

ARMENIAN QUESTION IN *TASVİR-İ EFKAR*
BETWEEN 1914 AND 1918

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ART
IN
HISTORY

DECEMBER 2006

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

ARMENIAN QUESTION IN *TASVIR-İ EFKAR* BETWEEN 1914 AND 1918

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DECEMBER 2006, 142 pages

In this study, some aspects of the Armenian Question between 1914 and 1918 have been evaluated within the frame of historical methodology. For the first time, all the issues of *Tasvir-i Efkar*, a daily newspaper published during the studied period, have been evaluated in the frame of the Armenian Question. All news and articles related to the Armenians have been examined and a great deal of them has been used in the study. By doing so, it is aimed to submit *Tasvir-i Efkar* as a historical source for the studies on the Armenian Question.

Keywords: Armenian Question, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, World War

ÖZ

TASVİR-İ EFKAR'DA ERMENİ MESELESİ 1914-1918

GÜL, SERKAN

Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. ÖMER TURAN

Aralık 2006, 142 sayfa

Bu çalışmada, tarih metodolojisi çerçevesi içinde, Ermeni Meselesi'nin 1914-1918 tarihleri arasındaki dönemi bazı yönleri ile ele alınmıştır. Bu dönemde Türkiye'de yayınlanmakta olan günlük Tasvir-i Efkar gazetesinin bütün sayıları ilk defa olarak, Ermeni Meselesi çerçevesinde ele alınmıştır. Böylece, Tasvir-i Efkar gazetesinin bir tarih kaynağı olarak, Ermeni Meselesi ile ilgili çalışmalara katkı yapması hedeflenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ermeni Meselesi, Tasvir-i Efkar, I. Dünya Savaşı

To My Parents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ömer Turan for his guidance, advice, criticism, encouragements and insight throughout the research. Without his unwavering support, I could not have completed this work.

I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Seçil Karal Akgün and Prof. Dr. Yavuz Ercan. They took part in my thesis committee and made valuable suggestions and comments.

I would also like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Taha Niyazi Karaca. He continuously supported and encouraged me throughout the work.

I would not have gotten through this process without support of my friends Taner Beyoğlu, Kurtuluş Kılıç, Güngör Öğüt, Sadık Fatih Torun, Çağdaş Kılıç, Mustafa Özbaş, Umut Alten, Aybuke Çiftdoğan, Eyüp Günaydın, Emre Altun, Ali Aksoy, Erkan Özdoğan and Ali Delibaş. Their academic and morale support were precious.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family. They have always supported me throughout my education. They are always there whenever I need them.

Despite all valuable corrections, comments and suggestions of these names, there may be some mistakes. All responsibility of mistakes is, of course, mine.

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ABREVIATIONS

| | |
|------|--|
| BOA | Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi |
| CUP | Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Partisi) |
| DH | Dahiliye Nezareti (Ministry of Interior Affairs) |
| FUP | Freedom and Union Party (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Partisi) |
| HR | Hariciye Nezareti (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) |
| HU | Harb-i Umumi (World War) |
| KLS | Klasör (file) |
| KR | Karton (cardboard) |
| nr . | Numara (number) |
| No. | Number |
| OBE | Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler |
| SYS | (Siyasi) |
| TE | Tasvir-i Efkar |

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I.1. A Concise Historical Background of the Armenian Question

The period between 1914 and 1918, in which the World War I took place, became the most tragic phase in the Ottoman History. The Ottoman Empire was faced with an ultimate collapse after a long lasting regression. The Ottoman Empire, in a matter of life or death, was to struggle for the existence with all her power.

The Ottoman Empire and Germany had been becoming closer to each other for a long time and the result was the alliance of the Ottoman Empire with Germany in the World War. On the other hand, the Great Powers of Europe including Great Britain, France and Russia had formed the Triple Entente (Allies). The Ottoman Army had to fight against these enemies in a vast geography and in many fronts ranging from Caucasia to Çanakkale, from Iraq to the Suez Channel. Owing to the continuous wars and political turmoil, both the Ottoman Army and the people had been faced with great disasters in recent years and now they had to shoulder all the burdens for the sake of the Empire.

Immediately after the outbreak of the First World War, the Ottoman administration and the army had to deal with another problem, the Armenian Question. With the commencement of the war, the Armenians collaborated with the Allies and a front virtually emerged against the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, coping with the problem was extremely difficult because the Armenians used to live in all over the Empire and it was impossible to distinguish who the enemy or the comrade was. Attachment

of the Armenians to the Allies in such a fragile manner was going to bring in emergence of very tragic consequences.

The First World War years were not the time in which the Armenian Question came into being. Having shared a history of nearly one thousand years, the Turks and the Armenians had peacefully carried their relations. However, the ideals of independence emerged among the Armenians in 19th Century and many Armenian revolts broke out in Anatolia. General Mayewski, the Russian concuil-general in Van and Erzurum, had submitted a report on the Armenian Question. In his report, he stressed the driving forces behind the Armenian uprisings. According to Mayewski, there were mainly three reasons for the Armenian uprisings. These reasons were as follows:¹

1. Obvious advance of the Armenians in politics.
2. Development of such ideas as nationalism, freedom and independence.
3. Instigation of these ideas by Western governments and spread of these ideas by attempts and inspirations of the Armenian priests.

Mayewski had rightly stressed the role of the Armenian Church in spread of revolutionary ideas among the Armenians. However, the role of the church decreased in the course of time and the revolutionary Armenian parties came to fore. He also rightly pointed the role of the western governments out related to development of the Armenian Question. The role of the Great Power continuously became determinative.

The history of the Turkish-Armenian relations and the activities of the Great Powers on the Armenians have become subject of many works and this work does not cover these subjects. Nevertheless, it is colloquial to say a few words to clarify transfer of the Armenian Question to an international problem.

¹ General Mayewski, *Ermenilerin Yaptıkları Mezalimler*, trans. Azmi Süslü, A.Ü. İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, Ankara, 1986, p. 16.

The role of Europe upon the emergence of the Armenian Question became determinative. Although the Turks and the Armenians were the two sides of the question, it is hardly possible to identify them as the causers of it. The Armenian Question was created by the Great Powers of Europe.² However, after intervention of the Great Powers, the Armenians were easily carried away with great expectations.

The Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78 is generally accepted as the event, which brought the Armenians' situation as a problem to the political agenda of the Ottoman Empire and Europe. The war resulted in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the St. Stefano Treaty was signed at the end of the war in 1878. The Armenians regarded the postwar situation as an opportunity to materialize their political aims.

When the war resulted with victory of Russia, the Armenian Patriarch Nerses and some Armenian notables visited Grand Duke Nikola and requested some regulations about the Ottoman Armenians. Their first aim was to secure independence from the Ottoman Empire. However, Russia did not warmly respond the Armenian request because it was against the Russian interests. Russia feared that an independent Armenia would be a sample for the Armenians in Russia.

When the Armenians perceived impossibility of an independent Armenia, they requested autonomy under Russian protectorate but Russia did not again approach temperately to this request. Yet, Russia guaranteed the Armenians to enclose a special article about them in the peace treaty.³ The St. Stefano Treaty concluded on 3 March 1878 included an article about the Armenians. With the St. Stefano Treaty, the name of the Armenians was firstly enclosed to an international treaty. This was a

² Seçil K. Akgün, 'Ermeni Sorununa Işık Tutacak Bazı Belgeler', *Ermeni Araştırmaları I. Türkiye Kongresi*, v.1, ASAM, Ankara, 2003, p. 75. Akgün identifies the question as an 'artificial' (yapay) problem created by the Great Powers in the last quarter of 19th Century. For the role of the Great Powers and missionary activities in emergence of the Armenian Question see; Jeremy Salt, *Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians, 1878-1896*, Frank Cass, London, 1993; William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902*, Knopf, New York, 1951 and Ömer Turan, *Avrasya'da Misyonerlik*, ASAM, Ankara, 2002.

³ Bilal Şimşir, 'Ermeni Gaillesinin Tarihsel Kökenleri Üzerine', *Armenian Studies*, v.1, ASAM, Ankara, 2001, p. 11

milestone for the Ottoman Empire because the Armenians were coming to agenda of the international politics.⁴

The conditions and the outcomes of the St. Stefano Treaty were against the interests of the other European Powers so a new conference was convened in Berlin and the Berlin Treaty was signed on 13 July 1878. Here, Article 16 of the St. Stefano Treaty was re-approved as Article 61. Nuriya Cheras, who had been sent to Berlin with the former Patriarch Hrimian, had once stressed importance of the St. Stefano and Berlin treaties as follows:

The Berlin Congress did not only enclose Article 61 instead of Article 16 but it also laid the foundations of the Armenian state that will be found in future. In fact Europe did not give us autonomy, but it granted us such an article which would lead us the aim that we burn to reach it...with the Berlin Congress we obtained a goldmine. It is our business to work it and take out the gold.⁵

After the Armenians came to the political agenda of the Europe they tried to utilize all the opportunities to attract attention of European states and public opinion. The Armenians decided to follow the Bulgarian sample. The Bulgarians had revolted in 1876 and they propagandized the events as massacre of the Muslim Turks against the Christian Bulgarians. Thus they received support of European public opinion and they gained a great degree of autonomy in 1878.⁶ The Bulgarians had received a great degree of autonomy with the Berlin Treaty. However Ignatiev, the former Russian ambassador to İstanbul, claimed that there was no territory in the Ottoman Empire called Armenia and the Armenians used to live in a scattered manner in the Empire so it was not possible to give the rights to the Armenians which had been previously granted to the Bulgarians.⁷ Thus, the Patriarch Narses Varjebatian

⁴ Şimşir, *Ermeni Gâilesi*, p. 116.

⁵ Şimşir, *Ermeni Gâilesi*, p. 119.

⁶ For the details of transformation of the Bulgarian Question to an international problem and the European intervention see Ömer Turan, *Turkish Minority in Bulgaria (1878-1908)*, TTK, Ankara, 1998.

⁷ Cevdet Küçük, *Osmanlı Diplomasisinde Ermeni Meselesinin Ortaya Çıkışı (1878-1897)*, İstanbul Üniversitesi, İstanbul 1984, p. 3.

announced that if it was necessary to revolt to attract the attention of European states, this would not be difficult.⁸

In order to reach to political aims, the Armenians did not hesitate to use military means and there occurred many Armenian uprisings during the last quarter of the 19th century. The Armenians formed many terrorist groups and revolted for an Armenian state. The number of the uprisings suddenly increased with formation of the Armenian committees. Two Armenian revolutionary parties were especially important when the Armenian activities are considered. The Tashnaksutun and the Hunchak were the leading Armenian revolutionary parties. They played a significant role in organization of revolts, propaganda and terrorist activities.

The Hunchak Committee was firstly found by Nazarbey and his wife Naro in 1886 in Switzerland but the name was accepted in 1890.⁹ It was found with social democrat expressions and the society published a newspaper called Hunchak. The Committee aimed to establish an independent Armenia. The Committee opposed the opinions which perceived help and intervention of the European states only way for the Armenian indepenence and the Committee preferred a revolutionary way. There were mainly two objectives in the Hunchak program for short term. Firstly, organizations should be extended in different cities where the Armenians lived. Secondly, these organizations should be intensified and they should be ready for revolts that would break out in proper times.¹⁰

The Hunchaks organized their first branches in Eastern Anatolia. Then, they extended their organizations and opened new branches in İstanbul and İzmir. Many other Hunchak branches were opened one another after in big cities of Anatolia. Hereafter, they began to organize uprisings and assassinations in different parts of

⁸ Azmi Süslü, *Ermeniler ve 1915 Tehcir Olayları*, Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Yayınları, Van, 1990, p. 36.

⁹ Kamuran Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, Rüstem, 5th edition, İstanbul; 2001 p. 171.

¹⁰ *Ermeni Komitelerinin Amal ve Harekat-I İhtilaliyyesi*, Ed. Erdoğan Cengiz, Başbakanlık Basımevi, Ankara, 1983, p. 22.

the Ottoman Empire.¹¹ The Hunchaks also committed assassinations against the Armenians who did not approve the methods of the Hunchak.¹²

The Tashnaksutiun Committee (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) was founded in Tiflis by the Armenian students in 1890. The program of the Tashnaksutiun was drafted during the General Congress in 1892.¹³ The methods to be used by the revolutionary bands organized by the Party were as follows:

- To propagandize for the principles of the Tashnaksutiun and its objectives based on an understanding of, and in sympathy with, the revolutionary work.
- To organize fighting bands, to work with them with regard to the above-mentioned issues and to prepare them for activity.
- To use every means, by word and deed, to arouse the revolutionary activity and spirit of the people.
- To use every means to arm the people.
- To organize revolutionary committees and establish strong links between them.
- To stimulate fighting and to terrorize government officials, informers, traitors, usurers and every kind of exploiter.
- To organize financial districts.
- To protect the peaceful people and the inhabitants against attacks by brigands.
- To establish communications for the transportation of men and arms.
- To expose government establishments to looting and destruction.¹⁴

As it can be derived from the program of the Tashnaksutiun, the Armenians were ready to use all political, military and financial means to reach the aim of independent Armenia. They had decided to arm the Armenians and to attack to the government establishments and officials. Terrorist activities were the primary method of the Tashnaksutiun.

Establishment of the Armenian revolutionary parties sharply accelerated the Armenian revolts and terrorist activities. The Armenian parties forced the Armenians to join their activities and they organized assassinations against those who refuse to

¹¹ Mehmet Hocaoglu, *Arşiv Vesikalarıyla Tarihte Ermeni Mezalimi ve Ermeniler*, Anda Dağıtım, İstanbul, 1976, p. 159.

¹² Hocaoglu, *Tarihte Ermeni Mezalimi*, p. 159-160.

¹³ For the programs of the Hunchak and Tashnaksutiun committees see; Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question*, Documentary Publications, Ankara, 1988, pp. 683-702.

¹⁴ Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1963, p. 168.

support them. They attacked the Muslims and repressed them with terrorism. However, the Armenian revolts were introduced to the European public opinion as the Turkish massacres against the Armenians.

The Armenian Question had taken place, more or less, in the agenda of the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers from 1878 to 1914. By excusing the question, the Powers interfered to the Ottoman Empire and the Empire was continuously kept under pressure in changing levels. However, the most tragic phase of the question was going to be experienced during the World War I years, in which both the Turks and the Armenians had to face with bitter events. The Armenians attempted to benefit from the war conditions and they revolted to materialize their unceasing independence myth. They did not hesitate to fight against the Ottoman Army and to massacre many Muslim populations in different parts of the Empire. The Ottoman administration firmly responded the Armenian activities and the relocation of the Armenians were decided to prevent these activities. Consequently, many of the Muslims and Armenians were destructed through the War.

Relocation of the Armenians was defined as genocide by some groups within the following years and the Turks were stigmatized as the sole responsables of the events. Validity of such asserts is highly open to discussion. In order to come up with the reasons and the results of the Armenian relocation, it is vitally important that both the pre-World War conditions and the wartime developments should be carefully evaluated.

Historical studies require usage of both primary and secondary sources. In this work, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, a daily newspaper during the war years, was studied as a historical source related the Armenian Question. *Tasvir-i Efkar*, which had not been previously studied in regard to the Armenian Question, became the leading source of the work. However, I have made fairly extensive use secondary sources. The primary objective of this work is to introduce *Tasvir-i Efkar* as a historical source upon the Armenian Question. Those researchers who deal with the Armenian Question would apply to the work to get information about the news and comments of *Tasvir-i Efkar*.

I.2. *Tasvir-i Efkar*

Tasvir-i Efkar is one of the leading newspapers of the History of the Turkish Press. *Tasvir-i Efkar* began to be published by Şinasi, a leading intellectual and literary man of 19th Century, in 1862 and it took a distinguished place in intellectual and political life in Turkey.

History of the Turkish press began with *Takvim-i Vekayi* which was the first Turkish newspaper and firstly published in 1831.¹⁵ *Takvim-i Vekayi* was an official newspaper and it used to announce the issued laws, regulations and appointments. *Takvim-i Vekayi* was an irregular newspaper and it had French, Arabic, Greek and Armenian printings as well as Turkish. *Ceride-yi Havadis* was the second Turkish newspaper in the Turkish Press. *Ceride-yi Havadis* was published by William Churchill and it had a semi-official character. Publication of the *Takvim-i Vekayi* and the permission to the publication of the *Ceride-yi Havadis* had basically been based on pragmatic considerations. The expectation of the official institutions from a newspaper was that the newspapers were to announce the works and the renovations of the state.¹⁶ *Takvim-i Vekayi* had been directly founded for this purpose and *Ceride-yi Havadis* also followed the same way. However, *Ceride-yi Havadis*, which held “the monopoly of publishing the Turkish newspaper for twenty years”, played a significant role in the Turkish Press by allowing the Turkish reader to meet with the news and articles, by training a generation of journalists, printers, distributors and some other branches of the press sector.¹⁷

Fallowing *Takvim-i Vekayi* and *Ceride-yi Havadis*, the Turkish press met with *Tercüman-ı Ahval*. *Tercüman-ı Ahval* began to be published by Şinasi and Agah Effendi in 1860 and it brought a new understanding to the Turkish Press that had

¹⁵ For the details of the history of the Turkish press see; Hıfzı Topuz, *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*, Remzi, İstanbul, 2003 and E. Benhan Şapolyo, *Türk Gazeteciliği Tarihi*, TTK, Ankara, 1969.

¹⁶ Hüseyin Seçmen, *Şinasi*, TDK, Ankara, 1972, p. 53.

¹⁷ Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*, 8th edition, TTK, Ankara, 2000, p. 146.

been pinched in a narrow frame so far. *Tercüman-i Ahval* was the “first intellectual and political newspaper in Turkish”.¹⁸ Şinasi wrote the preface of *Tercüman-i Ahval* and explained the objectives of the newspaper. According to Şinasi, the aim of *Tercüman-i Ahval* was not only to give the news but also to defend the rights of the people and to explain the thoughts for the sake of the state. Moreover, *Tercüman-i Ahval* was going to address the people with a language which they could understand.¹⁹

Şinasi wrote only three articles in *Tercüman-i Ahval* and he worked there until the publication of issue 24. Then, he left *Tercüman-i Ahval* and began to work for founding his own newspaper. Şinasi submitted a petition to the Ministry of Education in April 1861 and demanded permission for publishing newspaper.²⁰ In his petition, Şinasi indicated that his newspaper was to focus on education and news, and it was going to be in Turkish.

After completion of the bureaucratic procedures, Şinasi was given necessary permission for publishing a newspaper with the imperial decree (*irade-yi seniyye*) of the Sultan Abdulmecit on May 14, 1861.²¹ When permission was granted, the name of newspaper had not been determined yet. Then the name was determined as *Tasvir-i Efkar* and the newspaper began to be published on June 27, 1862. The preface of the *Tasvir-i Efkar* was written by Şinasi²²

¹⁸ Seçmen, *Şinasi*, p. 54

¹⁹ Seçmen, *Şinasi*, pp. 54-55

²⁰ Ziyad Ebüzziya, *Şinasi*, ed. Hüseyin Çelik, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1997, p. 192. The original petition of Şinasi was as follow:

[sic.] “Maarif ve havadise dair haftada mümkün olduğu miktar Türkçe gazete çıkarmak emelinde olduğumdan naşi nizam ve emsaline tatbiken bu babta müsaade-i seniye-i nezaret penahilerinin şayan buyurulmasını istida eylerim.

Her hususta emrû ferman Hazret-i min lehü'l-emrindir.”

²¹ Ebüzziya, *Şinasi*, p. 199.

²² Şinasi, *Makaleler*, ed. Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, Dün-Bugün Yayınevi, Ankara, 1960, pp.15-16. The first article was as follows:

[sic.] “Her bir devlet idaresine müvekkel olduğu bir hey’et-i mecmua-i milliyenin bekasiyle paydar ve hayr-ü menafiine muvafık surette tedbir-i meham eylemekle kavi-ül iktidar olmak kaziyesi manend-i bedihi-i evveli burhandan müstağnidir. Bir hal-i medeniyette bulunan halk ise kendi menafiinin husulü hakkında ne suretle sarf-ı zihin eylediği terceman-ı efkar olan gazeteleri lisanından malum olur.

With the beginning of *Tasvir-i Efkar* to publication, it became an important figure of the Turkish press. *Tasvir-i Efkar* was distinguished with both its language and style, and its technical peculiarities. Şinasi's ideal of "addressing the people with an easily understandable language" materialized with *Tasvir-i Efkar*. The writings in the newspaper were abridged and unnecessary elaborative style was dismissed from the newspaper.²³ The new understanding of *Tasvir-i Efkar* brought about emergence of proximity between the people and *Tasvir-i Efkar* and more readers began to follow *Tasvir-i Efkar*. *Tasvir-i Efkar* also brought innovations in term of format. It was divided into different sections including the internal affairs (*dahiliye*), foreign affairs (*hariciye*) and serials (*tefrika*). The news of internal affairs was given under the titles of *payitaht* (capital) and *eyalat* (provinces). The news of foreign affairs used to be given according to the continents; Europe, Africa etc. *Tasvir-i Efkar* also published different literary works in the *tefrika* section.²⁴

When the publication policy of *Tasvir-i Efkar* is regarded, it can be observed that the newspaper supported the innovations and the reforms in the Ottoman Empire. It should be noted that publishing of sharp critics was not possible in the conditions of the period. However, Şinasi still wrote articles on political subjects and he mentioned about necessity of the reforms on financial and legal fields.²⁵ Despite his political articles, Şinasi came to fore with his literary and intellectual peculiarities.²⁶ *Tasvir-i Efkar* became more politic with participation of Namık Kemal to the newspaper. Namık Kemal began to write for *Tasvir-i Efkar* in 1863 and he became the editor-in-

Bu mütalaaya mebni, her bir, her bir memleket-i mütemeddine için elzem olan o türlü varakanın, Millet-i muazzama-i Osmaniye miyanında peyda olmasına mukaddemleri sa'i ve muvaffak olduğum misillü, teksir-i idadı emeli ile bu def'a dahi ba-ruhsat-i seniyye havadis ve maarife dair işbu *Tasvir-i Efkar* gazetesinin te'sisine teşebbüs eyledim. Madam ki, devlet ve millete ümid-bahş-i fevz ü felah olan asr-i humayun-i cenab-ı padişahide meydana çıkmış olmasından naşi vazife-i şükranıyetimi bu yolda umuma hizmet etmekle eda etmiş olacağımın beyanına ibtidar olunur."

²³ Seçmen, *Şinasi*, pp. 57-58.

²⁴ Seçmen, *Şinasi*, p. 57.

²⁵ Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*, p. 147.

²⁶ "Yeni Osmanlı hareketi birçok etkinin ürünü olmasına rağmen, onun entelektüel temellerini atmak, bir kişinin üzerine kaldı. Bu kişi yayınları on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ortasında Avrupa'da geçerli edebi, sosyal ve siyasi kavramlarla Türk aydınlarını tanıştıran Şâir Şinasi Efendi idi. Bizzat Nâmık Kemâl, Yeni Osmanlıların entelektüel üstadlığının bütün şerefini, Şinasinin omuzları üzerine yerleştirir." Şerif Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*, İletişim Yayınları, 1998, İstanbul, p.281

chief after Şinasi's departure to Paris in 1865. Being different from Şinasi, Namık Kemal wrote more openly on political subjects and he severely criticized the governmental policies. The government was, of course, well aware of the situation.²⁷

Namık Kemal actively took part in political life as one of the foremost members of the New Ottomans. He was a fervent defender of liberty (hürriyet) and homeland (vatan) concepts. Thus, *Tasvir-i Efkar* became the meeting place of the New Ottomans. Some leading members of Young Turks like Ebuzziya Tevfik, Ayetullah, Reşat and Nuri frequently met in the *Tasvir-i Efkar* Printing House.²⁸ Among these figures, Tevfik Bey wrote in *Tasvir-i Efkar* with a pen name.

Because of Namık Kemal's writings, the government had a negative opinion about both *Tasvir-i Efkar* and Namık Kemal. Namık Kemal had to leave Turkey when he attracted reaction of the government because of his writings about the Eastern Question. Namık Kemal left the control of the newspaper to Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem, an important literary and intellectual figure of the time. *Tasvir-i Efkar* continued to the life of publication until 1869 and 830 issues had been published when the newspaper was closed.²⁹

Tasvir-i Efkar returned to the publication after a long period with the declaration of constitution in 1908. Ebuzziya Tevfik had been expelled to Konya and he could come to İstanbul in 1908 with the amnesty. Tevfik Bey joined to the Committee of Union and Progress and he was elected deputy from Antalya.³⁰ Then he reactivated the *Tasvir-i Efkar* Printing House and began to publish *Tasvir-i Efkar* in 1909 by affixing 'Yeni' to the beginning of name.

Some people criticized usage of *Tasvir-i Efkar* name by Tevfik Bey. The basic reason of the critics was that they had a deep respect to *Tasvir-i Efkar* and its writers,

²⁷ Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*, p. 148.

²⁸ Alim Gür, *Ebuzziya Tevfik: Hayatı; Dil, Edebiyat, Basın, Yayın ve Matbaacılığa Katkıları*, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1998, pp. 26-27.

²⁹ Alpay Kabacalı, *Türkiye'de Matbaa, Basın ve Yayın (Başlangıcından Günümüze)*, Literatür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000, p. 67.

³⁰ Gür, *Ebuzziya Tevfik*, p. 35.

especially Şinasi and Namık Kemal, so they opposed usage of the name with commercial purposes. The opponents claimed that the name of *Tasvir-i Efkar* was being used as a trade mark. However, Tevfik Bey stressed that he did not have any commercial intention on using the name of *Tasvir-i Efkar* by reminding the long years which passed since Şinasi and his *Tasvir-i Efkar*.³¹ Tevfik Bey also reminded his legal rights to use *Tasvir-i Efkar* name but he defined the reason behind using the name as his respect and devotion to Şinasi's thoughts. He expressed his affiliation to *Tasvir-i Efkar* by saying that "...whenever I intended to publish a newspaper, the name of it was going to be *Tasvir-i Efkar*".³²

Yeni Tasvir-i Efkar was opened and closed for several times due to economical problems. And the newspaper quitted the 'Yeni' from the name on 15 February 1911 and again adopted the name of *Tasvir-i Efkar*.

When the political standing of *Tasvir-i Efkar* is considered, it can be seen that the newspaper followed a pro-Ittihadist policy. Moreover, there were rumors saying that *Tasvir-i Efkar* was being financially supported by the CUP.³³ Although this claim could not be proved, it was reflecting the close relation of *Tasvir-i Efkar* with the CUP. *Tasvir-i Efkar* was influenced by the political turmoil and the power struggle experienced in Turkey between 1909 and 1913. When the CUP was destitute from the political power, *Tasvir-i Efkar* was exposed to the pressure of the governments and it was closed and opened for several times. Along with firming of the CUP administration in Turkey, *Tasvir-i Efkar* could find chance to be published regularly.

Close relations between the CUP and *Tasvir-i Efkar* continued after Tevfik Bey. Tevfik Bey died on January 27, 1913 and control of *Tasvir-i Efkar* passed to Velid Bey, the son of Tevfik Bey. Henceforth, Yunus Nadi Bey undertook the responsibility of the editorship and he continued to write until July 28, 1918, when Yunus Nadi wrote his last article in *Tasvir-i Efkar*. Appointment of Yunus Nadi as

³¹ Gür, *Ebuzziya Tevfik*, pp. 245-246.

³² Gür, *Ebuzziya Tevfik*, p. 246 .

³³ Gür, *Ebuzziya Tevfik*, p. 248.

the editor of *Tasvir-i Efkar* strengthened the relation between the CUP and *Tasvir-i Efkar*. Yunus Nadi was an active member of the CUP and he was very close to the leaders of the party. Thus, *Tasvir-i Efkar* stood pro-İttihadist as long as Yunus Nadi was the editor of *Tasvir-i Efkar*.

As it was mentioned, Yunus Nadi wrote his last article for *Tasvir-i Efkar* on July 28, 1918. Hereafter, *Tasvir-i Efkar* was not published from June 28 to October 12, 1918 and no reason for this blank period was indicated. Later, *Tasvir-i Efkar* began to be republished on October 12, 1918 and Velid Ebuzziya became the editor of the newspaper.

During the period that this work covers, *Tasvir-i Efkar* kept its pro-İttihadist line. The newspaper stood close to the government and it did not have a critical attitude against the government.³⁴ While reminding close relation between *Tasvir-i Efkar* and the CUP, it should be also noted that a firm censorship was applied to the newspapers during First World War years so it was hardly possible to observe critics against the Ottoman administration. The newspapers had to submit their drafts to censor controllers before publication and they were not allowed to write any negative news and articles during the war years. Otherwise, they could be closed temporarily or permanently.³⁵

Tasvir-i Efkar regularly continued publication during the war years despite some gaps. It was a daily newspaper with eight pages in 1914. After the outbreak of the World War, *Tasvir-i Efkar* became a four paged newspaper in 1915. The main reason of decrease in page number was paper shortage, which even prevented sometimes publication of *Tasvir-i Efkar*. The newspaper could not be published because of the

³⁴ The issues of *Tasvir-i Efkar* that I studied let me say that there was not any serious criticism from *Tasvir-i Efkar* to the CUP.

³⁵ *Tasvir-i Efkar* wrote several times about closement of the newspapers because they they did not submit their drafts before publication. To illustrate, 'Rehnuma', a weekly Armenian newspaper, was closed for a three month term by censor control. *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 29 June, 1915, no: 1486.

shortage from January 25 to February 7, 1916.³⁶ There were also several gaps in publication of *Tasvir-i Efkar* between May 9 and June 12, 1916, and from June 28 to October 12, 1918. There was no explanation for gaps in *Tasvir-i Efkar*. Despite these gaps, the newspaper was regularly published during World War years.

When the publication policy of *Tasvir-i Efkar* is considered, it is possible to say that it consistently followed the line of the first *Tasvir-i Efkar* of Şinasi. *Tasvir-i Efkar* addressed people with an easily understandable language and published political and intellectual writings. The editorial articles were written by Yunus Nadi, who interpreted national and international political developments. Before the outbreak of the war, the *Tasvir-i Efkar* used to give detailed news from Anatolia and the world, and it closely watched the Turkish and European newspapers. The news related to İstanbul was given under the title of *Bab-ı Ali*, in which political developments in İstanbul were announced to the reader. There was also a section for international developments called *hariciye*. *Tasvir-i Efkar* continued to publish serials (*tefrika*) by following the tradition of the first *Tasvir-i Efkar*.

Although there was no change on editorial and writer cadre of *Tasvir-i Efkar*, the publication policy of the newspaper changed after the outbreak of the World War. During the war years, *Tasvir-i Efkar* reserved considerable amount of its pages, even not totally, to war news. *Tasvir-i Efkar* widely announced the official announcements of the Ministry of War. The announcements of Germany and Austria-Hungarian Empire also widely took place in *Tasvir-i Efkar*. All these announcements were undoubtedly narrating the ‘victory’ of the Ottoman Empire and her allies.³⁷ On the other hand, the news related to international developments was given place in the newspaper. It is interesting to observe that the developments on the Russian Revolution were the number one subject through 1917. *Tasvir-i Efkar* closely followed Russia and carried these developments to the headline for many times.

³⁶ *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 7 February, 1916, no: 1678. *Tasvir-i Efkar* announced that the newspaper could not be published for several days because of papers shortage. Paper used to be imported and *Tasvir-i Efkar* wrote that papers had not arrived from Europe.

³⁷ The Ottoman war office was regularly sending information about situation of the fronts. However, primary aim of the office was not to truly inform people about the situation of the war but to motivate to the war so given information were generally manipulative.

Cenab Şehabettin and Ahmet Rasim, both of them were important literary figures of the time, were among the writers of *Tasvir-i Efkar*. Şehabettin was famous with his witticism and he sometimes wrote concise sentences for *Tasvir-i Efkar* called ‘*Tiryaki Sözleri*’. On the other hand, Ahmet Rasim had been commissioned as front-line correspondent. He was sent to Rumania by *Tasvir-i Efkar* to watch developments in the front and behind the front lines and he wrote about his observations for *Tasvir-i Efkar*. Later, Ahmet Rasim was sent to Batum in 1918 and he wrote comprehensive articles about the political, economical and social situation of Batum.

Tasvir-i Efkar, like the other newspapers, had to stay within a frame during the World War. However, the condition changed at the end of the war. Turkey was standing on threshold of a new era. The World War was lost and the Mudros Armistice was signed. On the other hand, the CUP regime collapsed and the leaders of the Committee fled from Turkey. The next phase was the invasion of Turkey. *Tasvir-i Efkar* was among the newspapers, which opposed to invasion of Turkey by the Allies. The newspaper wrote articles and reproached the invasions, and it also delivered some articles to support the Turkish National Struggle.

Tasvir-i Efkar changed its name as *Tevhid-i Efkar* in 1921 and it was published under this name until March 5, 1925. Then, its publication was stopped for a long time. *Tasvir-i Efkar* was again opened by Ziyad Ebuzziya on May 2, 1940 and it continued until 1946. It should be noted that Ziyad Ebuzziya published another newspaper called *Tasvir* from 1945 to 1949. Hereafter, the name of *Tasvir-i Efkar* disappeared from the Turkish press life but not from history of the Turkish press.

I.3. Introduction to the News on the Armenian Question in *Tasvir-i Efkar*

It is appropriate to say a few words about the position of *Tasvir-i Efkar* related to the Armenian Question, which constitutes the subject of this thesis. *Tasvir-i Efkar* wrote from late 1913 to late 1918 about the Armenian Question with changing frequencies. The reform question for Eastern Anatolia, which came to the agenda at the end of 1913, was closely followed by *Tasvir-i Efkar*. *Tasvir-i Efkar* gave the news and Yunus Nadi interpreted the developments related to the reform project. These writings evaluated historical genesis and the present situation of the subject. Moreover, opinions and interviews of the Armenian Patriarchate, the Armenian Parties, the CUP and the government appeared in *Tasvir-i Efkar*. There was also some news about the developments followed sign of the reform project and the nomination of the reform inspectors. All these subjects will be detailed in this work.

While the discussions on the reform project were continuing, there emerged another problem in Turkish-Armenian relations. This problem was related to the Armenians' participation to the general elections and *Tasvir-i Efkar* widely focused on the problem. The Armenians demanded to be represented in the *Meclis-i Mebusan* with twenty deputies. In case of refusal of their demand, the Armenians threatened the government with boycotting the elections. The problem continued for a long time and there occurred many negotiations and disputes between the Armenians and the government, and also within the Armenian society. Details of the problem will be given in the content of the work.

Tasvir-i Efkar gave detailed news related to the Armenians and the Armenian Question in prewar period. However, with the commencement of the World War I, there occurred a serious decrease in news and articles related to the Armenian Question appeared in *Tasvir-i Efkar*. When the attitude of *Tasvir-i Efkar* at the beginning of the war is considered, it can be observed that it openly approached to

the Armenians free from bias. The Armenians' material and moral assistance to the state and patriotic writings of the Armenian newspapers were frequently announced by *Tasvir-i Efkar*. It would not be wrong to evaluate *Tasvir-i Efkar*'s approach as pragmatic. The main aim was to grant the Armenian loyalty for the state. The Armenians had not stated expressly their position at the beginning of the war and *Tasvir-i Efkar* was trying to motivate the Armenians to stay loyal to the state. At first, *Tasvir-i Efkar* did not touch upon the Armenian rebellions and massacres against the Turks which were common in many parts of the state. There was no negative news and articles about the Armenians for a long time in the newspaper.

Tasvir-i Efkar did not mention about the relocation of the Armenians and applications experienced during the relocation. The main reason was the censorship applied during the War. The news and articles about the relocation could be given after the General Congress of the CUP in 1916 and *Tasvir-i Efkar* began to publish the news about the reasons of the relocation. These news and articles, appeared in *Tasvir-i Efkar*, will be given in this study.

Ad finem the war, the Armenian Question again began to be an important subject of the agenda. The Bolshevik Revolution and Russian withdrawal from the war brought about emergence of new developments. *Tasvir-i Efkar* began to announce developments related to formation of the Caucasian Federation and later making of the Armenian Republic. Then, with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian Question again became one of the most important articles of the agenda.

CHAPTER II

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR I

II.1. The Reform Project for the Armenians

II.1.1. Resurrection of the Reform Project

Reforms for the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia came to the agenda of Turkish-European powers' relations with the St. Stefano and the Berlin Treaties in 1878 after the Turkish-Russian War of 1877-78. Aftermath, the problem continuously stayed on the table for a long time.³⁸

Having faced with a certain defeat in the Turkish-Russian War, the Ottoman Empire had to accept some stipulations related to the Anatolian Armenians. Expectations of the Armenians from Russia were highly great that they even aimed to have an independent Armenia. This expectation was declared by Mıgırdıç Hrimyan, sent by the Patriarch to Edirne, to the Grand Duke Nicholas after the war. However, the demand of the Armenians for an independent Armenia was not welcomed by Russia

³⁸ Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol.VIII, TTK, Ankara,1995, p. 126. Karal defines role of the Ottoman-Russian War in emergence of the Armenian Question as follows: “ There was not an Armenian question in the Ottoman Empire before the Ottoman-Russian War. However, such a question emerged with the war and it continued until the collapse of the empire by taking different forms.”

Arman J. Kirakossian, *British Diplomacy and the Armenian Question from 1830s to 1914*, Princeton; 2003, p. xi. “the Armenian Question... it emerged as a factor in international politics in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.”

because this might have provoked the Armenians of Russia.³⁹ Thus, the Armenians had to reduce their claim to Russian protectorate. This was also rejected by Russia and the Armenians had to suffice with some regulations with smaller significance. Russia added an article to the St. Stefano Treaty and agreed on application of some reforms in Eastern Anatolia and protection of the Armenians against the Kurds and the Circassians.⁴⁰

The St. Stefano Treaty had caused discontent among the European powers because it forced the balance of power in Europe on the behalf of Russia. Great Britain especially felt her interests threatened with the treaty. Russia had not only gained a great deal of control over the Ottoman territories but also had found opportunity to interfere to the Ottoman Empire under the guise of the reforms for the Armenians.⁴¹ Thus, renegotiation of the St. Stefano came to the agenda. The main aim was to decrease Russian gains over the Ottoman Empire. The Patriarch Nerses regarded convention of the new congress as an opportunity to propagandize the Armenian cause and he had sent many delegations after the St. Stefano to European capitals and sought the ways of getting support for independence or autonomy in some provinces of Eastern Anatolia.⁴² The ex-Patriarch Hrimian, Horen Narbey, Minas Chiras, Stephan Papazian were sent to some European capitals to request support for establishment of an autonomous Armenia.

Some articles of the St. Stefano were changed with the Berlin Treaty and Russia had to leave some gains. The Ottoman Empire could secure some territories in Eastern Roumelia and in Eastern Anatolia. However, Kars, Ardahan were left to Russia and Cyprus to Great Britain. Moreover, Batum was designed as a free port for the Great

³⁹ Salahi Sonyel, *The Great War and The Tragedy of Anatolia*, TTK, Ankara; 2001, p. 16.

⁴⁰ Kamuran Gürün., *Ermeni Dosyası*, Rüstem, 5th edition, İstanbul; 2001, p. 116.

⁴¹ Şaşmaz, *British Policy and the Application of Reforms for the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia (1877-1897)*, TTK, Ankara; 2000, p. 19.

⁴² The Eastern provinces where the Armenians had claimed right of having autonomy, or even independence, used to be called as Vilayet-i Sitte, the Six Provinces, including Erzurum, Van, Harput, Diyarbakır, Sivas ve Bitlis.

Powers. In addition to these regulations, an article related to the Armenians was embedded to the Berlin Treaty. This article was as follows:⁴³

The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the amelioration and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and guarantee their security against the Circassians and the Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application.

It should be noted that Article 61 did not fully satisfy the expectations of the Armenians. Despite dissatisfaction of the Armenians, it can be said that the Armenians put an important step by bringing their cause to the European agenda. The Armenians regarded the Treaty as a ‘gold mine’ that would bring independence for the Armenians if it is worked effectively.⁴⁴ The main difference between Article 16 of the St. Stefano and Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty was that “the supervision of over the implementation of the reforms was taken away from Russia and given to the Signatory Powers.”⁴⁵

After the Berlin Congress, patronage of the reforms for the Armenians passed to Great Britain. Great Britain’s intervention to the problem was not a coincidence. Britain had extensive economical and political interests over the Ottoman Empire including security of trade routes and Eastern Mediterannian. Thus, Britain did not leave the Armenian Question to Russia, which had been acting as the protector of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire for a while. Britain took the initiative from Russia and decided to press the Ottoman administration to reforms on the behalf of the Cristians. Although Russia had been the leading supporter of the Armenians until the Berlin Congress, the Patriarch Nerses decided to be foisted on Britain thereafter. This decision naturally caused emergence of diversities on opinion among the Armenians because the Pro-Russian Armenians claimed that the Patriarch “had betrayed to the

⁴³ Sonyel, *The Great War*, p. 17.

⁴⁴ Ali Karaca, ‘Türkiye’de Ermeniler İçin Yapılan Reformlar ve Tehcir Gerçeği (1878-1915)’ in *Uluslararası Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri Sempozyumu*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul; 2001, p. 110

⁴⁵ Şaşmaz, *British Policy*, pp. 22-23.

Armenian cause by having listened to Britain as opposed to Russia, so that the Congress had done nothing for them.’’⁴⁶

Britain perceived the discontent among the Armenians so she had to put some steps not to lose the Armenians to Russia. Thus, Britain decided to prepare a reform project for implementation of Article 61. Lord Salisbury, the State Secretary of Britain, undertook preparation of the reform scheme and Sir Layard, the British ambassador to İstanbul, helped him in his task. The Armenian Patriarch also involved in the project. The Patriarch defended appointment of an Armenian governor to Eastern Anatolia but this proposal was not accepted by Layard by arguing that ‘‘time had not yet come for it.’’⁴⁷

Salisbury noticed Layard on details of the reform scheme on August 8, 1878. According to the scheme, following applications were supposed to be implemented by the Ottoman Empire⁴⁸:

1. Establishment of security and order in provinces.
2. Inspection and investigation of present situation of the financial affairs.
3. To take necessary precautions to reform the judicial affairs.
4. Investigation of situation and needs of the provinces, and to spend effort for increasing natural sources.

Layard prepared a detailed project and submitted to Abdulhamit. Layard offered that implementation of the reforms should be carried out by the foreign officials. According to the project, the Ottoman administration had to employ these officials in every strategic institution. The empire was expected to admit formation of a gendarmerie force, which was to be formed and commanded by the Europeans, in the Anatolian provinces; formation of courts in important cities and appointment of the Europeans to these courts with an certain authority of vote on court decision; and

⁴⁶ Şamaz, *British Policy*, p. 24.

⁴⁷ Şamaz, *British Policy*, p. 25.

⁴⁸ Karaca, *Reformlar ve Tehcir Gerçeği*, pp. 111-112.

appointment of the European tax-collectors, who were to be responsible for revenues of the provinces and annulment of *iltizam*.⁴⁹

The British reform project was considered by the Ottoman statesmen as a violation of the Sultan's authority and interference to the Ottoman Empire's internal affairs so it was hardly possible to approve all these stipulations. However, it was also difficult to turn back to Great Britain. Thus, Abdulhamit and Safvet Pasha were adherent to reach a compromise with Britain. The Sultan could support the reforms as long as his rights were not infringed.

Great Britain was seemingly very decisive about implementation of the reform project. However, there were some serious obstacles before the British government. Besides all other obstacles, two of them seemed very serious. Firstly, it was nearly impossible to find the necessary European officials for the courts, gendarmerie and tax-collection. These officials, especially judges, had to know "the Turkish language and customs and codes of law."⁵⁰ Secondly, application of so wide reforms required a great deal of expenditure. Hiring officials, reforming gendarmerie and tax system would certainly be too expensive for the Ottoman economy to be paid. Moreover, the Ottoman treasure was nearly empty. Thus, Abdulhamit requested a British loan for the reform expenditures. Layard tried to grant a 6 million sterling loan for the Ottoman Empire but the British government did not accept it and his attempts stayed vain.⁵¹

Armenians' expectations from Great Britain were very high and they had even turned their back to Russia. However, it was understood that Great Britain could not cope with the reform question alone. The Armenians decided to get again support of

⁴⁹ Karaca, *Reformlar ve Tehcir Gerçeği*, p. 112.

⁵⁰ Şaşmaz, *British Policy*, p. 31.

⁵¹ For the details of the British proposal for the reforms and the difficulties on the application of the reforms, see. Şaşmaz, *British Policy*, pp. 28-32.

Russia which had rightly disillusioned with previous attitude of the Armenians. Thus, the Czar of Russia rejected the Armenian demands for support.⁵²

In 1880, the Liberal Party won the elections in Britain and Gladstone became the prime-minister and Lord Granville became the State Secretary. New cabinet sought the ways of making an international consensus for the reforms. The government gave an instruction to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Petersburg and Rome embassies of Britain and wanted from them to persuade the governments to force the Ottoman for application of Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty.⁵³ The six states gave a joint note on 11 June 1880 and asked from the Ottoman Empire what had been done related to the Armenians in the frame of the Berlin Treaty.⁵⁴

In response to the Powers, the Ottoman Empire declared that meticulous researches had been carried out in Eastern Anatolia so far and after working was completed, new regulations would be put into effect. Among the regulations; directors of districts (*nahiye*) shall be chosen among people who is majority there and co-director shall be chosen from minority, delegations composed of 4-6 member shall be constituted, every district shall have their own gendarme, gendarme organization shall be reformed in all provinces. In addition to these regulations, it was also guaranteed that entrance of the non-Muslims to the state service shall be extended.⁵⁵

Abdulhamid II and the Ottoman administration were seemingly reluctant to apply the reforms. Thus, Great Britain decided to enforce the Ottoman Empire about the reforms so Britain sent her navy to the Aegean Sea and threatened the Ottoman Empire. As a response to this action, Abdulhamid warned Layard, the British ambassador at İstanbul, that if the Great Britain attacks the Ottoman Empire, the

⁵² Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, p. 133. The Czar replied the Armenian demands as follow: “I do not care about your business. Britain undertook to defend your interests. You must apply to the British government.”

⁵³ Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 153

⁵⁴ Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, p. 134. The note was not solely related to the Armenians. When the Great Powers pressured the Ottoman Empire for implementation of the reforms granted for Montenegro and Greece in the Berlin Treaty, they also brought the Armenians to the agenda.

⁵⁵ Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p.157

Empire would resist against her and would call the support of Russia. This reaction prevented the British intervention but the Ottoman government promised for application of the reforms.⁵⁶

The Powers proclaimed that the Ottoman efforts were not sufficient to fulfill expectations. However, they were not able to implement any direct sanction thanks to differences on opinion. Although Britain seemed constant on forcing the Ottoman Empire, other states, especially Germany and Russia, did not seem dilettante like Britain.⁵⁷ International conjecture did let the Ottoman Empire take breath.⁵⁸

Despite some insignificant attempts, pressure of the Great Powers over the Ottoman Empire prominently decreased after 1883. Great Britain seemingly decided to guard the balance over the Ottoman Empire. So as to demonstrate the British policy in the late 1880s, it is colloquial to give an ear Lord Salisbury's speech in the House of Lords. In his speech Salisbury said as follows.

The Ottoman State is a weak and poor state. This weakness and poorness is not especially her fault. The Ottoman State fell into this situation because of activities of the others...Difficulties that the people of the inner Anatolia have to bear-even if these difficulties are true- emanate from the weakness of the Ottoman State rather than malicious of the state.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Küçük, *Osmanlı Diplomasisi*, pp. 49-53.

⁵⁷ Şaşmaz, *British Diplomacy*, p. 110. “...from 1880 to 1894 every new British ambassador sent to İstanbul was especially instructed to conclude the question of reforms according to the way Britain understood. Goschen, Dufferin and Thornton did all they could to persuade the Porte. They utterly failed. The reason for their failure was that Britain could not convince Russia and Germany to back her on reform the eastern provinces.”

⁵⁸ Yavuz Ercan, *Ermenilerle İlgili Araştırmalar*, Toplu Eserler: I, Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara, 2006, p. 186.

Münir Süreyya Bey had prepared a report about the political history of the Armenian Question. This report was published by the Prime Minister's State Archives under the title of *Ermeni Meselesinin Siyasi Tarihçesi 1877-1914*. In his report, Münir Süreyya Bey distinguishes the political phases, which the Armenian Question followed until 1914, into three parts. The phases expand respectively from 1880 to 1883; from 1894-1897; from 1912-1914. Münir Süreyya Bey gives less significance to the first and the third phases than the second phase. He argues that six important states of Europe; Great Britain, Russia, France, Austria, Germany and Italy had involved to the Armenian Question from 1880 to 1883 and there were serious diversities among the powers. Thus, their pressure over the Ottoman Empire became slight. However, Britain, Russia and France undertook the responsibility for the Armenian Question from 1894 to 1897 and the other states did not involve. Thus, the pressure over the Ottoman Empire became stronger. Münir Süreyya Bey, *Ermeni Meselesinin Siyasi Tarihçesi (1877-1914)*, Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Ankara, 2001, pp.5-6.

⁵⁹ Münir Süreyya, *Ermeni Meselesinin Siyasi Tarihçesi*, pp. 20-21.

The Armenians disillusioned with the Great Powers' decreasing attention and they decided to attract the attentions once more. Thus, the Armenians began to follow a reactionary and revolutionary policy. The first serious attempts were *Anavatan Müdafileri Cemiyeti* events in Erzurum and the *Kumkapı* Protest in İstanbul that both occurred in 1890.

The Armenians revolted in Erzurum by pretexting investigations made by the Ottoman administration in some Armenian schools and churches as a result of secret information claiming that the Armenians stocked arms in these buildings. The Armenians had got information about the descents and they had prepared to resist against the Turkish soldiers. The Armenians fire over the Turkish soldiers caused an armed struggle between the Turks and Armenians. During the events, nearly 100 peoples died from both sides. The Armenians believed that such actions would attract attentions of Europe. However, reaction of the European states did not become as severe as the Armenians expected. Thus, the Armenians decided to organize a demonstration to protest the Erzurum Events and to attract attentions of the Europeans once more. The Armenians thought that the Europeans would be indifferent to the events in Anatolia but they were not able to ignore events in İstanbul. Thus, they organized the *Kumkapı* Protest in July 1890.⁶⁰ However, the protest went further of being a peaceful demonstration and was turned to an armed struggle by the Armenians.⁶¹ Although The Armenians initiated the events, they were exaggerated and reflected to the European public opinion as a massacre against the Armenians.

The Armenians by attracting attention and interest of the European press requested the European pressure over the Ottoman Empire for application of the reforms. The Armenian propaganda was seemingly successful and the European representatives in İstanbul prevented punishment of the Armenians participated to the events. This encouraged members of the Armenian bands and societies on terrorism. Moreover,

⁶⁰ Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler*, pp. 458-461.

⁶¹ Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler*, p. 453.

Abdulhamid had to declare an amnesty for the Armenians in 1891 but terrorist attacks and incidents continued.

Britain continued to be champion of the Armenian cause during the 1890s while Russia was keeping her cautious policy. Russia had two hesitations about the Armenians. First of all, Russia had a great number of Armenian population and she hesitated that developments in the Ottoman Empire could provoke them. Secondly, Russia had a bitter experience in Bulgaria. Russia had spent too much effort to make Bulgaria independent. And after Bulgaria gained independence she firstly took position against Russia with a British maneuver.⁶² Thus Russia stayed remote and suspicious to the Britain's Armenian policies. France shared the Russian policy and announced that Russia and France would slow down Britain about the reforms.⁶³

In order to secure her economical and political situation in East, Germany was getting closer to the Ottoman Empire during 1890s. Germany was seeking the ways of expanding her influence in the Middle East and Far East so Germany needed positive approach of Abdulhamid. In order to prove Germany's intention to establish close relation, Wilhelm II visited İstanbul. Wilhelm's visit to İstanbul was very important and courageous move because Abdulhamid's image in the European public opinion was very negative and he was being called as 'Red Sultan' by referring 'Armenian massacres'.⁶⁴

Having left by the other Great Powers of Europe, Britain tried to impose her policy to the Ottoman Empire by sending a naval force to the Çanakkale in 1895. However, she had to withdraw because of difference among the powers and decisive attitude of Abdulhamid. Thus, the Armenian reform aimed an autonomous Armenia, had to wait for a while.⁶⁵

⁶² Mim Kemal Öke, *Ermeni Meselesi(1914-1923)*, İz Yayıncılık, İstanbul; 1996, p.100.

⁶³ Öke, *Ermeni Meselesi*, p.100

⁶⁴ Öke, *Ermeni Meselesi*, p. 100

⁶⁵ Öke, *Ermeni Meselesi*, p. 101

From 1895 to 1897 there were many Armenian revolts all over Anatolia. Although the government tried to implement reforms and adopt security in Anatolia, it had basically two obstacles. These were the Armenian revolutionaries' activities and financial problems. It is obvious that "the revolutionaries tried to disrupt the application of reforms by stopping the Armenians taking part in them, because the aim of the revolutionaries was not to see the condition of the Armenians improved, but to seek to establish Armenian autonomy under the guise of reforms".⁶⁶ The aim was to expose a reaction against the Ottoman Empire before the European public opinion.⁶⁷ Thus, the revolutionaries did not hesitate to shed blood of the Turks and to cause shedding blood of the Armenians.

Britain continued her attempts to complete the reforms. The Great Powers agreed on working of the ambassadors in İstanbul. The meetings began but the participants except Britain were not as enthusiastic as before. The meeting on 23 December of 1896 was seemingly the last meeting. And with the outbreak of the Turkish-Greek War on 18 April 1897, the reforms were postponed until the end of the Balkan Wars.⁶⁸

By the end of 1912, the situation of the Ottoman Empire was completely critical. The Empire had to cope with many problems. Italy had invaded Tripoli and the Balkan states had formed an alliance against the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Russia and Britain had already agreed on participation of the Empire. The Russian ambassador sparked off the Armenian Question by sending a telegraph on 26 November 1912. In his telegraph, he reported the situation of the Armenians as follows:

The reforms granted by Abdulhamid on 20 October 1895 were forgotten...All consuls agree that the Kurds commit brigandage and plundering; they kill the Armenians and force the Armenian women to convert Islam. Responsibles of these actions were not found and punished...This situation explains why the Armenians tend to get closer to Russia. All the consuls in Armenia affirm this situation. The

⁶⁶ Musa Şaşmaz, *British Policy*, p. 268

⁶⁷ Ercan, *Toplu Eserler*, p. 17. the events in Anatolia were wrongly reflected by the newspapers to the European public opinion. However, objective journalists and diplomats were able to write the truths. By quoting from the report, published in the Blue Book, of the British Consul Williams, Ercan writes on the Van Events in 1896 that "the articles in the newspapers related to the Armenian Question are not right. All of them are lies."

⁶⁸ Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 225

Armenians desire implementation of reforms under Russian control and they even desire a Russian occupation. They demand protection of unfortunate Armenians in Turkey in the name of God.⁶⁹

As it can be understood from the Ambassador's telegraph, Russia was ready to take serious steps for the Armenian Question. Timing of Russia was also noteworthy to indicate. First of all, collapse of the Ottoman Empire was a matter of instant and the Great Powers were ready to take their share. In this situation, the Armenian Question would have been the appropriate opportunity for Russia to realize her intentions over the Ottoman Empire. Another point about the timing of Russia was closely connected with the existing situation of the Ottoman Empire which had newly lost Tripoli to Italy in 1912 and she had to fight against the Balkan states at that moment. The future of the Ottoman Empire was not brilliant and Russia was insistent on taking her share from the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Russia again began to heat the Armenian Question.

The Armenians also regarded the situation of the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars highly suitable for "a fight for freedom and an opportunity for action. Their agitations increased."⁷⁰ The Armenians sent many petitions to leaders and they delivered many articles at different journals and newspapers in Europe and USA.⁷¹ The Armenians again tried to make popular the reform project which had been taken backseat for a long time.

In this troublesome situation, the Ottoman Empire decided to deal with the reforms for the Eastern Anatolia once more. The aim was to prevent intervention of the European state by excusing the Armenians.⁷² The government applied to Britain to discuss what could be done in Eastern Anatolia for establishing security, order and progress. The Committee for Union and Progress planned to leave the reforms to the British specialists. The Sublime Porte demanded appointment of a governor-general and specialists from Britain and declared that the government will apply the Reform

⁶⁹ Cemal Pasha, *Hatırat*, ed. Metin Marti, İstanbul; 1996, pp. 364-365

⁷⁰ Roderic Davison, 'The Armenian Crisis 1912-1914', *American Historical Review*, v. 53, no: 3 April 1948, p. 485.

⁷¹ Davison, *The Armenian Crisis*, pp. 485-486

⁷² Karaca, *Ermeniler İçin Yapılan Reformlar*, p. 153

Project prepared by them in the Eastern cities. The proposal was offered by Tevfik Pasha, the ambassador to London. However, the proposal caused a controversy among the Great Powers. Especially, Russia firmly opposed to leave reform project to the hands of Britain.⁷³

Russia feared that Britain would come to her backdoor by excusing the reform project and this fear was not baseless. Russia was regarding Eastern Anatolia as her sphere of influence and existence of another power in the region was undesirable. Russia was eager to intervene in the situation directly. Russia demonstrated her enthusiasm for interference by giving a note to the British Foreign Ministry. Russian ambassador to London declared that the Ottoman government should come to an agreement or she must venture the Russia's right to defend its own interests.⁷⁴ Russia proclaimed that appointment of specialists must be in the framework of general reform workings. In order to discuss the matter, she insisted on need for meeting of Russian, British and French ambassadors.⁷⁵

Germany was also following the developments very carefully. Germany and the Ottoman Empire had been improving their mutual relations for a while. The Ottoman Empire was regarding Germany as an insurance against Russia and Britain. On the other hand, Germany had important investments and economical interests in the Ottoman Empire. Germany had gained many privileges including construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway line. Thus integrity of the Ottoman Empire was essential for Germany.⁷⁶

Germany began to calculate results of re-emergence of the Armenian Question on the agenda of international politics. Germany decided to “neutralize Russia by reaching an understanding with Britain on guarantees for the territorial integrity of Turkey's Asiatic provinces against possible encroachment by Russia.”⁷⁷

⁷³ Sonyel, *The Great War*, p. 74

⁷⁴ Öke, *Ermeni Meselesi*, p. 101

⁷⁵ Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 242

⁷⁶ Öke, *Ermeni Meselesi*, pp.101-102

⁷⁷ Kirakossian, *British Diplomacy*, p. 314.

In order to decrease the Russian impact, Germany and Britain urged that the matter should be discussed by all Powers. Russia had to reach an understanding with the Great Powers. Thus, Russia called the ambassadors of Britain, France, Austria, Germany and Italy for meeting on June 6, 1913. Although Germany insisted on participation of an Ottoman representative, it was rejected by Russia.⁷⁸

The reform draft prepared by Russian, British and French specialists was submitted to participant states on 30 June 1913. The draft suggested serious reforms on the behalf of the Armenians. Meanwhile, the Ottoman government submitted a new reform perspective. The government had prepared a law draft called General Administration of Provinces. Now, the Ottoman administration suggested implementation of the reforms by making some changes on the law. Thus, there were two reform drafts on the table. These drafts were discussed from 3 to 24 July but there was no consensus among the Powers. Germany, Austria and Italy supported the Turkish thesis. Britain was also close to this group.⁷⁹

Britain, Germany and Italy were getting closer to the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Russia needed a partner to force the Ottoman Empire so she tried to get support of Germany⁸⁰. Blocking of the states was quite interesting. Although Britain and Russia were the champions of the Reform Project, they had serious disagreements about the subject. Britain had serious hesitation, like Germany, about Russian influence over the Ottoman Empire so Britain diverged from Russia. On the other hand, the approach of Germany had become quite important when Russia and Britain diverged on the character of the reforms. As it was mentioned, Germany had strong economical and political interests over the Ottoman Empire so it was difficult for both Germany and Russia to reach an understanding. However, Germany could not risk a serious disagreement with Russia and followed a policy of middle course. In this sensitive balance, both side continued discussions on the reform for a while and

⁷⁸ Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 242

⁷⁹ Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 246

⁸⁰ Kemal Çiçek, *Türk-Ermeni Anlaşmazlığının Siyasi Kökenleri, Tehcir ve Geri Dönüş Üzerine Yaklaşımlar*, Teori, no:183, p. 76.

agreed on a new reform draft. The reform draft was submitted to the *Bab-ı Ali*. Then, from September 1913 to February 1914, suggestions and contra suggestions were submitted and negotiations continued.

The British ambassador Mallet, who had been appointed to İstanbul in October, reported his enthusiasm about the Turkish government's 'willingness to apply reforms' in Eastern Anatolia. He especially reported that Talat Bey and Cemal Pasha were showing an 'incredible sensitivity' towards the Armenians.⁸¹

Mallet reported that the Committee of Union and Progress was resolute about making serious reforms and Talat Pasha had also an intention to visit the eastern provinces. Although the ambassador believed in positive result of such a visit, he had a hesitation about the continuity of the positive atmosphere. Mallet expressed that the Powers, especially Russia and Germany, had to avoid from activities that could be perceived by the Ottoman Empire as a threat.⁸² The approach of the British ambassador was clearly revealing the British suspicion against Russia and Germany. Britain intended not to leave the Ottoman Empire to the hands of her rivals.

In December, meetings between the Grand vizier Said Pasha and ambassadors of Germany and France continued. By referring to Nouveau *Frei* Press, *Tasvir-i Efkar* delivered an article related to these meetings. According to the article:

Progress of the discussions is pleasing... the sides are getting closer to each other... the discussions can be concluded at weekend...the sides agreed on division of six provinces in Eastern Anatolia to two sectors of inspectorships and appointment of two inspectors for administration of these sectors from neutral states for 10 years... in case of disagreement between the governors and the inspectors, the Ottoman government will not resist solution of problems by the ambassadors...the Great Powers suggested that members of the province assemblies should be composed of Muslims and Christians as half and half but the Ottoman government refused this proposal and argued that the Christian population in Eastern Anatolia is too little in respect to the Muslim population so instead of this implementation, the government suggested proportional representation.⁸³

⁸¹Kirakossian, *British Diplomacy*, p.324.

⁸² Kirakossian, *British Diplomacy*, p. 325

⁸³This article was published on 3 January 1914 in *Tasvir-i Efkar* and gave details of the article published on 16 December 1913 in Nouveau *Frei* Press. (The initials of TE will be used instead of *Tasvir-i Efkar* hereafter in footnotes.)

The project on the table was not desirable for the Ottoman administration. The extent of the reforms was extremely comprehensive and implementation of these reforms was going to seriously decrease influence of the Ottoman administration in Eastern Anatolia. The new reform project nearly envisaged a complete international control for eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

II.1. 2. Reform Project in *Tasvir-i Efkar* from 1 January 1914 to World War I

Discussions on the reforms for Eastern Anatolia were one of the important articles of the political agenda of the Ottoman Empire during the first months of 1914. The government continued to negotiate with the Russian and the German diplomats on the details of the reforms.

One of the most important subjects of the discussions was appointment of the inspectors-general and their authorizations. The Ottoman government had acceded to the nomination of the foreign inspectors on 24 December 1913. This step was welcomed by Britain foreign office but Russia did not satisfy with the Turkish offer by claiming that some important points are absent. Russia requested from the Ottoman government making definite the following points:⁸⁴

- The provinces to be assigned to each sector should be selected.
- The Porte should agree to empower the inspectors to appoint low-ranking officials for the approval of the Porte.
- There should be provisions for judicial reforms or for allowing conscripts from the Armenian populated provinces to serve within two sectors only.

In the frame of above mentioned points, Russia decided to continue negotiations. Russian pressure over the Ottoman government caused negative response of Germany. Although Germany was not against appointment of the inspectors-general it had in prospect of giving wider ample scope to the Ottoman government. Thus, Germany expected to limit Russian influence. However, German attempts remained

⁸⁴ Kirakossian, *British Diplomacy*, pp. 326-327.

fruitless. Several days after the Russian initiative, Germany and Russia jointly submitted the draft related to the authorizations of the inspectors-general. The draft was very close to the previous Russian proposals. According to the project prepared by Germany and Russia, it was proposed appointment of the foreign inspectors-general appointed by the Ottoman government and assistance of the inspectors by the European advisers. In case of disagreement between the inspectors and the Ottoman officials, the ambassadors of the Great Powers in İstanbul would intervene to disagreement.⁸⁵

Said Halim Pasha and German *charge d'affaires* Baron von Montebos met on 2 January 1914. In the meeting, Said Pasha informed Montebos about the decisions concluded by the government. These were related to the authorizations of the inspectors-general and the advisers. According to the regulations, based on the new Province Law, foreign inspectors and advisers would have an extensive control over administration, finance and army to execute the reforms.⁸⁶ The Ottoman government had nearly accepted all the demands of Russia. There were only some details to be discussed.

Mutual exchange of views continued for a while. Diplomacy traffic was very intensive in İstanbul. The Ottoman government had serious hesitations about

⁸⁵ TE, 1 January 1914 , no:954. In the last meeting between Said Halim Pasha and Russian and German ambassadors, appointment of the inspectors was discussed. According to the news in TE, Russo-German plan had suggested appointment of inspectors-general by the Ottoman government and working of the inspectors with the European advisors. In case of disagreement between the inspectors and the advisors, ambassadors of the Great Power were to interfere in the disagreement. It is understood from the news that TE supposed that the inspectors would be the Turkish officials. The original proposal, as it was revealed later, must have been that the inspectors should be chosen by the Ottoman government among the foreign officials. In case of disagreement between the inspectors and the Ottoman provincial officials, the ambassadors of the Great Powers should interfere in the disagreement.

⁸⁶ TE, 3 January 1914, no: 956. The authorities which the inspectors would have were as follow: ““The inspectors could appoint and discharge officials; they could take any administrative measures to implement the reforms including control of finance, administration etc... While executing their mission the inspectors, of course, would comply with decisions of the Meclis-i Mebusan. The same way would be followed in case of disagreement between the governors and the inspectors related to the Constitution of the state.”

violation of the sovereign rights and was insistent on preventing such a violation.⁸⁷ However, the Ottoman government had very little initiative in the negotiations and it had to accept the results of the Great Powers' impositions.

While the discussions were going on, extraordinary developments on the Russian border attracted attentions that caused serious suspicions about intentions of Russia. Russia began to reinforce her Armenian border with military forces which had actually completed their missions but had not discharged yet.⁸⁸ It was not possible to predict how far Russia could go ahead but Russian invasion over Eastern Anatolia was within the bounds of possibility. The Russian threat was forcing the Ottoman government to reach a reconciliation on the reform project.

The diplomats of the Great Powers were continuously visiting the Grand vizier Said Pasha to discuss the developments. Russian and Germany were especially active in the negotiations.⁸⁹ At the end of January, the negotiations were about to come to an end. After his visit to Said Pasha, the Russian *charge d'affaires* Gulkevich explained that he was informed that application of the reform project would begin as soon as great Ottoman public borrowing (*istikraz*) is completed.⁹⁰

The news related to conclusion of the negotiations began to be given in the newspapers at the beginning of February 1914. *Tasvir-i Efkar* was announcing that the negotiations were positively concluded and the sides agreed on controversial subjects.⁹¹ Gulkevich and Said Pasha again met on February 1, 1914. After the

⁸⁷ TE, 5 January 1914, no: 958. In the news, it is expressed that discussions on the reform were not concluded so far but if the government's point of view is accepted, the problem would be certainly solved.

⁸⁸ TE., 7 January 1914, no: 960. It is commented in the article, referring to *Nouveau Frei Press*, that Russia continues secret preparations in the mentioned borders to be ready for a possible Turkish-Greek war.

It is argued that Russia tries to create new problems in the Balkans so as to bring the Straights Question to agenda again. (TE., 1 February 1914, no: 982)

⁸⁹ TE., 16 January 1914, no: 968.

⁹⁰ TE, 31 January 1914, no: 981.

⁹¹ TE, 1 February 1914, no: 982. By quoting from *Osmanier Loyd* it is said that "we can regard the Question of the Anatolian Reform as completed. Complete agreement was constituted on the points which are the basis of the Reform Project. The protocol on the reform can be signed in a few days."

meeting, some newspapers stated that discussions had been completed and the law related to the reform had been prepared and signed.⁹²

Despite the rumors on completion of the negotiations, *Tasvir-i Efkar* announced on 4 February that Russia had submitted a new suggestion related to the reform project and discussions would continue nearly ten days. *Tasvir-i Efkar* wrote that Russia had offered a new way of solution about controversial points. It was also stressed that three of controversial points had been solved at the meeting between the Russian and the Ottoman official.⁹³

While the diplomatic attempts to dissolve the reform question, the Patriarch Zaven Effendi joined to the debates by making a statement which appeared in *Tasvir-i Efkar* on 6 February 1914. The Patriarch widely explained his and the Armenians' approaches to the reform question in the interview. First of all, he emphasized that the Armenians were loyal to the Ottoman Empire and they desired rise of the empire. He also urged that there could not be any doubt and hesitation about necessity of the reforms. The Patriarch claimed that application of the reforms would prevent intervention of European states to the Ottoman Empire. However, he defended that performing of the reforms should be given to the European or the American officials. In that case, it was obvious that intervention of foreign powers was indispensable. The interpretation of the patriarch was as follows:

Three points about the reforms should be considered: Firstly, we should place conscious of responsibility to mind of the officials because lack of this conscious causes significant problems. According to my experiences in the provinces, the officials without conscious of responsibility move arbitrarily. However if they are well administrated they can work very well. Secondly, administrative and civil needs should be assured; education, trade... High and dangerous influence of irresponsible aghas and begs should be abolished. Thirdly, we should think of land question. Richs acquired estates of poor people with different ways. However if people have their own estates their loyalty and devotion to the state increase.

We must definitely decide to adapt mentioned principles to our administration and we must begin to perform them constantly. Europe has a dominant influence and we have to reform ourselves before European influence invades us. Thus we can escape from invasion and we do not let intervention of

⁹² TE, 3 February 1914, no: 984. TE notified that according to its investigations the agreement was not signed and there are some points about which investigations were not finished. However, TE informs that signing of the agreement is very close.

⁹³ TE, 4 February 1914, no: 985. There was no detail in TE about the new Russian offer and solved problems.

foreigners. Neighbors can not interfere in a house that is well administered. Otherwise the house will be vulnerable to intervention.

When we come to application of the reform, this should be left to foreigners; European or American.⁹⁴

The interpretation of the Patriarch Zaven Effendi was quite interesting. He inclined that the implementation of the reforms was indispensable. However, he had serious contradiction in his interpretation. Although he regarded the reforms as a mean of preventing the foreign powers from interfering to the internal affairs the Ottoman Empire, he insisted on leaving application of the reforms to the foreign officials. Such an explanation was not seemingly intimate. It was obvious that the Great Powers had interfered to the reform project for their personal interests and aftermath they were not going to withdraw from the scene. Thus, the Patriarch's wish to leave execution to foreigners meant continuous external intervention to the Ottoman Empire.

On 6 February 1914, there was another important article in *Tasvir-i Efkar* announcing a memorandum submitted by the Anglo-Ottoman Society to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sir Edward Grey. This memorandum was described as important and fair by the newspaper. Details of the memorandum were as follows:

The Armenian and Chaldean Christians desire to remain within the Ottoman administration. Their expectation is to be protected against violence and attacks of the Kurds and to have civil administration in addition to the independence that they already have. Some foreign officials spend effort to constitute a perfect administration in the Armenian province. It is upsetting that Britain could not persuade the Bab-ı Ali to accept appointment of many experienced and able officials. These should be appointed with necessary authority to provide security and to establish a perfect administration...they certainly deserve such a mission.⁹⁵

In the declaration, it was claimed that if integrity of the Ottoman Empire was guaranteed, every reform could be applied related to the Armenians. The memorandum also stressed global interests of Britain. The Anglo-Ottoman Society urged that Britain had many Muslim populations in her Indian and African dominions so establishment of friendly relations with the Ottoman Empire would be very important. Moreover, emergence of disputes in Anatolia would give damage to

⁹⁴ TE, 6 February 1914, no: 987.

⁹⁵ TE, 6 February 1914, no: 987.

trade.⁹⁶ This memorandum was signed by Thomas Barclay, Harold Cox, Aubrey Cox, Walter Guinness and E.N. Bennett. The reaction of the Foreign Office to this appeal was not positive. It is said by the Office that ‘‘the names of the signatories do not inspire confidence. They are all names associated with political fads or extremes.’’⁹⁷ Thus, the attempts of the Society remained vain.

There was an ambiguity about the result of the negotiations. The news saying that the project was concluded could not be affirmed to the government. Although the reform project was signed on 8 February 1914, the newspapers could not certify the news because the government did not make any official announcement for a while. This was mainly due to fear of the Ottoman government to declare people the agreement.⁹⁸

Tasvir-i Efkar finally announced conclusion of the discussions on 10 February 1914. According to the newspaper, disagreement on the share of the Muslims and non-Muslims in the provincial assemblies had caused extension of the negotiations. This was regarded as the most controversial problem. The Ottoman government had suggested proportional representation. However, the states refused this suggestion because a regular census had not been made in the region and certain numbers of different ethnic groups were unknown. Thus, the states proposed representation of the Muslims and non-Muslims half and half. At the end of the negotiations, making of a census was put to top of list that would be made as soon as the reform begins. Bitlis and Van were only provinces where application of half and half representation was accepted. Until a census is made, application of proportional representation in

⁹⁶ TE, 6 February 1914, no: 987.

⁹⁷ Sonyel, *The Great War*, pp. 75-76. Also see for details of the Reform Project; Zekeriya Türkmen, ‘İttihat ve Terakki Hükûmetinin Doğu Anadolu İslahat Müfettişliği Projesi ve Uygulamaları (1913-1914): Ermeni Meselesine Çözüm Arayışları’, *Armenian Studies*, vol. 9, Ankara, Spring 2003.

⁹⁸ Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 249. Gürün quotes from *Tanin*: ‘‘Tanin wrote on 11 February that the negotiations on the reforms were positively completed and an agreement on all the subjects was provided... Although some of our colleagues reported preparation and sign of a protocol, this is baseless. The Bab-ı Ali will only satisfy with declaration of principles to the ambassadors.’’

other provinces was accepted. However works for census had to be started as soon as possible.⁹⁹ The Reform Scheme included the following implementations:

- Sectors of inspectorships: the Eastern Anatolia shall be divided into sector and each sector shall be under the control of inspectors-general selected by Turkey and approved by the Europeans. The first sector shall include provinces of Erzurum, Sivas and Trabzon; the second sector shall include provinces of Van, Bitlis, Harput and Diyarbakır.
- Inspectors-general: the inspectors-general shall have authorities of inspecting administration, justice and gendarme, and calling the military forces to help in case of necessity in their sectors.
- The inspectors shall dismiss lower officials and they shall also dismiss the higher officials as long as they submit the decision to the Sultan and inform the related ministry with telegraph.
- In case of serious events the inspector shall dismiss the officials by receiving consent of center of administration.
- The land problem shall be solved under supervision of the inspectors.¹⁰⁰

As it can be seen, the Reform Scheme included very heavy stipulations for the Ottoman Empire. The Vilayet-i Sitte and Trabzon had been included to the reform zone and these provinces were to be administrated by the foreign inspectors. The Ottoman control over these provinces and the inspectors would presumably be symbolic. The inspectors had extensive authority over all civil and military officials and institutions. They could even dismiss lower officials and they could demand dismiss of higher officials. The Reform Scheme also envisaged implementation of a land reform under supervision of the inspectors. The land reform probably aimed to confiscate the land of the Muslim population and to give lands to the Armenians.

⁹⁹ TE., 10 February 1914, no: 991. Sonyel describes the new reform scheme as follow: “The reform scheme for Anatolia, though much less comprehensive than the original Russian draft, granted considerable autonomy to the six provinces of eastern Anatolia, along with the province of Trabzon, which were to be consolidated two administrative units....inspector-general would be appointed by the sultan for a fixed term, but could only be removed with the consent of the powers.” (Sonyel, *The Great War*, p. 75)

Yunus Nadi, the editor of *Tasvir-i Efkar*, wrote an article on 10 February and criticized intervention of the states to reform question. He urged that the Ottoman Empire voluntarily applies the reforms and aims fortification of the state administration...Yunus Nadi admits necessity of foreign assistance during implementation of the reforms but he strongly refuses violation of independence During the negotiations, Russia continuously brings new stipulations to the table. By referring to Frankfurter, TE wrote that during the negotiations, Russian demanded 4 millions of frank amnesty for the Russian subjects who damaged because the Balkan Wars. (TE., 9 February 1914, no: 990)

¹⁰⁰ TE, 17 February 1914, no: 998. On 17 February *Tasvir-i Efkar* quoted details of the Eastern Anatolian Reform from the Petersburg reporter of *Tan*.

The Reform Scheme was not easily acceptable for the Ottoman public opinion. The intervention of the Great Powers to the subject had nearly brought the Ottoman Empire to the threshold of disintegration. Yunus Nadi criticized the policy that had been followed by the Great Powers with an article on 13 February 1914. He stated that the Powers used the non-Muslim population to intervene to the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire. In his analysis, he indicated that the government had brought the reform project to the agenda a year ago and had offered to divide Anatolia into 6 sectors of general inspectorships. However, the problem had been turned to Eastern Anatolian Reform and an international problem. This problem continued for a year and deleted the application of reforms. Yunus Nadi urged that existing situation was not much different than the beginning but that was waste of time.¹⁰¹

After agreement on the reform project was concluded, the next step was election and appointment of the inspector-generals. There emerged some disagreements between the Great Powers on determination of the inspectors.¹⁰² The Ottoman government requested two candidates from neutral states of Europe. These states were Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.¹⁰³ Before submitting to the Ottoman Empire, a list of candidates was composed and the list was submitted by Russia. The list included; “Assistant High Commissioner with Dutch East Indian Company Westenenk and the War Ministry’s Secretary General Doormann from Nederland; Major-General De Guise and Vice Governor of the Congo Henri from Belgium, and Norway’s War Ministry Secretary General Hoff.”¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ TE., 13 February 1914, no: 994. Yunus Nadi’s statement: “...the Ottoman government and nation had wholehearted intention to implement the reforms. However, intervention of the European states deleted the reforms for a year even if it did not caused any other damage... the European states exterminated possibility of living a normal life by following unnecessary attempts like census and half and half representation. It is not a reflection of healthy mentality to make the subjects that the government is responsible to solve, as international problems.) (Same day, the Greek newspapers congratulated the government for the Eastern Anatolian Reform and stated that the government could focus on domestic and foreign matters hereafter. They also announced beginning of a new period for people of the Eastern Anatolia and entrance of Turkey to a period of renewal.”

¹⁰² Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p.250.

¹⁰³ TE., 14 February 1914, no: 995.

¹⁰⁴ Kirakossian, *British Diplomacy*, pp. 328-329. The rank of Hoff is given as major in the Turkish sources. See; Gürün, p.250, Sonyel, p. 75.

The Ottoman administration was still trying to get more initiative on implementation of the reform project. Thus, the Ottoman government intended to establish a special bureau for the reforms. On 22 February 1914, the *Tasvir-i Efkar* announced the plans for formation of the new bureau while the discussions on appointment of the inspectors-general were continuing. According to news, the reforms shall be implemented by the Turkish and foreign officials together. However, there was no special bureau for this purpose in *Bab-ı Ali*. Thus, it was planned to establish such a bureau and appoint an able person as the head of the bureau. The newspaper claimed that a board of investigation would be constituted bound to the Ministry of Interior Affairs and headed by a British official.¹⁰⁵ Appointment of a British official for the planned bureau was to receive the British support but the attempts of the Ottoman administration were not taken serious and the process for the reform project was continued.

Through March 1914, discussions on the determination of the inspectors continued. The government demanded names of the inspectors from the Great Powers. However, Russia was discontent with the Turkish proposal because Russia thought that the right of inspector's determination belonged to her.¹⁰⁶ There were four names determined by the Great powers. Two of the candidates were from Belgium and two from Netherlands. Russia preferred the Belgian candidates and Britain preferred the Dutch candidates. The ambassadors of other states declared that they would accept agreement of the British and Russian ambassadors.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ TE., 22 February 1914, no: 1003.

¹⁰⁶ TE., 24 March 1914, no: 1027.

¹⁰⁷ TE., 26 March 1914, no: 1029. *Tasvir-i Efkar* reported that Britain and Russia agreed on appointment of an inspector from Belgium and another from Nederland. However the decision was submitted to the *Bab-ı Ali* yet.

Boghos Nubar Pasha's statement on determination of the inspectors: " Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers work on appointment of the inspectors-general. Acceptable peoples cannot be found in Switzerland and Denmark. There are acceptable candidates in Belgium, Nederland and ... the inspectors will be appointed among them... The most important point that the Ottoman government considers is to keep integrity of the state. It should not be forgotten that the situation of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the Balkan Wars emerged because of the Macedonian Reform. Thus Turkey will get greatest benefit from fully implementation of the reforms. Direct appointment of foreign governors has never been discussed because this may cause turn of the reform to autonomy. Nevertheless the Armenians have never imagined independence and I have continuously said this. The inspectors will be officials of the Ottoman and they will be selected by the government among the European states' candidates." (TE., 23 March, no: 1026)

While the determination and appointment of the inspectors were being discussed, the government was also trying to constitute the Board of Inspection Bureau (*Heyet-i Teftişiye Müdüriyeti*). The bureau shall be bound to the Ministry of Interior Affairs. The name of Mister Gross was stressed for the chairmanship of the bureau. Mister Gross, the member of the Commission for Finance Reform, was thought as the head of bureau for six month duration.¹⁰⁸ However, the attempt of the Ottoman government stayed fruitless and establishment of the bureau could not be realized.

On 15 April 1914, the British ambassador Mallet reported that the Porte had selected Hoff and Westenenk for the position of inspectors.¹⁰⁹ Shortly after their appointment, the inspectors came to Turkey on 3 May 1914.¹¹⁰ As soon as they arrived in İstanbul they visited Said Pasha and Talat Bey on 4 May. At the meetings, it was decided that one of the inspectors shall be settled in Harput and the other in Trabzon. Moreover, appointment of higher finance inspectors to the seat of the inspectors was also accepted.¹¹¹

There was another interpretation of Nubar Pasha that appeared in Tan and quoted in Tasvir-i Efkar on 6 April. In the interview he said that “the integrity of the Ottoman Empire have always been a basic principle for European diplomacy...However the integrity would be in danger if the reform for The Armenians is not implemented...because the officials are responsible for extension and defects, control of the Europeans over the officials is necessary...the word of control caused discontent of the Ottoman government. However this idea was easily changed because neither Europe nor the Armenian Delegation did not have an intention to violate authority of the Sultan...decided to implementation of inspection with the consent of the Ottoman government...the implementation of the reform is a necessity for the Ottoman State...the interests of the Turks and the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia are common...” (TE., 6 April 1914, no:1040)

¹⁰⁸ TE., 28 March 1914, no: 1031. Yunus Nadi stated that the Ottoman government had a strong intention to implement the reforms. And the government had offered the project and demanded contribution of the European states. Britain had approved and appreciated the government’s initiation. However a European state was disturbed when she understood that the government was constant on the implementation of the reforms. (Here Yunus Nadi implies Russia) And she made everything to transform the matter to an international problem...

Yunus Nadi claimed that Appointment of Mister Gross may help solution of the problem. He has already been occupying an important position and he is aware of the problems.

¹⁰⁹ Kirakossian, *British Diplomacy*, p. 329

¹¹⁰ TE., 4 May 1914, no: 1038. “The inspectors came to Turkey yesterday and settled in Pera Palace. Monsieur Vestenenk came with his wife. He worked some 10-15 years India and he has special knowledge on administration. He also sufficiently knows Arabic.” (TE., 4 May 1914, no: 1038)

¹¹¹ TE., 5 May 1914, no: 1039

Westenenk interviewed with the İstanbul newspaper and this interview was quoted as follow: “I came here with deep affection... and I want greatness and progress of the state... I am familiar the mission that I am appointed... I closely acquainted with the laws and customs of the Muslims while accommodating in India...I should indicate that the governor-general in Indian dominion has the

The contract between the government and the inspectors was signed on 15 May 1914. Although Harput and Trabzon were mentioned as the seats of the inspectors during the first meeting, the seats of the inspectors were re-determined. Westenenk was appointed to the sector including Erzurum, Sivas and Trabzon and he was to be stationed in Erzurum. The second sector included Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Van and Bitlis, and the inspector Hoff was to be stationed in Bitlis until a certain center was determined. The inspectors were to have their clerical offices including a director for private cleric, a private secretary, two interpreters for Kurdish and Armenian, an aide de camp, a law consultant, and one each official for education, farming, trade, police and gendarme etc.¹¹²

The Inspectors-general selected three officials for the clerical offices from their states. Hoff appointed Belaher as the head of the office and Rahe and Kraak as clerks. These officials were from Norway. Westenenk appointed Torla as the head of the office and Dulle and an officer as clerks. These officials were from Belgium.¹¹³ According to the contract between the government and the inspectors, the inspectors were going to begin to service on 14 July 1914.¹¹⁴

Hoff firstly went to Erzurum by passing from Trabzon on 24 July. Then he arrived in Van on 4 August 1914. Hoff began to meet with the local administrators and the Armenians as soon as he had arrived in his field of mission. However, outbreak of

authority of the king's attorney...Justice, finance, trade, farming and even the military, in case of necessity, are under the control of the governor. The governor can even change the laws...the most necessary thing for a state is a just, honest and powerful administration. These are the things that I will try to implement during my mission..." (TE., 6 May 1914, no: 1040)

¹¹² TE., 27 May, no: 1091. "Monsieur Hoff and monsieur Westenenk went to Europe to complete their personal businesses. It was reported that Hoff will return at the end of June and Westenenk will return on July." (TE., 27 May, no: 1091). Hoff returned to Turkey (TE., 27 June 1914, no: 1022) and he was received by the Sultan on 4 July (TE., 5 July, no: 1029).

On 7 July, *Tasvir-i Efkar* wrote that travel allowances of Monsieur Hoff were paid and he will leave İstanbul next Saturday or Monday to begin inspections. (TE., 7 July 1914, no: 1132)

¹¹³ TE., 12 July 1914, no: 1137. Belaher, Rahe and Torla were law school graduates; Krak was a lieutenant; profession of Dulle was not indicated ; the name of the officer in Westenenk's office was not given. (TE., 12 July 1914, no:1137)

¹¹⁴ TE., 13 July 1914, no: 1138. On 13 July, *Tasvir-i Efkar* wrote that the inspectors received their travel allowances and they will go to their place of mission today or tomorrow.

the World War I interrupted his mission and he was recalled.¹¹⁵ On the other hand, Westenenk had received declaration indicating cancel of the mission before leaving İstanbul and he never went his field of mission.¹¹⁶

To sum up, the Ottoman Empire had faced with a certain division with the Reform Project. The Project was a product of long-lasting plans and calculations. Both the European states and The Armenians had their own plans and they tried all the ways to apply them. Armenian had used all political and terrorist means for independence. And this aim was about to materialize with the new Reform Project. When it is considered the conditions the Project, it can be easily come up the conclusion that it was an entrance to the way of independent Armenia. However, outbreak of the World War I interrupted implementation of the Reform Project and the Armenian Question entered a new way.

II.1.3. The Bitlis Uprising

The reform project was accepted on 8 February 1914 and then the negotiations for determination of the inspectors-general began. While these negotiations were continuing, a revolt broke out in Bitlis province on February 1914.¹¹⁷ Although the revolt was interpreted as an ordinary reaction against the Reform Project at the first days of the event, the following days were going to unveil some conspiracies. The revolt was to bring both a military trouble in the region and serious political problems between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.¹¹⁸

The Bitlis Revolt broke out with attacks of one of the regional sheikhs called Molla Selim to Bitlis. Molla Selim was captured during the attack but he was saved by his

¹¹⁵ Karaca, *Ermeniler İçin Yapılan Reformlar*, p. 157.

¹¹⁶ Karaca, *Ermeniler İçin Yapılan Reformlar*, p. 157

¹¹⁷ TE, 3 April 1914, no: 1037. The outbreak of the revolt was firstly announced on 3 April in *Tasvir-i Efkar*. However it was reported that the revolt broke out on 26 February. (TE., 4 April 1914, no: 1038)

¹¹⁸ Although the Bitlis Revolt widely occupied the public opinion and it is closely connected with the Reform Project, there has been no special work about the subject yet. There are several works which just shortly point to the Bitlis Revolt.

men from hands of the soldiers. The first impression was that this movement was a reaction against the implementation of the reforms.¹¹⁹

When the revolt broke out the rebels attacked the Armenian monasteries around the city. However the government immediately took the necessary precautions and sent gendarme against the rebels. Having feared the events the Armenians did not open their shops in the city for a while. However, the governor of Bitlis talked to the Armenian notables and gave necessary guarantees.¹²⁰ Thus the Armenians opened their shops and the life began to turn to normal. On the other hand, Molla Selim sent a letter to the Armenian representative and he indicated that the uprising was not targeting the Armenians so there was no reason to fear for the Armenians. The reason for the letter was interpreted that the rebels were hesitating from an Armenian armed resistance.¹²¹

The local government took all precautions to push the uprising. The number of the rebels was nearly 2000 and the local armed forces were not enough. Thus urgent assistance was requested from Van, Muş and Trabzon. The local government also decided to arm some of trustable Muslims and Armenians to save the city. The Armenian representative in Bitlis sent a telegraph to the Patriarch and reported that the Muslims and the Armenians did nothing that could harden the government's work. He also demanded from the religious leaders keeping of goodwill and serenity.¹²² On the other hand, the government gave the Armenians 150 riffles to secure themselves against the rebels.¹²³ Attempts of the government clearly

¹¹⁹ TE., 4 April 1914, no: 1038. *Tasvir-i Efkar* wrote that “upraise in Bitlis is completely ‘irticai’ movement and there is no doubt about that. It had been reported with a letter that there was a discontent against the reforms in Bitlis. The letter was saying that a group feels suspicion and fear against the reforms which aims the fortification of the administration. They believed that the reforms threaten their existence in the region so they are against the reforms.”

¹²⁰ TE., 4 April 1914, no: 1038. The governor said the Armenians that the Muslim people do not any evil thought towards the Armenians and he gave guarantee for security to the Armenians.

¹²¹ TE., 4 April 1914, no: 1038.

¹²² This article was comprehensively delivered in *Tasvir-i Efkar* on 4 April by quoting from the Armenian newspapers.

¹²³ TE., 7 April 1914, no: 1041. The details of the revolt were surfacing day by day. *Tasvir-i Efkar* gave news and announced details of a telegraph sent by the Armenian representative to the Patriarchate on 23 March. In the telegraph it was reported that the rebels had entered to the city on 20

demonstrated that both the local and central administrations spent great effort to suppress revolt and to protect the Armenian and the Turkish citizens in the region.

After the intervention of the government, the rebels withdrew to the mountains around the city. However there was a very interesting development that Molla Selim, the leader of the revolt, took refuge to the Russian Consulate and the consulate was surrounded by military forces.¹²⁴ The *Jeunne Turc* newspaper wrote that the government regarded the leaders of the revolt as ordinary criminals and would request their surrender.¹²⁵

Taking refuge of the leaders to the Russian Consulate caused a diplomatic problem. The Ambassador Giers, on hearing the news, “very confidently expressed his regrets to British Ambassador Mallet for the admittance of the Kurds to the Russian Consulate, as it would encourage the idea that the movement was inspired by Russian agents, but he could not now surrender them. He told Mallet he would instruct the consul to arrange their escape.”¹²⁶ Giers was right to think that Russia could be blamed of inspiring the revolts. Although he was aware of the situation, he was reluctant to surrender the leaders of the revolt. This situation was paradoxical because Russia had been the champion of the Reform Project addressing to the Armenians. However Russia was now protecting the Kurdish leaders who revolted against the reforms. The attitude of Russia was criticized by the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph in İstanbul as follow:

Do precautions and operations that the government applies become useless if the Kurdish feuds, the only responsible of the uprising, think that they will not be surrendered when they take refuge to the foreign consulates? If they assure that they will be never punished; do not they continue to their activities? Russia wants to keep its ascendance over the Kurds and also wants implementation of the reform... because the current event does not include a political character but it is a reaction against the reforms with complaints, murders and crimes, it is anticipated that the leaders will be surrendered.¹²⁷

March and the government gave 150 rifles to the Armenians to secure themselves. It is also reported that an Armenian was injured during the attack and Molla Selim took refuge to the Russian Consulate.

¹²⁴ TE., 5 April 1914, no: 1039.

¹²⁵ TE., 7 April 1914, no: 1041. The government was expecting that Russia was going to accept the demand.

¹²⁶ Sonyel, *the Great War*, p. 79

¹²⁷ TE., 11 April 1914, no: 1045. The news was quoted from the Daily Telegraph.

There was news claiming that the Russian Consul at Bitlis had been dismissed because he admitted the leaders of the uprising to the consulate.¹²⁸ However it was later announced that the news related to dismissal of the consul was not true and there was not such a decision of the Russian government.¹²⁹

Although suppression of the revolt was announced, some of the rebels were still struggling against the government. The government captured Sheikh Erin and Süleyman Agha, who were among the leaders of the revolt, with 11 rebels on May 1914.¹³⁰ The situation was almost under control. The notables of Bitlis sent a telegraph to the Armenian *Azadamard* newspaper and indicated that security was established and the people were content with the government.¹³¹

The government was seemingly controlling the situation but the events continued with a decreasing impact until September of 1914. The telegraph that was sent to the Armenian Patriarch from Bitlis was informing that security was completely established both in Bitlis and in surroundings.¹³² Finally, Molla Selim and his four men had to leave the Russian Consulate and surrendered by the government.¹³³

The leaders of the CUP were sure about the Russian conspiracy in the Bitlis Revolt. They rightly thought that Russia was aiming to interfere to the Ottoman Empire by excusing the Armenians. Cemal Pasha's statement was as follow:

Russia did not want establishment of security and tranquility in the Eastern Anatolia. It is necessary to protect the Armenians and to waken mercy of the Europeans towards them. However Russia provokes the Kurdish begs, especially influential sheiks, against the government and the Armenians.

¹²⁸ TE., 12 April 1914, no: 1046. There was news on 12 April in *Tasvir-i Efkar* that announced the meeting of Talat Bey and Kamer Effendi, in the meeting, Kamer Effendi informed Talat Bey about the developments in Bitlis and villages. Talat Bey guaranteed that all the precautions shall be taken and the responsible of the events shall be punished.

¹²⁹ TE, 17 April 1914, no: 1051.

¹³⁰ TE, 7 May 1914, no: 1071.

¹³¹ TE, 7 May 1914, no: 1071. The telegraph was signed by the mayor of Bitlis, chiefs of villages (*muhtars*), the Armenian priests and some respected people of the city.

¹³² TE, 13 September 1914, no: 1214.

¹³³ TE, 13 September 1914, no: 1214. Although *Tasvir-i Efkar* was announcing the capture of Molla Selim, this news was probably wrong. Molla Selim seemingly stayed in the Russian Consulate until November and surrendered when the World War broke out. (Sonyel, *the Great War*, p. 79)

For this purpose, she protected Bedirhani Abdurrezak Bey in Russia. On the other hand, Russia incited the revolt of Molla Seyyid via the Russian Consulate against the government.¹³⁴

Tasvir-i Efkar also changed its point of view on the Bitlis Revolt because of developments following the revolt. Although *Tasvir-i Efkar* had interpreted the Bitlis Revolt as a regressive (irticai) action against the reforms at the beginning of the revolt in February 1914, Yunus Nadi later wrote that the events in Bitlis could not only be attributed the Kurds opposing the reforms in the Eastern Anatolia. Even though he did not stress the name of Russia he openly explained interference of foreign powers to the events by implying Russia and he described the Bitlis incident as a conspiracy.¹³⁵ After the revolt of Molla Selim was suppressed, Abdurrezzak Bey revolted on 26 May 1914 with the encouragement of the Russian Consul at Hoy, Iran. About the revolt Grand Vizier Said Pasha informed Mallet by openly indicating Russian interference.¹³⁶

The Bitlis Revolt and other movements of the Kurdish leaders openly demonstrated that Russia was looking for ways for intervention the Eastern Anatolia by excusing the Armenians. Russian support in these incidents was quite clear. Protection of the rebel leaders and supporting of the other Kurdish leaders openly proved the Russian aim.

The argument of the Kurdish reaction against the reform project can be hardly offered as the cause of the Bitlis Revolt. Firstly, the revolt broke out in February 1914 and the Reform Project had been signed on 8 February 1914. As it was mentioned, sign of the agreement was hidden from the public opinion for a while and even the newspapers in İstanbul could not certify the result of agreement. It is difficult to urge that the details of the reform project immediately arrived to the Kurdish leaders and they organized such a revolt in a few days. Secondly, Russian attitude during the incidents clearly demonstrated that Russia supported the rebel

¹³⁴ Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat*, p. 367.

¹³⁵ TE, 19 April 1914, no: 1053.

¹³⁶ Sonyel, *the Great War*, p.79

leaders. Russia protected them in the Consulate and did not surrender until the World War broke out.

The Turkish government's attitude during the revolt should be emphasized. The government immediately took necessary precautions to suppress the revolt. The Armenians in the region openly praised the government's precautions to protect the Armenians. The government protected the Armenian churches and shops, and also delivered arms to the Armenians for defending themselves.

II.2. Armenians in the 1914 Elections

II.2.1. Armenians in the 1908 and 1912 Elections

The Ottoman Empire had witnessed its first constitutional experience in 1876 with the acceptance of the *Kanun-i Esasi*. During this short-lived experience (1876-1878), different ethnic elements of the Ottoman Empire could find chance to participate in the administration of the empire.

The New Ottomans were the leaders of the constitutional movement. They thought that the Ottoman Empire could keep its integrity via declaration of the constitution and the adoption of the parliament. The constitutional administration included participation of the minorities to the administration with representation in the parliament. Thus, it was aimed that if the Ottoman minorities could have chance to express themselves in the parliament and join to the state administration, this would frustrate their separatist movements that the Ottoman Empire was highly suffering from.

The first constitutional experience was very difficult task to overcome. The Ottoman Empire was composed of many different ethnic and religious groups. To make these groups be represented in the Assembly in accordance with their population was

highly difficult. According to the provisional regulations, a fixed number of 130 deputyships were determined to “distribute to the provinces in proportion to population.”¹³⁷ However “foreign pressure on behalf of non-Muslim communities and the government’s desire to appeal to these groups in an effort to defuse nationalism and separatism resulted in disproportionately large quotas for provinces with non-Muslim populations.”¹³⁸

The Armenians were given nine deputyships in the short-lived first parliament. The names of deputies and their electoral sectors were as follows:

| <u>Name of the Deputy</u> | <u>Region</u> |
|---------------------------|---|
| 1. Ohannes Allahverdi | İstanbul (Vice-President of the Parliament) |
| 2. Sebuhan Maksudian | İstanbul |
| 3. Rupen Yazician | Edirne |
| 4. Sahak Yavrumian | Bursa |
| 5. Hamazasb Ballarian | Erzurum |
| 6. Manuk Karcian | Aleppo |
| 7. Mikael Altıntop | Ankara |
| 8. Hugo Shahinian | Sivas |
| 9. Daniel Karacian | Erzurum |

In addition to these deputies, there were four Armenian representatives in *Meclis-i Ayan*. These were Ohannes Kuyumcuian Pasha, Abraham Eremian Pasha, Manuk Azarian and Gabriel Noradunkian. As it was indicated, the first constitutional period continued for a short while. By excusing the outbreak of the Turkish-Russian War of 1877-78, Abdulhamid annulled the Parliament and the constitution in early 1878. And there was no election and parliament until the second constitutional period began in 1908.

¹³⁷ Hasan Kayalı, Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1919, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 27 (1995), p. 267.

¹³⁸ Kayalı, *Elections and Electoral Process*, p. 267.

After the 1908 Revolution led by the Committee of Union and Progress, the *Kanun-i Esasi* (the Constitution) was resurrected. With the second constitutional period, the Ottoman political life became highly colorful. New political parties were founded and many publications appeared in different parts of the Ottoman Empire.

Under tumult of the revolution, it had been announced on 24 July 1908, the day after revolution that the new parliament was to be summoned, which had been officially suspended for 30 years¹³⁹ and the elections were made in 1908.

The Armenians were also taking part in political life. There were several Armenian parties such as Tashnak, Hunchak and Ramagavar in the Turkey before the 1908 Revolution. These parties had mainly followed revolutionary ways for an independent Armenia and They were responsible for many revolts and incidents in different parts of the Empire. However, the CUP sought the ways of compromise with the Armenian parties before and after the Revolution. Both the CUP and the Armenian parties were against Abdulhamid's administration so they could come together. Moreover, the Armenians thought that the new regime could offer more suitable political condition for them and they supported the CUP.

The Armenians negotiated with the CUP for collaboration in the elections. They demanded 20 Armenian members of the parliament. The Armenian parties were defending the principle of proportional representation and they requested 20 MP for estimated 2 millions of Armenian. However, they were granted 11 deputies in the 1908 elections. The name of deputies, their area of election and their parties were as follow¹⁴⁰:

¹³⁹ Aykut Kansu, *1908 Devrimi*, İletişim, İstanbul; 2001, p. 273

¹⁴⁰ Kansu, *1908 Devrimi*, pp. 377- 446. Kansu indicated that he inspired from the work of Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart Rustow with some differences. Ahmad and Rustow added three additional names to the list. These are Agop Hıraklian (Maraş), Vahan Effendi (Maraş) and Stephan Şiracian (Ergani). (Ahmad and Rustow, *İkinci Meşrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler 1908-1918*, İstanbul; 1976). Kansu did not indicate these names. And there is not also any knowledge about these names in Çark's work while the other names were mentioned. (Y.G. Çark, *Türk Devleti Hizmetinde Ermeniler: 1453-1953*, Yeni Matbaa, İstanbul, 1953).

| <u>Name of the Deputy</u> | <u>Region</u> | <u>Party</u> |
|---|---------------|--------------|
| 1. Agop Babikian/Agop Boyacian ¹⁴¹ | Tekfurdag | CUP |
| 2. Bedros Hallachian | İstanbul | CUP |
| 3. Kirkor Zohrap | İstanbul | CUP |
| 4. Stephan Ispartalian | İzmir | Independent |
| 5. Nazareth Dagaverian | Sivas | FA and HİF |
| 6. Karekin Pastirmacian | Erzurum | Independent |
| 7. Varteks Serengulian | Erzurum | Socialist |
| 8. Vahan Papazian | Van | Independent |
| 9. Kegham Garabetian | Muş | Independent |
| 10. Artin Bosgezenian | Aleppo | CUP |
| 11. Hamparsum Boyacian | Kozan | Socialist |

The Armenian deputies were mostly members of the Tashnak. Varteks, Pastirmacian and Zohrab were the Thasnakists. Hamparsum Boyacian was member of the Hunchak. Some of the deputies like Hallachian were directly member of the CUP. Dagaverian was an active member of the Freedom and Union Party (FUP-*Hürriyet ve İtilaf Partisi*).¹⁴²

Members of the Tashnak took place in the lists of the CUP and members of Hunchaks and Ramgavar were placed to the lists of the FUP during the 1908 and 1912 elections. It should be noted that placing of the Armenians to these parties does not demonstrate that they were really members of these parties.¹⁴³ The aim of the Armenian deputies was basically pragmatic. They thought that collaboration with the CUP would help the Armenians to have more deputies in the Parliament.

¹⁴¹ Agop Babikian died on 28 August 1909 and Agop Boyacian was elected instead of him. Demir writes that Boyacian was also elected as the deputy of Tekfurdag. (Fevzi Demir, *İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi Meclis-i Mebusan Seçimleri: 1908-1914*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, İzmir; 1994, p. 61). Howeveri Çark states that Boyacian was the deputy from Van. See Çark, *Türk Devleti Hizmetinde Ermeniler*, p. 236.

¹⁴² T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler*, vol. I, Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, İstanbul, 1984, pp. 573-574.

¹⁴³ Tunaya, *Siyasal Partiler*, p. 574.

The new parliamentary elections were made in 1912 and the new parliament was summoned. However the new parliament survived for a short time. With the breakout of the Balkan Wars, the parliament was suspended until 1914. The Armenians had demanded 15 members of parliament in 1912 elections. However they had to suffice with 11 deputies in the elections. These were as follow¹⁴⁴:

| <u>Name of the Deputy</u> | <u>Region</u> | <u>Party</u> |
|---------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| 1. Hugo Boyacian | Tekfurtag | Independent |
| 2. Bedros Hallachian | İstanbul | Independent |
| 3. Kirkor Zohrab | İstanbul | Independent |
| 4. Vohan Bardizbanian | İzmir | Independent |
| 5. Pashayan | Sivas | Independent |
| 6. Stephan Chiracian | Ergani | Independent |
| 7. Karekin Pastirmacian | Erzurum | Independent |
| 8. Varteks Serengulian | Erzurum | Independent |
| 9. Viramian Effendi | Van | Independent |
| 10. Artin Bosgezenian | Aleppo | Independent |
| 11. Trajan Narli | Gelibolu | Independent |

Although the Armenians accepted to participate in the elections they were not satisfied with quota which was offered by the CUP for the parliament. They were repeatedly stressing the necessity of the representation according to population. The Armenians claimed that there were nearly 2 millions of Armenian in Turkey and they

¹⁴⁴ Ahmad and Rustow, *Meclisler*, pp. 265-284. Ahmad and Rustow give the list of the deputies who were the members of the parliament in 1908, 1912 and 1914. Here they indicate 11 names as the deputy elected in the 1912 elections. However they urge that there were 13 Armenian deputies in the parliament (Ahmad and Rustow, *Meclisler*, p. 247). This number was given as 10 by Demir. (Demir, *Meclis-i Mebusan Seçimleri*, p. 136)

Ahmad and Rustow indicated the political position of the Armenian deputies as independent in the given list. Although some of these deputies had affiliation with some political parties. The classification of the authors was accepted.

might have had 20 deputies in the parliament. This request of the Armenians could not be materialized during the 1908 and 1912 elections. Although they negotiated with the CUP, especially during the 1912 elections, they could not get the expected number. On the contrary, their strict attitude probably reduced number of Armenian deputies in the 1912 elections.¹⁴⁵ The Armenians were seemingly increasing their political effectiveness and they were getting ready for further political duels.

II.2.2. Armenians in the 1914 Elections

The parliament had been summoned on May 1912 and suspended on August 1912. And opening of the parliament was postponed without determining any date with break out of the Balkan Wars. Thus the parliament stayed closed until May 1914.

Related to political developments, participation of the Armenians in the elections became a great and long lasting problem in 1914. As it was interpreted above, the Armenian Question had been resurrected and the debates for the Anatolian Reform on behalf of the Armenians had increased in 1913. Thus the Armenians gained political advantages that they had never had since 1908 and they followed strict negotiations with the CUP and stayed uncompromising for a long time.

The Armenian religious and political groups had decided to cooperate in the election negotiations with the government. A joint commission composed of Protestant and Catholic Armenian representatives, and political parties was constituted to decide the terms as condition of joining elections. The commission prepared a proposal and submitted to the government on 15 November 1913. Their expectations mainly focused on two points. Firstly, they insisted on implementation of proportional representation and they demanded nomination of 20 Armenian deputies for the

¹⁴⁵ Demir, *Meclis-i Mebusan Seçimleri*, pp. 135-136. In 1912 elections, the Armenians followed a strict attitude and they did not calmly negotiate with the CUP. The CUP granted 11 MP to the Armenians but they could get more if they had continued to the negotiations.

estimated 2 million Armenians.¹⁴⁶ Secondly, the Armenians urged that the Armenian deputies had to be directly elected by the Armenian secondary voters. Thus the CUP and the government should not interfere to determination of the Armenian deputies.¹⁴⁷

The expectations of the Armenians were too great to be accepted by the CUP and the government. The CUP government was seemingly warm to increase number of the Armenian deputies but it strongly refused the other demands of the Armenians. The government responded the Armenians that their demands require changes on the constitution and that was impossible in that time.¹⁴⁸

While negotiations were continuing, discussions on the Reform Project were also continuing. Thus, the Armenians probably waited the result of the Reform Project. Yet, the elections had already begun in different parts of the Empire and there was no compromise with the Armenians. Although the Armenians were not certain about participating in the elections, Artin Bosgezenian was elected as Harput deputy from the CUP.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ The Armenians claimed the Armenian population as 2 million in the Ottoman Empire. This number was also stressed by the Patriarch Zaven Effendi in one of his interview with the *Tasvir-i Efkar* on 6 February 1914. In the absence of a certain census result, the Armenians were exaggerating the Armenian population. Works on the Armenian population demonstrates that the Armenian population was considerably less than 2 millions. Some suggestions about the Armenian population in 1914 as follow: Shaw suggests the numbers of 1.161.169 Armenian Gregorian; 68.838 Armenian Catholic; 65.844 Armenian Protestant so sum of 1.295.851 (Stanford J. Shaw, 'The Ottoman Census System and Population', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 9 (1978) no: 3, (pp. 325-338) p, 336). Karpat gives the Armenian population in 1914 as 1.229.007 (By quoting from Karpat; H. Özdemir, K. Çiçek, Ö. Turan, Ramazan Çalık and Y. Halaçoğlu, *Ermeniler; Sürgün ve Göç*, TTK, Ankara, 2004, p. 11). Pallavicini, the Austria-Hungarian Ambassador to İstanbul, had written on 28 June 1913 that "the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire had never reached to 1.600.000 (in Özdemir, at.all., p. 19, see also for detailed analysis of sources about the Armenian population pp. 5-52). And also see Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities; the Population of the Ottoman Empire and the End of the Empire*, New York University Press, 1983.

¹⁴⁷ Recep Karacakaya, *Türk Kamuoyu ve Ermeni Meselesi(1908-1923)*, Toplumsal Dönüşüm, İstanbul, 2005, pp. 217-218.

¹⁴⁸ Karacakaya, *Türk Kamuoyu*, pp. 219-220. By quoting from Hüseyin Cahit, Karakaya writes that Armenian claims could torture good relations between the Armenians, Turks and Kurds. And there might emerge hatred between peoples.

¹⁴⁹ TE, 3 February 1914, no: 984. Artin Bosgezenian had been member of the parliament in 1908 and 1912 from the CUP (Çark, *Türk Devlet Hizmetinde Ermeniler*, p. 236).

Şükrü Bey, the General Secretary of the CUP, interviewed with the Armenian *Panpar* newspaper and interpreted the latest developments. He expressed that although the CUP agreed with the Greeks on all the subjects about the elections, any agreement with the Armenians could not be concluded. Şükrü Bey said that the CUP suggested its conditions and there would not be any other suggestion anymore. By reminding commencement of the elections he expressed his disappointment about the attitudes of the Armenians. Şükrü Bey was stressing the connection between the Reform Project and the discussions on the elections. He urged that the Armenians preferred transfer of their legal situation to an international problem during the Reform discussions and they diverged from the Ottoman administration. The interpretation of Şükrü Bey was reflecting a deep disappointment. It can be said that he was not sure about goodwill of the Armenians. At the end of the interview, he expressed that the Armenian Patriarchate decided to participate in the elections but they would probably have less deputy aftermath because the elections had already begun in many places.¹⁵⁰

The attitude of the Armenians was also criticized by some Armenians. The Armenian *Panpar* newspaper delivered an article and analyzed the Turkish-Armenian disagreement on the elections. The newspaper asked the Armenian society that “is it our business to make the government accepted the principle of proportional representation?” The newspaper argued that Greeks and Arabs negotiated with the government like diplomats and bargained like merchants. However, the Armenians were suffering from political chaos while defending some principle. *Panpar* reminded that the CUP was favoring the approach of the Greeks rather than the Armenians and the Young Turk newspapers were clearly reflecting this understanding of the Ottoman administration. The newspaper was not sharing the Armenian political parties’ policies related to the elections. It is written that the rights of the Armenians could be defended by the representatives of the nation in the parliament. The newspaper warned that the attitude of the Armenians could cause negative thoughts among the Muslims and emergence of such feelings could

¹⁵⁰ TE, 3 February 1914, no: 984.

negatively affect the Reform Project because application of that was only possible with good will of the Muslims. Thus the right way was to join to the elections.¹⁵¹

The news and interpretations, appeared in the press in these days, enforced the Patriarch to express the position of the Armenian Patriarchate. The Patriarch Zaven Effendi interviewed the *Tasvir-i Efkar* and he widely expressed his thoughts related to the elections. His thoughts were as follows:

The way that the Patriarchate follows is to protect the political rights of the Armenians...we demanded the proportional representation and determination of number of deputy in accordance with the Armenian population...we want that we should not discuss in every elections the number of Armenian deputy so the number should be certified...the government satisfied with promising... according to the counts of the Patriarchate, the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire is nearly 2 millions so we demanded 20 deputies. The government promised for 18 deputies and if it become possible 2 extras...the number of deputy may be 20 or 15, we do not care so much number of deputies. We want determination of a certain number and stability of the number in all elections...we do not doubt about good will of Talat Bey but he will not forever stay as the Minister of Interior Affairs. If he changes, the new minister may not accept his predecessor's promise... the government must add an article related to the Armenians to the Electoral Law guaranteeing the number of Armenian deputies...the Armenian Assemblies will decide to the participation to the elections and there is no certain decision...the political pastries work in close relations with the Patriarchate. Their individual movements do not make any sense...we did not collaborate with Greek Patriarchate...¹⁵²

As it can be seen, the Armenians were especially insistent on determination of certain quota for the Armenian deputies. As the Patriarch expressed, they were demanding 20 deputies. Although the Armenians were to continue the negotiations to have 20 deputies, they were seemingly ready to reduce their demands. The Patriarch was also stressing the positive attitude of Talat Bey, the Minister of the Internal Affairs. Talat Bey had promised the Armenians to meet their expectations. However, the Armenians were insisting on legal regulation guaranteeing a quota for the Armenians.

Because discussions between the government and the Armenians could not be concluded, the Catholic Armenians decided to dissolve their agreement with the Armenian societies and to reach an agreement individually with the CUP. The

¹⁵¹ The news was quoted in *Tasvir-i Efkar* on 5 February (TE, 5 February 1914, no: 986).

¹⁵² TE, 6 February 1914, no: 987.

Catholic Armenians demanded reserve of two deputyships for themselves, one deputy from İstanbul and one from Ankara.¹⁵³

The Armenian Assembly was continuously gathering to discuss the elections but these gatherings always concluded without reaching any result. The political parties were resisting against an agreement with the government. Thus they sometimes boycotted the meetings of the Armenian Assembly.¹⁵⁴ It was obvious that the Armenian parties were very influential and the Patriarchate had to reach a compromise with them. However, the parties were still undecided. This situation was being bred with political rivalry among the Armenian parties, which were struggling to increase their influence among the Armenians.

In order to dissolve the divergences, the Armenian newspapers wrote, the Armenian Assembly decided to form a commission composed of the Armenian parties, the Catholic Armenian and the Protestant Armenian representatives under the Patriarch's presidency. This commission was going to determine stipulations, place and style of the discussions and the Patriarch was going to apply them.¹⁵⁵ Establishment of a commission had before discussed but a consensus could not be reached. However, the Armenians were well aware of critic situation that the Armenians faced with not to be represented in the *Meclis-i Mebusan*. On the other hand, although the Catholic Armenians had decided to negotiate with the CUP separately, they also took part in the commission.

Mecmua-yı İhbar, which reflects the Catholic Armenians' opinions, announced that the Catholic Armenians began to negotiate with the government and Kardashian was appointed to interview with Şükrü Bey. Kardashian urged that the Catholic Armenians had had 3 members of parliament 30 years ago and he demanded same number for the 1914 elections. However, Şükrü Bey reminded that the elections had

¹⁵³ TE, 6 February 1914, no: 987.

¹⁵⁴ TE, 8 February, no: 989. "...because the Assembly did not want to reach any decision without consulting to the Armenian parties, the parties were invited for consultation but some of the parties did not join to the call. The Hunchak and Ramgavar representatives came to the meeting but the Tashnaksuthiun and Reforma Hunchak representatives did not come to the meeting."

¹⁵⁵ TE, 9 February 1914, no:990. The meeting was probably held on 6 February 1914.

already begun and had been completed in most places. Thus the Catholic Armenians would have one deputy but he promised to work one more deputy.¹⁵⁶

After the meeting at the Armenian Assembly on 6 February 1914, the Armenian parties gathered to evaluate the latest developments. They decided that the Patriarch would negotiate with government about participation to the elections. They declared that if the government accepts some of the expectations of the Armenians, they could participate to the elections.¹⁵⁷

The Armenian attitude related to the elections had turned one of the most popular subjects of the press through February. The Turkish and the Armenian newspapers were continuously writing on the subject. And, meanwhile, there emerged a polemic between *Tasvir-i Efkar* and the Armenian newspapers. Yunus Nadi had written an editorial article on 8 February 1914 and had criticized the Patriarch by saying that “the Armenian Assembly could not seemingly decide to return the Patriarchate from the wrong way that it had sent the Patriarchate in the past.”¹⁵⁸ The Armenian newspapers revealed a serious reaction to this interpretation and they criticized Yunus Nadi.

Panpar claimed that the Armenians were just struggling for their rights and they were behaving in accordance with the spirit of the parliamentary system (*meşrutiyet*). And the newspaper the struggle of the Armenians could not be interpreted as “wrong way”. However Yunus Nadi urged that the parliamentary system and the constitution were two different things and the demands of the Armenians were against the existing structure of the constitution. Yunus Nadi continued as follow¹⁵⁹:

...the proportional representation can be consistent to the spirit of the parliamentary system (*meşrutiyet*) but it is contrary to the present constitution. To insist on the subject and to boycott the elections is a reflection a revolutionary spirit...the proportional representation can be applied. However, this subject is related with the constitution and the place of discussions can not be mountains or streets, but must be discussed in the parliament.

¹⁵⁶ TE, 10 February 1914, no: 991.

¹⁵⁷ TE, 10 February 1914, no: 991.

¹⁵⁸ TE, 8 February 1914, no: 989.

¹⁵⁹ TE, 11 February 1914, no: 992.

Another subject of polemic was that the Armenian newspapers claimed that the Armenians were not participating to elections in the provinces. However, Yunus Nadi insisted that the Armenians were participating to the elections and this could be seen from the registrations of the elections. However he urged that the participation to the elections was a legal right and whoever was eager could use this right, or not.¹⁶⁰ Despite all these debates, Yunus Nadi stressed that if the Armenians could show their goodwill and if they really intended to solve the problem, solution of the problem, without violating the constitution, could be easily found.

As mentioned before, the Armenians had decided to form a commission for negotiations and determined some points to be discussed with the government and the CUP. Zaven Effendi and Kamer Effendi visited Talat Bey on 9 February 1914 and informed him about the meeting in the Armenian Assembly. They submitted their conditions for the elections. According to the *Azadamard*, the Armenian parties had determined the following articles as the precondition to participate the elections.¹⁶¹

1. The Armenians should have 20 deputies in the parliament.
2. The Armenian candidates should be determined by the Armenians.
3. The Armenians should determine the sectors from where the Armenian deputies would be elected.
4. The government should promise to submit a law draft related to the proportional representation.
5. The government should promise to delay the elections in some places for election of the Armenian candidates.
6. A commission should be constituted under the presidency of the patriarch to discuss these articles.

According to interpretations of the Armenian newspapers, Talat Bey had expressed his positive opinion on these demands so the way for the Armenians was opened to have 20 deputies. The Minister was warm about nomination of the Armenian candidates among prestigious Armenians by the Armenian people themselves. According to the newspapers, he also guaranteed submission of a law draft to the

¹⁶⁰ TE, 11 February 1914, no: 992.

¹⁶¹ TE, 11 February 1914, no: 992. These articles were quoted from the *Azadamard* by the *Tasvir-i Efkar*.

parliament to regulate the electoral process of the Armenian deputies. On the other hand, Talat Bey was reminded that the elections had already finished in some election districts where the Armenian deputies were supposed to be elected. Talat Bey urged that the Armenians would elect missing deputies from different places instead of their election districts. And he addressed the CUP General Secretary to discuss which places are convenient for election of the Armenian deputies.¹⁶²

After his meeting with Talat Bey, the Patriarch met with the Armenian Assembly, the party members, the Catholic and the Protestant representatives and informed them about his meeting with Talat Bey. During the meeting, the decision of constituting a commission for negotiation with the CUP was taken.¹⁶³ The Armenians had satisfied with pledges of Talat Bey and they could now reach a compromise with the government.

Although the Armenians nearly agreed with Talat Bey on participation to the elections, the Armenian newspapers were announcing the disagreement between the Armenian representatives and the CUP Headquarter. They wrote that there were great differences between Talat Bey's promises and the inclinations of the Headquarter. And it was declared that the Armenians were going to interrupt the negotiations if the CUP Headquarter would not turn toward the inclinations of Talat Bey. The Armenians especially disappointed when they were said that it was not possible to reserve 20 deputyships to the Armenians.¹⁶⁴ Actually, the situation was not simple to be easily solved. Although Talat Bey and the CUP Headquarter were eager to solve the problems with the Armenians, they had serious obstacles. The elections had been completed in many places and some candidates were waiting for being elected. Under such a circumstance, giving 20 deputyships to the Armenians were going to disrupt all balances.

¹⁶² TE, 12 February 1914, no: 993.

¹⁶³ TE, 12 February 1914, no: 993. The newspaper also announced by quoting from the Armenian newspapers that the Armenians would have two deputies from İstanbul and Erzurum, and one deputy from Bitlis, Muş, Harput, Sivas, İzmir, Kozan, Kayseri, Karahisar-ı Şarki, Tekfurdag, Trabzon, Diyarbakir and Amasya.

¹⁶⁴ TE, 13 February 1914, no: 994. *Tasvir-i Efkar* quoted the news from the Armenian *Azadamard*, *Panpar* and *Jamanak* newspapers.

Following the meetings with Talat Bey and Şükrü Bey, the Armenian Commission met and evaluated the results of the negotiations. The Armenians determined that there were great differences between inclinations of Talat Bey and the CUP Center. And the elections had been already completed in many places so it was seemingly impossible for the Armenians to have 20 deputies. The commission revised the Armenian demands and decided to work for 16 deputyships, which number was also uncertain at the moment. The decisions of the Armenians were submitted by Kamer Effendi, the Chamberlain of the Patriarchate, to Talat Bey. Talat Bey met with the CUP Center and guaranteed elections of 16 Armenian deputies. He also promised to spend effort for two more Armenian deputies.¹⁶⁵

The Armenian attitude about participating to the elections was still uncertain. The elections were continuing in different parts of Anatolia and the Armenians had not reached a conclusion about the subject yet. They continued discussions between themselves and with the government. However, the Armenians began to discuss on determination of the candidates. In order to prevent emergence of a dispute among the Armenian parties, it was decided that the political parties were not going to show candidates in the name of the parties. However the party members could be candidates individually.¹⁶⁶

Ambiguity of the situation became extremely dangerous for the Armenians because they faced with not to be represented in the *Meclis-i Mebusan*. Thus, the Patriarch Zaven Effendi took initiative and made a maneuver. The Patriarch determined Zohrab Effendi and Hallachian Effendi as the İstanbul candidates.¹⁶⁷ When the Patriarch was asked from where he received such an authority, he indicated that he had such an authority as the Patriarch of the Armenians. He also indicated that these persons had already been elected two times as the candidates of the nation¹⁶⁸ so they were esteemed by the Armenians. This maneuver of the Patriarch probably aimed to

¹⁶⁵ TE, 14 February 1914, no: 995.

¹⁶⁶ TE, 14 February 1914, no: 995.

¹⁶⁷ TE, 28 February 1914, no: 1009.

¹⁶⁸ TE, 28 February 1914, no: 1009.

break resistance of the Armenian parties. The common opinion in the Armenian Assembly was that after participating to the election in İstanbul, it was not practically possible to boycott the elections in provinces. In this respect, the Armenian parties decided to leave determination of the province candidates to the negotiations between the Patriarchate and the Armenian Murahhashanes.¹⁶⁹

The Patriarch announced that the Armenian Assembly (*cismani*) members were not going to be candidate in the elections and called the Armenian parties to determine the province candidates. Zaven Effendi informed that the Armenians were guaranteed 15 parliament memberships and one more was promised. He warned the parties that if they reject participation to the election they would be seen as abstains (*müstenkif*).¹⁷⁰

The Armenian parties were still undecided about taking part in the elections. Şükrü Bey visited the Patriarch and promised election of a deputy from Izmit so the Armenians could have 16 deputies. There had been six Armenian deputies from Aleppo, Sivas, İzmir, Ergani and İstanbul. Şükrü Bey demanded determination of 10 candidates from provinces. Thus there was no reason for boycotting the elections. The Patriarch decided to take responsibility in case of the parties' rejections.¹⁷¹

The Patriarch met with the party representatives and discussed about the province deputy candidates. The province representatives were sending telegraphs and asking the decision of the Patriarchate and the parties. The parties declared that they were not going to show candidates but they were going to participate to the elections and accept the policy of the Patriarchate.¹⁷²

While the discussions were continuing, the Armenian Delegations (*Murahhashane*) were sending telegraphs and showing candidates for the Parliament. Van sent a telegraph and suggested Viramyan Effendi and Papazian Effendi as candidates.

¹⁶⁹ TE, 28 February 1914, no: 1009.

¹⁷⁰ TE, 2 March 1914, no: 1011.

¹⁷¹ TE, 4 March 1914, no: 1013.

¹⁷² TE, 5 March 1914, no: 1014.

However, these names were Tashnaksouthion members so the Patriarchate requested determination of different names instead of them from Van and Muş Delegations. Bitlis suggested Minas Çiraz Effendi, who was residing in Paris. Kozan had firstly suggested Hamparsum Boyacian but he was also a party member so Mathias Nalbandyan Effendi was shown as the candidate instead of him. The names of these three candidates were submitted to the CUP center. Maraş deputyship had been reserved a Catholic Armenian so the Patriarchate did not request a candidate from Maraş Delegation.¹⁷³

Although electoral process was rapidly continuing Van, Muş and Erzurum had not submitted their candidates yet. Thus, Şükrü Bey requested immediately determination of the names.¹⁷⁴ However, Muş Delegation sent a telegraph signed by the Protestant and Catholic religious leaders and by the Tashnak and Hunchak representatives and it declared that the Armenians were boycotting the elections. According to the explanation of the Muş Delegation, the Armenians were insistent on fulfillment of their expectations. They still requested reserve of 20 deputyships for the Armenians. They also requested that these deputies should be directly elected by the Armenian secondary voters. On the other hand, Van and Erzurum had not responded the Patriarchate's call for determination of the candidates.¹⁷⁵

There was no time for further delay so the patriarchate requested immediate determination of the candidates from the delegations. Otherwise, the candidates were to be determined by the Patriarchate.¹⁷⁶ Despite the warnings of the Patriarchate, the delegations did not submit the names of their candidates so the Patriarchate had to prepare its own list.¹⁷⁷ However, Muş decided to take part in the elections and announced the name of Kegam Karabetyan before the list of the Patriarchate was submitted to the Ministry of Interior Affairs. Thereupon, the Patriarchate requested a

¹⁷³ TE, 5 March 1914, no: 1014. Minas Effendi rejected the candidature and the Patriarchate demanded new candidate from the Bitlis Delegation.(TE, 14 March 1914, no: 1023)

¹⁷⁴ TE, 6 March 1914, no: 1015.

¹⁷⁵ TE, 8 March 1914, no: 1017.

¹⁷⁶ TE, 12 March 1914, no: 1021.

¹⁷⁷ TE, 15 March 1914, no: 1024.

document from the Tashnak guarantying that he was not member of the party before approving candidacy of Kegam Effendi.¹⁷⁸

After intense endeavours of the Patriarchate, the Armenian delegations began to declare their candidates for the vacant seats. Bitlis submitted the name of Armanak Hacikian Effendi instead of Minas Effendi. The Patriarchate was notified on election of Tomayan Effendi as the Kayseri deputy. Pastirmacian Effendi, who was in Switzerland, sent a telegraph to the *Azadamard*, announcing that he accepted the Erzurum candidacy. The Armenians, meanwhile, sent telegraphs protesting the Patriarchate to the *Azadamard* and they accused the Patriarchate of intervening with the election right of the provinces.¹⁷⁹

Although there was a consensus among the Armenian parties on the principle that no one among the party members would be nominated for deputyship, the parties changed their points of view and they endeavored to send their members to the Parliament.¹⁸⁰ While the nomination process for the candidates was going on, disagreement between the parties and the Patriarchate severely continued. In order to solve the candidacy problem, the Patriarch met with the party representatives. Here, the Patriarchate expressed that the party delegates had not presented the candidates so far, and the list of the candidates had already been submitted to the government by the Patriarchate. Thereupon, it was time to put an end to the disputes on the elections.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ TE, 15 March 1914, no: 1024. There was also news related with election of new members to the Armenian Assemblies; *Meclis-i Cismani*, *Meclis-i Ruhani* and *Meclis-i Umumi*. On 13 March 1914, Ormanian Effendi, one of the former patriarchs, Arsharuti and Torian Effendis were nominated to the *Meclis-i Ruhani*. It was announced that the member of the *Meclis-i Cismani* was to be determined next week. By the way, Gabriel Noradunkian, member of *Meclis-i Ayan*, was nominated as the President of the *Meclis-i Umumi* (Armenian General Assembly).

¹⁷⁹ TE, 22 March 1914, no: 1031.

¹⁸⁰ “Because the political parties did not want to show candidates, the Patriarchate had declared that it was going to determine neutral candidates. Later Tashnaksothion changed its point of view and the party member Tiryakian Efendi visited the Patriarchate where he demanded at least three deputy in the Parliament.” (TE, 14 March 1914, no: 1023).

¹⁸¹ TE, 28 March 1914, no: 1031.

Dispute among the Armenian parties was so clear and this expressed itself in constitution of the *Meclis-i Cismani*. During the electoral process of the *Meclis-i Cismani* the Tashnak did not want to reach an understanding with the other parties. Although the parties represented in the *Meclis-i Umumi* sent members to the *Meclis-i Cismani* but the Tashnak stayed abstain.¹⁸² The reason behind the uncompromising attitude of the Tashnak was that the party had not satisfied with the development related to the general elections.

Standing of the Tashnak was very severe and far away from compromising. This situation was openly revealed during the meeting convened by the Patriarch on 27 March 1914 to dissolve problems about the elections. The Patriarch had arranged the meeting to persuade the Armenian parties on disputed points. At the meeting, the Patriarch was able to persuade the Hunchak and Ramgavar to participate in the elections. However, they stipulated that the candidates should not be members of any Armenian political party. Although this stipulation had been previously approved by the parties, it was now rejected by the Tashnak representative at the meeting. The Tashnak had decided to present its members for candidacy. In order to satisfy the demand of the Tashnak, three seats were offered to the party but the party insisted on four seats. However, the demand was not accepted by the other parties. Thus, the Tashnak member at the meeting declared that the party was not going to approve the six neutral candidates who had been previously determined by the Patriarchate. Yet, the Patriarch stressed impossibility of the return from the candidate list which had been previously submitted to the CUP Headquarter. He insisted on moving in the frame of previously determined decisions and he declared that further meetings on this subject were unnecessary.¹⁸³

Diverges among the Armenian parties reached a critical level and the Armenians delegations in Anatolia were highly discontent with the developments. Some radical Armenians, especially the Tashnaks in the provinces, were accusing the Patriarchate of not satisfactorily defending the rights of the Armenians. The news appeared in

¹⁸² TE, 29 March 1914, no: 1032.

¹⁸³ TE, 29 March 1914, no: 1032.

Tasvir-i Efkar clearly revealed the dimension of the discontent among the Armenians. According to the news of *Tasvir-i Efkar* by quoting from the *Jamanak*, the Patriarch had received a threat letter demanding fulfillment of the Armenians' expectations in the provinces related to the deputy candidates.¹⁸⁴ Although the other Armenian newspapers denied the letter, it had been probably sent to the Patriarch.¹⁸⁵ The Armenian delegates in the provinces were fairly under the control of the Armenian parties and the patriarchal authority had seriously diminished.

The Tashnak was, especially, very influential in the provinces and nomination of the Patriarchate candidates was uncertain. The results of the elections in Van and Erzurum, where the Tashnak candidates received majority of votes, revealed that the Patriarch did not have an absolute authority over the Armenians. Mededian Effendi and Mezadurian Effendi, the inspector at the Ministry of Justice, had taken most of the votes in Van and Erzurum respectively. Varteks Effendi, Boyacian Effendi and Pastirmacian Effendi followed them as the candidates of the Patriarchate. The local administrations had also strived for election of the Patriarchate candidates with the order of the government.¹⁸⁶

The Erzurum secondary voters sent a telegraph, a copy was also sent to the Armenian newspapers, to the Patriarchate. They wrote that although they spent effort for election of the candidates of the Patriarchate, election of these candidates did not seem possible. Therefore, the secondary voters stressed that they were not going to participate in the elections not to fall in a hard position before the Patriarchate and their own electors. Thereupon, the Armenian newspapers wrote that the Patriarch decided to visit Talat Bey for reminding the promise of the CUP on election of Varteks Effendi and Boyaciyan Effendi, the Patriarchate candidates. According to the news, Zaven Effendi had decided not to approve the deputies unless the Patriarchate candidates were not elected.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ TE, 12 April 1914, no: 1046. *Tasvir-i Efkar* quoted the news from the *Jamanak*.

¹⁸⁵ TE, 13 April 1914, no: 1047.

¹⁸⁶ TE, 25 April 1914, no: 1059.

¹⁸⁷ TE, 8 May 1914, no: 1072.

Despite all the efforts of the Patriarchate, only Varteks Effendi was able win the elections. The other winner was Mededian Effendi. Each of them got 112 votes. On the other hand, Boyacian Effendi, the other candidate of the Patriarchate, got 22 and Pastirmacian Effendi got 50 votes. However, the Patriarchate did not approve Mededian Effendi and continued to make an effort for Boyacian Effendi to be elected.¹⁸⁸

Zaven Effendi visited Talat Bey and he complained about the election of Mededian Effendi instead of Boyacian Effendi. Talat Bey urged that because the elections had concluded, there was nothing to do with the problem.¹⁸⁹ Thereupon, the Armenian newspapers wrote with the approval of the Patriarchate that “Mededian Effendi was neither shown as candidate by the Patriarchate nor got the votes of the Armenians in Erzurum. Thus, he could not be accepted the deputy of the Armenians.”¹⁹⁰

Under such discussions, the elections were completed in May 1914. The new Parliament maintained its existence until the end of World War I. There were 14 Armenian deputies in the Parliament. The Armenian members of the Parliament according to the 1914 elections were as follows:¹⁹¹

| <u>Name of the Deputy</u> | <u>Region</u> | <u>Party</u> |
|------------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| 1. Bedros Hallachian Effendi | İstanbul | CUP |
| 2. Kirkor Zohrab Effendi | İstanbul | Liberal |
| 3. Onnik İhsan Effendi | İzmir | Independent |
| 4. Karabet Tomayan Effendi | Kayseri | Independent |
| 5. Dikran Barsamian Effendi | Sivas | Independent |
| 6. Agop Hiralakian Effendi | Maraş | Independent |
| 7. Stephan Chiracian Effendi | Ergani | Independent |

¹⁸⁸ TE, 12 May 1914, no: 1079.

¹⁸⁹ TE, 19 May 1914, no: 1083.

¹⁹⁰ TE, 20 May 1914, no: 1084.

¹⁹¹ Ahmad and Rustow, *Meclisler*, pp. 265-283.

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------|-------------|
| 8. Varteks Serengulyan Effendi | Erzurum | Independent |
| 9. Osip Mededian Effendi | Erzurum | Independent |
| 10. Minas Chiraz Effendi | Bitlis | Independent |
| 11. Vahan Papazian Effendi | Van | Independent |
| 12. Asaf (Doras) Bey | Van | Independent |
| 13. Viramian Effendi | Van | Independent |
| 14. Artin Bosgezenian Effendi | Aleppo | CUP |

In conclusion, when the 1914 elections are considered, there are several important points that should be emphasized. Firstly, the Armenians followed an intransigent attitude during the negotiations with the government and the CUP. They obviously relied on the support of the European states because the election process was continuing concurrently with the Reform Project negotiations. Thus, the Armenians decided to wait the result of the Project instead of compromising with the government. The Armenians had thought that they could get more advantageous position with this policy.

Secondly, there were serious diversities among the Armenians. The Patriarchate, the Armenian parties and the Armenian Assembly could not compromise on a certain point. It was clearly observed that the Armenian parties, especially the Tashnak, did not accept guidance of the Patriarchate and they continuously complicated the problem.

Thirdly, it can be asserted that the government followed a patient and flexible policy towards the Armenians during the election process. Although the Armenians continuously brought many problems to the table, the government tried to come up an agreement with them. The government generally paid attention to the Armenian demands and tried to overcome problems.

CHAPTER III

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION DURING THE WORLD WAR I

III. 1. Activities of the Armenians at the Beginning of the World War

The war was at the door in Europe, while the Ottoman Empire was thoroughly engaged in the Armenian Question. The intergovernmental tension had severely boosted and thereupon the First World War broke out on August 1914. The Ottoman Empire had just signed a pact of alliance with Germany at the early days of the War. However, had being out of the war for a while, the Ottoman Empire truly entered into the First World War on October 31, 1914. That was the pretext to the beginning of a new phase within the Armenian Question.

In the early period of the War, there were two issues of the Armenian Question on the agenda. The first one is the Armenian Reform, extensively evaluated above, and the assignment of general inspectors to Southern Anatolia. As well the second issue was the Armenians' being subjected to the military service.

The Armenians concluded the newly issued Law of Military Obligation contrary to their interests. Patriarch Zaven Effendi pointed out that the new Military Law would be the most significant subject to be discussed after ended the negotiations for the reform project. The Patriarch uttered that “the people who rather got upset with the political problems would most probably be not to be pleased with the new Law”. The Patriarch also stated that the Armenians like the other elements of the Ottoman

society were ready to scarify all kinds of endeavors for defending the homeland which is a holly task; however, he urged that the implementation of the Law for the Armenians did not seem reasonable, if the existed circumstances of Armenians were examined.¹⁹² It was not clear that why the Patriarch regarded obligatory military service unreasonable for the Armenians.

The developments related with the Law of Recruitment were negotiated in the the Armenian National Assembly (General Armenian Assembly- *Muhtelit Ermeni Meclisi*). The Patriarch mentioned about the telegraphs from provinces informing that *muayyensizler* were called to arms and he informed the assembly about these developments. Zaven Effendi stated that the Patriarchate had maintained examinations on the new law and determined the articles to be demanded changes. Then, he submitted the determined articles to the Armenian Assembly to be reconsidered. After necessary discussions, the Assembly would bring the law to the Armenian deputies' attention.¹⁹³

The Military Commission of the *Meclis-i Mebusan* had already started to negotiate the Law for Military Obligation at the head of June. Meanwhile, the Armenian deputies had not yet made any attempt concerning the law. Upon the joint evaluation of the Armenians, they agreed on the view of the Patriarch and made application for the change in the law. They decided to meet with the Minister of War, Enver Pasha, to discuss the issue.¹⁹⁴

In July, the Law for Military Obligation was still on table of the Military Commission. Tomayan Effendi, the deputy of Kayseri, and Zaven Effendi met to

¹⁹² *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 22 May 1914, no: 1086. The speech of the Patriarch Zaven Effendi was delivered during the commencement of 1914-1915 mission period of the Armenian Assembly. And the Patriarch commented the latest political developments related to the Armenians including the Reform Project and the *Askeri Mükellefiyet Kanunu*. And Gabriel Noradunkian was elected as the president of the Armenian Assembly in the first meeting.

¹⁹³ TE, 31 May 1914, no: 1095.

¹⁹⁴ TE, 6 June 1914, no: 1101. The news was quoted from the Armenian newspapers by *Tasvir-i Efkar*. In the news, it is also stated that the Greeks had also decided to apply for changes on the *Askeri Mükellefiyet Kanunu*. According to the news, the Greeks had offered implementation of a tax for exemption from military service but the offer had been rejected by Committee for Military Affairs in the *Meclis-i Mebusan*.

exchange views on 12 July. Here, Tomayan Effendi informed Zaven Effendi about the attempts of the Armenian deputies in the *Meclis-i Mebusan* to change the law. Hereupon, the Patriarch decided to postpone his motion that he had prepared to submit the *Meclis-i Mebusan*.¹⁹⁵ Shortly after, Zaven Effendi stressed the new military law once again in his statement sent to all the Armenian churches thanks to his re-election as the Patriarch. In his statement, the Patriarch expressed his belief in change of the law. According to the Patriarch, the Armenians had not been accustomed with the military service so they could be confronted by many difficulties. The Patriarch proposed the military should be firstly endeared to the Armenians.¹⁹⁶ The arguments of the Patriarch and the Armenian deputies were not based on concrete reasons. The Armenians had been hardly working for obtaining more political, economical and social rights, and they were about to obtain their expectations. However, they were not dilettante to share responsibilities of the Turks.

While the discussions on the issue were continuing, the First World War broke out at the beginning of August. The Ottoman Empire had signed a treaty of alliance with Germany on August 1, 1914 just before the outbreak of the First World War. The Ottoman Empire declared itself neutral with the beginning of the war. A general mobility was proclaimed throughout the country and the army began to prepare for a possible war.

Regarding the attitude of the Armenians at the beginning of the war, it was not clear what kind of way they would pursue in the forthcoming days. The Armenian Patriarch arranged a meeting in order to decide on the way that the Armenians should follow. The meeting attended by the leaders of the Armenian political parties and the members of the Armenian National Assembly did not give birth to a certain decision.¹⁹⁷ Although the Armenians stressed the necessity of “staying loyal to the Ottoman Empire, making military service and not following foreign powers”, it was

¹⁹⁵ TE, 12 July 1914, no:1137.

¹⁹⁶ TE, 14 July 1914, no: 1139.

¹⁹⁷ Hikmet Özdemir at.all., *Ermeniler: Sürgün ve Göç*, TTK , Ankara, 2004, p. 56.

seen shortly after the meeting that the most of the Armenian organizations, especially the political parties, were not sincere on staying loyal to the empire.¹⁹⁸

The most tangible decisions about the policy that the Armenians would follow were adopted in the 8th Tashnak Congress held in Erzurum. In the Congress, the Armenians declared that the Ottoman Empire ought to not war against Russia and remain neutral. Moreover, “the representatives, attended from the Eastern Ottoman provinces and various places in the world, took decision to stay in opposition to the CUP and to wage a fierce struggle against it.”¹⁹⁹

In the course of war, the attitudes of the Armenians had been remarkably differing in respect of the region they were in. The Armenians had established strong underground organizations in many parts of the Ottoman Empire. They were especially influential in the eastern provinces where it was very difficult to keep the Armenians under control. On the other hand, the Armenians had also considerably strong organization in the western provinces and in İstanbul. However, control of these centers was not as difficult as the eastern provinces.

On the other hand; even if being symbolic, supports from the Armenians were being received at the beginning of the war. Although the supports were considerably insignificant in amount, newspapers often brought consciously the supports to foreground. The aim was to achieve the establishment of good relations between the Turks and the Armenians and strengthen the loyalty of the Armenians. About some positive attitudes and supports took part in newspapers, *Tasvir-i Efkar* said:

Shortly after the end of the war, the Ottoman Government canceled all capitulations unilaterally. Armenian newspapers enthusiastically welcomed the news about cancellation and wished goodness for the country.²⁰⁰ With special editions Armenian newspapers cited that the country was in the state of war, thence all Armenians should spiritually and materially sacrifice as much as possible. In the telegrams sent to all the churches, the Patriarch Zaven Effendi demanded preachers to call people to

¹⁹⁸ Hocaoglu, *Tarihçe Ermeni Mezalimi*, p. 570.

¹⁹⁹ Mim Kemal Öke, *The Armenian Question*, TTK Printing House, Ankara, 2001, p. 108.

²⁰⁰ TE, 12 September 1914, no: 1196.

make all kinds of spiritual and material contribution. He also wanted the allocation of some sections for the treatment of wounded Ottoman soldiers.²⁰¹

Upon the inspiration and initiative of the Patriarch Zaven Effendi, the Armenians decided to send a 50 bed mobile hospital to the region chosen by the government.²⁰² Moreover, a 150 people capacity section in Yedikule Hospital allocated to the wounded Ottoman soldiers.²⁰³ Furthermore, 10.000 pairs of socks made in *Dul Kadınlar Dar'ül Sinaisi* in Adana were sent to the soldiers. Following the patriotic attitudes of the Armenian citizens, the Ministry of War sent a letter of thanks to the Patriarchate.²⁰⁴ The Armenian newspapers quoted that the administrative board of Armenian Monastery in Jerusalem collected some 100 Liras to contribute to the patriotic endeavors.²⁰⁵

Some others can be added to the examples mentioned above. It might be interpreted that some Armenian citizens were still loyal to the Empire in the course of the War, and they tried to contribute as much as they could. However, if these examples are examined in detail, it can be seen that these events were peculiar to İstanbul and the some other big cities. However, the situation in Anatolia was certainly troublesome.

Due to the censorship in the course of war, the Ottoman newspapers could not openly write everything. Especially, bad news and defeats that might drive people into hopelessness were not pronounced by the newspapers. However, as in other newspapers, *Tasvir-i Efkar* gave place to the news about the actions of the Russians and Armenians from the different parts of Anatolia. This news was just a small piece of actual facts. Acute silence of newspapers about the great disaster the Ottoman Army suffered in Sarıkamış might disclose the dimensions of the censorship.

²⁰¹ TE, 11 November 1914, no: 1258.

²⁰² TE, 15 November 1914, no: 1260.

²⁰³ TE, 23 November 1914, no: 1268.

²⁰⁴ TE, 23 November 1914, no: 1268.

²⁰⁵ TE, 6 February 1914, no: 1342.

Just before the end of 1914, the Ottoman Empire was actually on the way to war with the Armenians. The Armenians and Russians were in collaboration in the region.²⁰⁶ The first uprising after mobilization order of the government took place in Zeytun in August 1914. The Armenian brigands attacked to the discharged Turkish soldiers and killed most of them. The struggle of the gendarme against the Armenian brigands continued for months and many Turkish soldiers and civilian people were killed during the incidents.²⁰⁷

The Armenians initiated an extensive uprising in Van at the end of 1914. The uprising reached up to a critic stage in March 1915. The Armenians perpetrated massacres against Muslims in many different places.²⁰⁸ In April, the rebellious movement had been very widespread any more and the rebels arrived to Van on April 20. In city center, many massacres were implemented; officials were killed and most of the city was set on fire.²⁰⁹ After the holding control of the city, the Armenians left Van to the Russian soldiers.²¹⁰

The volume of the Russo-Armenian cooperation had reached up to a striking level. So as to take ultimate advantage of the Ottoman weakness, the Armenians commenced some uprisings in Zeytun, Maraş, Kayseri, Bitlis, Muş and Erzurum. Moreover, many Armenians participated into the Russian army after the mobilization order and fought against the Ottoman army.²¹¹ The Russian army was not the only

²⁰⁶ Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Facts on the Relocation of Armenians*, TTK Printing House, Ankara; 2002, p.52.

²⁰⁷ Hocaoglu, *Tarihte Ermeni Mezalimi*, p. 574.

²⁰⁸ Halaçoğlu, *Facts on Relocation*. p. 54.

²⁰⁹ BOA, HR. SYS. HU. Kr. 110, dos. 12-2, nr. 56-62 in *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Kafkaslarda ve Anadolu'da Ermeni Mezalimi*, Ankara, 1995. In this document, massacres perpetrated by Russians and Armenians against Muslims in Van are expressed with many detailed examples.

²¹⁰ Sonyel writes about the situation of Van as follow: “Meanwhile the Russian troops reached Van on 14 May and deliriously welcomed by the local Armenian population. This Russian occupation compelled the Turkish Army to evacuate the city of Van on 17 May. Four days after this evacuation the Armenians burnt the Muslim quarter completely. Following these incidents an Armenian state was established in Van under Russian protection and the governors of Aram Manoukian, one of the revolutionary leaders...” Salahi Sonyel, *The Great War and the Tragedy of Anatolia*, TTK Printing House, Ankara; 2001, p. 110.

²¹¹ Özdemir at all., *Sürgün ve Göç*, p. 57. By quoting from Gaston Gaillard it is said that the Armenians of Erzurum and Doğu Beyazıt passed to the side of Russia with a mobilization call and they were armed and sent back to Turkey. It is asserted that three quarter of the Armenians of

one in which the Armenian war under the command of Entente Powers against Ottoman army, but also they participated into the French army to make war upon the Ottoman Empire.²¹² Thanks to their service, Armenians even were named as “Little Ally”.²¹³

The Armenian uprisings at the beginning of the war and their direct struggle against the Turkish Army as the members of Russian forces prepared the convenient environment for the Russian occupation of Eastern Anatolia. This kind of cases became so widespread that the government had to take radical precautions. Extensive information about the chain of events which gave way to implementation of the Armenian Relocation was made public by the Congress of Progress and Union in September 1916.²¹⁴ In the congress, Armenian uprisings, massacres and activities in the aim of facilitating the job of Russian army were explained in detail. The following words point out some details of the Armenian betrayal.²¹⁵

Instead of gathering together under the flag of the Ottoman Empire after the mobilization order, by passing over the borders through the Egyptian, Bulgarian and Romanian lands; volunteer young Armenians participated in the Russian army or Armenian brigands established by the Russians. By ignoring all the disagreements among themselves, Tashnak, Hunchak, Ramgavar and Reforma Hunchak Committees decided what kind of an action program they would implement if the Ottoman Empire entered the war. They decided that if the Ottoman army became successful, the Armenians would arrange rebellions and massacres in towns and set towns and villages on fire; they would also cut off the Army's ways of retreat through the brigands which are composed of Armenian soldiers induced to desert the Ottoman army with their guns. Furthermore, Echmiadzin Catholicos blessed the Russian Emperor as “the protector of the Armenians” and called all the Armenians to help Russian army with their life and property. His call was published in the 1914 issue of the *Ararat*, the official publication of the Catholicosate. Thereby, all the Armenians had to help Russian army by means of a holy order and it was observed that many Armenian soldiers commenced to desert the Ottoman army

Erzincan joined to the Russian troops and fought against Turkey. The Armenians of Harput were also armed and they formed troops.

²¹² Özdemir at all., *Sürgün ve Göç*, p. 57. By quoting from Gaston Gaillard it is said that the Armenians of Erzurum and Doğu Beyazıt passed to the side of Russia with a mobilization call and they were armed and sent back to Turkey. It is asserted that three quarter of the Armenians of Erzincan joined to the Russian troops and fought against Turkey. The Armenians of Harput were also armed and they formed troops.

²¹³ Arslanian, *British Wartime Pledges*, p. 517.

²¹⁴ The government had shortly explained the reasons for the relocation with the Law of Relocation but all the activities of the Armenians had not been demonstrated. The destructive activities of the Armenians and the developments which made the relocation obligatory have been announced in the CUP Congress of 1916. Besides, the historical development of the Armenian Question and the foreign powers' manipulation of the Question were clearly announced to the public opinion for the first time.

²¹⁵ TE, 30 September 1916, no: 1879.

with their guns... While the Ottoman government took necessary precautions it still thought that most of the Armenians would not be influenced by these aspirations.

The comments of the CUP administration clearly put their disappointment due to hostile behavior of the Armenians and the gravity of the situation. The Armenian revolutionary parties had decided to follow all the ways to put the Ottoman army into a catastrophic situation. In the further analysis of Armenian Question, it was stated that the roots of the problem dated back to putting of Berlin Congress on the agenda. Subsequently, it is uttered that Russia and England had been using Armenians in accordance with their interests. The comments also clearly reveal that they had been using the Armenian Question as a tGreekp to enlarge their sphere of influence and to penetrate into Ottoman territory more strongly.²¹⁶

The stage the Armenian Question reached up to in the course of the First World War is considered to be consequence of above mentioned historical process. The Ottoman Government persisted in maintaining good relations with the Armenians in spite of many problems of experience. The government avoided from treating all Armenians as enemy and continued to work for improving the conditions of the Armenians lived in. It was with disappointment that all attempts were vain. As it mentioned above; with the exception of some Armenian citizens, the Armenian activists rebelled just after the beginning of the war.²¹⁷

The dose of guerilla activities of Armenians has risen day by day. After a certain extent, the Ottoman Army had to battle practically a new front. Even, the situation was actually more troublous. The Armenian settlements inside Anatolia and their standing behind the existent front lines worsened the problem. The situation made to allow no more tolerance impossible. The developments necessitated the Armenian Relocation notified in the CUP can be listed as below:²¹⁸

²¹⁶ TE, 29 September 1916, no: 1878 and TE, 30 September 1916, no: 1879.

²¹⁷ TE, 29 September 1916, no: 1878.

²¹⁸ TE, 30 September 1916, no: 1879.

1. As soon as declaring war against Russia, the bandit leaders Antranik and Karakin Paternadjian (Armen Garo) passed the border of Beyazid with the Armenian volunteers and they destroyed the villages and killed the Muslims nearby the border.
2. On February 1330, the Armenian bandits attacked to the platoons which had been sent from Hicaz for soldier recruitment. They controlled the Van- Bitlis way and cut telegraph links. The bandits fought against the platoons for weeks. Gendarmes were shot in Muş. In Gümüş Village, a house was set on fire and director of *Nahiye* of Akan and nine soldiers were killed. In Muş, the bandits sheltered in Arak Monastery killed the commander of gendarme platoon and soldiers.
3. On 16 February, runaway soldiers and the bandits attacked to the Zeytun government building and arsenal. They plundered guns and cut the telegraph links. The bandits attempted to kill the officials and the Muslim families, and they killed some of the soldiers who had been sent to suppress the revolt.
4. In February, a bomb exploded in the house of Kigori Hampar, who just came from America, in Develi district of Kayseri. At the end of the initiated investigation, more than 90 bombs, hundreds of mauser rifles, gun powder in gas tins, many revolutionary documents in French, Russian and Armenian languages, a regulation composed of 70 articles indicating duties of the bandits and many other documents of correspondence were found in the Armenian Murahhashane and the Armenian schools. The captured suspects confessed that they prepared all these means of war for the independence of Armenians.
5. On 11 March 1331, 500 armed brigands gathered in Teke Monastery in Zeytun and they fought against the platoon sent to suppress them. And they martyred the gendarme commander Süleyman and the gendarmes in his retinue.
6. In Adana, Dört Yol and Iskenderun, the Ottoman Armenians landed by enemy navies for intelligence, spying and destroying railways, were captured with instructions in their hands.
7. Around Gevaş and Şitak, nearly 1000 brigands revolted and attacked to officials, destroyed telegraph links. They martyred gendarmes and the *Kadi* of Gevaş.
8. Later the revolt spread to Van. The houses of the Muslims, the buildings of the Ottoman Bank, *Düyun-u Umumiye*, *Reji*, the Post and Telegraph were bombed and the city was set on fire. On 7 April, the number of brigands armed with mausers, bombs, grenades, were more than 2500. The military forces and peoples sheltered to the Castle of Van and defended the city until the end of April. As soon as the city falls, the Armenian administration was proclaimed. The Russian and French hats were found in the earthworks around Van and Bitlis.
9. On 12 April, 60 dynamites, dynamite capsules in boxes, dynamite gun powders, many mausers and different rifles were found in Diyarbakir. Many fugitives escaped from military service were captured in churches and schools.
10. It is understood from confessions that Armenians were trying to compose a force with 30000 men in Sivas to prevent withdrawal of the Ottoman Caucasus Army. The situation was proved by bombs, specially prepared gendarme costumes, soldier tGreekpets and many forbidden guns obtained in Sivas, Suşehri, Merzifon and Amasya. Attacks to the soldier convoys headed towards Erzurum became beginning of the revolt.
11. On 16 June, Armenians of Karahisar-ı Şarki revolted during the gun search and they set the city on fire. 800 rebels attacked to the castle and martyred many soldiers, citizens, gendarmes and policemen. The commander of gendarme was among the masteries.
12. Hundreds of bombs and forbidden guns were found during the researches in İzmit, Bahçecik and Adapazarı. In the private clerical school of *Armişe* Monastery, again, highly destructive bombs, many small bombs and guns were obtained.
13. In Hudavendigar province, guns and bombs were found in many places. And armed bandits began to violate the public tranquility.
14. In Maraş, an armed group of 500 brigands formed regular earthworks around Fındıkcık village and they resisted and attacked to the military forces, and they martyred many soldiers.
15. Meanwhile, strong Armenian bandits attacked to peoples and soldiers in Boğazlıyan town of Ankara.
16. Likewise, Armenians began to armed revolt in Urfa.

The above mentioned events were only some pieces of hostile manner of the expectations of the Armenians and there occurred many other Armenian uprisings in all over the Empire. On the other hand, some individual actions of the Armenians also began to react. Prior to the relocation, many Armenian officials had been still continuing to their state service. However, some of them have intended to misuse their duty and authority and avoided from carrying out their responsibilities. Some news concerning this matter took place in newspapers. One of them was about Tolyan Effendi who was municipal doctor of District Makkarıköy.²¹⁹ A written complaint about Tolyan Effendi was submitted by the *imam*, village council and a few inhabitants of Village Osmaniye auxiliary to Municipality of Makkarıköy. According to the written complaint Tolyan Effendi had avoided from all his responsibilities since his assignment and above all he has tried to satisfy his individual profits. Upon the illness of a soldier's wife, he had been called and offered a cart for his access. Yet, he refused and said "I never come, you send me either a car or plane instead of a cart". When the inhabitants of the village complaint him to municipal manager Kalfayan who could compete with Tolyan in abuse, he protected Tolyan. The news mentioned that İsmet Bey were asked for dismissing Tolyan and Kalfayan who insists on not serving to Muslim people. The statements in the news show that the attitude of Armenian officers has been regarded as anti-Muslim.²²⁰

Furthermore, there is one more event from District Tercan. Though Sarkis Effendi, a vaccination officer of District Tercan, was charged with visiting soldier's rests for dressing their wounds, he did not carry out his duty and went his home. It was also revealed that he has made secret sale some medicines. Thus, he was dismissed.²²¹

The above mentioned events and many other made some urgent and radical precautions by the Ottoman government necessary. The most significant of these precautions was to move the Armenians from the zone of war and places risky for the

²¹⁹ TE, 20 February 1915, no: 1357.

²²⁰ TE, 20 February 1915, no: 1357.

²²¹ TE, 24 April 1915, no: 1420.

security of people and the army to more secure regions of the country. The inevitability of this measure is expressed as below:

...all these developments and events threatened security of our army, food supply directions and convoys, and rebellions took a very serious form that our army stayed between two fires and this would even cause defeat of our armies. Thus, dislodging of the Armenians from battle fields, camp and railway zones became an obligation.²²²

Before the decision for total relocation of the Armenians on April 24, 1915 some Armenians, who were supposed to be related with insurrectionary actions, were arrested. Yet, the Armenians had a considerably extensive and well structured organization. Thus, it was not easy to pacify the Armenian insurrectionists.

The Armenians have assumed a very menacing attitude against the Ottoman Empire, from then on. Particularly the Russian support to the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia made the Ottoman struggle thoroughly difficult. The newspapers often gave place much news about the severe violence of Russian troops on local people in the course of Russian occupation of Eastern Anatolia collaboration with the Armenians.²²³

²²² TE, 20 September 1916, no: 1879.

²²³ TE, 18 April, no: 1414. The atrocities perpetuated towards the Muslims were not limited with the Eastern Anatolia. *Tasvir-i Efkar* quotes from the Russian journal *Novavremia* that 'In... where is very distance from the war zone, the Russians deprive the Ottoman citizens of personal freedoms and they are being imprisoned. The Ottoman citizens who are very crowded in Russia are being exposed to every kind of atrocities and oppression of the Russian officials. The Ottoman citizens in the age from 17 to 50 are being captured and sent to the city of Tobolosk, Siberia, as the war captures.'

TE, 6 July 1915, no: 1493. *Tasvir-i Efkar* quotes from the Journal of Albayrak, published in Erzurum that 'the Russians attack to ...and capture Osman Ağa, and they demand his wife cook for themselves. After torture and oppression, he had to show place of his wife...they raped his wife before him and they killed him brutally.'

TE, 21 July 1915, no: 1508. Another news quoted from Albayrak was as follow: 'the Russians attacked to violate chastity of the Muslim women and the women tried to escape by leaving their babes on snow. The monsters did not show any pity even in the slightest degree and they raped the women. Then they bayoneted cheeks of babes and breast of women so they prevented feeding of babes and caused their dead with great suffering.'

III. 2. The Relocation Law and Its Application

With the beginning of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire found itself in a mortal struggle. The picture has been too discouraging for the Ottoman Empire since the beginning of the war. Especially in the Eastern Front, the Eastern Forces were mostly surpassed. It means that the Eastern Anatolia became virtually unshielded and vulnerable to Russian occupation. The Armenians have worsened the circumstances for the Ottoman Empire; already have maintained a struggle against Russia under considerably negative circumstances. As mentioned in detail above, the Armenians have never hanged back from any attempt which could exacerbate already bad circumstances of the Ottoman Empire and on the other hand make the Russian operations easier.²²⁴

The Ottoman Government had warned the Armenians so far the circumstances were worsened. However, it has been thoroughly observed that all attempts were vain. To be the pioneer measure, Talat Pasha sent a secret order to the eastern provinces so as to inform the officials that relocation of the Armenians and representatives of missionary organizations to other regions were on the agenda.²²⁵ Although such a serious precaution was not taken, some Armenians were disarmed and charged with back front duties as initial precautions.²²⁶

The primary precautions taken against the Armenians have not been effective and deterrent. The activities of the Armenian brigands and uprisings have gradually gained impetus. Many severe uprisings broke out in different regions of Anatolia. Thus, the Ottoman Government took the first concrete crucial step and 1800 Armenians were arrested upon the decree issued on April 24, 1915.²²⁷ The detained

²²⁴ TE, 29 September 1916, no: 1878 and TE, 30 September 1916, no: 1879.

²²⁵ BOA. DH. ŞFR., no: 14/ 119 in *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler*, Ankara, 1995, p. 6. (Hereafter OBE).

²²⁶ Kemal Çiçek, *Ermenilerin Zorunlu Göçü*, TTK, Ankara, 2005, p.31.

²²⁷ Çiçek, *Ermenilerin Zorunlu Göçü*, p.35. Gürün suggests the number as 2345 see; Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, TTK, Ankara, 1985, p. 213.

Armenians were not ordinary people; on the contrary they were the members of the revolutionary parties.²²⁸

Enver Pasha on the other hand believes in the necessity of Armenians' relocation from battle fields to far away regions. Two reasons lay behind his plan. Firstly, he aimed to stop the activities of Armenian brigands in the back fronts on battle field. Subsequently, he wanted to retaliate to the relocation of Muslims from Russia. Enver Pasha informed Talat Pasha about his desire with a letter sent on May 2, 1915. By stressing on the uprisings in Van, he offered relocation of the Armenians to inner Anatolia or Russia. Enver Pasha also proposed that the rebels and their families with other people from centers of revolt should be moved behind the borders; centers of revolt also should be dispelled and the Muslims, who had forced to immigrate over Ottoman boundaries in heartbroken conditions, should be settled to the places deserted by the Armenians.²²⁹

The former idea was implementation of relocation in critic areas where the rebellions were intense. Regarding urgency and sensibility of the circumstance, Talat Pasha used his own personal initiative and started the implementation of relocation without issuing any law from *Meclis-i Vükela*.²³⁰

At first, Talat Pasha ordered the governors of provinces for the relocation of the Armenians from Van, Erzurum and Bitlis to outside of the battle field. As said by the order, the governors would act in corporation with the commanders of 3rd and 4th armies.²³¹

Here, a point should be emphasized. Many undesirable events were being experienced related to the Armenian officials and soldiers in different parts of Anatolia and the Ottoman administration was taking precautions against these events. Although the government arrested many Armenians, the trustworthy Armenian officials were not under threat. During the heydays of the events, Berberian Effendi, *Muhasebe-yi Umumiye Müdür-i Umumisi*, was appointed to membership of *Islahat-ı Maliye Komisyonu*. TE, 12 May 1915, no: 1438.

²²⁸ Özdemir at.all., *Sürgün ve Göç*, p. 62.

²²⁹ Mehmet Saray, *Ermenistan ve Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri*, ATAM, Ankara, 2005. Saray quotes the telegraph of Enver Pasha from BOA. DH. ŞFR. No: 52/282.

²³⁰ *Meclis-i Vükela Mazbatası*, 198/163 in OBE, p. 8.

²³¹ OBE, p. 8.

Members of the Armenian brigands, people involved in insurrectionary movements and disloyal Armenian officers have been the ones relocated firstly.²³² Then, the scope of relocation has been begun to extend.²³³ The decision about the relocation of the Armenians has been continually notified thorough the telegrams sent different places of Anatolia.

The relocation has become widespread. England, Russia and France held a meeting in order to negotiate the situation of the relocated Armenians. These countries declared that they protested the Ottoman Empire, because they believe that the Ottoman Empire has massacred the Armenians. The international political pressure upon the Ottoman Empire has continued to rise. Although Talat Pasha had implemented the relocation with his personal initiative, he understood that he could not shoulder the responsibility alone and drafted a bill. Then, he submitted it to the prime ministry to be negotiated in the cabinet. After had being investigated, the bill was sent to the cabinet and the law was approved by the cabinet on May 30, 1915.²³⁴

The law²³⁵ was composed of four articles. The Armenians were not cited in the law. That is to say, the law had not solely been issued for the Armenians. The law was applied on some Greeks and the Arabs as well as the Armenians. The aim was to get rid of the threats emerged in the course of the war.²³⁶ The articles of the law are listed below:

Article 1: If any resistance, conflict or armed attack by the people against the orders of the government or regulations issued in the aim of ensuring national defense and security occurs in the course of campaign; the commanders of armies, army corps, divisions and their deputy commanders

²³² BOA. DH. ŞFR, no: 52/249 in OBE, p. 26. The cipher telegraph dated 6 May 1915, which was sent by Talat Pasha to the governors of Erzurum, Bitlis, Van, Sivas, Ma'muret'ül-aziz and Diyarbakır, orders dismiss and relocation of the Armenian state servants in the Ministry of Finance to the regions where the Armenian population did not exist.

²³³ BOA. DH. ŞFR, no: 52/282 in OBE, p. 28-29. The telegraph sent by Talat Pasha to the governors of Van and Bitlis on 9 May 1915, ordered relocation of the Armenians. The telegraph urged that Van and its vicinity became the center for rebellions and revolution.

²³⁴ Halaçoğlu, *Facts on the Relocation*, p. 71.

²³⁵ The original name of the law was *Vakt-ı Seferde İcraat-ı Hükiümete Karşı Gelenler İçin Cihet-i Askeriyece İttihaz Olunacak Tedabir Hakkında Kanunu-u Muvakkat*. Because the Parliament was in vacation, the law was called as *muvaqqat* (provisional). When the Parliament was summoned on 15 September 1915, the law was ratified by the Parliament. Öke, *The Armenian Question*, p.126.

²³⁶ Çiçek, *Ermenilerin Zorunlu Göçü*, p. 45.

and commanders of separate regions authorized and obligated to suppress the attacks or oppositions and punish them violently through using armed forces.

Article 2: The commanders of armies, separated army corps and divisions can decide individual or mass relocation of inhabitants of villages or towns due to military necessities or doubt about spying activities, treachery.

Article 3: The law takes effect as of the publication date.

Article 4: The deputy chief-commander and the Minister of War are responsible for the enforcement of the law.²³⁷

The issued law clearly revealed that the Ottoman administration had seriously apprehended for security and logistic of the army, which were vital in the war condition. Thus, relocation was regarded as an indispensable precaution. On the other hand, the government did not neglect to take some measures so as to execute the relocation in order. These measures were to secure the safety of life and property of the emigrants. Many telegrams were sent to different places of Anatolia to inform about the rules which would be applied during the implementation of the Relocation Law and strict instructions were laid in order to lead officers to stick to the rules.²³⁸

The reasons for relocation, the instruction about who would be subjected to the relocation and the rules which would be followed throughout the relocation were notified as below:

The aim of the government in forcing the Armenians from their present areas and sending them designated paces is to ensure that these people do not carry on with their illegal and anti-Ottoman activities, and that they are made unable to pursue their national desire for an independent Armenia. The annihilation of these people is out of the question, if anything, their absolute security should be provided for during the course of their transfer. And by putting aside money from the refugee funds, their expenses should be met. You should take all the necessary precautions to this end. Apart from those, who have been already subjected to the forcible relocation, the others, who have been allowed to remain, should not be forced out of their homes; they should be left untouched. As you have been notified previously, our government took the decision not to relocate those Armenians, that is, the families of Armenian soldiers, and the needed artisans, as well as Protestant and Catholic Armenians. Anyone attacking the Armenian groups being transferred, or the gendarmerie and the officials, who are leading these attacks, should immediately be persecuted. And they should be referred to the courts-martial. You should understand that the provincial and sanjak administrations should be held responsible, should these attacks take place and persist.²³⁹

The major reason for the implementation of relocation was to neutralize the Armenians who moved illegally against the Ottoman Empire and intended to found

²³⁷ Çiçek, *Ermenilerin Zorunlu Göçü*, p. 45.

²³⁸ The circular was sent to Hüdavendigâr, Ankara, Konya, Izmit, Adana, Maraş, Urfa, Aleppo, Zor, Sivas, Kütahya, Karesi, Niğde, Mamuretülaziz, Diyarbakır, Karahisar-ı Sahib, Erzurum and Kayseri. Halaçoğlu, *Facts on the Relocation*, p. 78

²³⁹ Halaçoğlu, *Facts on the Relocation*, p. 78-79, quoted from BOA, ŞFR., no: 55/292.

an independent Armenian state. The Ottoman administration aimed to remove the Armenian threat by relocating them.²⁴⁰ Besides, the government openly declared that it had never an intention to massacre Armenians through the relocation. The government ordered its officers in order to take all necessary precautions and undertook the satisfaction of Armenians' all needs during the relocation. The Catholic²⁴¹, Protestant²⁴² Armenians and families of soldiers were exempted from relocation. The Ottoman Government had ordered that all officers have to obey all rules carefully during the implementation of relocation; otherwise they would be punished violently.

The law of relocation was principally implemented in regions threatening the security of fronts. Erzurum, Bitlis and Van behind the Caucasian and Iranian Fronts;

²⁴⁰ TE, 17 June 1915, no: 1474. The Ottoman administration was trying to neutralize the Armenian revolutionaries. The details of the news related to the trials of the Hunchak members, appeared in the *Tasvir-i Efkar*, were as follow: “Müstakil ve muhtar bir Ermenistan teşkili için suikastlar tertip eden, ecnepleri hükümet-i seniyye aleyhine tahrik etmek suretiyle memalik-i mahruseden bir kısmının daire-yi hükümet-i seniyyeden çıkarılmasına teşebbüs ve bu maksatla memalik-i ecnebiyenin muhtelif mahallerinde hafi ve celi kongreler akdiyle beraber, neşriyat ve tahrikat ve mekatibatta bulundukları icra kılınan muhakeme-yi vicahileri neticesinde sabit bulunan Hınçak komitesi aza-yı nafizesinden Nafize, Rusya tebasından Kafkasyalı Matyos Sarkisyan veyahud Tekfurdağlı Hamparsum Kirkor, ve Varnalı Agop Hazaryan, Muratyan nam Murat Zakaryan, ve Giresunlu rençber Minas, Gabriel Keşişyan nam-ı diğer Samsunlu Sarı Haçin veyahud Minas, ve Bitlisli terzi Vartan Kalıncıyan nam-ı diğer Agadir Bedros, ve komisyoncu Çemişgezekli Vahan Boyacıyan nam-ı diğer Roben, Minas Karabetyan, ve Harputlu doktor Bedros, tacir ve kunduracı Estepan Muratyan, ve emlak tellalı Arapkirli Aram, ve mekteb-i tıbbiye üçüncü sene talebesinden Hırant veledi Abraham Kegaryan, ve saraşhanede çadırcı amelesinden Şebinkarahisarlı Karakin veledi Arakil Bogosyan, ve kuyumcu Mikail Bogosyan, ve Kilis Hınçak şubesi reisi Singer Kumpanyası tahsildarı Agob veled Hazarbasımacıyan, ve mezkur şube azasından Mıgırdıç veled Ohannes, ve Ermeni mektebi muallimlerinden Tomas veled Vahan Tomasyan, ve Mekteb-i Harbiyede zabıt namzeti Vanlı Kegam veled Karabet Vaykinyan, ve Bahçecik Ermeni mektebi muallimlerinden Yervani Penavud veled Ohannes Topuzyan ve Kayseri Hınçak şubesi azasından ve mektep muallimlerinden Ohannes veled Estepan Pergazyan ve kurukahveci Karnik veled Kirkor Boyacıyan'ın Mülkiye ceza kanunname-yi humayunun 54. maddesine göre idamlarına Dersaadet Divan-ı Örfisinden isdar kılınan karar hazret-i padişahiye gönderilmişti. Bu konuda irade-yi seniyyenin ulaşmasıyla merkumun şehir-i haziran-ı Greekiyenin ikinci günü sabah 3.30 sıralarında alel-husus memur-u ruhani vasıtasıyla merasim-i diniyenin ifasını ve vasiyetnamelerinin tahririni ve muayene-yi tıbbiyelerinin icrasını müteakip usulüne uygun idamları icra olunmuş ve cürm-ü mezkurdan dolayı yine gıyaben idam cezasına mahkum olan komitenin Merkez-i Umumi reisi olan Sabahgelyan ve azadan diğerleri hakkında dahi Dersaadet tarafından muktezıyat-ı kanunun icrasına tevessül kılınmıştır.”

²⁴¹ The order for exemption of the Catholic Armenians from relocation was repeated with many telegraphs. On 4 August 1915 (22 N. 1333) the Ministry of Interior Affairs sent a telegraph to provinces and *mutassarıflıks*, and ordered prevention of the Catholic Armenians' relocation. BOA. DH. ŞFR., no: 54-A/252 in OBE, p.72.

²⁴² Similar to the Catholic Armenians, an order was sent to the provinces and *mutassarıflıks* on 15 August 1915 (4 L. 1333) related to the Protestant Armenians, and their exemption from the relocation was repeated. BOA. DH. ŞFR., no: 55/20 in OBE, p. 78.

Mersin and İskenderun behind the Sinai Front were the places where the Armenians extensively subjected to relocation.²⁴³ Before the relocation law, some Armenians had been transferred to Konya from different places of Anatolia. However, the transfer of Armenians was stopped due to fact that the Armenians have begun to reorganize in Konya and they were sent to Urfa, Zor and southeastern Aleppo.²⁴⁴

The officers had been seriously warned about safety of life and property of the Armenians at implementation of relocation. Talat Pasha warned military authorities once more in order to hinder any possible attack against Armenians. As it was said in the notification that:

...Ottoman military commanders to ensure that neither the Kurds nor the Muslims used the situation to take vengeance for long years of the Armenian terrorism. The Armenians were to be protected and cared for until they returned their homes after the war.²⁴⁵

The other important problem emerged in the course of relocation was the condition of deported Armenians' properties. When the law of relocation was issued, Armenians had been given permission to take their property at amount that they are able to carry. Furthermore, it had been also notified that the goods, properties and valuables of Armenians which they left behind because of the relocation would be returned them in the proper way.²⁴⁶ The safety of these properties was under the guarantee of the state and organized by the Commission for *Emlak-ı Metruke* (The Commission for Deserted Properties). Yet, these properties began to be collected by some people with small prizes. Accordingly, the measures listed below were taken by the authorities:

- a) Forbid the entry or free circulation of all (strangers) and suspects in localities which will be evacuated.
- b) If there are people of this category already in the district, make them to leave immediately.

²⁴³ *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler*, p. 9. Adana, Ankara, Aydın, Bolu, Bitlis, Bursa, Canik, Çanakkale, Diyarbakır, Edirne, Eskişehir, Erzurum, İzmit, Kastamonu, Kayseri, Karahisar, Konya, Kütahya, Mamuretülaziz, Maraş, Niğde, Samsun, Sivas, Trabzon ve Van were the places from where the Armenians were forced to relocation.

²⁴⁴ *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler*, p. 9. Aleppo, Rakka, Zor, Kerek, Havran, Musul, Diyarbakır ve Cizre were the regions where the Armenians were settled in.

²⁴⁵ Sonyel, *The Great War*, p. 116.

²⁴⁶ Çiçek, *Ermenilerin Zorunlu Göçü*, p. 47.

- c) If there are such persons who have bought goods at ridiculous prices, take steps to annul the sale, to restore prices to the right level, and to prevent illegal profits being made.
- d) Authorize the Armenians to take away with them everything they wish.
- e) If there is found among the goods not taken away stuff which has deteriorated by the weather, sell by auction that of primary importance.
- f) The merchandise not taken away that can remain without deteriorating; keep it on behalf of the owner.
- g) Prevent all agreements of the nature of hiring, pawning, attachment or sale or mortgage, which is likely to take away all rights of a proprietor to his property, and so sever his attachment to the country; consider as null and void all agreements of this kind which have been made from the time the relocations commenced until now.
- h) Prevent any further agreements of this kind being concluded.
- i) Authorize the formalities of definite sales, but prevent foreigners from buying land and household furniture.²⁴⁷

As can be observed, the Ottoman government was very sensitive about the properties left behind by Armenians. As Armenians were assumed to be return the places they left, the authorities made provisions to this effect. They have tried to prevent the properties from being plundered and sold below the vale.

Another problem waiting for the Ottoman Empire was the cost of relocation. The government established *İskan-ı Aşair Müdriyeti* with the purpose of satisfying the needs of people subjected to the relocation and controlling the budget allocated to the relocation. The government had to use most of this directorate's budget to satisfy the needs of deported Armenians. As said by the report submitted by the Ministry of Interior to the Prime Ministry on December 7, 1915; 25 million piastres were used throughout 1915 and 86 millions were used until the end of October 1916. Another note from the report said that 150 more millions were required up to the end of the year.²⁴⁸ Additionally, the government has made several further requests from the Assembly for extra allowances to the directorate.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷ Sonyel, *The Great War*, p. 117-118. See also OBE, p. 11-12 for the circular dated on 11 August 1915 (29 B. 1333) which is quoted from BOA. DH. ŞFR, no: 54/381. In another circular sent by Ministry of Interior to Trabzon orders that shelters should be provided to refugees coming from Batum, their things that could bruise should be sold, their immovable properties should not be assigned to anyone, their jewelries should be protected and collecting taxes from the Armenians should be postponed. BOA, DH. ŞFR, nr: 54/420 in OBE, p. 66-67.

²⁴⁸ Kamuran Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p.290 from Genelkurmay, no: 1/2 KLS 361, Dosya 1445, F. 15-22. In *Facts on the Relocation*; "The annual budget of this directorate (*İskan-ı Aşair and Muhacirin Müdüriyeti*) for the year 1915 was 78.000.000 and for the year 1916, 200.000.000 piastres (kuruş). This sum was spent yearly for relocated Armenians, Greeks, Arabs, as well as for Muslim refugees

Despite all precautions taken by the Ottoman Government, many problems have emerged in the course of the relocation. There are two principal reasons for the problems. It should be primarily point out that there was a general defectiveness of security due to the war conditions. It was impossible to charge sufficient number of officers with controlling such a vast mass emigration. The efforts of security forces to ensure the security of Armenians were not enough most of the time.²⁵⁰ Regarding the massacres conducted against Muslim people by Armenians, it can be deduced that some groups intended to revenge. Armenians sometimes were open these kind of attacks due to fact that they could not be protected enough. The attacks and massacres by the Kurdish tribes on the Armenians were also known.

Apart from the above mentioned reasons, there were some other essential reasons for the Armenian losses like inconvenient climatic conditions, malnutrition and epidemic diseases stirred by unsanitary conditions. During the war, the economy of Ottoman Empire was too weak. The government has not been capable of financing its own soldiers, yet.²⁵¹ Above all, the Ottoman Government has tried to meet the need of the Armenians as much as possible. The government sometimes went to reduction in the

thrown out of Russia.” Halaçoğlu, *Facts on the Relocation*, p. 92, footnote 239 from BOA, BEO., no: 334063.

²⁴⁹ *Meclis-i Mebusan Encümen Mazbataları ve Levayih-i Kanuniye*, Devre:3, İçtima Senesi: 3. The government submitted a law draft to *Meclis-i Mebusan* to add 50.000.000 *kuruş* to the budget of *Muhacirin Müdüriyeti* on 23 *Teşrinisani* 1332. Here The Committee for Finance Affairs demonstrated the details of the expenditures of the Directorate. The government also demanded 2.375.000 *kuruş* for administration of the deserted properties (*emlak-ı metrukenin temin-i idaresi için*) from *Meclis-i Mebusan* with an article of the law draft.

²⁵⁰ Samuel Edelman, the Consul of Aleppo, reports the events in Urfa that “...during the control for weapons two policemen were killed with the fire of Armenians, and this triggered arming of the Kurds and their attack to the Armenian quarters...although the polices hate the Armenians they did their job very well but their number was not enough to prevent the events. The population of Urfa is 50.000 and 20.000 of them are Armenians, and a garrison is needed to protect such a population.” Özdemir at.all., *Sürgün ve Göç*, p. 64, footnote 167 quoted from US ARCHIVES NARA 867.4016/203.

²⁵¹ Hikmet Özdemir, *Salgın Hastalılardan Ölüm, 1914-1918*, TTK, Ankara, 2005, p. 176 by quoting from Liman von Sanders, *Türkiye’de Beş Yıl*, p. 158-159. “ Yiyecek ve ısıtıcı elbise noksanı yüzünden büyük kayıplara uğruyoruz. Pek çok Türk eri, hala ince yazlık elbise ile geziyor. Kaputları ve kunduraları yok. Ayaklarını çoğu zaman paçavra ile sarıyorlar, ama yine de ayakları çıplaktır. Yiyecek ancak günlük ihtiyacın üçte biri oranında geliyor. Bütün erlerin yüzleri, yeterli gıda alamadıklarını gösteriyor.”

expenses of the army in order to finance the relocated Armenians.²⁵² As it mentioned above, an enormous budget had been allocated to finance the relocation. Furthermore, the foreign aids were allowed to be transfer to the Armenians.

III. 3. Changes on the Regulation of the Armenian Catholicosate and Patriarchate

The Armenians had been organized in accordance with the *Ermeni Millet Nizamnamesi* issued in 1863. All decisions about the Armenian community were taken and executed in accordance with this regulation. The regulations had not only a religious content. The issues related with education, jurisdiction, social relations and economy were administered in appropriate with this regulation. The *Ermeni Millet Nizamnamesi* gave the Armenians so much right that the Armenians practically had a new state of their own within the body of the Ottoman Empire. Even, the regulation was also called as the *Ermeni Teşkilat-ı Esasiyesi* (The Armenian Constitution).²⁵³

There was another significant aspect of the regulation that it allowed the foundation of a large scale assembly. According to the regulation, there would be a new assembly, the *Meclis-i Cismani* (Secular Assembly) in addition to *Meclis-i Ruhani* (Spiritual Assembly). Besides, an inclusive assembly, the *Meclis-i Umumi* (the General Assembly)²⁵⁴ was established with its 140 members including representatives of both the *Meclis-i Cismani* and the *Meclis-i Ruhani*. All secular decrees would be subjected to ratification of the *Meclis-i Umumi*. Thus, the centuries old customs were changed and the effect of civilians on the Armenian community

²⁵² Çiçek, *Ermenilerin Zorunlu Göçü*, p. 97-98; “... mesela 20 Temmuz 1915 günü Erzurum vilayetine çekilen bir telgrafta, Üçüncü Ordu’nun erzak taşımak için kullandığı 600 arabanın 510’nun, Ermenilerin de sevk edilmesinde kullanılması nedeniyle sıkıntıya düştüğü belirtilerek, arabaların bir kısmının geri gönderilmesi emredilmektedir.” By quoting from BOA. DH. ŞFR. 54-A/ 50.

Additionally see p. 103-104 for the details of regulation prepared by *Muhacirin Müdüriyeti* and put into effect on 17 October 1915 to meet needs of the Armenians.

²⁵³ Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*, p. 166.

²⁵⁴ The original translation of the Assembly from the Armenian is the *Milli Meclis-i Umumi*; Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*, s.167.

was augmented. In such a case, the Armenian Church would be thoroughly politicized and be controlled by the political parties in the forthcoming years.

Granting some rights to the Armenians, the *Ermeni Millet Nizamnamesi* has motivated the Armenians to use these rights as threats against the authority of the Ottoman Government and prepared a ground for the Armenian struggle for independence. The Regulation also gave rise the emergence of long lasting problems. During the First World War, the enormity of these problems has reached peak levels. In consequence, the Regulation had to be altered and rearranged in 1916. The new Regulation, the *Ermeni Katogikosluk ve Patrikliği Nizamnamesi*, came into force on August 12, 1916. The reaction of the *Tasvir-i Efkar* on the new Regulation was as stated above:²⁵⁵

The Government changed the Regulation of the Armenian Patriarchate and issued a new regulation. The former Regulation had completely different character from the regulations of the other patriarchates, especially from the Regulation of the Greek Patriarchate. The Greek Patriarchate has the Spiritual Assembly and the Composed Assembly, which had a limited number of members. However, the Armenian Patriarchate had the Spiritual Assembly and the Secular Assembly as well as the National Assembly, which regularly summoned like parliaments with 140 members and it had the right of nominating members of the Secular Assembly. The Regulation had been prepared by a patriarchal commission and the grand vizier of the time received the imperial decree for the Regulation in 1279 without discussions of *Şura-yi Devlet* and *Meclis-i Vükela*. The basic reason for regularity and success of the Armenian revolutionary organizations was the Regulation of the Armenian Patriarchate. All power had concentrated on the National Assembly, which had been mainly composed of the common people. The Armenian revolutionary parties could directly manipulate most of the members of the National Assembly. Thus, all the religious leaders also became intermediaries performing the policies of the Armenian committees. The Armenian priests had gained hearts of the people with religious inspiration but this time, they used their influence to inspire the hearts of the people with political ideas. These political ideas supported by religious influence embraced all the Armenian youth and they scarified blindly themselves with the orders from above. They also became instruments to the international politics with maneuvers of England and Russia. The government abolished the National Assembly and formed the Spiritual Assembly composed of religious leaders for religious matters. Besides the Spiritual Assembly, the Composed Assembly was formed. This assembly is composed of the religious leaders and limited number of civilian members from Armenian people and the assembly is responsible for dealing with religious institutions, education and works of charity. The Catholicos Effendi is nominated as the head of the Composed Assembly. With the new regulation, the government did not touch to the religious privileges granted by the constitution and the Patriarchate was secured from being ... in the hands of the committees.

The comment of Yunus Nadi clearly defined the evils of the Regulation. It was claimed that the Regulation had been ratified by the Grand Vizier of the time without

²⁵⁵ TE, 11 August 1916, no: 1829.

submitting evaluation of the Chamber of Ministers. The Armenians had been given the right of having a National Assembly composed of 140 members. They were regularly gathering just like a regular parliament. According to the interpretation, success and improvement of the Armenian revolutionary movement had been resulted in the *Ermeni Millet Nizamnamesi*. The revolutionaries acquired the political power in the National Assembly in time and the religious authorities had to yield to the political figures. Thus the religious leaders, who had gained respect of the Armenian people with religious inspiration, began to use their influence to inspire political thoughts. Thereafter, revolutionary ideas had speedily accelerated among the Armenian youth and they were manipulated by the foreign powers. At the final stage, detrimental effects of the process came to the fore during the World War. Thus, annulment of the former *Ermeni Millet Nizamnamesi* became an unavoidable precaution.

The new Regulation was composed of 39 articles.²⁵⁶ According to the first article of the new Regulation, Catholicosate of Sis and Akhdamar were unified and the Patriarchate of İstanbul with the Patriarchate of Jerusalem were made subsidiary to this new Catholicosate. This catholicosate was made the spiritual center for all Ottoman Armenians and all relations with the Echmiadzin Catholicosate were broken. The Monastery of Mar Yakup in Jerusalem was became the residence of the Patriarchate and the Catholicosate.²⁵⁷ Its sphere of spiritual activity was limited with the Ottoman lands. The main goal tried to be achieved through the first article of the new regulation was to undercut the authority of the Echmiadzin Catholicosate²⁵⁸ thoroughly.

²⁵⁶ The articles of the Regulation were published in the *Tasvir-i Efkar* on August 11, 1916 and following days. For the full text of the Regulation published in the *Takvim-i Vekayi* see Pınar Kundil, *Armenian Question According to Takvim-i Vekayi 1914-1918*, unpublished MA Thesis, METU Graduate School for Social Science, Ankara, 2003, p. 102-106.

²⁵⁷ For the history of the Armenian Patriarchate at Jarusalem see; Yavuz Ercan, *Kudüs Ermeni Patrikhanesi*, TTK, Ankara, 1988.

²⁵⁸ The Echmiadzin Catholicosate was the first religious and administrative center of the Armenians. Although some other religious centers emerged through the history, Echmiadzin kept its importance as the leading religious center. Canan Seyfeli, Sis (Kilikya) Gatoğikosluğu'nun Geçirdiği Evreler, *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, sayı:16-17, Kış 2004-İlkbahar 2005, ASAM, Ankara, p. 110-111.

As said in the second article of the new Regulation; with his imperial certification for the office (*Memuriyet Berat-ı Aliyesi*), the Patriarch has to carry out his duty in accordance with the rules listed in the new Regulation. The Patriarch would be under the authority of the Ministry of Justice and Sects (*Adalet ve Mezahip Nezareti*) and he would be able to apply to the ministry only about the issues related with sects.

The 3rd and 4th articles of the Regulation contained the method and conditions concerning the election of the Patriarch. As stated in the 3rd article that if the positions of patriarchate and catholicosate are vacated, the members of *Meclis-i Ruhani* and *Meclis-i Muhtelit* select a deputy among appertaining members with the imperial permission inside of three days and notify him to the Ministry of Justice and Sects. Next, the Ministry approves the deputy official in communication with the Prime Ministry (*Bab-ı Ali*). Subsequently, the deputy establishes two deputyships one from the ecclesiastical class and one from the non- ecclesiastical class. Then, the *Meclis-i Ruhani* and *Meclis-i Muhtelit* is commissioned under the chairmanship of the deputy Patriarch within 45 days and prepared a book consisting of the selected names among the people who have the prelacy (the rank of episcopacy) and appropriate for the Patriarchate. The names are voted secretly and they are registered to the book regardless of the number of their votes. The number of registered candidates should be at least 7. The names are submitted to the Ministry of Justice and Sects. If necessary, the Ministry cancelled the names evaluated as not appropriate to the Patriarchate. After that the Commission for Election votes the candidates again and determined the top three. Later than electing the one of the three, *Meclis-i Ruhani* submits the name to the Ministry and asks for his approval. Lastly, the rank of the Patriarchate and Catholicosate is granted to the elected person along with the approval by the Sultan.

The 4th article of the Regulation lists the features that the candidates should have. According the article, the ancestors of the candidate should be the Ottoman citizen. Besides, he should obtain the confidence of the people and the state through his good character and behaviors and he should absolutely not be pronounced to imprisonment. Additionally, he should successfully manage a 5 year delegation

(*murahhaslık*). He should be also under 45 years old, should know the official language of the state and should be aware of the laws and regulations of the state.

The 5th and 6th articles of the Regulation determine the duties and formation of *the Meclis-i Ruhani*. As indicated by 5th article, *the Meclis-i Ruhani* is composed of 12 members. The half of 12 contains the delegates appointed by the *Bab-ı Ali* and the other 6 consists of other bishops. The Patriarch is the chairman of *Meclis-i Ruhani*. One of the members of the Assembly becomes acting president, in the time of his absence. The term of office for each member is two years and the half of total members is renewed once every year. At the end of the first year after the regulation come into force, the alteration is done by lot.

The 6th article of the Regulation lists the duties of *the Meclis-i Ruhani*. The details of the article was as follows: To control the religious affairs of the community; to save the beliefs and narrations of the Armenian Church and protect them from distorting; to lead the employees of the church work in order; to deal with the issues concerning education and promotion of ecclesiastical class; to work for bringing monks, priests and bishops; to wholly achieve the religious education in the Armenian schools; to investigate in the complaints by the community members about the delegates and to take necessary action; to provide the assignment of new delegates by the Ministry of Justice and Sects.

The 7th and 8th articles of the Regulation determine the duties and formation of the *Meclis-i Muhtelit*. As indicated by 7th article the *Meclis-i Muhtelit* is composed of 12 members. The four of 12 are elected among the members of *the Meclis-i Ruhani* and the other 8 are selected outside the ecclesiastical class among esteemed people of the community. Although, the usual president of the assembly is the Patriarch, a member of the *Meclis-i Ruhani* can be assigned deputy president. The ecclesiastical members of the *Meclis-i Muhtelit* are elected by the *Meclis-i Ruhani*. One of the members outside the ecclesiastical class is elected by the Patriarchate and also the other seven are elected by delegation centers (*murahhaslık merkezi*), each of them can only send one member. The seven are appointed with the approval of the Ministry of Justice

and Sects. The term of office for each member of *the Meclis-i Muhtelit* is two years and the half of total members is renewed once every year. At the end of the first year after the regulation come into force, the alteration is done by lot.

The 8th article of the Regulation lists the duties of the *Meclis-i Muhtelit* as follow:

To control the properties and outcomes of the Patriarchate Fund; to manage the private schools established by churches and monasteries which are under direct authority of the Patriarchate; to attentively rule the estates, properties and cashes of endowments; to investigate in the books of account sent by the delegate centers in order to follow properties of above mentioned foundations; to control whether the cashes and estates granted by will spend legally or not... Besides, the *Meclis-i Muhtelit* meets once a week.

The 9th article of the Regulation establishes the tasks and authorities of the *Meclis-i Muhtelit* concerning the community schools. According to the article; while the *Meclis-i Ruhani* is responsible for the education of religious schools, the *Meclis-i Muhtelit* on the other hand is responsible for the finance of these schools. The establishment and development of schools in addition to the organization of training stuff and their assignments are under the authority of the *Meclis-i Muhtelit*. However, all these measures are subjected to the supervision of the Ministry of Education.

The following articles between 10 and 16 organize the relation between the Patriarch and the assemblies. The articles between 17 and 21 contain directives about general administration of the Patriarchate. The rules related with delegate centers takes place beginning from the 22nd article to the 28th. The articles between 29 and 39 are also made up of general regulations.

The 37th article of the Law specifies that the Regulation of Armenian Patriarchate dated on Ramadan 20, 1279 (1863) was revoked. Consistent with the 39th article, the Ministry of Justice and Sects is responsible for the enforcement of the new law.

Regarding the changes laid by the new Regulation for the Armenian Patriarchate and Catholicosate, the two significant points are particularly striking. These points pronounced by Yunus Nadi as below:²⁵⁹

1. The abolishment of an organization titled as the National Assembly which has ruled over all Armenian institutions as a significant political element.
2. The attachment of the highest spiritual organization of Ottoman Armenians to the Ottoman jurisdiction and breaking off all relations with *Eçmiyazın Catholicosate* and its environment.

In the next parts of his article, Yunus Nadi utters the effects of the 1863 regulations and how the Armenian Church has become a slave at the hands of the Armenian brigands.

The reason that forced the Ottoman Empire to change the Regulation is that the patriarchate regulation included many articles which were completely against the spirit of the constitution and caused many conflicts. Accordingly, the Ottoman administration thought it necessary to remove these conflicts. It was the Armenian National Assembly that significantly misled the Armenians. The Regulation had been prepared by a Patriarchal committee in 1279 and the grand vizier of the time had it approved to the sultan without any discussion on it. With the Regulation, a National Assembly composed of 140 members was established and it used to be summoned at certain times. The Assembly members were to be elected by the Armenian people and the Assembly controlled the Secular and Spiritual Assemblies, and other Armenian institutions including even the Patriarchate. The Armenian Committeesall the Armenian institutions and they made the Armenian religious men their servants for political purposes. Priests, teachers and all other people having a position, more or less, in the society became tools of the committees because of the Assembly's pressure...Attachment of the Armenians to the Catholicosates within the Ottoman border instead of Echmiadzin, which was defender of the Russian interests, as the highest religious center is reasonable.²⁶⁰

Regarding the measures in the Regulation of Armenian Patriarchate and Catholicosate, it can be deduced that the freedoms of the Armenians concerning their social life, religion and education have been never interfered. The Armenians had extensive rights like being able to elect the members of their own assemblies; growing up their own ecclesiastics; establishing the community schools and controlling their incomes and expenditures; directing all community estates, cashes and other sources of income however they want as long as they act in accordance with the laws. The only thing the Armenians lost after the new Regulation was their National Assembly which was a practically independent organ and their bounds with Echmiadzhin which had tried to control the Ottoman Armenians from outside.

²⁵⁹ TE, 11 August 1916, no: 1829.

²⁶⁰ TE, 11 August 1916, no: 1829.

After annulment of the former Regulation, Patriarch Zaven Effendi was also dismissed from his post in August 1916. Habayan Effendi, the Patriarch-Catholicos of Ottoman Armenians at Kudüs, sent a telegraph to the Ministry of Justice and Sects and he notified his decision on appointment of Gabriel Cevahircian Effendi, the Preacher of the Galata Church, as the Patriarch representative at İstanbul in accordance with the new Regulation. Then, Cevahircian Effendi and Baha Bey, the Director of Sects (*Mezahip Müdürlüğü*), arrived together to the Armenian Church at Kumkapı and Cevahircian Effendi received the documents of the Patriarchate from Zaven Effendi.²⁶¹

The religious affairs of the Armenians were administered according to the new Regulation until the last days of 1918. After the collapse of the Talat Pasha Cabinet at the end of the First World War, the Armenian Patriarchate applied to the new cabinet and demanded resurrection of the former Regulation. The Armenians also demanded return of Zaven Effendi to the post of patriarchate. Hayri Bey, the Minister of Justice and Sects at Ahmet İzzet Pasha Cabinet, stated that the existing Regulation had been implemented as a provisional law and approved by the imperial decree (*irade-yi seniyye*) so annulment of the law required following of the same procedure. However, he promised for bringing the matter to the cabinet.²⁶²

III. 4. The Armenian Activities after Relocation

Although, the Ottoman Government had decided to deport the Armenians, the Armenian uprisings continued. Armenians revolted in Boğazlıyan on July 23, 1915; in Maraş on August 1; in Urfa on August 9; in Mountain Mosses (Antioch) on September 14; in Urfa on September 29; in Islahiye on February 7, 1916; in Akdağ

²⁶¹ TE, 2 September 1916, no: 1851.

²⁶² TE, 9 November 1918, no: 2555.

Madeni on April 4; in Tosya on April 9 and in many other places on different dates.

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Particularly, the Russian occupation of the Eastern Anatolia and Black Sea region has led to the emergence of very tragic consequences for the Muslims in these regions. It is plausible that the Russians and their Armenian partners have executed massacres many times in Anatolia. The official writings, testimonies of witnesses and the publications of the press of that period corrected the news about the massacres.

Erzurum was one of the cities which have most extensively experienced massacres of Muslims. In corporation with the Russians, the Armenian brigands killed some of 2000 Muslim people they took away during their relocation from Hasankale to the frontiers and they sent the rest of 2000 to the inner Anatolia. The Armenians executed 9 people in Erzurum and take males under 14 away unknown places. Also an Armenian court in Sub-district Pekreç executed 300 or 400 people and they got rid of all Muslim population in Aşkale, Tercan, Ilıca, Tavuskerd and around Artvin.²⁶⁴

According to the eyewitnesses of a person from Hınıs the district of Erzurum, the Armenians and Russians raped; also massacred people including kids and elders; burned people by sticking them forcibly into buildings; slit abdomens of pregnant women and exposed unborn babies by hanging them on the bayonets of their guns; also massacred more than 500 people trying to emigrate from Hınıs to Varto and seized the property and animals of these people by violence.²⁶⁵

²⁶³ Sonyel, *The Great War*, p. 127-128.

²⁶⁴ BOA. HR. SYS. HU. kr. 110, dos. 12-2, nr. 9-11, 17 in *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Kafkasya'da ve Anadolu'da Ermeni Mezalimi 1906-1918*, Ankara, 1995, pp. 52-57. This document was dated on 24 May 1916 (21 B. 1334).

²⁶⁵ This testimony was given by Ali Effendi bin Hacı Yusuf. For details of this testimony and the other testimonies see BOA. HR. SYS. HU, kr. 110, dos. 12-3, nr. 12-14, 16, 18-26, 28-39, 41-44 in *Ermeni Mezalimi*, p.68-95.

As it was mentioned before, some articles about the atrocities conducted by the Armenians in Erzurum had been published at *the Tasvir-i Efkar*. However, the most striking article of the newspaper about the events in Erzurum is the one written by Yunus Nadi after the emancipation of Erzurum.²⁶⁶ What makes the article interesting that it reflected the mood of the Turks during the Armenian attacks and it revealed how the Turks perceived the events. Yunus Nadi expressed his thoughts as follows:

Erzurum witnessed massacres like the other invaded parts of the state...we were driven to hatred and anger by the Armenian bands' massacres, which occurred before and after. In fact, we still observe monstrous actions of these bandit groups during the recovery of Erzurum. As it can be read from the official announcements, driven Armenian bands set different places of the city on fire before escaping. The first thing that the Turkish arm had to deal with as soon as they reached the city was that the soldiers tried to put out fires... news coming from the recovered cities of Eastern Anatolia related to the atrocities committed by the Armenians is so tragic that they cause deep sorrow in the our hearts. There is nearly no town, village and house not having destructed, no people not having assaulted beginning from Erzincan and its vicinity. The crimes that the Armenians committed after the armistice with Russia and withdrawal of the Russian forces were so otiose, meaningless and bloodthirsty actions. It is certain that these crimes will be sharply reacted not only by our people but also by all humanity...when the humanity learns the truths...they have to account for cruelties committed against from a newborn to a gray haired elder... Evidences which prove the essential character of the Armenian banditry are enough to stuff libraries.²⁶⁷

This article was delivered through the end of the war. However, mentioned events were not only peculiar to that period. Yunus Nadi was, in a way, analyzing the atrocities experienced by the Turks in Erzurum and Erzincan through the war. It should be retained that these events were well known but they had not been publicized before because of the censorship. The authorities, truly, thought that informing the people on these disasters would cause serious disillusion.

In forthcoming line of his article, Yunus Nadi maintains that so as to cease the brutality of the Armenians, even the Russians had to call the Turkish army through an official protocol during the negotiation of the armistice to save Muslims from the attacks of the Armenians.²⁶⁸ Yunus Nadi completed his article as below:

²⁶⁶ TE, 13 March 1918, no: 2392.

²⁶⁷ TE, 13 March 1918, no: 2392.

²⁶⁸ TE, 13 March 1918, no: 2392. Here Yunus Nadi gives the first article of Kelkit armistice commission. According to the article: "Against the attacks of the Armenian brigandines, enough Turkish military forces should be brought to protect peoples and shops.

...documents of tragedies are abundant before our eyes...Destructions were so great that even the Russian commanders felt themselves obliged to submit condolence. We want that these tragedies should not be forgotten. We also want that the massacres perpetrated in the name of a subject, who constituted a little part in respect to the Turkish and Muslim population, should be left to curse of humanity and justice of history.

As can be inferred, the article of Yunus Nadi was a reflection of a great suffering. These circumstances revealed the feelings of the Turkish people in that period and their perspective about the events they lived. These words can be apprehended as the expression of traumatic conditions of that period. It was explicitly accounted that the Muslims have been subjected to great persecutions in different places of Anatolia. What deserves to be accentuated that the ones who did not want the memories of that period to be forgotten were the Turkish people. Yunus Nadi acknowledges the bad experiences to the damnation of people and the justice of the history.

One of the cities suffered a lot from the Russian occupation was Trabzon which has remained under occupation for two years. The ravages and massacres executed by the Armenians and the Russians have caused Trabzon to be devastated.

There were many events perpetrated by the Armenians in corporation with the Russians in Trabzon. According to the testimonies of eyewitnesses²⁶⁹; the Russians and Armenians murdered many people and raped many others in Sürmene and Of. In the villages of Sürmene and Of, while males were killed, some females were raped and murdered.

One of the massacres carried out in Trabzon and took place in registers was the one executed in Yomra, the district of Trabzon. According to the sworn testimonials send by the Directorate for Police of Trabzon to the Ministry of Interior, the events has developed as mentioned below;

²⁶⁹ This testimony was given by Fortunzade Polat and İsmail Cibizade Saadeddin Effendi of Sürmene. They gave the names of victims of massacres and rapes one by one. For the details of the testimony see BOA. HR. SYS. HU, kr. 110, dos. 12-3, nr. 12-14, 16, 18-26, 28-39, 41-44 in *Ermeni Mezalimi*, p.79-80.

According to testimonies made under oath by Fatma daughter of Ali Osman, wife of Mehmet son of Salim from the village of Kalafka and Alemdaroğlu Besin son of Mehmet from the village of Ipsil, Armenians and Russians gathered up Muslims from the village of Kalafka in the sub-district of Yorma in Trabzon, picking them from their homes and then separating men from women, took the men to unknown whereabouts, raped the teenaged girls and women, killed a newborn baby by throwing up and picking it at the point of a bayonet; they perpetrated the same atrocities in the village of Ipsil, Haçavna and Solday in the sub-prefecture of Maçka violating women and teenaged girls and ferociously killing and burning many people; these massacres had been instigated by Greek Ottoman citizens; the names of the victims had been quoted in the said testimonies.²⁷⁰

Many similar massacres and rapes occurred in Trabzon. The assaults of the Armenians and the Russians were not limited with rapes and massacres; they also turned the city into shambles. As written by *Tasvir-i Efkar* just after the end of the Russian occupation, the major mosques of the city were used as food stock and the commodities inside were set on fire. Including the pulpit, all wooden parts of the mosques were smashed to use. The graveyards and tombs were destroyed. Especially, the tomb which was in the mosque constructed by the Sultan Yavuz Selim and kept the belongings of his mother, Gülbahar Sultan, was robbed and converted to a stable. The graves of Kadri Bey, the Governor of Trabzon, and Hamdi Pasha, the Commander of Trabzon, were destroyed. All wooden houses which constitute most of the city were almost completely destroyed and used as stables.²⁷¹

Another city which has extensively experienced the Armenian and the Russian massacres was Van. Van was one of the cities where the greatest number of assaults were experienced and registered. The evidences and eyewitnesses prove the massacre of thousands of Muslims in Van. Some registered assaults have occurred as described below:

[sic.] The Armenians and Russians committed widespread atrocities in Van and its surroundings and according to the testimony of Firdevs living in Abbasağa quarter, the occupants murdered by torturing women, girls, aged Muslims without distinction, ripping the belly of a pregnant woman and extracting the young from the wombs to behead it, storming houses and killing the household after they had inflicted them tortures for hours; stripping off the clothes of a small male baby aged six and cutting of his sexual parts they butchered him, raping and violating Muslim women and those who took refuge in an American foundation, desecrating cemeteries and exhuming buried corpses and profaning tombs of venerated persons by filling in filths.²⁷²

²⁷⁰ BOA. HR. SYS. HU, kr. 110, dos. 12-4, nr. 125-126 in *Ermeni Mezalimi*, p. 236.

²⁷¹ TE, 13 March 1918, no: 2392.

²⁷² BOA. HR. SYS. HU, kr. 110, dos. 12-2, nr. 114-116 in *Ermeni Mezalimi*, pp. 107-110. The date of the testimony is 30 June 1916 (28 Ş. 1334).

Van encountered with the most serious Armenian uprising at the beginning of the First World War. Most probably, the uprising was one of the most decisive reasons for the adoption of the relocation. As mentioned before, the Armenians also founded the Armenian Republic in Van on April 1915. Afterward, the Armenians in corporation with the Russians perpetrated large scale massacres in the region in the time of the Russian occupation of Van.²⁷³ Some of these occurred as illustrated below:

During the occupation of Van and Bitlis terrible cruelties were committed by Russian and Armenian brigands against the Muslim population; Cossack cavalry arriving in Bitlis, massacred Muslim families and children fleeing the Armenians; hearing that the Russians were coming to Van, Armenians uprose and pursued the fleeing Muslim population trying to escape and tragically killed them, massacred thousands of women, young girls and men among those who didn't emigrate; all the population of the villages of Zive, Mollakasım, Şeyhkara, Şeyhayne, Ayans, Paksi, Zorabad and many other villages, who stayed unable to emigrate were all exterminated and not a single person escaped the carnage; on the eve of the arrival of the Russians to Dir, a town attached to Hakkari, Armenians made irruptions on the roads and massacred all the male Kurdish population of the villages situated on these roads and cut up into chunks with daggers and swords more than thousand small children the oldest less than three years and used the cut and broken bodies as trenches and ravished more than four hundreds Kurdish girls, the old women being killed.²⁷⁴

It was clear that the Armenians implemented many massacres, plunders and rapes in different places of Anatolia following the approval of the relocation. The Armenians moved in accordance with the Russians especially in the regions under the Russian occupation. Much information from the different regions of Anatolia about the massacres perpetrated by the Armenians reached İstanbul.

Checking the issues of *Tasvir-i Efkar*, it is obvious that the newspaper did not give places to the detailed and explicit news about the Armenian activities. The principal reason was the existing censorship. The unpleasant developments and troublous

²⁷³ Ş. Nezihi Aykut, 'Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Anadolu'da Ermenilerin Yaptığı Katliamlar 1914-1918' in *Uluslararası Türk- Ermeni İlişkileri Sempozyumu*, İstanbul Üniversitesi, İstanbul, 2001, p. 206-207: 'Van merkezinde bütün camiler tahrip edilip, Müslüman mahalleri yakılmıştır. Van'da kıyıma uğrayanların adedinin 10.000'i aştığı raporlarda bildirilmektedir.... Van'ın işgal edileceğinden haberdar olan Van Ermenileri, kasaba ve köylerde ayaklanma başlatarak hükümetin emirlerine itaat etmeyip, vergi vermemeye başlamışlar, askeri hizmetlerini yerine getirmeyerek Ruslara sığınmışlar, eli silah tutan Ermeniler, köylerinden kasabalara, kasabalardan köylere giden İslam ahaliye taarruz ederek katletmeye başlamışlardır...'

²⁷⁴ BOA. HR. SYS. HU, kr. 110, dos. 12-2, nr. 92-98 in *Ermeni Mezalimi*, pp. 95-104. There are testimonies of many eyewitnesses in the registration dated 17 June 1916 (15 Ş. 1334).

events were hidden from the public in order to not to drive the people into despair. More detailed news just began to take place in the newspapers after the withdrawal of Russia from the First World War and the recovery of the lands under the Russian occupation. Through the end of the war, *Tasvir-i Efkar* was able to begin writing the Armenian Question and the Armenian massacres against the Muslims.

The events reported by *Tasvir-i Efkar* bring out explicitly the cruelty of the Armenians on the Muslims. According to *Tasvir-i Efkar* there were mainly two reasons of the Armenian violence against the Muslims. Firstly, The Armenians had become as slaves of the European policies and they were utilized by the European states. Secondly, the Armenians revolted against the Ottoman Empire depending on the support of the European states with the independence ideal. The newspaper also portrayed the sufferings of the Muslims and expressed how the Muslims had been massacred in front of the eyes of the entire world. *Tasvir-i Efkar* called the states, which have accused the Ottoman Empire of massacring the Armenians, to see and recognized the brutality of the Armenians which the Muslims suffered from. What is interesting that while the developments were accepted as the Armenian massacre by some people, *Tasvir-i Efkar* acknowledges the brutality of the Armenians to “the damnation of people and the justice of the history.”²⁷⁵

²⁷⁵ TE, 13 March 1918, no: 2392

CHAPTER IV

ARMENIAN QUESTION IN THE LAST PHASE OF THE WORLD WAR I

IV.1. Political and Military Developments in Caucasia in Respect to the Armenian Question

IV.1. 1. Withdraw of Russia from the World War

While the World War was continuing with its all extremity, there emerged important developments in Russia. These developments became highly determinative for the process that the Armenian Question was going to follow.

A revolutionary movement had begun by March of 1917 in Russia. The revolution which had spurred by the Petrograd Uprising on 6 March came to an end on 7-8 November of 1917.²⁷⁶ Thus, the Bolshevik administration was established in Russia. The developments in Russia were closely pertaining to the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the developments in Russia became one of the most important subjects of the Ottoman press through 1917.

With the beginning of the revolutionary movement, there occurred serious disintegrations in the Russian army. Thus, strength of the army had decreased and withdraw of Russia from the war began to be pronounced.²⁷⁷ According to the

²⁷⁶ Kamuran Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 301

²⁷⁷ TE, 19 March 1917, no: 2063.

reports, disorder and unsteadiness in the army had extremely increased and number of fugitive soldiers had reached to 1.200.000.²⁷⁸ Meanwhile, Tsar Nicholas had been caught and forced to abdicate from the throne. Mihail Aleksandrevich, the brother of Nicholas, ascended the throne.²⁷⁹ Russia entered the way of disintegration. It was written by the newspapers that Lithuania, Ukraine, Estonia and Caucasia were demanding autonomy with hope of getting benefit from the situation.²⁸⁰

Tumult in Russia also deeply effected Caucasia. The Russian authority had seriously weakened. In order to strengthen the authority, Russia planned to establish an independent Caucasia Army. Charnapazof, the commander of the Caucasian Army, was discharged from the office.²⁸¹ The situation of Caucasia turned to a civil war and the different nations of Caucasia began to struggle for independence. They were not obeying to the Russian authority. In Caucasia “killings of people and confiscation to their lands were frequently observed.”²⁸²

The new Bolshevik administration of Russia decided to restructure the Caucasia administration to assume the control back and established Special Trans-Caucasian Committee (Osobyi Zakavkazskii Komitet abbreviated as Ozakom). This committee was “established by Russia’s new administration in Caucasia would heal the wounds inflicted by the ‘divide and rule’ policy of the old regime.”²⁸³ The Caucasian nations had been rescued from the “oppressive administration of the Tsarist Russia with the revolution” and they believed that a new state having “federative and democratic” structures would be established. This “new state which would rise over the old ruins of the Romanoffs would establish unity and peace among the elements.”²⁸⁴

When the situation was evaluated from the Caucasian Armenians’ point of view, the developments were not satisfactory for them because the Armenians’ plans were not

²⁷⁸ TE, 26 March 1917, no: 2070.

²⁷⁹ TE, 21 March 1917, no: 2065.

²⁸⁰ TE, 28 March 1917, no: 2072.

²⁸¹ TE, 18 May 1917, no: 2123.

²⁸² TE, 22 August 1917, no: 2199.

²⁸³ Mim Kemal Öke, *The Armenian Question*, p. 130

²⁸⁴ Öke, *Armenian Question*, p. 130.

limited with Caucasia. Their claims over the Turkish lands still continued. The Tashnak Party especially aimed the final destruction of the Ottoman Empire and hesitated on prevention of this aim. However, the decision taken by the Provisional Government gave a great opportunity to the Armenians for their aims over Eastern Anatolia. According to the decision of the government taken on May 9, 1917, an Armenian civil administration would be established while the Russian occupation was continuing in Eastern Anatolia. When it is remembered that all the Russian army nearly disintegrated at the beginning of the revolution, it can be seen that aim of Russia was to keep her previous gain by using the Armenians.²⁸⁵

Situation in Caucasia took a new form when the Bolsheviks seized the power in November 1917. As the first action, the Bolsheviks proclaimed a declaration on November 15, 1917 and they declared that all the nations living in Russia are equal and sovereign, and they can establish independent states from Russia if they want.²⁸⁶ Thus, a road to independence was opened for the Armenians like the other Caucasian nations. Lenin, the leader of the new administration, had even declared before the revolution that Russian armies should withdraw from the Armenian lands in Caucasia and the Eastern Anatolia. After the revolution, Lenin repeated his views. However, there was a contradiction between Lenin's claim of "integrity of the Romanoff Empire and the ideal of all nations' independence in the world". This dilemma clearly expressed itself with the Bolshevik Declaration on January 11, 1918. According to the declaration "although it was stated in it that Russian armies should get out of Eastern Anatolia, it was also emphasized that this area should be colonized by Armenians and that its administration should be entrusted to the Soviet Armenians. The conclusion that can be drawn from these views can only be interpreted to mean that the Bolsheviks were trying to gain time to the Tsar's legacy."²⁸⁷

²⁸⁵ Öke, *Armenian Question*, pp. 130-131.

²⁸⁶ Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 301.

²⁸⁷ Öke, *Armenian Question*, p. 131-132. About the declaration, Gürün writes that the Declaration signed by Lenin and Stalin was published on 13 January in Pravda. And it was called as 'Number 13 Decree'. According to the Decree:

1. Military forces should be quickly withdrawn from the Turkish Armenia, and an Armenian militia should be formed to guarantee life and property security in the region.

Soon after the revolution, on the other hand, the Bolsheviks called the Ottoman Empire for an armistice on November 26, 1917. Negotiations for the armistice began on 4 December in Erzurum and the armistice was signed on December 18, 1917. Although the Russians had some plans as mentioned, the fate of Caucasia and Eastern Anatolia were going to become definite after the final peace agreement. Negotiations for the peace agreement had been left to Brest Litovsk.²⁸⁸

IV.1.2. The Brest Litovsk Treaty

The members of the Turkish delegations for the Brest Litovsk were Grand-vizier Talat Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Nesimi Bey, the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin Hakkı Pasha and Zeki Pasha.²⁸⁹ Talat Pasha visited Berlin to exchange views before moving to Brest Litovsk where he arrived on 3 February 1918 and participated to the negotiations.

The declaration of the Soviet administration which was announced when the Brest Litovsk negotiations began was not welcomed by the Ottoman administration. As it was mentioned, the Soviets had declared that they were to abandon Eastern Anatolia but they planned to leave the region to the Armenians under the Russian protégé. The Soviet administration thought that the Armenians would join to the Soviets in time.

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2. Those Armenians who sheltered to near regions should return.
 3. Those Armenians who were deported by the Turkish government during the war should return to their lands.
 4. An Armenian National Government, which is elected with democratic principles, should be constituted.
 5. A mixed commission should be constituted for evacuation of foreign troops from the Armenian lands. (Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 302-303)

²⁸⁸ TE, 2 December 1917, no: 2298. The *Tasvir-i Efkar* announced the armistice between the Ottoman Empire and Russia for the first time. Russia's call for peace was discussed in the *Meclis-i Mebusan* on 3 Kanunuevvel 1333 (3 December 1917). Ahmet Nesimi Bey expressed the government's point of view to peace treaty. The Members of the Parliament generally demonstrated a positive reaction to peace. They demanded signing of a honorable treaty and recovery of occupied lands. For the details of discussions on the Russia's call in the Parliament see. MMZC, 3 Kanunuevvel 1333, 13. İnikad, 1. celse.

²⁸⁹ TE, 23 December 1917, no: 2319

The Ottoman government thought that they could not reach an agreement under these conditions with the Soviet administration. Moreover, Russian army began to leave the regions in his hands to the Armenians and it was a serious problem.

Enver Pasha sent a telegraph to Vehip Pasha, the Commander of the Third Army, and ordered him to contact with the Russian General Staff in Caucasia to prevent the Armenians, who were replacing the Russian troops, from committing massacres. Ahmet Nesimi Bey protested the Soviet declaration to leave Eastern Anatolia to the Armenians as follows: “With this action aimed at organizing Armenians in Eastern Anatolia while holding peace negotiation with Turkey and her allies, the administrators of the Republic of Russia have resorted openly to a policy hostile to Turkey.”²⁹⁰ After his arrival to Brest Litovsk, Talat Pasha also protested the Russian plan and he warned that if this plan is applied, the necessary precautions would be taken.

The Ottoman delegation tried to prevent Russian interference to Eastern Anatolia by using the Armenians as an excuse. Thus, the delegations suggested that “position of those nations which were not independent before the war should be determined by Russia and the Ottoman Empire according to their constitutions. Each state should solve the problems within the state by reaching an agreement with the nations.”²⁹¹ Thanks to the decisive approach of the Ottoman Empire, the Soviet Russia had to abandon her plans relate to the Armenians and Eastern Anatolia.

The peace negotiations were concluded and the Brest Litovsk Treaty was signed on 3 March 1918. According to the treaty; the Ottoman Empire was recovering Kars, Ardahan and Batum which had been lost to Russia with the Berlin Treaty in 1878. Moreover Russia accepted to withdraw from the Eastern Anatolia that Russia had occupied during the World War. Russia also promised to disperse and disarm the

²⁹⁰ Öke, *Armenian Question*, p. 134

²⁹¹ TE, 31 December 1917, no: 2327

Armenian brigands. Thus a brilliant agreement for the Ottoman Empire came to earth.²⁹²

IV.1.3. The Caucasian Federation

While the Brest Litovsk negotiations were continuing, new formations were emerging in Caucasia. The Armenians, the Georgians and the Azerbaijanis came together after the revolution and attempted to establish a federation independent from Russia.²⁹³ They hoped to establish a state by using the condition that Russia had fallen in. For this purpose they firstly formed a 'constituent assembly'. However the assembly was dispersed by the Bolsheviks. Then a diet assembly (*Seym*) was established and its members were selected among the dispersed constituent assembly.

Three nations in the Caucasian Federation were going to be autonomous in their internal affairs. On the other hand, joint movement in foreign affairs was principally accepted. The cabinet of the federation was composed of 12 members. There were 4 Muslim, 3 Armenian, 3 Georgian and 2 Russian members in the cabinet. The number of members had not determined according to population but according to a quota.²⁹⁴

²⁹² For a detailed study for the Brest Litovsk Treaty see; Akdes Nimet Kurat, 'Brest-Litovsk Müzakereleri ve Barışı (20 Aralık 1917-3 Mart 1918)', *Belleten*, v. XXXI, July 1967 (pp. 375-413).

²⁹³ Richard G. Hovannisian, Dimensions of Democracy and Authority in Caucasian Armenia, *Russian Review*, vol. 25, no: 1, January 1974, (pp. 37-49), pp. 38-39. Hovannisian wrote that "Denouncing the Bolshevik coup and proclaiming loyalty to the so-called Russian Democracy, Tashnaksutun and other Armenian societies tried to deal with the Turkish threat by joining the principal Georgian and Azerbaijani parties in forming an interim Transcaucasian directorate." Although the establishment of the Caucasian Federation is attributed to the Turkish threat by Hovannisian this determination is seemingly false. This may only be true for the Armenians. However the Azerbaijanis were trying to get support of the Turkish government and had good relations with the government. And there was no reason for them to come together with the Armenians and the Georgians against the Ottoman Empire. This interpretation was actually supported by Hovannisian in one of his earlier work: "...As Turkish division drove deep into Russian Armenia, the Georgians, having secured German protection, and the Muslims, enjoying the benevolence of the invaders, deserted the Armenians in May 1918, by declaring the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan." R.G. Hovannisian, *The Allies and Armenia*, 1915-18, *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 3, no: 1, January 1968, (pp. 145-168), p. 146.

²⁹⁴ TE, 7 March 1918, no: 2386. *Tasvir-i Efkar* wrote that there were 4.5 millions of Muslims in Caucasus. And the Muslims could have had 7 members in the cabinet if there was proportional representation. And it was also indicated that the Armenians could have more member in respect to their population. However the number of members in the Cabinet is given as 11 by Esat Uras. According to Uras, there were three members of the Armenians, the Azerbaijanis and the Georgians

In the new Caucasian Government, the Armenians and the Georgians were hesitating from intervention of the Ottoman Empire. Thus the Armenians were trying to resist against the Ottoman Army with two army corps. And the Armenian brigands were attacking to the Turks.²⁹⁵ On the other hand the Georgians were looking ways of becoming closer to Germany and Great Britain. And the Azerbaijanis were getting closer to İstanbul.²⁹⁶

IV.1.4. The Trabzon Conference

After signing the Brest Litovsk with Russia, the Ottoman Government began to negotiations with the Caucasian Federation for an agreement.²⁹⁷ The first negotiations began on March 1918 in Trabzon. The Ottoman Government was expecting recognition of the Brest Litovsk Treaty by the Federation. The Caucasian delegation in Trabzon was inclined to recognize the Brest Litovsk. Chenkeli, the head of the Caucasian delegation, submitted the following declaration by receiving the contest of the other delegates for recognition of the Brest Litovsk Treaty:

Trans-Caucasia delegates, as a response to the letter of the Ottoman delegation dated on April 6, 1918, declare approval of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and request continuity of further negotiations on the basis of this treaty.²⁹⁸

and two members of the Russians. The government was called as the Caucasian Commissariat and the Georgian Kekechkuri was the head and the Commissar of Foreign Affairs in the Commissariat. Esat Uras *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*, Belge Yayınları, İstanbul, 1987, p. 640.

Ovannes Kachaznuni urged that the Georgians were always very powerful in the government, the commissariat and the Seym. This was mainly due to the Georgians' experiences in the state service. The Georgians had taken places in the Russian service and they had able statesmen. Thus the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis had to stay shadow of the Georgians. Ovanes Kaçaznuni, *Taşnak Partisi'nin Yapacağı Bir Şey Yok*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, pp. 36-37.

²⁹⁵ TE, 7 March 1918, no: 2386

²⁹⁶ TE, 7 March 1918, no: 2386

²⁹⁷ When the Brest Litovsk was signed Chegize, the Head of Seym, and Kekechkuri had announced that they did not recognize the Treaty. Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler*, p. 643.

²⁹⁸ Enis Şahin, *Türkiye ve Maveraya-yı Kafkasya İlişkileri İçinde Trabzon ve Batum Konferansları ve Antlaşmaları (1917-1918)*, TTK, Ankara, p. 422. "Maveraya-yı Kafkas heyet-i murahhasası heyet-i murahhasa-i Osmaniye'nin fi 6 Nisan sene 1918 tarihli mektubuna cevaben, Brest-Litovsk Muahedenamesi'ni kabul ettiğini ve işbu muahedeye istinaden müzakerat-ı müteakibeye devama hazır bulunduğumuzu beyan ve kesb-i fahr eyler."

The Armenian delegates Hadisian and Kachaznuni also supported recognition of the Brest Litovsk. They sent a telegraph to Tiflis and Said that “we find it inevitable to attract attention of the Tashnaksutiun that we consider recognition of the Brest Litovsk as the least evil action in existing conditions.”²⁹⁹ This situation was giving Turkey right for some further demands. According to the Brest Litovsk, Turkey had acquired Kars, Ardahan and Batum and Turkey demanded desisting of the opposing side from these cities and conceding them to herself in accordance with the treaty.

All these mentioned developments meant that the Armenians renounced their claims to the Eastern Anatolia. However the Armenians were not willing to agree with the Ottoman Empire because they still believed that they could reach their aims by resorting to arms. In order to discuss the subject, an Armenian National Assembly³⁰⁰ was summoned in Batum in April. The assembly decided not to recognize the Brest Litovsk and to continue the war.

The Seym was also continuing to discuss the subject. During the discussions the Georgian and Armenian speakers indicated impossibility of recognizing the Brest Litovsk and defended continuity of struggle against Turkey. The Azeri Rüstembekov was the only speaker who resisted to war against Turkey and he declared that the Azerbaijanis were not going to fight against the Turks in case of war. The standing of the Azerbaijanis was highly reacted by the Georgians and the Armenians. The *Seym* decided on 13 April 1918 that the delegation in Trabzon must be recalled immediately and the war against Turkey must continue.³⁰¹ The Trabzon Conference was concluded with return of the delegates to Tiflis on 14 April.

²⁹⁹ Şahin, *Türkiye ve Mavera-yı Kafkasya*, p. 423.

³⁰⁰ John S. Kirakossian, *The Armenian Genocide*, Sphinx Press, Madison, 1992, p.241. Before the Armenian National Assembly, there had been another organization, the Armenian National Council. The Council was “established in Tiflis by the Armenian National Congress, September-October 1917. The Congress supported the Russian Provisional Government. The Armenian National Council came to replace the National Bureau, and its declaration of November 1, 1917 noted that ‘as an executive organ it assumes supreme direction in all national matters.’ After formation of the Armenian Parliament, the Armenian National Council was dissolved.”

³⁰¹ Şahin, *Türkiye ve Mavera-yı Kafkasya*, pp. 435-439.

The step of the Georgians and the Armenians was useless. The Turkish Army had completely seized Trabzon and the Eastern Anatolia with an advanced campaign. Chenkeli, who was temporarily head of the Transcaucasian Government, sent a telegraph by indicating his “hope for an interview as soon as possible.” This was an expression of request for peace. As a response, Vehip Pasha wrote Chenkeli to call peace by getting consent of İstanbul. Vehip Pasha demanded withdrawal of the Caucasian forces from the regions which they had to abandon and suggested restart of the negotiations.³⁰² Finally the *Seym* had to recognize the Brest Litovsk with recovery of Kars by the Turkish army on 25 April 1918.³⁰³

IV.1.5. The Batum Conference

After recognition of the Caucasian Republic to the Brest Litovsk, it was decided to summon a conference in Batum to negotiate the terms of final peace treaty. The Batum Conference began on 11 May 1918 under these conditions. The head of the Conference was Halil Bey who was also head of the Turkish delegation. At the beginning of the Conference, Chenkeli declared that the peace could be established with recognition of the Brest Litovsk. However the situation had changed for Turkey. Turkey had to fight after the Trabzon Conference and had given great casualties so Turkey reminded these facts and demanded indemnification of these lost.³⁰⁴ Meanwhile the *Seym* dissolved itself and members of the Caucasian Federation, the Georgians, the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians, declared their independence.³⁰⁵ Then Turkey was going to negotiate with each state separately.

³⁰² Şahin, *Türkiye ve Mavera-yi Kafkasya*, p. 486.

³⁰³ Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 302.

³⁰⁴ Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 305. Halil Bey was now demanding the region covering Ahıska, Ahılkelek, Gümrü and Kars-Gümrü-Culfa railways. For the details of Turkish Delegation’s demands see Şahin, *Türkiye ve Mavera-yi Kafkasya*, p. 549.

³⁰⁵ *Seym* annouced on 27 May 1918 that owing to disagreements emerged among the nations which constitute the Independent Republic of Caucasia, the *Seym* decided to quit all its authority by regarding impossibility of establishment a government administrating all Caucasia. Uras, *Tarihî Ermeniler*, p. 647.

The peace agreement with the Armenians was signed on 4 July 1918. The treaty was signed by Halil Bey and Vehip Pasha in the name of Turkey, and by Hadisian, Papacanyan and Kachaznuni in the name of Armenia. With the agreement Turkey passed the Turkish-Russian border of 1877 and acquired some gains in Caucasia. Moreover Turkey could take control of Gümri-Culfa railways so Turkey had a strategic control in Caucasia. On the other hand, the agreement meant that the Armenia was being recognized by Turkey. The new Armenian state had to live as a 'tiny state'.³⁰⁶

IV.1.6. The Istanbul Conference

The Ottoman government had promised to the Caucasian states to aid for reconciliation with her other allies. Both to discuss the details of this subject and to solve problems between the Georgians, the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians, all of them had declared independence during the Batum Conference, convention of a conference in İstanbul was accepted.

The Armenian delegation came to İstanbul in June 1918 under the leadership of Aharonian and Hadisian (Hatizof) was accompanying him.³⁰⁷ Aharonian made a statement and interpreted the situation in his arrival to İstanbul. When he was asked about the results of the Batum Conference, he replied that basis of negotiations was determined in Batum and the details were going to be determined in İstanbul. While he was evaluating relations with the Ottoman government, he indicated that the

³⁰⁶ TE, 6 July 1918, no: 2507. The *Tasvir-i Efkar* was going to write that Armenia had a territory of 11.000 km² and a population of 1 million. And it was also indicated that the Armenians did not see their lands enough and they thought that it was not possible to keep their existence within the existing situation. Thus Armenia was demanding extension of her territory by taking lands from Georgia. For the details of the Turkish-Armenian Agreement see Şahin, *Türkiye ve Mavera-yı Kafkasya*, pp. 636-639.

³⁰⁷ TE, 21 June 1918, no: 2492. Mülazım Loydizyan, Mülazım Artin Agabalof ve Katip Koçeryan were the other members of the delagation.

Armenians had very good relations with the government and Halil Bey, the head of the Ottoman delegation, was sincerely trying to dissolve the existing problems.³⁰⁸

The Armenian delegate Hadisian had made very interesting statements to Tasvir-i Efkar. Hadisian stressed that Caucasia had been in a very chaotic atmosphere since the revolution and contribution of Turkey was indispensable to establish stability. He especially urged that Armenia's relation with Turkey was going to determine form of Armenia's relations with her neighbors. By reminding religious and racial relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey, he indicated that relations with Azerbaijan were going to be directly effected from relations with Turkey. Hadisian continued his comment by saying that the Armenians had thought that Turkey would not accept an Armenian state but falsehood of this view was understood during the negotiations. Hadisian was aware of impossibility of survival of Armenia among four states without Turkish support and recognition. Hadisian Said that Turkey had principally accepted establishment of independent Armenia and the details would be discussed in the İstanbul Conference.³⁰⁹

Meanwhile one of Yunus Nadi's articles relate to Hadisian caused a polemic. Yunus Nadi, by addressing a statement of Hadisian, wrote that the Armenians owe their existence in Caucasia to Turkey. He reminded that Turkey was the first state recognizing Armenia and Armenia was not able to reach her existing situation without consent of Turkey. Then he wrote following lines by referring Hadisian:

... The Armenians fought, rightly or wrongly, against Turkey. Today, it is unreasonable to seek oppressive and oppressed in the Armenian Question. It is necessary to confess bravely and humanely that the war was followed by the Armenians so as to reach a certain aim. No war may occur with action of one side. Every war has two sides. We were one side of the Armenian Question...we made many efforts to reach the aim of independence. We worked with our means. We worked as a mean of the states that we expected their help. Shortly, we tried all the ways in order to weaken Turkey. The last war was especially the last trump card and the last party to play. We fought with all our power and endeavors at the war. It is impossible to think that Turkey would wait unconcerned while we were threatening its existence. It was very usual that Turkey, confronted by attacks, defended itself against the attacks. In this misfortune time, we were well aware that Turkey would take severely the necessary precautions. This is the Armenian Question. We have to honestly confess that we lost the last party.

³⁰⁸ TE, 21 June 1918, no: 2492. The interview was given to the Armenian *Jamanak* newspaper and quoted by *Tasvir-i Efkar*.

³⁰⁹ TE, 22 June 1918, no: 2493.

Our situation is more or less situation of a loser. The difference is that we did not have a political and national existence. We followed a dream of having an existence over a vast area. Now, a part of this dream including Turkey eternally ended...The fate enforces us to have a political existence in Caucasia...the Armenian Question should be closed definitely and there is no oppressive and oppressed in the Armenian Question...³¹⁰

Yunus Nadi stated that the reason why he wrote about this subject was that the Armenians were becoming a mean of the Allied Powers' propaganda. He wrote that "the Armenians are giving declarations to big newspapers and they claim that the Turks terminated the Armenians in Turkey and now trying the same thing in Caucasia, and they ask how long the world will keep silence." Yunus Nadi regarded the Armenians' provocations of the world public opinion against the Turks as unacceptable while massacres perpetuated to the Turks were being disregarded. Yunus Nadi was claiming that the Caucasian Armenians were accepting the Turkish soldiers as saviors and he insisted on necessity of putting forward the truths for understanding of reality. According to Yunus Nadi, the way of reaching reality was not to make propaganda as the Armenians but to form a commission from neutral states which was supposed to visit the region and expose the truths. He regarded this solution as the shortest cut on liquidation of the problem.³¹¹

After the article of Yunus Nadi, the Armenian newspapers began to deliver articles relate to the subject. *Hayranik* shared the views of Yunus Nadi and depicted their grief. The newspaper wrote that the Armenian propaganda in Switzerland and the Entente states would not be attached importance because neutral states already knew the truths. According to the *Hayranik*, the propagandists were working for the Entente states and nobody would not esteem to their words. *Jamanak* was also agreeing with Yunus Nadi's point of view. The newspaper reminded the Caucasian Armenians' submission of their sincere appreciates to Turkey for recognition of the Armenian Republic and it also noted that the Turkey's Armenians was working for friendly relations via press. Thus writings of the outside Armenians should not be

³¹⁰ TE, 29 June 1918, no: 2500. Yunus Nadi Bey says that he did not personally hear this speech from Hadasian. Yunus Nadi urges that he learned the speech from someone who personally heard and wrote it.

³¹¹ TE, 29 June 1918, no: 2500.

noticed too much.³¹² Meanwhile Hadisian sent a correction to *Tasvir-i Efkar* for the article of Yunus Nadi addressing himself. Hadisian stressed the following point in his correction:

1. I think that the relation between Ottoman State and the Armenian Republic is very friendly and this should always be so in future. All the Armenian parties share my opinion on this subject. Following friendly relations is one of basic principles of the Armenian government that I undertake the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of it.
2. I think that the situation of the Turkey's Armenians is not a matter of the Ottoman State and the Armenian Republic relations.
3. I have never thought that the Armenians are responsible of the sad events occurred in recent years – relate to the Armenian Question- and I have not said anybody such a thing. In the same way, I have never thought that the Armenians have received the punishment which they deserved and I have not said anybody. Despite all tragic events I think that relations between the Ottoman government and the Turkey's Armenians should be formed on the basis of mutual trust and friendship. Moreover the Armenians had not, in any case, intended to separate from the Ottoman Empire.³¹³

When the polemic between Yunus Nadi and Hadisian is considered, it is not possible to determine who was telling the truth. However, determinations of the both sides were interesting. Yunus Nadi was reflecting the situation of the Armenians who had waged a war against the Ottoman Empire and they had lost it. Through the war, they collaborated with the enemies of the state to reach an independent Armenia over the Turkish lands, which was presumably seen impossible anymore when Yunus Nadi wrote these words.

Although Hadisian did not assume the words which had been arrogated him, his correction, which was kindly published in the *Tasvir-i Efkar*, included some important points. First of all, he stressed the 'friendly' relations between Armenia and Turkey and he indicated that all the Armenian parties were sharing this opinion. Actually, Armenia was dependent on support of Turkey to survive. And Turkey was the most influential power in Caucasasia at that time and standing of Turkey was going to be determinative.³¹⁴ Secondly, Hadisian declared that the Armenian Republic was

³¹² TE, 1 July 1918, no: 2502.

³¹³ TE, 6 July 1918, no: 2507.

³¹⁴ Ahmet Rasim, who had visited Batum for the *Tasvir-i Efkar*, had written that "the Ottoman entered to Caucasasia after the Russian Revolution and she protected all customary, political and religious rights of the Caucasian nations at that time. Thus, one the Armenian delegates at the Batum Conference had said that the Ottomans became the father of Caucasasia." TE, 17 June 1918, no: 2488.

not going to interfere to the Turkey Armenians' relations with the Turkish administration. This situation had become an ordinary case for many years. Finally, Hadisian was reluctant to talk about the responsibility of the events which occurred during the World War. He rejected accusation of the Armenians for the events and he insisted on establishment of mutual trust and friendship between the Turks and the Armenians. After the statement of Hadisian, the polemic between Yunus Nadi and Hadisian was concluded.

By the way; although the Armenian, the Georgian, the Azerbaijani and the North Caucasian delegates stayed through the summer in İstanbul, the Istanbul Conference could not be convened.³¹⁵ The *Tasvir-i Efkar* published the last article relate to the subject on 30 October 1918. The Armenian delegation interviewed with İzzet Pasha, the Grand vizier of the new cabinet. In the meeting, withdrawal of the Ottoman Army to the borders which had been determined with the Brest Litovsk was accepted. Moreover, İzzet Pasha promised to make necessary arrangements for return of the refugees and to solve all problems relate to Armenia within one month. On the other hand, the Armenian delegation expressed their insistence to establish good relations with the Ottoman government and to prevent emergence of evil thoughts.³¹⁶

The Mudros Armistice was signed on 30 October 1918 under the shadow of these developments and the World War officially came to an end for the Ottoman Empire. This was beginning of a new era and all negotiations and treaties lost their validity. Hereafter great expectation for Armenia, 'Little Ally' of the Allied Powers, emerged.

IV. 2. The American Intervention and the Wilson Principles

Participation of the United States of America to the World War became a turning point for the fate of the war. America declared war to Germany in April 1917 and to

³¹⁵ Şahin, *Türkiye ve Mavera-yi Kafkasya*, pp. 645-646.

By the way, the *Tasvir-i Efkar* was not published from 28 July 1918 to 12 October 1918

³¹⁶ TE, 30 October 1918, no: 2545.

Austria-Hungary Empire in December 1917 but she did not declare war to the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. Then, President Wilson proclaimed a fourteen articles declaration which was called as the Wilson Principles in January 1918. The declaration was aiming to determine principles of the postwar era. The twelfth article of the Principles was related to the Ottoman Empire and the nations of the Empire. The article was as follow:

The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.³¹⁷

Wilson was closely watching situation of the Armenians. It was seemingly impossible for Wilson to ignore the Armenians because of strong sympathy towards the Armenians in the American public opinion. Wilson had been continuously informed about the Armenian Question during the war and the source of this information was Morgenthau who was the USA Ambassador to İstanbul from 1913 to 1916. Morgenthau was regularly sending information to America via not only official but also unofficial documents. It should be noted that influence of Morgenthau over Wilson is a well known fact. Thus personal closeness between Wilson and Morgenthau had undoubtedly influenced Wilson's point of view to the Armenian Question.

After his return to America, Morgenthau continued to work for the Armenians. He published his book called *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* to increase support of the Americans to the Armenians. In his book, Morgenthau claimed that the Armenians were exposed a great extermination campaign by the Ottoman administration. According to his interpretation, The Ottoman Empire and Germany jointly followed this policy of annihilation. Morgenthau wrote:

³¹⁷ John M. Cooper, Jr., 'A friend in Power? Woodrow Wilson and Armenia', *America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915*, edited by Jay Winter, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 105.

TE, 12 October 1918, no: 2527. Wilson Principles became the subject of *Tasvir-i Efkar* which announced the XII. Article as follow: "Bugünkü Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun, Türk aksamına emin-i hukuk-u hakimiyet bahşetmek lazım gelir. Türkiye'nin hakimiyeti altında bulunan diğer milletlere de serbest bir inkişaf salahiyyeti verilmelidir."

...The Turkish government was determined to keep the news, as long as possible, from the outside world. It was clearly the intention that Europe and America should hear of annihilation of the Armenian race only after the annihilation had been accomplished.³¹⁸

It was not possible to follow an annihilation policy without knowledge of the world as Morgenthau claimed. Many countries including America had consulates in many parts of the Empire and they were able to follow the developments related to the Armenians. Moreover there were countless missionary centers and the schools of these centers in every parts of the Empire. All these councils and missionaries had chance to send information whenever they wanted. Thus it is appropriate to claim that the Ottoman administration was secretly annihilating the Armenians.³¹⁹

James W. Gerard, the USA Ambassador to Berlin, had published a book, which was similar to the Morgenthau's book, in 1917.³²⁰ Gerard's *My Four Years in Germany* was including serious accusation against Germany. The book was serving to the anti-German campaign in America. The campaign was so obvious that the book was immediately filmed and the film was personally watched by Wilson.³²¹ It is hardly possible to think that publication of the ambassadors' books in such a short time with a hurry was a coincidence. These books were clearly products of the war propaganda for receiving public support to the war.³²²

³¹⁸ Lloyd E. Ambrosius, 'Wilsonian Diplomacy and Armenia', *America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915*, edited by Jay Winter, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 114.

³¹⁹ The reliability of information given by Morgenthau and his sources of information were widely devalued with recent works. See Heath W. Lowry, *The Story behind Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, The Isis Pres, İstanbul, 1990.

³²⁰ James W. Gerard served as ambassador to Germany until 1917. He returned to the USA in 1917 and began to work for the Armenian cause. He became the chairman of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenian (ACIA) and served for a decade. Mark Malkasian, 'The Disintegration of the Armenian Cause in the United States, 1918-1927', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.16, no: 3, August 1984, (p. 349-365), p. 352.

³²¹ Ambrosius, *Wilsonian Diplomacy*, p. 115.

³²² "I am considering writing a book in which I would bare, not only German's permeation of Turkey and the Balkans, but that system as it appears in every country of the world...this particular detail of the story and Germany's abettance of the same, I feel positive will appeal to the mass of Americans in small towns and country districts as no other aspect of the war could, and convince them of the necessity of carrying the war to a victorious conclusion...we must win a victory for the war policy of the government and every legitimate step or means should be utilized to accomplish it." Lowry, *The Story Behind*, p. 2. Lowry quoted from Morgenthau's letter to President Wilson. Morgenthau was trying to persuade Wilson to use 'massacres of Armenian' as war propaganda against the Turkey and Germany.

Ad finem the war, the view of establishment an Armenian state under the mandate of the USA began to be seriously discussed. This view began to come more often to the agenda just after the war and especially during the discussions on peace conditions were going on. And Wilson was warm to the idea of American mandate over Armenia. Westermann, the American delegate at the Paris Conference, had reported that Wilson had said at a time of interview his intention to establish an American mandate over Armenia and Constantinople. The President had said “it would be in a strategic position to control that portion of the world.”³²³ The American mandate over ‘Armenia’ was nearly becoming true. Warren Harding, the Senator of Ohio, submitted a bill proposing the American mandate over Armenia to the Senate on 13 May 1919. Wilson defended the bill as follow:

...that the Congress grant the Executive the power to accept for the United States a mandate over Armenia...At their hearts this great and generous people have made the cause of Armenia their own. It is to this people and to their Government that the hopes and earnest expectations of the struggling people of Armenia turn as they emerge from a period indescribable suffering and peril, and I hope that the Congress will think it wise to meet this hope and expectation with the utmost liberality.³²⁴

The bill was rejected by the Senate with 52 countervotes versus 23 affirmative votes. Thus, the American mandate over ‘Armenia’ was not realized. However, America continued to follow situation of the Armenians for a while. General Harbord was sent to make detailed examinations, which were to be determinative for the mandate proposals, in Istanbul, Batum, Armenia, Syria and Caucasia. The report of General Harbord did not support the Armenian claims. He stressed the role of the instigations in emergence of the hatred between the Turks and the Armenians. In his report, Harbord said as follows:

Herbert Hoover, President of the USA, wrote about the support of public opinion to the Armenian cause as follow in his memoirs: “Probably Armenia was known to the American school child in 1919 only a little less than England. The association of Mount Ararat and Noah, the staunch Christians who were massacred by the Mohammedan Turk, and the Sunday School collections over fifty years for alleviating their miseries-all cumulate to impress the name Armenia on the front of the American mind.” Quoted in Malkasian, *The Disintegration of the Armenian Cause*, p. 350.

³²³ Cooper, *Wilson and Armenia*, p. 108.

³²⁴ Cooper, *Wilson and Armenia*, p.109-110.

There is much to show that, left to themselves, the Turks and the Armenian when left without official instigation have hitherto been able to live together in peace. Their existence side by side on the same soil for five centuries unmistakably indicates their interdependence and mutual interests.³²⁵

General Harbord also urged that the Armenians were not majority even before the war “in the region claimed as Turkish Armenia, excepting in a few place”³²⁶ This explanation was so important beyond many talks. Thus, America was able get first hand information from a high rank official about the Armenian Question. It was presumably understood by the American administration that wartime agitations and disinformation were not reflecting realities.

Henceforth, the American interest to the Armenian Question gradually dwindled.³²⁷ The America’s concern to the Armenians was mainly derived from the internal policy concerns and it had pragmatic purposes. Although America had closely paid attention to the Armenians for a while, the America lost her attention to the subject when her political agenda changed.

IV. 3. Discussion on the Armenian Question in the *Meclis-i Mebusan*

After the resign of the Talat Pasha government, the mission for establishment of a new cabinet was given to Ahmet İzzet Pasha.³²⁸ İzzet Pasha announced the government program to the *Meclis-i Mebusan* to receive vote of confidence on 19 October 1918 (19 Teşrinievvel 1334). The program of the government was quite brief and it mainly focused on two subjects. The primary objective of the government was to sign an agreement as agreeable as possible. The second subject was the return

³²⁵ Akgün, *Ermeni Sorununa*, p. 75.

³²⁶ Akgün; *Ermeni Sorununa*, p. 79.

³²⁷ Cooper, *Wilson and Armenia*, p.110.

³²⁸ TE, 13 October 1918, no: 2528. Before the new Cabinet received the vote of confidence, appointment of Oksan Effendi as the Minister of Post came to foreground. Because he had taken part in former cabinet, *Tasvir-i Efkar* was expressing the doubts about this appointment. The day after, *Tasvir-i Efkar* announced the suggestion of the Ahmet İzzet Pasha to Oskan Effendi. (TE, 14 October 1918, no: 2529).

of the refugees who had been transferred from their homelands due to the war conditions. İzzet Pasha declared that the refugees' movable and immovable properties were going to be given back and their values were going to be paid if they were sold. He announced that the decision was taken and the works on it began.³²⁹

The program of the government was sincerely approved by the Armenian deputies. Artin Bosgezenian, the deputy of Aleppo, gave a long speech about the program. He found the program acceptable according to the constitution and he expressed his hope on application of all liberties guaranteed by the constitution.³³⁰ All the Armenian deputies gave vote of confidence to the government. Although the Greek deputies positively approached to the given promises they decided to give vote of abstention and they gave a motion to declare their decision with the signatures of 10 Greek deputies. Then the voting for confidence was held and the government received 121 votes of confidence out of 131 votes, and 10 votes of abstention were given.³³¹ When the voting was regarded it can be said that there was not any deputy opposing to return of the refugees among the participants.

Immediately after formation of the new cabinet, there arose accusation against the former cabinets. These accusations were including unnecessarily participation to the World War; misuse of the state sources; maltreatments against the minorities etc. In this frame, the Armenian Question again came to the agenda. It was being said that the new cabinet had ordered application of necessary investigations towards the responsible officials who had misused their authority during the implementation of the relocation.³³²

³²⁹ The *Meclis-i Mebusan* Zabıt Ceridesi, c.1, Devre: 3, İctima Senesi: 5, 4. İnıkad (19 Teşrinievvel 1334), TBMM Basımevi, Ankara, 1992, pp. 28-29.

³³⁰ TE, 20 October 1918, no: 2535. Artin Effendi said that “the Constitution of the state is one of the most civilized and progressive constitutions in the world and it protect all liberties. Properly implementation of the constitution is sufficient.”

³³¹ MMZC, 4. İnıkad, p. 30-36.

³³² TE, 24 October 1918, no: 2539. Tasvir-i Efkar wrote that “it is said that Fethi Bey, the Minister of Internal Affairs, gave order for carrying out investigations about all ranks of officials who involved directly or indirectly in massacres (*mezalim*) perpetuated to the Armenians. However, this news could not be verified.”

The CUP and the former governments had virtually become a scapegoat for destruction of the Ottoman Empire. It was true that the CUP had controlled all means of the state since 1912 and it had to assume responsibility of the catastrophic result of the War. However, there was a serious inconstancy in attitudes of some deputies and journalists. They used to praise the administration during the heydays but when the things reversed, they also reversed. And with many other accusations, the CUP was accused of massacring the Armenians as well. However, there were consistent people and they were trying to express the truths. In those days, *Tasvir-i Efkar* delivered an article and asked “who is oppressive, who is oppressed?”³³³ It should be pointed that *Tasvir-i Efkar* was not also a pro-Ittihadist newspaper anymore.³³⁴ And *Tasvir-i Efkar* was also criticizing the CUP policies but it steadily defended the Turkish rights on the Armenian Question. The article of *Tasvir-i Efkar* was as follow:

Today, the Armenians are stressing the detriments and destructions which they were exposed at the war. A question should be asked: Who met with greatest disasters at the war? The casualties of the Muslims were perhaps greater than sum of all humanity. The Muslims had to shoulder all burdens of the war. Many Muslims died...they lost their trade and industry. The Muslims face with great danger in terms of race and progeny for the future. Despite all these disasters, all responsibility of tragedies were given to the Muslims...it is the greatest tragedy for the Muslims to be regarded as responsible of the events...³³⁵

The article of *Tasvir-i Efkar* does not require anymore interpretation. It clearly explains how the Turks perceived the events. Many Muslim populations had been perished through the War. Turkey had suffered from a great destruction and many lost. Economical, political and social structures of Turkey had been completely devastated. However, the Turks were still being accused of massacring the Armenians.

Under the shadow of gloomy atmosphere of İstanbul, it was not possible for the members of the Committee for Union and Progress to stay in Turkey. Thus, Talat Pasha and the other leading figures of the CUP fled to abroad. Meanwhile, sending

³³³ TE, 28 October 1918, no: 2543. The title of the news was “Zalim kim, mazlum kim?”

³³⁴ *Tasvir-i Efkar* had not been published from 28 July to 12 October 1918. In that period, Yunus Nadi had left the newspaper. After remove of Yunus Nadi, *Tasvir-i Efkar* passed to opposition to the CUP, which had already lost its power.

³³⁵ TE, 28 October 1918, no: 2543.

of the members of the Said Halim Pasha and the Talat Pasha cabinets to the *Divan-ı Ali* became a current issue. Thus flight of the CUP leaders became the subject of discussion in the Parliament and Fethi Bey, the Minister of Internal Affairs, was asked how these people could flee. Fethi Bey said that “if the government was independent and discrete (*müstakil ve münferit*) these people could not flee and the government had nothing to do.”³³⁶ At the same day, Fuat Bey, the deputy of Divaniye, submitted a motion (*takrir*) to send the members of the Said Halim and the Talat Pasha cabinets to *Divan-ı Ali*. So as to be examined, the motion was sent to the Fifth Branch (5. *Şube*) of the Assembly with drawing lots.³³⁷

Accusations about the ex-cabinets were coming one after another. Emanuel Emanuelidi, the deputy of Aydın, tabled a question to the government about actions of the former governments. The motion had also been signed by Tokinidis Effendi, the deputy of Çatalca, Vangel Effendi, the deputy of İzmir. The motion was including extremely serious imputations about the relocation and its results. The Greek deputies were asking the government’s thoughts about the following claims and the government was being asked what and when precautions would be taken³³⁸:

1. Without any reason except being member of the Armenian nation, one million people without exception of women and children were killed and destroyed.
2. 250.000 people from the Greek population, which has been agent of civilization for forty centuries in Anatolia, were deported from the Ottoman borders and their properties were confiscated.
3. After the war, 550.000 Greek people were killed and destroyed in Black Sea region, Çanakkale, Marmora, and Adalar, and their properties were confiscated and seized.
4. The non-Muslim subjects of the state were excluded from trade and trade was monopolized in the hands of influenced people. Thus all citizens of the state were virtually robbed.
5. The members of The *Meclis-i Mebusan* Zohrab Effendi and Varteks Effendi were murdered.
6. Maltreatments directed towards the Arab nation became the main reason of the existing disasters.
7. 250.000 people from the worker battalions, formed with pretext of the war, died because of starvation and deprivation.
8. The state participated to the war without any reason and an island of the state was given to Bulgaria to attain this ominous reason.

³³⁶ MMZC, 11. İnikad, p. 99.

³³⁷ The investigation of the Fifth Branch will be mentioned in the following pages.

³³⁸ TE, 5 November 1918, no: 2551.

The motion was submitted on October 2, 1918 and came to the agenda of the Parliament on October 4, 1918 (MMZC, 11. İnikad, p. 109).

The motion caused emergence of serious debates and rising of tension in the *Meclis-i Mebusan*. Emanuel Effendi claimed that he had not given the motion with revengeful sensations and he had just wanted to get information about the precautions of the government. However, Fethi Bey, the Minister of Internal Affairs, stressed that the Turks had suffered from destruction of the War as much as or maybe more than the Greeks, the Armenians and the Arabs so Fethi Bey expressed his sorrow about Emanuel Effendi's disregard about the Turks.³³⁹ Nevertheless he explicated the government's insistence on taking all complaints into consideration. He also gave guarantee for protecting minority rights as the program of government promised. As a step to fulfill this aim, he announced preparation of a law draft which was envisaging proportional representation of minorities in municipal and local assemblies. In addition to these explanations, Fethi Bey again emphasized that one of the government's urgent aims was to ensure return of the refugees to their homeland and compensation for their loss.³⁴⁰

During the debates related to the motion of Emanuel Effendi, Ali Haydar Effendi, the deputy of Asir, submitted a motion, which was referring the sixth article of Emanuel Effendi's motion related to the Arabs and the Arab deputies were demanding exclusion of that article. The Arab deputies had decided to postpone solution of the problems concerning the Arabs to an appropriate time. However, Emanuel Effendi opposed to the motion of the Arab deputies by stressing that he was a deputy and he had right to speak for all the Ottoman nations.³⁴¹

Mehmet Emin Bey, the deputy of Trabzon, intended to respond the motion of Emanuel Effendi by saying that it was including serious and unjust accusations against the Turks. However, Hüseyin Cahit Bey, the vice-president of the *Meclis-i Mebusan*, did not let speaking by arguing that the subject was to be discussed between the owner of the motion and the government according to the *Meclis-i Mebusan* internal regulation. Thus, İlyas Sami Effendi, the deputy of Muş, interfered

³³⁹ TE, 5 November 1918, no: 2551.

³⁴⁰ MMZC, 11. İnikad, p. 110.

³⁴¹ MMZC, 11. İnikad, p. 110-111.

to the discussion and he complained about serious accusations of Emanuel Effendi and tolerant responses of the government. İlyas Sami Effendi urged that “*geleceğe ait mevcudiyet-i milli*” was being besmirched and the claim of “monstrously” destruction of one million people by the Turks without a cause implicated the Turkish nation. Mehmet Emin Bey stressed necessity of the discussions’ continuity and bringing the truths out into open. Rüşti Bey, the deputy of Kastamonu, said that the Turkish nation was being insulted and was subjected to unjust accusations. By excusing the Assembly’s internal regulation, continuity of the discussions was not permitted and the debate was concluded.³⁴²

Soon after the motion of Emanuel Effendi, Matyos Nalbandian Effendi, the deputy of Kozan, and the other Armenian deputies also submitted a motion of question. The Armenian deputies were asking the government’s point of view concerning “the causers and the perpetrators of atrocities and their victims” because of “*hükümete karşı gelenler için ciheti askeriyece ittihaz olunacak tedabir hakkındaki kararname ile işbu kararname mucibince ahar mahallere nakledilen eşhasın emval ve emlak ve matlubat-ı metrukleri hakkındaki kararname*.”³⁴³

Artin Effendi stated that Fethi Bey’s response to the Emanuel Effendi’s motion was also responding this motion. Artin Effendi expressed their gratitude to the government and he praised its works. And he said that if he had been member of the government he would have done the same works. Fethi Bey again mentioned that the government was doing its best but solution of the problems required time. Matyos Effendi expressed his thanks to the government after explanation of Fethi Bey.³⁴⁴

Another subject which was in the agenda of the Assembly was the annulment of “temporary law for the measures to be taken up by the military concerning those who haven taken up arms against the state during the time of full mobilization.”³⁴⁵ There was no objection on annulment of the law in the *Meclis-i Mebusan*. According

³⁴² MMZC, 11. İnikad, p. 111.

³⁴³ MMCZ, 11. İnikad, p. 112.

³⁴⁴ MMZC, 11. İnikad p. 112-113.

³⁴⁵ The translation of the law is quoted from Halaçoğlu. Halaçoğlu, *The Facts on Relocation*, p. 74.

to Artin Effendi, the law had been one of the most important factors of the experienced tragedies so the annulment of it was not enough. He urged that nobody would be given the right of enforcing people to relocation any longer. Thus he suggested making of legal arrangements to prevent application of such laws³⁴⁶

While the annulment of the law was being discussed, Mehmet Emin Bey, who had not been permitted to express his thoughts previously, found a chance to explain his views related to the motion of Emanuel Effendi and his colleagues. Mehmet Emin Bey claimed that the numbers given by Emanuel Effendi were not reflecting the truth and they had been exaggerated, and when the living Armenians were considered this truth could be seen.³⁴⁷

According to Mehmet Emin Bey, relocation of the Armenians and the Greeks was not because of their nationalities but because of their collaboration with the enemies. And he gave some examples of these collaborations. The tension in the *Meclis-i Mebusan* was increasing and counter-accusations were going on. Thus some deputies interfered to conclude the debate. Hasan Fehmi Effendi stressed that the sore topic would not be opened up. Artin Effendi and Hüseyin Cahit Bey similarly agreed with Hasan Fehmi Effendi.

Within these debates Ahmet İzzet Pasha Cabinet surprisingly resigned. Ahmet İzzet Pasha had been accused of being moderate towards the CUP and there were some Unionists ministers in the cabinet. Thus the short-lived cabinet of Ahmet İzzet Pasha had to resign and Tevfik Pasha was appointed to form the new cabinet. The *Meclis-i Mebusan* convened to hear the program of the Tevfik Pasha Cabinet on 18 November 1918 (18 Teşrinisani 1334). The primary article of the program was the peace treaty between the Ottoman State and the Entente States. The program was also consisting of an article related to rights of the Ottoman people. According to the program, all people in the Ottoman State without exception of nationality and religion were going

³⁴⁶ MMZC, 11. İnikad p. 114.

³⁴⁷ MMZC, 11. İnikad, p.115.

to benefit from political rights so peace and tranquility in the state could be ensured.³⁴⁸

During the discussions of the new program, the subject of relocation again came to the agenda. By reminding signing of the armistice, Artin Effendi said that the final peace treaty was going to be signed in the near future so the Ottoman government was to take initiative for strengthening his hand. Artin Effendi claimed that the Turkish nation was standing on “*alemi medeniyet ve alemi siyaset nazarında müttehim*” position. Artin Effendi was portraying the events of “the Armenian massacres” as the most mournful and bloody phases of the Ottoman History. According to him, accusation of the Turkish nation for the events was wrong. He was accusing the former war cabinets. Artin Effendi stated that the Armenians had been protected by the Turks in many Turkish cities and gave the sample of Konya, which had protected the Armenians. He also indicated some governors who had protected the Armenians but he claimed that these governors were not majority and many of the officials applied the relocation with the order of the government and perpetuated violence against the Armenians. He widely expressed his thoughts in the Assembly and demanded punishment of responsible officials. Thus the Ottoman State was not going to participate in the peace negotiation with empty hands.³⁴⁹

Artin Effendi’s one-sided accusation of the Turks was met with reaction by the *Meclis-i Mebusan* members. İhsan Bey, the deputy of Mardin, criticized mentioning of maltreatments towards the Armenian women and girls while the Muslim women, who had been exposed to many violations, were being ignored. He complained about distortion of the truth and he pointed the deputy of Van out as one of the responsible who put the state into blood and misery. He yelled by saying “hakikati meydana koy, hakikati güneş gibi parlat. Silah altında Rusya’ya muavenet eden mebuslar.”³⁵⁰

³⁴⁸ MMZC, 14. İnikad (18 Teşrinisani 1334), p. 136.

³⁴⁹ MMZC, 14. İnikad, p. 141-144.

³⁵⁰ MMZC, 14. İnikad, p. 144.

İlyas Sami Bey evaluated the events as ‘*mukatele*’ not a massacre. When the war broke out, he claimed, the best and well-made weapons had been given to the Armenians and the Greeks, and the worst weapons to the Kurds. The Armenians had been regarded and trusted as brothers but they used their weapons against Turkey. İlyas Sami Bey reminded the deputy Karakin Effendi who was still in Russia with his arm against Turkey. Karakin Effendi had attacked to Van with his armed bands even there was no initiative against the Armenians and he had sent a telegraph, which was virtually an ultimatum, to the Ottoman government about the national aspirations of the Armenians. It was written in the telegraph that “our armed forces will help to Russia with their arms and our disarmed forces will distract and detain the government.”³⁵¹

Dikran Barsamian, the deputy of Sivas, interrupted the speech of İlyas Sami Effendi by saying “he was demanding his natural rights indeed, he was demanding the Wilson Principles.”³⁵² İlyas Sami Effendi stressed that Karakin Effendi was not satisfied with writing the telegraph and he occupied Van with a force of 20 thousands men. The Ottoman Army stayed immobile between the Armenian and the Russian forces. The seventy percent of the population including women and children had been massacred during these events and ‘*mukatele*’ began thereafter.³⁵³

The *Meclis-i Mebusan* had convened to vote of confidence for the Tevfik Pasha Cabinet but the debates had turned to the Armenian Question. The Armenian and the Turkish deputies were mutually accusing the other side. However accusations of the Armenian deputies were being highly tolerated. Then these debates were concluded and the *Meclis-i Mebusan* turned to the primary article of the agenda.

114 deputies participated to the vote of confidence and 84 pro-votes were given to the new cabinet. There were 27 con-votes and 3 neutral. 120 deputies had not participated to the voting. Because the necessary majority for gathering was not

³⁵¹ MMZC, 14. İnikad, p. 157. “Müselleh kuvvetlerimizle Rusya’ya müsellehan muavenet edecek, gayri müselleh kuvvetlerimizle de mesaili dahiliyeyi, vezaifi hükümeti daima işgal ve işkal edeceğiz.”

³⁵² “Yani hakkı tabiisini istiyordu, Wilson prensiplerini istiyordu!”

³⁵³ MMZC, 14. İnikad, p. 157.

provided in the Assembly, the session was postponed. The Armenian deputies had given the new cabinet vote of confidence. All the Greek deputies had given vote of nonconfidence.³⁵⁴ In the voting held on 19 October 1918 (19 Teşrinisani 1334), the Tevfik Pasha Cabinet could take vote of confidence by receiving 91 votes out of 124. There were 25 opposite and 7 neutral votes.³⁵⁵

IV.3.1. The Fifth Branch Commission

After the defeat of the Ottoman State and sign of the Mudros Armistice, the leading figures of the CUP, including Talat, Enver and Cemal Pashas etc., fled abroad on 1-2 November night. Fled of these people became a subject of debate in the *Meclis-i Mebusan* and the government was criticized for not taking necessary precautions.

Defeat at the war brought about the CUP's self- annulment so the CUP Era had come to an end in Turkey.³⁵⁶ Hereafter, many accusations and critiques were directed towards the leaders of the CUP. Political rivals and opponent press, which had been repressed by the CUP regime, increasingly revealed their critiques day by day. There was a kind of lynch campaign against the CUP. Meanwhile, a motion was submitted to the *Meclis-i Mebusan* suggesting driving of the former Said Halim Pasha and Talat Pasha Cabinets to the Supreme Court.

The motion was submitted by Fuat Bey, the deputy of Divaniye, and it included ten articles.³⁵⁷ The motion was assigned to the Fifth Branch Commission with drawing of lots to be discussed. The Commission examined the motion and initiated to work on it. The motion included two articles related to relocation and maltreatments perpetuated during relocation. The fifth article of the motion was about the provisional laws. Because the law of relocation had been issued as a provisional law,

³⁵⁴ MMZC, 14. İnikad, p. 164-166.

³⁵⁵ MMZC, 14. İnikad, p. 168.

³⁵⁶ TE, 2 November 1918, no: 2548. The *Tasvir-i Efkar* was announcing the convention of the CUP Congress. In the Congress, the liquidation of the CUP was accepted.

³⁵⁷ Said Halim Pasha ve Talat Pasha Kabinelerinin Divan-ı Aliye Sevkleri Hakkında Takrir.

the relocation question was undertaken in this context.³⁵⁸ The tenth article of the motion was related to formation of militia groups which were supposed to commit many crimes.³⁵⁹ It could be understood from the hearings at the Fifth Branch that the tenth article had been embedded to the motion to investigate the activities of the *Tekilat-ı Mahsusa* (The Secret Organization).

None of the former cabinet members admitted responsibility in application of relocation in the Commission. The common view was that the Ministries of War and Internal Affairs were responsible for the relocation law and its application. Most of the ministers claimed that they had not been informed about the developments during the relocation and they had not had any authority related to the subject. However all the ministers said that they had tried to prevent any negativity which they knew and heard. On the other hand, the ministries generally regarded application of the relocation law as an obligation and they stressed its necessity in wartime. However, they expressed their discontents with maltreatments and they claimed that they had punished the responsible officials of the maltreatments as much as possible. Testimonies of some cabinet members in the Commission are given below.

Sait Halim Pasha, who was the Grand Vizier when the relocation law was issued, explained why they needed the relocation with following words:

...inhuman action occurs in normal times. It is not possible to talk about such a thing in war time. The state was in a war. However, it was shot from back by its subjects and transport of goods was infringed. Thus, the government had to make such a law in order to secure back of the army upon the request of commanders as a must. However, I want to say that to make a law and to implement it rightly and wrongly are different things.

Said Pasha said that the Minister of War had reported relocation of the Armenians because they were endangering the army in their present locations. However, “relocate them”, he stressed, did not mean “kill them”. There occurred some

³⁵⁸ The fifth article of the motion is as follow: (The Cabinets of Said Halim Pasha ve Talat Pasha) kavaid-i hukukiye ve insaniyyeye ve hassaten Kanun-u Esasimizin ruh ve sarahatine külliyyen münafi, muvakkat kanunlar ve emir ve nizamlar ısdar ederek memleketi bir sahne-i fecaiye kalbeylemesi.

³⁵⁹ The tenth article of the motion is as follow: (The Cabinets of Said Halim Pasha ve Talat Pasha) dahil-i memlekette bir hercümerci idari vücuda getirerek ve hürriyet, can ve mal, ırza musallat bir takım çetelere müzaheret ederek ika eyledikleri fecayi-e iştirak eylemesi.

undesirable events but application of the law did not aim these events. Moreover, the Armenians had perpetuated many massacres and they widely became one of the most important factors of relocation. Sait Pasha continued to his testimony as follows:

...to punish responsible of the Armenian massacres necessitated punishment of responsible and executors of the Muslim massacres. It was not appropriate to unconcern one side of the question while taking the other side into consideration. This obligation highly hardened dissolution of the problem in wartime because provocation of both sides could again cause many other disasters.³⁶⁰

İbrahim Bey, the Minister of Justice, was the next to be interrogated. According to his testimony, the relocation law was issued with the initiative of the army. The events of Erzurum, Şebinkarahisar and Bitlis were also considered during the decision making process. Moreover, when the declarations of the Armenian Committees were read, it can be seen that issuing of the law was indispensable for guaranteeing security of the army's back. İbrahim Bey did not evaluate the relocation law as an indication of intrinsic hatred against the Armenians. The government had taken a decision with the request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and an allocation had been set aside to provide needs and wellbeing of the Armenians. Thus, the subject to be discussed, according to İbrahim Bey, would not be the relocation law but would be misapplications of the law by some officials.³⁶¹

İbrahim Bey reminded the commissions which had been formed to prevent maltreatments and to punish responsible officials. İbrahim Bey had personally appointed trustable members to the commissions.³⁶² İbrahim Bey also mentioned about a regulation on the law of conversion. According to the former law, a person over fifteen could convert its religion but the age was expanded to twenty. The new law aimed to protect young girls who might have been forced to convert the Islam so

³⁶⁰ MMZC, Said Halim ve Talat Pashalar Kabineleri Azalarının Divan-ı Aliye Sevkleri Hakkında Beşinci Şubece İcra Kılınan Tahkikat, c.1, Devre:3, İçtima Senesi: 5, TBMM Basımevi, Ankara, 1993, p. 88.

³⁶¹ *Beşinci Şubece İcra Kılınan Tahkikat*, p. 117.

³⁶² *Beşinci Şubece İcra Kılınan Tahkikat*, p. 117. İbrahim Bey mentioned about three members whom he appointed. The names of two members were Asım Bey, a judge in homicide, and Nihad Bey, the chief-assistant at Attorney General's Office. İbrahim Bey could not remember the third name. İbrahim Bey had addressed to the commission members as follow: "Beyefendiler bir takım fecayi mevzu bahistir. Ve bu devletin, milletin namusuna müteallik bir meseledir. Tahkikat yapacaksınız, yarın ahrette elim sizin yanınızdadır.. Kim bu yolda harekete cüret etmişse onu Zat-ı İlahinin huzurunda söyler gibi yazacaksınız."

they could have been taken as wife by the Muslims. Moreover, non-Muslim girls over twenty had to get approval of their families to marry with the Muslims. All these regulations aimed to prevent abuse of the young girls during the relocation.

İbrahim Bey admitted existence of some undesirable events but these were ‘exceptional’ and the government was not informed during occurrence of them. When the information reached to the government, the government often formed inquiry commissions and appointed ‘honest and capable’ officials to the commissions.³⁶³

Halil Bey³⁶⁴ said in his testimony that he had been in Berlin when the law of relocation was issued so he had no role in preparation and application of the law. Halil Bey tried to prove his sympathy towards the Armenians in the commission. According to his testimony, he had attempted to save life of the Armenian deputies Varteks Effendi and Zohrab Effendi. When he was in Berlin, the deputies had been deported and the son of Zohrab Effendi asked for help to save his father. Thus, Halil Bey had sent a telegraph to Talat Pasha and he had requested “exclusion of the deputies from such application”. Halil Bey had also demanded sending of the Armenian deputies to abroad if their return to İstanbul was regarded as dangerous. In his return to İstanbul, Halil Bey personally occupied with the subject and he insisted on recovery of the deputies, who had been sent to Diyarbakır. And Talat Pasha sent

³⁶³ *Beşinci Şubece İcra Kılınan Tahkikat*, p.118. As it is clearly seen that İbrahim Bey was admitting existence of officials, who were misusing their authority but the government was not informed about these events. And the government was taking necessary precautions against the maltreatments. However, the testimony of İbrahim Bey was openly distorted by the Armenian historian Dadrian. Dadrian had written as follow: “İbrahim accepted responsibility for the atrocities resulting from the Temporary Law for Relocation, collectively for the Cabinet, and individually as a minister...” the following statement of İbrahim Bey reveals that he did not regard himself responsible for any events: “...Tahdis-i nimet olarak söyleyeceğim ki ‘Haza min fadlı Rabbi’ memurin-i adliyeden bu gibi suiistimalata kapılan bir memur olmamıştır.” See p.118. Dadrian again wrote by referring İbrahim Bey: “an appreciably large number of convicted common law criminals upon the instance of the Army claiming to be needing them.” However the testimony of İbrahim Bey about the subject (about the militia composed of criminals) was exactly as follow: “Bundan benim haberim olmadığı gibi Heyet-i Vükela’nın da katiyen malumatı yoktur. Ve Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’dan maksat nedir ve ne suretle teşkil ve tedvir olunur? Katiyen bilmiyorum ve bilmek mecburiyetinde kalamam.” See p. 122. For Dadrian’s writings, see Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 6th edition Berghahn Boks, New York, 2004, p. 320.

³⁶⁴ Halil Bey had occupied posts of Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Mezahip and he was also President of The *Meclis-i Mebusan* during the World War I.

certain orders to the governors of Diyarbakır and Aleppo and said them “cancel the courts of these people and send them safely back”. However, the deputies were attacked on return way and killed by brigands. Thus, the brigands were decisively followed and the leader and members of the brigands were captured and executed.³⁶⁵

Cavid Bey, the former Minister of Finance, also testified at the commission. Cavid Bey had resigned from his post at the beginning of the World War because he was against participation of the Ottoman Empire in the war. He returned to the ministry in 1917 when the Talat Pasha Cabinet was formed.

Cavid Bey said to the commission that he was not a member of the cabinet when the law of relocation was issued and applied, and he also indicated his objection to the law. He informed the commission about his works related to the properties and real estates of the Armenians. Cavid Bey had begun to make and apply necessary legal regulations about the ‘deserted properties’. He could also take a guarantee from Talat Pasha for return of the Armenians and the Arabs to their homelands. However, Cavid Bey urged, the Armenian massacres against the Muslims in Caucasia prevented return of the Armenians.³⁶⁶

Debates in the *Meclis-i Mebusan* and interrogation at the Fifth Branch vehemently continued. However, an important development finished all these discussions. Sultan Vahdettin annulled the *Meclis-i Mebusan* on 21 December 1918. At the last session of the *Meclis-i Mebusan* on 21 December, the motion of Hüseyin Kadri Bey and his colleagues was being discussed. The motion was accusing the government not to materialize its pledges which had been given in the program of the government and they were waiting an explanation. To response the motion, Mustafa Reşit Pasha, the

³⁶⁵ *Beşinci Şubece İcra Kılınan Tahkikat*, p. 163. Dadrian claims that there was a meeting between Zimmerman, Undersecretary of German Foreign Affairs and later the Minister, and Halil Bey. And Dadrian urges that at this meeting, Zimmerman mentioned about “forcible mass conversions to Islam of Armenian children whose parents had been killed...” Dadrian, *Armenian Genocide*, p. 226. During his testimony, Halil Bey had Said that “I have never signed any *ihtida mazbatası* (document of conversion) coming from the provinces as the Minister of Mezahip. And if you ask to any Armenian on the street, he can tell my effort on this subject.” See p. 163.

³⁶⁶ *Beşinci Şubece İcra Kılınan Tahkikat*, p.197

Minister of the Foreign Affairs, informed the *Meclis-i Mebusan* about the works of the government.³⁶⁷ However, soon after his response, the Minister of the Internal Affairs Mustafa Arif Bey announced the Imperial Decree on the annulment of the *Meclis-i Mebusan*.³⁶⁸

The Armenian Question was not going to be discussed in the Assembly hereafter. However, this subject was going to widely engage the agenda of Turkey. Under the shadow of occupation, a men-hunting began in İstanbul. The administrations of the Armistice years were going to constitute the *Divan-ı Harp* and many former officials were going to be tried in the courts. Thus the administrations imagined getting more on the peace table from the Allied Powers and they also wanted to close old political accounts of the past.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁷ MMZC, 21. İnikad (21 Kanunuevvel 1334), p. 360-363.

³⁶⁸ MMZC, 21. İnikad, p. 363-364.

The Decree was as follows: Esbabı zaruriyyei siyasiyyeden naşı Meclisi Mebusanın feshi iktiza etmesine ve Kanuni Esasimizin muaddel yedinci maddesinin fıkrâi mahsusası mucibince ledeliktiza, Heyeti Mebusanın feshi, hukuku şahanemizin cümlesinden bulunmasına binaen, meclisi mezkurun bugünden itibaren bermucibi kanun feshini irade eyledim.

³⁶⁹ For the details of the *Divan-ı Harp* trials and the interpretations of the press see; Feridun Ata, *İşgal İstanbul'unda Tehcir Yargılamaları*, TTK, Ankara, 2005. In this work, the news related to the relocation has been widely quoted from the *Tasvir-i Efkar* and from the other newspapers beginning from the end of 1918. And also see; Bilal Şimşir, *Malta Sürgünleri*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 1985.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The Armenian Question emerged in 19th Century and it still stands as one of the most controversial problems in Turkey. Today, the question engages the agenda with its historical, political and judicial dimension. It should be constantly stressed that any historical event requires to be studied with the guidance of historical sources. This is an unavoidable fact.

In this study, some aspects of the Armenian Question between 1914 and 1918 have been evaluated within the frame of historical methodology. For the first time, all the issues of *Tasvir-i Efkar*, a daily newspaper published during the studied period, have been studied in the frame of the Armenian Question. All the news and the articles related to the Armenians have been considered and great deals of them have been used in the study. By doing so, it is aimed to submit *Tasvir-i Efkar* as a historical source for the studies on the Armenian Question.

Fallowing determinations can be offered about *Tasvir-i Efkar* within the studied period. First of all, there were great differences in amount of news and articles on the Armenians and Armenian Question in different periods. The Armenian Question became one of the leading subjects in *Tasvir-i Efkar* from the beginning of 1914 to the outbreak of the World War. However, there occurred a considerable decrease in news and articles by the outbreak of war. The basic reason was the strict censorship applied to the press so limited number of news appeared in *Tasvir-i Efkar* in this period. The news on the Armenian Question again began to take place more often by the end of 1917 and through 1918 in *Tasvir-i Efkar*. After the Russian Revolution in October 1917, the political and military developments had accelerated in Caucasia.

Establishment of the Armenian Republic and recovery of the Eastern Anatolia by the Turkish Army were noteworthy developments in 1918. After recovery of the Turkish lands, the Turkish public opinion could be informed about the tragic events experienced different parts of the Empire during the World War I.

Before the outbreak of the First World War, the Armenian Question had entered a new way. With interference of the European Powers, reforms for the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia came to the agenda and the subject began to be intensely discussed in 1913. At the beginning of 1914, discussions on the reform project were about to be completed. The agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, signed in the name of the other states, was signed on February 8, 1914. Then, the foreign inspectors were appointed to apply the reform project.

When the prewar period is considered, the reform project can be defined as the most important subject of the agenda related to the Armenian Question. The European Powers, especially Russia, forced the Ottoman Empire to approve an insulting reform project. The Vilayet-i Sitte and Trabzon were taken into reform zone. These provinces were to be administered by two foreign inspectors with an extensive control over justice, finance, military and local administration.

It can be briefly said that the Ottoman Empire came to the threshold of disintegration of Eastern Anatolia with the reform project. The Armenians, on the other hand, nearly reached their long lasting aims. They presumably believed that there would not be a return from the way that the Armenian Question entered. On the other hand, the European intervention and attitudes of the Armenians disillusioned the Ottoman public opinion. The reform project had burned the bridges between the Turks and Armenians.

When the wartime developments are considered, determinations of *Tasvir-i Efkar* about the events experienced during the World War were noteworthy. According to *Tasvir-i Efkar*, the reasons for all the sorrow events and for enmity between the Turks and the Armenians were collaboration of the Armenians with foreign powers

and their revolts against the state. *Tasvir-i Efkar* certainly believed that the mistreated side was the Turks. It mentioned about burnt cities, plundered properties and murdered people. Moreover, Yunus Nadi, the editor of *Tasvir-i Efkar*, suggested formation of commissions from neutral states to make the events clear. Yunus Nadi left the events to ‘justice of history and curse of humanity’. This approach was reflection of self-trust that the Turks rightly had at the end of the events.

By the end of the World War, the Ermenian Question was again brought to the table. Many Turkish statesmen and officials were sent to courts with accusation of massacring the Armenians. Moreover, the attempts for establishing an independent Armenia accelerated. However, all these attempts were vain. The Armenian Question came to end for Turkey with Lousanne Treaty on July 24, 1923.

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