the workers we observe that together with the peasants who were deeply hit by the heavy taxes on agricultural income, tradesmen were another group who were getting into a worse economic situation. For instance, while the imports decreased in 1933 compared to 1928, the ratio of the consumption goods to the import goods dropped from 52% to 25% within the same period (Tezel 1989: 85). Moreover, the broadening relations with Germany and the focus of the government on wheat hurt the trade area. In the 1930's, the trade companies were either in debt or made very little profit.

The industry took advantage of the crisis and the profit rate of the industrial investments rose due to the increasing exploitation of the working class. The political uncertainties after 1925 gave the government the chance to close the labor organizations and to ban the right to strike. The 1920's were the years marked by the unceasing industrial labor shortage. In that period, at least three quarters of the population were in the rural areas and their main economic activity was agriculture mainly in small farms with low productivity. Therefore, the rural standard of life was very poor, and the situation became worse during the World War II since the state oppressed the farmers to produce agricultural surplus. Despite this fact, the peasants were not willing to migrate and settle in urban areas. They participated in urban industrial jobs only seasonally, so this was impeding the growth of a regular urban work force.

Although the state used a variety of strategies such as subsidized housing, paid vacations or social insurance in order to form an industrial work force, the industrial labor shortage continued until the 1950's. This can be explained by the low improvement in the living standard of workers. Between 1914 and 1950, urban real wages fell by 30 percent, albeit with short-term variations (Pamuk 1994: 39).

In the period after 1923, the powerful military and the bureaucracy together with the bourgeoisie constituted by a small group of people acted together to improve capitalism and capital accumulation. This led to the expropriation of the people. Expropriation took place because of the heavy taxes and the increase in the price of the most important consumption goods produced by the state monopolies. The peasants used to pay extra taxes in addition to the indirect taxes.

One crucial example of taxes collected from the peasants was the tax called "aşar", which was a very heavy burden for them. Actually, "aşar" was not a tax which was initiated after the construction of the Republic. On the contrary, it was inherited from the Ottoman Empire. According to Barkan, there was a great relationship between the withdrawal of the rich people of the small villages from their small world to the cities and the collection of "aşar". He declares that those big farm owners, landlords, did not have much contact with their land after the migration to the bigger villages and even towns, and they survived by spending the money coming from their farms and lands (Barkan 1964: 803-804). After they had settled down, they were expected to play a great role in the administration and the representation of such areas against the government. However, they become people running after their own interests and looking forward to obtain some privileges from the state.

The result was the emergence of a group of people who were incessantly trying to receive some profits and who were always dreaming about the additional positions that could be obtained from the state. As a consequence of the migration to the bigger villages and towns, such people, the landlords, left their land which was big enough to be cultivated by themselves to the other people who worked on them and shared the income. The landlords were unemployed and unimportant people of the

towns although they used to be an important group while they were living in their small villages. The poor people cultivating the land of the rich, on the other hand, did not pay attention to the proper planting rules and this led to the weaker lands. Consequently, the poverty and outbreak of diseases and worse conditions for the ones living on these lands occurred (Barkan, 1964:803-804). Thus, the income of the landlords living in the bigger villages or towns decreased. Finally, the effect of expropriation appeared. In fact, the income tax “aşar” was the heaviest burden for these people and a way to collect it appropriately was not found. Because of the improper attitudes of the tax collectors, a significant amount was lost and a decrease in the state’s income was apparent.

The severe result of this tax collectors’ rotten attitude worsened the agricultural structure, social structure and the economy of the Empire and it carried on deteriorating in the following years. Even in the new Republic, this income tax existed. According to the regulations of this tax, the peasants had to pay one tenth of the produced crop to the government. This was a huge amount for them. On the other hand, the bribe rumors related to the officers collecting the tax increased, and it finally turned out to be an ineffective kind of tax.

Another important example of such taxes was the road building tax. Each citizen between 18 and 60 years old had to pay or had to work for the construction of the roads in the country. Another one was the tax paid for the cattle which required the peasants to pay a tax for each livestock animal. Furthermore, a tax was used to be collected for the education. This tax demanded to collect the financial reserves in order to pay the amount between 35% and 65% of the education expenses from the residents of the area. Many people became the slaves of the usurers who used to provide the huge amount of money to the peasants but finally people had to pay off that amount back to the usurer in extremely huge amounts. This made the situation worse since it was a vicious circle that many people were trapped in.

Besides, the enactment of a law called “Tahrir-i Sükun” dated 4th March 1925 plays a major role in the developments related to the workers’ situation. This law is a kind instrument of the new Turkish state to show its power. Although the Constitution of

the Republic was liberal, this law was not and had a negative influence on a variety of groups and the most important one was the impact on labor. While planning to impoverish the opposition, this law limited the workers' movement greatly.

When the Labor Law draft prepared in 1924 is examined, it is clear to see that it includes the right to strike as it is stated by Yüksel Işık. However, because of the unwillingness of the political power which was spending serious effort in order to overcome the huge amounts of problems of the country, the draft could not be enacted. Furthermore, the government who was resisting against the strike and unionization right changed its opinion on a Labor Code (Işık 1995: 90).

On the other hand, all the taxes added to the economic problems of the people who were already in really terrible economic situation. When the government abolished the "aşar", a tax collected from the peasants in 1925 in order to reach an agreement with the big land owners, it appeared at the beginning that it would help the peasants and ameliorate their economic wounds; however, it did not since the government rose abruptly the other taxes and the price of the main consumption products manufactured by the state monopoly. According to Koç, the most important implication of this incident is that the income obtained from the state monopoly manufactured goods rose from 16 million Turkish Liras in 1924 to 61 million in 1929. This is the most important implication of the expropriation of the people (Koç, 1979c: 58-59).

During the severe expropriation of the people, a class struggle did not accelerate because of the strong military and bureaucratic forces and the talented governing forces. When a public alienation from the Republican People's party emerged and different tendencies appeared, a second party, Free Party (Serbest Fırka) was built by Fethi Okyar and this emergence happened with the deliberate expectations of Atatürk. This was an artificial oppositional construction which was assumed to maintain the opposition under control. However, the party gained popularity in a couple of months. Many workers and artisans started to support it although the party was supporting the bourgeoisie. When Okyar criticized the tax policy of the

government, the state monopoly on the basic manufacturing goods, he received more public attention and more governmental worry, which led to its liquidation.

During the years of the economic crisis, the RPP, somehow, succeeded in strengthening the bourgeoisie within the dominant classes and obstructing the improvement of the working class. In fact, the acceptance of the 'populism' principle by RPP in 1931 together with other five can be interpreted as a means to prevent class struggle. As Karpat argues, the aim of the RPP while accepting populism principle was to found the unity of the Turkish society and thus the refusal of the class struggle (Karpat 1967: 50). Moreover, the revolution principle meant the revolution or the necessary changes to be made for the sake of capitalism.

In 1923, Workers Associations Union (Amele Dernekleri Birliđi) was established and all the associations that would emerge in many cities were planned to be united but this attempt failed. In 1924 Worker Elevation Association (Amele Teali Cemiyeti) was established, but its executives were arrested and the people from Republican People Party were appointed. However, after the isolation of those from the association in 1927, Worker Elevation Association was closed completely in 1928. In 1924 and 1925, there were important labor movements. Nevertheless, there were many developments to prevent it after 1925.

A very important development, the first forum, İzmir Economic Conference, was organized in 1923 so as to discuss the new economic policies of the newly built republic and some labor organizations took part in the Conference and they asked for the right to establish unions and right to strike. The demands of the workers were mainly based on the economic issues and the worker representatives aimed at the recovery of the harmful situation in the workplaces. Some of the demands, for instance, were the introduction of a workday limited by eight hours, Friday as the day off and a yearly time off after a year of employment in a workplace. Moreover, some suggestions were given in order to strengthen the workers as a class. This meant a powerful identity feeling and those representatives wanted the right to organize. Another important suggestion was the use of the word 'iřçi' instead of the former word, 'amele' which was associated with the muscle power instead of skill.

Actually, there is not such distinction in English. Some other important suggestions were the celebration of the 1st May as the Workers' Day and the need to change Tatil-i Eşgal Law dated 1909 due to its ban on strikes, so the worker representative group expressed the demand for the emergence of unions. As a result, the right to unionize was recognized and to revise the labor laws of the Ottoman Empire was accepted as a future task. Nevertheless, the policies of the state were hostile to labor movement in the following years (Berik and Bilginsoy 1996: 35).

According to Feroz Ahmad, workers played a very important role in the independence struggle and their significant position gave the way to their representation in the February 1923 İzmir Economic Congress. He states that the Kemalists, who wanted to control and supervise the group, appointed secretly one of their supporters, Aka Gündüz, to administer the group instead of a worker representative. Aka Gündüz was someone who had no relation at all with the workers. Moreover, he adds that the workers were divided into two groups as male and female. A woman from İzmir and named Rukiye was arranged to represent the woman workers by the Kemalists. She was not a worker either. Despite all, the workers were able to put forward their program successfully (Ahmad 1998: 130-135).

The workers celebrating the May Day in 1923 marched to the Parliament and repeated the demands that they had already asked for at the İzmir Economic Congress. However, the reaction of the government was to arrest the leaders of this march, forbid some newspapers and abolish Workers Association, Amele Teali Cemiyeti. Afterwards, the government declared the 1st May as the Spring Fest in order to prevent May Day to become the Workers Fest. Until 1976, May Day was not celebrated officially.

The important event in 1923, impeding the foundation of labor organizations, was the arrest of several young people who were caught while distributing declaration forms due to 1st May. They were suggesting the cooperation among the workers. However, they were sent to court because it was claimed that a huge crowd of workers had been preparing to overthrow the government. After 15 days in prison

those 15 people were sent free after the first trial. However, the rumors of torture in prison were deterrent and to form organizations advocating labor movement became an issue requiring courage (Sülker 1968a: 19).

By the end of the twenties, the state revenues increased, which means that the bureaucracy started to have more control on the production of the country after the new sharing period of the crisis. The ones who made profits from the crisis were not only the industry. The bureaucracy also had great part from the profit. As a result, while we observe the emergence of the state capitalism in this period, we can also see the fusion of both, industrial bourgeoisie and bureaucracy.

As a result of the state economy policies, the industrial production increased since those two groups, bureaucracy and industrial bourgeoisie worked in cooperation. There was a heavy political control on the economy. On the other hand, the interests of both groups were common. Therefore, this ruling coalition decreased the income of the workers and peasants by means of tax and pricing policies in order to increase its own profits. Etatism of that period is somehow similar to the 1970's models of the nationalist movements. This model is based on the domination over the working classes and the peasants in order to ensure a rapid increase in the income of powerful groups in the name of setting a national economy.

When the period after the İzmir Economic Congress is researched, weak figures of workers are observed. For instance, the number of the work places employing more than 100 workers was 155 in 1927. 33 of them were performing in the field of mining and 22 of this total 33 were in Zonguldak. The rest, 74 work places were mainly in İstanbul, İzmir, Bursa and Kayseri. 84.4% of the workers performing in the manufacture industry were in mining, forest products and agriculture and textile industries. In the field of industrial product, there was cement, sugar and leather apart from textile.

The economic recession which started in 1928 in the newly established republic became more severe with the effect of 1929 economic crisis. Because of the crisis, the price of the manufactured goods, and especially the agricultural products,

decreased abruptly. The price of the agricultural products, for instance, fell by one third or one fourth. Turkey, an agricultural society, was hit enormously by the crisis. The people who were badly affected by this incident were mainly the ones living in Western Anatolia. The big business which was producing to export and the small companies were the ones who were seriously hit by the price drop. As a result, the income of such groups decreased terribly. On the other hand, the price of the industrial goods did not fall, which affected the peasants significantly. The income of this group became worse than ever before. Furthermore, the income of the state decreased accordingly. In fact, the needs of the state rose abruptly in this period because the possibility of another World War increased the military expenses. Moreover, because of the weaknesses and the failures of the private sector, the requirement for more state investments was the issue.

In 1932 and 1934 there were two draft labor laws. In June 1936 the 3008 Labor Law was accepted. The aim was to arrange the labor relations by organizing labor contracts, disagreements, strikes and lock-outs and so on. However, there was an important problem: this law included a limited group of workplaces because the ones employing less than 10 workers were out of the coverage area of the Labor Law. Furthermore, the workers of the state enterprises and the municipalities were left out. As a conclusion, the Labor Code, which was aiming at planning harmony between the capitalist and labor, appears to be the result of the attempts of the government who was trying to control the work area. In fact, Sabri Tıǧlı, the General Secretary of İstanbul Textile Workers Trade Union and Teksif and a former RPP delegate between 1973 and 1980, remarks the role of a strike in 1936 in the emergence of the concept of a labor law:

In 1936, the government realized that there was not a labor law. In fact, there was not noteworthy industry in Turkey in such years. There was some kind of state industry, but private sector was seriously insignificant. The technicians and some others working at the public sector built the private sector. The Act 3008 was introduced after a strike which had taken place in the 1930's in a textile factory. That was how the government remembered that a labor law was necessary.

During the war years, there was a severe rise in the prices together with the taxes. Besides, basic needs became hard to find, so the black market was widespread. Moreover, the rights of the workers were restricted. All the rights given in 1936 were suspended by the National Protection Law of 1940. A kind of compulsory work was put into effect and vacation right was restricted. It was also accepted that the women and the children could work at any job. Furthermore, the working conditions were made even more difficult with a change in the National Protection Law in 1944.

As a result of the privileges offered to the dominant classes by the state, the suppression and exploitation opportunities increased. Thus, the real wages of the workers decreased abruptly and working conditions became worse. In brief, the war period meant poverty for the working class. The National Protection Law introduced after the war supplied the government with a much broader area of freedom to carry out a war economy. The bourgeoisie class was ready to accept and to perform all these instruments provided by the state.

During the same period, the newspapers were full of news stating the people who were able to make huge amounts of profits due to the war conditions. The single party regime, however, was not able to overcome this problem. In addition to the low income groups, the bureaucrats whose salaries were not capable to catch up with the price increase and the employers who did not have a chance to take advantage of the war conditions started to complain. My opinion is that those huge profits obtained by a small amount of people created a confusion among the public who were in deep poverty and shortage and the state of course was the one to blame for. This responsibility led the government to pull the attention to the non-Muslim minorities who were basically the rich tradesmen of the period. The result was the introduction of a law called Wealth Tax Law (Varlık Vergisi) in 1942. 70 % of the tax was received from İstanbul and 65 % of the collected tax amount came from the non-Muslims and the foreigners living in the country because the tax rate of the non-Muslims was 10 times more than that of the Muslims (Clark, 1972: 69). After a time when the effects of the war were felt soft and the unusual situation was roughly over, the serious impact of this law appeared and the hot debate started about it.

Naturally, the etatist principle of the government also became an important issue to be questioned. Accordingly, the bourgeoisie declared its uncomfortable feelings about the harmful circumstances due to this tax.

This economic decline hit the workers severely because the government's new regulations formed new burdens for them. Since their income went down steadily, the worsening conditions of the peasants and workers became more critical. The poor peasants sold their cattle and lands in order to pay the high taxes and went under the control of the usury. On the other hand, many stores and workshops had to be liquidated because of the poverty of their owners. The situation of the state officers, however, became better when compared with the workers. The reason was the new wage system which was put into effect in 1929 and which increased the income of the officers.

During the period after the 1930's, planned economy period, SEEs occupy a major place in the manufacturing industry. To illustrate, the construction of the state owned factories such as Sümerbank in Malatya, Kayseri, Ereğli, Nazilli and Bursa was in this period. Moreover, there was the emergence of the paper factory in Izmit, iron and steel factory in Karabük, and some others. The national necessities played an important role in the construction site of the factories in terms of military protection (Akalin 2000a: 27). As a result, it is nearly impossible to declare a private industrial realm and the workforce in the private industry. In the subsequent years, a public organization working class, apart from the public and identical with the state officials emerged. According to the citizens having a place out of the inner circle of the state, both groups, working class in the public organizations and factories and the state officials constituted the privileged class. High or low ranked did not matter as their dignity was stemming from their position in the state, which had a completely abstract and unreachable place in the mind of an average individual.

In the second half of the twenties, there were some labor actions such as the strikes of the Soma-Bandırma and Adana Railroad Companies, The İstanbul Dock Company, the İstanbul Trolley Company and Tobacco Company. After the

religious-ethnic rebellions in Eastern Turkey, the Public Order Law was enacted in 1925 and it ended union activity in addition to all political opposition. Later, the Penal Code of 1935, punishments on strikes was imposed and finally according to the 1936 Labour Law, strikes became illegal. The last legal formation was in 1938, when the Law of Associations banned all form of organizations based on social class and thus, abolished all unions.

At the end of the war, the Wealth Tax created a separation between the two dominant classes, the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie. I believe this was a major event leading to the end of the single party era. Another event of the period was that the USSR demanded some of the Turkish territory. The USA, who was making plans about the cold war, started close relations with the Turkish state and decided to initiate a financial and military aid to Turkey. This was a great help for the bureaucracy who had already been in serious trouble. The government declared the need for an opposition party and the elections to be held in 1946.

The expectation of the government was a loyal opposition who could work in cooperation with the government to develop policies conforming to the current world politics. The etatist policy was of course expected to remain powerful although some freedom was planned to be released for the economy. The unexpected result of the elections was a real shock for the bureaucracy particularly. The opposition party was able to get astonishing power even though it had a short period of time to get prepared and organized just before the elections. The RPP was able to remain in power despite the rumors about the fraud in the elections and the opposition party received a small minority in the Parliament.

Between the elections of 1946 and 1950, the suppressive government changed its attitude and showed a much more flexible policy. The government tried to calm things down and eliminate the heavy burden of critics by compromising, by starting new policies and appointing new people to some important positions within the bureaucratic circle. Due to a close relationship with the USA, American experts were asked to prepare the economic plans. In this period, the firm concept of secularism was softened. However, all these attempts were too weak to regain the

space captured by the opposition. Naturally, the new events and circumstances were on the way for the working class who had been living under economic and legislative suppression as a powerless marginal group since the early years of the Republic.

As a summary, in this chapter, a discovery of the labor movement has been made while observing the economic situation during the single party era of the Republic. Moreover, the lack of workers' class consciousness is dealt by discussing the reasons as the etatist and suppressive policies of the state and the developments occurring within the bourgeoisie. As Yavuz states, since the state did not want to share its vast power with any real or potential opposition party, the emergence of a proletarian or bourgeois class identity was very difficult. The reason why even the bourgeoisie was not able to become dominant or autonomous and had to live within 'etatist' ideology is partially this attitude of the state (Yavuz 1998: 175).

In addition, the legal framework regarding the workers' rights are examined in this section. During the period between 1923 and 1945, the state enacted laws and applied policies in order to prevent the establishment of a labor movement. Nonetheless, various labor organizations were noticed and they organized workers politically and started a movement. The conclusion is that since the size of the working class was too small in this period, the actions of such groups were not able to become a mass movement.

CHAPTER THREE

LABOR RELATIONS IN THE MULTI-PARTY ERA UNTIL 1971

3. 1. The Attitude of the RPP and the DP towards the working class

In order to discover the emergence of Türk-İş and its self-understanding after its establishment in 1952, a lot of local and international factors affecting Turkish politics and economy should be examined. Within this perspective, the period after the World War II, especially the change in the international power politics, the wrecked economy of the European countries, the emergence of the U.S.A. as an economic super power and its monetary policies dictating those ruined European states together with the newly independent former dominion states from all over the world are the topics requiring exploration. Another important topic bringing about the emergence of Türk-İş is the new currents of democracy discourse in the political realm of those countries.

In this chapter, many factors leading to the establishment of Türk-İş and influencing its policies will be examined under three headings. First topic to be dealt with is the international arena providing the necessary ground for its establishment. In other words, the emergence of the U.S.A. as a real power in the post-war era and its will to rise the already increased value of the Dollar in addition to its determination to control the workers of the developing countries as Turkey so as to stop the march of communism towards the ruined European countries and the developing countries.

The second topic will be the local experiences as important factors in the emergence of Türk-İş. The emphasis on democracy and democratic regimes in the international arena influenced effectively the newly emerging states and the different groups, especially the intellectual circles of such countries. Thus, the U.S.A. spent great effort balancing between the promotion of democracy and communism. In other

words, its effort to prevent communism was not easy. While promoting democracy in the international sphere, those countries were not left alone since the aim was to attain democracy within the boundaries of the rules set by the U.S.A. This required a severe American control on the working class of those newly emerging states. As a matter of fact, Turkish political developments of the post-war period cannot be examined without considering the role of this super power. In this part of the chapter, the emergence of the DP, the impact of the international democracy discourse on its emergence and the attitude of both, the DP and the RPP, towards the working class after the 1946 elections until the 1960 military coup will be discussed.

The third topic to be discussed in this part of the chapter will be the effects of the 1961 Constitution on the working class and on Türk-İş. The liberal atmosphere and widened democratic, economic and social rights assured by the new Constitution and changes in the self-understanding and attitude of Türk-İş after the enactment of the laws regarding collective agreements, strikes and social security will be focused on intensely. Because of such laws and the broad rights given to the workers, divisions appeared in Türk-İş in that period. Two support groups were born: the supporters of the Justice Party and the Republican Public Party. Moreover, Türk-İş gained power and thus respect of the political parties. As a result, it started to have very close relationships with the political parties. In fact, its policy, ‘non-partisanship politics’ became useless since Türk-İş had already taken invisibly its space in the political arena.

In the previous chapter, the two important periods regarding workers and workers’ movement were examined. The first period was the decade after the establishment of the Republic. During this decade, neither a relatively powerful industry nor a noticeable amount of workers can be observed. The lack of an influential bourgeoisie class and related problems in terms of a working class were also pointed out in the previous chapter. My argument is that the new Republic inherited the economy, thus, the industry of the Ottoman Empire. That is the reason why the working class was not able to flourish. The second period that was investigated starts with the 1929 economic crisis, which hit the whole world severely and

especially the developing countries like Turkey. The negative impact of the crisis on the newly born industry and precisely on the workers has already been discussed in the previous chapter by investigating the developments in the other classes such as the bourgeoisie, the tradesmen, the minorities and the peasants.

Besides those two crucial periods, the situation of the industry and the workers was explored while attributing it to the attitudes of the RPP towards its competitor, the DP before and after the 1946 elections. Köker states that 'to step into a multi-party and democratic life and to change the government peacefully in 1950 is usually accepted an exceptional case in terms of transforming authoritarian regimes to democratic one' (Köker 1990: 213). We notice that the government maintained a conciliatory policy between 1946 and 1950; however, it was too late since the DP had already managed to receive a great support from the society, particularly the bourgeoisie and the peasants. Although the RPP moderated its radical secularity concept, produced new policies, appointed some people to the crucial positions of the state ranks and had American experts prepare the economic programs succeeding the crisis, the opposition, the DP, had already carved its space in the society and its success was inevitable in the 1950 elections.

Between 1946 and 1950, there was a totally new understanding in the Turkish politics: for the first time in its history, a political party emerged and gave the people the right to speak. Although it was a fake right to speak, this was something totally new and impressing for the society. This attitude made the DP appealing to voters. The DP wanted to demonstrate to the public that it was a genuine party; thus, it was not a party under the guidance of the RPP. They wanted to prove their attitude of an independent party by means of their well-known poster showing a raised hand with a palm and stating 'Enough is Enough! It is the Nation's Turn to Speak! Moreover, they blamed the governing party and especially Adnan Menderes claimed that there was little difference between Stalin's regime and that of the RPP in Turkey (Ahmad 1976: 56).

The individual who used to be a sole producer in the single party regime was given the right to speak and even to change the governments and this was the difference of

the DP from the RPP. The DP showed the Turkish people that they were valuable individuals and powerful citizens. Through its high number of local branches and offices, the DP was inside the community, not far from the community. This made it attractive to masses since the public felt for the first time their own representatives should govern, not a party as the RPP, far from the society. By means of such a wide network in the rural communities, they listened to the people who had previously felt left alone, out of the political sphere.

In fact, their appearance to care for the public did not last long. During the first years of its reign, the DP showed its policy which was away from the political liberalism but close to economic liberalism. After coming to power, the DP liberalized foreign trade for most goods which used to be kept under the control of the state. Furthermore, it did its best to eradicate barriers restricting the entrepreneurs. On the other hand, it spent great energy to support large landowners. Actually, the leader of the party, Adnan Menderes, himself was an important landowner himself. Therefore, the DP had a tendency towards the agriculture and the agricultural society was the class that the DP tried to gain votes. The RPP, on the other hand, aimed at minimizing the agricultural society. Thus, it emphasized industrialization of the country. Its goal was a mechanized industry for the new Republic. That is the reason why the DP gained popularity in the rural area because of its populist discourse. However, the RPP gained the support of the people living in the cities and unfortunately this was its main and unique support resource.

The 1950 elections have an exceptional place in the Turkish political history and thus, its effects on classes as bourgeoisie and workers are the main topics of this study. Many changes occurred in economy, politics and in different classes after the elections of 1950. First of all, the politics, which used to be the task of the elites before 1950, went through transformation and the voters started to feel the power of their votes. The opposition gained supremacy by means of two policies, economic liberalism supporting the market against the state intervention and religious liberalism defending traditions against the authoritarian regime of the center. The bourgeoisie was finally able to attract masses.

In that period, the impact of the U.S. based economic policies in the international arena was noticeable. The American effort was the practice of Keynesian policies by means of the Bretton Woods system, which was based on the free circulation of the Dollar by the use of cheap credits and loans. Meanwhile, the ruined European states after the World War II together with the countries who had just gained their freedom were under heavy industrialization process. Due to the empowerment period of the U.S. economy, the world was going to a stage of Americanization. The party in power in Turkey, the DP, emerged as a result of its sensibility to such American policies. The RPP, on the other hand, was totally against the American aid and it promoted a balanced budget and an economy not depending on credits and loans. It was the supporter of an economy guided by the state while the DP was stressing a new group constituted by the rich.

The DP gained popularity among the rural communities and the immigrant groups of the rural area. The party even promised to create one rich person in each district and to form a small U.S. in the country. At this point the question is ‘what kind of bourgeoisie was formed by those migrants?’ Those were the people who were expecting an opportunity, a miracle, to become rich all of a sudden and thus running after the prospects of gaining economic power. Their hope was the DP. Those were the supporters of the DP unlike the ones for the RPP who had failed to organize the peasants. Consequently, the policies of the DP were closely similar to those of the newly emerging Keynesian policies.

The migration of huge numbers from villages into towns and cities accelerated in the 1950’s. One reason was the increasing mechanization of agriculture. Meanwhile, the DP gave priority to the construction of highways across the country, so they built as many as they could especially in the western Anatolia. Since there was no difficulty in the flow of people and economic goods any longer, an ordinary citizen felt that the fortresses around the cities were destroyed and the cities, which had been under the domination of bureaucratic elites previously, became reachable and habitable for them. This was another prominent difference of the DP.

On the other hand, although Turkey was in the multi-party era, the democratic regime was not a part of the political life with its institutions as the trade unions. Instead of such organizations, religious orders, extended families and local area networks served as a place of refuge and satisfied the needs of those who were moving into towns in great numbers. Unfortunately, people found an entry into jobs and political arena through these networks, which formed an awkward closeness between the newcomers and power holders. This caused an immense weakness of democracy in Turkey and it is still the case. Since the DP rule, the attitude has been that instead of the institutions, the network of people has played a major role in politics. Unfortunately, Turkey has not been able to go through that stage and reach a high level of democracy in this sense. The relations have been in a sense of patron-client relations, votes are given for a variety of favors. In addition, during the DP rule, corruption became heavily widespread, which caused later a public deterrence from that party.

When the workers of the period after 1946 are examined, it is possible to observe that those were the ones who migrated to the cities, kept their land ownership links with the rural area and thus who were not totally expropriated. In fact, they bought new lands in their home villages. Their connection with their native lands prevented them from developing a sense of class.

Before exploring the issues related to the workers' situation in the period after the 1950 elections, a discovery of the main economic events of the period between 1945 and 1950 is necessary to be dealt by referring to the external factors stemming from the relations of the country with the major powers such as the U.S.A., Britain, Germany and Russia since such events had a noticeable impact on the workers' movement. While discussing the main events, the topics as the foreign debts of Turkey related to its imports and exports will be dealt with by investigating import substitution policy during that period. The next issue to be discussed is the foreign relations of Turkey, especially the shift from Germany to the United States and England.

In order to understand the shift from Germany to the U.S.A., to touch upon the growing foreign debts of Turkey during the Second World War is necessary. In addition, a discovery of the balance of payments is crucial. In that period, the imported products of Turkey depended on the external factors. The supply of the imported products of the country decreased seriously. In addition, the export products of Turkey were already an issue of severe competition among the powerful countries. Since the import of the machinery and the raw materials decreased substantially, the industrial production was hurt severely. The low value of the foreign currency led to a serious increase in the profits of the tradesmen selling foreign products. On the other hand, the foreign trade between Turkey and England and the United States grew bigger. For instance, the foreign trade of Turkey with the U.S.A., which was 14% in 1940, increases to 44% in 1945 (Tezel 1982a: 184). Moreover, between 1945 and 1950, the proportion of the trade with the U.S.A. constituted 25% of the imports and 23% of the exports (Tezel 1982b: 187).

Table 1: Percentage of the Export Value of Turkey with important countries between 1924 and 1945

	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>England</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
	<u>Austria</u>					
	%	%	%	%	%	%
1924	13	22	15	12	10	1
1930	14	21	9	12	12	5
1935	43	10	5	3	10	4
1940	9	16	10	6	14	1
1945	-	0	23	1	44	-

Source: From State Statistics Institute Foreign Trade Publications in Tezel, 1982, p. 168.

In 1942, after the death of Refik Saydam, a change in the economic policies of Turkey occurred. The government's attitude towards the wealthy class became more lenient. The new government built by Saraçoğlu faced with the highest inflation rate that the country had ever seen. Despite the severely high inflation rate and the price increase in the imported products, the new government did not increase the rate of the customs taxes. Although the government faced with many difficulties while trying to cover the budget deficit, a rise in the customs tax was not an alternative. This means that the government had an extremely tolerant attitude towards the tradesmen. The economic policies of the period between 1940 and 1942 show the power loss of the bureaucracy. Moreover, it has been found out that the workers were totally out of the inner circle of the state apparatus in those years.

The collapse of Germany affected the foreign trade of Turkey since Germany had an important role in the Turkish foreign trade. In addition, the tendency towards the USA due to its financial aid and food support led to a higher tendency towards that country and the result was increasing pressure for a liberal foreign trade. Therefore, as a result of the liberal import policy and low valued foreign currency policy, the industry was able to display a change towards development. However, since the economic policy of the government depended on the reserves of the state and foreign credits, especially the USA, more than necessary, it is argued that it was an imprudent policy. For instance, the reserves were about 235 tones of gold despite the war in 1945 and a big majority was used between 1946 and 1950 in order to cover the trade deficits. As a result, the reserves were about 102 tones of gold in 1950.

Table 2: Increase in the foreign debts between the years 1907 and 1950 and the ratio between the foreign deficit and the total resources.

	Gross National Product (Million TL)	Foreign Deficit (Million TL)	Foreign Deficit/ Total Resources Ratio % (1)
1913	163	11	6.2
1926	1649	54	3.2
1927	1473	42	2.8
1928	1634	25	1.5
1929	2071	119	5.4
1930	1579	- 3	-0.2
1932	1170	- 3	-0.3
1933	1141	-17	-1.5
1947	7539	150	2.0
1949	9042	366	3.9
1950	9683	227	2.3

Source: Tezel, 1982: 190 (1) Minus sign shows that there was foreign surplus

The table demonstrates clearly the huge foreign debt left from the Ottoman Empire and the achievement of the newly built Republic since there was a gradual decrease until 1929. However, between 1930 and 1933, the government was very successful in dropping it despite the world economic crisis. During the multi-party era, on the other hand, the foreign deficit increases and this will lead to economic crises affecting the industry and workers badly.

In order to solve the foreign debt problems of the developing countries, Bretton Woods system and Keynesian policies were put into effect. The results of this system and Keynesian policies in the international arena were the most influential

elements of the foreign debts of the developing countries in that period. The Keynesian notion of governmental regulation of the economy led the public to blame the government for whatever went wrong in the economy. On many levels of public opinion, there was disenchantment with the lack of moral focus in government, and the corruption of the political process through tax breaks and subsidies. Briefly, Keynes was for a system of macroeconomics that would permit the regulation of the economy such that massive unemployment would be a problem. Turkish state was influenced by the Keynesian approach: efforts to attain full employment. In order to achieve full employment, a regulation of the labor market was necessary. That was the reason why Employment Association (İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu had already been built). Moreover, the key was to unlock non-productive savings either through regulatory schemes, or by substituting government spending on public goods, paid for through borrowing and taxation until prosperity itself would right the balance. His legacy managed economy dominated politics of the 50's, 60's and 70's.

After the Second World War, the USA gained substantial power in terms of the economic relations between center and periphery. Of course, this had an enormous influence on the foreign trade relationship of Turkey and its foreign trade. The USA became the primary shareholder in the foreign trade of Turkey. The effects of this close connection with the USA on the industrial development and workers are the main concern to be discussed in this chapter.

The foreign trade policy of Turkey after the war relied mostly on the reserves of the country and credit expectations from the western world. Liberal trade experiment of the period emerged mostly from the foreign pressure and did not last long. Between 1945 and 1950 the biggest share in the foreign trade belonged to the U.S.A. The second share was Britain's: 18% of the imports and 15% of the exports. The share of Germany was very low. The imports fell to a 5% and the exports to a 9%. However, in 1950 the imports rose to 20% and the exports to 25% (Tezel 1982b: 187). As a result, Germany had a major effect on Turkish foreign debts, thus on the economy of the country in the following years.

Another important topic to be discussed about the foreign relations of Turkey is the foreign capital. During the single party period, there was a foreign economic policy emphasizing minimum use of foreign resources. The government wanted to survive independently; thus, by not relying on foreign supplies and credits. In fact, there were two major periods that the foreign world was unable to deal with the countries as Turkey: 1929 economic crisis and the Second World War. Naturally, the Turkish government had to stress étatism within the industrialization process. Whether the government was for or against the foreign capital is a debated issue discussed by many researchers. Furthermore, between 1923 and 1950, a nationalization process can be observed. The Turkish government nationalized 24 foreign enterprises. A huge amount of it was in the field of railways, ports and municipal services. This was the evidence that the government was against foreign capital.

The similar protective measures can be observed in the same period. The state was the main regulator of the working conditions. As Makal states 'although this was the end of the single party era, the state spent great effort to maintain its role in the labor relations within its own traditional authoritative attitude. Its will to restrict the autonomy of both parties within the labor relations while giving them some kind of freedom remained the same in that period also (Makal 1999: 468). As expected, the state aimed at founding limited trade unionism kept under the authority of the state itself.

What was going on in the international areas in that period? The shift from England to the U.S.A. in the foreign policy after the 1940's was mainly due to the attitude of the Soviet Unions who wanted to obtain some territory in the Black Sea region and Eastern Turkey together with unacceptable demands on the straits of İstanbul and Çanakkale. Moreover, when the Soviet Unions invaded the North of Iran in 1941, the discomfort of the Turkish government rose. The most striking crisis in the relations with this country was in 1945 when the Soviets asked for the two Turkish cities, Kars and Ardahan. In addition, they wanted to build Soviet bases in two straits, İstanbul and Çanakkale. Those demands were repeatedly raised in the Potsdam Conference. The result was the immense worry of the Turkish government about the Soviets' attitude between 1945 and 1946 and the inclination towards the

U.S.A. The assault of the Soviets appeared as a great threat to the Turkish government and so did the regime of the Soviets. With the onset of the warm relations with the U.S.A., Turkish governments of the multi-party era also were worried about the Soviets and their regime, communism. For instance, İbrahim Yalçınoğlu, the General Director of Teksif and one of the five members who were present in the establishment of Türk-İş in 1952, remembers the days of the first years:

There was not job security in those years. There were not laws and regulations protecting the unionists. That was how those unionists struggled. There were very tough conditions. The struggle was not done in calm and peaceful atmosphere. No, people were fired. For example, I have a memory. I saw a calendar one day in 1956. It told me the days off during the whole year. Then, why don't you give those days off? Why do you make the workers work on such days? People accused me to be a communist but this is nonsense, this is not true at all!

The shape of the relations of Turkey with the U.S.S.R. and the shift towards its competitors are important characteristics of the Cold War period. Furthermore, the fear from communism was the dominant political concern. That is the reason why it is necessary to explore the foreign relations of Turkey in that period. In order to discover the attitudes of the Turkish workers and the impulses behind the emergence of Türk-İş, the foreign trade, foreign debts and foreign relations of Turkey in that period are worth discussing.

The shift of Turkey from the Soviets to the U.S.A. in the foreign policy had great economic, social and political impact on the country. The wealthy classes who appeared after the war and who gained power in the following years were happy with this foreign policy shift. The new political system, multi-party period started in those years, in 1946. Moreover, the liberal economic policy of the opposition party, the DP, was similar to the policy supported by those wealthy classes since they wanted more relationships with the foreign capitalist classes. In fact, the government also changed its policy after the war and emphasized foreign credits and investments. After the 1950's, Turkey received a great amount of American credit and investment since it had already built warm relations with the U.S.A.

First important event to be raised while discussing the relations of the country with the U.S. in that period is the visit of the American battleship, Missouri, in 1946 to Turkey. This was a demonstration of the American power against the Soviets who had been threatening Turkey for years. The speech of the President Truman when Missouri boarded İstanbul port is valuable in order to show the Turkish and Middle Eastern policy of the U.S.A.:

When we look at Near East and Middle East, we observe a region with critical events. There are ample resources in that region. The mostly used air, land and sea transport passes through this region. That is the reason why it has great economic and strategic importance. However, no country in that region is powerful enough to resist any threat by themselves alone or by uniting with the others in their neighborhood.

In this sense, it is possible to foresee that this is an area of challenge among the big and powerful countries and this challenge may lead to confrontation.

The United Nations has the right to defend the Near Eastern and Middle Eastern countries' sovereignty and territorial unity in any case(Ulman 1961a:75).

The words of the President show that he wants the protection of the U.N. for that region, not the intervention of the U.S.A. yet in order to restore peace. There was no doubt that this speech was a clear warning against the Soviets and it was accepted happily by the Turkish press (Ulman 1961b: 76). Turkish government of 1946 had to deal with a major problem after the war: keep its army staff in a satisfactory number while modernizing its industry and opening new work areas. The government needed financial assistance and the speech of Truman was happily received by the government and the public. Later in 1947, a message of Truman for the Senate and the Parliament demonstrated the new American foreign policy, and it was known as Truman doctrine. He suggested a 400-million-dollar aid for two countries, Turkey and Greece. Nevertheless, the share of Turkey was only 100 million dollars. Adnan Başaran, a former leader of Demiryol-İş, comments on that period when the U.S.A. provided aid and started warm relations with Turkey. He adds his opinion on the American implicit interference before and after the establishment of Türk-İş:

This was a process which started with the American Marshall aid in 1947. We had to pass onto a new stage, multi-party democracy. This can be an American advice: since there are trade unions in a democratic regime, we must build them. At that time, this circular saying that they started the emergence process of unions was sent to the governors by the Interior Ministry. The governors sent that circular to the institutions as we call State Economic Enterprises today. That was how our union, which used to be called Railway Workshop, was built in 1950. However, who are the founders? Since this was something realized by the governor, they were the employers as warehouse managers and assistant warehouse managers together with the officers. They took a few workers also. Before the emergence of such unions in 1950, the general idea about a worker was an ill-minded person who can harm Turkey if he is left free. This was the individual who can mess up. For instance, there used to be steam engine locomotives in that period, and there were squares for the locomotive workshops. They used to accumulate tons of coal there. If a locomotive was going from İstanbul to Ankara, it used to be filled with coal in those squares. The workers used to be brought under firm control on 1st of May. In fact, police and army officials used to come in huge numbers in order to protect those squares filled with coal from us. They used to think that the workers could harm on Labor Day. Those were weird things of course. Our friends who did not come to work on Labor Day used to be taken, investigated and interrogated.

Another reflection of the foreign dynamics is the lift on the ban to form organizations based on classes in 1946. The RPP gave more and more importance on the organization of the workers after the ratification of the 5018 Law on Workers' and Employers' Trade Unions and Confederations in 1947. As Yıldırım Koç remarks, "Turkish Republican State tried to shape and direct unionization movement and the U.S.A. tried to influence it" (Koç 2003: 80). In addition, the declaration of Sabri Tıǧlı, former General Secretary of Teksif, and İsmail Özkan from Basın-İş give evidence to the efforts of the RPP to build a confederation:

Three people from the RPP were assigned to deal with the establishment of a confederation because the trade unions were perceived as adventurous bodies. The goal was not to let them invaded by outsiders. Those three people were Sabahattin Selek, Dr. Vebi Barkın and Ali Rıza Arı who became a parliament member later. They were all from RPP and they started to come to our working areas after 1947.

In the global level, the International Labor Organization, built in 1919, accepted a reforming act in 1944. It was the Goals and Aims Declaration of the International

Labor Organization, also known as Philadelphia Declaration stating that ‘labor is not a commodity and the inevitable condition of the sustainable improvement is freedom of thought and organization’. In addition, in 1948, the ‘Agreement on Unionization Liberty and Protection of Right to Unionize’ (Agreement number 87) was accepted by the ILO. This was a very important arrangement since it was the first aiming at saving the independent use of the right to unionize for the employers and workers against the state. As it is possible to observe, the period after the war went through numerous changes and Turkey was influenced from such happenings of the foreign world

For instance, NATO was founded in 1949 and it was a new period during which the American foreign policy was changing totally: an enormous effort to control the Near East and the Middle East. Those were the years when Turkey found itself in very close relationship with the U.S.A. The importance of the focus on that topic is deeply related to the emergence of Türk-İş since there have always been rumors that the U.S. government had an influence in its emergence.

For instance, İsmail Özkan, the General Director of Basın-İş and Türk-İş Board member, states:

I do not remember but I heard that the invitations of the Americans started after 1950 and continued until 1973. I could not go after that year. None of the unionists were influenced by the Americans. They did not like the trade unionism of the U.S.A. because it is not suitable to ours. They have federative system, but we had a tendency towards nationalist type trade unionism. In fact, trade unionism in the U.S.A. is totally different than ours. While the total membership of the trade unions is 1 million in Turkey, it is 3 million only for the metal workers in the U.S.A.

On the other hand, when the interior affairs of Turkey are researched, a power shift and a separation of the bourgeoisie from the bureaucracy can be observed after war period. The bourgeoisie felt itself powerful enough to separate from the bureaucracy after gaining political control with the help of the bureaucracy. Moreover, it strengthened itself after the war by taking advantage of the economic situation due

to the war. The importance of the issue is whether this capital accumulation led to the industrialization or not. This is a turning point for the people who want to investigate the workers' situation and the workers' movement in the Turkish Republic. Then the main question is that 'what made the opposition so powerful against the RPP?'. The most reasonable answer is that the opposition's promises to get rid of state monopolies and heavy taxes of the government from all sections of the society were the main means to obtain the support of masses. Furthermore, people voting for the DP knew that the market economy would bring a new economic sphere in which there would be economic opportunities. Their promise was to launch liberal economy by which they implied freely competing suppliers; thus, no bureaucratic intervention at all. This made the DP appealing to masses that had been under heavy control of the RPP for decades.

The percentage of the population living in capitalist production conditions was very low in that period. The population of the country was around twenty million and the peasants constituted 80 % of it. The RPP did not succeed in penetrating this important part of the society. During such years, the most common sort of work in the cities was self-employment. 37% of the workers were either self-employed or were working in their family business. According to the employers' claim, the number of waged workers was almost 400.000 (Tezel 1982c: 168). Then the question to be answered is that 'was there a big proportion of the population to join the bourgeoisie?'. My answer is a positive one since most of the agricultural and industrial producers were small businessmen, they were eagerly waiting for a liberal market. In addition to their reaction against bureaucracy, they had already made profit before 1950 and they aimed at increasing it steadily.

As a summary, after the 2nd World War, the change in the international power relations influenced Turkey and thus the Turkish working class. A tendency towards the U.S.A. may have led to the intervention of that great power into the establishment of a workers' confederation. Another important factor leading to the emergence of Türk-İş is an internal one, a change in the political system in Turkey in 1946 and the onset of the DP rule after the 1950 elections. A good number of trade unions were founded after the 1946 elections with the introduction of the 5018

Workers' and Employers' Trade Unions and Confederations Law in 1947 and their number increased rapidly. According to Bayram Meral, the former General Director of Türk-İş, the part of the state enterprises had been important since the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. He stresses that traditionally, this role of the public sector was significant in the trade unionism after 1946:

During the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, most of the industrial investments which were able to emerge were established by the state. Consequently, the first important unions were in the public sector after 1946. By 1950, most of the workers were at the public sector. Before the 1961 Constitution which provided the right to strike, the support of the trade unions was the workers of the state factories (Meral 1986: 7).

In short, the attitude of both political parties seemed vote oriented. The war affected the families seriously. Between 1939 and 1946, many men, head of the families, were taken into military and the families left without an income, so a severe economic misery hurt the workers' families. The income distribution became worse and the workers' economic situation became impossible to repair. In addition to this expropriation, the worsening working and living conditions resulted in a high determination of the workers to get organized under a bigger institution in the following years. Within this picture of the after war years, both the RPP and the DP changed their attitude towards the workers and carried out policies to appear attractive to the working class. While the RPP was trying to organize them under its control, the DP was promising a better income and better rights for them. The result was the emergence of Türk-İş.

In the international arena, the most important factor leading to the emergence of Türk-İş was the popularity of the Keynesian policies after the cold war. Naturally, the American influence to rule the developing countries as Turkey together with the newly established former colonial states was undeniable. Its dominance by means of the spread of the Bretton Woods system via IMF and World Bank was observable in Turkey since one of the main components of this system was the control over the working class. Therefore, Türk-İş was born by such initiatives complying with the waves of the Keynesian economic system enforced worldwide by the U.S.A.

3.2 The Emergence of Türk-İş and its Self-Understanding

Türk-İş was founded in 1952 as a complex product of many external and internal factors and developments (Koç 1986b: 16). It was in Ankara on 31 July 1952. In the previous section of this chapter, such factors were discussed intensively. However, similar effects and developments will be debated in this section together with some additional events by referring to the interviews made with former Türk-İş executives. Before the 1946 elections, noticeable efforts of the RPP to gain the support of the workers and to challenge against the DP, its competitor, were obvious. First, in June 1945 Labor Ministry was formed. Then in June 1945 again, the 4772 Work Accidents, Work Illnesses and Motherhood Insurance Law was accepted. In addition, Employment Association (İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu) was built in 1946. The most important of all was the revolutionary change in some articles of the Associations Law by lifting the ban on the foundation of associations based on class. Nevertheless, when this broad freedom environment due to this change in law and the possibility of the associations to get out of control were realized, the 5018 Workers' and Employers' Trade Unions and Confederations Law was accepted in 1947. The RPP was aware of the fact that it needed the support of the workers but the concessions given were too large and they should be tailored. The Labor Minister Sadi Irmak justifies the enactment of the 5018:

This law was introduced in order to protect the Turkish workers, who have a nationalist consciousness and independence ideals, from the harmful tendencies and to keep those associations away from any kind of political currents since their mission is to serve the work profits. The final goal is to provide those associations with better equipments to increase cooperation among those associations which are beneficial to the national and professional interests (Koç 1998a: 42).

As it is stated before, there was an increase in the number of trade unions after the 5018 Law in 1947. Kemal Sülker declares that “there was a sharp rise in their number. In 1948, 73 workers' trade union, 4 employers' trade union and 1 workers' trade union association were founded” (Sülker 1955a:103).

In fact, Sadık Şide, a well-known unionist, former general secretary of Türk-İş and former Social Security Minister after the 1980 military coup, claims that those were all some kind of sick bodied people who could never be able to recover. The reason was the inadequacy of the legal regulations. Furthermore, the political parties' authoritarian attitude led those unions to be in a flirting situation with them. In fact, some workers' organizations became the territory of the political parties; therefore, most of them were far away to protect workers' rights and profits. Moreover, some severe challenge among the unions was making them even weaker (Şide 2004a: 29). During the interview he underlined that there had been an obvious separation of the two political groups in Türk-İş, which had happened mostly after the 50's when the DP had come to power. He also added that both parties had spent great effort to share the workers.

Another member of Türk-İş, Ömer Sönmez, former General Secretary of Demiryol-İş, agrees with Şide:

When I came to the railway company in 1946, the multi-party system had just been founded. With its onset, a half page Trade Union Law was introduced. It was not even one whole page. However, this led to the launch of the trade unions. In fact, I can't say that it was beneficial to the workers because it did not have a power. If the state and the officials had helped the unions, those organizations could have done more. We had only kept the door of the trade union open to show that there had been a union until 1963, that's it!.

Before 1950, most of the workers were employed by the state. The most important state institutions of those years were the work places of Sümerbank, Etibank, Sugar Plants (Şeker Fabrikaları), Tekel, TSR (Turkish State Railways) and Defense Ministry. The state who was traditionally authoritarian and dominant was the extremely powerful employer of the period. On the other hand, the private sector was incomparably small and weak. This meant that it was difficult for the workers to get organized and unionized as the workers were highly employed within the paternal structure of the state providing them better supplies as housing and so on. One major weakness of the trade unions of that period was that they were all

gathered under small groups. Adnan Bařaran from Demiryol-İř explains this divided appearance of the trade unions regretfully:

It was easy to divide the trade unions. Each party called people conforming to its own views by telling that they were excellent people for the establishment of the union. They promised better rights compared with other unions. Therefore, Turkish trade unionism had already been divided at the establishment. Worker Unions Association was founded in İstanbul in 1948. I remember a debate session in 1950. I remember that one unionist alleged that there was heavy unemployment in the country. Right away, another unionist raised his hand and claimed that this was not true. He argued that there was feeble unemployment only. Such disagreements started those days and they still exist today. Trade union movement had already been divided in those days. We kept saying everywhere that those divergences would harm us instead of helping us. Unfortunately, this is the fate of Turkey I think. We could not change it much.

Meanwhile, the increase in the leftist tendencies worried the government of the RPP after 1946. The first step taken was the martial law declaration to avoid such communist movements. Another one is the foundation of trade unions under the guidance of the RPP which was still in power. For instance, İsmail Özkan, the General Director of Basın-İř stresses:

I used to be an executive committee member of the Press Advertising Institution. This is an organization that gives advertisements to all the newspapers in Turkey. The founder of this organization is Sabahattin Selek who established it in 1961. He resigned from the army when he was a lieutenant and he is the writer of the 'Anatolian Revolution'. I have heard that in 1949, the leader of the RPP, İnönü, gave him the duty to unionize the workers.

In fact, we notice a great number of emerging trade unions in the late 1940's. This increasing number of the unions could have worried the government and might have led to the emergence of Türk-İř as a uniting force to keep such small unions under the authority of a confederation. While discussing the establishment of Türk-İř, Yalçınođlu, the General Director of Teksif, underlines the important role of the state and maintains that there was a movement within the workers who wanted to be united in an organization because it was almost impossible to get a pay raise. It was only through one means: court-house. There was trade union but the right to strike

did not exist. The RPP limited the yearly membership due that the trade unions could demand from their members. In fact, this limited amount of money was not easy to collect, so the party supported financial aid to them in order to set up more control. Besides, the fines gathered in the Labor Ministry were distributed to the trade unions. The memories of İbrahim Yalçinoğlu seem to approve this illegal procedure as he declares:

Trade union membership rate was 100% but when the day to get the salaries came, nobody volunteered to give the union membership fees. Türk-İş needed financial aid and was not able to find it. The fines collected from the workers when they break a machine or for any other reason used to be gathered in a fund in the Labor Ministry and then it was sent to Türk-İş. This was not a legal procedure but it has strengthened Türk-İş.

The justification of Yalçinoğlu is that this illegal procedure was vital so as to help Türk-İş to survive. Since there was not a check off system to cut automatically the union membership fee from the salary of the workers, they were not willing to pay it. Türk-İş, on the other hand, had some expenses and some money was given to the confederation, Türk-İş, and even to some federations. He argues that he has heard that the whole money transfer from the fund was done by the will of the Labor Minister.

According to Koç, the total of the money distributed to the trade unions in İstanbul between 7 March 1947 and 28 November 1949 was 19 600 Turkish Liras (Koç 1986c: 27). Another policy of the RPP to prevent trade unionists was to include them in the inner circle of the party, in other words, to make them parliamentarians. The DP was also interested in trade unions after the 1946 elections. There was an increase in the number of workers attracted by the DP. The result was a high competition between the two parties so as to profit from the votes of this working class who was increasing in number.

However, despite their growth in quantity, the workers were unable to solve the problems such and increase in their salary. They did not a chance for collective

bargaining. Sedat Ağralı, a journalist and the General Director of TGS (Turkish Journalists Union) between 1966 and 1967, underlines the importance of the issue:

There were disagreements at work. This is very important. The Act 5018 was put into effect, but when both parties, workers and employers, could not reach an agreement, there occurred the problem. They had to go to the High Arbitration Committee, from which a final decision could be reached in a very long period as one year or even three years. There was not the Collective Agreement Law at the time. One day, I stood up and claimed that this was a very long process and the pay raise was starting from the day of the decision, so this had to start from the day I sat at the bargaining table. When I said this at the work council, the employers got very angry and argued that this was too much. I mean the disagreements at work were difficult to solve and it used to take long years to end them.

Between 1951 and 1952, there was a sharp increase in the number of trade unions and federations. For instance, while the number of federations was 1 in 1948 and 3 in 1950, it became 8 in 1951 and 16 in 1952 (Tuna 1964: 33). These figures show that a tendency towards a wider institution, in other words, towards a confederation, had already started and this will play an important role in the establishment of Türk-İş. Although there are many rumors that the U.S.A. made it possible its establishment, trade unionists that have been interviewed during this study and some writers as Koç disagrees with this idea. He argues that “Türk-İş is the natural result of the unification process of the trade unions born and expanded between 1946 and 1952; it is the first organization including almost all the work areas throughout the country in its history. Need to form a central structure has increased due to the rise in the unionist organization” (Koç 1998b: 54).

However, according to Feroz Ahmad, ‘the government encouraged the apolitical trend among the workers by having the unions organized under the supervision of American experts. The workers of the 1950’s failed to win any significant rights (essentially the right to strike and to bargain collectively) not because they were ignorant and lacked consciousness (as most claim) but because the two parties had tacitly agreed not to make concessions to the workers’. Unfortunately, the political aspirations of those workers were divided into two major parties who had already motivated the workers towards the concept that they should have no affiliations with

any political party (as they did in Britain) instead (as in the US) they should lobby and bargain for economic concessions with the party in power (Ahmad 1994:142). While discussing the role of the U.S.A. in the establishment of Türk-İş and its impact on the trade union movement, one of the unionists, Yalçınoğlu, stated:

By means of the Regional Labor Managements of the state, education was done in the trade union movement. I joined most of these seminars organized and financed by the state. This is the reality! Many Americans and academicians from İstanbul came to Malatya to educate us. Those were not American unionists. Those were the state officials from their Labor Ministry. During the seminars, they told us that there should be unions and right to strike. First unions in many industry branches were founded and finally Türk-İş was born in the Sümerbank workers' union building in Bursa. This building is still ours. We are also the founding member of Türk-İş.

Under this topic, a brief observation of the external dynamics playing serious role is necessary. The most important role was the impact of the Cold War during which the trade unions which are members of the ICFTU in Europe and the AFL in the U.S.A. were under the influence of anti-communist political currents. People who have been thought to be communists were evacuated. The chief role of the ICFTU unions was defined: the anti-communist struggle. In a congress of the ICFTU in July 1951, the decision of influencing the unionism especially in the developing countries to fight against communism was taken. In addition, it allocated \$700.000 to spend in a period of three years (Kocher 1951: 38). The argument of Adnan Başaran, a former leader of Demiryol-İş, supports the political struggle against communism in the 1950's and 1960's after the establishment of Türk-İş:

As a group we chose social democracy. There used to be worker committees within the RPP, where we worked for a while. There was severe fanaticism then. You could not even wear a red tie because a person wearing a red tie meant this person could disseminate communism. We could not dare to pronounce the word 'social' between 1955 and 1965. Who was fighting against this? Our friends from the trade unions, the ones we were struggling together. For instance, let's say the trade union in Sivas was a rightist union working for the party and they used to see you like this as if wearing a red tie was an offense or was a part of communism.

Before the emergence of Türk-İş, the AFL spent great effort so as to gather the trade unions built after 1946 under a wider organization, a confederation which could control and rule them. In 1951 some trade unionists were invited to the USA and their expenses were paid by the AFL. The first warm relations with the ICFTU were quitted in time when a closer contact was established with the AFL. The result was more supremacy of the American unions and unionists and less impact of European labor class unions. On the other hand, it seems like the Soviets also were interested in the events happening in trade unions in Turkey and spent effort to be in touch despite the widespread fear of communism in the country and the effects of the Cold War were on the international stage. Avni Erakalın, the founder and first leader of Workers' Party of Turkey (WPT), illustrates the case:

After the Saraçhane meeting in 1961, we were having a press meeting. A man with blond hair and blue eyes showed up. He was a reporter from Pravda. He was speaking Turkish with a different accent. He asked us our goal. I answered him that we aimed at building a workers' party in Turkey.

After investigating the internal and external situation and the political currents of the period before the establishment of Türk-İş, it is possible to claim that Türk-İş was born due to the reaction of the workers against poverty and difficult working conditions together with the efforts spent by the government and the opposition to attract the votes of the workers. The intervention of the U.S.A. accelerated the process. Many writers as Şide and Koç, who have worked at the high ranks of Türk-İş, touch upon the arrival of Irwing Brown, General Director of the AFL-CIO, in Turkey. However, there is a disagreement on the issue of the mission of Türk-İş. While Şide believes that Brown's arrival was an important event with regards to the links with the West and Western type of unionism during the establishment of Türk-İş, Koç claims that this created the easy means to put Turkish trade unionism under the control of the AFL, thus the American authority. Nonetheless, he also announces that it was not the Americans who had the Turkish unionist and state official build Türk-İş because the U.S.A. did not have the power to influence the public developments in Turkey in those years and the break down of the American trade union movement leading to the separation of the AFL and CIO was limiting the

opportunities to influence. He also declares that Irving Brown was known to be the CIA spy but his several meetings and the visit of several unionists to the U.S.A. were not very powerful developments leading to the emergence of Türk-İş (Koç 1998c; 54-55).

Unlike Koç, Şide believes that the demand to build a confederation was intense and they offered it continuously. One important movement was the efforts of the textile workers from all over Turkey to build a professional federation. He argues that the workers and the trade union high ranked officials of this branch of industry were talking as the representatives of the all Turkish workers and unionists. Therefore, his claim is that ‘this was the reason why they wanted to prevent such misunderstanding and construct a body within which Turkish workers could be gathered and this high institution could make decisions, speak up, lead collective bargaining, sign collective contracts in addition to protecting working class against political parties and following the workers’ movement abroad to provide new offers to the workers (Şide 2004b: 32-33). The argument of Yalçınoğlu supports Şide while he was talking about the establishment days of Türk-İş. He declares:

It was totally an amateur establishment. Unlike today, it was very peaceful and there was not any challenge. Nobody had any financial expectations. We used to collect money from our friends to send unionists from Malatya. I was a very young unionist at the time. There was a real cooperation. Our friends used to give us very little money. Once it was all finished and we got back. Some friends who had to stay more told me that they, 11 people, had spent the night in one single hotel room.

Finally, Türk-İş was established on 6 April 1952 in Bursa. The first temporary executing committee had 5 members, some of whom will be the general secretaries and directors in the following years. It included:

Ömer Akçakanat: General Director

Şaban Yıldız: General Secretary

Seyfi Demirsoy: Accountant

Mehmet İnhanlı: Controller

Adil Boğakaptan: Member

İbrahim Yalçınoğlu

As one of the five members of the first executing committee of Türk-İş, İbrahim Yalçınoğlu, claims that Türk-İş movement started in Malatya in 1951, before which unionism was done by means of Labor Ministry. He maintains:

In 1951 there were labor representatives only in the factories and trade union movement started after that year. There is a close relationship between textile workers and Türk-İş since its emergence stems from the textile factories. The workers of Sümerbank have the biggest share and so does the textile workers. For instance, in Malatya, Kayseri, Nazilli, Bursa and İstanbul, the Sümerbank textile workers are important in terms of their number and financial power. That is the reason why it also built some other branches of industry as sugar, iron and steel and cement. In other words, it contributed to the development of other industry branches besides its own serious share in the economy. In 1950, when the workers' army was getting into the world of workplace, singles' guest houses where the workers of Sümerbank used to live and work were founded. The 1950 elections showed the public that if there are elections there can be trade union movement.

The name of the confederation, Türk-İş, was suggested by Kemal Sülker who used to be a journalist during this meeting. Türk-İş was officially built on 31 July 1952. The first general meeting of Türk-İş was held in İzmir in the Fair Casino (a recreation place) on 6 September 1952 and the founding unions are given below:

1. Ankara Trade Unions Federation
2. Bursa Trade Unions Association
3. Eskişehir, Sakarya Region Trade Unions Federation
4. Adana Southern Region Trade Unions Federation
5. İstanbul Trade Unions Association
6. İzmir Trade Unions Association

7. Black Sea Region Trade Unions Federation
8. Turkish Transportation Workers' Federation
9. Toleyiş, Hotel, Restaurant and Entertainment Workers' Federation
10. Teksif, Textile and Weaving Industry Workers Trade Union Federation

Most writers as Sülker claim that the financial aid offered by Irwing Brown was refused right away and Türk-İş was built by its own means (Sülker, 1969:41). For instance, Şaban Yıldız, the first General Secretary of Türk-İş declares: “Türk-İş, which was built with the extremely positive intention, refused the financial aid offers at the beginning of 1952 during the preparations of its establishment despite the fact that it had no money at all in its reserves.” (Yıldız 1966: 42). Adnan Başaran from Demiryol-İş explains the financial difficulties that they faced in 1950 and 1951 as a worker and as a unionist:

The future of a worker was not clear. If a worker complained an investigator from Ankara about the worn out clothes at the work place and blamed the employer for not providing the new ones, you could not find this worker again, he would be lost. He used to be sent to another place to work or he used to be fired, we had no idea at all about his future. Everything was very mysterious done. As a result, if you connect this worker who is already under heavy pressure to a trade union, there appears the weakness. The worker of those years was scared and horrified. He was afraid of getting the sack. There used to be artisanship schools during such years. They were kind of vocational schools whose students were rather brave. I was one of them. In 1951, we captured the trade union which had been built in 1950 by the state initiators together with the managers of the work areas. Finally, the property of the worker was given to the worker, but we had no financial reserves at all. The employer used to give us a very small room with a small table and a few chairs. That is where we are coming from originally. We used to collect 25 Cents and we used to spend a lot of time and energy to gather it. They were telling us that they could buy chocolate to their grand children instead of giving that amount to us. This was our origin. This is where we are coming from.

Many resources as Trade Unionism Encyclopedia of Turkey (Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi) declare the financial assistance of the Western countries and

especially the U.S.A. It claims that ‘Boris Shishkin, the economy expert of the AFL and the Europe representative of the Marshall Plan, came to Turkey in January 1951, visited İstanbul Workers’ Trade Union Association and said that some financial support could be given within the framework of the Marshall Plan to the future confederation’ (Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi, 1998; volume 3-326).

Despite all the contradictory arguments on the issue that whether Türk-İş received financial aid and ideological support from the U.S.A. before and during its establishment, the most reasonable answer seems to be a positive one. Besides financial aid received from the U.S.A. another important point to be discussed is the article 5th of the 5018 Law accepted in 1947. It is important because it sanctioned any kind of political activity for the trade unions. This had a very serious impact on the future policies of Türk-İş in terms of its political attitude. In the following chapter, the political stance of Türk-İş will be dealt intensely. The 5th article said: “Trade unions of workers and employers can not deal with political propaganda and political broadcasting activities as trade unions and cannot involve in the activities of any political institution. Any act against the Article 5 will cause the close up of the trade union for a period of three months and one year temporarily or permanently”.

The effect of this article on Türk-İş, which was born after the enactment of this law, could be observed for many years and thus its executives have been frightened for a long period of time. The first evidence of their fear is the ban that they themselves added on the Türk-İş regulations: “Unionists who have taken part in Türk-İş ranks cannot use their Türk-İş title and authority for religious and financial purposes in the political party elections, cannot work in the political parties at the same time and cannot use their title as a propaganda tool. If they do so, they will be counted as resigned from their duties at the Confederation” (Article 41 of the Türk-İş Regulations).

Despite the article, banning any kind of political activity and propaganda, the executives of the Türk-İş trade unions tried to get involved with the DP and RPP individually. They had a greater tendency towards the DP since it was giving

extensive rights to the workers by means of laws so as to gain their support. Some of them were aiming at being included in the lists of those political parties to be members of the parliament.

After the 1946 elections, the major means to gain rights for the working class was the magic of their votes. As it was the same case with the other classes of the Turkish society in that period, workers were pleased and thankful to the DP, which appeared to be giving them some kind of value. This was the very new innovation: the workers were satisfied to have been given such an importance. This may be one of the reasons why they carried out a conforming attitude. Between 1946 and 1961 the number of strikes was very low. Besides the attitude of the working class, the role of the Cold War can not be ignored. Moreover, the public officers showed similar behavior, so the number of strikes is very low as well.

There was a similar picture with regards to the period after the 1946 elections. The arrival of the DP awakened hopes, but soon the party proved to have mistaken the workers and many other classes of the society. According to the Labor Law 3008 strikes had already been banned. The strikers were threatened to be sent to prison from one month up to one year in addition to the financial penalty according to this law introduced in 1936. The multi-party era did not bring much freedom. In fact, how can one talk about trade unions, emergence of a confederation as Türk-İş and union rights without the right to strike?

Kemal Sülker also argues that both parties act ignorantly and did not want to promote the right to strike. He gives the example of the RPP before the 1950 elections: “The Labor Minister of the RPP before 1950, Şemsettin Sirer, called the union leaders for a meeting and asked them to act against the right to strike. In fact, he asked them to send him telegrams stating that they did not want the right to strike. Some unionists, supporters of the RPP, sent Sirer those telegrams and he read them in the Parliament” (Sülker 1968b: 66-67).

The results of the 1950 elections showed that most workers voted for the DP, a new party promising the right to strike intensely and giving all social classes right to speak. This was a totally new political understanding which convinced millions of voters. However, in the following years the working class noticed the DP's hostile attitude and they spend great effort to save their right by means of meetings and other instruments as the media. In fact, the worsening economic conditions with very high inflation rate and devalued Turkish Lira worsened the life standards of the workers especially in the second half of the 1950's. For instance, the state expenditure in the Budget, which used to be 3.5 billion Turkish Liras in 1956, rose to 6,7 billion Liras in 1959. The government, thus, increased the price of the basic goods manufactured by the state and increased the currency supply. There was no way to slow down the price increase and shortages were marked. The result was a really big decrease in the real income of the workers. The situation was similar for the state officers.

The working conditions, however, improved. The workers working at the public workplaces were able to obtain pay raises due to their close relations with the government. In addition, the majority of the workers had not break up their relations with their home villages and totally expropriated. There were severe conflicts between the workers and public officials. One of the unionists, Mustafa Başıoğlu, General Manager of Sağlık-İş since 1965, former General Education Secretary of Türk-İş, exemplifies the worker-officer distinction by explaining his own experience:

Turkey went through a worker-officer distinction period. This is not a debate issue and not on the political agenda today. Can you believe that the political parties declared and promised that they would end this distinction before the 1965 elections? In fact, we struggled a lot. Some people were hired to work at hospitals and schools and they were given neither the rights of the workers nor the rights of the officers. They were called 'müsdahdem' and they were made work for 12 hours a day. You do not pay them for their overtime work and there was not collective agreement. This was a great fight and a great struggle. Their status was based on the Article 19 of the 3656 Law and Article 10 of the 3659 Law. There was the definition of officer and how to become

an officer in the 788 Law. This group was neither workers nor officers. This unfair situation has led me to become a rebellion.

İbrahim Yalçınğlı reflects the similar arguments and adds:

One worker was given the sack in Malatya. I asked them the reason of its dismissal. They said they had fired him because he had entered the work place by using the door allocated to the officers. Can you believe that? People used to be fired because of using the door of the officers. Besides, workers used to eat at their restaurant in a separate place. They used to give the workers jail loaves, black and hard like a stone. Officers used to be given white beautiful loaves of bread. We struggled against that. We insisted that workers should eat this white bread. This is a small example of oppression. It emerged as a revenge sentiment. I lived those days. The surroundings of the factory in Malatya are full of apricot trees. I witnessed a worker who was fired because of stealing one apricot. This accumulation before 1960 helped the workers to understand their own condition. They wanted to prove their own existence. They wanted to say 'I am an individual in this factory'. This is a link which connected the workers to each other. As a result, we became more and more powerful and finally in 1961 we were able to do the Saraçhane meeting, the greatest meeting of the unionist action.

In brief, between 1946 and 1961, the salaries rose in general except for some years. Furthermore, employment opportunities increased and the working conditions improved. The same unionist includes:

To tell the truth, the governments of that period were not opposing against us. They provided some kind of help to improve the Turkish workers a little between 1950 and 1960. For example, there was not anything like a premium (ikramiye) paid in addition to the salaries. The DP government gave an extra amount of premium which equaled 2 month's salary. This was not something legal in that period but there was an orientation in it. A fake image like Türk-İş asked for the premium was created and people were convinced that this was the reason why this extra payment was given. This was done between 1954 and 1960. For instance, it was given for both religious holidays. This was not a legal procedure. There was not collective agreement. The unions did not have legal force, but it was given and this fake image was created. We told that we had been getting it, but this was not the truth.

Although the interviewed unionists argue that the working conditions improved between 1950 and 1960, it seems unreasonable to believe that after examining the

party programs of the DP. At the beginning of the DP rule in government, although their program included some kind of opinion on working conditions, the emphasis lost importance in time and finally disappeared. The 1951 program of the party announces: “The amendments of the Law have been going on in order to make the trade unions more beneficial organizations for our workers” (Öztürk 1968: 71).

The similar declarations existed in the succeeding programs until 1954. However, the emphasis on the working class lost its importance and there was almost nothing about the working conditions on the 1955 and 1957 party programs of the DP. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the limited number of announcements of the DP about the workers and working conditions on its party program lost their little importance in the first years of its leadership in government and they disappeared totally after 1955. The evaluations on the working conditions which existed on the initial programs after 1950 faded away in the following years. Naturally, the emergence of Türk-İş occurred in a suitable period, 1952, when the DP appeared to be interested in the workers at least for a while and willing to improve their working conditions in order to get the support of the workers. Therefore, most internal conditions also were affirmative for Türk-İş to be born. Of course, the kindness of the DP on their will to improve the workers and their working conditions and life standards are debatable. For instance, the right to strike, which was accepted as a natural right within the democratic framework in their first program, was promised to be legalized. However, it did not exist anymore on the following programs.

One positive development between 1950 and 1960 is the changes in the regulations about the holidays and off days of the workers and the salaries to be paid on such days. In 1951, half of the salary was accepted to be paid for the weekend holidays and general off days. Furthermore, later, in 1956, this amount was accepted as the full salary. The DP, as a party emphasizing industrialism by means of private sector and urbanization, enacted a law in 1954 and it made it compulsory to give an hour lunch break for the workers living in the cities and villages with a minimum population of 10.000 or more. There were some important steps in social security policy as well. Starting from 1949 during the rule of the RPP, the regulations

concerning the elderly and then after 1950 with the DP rule, some others concerning the motherhood, illness and death were introduced.

Despite such improvements on individual work relations, the ones on the area of collective work were not progressed. The reason was the fact that the DP, which had had sensitive relations with the working class during its opposition period from 1946 until 1950 and the first couple of years of its reign, changed its attitude towards not only the workers but also many other classes. It performed an extremely different, intensely authoritarian attitude towards all the segments of the society. This was reflected clearly on the work sphere and especially on the collective work relations. The dominant characteristic of the party was also observable in the trade unions. Almost all promises of the DP while in opposition were not put into effect after coming into power and the best illustration was the right to strike.

The pressure during that period can obviously be observed in decisions taken in the Second General Meeting of Türk-İş in 8-11 August 1953, only one year after its emergence. On the other hand, the DP government had still a peaceful image, able to solve the workers' problems. As Şide comments:

It is clear that many administrators make pressure on trade unions and members of the unions. This is one of the problems that we have been facing. In fact, we have many letters in our files and folders including the cases exposed to such tough manners. It is clear that none of us will stay indifferent against such destructive manners restricting freedom and the first authority to go is the government. Despite being lacked full legal support, trade unions and our members won't be let terrorized in the hands of the pressure makers (Şide 2004c: 47).

What made the DP frustrated and angry against the working class? The answer to this question requires a discovery of the internal factors such as the economic explanations and its reflection to the industry and the working class of the period. An understanding of change in the economic policy of Turkey took place by the end of the 1940's. The new policy meant liberal market in the foreign and internal market, support of the private entrepreneurship at any level, general restriction on étatism, restriction on state investment, mechanization of agriculture and emphasis on road construction and encouragement of foreign private industry. Within this

policy, both the RPP and the opposition party, the DP, had already had consensus. Foreign support sources as the U.S.A. were working in cooperation with them. There was only one exception: Turkey did not agree with: sales of the State Economic Enterprises to the private sector despite the promises of the DP to the American aid sources. On the contrary, the SEEs were expanded and profit from them on the way to the economic improvement was the preference of the party despite American pressure.

After 1950, Turkey began to follow a more liberal economic policy and began to encourage foreign capital. On the other hand, the DP (and the other ruling parties until the 1970's) governed by means of state capitalist policies despite the fact that the DP had intense free market ambition. During the post-war period, especially the first half of the 1950's, internal migration increased abruptly. The governments faced with the problems stemming from the shanty town (gecekonu). Peasants, who were not able to survive the commercialization and mechanization of agriculture, migrated to the cities hoping to find a job and better education facilities for their children. Since the market opportunities of the big cities were not large enough, those migrants had to be in the marginal sector of the economy whose workers were unable to find accommodation. The result was the fast growing amount of shanty town areas with full of migrant families. The state was not aware of the fact that those people lacked the basic infrastructure as water, electricity, sewage or public transport. Or else, the state's preferences did not include providing them with vital life necessities. Although state capitalist policy was in force until the 1970's, the governments did not plan the living conditions for those migrants. The problems resulting from those migrants grew gradually since the governments of those years did not provide them with employment, their major motive to move to the bigger cities. In addition, another major problem was that they lacked the social security protection of the state.

The period after 1950 faced with many economic difficulties. The DP which was able to come into power as a sole governor acted extremely confidently, which led to emergence of many economic problems which were very difficult to solve and destruction of many classes, especially the working class. The budget deficit, which

used to be non-existent between 1945 and 1949 despite wounds of the war, emerged in 1950 with the arrival of the DP in power and it increased sharply after the same year.

Table 3: Budget deficit between 1945 and 1962

	<u>Money</u>	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Income</u>	<u>Expenses</u>	<u>Increase in</u>	<u>Deficit**</u>
	<u>Supply</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>(Budget)</u>	<u>(Budget)</u>	<u>Expense Ratio</u>	<u>(-)</u>
	<u>*</u>	<u>(%)</u>	<u>**</u>	<u>**</u>	<u>(%)</u>	<u>(-)</u>
1945	919	-7,6	658,8	600,7		58,1
1946	975	6,1	1 041,5	1 018,9	69,8	22,6
1947	888	-9,2	1 615,0	1 564,2	53,5	50,8
1948	932	5	1467,7	1 401,8	-10,4	65,5
1949	803	-13,8	1 628,2	1 572,0	12,1	56,8
1950	862	7,3	1 419,4	1 467,4	-6,7	-48
1951	1007	16,8	1 646,0	1 580,5	7,7	65
1952	1104	9,6	2 235,8	2 248,9	41,4	-13,2
1953	1286	16,5	2 272,1	2 294,1	2	-22
1954	1326	3,1	2 390,8	2 564,7	118	-173,9
1955	1744	31,5	3 148,4	3 308,9	29	-160,5
1956	2253	29,2	3 304,8	3 487,2	5,4	-182,6
1957	2853	26,6	3 966,6	4 162,8	19,4	-196,2
1958	2955	3,6	4 822,1	4 977,1	19,6	-155
1959	3295	11,5	6 385,8	6 728,0	35,2	-342,2
1960	3699	12,3	6 933,3	7 320,3	8,8	-387
1961	3984	7,7	10 933,8	11 382,5	-55,5	-448,7
1962	4368	9,6	9 017,8	9 118,1	-20	-100,3

* The amount of the banknotes in circulation

** Million Turkish Lira

Source: Kepenek, Yentürk; 'Türkiye Ekonomisi'. 1983: 96

In 1950, when the DP won the elections and the RP's votes dropped abruptly, great changes that had been already planned in the economy started to come on stage. The great success of the DP was due to the hegemonic authority of the RPP, which had produced hatred against the single-party system, and the new liberal politics promised by the DP before the elections. Those were the two prominent causes of their success. However, the DP used this victorious result of the elections for authoritarian purposes instead of a cooperative manner with the segments of the society who had already been frustrated by the RPP who had been presenting similarly rigid attitude. This overconfidence of the DP due to its electoral success will lead itself into its end and its leader's end.

After 1950, the DP displayed a despotic attitude not only towards many groups of the society but also towards its own organization whenever it opposed. As a result, it gained the aversion of many groups in the following years. In addition, the DP ruled the country under its own control by eliminating any kind of opposition, and especially the leftist movements. Unfortunately, after its inaugural, it showed what kind of democracy they wanted to settle in the country.

During its rule, the DP did not want a theocratic state. Nonetheless, it ignored all kinds of such activities. The major directors of the party were quite permissible to the fundamentalist actions. That was the reason why there was an important change in the religious aspect of the Turkish politics and the severe laicism of the period of Atatürk was roughly liquidated. Naturally, any kind of leftist action or any kind of support for the working class was encountered by severe criticism of the DP.

Between 1950 and 1954 there was a great increase in the GNP in Turkey, which was beneficial for the notable success of the DP in that period. The power of the DP was mainly based on the agriculture since it used many means to receive the sympathy of this group. The bank credits distributed between 1950 and 1960 shows the huge disparity between the two groups, agriculture and industry, and the stress of the DP on the agricultural development, thus the peasant class.

Table 4: Functional distribution of the bank credits between 1950 and 1955

	Agriculture	Industry	Others
	%	%	%
1950	31,67		68,33
1955	30,78	2,73	66,49
1960	24,81	2,31	72,88

Source: Kepenek, Yentürk; ‘Türkiye Ekonomisi’. 1983: 97

The two main supporters of the DP were the group of people dealing with trade and living in the big cities and large landowners in the rural area. That was the reason why industrialization process was too slow. In fact, deliberately or not, the DP ended the will to industrialize as it is observed in the table above. By means of its populist policies, it retarded industrialization. As a result, the Turkish working class did not find the opportunity to grow and gain power.

During this period, new agriculture capitalists, especially in Çukurova and Bursa regions, emerged but they did not invest on industry. This group became a consumer society purchasing all kinds of luxury items instead of making industrial investments. Moreover, during the same period, the DP increased the supply of money, which also contributed to a high rate of inflation. The DP rejected the concept of plan and never accepted a planned economy. Since the party did not organize any structural changes in the country, it condemned itself to a bankruptcy. In addition, the DP did not provide better economic conditions for the state officials. On the contrary, it forced them to loose power. In 1953, the party started a severe attitude even in its own system and a rather weak democracy became obvious in its own organization.

During the first years of 1950, workers wanted to be in the political sphere in addition to their activities in trade unions because they wanted to see more workers in the Parliament. That is the reason why they built ‘Support Committee of Turkish

Worker Parliamentarians' in 1954. The aim of the Committee was to support the future worker parliamentarians for the 1954 elections. 11 unionists founded this Committee to support all the workers who were willing to become deputies regardless of their political party affiliations. However, the Committee was liquidated by a court verdict (Sülker 1955b: 306-307).

Meanwhile, the DP initialized an intensive mechanization program in agriculture in order to obtain increasing support from the peasants. For instance, the number of tractor increased ten times in a very short period and the government increased the amount of credits for the peasants. DP showed great sympathy towards peasants in order to secure its control; thus, it obtained their support. As a consequence, how can we expect a sustainable economic development within the figures indicating the DP's preferences? How can we expect an industry and a working class to thrive on during the ruling years of the DP? During the upheaval period, 1950-1954, in spite of the high GNP, the DP was not able to transfer the income of the agriculture to the industry. In fact, it was not a priority of the party as it gave great importance to the peasants believing that the economic development could be done by means of the elevation and contribution of this class.

In the second half of the fifties the friction between the RPP and DP had already been increasing. There were two major issues preparing the end of the DP. First one was the conflict in the interpretation of laicism between the two parties. The second one was the political freedom, which was hotly debated in the political sphere of the country and caused the overthrow of Menderes himself. Until the elections of 1954, the RPP maintained its discourse, a party representing the entire nation. Moreover, it continued its role as the guardian of Atatürk's legacy and reforms. The RPP's official ideology was stemming from the six principles of Kemalism: republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, reformism-revolutionarism, and étatism. After 1954, the party was involved intensely in a group, a new generation of intellectuals stressing economic étatism more radically or some others expressing socialism.

Between 1950 and 1954, it is said that there had been 'white terrorism' in the country since the coercion on working classes, on media and on any kind of opposition augmented cruelly. The success of the DP in 1954 elections was so great that it became a source of weakness for itself at the end and prepared the necessary conditions for the break up of the party. In 1955, the parliament asked for the resignation of some of the ministers. They elected Menderes as the prime minister but they voted for the resignation of all the ministers. Despite the opposition, Menderes did not resign. Instead, he continued with a new cabinet. However, this time, because of the fear of losing his position, his oppression on society and on the parliament increased and this resulted in his party's and his own end.

After the 1957 elections, the RPP demonstrated a relative success. The number of its representatives in the Parliament increased from 31 to 173 and the DP's decreased from 490 to 419. This created the idea that their stand with the integration of new socio-economic ideas could mean a future success. Meanwhile, Menderes was losing some prestige in the party. Compared with the RPP, the weakness of the DP was that they did not have intellectual personalities working in their party.

Although the DP performed a relative success in the 1957 elections, there was a sharp drop in the DP's votes compared to the 1950 and 1954 elections, but it had the necessary amount of the votes to win the elections again. Finally, Menderes was the prime minister for the fifth time. However, after 1957, the DP was not able to stop its fall due to high inflation rate which was impossible to stop and wrong economic policies of the party in the country. On the other hand, the DP was still over-confident and the oppression increased. Besides, the parliament and the opposition were not able to stand for those threats stemming from the DP.

To conclude, during the multi-party era, compared with the RPP's attitude, the government of the DP did not perform a different pattern towards the working class and working conditions. As Erol Kahveci underlines the remarks of Berberoğlu about the single party era, "One of the major aims of the new Turkish state throughout the 1930's and 1940's was to maintain a docile labor force in order to increase production and reach the five-year plan targets. To achieve this, workers

were forced to work long hours for little pay and under unsafe working conditions, while unions were outlawed and strikes banned (Berberoğlu 1982:182). Consequently, this trend was still influential and in effect during the fifties.

When the economic growth data are observed it is possible to notice the strain on the whole society, especially the working class. Bulutay divides the period between 1950 and 1980 into four stages: 1950-1953, 1954-1963, 1964-1973 and 1974-1980. He finds the first and third stages successful. He states that the period between 1950 and 1953, during which agricultural development was important and foreign aids were received, was very successful. However, there was a decrease in the exports after 1953, so there was stagnation and recession between 1954 and 1963 (Bulutay 1981: 501). In short, there was great improvement in agricultural income and agricultural exports between 1950 and 1953. It was hoped that industrialization could be financed by such agricultural resources. However, a decrease in the export of the agricultural products took pace after 1953, which destroyed all the expectations mentioned above. Moreover, agricultural income declined until the mid-sixties.

The effects of the technological progress in the agricultural area were great on the increase in the number of industrial workers during the decade before 1960. The major technological development was the rise in the use of tractor. After the war, the governments did not succeed in providing land to the rural people who owned little land or no land at all. However, there were transformations in the agricultural area since loan possibilities increased, the number of tractors rose, land transportation improved and the price of the agricultural products were intensely supported. The most striking development of the period was the enlargement in the increase of the arable land due to the rise in the number of tractor. While the arable land was 12.7 million hectare in 1945, it became 23.2 million hectare in 1962. That makes an 83% increase (Kepenek, Yentürk; 1983a: 105).

Due to the great increase in the mechanization of the agriculture a high number of peasants were left jobless in the 1950's. Thus, they started to look for a job in the areas other than agriculture. Consequently, there was a labor flow to the urban areas

and there was another group who started temporary labor in the rural area because they could not find a job in the city. In this context, the result was the emergence of a labor mass relatively free from land and a waged labor class supplying workers to the developing industry. In the period after 1960, a more qualified working class appeared. Furthermore, the old mixture of peasant-industrial worker type was transformed into a more permanent type working class.

During this economic deterioration period, the reason why the workers did not show intense opposition to the seriously worsening conditions by the end of the fifties could be the unexpectedly high life standards provided by the DP during the first couple of years of the same decade. Actually, what was going on in the foreign world in that period? The world was facing another economic crisis after the Korean War. Although it had been some years after the war, the negative effects were spreading by the end of the fifties during which devaluation decision was taken in many countries in order to reach economic stability. The result was the postponement of the crisis to the 1970. The negative consequence of the crisis was exceedingly high unemployment rate and stagflation. Naturally, Turkey was also influenced. In Turkey, this crisis of 1957-1958 gave rise to the contradictions stemming from liberal economy policy. The discontent of the bourgeoisie, who gained more economic power in the fifties, increased after the 1957 elections. Moreover, the army and state officers were expropriated rapidly, which prepared the suitable ground on the way to a military coup.

Menderes, aware of the largely rising opposition due to expropriation and intense contradictions among the dominant classes after the 1957 elections, wanted to eliminate the aspirations of the strengthening bourgeoisie on their way to the parliament. Since the bourgeoisie showed its will to become the sole leader in the parliament, the innovation of Menderes was the National Front (Vatan Cephesi). They opened places in the villages and called them National Front offices. This was neither a political party nor an association. In fact, it was an illegal effort to organize the remaining feudality against the military.

The RPP challenged its competitor by means of mass demonstrations. Menderes made a mistake and responded such demonstrations with rough measures and threatened to close down the RPP. In fact, he used the army against those actions. By the year 1958, there was not any kind of communication between the parliamentarians of the two parties. In addition to the political problems, right after the intervention when it was understood that the regime of the DP had condemned the country to a huge amount of external and internal debt, the RPP proved that it was declaring the truth as an opposition party.

In 1958, the government of Menderes received a great amount of credit from the IMF and accepted the stabilization program. Unfortunately, the DP used up all the money and did not transfer it into investments. Moreover, the most important mistake of Menderes was the usage of the military in order to stop political disorder. Together with the irreparable economic problems, this authoritarian attitude of the DP not only over the working class but also the whole social life and institutions created tense relations within the Turkish society. Despite the discontent from the most segments of the society, the DP did not compromise. On the contrary, it performed a gradually escalating rough behavior.

The arguments and fights occurring in the parliament divided the country into sects. One important offense against the journalists is reported by Sedat Ağralı, a journalist and a trade unionist. According to a piece of news published in 1959 in a Turkish newspaper, Milliyet, the Vice Minister of Press and Broadcast, Abdullah Aker declared that ‘even journalists can be beaten because of a sudden anxiety moment’. As a result of such a brutal declaration, 6 trade unionists with a journalist background visited the Vice Minister to discuss his declaration. Those were Sedat Ağralı himself, Babür Ardahan and Semih Tiryakioğlu from the İstanbul Journalists Union and İlhami Soysal and Doğan Kasaroğlu from Ankara Journalists Union and finally, Mesut Özdemir who was the leader of TGSE, Turkish Journalists Union Federation (Milliyet, 30 September 1959). Obviously, the last years of the 1950’s appear as a period of offense and brutality against many segments of the society due to the rough attitude of the DP, which turned out to be a political party attacking whoever criticizes the party, including the workers and unionist particularly.

Finally, in the next section of this chapter, a change in the attitude of the working class will be discussed: the working class started to show its existence after the 1960 since it had been under heavy control for a long time. It had been going on through penalties, fines, deceit and misconception for the last decades. However, those tough decades were the reason and motive for them to flourish after 1960. Some radical trade unions had already been eliminated by the RPP until 1946. Thus, a trade unionism under the control of the dominant classes was supported after the Trade Union Law of 1947. The law required the trade unions to be indifferent to politics and banned any political activity. The RPP supported trade unionism which could thrive on under its own guidance and control. During the first years of the fifties some unions supporting the DP emerged since the party promised the right to strike before the 1950 elections. Under this whole picture and the two parties, the RPP and the DP on stage, another factor influencing from abroad came to the arena. The U.S.A. and its trade union confederation AFL spent great effort to form a confederation in Turkey to unite all the trade unions under one administration and organize them easily under the control of the state. As a result, Türk-İş was born as a consequence of the efforts spent by the government and the U.S.A.

As a conclusion, towards the end of the 1950's, the RPP began recovering from its declining electoral performance and becoming a challenge to the governing party, the DP. It is intensely argued that this increase in the electoral success of the RPP led the DP to a much more authoritarian attitude, which triggered the military intervention of 1960. Between 1950 and 1960, the middle class bourgeoisie got back to the RPP. Nevertheless, the most significant loss of the RPP in that period was in the support of the peasants. Meanwhile, a variety of rights given between 1950 and 1959 to the working class without their own struggle made them inactive and submissive. Trade unions and especially Türk-İş were managed more and more under the control and orientation of the DP government. The statement of Sabri Tıǧlı, former General Secretary of Teksif, gives evidence while clarifying the control on the trade unionist stemming from two authorities, the government and the

employers and underlines the difficulties of the period before 1960 by stressing threats against them:

The DP spent great effort to capture Türk-İş in order to maintain it under its control. In that period, they used to give us the sack. Because I was a trade unionist, they closed down the department that I used to work and fired me, for instance. Later on, I found a job at a public sector factory, Sümerbank. I worked there until 1959. They used to fire many workers and trade unionists. The employers used to see the trade unionists as enemies. They were scared that the trade unionists would ask for new rights.

As a result of the interviews made during the study, it can be concluded that Türk-İş was unable to solve the tension between the two groups of the society and the workers. First, it had to solve the tension between the workers and the public officers. Second, it should have found a solution to the tension between the workers and the artisans. However, it seemed to have ignored according to the result drawn from the interviews since those unionists remember them very clearly.

During this decade, the impudence of the DP rose and it ended up with its failure and liquidation. In that period, the workers did not gain much as it was the case with the other classes of the society and they were condemned to live in severely hurting economic atmosphere and very difficult working conditions. The non-stop conflict of the DP with all the segments of the society led the country to a military intervention and thus, there came the coup on 27 May 1960.

3.3. The effects of 1961 Constitution and Labor Laws on Trade Union Movement

Since the economic, social and political factors leading to the 1960 military intervention have been studied intensely while discussing the self-understanding and the position of Türk-İş after its establishment in the previous section, the developments occurring in the trade unions, especially in Türk-İş, in the working conditions of workers the coup will be examined by referring to the new legal

norms such as the 1961 Constitution and the 274 Trade Union Act and 275 Collective Labor Agreement, Strike and Lock-out Act enacted in 1963 under the influence of the new Constitution. One leading argument explaining the 1960 military intervention is the increasing success of the RPP and the failure of the DP towards the end of the 1950's, causing its severely authoritarian attitude towards the masses. Related to our context, the relation of those two parties, the RPP and the Justice Party (JP), born out of the remains of the DP, with the workers and particularly with Türk-İş will be the focus point of this part of the study.

Trade unionism started in Turkey after 1960 although it is a well-known fact that unionization of the workers begins in the last period of the Ottoman Empire. Within those decades, trade unionism in Turkey had faced many restrictions and legal bans. Nonetheless, the period after 1960 is markedly different since there occurred a turning point with the 1961 Constitution. With the contribution of the totally new norms and widened legal framework set by the new Constitution, trade unionism gained incredible significance within the economic and social life compared with the period before 1960. That is the reason why the argument declaring the starting point of trade unionism in 1960 seems accurate. This has been admitted by many union leaders during the interviews. One example is the statement of Enver Turgut, who was the General Director of Yol-İş between 1958 and 1960, General Director of Tes-İş in 1966, a Parliament representative of JP in 65, the Director of the Labor Commission for 4 years and Social Security Directory Counselor between 1978 and 1981:

There were Parliament members with a worker background during the DP governments, but workers did not perform well in that period. I mean they did not show up that much and they did not display an appealing position in the society. Türk-İş was built after us, after the 1960 intervention. It did its congresses after that date. Because we played a prominent role in the main structure of Türk-İş and we supported it by means of our contribution, Türk-İş flourished. It became a body which deserved attention and it started to be taken seriously.

Despite many declarations as the one of Enver Turgut who starts trade unionism after 1960, there are a few union leaders who expressed that the DP had great

involvement in workers' affairs and it did its best to improve workers' rights. To illustrate, one leader who used to be a DP deputy argues:

Before 1960 our goal was to stay in political life as much as we could and try to find as many solutions as we could while settling in it. Adnan Menderes had great care for the workers and great contributions for them. I used to be in contact with him and tell him what we should do, how we should solve the problems related to the workers. I was effective in solving the problems emerging from working conditions.

Nevertheless, it is widely confirmed that the DP was ignorant to the workers' problems as well as the difficulties that many groups had been facing in the multi-party era. More than ignorance, the party was in a confrontation stage with many segments of the society, which prepared its unfortunate end. Finally, on 27 May 1960 the military coup took place and one year later the Constitution of 1961 was accepted. Menderes and two ministers from his cabinet were executed and hundreds of members of the party were sent to prison. After the intervention, the National Committee (NC) took the authority to govern and General Gürsel was the head of the NC, the president and the vice president. During the period of the NC, one of the most important events was that 147 professors were given the sack.

While the country was in an economic recession period, naturally, the workers were the group mostly hit by the deteriorating developments. The small business owners of the period, on the other hand, were trying to survive. This was the stage that they started to realize the importance of the unions to gain power against the workers. Yalçınoğlu, the General Director of Teksif, touches upon this issue taking place before the 1961 military coup, the unionization of their counterparts, the employers:

After 1957 and 1958, the employers also started to get together and especially, the private entrepreneurs became more powerful in this area. Becoming a member of the trade union and struggling for worker's rights were interpreted as extreme left and communism in those years, but this was non-sense. In the private entrepreneurship, the textile industry was more powerful and larger than the others. Actually, the other branches were almost non-existent. The major industries as cement, sugar, road building, mines and textile belonged to the state. Private sector consisted of small business like corner shops. Therefore, the employers who were gathering against the workers were mainly the state based industries. For example, Kula in İzmir, Santral Mensucat in İstanbul, Çukobirlik in Adana were huge and popular factories of those

years. They were all owned by the state. Similar to the worker's trade unions, the unionization of the employers was born and developed in the state owned factories. When the 1960's came, the employers started to resist: they did not cut off our membership dues in order to put the trade unions and their workers into financial problems. They also established trade unions within the factories. For example, they built one in Malatya, a trade union for artisans. We struggled against that. Are artisans and workers two separate groups? Those were developing out of Türk-İş and the result was a number of small trade unions in one factory, which was creating more weakness for the workers. Finally, the 1960 intervention took place and after the intervention, trade unions became active. As a result, laws regarding the trade unions and strikes were enacted in 1963. Actually, I, myself, lived through this period of struggle and fight.

One important factor leading to the 27 May intervention was that the DP lowered the salaries of the state and army officers. There was an obvious decrease in their life standards. Those were the two core groups of the RPP and their authority decreased as well. Moreover, the DP who used coercion to deprive the opposition and the media of the right to speak augmented the conflict with many other groups of the society. The army officers who prepared the coup on 27 May 1960 were a group of young people and they called themselves National Committee. Although they declared that they had no intention against any group while making the coup, it was clear that they were absolutely against the DP.

Meanwhile, what was happening in the high ranks of Türk-İş? One example is Kemal Türkler, the leader of Türkiye Maden-İş, a member of Türk-İş until 1967. He declared on 15 June 1960: "Today, whatever your political affiliation is, it is a mistake to discuss political parties. Today, the most important and the only national task is to quit party discussions and to help the military administration" (Şen, 1964: 123). As it can be observed from the declaration of Türkler, the 27 May intervention was welcomed by many leaders of Türk-İş. On the other hand, Tevfik Nejat Karacagil, a former executive from Türk-İş and a DP enthusiast, gives all the details of the turmoil:

They sent the discharge verdict of the Türk-İş executives, but we refused it because we were a large group and powerful enough to do that. However, this led to turmoil. We were trying to find supporters everywhere about who to elect. Our candidate was Seyfi

Demirsoy who was originally from the RPP, but he was supporting us. The candidate of the opposition was Bahri Ersoy and their General Secretary candidate was Hasan Özgüneş, a RPP fan and a colleague that I really loved. He was from Gaziantep. The candidate against him was Halil Tunç from the DP, actually the founder of the DP National Front. He wanted to withdraw, but we told him not to do that. When the first tour of elections was finished, our candidate Seyfi Demirsoy won more votes than Bahri Ersoy. However, he could not win two thirds of the votes, so we had another tour. Ersoy withdrew and Demirsoy was elected and so was Halil Tunç due to our efforts. Ömer Ergün, who was RPP oriented, was elected by both sides as the financial secretary. Thus, that was how that congress was over.

As it is observed from the explanations of Karacagil, there was heavy political struggle within the executive branch of Türk-İş after the military intervention. Actually, this will be the case until the adoption of the new principles of Türk-İş, particularly the ‘non-partisanship’ principle accepted in 1964. In fact, whether Türk-İş has led this principle or not, whether it was willing or unwilling to lead it and whether it was beneficial or harmful to the confederation will be the most important focus point in the following part of the study.

Back to the political sphere in general, one year after the military intervention, in 1961, the new constitution was accepted. The differences between the Constitution of 1961 and 1924 can be separated into two categories: all the opportunities that were misused by Menderes in the name of democracy were blocked and the control over political leaders and their creative actions were minimized in the 1961 Constitution. The new constitution accepted four of the six principles of Atatürk: nationalism, democracy, laicism and social state. It gave all basic rights and freedom to the citizens, so it was similar to a Western Constitution. It was forbidden to misuse the religion in the political activities. Kemal Sülker underlines the radical change marked in this new Constitution:

This was a revolutionary Constitution granting many rights in terms of social justice and envisaging a just salary and a high standard of life deserved by a citizen, which had been the promises of many political parties before but they had never been given. However, the workers did not realize easily the importance of those broadened rights (Sülker 1968c: 96).

It is noticeable that there was a gradual increase in the number of workers who joined the trade union movement after the Constitution. However, they faced with the problem of the introduction of the new laws regarding the right to strike and to collective bargaining. İlhan Akalın argues that ‘the consciousness and the cultural accumulation of the workers were so weak that they were unable to manipulate neither the trade unions and nor the regulations about the right to strike. Their organization, Türk-İş, and trade unions also were in a similar situation’ (Akalın 2000b: 107). That is the reason why it is not possible to state that there was strong consciousness. The speech of Ecevit before the ratification of the Acts 274 and 275 shows evidence to this weakness:

When I was the Labor Minister, there was a Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lock-out Law draft. Türk-İş did not like it. So it prepared a new draft and added new and broader regulations. We found this draft of Türk-İş too modest. We prepared a more revolutionary draft than they prepared (Sülker 1976: 237-238).

The words of Ecevit show that the draft of the Acts 274 and 275 prepared by Türk-İş was not reflecting the demands of the workers or even was not strong enough to save the workers’ rights. As a result, the government’s draft was giving wider rights and better working conditions to the workers than the one prepared by Türk-İş executives. Naturally, the drawbacks of their attitude will influence the future actions and strength of Türk-İş during the following periods.

On the other hand, the intervention of 1960 was directly marked by the intellectuals of the bourgeoisie. After the 1960 intervention, the appearance of the RPP, somehow linked with the NC, had negative influence on the RPP. Moreover, during the referendum of the Constitution, the RPP campaigned for 'yes' votes. Meanwhile, a new party, the Justice Party, was build and it was totally in an opposite direction. The Justice Party didn't ask its members to accept the new Constitution. On the contrary, it asked for 'no' votes, so this new party was advancing in a similar path with the DP and trying to inherit the remains of the DP. Although the new Constitution was accepted by the majority of the votes, the results were not satisfactory. One possible interpretation of the unexpectedly high proportion of the

'no' votes is the protest of people who had been disturbed by the offense against Menderes.

It can be concluded that workers and many other groups who had been bothered by the insulting actions against Menderes displayed their detest by means of intense motives and feelings of pity while somehow safeguarding the victimized. The percentage of 'yes' was 61.7 and 'no' was 38.3, this was not sufficient enough for the NC and this was a kind of warning for the RPP. As a result, in the elections of October, the RPP, who was quite sure about winning, was defeated. The two important reasons for the defeat were that the RPP appeared identical with the NC in front of the public and a good number of the fans of the DP who would never vote for the RPP were still existent since this group had recently faced the execution of Menderes. Actually, the peasants in Turkey never elected the representatives of the rapid reforms whenever the right to vote is given to them. The reason was that since the establishment of the Republic, the RPP was not able to adjust a wider reform politics to the local conditions.

One trade union leader Tevfik Nejat Karacagil, illustrates the case by giving his own experience after 1960:

When the 1960 intervention took place, I was the General Director of İstanbul Trade Unions Associations which was a structure uniting all the trade unions in İstanbul. I would not tell what happened, but we were harmed after the military intervention because we were from the DP background. When the intervention took place we were the dominant group in that Association. There was an opposition group against us consisting of 10 unionists. They sent us a telegram saying 'opportunists withdraw!' That meant we should resign as a group of hypocrites, but we did not. On the other hand, we were ruined as the DP supporters. Many of our friends were sent to jail. Some of our friends were arrested at the entrance of the dock and sent to Yassıada claiming that they had opposed İsmet İnönü. We became miserable. I was the director of İstinye trade union at the time. The director who invaded it made a congress and did not give me candidacy. He ordered me not to be a candidate. I was sent to exile to another dock. Meanwhile, we did the congress of İstanbul Trade Union Association. It was very interesting: the congress was done under the tight supervision of National Front Committee and intervention government. I have the pictures of it. Of course, we withdrew and our friend from the RPP came over. The thing that bothered me the most

was that there were people who enjoyed hypocrisy at any period, they shut us down. In mid-November 1960, the 4th Congress of Türk-İş gathered. Its General Director was removed and so was the General Secretary because the military intervention had taken place.

Another unionist, Kenan Durukan, who used to be the General Director of Harb-İş between 1960 and 1964 and a RPP deputy between 1973 and 1980, adds that there was a great fear of communism after the 1960's as well and the DP enthusiasm was still widespread in that period:

It was strange because all the trade unionists were far away from the class consciousness. They were only the fans of the RPP or the DP. There was not a concept as class consciousness and there was not education. There was fear of communism. In addition, there was DP adoration. In those years, most people were the DP fans. People used to cry when they heard the name, Adnan Menderes.

In that context, Justice Party (JP) was born and it had a similar structure with the DP in terms of its members, program and premise. The head of the party, General Gümüşpala, was one of the army members who had been forced to retire after the coup of 27 May. Actually, he had the highest ranked position in the army. The JP, who emphasized market economy, not an interventionist state economy in its program, encouraged its voters not to accept the new Constitution.

Unlike the other military interventions, the military rule of 1960 was open to cooperation with civilians who mostly belonged to the RPP. Furthermore, it prepared the necessary ground for the capitalists to improve, the pre-capitalist relations to liquidate and the liberal and democratic structures to emerge partially. Although it was under the control of the state, there were transformations in the rural area, a great increase in the number of workers because of the fast improvement in capitalism. The major change after 1960 was that the working class became important actors in the society, which provoked an increase in the level of trade unionism and political organization.

Meanwhile, the economic policy needed to be revised since import substitution policy was not strong enough to catch up with the improvement steps taken after the

1960's. The Turkish capitalists were not able to compete with the others in the foreign market. Moreover, they lacked the necessary financial resources in their reserves in order to support their imported materials. Furthermore, a reliable government to realize the necessary transformations to increase the amount of foreign capital was not created.

With the adoption of the 1961 Constitution, the country observed a more democratic regime. This created the necessary ground for the workers to join the political sphere in addition to two other groups, intellectuals and students. The changes in the new Constitution gave the way to the leftist movements to appear and flourish. Since the emergence of the Republic, a party, 'Workers' Party of Turkey' (WPT) which declared overtly that it represents the interests fighting against those of the ruling classes, was allowed to take its place on the political arena despite resistance of many power structures.

Many politicians of the DP were sent to court and some of them to prison. As a result of the judicial procedure, the former Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and the former Minister of Finance, Hasan Polatkan, were sentenced to death. Many others were sentenced to many years of prison. Naturally, these heavy rulings led to a lot of public arguments and discomfort. As a result, the government of the RPP let some of those people out. In addition to the representatives of the DP who were left out of the political arena, the army officers of the 27 May enacted a law to prepare the necessary ground for the retirement of the older army officers. The Chief of the Army Commander Ragıp Gümüşpala also had to retire. He will join the former DP groups and will become the Head of the Justice Party later.

The 1960 military takeover was justified as a step necessary for the preservation of democracy. In fact, this was a step which appeared to be a response against a threat to the RPP. Throughout the 1950's, the RPP was a minority party because its strong support for reform and secularism did not appear appealing any more to the less educated peasant voters who seemed to have been influenced easily by the DP. In that period, the voters were divided into two hostile groups: one progressive and

civic-minded and one uneducated and provincial. Since the supporters of the RPP were the first group, the party, which introduced democracy to the country, was destined to lose weight in politics and did not have much chance to regain power by democratic means.

The military takeover brought an end to the decade of DP dominance. However, it also interrupted the effort of the RPP to return to power ultimately by means of free elections. The Constituent Assembly was assembled in late 1960. Not surprisingly, all former members of the DP were excluded from becoming members of the Assembly. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the 1961 Constitution was solely the work of the RPP. One great novelty of the 1961 Constitution is that, unlike 1924 Constitution, it clearly recognized the existence of such social groups as labor and it gave them the right to organize themselves politically on the basis of occupation and interest. It promised a variety of economic and social programs while supporting free enterprise and political freedom, which meant less intervention of the state in the affairs of the society.

The two important events after the 1960 military intervention reflecting the attitude of some Türk-İş leaders towards participating in the political life in the 1960's are the establishment of the WPT, Workers' Party of Turkey, in 1961 and the emergence of the idea to build a "Workers' Party" (Çalışanlar Partisi). The WPT, Workers' Party of Turkey, was founded on February 12, 1961 by eleven trade union leaders, most of who were from Türk-İş. Those were Kemal Türkler, Avni Erakalın, Şaban Yıldız, İbrahim Güzelce, Rıza Kuas, Kemal Nebioğlu, Salih Özkarabay, İbrahim Denizcier, Adnan Arkın, Ahmet Muşlu, Saffet Göktürkoğlu and Hüseyin Uslubaş. When the party was founded, initially, Avni Erakalın was the president and Kemal Türkler was the vice-president of the party.

However, the dominant group in Türk-İş had been unwilling to join or support the WPT. As a result, the trade unions wanting to support the WPT were forced to leave the confederation. Surprisingly, the same Türk-İş executives agreed to build another class based party for the workers right after the foundation of the WPT since they were quite frightened with the idea of a party based on working class. It was

planned to name it the "Workers' Party". However, due to the active life of the WPT and the support of the unions and intellectuals for the WPT, the idea of the Workers' Party faded. Adnan Başaran from Demiryol-İş comments on the motives bringing about the foundation of WPT and the Workers' Party:

After the adoption of non-partisanship politics principle, they wanted to build the Workers' Party. Previously the WPT was founded, but the number of workers in the party diminished in time. In fact, the party was devoid of workers at the end. As a result, Türk-İş wanted to try to found the Workers' Party. There were many political divisions within Türk-İş, so everyone wanted to remain in the original party. That is the reason why the Workers' Party idea did not succeed. The excitement that emerged during the foundation of the WPT can not be observed in the emergence of the Workers' Party. As a result, we left the positions that we had in the party.

Before the 1961 elections, it was expected that the RPP would win comfortably by a majority. However, it was not the case. The Justice Party (JP) and the New Turkey Party (NTP), the successors to the DP, won 238 seats. This was the majority of the Parliament with 450 seats. After 1961, with the restoration of the civilian regime, coalition governments led the country for many years, which brought about an unstable political atmosphere and its drawbacks. The RPP, on the other hand, became the dominant partner of those coalition governments.

The RPP returned to power in the 1961 elections. Nevertheless, the number of people who doubt the situation increased. They argued that the only way the RPP could appear powerfully on the political stage was by means of the contribution of the military through an intervention not through free elections. In fact, their argument was correct since the electoral performance of the RPP in 1961 was less than the one in 1957 and its place on power was quite weak. Finally, in the 1965 elections, the RPP lost power and showed its lower electoral performance in its history. It seemed that the support of the military was not an accurate means to assist the RPP gain power in the electoral arena. The result was the final resignation of the prime minister, İnönü, in February 1965. The involvement of the military in politics in 1961 was something new in Turkish politics and did not help the RPP to survive. Now, the way to the success of the Justice Party (JP) was open.

After describing briefly, the political circumstances leading to the 1960 military coup and the developments following it, especially the arrival of the 1961 Constitution, the next step will be a focus on the working class after 1961, their attitude towards it, their expectations from it and the emergence of the laws regarding labor relations by focusing on the agreements and the controversies which took place within Türk-İş.

After 1960, the urban area did not develop as fast as the number of people migrating to the big cities. It was not powerful enough to provide employment for those migrants. The result was a sharp increase in the unemployment rate. Before 1960, the DP was aware of the fact that they would not be able to afford minimizing the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). Although they promoted liberal economy tools in the country, they did not dare to touch the SEEs. On the contrary, they built some new ones, which resulted in an increase in the number of people working there as workers or officers. Naturally, this was a means for the party to increase political domination over some groups and to provide some privileges and interests to some others. What was the highly discussed issue within the labor relations context in that period? It was the right to strike until 1963 and the working class did not succeed in obtaining it before due to the exhausting DP authority over them.

Due to the 1961 Constitution, the 1960's were totally different than the previous decade. The freedom atmosphere after the new Constitution cannot be linked directly with the army who carried out the military coup. In fact, it is because of the academicians who drafted it. Thanks to this new Constitution, many groups, especially the working class, who had been seriously monitored before, was let to engage in political struggle against the established powers. One important novelty was the emergence of the Constitutional Court, which caused frustration and controversy for the upcoming governments.

The most important part of the new Constitution is the freedom of thought, expression, association and publication which were brought by it. In addition to those democratic liberties, one key feature of it was that it envisaged social and economic rights. These positive properties of the Constitution made it highly

welcomed by the working class. In order to succeed in social justice, the state had the responsibility to plan economic development. Nevertheless, this did not occur in practice because the already existing power groups of the previous period kept the state under their control. The chief reason may be the role of the working class in the attainment of those extremely large democratic rights. Were they obtained by them or were they given by the state? Yalçınoğlu has the answer:

To state that the workers were 100% effective in obtaining those broad democratic rights is a little selfish. We have to be honest: the people who prepared that Constitution drafted those rights carefully and properly. Whether the working class deserved them or not can be discussed. Whether they were too large or not can be debated. However, they were wonderful. The right to strike and to collective bargaining came with the new Constitution. Nonetheless, we were not ready for them since we had not been fighting for them for a long time. During the military takeover, the trade unions came to a halt. When this period was over, the new laws emerged. I participated in the General Meetings of Türk-İş in Bursa in 1961 and 1963, during which I noticed that the working class thrived on. I felt that we were not ready after the ratification of the Law. Meanwhile, the employers, who were mainly the ones of the state, improved and built federations and confederations.

If the rights given to the workers and trade unions after 1960 are compared with the ones of the international arena, a very progressive picture appears. In the Western societies, starting from the 19th century, trade unions played very important roles while struggling for democracy and union rights which are the major components of democracy. Unionist struggle was part of democracy process and the best examples of it could be observed in such Western countries as England and France.

How was the situation in Turkey? Most of the democracy process was ascribed to the military and bureaucracy. As a result, unionist movement was not born out of a class struggle in Turkey. Moreover, democratic and unionist rights were way behind the trade unionism in Turkey. In other words, they were given relatively early while compared to the growth of the industrial worker. Obviously, the trade unions are extremely important components of democracy. However, they should not be expected to get stuck within the democratic structures. On the contrary, they should play a role in the political arena and as a unity combined by class consciousness,

they should have the chance to be elected to the parliament and become a governing structure as their equivalents in many European countries.

In the case of Turkey, the will to play a role in the political sphere has been almost non-existent in Türk-İş, the largest and most powerful union of the country. The rights were not obtained by the working class. On the contrary, those were the rights given by the state authorities. Consequently, the working class in Turkey has benefited from the struggles of its Western counterparts. However, one drawback was that the working class in Turkey did not go through the experiences of the Western counterparts and this resulted in their lack of class consciousness. To sum up, the lack of class consciousness of the workers after 1960 was not considered as a big deal at that time. Moreover, the rights provided by the new Constitution and new laws concerning the working conditions were too early or too large for the workers who lacked class consciousness. İsmail Özkan from Basın-İş underlines the problems stemming from those rights given particularly to the unionists too early:

When the Trade Union Law was enacted in 1963, there was a reality. Most of our trade unionists do not mention that. Originally, we came from shanty towns. If you had good propaganda skills, you were able to become a trade unionist. That was how we became unionists. We did not know the laws. Since we came from the very poor parts of the city, we became excessively proud of ourselves when we emerged as the leaders of trade unions all of a sudden and thus, we were unnecessarily flattered. Our life changed totally because we sat behind a leader's huge desk while we used to be just workers a short time ago. As part of the change in our life, we became addicted to the clubs where alcohol was drunk terribly. In other words, we could not absorb this new statute. Formerly, we were from the street culture, not from the academic culture. Most of us were graduates of primary school only, but now most of the unionists are university graduates. Although some trade unionists do not admit that, this was the truth. Unfortunately, most of the unionists ruined their home and family. Why? Because he comes from the shanty town. Just imagine! Your dress, your life, your community changes suddenly. You leave the shanty town and move into an apartment. Everything changes then. What does not change? Your wife. Unfortunately, some friends even changed their wives. We became overconfident and too arrogant.

In addition, the views of another Unionist, İbrahim Yalçınođlu, the General Director of Teksif, support the claim of Özkan when he comments on this new type of trade unionist which appeared especially in the second half of the 1960's:

I may be too offensive in that statement. We were spoiled because we were given far too many rights. What happened in 1966? The Act 440 which initiated participation in the administration of the work was introduced. I was elected to the management of Sümerbank. I was an Execution Board member and I was extremely powerful and effective there. We did not know where to stop. From that moment on, we started to administer. Yes, the workers were selected to the Execution Board membership in the factories and institutions. Years later, the government wanted to change this Act 440. I asked the Industry Minister why they wanted to change it. He told me that Sümerbank could be an exception, but people did not want to work due to this law. Let me tell you one incident! One day, they spanked the managers in our factory. I was the Execution Board member of Sümerbank then. I remember workers who used to come to the factory, go to the refectory, spend the whole day while playing 'saz' and finally leave in the afternoon. I even witnessed workers taking away the lunch provided by their own factory and giving it to the workers of another factory. Nobody could do anything. That means we could not use those rights appropriately. If we really look at the issue objectively, we did not use the given rights properly. Why? Because we did not obtain them after a 50 or 100 years' struggle. In 3 to 5 years, we reached the level of England, which attained that level in 200 years. We could not absorb it. I expressed that in the congresses by stating that one day our children could ask us the reason. They can ask us why we could not manage and why our rights were taken away although they were given previously. In fact, they were taken by the 1980 military coup.

As Özkan and Yalçınođlu describe, the newly emerging type of trade unionist was not an expected image. In fact, many trade union leaders were aware of the fact that this was not the way that it should be. Mustafa Bařođlu, the leader of Sađlık-İř for more than 40 years gives the clue. How to end the corrupted image of trade union leaders? In fact, this may be the clue of his long term leadership:

Propaganda is very important. Trade unions were harmed somehow. For instance, in one of the trade unions, a leader obtained illegally some amount of money. The attitude of one single person affects the whole group. There used to be a Jaguar incident of řemsi Denizer years ago, for example. Then, the whole society has negative feelings about the trade union leaders. The society believes that those leaders confiscate the

money from people, they spend it at the night clubs, they use luxurious cars, etc... Trade unionists must find means to erase those misconceptions. We need a trade unionism which unites with the public. What can we do? We can help the poor, help the schools. We can find ways to integrate with the society. We can produce new policies to protect the general interests of the country.

By the end of the sixties, the base structures of the unions, the members, were probably aware of this new type. In fact, the former trade unionist type before 1960 described by Sabri Tıǧlı, former Teksif executive, is the worker working for long hours and then performing the duties of the union as a volunteer with no financial expectation at all. As he remarks: "I used to go to work at 11 PM and leave work at 7 AM. After that, I used to go to the trade union and work from the morning till night as a volunteer".

The former image of a trade union leader was totally different than the one in the sixties. First of all, this was based on a volunteer relationship. Basically, the workers who were a little aware of the working conditions in the factory and who were aware that they could demand because they deserved better were getting involved in the trade union issues. After establishing a trade union or joining it, they were not exempt from their duties at work. On the contrary, in addition to their work at a factory the whole day, they spent extra long and difficult hours in the trade union. What's more, they got no financial assistance at all from the trade union in return for their work and energy at the union. They did not even have a salary from the trade union. Therefore, they did not have any profit expectations at all from their union since this was a volunteer mission. Moreover, there was not a protective labor law in that period before the 1961 Constitution and the 1963 Labor Acts. The worker who was also an executive of the trade union where he was working as a volunteer was not protected by the law against the employer. They had been threatened for years by their employer and suffered incredibly. As a summary, those were very brave and modest people.

However, with the introduction of the Constitution and the labor laws following it, this type and image of the trade union leaders have totally changed. This newly emerged type of trade unionists was people who were becoming unionists in order

to gain power in society and make more and more money. Since those union leaders were protected by the law, they gained power and a couple of them used it unwisely and selfishly. On the newspapers and magazines, some trade union leaders appeared as very rich men living in big houses and driving very luxurious cars. This new picture of the new trade union leader type affected people negatively. As a result, a title ‘trade union Agha’, which has been used for years, emerged in order to describe them. This title meant that those leaders were making people work while they were simply sitting and doing nothing and they were misusing the workers by obtaining incredible financial profits out the workers. All of the interviewers complained about those people and expressed that the number of such unionists of the new type which emerged in the sixties was very low but this was hurting and damaging.

This newly emerging and arrogant attitude of the trade union leaders after the 1960’s can be closely linked with the lack of education and class consciousness. Since the trade unionism in Turkey lacked class consciousness and it was shaped by the economic and social affairs of the period, it was likely to have been influenced by the American trade unionism and thus, instead of class consciousness, salary consciousness was the motive. In 1960, the number of the workers reached 800 thousand, 300 thousand of which were trade union members. During the decade before the military intervention, the workers were silenced and ‘government friendly’. Similarly, Türk-İş had close relationship with the DP. This resulted in its failure to take its place within the forces who were trying to obtain constitutional and legal rights before 1960. Even after the ratification of the 1961 Constitution, the workers were unaware of the extensive rights given to them. Fortunately, they started to act rather unanimously.

The first instance was the famous Saraçhane Meeting. Previously, in July 1961, municipality workers in İzmir and in August 1961, İstanbul Bahariye Mensucat (textile industry) workers had left work. In addition, the same year in August, the workers of the SWA (State Water Affairs) had taken action in İzmir. Moreover, in October, the workers of İzmir Sümerbank decided to grow their beard in order to show their reaction. This was called beard growing action. Yalçınoğlu from Teksif reminds the importance of this action:

At the İzmir Congress of Teksif I was a delegate. They said that they wanted to make pressure on the employer. They talked about a 'strike whose symbol would be beard'. I returned to Malatya. I heard that no worker cut his beard. All of them grew their beard 100 %. Only one worker cut it. While he was going to the refectory, they painted his face with red paint. There was such a unity. I told you the reason for it. Previously, there was the oppression and ill-treatment.

Besides this beard growing action in İzmir, in December in Ankara, SWA workers had also done the same and EGS (Electricity Gas Bus) workers marched. During the last days of December 1961 and the first days of January 1962, the dock workers in İstanbul stopped work. On the last day of 1961, 31 December 1961, Türk-İş organized a meeting to obtain main union rights as right to strike (Saraçhane Meeting). Avni Erakalın, the General Director of İstanbul Trade Unions Association between 1960 and 1962 and the first leader of Workers' Party of Turkey (WPT), remembers every moment of the meeting very accurately and expresses the magnitude of this meeting while some tears dropping down his eyes:

A revolutionary Constitution was accepted in 1961 and we supported it. The military was in touch with Türk-İş by means of its connection with the RPP. We decided to organize a meeting in Taksim Square in the middle of İstanbul. We went there. There was Martial law in İstanbul. The governor, Refik Tulga, asked us how we could arrange a meeting against the army, the Martial law and the military intervention. We told him we would. Nuri Beşer, a supporter of the DP, was the General Director of Türk-İş at that time. I wanted to stress the opposition of Türk-İş against the meeting, but I wanted to obtain public awareness. I knew that the army would accept it, but I wanted to organize it just a means of political action. This was heard even abroad. We delayed it and then Türk-İş decided to join. It was a wonderful meeting with 200 thousand people. All the citizens were there to see us. We gave them flowers and chocolate. We wanted to obtain the right to strike and collective bargaining. This was a reaction against the Martial law, not only strike and collective bargaining. We had many demands many of which are still not realised. For instance, the management of the Social Security Association by the workers and unemployment insurance were some of them. Kemal Türkler, who gave wonderful speech, expressed all those demands. Meanwhile, a soldier came to me and told me that Refik Tulga had wanted to talk to me. Refik Tulga told me that he had been deceived because he had been told that we would destroy and ruin everything since we were the communists. He congratulated us and the workers. Anyhow, later, Türk-İş supported us intensely.

Another trade unionist, İbrahim Yalçınoğlu from Teksif touches upon a different aspect of the Saraçhane Meeting, the oppression of the last 20 or 30 years:

We were oppressed for 20 or 30 years. There were no laws concerning collective agreements and strikes. We decided to organize a meeting so as to make pressure for the enactment of such laws. We were going to the meeting. In the workshop of our factory we had hundreds of flags and pennants prepared. Nobody opposed us. We were already in fight, so the employer could not object to it. Because the law was about to be introduced, we wanted to make pressure so that it is introduced the way that we wanted it to be. We wanted to demonstrate our power. To illustrate, hundreds of people wanted to join this meeting. Workers from Malatya, for instance, went to this meeting with no financial expectation at all. They wanted to see the atmosphere; they wanted to shout by their own financial means. This famous meeting became our starting point. This was a warning or a threat. We gave the message that we were present.

As it is observed in the explanations of two union leaders, Erakalın and Yalçınoğlu, there was a vibrant appearance in many spheres in Turkey after 1960. This was partly due to the passage in multi-party era after 1946 when the inert social structure was broken and started to gain a dynamic composition. That is the reason why many important strikes occurred after 1960 because trade unionism started to institutionalize in terms of strikes, lock-outs and collective bargaining. Naturally, the economic and political factors had a major role in the institutionalization of trade unionism and the emergence of Türk-İş as a serious body.

During this dynamic period, the number of workers increased due to the economic development. Besides the quantitative improvement, there was a qualitative recovery in the working class. A new type of worker was emerging in that period. The temporary worker who used to keep links with the rural area was becoming a permanent industrial worker.

In the 1960's and 1970's, the state led a major role to develop private sector. It became a main supplier for industries producing both the consumption and investment goods by means of public investments. It gained a primary role in the industrial activity while regulating private sector particularly by means of central

planning during the first years of the 1960's. The state had a control on currency rates, interest rates and principally on providing credits to some particular industry and small business by means of state banks.

The result was that the working class started to thrive on related to the improvement in the industry. Similarly, class consciousness began to play a role slowly in the reactions of the working class. For instance, a group of construction workers who lost patience due to unemployment asked permission to march on 26 April 1962, but they were ignored. Finally, they gathered and marched on 3 May. They could pass the police barricades and reached the Parliament. Unfortunately, they were harmed by the police at the end. Their friends, workers, who heard that, were successful in resisting (Sülker 1968d: 97). This proves the seeds of the growing class consciousness in that period. In fact, the strikes and other reactionary responses of the workers were in the big cities as İstanbul and İzmir in 1961. Nonetheless, those spread to some other cities as Afyon, Hatay, Samsun, Tokat and Malatya in 1962. Besides, it is possible to observe the growing voice of the trade unionists in the press. One significant illustration is the extremely critical declaration of Ağralı, a journalist and a unionist. In his statement in June 1962, he touches upon the financial abuses and went on explaining them by underlining the corruption cases going on in the Workers' Insurance Institution related to the political individuals, the employers and the organization itself:

The Institution has become a child who is not able to survive because the Ministries have already been in a queue to get some interests out of it. This Institution has become a place to take advantage of. The Health Ministry may invade our hospitals, another ministry may invade our houses and the Finance Ministry may invade our money tomorrow. We have no option than saying welcome. Moreover, the total of the amount which the employers should pay the Institution in 1962 together with the ones from the last year is 804 million 400 thousand Turkish Liras. In the report, it is stated that 623 million 521 thousand Liras was collected from them. Every year, there is an increase in the amount which can't be collected. A huge group of employers in Turkey are used to not paying their dues to the Institution and this has become a means of profit for them by investing that amount of money. Furthermore, there are serious corruption cases. According to the inspectors' reports, in İstanbul, 129 pharmacies out of 147 gave

cheaper medicines instead of the ones written on the prescription. The similar situation is in İzmir (Hürriyet, 1962).

It appears that more than thirty years ago, the trade unionists were aware of the fact that this Institution would become a corruption area for the political individuals and it would go bankrupt as it is happening today. The similar explanation of Ziya Hepbir, a former leader of Petrol-İş, about the same Institution shows the slowly rising class consciousness among the workers in the first years of the 1960's:

I will talk about the deceitful people who can vacuum the money taken to the Institution from those poor workers. I do not understand why the responsibilities have not taken measures when the fraud allegation about one of the Commission Directors was told. This Institution requires a total reform from 'a' to 'z'. We expect this reform from our young Minister Bülent Ecevit (Akşam, 1962 and Ulus 1962).

Although the speech of Hepbir was interrupted by the Congress Director Professor Cahit Talas, he went on and he was able to finish it because the worker delegates applauded Hepbir vigorously by shouting 'this is the place of this critic and we want it to be clarified here now'. Therefore, all these declarations of the trade union leaders and worker delegates show evidence to the blurred but improving appearance of class consciousness in that period. Furthermore, one year later, in 1963, the same issue will be raised by Ağralı who announced that the Workers Security Institution had hidden the corruption cases (Son Havadis, 23 May 1963). When Fuat Alan, the former General Director of Belediye-İş and Türk-İş Executive Board member, expresses his feeling on the issue during the interviews, it is possible to argue that class consciousness appeared and started to grow gradually after 1961:

We tried to perform unionist activities within the class consciousness philosophy in that period. After the Acts 274 and 275, we were on a new stage, collective agreements. We signed many of them with the municipalities. We got organized in 2200 municipalities. We had huge marches against the dismissals from work. We marched to Ankara because of the removal of 400 workers in İzmir. Naturally, we also struggled against perspectives opposing class consciousness philosophy within the confederation.

Another evidence of rising class consciousness of the resistance of the trade unionists against the actions and structure of the Workers' Insurance Institution, which will become the Social Security Institution (SSI) in 1964, took place in 1962. By the way, the first person to be registered to the SSI was not an ordinary worker. It was an interesting character: a worker from the Eyüp Balat Flour Factory in İstanbul, Zühtü Tetey. Sadık Şide gives the details on this registration:

Zühtü Tetey was given an honor medal by the SSI. He was around 60 years old at the time. He had been retired early because of his illness. He was a mature and experienced person. He was a trade unionist. First, he was the leader of Food Workers Union, later the leader of the İstanbul Workers Unions Association and then the member of Türk-İş Executive Board. He was one of the masters of Turkish trade unionism (Şide 2005: 39).

In the summer of 1962, Labor Minister Bülent Ecevit gave a speech in the 17th General Congress of this institution underlining new changes related to workers. He stated that “the social security rights given by the Constitution to all the citizens should be put into effect and he would increase his contribution to realise this”. However, on the second day of the Congress, press representative and trade unionist Sedat Ağralı who labeled the Social Security Institution ‘a cow from which you can always obtain milk’ showed his reaction by attacking the government:

Turkish workers could not benefit at all from this Institution and they had only one chance: they had to go abroad to work. The Turkish worker who goes to Germany to find a job is sold in exchange for a penny due to the agreement signed by the government. This Institution has become an interest area for the governments and this abuse should be stopped (Akis Journal, 1962).

The severe speech of Ağralı and the applause of the content audience demonstrate the initiation of seriousness of the trade unions and the development in class consciousness since he showed his reaction very clearly in front of the Congress including 84 worker representatives, 84 employer representatives and Labor Ministry officials. The most striking event was the attitude of the audience: his speech was applauded heavily. This was the proof of the growing class

consciousness within the working class. He also criticized the partial attitude of the government towards the employers:

According to the Labor Law, the employers who do lock-outs in order to influence the decisions of High Arbitration Institute should pay a minimum fine of one thousand Turkish Liras and should be sentenced a minimum of 3 month's prison. In Turkey, have you ever heard any employer who has been punished because he has done lock-out? In our country, all the laws which are supposed to provide social justice are the Inquisition tools granted to the employers. I can't say that those are the books to be burn. I believe those are the books burning us (Akis Journal, 1962).

Those are the vocalizations of a journalist and a unionist as well. They display obviously the change in the attitude of the workers who interrupted Ağralı by applauding him extensively. Another important issue that Ağralı touches upon is a very important topic in social security: accidents occurring at work. While he was declaring the numbers of those accidents the whole audience listened to him silently:

According to the Report, the number of business under the social security system is 40.426 in 1962. The number of the workers in that category is more than 600.000. This year, there is not an increase in work related illness, injury and death ratio compared with last year. However, there is an increase of 7.5% in the number of work related accidents. It rose from 68.742 to 73.885. This is a terrifying number. This shows us that the Turkish workers work in such a severe old and immature condition that one out of 7 workers faces with work related accidents. Furthermore, a very small minority in Turkey is a burden for the 29 million people while the population of the country is 30 million. Therefore, there is no way to talk about a standard of life which the individuals deserve. If the government can not assure social security, expecting peace will only be imagination (Akis Journal and Tercuman, 1962).

Those upheavals of the trade unionists in such an important Congress show us that the workers were fed up with the situation: the rights provided by the 1961 Constitution were not put into effect by means of new laws. A declaration of Ethem Ezgü shows the pressure done by the union leaders for the enactment of a new labor law:

Workers will definitely gain their rights. If the right to strike is not given in two years, the Constitution will be violated. Then, we will continue to go on a strike to get the rights of the Turkish workers. Moreover, some amount of money has been cut from the workers' salaries by the state under the name of savings. The purpose of this is to pay the salaries of the state officers. How can the state have such a right? (Öncü, 12 June 1962)

Until 1963, the workers still lacked the right to form collective agreements and to strike because unionist actions were still limited. Nevertheless, the workers were not active enough to put an end to this restriction and initiate action to start the emergence of new laws regarding their own fate. The two rights, right to strike and right to form collective agreements, were obtained with the introduction of two laws in 1963, without intense efforts of the workers despite some struggling actions. In some other countries, however, those rights were obtained were gained after many long and difficult or even bloody struggles. The difference in Turkey was that they were given by the state before such fights occurred as a result of a reformist Constitution.

Furthermore, the 48th article of the Constitution was revolutionary in terms of the social security right. It accepted the principle of the clause 22 of the Human Rights Declaration which says 'each individual has the right of social security'. The article 48 of the Constitution took social security as a basic right for all the members of the society. This right can neither be captured nor given up. According to the Constitution, it will be provided by means of social insurance and aid (Güzel and Okur 1996: 35).

Finally, with the impact of the reformist Constitution and the severe reactions of some trade unionists together with the marches and strikes of the workers, the Trade Union Act 274 and Collective Agreement, Strike and Lock-out Act 275 were ratified in 1963 and were put into effect in 24 July 1963. Since the article 46 of the Constitution used the term 'laborers', which meant both group, workers and officers, on 14 August 1965, the Law 624 was introduced in order to organize the trade union rights of the officers.

The results of both, Act 274 and 275 were immense. The first and the most important one regarding our focus is their positive effect on trade unions, particularly Türk-İş. It initiated an immediate recovery period in which it became intensely active. The first example can be observed in the change of attitude in the RPP government. During the preparation procedure of the 1st Development Plan the workers were not given a say and Türk-İş administration was really bothered on this issue. That's why they wrote a letter to the Prime Minister, İnönü, on 20.7. 1063:

We regret to inform you that we learned that the 5 years' Development Plan, prepared by the State Planning Organization, was offered to the specialists and the government and at the last minute, was given to the employers to be examined due to the pressure coming from the big capitalists. We know nothing about its aim and practice. National planning can never reflect the profits of a definite group. This can not be called a plan if it is employed under the influence of a group.

Our focus is that the government, who does not feel uncomfortable about the examination of the Plan by the employers, should not forget the Turkish workers who will carry the principle burden in the implementation of the plan. The Plan can only be successful with the contribution of the Turkish workers. Therefore, it is the right of the Turkish worker to say the first word about the Plan. The government must very well know that a plan lacking the view and the support of the trade unions can not be executed and will not be executed (Ağralı 1967: 175).

This declaration of Türk-İş gives evidence to the slowly increasing popularity of the Confederation because its administration was invited to the meeting about the plan and a group of Türk-İş executives joined it. However, the willingness of the government to the participation of Türk-İş is a debatable issue. Moreover, in the following years, the governments did not take the opinion of the Confederation on important issues regarding the workers such as social security, national income distribution and minimum wage.

Having given the power to sign collective agreement contracts and the right to strike, Türk-İş gained popularity among the workers after 1963. The news about the first collective agreement contracts signed in that period appeared in many newspapers. For instance, the one between the trade union of food workers, Gıda-İş, and their employer, Hacıbekir, was signed on 12 September 1963. It covered 210

workers. It was a detailed contract with 14 sections. The contract was valid for 3 years and the parties agreed not to go on a strike or lock-out during that period (Milliyet, 12th September 1963).

Another illustration is the first collective agreement contract which was signed on 7 February 1964 between the workers and the employers of press. The parties signing the contract were the Turkish Journalists Trade Union and Turkish Journal Owners Trade Union together with two journals: Cumhuriyet and Milliyet. This was a very long and detailed contract. It had 22 pages and 14 sections clarifying every single detail on the worker-employer relations, so it has a revolutionary aspect. As it cannot be expected, many state officials such as the governor of İstanbul Niyazi Akı, The Commender of First Army Division and İstanbul Martial Law Commender Full General Refik Yılmaz, the mayor of İstanbul Haşim İşcan were present during the signature ceremony of the collective agreement contract (Milliyet, 8th February 1964).

*document 1

The impact of the new laws in 1963 was the attainment of power in the collective bargaining process. Since the introduction of those two laws, relatively more consciousness appeared within the workers. Kenan Durukan, former leader of Harb-İş, touches upon the arrival of the new laws in 1963 by comparing the consciousness of the two parties, the workers and the employers:

When we were in the U.S.A. those two laws were accepted. After we returned, collective agreement efforts started. In that period, the employers were not aware of what was going on. The trade unionists were more conscious. However, this was not a political consciousness. In the education courses, they used to learn things like how to make collective agreements and so on. However, they were far away from the working class consciousness. They were not aware of the fact: why a better salary? Why better working conditions.

As Durukan touches upon, not only the trade union leaders of that period, the sixties, most of the ones who were interviewed during the study also lacked both class consciousness and political consciousness since they did not even use this

word. Political consciousness requires the aggregated dissatisfactions at an individual level first and then at a political level. It incorporates shared interest. That is the reason why it needs the recognition of the workers who should believe that their individual welfare is definitely related to their class. By stressing their discontent and dissatisfaction, they should express their expectation as a class. First, they must realize that unless they act as a whole, they are not able to gain important resources in the society due to inequities in the decision-making process. They should believe that they can correct social and political inequities by joining in the political arena. This participation should stem from an awareness leading to collective action not simply individual reaction. The disadvantaged position of the workers must be realized by their own class; thus, they need to succeed in mobilizing class consciousness to reach high level of political involvement in the high ranks of the political realm.

What was the opinion of the union leaders about those two Acts? Despite the ratification of Acts 274 and 275, there were some trade unionists who were still unsatisfied with the state's attitude towards the workers. For instance, Sedat Ağralı, who himself had the chance to appear on the newspapers since he was a journalist and a unionist as well, stresses that 'the government and the state are always suspicious towards the workers' movement in every period' (Her Gün, 23 December 1963). On the other hand, Enver Turgut, former General Director of Tes-İş, claims that those two Acts initiated the arrival of trade unionism in Turkey. He also adds that they tried to complement the deficiencies of those reformist laws:

We focused on the retirement regulations. For instance, there was 'Worker's Union' (Amele Birliği), trade unions, railway union. They were all separate associations. We united them. We stated that the retirement dues cut off the salaries of our friends were disappearing because those associations were going bankrupt. I mean my friends who had paid their dues were not given the chance to retire, and they were not taken care when they fell ill. We united them under one association: Social Security Institution (SSI).

During the period after 1961, with the restoration of a civilian regime, Turkey faced coalition governments in the political system. The Republican People's Party was the dominant partner in a series of coalitions which were quite weak political structures. In that period, the party experienced a major transition, İsmet İnönü, the glorious leader, was replaced by a younger leader, Bülent Ecevit. Moreover, the party demonstrated a more clearly defined ideological position. In particular, in the 1960's and the 1970's, although coalition politics emerged, a highly personal rivalry also appeared between the RPP leader and his counterpart, the Justice Party.

After the elections of 1961, the RPP returned to power, but the help of the military rather than through the free choice of the electorate was the reason for the arrival of the party on the political stage. The evidence was that the performance of the party actually declined from the level of 1957. By 1965, the RPP was again out of power and it is claimed that it was the worst electoral performance in its history. Four years later, its performance was even worse.

After the last resignation of İnönü from the government, the party began to undergo fundamental change. In 1964, both Feyzioğlu and Ecevit, the rising stars of the party, declared their new vision, 'Our Ideal of a Progressive Turkey'. This was a sign of change. The emphasis was on land reform, social justice, social security, economic development, education, secularism, etc. It is claimed that this slogan was a kind of investment that will pay off, not in 1965 but in 1969.

Meanwhile, what was going on within Türk-İş? First of all Türk-İş became an organization which was taken seriously by various governments and the public. That is the reason why it became a reputable institution increasing the quantity and the quality of its workers. The first explanation is the rising class consciousness among the trade unionists and the workers in that period. Trade unionists of Türk-İş having different ideologies were able to live in peace and discuss the issues in a peaceful atmosphere in the confederation. Many of the trade unionists put across the argument that there used to be a hierarchal discipline within Türk-İş. İsmail Özkan, for instance, underlines the importance of the hierarchal structure of Türk-İş and

states that “there used to be unity because of the discipline”. He adds that they used to respect each other and help each other. He exemplifies that:

The General Director of Türk-İş was Halil Tunç at the time. I used to criticize him a lot during the execution board meetings. However, after living his room and coming down the steps I used to shut my mouth up. I would never make announcement to the press. Politically, I believe in chain of command. The problems debated in the board should be kept there. We should be careful on this point.

Moreover, another unionist, Fuat Alan, clarifies the same issue by focusing on the unity of the workers as a class and the advantages of it:

Hierarchy is very important. In the old structure of Türk-İş, there used to be hierarchy and discipline. The decisions taken by the confederation used to be applied to the trade unions top down and this used to be done very effectively. There used to be unionist discipline, respect and affection. I am not able to see it today. The hierarchy of the past was useful and beneficial. The union discipline and class discipline between the confederation and the trade unions was important. Of course, this was an important element in order to struggle together. When the decisions taken by the confederation were sent to us, we used to obey them all. Unfortunately, today there is weakness on this issue.

Another unionist, Mustafa Başoğlu, the General Director of Sağlık-İş since 1965, a union leader who was able to maintain his leadership for more than 40 years, argues that he used to have close contact with the RPP representative, Kenan Durukan despite the fact that he was a JP representative in Parliament. He remembers that people were amazed when they saw them sitting and talking nicely. Ethem Ezgü, the member of Türk-İş Execution Board, and İbrahim Yalçınoğlu, the leader of Teksif, support Durukan by announcing that there was not a separation between the two groups, the JP and RPP fans. All those declarations demonstrate that the class consciousness was more dominant in the party membership. Yalçınoğlu adds:

We never had difficulties because we had unionist parliamentarians from different parties. On the contrary, that helped us since they all tried to save workers’ rights in the Parliament. Regardless of their political party membership, they were all united. That’s why Türk-İş was somewhere different that people had expected. It had a high reputation. The governments were not able to get rid of its pressure. We are proud of

that. When Seyfi Demirsoy left the Türk-İş building and headed to the Prime Minister's office, the Prime Minister used to wait for him at the front door. 'There was a government in Ankara, but there was also a Türk-İş'. I think we had a congress in 1971 in Erzurum. 17 ministers came and 4 of them gave speech. Similarly, when we had a congress in Ankara, the Prime Minister and all the Ministers used to come and tell us about what was going on. The opposition party also used to come because Türk-İş was a great pressure group.

Despite the arguments of those trade union leaders claiming that there used to be unity within Türk-İş, there were some other leaders who opposed. Their main stand point is that there was the JP-RPP distinction and fanaticism within the confederation, but this used to be done secretly, so nobody knew about it. That was where the power of Türk-İş was stemming from. The first example of the separation is given by Kemal Sarısoy, a former Türk-İş Executive Board member:

Türk-İş was divided into two groups, called rightists and leftists. There was friction between the two. Although we appeared as a whole body in front of the public, we were divided into two groups in terms of political views. Actually, into three. Later, it became four before 1980 military coup. The parties were obviously and intensely stimulating Türk-İş. There was an attitude which was a characteristic of Turkish people. When you talk about general interests, you are a united whole. When you talk about individual interests, people work for their own benefit. The truth is that the political parties managed us.

Within this new perspective of emerging divisions within Türk-İş, a short revision of the events that were going on in the political sphere starting from the second half of the decade until the 1971 military coup is necessary. Since the division occurred related to the two political parties, the RPP and the JP, the focus will be on the relations of Türk-İş with both by referring to the views of the interviewees.

In the sixties, the bureaucracy and the intellectuals agreed on one topic: development. The task to do was to get rid of the corrupted politicians who run after their own interests only. The governing class should be composed of politicians who were willing to serve the citizens and who were for a national plan. Within the new order envisaged by those two groups, the basic stress was on industrialization, economic independence and social justice. That is the reason why the intellectuals

supported the 1960 intervention since they believed that this was the initiation of the industrialization period.

The institution given the role in this new development perspective was the State Planning Organization (SPO). Because of its privileged position in the 1961 Constitution, the SPO was given a more important emphasis than many ministries dealing with the economy. The Head of the SPO was a kind of Vice Prime Minister. The five-year plans were obligatory for the public sector. In other words, state factories had to obey them. However, the plans were formulating a model for the private sector. They did not have to obey them. The SPO was the center for the investment decisions. Therefore, the credits and scarce foreign currency resource allocations were under the authority of this institution which provided the industry with the profit to obtain bigger pieces from the scarce resources. Naturally, the new rights offered the workers after the new Constitution were given in order to respond the needs of this new model.

The drawback of this new model giving priority to the State Planning Organization was apparent: impairment in the functionality of the state due to political intervention and emergence of this impairment during the period with economic difficulties. Therefore, Turkish economy entered a new phase after 1960: the partisanship within the financial circulation mechanisms and redistribution of income led to the establishment of the domestic market. Both instruments stressed the regulation of the state. Since this new model was meeting the demands of the industrial bourgeoisie, the formerly brilliant and currently dull public officers and finally the intellectuals, it gained the support of those three prominent groups of the society.

Obviously, the Keynesian model adopted after the War and this model were quite similar. In the Keynesian model, the economy is under the control of the state and the bureaucracy gains importance. In addition, the domestic market emerges and redistribution because of reproduction is necessary. The industry in the countries of the periphery is protected from the international competition and this was called import substitution policy which proposes the protection of the domestic industry.

In other words, the consumption products previously imported from abroad are forbidden to enter the country since the domestic industry produces them now.

Industrial development by means of import substitution policy requires the import of the semi-processed goods and raw materials. That is why the import demand of the country becomes dependent on the growth potential of the country. Therefore, import substitution policy neither prevents the integration with the global economy nor diminishes it. Capitalist system requires profit maximization of each individual capitalist. In other words, it suggests minimum cost, thus, lowest salaries for the workers. The capitalist class on the whole, however, should keep the salaries at a level that the demand can be maintained alive on the market. In other words, if each individual capitalist keeps the salaries low, a demand problem may rise and the role of the state may become more important. The state acts in a way to balance the profit maximization demand of the employer and salary maximization of the worker. That is the reason why it is not possible to declare that the Turkish state was eager to provide the workers with widened rights after the 1961 Constitution by means of the Acts 274 and 275. This was mainly due to the economic pressure stemming from the foreign forces. The unwillingness of the Turkish state while giving rights to the workers is underlined clearly by Ömer Sönmez, the former General Secretary of Demiryol-İş:

We were in great trouble in those years. I can't claim that the state had contributions. In fact, the state never says 'take this and put it in your pocket, it's yours'. You must struggle. This is the goal of trade unionism. You must try to obtain lacking things that you think are required. You must try to increase life standard. You must contribute to the social or educational affairs. You must be helpful in any area. These things can be realised by the struggle of the trade unions. Nobody gives you rights because they are willing to.

Within this critical perspective about the attitude of the state there is a very important issue regarding workers. In the capitalist system, low consumption and decrease in the profit rate may lead to a crisis. That is the reason why import substitution policies aim at promoting consumption and providing a good level of profit for the capitalists. If the domestic industry does not challenge against foreign

industry in the domestic market, it can reach high levels of profit. Of course, a well-disciplined working class is the key component of the import substitution policy. Thus, the industry should be firm against the workers' demands such as high salary and better working conditions.

In the 1960's, the state in Turkey was kind of a guaranty mechanism for the income distribution. For instance, the state was the supporter of the agriculture, so many leftists in that period were against this policy and they suggested taxes for the agricultural activity. Since the political parties were dependent on the agricultural groups in the rural areas, they did not want to introduce taxes for them.

During the same period, there was rapid migration. In fact, almost half of the residential areas of the big cities were made up of shanty towns by the end of the 1960's. As Bulutay argues, 'the second major part of industrialization in Turkey is the 1960's and 1970's. This is largely an import-substitution phase of Turkish industrialization and this period contributed greatly to manufacturing employment and urbanization, and expanded urban employment' (Bulutay 1995a: 189). Migrants, who moved to big cities with the incentive of employment and who were from the agricultural background formerly did not break up their connections with their home villages after migrating to the big cities. If they had land in their home village, they either sold it or rented it. This created a consumption capacity for the market. Moreover, when they migrated to the big cities, they constructed houses in one night in the shanty town areas. This was also another means of consumption for the market. As a result, although rapidly growing shanty towns of the sixties were the sources of many problems, they created demand for the market.

The functioning market is not enough by itself, so additional resources are necessary to run the economy smoothly in this system. What happened in Turkey until the mid-sixties was that the majority of the additional resources were from the foreign states or international institutions as financial aid or credit. The biggest portion of those was from the U.S.A. The American financial and military aid continued until 1974 and it was large enough to cover almost half the foreign trade deficit. The

other two income categories were the one from the tourism and the Turkish workers sending money from abroad, but those were not a huge amount.

Meanwhile, during this period between 1961 and 1971, after the restoration of a civilian regime, Turkey faced a coalition politics in the political system. Both parties were the dominant partners in a series of coalitions which were quite weak. In that period, the RPP experienced a major transition. İsmet İnönü was replaced by a younger leader, Ecevit. Furthermore, the party demonstrated a more clearly defined ideological position.

After the resignation of İnönü from the government, the RPP had to undergo fundamental changes. Turhan Feyzioğlu and Bülent Ecevit became the two shining stars of the party. They declared their ideal as a 'Progressive Turkey'. This declaration included such terms as land reform, social justice, social security, economic development, democratic étatism, education, secularism, the fine arts, nationalism and youth (LaPalombara, Weiner 1966: 250). In fact, those terms conformed to the social state concept of the new Constitution. 'The third part of the Constitution included regulations on working and agreement liberty, right to work, working conditions, right to rest, justice in salaries, social security right, developing cooperatives, protection of farms and agriculture' (Makal 2002: 530).

As mentioned earlier, this was the period of planning. In fact, the five-year plans drafted between 1963 and 1978 envisaged the American aid in order to cover foreign trade deficit. Naturally, close attention of the U.S.A. to the Turkish economic and political arena and particularly to the trade union movement can be observed after 1963 in return. In fact, a report of a meeting between Türk-İş Executive Board and the Labor Minister Cahit Talas on 14th March 1961 demonstrates that the relations between the American aid agencies and Türk-İş had already been an emphasized issue. In the 1962 activities section of the report, it is stated that 'AID will do any kind of aid to the Turkish workers and trade unionists by means of Türk-İş and the starting date of this regulation is 1.1.1962'. Concerning worker-employer relations, the aim of this project which will end in 1965 is:

To increase the production and the proportion of the private aid in the production. To educate 900 talented trade unionists and teach them trade unionism. Skilful unionists to do collective bargaining and to deal with complaints are necessary to reach sustainable worker-employer relations and to increase productivity. Türk-İş has been given the responsibility to organize and execute this program. Türk-İş is composed of 11 federations, 162 trade unions and 300.000 workers (Koç 2002: 263).

Naturally, in that period, the executives of Türk-İş were in touch with many American government officials and trade unions. Alpaslan Işıklı argues that the American financial assistance that Türk-İş received from AID (Agency for International Development) was equal to the amount that it obtained from the workers' dues. This created the necessary situation for the Türk-İş officials to visit the U.S.A. He adds that many organizations which were involved in political activity in Latin America were in touch with Türk-İş. Those were AIFLD, AFL-CIO and AAFLI (Işıklı 1981a: 355). Most of the interviewers underlined their visit to the U.S.A. in such years, but some found them beneficial and some unnecessary. However, it is also argued by Anıl Çeçen that the U.S.A. introduced AID financial assistance to Türk-İş so as to impose American type trade unionism by means of the non-partisanship policy:

Türk-İş, which had been leading the Turkish trade unionism by itself alone for years, got rid of the DP domination thanks to 27 May intervention. Nevertheless, it went under the influence of the American type trade unionism by means of AID assistance. By supplying economic aid, the Turkish trade unionism was thrown into non-partisanship policy dilemma. The visits of the unionists to the U.S.A. were the major means of this political impact. The workers' training was transformed into American unionism education. The Americans taught the Turkish workers that economic struggle would be adequate and political struggle was unnecessary. In order to implement non-partisanship policy, they provided good amount of financial assistance (Çeçen 1973: 217).

Before stating the views of the interviewers on the issue, regarding this topic, a very important document, provided by one of the interviewers, a former Türk-İş official is worth mentioning. It was signed in 1962 in Emirgan İstanbul by four trade unionists, Kemal Türkler, Bahir Ersoy, Rüştü Güneri and İbrahim Denizcier. The striking prominence of this document is that the trade unionists who signed it and

declared their opposition against American intervention on Turkish trade unionism were not only the supporters of the leftist currents or leftist political parties. Surprisingly, they were, on the contrary, unionists from both currents; left and right. For instance, Kemal Türkler and İbrahim Denizci were the founders of the Workers' Party of Turkey (WPT) in 1961. Later in 1967, Türkler established the CRTUY, Confederation of Progressive Workers' Unions, and he became the General Director. Bahir Ersoy also was a RPP parliamentarian between 1969 and 1980. However, Rüştü Güneri was a DP deputy between 1957 and 1960. Thus, this is the evidence that the political affiliation did not matter. Supporters of both groups showed that they were against American policies to interfere with the trade unionism in Turkey by signing such a document in which they state their opposition against the American yellow unionism.

The authentic document, signed on 30 March 1962, clarifies the intensity of the American pressure on the trade unionism in Turkey since the beginning of the sixties because it has a clause underlining the objection against any kind of intervention

The basic principles about the organization and activities of the Turkish trade unions:

- 1- a trade union is a non-partisan organization based on strike and collective agreement
- 2- Turkish trade unionism definitely refuses yellow unionism.
- 3- Turkish trade unionism definitely refuses interventions
- 4- The establishment and organization system of Turkish trade unionism is Turkish type trade union.

As a result, we are for unification and against divisions.

* document 2

The extreme American interference on any field in Turkey is stressed by Çavdar. He announces that starting in the late fifties and continuing severely in the 60's, Turkey became a place where all Westerners were taking advantage of (Çavdar 2002: 432).

Despite such written and verbal agreements about yellow trade unionism of the U.S.A., many Türk-İş executives were invited and most of the interviewed unionist went there and came back with positive or negative opinions about the American trade unionism. Moreover, they were invited to Israel to attend classes on trade unionism. Kenan Durukan who went to the U.S.A. with a huge group of Türk-İş trade unionists states that he benefited a great deal from this visit:

Before doing my military service in 1963, I went to the U.S.A. with a lot of Turkish trade unionists. They used to send us there so that we could gain consciousness and experience. There was Avni Erakalın, Ziya Hepbir, Kaya Özdemiroğlu, Beyhan Cenkçi, Mustafa Ekmekçi, Osman İpekçi, Şevket Yılmaz in my group. I had a chance to make observations and research in the U.S.A. with a group of unionists who will be the most significant characters in trade unionism in Turkey in the future. This was a turning point for me. It was extremely beneficial. Naturally, my conception of world has changed. I noticed that there were many basic inaccuracies in our education. For instance, the sayings like 'one Turk is capable of changing the world'. I noticed that there is no such a thing and this was not nationalism. I learned what nationalist feeling is. You will save national interests, and spend some effort to increase them, but you will also accept the truth. Can you believe? Many of my friends put the empty coke bottles in their luggage and took them back to Turkey because the Americans were throwing them in the trash. We were having trouble in understanding this consumption economy. We used to ask the Americans and their answer was 'if we do not run the consumption economy like this, unemployment will rise'. This was a balance, but we were not able to understand it because our country was in poverty. It was impossible to throw coke bottles in the trash in our country.

During the interviews, two other unionists who mentioned their visits to the U.S.A. are Sedat Ağralı and Avni Erakalın. Interestingly, most of the unionists who went to the U.S.A. in the sixties visited also Israel so as to get union education. Ağralı, who is one of them, declared that he was lucky to receive a wonderful unionism education in Israel:

I went to Israel in 1963 for education. I flew to Jerusalem from Cyprus. I went to Asia-Africa School and had trade unionism education. I am sorry to say that: although Israel was a newly built country in those years, it was compulsory to finish secondary school. Many well-educated people from all over the world were going there. I received wonderful trade unionism education in Israel. Moreover, I was invited to the U.S.A. as

a guest from Türk-İş. In 1965, I went there and got unionism education at Wisconsin University.

Similarly, Tevfik Nejat Karacagil, an executive of Deniz-İş and Türk-İş and the former General Director of Cevher-İş, declares himself really lucky to have been invited to the U.S.A. and to Israel:

I went to the U.S.A. I received education on trade unionism at the Saint Jean College for three months in 1963. Later I went to Israel for the same purpose. I stayed there for one month. They taught us many things. In Israel, I learned the things that I did not in the U.S.A. We did all these with a nationalist sentiment.

Nevertheless, there were some other trade unionists who were critical about their visit to the U.S.A. by declaring that these visits were arranged to influence Turkish trade unionists and to keep them under American control. Avni Erakalin declares that ‘the aim the U.S.A was to gather power in one confederation’. He believes ‘the intention of the U.S.A was not naïve’. He thinks that ‘if they provide education in their country, this is due to the fact that they want to manage our confederation easily’. In addition, İsmail Özkan from Basın-İş argues that those two countries invited the Turkish trade unionists for different purposes as to influence them or to promote their country:

The Americans used to invite us frequently to their country to brainwash our trade unionists. Their aim was to promote American trade unionism. For instance, I went to Israel. Who would Israel like to invite? It invites people who have the power of influencing public opinion. However, the best trade unionism on earth is in Israel because we saw it when we went there. Their trade union is different than ours. The dues of all the workers are gathered in one trade union. Then, the money is given to the necessities. Now in Turkey, there is no money in Türk-İş, but there is a lot in the trade unions. The Israelis invite us frequently. When we went there we observe everything. Their aim is promoting Israel because they built a college where they invite people from all over the world, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mozambique, many Asian and African countries.

After coming back to their country, some of those trade unionists organized education activities and they became the instructors who provided the workers with

lessons about trade unionism. Aydın Engin, a journalist from a newspaper, Cumhuriyet, asserts that these education activities of the trade unions were tricky:

Between 1963 and 1973, the training courses of the trade unions were fake activities. Trade union leaders and the major union representatives of the important factories used to get on a bus, go to a luxurious hotel, in Abant for instance, roast lambs, drink alcohol and then write the invoice as if it was a part of the education fund. This was a routine habit. After the improvement in the left and the emergence of the social democrat movement within Türk-İş, trade unions could not be this much fearless and unrestrained. In that period, academic staff from Ankara and İstanbul universities, Professors and Associate Professors working on the fields such as Labor Law, Constitutional Law and Administrative Law was invited to those education and training seminars (Engin 1999: 18).

After making clear the American pressure on the Türk-İş executives by means of education visits to the U.S.A. and the useless training seminars given by the trade unionists in order to create a vacation opportunity for themselves, the next major issue to be argued is the impact of this pressure in the emergence of ‘non-partisanship policy’ of Türk-İş. In fact this is the focus point of this study. The 5th Congress of Türk-İş took place in Bursa between 27 January and 3 February 1964. The importance of the 5th Congress for this study is that the non-partisanship policy was added to the administrative law of the Confederation in this Congress. The third Clause said: ‘Unless there is a common agreement of a Board constituted by the Executive Board and one representative of its institutions, Türk-İş aims at maintaining its independence against political parties and their organizations and keeping the non-partisanship policy (Ağralı 1967: 203)’.

After the official adoption of this policy, the Türk-İş administration will face many problems due to the effectiveness debates regarding the policy. Particularly, in the seventies, the discussions on the policy will divide Türk-İş and there will be separations from the Confederation. Those divisions within Türk-İş and the reason for the separations are the topics of the next chapter and only the starting point will be focused in this part.

In March 1965, in Zonguldak Kozlu, protests of the mine workers took place. In order to stop the severe boycott police and army forces were sent. 18 workers were arrested. Because of the bloody clashes, 2 workers were shot dead and at last, the army was able to stop those severe protests (Sönmezsoy 1981: 150). The General Director of Türk-İş, Seyfi Demirsoy went there to calm things down. He announced there that ‘there could be the interference of the communists in those events’. This declaration discouraged some trade unionists supporting TLP within Türk-İş. Moreover, some unions who were planning to join Türk-İş changed their mind by explaining that Türk-İş was under the domination of the U.S.A.

Right after the Zonguldak protests, on 19 March 1965, the trade union leaders within the Confederation gathered in Ankara and they advocated the safeguarding of the non-partisanship policy. They declared a memorandum and declared:

People who think that the power of Türk-İş is an obstruction for their interests will not be able to use the workers’ movement to serve their political goals. Political aims stemming from any political institution and any direction will not be integrated into the Türk-İş structure (Ağralı 1967: 204)

As the document signed by the four leaders of Türk-İş, Kemal Türkler, Bahir Ersoy, Rüştü Güneri and İbrahim Denizcier, in 1962 in Istanbul shows, this policy of Türk-İş was not an immediate decision of the confederation. It has a base since this had been a debated and consented issue among many trade unionists. As it can be observed in the document, which promotes this policy in its first article, there are two leftist unionists, Kemal Türkler and İbrahim Denizcier, who signed the protocol. Interestingly, those two unionists had been the founders of the Workers’ Party of Turkey in 1961.

Thus, as a result of such efforts depending basically on the American influence, during the 5th Congress of Türk-İş between 27th January and 3rd February 1964 in Bursa, the non-partisanship policy was accepted. Under the impact of American trade unionism, this adopted policy of Türk-İş meant the detention of the trade unions from political power in terms of their own democratic tendencies. The internal factor which is the second reason for adopting this policy was the growth in

Workers' Party of Turkey and the discontent stemming from the supporters of the party within Türk-İş. In addition, the Trade Unions Act 274 was forbidding the unions from having organizational and financial connections with the political parties, but somehow, it also drew a legal framework allowing them to function as a powerful democratic power.

Consequently, this non-partisanship policy notion of Türk-İş is worth focusing in detail since it constitutes the heart of this study, the self-understanding of Türk-İş. In fact, this debate will clarify the answer to three most important questions: what was the interpretation of Türk-İş while explaining this policy? Was there a non-partisanship policy of Türk-İş in practice? Was it useful or beneficial?

The first explanation of the term comes from Kemal Sarısoy, a former Türk-İş Executive Board member. He announces that this policy is not applicable since there have always been close contact of trade unions with the political parties. He argues that this is the rule of the game. He also touches upon a very important issue: voters in Turkey consider the political tendencies of their families. He states:

Non-partisanship policy means ruling each political party. I mean 'I will be close to you, but what will you give me? I will not serve you now, but I will help you if you do the things that I am asking from you'. In practice this policy is not possible to realise. Which one of us could remain non-partisan? Which one of us did not talk for or against a party at a diner? The executives will support non-partisan policy, but the reality is totally different, this is not true. What can be done? We can keep the same distance for each party. In Türk-İş, this did not happen. We were inside the parties. The non-partisanship policy was adopted to influence the parties, but they stimulated us. Non-partisanship policy has never been successful.

There was not a consensus on the adoption of non-partisan policy. This was a non-sense policy. People vote in order to their family orientation. What could be done? The workers would never listen to us while making decisions on voting. We did not have such a high level of education. People vote according to their father's or mother's preferences, so this policy was never applicable. I can definitely tell that the political parties were managing Türk-İş.

İsmail Özkan, the former Board member, expresses similar ideas as Sarısoy while claiming that the role of the trade union is secondary for the workers because family tendency is almost the sole determinant of the voting attitude in Turkey:

In Turkey, this is the perspective of the workers: the political parties are our fathers and trade unions are our uncles. I mean they put their primary emphasis on political parties, then comes the trade unions. For example, you are a candidate for the Communist Party. Your father will not say 'my daughter who is in the Communist Party should be a Parliament delegate. If he is a rightist, he will vote again for a right wing party.

Enver Turgut, a former General Director of Tes-İş and a JP deputy in 1965, explains the reason why Türk-İş cannot stand far from the political parties. He argues that there is a patron-client relationship between the trade union members, the workers, and the parties:

After the military intervention, particularly after 1965, the political parties used to ask the name of 10 trade unionists who could become deputies in the future elections. Türk-İş used to give those names to the RPP and the JP by considering political tendencies of those unionists. Therefore, political sphere took advantage of us. Who is the founder of the trade union? It is the workers. Why do they found trade unions? Because they want the union to protect their rights. Therefore, the workers feel themselves within the structure of the trade union. Thus, they are glad to see people, appointed by themselves and taking part in politics because they benefit from this situation. If they do not benefit, they children may benefit. When they have a problem, they write to us or call us. We have to deal with them and help them. They are happy to see the people that they have chosen once in the Parliament. They are satisfied with that.

Paradoxically, Enver Turgut, who argues that there was close contact between Türk-İş and the political parties, has a totally different stand point on the non-partisanship policy and declares that this was existent and this was the main reason for the success of Türk-İş:

As people having a role in the political arena, we tried to keep the structure of Türk-İş safe and secure. We did not give up this institution for the sake of our political party. They call this non-partisanship policy but I am against that. I call it 'to remain out of the political realm'. This is where the grandeur of Türk-İş is emerging. If Türk-İş had

entered a political party, it would have been the slave of it and it would have been divided. We paid the most attention to prevent the division of Türk-İş. We were four friends, myself, Kaya Özdemir, Hasan Türkay and Mustafa Ertuğrul. We always kept the Türk-İş structure above the political parties.

Mustafa Başoğlu, the leader of Sağlık-İş, argues that this was a wrong term and he has changed it:

This was not non-partisanship policy, but this was independent policy. I support it because when there is partisanship there is segregation. Let me give you an example. The General Director of Maden-İş in Zonguldak, Şemsi Denizer, was a candidate for the Parliament, but could not win although most people in this city are mine workers. In the trade union-political party relation, the workers usually prefer the party. I mean they prefer the party leader to the union leader. Political affiliation is something different. This is something like a fanatic of a football club. Workers can even prefer a singer like İbrahim Tatlıses to me. They can go there, he can shout there and he can spend a lot of money there. As a unionist, you spend a lot of energy to find financial assistance, but he can exchange you with this singer in return for a couple of songs. They think that the union lives on their dues, so they find our efforts to serve them very natural, they take it for granted.

Ömer Sönmez from Demiryol-İş also claims that this non-partisanship policy of Türk-İş did not work:

It did not work because any trade unionist dealing with politics has a goal. Who is going to draw the goal? A political party. I was not a Parliament member. In none of the official meeting of our union, my colleagues said 'things would be better if such party were in power'. I did not let them say that. If you say that there will be confusion and fight in the trade union.

On the other hand, there are some trade unionists who do not share the same opinion with the above mentioned union leaders. For instance, Tevfik Nejat Karacagil, the former General Director of Cevher-İş, justifies the adoption of the policy:

Neither in the world nor in Turkey, trade unions can stay out of the political sphere. There used to be people from the DP, the RPP and the WP in Türk-İş. What can Türk-İş do? Which party can it support? Türk-İş had to accept this non-partisanship policy.

Interestingly, İbrahim Yalçınođlu from Teksif asserts that this policy has been very successful because Türk-İş has never been a dominion of a political party:

The danger was to become involved in political parties. I have witnessed that Türk-İş has never lived under the domination of a party. This was the non-partisanship policy. According to the legal framework, political party membership was possible at the time, but we have always stayed away from the political parties. The greatest leaders of those years, Seyfi Demirsoy, Halil Tunç and Şevket Yılmaz, kept telling us to prevent ourselves from entering the political parties. The reason for their advice was to avoid division of Türk-İş.

The two other trade union leaders and Türk-İş executives who share the opinion of Yalçınođlu state that non-partisanship policy has been present and the reason for its protection has been the fear to be divided, which is the cause of the success of Türk-İş. One of those unionists is Sadık Şide, a former Türk-İş General Secretary and former Social Security Minister defined the policy:

Since the trade unionist was fed up with the political intervention, Türk-İş declared that political parties could divide the confederation. Seyfi Demirsoy and Şevket Yılmaz asked the unionist to get rid of their political party tendencies before coming to Türk-İş. That was how we could concentrate on workers' developments and deal with their problems. Both party, the RPP and the JP were trying to control us, but we did not become their dominion. They used to ask us strange things. For example, they were telling us 'if you carry this poster, we will give you thirty thousand Liras. What does that mean? We have never been under their control.

İbrahim Yalçınođlu from Teksif remembers a dialogue between Ecevit and Seyfi Demirsoy:

After 1975, street movements and ideological fights started in Turkey. We tried not to join them. Türk-İş also tried to avoid them and remained neutral. In fact, Türk-İş was the guardian of the regime. For example, once Ecevit asked Türk-İş what it had been waiting for and he told the confederation to go into the streets to fight. The Türk-İş leader Seyfi Demirsoy answered him that they were not going to and Ecevit could go if he had hundreds of members. This statement saved the regime. If you go into the streets to join the already existing fight, you can destroy the regime and this can solve nothing.

The other unionist, Çetin Göçer, a former Türk-İş Finance Secretary and the leader of the JP Youth Branches, argues that Türk-İş did not let the political parties to interfere with the structure of the institution. He has negative ideas about the attitude of the political parties towards the different groups:

Including my party, the JP, no party protected workers' rights 100%. They promise many things before the elections, but we have noticed that everything changes once in power. They always misused the people, the workers, the farmers, the officers, the retired. I never believe that political parties have good intentions for those four groups. I was a member of the JP, but I left this party identity away and did not want Türk-İş to be affected by the JP.

After the adoption of the non-partisanship policy, more and more assertiveness can be observed in the attitude of Türk-İş. An incident showing the firmness of some union leaders after the introduction of the Act 274 and Act 275 is worth mentioning since it displays the relationship between the press and Türk-İş, which performed a firm stand even after the adoption of its new principles in its 5th Congress during the winter of 1964. Sedat Ağralı was the victim of the incident, but his firm speech shows that there were many changes in the attitudes of the workers in that period:

We declared 24th July the Workers' Day. This was because the right to strike was given in Turkey. This meant we became equals with our Westerner counterparts. One day Seyfi Demirsoy called me and asked me to give a speech because of this important day. In Ankara Halil Tunç was given the responsibility to deliver a speech and in İstanbul it was me. I prepared the text and went to the radio station. Just before my speech, the Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) censored my text. They did the same thing to Halil. I heard that he got very angry and left the radio station. I did not know what to do. I decided to deliver it even though they curtailed it. The next day, I talked with Seyfi Demirsoy and I explained that I had not had a chance to call him and I had read the censored text. He was happy about my decision. This happened on 24th July 1964.

After his speech, Ağralı sent a protest message while detesting the attitude of TRT General Director Adnan Öztrak, who was one of the important people preparing the 1961 Constitution, and the Assistant Director Professor Dr. İsmet Giritli from the İstanbul University. He accuses them for curtailing two thirds of his speech. Moreover, he detests the argument of those two TRT

directors: there were parts which could be misunderstood and all the radio listeners are not mature enough to completely understand workers' issues.

Furthermore, an obvious protest of Türk-İş against the political realm was its reaction just before the elections of 10 October 1965. Türk-İş declared that 9 Parliament deputies acted against the workers' and the nation's interests and it asked the public not to vote for them. The result of the elections was interesting: only three of those nine deputies were able to be elected. This shows the developing strength of Türk-İş in the second half of the sixties.

During the sixties, despite the close contact between the U.S.A. and Turkey in terms of foreign financial aid influencing the trade union affairs, the American capital was not willing to come to Turkey to invest in huge amounts. Thus, the country had a gradual tendency towards Europe in the 1960's regarding foreign investment. However, the Europeans were willing to hire workers and lower their labor cost by making them work in their own countries, not by investing in Turkey. As a result, most of the European countries preferred calling Turkish workers in their own countries and the number of such workers rose abruptly until the mid-seventies. While their number was 13.000 in 1962, it became 480.000 in 1970 and over 800.000 in 1974 (Keyder 1989b: 250). The two consequences of this rapid increase were that the opportunity to find a job for the immigrants in the big cities remained intact and the foreign currency that they sent from abroad was serving the import substitution policy of the period. The planners of the State Planning Organization did their best to keep this source of income at the same level or to increase it somehow by the end of the sixties.

After 1965, in the political sphere in Turkey, two young leaders were on stage, Ecevit of the RPP and Demirel of the JP, who will remain there for decades. In that period, the upheaval of the Justice Party was inevitable in the political arena. The reason was the inheritance that the JP obtained from the old power, the DP. After the elections of 1965, Demirel started to have warm relations with the high ranked officials of the military. As a result of this new type of alliance between the young

leader of JP, Demirel, and the military, Cevdet Sunay was elected the president of Turkey in 1966.

After the elections of 1965, socialists formed a group in the parliament for the first time (Workers' Party of Turkey). The majority of the votes were for the JP which was quite successful in the whole country. In fact, the results were brilliant in the West. The period starts with the era of Demirel who was the prime minister and ends with the military coup of 12 March 1971 since he was forced to resign.

In that period, Demirel was able to build economic relations with the Soviets as well because there was a kind of relief between the USA and the USSR. Demirel had an advantage in the same period. It was the foreign currency reserves collected from the sums of money sent by the Turkish workers from the European countries. Another advantage of the period was the improvements in industry. Consequently, Turkish society lived in prosperity and this resulted in a gradual rise in consumption. Therefore, between 1965 and 1971, there was a quite strong dialogue between the public and the JP as it was the case for the DP.

During that period, most demands of the trade unions were accepted by the employers. Those workers who were a member of trade unions were able to attain high level of salaries. Those were the privileged workers of the modern industry. Therefore, two categories of workers emerged: an aristocracy of working class working in the modern factories and a relatively poorer working class employed in the small business. Those were living in bad conditions since they were not able to demand as workers of the small business, informal sector, which could always replace them if they asked for higher salaries (Keyder 1993: 73). While the workers of the high capacity import substitution industry were able to demand as they were members of trade unions, the workers of the informal sector were in miserable conditions.

Keyder points out the lack of competition leading to the sustaining power of monopolies and oligarchic structures. He announces that those are able to accept the high salary demand of the trade unions since they can take advantage of the profits

provided by the protection. Those were mostly the enterprises which were employing more than a thousand workers who were members of powerful unions. They were the ones who were receiving higher salaries than the other workers. Consequently, they are called workers aristocracy by Keyder. The workers in the state industries were in this group of aristocracy. However, the industries which were employing around one hundred workers could not be compared with the other group even if they were the member of trade unions. As Keyder concludes, 'although they were supported by their union, they could not be expected to be compared with the workers aristocracy group (Keyder 1989c: 236-237).

One reason for the improvement in the power of Türk-İş is the adoption of the 'national type unionism' in the sixties. This means central structures emerged as a result of enlargement in the trade unions which are organized according to work branches. After the introduction of the Acts 274 and 275, Türk-İş criticized the lawmakers because they led the way to the establishment of many trade unions in one work place. Türk-İş wanted only one Turkish type trade union in each work branch in order to have one single power in each factory since this would prevent the workers from getting divided. İbrahim Yalçınoğlu, the leader of Teksif, explains the reason why they built national type trade unionism in their union:

If there is national union, there is only one trade union in that area, so this provides more power. The central body also becomes more powerful since all the dues are gathered there and are given from there. It has been difficult to do to that stage because the local unions did not want to give up everything and join the national union. We spent great effort to persuade them to join.

Although many unionists as Yalçınoğlu assert that the membership to Türk-İş became 100% after 1965, and Türk-İş gained substantial power, it started to lose its members after 1967 with the establishment of another confederation, a new challenge. As all the interviewers agree, the emergence of the CRTUY, Confederation of Progressive Workers' Unions, caused a loss of power since the workers in Turkey were divided into two groups. What was the incentive leading to the emergence of the CRTUY? An important strike: Paşabahçe strike in İstanbul in 1966.

The strike started in the Paşabahçe Bottle and Glass Factory on 31 January 1966. This was a long strike which Türk-İş wanted to end it on 6 April 1966. However, the trade union, Kristal-İş claimed that this decision of Türk-İş was not fair because it had been 65 days and their demands were not accepted. This was an issue of honor for the Turkish workers. If this strike were given up, the strikes would be impracticable. The critical point was that Türk-İş ended its relationship with the trade unions involved in this strike. Those unions which were temporarily sentenced to be left out for three months founded the CRTUY. This was the turning point of the Turkish trade unionism which will still have its effect on today's weaknesses since the power of the workers was divided into two in 1967 with the emergence of the CRTUY. Since then, it has not been possible to end this separation and to unite those two groups. Sabri Tıǧlı, former leader of Teksif stresses the important role in the division:

Türk-İş sent some people from its institution to support the Paşabahçe strike. The leader of Maden-İş Kemal Türkler, the leader of Petrol-İş Ziya Hepbir and some others were sent. The Manager of the factory was Şahap Kocatopçu ended the strike one day. The executives of Türk-İş agreed and signed the contract with the Ankara government without letting the responsables of the strike in İstanbul know about their agreement. Of course those responsables in İstanbul, Kemal Türkler, Ziya Hepbir, etc. protested against those Türk-İş executives. They were upset because of the behaviour of Türk-İş. Then Türk-İş sent those people and their trade union away. Those founded the CRTUY. If they had not been sent, there would not be the CRTUY.

All the interviewers agree that the establishment of the CRTUY affected the Turkish workers severely. Avni Erakalın, for instance, asserts that 'he had never wanted the establishment of the CRTUY'. He adds that he did not want to play a role in its emergence since he did not want to be divided. He expresses:

Kemal Türkler was a very close friend of mine. I told him not to do that. I asked him to wait for one more term. We could have been the leaders then. We could have gained much more power. The CRTUY was born after many fights. I don't think Kemal did that deliberately.

Sabri Tıǒlı adds on the issue:

Paşabahçe strike led to the division of Türk-İş. We should not get divided, this was wrong. The dismissed trade unions as Maden-İş and Petrol-İş founded the CRTUY. Today, the CRTUY is the second confederation against Türk-İş.

Back to the political sphere in the second half of the sixties, similar to the fragmentation in the trade union movement, the political arena also was going through a fragmentation period. After the arrival of Demirel in government in 1965, the economy began to expand. However, there was constant rise in the prices leading to a gradual increase in the inflation rate. The government emphasis was on industry and foreign investment. The inclusion of the local capitalist in the foreign investment was aimed by the government. Moreover, the government tried to keep the salaries as low as possible in order to minimize the cost of the capitalists, thus, the industrialization process since this is the easiest way to help the foreign and local investors whose goal was to increase the profit as much as they could.

This flourishing situation in economy continued until the end of the sixties. In fact, the general economic situation kept on declining rapidly. Meanwhile, the workers assertiveness increased and it reached a level of militancy. In addition, the students' protests were causing difficulties in the universities. The media was showing the shortcomings of the weakened Demirel government in power after the 1969 elections.

In addition, the impact of foreign dynamics was great after 1968, which was a critical year for the whole world. This was the year when student movements started in many countries of the Western world as Germany and France. Accordingly, the students in Turkey were protesting and demonstrating in the streets of the big cities. The multi-party system was getting into trouble because things were getting out of control. The decay of the system continued because the factories were occupied by workers and the universities by students. There were clashes between ideologically

opposed groups. What's more, the government of the JP had to deal with severe economic deterioration.

By the end of 1960's, an outcome of the fast social and economic changes, Turkey faced the fragmentation of the political parties who mostly supported capitalism. The RPP believed that the capitalist should not directly involve in politics. This should be the arena left to the party and the state. The JP, on the other hand, believed in the direct participation of the capitalist in the struggle for political power. Demirel was accused for the fragmentation of the right. He was known to fail in dealing with working class issues such as strikes. Furthermore, he was not successful in curbing the high inflation rate, which was causing tension among many groups of the society.

In fact, the problem with both political parties was that they have not achieved the necessary ground for the expanding industry during the rapid social and economic transformation. Meanwhile, the RPP adopted 'left of the center' policy, which provided the party to get rid of its former appearance as a structure close to the bureaucracy. This was something difficult to explain to the public, especially to the people in the countryside. However, the votes of the RPP increased in the big cities and underdeveloped areas of the country. With the adoption of the left of the center policy, the RPP started to have trade unionist candidates in its elections lists. Before the 1969 elections, the RPP prepared a manifesto and called it 'change in order program' and declared that the party wanted the authority from the public. They announced their understanding of society, individual and ethics regarding the left of the center policy in that manifesto:

The class divisions based on economic power will be abolished in this order because the capital and the labor will unite broadly in the same groups and the public will take place effectively in the administration in the cases when this unification does not exist. In the left of the center humanistic order which will be set by the RPP, while the class divisions will remain, the notion as public and individual will gain different meanings. The RPP wants to save the individual from the dependency on the capitalist and feudal powers, but this also means saving the individual from dependency in

addition to not making the individual the slave of the state and the public. In an order where the will to earn more and more is pumped at any cost and where some people earn uncontrollably by not deserving it and by damaging the public the ethics also will be destroyed, the values will be torn down and individuals will be indifferent to each other. That's why, in the order change realized by the RPP in terms of left of the center, ethical crisis will end and the moral development of the society as well as the economic improvement will be realized.

Source: the RPP Manifesto, 'Change in Order Program', 'İnsanca Bir Düzen Kurmak için Halktan Yetki İstiyoruz, CHP'nin Düzen Değişikliği Programı', 1969, Ulusal Basımevi, Ankara. pp. 132-133.

As a result of a change in the RPP policy, for the first time in its history, 7 trade unionists were elected in the 1969 elections, during which the JP had 4 and TLP had 2 trade unionist parliamentarians. The RPP started to collect the votes of the working class. However, the party could not support a base structure for the workers and it was not able to create it. That was the reason why it could not form a wide worker class and could not create connections with the trade unions.

What were the economic conditions of the workers in the late sixties, regarding their salary and life standard? According to the statistics of the Labor Ministry, there was 4% increase per year in the salaries of the workers until 1971 due to the collective agreement system after 1963 (Işıkılı 1981b: 362). However, the increasing inflation rate and worsening economic situation harmed the life standard of the workers, which will never rise and will become worse in the seventies.

On the other hand, despite the growth in economy, the critiques of the intellectuals of the left were severe and in that period it is possible to observe the demonstrations of the students. The RPP was supporting those protesting students but the government of JP remained indifferent. In fact, although JP seemed not to respond, it tried to control all these demonstrations and change the Constitution of 1961 for its own interests.

As a result of unstable economic and political environment in the country, the National Security Council sent an issue of warning. On 27 March 1971, it issued a strong statement. The major motive of this military intervention was to stop anarchy in the country and to end social and economic unrest. The impact of this intervention on the working class will be discussed in the next chapter since it is within the boundaries of the coming section.

To conclude, the 1960's era which started with a military coup and which brought a variety of rights to many groups, particularly the workers by means of a democratic Constitution and new Laws ended by another military intervention. However, this was a period during which broad rights were given to many groups. Accordingly, the workers started to gain class consciousness and the workers movement gained strength.

Until 1968, the pluralistic characteristic of the multi-party system worked fairly good although the political and economic structures of the country were not mature enough to support the rights provided by the Constitution. Since those structures were not able to meet the constant demands emerging from the democratization process, the expectations were withdrawn.

The ideological structure of the political system has great impact on the industrial relations whose major institutions are trade unions, strikes, lock-outs and collective bargaining. Thus, a powerful unionist action and working class consciousness depends on the strength of a democratic regime. In Turkey, the emergence of Türk-İş took place after the end of the single party era, in 1951 when the DP won the elections of 1950. Since the multi-party era was the beginning of the democratic regime, Türk-İş emerged as an important institution of the new democratic structure. Moreover, it gained strength and particularly the number of its members increased with the impact of 1961 Constitution. However, the problem to be debated is that whether this was only a quantitative increase or not. During the study, it occurs that the relationship between the worker and the trade union was not strong, so the

qualitative strength of Türk-İş has been a debatable issue leading to its currently weak structure.

This chapter of the study principally aims at investigating the self-understanding of Türk-İş, which has never been an organization of class struggle since its birth in 1952. It has been rather a service organization serving especially for the financial needs of the workers. The attitudes of the political powers against the attempts of the workers to unite their political strength has influenced Türk-İş and caused the adoption of "non-partisanship politics" principle. This doctrine of Türk-İş has not displayed a neutral attitude since its birth; on the contrary, it has been partial since it appears to be a kind of deliberate abstention. In other words, this meant withdrawal from the political arena whenever it is necessary and full participation when it is required.

As a conclusion, the two important political parties of the multi-part era, the RPP and the DP seemed to be interested in workers and had very close relations with Türk-İş. However, this was a relation based on interests serving the political aspirations of the parties. The speed of the democratization was really fast. It was so fast that the period ended with the intervention of the military in 1971!

CHAPTER FOUR

TRADE UNION MOVEMENT AND TÜRK-İŞ BETWEEN 1971 AND 1980

4.1. Economic, Social and Political Situation of the Period

The sixties were marked by the onset of the economic policies based on plans. Three five-year plans starting from 1963 were the most significant components of the investment policies. While the public sector investments had to conform to the plans and programs, the private sector investments needed the help of the public institutions in order to profit from the State Planning Organization, thus to conform to the programs as well. Only the First Plan was rather different than the others because it emphasized public investment and state entrepreneurship for the economic development. The Second and the Third Plan, however, underlined the private sector supported by state subsidy and suggested limited public industry providing help to private industry. In fact, those two plans were giving secondary importance to the social aims. The seventies were the decade during which there was more emphasis on the domestic market and import substitution policy. There was an increase in the investments and thus in the number of the workers.

In the seventies, the new situation was that there a was great increase in the demand of long-lasting consumption goods such as radio, television, washing machine, vacuum cleaner, car, etc... In the previous decade it was impossible to meet those demands for this new group of consumption goods because of the scarce foreign currency reserves. As a result, those goods started to be produced in the country in the seventies. However, at the beginning, this was an industry based on assembly only. In time, it will gain a more modern characteristic by means of a more domestic structure and more side industries receiving its support. Unfortunately, this was an industry depending on the foreign resources seriously because it required the technology and the basic materials from them. Moreover, when compared with its

counterparts, the domestic industry was really poor in the production of the goods in terms of quality. It also started to become more common than the sixties when it used to supply only the demands of the bourgeoisie. For instance, in the seventies, most houses in the big cities owned a TV.

As a result, the different characteristic of the seventies was that long-lasting consumption goods diffused across many parts and many groups of the country. The reason for the diffusion was the relatively gradual increase in the income of the workers and middle classes following the rapid growth. Türk-İş was able to obtain higher salaries for its members when compared with the sixties and it gained a really important space in the political and public arena. In this chapter, the noticeable appearance of the Türk-İş leaders opposing the non-partisanship policy will be debated. At the beginning of this new era, because of the rapid growth, it was assumed that the dependency on the foreign resources would be reduced but it did not take long to realize that this was an inaccurate assumption. During the seventies, the economy of the country became more and more dependent on the imports.

In the seventies the exports, on the other hand, showed a different pattern than the previous decade. The proportion of the industrial goods increased within the total sum of exports which used to consist of agricultural goods mainly. In the sixties, the excessive dependency on imports despite the small capacity of exports was met by the foreign credits and aids together with the amount sent by the Turkish workers from abroad. However, in the seventies there were dramatic changes in the world economy which was hit by the oil crisis and Turkey was one of the developing countries which were harmed seriously. In addition, the politicians of the country were mistaken because their assumption that foreign aid flow would continue forever failed. The result was a disastrous picture of Turkey as a country in irreparable economic and political trouble in the seventies. Thus, in this chapter, the workers and the working class will be examined within this context. First the rise and then the abrupt drop in the economic indicators threw all the groups into huge problems and the workers were the class who were mainly affected by the situation. Therefore, the end of the seventies will face with clashes in the whole society.

Furthermore, our focus, Türk-İş, did not show a successful performance in that period and it was affected by the harmful dispute between the RPP and the JP. The political party distinction in the political arena was reflected within the Türk-İş structure and the harmful fight between the RPP and the JP injured the Confederation worse than ever; thus the result was a power loss.

The seventies were marked by the world economic crisis, petrol crisis, so this chapter focuses on the workers' movement and the workers, particularly Türk-İş, by referring to the severe economic problems during this decade. The Keynesian policies were the reference point of that period during which the external debts of the developing countries were covered by foreign credits and loans with low back-payments. However, when the external debts of such countries started to become a chronic problem, the hopelessness rose and finally, it was felt that it was impossible to get out of this vicious circle.

As an ally of the West, Turkey benefited quite a lot from the situation stemming from the Cold War during that period. Moreover, because of its location, it had a rather privileged position compared with the other developing countries, so it received important sums of money from abroad. However, the problem which was not noticed by the leading governments was that they never considered whether or not those foreign aids and credits would be interrupted in the future. This lenient attitude of the political leaders of the period while the import dependency was becoming a chronic disease can be observed in their moderate behavior towards the export sum. Since they believed that those Western aids and credits will continue with no interruption at all, they did not spend much effort to increase the amount of the export so as to obtain a rise in the foreign currency income.

In the seventies, as many developing countries, Turkey was in real debt and this was called 'debt trap' by such countries. The amount of the external debt increased abruptly after 1975. The two important solutions of the governments to manage the crisis were devaluation and low salaries. During the period of the Third Plan, between 1973 and 1977, the investments in industry that had been planned were behind the plans. Similarly, the plans drawn for the agriculture were not reached.

Both the indicators of the industry and the agriculture show that those plans did not influence the investments.

The reasons for this severe crisis that Turkey faced in the mid-seventies were the external and internal developments occurring in that period in addition to the problems stemming from the production for the internal market and the import debts. The two most important reasons were the increase in the petrol price and the crisis which occurred because of the Cyprus problem. In the beginning of 1974, OPEC multiplied the price of petrol more than five times. As a result of this unexpectedly high rise in the petrol price, the energy and input costs increased excessively. In addition, the rise in the military spending due to the Cyprus problem caused another burden on the budget. The foreign aids for the military were also cut down owing to the same problem with Greece, which added another burden as well. However, the workers and their trade unions were blamed as the source of this crisis by the employers who claimed that the workers had been given unnecessarily broad rights. They claimed that the incessant demand of the workers for higher salaries in the seventies by misusing their right to strike was the main reason for the economic crisis of the seventies. Of course this was not the real reason given the fact that the petrol crisis hit the whole world, not only the Turkish economy.

The world economic crisis of the 1970's had harmful effects on trade unionism. Technological supremacy was under the control of a few countries in that period. The external markets became smaller and the internal markets attained a satisfaction level. The economies of the countries became more and more dependent on each other. Because of the rising competition between the developing countries, their economic structures fell into a deep crisis. As a result, higher salaries and full employment became remote aims. Thus, the frequency of the strikes rose in the world in the seventies as well as in Turkey, which created a friction structure in many countries.

Another reason for the negative impact on the trade unionism was the change in the economic structures. In other words, service sector gained importance and the industry sector in which trade unionism was traditionally powerful lost its supremacy. The employment rate was higher in the service sector, which meant more workers in the service sector, who are not members of trade unions. Naturally, this had a negative influence on trade unions of the period in the whole world.

Moreover, because of the crisis, the trade union membership dropped in many countries. Another major cause of the drop in trade union membership was the problem of trust felt towards the trade unions. The trust of the workers to their trade union leaders and members is a necessary compound of unionism. In addition, the trust of the society, the political parties, governments and institutions to trade unions is very important.

In the second half of the seventies, trade unions lost the loyalty of their members who started to trust less to their unions. Many studies carried out in the U.S.A. and in Europe showed that trade unions and their leaders have lost the trust of the workers in the seventies. A poll done in the U.S.A. by Opinion Research Corporation between 1975 and 1985 showed that the trade unions were ranked 13th among the 14 institutions in a trust based ordering. When the trust of people to seven institutions which were religious groups, military, Constitutional Court, press, Congress, large enterprises and workers' organizations was asked, the trade unions were ranked 6th between 1975 and 1980 and 7th between 1981 and 1985 (Lipset, 1986: 288-299. In Altıparmak, 2001: 69).

The interviewers of this study also stated the similar situation about the trust and respect to the trade unions by the workers and the public. Furthermore, many writers as İlhan Akalın declare the drop in the level of trust to the trade union leaders in the seventies and he believes that the reason is the attitude of those leaders in the fifties and sixties. He gives the example of a leader from Türk-İş, Seyfi Demirsoy:

Seyfi Demirsoy, who was declared as a 'great conciliator' was a candidate from the RPP in 1957. That's what he said during a press meeting that he organized with trade unionists: "Since the Labor Party efforts have not been successful in our country, it will be beneficial to support a party which can handle workers' problems efficiently and it

will be useful for us to be represented within this party. The leader of the RPP, İnönü, is a statesman who knows about the workers the most. His last declaration about focusing on the workers' problems as a non-partisan law suit is the proof of this situation". The same man, Seyfi Demirsoy, will later tell the Prime Minister of the period, Demirel, that 'he is the Prime Minister who understands the workers the most' (Akalin 2000c: 110).

As a result, the Türk-İş leaders' attitude, which shows support for both parties, the RPP and the JP, in that period depending on their own interests and decisions made them appear as leaders that the public has difficulty in trusting. In the seventies, in Turkey, despite the economic crisis, the governments tried to carry on their industrialization process, which was intensely underlined in the Development Plans. The traditional economic model of the sixties and the first half of the seventies was in effect. This was the usual policy of domestic production emphasis instead of imports and thus, it aimed at producing the investment products and semi-processed goods. This was mainly the assembly industry. By the mid-seventies, it was possible to see a great amount of TV antennas even at the roofs of the houses located in the shanty towns. Similarly, radios, tape recorders, refrigerators and even cars were used by many worker and peasant families.

This change in the consumption goods led to an intense import dependency although there was no change in the amount of exports. So as to maintain a high level of growth, Turkish economy received a significant sum of foreign resources. For instance, the amount of external credits and aids rose to 1 billion Dollars between 1975 and 1976 while it was around 300 to 500 million dollars between 1962 and 1974. The second external resource, the money sent by the workers from abroad, increased to a level of more than 1 billion Dollars in the seventies while it was around 100 million between 1965 and 1969 (Boratav, 2003a: 122). This was a great contribution to cover the external debts.

The import substitution policy of the period was based on the vividness of the internal market. Within the context of this model, the salaries were part of the costs for the individual capitalist, but as a whole, they were the sustaining elements of the growing economy since they were causing demand in the market. That was the reason why there was no need to keep the salaries very low. Therefore, collective

agreement system by means of providing the right to strike was a meaningful change to be made in the legal structure. That is the reason why a relative rise in the salaries of the workers related to an increasing number of strikes is significantly apparent in the beginning of the seventies.

In fact, this relative rise in the workers' salaries and the number of strikes in the seventies seems to be misleading if the statistical data is investigated. First of all, according to the Labor Ministry Statistics, between 1958 and 1963, until the introduction of the Acts 274 and 275, there was a 1% increase in the salaries of the public sector workers covered by the Social Security Institution (SSI). There was not an increase for the private sector workers in such years. After 1963, there was a 4% increase in the salaries of the workers until 1971, which means the new legal regulations and rights given to the workers caused an apparent improvement (Işıklı 1981c: 362).

The writers as Işıklı, however, point out that after 1971, there was an obvious drop in the workers' salaries according to the SSI statistics:

It can be said that the drop in the salaries of the workers was around 40% between 1970 and 1979. This can be explained by the fact that the right to strike became practically impossible to be used widely; hence, the power of the workers was restricted in the collective bargaining (Işıklı 1981d: 363).

During this period which started with the 12 March regime, there were frequent martial law declarations and the right to strike was given under the authority of the martial law commanders. Moreover, the governments, who had the right to postpone the strikes according to the Act 274, used this intensely in that period to put them off.

As it is asserted by Işıklı, the union leaders interviewed during the study also expressed their opinion on the focus on salaries rather than social rights since the salaries were going down in that period. For instance, Sadık Şide supports the stress on salaries during the collective bargaining process:

People who do not know this subject are talking non-sense. The explanation of the topic is that the most important part of the collective agreements is the salary section. The other parts are almost the same. The collective agreements started after the 1960's. Now they are rather good. They include many important details. Now, how can we change the parts which work greatly? This is unnecessary. Of course you deal for salary only. We have already maintained social rights under a system. So, this is good because it does not stop work by struggling. The worst characteristic of our country is that people who know nothing about a topic talk too much on that subject.

Kemal Sarısoy also agrees with Şide and announces that they used to obtain better salaries without struggling too much:

We did not have much problem about the trade union laws in those years. We used to discuss in the party about the salary policies. We were able to solve easily. We did not use to fight or struggle.

It appears that the 'fake' increase in the salaries in the seventies is not a real increase as writers such as Işıklı argue. There are some other variables as the inflation rate to find out the real salary increase. Therefore, although there was a quantitative increase, this did not mean a real increase because there was not a rise in the life standards of the workers in that period as well. Sedat Ağralı focuses on the really deteriorating salaries and criticizes the attitude of the governments blaming the workers for the causes of the economic crisis:

There are efforts to show the little increase in the workers' salaries as a reason for the economic crisis. The workers are blamed for the crisis. The governments worsened the economy and destroyed peace in the labor. They announce on every occasion that the remedy to get over the crisis is to freeze the salaries of the workers. Those are all lies and there is no social state approach in our country. In fact, in Germany, a worker needs to work 10 minutes for one liter of milk and 2.5 hours for one kilogram of butter. However, in our country, a worker needs to work one hour for one liter of milk and 1.5 days for one kilogram of butter. The unwise and unskilled governments are blaming the workers, not themselves (Son Havadis, 1974).

However, relatively high salaries can be noticed in the SEEs in that period. Since the SEEs were rather easy-going towards the demands of the workers, especially in the area of pay raise, it was not difficult to get higher salaries for the workers in that

period because SEEs were part of the political concerns. However, whether this was a real salary increase or not is debatable. The similar attitude of the SEEs was noticeable in the employment policies as political parties were keeping them under their dominance to provide employment for their supporters.

Moreover, as a result of those political pressures on the SEEs, not only themselves but also the private sector was influenced and it was inevitable for the private sector to keep the salaries low. Consequently, it can not be declared that the governments and the private sector gave high salaries and many benefits to the workers because of the strong actions of the workers. Of course the workers' movement gained some kind of momentum in that period and the trade unions, particularly Türk-İş, became comparatively strong institutions which were able to influence the governments somehow in the decision-making procedure. Nevertheless, this is not the major reason for the change in the attitude of the governments in the seventies as it has been explained above. One of the interviewed, Ethem Ezgü, expresses the rising power of Türk-İş in that period and relates it to the Confederation leader:

There had been wonderful periods of Türk-İş. We can never forget them. Particularly during the leadership of Seyfi Demirsoy, we had extremely interesting events. The Ministers asked our help to do the meetings. I relate this to the leader. His power solved the problems efficiently. Türk-İş obtained rights that nobody could get. It was the best era of Türk-İş in terms of salaries, rights or legal regulations.

İbrahim Yalçınğlu, on the other hand, does not agree with Ezgü. He argues that they started to lose power in the seventies and he claims that the employer of that period changed:

The employer was not the one of the 1950's or 1960's. We lost power but they gained. They found lawyers and well-educated staff. They constructed better relations with the government. However, within Türk-İş, there had been divisions such as the Confederation of Progressive Workers' Unions. We could not form unity. There was a hope to build a party. Some expected to become parliamentarians. I do not complain about those. This was very natural, but the Turkish trade union movement lost power.

Despite the power loss in trade unionism, as a result of the populist policies of the governments, a strong social security system was built in Turkey. This was a very

progressive step in the world of the workers who used to struggle for higher salaries only. During the study, it was noticed that almost all of the trade union leaders emphasized their struggle to gain the right to strike. All of them underlined their efforts which lasted long years. However, they did not talk about their demand for a just social security system or working conditions. It looks like they wanted to gain the right to strike in order to attain higher salaries only. It appears that this was the sole reason for their struggle. According to the report about the opinion of the RPP on the Second Plan covering the period between 1968 and 1972, the suggestion of the Plan, increase in the salaries which were higher than the minimum wage should be adjusted by referring to the productivity increase, existed in the First Plan as well. The report is worth mentioning because the emphasis on the salary increase despite the lack of any aim on the working conditions in that period is an obvious case:

The Second Plan suggests salary increases should be according to the productivity increases. In fact, this is an accurate principle which already exists in the First Plan. Including the workers, nobody refuses its accuracy. However, will this principle be practiced in a democratic approach? Will the possibility of the irresponsible and unskillful behaviors of the entrepreneurs in the private sector, the managing officers in the public sector and the governments be prevented? Related to a report about the Plan published by Türk-İş, the workers are right to ask this. The mentality and the attitude of the JP government are not hopeful at all.

In order to increase productivity, the RPP government had prepared a law and established National Productivity Center. However, the financial sources and staff opportunities were limited largely by the government. Why? Because this institution has a Director who was an elected worker, a trade unionist. In fact, the JP government which tries to be perceived as a supporter of the public, workers and democracy can not stand seeing workers at any decision making mechanism.

Source: RPP Group Publications, 6, (1967), "Opinion of the RPP on the Second 5-Year Plan", Ulusal Basımevi, Ankara. pp. 64-65.

There are two statements that can be finalized in this report of the RPP. First, regarding the attitude of the workers in that period, beginning of the seventies, although the workers had to work long hours and in very bad conditions, there was

not a stress on the social security system. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the new legal regulations regarding the social security system were provided by the state itself due to some other reasons. Second, the negative attitude of the JP towards the working class sharpened and it became more and more severe.

In 1974, a new regulation was made by the Sadi Irmak Government and Social Security Ministry was formed. All the plans after 1963 suggested the establishment of this Ministry, but governments did not focused on it or ignored it. In 1974, this was not an establishment stemming from the demands of the workers. Sadık Şide, the first Social Security Minister of the country underlines the miserable conditions in which this Ministry was born:

They gave us three rooms on the second floor of the SSI Management Building. We had no furniture at all. We borrowed tables, chairs, two phones and two file cabinets from the SSI. That's how we started to serve (Şide: 2004: 56).

The statements of Şide give evidence to the poor conditions in which this Ministry emerged. In fact, this was an establishment including three important and large organizations, the SSI, BAĞ-KUR and Workers' Union. Therefore, the ministry should have started with a much larger organization.

Despite the proposals of the RPP and its focus on the salary increase related to productivity in its declarations as the above mentioned report about the opinion of the RPP on the Second Plan, some trade unionists who were the JP Deputies in the Parliament announced that the JP and its leader, Demirel, was the political leader who contributed most to the workers' rights. Enver Turgut, for instance, was a JP Deputy and was the Chair of the Labor Commission for 4 years in the Parliament. He describes how they have been refused by the other JP Deputies at first because they had a trade union background, how they received the support of Demirel and how they were acknowledged later by the others in the Parliament:

We were four friends in the Parliament. We suffered a lot. We had to give our law drafts to our group in the Parliament. First, we had to obtain the approval of our group and then we could take them to the Parliament. We had many difficulties in that procedure. One day, we asked for an appointment with Demirel and we spent three and

a half hours together. We told him that we were isolated because of the attitudes of the other JP Deputies who regarded us as strangers and stared at us as if we had been aliens or ghosts. We also told him that they were in a big worry about our law drafts because they thought we were tricking them, so we had difficulty in expressing ourselves. We added that he had taken us into the party, but we had been faced with an attitude of a stepchild because the parliamentarians who represented the peasants, lawyers, doctors, etc... expressed their opinions and receive support, but we could not and this was really bothering.

When the reason for the attitude of the other JP Deputies who consider those with a trade union background as aliens, the answer of Turgut was very interesting and clear enough to summarize the situation:

Let me give you an example about the reason why they saw us as monsters. Once we gave a law draft about the Social Security Institution (SSI). The aim was to build pharmacies under the authority of the SSI so that the money of the workers could go to that institution instead of private ones. They did not like our draft because most of those people had daughters and daughter-in-laws who were pharmacists. This was against their interest. That's why they were trying to stop us. This is one example. Of course, there were many of them. Finally, Demirel gave an important speech at a group meeting one day. He stated that he trusted us completely and he was not against any of our law drafts. After that, we had better relations in our group and we built better relationship between our party and Türk-İş. That's why the leader of Türk-İş told Demirel that he was the Prime Minister who could understand the Confederation the best. This was the structure of Türk-İş. Today, it is the same Türk-İş, but the conditions are different. They are in difficulty because they cannot demonstrate their power. They should have been a unity in order to show this power. There is no such a unity today.

In fact, in that period, the workers gained relatively higher salaries from both, the public and the private sector, especially in the first years of the seventies. As a result, when the salaries in Turkey are compared with the ones in other developing countries which were going through similar processes as Turkey, it is easy to observe that they were relatively higher. For instance, in South Korea, a country which was the most successful example of the period among the countries having an external market oriented industrialization policy, hourly salaries in Dollars were lower than the half of the ones in Turkey. Actually, they were able to pass that level in Turkey years later, in 1983 (Boratav, 2003b: 125). The populist attitude of the

governments was the reason for the increase in the salaries. Enver Turgut illustrates the case of Demirel since he knows more about him as a JP Deputy:

Turkish workers voted for the JP more than the RPP. Demirel wanted us in his party because he wanted to win the elections. This is very natural. When he was a Prime Minister, he gave all the rights to the workers. He supported our proposals. He supported the low income groups such as the workers, small businessmen and the peasants. He knows the value of people who vote for him. If people do not vote for him he believes that this was because he did not serve them. He never accuses them. That's why we have a deep belief for him.

The similar deteriorating and populist attitude of the governments in the seventies can be observed in the agriculture. The governments sold the agricultural products as wheat and sugar and were able to decide on the level of the prices. They decided on higher levels and used their power to gain the sympathy and the votes of the peasants. They exaggerated this power and misused it before the elections. They could even give prices which were higher than the ones in the external market.

As a result, it can be concluded that there was an increase in the income of many groups such as the workers and peasants in that period. Nevertheless, whether this was a real increase or not is a debatable issue. This situation continued until the second half of the seventies except for the period of the 1971 military intervention. Moreover, during this period of the development plans, the investments did not seem to follow the plans when they are compared in detail. For example, the investments in the transportation and housing were more than the planned proportion. However, the investments in the agriculture were lower than the planned goals. Therefore, the development plans were not very effective and were not successful in influencing the investments.

After describing the economic circumstances in the country from the beginning of the seventies to the economic crisis in the second half of the decade, an assessment of the political developments is necessary in order to explore the situation of the working class in that period. The major development was of course the 12 March 1971 intervention. The events leading to the intervention were too rough. For instance, a politically oriented bank robbery was done in January, a United States

sergeant was abducted in February, and finally four United States military officers were abducted in March. They all mean that the authority of the state almost disappeared. The result was the memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Commanders of the Armed Forces issued on 12 March 1971. The important drawback of the intervention regarding the context of this study was that the 1961 Constitution, which allowed Turkey to live through its most liberal period ever, was amended and the widely given rights were curtailed.

What was the situation just before the 1971 coup in terms of the trade unions and particularly Türk-İş? Firstly, in the political sphere, the non-partisanship policy of Türk-İş had been criticized heavily before the coup, particularly by the RPP. According to the Party Report published after the 10th RPP Congress in 1970, the non-partisanship policy of Türk-İş had been useless and the Confederation was severely criticized:

In a period during which the regroupings according to the financial interests have been fast and the consciousness of the workers has risen, the Turkish workers' movement has fallen into a paradox as non-partisanship policy. In addition, the interest groups who are against the labor have been politically supported. Today, the current grouping movement is taking place outside of the Turkish workers' institutions. It is independent from the unions. Therefore, the leaders of the workers should not slow down this movement. On the contrary, they should spend effort to support it and to reinforce it. They should support the political currents which protect and save the workers' rights.

Source: The RPP 10th Congress Report, 3 July 1970, Ankara. p. 47.

As the RPP which criticized Türk-İş leaders severely, they themselves started to criticize the non-partisanship policy. This reaction of the Türk-İş leaders started within the debate of the demands for the amendments in the Acts 274 and 275. The workers of the Confederation of the Progressive Workers' Unions (CRTUY) were against this amendment. As Feroz Ahmad argues, 'the government wanted to destroy the political trade unionism led by the CRTUY by introducing a law supporting the government-friendly Türk-İş (Ahmad 1995: 174). This amendment

was about a ban on trade unions that were not able to represent one third of the workers in an enterprise. In fact, the aim was to abolish the CRTUY. The result was the reaction of the workers on 15-16 June 1970. They reacted so seriously that they caused dramatic chaos in the Marmara region of Turkey. Finally, the army was able to stop them. However, the continuing fight between Türk-İş and the CRTUY was so severe that it ended up with a bombing event. The General Office of Türk-İş in Ankara was bombed on 29 December 1970 at night. As a result of this bombing, it declared the next day:

The criminals who committed this crime against all the Turkish workers must be found as soon as possible. If they cannot be found fast, the government will be held responsible for that. The resignation of the government which is in a miserable condition to stop such incidents will be asked. In order to protest this criminal attempt, all the members of Türk-İş will stop work tomorrow (31 December 1970) between 9 and 11 (Türk-İş Journal, 1970: 5-6).

This declaration of Türk-İş demonstrates how furious the Confederation was about this incidence since it ordered its members to stop work for two hours on 31 December 1970. Moreover, soon after this proclamation, on 14 January 1971, four leaders of Türk-İş, Abdullah Baştürk, Halit Mısırlıoğlu, Feridun Şakir Övünç and İsmail Topkar, handed in a report to the Executive Committee. All of those unionists were the supporters of the RPP. This report was called ‘the Report of the Four’ (Dörtler Raporu).

This report was closely connected with the separation of the CRTUY from Türk-İş because even after the separation the opposition existed within Türk-İş. This Report was the statement of the social democrat movement within Türk-İş, which was established by the remains of CRTUY. Furthermore, the left of center approach of the RPP played a major role in the improvement of this movement because the trade unionists in Türk-İş having close links with the RPP started to act more efficiently and loudly. In the Report, the non-partisanship policy was criticized severely. The attitude of Türk-İş, as a Confederation including all kinds of political tendencies was disapproved. In addition, the non-partisanship policy was declared inconsistent and insignificant since there was serious partisanship within the structure of Türk-İş.

Their proposal was to support social democracy and the RPP since it was the party underlining social democracy. Many union leaders as Enver Turgut stated the inefficiency of this policy:

Türk-İş was not strong because when the leftist party comes to power, it supports it. When a rightist party comes to power, it supports it. Unfortunately, the non-partisanship policy of the very old days did not exist. The important thing is that Türk-İş should be represented in the Parliament. Today, when a trade unionist is elected to the Parliament, it must quit his job in the union. This creates a separation from the union. Then what happens is that he cannot set the link between the trade union and the government.

The most significantly criticizing part of the Report was that Türk-İş was not successful in its non-partisanship policy because Türk-İş did not support the political parties, but the parties influenced Türk-İş. Those four unionists, who claimed that they were the supporters of the left of center policy, were anti-communists. They suggested that Türk-İş leave definitely this non-sense policy and be a leader of social democracy in Turkey. They strongly proposed a change in Türk-İş.

The reaction of the four unions, Genel-İş, Ulaş-İş, Yol-İş and Petrol-İş, spread to more unions. On 2 July 1971, the Report of Twelve was written and given to the Türk-İş Executive Board. As it can be understood from its name, twelve unions unified this time to show their reaction against the non-partisanship policy. This was a comprehensive policy consisting of 10 parts. It basically put forward the economic situation of the country by describing the problems and suggesting solutions. Kenan Durukan was one of the leaders who supported both Reports and he is the one who comments that keeping Türk-İş distant from the word ‘class’ has been the major problem for decades and the drawback of this approach is reflected in the current problems of the Confederation:

When I was elected the General Director of the trade union in 1971, four unions gathered in Kızılcahamam to establish the social democratic order for the Turkish workers’ movement. This was called the Report of the Four. I called those colleagues and told them that I wanted to join this movement which was offering solution to the

24 principles of Türk-İş and the problems of Turkey. The Report of Twelve was more comprehensive because it was trying to identify the class based perception of the workers' movement. In the reports, the priority was given to the protection of the workers against the capitalists in a social democratic approach. In fact, the adoption of a trade unionism based on masses by Türk-İş versus the emergence of the CRTUY with a class based policy was the most serious mistake of the Turkish trade union movement. Unfortunately, this fight still goes on today. Türk-İş is a working class organization. However, Türk-İş, a structure whose administration and members are workers, denies that and it does not want to declare itself as a class based organization. The CRTUY, on the other hand, emerged with a claim that they are struggling for the workers' class and they are a class based union. This was a populist declaration. This fight still remains the same today. This is the dilemma of the current problem.

The solution of the Report suggested by 12 unions was mixed economy, which meant state and private entrepreneurship together with cooperatives. This Report was very similar to the previous one in that it suggested the support of Türk-İş for the left of center policy. This one also was rejected severely by the Türk-İş executives who claimed that there were more important problems of the country those days and the significance of the Report was reduced.

Meanwhile, a noteworthy development was the establishment of the Confederation of Nationalist Workers Union, CNWU (Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, MİSK) on 23 June 1970. The CNWU was founded right after the 15-16 June Workers' protests. First it was a weak union, but with the National Front government, in which the NMP (Nationalist Movement Party) was part of the coalition, it gained power between 1975 and 1976.

Moreover, on 22 October 1976, another confederation, the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions, CTRTU, (Türkiye Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, HAK-İŞ) was built. The founders were some independent trade unions. This one gathered the traditionalist regions where the industry was weak. The people who established it did not have long years of trade unionism experience. As the CNWU, the CTRTU also was built during the National Front government.

Since its 7th Congress in April 1968, Türk-İş had been aware of the fact that the establishment of the CRTUY could have led to the emergence of some other unions challenging the power of Türk-İş. That's why during this Congress, the main issue that the trade unionists discussed was the CRTUY which had emerged a year before. For the first time, there had emerged a new structure which could be able to influence masses with its ideological stand. As it had been accurately guessed in 1968 by the Türk-İş officials, the CRTUY gained power and became a challenge throughout the 1970's. In fact, in addition to the progressive approach of the CRTUY, with the emergence of others having nationalist, liberal and Islamist positions, the challenge among those sharpened since they were seriously affected by the severe ideological divisions of the period. The result was a relentless and brutal fight that went on in the second half of the seventies particularly.

On 12 March 1971, this was the second time that the military intervened and the JP, the party which was born out of the ashes of the DP, was driven out and its leader, Demirel, was forced out. Nonetheless, this second time was different than the first one: this intervention was welcomed by many people because they were happy to have the military stopping the violence and anarchy. The response of Türk-İş to the military intervention was supportive. The declaration of the Executive Board was interesting:

It is not possible to announce that the Turkish Armed Forces, which is the best example of loyalty to the Constitutional system and democracy, intervened with no reason whatsoever. The reason is that the events leading to the memorandum had no connection with a democratic regime. The Türk-İş Executive Board agrees with the First Clause of the memorandum of the Armed Forces Generals. Within this context, asking them to remain silent in spite of putting the state's unity means denial of its existence. Today, the unity of the states can be harmed by internal divisions not external attacks. (Koç 1998d: 72-73).

The attitude of the RPP and its leader, who unwillingly expressed their approval, was not different than the attitude of Türk-İş again. Ecevit, however, performed a totally different attitude than the leader of the party. As a result of the dispute between the two, the candidates supported by Ecevit won the party elections and he

was elected Secretary General; thus, İnönü, the party chairman, resigned and Ecevit became the chairman in 1972.

There was a significant increase in the votes of the RPP, which was able to double its votes particularly in the urban areas in 1973. Some of the big cities which supported the JP previously in the earlier elections changed their voting patterns in the municipal elections as well. The migration to the urban areas and the change in the voting patterns of the working class has a role in this success of the RPP, which was able to dominate the urban electorate in the 1973 elections. The slogans such as ‘a public sector versus capitalism’, ‘independent and populist development’, ‘humane and democratic working conditions’ and ‘democracy based on associations’ were the reasons for the election victory of the RPP (Bozarslan 2001: 460). However, this was not the case in the rural areas, where the RPP did not show the similar success. The achievement of the RPP in those elections in urban areas was due to electoral shifts and the working class was largely in that change. Alpaslan Işıklı evaluates the relationship between the non-partisanship policy of Türk-İş and the results of the elections:

Despite the deceiving non-partisanship policy which lasted long years in our country, the workers were not able to get rid of their attitude to support conservatist and capitalist-friendly parties and prop up governments which were acting against the workers’ interests. The October 1973 elections are the first example of the workers unification, which could influence the establishment of the government. (Işıklı 2003: 270).

After the elections, although the RPP was expected to perform unsuccessfully because of a new and young leader who did not have enough time to fortify himself and the party, the signs of change in the party in the election campaigns made it successful. He was able to appeal since he looked optimistic and promising. Moreover, enthusiastic crowds, who chanted loudly ‘Populist Ecevit’ and ‘Our Hope is Ecevit’, supported him because of his commitment to democracy. He was given the nickname ‘Karaoğlan’ which was a symbol that meant that he was young and he was an ordinary person belonging to any class of the Turkish society. For the first time in its history since its establishment, the RPP changed its traditionally

elitist image and its leader was able to gain the attention of the groups who previously supported the JP. Of course, the change of attitude and the support of the working class are undeniable. However, the attitude of Türk-İş towards the RPP in that period needs to be debated in detail and this will be the focus in the next part of this chapter since it requires special attention. In addition to its change in the leadership, another reason for the success of the RPP was the new left-of center stance. Ergun Özbudun and Frank Tachau underline the significance of both changes:

There may well have been a kind of synergistic dynamic at work here, in which the two developments fed on each other. At any rate, a new figure, Bülent Ecevit, became the head of the RPP, the first change in top leadership since the death of Atatürk in 1938. He was young and dynamic, and determined to move the party from its traditional image as the political arm of the etatist elite which, despite its populist rhetoric was distrustful of the masses. With resignation of the octogenarian İsmet İnönü and the defection of his more conservative supporters, the party entered the 1973 campaign perhaps less divided than at any time since the advent of the multi-party regime (Özbudun and Tachau 1975: 467-468).

As both writers emphasize, the RPP emerged with a new face and a new image as a party less divided and stronger than ever, which made it popular among the classes and particularly the workers. Since the party underlined social justice, social security and economic development, it succeeded in gaining the votes of the working class. Furthermore, the slogan 'left of the center' worked and it had a significant contribution in the 1973 elections, after which it won 185 seats in the Parliament. The party, however, needed a coalition partner since it won 185 seats and 40 more were necessary. After a long bargaining process which took three months, in January 1974, it formed a coalition government with the National Salvation Party (NSP) which was a newly born party at the time. Naturally, this decision of Ecevit surprised his supporters. The coalition government did not last long because the anti-Western stance of NSP and the stress of RPP on secularism caused a conflict within the government.

The number of the trade unionists candidates in the lists of the major parties was rather more before the 1973 elections: the RPP 11, the NAP (Nationalist Action

Party) 7, the JP 3, the NSP (National Salvation Party) 3. However, only 5 candidates from the RPP and 2 from the JP were able to be elected as deputies. In the 1977 elections, the figures were not different as 9 trade unionists were elected to the Parliament and 6 of them were from the RPP.

İsmail Özkan, the Director of Basın-İş and the General Secretary of the NMP, evaluates the year 1973 when the elections were held:

If there is a state, there can be trade unions. The social democrats were louder, but we were more dominant. We did not let any of the social democrats in the Executive Board of Türk-İş in 1973. We were having our Congress in 1973 in a huge cinema called Derya. The first rows were reserved for the protocol and they were all filled with important state figures as the President Fahri Korutürk, İnönü, Prime Minister and most of the ministers. Today, you cannot see one minister. We were much stronger in the past.

Furthermore, Enver Turgut, a former Türk-İş leader and a JP Deputy, focuses on the failure of the JP after 1973:

The JP was mistaken in the 1973 elections. I was a Parliamentarian at the time. I told them that we were not bothering them to become parliamentarians again. I stated that they should keep unionist in the party after we left. Nevertheless, they did not take unionists and they failed because they did not take the support of the workers who did not want to vote for a party in which there were not people representing workers. There was an attitude change of Demirel. He thought whoever he chose as a candidate, he could win the elections, but this was not the case. The group that you represent appoints you somewhere and wants you to serve them. If you are not there to serve them, they want to penalize the party and they do not vote for it.

An important development after 1973, with the power gain of the RPP, there were many unions who separated from Türk-İş between 1973 and 1976. This was mainly because the social democrats could not win in the 1973 Congress. Moreover, Seyfi Demirsoy, the conciliatory leader, died in January 1974. Halil Tunç became the General Director and Sadık Şide became the General Secretary of Türk-İş. The non-partisanship policy created severe controversies among the leaders of Türk-İş in that period. Meanwhile, the pressure of the employers on workers increased and on 16

June 1975 Halil Tunç, who went to Turkish Electricity Institution in Alsancak, İzmir to protest the unbearable attitude of the employers, shares his experience:

The lock-outs increased by the mid-1975 particularly in the private sector. Especially around İzmir, there were attacks of lock-outs. In addition, CRTUY was thriving on. A kind of discontent and annoyance had started in our Confederation. There were people criticizing the attitude of Türk-İş. They used to ask the question 'why Türk-İş was so passive?'. Then, we wanted to demonstrate our power. We wanted the things that were planned by our organization to be implemented. We wanted to stop lock-outs. Many unionists reacted against that. I was left all alone. I visited many enterprises and talked with their representatives. They encouraged me and I cut off the power on 16 June 1975. The protest would start at 6 in the morning and last 8 hours. We did everything as it had been planned. The boats did not work, the planes did not take off, the trains did not work. 80 thousand people left work. There was not a single event that required police intervention. At 2 PM, the power came back. However, the governor only went in trouble because he was fired (Koç 1998e: 73).

In addition to Tunç, Çetin Göçer, the leader of Belediye-İş and the leader of the JP Youth Organization, stresses the importance of this protest:

We organized the most important strikes in Turkey. In 1975, in İzmir, for instance, we organized a power cut strike. I was the one who cut the power of the whole city except for the hospitals. We did not disturb people to reach our goals in trade unionism. The strike lasted 38 hours. Halil Tunç was with us. When it was 6 in the morning, the radio broadcast started. The radio speaker said 'this is Turkish Radio' and we cut off the power. Halil Tunç was crying. There was the JP government. Demirel never forgave me. I was a supporter of the JP and I cut the power off, which was a reaction against the government of the JP. When I was elected to Türk-İş years later, he hugged my colleagues while congratulating, but he only shook my hand. For me, the group that I represented was more important. I did not prevent the strike. This was the first general strike in Turkey. I was sent to court on 16 June 1975. I was sentenced to 8 months' prison and fined to 10 thousand TL. However, our struggle continued.

As it can be noticed in the words of Göçer, in that decade, many trade unionists realized the fact that the interests of the workers were more important than the interests of the party. Despite the fear of a future threat or penalty, the unionists of the seventies were becoming more class conscious and the leadership of Göçer in this general strike constitutes the best example of this case.

In the 1977 elections, the RPP was the largest party in the Parliament again but it needed another party to come to power again. Meanwhile, after Ecevit came to power, in July 1978, he signed a ‘Social Contract’ with the leader of Türk-İş, Halil Tunç. Those were the years of severe economic problems and the collective agreements were in crisis. As a consequence, the Social Contract emerged as a solution to the problems. Because of this agreement, Türk-İş gained popularity and respect. Moreover, the visit of the leader of CRTUY, Fehmi Işıklar, to Türk-İş in October, the same year is important to underline since he asked for common action to save the democratic regime.

In the 1979 elections, there was a sharp drop in the RPP votes and an increase in the votes of the JP. The reason was the belief that the RPP was unable to stop terrorism and to solve the economic crisis hitting the country severely. As a result, the JP government started a new economic program on 24 January 1980, designed by the IMF. The severe implications of this program on the workers will be discussed in the second part of this chapter since they can be obviously observed in the eighties.

Türk-İş was not successful in those years and it was not able to build a strong and unified reaction against such economic pressures on the workers. The last years of the seventies were the years of terrorist actions everywhere in the whole country. They were the year of economic and political chaos. The two parties, the RPP and the JP were in deep fight, which divided the country in two separate parts. The party leaders totally lost communication and those happenings affected Türk-İş as well. The fans of the RPP and the JP within Türk-İş were struggling hard to have a Confederation under their influence. In fact, it was a period to show the power of Türk-İş, but this did not happen. The General Director of Türk-İş, Halil Tunç, who was a deep supporter of the RPP, became a voice of the party in the Confederation. The trade unionists supporting the JP, on the other hand, were the fervent advocates of non-partisanship policy. As a result of the severe struggle between the RPP and JP fans in the Confederation, a new candidate, İbrahim Denizcier, who was known with his modestly won the elections of 1979 and became the leader of Türk-İş.

To conclude, the 1970's were a period of social and political upheavals in Turkey. In fact, trade union movement became stronger and more influential. Accordingly, trade union membership grew rapidly. Türk-İş, however, with its largest number of membership, could have played an important role in the link between the trade union movement and the politics. Actually, the crisis in the 1970's hurt all Western trade unions and the Turkish union movement was affected accordingly after 1980.

During the last years of the seventies, not only Türk-İş but also all the institutions of the country were suffering from those divisions stemming from the JP-RPP distinction. In the second half of the seventies, Turkey went into a period of terrorist violence. In 1977, for example, the May Day celebrations in Taksim Square in İstanbul ended with thirty-nine deaths and many were wounded (Samim, 1987: 147). Furthermore, the terrorist attacks and the chaos were triggered in 1979 and 1980. There was no way for the government to stop them. Moreover, the economic structure of the country was worse than ever. Unfortunately, the country was in a kind of civil war and the result was the 1980 military coup.

4.2. Effects of the 1980 Coup on the Working Class and Türk-İş after 1980

The onset of the eighties is remarked by two major problems: economic stagnation and rampant anarchy. Unfortunately, the decade started under the influence of the economic crisis of the seventies, which stemmed from the serious increase in oil price in the world market and the Cyprus problem between Turkey and Greece. In fact, the real cause of the chronic trouble was the ineffective industry which was oriented to the local market in a period when import substitution policies were in effect (Önder 2003: 249). In January 1980, the minority government of Demirel introduced an economic stabilization program, which was advised by the foreign creditors, the IMF and the WB. Demirel, who started the program to curb economic discomfort, was not able to initiate useful measures to curb anarchy which had already spread all over the country.

Demirel's government, the last civilian government of the seventies, had to confront increasing economic and political problems. Therefore, the adoption of the policy package on 24 January 1980, aiming at a massive restructuring of the economy, was promoted in the mind of the public as the sole remedy of the economic dead-end. It was introduced to the masses as a program with no alternative at all. The main drive of this neo-liberal program which will affect seriously the country in the following years was the export-oriented strategies.

This was not only a stabilization program. In fact, the program which was marketed particularly by the World Bank had a structural adjustment perspective which aimed at an internal and external market liberalization and empowerment of the capital against the labor (Boratav 2003c: 148). The most important feature of the program was that the only leading factor was the prices set by the market within the economic decision-making process. The prices would be adjusted according to the supply and demand of each product or service. The market would make the necessary arrangements in the long run to find its balance.

There is no way to disagree with Kepenek and Yentürk, who announce that 'there is nothing new in those proposals if one knows the developments in the general economy theory, which have been going on for almost 200 years. The books titled Introduction to Economy are full of a variety of this approach' (Kepenek and Yentürk, 1983b: 197). However, the interesting point is that the austerity program was introduced to the Turkish society who was in a totally miserable economic situation as if it was a totally new economic invention tool. Besides, the income distribution was progressively worsening.

The Development Plans starting in 1963 were ineffective in the seventies and particularly the first half of the eighties.

Table 5: Goals and Realisations in the National Gross Product According to the Periods

<u>Periods</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Realisation</u>
1 st Plan (1963-1967)	7,00%	6,60%
2 nd Plan (1968-1972)	7,00%	6,30%
3 rd Plan (1973-1978)	7,90%	5,20%
1978 Program	6,10%	1,20%
4 th Plan (1979-1983)	8,00%	1,70%

Source: A variety of Yearly Economic Reports. In Önder. In Köse, Şenses and Yeldan, 2003: 274.

As it is apparently observed in the above table, there was an abrupt drop in the GNP after 1978. According to the neo-liberal theory imposed by the austerity program, a shift to an export promotion development strategy was the key element to success. Thus, Turkey lifted the upper limit on foreign currency and interest rates. The result was a rise in both, which created an increase in the costs of the capitalists. Consequently, the capitalists tried to stop a possible increase in the other components of the cost and the taxes. Preventing salaries from increasing was the easiest way to control and compensate the rising costs. With the contribution of the governing rule, the real salaries dropped in that period.

In the world economic system, the economic crisis of the 1970's created new changes in the international market where challenging required a transformation in the Taylorist and Fordist system which were unable to meet the demands of the crisis. Fordist system, which used to be favorable between 1945 and 1970, supported mass production and mass consumption; thus, high salaries were favorable in that period. Consequently, the assumption was that there would be peace between the two parties as long as the capital accumulation existed.

The crisis of the seventies required the use of high technology, adjustment to the new demand conditions and achievement in the competition. Then, the old system of massive and standard production needed to be given up. Instead, making frequent changes in the product and creating new demand became fashionable. This new system was called postfordist production and it was proposed that the workers and the consumers could live in harmony within the context of their common interests. Briefly, the difference from the previous system was ability to shift quickly to the production of a new item, to use microelectronic technologies, to increase the efficiency by lowering the wasted time of the machines and to reduce the production of low quality goods causing inefficiency. As a result, the ideal worker image, ‘the one who does not think’, drawn by Taylor was disappearing.

Within this perspective, the factories of the state sector appeared to be inefficient, unable to transform into the new means of production and to conform to the latest techniques. Therefore, the suggested solution was to close them down. The 1970’s and the 1980’s witnessed a powerful mode of privatization, in which, unfortunately, Turkey also took its place intensely. Under the structural adjustment policies, following the coup, the economic role of the state was rather intended to the benefit of the private sector. Peker highlights that ‘this had a significant impact on labor, with increased redundancy, and also increased subcontracting, home-working, contract labour and temporary forms of employment. This reduced the real wages of urban laborers and deregulated labour markets, making migrants less secure’ (Peker 1996: 10). Naturally, how can a steadiness be expected in trade union membership under these circumstances?

The trade unions evaluated privatization as an approach weakening and destroying the labor movement since they observed a serious decline in their membership due to privatization. Therefore, they performed strong resistance against it. The Turkish trade unions criticized the governments for handing over profitable enterprises to the private sector and particularly to the foreign multinational corporations who were alien to national interests instead of rehabilitating those SEEs, which made an invaluable contribution to social stability by creating employment (Dereli 1998: 326-327).

In this new system influencing the economies of the world in that period, the new type was the 'creative worker who was able to integrate into the company'. The approach of the new workers should be 'we are the company'. Therefore, instead of unskilled workers, more and more skilled, or highly skilled workers were required in this system. Naturally, the loyalty of this new worker type to the company and to the product itself could cause alienation from the trade unions, which brought about an abrupt drop in the union membership in general around the world. İbrahim Yalçınoğlu, the leader of Teksif, illustrates the case in Turkey by stressing the negative impact of the 1980 military intervention together with the developments that were going on in the foreign world:

Trade unions in Turkey came into a period of halt after 1980. They might have appeared as if they were working, but their functions were stopped. After the 1982 Constitution, the broadened rights of the last two decades were curtailed. Going on a strike was made difficult. What can a worker do? They can spank the worker who can be fired with no reason. Traditionally, during a strike there must be excitement such as folkloric music and dance. Now, there is nothing in the strikes. The worker does not come to the factory during the strike. How come a worker can stay at home during the strike? They can't get together. You must gather them in front of the factory and motivate them. What kind of strike is this? There is only one man with a sign saying 'there is strike in this factory and he stands alone by himself in front of the factory. Both the worker who wants to work and who does not want to work can go and work. The raw material can go in and get out as a product. Is this a strike? The concept of strike is ended by the authorities. The workers are alienated from the trade unions because of them. Another factor is the reduction in the state sector. People with a public sector background used to come more in quantity to the trade unions before the 1980's. Now, we have more from the private sector and those cannot motivate. There is no power today. That's why the workers are alienated as well.

In that period, in addition to the drawbacks of the postfordist system, structural adjustment policies were invented by the IMF to secure the integration to the world capitalist system. There have been many adverse effects of these policies on the developing countries which were desperately looking for some means to find a relief from the crisis. First of all, as a result of the deregulation of the economy, Central Banks lost control over the monetary policy and interest rates were determined in

the free market by the commercial banks. Banks were captured by the foreign finance giants and privatized under the control of the international finance institutions. Industries and national enterprises oriented to domestic market collapsed and domestic consumption decreased. Labor costs decreased as well and indebted developing countries became the land of exploitation for foreign enterprises. Many writers use the term "crisis" to indicate the serious trouble in which the organized labor has been lately. It is because the worldwide membership has dropped dramatically. Furthermore, the labor movement is isolated alarmingly from the growing and dynamic parts of the society. It is confined to economic sectors that are struggling for survival (Heckscher 1988: 249).

Structural Adjustment Policies imposed by the IMF and the WB were severely criticized by the trade unions in the 1980's. Nonetheless, the advocates for structural adjustment policies believe that debt crisis of the 1980's was due to mainly two reasons: the government intervention in economies resulting in inefficient, unproductive and bureaucratic masses and the inability of the indebted economies in dealing with external shocks (Sparr 1994: 55). To make developing countries more capitalistic so that their economy could be stronger and more efficient was necessary for them. However, both organizations, the IMF and the WB have been heavily criticized by trade unions and non-governmental organizations worldwide on the grounds that their policies have not led to wealth and happiness but an economic disaster with increased poverty and external debt, decreased natural resources, destroyed public services and brought about a loss of national independence in the developing countries. One of the interviewers, Fuat Alan, focuses on the importance of nation state for the growth of the trade union movement:

We notice an externally motivated economic policy in Turkey. The drawbacks of this policy should be evaluated. We must have the concept of nation state. Because of the impact of the foreign stimulus, trade unions lost power. According to my understanding of trade unionism, the task of trade unions is not signing collective contracts only. They must deal with the social and political issues regarding our country. After the 1980's, trade unionism had a structure executed from the high ranks solely, which caused the alienation of the member workers. Therefore, the rights were

restricted. In addition, the neoliberal policies of this period were contradictory to the rights of the farmers and workers. The capitalists thrived on after 1980 in Turkey, but not the workers.

As it is declared by many writers ‘the decade of the 1980’s marked a crucial turning point in Turkey’s socioeconomic structure and polity (Eralp, Tünay and Yeşilada 1993: 1). In addition to the austerity program, the 1980 coup changed the structures in the Turkish economy. Moreover, the Turkish society had to deal with the new political system. The coup of September 12, 1980 however, did not surprise the Turkish public as the country had been experiencing its deepest sociopolitical and economic crisis since the founding of the Republic (Yeşilada 1998: 346). It is also argued that the military deliberately failed to use its power to stabilize the situation so that the intervention would be welcomed and the rule in the military regime could be followed easily. However, one significant characteristic of the Turkish army which distinguishes it from the other instances in the world is that it takes over political power and shortly afterwards returns to its barracks because it only aims at creating conditions for a better functioning democracy. This depoliticized attitude of the military which never aims at remaining in power for long years makes it different than the ones in the other countries, particularly in Latin America. That is the reason why Turkish nation, the inherited generations of the Ottoman state, born as a ‘warrior state’, has a deep affection and respect towards the military which is acknowledged as the guardian of the principles of republicanism and secularism in the Turkish polity. (Heper and Güney, 1996, 619-620). As it can be observed in the speeches of Kenan Evren, “Turkish Armed Forces do not undertake military interventions unless it is willed by the people, and the military returns to its barracks because the people want that as well” (Evren 1990: II, 363).

What was the attitude of Türk-İş against the coup? It was rather an approval of the intervention. Boratav highlights that ‘the military rule followed the approaches of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey and Employer Union Confederation of Turkey. The Administration of Türk-İş, on the other hand, surrendered to the common attack of the capitalists and the military rule in return for some small concessions as the check-off system to collect the dues (Boratav

2000: 163). In fact, the Labor Report offered to the 12th Congress on 24-28 May 1982 gives evidence to the consent of Türk-İş to the military intervention:

The Parliamentarians ran after their party interests and did not deal with the anarchy and terror before 1980. The Turkish military, which had been observing those incidences closely, showed its responsibility to the Turkish Nation. The aim of the September 12 intervention is to provide wealth and happiness, to protect the unity of the country and the nation, to strengthen democracy and to restore state authority. That is the reason why the military had to intervene (Koç 1986e: 208-209).

Nevertheless, during the Congress, trade unionists debated the issue and declared their disapproval to the intervention since there were many unionists who were against this conciliatory attitude of Türk-İş. To illustrate, İsmail Hakkı Süren, a delegate of Türk Metal Union, blames the September 12 rule for behaving as an employer:

The rule after September 12 annoyed Türk-İş which is the representative of the good intention. The representatives of the employers teased Turkish workers and showed their emotionlessness by labeling them ‘the happy minority’. In fact, they can not pay even the rent with the salary (Koç 1995a: 88).

Another trade unionist, Muzaffer Saraç, the leader of Yol-İş, blamed Türk-İş for not mentioning any of the damages done by the military rule in the Labor Report:

In this period, some unionists in Yol-İş were arrested as it happened in other unions of Türk-İş. Some of our unions were liquidated. We know that Türk-İş is sorry about what is going on and it does not have much power. However, there is not a word about all these in the 534 pages Labor Report. Since 12 September, almost 100 trade unionists, my friends, have been arrested. They were exposed to severe acts that they did not deserve at all. As the other unions of Türk-İş, Yol-İş never accepted or promoted anarchy and terror, but some of our unions were liquidated without even an investigation. So far, there is not a single union, a member of Yol-İş, which has been found guilty. My union, the one that I am the General Secretary, the one in which I grew up and learned trade unionism, has been given to a trustee. When we asked what the offense of this union was, they responded that they had been investigating because it had been dealing with politics (Koç 1995b: 90-91).

In fact, one year before the 13th Congress of Türk-İş, in 1981, Yol-İş organized its 13th General Congress and the Labor Report evaluated the military intervention rather cautiously:

The statement of the General Evren, the President about the economy of our country and the labor gives us the message that liberal approach will exist. However, the liberal approach which is formulated under the perception of 'laissez faire laissez passer' requires a strict control of the trade unions in the developing countries like ours. In this approach, production costs and domestic consumption must be reduced in order to succeed in an increase in the exports. Therefore, this requires a severely low level of salaries kept under control.

The workers are aware of the fact that this is a transition period and do their best to compromise. Nevertheless, the employers are trying to take full advantage of this period and to influence in order to get the necessary changes according to their interests. They are trying to influence the authority in order to lift the check-off system and to end the liberal trade unionism. Production increase has never been possible by means of dominance in anywhere and anytime. It requires peace in labor; thus, the employers must give up their extreme profit dream and respect the rights of the workers. In order to provide a necessary working environment, a suitable atmosphere in which trade unions can exercise their basic functions and duties must be prepared quickly (Demiryol-İş, 1992: 126-127).

As it is underlined in the above mentioned report, Bulutay also assesses that 'in the 1980's, when the wages were relatively low and the unions were silenced under the military regime, there was a comparatively lower rate of employment growth' (Bulutay 1995b: 193). Another important declaration was made by Fikret Yoleri from Basın-İş during the 12th Congress of Türk-İş, on the issue of the role of Türk-İş in the political arena. He proposed that Türk-İş should be more efficient in the political sphere and should form a political party:

Türk-İş must be unified and should play a significant role in the politics. If Türk-İş will maintain its non-partisanship policy, remain indifferent and leave the political sphere to the representatives of the capitalists, those people will profit from the workers but help the capitalists. Türk-İş must find the means to be represented powerfully in the political arena instead of begging people, as it was the case before, for the enactment of a law

from which the workers can benefit. This can be either by founding a party for the workers or by supporting an already existing party (Koç 1995c: 87).

It is apparent that the discussions on the non-partisanship policy were on stage after the 1980 intervention as well. This reminds the statements of the second leader of Türk-İş between September 1952 and August 1953, İsmail İnan, and proves that this debate which had been going on for more than thirty years would be a vital discussion point in the future:

I can accept the non-partisanship policy if it is at the same consciousness level as in the U.S.A. They organize rallies and they follow the Parliamentarians there. It is rather efficient. Here, it is incompatible and it does not have principles. This is an incompatible neutrality used under the label of non-partisanship policy. The JP comes and asks candidates from Türk-İş. The response is: 'here you are'. The RPP comes and asks candidates from Türk-İş. The response is: 'here you are'. This means lack of character. Are you the construction area principal? Don't you have any principles? (Koç, 1998f: 122).

After the emergence of the framework of the Constitution, the reactions against the Draft led to the surfacing of the approaches which supported the intensification of the political actions. The leader of Türk-İş, Şevket Yılmaz, declared on 8 September 1982 his views on the issue:

Trade unionism is a representation task. We want to do it properly. If there will be no possibility to do it, we can perform this task of saving and improving the rights and freedom in another sphere. We can take off our ties, wear our overalls and get involved in politics in 67 cities of the country (Koç 2000: 169).

Moreover, on 9 September 1982, during an Execution Committee of Türk-İş, this topic of establishing a party was discussed again, but the Confederation could not reach an agreement. Those debates did not last long and were all over after a short period of time. The reason for such debates was the power loss in Türk-İş after 1980. One of the interviewers, Ömer Sönmez, the General Secretary of Demiryol-İş, argues that trade unionism used to be more powerful before 1980 coup due to the fact that each union used to make its own collective contract. He mentions that it is Türk-İş which makes the contract today and everyone has to obey it. He believes

that is the reason why it is not that strong. Furthermore, he highlights an important point about the non-partisanship policy:

We did not support a specific party as a whole, but each union showed itself as a supporter of a party in order to pursue its interests. I have never let politics in my union. Was that useful? Suppose I told a party that I supported it. I may have told or I may have pretended as if I did. However, I can never know how 3000 people vote because it was forbidden to ask people to vote for a party in the congresses or meetings. The governments, on the other hand, knew that we were supporting them, but this was not true.

At this point the opinion of one of the interviewers, Fuat Alan, is worth mentioning since they argue against the views of Ömer Sönmez. Fuat Alan is one of those trade unionists who argue that trade unions must be in the political sphere:

There is no way to keep trade unions out of the political arena. The only task of trade unions is not collective contract. They must struggle against all kinds of decisions harmful to the working class. Thus, they need political struggle. The 24 principles of Türk-İş should be revised and modified. Trade unions must be involved in politics.

Enver Turgut, on the other hand, supports Sönmez while expressing the behaviour of the trade unionists while they are making their choice in political party affiliation:

I am from a family with a Democrat Party background. If they offer me to make me a RPP Parliamentarian, I will refuse it. I can't change my background in order to become a parliamentarian because I can't support their view.

As a result, it can be declared that there is a similarity between the political party choice of the trade unionists while becoming a Deputy and the voting behaviour of the public: the impact of the family's choice. Another interesting point to be underlined is that all the interviewers who played a role in politics and who became parliamentarians stated that they were not willingly involved in politics, but the political parties invited them and made pressure on them to enter politics. Mustafa Başoğlu, for instance, expresses his memories on the issue:

I did not apply for a political party. Political realm is not an arena that I wanted to enter specifically and willingly. Because of the requirements in my job, I had already been involved in politics. I did not enter in active politics eagerly, but the conditions of

the period pushed me in and I did not refuse it. I am happy now because I became a Deputy three times.

Enver Turgut and Sadık Şide also agree with Başoğlu and state that political parties called them:

I have never thought to be in politics. I was not ready but I had self-confidence. I have always kept distant to politics. Political arena has always called me to join. Otherwise I was happy in my job in the trade union.

Back to the military coup, there was no doubt that the power of Türk-İş, underlined by most of the interviewers, was weakened right after the military intervention. Enver Turgut, for instance, explains the situation in that period very clearly:

After the 1980 coup, all of our rights were taken. During our period, we used to be the leader of our trade union and become parliamentarians at the same time. After the intervention, they changed the regulation. We had to resign from our position in the union in order to become a Deputy. However, in the past, since we were able to perform both, we used to be and think together with the workers. We had never been drifted apart. Nevertheless, we fell apart after 1980 because the working class and the Parliament were separated from each other. The workers were not represented in the Parliament anymore; thus, our rights were taken away gradually one by one. Later, we wanted to get them back, but it was too late.

An important declaration two days after the 1980 coup was the ban on strikes and the control on the collective bargaining process. The attitude of Türk-İş was definitely conforming to the military rule. The leader of Türk-İş, İbrahim Denizcier, declared that they supported the military intervention as the Türk-İş society. Moreover, the appointment of Sadık Şide as the Social Security Minister to the military government established in 22 September 1980 was the proof of the support of Türk-İş to the military rule. The result was surprising: the membership of Türk-İş to the ICFTU was lifted because of this appointment.

An examination of those two Labor Reports after the 12th and 13th Congresses of Türk-İş gives the clues of the onset of worries within the Confederation between 1980 and 1982. In addition, the three Türk-İş leaders who were chosen to the Consultative Assembly, which had been established after the coup to engage in the

restructuring of the political system and its institutions, had similar worries as reported in the Congresses of Türk-İş. Those were Mustafa Alpdündar, Feridun Şakir Ögünç and Vahap Güvenç and their significance is that they were the members of the Assembly which prepared the 1982 Constitution. Although Alpdündar commented that there had not been a consensus between those three Türk-İş leaders including himself and Şide, the Social Security Minister, there are some other unionists who expressed that they were all a unity and they acted as a whole to save the workers' rights. For instance, by assessing his observations of the period, Yalçınoğlu argues that they all worked in harmony and the presence of Şide reduced the risk of more curtailed rights:

There are many people criticizing Şide because he was the Minister of the military government. If he had not been there, Turkish workers' movement would have been wounded more. Let's be rational! Şide is a very clever person. If he had not been the Minister, somebody else would have come and the transition period would have been much longer. Although there are people who believe that he was not beneficial for the workers, he had many contributions. I had many contacts with our friends in the Consultative Assembly. I realized that they were all contributors.

Sadık Şide asserts that they were four people in the Assembly and they were not getting along. He agrees that September 12 deprived things from the workers and he tried to do his best to resist:

September 12 limited the rights of many groups and the workers as well. The conditions of the period required that. Despite this, we kept trade unionism going. We tried to find the means to compensate the restrictions. I was able to save the workers' rights at a maximum level during the most difficult times. If I had not been there, we could have lost more power. Yes, we suffered wastages, but I was able to reduce them to 10 per cent from 90 per cent. Many of my friends, trade unionists, were taken by the police and army and sent to prison. I resisted and objected to them. I explained them that this was wrong. I told them that those people were trying to save workers' rights in the trade unions. They did not appear sympathetic to the military, and that's why they were denounced. I used to react and take those friends out as fast as I could. I did my best to struggle.

Koç disapproves people who criticize Şide because he believes that it is not a proper action to get rid of the responsibilities by making him a scapegoat (Koç 1986f: 209). During the preparation period of the Constitution, there were many discussions within Türk-İş and the Consultative Assembly. The concerns of the Confederation about the new Constitution were announced in the 30th Anniversary declaration of Türk-İş on 31 July 1982:

Türk-İş has a historical role in the advent and recognition of the constitutional order which endorses the social state principle based on basic rights and freedom. Türk-İş has successfully and responsibly used those obtained rights for 30 years. The contributions of Türk-İş to the economy and the wealth of the country are admitted by the nation. Türk-İş is for a Constitution which is based on pluralist democracy and social state principle. It expects consciously and firmly a Constitution which is suitable for our nation. The Turkish nation, the Turkish workers and Türk-İş believe in their own power (Şide, 2004d: 281-283).

On 8 September 1982, Türk-İş organized a ‘Constitution Conference’ in Ankara and a declaration, approved by the representatives of Türk-İş unions from the 67 cities of Turkey, was made and applauded fervently by them:

The Constitution Draft offered to the Turkish nation and the developments which have been occurring in the Consultative Assembly regarding this Draft are definitely far from fetching pluralistic and liberal democracy which is the political choice of the nation. The Constitution Draft has the elements of a system which will abolish the rights and the freedom of the laborers and all the workers economically as well as politically and will bring about the dominance of a group of capitalists in the economic and political sphere of Turkey. If this Constitution is accepted, the workers will lose their basic rights and freedom and their individual rights and freedom will even be restricted and never be protected. Moreover, democracy will have a formal and distorted profile in which people will only use their rights to vote at the elections. The ones who are planning to save their profits by means of this Constitution Draft are expecting that the workers will not be able to struggle severely because their freedom will be restricted and they will be economically disabled. Nonetheless, those will see that they will be definitely mistaken (Belgelerle Türk-İş Tarihi 2002: 59-61).

Surprisingly, the attitude of Türk-İş, which used to be absolutely against the Constitution Draft in its Congresses and Conferences, changed and it turned out to

be a positive one just days before the referendum. It was really shocking to see a totally different Türk-İş because on the eve of the referendum it wanted its members to vote 'yes'. The interpretation of this change in attitude can only be explained by the lack of class consciousness again as it is the main focus of this study. The lack of consciousness has caused the Confederation, Türk-İş, which has always demonstrated indecisiveness in important decision making procedures about the future of the workers, to try to persuade the workers to approve the 1982 Constitution. On 4 November 1982, only three days before the referendum, Türk-İş Executive Board made a declaration about the Constitution:

It is necessary that we go to vote on 7 November 1982. You should keep in mind that:

1. The most important feature of the Constitution is to give the way to the democratic parliamentary regime,
2. It aims at not going back to the severe days before 12 September 1980,
3. It aims at maintaining democracy permanently and as a way of life which can not be given up and which is suitable to the political regime preference of the Turkish nation,
4. It eliminates widely the unfairness which the laborers and all the workers were exposed to during the preparation stage.

This should be a sound evaluation. You should not be pessimistic about the future and you should not be prejudiced. Türk-İş expects and wants the Turkish nation and our workers to keep those in mind while voting on 7 November 1982 (Şide, 2004e: 283-285).

Moreover, the leader of Türk-İş, Şevket Yılmaz, supported apparently the September 12 intervention. Furthermore, he wanted people to vote 'yes' for the Constitution when he gave a speech on the radio and TV before the referendum. There was one important trade unionist, a member of the Consultative Assembly, Mustafa Alpdündar, who showed his reaction clearly and said 'no' to the Constitution. However, he would be vetoed by the military in the subsequent years when he wanted to enter politics.

Finally, the Constitution was accepted overwhelmingly by the support of Kenan Evren, the President. Voter Participation was 91.27 per cent. While 91.37 per cent of the votes were affirmative, 8.63 per cent was only negative. The result was a huge majority who accepted the Constitution. In fact, this acceptance of the 1982 Constitution by the public was different than the one in the 1961. When the 27 May Constitution was asked to be voted, 61.5 percent of the votes were affirmative. Işıklı argues that this should be accepted as the indicator of the presence of the democratic conditions. He adds that 27 May intervention pulled only the characters of the ruling party out of the political arena, but 12 September intervention started to work not only by abolishing the political life but also by intensely dominating and controlling the academic, scientific and unionist life together with the communication means as a whole (Işıklı 2002: 200-201). Karacagil underlines the issue while comparing the two Constitutions and emphasizing the left-right distinction which divided the country into two separate worlds in that period:

The intervention of 27 May was done against the rightist. All the rightist trade unionists were arrested and the leftist ones were flattered. Why do we support the 27 May intervention? Because we never forget that it gave us the right to strike and collective bargaining. However, after 12 March and 12 September interventions, they restricted our rights severely. Nevertheless, I always say that the Turkish Armed Forces must protect the Turkish trade unionism movement because this is the production army and everything that the military uses are produced by them.

Moreover, unlike the 1961 Constitution, 1982 Constitution was long and detailed. In fact, it was reflecting the reactions against the previous Constitution and the labor relations between 1961 and 1980. Therefore, it included many detailed changes unfavorable to the workers. As a result, it was rather restricting in terms of workers' rights. As a reaction to the preceding period, it limited the actions of the trade unions, the right to collective bargaining and right to strike. Instead of a stress on collective bargaining, the authority of the High Arbitrary Council, however, was widened, which meant less power to the workers in terms of collective bargaining.

When the minutes of the Consultative Assembly between the period 1980 and 1983, when the elections took place, are surveyed, it is apparent that Mustafa Alpdündar

was the one who talked the most and thus who objected the most to the new laws and regulations. During the preparation discussion of the Acts 2821 and 2822, his reaction against the stronger authority of the High Arbitrary Council and the 60 days limit for the strikes is really significant:

The High Arbitrary Council is an already existing institution. If we accept this clause, clause 58, the trade union will be out and the Council will be in. According to the new regulation, if the workers who go on a strike reproach the others for not joining it, the Council will intervene. Then, the strike will end and there will be no collective bargaining. Moreover, I object to the 60 days limit for the strikes. Of course I do not wish them to last 60 days. I wish they could end in 6 days. This new regulation is very harmful. All the employers will wait for the end of this 60 days period and then the High Arbitrary Council will intervene. That means why the employers should deal with the workers. They will not finish the disagreement after a collective bargaining period. This means the end of the trade unions. (Minutes of the Consultative Assembly, Vol. 9. 1982: 629-634)

It is observed by the military officials after the 1980 coup that the legal regulations of the 1961 Constitution providing the necessary ground to trade unionism to flourish, were not used properly and sometimes even were gathered with terrorist actions. Consequently, all the trade unions were blamed for such anarchy and the new legislation was prepared under the motive to limit them and all their activity in the political arena. As Yazıcı emphasizes, ‘the trade unions had to recognize the new legal regulations which lower the status of the trade unions to a workers’ association. Those developments were the clues of a difficult period in terms of Turkish workers’ movement (Yazıcı 1996: 150-151).

After the recognition of the 1982 Constitution, the next clue signaling the difficult period for the workers was the new Labor Acts 2821 and 2822. The similar ineffective stand of Türk-İş was the case during the preparation stage of the two Acts which will damage and restrict the workers’ rights and workers’ movement in the succeeding years. The reactions and the critiques of the three members of the Assembly with the Türk-İş background and the Minister Sadık Şide were not taken into account as it happened during the Constitution Draft. The Drafts of the Trade Unions Act 2821 and Collective Contract, Strike and Lock-out Act 2822 were sent

to Türk-İş in order to receive the opinion of the trade unionists. Türk-İş stressed clearly that those two new Acts should have been based on the Acts 274 and 275 in addition to the ILO norms and principles. However, since sending the Drafts to Türk-İş to get its opinion was a superficial act, the views of the Confederation were not taken into account naturally.

The critiques and demands of Türk-İş were totally ignored and the laws were introduced in May 1983. In the new Acts, the most important part to be underlined regarding the focus of this study is the changes about the relationship between the trade unions and the political sphere. Those two acts aimed at forcing the trade unions to perform activities in their own professional sphere only. In other words, trade unions were prevented from political activity as much as possible and the justification was to stop their actions which were against the unity of the country. This principle of the 1982 Constitution and the Acts 2821 and 2822 led the unions and particularly Türk-İş to a weakened position. In addition, the largest Confederation, Türk-İş, lost respect and support among its members since it performed a conforming attitude towards the enactment of both Acts.

Furthermore, Acts 2821 and 2822 aimed at diminishing the number of the trade unions because they regulated the organization of the unions different than the previous ones. Unlike the Act 274, the new one, 2821, brought in a new system in which the organization of the trade unions would be based on industrial branch. Furthermore, it forbade the establishment of workplace based trade unions. A very important change which will lead to the loss of members and thus loss of power was that more than one trade union could be allowed to be established in one industrial branch. In addition, according to Act 2822, a minimum 10% membership in that branch was required in order to obtain the right to collective bargaining and only the members of those which were qualified to collective bargaining could profit from the contract. That meant the liquidation of the small trade unions and the survival of the central and relatively bigger unions on the arena. Previously, the check-off right, which used to be given up to four trade unions in one workplace, was given to a single union in the new law. Those drastic changes were criticized severely by the academicians and journalists at the time. However, the reaction of Türk-İş was not

strong enough to prevent their enactment. The result is the dramatic problems that are still on stage and a really weak trade unionism and thus a feeble Confederation, Türk-İş.

To conclude, 12 September 1980 military intervention aiming at ending terrorist actions and the anarchy which had been going on in the 1970's in the country limited the most important rights of the workers by means of the 1982 Constitution and the Acts 2821 and 2822 regarding trade unions, strikes and collective contracts. The attitude of Türk-İş was rather weak since the power of the military was very strong. Türk-İş was not influential enough to resist and performed a conforming attitude despite some upheavals after the coup. The divisions that had occurred since the second half of the 1960's within the trade union movement were the primary reason for this weakness and it is still the case. That's why the suggestion of all the trade unionists for Türk-İş to gain power has been a unified organization for the Turkish workers. Moreover, the second suggestion to have a strong Confederation is that Türk-İş must give up the non-partisanship policy which has been useless since its adoption and perform a powerful stand in the political arena.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The study of trade union movement in Turkey, particularly the largest Confederation, Türk-İş, requires a detailed investigation of the past, particularly the Ottoman Empire, since Turkey inherited most of its institutional culture from the Empire and integrated Western means into the already existing norms. The argument of this study, the weakness of the unionist movement and the lenient and blurred attitude of Türk-İş since its establishment, should be evaluated by considering the developments that have been going on since the last decades of the Empire. First, we should underline that the trade union movement in Turkey did not emerge as a result of similar motives as in Europe. On the contrary, it came out with the impact of the westernization process during the last years of the Ottoman Empire.

To begin with, during the last years of the Ottoman history, the introduction of the first Civil Code, called Mecelle, did not have an impact on the labor relations much since it was a law significantly influenced by the Islamic Law. The second most important event regarding the labor movement is the adoption of the Second Constitution in 1908, a significant step towards westernization. Right after that, a high number of strikes can be observed in the Empire, particularly in the Balkans, with the impact of a law introduced in 1909, Tatil-i Eşgal. This Law, enacted with the influence of the westernization process, regulated the industrial relations in the Empire and later it was in effect even after the establishment of the Turkish Republic until the enactment of 1936 Labor Law (Act No. 3008). Although there is disagreement about whether it forbade strikes or not, it clearly banned the establishment of trade unions. As a consequence, the weakness of trade unionism in

Turkey has its base in the Ottoman Empire and its destiny did not change much during the new Republic.

During the Empire, the picture in the labor relations was that the Western capitalists and the minorities living in the Empire were the majority within the capitalist class and they were severely strong against the workers who were mainly the Turks. Despite the power of those groups, we notice some reactions and strikes in the last decades of the Empire. However, those were all insignificant acts lacking a movement as a whole and the most important part was that there was not even a concept like a class or class consciousness within those reactions since there was not a considerable class of workers. Therefore, the situation was totally different than the one in the Western world. In other words, instead of the bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy was the leading class maintaining the controlling role of the period. The Ottomans did not achieve to join a developed phase of production, so a working class did not flourish during the Empire because of their top-down policies. Therefore, a low increase in the number of workers and an insignificant trade union movement can be observed in that period.

Furthermore, the key role was played by the foreign capital during the process of integration into the world capitalist market. The result was the increasing amount of imported industrial products. Nevertheless, the exports were constituted by the agricultural goods only. As a consequence, the economic as well as political dependency on the Western states increased and this was an inevitable impediment to the improvement of industry and a working class during the Ottoman Empire.

After the establishment of the new Turkish Republic in 1923, the emphasis was on national industry, but during the first years, the growth in industry was not as high as the one in agriculture. Moreover, the inherited industry from the Empire was very small. During the single party era, state intervention on the economy was remarkable and the number of private enterprises was quite low. Furthermore, many of them were severely hit by the 1929 world economic crisis. As a result, the economic policy of the single party, the RPP, was planned economy, an anti-liberal

approach, stressing state entrepreneurship which started to improve in the subsequent years.

With the introduction of the 1st Industrial Plan in 1934, a rapid industrialization period started, which influenced the growth of a working class. However, despite the enlargement in the working class, we observe the severe control of the RPP on the workers. In fact, the RPP had already denied the working class by adopting the populism principle, by which it aimed at the unity of the Turkish society and refused class struggle. As a consequence of its will to control the work area, the RPP government accepted the Labour Act 3008 in 1936.

During the war years, workers went through a severe economic deterioration period. Their income level dropped abruptly. After the war, in the second half of the forties, the RPP government started closer relations with the U.S.A. Within the country, a need to elections was felt clearly, so the RPP was forced by the internal and external factors to establish democratic elections and start the multi-party era. The results of the 1946 elections displayed the astonishing future power of the opposition party, the DP. Meanwhile, the serious economic conditions were still the case for the poorer segments of the society and thus the workers.

The individual of the multi-party era was equipped with the right to speak and with a feeling of power though this was a fake endowment of the DP. This was something genuinely new in the history of the Republic. That is the reason why it was easy for the DP to get the support of many groups and the workers as well in the elections. In fact, what happened basically after the elections was that the workers, unable to perform a united and strong will, were exploited not only by the RPP as usual but also by the newly emerged party and this went on for decades. Even after the establishment of Türk-İş as a united force, this abuse of both parties became an unfortunate tradition, which is one of the most critical points argued in this study. In fact, it is undeniable that both parties played a role in the emergence of Türk-İş since there had been a great number of small unions before its establishment and both parties aimed at having a unique organization to be kept under control.

Otherwise, the increase in the number of such small unions could have posed a threat against their supremacy.

In the 1950's, the foreign policy of Turkey changed since the country started to have closer relationship with the U.S.A. The superpower was interested deeply in the political and economic affairs of Turkey. Therefore, it is obviously found out that the U.S.A. had a great influence on the developments about the workers and unions. Its policy to diffuse democracy all around the world was extremely popular but this was a kind of democracy whose boundaries were drawn by the U.S. itself. What was the tool of the Turkish political parties and the USA to suppress the workers then? It was the establishment of a confederation of the workers, a union to cover all of them so that it could be manageable and controllable. What was the means to keep it under control? It was a unique invention, 'non-partisanship politics'.

As a result of its future plans, the RPP, the authoritarian party of the decades, changed its attitude towards the workers and performed an unexpectedly flexible policy. However, it was too late. The opposition party had already carved its space in the political arena because it acted friendly to the lower classes of the society and especially the workers and farmers. The result was the remarkable success of the DP until 1960. It gained a significant popularity because people thought they were given the chance to be assertive for the first time since the establishment of the Republic. Therefore, not only the different groups but also the misled workers felt the DP as their voice in the political arena.

A lot of internal and external factors led to the emergence of Türk-İş in 1952 and the manipulation of its policies. As the largest confederation representing the workers, the self-understanding of Türk-İş remained blurred for decades since it did not have a clear stand protecting and enhancing the rights of the workers. In addition, the workers themselves have not developed a sense of class because since the establishment of Türk-İş, they have been mainly the migrants of the big cities who have kept their links, especially the landownership, with the rural area. They were not totally expropriated and their connection with their native land remained. That is the reason why, it was difficult for them to feel as a whole, as a class.

Another very important problem hindering the improvement of a working class was the lack of strong bourgeoisie and the lack of necessary conditions to have it developed. After the 1950's, due to the shift in its foreign policy, Turkey received a great deal of American credit but this did not serve to progress in the investments and thus to increase the number of workers. As a result of Keynesian policies, the Bretton Woods system the newly developing working class was under control by means of the IMF and World Bank. Türk-İş was born in such an international atmosphere and it conformed to the Keynesian economic system imposed by the U.S.A. to the whole world. During the study, it was discovered that there was direct financial involvement of the U.S.A. in Türk-İş during its establishment and the subsequent decades. Many of the Türk-İş leaders were invited to the U.S.A., Israel and Germany to learn trade unionism and they spent even months in those countries. In addition, many members of the AFL, the largest American confederation, and many state officials came to Turkey to teach trade unionism to the Türk-İş leaders. Then, it is impossible to argue that Türk-İş was the workers' confederation built free of the external forces.

Besides the external influence, what was the internal atmosphere in the 1950's? Was there an impact of the RPP and the DP on Türk-İş? Unfortunately, the answer is a positive one since there was an intense intrusion of both. Then, one can ask the question: 'what is the meaning of non-partisanship politics invented by Türk-İş?' The answer is the key argument of this research debated during the whole study.

First of all, after its establishment, Türk-İş adopted its Article 5, banning its unions and members from joining in any political activity and propaganda. However, despite the punishment designed in this Article, it is easily found out during the study that most of the Türk-İş executives were involved in politics at any level. Moreover, the adoption of the non-partisanship policy in 1964 led to the exclusion of the Türk-İş workers from the political arena. In addition, the rise in the salaries and the improvement in the working conditions was another impact to keep them out.

However, one major event in the sixties is the 1960 military coup and the 1961 Constitution. The contribution of the Constitution to the trade unionism in Turkey was immense since it was giving broadened rights to the Turkish society for the first time since the establishment of the Republic. Accordingly, the working class gained importance, which stimulated an increase in the power of trade unionism. The military takeover brought an end to the DP dominance. The result was the emergence of the Justice Party, which stepped into the political sphere by filling the gap left by the end of the DP.

In terms of the legal structure, a number of laws were enacted after the 1961 Constitution. The most important ones related to the issues covering the workers and trade unions were the 274 Trade Union Act and 275 Collective Labor Agreement, Strike and Lock-out Act. Most of the Türk-İş leaders interviewed during the study are in the opinion that trade unionism started after the introduction of these two Acts in 1963. In fact, there is a sizeable increase in the amount of strikes and the rights obtained by the workers after that period.

In the sixties the number of workers who joined the labor force rose abruptly because there had been a substantial increase in the number of peasants left jobless in the 1950's due to the mechanization of the agriculture. In that period, there is massive migration and thus labor flow and this had a significant impact on the developing industry since the workers of that period were free from land and were not temporary workers. However, the lack of education and class consciousness among the largest confederation of Turkey, Türk-İş, led to the 'soft relations' with the subsequent governments. The result was a hindrance to the workers' rights.

Another impediment was the fact that the trade unionist movement was not born out of a class struggle. There was a mechanism of donation from the governments to the trade unions and thus the workers. For instance, the donations of the Turkish state did not stem from the eagerness of the government or the military to give instinctively. The rights supplied to the workers by the two new acts were not a result of the state willingness. On the contrary, this was due to the exterior factors making economic pressure on the Turkish state because the state should have acted

as a balance mechanism to stabilize the profit maximization demand of the employer and the salary maximization demand of the worker. Otherwise, low consumption and decrease in the profit are reasons for a crisis. Furthermore, after 1960, the democracy process was attributed to the military and bureaucracy. The most important components of democracy, trade unions, were under the influence of the governing parties. Especially, the focus of the study, Türk-İş, has been affected significantly by the political parties despite its non-partisanship policy.

The working class in Turkey did not go through severe struggles which the European workers experienced for decades, even centuries. Therefore, they have never been enthusiastic about playing a role in the political sphere. The rights were not obtained after serious struggles. As a consequence, the rights were given and the lack of class consciousness was inevitable. Then it is possible to conclude that this is the reason why the rights were given. While releasing rights, the aim of the power mechanisms such as the governments, political parties, military and bureaucracy was to draw the line where the trade unions and workers' rights should be limited. Hence, everything was controlled and nothing was spontaneous. Naturally, the 'non-partisanship' policy of Türk-İş was not either. It was invented to keep the confederation under the authority of the governments and political parties.

Of course, the solution that should be suggested is the abolition of this policy which has been limiting the activities of Türk-İş for decades. Türk-İş must play an important role in the political arena so that democracy can be strengthened in Turkey. Turkish trade unions should act as a unity combined by class consciousness to gain power and to obtain rights. Moreover, trade unions should be allowed to step into politics, should have the chance to be elected to the parliament as it is the case in Europe.

Although a period of great recovery in terms of worker's rights was observed after the Act 274 and 275 and Türk-İş leaders claimed that they themselves played serious roles to obtain them, the strength of the Confederation in social and political issues is debatable since the governments of the sixties did not take the opinion of Türk-İş on important topics such as social security, income increase or minimum

wage. On the other hand, Türk-İş became very popular after 1963 because it was finally given the right to strike. The public started to have an image of Türk-İş signing collective agreements and negotiating with the employers some of whom were highly ranked state officials. This was striking of course, but was that a real power or was Türk-İş an equal of the private or public sector employer while sharing the negotiation table? My interpretation is a negative one since many of the Confederation officials declared the same.

The period of coalition governments ended with the 1971 military coup. Meanwhile, the workers of the previous decade had already gained strength because of the new legal structure, the adoption of national type unionism and the emergence of a modern type worker who had the power to bargain and obtain. Thus, the significant improvement on Türk-İş was inevitable in the sixties. One major event was the emergence of the 'Confederation of Progressive Workers' Unions' CRTUY, which led to the divisions among the trade unions in Turkey. This has been the major problem hindering the unity of the Turkish workers and today it is still a severe problem. All the Türk-İş leaders interviewed during the study underlined this problem about the unity since it is still the case in Turkey. They all want a unified power for the Turkish workers to be strong and powerful against the employers.

The seventies were different than the sixties in that the seventies were marked with the introduction of new consumption goods such as radio, TV, appliances, etc. Consequently, these items started to have been built in the country and diffuse throughout the country, which meant a new group of modern workers in the factories and assembly lines. However, this also meant a more dependent economy on the foreign resources. In fact, the most important event in the seventies was the economic crisis of the early seventies. Hence, Turkey was in real debt in the seventies as it was the case for many developing countries. Furthermore, the number of strikes increased abruptly in both, Turkey and the Western world. Similar to the Western world, the trade union membership dropped and there was a loss of loyalty to the trade unions in the second half of the seventies. Despite the economic crisis, governments in Turkey tried to keep up with the industrialization process stressed by the Development Plans. Within this framework of industrialization, the salaries

were an important part of the costs for the capitalists. Thus, a significant drop in the salaries was noticeable in that period except for the workers of the State Economic Enterprises.

One important event in the seventies was the emergence of critics against the non-partisanship policy for the first time. The two major political parties, the RPP and the JP, on the other hand, were in close contact with the Türk-İş leaders and had a considerable influence on the Confederation. The emergence of another confederation, the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade unions, HAK-İŞ, in 1976 added to the current problem of divisions among the workers throughout the country.

Towards the end of the seventies, Türk-İş lost power and was not able to react against the severe economic pressures on the workers taken by the governments. Beside economic crisis, terrorist actions triggered throughout the country. The brutal fight between the two major parties, the JP and the RPP divided the country and Türk-İş as well. The income distribution worsened and the unemployment rate increased abruptly. This was a period of shortages. A common public hatred occurred against the political area. In addition, the 'non-partisanship policy' was still under discussion. The right-left division was on stage constantly and the governments were unable to stop public upheaval and terrorist attacks. The result was the 12 September military coup in 1980.

It was declared by the military generals that the aim of the coup was to put an end to the terrorist attacks and never-ending dispute among the political parties. However, the result was the 1982 Constitution which limited the Turkish society as a whole from political activities and thus the curtailment of the most rights of the workers. The two new acts, 2821 and 2822 which were enacted to regulate the trade union activities such as strikes and collective contracts were extremely detrimental to the working class. Nevertheless, Türk-İş showed almost no reaction at all against the military and the ratification of the Constitution and the Acts 2821 and 2822. In fact, the absolute silence and the weakness of Türk-İş in that period influenced its actions in the following decades and unfortunately, it is still the case. The silence of Türk-İş

since 1980 ended somehow only after the arrival of a new leader, Salih Kılıç, a few years ago. Unlike the past, the declarations of the new leader can be observed in the media today. However, is it sufficient to gain back the workers' rights ruined in the eighties and to improve them?

Since the answer is a negative one, there are some suggestions to end the erosion in the trade union activities and to contribute them to gain power. First of all, in the case of the whole country, the major confederations should be unified and Türk-İş can play an important role in the unification. Second, this unification should occur by the will of the workers and trade unions themselves. Third, Türk-İş, which played a rather important role in the political sphere of the country before the 1980s, must abandon its 'non-partisanship' policy and should take its place in the political sphere actively. This may be reached by means of the establishment of a political party. Fourth, all the legal framework regarding trade unions and workers should be abolished and new legal norms must be adopted. Then, it will be possible for Türk-İş to gain power and respect and thus, to change things for the better of the workers.

Since its emergence, Türk-İş struggled quite powerfully in order to gain rights from the governments. It has been found out that the efforts of Türk-İş workers contributed to its power while gaining rights from the governments before the military intervention of 1980. Especially, the strength of Türk-İş can be observed during the enactment of laws concerning workers' rights. That is the reason why it is impossible to conclude that the rights have been donated to the workers since the birth of Türk-İş. The protests, marches, meetings of the workers have helped significantly while negotiating for further rights. In addition, the attempts of the governments to provide the workers with extensive rights should not be looked down on since they influenced positively the progress of the workers' movements in Turkey.

To conclude, 12 September 1980 military intervention aiming at ending terrorist actions and the anarchy which had been going on in the country during the 1970's limited the most important rights of the workers by means of the 1982 Constitution

and the Acts 2821 and 2822 regarding trade unions, strikes and collective contracts. The attitude of Türk-İş was rather weak since the power of the military was very strong. Türk-İş was not influential enough to resist and performed a conforming attitude despite some upheavals after the coup. The divisions that had occurred since the second half of the 1960's within the trade union movement were the primary reason for this weakness and it is still the case. That's why the suggestion of all the trade unionists for Türk-İş to gain power has been a unified organization for the Turkish workers. Moreover, the second suggestion is that Türk-İş must give up the non-partisanship policy which has been useless since its adoption and perform a powerful stand in the political arena.

One of the essential tasks of the working class and the trade union movement is to develop the democratic structures and institutions of the country. The best way to realize that is to gain new rights while trying to maintain the present ones. First of all, the fragmented working class in Turkey must be unified and their absolute silence should end. The voice of trade unions must be heard as it was the case before 1980. Furthermore, the unified force of the workers must be felt in the society. Furthermore, the working class and the trade unions in Turkey ought to be patient and careful while struggling for their rights. In addition, the trade union movement must have better relationship with the government. However, when this is not possible, it must be ready to protest to save its own rights and to gain more. Those protests must be organized in such a way that they do not harm the class itself. To conclude, as it is the case in the international arena, in Turkey also struggling and fighting for rights are always the most vital means to obtain and sustain rights and freedom.

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Interviews

Sedat Ağralı, (31 January 2006, at the Retired Trade Unionist Association, İstanbul)

Fuat Alan, (31 January 2006, at the Retired Trade Unionist Association, İstanbul)

Mustafa Alpdündar, (February 2005, at his home, Ankara)

Adnan Başaran, (31 January 2006, at the Retired Trade Unionist Association, İstanbul)

Mustafa Başoğlu, (6 September 2005, in his room in the union, SAĞLIK İŞ, Ankara)

Avni Erakalın, (31 January 2006, at the Retired Trade Unionist Association, İstanbul)

Ethem Ezgü, (7 September 2005, at his home, Ankara)

Kenan Durukan, (31 January 2006, at the Retired Trade Unionist Association, İstanbul)

Çetin Göçer, (February 2005, at the Retired Unionist Association, Ankara)

Tevfik Nejat Karacagil, (31 January 2006, at the Retired Trade Unionist Association, İstanbul)

İsmail Özkan, (February 2005, at the Retired Unionist Association, Ankara)

Kemal Sarısoy, (6 September 2005, at the Retired Unionist Association, Ankara)

Ömer Sönmez, (February 2005, at the Retired Unionist Association)

Sadık Şide, (March 2005, at the unionö ŞEKER İŞ)

Sabri Tıǒlı, (31 January 2006, at the Retired Trade Unionist Association, İstanbul)

Enver Turgut, (February 2005, at the Retired Unionist Association)

İbrahim Yalçınođlu (8 September 2005, in his room in the union, Teksif)

APPENDICES

APPENDIX-A

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Gözde Yirmibeşođlu

Nationality: Turkish (TC)

Date and Place of Birth: 28 September 1963

Marital Status: Single

Phone: +90 312 210 21 60

Fax: +90 312 210 12 91

Email: gozdey@metu.edu.tr

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MA	METU Gender and Women's Studies Dept.	2000
BA	AU Lab. Eco. And Ind. Rel. Dept.	1986
High School	Notre Dame de Sion French High School Istanbul	1982

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
1994-Present	METU	Instructor
1992-1994	Gec Alstom	Sales Manager

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English and French

PUBLICATIONS

1. Yirmibesoglu, G. “Advertisements: Rolling Wheels Pumping Out Sexuality and Motherhood to Reproduce Non-Reactionary Consumers”, İletişim, Gazi Üniversitesi Dergisi, Kış 2001, 12: 25-47
2. Yirmibesoglu, G. “Visible Hand in a Global Market – Learning English”. Global Awareness Conference, Rome Italy, May 2005, 147-157
3. Yirmibesoglu, G. “Turkish Women in Trade Union Leadership”. Women as Global Leaders Conference, Dubai, UAE, March 2005.
4. Yirmibesoglu, G. “Women in the Political Sphere in Cyprus”. Women as Global Leaders Conference, Abu Dhabi, UAE, March 2006.
5. Yirmibesoglu, G. “Learning English and the Market”. BESIG Conference, Milan, Italy, December 2006.

APPENDIX-B

DOCUMENTS

1. Protocol signed on 30 March 1962 in İstanbul by four trade unionists: Kemal Türkler, Bahir Ersoy, Rüştü Güneri and İbrahim Denizcier
2. The first Collective Agreement Contract signed in 1964 between the workers and the employers of the press.

TÜRK SENDİKACILIĞI İLE İLGİLİ TARİHİ BİR BELGE

Protokol

Türk işçi sendikalarının teşkilatlarına ve faaliyetlerine ait temel prensipler.

- 1- işçi sendikası free ve Toplu sözleşme dayanan partiler üstü mesleki teşkilattir.

- 2- Türk işçi sendikacılığın köşkiyle ~~teşkilatları~~, aynı sendikacılığın katıyetle vadediler.

- 3- Türk işçi sendikacılığın güdümleri sendikacılığın Keza kadayetle vadediler.

- 4- Türk işçi sendikalarının kuruluş ve teşkilatlarına sistemi Türkiye Tipi Sendikadır.

- Ben yönden Birleşme ve Tanımlama, parçalanmalarına karşıdır.


Emirhan Mehmetoğlu gazinosu


30. Mart. 1962

Saat. 17:00

Risale Günleri Kemal Türlü

Bahrim Ersoy. İbrahim Beyaz





TOPLU SÖZLEŞME

Handwritten signatures and notes:
- A large signature at the top left.
- A signature below it, possibly "Ayhan".
- A signature to the right, possibly "Ali".
- A signature below that, possibly "Ali".
- A signature at the bottom left, possibly "Ali".

TARAFLAR :

TÜRKİYE GAZETECİLER SENDİKASI
İLE
TÜRKİYE GAZETE SAHİPLERİ SENDİKASI
VE
CUMHURİYET - MİLLİYET GAZETELERİ

Yürürlük tarih: 1 Şubat 1964
İmza tarihi: 1 Şubat 1964

TOPLU İŞ SÖZLEŞMESİ GİRİŞ

TARAFLAR:

Bu Toplu Sözleşme, bir yanda merkezi İstanbul'da bulunan Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası (bu sözleşmede sendika diye anılacaktır), diğer yanda merkezi İstanbul'da bulunan Türkiye Gazete Sahipleri Sendikası (bu Sözleşmede İşverenler Sendikası diye anılacaktır) ve İstanbul'da yayınlanan ve merkezi İstanbul'da bulunan (bu toplu sözleşmete işveren diye anılacaktır) arasında, o işyerindeki çalışan fikir işçilerinin veya fikir işçisi durumunda bulunanlar ve hizmetlilerin ve işverenin haklarını korumak ve münasebetlerini düzenlemek üzere işyeri esasına göre ve o işyerinin hususiyetleri ve imkânları nazara alınarak imzalanmıştır.

İşveren, mevzuat mümkün kıldığı müddetçe, fikir işçilerinin ve fikir işçisi durumunda bulunan kişilerin kanunî ve akdî bilimum iş şartlarının görüşülmesi ve pazarlığı hususunda Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikasını yetkili tek temsilci olarak tanıdığı gibi, Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası da işvereni ve İşverenler Sendikasını yetkili tek temsilci tanır.

Taraflar, aynı zamanda bir Gentlemen Agreement (şeref sözü) mahiyetindeki bu toplu sözleşmenin, işveren ve fikir işçileri arasında daha iyi sosyal ve ekonomik gelişmeler doğuracağına inanmaktadır.

GENEL HÜKÜMLER:

İşverenle fikir işçileri arasında her nevi özel anlaşma yapmak serbesttir. Ancak bu özel anlaşmaların yazılı olması, işbu toplu sözleşmenin tanıdığı hakları azaltıcı, kısıtlayıcı ve bozucu hükümler taşıması şarttır.

Bu özel anlaşmalarda, fikir işçisinin iş nov'i, ücret miktarı, meslek kademesi, o gazetedeki hizmet süresi ile diğer işveren bir veya daha fazla gazete, dergi veya ajansa sahipse bu organlardan hangisinde görevli bulunduğu hususlarının serhatle belirtilmesi şarttır.

Bu özel anlaşmaların bir sureti, imzalandığı tarihten sonraki 15 iş günü içerisinde, işveren tarafından sendikaya gönderilecektir.

Fikir işçisinin iş nov'inde, ücretinde ve çalışma şartlarında vuku bulacak her türlü değişiklik yazılı özel anlaşmaya dercedilecek ve değişiklikler yukarıda belirtilen süre içinde yazılı ile sendikaya bildirilecektir.

Taraflar,..... Gazetesinde çalışan fikir işçilerinin iş nov'ini, buçünkü ücretini, meslek kademesini ve o müessesedeki hizmet süresini gösteren bir listeyi, işbu Toplu Sözleşmenin imzalanmasından sonra karşılıklı parafı elip protokola bağlayacaklardır.

B İ R İ N C İ B Ö L Ü M (SENDİKA HAKLARI)

SENDİKA TEMİNATI:

Madde 1-İşveren, bu Toplu Sözleşmenin taraflarından birini teşkil eden Sendikanın yöneticilerini, temsilcilerini ve üyelerini, sendikacılık görevini yapmaktan dolayı işten çıkaramaz, ceza koymaz, bu görevini yapmasına mani olacak gayesiyle başka hareketinde bulunamaz.

İşveren, müessesesi mensubu olup sendikanın:

A-Yöneticisi olanlara yılda 21 gün,

B-Temsilcisi olanlara yılda 10 gün,

C-Üyesi olanlara yılda 3 gün,

den fazla olmak üzere işi aksatılmak üzere kongre, grev yapılması dışında ve sendikanın isteği tarihiyle sendikayla ilgili görevini yapabilmek üzere izin verecektir.

Bu süre içinde işveren hiçbir şekilde ücret kesmeyecek ve bu süre yıllık izinden sayılmayacaktır.

Bahis konusu süre içinde fikir işçisine işinde vakâlet edenlere, her ne nam altında olursa olsun ayrıca bir ücret ödenmeyecektir.

SENDİKA AİDATI:

Madde 2-İşveren, müessesesinde çalışan sendika üyelerinin aidatlarını ücretlerinden keserek, her ay sendikanın göndereceği bordroya göre sendikaya verecektir.

Sendikasız fikir işçilerinin dayanışma aidatı lahf, alâkalı fikir işçisinin yazılı muvafakatı ve bu muvafakat müraaatının sendikaca kabulü şartı ile aynı hükme tabidir. Bu muvafakatı temin elip işverene tevli etmek sendikaya aittir.

Şu kadar ki, sendika üyesi olmayan fikir işçilerinin işbu Toplu Sözleşme hükümlerinden hiçbir şekilde yararlanmaması hususunu taraflar kabul ve taahhüt ederler.

İLÂNLAR:

Madde 3-İşveren işyerinde, Sendikaca gönderilecek her çeşit bildiri, liste, grov ilânı, açıklamalar gibi Sendikaya ait belgeleri asnak veya yapıştırmak üzere, görünür bir yerde ilân levhası bulunduracaktır.

Bu bir canekân halinde olacak ve işveren tarafından yaptırılacaktır. Anahtarı Sendika Temsilcisinde bulunacaktır.

İ K İ N C İ B Ö L Ü M

(ÇALIŞMA SÜRELERİ VE FAZLA MESAI)

ÇALIŞMA SÜRESİ:

Madde 4-Fikir işçilerinin günlük çalışma süresi 8 saattir. Fikir işçisi iki haftada 3 gün izin yapar, Devamlı göce çalışanların haftada 2 günlük izin hakkı bakiidir.

Fikir işçisi işinin icabına göre çalışma süresi içinde 1 saatlik tatili yapacaktır.

08.00 den 20.00 ye kadar olan süre normal çalışma süresidir.

Yukarıda belirtilen normal çalışma saatlerinin öncesinde veya sonrasında çalışan fikir işçilerinin o güne ait ücretleri, yevmiyenin bütününi kapsayacak şekilde yüzde 10 fazlası ile ödenir.

Ancak iki haftada bir defa normal çalışma süresinin arizi şekilde aşımı halinde, çalışma yine 8 saat kalmak şartı ile yüzde 10 fazla ödeneğe ait bu hüküm uygulanacaktır.

Bütün çalışmalar, çalışmaya başlama saatinden itibaren sürelidir. Çalışma, hiçbir şekilde parçalı ve inkıtalı olarak yapılamaz.

İŞ SAATLERİNİN TAYİNİ:

Madde 5-İşyerinde çalışan fikir işçilerinin hangi saatler arasında çalışacakları, işveren tarafından evvelce kesin olarak belirtilir. Bu çalışma saatlerinde yapılacak değişikliklerin yazılı ile Sendika Baş Temsilcisine ve ilgiliye tebliği şarttır.

FAZLA MESAI:

Madde 6-Günlük normal 8 saatlik çalışma süresinden fazla çalışma, fazla mesaidir.

Fazla mesai sürelerinde boher saat için verilecek ücret, normal saat ücretinin yüzde 50 fazlasıdır. Saat 24.00 den sonra yapılan fazla mesailer ise yüzde 100 zanlı ödenir.

Fazla mesai saatlerinin hesabında yarım saattten az olan mesailer yarım saat, fazlası ise bir saat sayılır.

Fazla mesailere ait ücretin, müteakip ücret tediyesi ile birlikte ödemesi mecburidir. Fazla mesaiye lüzun olup olmadığı hususunda Genel Yayın Müdürü veya yetkili kılacağı kişiler karar verir. Gazeteci keniliğinden fazla mesai yapamaz. Mesleğin icap ettirdiği ve Genel Yayın Müdürünün veya yetkili kıldığı kişilerin haberdar edilemeyeceği haller müstesnadır. Günlük fazla mesai süresi meslek icabı tahdit edilemez.

ÇALIŞMAYA SAAT 24'ten SONRA BİTEN FİKİR İŞÇİLERİ:

Madde 7-Çalışması saat 24'den sonra biten fikir işçisi, ertesi gün saat 12'den evvel işe çağırılmaz.

Ü Ç Ü N C Ü B Ö L Ü M
(ÇALIŞMA ŞARTLARI)

MALZEME TEMİNİ:

Madde 8-İşveren, bu Toplu Sözleşmenin kapsamına giren fikir işçileri için, işin görülebilmesini sağlayan her türlü araç ve gereçleri inkânları dahilinde temin eder.

Foto muhabirlerinin kâğıt, film ve eczası işveren tarafından aynen veya nakden temin edilir.

Foto muhabirinin işyerinde kullandığı fotoğraf makinesi ile agrandizör, kurutma makinesi vesair ekipmanın tamamı kendisine aitse, o kişiye işveren tarafından her ay 100 lira net makine ve ekipman amortisman tazminatı ödenir.

Sadece fotoğraf makinesi fikir işçisine ve diğer ekipman işverene aitse, o kişiye ödenecek amortisman tazminatı net 50 liradır.

Fotoğraf makinesinin veya diğer ekipmanın işveren tarafından temini halinde, işveren yukarıda bahis konusu tazminatları ödemek yükünlülüğünden kurtulur.

İŞ NEV'İNİN VE İLİNİN DEĞİŞTİRİLEMESİ:

Madde 9-İşveren, kendi yazılı razası olmadıkça fikir işçisinin işinin nev'ini (örneğin:Muhabirlik, sekreterlik, arşiv memurluğu, idare gibi bölümler arasında değişiklik) yapamaz veya çalıştığı ili değiştiremez.

Ancak, arızî olarak 3 ayı aşmamak şartı ile yapılacak bu kabîl değişiklikler halinde bu hüküm uygulanmayacaktır. İşverence tarafından bu yolda yapılacak teklifi arızî haller hariç, fikir işçisinin kabul etmemesi hali, kendisinin işten çıkarılmasına veya herhangi bir surette cezalandırılmasına sebep teşkil etmez.

EK İŞLER:

Madde 10-Fikir işçisine esas işinin dışında işveren, işveren vekili, yazı işleri müdürü veya şefi tarafından bir iş siparişi edilirse, (örneğin: tetkik yazıları, araştırmalar, seri röportajlar, arşiv çalışmaları gibi) bu iş için ayrı bir ücret ödemesi şarttır. Bu işin ücretinin evvelce kararlaştırılması gerekli-

dir. Eğer bu ücret peşinen kararlaştırılmamış ve fikir işçisiyle işveren arasında ihtilâf çıkıyorsa bu ihtilâf Sendika Baş Temsilcisi ve işveren arasında basının örf, âdet ve şartlarına dayanılarak halledilir. İhtilâfın yine de halledilememesi halinde, konu Sendika ve İşveren tarafından müştereken ele alınıp halli cihetine gidilir.

REKLÂM VE İLÂNLA İLGİLİ İŞLER:

Madde 11-Fikir işçilerinin esas görevlerinin haricinde, haber mahiyeti dışında, reklâm ve ilânla ilgili olarak yazı yazmaları, resim çizmeleri, resim ve karikatür çizmeleri, önceden kararlaştırılacak ayrı bir ücrete tabidir.

Gazete veya dergilerin kendi faaliyetlerine ait olup doğrudan doğruya gazete veya dergile çıkan ilân ve reklâmlar bu hükmün dışındadır.

Mizanpaj yapılması da bu hükme tabi değildir.

ÇALIŞMANIN İŞVERENE TAHSİSİ:

Madde 12-Fikir işçisi, her türlü mesai ve faaliyetini işverene tahsis etmek mecburiyetindedir. Başka bir işte çalışmaz. Başka bir meslek veya sanat icra etmez. Fikri ve bedeni faaliyetinin mahsulü olan eser, haber, röportaj, resim, karikatür, fotoğraf, sinema v.s. gibi bilcünle hususları işvereninden başkasına ivazlı veya ivazsız devredemez, kullanılmasını veya neşrini terk edemez, ruhsat veremez.

Fikir işçisinin, işverene verip de, bunun tarafından 3 ay içinde kullanılmayan roman, hikâye, tiyatro eseri, tablo ve sanat eserlerini başka bir müessese veya temsil teşekkülüne vermek istemesi halinde işverenden yazılı izin alınması lâzımdır. Buna temin maksadı ile, işverene yazı ile müracaat etmesi gerekir. İşveren bu müracaata en geç 15 gün içinde cevaplandıracaktır.

İşveren özelliği olan bu eserleri kendi müessesesinde kullanmaya imkân göremiyorsa, fikir işçisinin, avans veya sair bir ad altında bu eser için peşinen almış olduğu ücreti iade etmesi şartı ile, izin vermemezlik edemez.

Fikir işçisine, gazete dışında çalışması hususunda izin verip vermemek, işverene aittir.

Yazılı müracaata üzerine fikir işçisine işveren tarafından bu izin verildiği takdirde, o fikir işçisiyle işveren arasında günlük çalışma süresi ve aylık ücret üzerinde işbu Toplu Sözleşmedeki ücret ve çalışma süresi hükümlerine bağlı olmayarak özel anlaşma yapılabilir. O takdirde, günlük çalışma süresi ile ücret ve dışarıda çalışma izninin mahiyeti, ferdi iş mukavelesine serahatle dercedilir.

Bu durumda olan fikir işçileri, günlük çalışma süresi ve ücret konusu hariç, işbu Toplu Sözleşmenin diğer hükümlerinden eksiksiz faydalanırlar.

İşbu Toplu Sözleşmenin taraflarca kabulü tarihinden önce akdedilmiş olan ferdi iş mukavelerindeki "gazete dışında çalışma izni" hükümleri de, yukarıdaki üç fıkra gereğince yeniden düzenlenir ve fikir işçisiyle işveren arasında yeniden anlaşma yapılır.

İSMİN YAYINLANMAMASI:

Madde 13-Fikir işçisi, haklı bir sebebe dayanarak şartı ile, çalıştığı müesseseye verdiği eser ve işlerin bazılarında isminin yayınlanmamasını isteyebilir. İşveren khi, aynı hakka sahiptir.

ESERLERİN BAŞKASINA SATIMI:

Madde 14-Fikir işçisinin yazı, fotoğraf, resim, karikatür veya haberini işveren, yurt içinde başka bir yayın organına ücret mukabili devrederse, elde edilen gelirin yarısı fikir işçisine verilir. Yurt dışında bu hüküm uygulanmaz.

İşverenin birden fazla yayın organı varsa bunlardan birinde çalışan fikir işçisinin yukarıda belirtilen eserlerinin diğer yayın organında kullanılması ayrı bir ücrete tabidir.

MASRAFLAR:

Madde 15-Muhabirlerin esas görevini yapabilmesi için gerekli masraflar, müessese tarafından ödenir. Devanlı olarak bugibi işlerde çalışanlara masraf karşılığı yapılacak ödemenin önceden götürü karşılaştırılması da caizdir.

Fikir işçisi şehir içi ve şehir dışı görevlerde kondisine ait vasıtaya kullanıyorsa, bunun için ek bir ödeme yapılması gereklidir.

SEYAHAT ÖDEMELERİ:

Madde 16-Fikir işçisi, görevli bulunduğu ilin dışına iş ta-
kibi için gönderilirse, yol, otel, yemek ve muhabere masrafları
işveren tarafından kendisine ödenir.

Bu maksatla fikir işçisine ödenen avanslar, bu işten dönüş
tarihini takiben en geç 10 gün içinde kapatılır. Bu gibi işler-
de fikir işçisi fazla mesai talep edemez.

Ancak kendisine işin mahiyeti ve süresine göre, işverenin
tayin edeceği ek bir ücret ödenir.

Yurt dışına gönderilen fikir işçilerine masraflarının kar-
şılığı olmak üzere, kullanacakları para döviz olarak müessese
tarafından sağlanacaktır. Yurt dışında geçici görev alan fikir
işçilerine yukarıda belirtilen şekilde ödeme yapılacaktır.

KAZA SİGORTASI:

Madde 17-İşveren, tehlikeli işlere gönderdiği fikir işçile-
rini 10.000 liradan aşağı olmamak üzere, geçici olarak ve o işe
münhasıran ölüm ve sakatlığa karşı sigortalayacaktır,

İşçilerini umumî olarak ve 10.000 liradan aşağı olmamak üze-
re ölüm ve kazaya karşı sigortalanmış bulunan işveren bu mükelle-
fiyetten muaftır.

FIKİR İŞÇİSİNİN DONATIMI:

Madde 18-Fikir işçisinin görevini yapması için gönderilece-
ği yere veya olayın vuku bulunduğu mntakaya göre dağıtılması işve-
rene aittir. Görev sırasında bu eşyanın ve kullandığı malzemenin
kendi kusuru olmaksızın hasara uğramasından fikir işçisi sorumlu
tutulamaz. Eğer bu malzeme fikir işçisine aitse hasar miktarı iş-
verence karşılanır.

İÇ TÜZÜK:

Madde 19-Müessese, fikir işçilerinin uymaya mecbur oldukla-
rı bir iç tüzük hazırlamak hakkına sahiptir. Ancak, bu iç tüzük,
hiçbir şekilde bu Toplu Sözleşme hükümlerine aykırı, onun sağla-
dığı hakları azaltıcı, kısıtlayıcı ve bozucu mahiyette olamaz. İç
tüzük hazırlandığı sırada, Sendika Temsilcileri bu hazırlığa ka-
tılır.

GIDA YARDIMI:

Madde 22-Fikir işçilerinden, mürettephane ve makine dairesi gibi antimuan ve kurşun zehirinin yayılabileceği yerlerle teması olan ve zaman zaman onalarda çalışmak mecburiyetinde bulunanlara günde 250 gramdan az olmamak üzere süt, ayran veya yoğurt verilecektir. Fikir işçisi bunların cinsini seçmekte serbesttir. Fikir işçileri, bu konuda yapacakları değişikliği 7 iş gününden önce haber vereceklerdir. Değişiklik Sendika Temsilciliğinin haftalık listelerinde düzenlenir.

İşveren, müessesesinde çalışan fikir işçilerine günde bir övün yemek temin etmek hususunda gayret sarfedecektir.

D Ö R D Ü N C Ü B Ö L Ü M

(İZİNLER, İZİN ÜCRETLERİ VE İZİNDEN GERİ ÇAĞIRMA)

YILLIK ÜCRETİ İZİN:

Madde 21-Meslek kıdemi 10 yıldan az olan fikir işçisine, yılda 4 hafta, 10 yıldan fazla olana yılda 6 hafta ücretli izin verilir. Yıllık ücretli izin müddetinin tayininde fikir işçisinin kıdemi, aynı işyerindeki hizmetine göre değil, meslekteki hizmet süresine göre hesaplanır.

Yıllık izin hakkının hesaplanmasında takvim yılı esastır. İzin 1 Ocak günü iktisap edilir.

Yıllık izin listeleri, İşveren ve Sendika Baş Temsilcisi ile birlikte işleri aksatmayacak şekilde tanzim edilir.

Bağyazar, fıkra yazarları, karikatürist veya benzeri işlerde çalışıp da her gün eser vermek zorunda olan fikir işçilerinin izin süresi içindeki hususi durumları, ferdi mukavelelerde tanzim edilir.

İZİN GİDERİ ÖDENEĞİ:

Madde 22-Yıllık izne çıkan fikir işçisine, meslek kıdemi 5 yılı doldurmuş ise, son aylığı tutarının dörtte biri nisbetinde "izin gideri" ücreti, maaşına ilâveten ödenir. Bu, bir yıllık izin karşılığıdır.

YILLIK İZİNDEN GERİ ÇAĞIRMA:

Madde 23-Fikir işçisi yıllık iznini kullandığı süre içinde işveren veya vekili veya yazı işleri müdürü veya şefi tarafından izni kesilerek göreve çağırılırsa, aldığı izin gideri ödeneğini iade etmesi istenemez. Fikir işçisi izni sırasında eğer imkanet ettiği ilin dışına çıkmışsa, o yere gidiş dönüş ücreti; tevsik edeceği şekilde (yanında bulunan ailesi ofradı buna dahildir) kendisine ödenir. Fikir işçisinin geri kalan izin hakkı bakidir. Dönüş yol süresi izinden sayılmaz.

HAFTALIK İZİNDEN GERİ ÇAĞIRMA:

Madde 24-Fikir işçisi haftalık iznini kullandığı sırada göreve çağırılırsa, o günkü çalışması 8 saati doldurnasa dahi, tam gün fazla mesai yapmış sayılır. Kendisine yüzde 50 zamlı olarak bir yevmiye ödenir ve o günkü iznini kullanmış sayılır.

SAKLI KALAN İZİN:

MADDE 25-Muvakkat bir görevle il veya yurt dışında bulunan fikir işçileri, haftalık izin isteyemezler. Ancak, bu görevleri sırasında kullanmadıkları haftalık izinlerini, dönüşlerinde izin olarak kullanmak hakkına sahiptirler.

MAZERET İZİNİ:

Madde 26-Fikir işçisi çocuğu dünyaya geldiği zaman 3, eşi, çocuğu, anası veya babası öldüğü zaman 4, çocuğu evlendiği, kardeşi, büyükannesi, büyükbabası veya torunu öldüğü zaman 2 gün olağan üstü ücretli izine hak kazanır. Bu izinler senelik izinden sayılmaz.

BAYRAM VE TATİLLERDE ÇALIŞMA:

Madde 27-Ulusal bayram, genel tatil günleriyle 10 Ocak günü işinin mahiyeti icabı müstemiren çalışılması fazla mesai sayılır.

B E Ş İ N C İ B Ö L Ü M
(HASTALIK, GEBELİK VE ASKERLİKTE ÜCRET)

HASTALIK HALİ:

Madde 28-Fikir işçisinin uğradığı hastalık sebebiyle iş akdi işveren tarafından feshedilemez. Ancak, bu hastalığın 6 aydan fazla uzaması halinde eğer şartları mevcutsa kiden tazminatının ödenmesi suretiyle iş akdinin feshi cihetine gidilebilir.

Hastalık süresinde İşçi Sigortaları Kurumunun fikir işçisine ödediği ücret son aylığından az ise aradaki fark fikir işçisinin tevsiki üzerine işveren tarafından kendisine ödenir.

Bu maddenin 1.nci fıkrasında yazılı haller dolayısıyla vazife göremeyecek duruma düşüp de işveren tarafından işinden çıkarılan fikir işçisi azami bir yıl içinde iyileştiği takdirde, münhal ise eski işine tekrar ve tercihan alınır.

GEBELİK HALİ:

Madde 29-Kadın fikir işçisi, hamileliği halinde, hamileliğin 7.nci ayından itibaren doğumun 2.nci ayının sonuna kadar izinli sayılır. Bu müddet zarfında işveren fikir işçisine son aylığının üçte ikisini öder. Doğum vuku bulmaz veya çocuk ölü dünyaya gelirse, bu halin vukuundan itibaren 1 ay müddetle bu ücret ödenir. Fikir işçisinin sigortadan veya bağlı bulunduğu teşekküllerden alacağı yardım, bu ödeneye tesir etmez.

ASKERLİK HALİ:

Madde 30-İlk muvazzaf askerlik hizmeti için silah altına alınan fikir işçisine normal askerlik süresinde son aldığı ücret yarı nisbetinde ödenir.

Fikir işçisiyle işveren arasındaki yazılı sözleşmenin belirli bir süreyi ihtiva etmesi ve bu sürenin askerlik süresinde sona ermesi halinde, işveren fikir işçisinin iş akdini feshedemez. Fikir işçisi askerliğinin bitiminde eski işine döner.

VEKÂLET ÜCRETİ:

Madde 31-Göbelik ve askerlik süresince fikir işçisine daimi kadrodan biri vekâlet ediyorsa, kendisine kararlaştırılacak bir vekâlet ücreti ödenir.

A L T I N C I B Ö L Ü M
(KIDEM, İHBAR, ÖLÜM, DOĞUM, EVLENME TAZMİNATLARI)
(VE TARAFLARIN SORUMLULUĞU)

KIDEM TAZMİNATI:

Madde 32- Meslekte en az 5 yıl çalışmış olan fikir işçisine kıdem hakkı tanınır.

Kıdem hakkı fikir işçisinin mesleğe ilk giriş tarihinden itibaren hesaplanır.

İş akdinin feshi halinde fikir işçisi, bu süreye göre hesaplanacak kıdem tazminatını almaya hak kazanır.

Daha önce kıdem tazminatı almış olan fikir işçisinin meslek kıdeminin hesaplanmasında da, işbu maddenin yukarıdaki hükümleri uygulanarak, fikir işçisinin mesleğe ilk giriş tarihinden itibaren geçen süre, meslek kıdemi olarak kabul edilir.

Ancak, fikir işçisi daha önce kaç yıl için kıdem tazminatı almışsa, o kadar yıla ait tazminat hesaptan düşülür ve bahis konusu yıllar için ikinci defa kıdem tazminatı ödenmez.

Fikir işçisi daha önce kıdem tazminatı alıp almadığı konusunda, ferdi iş mukavelesindeki beyanı ile bağlıdır.

Kıdem tazminatının hesaplanmasında, fikir işçisinin son aylığı esas ittihaz olunur. ve her kıdem yılı için 1 aylık ücreti miktarında kıdem tazminatı ödenir.

Yıllık hizmetin 6 aydan az kısmı nazara alınmaz, ilk mukavele yılında bu hüküm uygulanmayarak, yıllık hizmetin 6 aydan az kısmı da 1 yıl sayılır.

İHBAR TAZMİNATI:

Madde 33-İşyerinde 3 yıllık hizmet süresi bulunan fikir işçisinin işten çıkarılması 3 ay önceden ihbara tabidir.

İşyeri hizmet süresi 3 yıldan az ise, işten çıkarılma 1 ay önce ihbar edilir. Fikir işçisi ihbar süresinde çalışmak istemezse ihbar tazminatı talep edemez.

Çalıştırmama isteği işverenden gelmişse, ihbar süresine ait aylıklam, fikir işçisine peşinen ödenir.

ÜCRETLİ İZİN TAZMİNATI:

Madde 34-Fikir işçisi o takvim yılına ait yıllık iznini kullanmadan işten çıkarılmışsa izin süresine ait ücreti kendisine peşin olarak ödenir. İhbar süresi hiçbir surette yıllık izinden sayılmaz.

Bu halde, fikir işçisi ayrıca "izin gideri ücreti" talep edemez.

ÖLÜM TAZMİNATI:

Madde 35-Fikir işçisinin ölümü sebebiyle iş akdinin sona ermesi halinde, eşi ve çocuklarına ve bunlar bulunmadığı takdirde geçimi kendisine tereddüp eden ailesi efradına veya mirasçılara, müteveffanın son aylık ücretinin 3 mislinden aşağı olmamak üzere kıdem hakkı tutarında ölüm tazminatı verilir.

SOSYAL YARDIM:

Madde 36-Fikir işçisine eşi, çocuğu, ana ve babası öldüğü zaman 500 lirabrüt tazminat, evlendiği zaman 1.000, çocuğu doğduğu zaman 500 liralık sosyal yardım hediyesi verilir.

TARAFLARIN SORUMLULUĞU:

Madde 37-Haklı ve kâfi sebep olmadıkça, fikir işçisi işten çıkarılamaz. Gazetenin umumî siyasetini, tutum ve gidişini; veçhe ve karakterini tayin ve tebdil etmek işverene aittir. Fikir işçisi, buna riayet etmeyi, gazetenin ciddiyetine itina göstermeyi, hariçten her hangi bir menfaat veya dostluk mukabili, olarak yazı yazmamayı, resim çizmemeyi, fotoğraf çekmemeyi, tevdi edilen bilucum işlerde işverenin talimat ve direktiflerini, müessesenin örf ve teahhütlerini, meslek haysiyet ve şerefini, Basın Ahlak Yasası ve iş tüzük hükümlerine uygun hareket etmeyi; yalan veya kasıtlı haber, resim, fotoğraf, karikatür getirmemeyi taahhüt eder.

Ancak, işverenin gazetenin veçhe ve karakterinde yaptığı değişiklik, fikir işçisinin şeref ve şöhretini veya umumiyetle manevi menfaatlerini ihlâl edici bir vaziyet ihdas edecek şekilde bariz bir durum yaratmışsa, fikir işçisi ihbar müddetini beklemeden akdi feshedebilir.

Fikir işçisi meslek ve vazifesiyle ilgili her türlü ihmalden mes'ul olup, aldığı talimattan hiç bir veçhile inhiraf edemez.

Kanun örf ve âdet ile ferdi iş mukavelelerinde ve işbu Toplu İş Sözleşmesinde mevcut sair hükün, şart ve sebeplerden naada bu hükünlere muhalofet, işverene ferdi iş akdini muhik sebebe müsteniden derhal fesih hakkına bahşeder.

Fesih kararından sonra sendika işveren nezdinde bu kararın düzeltilmesi için müracaatta bulunabilir.

Hırsızlık, dolandırıcılık, şantaj yapanlarla, çalıştığı gazetesini kasitli yollarla ve maddi menfaat karşılığı âlet ederek zamara uğratanların iş akitleri, sayılan bu hususların işveren tarafından Sendikaya isbat ve kabul ettirilmesi halinde feshedilirse, mukavelesi feshedilen kişi kıdem tazminatı talebinde bulunamaz.

Ancak herkesin adalet makamlarına müracaat yolu açıktır.

Y E D İ N C İ B Ö L Ü M

(STAJ SÜRESİ, YETİŞEN FİKİR İŞÇİLERİ VE EĞİTİM.)

STAJYER FİKİR İŞÇİSİ:

Madde 38-Bir işyerinde stajyer fikir işçilerinin sayısı hiçbir şekilde mukaveleli fikir işçileri kadrosunun yüzde 10'nu geçemez.

Staj müddeti en çok üç ay olup, bu müddet içinde taraflar iş akdini ihbar müddeti ve tazminat mükellefiyetine tabi olmaksızın feshedebilirler.

YETİŞMEKTE OLAN FİKİR İŞÇİSİ:

Madde 39-Staj devresinden sonra 2 yıl, fikir işçisinin yetişme devresi olarak kabul edilir. Bu devrede bulunan fikir işçisine "yetişmekte olan fikir işçisi"denir.

FİKİR İŞÇİSİNİN EĞİTİMİ:

Madde 40-İşveren, yetmiş beş yaşta olan fikir işçilerinin 2 yıl müddetle eğitimleri için biregüsten teşekkülü kurulmasına, in-kânları dahilinde müzakere olmayı kabul eder. Bu eğitim teşek-külü probleminin gerçekleştirilmesinde İşverenler Sendikasının fa-aiyyet göstereceği de keza taraflarca kabul edilir. Bu konuda ileride vuku bulacak talepler işverenle Gazeteciler Sendikası arasında öncelikle görüşülecek ve kısa sürede gerçekleştiril-mesine çalışılacaktır.

İşveren kadrosundaki fikir işçilerinin meslekî gelişmelerini sağlamak gayesiyle, senatikanın işe hâşel yormayacak şekil-de eğitim yaptırmasına müzahar olmayacaktır. Bu eğitim fikir işçi-sinin yabancı dil öğrenmesi veya bildiği yabancı dili geliştiri-mesi, seminerlere katılması şeklinde olabilir. Fikir işçisi, yukarıda belirtilen şekilde, kendi isteği ile ve uzun bir sü-re eğitime katılacaksa, bu eğitim gerek yurt içinde, gerek yurt dışında olsun, işveren yıllık ücretli izni dışında kendisine 6 ayı geçmemek ve senede ancak 2 kısıya işleri aksatmamak üzere ve münavebe ile ücretsiz eğitim izni verebilir.

Eğitim izni süresi sonunda işe dönmeyen fikir işçisi nüsta-fi addedilir. Bu ücretsiz izin süresi içinde iş akdi devan eder.

S E K İ Z İ N C İ B Ö L Ü M (SENDİKA TEMSİLCİLİĞİ)

SENDİKA TEMSİLCİLİĞİ:

Madde 41-Sendika, işyerinde birer Baş Temsilci olmak üzere 3 Sendika Temsilcisi tayin eder. İşveren, Temsilcilerin, iş şartları, Toplu İş Sözleşmesi hükümlerinin uygulanması ve fi-kir işçilerinin haklarının korunması için, işi aksatmayacak şekilde bulunacakları faaliyete mani olmayacaktır. Temsilciler bundan başka Sendikala fikir işçilerinin her türlü hareketle-rini kontrol ile, gerek işyeri tüzüğüne, gerek sendika tüzük-lerine, gerekse çalışan şartlarının aykırı harekette bulunan üyeler hakkında Sendikaya rapor vermekle mükelleftir. Aynıca gerekli hallerde işverene de bildiri verir.

Temsilciler, işyerinde Toplu İş Sözleşmesi hükümlerinin tatbikini sağlarlar ve icabı halinde aksaklıkların düzeltilmesi için işverenle temas ederler.

TEMSİLCİLERİN ÇALIŞMA TARZI:

Madde 42-Sendika Temsilcisi ve Baş Temsilci şu şekilde çalışırlar:

Fikir işçisi işbu Toplu Sözleşmenin tatbikinden doğan ihtilâfını, şikâyetini veya talebini, kısmındaki işlere bakmakla görevli Sendika Temsilcisine bildirir. Temsilci bu müracaatın yazılı olmasını isteyebilir. O halde, müracaat yazısını aldığı fikir işçisine yazılı olarak bildirir.

İşveren, işveren vekili veya ilgili merci, Sendika Temsilcisinin böyle bir müracaat üzerine yapacağı görüşme talebine uymak, kondisiyle şikâyet konusunu görüşmek zorundadır.

Sendika Temsilcisinin konuyu halledememesi halinde mesele yazılı olarak Baş Temsilciye bildirilir. Baş Temsilci, dilerse diğer temsilcilerle de istişarede bulunarak ihtilâf konusunu 3 iş günü içinde kesin surette hal yoluna gider ve neticeyi bir rapor halinde Sendikaya bildirir.

İhtilâfın halledilememesi halinde, mesele Baş Temsilci tarafından yine yazılı bir rapor şeklinde sendikaya aksettirilir.

Yukarıdaki işlemlerin yapılmasından sonra, sendika ihtilâfı ele alır ve işveren veya vekiliyle temasa geçer. Bu durumda işveren sendikanın müracaatını kabulden ve görüşmelerde bulunmak üzere yetkili bir şahıs tayin etmekten kaçınmaz.

İhtilâfın işveren ile sendika arasında da halledilememesi halinde, taraflar özel hakene gitme hakkına sahiptirler.

D O K U Z U N C U B Ö L Ü M

(SOSYAL ŞARTLAR VE TEKAÜT SANDIĞI)

SOSYAL TEMASLAR:

Madde 43-Bu Toplu Sözleşmenin tarafları, çalışan fikir işçilerinin sosyal hakları ve imkânlarını geliştirmek, işsizliği veya işçi ihtiyacını karşılamak ve fikir işçileri içine ortaklaşa bir tekaüt sandığı kurmak yolunda çalışmak üzere,

Toplu Sözleşme süresi içinde görüşme yapmayı ve inkanlar hazırlamayı kabul ederler. İşveren bu görüşme hakkını kendisini temsil etmek üzere bağlı bulunduğu sendika devredebilir.

O N U N C U B Ö L Ü M
(AŞGARI KADROLAR)

ASGARİ KADRO:

Madde 44-İşveren, gazetesinin tıraji 100 binden aşağı iş, (100 bin dahil) Basın İlan Kurumu Genel Kurulunun 24.Mayıs. 1962 tarih ve 14 sayılı Genel Kurul kararının 5.ci maddesinde belirtilen ve 2.Aralık.1963 tarihinde yürürlükte bulunan asgarî kadroları bulunduracaktır.

Traajların 100 binden yukarı olması halinde ise, aşağıda belirtilen asgarî kadroyu bulundurmaya mecburdur:

1 İdare Müdürü, 6 idarî personel, 1 Genel İyayın Müdürü, 2 Sorumlu Yazı İşleri Müdürü, 3 Sekreter, 1 İstihbarat Şefi, 7 Muhabir, 3 Foto Muhabiri, 2 Muhabir, 1 Mütercim, 6 Spor Tazarı ve muhabiri, 4 Musahhah, 2 Ressam, 1 Magazin Sekreteri, 1 Magazin Sekreter Yardımcısı, 1 Karikatürist, 1 Memleket Servisi Şefi, 3 Ankara Muhabiri, 1 Ankara Foto Muhabiri, 1 İsmir Muhabiri, 1 Teleks Memuru, 1 Radyo ve Telsiz Dinleme Memuru

O N B İ R İ N C İ B Ö L Ü M
(ÜCRETLER)

ÖDEME ZAMANI:

Madde 45-Fikir işçilerinin ücretleri her ay peşin olarak ödenir.

YETİŞMEKTE OLAN FİKİR İŞÇİLERİNİN AŞGARI ÜCRETİ:

Madde 46-Mesleğe ilk giren ve yetişmekteki fikir işçileri, yetişme devresi olan 1 ve 2.nci yıllar içinde asgarî ücret komisyonlarıınca tesbit edilen asgarî ücreti alırlar.

ASGARİ ÜCRETLER: TABLO -I

Madde 47- Muhabirler, foto muhabirleri, spor muhabirleri ve spor yazarları, meslek kıdemlerine göre aşağıdaki tabloda gösterilen asgarî brüt ücreti alırlar:

<u>Meslek kıdemi</u>	<u>Brüt ücret</u>
3-4-5 yıl	1270 TL.
6-7-8 "	1425 "
9-10-11 "	1700 "
12-13-14 yıl	1820 "
ve daha yukarısı	

ASGARİ ÜCRET: TABLO -II

Madde 48-Her türlü kısım şefleri, istihbarat, memleket, dış haberler, fotoğraf, spor, dış münasebetler, iç münasebetler, ilân, abone, sevkiyat, personel servisleri şefleri, yurt büroları şef veya temsilcileri, sekreter yardımcıları, ressam- lar, karikatüristler, mütercimler meslek kıdemlerine göre aşağıdaki tabloda gösterilen brüt asgarî ücreti alırlar:

<u>Meslek kıdemi:</u>	<u>Brüt ücret</u>
3-4-5 yıl	1425 TL.
6-7-8 "	1700 "
9-10-11 "	1950 "
12-13-14 yıl	2240 "
ve daha yukarısı	

ASGARİ ÜCRET: TABLO -III

Madde 49-Sekreterler, idare, müessese müdürleri, yazarlar, fıkra yazarları meslek kıdemlerine göre aşağıdaki tabloda gösterilen asgarî brüt ücreti alırlar:

<u>Meslek kıdemi</u>	<u>Brüt ücret</u>
3-4-5 yıl	1700 TL.
6-7-8 "	2100 "
9-10-11 "	2375 "
12-13-14 yıl	2500 "
ve daha yukarısı	

ASCARI ÜCRET: TABLO -IV

Madde 50-İdari personel, ilan, abone, tevziat, muhasebe, personel servisi memurları, radyo nonitörü, radyo foto. ve telefoto operatörleri meslek kademelerine göre aşağıdaki tabloda gösterilen asgari brüt ücret alırlar: (Bu maddede bahsi geçen kişiler için, kanunî staj süresi hariç yetiştirme devresi düşünülmeden, ücret tablosu o şekilde düzenlenmiştir)

Meslek kademi	Brüt ücret
1-2 yıl	860 TL.
3-4-5 "	1140 "
6-7-8 "	1425 "
9-10-11 "	1550 "
12-13-14 yıl	1700 "
ve daha yukarısı	

ASCARI ÜCRET: TABLO -V

Madde 51-Musahhihler, arşiv memurları ve haber servisi, haber alıcıları meslek kademelerine göre aşağıdaki tabloda gösterilen asgari brüt ücreti alırlar:

Meslek kademi:	Brüt ücret:
1-2 yıl	600 TL.
3-4-5 "	860 "
6-7-8 "	1140 "
9-10-11 yıl	1425 "
ve daha sonrası	

DIĞER HİZMETLİLERİN ASCARI ÜCRETİ:

Madde 52-Daktilolar, santral memurları, veznedarlar, mütemetler, kâtipler ve haber taşıyıcıları (copy-boy)-teknisyen telâkki edilmeyen kişiler) ayda asgari brüt 500 TL, tahsildarlar ayda asgari brüt 400 TL. ücret alırlar.

Bu maddede bahsi geçen hizmetlilerin ücretlerine bu Toplu Sözleşme tarihinden itibaren hesaplanmak üzere 2 yılda bir yüzde 5 oranında zam yapılır.

ÜCRETTE KIDEM HESABI:

Madde 53-Ücret tablolarında bahis konusu meslek kademi, fikir işçisinin mesleğe ilk başladığı tarihten itibaren geçen süredir. Meslek kademının herhangi bir yılını doldurup diğer yıla atlayan fikir işçisine, otomatik olarak içine girdiği yeni meslek kademi yılının ücreti uygulanır.

GENEL YAYINA VEKÂLET:

Madde 54-Ücretleri 3 numaralı tabloda gösterilen sekreterlerden Genel Yayın Müdürüne vekâlet edenler, bu vekâlet müddeti 1 haftayı aşılırsa, çalıştığı sürece, günlüğüne işbet eden miktarın yüzde 10.üü vekâlet ücreti olarak alır.

O N İ K İ N C İ B Ö L Ü M
(ÖZEL HAKEM)

HAKEM HÜKMÜ:

Madde 55-İşbu Toplu İş Sözleşmesinin tathikatından doğacak birköümlle ihtilaflar özel hakem yoluyla halledilecektir.

SEÇİMİ:

Madde 56-Taraflardan birinin diğerine yazılı müracaatı üzerine, taraflar, bir hakem seçmek üzere 3 iş günü içinde toplanırlar. Hakem bu toplantıda seçilemediği veya taraflardan biri toplantıya gelmediği takdirde, toplantı tarihini takip eden 3 iş günü içinde, her bir taraf, diğerine hakemini yazı ile bildirir.

Seçilen hakemler 3 iş günü içinde toplanarak üçüncüsünü seçerler. Bu hususta anlaşamadıkları takdirde, üçüncü hakemin taraflardan birinin müracaatı üzerine işyerinin bağlı bulunduğu en kademli İş Mahkemesi Reisi seçer.

ÇALIŞMASI:

Madde 57-Hakemlerin veya hakemin seçilişinden sonra, taraflar hakem kuruluna birer temsilci tayin ederler.

Hakemler, taraflardan her türlü delil, bilgi ve tanık istemek, lüzumu halinde işyerinde soruşturma yapmak hakkına sahiptirler.

Hakemler, tayinlerini takip eden 3 iş günü içinde ilk toplantılarını yapmak ve kararlarını en geç 15 gün içinde vermek mecburiyetindedirler. Aksi takdirde, taraflardan her biri işbu mukaveledeki tahkin kaydı ile bağlı doğrudur.

Hakem giderleriyle avukatlık ücreti ve bilcümle masraflar, aloyhine karar verilen tarafa yüklenir. Ancak, ihtilâfın bağında gerekli bilcümle masrafı bilâhare haksız çıkacak tarafta ödemek kaydı ile, ihtilâfı çıkaran karşılar. Hakemler tayin edilen süre içinde kararlarını veremezlerse, masraf ve hakem ücretleri taraflar arasında bölüşülür.

Hakem ücreti hakem başına 1000 lirayı aşmayacaktır.

O N Ü Ç Ü N C Ü B Ö L Ü M (TOPLU SÖZLEŞMENİN SÜRESİ)

SÜRE VE YENİLEME:

Madde 58-Ellisekiz madde ve ek iki maddeden müteşekkil işbu Toplu İş Sözleşmesi, taraflar arasında 7.Şubat.1964 tarihinde imzalanmış olup, 1.Şubat.1964 tarihinden itibaren yürürlüğe girmiştir.

Bu Toplu İş Sözleşmesinin süresi, yürürlüğe giriş tarihinden itibaren 3 yıldır.

Taraflar, bu sürenin bitimine 30 ilâ 30 gün kala arasında sözleşmeyi feshettiklerini veya bazı maddelerini tâdil etmek istediklerini yazı ile bildirerek karşı tarafı görüşmeye çağırarak yetkisine sahiptirler.


Taraflar, Toplu İş Sözleşmesinin bitim tarihine 30 gün kalaya kadar birbirlerine fesih, tâdil ve yeniden görüşme ihtilâfında bulunmazlarsa, bu Toplu İş Sözleşmesi kendiliğinden 1 yıl süre ile yenilenmiş sayılır. Tâdil veya yeniden görüşme çağırması üzerine, Toplu İş Sözleşmesi süresinin bitimiyle birlikte yeniden başlayacak müzakereler sırasında, müzakereler sonuçlanıncaya kadar işbu Toplu İş Sözleşmesi hükümleri yürürlükte kalır.

ONDÖRDÜNCÜ BÖLÜM
(EK MADDELER)

EK MADDE I-İşbu Toplu İş Sözleşmesinde bahsi geçen iş yönet-
melik, işveren ve sendika temsilcilerinin müşterek çalışması i-
le en kısa zamanda hazırlanarak yürürlüğe girer.

EK MADDE II-İşbu Toplu İş Sözleşmesi, işyeri esasına göre ya-
pılmış olup, bircümle hükümleri mezkûr işyerinin imkânları ve
özellikleri nazara alınarak inzalanmıştır. Bu sebeple, diğer iş-
yerleri ile yürütülecek müzakerelerde gerek Türkiye Gazeteciler
Sendikasını, gerek Türkiye Gazete Sahipleri Sendikasını bu hü-
kümler hiçbir surette bağlamayacaktır.

Türkiye
Gazeteciler Sendikası
Adına
Genel Başkan
Hasan Yılmazlar




Türkiye
Gazete Sahipleri
Sendikası Ad.
Umumi Vekil
Prof. Halit Kemal Elbir




Cumhuriyet Gazetecilik
Matbaacılık T.A.Ş. Ad.

Doğan Nadi ~~Matbaacılık~~



Genel Sekreter
Sedat Ağralı



Genel Muhasip
İsmet Yenisey



Milliyet Gazetecilik
T.A.Ş. Adına
Erçiment Karacan



APPENDIX-C

TURKISH SUMMARY

TÜRKİYE'DE SENDİKACILIK: TÜRK-İŞ'İN KENDİNİ TANIMLAMASI VE TOPLUMDA VE SİYASETTEKİ ROLÜ (1950-1982)

Bu tezde, Türkiye'deki sendikacılık hareketi Türk-İş temel alınarak 1980 yılına kadar olan olaylar ve yorumlar ele alınarak incelenmiştir. Tezde sorgulanan temel noktalardan biri Türk-İş'in siyasetle olan ilişkisidir. Kurulma aşamasında ve kurulduktan sonraki yıllarda Türk-İş'in siyasi alana hangi ölçüde katıldığı dış ve iç dinamikler gözönünde bulundurularak araştırılması tezin ana ilgi alanıdır.

Tezde Türk-İş'in kurulmasında birinci faktör olarak dış dinamikler öne sürülmüştür. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemde başta Almanya ve İngiltere gibi ülkelerle hacmi azalan dış ticaret ve dış ilişkiler Amerika ile daha yoğun bir nitelik kazanmıştır. Bunun da ülkenin bir çok alanına olduğu gibi çalışma ilişkilerine de yansıdığı açık bir şekilde görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemde 1950'li yılların başında Türk-İş'in kurulması rastlantı değildir. Türkiye'de şehirleşme ve endüstrileşme oranının artmasına paralel olarak işçi sınıfı da söz konusu dönemde sayıca çok büyümüştür ve sendikalaşma oranı oldukça yükselmiştir. Büyük ya da küçük kapsamlı çok sayıda sendika türemiştir. Çok partili hayata henüz geçmiş bir Türkiye için bu kadar çok sendika Amerika açısından tehdit oluşturur hale gelmiştir ve bu nedenle Amerika bu irili ufaklı sendikaları bir konfederasyon adı altında belli bir çatıda toplayıp kendi yönetimi ve kontrolü altına alma isteği sonucunda Türk-İş'in kurulma aşamasında ve sonraki yıllarda müdahale etmiş ve birçok şeyi kontrolü altında tutmuştur.

Türk-İş'in kuruluşunu ve sonraki yıllardaki tutumunu ciddi olarak etkileyen iç dinamiklerden en önemlisi siyasal partiler olmuştur. Çok partili hayata henüz geçmiş olan Türkiye' de genellikle iki siyasal partinin Türk-İş ile çok yakın temasları olmuştur. Bu iki büyük parti, önceleri Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi ve Demokrat Parti ve sonraları Demokrat Partinin kapatılmasıyla Adalet Partisi Türk-İş'i ve onun üyesi olan işçileri büyük bir oy potansiyeli olarak görmüşler ve ona hükmetmek için birbirleriyle yarışmışlardır. Yaşanılan dönemlerin özelliklerine göre Türk-İş'i kontrolleri alma açısından yarışta galip gelen taraf hep değişmiştir. Seçim kaygıları nedeniyle hem Türk-İş'in kurulmasına hem de sonraki aşamada onun siyasal alanda önemli rol oynamasına olumlu bakmışlar ve onu desteklemişlerdir.

Söz konusu yıllarda, 1950'li yıllarda Türkiye bir göç ve dolayısıyla bir endüstrileşme döneminden geçmektedir. Cumhuriyet kurulduğundan beri ilk kez işçi sayısında ve buna bağlı olarak sendika sayısında bir artış söz konusudur. Bu küçük ve güçsüz sendikalar 1950 öncesinde devletin kontrolü altındadırlar. Bu dönemde sendikalar üzerinde Türkiye'nin güçlü devlet anlayışı ciddi bir şekilde hissedilmiştir. Ancak bu zayıf sendikalar 1946 seçimlerinden sonra kendilerini göstermeye ve isimlerini duyurmaya başlamışlardır. Bu aşamada güçlü devlet bunları kendine karşı birer tehdit olarak görmüş ve bunları kendi kontrolü altında toparlamayı, biraraya getirmeyi ve kendi oluşturduğu bir kurumun çatısı altında birleştirmeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu aşamada tez Türk-İş'in hem iç hem de dış dinamiklerin etkisi altında kurulduğunu görüşünü savunmaktadır ve daha da ötesi her dönemde Türk-İş'in bu iki faktörden kopamadığı saptanmıştır.

Bunun en büyük göstergesi olarak Türk-İş'in kurulduktan yaklaşık on yıl sonra kabul ettiği partilerüstü politikası tezde yoğun bir biçimde irdelenmiştir. Daha da ötesi, Türk-İş'in kendini tanımlaması başlığı altında bu politika tezin temel eleştiri unsurudur. Bu politikanın kabulü ile bir işçi konfederasyonu olan Türk-İş kendisini siyasal alanın dışında tutmayı kendine amaç edinmiştir ancak bütün dönemler incelendiğinde Türk-İş'in bu amaca yönelmediği, aksine genellikle siyasetin göbeğinde yer aldığı gözlemlenmektedir. Tez Türk-İş'in değil siyasal alandan çekilmek, aksine 1980 askeri darbesine kadar siyasal alanda aktif rol oynadığını savunmaktadır.

Genel olarak bakıldığında Türkiye'deki sendikacılık hareketinin incelenmesi konunun ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasi yönden irdelenmesini gerektirmektedir. Dolayısıyla, Türk-İş'in toplumdaki ve siyasetteki rolü incelenirken her dönem için söz konusu ekonomik göstergeler dikkate alınmış ve Türk-İş'in tutumu ve rolü ile ilişkilendirilerek araştırılmıştır. Türk-İş'in kurulması ile yakından ilgili olan Cumhuriyetin ilk dönemlerinden başlayarak Türkiye'deki iç ve dış gelişmeler sendikacılık hareketi ile bağlantılı olarak yorumlanmıştır. Bunun da ötesinde, Cumhuriyet öncesi dönem, Osmanlı son dönemlerindeki ekonomik gelişmeler endüstri ilişkileri kapsamı içerisinde açıklanarak ilk işçi sınıfının ortaya çıkışı ve sendika arayışları tezin ilk bölümünde ortaya konmuştur.

İlk bölümde Osmanlı yönetiminde ilk endüstrileşme nüveleri ve buna bağlı olarak Avrupa'nın da etkisiyle çıkan işçilerle ilgili kanuni gelişmeler ortaya konmuştur. Örneğin ilk olarak Tatil-i Eşgal yasası ve 1908 Anayasası süresince azınlıklar ve Balkan bölgesinde yaşayanların yaptığı çok sayıda grev görülmektedir. Bir çok kanuni yasağa rağmen bu dönemde grevlerin önüne geçilememiştir. Daha sonra Cumhuriyetin kurulmasıyla birçok alanda değişimler olmasına rağmen endüstriyel ilişkiler alanında önemli bir değişikliğe rastlanamamaktadır.

Tek parti döneminde güçlü devlet geleneğinin de bir parçası olarak yeni gelişmekte olan endüstrileşmenin bir parçası olan işçilere sendikal haklar konusunda ciddi kısıtlamalar gelmiştir. En önemlisi grev hakkı tamamıyla yasaklanmıştır. Bu dönemde devlet her alana müdahale eden ve hükmeden otoriter bir devlettir ve bu tutumun doğal bir sonucu olarak da devlet ekonomik alana da önemli ölçüde müdahale etmiştir. Sonuçta, işçi sınıfının gelişmesi ve sendikacılığın nefes alması tamamen devletin kontrolündendir. Devlet istediği şekilde işçilerle ilgili kararları tek taraflı olarak almıştır. Örneğin ücret sorununu İkinci Dünya savaşı sonrasına kadar otoriter devlet tarafından ertelenebilmiştir.

Tartışılan bir başka konu ise Türkiye'de burjuvalaşma oranının yükseltilememesi ve varolan burjuva sınıfının gerekli dönüşümü sağlayamamasıdır. Buna ek olarak mülsüzleşme de tezde gerekli bir biçimde işçi sınıfının gelişmemesinin bir nedeni olarak dile getirilmiştir. Köyden kente göçeden ve yeni kurulmakta olan sanayide çalışmakta olan işçi henüz köyünden kopmamış ve toprağıyla yakın ilişki içindedir.

Bu durum onun kendisini bir burjuva sınıfı üyesi olarak hissetmesini engeller ve hatta işçi sınıfı üyesi olarak hissetmesi ya çok uzun yıllar sonra gerçekleşecek ya da hiç gerçekleşmeyecektir. Bu durumda bir işçi sınıfı bilinci ya da yoğun sendikalaşma isteğinden söz etmek bu dönemler için mümkün değildir.

Tek parti döneminde burjuva sınıfının yeni yeni ortaya çıkıp gelişmeye başladığını belirtmek her şeye rağmen mümkündür. Hatta bu yeni ayağa kalkmaya çalışan burjuvazi büyük toprak sahipleriyle birlikte hareket ederek otoriter devletin sürdürdüğü devlet kapitalizmine karşı savaş açmıştır. Bunun da ötesinde fakir köylüye ve işçiyi de yanına alarak çok partili döneme geçişi zorlamış ve Demokrat Partinin göreve gelmesinde büyük rol oynamıştır. Tek güç olan ve güçlü devlet geleneğinin tek temsilcisi olan, askeri ve sivil bürokrasi ile yakın bağları bulunan Cumhuriyet Partisi'nin yönetimi yıkılmış ve ilk kez bir alternatif, DP, göreve gelmiştir. Bu işçiler açısından çok şey ifade etmektedir çünkü DP göreve gelmeden önce grev hakkı gibi işçilerin en büyük mücadele alanından söz etmekteydi. Ancak göreve gelmeden önce işçi sınıfına büyük sözler veren ve dolayısıyla işçilerin desteğini alan DP göreve geldikten sonra bu sözleri bir kenara atmış ve işçi sınıfını büyük hayal kırıklığına uğratmıştır.

Diğer partiye baktığımızda malesef DP'nin bu tutumu hep devam etmiş ve diğer partilere ve özellikle ana muhalefet partisi CHP'ye de sıçramış işçiler birçok vaatler ile hayal kırıklığına uğratılmış. Oy kaygısı partileri Türk-İş'in gözünde her ne kadar güvenilmez yapsa da Türk-İş kurulmasından itibaren dış dünya, özellikle Amerika'nın olduğu kadar iç etmenlerin, özellikle bu iki partinin destekçisi olmuştur. Oy potansiyelinin karşılığında da kanuni düzenlemelerde ufak tefek haklar elde etmiştir.

İkinci bölümde tezin konusu çok partili dönem içinde işçi sınıfının durumu ve 1960 askeri darbesinin işçilere ve sendikalara, özellikle de Türk-İş'e olan etkileridir. 1952'de birçok dış ve iç etmen sonucu Türk-İş kurulur. Aslında kurulması için çok elverişli bir dönemdir çünkü ekonomik şartların çok kötü olduğu ve hatta işçilerin çok zor ekonomik şartlardan geçtiği bir dönemdir. Dolayısıyla, zaten yeni bir alternatif arayan işçilerden DP için hazır bir destekten söz edilebilir.

Türk-İş'in kuruluşundan sonraki 10 yıl içerisinde tezde üzerinde durulan en önemli olay partilerüstü politikanın Türk-İş tarafından kabulüdür. Bunun anlamı Türk-İş'in hangi parti görev başında olursa olsun onun tarafını tutmayacağı sözüdür. Ancak tez kapsamında yapılan çalışmalarda bunun bu şekilde gerçekleşmediği, Türk-İş'in siyasete karşı sessiz kalmadığı, siyasi partilerle yakın ilişki içinde olduğu söylenebilir. Bu partilerüstü politikanın kabulünde 1960'ların başında Amerikalı siyasetçi ve sendikacılarla Türk-İş'in yakın ilişkilerinin de büyük etkisi olduğu görülmektedir. Çok sayıda Türk-İş yöneticisi o yıllarda defalarca A.B.D. ve İsrail'e sendika eğitimi almaya gitmiş ve dolayısıyla Amerikan sendikacılığının yoğun etkisi altında kalmıştır. Bu ziyaretlerin doğal sonucu olarak da bir Amerikan talebi olan partilerüstü politika hiç karşı koyan olmadan çoğunluk tarafından kabul edilmiştir.

Kurulduktan sonraki yaklaşık 10 yıl içerisinde Türk-İş partiler ile yakın ilişkiler geliştirmiştir ve hatta seçim dönemlerinde CHP ve DP Türk-İş'e giderek Parlamento'ya seçmek için belli sayıda işçi kökenli aday istemiştir. Bu adaylardan çoğu da Melis'e seçilmiş ve politikada aktif olarak yer almıştır. Bu rolleri tez süresince incelendiğinde bu milletvekillerinin işçi kimliğinden çok milletvekili kimliklerinin on plana çıktığı saptanmıştır çünkü Meclis'teki görev sürelerince onlar da genellikle bir kez daha seçilme kaygısına düşüp işçi sınıfının haklarını genişletecek mücadelelere girişmemişlerdir. Ancak, ekonomik şartlar 1960'ların başında daha da kötüye gittikçe işçiler grev ve protesto gibi önemli eylemlere başlamıştır. Hatta yaklaşık iki yüz bin kişinin katıldığı Saraçhane mitingi bunun en güzel örneğidir. İşçiler artık biraraya gelmeye, birlikte hareket etmeye ve hükümeti eleştirip meydan okumaya başlamışlardır. Toplumdaki diğer sınıfların da ayaklanması güçlü devlet anlayışına meydan okumanın en güzel örneğidir.

Sonuçta 1960 askeri darbesi yapılmıştır ve askerler 1961 anayasasını bir grup üniversite hocasının da katılımıyla hazırlamıştır. Türkiye'de ilk kez topluma, özellikle işçi sınıfına geniş haklar verilmiştir. Tez süresince yapılan görüşmelerde bazı Türk-İş yöneticilerinin bundan rahatsız olduğunu görmekteyiz.

1961 Anayasası ve arkasından sendikal alanla ilgili düzenlemeler Türkiye’de işçileri bir ferahlık durumuna itmiştir önce. Ama tabii dönemin şartları işçileri rahat bırakmamıştır.

Tezin üçüncü bölümü 1961 anayasası sonrası çıkan ve geniş sendikal hakları sunan yasaların incelenmesine ayrılmıştır. 1960 askeri ihtilali sonrası DP’nin sona ermesi ve Adalet Partisinin sahneye çıkması söz konusudur ve AP’nin neredeyse tamamıyla işçi sınıfını yönlendirme amacını bu dönemde gözlemlemek mümkündür. Bu yıllarda işçilere verilen haklar her ne kadar tepeden inme olarak gelmiş gözükse de işçi sınıfı da epey bir çaba göstermiş, eski pasif görüntüsünden sıyrılmıştır. Ancak yeni aktif rolleri bir yere kadar gözlemlenebilir çünkü geleneksel itaatkar rol hep devam etmiştir. Tez 1961 anayasası ve sendikal hakları içeren diğer yasaların her ne kadar tepeden inme ve hükümetler tarafından başlatılan haklar içerdiğini savunsa da aynı zamanda bu dönemlerde işçilerin ve sendikaların artık sesini duyurduğunu ve dolayısıyla iki grup, hükümet ve sendikalar, arasında belli bir mücadele sonucu hükümetlerin taviz vermeye başladıklarının da altını çizmektedir.

Tezin dördüncü bölümü 1970 sonrası döneme yani yine bir askeri darbe dönemine ayrılmıştır. Bu dönemdeki bozulan ekonomik şartlar ve toplumdaki sosyal çalkantılar döneme damgalarını vurmaktadırlar. Bu çalkantılar ve zorluklar içinde işçiler çok düşük yaşam standartlarında ayakta kalmaya çalışırken sendika yöneticileri, özellikle Türk-İş yöneticiler sendika aracılığıyla ve imkanlarıyla yaşadıkları lüks hayat nedeniyle toplum önünde çoktan bir güvensizlik unsuru olarak ortaya çıkmışlardır. Bu durum toplumda ‘sendika babaları’ sözünün ortaya çıkmasına bile neden olmuştur ve bu imaj hala devam etmektedir.

Dördüncü bölüm temel olarak 12 Eylül dönemini incelemektedir. Ayrıca bu bölüm tezin bitiş noktasıdır da. 12 Eylül toplumun tüm kurumlarında olduğu gibi Türk-İş’te de büyük bir suskunluğa neden olmuştur. Askeri darbenin ardından kabul edilen Anayasa ve sendikal hakları içeren kanunlar işçilere çok sınırlı alanlar bırakmıştır. 1960’lı yıllarda Türk-İş’ten kopmalar olmuştur ve yeni arayışlar, yeni işçi partisi kurma çabaları, yeni sendika ve konfederasyon kurma çabaları

görülmüştür. Nihayetinde Türkiye İşçi Partisi, DİSK ve HAK-İŞ'in kuruluşları bu döneme rastlar.

Genel olarak baktığımızda Türk-İş 1980 askeri darbesi öncesinde Türkiye'de siyasal alanda ve toplumsal alanda sesini duyurmuş ve hatta bazı dönemlerde oldukça aktif rol almıştır. Siyasetçiler ve parti liderleri Türk-İş'e gelmiş ve desteğini istemişlerdir. Bu 1980 öncesi dönemde Türk-İş'in gücünün bir göstergesidir. Ancak Türk-İş işçiler arasında bir sınıf bilinci oluşturamamıştır ya da oluşturmak istememiştir. Türk-İş daha çok işçilerin ücret konusundaki talepleriyle ilgilenen bir hizmet kurumu niteliğinden öteye genelde geçememiştir çünkü en önemli kavramı, sınıf bilinci kavramı Türk işçisinde gelişmemiştir.

Günümüzde Türk işçisinde birlik beraberlik yoktur, aksine bölünmüşlük vardır. Tez bu bölünmüşlüğün sona ermesinin ve beraberliğin kurulmasının gerekliliğinin altını çizmektedir. İşçi sınıfında beraberliğin yerleştirilememesi Türk-İş ve diğer konfederasyonların üyesi işçilerin bugün yerleşip kalmış olan işçilerin sessizliği ortamının sürdürülmesine neden olmaktadır. Bugün işçi sınıfı sonsuz bir sessizlik içindedir. 12 Eylül sonrası çıkartılan yasalar işçi sınıfını bir kapana kapatmıştır.

1980 öncesi dönemde Kamu İktisadi Kuruluşlarında yoğun olarak çalışan işçiler özelleştirme sonucu bunların çoğunun satıp kapatılmasıyla işsizlik oranı büyük oranda artmış. Dolayısıyla işe olan talep arttıkça ücret seviyeleri en az seviyeye düşmüştür. Sendikaları artık Toplu İş sözleşmesi yaparken görmek neredeyse imkansızlaşmaktadır.

Yapılması gereken en önemli çözüm öncelikle sözü edilen parçalanmışlığa son vermektir. Bunu gerçekleştirmek tepeden zorlama ile ya da kanun yoluyla düzenlemekle olmaz. Diğer bir önlem özelleştirmeden mümkün olduğu kadar kaçınmaktır. Bir diğer önemli nokta sendikaların korkmadan siyasi alana atılmasıdır. Ayrıca atılırken kendi işçi kimliğini kaybetmemelidir aksine yeni gelenler başta olmak üzere yardıma hazır olmalıdır.